

**POPULISM, NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM IN CHILE :
THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF CARLOS IBÁÑEZ, 1952-58.**

by

Jean Bernadette Grugel

**Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the
University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

February 1986

ABSTRACT

POPULISM, NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM IN CHILE : THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF CARLOS IBÁÑEZ, 1952-58

Jean Gruquel

This thesis is a discussion of the impact of nationalism and populism on Chilean politics with particular reference to the 1950s and the phenomenon known as Ibañismo. In the Introduction, I discuss the development of a parliamentary, liberal political system in Chile, and attempt to demonstrate how party politics had lost its dynamism by 1952. In Chapter I, I discuss the roots of Ibañismo, its relationship with nacionalismo, and its articulation in the 1940s and early 1950s. Chapter II deals with the presidential election campaign of 1952. Chapters III and IV are analyses of the administration itself, concentrating on its relationship within the labour movement, its failure to expand the social bases of political power and its inability to respond to the exhaustion of import substituting industrialisation in Chile. The political and economic results of the austerity measures undertaken in 1956 and 1957 are discussed in Chapter V. Chapter VI concentrates on the politics of opposition to Ibañismo, and some particularly conflictive and controversial issues in government-opposition relations are also discussed: Peronism in Chile; executive legislature relations; the Armed Forces; and the press. Chapter VII deals with the beginnings of mass politics and the changes in the Chilean political system which had taken place by the end of Ibáñez's term of office. The Conclusion endeavours to assess the influence of populism and nationalism on Ibañismo, and its legacy for Chilean politics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During my study of Chilean politics I have received invaluable assistance and support which I would like to acknowledge. I am grateful to the staff and students in the Department of Political Theory and Institutions and the Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, where the research was carried out, particularly Helena McGourty, Graham Hunter, Benardo Muñoz and Joan Ovens, Secretary of the Centre for Latin American Studies. My thanks are due to Margaret Burton for the typing, and to Pat Brooksbank, who, in addition to typing, has also done much to improve the text, and worked under pressure with such good humour.

Too many people helped me during my field research in Chile for me to mention them all by name. However, special thanks are due to Jorge Donoso, Maruja Pinto, Catalina Donoso, Naum Pollack, Chela Eskenazi, Regina Eskenazi, Martita Valenzuela and Amalia Carrasco; to the staff of both the Library of Congress and the National Library in Santiago; to Eduardo Ortiz and the staff at VECTOR (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales); to the members of the Chamber of Commerce, Santiago; and to the many individuals who so kindly gave me their time in interviews, especially Guillermo Izquierdo, and Oscar Jimenez for allowing me to consult their personal libraries and correspondence, and Alejandro Hales who not only gave me access to his private papers from the period, but also shared his considerable knowledge of Chilean politics with me.

My greatest debt of gratitude is to two people: firstly to Dr. Benny Pollack, my supervisor, whose advice and encouragement at every stage were invaluable; and secondly to my father, Robert Grugel, to whom this thesis is dedicated.

I alone must accept responsibility, however, for any inaccuracies which may appear in the text.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract	
Acknowledgements	i.
Table of Contents	ii.
INTRODUCTION	
AN OUTLINE OF THE CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM	1.
Liberalism and the Emergence of the Party System in Chile	3.
From Liberal Economics to State Capitalism: the case of the Radical Party	7.
The Parliamentary Tradition versus Presidential Power : The Civil War of 1891	19.
Constitutional Change, Political Incorporation, and Social-Economic Reform, 1920-52	26.
The Exhaustion of the Radical Governments and Disillusionment with Parliamentary Politics, 1947-52	34.
Conclusion	37.
CHAPTER I	
IBAÑISMO, NACIONALISMO AND THE <u>AGRARIO</u> <u>LABORISTA</u> PARTY	39.
Ibáñez as President, 1927-31	40.
The MNS and the 1930s : <u>Nacionalismo's</u> 'Finest Hour'	46.
The Ideology of the MNS	49.
Intellectuals and <u>Nacionalismo</u> : The Influence of <u>Estanquero</u>	53.
The Persistence of <u>Nacionalismo</u>	59.
<u>Ibañismo</u> as Anti-Radicalism : The Second Administration and the <u>Agrario Laborista</u> Party	60.
Conclusion	70.

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER II	
THE APPEALS OF POPULISM : THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN	72.
<u>Ibañismo</u> and Populism	80.
The <u>Agrario Laborista</u> Party (PAL) in the Electoral Campaign	87.
Left-wing support for Ibáñez	90.
Nationalism in the PSP	91.
Anti-Liberalism in the PSP	93.
Non-party support for Ibáñez	96.
Tactics and Programmes	98.
The Influence of Peronism During the Campaign	103.
Conclusion	109.
CHAPTER III	
POPULISM AND DEVELOPMENT, 1952-54 ...	110.
Populism in Government	111.
Social and Economic Development Before 1952	113.
The Limited Reforms of the First Year ...	119.
The Formation of the <u>Central Unica de Trabajadores</u> (CUT)	127.
Populist politics and the oligarchy : Rafael Tarud and CONDECOR	134.
The PSP leaves the Cabinet: the End of Populism	136.
The First General Strike	140.
The Prat Plan	143.
Conclusion	147.
CHAPTER IV	
THE END OF REFORMISM : FROM THE <u>NUEVO TRATO</u> TO THE KLEIN-SAKS MISSION	148.
Copper : The Price of Dependency	149.
The <u>Nuevo Trato</u> and its Consequences	156.
Ibáñez and the Labour Movement	160.
The Second General Strike	165.
The Political Dimensions of the Crisis	168.
The Crisis in the PAL	170.
Conclusion	176.

CHAPTER V	THE POLITICS OF STABILISATION, 1955-57	...	177.
	Anti-Inflationary Strategies	179.
	The Monetarist Interpretation of Inflation	...	179.
	Structuralist Interpretations of Inflation	...	184.
	Entente with the Right	188.
	The Arrival of Klein-Saks	190.
	<u>Ley 12.006</u> and the Third General Strike	...	196.
	Results of the Stabilisation Programme...		203.
	Conclusion	209.
CHAPTER VI	THE 'DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY' AND THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION	213.
	Ibáñez and the Armed Forces	215.
	From the <u>PUMAS</u> to the <u>Linea Recta</u>	217.
	The Response of the Opposition	220.
	The Press Under Ibáñez	223.
	Volpone and <u>La Nacion</u>	227.
	The Assault on <u>Horizonte</u>	232.
	The President and the Congress	233.
	The Response in Congress	239.
	The Radical Party in Opposition...	242.
	Opposition in Congress During Ibáñez's Rightist period	246.
	Peronism in Chile and the Congressional Hearings of 1955-56	247.
	End of the Entente with the Right in Congress		254.
	The Kelly Case	260.
	Conclusions : Why Did <u>Ibañismo</u> Fail?	263.

CHAPTER VII	ELECTORAL REFORM, EXPANDED PARTICIPATION AND THE RE-ALIGNMENT OF CHILEAN POLITICS 1956-1958	265.
	Popular Mobilisation in the 1950s and the CUT	268.
	The FECH and the Riots of April, 1957	272.
	The Response of the Left	276.
	The Formation of the <u>Frente de Accion Popular (FRAP)</u>	277.
	Two Strategies Inside the FRAP	284.
	The Formation of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	291.
	The Formation of <u>Todos en Contra de Alessandri (TOCOA)</u>	298.
	Electoral Reform and the Abrogation of the <u>Ley de Defensa de la Democracia</u>	305.
	The Presidential Elections, September 1958	308.
	Conclusion	316.
CONCLUSION	318.
	Postscript - <u>Nacionalismo</u> : From Allende to Pinochet	331.
APPENDIX NO.1	The Foundation of the <u>Movimiento Nacionalista de Chile</u> - 1940	340.
APPENDIX NO.2	<u>Agrario Laborista</u> Party Conference, Organised According to Function - 1953	353.
APPENDIX NO.3	Anti-Radical Party Cartoon - <u>La Nación</u>	355.
APPENDIX NO.4	Declaration of Principles - <u>Partido Nacional Popular</u> - 1959	357.
APPENDIX NO.5	Declaration of Principles - <u>La Democracia Agrario Laborista</u> - 1963	363.
BIBLIOGRAPHY	372.

INTRODUCTION

AN OUTLINE OF THE CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM

Chile is unusual in Latin America in that from Independence onwards politics has, with only brief exceptional periods, been organised around strong, ideologically distinct, political parties, and with political leadership drawn generally from the civilian elite. The party system emerged in the nineteenth century from two major controversies: the nature of Church-State relations, and the relative authority of the Executive vis-à-vis Congress. Despite the bitterness of the Church-State conflict, the religious questions was basically settled by the beginning of the twentieth century, but the struggles between President and Congress - which culminated in a Civil War in 1891 - continued to plague Chile even after the passing of a presidential constitution in 1925.

By 1920, three parties had come to dominate the political processes. The Conservative Party linked to the Catholic Church and the influential landowners of the Central Valley, the Liberal Party which was associated with the commercial bourgeoisie, located mainly in Santiago, and stood for a separation of Church and State, and the Radical Party, which emerged in the 1860s, articulated the interests of the incipient middle sectors and provincial bourgeoisie, especially in the northern mining regions and the agrarian, non-latifundia south.¹

1. Hereafter, I shall use the following operational terms:
Working class: to mean manual workers of all kinds, both male and female, employed in industry or in agriculture;
Middle class: to mean the 'petit-bourgeoisie' (small and medium employers and entrepreneurs, small farmers, professionals, intellectuals and white-collar state employees). The term 'middle sectors' is used interchangeably;

All three parties had their roots firmly in the nineteenth century liberal, parliamentary tradition, opposed any extension of presidential authority, and continued to defend parliamentary privilege. Instead, the presidential tradition, which found expression in the persons of Balmaceda, Alessandri and Ibáñez, developed in opposition to Congress, rather than alongside it, and on the margins of party organisation.

In order to fully understand the phenomenon of Ibañismo in the 1950s, it is important to understand first the political framework and historical background out of which it emerged, since, as a movement Ibañismo drew as much on the tensions which characterised the liberal democratic state in Chile, and especially the underlying presidential-Congressional dichotomy, as it did on the twentieth century populist experiences in Latin America and the Third World generally.

Footnote continued from page 1.

Bourgeoisie: big employers and large landowners, employing a labour force of more than fifty;

Oligarchy: a socio-economic group monopolising the use of political power, though originally agrarian-oriented, it is generally used here to refer to either industrial-oriented or agrarian-oriented sectors or both;

Dominant class or sector: those socio-economic groups which own the main means of production in a given society and whose political, moral, religious and cultural aims are hegemonic in that society;

Dominated class or sector: those socio-economic groups which provide the labour force in a given society and whose moral, political, religious and cultural aims do not normally prevail in a given society.

Liberalism and the Emergence of the Party System in Chile¹

The emergence of Latin American independence movements coincided with the growth of liberalism in Europe, and Chilean elites and intellectuals studying in Europe returned home enthusiastic converts to the new ideology. Liberal values, such as anti-militarism, parliamentarianism and republicanism, found widespread approval within Chilean creole society after Independence, though liberalism as a coherent doctrine came to be associated first with the Liberal Party and later with the Radical Party. The power of the Catholic Church had rapidly become the major political issue in Chile, and liberalism, with its critique of the eighteenth century marriage of religion with absolutism, was a natural response for Chilean reformers who identified the Hispanic colonial heritage and the Church with the oppression of the individual, religious fanaticism and opposition to any economic progress or social change. The Chilean historian, Alberto Edwards, argues that the religious question was the cleavage which gave birth to Chile's first party system.²

-
1. For details of the Chilean party system, see amongst others: Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1966; James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, University of California Press, London, 1969; J. Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front, Westport Conn., Greenwood, 1970; Alberto Edwards and Eduardo Frei Montalva, Historia de los Partidos Politicos, Editorial del Pacifico, Santiago, 1949; German Urzua Valenzuela, Los Partidos Politicos, Editorial Juridica, Santiago, 1968; Julio Heise González, 150 años de evolución institucional, Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1960; B. Burnett, Political Groups in Chile : the dialogue between order and change, University of Texas Press, London, 1970; G. Guillisoste Tagle, Partidos Politicos Chilenos, Editorial Nascimento, Santiago, 1969; and Rene Leon Echaiz, Evolución historica de los partidos politicos Chilenos, Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1971.
 2. Alberto Edwards, La Fronda Aristocratica, Editorial Univeritaria, Santiago, 1982, pp.107-117.

In the 1830s and 1840s, reform clubs were established in Santiago and the prosperous northern provinces of Chile in imitation of the European middle class reform movements, with the aim of promoting the separation of Church from State, the introduction of civil marriage, secular education, religious tolerance and freedom of thought. Perhaps the best known of the reform clubs was the Sociedad de la Igualdad, founded in the late 1840s by Santiago Arcos and Francisco Bilbao. In 1850, Chilean liberals José Victorino Lastarria and future president Federico Errázuriz expressed the liberal aspirations of the time in the pamphlet Bases de la Reforma, which called for a rapid extension of the suffrage, limitations on presidential power and terms of office, a unicameral parliament, and freedom of conscience.

The liberal reform movement in the 1840s and 1850s contributed directly to the founding of the Radical Party and appealed strongly to Chile's incipient middle class. Within these movements, in Chile as in France, the Masonic lodges were particularly influential.¹ The first Masonic lodges were founded in the 1850s and in the early 1860s a Grand Lodge was founded in Valparaiso.² The Masonry was important in shaping the aspirations of the middle sectors and in particular in articulating their opposition to the absolute authority of the Catholic Church over education, and the overt alliance between the Church, the latifundistas and the Conservative Party. At the same time, the Radical Party was also a product of the cult of French positivism, which found a natural home among Chilean intellectuals and middle sectors, and of the influence of Utopian socialism in the tradition of Proudhon, Saint Simon and Owen.

-
1. On the influence of the Masonry in Chile, see Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue, La Masonería y Su Influencia en Chile, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1973.
 2. It is important to note that masonic lodges in Chile were modelled on the French, reproducing especially the anti-clericalism characteristic of the French masonry, and differing from the Anglo-Saxon masonic tradition which is less concerned with either religions or social issues.

These bonds were cemented by the Radicals' affinity for French education, politics, literature, philosophy and culture in general.

Liberalism had little influence in government, until the presidency of Manuel Montt (1851-61), which, though politically conservative, rejected the supremacy of the Church in temporal matters. In order to defend the privileges of the Church, the ultra-aristocratic Conservative Party was founded in 1856. However, in 1861, the Conservatives then joined forces with the anti-clerical Liberals in a movement known as the Fusión against the anti-clerical but authoritarian National Party controlled by Montt and his Minister of the Interior, Antonio Varas. Conservatives and Liberals thus found themselves united in their rejection of authoritarian government and excessive use of presidential authority.¹ Despite their differences over the religious question, a preference for parliamentary government and parliamentary procedure characterised both parties. In addition, the elites of the two parties were increasingly bound together by kinship ties and joint economic ventures as a gradual fusion between landed wealth and the newer mineral or commercial wealth took place.

By mid-nineteenth century, therefore, Chilean politics were firmly established in the liberal parliamentary mold. Unlike in neighbouring republics, Chilean elites had established fairly stable political structures and had, by and large, accepted the existence of a strong centralising state. Though different ideologically and representing different economic interests, the three nineteenth century parties, Conservative, Liberal and Radical, were overwhelmingly 'liberal' in their outlook and behaviour. Indeed, it could be said that liberalism, understood as a dual concept of parliamentary practises politically and laissez-faire economically, came to dominate

1. This is, of necessity, a rather simplified and schematic description of a complex period in Chilean history. For further details see Maurice Zeitlin, The Civil Wars in Chile, Princeton University Press, Guildford, 1984; and Alberto Edwards, El gobierno de Manuel Montt, 1851-1861, Editorial Nascimento, Santiago, 1932.

Chilean political culture in general at this time. Though the Conservatives might have claimed that they represented a vision of a more organic society where the large landowners accepted a certain measure of social responsibility, particularly towards the peasantry, or the Radicals, that they expressed the need for a more just and humane treatment of the 'lower orders', while the Liberals preferred simply to stress the free play of market forces and the need for unregulated trade, in practice all three parties were united in doing very little. When reforms were enacted, such as the expansion of secondary education (1920) or the removal of income restrictions on the vote (1885), they were aimed at the incorporation of the middle sectors still numerically rather insignificant, but increasingly politically vocal.

Since political participation was confined to the social and political elites, class tensions had made little impact on the Chilean political system as it entered the twentieth century. This was to change quickly. An economic crisis after the First World War, brought on by a world depression and exacerbated in the case of Chile by a collapse in world markets for nitrates, her main export, and the emergence of a growing labour movement, focused the attention of political parties on the 'social question' for the first time. The 1920s and 1930s were a time of experimentation, as the nineteenth century political system was forced to adapt to new social and economic interests, economic depression, growing unrest, a radicalised petit bourgeoisie, an expanding trade union movement and the development of workers' parties. Experiments included military intervention (1924 and 1932), civil caudillismo (Alessandrismo 1920-27), authoritarian rule (Ibañismo 1927-31); and the re-establishment of oligarchic

domination (1932-38). New parties mushroomed during this period, and especially important were the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the National Socialist Movement, the Falange, and the Democratic Party.¹

All parties, however, continued to operate in, and adjust to, a restricted political system, characterised as much by its limitations - the exclusion of women and illiterates, a traditionally low voter-turn-out, and the widespread use of electoral fraud, vote-buying etc. - as by the apparent dominance of liberal democratic norms.

From Liberal Economics to State Capitalism : the case of the Radical Party²

The Radical Party came into existence in 1859, founded by a dissident Liberal, Manuel Antonio Matta, and mining entrepreneur and ex-associate of President Montt, Pedro León Gallo, both from the northern mining town of Copiapó. The party sought to represent the mining bourgeoisie and the new middle sectors which were emerging as a result of the expansion of the nitrate industry and the mines (especially silver) in the north of Chile. By 1864, Matta and Gallo had both been elected to Congress. The Radicals' strength lay initially in provincial towns - Copiapó, La Serena, Concepción, Valparaíso - and like the Liberal Party, was predominantly an urban party. An anti-centralist spirit was characteristic of the party during its early years, and though the capital city actually became one of the party's main centres of support in later years, the Radicals never lost their

-
1. On this period, see, among others: G. Strawbridge, Ibáñez and Alessandri : the authoritarian right and the democratic left in twentieth century Chile, Buffalo, New York, 1971; Urzua Valenzuela, op. cit.; Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52, University of Illinois Press, London, 1978; and F.M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-31 : the Honourable Mission of the Armed Forces, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1970.
 2. On the Radical Party, see the following: Florencio Durán Bernales, El Partido Radical, Editorial Nascimento, Santiago, 1958; Alberto Edwards and Eduardo Frei Montalva, op.cit.; Luis Palma Zuñiga, Historia del Partido Radical, Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1967; and German Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit.

provincial image. Support for the Radical Party in its strongest region, the norte chico,¹ where the party was founded, only declined in the 1960s with the expansion of the Christian Democratic Party.

From its inception, the social composition of the Party was mixed, and even contradictory. Although the petit bourgeoisie made up the mass of party supporters and voters, especially after the removal of the income restriction on the vote, the provincial and mining aristocracy and the non-latifundia landowners dominated the leadership and occupied the parliamentary seats. German Urzua Valenzuela categorises the early membership of the Radical Party as generally 'individuals without social ties to high society, and in terms of their economic activity belonging either to the small bourgeoisie or the big bourgeoisie'.² The Radical Party was founded only a few years after the development of the Liberal and Conservative parties, the leadership of the party was comparable with that of either the Liberals or the Conservatives in terms of privileges, wealth and education, and the Radicals participated in the trade-offs and compromises of the parliamentary period in the same way as the Liberals and Conservatives. It would be misleading, therefore, to speak of the Radicals as the 'left' of the party system in any sense in the nineteenth century.

1. The regions Atacama and Coquimbo comprised the norte chico. By 1860, it was the most economically developed area of Chile, principally because of the silver and gold mines located there. It was sparsely populated in comparison with the norte grande (Tarapacá and Antofagasta), and lacked both the proletariat which emerged in the nitrate towns of Antofagasta, and Iquique in the norte grande and the latifundia which dominated the Central Valley. Politics in the norte chico was thus dominated by small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, the mining bourgeoisie and related middle sectors. Maurice Zeitlin notes 'In 1859 ... the norte chico had probably become not only an enclave of bourgeois civilisation but also a second centre of political sovereignty, upheld in practice by the mine owning families, whose writ was all but local law'. Maurice Zeitlin, op.cit., p.45.

2. Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., p.149.

However, the Radical Party was progressive and modernising in three important respects. Firstly, the Radicals were the first to create a national party structure and establish a network of asambleas and party representatives throughout the country. Expansion of the party nationally was given additional impetus after the first national convention in 1888, and by 1919 there were more than 100 asambleas nationwide and a growing youth section. The fact that the Radicals could count on a better organisation enabled the party to expand after the Civil War of 1891, which caused some severe though temporary dislocation to the other major parties. Secondly, the strength of the Radical Party lay overwhelmingly in urban areas and among the expanding administrative and managerial groups. Between the years 1890 and 1920, Chile experienced a demographic shift towards urban centres and a corresponding increase in service sector employment, which was obviously beneficial to the Radical Party. (See Tables 1.1 and 1.2).

Thirdly, the Radical Party was able to attract a number of liberal intellectuals, who, though few, gave the party its distinctive ideology, based in a large part on their own experiences and education abroad, especially in France. The importance of this was recognised in the 1920s by Alberto Edwards:

Among the (Radical Party) leadership were the 'lions' of society, ... romantic ... poets on the lines of Victor Hugo, happily breaking every convention, democrats and free-thinkers, products of an intellectual bourgeois revolution, many of them with a burning faith in progress..

1. Edwards, op.cit., cited in Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., p.42.

TABLE 1.1¹CHILE : URBAN POPULATION, 1865-1920

Year	Cities over 5,000			Cities over 20,000		
	No.	Inhabitants	% Total Pop.	No.	Inhabitants	% Total Pop.
1865	20	348,462	19.1	2	185,815	10.2
1875	21	420,003	20.2	2	248,104	11.9
1885	33	587,172	23.2	5	362,651	14.3
1895	36	764,229	28.2	6	513,688	18.9
1907	49	1,092,231	33.6	8	716,587	22.1
1920	46	1,386,974	37.0	12	1,043,066	27.8

SOURCE: Chile, Censo, 1907, pp.1266-1267; Chile, Dirección General de Estadística, Censo de población de la República de Chile levantado el 15 diciembre de 1920 (Santiago, 1925), p.104.

TABLE 1.2²CHILE : DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY OCCUPATION, 1895 AND 1907

OCCUPATION	1895		1907	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. Professional, technical and related	11,259	1.1	23,744	1.9
2. Managers, proprietors and related	4,679	0.6	18,193	1.4
3. Sales, commerce and banking	65,241	6.3	82,383	6.6
4. Public admin. and office work	46,760	4.5	100,288	8.0
5. Agriculture and fishing	420,476	40.8	474,258	37.7
6. Mining	31,816	3.1	34,020	2.7
7. Transport	19,281	1.9	41,100	3.3
8. Artisan and industrial	242,520	23.5	310,529	24.7
9. Manual and day labor	17,521	1.7	-	-
10. Services	163,891	15.9	168,769	13.4
11. Other	4,363	0.4	3,490	0.3
Total	1,029,413	99.8	1,256,774	100.0

1. Karen Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, University of Nebraska Press, London, 1984, p.42.

2. *ibid.*, p.39.

Edwards goes on to describe liberalism as the 'spirit of the age'¹ and says -

The mass of the population, and especially the middle class, absorbed this spirit steadily, and although they felt it in a different way from the aristocrats and the intellectuals, this does not mean it was any the less noticeable.²

It was the Radical Party which gave the most lucid political and doctrinal expression to these predominantly middle sector aspirations, and as early as the convention of 1888, the Radicals emphasized the need for a democratisation of politics and society through an expansion of free, secular education and an extension of the suffrage.

At the same time, however, the Radical Party differed from the Liberals and Conservatives in its intransigent anti-clericalism rather than any fundamental disagreement over economic or social policy. During the period 1860-1891, laissez-faire became increasingly influential in determining Chile's economic policy, as tariffs were steadily removed or substantially reduced, coinciding with Chile's integration into the world system through her export of British-owned nitrates. Congress also began the onslaught on presidential authority in this period, though the 'golden age' and the excesses of the parliamentary republic did not begin properly until after the Civil War. It should be noted that the Radical Party, along with all other political parties in Congress - with the sole exception of a group of dissident Liberals who later formed the Democratic Liberal Party - opposed the reforms of President Balmaceda either to widen the franchise or to renegotiate the terms under which the British controlled the nitrate fields.

1. Edwards, op.cit., p.146.

2. *ibid.*, p.138.

One not altogether surprising result of the Radical Party's enthusiastic participation in the parliamentary game of the late nineteenth century and its willing endorsement of economic expansion through the unregulated export of primary products was that the party's actual record on social reform at this time was poor, despite the image it deliberately cultivated of being a party dedicated to progress and change.¹ In practice, there was little to distinguish the Radical Party from the Liberals or the Conservatives at this time, as Urzua Valenzuela points out:

None of the nineteenth century parties thought of the socio-economic problem as an urgent issue. The truth is that their members constituted a homogeneous mass sharing the same coherent set of political principles. The Radical Party has a history of ideological struggle, rather than struggles of an economic or material nature, which ... only became relevant in the first decades of this century.²

The debates between Enrique MacIver and Valentín Letelier at the 1906 conference mark the beginning of a change of direction within the Radical Party. Letelier carried the majority of the party delegates with him in proposing that the Radicals adopt a measure of 'socialist' policies, in preference to laissez-faire concepts of the nineteenth century. MacIver's position can be summed up in his reported comment at the conference: 'The workers have neither sufficient culture nor preparation to understand the problems of government, much less participate in them'.³ Despite his defeat, however, MacIver's influence over party

1. Both Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1963, and David Corkill, Chilean Politics in the Era of the Popular Front (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Essex, 1975) criticise the Radical Party's achievements at this time.

2. Urzua Valenzuela, *op.cit.*, p.50.

3. Cited in Remmer, *op.cit.*, p.65.

policy continued for some years, mainly because, unlike Letelier, he was a member of Congress. (The balance of power inside the Radical Party has always been weighted in favour of congressional representatives.) Nonetheless, the 1919 conference also signified a victory for reform, and between 1920 and 1938, the party shifted steadily to the left, ratifying the concept of the state's central role in the promotion of social and economic welfare policies and industrialisation. The philosophy of the Radical Party henceforth could be summed up as:

Secularism, defence of liberties, government based upon political parties, concern for public education, civil/juridical sense, equality of woman with man, defence of the parliamentary regime, concern for the working class, and the desire for an eventually classless society, evolutionary methodology, rationalism and tolerance.¹

In 1931, the party accepted the doctrine of the class struggle, and once again advocated the introduction of broad structural changes. The effects of this decision were some time in coming to fruition, since the Radicals saw no inconsistency in also putting forward candidates for office in Alessandri's conservative government (1932-1938), but eventually, in 1937, the historic Popular Front alliance was formed, consisting of the Radical Party, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, and Radical Pedro Aguirre Cerda was nominated as its presidential candidate.

The Radical Party differed from its nineteenth century counterparts, the Conservatives and Liberals, in its capacity to adapt to the twentieth century, both in terms of broadening its electoral constituency and in modernising its ideology. The Radicals' economic and social doctrines underwent considerable change which made possible the formation of an

1. Ben Burnett, op.cit., p.181.

alliance with Chile's left-wing parties on the basis of an agreement to use the resources of the State to finance and promote economic growth and public services in such fields as education, social insurance, welfare, industrialisation and health. The Chilean Popular Front was inspired by examples in Spain and France, and, for the Chilean Radical Party, the participation of the French Radical Party in the Popular Front government of Leon Blum was a particularly important factor. The French Radical Party had undergone a similar transformation in the twentieth century, evolving away from laissez-faire towards socialist-inspired economic doctrines. Both the French and the Chilean Radical Parties established alliances with the Left in order to create an electoral bloc capable of winning power and a movement with sufficient popular support to implement a programme of wide-ranging reforms. In both cases, anti-fascism was the cement of the Front. And, in the cases of both parties, changed economic and social goals did not alter the essentially democratic, liberal, and parliamentary/asambleista character of the party; indeed, anti-fascism strengthened the Radicals' commitment to liberal-democratic structures and practices.

Why did the Radical Party experience such fundamental ideological changes, in the first part of the twentieth century? In part, it was a transferred effect of the ideological upheaval which characterised European politics after the 1914-1918 war, Chile always being a country peculiarly imitative of European fashions.

Other important influences came from the Mexican revolution and later, the Civil War in Spain. More particularly, however, changes in Radical Party ideology reflected significant changes which were occurring within Chilean society. The 'ideological struggle' and the intellectual tradition which had characterised the party from its beginnings made it now possible for the Radical Party to advocate a series of political solutions which were virtually the opposite of the party proposals in the nineteenth century in response to the transformation of Chilean society in the first part of the twentieth century.

As a result of the rapid expansion of the urban population between 1885 and 1907, the increasing economic importance of the cities, and the creation of nitrate and mining enclaves, a degree of working class organisation and militancy, fuelled by appalling working and social conditions, developed for the first time. The proliferation of strikes in this period, such as the six-day strike in Iquique in 1901, and the 1906 strike in Antofagasta, where nearly a hundred demonstrators were killed, mark a watershed in Chilean history. By 1920, the Federación de Obreros Chilenos (FOCH), founded in 1909 with originally moderate, mutual-aid principles, was controlled by the leaders of the Socialist Workers Party (POS), affiliated to the Third International, and led by the legendary, charismatic figure of Luis Emilio Recabarren.¹ The small and medium bourgeoisie, in particular the bureaucratic, trade and service sectors, also experienced a similar process of rapid expansion in the years leading up to the First World War. As a result, the 'social question' could no longer be ignored, and all parties were forced to define themselves vis-à-vis economic and social issues.

1. For more details, see Peter De Shazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, University of Wisconsin Press, London, 1983; and Julio Cesar Jobet, Luis Emilio Recabarren : Los Origenes del Movimiento Obrero y del Socialismo en Chile, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1955.

TABLE 1.3
INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (1929)¹

Investment in :	<u>U.S. Dollars</u>	<u>%</u>
Copper	\$402,000,000	59.3
Manufacturing industry	\$ 18,000,000	2.6
Electricity and transport	\$ 56,000,000	8.2
Insurance and banking	\$ 13,000,000	1.9
Commerce	\$ 37,000,000	5.4
	<u>\$151,000,000</u>	22.3
	<u>\$677,000,000</u>	

In the period leading up to the Radicals' swing to the left, the Chilean economy suffered the double blow of a virtual collapse in world markets in natural nitrates, due to the end of the 1914-1918 War and the invention of synthetic nitrate; and secondly, the Great Depression, which affected Chile adversely because of her dependence on external trade and foreign investment. Foreign investment had increased in Chile throughout the period of authoritarian rule (1927-1931), and had penetrated into such areas as manufacturing and communications (see Table 1.3). Foreign capital in Chile rose from \$723,000,000 in 1925 to \$1,017,000,000 in 1930.² In the absence of sufficient domestic capitalisation, and with the landowners still largely untaxed, foreign loans also increased to pay for Ibáñez's public works programmes. The effects of the depression were somewhat late in reaching Chile, but by 1931 foreign loans and investment had dried up and the prices of primary products - and nitrates and copper made up 80% of Chile's exports between 1935 and 1929 - had fallen dramatically. The price of copper, for example, fell from 18 cents a pound in

-
1. J.C. Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile PLA, 2 vols. Santiago, 1951; vol.1.
 2. Comisión Económica para América Latina (ECLA), Antecedentes Sobre el desarrollo de la economía chilena, 1925-52, (1954) 1, 24.

1930 to 5 cents in 1933. Unemployment rose from 6,387 in Santiago in January 1931 to 113,000 in December 1932.¹ The economic crisis undoubtedly contributed directly to the downfall of Ibáñez in 1931.

Under Alessandri (1932-1938) there was a slow recovery and some signs of a slight increase in national prosperity. This was not matched, however, by a recovery in living standards or wages for the majority of the population, and the middle sectors were no exception to this. Paul Drake, in his study of the Chilean Left between 1932-52, argues that -

One reason so many from the middle sectors sided with the Front was the distance between their income and that of the upper class, which was even greater than the gap between middle- and lower-class incomes. As evidence of the low pay scales of the middle classes, it was estimated in 1937-38 that government white-collar employees earned from \$16 to \$80 per month, private white-collar employees in offices and shops an average of \$23 per month (\$276 per year) and public school teachers about \$36 per month (\$432 per year).²

Out of the turbulent 1930s, there emerged a variety of political organisations all concerned primarily with economic and social issues, representing students, workers, middle sectors, peasants and even concerned members of the upper class. One of these movements in particular, the Socialist Party, had the potential to win the middle sector vote away from the Radical Party, as studies of the Socialist Party have demonstrated.³ This competition cannot be discounted as yet another factor in pushing the Radical Party to the Left.

1. F. Nunn, op.cit., p.160.

2. Paul Drake, op.cit., p.193.

3. See Paul Drake, *ibid*; B. Pollack, 'The Chilean Socialist Party: Prolegomena to its structure and organisation', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol.10, no.1, 1978; and Paul Drake, 'The Chilean Socialist Party and Coalition Politics, 1932-46', Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol.53, Number 4, Nov. 1973, pp.619-43.

Initially, attempts by central government to ameliorate the social cost of the prolonged economic crisis besetting Chile in the twentieth century were brought about by movements which excluded the Radical Party along with all other mainstream political parties - Alessandrismo in 1920 ('the revolt of the electorate'); the reforms pushed through Congress by the military 'rattling of sabres' in 1924; the corporatist-military movement around President Ibáñez, 1927-1931; and the short-lived, military-led Socialist Republic of 1932. It was the Radical Party, however, which presided over the institutionalisation of change and the incorporation of the working class to the political system under the hegemony of the middle sectors. While this is not the place to deal with the multiple and complex legacy of the Radical Party governments between 1938 and 1952, nevertheless, it is essential to underline one of the Radical Party's achievements from this period, namely, the legitimisation of the concept of an economic and social role for the State in the eyes of the right-wing parties and particularly the economic elites, on the one hand, and of the possibility of parliamentary, constitutional change in the eyes of the left-wing parties. This was as much a result of the Radicals' willingness to compromise in government as it was an outcome of actual policy. It also corresponded to the general Radical strategy of minimising social tensions while at the same time maximising economic advances, both to be achieved within a framework of parliamentary, democratic institutions. (Although the Radical presidents made good use of the extensive presidential prerogatives under the 1925 constitution.) In order to understand the ideological bases of the Radical Party opposition to Ibáñez in 1952-1958, it is important to see that Radical Party philosophy now conceived of Chile's

parliamentary liberal democracy as a guarantee of the state-led import substituting industrialisation model implemented between 1938 and 1952, in a reversal of the classic nineteenth century articulation of liberalism as an alliance between democracy and laissez-faire; Ibañismo's potential authoritarianism came to be seen as a threat to both.

The Parliamentary Tradition versus Presidential Power : The Civil War of 1891

The historic commitment to parliamentary institutions on the part of Chilean elites, almost since Independence until 1973, has been well documented, and academic studies are legion concerning the incorporation of the middle sectors and later, of mass and workers' parties into Chile's liberal democratic political structures in the twentieth century.¹ Less academic attention has, on the whole, been paid to the trend in Chilean politics towards presidentialism or caudillismo.

It is a fact, nonetheless, that the supremacy of parliamentary institutions was at times brought into question in the nineteenth century, for example, by the increasing authority of President Manuel Montt (1851-1861), when tension within the ruling elite led to an attempted military uprising in the north of Chile as well as radically altering the party system. This was a fore-runner of the more serious struggle between the President and the dominant socio-economic elite during the administration of President Balmaceda.² Indeed, the peace and political stability for which Chile was famed during the nineteenth century had been established

-
1. Among other works, see Petras, op.cit.; Burnett, op.cit.; Drake, op. cit.; Alan Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile, Oxford University Press, London, 1972; Maurice Zeitlin, 'The social determinants of political democracy in Chile', Maurice Zeitlin and J. Petras (eds.), Latin America : Reform or Revolution? Fawcett, London, 1968; Gil, op.cit.; and Jorge Barria, El Movimiento Obrero, Trígono, Santiago, 1971.
 2. Zeitlin, op.cit. See also C. Pregger Roman, 'Economic Interest Groups within the Chilean Government, 1851-1891 : continuity and discontinuity in economic and political evolution', Science and Society, Number 43 (Summer) 1979.

in the first instance not by the proto-parties of the time - the pipiolos and the pelucones¹ - but by strongman Diego Portales, Minister in the government of Joaquin Prieto and thereafter the archetypal symbol of authoritarian government, independent of political parties, compromise and negotiation, especially for the Chilean Right. It is significant that the founder of the right-wing-corporatist Agrario Party, Jaime Larrain, describes Portales as a leader 'uncontaminated by the political passions of the period'.²

The attempted assertion of presidential authority on the part of President Jose Manuel Balmaceda remains the most serious threat to Chile's parliamentary institutions before 1920. His defeat inaugurated a period of extreme parliamentary dominance, where the very names of the presidents have paled into insignificance.

Historians of the nineteenth century differ radically in their interpretations of the Civil War, and in particular over which - if any - sectoral and economic interests were in conflict. Chilean Marxist historians have claimed that Balmaceda's proposed reforms constituted a programme benefitting 'progressive' economic sectors, the so-called 'national bourgeoisie', and as such were opposed by the Chilean oligarchy in alliance with British capital.³ Harold Blakemore, on the other hand, vigorously denies this, arguing instead that the Civil War was a conflict of 'personal and political allegiances within the governing class'.⁴ Maurice Zeitlin,

-
1. For a discussion of pipiolismo and peluconismo, see Rene Leon Echaiz, op.cit.
 2. Jaime Larrain, Chile, avanzada de occidente en el sur Ediciones 'Nueva Politica', Santiago, 1950, p.178.
 3. Julio Cesar Jobet, Ensayo critico del desarrollo economico - social de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1955; and Hernán Ramirez Necochea, Balmaceda y la contra revolución de 1891, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1969.
 4. Harold Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics 1886-1896 : Balmaceda and the North, Athlone Press, London, 1974, pp.394-418.

more recently, has concluded that the Civil War was indeed a struggle between fractions of the 'governing class', but at the same time accepts that the divisive issues were economic.¹

What is beyond discussion is that the crisis was provoked by Balmaceda's attempt to increase government revenue from nitrate production to invest in the development of economic infrastructure and the expansion of education. According to Maurice Zeitlin's study of the Civil War, these constituted 'social objectives contrary to the desires and objective interests of the dominant class'.² Two things are clear; firstly, that after Balmaceda's defeat, public spending on infrastructure and education fell, and attempts to encourage and protect Chile's nascent industrialisation was abandoned; and secondly, that apart from some members of the mining bourgeoisie, represented politically by a minority of dissident Liberals and Radicals, Balmaceda faced an opposition in Congress composed of representatives of Chile's landed aristocracy, and the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie combined, who were, in the last resort, supported by most of the Armed Forces.³

The most notable feature of Chile's political development at this time, then, was the harmony of interests that existed between large landowners of the Central Valley and the commercial or industrial class, resulting from the small size of Chile's elite strengthened by considerable joint economic ventures and inter-marriage. This allowed the formation in Chile of one ruling class essentially in agreement on the nature

1. Maurice Zeitlin, *op.cit.*, p.73.

2. *ibid.*, p.8.

3. See J.R. Bowman and M. Wallenstein, 'The Fall of Balmaceda and Public Finance in Chile', Latin American Perspectives, Vol.10 No.2-3 (Spring and Summer 1983).

of political and economic development, despite the existence of a (nominally) competitive party system.¹ The Civil War notwithstanding, an absence of tensions within the dominant class in what distinguished Chile at this time in Latin America. As late as 1916, the then Minister of the Interior recognised 'There are no currents which agitate and disturb us [referring to the Congress]. No important problems divide us, there are no national aspirations in conflict here'.² In the neighbouring republic of Argentina, for example, agreement was impossible between the exporting groups of Buenos Aires and the elites of the interior provinces, which ideologically took the shape of a struggle between centralism and federalism.³

We can conclude, therefore, that the existence of a liberal democracy in Chile in the nineteenth century was possible only because Congress represented a united ruling class. Congress did not become a forum for resolving antagonistic class or economic interests. Chileans themselves were not unaware of this. Alberto Edwards wrote 'our upper social class was simultaneously aristocratic and bourgeois at the moment of independence,⁴ and later, Chilean economist Anibal Pinto accepted that there were 'differences and frictions' within the ruling class, 'but no profound contradictions among them'.⁵ F.B. Pike goes so far, indeed, as to remark 'Almost the only clear middle class trait has been the tendency to shun the lower mass and to embrace the aristocracy'.⁶ He explains this as a result of the 'fact that historically ... the Chilean aristocracy has

1. See C. Pregger Roman, 'The origins and development of the bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Chile', Latin American Perspectives, Vol.10, No.2-3 (Spring and Summer), 1983.

2. Quoted in Urzua Valenzuela, *op.cit.*, p.61.

3. F.H. Cardoso and E.Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, University of California Press, London, 1979, pp.82-89.

4. Edwards, *op.cit.*

5. Anibal Pinto, Chile : Un caso de desarrollo frustrado, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1959, pp.38-40.

6. Pike, *op.cit.*, p.284. Pike uses the term 'middle class' to refer to the urban bourgeoisie at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.

in general been more open to entry by middle class elements than in other Latin American countries' and secondly, he argues that the 'alliance between middle and upper social sectors' was fostered by the anti-clericalism which erupted in nineteenth century Chile probably received more direction and impetus from the aristocracy than was common in other southern republics'.¹

The adoption of democracy in Chile differed significantly from the process by which democracy became the ideology of dominant elites in Western Europe, where the bourgeoisie embraced democratic ideals in its successful struggle against the landed aristocracy. In Chile, a liberal democratic ideology was assimilated without a simultaneous transference of power away from the latifundistas, who were, as a result, prepared to exercise their dominance through parliamentary institutions. Although it has long been accepted by political scientists that democracy in Chile has been primarily the ideology of the dominant class,² it is only recently that detailed research has been carried out to investigate the effects of the early emergence of a democratic party system controlled almost exclusively by members of that class.

In one such study of the effects of the party system between 1890-1930 on policy outcome, Karen Remmer produces data on political participation and public policy which contradict the generally-held proposition that party competition will bring about changes in the distribution of power in favour of less privileged groups.³ She claims that while the party

1. Pike, *op.cit.*

2. Ernst Halperin noted: 'European standards are not valid in Latin America. In such countries as Chile... the oligarchy has traditionally used democracy as its instruments of rule'. Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1965, p.29.

3. Karen Remmer, *op.cit.*

system offered pay-offs to the middle sectors in terms of employment and bureaucratic expansion (especially in the Ministries of the Interior and Education between 1875 and 1920), economic policy, benefited the socio-economic elite rather than responding to the needs or demands of either the middle sectors or the lower income groups.¹ She concludes that the development of a stable party system had little or no impact on such issues as State education, social policy and civil liberties, and that 'inter-party competition impeded rather than promoted state action on behalf of subordinate groups in Chile'.²

In order to illustrate that in Chile there was no corollary between the emergence of a party system and the introduction of reform legislation, Remmer compares the case of Chile with that of Argentina, where the development of political parties - later than in Chile - created 'patterns of political recruitment and policy formation (which) suggest a lessening of elite control over political outcomes and a reduction in political inequality'.³ One of the key reforms which can be used to measure the degree of incorporation of middle and lower-income groups in the introduction of compulsory primary education. It is a telling indictment of the Chilean party system that this was achieved in Argentina in 1884 and in Chile not until 1920.⁴

Returning to the crisis of 1891, it is fairly clear that what was a heated disagreement over the question of economic development, took the particular form of a struggle between president and Congress for power. As early as 1889, Balmaceda was reminded by the Radical Party

1. Remmer, *op.cit.*, p.154.

2. *ibid.*, p.205.

3. *ibid.*, p.174.

4. This trend was reversed after 1920 when Chilean politics began to open up to hitherto excluded groups, especially middle sectors, and the state began to arbitrate in social conflicts.

that 'our system of government is, and ought constitutionally to be, parliamentary, or the government of the cabinet'.¹ Between 1889-91, criticism of the president in the press seems to have focused less on his actual policies, and more on his ignoring Congressional disapproval and lack of confidence in those policies and his Cabinet.² The uprising against Balmaceda by Congress in 1891 was finally precipitated by his decision to press ahead with his budget proposals despite the fact that Congress had withheld its approval. Thus, Congressional justification of the uprising turned on the vital issue of presidential authority. The parallel with the bitter dispute between President Allende and an opposition-controlled Congress in the period 1971-73 is of course strikingly obvious, where once again opposition to economic and social reform was couched in the high-sounding terms of constitutional Congressional prerogatives.

In the light of this, it is easy to understand how Congress came to be seen as a reactionary body under the absolute control of the oligarchy. In contrast, the Civil War culminating in Balmaceda's suicide established firmly the image of the presidency as a 'progressive' office. In this sense, we should look less at the actual causes of the Civil War, and more at the mythology which surrounds Balmaceda and his image as a reform-minded patriot, committed to national development in defiance of Congress, in order to understand the desire for strong executive powers which characterised reform or left-wing movements in the early twentieth century.³ This tradition was later to contribute to and find expression

-
1. El Ferrocarril, 2/2/1889, quoted in Pike, op.cit., p.42.
 2. ibid., pp.42-46.
 3. See Cristian Gazmuri, 'La historia de Chile republicano, ¿una decadencia?', Alternativas (revista del centro de estudios de la realidad contemporanea academica del humanismo cristiano), No.5, June 1984, pp.106-155, for an interesting discussion of the perceptions of the Civil War and the Parliamentary Republic of Chilean historians and intellectuals including Fransisco Encina, Alberto Edwards, Jaime Eyzaguirre, Jorge Prat, Luis Emilio Recabarren, and Julio Cesar Jobet.

in the Ibañista movements of the twenties and the fifties. On the left, the Popular Socialist Party in particular was attracted by the possibilities of sweeping root and branch reforms enacted through an authoritarian executive. Clodomiro Almeyda, one of the most influential proponents of a type of left-wing authoritarianism, wrote:

Authoritarianism... happens to be the only way to organise the community and mobilise the productive forces against feudalism and the ruling oligarchies. Democratic liberalism... only serves to facilitate the rule of the reactionary minorities under cover of a semblance of public liberties.¹

Personalist authoritarian rule was attractive to Almeyda precisely because it rejected the compromises and accommodations of liberal democracy which had benefited the ruling class to the exclusion of the masses until 1920, and which still operated overwhelmingly in their favour in 1950.

Constitutional Change, Political Incorporation, and Social-Economic Reform, 1920-52.

After 1920, the old system of parliamentary supremacy was to prove inoperable. The election of Arturo Alessandri, candidate of the Liberal Alliance (a combination of Radicals, some Liberals, and Democrats) as President in that year, on a programme of palliative reform in the face of Chile's deepening social crisis, marks the simultaneous ending of an unconcerned laissez-faire attitude on the part of government and of Congress's dominance of Chile's political institutions. This is the case, despite the fact that a new 'presidential' constitution was not passed until 1925, and did not come into effect until 1932.

1. Quoted in Halperin, op.cit.

The scene was set for a further round of conflict between the executive and Congress after Alessandri's inauguration, and his absolute failure to get any of the promised reforms onto the statute book by 1924, due to the recalcitrance and delaying tactics of Congress in dealing with the bills sent by the President. A further stumbling block in this period was the loss of state revenue from exporting industries, especially nitrates after 1918. This left the government without sufficient means of financing reform, except though the introduction of income or property taxes - unacceptable notions even to Alessandri.

In the midst of the resulting political stalemate, the army intervened (September 5, 1924). The much delayed social and labour legislation was rapidly dispatched and Alessandri resigned (September 8, 1924). Following a short period of military rule, characterised by profound disagreement and institutional in-fighting, Alessandri was invited back from exile in March 1925 to serve out the remainder of his term of office. After his election for a second term in the same year, constitutional reform became inevitable.

The 1925 Constitution, which was to remain in force until its suspension after the military coup of September 1973, separated the Church from the State, included the promulgation of a labour code which implied the State's theoretical acknowledgement of its role in the management of the economy, and strengthened the office of the president vis-à-vis Congress. In all three areas, therefore, the Constitution broke with Chile's nineteenth century past and political traditions. The presidential term was extended to six years (though it was not renewable immediately); the president's control over his ministers was guaranteed; Congressmen were forbidden to hold Cabinet office while remaining in parliament; the

the president's power of initiating or rejecting legislation was increased; these were some of the most significant reforms introduced.¹ Despite the opposition of almost all the political parties, the new constitution was overwhelmingly ratified by plebiscite.²

It should be noted, however, that the presidentialism enshrined in the 1925 Constitution by no means signified the executive's absolute domination over parliament. As Chilean constitutionalist Bernardino Bravo Lira, commented on the reform:

The political parties retained their importance in fact after 1925, and their principal instrument continued to be the Congress... The basic institutional problem of the previous parliamentary regime survived the constitutional revision.³

The emergence of an authoritarian military reform movement around the figure of General Carlos Ibáñez, Minister of War, participant in the 1924-25 military intervention, prevented Alessandri once again from serving out his term of office. Despite the promulgation of the new 'presidential' Constitution of which Ibáñez himself was one of the signatories, Ibáñez represented a style of government which owed nothing to the formal party system. Only after the abrupt collapse of his regime in 1932 and the loss of prestige for Ibáñez's personalist government where the only institutional backing was provided by the Armed Forces, did the political parties return once more to the centre-stage of Chilean political life. Civilismo could be said to have been responsible almost solely for Alessandri's triumphant return in 1932 to the Moneda.

1. See Bernardino Bravo Lira, Regimén de Gobierno y Partidos Políticos, 1924-73, Edition Jurídica, Santiago, 1978, pp.88-128.

2. Gil, op.cit., p.89.

3. Bravo Lira, op.cit., p.19.

From 1932 to 1952, a kind of unspoken compromise was in operation between the executive power and the Congress, under which the president negotiated with the political parties in order to form a majority in Congress. This was made possible because of the fairly rapid incorporation of reformist centre and even Marxist parties.

Despite the absence of official restrictions on political activity (apart from a literacy qualification on the vote), and the existence of a liberal democratic, competitive party framework, political participation in 1920 was still the prerogative of the rural and urban elite. The socio-economic transformation which had taken place in Chile, the expansion of the urban population, the development of a proletariat in nitrate and mining enclaves as well as in the cities, the creation of a significant bureaucratic state apparatus and the numerical growth of the middle sectors had left the party system virtually untouched. The years 1920 to 1938 witnessed the rapid development of class consciousness on the part of the middle sectors and the urban working class, and their desire for reform was made manifest in the brief Socialist Republic of 1932, and the spectacular growth of the Socialist Party, which had 5 deputies on its foundation in 1933, and 19 just four years later.¹ Furthermore, in the 1937 elections for the Chamber of Deputies, the Socialists, Radicals and Communists combined received 35% of the votes cast.² During this period, a strategy for assuming power electorally was also developed in the form of the Popular Front. Although the Popular Front only lasted until 1941, the historic alliance between the Radical Party, distinguished

-
1. The ultra-leftism of the Chilean Communist Party tended to isolate it from the electorate and this may have benefited the Socialist Party.
 2. Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., p.61.

by its evolutionary and secular character, and the Marxist parties on the left formed the basis of the electoral victories of Radical presidents Juan Antonio Rios and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla in 1942 and 1946 respectively. An increased organisational capacity on the part of the trade union movement was also characteristic of this period, and the Confederacion de Trabajadores (CTCH), which controlled and united the labour movement until its disintegration in 1946, participated fully in the formation of the Popular Front.

It is important to note, however, that the profound changes which occurred within the party system as a result of the incorporation of the workers' parties through the Popular Front strategy and the victory of its presidential candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, took place because of the radicalisation of the middle sectors and the negotiation of a sophisticated alliance whereby the Radical presidential candidates could count on the votes and support of the left. It was not the result of any expansion in the terms of political participation. The table below reveals how the size of the electorate remained reduced and limited throughout this period.

TABLE 1.4
ELECTORAL POPULATION OF CHILE¹

YEAR	REGISTERED		VOTERS	
	TOTAL NO.	% OF TOTAL POPULATION	TOTAL NO.	% OF TOTAL POPULATION
1932P	429,772	9.5	342,990	7.6
1937C	475,354	9.8	412,230	8.5
1938P	503,871	10.3	441,441	9.0
1941C	575,625	11.2	450,248	8.7
1942P	581,486	11.1	464,669	8.9
1945C	641,495	11.6	449,930	8.1
1946P	631,527	11.2	477,785	8.5
1949C	591,994	9.1	464,872	7.8

P = Presidential elections. C = Congressional elections.

1. Chile en el siglo XX. (Revista Hoy) Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago 1983, No.5, Del Frente Popular a la 'Ley Maldita', p.12.

This contributed to reinforce the incorporation of the workers' parties under the hegemony of the Radical Party and the middle sectors, and helps explain the following assertion by German Urzua Valenzuela:

(From 1920), the middle class is virtually the leading class and its values influence decisively all governments whatever their political affiliation and what is more symptomatic, it provided the leadership for all the working class sectors who tried to make their importance known.

The Radical Party, therefore, played a unique and decisive role at the centre of Chilean politics in the years 1938-52. In the Popular Front period and beyond, under the guidance of the Radical Party, the government adopted a series of measures designed to stimulate industrial expansion coupled with the introduction of moderate social reform. These were successfully introduced with the support of the left. By encouraging yet containing the participation of the left within the parliamentary framework, the Radicals legitimised the democratic processes in the eyes of the left, and at the same time convinced the Liberals, Conservatives, and the economic elites of the necessity of the incorporation of the Socialist and Communist parties. Subsequently, the Communists and a majority of the Socialist Party leadership were committed to the idea of a gradualist socialist transformation instigated through the ballot box. The Radical Party itself became the 'natural' party of government, because it was the only party with any hope of building a government coalition successfully. Its credentials as a democratic and reformist party made it acceptable, for different reasons, to all sectors of the political spectrum. The Radical Party therefore, operated in government as a pragmatic party par excellence. Arturo Valenzuela has

1. Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., p.75.

gone as far as to argue that the tendency in Chile towards increased polarisation in the 1960s and early 1970s was aggravated by the displacement of a 'pragmatic' centre by an 'ideological' centre (the Christian Democratic Party).¹

The incorporation of the left into the parliamentary arena, brought some immediate benefits to the urban working class, especially an increased tolerance of trade unionism on the part of government. However, the temptations of power and office-holding contributed to the bureaucratisation of the Socialist Party in particular, and to bringing about a separation of the party leadership from the mass of the membership.² The result was a steady electoral decline throughout the 1940s. It is for this reason that Socialist Party historian, Julio Cesar Jobet, is critical of the party's participation in government in this period:

The Socialist Party was weakened and began to suffer from divisions as a consequence of its participation in the Popular Front and the illusions it placed in parliamentarianism.³

Nonetheless, the experience of government opened up an entirely new phase of development for the left, creating new possibilities in terms of political strategy. Henceforth, the left in Chile was to operate from within the political system, with access to state institutions, and with the possibility of winning control of them in the future.

-
1. Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes : Chile, John Hopkins University Press, London, 1978.
 2. B. Pollack, The Chilean Socialist Party : A Case Study in Party Organisation (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Liverpool, 1979).
 3. J.C. Jobet, El Socialismo a traves de sus Congresos, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1963, p.53.

It is, though, undeniable that the most tangible benefits of the Radical-Left alliance fell to the middle sectors. The setting up of semi-fiscal government agencies, such as the CORFO, the creation of new industries producing for the home market, and the expansion of social and educational services all provided secure, pensionable employment for the urban middle class. The changes which took place in the structure of the Chilean economy as a result of government policies in the 1940s is illustrated in the following figures: the percentage of the population engaged in the service sector of the economy grew from 35.5% in 1930 to 41.4% in 1949, while in the same period, the percentage of the population employed in production (agriculture, industry, construction and mining) actually declined, from 64.5% in 1930, to 58.6% in 1949.¹ One result of this was the growth of white-collar unionisation which occurred in the period 1946-51, years in which the trade union of the public employees, the ANEF, controlled by the Radical Party, dominated the labour movement.²

The economic growth of the years of Radical governments was not without attendant problems, particularly in the form of chronic balance of payments deficits and a growing inflation rate. Much of this was due to the nature of Chilean industrialisation which was financed without dismantling the economic and social power and privileges of the oligarchy. The failure of the Radicals to press for an agrarian reform left 86% of land in the hands of 9.7% of the population, and 74.8% of the population with only 5.2% of the land. In the rich fertile Central Valley, the situation was even more unjust with 92% of the land in the hands of just

1. Pike, op.cit., p.276.

2. Angell, op.cit., p.155 ff.

7% of landowners.¹ A direct result of Chile's system of land tenure was under-productive use of the land, which meant that a sixth of her foreign exchange was used to import food. At the same time, the Radicals failed to increase significantly the tax contributions of the very rich. Indeed, government revenue from income tax actually declined in the period 1940-50.² Nicholas Kaldor concluded in 1956 that the wealthiest groups in Chile spent 14.7% of their income in taxes, and 64.3% on consumer goods.³ What this meant was that the Radicals failed to redistribute national income to any significant degree and so failed to improve the standards of living for Chile's poor. In 1945, a survey of primary school children revealed that only 14% did not show evidence of long term under-nourishment.⁴ In an investigation in the late 1950s, only 13% of the population had received any secondary education at all, despite the emphasis of the Radicals on creating liceos (secondary schools) rather than primary schools.⁵ In 1955, the government census revealed that 30% of the population lived without the most minimal sanitary arrangements.⁶

The Exhaustion of the Radical Governments and Disillusionment with Parliamentary Politics, 1947-52.

In the late 1940s, under President Gabriel González Videla, the Radical Party's pragmatic and compromise approach to government neared exhaustion, and with the collapse of the political centre, the party system entered once again a period of fragmentation and crisis.

-
1. Pinto, op.cit., p.164.
 2. ibid., p.274.
 3. Nicholas Kaldor, Economic Problems of Chile, 1956 (mimeo).
 4. Pike, op.cit., p.278.
 5. Jorge Ahumada, En vez de la miseria, Editorial del Pacifico, Santiago, 1958, p.27.
 6. Pike, op.cit., p.276.

Following the death of Juan Antonio Rios in 1946, the successor to Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the Radicals chose Gabriel González Videla as presidential candidate for the forthcoming elections. González Videla had until that time been associated consistently with the left of the Radical Party, that is, the section of the party most firmly committed to an alliance with the left. The Communist Party, with whom González Videla had an especially solid relationship, endorsed his candidature, and held ministerial office on his victory. The new - and as it turned out - temporary alliance between the Radical Party and the Communist Party did not form the basis for another Popular Front, however. Firstly, because the alliance excluded the Socialist Party, which had been a key participant in the original Popular Front, and therefore, divided and weakened, rather than strengthened, the Left and the labour movement as a whole; and secondly, the Communists participated in government alongside the Liberal Party. Further, the alliance was informal. Nonetheless, the Communist Party benefited electorally from its participation in government (mostly at the expense of the Socialists though also the Radicals), and it polled 17% of the total vote in the municipal elections of 1947. Just months after the 1947 elections, and under severe pressure from the Liberals, González Videla forced the Communist Party to resign from government, and in 1948 forced the Communist leadership underground, deprived Communist Party members of the vote, and made the Party illegal through the passing of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia. Historians of the Chilean Communist Party usually cite pressure from the State Department in the United States and the Cold War as reasons behind the so-called Ley Maldita.¹

1. See especially Andrew Barnard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-47', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol.13, part 2, November 1981.

The outlawing of the Communist Party ended definitively the alliance and/or co-operation between the Radical Party and the left which had dominated Chilean politics since 1938, and rendered impossible any chance of its revival in the near future. It also ended the period of moderate social reform and inaugurated instead one of repression of the trade union movement. Meanwhile, the fractionalisation of the Socialist Party on the one hand and the antagonism, confrontation and rivalry between Socialists and Communists which reached a height in 1946 and 1947 on the other, had divided the CUTCH and left it vulnerable to the government's new aggressive policies.¹

The way was not open, however, for the introduction of a stable, long-term alliance between the Radical Party and the Right. Firstly, although both Liberals and Conservatives accepted Cabinet office from González Videla, he could not easily shake off his own or his party's earlier association with Communists and Socialists. Secondly, sectors of the Right were also critical of the expansion of the State bureaucracy which had occurred under the Radical governments which was regarded as wasteful, corrupt, expensive and, perhaps most important, an illegitimate source of maintaining an excess of Radical Party influence in government through patronage. Such were the criticisms by the Right over the Radical Party's proliferation of state organisms that it revealed fundamental disagreement on concepts of political participation and models of social organisation.² Finally, association with González Videla had in any case become a political handicap, since scandals and rumours of

1. See Halperin, op.cit.; Drake, op.cit.; Jorge Barría, Historia de la CUT, Prensa Latino Americana, Santiago, 1971; and Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism, Zed Press, London, 1984.

2. See Larraín, op.cit., for virulently anti-Radical Party diatribes from the extreme Right.

corruption affecting office-holders and the president himself spread throughout Chile. Given the length of time that the Radical Party had been in office, and the degree of its penetration and control of the organs of government, the corruption now associated with the Radical Party began to discredit the very institutions themselves.

Conclusion

Since 1938, the main source of legitimacy for Chile's multi-party system had come from the Radical Party in its role as a reformist, democratic centre party acting as 'broker' to both ends of the political spectrum. This had now come to an end. The resulting decline of the Radical Party brought into question the effectiveness of the party system and indeed democracy itself. This process affected members of the political elite as well as the general public, though in the case of the latter, it was reinforced by their relative marginalisation within the system to account for an important part of the sudden surge of support for the figure of the caudillo from the 1920s, Carlos Ibáñez, who was elected to the Senate in 1950. The fear of military intervention on the part of civilian elites in the period 1949-52 was also indicative of the growing crisis affecting the democratic institutions themselves.

The movement which began to crystallise around the figure of Carlos Ibáñez in 1949-50 was therefore composed of representatives of various political groupings or independent figures (military and civil) disaffected and disenchanted with the operation of liberal democracy in Chile, especially its operation under the Radical Party. It was made up of diverse elements such as the remnants of the fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s, politicised members of the Armed Forces (progressive and reactionary)

Marxist Socialists and personalist followers of 'the General' as Ibáñez was known to his intimates, and its ranks were quickly swelled by non-ideological, opportunistic, charismatic or machine politicians who were interested in preserving or consolidating their own position.

At the same time, these groups began to look at the example of Peronism in neighbouring Argentina. While in Chile, Popular Front style political coalitions had not brought full employment, but had nonetheless increased differentials between the working class and the tertiary sector of the economy, in Argentina just the reverse had occurred under Peron; employment opportunities expanded and wage differentials narrowed. Alejandro Chelén testified to the fact that admiration for Peronism contributed to the Socialists' decision to support Ibáñez: 'The echoes of Argentine Peronism, very much in fashion then, infected the atmosphere'.¹ He goes on to criticise the Agrario Laborista Party (PAL) in particular, however, for not distinguishing sufficiently between Chilean and Argentine reality, and for not criticising the authoritarian methods used by Peronists in pursuance of their objectives.

1. Alejandro Chelén, Trayectoria del Socialismo, Austral, Santiago, 1966, p.128.

CHAPTER I

IBAÑISMO, NACIONALISMO AND THE AGRARIO LABORISTA PARTY

Between 1920 and 1960, Chilean politics was dominated in an unprecedented way by the long-standing personal rivalry between Arturo Alessandri and Carlos Ibáñez, which eventually came to correspond to the thorny question of civil political supremacy or authoritarian military-led reform. Political divisions and disagreements in Chile have tended to be expressed by factionalism and personalism in a generalised way; so, for example, politicians have been variously described as Grovista, Gabrielista, Bossayista, Freista, Allendista, Pinochetista, etc. Further examples of the tendency towards personalism in Chile are: the tradition of a populist presidency, elected and mandated directly by the people, and the tensions which characterised the relations between President and Congress, and even between the President and his own party from 1920 to 1973;¹ the fact that the complex political strategy which the Popular Unity government tried to put into practice has now come to be associated directly with President Allende and may be termed Allendismo; and the regime of General Pinochet, which bears many of the hallmarks of an 'old-fashioned' dictatorship along the lines of Stroessner in Paraguay or Somaza in Nicaragua, indeed rather more than the bureaucratic-authoritarian model of the military regime of the 1970s might suggest.

1. During Ibáñez's second administration, the parties who had supported him in the election campaign complained that he ignored the programme they had drawn up, ignored the wishes of the parties, and even the wishes of his Ministers. In answer to their complaints of Ibáñez's personalism, the journalist Luis Hernandez Parker of Ercilla commented: '...they saw that Ibáñez prefers 'tea in the Moneda'... to meeting the Cabinet. What is happening with Ibáñez is nothing new. Their predecessors had the same problems with all the presidents from Arturo Alessandri, to Gabriel Gonzalez Videla. It is the old fight between the parties and the "personal friends"'. Ercilla, 14/4/1953.

General Ibáñez was the head of independent, anti-party populist coalitions in 1927, 1938 and 1952. Such coalitions may be described simply as personalist or caudillista. Another way to understand the unique features of Ibañismo, however, is within the context of Chilean nationalism, which has been a persistent undercurrent in Chilean politics, attracting a sizeable minority of the political elite, in contrast to the dominant liberal democratic ideology (at least until 1973). The fact that Ibáñez himself can only be described very loosely as a nationalist, and did not implement specifically nationalist as President, does not undermine the interpretation of Ibañismo as a form of nationalism, since Ibañismo as a body of ideas and political strategies to which diverse political sectors were able to express allegiance comprised more than the actions of Ibáñez himself would suggest.¹ Chile's nacionalistas consistently allied themselves with Ibáñez, whom they perceived as sympathetic to their aims and as their best hope for achieving power, due to his unfailing popularity and charisma.²

Ibáñez as President, 1927-1931

The 1920s saw the end of the Parliamentary Republic, and with it the end of the oligarchy's absolute hegemony in politics, as the middle sectors emerged as decisive political actors for the first time. The transition was by no means smooth, however. The passing of Arturo Alessandri's social reform programme was achieved only with the

-
1. During the 1950s, Ibáñez himself was actually accused by some of his supporters of not being Ibañista, particularly in 1956 when, under the state of seige legislation, several Ibañistas were detained and others put under house arrest, including Guillermo Izquierdo and Jorge Prat.
 2. It is important to clarify the rather confusing term nationalism or nacionalismo. I use the term to refer to anti-democratic, anti-marxist populist right-wing movements, which is the sense in which it is employed currently in Chile. Nacionalismo must be distinguished strictly from the economic anti-imperialist nationalism associated with left-wing groups in Chile.

co-operation of a group of army officers, including General Ibáñez, who packed the galleries of Congress, while the bills were under discussion.¹

Once on the centre stage, the Army was in no hurry to leave. Although their participation helped resolve the stalemate between the reformist President, Arturo Alessandri, and the conservative, obstructionist Congress in Alessandri's favour, it also weakened the civil political institutions, and Alessandri resigned soon after the legislation was ratified.

Military intervention in the 1920s took place as a result of the weakness and lack of legitimacy of traditional politics. Bitter divisions over the 'social question' meant that civilian politicians were spending almost all their time and energy locked fruitlessly in internecine quarrels. Ibáñez, who emerged as the 'strong man' of the various civilian/military coalitions in 1925 and 1926, argued that the civilian political elite was disorganised, directionless, divided and institutionally exhausted. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the military at this time came to symbolise reform as well as authoritarianism. Nunn says:

The reform politics of the military, with all its ramifications was called Ibañismo... By 1926, Ibañismo-authoritarianism appeared preferable to Alessandri's (then Figueroa's) democracy. The former seemed to mean action, the latter words and theories.²

-
1. For detailed accounts of the period see the following: F.M. Nunn, 'Military Rule in Chile : The Revolution of September 5th, 1924, and January 23rd, 1925', in Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVII, no. 1 (February 1967) pp.1-21; F. Nunn, Chilean Politics 1920-1931: The Honourable Mission of the Armed Forces, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1970; Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52, University of Illinois Press, London, 1978; and H. Bicheno, 'Anti-parliamentary Themes in Chilean History, 1920-1970', Government and Opposition, VII, 3 (Summer 1972), pp.351-388.
 2. F. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-31, p.112.

By 1926, then, Ibáñez was associated with the demand for technical, anti-party, anti-congressional, 'apolitical' government, albeit with a reformist orientation, which was to characterise his long career in politics.

When the civilian President, Emiliano Figueroa Larraín, resigned in 1927, Ibáñez stepped into the presidency, winning 97% of the votes in a hastily-called election.

Ibáñez's first administration, lasting up until his downfall and flight to Argentina in 1931, has proven difficult to classify. It falls uneasily between formal democracy and dictatorship, between civilian and military rule. The structures of representative democracy - periodic elections, Congress, a labour federation - were maintained, although in practice the executive retained an exclusive hold on power. Although undoubtedly authoritarian and repressive - the regime was marked by the deportation of several opponents, including Conservative leaders Rafael Luis Gumucio and Ladislao Errazuriz, Communist Elias Laferte, Trotskyite Manuel Hidalgo, and Radical Elias Mitchell, the harassment of the Press,¹ interference with the independence of the courts, and the screening of Congress members - Ibáñez was at the same time able to appeal to a remarkably broad section of Chilean society. His supporters included the military, of course, and ranged from some Radicals, including the future President Juan Antonio Ríos, presumably because of Ibáñez's secularism and reformism, some Right-wingers who applauded his anti-communism and authoritarianism, and even some progressive-minded individuals, such as José Santos Salas, who praised his spirit of reform and his sponsorship of industrialisation and public works programmes. Some of the most

1. Ibáñez took control of the newspaper La Nación, which thereafter remained the property of the government of the day. By February 1927, Ibáñez had closed 27 newspapers and journals. Nunn, op.cit., p.124.

fervent support Ibáñez received came from the nascent nacionalistas, the admirers of European fascism, who perhaps became his most durable supporters. They saw Ibáñez as a Chilean Mussolini or Primo de Rivera. In short, Ibáñez, in 1927 as in 1952, could almost be all things to all men. Many commentators emphasize the specific "chilean-ness" of the first Ibáñez regime, which, if it must be classed a dictatorship, was a remarkably mild one in the context of Latin American military dictatorships, and probably no more blood-thirsty or repressive than many 'democratic' regimes of the time.

Between 1927 and 1931, Ibáñez was responsible for a number of important reforms aimed at modernising Chilean society and stimulating economic development. He was helped in this by a short-lived boom in international demand for nitrate, and the United States' policy of 'easy' credit in the mid-late 1920s. The administration spent 2 billion pesos on public works programmes alone, building roads, schools, etc. encouraged the development of national industry by tariff protection policies and government loans, reformed and expanded the bureaucracy, and created COSACH, to control the production of nitrate, in association with foreign capital. The reforms marked the beginning of state participation in the economy, while simultaneously expanding the role of the middle sectors in the political and economic life of Chile.

One of the most interesting aspects of the regime was its attempt to create a government-sponsored labour federation, the Confederación Republicana para Acción Cívica (CRAC). This may be indicative of the influence of corporatist thinking, which was fashionable in Chile in the 1920s, rather than simply a reflection of straightforward paternalism, since the creation and promotion of the CRAC depended upon the repression of communist and anarcho-sindicalist leadership in the labour movement.

The CRAC organised both white-collar and manual workers, and, as the only legal workers' organisation, was a docile substitute for the independent communist-orientated FOCH. Its first objective was 'to lend unreserved cooperation to the programme of national reconstruction on which the present government has embarked'.¹ Ibáñez's carefully chosen Congress - the Congreso Termal - recognised the legal existence of the CRAC, and it was given 19 seats in the Congress, where it supported the government unconditionally.² With the collapse of the administration, the CRAC faded into oblivion.

In the 1920s, Ibáñez attracted the support of those groups - mainly from within the Catholic Church or Catholic intellectuals - who found much to be admired in Mussolini's Italy or integralism in Spain. For these groups, Ibañismo was a modern expression of the Portalian Republic, and symbolised above all a vigorous nationalism.³ An upsurge in nationalism, however, was not only a product of external influence, but, perhaps primarily, the result of the sterility of civilian politics in the face of the prolonged crisis besetting Chile since the end of the First World War. Ibáñez, with his energy, personal honesty and moral approach to politics, came to represent 'the antithesis of corrupt politiquería'.⁴ The

-
1. Quoted in Jorge Barría, El movimiento obrero en Chile, Trígono, Santiago, 1971, p.62.
 2. The independent labour federation created during Ibáñez's second administration in 1953, the CUT, did not receive legal recognition until the Popular Unity period.
 3. Diego Portales was a minister in the 1830s in the government of Joaquín Prieto. His legacy was an emphasis on order, authoritarian rule, a 'strong state', and the predominance of the executive wing of government over the parliamentary. He was not associated with any political party at the time, though the Conservative Party later in the nineteenth century defended the Portalian concept of government. In fact, however, almost every political group in Chile at some time appropriates his name in their defence. As well as authoritarian, Portales appears to have been anti-oligarchical, anti-militaristic and party to state intervention in the economy.
 3. René Montero Mareno, Confesiones Políticas, Editorial Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1959, p.133.

nacionalistas were attracted by his reformist, modernising but anti-communist stance, his desire to develop a specifically Latin American foreign policy, his preoccupation with regionalism,¹ and his distaste for political liberalism, and saw in his supposed corporatism an admiration for European fascism. Nationalist values - honour, hierarchy, law and order, patriotism etc. - have in any case much in common with the military values Ibáñez professed.

Ibáñez may not have openly confessed to an admiration for fascism, but he seems to have done little to disassociate himself from it, either. As a soldier, he may have had a preference for authoritarianism, but if he advocated or displayed anti-liberal and even corporatist tendencies in government, it is because he judged these the most suitable responses to the problems of that moment; he was, above all else, a pragmatic politician. In any case, fascism was broadly and generally admired in the 1920s and early 1930s even by groups who would later repudiate it.² (Paul Drake, for example, traces influences from corporatism in the early years of the Socialist Party.³) Also, the ambiguity of 'corporatism' as an idea is such that it is possible to see it at work even in the anti-fascist Radical Party, because of their espousal of social integration and state control of the economy.

Nonetheless, after the collapse of the regime in 1931 and the return

1. Regional development is and has always been important to Chilean nationalists. This has been one of their main points of contact with Ibáñez, who demonstrated a consistent commitment to the development of the far North and, perhaps particularly, the South. Amongst other initiatives, he encouraged the colonisation of the southern province, Aysén, created the Ministero de La Propriedad Austral, and created the freeport of Arica, on the border with Peru.
2. In 1923, El Mercurio concluded that the only people who said evil things about fascism were communists. Many within the Conservative Party and the Church saw corporatism and fascism as the best way of containing and perhaps crushing communism. See F.B. Pike, Chile and the United States, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1963.
3. Drake, op.cit., pp.71-72.

to civilian government, the nacionalistas adopted and defended Ibañismo wholeheartedly, above all because it implied the rejection of party-based liberal democracy. Ibáñez's chief capital in 1952 was his image as a stern but fair, authoritarian but progressive ruler, an image the nacionalistas had done much to promote throughout the 1930s and 1940s.¹

The MNS and the 1930s : Nacionalismo's 'Finest Hour'

After Ibáñez's flight into exile, Chilean politics entered a period of fragmentation and instability, ending only with the victory of Arturo Alessandri for the second time in September 1932. Alessandri represented the antithesis of the militarism which had dominated politics from 1924-1932. He governed on behalf of the oligarchy, and with the support of the Conservatives and Liberals, who, with the Church-State controversy firmly in the past, found little henceforth to divide them.

Although Ibáñez himself remained in Argentina until May 1937, the rivalry between Alessandri and Ibáñez continued. In the 1930s, the newly formed National Socialist Movement (MNS) defended the legacy of Ibáñez and bitterly opposed Alessandrismo. Alessandri symbolised the evils of an outmoded liberal democratic system in the eyes of the nacionalistas, which was corrupt and reactionary.²

An umbrella organisation with nacionalista overtones was formed to support Ibáñez in the 1938 presidential elections, the Alianza Nacional Libertadora, but nonetheless, Ibañismo became synonomous in this period with anti-democratic conspiracies as Ibáñez and his supporters sought to regain power.

-
1. As an example, see the article 'La Política Económica de Ibáñez' by Carlos Keller, in the Nacista newspaper, Trabajo, 26/7/1938.
 2. The Minister of Finance and 'officialist' presidential candidate in 1938, Gustavo Ross, was especially detested, since he was regarded as Alessandri's 'eminence gris'.

The National Socialist Movement (MNS) founded in April of 1932 was one of several parties formed in the aftermath of the fall of the government of General Ibáñez. The composition of the movement is difficult to be precise about - some members were from the Chilean aristocracy, alarmed by the short-lived Socialist Republic in 1932, but the victory of Arturo Alessandri and the Right in September 1932, to a large extent undermined that trend. Some of the aristocracy retained a degree of sympathy for the Nacistas expressed in the form of donations of money but active participation dwindled before it had really begun. The movement was mainly middle class and upper middle class, predominantly youthful and predominantly male.

The MNS, however, dissociated itself from the more extreme Hitlerist movements which grew up among groups of German immigrants and some Chileans of German descent in the South of Chile during the 1930s. The movement concentrated on Santiago and the central and southern zones, ignoring the north, which was traditionally either Communist or Radical. By 1934, nuclei of the party existed in Santiago, Valparaíso, Viña de Mar, Chillán, Temúco, Linares, San Bernardo and Osorno.

The highest vote ever polled by the MNS was 18,150; the party's newspaper, Trabajo, claimed a membership of 40,000, the majority of them members of the Nazi Assault Troops (TNA) formed in 1933.¹

The MNS engaged in both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities. By 1937, 3 Nacista deputies had been elected to the lower house, representing Santiago, Valparaíso and Temúco. It also participated in student elections between 1934 and 1936. Beyond a doubt,

1. Trabajo, 19/3/1937.

however, the movement's main impact was on the streets, where violence was one of its hallmarks. Many of the young Nacistas were attracted less by the ideology of the party and more by its cult of violent confrontation¹ with Socialists and Communists, even though there were deaths on both sides. Brutality as a tactic was more than justified, they argued; and it was actively encouraged and glorified by the MNS and subsequent nationalist groups. In La Verdadera Revolución, Gonzalez von Marees wrote - 'Violence is necessary, indispensable and dignifying'.²

In many ways, the MNS simply copied the German Nazi Party (NSDAP), particularly so regarding the 'style' of the movement. There was the same emphasis on achievement through violence, the same mobilisation of the young, the use of salutes, flags and uniforms. The MNS also copied the party organisation of the NSDAP. Internally, the party structure was authoritarian and hierarchical. The para-military wing of the MNS, the assault troops (TNA), was a reproduction of the Nazi storm troopers in Germany. At least 3 of the founding members of the movement had close ties with Germany - the leader, Gonzalez von Marees; Carlos Keller, educated in Germany and General (retired) Francisco Javier Diaz who had trained there. This admiration for Nazi Germany rather than fascist Italy is not surprising, because Chilean intellectuals had traditionally been sympathetic to Germany even since the military mission of Emil Körner at the end of the nineteenth century had begun training the Chilean Army.

Although the Nacistas officially endorsed the concept of 'the third

1. Confirmed by Oscar Jimenez Pinochet, the leader of the TNA at this time in an interview with the author. Juan Linz, 'A Comparative Study of Fascism' in W. Laquer (ed) Fascism, a Reader's Guide Penguin, Middlesex, 1976, p.25, recognizes 'the appeal of fascism was not only in its ideology but in its style, and the new form of political action it developed'. This 'new form' was often violent.
2. Gonzalez von Marées, J., La Verdadera Revolución, radio speech in Santiago, 1936.

position' in politics, equidistant from the right and the left, they systematically chose to attack the Socialist and the Communist parties. On the other hand, in spite of the party's much vaunted anti-oligarchical and anti-capitalist positions, the MNS were prepared to make alliances and enter coalitions with the Right-wing. El Nacionalista, the newspaper of a second nationalist movement, the Movimiento Nacionalista Chileno, similarly Ibañista, militaristic, and Hispanic but with less electoral appeal, consistently advocated a broad anti-communist front, or failing that, a united right-wing offensive against the Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, (1938-1941).¹ In 1941, El Nacionalista proposed making the Communist Party illegal. The Liberal and Conservative Parties ignored these overtures, however.

The Ideology of the MNS

According to its leader, Gonzalez von Marées, Judaism, the Masonry and Communism together made up the anti-patria, because they were movements/organisations with an international character.

In response, the MNS advocated the 'nationalisation' of Chile. This meant the "extirpation" of those 'international' elements. In other words, racial and cultural purity was at the heart of Chilean nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s. The main targets of the anti-patria propaganda however, were the Communists, presumably because the Jewish community was so insignificant,² and the Masonry was a traditional

-
1. The MNS disintegrated after its disastrous and unsuccessful uprising against the government of Arturo Alessandri in 1938. During the Second World War, especially during the first years, several small nationalist movements appeared, though without any electoral appeal whatsoever. The Movimiento Nacionalista Chileno was the most important, since its leader, General Ariosto Herrera, was responsible for an attempted coup against President Aguirre Cerda in 1939.
 2. M. Potashnik, National Socialism in Chile, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis), estimates that the pre-1945 Jewish population in Chile was less than 5%.

institution of the middle class. The Communists then, were identified systematically as the chief danger to Chile. Nonetheless, the Nacistas engaged in vituperative attacks on both Jews and the Masons, trying to establish a link between them and Communism. For example, El Imparcial spoke of 'the Chilean economy [being] in the hands of international Judaism and those other speculators in hunger and misery, mercenaries at the mercy of the Soviet hordes'.¹ On other occasions, Jews were perceived as part of 'the international capitalist system' - when the Nacistas wanted to emphasize their own anti-capitalism. The Guggenheims, an American Jewish family of German extraction with important interests in Chilean nitrate fields, were a favourite target and frequently pictured as 'strangling' the Chilean economy through their control of the nitrate industry. In this way, opposition to imperialism was used in part to justify anti-semitic sentiments.

As in Germany, anti-semitism was allied to theories of racial supremacy and the promotion of a meritocracy, a 'government by the best'. The MNS explicitly proposed a type of 'aristocratic' state, which they defined as 'government by the best'.² Nacionalista Ariosto Herrera, who had led the attempt to overthrow the government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, remarked:

Intelligence is not the privilege of everybody.
We must each reconcile ourselves to what Nature
has given us.³

Anti-semitism was not purely a nacista import, however. Frederick Pike argues that it would have in no way offended the Right-wing or the

1. El Imparcial, 6/8/1932. El Imparcial was sympathetic to the MNS.
2. J. Gonzalez von Marées, El Concepto Nacista del Estado, La Tracción, Santiago, 1932, p.15.
3. Ariosto Herrera, Speech Before leaving for exile, Santiago, 1940.

aristocracy, some of whom had long harboured anti-semitic sympathies, introduced into Chile from Europe at an earlier date.¹ As early as 1904, Nicolás Palacios had published Raza Chilena: Un libro escrito por un chileno para los chilenos, celebrating the manliness and stern sense of morality of the Chileans over other races, be they Jews, Gypsies, Negroes and over Socialists or Communists whom he regarded as proponents of ideologies "foreign" to Chile. Francisco Encina, one of the most famous of Chilean historians, also opposed uncontrolled immigration to Chile, and, significantly, in Nuestra Inferioridad Economica, links a racially mixed society with a backward economy.²

Chilean fascism was thus an ideological fusion of European Nazism/Fascism and indigenous thought. The influence of German thinkers on Chilean intellectuals is clearly illustrated in the works of leading MNS theorist, Carlos Keller. He was acquainted and corresponded with Oswald Spengler, and wrote an article explaining Spengler's supposed relevance to Latin America.³ Nietzsche's writings provided another of the German influences. The leaders of the MNS themselves were in no doubt that the movement was an imitation. As late as 1982 one of the prominent Nacistas of the 1930s rejected categorically the idea that the young men of the TNA were 'misguided innocents' as has been suggested; 'they were not madmen, but rather idealists and doctrinally national-socialists.' I am able to confirm this because I collaborated in the newspaper Trabajo (I am proud to say I still keep my identity-card) where the ideology was the same as the German Nazis and the Italian fascists'.⁴ It was also recognized at

1. F.B. Pike, op.cit., pp.343-4.

2. See Potashnik's thesis for a discussion of the influence of Palacios and Encina on the MNS.

3. C. Keller, Spengler y la situación Politico - Cultural de America - Iberica, La Tracción, Santiago, 1927.

4. Letter from Miguel Serrano to Enrique Zorilla, 5th September, 1982, kindly given to me by Zorilla who claimed that Serrano was one of the more extreme in the movement.

the time:

We Nacistas are not trying to be original...
The fascist ideology is in our judgement,
universal and applicable to every country sharing
our culture. It is not the simple desire to
imitate which had spread it across the entire
world, even into liberal and traditional England.¹

Like fascist movements in Europe, the MNS tended to present the depression and crisis of the 1930s in moral rather than in economic terms. The answer to the 'social question' was to be 'moral regeneration'; Gonzalez von Marées shared with the Right-wing of the time the belief that the problems besetting the working class could be attributed to their ungodliness and their tendency to drink. The triumph of liberal democracy, which Nazi propaganda described as a 'corpse' and 'the exaltation of mediocrity',² over the authoritarian Portalian state of the mid-nineteenth century, was identified as the principal cause of national decline.

In sum, the fascist ideology appealed to the kind of nationalism already current in some intellectual circles from the beginning of the twentieth century. The ideology was cleverly adapted to the Chilean situation; the concept of the anti-patria, the invasion of the homeland by foreigners, became an assertion of chilenidad, a revaluation of the catholic, Hispanic hierarchical inheritance. The MNS made skilful use of the Portalian myth and associated the prosperity and stability of the nineteenth century with the Portalian legacy. The party appealed to the anti-liberal tendencies - economic and political - already existent in Chile.

Nonetheless the MNS was only ever a party of limited popular appeal.

1. El Imparcial 11/11/1932.

2. J. Gonzalez, *op.cit.*, p.13.

In contrast, by 1937, the other newcomer of the 1930s, the Socialist Party, elected 19 deputies with 11.2% of the vote.¹ In 1983, the MNS tried to preempt the elections by a coup, because their candidate, General Ibáñez, had so little possibility of success. The plot originally involved sectors of the Armed Forces, as well as the MNS, but support from the military failed to materialize. Although the coup would have placed Ibáñez in power had it succeeded, the exact degree of his complicity is not known. He denied energetically any involvement with the attempt, which ended with the infamous 'massacre' of young nacistas in the Seguro Obrero building in the centre of Santiago. Many of the conspirators, however, assert exactly the opposite.²

Intellectuals and Nacionalismo : The Influence of Estanquero

During and after the Second World War, nationalism declined as a political force for two reasons: firstly, the emergence of a reformist democratic alternative in the shape of the Popular Front (a coalition of Radicals, Socialists and Communists). The Popular Front indicated that fundamental changes were possible democratically in Chilean society, and its impact on the Left was enormous and lasting. Secondly, the defeat of Germany discredited the pro-Axis fascist groups in Chile.

-
1. G. Urzúa, Los Partidos Politicos Chilenos, Editorial Juridica de Chile, Santiago, 1968, p.81.
 2. In an interview with Luis Correa Prieto, Ibáñez said: 'The lack of control of my most enthusiastic supporters, acting on their own initiative and without consulting me, has often injured my political career... This is what happened on the fifth of September, 1938... I did not have the slightest involvement in this incident'. Luis Correa Prieto, El Presidente Ibáñez, Editorial Orbe, Santiago 1962. On the other hand, Nacista Pedro Foncea claimed that Ibáñez actually betrayed the plot (Interview, November 1983). Oscar Jiménez, an 'inveterate conspirator', in his own words, in the 1930s and 1940s, said that he conspired with Ibáñez in the Patitas de Chanco conspiracy in 1949. (Interview, November 1983); obviously, it is difficult now to know the exact truth.

By 1945, nationalism was reduced to a fringe movement and there was little space in the political system for an authoritarian nationalist alternative. The majority of ex-Nacistas decided to play the democratic game as well and joined the Agrario Party which was renamed the Agrario Laborista Party.¹ An important sector of the party was already both corporatist and Ibañista and the Agrario Laborista Party was perceived at the time as having inherited the fascist mantle. An independent left-wing newspaper of the time, Las Noticias Graficas, claimed: 'With the entrance of the Nacionalistas...the Agrario Laborista Party became a fascist party completely, having already embraced Mussolini-style corporatism'.²

The Agrarians emphasized the need for a moral regeneration of society as did the old nationalist groups; defended authoritarian regimes abroad; attacked political pluralism; and called for 'strong government' at home. The admiration felt towards Germany and Hitler had been replaced in large measure by admiration for Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal. Nonetheless the Agrario Laborista Party was not exactly a direct descendent of the old National Socialist Movement. The party's political direction was determined fundamentally by the small and medium landowners from the Southern region,³ who perceived their interests as under-represented in the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties, but who nonetheless identified those interests as broadly similar. This was especially so in the 1940s when the party was under the leadership of

-
1. The Agrario Party had been formed in 1931, and was composed mainly of ex-Liberal and ex-Radical landowners from the Southern regions - much the same area sympathetic to the MNS.
 2. Los Noticias Gráficas 24/1/1945.
 3. Regionalism has always been important politically in Chile; traditionally the Conservative Party represented the latifundistas of the Central Valley, the Liberal Party represented the industrial bourgeoisie based in Santiago, and the Radical Party's strength lay in the mining areas of the North.

Jaime Larraín, who had been strongly associated with the industrial bourgeoisie and the industrial entrepreneurs' association, the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio. With Larraín's tendency in the ascendancy, the Agrarians endorsed Fernando Alessandri (Liberal) as Presidential candidate.

The main contact the Agrario Laboristas had with neo-fascist ideas was through the informal relationship which developed between the party and Jorge Prat's magazine Estanquero for which several important party members wrote (sometimes using pseudonyms).

During the war, fascist and integralist ideas had been kept alive in Chile principally by intellectual and university groups such as that gathered around historian Jaime Eyzaguirre, and the magazine Estudios. Eyzaguirre argued strongly in favour of Chilean neutrality during the war,¹ and claimed Chile had little in common with the Western democracies. The magazine supported the idea of a Chilean-Argentine unity, since these two countries supposedly best represented Hispanic 'non-Indian' America.²

By far the most influential, however, was Estanquero. Estanquero had inherited many of the neo-fascist characteristics of the earlier period; this and the Cold War climate pervading Chile in the late 1940s helped define the magazine/group as profoundly anti-marxist and anti-communist. While Estanquero denied the validity of the concept of class struggle, it offered instead a corporatist vision of society which owed

1. The issue of what Chile's position should be during the Second World War gave rise to heated discussion. It would be too simplistic to argue that only fascist sympathisers supported the idea of neutrality, since there was also resentment within Chile against U.S. interference in deciding Chilean foreign policy. Also her geographical position made her potentially vulnerable to attack from Japan.
2. Estudios along with most nacionalistas perpetrated the myth that the Chilean population is overwhelmingly of European descent; the truth is that it is mestizo, i.e. a mixture of European with the indigenous population.

as much to the influence of integralism as to Italian fascism. By 'corporatism', the Estanqueristas, and the MNS before them, meant a strong centralised state in which political parties would be replaced by interest and professional groups and controlled trade unions. They also advocated corporatism in a more left-wing sense, that is, they opposed free enterprise capitalism, and called upon the state to defend the nation's wealth from foreign capital, which had come to dominate the Chilean economy, according to Estanquero, principally because the Chilean middle class lacked the spirit of entrepreneurial capitalism. They, therefore, favoured a so-called 'third way' between capitalism and what they saw as anarchic and irresponsible communism.

Corporatism, as we have seen, was in no sense a 'new' doctrine in Chile. It was part of the assumption that Chile, as an Hispanic catholic nation, should look to Spain or Italy or Portugal for political models rather than copy the democratic structures of protestant England. Estanquero went so far as to equate chilenidad (literally 'Chilean-ness') with catholicism, and to link the spread of anti-catholic doctrines (communism and the protestant religions which supposedly encouraged the development of capitalism) with United States penetration in the Chilean economy.¹ Nor were the nacionalistas the first or only supporters of corporatism - sectors of the Catholic Church also flirted with the idea, as did the youth section of the Conservative Party, later the Falange Nacional. These sectors were increasingly concerned with the 'social question' which the Papal Encyclical Quadrogessino Anno had addressed. As corporatism combines social control with integration and mobilisation, it appealed not only to conservative groups, but to some reformist ones as well. It is important to note, though, that since the Second World

1. Estanquero 5/3/1952.

War, only the nacionalistas had supported the idea. As a first step towards corporatism, Jorge Prat proposed modifying the constitution to strengthen the powers of the President vis-à-vis Congress, reviving the authoritarian presidentialism which Ibáñez had championed.

Like the MNS, Estanquero encouraged and utilised the veneration of the 'Portalian' state, the national flag, patriotic symbols and anniversaries (Independence Day, etc.) to create an emotional, irrational and intolerant style and tone. To an important extent, style and rhetoric triumphed over substance in Pratist ideology, and these were emotional, violent, conflictive and demagogic. As happened during the Popular Unity government, and continues to happen today, the nacionalistas of Estanquero claimed the symbols of the patria for themselves, argued that patriotism was the opposite of 'international' communism, and thus managed to imply that Chilean marxists or communists were not Chilean at all. Prat argued that the purpose of Estanquero was:

to show the actions of the Communists in Chile for what they are, to show how they loot union funds to pay for their newspapers and propaganda, and the wages of their agitators; to proclaim how the Communists control the consciences of the workers by totalitarianism and terror. We will support everything which opposes and fights against communism. We will revive the religion of the fatherland, the mystique of the fatherland...which have been put to sleep by subtle, communist internationalist propaganda.¹

Estanquero also retained the racism and anti-semitism of the pre-war fascist movements. The revelations of the Holocaust in Europe did not deter the magazine at all:

The Jewish problem does not exist. The Jew as a problem exists, which is very different.

A little of history...the Jew did not love the land that fed him: he loved his race...the [Jewish] race

1. Estanquero, quoted in Campos Menendez (ed), Pensamiento Nacionalista, Editorial Gabriela Mistral, Santiago, 1975.

and money were his gods... The anti-semitic purge of Hitler may not perhaps have justification, but it does have an explanation. The Jew in Germany, without loving the country, came to dominate it.¹

Profoundly anti-Indian, and ignoring the fact that Chile is overwhelmingly mestizo, Estanquero claimed the Chilean 'race' was Western and European, specifically Hispanic.

Estanquero made its most original contribution to nationalist thought in the economic sphere, by articulating more clearly than before a nationalist programme for economic development. Its general strategy was threefold:

1. Chilean control over national resources, especially copper.

Estanquero claimed: "We will only achieve our economic independence when the control and the ties of North Americans over our international commerce disappear, and especially when Chilean copper and nitrates can arrive safely in our own ships to world markets, especially to Europe and to other parts of South America. We should nationalise the copper and nitrate industries in order to obtain this".² Prat described the Chilean bourgeoisie as more 'Yankee' than Chilean.³

2. An anti-inflationary programme comprising reduced public expenditure and a reduced bureaucracy, and stabilisation of wages and salaries. The programme advocated neither agrarian reform nor major tax reforms.

3. The simultaneous introduction of a period of 'social peace', which would include limitations on the right to dissent, press restrictions etc. The introduction of a form of corporatism would be crucial here, to fix wages independent of both management and unions, and to coerce the

1. Estanquero 12/1/1952, p.1.

2. Estanquero 12/1/1952, pp.21-2. The only other advocates of nationalisation at this time were the Communists and the Socialists.

3. Estanquero 14/3/1953, p.1.

the trade union movement into accepting the suppression of the right to strike.

The programme's appeal was based on the fact that no democratic government had been able to produce sustained growth. The economic growth of the 1938-47 period was accompanied by inflation, which became an increasing pre-occupation of the Right and the entrepreneurial groups.

The Persistence of Nacionalismo

Chilean political culture has been predominantly pluralist and democratic, yet anti-democratic nationalist ideas influenced by European fascism, took root and survived there, even after 1945 when fascism was discredited in Europe. The persistence of neo-fascist nationalism may in fact be linked to some of the reasons for its original take-off.

Nacionalismo in Chile emerged out of the political and economic crises of the early 1930s as a protest movement, mainly of the Right-wing though with reformist overtones. Since democracy was failing to guarantee even minimally decent living standards for a large section of the population, it was consequently failing to control the spread of left-wing ideologies or to provide 'social peace'. Significantly, two of the rising periods of nacionalismo correspond to periods of rapid popular mobilisation (the 1930s leading to the victory of the Popular Front and the early 1970s during the Popular Unity government).

Paradoxically in fact, some of the criticisms made by the nacionalistas of the operation of liberal-democracy in Chile were shared by others, notably socialists and communists, intellectuals and even part of the Catholic Church. Chilean democracy was based on a profoundly unequal distribution of social, economic and political power, and the traditional dominant sectors - the oligarchy and upper-middle sectors -

had proved themselves 'democratic' in the most limiting of senses, up to the time of the Popular Front and beyond. The suffrage was limited by literacy qualifications, and electoral procedures were notoriously corrupt. The MNS had been careful to combine indictments of democracy with populist demands for 'social justice',¹ and Estanquero called for extensive legislation in the fields of health, housing and mother and child benefits.

The combination of the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe, and the emergence of the Radical-Socialist-Communist alliance in the shape of the Popular Front, robbed the nacionalistas of any vestiges of electoral legitimacy during the 1940s. However, fascism as a system of ideas was never as completely discredited in Latin America as in Europe, in part because of the physical distance from Europe. At the same time, the nacionalistas began to emphasize their 'natural' racial and religious affinity with the authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal, and at this time in Argentina, rather than any identification with Germany or Italy. Estanquero was careful to place itself within the Chilean nationalist tradition, represented intellectually by Palacios, Encina and Edwards, and politically by Portales and Balmaceda and the Liberal-Democratic Party. When Carlos Ibáñez, dictator-President between 1927-1931, seemed certain to win the 1952 Presidential elections, the nacionalistas offered their support and expertise.

Ibañismo as Anti-Radicalism : The Second Administration and the Agrario Laborista Party

Ibáñez's alleged involvement in nationalist conspiracies to over-

1. For the Nacistas understanding of the term 'social justice' see El Imparcial, 6/8/1932. 'Social justice is for us synonymous with the union and harmony of the classes, of the renouncing of individual rights in favour of common ones, of recognising the right and duty of the intellectuals and morally most capable to rise and be important in life (my italics). It was not always made quite as clear as this.

throw democracy and close Congress did not damage his political standing. He emerged as a presidential candidate in 1942, supported by the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the nacionalistas - now reduced to an unimportant handful - losing only narrowly to Juan Antonio Rios. In 1949, he was elected senator for Santiago under the colours of the opposition block, the FRAS.¹

In 1952, Ibañez benefited from the disintegration and loss of prestige of traditional politics, which was taking place at the end of the Gonzalez Videla administration, in what was a similar scenario to the breakdown of democracy in 1924-1927. However, this process was by no means as profound between 1948-1952 as in the earlier period, and Ibañismo now came to symbolise a purification of democracy rather than its wholesale rejection. As such, Ibañismo must be understood in this period as opposition to the Radical Party more than anything else. Ibañez himself said during the campaign, 'my candidature represents a violent antithesis, and a complete and utter contrast to what the present regime stands for'.² For Ibañez and the Ibañistas - the Estanqueristas, the Agrario-Laboristas, and even the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) - anti-Radicalism was much more than an effective campaign device, and expressed rather the essence of their hopes for the style and tone of the new administration. Moreover, as far as the nacionalistas were concerned, while theoretically the rationale of nacionalismo, as of fascism, may be anti-communism, in practice this has always tended to become anti-liberalism, and in Chile anti-liberalism in fact means anti-Radicalism because the Radicals represented and dominated the liberal tradition. The Radical party itself understood only too well the challenge Ibañismo

1. See pp 77-8 for details of the formation of the FRAS.

2. Quoted in R. Montero Moreno, op.cit., p.126.

represented to their dominance of politics, and it was for this reason that the party offered the most tenacious opposition to the regime.

The characteristics of Ibañismo in this period are perhaps best revealed in a discussion of the Agrario Laborista Party (PAL), the movement which most closely identified with Ibáñez. In spite of the fact that the PAL was the largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies between 1953 and 1957, and was the axial party of government in the second Ibáñez administration, very few studies indeed of the party have been published.¹

The electoral fortunes of the PAL were bound up totally with the rise and fall of Ibañismo. Like Ibañismo itself, the PAL was a fusion of heterogeneous, and at times even contradictory elements, united by nebulous nationalist sentiment. Although Ibañista, the party's relations with the President were marked by tensions and disagreements, partly because Ibáñez distanced himself from all political parties, including those who had supported him (and continued to do so in Congress), and, because Ibáñez, as President, looked to non-Ibañista parties and independents for support. As a result, the national directive of the PAL

1. The few studies that do exist tend to be journalistic or semi-journalistic accounts, such as El Irracionalismo Político en Chile by Alfonso Stephens Freire, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1957. See also, Robert Abbot, 'The Role of Contemporary Political Parties in Chile', American Political Science Review, XLV No. 2, June 1951. The following account relies on interviews with members of the PAL (Sergio Recabarren, Javier Lira, Pedro Foncea, Oscar Jiménez, Rafael Tarud Guillermo Izquierdo and Alejandro Hales), on pamphlets, documents and party circulars (for example various copies of the Bulletin 'Sintesis'); Declaraciones de Principios, 1947 and 1950; 'Sergio Recabarren, Por Una Posición Renovadora Política del Agrario Laborismo, Nueva Acción Política, Santiago, 1951; Sergio Recabarren, Los Gremios en Lucha con los Partidos? Nueva Acción Política, Santiago, 1950; on speeches of the parliamentary members of the party, especially Guillermo Izquierdo, and the private documents, letters etc. kindly given to me by members of the party, especially Guillermo Izquierdo and Alejandro Hales.

severely criticised the President 'personalist' system of government, which some of the ideologues of the party regarded as a betrayal of the 'presidential-Portalian' system of government, associated with Ibañismo. Guillermo Izquierdo argued:

For Ibañez, a presidential system of government signifies opposition to political parties. For Señor Ibañez, therefore, this means that it is not possible to work in conjunction with them. Señor Ibañez conceives the presidential system as the manifestation of the will of the president, which need never give way to the desires or aspirations of a party tied to the regime... the Chief of State ... does not admit the right of political parties - I don't say to intervene - but even to express their most minimal preferences.¹

Like Ibañismo, the PAL can be described as the antithesis ideologically and organisationally of the Radical party. Of all the political parties in Chile, it is the Radical party which has been most systematically identified with the liberal democratic regime, which is of course founded on pluralist parliamentary representation. When Ibañez proposed in 1954 reforming the 1925 constitution to increase the power of the presidency, Julio Durán of the Radical party countered with the suggestion that reform of the political system was certainly needed - to establish a full parliamentary system of government. The passing of Ley Maldita thus came to be seen as a betrayal of the traditions and values of the Radical Party itself. The Radicals were also very proud of their system of internal democracy (asambleísmo), a model despised and rejected by the nacionalistas and Ibañistas.²

-
1. PAL Congress in 1954 and 1955. This speech was given to me personally by Guillermo Izquierdo who does not remember the exact date when he delivered them. There is no official record.
 2. Guillermo Izquierdo wrote: 'if there is anything that prevents dynamic action in political parties it is the excess of asambleísmo'. (private letter of Izquierdo to Guillermo Muñoz, Regional Secretary of the PAL in Antofagasta, 4/1/1956).

The PAL, on the other hand, had entered into political life with the object of giving representation to the non-latifundista farmers from the south of Chile. The party rejected liberalism and officially adopted the doctrine of 'functional democracy', corporatism by another name. The PAL argued that the liberal state was outmoded and that 'the contemporary state is an economic state without an economic constitution'.¹ Functional democracy was aimed at giving Chile that 'economic' constitution. Javier Lira, ex-nacista and PAL deputy, explained the doctrine as follows:

Functional democracy aspires to overcome, by evolution and the rule of law, our present institutional organisation and our very democracy. Above all else, our party...recognises that the individual has certain duties to the community and the state, and also has inalienable rights that enable him to function among equals. Our present society does not recognise sufficiently the rights that the function, the creative activity, the services that the individual gives to society, bestows on the citizen the right to participate directly in the conduct of the state, through his function, and in the direction of the economy.²

The PAL went to great lengths to demonstrate that, though the party doctrine was corporatist, it was not necessarily 'fascist'. Izquierdo argued - a little unconvincingly, it must be said - that 'corporatism... or functionalism is not necessarily either fascist or nazi'. He explained: 'National socialism and fascism were of course corporatist... but that is not enough evidence from which to say that anybody who proclaims those ideas are necessarily fascist, nazi or totalitarian'.³ The Radicals were certainly unconvinced by Izquierdo's arguments: he was

1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 10A, 9/11/1954 (Guillermo Izquierdo).
2. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 20A, 5/7/1955.
3. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 10A, 7/7/1953.

described by Radical Senator Raul Rettig as 'the best theoretician of fascism'.¹ Rettig said, 'we Radicals find the philosophic inspiration (of the PAL) fascist, their intentions fascist, and their language fascist'.² Rettig went on to claim, 'the position that the Honourable Senator Izquierdo espouses is the diametrical opposition to our position as Radicals'.³ The Radicals were quick to point out that while corporatism had interested a broad political spectrum in the 1920s, after 1945, when it had been thoroughly discredited in Europe, it was only associated with extreme right-wingers.

The entrance of the nacionalistas in 1945 strengthened significantly the wing of the old Agrario party which had always been corporatist. In 1942, three of the Agrario corporatists, Alejandro Hales, Eduardo Necochea, and Manuel Bart had produced an internal propaganda document advocating the adoption of corporatist structures, the 21-page Hacia el perfeccionamiento de una nueva democracia. : Ideas y programas para una concepción y organización corporativa de la sociedad. In 1945 Alejandro Hales published El Corporativismo, in which he argued:

We must bury the idea of social division and the class struggle... if we must classify, we could perhaps accept the classification Parasites and Workers.⁴

Hales evinced a strong admiration for the Salazar regime in Portugal, which, he argued, 'was not a dictatorship because it has nothing of absolutism; it is rather a regime of authority. It is a constitutional

1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 10A, 9/11/1954.
2. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 10A, 7/7/1953.
3. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 10A, 7/7/1953.
4. Alejandro Hales Jamarne, El Corporativismo: en el Pasado y en el Presente, Editorial San Francisco Padre de Las Casas, Santiago, 1945, p.161.

regime, because we should not think that a constitution need necessarily be liberal or parliamentary'.¹

Hales also traced the development of corporatist ideas in Chile, arguing that corporatism was not completely alien to her political system. He cited as examples Liberal Augustin Edwards MacClure, who argued that liberalism and corporatism were in fact complimentary; the corporatist overtones of the Socialist Republic; the proposals of a Radical parliamentarian in the 1930s that 'corporative associations' be formed to confront the economic crisis; and Eduardo Frei, leader of the Falange, who described corporatism as the 'third road'.²

As a first step towards the introduction of corporatism, the PAL tried to implement a corporatist model of internal organisation in 1953. This included the creation of a functional 'chamber', made up of representatives from mining, the professions, agriculture etc. the role of which was to produce 'technical' studies of national problems for the party to use to recommend solutions to the government. The confusion was such, however, within the government as well as within the PAL, that it is hardly surprising that little came of the idea. Also, although the party retained some representation by function at its congresses, the parliamentarians and the professional politicians retained the real influence inside the party.

Paul Drake, who has studied the influence of corporatism in Chilean politics, made the following comments on the corporatism of the Agrario party:

The party saw itself as the nucleus of an agricultural gremio the first step towards a 'National Corporative Front' of technocratic

1. *ibid*, p.110.

2. *ibid*, pp.131-160.

experts to take policy-making out of the hands of parties and the central state ... the Agrarians wanted to return to the 'corporate system' because "the gremios and powerful gremial corporations of the Middle Ages provided security, peace and well-being".¹

Once the nacionalistas entered the Agrario party, forming the PAL, the Agrarian corporatists combined with the 'fascist' corporatists to create an influential faction in a party not otherwise noted for its doctrinal clarity. They were able to exercise a significant influence particularly in the period leading up to, and during, the presidential election campaign of 1952.

The PAL's categorical rejection of European liberal ideology was an important point of contact with the Socialistas Populares.² Just as the PSP and the PAL looked to Ibáñez to provide a uniquely 'Latin American' solution to Chile's economic and political crisis, so they both rejected the rationalism and liberalism which is the heritage of the French Revolution. Guillermo Izquierdo once again:

We do not defend the concepts of liberty and equality as the democratic parties, who are still fundamentally inspired by the principles of the bourgeois revolution of 1789, understand these terms. We do not understand the concept of liberty in relation to selfish individual rights... To cultivate freedom as an end in itself is a mistake which will lead us to the edges of libertinaje. Neither do we understand the concept of freedom in relation to economic liberalism, which may be freedom for big businessmen... but not for the rest of society.³

The Radical party, on the other hand, understood as the heart of its philosophy the ideals of the French Revolution, and its relationship

-
1. Paul W. Drake, 'Corporatism and Functionalism in Modern Chilean Politics', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.83-116, p.97.
 2. See pp 93-6 for details of the PSP's anti-liberalism.
 3. PAL Congress 1954 or 1955 (see n1, p.63).

and identification with the French Radical party was extraordinarily close. The Radicals had used their influence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to take the first steps on the road to a separation of Church and State (the most sensitive issue in French politics also at this time), and to expand the education system, modelling it on the French system. Although the Radicals had long dropped *laissez-faire* in favour of state participation in the economy, the party still strongly identified with secularism, defence of public liberties, democratic representation, and middle-class government, all of which the French Revolution symbolised.

Furthermore, while the PAL claimed to represent los hombres de trabajo (by which it understood manual and intellectual 'workers') it rejected any division of society along class lines, tracing the origins of class conflict to the evolution of the liberal state. The Radicals, on the other hand, while always paying homage to liberalism, had evolved from paternalism to a recognition of the validity of the idea of class struggle, and a doctrine which might be termed social-democratic.

Another reason for the bitterness between the Radicals and the Agrario Laboristas may have been due to the fact that the PAL sought to replace the Radical party as the main centre party in Chile and therefore competed with the Radicals for the votes of the middle sectors. (Just as up to 60% of the Radical voters deserted to Ibáñez in 1952, so the Radicals were able to regain their pre-eminent position in Congress in 1957 as a result of the collapse of Ibañismo.) Although many of Ibáñez's 1952 electorate became Alessandri voters in 1958 in what was another 'personalist' victory, most of the leadership ended up in or near the Christian Democratic party, which in the long term did displace the

Radicals as the largest centre party.¹ One of the corporatists of the PAL, Alejandro Hales, predicted as early as 1957 that the Falange (the precursor of the Christian Democratic party) 'would take over our position and our electorate', though at the time he thought that an Agrarian party could still play a role in Chilean politics as a 'secular' centre party.²

The fortune of the PAL declined in direct proportion to, and as a result of the decline in the popularity of the government. There were however, contributing factors: firstly, the party's lack of ideological clarity, and related to this, its lack of internal discipline. By 1956, the party was riven with internal disputes to such an extent that the vice-president of the party, deputy David Lebón, said:

The saddest thing is that this party, which has grown up around the ideas of hierarchy and order, has been the first in not respecting the internal hierarchy of the party. We do not have even a basic sense of party discipline.³

By the beginning of 1957, some PAL parliamentarians were trying to reach an electoral agreement with the Liberals and the Conservatives, while others were actually inscribed in the FRAP list for the forthcoming

1. Of course not all PAL leaders became Christian Democrats. Some left politics altogether (for example Guillermo Izquierdo), some moved to the Right (for example Julio von Mühlenbrock) and some to the Left (e.g. Rafael Tarud). Although I would describe the overall ideological constellation of the PAL as 'centrist' or perhaps centre-right, it really does resist classification. Donald Bray, Chilean Politics During the Second Ibáñez Government, 1952-1958 (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1961), describes the PAL as 'ridden with factions, which included fascists, Chilean Nazis, Marxists and Trotskyists' (p.34), and the journalist Luis Hernandez Parker, writing in Ercilla, described the party as 'essentially rightist', owing to its origins in the southern Agrario party (Ercilla, 25/6/1956:..
2. Letter from Alejandro Hales to Javier Lira, 3/7/1957. Alejandro Hales blamed the Christian Democratic Party for the fact that attempts to revive an Agrarian party in the early 1960s failed. (Interview, September 1953).
3. Vea 4/1/1956.

Congressional elections.¹ Javier Lira of the PAL recognised that the party was little more than a group of friends, in fact, 'with very little consistency or solidarity'.²

Secondly, according to Ercilla journalist, Hernández Parker, the leadership of the PAL was corrupted by the power it exercised in government:

The party militants were able to give up riding a bicycle for the latest model station-wagon, and to move from their modest little houses to a bungalow in the barrio alto. The PAL had its fill of ambassadorships, ministries, and more than enough subsecretaries, vice-presidents, executives, advisors, directors, and parliamentarians.³

Alejandro Hales reached a similar conclusion, suggesting that the decline of the party was due to the fact that many 'opportunists' were able to join the party and gain positions of preeminence during the government, displacing to an extent the 'old-guard' leadership.⁴

Conclusion

Several attempts were made to revive an agrarian party in the period 1958-1963, which included the formation of the Partido Nacional Popular in 1959, and the Democracia Agrario Laborista in 1963-1964, but without any electoral success whatsoever.⁵ Furthermore, revivals of agrario laborismo were associated with nacionalismo, as the PAL itself had been, and nacionalismo was to have no further significant success until the

1. For details, see Vea 31/1/1957.
2. Interview, May 1983.
3. Ercilla 25/6/1956.
4. See the intervention by Alejandro Hales in the Junta Amplia of the Partido Nacional Popular, the 'successor' to the PAL, 14/4/1960 (Mimeo).
5. See appendix.

crisis which beset Chile after the victory of Popular Unity.¹

Nacionalismo was a key element in the articulation of Ibañismo in the period between the end of Ibáñez's first administration and his election for a second term. This was so in spite of the fact that Ibáñez accepted the support of the traditional democratic Right (as well as that of the nacionalistas) in the 1942 presidential elections, and that nacionalismo, as distinct from the figure of Ibáñez himself, could make little headway in terms of popular support. Ibáñez shared with the nacionalistas a rejection of Chile's dominant political culture without accepting nacionalismo as an ideology. As the influence of nacionalismo within the PAL grew after 1945, it replaced the nacionalista movements of the 1930s and 1940s and established a very similar relationship with Ibáñez. It was thus unable to develop a momentum and an electorate of its own.

1. See, for example, the reports in the Radical newspaper La Tercera de la Hora, 4/1/1960, which claimed that the Partido Nacional Popular was an attempt to revive Chilean nazism.

CHAPTER IITHE APPEALS OF POPULISM : THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Ibáñez's chief capital throughout the entire electoral campaign proved to be the unpopularity of the Radical Party and especially of President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla.

By 1952, the Radical Party had controlled the government for a total of fourteen years, since the formation of an anti-fascist Popular Front alliance in 1938. Radical candidates had secured the presidency in 1938, 1942 and 1946 with Communist and Socialist support. Yet, in spite of the reforms of the period - in particular the creation of the Corporación de Fomento (CORFO) to finance the expansion of national industry, the extension of state control over the economy and the proliferation of educational and welfare services funded by public money - the centre-left coalition was exhausted by 1952. The Communist Party had been made illegal by Gonzalez himself, their foremost ally inside the Radical Party before becoming President, and the Socialists, irrevocably alienated by right-wing shift policy - orientation that this implied, categorically rejected an alliance which had left them weakened electorally and divided internally. Since neither the Radicals nor the Left have ever been able to win executive office independent of the other in Chile, their division, and the widespread disenchantment with the Radicals long years in power paved the way for a populist alternative.

Mounting criticism of President Gonzalez focused in general on allegations of favouritism, corruption, social and administrative disorder and rising inflation. Gonzalez himself was depicted in the press regularly as interested only in his own welfare and that of his home town, La Serena. The desertion of important individuals associated with the

Radical Party or even members of the Party injured the government's reputation still further. Some even defected to Ibáñez, including Juan Bautista Rossetti, and Arturo Olavarría Bravo, both Cabinet members in the Popular Front government (1938-1941). Gonzalez's erstwhile partners, the Communists and the Socialists, paid more attention in their criticisms to the deepening dependence on the United States internationally and on the right-wing parties internally. The Ley de Defensa de la Democracia became the hated symbol of both, since it corresponded to the desire of the United States to maintain its hegemony politically over Latin America and also pleased the business community because, by eliminating Communist Party representatives in the trade unions, it severely restricted trade union rights. The internment camp at Pisagua, where members of the illegal Communist Party were detained, was a blot on Chile's much-vaunted democratic system.

For the Socialist Party, this meant a profound re-assessment of the validity of their alliance with the Radicals, and their subsequent rejection of it. Oscar Waiss, member of the Central Committee of the Popular Socialist Party which supported Ibáñez in 1952, explained:

In Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, we are forced to suffer constant disillusionment with those men that represent the hopes of the dispossessed masses, but who hand power over on any pretext to the creole aristocracy and the grand captains of foreign industry after reaching the top.

Gabriel Gonzalez is a most typical example of a leader of this sort. Instead of representing the will of the people and defending the national interests, he will be remembered as someone basically very superficial and a demagogue without any firm principles. He managed to arouse such hatred against this sort of facile politics that the people were driven as a natural reaction to Ibáñez.¹

1. Ercilla 11/11/1952, p.11. Interview with Oscar Waiss.

Gonzalez's unpopularity undermined the prestige of the Radical Party, and, by extension, of the liberal democratic system as a whole. This came about because the Radicals had dominated the political system since 1938, and, during that period, had been able to establish control over the state bureaucracy. Responsibility for the policies undertaken in Chile since 1938, namely 'modernisation' through state intervention, secularism, education and social mobility, was theirs, and they therefore came to be seen as responsible for the problems facing Chile at the beginning of the 1950s, especially the creation of a dual society where one sector achieves 'modernity' at the expense of the rest, and the failure to cure Chile's economic vulnerability and dependence.¹ The association between the Radical Party and the political system as a whole was deepened by their consistent advocacy of parliamentary politics since the nineteenth century. Ibañismo, by contrast, was founded on the disenchantment of the electorate with the compromises and pay-offs which are commonplace in a multi-party system such as Chile's, but for which the Radical Party was held to be especially responsible. Ibáñez was thus able to argue that the party system itself was institutionally exhausted. In this context, his disregard for pluralist politics became precisely his greatest asset. There was no need even to offer a comprehensive programme to the electorate.

1. For a detailed discussion of the traditional/modern society see, for example, Gino Germani, The Sociology of Modernisation, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1981, and David Apter, The Politics of Modernisation, The University of Chicago Press, London, 1965. Germani defines modernisation as 'a total process affecting the economic, the political and the social organisation - all the sub-system of society. Economic development is modernisation in the field of economy ... social modernisation includes change in all sectors of society at every level : personality, norms, social relations and institutions'. Our ideas of traditional/modern societies are generally coloured by the image of Western capitalist societies as 'modern', and of any non-urban, non-industrial societies as 'traditional'. Criticisms of the traditional/modern dichotomy are numerous; see especially, those formulated by the dependency theorists, for example F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Development and Development in Latin America, University of California Press, London, 1979.

Ibáñez had been waiting in the wings for just such a moment. Implicated in numerous conspiracies since his downfall in 1931, the perennial 'man on horseback' of Chilean politics, Senator since 1949, as an independent candidate he won nearly fifty percent of the vote of the 4th of September 1952 (see Table II.1). As Topaze, the satirical political review commented: 'the masses, guided more by instinct and intuition than by any rational assessment of doctrines or values, cried out to Ibáñez as one would cry out to a policeman when in danger of being attacked'.¹

TABLE II.1

VOTING PERCENTAGES IN THE 1952
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION²

<u>CANDIDATES</u>	<u>% of Vote</u>	<u>No. of Votes</u>
Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (Independent)	46.8	446,439
Arturo Matte Larrain (Liberal and Conservative Parties)	27.8	265,357
Pedro Enrique Alfonso ³ (Radical Party)	20	190,360
Salvador Allende Gossens ⁴ (Frente del Pueblo)	5.4	51,975

-
1. Topaze 12/9/1952.
 2. Estadísticas Electorales, 1925-69. Boletín de Información General No. 66, 25/6/1970. Oficina de Informaciones del Senado. Santiago, p.8.
 3. Two small parties - the National Falange and the Social Christian Party, which were later to form the Christian Democratic Party - also supported Alfonso's candidature.
 4. Allende was the candidate of the Socialist Party of Chile (PSdeCh), a small party which had broken away from the main body of the party - renamed the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) - in 1948, because of its decision to support the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia. Allende and a small number of socialists left the PSP and joined the PSdeCh, when the PSP agreed to officially endorse Ibáñez's candidature. The PSdeChile formed the Frente Del Pueblo with the illegal Communist Party and nominated Allende Presidential candidate. The Frente del Pueblo was the beginning of the official Socialist-Communist alliance that eventually formed The Popular Action Front (FRAP) in 1957.

Gonzalez Videla's decision to make the Communist Party illegal meant that he was forced to look for support to the Liberal and Conservative Parties. (In fact, the Liberal Party had even held Cabinet posts alongside the Communists in 1946.) The Gabinete de Concentracion Nacional between 1948 and 1950 was dominated by Jorge Alessandri as Finance Minister, who was responsible for the introduction of orthodox stabilisation methods to reduce demand in order to combat inflation. More than reaching a rapport with the right-wing parties, however, Gonzalez Videla tries to shape government policy to accommodate the business community and entrepreneurial groups. In a study of the relationship between government and the industrial bourgeoisie, Marcelo Cavarossi suggested:

The Radical governments to a large extent represented the interests of the country's bourgeoisie, particularly its more dynamic fractions in the 1930s and 1940s : the large industrialists.¹

Because there was no significant political split between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landowning oligarchy in Chile, unlike in other Latin American countries, the Chilean upper class was, as a whole, concerned with the question of industrialisation. Rather than opposing the industrialisation drive undertaken in the 1930s and 1940s, in which the state played a key role, the upper class sought to adapt government policy to its advantage, and to this end was prepared to ally themselves with the Radical Party. However, the relationship between the Radical Party and the 'economic right' was complex and at times contradictory. The harmony of the 1948-1950 period was far from permanent. In 1952, the Liberals and Conservatives preferred to present their own candidate, Arturo Matte Larrain, an entrepreneur associated with one of the largest economic groups in Chile.

1. Marcelo Cavarossi, The Government and the Industrial Bourgeoisie in Chile : 1938-1964, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1973. Unpaginated. James Petras in Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, University of California Press, London, 1969, shares this view, pp.132-5.

Nonetheless, at the time of the elections it was widely believed that there was little difference between the candidate of the Liberals and Conservatives, Arturo Matte, and the Radical candidate, who represented the Gabrielista right-wing of the party, Pedro Enrique Alfonso. Ercillá, the influential centre magazine, commented:

The two are both pro-American and identify with the West against Russia... Both are continuistas in that they follow fundamentally the policies of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla and Juan Antonio Rios... At bottom, both interpret the thoughts of the industrialists in this nascent stage in the economy of our country.¹

The off-on relationship between the Right and Gonzalez Videla, meant the main congressional opposition bloc between 1948 and 1950 was the FRAS. The FRAS was an alliance of four parties:

1. The National Falange, formed in 1937, originally the Youth section of the Conservative Party;
2. The Democratic Radicals, a small parliamentary group who had left the PR because of Gonzalez Videla's early association with the Communists;
3. The Agrario Laborista Party (PAL). A heterogeneous party composed of the Agrario Party, mainly ex-Liberals and ex-Radicals from the South, and disillusioned nationalists, it was united by little more than its Ibañismo; and
4. The Popular Socialist Party (PSP). This was the main trunk of the Socialist Party which had divided in 1948 over the decision of a few socialists led by Juan Bautista Rossetti to support the Ley de la Defensa Permanente de la Democracia.

1. Ercilla 11/1/1952, p.6.

TABLE II.2
FRAS PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN THE
1949 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS¹

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>NO. OF DEPUTIES</u>
PAL	8.3	14
DEMOC RADICALS	5.0	8
PSP	4.8	6
FALANGE NACIONAL	3.9	3

In 1949, the FRAS received 21% of the vote (see Table II.2) and elected two candidates to the Senate, Carlos Ibáñez and Popular Socialist member Eugenio Gonzalez. The alliance was broken in 1950 by the decision of the Falange to join Gonzalez Videla in the Gabinete de Sensibilidad Social, and that of the Democratic Radicals to rejoin the party. It had served, however, to elect Ibáñez as Senator for Santiago, and to unite the two main parties which would form the base of Ibáñez's presidential campaign, the Agrario Laborista Party and the Popular Socialist Party.

In sum, the period 1947-52 was characterised by the following: economic and political dissatisfaction with the Radical government and general loss of confidence in the party's policies by entrepreneurial groups, workers and even public employees, who had undoubtedly fared well under the Radicals, but who were increasingly doubtful of being able to defend their gains against inflation; and the return of caudillo Ibáñez to politics, surrounded by an amorphous group of supporters promising 'rectitude' and 'honesty' in government. On announcing his candidature he promised:

the regeneration of our corrupt political habits, the redemption of our people, and the prosperity and grandeur of the Republic. If I am elected, I will form a government to end the misery of the people, to put a stop to inflation...to finish with prevarication, robbery and fraud... to re-establish the dignity of the

1. Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., p.90.

government and the respectability of Chile, and to invest public money in a clearly defined programme of production and employment.¹

The wave of popular support for Ibáñez, then, was the result of the economic and political conditions of the period. The exhaustion of the import-substituting industrialisation model of development meant an increase in the rate of inflation, ended definitively the years of moderate reform and brought political crisis in its wake. Simultaneously, the party system entered a period of crisis and fragmentation.

The decline of the traditional parties can be seen in the tables below:

TABLE II.3
PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
TO THE LOWER HOUSE FOR THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES, 1949-57²

	<u>YEARS</u>	<u>VOTES OBTAINED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE</u>
<u>Conservative Party</u>	1945	106,264	23.62
	1949	105,603	22.72
	1953	78,383	16.06
	1957	121,223	13.08
<u>Liberal Party</u>	1945	80,597	17.91
	1949	83,582	19.98
	1953	84,924	10.90
	1957	134,741	15.34
<u>Radical Party</u>	1945	89,922	19.99
	1949	100,869	21.70
	1953	103,650	13.30
	1957	188,526	21.47

-
1. Estanquero 25/10/1950, p.6. Interview with Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. See also, Ercilla 2/9/1952, pp.12-15, where the four presidential candidates are interviewed.
 2. Estadísticas Electorales, 1925-1969, op.cit., p.10. 'Traditional' parties are understood here as the parties which date from the nineteenth century. For a discussion of the Radical Party as a traditional party, see Introduction, pp.7-19.

TABLE II.4
PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN ELECTIONS FOR REGIDORES
FOR THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES, 1947-56¹

	<u>YEARS</u>	<u>VOTES OBTAINED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF VOTE</u>
<u>Conservative Party</u>	1947	111,442	20.19
	1950	160,184	26.05
	1953	116,449	15.49
	1956	105,218	15.21
<u>Liberal Party</u>	1947	73,211	13.26
	1950	102,178	16.62
	1953	97,230	12.93
	1956	88,342	12.77
<u>Radical Party</u>	1947	137,647	24.93
	1950	146,840	23.87
	1953	119,361	15.87
	1956	134,272	19.41

In fact, as these tables indicate, the period of intense crisis did not begin until 1951-52, and reached its height in 1953. Thirty-six parties contested the parliamentary elections of that year.² By 1956-57, widespread disappointment with the Ibañez government's failure to control Chile's persistent inflation or to produce adequate reform led the electorate back to the political parties. Neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party recovered its pre-1950 position, however.

Ibañismo and Populism

Ibañismo was primarily a product of a crisis of legitimacy within the traditional political system. The electorate, especially the urban and

-
1. Estadísticas Electorales, 1925-1969, op.cit., pp.13-14.
 2. The parties contesting the March 1953 elections were: the Agrario Laborista Party, the Conservative Party, the Conservative-Traditional Party, the Democratic Party of Chile, the Falange Nacional, the Liberal Party, the Liberal-Progressive Party, the Radical Party, the Socialist Party of Chile, the Popular Socialist Party, the Renovative Action Party of Chile, the Agrarian Party, the Doctrinary Democratic Party, the Feminine Progressive Party, the National Christian Party, the Labour Party, the Chilean Women's Party, the Radical Doctrinary Party, the Popular Unity Party, the National Ibañista Movement, the Social Christian Movement, the Movement of the National Union of the Retired, the National Movement of the People, the Peasants Organisation Party, the National Union of Independents Party, the National Araucano Party, the Liberal Reform Party, the National Unity Party, the New Public Action Party, the Association of Fruit Sellers. Nineteen of these parties gained representation in Congress.
Zig-Zag 10/12/1952, p.26.

rural masses, was disillusioned with the political parties as agents of social change, and preferred to support ex-dictator Carlos Ibáñez, who had made his political career opposing and condemning political parties.

There has been much emphasis laid in some analyses of the 1952 elections on the nature of the relationship between Ibáñez himself and the electorate, that is, speculation about the extent to which the electorate, given the crisis in 'the formally democratic institutions'¹ in Chile, was searching for a 'father-figure' saw in Ibáñez a 'Father of the Nation' image. Ibáñez's own collaborators in the campaign emphasize this aspect.² Rene Montero, a collaborator in the first Ibáñez administration and later Secretary-General of the government, called the victory the result of 'a profound unease that began to pre-occupy the majority of sensible citizens and the mystical instinct of collective survival', emphasizing the messianic nature of Ibáñez's campaign.³ The retention in Chile of many elements of a traditional society in spite of the gradual development from the 1920s of a mass urban society, made possible the emergence of personalism as a political force.⁴

Ibáñez was not an example of an authentic candillo, if one looks in his personality and behaviour for all the characteristics that social psychologists assign to them. He was a leader without vitality, lacking personal presence, laconic, contradictory, negative, without acumen except that which allowed him to maintain the status quo socially... But in spite of these and many other characteristics, there developed around him all the charisma of an irresistible leader, which gathered a momentum against all the professional politicians in 1952.⁵

-
1. Norbet Lechner, La Democracia in Chile, Ediciones Signos, Buenos Aires 1970, p.98. He uses the term to refer to the loss of faith in the legitimacy of Congress, and political parties on the part of the electorate, which opened the way for a personalist, authoritarian alternative.
 2. See, for example, Ernesto Wurth Rojas, Ibáñez, Caudillo Enigmático, Ediciones Del Pacifico, Santiago, 1958, and Rene Montero Moreno, op.cit. Also, interviews with Javier Lira Merino (May, 1983) and Crescente Donoso Letelier, Ibáñez's son-in-law (August, 1983).
 3. Rene Montero Moreno, op.cit., p.116.
 4. David Apter, op.cit., defines 'traditionalism... as validation of current behaviour by reference to immemorial prescriptive norms', p.83.
 5. Urzúa, op.cit., pp.200-201.

As its personalist content might indicate, Ibañismo corresponds to the phenomenon generally known as populism, some of the characteristics of which are:

1. A movement with a strong emphasis on personal, charismatic leadership.
2. A movement lacking a clear ideological orientation, though almost always anti-oligarchical and nationalist, contending that the real conflicts in society are not between classes, but between rather, the 'people', and an 'oppressor' (i.e. the oligarchy, and/or an imperialist power).
3. In Latin America, a mainly urban phenomenon.
4. Generally, associated with a drive for industrialisation and development.
5. An attempt to reconcile the ultimately contradictory demands of the masses for increased participation and redistribution of resources, with the interests of a dominant economic sector.
6. 'A movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working class and/or peasantry, but which does not result from the autonomous organisational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology.'¹

Ibañismo, however, does not correspond to populism as defined by Di Tella (see No.6) in one very important respect: for Di Tella, the emergence of populism is the result of a significant split within the bourgeoisie, and the subsequent emergence of an anti-status quo section (who would then enter into a populist alliance with intellectuals and the

1. Torcuato D. Tella, Populism and Reform in Latin America, in Claudio Véliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p.47.

urban working class and/or peasantry). The dominant sectors in Chile, however, were remarkably unified, and were in general satisfied with the representation of their interests through the democratic parliamentary channels. Non-working class support for Ibáñez, the Estanqueristas and the PAL, received little support from the bourgeoisie, who, would have been in any case, alarmed by the anti-imperialist content of the electoral programme and the presence of the Popular Socialists. However, they were not inimically hostile to Ibáñez himself, as their endorsement of his candidature in 1942 and their later support for the government after 1956 showed.

Instead, Ibáñez attracted votes mostly from peasants, the working class, and the small middle-class (public employees, service industry employees, small shopkeepers, etc.). This was confirmed by the survey done in October 1953 of the voting patterns in the 1952 elections in Santiago.¹ In the barrio alto the traditional right wing areas of the city, Ibáñez obtained 46.6% of the vote, and in the poorer areas, nearly twenty per cent more - 63%.

Nor does Ibáñezismo correspond to the developmentalist model of populism described by Guillermo O'Donnell, Cardoso and Faletto and Octavio Ianni, of which Peronism in Argentina and Varguismo in Brazil are examples.² Ibáñezismo did not play a significant role in promoting industrialisation as populism did in Argentina and Brazil; the Radical Governments between 1938 and 1952 correspond somewhat better to that phase in Chile. Quite the reverse in fact, since Ibáñezismo emerged out of the frustrations and

-
1. Ricardo Cruz-Coke, 'Geografía electoral de Santiago', in Política y Espíritu, 1/10/1953, No.101, pp.17-19. Chilean social scientist, Anibal Pinto, argued that since Ibáñez was able to mobilise the unorganised urban, and to a lesser extent, rural mass not controlled by the political parties, he was in fact a 'populist in the pure sense' of the word'. (Interview June 1983).
 2. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973; Octavio Ianni, 'Populismo y relaciones de clase', Gino Germani, T. D. Tella and Octavio Ianni (eds.) Populismo y contradicciones de clase en Latinoamérica, Ediciones Era, Mexico, 1973; Cardoso and Faletto, op.cit.

problems inherent in industrialisation in Chile. However, Ernesto Laclau has argued that the emergence of populism is not limited to a particular moment in economic development, but is related primarily to divisions within the ruling elite, which causes one faction to appeal to the 'people', and to incorporate the masses into politics if only temporarily and in an inferior position.¹

Cardoso and Faletto accept that Ibáñismo was a 'completely amorphous populism', which came about primarily because of the temporary replacement of the middle sector - urban working class alliance with a middle sector - upper class alliance during the presidency of Gabriel Gonzalez, typified by Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia. Ibáñismo, they argue, represented an attempt to recreate the middle sector 'alliance with the popular sector, but in the absence of the political organisations that had formerly represented the various social sectors, the alliance adopted the form of a completely amorphous populism'.²

So, although Ibáñismo does not correspond exactly to populism as defined by either Di Tella or Cardoso and Faletto, it undoubtedly shares many common characteristics. Because of this, and because of the vagueness of the term itself, it is possible to classify Ibáñismo as it was articulated during the campaign as a variant of Latin American populism. However, it must be remembered that many of the populist elements had fallen away within a year of the government; it may be that the strength and tradition in Chile of politics organised along party lines prevented the emergence of a populist administration. Perhaps because of this, some

-
1. Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London, 1977.
 2. Cardoso and Faletto, op.cit., p.147.

political scientists have preferred to emphasize the purely personalist element in Ibáñez's victory. Brian Loveman in Chile places Ibáñez firmly in the 'hispanic tradition' of authoritarianism and personalism, rather than populism; James Petras describes him as a 'Bonapartist' figure; Donald Bray as simply 'authoritarian, nationalistic and hostile to the oligarchy'; and Frederico Gil suggests that there was little to distinguish Ibáñismo from the coalition politics practiced by the Radicals.¹

Personalist/populist coalitions in Chile rested on the fact that democracy was severely restricted in practice, if not in theory. In spite of government stability after 1932 and the reforms of the Radical governments, democracy was little more than superstructural in 1952. While participation in the Popular Front and the Radical coalitions between 1938 and 1952 had legitimised the liberal democratic system in the eyes of the working class parties, and especially their leaders, this was not necessarily true for either the working class or the peasantry, who remained excluded from genuine participation not only by enormous differences in their educational and cultural levels, and social and economic conditions in general, from those of the political establishment - which, of course, included leaders of all the political parties - but also by the widespread practice of vote-buying and the exclusion of a large percentage of the population from voting because of literacy qualifications. As a result, Ibáñez was able to establish a relationship with the electorate which by-passed the traditional channels of participation, the political parties, even though he came to power democratically.

1. Brian Loveman, Chile, Oxford University Press, London, 1979; James Petras, op.cit., p.165; Donald Bray, op.cit., p.6; Frederico Gil, The Political System of Chile, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1966.

Ibáñez's victory was thus the result of a 'political irrationalism'¹ of the masses at the time. The Chilean writer, Alfonso Stephens, who first used this term, argued that the most important division in Chilean politics in 1952 was not between the Right and the Left, but between those who regarded politics as a rational, coherent, legitimate activity and those who did not. He explained:

the concepts of Right and Left are of a political nature; they presuppose a clear concept of the idea of a State and its functions... a great part of our citizenry do not have any notion of what the State implies or of its significance.²

The backlash in 1952 against the 'professional politician' was a part of that 'political irrationalism'. Instead of being perceived as performing an honourable and responsible duty, politicians were seen as parasites, and as ignorant and incompetent.

This explains why Ibáñez's authoritarian image did him no harm at all. Given the crisis of political leadership, it seems probable that a good number of the population voted for Ibáñez hoping for an authoritarian anti-parliamentary government, rather than believing Ibáñez had fundamentally changed. In 1952 the electorate, in rejecting the candidates of the established political parties and voting for Ibáñez, voted for substantial if rather nebulous changes. To explain why fundamental institutional changes did not take place, we must look to the divisions, disagreements, weaknesses and vacillations within the government and to the rapid recovery of the parties and ideologies identified with traditional politics.

1. Alfonso Stephens Freire, *op.cit.*

2. *ibid.*, pp.15-16.

The Agrario Laborista Party (PAL) in the Electoral Campaign

The PAL was the party which identified most closely with Ibañismo. Although the PAL became the axial party of the government, Ibáñez's independence and his individualism made it a tense and sometimes uncomfortable relationship, and the campaign marked the high point of their co-operation.

Although there had been an Ibañista wing within the PAL since the 1930's, Ibáñez's nomination as candidate in May 1951 was not automatic. In fact, the decision indicated a shift within the party away from the traditional Right wing, led by the younger members and the nationalist wing of the party.¹ The party represented in fact a large proportion of landowners in the south, and the leader of the right-wing of the party, Jaime Larrain, was bitterly opposed to Ibáñez's nomination. An unequivocal advocate of laissez-faire capitalism, rather than the corporatism favoured by most of the Ibañistas, he had been the first president of the industrial entrepreneurs' association, the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio. The Ibañista wing of the party, organised an internal campaign within the party after Ibáñez's election as Senator in 1949, which triumphed over Larrain at the congress of Chillán on the first of May 1951. When Ibáñez was nominated presidential candidate, Larrain left the party, and headed a splinter group, the National Agrarian Party, which met in Temuco a few days later on May 14th, 1951.

1. A section of the Agrario Party advocated the adoption of corporatism in the 1930s, when it was very much in vogue. In 1944 members of the discredited Movimiento Nacional Socialista and other nationalist movements were accepted into the party, which was renamed the Agrario Laborista Party. These two factions comprised the basis of the Ibañista wing of the party, though other elements also supported his candidature. (For example, Julio von Muhlenbrock, right-winger, later member of the Liberal Party.) One of the most surprising features of Ibáñez's career was his ability to attract support from the entire political spectrum.

The PAL characterised the candidature of Ibáñez as:

the desire of the masses to realize social objectives through an efficient, authoritarian, and just government. The people await an efficient and sure government from General Ibáñez to obtain effective justice and social harmony.¹

The party mirrored Ibáñez's rejection of party politics with its own. They were both equally committed to a powerful, authoritarian executive. Within the PAL, this was strengthened by the corporatism adopted by some sectors, which implied replacing political parties with interest and functional group representation. In 1953, the party organised a Congress to try and implement corporatism as an internal mode of organisation; The unofficial relationship between the PAL and the neo-fascist group of Jorge Prat and the Estanquero magazine - with which some party members collaborated - further re-inforced the PAL's rejection of pluralist party politics.

The anti-party stance of the PAL must not be exaggerated, however. It was by no means as complete or profound as that of Ibáñez. It was a rejection of the traditional Chilean parties, especially the Radical Party, and to an extent an effective anti-Radical campaign device. Although the PAL was one of the very few groups to remain outside the coalitions of the Radical years, it had participated in a joint Right-wing presidential convention in 1946, and during the election campaign in 1952 was prepared to ally itself with the marxist Popular Socialist Party. The executive of the PAL pressed Ibáñez on a number of occasions to structure the cabinet around the parties active in the campaign; and it was in favour of channelling the amorphous Ibañista movement through

1. Pensamiento del PAL sobre el Programa para la Candidatura
Presidencial de Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (Mimeo 1951).

political parties. The PAL argued that -

The political parties and the groups which have formed around the candidature of Ibáñez should be the interpreters of these national aspirations.¹

During the campaign, the PAL found its identity compromised as an 'independent' party. Unlike the other major party endorsing Ibáñez, the Popular Socialist Party which was careful to maintain its image as independent, the PAL came to be identified as a party which was Ibañista, and nothing else. The fortunes of the party may be charted by the rise and fall of Ibañismo. Thus, of all the Ibañista parties, its representation in Congress increased most dramatically in the elections of March 1953 to 26 deputies, and fell to 10 in 1957 because of the unpopularity of the government.² The President of the party during the crucial campaign years of 1951 and 1952, José García, identified the primary function of the party only as that of giving support to Ibáñez.³ Ibañismo served the party leaders in hiding the very real ideological differences that existed within the PAL and was a convenient way to unify the party, since Ibañismo was elastic enough to mean almost anything. The party was thus able to obscure the fact during the campaign that they did not have any shared doctrine or programme chiefly because of the vagueness of Ibañismo itself, and because the mood of the country was anti-Radical, rather than pro-anything. Ibañismo during the campaign was understood only as the opposite of Radicalism. As soon as any effort was made to express more concretely and in detail what Ibáñez represented, divisions emerged among his supporters and within the PAL itself.

1. Op.cit.

2. The Radical Party recovered its position as the largest single party in Congress in the election of March 1957, receiving 21.4% of the vote. Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., p.92.

3. In the Sixth Annual Conference of the PAL in October 1952, Jose García expressed the view that the party should 'gallop at the side of Ibáñez'. Ercilla, 14/10/1952, p.4.

Despite its complete adherence to Ibañismo, however, the PAL was unable to become a successful personalist party either. The creation of a successful personalist movement - along the lines of the Justicialist party in Argentina - could only have been possible if Ibáñez himself had conferred his official support on the party. He was, however, unenthusiastic about heading any formal organisation, and preferred to retain his independence of action.

Left-wing support for Ibáñez

Although there were some suggestions that the Communist Party might unofficially support Ibáñez, mainly because of his promise to abrogate the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia left-wing support was channelled through the Popular Socialist Party. Why the Socialist Party (PS) which had been characterised by a clear anti-fascist position throughout the 1930s and 1940s should join ex-fascists in proclaiming the authoritarian Ibáñez presidential candidate, needs explaining.

One decisive factor was the Socialist Party's electoral decline in the 1940s. By 1945, the Socialists polled only 7.2% of the total vote, dropping from nearly 18% in 1941.¹ Such were the ideological and personal divisions within the party that three socialist parties contested the parliamentary elections of 1949.² In supporting Ibáñez, who already had broad popular support, the PSP was trying to recover its position as the major party of the working class.

-
1. Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., pp.86 and 90.
 2. These were the Authentic Socialist Party, a small group, nearer to social democracy than Marxist socialism, centering on the figure of Marmaduke Grove; the Popular Socialist Party, the largest fraction, and the Socialist Party of Chile, which had split from the main branch of the party, though retaining the official party name, in 1948 over its decision to support the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia.

Secondly, I would like to suggest that the PSP endorsed nationalist and anti-liberal values in a way that was similar to that of the PAL. They also shared an antipathy towards the Radical Party. Furthermore, the Socialist Party, like the PAL, had evinced signs of a tendency towards personalism especially in its early years, typified by the cult of Marmaduke Grove, and sectors of the PAL shared the PAL's anti-communism, which had been current in the party on its formation and resurfaced in the period 1948-1950 in the form of intense Socialist-Communist rivalry in the trade-union movement. Before discussing in more detail the nature of nationalism and anti-liberalism within the PSP, however, it should be pointed out the Socialists' support for Ibáñez was far more limited and reluctant from the beginning than that of the Agrario Laborista Party, and was based less on ideological affinity with Ibáñez himself and more on the party's ambition to control the Ibañista movement.

Nationalism in the PSP

A significant part of the PSP believed nationalism could be a progressive force in the Third World. They were especially influenced by Nasserism in Egypt, the emergence of national liberation movements in Africa and Asia, and the development of Yugoslav socialism. They wanted the Left in Chile to reject definitively Western influences, especially social democracy. Clodomiro Almeyda, Minister of Labour and of Mines between 1952-53, argued in Confesiones Politicas that the interests of the West are inimically hostile to those of the developing countries, which should struggle not to attain the consumption standards of the West, but to create a different type of society altogether. He, therefore, rejects mechanical adherence to Western forms of government and Western democracy in the dependent countries, 'whose needs and nature, interests and aspirations

have little in common with the historical circumstances which germinated the seed of liberal, rationalist thought in those regions'.¹

The party had been aware of the need for specifically Latin American socialism since its first appearance on the political scene. Its first Declaration of Principles put forward the goal of Latin American unity:

The Socialist Party will fight for the economic and political unity of all Latin American peoples. We will support the formation of a Federation of Socialist Republics of this Continent and an anti-imperialist economy.²

In its initial years, the party forged strong ties with APRA in Peru, and Acción Democrática in Venezuela in pursuance of a 'Latin American' ideology. Another manifestation of the Socialist Party's nationalism was its remaining outside the Socialist International, preferring instead to stress its opposition to all internationalisms.

Socialist nationalism was based on anti-imperialism. Almeyda accuses the United States of conspiring against Chile's sovereignty, culture, her future, and any possibilities the country may have of constructing a richer and juster society.³ The most obvious expressions of this nationalism was the demand for the nationalisation of U.S. interests and investments, especially in copper, the main source of foreign exchange and the cornerstone of the entire economy. This was the main point of contact with the nationalists of a more right-wing persuasion within Ibañismo. The nationalism of the PSP was therefore a blend of economic nationalism and cultural assertion. Although some of the nationalists of the PSP,

-
1. Clodomiro Almeyda, Confesiones Políticas, Prensa Latino Americana, Santiago, 1958, p.12.
 2. Declaration of the Principles of The Socialist Party, 1933, quoted in Benny Pollack, The Chilean Socialist Party : A Case Study in Party Organisation, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Liverpool University, 1979.
 3. Clodomiro Almeyda, op.cit., p.84.

Almeyda, for example, shared an administration for Justicialismo with the Estanqueristas, the party in no way reflected the overt racism of Estanquero.

The PSP was especially influenced by the emergence of anti-imperialist populist coalitions in two neighbouring countries, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario in Bolivia and Peronism in Argentina. They became aware through these examples of the possibilities of uniting the masses with fractions of the middle class, behind a charismatic leader and an anti-imperialist programme. The PSP participated in the Ibañista coalition to construct - and control - a similar alliance. Almeyda, in Confesiones Politicas, shows himself to be especially concerned for the Chilean Socialists not repeat the mistake of the Argentine Socialist Party. Significantly, Almeyda identified the Argentine Socialist Party as being 'European', and with little commitment to nationalism.

Anti-Liberalism in the PSP

Why was the PSP not put off by Ibáñez's authoritarian past? Partly because some socialists in fact shared with Ibáñez a tendency to deny the legitimacy of the parliamentary system in Latin America and argued instead that liberal democracy in Chile was associated with oligarchical domination. So they may have perceived more potential for a genuinely popular government with an authoritarian but decidedly anti-oligarchical figure like Ibáñez. This was re-inforced by the disillusionment among the Socialists with the Centre-Left coalitions of the 1940s. Raul Ampuero, Secretary-General of the PSP during the presidential campaign, described the centre-left alliance as offering only 'an ephemeral victory', because the Centre tended 'to capitulate without resistance to the traditional interests'.¹

1. Raul Ampuero, La Izquierda en Punto Muerto, Orbe, Santiago, 1969, p.10.

Anti-liberalism tended to be expressed as opposition to the Radical Party because of the Left's unfortunate experiences with Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, and because the Radical Party was the parliamentary party par excellence. Aniceto Rodriguez, Secretary-General of the PSP in the mid-1950s, wrote of the Radical Party in the following way:

We think that the Radical Party represents a symbol of bureaucratisation, inefficiency and administrative greed to the masses and that it should be expelled together with the loom and the distaff to the cellar of the past.¹

Far from being put off by the anti-democratic potential of Ibañismo, the party justified its collaboration with Ibañez in these terms:

To contribute to the disintegration of a political system that is worn out, and to create in this way the basis for a massive, popular revolutionary movement that can assume representation of the workers and take power to realise their permanent objectives.²

Both the nationalism current in the PSP and its disillusionment with political liberalism were rejections of the European influence in Chilean politics. Ibañez was presented as a uniquely Latin American solution. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the two fractions of the Socialist Party were divided on the issue of whether Chilean socialism should be identified with Western European variants or whether the party should identify Chile's interests as best served inside the Western bloc. On the contrary, Chilean socialism was always non-aligned. Furthermore, a significant tendency remaining within the PSP after the departure of Allende could best be described as 'social democratic' on the Western model. In the early 1950s, this tendency was headed by Felipe Herrera, Finance Minister in 1953. Rather the splits in the Socialist Party corresponded in large measure to personal and bureaucratic

1. Quoted in Ampuero, op.cit., pp.54-5.

2. *ibid.*, p.57.

inter-party problems, which were only compounded by ideological differences.

The PSP proclaimed Ibáñez as their presidential candidate in May 1952, a year later than the Agrario Laborista Party had done so. Their programmatic objectives were clear: abrogation of the Ley Maldita; agrarian reform; the creation of a state-controlled copper corporation; rejection of the Military Pact with the United States; government aid to set up a free trade union federation independent of state control; and economic and fiscal reform, especially the introduction of progressive tax legislation.

Amid some misgivings, the party decided that Ibáñez represented the 'anti-feudal and anti-imperialist impulse of the masses'.¹ Furthermore, it was argued that, without the PSP, Ibañismo might assume a more openly neo-fascist character. The PSP supported Ibáñez in the hope of providing the dominant political and ideological orientation to the heterogeneous movement which had gathered around him. This was precisely the explanation offered by Raul Ampuero, some thirty years later. He wrote:

the presence of a progressive political grouping (in the Ibañista coalition), was intended to impede the crystallisation of Ibañismo as a populist, potentially conservative movement, subject to the personal desires of Ibáñez, or used by the nacionalistas inside the coalition.²

Eugenio Gonzalez, Senator and Central Committee member, wrote shortly

-
1. Julio César Jobet, El Socialismo Chileno A Traves de sus Congresos, Prensa Latino Americana, Santiago, 1963, pp.69-71.
 2. Unpublished letter from Raul Ampuero to Jean Grugel, September 1984.

after the electoral campaign:

General Ibáñez arrived at the Presidency of the Republic thanks to the sentiments of the masses. This did not constitute a political victory as such.. The independent movement formed during the campaign was a reaction to the evils of politiquería and cannot survive long if it is tied to the fortunes of one individual...The foremost task for the new administration was to transform an emotional state - Ibañismo - into political consciousness.¹

The PSP, however, made a mistake in thinking that they would be able to dominate Ibañismo. In the event, the movement's heterogeneity and Ibáñez's own authoritarianism made this impossible.

Non-party support for Ibáñez

It would be as wrong to imply that Ibáñez's success in September 1952 was due to the adhesion of either the PAL or the PSP as to imply that Ibañismo corresponded necessarily to their political positions. More than anything else, Ibáñez won because of his image as a leader independent of political parties, and above party politics, at a time when the prestige of the liberal-democratic political regime and the political establishment were at their lowest.

As a result, then, most of the support for Ibáñez was not channelled through either of the main parties, or even through the minor Ibañista movements or parties forged in the campaign. Indeed the parties actually under-estimated the strength of the independent element in the victory. One of Ibáñez's aides during the campaign wrote:

The political parties... did not understand that the surprising success was not thanks to them, but rather the result of a mystical sense of confidence the person of General Ibáñez was able to awaken.²

-
1. Eugenio Gonzalez Rojas, El Socialismo Frente Al Liberalismo, in Julio César Jobet and Alejandro Chelén (eds.), Pensamiento Teórico y Político de Partido Socialista, Quimantú, Santiago, 1972, p.117.
 2. Ernesto Wurth Rojas, op. cit., p.271.

Spontaneous demonstrations of popular support for the 'General Hope' took place throughout the country and popular mobilisation was on the scale of the 1920 or 1938 elections. Women's groups played an especially important role in mobilising the female vote for their first Presidential election. Some Conservatives also wanted to support Ibáñez and a few defied the official decision of the party in order to do so.¹ The participation and votes of peasants were also especially significant because in voting for Ibáñez they voted for the first time against the wishes of their landlords. Table II.6 shows that Ibáñez scored highly or even beat Matte in the Central zones of the countryside, where latifundia predominated.²

Anti-democratic nationalist movements were also vocal in their support for Ibáñez, especially the Estanquero group. The magazine used the electoral campaign to make repeated attacks on the rights of workers, women, and other groups. Estanquero, however, constituted only a section of the nationalistic right-wing; it also acted as a forum for smaller fringe groups who also supported Ibáñez. These groups had minimal popular influence, but alarmed the opposition who very genuinely feared Ibáñez's victory might herald attempts to dismantle Chilean democracy. Ibáñez's links with coup attempts in the 1930s and 1940s were not forgotten.

Ibáñez, however, retained his independence vis-à-vis all the parties, movements and groups supporting his candidature, who saw in it what they wanted to see; Ibáñez consciously defined his candidature as 'apolitical', and drew instead on the personalist current which surfaced periodically in Chile - the Alessandrista movement in the 1930s being another example.

-
1. See the interview with Luis Ortega, El Imparcial, 22 April 1952.
 2. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasised since as Tables II.3 and II.4 indicated earlier, the dominance of the Right was not restored even after the decline of Ibañismo.

As it turned out, the size of Ibáñez's victory was surprising even to his supporters. The organisers of the campaign had estimated a total number of 309,900 votes, and received instead 436,345 - 126,445 more (see Table II.5).

TABLE II.5
FORECASTS AND ELECTION RESULTS
4th SEPTEMBER 1952¹

	<u>IBANEZ</u>	<u>MATTE</u>	<u>ALFONSO</u>	<u>ALLENDE</u>
<u>FORECASTS</u>	309,900	392,000	341,151	110,000
<u>RESULTS</u>	<u>436,345</u>	<u>257,066</u>	<u>187,044</u>	<u>52,348</u>
	<u>+126,445</u>	<u>-134,934</u>	<u>-154,107</u>	<u>- 58,652</u>

After the election, leaders of the Radical Party acknowledged that up to 60% of its electorate had deserted to Ibáñez.

Tactics and Programmes

The campaign was underway early - in 1950. Whatever may be said of the regime in power - whether or not it showed itself acquiescent to the interests of the economic elites - during the campaign, Ibáñez clearly articulated an alternative style, populist and authoritarian, which tried to by-pass the hitherto dominant political parties. Ibáñez concentrated on condemning the corruption and inefficiency of the existing party system, and especially the formidable network of clientelist relations the Radical Party had built up. He was accompanied by the PAL especially in this. Wurth Rojas, in his book on Ibáñez, describes the attacks against the Radical Party as 'cruel and destructive'.²

1. Ercilla 9/9/1952, p.12.

2. Wurth Rojas, op.cit., p.227. See also Montero Moreno, op.cit., pp.126-7, who says that Ibáñez exploited the weariness of the Chilean people with the Radical Party beyond the bounds of what was just.

VOTING RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1952 BY PROVINCES¹

Province	Ibanez	Matte	Alfonso	Allende	Void	Blank	Totals
Tarapacá	7,006	3,230	3,356	1,363	60	25	15,040
Antofagasta	13,512	2,707	5,460	2,495	42	31	24,247
Atacama	5,218	1,778	4,593	531	4	8	12,132
Coquimbo	7,425	10,314	12,169	1,905	41	70	31,924
Aconcagua	7,765	8,723	5,704	674	83	39	22,988
Valparaíso	43,258	20,419	16,971	4,250	53	88	85,039
Santiago	176,325	78,890	43,776	22,762	382	541	322,676
O'Higgins	15,016	14,498	6,095	1,567	40	85	37,301
Colchagua	5,874	12,068	4,187	587	30	85	22,831
Curicó	4,624	5,585	3,153	570	57	29	14,018
Talca	12,078	10,433	5,586	1,078	42	82	29,299
Maule	4,404	5,956	4,483	247	22	20	15,132
Linares	11,265	10,807	4,117	505	65	30	26,789
Nuble	13,103	13,489	10,653	909	15	33	38,202
Concepción	30,650	13,320	13,155	5,468	106	110	62,809
Arauco	2,584	2,422	3,318	1,497	18	12	9,851
Bío-Bío	7,382	6,257	4,362	736	24	51	18,812
Malleco	9,543	7,728	5,608	531	33	19	23,462
Cautín	23,650	14,009	8,952	1,208	139	40	47,998
Valdivia	16,133	7,724	6,546	1,248	75	8	31,734
Osorno	8,101	4,248	6,025	477	1	45	18,897
Llanquihue	7,977	5,477	4,501	474	54	26	18,509
Aysén	1,843	307	759	137	-	5	3,051
Chiloé	4,144	4,329	4,081	150	26	14	12,744
Magallanes	7,559	639	2,750	606	49	14	11,617
Totals	446,439	265,357	190,360	51,975	1,461	1,510	957,102

1. Zig-Zag, 25/10/1953, p.26.

The Ibañistas brought out several newspapers during the campaign, including Basta, Prensa Libre and La Escoba, which kept up the attacks on the government of González Videla, and undermined Allende's campaign by alleging it was financed by the Matte camp so that it could win votes away from Ibáñez, who was presented as the genuinely 'popular' candidate. None of these papers could match the circulation of the established dailies, of course, none of which supported Ibáñez; so radio stations, including the old MNS station, Nuevo Mundo, played an important part in the campaign. Estanquero also acted as a campaign forum for the Ibañistas, going as far as interviewing Clodomiro Almeyda, of the Popular Socialist Party. Estanquero emphasized the newness of Ibañismo, in its language, style and policy; yet again its most vituperative condemnations were reserved for the Radical Party.

The country does not want anything more to do with the professional politician, the individual in the asamblea who enters politics as an easy career... who ascends to public office through payments for services, through the rewarding of posts and other privileges.¹

Skilful use was made during the campaign, of the legacy of Ibáñez's first administration. His ignominious flight into exile in 1931 was largely forgotten, and instead, its genuinely creative aspects were emphasized. Ibáñez was portrayed as a statesman, above party politics, the builder of roads and infrastructures, the creator of the national air line (Línea Aerea Nacional - LAN), the police force, the Cuerpo de Carabineros, and the Contraloría-General. The authoritarian image of Ibáñez's first administration was a potent weapon in the campaign, especially in contrast to the disorder of Gonzalez Videla's presidency.

1. Estanquero, 11/10/1952.

The campaign used as its symbol a broom (to sweep away the corruptions of the Radicals), and encouraged mass participation. The 'Four Marches of the People', just days before the elections, converging on Plaza Bulnes in the centre of Santiago, typified the emotional aspects of the campaign. It attracted 200,000 supporters, the largest public meeting ever held up to that time in Chile. It comprised four separate columns: the first marching for National Sovereignty; the second for Labour; the third for Freedom; and the fourth for Social Justice. The participants swore an oath which exemplifies the emotive and populist rhetoric of the campaign. They promised:

To vote for Ibáñez and to defend with their life, if necessary, their triumph of sovereign will, to commit themselves physically and morally to building the future of Chile; and to be implacable with those who betray the people and those who try to rob the people of their victory.¹

The clearest programme was that of the PAL and PSP jointly, who formed a Consejo Politico to advise Ibáñez, and in which both parties made concessions. The Consejo Politico was composed of José García, Javier Lira, Alejandro Hales, Eugenio Gonzalez, Raul Ampuero and Santiago Wilson. The programme included proposals for workers' participation in private industry; the repeal of the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia; reform of electoral practices; extension of the suffrage; a programme of house building; the creation of a State Bank to put an end to the control of the private banking system over credit; nationalisation of coal and the creation of a Corporación de Ventas for copper; social security legislation including the creation of a state medical service and education reform; and a programme designed to further Latin American

1. El Mercurio 1/9/1952.

integration. Corporatism, favoured by some of the PAL members of the Consejo Politico, was not part of the joint programme.¹ (The Consejo Politico had become paralysed by the beginning of 1953 because of its degeneration into warring factions - like Ibañismo itself).

The major problem with the programme was that it was never officially endorsed by the presidential candidate. It was not translated into electoral promises, either. Though little public attention was paid to this at the time, it was the first indication that Ibáñez would not defer to the wishes of the Ibañista parties; it was the first of his consistent refusals to give the administration a coherent strategy and base. Ibáñez limited himself to promising to repeal the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, to abrogate the Military Pact with the United States, to reform the Public Administration, to introduce unspecified electoral reform and to stop inflation. He did not disclose the specifics of how the latter might be achieved.

A separate electoral programme was offered by the magazine Estanquero, which included diverse elements such as a Corporative Chamber in Congress; the creation of a congressional committee to 'investigate the irregularities, abuses, and corruptions of the Radical administration'; a programme of public works; and removal of the right to strike.² This programme represented rather what the Estanqueristas hoped to achieve through the access to power which Ibáñez's victory might give them; it was not, of course, a realistic programme that could be endorsed by all Ibañista sectors. It illustrates the fact that Ibañismo was a conglomerate of disparate political groups, united only in their seeking to accomplish

1. Texto de Los Puntos del Programa Presidencial Del Senador Don Carlos Ibáñez Del Campo, Aprobados Por el Consejo Politico, 1952 (Mimeo).

2. Estanquero 1/11/1952.

different aims through access to public office and any influence on the executive they might have. It was not based to any degree on congressional representation, which was rather the base of the traditional parties.

Like his image as a dictator, the lack of clear programmatic aims did not disadvantage Ibáñez in the campaign. Rather on the contrary, it seemed to confirm in the minds of the electorate his image as a strong man. El Mercurio was perceptive in ascribing Ibáñez's victory to the strength of his personality, at a time of widespread chaos:

His uprightness, the strength of his character, his high concept of the dignity of office, his love for Chile, his independence, his austerity, and his unshakeable will to use the powers that the constitution conferred on the President of the Republic, brought about the firm decision of the citizenry to elect him to the Presidency.¹

The Influence of Peronism During the Campaign

The connection between Ibáñez's supporters and the Peronist regime in Argentina were to cause constant problems for the government, especially the accusation of Peronist penetration into Chile during the election campaign. Ibáñez had been in exile in Argentina for six years after the fall of his first government in 1931, and had formed a personal friendship with Juan Perón. Other Agrario Laboristas were also on close personal terms with Perón, especially Guillermo Izquierdo Araya, President of the PAL between 1954-5, and earlier professor at the University of La Plata in Argentina. The Ibáñistas made no secret of their desire to promote an economic union with Argentina, which was widely interpreted by the opposition as a betrayal of Chilean national interests, while Ibáñez described the hostility of the Radical Party towards Argentina as 'war mongering'.²

1. El Mercurio 3/11/1952, p.3.

2. Ercilla 5/7/1952, p.7.

Obviously enough, apprehension about the links between Ibañismo and Peronism were as much related to Chile's distrust of her more powerful neighbour - whom she periodically accused of imperialistic pretensions, whatever the nature of Argentina's government - as it was related to fears that Chile's democratic system might be threatened by Peronist-inspired and controlled populism.¹

Several members of the PAL and leading figures in the campaign had been active in Acción Chilena-Argentina, an organisation which was officially set up to promote cultural ties between the two countries. Since it was in part financed by the Argentine government,² the movement was suspected with some justification of being an agent of Peronist propaganda in Chile. In addition, it was fairly clearly established that those Chileans who defended Peronism as a system of political ideas relevant to any Latin American nation, were the very ones who were suspected of plotting to overthrow parliamentary democracy in the late 1940s. Several members of Acción Chilena-Argentina were later active in the campaign on behalf of Ibañez, including Guillermo Izquierdo himself; Oscar Jiménez, ex-leader of the Nazi Youth Movement; and Conrado Rios Gallardo, later Ambassador to Argentina.³

-
1. The Chilean Armed Forces in this period remained for the most part cool towards anti-democratic nationalist movements, or towards the construction of a Peronist-type populist alliance in Chile, in spite of their support for General Ibañez. Among other factors, this is related to Chile's rivalry and hostility with Argentina, and fear of falling too much under her influence.
 2. This was confirmed by Guillermo Izquierdo Araya (interview July 1983).
 3. Some members of Acción Chilena-Argentina were involved in the plot, called the Complot de Colliguay in 1952, which was an attempt to discredit the government of Gonzalez Videla, by the kidnapping of two Ibañistas, Edgar Maas and Domiciano Soto and placing the blame on the government. The plot was uncovered however by the newspapers, principally Ercilla. (Interview with Guillermo Izquierdo Araya, July 1983).

Peronism's overt anti-liberalism, anti-pluralism and its neo-fascist overtones, as well as the regime's attempts to control the press, meant it was widely held to be a disappointing and dangerous contrast to Chile's democratic practices and her traditional respect for civil liberties, by a broad spectrum of public opinion, including the traditional Right-wing, the Radical Party and the Socialistas de Chile, now led by Allende. This was itself heightened by the persistent tendency of Chilean elites to identify with European patterns of party politics and ideologies, and their reluctance to identify Chile as a 'third world' country. Thus, at the same time as the Ibañistas claimed they articulated a programme for 'nationalist' development to protect Chile's national resources, the opposition, especially the Radicals, persistently accused Ibáñez of being prepared to hand Chilean sovereignty over to Argentina, at the expense of her democratic system. Their alarm was further increased by the open sympathy for Justicialismo, the 'ideology' of the Peronists, on the part of some prominent Ibañistas. Estanquero, for example, spoke approvingly of 'the raising of national consciousness of the different Latin American countries (which was occurring), headed by Argentina'.¹ And when Eva Perón died, the magazine eulogised:

Her wonderful eyes open in death as a window of purest crystal, through which the midnight sun shone, astonished... her hands were like white leaves on the white sheet... she was one of God's chosen and she died young... In America has died a woman, a great woman, and she was called Eva.²

Such extreme personality cults were unknown in Chile, and admiration for Peronism awoke a genuine fear in Chile that Ibañismo might follow the same authoritarian path.

-
1. Estanquero 26/1/1952.
 2. Estanquero 2/8/1952.

During the election campaign itself, the most prominent Peronistas in Chile were the Ibañista women's groups, and especially the vocal María de la Cruz Toledo, leader of the Partido Femenino Chileno. Women voting for the first time in a Presidential election, played a significant role in Ibáñez's victory, and María de la Cruz, chiefly through her emotional and impassioned speeches, was estimated to have won Ibáñez 50,000 votes alone.¹ Another personal friend of Perón, she consciously modelled herself on the figure of Eva Perón. She made repeated declarations to the Argentine and Chilean press of her adhesion to Peronism and her desire to replicate it as closely as possible in Chile. For example:

This period of world revolution will go down in history as the century of Perón and Evita. These two are the most incredible and important characters of the period. Their thought is not only an ideology of the present, but also of the future... In Chile, the people identify totally with the justicialist doctrine. Peronism is as popular as Ibañismo in Chile... Peronism is the realisation of Christianity. So, the history of mankind will be divided into two important eras. From the first century to the twentieth century will be the Christian period, and from the twenty-first century onwards will be the Peronist period.²

María de la Cruz's brand of Peronism caused a sensation during the campaign, and later proved an embarrassment to the government itself. It also proved divisive within the movement because she combined personalism with a particularly crude anti-Marxism, and made vituperative attacks on the PSP, especially the Secretary-General, theoretician Raul Ampuero, thus revealing one of the most important contradictions in Ibañismo: the irreconcilability of its left and right wings. Genuinely populist discourse which fused elements of right and left was never dominant in Ibañismo, which tended rather to revert into left or right wing versions, a result of Chile's traditional ideological polarisation.

1. Wurth Rojas, op.cit., pp.227-8.

2. Ercilla 11/11/1952 p.4. Interview with María de la Cruz Toledo.

During the campaign, it was alleged that Ibáñez's campaign was lavishly funded from Argentina. These claims were eventually investigated by a special Congressional Committee in 1956, headed by Socialist (later Radical) Florencio Galleguillos. The Commission confirmed that donations of money were given to Chileans to buy radio stations, to pay for pro-Ibáñez advertisements in newspapers, or advertisements attacking opponents of Ibáñez and praising Perón's regime. The Ibañista women's groups had also accepted money from Perón which was returned later, after the existence of the donation became publically known. María de la Cruz herself accepted money during the Ibáñez government to found a pro-Peronist, anti-Marxist labour federation to rival the new, independent Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT).¹

However, there is no evidence offered that the official organizers of the campaign were in direct receipt of any significant amount of money from Perón, though it seems clear that Perón did try to influence the course of politics in Chile - as he did in other Latin American countries.² The leaders of the campaign maintained that its budget was low and that it relied on donations from committed Ibáñez supporters. In the provinces, the campaign relied on independent Ibañista committees, and one such, the Movimiento Provincial Nacional Ibañista from Antofagasta,

-
1. For a detailed account of the Commission's findings, see Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias Cámara de Diputados, 32A, 5/7/1956
 2. The press abounded in accusations about the financing of Ibáñez's campaign with Argentine money. Ercilla claimed that Ibáñez's campaign seemed at least as well, if not better financed than those of Matte or Alfonso, (19/8/1952, p.4). Even ex-Ibañistas supported the accusations - for example, Conrado Rios Gallardo, ex-Ambassador to Argentina, alleged that Ibáñez received five million Argentine pesos as a campaign contribution (Vea 9/5/1956). Nonetheless, the Congressional report was much less sensational. In interviews, both Javier Lira and Alejandro Hales, co-ordinators of Ibáñez's electoral campaign, categorically denied receiving Argentine money. Ibáñez admitted receiving large donations of money from Arab businessman, Juan Yarur. Luis Correa Prieto, op.cit., p.160.

wrote to the headquarters of the campaign in Santiago:

Our movement is composed of people who are not tied to any political party, and we work disinterestedly in favour of that eminent patriot, Don Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, simply because we are idealists.¹

On funding the campaign in Antofagasta, the Movimiento said it prefers to finance any expenditure itself 'without bothering anybody in Santiago'.²

There was yet another reason why some of the opposition were concerned about Ibáñez's identification with Latin American nationalist movements, and especially the MNR government in Bolivia and that of Perón in Argentina: their fear of Ibáñez implementing a populist economic programme, aimed at dismantling the control over the Chilean economy exercised by the industrial bourgeoisie and the United States. It was the overt anti-U.S. attitudes of many Ibañistas that most alarmed the influential right-wing daily El Mercurio, rather than the movement's potential authoritarianism. El Mercurio expressed concern about Ibañismo on the grounds that:

The most delicate aspect of Chilean politics, and how it is assessed abroad is our relationship with the United States.³

The paper reminded Ibáñez that his attitude towards the United States during his first administration had been 'one of frank collaboration'.⁴ In fact, El Mercurio tried systematically to influence the direction of Ibáñez's government, to separate the executive from its populist supporters and to re-orient it along traditional right-wing and economically orthodox lines. During the period 1955-7 especially, it was successful because of the dual pressure on the government of the economic crisis after 1954, and its need to find a stable social and political base in view of the collapse of the populist alliance in 1953.

-
1. Letter from the Movimiento Provincial Nacional Ibañista, Antofagasta, to the Secretary-General of the campaign. Unpublished private letters of Alejandro Hales.
 2. *ibid.*
 3. El Mercurio 10/9/1952, p.3.
 4. El Mercurio 11/11/1952, p.3.

Conclusion

Populist movements have been consistently frustrated in Chile by the strength of traditional party politics, and the second Ibáñez administration, faced with a united opposition in Congress, from the Liberal party to the Communists, was to prove to be no exception. Ibáñez's overwhelming victory on the 4th of September, 1952, may suggest, however, that the democratic sentiments expressed by the majority of the Chilean political elite were not necessarily shared by the electorate, who perceived in Ibáñez, wrongly as it turned out, a way to circumvent the compromises inherent in Chile's political system, and a figure strong enough to confront the economic and political dominance of the Right-wing. It indicated the existence of a populist, potentially authoritarian current in Chilean politics, the strength of which has sometimes been under-rated. Ibafismo never succeeded in fusing the diverse and heterogeneous ideological threads it had temporarily united into a movement which could rival the established multi-party system. As such, it disintegrated rapidly after the victory, in part because of its own internal contradictions. There remained only an insubstantial and partly nostalgic sentiment.

CHAPTER IIIPOPULISM AND DEVELOPMENT, 1952-54

Ibáñez came to power in September 1952 promising to end Chile's endemic inflation, and at the same time to radically readjust the model of Chile's economic and social development in favour of lower income groups. By identifying the bureaucratization of government which had taken place under the Radical administrations (1938-52) as excessive, and a major factor in causing inflation, he was able to capitalise on the widespread dissatisfaction with the Radicals at a time when they were recognised to be in the pockets of the entrepreneurial groups and economic elites. While this anti-Radical banner had a clear populist appeal in 1952, especially so because of the Radicals' widespread use of a 'jobs for the boys' patronage system, it indicated a simplistic approach on the part of the incoming government to the complexities of Chile's economic and social problems.

Ibáñez was identified as a 'popular' (i.e. pro-labour) candidate during the election campaign. His supporters compared his victory to that of Petro Aguirre Cerda, candidate of the Popular Front in 1938. Ibáñez himself emphasized his long-standing opposition to the oligarchy and the power of economic groups. The presence of the marxist Popular Socialist Party (PSP) within the Ibañista coalition strengthened this impression, and the Agrario Laborista Party (PAL) also claimed a laborite element and ideology.

Areas in which reform was anticipated included social welfare, labour, and housing; the success of these reforms, however, depended on the extent to which the administration would be able to control Chile's

inflationary spiral, and on her income from copper production. Chile's dependence on copper left her vulnerable to the slightest fluctuation in international demand. Moreover, the Cold War and United States' pressure on Chilean governments throughout the 1940s meant that Chile had agreed not to sell copper to the Soviet Union. The government's ability to produce meaningful reform would depend on the way in which this issue was handled.

There was a further limitation on the government's reformist tendencies, the importance of which increased as the life of the government progressed. Ibañismo did not constitute by any means a consistent or lucid ideology. Despite the presence of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Agrario Laborista Party (PAL) which included left-wing elements, especially grouped around Rafael Tarud, President of the Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior (CONDECOR) and later Minister of the Economy, in fact, the Right had a voice in the Moneda Palace from the first, chiefly through 'personal friends' of Ibáñez himself. Some of these were close collaborators of the President from his first administration (1927-31). They included Rene Montero Moreno, Secretary-General of the government, and Edecio Torreblanca White, the first Minister of the Economy, and co-author of the infamous anti-communist legislation, the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia.

Populism in Government

Ibañismo was primarily a product of a crisis of legitimacy within the traditional political establishment. It was also a product of relatively low levels of working class solidarity and low levels of working class participation within marxist political parties. This was in part due to the fact that urbanisation in Chile outstripped industrialisation,

which was slow and only partial. Although there is no uniform opinion on the causes of populist movements, it is generally agreed that they are associated with changes in the levels of and demands for political participation as a result of mass mobilisation.¹

Ibañismo during the campaign was personalist, anti-oligarchic, nationalistic, and anti-status quo oriented. It was not organised along class lines, but was rather a coalition of different and contradictory sectoral interests. In spite of the difficulties locating Ibañismo within the historic stage of industrial consolidation, these ideological factors should allow it to be defined as a populist movement.

However, populist movements do not necessarily become populist regimes. Benny Pollack has recently distinguished between the two as follows:

Populism as a movement addresses the processes of mobilisation, through which the masses abandon their masters and the social traditions which dictate unchangeably their roles and status, and choose the options and political compromises that the new elites offer. Populism, as a regime, on the other hand, proposes a reconstruction of mass society, through which popular organisations are structured as appendices generally in favour of establishing autonomous mass organisations which could exceed their initial objectives.²

Populism as a regime is therefore related fundamentally to the way in which interest group or class interest is articulated within society and the relationship between the State and 'intermediary social organisations'.³ A fundamental reorientation of any social or class conflict, through the State, takes place in a populist regime. The State

-
1. See G. Ionescu and E. Geller (Eds.), Populism, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, and Torcuato di Tella, Populism and Reform in Latin America, in Claudio Véliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, Oxford University Press, London, 1965.
 2. Benny Pollack, 'Enfoques sobre los regimenes autoritarios en America Latina', Sistema, June 1984, Nos. 60-61, pp.37-62.
 3. ibid., p.43.

will thus be able to control the level of social conflict and its outcome. The influence of corporatism on populism as an ideology and as a paradigm of social organisation is obvious here. Genuinely populist regimes will therefore displace and incur the hostility of the democratic Right and of the marxist Left. In this sense, Argentina under Perón is a classic example of populist social control.

Populist regimes tend to use the resources of the State to undercut and displace the Left, and may mimic 'leftist' rhetoric. They aim to win the support of the working class and the mobilised masses, by using the resources of the State to intervene on behalf of labour, while at the same time using the State to control and limit the nature of their demands. Populist regimes thus integrate and restrict the emergent mass society at the same time. I shall examine below the failure of the Ibáñez government to consolidate populist relations with the newly formed labour federation, the Central Unica de Trabajadores; (CUT).

Some populist movements do not make the transition to populist regime because they do not win power - for example, the APRA movement in Peru. Ibáñez, however, won power at the head of a populist coalition, but the strictly populist phase of the regime was of short duration. In order to explain why this was so, it is first necessary to discuss the nature of social and economic development in Chile before 1952.

Social and Economic Development Before 1952.

Industrialisation in Chile took place under the hegemony of a middle class-working class alliance. It strengthened significantly the resources and autonomy of the State. Despite this, it did not displace the entrenched power of the ruling class. According to Ian Rox-

borough:

In Chile the amalgamation of the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy into a single class prevented the emergence of populism. Instead we find a relatively unified upper class challenged by the middle and working class. The result was a system of compromise and permanent negotiation - incorporation in the form of bourgeois parliamentary democracy.¹

The 'amalgamation' to which Roxborough refers dates from the late nineteenth century, when the latifundistas of the Central Valley, hitherto dominant politically and economically, showed themselves open to the 'new' wealth of the mining bourgeoisie. This had two important consequences for Chilean political development:

1. A relative absence of tension and conflict among Chilean economic elites in comparison with other Latin American nations. Chile lacked an anti-status quo-oriented sector of the bourgeoisie, who became the non-working class leaders of a populist alliance, according to Di Tella.²

2. The unity of the upper class in Chile obviously strengthened their hand vis-à-vis the demands for reform on the part of the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, who were increasingly better organised after the world depression of 1931-2.

Politically the Right was able to determine the 'rules of the game', even in the periods it was not in government. This was made evident particularly during the Popular Front and the subsequent Radical administrations. The centre-left Popular Front government chose to avoid confrontation, and to pursue a programme of industrialisation without implementing an agrarian reform, thus leaving untouched the

1. Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, The MacMillan Press, London, 1979, p.111.

2. Di Tella, op.cit.

traditional economic base of the ruling class. Through its economic power and parliamentary representation,¹ the Right was able to assert an influence over all administrations, especially when the reformist parties were divided amongst themselves in marked contrast to the cohesiveness of the upper class.

The Right was consistently pragmatic in its approach to the Radical governments in the 1940s. Industrialists resigned themselves to adjusting to a degree of State participation in the economy, and demanded terms as advantageous for themselves as possible, while still paying lip service to a free-market economy. The Liberal Party, meanwhile, had been prepared to participate in the government of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla. Ibáñez came under repeated pressure to accommodate the industrial bourgeoisie from the very beginning of his presidency. In terms of economic policy, this meant pressure to put an end to the inflationary spiral through the adoption of orthodox economic policies: cuts in wage and salary costs, reduction in demand, and a concomitant offensive against the trade union movement.

Entrepreneurial groups were able to put relentless pressure on successive governments through an established but informal network of personal contacts between the ruling class and any administration, and through the press. In 1952, the Chamber of Commerce published a series of articles in Santiago's newspapers, entitled 'The Causes of Inflation', which laid out as the causal factors of Chilean inflation, 'state expenditure, the wages of the workers, and the salaries of white collar employees!'.² El Mercurio, the influential right-wing daily paper,

-
1. The Conservative and Liberal parties were always exceptionally well represented in Congress, principally because of the corrupt practices common in Chilean elections prior to the reform of 1958, and because of the exclusion of a large proportion of the population through a literacy qualification.
 2. Chamber of Commerce (1952), Memoria.

systematically spoke out in favour of a stabilisation of wages from October 1952, and the employers' association, La Sociedad de Formento Fabril (SOFOFA), established personal relationships with some of Ibáñez's cabinet ministers, including Edecio Torreblanca, Guillermo Del Pedregal, and Arturo Zuñiga Latorre. As the populist base of the government disintegrated, so the pressure from the Right increased.

Chile has been subjected to political and economic domination since her integration into the international economy.¹ Until the depression of the early 1930s, this took the form of dependence on the export of primary products, nitrates especially. With the depression came the collapse of the international markets for Latin American export products. In response, a process of diversification of the economy was undertaken, based on the expansion of demand internally. This process became known as import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and relied especially on the implementation of protectionist economic policies. ISI was difficult in Chile however, because -

The extremely high degree of its integration into the pattern of world trade - for a country exporting raw materials - and its dependence on imports of food products which would be difficult to replace (tropical commodities and sugar, for instance) made Chile not only the country most violently affected by the crisis but also the one in which the import substituting process faced the greatest obstacles... The impossibility of curtailing imports and the need to increase imports of fuel and raw materials, such as cotton, in a phase when the import capacity had been reduced by a third, account for the slow rate of Chilean industrialisation in the 1930s.²

-
1. For a more detailed account of Chile's industrialisation, see F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, op.cit., and Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1970, on which this description is based.
 2. Celso Furtado, op.cit., pp.86-8.

Industrialisation stimulated the expansion of the middle sectors, who subsequently allied with the organised urban working class and the political parties of the Left in the Popular Front of 1938, defeating the Right-wing presidential candidate, Gustavo Ross. The victory of the Popular Front gave added impetus to the process of industrialisation via State-fostered development. At the same time, the middle sectors, who emerged not in response to dynamic industrialisation but who rather depended almost completely on the State, were now guaranteed an important and permanent role in politics. Once in power, the Radicals used the State to promote industrialisation, expand the education system, and proliferate the social services, all of which employed a large number of middle-ranking public employees, the party's main source of support. The Corporacion de Formento de la Producción (CORFO) was created in 1939 to finance and advise on economic growth and the development of economic infrastructure. CORFO consistently funded projects in which the risks were felt to be too high or the profits too low for private capital (infrastructure, electrification, pharmaceuticals, petroleum production, sugar refining, etc.). During the 1940s, the State became the motor of the Chilean economy, and its importance cannot be overstated. Furtado writes:

Chile is thus less a case of industrialisation based on spontaneous import substitution than of industrialisation fostered by State action designed to surmount the obstacles to the disruption of the foreign trade sector.¹

Chile's dependence on the United States did not lessen as a result of ISI policies, however, since the United States supplied most of the machinery and materials for Chilean industry, was a major source of loans

1. Furtado, op.cit., p.88. See pp.103-104 for the effects of the 1955-7 anti-inflationary programme, which attempted to reduce the State's role in the economy.

for the CORFO development programme, and had become the most important market for Chilean copper which had by now replaced nitrates as Chile's most important export. The Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia, outlawing the Communist Party, was in part brought about by U.S. pressure and a part of its anti-communist Cold War crusade in Latin America.¹

During the 1950s the industrialisation process in Latin America in general entered a period of crisis (the exhaustion of the 'easy phase of import substituting industrialisation'), slowing down the rate of industrial expansion, and leading to inflation and balance of payments crises. It was made more acute in Chile because of the relatively smaller internal market for finished goods, and because of the failure to resolve structural imbalances in the economy, especially under-production in agriculture and an unequitable land tenure system. Chilean economic elites began to look to investment from abroad, especially from U.S. private capital. At the same time, 'foreign industrial capital was searching for new markets. This search became connected with internal interests in a way that was acceptable at least to those in power'.² Chile's industrial bourgeoisie began to advocate policies, economic and political, which would appeal to U.S. investors and politicians, who may well be the most consistent advocates of the free market economy, as opposed to the protectionist, nationalist and statist development programmes associated with Latin American populist regimes (Brazil 1937-45, Argentina 1946-55).

Partly in order to attract U.S. investment, Chilean entrepreneurs began a campaign against the role of the State. While there had always existed a lobby for free-market economic policies, it was strengthened

1. Andrew Bernard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean relations with the United States', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol.13, No.2, 1981, pp.264-347.

2. Cardoso and Faletto, op.cit., p.157.

by the growing inflation in the late 1940s, and the increasingly combative labour movement. From the outset, the entrepreneurs advocated 'solving' inflation by means of orthodox remedies - lowering wages and demand. The Memoria of the Chamber of Commerce recorded in 1952:

Without a doubt the two main factors influencing the inflationary process in this country are wage increases and high taxes.¹

In 1950, Julius Klein, head of the U.S. firm of economic consultants, Klein-Saks, then currently employed by the right-wing Peruvian government of General Odría, visited Chile at the invitation of La Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio.

The economic problems of the 1950s limited the possibilities for the emergence of a populist regime in yet another way. Populist regimes in Latin America have traditionally been associated with periods of rapid economic growth, allowing room for political manoeuvre, and the satisfaction of contradictory sectoral interests, albeit only in the short term. Economic crises and rising inflation cannot allow this room for manoeuvre. Economic hardship tends to bring to a close 'populist' redistributive policies. In Argentina, for example, after three years of active economic intervention by the State, Perón fell back on orthodox stabilisation policies and by the early 1950s was looking for sources of increased foreign investment.

The Limited Reforms of the First Year

The administration opened with sweeping promises of reform. The Ibañista newspapers promised that the government would rapidly get a grip on inflation, began a vast programme of house building,² take action

-
1. Chamber of Commerce (1952), Memoria.
 2. See Prensa Libre 3/10/1952. Also La Nación 2/11/1952, where the Minister of the Interior, Guillermo Del Pedregal, rashly promised 'shanty towns will disappear'.

against price speculators and repeal the Ley de Defensa Permanente de Democracia. (In November 1952, the Minister of the Interior, Guillermo Del Pedregal, said to Congress: 'There exists a deep desire, shared by Chilean people of all classes, that the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia be derogated'¹). La Nación, the official government newspaper, commented approvingly on Bolivia's nationalisation of its tin,² and Raul Ampuero, Secretary-General of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) was interviewed in La Nación about the Bolivian nationalisation, and by extension, about Chile's dilemma over her copper policy.³

In October 1952 when Ibáñez took office, the government had two important advantages in their favour:

1. The size of the victory. Ibáñez had obtained 46.8% of the vote in a four-way contest. He commanded immense popular support, which helped the government to overwhelm the opposition in Congress, initially at least, where the anti-Ibáñez groups had a large majority. This was to be important especially with the passing of the Facultades Extraordinarias (Special Powers) by Congress.

2. A temporary economic boom between 1950 and 1952. Growth in the period 1949-1952 was high - 6% a year. Sales of copper increased to the United States because of the Korean War. The effects of this short-lived boom gave Ibáñez some initial advantages, although the long-term structural problems and trends remained unchanged. Inflation, which was an issue of primary importance during the campaign, also accompanied the mini-boom (see Table III.1).

-
1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarios, Cámara de Diputados, 4A, 26/11/1952.
 2. La Nación, 6/11/1952.
 3. La Nación, 2/11/1952.

TABLE III.1

EXCHANGE VALUE OF THE CHILEAN PESO
AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR¹

	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>PESOS</u>
	1943	32.16
	1944	31.53
	1945	32.05
	1946	34.42
	1947	47.15
	1948	59.82
	1949	77.74
	1950	89.88
	1951	85.48
	1952	123.87
	1953	174.10
December	1953	210.50
January	1954	235.00

The victorious Ibañista coalition contained sectors tied to the workers and also sectors tied to the bourgeoisie and the Right-wing. The first Cabinet reflected this heterogeneity which prevented the government adopting a really cohesive strategy. Divisions within Ibañismo and indiscipline, which were to haunt the administration and to make the formation of Cabinets almost impossible, were evident at the very beginning. Although the Agrario Laborista Party (PAL) had two representatives in the cabinet (Francisco Acevedo in the Ministry of Agriculture and Orlando Latorre in the Ministry of Justice) and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) had one representative (Clodomiro Almeyda as Minister of Labour), the Right maintained channels to the government

1. El Mercurio, 10/11/1955, p.3.

through 'independent' Ibañistas. In the first Cabinet these included Edecio Torreblanca (Minister of the Economy), Waldemar Coutts (Minister of Health), a leader of the Republican Militia in the 1930s, and Arturo Olavarría Bravo (Minister of Foreign Relations), deserter from the Radical Party and founder of Acción Chilena Anti-Comunista (ACHA). Col.(R) Abdón Parra, in the Ministry of Defence, was also a source of alarm to the left-wing of Ibañismo, setting as it did a precedent for the participation of military personnel in the government. Abdón Parra was later discovered to be a member of the pro-Ibáñez lodge in the Armed Forces called The Pumas.¹ Other Ibañista groups, as yet outside the Cabinet, were given sub-secretariats and positions in the Public Administration. This was especially the case with the Estanqueristas, whose leader Jorge Prat was named vice-president of the Caja de Ahorros, and who was later to be instrumental in the creation of the Banco del Estado. Both the Agrario Laborista Party and the Popular Socialist Party were strengthened by Cabinet changes in April and in June of 1953.

Although the long-term strategy proposed by the administration depended on winning a majority in Congress in the elections of March 1953, before these could take place the first Minister of the Treasury, Juan Bautista Rossetti, was successful in obtaining Facultades Extraordinarias from Congress for six months, to combat the economic problems and re-organise the government bureaucracy. (Law 11.151). Rossetti succeeded in part because of the alarming picture he painted:

I have come to the Honourable Senate to ask for the urgent dispatch of a bill to be able to pay the salaries of public employees, who otherwise would go unpaid... we are at the edge of an abyss of bankruptcy.²

1. See pp.215-20 for details.

2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 2A, 27/11/1952.

The government was able to put the Facultades Extraordinarias to only limited use. Inflation destroyed the benefits of some government action, as it did the first measures the administration took on taking office, amidst great publicity - the freezing of the prices of some 250 articles, including bread, meat, and vegetables. By January 1953, however, their prices had returned to their pre-November 1952 level.¹

Other government reforms were later reversed during the right-wing period in the second half of the administration. Some of the most important reforms of this period include:

1. The creation of the Instituto Nacional de Comercio (INACO) with the aim of regulating foreign trade.
2. The creation of the Banco del Estado, in June 1953, merging the Caja Nacional de Ahorros (Savings Institute), the Caja de Crédito Hipotecario (Mortgage Institute), and the Caja de Crédito Industrial (Institute of Industrial Credit).
3. D.F.L. No.173, broadening the powers of the Superintendencia de Abastecimientos y Precios, with the aim of maintaining a regular supply and a fair price for articles judged to be of 'prime necessity'.
4. The creation of the new Ministry of Mines.
5. The creation of the free port of Arica, the most northerly city in Chile, bordering Peru and Bolivia, and with the aim of stimulating development through trade.

1. El Siglo, 4/1/1953, p.3.

Others were reform with a social and popular content: wage and salary increases, the establishment of the minimum peasant wage, industrial compensation (in relation to years of service), and the creation of the Corporación de la Vivienda (CORVI).

By means of other decrees, Ministries and government agencies were reorganised. The Ibañistas took advantage of the Facultades Extraordinarias in this respect to remove many of the Radical functionaries in the Public Administration, appointed by previous regimes, which the Radical Party denounced as 'persecution of a political character',¹ and which helps explain the intransigence of the Radical opposition to Ibáñez. In spite of Rossetti's promise of 'technical reorganisation, with functional criteria',² the Ibañistas proved as hungry for political and public office as the Radicals had before them, and as ready to use the Public Administration as a sort of employment agency for government supporters. The Falangist journal, Política y Espiritu commented:

The Facultades Extraordinarias served only to disorganise the Public Administration still further, to increase expenditure, and to aggravate the problems they were supposed to solve.³

All these reforms were passed as Decrees with the Force of Law (D.F.L), without passing through Congress. Later Senators Raul Marín (Liberal) and Salvador Allende (Socialista de Chile) both complained that the government kept Congress very ill-informed about its actions. 'Nobody has any idea what economies have been effected through the... Facultades' complained Marín.⁴

-
1. Los Noticias de Ultima Hora, 22/11/1952, p.3.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 2A, 27/11/1952.
 3. Política y Espiritu, 7/11/1953, No.103, p.4.
 4. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 9A, 29/4/1953.

More pertinently, perhaps, the reforms did not touch the heart of the problems which they were supposed to address, which were inflation and excess bureaucratization. Inflation continued to gather pace throughout 1953, and in spite of the dismissal of many middle-ranking Radical functionaries, the Public Administration remained overstaffed and inefficient. There were signs that the administration lacked the will to see through a programme of reform, and was prepared instead to compromise with the political and economic establishment. It must be remembered that some members of the Cabinet and some 'personal friends' of the President, notably Rene Montero Moreno, Secretary-General of the government, were opposed to the influence of both the major ideological pillars of Ibañismo, the PSP and the PAL, and constantly undermined their influence. The PSP was later to explain its decision to withdraw from government in part because:

We have observed in many of the Ministers not only inexcusable vacillation, but also open connivance with those groups traditionally the enemy of the working class.¹

During the campaign, Ibañez had promised legislation against price speculation.² Although a bill establishing penalties for 'economic crimes' was sent to Congress in 1953, the administration actually gave the matter little attention and support. The Chamber of Commerce, the employers organisation, SOFOFA, and El Mercurio had successfully opposed similar projects sent by the Radical governments, and were

-
1. Resolution from the XV General Ordinary Congress of the PSP (October 1953). Quoted in Alejandro Chelén, Trayectoria Al Socialismo, Austral, Santiago, 1969, pp.136-7.
 2. The need for legislation against price speculation increased as inflation gathered pace, especially since it was suspected that some importers were marking prices up in the region of 500%.

immediately on the defensive:

What is called speculation in the language of the demagogue is only the breaching of those official prices which are incompatible with the realities of the market, and unjustifiable rationing, which is often only a camouflage for privilege.¹

However, it was the government's failure to obtain the legalisation of the Communist party that indicated most clearly its ambivalence towards reform. This was the issue on which the cooperation of the Popular Socialist Party depended, and the government's increasing anti-communism led to the party's withdrawal. A bill abrogating the Ley de Defensa Permanente de Democracia was included in the extraordinary sessions of October 1952-March 1953, but was successfully blocked by the Liberal and Conservative parties in Congress.² The Agrario Laborista deputy, Javier Lira Merino, explained later to the press that the bill failed through lack of will on the part of the government, and lack of organisation by the pro-reform parties in Congress.³ But by February 1953 Ibáñez declared he had changed his mind about legalising the Communist party.

A letter from the Secretary-General of the government, Rene Montero, to the President and published in El Mercurio made it clear that the 'independents' collaborating with Ibáñez, objected to the legalisation of the Communist party, and this contributed to the increasingly anti-Communist orientation of the government. They argued that reform of the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia would constitute 'a grave change to the security of the State', since 'communism was taking advantage of workers unrest'.⁴

-
1. El Mercurio, 3/9/1953, p.3.
 2. Although the opposition parties had a majority in Congress in theory, a majority in favour of abrogating the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia could have been mustered, because the Socialistas de Chile, most of the Radical Party, and the Falange Nacional would almost certainly have voted with the government on this issue.
 3. El Siglo, 23/1/1953.
 4. El Mercurio, 23/10/1953.

In September 1953, Ibáñez warned:

There is no economic plan that can be successful in an atmosphere dominated by industrial disputes. I have not come to preside over a country torn apart by social disorder, but to encourage hard work, and production, within a climate of order, discipline and collective self-sacrifice... the working classes should remember that the influence of Communism is powerful, and that it is a destructive and dangerous element.¹

With the impetus for reform lost at the beginning, Chile became more and more vulnerable to U.S. anti-communist pressure, especially during the 1953-55 period, as the country's stock of unsold copper piled up. This became an important reason for the delay in the passing of the reform until 1958. The U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had made clear the importance of an anti-communist line among U.S. allies at the Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, in 1954, especially because of the anti-imperialist orientation of the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz.²

The Formation of the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT)

The unification of the trade union movement in one single federation that lasted until its dissolution after the military coup in September 1973, was undoubtedly the greatest achievement of the populist phase of the regime. Raul Ampuero, Alejandro Chélen, and Julio Cesar Jobet, argue that Clodomiro Almeyda, the Popular Socialist appointed Minister of Labour in Ibáñez's first Cabinet, was an important source of support during the months leading up to the formation of the CUT.³

-
1. El Mercurio, 27/9/1953, p.17.
 2. On the Caracas Conference, see G. Connell Smith, The United States and Latin America : an historical analysis of inter-American relations, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1974, pp.212-215. The conference took place in March 1954, less than three months before the government of Arbenz was overthrown with the support of the United States.
 3. Alejandro Chélen, op.cit., p.132.

Almeyda had declared his firm intention to do everything in his power to assist the unification of the labour movement on taking office. He also declared that he was 'in favour of compulsory membership of trade unions for the workers, and of the formation of a single trade union federation'.¹

In the beginning, the government in general, and Ibáñez himself, were favourably inclined to the formation of the CUT. In the case of Ibáñez, this was probably due to the advantages he foresaw in the creation of a single trade union with strong governmental ties, and especially one controlled directly from the Presidential palace along the lines of the Ministry of Labour in Argentina. Government advances in this direction were rejected from the very beginning however, by Chilean labour leaders. Trade union members of the Comisión Nacional de Unidad Sindical (National Commission for Trade Union Unity) declared as early as November 1952:

We draw attention to the fact that our Commission of Unity is working towards a unified federation, independent of whatever government, free from the tutelage of all political parties, which will represent the principles of union democracy, and defend the permanent interests of the workers without exception.²

The Chilean labour movement had been historically combative, and with strong ideological traditions of socialism, communism, and anarchism. Furthermore, its long history of organisation and struggle, dating from the 1880s, helped maintain its traditional independence from government. Labour leaders then, were wary from the outset about government interference in the formation of the CUT. The PSP, the marxist pro-Ibáñez party, made it clear that it favoured the establishment of a

1. El Debate, 18/11/1952.

2. El Siglo, 17/11/1952.

central independent of government interference, and with a clear classist orientation.¹ Surprisingly perhaps, however, those few labour leaders belonging to the PAL also favoured a central independent of the administration, in spite of the party's theoretical adherence to corporatism, and its rejection of the idea of class struggle.

The unity of the labour movement had disintegrated in the 1940s due to bitter ideological disputes, especially between the Socialists and the Communists, compounded by the inter-party divisions rife in the Socialist party at this time. The process of disintegration reached a head in 1946 and led to the formation of two separate federations (both known as the CUTCH), one under Socialist leadership and the other led by the Communist party. These divisions seriously weakened the capacity of the labour movement to confront the increasingly right-wing orientation of the Gonzalez Videla administration. They were unable to offer any substantial opposition to either the orthodox deflationary programme of Jorge Alessandri as Minister of the Treasury (1947-50) or to prevent the passing of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, principally because the government was able to exploit the divisions within the labour movement. The Ley de Defensa de la Democracia operated at least as much against the independence and authority of trade unions, as it did against the civil rights of members of the Communist party. This was particularly so, since the Communists have traditionally been the most disciplined group within the Chilean labour federation. Thus, all sectors of the labour movement, Communist or not, regarded the repeal of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia as vital. For Ibañez, however, who was primarily interested in promoting trade union unity to serve the ends of the govern-

1. See interview with the PSP's General Secretary, Raul Ampuero, to this effect in Vea, 17/9/1952, p.5.

ment, the two were separate issues. Nonetheless, the initial harmony between the regime and the newly formed CUT had much to do with the government's promise to repeal the Ley Maldita, as it was popularly known.

When a Congreso Sindical was held in November 1952 to discuss the possibility of forming a unified federation, the Minister of the Interior, Guillermo del Pedregal was invited to address the meeting. Del Pedregal assured the Congress that 'the government does not fear your criticism. On the contrary, we want to know what you think, because the government is aware of what it owes to the people'. He went on to promise the creation of a Banco del Estado, and an agrarian reform.¹ He then promised the repeal of 'all hindrances to labour unity' - implying the reform of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia. In February 1953 the Constituent Congress of the CUT was held, in the presence of 2,400 delegates. On March 12th, 1953, the CUT held its first public meeting to which the President himself was invited.

Clearly the relations between the regime and the CUT were by no means hostile during the first six months of government. Two factors were soon to increase suspicions and hostility on both sides:

1. The victory of the anti-Ibáñez pro-Communist list in the elections for the National Executive of the CUT (see Table III.2). Five lists were presented:- the first, headed by Clotorio Blest, independent Catholic, and composed of Communists, Socialists of the Allende-led Socialist party of Chile, Radicals and Falangists; the second led by Manuel Collao, Popular Socialist, and supported by Ibañistas; the third, Anarcho-sindicalist;

1. Vea, 18/11/1952, p.4.

TABLE III.2

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE CUT, MARCH 1953¹

<u>PRESIDENT:</u>	Clotario Blest	(Independent)
<u>SECRETARY GENERAL:</u>	Baudilio Casanova	(P.S. de Ch.)
<u>VICE-PRESIDENT:</u>	Manuel Collao	(P.S.P.)
<u>SUBSECRETARY GENERAL:</u>	Isidoro Godoy	(Dissident Socialist)
<u>CONSEJEROS:</u>	Benardo Araya	(P.C.)
	Juan Vargas Puebla	(P.C.)
	Julio Alegría	(P.C.)
	Juan Diaz Iturrieta	(P.C.)
	Luis Figueroa	(P.C.)
	Eduardo Long	(P.S. de Ch.)
	Rosalía Figueroa	(P.S. de Ch.)
	Luis Quiroga	(Falange)
	Gilberto Cea	(Falange)
	Raul Pinto	(P.R.)
	Victor Urbina	(P.R.)
	Ortilio Olivares	(P.S.P.)
	Ramon Nuñez	(P.S.P.)
	Wenceslao Moreno	(P.S.P.)
	Miguel Pradenas	(Dissident Socialist)
	Manuel Ovalle	(Dissident Socialist)
	Leandro Moreno	(Independent)
	Elidoro Diaz Muñoz	(Independent)
	Ernesto Miranda	(Anarcho-Sindicalist)
	Ramon Dominguez	(Anarcho-Sindicalist)
	Hector Duran	(Anarcho Sindicalist)

1. Jorge Barría, Historia de la CUT, Prensa Latino Americana, Santiago, 1971, p.56.

the fourth, Trotskyists and the fifth, independent Ibañistas. The victory of the first list meant that the National Executive was dominated by representatives of the very political parties who were suspicious of the validity of Ibañismo as a popular pro-working class movement.

2. The increasingly anti-communist position of Ibáñez and the government. Although Guillermo Del Pedregal had promised the removal of all obstacles to trade union unity, Ibáñez himself showed little enthusiasm for the repeal of the Ley Maldita after taking office. When he arrived to address the public meeting of the CUT on the 12th of March, 1953, in Plaza Bulnes in the centre of Santiago, he declared: 'I have not come to recognise this federation', and underlined his distrust of the Communist party. He then announced that he had no intention of sending another bill to Congress legalising the Communist Party.¹

It can be legitimately concluded, therefore, that while it still seemed possible to influence or even control the CUT, Ibáñez was prepared to support its activities. The government did not encourage popular mobilisation, independent of its control, however. Nor did Ibáñez favour adopting a radical and unequivocal pro-labour position, as his dismissal of Clodomiro Almeyda, Popular Socialist, from the Ministry of Labour in March 1953 illustrated. Not only had Almeyda used his influence to promote and encourage the formation of the CUT, but he had also dismissed some officials from the Ministry hostile to organised labour, and replaced them with staff trusted by the trade union movement. Not surprisingly, industrialists were deeply alarmed at this, especially because of the powers of the Ministry of Labour to intervene in labour disputes.

1. Ercilla, 17/3/1953, p.4.

Finally, a friend of Ibáñez, textile magnate Juan Yarur, managed to persuade him to ask for Almeyda's resignation.¹ Almeyda was replaced by Leandro Moreno, member of the National Executive of the CUT, and long time supporter of Ibáñez.² Moreno, a trade unionist himself, and leader of the bakers' union, was a sharp contrast to the marxist intellectual Almeyda.

The appointment of Leandro Moreno was only one of the government's attempts to compromise the independence of the trade union movement. Maria de la Cruz of the Partido Feminino, another friend of the President, set up an anti-marxist labour federation, the Unión General de Asalariados, which Aniceto Rodriguez of the PSP, described as 'a group of petty declassé adventurers'.³ More seriously, Falangist Juan de Dios Carmona, alleged that the Unión General de Asalariados had received funding from the government.

Later, Maria de la Cruz was accused of accepting money from Argentina to set up another anti-marxist, anti-CUT and pro-government labour federation. The government was also party to the creation of a Labour Office inside the Moneda Palace in 1955, and intervened in trade union elections between 1955 and 1957, using the Koch-Yañez circular to declare invalid some of the results.⁴

-
1. Ercilla, 17/3/1953, p.4. See also Edesio Alvarado El Turco Tarud, Ediciones Territorio, Santiago, 1970, p.67. Ibáñez later acknowledged that Juan Yarur had been particularly generous during the presidential election campaign. See Luis Correa Prieto, op.cit., p.160.
 2. Leandro Moreno was forced to resign from the CUT first, before taking office.
 3. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 26/11/1952, p.3.
 4. See pp.167-8 for details.

Populist politics and the oligarchy : Rafael Tarud and CONDECOR

The most flamboyant and controversial figure in the administration during the first year was Rafael Tarud, President of the Consejo Nacional del Comercio Exterior (CONDECOR), and later also Minister of the Economy. His influence over the government was reputedly such that Vea, the popular weekly magazine, referred to him as 'The Tsar of the Nation's Economy and the Strongman of the Regime'.¹

CONDECOR had been established in 1947 in conjunction with the so-called preferential exchange rate to reduce duties payable on imports which were either to be used in industry or which had a clear social role (for example, medicines). Its policy decisions were therefore crucial to the economy as a whole, and to the industrial bourgeoisie in particular. CONDECOR was suspected of having become party to illegal 'deals' whereby the preferential exchange rate would be used to import luxury goods under the guise of industrial parts or other exempt articles, or to import currency which would later be sold on the black market. On his appointment, Tarud inaugurated an anti-corruption drive, which included leaked revelations to the press about past or current deals between ex-CONDECOR officials and various individual importers or sometimes well-known Chilean firms. One case involved four foreign consuls working in Santiago.²

Tarud's policy was to antagonise the oligarchy, and as such was unpopular with the 'independent' elements within the Cabinet. Ibáñez, however, refused to dismiss him because Tarud was also numbered among the personal friends of both Ibáñez himself and the influential First Lady, Graciela Letelier. Eventually the Liberals and Conservative parties tried

1. Vea, 17/6/1953, p.4.

2. Ercilla, 23/12/1952, p.4.

to impeach him instead. The contents of the accusation revealed that the motivations of the Right-wing parties were far from pure, however, and also point to a disturbing feature of the resentment of the upper class: it was based on the fact that Tarud was himself a successful businessman, though he was a first generation Chilean, his parents being Arab immigrants.¹ In other words, the accusation was founded on resentment fuelled by racism. It was stated in Congress, that:

Señor Tarud has been a failure as a Minister; he has endangered the nation's economy and has seriously compromised the nation's interests and the prestige of the government... Señor Tarud is ignorant of the traditions and civic practices of Chile, he is completely lacking in the political training, preparation and serenity which are necessary in government, he never could nor never will be able to understand that exercising authority is not the vain and capricious enjoyment of power.²

Impartial sources recognised the injustice of the charge and Tarud argued in his defence that he was the victim of the 'economic Right'. Nonetheless, the attempted impeachment only failed by the very narrow margin of 73 votes to 69.

The reasons underlying the charge were more complex than Tarud himself acknowledged, and related in part to the friction which existed between the government and the Congress. Members of the Congress complained constantly that they were not consulted nor even informed by the government. Tarud himself had a particularly bad relationship with Congress, partly because of the dominance of the Liberal and Conservative parties there (the only time he went as Minister of the Economy to report to Congress, he found himself unable to finish his exposition due to continuous interruptions from deputies and senators). Furthermore, Tarud was accused of giving preferential treatment to Arab businessmen over the traditional

-
1. Tarud's family came from Bethlehem. On the relationship between Ibáñez and the Chilean-Arab community, see Bray, op.cit.
 2. Quoted in Edesio Alvarado, op.cit., p.85.

Chilean bourgeoisie, and there may have been more than an element of truth in this accusation.

The PSP leaves the Cabinet : the End of Populism.

Between April and June 1953, Ibáñez restructured the Cabinet to give the PSP the key ministries which controlled the economy. Felipe Herrera was named Minister of the Treasury, Enrique Monti Minister of Labour, and Clodomiro Almeyda was appointed Minister of Mines. Rafael Tarud remained in the Ministry of the Economy. Herrera was then invited to draw up a 'plan' to combat inflation, in the wake of the failure of Juan Bautista Rossetti and the Facultades Extraordinarias¹ (see Table III.3).

Unfortunately, Herrera's room for manoeuvre was reduced immediately by the fall in copper prices in February 1953. Since economic expansion between 1947-52 was mainly conditioned by the expansion of foreign trade, especially copper, this was particularly damaging. The ending of the Korean War and the subsequent fall in demand for copper in the U.S. reduced Chile's capacity to import by 27% in 1953.²

TABLE III.3
INDEX OF PRICES AND THE COST OF LIVING IN SANTIAGO³

YEAR	INDEX OF THE COST OF LIVING		INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES	
	MARCH 1928 = 100	% of ANNUAL VARIATION	1913 = 100	% of ANNUAL VARIATION
1951	1,314.0	22.3	2,668.8	30.8
1952	1,605.5	22.2	3,309.0	24.0
1953	2,012.2	25.3	4,068.9	23.0
1954	3,465.8	72.2	6,386.9	57.0
1955	6,071.8	75.2	11,262.2	76.3

1. Rossetti had certain political advantages to combat inflation that could never be repeated during the period 1952-58, especially Ibáñez's enormous popularity. Anibal Pinto commented on Rossetti's failure: 'Rossetti lost this opportunity because of his limitations as a traditional politician'. Ercilla, 17/11/1953, p.6.
2. Enrique Sierra, Tres Ensayos de Estabilización en Chile, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1970, p.53.
3. Instituto de Economía de la Universidad de Chile, Desarrollo Económico de Chile, 1940-1956, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1956, p.215.

Herrera's plan became known as Que Paguen los Poderosos (Let the powerful pay). Despite its title, however, it did not propose any substantial anti-capitalist changes in the economy, and differed only in details from the other 'plans' proposed between 1952 and 1955.¹ One of the fundamental tenets of the plan was the unification of the exchange rate because of its systematic abuse by importers. The plan also proposed cuts in public expenditure of 1,500 million pesos (about 10 million dollars), compensatory wage rises of 15% for salaries below 7,550 pesos, and 10% for salaries between 7,550 and 25,000 pesos, and the introduction of a nominal family allowance of 400 pesos a month.

International lending agencies responded favourably to Herrera's proposals. The International Monetary Fund was ready to approve twelve and a half million dollars on the strength of the plan,² and the World Bank, a loan of twenty million.³ However, inside Chile, the plan was not greeted with much enthusiasm. The Right-wing parties criticised its 'populist' content - the wage increases and the family allowance. Bernardo Larraín of the Conservative party, argued that the plan did not reduce public expenditure nearly enough, since one and a half million pesos signified only 3% of the total budget. Neither did the plan propose any reduction in personnel. Industrialists were further alarmed by the government's recognition that a unified exchange rate would inevitably mean higher prices to the consumer, and it promised to offset these rises as much as possible by freezing some prices at the June 1953 level.

-
1. Herrera agreed with this (Interview, Aug. 1953). He added that he was able to work 'very amicably' with Jorge Prat, while Prat was Minister of the Treasury, and Herrera head of the Central Bank. Both their strategies differed significantly from that of inflacionista Guillermo Del Pedregal.
 2. El Mercurio, 6/9/1953.
 3. El Mercurio, 11/9/1953, p.1.

Neither was the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) very happy with the proposals of the plan. The CUT argued that government plans to freeze the prices of certain articles as promised would be ineffective and that the rises brought about by the unification of the exchange rate would be passed on to consumers. This was a major area of concern, since the rise in the cost of living in September 1953 was 9%, before any new rises might take effect.¹ In addition, wage increases in the region of 15% would be wiped out quickly, they argued, by the expected rise in inflation, which as it turned out was in the region of 40% in 1953 and 64% in 1954. Ercilla concluded that in general, the workers would be neither better nor worse off, and that industry would pay a small price.

However, to make the plan really effective, credit controls were necessary. These began to operate only days before Herrera's loss of power in October 1953. In any case, the implementation of credit controls depended on the cooperation of the Central Bank, which by tradition favoured reducing consumption by reducing wages and salaries as the means of tackling inflation. The President of the Central Bank, Arturo Maschke, opposed Herrera's plan as did some other prominent Ibañistas, including Osvaldo Koch, Minister of the Interior.

The Cabinet was forced to respond to an extent to criticisms from the labour movement of the plan, which they feared might undercut the government's popularity, especially with a senatorial by-election due in Santiago at the beginning of October 1953. In August, the Cabinet therefore voted to repeal the decrees dating from the Gonzalez Videla government limiting the countries with whom Chile could establish trading relations, especially in the matter of 'strategic materials', i.e. copper. This meant that the Cabinet had voted in favour of selling copper to the U.S.S.R.,

1. Ercilla, 27/10/1953, p.1.

who had made it clear that she would like to buy. However, a Cabinet meeting of September overturned the decision to trade with the U.S.S.R.¹ Politically, this signified a defeat for the PSP and the PAL, whose representatives in the Cabinet had championed the idea, by the 'independents' and the 'personal friends' of Ibáñez, a defeat which foreshadowed the fall of Herrera, and the PSP's decision to withdraw from government after the October by-election. Ercilla attributed the Cabinet decision to 'Ibáñez's personnel who are looking for an indirect understanding with the Right and want to separate themselves from the PSP'.¹

This incident pointed to a further problem during the initial populist phase of government: the inexperience of the government's team. For Ernesto Wurth Rojas, one of Ibáñez's biographers, this was crucial:

The Right-wing parties, rich in political experience, understood from the first that the great victory would be badly administrated, and that the victory would fall into their nets.²

The period of the Que Pagen los Poderos plan was characterised by inter-government divisions and resulted in a lack of co-ordination and in support for Herrera's initiative. In October the divisions were made public when the Ibañista groups were unable to agree on a single candidate for the senatorial by-election, and in the end presented three candidates. Socialista de Chile, Luis Quinteros Tricot won with the unanimous support of the Opposition from Conservatives and Liberals to Socialists and Communists. This lack of agreement - in effect the very heterogeneity of Ibañismo - prevented the adoption of any consistent anti-inflation plan until late 1955, when Ibáñez abandoned any pretensions at reform and reached an understanding with the Right.

1. Ercilla, 15/9/1953, p.4.

2. Ernesto Wurth Rojas, op.cit., p.29.

As a result of the vacillations within the administration, and Ibáñez's unwillingness or inability to challenge the status quo, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) decided to withdraw from further participation in the government. The party proclaimed itself loyal, however, to the 'Septembrist' programme of 1952. Secretary-General of the PSP and later Senator Raul Ampuero said:

We wanted to use the opportunity to solve Chile's social tensions and economic problems by peaceful means, electorally and democratically. Although we could have - and we did - entertain certain doubts about the other political ingredients in the movement, and although we knew that the personal position of the candidate was not ideal, we thought it fitting, and historically necessary that a party with specific objectives try to orient the enormous mass gathered around this 'Candidate of Hope'.

Sadly, the oligarchic forces, the forces of foreign capital, the regressive elements have been more capable than we have, and the experience has confirmed what the ex-Minister Guillermo Del Pedregal publically affirmed: 'The people win the elections but have lost every government. The Right may lose the elections, but on the other hand, all governments capitulate to the sovereignty of the economic interests it represents'.¹

The First General Strike

The departure of the PSP from government created the conditions for a confrontation between the regime and the workers, especially given the suspicions of the anti-Ibañista leadership of the CUT, and the increasingly free-rein given to the anti-labour groups within the government. The rises in the cost of living were also a crucial factor, given the fact the white-collar militancy especially, will tend to respond primarily to a worsening of its economic situation.

1. Bolétin de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 26A, 26/7/1956. In spite of the disillusionment with Ibáñez, the PSP pointed to the first year as 'the most positive of the six years of the government'. Chelén, op.cit., p.136.

Tension between the government and the CUT came to a head when the recently appointed Minister of the Interior, General Jorge Araos declared that the government would prosecute the President of the CUT, Clotario Blest for declarations he made at a rally celebrating the First of May. Blest had called President Ibáñez who was present at a small celebration of pro-government union leaders, a 'traitor to the working class'. Araos himself had earlier denounced the CUT as 'illegal' and the Sub-secretary of the Interior, Carlos Ferrer, declared it to be 'seditious'.¹ When Blest was detained on the 12th of May, the CUT called for a one-day General Strike on the seventeenth of May in solidarity and protest. The CUT also used the strike to demand the repeal of the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia, the establishment of a minimum wage, and the stabilisation of prices.

The participation of unionised workers in the general strike of May 17th was high, and included doctors, teachers, civil servants, health service workers, coal and copper miners. The strike was also supported by university students. Santiago was almost totally paralysed as a result, and the government was forced to use the troops to maintain essential services. In this sense, the strike was successful; also, Blest was freed and an amnesty obtained in Congress for him and for participants in the strike since it was illegal. But the other demands of the CUT were ignored. Historian of the Chilean labour movement, Jorge Barria, described the result as 'only a truce'.²

While the government argued in La Nación that the strike was illegal, the Left was unequivocal in assigning responsibility for the strike at the government's feet. The independent daily, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora

-
1. Ercilla, 18/5/1954.
 2. Barria, op.cit., p.58.

blamed:

The continuation of a policy of systematic hostility towards the Central Unica... At the same time, the government is supporting the activities of a central obrera callampa known as the Union Nacional Laborista, which Maria de la Cruz has organised and directs.¹

The strike was broadly supported by the entire opposition even by the Liberal party. Deputy Hugo Zepeda, President of the Party, agreed that the government was primarily responsible:

We Liberals have firmly rejected these sorts of demonstrations... but nonetheless, I have to recognise that the government has to bear a considerable burden of the responsibility for this strike.²

The sector most embarrassed by the open hostility between government and labour was the Agrario Laborista Party (PAL). The strike threw it into confusion and posed a fundamental dilemma for the party, which the PAL deputy and the vice-president of the party, Rene Benavides, recognised. He said:

We cannot play a double role... Either we are with the government or we are against it.³

The dilemma of the PAL was in fact an inevitable one. As the government moved more openly towards a repression of the labour movement and to the Right in its actions if not yet completely in its rhetoric, the PAL was caught between wishing to remain in government, with all the advantages that entailed - ministries, posts in the Public Administration, access to the media, etc. - but not wanting to abandon its claims to be a labourite party.

-
1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 10/5/1954, p.8.
 2. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 18/5/1954, p.3.
 3. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 18/5/1954, p.3.

The Prat Plan

With the party base of Ibañismo disintegrating, Ibáñez began to look beyond the original components of his first Cabinets: personal friends, the PAL and the PSP. The personal friends remained, but Ibáñez increasingly looked for a ministerial team, which would be able to muster a congressional majority for its economic policies. As all these attempts were frustrated - they included an approach to the Right-wing Radical Alfredo Duhalde, and the best-known initiative, the so-called 'Frei Plan'¹ - Ibáñez sought the support of his most controversial supporters, the Estanqueristas. Jorge Prat became Minister of the Treasury in July 1954, promising 'technical' solutions to rising inflation.² His plan involved sacrifices from both workers and entrepreneurs. A minimum wage was to be established for the workers, but, on the other hand, they were to lose their right to strike. Further, wage increases were to be no higher than 60% of the rise in the cost of living for 1955. The entrepreneurs were pleased by the restrictions on trade union activity that the plan implied, but far less happy about the much stricter credit controls Prat promised to introduce, and the changes in taxation he recommended, in order to increase the revenue to central government. Both sides were alienated by certain authoritarian tendencies within the plan: the CUT by the further impediments and restrictions on trade union activity, and the industrialists by the proposed Junta de Establizacion Economica which would oversee the programme. Prat recognised in theory, like Herrera before him, the need

-
1. The respected Falangist Senator, Eduardo Frei, later President of the Republic, 1964-70, came very close to heading a new Cabinet in June 1954. He even drew up an 'economic plan' which differed little from those of Herrera or Prat. The initiative collapsed because of lack of agreement between Frei and Ibáñez over details and personnel.
 2. See interview in Vea, 18/8/1954, p.4, during which Prat said he was 'allergic to politics'.

for an agrarian reform, though neither had enough time in office to even begin drawing one up.

Failure to reduce inflation was not due to a shortage of technical solutions, or of qualified personnel to carry them out, but was rather due to political factors. Anti-inflationary programmes were extremely costly politically to implement, and while the opposition of the labour movement was vociferous - the CUT threatened another general strike in October 1954, circumvented only by the government's closing the extraordinary sessions in Congress and decreeing a state of siege - the most effective opposition, prior to 1955, actually came from the entrepreneurial groups and the Right-wing parties. Their opposition was fundamental in the government's abandoning the plan.¹

In fact, however, Prat's period in office was dominated less by economic debate than by public controversy over the Cabinet's authoritarian tendencies and its heavy-handed use of state of siege powers. The two Ministers of the Interior of this period, Abdon Parra and Arturo Olavarría Bravo, were both suspected of wanting to close Congress permanently. The opposition itself was mobilised more in defence of civil liberties and against repression than against the economic measures of Prat.

Meanwhile the economic crisis continued to worsen. Strikes spread from the copper mines to the banks and the health service. El Mercurio urged the government to take 'stern action' against strikers.² The government's and the Right-wing press' obsession with the damaging effects

-
1. Marcelo Cavarossi argues that the major stumbling blocks in the adoption of an anti-inflation programme, were the entrepreneurs, not the workers: 'Chile's industrial entrepreneurs have supported only those stabilisation plans which did not involve a serious economic or political threat to their interests. They were able to successfully fight all attempts to which they were opposed'. Marcelo Cavarossi, op.cit.
 2. El Mercurio, Editorials, 1-12/9/1954.

of strike action on the national economy distracted public attention away from the government's role in the economic and social crisis. Two years of government inaction and vacillations vis-à-vis inflation, had left central government without the funds to pay for even the most essential services. The personnel in the health service, for instance, were in fact on strike over the issue of under-financing and the government's projected cuts. The budget for the Ministry of Health had been originally set at 12,000 million pesos for 1955, but was reduced by a half, to 6,000 million.¹ The Medical College issued a statement expressing its profound concern at government policy:

Not only is there no money for new buildings, but there is not enough for the normal running of the old hospitals... the supply of medicines and indeed of food is reduced to the absolutely indispensable...

The personnel, technical, administrative and auxiliary staff are not receiving their salaries on time, but weeks later... more than once, the sick in hospital have been forced to suffer while the auxiliary staff go on strike, which seems to be the only possible way they have of obtaining their wages.

The letter alleges that the government is deliberately trying to bring the health service into disrepute, in order to put public spending further.²

In September 1954 Ibáñez declared a state of siege in the provinces of central Chile (Santiago, Valparaíso and O'Higgins), and in Antofagasta in the far North in response to the strike action which was spreading to the transport unions, the teachers and the printers. (As a result of the

-
1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 5A, 19/10/1954 Senator Luis Bossay of the Radical Party, candidate in the 1958 Presidential elections, suggested that public expenditure should be reduced in defence, rather than in health.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 5A, 19/10/1954. Inserted at the request of Luis Bossay.

printers' strike, production of the two government-owned newspapers, La Nación and the evening paper, Los Tiempos, was temporarily halted.) It was the strike in the copper mines which was most costly however, - in El Teniente alone, the Braden-owned mine, the company estimated the strike cost 200,000 dollars daily.¹ In order to bring the strike to an end, General Eduardo Yañez, military commander of the province of O'Higgins where the mine was situated, drafted the striking miners into the army, then ordered the new recruits to return to work in the mines, on pain of court-marshal.

The Opposition's concern about the government's respect for public liberties mounted, particularly since it was known that Ibáñez was considering the possibility of changing the 1925 constitution to strengthen the powers of the Executive. The arrest of leading journalist Luis Hernandez Parker, of Ercilla, the closing of the Communist newspaper El Siglo and the detention of its editor worsened the situation. A committee to defend civil liberties, the Frente Civico was formed in October 1954, the CUT, the University Students' Federation (FECH),² the PSP, the Falange Nacional, the Radical Party, the small Partido de Trabajo, the PS de Chile, the Communist Party, and the Movimiento Nacional Cristiano. The Frente Civico issued a statement expressing its concern for Chile's democratic institutions because of the triumph of 'fascist elements' in the government.³

In spite of the anti-communist Cold War climate in pan-American relations, especially after the U.S. invasion of Guatemala, the New York

1. Hispanic-American Report, September 1954.
2. The FECH had never been 'Ibañista' as such, not even in 1951 or 1952, in spite of Ibáñez's overwhelming popularity. The Radical Party, the Left-wing parties and the Falange were the most widely represented.
3. Les Noticias de Ultima Hora, 1/11/1954, p.3.

Times recognised the fears of the Opposition in Chile as legitimate:

These events re-awakened congressional fears that President Ibáñez's putting the country under martial law was a step towards eventual suspension of all constitutional procedures.¹

Conclusion

Prat's economic plans were overtaken by political events. The clashes between the executive and Congress, and between the administration and the labour movement dominated the Prat-Parra/Olavarría Cabinet rather than the economic problems. Ironically, the 'conspirator' in the Cabinet was not Jorge Prat at all, but rather the Minister of the Interior, Arturo Olavarría. Prat himself claimed he resigned because of fundamental disagreements over Olavarría's authoritarian style of government.

I resigned as Minister of the Treasury precisely because I disagreed with Olavarría, when he did not recognise the futility of declaring a state of siege. I was opposed to Olavarría's orders to detain the editors of Las Noticias de Última Hora and La Tercera de la Hora; In October 1954 when I was still Minister, along with Roberto Aldunate,² I was able to obtain the release of the journalist, Hernandez Parker, who had been arrested. Although I believe in authoritarian government, I was never in favour of decreeing a state of seige while I was Minister.³

The resignation of Jorge Prat brought a definite close to the first phase of the regime. The exit of the PSP and the defeat of Prat ended any possibility of implementing populist or nationalist policies. From 1955 onwards, the Ibáñez government moved increasingly away from the radical positions it had espoused during the campaign, and showed itself ready to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. State Department, the American multi-national corporations mining Chilean copper, and the local bourgeoisie, with respect to its labour and economic policies.

-
1. Quoted in Hispanic-American Report, October 1954.
 2. Roberto Aldunate was Minister of Agriculture.
 3. Vea, 1/2/1956, p.9.

CHAPTER IVTHE END OF REFORMISM: FROM THE
NUEVO TRATO TO THE KLEIN-SAKS MISSION

By the beginning of 1955, the government was facing a deepening political and economic crisis and the decisions taken during the course of the year were to decide Ibáñez's orientation during the second half of his term of office. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the political changes which were taking place and in this way explain how a relationship developed, fostered through personal contacts, between the President and the Right wing in Congress, on the basis of the long-awaited legislation on copper policy, the government's harsh response to the General Strike of July 1955, and the strikes of August and September, and the administration's growing desperation to lower the inflation rate. These issues also divided a previously united Congressional opposition, and prepared the way for the realignment of political forces along the more traditional left-right axis which was to take place in 1956. The government's anti-communism and emerging entente with the business community also made possible a greater degree of harmony with the United States and foreign investors than was thought possible during the campaign. The most concrete evidence of this was in the passing of the Nuevo Trato copper legislation, and later the invitation to the New York consultancy of Klein-Saks to advise the government on an anti-inflationary strategy.

The background to the gathering economic crisis, and shifting policy direction was the growing estrangement between Ibáñez and the PAL, Ibáñez's main source of support until then. Although some members were to cooperate with Ibáñez until the end of the administration, they did

so in an individual capacity.

For organisational reasons, I shall deal separately with the new legislation for copper, the government's repression of the independent trade union movement it had earlier supported, and the political crises taking place at Cabinet and Congressional level. Obviously, however, these occurred more or less simultaneously. They were also all affected by the growing inflation rate, reaching 37.2% during June alone.¹ Finally it is important to remember that these developments also coincided with and were influenced by the discovery of a supposedly secret military lodge, known as the Línea Recta in the Army, and attempts on the part of Ibáñez to reform the Constitution giving more power to the executive.

Copper: The Price of Dependency

While many criticisms can be made of the concept of dependency,² it nonetheless remains a useful method in understanding the nature of economic and political structures and processes in Latin America, and the way in which Latin American development had been conditioned by its insertion into the world economic system. It may be especially relevant to Chile, because of Chile's early integration into the world economic system as a mining enclave through the development of the nitrate industry, under the auspices of British capital in the last quarter of

1. El Mercurio, 24/8/1955

2. For the debate on the usefulness of the dependency theory as a method of understanding Latin American political and economic development, see P.O'Brien 'A Critique of Latin American theories of dependency', I. Oxaal et al (eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975; and Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency: A Formal Model of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment?', World Development, No. 6, 1978, pp.881-924.

the nineteenth century. Income from the nitrate revenues was controlled by the strengthened and centralised state apparatus, which was in turn controlled by the oligarchical groups.

Despite the fact that Chilean nitrates dominated the world markets before the First World War, Chile's share of the profits nonetheless remained relatively small. In 1888, for example, while the nitrate exported to Europe was valued at 79 million dollars, only 28.7 million remained in Chile.¹ Revenues from Chile's mineral wealth financed a degree of diversification of the economy, giving rise to the development of middle sectors engaged in services and commerce in addition to those associated with the administration of the nitrate revenues.

When copper began to replace nitrate as the main extractive industry in Chile after the invention of cheap synthetic nitrate fertiliser in Germany, a similar pattern was repeated: foreign ownership, foreign investment and repatriation of most of the profits. At more or less the same time that copper became Chile's main source of foreign exchange, the United States replaced Great Britain as the main investor and the hegemonic centre for Latin American trade. North American capital displaced British capital to an important extent in the nitrate industry,² and more than 95% of Chilean copper was extracted by three U.S. enterprises, who acquired the mines in 1911: Chile Exploración (Chuquicamata), Andes Copper Mining Company (Portrerillos), and the Braden Copper Company (El Teniente). Only the pequeña minería, contributing less than 5.9% of the total copper production, was in the

-
1. Hernan Ramirez Necochea, Historia del Imperialismo en Chile, Austral, Santiago, 1970, p.62.
 2. By the time Ibáñez became president for the second time, 60% of nitrate mines belonged to the U.S. company, Anglo-Lautraro, 30% were in British hands, and 10% belonged to either other foreign groups or Chilean entrepreneurs. However, the state exercised a degree of control through the Corporación de Ventas de Salitre y Yodo de Chile. For more details see Panorama Económico, 4/3/1955, No. 117.

hands of Chilean entrepreneurs.

By 1952, Chile was producing between 15% and 21% of the world's total output of copper; its central importance to the Chilean economy can be measured by the fact that nearly a half of her total revenue for 1952 came from copper (191 million 773 thousand dollars out of a total 440 million dollars).¹ The following figures are a small illustration of the inequality of the relationship between the companies mining the copper and the Chilean state: between 1911 and 1950 the North American companies extracted around 8,885,173 tons of copper, valuing 2,200,836 million 7 thousand 536 dollars. Of that, 60% left Chile completely, and the remaining 40% included wages to employees, machinery, and new investment, as well as all taxes paid to the state.² Investment amounted to only 53½ million dollars from 1911 to 1948. The original investment in El Teniente amounted to less than 10 million dollars in 1926, and by 1952 Braden had repatriated 329 million dollars.³ In fact, the pequeña minería, property of Chilean entrepreneurs, paid a greater contribution in taxes, in proportion to its production, since it paid 19% more for every pound of copper exported than the gran minería.

1. Vea, 25/1/1953.
2. The figures are from Vea, 28/1/1953. Wages were not especially high, as the following anecdote illustrates: on a visit to Chile in 1952 a U.S. trade unionist commented 'with a lighter work load and less sacrifice, an American worker earns 16½ dollars daily in U.S. copper mines, while the Chilean miner earns only 1½ dollars a day', Vea, 28/1/1953. Working conditions were also poor. The Communist newspaper, El Siglo consistently brought to public notice the high accident rate in the mines, and the lack of educational and welfare provisions. See especially the editions of March and April, 1955.
3. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 30A, 20/1/1955.

During the 1950s the Latin American economies entered the difficult phase of growth, known as 'the exhaustion of import-substituting industrialisation'. In Chile, this coincided with the formation and victory of a nebulous and heterogenous populist movement around the figure of General Ibáñez. Certain indications suggested that once in office Ibáñez would implement a developmentalist economic programme, based on extensive public expenditure and state control. These were:

1. The legacy of Ibáñez's first government, 1927-1931, during which the President made use of public money to build up economic infrastructure and to provide some basic social welfare provisions to lessen the effects of the post-1918 economic depression from which Chile never fully recovered. Perhaps the most important of Ibáñez's reforms was the creation of the Corporación de Salitre (COSACH), introducing for the first time a degree of state participation in Chile's mining exports. The expansion of the 1927-1931 period was financed to a large degree by loans from the U.S., and Ibáñez apparently saw no contradiction in expanding the role of the state, and at the same time deepening Chile's dependency on the vagaries of the international economy and the U.S.
2. The Chilean tradition, dating from the 19th century, of a centralized state and a powerful administrative apparatus, unique in Latin America, which was utilised to a maximum by the Popular Front and the successive Radical governments in the 1940s to create the conditions and provide the economic, financial, and political stimulus for industrial growth.¹ As a result, Chilean industries were heavily dependent on state

1. On the relationship between the state and industrialisation in Chile, see O. Sunkel, Historia Económica de Chile, 1830-1930. Ediciones Cultura Hispanica de Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Madrid 1982; M. Mamalakis, The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From Independence to Allende, Yale University Press, London, 1976; and Celso Furtado, op.cit.

regulation, Government loans, protective tariff barriers etc. By 1952, Chile had evolved towards the establishment of a 'mixed economy', accepted, to a greater or lesser degree, by an important proportion of the business community. It seemed unlikely that Ibáñez, champion of public-expenditure-led growth in the 1920s, would fundamentally change this policy.

3. The anti-imperialist content of Latin American populism, and the identification of Ibáñez with Peronism, and to a lesser extent with the MNR and Paz Estensorro in Bolivia. This indicated that Ibáñez might embark upon a campaign to lessen Chile's dependency.

4. Many of Ibáñez's supporters during the election campaign openly called for the nationalisation of the extractive industries - copper, nitrates and coal, and the creation of powerful mechanisms of state control over private capital. Supporters of nationalisation comprised a broad spectrum of Ibáñez's supporters, ranging from the nacionalistas in the tradition of Francisco Encina at Estanquero, to the PSP, and including an important sector of the PAL.

Not all Ibañistas thought alike on this, however. The first Minister of the Economy, Edecio Torreblanca, came out strongly against nationalisation immediately, and also opposed the creation of a Corporación de Ventas - included in the joint PAL - PSP programme - which he condemned as excess bureaucratisation.¹

When Ibáñez took office, the problems of Chile's extreme dependence on her extractive industries were made worse by the decrees passed by President Gonzalez Videla at the wishes of the U.S. State Department, preventing the sales of 'strategic materials' - copper and nitrate -

1. El Siglo, 10/11/1952.

to the Soviet Union. The President of the Caja de Amortización, Santiago Wilson, later Minister of the Interior and of Justice, estimated that lost nitrate sales alone had cost the country 14 million dollars.¹

Indignation inside Chile at the injustice of the situation was by no means limited to left-wing sectors, but shared by the Falange Nacional, sectors of the Radical Party, and even some Liberals and Conservatives. This was acknowledged within the State Department in 1951; the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Edward Miller, noted in a confidential memorandum:

There has been a build-up of considerable anti-U.S. feeling in conservative and middle-class circles [in Chile] based primarily on the handling of the copper question.²

The model developed between 1948 and 1953 by Argentine economist Raul Prebisch of the Economic Commission for Latin America provided the theoretical framework for those politicians and economists who argued that Chile had thus far been unable to take advantage of her copper deposits for the purposes of national development, since it strongly attacked the notion of export-led growth, demonstrating instead how the declining terms of trade for primary products had impaired Latin American development.³ The almost total unity on the need to defend the terms of trade extended to the business community. The resentment was fuelled by the price ceilings arbitrarily fixed by the U.S. government on the price of copper, during the Korean War, and the subsequent

1. El Siglo, 8/11/1952.
2. The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. II, p.1239.
3. See The United Nations Economic Survey of Latin America, 1948, The Relative Prices of Exports and Imports in Underdeveloped Countries, United Nations, 1949, and The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, United Nations, 1950.

restriction on sales to the Eastern bloc.¹

There was no uniform agreement, however, on what the solution should be. While the Left favoured nationalisation, Chilean entrepreneurs and the Liberal and Conservative parties continued to believe that only 'adjustments' in the relations between the U.S. and Chile were necessary. The voice of the business elite, El Mercurio, termed nationalisation of copper a 'xenophobic', solution and favoured deepening the relationship with 'the secure and stable markets of the U.S.A.'.²

The Nuevo Trato, as it eventually emerged from Congress, reflected the position of the Right-wing, who remained happy about the growth of U.S. capital investment in the Chilean economy in general throughout the 1950s (see Table IV.1), and eager to encourage it, notwithstanding the creation of a Corporación de Ventas to control and monitor copper sales.

TABLE IV.1

U.S. INVESTMENT IN CHILE (in millions of dollars)³

<u>AREAS OF INVESTMENT</u>	<u>1929</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1950</u>
MINING	332	215	351
PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES + TRANSPORT	67	66	137
MANUFACTURING	7	28	29
TRADE	13	7	15
OTHERS	4	13	8
TOTAL	<u>423</u>	<u>329</u>	<u>540</u>

1. See for example, the Memoria of the Cámara de Comercio in Santiago, 1951, which opposed nationalisation and state intervention in general, but agreed that copper is an 'exceptional case'.

2. El Mercurio, 24/1/1955.

3. Panorama Económico, 4/3/1955, No. 117.

The growth of U.S. investment in public utilities and transport left 25% of all railways, 70% of telephone services, and the greater part of all electrical energy generated in Chile in foreign hands.

The Nuevo Trato and its Consequences

The Nuevo Trato finally emerged from Congress the 5th of May, 1955 after fourteen months of heated discussion. It ended two and a half years of indecision on the part of the government, during which stocks of copper had mounted unsold, reaching 156 thousand tons in February, 1954.¹ Following an agreement in 1951, the Convenio de Washington, Chile controlled 20% of copper sales, but she could only trade with Western markets, which were in general supplied by the U.S. companies themselves, especially as demand fell in the U.S. itself at the end of the Korean War. As a result, Chile suffered a big drop in foreign exchange, cutting her capacity to import drastically. The worsening of the economic situation provoked a prolonged political crisis within the government. In the wake of the disintegration of Ibañismo, Ibañez increasingly leaned towards the offer of support from the Right. Juan Antonio Coloma, President of the Conservative Party, had declared as early as March, 1954:

We are prepared to support a Cabinet of national confidence. What Chile needs now is a team capable of finding solutions using technical criteria, and with a sense of justice. In view of the predicament in which the country finds itself, I am sure that the great majority of the population are dismayed that nothing is being done while the economic situation worsens.²

-
1. Worth 100 million dollars at the 1954 exchange rate. Ercilla, 9/2/1954, p.2.
 2. Ercilla, 23/3/1954.

The Nuevo Trato provided a part of the basis of the agreement with the Right, especially the Conservative party, which was established mid to late 1955.

The new legislation attempted to create a 'good investment climate' for Chilean copper. It presumed that the steady decline in Chile's share of the world copper production, and the fall in government revenues, could both be solved by encouraging the U.S. companies to invest and produce more using reduced taxes as the incentive. Production costs of the U.S. companies would be reduced by between 60% and 70%. As such, it was based on a false premise, since world demand for copper fluctuates, an error pointed out at the time by Panorama Económico :

The fundamental defect of the legislation is that it is based on guaranteeing 'automatic incentives' to an industry which is tied in such a way to external factors that in many cases it is not enough to lower taxes to bring about new investment and increase production.¹

The irony of the new legislation was that the PAL-PSP programme had promised reform, but reform, expanding the role of the state in the copper industry. Instead, the Nuevo Trato demonstrated a belief in liberal economic theory, repeated again in the stabilisation policies of 1956-57.

Chilean economists warned at the time that to simply increase exports would not solve the economic crisis because, within the existing structure of the economy, increased exports would only simultaneously increase the vulnerability of the economy.²

Ibáñez claimed at the opening of Congress in 1957 that under the Nuevo Trato, investment had increased to 127 million dollars.³

1. Panorama Económico, 5/7/1955.

2. For more details see Panorama Económico, 5/7/1955.

3. See The Presidential Message to Congress, 21/5/1957.

While there is clearly some confusion about the exact figures, most sources argue that the rate of investment produced by the new legislation was in fact disappointing. Using the statistics of the Chilean Department of Copper, it is arguable, indeed, whether the legislation actually attracted any new investment at all (see Tables IV.2 and IV.3).

TABLE IV.2

GROSS INVESTMENT OF ANACONDA AND KENNECOTT IN CHILE¹
(millions of dollars)

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>ANDES (ANACONDA)</u>	<u>CHILEX (ANACONDA)</u>	<u>BRADEN (KENNECOTT)</u>
1945-1950	34	0	30	5
1950-1955	115	0	107	8
1955-1960	169	104	51	13
1960-1965	83	14	41	27

TABLE IV.3

NET^A INVESTMENT OF ANACONDA AND KENNECOTT IN CHILE²
(millions of dollars)

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>ANDES (ANACONDA)</u>	<u>CHILEX (ANACONDA)</u>	<u>BRADEN (KENNECOTT)</u>
1945-1950	7	(-12)	19	0
1950-1955	84	(-8)	89	3
1955-1960	105	93	6	6
1960-1965	(-35)	(-42)	(-6)	14

A. The net investment is the gross investment minus depreciation of currency and produces a more realistic figure.

1. Theodore Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, Princeton University Press, London, 1974, p.104.

2. *ibid.*

On the other hand, while Government revenue from copper increased, initially at least, the profits Kennecott and Anaconda made increased by a much greater percentage. As early as February 1954, Ercilla had pointed out that the Nuevo Trato would signify a considerable loss of revenue to the government.¹ Vistazo, the Communist publication, estimated the net losses at up to 52 million dollars annually² (see Tables IV.4 and IV.5). Moreover, within three months of the passing

TABLE IV.4

TOTAL TAX REVENUE FROM ANACONDA AND KENNECOTT³
(in millions of dollars)

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>ANDES</u> <u>(ANACONDA)</u>	<u>CHILEX</u> <u>(ANACONDA)</u>	<u>BRADEN</u> <u>(KENNECOTT)</u>
1945-1950	148	12	86	48
1950-1955	180	10	91	79
1955-1960	468	19	223	225
1960-1965	441	8	221	216

TABLE IV.5

PROFITS OF CHILEX AND BRADEN, AFTER TAX⁴

CHILEX	1950-1955	\$ 14.4 million a year
(ANACONDA)	1955-1960	\$ 29.4 million a year
BRADEN	1950-1955	\$ 11.2 million a year
(KENNECOTT)	1955-1960	\$ 20.0 million a year

1. Ercilla, 19/2/1954, p.4.

2. Vistazo, 10/5/1955, p.4.

3. Moran. op.cit.. p.106.

4. ibid.

of the Nuevo Trato Falangist Eduardo Frei pointed out in the Senate that while the U.S. paid a fixed price of 36 centavos per pound, prices on the London Metal Exchange were reaching 46 centavos per pound.¹ Criticisms of this sort typified the rapid disillusionment with the economic efficacy of the Nuevo Trato. Ultimately, it increased Chile's vulnerability to fluctuations in external trade, and left the decision-making in the hands of foreign enterprises.

The passing of the Nuevo Trato divided the opposition which had previously united against the Government. While the Left-wing parties firmly opposed the concessions to the U.S. companies, the Right-wing welcomed the initiative represented by the new legislation. Along with the Government's anti-union drive in mid-1955, the Nuevo Trato was part of a new harmony between the Government and the business community, and part of a search for an understanding with the U.S.A..

Ibáñez and the Labour Movement

The Government's relationship with the labour movement was one of steady decline during the first six months of 1955. Although some effort was made to include some leaders of the CUT in a short-lived and half-hearted initiative to set up an 'authoritarian popular government' during March and April, which would also have included representatives of the PSP,² the Government attitude was in general one of hostility and at times incomprehension. During this period, the Government continued

-
1. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarios, Cámara de Senadores, 2A, 9/7/1955.
 2. See Vistazo, 19/4/1955 for details. The idea of an 'authoritarian popular government' was repeatedly fostered by Rafael Tarud and Arturo Olavarría Bravo, and anticipated closing the National Congress temporarily. Tarud had already accepted the Ministry of Economy 'to give the Cabinet some popular colour'.

its attempt to form an officialist workers' federation and became increasingly anti-communist. The CUT's response was to call a General Strike on the 7th July.

For some of the opposition, especially the Radicals, the Government's attempts to compromise the independence of the labour movement, its intolerance of other ideologies, and the unravelling of the Linea Recta were inextricably linked together, and revealed Ibáñez's intention of creating a Peronist-type dictatorship.¹ Leading Radical Senator, Raul Rettig, declared that the Congressional opposition bloc, the Frente Civico, had been formed for the express purpose of defending Chilean democracy from government attacks:

If the parties of this alliance had not reached an agreement to do what we are now doing, an alliance with the Argentine Republic, which Ibáñez proposed as the axis of his foreign policy would now be in operation, and because of that we would have become an ideological colony of Señor Perón. This is the reason we Radicals have assumed the position we have assumed.²

The industrial climate was agitated and troubled as 1955 opened. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora estimated that during the first months of the year 5 thousand workers were on the strike, and another 80 thousand were in dispute with their employers³ (see Table IV.6). These figures may be somewhat misleading in that most of the strikes were of short duration, but they added to the climate of uncertainty and instability.

-
1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 8/6/1955, p.3. In an interview in 1983, Rettig somewhat revised his position. He said that although the Radicals' fears were very real at the time, in fact Ibáñez, though 'inept and inefficient', was completely democratic in his second administration.
 2. *ibid.*, p.4.
 3. The Linea Party was allegedly a pro-Ibáñez, populist, authoritarian, army-led conspiracy modelled on Peronism. For details, see pp.215-20.

TABLE IV.6

UNIONISED LABOUR, NUMBER OF STRIKES
AND NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS, 1950-1958¹

	NO. OF UNIONISED LABOUR	NO. OF CONFLICTS	NO. OF STRIKES ^A
1950	1,905	818	192
1951	1,930	858	185
1952	1,997	1,065	201
1953	2,067	1,431	208
1954	2,068	1,794	305
1955	2,177	1,781	275
1956	2,382	1,428	147
1957	2,121	1,066	80
1958	1,594	1,127	120

^A Illegal or legal strikes.

So for example, just as the strikes in the coal mines of Schwager and Lota were settled in January, others were beginning in the copper mines. The most serious strikes occurred in the Banco del Estado, which had become national and indefinite by April 1955, and had spread to almost all private banks, and in the Servicio Nacional de Salud, which began in January and progressively grew more intense until by May 50% of the patients had to be sent home.

The background to the strikes was government inaction, and sharp rises in the cost of living; in April alone, the Minister of the Interior, Carlos Montero Schmidt, announced increases in telephone charges of 71%, in electricity prices of 80%, and gas rises of 63%. All

1. Enrique Sierra, op.cit., p.140.

the opposition parties, including the Liberal and Conservatives, and some members of the Cabinet, recognised the role inflation played in precipitating social unrest. The Minister of the Treasury, Sergio Recabarren, of the PAL, declared in the Senate that inflation 'is the determining cause of all the ills the Chilean people are suffering'.¹

Nonetheless, the Government's response was repression. The Minister of the Interior was able to declare the strikes illegal, and, arguing that they were organised to promote political ends, use the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia to prosecute union leaders in the courts. On one day alone, 54 people were detained.²

Part of the Government's response was to create an Oficina Sindical in the Presidential palace with the aim of dividing the labour movement and weakening the authority of the CUT. The origins of the Oficina Sindical belong to the time of the 'authoritarian populist' alternative, and its President, Jorge Ibarra, claimed it existed 'so that the workers could reach the President without needing a political broker'.³ Ibáñez and Ibarra used the Oficina Sindical to try and set up a rival labour federation, the anti-communist Confederación de Trabajadores Independientes. Not surprisingly, the initiative met with the complete repudiation of the CUT.⁴

The visit of some trade unionists from the Peronist Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT) to open a branch of the Peronist sponsored

1. El Mercurio, 13/3/1955, p.7.

2. ibid., 2/4/1955, p.19.

3. La Nación, 17/4/1955.

4. The opposition parties also rejected the idea. See El Siglo, 8/4/1955, Las Noticias de Última Hora, 25/3/1955 and 11/5/1955; and Política y Espiritú, 11/5/1955.

Asociación de Trabajadores de América Latina (ATLAS) inflamed the situation further. Clotario Blest, President of CUT, described the new ATLAS office in Santiago as being 'on the pay-roll of Peronism',¹ and called on the working class to reject any attempts on the part of the government to stifle the independence of the trade unions.

The Chilean trade union movement was traditionally and historically autonomous and independent. Even at the height of Ibáñez's popularity the CUT had resisted all attempts at cooption. As a result, the Confederación de Trabajadores Independientes was able to make few inroads into the labour movement. as the disastrous turnout to its May Day celebrations, presided over by Ibáñez himself, Maria de la Cruz, and Jorge Ibarra indicated. After this, it was quietly dissolved. Nonetheless, it revealed a growing anti-communism on the part of the Government, and an intolerance of opposition. For example, the Confederación claimed:

The people can now resolve their problems directly through the mediation of the loyal servants of the President of the Republic, and without the need of anti-patriotic obstructionists, who secretly serve the interests of totalitarian communism.²

The failure of the Confederación set the seal definitively on the Government's attempts to put a populist facade on its increasingly right-wing orientation.

1. Vistazo, 19/4/1955.

2. La Nación, 24/4/1955.

The Second General Strike

At the end of June, the CUT issued a call for a one day general strike on the 7th of July, the second of three during the second Ibáñez Government. The immediate reasons for the strike were the rises in the cost of living and the Government's failure to cushion the poorest against the increases. (60% wage and salary rises were offered by the Recabarren-Montero cabinet, below the rate of inflation.) The CUT's goal therefore was to change the economic direction of the administration. In the background to the strike, however, was the steady deterioration in its relationship with the Government, and the CUT's subsequent prominence as a defender of public liberties within the Frente Cívico and in collaboration with the University Students' Federation (FECH). As such, the General Strike was as much a part of the labour movement's broad involvement in the social and political life of Chile as it was economist in origin. This was recognised at the time by the Centre and Left-wing parties in the Congress:

The national strike is a final, serious and responsible warning not only to the government, but also to political leaders, to the personages of the economic Right, to the golpistas and adventurers who are only waiting for the right moment to complete their obscure, twisted propositions.¹

The strike was generally regarded a success. Vea estimated that one million two hundred thousand workers took part.² It was also successful in that Ibáñez, after first refusing, agreed to meet the National Executive of the CUT. A short round of talks were initiated between the CUT and the Government on the 11th of July. However, the strike did not resolve any of the social and economic problems which had brought it about, and the wave of strikes begun in January continued

1. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 26A, 12/7/1955.

2. Vea, 13/7/1955, p.5.

unabated. New strikes continued to break out throughout July and August in the banking industry, the health service, transport and the public administration. University students and even school-children, staged marches and sit-ins also. El Mercurio estimated the cost to the Treasury of the strikes that year at 4 thousand million pesos.¹

While the Government and political parties of all colours recognised the role inflation played in social unrest, the Government's response was once again repression. On the 29th of August, for example, 1,500 health workers were arrested.² And although the strikes were petering out by September the Government requested Faculdades Extraordinarias from Congress, a request it later withdrew when it became clear that support was not forthcoming. In October, a state of seige was declared in five provinces: Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, O'Higgins, and Concepción. The Minister of the Interior claimed that the state of seige was promulgated to combat the 'sedicious activities of foreigners using false passports'.³

Ibáñez interpreted the strikes less as result of hardship, but rather as an attempt to destabilise the Government, and question the legitimate authority of the Presidency. His anti-communism became more pronounced than ever. This can be seen by the following extracts from his speeches:

Either the unions govern, or the principle of authority is respected. Let them go on strike as often as they want. The government will take all the means necessary against the strikers to safeguard public order, freedom to work, and institutional normality.

-
1. El Mercurio, 6/9/1955.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 58A, 29/8/1955.
 3. An accusation which the centrist Falangist magazine, Política y Espiritu, dismissed as 'not taken seriously by any political group'. Política y Espiritu, 15/10/1955, p.2.

and

with two national strikes, an endless series of partial strikes and the threat of a third national strike, the all-powerful CUT thought it would be able to overthrow me. The definitive re-establishment of authority will be impossible without firm and energetic intervention.¹

Ibáñez's opinions on the illegality of popular protest coincided increasingly with that of the Right-wing in Congress and in the media. El Mercurio criticised the CUT in the strongest terms, and the Conservative party emphasized the 'illegality' of the CUT.² At the same time, Ibáñez himself was increasingly criticised for failing to fulfil his campaign promises, and deceiving the electorate.

Falangist deputy Rafael Gumucio claimed:

We are at the end of a stage of moral disintegration provoked and induced by his Excellency, the President of the Republic. First it was the public administration... political parties have been torn apart and abused... the army has been brought into disrepute and corrupted... and now, the final stage in this moral degeneration, the government is trying to corrupt and liquidate the organisations of the workers of Chile.³

The anti-CUT offensive culminated in the passing of Decree No. 4161 in September, which gave the Ministry of Labour the right to eliminate arbitrarily candidates for office in trade union elections. The Decree became known as the Koch-Yañez Circular, after the ministers of the Interior and Labour. It was in fact a re-issue of the so-called

1. El Mercurio, 2/9/1955, and El Mercurio, 6/9/1955.
2. See for example, El Mercurio, 4/9/1955. Also the Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 28A, 13/7/1955, where Hecter Correa Letelier (Con) claimed 'that the illegal organisation, which is behind the strikes has a clear and proven political tendency'.
3. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 58A, 29/7/1955.

Holger-Letelier Circular dating from the administration of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla. While the main target of both Circulars was the Communists, they were also used to impede the elections of activists of any political persuasion, with the aim of rendering the trade union federation more malleable.¹ As such, it was strongly condemned by the CUT, the Socialist, Communist and Radical parties, and the Falange Nacional. Nonetheless it was used widely; by July 1957, Falangist deputy, Tomás Pablo claimed that the Circular had led to the elimination of 3,000 candidates from union office.²

The Political Dimensions of the Crisis

1955 was a year of political polarization. While the CUT was making a determined effort to protect its members against escalating prices, Chile's business community also took the offensive. In a series of press interviews, radio broadcasts, and well-publicised speeches, prominent businessmen and entrepreneurs argued vigorously for cuts in public expenditure and stabilisation of salaries and wages to slow down the rate of inflation. The President of the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, Jorge Alessandri, claimed in a radio speech in August:

No sector of the nation has been affected as gravely by the [inflationary] process as the business community. The idea that inflation

-
1. In the trade union elections at the state owned steel plant of Huachipato in August 1957, for example, 14 of the 18 pre-candidates were eliminated and accused of being 'well-known communists'. In fact, among the 14 were representatives of the Christian Democratic Party, socialists, independents and trotskyists, Ercilla, 8/8/1957.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados. 29A, 16/7/1957.

has affected principally the more modest groups... is wrong.¹

The businessmen's demands were echoed by the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Congress, where Ibáñez was urged to take steps to increase foreign capital investment, building on the Nuevo Trato, as a way forward out of the crisis.² The arguments of the entrepreneurs were strengthened further by the analysis of inflation published by the Central Bank in August, which attacked the principle of automatic wage and salary readjustments as a cause of inflation.³ In view of such class polarization, it was no longer possible for Government supporters to argue that Ibáñez represented a consensus above partisan class-based politics.

At the same time the government's failure to command a majority in Congress, severely limited its ability to react to the gathering economic crisis. Ibáñez's problems with Congress date from his first taking office, in September 1952, and relate to his own preferred 'presidential' style of government, which attempted to reduce to its constitutional minimum the role of Congress and political parties. Congress reacted in a variety of ways such as rejecting or delaying government bills to rejecting government nominations to ambassadorships,⁴ and impeaching

-
1. The speech was published in El Mercurio, 23/8/1955, pp.13 and 15. See also: an interview with Domingo Arteaga, President of SOFOFA, in Panorama Económico, 15/4/1955, No. 120; the speech by Fernando Smits, President of ASIMET at the Club de la Unión, El Mercurio, 15/3/1955; the speech by Adolfo Braun in the Santiago Chamber of Commerce, El Mercurio, 11/6/1955, p.17; and the Speech to the Businessmen of Kansas by the President of the Chamber of Commerce, Cámara de Comercio, Santiago, Memoria, 1956.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 9A, 6/6/1955. Speech by Senator Raul Marín (Liberal).
 3. El Mercurio, 12/8/1955, p.3.
 4. Nominations had to be ratified by the Senate. See Las Noticias de Última Hora, 3/12/1952 and La Nación, 3/12/1952 for details.

prominent Ibañista Senator, Maria de la Cruz. At the beginning 1955, government-congressional relations reached rock-bottom, because of Ibañez's much-publicised project of reforming the constitution, and because of the persistent rumours of military conspiracies, which were interpreted as attacks against parliamentary democracy itself.

The government's search for a Congressional majority was further hampered by internal divisions within the PAL. In addition, there was a general loss of confidence in Agrario Laboristas, who were increasingly regarded as incompetent, inefficient and possibly corrupt as well. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora had this to say on the new PAL-dominated Cabinet, sworn in January 1955:

the Agrario-Laborista Cabinet which we now have in the Moneda under the direction of Recabarren and Tarud, has already begun to show its true face, which is decidedly different from that it originally presented... The Agrario-Laboristas have forced the government to put up the prices of basic necessities, and, parallel to this, have undertaken a systematic campaign to hand key posts in the Public Administration over to members of their own party. To put it plainly, the people are hungry and uncertain, while the Agrario Laboristas enjoy immense power and the best and most secure jobs.¹

These factors combined made it impossible for the PAL to co-ordinate and lead government support in Congress.

The Crisis in the PAL

At the beginning of January Ibañez had rather reluctantly approached the PAL about forming a new Cabinet, after his attempt to form a Cabinet of 'personalities' failed. (The 'personalities' would have included Radicals Alfredo Duhalde and Marcelo Ruiz Solar. Not surprisingly the Radical Party rejected the suggestion. Mariano Puga Vega of the

1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 12/2/1955, p.3.

Liberal Party, Jorge Alessandri and Gustavo Ross, Minister of Finance and Presidential candidate in 1938, were also rumoured to have refused Cabinet office.) The new ministerial team which eventually emerged was dominated by the Agrario-Laboristas, with Sergio Recabarren as Minister of the Interior. The irony of this appointment was that Recabarren, although a founder-member of the party, had never been a supporter of Ibáñez's, and had even abstained from voting in the Congress of Chillán which nominated the party's presidential candidate. On his appointment, Ercilla described him as 'a permanent critic of Ibáñez's politics', and claimed he was appointed despite the opposition of the Leteliers, the family of the First Lady, Graciela Letelier.¹ Like his predecessors, Recabarren promised a new initiative which would include a bill establishing severe penalties for 'economic crimes' (i.e. price speculation and hoarding) and the abrogation of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia.

However, within a matter of weeks, Recabarren had moved to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior passed to Carlos Montero. Recabarren seems to have been remarkably ill-qualified to manage the nation's finances, particularly at such a critical moment. Unlike other Ministers of Finance such as Felipe Herrera and Jorge Prat, on Recabarren's own admission, his understanding of the economic and financial problems facing Chile was slight. Although his 'good intentions' were recognised at the time,² he proved weak and

1. Ercilla, 11/1/1955, p.5.

2. Recabarren's explanation of his programme as Minister of Finance was well-received in Congress. Senator Eduardo Frei commented:

'The Minister of Finance has spoken a language that parliament understands - elevated and patriotic. If the entire government were to speak in this way, the situation of the country would be very different.'

El Mercurio, 23/3/1955.

indecisive, and was eventually responsible for inviting the U.S. based Klein-Saks mission to Chile, principally on the advice of the influential El Mercurio.

It is most likely that Recabarren, with the support of a homogeneous Cabinet, was originally appointed with the belief that he, as an ex-parliamentarian and with good relations personally with Congress, would be able to obtain a working parliamentary majority. The PAL however was still unable to express a coherent ideology, and as such both the traditional Right, and the Left-wing parties regarded it with suspicion. The Right-wing for example was alienated by the presence of their bête-noire, Rafael Tarud. The ultra-conservative newspaper, El Diario Ilustrado commented lugubriously:

The new Cabinet is not what public opinion hoped for... the country wanted to see the appointment of men untouched by the political struggle as Secretaries of State.¹

The PSP, on the other hand, was profoundly distrustful of the conservatism visible in sectors of the PAL, especially the party representatives in Congress, and suspicious also of Ibáñez's proven capriciousness. Lack of Congressional support paralysed the PAL Cabinet, which eventually collapsed at the end of May, when the president of the party, Guillermo Izquierdo, announced the PAL's withdrawal from Government because:

It is impossible to try and govern as a responsible collective body with the Chief of State.²

The fall of the PAL Cabinet after only five months meant that by June 1955, 59 different appointees had occupied the 14 ministries.

1. El Diario Ilustrado, 6/1/1955.

2. El Mercurio, 30/5/1955.

The PAL's withdrawal from cabinet responsibilities brought to a head a severe and damaging internal crisis within the party. While the Junta Nacional, headed by Izquierdo, was thereafter quick to criticise the increasingly conservative orientation of government economic policies, the party's representatives in the Cámara de Diputados continued to defend a policy of collaboration with Ibáñez.¹ They argued that Ibáñez should be free to seek the support of the PAL, 'and every serious and responsible democratic party which is willing to contribute in a patriotic way to the solution of the problems facing the nation'.² The internal dispute was made public when the dissident fraction published an open letter in the press, criticising Izquierdo's leadership and threatening to withdraw from the party.

The internal wranglings in the PAL were never satisfactorily resolved because they were fundamentally a reflection of the tensions between the various disparate elements which had made up the party. The parliamentary, and more right-wing elements, represented members who perceived the party as a natural ally of the Liberals and Conservatives, were in conflict with the ex-nacionalistas, who had joined the party in 1945. When Guillermo Izquierdo, ex-nacionalista, was elected president, the tensions once again surfaced. Izquierdo had made no secret of his belief that the PAL should in some way turn itself into the vanguard party of a nationalist revolution. In joining the PAL he and the nacionalistas laid aside their rejection of

-
1. For example, at the party Congress in October 1955 at Concepción, the national executive demanded the completion of the programme of September 1952, and added: 'in no circumstances, and for no reason whatsoever, will the PAL be part of political alliances with the forces of reaction. On the contrary, its actions will be directed towards ending the unjust economic power of those sectors'. El Mercurio, 15/10/1955, p.17.
 2. El Mercurio, 22/6/1955.

parliamentary democracy, but they did not abandon their nationalist principles. Izquierdo said:

I entered the Agrario-Laborista Party in 1949, overcoming my natural opposition - I should say repugnance - to belonging to a political party. But there were many people who had been active in Chilean nacionalismo in the PAL, and I was naive enough to believe that it was possible that Agrario-Laborismo could be transformed into a movement, which could breathe new life into our fatherland.¹

Ironically, Izquierdo and the nacionalistas were in favour of opposing Ibáñez's stabilisation and anti-labour policies of 1955 and 1956 far more rigorously than the more democratic elements of the party, many of whom collaborated with Ibáñez at this time in Cabinets and in Congress.²

These internal divisions within the party contributed decisively to its electoral decline and eventual disappearance. Some party leaders preferred to interpret this as a lack of internal discipline rather than an inevitable result of its doctrinal paucity and ideological confusion. (For example the PAL was never able to satisfactorily define itself as either capitalist or anti-capitalist, at the level of rhetoric.) Some party leaders blamed these divisions on the PAL's participation in Chile's liberal democratic, parliamentary regime. Guillermo Izquierdo, for

-
1. Unpublished letter from Guillermo Izquierdo to the Directiva Provincial, Antofagasta, of the PAL, 4/11/1958. The hostility between the nacionalistas and the more traditional politicians in the PAL was stressed repeatedly by Izquierdo in conversation with the author. The nacionalista wing of the party operated almost as a party within a party, according to some members of the PAL (Oscar Jimenez, Pedro Fonca, Alejandro Hales). Ibáñez did not look too kindly on the nacionalista wing of the party.
 2. This is one of the contradictions of Chilean nationalism - its profound anti-oligarchical sentiments, as well as its anti-communism. The hostility between the nacionalistas and the traditional Right wing has been constant from the 1930s to the present day.

example, eventually came to argue that this made inevitable the party's disintegration. At the end of 1955, when internal pressures forced his resignation as president of the party, he blamed the development of politiquería (overriding personal ambition, leading to the adoption of opportunist or even corrupt practices), which, he claimed, was an inevitable result of parliamentary democracy:

I was obliged to resign from the presidency by the many pressures that the political system here entails. It is a system which is draining the life's blood of Chile. During the year and a half of my presidency of the party, I saw the disloyalty, the wickedness and the pettiness of many of the party, their absence of ideas, their insatiable desire to be important, without in the least deserving it, and their uncontrollable ambition. It was then that I understood that the PAL was not the authoritarian movement that I had imagined, and even less was it the party of the future, able to animate the masses with a revolutionary mystique. It was a party of asambleas, like so many others, full of intrigues and ambition.¹

Other PAL leaders preferred to blame the party's divisions on the lack of internal discipline, the inability to accept responsibility, and, perhaps, fundamentally, the party's newness. Alejandro Hales, Chile's Ambassador to Bolivia for more than three years during the Ibáñez government, argued

There can be no doubt that the crisis which our party experienced, began when we assumed the responsibilities of Government - we were not equal to the task with which the country had entrusted us. Placing the blame for our fiasco at the feet of General Ibáñez is nothing more than an excuse.²

In a private letter to fellow Agrario-Laborista, Javier Lira Merino, Hales attributed the reasons for the collapse of the PAL to the fact that:

-
1. Letter of Izquierdo to the Directiva Provincial, Antofagasta, of the PAL, 4/11/1958.
 2. Unpublished letter from Alejandro Hales to Carlos Hinrichs, President of Partido Nacional Popular in Concepción, 21/9/1960.

As individuals, we were not up to scratch, we lacked discipline, and we lacked maturity... We committed the error of forgetting our origins. Once we gained power, we forgot the members of our asambleas.¹

Conclusion

On the advice of El Mercurio's Rene Silva Espejo and under pressure from Chile's business community, Sergio Recabarren had contracted a private firm of U.S. economic consultants, Klein Saks, to investigate Chile's economic problems, and recommend solutions, especially on inflation. Klein-Saks had worked in a similar capacity in Peru in 1950, and Brazil in 1953.

The mission arrived in July 1955. When it began working in earnest in September and October, the Government's economic team was headed by Oscar Herrera, not by Recabarren, who was however more committed to stabilisations than his predecessor. The impact of the Klein Saks mission, which was as much political as economic, will be discussed in the next chapter.

1. Unpublished letter to Javier Lira from Alejandro Hales, 1/7/1954. The wide differences of interpretation about the Agrario Laborista Party between Izquierdo and Hales meant that while Izquierdo kept a relatively low profile in politics, Hales struggled for years unsuccessfully to revive an independent Agrario party.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF STABILISATION, 1955-57

I do not know how it happens, but in our country it seems that the individuals elected by the people are first deceived and then ally themselves with the 'economic Right'. I do not know what is the secret of the ease with which the Right can conquer power and attach itself to such traitors.¹

Ibáñez had identified the principal problem facing Chile during the election campaign as inflation. Nonetheless no consistent attempt to tackle the problem was made until the rises in the cost of living reached crisis levels. The expansion of foreign exchange from increased copper sales gave the government some breathing space in 1952 and 1953, but by mid-1955 Chile's inflation had risen to 80-84%, the highest experienced in Chile until the hyper-inflation of 1972-74.

In fact a series of mechanisms had come into existence which allowed the economy to 'adjust' to the inflation which had been present in Chile since at least 1928.² Steadily rising prices and preferential exchange rates on the one hand, and regular reajustes (wage-rises, generally annually, to make up the difference lost by the rise in the cost of living) on the other, helped cushion most of the industrial bourgeoisie, public employees, and sectors of wage earners from the harshest effects of constantly rising prices. Indeed, some economists argued that the

1. Ibáñez quoted in Vea 27/5/1953

2. Joseph Grunwald, 'The Structuralist School on Price Stability and Development in the Chilean Case' in A. Hirschman (ed.) Latin American Issues, Essays and Comments. The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961, points out that 'there is some evidence that Chile's price inflation started as far back as the late 1870s', p.99.

ECLA-type programme of state-led economic growth, put into effect assiduously by the Radical administrations of the 1940s required brief and intermittent bursts of inflation to help fuel growth and could possibly encourage native capital formation.¹ However, the economic crisis of 1954-55, provoked initially by a fall in demand for copper in the U.S.A. and Western Europe, indicated that Chile's inflation was neither 'brief' nor 'intermittent'. Nor could the inflation of the mid 1950s be the sign of a healthy expanding economy since the growth rate had slowed dramatically, while inflation showed no signs of following suit. Furthermore, Chile's fiscal reserves were also in deep crisis. From 1952 onwards, the state no longer had the income to meet current public expenditure.

The causes of inflation in the 1950s - and the failure to solve it - were as much political as economic. For example: an important reason for the delay in tackling the problem between 1952 and 1955 was that it proved impossible to reach a consensus between the administration and Congress on an anti-inflationary strategy, or, to put it another way, on which groups should pay for a stabilisation of the economy. In the discussion that follows, I hope to show how political considerations weighed at least as heavily as economic factors in the adoption of the stabilisation programme of 1955-57. Furthermore, I would suggest that the ultimate goal for the programme's main backers, the business community and the Conservatives and Liberals was more than just monetary stability; they were also concerned with consolidating the bases of a particular economic model, and one which would depend upon a less combative trade union movement.

1. 'Papalero' Guillermo Del Pedregal was one of the best-known exponents of the theory that inflation stimulates economic growth. He was a Minister during the Popular Front and with Ibáñez in 1953. For a discussion of this see Werner Baer, 'The Inflation Controversy in Latin America', Latin American Research Review, II, no. 2, 1964, pp.3-25.

Anti-inflationary Strategies.

Inflation in Chile was the subject of extensive and broad debate in academic and political circles in the mid 1950s. However, there was fundamental disagreement on the measures needed to curb it, a disagreement that divided Ibáñez's supporters. It would be erroneous to suppose that the Left opposed stabilisation in principle; rather, they made a different diagnosis of the problem from the traditional pro-capitalist groups and argued that only fundamental structural changes in the economy would bring long-term improvements.¹ During the campaign it suited all components of the victorious coalition not to be too specific about the nature of the anti-inflation programmes they favoured, and if the electoral programme, which included an extension of state control over Chile's mineral wealth and sweeping anti-capitalist slogans, seemed to reflect the temporary hegemony of the PSP-PAL alliance, then equally the anti-Radical demagogic content could well have been interpreted as a rejection of the statist ISI development model associated with the Radical party.

The Monetarist Interpretation of Inflation.

Monetarist economic theory in its purest form is most associated with the military regimes of the Southern Cone in the 1970s when its influence reached a zenith, arguing against the ECLA model of development. Monetarist or orthodox economists view inflation as the result

1. In 'Inflation and Stability in Chile, 1970-1977', in R. Thorp and L. Whitehead (eds), Inflation and Stabilisation in Latin America, Macmillan, London, 1979, Laurence Whitehead points out that the Popular Unity programme of 1970 devoted more attention to the problem of inflation than either of the other two candidates. The following discussion of anti-inflation theories relies in good measure on Thorpe and Whitehead (eds.), op.cit.

of short-term imbalances in the economy.¹ As a result, they recommend monetary and fiscal reform as a solution and a reduction in public expenditure in order to 'balance the books' (rather than higher taxation, for example). Furthermore, attempts to regulate prices 'artificially' (i.e. through subsidies, import controls, exchange control etc.) must be ended. Liberalisation of the economy, increased competition and investment from abroad should follow. Since inflation is regarded as the result of excess demand, credit restrictions and wage cuts in real terms are also generally recommended.

Given the centrality of the state in financing economic development in the 1930s and 1940s, either directly through CORFO loans or investment or as a result of government policies such as a complicated multiple exchange rate (high for luxury imports or manufactured goods which would be competition for Chile's national industry, low for heavy goods, machinery, spare parts etc.), orthodox economics implied a reverse of the role the state had gradually assumed in Chile. The policy of increasing state control over the economy dated from the time of the Popular Front and had been a reflection of the emergence of a stable and victorious alliance between the middle sectors and the organised urban working class. The implementation of an orthodox economic programme therefore implied either the end or the defeat of this alliance.²

-
1. A good example of monetarist arguments is Roberto Campos de Oliveira, 'Two Views on Inflation in Latin America', Albert Hirschman (ed.), op.cit. See also Werner Baer, op.cit. An early critique of orthodox analysis of Chilean inflation in the tradition of the ECLA school, was Osvaldo Sunkel, 'La Inflación Chilena: Un Enfoque Heterodoxo', El Trimestre Económico, October-December, 1958.
 2. In fact this alliance had fragmented during the government of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, as the passing of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia indicated. Ibáñez was also elected with the votes of the working class and the middle sectors, but this was not the result of a conscious structured alliance, quite the reverse.

In Latin America, the most important advocates of orthodox economics in the 1950s were the international financial agencies, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). David Felix explained in 1961 the importance of the IMF to the Latin American economies in the following terms:

The IMF has preached the anti-inflation gospel from its inception but its influence has increased in the past few years in direct proportion to the decline in the region's foreign exchange reserves for, in addition to its own ability to lend foreign exchange, the IMF leverage has been magnified by the fact that U.S. loans to Latin America were made contingent on the borrower meeting IMF lending criteria.¹

After the Korean War ended, Chile's foreign exchange reserves declined rapidly because of the fall in the price of copper, leaving her vulnerable to IMF pressure.

IMF-backed programmes and IMF credit won the support of Chile's economic elites who were desirous of strengthening their ties with foreign capital. Chilean manufacturers did not in general fear competition from foreign investment, because at the beginning of import substituting industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s their association had been mutually beneficial, as Cardoso and Faletto explain:

While import substitution was growing, the penetration of foreign capital was not regarded as a development problem, even though it marginalized certain domestically owned industries. In fact, internal industrial sectors had new fields for investment: each manufactured product stimulated the progressive replacement of its parts and components until the point was reached where the only products that had to be imported were those that required a very advanced technology on primary materials that did not exist in the country.²

-
1. David Felix, 'An Alternative View of the Monetarist-Structuralist Controversy', in A. Hirschman (ed.), *op.cit.*, 1961, pp.81-2. R. Thorp and L. Whitehead, *op.cit.*, agree that in the late 1950s and early 1960s the IMF wielded even more influence than usual in Latin America.
 2. F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, *op.cit.*, p.158.

By the 1950s this was no longer the case, in part because structural problems in the Chilean economy such as excessive income concentration, limited the further growth of the economy. Secondly, IMF-supported programmes offered business elites more than simply foreign investment: such programmes tended to change the environment in which foreign investment was made (reducing taxation for example) and lowering state control over domestic industry.

It could also be argued that Chile's economic elites endorsed orthodox economics for political and psychological reasons. Chile's right-wing jealously guarded Chile's 'European' democratic political system and culture, which they argued, could only be guaranteed by both political and economic liberalism. Just as the traditional Right-wing had rejected overtures from anti-democratic, nationalist movements in the 1930s and 1940s in favour of a pluralist Western European-type party system - which by a variety of rather less than democratic means they were able to dominate - so they welcomed liberal economic models which allowed them to continue the fiction that Chile was a part of the West. Hence in 1956, the Santiago Chamber of Commerce welcomed contacts with the IMF and North American capital, and praised the adoption of anti-inflationary measures 'which have been used for the same ends by countries of great tradition and economic maturity such as Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Greece, Austria, Portugal, Belgium... and the United States'.¹

Finally, the Chilean bourgeoisie was attracted by the implications of a government-backed policy of wage restraint, which they thought would allow them to maximise profits with a minimum of trade union

1. Cámara de Comercio, Memoria, 1956.

disruption. It took the Communist Party to point out the dangers of reducing the spending of those sectors dependent on wages and salaries to national industry and the native bourgeoisie.¹

For these reasons, therefore, the Right wing was all too ready to listen to advice from United States' 'experts', especially since it coincided with their own goals. And in 1955, the prestigious New York Times recommended that Chile adopt austerity measures to combat inflation:

The Chilean people can accomplish economic change only by renouncing the 'easy' way of automatic wage increases, extensive social security and by accepting genuine deflation.²

However, when American 'expert' advice was judged prejudicial to their interests, the business community lost no time in rejecting it, as when the Klein Saks Mission recommended reform of the tax system, or here, when the New York Times went on to criticise the excessive profits of Chilean industrialists.

Inside Chile, then, the most powerful advocates of orthodox stabilisation were the corporative associations of economic elites - SOFOFA, La Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, the Chamber of Commerce etc., and the Liberal and Conservative parties. In 1952, the Chamber of Commerce published a series of articles in the leading newspapers of Santiago, entitled 'The Causes of Inflation', which identified 'public expenditure, the wages of workers, and the salaries of white-collar workers' as the sole causes of inflation.³ El Mercurio, the influential voice of the biggest economic conglomerates in Chile,

1. Vistazo, 4/1/1956.

2. The New York Times, quoted in Hispanic American Report, April, 1955, p.179.

3. Cámara de Comercio, Memoria, 1952.

had been calling on Ibáñez to implement a stabilisation programme based on suppressing wages and demand since September 1951.¹

It should be noted, however, that since the import substituting industrialisation of the 1930s and 1940s, an important percentage of Chile's industrial bourgeoisie was actually dependent on the state either for tariff protection or for credit. Among this group were manufacturers of finished goods, and manufacturers of metalurgical products. These groups were less interested in eliminating the State from the economy. Rather, they needed State co-operations and support, and therefore favoured orienting government policy to their benefit. It was a difference of emphasis, however, since Chilean manufacturers as a whole were united about the social and political goals of stabilisation: the State should be responsive to 'the forces of production', and should not act as a 'broker' in the class struggle.

Structuralist Interpretations of Inflation

Structuralist explanations of inflation are most associated with ECLA/desarrollista economists. They can, but need not be, hostile to capitalism and foreign investment. Structuralists are united however in arguing that, after the first phase of industrialisation is completed in the Latin American economies, the prospects for further growth are limited by the backwardness of the social and economic structures. Long-time head of ECLA, Raul Prebisch argued:

The regular and intensive development of the economy requires a series of transformations in the forms of production, in the economic and social structure, and in income distribution. These changes will allow the economy to grow at a higher

1. In November 1952, El Mercurio suggested that Ibáñez use the Facultades Extraordinarias to impose an orthodox stabilisation programme over the heads of a recalcitrant Congress.

rate than the export of primary products, and lessen the impact internally of fluctuations in the prices of primary products. At the same time, obstacles in the way of development will be removed. If these changes are not carried out, or if they are only partially carried out, inequalities and tensions will remain, which can encourage or cause the inflationary tendency in Latin America.¹

Apart from the work of Anibal Pinto in Pamorama Economico, and Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, in the mid-late 1950s the structuralists were still unable to elaborate a complete structuralist anti-inflationary programme, especially in the short term.

The first detailed study of Chilean inflation from a structuralist perspective by the Mexican economist, Juan Noyola² was not made until 1956. The structuralists were sure, however, that an over-emphasis on monetary stability would only lead to economic stagnation, and by the mid 1950s, most of Chile's young economists and technicians shared a sympathy for structuralism. For example, Jorge Ahumada, later Christian Democrat, argued in his influential book in 1958, En vez de la Miseria, that four fundamental changes were necessary to produce further economic growth in Chile:³

1. improvement in the conditions of production in agriculture;
2. elimination of the structural causes of inflation;
3. reduction in the enormous inequalities in income distribution;⁴
4. steps taken to avoid excessive concentration of production and population.

1. Raul Prebisch 'El falso dilema entre desarrollo economico y estabilidad monetaria', in Boletín Economico para America Latina, ECLA, Vol. vi, No. 1, March, 1961.

2. Juan Noyola, 'Inflación y Desarrollo Económico en Chile y Mexico', Investigación Economico, Mexico, Edition IV, 1956.

3. Jorge Ahumada, En Vez de la Miseria, Ediciones. del Páccifico, Santiago, 1958, pp.65-6.

4. On income distribution in the 1950s, Ahumada claims that 5% of the population in Chile consume more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total national production, while 59% of the population have less than $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total national production. Ahumada, op.cit., p.75.

The elimination of inflation caused by structural impediments required a government prepared to restrict the privileges of business and land owning elites since structuralists attributed the slowing down of economic growth (see Table V.1) to the resistance of the upper class, whether agrarian or urban, to change, and to their consumption standards.

Table V.1

NATIONAL INCOME (IN MILLIONS OF PESOS.)

	<u>NOMINAL</u>	<u>REAL (\$ 1950)</u> ¹
1940	16,480.5	83,736.1
1941	20,426.1	90,600.3
1942	24,682.5	87,725.5
1943	232,646.5	98,728.6
1944	38,590.9	104,273.1
1945	44,659.4	111,142.8
1946	54,877.8	117,797.5
1947	64,042.9	103,354.4
1948	85,647.4	117,064.3
1949	104,109.5	119,987.1
1950	127,876.7	127,876.7
1951	153,863.2	126,046.4
1952	209,026.4	139,955.3
1953	286,089.4	152,592.1
1954	456,937.5	141,567.9
1955	739,363.4	130,887.5
1956	983,400.0	124,300.0

Further, they pointed out that industrialization had only improved the living standards for middle sectors upwards: figures released by CORFO in 1957 indicated that the annual per capita income of an obrero had only improved 2% between 1940 and 1956² (see Table V.2).

1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 25/3/1957.

2. ibid., 25/3/1957.

Table V.2

SUELDO VITAL (INDEX) AND YEARLY LOSS OF BUYING POWER¹

YEARS	INDEX OF AVERAGE SUELDO VITAL (BASE 1958 = 100)	ANNUAL LOSS OF BUYING POWER (NOT COVERED BY <u>REAJUSTES</u>)
<u>INFLATION RELATIVELY</u>		
<u>SLOW</u>		
1950	126.6	6.4
1951	128.5	10.4
1952	136.3	9.9
<u>ACCELERATING</u>		
<u>INFLATION</u>		
1953	137.2	17.9
1954	122.9	25.2
1955	111.8	26.2
<u>STABILISATION</u>		
1956	103.0	15.00
1957	100.4	12.5
1958	100.0	14.9

Economist Alberto Baltra, advisor to Luis Bossay, Presidential candidate of the Radical Party in 1958, argued

In Chile, as in Latin America, institutions and habits get in the way of growth. Among these obstacles can be included the high level of consumption of luxury goods of high income groups. If the proportion of national income which goes to those groups could be channelled into socially productive enterprises, the level of investment would increase considerably without needing to impose sacrifices on consumers of middle or low income. ... 3% of the active population consumes 21% of national income, while 69% of the population, manual and white collar workers, consumes only 37%. The per capita consumption of high income groups is

1. Enrique Sierra, Tres Ensayos, op.cit.

14 times greater than the average consumption of manual and white collar workers. It would be enough for high income groups to cut their consumption by half to increase the national income by 10%.¹

Entente with the Right

Two Ministers of Finance, Felipe Herrera and Jorge Prat, had presented anti-inflation packages to Congress in 1953 and 1954; neither won sufficient support to go ahead with the programme. Undoubtedly, the creation of a unified opposition Congressional bloc hindered the government and Ibáñez blamed Congressional opposition for his government's failure to control inflation:

Our inflation is a result of economic and administrative mismanagement. Our laws are inflationary, our social security excessive, and there is a temporary shortage of food, but the real trouble is the political opposition.²

(my italics)

The adoption of a coherent economic strategy was also prevented by intrigue and in-fighting within the Moneda, expressed primarily through constant Cabinet crises and changes. Apart from personality clashes of which there were many, the main tensions were between the 'populists' (the PSP, sectors of the PAL, especially Tarud, and some independents such as Guillermo del Pedregal), the 'traditionalists', ('personal friends' of Ibáñez, and first generation Ibáñistas such as Osvaldo Koch, Rene Montero, and Waldemar Coutts and some of the PAL e.g. Julio von Muhlenbrock), and the authoritarians, (Estanqueristas, perhaps a third faction of the PAL, some independents such as Arturo Olavarría Bravo and some of the military figures, Eduardo Yanéz for example).

-
1. Alberto Baltra, 'Los Factores Sociales y el Desarrollo Nacional', Pamorama Economico, 20/12/1957, No. 182.
 2. Hispanic-American Report, March, 1955, p.130.

No sooner was a new ministerial team able to draw up its plans, than it was dismissed and replaced.

Herrera's and Prat's plans for controlling inflation had also met with opposition from the labour movement and from employers' associations. The CUT interpreted stabilisation as cuts in the living standards of their members, and job reduction in the public services (the white collar workers and the public employees were among the most militant in the CUT). Both Herrera and Prat had also called for a measure of sacrifices from employers, who were cool towards the idea. Furthermore, it could hardly have been likely that the entrepreneurs would cooperate with the government while representatives of the PSP remained in office.

Anibal Pinto has explained the failure to adopt anti-inflationary programmes as the result of an empate social, a 'stalemate' between antagonistic groups. He describes the empate social as:

A situation of relative equilibrium between the power of important groups in society (the entrepreneurs, the middle sectors, and the working class), which prevents the freezing or the sensible modification of income structure, and at the same time prevents the adoption of firm and lasting policies in any direction. This is the social background... on which rests the inflationary tendency of the Chilean economy, which in the end is a product of wide-ranging aspirations... and the incapacity of the economy to fulfill them.¹

The experiences of the stabilisation programme adopted between 1955 and 1957 would seem to indicate that the entrepreneurs had much greater powers of resistance than the trade union movement, however; the CUT could do nothing to prevent the implementation of wage reajustes below

1. Anibal Pinto, Chile: Una Economía Dificil, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1964, p.61.

the level of inflation in both 1956 and 1957, years of rising unemployment, while the employers lobbied successfully to reduce the effectiveness of credit restrictions, and prevented the adoption of a more equitable tax structure.

The disintegration of the original Ibañista coalition, and the exit of the reformist or populist Ibañistas became a necessary prerequisite for the adoption of stabilisation. This occurred when the PAL Cabinet of January-May 1955 collapsed. Thereafter Ibáñez relied to a great extent on the advice of advisors personally loyal to him, and on so-called orejeros (literally, individuals to whom Ibáñez lent his ear), including Dario St. Marie (Volpone), editor of La Nacion, and Carlos Ferrer, sub-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. Many of his subsequent Cabinet appointments were not political party members, and some were ex-military figures, such as General Benjamín Videla., who was named Minister of the Interior, just prior to the third General Strike of January 1956.¹

At the same time the rise in inflation to over 80% alarmed Ibáñez enough to accept the relationship some sectors of the Right, particularly Juan Antonio Coloma, president of the Conservative Party, had been offering him since 1953.

The Arrival of Klein-Saks

The Klein Saks mission arrived in Santiago on the 4th of July 1955, initially on a ten month contract though it was renewed until 1957.

Vistazo estimated that the mission was costing the government 300 thousand dollars (225 million pesos).² During a press conference at

-
1. There is disagreement on how far the influential Volpone supported stabilisation. Donald Bray, op.cit., claims that Volpone was in no part responsible for the decision to invite the Klein Saks mission to Chile, while Anibal Pinto suggested in conversation with the author that stabilisation was probably carried out against his wishes.
 2. Vistazo, 13/9/1955.

the Banco Central, before presenting recommendations to the government, the head of the mission, Prescott Carter, claimed he would look for 'a Chilean solution to a Chilean problem'. This promise was belied however, by his sweeping and simplistic explanation of the causes of inflation:

Inflation is generated when spending exceeds income. The economy of a country is like that of an individual or a family; if more is spent than is received, there's disequilibrium. That is inflation.¹

El Mercurio praised the government's decision to employ the U.S. based team, and their 'independence' from 'ideological' schools of thought.² The Conservative Party were also pleased. The day after the mission arrived in Chile, Juan Antonio Coloma issued a statement making clear his Party's approval, without actually referring to the visit; he went on to suggest that the government adopt:

a policy of austerity to reduce public spending, and to stabilise and simplify the costs of our public administration, which will free the country of an excess of bureaucracy, help production... and give confidence to foreign capital... Under the present circumstances such a policy can only be carried out by individuals not affiliated to political parties, and with a recognized technical perception of the problems.³

In this way, the entente between Ibáñez and the Right-wing was born. By November 1955, Ibáñez was holding formal talks with the Liberal and the Conservative Parties to be assured of Congressional support. To an important extent, however, the relationship between Ibáñez and the Liberals and Conservatives was restricted to the implementation of the economic programme: the Right-wing did not feel

1. El Mercurio, 14/9/1955.

2. El Mercurio, 10/6/1955. See also editorials throughout the second half of 1955.

3. El Mercurio, 2/7/1955.

comfortable with the President's populist style and rhetoric, and Ibáñez, for his part, had been forced into the alliance by the exigencies of the economic crisis, the collapse of Ibañismo and the failure of populism, and the strength of the Congressional opposition bloc. 'I must look for help wherever I can find it', he said, 'I am grateful to the parties of the Right for helping me carry out plans against inflation'.¹

Not all sectors of public opinion were pleased, however. Spokesmen for the Radical Party, the Communist Party, and the two Socialist parties criticized in the strongest possible way the decision to contract the mission. Clodomiro Almeyda, ex-minister of Ibáñez, claimed that Prescott Carter's description of inflation as born of the tendency of governments 'to spend more than they receive, was evidence that the Mission did not understand the complex nature of development in dependent economies.'² Orlando Millas, speaking on behalf of the Communist Party, described the decision to employ the Mission, as 'mortifying for the dignity of the nation'.³

What reasons lay behind the decision to contract the Klein Saks consultancy? President Ibáñez claimed the reason was because 'the fact that it is foreign guarantees objectivity and impartiality in the reports the mission makes and the conclusions it reaches'.⁴ The minister

1. Ercilla, 3/1/1956. Newspapers which had earlier been bitterly critical of Ibáñez, such as El Debate, now had fulsome praise for the government's new economic strategy. Nonetheless his relationship with the Right was not easy - in fact Ibáñez never really had good reasons with any political party throughout his career. The ultra-reactionary right-wing El Diario Ilustrado was not afraid to attack Ibáñez in the harshest of terms as late as December 1955 (see, for example, the editorial of 12/12/1955 which accuses Ibáñez of corruption).

2. 'These foreign missions are ignorant of the social and political factors peculiar to Chile. It is absolutely necessary to take these into account to be able to explain and resolve the inflationary process.' Vistazo, 13/9/1955.

3. Vistazo, 13/9/1955.

4. Presidential Message to the Congress, 21/5/1956, p.16.

in charge of the economic programme offered a similar explanation.

Oscar Herrera declared in the Senate:

The government has contracted the services of the Klein Saks mission in its desire to come to grips with a technical and coordinated solution to the country's inflationary problem. It is an institution of international standing, an institution moreover, which cannot be accused of political bias in any direction, or of sympathy for any of the political parties.¹

Quite clearly, however, the mission was far from being impartial or objective politically. The recommendations that were made to the government were based on the assumption that inflation is the result of excess demand. As has been indicated earlier, within the context of Chile's state-led development, this assumption has far-reaching political implications, which can only be termed socially regressive. Anti-inflationary programmes based on a reduction in demand cannot be merely 'technical', as the government and the mission claimed, since they depend upon a reduction in the purchasing power and consumption of sectors dependent on wages and salaries. Furthermore, in order to successfully implement a wage freeze the government would be forced simultaneously to weaken and reduce the bargaining power and influence of the trade union movement.

The recommendations that the Klein-Saks mission made to the government concurred with the analysis of the economy made by the Central Bank in August 1955, which attacked the principle of automatic reajustes for workers and state expenditure as the primary causes of inflation.² Its

-
1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 24A, 2/1/1956.
 2. In fact the programme of stabilisation was carried out under the auspices of the Central Bank along with the Treasury. Both Oscar Herrera and Ibáñez protested their ignorance of economics. Enrique Sierra notes that the mission, while retained officially in an advisory capacity, 'did not have the character of advisor, but rather of direct collaborator, at the highest levels'. Enrique Sierra, op.cit., p.54.

conclusion was that inflation was monetary in origin. They also reflect the ideas traditionally associated with the Liberals and Conservative parties. While the Liberals and Conservative parties did not enter any formal alliance with the Executive, nor hold Cabinet positions, their support in Congress was a prerequisite for the success of the programme, and had been assured before the programme was sent to Congress.

Clodomiro Almeyda suggests that the Right-wing did not command broad enough support in the mid-1950s to impose its programme without additional support:

There was no need for a foreign mission to come to make these proposals. The Chilean Right had already made similar recommendations. If their point of view could not obtain the necessary degree of consensus in society to implement it, it is not only due to the resistance of those who benefit from the present situation, but rather fundamentally, because of the current level of social and political evolution, in Chile, it is not possible to return to absolute economic liberalism.¹

The programme was promoted by the business and entrepreneurial elites without the direct participation in government of their political representatives, the Liberals and Conservatives. Hence, employing the mission gave a spurious impartiality to a programme which it was claimed, was in the 'public interest', not the economic interest of one antagonistic group at the expense of others.

Albert Hirschman, Enrique Sierra and Ricardo Ffrench Davis in their analyses of the stabilisation programme, agree that the mission's main accomplishment was political.² In fact Anibal Pinto had pointed this

1. Clodomiro Almeyda, op.cit., p.95.

2. See Albert Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1963.
Enrique Sierra, op.cit. and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Políticas Económicas en Chile, Ediciones Nueva Universidad y Cieplán, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 1972.

out as early as May 1956 when he showed how the Mission had played an important role in finding partners for the programme, principally among the business associations, though also from the Liberal and Conservative parties.¹ The influence of the business gremios was considerable in part due to their corporate and individual participation within the apparatus of the state, including the state development agency CORFO, the giant state-owned Compania de Acero Pacifico (CAP), and the Central Bank. They were able to take advantage of the genuine fact of hyperinflation to become the government's main allies in the stabilisation plan. Such was the influence of the industrial/entrepreneurial lobby that stabilisation was abandoned once the industrialists no longer had any use for it.² From the industrialists' point of view, the Klein Saks mission was the symbol of the serious intentions of the government, characterised until then by weakness and vacillation in its economic policy.

An additional attraction of the Klein Saks mission was the possibility that it would serve as a channel through which foreign investment and loans would flow into Chile. Ffrench-Davis, in fact, gives this as the main reason for engaging the mission:

The true reason for contracting the Klein-Saks Mission was... that it came from the United States [and] had excellent relations with the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government.³

-
1. Panorama Economico, 26/5/1956. Radical Luis Escobar Cerda, agreed that the basic aim of inviting the mission to Chile was political (Panorama Economico, 25/7/1958).
 2. In conversation with the author, Anibal Pinto stressed the importance of the business gremios in the adoption and shaping of the stabilisation programme. He pointed to the fact that the business associations were able to nominate Jorge Alessandri presidential candidate of the Right wing in 1958 in preference to members of either the Conservative or Liberal parties, as further evidence of the political role they played.
 3. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, op.cit., p.28.

A loan of 75 million dollars was obtained to ease Chile's currency problems on March 1956, of which 35 million dollars was contributed by the IMF. The rest came from the U.S. Treasury (10 million dollars), and New York commercial banks - including the Chase Manhattan, the First National City and Grace National - who contributed a further 30 million dollars. Felipe Herrera, who broke with the Socialist Party over its opposition to stabilisation, described the aid offered by the IMF as 'valuable' and 'decisive'.¹

Ley 12.006 and the Third General Strike

On October 22nd, 1955, the Minister of Finance and the Economy, Oscar Herrera, outlined the government's new economic model to the Senate's finance committee; basically, he said, it aimed to bring inflation under control by controlling the money supply. The model did not address either the problem of unemployment or of growth. Internal demand was to be reduced by holding wage increases to below the rise in the cost of living, a reduction in government subsidies and a reduction in the degree of state interventionism. A reorganization of the Public Administration - which actually meant a reduction in personnel - was promised, which would mean a significant saving to the Treasury.

The programme outlined differed from the programme completed. First of all, Congress rejected the government's proposals to dismiss 42,000 of its 211,000 public employees. Public spending did fall, however (see Table V.3). Government subsidies in transport services and public utility companies fell throughout 1956. Panorama Economico estimated that the costs of fuel and electricity rose 52.5% during 1956, as compared with an overall rise in the cost of living of 37.7%

1. Felipe Herrera Lane, Desarrollo Económico o Estabilidad Monetaria, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1958.

TABLE V.3
PUBLIC SECTOR SPENDING¹

YEAR	PUBLIC EXPENDITURE	PUBLIC INVESTMENT	PUBLIC SECTOR CREDIT	
			CENTRAL BANK	CONSOLIDATED BANKING SYSTEM
1955	28.9	56.9	50.9%	27.5%
1956	28.4	45.6	43.9%	25.8%
1957	29.5	52.0	42.8%	25.5%

during the course of the year.² State support for the national airline Linea Aerea Nacional (LAN CHILE), fell from 49.7% of the airline's income in 1954, to 26.1% in 1956, and 17% in 1957.³ The reduction in CORFO's budget led to harsh criticism from the Radical Party especially the newspaper controlled by the left-wing of the party. Mundo Libre declared itself 'gravely concerned by the government's "anti-national" policy of destroying the patient work of increasing state control in the most fundamental areas of our economy'.⁴ However, the public expenditure cuts were by no means on the scale that Klein Saks and the Central Bank recommended. In its Memoria for 1956, the Chamber of Commerce expressed concern that the levels in public expenditure had not fallen significantly enough.⁵ Despite Radical party fears,

1. Enrique Sierra, op.cit., p.164.
2. Panorama Economico, 20/1/1957, No. 160, p.24.
3. Presidential Message to Congress, 21/5/1958.
4. Mundo Libre, 2/7/1956, p.2.
5. In 1957, when it was clear that the stabilisation programme had slowed down economic growth and the credit squeeze was hitting manufacturing industries, the Cámara de Comercio persisted in blaming the failure of the programme on the fact that public sector spending was not reduced sufficiently. However, the Memoria of 1957 makes the important distinction between 'productive' state spending, of which it approves, and which would be interpreted as subsidising to manufacturers companies etc. and useless and 'unproductive' state activity (e.g. 'excessive' social security etc.).

privatisation of state enterprises did not take place. Budgets were reduced and the activities of certain semi-autonomous bodies were restricted, most notably CONDECOR, hated by the industrial bourgeoisie since 1953, whose functions were taken over by the Central Bank. One important area where the demands to privatise the state holdings in the economy were resisted was in petroleum. Although an all-party congressional committee was created to investigate the possibility of inviting private capital, national or foreign, to invest in Chile's oil reserves which were at that time the monopoly of the state-owned Empresa Nacional de Petroleum (ENAP), the idea was rejected. The President of the Committee, Conservative Manuel José Yrarrazaval Larraín, described ENAP as 'admirable'.¹

The crux of the anti-inflationary package was Ley 12.006, which limited reajustes to no more than 50% of the rise in the cost of living of 1955. Ley 12.006 also attempted to limit price rises to 40% of the levels of November 1955 in order to make the wage ceilings more palatable. However, the Brigada de Investigacion de Estafas set up to monitor prices proved ineffective. Price controls proved impossible to implement, however, since there were numerous exceptions to which the law did not apply, for example, all imported goods, or products manufactured in Chile which required imported parts. The latter especially was a huge category, given the nature of Chilean industry's dependence on the U.S. for either primary materials or technology. The decision to end foreign exchange controls and the multiple exchange rate in April 1956, which instantly devalued the peso from 300 to the dollar to 495, caused further price increases to be passed on to the consumer (imports affected by the loss of the preferential exchange included

1. Ercilla, 10/7/1957, p.8.

sugar, oil, coffee and paraffin). Luis Bossay, who spearheaded the Radical Party's opposition to the stabilisation programme and used it as a very effective campaign device in the Congressional elections of March 1957, explained:

It is well known that the cost of living [in 1955] rose in the region of 85%. In one year, the manual and white-collar workers' standard of living declined by 85% in comparison with the standard which they enjoyed during 1954. In agreement with the stabilisation law, at the beginning of 1956 only 50% of the purchasing power they had lost was returned, and that only in the best of cases. This means that the Chilean worker began 1956 with only half the standard of living of 1955... It is also clear that every new price rise cuts still further into the lowly reduced and at times miserable standard of living of the workers.¹

The government's failure to control price rises alienated groups which accepted in principle the need for an anti-inflationary programme. Jorge Prat, whose anti-inflationary proposals had called for some, albeit not equal, sacrifices from employers as well as employees within the context of an overall authoritarian package, called the stabilisation a 'fraud' because it did not affect either private income or prices.² Eduardo Frei, whom Ibáñez wanted to appoint Minister of Finance in 1954, and who as President of the Republic, introduced a stabilisation programme in 1965, was another stern critic.³

The government's stabilisation programme coincided with a virulent anti-communist campaign, and the adoption of a mano dura in labour disputes. These were in fact political preconditions of the economic programme. Employers' associations regarded the anti-inflationary programme as an excuse for an offensive against the CUT (El Mercurio

1. Interview with Luis Bossay, Vea, 30/5/1956.

2. Interview with Jorge Prat, Vea, 1/2/1956.

3. See for example, Panorama Economico, 25/10/1957, No. 178.

called for 'the legal and effective exclusion of the CUT from public life')¹ as well as an opportunity to slow down the rate of inflation without losing their own privileges. Public liberties were put at risk during the programme which required an imposition of state of seige twice. Trade union officials found themselves imprisoned or relegated, journalists were arrested, El Siglo was closed, thirteen workers were killed in one incident after clashes with police, yet the Chamber of Commerce claimed that 'labour disputes have been overcome with equanimity, justice and a willingness to sacrifice'² (which can only have meant settled in the employers' favour).

When Ibáñez sent the bill to Congress, which was to become Ley 12.006 in November 1955, the CUT, supported especially by the public employees association ANEF, health service workers and teachers, all of whom would be particularly badly hit by cuts in public expenditure, declared their fervent opposition and called for a general strike on the 9th January. Labour leaders hoped that sectors of the 'national bourgeoisie' would support their call for the withdrawing of the bill, because of the damage national industry would sustain as a result of the slowing down of the economy and loss of buying power of consumers.³ By and large, however, opposition did not appear from the Right until after the stabilisation programme began to affect detrimentally their economic interests.

Just before the strike was to take place, the government imposed a state of seige in 20 provinces (the remaining five had been under a stage of seige since September 1955), and temporarily closed the

1. El Mercurio, 1/3/1956.

2. Memoria, Cámara de Comercio, 1956.

3. Opposition was reported in Vea, 4/1/1956 from some Liberals (Eduardo Alessandri, Gustavo Rivera, and Pedro Opazo). These were isolated examples, however.

Extraordinary Sessions of Congress. The day of the strike, military strength in Santiago increased to 30,000. Trade union leaders were detained under the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia in the early hours of the 9th of January, including Clotario Blest, Juan Vargas Puebla, Communist and ex-deputy and Treasurer of the CUT (both of whom remained in prison for 110 days), the vice-president and other national officials of the CUT, and many local and provincial leaders. Partly as a result of government activity, the strike was only 20% effective.¹

There were other important reasons for the ineffectiveness of the strike, however, mainly internal weaknesses within the CUT, the still relatively low level of unionisation, and a lack of preparations for the strike. Jorge Barria, in Historia de la CUT, attributes its failure to:

Weariness among trade unionists produced by the rounds of short strikes, and the threats of a general strike which were periodically issued by the CUT after the general strike of the 7th of July, [1955]. The possibility of a successful indefinite general strike was limited by the speed with which the decision was taken, and meant that adequate groundwork (propaganda, mobilisation of leaders etc.) was not undertaken. Also, there was not a sufficient degree of unionisation to make the strike effective.²

After its initial and combative early years, the CUT fell victim to a debilitating series of internal squabbles which were to reduce its effectiveness considerably for a number of years. The Communists,

1. The government's hard-line raised once again the issue of whether Ibáñez represented a threat to Chile's democratic way of life. The Argentine newspaper, Democracia, claimed at this time that plans had been made for a military coup in Chile. The government was also accused internationally of violating human rights in its treatment of trade union leaders (Vea, 11/1/1956).
2. Jorge Barria, Historia de la CUT, Prensa LatinoAmericana, Santiago, 1971, p.80.

Socialistas de Chile, Radicals and Falangistas within the CUT supported trade union participation in the Frente Civico in 1955, whereas the PSP trade unionists and anarcho-syndicalists tended to argue that the CUT should be in the forefront of revolutionary change rather than defending formal democratic freedoms. By 1956, there were also disputes within the CUT over political strategies and alliances between the Communists and the Socialists on the one hand, and between the Left, the Radicals, and the Falange. The lack of unity inside the CUT had inevitable repercussions on the effectiveness of the strike. In a confidential letter, written from prison, to the acting Secretary General of ANEF, Santiago Pereira, Blest described the 1956 strike as a 'tragic failure', and said that the CUT was no more than a 'corpse' afterwards.¹

After the failure of the general strike and the subsequent passing of Ley 12.006, the combativity of the labour movement declined. Fewer requests for improved wages and working conditions were made in 1956 and 1957, and fewer strikes and lower wages were the order of the day. As a result of the stabilisation programme, the percentage of national income received by the working class fell from 30% in 1953 to 25.5% in 1959, and that of the upper class increased from 43.6% to 49.3% in the same years.² The government's harsh repression of the labour movement led Socialist Senator, Eugenio Gonzalez, to comment:

It would seem that the President has decided at last to give a definite orientation to his government: a sort of economic liberalism, coupled with a covert political authoritarianism.³

-
1. The letter is in the possession of Santiago Pereira, who kindly showed it to me.
 2. Anibal Pinto, op.cit., p.44.
 3. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 13/6/1956.

TABLE V.4THE SUELDO VITAL DURING THE 1950s¹

<u>YEAR</u>	(in 1950 pesos) <u>SUELDO VITAL</u>
1950	3,800
1951	3,818
1952	4,082
1953	4,025
1954	3,958
1955	3,561
1956	3,146
1957	3,181
1958	3,031

Results of the Stabilisation Programme

The stabilisation programme had limited though temporary success in its original aim. By 1958, inflation had fallen to 25-30%, not as great a reduction as either Klein-Saks or the Central Bank had predicted. The fall in inflation was undoubtedly helped by the fortuitous though only temporary rise in copper prices in mid 1956.

However, the reduction in the rate of inflation was achieved at the cost of economic growth. Private industry was adversely affected by the credit restrictions, the loss of the preferential exchange rate, and eventually also by the fall in the internal demand for finished goods, caused by the drop in living standards. Manufacturing and the construction and associated industries were particularly badly effected. Building declined by 40% between 1956 and 1958 because of the reduction in state investment in housing and public works.² According to a survey

1. Instituto de Economía, 1963, Vol. II, p.46.

2. Panorama Economico (21/11/1952) estimated that only about 20% of all building contracts depended on private enterprise.

made by the industrialists' association, SOFCEFA, sales of metalurgical products fell by 50% during the first three months of 1956.¹

In effect, the overall result of the stabilisation was to deepen the recession which Chile had been suffering since 1953, and to raise unemployment. While precise figures are difficult to obtain, it was estimated, for example, that 11,000 dockers were laid off as a direct result of the programme.² In the building industry, unemployment rose from 10.7% in January 1956 to 32.5% in June 1957.³ Enrique Sierra estimates that as a result of stabilisation, unemployment rose 9% as a whole.⁴ According to ECLA, industrial production fell by 4% between 1955 and 1957.⁵ Economist Flavian Levine Bawden, director of the CAP, argued that in spite of the fall in inflation on 1955 figures, the economic situation had actually worsened considerably by 1957:

It is the worst of all possible situations - a continued increase in the cost of living, unemployment, and depression in the activities of production.⁶

The sectors worst affected by the programme were the unemployed and the wage-earners.

-
1. Quoted in Edmundo Perez, 'Seis Meses de la Misión Klein Saks', Principios, No. 35, July-August, 1956.
 2. Mundo Libre, 29/3/1957.
 3. Enrique Sierra (1970), p.65. Eduard Epstein, in 'Anti-Inflationary Policies in Argentina and Chile (or who pays the cost)', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, July, 1978, points out that of the anti-inflationary measures of Ibáñez, Alessandri, Frei and Allende, that of Ibáñez resulted in the highest increase in unemployment.
 4. Vistazo, 5/11/1957.
 5. Panorama Economico, 25/10/1957, No. 178.
 6. Flavian Levine Bawden, 'Analizando los problemas: Errores que se repiten', in Panorama Economico, 25/10/ 1957, No. 178.

By 1957 the CUT had recovered enough after the disastrous general strike to form part of a tenacious opposition to the government, and played an important role in uniting the Left (the two Socialist fractions, the Communist party, the Partido de Trabajo, and the Democrats of the People), in the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP). Along with the university students' federation, the CUT formed a Comando en contra las alzas (literally, group against the rises) in February 1957. Clotario Blest declared at the first meeting of the Comando:

Never has so much been tolerated from any President of the Republic as has been tolerated from Ibáñez. His only interest is helping his friends and family. He laughs at the cries of the entire nation, while his nearest and dearest have grown rich with scarcely believable speed.¹

The mobilisation of trade unionists and students against rises in the cost of public transport throughout February and March, culminated in riots in Valparaiso and Santiago, known as the riots of the Dos de Abril. Many in the opposition argued that hardship caused by the stabilisation measures were directly responsible.²

As economic growth slowed down and unemployment rose, criticism widened to include sectors who were initially favourable to the programme. The business associations, without whose help the programme would not have been adopted, offered their full cooperation at first, and participated in joint committees with representatives of the government to monitor the programme. They had seized upon the programme as a chance to reduce inflation by lowering wages, and at the same time weakening the power of the labour movement. In as much as the measures

1. Ercilla, 13/2/1957, No. 1136.

2. See p.272-6 for a full discussion of the Dos de Abril.

were the antithesis of the populist phase of Ibañismo immediately after the presidential elections, which saw the foundation of the CUT with government acquiescence if not support, Chilean manufacturers/entrepreneurs saw the programme as righting the balance, and re-establishing the pre-eminence they had enjoyed in economic policy-making in the last years of the Gonzalez Videla administration. Significantly, Conservative and Liberal party leaders took the offensive against the Left, instead of the defensive and consensual attitude they had assumed during the early years of the administration.¹

The content of the programme - credit restrictions, free competition for imported goods, higher interest rates - caused more problems for private industry than for the public sector, ironically given the ideological premium the model placed on private rather than state investment. The business associations campaigned for greater flexibility on credit and, dropping suddenly their free-market rhetoric, for state subsidies to industry and import controls. As a result, in 1957 credit was less restricted and some state investment rapidly found its way into public building programmes (which indicates that the government was responsive, to a degree, to the protests of the industrial bourgeoisie).² However,

-
1. The Conservatives and Liberals were particularly happy to see the repeal of the Ley Maldita shelved, and lost no opportunity to deny the right of the CUT to represent the working class and to participate in public life. Just as the passing of the Ley Maldita was in good measure a product of the Cold War, so the Conservatives and Liberals used the language of the Cold War to de-legitimize the CUT. So, for example, Juan Antonio Coloma claimed that the CUT protected 'comunizantes elements, who think their mission is subversion and agitation', and the Conservative Senator, Fransisco Bulnes Sanfuentes, described the Communist party as a 'sedition sect, which pursues its goals by criminal means'. (Both of these were reported in La Nación, 5/8/1956 and 22/8/1956).
 2. 'The composition of the board of directors of Chile's Central Bank largely explains the difficulty that existed in enforcing credit restraints. The board was dominated by private banking interest, which often neglected the public interest in favour of their own, and that of privileged clients.' Joseph Grunwald, 'The Structuralist Case' in Hirschman (ed.), op.cit., p.103.

the government's response was not enough to prevent the deepening of the economic recession, and the President of SOFOPA, Domingo Arteaga, claimed that only the 'negative part' of the recommendations of the Klein Saks mission had been put into practise.¹ Satisfied with the political pay-offs of the programme, however, the industrial entrepreneurs did not experience a complete change of heart; they would have chosen to restrict the programme to harsh reductions in wages and salaries, as their criticisms of the government-imposed wage reajustes for 1957 of 80% of the rise in the cost of living showed, although this represented in practise a further real cut in living standards.

Arteaga was perfectly correct in pointing out that the government was only implementing a part of the recommendations of the Klein Saks mission. Socialist Senator Salvador Allende made the same point, but noted that it was precisely the structuralist criticisms the mission made which were ignored by the government;² paradoxically, although the recommendations of the American mission were directed in general towards lowering inflation by cutting monetary expansion and reducing demand, some of its proposals, the norm in advanced capitalist countries, were too progressive for Chilean industrialists. For example, the Mission suggested legislation to reduce monopolies, and, where the Liberals, Conservatives and leading members of the business community were urging the government to cut taxes,³ Prescott Carter recommended a

1. El Siglo, 17/5/1957.

2. See Panorama Economico, 25/10/1957, No. 170.

3. For example, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, Hernan Elgueta, claimed that taxation was already excessive and was leading to a process of decapitalisation. El Mercurio, 7/6/1957. In 1956, 35% of all tax revenue in Chile came from indirect taxation, as compared to only 18% from direct taxation. Joseph Grunwald, 'The Structuralist School on Price, Stability and Development: The Chilean Case' in A. Hirschman (ed.), op.cit., p.114.

tax reform which would reduce tax evasion, and increase the tax paid on unearned income and transferred capital. He therefore recommended that the government investigate in detail the income of such groups as the members of the powerful Club de la Unión and the elitist Club Hípico and Club de Golf; the 200 biggest landowners in the country; those who had recently travelled to Argentina or the free port of Arica; and those who acquire property worth more than 6 million pesos. These recommendations were undoubtedly progressive in the context of the Chilean economy, and, if implemented, would seriously have restricted the privileges of the upper class. Vea greeted the proposals with 'The Mission wants the rich to pay' (Que paguen los poderosos), the slogan coined to describe the economic programme of Felipe Herrera during the initial populist year of government.¹ Nevertheless, because the government depended exclusively on Liberal and Conservative parliamentary support, it was unable, even if it had been willing, to implement these sorts of recommendations.

The assumption behind the stabilisation model was that private capital investment should replace state investment as the motor of the economy. Rather than encouraging investment by the native Chilean bourgeoisie, a determined effort was made to attract foreign investment by reducing the level of taxation to which foreign enterprises would be subject, and by reforming the foreign exchange system. In this sense, the programme was consistent with the Nuevo Trato de Cobre of May 1955.

Chilean industrialists and manufacturers saw no conflict initially between the interests of native and foreign capital, and cooperated with the Committee of Foreign Investment created by DFL. 237, which had been set up to investigate the optimum conditions for attracting foreign

1. Vea, 14/9/1957.

capital. The loss of protection and increased competition from abroad, however, revealed contradictions firstly, between the interests of native and foreign capital and secondly, between the free-enterprise ideology enthusiastically adopted by the Chilean bourgeoisie, and the policies from which they actually benefited.

Conclusion.

The arrival of the Klein-Saks Mission, the introduction of Ley 12.006, and the crushing defeats inflicted on the labour's movement signified a reversal of the original populist goals of the administration: The programme did not increase the living standards of the urban and rural workers, as promised in the presidential campaign, quite the reverse, in fact; it signalled a new harmonious relationship between the government and foreign capital, the opposite of the anti-imperialist rhetoric of 1951-1952; and it did not lead to economic expansion but deepened the recession. As such it re-established the left-right polarity which had previously characterised Chilean politics, which had been temporarily broken by Ibáñez' populism on the one hand, and the subsequent emergence of an multi-party anti-populist opposition on the other hand, lasting throughout the first period of the regime. Ibañismo had conspicuously aspired to end the Left-Right division¹ which was interpreted by the traditional democratic parties (by which I understand the Socialistas de Chile as well as the Radicals, Falange, and the Conservatives and Liberals), as an attack on political pluralism

1. See the numerous speeches made by Guillermo Izquierdo, in the Senate after his election in March 1953. For example, 'Our party has expressed on many occasions that it is necessary to overcome the left-right schema which divides Chile on politics. It is not that we are opposed to political parties, but that we believe in the rationalisation of the democratic game'. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 10A, 7/7/1953.

and Chile's party system itself: the opposition to Ibáñez made the distinction between 'enemy' and 'adversary', which they argued the government very dangerously ignored.¹

Although the original populist alliance forged in the presidential campaign, between the PAL and the PSP and the various small personalist, nationalist and populist groupings collapsed during the first year of the government when the PSP declined to accept further governmental responsibilities, the Popular Socialists did not abandon populism itself and pressed the government to complete the 'septembrist' programme.

Until the stabilisation programme, the two Socialist fractions remained divided on the question of strategic alliances, and the PSP adamantly refused to join the Frente Civico, unlike the Socialistas de Chile. The PSP argued that with the collapse of the Prat-Olavarria cabinet at the end of 1954 the threats to democracy had disappeared, and that, in any case, the differences between opposition from the Left, and opposition from the Right were incompatible. Raul Ampuero of the PSP claimed that the Frente Civico was only a smokescreen for 'economic and social demands of a clear reactionary extraction - free exchange, protection of the system of free enterprise, repudiation of all regulatory state interventionism in the economy, and broad freedom' for the introduction of new foreign capital.² Senator Quinteros of the

1. The use of the term 'enemy', rather than adversary is very symbolic. See, for instance, Salvador Allende: 'We have been tenacious adversaries of his Excellency Señor Ibáñez... but in spite of this, I have never called Señor Ibáñez anti-patriotic in spite of the enormous difference which separates me from him and his attitude as President'. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores; 10A, 23/3/1955. Of course this 'defence of democracy' attitude became in itself a formidable weapon against the government, and a convenient rallying point for the opposition.
2. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 3A, 1/6/1955.

Socialists within the Frente Civico justified electoral and parliamentary pacts with the Centre and Right-wing because 'it manifests the repudiation that we feel towards the government, and [Ibáñez'] efforts and threats to introduce totalitarianism... It demonstrates our common aim of preserving the constitutional norms of the Republic'.¹

The division between the two Socialist factions came to a head at the beginning of 1955 when Sergio Recabarren's appointment as Minister of the Interior left vacant a parliamentary seat in Santiago. Socialista Popular, Clodomiro Almeyda, ex-minister of Ibáñez represented the 'septembrist' parties - though he denied that he was in any way an 'official' candidate - against Falangista Rafael Gumucio, candidate of the Frente Civico, and therefore of the Socialistas de Chile. Gumucio campaigned on the one issue that united the Frente Civico, the defence of parliamentary and public liberties, and won a resounding victory.²

The divisions of the Socialists undoubtedly weakened the Left, and strengthened the hand of the Right-wing in the Frente Civico. The Socialistas de Chile and the Communists who were grouped together in the umbrella organisation, the Frente del Pueblo, were caught between two fundamental commitments - to the goal of unifying the Left in time for the Presidential elections of 1958, at the very latest, and to their undoubtedly sincere defence of parliamentarians and pluralism. The Radical Party, too, would have preferred to integrate the entire Left into the Frente Civico, since they feared the Socialistas de Chile leaving to form a 'Bloc of the Left' - the ultimate stated goal of both Socialist parties - and therefore leaving the Radicals in alliance with

1. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 3A, 1/6/1955.

2. Gumucio polled 50,811 votes to Almeyda's 27,489. El Mercurio, 11/3/1955.

Liberals and Conservatives, which would have cast doubts on the 'progressive' image the Radicals were keen on cultivating, especially under the headship of Luis Bossay.

In the event, it was the new alliance between the Liberals and Conservatives and the government which was to break the Frente Civico, and open the way for the formation of a new Left-wing bloc, the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), which grouped together the two socialist fractions with the Communists and other small leftist groups, the Partido del Trabajo led by Baltazar Castro, and the Partido Democratico del Pueblo led by Humberto Martones, and some independents such as ex-Ibañista, ex-intendente of Santiago, Mamerto Figueroa, and the ex-Minister of Finance, Guillermo del Pedregal. The major source division inside FRAP was whether or not the Radical Party should be admitted: this developed at an ideological level into a struggle between the strategy of a Workers Front and a rejection of class alliances on the one hand, and the Communist-backed strategy of National Liberation on the other, which implied an anti-imperialist alliance with sectors of the 'national bourgeoisie'.

During 1956, this problem was shelved in the opposition to the government's economic policies, and the FRAP cooperated with the Radicals in the municipal elections of April 1956, and by-elections in April for Tarapacá, when Radical Juan Luis Mauras won with FRAP support, and in Valparaiso, when Jaime Barros, the FRAP candidate, won with Radical support. These elections foreshadowed the congressional elections of 1957 in that they re-established the clear hegemony of the political parties.

CHAPTER VITHE 'DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY' AND THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION

The opposition parties greeted Ibáñez's victory in 1952 with howls of alarm. Quite apart from Ibáñez's suspected involvement in anti-democratic conspiracies throughout the 1930s and 1940s, a generation of now important political and congressional leaders had matured during the first Ibáñez administration, several of them prominent in the university-led demonstrations against Ibáñez in 1931 - Salvador Allende, Rafael Gumucio, Luis Bossay, and Eduardo Frei amongst them. The fact that Ibáñez was democratically elected in 1952 served only slightly to calm opposition fears, with attention in the press focusing on to rumours concerning the imminent closing of the reactionary Congress or the possibility of a military pronunciamiento, with or without the support of civilian golpistas. It rapidly became evident that the opposition feared an authoritarian coup with reformist pretensions, fuelled by talk of Ibáñez's victory as a 'peaceful septembrist revolution', as much as straightforwardly repressive intervention.

Government and opposition relations were highly charged throughout the life of the government. Sensationalist - and sometimes, it must be said, unfounded - reports in the press became commonplace, as did bitter verbal attacks by the President himself and government mouthpieces. It must be remembered that the media (radio and press)¹ played a crucial role during the administration in shaping the nature and bitterness of the government-opposition relationship. The administration was portrayed in

1. Radio played an important role in the 1950s, both as a means of information and as propaganda. However, because of the impossibility of obtaining radio transcripts, the following account deals with only newspapers and journals.

the press and by the opposition parties as authoritarian, excessively intolerant of criticism, and Ibáñez as another Perón, with a strong inclination towards militarism. Nepotism and corruption were further charges made against the executive, practices which, it was claimed, demeaned the democratic tradition in Chile. The strategy of the opposition climaxed with an attempt to impeach the President in 1956 in the wake of the Peronist hearings in Congress.

The fact is, however, that despite the persistent (and sometimes exaggerated) rumours of the time,¹ Ibáñez did not exceed his constitutional authority. It must also be remembered that the 'defence of democracy' attitude, sincere as it may have been, was also a convenient slogan around which an otherwise disparate opposition could rally. It was, moreover, a very useful stick with which to beat the government.

Did the second Ibáñez administration pose a potential threat to Chile's parliamentary institutions, saved only by an alert, watchful and suspicious opposition? Did the government fail to complete its campaign promises because of the unreasonable and stubborn refusal of the defeated parties to co-operate with the executive 'in the national interest', an opposition reduced to inventing plots or magnifying them to justify their intransigence? I hope to go some way towards answering these questions in a discussion of some 'key' areas in government and opposition relations: the issue of military involvement during the administration; government attitudes to, and the role of, the press; and the extent of executive, and more particularly, congressional authority. For many within the opposition, especially the Radicals, almost every negative feature of the regime - from its militarism, to its anti-liberalism, and even including the Dos de April riots - could be attributed to the Peronist influence. Finally, therefore, it must be remembered that the emotive question of Peronism was central to all three issues.

1. One of the best examples of exaggerated rumours comes from ex-Foreign Minister, and ex-Minister of the Interior, Arturo Olavarría Bravo, who claimed: 'There is not one...but a hundred plots in progress'.
Vea, 28/12/1955.

Ibáñez and the Armed Forces

Ibáñez's preference for appointing military figures over civilians, his militaristic, hierarchical and authoritarian value-system, even his tendency to wear military uniforms at public functions, all these combined to alarm the opposition. Radical senator, Luis Bossay, was to claim later that these were most important reasons for the Radicals' suspicion and wariness towards the administration.¹ Retired military officers appointed to Cabinet office included Colonels Benjamin Videla, Eduardo Yáñez, Francisco O'Ryan, Tobias Barros and General. later, Colonel Abdon Parra.

During the first two years alone, Ibáñez named seven retired military officers as foreign ambassadors, and confirmed two earlier military appointments of Gonzalez Videla, making a total of nine.² Of course several of the appointments were made rather as a result of friendship with Ibáñez. Some, like Tobias Barros, were old collaborators of the caudillo from the 1920s and 1930s.

The increased visible public role that the military assumed in the Ibáñez period began during the presidential campaign. Retired Colonel Ramón Alvarez Goldsack formed the Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo (MONAP), which the opposition feared was an attempt to organise a social base for authoritarian populism, along the lines of Peronism. The most important example of political activity in the Armed Forces during the campaign was the emergence of an organisation known as the PUMAS (Por una mañana auspiciosa - for a brighter tomorrow), which was also to have repercussions for the administration in 1955.³

-
1. Interview, October 1983.
 2. For details, see Prospero, Visión Espectral de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1964, p.68. The ambassadors included Tobias Barrios to Italy, Colonel (R) Hormazábal to Germany, General (R) Ruiz to Canada, Major (R) Gustavo Luco to Venezuela, Admiral (R) Enrique Lagreze to Panama, and General (R) Abdon Parra to Rome.
 3. Ercilla suggested rather cynically that PUMA should stand for Por un major ascenso - for quicker promotion. Ercilla, 17/3/1953.

The PUMAS were a group of army officers favourable to Ibáñez's candidature and reportedly ready to secure his victory militarily if necessary. As well as being Ibañistas, several of the PUMAs were also known golpistas during the Radical presidencies. Two of the PUMAs, Abdón Parra and Benjamin Videla, had reportedly been members of the shadowy Grupo de Oficiales Seleccionados (GOS) in 1941, headed by the then director of the Escuela Militar Colonel Alvarez Goldsack.¹ Radical Senator Gonzalez Madariaga alleged that the PUMAs intended to use the Ibañista and ex-Nacista radio Nuevo Mundo to call upon Ibáñez's supporters to secure his victory by violence, and may only have been prevented by the closing of the radio station on the day of the election.² Whatever the truth of this accusation, Ibáñez did not need non-electoral support, securing as he did very nearly an absolute majority of the votes cast.

Nonetheless, the president's personal knowledge of the officer corps in 1952 was small. This was partly a result of the policy of previous Radical administrations of discouraging contact between politicians in general (and Ibáñez in particular) and the officer corps. Changes were therefore the orders of the day. Twenty-nine generals and a total of forty high-ranking officers were retired almost immediately after Ibáñez took office, and the ex-PUMAs tended to replace the old guard. Abdón Parra's promotion was particularly notorious, since 24 generals were retired ahead of him to promote him to the rank of Colonel.³ General Carlos Mezzano Camino, who had denounced the complot de las patitas de Chancho was one of those retired, supposedly at the suggestion of the PUMAs.⁴

-
1. For the role of the GOS see H.E. Bicheno, op.cit. Ercilla claimed that the PUMAs were direct descendants of the GOS. Ercilla, 22/3/1955.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 41A, 29/3/1955.
 3. Ernesto Wurth Rojas, op.cit., p.244.
 4. For a discussion of how Ibañista/PUMA officers replaced 'constitutionalists', see Ercilla, 17/5/1953.

As an organisation, the PUMAs had disintegrated by October 1954, when Abdon Parra left the Cabinet to become Ambassador to Rome.

From the PUMAS to the Línea Recta

The Línea Recta emerged - or was uncovered, depending on whether it is defined as a secret military lodge or as 'an almost public political tendency'¹ - in March 1955. The opposition's alarm increased with the news that Ibáñez had invited over 50 officers to tea in his house in Dublé Almeyda, where they were allowed to criticise their superiors frankly and openly. However, Ibáñez let it be known later that the invitation had only been issued to bring the group out into the open, and told Congress that there was no call for alarm whatsoever. The government emphatically denied that the meeting was unconstitutional.²

It is difficult to gauge the extent of the support within the Armed Forces for the Línea Recta, just as it is almost impossible to evaluate the relationship with Ibáñez himself. Members of the Línea Recta claimed that Ibáñez favoured the creation of a military-civil Cabinet, and even named the man who would be appointed Minister of the Interior in such a Cabinet as General (R)Teodonio Ruiz Diaz, then ambassador in Canada. Ernst Halperin suggests that Ibáñez was involved, but that the movement failed because of opposition from the High Command.³ Ibáñez's biographer, Ernesto Wurth Rojas also supports the idea of Ibáñez's complicity.⁴

-
1. Raul Ampuero in a letter to Jean Grugel, September 1984.
 2. El Mercurio and La Nación, 21/4/1955.
 3. Ernst Halperin, op.cit.
 4. E. Wurth Rojas, op.cit., p.312.

On the other hand, Ibáñez seems to have had little to do with the actual formation of the Linea Recta, and eventually allowed its leaders to be dismissed. It may be that Ibáñez's almost obsessive desire to anticipate and be informed of any plots - for or against him - has been mistakenly understood as approval.¹

Because of the closed and secretive nature of military organisations, there are few indisputable facts which can be ascertained about the Linea Recta. Officers from the Air Force and the Army were involved, though not the High Command. Civilians were also rumoured to have contacts with the Linea Recta. Popular Socialists Oscar Waiss and Raul Ampuero were the two implicated most often. Oscar Waiss later acknowledged his involvement in the Linea Recta in an interview, and claimed that Alejandro Chelen and Francisco Pizarro, Popular Socialists, were also involved, and that the party in general were favourably disposed. However, he admitted that with hindsight their involvement was an error.²

The ideological orientation of the moment is also unclear. Clearly Ibáñista, it has been variously described as either left or right wing. Donald Bray, for example, describes it as 'a rightist movement, its membership drawn largely from the Liberal and Conservative parties and from the aristocracy'.³ On the other hand, Ercilla outlined the programme of the movement as 'progressive, and in favour of economies in public spending which would suppress all diplomatic, military, and consular missions abroad,

-
1. It is useful to compare Ibáñez's attitude to the Linea Recta, with his dismissal of Jorge Prat from the Banco del Estado. The circumstances are somewhat similar. Rumours had been circulating for some time of Prat's involvement in a plot, and Ibáñez seems to have simply left him enough rope to hang himself. Vistazo, 15/3/1955.
 2. Interview Madrid, September/October, 1984.
 3. Donald Bray, op.cit., p.104. This is based on a detailed interview with one of the participants in the movement, Hugo Barros. In the interview, Barros accepted that the Linea Recta was a secret organisation, but added that it was 'open but hidden like the Klu Klux Klan'. It is little wonder that the incident caused confusion in the opposition, when it seems that even the conspirators themselves could not decide what sort of an organisation they had.

except the absolutely indispensable'.¹ Also, Raul Ampuero has argued that a significant group of the officers involved in the Línea Recta were in favour of a socialist transformation of society, and he points to 'the fact that a large number of officers supported Allende's presidential campaign [in 1958] as proof'. Ampuero goes on, however, to acknowledge the existence of 'many ambiguities' ideologically within the Línea Recta, and the presence of a 'clearly authoritarian and personalist faction'.² F. Nunn argued that the programme of the Línea Recta, had nothing to distinguish it from any of the other movements within the Chilean Armed Forces between 1920-70.³

We could, therefore, conclude that the Línea Recta was doctrinally unclear and contradictory. As a result, it may be unwise to give too much emphasis to its stated ideology. Rather, it could be interpreted broadly and simply as an attempt to put the military onto the centre-stage politically, coinciding as it did with disunity among the government's civilian base, Cabinet crises, and an intransigent parliamentary opposition. We should remember that the military had not constituted an homogeneous ideological fraction in 1924 and 1925 and rapidly disintegrated into factions. Also, two of Chile's prominent caudillos, Marmaduke Grove and Ibáñez himself, were united in 1924 in the 'rattling of sabres', only to become shortly afterwards bitterest enemies.⁴ It is not surprising that the Línea Recta attracted both authoritarian right-wingers and reform-minded officers.

1. Ercilla, 24/5/1955.

2. Letter from Raul Ampuero to Jean Grugel.

3. F. Nunn, op.cit., p.247.

4. It was rumoured that Ibáñez's hopes to become the presidential candidate of the Popular Front in 1938 were ended by Grove's implacable distrust and opposition.

The Línea Recta was the expression of Ibañismo in the Armed Forces, itself an unclear and contradictory movement. Like Ibañismo in its populist phase during the campaign, the Línea Recta attracted the military equivalent of the Popular Socialists and Estanquero. Left and right wings of the Línea Recta were united in their distrust of traditional political parties - to whom Ibáñez was increasingly turning - and shared anti-Liberal and nationalist tendencies. Ultimately, the Línea Recta was a response to the political crisis. It represented an attempt to revive Ibañismo itself, this time in a militarist and genuinely authoritarian mould. An unnamed participant claimed in a press interview that the movement wanted:

General Ibáñez to abandon the political parties.
The PAL is tied to Ibáñez by only fragile chains...
Because of the anarchy of the Ibañista parties
and the strength of the opposition, the President
has not been able to fulfill his programme. Or
rather, it has been impossible to fulfill the
programme constitutionally. What is the alternative?
Revolution. If the parties and the gremios abandon
Ibáñez, there remains his armed gremio. We can be
trusted because we have sworn to defend Ibáñez to
the death.¹

Finally, it has been suggested that the Armed Forces chose to offer their support to Ibáñez purely because Ibáñez was felt to be the best guarantee of their corporative interests after alleged neglect under the Radical regimes.²

The Response of the Opposition

Amid some confusion about the precise goals of the Línea Recta, the opposition united in Congress and in the press to repudiate any suggestion that the Armed Forces had a political role to play.³ The

1. Ercilla, 24/5/1955. The rhetoric here is reminiscent of the populist language of Ibáñez's presidential campaign. It can be compared with the oath sworn at the end of the Four Marches. See p.101.
2. Augusto Varas Felipe Agüero and Fernando Bustamante, Chile, Democracia Fuerzas Armadas, Flacso, Santiago, 1983, p.111.
3. Confusion, however, was widespread. Senator Gonzalez Madariaga failed to see the link between the Línea Recta and the PUMAs: He said, 'some of the officers accused [of being members of the Línea Recta] have... even tried to justify it as necessary for the defence of the person of the president of the Republic, threatened - irony of destiny - by the earlier movement, the PUMAs'. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 3A, 1/6/1955.

sustained anti-militarist mobilisation from March to June 1955 was the last of the Frente Civico's offensive against the government before its collapse. It is perhaps remarkable that nearly three years into the life of the government, the battle lines were still drawn as during the presidential campaign: Ibañismo versus the rest.

The united opposition inside and outside Congress issued joint declarations calling in the government to respect 'the democratic traditions' of the Chilean Armed Forces. The documents were signed by the political parties of the Frente Civico, the CUT, the students' organisation, the FECH, and numerous professional associations.¹ The CUT was particularly alarmed at the suggestions of links between the Línea Recta and the dictatorship of Perez Jiménez in Venezuela, and, perhaps inevitably, with Peronism. The CUT rejected the idea that authoritarian government could ever prove beneficial to the members:

The workers are aware through hard-learned experience nationally and internationally that coups d'etat are fundamentally oriented towards the destruction of the few public liberties we currently enjoy and of our union rights.²

The Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, the Conservatives and the Liberals were as harsh in their criticism. The Liberal newspaper, El Debate, had in fact been instrumental in bringing the affair to public notice.

The Left was divided, as it had been over Ibañismo/populism. The Socialistas de Chile and the Communists were critical of the movement, despite its somewhat leftist overtones. Allende spoke of the need for a muro civico to defend democracy, and Luis Corvalán soon to be Secretary

1. El Mercurio, 25/3/1955 and 15/5/1955.

2. Vistazo, 29/3/1955.

General of the Communist party, attacked the movement as the work of 'declass  adventurers, detrimental to the interests of the working class'.¹ However, the Popular Socialists persisted in identifying liberalism as a greater threat to Chile than the possibility of a military intervention. Liberalism, they argued, unlike golpismo, was deeply entrenched in the political and economic system. Raul Ampuero outlined the PSP's position in the Senate, adding that the soldier cannot be expected to be 'ideologically neutral'. Ampuero was himself condemned in the debate for being undemocratic by the Liberal senators Raul Mar n and Eduardo Moore.²

The question of military intervention distracted both the government and opposition from Chile's pressing economic problems. Of course, the opposition might have felt that this was not such a bad thing, since it was unable to agree on economic solutions in the way it could unite to defend democracy. Meanwhile each group within the Frente C vico was able to see the L nea Recta as a manifestation of whatever feature of the Iba nez regime that it most loved to hate. The Radicals found it a clear example of Peronist influence on the government; the Communists linked it to the opening up of the economy to U.S. capital; and the Right-wing parties pointed to alleged socialist participation in the conspiracy.³ Even the PAL tried to use the incident to some sort of advantage. Professing total adherence to Chile's democratic way of life, the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Pecabarren, suggested that Congress should now offer the PAL Cabinet its full co-operation, since the PAL was all that stood between the country and military rule.

-
1. See Vistazo, 15/3/1955; El Siglo, 17/3/1955 and El Siglo, 18/3/1955.
 2. C mara de Senadores, 3A, 1/6/1955. Mar n and Moore were perhaps the two Liberal parliamentarians most distinguished in their anti-Iba nismo.
 3. See the debate in the C mara de Senadores, *ibid.*

The Línea Recta was the most serious military lodge within the Armed Forces since the 1920s and before 1970. The danger it was felt to represent was heightened since it followed suggestions of a possible coup from within the Cabinet the year previous, supported variously by Abdon Parra, Arturo Olavarría Bravo, or Jorge Prat, and according to some versions, at the instigation of General Perón.¹ The incident led to the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Colonel Tobias Barrios.

Nonetheless, the Línea Recta was unable to act, whether because of the watchfulness of the democratic parties, or because of lukewarm support for the initiative in government, perhaps a combination of the two. Twenty-two officers were arrested, court-martialled and dismissed. However, the fear of military intervention did not disappear - the Left remained suspicious that the heavy-handed tactics on the part of the government to implement the harsh austerity programme in 1956 might overspill into dictatorship and the April 1957 riots revived the question again.

The Press under Ibáñez

In democratic Chile, the size, scope and influence of the press were really extraordinary. El Diario Ilustrado, El Debate, El Imparcial and El Mercurio represented various factions of the Chilean Right, La Tercera de la Hora was strongly associated with the Radical Party, the Communists were on the whole able to continue publishing El Siglo in defiance of the Ley Maldita, and Las Noticias de Última Hora was the voice of the independent Left. Weekly magazines showed less political affiliation in general, the exception being the Communist Vistazo, and periodic, short-lived, publications by the Socialists such as ¿Que Hay?. The problem for

1. See Wurth Rojas, op.cit., pp.283-5, for the details of how a plot developed at the instigation of Juan Perón via the Argentine Ambassador in Chile, Ismael de la Cruz Guerrero.

these magazines, in any case, was financial rather than governmental intolerance. Of the weeklies, Ercilla, Vea, Zig-Zag and the satirical Topaze were of special importance. Not all these papers and journals were of national circulation, but there was also a long-lasting tradition of provincial journalism - El Tarapacá (Radical) of Iquique, La Unión (Radical) of Valparaíso and La Prensa Austral (Punta Arenas) were very important.

The press was influential both in shaping public opinion and as a forum of political debate and polemic. Certain newspapers were also able to directly influence policy-making, however; El Mercurio was undoubtedly the most influential of them all, and during the second Ibáñez administration played an important co-ordinating role between the government and the Klein-Saks team in Chile. Another example of the inter-action of politics and journalism was the series of articles published in El Debate after the fall of Perón, which contributed to Congress's decision to investigate the spread of Peronism from Argentina to Chile.

None of the established newspapers supported Ibáñez and few were even sympathetic. A possible exception was Vea, whose editor, Genaro Medina, was regarded as being Ibañista. The tradition of independence was strong, however, and even Genaro Medina did not hesitate, as President of the Circulo de Periodistas, to defend the freedom of the press against government interference during states of siege or of emergency. In any case, Vea was more a sensationalist magazine, its political content being limited to interviews and features rather than analysis. The most influential political correspondent of the time, Luis Hernández Parker, wrote for Ercilla. On the whole, the administration had recourse only to the

State-owned La Nación to defend itself. Attempts in the early part of the administration to found an Ibañista newspaper failed absolutely.¹

Relations between the administration and the newspaper proprietors and journalists were strained, troubled and at times openly hostile. Ibañez had proved intolerant of opposition as President in the 1920s; this and the repeated attacks on the press - left or right wing - by Ibañista radio stations and in Estanquero created a widespread fear that his victory would inaugurate a campaign of government harassment of journalists. Estanquero claimed: 'The newspapers lie every day. The Chilean Press is prostituted, poisoned or stupid',² and advocated censorship to prevent 'the propagation of doctrines or the exaltation of immorality'.³ All Ibañistas tended towards arguing that the press should not have party ties or affiliations. Since a free press is the cornerstone of any democratic system, any attempt to curb or reduce its power was interpreted as the first sign of a systematic disregard for civil rights. As such, therefore, the issue was very sensitive indeed.

Voicing the fears and opinions of the opposition, the newspapers became a major forum for criticising and attacking government action. The clashes that took place between the executive and Congress were reproduced between the executive and the press. Criticisms of the administration made in Congress were repeated in newspaper editorials. So, until mid-1955, the press as a whole reflected the 'defence of democracy' consensus that predominated within the opposition parties. Thus the

-
1. Guillermo Izquierdo admitted that there was an attempt made to buy the small paper, El Pueblo, using loans from Argentina, Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 4A, 26/10/1955. For the purposes of propaganda, however, the Ibañistas generally relied on radio stations, some of which broadcast from Argentina.
 2. Estanquero, 9/2/1952.
 3. Estanquero, 28/3/1953.

question of Peronism in Chile, the nature and scope of executive power, and the need to alert the public to the presence of suspected golpistas in the Cabinet or close to Ibáñez were issues given extensive coverage.

Extensive attention was also paid to the question of alleged harrassment of the press by government personnel or government supporters. Incidents included: arrests or relegations of journalists, including the editor of La Unión (August 1953), José Miguel Varas, editor of El Siglo (November 1954), Agustín Pico Cañas, editor of La Tercera de la Hora (January 1955), Guillermo Herera, editor of Las Noticias de Última Hora (January 1955), and Octavio Marfán, editor of El Debate (March 1955); a bomb planted in the offices of El Debate on the 3rd of July, 1955;¹ the prosecution of journalists and the temporary closing of papers under the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, especially El Siglo, periodically shut for between 10 and 30 days, but also the Radical papers La Unión and Mundo Libre; the closing of the printing press Horizonte during the state of seige in November 1954, preventing the publication of El Siglo, Vistazo, Las Noticias de Última Hora, and Ercilla as well as the trade union circulars which were published by Horizonte;² and physical attacks on journalists, the worst being an attempt against the life of Anibal Pinto co-proprietor of Las Noticias de Última Hora.³ In general, the adoption of state of siege powers by the government coincided with restrictions on press freedoms. This is partly why journalists were ready to lend their full support to condemnations of government policy.

-
1. It was alleged that the Policia Politica (Special Branch) was responsible for planting the bomb (Vistazo, 5/7/1955). El Debate was exceptionally anti-Ibañista and anti-Peronist. The bomb attack was uniformly condemned by the entire spectrum of the press as an attempt to silence opposition. The government also condemned the attack.
 2. Perhaps ironically, as well as publishing left-wing papers, Horizonte had published the Ibañista La Escoba, brought out especially for the 1952 electoral campaign.
 3. See Vea, 18/1/1956 for details.

By the end of 1955, the administration had achieved a measure of political stability. Policies were less zig-zag than before, and the government had found a social base of support among the industrial and entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. El Mercurio, in particular, supported the adoption of liberal economics coupled with anti-communism, which characterised government policy throughout 1956, and ignored issues for the most part which had earlier been regarded as important (rotation of cabinets, abuse of civil liberties etc.). The administration, therefore, should not have been as vulnerable to attacks from the press.

The years 1955-56 did not signal improvements in the government's relations with the press, however. Having neutralised the Conservatives and the Liberals, Ibáñez faced opposition from the Radical Party and the Left - more united than at any time since the passing of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia.

Volpone and La Nación

The appointment of Dario Sante-Marie (Volpone) as editor of La Nación in June 1954 and his polemics against Las Noticias de Ultima Hora and the Radical Party brought government and press relations to a new low. According to Luis Bossay, Volpone's campaign on behalf of the administration 'prevented the opposition from even respecting the government'.¹ Volpone's style of journalism while at La Nación became in some ways a prototype for the scurrilous 'yellow press' in the 1960s, the best example of which was Sante-Marie's own paper, Clarín.

1. Interview, July 1983.

Dario Sante-Marie is one of the most intriguing, successful and controversial figures in the history of Chilean journalism. His varied career makes it almost impossible to characterise him politically. A member of Pablo Ramirez's fabled team of young technicians during Ibáñez's first administration,¹ he worked for Arturo Matte in 1952, yet supported Socialist Salvador Allende in 1970. In the 1930s, he pioneered the creation of Hoy and La Hora, and helped establish Zig-Zag as one of Chile's foremost magazines. At the same time, he gained a reputation for influential friendships with Latin American political leaders such as Jorge Velasco Ibarra, Fulgencio Batista, Victor Haya de la Torre and Romulo Betancourt. His contacts spread to the United States after working for Wendell Wilkie during his unsuccessful bid for the presidency against Roosevelt. His appointment to La Nación came about partly due to his friendship with Carlos Dávila, Ibáñez's first director of La Nación in 1952, and short-lived President of Chile in 1932.

1956 opened with the passing of Ley 12,006, corner-stone of the new austerity initiatives. Simultaneously, a greater degree of intolerance on the part of the government was discernible towards trade unions and the press. Not surprisingly, therefore, 1956 also inaugurated an atmosphere of attack and counter-attack. The Radicals brought out a new paper, Mundo Libre with a small but national circulation, to spearhead the Party's campaign against the stabilisation measures. Trying to contrast the inefficiency and corruption of the Ibáñez regime with a renewed, dynamic

1. Pablo Ramirez had been responsible for the design and implementation of economic policies during Ibáñez's first administration. He gathered together a group of promising young men at the Ministry of the Economy, which included Juan Bautista Rossetti, Guillermo Del Pedregal and Alfonso Fernandez.

leftist Radical Party under the leadership of Senator Luis Bossay, it became a major target of La Nación, along with Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, now owned by Anibal Pinto, Arturo Matte Alessandri and Clodomiro Almeyda.

A series of investigative reports in Las Noticias de Ultima Hora into alleged government corruption was the prelude to perhaps the most celebrated example of Volpone's journalism. Articles in the evening paper implicated Volpone himself in the smuggling of contraband into Chile through Arica or from the U.S.; on the 9th of October 1956, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora published a picture of three vehicles, one a truck, loaded with suitcases and trunks outside Volpone's house, and alleged that import duty had not been paid on any of the articles. Similar allegations were made against Ibáñez himself, and the administration as a whole was accused of being responsible for 'the contraband of the century'.¹ Volpone responded by claiming that the attacks were not directed against him, but were directed instead against the free port of Arica, created by Ibáñez in 1953, and as such were 'anti-patriotic'.² On the 10th of October, La Nación ran as front page headlines an article entitled 'The chief maleteros³ and smugglers in Chile', accusing Pinto and Matte, distinguished figures in the Radical Party (Luis Bossay, Alejandro Ríos Valdivia, Isauro Torres, Juan Luis Mauras, Angel Faivovich, and Raul Gonzalez, editor of Mundo Libre), and on the Left (Salvador Allende, Orlando Millas, Victor Galleguillos, Galo Gonzalez, and Cesar Godoy Urrutia) of organised and repeated smuggling.

1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 9/10/1956. Volpone was also accused of using money from La Nación, that is public money, in order to buy his own paper, Clarín. He responded by claiming that Pinto and Matte had tricked the widow of the previous owner of Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, Carlos Becarra, into selling them the paper in 1956 'for a song'.
2. La Nación, 7/10/1956.
3. A 'maletero' is another word for 'smuggler', meaning, literally, someone who brings goods into another country illegally in their suitcase.

In some ways the bitter rhetoric used against the Radical Party as a whole and against certain individual members of the Party was a continuation of the language of the election campaign of 1952. The Radicals were portrayed as 'traitors'. Everyday La Nación carried the same cartoon where a Chilean roto was seen kicking a fat backside with the letters 'PR' written on it, saying 'The people kicked them out and they shall not return'. Attacks were made against Salvador Allende, a noted anti-Ibáñista, in the same vein. In such attacks, populist rhetoric was never far from the surface. Allende was accused of feigning a concern for the Chilean working class, while becoming inordinately wealthy himself through political influence. 'He was unable to build houses for the people, schools or health clinics (as Minister of Health in the Popular Front) but he has managed to build himself luxurious mansions in Santiago and Algorrobo.'¹

The opposition was not slow in responding in kind. Indeed, the atmosphere was so inflamed in October 1956 that the Chamber of Deputies devoted a special session to discussing the state of the press. Mundo Libre, especially, tried to present Volpone's invectives as an integral part of the administration's new authoritarianism, and linked his name with Peronist-inspired golpismo throughout 1956. Mundo Libre consistently argued that the dangers to Chile's democratic institutions had not passed just because of the capitulation of the Conservatives and Liberals. In response to La Nación's cartoon against the Radical Party, Mundo Libre ran a daily anti-Ibáñez cartoon, showing the number of days left of the

1. La Nación, 28/10/1956.

administration beside a pair of army jackboots. The Radicals of Mundo Libre were as prepared to make unsubstantiated charges against Ibañistas as La Nación did against Radicals. For example, Rafael Tarud was accused of winning a seat in the Senate solely 'thanks to the definitive argument of money'.¹ Eventually, Mundo Libre was forced to close when the Caja de Empleados Publicos y Periodistas, on which the government had four representatives, refused to re-schedule Mundo Libre's debt. Luis Bossay claimed that the paper had fallen victim 'to the hateful political persecution which is the object of this government'.²

Why was Volpone allowed to remain as editor of La Nación, spokesman of the government, despite his campaign of vilification, which had even been condemned by Cabinet members (such as Osvaldo Koch) as insulting, in appalling taste and alien to the traditions of Chilean journalism? Unfortunately, the answer is not clear. It is not even clear how much influence Volpone actually exercised over Ibañez in terms of policy-making. It would be unjust to imagine that Volpone's insults were necessarily the opinions of Ibañez himself. Even Luis Bossay, who argued that the government was harsher with the opposition than any other democratically-elected government in Chile, distinguished between the government's attitude to Mundo Libre and La Nación's.³ Perhaps the most accurate interpretation is somewhat 'freudian': that Volpone was able to say what Ibañez sometimes thought but as President was, of course, unable to say.⁴

-
1. Mundo Libre, 7/3/1957.
 2. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 27/4/1957.
 3. Interview, July 1983.
 4. This interpretation was suggested to me by Anibal Pinto. (Interview, July 1983).

The Assault on Horizonte

Government relations with the press reached rock-bottom in April 1957 with the assault on the printing press Horizonte. The attack followed immediately on a period of student protest and popular mobilisation in Valparaiso and Santiago against rises in the cost of transport which culminated in rioting, leaving 21 people dead and at least 182 injured. As such, it constituted one of the weakest moments for the regime, when control seems to have slipped from Ibáñez's grasp.

Horizonte was attacked on the 2nd of April, the night of the worst rioting. All the printing machinery was destroyed and there was an attempt to start a fire in the building. El Siglo estimated the damage at 100 thousand pesos.¹ Furthermore, 22 printers preparing the next day's editions were detained. Unlike the other acts of vandalism during the riots (windows broken, shops looted etc.), press reports indicate that the attack on Horizonte was well-organised and politically-motivated, and aimed at silencing an important part of the left-wing press.

Investigations by the Fiscal Militar (Military Prosecutor), Francisco Saavedra led to the detention of 7 members of the Policía Política, Chile's 'Special Branch'. It is more than likely that orders came from higher up than the officers arrested, however. Ibáñez's son-in-law and confidante, Crescente Donoso, while denying in the most emphatic terms any possible involvement on the part of Ibáñez, suggested that the Under Secretary of the Interior, Carlos Ferrer, or the . Director of the Policía Política, Luis Muñoz Monje, could have been responsible.² While the government does not seem to have been directly

1. El Siglo, 5/5/1957.

2. Interview, September, 1983. Muñoz Monje was later forced to resign.

responsible, there was little condemnation forthcoming either, from La Nación. Instead, Volpone preferred to concentrate on the arrest of some Socialists in connection with incidents on the night of the 2nd of April.¹

Journalists in Chile have traditionally played a vital role in politics. It was rather inevitable, therefore, that relations between the press and the government would be far from harmonious, particularly given the fact that Ibáñez had not obtained the support of any of the mainstream papers. However, the administration's attitude towards the press is perhaps best described as threatening rather than repressive, since almost all newspapers, including the Communists' El Siglo (technically illegal due to the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia), were able to appear with only short absences.

The President and the Congress

The extent of Presidential and of Congressional authority was another conflictive area for government-opposition relations. Again, the initial panic in Congress was brought about by Ibáñez's known disregard for parliamentary procedures and the anti-democratic sympathies of some of his followers. Ibáñez's 'attacks' on Congress remained purely verbal, despite his talk of reform and change, but it was this very harshness of language that prevented compromise or conciliation. Congress in this period can be seen as either defending the institutional framework of Chile's democratic regime, or, rather more cynically, as defending the substantial privileges - material and political - that membership entailed. In the event, the parties with whom Ibáñez was eventually to reach an agreement over economic problems were the very parties who most resisted any attempts, by Ibáñez or any other President, to keep Congressional activity

1. The Socialists detailed included: Mario Palestro, deputy; Eduardo Long Alessandri, legal advisor to the CUT; and the editor of the Socialist Party magazine, ¿Que Hay?, Moises Silva Neale, also arrested were some journalists working on El Siglo.

strictly within the limits laid down by the 1925 constitution. Consequently, all plans for parliamentary reform ended as the austerity measures began.

A disregard for parliamentary politics was one of the few ideological contributions of Ibáñez himself to Ibañismo, and one of the few elements characteristic of the entire administration, noted more for its abrupt and sudden shifts in policy and rhetoric than for its consistency. Ibáñez expressed the greatest contempt for Congress, before and during his presidency, and was elected on a tide of anti-party, anti-Congressional feeling, in the teeth of a Congress dominated by the traditional parliamentary parties (the Conservatives, Liberals and Radicals). Undoubtedly, the President had been indelibly marked by his experiences of the parliamentary destruction of Alessandri's reform programme in the early 1920s, and he had then accused the Congress of wasting time in 'byzantine' discussion. Coloured by this experience, he gave a speech as early as 1924 blaming politicians and political parties for the problems facing Chile.¹

Ibáñez saw no reason to hide or cloak his contempt for the party system after his election. He always took the opportunity to condemn political parties for being obstructionist, demagogic and unpatriotic in his annual speeches opening the new sessions of Congress.

Hernandez Parker of Ercilla claimed that the opposition listened to Ibáñez's speech in May 1953, anguished by the hard and threatening language... [a speech] which did not have one word of encouragement and hope in its 18 thousand'.² He adopted a similar note in his messages

-
1. Carlos Sáez Morales, 'Recuerdos de un soldado', Ercilla, Santiago, 1933, cited in Mario Góngora, Ensayo Histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX, Ediciones la Ciudad, Santiago, 1981, p.64.
 2. Ercilla, 26/5/1953.

for the New Year. The aggressive tone became especially marked in 1954 and 1955 when the government was as yet unable to confront the economic crisis decisively, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the opposition press, who implied that Ibáñez's goal was to distract attention from the economy.¹

In public or off-the-cuff declarations, the President's language took on a markedly populist tone, blaming the administration's failures on Congress itself. For example, in a speech celebrating the second anniversary of the 4th September 1952, he said:

Indiscipline and corruption in politics are what are undermining Chile.² The most serious aspect of this is that the root of the problem lies in the National Congress, a public body which refuses to play the role assigned to it by law. The Congress now has aspects similar to the Congresses of 1891 or 1924, Congresses which became true collective and irresponsible dictatorships which ran the country.³

On other occasions, Ibáñez described Congress as a 'collective tyranny of irresponsibility' and Congress members as 'indulging in an orgy of anarchic behaviour'.⁴

The root of the problem lay in the ambiguity of the 1925 constitution, which protected both executive and congressional prerogatives. Ibáñez, however, undertook a jealous defence of presidential authority and saw any expansion of congressional power as a reduction in his own and a violation of the spirit, if not always the letter, of the constitution.

-
1. One of the criticisms made by Las Noticias de Ultima Hora of the opening of Congress in May 1955 was that it virtually ignored the economic crisis confronting the country. (editorial) La Noticias de Ultima Hora, 23/5/1955.
 2. Ibáñez actually used the emotive term, 'la patria'.
 3. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 4/11/1954.
 4. El Mercurio, 2/5/1955.

On this issue, he was absolutely consistent. He, therefore, stressed that the key to any working relationship between the executive and Congress must be on the basis of the subordination of Congress to the President:

It is my firm and decided intention to fight for the restoration of the presidential regime with all its power intact because the presidential system of government is the bulwark of our institutions and the only system which will protect and safeguard in a democratic way the most fervent desires and aspirations of our people...

It is well known that the presidential system of government means that the President of the Republic is at the same time Head of the government, and his mandate does not depend upon him winning the confidence of Congress.¹

Ibáñez argued for a stricter separation of powers in order to prevent the Congress and/or political parties playing any role in the administration of power. The role of Congress was therefore simply to oversee or check the executive branch. It is for this reason that Ibáñez preferred to appoint as much as possible friends or even relatives to positions of authority rather than representatives of political parties, who would not be answerable solely to the president, but also to the directives of their parties. On this issue, he said:

It is the party combinations that have created a crisis in Chile. Rivalry, an appetite for administrative posts, and a congenital refusal to conform on the part of the leadership have led to their degeneration into useless instruments. The system of political combinations is the cause of the weakness of our presidential regime, and the real reason for our recent crisis.²

-
1. Ibáñez's Message to Congress 21/5/1954, pp.xxii-xxxiii. Ibáñez's speeches in May, inaugurating the ordinary Congressional sessions are the clearest exposition of his political beliefs. The twin themes of any overtly-political Congress and bureaucracy and an obstructionist opposition predominate. It would seem though that Ibáñez genuinely envisaged himself fulfilling his office as President more democratically than representatives of political parties were able.
 2. El Mercurio, 1/1/1955.

Although Ibáñez did appoint members of political parties to Cabinet office, it was in an attempt to neutralise the party rather than reach a compromise with it.¹ Historian Mario Góngora put it succinctly: 'What did matter to him [Ibáñez] was to have followers in the leadership of all the parties'.²

Ibáñez argued that the presidency had been reduced to a secondary role during the Radical administrations, and proposed constitutional reforms on several occasions.³ The most detailed attempt was in mid-1954, when he named a consultative commission to suggest reforms of Congress and the Controloría General. Among the changes recommended were a re-elective presidency but with the presidential term of office reduced to four instead of six years; the Controler : General appointed for only four years, and with the appointee removable in certain instances; reduction of the offices of the Senate, ending their right to oversee ambassadorships and diplomatic offices; fifteen of the forty-five senate seats given over to corporative or institutional representation, notwithstanding Ibáñez's assertion when the commission was set up that he was not favourably disposed to the idea of corporatism; and a statute of political parties, to reduce their proliferation.⁴ Ibáñez was forced to shelve these particular proposals as a result of the rapid and extensive popular mobilisation under the leadership of the united opposition, the Frente Civico, which was then at its height. It is worth remembering that the opposition understood the proposed reforms only as part of an anti-Congressional and authoritarian package; after all, these proposals coincided

-
1. More than one ex-Cabinet Minister told me in confidence that Ibáñez made a personal request that he remain in his post in an individual capacity and against the wishes of the party after the party had decided to withdraw from government responsibilities.
 2. M. Góngora op.cit., p.81.
 3. He made this charge in a letter to the Chamber of Deputies. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 27A, 5/10/1956.
 4. For further details of proposals see El Mercurio, 4/3/1955; the presidential message to Congress, 21/5/1955 and Wurth Rojas, op.cit., pp.305-310.

with the discovery of the Línea Recta and rumours of other anti-democratic conspiracies supported by government devotees. Another frequent criticism of the proposals made by the opposition was that Ibáñez was using the issue of constitutional reform to deflect attention away from the worsening economic and financial system.¹

Ibáñez also requested reform of the consejerías parlamentarias (congressional representatives sitting on the governing board of the various semi-autonomous, state funded organisations - the Central Bank, Banco del Estado, CORFO, CAP, etc.) because it extended the influence of political parties into spheres of government that properly belonged to the executive.² While Ibáñez was justified under the constitution in claiming that the conserjerías had become 'perks' of the job for Congressmen, the issue was submerged in a general defence of Congressional privilege. The Frente del Pueblo, which was actually opposed to their existence, remained silent on the issue from tactical considerations, while the Liberals and Conservatives were able to claim that a strong Congress was needed to counter Ibáñez's 'excessive' presidentialism:

The suppression of the consejerías parlamentarias would be dangerous in view of the fact that this government has been characterised by personalism and a lack of consultation... the administration would thus be able to prevent any criticisms being made.³

The Radical party and the Frente de Pueblo, moreover, argued that if Congress had no right to meddle in the affairs of semi-autonomous bodies, then neither did Ibáñez:

Autonomous or independent institutions, generally called semi-fiscal institutions, were created with

-
1. See El Mercurio, 4/3/1955.
 2. I am indebted to both Crescente Donoso and Oscar Salas for discussing this issue at length with me.
 3. El Diansio Ilustrado, 2/12/1955.

the express purpose of making them independent of the administration in general, and specifically, free of any possible intervention by the President of the Republic.¹

The Response in Congress

Not surprisingly, Congress responded with a stubborn refusal to cooperate with the executive. It was, for example, able to frustrate some executive initiatives such as the programme of economic unity with Argentina which remained four years in the Senate under discussion. Congress also became a forum from which to attack the executive, and in which the opposition, while it remained united, could always be on the offensive because the Ibañistas had been unable to win a majority in the March 1953 elections. Indeed, some of the opposition, especially the 'traditional' parliamentary parties (the Radicals, Liberals and Conservatives), argued that the president already held excessive powers, and that Congress was disadvantaged under the 1925 constitution; since the Ordinary legislative sessions, when parliamentarians could present private members' bills, lasted only four months of the year; the Extraordinary sessions were convoked by the President to discuss bills sent by the executive.

All Ibáñez's projects of constitutional reform were regarded as systematic attempts to reduce the authority of the National Congress and to create a political climate in which the Congress could be closed completely. Initially, therefore, Left and Right were unanimous in rejecting

1. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 3A, 1/6/1955. In a sense, both Ibáñez and the Radicals were right. Chile's political system was indeed hybrid, and the separation of powers was an ideal rather than a reality. In practice, most legislation originated in the Presidency, while Congress, designed to legislate, played an important role in the administration of government. For a discussion of this issue see: Alejandro Silva Bascúnan, 'Notas para una Crítica de la Constitución', Anales de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Católica, Año XXX 1957.

Ibáñez's proposals and his methods. There was little difference in the criticisms made by the Allendista Socialists, the Radicals or the Liberals. Thus Gregorio Amunátegui of the Liberal Party accused the President of offering the country empty rhetoric to cover his repeated failures;¹ Radical Senator Anjel Faivovich accused Ibáñez of attempting to end the institutional development of the Republic; and Socialist Salvador Allende accused the president of 'breaking the rules of the democratic game', till then observed by all Chilean politicians whatever their political affiliation. He went on:

The President has sown the seeds of hatred and verbal violence which have never before been part of our democratic culture, in his desire to destroy men, parties and institutions.²

Broadly speaking, two distinct stages of Congressional opposition can be discerned. The first, a period of broad-based unity, lasted from December 1952 until September 1955, and the second one of opposition from the Left, lasted from September 1955 until March/April 1958.

Initially Congress agreed to pass the Facultades Extraordinarias requested by Juan Bautista Rossetti on behalf of the administration, but attitudes hardened during the election for the seat in the Senate vacated by Ibáñez and in the run up to the congressional elections. After the elections, the opposition remained in control of the Senate. In the lower chamber, it seemed at first that the Ibañistas had gained control by a very narrow margin, but political horse trading led to the election of

-
1. Amunátegui's exact words were: 'The present Primer Mandatario is following the same road as that of all those rulers who fail. They cannot give the people bread, so they provide circuses instead'. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 5/11/1954.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 29A, 30/3/1954.

ex-Ibañista Baltazar Castro as president of the Chamber on behalf of a united opposition. Castro had been an independent, left ward-leaning Ibañista, a personal friend of the Ibáñez-Letelier family, and a founder of the small Partido del Trabajo. Ironically perhaps, he was one of the first to articulate the 'defence of democracy' strategy, which was to become the lynch-pin of the opposition tactics in the first half of the regime. In an emotional first speech as President of the Chamber of Deputies, he defended the unity of the Left and Right in Congress from the criticisms formulated by the government in the following way:

The vertebral column of our country is the defence of our democracy, respect for juridic institutions, and respect for civil liberties. ... It is true that we represent a broad combination of the Conservative party to the Frente del Pueblo. But... both these extremes are united in having the decided courage to defend verbally, and if necessary actively the democratic stability of our constitutional institutions.¹

The unity of the entire opposition lasted until the decisive change in the direction of the government's economic policy brought it in line with Right wing goals, and as such, formed the basis of an official entente between the Ibáñez and the Conservatives and the Liberals. Thereafter, the government was able to muster a sufficient majority to pass the economic measures. Between the end of 1955 and 1957, therefore, the main Congressional opposition bloc was composed of the Radical Party, the two factions of the Socialist party, the Communist party and the Falange. This alliance helped bring about the unification of the Socialist party and the adoption of the Socialist-Communist 'workers' front' strategy in the shape of the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP). It was also the basis

1. Cámara de Diputados, quoted in La Nación, 8/8/1953.

of the 1958 Congressional bloc, TOCOA (Todos en Contra de Alessandri) Ibañez was eventually to ally himself with TOCOA in order to dispatch the Electoral Reform and the abrogation of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia.

Before dealing in more detail with the Congressional opposition during the second part of the administration, it is worthwhile saying a few words about the specific role of the Radical Party, since the Radical Party (along with the small group of Allendista socialists) offered the most consistent opposition throughout the regime. To this, therefore, I now turn.

The Radical Party in Opposition

Ibañismo, as it was articulated during the campaign, was distinguished mainly by its opposition to the Radical party and the Radical administrations of 1938-52. All wings of Ibañismo perceived the Radicals as inefficient, corrupt and given to compromise with the oligarchy. The enmity between the two movements deepened as a result of some of the initial measures taken by the incoming administration in 1952-53 which took on the character of open harassment of the party.

A notable example of this was the re-organisation of the Public Administration. In October 1953, Ibañez had requested and obtained from Congress the right to re-organise the Public Administration and re-appoint civil servants in key posts. The stated goal of the policy was to reduce and systemise an over-extended bureaucracy. Juan Bautista Rossetti, who requested the Facultades on behalf of the administration, promised a 'technical reorganisation with a non-political character'.¹

1. Quoted in a speech by Pedro Opaso. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 2A, 20/10/1953.

The Radicals claimed, however, that the reorganisation was a pretext to sack Radical functionaries (of which there were many), and denounced the operation as 'persecution of a political character'.¹ It is certainly the case that many, though by no means all, Radical functionaries were sacked. Especially affected were the staff in the Ministries of Labour, Education and Health.² Ibáñez's undisguised antipathy towards the Radicals left behind, and the Radical-controlled Controleria General added fuel to the flames. For example, in a speech in Concepción in 1953, he said:

We still are not in command of the country. We had to request Facultades Extraordinarias in order to remove empleados who should have resigned when the new President took over and who still have not done so.³

The reorganisation was unable to achieve its stated objects. The administration was subsequently attacked in the strongest terms for using the Facultades to reduce Radical personnel, yet at the same time actually expanding the total number of empleados. The Falange journal, Politica y Espiritu commented:

The Facultades Extraordinarias only served to disorganise still further the Public Administration, increase the burden in terms of costs that this signifies for the country and aggravate the problems they were supposed to be solving.⁴

Politica y Espiritu alleged furthermore, that 1,050 functionaries were removed within twelve months, but that 4,400 new appointments were made.⁵ By 1955 allegations were being made that Ibáñez had created 15,000 new

-
1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 22/11/1952.
 2. In November 1952 Ibáñez simply asked for the resignation of functionaries who 'occupy posts of confidence in the para medical services'. One of the staff affected was Radical Domingo Durán, brother of Radical Party president, Julio Durán and vice-president of the Caja de Empleados Particulares. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 6/11/1952.
 3. La Nación, 5/2/1953.
 4. Politica y Espiritu, 7/11/1953. Of the 4,400 new appointees only 900 were in the Ministry of Education which was the area on which all groups agreed that an expansion of services was necessary.
 5. *ibid.*

jobs in the Public Administration.¹ What seems to have actually happened is that the Ibañistas, once in government were as predisposed towards clientelism as the Radicals had been, and manipulated civil service appointments in the same way.

In essence then, the Ibañistas simply displaced the Radicals. The major difference, according to the critics of the changes, was that the 'new functionaries are useless'.² Since this process was discernible immediately, it provoked a rapid disillusionment with the government and created a degree of solidarity with the Radical Party among sectors not normally sympathetic to the idea of an extensive state bureaucracy. (Liberals and Conservatives) or to the Radical party's dominance of that bureaucracy (Socialists and Communists). Las Noticias de Ultima Hora commented:

The problems of the Public Administration cannot be solved by means of an unjustifiable persecution or by desperately throwing people out into the streets in order to fill the vacancies with individuals who do not deserve the appointment and are not up to doing the job.³

The new administration also used the Facultades of October 1952 to set up a special commission to investigate so-called 'public crimes', (D.F.L. 6044; November 1952). Composed of various prominent Ibañistas including Ramón Vergara Montero, Javier Lira Merino and Luis Barrioja Errazuriz.⁴ The commission was a 'natural' outcome in many ways, of the bitterness of the election campaign and was widely acknowledged to be a

-
1. This particular figure was quoted by Radical deputy Humberto Enriquez. See Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 6/1/1955.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 11A, 12/5/1953. (Pedro Oposo).
 3. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 30/11/1952. See also: Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 9A, 29/4/1953; 11A, 12/5/1953; and 2A, 20/11/1953 for criticisms by Liberal senators Pedro Oposo and Raul Marin.
 4. Ramón Vergara had been convicted of conspiracy against the State during the presidency of Gonzalez Videla, fined and sentenced to four years banishment from Chile.

form of political persecution with the aim of denigrating the Radical Party's public image.¹

Ibáñez's overwhelming victory in September 1952 created a crisis in the Radical party and led to serious attempts to reform the party internally and to rethink party strategy. A new directorate was appointed immediately headed by the deputy Julio Durán Neumann. Exceptionally anti-Ibáñista, Durán went on record shortly after the elections as saying that Ibáñez's presidential campaign was a permanent injury to the Radical party.² More importantly, he was authorised to make electoral pacts with other 'democratic political movements', and in consequence, the Radicals consistently emphasized the theme of unity of the opposition, and constituted the nub of anti-Ibáñez electoral and congressional alliances.³

Once the party had adjusted to its loss of power, spurred on by its ferocious opposition to Ibáñez, it was able temporarily to heal or at least mask the serious divisions in the Party, which were partly the product of inter-party conflicts engendered by fourteen years in government, and partly the outcome of the Radicals' extraordinarily diffuse ideology. Since its original raison d'être had been anti-clericalism, the ending of the Catholic Church's political influence exposed tensions which persisted throughout the twentieth century between the leadership and the base (asamblea) on the one hand, and between the right and the left of the party on the other. These tensions were never fully resolved and in

-
1. There were no prosecutions as a result of the Commission's findings, though in its report it was alleged that millions of pesos had mysteriously gone astray, especially out of CORFO's budget. In 1957, Julio Durán requested the reconstitution of the Commission to investigate abuses committed by government personal since 1952.
 2. Vea, 8/10/1952. Zig-Zag, 11/10/1952 also carried an interview with Durán.
 3. Radical Party, Cuenta de la Gestión Desarrollada Por la Junta Nacional Ejecutiva Durante el Período Comprendido Entre el 13/IX/1952 - el 25/IV/1953, pp.12-15.

essence represent the contradiction between the Party's nineteenth century liberal origins and its twentieth century adoption of statism.¹ These differences were submerged for the most part during the lifetime of the Ibáñez administration, and enabled the Radicals (along with the small group of Allendista socialists) to offer the most consistent opposition to the regime. Party differences did not openly emerge again until the 1957-58 electoral campaign, when it became clear that many on the Right of the Party were less than happy with Luis Bossay's attempts to link the Party with the FRAP.

Opposition in Congress During Ibáñez's Rightist Period

After 1955, opposition took shape initially around the issue of the economic austerity measures and the Radicals, Socialists and Communists were able to constitute a more cohesive bloc ideologically than was possible during the first part of the regime. This was accentuated by the pre-eminence within the Radical Party of the Bossay/leftist wing of the party. In the second part of the administration, the Radicals thus tried to combine two ideological strands in an anti-Ibáñez alliance. - a defence of civil liberties with the defence of the standard of living of blue and white collar workers. In November 1955, the Radicals voted to maintain an attitude which would allow it 'to accentuate opposition to the present government, and at the same time accentuate its jealous defence of the democratic regime'. Furthermore, the Party voted to maintain its 'democratic and socialist orientation', and, with an eye to the 1958 presidential elections, spoke of the 'need for a regrouping of the Left'.²

-
1. This was acknowledgement inside the Party: Humberto Alvarez Gonzalez said: 'In the political sphere we are liberals in the economic sphere we have a socialist vision. We know that this ideological duality has helped to form two internal currents inside the party: the so-called right and left'. Quoted in Urzua Valenzuela, op.cit., pp.155-6.
 2. El Mercurio, 14/11/1955.

The Radicals also presented the differences between the government and the opposition in moral terms rather than purely differences in economic policy. Luis Bossay argued:

We need to put forward the differences between Ibañismo and Radicalismo from ... an ethical and moral angle... the Radical Party has always made use of the democratic institutions, and the ballot-box to come to power... The Ibañistas have never shared this sense of republican responsibilities... the Ibañistas did not scruple to ally themselves with a dictatorial government, in territorial dispute with Chile, and a government which clearly wanted to pursue an imperialist line of action in our country.¹

The attempt to contain the frame of reference of government and opposition relations to the same dichotomy, democracy versus Ibañismo characteristic of the early part of the administration was also a device to win support from lukewarm members of the Right, especially the Liberals, who supported the economic programme, but who retained an instinctive distrust and dislike of Ibañismo. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the Radical Party's prominence during the Peronist hearings in Congress and the subsequent attempt to impeach Ibáñez, which was supported by the Liberal Party.

Peronism in Chile and the Congressional Hearings of 1955-56

Ironically, the most detailed discussion of Peronism in Chile took place after the overthrow of Perón in 1955, when any danger that Chilean sovereignty might have faced had passed. Research carried out by anti-Ibañista journalist, Raúl Gonzalez, in Buenos Aires immediately after the fall of Perón and published in El Debate,² led to renewed speculation, and

-
1. Mundo Libre, 18/6/1956. Bossay is of course referring to Perón's Argentina.
 2. See El Debate, between 5/12/1955-28/1/1956.

to the setting up of a special committee in Congress to investigate the allegations which had been current in Chile since at least 1949: in short, that Perón had tried to manipulate Chilean politics for his own ends, with the ultimate aim of establishing Argentina's hegemony in the Southern Cone, and that Péron had been assisted in this by Chilean nacionalistas and Ibañistas.¹ The issue touched an extraordinarily sensitive nerve in Chilean politics. In part, of course, the reaction is related to a traditional fear of her larger and more powerful neighbour, but it is also more complex than that.²

The emergence of Ibañismo was due to a series of fundamental ideological divisions in values, perceptions and aspirations within Chilean elites, which were independent of the right-left, capitalist-socialist dichotomy. This secondary (and generally less important) political cleavage can be described as 'European' versus 'Latin American' values. By 'European' I understand a political culture which is generally rational, predictable, formal, tolerant, and evolutionary, and political system which is parliamentary, multi-party and liberal-democratic; and a 'Latin American' political system in this context, may be taken to imply a populist and/or military regime with a nationalist or irrational component.³ In Chile in the 1950s, the Conservatives, Liberals,

-
1. Two books in particular, published in the 1950s, capture the virulent anti-Peronism of some sectors in Chile at this time: Alejandro Magnet, Nuestros Vecinos Justicialistas, Ediciones del Pacifico, Santiago, 1953, which put forward the view that Peronism evinced clear 'messianic tendencies', p.24, and went into 3 editions between October and November 1953; and Ricardo Boizard, El Caso Kelly, Ediciones Andes, Buenos Aires, 1957.
 2. Chile's fears of Argentine territorial expansion should not be under-estimated in this period. Systematic concern was demonstrated in the press and in Congress over the disputed territory in the Antarctic for which Chile was in dispute with Argentina, and the occasional illegal use of Chilean waters by Argentine ships provoked an outcry in the Congress. The Radicals were once again in the forefront of this. See, for example, Isauro Torres's speeches in the Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara del Senadores, 45A, 19/4/1955, Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, 24A, 1/9/1953; and the speech by Senator Gonzalez Madariaga, who represented the constituency of Magallanes in the South, in the Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara del Senadores, 3A, 1/6/1955.
 3. See Clodomiro Almeyda, op.cit., and Alfonso Stephens Freire, op.cit.

Radicals and the Frente del Pueblo adopted 'European' positions, while the 'Latin Americanists' were the nacionalistas, fascists, most Ibañistas and some factions of the Popular Socialist Party. That is, the issue cut clearly across party divisions on class lines. The 'European'/'Latin American' dichotomy was evident in Chile before the Second War in Europe. However, the emergence of fascism in Europe, which was still a comparatively recent memory in the 1950s, and the spread of fascist ideas to Latin America brought about an assimilation of the anti-fascist struggle with the 'European' position, while 'Latin Americanism', the advocacy of neutrality between 1939-45, and the adoption of the 'third position' became confused with a sympathy for the Axis powers. For the 'Europeans', the link between Latin American nationalism and fascism was established by the well-founded suspicions of co-operation and assistance between the Peronists in Argentina and the Nazi regime in Germany.¹

Peronism, therefore, offended the sensibilities of the democratic parliamentary lobby in Chile, the clearest and most consistent exponents of which tended to be the Radical Party. In 1953, Luis Bossay explained his objections to the Ibáñez government because:

This government... has maintained a policy of goodwill towards a totalitarian regime that has persecuted Socialists and harassed intellectuals, - even as I speak, the majority of Argentine Socialists are to be found in prison. This is the cause of our anxiety.²

Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the decision to set up the Peronist hearings stemmed in good measure directly from the bitter and permanent hostility that existed between the nationalists and the Radicals.

-
1. See Ronald Newton, 'Indifferent Sanctuary : German-speaking Refugees and Exiles in Argentina, 1933-44', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 24, No.4, November 1982. This is, of course, a more complicated issue than it may appear here. At times, the 'Latin Americanists' adopted 'European' values and vice-versa. The Frente del Pueblo, for example, never wavered from their espousal of continental solidarity, while some of the nacionalista doctrines were based on the supposed racial 'superiority' of the Chileans over other Latin Americans.
 2. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara. del Senadores, 3A, 27/10/1955.

The allegations that Peronism - and by implication Ibañismo - was totalitarian were to be made repeatedly, and not simply by the Radicals, but also by Allendista Socialists, Liberals, Conservatives and Falangistas.¹ Ibáñez's defence, and that of his associates, of so-called 'strong governments' (gobiernos fuertes) caused further alarm in democratic parliamentary quarters. For example, Ibáñez declared:

Strong governments that want to impose discipline on their countries and want to put the people to work in a context of social justice, are being called totalitarian governments or dictatorships.²

Given Ibáñez's known anti-communism,³ this was understood as a defence of Latin American 'national-popular' regimes (for example, Peronism), and the authoritarian regimes of the Iberian peninsular. Guillermo Izquierdo was also a noted exponent of the concept of 'strong government'.

However, an investigation into the links between Peronism and Ibañismo was forthcoming for different reasons. The Radicals and the Socialists wished to castigate the government and at the same time show their rejection of all forms of authoritarianism, while the Liberals wished to castigate the government and also to use the occasion to oppose the spread of 'foreign' doctrines into Chile (the latter could,

-
1. Salvador Allende made a series of anti-Peronist speeches in Congress from as early as 1949 (for example, Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 6A, 12/6/1956); Senator Moore of the Liberal Party described Peronism as 'totalitarian' in the Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 11A, 4/7/1953; Conservative Senator Francisco Bulnes condemned Peronism in the Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 4A, 3/6/1953; and Pólitica y Espiritú, 15/8/1952 expressed concern at the abusive propaganda issued in Buenos Aires against the government of Gonzalez Videla.
 2. Quoted in Estanquero, 18/4/1953.
 3. On the opening of Congress in 1954, Ibáñez described the Communist Party as a 'fanatic, destructive sect full of foreign ideas' (Presidential Message to the Congress, 21/5/1954); and, while defining Chile's position internationally, he said 'Chile is with the free world... and against Communist imperialism' (Presidential Message to the Congress, 21/5/1955). Some of the anti-communism current in Chile at this time was more a product of the international cold-war climate than of internal factors.

and was, interpreted as much as communism as Peronism). Thus, the commission in its final report, recommended that tougher legislation be introduced to 'sanction energetically' Chilean citizens espousing 'doctrines contrary to the dignity of the nation'.¹ This was interpreted as an attempt to resist the repeal of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, especially since the Commission argued, though with various members dissenting, that anti-imperialism, (and not authoritarianism) was the outstanding characteristic of Peronism.²

Following the lead of Raul Gonzalez's articles, three committees were set up with all-party representation.³

1. To investigate ideological and financial penetration by Peronists/Peronism into Chile, including an investigation into the funding of Ibáñez's election campaign of 1952 and the Colliguay Plot of 1949. This committee was made up of Florencio Galleguillos (President), Manuel Rioseco, Alfonso David, Lya Laffeye, Luis Valdes, Fernando Pizarro, Gustavo Loyola, Rafael Gumucio, and Javier Lira.

2. To analyse the breakdown of negotiations of the sale of Chilean steel to Argentina. Members of this committee were: Armando Mallet (President), Frederico Buchel, Sergio Sepulveda, Salvador Correa, Ignacio Palma, Rene Benavides, and Juan Fuentealba.

-
1. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 32A, 5/7/1956.
 2. The other side of the coin, as it were, was the classic Liberal insistence that to be 'democratic' essentially meant favouring liberal capitalism. In the debate on the Treaty of Economic Unity between Chile and Argentina, Liberal Senator Aldunate argued: 'It would be disastrous to a country as exceptionally poor as ours to cut ourselves off from the world system of commerce and aid which the U.S. leads, from which we have received, are receiving and will continue to receive numerous benefits, in favour of union with Argentine economy... The U.S. (is) frank, generous, and relations with it, offers incalculable advantages not only for maintaining freedom in the democratic parts of the world, but also for the progress of our economy in the future'. The Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 2A, 25/3/1953.
 3. For further details of the composition and scope of the committees, see El Mercurio, 3/10/1955.

3. To investigate any corruption or financial irregularities which may have occurred over the importation of Argentine butter.

This committee was made up of: Juan de Dios Carmona (President), Gustavo Aqueveque, Hernán Brucher, Sergio Ojeda, Jose Oyarce, Ignacio Urrutia, Jose Serrano, and Ricardo Weber.

The first committee, clearly the broadest in scope, caused the most speculation in the press and in Congress, however, speculation fuelled by the anti-Ibañista sympathies of Galleguillos, the President himself. Shortly before presenting the committee's findings in Congress, for example, Galleguillos alleged that the government of Ibáñez had offered no assistance whatsoever to the committee.¹

The committee sat a total of 376 days, visited Buenos Aires four times to gather information, consulted documents handed over by the new military government of General Aramburu in Argentina and by Ibáñez himself,² and took evidence from 87 witnesses. Its long report established clearly that attempts were made to influence the course of Chilean politics from Buenos Aires, though it could not establish any collusion on the part of Ibáñez or his government.³ The report did reveal, however, that a close relationship existed between anti-democratic nationalists such as Guillermo Izquierdo, and nationalist organisations in Chile and

1. Mundo Libre, 13/6/1956.

2. It was alleged, perhaps maliciously, that Ibáñez, who handed over copies of his private correspondence with Perón, co-operated with the committee only after it was known that the government of General Aramburu was prepared to make the documents available.

3. Not even the fiercely anti-Ibañista Mundo Libre alleged that the government was anything more than 'complacent' in the face of Peronist penetration. Mundo Libre, 13/6/1956.

Peronism. This was now beyond all doubt. The report detailed the channels through which a steady stream of money did indeed flow from Buenos Aires to Santiago, as had been long suspected, for the founding of newspapers, buying of radio stations, publishing of pro-Peronist articles, and the formation of an anti-Communist trade union central, headed by Maria de la Cruz.

The committee's findings did not, however, implicate important members of the government, past or present, nor personal associates of Ibáñez, nor the official organisers of the presidential election campaign. Nonetheless, allegations were made against Benjamin Videla, Minister of the Interior, Carlos Ferrer, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior, and Dario Sante Marie. There were, in fact, some suggestions made that the committee had not really addressed the fundamental question of corruption or excess profits from trade with Argentina, which might have been the result of pro-Peronist activity in Chile. Investigation along these lines, it was felt, would have implicated individuals much closer to the Moneda; as Ercilla put it: 'The fat fish are still swimming free' (los peces gordos nadan impunes).¹

The committee's report contained little that was actually new.² Guillermo Izquierdo, for example, who was one of the nacionalistas most deeply implicated, had never denied being in receipt of Argentine money. In another sense, however, the mere existence of such a committee, surrounded as it was by publicity, sensationalism and controversy, was more important than its report, since the committee's very existence was a victory for the opposition. And certainly, the committee's work contributed significantly to the atmosphere of tension and antagonism which characterised

1. Ercilla, 4/6/1956.

2. For full details, see Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Diputados Sesión 32A, 5/7/1956. See also Donald Bray, 'Peronism in Chile', op.cit.

Government-Congressional relations throughout 1956.

End of the Entente with the Right in Congress

Ibáñez had been able to forge an alliance with the Conservatives and the Liberals in late 1956 on the basis of a series of anti-inflationary measures. By the end of 1956, there were sure signs of disenchantment within the relationship. Firstly, the immediate danger of hyper-inflation had passed, and business associations were beginning to betray some concern about the sudden fall in demand for goods and services. Secondly, the revival of the question of Peronist penetration in Chile, including as it did implications of government complacency vis-à-vis national sovereignty and allegations of corruption, also put a strain on what was always a weak relationship. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the Liberal and Conservative Parties were looking towards 1958 and the Presidential elections. The municipal elections of April 1956, where the Radicals, Liberals and Conservatives all made gains at the expense of the Ibañista parties, indicated the unpopularity of the government, as did the two by-elections held at the same time in Valparaíso and Tarapacá, which were both won by the Radical-FRAP alliance.

The anti-government trend was confirmed by the results of the Congressional elections of March 1957, in which the entire Lower House and part of the Upper House were renewed. (See Tables VI.1 and VI.2) Ibáñez had, in fact, broken his general rule of not interfering directly in Congressional elections and made a request by radio, two days before the elections, to the voters not to elect a 'Congress with inflationary tendencies'.¹ This was interpreted as a call to vote for the Conservatives,

1. Vea, 7/3/1957.

TABLE VI.1

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VOTE AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES
IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1953 AND 1957¹

<u>PARTIES</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1957</u>
Radical	103,112	188,526
Liberal	81,750	134,741
Conservador Tradicionalista	77,672	Conservador Unido 121,223
Falange Nacional	22,171	82,710
Agrario Laborista	117,185	68,602
Socialista Popular	67,449	55,004
Democrático del Pueblo	31,515	44,213
Socialista de Chile	38,371	38,783
Agrario of Jaime Larrain	8,100	Partido Nacional 37,975
Partido Conservador (Social Christian)	36,876	33,654
		Partido del Trabajo 17,785
		Movimiento Republicano 10,393
Nacional Cristiano	20,669	9,085
Partido Laborista	7,976	8,010
Radical Doctrinario	17,889	5,577
		Democrático Doctrinario 3,302
Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo	18,779	1,342
Others	122,146	Independents 17,304
Total vote	<u>771,660</u>	<u>878,229</u>

1. Zig-Zag, 26/10/1957, p.28.

TABLE VI.2ELECTIONS FOR THE LOWER HOUSE 1957

<u>Parties</u>	<u>Deputies</u>	<u>Votes</u>
agrario lab.	10	68,602
conservador unido	20	121,223
conservador	3	33,654
democrát. doct.		3,302
democrático	5	44,213
falange nacional	17	82,710
liberal	30	134,741
laborista		8,010
mov. republicano	1	10,393
mov. nac. del pueblo		1,342
nacional cristiano		9,085
nacional	7	37,975
del trabajo	4	17,785
radical doctrinario		5,577
radical	36	188,526
socialista popular	5	55,004
socialista	7	38,783
independientes	2	17,304
<hr/>		
Total vote		878,229
<hr/>		

1. Urzua Valenzuela , op.cit., p.95.

Liberals and Agrario Laboristas. In the event, the elections signified the end of the Ibañista parties. The number of Agrario Laborista deputies fell from 26 to 13. Neither the Left nor the Right-wing parties obtained a clear majority in Congress, though, the Radicals, who had contested the elections on an anti-government platform, became once again the single largest party. Thus by the end of 1956, alliance with Ibáñez was coming to be seen as a hindrance to the Liberals and Conservatives ambitions for 1958, and rumours of a divorce were heard. The first definite step towards this came in December 1956, when the Right-wing votes split over the attempted impeachment of Ibáñez.

Following the report of the Galleguillos committee, the Radical Party announced its intention to impeach Ibáñez for 'having gravely compromised the honour and security of the State, and for having infringed the Constitution and the Law'.¹ In addition to charges arising out of the Galleguillos report, Ibáñez was also accused of nepotism, disorganisation of the Public Administration, negligence in defending Chile's claim to the disputed Antarctic territory with Argentina, and interference in the affairs of the Armed Forces (the Línea Recta conspiracy/movement). Although, according to Ercilla, it was the generally accepted objective view that the accusation 'lacked a firm juridical base', less than half of the Chamber of Deputies actively rejected the accusation. The vote was as follows:-

TABLE VII.3²

<u>In favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstentions</u>
30	48	37
(Radicals, <u>Frente del Pueblo</u> , Liberals) ³	(Conservatives, National Party)	(Popular Socialists, <u>Falangistas</u>).

1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 27A, 5/12/1956.
2. Ercilla, 12/12/1956.
3. Anti-Ibañismo would seem to have had deeper roots in the Liberal Party than the Conservative.

In April 1957, just a few months later, the relationship plummeted to a further low. In the wake of the rioting of April 1957, in particular of the 2nd of April, the government requested Facultades Extraordinarias. Minister of the Interior, Benjamin Videla, who presented the request in Congress, argued that the rioting corresponded to 'a course of action, organised, planned and orchestrated by the Communists'.¹ Such was the alarm felt on the Conservative and Liberal benches that despite strong objections, Congress approved the request.² The Facultades Extraordinarias took effect from the 16th of April. On the 25th of April, just 9 days later, Ibáñez sent a message to Congress saying that, after all, there was no longer any need of them. On all sides of the political spectrum this was interpreted as a gesture of profound contempt towards Congress. A sense of aggrieved pride and outrage was particularly strong in the Falange, because Eduardo Frei had unexpectedly voted in favour, a move regarded as politically inastute in view of the forthcoming presidential elections.³ Falangist deputy Juan de Dios Carmona described Ibáñez's actions as showing 'a lack of respect for public opinion, Parliament and for the whole country'.⁴ Falangist Ignacio Palma went further.

-
1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 5A, 10/4/1957. Ibáñez took a similar line in his opening speech at the new sessions of Congress in May 1957, when he laid the blame for the riots firmly at the door of the 'Marxists'. (Presidential Message to Congress, 21/5/1957.)
 2. Indeed, one cabinet minister of the time, who asked not to be named, suggested that the Conservatives and Liberals actually took the initiative and offered the Facultades Extraordinarias to Ibáñez.
 3. Frei had argued that, despite his reservations, it was better that the government have the power it felt adequate to the situation rather than act outside the law. He was responsible for an amendment limiting the length of time of the Facultades Extraordinarias to 60 days, not the 6 months the government had initially requested. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 6A 6/4/1957. Some of the Liberals also stressed that their loyalty lay in maintaining the democratic forms of government and the rule of law. Voting in favour was not 'a manifestation of confidence in any one man' said Eduardo Moore (Liberal) Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 25/4/1957.
 4. *ibid.*

He said:

Now I realize that what we should have given the Government were not Facultades Extraordinarias but Facultades Mentales.¹

The ultra-right newspaper, El Diario Ilustrado commented on the affair - 'His excellency Señor Ibáñez has a very twisted sense of presidential government'.²

Explanations of Ibáñez's behaviour vary. Some parliamentarians argued that Ibáñez returned the Facultades with the express purpose of humiliating Congress. It is more likely, however, that Ibáñez grew tired of the unending series of queries and complaints of executive action from Congress and the press.³ What is certain is that the abruptness of Ibáñez's behaviour offended Congress as a whole, and the Liberals, Conservatives and Falangistas in particular.

Shortly afterwards, following the fall of Videla from the Ministry of the Interior, Ibáñez renewed his practice of sudden and seemingly needless changes in the Cabinet members, underlining the President's unpredictability. It was to this that Liberal Senator Eduardo Moore drew attention on the appointment of Jorge Aravena Carrasco as the new Minister of the Interior in a Cabinet of independent 'personalities' and retired military officers:

We know only one thing about him: that he has twice been expelled from his party [the PAL]. We know Señor Aravena for no other distinction. He does not inspire us with confidence.⁴

-
1. op. cit. 2. *ibid.*
3. For example, after a motion moved by Salvador Allende, the Senate sent a list of 58 detainees from the town of Curepto, one as young as 14, requesting that the government provide details of the charges that were to be offered etc. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias Cámara de Senadores, 12A, 17/4/1957. This was only one of several such motions between the 16th and the 25th of April.
4. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 25/4/1957.

The Kelly Case

The definitive alienation of the Conservatives and Liberals from the government was the result of the attempt in Congress to impeach the Ministers Osvaldo Sante Marie (the brother of Dario Sante Marie), Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Arturo Zuñiga Latorre, Minister of Justice, in what came to be known as The Kelly Case.

After the overthrow of Perón, Chile received numerous refugees from Argentina. Most were fleeing possible political persecution. However, of a group of six Argentine refugees escaping from the Río Gallegos prison and arriving at Punta Arenas in the South of Chile on the 18th of March 1957, the Argentine government requested the extradition of six on the grounds that they were common criminals. The Supreme Court in Santiago rejected this petition on behalf of five of the refugees, and declared that they had the right to remain in Chile. These were: Jorge Antonio, an Arab-Argentine entrepreneur; John William Cooke, the ex-president of the Peronist Party; Hector Cámpora, ex-president of the Chamber of Deputies; Pedro Andrés Gómez, Peronist trade union leader and ex-deputy; and José Gregorio Espejo, trade union leader and personal friend of Eva Perón.

In the case of Guillermo Patricio Kelly, however, the Chilean Supreme Court concurred with the Argentine government and declared that Kelly must stand trial on criminal charges in Buenos Aires. It turned out that as a young man, Kelly had been a member of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista, which had been closely identified with pro-Nazi activities during the Second World War. He was wanted in Argentina in

connection with a murder which had been committed during a raid on Communist Party headquarters in Buenos Aires. Ricardo Boizard said of him, 'Kelly committed every crime in the Penal Code; he robbed, committed arson, and committed murder'.¹ Even his ideological 'ally' or fellow-traveller, Guillermo Izquierdo, admitted that Kelly was 'rather mad'.² After his petition for asylum was rejected, Kelly, who seems to have enjoyed a remarkable degree of liberty while in prison, escaped dressed as a woman.³

The enquiry set up by the House of Deputies established two main areas of investigation: firstly, the events surrounding the escape itself, and secondly, the inability to recapture Kelly after his flight. During the course of the investigations, it emerged that the escape had been planned by nacionalistas in Chile, aided principally by one of Kelly's many visitors, Blanca Luz Blum.⁴ However, after investigating the circumstances surrounding the failure to recapture Kelly despite one of the biggest man-hunts in Chilean history, the all-party Commission (composed of Salvador Correa Larraín, Gustavo Martínez Martínez, José Oyarce Jara, Humberto Pinto Díaz, and Ana Eugenia Ugalde) alleged negligence on the parts of the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs. The most damning evidence was the confirmation by the Argentine government that it had warned the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in confidence of the existence of escape plans prior to the attempt. For the Supreme Court Judge, Eduardo Ortiz Sandoval, this proved that the entire affair was 'both grave and shameful for Chilean justice'.⁵ As a result, Congress

-
1. Ricardo Boizard, op.cit., p.16.
 2. Interview July 1983.
 3. See Boizard, op.cit., and Ercilla, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora and Veá, September 1957, for details.
 4. Guillermo Izquierdo confirmed that 'certain nationalist acquaintances' of his helped Kelly to escape, while maintaining that he had nothing whatsoever to do with it. He was in fact in Santo Domingo at the time. (Interview May 1983).
 5. El Mercurio, 30/9/1957.

voted comfortably in favour of the impeachment of the Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs.¹

Ibáñez had lost the goodwill of the Liberal Party through the Galleguillos report and the return of the Facultades after the Dos de Abril; the Kelly Case proved the final straw for the Conservatives, who were the prime movers in impeaching Sante Marie and Zuñiga Latorre. The case also allowed the Conservatives to demonstrate their independence from the government to the public. And by April 1957, a desire for independence was also manifest in the PAL, which had paid the heaviest price of all, in terms of loss of votes, for collaboration with Ibáñez. On the Kelly Case, Mario Hamuy of the PAL stated clearly to journalists:

There is no reason why we should be loyal to a government in which we have no representation, and which is partly composed of organised profiteers.²

Relations between Ibáñez and the Right-wing parties remained cool thereafter. Initially, there were rumours that Ibáñez would turn in anger to the FRAP, but these proved to be rather exaggerated. Nonetheless, Ibáñez did forge an alliance with the Left and Centre in Congress to pass far-reaching political reforms in 1958, while still retaining as much as possible an anti-inflationary orientation in economic policies. Indeed, Ercilla, described Ibáñez's policy as 'ambidextrous'; both with the Left and the Right from the middle of 1957.³

1. In the Cámara de Diputados, the vote was 100 to 8, although in the Senate the margin was smaller owing to the abstention of most of the members of the FRAP.
2. Ercilla, 9/10/1957.
3. Ercilla, 15/5/1957.

Conclusion : Why Did Ibañismo Fail?

Despite the organisational strength of the opposition, and their undoubted advantages both in Congress and in the press, the reasons for the failure of Ibañismo go deeper than these.

A close investigation reveals that Ibañismo had begun to fall apart almost immediately after the September 1952 elections, and before co-ordinated opposition could be offered, after the Congressional elections of March 1953. The problem was the total and utter heterogeneity of the victorious coalition. Moreover, this was patently clear at the time. El Mercurio, for example, drew attention in December 1952 to 'the complete disparity in the aspirations ... of the alignment of forces victorious on the 4th of September'.¹ Ibáñez was soon at odds with the Popular Socialists and the PAL; María de la Cruz's crude brand of Peronism offended almost all other sectors of Ibañismo; the independents attacked the Ibañista parties, Estanquero frightened democratic supporters of Ibáñez; and they were all in competition for appointments in the Cabinet, the Public Administration and appointments abroad. Personal rivalries played a part, though the major problem was the lack of ideological consensus. As Topaze put it:

At the moment, the President could put into practice two revolutions: the Marxist-Ampuerista-Ibañista revolution or the Hitler-Mussolini-Lira Merinista-Ibañista one?²

-
1. El Mercurio, 20/12/1952.
 2. Topaze, 24/4/1953.

The failure of Ibañismo was also due to the difficulty - indeed impossibility - of implementing a programme of extensive reform from purely 'technical' non-political criteria, especially in a country as politicised as Chile. In terms of the sophistication of political organisation, Chile had changed almost beyond recognition from the days of Ibáñez's first administration, when he could comfortably dismiss and ignore the opinions of political parties and organised interests with impunity. Ibáñez attempted to tackle Chile's endemic economic problems - inflation, economic dependency, an underproductive agricultural sector, underemployment, etc. - and her extensive social problems without anything more than a vague desire for non-specific reform as an ideological base and without any organised social base. This may have been possible in the 1920s, but it was certainly no longer possible in the 1950s. It may be no accident that the three democratically-elected presidents who followed Ibáñez - Alessandri, Frei and Allende - offered 3 distinct, political cures for Chile's ills. Ibañismo's weaknesses, therefore, coupled with the strength of the party system, combined to frustrate the attempt to generate an alternative system of political values and representation whether populist, authoritarian or nationalist.

CHAPTER VIIELECTORAL REFORM, EXPANDED PARTICIPATION AND THE RE-ALIGNMENTOF CHILEAN POLITICS 1956 - 1958

The results of the parliamentary elections in March 1957 sounded the death-knell of Ibáñismo. Although Ibáñez still had 18 months of his 6 year term to serve, public attention was thereafter given over to the question of candidates and possible alliances for the 1958 presidential elections. This was ironic, in one sense, since the last year of the administration saw the two most far-reaching reforms of the entire administration enacted: the introduction of new electoral regulations and procedures, reducing corrupt practises to a minimum and the legalisation of the Communist Party. These two reforms made possible the emergence of the two mass movements - Christian Democracy and a united Left alliance (FRAP) - which from 1958 onwards challenged the hitherto hegemonic dominance of the Right through an on-going process of mobilisation and integration and were thus an essential component in the democratisation of Chilean society.

The years 1956-58 registered decisive changes in Chile's party system. The fragmentation of the system, so evident in the proliferation of small parties which reached a total of 36 with Congressional representation in 1953, had been reversed. Personalism was significantly reduced, though it did not disappear altogether. The 'political irrationalism' of the early 1950s described by Alfonso Stephens was also reduced, as political blocs more ideological than ever before took shape.¹ An almost inevitable

1. See Chapter II, p.86.

corollary of this development was the re-establishment of the Left - Centre - Right continuum.

The Conservatives and Liberals were unable to retain their dominance in Congress after 1957, and found themselves outmanoeuvred and isolated by the formation of the anti-Alessandri Bloque de Sanamiento Democrático or TOCOA (Todos en Contra Alessandri - Everyone Against Alessandri) as it came to be known. TOCOA was an ad-hoc alliance composed of the Left and Centre parties, with the aim of pushing electoral reform and the legalisation of the Communist Party through Congress to prevent the victory of Alessandri in 1958. Despite this, the Right, united behind the independent candidature of businessman Jorge Alessandri, proved resilient enough to win.

The triumph of populism in 1952 was a reflection, at least in part, of the steady shift of the Chilean electorate to the Left, a process dating at least from the victory of the Popular Front in 1932, and arguably the 'revolt of the electorate' in 1920. By 1957 and 1958, the unstructured populism of Ibáñismo had given way to a doctrinaire - and overwhelmingly democratic - left-wing alliance, with the Socialist and Communist Parties more in harmony than at any time in the previous 20 years. Notwithstanding this, the demise of populism re-inforced the party system without necessarily strengthening its foundations. Thus, ideological motivation did not replace personalism and clientalism as the motor of Chilean politics to the same extent; the electoral campaign of Jorge Alessandri in 1958 was to a very important degree based on his paternalist image. That is to say, therefore, that the modernisation of Chilean political organisations/movements was not matched by the development of 'modern' political behaviour on the part of the electorate. Nor did any redistribution of economic power take place

at this time.¹ Co-optation and clientelism rather than achievement remained major determinants of social advancement, undermining the impartiality of the democratic institutions. As a result, the triple crisis - of legitimación, penetración y participación - identified by Norbert Lechner did not disappear.²

These factors continued to weaken Chile's apparently stable democracy.

According to Osvaldo Sunkel, despite the changes Chile experienced from the 1930s to the 1950s,

The concentration of economic power in the hands of a small elite has pervaded all activities of social life and has led to the growth of a system of control over the government, the press, finance and middle-class employment. Instead of moving towards a system which rewards merit and effort, Chilean society, though changing and modernising, has extended to the new urban activities and classes a traditional clientele system of political domination which is structurally and functionally incompatible with the organisation of a modern and effective democracy.³

Finally, the 1958 presidential elections revealed that the electorate was more or less evenly divided between the Right, Centre and the Left, a pattern which held good until the forcible end of democracy in 1973. In a study of the Chilean electorate between 1952 and 1972, James Prothero and Patricio Chaparro concluded:

the basic immobilism of the Chilean system was rooted in a distribution of opinion that had not changed since the Ibáñez regime of 1952-58. Differing election outcomes since then were explicable more by the specific alternatives and the structure of competition in each election than by a basic change in public opinion. An expanding electorate strengthened the Centre and the Left, but it had not radically altered the level of ideology or the ideological content of Chilean opinion.⁴

-
1. Norbert Lechner, op . cit, pp. 94-103.
 2. The outstanding example of this was the failure of all the Centre/Left governments between 1938 and 1958 to dismantle the land tenure system. Latifundia constituted, despite industrialisation, the most important source of social, economic and political prestige for Chile's economic elite.
 3. Osvaldo Sunkel, 'Change and Frustration in Chile', in Claudio Veliz (ed), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, OUP, London, 1965, p.134.
 4. James W. Prothero and Patricio E. Chaparro, 'Public Opinion and the Movement of the Chilean Government to the Left, 1952-72', in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Chile Politics and Society Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1976, p.109.

Popular Mobilisation in the 1950s and the CUT

The introduction of the cedula única and the abrogation of the Ley Maldita were part of a series of measures opening up the political system to sectors hitherto excluded - peasants, illiterates, the marginal population (women had received the vote in the late 1940s) - which continued throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. However, these reforms were themselves brought about by an increase in mass mobilisation during the 1950s. Indeed, in retrospect the 1952 - 1958 period is one of radicalisation, and of proliferation of both formal political organisations and of single-issue frentes, including the Chilean section of the international Movimiento de los Partidarios de la Paz, the Comité Nacional Feminino de Unidad and the Liga de los Derechos Humanos del Hombre. These were movements in which the banned Communist Party exercised an important influence.¹

The Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) and the Federación de Estudiantes de Chile (FECH) also assumed important roles in this period, with the capacity to mount effective protests against the government. Popular mobilisation was not confined to Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción but extended to many small and medium - sized provincial towns, including La Serena, Copiapó and mining centres.

The formation of the CUT in 1953 was a milestone in Chilean trade union history and in working class militancy. It grouped together almost all unionised blue and white collar workers, and despite its ambiguous legal status, was able to co-ordinate two relatively successful general strikes against Ibáñez in 1954 and 1955. Indeed, James Petras argues that class

1. See Carmelo Furci op. cit. Furci states that during the period of illegality in the 1950s, militants of the party were encouraged to act in 'mass Front organisations. Several different Fronts appeared during the period 1949-1956, and the PCCh presence has always been of considerable importance'. p.60.

consciousness and combativity steadily increased between 1946 and 1960, despite the fact that the number of organised workers actually declined.¹ The CUT defended the interests of the working class as a whole, and, especially between 1953-55, filled the vacuum which the divisions of the left-wing parties had created. The Declaration of Principles of the CUT issued on its foundation made clear that strike action would be endorsed for political ends. The Declaration went on:

the present capitalist regime, founded on the private ownership of the land, of the instruments and methods of production, and in the exploitation of men by man, divides society into antagonistic classes of exploiters and exploited, and should be replaced with an economic and social regime which puts an end to private property and fosters a classless society in which each individual and humanity as a whole can find complete fulfillment.²

During the three general strikes of 1954, 1955 and 1956, the CUT's demands were by no means purely economic and incorporated such political goals as the abrogation of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, and the introduction of a tax reform which would increase the percentages paid by foreign enterprises and latifundia, and decrease the load of the waged and salaried groups.

Furthermore, the CUT participated in the Frente Cívico and the mobilisation against the Línea Recta along with the FECH. Chilean trade unionism was distinguished in this period by its absolute rejection of Peronism, 'national-popular' regimes and state-sponsored unionism, factors influencing its attitude towards Ibáñez. Not surprisingly, given the dominance of the anti-Ibáñez groups amongst university students, the FECH was also soundly opposed to authoritarian regimes. Thus the 1950s marked the

1. It is very difficult to obtain membership figures for the CUT. James Petras, op. cit. pp.169-70 accepts the figures 336, 350 (16% of the active population for 1959 put forward by James Morris et al, Afiliación y finanzas sindicales en Chile, Instituto de Organización y Administración, Departamento de Relaciones Laborales, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago 1962, Sunkel op. cit, estimates the figure at only 12% of the active population, p.127.
2. Quoted in Jorge Barría, Historia de la CUT, op. cit. pp.52-53.

beginning of friendly collaboration between the two organisations. One of the missions in which they cooperated took place shortly after the foundation of the CUT in October 1953, when delegates from the FECH accompanied representatives from the CUT on an unsuccessful visit to Argentina to request the release of imprisoned workers and student leaders. Later, in 1957, the CUT and the FECH were successful in leading demonstrations against rises in transport costs dictated by the government's stabilisation policy, successful, that is in mobilising public opinion, though not in obtaining the desired reduction in fares.

During the 1956-57 austerity measures, the CUT was unsuccessful in defending jobs and living standards. Furthermore, their call for a general strike in January 1956 was only partially obeyed. It was this very weakness as a bargaining organisation that pushed the CUT into promoting political activity. It was instrumental in pressurising the Communist Party and the two Socialist fractions into forming the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) which was a display of solidarity in the face of government aggression. Indeed, as early as June 1955 Ercilla had claimed that the CUT was looking for another Popular Front¹ and Clotario Blest, President of the CUT went on record in early 1956 saying:

Since I am neither anti-political nor apolitical, I repudiate the break-up and fractionalism of the parties of the Left, because it signifies a political defeat for the workers. The metaphysical differences which divide these parties should be put to one side.... They should unite in one bloc, capable of ending once and for all the dominance of the economic oligarchy and the intervention of imperialism in this country.²

-
1. Ercilla, 28/6/1955
 2. ANEF, (the magazine of the public employees), No. 12 April-June 1956, p.25, (quoted in Maximiliano Salinas Campos, Clotario Blest, Arzobispado de Santiago, Vicaría de la Solidaridad, Santiago, 1980, p.154)

Historian of the Chilean labour movement, Jorge Barria, argues that the formation of the FRAP corresponded to a recognition on the part of the trade union movement that successful opposition to the stabilisation programme depended on the emergence of a co-ordinated political strategy, with the aim of directly confronting the government, rather than promoting industrial conflict.¹

The 'success' of the CUT in the period 1956-8, then, was limited to its ability to act as an instrument for increasing political consciousness and co-ordinating working class mobilisation. This was particularly evident after the total breakdown of relations with Ibáñez which occurred with the passing of Ley 12,006. Although the general strike in January 1956 was a failure, following the death of three workers in a confrontation with police in the nitrate company town of Pedro de Valdivia, (owned by Anglo-Lautraro) in September of that year, the CUT was able to mobilise what the Falange journal Política y Espiritu described as a 'multitude' in Santiago in protest against the government's anti-labour bias and to celebrate the anniversary of the Popular Front, in spite of the State of Emergency which was then in force.²

The CUT grouped together trade unionists of all political affiliations, but its relationship was particularly close at this time with the Communist Party. Several labour leaders held prominent positions within the Communist Party, and were able to exert a special influence in the development of policy-making and political strategy. Among these were Juan Vargas Puebla, Treasurer of the CUT, and Juan Chacón Corona who were members of the

1. Jorge Barria, El Movimiento Obrero, op.cit., p.121.

2. Política y Espiritú, 1/11/1956. La Nación blamed 'extremists and demagogues openly obeying orders from abroad for the incident, (23/9/1956), and went on to claim that the country was in the grip of a 'communist - Bossayist conspiracy', (23/9/1956).

Political Commission of the Communist Party¹. This offered the CUT the advantage of a permanent forum in El Siglo. The interaction between the two organisations was a reflection of the Communists' decision to support and operate through the CUT as much as possible, and to promote mass mobilisation with the aim of regaining legal recognition. It was a part at the same time, of the rejection of the strategy of armed struggle.

The FECH and the Riots of April, 1957

Since the FECH was set up in 1906, Chilean university students have been in the forefront of political activity. Though not necessarily always dominated by the Left-wing parties, the students have traditionally been on the side of change, progress and reform, and have concerned themselves with issues not directly affecting the universities. Informal alliances with workers' organisations have been fostered as much as possible, and the Radical, Communist, Christian Democratic (ex-Falange) and Socialist university federations have also encouraged political affiliation and participation among secondary school students.³

On the whole, the FECH resisted the lure of nationalism and populism in the 1930s - 1950s and the PAL made no inroads at all in the university despite its becoming the largest single party in Congress in 1953. Moreover, neither the FECH nor Ibáñez had forgotten the role played by the students in Santiago in ousting the General in 1931.

1. Furci, op. cit., p.60.
2. The passing of the Ley Maldita had caught the Communist Party in a state of confusion about the tactics it should adopt in response. There were deep internal rifts between the 'moderate' sector, which included Galo Gonzalez and Luis Corvalán, future Secretary Generals, and a sector headed by Luis Reinoso, which postulated guerilla action to overthrow Gonzalez Videla. Victory went to the moderate faction in 1950 with the expulsion of Reinoso and his followers.
3. School children participated in the wave of strikes in July-September 1955 to the outrage of Ibáñez. He threatened to close all secondary schools if niños en calcetinos take part in street protests against the authority of the government. El Mercurio 2/9/1955.

An examination of the university students publication, Claridad, is a telling revelation of the FECH's belief in the need to defend public liberties against Ibañismo. Claridad spoke out against the government's detention of journalists, Ibáñez's frequent use of special powers, the government's disparagement of Congress etc. The FECH's bete noire however, was not so much Ibáñez himself as Carlos Ferrer, Under-Secretary of the Interior, who was blamed for example, for the decision to deport from Chile Peruvian students fleeing the dictatorship of General Odría in 1955. Claridad described Ferrer as the 'a symbol of fascism'.¹ The FECH was successful in eventually obtaining the return of the students from Peru, but Ibáñez resisted their demands to remove Ferrer.²

The FECH was also instrumental in the setting up of a Comando en contra de las alzas in December 1956, along with the CUT, to encourage public protests against the second stage of stabilisation measures due in 1957 in general and against rises in the cost of public transport in particular. This was the beginning of the wave of demonstrations in Santiago and Valparaiso that was to culminate in the night of rioting known as el Dos de Abril during which shops and businesses were looted and robbed at random. It was during the night of el Dos de Abril that the printing press Horizonte was ransacked.³ Confined at first merely to students stoning buses, by March the situation had become explosive, with regular confrontations taking place between students and shanty-town dwellers on the one hand, and police bent on stamping out protests on the other.

1, Claridad, June 1955.

2. Carlos Ferrer was also implicated in the assault on Horizonte in April 1957, after which he was moved to the Vice-Presidency of INACO, the government agency regulating imports and exports. Shortly after, he was dismissed, however, following allegations of corruption. Vistazo, 8/10/1957.

3. A detailed discussion of the FECH and el Dos de Abril is to be found in Frank Bonilla, 'The Student Federation of Chile: 50 years of Political Action' Journal of Inter American Studies, Volume II, No. 1, January 1960 pp.311-334. It is particularly interesting because of its extensive use of data gathered in the mid-1950s on the relative party strengths in the FECH.

The catalyst of the riots was undoubtedly the death of a young student Alicia Ramirez in Valparaiso, but in fact, the students, represented by the Comando, had lost control of the movement by April 1957, and the CUT had dropped out earlier. The demonstrations and riots which suddenly occurred in the streets of Santiago and Valparaiso were spontaneous, most probably generated by disillusionment with Ibañez's failure to fulfill the promises made in 1952, and resentment on the part of the urban poor at having to pay the costs of the stabilisation of the economy. Indeed, Ercilla blamed the government's anti-inflationary programme,¹ and for Las Noticias de Última Hora, utter weariness with Ibañismo and responsible:

It is not even a question of money. The shanty-towns of Santiago and Valparaiso have risen up against the sinister symbols of government failures and negligence.²

Contributing factors, some of which were identified at the time, may have been: public dissatisfaction with the results of the Congressional elections which took place immediately before the riots, in which there was neither an overwhelmingly clear victor not even an overwhelming rejection of the government³; 'the unjust and inhuman repression by the police of the popular protests in the months before the riots;⁴ and general mismanagement on the part of the government of the demonstrations as a whole. There is certainly substantial truth in the final allegation. For example, the Minister of the Interior, Benjamin Videla, initially offered to discuss the situation with the FECH, after mediation by Senator Allende. The offer was almost immediately withdrawn, however, perhaps countermanded by Ibañez himself.

-
1. Ercilla, 3/4/1957.
 2. Las Noticias de Última Hora, 30/3/1957.
 3. This explanation was suggested to me by Socialist Gustavo Horwitz, a law student at the time (Interview, May 1983).
 4. This was the reason put forward for the increasingly violent protests by the beginning of April by the FECH itself. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Diputados, 3A., 1/4/1957. In addition, Senator Humberto Martones of the FRAP (and ex-Ibañista) claimed that the behaviour of the police constituted a 'public danger', Las Noticias de Última Hora, 2/4/1957.

It is also possible that the offer was simply part of government's tactics to mislead the students and reduce the criticisms from Congress over its intransigence. In taking this decision, Ibáñez and the Cabinet may have been influenced by the spectre of 1931, an image repeatedly used in the press coverage of the students' demonstrations. Whatever the reasons, though, the government appeared weak and untrustworthy, and passions were inflamed further.

Another less likely reason that has sometimes been offered in explanation is that the Minister of the Interior Videla, in collusion with the Jefe de la Plaza, General Horacio Gamboa,¹ allowed the rioters to take control of the centre of Santiago, 'withdrawing the police at the climax of the troubles in order to obtain Facultades Extraordinarias for Ibáñez or perhaps even cause such alarm and confusion in Santiago that a coup d'etat might become possible. There is little evidence to substantiate this idea, based as it is in the image of Ibáñez as an inveterate conspirator rather than a rational assesment of the facts. It is true that the police withdrew, leaving central Santiago virtually without protection, but it also true that the army, who eventually quelled the disorders a few hours later - meeting with surprisingly little resistance, as the rioters dispersed - showed no indication of wishing to remain on police duty for longer than necessary. It is also the case that Ibáñez, the Cabinet, Gamboa himself and La Nación blamed the troubles on 'communist and professional agitators', an almost standard prelude to a military intervention in Latin America, but this had become in effect that regime's standard response to criticism from any quarter by 1957.²

-
1. Gamboa was not from the Army but was a member of the para-military police force, the Carabineros. Under state of siege, the Jefe de la Plaza was the ultimate military and civil authority.
 2. See, for example, an interview with Gamboa in Zig-Zag 6/4/1957.

The Role in el Dos de Abril

La Nación placed the ultimate responsibility for the riots on the Communists and emphasized the participation particularly of vandals and lumpen¹ General Gamboa blamed 'professional agitators' and political activists who had infiltrated the FECH² The fact is, however, that, with the exception of a few individuals members of the Popular Socialist Party, the FRAP limited itself to condemning the violence of the police and the refusal of the government to negotiate or reach a compromise with the FECH. Their chosen forum for political debate remained the Congress or the press.³ They did not participate in the rioting much less lead it. A number of FRAP and labour leaders were detained, including Clotario Blest who was relegated to Molina for three months, but this was in a 'pre-emptive' measure undertaken by the government. On one such occasion La Nación referred to 22 political and trade union leaders arrested at a 'clandestine' meeting, without giving further details.⁴ Socialist and especially Communist student leaders, whose initial participation in the Comando en contra de las Alzashad had been with the blessing of their respective parties, but who had then gone on to advocate building on the possibilities of mass insurrection in Chile, found themselves expelled.

Frustration with the parliamentary orientation of the FRAP in the 1960s caused some left-wingers to see El Dos de Abril in a rather romantic light, as a lost, golden opportunity for creating a mass revolutionary movement. Socialist Alejandro Chelén, for example, wrote that 'el Dos de Abril offered the spectacle of a truly revolutionary struggle'.⁵

-
1. La Nación, 3/4/1957 and 4/4/1957.
 2. Horacio Gamboa, En la Ruta del Dos de Abril, Imprenta Fantasia Santiago, 1962.
 3. See the condemnation of the government by Senator Salvador Allende who, in his capacity as President of FRAP, had tried to mediate between the government and the students in Zig Zag, 6/4/1957.
 4. La Nación, 3/4/1957.
 5. Alejandro Chelén, Trayectoria del Socialismo, op cit., p.149.

Writing nearly ten years later James Petras echoed these criticisms and condemned the legalistic and parliamentary approach taken by the FRAP over el Dos de Abril. He argues:

The FRAP parties, with the possible exception of the Popular Socialist Party, neither led nor supported the demonstrations. Instead, they called for an investigation to examine why the government had permitted so explosive a situation to come to pass. Whatever opportunities existed for channelling the anger of the masses into Left political action were not used.¹

However, it is difficult to see how one short burst of indiscriminate rioting, which died as suddenly as it erupted, could form the basis for such a movement. This line of analysis tends to exaggerate the extent of the leadership offered by the FECH. Petras states: 'During the 1957 demonstrations, the students filled the vacuum resulting from the weakness of the left-wing parties.'² In fact, almost all participants and observers of the demonstrations concur in describing the events as spontaneous. The FECH presided over numerous public meetings, joint declarations, campaigns etc. with the CUT, but social stratification being as rigid as it was in Chile, students had little direct contact with shanty-town dwellers, who at this time were also beyond the influence of the CUT.

The Formation of the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP)

The re-grouping of the Left began almost immediately after its division in the wake of the Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia, and the split in the Socialist Party over the issue of supporting Ibáñez in 1952. In fact, the formation of the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) represented rather a return to the traditional policy of alliance between Chile's workers' parties

1. Petras op. cit., p.177

2.. Petras ibid., p.177 In any case, Petras presupposes, rather than demonstrates, that the Left was particularly 'weak' at the beginning of 1957. A parliamentary Left such as the Chilean, is not, per se, a 'weak' Left.

than a completely new stage in their development. This is not to imply that the divisions had been superficial or the result of mere personality clashes through these were also important. The Socialist and the Communist were divided on the vital question of political strategy - as indeed were the Socialists among themselves. This was compounded by virtually irreconcilable foreign policy differences. (See table VII.1). The FRAP - and later the Popular Unity - alliance was based not on a resolution of these differences, but on the recognition that unless the Socialists and Communists worked together, there was no possibility of either party ever winning power. Ideologically, however, the FRAP merely papered over the cracks.

The process of the unification of the Left is sometimes dated from the formation of the CUT. It is more logical, however, to date it from the formation of the alliance of the Socialistas de Chile and the Communist Party in the Frente de Pueblo in support of Salvador Allende's presidential candidature in 1952. Allende himself consistently argued that the Frente del Pueblo was the beginning of an on-going process of unification. He said during the 1952 elections:

the Frente del Pueblo is not an electoral alliance but rather a movement of renewal which is just beginning ... we are a movement around which others will gather in the future.¹

It is important to note that the formation of the Frente del Pueblo neutralised the most virulently anti-communist Socialists, the sector that had supported the passing of the Ley Maldita. Though small in number, they had managed to retain the official party name, but had to wait until the entry of Allende and his few followers in 1952 to regain any credentials as a 'socialist' party.

1. Vistazo, 9/9/1952.

TABLE VII.1Two Political Strategies within the FRAP, 1956¹

PCCh's Strategy	PSCh's Strategy
1. Organization of all working people, unity of all progressive forces in spite of their class, ideology, religion.	Unity of the working class, peasants intellectuals and all manual workers.
2. Implementations of the bourgeois revolution as a step in the struggle for Socialism.	Struggle for Socialism; the bourgeois revolution must be included not as a step towards Socialism, but within the process of the revolution.
3. Possibility of taking power by peaceful means, i.e. the parliamentary struggle.	Both the peaceful road and armed insurrection must be taken into account as possible ways to achieve power.
4. Alignment with the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp.	Independence from the Socialist camp. Autonomy of all revolutionary movements.

The Socialistas de Chile represented only a small fraction of Chilean Socialism compared with the Popular Socialists. For this reason, some historians of the Socialist Party have preferred to emphasize rather the contribution of the CUT and the general improvement in Socialist - Communist relations once the Popular Socialists left government in 1953 which coincided fortuitously with the death of Stalin as the origins of the FRAP alliance.² Alejandro Chelén went even further, to argue that the pact signed in October, 1955 between the Popular Socialists and the Partido Democrática del Pueblo, led by Humberto Martones - both ex-Ibáñista parties - formed the basis of FRAP.³

1. Furci op. cit., p.71.

2. Raul Ampuero, op. cit. pp.53-54.

3. Chelén, op cit., p.143. Chelén wrote on another occasion: 'With the collaborationist experiment finished, and all possibility of initiating another attempt discarded ... the Popular Socialists began the task of grouping together a united alliance of all parties on the Left, excluding the Radical Party. In this way, the FRAP was born'. Alejandro Chelén Flujo y Reflujo de Socialism Chileno, in Chelén and Julio Cesar Jobet, (eds), Pensamiento Teórico y Político del Partido Socialista, Quimantú Santiago, 1972, p.218.

Once the Popular Socialists had left government, the main obstacle to the creation of a Socialist - Communist pact and to the unification of the Socialist Party was the decision of the Frente del Pueblo to participate in Congress in the broad anti-Ibáñez opposition bloc with the Radicals the Falange, Liberals and Conservatives. The strategies of the Popular Socialists and the Frente del Pueblo were determined by utterly different criteria, as a discussion in the Senate between Aniceto Rodriguez, representing the Popular Socialists, and Salvador Allende, representing the Frente del Pueblo in October 1953, illustrated. Roderiguez sustained:

What has always seemed to use most dishonest and contrary to the interests of the people is the policy of blocs, alliances and attitudes of permanent harmony that the (Radical) party has sustained with the forces of reaction... We do not think it possible, even on the pretext of special circumstances to reach an understanding and compromise which eventually become, permanent alliances - between groups of the Left and those of the Right.

Rodriguez's position is based in the disillusionment with the Socialist-Communist-Radical Party alliance in the Popular Front. Popular Socialist support for Ibáñez's populism had been founded on the party's rejection of formal class alliance symbolised by the Popular Front. Significantly, it is the very heritage of the Popular Front and alliance with the Radical Party which Allende, in his reply, chose to defend:

I will always defend what signifies, in my judgement, an advance for Chile; and that advance began in 1938 ... I cannot deny the Radical Party its role in the advent of a 'popular government'.²

The Popular Socialist Party made it clear that they would not, under any circumstances, be in the forefront of a defence of parliamentary democracy, particularly given the circumstances under which such a system then operated

1. Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 3a, 27/10/1953.

2. *ibid.*

in Chile. In reply to a suggestion from the Frente Nacional del Pueblo (FRENAP - the Frente del Pueblo combined with Baltazar Castro's Partido de Trabajo, which took place in May 1955) that FRENAP and Popular Socialists form a joint committee of unity, the PSP again repeated its objections to FRENAP's policies, and went on:

This 'immaculate' democratic tradition about which there is so much myth-making does not exist in Chile: traditionally elections have served as a legalistic mask for fraud, intervention, and bribery, and have twisted the free expression of the wishes of the people... The Rightwing parties and the Radicals have perfected the most horrible repressive legislation.¹

At the same time, the Popular Socialists had not completely abandoned their populist aspirations of 1952; as late as December 1954, for example, the PSP were again considering joining the government.² Mindful of this, as well as the implication of the Popular Socialists in the Línea Recta, the Communist Party magazine, Vistazo, issued a more or less open warning to the PSP about the dangers of encouraging military intervention:

Some sectors of the Left seem to be falling for the siren calls of a 'short' period of dictatorship, and are even thinking about the possibility of staging another well-planned 'Colliguay plot',

and came out very strongly against 'eliminating the constitutional and democratic forms of government - even in the name of the people or of a 'left-wing' coup'.³

In the event, it fell to the Conservatives and the Liberals to shatter the precarious unity of the Frente Civico. The regime's adoption of orthodox stabilisation policies with the support of the Right in Congress ended periodic overtures to the PSP as definitively as it ended the fragile alliance between the Frente del Pueblo and the Centre and Right - wing parties.

-
1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 23/5/1955.
 2. This was confirmed by Aniceto Rodriguez, Secretary General at the time, in an interview with Vea, 11/5/1955. He said, 'we wanted to construct a "popular" government in conjunction with the CUT'.
 3. Vistazo, 19/4/1955.

Thus the debate over political strategy within the Left took on a less immediate and more academic character, and was therefore relegated to a secondary level of importance. As a result, the FRAP alliance was signed shortly afterwards, on the 1st March, 1956, by Baltazar Castro and Jose Oyarzun for FRENAP, and Raul Ampuero and Humberto Martones for the Popular Socialists and the Democraticos del Pueblo. The process of unity was aided by the government's intolerance of left-wing or trade union protest at the time, which was an integral, if unacknowledged, part of the stabilisation programme. Indeed, Oscar Waiss has argued that the talks leading up to the FRAP pact were started by detainees in the Pisagua internment camp, initiated by Waiss himself and Volodia Teitelboim on behalf of the Communist Party.¹

On its formation FRAP counted with the support of 8 senators and 37 deputies (out of a total 148 deputies and 45 senators). After the 1957 Congressional elections, however, FRAP's representation in the Chamber of Deputies fell to 22, though in the Senate representation increased to 10, corresponding to just under 11% of the total vote. Compared with the 1945 elections, when the Socialists and Communists shared 23% of the vote, the 1957 results do not seem too impressive. Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the Communist Party was still illegal and only able to compete under the banner of the Frente del Pueblo, that a considerable number of known Communist Party members or sympathisers were still deprived at least technically of the franchise (Allende estimated the number of disenfranchised Communists at 25 thousand), that the number of PSP deputies had been swelled rather artificially on the tide of Ibañismo in 1953 and that the PSP paid the price for the government's unpopularity in 1957, the results for the FRAP were deceptively low. Another important factor - soon to be eliminated -

1. Interview with the author, Madrid, August, 1984. Waiss also made this claim to Carmelo Furci, (op. cit. p.69), though Furci, on the basis of an interview with Teitelboim, does not attribute much importance to it.

in FRAP's relatively disappointing result, was the continuing division of the Socialist Party.¹

Sectors of the Left were overly preoccupied with the FRAP's 'failure' in 1957, without realising sufficiently that the chances of FRAP winning a Congressional majority were limited, not only by the corruption and vote-buying of the Right, but inherently, owing to Chile's multi-party system and the complex electoral alliances which ensued.

The significance of the FRAP was much greater than either that of the Socialists or Communists individually. German Urzua Valenzuela states:

The Frente de Acción Popular does not represent, however, the actual strength of the two parties, but the strengthening of a broad sector of the electorate characterised by its diversity. As a result, it assumes an importance which is greater than both of the principal parties separately which make it up.²

the FRAP'S strength was not simply electoral, either. For example, the Left was now able to dominate the CUT, where it operated in competition with the Radicals, the Falange, and the smaller groups of trotskysts, anarchists and independents, in place of the rivalry between the Socialists and Communists which had weakened the labour movement as a whole.

Las Noticias de la Ultima Hora commented after the Congressional elections:

Although it is true that the FRAP has made important progress politically during the last year ... it was unable to overcome the prolonged series of errors committed by the party directives. The FRAP has been unable to demonstrate that those errors are being corrected to the bulk of the population, and this has meant that the parties in the FRAP have scarcely been able to defend their percentage from the previous parliamentary elections.³

-
1. Indeed, this is the main explanation offered by Jobet, (El Socialismo Chileno traves de sus congresos, op. cit. p.86). Chelen on the other hand, following the logic of his argument that the Popular Socialists represented the true face of Chilean socialism, stressed public dissatisfaction with Ibáñez and its repercussions on the PSP. (Chelen, op. cit. p.139).
 2. German Urzua Valenzuela, op. cit., p.100.
 3. Las Noticias de la Ultima Hora, 4/3/1957. The 'errors' were, principally Socialist-Communist rivalry, internal splits in the Socialist Party, and the participation of the PSP in government.

The FRAP's chances of winning presidential elections were much greater, as became evident in a little more than a year later, when Allende, FRAP's presidential candidate, was beaten into second place by less than 40,000 votes.

Nevertheless, between 1956 and 1958 the FRAP functioned more as a parliamentary bloc and an electoral alliance than as the axis of a mass movement. Indeed, if anything, the very existence of the FRAP underlined the electoral orientation of the Chilean Left and its commitment to parliamentary politics. Despite the euphoric talk of building a single Marxist workers' party which circulated at this time, the Socialists and Communists jealously defended their separate organisations, recruitment etc., and more importantly, their particular interpretation of Chilean politics.¹

Two Strategies Inside the FRAP

Until the time of the military coup of 1973 and indeed beyond, the choices and decisions facing the Left in Chile were expressed in terms of two opposing strategies - the Frente de Trabajadores and the Frente de Liberacion Nacional. This dilemma was never fully resolved. The two irreconcilable positions emerged in the period 1956-58.

Soon after the PSP and the PS de Chile were integrated in to the FRAP, the (United) Socialist Party was founded in July 1957 out of the fusion of the two. The union took place at the XVII General Conference of the Socialist Party. Both Salvador Allende and Aniceto Rodriguez stepped down as Secretary-General of their respective parties, in favour of ex-Popular Socialist, Salomon Corbalán. The results of the elections for the new Secretary-General

1. The Secretary General of the (United) Socialist Party, Salomon Corbalán, said, 'A single party should be our object, to be realised within a fixed period and by stages'. Vistazo, 9/7/1957.

were a rough indication of the extent to which the militants of the PSP had outnumbered the Socialistas de Chile. Manuel Mandujano, candidate of the PS de Chile, was not even taken into account, and the contest was between three Popular Socialists: Salomon Corbalán (84 votes), Eugenio Gonzalez (70 votes), and Galvarino Palacios (1 vote).¹

The XVII General Congress also underlined the Socialist Party's commitment to the Frente de Trabajadores, that is the alliance with only strictly workers' parties - in the case, the Communist Party.²

The possibility of alliances with centrist parties, especially the Radical Party, was firmly rejected. The social base of the Radical Party was defined as 'the petit bourgeoisie in a stage of disintegration ... heterogeneous and unstable'.³ Furthermore, the Congress accorded:

The attitudes and activities of the Radical party are based on a demagogic combination of vaguely progressive declarations and reactionary compromises in practice as a result of which it has become the biggest obstacle to a genuine democratisation of the country. Because of this, the Socialist Party has no confidence in the democratizantes and populist declarations of some Radical Party members. On the contrary, the Socialist Party thinks it its duty to point out to the working class the deliberately confusing and reactionary content of the Radicals.⁴

1. Ercilla, 10/7/1957.

2. For a discussion of the Frente de Trabajadores, see Ernst Halperin, op. cit., A. Chelén and J.E. Jobet (eds.), op. cit., Carmelo Furci, op. cit., B. Pollack, 'The Chilean Socialist Party: Prolegomena to its structure and organisation', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 10, no. 1 (1978), and La Polemica Socialista-Comunista, Published by the Central committee of the Socialist Party, Prensa Latinoamericana, 1962.

3. Jobet, El Socialismo a traves de sus congresos, op. cit., p.89. See p.87-93 for a detailed discription of the Congress.

4. ibid., p.90.

In rejecting the idea that the Radicals had 'a role to play in the advent of a "popular" government',¹ the Socialist Party followed the PSP's thesis that a bourgeois democratic revolution was not a necessary step in economically dependent societies before a socialist transformation could take place. Indeed Salomon Corbalán dismissed this as a 'européizante concept'.² He explained why in the following way:

It is impossible for the bourgeois capitalists of Latin America to take the initiative in the economic liberation of our peoples ... Thus, the character of the American revolution cannot be bourgeois democratic as we Socialists and Communists used to believe... The only social class with this historic authority is the working class, because it has not been compromised by the existing order.³

The categoric rejection of class alliance, then, took the concrete shape of hostility towards the Radical Party. Considering the depth of anti-Radical feeling in the PSP, this is hardly surprising. A letter from Raul Ampuero, one of the architects of the Frente de Trabajadores, to the XVII Congress indicated just how strong and bitter this feeling was:

There can be no possible justification for the Congress of Unity thinking of a Radical as a successor to Ibáñez. The following is what happens with the Radical Party: before the elections, the Radicals choose the candidates, the Liberal Party lend the money, and the Socialists stick up the posters. After the elections, the Liberals get their money back with interest, the Radicals in the government begin to steal and to rob, and the Socialists are left, looking at the posters.⁴

The rigidity of the Frente de Trabajadores was modified by the use of a broad definition of the term 'worker' in the Socialist Party. It was used to refer to a part of the middle sectors, especially white-collar employees, as well as manual workers. This is partly a reflection of the fact that the Socialist Party was more 'middle-class' in terms of its composition and base of support than the Frente de Trabajadores might indicate. However,

-
1. This was the position of the Frente de Pueblo. See p.280 for details.
 2. Vistazo, 9/7/1957.
 3. Ercilla, 14/1/1958.
 4. Ercilla, 12/6/1957.

it was also born out of electoral necessity: given the size of the middle sectors and of the peasantry in Chile, attracting only the votes of urban blue-collar workers would result in certain failure; especially if that vote was split between the two workers' parties. Thus the strategy of the Socialist Party was to 'pinch' votes from the Radical Party at the same time as condemning the Radicals as the corrupt tools of Chile's economic elite.

Raul Ampuero argued:

The mass of Radical voters has so far remained true to the directives of the Radical Party because the Left, instead of unmasking the reactionary policies of the Radical leadership, managed to hide it through their own appalling sense of strategy. By putting forward our own (presidential) candidate, Allende, we are helping the militants of the Radical Party find their true road, rather than the path of deception.¹

Instead of clarifying the Socialists' position, however, this ambiguity served at times to increase confusion.

Despite the parliamentary orientations of the FRAP, the new Socialist Party did not completely discard its 'nationalist - populist' or revolutionary rhetoric. At the XVII Congress, the Socialist Party expressed its adhesion to the 'principals, programme and methods of revolutionary socialism, as the theoretical and political expression of the desires of the working class'.² The Socialists' use of revolutionary language was a legacy from the PSP, and it is no accident that Chelèn describes the doctrine of the PSP as the 'cement' of the new party.³ The commitment of the Socialist Party to revolutionary politics remained generally at the level of rhetoric. Just as the Socialists had proved easy prey for the ideological fashions of the 1930, 1940s, and 1950s - Popular Frontism, Justicialismo, Titoism, Nasserism etc. - so the image

1. Vea, 28/11/1957.

2. Jobet, op. cit., p.87.

3. Chelèn, op. cit.

of Maoism and more especially Castroism served as an example for the 'revolutionary' socialists of the 1960s who did not distinguish supporting the Cuban revolution from trying to imitate it. Oscar Waiss, for example, argued that Allende lost the 1958 presidential election because he did not offer a revolutionary option to the voters:

The FRAP would have won on this occasion if it had found the necessary language. The people are tired of hearing the same phrase and are looking instinctively for someone to interpret their revolutionary will as Fidel Castro has done in Cuba.¹

The adoption of the thesis the Frente de Trabajadores by the Socialist Party, which dates from around 1955, and the subsequent formation of the FRAP, which was to be the instrument through which the strategy would be implemented, were made easier by a relaxing of the tensions between the Socialists and the Communists during the period of de-Stalinisation. Ampuero himself acknowledges this in La Izquierda en Punto Muerto.² Meanwhile, the Communist Party found ratification for its parallel and opposing strategy of the Frente de Liberacion Nacional at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which supported the concept of the 'peaceful road to socialism'.³ Thus, events outside Chile continued to exercise an important influence over the course of Chilean politics.

The Communist Party's National Liberation doctrine proposed a multi-class alliance against imperialism and the oligarchy. Contrast Oscar Waiss's explanation above for the FRAP's failure to win the 1958 elections with the analysis made by Volodio Teitelboim in 1959: Teitelboim concluded that the FRAP had not proved attractive enough to the 'national bourgeoisie':

1. Oscar Waiss, Nacionalismo y Socialismo em America Latina, Ediciones Iguarzu, Buenos Aires, 1961, p.145-46.
2. Ampuero, op. cit., p.56.
3. On the strategy of liberacion nacional, see E. Halperin, op. cit., Furci, op. cit., and La Polemica Socialista-comunista, op. cit.

There was a shift in policy, away from our line, towards the left, not 180 degrees, but about 20 or 30 degrees. This was enough for the national bourgeoisie to feel threatened, and as a result, only a small proportion supported our candidate ... The evolution of our attitude towards the national bourgeoisie and our ability to find allies for the working class are the measure of our maturity as a party.¹

Adopting the Frente de Liberacion Nacional in 1956, the Communist Party merely re-affirmed the principle which had in fact guided their policies since the formation of the Popular Front. As Ernst Halperin has pointed out:

The Chilean Communist Party had already practised the policy of the Peaceful Road for over twenty years. Even at the time of their persecution by Gonzalez Videla, they had expelled the advocates of armed insurrection from their ranks.²

Such a strategy had made possible the Communists' participation in the Frente Civico with democratic right-wingers at a time when it was thought that the Ibañez regime constituted a grave threat to basic public liberties. Later, the Communists tried to unite disaffected businessmen with the Centre and Left against the economic stabilisation programme - though with little success.

Thus, communists strived constantly within the FRAP to broaden the alliance to include the Radical Party. For the Communists, this need was particularly urgent in the run-up to the 1958 presidential elections. Galo Gonzalez, Secretary General of the Communist Party explained:

At the moment, there does not exist any possibility of reaching an understanding with the Radical Party ... but perhaps tomorrow, ... We Communists, in spite of what the government of Gonzalez Videla signified, have always considered it necessary to reach an understanding with the Radical Party ... the Radicals are a democratic grouping and are on the Left... and what we need now especially is to unite all the democratic forces in a broad independent movement of national liberation.³

-
1. Volodio Teitelboim, 'Algunas Experiencias Chilenas sobre el Problema de la Burguesía Nacional', Principios, July 1959, No. 59, pp.20-30
 2. Ernst Halperin, op. cit., 1965, p.60.
 3. El Mercurio, 3/8/1957.

The FRAP's willingness to participate in electoral pacts with the Radical Party in 1956 and 1957 had raised the Communists hopes of presenting a joint candidate for the presidency. Such was the dissatisfaction felt within the Communist Party over the Socialists insistent exclusion of the Radicals that rumours circulated in 1958 about the possibility of the Communists, under the new leadership of Luis Corvalán, withdrawing from the FRAP to support the candidature of Luis Bossay.

Part of the reason why the Communists were unable to impose their strategy in the FRAP was their relative weakness vis-a-vis the Socialists. Firstly, the party was still technically illegal (though in fact between 1957-58 the status of the Communist Party was ambiguous and perhaps would be better termed 'semi-clandestine, since even El Mercurio openly interviewed Communist Party leaders); and secondly, the Socialists hugely outnumbered the Communists at this time.¹

Critics of the Frente de Liberacion Nacional claimed that the Communist Party was trying to revive the Popular Front. The Communists themselves stressed time and again that a Frente de Liberacion Nacional alliance would be fundamentally different in one important respect: the hegemonic sector within the alliance would not be the bourgeoisie or the petit bourgeoisie represented by the Radical Party - as had been the case during the Popular Front - but the working class. Corvalan explained:

We think that the Radical Party has a place in the working class 'popular' movement, but on different terms from the Popular Front.²

-
1. Furci estimates that the size of the Communist Party fell from around 30,000 in 1946 to 5 - 10,000 by 1958. op. cit., p.59.
 2. Vea, 1957 (date unknown).

Like the Frente de Trabajadores, the Liberación Nacional strategy was not without its contradictions. The Radical Party was, it is true, looking for an alliance with the FRAP as the Communists pointed out, but on its own terms. Luis Bossay was not prepared to withdraw his candidature in favour of that of Allende and the Radical Party in general was not prepared to be the junior partner in the alliance. As Carmelo Furci pertinently wrote:

It is difficult to suggest the formation of a political alliance while at the same time declaring that one particular class or party was to be predominant. A political alliance is the result of much compromising, but more important, it must be assumed that the future leadership of that alliance will emerge out of political competition.

FRAP chose its presidential candidate by election in September 1957. It was evident that a Communist candidate would be unacceptable to many Socialists, anti-communism being by no means dead in the Socialist Party. But many of the old Popular Socialist were unacceptable to the Communist Party well. Eventually the competition was reduced to Salvador Allende and various representatives of small independent parties, including Alejandro Serani ex-Head of the Masonry, Humberto Mewes, ex-Controller General of the Republic, and ex-minister Guillermo Del Pedregal. Allende won a resounding victory, his main base of support being ironically enough in the Communist Party.² In fact, this alliance was to prove the basis of Allende's entire career in the 1960's and 1970's, as his support declined in his own party.

The Formation of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC)

The largest single party of the 1960s in Chile, the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was also founded in July 1957, out of the union of two fractions from the Conservative Party - the Falange Nacional and the Social

1. Furci, op. cit., p.55.
2. Allende won 508 votes to Serani's, his nearest rival, 350. See Ercilla 11/9/1957 for details.

Christian Conservatives led by Eduardo Cruz-Coke. Initially, the prestige of Senator and presidential candidate Eduardo Frei was much greater than the image of the party as a whole. Frei had been offered government office by Ibáñez in 1954, was liked and respected as a parliamentarian and was well-received by the media. He won the symbolic first majority for Santiago in the 1957 Congressional elections, indicative of his popularity. The year 1957 also marked the emergence of the PDC as a real challenger for power. The number of Falange deputies increased from 3 to 17, and the number of votes the party received almost quadrupled.¹ The Falange had made the transition from small elite - it had originally been the youth section of the party of the privileged, the Conservative Party - to Christian Democracy a mass party with a significant following.²

The first president of the PDC was deputy Rafael Gumucio. He immediately proclaimed the PDC's intention of operating on two fronts: to attract the current or ex-Radical Party middle sector and public employee vote, and to challenge the Socialist - Communist hegemony over the working class, in Parliament and in the CUT. The PDC reaped the fruits of this strategy with their victory in 1964 thanks to a disparate coalition of shanty-town dwellers, peasants, white-collar workers, the self-employed trade unionists and women voters. By 1964, the party had replaced the Radical Party as Chile's main centre party. In 1957 its votes did not necessarily come from disaffected Radicals, as the Radicals also increased their vote to become the largest single party in Congress. The PDC was finding its own constituency, often among previously politically uncommitted sectors, especially in the cities.³

-
1. The Falange polled 22,353 in 1953 and 82,710 in 1957. Urzua Valenzuela, op. cit., p.95.
 2. On the Christian Democratic Party. See G. Grayson, El Partido Democrata Cristiana, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1968; and Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy, Princeton Univ., Press, Guildford, Surrey, 1985.
 3. On the electorate of the Christian Democratic Party, see Petras op. cit., pp.203-09; Michael Fleet, op. cit., pp.43-79; Halperin op. cit., pp.192-205.

The party's growth was part of a more pragmatic approach to politics, in contrast to the 'ideological period' of the 1940s. In his study of Chilean Christian Democracy, Michael Fleet uses data gathered by Chile's foremost electoral analyst, Eduardo Homily, just prior to the 1958 elections to conclude:

Frei's expanded support base (was) ... both broader socially and more conservative politically than in earlier years. Prior to 1958 the party's small following had been predominantly petit bourgeois in character. But of the 305 respondents indicating a preference first prior to the presidential election, 20.8% preferred Frei and of those only 39.1% were from professional or independent worker backgrounds, while 40.6% were from white collar and 20.3% from blue collar worker backgrounds ... He enjoyed disproportionately strong support among regularly practising Catholics ... Frei's supporters held moderate or centrist views on most ideological issues.

Like the Radicals, the PDC had emerged as a reformist centre party with a mass following. However, there were important differences: firstly, the PDC became more interested in presiding over a continuous process of mass mobilisation, rather than concentrating on elections as the Radicals tended to, and secondly, the PDC was an 'ideological' rather than a pragmatic party.²

These two factors, and in addition, the Catholic origins of the Christian Democrats in contrast to the Radicals fierce secularism, meant that the PDC was now in the position of being a competitor to the FRAP rather than a potential ally, as the Radical Party was. This is something that the FRAP was not unaware of. Vistazo, for example, recognised the dangers the PDC represented:

Apart from the Marxist parties, there is no other political organisation that can beat the Christian Democratic leadership for its capacity and internal unity.³

-
1. Michael Fleet, op. cit. pp.59-60.
 2. For a discussion of mobilisation by the PDC, see B. Pollack and H. Rosenkranz, 'Political Strategies and Mobilisation in Chile 1963-73' B. Pollack (ed) Mobilisation and Socialist Politics in Chile, Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, Monograph Series No. 9, 1980.
 3. Vistazo, 30/7/1957.

TABLE VII.2¹Ideological Self-Placement of Christian Democrats and
Frei Supporters, August 1958

Subgroup	Left	Centre	Right	
<u>Falangistas</u>	28.6%	42.9%	28.6%	n=7
Christian Democratic supporters	12.1	66.7	21.2	n=33
Unaffiliated <u>freistas</u>	-	60.0	40.0	n=15

SOURCE: Hamuy 1958.

TABLE VII.3¹Occupational Statuses of Christian Democrats and
Frei Supporters, August, 1958

Subgroup	Employers	Professional Independent Workers	White Collar Workers	Blue Collar Workers	Domestic Workers	
Falangistas	-	50.0%	37.5%	12.5%	-	n=8
Christian Democratic supporters	6.3%	-	68.8	18.8	6.3%	n=16
Unaffiliated <u>Freistas</u>	-	50.0	50.0	-	-	n=6

SOURCE: Hamuy 1958.

TABLE VII.4¹Extent of Religious Practice of Prospective Catholic Voters by
by Candidate Preference, August, 1958

Candidate Preference	Non- practising	Irregular	Regular	All Catholics
Alessandri	34.0%	43.0%	43.0%	40.9%
Allende	28.1	29.3	11.1	22.8
Bossay	17.2	6.5	6.6	10.1
Frei	20.3	20.7	37.0	26.2
	64	92	81	237

SOURCE: Hamuy 1958.

1. Fleet, cp.cit.

Nonetheless, the Socialist Party chose to insist that there was no essential difference between the PDC and PAL many of whose militants had swelled the ranks of the Christian Democrats. At the 1957 XVII General Party Conference, the Socialists accorded:

the PAL and the Christian Democratic Party express the interests of the agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie and of some middle sectors, tied to imperialism and to the Vatican, whose aim is none other than to continue the defence of the present social and economic structure of the country and the exploitation of the working class; their only difference from other sectors of the bourgeoisie lies in their marked tendency to want to strengthen the power of the church.

Because of the development of ideological parties typified by the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats, the 1950s marked a watershed in Chilean politics. The electoral and parliamentary manoeuvres and machinations, so characteristic of Congress and of Ibáñez during the 1950s when alliances and appointments were made out of expedience, were never to be repeated on quite the same scale. Unlike the Conservative, Liberal and Radical Parties, members of the Christian Democratic, Socialist and Communist Parties were not bound by personal, family or class ties, but by an expressed commitment to shared ideals. They attempted to appeal to the general public less by resorting to clientelism, and more by means of articulating a clear ideological vision of a more equalitarian society.

One of the most important differences between the pragmatic, parliamentary parties, whose intellectual origins were rooted in the nineteenth century, and the new ideological parties, lay in their interpretations of the 1925 Constitution, a subject that had been in the forefront of political discussion throughout the 1950s because of the struggles between Ibáñez and the Congress.

1. Jobet, *op. cit.*

The parliamentary parties fought to retain as far as possible parliamentary prerogatives, while both the FRAP and the PDC proposed strengthening the office of president, and at the same time, subordinating the president to the decisions taken by the party. Chilean professor, Bernardino Bravo Lira, said of this:

These ("ideological") parties developed an important sense of their own role. They are not promoted simply as one of many political groups but as movements responsible for founding a new order. As a result, they propose to subordinate the president to the party, and to transform the presidential election into a plebiscite, where instead of renovating simply the office of the Head of State, the electorate chose a party programme. In a word, their goal is not to govern within the established order, but to transform it: to establish a new form of party government, a regime where one party is in control, which has nothing to do with inter-party negotiations, and which sanctions the temporary or permanent ascendancy of one governing party.

Both ideological coalitions - Christian Democracy and the FRAP - went on to win power in the 1960s and 1970s, though neither succeeded in imposing their vision of party control over the presidents. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the ideological parties were in the ascendant from 1957 onwards. This is amply demonstrated by Bravo Lira in the diagrams reproduced below. (See Tables VII, V and VI).

The PDC's candidate, Eduardo Frei, outlined his programme in a radio speech on the 25th of July, 1957. He pledged support to the growing demand for electoral reform, proposed an agrarian reform, though without specifying the need for land distribution to the peasantry and his economic programme was notable for its vagueness, perhaps deliberate, since the PDC was trying to attract a very varied electorate. However, Frei's specific commitment to control inflation with monetary, fiscal and credit policies met with the

1. Bernadino Bravo Lira, op. cit., pp.71-72.

TABLE VII.51






TABLE VII.61



approval of the Liberal Party and El Mercurio. Indeed, it even merited some favourable comment from the ultra-reactionary El Diario Ilustrado, which went on to suggest that Frei combine tight monetary control with anti-communism.

In this way, a campaign to canvas support for Frei among the right was born. It proved more successful, however, inside the Liberal Party than the Conservative Party, whose leader, Juan Antonio Colomna, made no secret of his disapproval.¹ Nonetheless, the Liberals and Conservatives had undertaken to support a joint candidate, though choosing a suitable candidate with sufficiently wide appeal was proving a problem. Frei seemed an ideal compromise solution to some Liberals since, it was felt, he was close enough ideologically to the Right to be acceptable (Frei rather than the PDC as a whole) and yet, since he represented only a relatively small party, it would be possible for the Right to dictate policy without actually occupying the presidency. Frei's candidature was opposed by the distinguished Senator Raul Marin Balmaceda, reviving the secular - religious dichotomy within the Right. Raul Marin was speaking vigorously against the Liberals endorsing Frei, though he was expected to lose, at the party conference, when suddenly he collapsed and died. Out of respect for his memory, the Liberals first postponed a decision and then rejected support for Frei, so putting an end to the possibility of PDC - Right-wing alliance - at least for 1958.

The Formation of Todos en Contra de Alessandri (TOCOA)

In spite of the overall defeat of the parties and movements associated with Ibañismo the 1957 parliamentary elections hardly changed the balance of power inside Congress. The PAL managed to hold on to 13 of its 26 seats in the Chamber of Deputies a significant 'success' in view of the government's

1. See for example, the interview with Colomna, Vea, 29/8/1957. One of the prominent Liberal supporters was Osvaldo de Castro, who owned the anti-Ibáñez paper, El Debate.

unpopularity.¹ The composition of the Senate in particular was hardly altered since only 20 seats were renewed. (See Table VII.7)

TABLE VII.7

THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE SENATE, 1953-57

<u>PARTIES</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1957</u>
Liberal	11	10
Radical	10	9
FRAP	8	9
Conservative	7	6
National ¹	5	4
Agrario Laborists	2	4
Falange	1	2
MRI ²	1	1

1. The National Party was a right-wing party composed mainly of ex-members of the agrarian party of Jamie Larrain.

2. The MRI was a tiny independent ex-Ibáñista party, headed by Jorge Lavanderos.

The peculiarity of the 1957 Congressional elections in this respect did not pass unnoticed by Chilean analysts at the time; Ercilla said:

It would seem that the elections of the 3 March 1957 will go down in history as the first in which all the parties came out winners or nearly winners. In any case, there were no losers.²

Throughout 1957, with a seeming stalemate in Congress and with no initiatives forthcoming from the government, media attention focused on the presidential contest, made more exciting by the fact that it was far from clear who the eventual winner would be. A sudden by-election in Santiago on the 23 March

1. Pollsters predicted that the PAL would only retain 10 seats. Ercilla 6/3/1957.

2. Ercilla, 27/3/1957.

1958, just six months before the September presidential elections, changed that uncertainty completely.

The by-elections was caused by the sudden death of Liberal deputy Fernando Rojas Wolf, who had represented the 3rd District of Santiago, which was a significant seat to watch in order to monitor the swings of public opinion because of its social and occupational diversity. The 3rd District was made up of the communas of Providencia (upper-middle class residential), Las Condes (upper-middle class residential), Nuñoa (white-collar), San Miguel (an industrial belt and a FRAP stronghold), Puente Alto, La Granja and La Cisterna (white-collar-blue-collar, urban-rural mixed, and Pirque, La Florida and San Jose de Maipo (semi-rural). However, in March 1958, the by-election acquired the character of a pre-election plebiscite, since the four major presidential candidates each endorsed one of the runners and participated in the electioneering.¹

The idea of the by-election as a fore-runner to the presidential election was encouraged particularly by the Christian Democrats, since Frei's candidate Eduardo Simián Gallet of the National Party, was widely tipped to win. In fact, though, the by-election in the 3rd District had less of the makings of a plebiscite than at first appeared. Firstly, the district had a traditional bias to the right, and secondly, the Radical Party endorsed the candidature of a dissident Socialist, Juan Briones, thus engendering some degree of confusion in the electorate which may have affected adversely the FRAP's vote. In the event, the candidate of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, Enrique Edwards Orrego, won a clear majority.

1. On the by-election, see Hispanic American Report, March 1958, Volume XI No. 3., which contains a detailed report by Dr. J. Thompson; also El Mercurio, 24/3/1958.

TABLE VII.8

RESULTS OF THE BY-ELECTION IN THE 3RD
DISTRICT OF SANTIAGO, 23RD MARCH, 1958

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Parties</u>	<u>Vote</u>
Enrique Edwards	(Liberal and Conservative)	29,051
Eduardo Simian	(PDC and National)	23,564
Rene Aravena	(FRAP)	21,172
Juan Briones	(Radical)	8,358

Edwards had won by more than five thousand votes. Henceforth, Frei Allende and Bossay were aware that in order to reach the Moneda, the candidate they needed to beat was Alessandri. These three candidates thus concentrated their efforts on undermining his campaign and in the main refrained from attacking each other. Scarcely a week after the by-election, all political parties with parliamentary representation except the Liberals, Conservatives and the tiny MRI, formed the Bloque de Sanamiento Democratico or TOCOA (Todos en Contra de Alessandri) as the pact came to be known, with two declared aims: to dispatch an electoral reform and to legalise the Communist Party before September 1958. Both the reforms were put forward with the specific intention of reducing the possibility of Alessandri's victory, As political commentarist Luis Hernandez Parker said,

TOCOA - Todos en Contra de Alessandri - in the guise of a parliamentary alliance, is seeking real reforms which have long been desired by the individual parties within the pact. All the parties ... want to see a radical reform of the electoral law and all reject the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia in its present form. But it is also undoubtedly the case that this parliamentary bloc would never have been formed if the result in the 3rd District had been different¹

1. Ercilla, 2/4/1958

El Mercurio, Alessandri's chief backer, was concerned and indignant at the unexpected appearance of TOCOA and its efforts to isolate Alessandri from the crucial moderate and centrist voters, and in response claimed that such a reform would open the floodgates to a Marxist take-over.¹

The emergence of the TOCOA alliance altered the make-up of Congress, leaving the Liberals and Conservatives in a minority. Guillermo Perez de Arce of the National Party replaced Fernando Alessandri (Liberal) as President of the Senate, with Carlos Alberto Martinez (FRAP) as Vice-President, and in the Chamber of Deputies, Juen Luis Mauras (Radical) became President in place of Hector Correa Letelier (Conservative) with Juan De Dios Carmona (Falange) as Vice-President. The composition of the Senate was now as follows:

<u>TOCOA Parties</u>	<u>TABLE VII.9²</u>	<u>Opposition Parties</u>	
Chamber of Deputies			
Radical	37	Liberal	30
FRAP	17	Conservative	22
Christian Democratic	15	Independent	3
Agrario Laborista	11		
National	5		
Democratic	2		
Independents	5		
Senate			
Radical	9	Liberal	10
FRAP	9	Conservative	6
National	4	MRI	1
Agrario Laborista	3		
Christian Democratic	1		
Independents	2		

1. As examples, see El Mercurio, 29/3/1958; and its weekly commentary, La Semana Politica, 3/8/1958, 10/8/1958, 17/8/1958 and 24/8/1958.

2. Zig-Zag, 5/4/1958.

Even more surprising than the formation of TOCOA itself, however, was the cordial relationship which subsequently developed between the parliamentary bloc, and the government, or to put it in another way, between President Ibáñez and his most intractable critics. It is true the two reform bills were drafted and sponsored by TOCOA but nonetheless their success depended on government support. In one of the sudden changes of direction and language which characterized Ibáñez's long political career, after making use of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia apparently happily for almost six years, he requested its abrogation in Congress, saying, 'The Ley de Defensa de la Democracia has been described, with good reason, as a legislative assault on the principle of freedom of thought... Practice has revealed it to be a fiasco.'¹

Probable factors influencing Ibanez's decision to support the legislative initiative undertaken by TOCOA included: Ibanez's coolness towards the Right in the wake of the Kelly case,² amply illustrated by Volpone's vituperative attacks on leading Liberals and Conservatives throughout 1958.³ the President's subsequent attempt to reach an understanding with FRAP, an attempt which included offering the Ministry of the Interior to Baltazar Castro of the Partido del Trabajo in October 1957; Ibanez's basic hostility to any and all manifestations of Alessandrismo; and the President's gesture in April 1958, cancelling a long-awaited trip to the U.S. in protest at the decision of the U.S. Congress to reduce imports of Chilean copper, compounded for Chile by a general fall in international copper price (in January 1958 the price of copper fell to 25 cents a pound, the lowest since February 1953)⁴

1. Ercilla, 7/5/1958. Only a year previous to this, El Siglo had described Ibáñez's anti-communism as an 'obsession'. El Siglo, 22/5/1957.
2. See pp.260-2.
3. See La Nacion and Clarín throughout June and July 1958.
4. The proposed visit had initially been scheduled for November 1957, but was cancelled due to Eisenhower's ill-health. It would have been Ibañez's first visit north of the border.

Ibáñez's wish to go down in the history books as a president essentially concerned with extending democratic freedoms - to which many of his collaborators are witness - rather than an erstwhile dictator, democratically elected the second time around may also have played an important psychological role. The change in government policy - from close association with the right-wing parties to an unofficial understanding with the Centre-Left- was made possible by Ibáñez utter disregard for political parties. It is typical of political alignments in the Ibañez era that a Conservative Minister of the Interior, Abel Valdes, presided over the official re-entry of the Communist Party into political life.¹

On the other hand, from the point of view of Ibáñez's old adversaries in the Centre and Left, Ibañismo was now a dead issue electorally and politically and alliance could therefore be entered into with the government within necessarily compromising their integrity. From the time of its formation, the Bloque strove actively to retain the good-will of the President. Allende, for example, praised his decision not to visit the U.S.:

I have been an implacable enemy of the present regime, but I must recognise the noble - if late - gesture of the President in assuming a proud defence of Chilean copper, which has won him the unanimous support of the entire population.²

At the same time, strenuous efforts had to be made within TOCOA to prevent the right-wing of the Radical Party from trying to impeach another of Ibañez's ministers, Raul Rodriguez Lazo. This would most certainly have lost Ibañez's support and divided TOCOA itself. Indeed, it was widely interpreted as an attempt to do just that, and to drive the Radicals into the Alessandri camp.³

-
1. As might have been expected, Valdes was expelled from the Conservative Party.
 2. Ercilla, 23/4/1958.
 3. Ercilla, 21/5/1958.

Tensions were also reportedly caused within the Bloque by sectors within the Socialist Party, who interpreted TOCOA as bordering on the despised strategy, associated with the Communist Party, of alliance with the 'national bourgeoisie'. The Socialists were, in general, at pains to stress that the existence of the Bloque involved in no way programmatic compromises.

Although the Bloque succeeded in piloting an electoral reform through Congress and in legalising the Communist Party, it could not prevent Alessandri's victory. After the September elections, inevitably, such a disparate parliamentary bloc (the Christian Democratic Party, the National Party, the Radical Party, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Democratic Party and the Partido del Trabajo) collapsed.

Electoral Reform and the Abrogation of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia

Some parties within the Bloque were more committed to pushing through the electoral reform than in legalising the Communist Party. Basically, this was the position of the Christian Democrats, PAL and the National Party. In interviews with the press immediately after the formation of TOCOA, representatives of the centre parties, (including the Radical Party) drew special attention to the necessity of changing the electoral legislation, which would theoretically benefit all centre and left wing parties equally, while the legislation of the Communist Party would obviously be of most direct benefit to the FRAP.¹ However, during talks prior to its formation, Communist Orlando Millas had negotiated an agreement binding all parties to supporting both issues, by conceding, on behalf of the FRAP, that the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia be replaced by a fairly stiff Ley de Seguridad Interior. This

1. Vistazo, 1/4/1958.

was significant because an inability to reach agreement on the nature of the law to replace the Ley Maldita had paralysed efforts in the past to remove it from the statute book.

The electoral reform passed quickly through the Congress, despite the opposition of the Liberals and the Conservatives, and the new law appeared in the Diario Oficial of 31st May 1958 (no. 24, 058). Its main provisions were as follows:

1. The introduction of a single ballot, the cedula unica, printed by the government and replacing individual ballot papers produced by the various parties (this meant in practise that a completely secret ballot was possible for the first time in Chile).
2. Campaign offices and committees were henceforth to be closed 48 hours before a ballot taking place.
3. Possible prison sentences were introduced for the selling or buying of votes.
4. Fines or prison sentences were introduced for failing to register in the electoral register or for failing to vote.
5. The time limit for electoral campaigning was reduced to four months prior to the election.
6. Regional pacts between parties were made illegal, though national pacts (such as the FRAP) remained inside the law.
7. Electoral registration was to be possible up to 90 days before an election taking place.

More than anything else, these reforms constituted a modernisation of an antiquated, unjust and corrupt electoral system by removing some of the anomalies which had prevented real and genuinely free elections in the past. The long term implications of the reform were, however, enormous. Apart from reducing corrupt practices to a minimum, the reform also aimed at increasing the size of the electorate by increasing registration and making voting compulsory, and incorporating social sectors hitherto all but outside the political system itself, regardless of whether they were technically entitled to vote or not. Sections which were marginal to Chilean politics and mainstream social political organisations at this time could be found in both the cities' shanty-towns and in the country-side, since in general, understanding and faith in electoral

and parliamentary politics were restricted to upper and middle classes. Before the 1958 reform, the incorporation of lower income groups had been limited to politicised, class-conscious urban sectors in occupations where unionisation was possible. Nonetheless, the act did not put an end to the literacy qualification which continued to exclude a substantial proportion of the population and sustained the underlining elitism of Chile's political system. An illustration of this elitism was found immediately after the passing of the electoral reform in the ultra-conservative El Diario Ilustrado which proclaimed 'the right to vote is not a natural right.'¹

Before the new law was introduced, the electorate comprised no more than 20% of the population.² The reform was introduced too late to have any effect in the September elections, in terms of increased participation: in September 1958, Chile's registered voters totalled 1, 497,902 of which number 1,245,526 actually voted.³

The abrogation of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia proved more troublesome than the electoral reform. At the beginning of May 1958, Ibáñez had sent a bill to Congress which would legalise the Communist Party, but which, taken as a whole, was felt to constitute a more authoritarian and anti-liberal law than the despised Ley Maldita. For example, the new bill proposed making a criminal offence 'to spread by written word or word of mouth ideas and doctrines which tended towards reducing patriotic sentiment'.⁴ Another article of the bill gave the president the authority to declare political parties illegal. Ercilla described the proposed bill as a 'siamese twin' of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia⁵. Of all the 49 articles, only one was approved by the Congress,

-
1. El Diario Ilustrado, 25/5/1958.
 2. A good discussion of Chile's electoral system of the time is Ricardo Cruz-coke, Geografía Electoral de Chile, Ediciones del Pacífico, Santiago, 1952.
 3. Ercilla, 7/9/1958.
 4. Hispanic American Report, September 1958, Volume XI, No. 9.
 5. *ibid.*

the article referring to the legalisation of the Communist Party. At the end of July, however, a settlement was reached with the executive, the basis of which was a straight-forward substitution of the Ley Maldita for the pre-1948 Ley de la Seguridad Interior, which Ibáñez was on record as criticising. (This had been the basis also for agreement within the Bloque itself).

Of all Santiago's daily papers, only El Mercurio and El Diario Ilustrado criticised the measure. El Diario Ilustrado criticised 'the baffling fickleness of the President'¹ and El Mercurio called it 'protection for the secret activities of the Communists'.² El Mercurio was scandalised even further by the abrogation of the Koch-Yanez circular which occurred simultaneously, and which it mourned as a bulwark against 'trade union terrorism'³. The general reaction was more favourable, however La Nacion's comment was typical; the abrogation was praised as 'one of the most positive achievements of the President. With the abrogation of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, an unpleasant chapter of our civic life has been closed'.⁴

The Presidential Elections, September 1958

Hard on the heels of the legalisation of the Communist Party came the presidential elections. Surprisingly, the four major candidates, who each represented fairly distinct and definable socio-economic sectors supported by the weight of established party machines were joined by a fifth. Antonio Zamorano, an ex-Catholic priest who claimed to have been unfrocked because of his campaigns on behalf of the poor in Catapilco, near San Felipe, in the traditional latifundia area of Aconcagua, and who was then elected deputy

-
1. Quoted Ercilla, 6/8/1958
 2. El Mercurio, 1/8/1958.
 3. ibid.
 4. La Nacion, 3/8/1958.

representing Valparaiso in March 1957, had gained some prominence nationally when he undertook the defence of the President in the Chamber of Deputies during the Kelly Case.¹ However, his candidature was regarded as somewhat of a joke, taken only a little more seriously when Zamorano, whose campaign consisted of a nebulous series of promises to the poor, received the support of the powerful figure of Darío Sainte Marie through the newspaper Clarín.² Estimates of the total vote he would receive hovered around 40,000 and proved accurate; he polled 41,268, slightly more than the difference between Alessandri and Allende. After the elections, rumours were rife that Zamorano had been financed by Alessandri supporters with the aim of winning enough votes in the country-side from potential Allende supporters to prevent the FRAP from winning. Obviously such allegations are difficult to verify absolutely.

After the Liberals and Conservative parties failed to endorse Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei's effort to reach the Moneda, the Conservatives decided to offer their support to Jorge Alessandri,³ and were quickly followed by the Liberals. Jorge Alessandri, brother of Liberal senators Fernando and Eduardo and son of ex-President Arturo, has been Minister of the Treasury during the right-wing period of Gabriel González Videla's presidency, and rather than any political party, he represented Chile's industrial bourgeoisie. Formerly President of the business interest association La Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, Alessandri had a reputation for efficiency and honesty. The Liberals and Conservatives were shrewd enough to realize that Alessandri's appeal went beyond entrepreneurial and management groups, and during the campaign his image as an 'independent' above party politics was stressed. It

1. See pp. 260-2.
2. Darío Sainte Marie's brother, Osvaldo, was one of the ministers impeached following the escape of Guillermo Kelly. This may have had something to do with his attitude.
3. Alessandri had been elected Senator for Santiago in March 1957.

was well known, for example, that Alessandri had been rather luke-warm about Ibáñez's stabilisation programme, and, as Las Noticias de Ultima Hora implicitly recognised, he represented the benign or 'acceptable' face of capitalism:

He is the sort of businessman who thinks that a worker is more than a simple machine.¹

During the campaign, comparisons were made between Ibáñez and Alessandri for which there was some basis. Despite party backing, both represented the idea of the 'honest' caudillo and the victory of both underlined the shaky foundations on which the party system rested. Alessandri encouraged the notion that ex-Ibanez supporters had passed to his camp; after he was elected to the Senate, he said to journalists: 'The votes that Ibáñez received are still around, and I have got them'² He had also inherited the support of some prominent ex-Ibañistas including María de la Cruz, Ramon Alvarez Goldsack of MONAP and Arturo Olavarria Bravo.

The difference between Alessandri and Ibáñez were just as important, however. Firstly, Alessandri's appeal, though not restricted to his own class, was more limited than that of Ibáñez: in 1952; Ibáñez had almost won a clear majority in a four way race, whereas in 1958 Alessandri was only just the victor. In addition, Alessandri, though only second generation Chilean, and son of rabble-rouser Arturo Alessandri, was accepted by, and was part of Chile's reduced economic and social elite something Ibáñez could never have achieved - and in all probability would never have wanted to.³

Chile's two centre parties also contested the election. Eduardo Frei stood with the support of his own party, the Christian Democratic Party, the PAL,

1. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 7/3/1957.
2. Ercilla, 12/2/1958.
3. Ibáñez's interviews with Luis Correa Prieto are very revealing in this respect. He returns time and again to the mutual distrust and dislike between himself and the oligarchy. Ibáñez described himself as a man of the middle class. Correa Prieto, op. cit., p.178

and the National Party. Ideologically Frei articulated 'progressive' Catholic social thought, though he insisted that he did not represent an attempt to increase the political influence of the Catholic Church, and in a speech in July 1958, described the religious question in Chile as 'settled'. His campaign was the climax of a period of rapid expansion of the Falange throughout the 1950s, but having lost the support of the right-wing parties, he was given little chance of success.

The campaign of the Radical candidate, Luis Bossay, was based on the Radical Party's gains in Congress in March 1957, when it polled nearly 190,000 votes. This was important psychologically since whichever candidate were to win the presidency, Radical Party's 36 deputies and Senators still left it the largest single party in Congress.¹ The Radicals' gains at the expense of Ibañismo in 1957, however, proved very misleading and the party finished a poor fourth.² Not only were the Radicals squeezed between the Right and the Left by Alessandri and Allende, but the deep divisions from which it had suffered during the presidency of Gonzalez Videla also returned with renewed vigour.

At the XX Party Convention in June 1957, the Radicals had endorsed both the candidature of Bassay, whose strength lay in the youth sector of the party and the asambleas rather than the within the party leadership in Santiago, and also a leftward-leaning programme. The Convention approved a resolution calling for the defence and extension of public freedoms and trade union rights, reaffirmed its opposition to the Ibañez administration, and proclaimed its intention to:

1. This was proved to be the case in 1961 when Alessandri invited the Radical Party into the Cabinet.
2. The 'plebiscite' in the by elections for the 3rd district of Santiago in March 1958 was correct in the respect that the candidate of the Radical Party, Juan Briones, ran a poor fourth.

intensify the permanent struggle to implement such principles of the Left as the just redistribution of wealth and the defence of the economic interests of sectors dependent on wages and salaries. It is in this that our programme of action is founded. We stand for a decided and unswerving advance in terms of national policies... The Radical Party will implement its policies and work in parliament independently or in an understanding with those parties who coincide with its fundamental programmatic goals.¹

In mid-1957, the Radical Party Convention, therefore, was looking for an understanding with the FRAP. However, there was strong pressure from the right-wing party alike represented by Julio Duran, Alfredo Duhalde, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla and Isidoro Muñoz Alegria among others - to come to an understanding with the Liberals and the Conservatives, which meant in practice a withdrawal of Bossay's candidature in favour of that of Alessandri, whom they all but publically endorsed.² On the other side, some radicalised sectors of the Left, seeing that Bossay's chance of victory were slight, came out openly in favour of Allende, including some of Bossay's erstwhile allies in the Juventud of the party. Victor Barberis, ex-President of the FECH, formed the Partido Radical Intransigente Anti-Imperialista in February 1958. He explained:

We had faith in Bossay ... but we have lost that faith, because he has tied himself utterly and without a struggle to the Right of the Party.³

The new splinter group also called for Bossay's withdrawal, but this time in favour of the FRAP.⁴

Such were these disagreements and internal divisions -widely reported in the press - that Bossay apparently came close to standing down after the Party's

1. El Siglo, 30/6/1957.
2. See Vistazo, 3/9/1957 for a discussion of the pressures from the Right of the party on Bossay.
3. Vistazo, 10/2/1957.
4. Barberis later joined the Socialist Party along with a steady stream of other members of the Youth Section of the Radical Party in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

disastrous defeat in the third district of Santiago.¹ Later, Bossay estimated that the party's internal divisions had cost him about 15,000 votes.²

Senator Salvador Allende represented the predominantly Marxist FRAP. Despite the Communist Party's behind-the-scenes effort to negotiate an agreement with the Radical Party - to the indignation of many Socialists - the FRAP fought a generally cohesive and unified campaign and contested the election on the issues of agrarian reform, increased taxes on foreign-owned mines, a rapid expansion of welfare services, and a radical redistribution of national income. The anti-inflationary stabilisation programme of 1956 and 1957 and the Klein Saks Mission, which were broadly associated with Alessandristas if not Alessandri himself, may have benefited Allende indirectly, by indicating the bankruptcy of traditional laissez-faire capitalism as a means of solving Chile's economic problems. He was also able to exploit a generally felt resentment of Chile's dependence on the U.S., particularly with respect to copper sales. The level of dissatisfaction was symbolised by the President's cancellation of his tour in April. Allende promised to restore diplomatic and trading links with the Soviet Union in a search for new markets.

The Socialists and Communists had hoped that the Electoral Reform would increase FRAP's chance of victory, but in the event Allende ran a very close second. However, the Electoral Reform may have assisted the FRAP's campaign in the central valley provinces where the Left did well, often winning votes that had gone to Ibáñez in 1952.

1. La Nacion, 3/4/1958

2. Interview, August, 1983.

TABLE VII.8¹THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1958

Provinces	Alessandri	Bossay	Zamorano	Allende	Frei
Tarapaca	3.558	3.859	529	8.299	4.922
Antofagasta	5.670	5.866	1.083	14.954	6.567
Atacama	2.533	5.423	247	6.167	3.621
Coquimbo	10.460	8.886	1.280	14.283	7.952
Aconcagua	10.018	4.233	1.530	7.290	5.953
Valparaiso	35.680	17.192	5.727	26.611	29.913
Santiago	151.797	51.984	11.194	121.452	91.305
O'Higgins	16.753	4.517	2.175	14.537	8.426
Colchagua	13.556	3.435	477	6.190	4.379
Curico	6.509	2.458	704	6.067	3.107
Talca	9.673	4.163	7.206	8.584	6.337
Maule	5.823	4.551	830	2.749	3.375
Linares	10.674	4.044	4.156	7.927	5.912
Nuble	11.988	11.164	811	10.947	11.290
Concepcion	17.418	13.091	624	34.594	18.154
Arauco	1.932	3.125	61	6.258	1.616
Bio-Bio	7.660	4.670	200	7.360	3.611
Malleco	10.133	5.592	187	7.485	4.951
Cautin	21.228	8.979	920	11.921	12.587
Valdivia	12.387	6.791	637	11.559	7.545
Osorno	8.318	5.524	156	5.542	2.770
Llanquihue	7.430	4.304	219	4.956	6.075
Chiloe	6.146	4.621	157	3.689	1.559
Aisen	1.229	1.027	44	1.261	953
Magallanes	1.285	2.791	151	6.708	2.857
Total	389.948	192.110	41.305	356.499	255.777

TABLE VII.9¹THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1958

Province	% of Total Vote				
	Alessandri	Bossay	Zamorano	Allende	Frei
Tarapaca	16.4	17.8	2.4	38.2	22.7
Antofagasta	16.4	16.9	3.1	43.2	19.0
Atacama	14.1	29.1	1.4	34.2	20.1
Coquimbo	24.0	20.4	3.0	32.8	18.3
Aconcagua	34.2	14.5	5.2	24.9	20.4
Valparaiso	30.7	14.8	4.9	22.9	25.4
Santiago					
O'Higgins	35.8	9.7	4.6	31.1	18.0
Colchagua	47.9	12.1	1.7	21.9	15.5
Curico	34.3	13.0	3.7	32.0	16.4
Talca	26.8	11.4	19.8	23.5	17.5
Maule	33.1	25.9	4.7	15.7	19.2
Linares	32.1	12.2	12.5	23.9	17.8
Nuble	25.6	23.9	1.8	23.4	24.1
Concepcion	20.4	15.3	0.7	40.6	21.3
Arauco	14.7	23.8	0.4	47.6	12.3
Bio-Bio	32.1	19.6	0.8	30.8	15.1
Malleco	35.4	19.5	0.7	26.1	17.3
Cautin	37.5	15.9	1.6	21.0	22.2
Valdivia	31.4	17.2	1.6	29.3	19.1
Osorno	36.8	24.5	0.7	24.5	12.3
Llanquihue	33.2	19.2	1.0	18.1	27.1
Chileo	37.5	28.2	0.9	22.5	9.5
Aisen	26.3	22.0	0.9	27.8	20.9
Magallanes	9.1	19.9	1.1	47.8	20.3
Total	31.56%	28.85%	3.34%	28.85%	20.70%

Conclusion

The elections in September 1958 confirmed some political trends noted earlier. The drift of the peasant votes away from the parties of the Right in those areas dominated economically, socially and culturally by latifundia and the landowners, which was in part responsible for Ibañez's resounding victory in 1952, continued. The introduction of the secret ballot was undoubtedly the single most significant factor in breaking the political monopoly of the Right in the Central Valley provinces. The new Christian Democratic Party was the first to appreciate fully the importance of the peasantry who henceforth could no longer be ignored. On the other hand, personalist caudillista leadership absolutely independent of the political parties was now a phenomenon of the past. Populist rhetoric, however, was to be found in all the major parties.

Ibañismo had collapsed as a viable political movement long before the 1958 elections. Perhaps for this reason the sitting government did not endorse openly any of the candidates.¹ Two Ibañistas - Colonel(R) Abdon Parra and Colonel(R) Benjamin Videla - both tried unsuccessfully to launch themselves as 'independent' candidates with the aim of inheriting Ibañismo only to discover that it no longer existed. By 1958 the Ibañista parties and movements which Ibañez had helped to create then helped to disintegrate by simply ignoring had disappeared. Members of Ibañista parties and 'independent' Ibañistas could be found in parties throughout the political spectrum - though not in the Radical Party. Similarly, the votes of Ibañez's supporters were dispersed between Alessandri, Frei and Allende. Although many disaffected Radicals had voted for Ibañez in 1952, Bossay benefitted little from Ibañismo's demise in 1958.

1. Ibañez was rumoured to prefer the candidature of his old adversary Salvador Allende.

The disappointing result for Bossay marked the definite decline in the Radical Party's electoral fortunes, its parliamentary majority notwithstanding. In its place came the mass movements of the Centre and Left, the Christian Democratic Party and the FRAP. The Electoral Reform operated to the benefit of both, but the enormous increase in the Christian Democratic vote was the most important indication for the future.

Nonetheless, victory went to Alessandri. The 1958 elections reveal a remarkably resilient political Right in Chile. Alessandri was the first representative of the Liberal and Conservative Parties to be elected President since his father Arturo was returned to the Moneda for the second time in 1932, and in order to achieve this, his 'independence', austerity, modesty, honesty and sense of duty were exploited to the full. Alessandri's appeal went beyond the landowners and upper-middle class, and was indicative of the continuence of traditionalism in Chile.

CONCLUSION

It could be argued that, before 1973, political scientists tended to overstate the continuity of parliamentary procedures and the stability of Chilean politics. In retrospect, this seems to have been on the one hand the result of a certain degree of complacency vis-a-vis the limitations of the democratic system in Chile - on the part of academics and the Chilean political elite alike - which were especially notable before 1964, and on the other, a failure to take sufficient account of the personalist and populist currents in Chilean politics upon which Ibañismo drew. It was exacerbated by a fairly general ignorance of the 1950s, a crucial decade for understanding Chilean politics, not least in terms of party organisation, the framework of government and opposition relations, popular mobilization and participation and economic development.

Ibañismo appeared on the political scene in 1950-52 with all the pretensions of a reformist, progressive movement. In the Introduction, I attempted to demonstrate how party politics at this time was entering a period of crisis and loss of legitimacy. The Radical Party had dominated Chilean politics since 1938, initially in alliance with the Left, and had presided over the institutionalisation of the party system after the personalism and factionalism of Alessandrismo and Ibañismo in the 1920s and 1930s. During the Radical period of government, the Chilean economy also recovered from the disruption brought on by the Great Depression, and industrialisation was undertaken under the protective mantle of the state. Divisions on both the Left and the Right made the Radical Party's hegemony easier.

The alliance between the Radicals and the Left reached a definitive end in 1948, with the passing of the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia, marking the exhaustion of the Radicals as an innovative party of government. Gathering dissatisfaction with the Radical Party among its erst-while supporters, principally middle sectors and white collar employees, was less the result of a sharp worsening of their economic situation, and more a product of the opportunism, bureaucratisation and even corruption associated with the government and with governmental institutions. It became a crisis of the system rather than of one party.

Populist movements in Latin America have emerged out of just such a stalemate in traditional politics. The middle sectors were especially vulnerable to the emotional, rather simplistic appeals of ex-dictator-President Ibáñez as a result of their disillusionment with the Radical Party while the disarray of the Left wing parties meant Ibáñez was also able to appeal to the urban and rural working class. At the same time, populist movements, because of their lack of formal organisation and vague ideology, have also acted as a vehicle for diverse and heterogeneous groups whose chances of winning influence and power in the normal course of a democracy are minimal. In 1952, these included fractions of the ex-Nacista and nacionalista movements, the Agrario Laborista Party representing some of the non-latifundia southern agricultural interests, retired military officers, Arab-Chileans, and sections of the authoritarian Right (Estanquero). For the Popular Socialists, populism appeared a way of recovering their preëminence in working class politics. In another very real sense, the PSP's endorsement of Ibáñez was an attempt by the party to recover its populist discourse of the early days of the Socialist Party under the leadership of Marmaduke Grove.

Populism tends to be defined as either an ideology or as a movement, that is in terms of its social composition. The later is more common. It is usual to locate populism as 'an intermediate stage in the progression from a traditional to a modern society'.¹ With reference to its social composition, the outstanding feature of populism is its cross-class nature; arising from this, populism questions the legitimacy of class conflict and poses instead a dichotomy between the nation-state and the outside world, characterised as a (usually imperialist) oppressor in much the same way as Marxism characterises the dominant class.

Populism in Chile made temporary allies of the anti-imperialist, programmatic Left and a neo-fascist, hispanophile extreme Right by appealing to the nationalist sentiments of both. Chile was perceived not only as economically dependent on U.S. investments and markets, but also as culturally oppressed by U.S. materialistic, protestant values.

Robert Dix, in a discussion of theories and typologies of populism, offers the useful distinction between authoritarian populism and democratic populism. Authoritarian populism, according to Dix, is characterised by an absence of intellectual participation in the leadership of the movement as compared with democratic populism, by a traditionalist value-system rather than a modernising approach, and as an corollary of these by allocating a role to the masses which is 'to acclaim rather than to participate'.²

He goes on to explain the distinction in the following way:

-
1. Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London, 1977.
 2. Robert Dix, 'Populism: Authoritarian and Democratic', Latin American Research Review, Vol. XX, No.2, 1985, pp.29-52

Authoritarian populism tends to eschew elaborated ideologies and concrete programmes; the parties embodying the democratic variety have tended to pay considerable attention to them, although remaining broadly pragmatic in expression and implementation. While the authoritarian populists have stressed the negative, the democratic populists have placed somewhat more emphasis on the positive. While the former have promised immediate gains for the masses, the later have paid more attention to structural reforms. While nationalism has been a minor element in authoritarian populism... democratic populism has been explicitly anti-imperialist especially at the outset.¹

Dix locates Ibañismo within authoritarian populism, despite its formal adherence to the rules of the democratic game. While this would seem on the whole to be correct, it would be wrong to accept the implication that authoritarian populism is in essence always conservative and non-ideological. The entire basis of the PSP support for Ibáñez was constructed around the argument that a degree of authoritarianism was necessary to implement a socialist transformation in areas of the Third World like Chile, where democratic values and institutions had been usurped by the oligarchy.

Ideological currents which helped to shape and influence Ibañismo as a populist movement, particularly in its formative phase, were:-

1. Peronism. Peronism proved particularly attractive to the ideological elements within Ibañismo - both to the Popular Socialists, to whom it served as an example of a successfully mobilising mass movement, distinguished by its anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical tone, and to the nationalists within or near the PAL who admired Peron's anti-communism and recalled with nostalgia his pro-Axis foreign policy during the Second World War. One very important factor to which less attention was paid at the time, however, was that populism in Argentina

1. op.cit., p.41.

was created on the basis of an economic boom, with Argentine exports fetching optimum prices on the world market. Redistributive policies were much less a feature of Peronism in the latter part of the regime as economic growth slowed down considerably. The Chilean economy, especially in the 1950s, was in no sense comparable with that of Argentina, making much less possible the simultaneous satisfaction of contradictory sectoral interests which characterised Argentine populism.

2. Anti-colonialism. Members of both the Popular Socialist Party and the PAL were in varying degrees sympathetic to national liberation struggles and the process of de-colonialisation in the Third World. It is indicative that the Popular Socialist Party was one of the few non-Asian parties to attend the 1953 Conference of Asian Socialist Parties in Rangoon. The nationalism of Colonel Abdul Nassar in Egypt was also a potent symbol of anti-imperialism and reform, and reinforced the idea of the Armed Forces as a potentially progressive force.¹ The presence of Chileans of Arab descent within the Ibañista movement did not go unnoticed in the press in Chile, and in fact allegations were widespread that Ibáñez's presidential campaign was financed by Arab businessmen.² In general, for these groups, Ibañismo represented an attempt to implement a specifically 'Third World' approach to Chile's problems of under-development through a combination of populism, socialism, and nationalism.

3. Authoritarianism/Integralism. Some groups within Ibañismo were influenced by the nationalist, authoritarian, catholic regimes in the Iberian penninsular, and hoped to cast Ibañismo in a similar mould.

1. C. Almeyda, op.cit.

2. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Ibáñez and the Arab-Chilean community see, D. Bray, Chilean Politics During the Second Ibáñez Administration, op.cit.

Such ideas were to be found principally within the vocal but marginal nationalist groups, most prominent being the Estanqueristas, who were attracted by corporatist political structures as a way to replace the party system and control the trade union movement, and by the authoritarian, anti-liberal, and anti-democratic character of the Franco and the Salazar regimes.

4. Nationalism. A diffuse nationalism characterised the Ibañista movement as a whole, integrating both its third world and integralist elements.

Comparisons between Ibañismo and populist movements abroad, either in Latin America or beyond, however, were made by relatively few Ibañistas. On the whole, with the exception of sectors of the PSP, intellectuals were not prominent within the movement and it did not have a particularly ideological character. Ibáñez himself was partly responsible for this, as he seems to have understood little and sympathised less with intellectual reasoning, and, as President, preferred to put his trust as far as possible in his old collaborators. Perhaps the most important effect of the ideological content of Ibañismo was the extent to which it complemented the dichotomy between president and parliament present in Chilean politics since Independence, and reinforced the demand for strong executive powers to curb the 'excesses' of the party system:

It is nonetheless true that Ibáñez's own appeal to the majority of the electorate was overwhelmingly personalist and non-ideological. His successful candidature in 1952 has been variously described as an 'emotional phenomenon'¹, a 'spontaneous populist movement'², a 'spiritual

1. Alejandro Hales, interview with the author, May 1983.

2. Oscar Waiss, interview with the author, September 1984.

posture',¹ and the result of a 'subconscious phenomenon deep-rooted in the collective [national] soul'.² It was perceptively summed up by Alfonso Stephens as 'the political expression of apoliticism'.³ In 1952, Ibáñez appeared almost as a miracle worker, and his greatest assets were his image as incorruptible, and his heartfelt antipathy to the Radical Party.⁴ These were both symbolised by Ibáñez's electoral motif which was a broom (to sweep away the 'orgy of corruption' of the Radical Party's period in government).⁵ Instead, Ibáñez promised 'to reestablish a sense of public morality' in politics.⁶

Despite his personal popularity, however, Ibáñez's near majority in a fourway contest in September 1952 proved only an ephemeral victory. There were three major reasons for this: the heterogeneity of the movement itself; the strength of the opposition and the resilience of the party system; and the attitude of Ibáñez himself.⁷

As early as March 1953, Ibañismo had disintegrated into warring factions, and was unable to present a united front for the congressional elections of that month. Instead, three separate lists were drawn up. These were as follows:

1. The Alianza Nacional del Pueblo (ANAP). Made up of the 'ideological' component of Ibañismo, the Popular Socialist Party and the PAL. Both

1. Maria de la Cruz, Ercilla, 23/12/1952.

2. R. Montero Moreno, op.cit., p.139.

3. A. Stephens, op.cit., p.7.

4. R. Montero wrote: 'Ibáñez became almost a sort of panacea, the antidote for everything wrong with the country', op.cit., p.146.

5. This was reportedly Ibáñez's own description. E. Würth Rojas, op.cit., p.229.

6. op.cit., p.229-30.

7. Anibal Pinto, in Chile, un caso de desarrollo frustrado, op.cit., adds that the deterioration in the economic situation after 1953 also contributed to the failure of Ibañismo. pp.325-6.

these parties consistently argued that a programme of government action should be drawn up in line with the electoral documents drawn up by their own parties.

2. The Federacion de Fuerzas Ibañistas (FENAFUIB), a personalist organisation formed by Maria de la Cruz after her election to the Senate in January 1953. Like Maria de la Cruz herself, FENAFUIB was distinguished by its outspoken opposition to socialism and the Popular Socialist Party.

3. The Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo (MONAP). This grouped many of the independent Ibañistas under the leadership of Retired Colonel Ramón Alvarez Goldsack. It attracted those Ibañistas who opposed the 'politisation' of Ibañismo.

After the Congressional elections, in which the Ibañistas failed to win control of Congress, it was suggested that the fundamental reason why three Ibañista lists were presented - the cause of the failure, that is, - was because Ibañez refused to interfere personally owing to his rigid interpretation of the constitution and the separation of powers. This was not exactly the case, however. As early as October 1952, Zig-Zag reported that efforts were being made to create a single Ibañista party 'with a programme and doctrine that will serve as an endorsement for the new President',¹ and, even more significantly, La Nación exhorted the Ibañistas towards unity throughout February 1953, and reported Ibañez's active involvement in efforts to draw up a single list of candidates.² Until March 1953, the administration was able to retain the initiative thanks only to the disarray of the defeated opposition parties. Such

1. Zig-Zag, 20/9/1952.

2. La Nación, 3/2/1953.

was the size of Ibáñez's victory, that 'there virtually did not exist a political opposition to the Presidency'¹ between September 1952 and March 1953. Once the opposition had re-grouped, however, the deep divisions, always present in Ibañismo, were simply made more obvious. The organic weakness of Ibañismo was exacerbated in government by the lack of expertise on the part of most of Ibáñez's supporters, and the opportunism, excesses, ambitions and corruption of others.²

The rebirth of the opposition dates from Ibañismo's failure to secure an absolute majority in Congress in 1953. Initially, in disarray, the opposition in Congress formed a united bloc to mobilise against any anti-democratic tendencies within the government. Not only was the broadly-based Frente Civico suspicious of Ibáñez's relationship with the Armed Forces, and the support for the Government from avowedly neo-fascist groups, but it was also hostile to the philosophy of the 'official' Ibañista party, the PAL. 'Functional democracy' was interpreted quite rightly as an apology for corporatism, and the party scarcely masked its approval of the authoritarian dictatorships of General Franco in Spain, Salazar in Portugal and Perón in Argentina.

Once again, however, the authoritarian-parliamentary dichotomy proved not to be necessarily identical to a conservative-reformist one. Take for example, a speech by Liberal senator Raul Marín Balmaceda, in defence of Chile's parliamentary institutions in which he said:

1. Topaze, 14/11/1952.

2. While much was made of the corruption which accompanied the second Ibáñez administration, in all fairness it should be pointed out that, according to Anibal Pinto, editor of Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, the newspaper responsible for the denunciation of so many of the Ibañistas, the administration was certainly no more corrupt than the previous one and possibly less so.

I find myself in complete agreement with the honourable senator Izquierdo, in thinking that it is an error for universal suffrage to be the basis of government.¹

It was views such as this, expressed in Congress and in the press, which prevented the Popular Socialists from joining the Frente Civico after leaving the government.

Nonetheless, the opposition to the Ibáñez government did gradually take on a progressive and mobilising character. This was accentuated during the right-wing period of the administration after 1955, when the Conservatives and Liberals lent conditional support to the government on the basis of the anti-inflationary programme. It had, however, begun earlier, with the mobilisation of the trade union movement, the student organisations (mainly university students but also school-children), journalists and the press on behalf of the Frente Civico. Opposition to any sign of militarism was especially marked. The mass demonstrations also served to indicate that the operation of democracy in Chile was more complex than the Ibañistas has assumed - democracy was indeed limited, but it seemed to be preferred to any proposed authoritarian or corporatist structures, at least by organised interest groups. Popular participation in government was significantly increased by the end of the administration with the legalisation of the Communist Party, the Electoral Reform Law, and the formation of two mass, mobilising electoral movements, the left-wing Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), and the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

A third important reason for Ibañismo's rapid decline was the personality of Ibáñez himself. While almost without exception, Ibáñez

1. Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias, Cámara de Senadores, 1957, 11/8/1955. Marín goes on to propose 'government by the best', a narrow ruling clique, though in theory, drawn from all sectors of society.

has been described as charming, thoughtful and honest by his bibliographers, family, friends and acquaintances, he seems to have possessed almost two distinct personas, a private and a public one.¹

Some of his bibliographers have suggested that Ibañez ran for the presidency in 1952 in a bid to gain historical recognition for the achievements of his first administration;² others have attributed it to Ibañez's excessive desire for power.³ Whatever the reason, it would seem that by 1952 he was ill-equipped to play the authoritarian dominating role as President which he had envisaged for himself. This was partly due to his advancing age (he was over 70 when he became President), to his inability or unwillingness to master the increased complexity of government since the 1920s, and to the lack of coordination on the part of the Ibañista parties.

However, it is difficult to escape the impression that Ibañez did not take every aspect of his second administration seriously enough. This is quite a grave accusation, but, for example, no other explanation which is adequate can be found for the frequent - and unnecessary - changes in Cabinet personnel and orientation, which severely disrupted the workings of government and created a climate of unease. Nor is this solely a judgement made with hindsight; Las Noticias de Ultima Hora described Ibañez as a 'complacent spectator rather than the arbiter of power'.⁴ Ibañez was also distinguished by his unpredictability ('more than discreet, he [was] impenetrable', according to Würth Rojas⁵).

1. Ibañez's name is remembered with perhaps surprising warmth given his reputation for intrigue and his image as a strong man. Even many of his old adversaries speak of him with affection.
2. R. Montero, op.cit.
3. E. Würth Rojas, op.cit.
4. Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 4/5/1955.
5. E. Würth Rojas, op.cit., p.265.

These factors, coupled with his absolute refusal to delegate authority either to organisations or to individuals,¹ were to a great extent responsible for the uncertainty and instability which characterised government under Ibáñez.

Any overall assessment of the second Ibáñez administration is generally negative - a capricious, even vacillating President, institutional instability, undistinguished politicians, economic crisis, inflation and even corruption are the usual themes. Yet it would be unfair not to draw attention to some of the positive aspects of the period also. These included the creation of the Banco de Estado, the creation of the Ministry of Mining and the Department of Copper, the establishment of a minimum peasant wage, the educational law of 1955 (the Ley Herrera) giving impetus to the development of primary schools, and the CORFO-funded sugar refinery, the Compañía Refinería de Azúcar de Vina del Mar (CRAV). Alejandro Hales went so far as to describe Ibáñez as 'desarrollista' when discussing the social developments of the period.²

Ibáñez seems to have paid most consistent attention to foreign affairs, however, and in this area, if in no other, a line of continuity with the first administration can be traced.³ Indeed, Ibáñez's commitment to Latin-Americanism and continental solidarity constituted a fundamental attraction for the nacionalistas, the PSP and the PAL. Expectations were therefore high in 1952 that Ibáñez would embark upon an anti-imperialist foreign policy and one that was aimed at promoting

1. According to Oscar Waiss, Ibáñez's attitude to politics was one of a patrón de fundo (Interview, September, 1984).

2. Interview, May 1983.

3. Javier Lira, member of the PAL and ambassador to Italy in the 1950s, said that Ibáñez was preoccupied with international affairs throughout the life-time of the government. (Interview, May 1983).

Latin American economic unity. Shortly after Ibáñez took office the Ibañista newspaper, Prensa Libre, wrote:

After a long sleep, Indo America is beginning to waken, and its awakening has been abrupt. After long years of living in an abject state of colonialism, despite the fact that the majority of our nations have long obtained their independence, the children of our America have begun to free themselves from the claws of Yankee imperialism.¹

Populism and anti-imperialism in neighbouring Bolivia was an important influence on the orientation of Chilean foreign policy in the initial months after Ibáñez's election, perhaps more so even than Peronism.²

Ibáñez's first Foreign Minister, Arturo Olavarría Bravo, was reputed to be orienting Chile's foreign policy towards the construction of a 'Third Front', combining Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.³

At the same time, however, the opposition was seized with the fear that Ibáñez would involve Chile in an alliance with the populist regimes of Argentina and Bolivia which would benefit the suspected sub-imperialist ambitions of Perón. Congress's refusal to ratify the Chilean-Argentine Treaty of Economic Unity in 1953 was a reflection of this fear, which was inflamed by the syncophancy of certain prominent Ibañistas, notably Senator María de la Cruz, towards Perón during his visit in February 1953.

In the event, Ibáñez's foreign policy proved nowhere near as radical as his supporters hoped or the opposition feared. He disappointed many

1. Prensa Libre, 2/12/1952.

2. For Javier Lira, Bolivia was 'the symbol, the key... which Chile will someday use to make Chilean copper truly Chilean'. Prensa Libre, 10/11/1952. He was referring to the nationalisation of the mines in Bolivia.

3. Ercilla, 30/12/1952. He was also reported to be involved in plans for an Economic Conference of the Underdeveloped Countries in Chile which did not come to fruition.

of his supporters by not following through the anti-imperialist, Third Worldist rhetoric of the first months in power, while at the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Relations continued to protect some Chilean interests effectively, especially in the Antarctic where territory was disputed with Argentina.

Nonetheless, Ibáñez's bequeathed to his successor the important legacy of much-improved relations with neighbouring countries. His visit to Bolivia - the first by a Chilean president in the twentieth century - did much to heal the bitterness between the two countries dating back to the War of the Pacific in 1879, and improved relations with Argentina did not end with the fall of Perón but continued after his downfall.

Postscript. Nacionalismo: From Allende to Pinochet

If the government of General Ibáñez is a failure... the nation will hope for no more from the democratic regime... It will look for a different sort of political regime, or it will fall prey to anarchy, dictatorship or caudillismo.¹

It is certainly true that, following their own particular failure to win influence in the 1950s, the anti-democratic nacionalistas abandoned the kind of 'entryism' they had practised with Ibáñez. Instead of trying to win mass electoral support, such movements concentrated for the most part on recruiting from within elite organisations and the universities, and also at establishing a working relationship with the conservative, traditional wing of the Catholic Church opposed to the Church's increasing concern with social and economic justice after the second Vatican Council.² At the same time,

1. Estanquero, 29/1/1954.

2. Catholic conservatism in Chile is best represented by the integralist organisation FIDUCIA. See also Jorge Hubner, Los Católicos en la Política, Editorial Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1959.

however, the stability of the democratic regime under Jorge Alessandri and Eduardo Frei limited their chances of real success.

Present-day nacionalismo has emerged out of the opposition to the Popular Unity government (1970-73). Patria y Libertad, which first came to public prominence late in 1971, was the largest, most influential and most active of various nacionalista groups, openly calling on the military to overthrow President Allende. The emergence of Patria y Libertad was part of the divisions within the bourgeoisie on how to confront Popular Unity. Patria y Libertad represented a vocal but minority position, postulating sabotage and terrorism in order to overthrow the government, while the majority of the opposition initially at least, favoured legalistic and institutional obstruction from Congress, the civil service, and the judiciary. While the mobilisation of the middle class, which played an increasingly important role in the opposition's strategy after 1972, did not take place under the leadership of Patria y Libertad, it nonetheless conformed to their strategy of direct confrontation with the government.

Of all the civil opposition groups of the early 1970s - the right-wing National Party, the centrist Christian Democratic Party, and the autonomous associations of employers, women and neighbourhood committees - the nationalist movements, specifically Patria y Libertad, were the only ones proposing a radical restructuring of society, to take place after the coup, which would include a permanent substitution of liberal-democracy for a corporatist, functionalist state, and one in which Marxism as an ideology would be eradicated. Nonetheless, the movement's impact, like the MNS in the 1930s, was not due to its ideological content, but rather a result of its reactionary terrorist activities. Amongst other things, Patria y Libertad was responsible

training small military units inside and outside Chile, planting bombs on train-lines, in oil pipelines, and in left-wing party offices, and encouraging an atmosphere of confrontation and violence on the streets of Santiago. Later, Pablo Rodriguez, leader of Patria y Libertad, explained the movement's role during Popular Unity in the following terms:

As the political situation became more and more desperate, the movement was inundated with hysterical anti-marxist elements. There were two possibilities for us: either we purge ourselves internally, or we accept the 'dirty work' of creating the conditions for the coup d'etat. I chose the second alternative.¹

From the 1930s to the present day nationalist movements have tried to make contact with the Armed Forces. According to the philosophy of the MNS, and of Estanquero, the Armed Forces were the last repository of Chilean sovereignty and patriotism. The level of support for nationalist movements within military circles is difficult to evaluate, though very probably it has not been high. Patria y Libertad was able to diffuse its ideas to a greater degree than ever before among the officer corps. Patria y Libertad boasted of the participation and sympathy of some prominent military figures, including General Roberto Viaux, leader of an unsuccessful revolt against President Frei in 1969, known as the Tacnazo. The nacionalistas were also implicated in the uprising of June 1973, after which several, including Rodriguez himself, had to go into temporary exile in Ecuador. Neither is there any doubts that the nacionalistas were active participants in the events surrounding the 11th of September, immediately after which Patria y Libertad went into voluntary liquidation, claiming its goals were realized.

1. ¿Que Pasa? 7/4/1983. p.13.

After the coup, it seemed likely that the ex-militants of Patria y Libertad would be rewarded for their 'dirty-work' during the government of Allende, and for their contacts with the military. However, although they remain apologists of the Pinochet regime, they have not held positions of authority or influence since its inception, and a programme of economic liberalism has been implemented in preference to their own corporatist-statist ideas.

Why did the nacionalistas fail to win power after the coup? Firstly, they were not the only civilian group supporting military intervention, nor, as it turned out, were they the best-connected or best-equipped to determine and control public policy afterwards. The coup articulated interests that went beyond those represented by the purely nationalist organisations and comprised sectors hitherto categorised as the 'democratic right and centre'. Throughout the Popular Unity period, a group of tecnocrats, based primarily in the Institute of Economy of the Universidad Católica - many trained in the University of Chicago - had been working secretly on an alternative economic programme to be effective after the coup. The so-called 'Chicago Boys' counted with the commitment of the Navy, and of Admiral José Toribio Merino, member of the military Junta. Their influence was guaranteed by the Junta's decision to leave economic planning in the hands of the Navy.

The Nacionalistas were unable to offer similar economic expertise. Further, Chile's industrial bourgeoisie had long paid lip-service to the ideas of economic liberalism, so the Chicago Boys were able to rely on the support of an important proportion of the banking and business community. The model was also acceptable to the U.S. State Department, perhaps the greatest advocate of free market economics.

Finally, many of the makers and supporters of the coup were looking for an economic model that was the exact opposite to that of Popular Unity; state-oriented development had fostered popular mobilisation and the development of an articulate working-class movement demanding a fundamental redistribution of power. The military government was looking for a model which, above all else, would de-activate the trade unions and end working-class political participation. Free-market economics, coupled with a restrictive Labour Plan and harsh repression, seemed the solution. As a result, the statist programme of the Nacionalistas was treated with suspicion.

In organisation, tactics and ideology, Patria y Libertad conformed to the pattern of a classic neo-fascist party. Depending on the activity of a select few adherents, Patria y Libertad undermined not only the government of Allende, but also the operation of the liberal-democratic state, existing in Chile before 1973. Pablo Rodriguez explicitly rejected any suggestion of creating a mass party. He said:

It is better to be able to rely on a handful of convinced loyal followers than on an apathetic vacillating mass.¹

Like the MNS, Patria y Libertad was, and nacionalismo continues to be, elitist and middle-class to upper-middle class in composition. Chilean nationalist movements have consistently failed to attract support from either the working class or from the marginal population. Patria y Libertad were followers of the ideological tradition, described earlier, of the MNS and of Jorge Prat whom they tended to admire, although in recent years, the anti-semitic, anti-masonic, and anti-capitalist elements shared by the MNS and the

1. La Tercera de la Hora, 6/3/1983.

Estanqueristas have to a large extent been removed.

In recent years, the nacionalistas tried to produce a political model which would be a permanent alternative to liberal-democracy. As such, the nature of the political system Pinochet will eventually leave behind is one of their major preoccupations. While they are relatively happy with the current personalist system of government built around the figure of Pinochet himself, they regard this as only an interim solution. They would be happier still to see the formation of a movimiento civico at base level to lend active popular support to the regime - though clearly, as Pinochet's popularity steadily wanes, the time for this has past. In this sense, the Constitution of 1980 was a disappointment for the nacionalistas, based as it was on the regime's neo-liberalism. The nationalist magazine, Avanzada, criticised it as being 'more or less the same as the constitution of 1925, with the addition of the [anti-communist] Ley de defensa de la democracia'. It added, 'experience has demonstrated that this system has failed'.

Their own preferred project is one of 'functionalist' or 'nationalist' democracy, i.e. corporatism.

The resistance against the Popular Unity government was not headed by the political parties... it was headed by the gremios, by the women's organisations, by the young people, by college professors, even by sports associations. All of these make up the nation... [we need] a renewed democracy, completely different from the traditional democracy existing until 1973... it will not be a democracy of political parties... We must implement other channels of participation which put the people in direct communication with the authorities... Also a nationalist democracy needs to facilitate the participation of experts and specialists in

decision-making, establishing institutions through which their advice can always reach the government.¹

As yet, the grandiose constitutional and political model of the nacionalistas has met with as little success as their economic programme, and for the same reason: the military regime is intent above all on demobilisation, and the project of the nacionalistas is one of hierarchical controlled participation.

However, the economic crisis which has beset Chile from around 1981, and the subsequent alienation of the neo-liberals from the Cabinet, raised nationalist hopes for a radical change in the political and economic direction of the administration. The nacionalistas - grouped together in the National Action Movement (MAN), since 1983 when political parties and movements once again openly emerged - made it known that they were ready to go to the Moneda is called. They base their hopes on two factors: firstly General Pinochet's tendency to use nationalist and populist rhetoric, especially when under pressure. So, like the nacionalistas he roundly condemns Chile's traditional politicians ('los señores políticos') and refuses to co-operate with them. Secondly, the nationalist sympathies of the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Onofre Jarga, ex-Nacista, and ex-member of the right-wing National Party, appointed in August, 1983.

Following the example set by Jorge Prat, (ex-youth leader of the Conservative Party and pre-candidate for the presidency in 1963 with right-wing support), the nacionalistas had forged strong ties with the extreme-right of the National Party during the Allende administration,

1. Gustavo Cuevas Farren in an interview with Cosas 7/4/1983. Cuevas is a nationalist intellectual associated with the Institute of Political Science of the University of Chile.

to the point in which it was said that many militants of Patria y Libertad were simultaneously members of the National Party. This co-operation was possible because many, though not all, nacionalistas had joined the National Party in the 1960s. Jarpa had been sympathetic to nacionalismo throughout his political career, and had been appointed to preside over an apertura - or so it was claimed initially, at least. It therefore seemed more than possible that the way was finally open to a nationalist authoritarian alternative. However, Jarpa was appointed to broaden the base of the regime, to defuse the popular protests, and to win support from sectors within the opposition, that is, the right-wing critics. As a result, the nacionalistas, already Pinochet supporters, and without any real popular influence, merited little of Jarpa official attention, and Jarpa's dismissal in February 1985 left them as far away as ever from making and controlling policy.

Currently, while nacionalistas have close contacts with the Pinochet regime, they are as far removed as ever from real influence. As a result of their alienation from power, a few nacionalistas have gone into open opposition, and are attempting to forge links with small agriculturalists from Southern Chile - traditional supporters of nacionalismo - in protest at the government's economic policies. These include Roberto Thieme, ex-Secretary of Patria y Libertad. Thieme criticises the bulk of the nacionalistas because -

I don't understand how those hard-line nacionalistas... can continue to offer a nationalist alternative to a government serving only the interests of foreigners.¹

The majority, however, are tied to Pinochet, and to defending the

1. ¿Que Pasa? 7/4/1983.

'mission' of the Armed Forces, because, policy differences notwithstanding, their fate is irrevocably bound up with that of the current military regime.

APPENDIX NO. 1

THE FOUNDATION OF THE MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA DE CHILE

1940.

Demandante _____

Domicilio _____

Querellante _____

Domicilio *Acta de fundación*

Apoderado _____

Domicilio *del Movimiento Nacio-*

Demandado _____

Domicilio *realista de Chile. -*

Querellado _____

Domicilio _____

Apoderado *12 de febrero de 1940. -*

uno

Página uno (1)

ACTA SOLEMNE

En Santiago de Chile, a doce de Febrero de mil novecientos cuarenta, en reunión solemne, e invocando el nombre de Dios, el nombre de Chile y el nombre de los que labraron su gloria y prestigio, los firmantes declaran constituido el

MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA DE CHILE

Movimiento popular destinado a unir a todos los chilenos, sin distinción de clases, a fin de constituir una fuerza nacional capaz de encauzar y dirigir por el camino de la grandeza futura, los destinos espirituales, políticos, sociales y económicos de la Nación.


Su base fundamental está en la organización, en la selección, la disciplina, el patriotismo y la subordinación a una Jerarquía que comienza en el Consejo Nacional, dirigido por el Comisario Nacional, Jefe del Consejo.

Organización integralmente revolucionaria. por cuanto no acepta combinaciones políticas, ni soluciones parciales.

Su finalidad es la instauración del Estado Nacionalista, bajo los conceptos que se expresarán, e inspirado en los siguientes principios:

I.- EL ESTADO NACIONALISTA

El Estado Nacionalista será el orientador, propulsor y director de la vida nacional.



Estado corporativo popular; Gobierno fuerte, sólidamente apoyado por la voluntad nacional.

Garantizará el orden interno y la seguridad y el prestigio internacional del País. Dará opción para llegar a los más altos cargos a todos los chilenos sin distinción y sólo aceptara que gobiernen los más capaces, honrados y patriotas.

El Estado Nacionalista tendrá por finalidad forjar el


ENGRANDECIMIENTO DE CHILE

El que se irá obteniendo palmo a palmo, por el esfuerzo tesonero, la perseverancia y el sacrificio de todos los chilenos, en medio de una absoluta colaboración de clases y bajo el imperio de una estricta justicia social.

Cada uno tendrá su misión que cumplir. Con la voluntad dispuesta de todos los hijos de esta tierra, Chile será el director espiritual de América-Ibera y encabezará la lucha de ésta por la liberación del yugo económico del capitalismo internacional. El Estado Nacionalista realizará la grandeza de Chile, mediante un concepto de unión entre el pasado, el presente y el futuro de nuestra nacionalidad, para lo cual restaurará las tradiciones del pasado, pondrá orden y justicia en el presente y creará los sólidos fundamentos del porvenir.

II.- OBRA DE RESTAURACION NACIONAL

Nuestra cultura occidental, regida por los principios espirituales del cristianismo, es objeto de una tenaz campaña de demolición, dirigida y sustentada por el Marxismo, la Masonería y el Judaísmo, a cuyo servicio está el capitalismo internacional. El Nacionalismo destruirá a estos enemigos de nuestra cultura y defenderá con todas sus fuerzas sus insti-



tuciones fundamentales: LA PATRIA, LA FAMILIA, LA PROPIEDAD Y LA RELIGION.

1.- LA PATRIA

Su defensa - Vigorización y exaltación

Chile ante todo y sobre todo.- El Nacionalismo propenderá: 1) a la defensa y vigorización de la idea de Patria; 2) a la exaltación del amor patrio; y 3) a la restauración de las tradiciones chilenas.- Despertará el orgullo de raza, el orgullo de ser chileno y defenderá todo lo bello, grandioso y noble creado por nuestra nacionalidad.

Luchará por la dignificación y el respeto a las Fuerzas Armadas.- Formará a la juventud en la Escuela del Patriotismo.- El individuo por su nacimiento queda ligado indisolublemente a Chile y se debe por entero y por siempre a la grandeza de su Patria.

Culto permanente a Chile en todas las manifestaciones de nuestra vida.

2.- LA FAMILIA


Su defensa y dignificación

El Nacionalismo propenderá a que el Estado defienda, vigore y dignifique a la familia como institución básica de la Nación y salvaguardia de su futuro económico, cultural y social.

Para este efecto propicia:

a) El robustecimiento de la autoridad moral del padre de familia.

b) La feminización de la mujer y vuelta de ésta al hogar, santuario donde ha de prepararse para cumplir con el destino sagrado de la Maternidad, sin perjuicio de que ejerza calificadas actividades en donde desarrolle precisamente su influencia moralizadora.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, possibly reading "Cristóbal", is written over a circular stamp. The stamp contains some illegible text and a central emblem.

buals

Página cuatro (4)

el
 c) Estímulo de la municipalidad y de la natalidad, en cuanto esta última asegure la conservación de una raza fuerte y sana.

d) ^{la} Constitución de la propiedad familiar inalienable e inembargable. El conjunto familiar, base de la actividad económica; los hijos colaboradores y sucesores del padre en el trabajo; formación de la tradición familiar en el trabajo.

3.- LA PROPIEDAD

Su concepto

El derecho de propiedad, como función social, o sea, elemento útil no sólo a su dueño sino que, ante todo, a la colectividad.

El derecho de propiedad con las limitaciones que, a su ejercicio, pueda imponerle la justicia social, la moral y las conveniencias de la colectividad.

Respeto y ayuda a la iniciativa privada socialmente útil. Oportunidad y facilidades a todos los ciudadanos para que puedan ser dueños de un bien raíz.- El dinero al servicio de la colectividad y del Estado, no su subyugador y corruptor.

4.- LA RELIGION

Reconoce la concordancia que existe entre las más altas exigencias de la naturaleza humana y los principios sustentados por el Cristianismo.- Siendo la Religión una fuerza moralizadora por excelencia, el Estado Nacionalista apoyará en este sentido su influencia en el hogar, en la escuela y en la sociedad.

Respetará la libertad de conciencia religiosa y mantendrá a la Iglesia totalmente alejada de las luchas políticas.

INSTITUTO VITTE A A
Arizaga
 14.7

Curo

Página cinco (5)

III.- CREACIONES DEL ESTADO NACIONALISTA

Ante la completa descomposición de las instituciones del Estado democrático, liberal-individualista, es indispensable crear una mística que dé unidad, estabilidad y orden a la vida política, social y económica de nuestra Patria, lo que se obtendrá mediante: la estructuración orgánica del Estado Nacionalista de Chile; el Imperio de la justicia social; el enaltecimiento del trabajo; la protección y fomento del comercio y la producción; y la orientación de la educación pública.

1.- ESTADO ORGANICO

Dentro del Estado Nacionalista el individuo deja de ser un átomo libre y desamparado, para entrar a actuar como miembro integrante de un conjunto orgánico. El Estado será el propulsor y regulador de las actividades nacionales.


Organización y jerarquización de todos los individuos, según las diversas actividades del trabajo.- Cambio del régimen de partidos por el de gremios y corporaciones; Cámara Corporativa y Consejos Funcionales en lugar de las cámaras políticas; extirpación del sufragio universal y su remplazo por un sistema de sufragio calificado.

Unidad gubernativa.- Reajuste de la burocracia a las exigencias de los servicios del Estado y regularización de la función administrativa de acuerdo con los Estatutos y escalafón del personal; administración pública, honrada y eficiente.

2.- JUSTICIA SOCIAL

Primacía del interés colectivo sobre el particular.
Unidad, armonía y equilibrio entre el capital y el trabajo.
Sindicalización obligatoria.- Arbitraje obligatorio de los

APROBADO EN LA COMISIÓN DE LEGISLACIÓN
N.º 547



les

Página seis (6)

conflictos sociales por tribunales emanados de los mismos gremios y corporaciones y controlados por el Estado. En consecuencia, prohibición de lockouts y huelgas.

3.- ENALTECIMIENTO DEL TRABAJO

El trabajo como un derecho y un deber social será garantido por el Estado, quien lo defenderá, estimulará y orientará.- Dejará de ser mercancía y su remuneración será fijada teniendo presente las necesidades del obrero o empleado y las exigencias económicas de la producción.- El trabajo será la única fuente de derechos políticos los que han de ejercerse dentro de los gremios y corporaciones.

Servicio del trabajo obligatorio para la juventud de todas las clases sociales y en relación con el servicio militar y bajo las órdenes inmediatas de los jefes del Ejército, con el objeto de educarla en un espíritu de disciplina y de dignificación del trabajo manual.-

4.- LA PRODUCCION Y EL COMERCIO

Su protección y fomento

La producción y el comercio, orientados, dirigidos y controlados por el Estado.- Fomento del comercio exterior, en especial con los países de America del Sur.- Protección del Capital que produce; extirpación del capitalismo parasitario obligándolo a invertirse en actividades útiles a la colectividad.- Supresión de los Trust y Karteles.- Formación de un Capital Nacional destinado a rescatar nuestras riquezas de manos del capitalismo internacional y a industrializar el país.-

El Crédito función social: su lucro regulado por el Estado.

Ahorro Nacional obligatorio y garantía por el Estado de estos fondos y de los de Previsión Social.



siite

Página siete (7)

5.- LA EDUCACION PUELICA

Su orientación

La función educacional es una de las funciones centrales del Estado Nacionalista, porque en gran parte, el bienestar de los trabajadores manuales e intelectuales, la formación de los elementos dirigentes del Estado y la marcha progresiva de la producción de la riqueza y del comercio, dependen de la orientación de la función educacional. Esta orientación es la base fundamental de la estabilidad y progreso de la Nación.

Ella necesitará reajustarse a las nuevas modalidades del Estado Nacionalista, en tal forma que dé por resultado, tanto la regeneración moral como el progreso económico y la depuración política del país.

Por consiguiente, el Estado Nacionalista se valdrá de la Educación Pública para formar ciudadanos eficientes, honrados y patriotas, presentando a la juventud variadas oportunidades, de acuerdo con las aptitudes.

Ayudará toda iniciativa que tenga por objeto la difusión de la cultura y que cumpla con los objetivos anteriores.

Organizará la enseñanza dándole ingerencia, por medio de Consejos, a todos los elementos que en ella tengan un interés directo.

Velará por la estabilidad y el prestigio de la carrera docente; por eso atenderá, tanto a su génesis como a lo que atañe a su situación económica.

En Educación Primaria procurará que, descentralizándose los servicios, pueda exigírsele a los particulares que ayudan a su progreso. Tenderá a la creación de escuelas diferenciadas: del campo y de la ciudad, y a la formación del mayor número posible.

ARIOSTO HERRERA
(Firma)
 14

de artesanos, considerada como una de las bases fundamentales para hacer más efectivo el mejoramiento de nuestro standard de vida popular.

En Educación Secundaria irá al establecimiento de variados tipos de colegios, uno de los cuales debe suministrar una seria cultura humanista, que pueda conducir a las llamadas carreras liberales de la Universidad; los otros se orientarán directamente a las actividades productoras.

En la Enseñanza Superior, el Estado velará por que las Universidades cumplan su triple papel: de formar una élite profesional, de mantener centros de investigación y de realizar obra de difusión popular de la cultura, todo ello proporcionalmente a las necesidades del país y a los grandes ideales nacionalistas.

IV.- COMUNIDAD NACIONAL

El Estado Nacionalista dará vigor y articulación a la comunidad nacional, mediante el robustecimiento del bienestar colectivo de las comunidades que contribuyen a formarla: la familia, en el campo social; el gremio, en el campo económico-social; la ciudad, la provincia y la región, en el campo político-administrativo; el robustecimiento de la acción disciplinada de las instituciones del Estado: la escuela, en la formación moral e intelectual de la juventud y el pueblo; las fuerzas armadas, en la defensa interior y exterior de la Nación y como escuela de disciplina de la ciudadanía; las fuerzas productoras y el comercio, como entidades creadoras de la economía chilena; robustecimiento, en suma, del bienestar de la Patria toda entera, en armonía con el bienestar individual.

Con el fin de asegurar esta máximo objetivo, el Nacionalismo luchará por que el Estado Nacionalista incorpore efectivamente



**PAGE
MISSING
IN
ORIGINAL**

EN EL NOMBRE DE CHILE,
 EN EL NOMBRE DE LOS QUE LAHRARON EL PRESTIGIO Y
 LA GLORIA DE CHILE.

JURAMOS, POR DIOS, CONSAGRARNOS POR ENTERO Y POR SIEMPRE
 A LA GRANDEZA DE CHILE.

Por consenso unánime de los miembros fundadores del MOVIMIEN-
 TO NACIONALISTA DE CHILE, entregamos la Presidencia del Consejo
 Nacional de nuestra Organización, con el título de Comisario
 Nacional, al Chileno Ariosto Herrera Ramires, cuyas prendas de
 acendrado patriotismo, honrades, valentía y alta moralidad, son
 ejemplo vivo para sus comnacionales.

*Primero a investigaciones dejenos de
 parte mi juramento ante los pederios.*

Siendo

Mo. M... ..

Traged de Bar... Victor M. Tugan... de la P.

N. Rosenber...

Carlos E. Diez...

1965

Blumenfeld...

Alfredo Payer...

Titus Dietrich...

H. Carcano F.

10.2

Primeramente...

once

Página once (11)

Bernardino Hernandez

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

Antonio de la Torre
Jose Felices H.

Japarrici J. Dominguez

~~Alonso~~
Alonso

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

Rosa

Luis Carreras

Rosario

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

Jose Luis
Alfonso

Antonio Salas

Jorge

Jorge Salas

Juan de Huicho

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

Luis

Juan Jose
Gonzalez Ruiz

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

Amador

~~Alfonso~~
Alfonso

Alfonso
N. 11

APPENDIX NO. 2

AGRARIO LABORISTA PARTY CONFERENCE,
ORGANISED ACCORDING TO FUNCTION


1953

PARTIDO AGRARIO LABORISTA 7º CONGRESO GENERAL EXTRAORDINARIO



PRIMERAS CONFERENCIAS NACIONALES POR FUNCIONES


VALPARAISO, 18 - 19 - 20 Y 26 DE NOV. DE 1953



APPENDIX NO. 3

ANTI-RADICAL PARTY CARTOON - LA NACION

HACE 1.499 DIAS



**EL PUEBLO LOS ARROJO DEL PODER Y NO
VOLVERAN.**

APPENDIX NO. 4

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES - PARTIDO NACIONAL POPULAR

1959

Declaración de Principios del Partido Nacional Popular

El Partido Nacional Popular es una organización política integrada por chilenos sin distinción de clases ni de credos, que lucha por instaurar un orden nuevo que restablezca y exalte el recio estilo chileno que conformó la nacionalidad, modernice las estructuras del Estado y dé a los trabajadores una participación preponderante en la dirección de la vida nacional.

Se inspira en una concepción de la sociedad basado en los altos y permanentes valores del espíritu y rechaza toda interpretación materialista que, como el capitalismo individualista, conduce a una sociedad anárquica e injusta, o que, como el socialismo marxista, destruye la libertad y anula la personalidad humana.

Afirma que la nacionalidad constituye la expresión integral y permanente de la tradición, la sangre y el suelo, y que su personificación política debe ser un estado orgánico, que oriente y movilice las energías y aspiraciones del pueblo hacia la realización de su destino histórico. Rechaza, en consecuencia, tanto el concepto liberal del Estado como organización pasiva, como la visión marxista de un mundo dividido en clases sociales antagónicas.

En lo político.- El Partido Nacional Popular lucha por perfeccionar nuestra democracia y defiende las normas de libertad y de respeto a la personalidad humana que han caracterizado la trayectoria de Chile como nación independiente.

Sostiene que nuestro actual sistema de Gobierno representativo, que refleja el anticuado esquema de la división en clases sociales o económicas, debe ser reemplazado por una organización que agrupe a los ciudadanos según la función que cumplan en la comunidad.

Propicia la modernización del poder Legislativo y de los Municipios, dando representación, además de los Partidos políticos, a las organizaciones culturales, profesionales, económicas y sindicales.

Aspira a la organización de un gobierno fuerte, activo, realizador, cimentado en las fuerzas vivas de la Nación, que encauce e impulse hacia fines permanentes de interés nacional, las sanas aspiraciones de mejoramiento y el ímpetu vital del pueblo chileno.

En lo económico.- El Partido Nacional Popular sostiene que la economía debe estructurarse al servicio del hombre y de la comunidad nacional, y rechaza toda forma de organización económica en que el hombre sea sólo un simple factor en el proceso de la producción o del consumo.

Afirma que el trabajo debe ser dignificado y valorizado como aporte espiritual y deber social, y no puede, en consecuencia, considerársele como una mercancía sujeta a las alternativas de la oferta y la demanda.

Reconoce el insustituible valor de la iniciativa privada que desarrolla al máximo la facultad creadora del hombre y permite obtener los más altos resultados en el proceso productor.

- El Estado debe orientar e impulsar la iniciativa privada para que sirva el interés de la comunidad y

el desarrollo y fortalecimiento de la economía nacional: reprimir la acción de los monopolios nacionales y extranjeros y todo otro atentado contra el interés común, y sancionar la inactividad o deterioro de los medios de producción. Corresponde, asimismo, al Estado la organización de los servicios de utilidad pública y de aquellas actividades económicas vitales que la iniciativa privada no esté en condiciones de afrontar con eficacia.

El Estado debe impulsar un gran plan de expansión económica, aprovechando los recursos humanos y las posibilidades geo-económicas que el país contiene en cada zona, y dando a los trabajadores una participación creciente en las utilidades y dirección en las empresas, transformándolos en accionistas o asociados de las mismas a través del sistema de capitalismo popular. Como un medio de hacer efectiva la acción orientadora e impulsora del Estado, el Partido propicia la creación de un Consejo Nacional de Economía, con representación efectiva del trabajo organizado que coordine y planifique el desarrollo económico y la capitalización nacional.

Es imprescindible efectuar una reforma agraria seria y constructiva que permita elevar el nivel de la producción agrícola e incorporar al trabajo de la tierra a un mayor número de propietarios, mediante la colonización de los latifundios inexplorados y zonas deshabitadas del territorio y la introducción de nuevas técnicas y modernos métodos de cultivo.

Es de urgencia social y de interés nacional mejorar las condiciones de vida del campesinado y elevar su nivel cultural y su capacitación técnica, valorizando su trabajo y creando un mayor poder consumidor para el desarrollo de la industria nacional.

Las fuerzas armadas deben participar en el desarrollo de la economía nacional mediante la ampliación del servicio militar del trabajo a toda la juventud.

Este servicio debe ser una institución fundamental del nuevo Estado Nacional.

En lo social.- El Partido Nacional Popular aspira a restablecer la comunidad nacional para que el pueblo chileno pueda afrontar ~~unido las tareas del~~ porvenir, reintegrando al espíritu de la nacionalidad a los grupos desvinculados de ella por las fallas y contradicciones del actual sistema capitalista o desorientados por la propaganda del marxismo internacional.

Rechaza la lucha de clases como método para alcanzar el bienestar del pueblo. La división del organismo nacional y el debilitamiento del Estado exponen al pueblo a perder su libertad y sus derechos a manos de grupos minoritarios o intereses extranjeros.

La familia es la base de la organización social y es deber del Estado defenderla, fortalecerla y procurar su bienestar, asumiendo la responsabilidad de dar a cada familia un hogar propio y garantizar el derecho a la educación y al trabajo. La defensa de la raza debe procurarse, especialmente a través de la defensa del niño y de la mujer.

En lo cultural.- El Partido Nacional Popular afirma que Chile debe ser fiel a su herencia espiritual de Occidente, y mantener su posición de vanguardia de la cultura en esta zona del mundo.

Propicia la libertad de enseñanza dentro de una orientación superior del Estado, y sostiene que los actuales programas educacionales deben ser reformados dando mayor impulso a la capacitación técnica y a las actividades creadoras de riqueza.

La escuela debe ser fundamento de nuestra vida cívica y crisol espiritual de la nacionalidad. Junto al desarrollo del intelecto debe exaltar los valores morales y forjar el carácter, la voluntad y el espíritu de creación y de lucha de la juventud. Debe atender,

asimismo, a la cultura física y al fortalecimiento de la raza.

En lo internacional.- El Partido Nacional Popular defiende el derecho a la libertad y a la autodeterminación de sus destinos de todos los pueblos del mundo y rechaza el colonialismo y el imperialismo.

Sostiene que las relaciones internacionales deben regularse por un común derecho internacional, cimentado en el respeto de los tratados y de los convenios internacionales.

Afirma que la prosperidad de los países iberoamericanos debe buscarse a través de un amplio entendimiento zonal que promueva la integración económica y abra el camino hacia la unidad política.

Chile tiene los medios para llegar a ser el núcleo cultural e industrial de una gran zona de co-prosperidad en América Austral. Chile debe defender con decisión y energía sus derechos territoriales en los espacios continentales, insulares y marítimos.

APPENDIX NO. 5

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES - LA DEMOCRACIA AGRARIO LABORISTA

1963

DIRECCION DEL REGISTRO ELECTORAL

Nº 47

Dispone existencia legal del Partido
Democracia Agrario Laborista.

Santiago, 10 de Febrero de 1964.

Vistos: La solicitud de inscripción en el Protocolo de los Partidos Políticos, del Partido "Democracia Agrario Laborista"; su documentación adjunta; el "Diario Oficial" del día 10 de Enero ppdo. en el que se publica dicha solicitud; la nómina de sus adherentes, y

Considerando:

Que desde la fecha de la publicación indicada en el "Diario Oficial" han transcurrido más de treinta días y que dentro de este plazo no se ha formulado oposición alguna a la solicitud mencionada;

Teniendo presente lo dispuesto en el artículo 20 de la Ley 14.852 General de Elecciones,

Resuelvo:

a) Se declara la existencia legal del partido político denominado "Democracia Agrario Laborista".

b) Se tendrá para todos los efectos legales como la primera mesa Directiva Central de este Partido. la siguiente:

Presidente: Benjamín Videla Vergara;

Secretario: Guido González Novoa;

Tesorero: Alejandro Hales Jamarne.

c) Publíquese en el "Diario Oficial" esta resolución y practíquese en la misma fecha de esta publicación la inscripción respectiva en el Protocolo de los Partidos Políticos de esta Dirección.

Anótese y comuníquese

Andrés Rillón Romani
Director Subrogante

DECLARACION DE PRINCIPIOS

1. La Democracia Agrario Laborista constituye una organización política integrada por chilenos, sin distinción de clases o de credos, que lucha por instaurar un orden nuevo que restablezca y exalte el recio estilo chileno que conformó la nacionalidad, que modernice las estructuras del Estado, otorgando a los trabajadores, del músculo y del cerebro, una participación orgánica y principal en la dirección de la vida nacional, logrando el bienestar y la emancipación política, social y económica del PUEBLO.

2. La Democracia Agrario Laborista se inspira en una concepción de la sociedad basada en los altos y permanentes valores del espíritu y rechaza, por lo tanto, el capitalismo individualista, que conduce a un orden injusto y anárquico y a cualquiera otra forma ideológica o política, como el marxismo, que destruye la libertad, anula la personalidad humana y desfigura la Democracia, entendida en su más pura y auténtica concepción.

3. La Democracia Agrario Laborista declara que el actual "orden jurídico institucional" y la estructura capitalista, a la cual sirve, están en plena crisis y urge su reemplazo.

4. La Democracia Agrario Laborista lucha por constituir una sociedad basada en los siguientes principios fundamentales.

- a) respeto a la persona humana y a sus derechos inalienables;
- b) Fortalecimiento de la FAMILIA y sus objetivos fundamentales;
- c) Exaltación del trabajo a un plano de dignificación integral, transformándolo en la base de todo derecho;
- d) Creación de la EMPRESA, con la participación del trabajo y el capital en equiparidad de condiciones, en su conducción y usufructo de sus bienes;
- e) Representación FUNCIONAL orgánica del "trabajador", en el Estado;
- f) Instauración de un orden socio-económico basado en la JUSTICIA y la fraternidad;
- g) Reconocimiento en la Constitución Política de los Derechos Sociales (Derecho al TRABAJO, Derecho a la EDUCACION, Derecho a la CASA PROPIA);
- h) Respeto a la autodeterminación de los pueblos e integración política y económica de latinoamérica.

EN LO POLITICO

5. Las sociedades son colectividades vivas que están en permanente evolución para alcanzar formas más perfectas y justas de convivencia. Por lo tanto, afirmamos que es necesario superar el sistema democrático actual, caduco e inoperante.

6. A la representación político regional, debe agregarse una representación funcional, que organice a los trabajadores que actúan en el proceso productor y cultural, para darle expresión, a través de los organismos de bases e intermedios, en el Estado, en forma directa y permanente, contribuyendo a orientar y planificar el desarrollo del país. Instauraremos un Estado activo.

7. Junto a una Cámara Política, representativa de la inquietud y anhelos cívicos del país, propugnamos la existencia de una Cámara Funcional, que sea expresión de los intereses culturales y económicos de la sociedad.

6 El perfeccionamiento de la democracia requiere esencialmente de la moralización de la vida política, destacando a aquellos que demuestren auténtica vocación por la cosa pública y afán de servicio. Se debe mejorar el sistema de generación de los poderes públicos, de manera que él sea fiel reflejo de la opinión ciudadana, exento de cualquier presión que pueda tergiversar su pensamiento.

9. El ciudadano que actúa en la vida pública, debe hacer declaración de sus bienes y debe, además, quedar inhabilitado para gestionar negocios particulares con el Estado. Deben crearse la Administración Civil del Estado como tal y los Tribunales Administrativos. Deben reglamentarse el financiamiento, duración y prácticas de las campañas electorales y los partidos políticos someterse a un Estatuto legal.

EN LO ECONOMICO

10. La producción de bienes materiales debe estructurarse al servicio del hombre y del bienestar de la sociedad. Es ineludible la obligación de dar al PUEBLO, cultura, habitación y bienestar, de manera que cada ciudadano pueda desarrollar a plenitud su personalidad.

11. LA PLANIFICACION económica es el medio para alcanzar el desarrollo de la economía nacional y deberá llevarse a cabo con la intervención de los que participan el proceso productor, en la actividad distribuidora y en el consumo.

12. Frente a la economía liberal individualista que se conforma con reglamentar el proceso económico, en función de leyes que considera invariables y al concepto económico estatista, que convierte al Fisco en empresario, capitalista, distribuidor y comerciante, propugnamos la idea de una ECONOMIA AUTO ORGANIZADA, que salvaguardando la iniciativa privada, la oriente y conduzca en procura del bien común.

13. Representaciones directas de los diversos sectores que intervienen en el proceso productor deben conformar un CON-

SEJO NACIONAL DE ECONOMIA y organismos similares en las distintas zonas geo-económicas del país, para llevar a cabo la planificación económica y la auto organización de la producción.

14. La redistribución del ingreso nacional es factor esencial para aumentar el mercado de consumo interno, incorporando a éste particularmente la masa campesina. Para alcanzar este efecto es necesario realizar una auténtica **REFORMA TRIBUTARIA** y **CREDITICIA** y llevar a cabo una Política Agraria que permita al país abastecerse de alimentos y materias primas esenciales y una Reforma Agraria que distribuya, justa y racionalmente la tierra, que fomente el cooperativismo, la mecanización e industrialización de las actividades del agro.

15. Propugnamos la dictación de una **LEY SOCIAL** de la **PRODUCCION**, que inicie la creación de la nueva empresa, en la que el trabajo, conjuntamente con el capital y la técnica, tengan paridad de deberes y derechos.

16. Los adelantos que la ciencia y la técnica han alcanzado, permiten al hombre lograr un progreso equitativo y acelerado. Para este efecto se requieren capitales y mercados de consumo. Es por esta razón que somos partidarios de establecer relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales con todos los países del mundo y luchamos por la integración económica de la América Latina.

EN LO SOCIAL

17. El hombre es un ser eminentemente social y requiere el amparo de la sociedad donde vive y la ayuda del Estado que lo rige. Se debe propender a la organización y perfeccionamiento de toda organización societaria útil, sea de carácter cultural, gremial, deportiva, o cooperativas principalmente.

19. Las asociaciones señaladas, constituyen las "organizaciones de bases", indispensables para el buen ordenamiento

social y factores esenciales para realizar los cambios de estructuras en el campo económico, social y político. Además, deberán crearse los canales que hagan posible las grandes reformas que se preconizan, con carácter de instituciones de Derecho Público. Estos serán los denominados "cuerpos intermedios".

20. Los cuerpos intermedios podrán ser las juntas de planificación, de desarrollo, los consejos económico-sociales, los consejos regionales o profesionales, las juntas vecinales, los organismos de reforma agraria, de seguridad social, de vivienda, de salud, etc., integrados por representantes directos de las organizaciones de bases, de manera que la comunidad integrada, participe activa y responsablemente, según sus funciones y competencias, en la solución de sus respectivos problemas y en la realización de iniciativas posibles.

21. La concepción orgánica de la sociedad supone el ejercicio permanente de la JUSTICIA SOCIAL, según la cual el TRABAJO, es el fundamento de la vida económico-social. La retribución de toda actividad útil, debe ser justa, de manera que el TRABAJADOR pueda satisfacer sus necesidades fundamentales y las de su familia y atender a sus desarrollo cultural.

22. LA FAMILIA es la base primera e inamovible de toda sociedad organizada, por lo que es indispensable su defensa en el plano moral y material, garantizando la Educación para los hijos y propendiendo a que toda persona que habita una propiedad, le pertenezca.

23. LA EDUCACION debe ser obligatoria y gratuita, de manera que tenga acceso a ella toda la población. Se debe erradicar definitivamente el analfabetismo y la enseñanza debe estar orientada a lograr la capacitación profesional, artística, técnica o artesanal de las nuevas generaciones.

24. La PREVISION SOCIAL debe ser integral e igualitaria, incorporando a la SEGURIDAD SOCIAL a todos los trabajadores, sin distingo, ni condiciones.

EN LO INTERNACIONAL

25. El principio de **AUTODETERMINACION** de los pueblos y su respeto irrestricto, el rechazo de las segregaciones raciales, la eliminación del colonialismo y de todo tipo de imperialismo, son aspiraciones vitales para los países en desarrollo.

26. La consolidación de una **PAZ JUSTA**, lograda a través de una convivencia constructiva, no impuesta, es aspiración lógica de nuestros pueblos, que requieren desenvolverse dentro de un ámbito armónico, que les permita conjugar sus posibilidades, para de esta manera poder aprovechar los adelantos que la ciencia y la técnica brindan hoy a la **COMUNIDAD HUMANA**.

27. El común origen racial y cultural de nuestros pueblos y la necesidad de constituir "grandes espacios económicos", para lograr el desarrollo y alcanzar el progreso, son imperativos que conducen naturalmente a la **UNIDAD LATINO AMERICANA**.

28. La coordinación de las economías de los países latinoamericanos debe inspirarse en el propósito de dar forma y vida a una economía complementada e integral, que propenda a la industrialización de las materias primas, obtenga mercados de consumo, dentro del continente y en cualquier nivel comercial, asegure precios justos y permita, conjuntamente con un aumento de la producción, elevar el nivel de vida de la población.

29. El proceso de integración política y económico latinoamericano, debe constituir una empresa en que participen todos los sectores sociales y especialmente los "trabajadores". La formación de una conciencia colectiva continental, será misión principal de las Universidades, Institutos culturales, gremios, sindicatos y asociaciones profesionales y técnicas.

30. Conjuntamente con propiciar una acción diplomática, comercial y cultural intensa con los países hermanos de Latino América, Chile debe extender sus relaciones con todas las naciones del mundo especialmente con los países com-

prendidos en el área de los pueblos en desarrollo. Además por razones geo políticas y por su calidad de país marítimo. deberá incrementar sus relaciones con los países ribereños y circunvecinos del Océano Pacífico.

EN RESUMEN:

La Democracia Laborista Incha:

1. Por levantar el nivel espiritual y material de la República conservando y acrecentando los valores morales, culturales y temporales legados por las generaciones pasadas y por interpretar el anhelo ciudadano de situar a Chile y al Continente latinoamericano en el lugar que le corresponde en el concierto de las Naciones.
2. Por perfeccionar la Democracia, concebida hoy exclusivamente sobre la base de partidos, con representación regional y política, para instaurar una Democracia Funcional, en la que tengan representación directa, orgánica y permanente. todas las fuerzas vivas y anhelos de la Nación.
3. Por auto-organizar el proceso económico al servicio del Hombre y no de grupos privilegiados, inbuidos sólo en el afán de lucro egoísta e incontrolado, ni tampoco del Estado omnipotente, a través de la planificación, orientada y realizada por los propios interesados, que integrados en sus organismos de base. se presentarán en el Estado Activo, en los cuerpos intermedios y además, a través de la nueva Empresa en que coparticiparán todos los factores que intervienen en la producción.
4. Por la integridad de la Familia y su desarrollo espiritual, intelectual y físico y por la subordinación del interés particular y de círculo, al interés general de la sociedad, por medio de una acción, cuya preocupación preferente sea el progreso social, logrado en la armonía y Justicia Social, el estímulo a la función productora, la dignificación plena del Trabajo, y el reconocimiento a los Derechos Sociales.
5. Por la Unión Política y Económica de los Pueblos del Continente Latinoamericano, de igual origen y común destino.

BIBLIOGRAPHYPrimary Sources

(1) Daily Newspapers (1952-58, unless otherwise stated)

El Mercurio

Las Noticias de Ultima Hora

La Nación

El Debate

El Siglo

El Diario Ilustrado

La Tercera de la Hora

Mundo Libre (1956-57)

Prensa Libre (1951-53)

Clarín (1957-58)

Trabajo (1932-38)

(2) Weekly, fortnightly or monthly magazines and periodicals (1952-58, unless otherwise stated)

Ercilla

Vea

Zig-Zag

Topaze

Vistazo

Estanquero (1948-54)

Política y Espiritu

Panorama Económico

Principios

Basta (1952-53)

Bandera Negra (irregular)

¿Qué Hay? (irregular)

Claridad (irregular)

Estudios (1944-54, irregular)

(3) Parliamentary Records (1952-58)

Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias de la Cámara de Senadores

Boletín de Sesiones Ordinarias de la Cámara de Diputados

Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias de la Cámara de Senadores

Boletín de Sesiones Extraordinarias de la Cámara de Diputados

(4) Interviews (Santiago, 1983, unless otherwise stated)

- Luis Barrios - Professor of Sociology, Universidad Católica.
- Luis Bossay - member of the Radical Party, ex-Senator, and presidential candidate, 1958.
- Carlos Céspedes - member of the Radical Party, ex-President of the important asamblea in Santiago, Pedro Aguirre Cerda.
- Luis Correa Prieto - Minister of the Economy in 1957, ex-President of the Cámara de Comercio.
- Maria de la Cruz - leader of the Ibañista women's movement, briefly Senator in 1953.
- Julio Chaná Cariola - Minister of the Economy in the Alessandri government (1958-64), executive of the Cámara de Comercio.
- Crescente Donoso - Ibáñez's son-in-law, executive in the Cámara de Comercio.
- Pedro Foncea - ex-Nacista, Minister of Labour, 1954.
- Alejandro Hales - Agrario Laborista, Minister for Mining 1953-4, Minister of Agriculture 1954, Ambassador to Bolivia 1955-58, Minister for Copper 1966-70.

- Felipe Herrera - Socialist, Minister of the Treasury 1953, ex-President of the Inter-American Development Bank.
- Gustavo Horwitz - Socialist, student leader during the Ibáñez administration.
- Ricardo Ibáñez - Carlos Ibáñez's son.
- Raul Irriarte - Socialist, researcher in VECTOR (Institute of Social Sciences), student leader and member of the Radical Party in the 1950s.
- Guillermo Izquierdo - ex-President of the Movimiento Nacionalista de Chile, ex-President of the Agrario Laborista Party, Senator. 1953-61.
- Oscar Jiménez Pinochet - ex-Nacista, Minister of Health 1957-58, Minister of Health during the Allende government (1970-73).
- Ricardo Lagos - economist, currently representative of the Socialist Party in the Alianza Democrática, Radical Party member and student leader in 1950s.
- Jorge Lavanderos - Deputy (Independent) in 1950s, later Deputy for the Christian Democratic Party.
- Javier Lira Merino - ex-Nacista, member of the Agrario Laborista Party, Deputy and Ambassador to Italy during the second Ibáñez administration, Ambassador to Venezuela during the government of Frei (1964-70).
- Tomas Moulián. - sociologist in FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales).
- Eduardo Ortiz - President of VECTOR (Institute of Social Sciences).
- Anibal Pinto - economist at ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), journalist, and ex-owner of Las Noticias de Última Hora with Clodomiro Almeyda.
- Sergio Recabarren - ex-Nacista, Deputy, Ministry of the Treasury and Ministry of the Interior during the second Ibáñez administration.
- Raul Rettig - ex-President of the Radical Party, ex-Senator, currently President of the Colegio de Abogados.

- Patricio Rojas - Falangista in the 1950s and student leader, Minister of the Interior during the Frei government (1964-70).
- Oscar Salas - ex-Nacista, regular contributor to Estanquero, executive of the Cámara de Comercio.
- Rafael Tarud - twice Minister of the Economy (1953-4, 1955), Senator 1957-73.
- Oscar Waiss (Madrid, 1984) - member of the Socialist Party, journalist, ex-editor of La Nación.
- (5) Cámara de Comercio, Memorias, 1951-59.

(6) Party Documents:

Unpublished materials and documents (including speeches, conference memoranda and minutes, private and party correspondence, party propaganda and bulletins and records of party congresses) from the Movimiento Nacional Socialista, Movimiento Nacionalista de Chile and Agrario Laborista Party. Personal libraries of Guillermo Izquierdo, Alejandro Hales and Oscar Jimenez.

Unpublished letter from Raul Ampuero to the author.

Cuenta de la Gestion Desarrollada por la Junta Nacional Ejecutiva durante el periodo comprendido entre el 13/IX/1952 - el 25/IV/1953 - Radical Party National Conference.

Secondary Sources

(1) Books

- Jorge Ahumada, En Vez de la Miseria. Editorial del Pacifico, Santiago, 1958.
- Clodomiro Almeyda, Reflexiones Politicas. Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1958.
- Edesio Alvarado, El Turco Tarud Ediciones Territorio, Santiago, 1930.
- Alan Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement, O.U.P., London, 1972.
- Raul Ampuero, Democracia y Revolución. Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1955.

- Raul Ampuero, La Izquierdo en Punto Muerto, Orbe, Santiago, 1969.
- René Arriagada and Sergio Onafre Jarpa, Por una política nacional, Ediciones 'Nueva Política', Santiago, 1952.
- Jorge Barria, El Movimiento Obrero, Trígono, Santiago, 1971.
- Jorge Barria, Historia de la CUT, Prensa Latino America, Santiago, 1971.
- Harold Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda and the North, Athlone Press, London, 1974.
- Ricardo Boizard, El Caso Kelly, Ediciones Andes, Buenos Aires, 1957.
- Bernadino Bravo Lira, Regimen de Gobierno y Partidos Politicos en Chile, 1924-1973, Editorial Juridica de Chile, Santiago, 1978.
- Leonides Bravo, Lo que supo un auditor de guerra, Editorial del Pacifico, Santiago, 1955.
- Ben Burnett, Political Groups in Chile, University of Texas, London, 1970.
- G. Campos Menendez (ed.), Pensamiento Nacionalista, Editorial Gabriela Mistral, Santiago, 1975.
- F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, University of California Press, London, 1979.
- Alejandro Chelén, La Trayectoria del Socialismo, Austral, Santiago, 1966.
- Ricardo Cruz-Coke, Geografía Electoral de Chile, Ediciones de Pacifico, Santiago, 1952.
- G. Connell Smith, The United States and Latin America: an historical analysis of interamerican relations, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1974.
- Luis Correa Prieto, El Presidente Ibáñez, Orbe, Santiago, 1962.
- Peter Deshazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, University of Wisconsin Press, London, 1983.
- Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoleedor: cincuenta años de historia política de Chile, Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1954.
- Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, University of Illinois, London, 1978.

- Florencio Durán Bernales, El Partido Radical, Editorial Nascimento, Santiago, 1959.
- Rene Leon Echaiz, Evolución histórica de los partidos políticos, Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1971.
- Alberto Edwards Vives and Eduardo Frei, Historia de los partidos políticos chilenos, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1949.
- R. Ffrench-Davis, Políticas Económicas de Chile, 1952-1970, Ediciones Nueva Universidad y Cieplán, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 1973.
- Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy, Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey, 1985.
- Eduardo Frei, La verdad tiene su hora, Ediciones del Pacífico, Santiago, 1955
- Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1984.
- Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.
- Horacio Gamboa, En la Ruta del Dos de Abril, Imprenta Fantasía, Santiago, 1962.
- Gino Germani, T. DiTella and Octavio Ianni (eds.), Populismo y Contradiciones de clase en Latinoamérica, Ediciones Era, Mexico, 1973.
- Gino Germani, The Sociology of Modernization, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1981.
- F. Gil, The Political System of Chile, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1966.
- Mario Gongora, Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX, Ediciones la Cuidad, Santiago, 1981.
- J. Gonzalez von Marées, El concepto nazi del Estado, La Tracción, Santiago, 1932.
- J. Gonzalez von Marées, El problema del hambre, Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago, 1937.
- J. Gonzalez von Marées, La Verdadera Revolución (radio speech), El Imparcial, Santiago, 1936.
- George Grayson, El Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, Santiago, 1968.

- Alejandro Hales, El Corporativismo en el pasado y en el presente, Editorial San Francisco Padre Las Casas, Santiago, 1945.
- Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965.
- Julio Heise Gonzalez, Historia Constitucional de Chile, Editorial Juridica de Chile, Santiago, 1954.
- Felipe Herrera, Desarrollo Económico o Estabilidad Monetaria, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1958.
- Albert Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1963.
- Albert Hirschman (ed.), Latin America: Issues, Essays and Comments, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961.
- Jorge Hubner Gallo, Los Católicos en la política, Editorial Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1959.
- G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (eds.), Populism, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969.
- Julio Cesar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile, Prensa Latinoamericana, 2 vols, Santiago, 1971.
- Julio Cesar Jobet, El Socialismo a través de sus Congresos, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1963.
- Julio Cesar Jobet and Alejandro Chelén (eds.), Pensamiento Teórico y Político del Partido Socialista, Quimantú, Santiago, 1972.
- Julio Cesar Jobet, Recabarren: los orígenes del movimiento obrero y del socialismo chileno, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1955.
- Carlos Keller, La Eterna Crisis Chilena, Editorial 'El Imparcial', Santiago, 1931.
- Carlos Keller, Spengler y la situación político cultural de America-Iberica, La Tracción, Santiago, 1927.
- Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London, 1977.
- Jaime Larraín García, Chile, Avanzada de Occidente en el Pacifico Sur, Editorial 'Nueva Política', Santiago, 1955.
- W. Laquer (ed.), Fascism, a Reader's Guide, Penguin, Middlesex, 1976.
- Norbert Lechner, La Democracia en Chile, Ediciones Signos, Buenos Aires, 1970.

- Brian Loveman, Chile, O.U.P., London, 1979.
- Alejandro Magnet, Nuestros Vecinos Justicialistas, Ediciones de Pacífico, Santiago, 1953.
- M. Mamalakis, The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From Independence to Allende, Yale University Press, London, 1976.
- Rene Montero Moreno, Confesiones Politicas, Edition Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1958.
- Theodore Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, Princeton University Press, London, 1974.
- James O. Morris, Elites, Intellectuals and Consensus, Cornell University, New York, 1966.
- Frederico Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-31: The Honourable Mission of the Armed Forces, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1970.
- Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernisation and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.
- James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, University of California Press, London, 1969.
- F.B. Pike, Chile and the U.S., 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to U.S. Diplomacy, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 1965.
- Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue, La Masonería y Su Influencia en Chile, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1973.
- Anibal Pinto, Chile, un Caso de Desarrollo Frustrado, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1959.
- Anibal Pinto, Chile, una Economía Dificil, Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1964.
- Próspero, Visión espectral de Chile, diez piedras en su camino, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1958.
- Hernan Ramirez Necochea, Historia del Imperialismo en Chile, Austral, Santiago, 1970.
- Sergio Recabarren, ¿Los Gremios en Lucha con los Partidos? Nueva Acción Política, Santiago, 1950.
- Sergio Recabarren, Por una Posición Renovadora Política del Agrario Laborismo, Nueva Acción Política, Santiago, 1951.

Boletín de Información General No 66. Estadísticas Electorales, 1925-1969. Dirección de Registro Electoral y Oficina de Informaciones del Senado (23/6/1970).

Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1957.

Instituto de Economía de la Universidad de Chile, Desarrollo Económico de Chile, 1940-1956, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1956.

Klein-Saks Mission, El programa de estabilización de la economía chilena y el trabajo de la Misión Klein-Saks, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1958.

Chile en el Siglo XX (Nos 1-12), Revista Hoy, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago, 1953.

Hispanic American Report, Stanford, California

(2) Articles:

Roger Abbot, 'The Role of Contemporary Political Parties in Chile', American Political Science Review, Vol. XLV, No. 2, June 1951.

Werner Baer, 'The Inflation Controversy in Latin America', Latin American Research Review, II, no. 2, 1964, pp.3-25.

Manuel Barrera, 'Perspectiva histórica de la huelga obrera en Chile', Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, September 1971.

Andrew Barnard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean relations with the United States', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1981.

H.E. Bicheno, 'Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History, 1920-1970', K. Medhurst (ed.), Allende's Chile, Granada Publishing Ltd., Norwich, 1972.

Cole Blaiser. 'Chile: A Communist Background'. Political Science Quarterly, LXV, September 1950.

Frank Bonilla. 'The Student Federation of Chile: 50 Years of Political Action', Journal of Inter American Studies, Volume II. No. 1, January 1960, pp.311-334.

J.R. Bowman and M. Wallenstein, 'The Fall of Balmaceda and Public Finance in Chile', Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 10, Nos 2-3 (Spring and Summer), 1983.

- Karen Rémmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, University of Nebraska Press, London, 1984.
- Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, Macmillan, London, 1979.
- Carlos Saez Morales, Recuerdos de un soldado, 3 vols, Editorial Ercilla, Santiago, 1933.
- Maximiliano Salinas Campos, Clotario Blest, Arzobispado de Santiago, Vicaría de la Solidaridad, Santiago, 1980.
- Enrique Sierra, Tres Ensayos de Estabilización, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1970.
- Alfonso Stephens Freire, El Irracionalismo Político en Chile, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1957.
- John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front, Wesport Conn, Greenwood, 1970.
- Barbara Stallings, Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, Stanford, California, 1978.
- George Strawbridge, Ibáñez and Alessandri: the Authoritarian Right and the Democratic Left in Twentieth Century Chile, Buffalo, New York, 1971.
- R. Thorp and L. Whitehead (eds.), Inflation and Stabilisation in Latin America, Macmillan, London, 1979.
- German Urzua Valenzuela, Los Partidos Políticos Chilenos, Editorial Juridica de Chile, Santiago, 1968.
- Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Chile: Politics and Society, Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1976.
- Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Vol. 4: Chile, John Hopkins University Press, London, 1978.
- Augusto Varas, Felipe Agüero, and Fernando Bustamante, Chile, Democracia, Fuerzas Armadas, Flacso, Santiago, 1983.
- Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, O.U.P., London, 1965.
- Oscar Weiss, Nacionalismo y Socialismo en America Latina, Ediciones Iguazú, Buenos Aires, 1961.
- Ernesto Würth Rojas, Ibáñez, Caudillo Enigmático, Ediciones del Pacífico, Santiago, 1958.
- Maurice Zeitlin, The Civil Wars in Chile, Princeton University Press, Guildford, 1984.

- Donald Bray, 'Peronism in Chile', Hispanic American Historical Review, Volume 42, No. 1, February 1967, pp.38-49.
- Alejandro Chelén, 'Flujo y Reflujo de Socialismo Chileno', in Julio Cesar Jobet and Alejandro Chelén (eds.), Pensamiento Teorico y Politico del Partido Socialista, Quimantú, Santiago, 1972, pp.209-225.
- Luis Cruz Ocampo, "El Fracaso de la Democracia", Atenea, Año X, no. 100, August 1933.
- Ricardo Cruz-Coke. 'Geografía electoral de Santiago', Política y Espíritu, 1/10/1953.
- Ricardo Cruz-Coke, 'Nueva geografía presidencial', Política y Espíritu, 1/11/1958.
- Torcuato Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, O.U.P., London, 1965.
- Robert Dix, 'Populism: Authoritarian and Democratic', Latin American Research Review. Vol. XX, No. 2. 1985, pp.29-52.
- Paul Drake, 'Corporatism and Functionalism in Modern Chilean Politics', Journal of Latin American Studies. Volume 10, No. 1, 1978. pp.83-116.
- Paul Drake, 'The Chilean Socialist Party and Coalition Politics, 1932-46', Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 53, No. 4, November 1973, pp.619-643.
- Enrique Epstein, 'Anti-inflationary Policies in Argentina and Chile (or who pays the cost?)', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, July 1978.
- David Felix, 'An Alternative View of the "Monetarist-Structuralist" Controversy', in A. Hirschman (ed.), Latin America: Issues. Essays and Comments, New York, 1961.
- Cristian Gazmuri, 'La historia de Chile republicano, ¿una decadencia?. Alternativas (revista del centro de estudios de la realidad contemporánea académica del humanismo cristiano). No. 5. June 1984, pp.106-155.
- Eugenio Gonzalez Rojas, 'El Socialismo Frente al Liberalismo', in Julio Cesar Jobet and Alejandro Chelén (eds.), Pensamiento Teorico y Politico del Partido Socialista, op.cit.
- Joseph Grunwald, 'The "Structuralist" School on Price Stabilisation and Economic Development: The Chilean Case'. in A. Hirschman (ed.), Latin America: Issues, Essays and Comments, op.cit.

- Dale Johnson, 'The National and Progressive Bourgeoisie in Chile', Comparative International Development, Vol. 4, No. 4, California, 1969.
- Flavian Levine Bawden, 'Analizando los problemas: errores que se repiten', Panorama Económico, No. 178, 25/10/1957, pp.67-85.
- Tomas Moulián, 'Lineas Estrategicas de la Izquierdo: Frentismo, Populismo, anti-reformismo, 1933-1973', Documento de TrabajoFLACSO, No. 142, May 1982.
- Ronald Newton, 'Indifferent Sanctuary: German-Speaking Refugees and Exiles in Argentina, 1933-34', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 4, November 1982.
- F. Nunn, 'Military Rule in Chile: The Revolutions of September 5th 1924, and January 23rd 1925', Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII, no. 1, February 1967, pp. 1-21.
- P. O'Brien, 'A Critique of Latin American theories of dependency', in I. Oxaal et al (eds), Beyond the Sociology of Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975.
- Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency: A Formal Model of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of Underdevelopment', World Development, No. 6, 1978, pp.881-924.
- Edmundo Perez, 'Seis Meses de la Mission Klein-Saks', Principios, No. 35, July-August. 1956.
- Anibal Pinto, 'Desarrollo Economico y Relaciones Sociales en Chile', El Trimestre Economico, No. 120, October-December 1963.
- B. Pollack, 'Enfoques' sobre los regimenes autoritarios en America Latina', Sistema, Nos 60-61, June 1984, pp.37-62-
- B. Pollack and H. Rosenkranz, 'Political Strategies and Mobilisation in Chile, 1963-73', B. Pollack (ed.), Mobilisation and Socialist Politics in Chile, Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, Monograph Series, No. 9, 1980.
- Raul Prebisch. 'El falso dilema entre desarrollo economico y estabilidad monetaria', Bolétin Economico para America Latina ECLA, Vol. VI, No. 1, March 1961.
- C. Pregger Roman, 'The origins and development of the bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Chile', Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 10, Nos 2-3 (Spring and Summer), 1983.

- James W. Prothero and Patricio E. Chaparro, 'Public Opinion and the Movement of the Chilean Government to the Left, 1952-1972', in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Chile: Politics and Society, Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1976.
- Oswaldo Sunkel, 'Change and Frustration in Chile', in Claudio Veliz, Obstacles to Change in Latin America, O.U.P., London, 1965.
- Oswaldo Sunkel, 'La Inflación Chilena: Un Enfoque Heterodoxo', El Trimestre Económico, October-December 1958.
- Alejandro Silva Bascuñan, 'Notas para una crítica de la constitución', Anales de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Católica, Año XXX, 1957.
- Volodio Teitelboim, 'Algunas Experiencias Chilenas sobre el Problema de la Burguesía Nacional', Principios, July 1959, No. 59, pp.20-30.
- John Thompson, 'The Third Congressional District Election of March 23', Hispanic American Report, Vol. XI, No. 3, March 1958, pp.159-165.
- M. Zeitlin, 'The Social determinants of political democracy in Chile', in M. Zeitlin and James Petras (eds), Latin America: Reform or Revolution, Fawcett, London, 1968.
- (3) Unpublished Theses:
- Donald Bray, Chilean Politics During the Second Ibáñez Administration, 1952-58, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1961.
- Marcelo Cavarozzi, The Government and the Industrial Bourgeoisie in Chile, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1973.
- David Corkhill, Politics in the Era of the Popular Front, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Essex University, 1975.
- Philip Joseph Houseman, Chilean Nationalism, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1960.
- Eduardo Ortiz, Chilean Politics, 1931-32: The Effects of the World Depression, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Liverpool University, 1980.
- B. Pollack, The Chilean Socialist Party: A Case Study in Party Organisation, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Liverpool University, 1979.

Michael Potashnik, Nacismo: National Socialism in Chile,
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California,
Los Angeles, 1974.