

ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS, 1625-1660

by

ALASTAIR MacFADYEN

A dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor
in Philosophy in the University of Liverpool.

September 1967.

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Since my first course of postgraduate research was devoted to the preparation of a dissertation entitled 'Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1604-1625', the present dissertation completed my study of Anglo-Spanish relations during the first half of the seventeenth century. My first aim in preparing this dissertation was to make a close examination of certain particular aspects of relations between England and Spain during the first half of the seventeenth century. I was particularly interested in Anglo-Spanish commercial relations, and hoped to be able to demonstrate the nature of the trade between the two countries and to explain its value for England. I was also anxious to consider the effects of war upon Anglo-Spanish commerce. The consequences of the war which concluded the period covered by this dissertation were of particular interest, since Cromwell's critics have charged him with endangering Anglo-Spanish trade by bringing the two countries to war in 1655.

Other particular questions which motivated the study and research for this dissertation were in connection with developments in the New World during the first half of the seventeenth century. A consideration of these developments was necessary, in the first place, in order to appreciate fully the significance of Anglo-Spanish commerce in Europe. With regard to America and its impact on Anglo-Spanish relations, I also wished to consider Spanish policy in America, particularly towards the Englishmen and the

and the English colonies which appeared there during the first half of the seventeenth century. Although it has never been doubted that the charges made by Cromwell against Spain to justify his West Indian expedition of 1655 were exaggerated, the Spanish case has not been satisfactorily examined and presented by any English study of the subject.

It was primarily to consider these particular aspects of Anglo-Spanish relations that this dissertation was prepared, although it was found necessary to include the essential background of diplomatic history for the period studied.

Owing to a lack of reliable statistical records, I had to rely upon sources of a less precise nature when considering Anglo-Spanish trade, but the evidence gained from them was sufficient to establish the fact that England derived great benefit from her commercial links with Spain during the seventeenth century. One of the most important benefits of the Spanish trade was that England was given access to Spanish America, and the evidence drawn from both English and Spanish sources confirmed the view that the English merchants of the first half of the seventeenth century were disinclined to have direct commercial dealings with Spanish America and preferred to obtain their share of the profits of the Spanish American trade indirectly through Spain. My researches also proved that war between

England and Spain did not halt trade between the two countries. During Cromwell's war particularly, trade continued and was able to survive the war virtually unimpaired.

In connection with Spain's American policy, this dissertation has shown that on the question of her colonial monopoly Spain remained firmly uncompromising, even when the refusal to admit foreigners to the colonies threatened, as it did in 1655, to result in war with England. However, the researches for the dissertation have also revealed that Spain's American policy during the first half of the seventeenth century was not as inflexible as it has often been represented. In practice the Spanish government no longer claimed to monopolise the North American territories possessed by England and was disposed to be lenient in its handling of Englishmen captured in the Caribbean, even though from the Spanish point of view they could be treated as pirates since there was no legal justification for their presence in America. Such modifications of her policy were due to Spain's determination, evident throughout the period, to remain on good terms with England, and when the dangers of war with that country were accentuated by the establishment of strong republican government there, the Spanish government was prepared to concede formal recognition of the English colonies in the Caribbean.

These concessions, although regarded by Spain as considerable, were not sufficient to secure the friendship of Cromwell and to deter him from launching his attack on the Spanish West Indies in 1655.

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DATES

The New Style calendar is used throughout the dissertation.

INTRODUCTION

"So it was resolved to send a fleet and land forces into the West Indies, where it was taken for granted that the peace was already broken by the Spaniard contrary to the former treaties, and not to meddle with anything in Europe until the Spaniard should begin" (John Thurloe, 1655).¹

"The success of the design in the West Indies will not require any answer about the importation of bullion" (Edward Montagu's notes on the debates in the Protector's Council, 1654).²

"Those who have acquaintance with affairs here think that the war with the Spaniards will bring great harm to England, and particularly to the present government. The most dangerous question for the future is that the people will suffer from diminishing gains and fresh losses. The losses consist in the augment of taxes and the diminution in the interruption of trade and the cessation of business with the Spanish dominions, which have simultaneously enriched the customs and proved a gold mine to trade" (Giovanni Sagredo to the Doge, 1655).³

In spite of Cromwell's efforts to give them the appearance of a crusade, the West Indian expedition which sailed from England in December 1654, and the outbreak of war with Spain which followed almost twelve months later, were not unanimously approved by English opinion. As the above extract from a despatch of the shrewd and well-informed Venetian ambassador indicates, those who opposed Cromwell's actions did so chiefly for commercial reasons. They argued that the Spanish trade made a large contribution to England's commercial prosperity and that its disruption as a result of war would do their country great harm. In connection with Anglo-Spanish trade, two particular questions will be examined in this dissertation: Why was it considered so valuable by those who opposed the ending of peaceful relations with Spain?; and to what extent were they proved correct in what they forecasted about the consequences of a war? These two questions will require a consideration, first, of the nature of the Spanish trade, and, secondly, of the effects upon it of the two wars which open and close the period being studied. The objections to the West Indian expedition, and to the war with Spain which it threatened to bring, were answered, as the first two of the above quotations show, with the assurances that Cromwell's Caribbean venture would compensate for any commercial losses sustained in Europe, and that, in any case, hostilities could be confined to America, where, because of Spanish policy, a state of war already existed. These assurances give

rise to other interesting questions. What was the justification for the assumption that events in the Caribbean would have no bearing on Anglo-Spanish relations in Europe? Was Cromwell's denunciation of Spanish policy in America justified? Was there any justification for assuming that the trading opportunities in the Caribbean, which the expedition of 1655 was intended to enlarge, were either available or even acceptable to English merchants as an alternative to the opportunities offered by Spain in Europe? Commercial and colonial developments in the New World during the first half of the seventeenth century and their effect upon Anglo-Spanish relations will have to be reviewed.

It was to consider these particular questions, rather than to give a full account and explanation of Anglo-Spanish diplomacy, that I prepared this dissertation. Part II of the dissertation is devoted to the questions mentioned. My intention in Part I has been to provide what I considered to be the essential background of diplomatic history for the period 1625 to 1660, and I have also taken the opportunity in the first part of the dissertation to restate the principles of seventeenth-century Spanish foreign policy which I developed fully in an earlier dissertation entitled 'Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1604-1625'.

My documentary sources were primarily Spanish. I used the vast collection of diplomatic papers stored in the archives at Simancas. The consultas recording the debates of the Spanish Council of State, together with the other documents included in the section Estado, enabled one to make a close observation of the actual process of Spanish policy making. In determining the nature of Spain's policy towards Europe in general and towards England in particular, I found the documentation published by Lonchay and Cuvelier under the title 'Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les Affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe. siècle' to be a valuable supplement to the diplomatic material available at Simancas. At Simancas I also made extensive use of the section Guerra y Marina; this section, as yet little used by historians, revealed a great deal about England's trade with Spain during the wars. Owing to the lack of reliable statistical evidence, I had to rely on material of a less precise nature for details concerning Anglo-Spanish trade. The Inquisition documents in the Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid provided much information about the English trading community in Spain during the seventeenth century, and about its relations with the Inquisition. The section of the dissertation dealing with America is based almost entirely upon material gathered in the Indies archives at Seville.

My main English sources were the unpublished and published state papers in the Public Record Office. When compared with the abundance of the Spanish records, the English material available to the student of seventeenth-

century Anglo-Spanish relations is very scant. The value of the State Papers Spanish was limited; regular diplomatic correspondence between London and Madrid ceased during the early stages of the Civil War and was not resumed until the Restoration. Additional Manuscripts in the British Museum and the published Clarendon and Thurloe papers helped to remedy some of the deficiencies of the Record Office state papers.

PART I

CHAPTER I

THE PEACE TREATY

War or peace?

"He who advises war must surely wish to see our country ruined". This is how Olivares summed up his opinion when the question of war with England was debated by the Spanish Council of State in April 1624.¹ Since 1604, and more especially since 1618, the objective of Spanish diplomacy had been to preserve the peace with England, and in 1624, when war seemed likely following the complete breakdown of the protracted marriage treaty negotiations, the value of that peace for Spain was never more evident. Spain was already overburdened with war in Europe. In the Netherlands the war had started again with the rebellious northern provinces after a period of truce, whilst in Germany, where in the summer of 1625 the King of Denmark intervened to rally the opponents of the Hapsburgs, Spain was also committed to participate in the war there not merely because of family ties with the ruling house of Austria, but because Philip IV was now in possession of German territory, the Lower Palatinate, which had been captured in 1620 in order to safeguard the vital land routes linking Italy and the Netherlands. The preservation of those lines of communication had already involved Spain in a war with France in Italy, and in 1624 and 1625 Richelieu's renewed efforts to close the important Alpine valley of the Valteline resulted in further hostilities. With such onerous commitments abroad, it is hardly surprising that Spain

should have wished to avoid war with England, and although Olivares and the Council of State recommended that preparations for war should be made in April 1624,² it was not until the English fleet appeared at Cadiz in the autumn of 1625 that the existence of a state of war with England was finally recognised in Spain.³

The seriousness of the loss of England's friendship in 1625 can only be fully understood if one bears in mind the great importance which seventeenth century Spain attached to her possessions in the Low Countries. It is clear from contemporary sources of every kind that for most seventeenth century Spaniards the future of the whole Spanish empire was identified very closely with their country's efforts to retain the loyal southern provinces of the Netherlands and, during the first half of the century at least, to recover the rebellious northern provinces. England's neutrality was always considered vital for the achievement of these aims. And now that England had joined the ranks of Spain's enemies, Philip IV and his government in 1625 were faced with the urgent necessity of finding new ways to bring the war in the Low Countries to a satisfactory conclusion and to counteract the new dangers which England's enmity now presented.

The first project considered by Spain was a league with her allies in Germany. In Madrid this appeared to be the obvious solution to the many problems which faced both the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs, and in the months immediately following the outbreak of war with England much of

Spain's diplomatic energy was directed towards its conclusion. The idea, conceived chiefly by Olivares, was that Spain would unite with the Emperor and the Catholic League to bring about the destruction of their respective enemies and to re-establish peace in Germany and the Low Countries. Since Spain had not hesitated to give assistance to the Emperor, it was not considered unreasonable in Madrid that the Germans should reciprocate by assisting Philip IV against the Dutch.⁴ But this expectation of German help in the Low Countries hampered the formation of a Hapsburg league, for although the Emperor and Maximilian of Bavaria were anxious to secure as much Spanish help as was possible against the invading Danish armies, they were not prepared to become involved in a war with the United Provinces. It was the German refusal to agree to Spain's demand for a declaration of war on the Dutch which prevented a conference, opened in Brussels in 1626, from reaching an agreement on the proposed league.⁵ Although the idea of a Hapsburg league was not entirely abandoned by Spain, it was clear that it would have to be given up for the time being at least, and in July 1628 the Archduchess Isabella in Brussels was informed by Philip IV that there was no hope at the present time of the Emperor joining the war against the rebels.⁶ Disappointed with the outcome of its plans for a German alliance, in 1627 the Spanish government turned its attention to a second project, the aim of which, rather surprisingly, was to form an alliance with Spain's traditional enemy, France.

The differences between France and Spain in Italy were again resolved by the treaty of Monzon in 1626, and the advent of another Huguenot rebellion in the same year, and of war between France and England in the following year, seemed to provide an admirable opportunity for Louis XIII and Philip IV to enter into a union which would be of benefit to both countries. The principal object of the union was a concerted attack on England, and in return for Spanish help against the French Huguenots it was hoped that Louis XIII would be prepared to make important concessions with regard to the Dutch, who had been receiving French aid since the beginning of their rebellion.⁷ Suspicion of France was so deeply ingrained in Spain that some of Philip IV's councillors hesitated to agree with the proposal that Spain should help to bring about the surrender of La Rochelle, which Buckingham was proposing to assist with an English fleet in the summer of 1627; their hesitation and their apparent readiness to put matters of state before matters of religion earned them a sharp reproof from the King.⁸ Don Fadrique de Toledo eventually sailed northwards with a Spanish fleet in November 1627, but by then the English armada had already been forced to retire from the Isle of Rhé.⁹ This in fact was the only assistance which Spain offered to France, because it became increasingly obvious during 1628 that Spain's hopes of reciprocal concessions from Richelieu and Louis XIII would never be realised. It was clear that in the Low Countries, where in October 1627 France had made another subsidy

treaty with the Dutch, and especially in Italy, that Richelieu intended to continue his policy of seizing every opportunity to embarrass Spain. Such an opportunity was furnished by the succession in 1627 of a Frenchman, the Duke of Nevers, to the duchy of Mantua. Spain's fears, confirmed by what Ambrosio Spinola was able to report following the conversation he had had with Louis XIII and Richelieu whilst passing through France on his way from Brussels to Madrid,¹⁰ were that France would use the succession of the Duke of Nevers as a pretext for further intervention in Italy and for acquiring territory there.¹¹ Prompted by these fears, early in 1628 Philip IV ordered his troops in Milan to occupy Monteferrat, a strategically important part of the Mantuan estates situated on Milan's western frontier, and by doing so the King not only destroyed any chance that there was of achieving a Franco-Spanish alliance, but also brought the two countries a step nearer another war in Italy. The expected French invasion came in March 1629.

In 1628 Spain's problems abroad were as great as they had been in 1625. Efforts to lessen them by means of the German and French alliances had been unsuccessful. In addition, Spain was also facing a serious financial crisis. As the plan, conceived by Olivares in 1624, for a more equitable distribution of responsibility for the defence of Spain's scattered dominions had not been realised,¹² Castile alone continued to bear the burden of financing Spain's costly exploits abroad. But Castile's resources were

steadily dwindling during the seventeenth century, and, consequently, the Spanish government's constant problem was how to find enough money to meet all the demands which were being made on the royal treasury. The shortage of money, aggravated in 1628 by the destruction of the New Spain fleet by Piet Heyn off the coast of Cuba, was felt most acutely in the Low Countries. Despatches from Brussels frequently protested that the continuation of the war against the Dutch was being hampered by the inadequacy of the supplies to Flanders from Spain of both men and money. The difficulties experienced by the government in Brussels seem to have given it a very realistic appreciation of Spain's capabilities; the same cannot always be said of the government in Madrid. For example, the Archduchess Isabella had to reject a proposal from Madrid that she should take advantage of the absence of Buckingham's fleet from England in 1627 and send an expedition of 1500 men to the English coast; her reasons were, first, that she could not afford to take 1500 men from her armies, and, secondly, that such numbers could achieve little against England.¹³ And it was Ambrosio Spinola, after a long period of service in the Low Countries, who insisted that Spain could not hope to be able to pursue wars with England, France and the Dutch rebels all at the same time.¹⁴ In view of its experiences, it is not surprising that, as in 1604,¹⁵ the first steps towards a peace settlement with England should have been taken by the government of the Archduchess.

A peace between England and Spain was first broached in the spring of 1627 when Peter Paul Rubens, on behalf of the Archduchess, and Balthazar Gerbier, on behalf of the Duke of Buckingham, entered into an informal discussion about the possibility of a settlement.¹⁶ Madrid did not object to these discussions when they were recommended by the Archduchess; they were to be continued, but not in the King's name and only with the intention of prolonging them until the alliance with France had been concluded.¹⁷ The impossibility of achieving that alliance and the other circumstances already mentioned had the effect of changing radically the attitude of the Spanish government to the peace with England, and by the summer of 1628 it was realised that a settlement had to be obtained. News of the imminence of the surrender of La Rochelle and the possibility of an Anglo-French peace gave added urgency to the pursuit of an Anglo-Spanish peace.¹⁸ "It is essential that peace is made with England", Philip IV wrote to the Archduchess in December 1628; he also asked her to convey to the English government his desire to receive an English ambassador in Madrid so that a treaty could be concluded as quickly as possible.¹⁹

Peace with Spain was also welcomed in England. Charles I had gone to war in 1625 because negotiations with Spain had failed to secure the restoration of the territorial possessions of the Elector Frederick. Whilst Philip IV had promised to use his influence with the Emperor to further the cause of the Elector, he had refused to accept the English demand that

he should promise to bring about the restoration of the entire Palatinate by force of arms if that were necessary. And since 1625 Charles I had tried in two ways to hasten the recovery of the Palatinate; first by attacking Spain and thereby breaking the peace treaty of 1604, and secondly by actively assisting Frederick's friends and allies in Germany. Both of these projects had proved ineffectual very largely because of the King's increasing poverty. Parliament had not responded as generously as was expected to the King's appeal for its full co-operation in a war which was to be waged on behalf of Prince Frederick and the Protestant cause. Parliament's failure to co-operate finally resulted in a dissolution in March 1629 which was to last for the next eleven years. Therefore, Charles I was incapable of engaging in active warfare against Spain, Germany and also France, and it was his favourite Buckingham who, through his own confidant Balthazar Gerbier, explored the possibilities of a peace with Spain early in 1627. Buckingham's assassination in September 1628 did not lessen England's inclination towards peace. The man who replaced Buckingham as Charles I's most trusted adviser was Richard Weston, the Lord Treasurer, and he and Francis Cottington, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were strongly in favour of a reconciliation with Spain; it was their correspondence with Carlos Coloma, a former Spanish ambassador in London then residing in the Netherlands, and with Olivares himself in Madrid, which finally resulted in an agreed exchange of ambassadors between the two countries

and in the arrival of Francis Cottington in Madrid in December 1629 to begin negotiations officially.²⁰

The peace treaty and its problems

In Cottington's conferences with Olivares, the first two issues raised were the inclusion of the Dutch in the peace arrangements and the restitution of the Palatinate, and agreement on these two points was hampered from the beginning by the refusal of the United Provinces and of the Emperor to participate in the negotiations. The English government was bound to the Dutch by a treaty of alliance of June 1624, but the rejected invitation to take part in the conference, and Philip IV's consent to the proposal that the English government should have written authority to mediate between himself and the Dutch, were sufficient to persuade Charles I that he was released from his obligations under that treaty. Not only did he consider himself free to conclude peace without his Dutch allies, but he was also prepared to allow his ambassador to discuss the possibility of an anti-Dutch league with Spain. The form of such a league was actually agreed upon by Cottington and Olivares in January 1632; it was never ratified either by Charles I or Philip IV. The Palatinate was the other matter which occasioned long discussions between Olivares and Cottington. Naturally, the English government hoped for important concessions from Spain. But both Olivares and Carlos Coloma, who had gone to represent Philip IV in

London, made it clear that the restoration of the Palatinate could not be made a condition of the peace treaty, and all that Philip IV was prepared to do was to promise his support for Prince Frederick provided that the conduct of the latter enabled the Emperor to raise the Imperial ban which had been imposed upon him in 1620.²¹ This was what had been offered in 1625, and because of his dissatisfaction with it Charles I had gone to war. In 1630, however, he was not in a position to be able to bargain, and, consequently, he had to be satisfied with a written promise of Philip IV's support for his brother-in-law.

By the end of June 1630 the obstacles in the way of peace had been cleared to the satisfaction of both sides, and Francis Cottington, together with the two delegates appointed by Philip IV, the Count Onate and the Marquis of Flores Davila, was able to prepare for the renewal of the peace. The basis of the peace was to be the former treaty of 1604, but Cottington was informed by the Spanish commissioners that the Spanish government wished to make certain modifications and additions; these were, first, concessions for the English Catholics, second, Charles I's renunciation of the Dutch and the withdrawal of all English troops from their service, and, third, an acknowledgement of Spain's American monopoly.²² However, when Cottington stated that he was not empowered to admit any changes to the 1604 treaty, it was decided, in view of the necessity of ending the war with England as quickly as possible, that the peace would be renewed in its old

form. No doubt with the King of Sweden's recent invasion of Germany in mind, it was pointed out by the Council of State in Madrid that Spain's difficulties abroad had been much less in 1604 than they were in 1630.²³ The negotiators completed their work in Madrid in November, and the treaty was formally ratified and proclaimed by Charles I and Philip IV on 17 December 1630.

The Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations of 1604 had produced a treaty of compromise, the wording of which, inevitably, was vague and imprecise. The ambiguities of the treaty had raised problems for the subjects, and particularly the diplomatic representatives, of Philip III and James I, and as their treaty was retained and renewed virtually without change in 1630, these same problems were transmitted to the subjects and ambassadors of their successors. There was, for example, the question of Anglo-Spanish colonial and commercial rivalry in the Indies. The treaty omitted any precise reference to America, and when dealing with the re-establishment of commercial relations between the two countries, it merely accorded the English merchants the privilege of recovering trade where it had existed before the war, "agreeably and according to the use and observances of the ancient alliances and treaties".²⁴ Both James I and Charles I maintained that this clause did not exclude Englishmen from America, whilst Philip III and Philip IV claimed that it did. Outside the renewed treaty of 1630, there were the documents which had been

drawn up by Cottington and Olivares and which dealt with the Palatinate; there were also conflicting interpretations of their content. Both the Indies and the Palatinate issues will be dealt with more fully in later chapters. At this point detailed attention can be given to the effects and consequences of another ambiguous section of the treaty, namely its religious clauses.

Philip III and James I had agreed in 1604 that their subjects should have freedom of conscience when they visited their respective countries for the purpose of conducting trade, and that they should be allowed to practise their religion provided that they did not cause a "public scandal". Since, as will be explained later, the numbers of Englishmen residing either temporarily or permanently in Spain were considerably larger than the Spanish subjects living in England, these religious agreements were of much greater concern for the former than the latter. Because the treaty was unspecific about the extent of the religious freedom allowed, and about what constituted a "public scandal", detailed instructions regarding the application of the treaty were issued in Spain in 1631 by the Council of the Inquisition to all its provincial commissioners. The English visitors were not to be questioned about their religion by the Inquisition officers; they were to practise their religion in private, and eat meat on fast days in private; they were not to be allowed to proselytise; they were to be allowed the use of their own religious manuals provided that they had been clearly labelled

as books prohibited to Spanish catholics, but they were not to be permitted to bring into Spain religious books which were not for their own personal use; and, finally, they were to be required to make the proper reverences to the sacrament in churches and in the street.²⁵

The treaty was also vague about who exactly were the beneficiaries of its religious concessions in Spain; clearly, the visitors to Spain even for commercial reasons varied considerably. In the years immediately following 1604 this had been the cause of some friction between the Spanish authorities and the English diplomatic representatives. The English ambassadors had tried to win acceptance of their claim that the treaty's privileges were available to the whole of the English trading community residing in Spain. In reply, the Spaniards had insisted upon their interpretation of the treaty, which was that only the yentes y vinientes (comers and goers) could benefit from its religious clauses; these were the Englishmen whose stay in Spain was only long enough to allow them to complete their business transactions, and the Spanish aim had been to limit their period of stay as much as possible so as to exclude the majority of the members of the English community from the benefits of the treaty.²⁶ By 1631 the Inquisition was obviously disposed to be more generous in its interpretation of the treaty's religious clauses. Freedom of conscience was now to be given to those Englishmen who lived in casas posadas, which were lodging-houses kept by native catholics.²⁷ Clearly, this concession allowed many Englishmen to live in Spain for several years as protestants,

or, more precisely, without accepting catholicism. The evidence available from the Inquisition documents of the period indicates that this particular section of the English community in Spain made every effort to avoid giving offence in matters of religion. The case of Peter Wright, a native of Exeter who appeared before the Inquisition of Logrono in 1630, is a rare example of an Englishman who did transgress. In the presence of several witnesses he had denounced transubstantiation and the virginity of the Virgin Mary, but having acknowledged his errors, he was absolved and placed in a monastery for a year to receive instruction in catholicism.²⁸ Generally, the conduct of those Englishmen who had the benefit of the treaty's privileges was without reproach. From Bilbao in 1648, the Inquisition commissioner reported that there were nine casas posadas for Englishmen in the town and that he could find no fault with the behaviour of their occupants. This, he felt, was to some extent due to the fact that the houses were run by devout Biscayan catholics who would not permit their lodgers to be disrespectful to the catholic faith in any way; on a fast day, they would not even allow meat to be served to a sick man until a doctor's certificate had been obtained. Although attempts were made to convert the English, according to the Bilbao commissioner conversions were very few, and those who died as Protestants in Bilbao were buried at night in unmarked graves at some distance away from the town.²⁹

Excluded from the privileges accorded by the religious clauses of the treaty, and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Inquisition in matters of faith, were the permanent English residents, and from 1631 they were identified by the Spanish authorities as those Englishmen who either owned or rented living accommodation in Spain.³⁰ They could not be classed as yentes y vinientes. Again the Inquisition documents leave one in no doubt that these permanent residents did their best to conform with the requirements of the Inquisition; they lived as Catholics, or, at any rate, gave a very satisfactory appearance of doing so. Doctor Juan Ruiz de Occa, the priest in charge of the church of Santa Maria la Mayor in Seville, where many Englishmen lived, commended the conduct of his English parishioners very highly; they received the sacraments frequently, ate fish on fast days and gave generously to their parish church.³¹ Again the cases of Englishmen forcibly detained and tried by the Inquisition are exceptional, although large numbers did present themselves voluntarily in order to renounce their heresies, to be absolved and to receive further instruction when that was considered necessary. One example of these voluntary conversions is that of Thomas Pawley, a man who is in many ways typical of the men who made up the English community in Spain during the seventeenth century. Pawley, a Cornishman, was aged twenty-seven when he presented himself to the Inquisition in Bilbao in 1646. His parents were Protestants and at the

age of thirteen they had sent him to Spain to live with his uncle, William Pawley, who was a merchant living in Madrid. After seven years in Madrid, he had been sent to act as his uncle's agent in Bilbao, and it was there that he was converted to catholicism.³² Although the majority seemed determined to conform, it was apparently not impossible for Englishmen to live in Spain permanently without accepting catholicism as long as England and Spain were at peace; as soon as war broke out, conversion was forced upon them if they wished to remain in Spain. Four Englishmen imprisoned in the secret prison of the Inquisition of Murcia in 1626 confessed that they had lived in Spain for several years as protestants.³³ In 1648 the Council of the Inquisition was informed that an heretical Englishman, whose name according to all the Spanish records was Guillermo Guevo, was living in Malga with his wife and family, and yet it was not until 1658 that he was finally arrested and tried by the Inquisition.³⁴

In a country usually associated in the seventeenth century with the most extreme forms of religious intolerance and bigotry, it is surprising to find so much religious freedom granted to the English visitors to Spain. The Inquisition demonstrated its generosity by its relatively liberal attitude not only to those Englishmen whose consciences were afforded the protection of the peace treaty, but also to those who technically could not claim such protection.

Apart from the difficulties arising from the content of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty, the actual re-establishment of peace in 1630 also raised problems for the Spanish and English governments. For England, as in 1604, there were all the problems and embarrassments of neutrality to be faced. England's role as a belligerent in the war in the Low Countries, very limited though that had been, was terminated by the peace treaty, but it was clear from the start that steering a strictly neutral course in the war between England's former ally, the United Provinces, and Spain would not be easy.

The protection of England's ports was now available to both Spain and the United Provinces, but showing an increasing disregard for their former allies, the Dutch pursued their enemy's shipping into the English ports and captured them there. There were many ships from Dunkirk taken as prize by the Dutch in English ports after 1630, and Necolalde,³⁵ the Spanish agent in London, had instructions to protest against Charles I's failure in this respect to fulfil his obligations to Spain.³⁶ The Dutch gave further offence to the English government by their declared intention of putting a stop to trade between neutral countries and the Spanish dominions.³⁷ In fact, their attempts to apply this to English merchant shipping were rare. But these factors, together with the Dutch assertion of the principle of mare liberum as a defence of their intrusion into what were regarded as exclusively

English fishing waters in the North Sea, served to worsen Anglo-Dutch relations, already considerably strained by growing commercial rivalry in Europe and the Far East.

However, it was not only the Dutch who demonstrated the costly consequences of England's neutrality. Just as troublesome to England after 1630 were the privateers from Spain and Flanders. Operating in the Channel and on England's east and west coasts, they made little effort to distinguish between the shipping and property of friend and foe. Of the privateers from the Biscayan ports, Admiral Sir John Penington wrote in 1634: "These are none of the King of Spain's men of war, but picking rascals set out by private men, which come forth without any manner of provisions, and so are forced to rob every man they meet, and indeed are no other than pirates."³⁸ The privateers both from the Biscayan ports and from Dunkirk infested the Irish Sea and did much to disrupt traffic between England and Ireland during the 1630's.³⁹ In the Channel any small and unprotected trading vessels passing either to the United Provinces, or to France after 1635, were liable to be captured by the Dunkirk privateers.⁴⁰ Through his agent, Arthur Hopton,⁴¹ in Madrid, Charles I was able to make his protest against such violations of the peace, and he obtained in reply a promise of a full investigation both in Dunkirk and San Sebastian and a reaffirmation of Philip IV's determination to compel all his subjects

to observe the treaty of peace,⁴²

It was obvious that diplomatic protests would be of little avail unless Charles I himself took steps to enforce respect for his neutral position and to reassert England's claim of sovereignty in the Channel and North Sea. The attention which Richelieu gave to the French navy in preparation for a war with Spain gave added urgency to the need for such action; a stronger French navy was bound to add to England's difficulties at sea.⁴³ It was to meet the new naval challenge from France, as well as to command more respect from the United Provinces and Spain, that the first of the ship-money fleets was formed in 1635. In providing convoys to protect Anglo-Flemish commerce, the ship-money fleets performed a valuable service for English trade during the 1630's,⁴⁴ but their inability to re-establish firmly England's diminishing reputation at sea is fully demonstrated by the collision which occurred between the Spanish and Dutch fleets in the Downs in October 1639.

Faced with the continuation of the war in the Low Countries, Spain needed and expected to derive two immediate benefits from the peace with England. The first was the opportunity to make use of English shipping, and the second was the refuge now available in the English Channel ports for vessels prevented from reaching their destination in the Spanish Netherlands. As Spain's own declining ship building industry was unable to cope with the country's shipping needs, foreign ships had

either to be bought or hired. In both her imperial and European trades, Spain was very dependent upon foreign shipping during the first half of the seventeenth century, and in this connection, England had a very important contribution to make.⁴⁵ "They think nothing safe but what is not an English bottom", Hopton wrote in 1631.⁴⁶ It was English vessels, for example, which were very largely responsible for carrying on Spain's trade with the Netherlands. They were also used by the Spanish government to transport money and soldiers to the Low Countries, particularly after 1635 when war with France made the need to reinforce the Spanish armies in the Netherlands as often as possible more urgent. The Dutch objected strongly to English merchant ships serving Spain in this way, and although it was known that Dutch ships were also employed by Spain, Charles I did indicate that he was prepared to ban the use of English merchant ships for the transportation of Spanish soldiers if in return Admiral Tromp would refrain from stopping English ships in order to search them.⁴⁷ As no reply was received to this proposal, no such ban was issued, and during 1639, when Spain had plans for adding at least 16,000 Spaniards and Italians to the armies in the Netherlands,⁴⁸ many English ships were employed by the Spanish government. "Their transportation of men this year would have hardly been possible without the help of English shipping", Hopton wrote to Cottingham.⁴⁹ Eight English vessels were included in the large fleet which was formed at Corunna in the summer of 1639 in order to carry 9,000 men to Flanders.⁵⁰

The events associated with the Spanish fleet of 1639 are very well known. Alonso de Cardenas,⁵¹ Philip IV's agent in London, had orders to inform Charles I of its coming so that he would be ready to give it hospitality should either all or part of the fleet be forced into an English port.⁵² Charles I could not offer to convoy the fleet through the Channel since that would have compromised his neutrality.⁵³ When, after a battle in the Channel, the Spanish fleet, followed by the Dutch, sought refuge in the Downs, the King did endeavour to prevent the renewal of hostilities between the two fleets, but it does seem as though his actions were motivated as much by a desire to profit financially and politically from the presence of the two fleets in English waters as by a determination to remain strictly neutral.⁵⁴ But his hopes of financial gain were shattered by Admiral Tromp who, with complete disregard for the King and his navy, attacked the Spanish fleet. For both Spain and England the consequences of that attack in October 1639 proved very costly. For Spain it meant the loss of many valuable ships, and it also meant that the £11,000, which the fleet's stay in the Downs had cost Cardenas, had been spent in vain. Most of that sum had been used to purchase gunpowder and provisions for the fleet and to maintain the Spanish soldiers whilst they remained in England;⁵⁵ the rest was spent on bribes to influential Englishmen. The Master of Ordnance, the Earl of Newport, received £300 for facilitating the purchase of gunpowder from the royal stores, and for assisting in the arrangement of

a contract between Cardenas and the masters of seven English ships for the transportation of the stranded soldiers to Dunkirk.⁵⁶ Although it could not be counted in such material terms, the effect of the destruction of the Spanish fleet in 1639 was no less costly for England. Charles I suffered a considerable loss of prestige, and the events in the Downs demonstrated not only to Spain, but also to France, the United Provinces and to the King's own opponents at home, the feebleness of royal government in England.

Whilst the peace with Spain was to cause the government of England a great deal of embarrassment in international diplomacy, in other respects, as will be seen later, the treaty of 1630 was to prove very advantageous to England. The peace treaty affected Spain in much the same way; it had its advantages and disadvantages. In re-establishing the neutrality of England, the peace of 1630 fulfilled one of the chief aims of Spanish foreign policy in the seventeenth century. But it also presented Spain with some difficult problems, the principal one being the Palatinate. From 1630 until the outbreak of civil war in England, the Palatinate dominated Anglo-Spanish diplomacy.

CHAPTER I ITHE PALATINATE

With the peace signed and proclaimed, the Spanish ambassador, Don Carlos Coloma, prepared to leave London, and in his last royal audience, he was informed by the King that their two countries only had a peace which was "barely and simply concluded now with promise of further satisfaction".¹ Charles I was reminding the ambassador of the King of Spain's promises regarding the Palatinate. For the next decade, English diplomacy endeavoured to keep Spain to those promises. When direct negotiation with the King of Spain and the Emperor failed to achieve the immediate restitution of the Palatinate, the English government sought the aid of the enemies of the Hapsburgs. The governments of the United Provinces, France and Sweden were all invited to assist in the recovery of the Palatinate.² The invitations were declined when it became clear that the King, determined to rule without his Parliament, could offer but little in return for their assistance. It is true that he allowed Sweden and the United Provinces to recruit troops in England. It is also true that in 1637, having agreed that the young Prince Charles Lewis should be provided with a fleet,³ he gave the appearance at least of being ready to go to war with Spain, because he was so angered by that country's failure to fulfil her promises to him; the leading merchants in Spain were actually warned of the possibility of a breach with Spain by the ambassador, Baron Aston.⁴ But this was not

enough to satisfy the Dutch, the Swedes and the French. They wished to see Charles I firmly committed to the realisation of their plans. "Our hope is in a composition wherein everybody must be contented to forego their interest to fit us which is hard to believe", wrote Arthur Hopton.⁵ The King was no doubt also aware of the weakness of his position, but the fact is that he was not able to pay the price which was demanded for the Palatinate by the enemies of the Hapsburgs. That, however, is not the full explanation. There was also a great mistrust of the French and the Dutch which stemmed partly from the suspicion, particularly strong during the 1630's, that those two countries planned to absorb the Spanish Netherlands.⁶ Because of that mistrust, Charles I was always inclined more to Spain than to her enemies,⁷ although on occasions he seemed determined to demonstrate the contrary, and, inevitably, his failure to obtain help from elsewhere for the recovery of the Palatinate obliged him to fall back on the promises made by Philip IV. Unfortunately, Spain, no less than the United Provinces, Sweden and France, expected to be amply rewarded for her efforts to satisfy the King's desire for the complete reinstatement of his brother-in-law and later of his nephew.

The Palatinate and Spanish foreign policy

When Philip IV appointed the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo to take charge of state affairs in the Netherlands in 1643, he wrote to him as follows: "I entrust you with the most important part of my monarchy, for Flanders is the key to everything."⁸ The King in these few words was expressing

the most strongly held belief of seventeenth-century Spain. Mistaken though they may have been, it was nevertheless the conviction of all Spanish governments that the fate of the whole Spanish monarchy was dependent upon the Low Countries, and their conservation as part of the Spanish empire was the mainspring of Spain's foreign policies in Europe during the seventeenth century. Spanish policy with regard to the Palatinate was no exception.

Coinciding as it had done with the Spanish occupation of the valley of the Valteline, the seizure of most of the Lower Palatinate by Spinola in 1620 had taken place primarily for the purpose of safeguarding the communications of the Low Countries with Germany and the Spanish possessions in Italy. With the Dutch truce due to expire the following year, the advantages of the acquisition of the Lower Palatinate had been obvious in 1620, and since then it had not ~~ceased to~~ be regarded by Spain as a place of great strategic importance. Philip IV referred to it as "the bridge on the Rhine", and in 1638 wrote to the Cardinal Infante: "The Palatinate is the best guarantee of our continued possession of the Low Countries and Italy".⁹ But it had always been maintained both by Philip III and Philip IV that Spain had no intention of keeping the Palatinate. They had both insisted that it would be relinquished once they were assured of a permanent and universal peace, which, of course, would have to include a Dutch treaty acceptable to them.¹⁰ The unpopularity of Spain's

possession of German territory with the German princes, including the Catholic Electors and the Duke of Bavaria, had been very soon evident, and in 1629 and again in 1633, when it was suggested from Germany that Philip IV should renounce the Palatinate unconditionally in order to facilitate a peace settlement, the King and his government found it necessary to reassert and to defend their determination to hold the Palatinate until their conditions for relinquishing it had been entirely fulfilled. Their arguments were these. The conquest of the Palatinate, which had been Spain's contribution to the execution of the Imperial ban on Prince Frederick, had involved the country in a great deal of expense, and yet no compensation had been received from the Empire. Furthermore, the refusal of Philip IV to separate himself from the Emperor on the question of the Palatinate had resulted in a war with England, which Spain had had to fight alone. The opinion of the Spanish government was that for these reasons alone the retention of the Palatinate was justified until peace had been achieved. "We do not wish to be left with the Palatinate, but we do not wish to be left without it if we are not to be included in a universal peace", the Count-Duke stated at a Council meeting in 1630.¹¹ Naturally, the peace which Olivares had in mind encompassed the Low Countries and included the re-establishment of the King of Spain's sovereignty over the whole of these territories, and it was clear that one of the benefits which Spain hoped to derive from

the Palatinate was the assistance of the Emperor and his German allies in the reconquest of the rebel provinces.

Reference has already been made to the unsuccessful attempts made by Spain in 1626 to procure the formation of a Hapsburg league. The idea was revived again in 1629, and since it concerned the Palatinate and was being discussed at the same time as the peace with England, Spain's plans for the league had to be kept secret.¹² There was no doubt in Madrid as to which of the two negotiations was the more important. It was reckoned that the league would solve all Spain's difficulties, and although it might necessitate handing over the Palatinate, that loss would be fully compensated by German help in the Dutch war. It was emphasised that the Palatinate would not be renounced without the Emperor's open declaration of war on the Dutch.¹³ The Spanish government's enthusiasm for a Hapsburg league was not matched in Germany, and it became obvious that obtaining the league and German assistance against Spain's enemies required much more than the mere offer of the renunciation of the Palatinate.

Between 1630 and 1648, the ablest of Spain's diplomats were employed in Germany. They included the Duke of Tursi, the Marquis of Cadereyta, the Marquis of Castaneda, the Duke of Guastala, Jacques Bruneau, the County Onate, Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo and Antoine Brun. A great

deal depended on their diplomatic skill, for it was they who had the difficult task of convincing the Emperor and the Catholic princes of the Spanish view that the Low Countries were as important to Germany as they were to Spain. As the Spanish presence in the Low Countries had facilitated the survival of the Empire and the Catholic faith, the Germans had to be made to appreciate that they were under an obligation to perform some service for Spain in return.¹⁴ In winning acceptance of this view, the diplomatic skill of the ambassadors was reinforced by the money which they were required by their government to distribute regularly in the form of pensions to the Catholic Electors.¹⁵ The payment of pensions was considered to be the most effective way of counteracting the influence of the Duke of Bavaria. His opposition to German intervention in the Low Countries, and his negotiation of a treaty of neutrality with France in May 1631 made him in Spain's opinion "the greatest enemy of the House of Austria", and the Spanish diplomats received orders to reduce the Duke's influence and the Emperor's dependence on him by destroying the unity of the Catholic League; for this purpose, and regardless of the cost, they were to win over the electoral members of the League.¹⁶ Once Maximilian had committed himself again to the Imperial party, the government in Madrid decided on a policy of reconciliation with him, and Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo was entrusted with the task of enlisting his support for German intervention in the Low

Countries.¹⁷

If the Emperor and the Catholic princes were to be persuaded to take an active part in the Dutch war, it was clearly essential that their commitments inside and outside the Empire should be reduced to the minimum. For this reason it was Spanish policy in 1630 to persuade the Emperor to terminate the Italian war. The Emperor had joined in the war there because Mantua was an Imperial fief. Spain was largely responsible for setting this war in motion, and Philip IV does seem to have felt a personal sense of guilt for it.¹⁸ The Spanish government's realisation in 1629 of the impossibility of carrying on a war in Italy and in the Low Countries at the same time obliged it to advise the Emperor to negotiate a settlement of the Mantuan dispute with France. Freed from the Italian war, it was hoped that he would be more ready to accept the Hapsburg league.¹⁹ With the same objective in view, Philip IV and his ministers were also anxious to dissuade the Emperor from antagonising the Duke of Saxony by his determination to enforce the Edict of Restitution, which required the restoration of all ecclesiastical property. Explaining his decision to send an ambassador to the Duke of Saxony at the end of 1631, Philip IV said that he did not regard "this war as a war of religion". "In the present state of affairs, the Edict of Restitution can be nothing but harm to the Catholic Church", he added.²⁰ At first this was advice which was unacceptable in Vienna. John George of Saxony,

therefore, joined forces with Gustavus Adolphus, and it was not until May 1635 that he was persuaded to detach himself from the enemy in return for the Emperor's postponement of the execution of the Edict of Restitution.²¹

Of all the inducements offered to the Emperor and the Catholic League in order to obtain their active co-operation in the war against the United Provinces, and also against France when it became apparent that war with that country was inevitable, that which was expected to produce the best results was Spain's own contribution to the defence of Catholicism and the Austrian Hapsburgs. In the early stages of the German war, the Spanish ministers had had many doubts about the advisability of giving continued assistance to the Emperor. Did not Spain require to apply all her very limited resources to the Dutch war? And was it not also a fact that by conferring the electoral title upon Maximilian of Bavaria in 1621, against the advice of Madrid, the Emperor had prolonged the war and destroyed all hopes of an early settlement, and that in consequence the war's objective had become the conservation of the Duke's territorial and titular acquisitions.²² However, it had also been realised that Spain could not afford to witness the destruction of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and since 1618 the Spanish government had recognised that it had a duty to the Emperor which would have to be respected and fulfilled whatever the circumstances. Accordingly, from 1618 to about 1640, Spain, despite her great financial difficulties, donated

substantial sums of money for the war in Germany.²³ In 1632 it was felt that such monetary assistance was not enough, and Philip IV decided to stage a large military campaign in conjunction with the Emperor.²⁴ It was hoped that the planned campaign would end both the German and Dutch wars, but immediately Spain's aim was to secure the routes linking Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. The isolation of the Netherlands was threatened by the armies of Gustavus Adolphus and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar which had occupied the Lower Palatinate at the end of 1631, and also by Richelieu's intervention in Lorraine early in the following year.²⁵ The culmination of Philip IV's planning was the march of the Cardinal-Infante's army from Milan to the Netherlands and the defeat of the Swedes at Nordlingen in September 1634. This campaign, one of the most spectacular of the war, halted the Swedish successes and gave renewed confidence and power to the Emperor and his allies.

By all these means Spain endeavoured to win the full co-operation of the Empire. Count Onate finally succeeded in obtaining the Emperor's acceptance of an offensive and defensive treaty against the Dutch in October 1634. To the great disappointment of the government in Madrid, the treaty did not promise the Emperor's help against France, and it was not until two years later that Ferdinand II declared war on Louis XIII.²⁶ Onate's personal opinion in 1634 was that very little could be expected from Germany, even though the Emperor had accepted the treaty.²⁷ He was proved

correct. France's declaration of war in 1635 meant that Spain was now having to contend with a two-sided assault on the Netherlands, and, consequently, the appeals from Madrid and Brussels to the Emperor and the Catholic League for offensive action against France and the United Provinces became more frequent and more insistent. The Cardinal Infante wrote to the Marquis of Castaneda in 1637: "The situation worsens here. The only remedy is the immediate intervention of German forces".²⁸ These appeals, however, obtained no response. The Emperor did allow Imperial troops commanded by Piccolomini to join the Cardinal Infante in 1635, but they were withdrawn to Germany in 1639. The German invasions of the United Provinces and France, for which Spain petitioned, never came.

Since the beginning of the war in Germany the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs had disagreed on a number of issues. During the last stages of the war their differences became very marked and finally resulted in 1648 in the complete disintegration of the Austro-Spanish partnership. They were unable to agree as to which was the principal enemy of the Hapsburgs; for the King of Spain it was France and the United Provinces, whilst for the Emperor it was Sweden. Understandably, the Spaniards resented the application of all their contributions to the Swedish war. "The Emperor has done nothing with all the money he has been given, and any we give him in the future we shall have to consider as ~~lost~~", Philip IV informed the Cardinal Infante.²⁹ In fact, Spain's contributions

dwindled rapidly after 1640, for her resources became entirely absorbed by the French and Dutch wars and by the Portuguese and Catalan revolts.³⁰ The rift between Madrid and Vienna widened in consequence. A strong hostility to Spain was detected in Germany, and reports from there confirmed the belief in Madrid that the Emperor and his ministers would be prepared to sacrifice Spain's interests, especially in the Palatinate, in order to conciliate France, Sweden and England, and Ferdinand III had to be reminded again that the Palatinate would not be renounced without the assurance of a universal peace.³¹ Such reminders, however, were in vain, and in protest against the Emperor's failure to comply with his wishes in 1648, Philip IV refused to hand over Frankenthal, the last remaining Spanish garrison in the Palatinate, to the reinstated Elector. It was finally surrendered in exchange for the Imperial town of Besancon in 1651.³²

The principal objective of Spanish diplomacy after 1630 was undoubtedly the Hapsburg league, and it is against the background of the attempts to secure that league that Spain's relations with England have to be seen. Having failed to gain the full co-operation of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and since it was their intention to continue the Dutch war until a settlement satisfactory to Spain had been reached, the Spanish ministers realised that much attention had to be given to England if only to ensure that she remained neutral. The problem for Spain was that English neutrality and the Palatinate were inseparable issues.

Spain, England and the Palatinate

It was evident soon after the re-establishment of peace in 1630 that the chances of an agreement between Spain and England on the question of the Palatinate were very remote. Sir Robert Anstruther was sent by Charles I to Vienna early in 1631 to seek the restoration of the Palatinate. Anstruther soon learnt that the restoration of the Palatinate, even the Spanish part of it, would have to be bought by Charles I; his help against the Dutch was expected.³³ England, of course, had no intention of becoming involved in a war with the Dutch, and it was maintained that she was not required to do so either by the actual treaty of 1630 or by any of the additional documents prepared by Cottington and Olivares.³⁴ Spain argued differently, and had no intention of parting with the Palatinate without English assistance in the Dutch war, even though that may not have been specifically mentioned as a condition of restitution. "That restitution should be made to his brother-in-law and nephews whilst Your Majesty is left with a war with the Dutch, who are aided by English troops, is the crudest and most impious suggestion that has ever been made"; this was the Count-Duke's indignant comment on Charles I's protest that Philip IV, contrary to his promises, was putting difficulties in the way of the Palatinate's restoration.³⁵ Whilst it was clear, therefore, that Spain's price for the renunciation of the Palatinate would not be paid by Charles I, it was also clear that Spain could not afford to disillusion him

entirely on this matter. The approach of the war with France reinforced the necessity of not antagonising England.

When the councillors of state met in Madrid on 10 February 1634, they were told by the secretary of the Council, Andres de Rocas, that he had been instructed by the Count-Duke to inform the Council that the King wished to know what action the councillors recommended to ensure England's separation from France. The King wanted their advice on this matter because war with France seemed imminent. The councillors came to the conclusion that making firm proposals to Charles I regarding the Palatinate would be inadvisable. Such proposals would be likely to offend the Duke of Bavaria, whom Spain was then making great efforts to conciliate. The councillors added, however, and Philip IV agreed with them, that Necolalde could discuss the Palatinate with the English ministers provided that he did not involve the King's name. It was also agreed that Necolalde would probably find 20,000 ducats useful in persuading those ministers to consider a treaty with Spain.³⁶ In fact, Necolalde had no difficulty in keeping England away from France. Intensely suspicious of Franco-Dutch diplomacy during the early part of 1634, Charles I revived the Anglo-Spanish league which Cottington and Olivares had discussed in Madrid, and as a prelude to the conclusion of that league, a naval treaty was drawn up in London in August 1634. Charles I was to form a fleet for the purpose of guaranteeing free navigation through the Channel, and in return Philip IV was to furnish him with a loan.³⁷

The terms of the treaty were sent to Madrid, but from there no further progress was made. Each side blamed the other for the failure of the treaty. In Spain it was said that Charles I had been too evasive about the anti-Dutch league, whilst in England it was Philip IV's delay in providing the money which was blamed.³⁸ The Cardenal Infante had been directed from Madrid to provide the loan, but he had been unable to do so because of the costliness of the war in the Low Countries; in view of his financial problems, he did not feel that spending money in this way in England was justifiable.³⁹

The impossibility of making a treaty of alliance with England emphasised the importance of having a reliable ambassador in London. "It is essential that a capable diplomat be sent to England to thwart the designs of Louis XIII and our other enemies", the Cardenal Infante advised Philip IV.⁴⁰ However, some difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable man for the post of permanent ambassador,⁴¹ and in the meanwhile, it was decided that Count Onate y Villamediana, the son of Count Onate, should represent Philip IV as extraordinary ambassador in London.⁴² In view of the dangerous situation in the Low Countries, where the Spanish armies were now opposed by the French as well as by the Dutch, Philip IV realised that the Count could do no greater service for Spain if he succeeded in persuading the King of England to break with France and the United Provinces. But as that was a very doubtful possibility, the ambassador was instructed to aim at keeping

England neutral at least.⁴³ The importance which the Spanish government attached to the mission of Count Onate y Villamediana is indicated by the reference in his instructions to two items, both of which are very closely associated with Anglo-Spanish diplomacy of the Gondomar period. Onate was asked to investigate the possibility of reacquiring Spanish pensioners in England; the pensions paid by Gondomar had not been resumed in 1630. He was also empowered to propose an Anglo-Spanish marriage treaty should that prove helpful in achieving the main objectives of his mission.⁴⁴

During his stay in London, Onate y Villamediana was able to reopen negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish alliance. But the usual difficulties prevented the negotiations from making much progress. Charles I insisted on obtaining the complete restitution of the Palatinate before engaging in any hostile action against the Dutch. This was unacceptable to Spain.⁴⁵ At the same time as he was negotiating with the Spanish ambassador, Charles I was continuing his efforts to recover the Palatinate with the help of France.⁴⁶ The King also rejected Onate's request to be allowed to recruit English soldiers for Spain and the Low Countries, and granted permission instead to the Dutch.⁴⁷ And in spite of the strongest opposition offered by the Spanish ambassador, the King gave his consent to the lending of a fleet of ships to Prince Charles Lewis.⁴⁸ Philip IV and his ministers correctly interpreted these actions as an attempt by Charles I to intimidate

Spain, and as further proof of the fact that the English government had no intention of doing anything in return for Spain's renunciation of the Lower Palatinate.⁴⁹ Their response to these manoeuvres was firmly uncompromising. "It is essential that one displays no signs of fear when dealing with the English", wrote Onate from London, and in accordance with this advice, Baron Aston was bluntly informed in Madrid that the King of Spain did not want amistades amedias.⁵⁰ Charles I's failure to come to an understanding with Louis XIII ensured the success of the mission of Count Onate y Villamediana. The English alliance had again proved unobtainable, but England had remained neutral, and that, as the ambassador emphasised, had cost Philip IV nothing, nor had the King been obliged to commit himself in any way in the matter of the Palatinate.⁵¹

In dealing with England about the Palatinate, the Spanish government was greatly consoled by its conviction that Charles I would not be able to gain satisfaction from Spain's enemies.⁵² Yet in spite of that very well founded conviction there was no minimisation of the anxieties which the Spanish ministers experienced when they contemplated the harm that England could do to the Spanish empire. Indeed the succession of crises with which Spain had to cope between 1630 and 1640 had the effect of magnifying those anxieties. One such crisis was the capture of Breisach by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar in December 1638. The danger of the Low Countries being cut

off entirely from Italy became much greater. The loss of Breisach to the enemy increased Spain's reliance on the alternative line of communication with Flanders by sea, and consequently had the effect of enhancing the value of England's friendship.⁵³

Philip IV and his advisers had good reason to be very indignant about the failure of Charles I to save the Spanish fleet from destruction by the Dutch in the Downs in October 1639, but when it was hinted by Baron Aston that this might be a very favourable opportunity to renew overtures in England for an alliance against the Dutch, it was decided that they should not reveal the full extent of their resentment to the English government.⁵⁴ In view of past experiences, the Spanish government was very pessimistic about Charles I's will and ability to help Spain, but in the circumstances it seemed advisable that no opportunity to treat with him should be missed. Count Onate expressed the general feeling of his colleagues: "The King of England can either facilitate or make very difficult our communications with Flanders by sea, and, therefore, we should return to the treaty with him, even though it may be without any hope of his going to war".⁵⁵ In any case it was obviously a situation which required very careful handling, and as Alonso de Cardenas was not considered to have sufficient diplomatic skill, it was decided that two extraordinary ambassadors should be despatched to England to help him. The Cardenal Infante nominated the Marquis of Velada, Governor of Dunkirk, and he was accompanied by Virgilio Malvezzi,

an historian and confidant of Olivares. The two ambassadors arrived in London in May 1640. Although their first discussions with Strafford on the subject of a treaty of alliance were not unpromising, a change of attitude on the part of the English government was soon detected by the ambassadors. They attributed this change to the Scottish troubles. Charles I was now desperately anxious to obtain a loan from Spain, but, as on previous occasions, he was very vague and evasive about what he proposed to do in return.⁵⁶ It was obvious, in fact, that Charles I could do nothing to help Spain. It was equally obvious now that he could do nothing to harm her.⁵⁷ The necessity of conciliating the King of England was no longer as urgent as it had appeared to be at the beginning of 1639. Philip IV was not unwilling to help the King with a loan, but, as he informed the Cardenal Infante, he also appreciated that it was vital that Spain avoided "all unnecessary expenditures".⁵⁸ In December 1640 Velada and Malvezzi were ordered to leave London; their presence there was no longer required.⁵⁹

The Palatinate presented Spain with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand there was the government's main intention of bartering the Palatinate for German assistance in the subjection of the Dutch rebels. To be balanced against that was the need to please Charles I if only to guarantee his neutrality, but giving him satisfaction on the Palatinate issue was difficult for two reasons; the first was that Charles I could not fulfil the conditions which Spain required for the renunciation of the Palatinate, and the second,

that any concessions which Philip IV made to him would be likely to give offence to the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria. It was fortunate for Spain that Charles I was unable to find any support from elsewhere for the recovery of the Palatinate. The aid of the United Provinces, Sweden and France was sought unsuccessfully, and in the end the King had to come back to Spain, even though he was fully aware of what Philip IV's plans for the Palatinate were and what was expected from him in return for its restitution. It was always plainly stated by the Spanish government that it could only negotiate for that part of the Lower Palatinate held by Spain, and that no agreement even for that could be entered into without the full consent and approval of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria. That Spain required England's help against the Dutch was also made clear from the beginning. In a despatch to Lord Weston, Hopton wrote, "I do fear they are so much bent to make a separation between His Majesty and the Hollanders as the not doing it will make them cold towards us, and the doing it may make the Palatinate a dear purchase for England". And commenting on Spain's wider aspirations, Hopton also remarked that "the Count Duke's intention of using the Palatinate in settling affairs in Germany and Flanders will so prolong it that I doubt whether it will be fit for His Majesty to expect an end thereof".⁶⁰ Frustrated in all his efforts to regain the Palatinate, Charles I did not hesitate to blame Philip IV and to accuse him of disloyalty to their peace treaty of 1630. But any danger that there may

have been of the King of England carrying that accusation to the point of terminating the peace had passed by the end of 1640. The escape from the Palatinate dilemma was noted with relief by the Council of State in January 1641: "The present circumstances of the King of England mean that we have little cause either to expect anything from him or to fear him".⁶¹

CHAPTER III

SPAIN, THE CIVIL WAR AND THE INTERREGNUM

"The English will be treated as one nation".¹ In writing thus to Alonso de Cardenas in 1644, the King of Spain was reaffirming his intention of remaining strictly impartial in the dispute between Charles I and Parliament. As long as the outcome of England's troubles was uncertain, a declaration by Philip IV in favour of either party was obviously inexpedient. The avoidance of such a declaration was the aim of Spain's English policy until 1650.

The first requirement of neutrality was the denial of assistance to the Stuarts. As a monarch who was himself troubled by rebellious subjects, Philip IV was inclined to sympathise with Charles I: "All my natural desires urge me to declare for the King", he said in January 1650.² But, as Philip IV himself realised, his government's policy towards England's internal problems could not be dictated by personal feelings of sympathy with the plight of the English monarchy. There were more important considerations. In the first place it was clearly in the interests of Spain that England should be totally preoccupied with affairs at home. This consideration was foremost in the minds of the King and his councillors when they agreed as early as September 1638 that it would be unwise to contribute to the termination of the Scottish war by helping Charles I.³ The decision not to help the King of England was also determined by two other factors. The first was the Spanish government's realisation that it lacked the resources

to help him, and the second was Charles I's exchange of ambassadors with the new King of Portugal. The recognition of the Braganzas destroyed any sense of obligation to the royalist party in England experienced by Philip IV and his ministers.⁴ The execution of Charles I did not alter Spanish policy. An acknowledgement of all Charles II's royal titles was approved by the government in Madrid, but it had to be antedated so as not to conflict with Parliament's renunciation of royal government in England,⁵ and when the new King's ambassadors, Francis Cottington and Edward Hyde, came to Madrid at the end of 1649, they found the Spanish government no more inclined to help Charles II than it had been to help his father. In January 1650 Philip IV received the following advice from the Governor of the Netherlands, Archduke Leopold: "It would not be wise to risk our money on a prince who is excluded from his throne and who allows himself to be advised by poor ministers and a French mother".⁶ The appeals of Cottington and Hyde on behalf of their King received only verbal replies, and although no outright denial was given, a firm undertaking to help him was astutely avoided by the Spanish government until the ambassadors were asked to leave in December 1650, following Philip IV's decision to recognise the republican government in England.⁷

Whenever the Spanish ministers met to consider the events which took place in England between 1640 and 1650, and to advise Philip IV how to react to them, the feeling that the Stuarts could not be trusted was always very

evident in their discussions and counsels. That feeling was still evident after 1655 when war with Cromwell and hopes of a Stuart rebellion in England obliged Spain to resume dealings with Charles II. The treaty which Archduke Leopold negotiated with the exiled King in April 1656 did little to reassure the Spanish government. The members of the Council of State agreed unanimously with the view expressed by the Duke of San Lucar at a Council meeting in April 1657: "How considerable are the disadvantages and how few and uncertain are the advantages which will result from the residence of the King of England in Flanders and from the treaties made with him".⁸ Despite the fact that Philip IV and Charles II now had a common enemy, their treaty of 1656, like other treaties which had been made by the Spanish Hapsburgs and the Stuarts, remained unfulfilled. As long as Charles II was unable to acquire an English port and to give clear proof of a large Stuart following in England, Spain did not feel under any obligation to provide the men and money promised by the treaty.⁹ Charles II replied to Spain's failure to help him in exile by refusing when he was restored to the throne to surrender Dunkirk and Jamaica as he had promised in the treaty.¹⁰ The feeling of mistrust was apparently mutual.

Apart from requiring a denial of assistance to the Stuart kings, Spain's adoption of a policy of neutrality with regard to the events in England also required, if not a complete rejection, at least a very cautious handling of the appeals for help which were received from Ireland. It was inevitable that Spain's aid should be sought by the Irish. For political as well as

religious reasons, the Spanish Hapsburgs had always regarded the protection of Irish catholicism as one of their first duties. In 1642 there was an additional argument for giving the Irish the assistance they requested, and this was that if they failed to obtain satisfaction from Spain, it was certain that they would turn to France. But Philip IV was also reminded by his councillors of two other important considerations; the first was the indisputable fact that the Irish were in a state of rebellion, and the second was that both King and Parliament would be antagonised if Spain openly committed herself to the Irish cause.¹¹ Having weighed all these considerations, it was agreed that any assistance which Spain rendered to the Irish catholics would have to be done with the greatest secrecy. In 1642 they were granted the sum of 20,000 escudos and permission to purchase arms and munitions in Flanders and Spain.¹² Two agents, Francisco Foisotte and Diego de la Torre, were also sent in 1645 to represent Philip IV at Kilkenny.¹³ Officially, the purpose of their mission was simply to recruit Irishmen for the Spanish armies, but the details contained in the accounts of their expenditures in Ireland reveal that they were also empowered to help defray the cost of the war there by making gifts of money to O'Neil and the confederate catholics.¹⁴ Only twelve months after they were despatched to Ireland, realising that the trend of events in England necessitated the maintenance of good relations with Parliament, the Spanish government decided that it would be very unwise to allow Foisotte and la Torre to remain there; they were ordered to leave.¹⁵ Whilst they were determined to do nothing which would offend Parliament,

the possibility of the complete destruction of catholicism in Ireland greatly concerned Philip IV and his ministers during the late 1640's, and their concern prompted their decision in the summer of 1647 to make a further donation of money to the Irish. In order to disguise the actual source of the subsidy, it was paid to the Irish through papal channels.¹⁶ However, their concern for Irish catholicism and their desire to defend and protect it even by secret means were finally overcome by the demands of state politics. Once Philip IV had recognised the new government in England, Ireland very clearly could not be allowed to jeopardise his relations with Parliament. All subsequent requests for aid from Ireland were refused, the refusal being justified on the grounds that the present state of his empire prevented Philip IV from complying with the requests. The Irish were promised, however, that as soon as his affairs improved they would receive the assistance which the King wished to give them.¹⁷

In addition to the religious and political considerations, there was also one other motive for Spanish interest in Ireland, namely the recruiting of Irish catholics for the Spanish armies. The dearth of soldiers in the Spanish empire became particularly acute after 1640, and the Spanish government was anxious to recruit troops in England and Scotland as well as in Ireland, even though it was recognised that the recruitment of English and Scottish protestants would be likely to cause religious difficulties. The primary purpose of the Scottish, English and Irish levies

was to satisfy Spain's great need for soldiers, but they were also seen as a way of making sure that the enemy did not obtain reinforcements of manpower from Britain.¹⁸ Recruiting in Ireland was done by the Spanish agents there, but when they were recalled it became the responsibility of Alonso de Cardenas in London, although contracts with Irish captains were also made in Madrid. One of the first concessions obtained by Cardenas from Parliament, following his recognition of its authority, was the permission to continue levying troops in Ireland.¹⁹ Parliament, it seems, could not do enough to facilitate the removal of hundreds of Irishmen to Spain and Flanders. Licences were readily granted to Irish captains who wished to enter into contracts with the Spanish government and to the owners and captains of merchant vessels who were prepared to transport the troops. Naval protection was also provided for the convoys of ships carrying Irishmen,²⁰ and when none were otherwise available, the impressment of ships to transport the recruits was permitted. Ameriga Warner experienced such an impressment in 1653 with disastrous consequences. He was obliged by the commissioners in Ireland to take 600 Irishmen from Limerick to Spain. After forcing his ship on to rocks, "those wicked Tories" stripped the vessel of every saleable article, including the crew's clothes, and went ashore to sell them. Warner estimated his loss at £1,600, and in addition to that he was also being sued for £1,000 because of his inability to honour a contract he had made with Bristol merchants for a voyage to Virginia.²¹ In spite of the obvious favour with which the English Parliament regarded the Irish levies, the Spanish government began to doubt the advisability of continuing to import Irish

troops into Spain and Flanders. The large scale Irish desertions to the enemy in Catalonia in 1653, which were suspected to have been instigated by Charles II in Paris, finally convinced Philip IV's government of the necessity of ceasing all Irish recruitment immediately. Cardenas was asked to explain to Parliament that this step had been taken in order to prevent the loss of the whole of Catalonia.²²

All the decisions of the Spanish ministers regarding their country's attitude to the English civil war were arrived at after due consideration of the information which they received from the ambassador in London, Don Alonso de Cardenas. Great reliance was placed upon the detailed accounts of the conflict which he supplied during the years 1640 to 1650. Providing accurate reports was not easy, but to the news of events which was generally available in London, Cardenas was able to add information obtained from more reliable sources. One of his informants was Peter Peterson, an assistant of Henry Scobell, Clerk of Parliament, to whom he paid £6 a month for two and half years for general information and for copies of acts of Parliament. Balthazar Gerbier, Master of Ceremonies of Parliament, and Oliver Fleming, his successor in that office, were also paid for the details they furnished to the ambassador about Parliament's proceedings, and the wife of Walter Frost, the secretary of the Council of State created in 1649, received small gifts from Cardenas in return for her accounts of what happened at the Council meetings.²³ Since he was able to witness the progress of the civil war from

close quarters, it is not surprising to find that Cardenas became convinced sooner than his government did that Spain should identify herself with the Parliamentary cause. Early in 1646 his recommendation of closer relations with Parliament was approved by Philip IV and his ministers, but when in 1649, following the execution of Charles I, he suggested that new powers incorporating recognition of the republican government should be sent to him, they persisted in their refusal to acknowledge their support of Parliament openly.²⁴ Their refusal placed Cardenas in a very difficult position.

Declaring that his credentials were no longer valid, Parliament refused to negotiate with him and denied him the privileges of a diplomat.²⁵ One consequence of this was that very early one morning Cardenas and his family were roused by the arrival of three soldiers at his house. They demanded lodgings or the equivalent sum of money to maintain themselves elsewhere, and threatened to summon more soldiers if the money was not paid. When Cardenas protested to the authorities about this incident, he was informed that his name had been included in a list of ordinary London citizens who were required to provide accommodation for the army.²⁶ Regardless of such embarrassments, during the early months of 1650 the Spanish government continued to deny him new powers, and in order to prevent the pronouncement of his dismissal, Cardenas had to enlist the support of members of Parliament. Henry Marten, Henry Neville and James Chaloner each received £100 in February 1650 for having opposed the view in Parliament that the ambassador

should be ordered to leave England.²⁷

The incident which finally compelled Philip IV's government to abandon the policy of neutrality, to which it had adhered since the beginning of the conflict in England, was the assassination of Parliament's agent, Anthony Ascham, by royalist exiles in Madrid in May 1650. Together with his orders to give an account to Parliament of Ascham's death and of Philip IV's determination to punish the assassins, Cardenas was sent his new credentials in June.²⁸ Avoidance of a formal recognition of the new government was still attempted in these credentials, and for this reason they were unacceptable to Parliament.²⁹ On 2 December 1650 a new set of powers couched in terms fully acceptable to Parliament was despatched to Cardenas by a special courier. He received them in London on 30 December and the news of their arrival was communicated immediately to Parliament where the members greeted it with aplausos extraordinarios. On 5 January, with great solemnity, Cardenas was received by Parliament as the ambassador of the first country, apart from the Province of Holland, to recognise the new republican government of England.³⁰

At the beginning of 1651 it is possible to detect a feeling of optimism in Madrid. The Spanish ministers had hopes of an improvement in their country's affairs. They were not disappointed, although the improvement for which they hoped did not prove to be long lasting. Aided by France's recurring internal divisions, during the year 1651 and 1652 the Spanish armies

achieved successes in Catalonia and Flanders where Dunkirk was recovered from the French in September 1652. Also very encouraging for the Spanish government during these two years was the prospect of good relations with England. The governments of Portugal and France were unsuccessful in their attempts to resolve their differences with the new republic, and Blake's interception of the French fleet on its way to relieve Dunkirk, which was on the point of surrendering to Spain, was interpreted in Madrid as a clear indication of England's good-will, and it was expected that closer co-operation between the two countries would follow.³¹ But in order to ensure the continuation of good relations with England, it seemed advisable that Spain should form an alliance with the new government, or at least make a new treaty of peace with it since the validity of the 1630 treaty was now being questioned.³²

As was customary Cardenas did not have to rely entirely upon his own diplomatic skill to achieve the desired closer co-operation with England. To facilitate his own negotiations with Parliament and to hinder those of the French and Portuguese, whose secret tactics for winning support in England were the same as his own, Cardenas made good use of the money made available to him for his gastos secretos.³³ From the beginning of 1651 until its dissolution in 1653, the ambassador spent a great deal in gaining support for himself and Spain in the Long Parliament. Between October 1650 and March 1651 gifts worth £945 were distributed in Parliament

with the help of the Master of Ceremonies, Oliver Fleming, whilst two members of the Council of State, Henry Marten and Thomas Scott, were each paid £500 a year for two years. Gifts of wine were also made to Marten and to other members like James Chaloner, Henry Neville and Alexander Popham who demonstrated their support of the attempts of Cardenas to strengthen the friendship between England and Spain.³⁴

Cardenas was instructed as early as November 1650 to explore the possibilities of a new peace treaty and an alliance against France and Portugal with the English government, but it was not until the ambassador on his own initiative had made firm proposals to Parliament in January 1652 that the government in Madrid decided to send him powers to negotiate a peace and an alliance.³⁵ Although the Spanish ministers appreciated that a peace treaty would be of great benefit to their country, there was less certainty about an alliance, for that seemed to pose too many problems. The idea, suggested by Cardenas, that England should receive Calais in return for assisting Spain against France and Portugal was welcomed neither in Madrid nor in Brussels. Archduke Leopold was opposed to England's acquiring Calais because it would strengthen her ability to isolate the Netherlands if there were any differences with Spain in the future.³⁶ An English alliance also raised religious problems. Was it permissible for a catholic prince to join with heretics in a scheme to

capture territory belonging to another catholic prince?: the theologians who were called together to consider this question decided that in cases of necessity it was.³⁷ The principal difficulty about Spain's formation of an alliance with England was occasioned by the outbreak of war between England and the United Provinces in June 1652. The Spanish government had no wish either to be drawn into that war or to give the Dutch any cause for suspecting that that was its intention.³⁸ It was principally the determination to preserve the peace with the United Provinces which prompted Philip IV to instruct Cardenas in December 1652 that he was to confine himself to a peace treaty with England which was to include a promise by both countries that they would not assist their respective enemies. However, the ambassador was also reminded of three particular circumstances which would require him to proceed with the preparation of an alliance; they were, first, the possibility of a settlement of Anglo-Portuguese differences, secondly, the possibility of a settlement of Anglo-French differences, and thirdly, the conclusion of a Franco-Dutch treaty which was hostile to Spain.³⁹

In reply to his proposed renewal of the peace treaty, a list of thirty-five articles was presented to Cardenas by Parliament on 12 November 1652. He was informed that the articles were intended to remedy those deficiencies of the former peace treaties which had been the cause of the difficulties experienced by English merchants and others in Spain since 1604. Of the thirty-five articles three in particular were unacceptable to Spain

in the form proposed by Parliament. The first one referred to the payment of customs duties. Parliament wished merely for an agreement that the merchants of the two countries would not be required in the future to pay duties higher than those they were then paying. The Spanish government objected to this on the grounds that recent increases in customs and excise had raised the duties in England above those in Spain, and insisted that only equality in the payment of duties would be acceptable. The form of agreement recommended in Madrid was similar to that which had been included in the treaty with the Dutch in 1648 when the governments of Spain and the United Provinces had agreed that for the payment of duties their merchants would always be treated as natives. The second English clause to which Spain could not consent proposed a mutual concession of free trade within all the possessions of the two countries, including those in America. Spain could not agree to the admission of Englishmen to the American colonies, and for this particular point the formula adopted in 1604 and 1630 was preferred. However, in order to ensure the successful conclusion of the treaty, Philip IV was prepared to acknowledge England's possession of places occupied by Englishmen in America. The third controversial article of peace concerned the religious liberty of English protestants in Spain. Dissatisfied with the imprecise wording of the old treaties, Parliament wanted it clearly stated that Englishmen in Spain should be free to practise their religion in their houses and ships and have the liberty to use their

bibles and other religious books. Such an explicit concession of religious liberty for heretics in Spain was rejected by the Council of the Inquisition, which maintained that the religious clauses of 1604 and 1630 had allowed the English merchants sufficient freedom to discharge their religious duties without interference from the Inquisition.⁴⁰

Guided by the directions despatched to him from Madrid on 15 February 1653, Cardenas continued with his negotiations for a renewal of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty during the rest of the year. Temporarily interrupted by the dissolution of the Long Parliament, they were resumed with the new Council of State, and according to a report made later by Cardenas, agreement on the treaty, including the three disputed articles, had virtually been reached when the negotiations had to be suspended again owing to another change of government in England.⁴¹

Cromwell's acquisition of supreme power in England in December 1653 was welcomed in Spain. The Spanish ministers, meeting in Madrid early in February 1654 to debate the establishment of the Protectorate, were agreed that Cromwell "showed no signs of disaffection for Spain", and they were confident that in looking round for the necessary means of maintaining his personal position, the Protector would find none better than friendship with Spain.⁴² The ministers were also aware that Spain was in need of England's friendship, the urgency of which need became increasingly more evident to them as the year 1654 progressed. In his despatches from Flanders, Archduke Leopold warned of the dangers which would follow for the Spanish empire,

especially in its present state, if Cromwell were to become an enemy. The Archduke accepted the generally held view that the Protector was bound to seek new ways of employing his fleet, which the Dutch peace had rendered inactive; it was important to ensure that the form of employment chosen should favour Spain and not France.⁴³ Philip IV and his ministers did not need to be reminded of the dangers of Cromwell's enmity, and they were determined to avoid them whatever the cost.⁴⁴ The cost, in fact, was to prove much too high for Spain.

In order to complete the preparations of the new peace treaty, Cardenas met the commissioners appointed by Cromwell in January 1654. At his first meeting with them, the ambassador found the commissioners "very cold and almost incapable of discussing the matter". Cardenas expected to return to the articles of the previous year, on which, as he said, there were very few remaining differences between Spain and England, but instead he was presented with a new set of articles which revived England's insistence on the three points already rejected by him as unacceptable to his government. Cardenas, who again presented Spain's objections to the three articles, could only conclude that Cromwell's intention was to prolong the Spanish negotiations until the Dutch peace had been finally settled.⁴⁵ For the next twelve months nothing more was done about the peace treaty. This was, first, because the English government was preoccupied with the Dutch peace during the early months of 1654, and, secondly, because Cardenas on instructions

from his government turned his whole attention again to an Anglo-Spanish alliance.⁴⁶ France's endeavours to win the favour of the Protector by offering him Dunkirk and an annual pension necessitated the revival of the alliance.⁴⁷ Cardenas was granted an audience with the Protector on 4 March 1654, and after stressing France's close association with the exiled Stuarts, the ambassador affirmed that it would be in the interests of both Spain and England if they were united against France.⁴⁸ Two days after this meeting with Cromwell, Cardenas paid £500 in gold to John Thurloe, whom he expected in return for the gift to assist the negotiations of Spain and to hinder those of France.⁴⁹ These were the opening stages of the competition between Spain and France for the English alliance.

There was little doubt both in Brussels and Madrid that the successful competitor would be the one who was able to pay most.⁵⁰ The Spanish government was very willing to accept the terms stated by Cromwell early in 1654, for it was certain that however high the sum he demanded, it would be money well spent if it purchased his declaration of war against France.⁵¹ What the government in Madrid did not take into account was the problem of finding the money promised. Archduke Leopold was directed to provide Cardenas with the £100,000 which, in addition to the annual subsidies, was to be paid to Cromwell as soon as the treaty of alliance was completed. The Archduke had to inform Philip IV in September 1654 that he had been unable to gather the money together.⁵² Lack of money was not the only

difficulty experienced by the Spanish government in its attempts to obtain an alliance with Cromwell. In June 1654 Cromwell increased his terms by demanding not only Calais as security for the payment of the subsidies offered, but also the immediate, although temporary, cession of Dunkirk. These new conditions were rejected in Madrid. The councillors of state who met to consider them on 26 August 1654 suspected that Cromwell now had no intention of joining Spain in a war against France and that his purpose in introducing the new demands was solely to bring the negotiations to a close.⁵³ Their suspicions would have been fully confirmed had they had any inkling of the nature of the instructions, which, two days after their own meeting in Madrid, were issued by the Protector in London and which required Admiral Penn and General Venables to consider and to recommend ways of making war on Spain in the West Indies.⁵⁴

When the state of Spain's relations with England was reviewed in Madrid in November 1654, Philip IV and his councillors found very little to cheer them. They found that the United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden and Portugal had all successfully negotiated treaties with Cromwell, and that the French were on the point of settling their differences with him. And yet Spain, the country which had been first to recognise the new republic, had so far failed to obtain either an alliance or a new peace treaty. The government was inclined to blame Cardenas for the failure. As there now seemed little chance of persuading the Protector to become an ally of Spain, the ambassa-

dor in London was instructed to apply himself again to a simple renewal of the Anglo-Spanish peace.⁵⁵ As he had grave doubts even about Cromwell's desire for a peace treaty with Spain, Cardenas delayed the reopening of this matter until the arrival of the Marquis of Lede in May 1655.⁵⁶ The Marquis had been sent by Philip IV to congratulate Cromwell on his appointment as Protector. The two ambassadors were informed that England's terms for a new peace treaty included the three controversial articles to which Spain had already objected on two previous occasions. And in 1655 the payment of unequal customs duties, the explicit concession of religious freedom to English merchants in Spain, and the admission of Englishmen to the Spanish colonies were no more acceptable to the Spanish government than they had been in 1652 and 1654. The articles were considered to be exorbitant and unfair and were regarded as clear proof of la perfidia inglesa. Cromwell's insistence upon their inclusion in the treaty, together with the report that the English merchants were busily embarking themselves and their belongings on Blake's fleet at Cadiz, forced the Council to State to conclude in July 1655 that the Protector was determined to break with Spain.⁵⁷ Whilst the Spanish ministers reluctantly recognised the imminence of war with England, they also recognised that the consequences of such a war were likely to be disastrous for the Spanish empire, and until the end of the year, in spite of the news of England's conquest of Jamaica and of the enforced departure of Cardenas from England on 11 November 1655, they

continued to hope that the crisis could be averted.

PART II

CHAPTER IV

ENGLAND'S TRADE WITH THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

1. In peace time

In the autumn of 1655, the Spanish government was most reluctant to acknowledge the inevitability of war with England. It was not until December, more than a month after Cromwell's declaration of war, that the Council of State finally concluded that there was now no hope of keeping the peace with England and recommended that Philip IV should take steps to prepare Spain for the war.¹ The reluctance of the Spaniards to accept the fact that the war could not be avoided is understandable. During the years since 1650, as England had been regathering her strength and vitality, Spain had viewed with growing apprehension the possibility of finding herself at war with the new republic, as well as with Portugal and France, and during these years the aim of Spanish diplomacy had been to prevent such a situation arising. In the autumn of 1655, the Spanish government was even ready to overlook the loss of Jamaica, if that would have facilitated a peace with England on Spanish terms.² Spanish diplomacy, however, failed to avert the crisis of 1655. But as the Spanish government faced the future with considerable anxiety, now that England had joined the ranks of Spain's enemies, it was able to find some consolation in the belief that the Protector, by depriving his subjects of their trade with Spain, would be certain to make his government

very unpopular in England.³ Whilst this, indeed, was very small comfort for a country already overburdened with war, such speculation about the effect that the loss of the Spanish trade would have in England proved to be not without some foundation.

When Alonso de Cardenas announced his intention of leaving England, the merchants in London became so alarmed by the prospect of an imminent war with Spain that they resolved to make a direct appeal to the Protector in an attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.⁴ The first and immediate concern of the merchants was to save the English property that had been embargoed in Spain,⁵ but their petition also drew the Protector's attention to the importance to the state of trade in general and of the Spanish trade in particular.⁶ The petition insisted that war with Spain would be commercially inexpedient for England, and the merchants urged Cromwell to postpone any further hostile action against Spain, since they were certain that the Spanish government had only proclaimed the embargo in the hope of being able to arrange a peace treaty more speedily. That there was widespread anxiety in London mercantile circles about the loss of the benefits of the Spanish trade is proved by the inclusion of the Lord Mayor, the sheriffs and most of the aldermen of the city amongst those who signed the petition. The merchant petitioners failed to achieve their object, but the fact that their alarm was sufficient to induce them to attempt to dissuade Cromwell from involving England in a war with Spain seems to pose two

questions; the first one being, was there any justification for the great value which they apparently attached to the Spanish trade?; and the second, were they being unnecessarily pessimistic about the effects upon English commerce of Cromwell's decision to declare war on Spain? The object of the present chapter, and of the succeeding one, will be to consider these questions.

The trade with the Iberian Peninsula

Whilst woollen cloth continued to dominate English commercial and industrial activity, as it had done during the previous century, the seventeenth century witnessed certain fundamental changes in the pattern of trade abroad and of industrial enterprise at home. England's external commerce had been traditionally tied to the markets of northern Europe, particularly to those of the Low Countries and Germany, where the Company of the Merchant Adventurers had disposed of the greater part of England's output of heavy broadcloth. This type of cloth was the principal product of the old draperies. After the boom, which the trade in the products of old draperies enjoyed during the first decade and a half of the seventeenth century, England's markets in northern Europe began to decline.⁷ The reasons for this decline were several, but, principally, it was due to the unstable political situation in Germany and to the increased production of cloth in Germany and the United Provinces. The decreased demand for their produce inevitably resulted in the decay of the old draperies. At the same time,

inside and outside England, other changes were also taking place, for as the traditional markets in northern Europe contracted others in southern Europe were being opened up and expanded. This expansion was reflected at home in the rise of the new draperies, producing the cheap, light and colourful worsted cloth which proved very popular in the countries of the Mediterranean. The bays, says and perpetuanoes of the new draperies provided the stimulus for increased commercial activity in the eastern Mediterranean, a region which attained a position of special importance in England's trading economy during the seventeenth century. But in the context of England's trade expansion in southern Europe of no less significance than the Levant was the Iberian Peninsula. The markets of Spain and Portugal had long attracted trade from England, but during the seventeenth century they acquired a much greater prominence in English foreign commerce than they had enjoyed hitherto.

Cloth, of course, was one the chief items which England supplied to Spain. As elsewhere in the Mediterranean region, the demand in Spain was for cloth that was lighter in texture, although less durable, and cheaper than the heavy and expensive broadcloth, and this was a demand that the new draperies in England were able to satisfy. Whereas the trade in heavy textiles was monopolised by the port of London and the Company of the Merchant Adventurers, much of the trade in the worsted fabrics of the new draperies was concentrated in the ports of the provinces.⁸ This is one

indication of the role played by the outports in Anglo-Spanish trade,⁹ and further evidence of the importance of that role is to be found in the substantial contribution which the ports outside London, particularly those in the west, made to the provision of Spain and Portugal with fish. Fish was another important item of England's seventeenth century trade with the countries of the Mediterranean.

In their attempt to impress the value of the Spanish trade upon Cromwell, the merchant petitioners of 1655 claimed that Spain and its dominions consumed more than three quarters of England's annual catch of fish. According to Richard Baker, a prominent London merchant in the Spanish trade, the sale of fish to Spain was worth at least £500,000 a year to England.¹⁰ This trade in fish was generally conducted on a triangular basis; ships from the ports of Devon and Cornwall supplied Spain and Portugal with fish that they had brought from the Newfoundland fisheries, and then returned to their home ports with wine, oil and other commodities of the Iberian Peninsula.¹¹ This triangular arrangement was completed and its profitability increased when ships proposing to carry fish from Newfoundland to Spain were also permitted to deposit colonists and provisions in New England before sailing north to the fisheries.¹²

The triangular trade was considered to be very valuable by the English, but it was not, however, the only means by which the Iberian Peninsula received English fish. For despite the efforts of the first two Stuarts to

exclude foreigners and foreign shipping from every aspect of the fishing industry, including the transportation of the fish to its destined markets, foreign merchant shipping, at any rate until 1651, was supplying Spain with fish that was brought from English ports. There are two reasons for this. The first is that in Spain fish, like materials for ship building, was in such great demand that any means of procuring it was favoured and encouraged by the Spanish government. Consequently, government policy not only connived at, but also officially consented to the importation of fish and other necessary provisions by the merchants and shipping of such enemy countries as France and Holland.¹³ The second reason is that the attempts of the English government to exclude the French, the Dutch and other foreigners from the fish trade were frustrated by opposition of the western ports to the imposition of shipping restrictions.¹⁴ Foreign ships came to those ports, either to purchase Newfoundland fish for themselves, with which they then proceeded to Spain and Italy, or to be freighted by English merchants for the same purpose. This foreign intrusion into the fishing industry was looked upon, particularly by the Admiralty, as a serious threat to the naval strength of the country. It was a widely held conviction that the country's shipping strength was directly dependent upon the fishing industry, which furnished not only a training ground for sailors, but also gave a stimulus to ship building.¹⁵ It was this same conviction which resulted in the Navigation Acts of 1651 and the reassertion of an English monopoly over the whole of the trade in fish. However, the demand in

Spain for English fish was such that in 1657, when English merchants were finding it difficult to introduce their fish into Spain because of the war, the Protector consented to a Parliamentary bill which relaxed the Navigation Acts and allowed foreigners to buy fish and to export it for the purpose of selling it in Spain.¹⁶ Similarly, in the interests of the fish trade and its Spanish markets, those merchants engaged in the triangular trade in fish and, therefore, in direct commerce between the new world and Spain, were exempted from the extended Navigation Acts of Charles II's reign, which restricted all colonial trade to the mother country.¹⁷

Worsted cloth and fish were the principal commodities exported by England to Spain and Portugal. Other exports included lead, tin, wax, wheat, butter and cheese.¹⁸ As during the previous century, England continued to import oil, wine, dried fruit and iron ore from Spain and Portugal during the seventeenth century. Amongst the imports from the Iberian Peninsula, much less prominent in the seventeenth century were the East Indian products which had previously been acquired by England through Lisbon, whilst Spanish wool, small quantities of which were imported during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, was brought from Spain in increasing amounts from the early 1620's. Dr. Millard's import statistics show that Spanish wool valued at £22,289 was imported into London between Christmas 1620 and Christmas 1621, whilst the value of the wool imports during the twelve months from Christmas 1633 to

Christmas 1634 amounted to £20,157; during the latter period, wool was the fourth most valuable import from Spain and Portugal.¹⁹ Spanish merino wool, produced in Old Castile and exported from Spain through the port of Bilbao, enabled the English to develop the production of a new type of cloth, called Spanish or medley cloth. This was a high quality cloth, which, because of its costliness, could only be sold in northern Europe, where its sale compensated to some extent for the diminishing sales of broadcloth.²⁰ Until the Peace of Westphalia permitted Spain to supply the Dutch with merino wool, most of the wool exported by Spain was acquired by England, and in 1655 one of the fears expressed by the London merchants was that the coming war would give the Dutch the opportunity of monopolising the Spanish wool export.²¹ Apart from merino wool, England also obtained soap and dyeing materials from Spain for use in connection with cloth making. Cochineal and indigo, brought to Spain from the Caribbean, were imported into England in much larger quantities after 1630, and Spanish dyes continued to be of importance to the cloth industry during the rest of the century even though dyes also became available from the English West Indian islands.²² Two other seventeenth century additions to the list of imports from the Iberian Peninsula were sugar, grown in Brazil, and tobacco, grown in the colonies of the Spanish Indies.

Tobacco was brought to England from Spain in increasing quantities during the first two decades of the century. The amount of Spanish tobacco

imported into London by English merchants during the period Christmas 1620 to Christmas 1621 was valued at £33,207; of the most valuable imports from the Iberian Peninsula, tobacco came second in the list, the first place being taken by sugar, valued at £59,186.²³ But as the imports of Spanish tobacco increased, so also did the imports of tobacco from England's colonies in the new world. Although the English government endeavoured to discourage the new colonies from relying too heavily upon the production of a single commodity, more and more tobacco was grown in Virginia and in the Caribbean island settlements.²⁴ Tobacco was a highly profitable commodity, so it is hardly surprising, notwithstanding the government's attitude, that those who were most immediately concerned with the promotion of the prosperity of the colonies should have encouraged tobacco growing, or that they should have wished to reserve the English market entirely for colonial tobacco. However, in deference to the views of the government, the attacks upon the importation of tobacco grown in the Spanish colonies had to be supported by arguments other than the necessity of protecting and developing tobacco cultivation in the English colonies. Addressing the House of Commons in March, 1621, Sir Edwin Sandys, the Treasurer of the Virginia Company, attributed the scarcity of silver to the excessive amount of tobacco that was being brought from Spain. He calculated that £120,000 was spent in Spain on tobacco each year, and argued that the resulting loss of bullion could be avoided if the tobacco were brought instead from Virginia and the Somers Islands.²⁵

The campaign for the exclusion of Spanish tobacco was only partially successful. Charles I's proclamation of 19th April 1625,²⁶ prohibiting the importation of all tobacco except that grown in Virginia and the Somers Islands, was never fully enforced. Even during the war with Spain, quantities of Spanish tobacco came into England, and as soon as peace was restored its importation was resumed by English merchants. The value of tobacco imported into London by English merchants between Christmas 1633 and Christmas 1634 was almost equal to that imported between Christmas 1621 and Christmas 1621.²⁷ The first two Stuarts were alike not only in their abhorrence of tobacco and the pernicious effects that it was said to have upon those who became addicted to it, but also in their readiness to temper their strongest feelings whenever an opportunity of improving their financial position presented itself. In this context, Spanish tobacco, always in demand in England because of its good quality, had a special significance. But even though James I and Charles I, in their own financial interest, were not prepared to enforce an absolute prohibition of imported foreign tobacco, they were ready, in the interests of the colonies, to approve a tariff arrangement which gave preference to colonial imports. This arrangement gave some satisfaction to those who were demanding a colonial monopoly of the English tobacco market without actually depriving the government of the revenue derived from Spanish tobacco. Colonial preference, introduced during the reign of James I, was continued and

extended during the next reign and during the interregnum. Duties on imported colonial tobacco were gradually lowered. At the same time, although not to the same extent, there was also a reduction of the duties on non-colonial tobacco imports. Since 1615, two shillings had been levied on every pound of imported Spanish and foreign tobacco; in 1644, when it was endeavouring to raise money for the war against the King, the Long Parliament lowered that duty by sixpence, whilst a further revision of customs during the Commonwealth reduced the total amount of duty on every pound of foreign tobacco to one shilling.²⁸ Spanish tobacco was a valuable source of revenue, and no English government was apparently prepared to permit its entire exclusion from England.²⁹

There was, of course, in England at this time, as in other European countries, a rapidly expanding market for tobacco, and this also helps to explain why the English merchants were able to continue importing Spanish tobacco, despite tariff discrimination and a great increase in the amount of tobacco being imported from the English colonies. And it was this growing international demand for tobacco, combined with the increased output of the colonies, which enabled English merchants to begin re-exporting tobacco to Spain. Colonial tobacco was first taken to Spain during the late 1630's, and its appearance there, and the need to decide whether or not it was to be admitted, put the Spaniards in a dilemma. Being particularly sensitive about any matter which related, however remotely, to the question of her sovereignty in the Americas, Spain was always

anxious to avoid any suggestion, even by implication, of a renunciation of that sovereignty. And from the Spanish point of view, tobacco, whether grown on the north American mainland or in the Caribbean islands, was "produce of the Indies", and therefore was liable to be sequestrated as contraband in Spanish ports if it were not accompanied by certificates issued either in Lisbon or in Seville.³⁰ If English colonial tobacco were admitted to Spain, could it not be then argued that, by accepting the produce of the English colonies in the new world, Spain was thus acknowledging England's possession of those territories? To be weighed against this consideration, there was, of course, the Spanish government's wish not to give the English government any reason for taking offence against Spain.

England's opportunity to test the attitude of the Spanish government towards English colonial tobacco came in 1638, when a quantity of Virginian tobacco was denounced by the Almirantazgo on its arrival in Seville. Arthur Hopton, who took a special interest in this case, was instructed by his government to obtain the release of the tobacco and to defend the legitimacy of Charles I's claims to Virginia. Whilst Hopton never doubted that it would be "a point well gained" if the Spaniards were persuaded to admit tobacco from the English colonies, he had little hope of their committing "any act to acknowledge our right in those plantations." He suspected that the Count Duke, with whom he had discussed the matter, would probably "run some middle course to prevent unkindness".³¹ The

outcome of this particular case is unknown, but it is evident that Hopton was not far wrong in his predictions concerning the means that the Spaniards would employ to extricate themselves from their predicament. The compromise solution adopted by Philip IV's government was not an unfamiliar one. In order to avoid any implicit recognition of Charles I's possession of territories in America, the free and unrestricted admission of English colonial tobacco was not granted. Instead Philip IV agreed to sell the English merchants special licences for its importation,³² in the same way that he sold them licences to import contraband merchandise from France. It would be impossible to say how much tobacco entered Spain by means of such licences. But in 1642, the Indies merchants in Seville felt obliged to protest against the large amounts of "tobaco de contrabando", originating from the "las islas de la Virginia, San Christobal, y la Barbada, y otras que se detentan por el Rey de Inglaterra", which the English had been permitted to introduce into Spain during the previous four years. The tobacco licences, they said, were likely to result in the ruin of their trade in tobacco, the most lucrative item of the Indies commerce, and in the impoverishment and depopulation of those parts of Spanish America which were entirely dependent upon the proceeds of their tobacco production.³³ Despite such warnings of imminent disasters, the Spanish merchants, it seems, were unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain the exclusion of foreign

tobacco. Four years later, in 1646, the Council of Finance reported to the Council of State that Seville's tobacco trade had so contracted, owing to the competition of tobacco imported by the English, that the amount of customs revenue to be derived from it was almost worthless.³⁴

Of the items which came to England by way of the Spanish trade, the most highly prized were the precious metals. Referring to the bullion imports from Spain, the merchants' petition of 1655 said:

"We also bring great store of monies from Spain all proceeding from the product of our fish and manufactures; so that the importation exceeds the exportation; the reason whereof is that our fish and manufactures are carried and expended in all places in his (the King of Spain's) dominions, and nothing is brought from them in return."³⁵

This statement, although not in entirely accurate terms, refers to a basic and important characteristic of the Spanish trade. The trade with Spain was always well balanced in England's favour, and it was for this reason that it was so highly esteemed not only by the merchants who took part in it, but also by the economic theorists of the time. Although it is now generally agreed that the mercantilist economists attached too much significance to the acquisition of bullion, their constant preoccupation with the need to increase the inward flow of precious metals, and conversely to restrict their outward flow, is understandable when one considers that the economic life of a country

in the seventeenth century was dependent to a very great extent upon the ready availability of cash. Silver, particularly, being the metal most commonly used as a medium of currency exchange, was always in great demand, and since it was the Spanish trade which supplied England with its precious metals, any interruption of the trade immediately resulted in a scarcity of silver. So that in 1625, when the outbreak of war with Spain made it difficult to obtain silver, the East India Company had to apply for permission to export £30,000 worth of gold each year instead.³⁶ Spanish gold, which was referred to by Richard Baker as the "blood in our veins", was also required by England, as this concession to the East India Company illustrates, to finance trade with the Baltic, with the Levant and especially with the East.³⁷ With the commodities purchased in those parts, England was able to develop that re-export trade which was to become an important feature of English commercial activity later in the century.³⁸

The withdrawal of bullion from Spain by foreign merchants was prohibited by the laws of Castile, but during the seventeenth century, as during the previous one, these laws could never be effectively enforced by the Spanish government. The need of the countries of northern Europe for Spain's gold and silver was as great as Spain's need for their manufactured articles, and in order to evade the prohibition against the extraction of bullion from Spain, the merchants

of northern Europe resorted to a great variety of fraudulent and deceitful practices. Smuggling was a characteristic common to the commercial activities of all countries in the seventeenth century,³⁹ but nowhere was illicit trading carried on more extensively than in Spain. The amount of bullion smuggled out of Spain cannot be accurately assessed; it has been estimated that it was between 10 and 30 per cent of the registered bullion which, in accordance with regulations, was transferred directly from the Indies fleets to the Casa de Contratación before being distributed to its owners.⁴⁰

With the help and co-operation of the professional smugglers, known in Spain as the metedores, most of the unregistered bullion was taken from the Indies fleets and secretly put aboard the foreign ships which were waiting, usually in Cadiz Bay, to convey it northwards.⁴¹ The attempts of the Spanish government to check this growing efflux of Spanish American treasure were of no avail. In 1628, Philip IV was obliged to agree to the suspension of a recently issued cédula, which had required foreign merchants to give guarantees that they would take away Spanish produce, and not precious metals, from Spain. The Spanish merchants in Seville objected to the cédula on the grounds that it had discouraged the foreign merchants from sending their merchandise to Spain, and consequently had made it very difficult to stock the Indies fleets with those articles, which

were in such great demand in the colonies, and which could only be obtained from outside the Spanish Peninsula.⁴² Unable, therefore, to prevent the loss of bullion, the Spanish government endeavoured to compensate itself by selling pardons, or indultos, to those who confessed to having engaged in the smuggling of bullion. The proceeds from the indultos, however, did not satisfy the Spanish government's own need for precious metals,⁴³ and as gold and silver became scarcer, as it did during the later years of the reign of Philip IV when there was a rapid fall in the Casa's receipts of registered treasure,⁴⁴ the government had no alternative but to take possession of the registered treasure aboard the Indies fleets which was consigned to private individuals.⁴⁵ Whilst these measures, the selling of indultos and the confiscation of privately owned treasure, afforded the Spanish government some immediate financial relief, in the long-run they only aggravated its monetary problems, since, inevitably, they gave added stimulus to bullion smuggling.

There is no doubt that England received a good proportion of this smuggled bullion. In one of his despatches from London, the Spanish agent, Necolalde, remarked that there was not a ship arriving in England from Spain which did not carry a large amount of bullion and coinage.⁴⁶ Speaking about Spanish gold and silver, Richard Baker said, "We were wont to have a proportion equal with any".⁴⁷ Albert Girard maintains that, whereas on the one hand

Spanish port officials used the illegal removal of precious metals as a pretext for subjecting the French to continual abuse, on the other hand they were inclined to overlook the same offence when it was committed by the English, because the latter, unlike the French, were able to revenge themselves at sea for any harsh treatment they received in Spanish ports.⁴⁸ But in this connection, naval superiority was not the only asset possessed by the English. Equally advantageous were those special privileges which the Spanish government conceded to the English trading communities in Spain. The religious and commercial concessions, included in the 1604 treaty and renewed in 1630, were extended in 1645 when the English residents in the ports of Andalusia were granted a number of civil and legal privileges; the English community in southern Spain paid 4,000 ducats in silver for the privileges. Amongst other concessions, the royal grant of 1645 freed the English merchants and factors from paying forced loans, recognised the inviolability of their houses and property and suppressed the practice of arbitrarily confiscating their books and papers, which in future were to be inspected in their houses. Philip IV's cédulas of 19th March and 9th November 1645, which granted these new concessions, also appointed a juez conservador for the English; with the exception of suits between English men and Spaniards or other foreigners, in which the former were the defendants, he was to have entire judicial responsibility for all legal proceedings involving Englishmen. The

protracted nature of Spanish justice had been a constant complaint of the English in Spain since 1604, and this appointment of a juez conservador was intended to provide a remedy. The cédulas of 1645 also resolved two other matters which in past years had occasioned many protests from the English traders in Spain. The first of these concerned the guards which were put aboard English ships by the port authorities. The practice since 1604 had been that the officials of the Almirantazgo and of the Almojarifazgo posted guards on the ships when they came into the ports and expected the ships' masters to maintain them until the official inspection took place some twelve to fifteen days later. But according to the cédulas of 1645, English ships had to be inspected within three days of their arrival, and if the placing of guards aboard the ships was unavoidable then their expenses were to be paid by the Almirantazgo and the Almojarifazgo. The other matter dealt with by the 1645 cedulas concerned the officers who inspected the ships in search of secreted bullion.⁴⁹ Observing the letter of the law, they had frequently taken even small sums of Spanish money from the ships, despite the claim of the English masters and merchants that they needed an amount of money in order to purchase provisions and supplies for the return journey to England.⁵⁰ In 1645, Philip IV agreed that the English masters should be allowed to have three reals for every ton on board their ships.⁵¹ The very favoured position, which the English thus acquired in Spain by means of these privileges, enabled them to engage in many illegitimate activities, for which there were innumerable opportunities

offered in Spain, particularly in the Indies trade.

England and the Indies trade.

The location, mainly in the southern ports of Seville, Malaga, San Lucar and Cadiz, of the permanently resident English communities in Spain is a clear indication of the basic reason for the English traders' interest in Spain. They came to Spain with the intention of securing a share for themselves in the profits of the Spanish American trade. Controlled by the Casa de Contratación, the trade with the American colonies was theoretically reserved for the subjects of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. In practice, however, the fact was that this Castilian monopoly of the Indies trade was gradually being replaced by a foreign one. In the seventeenth century not only were the Spaniards incapable of providing the kind of goods required by the colonies, but they were also no longer able to furnish sufficient capital to finance the trade. Consequently, it was with foreign capital, as well as with foreign produce, that Spain's trade with America was conducted. In the early years of the century, the native Spanish merchants tried unsuccessfully to check the process which was gradually forcing the American trade into complete dependence upon foreign capital. At the request of the Consulado of Seville, a cédula was issued in 1608 which prohibited the foreign merchants from selling their goods on credit to the cargadores, having

arranged with the latter to receive payment in the Indies.⁵² But, like most of the legislation governing the Indies trade, this cédula remained inoperative, since the Spaniards, lacking the capital with which to purchase the goods in Spain, had no alternative but to resort to this kind of foreign financial co-operation in order to keep the Indies trade going. The English were prominent amongst those foreign merchants who were only too anxious to exploit this lack of capital. The large amount of debt which the English merchants had to forfeit in Spain in 1655 gives some indication of the extent of their willingness to invest their capital in commercial ventures that were largely conducted on a credit bases. In fact the English assets seized by the Spanish government in 1655 were chiefly in the form of debts owed to the English by Spanish merchants. In Malaga, for instance, the value of debts to the English amounted to 1,128,766 reals, whilst the value of ships, money and other property belonging to them amounted to 152,768 reals.⁵³ That the Spanish government acquired little else apart unpaid debt in 1655 was, of course, due to the fact that the merchants, having been forewarned about the impending war, were able to take the precaution of either hiding their moveable property or of removing it from Spain.⁵⁴

The fraud and deceit, characteristic of every aspect of the Indies trade in the seventeenth century, was the inevitable result of a situation in which Castile, whilst continuing to uphold a monopoly of its colonial trade by statute, lacked the necessary resources to maintain a policy of exclusion

in practice. The foreign merchant was legally barred from all direct commercial contact with the Spanish colonies, but the need for his merchandise and his capital gave rise to a great many illegal practices which enabled him to participate actively in the Indies trade. Whatever the form of their deceits and frauds, the foreign intruders in the Indies trade were able to rely upon the co-operation of Spaniards, who included officials at all levels of the trade's administration. When the Casa de Contratación in Seville could not be by-passed, merchandise, although effectively still the property of the foreign merchant, passed through all the processes of inspection, of registration and of being loaded aboard the Indies fleets under the name of a Spaniard.⁵⁵ But, in fact, during the seventeenth century it became less and less necessary for the illegal participant in the Indies trade to use the official channels, and the reason for this was that much of the actual loading and unloading of the fleets was transferred from Seville to the ports of Cadiz and San Lucar. This change, which inevitably undermined the Casa's control and surveillance of the trade, was partly due to the employment in the Indies fleets of ships that were generally of a higher tonnage than those used during the previous century, and such large vessels had difficulty in navigating the river Guadalquivir as far as Seville.⁵⁶ Girard maintains that foreign pressure was also responsible for accelerating the translation of the Indies traffic to Cadiz and San Lucar when it became apparent that there were

greater opportunities for fraud in those two ports than in Seville.⁵⁷ Cadiz Bay, particularly, away from the watchful eye of the officials of the Casa, was a most favoured venue for all kinds of illegal activity. With the help of the metedores, merchandise could be taken directly from the foreign merchant ships to the flotas after the last inspection by the Casa had been completed.⁵⁸ In this way foreign merchants were freed not only from the regulations which had to be observed when goods were officially sanctioned by the Casa for despatch to the Indies, but they were also able to escape the payment of customs duties and the avería. The native Spanish merchants, who were obliged to continue trading with the colonies via the Casa, not unnaturally resented this evasion of the payment of duties, for it placed upon them the whole burden of the avería, the rates of which rose as the total returns from the tax diminished; and, as the Council of the Indies realised, the increased avería charges only encouraged more fraud.⁵⁹ What irritated the Spanish merchants even more was that foreign merchandise, having avoided the payment of all taxes, could then be sold in the Indies more cheaply than merchandise on which customs and the avería had been levied.⁶⁰

In Spain, the part played by the English in the violation of the laws governing the Indies trade was alleged to be considerable.⁶¹ In 1652, Cardenas received instructions to request the English government to put a stop to it, and to remind the government that Englishmen were excluded from the

Indies trade, even though the matter was not referred to in the peace treaty.⁶² But the Spanish government could do little more than protest, and since protests were of no avail, it resigned itself, as it frequently did in the seventeenth century, to the inevitable and sought to make what profit it could from the situation. Consequently, in 1639, the English community was included in a loan that Philip IV requested from the merchants in Seville; the loan was to be used in the preparation of the armada of Diego de Ibarra, which was due to sail with the Indies fleet. The English consul in Seville advised his compatriots not to contribute to the loan, but Philip IV refused to exempt them, insisting that the English had as great an interest as anyone in the benefits resulting from a well protected fleet.⁶³ Nor was the Spanish government prepared to release the English from the imaginaria, the general fine which was imposed upon the Indies trade in 1640 for frauds committed during the previous year. The English ambassador objected to the inclusion of his countrymen in the imaginaria on the grounds that they could not take part in the Indies trade. The Council of the Indies was of a contrary opinion.⁶⁴

The resentment borne by the native Spanish merchant against the foreign intruder, into whose hands the Indies trade was falling, gave rise during the 1630's and 1640's to an attack upon the Spanish government's policy with regard to naturalisations.⁶⁵ If there was nothing that could

be done to curtail the activities of the foreigner, which were carried on outside the law, there was at any rate some satisfaction to be had from attempting to deprive the foreigner of his only means of lawful participation in the Indies trade. A grant of naturalisation conferred upon a foreigner the same privileges as were enjoyed by the natives of Castile and Aragon in respect of the Indies and of the trade with them. During the sixteenth century and during the reign of Philip III, naturalisations were granted only sparingly, and the regulations governing eligibility for naturalisation were all strictly observed. During Philip IV's reign, however, naturalisation was conceded more freely. Again it was a case of the the Spanish government taking advantage of a situation from which it was able to profit financially, since those foreigners who were unable to fulfill all the required conditions were ready to pay well for the licence of naturalisation.⁶⁶

The Spanish merchants disapproved of their government's liberality, and in 1630 and again in 1643, the Consulado of Seville petitioned for the withdrawal of recently issued licences of naturalisation. The merchants' request of 1643 was supported by the Casa de Contratación, which maintained that the granting of so many naturalisations had extended foreign control over the trade in Seville and Cadiz, and had increased the amount of fraud committed by the foreigners.⁶⁷ In accordance with the wishes of his subjects in Seville, Philip IV agreed, fifteen years after their first petition, to revoke all the certificates of naturalisation which had been

granted to foreigners who had not fulfilled all the conditions of eligibility.⁶⁸

The number of British subjects who gained certificates of naturalisation was small. Between 1600 and 1643 there were only five.⁶⁹ Amongst them, there was Richard Suit, who, together with four natives of France and Portugal, was naturalised in 1631, having agreed to pay Philip IV a sum of money in return for the concession.⁷⁰ Suit, apparently, was not slow to take advantage of the privileges which his naturalisation gave him. During the years from 1631 to 1645, when, presumably, he lost his naturalisation, he established himself as one of the leading participants in the Indies trade.⁷¹ It seems, however, that Suit may have been over ambitious in his commercial transactions. In 1635, he was said to be a rich man,⁷² and yet early in 1645, on the orders of the Consulado of Seville, he found himself in the prison of the Casa, bankrupt and unable to pay his debts.⁷³ Not the least part of his financial difficulties was due to his being called upon, as the sponsor⁷⁴ of ships' masters who had defaulted in their payment of the avería, to furnish the sum which the administrators of the avería had lost as a result of the masters' deceit.⁷⁵ One ship with which Suit was associated, both as sponsor of the master and as owner of part of the cargo, was the Santa Clara.⁷⁶ The Santa Clara was an English ship which was freighted for the Indies trade in 1642, and which, instead of returning to Spain, sailed directly from San Domingo to England.⁷⁷

Just as merchandise belonging to foreigners was excluded from the

Indies trade in principle, so also were the ships owned by them. Owing to the decadence of Spanish marine shipping, the Spanish government had long since recognised the necessity of employing ships of a non-Spanish construction in the Indies trade. It was required, however, that such ships should be owned by Spaniards, and that they should carry crews that were totally Spanish.⁷⁸ But such was the scarcity of ships and sailors during the reign of Philip IV that his government had to allow the hiring of foreign owned vessels for the Indies trade. The registration of these ships in the names of their alleged Spanish owners was, seemingly, a formality that still had to be observed, but the fact that their crews, with the permission of the Spanish authorities, were composed of aliens as well as Spaniards was a clear indication of their foreign ownership.

Since England enjoyed such a long period of peace with Spain, and since, with an expanding merchant navy, she had plenty of ships available for employment in foreign service,⁷⁹ it was the English who were able to derive most benefit from the Spanish government's concessions with regard to the use of alien shipping in the Indies trade.⁸⁰ In November 1637, Juan Cespedes, a prominent Seville merchant who was associated with Richard Suit in many commercial ventures, obtained a licence from the Council of the Indies for three English ships to take frutos de cuaresma to San Domingo and Puerto Rico; a third of the crew could be composed of

foreigners, as long as the captain, master, pilot and other officers were Castilians.⁸¹ With this licence, Cespedes and Suit sent the San Jorge to San Domingo in January 1639, and they included two more English ships, the Ulyses and the Santiago, in the New Spain fleet of 1642. In the same fleet there was another English vessel, the Conteno, which sailed with a crew that was half English.⁸² Such concessions as these, of course, afforded the English many opportunities for deceiving and defrauding the Casa de Contratación. That they did not hesitate to make the most of these opportunities is evident from the events associated with the Santa Clara.

Captain Pedro Henriquez de Almeida was granted permission to use the Santa Clara to transport ship building materials to San Domingo, where he proposed to construct three galleons. With these materials and other merchandise, the ship sailed from Cadiz with the Tierra Firme fleet in September 1640.⁸³ There were twenty-two English sailors aboard her, and amongst them was the ship's English captain, Benedict Stafford. Taking advantage of the absence of the Spanish master, Francisco Alicante, and of some of the Spaniards, Stafford sailed from San Domingo on 7 July 1642, with his English crew and the rest of the Spaniards; also on board was the cargo which had been loaded for the return journey to Spain, and five of the Spanish merchants who had a share in it.⁸⁴

With its cargo of skins, cochineal, tobacco, sugar and a considerable amount of bullion, the Santa Clara reached Southampton on 26 August 1642. Its arrival set in motion a series of long and involved negotiations which, from the Spanish point of view at any rate, never reached a satisfactory conclusion. Several factors served to complicate and protract the proceedings. In the first instance, there was disagreement concerning the ownership of the cargo between the Spanish government and the five Spanish merchants who had come to England. Alonso de Cardenas insisted in the Admiralty Court that it belonged to Philip IV, since the ship had committed a breach of Spanish law by not returning to Spain. The five Spanish merchants, on the other hand, were most anxious to prove that they were the lawful owners, not wishing to see the ship and its cargo sent back to Spain.⁸⁵ There was also the fact that the ship could not have arrived in England at a more confused and difficult time. The Long Parliament, in need of money to pursue the war against Charles I, took the silver, gold and other merchandise into its custody until the question of ownership had been determined by the Admiralty Court. Parliament subsequently released the merchandise and allowed the Spanish merchants to sell it, having first received from them £20,000 worth of bullion as security for the return of the proceeds of the sale in the event of the Admiralty Court's decision going against them.⁸⁶ This money, which together with a further "loan" of £30,000 worth of silver was

immediately minted by the Long Parliament, was never recovered by the Spaniards. Not even the combined efforts of the ambassador and the merchants, after the latter had received a pardon from Philip IV for their offence,⁸⁷ could induce Parliament, and later Cromwell, to repay the money, and because the English government could claim, justifiably, that the Spanish merchants had consented to the loan, the Spanish government hesitated to permit its recovery by means of letters of reprisal.⁸⁸ The outbreak of war in 1655 and the Protectorate's appropriation of all Spanish property closed the case of the Santa Clara for the Spaniards after thirteen years of costly negotiations. If the sailing of the Santa Clara from San Domingo to Southampton came about as a result of collusion between Stafford and the five Spanish merchants, as some aspects of the evidence seem to suggest, then the conspirators grievously erred in their failure to appreciate that the obsession with the acquisition of gold and silver was something that Spain shared with every country, including England, in the seventeenth century.

The participation of foreign shipping in the Indies trade, whether hired or owned by Spaniards, was resented by the owners and builders of Spanish ships, and in response to a petition, made on their behalf by the Universidad de Mareantes of Seville, Philip IV issued a prohibition against the admission of foreign built ships to the Indies trade in July 1642.⁸⁹ The prohibition was intended to stimulate shipbuilding in Spain. But the

good intentions of the Spanish government were insufficient to revive an industry that had been languishing for so long, and the prohibition, consequently, could not be enforced as there were never enough Spanish ships available to carry on the trade with the American colonies. As already seen, three English vessels sailed with the New Spain fleet in 1642 only seventeen days after the publication of the prohibition. And even after the Santa Clara episode had fully demonstrated the dangers attendant upon the employment of hired foreign ships, the Spanish government had no alternative but to continue to allow such ships to take part in the Indies trade. Richard Suit and Juan Cespedes were permitted to include one English ship, the Fama, partly crewed by Englishmen, in the Tierra Firme fleet of 1643, and two others, the Santiago and the Santo Tomas, in the New Spain fleet of 1644.⁹⁰ Although it was experiencing great difficulty in finding ships for the fleet destined for New Spain, the Casa de Contratación was most reluctant to include the ships of Suit and Cespedes, because they had been hired from Englishmen.⁹¹

It was clearly impossible for the Spanish government to achieve a total exclusion of foreign shipping from the Indies trade, and by the late 1640's it would appear to have adopted the compromise policy recommended by the Casa de Contratación. The Casa's recommendation was that Spanish ships should always have preference over foreign ships, but if the latter were

licenced to take part in the trade with the colonies their crews were to consist only of Spaniards, so as to avoid a repetition of the flight of the Santa Clara.⁹² But, as already pointed out, policy and practice were very different matters in the Indies trade. Regulations, it seems, were made only to be broken and evaded by Spaniards and foreigners alike. The English ship, the Santo Christo de Buen Viaje, is a further illustration of this fact. Captain Juan Antonio Belvis of Seville, by virtue of a licence he had received in 1645 to transport materials, necessary for the construction of a galleon in two foreign ships to San Domingo, sent the Santo Christo de Buen Viaje⁹³ to Hispaniola in September, 1647. The only condition of his licence was that the two ships should carry totally Spanish crews.⁹⁴ It was suspected that this had not been observed, and an investigation was ordered in San Domingo.⁹⁵ The investigation revealed that after the Casa officials had completed their inspection of the ship and before it had sailed from Spain, Captain Belvis had taken aboard Captain Robert Park, who was understood to be the owner of the ship, and twenty-four Englishmen. Apparently, Park and his countrymen also escaped detection when the ship was inspected on its arrival in San Domingo. Of the twenty-four English, only eight were known to have returned to Spain, and of that eight, only one, Robert Ingle, failed to avoid being detained by the Casa de Contratación.⁹⁶ In San Domingo the Santo Christo de Buen Viaje was seized together with a quantity of cloth,

wine and other merchandise, all of which belonged to Park and which he had presumably smuggled aboard the ship with the intention of selling it on Hispaniola.⁹⁷ Park died on the island.

Richard Baker in his pamphlet of 1658 alleged that the hiring of English ships for the Indies trade ceased entirely after the Santa Clara failed to return to Spain.⁹⁸ This, as proved by the case of the Santo Christo de Buen Viaje, was not so. It may be, however, that the civil wars rendered English ships less readily available for hire,⁹⁹ and having once lost this advantage, gained during the preceding years of peaceful trading with Spain, the English would no doubt find it difficult to recover, especially after 1648 when Dutch ships became available. But if in fact there were fewer opportunities, due either to the policy of the Spanish government or to the political upheaval in England, of employing English shipping in the Indies trade, as Richard Baker pointed out, there were other 'vies et modes' by which the same benefits could be obtained.¹⁰⁰ Some of these have already been mentioned. England's exploitation of Spanish America was conducted, largely on an illegal basis, through the ports of Seville and Cadiz. Similar opportunities for trade with America were also available through Lisbon.

The nature of England's trade with Portugal during the seventeenth century differed very little from that with Spain. Portugal offered the same markets for English cloth, fish and other merchandise. Although, in terms of commercial value, the Portuguese trade took second place,

after the Spanish trade, there were nevertheless certain factors, particularly associated with the Portuguese trade, which made England's maintenance of commercial ties with Portugal very worth while. In times of war between England and Spain, for instance, Portugal provided a convenient base from which to introduce merchandise into the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁰¹ And there was also the sugar with which England was supplied by Portugal, until, towards the end of the century, the English West Indian colonies supplanted Portuguese Brazil as the principal source of sugar supplies. But, undoubtedly, the most important factor connected with England's trade with Portugal was that it furnished another means of establishing indirect commercial contact with the American colonies, and this was contact not merely with the Portuguese colonial empire, but also with the Spanish colonies in South America, which, in view of their supplies of silver, were more attractive to the English trader than Brazil. Both Boxer and Chaunu are agreed that the amount of trade carried from Portugal to Brazil, and from thence, via the Rio de la Plata and the routes over the pampas, to Peru and Chile, was considerable.¹⁰² Such trade, of course, was illegal, and therefore it is impossible to assess its exact value. But Chaunu believes that it was equal in value to the official trade between the Iberian Peninsula and the Pacific coast of South America, which was carried on by way of Porto Bello and the isthmus of Panama.¹⁰³

Portugal's colonial trade policy, at any rate until the revolt of 1640,

was as exclusive in theory as that of Castile, but circumstances made a Portuguese monopoly of the Brazil trade as impossible to achieve in practice as a Castilian monopoly of the Indies trade. The factors facilitating foreign penetration into the Brazil trade were the same as those already mentioned in connection with the breach of Spain's colonial trade monopoly. Portugal, like Spain, was dependent upon supplies of merchandise from northern Europe. But a much more decisive factor was Portugal's lack of shipping resources. Ships became particularly scarce after 1624 when the Portuguese - Dutch struggle for Brazil began in earnest. A state of undeclared war between Portugal and the United Provinces, which was unchanged by a truce of ten years agreed upon in 1641, continued until the outbreak of open war in 1657.

To supplement the dwindling number of Portuguese ships available for the South American trade, Portugal was obliged to resort to the hiring of foreign ships, and since Portugal experienced a more acute shortage of ships than Spain, the number of foreign ships admitted to the Brazil trade in the seventeenth century was greater than that of those employed in the Spanish Indies trade.¹⁰⁴ Flemish, Hansa and occasionally French and Italian ships were hired by the Portuguese, but especially numerous were the English vessels. Once again England was able to gain the advantage over her principal maritime and commercial rivals, the Dutch, as, not unnaturally, ships from the United Provinces were very unwelcome

to the Portuguese. As the Portuguese-Dutch conflict proceeded in Brazil, an increasing number of English ships were plying between Portugal and Brazil.¹⁰⁵ The position of English shipping in the Brazil trade was firmly consolidated by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of January, 1642; John IV agreed that in future Portugal would hire only English vessels. This superseded a similar concession made to the Dutch during the previous year.¹⁰⁶

Theoretically, the licences issued by the Portuguese government for the hiring of ships from England did not confer upon the ships' owners the right to trade with Brazil. But, in practice, it is clear that from Portugal English merchants were actively trading with Brazil long before the right to do so was conceded by the Portuguese in their treaty with Cromwell in 1654.¹⁰⁷ Inevitably, the freighted ships furnished the opportunities for such trade, and the English were assisted in their exploitation of these opportunities by the fact that the Brazil trade was not subjected to the same degree of administrative supervision and control as the Spanish Indies trade. The policy of centralisation, which was characteristic of Spain's administration of the American commerce in the seventeenth century, was not to be found in Portugal's organisation of her colonial trade. Several ports, and not just one, or two at the most, as in Spain, had a share in the trade both in Portugal and in Brazil; it was because of this dispersed nature of the trade that the attempts of the Portuguese to establish a system of convoys for the Atlantic crossing

had little success.¹⁰⁸ Whilst the lack of supervision in Portugal enabled the English to trade unofficially with the Portuguese colonies in Brazil, as equally helpful was the attitude of Philip IV's government, which, in order to discourage the English from engaging in direct commercial activities with Brazil, was apparently prepared to encourage English trade via Portugal. Madrid was always inclined to take a more liberal outlook when dealing, not with its own colonial empire, but with that of Portugal. It is interesting to note that the natives of the Netherlands, although denied access to the Castilian colonial empire, were admitted by Philip IV to the Portuguese East Indies.¹⁰⁹ So that when Necolalde wrote from London in 1634 to advise his government that he had been approached by Francis Cottington and others about the possibility of sending ships directly to Brazil, he was asked to discourage them, even though they were planning, firstly, to use the ships of a subject of Philip IV, the Flemish merchant and financier, Peter Richaut, and, secondly, to visit Madeira on the way to Brazil to register the cargo. And in order to induce Cottington and his friends to give up their ideas about direct trade between England and Brazil, and at the same time to further his plans for bringing about the political and diplomatic estrangement of France and England, Philip IV suggested that Necolalde might secure the co-operation of some of Charles I's ministers by interesting them in a proposition, the substance of which was as follows: the King was

prepared to transport any articles of merchandise, which the ministers might send to Lisbon, across the Atlantic in his own name and free from the obligation to pay duties in Brazil; the proceeds from the merchandise were to be accorded similar privileges for the return journey. Anyone interested in the proposition was to be assured that he would make a handsome profit.¹¹⁰ Whether or not advantage was taken of Philip IV's offer is uncertain. It is, however, very certain that by the 1650s, either illicitly or by means of special licences granted by the new Portuguese government, the English had secured a substantial share in the trade which passed between Portugal and Brazil. When, in 1650, General Blake seized the nine English ships which were then preparing to sail from Lisbon to Brazil, it was revealed that a large proportion of their cargoes of cloth and refined sugar belonged to English merchants.¹¹¹

The Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1654, therefore, merely confirmed an already well established practice. The treaty gave the English the right to trade with Brazil on exactly the same terms as Portuguese subjects. Cromwell had wished to obtain complete freedom of action for the merchants, but the condition required by the Portuguese, that they should conduct their commercial dealings with Portuguese South America through Lisbon and the other ports, was not a difficult one to accept in view of the unrivalled position which the English had succeeded in establishing for themselves in the Brazil trade by 1654. Their potential

rivals in this sphere of commercial and maritime expansion, the French and the Dutch, although they too had not hesitated to acknowledge the new Portuguese government, did not obtain privileges, similar to those enjoyed by the English from Portugal until 1661 and 1667.¹¹² The fact was that the English, whose country enjoyed a long period of peace in Europe, were able to offer much more in return for commercial privileges than the French and the Dutch. Whereas England, as we have seen, was able to provide Portugal with ships, France and the United Provinces were unable to do the same; the vessels of the latter were unwelcome to the Portuguese, whilst the former was itself inadequately provided with ships. In addition to carrying trade to Brazil, English shipping was also used to transport munitions and other necessities of war to the Portuguese in Brazil.¹¹³ This latter service was one which gave great offence to the Dutch and served to increase the tension between England and the United Provinces. Furthermore, as a neutral country and as an intermediary of commerce, England was able to render Portugal valuable assistance in Europe after 1640. The Portuguese relied upon the English and upon English shipping to carry their trade to and from northern Europe,¹¹⁴ and also to assist them in extracting from Spain certain essential items, which the 1640 revolt and the consequent cessation of Spanish-Portuguese trade made difficult to obtain. For a country at war, one such item was iron ore, and it was apparently

through the English that Portugal acquired its supplies of ore from the Biscayan provinces after 1640.¹¹⁵

England and the carrying trades

These services rendered to Portugal are but one illustration of the kind of commercial activity, ancillary to the main stream of their own trade with the Iberian Peninsula, to which the English were able to give their attention after 1630. During that period, when their country's greatest assets was the peace it enjoyed in Europe, the English had the opportunity of developing a European carrying trade, the commercial advantages of which had already been well proved by the Dutch.

Consequently, the English, as neutral and intermediary traders, were responsible for much of that trade which, for the duration of the wars, continued to pass between Spain and her enemies, France and the United Provinces. "By us the Hollanders and French are driving as great a trade as in time of peace", wrote Hopton.¹¹⁶ Also important, for England as well as for Spain, was the English contribution to the promotion of trade between Spain and her territorial possessions in the Low Countries at a time when that particular line of commerce was beset by many hazards.

The war in the Low Countries had disastrous effects upon the industrial and commercial life of the Spanish Netherlands, and even the truce of 1609, although providing twelve years respite from actual fighting, did little to improve their economic condition. The Dutch,

on the other hand, continued to prosper. During the period of the truce they derived great commercial benefit from freedom of access to Spain and Portugal. The greater part of the cloth production of the Spanish Netherlands was sold in the Iberian Peninsula, and whilst the truce lasted, competition in the Portuguese and Spanish markets between the textiles of the northern and southern Netherlands, serious enough even during war, was intensified. In this contest, the Dutch had all the advantages; they had the capital, and they also had the ships. The Spanish Netherlands were especially short of the latter, and for the transportation of the cloth they were able to dispose of in Spain, the Flemish merchants had to rely chiefly upon French ships. The French merchant ships were loaded with merchandise from the Spanish Netherlands at the ports of Calais, Rouen and St. Malo.¹¹⁷ Consequently, when the truce ended in 1621 the Spanish Netherlands found themselves no better able to resist the Dutch, in the field of commerce as well as on the battle field, than they had been twelve years before. The Dutch again resumed their blockade of the Flemish ports, and the traffic plying between Spain and the Spanish Netherlands was again menaced by the constant danger of attack by Dutch men of war.

When thus faced with the possibility of a complete breach of Spain's commercial links with her territories in central Europe, the Spanish government decided to take steps to provide the Low Countries trade with the necessary protection against the Dutch. The government hoped, at the same time, to

undermine the commercial superiority of the Dutch and to relieve the economic depression of the Spanish Netherlands by giving positive encouragement to their trade with Spain. The cédula of 4 October 1624 established the Almirantazgo of the Low Countries in Seville. The Almirantazgo, a company incorporating all the Flemish and Hansa merchants residing in Spain, as well as the merchants in Flanders and the Hansa towns who were engaged in trade with Spain, was invested with the authority to control and supervise all trade between Spain, or more specifically the Andalusian ports, and the Spanish Netherlands and Germany.¹¹⁸ A subsequent cédula of 22 September 1626 restricted the transportation of merchandise to Flanders from Spain, and vice versa, to ships of the Almirantazgo.¹¹⁹ The Almirantazgo was also given powers to ascertain, investigate and judge contraband offences committed by the Dutch and by other nations trading in Spain and Portugal.¹²⁰ In return for these concessions, the Almirantazgo promised to maintain twenty-four vessels for the purpose of protecting Spanish-Flemish commerce.¹²¹

Although the ships of this fleet established a considerable reputation by their exploits,¹²² the Almirantazgo did not succeed in achieving the primary aims for which it had been founded. Even those for whose benefit it had supposedly been created began to complain about the restrictions imposed by the Almirantazgo. One such restriction, against which there were strong objections raised in the Spanish Netherlands, particularly in

Antwerp, required all merchandise intended for Spain to pass through Dunkirk, the port selected for the location of the Almirantazgo's administration in the Low Countries.¹²³ There also were protests against the Almirantazgo in Spain. It was alleged that, by means of its privileges, the company of the Almirantazgo was endeavouring to introduce measures which were excessively restrictive, and which were threatening to destroy, rather than stimulate, trade with the Low Countries. Such was the complaint of the Spanish merchants taking part in the Indies trade.¹²⁴

At the outset, the complete exclusion of the Dutch from all commercial contacts with Spain was regarded as an essential step towards the promotion of the Low Countries trade. In 1625, the Junta de Comercio in Madrid considered the means by which this exclusion could be achieved, and one of its first recommendations was the immediate proscription of those licences which permitted trade between the Spanish Netherlands and the United Provinces. The comment of Jean van de Woumer, the representative of the Archduchess in the Junta, on this proposal was that it would mean a loss of 200,000 ecus a year to the Archduchess, and that accordingly the money supplied by Spain to the Low Countries would have to be augmented by that amount.¹²⁵ These licences, in fact, had represented a valuable source of income for the government in Brussels during the years prior to the conclusion of the truce in 1609, and the selling of them had been resumed

as soon as the war in the Low Countries reopened.¹²⁶ On the Junta's recommendation, the sale of the licences was forbidden, but in January 1629 this prohibition was withdrawn, and Philip IV allowed the licences to be issued again, on condition that there was no trade in provisions of war and that the Dutch did not take timber from the Spanish Netherlands.¹²⁷ Philip IV's approval of a licenced trade between the belligerent provinces in the Low Countries can be seen, on the one hand, as a concession that the King was obliged to make in order to reduce, if only slightly, the tremendous financial burden which the cost of defending the Spanish Netherlands imposed upon Castile. On the other hand, it can be seen as another indication of the failure of the Almirantazgo, to reinvigorate the economic life of the Spanish provinces in the Low Countries. It had not given the expected stimulus to Spanish-Flemish trade; and it had failed to provide adequate protection against enemy attacks, as it had also failed to render the trade less reliant upon the co-operation and assistance of foreign intermediaries and their shipping. That Philip IV's government was aware of the full extent of the Almirantazgo's failure is evident from the instructions which were prepared for the Cardenal Infante in 1632. In these he was told that one of the principal reasons for the decayed state of Spanish-Flemish trade was the lack of security at sea, and his attention was drawn to one particular effect of that. Owing to the perilous nature of the sea voyage between Spain and the Low Countries, insurance rates on merchandise sent to Spain

from Flemish ports and aboard Flemish and Spanish ships were very much higher than those required if the same merchandise was despatched from French ports and in French merchant vessels. The rates in Flanders were twenty to twenty-five per cent, as compared with ten per cent in France. Cheaper insurance rates outside the Spanish Netherlands was a further inducement to those engaged in the Spanish-Flemish trade to seek the services of a third party. The Cardinal Infante was instructed to consider the possibility of using the royal fleet to escort merchant shipping in order to discourage the Flemish from trading with Spain via France and England.¹²⁸ The need to apply a regular system of convoys for the trade with Flanders was obvious. But the Almirantazgo had already failed to achieve that, and since its shipping resources were already overtaxed by many other commitments at sea, it was not likely that the royal navy would be able to supply the necessary naval protection.

In the circumstances, therefore, the preservation of the commercial links between Spain and Flanders required the co-operation of England and France, and when, in 1635, the outbreak of war deprived them of the use of French ports and shipping, the Flemish merchants came to rely solely upon England. Above all, English ships were needed in Flanders, and the merchants there would have liked to be free to freight them and to despatch them to Spain from Dunkirk and other Flemish ports. However, this practice was disapproved of in England. English government policy favoured instead a

means of aiding the Flemish merchants which proved more profitable for England. This was the 'composition trade', an arrangement whereby merchandise was brought across the Channel to Dover to be re-exported from there to Spain aboard English merchant ships. Clearly, England was able to benefit from the composition trade in several ways. Whilst it provided employment for English merchant ships, and was thus able to give active encouragement to shipbuilding, it also added to the country's customs revenue. There were, in fact, certain customs concessions in favour of the Flemish merchants. These were made by the farmers of customs in Dover, with the permission of the Privy Council, in order to attract as much of the Spanish-Flemish trade as was possible to England. A duty of sixpence in the pound was paid on all Flemish goods imported into Dover for re-exportation to Spain. The same charge was made on Spanish merchandise which came to Dover and was transferred from there to Flanders.¹²⁹ And it was because the composition trade was a two-way process, with the trade carried by English ships from Spain to Flanders being operated under the same conditions as that from Flanders to Spain, that it benefited England in one other way. As the bullion belonging to the Flemish merchants, together with the other produce brought from Spain, was landed in Dover before being shipped across the Channel, the composition trade was one more source from which England

was able to obtain gold and silver. In 1636, the English government announced its intention of imposing a duty of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on bullion and coinage sent to Flanders from Spain by way of England, the prime object of the imposition being to induce the Flemish merchants to leave either the whole or part of their treasure in England. The merchants who forfeited their Spanish bullion were given bills of exchange, with which they were able to receive repayment in Antwerp.¹³⁰

England profited greatly from the composition trade, but in assuming responsibility for the continuation of Flemish-Spanish trade, the English were faced with the opposition and hostility of Spain's enemies. Whilst, on the one hand, the outbreak of war between France and Spain was advantageous to England in that it eliminated the rivalry of a country which, until 1635, had shared in the task of promoting trade between the Low Countries and Spain, on the other hand, it augmented the hazards to which the composition trade was exposed in the Channel. Both the French and the Dutch, being at war with Spain, claimed the right to seize the ships and property of their enemy. England could not deny them this right, since it was accorded to all belligerents in the seventeenth century by international consent. There was, however, no international understanding about the ways in which the neutral trader was or was not affected by the execution of this right, and the fact that the Dutch and the French, whenever they had the opportunity, stopped English ships in the Channel to search them

for anything that belonged to the subjects of the King of Spain provoked a strong protest in England.¹³¹ And as the English government alleged that attempts on the part of the Dutch and French to interrupt the composition trade were in effect an infringement of England's sovereignty over the Narrow Seas, Charles I was obliged to use the navy, which he had formed to assert that claim of sovereignty, to protect the lucrative composition trade. Accordingly, the Earl of Lindsay was ordered to prevent the searching of English merchant ships, particularly those which came from Spain and Portugal and were carrying bullion and other commodities of those countries.¹³² Ships of the royal navy were also used to convoy fleets of merchantmen back and forth across the Channel. Captain Sir George Cateret advised the Lords of the Admiralty in June 1636 that he was preparing to escort his fourth merchant fleet of that year from the Downs to Ostend and Calais. In this same letter, Cateret also remarked that, apart from finding it necessary to be constantly on the alert to counter a possible French or Dutch assault, the royal escort ships were also experiencing difficulty in keeping in check some of the members of the merchant fleets. Apparently, a number of the English vessels transporting Spanish merchandise were in the habit of deliberately straying from the main body of the fleet in order to allow themselves to be taken either by the French or the Dutch. According to Cateret capture by the French was particularly welcomed, as they, in addition to giving substantial rewards

to the ships' masters, were prepared to double the freight charges, owed to the owners by those who had hired the captured vessels.¹³³

Despite the hazards, the Flemish composition trade was highly valued in England. It was said to be worth as much as £60,000 annually to the state during the years when it was most flourishing.¹³⁴ It is hardly surprising therefore that the English were so determined to retain their hold upon Flemish-Spanish commerce, and, with the co-operation of their government, to resist any attempts to deprive them of its fruits. However, it is no less surprising to find that the Flemish bitterly resented the restrictions to which they were subjected so that the English could enrich themselves at their expense. It was reported early in 1637 that the Flemish merchants, anxious to use their own ships, instead of English ones, in their Spanish trade, were planning to sail them with English crews, and presumably under the English flag, in order to safeguard them against the French and Dutch. The customs farmers in Dover, not unnaturally, were alarmed by this report, and suggested that the plans of the Flemish merchants could be easily thwarted if Charles I insisted on the observation of the proclamation which had recently recalled all English sailors in foreign service to serve in the ship-money fleets.¹³⁵ But, in fact, there was little cause for alarm, for the Flemish were powerless to effect any changes with regard to the English hold upon their Spanish trade, and the realisation of this only increased their resentment and

induced them to lay much of the blame for their economic difficulties at England's door. The Cardenal Infante, writing to Philip IV in February 1638, referred to these Flemish grievances and alleged that the English had recently taken rigorous action against a ship, which, because it was unable to reach an English port, has sailed directly to the Iberian Peninsula. The Cardenal Infante felt that England's conduct in connection with the composition trade did not conform with what one had a right to expect from a country at peace with Spain, and he asked Philip IV to consider if there was not some justification for assuming that a state of war existed between the two countries.¹³⁶

As the subjects of a country at peace in Europe after 1630, and therefore able to engage actively in lucrative carrying trades, the English did not restrict themselves solely to Spanish-Flemish commerce. There was also the opportunity to share profitably in trade between the belligerent countries. And just as the English government insisted that the merchants were not to be the sole beneficiaries of the Flemish trade, so it also insisted that trade with Spain and Portugal, undertaken on behalf of the Dutch and the French, should further enrich the country by contributing to the customs revenue. When, therefore, it was learnt that merchandise from Calais and other French ports, and from the United Provinces, as well as from the Spanish Netherlands, was being transferred to English vessels bound for Spain and Portugal in the Downs, without being deposited first in Dover, and consequently without paying

customs duties, the Early of Lindsay was ordered to put a stop to the practice.¹³⁷

In 1604, and again in 1630 when the Anglo-Spanish peace was renewed, both James I and Charles I promised that their subjects would not assist the Dutch, either by conveying the goods of the latter to Spain, or by carrying commodities on their behalf from Spain to the United Provinces.¹³⁸ But contraband activities were so favoured by conditions in Spain, that the promises of James I and Charles I could not be expected to achieve the result at which Philip III and Philip IV were aiming when they insisted upon them. Also included in the treaties was an agreement concerning the clear registration and sealing of merchandise destined for Spain by the English customs authorities.¹³⁹ This agreement also failed to achieve the desired objective, namely the commercial exclusion of the Dutch from Spain, principally because the English traders did not carry out its stipulations. Because of the disorders it tended to create in the ports, no one regretted this failure to fulfil the requirements of the peace treaties more than Hopton.¹⁴⁰ The general cargo registers, or libros de sobordo, as they were known in Spain, the contents of which were expected to correspond with the sealed packs of merchandise on board the English vessels, were also used by the Spanish contraband officials to substantiate the legitimacy of the ships' cargoes. In 1639 Hopton protested that his compatriots were being unjustly and harshly punished

for failing to provide libros de sobordo which satisfied the Spanish officials. In reply to this charge, the Almirantazgo asserted that its officers in the ports, the veedores de contrabando, were dealing very leniently with the English, since it was a certain fact that there was a considerable amount of merchandise aboard English merchant ships which was purposely omitted from the libros de sobordo, so that it could be smuggled into Spain. The penalty incurred when such deception was discovered was the loss of all the merchandise not included in the ship's register, together with one fifth of the rest. But, as was pointed out by the Almirantazgo, in deference to Anglo-Spanish friendship, the masters of English ships who transgressed in this way were only condemned to forfeit one fifth of their unregistered cargo.¹⁴¹

Such indications of a readiness to moderate the threatened penalties in their favour were not likely to assist in persuading the English to desist from smuggling Dutch and other prohibited merchandise into Spain, especially as the chances of their being discovered were, in any case, only very slight. The ease with which smuggling could be carried on in Spain is explained, first, by inadequacy of the facilities for guarding and supervising the Andalusian ports, and, secondly, by the laxity and incompetence of the Spanish officials, amongst whom there was often disagreement about the scope of their respective duties and responsibilities with regard to contraband activities. In Malaga, for instance, there was friction between the Veedor de Contrabando

and the Corregidor. The Veedor in Malaga, Miguel Marinsen, reported that ships came to the port and were there for three or four days without being visited and inspected. Thus the ships' masters had plenty of opportunity to contact their agents in the port and to arrange for the secret unloading of part of their cargo. Moreover, there were English vessels which were never inspected, because the traders, on coming ashore, claimed that their ships were merely en route from the Levant to London. The Veedor said that he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to impress upon the Corregidor the necessity of visiting these ships to make sure that they were English, and not French or Dutch, and that they were not carrying cargoes of prohibited goods.¹⁴² For those who were unfortunate enough to be caught smuggling, there were of course the royal pardons, which Philip IV was only too ready to sell. Hopton, reporting that the Count of Penafior, President of the Casa de Contratación, had been instructed to inspect the books of the English merchants in Cadiz for evidence of illegitimate trade, said that the merchants were certain "to be found faulty", but that all would be "ransomed by money which they seek by so many ways."¹⁴³

There is no doubt that the English did much to facilitate Dutch trade with the Iberian Peninsula after 1630, but, in fact, the extent to which they were able to act as intermediarily for the Dutch was limited by the fact that the Dutch themselves were given many opportunities of

trading directly with Spain during the war. In 1629, writing from Dunkirk, the Veedor General of trade and contraband in the Spanish Netherlands, informed Philip IV that the Flemish merchants were protesting that, whilst the Dutch were allowed to trade freely with Spain through Bayonne and Portugal, their ships and merchandise were being arrested in Spain on suspicion of being Dutch, even though they were able to supply certificates from Dunkirk.¹⁴⁴ This connivance at Dutch trade is explained by the fact that Spain, because of the need for those vital products of the Baltic, was unable to dispense with the services of Dutch shipping even while hostilities were in progress. Consequently, Dutch ships, theoretically barred from the Iberian Peninsula, were allowed to import timber and other valuable naval materials into Spain, whilst to Portugal they were permitted to bring Baltic grain whenever poor harvests resulted in a scarcity of wheat.¹⁴⁵ During the war the Dutch were also able to maintain direct commercial contacts with the Iberian Peninsula by means of those licences which they purchased in the Spanish Netherlands, and which enabled them to take salt from Spain and Portugal. It was alleged in 1639 that the licences were being abused by the Dutch who were using them to facilitate their extraction of gold and silver. However, in view of the financial gain which Spain made from this particular concession, the Spanish councillors did not feel that these allegations were serious enough to warrant the withdrawal of the salt

licences.¹⁴⁶

France's mercantile navy was very much inferior to that of the United Provinces, and for that reason the French, in order to maintain their commercial links with Spain after 1635, found it necessary to rely upon neutral shipping to a much greater extent than the Dutch.¹⁴⁷ There were items of French manufacture which were almost as indispensable to Spain as the naval materials and grain of the Baltic. French linens always found a ready market in Spain, from where they were re-exported to the Indies, and at the beginning of the war with France, there was a particularly high demand for them as 1636 and 1637 were years of relative expansion in the Indies trade.¹⁴⁸ And it was because of the scarcity of French linen, resulting from the ban on trade with the enemy, that in 1635 the Casa de Contratación recommend the adoption of a modus vivendi in respect of France, and suggested that French manufacturers might be obtained through England.¹⁴⁹ The Spanish government accepted this advice and proceeded to issue the permisiones which licenced the importation of French merchandise. The English government for its part lost no time in arranging for the reception of French linen into English customs houses.¹⁵⁰ Dover was the principal port of reception and re-exportation, and there English agents were employed by the French merchants to conduct their trade with Spain.¹⁵¹

The permisiones usually had to be purchased from the Spanish Crown. Benjamin Wright, the merchant financier living in Madrid, bought licences for the importation of considerable quantities of French merchandise, whilst Richard Suit was one of a number of English merchants of Seville, who, having reached a satisfactory settlement with Philip IV, were granted permission to import 240,000 ducats worth of French contraband.¹⁵²

But the permisiones were also used by the Spanish government as a means of cancelling outstanding debts. Captain John Limbrey, who in 1641 still had not been paid the expenses he incurred when arranging for the transportation of soldiers from Spain to Italy in 1633, was given a licence, valid for one year, to introduce into Spain French merchandise to the value of 49,630 ducats.¹⁵³ A similar concession for the importation of French merchandise valued at 200,000 ducats was made to Peter Richaut. Richaut had been giving valuable financial assistance to the Spanish embassy in London for many years, and it was said in 1638 that he was still owed 480,000 ducats by the Spanish government.¹⁵⁴

The permisiones provided the English with an admirable cover for smuggling which, of course, they did not hesitate to exploit. Lorenzo Andres, the Veedor de contrabando in San Lucar, informed Philip IV in September 1640 about the recent arrival of five English ships, which by virtue of permisiones were said to be carrying cargoes of French merchandise. Instead of entering the port, the ships had anchored some distance out

to sea, and Andref, suspecting that they intended to engage in smuggling, sent out a reconnaissance boat. Although well armed, the boat could do little more than keep a watch on the ships. The ships were anchored at sea for six days, and during that time they were visited by eight boats which took away contraband cloth and tobacco. When three of the ships eventually entered San Lucar, the masters alleged that they had been waiting at sea for instructions from the merchants to whom their cargoes were consigned.¹⁵⁵ Such incidents can be regarded as typical of the kind of activity which flourished on the Andalusian coast and in which the English traders were deeply involved. Even Sir Arthur Hopton had occasion to lament the apparent readiness of his compatriots to cheat their own government, as well as that of Spain. As Hopton explained to Secretary Coke, the "French trade by permission" brought to Spain "such things as must be had at any rate and do make no returns but in money".¹⁵⁶ The money so obtained, of course, had to be smuggled aboard the English ships, and this was usually done at night, and at some distance from the ports after the ships had sailed. But more reprehensible than this, at any rate in Hopton's view, was that some of these English vessels took their cargoes of bullion and coinage directly to France, thus evading the payment of English customs duties. Commenting on the Spanish government's decision to withhold sailing permission from foreign ships until they had given guarantees that they would not anchor within

twenty leagues of the coast, Hopton remarked, "I cannot deny but that our English have been much to blame, for the disorder hath been too apparent and wholly for the benefit of strangers (the French), for they carry none of the money into England." ¹⁵⁷

The Spanish government, therefore, had ample justification for its criticism of the behaviour of the English traders in Spain. Such criticism, however, could be countered as it frequently was, by English allegations of unjust treatment in the courts and ports of Spain. One of their particular complaints referred to the heavy charges made on English ships and their cargoes when they came into the Spanish ports. In addition to the customs duties, there were levies exacted by the officials of the Almirantazgo, Contrabando, and the Inquisition, whose inspection of the ships was compulsory. The charges made by the Inquisition, against which most of the complaints were directed, varied from port to port; in 1648 the charge made in San Lucar for each visit to a ship was 32 reals, whilst in Cartagena it was only 8 reals. ¹⁵⁸ When the nature of the cargo required a long and thorough inspection, additional charges were made for each bale of merchandise or barrel of fish. Objections to these impositions were answered by the Inquisition with the assertion that they were hardly sufficient to compensate for the time that had to be spent on the inspection of English vessels, which were known to secrete heretical literature in barrels of fish and in bales

of cloth, and which also brought their cargoes of cloth in very large bales so as to obscure the exact nature of their content and value.¹⁵⁹ Deciding who was to blame for the misunderstandings which arose between the English merchants and the Spaniards is difficult, but it is significant that England's ambassadors in Spain showed little sympathy for the merchants. The general opinion of the ambassadors was that the merchants were themselves very largely responsible for their own difficulties in Spain. In 1606, Sir Charles Cornwallis described the merchants as "being people disordered, uncharitable, unfriendly amongst themselves and scandalous to this people", whilst Sir John Digby said that they were "many times justly causers of their own troubles by attempting many things contrary to the laws".¹⁶⁰ Sir Arthur Hopton's opinion of the English merchants did not differ from that of his predecessors. He found, particularly in the Andalusian ports, that the English trade was being conducted by "a confused company of vain young men", and that "amongst so many young men, as are here without any head, it cannot be excused but that sometimes trouble will happen". But despite such unavoidable troubles, Hopton was nevertheless convinced that the English had "a very good trade" in Spain, and that they were "not very ill dealt with all."¹⁶¹

That Hopton's conviction was also shared by the English traders is evident from the fact that the injustices and inconveniences, which

the latter claimed they encountered in Spain and against which they were constantly protesting, did not prove to be a serious impediment to their trade with Spain. On the contrary, the Spanish trade flourished. Essentially, the value of the Spanish trade for England lay in the fact that it had commercial ramifications which extended beyond the limits of the Iberian Peninsula. Through their trade with Spain and Portugal, the English were able to establish commercial relations with Spanish America, and they were also able to take an active part in trade between the Iberian Peninsula and other European countries. This extension of the commercial activities of the English was made possible by the long period of peace which their country enjoyed in Europe. For although, with regard to England's role in European affairs, the first two Stuarts' avoidance of war can be said to have resulted in political stagnation, from the point of view of the country's trading interests, it is undeniable that the peaceful years of their reigns resulted in commercial growth and expansion. Since, therefore, peace made such a vital contribution to England's commercial prosperity in the first half of the seventeenth century, inevitably one must consider how external trade in general and the Spanish trade in particular, was affected by the Civil Wars. Lacking the support of reliable statistical evidence, the effect of these wars upon the trade with Spain cannot be conclusively determined. But the impression that can be derived from other sources of information

would seem to be entirely in accord with the implications of the customs figures which Ashley uses to demonstrate his contention that the Civil Wars were not harmful to foreign trade.¹⁶² It is also, perhaps, a factor of no small significance that the English in Spain were able to obtain an important extension of their privileges in 1645, for these concessions do not appear to indicate a weakening of the position of the English mercantile community in Spain, which one could have expected had there been a substantial contraction of Anglo-Spanish trade as a result of the Civil Wars. If, however, England's trade with Spain did suffer during the period of internal political strife, one can safely assume that the re-establishment of political stability under the Commonwealth together with the augmentation of the country's naval resources and the consequent introduction of convoyed merchant fleets,¹⁶³ facilitated the trade's rapid recovery of its former prosperity, and enabled the London merchants to claim in 1655, not without considerable justification, that "the trade with Spain gives more benefit to the Commonwealth than any other."¹⁶⁴ As trade had benefited so much from the external peace which England had enjoyed since 1630, the merchants' fears about the effects of the impending war with Spain are understandable. The next five years would show whether or not their fears were justified.

CHAPTER V

ENGLAND'S TRADE WITH THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

2. In war time

The war of 1625 - 1630

When engaged in war, particularly with the countries of northern Europe, Spain always endeavoured to deprive her enemies of the considerable commercial benefits which they derived from the Iberian peninsula during peace time. Accordingly in 1625, following Buckingham's unsuccessful assault on Cadiz, the Spanish government ordered the seizure of all English property in Spain, and in his pragmática, dated 24 December 1625, Philip IV imposed a ban on all commercial transactions with Englishmen in Spain, and under penalty of immediate confiscation, prohibited the importation of all English merchandise into Spain.¹ At first, Scottish and Irish merchants were expressly excluded from the ban, but they were included later when it was discovered that they were abusing the special concession made to them by bringing in English produce.² As already seen, the Spanish government had tried without success to deny to the Dutch all commercial contacts with Spain and its dominions, and it is very evident that the attempt to sever England's trading links with Spain between 1625 and 1630 was equally unsuccessful.

The maintenance of England's trade with Spain during the early stages of the war was in part the result of special licences issued by the Spanish

government in respect of certain vital commodities which were supplied to Spain by England and other northern European countries. These were the items known in Spain as bastimentos, and they included such things as wheat, rye, barley, cheese, salted pork and fish. These imported provisions, always in great demand in Spain, were required for the provisioning of the fleets, as well as for consumption by the public at large. The naval preparations of 1625 and 1626, which were undertaken as precaution against the possibility of another English naval attack, resulted in a great scarcity of provisions in Spain. Such was the shortage of bastimentos that the factor of the armada de océano, Fernando de Carita, was obliged to appeal to the Junta de Armadas for permission to obtain fish and other provisions from English sources. When considering this request, the members of the Junta recognised that there was a strong possibility that the English would use contracts made with the factor to engage in illegal trade, but they also realised that such contracts would be prejudicial to the enemy, since the English government was anxious to prevent bastimentos reaching Spain.³ Acting on the advice of the Junta, Philip IV agreed to de Carita's request. Amongst those with whom contracts were made for bastimentos was Adrian Paez, a Flemish merchant, who in order to fulfill the terms of his agreement with de Carita, acquired fish in England and transported it to Spain.⁴ The shortage of vital provisions continued in Spain throughout the war, and the French alone, free after the Treaty of

Monzon to resume open trading with the Iberian peninsula, were unable to satisfy Spain's need for them. Consequently, in June 1629 we find the Spanish Council of War recommending that, in view of the scarcity of bastimentos, no action should be taken against the islanders on Ibiza who had obtained wheat from English ships in exchange for salt.⁵

Apart from fish and the other provisions required by Spain, there was also another important item of Anglo-Spanish trade, namely cloth, admitted to Spain under royal licence whilst Charles I and Philip IV were at war; such licences were granted usually with the object of affording the Spanish crown some financial benefit. Adrian Paez, to whom reference has already been made, was authorised by a royal decree in October 1628 to import ropa de contrabando worth 1,000,000 escudos; in return for this permission to sell cloth from the provinces of Holland and Zealand and from England, Paez paid 60,000 ducats worth of silver plate directly into the royal treasury in lieu of the usual customs duties.⁶ Both the Almirantazgo and the Council of War protested that concessions like that granted to Paez could only serve to discourage those who were trying to revive the textile industries of the Spanish Netherlands; the strict enforcement of the ban on cloth imported from England and the United Provinces was essential if they were to succeed.⁷ Philip IV's reply to these objections was that he had granted Paez his licence after due consideration of all the circumstances and that he was not prepared to withdraw it.⁸ At a time when enormous demands

were being made on the Castilian treasury, no offer of financial help, however small, could be refused by Philip IV, even though his acceptance of it might be contrary to the interests of his possessions in the Low Countries.

Royal licences, of course, only accounted for a small proportion of the Anglo-Spanish trade which continued during the war of 1625 - 1630; most of it was carried on illegally. Whilst it seems that there were very few Iberian ports where trading in forbidden English merchandise did not occur during the five years of hostilities, nowhere were the contrabandists more active than in Portugal; it was said that the English and the 'rebels' were trading in all Portuguese ports as openly and as safely as they would do in any English or Dutch port. In Madrid, this state of affairs was blamed on the Portuguese, for they were refusing to respect the orders of the Captain General who, as Philip IV's chief military representative in Portugal, had the task of enforcing the ban on English trade. From the Council of State in Lisbon, the members of which, it was alleged, were more concerned about the particular interests of Portugal than about the general welfare of the whole Spanish empire, down to minor civil administrators, the officials of the Captain General encountered resistance to their attempts to carry out their orders. "Nowhere in the world could one find a larger gathering of ministers who were such blatant robbers and pirates", reported the maestro de campo in Portugal,

Don Fernando de Toledo.⁹ Portuguese antipathy to Castile is not the whole explanation of the freedom with which contraband trade was practised in Portugal during the war, for the Castilian members of Philip IV's Portuguese administration were also found to be guilty of breaches of the contraband regulations.¹⁰ Moreover, the problem of unreliable and corrupt administrative officials was not one which was restricted to the kingdom of Portugal. The same difficulties were experienced by the Castilian Crown throughout the Iberian peninsula, and throughout the whole empire, and made the complete stoppage of English trade during the war impossible to achieve.

The Biscayan coast, particularly the port of Bilbao, was another point of access for prohibited English merchandise. According to the Corregidor of Bilbao, many Spanish merchants went frequently to the French ports of San Juan de Luz and Bayonne, where they purchased English produce with silver plate.¹¹ So large were the quantities of English merchandise entering the country through Bilbao, and through other neighbouring ports, that the Junta de Represalias in Madrid concluded that England was deriving the same benefits from Spain during the war as it had done during the peace.¹² Since contraband trading was so extensive, it is hardly surprising that on his arrival in Bilbao in 1628, the newly appointed veedor de contrabando, Don Francisco Barrionuevo de Cabredo, received a very hostile reception from the municipal and port officials and

also from the Consulado; writing to secretary of state, Antonio Camero, the Veedor reported that the merchants in Bilbao seemed to find his appointment so intolerable that he could only assume that the frauds they had practised up to the time of his arrival had been considerable.¹³ The same kind of opposition by the municipal and provincial officials was also experienced by the new Veedor of San Sebastian and the province of Guipuzcoa; the Veedor strongly suspected that the reasons for their opposition were the same as those stated by the Veedor of Bilbao.¹⁴

As far as the southern coast of Spain is concerned, the evidence available both from English and Spanish sources does not suggest that illegal commerce was as extensive there as it was in Portugal and the north west of Spain. This is surprising in view of the fact that England's peace time trade with Spain was concentrated on the southern ports, for it was through them that English merchandise passed to Spanish America. Although John Nelson, whilst being examined in the Admiralty Court in January 1930, was able to say that on a recent visit to Ayamonte on board the Prosperous of London, he and other members of the crew 'had as free liberty to go on shore and return to the ship as in time of peace between England and Spain', it does appear that for most of the war the southern coast was avoided by English shipping and English merchandise.¹⁵ One possible explanation of this is that the years of Charles I's war with

Spain coincided with the first years of the newly created Almirantazgo,¹⁶ and one could assume that the vigilance of the Almirantazgo in the early stages of its career was sufficient to discourage the contrabandists. But if the way to the Spanish colonial empire through the mainland ports was closed to English trade, access to the colonies was still possible via the Canaries. The part played by the Canary islands in helping Spain's enemies to maintain their commercial links with the American colonies was well known by the Spanish government. A despatch devoted to this subject was sent by Philip IV in June 1627 to his viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis of Cerralbo. In this despatch, the King explained that because of the war foreigners were selling their contraband cloth in the Canaries and taking away the gold and silver which they obtained from their sales. From the Canaries the ropa de contrabando was shipped illegally to the Caribbean islands, and there, because it came 'out of register', could be sold more cheaply than that which was registered on board the flotas. This, as the King pointed out, was threatening to destroy Castile's trade with her colonial empire, for in recent years there had been a marked diminution in the size of the New Spain flotas.¹⁷ Philip IV's orders to his ministers in New Spain and the Canary islands, urging them to adopt more efficient systems of inspection for the ships plying between the Canaries and America, produced little or no result, and the Canaries continued to serve as a base for all kinds of commercial frauds, practised

by the Spanish and the foreign merchant during peace time as well as during war time.¹⁸

An examination of the documentary evidence relating to Anglo-Spanish trade during the war of 1625 - 1630 results in the conclusion that the maintenance of trade links between England and Spain during the period of the hostilities owed more to the enterprise of foreign intermediaries than to the English themselves. There are many references, particularly in Spanish documents, to the part played by French, Dutch and Hansa merchants and their shipping in the transference of English produce to the Iberian peninsula after 1625. Sir Anthony Sherley, who was then residing in Spain, informed the secretary of the Consejo de Guerra, Clemente Ochiandiano, in 1627 that the English were conducting their commercial dealings with Spain through Hamburg, Lubeck and St. Malo as freely as they had done during the peace.¹⁹ Fernando Alvia de Castro, veedor general of the Spanish forces in Portugal, advised Philip IV in November 1626 about the vessels from Hamburg which were coming into Lisbon and other Portuguese ports with cargoes of English cloth.²⁰ In order to put a stop to these breaches of the prohibition of December 1625, it was suggested to the government in Madrid that more thorough identification and certification of cargoes bound for Spain and Portugal should be undertaken by Spanish officials in the foreign ports from which they were dispatched; it was thought that this was particularly necessary in Calais and Hamburg, the principal ports by way of which

forbidden English and Dutch merchandise was reaching Spain and Portugal.²¹ This was not a new idea; it had already been tried unsuccessfully by the Spanish government in its attempts to exclude Dutch cloth from Spain.

Further evidence of the role played by the merchants and merchant shipping of friendly countries in the continuation of Anglo-Spanish trade during the war is provided by Dr. Millard. Whilst the London port books have revealed a decline in the importation of Spanish produce after 1625, they have also shown that considerable quantities of sugar, cochineal, dye-wood, oranges, lemons and wine still managed to reach London between 1625 and 1630; they were brought directly from Spain and Portugal, and also from Germany and the Netherlands, not by English ships, but by merchant vessels from Holland and Hamburg. Dr. Millard notes that in the year 1619, 41 English ships imported Spanish wines into London, and in 1633 there were 73; in 1628 there were only 6, and significantly, they brought their cargoes of wine from the Canary islands. In fact, in 1628 most of the Spanish wine deposited in London arrived on board 22 Dutch and 25 Hamburg vessels.²²

Despite the re-routeing of Anglo-Spanish trade through neutral intermediaries, to which Dr. Millard refers, inevitably, there was a contraction of English trade with Spain between 1625 and 1630. Whilst the consequences of this contraction were reflected generally, for example, in the shortage of silver already mentioned,²³ as might be

expected, their effect was particularly evident in the western ports of England, where prosperity depended to a large extent on trade with Spain and Portugal. In August 1626, the citizens of Bristol protested that owing to recent shipping losses and the stoppage of trade with Spain, they were unable to bear the expense of equipping two ships of war as they had been directed to do by the Council of State.²⁴ In the long run, however, Anglo-Spanish trade was not seriously damaged by the war of 1625 - 1630, for it was followed, as already seen in the previous chapter, by a period in which that trade prospered and expanded. But it is clear that it was largely due to the help given by the United Provinces and by the Hansa ports that England's trade with Spain and Portugal was able to survive the crisis of 1625 - 30, for the fact is that although there were English vessels which continued to trade with the enemy, most of the English merchant shipping, normally engaged in the Anglo-Spanish trade in peace time, was occupied with privateering after 1625.

As in Spain, the outbreak of hostilities in 1625 resulted in England in a proclamation ordering the cessation of trade with Spain.²⁵ The ban, apparently, was intended to be complete and unconditional and was applied to all the territories of the King of Spain and the Archduchess. Three months later, however, the government decided to revise its former prohibition, and in a new pronouncement it was explained that it was not intended to apply the ban "to any that exercise the trade of

merchandise with the subjects of the King of Spain or the Archduchess or that shall bring or import any of the commodities of the said King of Spain or Archduchess countries so as they do not hazard their ships or expose them to be seized upon in any of the ports of the said King of Spain or Archduchess, provided that always the above said merchants shall not under colour of trade and commerce carry with them in to the King of Spain's dominions or those of the Archduchess any manner of victuals, munition and other furniture of war either by land or sea upon the severest penalties to be inflicted".²⁶ The failure of the merchants to honour the conditions stipulated by the government for the continuation of trade with the enemy resulted in the revocation of the decree of April 1626, and the reinforcement of a complete ban on trade with Spain, Portugal and the Low Countries in September 1627.²⁷ Strongly reflected in the vacillation of the government's attitude to trade with the enemy is the concern to safeguard England's shipping. With the ship-money fleet as yet unformed, and the idea of a strong state navy not to be realised for another twenty years, it is hardly surprising that the English government showed such concern. For extensive offensive and defensive operations at sea, the government required the full co-operation of the country's merchant shipping, as is evident from the number of merchantmen which took part in Buckingham's expeditions to Cadiz and La Rochelle;²⁸ it could not risk losing to Spain merchant ships and their crews which

could be well employed either augmenting the small royal navy when required or operating against the enemy as private men of war. From the beginning of the war, the government's policy was to encourage privateering. Buckingham had orders from the King to begin issuing letters of marque against the subjects of the King of Spain in April 1625.²⁹ Theoretically letters of marque, obtainable in peace time as well as in war time, only empowered the recipient to recover by force the value of his alleged, unjust losses, but in war time this condition was usually waived, and the privateer was authorised to operate against the enemy wherever, and as long as, he was able. When war broke out with France in 1627, Buckingham was told by the King that he was not to demand proof of loss and damage, but was to issue the letters of marque 'generally and freely to all who desire to take them'.³⁰

Until the inclusion of the French in 1627, the letters of marque dispensed by Buckingham required their holders to attack and despoil the subjects of the King of Spain and the Archduchess. But had the privateers been obliged to restrict themselves to Spaniards and Spanish shipping, then there certainly would not have been the demand for the licences that there was during the first two years of the war, for outside the Indies fleets which, in view of their size and defences, were beyond the scope of the private man of war, there were very few Spanish

merchant ships. There was, of course, the inter-island traffic in the Caribbean, but the distance and cost of a West Indian expedition and above all the risks involved in it, were sufficient to deter the majority of English merchants in the seventeenth century, as indeed they had been during the latter stages of the Elizabethan war,³¹ from participating in privateering ventures on the other side of the Atlantic. In any case, it was not the intention of the government in 1625 that English merchant ships, equipped and licensed for privateering, should direct their attentions solely to Spaniards and Spanish vessels. A far more important task they were required to perform was that of preventing neutral countries from supplying Spain with contraband of war. It was a generally recognised principle in the seventeenth century that neutral countries could continue trading with warring states provided that they did not furnish them with items of contraband. On the question of contraband, however, there was no general agreement.³² In accordance with its policy of encouraging privateering, the English government insisted on an extensive list of prohibited articles during the war of 1625 - 30; the proclamation of 14 March 1626 listed "ordnance, arms of all sorts, powder, shot, match, brimstone, copper, iron, cordage of all kinds, hemp sail, canvas, cables, anchors, masts, rafters, boat oars, balks, deal board, clap board, pipe staves, vessels, vessel stuff, pitch tar, rosen, okam, corn, grain, victuals of all sorts,

all provisions of shipping, and all munition of war, or of provisions for the same."³³ Such a wide interpretation of contraband was strongly opposed by the neutral states, France, United Provinces and the Hansa League, which endeavoured to continue their trade with Spain. Both the French, as exporters of cloth, grain and other provisions, and the Dutch, as purveyors of vital naval stores, always favoured a less extensive definition of contraband. The consequence of this difference of opinion was that it was French, Dutch and German ship owners and merchants who bore the brunt of English privateering attacks between 1625 and 1630.³⁴ The Dutch protested strongly against the treatment they were receiving at the hands of the English, and expressed themselves particularly resentful of England's assertion of the right of search. In reply to this protest, it was stated that the right to stop and search Dutch and other neutral ships would not be relinquished in view of the many occasions on which the Dutch had been found to be contravening England's pronouncement regarding contraband trade with Spain, and the Dutch were further assured that the Admiralty Court would only permit the privateers to retain contraband and goods belonging to the Spaniards and Portuguese.³⁵ The French, who, it was alleged in England, frequently carried goods of Spanish and Flemish ownership and unloaded them in Calais for transference to Dunkirk,³⁶ were as equally resentful as the Dutch of the interception of their ships by the English navy and the private men of war. This resentment provoked reprisals against

England, and led ultimately to war between France and England. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1627, one of the 'perfidious dealings' of which France was accused by the government of England was that its subjects had "fraudulently covered and protected Spanish merchandise, thus frustrating his majesty's subjects of their profits and gains by the Spanish war".³⁷

However, despite these alleged efforts of the French and other neutral traders with Spain to deprive the English privateers of their rightful rewards, there was in England a considerable demand for privateering licences from 1625. During the first three years of the war over 700 warrants were issued. In some cases the warrants allowed for the setting out of more than one vessel for privateering; the Earl of Warwick, for example, obtained a licence for 8 ships.³⁸ The size of the demand may be partly explained by the fact that prizes were obtainable without the necessity and cost of moving far from home ports, although no doubt most privateers were ready to venture further than a private man of war commanded by Captain Cooke; until he was ordered to take to the open sea, or forfeit his letters of marque, Captain Cooke positioned himself in the Thames and stopped as many merchant ships as he could on the pretext of looking for evidence of trade with Dunkirk.³⁹ The Channel, obviously, provided many opportunities for the interception of French, Dutch and German vessels on voyages to and from Spain,

Portugal, and the Spanish Netherlands. A fleet of six ships, equipped and put to sea by the city of London, had instructions to ply between the Isle of Wight and the North Foreland, and was subsequently ordered to keep to the French coast and there "make stay of all French ships and goods, and to sink or take any Spaniards and Dunkirkers, and to intercept all Hamburgers or Lubeckers carrying munition to Spain".⁴⁰ Further afield, the English conducted their privateering on the north west coast of Spain. According to reports from Corunna received by the Spanish Council of War in Madrid, the Galician coast was so infested with privateers from England, and also from North Africa, that the province was virtually in a state of siege. Apart from vessels operating singly on the coast, it was also reported that there were English squadrons consisting of nine, twelve, and as many as thirty-eight ships.⁴¹ The ships and merchandise of foreigners, as well as of Spaniards, were seized by the privateers, and in Galicia there was considerable anxiety about the resulting scarcity of salt, as in the past lack of salt had caused devastating plagues.⁴² Apart from its complete lack of naval defences, a further attraction of the Galician coast for the English privateers was its concealed bays and inlets; there they were able to lie in wait for the Portuguese caravels returning alone and unarmed from Brazil laden with sugar.⁴³ Such was the state of affairs in the north west that the Abbot of Oya in Galicia felt compelled to write to the governor and captain general of Galicia, the Marquis of Espinardo, in the hope that he would be

able to prevail upon the King to take action at a time "when the glory of Spain had fallen so low". In the Abbot's opinion the English were masters of the Galician coast and also of the Indies; "His Majesty may have dominion over Brazil, but they have the use of it". During the two years the Abbot had been at Oya, sixteen sugar ships had been taken from the Portuguese between Cape Finisterre and Viana in Portugal; his predecessor had occupied the office for three years, and in that time, the Portuguese had lost forty-two vessels. From the monastery, the Abbot himself had seen ships being pursued by the English. A ship recently captured had contained a cargo of sugar, tobacco and other merchandise valued at 100,000 ducats; thirty of the crew had drowned whilst trying to escape, and the rest had taken refuge in the monastery.⁴⁴

Without evidence of a more precise nature, it is impossible to assess with any certainty how profitable privateering was during the war of 1625 - 1630. However, evidence of the demand for letters of marque in England, combined with the Spanish evidence just mentioned, does reveal an intensity of privateering which suggests that its rewards were not inconsiderable. But it is very doubtful if those rewards were sufficient to compensate fully for the loss of peaceful trading with the Iberian peninsula. Whilst privateering may have done much to help the London merchants overcome the consequences of the loss of the Iberian trade, it was hardly likely to satisfy the outer ports, where there was a strong

interest in the Spanish trade; it was those ports, rather than London, which, apart from the complete stoppage of trade, also had to suffer the consequences of the counter privateering activities of the enemy. Privateers from Dunkirk, Vizcaya and France frequented the undefended coasts of England throughout the war; fishing and coastal trading were disrupted by their activities, and in the west particularly, their presence on the coast virtually closed the ports there.⁴⁵ The enemy privateer from Dunkirk and elsewhere caused a great deal of damage, and Carlos de Coloma cannot have been far from the truth when he wrote in a letter to Olivares in 1630 that "in England all commercial interests want peace."⁴⁶

The war of 1655 - 1660

When comparing the Anglo-Spanish wars of 1625 - 30 and 1655 - 60, one fact is very evident; the English privateer was by no means as active during the Protector's war as he had been during Charles I's war. Possessed now of a sizeable state navy, the Protector did not have to rely on privateering as Charles I had had to do, and whilst the war with Spain lasted, the privateer received little encouragement from his government; indeed the Protector's policy appears to have been aimed at discouraging rather than encouraging privateering. Three months before the dismissal of the Spanish ambassador and the publication of the declaration of war on Spain, all letters of marque were withdrawn on orders of the Protector;⁴⁷ most of the letters of marque then in

use had been issued by the Long Parliament for reprisals against France and the United Provinces. The protests of the Dutch ambassador, with whose country England had been at peace since April 1654, were partly responsible for the withdrawal,⁴⁸ but there were also two other important reasons for it. In the first place, the state navy was finding itself competing unsuccessfully with the private men of war for sailors to man its ships. In March 1653, the Council of State had temporarily suspended the issuing of letters of marque so that the fleet could be fully manned before it put to sea; and in April 1654, Captain Ben Sacheverell, commanding a squadron of four ships in the Channel, informed the Admiralty Committee that the private men of war were "doing much injury" by their enticement of seamen, and by their instigation of mutinies whenever officers went to impress for the state.⁴⁹ Another reason for the withdrawal of the letters of marque in July 1655 was the privateers' indiscriminate use of their powers; the ships of friend and foe alike were subject to their attacks.⁵⁰ Cromwell's declaration against Spain in December 1655 called for universal reprisals on the subjects of Spain,⁵¹ but it was apparently intended that this job should be done principally by the state navy, for the number of letters of marque received by private individuals was exceedingly small when compared with the spate of licences issued between 1625 and 1630. Moreover, unlike the subjects of Charles I, who had obtained unconditional privateering warrants, those who applied to the Protector for letters of marque had to comply with certain

regulations; before the licences were granted, they had to provide satisfactory proof in the Admiralty Court of the nature and extent of the losses they had sustained, and which they proposed to recover by reprisal, and they also had to bind themselves under surety that they would respect the shipping and property of England's allies.⁵² In other respects also, the privateer was much less favoured by government policy in 1655 than he had been in 1625.

It will be remembered that in accordance with his policy of encouraging privateering, Charles I had insisted on an extensive contraband list during his war with Spain; in comparison, Cromwell's list was less extensive. The paucity of Spanish shipping meant, as it had done between 1625 and 1630, that prizes, both of Spanish owned cargoes and contraband goods, had to be taken from neutral ships. Having rejected the Dutch demand for the recognition of the principle of the neutral flag giving inviolable protection to its ship's cargo, Cromwell insisted on the right of England to search neutral vessels trading with Spain.⁵³ But although refusing to forfeit the right of search, Cromwell did make important concessions in respect of contraband both to France and the United Provinces, for cordage, masts and other naval materials, as well as corn and other provisions were recognised as 'free' items of trade by him.⁵⁴ The curtailment by the government of the contraband list inevitably limited the scope of the privateer, but probably much more frustrating for him was the astuteness with which the neutral trader, especially the Dutch, sought to deprive him

of the articles which he could legitimately seize, and which he could expect to be awarded as 'good prize' by the Admiralty Court. The organisation of convoys for ships trading with Spain was one method successfully employed by the Dutch to avoid inspection and the seizure of contraband cargoes. The size of the convoys was often sufficient to deter the English naval commanders from attempting to intercept them.⁵⁵ On the subject of the Dutch convoys, Thurloe wrote in 1655: "They have a design to hinder the Protector all visitation and search, and this by very strong and sufficient convoy; and by this means they will draw all trade to themselves and their ships".⁵⁶

The lack of encouragement from the government for the private men of war, combined with the difficulties of obtaining legitimate prizes, had several notable results. First, the number of prize cases dealt with by the Admiralty Court was small, and consequently, the amount of revenue derived by the state from prizes taken during the war was also small.⁵⁷ A second result was that the privateers, faced with an unsympathetic government, resorted to other foreign princes and governments for their letters of marque. Richard Baker, the author of The Merchants' Humble Petition, asserted that Englishmen with commissions from the enemy were principally responsible for the damage to English trade; in 1657, he said that a total loss of 1,800 ships was chiefly caused by them.⁵⁸ The extent of the harm done by English privateers in foreign service, although probably

exaggerated by Baker, was sufficient to compel the Protector to issue a declaration prohibiting the receipt of foreign letters of marque by his subjects.⁵⁹

Apart from resorting to foreign privateering licences, was there no other way in which the English merchant could employ his capital and shipping now that he was no longer obliged to devote them to the service of the state either by adding to the numerical strength of the state navy or by setting out private men of war? The obvious alternative was to continue trading with the enemy, and both English and Spanish sources testify to the large numbers who, by one means or nother, were able to trade with Spain throughout the war. They were fortunate in that they had the full support of the government, which now had no need to be as concerned about the fate of shipping trading with Spain as the royal government had had to be in 1625, and as long as the enemy was not receiving munitions of war from England, continued trading with Spain was advantageous to the state and the government. It ensured the availability of vital bullion supplies, and furnished the treasury with customs revenue. Consequently, apart from raising the duties on imported Spanish wine by £5 a tun,⁶⁰ the government did nothing to hinder or discourage trade with Spain. In fact, it was ready to do what it could in order to facilitate that trade and to make it as safe and as secure as possible; its principal contribution to the maintenance of Anglo-Spanish trade during the war was

the provision of protection for the convoys of merchant ships. The turbulent conditions which had prevailed at sea since the civil war had made protection for the mercantile marine very necessary, and the provision of it had become an established and regular duty of the state navy. Although differences with the United Provinces and France were now settled, there was still considerable danger at sea for the unaccompanied merchant ship; in addition to the bands of pirates from North Africa and elsewhere, which had to be contended with even in peacetime, there were also a large number of Spanish and Flemish corsarios at sea after 1655 in search of English prizes.⁶¹ A frequent convoy service was operated throughout the war to and from the Portuguese and Spanish mainland ports, the Straits and beyond, and also the Canary islands.⁶² The merchant fleets were accompanied by one, two or three frigates, depending on the size of the convoys, on the outward and return journeys, and if on occasions it proved necessary, the frigates held the Spanish privateers at bay so that unloading and reloading at the port of destination could proceed without interruption.⁶³ The most frequent terminus of the convoys, consisting of ten to thirty vessels, was the Canary islands, where, according to one observer, "there was no danger for English ships or men to trade, and of the twelve months of the year there are English ships there trading".⁶⁴ Welcomed by the islanders because they were prepared to pay high prices for wine, the English traders, having first bribed the island administrators, were able to complete their transactions

openly and freely; a London merchant, William Clapham said that he had paid the Governor and his officials £300 for the privilege of trading in the Canaries with his ship the Martin.⁶⁵

Proof of the continuation of Anglo-Spanish trade between 1655 and 1660 is amply provided by the English source materials for the period. But even more revealing on the subject are the Spanish sources, and it is from them that one learns more about the extent of the war-time trade, and about the ways in which it was carried on.

A letter of intelligence received by John Thurloe from Marseilles in November 1655 informed him that the King of Spain "had a prohibition to bring any English merchandise in his estate, although he can hardly be without them."⁶⁶ Thurloe's informant was stating a fact which the Spanish government steadfastly refused to acknowledge as long as the war lasted; England's exports, especially its cloth, were indispensable to Spain, which in recent years had come to rely on them to satisfy the demands of Spaniards at home, as well as those of Spaniards overseas. Ignoring this fact, the government made determined, although fruitless, efforts to exclude English merchandise. All commercial dealings with the subjects of the Protector were forbidden in April 1656. All stocks of English merchandise then in Spain were to be registered within fifteen days of the publication of the ban, and six months were to be allowed for their disposal; English goods discovered after that period would be

seized as contraband.⁶⁷ Seventeen months later another pragmática issued by the Council of Castile reasserted the government's determination to prohibit the entry into Spain of the merchandise of England, and also of Portugal and France, and ordered the registration of all stocks of such merchandise within six days of the publication of the pragmática. The merchandise so registered was not to be disposed of in Castile, but was to be despatched to the Indies.⁶⁸ The latter concession was opposed both by the Casa de Contratación and by the Consejo de las Indias, but it was made by the government in response to an appeal by the Consulado of Seville. The Consulado, on behalf of the merchants interested in the Indies trade, had informed the Casa earlier in the year that in 1656 the cargadores had bought for the fleets of 1657 large quantities of English cloth, which were not covered by the period of six months grace allowed by the edict of April 1656. Although quantities of English baize, woollen stockings, hats and a variety of other articles were registered in Seville, Cadiz and other Andalusian ports in September 1657, the President of the Casa was of the opinion that they represented only a fraction of the amount of enemy manufactures which were then in Spain "respeto de la mucha ropa de este genero que se encierra en las alamacenes de los mercaderes".⁶⁹ The government's intention was that the merchandise derived from Spain's enemies should be eliminated once and for all in Castile and in America, but, as will be seen, neither the pragmáticas of 1656 and 1657, nor the penalties they threatened for those who infringed them, proved adequate enough for the

achievement of that aim. The fact was that the needs of the Spanish colonies for manufactured articles, especially cloth, could not be satisfied by Spain, Flanders and the United Provinces; there was still a demand for manufactures from England and also from France. Apart from the year 1659, at least one of the two annual Indies fleets was able to leave Spain during the five years of the war, and in all of them France and England had a strong interest. The returning New Spain flota, which took refuge from the English navy in the Canaries in February 1657 and unloaded all its bullion there before the commencement of Black's attack, was no exception; it was learnt by the Council of the Indies that the "frutas de la flota" were being transported in Dutch bottoms from the Canaries to England and France.⁷⁰ An investigation into the outward bound New Spain flota of 1660 revealed that it had contained more unregistered and forbidden foreign cargoes than any previous flota. Whilst the fleet had been preparing to leave in Cadiz bay, several French and Dutch ships had arrived and unloaded their cargoes of English and French cloth directly on to almost every ship in the fleet.⁷¹

The ease with which English merchandise and English merchants were able to take part in the Spanish American trade during the war is very well demonstrated by the case of John Wilmot, an Englishman who lived throughout the war in Puerto Santa Maria. Wilmot, together with Simon Delboe and other merchants of London, obtained permission from the

Protector and his Council to send two ships from London to Cadiz with merchandise destined for the West Indies.⁷² Part if not all of the ships' cargo of cloth was subsequently transferred at Cadiz to a Spanish vessel, the Pava Real, owned by Francisco de Morales. This was done secretly and apparently with the collusion of a Cadiz magistrate, Don Antonio Isquiendo, who also had wine, olives and fruit in the vessel. The ship was officially registered for a voyage to Maracaibo, but it went instead to Cartagena and Havana. The ship returned from there with logwood, which was to be unloaded in the Canaries for Wilmot, and with a quantity of silver plate and coinage; according to Morales, although all the silver was all collected at Havana in the name of Isquiendo, at least 2,000 pieces of eight belonged to Wilmot.⁷³ John Wilmot was only one of the many English merchants who preferred trading with Spanish America through Spain, even during the war. As the Pava Real illustrates, it was not difficult to evade Spain's imperial regulations and the administrators of the empire and its trade were easily deceived. Unfortunately for the Pava Real, the deception worked too well; on the return voyage, within sight of Tenerife, the ship was seized as a Spanish prize by Captain Lightfoot's frigate, the Nightingale.⁷⁴

In trying to exclude English, French and Portuguese trade from Spain, the Spanish government's most serious disability was that it could not rely on the complete loyalty and co-operation of the ordinary Spanish

citizen, and even its own officers could not be wholly trusted to carry out the orders they received. The general lack of respect for orders from Madrid, especially those dealing with contraband, made the job of the conscientious government official a difficult and frustrating one. Reporting on his attempts to execute the order he had received for the exclusion of English fish from Spain, the Veedor de Contrabando of Santander said that residents in the port were ridiculing him and his efforts to implement the ban.⁷⁵ And according to corregidor Don Luis Fernandez de Cordoba, there were few in the port of Malaga who were not dealing with contrabandists and in contraband because of the "anguish which their inability to sell their produce is causing them". Amongst the culprits in Malaga was the prior of Santo Domingo, who regularly sent out his friars at night to the English ships to exchange raisins and wine for cloth, on which he was said to be making a substantial profit.⁷⁶ Even the British exiles in Spain, apparently, could not refrain from participating in illegal trade with their native country. In February 1656, all subjects of the Protector were ordered to leave Spain within thirty days; Catholics who elected to stay were asked to leave the ports and to take up residence in places thirty leagues distant from the coast.⁷⁷ Amongst those who successfully applied for exemption from the latter requirement was William Pawley, who received permission for himself and his sister to remain in Alicante on account of his age and ill health.⁷⁸ Pawley's sixty-eight years and poor health, seemingly, did not entirely

destroy his commercial and business interests; in 1659 an English vessel from Plymouth, of which Pawley was part owner, was seized by a Majorcan privateer, and the ship and its cargo of sardines, which was consigned to Pawley and another exiled English merchant, Anthony Bassett, was pronounced legitimate prize in Gibraltar.⁷⁹ Although possibly difficult to recognise as such, three Englishmen, Antonio Oton, Henrique Rumbon (Henry Rumbold) and Juan Balmonte (John Wilmot), were said to be actively engaged, together with other foreigners, in introducing ropa de contrabando into Puerto Santa Maria.⁸⁰ An Admiralty Court examination of 1659 also reveals that William Bland, who had lived in Andalusia for a long period, continued during the war to serve as agent in Cadiz for his brother, John Bland, a merchant of London.⁸¹ The arrest of a Hamburg ship in Cadiz brought to light the extensive dealings which Pedro Colart, a native of Flanders, had with merchants in London; using fictitious Spanish names, he received their goods in Cadiz, and sent them gold and silver in return.⁸²

The evasion of Philip IV's orders regarding trade with the enemy by native and foreign merchants in Spain would not have been so widespread, nor so easy, if government officers had not been so inefficient and so corrupt; it was they who were principally responsible for frustrating the government's efforts to prevent trade with England. There is a great deal of evidence to illustrate this. In August 1659 Don Carlos de

Torres y Collantes was charged with having failed to carry out his duties as veedor de contrabando in Velez; earlier in 1657, Don Carlos had denied an allegation by the Veedor in Puerto Santa Maria that English ships were being allowed to discharge their cargoes in Velez.⁸³ Fraud and corruption amongst the Cadiz customs officials came to light as a result of an investigation in 1656 by Lorenzo Andres Garcia, an official of the Casa and veedor de contrabando in Seville. His investigations revealed that 332 packs of English and French merchandise had been brought into Cadiz from Dutch and Hamburg ships anchored in the bay; the customs had not only allowed the packs to pass through the customs, under pretence of their being of German, Flemish and Dutch origin, but had also underestimated their value, thus cutting the duties levied on them by 50 per cent.⁸⁴ In Malaga, one of the Andalusian ports frequently visited by English vessels, the corregidor, Don Luis Fernandez de Cordoba, was advised by the Council of War that the cargoes of English ships were being brought ashore at night with the assistance of persons in whom he placed great trust.⁸⁵

Failing to secure the complete obedience of the hombres de negocios and of its own officers, the government had to rely on its only other means of discouraging trading with the enemy, namely privateering. In the north, the Flemish privateers were again active, using as their principal bases the ports of Ostend and Dunkirk; both these places now

also sheltered Charles II's privateers, who, since the conclusion of the Anglo-French alliance, had been forced to forsake their original base at Brest. The damage inflicted by the Flemish privateers on English trade was most serious during the early stages of the war, and it was borne chiefly by the peripheral ports, where the benefits of a protected convoy were rarely available; the mayor of Yarmouth wrote in 1656: "It is a shame to our nation that we are afraid to go to sea for two or three towns".⁸⁶

The formation of a Channel squadron in the summer of 1656 to maintain a watchful eye on the Flemish ports,⁸⁷ and the fall of Dunkirk in 1658, effectively curbed the activities of the Flanders-based privateers, and for the rest of the war they were less serious a menace in the Channel and on the English coasts. Further south, there were two principal centres of Spanish privateering; the first was on the north west coast of Spain and the second in the Straits. In the province of Guipuzcoa, according to the governor of the province, Baron de Vataville, in 1658, there were twenty-four Spanish vessels actively engaged in privateering; there were also thirteen private men of war from Ostend, and seven English and Irish frigates commissioned by Charles II.⁸⁸ Together these privateers aimed at disrupting the trade which England and France were carrying on illegally with Spain. Both in Madrid and San Sebastian there was considerable doubt about the value of the Irish contribution to these efforts to destroy enemy trade, for it was discovered that they were buying up stocks of

English merchandise in France, taking it to San Sebastian, and there claiming that it was prize which had been taken at sea.⁸⁹ The privateers of the north west, known to the English as the Biscayners, were able to cause a certain amount of harm to England; Bristol, for example, lost ships to them.⁹⁰ On the whole, however, the losses sustained by the English traders as a result of the activities of the Biscayners, and the other Spanish privateers, were not as considerable as Richard Baker, for instance, would have had the government believe in 1657 and again in 1659.⁹¹ The evidence of the Spanish records, certainly, does not indicate that the shipping losses were great. A detailed report, prepared by Baron de Vatevile on thirteen prize ships brought into San Sebastian at the end of 1658 and beginning of 1659, shows that only two of that number were English ships containing English cargo; the rest were either French or Dutch, the latter usually carrying French and English owned cargo.⁹² The Spanish privateers also had opportunities for capturing English trading vessels in the Straits of Gibraltar. A broad-sheet, published in Madrid in 1658 no doubt to assist the government in its efforts to encourage the taking out of more privateering licences, related the capture of eleven English vessels in the Mediterranean by the Majorcan privateers between March and September of 1658.⁹³ In response to an appeal by the Levant Company which claimed that its trade "was never before in so languishing a condition as it now is, by reason of the swarms of Turkish and Spanish pirates festering those seas", armed protection was promised

by the Protector's government for ships passing through the Straits.⁹⁴
 The convoys to the Straits and the Levant, although not as regular as the convoys to the Canaries and the Atlantic Spanish ports, were sufficient, together with the English squadron stationed in the Mediterranean, to prevent serious damage by the privateers from Majorca and the Spanish bases in North Africa.

The achievements of Spanish privateering against England during the war were inevitably limited. The presence of an English fleet on the coast of Spain until the summer of 1657, and the implementation of a regular convoy system, did much to safeguard English trade and to frustrate the efforts made by the privateers to disrupt it. Apart from these drawbacks, the Spanish private man of war also operated under one other disadvantage. A great deal of England's trade with Spain during the war was carried on via the Dutch, and whereas other European governments in the same circumstances claimed for their privateers the right to stop and search neutral merchant shipping, the Spanish government was not prepared to concede this right to its privateers. In his treaty of peace with the United Provinces in 1648, Philip IV had agreed to accept the principle of the inviolable neutral flag, and despite the strongest objections offered, for instance, by Baron de Vatevile, the King insisted that his privateers should respect the terms of the 1648 treaty and allow Dutch ships to pass without interference, regardless of the nature of their cargo.⁹⁵ As is to be expected, this decision was displeasing to the privateers, and for one of them particularly it had

unfortunate consequences; Captain Juan Gallo found himself in prison for having taken a small boat from a Dutch fleet anchored in Cadiz bay, even though it was found that the boat's cargo consisted of West Indian tobacco and cochineal, all of which was destined for England.⁹⁶ Such conditions were hardly favourable to privateering, and it is not surprising to find Baron de Vatevile informing the King in 1659 that many of the corsarios of Guipuzcoa were disposing of their vessels.⁹⁷ Before leaving the subject of Spanish privateering, it is worth noting that on the south west coast of Spain, the region to which the English traders and trade were most strongly attracted during the war of 1655-1660, there was a notable absence of privateers.⁹⁸ The merchants and ship-owners of Cadiz, Seville, San Lucar and Puerto Santa Maria could not be persuaded to participate in privateering.⁹⁹ The consequences of not having privateers in the vicinity of these ports were described by the Almirante General, Don Manuel de Banuelos: "Not one bale of merchandise has entered the Cadiz customs in the past month, and yet within sight of both Cadiz and San Lucar, English and French ships are busily discharging cargo".¹⁰⁰ Don Manuel, together with the Governor of Cadiz, Conde de Molina, and two other persons, offered to equip one or two private men of war in the hope that others would follow their example.¹⁰¹ The offer, in fact, produced no results; first, because the King replied that he would only grant a licence for five or six ships, which, as the Conde de Molina pointed out, was impossible in view of

the high initial expenditure which such a number would entail, and secondly, because the natives of Cadiz and the other Andalusian ports were not interested in privateering.¹⁰² Their disinterest is understandable, since their prizes as privateers would have been the ships and cargoes in which they had a very strong interest as merchants. Whilst they may not have been seriously damaging to England and English trade, the Spanish privateers did add to the cost of the Spanish war, and, consequently, to the financial problems with which Cromwell had to cope. The division and dispersion of the fleet to provide protection for the merchant convoys was expensive, but to be weighed against that expense is the consideration that the convoys helped to safeguard the commercial advantages which England had secured in Spain during the previous period of peace.

As had happened during the preceding Anglo-Spanish war, England's trade with Spain during the period 1655 to 1660 was partly taken over by neutral states, the chief one being the United Provinces, although Sweden and the Hansa ports, particularly Hamburg, also made their contribution. In 1655, the role of commercial intermediary was very much easier for the Dutch than it had been in 1625. Spain and the United Provinces were now at peace, and, furthermore, in his peace treaty with them, Philip IV had agreed that the Dutch should have complete freedom to transport the merchandise of all countries, including those at war with Spain. Cloth, still England's chief export to Spain, was carried there on Dutch ships either directly from

England, or from Dutch ports to which it had been previously transferred from England. Referring to the large quantities of English baize, which was being received in Amsterdam and Middleburg from whence it was being despatched to Spain, Jacques Richart, the Spanish consul in Amsterdam said: "It is a certain fact that in a hundred bales sent from here to Spain, there will not be one which was manufactured here". Richart went on to explain that such cargoes were claimed to be of Dutch origin, and that the ships' captains were always well provided with falsified documents to support their claims.¹⁰³ If on their arrival in Spain, the cargoes from these Dutch ships were declared to the customs authorities then the false documents were produced, and it was very difficult for the customs officials to prove that they were prohibited articles from England, although they might suspect them to be so. Their main difficulty arose from the similarity between the Dutch and the English baize, serge, bombazine and sempiternum. To assist them, the Dutch ships were required to furnish a certificate, obtained from the consul in Amsterdam and testifying to the Dutch origins of those types of cloth which might be suspected of being English. This regulation alone was obviously a very inadequate safeguard; such certificates were easily counterfeited, or altered after they had been issued by Richart. For example, a certificate, issued by Richart in Amsterdam for seventy-seven pieces of baize from Leyden, claimed when presented in Seville to cover four hundred and twenty seven; Richart was sure that the additional cloth must have been made in England.¹⁰⁴ Also aimed at preventing the Dutch

from introducing English manufactures, but also equally unsuccessful, was the order from Madrid in 1659 that Richart should send regular, detailed reports on the certificates issued by him so that these could be checked against those received at the Spanish customs.¹⁰⁵ The tightening of the regulations in this way had no effect, for the difficulties it caused were easily circumvented by the Dutch; they simply stopped declaring the cargoes of their ships, thereby escaping the payment of customs, as well as avoiding the possibility of discovery and confiscation.

Frequently seen in the Andalusian ports throughout the war were the almacenes. These were ships of the United Provinces, and also a small number from the Hansa towns, which anchored at some distance from the ports where they served as floating warehouses, from which goods from England and France were discharged and into which Spanish produce was received without any reference to the customs and other port officials. There were always several almacenes in Cadiz bay; anchored safely beyond the range of the port artillery, they conducted their illegal business, completely outwitting the more conscientious port officers, who on orders from Madrid endeavoured either to banish them from the bay, or at least to compel them to respect the customs and contraband regulations. It was agreed between the Dutch and Spanish governments that Dutch vessels should receive one visit from port officials as soon as they arrived in Spain, and it was also agreed that the purpose of that visit would only be

the examination of the ships' documents; there was to be no inspection of cargo.¹⁰⁶ This privilege of uninspected cargo, which the Dutch were always ready to defend by a show of arms whenever the one agreed visit took place, meant that the customs and contraband officials remained completely ignorant about the nature of a ship's cargo until its captain was ready to declare it.¹⁰⁷ This he very rarely did. Instead merchandise from the almacenes was either taken ashore secretly or transferred directly on to the ships preparing to leave for America.¹⁰⁸ The Dutch store ships were even responsible for disposing of the cargoes taken from Spanish vessels captured by the English fleet.¹⁰⁹ In attempting to stop these activities, the Spanish port authorities were seriously hampered by their lack of strength; they never had sufficient men, arms and ships to be able to force the Dutch to respect Philip IV's decrees whilst they were in his ports and to compel them to leave when their transactions were completed.¹¹⁰ The Dutch, in consequence, were left to operate their almacenes in complete freedom. They were able to dispose of their illegal merchandise without interruption, and were free to receive Spanish and American produce directly from the mainland and from the flotas when they reached Cadiz, and to return with their cargoes to England and the United Provinces.¹¹¹

The Dutch did a great deal to facilitate the continued flow of trade between England and Spain during the war, but for this help there was little

feeling of gratitude in England. On the contrary, the feeling was one of intense hostility to the Dutch; they were regarded as a people totally without scruples and interested only in their own economic advancement. It was strongly believed that they were determined to use the occasion of the Anglo-Spanish war to capture a substantial proportion of Anglo-Spanish trade. This was the view of the London ship-owners in 1658 who complained to the government that the Dutch were putting English shipping and sailors out of work; it was also pointed out that the Dutch were violating the Navigation Laws, which required the employment of English ships. A reply to this protest was made by the Commissioners of Customs who stated that it was difficult to detect breaches of the Navigation Laws because the Dutch ships were so cleverly disguised as English ones.¹¹² The same concern about the Dutch appropriation of the Anglo-Spanish trade was expressed by Richard Baker; for him the Dutch, and "the blood sucking Jews", were England's worst enemies.¹¹³ It was obviously not to England's commercial advantage that the Dutch should obtain a large hold on Anglo-Spanish trade, but any estimate of the extent to which the United Provinces made commercial gains at England's expense during the war of 1655-60 would be unacceptable for two reasons if it were based solely on the allegations of Baker and others; the first reason is that a time when antipathy towards the Dutch was intense, verbal attacks on them were frequent, bitter and inevitably distorted, and

the second is that it would fail to take account of the evidence which proves that England managed to retain control over much of its own war-time trade with Spain.

Reference has already been made to the convoys of merchant ships which plied between England and the Andalusian ports and the Canary islands. It was also not unknown for English trading vessels to join Dutch convoys;¹¹⁴ securely anchored in the midst of a Dutch fleet, it was only rarely that English ships were detected and captured in Spanish ports.¹¹⁵ Whether or not they formed part of a Dutch fleet, it was easy in fact for the English merchant ships to conceal themselves in the large, busy ports like Cadiz and Malaga; from these large ports, it was apparently the English practice to send small Spanish boats with merchandise to the smaller ports, where concealment was not so easy.¹¹⁶ The English merchants, ship-owners and ships' captains, who were responsible for carrying on trade with Spain, were equally resourceful with the Dutch in devising schemes to evade the Spanish ban on trade with England. For example, furnished with documents supposedly issued to them by Jacques Richart in Amsterdam, they continued to dispose of their Newfoundland fish in the Andalusian ports.¹¹⁷ They also succeeded in disguising the identity of their ships and cargoes by sailing them under a Dutch or German flag and by providing them with appropriately forged papers. In his correspondence of September 1657, Richart referred to the ships which were leaving England for Spain flying Dutch flags.¹¹⁸ A particular

example of such deception came to light in 1657 when a ship, claiming in this instance to be from Hamburg, was arrested at Velez. During the investigation which followed the arrest, the German captain declared that the ship was the Martin of London, and not the Angel Gabriel of Hamburg as stated in his papers; he had been persuaded by the English captain of the ship, John Martin, and John Biger, the owner of the cargo of cloth and tobacco, to accompany them on the voyage and also to allow them to use the documents he had obtained in Hamburg for a voyage with the Angel Gabriel which had not taken place.¹¹⁹ Another English vessel, which successfully masqueraded as a Dutch ship in the Canaries, was the Irish Merchant; it was chartered by Fernandez Carvajal, a Spanish merchant who had lived in London for many years, to take English and French merchandise to Tenerife and to return with wine.¹²⁰ The Spanish government was often reminded by reports received in Madrid of the frequency with which English trading vessels were visiting the ports of Spain. "England is not likely to feel the effects of the war if our ports are open to them" was the comment of the Count of Peralta, who, having brought a squadron of the Galeras from Genoa to the southern coast of Spain, saw and heard reports of ships from England trading at Malaga and Velez.¹²¹ Philip IV's ministers were reluctantly obliged to admit that as long as the "fuercas de mar" were lacking, there was little that could be done to alter this state of affairs.¹²²

This chapter has endeavoured to show that war between England and Spain in the seventeenth century did not mean the complete cessation of trade between the two countries. It continued, in spite of hostilities, during both Anglo-Spanish wars of the first half of the century, but it is clear that it was particularly extensive during the second war. Statistics quoted by Ashley for the period 1655 to 1660 reinforce the evidence provided in this thesis; although reduced in the initial stages of the Spanish war, the annual revenue derived by the Protector's government from tonnage and poundage increased during the rest of the war, especially during its later stages.¹²³ England's foreign trade did not suffer as a result of Cromwell's war with Spain. It was very largely due to the strength which it had acquired during thirty years of uninterrupted peaceful trading that Anglo-Spanish trade was able to survive Cromwell's war with Spain almost unimpaired. But credit must also be given to Cromwell for his encouragement of war-time trade and for the facilities he provided to safeguard it; he was not, as has been alleged, totally insensitive to matters of commercial importance.¹²⁴ The government's answer in 1654 to those who objected to the West Indian venture, and to the possibility of a break with Spain, was that trade and peace would continue in Europe even though war might ensue in America.¹²⁵ It was indeed fortunate that in one respect at least this forecast proved correct, since the opportunities for direct trade with Spanish America, for which the West Indian expedition was to

prepare the way, were still unacceptable to the large majority of English merchants as an alternative to their trade with Spain. An explanation of this fact requires a more detailed examination of developments in the New World; so far, those developments and their influence on Anglo-Spanish diplomacy during the first half of the seventeenth century have only been very lightly treated.

CHAPTER VI

SPAIN, ENGLAND and AMERICA

The Spanish monopoly and European diplomacy

"In effect we have conceded navigation to the Indies which, in order to avoid, I would have preferred to have broken off the peace negotiations".¹ This was the Constable of Castile's comment on the peace treaty made with James I in 1604. Since the official Spanish view of the treaty, contrary to England's interpretation of it, maintained that the omission of any reference to America in the treaty upheld Spain's claim to exclusive possession of the territories assigned to her by the papal decree of 1494, this was a comment he could only make within the privacy of his correspondence with his king. A public statement of this view-point would have amounted to an open acknowledgment of Spain's renunciation of her American monopoly. The preparations for the treaty of London in 1604 were not the first occasion on which the Spanish monopoly had been challenged in European diplomacy. In 1559, Henry II of France had demanded for his subjects a recognition of their right to trade in America. The government of Philip II rejected this demand, and the treaty of Cateau Cambrésis made no reference to America. It later came to light that the French and Spanish governments had agreed verbally that their peace treaty of 1559 would not apply beyond the lines of amity.² The exact position of those lines cannot be easily determined. A declaration by

Louis XIII in 1634 defined them as the first meridian and the Tropic of Cancer, and stated that west and south of those lines the peace with Spain had no effect.³ 'No peace beyond the lines' was the principle upon which France's American policy was based in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it governed all the activities of Frenchmen in the New World and their relations with the Spaniards they encountered there. Until 1684, when peace in America was finally accepted by both France and Spain, Frenchmen went beyond the lines at their own risk, being totally excluded from the benefits of any Franco-Spanish peace treaty which may have been in force in Europe.⁴

As will be seen later, Spain was quite certain that her seventeenth century peace treaties with England had no territorial limits, and for a time at any rate after 1604, the English government was of the same opinion. Having received from Marie de Medicis in 1610 the first official notification of the substance of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1559,⁵ James I firmly rejected the suggestion made by some of his subjects that he should follow the French example and adopt 'no peace beyond the line.' The King informed Count Gondomar that he could find no clause in the peace treaty which warranted his following the French example, and assured him that Englishmen who refused to respect the peace with Spain, wherever they might be, would be treated and punished as pirates.⁶ However, it was recognised in England that the treaty's silence on the

question of America, and the conflicting interpretations of that silence, were bound to lead to difficulties. English merchants protesting in 1607 against their treatment by Spaniards in the West Indies were reminded by Salisbury that their protest had raised a matter of such 'tenderness and point of honour, that they that went thither must run their own peril'.⁷ But every effort seems to have been made both by James I and Charles I to obtain the universal acceptance and observation of the 1604 and 1630 treaties by their subjects. Salisbury, for example, in replying to the merchants just mentioned was sharply critical of the fact that Virginia had already become "infamed for piracy";⁸ this was one reason why he was unable to show more sympathy for their complaints. And in 1630, the newly created Providence Company advised the Governor of the island of Providence that it was not unlikely that Spain would endeavour to recover the island, and whilst he was asked to take steps to safeguard the island against attack, he was also instructed to avoid giving offence to the Spaniards.⁹

In the late 1630's a change of attitude on the part of the English government towards the question of whether or not the West Indies was included in the peace treaties can be detected. Officially the change was attributed to the Spanish assaults on the English settlement in the Carribean, but it was probably also partly due to Charles I's growing disappointment with Spain and her failure to bring about the restoration

of the Palatinate. According to Sir Thomas Roe, by 1637 Charles I had come to the conclusion that if a universal peace had been established by the treaties of 1604 and 1630, then it had been broken by Spain in the West Indies.¹⁰ This same argument was also stated in a memorandum handed to the Spanish ambassador by the Providence Company in 1637, and later in 1655, when justifying his West Indian expedition, Cromwell was also to make the same claim that any peace which had existed in the Indies had been well and truly broken by Spain.¹¹

The issue of 'no peace beyond the line', of course, did not affect or change in any way the grounds on which the English government rejected the Spanish claim to monopolise the New World. From the year 1497 when John Cabot, commissioned by Henry VII, set out on his voyage of exploration and discovery, the view of the English government was that England was under no obligation to respect the papal division of 1494, and that Englishmen were free to claim possession of lands not already possessed and occupied by a Christian prince. At the diplomatic conference table, England's demand for Spain's recognition of that freedom was made first at the abortive Anglo - Spanish peace negotiations at Boulogne in 1599,¹² and again at the successful peace conference of 1604. James I's instructions to his delegates in 1604 stated that his government would be ready "to prohibit all repair of our subjects to any places where they are planted, but only to seek their traffic by their

own discoveries in other places whereof there are so infinite dimensions of vast great territories as themselves have no kind of interest".¹³ But in 1604 Philip III was as determined as his father had been in 1559 not to permit any infringement of Castile's monopoly, even though it was becoming increasingly obvious that Spain did not have the resources needed to enforce a policy of exclusion, and, as in 1559, the way out of the resulting diplomatic deadlock was the omission of any specific reference to America in the treaty of London. The English government was in no doubt that the treaty's silence on this controversial issue did not mean that England had agreed to respect the Spanish monopoly: "They are making a great mistake whoever holds that view, because the meaning is quite clear", retorted James I when Nicolo Molin, the Venetian ambassador, remarked in his presence that there were some who maintained that the treaty was intended to exclude and not admit Englishmen to the New World.¹⁴

The English view was again firmly stated in 1607. The first permanent settlement in Virginia provoked a protest from Spain on the grounds that "that territory falls within the limits of the Indies discovered and possessed by Castile".¹⁵ In reply both James I and the Earl of Salisbury agreed that there were parts of America, those parts effectively settled and occupied by Castile, which were prohibited to Englishmen, but they rejected the claim made by the Spanish ambassador on behalf of his government that Virginia was included in the forbidden area.¹⁶ During the early years of its history, when the new Virginia colony experienced

many difficulties, the Council of State in Madrid repeatedly urged the destruction of the colony, but apart from a voyage of reconnaissance in 1611 nothing further was attempted by Spain.¹⁷ Spain, in fact, was not prepared to risk valuable men and ships in order to defend her claim to territory which was outside the natural sphere of her colonial interest. Spain, consequently, in practice accepted the permanent presence of Englishmen in North America, and it ceased to be a matter of diplomatic dispute between the two countries, although, whenever an opportunity presented itself, Spain did continue during the seventeenth century to remind England, and the other European countries, that in theory at any rate Castile's Indies' monopoly encompassed the North American continent.¹⁸ The nature of the English government's response to the Spanish monopoly was apparently well known to the ordinary Englishman. George Bellin, whilst being questioned in Santo Domingo, was asked if he did not know that all the Indies belonged to the King of Spain; he replied that he was aware that all inhabited places belonged to His Majesty, but that all uninhabited places could be occupied by anyone. Bellin, who claimed to be a Catholic, stated that he and his colleagues had come to the West Indies with a commission from the Earl of Montgomery to colonise the island of Fonesca.¹⁹

For the English government the only permissible colonial monopoly was that which was based solely on effective possession and occupation, and it maintained that Englishmen had an inalienable right to explore,

settle and trade with lands not so possessed by Spain. The aim of this chapter will be to consider the ways in which Englishmen both used and abused that right, and also to see how Spain reacted to these encroachments on her monopoly in the New World during the period 1625 to 1660. For the purposes of this study attention will be concentrated on the Caribbean and South America, since in practice Spain had relinquished her claims to those parts of North America settled by Englishmen.

Englishmen in Spanish America

Pirates, Privateers and Traders

A great deal has been written about the piracy which flourished in the Caribbean for most of the seventeenth century. Because of its distance from Europe, and because of the disorder and confusion which prevailed there, the Caribbean was an ideal retreat for European pirates. These pirates gained a livelihood by preying on Spanish vessels plying between the islands, but since they professed no loyalty to any country and showed no respect for any peace treaties, no shipping in the Caribbean was safe from their attacks. They usually operated in very small groups, and used as their bases the islands left unoccupied by the Spaniards. During the early years of the seventeenth century, the islands of Tortuga, lying off the north coast of Hispaniola, became the principal base of the pirates.²⁰ Englishmen were prominent among the

West Indian pirates.

The difficulties experienced both by James I and Charles I in trying to prevail upon all their subjects to respect their peace treaties with Spain, and to cease their piracy, is very well illustrated by the careers of the first and second Earls of Warwick. The first Earl of Warwick, who received his peerage from James I in 1610, had made a fortune from privateering during Elizabeth's war with Spain, and by obtaining commissions from the Duke of Savoy, he was able to continue privateering against Spain after 1604.²¹ His son, the second earl, followed his example. Both father and son were actively concerned with the formation of a company to colonise Bermuda in 1612. In view of the King's hostility to pirates, the leading members of both the Virginia and Bermuda companies were very anxious that the new colony should not do anything to antagonise James I on that score and thereby cause the dissolution of the company and colony. The Virgian company, particularly, became very agitated when it was learned that Warwick was secretly using Bermuda as a base for piracy against Spain. One of his ships, the Treasurer, commanded by Captain Elfrith, was in the West Indies during 1619, and when the Spanish ambassador protested about its activities, Sir Edward Sandys, the treasurer of the Virginia company, was most anxious to disassociate his company from Warwick's piracy.²² Despite the embarrassment caused by the second Earl of Warwick, James I was not able to curb his activities; he was too influential a subject, as his

contribution to the war of 1625 - 1630 demonstrates,²³ for the King to take drastic action against him. The success with which such an eminent Englishman flouted the Spanish peace in the West Indies was inevitably an inducement and an encouragement to lesser Englishmen to follow suit.

They were also encouraged and favoured by one other factor. The new English colonies in the West Indies were repeatedly urged by their founding companies to avoid provoking Spain, but as they had to face the very real possibility of attacks by Spain, and as they had little hope of obtaining help from the English government, one obvious method of strengthening their defences was to welcome the West Indian pirates. This happened in Bermuda, Providence and also in Tortuga. Tortuga was incorporated into the Providence island company in 1631, and its first English governor, Anthony Hilton, unknown to the company, allowed the island to continue to be used as a base for pirates of all nations.²⁴ Apart from the Caribbean islands, it also seems that Virginia served as a base for West Indian piracy. It was reported from Florida in 1649 that two Spanish frigates carrying provisions to the Florida garrisons had been captured by an Englishman, Thomas Carmel, who was said to have come from Virginia.²⁵

It was not only Spanish Caribbean shipping which was attacked by the pirates, for the latter were also attracted to the isolated and

undefended Spanish settlements. The Governor of the town of Cumana in the province of New Andalusia, gave details of such a pirate raid in one of his letters. The pirate ships, one English and the other French, arrived at Cumana under cover of darkness on 29 April 1654, and one hundred men, all well armed, were landed from them an hour before dawn. The raiders moved with such stealth about the town that the Governor was unaware of what was happening until heard the screams of the women and children who were being rounded up by the invaders. A number of anxious townspeople then gathered at the Governor's house, and with their help, and the assistance of eight soldiers, he was able to force the raiders to abandon the church which they had occupied; they then released their prisoners and returned to their ships. The Indian guide of the raiding party, who was taken prisoner by the Spaniards, informed the Governor that the pirates had intended to sack the town and to carry off the women, and that they had selected Cumana because it was believed that there were few people living there.²⁶ This Cumana raid is typical of the piratical attacks which were often made on the defenceless Spanish settlements.

In the confused setting of the seventeenth century Caribbean, the distinction between the English pirate and the English privateer cannot be easily made. The theoretical difference between them is that the privateers possessed licences, issued to them either by the English government or the colonising companies, for their plundering ventures,

whilst the pirates had no such commissions. It followed naturally from the English government's defence of the presence of Englishmen in the Caribbean that the latter should not only have the right to defend themselves against Spain and against any other European country which tried to prevent them from acquiring uninhabited territory, but that they should also be able to resort to reprisals, sanctioned by letters of marque, when all attempts to obtain compensation for injuries and losses sustained in the West Indies had failed. Included in the charter of the Providence Company was the privilege of granting powers of reprisal after the Crown's permission had been obtained.²⁷ The Spanish attacks on the islands of Tortuga and Providence in 1635 resulted in further royal confirmation and approval of that privilege. Although able to issue letters of marque, the Company did not wish to see the island of Providence becoming a centre for unauthorised plundering of the Spaniards.²⁸ There are a number of examples of privateering expeditions commissioned by the Company.²⁹ Two of them, both commanded by Captain William Jackson, went to the Caribbean in 1639 and again in 1642; the second of these two voyages, about which there is plenty of information available,³⁰ was financed by the Earl of Warwick and a group of London merchants. Jackson's voyage of 1642 is worth considering in detail, because it illustrates very well the disadvantages of privateering in the Caribbean during

the seventeenth century.

This must have been one of the largest privateering expeditions to have gone to the West Indies since the conclusion of Elizabeth's war with Spain; there were seven vessels and about eleven hundred men. The ships were prepared and equipped solely for the purpose of attacking and robbing Spaniards in the Caribbean, and according to one member of the expedition, a Scot, Robert Adam, they carried nothing but provisions, powder and shot.³¹ But despite the strength of his expedition, Jackson steered clear of the more important and wealthier centres of Spanish settlement in the Caribbean, and confined his attention to the less well defended, but much less prosperous, parts of the Spanish empire. Beginning with the island of Margarita, Jackson raided Spanish settlements on the northern coast of South America, including the towns of La Guaira, Puerto Cabello and Maracibo; Jamaica was then invaded, and the voyage terminated with raids on Spanish towns in Honduras. Jackson's tactics were the same throughout the voyage. The towns were attacked and captured in the belief that they harboured stores of treasure. In most cases the English captors were disappointed and found nothing of great value. If the townspeople agreed to a ransom for their town it was restored to them undamaged, but if they refused it was set on fire before Jackson and his men retired. It is certain that the ransom money obtained by Jackson would not be

enough to repay the investors in the expedition. Up to the time of the attack on Jamaica, after which two hundred disgruntled members of the expedition received the commander's permission to return to Barbados, the value of the booty taken was said to be insufficient to defray one-twentieth of Jackson's own contribution to the expenses of the voyage.³²

An apt comment on the outcome of the whole expedition was Jackson's decision to conclude his second visit to the Caribbean with a raid on a defenceless monastery, from which he was able to take the church plate whilst the monks were "drinking and revelling with their whores".³³

Apart from its demonstration of the fact that the rewards of Caribbean privateering were invariably meagre, Jackson's voyage also draws attention to the many hazards which faced the privateer in the Spanish Indies. At Maracaibo Jackson lost one of his ships and eighty-nine of his men, who were taken prisoner, and in the Gulf of Mexico, three more of his ships were wrecked when they struck rocks.³⁴ The expedition's misfortunes did not end with its departure from the Caribbean; a meeting with a Dunkirk private man of war not far from Dunkirk resulted in the sinking of another vessel and the loss of its captain and twenty of its crew.³⁵

The financial disappointments associated with Caribbean privateering in the seventeenth century explains why there were so few privateering ventures organised on a scale equal to those of Captain William Jackson. It also explains why Englishmen in the Spanish Indies seem to have preferred,

whenever they had the opportunity, to engage in peaceful trade with the Spanish colonists. Such opportunities were often available. Direct trading which the Spanish colonies was forbidden, but the attempts of the Spanish government to stop it were as unsuccessful as the attempts, already referred to, to prevent Englishmen from trading indirectly with the colonies by way of Spain and the flotas. The Spanish settlements in America were sparsely distributed, and there were areas in the Caribbean and on the South American mainland which were never effectively drawn into Spain's empire with the result that the seventeenth century colonial administrators found it impossible to prevent English and other foreign interlopers making contact with the native populations of those areas. Thus the Providence Company is found trading with the Indians of the Mosquito coast, which lay opposite the island of Providence and from which valuable dyewoods could be obtained.³⁶ And lacking any other means of excluding the English traders, the Spanish imperial authorities resorted to bribery; this was the method employed by the governor of Florida, Don Luis Rojas de Borja, who gave Philip IV an account in 1628 of his efforts to persuade the Indians of the southern coasts of Florida to desist from trading with ships from England and Holland.³⁷

It was not only the Indians who were guilty of encouraging the English traders. The Spanish colonists, and even the imperial officials, were also prepared to welcome contraband trade, called by the Spaniards rescate. Apart from the difficulties arising from the extensive spread

of Spain's American empire, two other reasons can be offered to explain why there were so many opportunities for rescate. There was in the first place the organisation of the trade between Spain and her colonies. It was very rigidly controlled, and as all trade with the colonies had to be confined to the two annual fleets, merchandise legitimately introduced into America was both expensive and scarce. The consequences of Spain's imperial trade administration were felt most acutely by these Spanish settlements which were located at some distance from the terminal ports of the fleets and from the main centres of the empire in the Caribbean. Such isolated places were allowed ships of permiso which detached themselves from the main fleet when it reached the Caribbean and made their way, very often alone, to their destination ports. But by leaving the fleet and the protection of the galleons, the ships of permiso immediately exposed themselves to the privateers and pirates, and as the numbers of the latter increased in the early seventeenth century, so the numbers of permiso vessels diminished and also, consequently, the legitimate supply of European merchandise to the remoter parts of the empire. The island of Jamaica was one of the places so affected; according to Chaunu, direct links between the island and Spain had virtually ceased by the early 1630's.³⁸ Jamaica and the other remote settlements suffered in one other respect as a result of Spain's imperial trade policy. In the seventeenth century, with only a limited amount of money available for

the construction and maintenance of defences in the Indies, Spain concentrated on the defences of those towns and ports which lay on or close to the routes taken by the fleets in and out of the Caribbean. Places which did not have such strategic importance were totally neglected. La Guaira, the port for Caracas, is a typical example of such neglect. In 1638 the Governor of Venezuela expressed his grave concern about La Guaira's lack of defences and also about his own lack of money to provide the port with the fortifications which he considered essential.³⁹ The Governors of the island of Margarita and of Cumanagates made similar complaints about the inadequate defences of the ports in their provinces.⁴⁰ So that the isolated and neglected Spanish colonies, irregularly supplied by the fleets, were not inclined to turn away the English contrabandists, and even if they were so inclined, they invariably lacked the means to force the withdrawal of the intruders and to defend themselves against reprisals taken by the rejected trading ships.

In connection with rescate, there is a third factor to be mentioned and that is the generally poor quality of the colonial administrators, against whom, as amongst their counterparts in Europe, inefficiency, corruption and neglect of their duties as royal officials were commonplace. One of the principal weaknesses of the colonial empire of Spain in the seventeenth century is the failure of the government to secure the loyalty and obedience of its own servants. There is plenty of evidence

to illustrate that fact. In the province of Cumanagatos two successive governors, Juan Urpin and Francisco Berrocal de Campo, together with other officials of the province, were found to be guilty of permitting trade with English ships.⁴¹ It was not unknown for the colonial officials to monopolise the rescate for themselves and for their own financial advantage. This happened in Caracas, where the provincial treasurer, Pedro de Perlata, although poverty-stricken on his arrival in the province, managed to amass a considerable fortune within a very short time.⁴² For their own profit two governors of Puerto Rico, Diego de Aguilera and Jose de Novoa, also reserved trade with the foreigners, amongst them Englishmen from the English West Indian islands, for themselves; offering silver and provisions to the traders, the Governors bought their cargoes of cloth and negroes cheaply and sold them to the islanders at extortionate prices.⁴³

The part of the Spanish Indies most frequently visited by the English merchant vessels was the north coast of the South American mainland, extending from Trinidad to Maraciabo; Chaunu refers to this as the "domaine du rescate".⁴⁴ The colonists in this area made a living from the cultivation of tobacco and **caca**, and as the two fleets a year proved to be an inadequate outlet for those products, there was always a welcome for foreigners who wished to purchase them. But they were also welcome for another reason; they supplied the African slaves which were needed

on the plantations of Venezuela and its neighbouring provinces. Negroes were scarce and the colonists were willing to pay well for them. Both Nicholas Philip, who came to the provinces of Cumana and Cumanagatos in 1643 and again in 1648, and William Jaquete, who arrived in Cumamagatos in 1648, brought a ship-load of negroes.⁴⁵

Distinguishing between the English trader and the English pirate in the West Indies is as difficult as trying to distinguish between the pirate and the privateer. In the Spanish records no distinction is made; all Englishmen in the Caribbean are referred to as pirates. The declared intention of Englishmen trying to establish a direct commercial link with the Spanish Indies was to seek peaceful trade wherever they could find it,⁴⁶ but it is certain that they did not hesitate to follow the example of the pirate and the privateer when their offers of trade were rejected.

Whilst there is no lack of evidence to prove that it did exist, before 1660 direct English trading with the Spanish colonies was not considerable. This fact is easily explained. In setting out in search of trade with the Spanish colonists, the English merchant vessels faced many dangers. The hazardous nature of Caribbean trade was partly the result of the distance which separated the Spanish colonial communities from the safety of the English West Indian islands; until the conquest of Jamaica provided him with a secure base in the heart of Spain's colonial empire

in the Caribbean, the Englishman seeking trade with the Spaniards had to operate from the periphery. Amongst the many dangers to which he was exposed was the constant threat of apprehension by the Spanish authorities. Capture and a spell of imprisonment in Seville were the outcome of Nicholas Philip's voyage of 1643. Accompanied by Francisco de Medina de Melgava from Seville, who served both as master and as negotiator with the Spaniards, Nicholas Philip came to the Caribbean with his ship, the Discovery, and a cargo of negroes and other merchandise. It was unfortunate that his stay in the port of Posuelos, where he was permitted by the governor of Cumanagatos, Juan de Urpin, to anchor and to trade, coincided with the annual visit of the royal patache to the pearl island of Margarita. The Discovery was seized by the patache, and Philip and his men were transported to Spain and imprisoned at Cadiz; they were eventually released in 1646.⁴⁷ Similar to Nicolas Philip's experiences were the experiences of William Jaquete in Cumanagatos in 1648. His ship, the Flower of May, was allowed to trade its negro slaves by Urpin's successor, Francisco Berrocal de Campo. But when notification was received from Santo Domingo that the papers presented by Jaquete were invalid, the Governor and his officials secretly arranged the capture of the English captain and his ship, and whilst the Governor went off to Santo Domingo to explain what had happened, the prisoners and the ship were left in the sole charge of two brothers, Juan and

Dionisio Sedeno. A subsequent investigation into the affair revealed that the two brothers, who by the control which they had over all the royal officials, including the Governor, wielded considerable power in the province, had acquired most of the proceeds from the captured ship and its remaining merchandise by falsifying the treasury records.⁴⁸

Unfortunately, it was not only the Spaniards who were liable to interrupt the successful conclusion of a trading venture in Spanish America. Such were the conditions in the seventeenth century Caribbean that English trading vessels were safe neither from Frenchmen nor even from their own countrymen. A ship belonging to Samuel Wilson and company was anchored in June 1651 in the port of Guaira; it was taking on board a cargo of hides and tobacco when it was set upon by a French privateer and forced to surrender itself and its cargo; Wilson estimated his losses at £10,000.⁴⁹ Another English trading vessel was in Guaira in 1642 when William Jackson was on the Venezuelan coast. It was his intention, apparently, to take the ship, but the idea was given up when three of his pinnaces which approached the ship were warned that there were many Spaniards on board.⁵⁰

For the English trading ships, operating as they usually did either singly or in two's and three's, the hazards of the Caribbean were sufficient to discourage even the most adventurous merchant from putting his money into such risky enterprises and to make him prefer the alternative means of tapping the riches of Spanish America. The

Indies trade via Spain of course, was not without its risks, but judging by the extent to which English merchants and ships participated in the flotas, they were clearly reckoned to be less than the risks involved in direct commercial dealings with the Spanish colonies. And as well as its risks, trading through Seville and Cadiz also had its advantages, the two principal ones being first, the protection of the galleons, which in the Caribbean of the seventeenth century was an invaluable asset, and second, access to the largest and most prosperous centres of Spanish settlement. Debarred from places like Cartagena, Porto Bello, Havana and Santo Domingo, the traders operating directly from England and the English West Indian islands had to confine their attention to places of very limited resources. This preference for trade through Spain is a characteristic of the whole seventeenth century, for Cromwell's efforts at the end of the period under study to strengthen and enlarge England's commercial links with Spanish America did little immediately to lessen the attachment of English merchants to the Spanish trade. As a substitute for the trade with Spain, Cromwell offered the merchant community direct access to the wealth of the Indies.⁵¹ He endeavoured to realise his offer in two ways. The first was by diplomatic means, making unrestricted trade in the Spanish Indies an essential condition of his treaty with Spain,⁵² and the second by means of conquest.⁵³ Neither of these was successful. It is true, of course, that the West

Indian expedition of 1655 provided Englishmen with an island conveniently placed at the centre of the Caribbean, and during the second half of the century, Jamaica was used as a base for illegal trade with the Spanish colonies.⁵⁴ But in fact the addition of Jamaica to England's colonial empire did little to enhance the attractions of direct commerce with the Spanish Indies; during the rest of the century, trade with Spain continued to be given first priority, and as Jean MacLachlan has shown, it was the defence of the country's commercial interests in Spain that was the primary economic motive for England's resistance to the accession of a Bourbon in Spain in 1700.⁵⁵

Colonisers and Conquerors

The Caribbean islands abandoned by Spain because they were not considered to have either economic or strategic value attracted settlers from other European countries, the most active colonisers of the first half of the century being the Dutch, French and English. Outside the North American mainland, the first settlements to be established by Englishmen were in the Bermuda islands in 1611, and these were followed by the foundation of permanent colonies on the islands of the Lesser Antilles, where by 1660 Englishmen had settled on Anguilla, Antigua, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Santa Cruz, Saint Christopher, Nevis and Barbados. Since the attempts to establish colonies on the islands of

Tortuga and Providence did not succeed, Barbados was the focal point of the English colonial empire in the Caribbean until the conquest of Jamaica in 1655.

Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, the position of the English colonies in Spanish America was precarious. Such were the problems and difficulties they had to face that their survival as permanent colonies was by no means assured. Not least amongst their difficulties was their lack of economic stability, which they were not able to achieve until the tobacco and sugar plantations were successfully developed during the second half of the century. There was in addition the ever present threat of eviction by the Spaniards. As will be seen, this was a threat which on occasions did become a reality. Apart from the Spaniards, the English colonies also had to contend with settlers from other European countries, which were equally covetous of the vacant Caribbean islands. In some cases islands had to be shared. The island of Santa Cruz, for example, was shared with the Dutch, whilst Tortuga and Saint Christopher both had French as well as English settlements. Such sharing of islands was rarely harmonious, despite the fact that the rival colonies had a common interest in defending themselves against the native Caribs and against the Spaniards. On Saint Christopher there was rivalry between the French and English colonies until they were all destroyed and the colonists evicted by Spain

in 1629.⁵⁶ On Tortuga, obviously valuable because of its closeness to Hispaniola, friction between the French and English settlers culminated in the expulsion of the English by the French in 1640, and again in 1654 after they had returned to the island.⁵⁷ Added to the difficulties just mentioned, there was also the Caribbean climate which for Englishmen was much less congenial than that of North America. All these factors together explain why Englishmen generally were reluctant to take part in the establishment of permanent West Indian colonies. The Providence Company was unable to find enough settlers for Providence island,⁵⁸ and the same difficulty was experienced when the newly acquired Jamaica had to be colonised. Cromwell's endeavours to encourage emigration to Jamaica from England and from New England produced disappointing results.⁵⁹

The future of the English West Indian colonies in the early seventeenth century was most seriously jeopardised by the fact that they were not able to rely on the support of the English government, which until 1654 gave no indication of its willingness to help the colonists meet and overcome the dangers with which they were faced. A consequence of this particular disability, as already seen, was that the colonies, left to fend for themselves, became dominated by and dependent upon the pirate and the privateer. Colonising in the Caribbean was done in a way which was typical of all English colonial expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was left entirely to the initiative and enterprise of private individuals,

the government's part in it being limited to the allocation of proprietary grants and the granting of patents for the formation of colonising companies. Although this policy gave the colonisers and their colonies a degree of freedom which was enjoyed by no other overseas European colonies, amongst the principal colonisers of the early seventeenth century, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the government's unwillingness to involve itself actively in the formation of a colonial empire. Those whose interests were directed towards the Caribbean, where the dangers and risks were greatest, were most anxious to obtain more support from the government. The need for state involvement was most strongly expressed by the Puritan party, the leading members of which planned amongst other things the creation of a West Indies Company to defend the existing colonies and to acquire more territory in Spanish America. Such a project, as was pointed out by the Earl of Northumberland when corresponding with Sir Thomas Roe, one of the foremost supporters of the West Indies Company, had to be pursued "at a great expense for some years, without a present profit", and therefore was "too great an undertaking for a few well affected men to go through with it".⁶⁰ Northumberland's reference to the costliness of a more ambitious policy in the Caribbean is unusual. It is more usual to find its advocates, in public at any rate, claiming that more Caribbean territory could be acquired easily and cheaply, and that the resulting rewards would be more than adequate compensation for any expenses incurred initially.

John Pym suggested in the House of Commons in 1640 that the King might use the Englishmen already settled in Virginia and the Lesser Antilles and "with a very small charge might set them down in some advantageous parts of those pleasant, rich and fruitful countries, and easily make himself master of all that treasure, which not only foments the war (he refers to the war in Germany), but is the great support of prosperity in all Christendom".⁶¹ Such arguments made little impression on the government as long as the Stuarts endured. Charles I had no money for schemes of this nature, however cheaply they might be executed, and had he been able to afford them, it is not likely that he would have been prepared to spend money to satisfy the ambitions of men, who, as well as being interested in colonial expansion in Spanish America, were also the Crown's bitterest critics at home; John Pym, the Earl of Holland, the Earl of Warwick, Lord Brooke and Viscount Saye and Sele, all important members of the Providence Company, were also prominent members of the opposition to Charles I.

There was also one other factor which was certain to turn Charles I against the projects advocated by the Puritan colonisers. A more ambitious and more aggressive policy in the West Indies was clearly regarded by those who proposed it as being incompatible with the peace with Spain in Europe: "The West Indies business must make a breach with Spain", Sir Thomas Roe wrote to Elizabeth of Bohemia in October

1637.⁶² Since the King, as we have seen, was hoping that Spain would bring about the restoration of the Palatinate, he was not ready to risk a war and the consequent loss of Philip IV's help for the acquisition of more territory in the distant West Indies. Owing to his disappointment with Spain's efforts to restore his nephew, Charles I did seem willing in 1637 to favour the proposal that the Prince should be provided with facilities for a conquering expedition in the West Indies,⁶³ but by that time it was too late; the plan could not be pursued because of the King's preoccupation with affairs at home. Apart from adding to the difficulties of restoring the Palatinate, the destruction of the peace of 1630, caused by English aggression in the Caribbean, also jeopardised England's lucrative trade with Spain. It is interesting, although hardly surprising, that the advocates of a policy of state-sponsored expansion in Spanish America, reinforced their arguments by emphasising the value of more direct trade with the West Indies, and by strong criticism of the Spanish trade. Sir Thomas Roe informed the House of Commons that he believed the Spanish trade to be of little value "being only for wine, fruit, oranges and curiosities for saucers or effeminacy"; he also maintained that English merchants in Spain were underselling their commodities in order to be able to acquire money to purchase tobacco, which, as

well as being injurious to the woollen industry, also meant the loss of precious metal to England.⁶⁴ Roe was seemingly unaware, or was possibly deliberately refusing to acknowledge his awareness, of the value of the Spanish trade. The two previous chapters have shown how valuable and important that trade was, and by their denunciation of it, Roe and colleagues could not hope to gain the support of the King and of the merchant community at large for their demands for an extension of England's West Indian empire and trade. But although unsuccessful with the government of Charles I, their persistence was not unrewarded, for in 1655 it seemed at last that their hopes of "a more forward" policy in the Caribbean had been realised.

In English colonial history, the West Indian expedition of 1655 was an unprecedented event; the state was fully implicated for the first time in a colonial venture, and the expedition resulted, also for the first time, in the conquest of territory occupied by the Spaniards. Because it was so unprecedented, the expedition has never ceased to be a matter of great controversy since it was first considered early in 1654. Opposition to the expedition and its objectives, and to the war with Spain which it threatened to provoke, was not confined entirely to the merchants involved in the Spanish trade. Within the Protector's own Council strong criticisms were

voiced; John Lambert objected because he felt that such an ambitious enterprise was inadvisable when there were so many problems still unsolved at home, and he did not believe that the expedition would fulfill its promises of wealth and riches.⁶⁵ Lambert's views, of course, did not prevail, but Cromwell's decision to reject these and other objections did not put an end to the debate surrounding the West Indian venture of 1655. It has been the subject of a prolonged dispute amongst historians, who have conflicted in their attempts to explain and interpret the event; especially controversial have been their efforts to establish Cromwell's real motives for departing so dramatically from the traditional trend of English colonial policy. To come to some definite conclusion about these motives, if that is in fact possible, would require a dissertation for itself. More appropriate for this study, and possibly helpful in determining the underlying motives of the West Indian expedition, will be a detailed consideration of the charges which Cromwell made against Spain in order to justify his attack on Spanish America. As far as the Indies was concerned, he had two grievances in 1655; the first was that Englishmen had been debarred by Spain from trading with "so great and rich a part of the world against all reason", and the second that Englishmen caught in the Indies, even when on their way to and from their own colonies, had been subjected

to cruel and barbarous treatment by the Spaniards.⁶⁶ Clearly it would be impossible to comment on these grievances without first examining the nature, as well as the motives, of Spain's response in the seventeenth century to the encroachments of England on her American empire.

Spain and Englishmen in America

As we have seen, Spain's interpretation of the omission of America from the peace treaty of 1604 was that her claim to monopolise that part of the world had been upheld, and, consequently, it was maintained in Madrid that any method which was employed to curb the infiltration of Englishmen into the Caribbean was justifiable. In Spain's view the English were the breakers of the treaty. Clearly, the most effective method of dealing with the intruders was to expel them by force. But for Spain in the seventeenth century that was an impossible solution to the problem; the men, money and ships needed to maintain a constant guard on the Indies were not available. Only on one occasion before 1630 was Spain able to make a practical demonstration of her determination to evict the English from the West Indies and that was in 1629 when the galleons of Don Fadrique de Toledo visited the

islands of Nevis and Saint Christopher and evacuated the English and French settlers found there. According to one member of the English community of Nevis, the Spaniards did "no violence to any man", and those colonists who did not accept the offer of service with Spain were provided with vessels to return them to England and France.⁶⁷ Isolated attacks, like that of Toledo in 1629, on the foreign occupied islands could not hope to have lasting success; Nevis and Saint Christopher were reoccupied almost immediately. What was needed was a permanent guard on the islands and lands claimed by Spain, but for that the means were not available. The Armada de Barlavento, which had the special task of protecting the colonies and of enforcing Spain's American monopoly, ceased to exist in 1610, and thereafter the Caribbean's only permanent naval defence was confined to the small fleets maintained by the governors. These fleets, although adequate in some cases for the defence of their own provincial ports and shipping, were not equal to the task of compelling the withdrawal of all foreign intruders from the West Indies.⁶⁸

Since Spain was not in a position to adopt the obvious and most effective solution, other ways of dealing with the English had to be tried. Reduction of the opportunities for illegal trade was one way. For example, tobacco-growing in Venezuela was forbidden

for a time, whilst the northern part of the island of Hispaniola, frequently visited by Englishmen and other foreigners, was depopulated.⁶⁹ Spain also endeavoured to check the English invasion of the Indies by punishing those who went there. The best known example of an offender against the treaty of 1604, whose punishment was intended to be a warning to his compatriots, was Sir Walter Raleigh; his execution in 1621, following his voyage to the Orinoco, was largely due to the skilful handling of Spain's diplomacy in London by the Count Gondomar. Although Raleigh's death was a spectacular vindication of the Spanish monopoly, it did little to diminish English interest in Spanish America, for between 1621 and 1629 three new colonising projects were begun; the first for the Lesser Antilles, the second for Guiana and the third for the islands of Providence and Henrietta.

After 1630, with the Indies question still unsettled by the new peace, Spain had to face growing English pressure on her empire in the Caribbean. Very alarming was the enlargement of the English colonies in the islands of the Lesser Antilles. As much detailed information as possible was obtained from English prisoners about the numerical strength and fortifications of the colonies. In 1634 maps of the occupied islands were procured and these were examined closely both by the King and the Council

of the Indies.⁷⁰ But more alarming after 1630 was the interest shown by England in islands outside the Lesser Antilles group. In the islands of Santa Catalina and Tortuga, called by the English Providence and Association, settlements were made. This movement into the heart of the Caribbean, and into closer proximity to the chief centres of Spain's colonial empire, heightened the threat of foreign aggression, particularly as these early English island colonies, as already seen, were little more than pirate and privateer bases. Writing in January 1632, the Governor of Puerto Rico referred to the dangers with which inter-island communications, as well as communications between the colonies and Spain, were threatened by the presence of English, French and Dutch in the Lesser Antilles.⁷¹ And from the other end of the Caribbean, the Viceroy of New Spain, reporting in 1645 on the condition of the viceroyalty, stated that great harm had been caused in recent years by foreign pirates, who by their persistent attacks on colonial shipping had destroyed free and safe commerce in the area.⁷² According to Francisco Diaz Pimenta, who commanded the Tierra Firme fleet of 1641, Cartagena was one of the places which had suffered from the proximity of Santa Catalina; when reporting the success of his expedition against that island, he referred to the immediate recovery of Cartagena's trade, which had steadily diminished since the English occupation

of Santa Catalina.⁷³ The governors of Jamaica and Hispaniola had similar experiences to report. Their islands were infested with English and French pirates. Don Juan Morfo Geraldino, governor of Hispaniola, found it impossible to apprehend them because they were as familiar with the island as the Spaniards and because they had the advantage of ships, with which they were able to move quickly from place to place.⁷⁴ The need for action was obvious, but what form that action should take was in itself a great problem for the Spanish government. It was unfortunate that as the invasion of Englishmen into the Caribbean gathered momentum, Spain's resources for dealing with them dwindled.

The resolution of the problem by diplomatic means was rejected by the government of Philip IV. In 1630, and again in 1634 when Necolalde was empowered to negotiate a league with England, it was decided that the withdrawal of Englishmen from the Indies would not be demanded, and that, as in 1604, America would not be mentioned in any written agreement with the English government. By means of this stratagem, the embarrassment of a possible refusal would be avoided, and Spain could also continue to interpret silence on the subject of America as an affirmation of her monopoly, and as a justification of her right to take steps to expel the

intruders.⁷⁵ But the assertion of that right was even more difficult for Spain after 1630 than it had been before. Ships were in short supply; apart from the demands for them in Europe, they were also required in Brazil where on two occasions, in 1631 and 1639, a Castilian squadron went to assist the Portuguese against the Dutch.⁷⁶ Continual use of the galleons protecting the Indies fleets to evacuate the islands was not considered advisable. It was pointed out by the Junta de Guerra de Indias that employing the galleons only endangered the safety of the fleets, and for that reason it was decided in April 1630 that the armada accompanying the Tierra Firme Fleet of that year should not pay another visit to Saint Christopher, to which the English and French settlers had again returned.⁷⁷ In fact after 1630, the galleons which crossed the Atlantic with the flotas were used only against those island colonies, which, owing to their proximity to the routes taken by the fleets and to the principal colonial ports, were considered particularly dangerous. One such island was Santa Catalina, occupied by the English since 1630. In 1635, and again in 1640, small expeditions were sent out from Cartagena to evict the settlers, but neither was successful.⁷⁸ So in 1641, having wintered in Cartagena, Don Francisco Diaz Pimenta was ordered to use his galleons against the island, and on this occasion the

English colonists were unable to resist. Most of them were taken prisoner and subsequently transported to Spain where they were imprisoned. A Spanish garrison was left by Pimenta in order to prevent the island's reoccupation.⁷⁹ As the frequent use of the galleons was not favoured by the government, the local colonial administrators were obliged to find their own means of dealing with troublesome English islands. But because their resources were very limited, they were able to make little headway. An expedition sent from Santo Domingo in 1635 successfully cleared the island of Tortuga, but in a very short time the expelled Englishmen and Frenchmen had returned.⁸⁰ On several occasions, the governors of Puerto Rico evicted the foreigners from Santa Cruz only to find that they had returned immediately after the Spaniards had withdrawn. Don Inigo de la Mota Sarmiento, governor of Puerto Rico, was in no doubt that the only effective method of dealing with the intruders would be to have an armada permanently stationed in the Caribbean.⁸¹ The government in Spain did not need to be reminded of the value of such an armada. In January 1633, the Junta de Guerra de Indias recommended the provision of a squadron to tour the islands.⁸² However, owing to the difficulties of finding ships, it was not until 1643 that the Armada de Barlovento was reformed, but it lasted only until 1648, when it was recalled to Europe and

the Caribbean was again left with very inadequate naval defences.⁸³

In the correspondence which passed unceasingly back and forward between Spain and her colonies, the student of seventeenth century Spanish America is constantly made aware of the immensity of the problem of defending the empire. From the colonies came repeated appeals for more help and protection, whilst in Spain discussions at government level about the ways and means of complying with these appeals usually ended with the reluctant recognition of Spain's inability to furnish adequate assistance.⁸⁴ Yet in spite of a great many difficulties, Spain managed to avoid any major loss of territory until 1655.

News of extensive naval preparations in England and of the rumour that there was to be a West Indian expedition was received in Madrid in the autumn of 1654. As Cromwell kept the destination of the fleet a closely guarded secret, Alonso de Cardenas was not able either to confirm or deny the truth of the rumour, and although neither he nor his government could believe that an attack on Spanish America was intended, it was decided, as a precaution, to strengthen the defences of Santo Domingo as Hispaniola was said to be the destination of the English fleet. The newly appointed governor of Hispaniola, Conde de Penalva, sailed from Spain with two hundred arquebusiers. He reached the island in April 1655, only fourteen days before the arrival of the English fleet, and he began immediately

to prepare Santo Domingo for an attack.⁸⁵ The city was still not very well fortified and garrisoned, but the appearance of Blake's fleet on the southern coast of Spain meant that nothing more could be done to help the colonies, and Philip's only consolation in June 1655, when news of events in the Caribbean had not yet reached Europe, was his conviction that Cromwell would never risk a war with Spain.⁸⁶

Hispaniola was able to repulse the English attack, but Jamaica, upon which Penn and Venables fell next to save the venture from complete disaster, was not so fortunate. Jamaica, an island virtually abandoned by Spain, was in a poor state of defence. Four years before its capture, the governor, Don Francisco de Proenca, provided his government with a report on the state of the island; the strength of the militia was reduced to five hundred and the island, according to Don Francisco, was in great danger of being seized by the English from Saint Christopher and Barbados.⁸⁷ Disinterest in the island of Jamaica, which partly explains the state of affairs described by the Governor, is further reflected in the reaction to the news of Jamaica's surrender, for although the attack on Spanish America was regarded as a breach of the peace treaty, the government in Spain was not greatly perturbed by the actual loss of Jamaica; the councillors of state were agreed that "the island of Jamaica itself is not a matter of great importance".⁸⁸ This belief that Jamaica

had little value determined the fate of the island. With so few resources to meet its heavy commitments in the seventeenth century, Spain had to base its defence of the Indies on an order of priorities. Some islands in the Caribbean were abandoned altogether. Jamaica, although not totally forsaken, was so sadly neglected that its surrender in 1655 was inevitable.

In addition to the failure to regain the islands occupied by the English, and to prevent the loss of Jamaica, Spain's lack of the necessary means to enforce her exclusive claim to America also had an important bearing on other aspects of the controversial Indies question. For instance it affected the treatment of Englishmen arrested in America. There was never any doubt in Spain that all Englishmen, including all those who claimed to be making for Virginia and the other English colonies, were breaking the peace treaty of 1630. They were all regarded as pirates, and could be treated as such, the usual penalty for piracy being death by hanging. "The peace treaty with England does not prohibit the treatment as pirates of Englishmen found pirating in the Indies even when they say they are on the way to Virginia," Philip IV wrote in October 1639.⁸⁹ It should be noted that this statement of Spanish policy was based solely on the claim to monopolise the New World, and it was not the result of Spain's application of "no peace beyond the line".

As far as England was concerned, Spain never doubted that the peace treaties of the first half of the century were universal, and it was for this reason that the suggestion, made in England in 1654, that an assault could be made on Spanish America without breaking the peace was firmly rejected in Madrid.⁹⁰ Spain's interpretation of the treaty, particularly with regard to the treatment of Englishmen as pirates, was never formally disputed by Charles I, and consequently we find his ambassador in Spain, Arthur Hopton, writing in April 1641 that he was uncertain how to proceed in connection with the release of Englishmen brought from the Indies: "Hitherto their liberty hath been negotiated by way of courtesy," he explained.⁹¹ Recognising that an agreement to satisfy both sides was impossible, Charles I was as unwilling as Philip IV to force a diplomatic debate on the whole matter of the Indies in order to clarify the position of Englishmen in America. In fact there was no urgent need to do so since Spain, despite the King's repeated assertion of his right to have them hanged on the spot, generally showed leniency towards the English prisoners taken in the Indies.

Englishmen captured in the West Indies were brought to Spain and placed in the prisons of the Casa de Contratación, from which after only a very short spell they were allowed to escape on the instructions of the King and the Council of the Indies. The

simulated escape appeared to be the most acceptable solution for one or two reasons; it saved the government the expense of maintaining the prisoners for a long period, and since, in theory, they escaped, it could not be said that the government had pardoned them; the escape was also a useful way of forestalling any attempt the English ambassador might make to obtain the release of his countrymen.⁹²

The ease with which the prisoners obtained their freedom impressed Arthur Hopton, who wrote in 1633: "In all things concerning His Majesty's subjects, I find in all men, and particularly in the Conde, respects that I think the subjects of no other king or ally of their's have found, thus much I hold myself bound to testify."⁹³ A man who came into close contact with the prisoners was William Marston, an English merchant in Seville, and it is interesting, although not surprising, that he showed little sympathy for them. He wrote in 1640: "If there be not some course taken to remedy the many exorbitants of our ships and seamen upon the coast of the Indies (where the Spaniards say they do more mischief than either French or Hollanders) we shall be continually oppressed and charged with multitudes of these people, our charity in relieving them and getting them out of prison and sending them from this country being no small encouragement to their wicked and thieving courses."⁹⁴ The reasons for Spain's clemency are not difficult to find. The cost

of keeping the prisoners is one reason which has already been mentioned. Another, and more important reason, was stated by Philip IV himself when giving his decision about the fate of several English, French and Dutch prisoners of the Casa. Whilst the French were to be shown no mercy, no rigorous action was to be taken against the English and the Dutch because of the danger of reprisal by England and the United Provinces; the Dutch and the English prisoners were to be given their freedom if they could not be persuaded to join the Spanish navy.⁹⁵

As the numbers of Englishmen in the Caribbean increased, Philip IV's advisers began to express doubts about the favour which had been shown to the prisoners. Their demands for sterner measures resulted in December 1644 in the drawing up of a cédula which required all colonial governors to inflict the penalty for piracy on all Englishmen as soon as they were caught in the Indies.⁹⁶ Although he was urged by the Junta de Guerra de Indias to issue the cédula without delay, the King hesitated and finally decided in March 1645 to withdraw it. He explained that he came to this decision not because the content of the cédula was contrary to the peace treaty, but because he felt it would be unwise to propose to Charles I a matter which in his present circumstances he would not be able to execute, or which, by Spain's insistence on it,

might result in a breach with England.⁹⁷ Philip IV added later, when he was again advised to enforce the cédula of December 1644, that application of the cédula would be postponed until "God is pleased to improve our state of affairs".⁹⁸

Although possibly with great reluctance, the Spanish kings and their ministers frequently did bring themselves to face the harsh realities of Spain's position in the world, and on occasions they were ready, even in public treaties, to modify their policies and the long established principles on which they were based. One major matter of policy on which Spain was prepared to make concessions was her claim to exclusive possession of the New World. We have seen already how Spain in practice had renounced the unoccupied east coast of North America, although for a century a formal acknowledgement of that fact had been successfully evaded. As the seventeenth century progressed, Spain found it increasingly difficult to oppose the intrusion of other European countries into Spanish America and to resist their demands at the diplomatic table for recognition of their colonial possessions. Spain's first major modification of her Indies policy came in 1648 when, in addition to his confirmation of their independence, Philip IV also recognised the claim of the Dutch to overseas territory, including the islands held by them in the Caribbean; in the same treaty a mutually exclusive colonial trade

monopoly was accepted by both sides.⁹⁹ Recognising the impossibility of evicting the English from the West Indies, and when faced with the possibility of an Anglo-French alliance, the Spanish government was willing in 1655 to make the same concessions to England as had been made to the Dutch. This was stated by the Council of State in November 1654: "They may retain possession of all those islands and lands which they occupied at the time of the peace, and of those not ruled by Your Majesty and in which Spaniards reside."¹⁰⁰ There seemed a willingness in Madrid to go even further by allowing the Protector to keep Jamaica; certainly Cardenas had instructions that the restoration of the island was not to jeopardise his chances of reaching an agreement with the English government.¹⁰¹ But what was regarded by Spain as a major concession was unacceptable to Cromwell. He would agree to nothing less than unrestricted access to Spanish America. This "scandalous pretension" was firmly rejected in Madrid.¹⁰²

Failure to reach agreement on the Indian question, which in England was attributed to Spanish obstinacy, was used by Cromwell to justify his ending the Spanish treaty negotiations and his decision, taken almost a year before the treaty negotiations were finally terminated, to despatch a fleet to the West Indies. The particular aim of this chapter has been to look more closely at the Spanish

side of this Indies question, and amongst other things, it has shown that the allegations made by Cromwell can be easily answered and that on this particular issue, it was probably Spain which had greater cause for being aggrieved. Cromwell referred to the losses and injustices suffered by his subjects in the Caribbean. Spain's reply would be that she was obliged to take action not merely because of the monopoly which she claimed to have in that part of the world, but because of the need to defend her colonies and the colonial trade from the pirates and privateers harboured by the English colonies in the West Indies. It would also be added that Philip IV, often against the advice of his own councillors, elected not to use his full powers when dealing with Englishmen in Spanish America, and treated them with a clemency which, according even to one Englishman, William Marston, their conduct did not deserve. Furthermore, Spain could reply with some justification that as far as the reception given to Englishmen in the Caribbean was concerned, Cromwell had as much reason to be hostile to France as to Spain; the Providence Company had lost Santa Catalina as the result of Spain's recapture of the island, but it had also lost Tortuga as the result of the expulsion of the English colonists by the French. To the charge that Englishmen were debarred from America, Spain's answer would be that in 1655 Philip IV was willing to accept the principle of

"effective occupation" as a basis for resolving the Anglo-Spanish dispute in the New World, and that by refusing the Spanish proposal, Cromwell was rejecting what had always been the central theme of England's American policy. Moreover, by requesting complete freedom of action in the Indies, Cromwell was demanding from Spain a privilege which, in respect of her own overseas possessions, was denied by England to other European countries.

CONCLUSION

"It is essential that we keep the peace with England whoever is in command there".¹ This advice, which Philip IV received from his Council of State in January 1650, illustrates very well the nature of Spain's English policy during the seventeenth century. Regardless of the changes of government which occurred there, peace with England was always Spain's intention. Spain's policy in respect of England was shaped against the background of the many problems with which the Spanish government had to cope both at home and abroad, and its aim to maintain peaceful relations with England was dictated by Spain's first objective in foreign politics, namely the preservation of those territories outside the Iberian Peninsula in northern and southern Europe. In order to detach England from Spain's enemies, alliances with the English government, based during the reigns of James I and Philip III on a marriage contract and later on defensive and offensive agreements against the Dutch and the French, were attempted, but when they proved unobtainable, the Spanish government was content to limit its aim to the securing of England's neutrality. This dissertation has drawn attention to the ways in which the Spanish government demonstrated its determination to maintain good relations with England and to make certain of her neutrality. The English merchant community in Spain enjoyed a privileged position. Its members in southern Spain received

special concessions from Philip IV in 1645, and throughout the period 1630 to 1655 Spain's liberal interpretation of the religious clauses of the peace treaty allowed Englishmen a large measure of religious freedom. The same desire to conciliate the English government was also noted in Spain's response to English encroachments on Spanish America. The Spanish government's readiness to modify its American policy was shown in its treatment of Englishmen taken prisoner in the Indies, and in its willingness to acknowledge the loss of the Caribbean islands, including Jamaica, possessed by England. There were, however, limits to the concessions which Spain was ready to make in order to be assured of England's good-will. It was not prepared to sacrifice what were considered to be major matters of principle. Philip IV refused to settle the Palatinate issue with the English government in a way which either jeopardised his relations with the Austrian Hapsburgs or did not fulfil his own conditions for the renunciation of the Lower Palatinate. And in 1655, when the dangers threatened by England's hostility had never been greater, the King was not willing to purchase the renewal of the English peace by renouncing his country's commercial monopoly in Spanish America. The refusal to make these sacrifices resulted in two Anglo-Spanish wars, and in each case the responsibility for initiating hostilities was England's. In 1625 and 1655 it was only with the greatest reluctance that the Spanish government recognised the existence of a state of war with England.

Whilst Spain's policy in respect of England was dictated by the demands of a much wider European policy, England's diplomatic and political relations with Spain between 1630 and 1640 were governed by less complex motives. Following the pattern established by his father, Charles I's dealings with Spain were dominated by one issue. For his father it had been the pursuit of the Spanish marriage treaty; for Charles I it was the recovery of the Palatinate. Neither was successful. In fact, for England the fruits of friendship with Spain were not political; they were primarily commercial. The value of the Spanish trade in the seventeenth century is indisputable, and because, as this dissertation has shown, the cessation of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean the total disruption of commercial relations, the prospect of an Anglo-Spanish war alarmed the English government much less than it did the Spanish government. But as long as there was an absence of strong government in England, there was little danger of such a war, and in spite of her many internal and external problems, Spain continued, as she had done since 1604, to take the initiative in Anglo-Spanish diplomacy. That initiative had been lost by 1650 as a result of changed circumstances in England.

This dissertation has not provided an explanation of Cromwell's dealings with Spain. It is doubtful if the motivations of his foreign politics can be satisfactorily explained. Leaving his motives aside, what this dissertation has demonstrated is that the price stated by Cromwell

for remaining at peace with Spain in 1655 was unnecessarily high. Two of his conditions for peace in particular, those referring to the Inquisition and the Indies, were not urgently needed, for the lack of them had not proved disadvantageous to England and Englishmen in the past, nor was it to prove so in the future. If it is inferred from this that Cromwell was deliberately planning to break with Spain, it does not necessarily follow that he was either totally unappreciative of England's commercial interests in Spain, or that he was ready to sacrifice them in order to capture more territory in Spanish America. If in 1654, with the example of a previous Anglo-Spanish war to guide him, he calculated that England would not lose her commercial advantage in Spain, his calculations were subsequently shown to be accurate. Although the West Indian expedition failed immediately to bring the large rewards promised by its supporters, Anglo-Spanish trade suffered very little damage as a result of the war which the expedition provoked.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.I.	Archivo General de Indias, Seville
A.G.S.	Archivo General de Simancas
A.H.N.	Archivo Historico Nacional de Madrid (Seccion de la Inquisicion)
B.M., Add. MSS.	British Museum, Additional Manuscripts
<u>Cal. S.P.</u>	<u>Calendar of State Papers</u>
P.R.O., H.C.A.	Public Record Office, High Court of Admiralty
P.R.O., S.P. 94	Public Record Office, State Papers, Spain.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Thurloe Papers, I, 759.
2. Clarke Papers, III, 203.
3. Cal. S.P. Venetian, 1655-56, p. 138.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Consulta of the Council of State, 29 April 1624, P.R.O. Simancas Transcripts 31/30.
2. Ibid.
3. Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 7 November 1625, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, II, 758.
4. Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 9 September 1626, ibid., II, 899.
5. Albrecht, Die Auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern, p. 170.
6. Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 4 July 1628, Lonchay, op.cit., II, 1242.
7. Instructions for Lorenzo Ramirez for his mission to France, 1627, A.G.S., Estado Francia K 1436/10.
8. Consulta of the Council of State, 2 July 1627, ibid., K 1435/1.
9. Olivares to the Junta de Estado, 28 November 1627, ibid., K 1435/131.
10. Rodriquez-Villa, Spinola, p. 476.
11. Philip IV to Marquis Aytona, 16 March 1628, B.M., Add. Mss. 28474/279.
12. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 325.
13. Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 5 August 1627, Isabella to Philip IV, 23 August 1627, Lonchay, op. cit., II, 1080, 1085.

14. Consulta of the Council of State, 10 January 1629, A.G.S.,
Estado Francia K 1437/no.12A.
15. MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations' p. 71.
16. Michel, 'Les Missions Diplomatiques de Rubens', p. 411.
17. Philip IV to Isabella, 11 April, 1 June, 20 October 1627, Lonchay,
op.cit., II, 1022, 1055, 1118.
18. Philip IV to Isabella, 17 August 1628, ibid., II, 1269.
19. Philip IV to Isabella, 18 December 1628, ibid., II, 1317.
20. The correspondence mentioned is to be found in A.G.S., Estado
Inglaterra 2517, 2519.
21. Cottington to Viscount Dorchester, 19 February 1630, P.R.O., S.P.
94/34(2), 180; Summary of points discussed by Olivares and Cottington,
14 February 1630, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2519; Coloma to Charles I,
30 March 1630, ibid.; Consulta of the Council of State, 11 May 1630, ibid.
22. Consulta of the Council of State, 26 July 1630, ibid. 2562.
23. Consultas, 30 July 1630, ibid. 2562, 3, 20 August 1630, ibid. 2519.
24. Davenport, European Treaties, I, 256.
25. A.H.N., Cartas Acordadas 497/392.
26. MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', pp. 86, 136.

27. A.H.N., Cartas Acordadas 497/392.
28. Ibid., Relaciones de Causas de Fe de Logrono 836/483.
29. Pedro de Villareal to the Council of the Inquisition, 10 February 1648, A.H.N., Visitas de Navios 3645(1).
30. A.H.N., Cartas Acordadas 497/392.
31. Doctor Juan Ruiz Occa to the Council of the Inquisition, 19 May 1648, A.H.N., Cartas al Consejo 2983.
32. Ibid., Relaciones de Causas de Fe de Logroño 837/311.
33. Ibid., Cartas al Consejo 2022/43.
34. Inquisition of Granada to the Council of the Inquisition, 11 May 1648, A.H.N., Cartas al Consejo 2632; Council to Granada, 23 March 1658, ibid., Cartas del Consejo 617/8.
35. Following the departure of Carlos Coloma, who returned to Flanders after the signing of the peace treaty, Juan de Neocolalde was in charge of Spanish affairs in London. He served as Spanish agent from July 1631 to October 1637.
36. Consulta of the Council of State, 21 October 1633, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2520.
37. Sir John Coke's report to the King on the unsatisfactory state of England's foreign relations, 8 June 1634, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1634-35, p. 69.

38. Sir John Penington to Lords of the Admiralty, 20 September 1634, ibid., p. 212.
39. Coke to Hopton, 21 February 1633, P.R.O., S.P. 94/37(1) 5; Captain Richard Plumleigh to Cottington, 15 June 1633, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1633-34, p.99.
40. Penington to Lords of the Admiralty, 11 February 1638, ibid., 1637-38, p. 246.
41. Arthur Hopton went with Cottington to Spain in 1629, and was English agent there from 1631 until 1635. He was knighted in 1638, and in the same year he returned to Spain to succeed Baron Aston as English ambassador.
42. Spain's reply to Hopton's complaints about the activities of the privateers from San Sebastian and Dunkirk of April 1634, B.M., Egerton MSS. 1820/342.
43. Sir Thomas Roe to Wentworth, 1 December 1634, Cal.S.P. Domestic, 1634-35, p. 338.
44. See Chapter IV.
45. Ibid.
46. Hopton to Dorchester, 18 June 1631, P.R.O., S.P.94/35(2), 248.

47. Earl of Northumberland to Penington, 11 August 1639, Cal.S.P. Domestic, 1639, p. 444; Hopton to Windebank, 28 September 1639, P.R.O., S.P.94/41(2), 188.
48. Cardenal Infante to Philip IV, 19 October 1639, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, III, 1009.
49. Hopton to Cottingham, 18 June 1639, P.R.O., S.P.94/41(1), 114.
50. Cardenal Infante to Philip IV, 19 October 1639, Lonchay, op. cit., III, 1009.
51. Alonso de Cardenas was sent as Spanish agent to London in 1638. He was given the title of ordinary ambassador in 1640, and remained in England until 1655.
52. Secretary Coloma to Secretary Rocas, 12 September 1639, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2521.
53. Northumberland to Penington, 16 September 1639, Cal.S.P. Domestic, 1639, p. 503.
54. Gardiner, History of England, IX, 62.
55. Most of the Spanish and Italian soldiers eventually reached the Netherlands.
56. Embassy accounts of Cardenas, A.G.S., Hacienda. Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas 2634.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

1. P.R.O., S.P. 94/35(1), 159.
2. See Gardiner, History of England, VII, VIII.
3. Ibid., VIII, 204.
4. Aston to Windebank, 14 September 1637, Calendar of Clarendon State Papers, I, 140. Baron Aston served as ambassador in Spain from 1635 until 1638.
5. Hopton to Cottingham?, 6 June 1633, P.R.O., S.P. 94 36(2), 311.
6. Gardiner, op. cit., VII, 210.
7. Hopton to Aston 13 May 1637, P.R.O., S.P. 94/39 (1), 122.
8. Philip IV to Castel Rodrigo, 24 November 1643, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, VI, 562.
9. Philip IV to Onate, 28 April 1635, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2461; Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 5 November 1638, Lonchay, op. cit., III, 807.
10. MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', p. 399.
11. Consulta of the Council of State, 24 December 1630, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2331; Philip IV to Castaneda, 22, 25 July 1633, ibid., 2459.
12. Consulta of the Council of State, 14 May 1630, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2519.

13. Additional instructions for the Duke of Tursi, 14 March 1630, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2411. Tursi was sent as extraordinary ambassador to Vienna in 1630.
14. Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 3 February 1630, Lonchay, op. cit., II, 1575; Philip IV to Ferdinand III, 17 May 1644, ibid., VI, 572.
15. Philip IV to Tursi, 6 September 1630, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2456.
16. Philip IV to Tursi, 15 July 1630, ibid., 2456; Philip IV to Cadereyta, 28 May 1631, ibid., 2457.
17. See Fraga Iribarne, Don Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo.
18. Torrente Ballester, Sor Maria de Agreda, I, 58.
19. Philip IV to Bruneau, 8 January 1630, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2456; Archduchess Isabella to Philip IV, 24 January 1630, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, II, 1567. The Treaty of Cherasco of 1631 settled the Mantuan dispute in favour of the French candidate.
20. Philip IV to Guastala, 2 November 1631, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2457.
21. Wedgwood, Thirty Years War, p. 386.
22. MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', pp. 367, 397.
23. Mecenseffy, 'Habsburger im 17. Jahrhundert'.

24. Philip IV to Guastala, 30 January 1632, A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2458;
Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 2 November 1632, Lonchay, op. cit.,
II, 1961.
25. By the Treaty of Vic(January 1632) the Duke of Lorraine ceded some of
his strongest places to France. At the same time the Electors of
Trevés and Cologne put themselves under French protection.
26. Mecenseffy, op. cit., pp. 29, 37.
27. Onate to Cardenal Infante, 8 November 1634, Lonchay, op. cit., VI, 399.
28. Cardenal Infante to Castaneda, 24 August 1637, ibid., VI, 449.
29. Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 9 October 1639, ibid., III, 1002.
30. See Mecenseffy, op. cit.
31. Saavedra to Philip IV, 11 October 1637, Lonchay, op. cit., VI, 455;
Cardenal Infante to Philip IV, 9 September 1638, 4 October 1641,
ibid., III, 766, 1357; Consulta of the Council of State, 10 March 1639,
A.G.S., Estado Alemania 2340.
32. Truchis de Varennes, Un Diplomate Franc-Comtoise, p. 388.
33. Gardiner, History of England, VII, 187.
34. Dorchester to Hopton, 13 October 1631, P.R.O., S.P.94/35(2), 305.
35. Consulta of the Council of State, 20 November 1631, A.G.S., Estado
Inglaterra 2519.

36. Consulta of the Council of State, 10 February 1634, ibid., 2520.
37. Clarendon State Papers, I, 125.
38. Consulta of the Council of State, 29 September 1634, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2520; Necolalde to Philip IV, 1 December 1634, ibid.; Windebank to Hopton, 24 January 1635, Clarendon State Papers, I, 226.
39. Cardinal Infante to Philip IV, 15 September 1635, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, III, 202.
40. Cardinal Infante to Philip IV, 22 December 1635, ibid., III, 253.
41. It would seem that the English embassy was not very popular amongst the Spanish diplomats. Five men were appointed as the ambassador to London between 1630 and 1640, but each one excused himself from taking up the appointment. The appointment of Cardenas in 1640 gave the London embassy its first fully accredited resident ambassador since 1630.
42. Count Onate y Villamediana was in London from May 1636 to July 1638.
43. Consultas of the Council of State, I, 26 June 1636, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2521.
44. Consultas of the Council of State, 21 May, 1 June 1636, ibid., 2521.
45. Charles I to Onate, 20 April 1637, Onate to Charles I, 23 May 1637, ibid., 2521.

46. Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 204.
47. Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 27 April 1637, A.G.S., Estado Flandes 2244.
48. Gardiner, op. cit., VIII, 204.
49. Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 29 May 1637, A.G.S., Estado Flandes 2244;
Cardenal Infante to Philip IV, 12 October 1637, Lonchay, op. cit., III,
521.
50. Onate to Cardenal Infante, 7 August 1637, ibid., VI, 447; Consulta of
the Council of State, 20 August 1637, A.G.S., Estado Flandes 2052.
51. Consulta of the Council of State, 7 November 1637, ibid. 2052.
52. Ibid.; Consultas of the Council of State, 9 January 1632, 17 July 1638,
ibid. 2520, 2521.
53. Consulta of the Council of State, 8 January 1639, A.G.S., Estado Alemania
2340; Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 9 April 1639, Lonchay, Correspondance
de la Cour d'Espagne, III, 882.
54. Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 29 November 1639, ibid., III, 1040.
55. Consulta of the Council of State, 29 October 1639, A.G.S., Estado
Inglaterra 2564.
56. The three ambassadors to Philip IV, 9 July 1640, Lonchay, op. cit.,
VI, 514; Cardenal Infante to Velada, 10 June 1640, ibid., VI, 511.

57. Consulta of the Council of State, 17 November 1640, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2521.
58. Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 10 November 1640, Lonchay, op. cit., III, 1154; Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 17 December 1640, A.G.S., Estado Flandes 2247.
59. Philip IV to Malvezzi, 17 December 1640, ibid., 2575.
60. Hopton to Weston, 15 January 1633, P.R.O., S.P. 94/36(2), 236; Hopton to Dorchester, 1 December 1631, ibid., 35(2), 331.
61. Consulta of the Council of State, 26 January 1641, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2522.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

1. Consulta of the Council of State, 31 May 1644, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2522.
2. Consulta of the Council of State, 1 January 1650, ibid. 2526.
3. Philip IV to Cardenas, 13 September 1638, ibid. 2575; Consulta of the Council of State, 12 February 1639, ibid. 2521.
4. Consulta of the Council of State, 12 May 1646, ibid. 2523; Consulta of the Council of State, 1 January 1650, ibid. 2526.
5. Consulta of the Council of State, 2 August 1649, ibid. 2524.
6. Archduke Leopold to Philip IV, 28 January 1650, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, IV, 418.
7. Philip IV to Archduke Leopold, 3 January 1650, ibid. IV, 408; Consultas of the Council of State, 30 August, 6 December 1650, A.G.S. Estado Inglaterra 2526.
8. Consulta of the Council of State, 22 April 1657, ibid., Estado Flandes 2090.
9. Consulta of the Council of State, 16 September 1656, Guizot, History of Cromwell and the English Commonwealth, I, 545.
10. Consulta of the Junta de Estado, 8 July 1660, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2530.

11. Consultas of the Council of State, 31 December 1643, 6 October 1645, ibid. 2565.
12. Consulta of the Junta formed to consider question of aid for the Irish, 17 November 1642, ibid. 2525; Consulta of the Council of State, 31 December 1643, ibid. 2522.
13. Francisco Foisotte was sent to Ireland from Flanders and Diego de la Torre from Spain.
14. The instructions (17 September 1645) and the accounts of Diego de la Torre are in A.G.S., Hacienda, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas 2635.
15. Consulta of the Council of State, 12 May 1646, ibid. Estado Inglaterra 2523; Philip IV to Diego de la Torre, 12 August 1646, Philip IV to Francisco Foisotte, 16 August, 1646, ibid. 2576. To the great annoyance of both the Spanish government and the English Parliament, Foisotte delayed his departure from Ireland until 1652 - Consulta of the Council of State, 1 February 1652, ibid. 2569.
16. Consulta of the Council of State, 4 June 1647, ibid. 2523; Consulta of the Council of State, 13 October 1648, ibid. 2524.
17. Archduke Leopold to Philip IV, 31 January 1651, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, IV, 574; Consulta of the Junta de Estado, 28 October 1652, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2528.

18. Philip IV to Malvezzi, Velada and Cardenas, 4 September 1640, ibid. 2575; Consulta of the Council of State, 22 August 1641, ibid. 2522.
19. Consulta of the Council of State, 6 May 1651, ibid. 2527.
20. Warrant of the Council of State, 15 September 1653, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1653-54, p. 435; Captain Robert Story to Navy Commissioners, 26 September 1653, ibid. p. 493.
21. Petition of Ameriga Warner to the Protector, 26 June 1654, ibid. 1654, p. 219.
22. Consulta of the Council of State, 31 August 1653, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2528.
23. Accounts of the secret expenses of Cardenas in England, ibid. 2532.
24. Consulta of the Council of State, 12 May 1646, ibid. 2523; Consulta of the Council of State, 12 August 1649, ibid. 2524.
25. Consulta of the Council of State, 28 September 1649, ibid. 2524.
26. Consulta of the Council of State, 26 October 1649, ibid. 2524.
27. Secret accounts of Cardenas, ibid. 2532.
28. Philip IV to Cardenas, 10 June 1650, ibid. 2576.
29. Cardenas to Philip IV, 12 July 1650, ibid. 2567.
30. Philip IV to Cardenas, 2 December 1650, ibid. 2576; Consulta of the Council of State, 26 February 1651, ibid. 2527.

31. Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, I, 341, 348, II, 107; Philip IV to Parliament, 27 November 1652, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2577. Parliament's decision to attack the French fleet cost Cardenas a total of £2,775. Amongst those rewarded by the ambassador for their part in the incident were John Thurloe and Robert Blake; Thurloe received £262 and Blake £1,175 - Secret accounts of Cardenas, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2532.
32. Cardenas to Philip IV, 23 January 1652, ibid. 2528. It was the pro-French Presbyterians who claimed that Spain's treaty with Charles I was no longer valid.
33. Consultas of the Council of State, 4 February 1651, 15 November 1651, ibid. 2527.
34. Secret accounts of Cardenas, ibid. 2532. The sums mentioned here were additional to those spent by Cardenas in pursuit of Blake's attack on the French fleet - see Note 31 above.
35. Consulta of the Council of State, 24 November 1650, ibid. 2526; Cardenas to the Council of State of England, 23 January 1652, ibid. 2533; Consulta of Junta de Estado, 25 March 1652, ibid. 2528; Philip IV to Cardenas, 27 April 1652, ibid. 2576.
36. Guizot, History of Cromwell and the English Commonwealth, I, 464, 471, 473.

37. Consulta of the Junta de Estado, 25 March 1652, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2528; Philip IV to Secretary Diego de la Torre, 4 November 1652, ibid. 2569.
38. Consulta of the Council of State, 11 November 1652, ibid. 2569.
39. Philip IV to Cardenas, 13 December 1652, ibid. 2534.
40. Consulta of the Council of State, 8 February 1653, ibid. 2569; Consulta of the Council of the Inquisition, 31 March 1653, ibid. 2528; Report by Cardenas of his negotiations in England, ibid. 2534.
41. Ibid.
42. Consulta of the Council of State, 3 February 1654, ibid. 2529.
43. Archduke Leopold to Philip IV, 19 May 1654, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, IV, 1106.
44. Philip IV to Cardenas, 8 July 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2577.
45. Cardenas to Luis de Haro, 2 February 1654, Cardenas to Philip IV, 10 May 1655, ibid. 2577. The first of these letters was a copy sent to Spain in May 1655; the original despatch, apparently, had gone astray.
46. Philip IV to Cardenas, 18 November 1653, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, IV, 1045.
47. Guizot, History of Cromwell and the English Commonwealth, II, 81.

48. Cardenas to Philip IV, 6 March 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2533.
49. Secret accounts of Cardenas, ibid. 2532.
50. Archduke Leopold to Philip IV, 1 May 1654, Lonchay, op. cit. IV, 1099.
51. Philip IV to Cardenas, 8 July 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2577.
52. Archduke Leopold to Philip IV, 12 September 1654, Lonchay, op. cit., IV, 1123.
53. Consulta of the Council of State, 26 August 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2529.
54. Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, 475.
55. Consulta of the Council of State, 1 November 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2570; Philip IV to Cardenas, 4 November 1654, ibid. 2577.
56. Cardenas to Philip IV, 10 May 1655, ibid. 2577.
57. Philip IV to Cardenas, 28 June 1655, Lonchay, op. cit. IV, 497; Consulta of the Council of State, 26 July 1655, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2570.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Consultas of the Council of State, 10, 29 December 1655, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2529, 2570.
2. Philip IV to Cardenas, 24 September 1655, ibid., 2577.
3. Consulta of the Council of State, 2 September 1655, ibid., 2529.
4. Cardenas to Philip IV, 25 October 1655, ibid., 2529; Giovanni Sagredo to Doge, 8 October 1655, Cal. S.P. Venetian, 1655-56, p. 119.
5. The decision to sell all that had been embargoed on 2 September 1655, and to devote the proceeds to naval preparations, was not taken in Spain until the following December - Consulta of the Council of State, 29 December 1655, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2570.
6. Texts of the petition are to be found in Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p.2, and Thurloe Papers, IV, 135.
7. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England; Fisher, 'London's export trade'; Millard, 'The Imports of London'.
8. Supple, op. cit., p. 105.
9. For some details of traffic between Bristol and Spain see McGrath, Merchants and Merchandise in Seventeenth-Century Bristol, pp. 279, 281.
10. Baker, op. cit., pp. 2, 5.

11. Davis, 'Merchant shipping in the economy of the late seventeenth century', p. 63; Innis, The Cod Fisheries, p. 50.
12. Acts of the Privy Council (Colonial Series), 1613 - 1680, pp. 248, 268, 273, 276.
13. The province of Guipuzcoa had enjoyed the privilege of being allowed to acquire provisions by any means possible since 1595 - Cédula, 21 April 1595, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3431.
14. Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1631 - 33, p. 176; ibid., 1633-34, p. 318.
15. Petition of the Master, Warden and Assistants of Trinity House to Privy Council, 1633, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1633-34, p. 367.
16. Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments, pp. 239, 242. The bill was promoted and defended principally on behalf of the western counties.
17. Acts of the Privy Council (Colonial Series), 1613-1680, p. 303.
18. Browne, The Merchant's Avizo.
19. Millard, 'The Imports of London'.
20. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England, p. 149.
21. Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p.2.
22. Millard, op. cit.; McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, p. 10.

23. Millard, op. cit.
24. Beer, Origins of the British Colonial System, p. 90.
25. Stock, op. cit., pp. 27, 69.
26. Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1625 - 26, p.7.
27. Millard, op. cit.
28. Beer, op. cit. pp. 413, 403.
29. In their petition of 1655 the London merchants stressed the amount of revenue which the government was able to derive from imported Spanish tobacco - Baker, op. cit., p.3. Colonial preference was also applied to sugar imports, but as the sugar production of the English islands in the Caribbean did not begin to expand until after the Restoration, tariff discrimination against Brazilian sugar, imported from Portugal, did not become as heavy as that against Spanish tobacco until later in the century.
30. The Veedor de Contrabando in San Sebastian reported to the Junta Suprema of the Almirantazgo in Madrid that he had placed an embargo on a quantity of tobacco, brought into the port on board an English ship, because it was not certified either by the Alfandiga in Lisbon or by the Casa in Seville - Francisco de Remata to Secretary Lacaro de Rios Angulo, 6 February 1640, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3183.

31. Hopton to Coke, 30 December 1638, P.R.O., S.P. 94/40(2), 244;
Hopton to Coke, 29 April 1639, ibid. 94/41 (1), 84; Hopton to
Cottingham, 18 May 1639, ibid. 94/41 (1), 104.
32. William Marston, an English merchant residing in Seville, was granted
a licence to import about 100,000 pounds of English tobacco; in addition
to the payment of the ordinary customs duties, Marston agreed to pay
Philip IV sixteen maravedis for every pound of tobacco - Juan de la
Calle, veedor de contrabando in Seville, to Lacaro de Rios Angulo, 29
November 1639, 19 February 1640, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3186.
33. Junta of the Almirantazgo in Seville to Philip IV, 4 November 1642,
ibid. 3211.
34. Consulta of the Council of State, 4 September 1646, ibid., Estado
Inglaterra 2523.
35. Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p.2.
36. Acts of the Privy Council, 1625-26, p. 338.
37. Baker, op. cit., pp. 2, 11; MacCulloch, Early English Tracts on
Commerce.
38. Davis, 'English foreign trade'.
39. Ramsay, English Overseas Trade.
40. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution, p. 37.

41. Haring, Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies, p. 112;
McLaclan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, p. 14.
42. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, A.G.I., Indiferente General 756.
43. Spain had many costly commitments outside Castile where vellón, the debased coinage normally used inside Castile for currency transactions, was unacceptable.
44. Hamilton, 'Imports of American gold and silver into Spain'.
45. Dominguez Ortiz, 'Los caudales de las Indias'. The usual practice was to compensate the owners of the appropriated bullion either with vellón or a grant of juros.
46. Consulta of the Council of State, 11 November 1631, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2520.
47. Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p. 11.
48. Girard, Le Commerce Français à Seville et Cadiz, p. 62.
49. Juezes de sacas.
50. Petition of the Spanish trade merchants to Charles I, May 1636, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1635-36, p. 427; Hopton to Windebank, 13 September 1639, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (1), 170.
51. Girard, op. cit., pp. 97, 107. Copies of the cédulas of 19 March and 9 November 1645 in P.R.O., S.P. 94/43.

52. Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, IV, 393. It is not unlikely that in 1608 the Spanish merchants were more concerned about their own mounting debts to foreigners, which they were hoping to cancel by means of royal legislation, than about the effects of the employment of foreign capital on the Indies trade as a whole.
53. A.G.S., Estado Negocios del Norte 2981.
54. Corregidor of Malaga to Philip IV, 21 September 1655, ibid. 2981.
55. Girard, op. cit., p. 87.
56. Dominguez Ortiz, Orto y Ocaso de Sevilla, p. 89.
57. Girard, op. cit., p. 87.
58. Casa de Contratación to the Council of the Indies, 10 August 1640, Chaunu, op. cit., V, 368.
59. Ibid.
60. Chaunu, op. cit., IV, 536; Dominguez Ortiz, 'La concesión de naturalezas para comerciar en Indias'.
61. Although the Spanish authorities never doubted that the English were active participants in the illegal transference of merchandise to and from the flotas, I have only found one recorded instance of an English ship actually caught whilst engaged in the removal of Indies products from the New Spain fleet - A.G.I., Contratación 5176/Libro 1647-48, 340.

62. Philip IV to Cardenas, 14 May 1652, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2577.
63. See Philip IV's decreto on the letter of Conde de Salvatierra, Asistente of Seville, to the Junta de Armadas, 26 January 1639, A.G.I., Indiferente General 1873.
64. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 24 September 1640, ibid. 761.
65. Chaunu, 'Politiques et économies atlantiques'.
66. Dominguez Ortiz, 'La concesión de naturalezas para comerciar en Indias'.
67. Cédula, 30 November 1630, A.G.I., Contratación 50B; Casa de Contratación to the Council of the Indies, 5 December 1643, Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, V, 413.
68. Cédula, 22 April 1645, A.G.I., Contratación 5092/Libro 1644-70, 12.
69. An account of the naturalezas granted between 1600 and 1643, ibid. 50B.
Not included in this list is William More, a resident of Seville, who was naturalised in April 1643 - ibid. 596B.
70. Ibid. 596B.
71. Details of the extent of Suit's participation in the Indies trade can be found in the avería accounts - ibid. 4459 - 4470.
72. See the examination of Richard Suit and Juan Cespedes as guarantors of the master of the Nuestra Señora de Monserrate, ibid. 25.

73. Register of releases from the prison of the Casa de Contratación, 1626-1663, ibid. 4884. In 1648 Suit appealed for a moratorium of three years - Secretary Navarrete to the Casa, 16 January 1648, A.G.S., Indiferente General 591/Libro 17, 133.
74. The sponsors, or fiadores, bound themselves to pay the avería if the masters whom they sponsored failed for any reason to satisfy the receptor of the avería.
75. Inspection register of the Casa prison, 1588 - 1637, A.G.I., Contratación 4887, 318, 319, 382.
76. Register of the Santa Clara, ibid. 1184.
77. See below.
78. Girard, Le Commerce Français à Seville et Cadiz, p. 21.
79. Johnsen, 'The Navigation Act of 9 October 1651'.
80. Hopton to Cottington, 16 May 1640, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (2), 322.
81. Secretary Ocana y Alarcon to the President of the Casa, 24 December 1637, A.G.I., Indiferente General 589/Libro 12.
82. Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, V, 342, 390, 397. The register of the San Jorge is in A.G.I., Contratación 1451, and of the Ulyses and the Santiago in ibid. 1186. In the last two ships particularly, Richard Suit had a substantial interest in the cargo.

83. Register of the Santa Clara, ibid. 1184; Chaunu, op. cit., V, 364. Almeida was registered as the owner of the ship, but in fact the ship belonged to Isaac Legay, a London merchant - Stock, Debates and Proceedings of the British Parliaments, p. 138.
84. Relación concerning the Santa Clara, 3 August 1643, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 87/Ramo 5.
85. Cardenas to Philip IV, 1643, ibid.
86. A statement by Melchor de Aranguren on behalf of the Spanish merchants interested in the Santa Clara, ibid.; Stock, op. cit., note 142, p. 138.
87. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 9 August 1650, A.G.I., Indiferente General 766.
88. Consultas of the Council of State, 9 September 1645, 18 May 1646, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2523.
89. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 3 December 1641, A.G.I., Indiferente General 762; cédula, 1 July 1642, ibid., Contratación 5091/Libro 1642-43, 268.
90. Chaunu, op. cit., V, 404, 432, 437.
91. Casa to the Council of the Indies, 16 May 1643, Chaunu, op. cit., V, 408. The lack of ships delayed the sailing of the New Spain fleet until the following year.

92. Casa to Philip IV, 14 October 1648, A.G.I., Contratación 5176/Libro 1647 - 48, 367.
93. The Spanish papers give the ship's alternative name as the Mercader de Livorno, which may have been a translation of its English name.
94. Register of the Santo Christo de Buen Viaje, A.G.I., Contratación 1451.
95. Secretary Navaratte to the President of the Casa, 6 July 1649, ibid., Indiferente General 591/Libro 17, 315.
96. Collection of papers relating to the Santo Christo de Buen Viaje, ibid., Contratación 5741/No. 5, Ramo 3.
97. There is a detailed list of the merchandise belonging to Park which was seized in Hispaniola in ibid., Santo Domingo 75/Ramo 2.
98. Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p. 11.
99. Professor Boxer does say, however, that English vessels continued to be used in the Brazil trade during the Civil War, and there does not appear to be any reason to doubt that the same applied to the Spanish Indies trade - Boxer, 'English shipping in the Brazil trade'.
100. Baker, op. cit., p. 11.
101. See Chapter V.
102. Chaunu, 'Politiques et économies atlantiques'.

103. Ibid. See also Hamilton, Imports of American Gold and Silver, p. 466.
104. Boxer, 'English shipping in the Brazil Trade'. See also Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil.
105. Boxer, 'English shipping in the Brazil trade'.
106. Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England and Holland, p. 102; Portuguese-Dutch truce, 12 June 1641, Davenport, European Treaties, I, 343.
107. Anglo-Portuguese treaty, 20 July 1654, Davenport, op. cit., II, 31.
108. Mauro, Le Portugal et l'Atlantique, p. 450.
109. Philip IV to Roos, 7 April 1640, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, III, 1092.
110. Consulta of the Council of State, 10 February 1634, A.G.S. Estado Inglaterra 2520.
111. P.R.O., S.P. Portugal 89/4, 115; Chapman and Shillington, The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal, p. 117.
112. Mauro, Le Portugal et l'Atlantique, p. 462.
113. Boxer, 'English shipping in the Brazil trade'.
114. Mauro, op cit., p. 458.
115. Ibid., p. 400.

116. Hopton to Windebank, 13 September 1639, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (1), 170.
117. Girard, Le Commerce Français à Seville et Cadiz, p. 60.
118. Dominguez Ortiz, Orto y Ocaso de Sevilla, p. 33; Girard, op. cit., p. 57.
119. Ibid., p. 60.
120. Ibid., p. 187; the cédula of 16 May 1628 ordered the appointment of veedores de contrabando for all the ports - A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 987. The veedores had judicial responsibility for all legal proceedings arising out of contraband offences; appeals were judged by the Junta Suprema of the Almirantazgo in Madrid.
121. Fernandez Duro, Armada Española, IV, 405.
122. Ibid., 406.
123. Merchants of Antwerp to Archduchess Isabella, 1631, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, II, 1738.
124. See the Consulado of Seville to Philip IV, 31 August 1627, with Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 30 September 1627, A.G.I., Indiferente General 755.
125. Consulta of the Junta de Comercio, 1625, Lonchay, op. cit., II, 702.
126. MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', p. 163.

127. Consulta of the Council of State, 9 January 1629, Lonchay, op. cit., II, 1334; Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 14 December 1629, ibid., 1548.
128. Instructions to the Cardenal Infante, 10 October 1632, ibid., III, 633.
129. Anthony Percival to Lord Treasurer Juxon, 29 December 1636, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1636 - 37, p. 245.
130. Aston to Olivares, 10 November 1636, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2521; Consulta of the Council of State, 29 November 1636, ibid.
131. Petition of Arnold Brames, Henry Booth and other Dover merchants to the Lords of the Admiralty, 13 July 1635, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1635, p. 244. One trick used by the Dutch, apparently with the approval of Admiral von Tromp, was to lure the English merchant ships into a trap by flying English colours - See ibid., 1650-51, p. 484.
132. Coke to the Earl of Lindsay, 5 July 1635, ibid., 1635.
133. Captain Sir George Carteret to the Lords of the Admiralty, 24 June 1636, ibid., 1635-36, p. 561.
134. See ibid., 1651-52, p. 202.
135. Percival to Juxon, 6 January 1637, ibid., 1636-37, p. 245.
136. Cardenal Infante to Philip IV, 28 February 1638, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, III, 220 (Note 1).

137. Lords of the Admiralty to the Earl of Lindsay, 25 May 1635,
Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1635, p. 73.
138. Dumont, Corps Universal Diplomatique, V, 32.
139. Ibid.
140. Hopton to Windebank, 7 July 1639, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (1), 132.
141. Consulta of the Junta de Almirantazgo, 4 May 1639, with Consulta
of the Council of State, 4 June 1639, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2564.
142. Miguel Marinsen to Philip IV, 18 September 1640, ibid., Guerra y
Marina 3184.
143. Hopton to Windebank, 16 May 1640, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (2), 319.
144. Hurtauño de Urizar to Philip IV, 8 June 1629, Lonchay, op. cit., II, 1413.
145. Philip IV to Archduchess Isabella, 22 January 1626, ibid., 805;
Philip IV to Cardenal Infante, 12 December 1637, 22 January 1638,
ibid., III, 596, 613; Mauro, Le Portugal et l'Atlantique, p. 342.
146. Cardenal Infante to Philip IV, 27 May 1639, Lonchay, op. cit., III,
910; see also ibid., 1130.
147. Girard, Le Commerce Français à Seville et Cadiz, p. 87.
148. Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, VIII, 1757.
149. Ibid., V, 271.
150. See Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1635, p. 37.

151. Anthony Percival to Secretary Nicholas, 17 June 1635, ibid., p. 112;
see also Shilton and Holworthy, High Court of Admiralty Examinations,
p. 110.
152. An undated list of grants of permisiones, A.G.S., Hacienda Contaduría
del Sueldo 159; cédula, 22 February 1638, ibid.
153. Cédula, 15 May 1641, ibid.
154. Consulta of the Council of State, 12 March 1638, A.G.S., Estado
Inglaterra 2564.
155. Lorenzo Andres to Philip IV, 9 September 1640, ibid., Guerra y Marina
3184.
156. Hopton to Coke, 9 April 1639, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (1), 176.
157. Hopton to Coke, 29 September 1638, ibid. 94/40 (2), 231.
158. List of charges made by the Inquisition for visits to foreign ships,
1648, A.H.N., Visitas de Navios 3646.
159. Inquisition of Logroño to the Council of the Inquisition, 27 April
1613, ibid. 3645.
160. Cornwallis to Salisbury, 4 March 1606, Digby to Salisbury, 20 April
1612, MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', pp. 157, 155.
161. Hopton to Coke, 18 December 1638, P.R.O., S.P. 94/40 (2), 339;
Hopton to Coke, 18 May 1639, ibid. 94/41 (1), 101.

162. Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 57.
163. Ibid., p. 156; Oppenheim, 'The Navy of the Commonwealth'.
164. Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p. 2.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Henry Atye to Aston, 12 November 1625, P.R.O., S.P. 94/33 (2), 126; Pragmática, 24 December 1625, Biblioteca Nacional, Tomos Varios 2357, 75.
2. Consulta of the Junta de Represalias, 21 July 1627, A.G.S., Estado Negocios del Norte 2983.
3. Consulta of the Junta de Armadas, 7 May 1626, ibid., Guerra y Marina 3150. Fish and all varieties of foodstuffs were included in the English list of contraband materials, which the merchants of England and of neutral countries were forbidden to take to Spain - See Jessup and Deak, 'The early development of the law of contraband of war', and also Acts of the Privy Council, January - August 1627, p. 417.
4. Antonio de Oquenda to Philip IV, 24 April 1627, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 967; William Roberts to Secretary Nicholas, 28 June 1627, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1627-28, p. 222.
5. Consulta of the Council of War, 28 June 1629, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 992.
6. Cédula, 10 October 1628, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, II, 1282.
7. Almirantazgo to Philip IV, 19 September 1628, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 991; Consulta of the Council of War, ibid., 972.

8. Ibid.
9. Fernando de Toledo to Philip IV, 17 December 1626, ibid. 947;
Fernando de Toledo to Olivares, 20 February 1627, ibid. 954.
10. Consulta of the Council of War, 28 March 1627, ibid. 954.
11. Francisco de la Puente Agüero to Philip IV, 23 January 1626, ibid. 945.
12. Consulta of the Junta de Represalias, 14 May 1627, A.G.S., Estado
Negocios del Norte 2984.
13. Francisco de Barrionuevo Cabredo to Secretary Antonio Camero, 25
August 1628, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 987.
14. Correspondence of Francisco de Retama, veedor in San Sebastian,
1628, in ibid. 987.
15. Deposition of John Nelson, 22 January 1630, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/48.
16. See Chapter IV.
17. Philip IV to the Marquis of Cerralbo, 23 June 1627, A.G.I., Santo
Domingo 119/Ramo 6.
18. See Morales Padron, El Comercio Canario-Americano.
19. Sherley to Ochiandiano, 13 August 1627, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 968.
20. Consulta of the Junta de Represalias, 20 November 1626, A.G.S.,
Estado Negocios del Norte 2983.
21. Fernando de Toledo to Philip IV, 17 December 1626, A.G.S., Guerra y
Marina 947.

22. Millard, 'The Imports of London', Tables 27 and 42.
23. See Chapter IV, Note 36.
24. Citizens of Bristol to the Privy Council, 24 August 1626, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1625-26, p. 404.
25. Proclamation, 3 January 1626, ibid. p. 186.
26. Privy Council, 12 April 1626, Acts of the Privy Council, May 1625-May 1626, p. 408.
27. Privy Council, 1 September 1627, ibid., January-August 1627, p. 495.
28. Oppenheim, 'The royal navy under Charles I'.
29. Charles I to Buckingham, 17 April 1625, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1625-27, p. 7; lists of warrants for letters of marque in ibid., 1628-29, pp. 285, 439, 484, and 1629-31, pp. 151, 467.
30. Charles I to Buckingham, 10 May 1627, ibid., 1627-28, p. 159.
31. Andrews, 'The economic aspects of Elizabethan privateering'.
32. See Jessup and Deak, 'The early development of the law of contraband of war', Pyke, The Law of Contraband of War, and Marsden, 'Early prize jurisdiction and prize law in England'.
33. Jessup and Deak, op. cit., p. 73.
34. Evidence of French, Dutch and German prizes in P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/45-48.

35. B.M., Stowe MSS. 133, ff. 204, 206, 223.
36. William Cary to Buckingham, 17 June 1626, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1625-26, p. 349.
37. Ibid., 1625-49, p. 243.
38. Ibid., 1628-29, p. 285. Comparison may be made with the number of privateers operating between 1589 and 1591; the approximate number given by Andrews is 236 - Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, p. 32.
39. The Privy Council to Sir Henry Martin, 3 May 1629, Acts of the Privy Council, May 1629 - May 1630.
40. Buckingham to the captains of the City of London fleet, 16 December 1626, Buckingham to Sir John Penington, 3 January 1627, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1625-26, pp. 488, 504.
41. Consulta of the Council of War, 30 April 1627, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 951; Respardo de Figueroa to Philip IV, 13 June 1627, ibid. 967; Marquis of Espinardo, Governor and Captain General of Galicia, to Philip IV, 13 May 1628, ibid. 986.
42. Respardo de Figueroa to Philip IV, 2 May 1627, ibid. 967.
43. Consulta of the Council of War, 26 May 1628, ibid. 971.
44. Tomas Bravo de Mendoza, Abbot of the monastery of Nuestra Senora de Oya, to Marquis of Espinardo, 1 May 1628, ibid. 971.

45. Petition of owners and masters of ships of Ipswich, August 1626, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1625-26, p. 416; Petition of all the mariners and poor seafaring men of the ports and sea coasts between London and Berwick to the King, 3 April 1627, ibid., 1627-28, p. 107; Mayor and others of Newcastle to the Privy Council, 17 March 1630, ibid., 1629-31, p. 306; Mayor and others of Exeter to the Earl of Pembroke, 8 September 1629, ibid., 1629-31, p. 44; Mayor and others of Dartmouth to the Privy Council, 17 September 1629, ibid., 1629-31, p. 52.
46. Coloma to Olivares, 17 April 1630, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2519.
47. Protector's decree, 22 July 1655, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1655, p. 240.
48. Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 171.
49. Captain Benjamin Sacheverell to the Admiralty Commissioners, 24 April 1654, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1654, p. 101.
50. Ibid.
51. Protector's declaration against Spain, 9 December 1655, ibid., 1655-56, p. 40.
52. Examples of letters of marque granted under these conditions are to be found in ibid., 1655-56, pp. 17, 177, 350, 379, 1656-57, p. 163. A number of letters of marque were also granted to merchants planning trading voyages to north Africa and the East and West Indies - ibid., 1656-57, pp. 163, 246, ibid., 1657-58, p. 30.

53. Wilson, Profit and Power, pp. 58, 80.
54. Jessup and Deak, 'The early development of the law of contraband of war', p. 538.
55. Captain Henry Hatsell to the Admiralty Commissioners, 25 August 1656, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1656-57, p. 410; Captain Whitehorn to the Admiralty Commissioners, 29 April 1656, ibid., 1655-56, p. 284.
56. Thurloe Papers, IV, 203.
57. Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, pp. 85, 172.
58. Petitions of Baker and other merchants, 1657 and 1659, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1657-58, p. 248, ibid., 1659-60, p. 9.
59. Council of State, 27 December 1658, 22 August 1659, ibid., 1658-59, p. 222, 1659-60, p. 101.
60. Ashley, op. cit., pp. 61, 68.
61. See below this Chapter.
62. References to convoys to and from the Spanish mainland ports of Cadiz and Malaga and the Canaries in Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1655-56, p. 299, 1657-58, pp. 71, 255, 1658-59, pp. 241, 275, 1659-60, p. 203.

63. Captain Butler to the Admiralty Commissioners, 19 February 1660, ibid., 1659-60, p. 353; Captain Fenn to the Admiralty Commissioners, 27 May 1660, ibid., 1659-60, p. 558.
64. Deposition of Charles Tey, 9 January 1659, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/73.
65. Report of Jacques Richart on frauds in Amsterdam and the Canaries, 27 June 1656, A.G.S., Estado Flandes 2088; Deposition of William Clapham, 17 July 1656, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/71.
66. Thurloe Papers, IV, 100.
67. Pragmática of the Council of Castile, 8 April 1656, A.G.S., Estado Negocios del Norte 2990.
68. Pragmática of the Council of Castile, 11 September 1657, A.G.I., Indiferente General 772.
69. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 23 April 1658, ibid. 772; Testimonio de los autos fechos sobre el registro de la ropa y otros generos de los tres reynos de Inglaterra, Portugal, y Francia y de los seis dias que se concedieron para que se manifestassen, 1658, ibid. 772.
70. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 25 June 1658, ibid. 772; Girard, Le Commerce Français à Seville et Cadiz, p. 84.

71. Report on the results of the investigation conducted by Francisco de Leyba in San Lucar of the New Spain fleet of 1660, 6 June 1660, A.G.I., Indiferente General 777.
72. Meeting of the Council of State, 29 April 1658, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1657-58, p. 378.
73. Depositions of Francisco Morales, 15 March, 19 December 1660, and Diego de Guevara, 19 March 1660, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/73.
74. A report from Cadiz, considered by the Council of the Indies in July 1658, referred to an unlicensed ship, partly owned by Wilmot, which had left Cadiz for Honduras; it was said that the ship intended to return to Holland - consulta of the Council of the Indies, 23 July 1658, A.G.I., Indiferente General 772.
75. Veedor de Contrabando in Santander to Secretary Oyanguren, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3387.
76. Luis Fernandez de Cordoba to Secretary Oyanguren, 27 November 1657, ibid. 3405.
77. Cedula, 26 February 1656, A.G.S., Estado Negocios del Norte 2990.
78. Consulta of the Junta de Represalias, 30 May 1656, ibid. 2983.
79. Consulta of the Council of War, 5 March 1660, ibid., Guerra y Marina 3430.
80. Antonio Menendez Suarez to Secretary Oyanguren, 7 December 1659, ibid. 3430.

81. Deposition of John Bland, 19 November 1659, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/73.
82. Relación concerning the Fortuna, June 1658, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3387.
83. Don Juan de Toledo was responsible for investigating the charges against the veedor. Juan de Toledo to Secretary Oyanguren, 26 August 1669, ibid. 3430; Conde de Peralta, veedor of Puerto Santa Maria, to Oyanguren, 18 February 1657, ibid. 3405; Carlos de Torres y Collantes, veedor of Velez, to Oyanguren, 20 March 1657, ibid. 3405.
84. Lorenzo Andres Garcia to Secretary Oyanguren, 6 August 1656, ibid. 3390.
85. Consulta of the Council of War, 3 October 1657, noted on a letter from Luis Fernandez de Cordoba to Secretary Oyanguren, 24 September 1657, ibid. 3405.
86. Mayor William Burton of Yarmouth to the Admiralty Commissioners, 17 June 1656, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1655-56, p. 358. For similar complaints from Newcastle, King's Lynn, Hull, Hastings and Rye see ibid., 1656-57, p. 271, 1655-56, pp. 200, 210.
87. Council of State, 13 June 1656, ibid., 1655-56, p. 34.
88. Baron de Vatevile to Philip IV, 25 July 1658, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3417.
89. Augustin del Rio y Falcon, veedor de contrabando in San Sebastian, to Philip IV, 21 May 1656, and consulta of the Council of War, 21 August 1656, ibid. 3404.

90. T. Mompesson to Secretary Nicholas, 23 January 1657, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1657-58, p. 261.
91. Petition of Baker and other merchants, 1657, ibid., 1657-58, p. 248; Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, p. 8.
92. Baron de Vatevile to Secretary Oyanguren, 8 January, 11 April 1659, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3431.
93. Relación verdadera de los felices sucesos que han tenido los bajeles del reino de Mallorca contra los enemigos de esta Católica corona, Franceses, Ingleses y Moros desde los primeros de Marzo hasta el mes de septiembre de este año 1658, Biblioteca Nacional, Tomos Varios, 2386, ff. 170-71.
94. Levant Company to Sir Thomas Bendish, ambassador in Constantinople, 20 September 1657, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1657-58, p. 95.
95. Baron de Vatevile to Philip IV, 8, 14, 28 July 1658, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 2092; Baron de Vatevile to Philip IV, 29 April 1659, ibid. 3431.
96. Conde de Medinaceli to Philip IV, 26 October, 10 November 1658, ibid. 3442.
97. Baron de Vatevile to Philip IV, 29 April 1659, ibid. 3441.
98. It is also interesting to note that there were no privateers in the Canary Islands; Spanish privateers were not permitted to go to the

- Canary Islands, Terceira Islands, Brazil, Madeira and other places in the Indies - consulta of the Council of War, 24 January 1656, ibid. 3378.
99. None of these places appears in the lists of privateering licences issued - see ibid. 3408, 3409, 3421, 3432, 3444.
100. Manuel de Banuelos y Sandoval to Secretary Oyanguren, 14 July 1658, ibid. 3419.
101. Conde de Molina to Secretary Oyanguren, 9 July 1658, ibid. 3419.
102. Conde de Molina to Secretary Oyanguren, 6 October 1658, ibid. 3419.
103. Richart to Lorenzo Andres Garcia, 2 September 1656, ibid. 3393.
104. Richart to Secretary Oyanguren, 18 September 1659, ibid. 3430.
105. Richart to Secretary Oyanguren, 7 April 1659, ibid. 3431.
106. Cédula, 10 April 1656, ibid. 3383.
107. Andres Hurtado de Corquera, veedor in Cadiz, to Secretary Oyanguren, 21 November 1657, ibid. 3405.
108. Andres Hurtado de Corquera to Oyanguren, 4 November 1657, ibid. 2405; Conde de Herman Nuñez, veedor in San Lucar, to Oyanguren, 17 December 1656, ibid. 3405; consulta of the Council of the Indies, 5 February 1658, A.G.I., Indiferente General 772; Conde de Medinaceli to Philip IV, 18 January 1660, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3442.

109. Lorenzo Andres Garcia to Secretary Oyanguren, 24 September 1657, ibid. 3405; Andres Hurtado de Corquera to Philip IV, 21 July 1658, ibid. 3420.
110. Consulta of the Council of War, 6 June 1659, ibid. 3428.
111. See above this Chapter.
112. Council of State, 16 May 1658, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1658-59, p. 7;
Reply of the Commissioners of the Customs, 31 July 1658, ibid., p. 8.
113. Baker, The Marchants Humble Petition, pp. 2, 9, 13.
114. Captain Whitehorn to the Admiralty Commissioners, 29 April 1656, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1655-56, p. 284.
115. Philip IV to Secretary Oyanguren, 10 July 1656, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3383.
116. Carlos de Torres y Collantes, veedor in Velez, to Philip IV, 31 October 1656, ibid. 3390.
117. Jacques Richart to Secretary Oyanguren, 5 May 1659, ibid. 3431.
118. Consulta of the Council of War, 7 January 1658, ibid. 3408.
119. Don Juan Villaran Ramirez, alcalde mayor of Malaga, to Secretary Oyanguren, 10 April 1657, ibid. 3405.
120. Deposition of Juan Lopez de Miranda, 25, 31 January 1657, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/71.

121. Conde de Peralta to Oyanguren, 18 February 1657, A.G.S., Guerra y Marina 3405.
122. Consulta of the Council of War, 7 January 1658, ibid., 3408.
123. Ashlety, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 57.
124. Prestwich, 'Diplomacy and trade in the Protectorate'.
125. Edward Montagu's notes on the meeting of the Protector's Council 30 April 1654, Clarke Papers, III, p. 203.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

1. Constable of Castile to Philip III, 8 July 1604, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 841.
2. Davenport, European Treaties, I, 246; Mattingly, 'No peace beyond what line?'
3. Fernandez Duro, Armada Española, IV, 145.
4. Crouse, The French Struggle for the West Indies, p. 146.
5. Folmer, Franco-Spanish Rivalry in America, p. 128.
6. Gondomar to Philip III, 9 May 1614, Documentos Inéditos Para la Historia de España, IV, 53.
7. Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments, p. 16.
8. Ibid.
9. Newton, Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans, p. 95.
10. Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 27 March 1637, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1636-37, p. 503.
11. Providence Company to the Spanish ambassador, undated, P.R.O., S.P. 94/43, 2; Thurloe Papers, I, 761.
12. Goodman, Anglo-Spanish Diplomatic Relations, p. 32.
13. Davenport, op. cit., I, 247.

14. Molin to the Doge, 2 November 1604, Cal. S.P. Venetian, 1604-7, p. 291.
15. Philip III to Zuniga, 12 June 1607, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2571.
16. Zúñiga to Philip III, 8 October 1607, ibid. 2586.
17. Consulta of the Council of State, 3 July 1610, ibid. 844; Lerma to Velasco, 13 November 1611, ibid. 2588.
18. See Chapter IV, Notes 30, 31.
19. Auto made in Santo Domingo, 23 November 1629, with consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 7 July 1630, A.G.I., Indiferente General 1870.
20. Deschamps, Piratas y Filibusteros, p. 40.
21. Craven, 'The Earl of Warwick, speculator in piracy'.
22. Ibid; Acts of the Privy Council (Colonial Series), 1613 - 1680, p. 30; Wilkinson
 . The Adventurers of Bermuda, p. 148.
23. See Chapter V.
24. Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 148, 232; Newton, Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans, p. 152.
25. Hacienda officials of Florida to Philip IV, 27 May 1649, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 225.
26. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 1 September 1656, ibid., Indiferente General 770.

27. Newton, op. cit., p. 88.
28. Ibid., pp. 207, 220.
29. Ibid., pp. 229, 234, 257, 266.
30. Harlow, The Voyages of Captain William Jackson.
31. Declarations of the prisoners captured in 1642, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 215.
32. Harlow, op. cit., p. 32.
33. Ibid., p. 33.
34. Declarations of the English prisoners, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 215;
Harlow, op. cit., p. 32.
35. Ibid., p. 35.
36. Newton, op. cit., pp. 139, 166.
37. Luis de Rojas de Borja to Philip IV, 30 June 1638, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 225.
38. Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, VIII (I), 57.
39. Governor of Venezuela to Philip IV, 24 June 1638, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 194 .
40. Francisco de Santillar y Argotte to Philip IV, 2 December 1648, ibid. 181;
Francisco Berrocal de Campo to Philip IV, 24 May 1649, ibid. 87/Ramo 4.

41. Fernando de Cepeda to Philip IV, 9 August 1651, ibid., 210. Cepeda, an official of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, had been commissioned to investigate the charges against the two governors.
42. Citizens of Caracas to Philip IV, 8 December 1651, ibid., 210.
43. Relación concerning the investigation into the activities of Diego de Aguilera and Jose de Novoa, dated 5 January 1659, ibid., 171/Ramo 3.
44. Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, VIII (I), 626.
45. See below this Chapter.
46. Nicholas Philip to Francisco Bermocal de Campo, 5 November 1648, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 181.
47. Relación prepared by the Cabildo de Justicia of New Barcelona concerning the visits of the English ships to Cumanagatos, 1651?, ibid., 210; entry 3 June 1645, Inspection register of the Casa prison, 1637-1665, ibid., Contratación 4887, f. 381; consultas of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 7 November 1645, 6 September 1646, ibid., Indiferente General 1874.
48. Fernando de Cepeda to Philip IV, 9 August 1651, ibid., Santo Domingo 210.
49. Deposition of Henry Watkins, 19 December 1655, P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/70.
50. Declarations of the English prisoners captured in 1642, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 215.

51. Edward Montagu's notes on the Protector's Council meeting of 30 April 1654, Clarke Papers, III, 203.
52. See above Chapter III.
53. See below this Chapter.
54. Nettels, 'England and the Spanish-American trade'.
55. McLachlan, 'Documents illustrating Anglo-Spanish trade'; McLachlan, War and Peace with Old Spain.
56. Fernandez Duro, Armada Española, IV, 109.
57. Mims, Colbert's West Indian Policy, p. 23; Crouse, The French Struggle for the West Indies, p. 122.
58. Newton, Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans, p. 307.
59. Strong, 'A forgotten danger to the New England colonies'.
60. Earl of Northumberland to Sir Thomas Roe, 16 August 1637, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1637, p. 358.
61. Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments, p. 98.
62. Sir Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 12 October 1637, Cal. S.P. Domestic, 1637, p. 459.
63. Sir Thomas Roe to Prince Charles Lewis, 31 December 1636, Sir Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 17 March 1637, ibid., 1636-37, pp. 250, 503. See also Gardiner, History of England, VIII, 204.

64. Stock, op. cit., p. 100.
65. Edward Montagu's notes on the Protector's Council meeting of 30 July 1654, Clarke Papers, III, 207.
66. Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, 400.
67. Fernandez Duro, Armada Española, IV, p. 109; Harlow, Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, p. 6.
68. Hussey, 'Spanish reaction to foreign aggression in the Caribbean', pp. 295, 296.
69. Arcila Farias, Economía Colonial de Venezuela, p. 82; Hussey, op. cit., p. 294.
70. Secretary Carnero to Secretary Rocas, 20 July 1634, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2520; Description of the islands occupied by the English and the Dutch, 1634, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 170/Ramo 6.
71. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 23 September 1632, ibid., Indiferente General 1871.
72. Viceroy of New Spain to Philip IV, 26 February 1645, ibid., Contratacion 35/Ramo 4.
73. Chaunu, Seville et l'Atlantique, V, 399.

74. Don Juan Morfo Geraldino, governor of Hispaniola, to Philip IV, 17 March 1635, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 88/Ramo 1; Aviso from Don Francisco Proenca, governor of Jamaica, June 1651, ibid. 177/Ramo 1.
75. Consultas of the Council of State, 20 August 1630, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2519, 29 September 1634, ibid. 2520.
76. Fernandez Duro, Armada Española, IV, 129.
77. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 18 April 1630, A.G.I., Indiferente General 1870.
78. Newton, Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans, pp. 193, 282; Fernandez Duro, op. cit., IV, 338.
79. Newton, op. cit., p. 302; Fernandez Duro, op. cit., IV, 338.
80. Newton, op. cit., pp. 192, 280.
81. Diego de la Mota Sarmiento to Philip IV, 27 March 1637, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 156/Ramo 2.
82. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 14 January 1633, ibid., Indiferente General 1871.
83. Hussey, 'Spanish reaction to foreign aggression; p. 297.
84. Consulta of the Council of State, 20 July 1645, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2523.
85. Wright, Spanish Narratives of the English Attack on Santo Domingo, p. 47.

86. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 14 June 1655, A.G.I., Indiferente General 770.
87. Aviso from Jamaica, June 1651, A.G.I., Santo Domingo 177/Ramo 1.
88. Consulta of the Council of State, 19 September 1655, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2529.
89. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 24 October 1639, A.G.I., Indiferente General 1873.
90. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 4 November 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2529.
91. Hopton to Coke, 29 April 1639, P.R.O., S.P. 94/41 (1), 84.
92. Consultas of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 27 April 1634, A.G.I., Indiferente General 1871, 29 April 1638, ibid. 1873.
93. Hopton to Coke, 7 March 1633, P.R.O., S.P. 94/36 (2), 250.
94. William Marston to Hopton, 20 April 1640, ibid. 94/41 (2), 310.
95. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 7 February 1640, A.G.I., Indiferente General 1873.
96. Cédula, 30 December 1644, ibid. 1874.
97. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 14 March 1645, ibid. 1874.
98. Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, 7 November 1645, ibid.

99. Davenport, European Treaties, I, 361.
100. Consulta of the Council of the Indies, 4 November 1654, A.G.S., Estado Inglaterra 2529. The peace referred to is that of 1630. At the peace negotiations of 1660, Spain tried without success to procure the "return of Jamaica and other Barlovento islands occupied since the peace treaty of 1630" - consulta of the Council of State, 28 June 1660, ibid. 2530.
101. Philip IV to Cardenas, 24 September 1655, ibid. 2577.
102. Consulta of the Council of State, 26 July 1655, ibid. 2570.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Consulta of the Council of State, 1 January 1650, A.G.S., Estado
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