Strategies of Stability

U.S. Interventions in the Middle East (1953-2008)

A Social Complexity Approach

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy

by

Sherif Abdel Rahman Seif El-Nasr

Department of Politics

University of Liverpool

March 2012

Abstract

Middle East stability has been a key element of United States foreign policy since the end of World War II. The American national interest has generally been held to be at stake in three areas: securing the continuous flow of oil and gas to the West, facilitating the movement of U.S. naval and commercial traffic from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, and (until 1991) containing Soviet influence in the region. All these interests necessitated a concern with overall stability in the region. However, US stability-driven policies towards the region (1953:2008) have achieved little success. American decision-makers irreversibly affected their immediate target (regional stability) in ways that that are inconsistent with their interests in the region. The Middle East system remains one of the most volatile regions of the world in spite of the repeated American intervention in its affairs. On the other hand, the problems that the United States faces in the region have not lessened as a result of its recurring intervention; indeed, they may well have grown worse. In this thesis I seek reasonable explanations for this phenomenon.

Using a qualitative variant of complexity theory this dissertation introduces the concept of 'dynamic stability' as an alternative to the traditional version of the term which I referred to as 'simple stability'. A detailed historical account is employed to explore different strategies pursued by U.S. administrations to achieve stability in the Middle East. These strategies include: (1) the status quo strategy, (2) the hegemony strategy, and (3) the surrogate strategy. Different model(s) of intervention grew out of each strategy. Pre-emptive/post-hoc models of intervention grew out of status quo strategy. The regime change model of intervention grew out of hegemony strategy, and the pro-Israel model of intervention grew out of the surrogate strategy. The unifying factor among these strategies, I argue, is their lack of complexity; all these strategies include a simplistic perception of stability based on *imposing* some fixed arrangements on Middle East system through despotic allies; military invasion or regional surrogate, respectively, while ignoring or at best under-estimating the ability of sub-state actors to dynamically self-stabilize through bottom-up/emergent free local interactions.

Acknowledgment

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Introduction

Middle East stability has been a key element of United States foreign policy since the end of World War II.[1] The American national interest has generally been held to be at stake in three areas: securing the continuous flow of oil and gas to the West, facilitating the movement of U.S. naval and commercial traffic from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, and (until 1991) containing Soviet influence in the region. 'All these interests, for different reasons, necessitated a concern with overall stability in the region.'[2] However, US stability-driven policies towards the region have made little success. American decision-makers irreversibly affected their immediate target (regional stability) in ways that are inconsistent with their interests in the region.[3] The Middle East system remains one of the most volatile regions of the world in spite of the repeated American intervention in its affairs,[4] and the problems that the United States faces in the region have not lessened as a result of its recurring intervention; indeed, they may well have grown worse. In this thesis I seek reasonable explanations for this phenomenon.

US Strategies of Stability

American administrations adopted different answers when addressing the question: How can the US maintain stability in the Middle East in a way that supports American interests in the region? In this respect several strategies have been embraced; in this thesis I address three of them (1) the status quo strategy, (2) the hegemony strategy, and (3) the surrogate strategy. Different models of intervention

---

[1] On the importance of Middle East stability for the U.S. see Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), James T. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003). Nigel J. Ashton, ed., *The Cold War in the Middle East, Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967–73* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007). Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008). Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
[2] Richard Crockatt, *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 94.
[3] Being an immediate target implies that 'regional stability' was sought by the US in order to serve/secure other ultimate interests in the Middle East. In this meaning regional stability was treated as an auxiliary factor; it was targeted not for its own sake, but to facilitate achieving other US interests.
[4] The time-frame explored in this study (1953-2008) does not cover the events of the "Arab Spring" which began on Saturday, 18 December 2010, and included a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that occurred in countries of North Africa and Middle East (e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen).

1

grew out of each strategy. Pre-emptive/post-hoc models of intervention grew out of the status quo strategy. The regime change model of intervention grew out of the hegemony strategy, and the pro-Israel model of intervention grew out of the surrogate strategy. The unifying factor amongst these strategies, I argue, is their lack of complexity; all these strategies include a simplistic perception of stability based on *imposing* some fixed arrangements on the Middle East system through despotic allies, military invasion or regional surrogate.

(1) The Status Quo Strategy

According to this strategy, the US identified its regional interests with the stability of some regional regimes and intervened for the benefit of them. The logic behind adopting this strategy was that: without the help of those (mostly autocratic) regimes, anti-Western groups (e.g. nationalists, communists and Islamists) would come to power and negatively affect regional stability.[5] The stability of those regimes and the stability of US interests were thus considered two faces of the same coin.

Two models of intervention grew out of this strategy (A) a pre-emptive model and (B) a post-hoc model. The pre-emptive model of intervention was employed to maintain the status quo by eliminating a perceived threat (allegedly unavoidable) before it materialized.[6] In most of the cases that witnessed this kind of pre-emptive intervention, regional stability (in terms of the status quo) remained intact; however, American intervention took place to gain a strategic advantage before the circumstances tilted against U.S. interests (and against regional clients tasked with maintaining the flow of US interests).

On the other hand, the post-hoc model of intervention was employed to *restore* regional stability (in terms of the status quo) whenever it was disrupted. Restoring the status quo required the United States, in some cases, to help some disloyal regimes and oppose some of its traditional allies (as in the case of the Suez crisis when the US confronted both France and Britain for the benefit of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt).

---

[5] Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 2 – 26.
[6] On the concept of pre-emption see Seyom Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century* (MA: The Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 113- 142.

The main feature of the above strategy of intervention is its top-down character (securing regional stability through bolstering regional clients). In its ambition to secure the regional status quo, Washington focused on the top part of power hierarchy and aligned itself with power-holders. In most of the cases that witnessed US preemptive/post-hoc interventions, Washington was not keen to consider local actors or at least to explore their preferences.

(2) The Hegemony Strategy

Hegemony is said to secure stability by overawing potential rivals; any regime that is identified as a threat to the hegemon (in this case the US) runs the risk of becoming a target for violent retribution.[7] Proceeding from this strategy,[8] Washington intervened in several countries to disrupt the existing status quo and advance a new 'stability' formula, based on promoting the American model of liberal democracy. Embracing this strategy presented a departure from the traditional U.S. foreign policy based on maintaining the status quo and system equilibrium. Hegemonic status was the condition under which the 'regime change' model of intervention surfaced as one of US foreign policy choices, 'because there was less constraint forced by the dynamics of the international system.'[9]

American hegemony mixes both the hard power of military capability with the soft power of democratic ideas and liberal institutions.[10] American military dominance is both absolute and relative. In absolute terms, 'the US has military capabilities that can supposedly defeat the adversary while its own forces are sheltered from the inherent dangers of war. In relative terms it is apparent that no other power can remotely match US power capabilities.'[11] On the other hand, it was under the banner of exporting the American values that Washington intervened in several countries to disrupt the

[7] Adrian Little, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
[8] For more elaboration of the hegemony strategy see: Michael Lind, "A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World", *Parameters*, Vol. 38 (Autumn 2008), pp. 48-60.
[9] Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics, Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*, (Michigan: the University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 10.
[10] Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era, Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 33.
[11] Kanti Bajpai and Varun Sahni, "Hegemony and Strategic Choice," in Chandra Chari, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in A Globalized World: The Changing Balance Of Power in The Twenty First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 95.

existing balance and advance a new stability formula based on the American model of liberal democracy.

(3) The Surrogate Strategy

According to this strategy the United States backed a regional surrogate tasked with maintaining American interest of regional stability. Starting from the Six-Day war, Washington chose Israel to play this role. Most U.S. leaders chose to throw their weight behind Israel.[12] Stability was in the heart of the relationship between the two countries. Washington looked to Israel to stabilize the Middle East in the face of both Arab nationalism and Soviet encroachment, especially after the erosion of British influence.[13]

Proponents of this strategy argue that Israel is capable of maintaining American interests of promoting regional stability and preventing war, but this requires the US to invest heavily in Israel by ensuring its absolute military superiority through providing it with unlimited arms supplies and economic assistance.[14] The adoption of this strategy explains the steadfast American support for Israel. 'Although the US has no treaty commitment to the preservation of Israel's security, there is a long-standing national consensus that Washington has a basic interest in Israel's survival.'[15] The United States backed Israel because doing so supposedly served American interest in regional stability (by countering Soviet penetration, nationalist fervour, and Islamist movements). In exchange of these strategic services US administrations had always overlooked Israel's regional adventures and did not intervene decisively when regional instability is caused by it. This US behaviour comprises what this thesis addresses as a pro-Israel model of intervention which entails the US reaction to violations of regional stability committed by its regional surrogate.

---

[12] Israel is a pro-Western country that has a special relationship with the U.S. For ideological or electoral reasons many high-ranked Americans politicians and Congress men strongly back Israel, making its security an important political issue for any administration. See Nora Bensahel, Daniel Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment In The Middle East*, p. 4.

[13] Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine, Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (California: University of California Press, 1999), p. 96.

[14] Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 188.

[15] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 2 Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret.

The Research Problem

The above strategies proved counter-productive in many cases. They negatively affected the US immediate target of securing regional stability. Despite decades of American involvement in Middle East affairs and despite several cases of intervention (and non-intervention in the case of Israel's violations to regional stability), the elusive goal of regional stability has arguably not been achieved. The historical evidence (1953-2008) showed that the Middle East system[16] was one of the most volatile regions of the World in spite of the repeated American intervention in its affairs. On the other hand, the problems that the United States faced in the region did not lessen as a result of its recurring intervention; indeed, they might well have grown worse. In this dissertation I seek reasonable explanations for this phenomenon.

The Research Argument

The argument I suggest here is that: the US strategies of stability have been simplistic in nature; they are based on a simplistic perception of stability.[17] This simplicity is manifested by the desire to stabilize the Middle East system in top-down, forcible and reductionist styles instead of boosting the dynamism of the Middle East system or enhance its local actors' ability to self-stabilize. This kind of simplistic involvement has negatively affected the Middle East system (and sub-systems) in terms of hampering its ability to self-organize in the face of regional crises and hence participated in making the region one of the most volatile areas in the world.[18] Simultaneously, enforcing simple stability on the Middle East system has irreversibly affected American interests in ways that were inconsistent with its own objectives.

---

[16] According to Robert Jervis, we are dealing with a system when a set of elements or units is interconnected through a network of relationships so that changes in some elements or in their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and the entire system exhibits properties and behaviours that are different from those of the parts. Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political & Social Life* (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 5.

[17] See Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No.3 (April 1964), pp. 390-406. For more elaboration of the differences between the two terms refer to chapter two of this dissertation.

[18] Melvin A. Conant tried to answer the question: What makes the Middle East so unstable? in Melvin A. Conant, "Middle East Stability: A View from the USA," *Energy Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 11 (November, 1992), pp. 1027-1031.

A secondary argument of this dissertation is that: the Middle East, whatever its exact definition,[19] represents a complex system[20] and as such it cannot be stabilized through simplistic strategies (strategies based on comprehensive controlling). Following complexity theory notions,[21] I suggest that stability is an emerging property;[22] one that evolves dynamically through free interactions among system (most often, local) components. In this view, stability in the Middle East system can only be achieved in a bottom-up style. Thus I propose 'dynamic stability' as a better strategy than 'simple stability'.

Simple Stability

Simple stability is based on deliberately perpetuating some sort of equilibrium, pattern of behaviour, or status quo, and preventing, as far as possible, any spontaneous change or unplanned alteration. This kind of stability is characterized by constancy and simplicity. It is constant in the sense that it is based on preserving *one* (balanced) pattern of interactions among system elements. It is simplistic in the sense that it is controllable, predictable, and reversible. When applied to social systems, this type of stability is usually *imposed* by one actor (or a small group of actors) on the rest of the system components in a top-down style.

Dynamic Stability

Dynamic stability refers to systems' *internal* ability to cope with disturbances.[23] Coping with disturbances refers to finding a new equilibrium point after a stimulus has been imposed. This type of stability emerges, in a bottom-up style, as a result of multiple and overlapping interactions between system (most often, local) elements.

---

[19] There is hardly any disagreement over the strategic importance of the Middle East; however, there is almost no agreement on its definition. For further elaboration refer to chapter one of this dissertation.
[20] Please refer to chapter one of this dissertation.
[21] To be illustrated in the next chapter
[22] In the context of complexity theory, 'emergence' can be defined as: 'the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems, see Peter A. Corning, "The Re-Emergence of 'Emergence', A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory," *Complexity*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2002), pp. 18-30, at: http://www.complexsystems.org/publications/pdf/emergence3.pdf
[23] Disturbances can be viewed as differences effected in the actual state of the system. See Erica Jen, *Robust Design, A Repertoire of Biological, Ecological, and Engineering Case Studies* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 8, Sven Ove Hansson and Gert Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," *Synthese*, Vol. 136 (2003), pp. 219–235, and Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems," pp. 390-406.

The resultant stability cannot be calculated from the partial interactions between system elements, because these interactions are usually nonlinear.[24]

In the descriptive chapters of this dissertation it will be shown that Washington has always focused, in its ambition to stabilize the Middle East system, on the top part of power hierarchy -political regimes, either through allying with power holders, (while ignoring other local actors), or through ousting unfriendly regimes and handing power to more co-operative clients. These policies have contributed to deepen either the state of political stagnation through maintaining the status quo, or the state of chaos through forcibly ousting un-cooperative regimes as a pretext to installing more reliable regional stabilizers. Similarly, backing a specific regional surrogate constantly to take care of regional stability has hardly yielded helpful outcomes either for the Middle East system or for US regional interests. Washington seemed reluctant to accept the fact that stability could not be imposed, on a top-down style, on complex systems and thus declined, in most cases, to promote local dynamism.[25] This simplistic approach to regional stability has resulted in many problems both for the regional actors and also for the U.S. interests in the Middle East.

This study argues that a dynamic strategy framework (based on empowering local actors) would allow for a more sustainable form of stability that would benefit both the US and the Middle East system. Applying the dynamic stability model does not include focusing on the interests of the people of the region while ignoring US interests. This study contends that, considering local actors and local interactions serves the interests of both the US and the people of the regions. this is why this study advice the US government, or any other power with a genuine interest in stabilizing the Middle East, to help this region restore complex-systems' attributes, given that social entities with higher complexity stand a good chance of being stable in a dynamic way.[26] The role of external actors in this case should be limited to help the concerned regimes and local actors to gain complex attributes rather than to intervene

---

[24] By non-linearity I refer to the un-proportionality between inputs and outputs of any system, for more elaboration, refer to chapter two of this dissertation.

[25] Amy Hawthorne, "Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?", *Current History* (January 2003), pp. 21, 22.

[26] Complex systems spontaneously arrange its components and their interactions into a sustainable, global structure that tries to maximize overall fitness, without need for an external or internal controller. See Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," *paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, London, (10-13, April, 2000).

militarily/support despotic regimes/enhance a regional surrogate to impose artificial stability on Middle East system.

The arguments of this dissertation are evaluated through both conceptual model derived from complexity theory and historical case study analysis. The dynamic vs. simple stability framework, enhanced by three strategies of stability (the status quo, the hegemony, and the regional surrogate) and four models of intervention (pre-emptive, post-hoc, regime change, and pro-Israel), structure the case study analysis. The conclusion will be based on whether the American intervention has enabled the concerned regimes (Middle East sub-systems) to self-stabilize or caused further regional instability. The outcome of each case study will be evaluated both against the regional (sub-) system stability and the American interests.

Accordingly, when the outcome of a certain intervention negatively affects the American interest in addition to affecting the concerned regime's ability to cope with disturbances, this increases the likelihood that the outcome of the intervention is destabilizing, especially if the US intervention appears as a permanent rather than a temporary action; such outcome enhances confidence in the accurate characterization of a given intervention. In the pro–Israel model of intervention the cases will be evaluated against the American reaction to Israel's regional behaviour; in terms of whether the Israeli behaviour has served or hampered the American interest in maintaining regional stability and whether the US opposed Israel when it acted in ways that the United States deemed undesirable or not.

The Objectives of the Study

This dissertation has five main objectives: (1) understanding what constitutes 'stability', and distinguishing between different types of stability and between the theoretical paradigms from which these types are derived, (2) exploring the contributions of conventional IR theory in defining stability, (3) determining the type of stability targeted by U.S. administrations over the course of their intervention in the Middle East, (4) evaluating the consequences of American intervention in the Middle East and attributing these consequences to the strategy adopted, and (5) analysing the main aspects of American strategies of stability in the Middle East and discussing an alternative (dynamic) formula for stabilizing the region.

To be clear, I do not propose 'dynamic stability' as a categorical means of successful foreign intervention in the Middle East. Rather dynamic stability represents the best means by which to avert (top-down) foreign intervention and to foster self-organizing practices in complex systems. The role of external actors (like the US) in this case will be limited to help the concerned (sub-) systems and local actors to gain complex attributes rather than to intervene to impose artificial stability.

The Significance of the Study

Proceeding from the notions of 'complexity theory'; this study redirects the attention to the real sources of sustainable stability, namely, local actors and local interactions. It is argued that considering these variables, in the case of US-Middle East system of interactions helps maintain regional stability necessary to both US and the people of the region. In the long run, only a bottom-up approach can arguably ensure converging interests. The implicit assumption here is that the interests of the US do not necessarily contradict with those of the people of the region.

The study also sheds light on the fact that the United States, or any other power with a genuine interest in stabilizing the Middle East, should work to help this region restore complex-systems' attributes, given that social entities with higher complexity stand a good chance of being stable in a dynamic way.[27] However, if the Middle East is to be more complex, the inevitable process of change must be managed— mainly by local actors.[28] Accordingly, any future partnership between US and Middle East countries should be founded on the respect for the sovereignty of not only states but also peoples.

The Originality of the Subject

This thesis represents a qualitative research project that seeks to fuse conceptual and empirical work on US intervention in the Middle East after the WWII. It aims to make a theoretical contribution to the field of IR theory by analysing the key concept of 'stability' using aspects derived from complexity theory. The concept of *stability* has

---

[27] Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," *paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, London, (10-13, April, 2000).
[28] Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington: The Brookings institution, 2008), p. 32.

not received the attention it deserves in theoretical literature. This study will try to fill this gap by distinguishing between two models of stability; (1) stability as being used by traditional IR theory and as being targeted by the American foreign policy on the one hand, and (2) stability as being portrayed in complexity theory, on the other.

The difference between the two models is that the first equates stability with enforcing a pre-defined equilibrium (status quo), while the second considers stability as an emergent ability to accommodate disturbances. In other words, the second type of stability refers to a more dynamic pattern, in which the system reaches consecutive temporary balanced states through internal processes of self-organization, not through external power that imposes status quo arrangements on system components.

Distinguishing between those two types of stability and deciding which type offers the best explanatory framework for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (1953-2008) is the main contribution of this dissertation. The findings of this dissertation, I argue, will have significant implications for research in the field of international relations theory and the field of U.S.-Middle East studies, which has typically viewed analyzing stability types as of comparatively minor importance.[29]

---

[29] See for example Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Special Issue on the Balance of Power (Apr., 1989), pp. 183-198, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396.

Chapter 1

Methodology

1.1 Introduction

This study argues that conventional theories of international relations[1] do not present the most suitable framework to analyse US strategies of stability in the Middle East[2] as they reflect static assumptions derived from the Newtonian perspective (to be illustrated in detail in the next chapter). In the following I refer briefly to this point and develop a theoretical foundation, derived from complexity theory, which tries to avoid the shortcomings of these conventional theories.

1.2 Newtonian-Based Perspectives

Generally speaking, traditional IR perspectives reflect the ideas of the Newtonian world-view (simplicity, reductionism, equilibrium, etc.); both ontologically and epistemologically. Because of this 'Newtonian influence', the analyses presented by traditional perspectives are simplistic in nature and reflect a reductionist and equilibrium-based paradigm. The deficiencies of IR conventional perspectives can be summed as follows:[3]

- **Simplicity**

As a general rule, social theories have a historical preference for parsimony, they adopt the principle of Ockham's razor, namely that 'the more a theory explains in the simplest terms, the better it is.'[4] Traditional IR theories are no exception; they introduce simple notions to explain complex phenomena, for example: self-interested

---

[1] By conventional theories I refer mainly to realism, liberalism and constructivism.

[2] For a lengthy discussion of this point see Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, "IR-Theory and Transformation in the Greater Middle East: The Role of the United States," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, Vol. 6, No. 1-3 (2007), pp. 57-86.

[3] The following critic of conventional IR theory will draw on M. Hoffmann and D. Johnson, "Change and Process in a Complex World," paper presented at the *Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*, March 18–21, 1998.

[4] Malcolm Williams, *Science and Social Science* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 41.

states compete constantly for power/security (Realism),[5] economic interdependence dilutes security dilemmas,[6] institutions matter in international politics,[7] democracies do not wage wars against each other (Liberalism),[8] and state behaviour is shaped by elite beliefs, collective norms, and social identity (Constructivism).[9]

The interaction of variables (e.g. state and structure, institutions and interests, norms and power), the change of explanatory patterns over time (e.g. from power politics to economic interdependence to democracy promotion) and the alternation of dependent and independent variables (e.g. economic crises and offensive foreign policy)[10] do not receive considerable attention in the theoretical notions of these perspectives.

- **Reductionism**

Traditional perspectives are based on reductionist epistemological bases; they believe that concentrating on few explanatory factors can lead to understanding the whole. The common reductionist tendency of these approaches appears in their over-concentration on the 'state' as the main explanatory factor. 'This causes an analytically convenient but arbitrary reduction of the rich image of international relations.'[11]

State-free topics, ironically, have been examined using the same conventional assumptions and methodologies.[12] For example, environmental politics are examined using traditional means without seeking to explain why or how the environment has

---

[5] John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 71.

[6] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Independence and Interdependence," *Foreign Policy*, No. 22 (Spring 1976), pp. 130-161.

[7] Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51.

[8] Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *The US Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.

[9] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[10] In some cases offensive foreign policy can lead to economic crises while in other cases economic crises lead some regimes to adopt offensive foreign policies.

[11] M. Hoffmann and D. Johnson, "Change and Process in a complex world". According to Barry Buzan, we should exclude from this analysis strong versions of liberalism, which take the state off the centre stage of world politics. Milder versions, however, leave the state and the state system in, but have lots of non-state actors and systems operating across and outside state boundaries. See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[12] M. Hoffmann and D. Johnson, "Change and Process in a complex world".

become a relevant new issue. This willingness to approach new issues with traditional methods and perspectives while ignoring their emergence in the first place is apparent in a variety of issues, other than environment, such as ethnic conflicts, human rights, and regionalism.[13]

- **Equilibrium**

Equilibrium, as Richard Ned Lebow put it, has been a fundamental concept for many theories or approaches to psychology, economics, political science, sociology and international relations.[14] At a core level, traditional approaches share a commitment to equilibrium-based assumptions. Starting with such an equilibrium-based world view, IR scholars derive basic assumptions, generally about the nature of the international system or actors within the system. The equilibrium assumption allowed traditional scholars to assume a constant anarchical international system. From this basic supposition, secondary assumptions about effects on states are deduced (i.e., security dilemma, problems of collective action, the priority of the national interest, concerns about relative gains, etc.). Explanations are then built on these assumptions and research is conducted to ascertain whether or not observations of world events match expected outcomes.[15]

- **Rigidity**

Traditional perspectives are based on rigid assumptions, and this means that if the patterns of interaction, dealt with by these perspectives, change from one period to the next then the explanation based on the initial assumptions will no longer hold.[16] Neo-realists, for example, faced a theoretical problem after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union without the eruption of a 'major war,' because this phenomenon contradicted with their inflexible theoretical notions. It might also be argued that the constructivist analysis, because of similar rigidity, failed to account for anomalies such as the conflict between states with the same ideational background and value system, as was the case in the second Gulf war, when Iraq (an Arab, Muslim state)

---

[13] Hoffmann and Johnson, "Change and Process in a complex world"

[14] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 48.

[15] Hoffmann and Johnson, "Change and Process in a Complex World"

[16] Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation* (London: Routledge, 1992).

attacked Kuwait (an Arab, Muslim state) for reasons that have very little to do to with differences in ideas, values or social norms.

Traditional perspectives are perhaps best summed up, as M. Hoffmann and D. Johnson contended, by a statement from the research methods book by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sydney Verba, who argue that, 'political scientists would learn a lot if they could rerun history with everything constant save one investigator-controlled explanatory variable.'[17] This quote is indicative of a perspective that assumes that IR phenomena are linear in nature, have equilibrium predominate, and have variables with discrete, constant effects.[18]

1.3 Complexity-Based Perspective

To develop a theoretical foundation that avoids the above shortcomings; this study embraces a conceptual framework derived from complexity theory. For the purpose of this study, I adopt Neil E. Harrison's definition of a complex system as 'any system consisting of a large number of units in a state of free, unplanned, interaction between its components. The components of any complex system interact, usually nonlinearly, in circumstances that are affected by the initial state of the interaction.'[19]

Paul Cilliers summarizes the main features of complex systems as follow: they are (1) open—exchange resources and energy with their environment, (2) dynamic—change over time, (3) have a memory—past states have an influence on present states, (4) nested—the components of which may themselves be complex (sub-) systems, (5) non-linear—a small perturbation may cause a large effect, a proportional effect, or even no effect at all, and (6) containing feedback loops, both negative—damping and positive—amplifying.[20]

---

[17] Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
[18] Hoffmann and Johnson, "Change and Process in a Complex World,"
[19] Neil E. Harrison, "Thinking about the World We Make," in Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
[20] Paul Cilliers, *Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems* (London: Routledge, 1998).

The theoretical claim in this thesis is not that complexity theory explains everything.[21] However, this study argues that complexity helps construct a coherent conceptual framework to tackle US strategies of stability and decide whether they enhanced or hampered Middle East system's internal dynamism (self-organization). The theory introduces a wealth of conceptual tools that can be fruitfully applied to explain the outcomes of US stability-driven strategies in the Middle East. The theory can do so through focusing on the role designated to local actors that interact in a bottom-up style.

The vocabulary of complexity theory (to be illustrated in chapter two) consists of a list of terms for thinking about the structure and dynamics of social systems. In this study, complexity theory introduces dynamic explanatory concepts (such as 'dynamic stability') to chart US-Middle East system of interactions. This is unlike most of the prevailing perspectives in the field of international relations which represent static or normative notions, both with regard to agents, structure or relations among system elements.[22]

Complexity theory, though still repeatedly described as a new theoretical approach, has been adopted and applied by many scholars with backgrounds as diversified as: international relations (Robert Jervis[23] and James Rosenau[24]), philosophy and

[21] Robert Geyer, "European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, (March 2003) pp. 15–35.

[22] There are several studies that have utilized complexity theory in analyzing Middle East-related topics: Adrian Little, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), N.J. Rengger, *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order Beyond International Relations theory?* (London: Routledge, 2000), Klaus Mainzer, *Thinking in Complexity, The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind* (New York: Springer, 2007), Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition And Collaboration* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), James N. Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics, Volume 2: globalization and governance* (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), Graeme Chesters and Ian Welsh, *Complexity and Social Movements: Multitudes at the Edge of Chaos* (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010), Alexander Dawoody, "US Policy toward Iraq Within the Context of Complexity Theories," (Ph.D. dissertation, Western Michigan University, 2004).

[23] Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[24] James N. Rosenau, The Study of World Politics, Volume 1, Theoretical and Methodological Challenges (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

computer modelling (Paul Cilliers)[25], history (Alan Beyerchen)[26], sociology (John Urry)[27], and development theory (Neil E. Harrison).[28]

1.3.1 Is The Middle East a Complex System?

Following the criteria suggested by Neil E. Harrison and Paul Cilliers,[29] it can be argued that the theoretical definition of complex systems applies, at least partially, to the Middle East system:

(i) The Middle East system comprises a large number of actors, (regimes, governmental institutions, political parties, nongovernmental organizations, trade unions, social groups, individuals etc.)

(ii) These various actors interact continuously. The degree of formal relations across the current version of the Middle East is limited, especially in the political sense. However, the minimum requirements of interactions do exist; the Middle East countries, with the exception of Israel, share most of the factors (common history, language, religion and geographical adjacency, etc.) necessary for steady interactions.

(iii) The Middle East system has a potentiality of nonlinear interactions: small inputs can produce large outputs. Small events (minor territorial disputes) can provoke wide-range crises (regional wars); tiny developments disclose themselves in an explosive way.

(iv) Actors primarily interact with others that are in their near locality, neighbour states (on the regional or even international level), as well as their colleagues or partners (on agent-based level). Actors can, however, easily interact with more distant parties via means of telecommunications.[30]

---

[25] Paul Cilliers, *Complexity and Post-modernism: Understanding Complex Systems*, (London: Routledge, 1998).
[26] Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992), pp. 59-90.
[27] John Urry, "The Complexity Turn," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2005), pp. 1-14.
[28] Neil E. Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
[29] Cilliers, *Complexity and Postmodernism*, p. 142.
[30] This conception of complex social systems is consistent with that of regionalism; a region can be understood as consisting of an interrelated group of countries which are particularly close to one another in two senses: first geographically in terms of their physical proximity to one another, and

(v) The activity of an actor may eventually reflect back on itself. A governmental decision can produce a popular/regional/international response (positive feedback), and a massive demonstration can lead to wide official actions (negative feedback).

(vi) The Middle East system is certainly open. Although it is possible to draw its borders, there is a constant flow of commodities, products, money and information through the system. It is continuously influenced by the wider international system, and the internal sub-systems, by physical and nonphysical inputs and outputs.

(vii) The Middle East system is never in a state of static equilibrium, its components may be co-operating or disputing, but they never stand still. Middle East system stability has to be understood in dynamic terms. There is always a good chance for stability to emerge in Middle East regimes as long as system local components are healthy enough to accommodate challenges.[31]

(viii) Middle East system is greatly influenced by its history. Today's details are largely a result of yesterday's accumulations. Many important cultural trends change fairly slowly over long periods of time, but specific influences can cause sharp changes as well.[32]

Given the above characteristics of the Middle East system, It can be concluded that the Middle East, whatever its exact definition,[33] represents a complex system and as such it cannot be stabilized through simplistic strategies (strategies based on controlling from without). Following complexity theory notions,[34] stability is an emerging property;[35] it evolves dynamically through free interactions among system

---

second functionally because of the relationships which bind them together. Robert Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific: Towards a Conceptual Understanding," *Asian Security*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 190-213.
[31] Roger Lewin, *Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 13, 14.
[32] In spite of the applicability of most of these characteristics to the Middle East, it should also be noted that the Middle East system has been deprived of many of its dynamic attributes. The extreme centralization, which prevailed in Middle East countries, since gaining their independence led to the absence of many of the above qualities. See Paul Aarts, "The Middle East: A Region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 5 New Regionalisms in the New Millenium, (October 1999), pp. 911-925.
[33] There is hardly any disagreement over the strategic importance of the Middle East; however, there is almost no agreement on its definition, for further elaboration refers to pages 26-29 of this chapter.
[34] To be illustrated in the next chapter
[35] In the context of complexity theory, 'emergence' can be defined as: 'the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems.

(most often, local) components. In this view, stability in the Middle East system can best be achieved in a bottom-up style. This study argues that the US administrations have dealt with the region as a simple rather than a complex system and this was responsible for a considerable amount of the instability in the region. The alternative to these simplistic strategies is to start thinking of the region as a complex system and to reconsider the role of local-level actors.

1.3.2 Complexity Methodology

The following chapters will apply complexity theory to historical cases of US intervention in the Middle East which is argued to be a complex system. For any method to be used in the study of a complex system, such as that of US-Middle East system of relations, it has to be particularly suited to the study of this kind of systems. In other words, it should avoid standard simplifying assumptions. Yaneer Bar-Yam summarizes some of relevant tips in the following:

• Do not assume that only a few parameters are important. The behaviour of complex systems depends on many independent pieces of information.

• Do not take it apart; take interactions into consideration and avoid pure reductionism. Since interactions between parts of a complex system are essential to understanding its behaviour, looking at parts alone is not sufficient. It is necessary to look at parts in the context of the whole.

• Do not assume smoothness, much of the quantitative study of simple systems assumes that a system is essentially uniform and that local details do not matter for the behaviour of a system on larger scales. These assumptions are not generally valid for complex systems.[36]

The main idea behind complexity methodology is that the emergence of global properties in complex systems (such as stability) can be attributed to the evolution of local interactions between local elements of a system during learning strategies. The theory expects dynamic stability to emerge in complex systems out of local-level,

See Peter A. Corning, "The Re-Emergence of 'Emergence', A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory," *Complexity*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2002), pp. 18-30, at:
http://www.complexsystems.org/publications/pdf/emergence3.pdf
[36] Yaneer Bar-Yam, *Dynamics of Complex Systems* (MA: Perseus Books, 1997).

bottom-up interactions. Conversely, complexity theory attributes instability to top-down/forcible/reductionist arrangements that ignores local-level interactions. Complexity theory directs the attention to the role played by local-level actors and to the bottom-up nature of dynamic stability. The theory, thus, helps explain why simplistic strategies (which are top-down/forcible/reductionist) are often ineffective in dealing with complex systems' crises.

Two Possible Methods

According to Yaneer Bar-Yam, there are two general methods for studying complex systems: in the first, a specific system (for example, US-Middle East's system of relations) is selected, and then the system elements as well as their interactions are identified and described. The objective is to show how a certain holistic property (like stability/instability) emerges from them. The second approach considers a class of systems, where the essential characteristics of the class are described, and statistical analysis is used to obtain properties and behaviours of the systems.[37]

For the purposes of this study, I embark on the first method. Using a qualitative approach derived from complexity theory, I examine selected historical case studies,[38] to explain the paradox of how US stability-driven strategies led in many cases to destabilizing effects. I attain this target by distinguishing between simple stability and dynamic stability. Following complexity theory notions, this thesis argues that dynamic stability emerges, in a bottom-up style, out of local-level interactions, and that top-down/forcible/reductionist strategies are expected to result in artificial stability.

The application of the previous methodology to each historical case study that follows proceeds in three parts: First, each case begins with a summary illustrating the main points of the case. Then, each case presents a historical background which looks at the broad but vital details that were considered at the US intervention in the concerned

---

[37] Ibid.

[38] A case study approach uses in-depth investigation of one or more examples of a current or historical social phenomenon, utilizing a variety of sources of data. A 'case' can be an individual person, an event, or a social activity, group, organization or historical incident. On the method of case study, see John Gerring, *Case Study Research, Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Victor Jupp, *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 2006).

subsystem. In this part, the particular framing of the relevant issues that invited the US administration to intervene is investigated at a substantive level. The third step consists of an evaluation of the US intervention. In this phase of the analysis a decision is made on the type of stability this intervention targeted. The outcomes of US intervention are then examined and a comparison is made between the predictions of the theory and the actual evolution of events.

The crucial part of these analyses lies in the long-run relationship between intervention and stability, not in the immediate success or failure of the actual intervention. In many cases the immediate outcomes of a certain intervention gave the impression that the US had scored its objective from this intervention and that the concerned system (which witnessed that intervention) had been stabilized. However, examining the long-term repercussions might reveal that the system incorporated serious seeds of instability and that the US intervention rendered regional stability a far-fetched objective.

1.3.3 Complexity Theory and Traditional IR Theories

Introducing complexity theory as a proposed explanatory framework does not disprove other theories of international relations. Apart from a Complexity perspective, several different theoretical approaches can be utilised in order to explain a particular event. 'Complexity theory can act like a synthesis between these various theories and creates a new framework which bridges the opposing positions of IR theories.'[39] The complexity framework, as Robert Geyer put it, 'helps to overcome the separation between the main perspectives of international relations.'[40] In this meaning, complexity theory can be thought of as complimentary to existing IR approaches. 'It fully acknowledges that traditional IR theories provide important insights into international politics. What it rejects is the exclusivity these approaches claim in showing how IR works.'[41] Complexity theory can be used, accordingly, with (rather than against) existing concepts and theories in IR.

---

[39] Geyer, "European Integration", pp. 15-35.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010), pp. 89-90.

20

Complexity theory, however, claims to add descriptive and explanatory insights to the theoretical notions maintained by traditional IR theories, especially with regard to the study of systems stability. This is because with traditional theories system stability is difficult to assess, and basic dynamic features are frequently ignored. Traditional models, after all, invoke some inductive assumptions (such as the notion that 'stability is equal to peace') that are empirically invalid, as I will illustrate in the following chapters.

1.4 Historical Evidence (Historical Case Study Analysis)

Given the wide range of US intervention in the Middle East, historical case study approach provides the most detailed evidence both geographically and temporally. Historical case study is a research strategy that uses in-depth investigation of one or more examples of a social phenomenon to understand the dynamics present within certain systems of interactions.[42] Case studies can be used to accomplish various aims: to provide description, test theory, or generate theory.[43] 'Case studies have a poor reputation in some fields, but good case studies have made important contributions to social science.'[44] More important, 'using case studies is perhaps the most appropriate method for exploring "how and why" questions.'[45] Another advantage of case studies is that they allow the researcher to include a broad range of evidence, including documents, archival records and secondary data sources.[46]

Historical case studies as practiced in the social sciences tend to be viewed as essentially offering empirical results. I have used historical cases findings, however, not only as empirical evidence but also as inputs to the testing of theoretical argument. This study has a social science orientation; the ultimate aim is to contribute to the development of theory and not just to explain particular historical episodes. This study views the explanation of a set of individual cases as a useful first step in the long process of theory-building in the field of international relations.

---

[42] Jupp, *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, p. 20.
[43] Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (October 1989), pp. 532-550.
[44] Roger K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994.
[45] Richard T. Cupitt, *Reluctant Champions: US Presidential Policy and Strategic Export Controls. Truman, Eisenhower, Bush, and Clinton* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 26.
[46] Steven Van Evera, *Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science* (Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT, 1996).

Through a survey of the key cases of US intervention in the Middle East (1953-2008) I have identified fifteen separate attempts to achieve regional stability. Thus, while a case is always singular, the research design of this study refers to several cases. I will focus on the imposition/emergence of stability in the 15 cases of US intervention in Middle East (sub-) system. My evaluation of each case is based on careful reading of available historical accounts. I analyse extensively the cases on the basis of two concepts derived from both complexity perspective and Newtonian perspective, they are, consecutively, dynamic stability and simple stability.

Each case refers to an US attempt of intervention in one of Middle East crises. The cases are 'historical' in the sense that they are retrospective. However, they are also 'analytical' in the sense that I have employed a variety of theoretical concepts in attempting to explain the logic that led to a particular outcome of the intervention. These historical cases are, thus, of twofold value. First, they provide an empirical base for the theoretical analysis. Second, the cases are intended to present historical explanations of the (mostly negative) outcomes of US intervention in the Middle East.

1.4.1 Cases Selection

There are two ways to study the impact of US intervention on Middle East stability. One might observe the attributes of many cases of intervention. Or one might study the attributes of a particular case. The first approach is a cross-case statistical method (large-N). The second is a within-case or case study method (N=1). Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. To get the most out of both, the methodology employed in this study represents a middle way between the large-N method and the N=1 case-study method.[47]

The main shortcoming of the first method (large-N) is that, while useful for the observation of general trends, it does not provide in-depth qualitative analysis of smaller-N studies. It is true that large-N approaches provide an important benefit in terms of their analytical clarity and theoretical elegance, however, this frequently comes at the expense of the richness and profundity derived from selected case-

---

[47] For more elaboration on large N and N=1 methods, refer to Allison McCulloch, *Seeking Stability amid Deep Division: Consociationalism and Centripetalism in Comparative Perspective* (PhD dissertation, Queen's University-Ontario, 2009), pp. 6-8.

studies.[48] Another problem with this method is that the higher the number of cases, the more difficult it becomes to achieve conceptual uniformity across cases.[49] To properly engage the question of whether or not US intervention promoted stability in the Middle East, it is necessary to get at the details that inform specific cases. Intervention did not happen in a political vacuum; it is vital to have a proper understanding of the context in which it took place. This requires a level of description not found in statistical (large-N) studies. As such, a large-N study would be inappropriate for the research project undertaken in this study.

On the contrary, the N=1 case study analysis has the advantage of in-depth analysis of a single case. This method rests on the existence of a micro-macro link. We gain better understanding of the whole by focusing on one key element. Sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual case is more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of cases.[50] The main criticism of the N=1 case study method is that in most circumstances the individual cases are not sufficiently representative to permit generalization to other situations.[51] What single cases gain in descriptive richness, they frequently lose in wider explanatory power. Accordingly, the use of a single case study approach would constitute a flawed basis for assessing the US intervention in the Middle East. As Lijphart notes, "[a] single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the grounds for disproving an established generalization."[52] To overcome this weakness, this study is based on analysing a reasonable number of cases (Medium-N) so as to improve their representativeness. From the single-case study method, it borrows the process of fleshing out the historical details of the case under consideration, but it does so on a more limited basis. That is, the method deals with only certain aspects of the historical cases examined, specifically those aspects that have theoretical relevance.

In this study generalization involves the statement of a theoretical proposition (simplistic intervention in complex systems negatively affects their stability), which in turn will be tested through the use of further case studies. The depth and rigour of

---

[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Jupp, *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, p. 20.
[52] Arend Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 255.

23

the analysis will be the crucial issue here. The selection of 15 cases of deeply divided cases allows to retain some of the richness and deep description offered by the single case-study method while allowing for a degree of generalization to other cases. The historical cases selected in this study reflect different US Presidents and administrations from different political parties, so the effect of political ideology on patterns of intervention can be roughly neutralized. Cases of US involvement in the Middle East prior to Eisenhower administration are excluded because of its weak relevance to the problem considered in this study, given that before Eisenhower, the US involvement in the Middle East was limited to certain kinds of emissary or other forms of archaeological influences. For the purposes of this study, only limited effort will be devoted to covering these forms of intervention.

The selected cases cover the major instances of the US, mostly forcible, intervention in the region. Non-forcible cases (e.g. US efforts to attain an Arab-Israeli peaceful settlement) have been touched in several instances (the US role in the aftermath of the Six-Day-War, and its active role in the peace talks that followed the October/Yom Kippur War in 1973). However, a separate study is still required, I argue, to conceptualize the US pattern of intervention as a peace broker in the Middle East. The sample is not random, but reflects the selection of specific cases to extend the analysis to a broad range of intervention styles. The process of selecting the cases takes into account covering the main countries in the 'Middle East' as being *defined* by US administrations, namely: Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan, throughout most of the period of US active involvement in the region (1953-2008).[53]

In spite of the fact that there is some kind of a continuation of US interests in the Middle East, different strategies have been adopted to serve these interests. The selection of a broad time-frame reflects the desire to discover these different strategies of intervention. US strategies of intervention were argued to be emergent properties of the US-Middle East complex system of interactions, and as such they took some time to evolve and be observable. Selecting this broad time-frame enabled the researcher to discern three strategies of stability: the status quo strategy, the hegemony strategy, and the regional surrogate strategy. These strategies did not appear consecutively, and

---

[53] On the US definition of the Middle East, please refer to pp. 21-24 in this chapter.

there was some kind of overlapping between them, however, it was necessary to choose a broad time-frame to distinguish between them and understand the circumstances that accompanied the emergence of each strategy.

Table 1.1 **US Interventions in the Middle East (1953-2008)**

Intervention	Administration	Year
Intervention in Iran	Dwight D. Eisenhower	1953
Intervention in Egypt		1956
Intervention in Jordan		1957
Intervention in Jordan		1958
Intervention in Lebanon		1958
(Non)-intervention in Six-Day-War	Lyndon B. Johnson	1967
Intervention in Jordan	Richard M. Nixon	1971
(Non)-intervention in Arab-Israeli stalemate (state of no-war-no-peace)		1971-1973
Intervention in October War		1973
(Non)-intervention after operation Babylon	Ronald W. Reagan	1981
Intervention in Lebanon		1982
Intervention in Saudi Arabia	George H. W. Bush	1990
Intervention in Kuwait		1991
Intervention in Afghanistan	George W. Bush	2001
Intervention in Iraq		2003

1.4.2 Methodological Challenges:

Some methodological challenges are expected to encounter this study, these challenges include:

- The challenge of subjectivity: the judgment on the successfulness of a certain US intervention in the Middle East is often subjective and open to debate. However, it can be argued that when the outcome of a certain intervention negatively affects the US interests in addition to affecting the concerned system's ability to cope with disturbances, this increases the likelihood that the outcome of the US intervention is

destabilizing, especially if the US intervention appears as a permanent rather than a temporary action; such outcome enhances confidence in the accurate characterization of a given intervention.

- The challenge of causality: It must be admitted, at the outset of this research, that determining the relation between US intervention and the subsequent system's ability/inability to accommodate disturbances is problematic. However, a continued reliance on the US presence and/or the inability of the concerned system (that witnessed the US intervention) to self-adapt to further crises, offers a convenient causal link between the US intervention and the system's stability (or instability).

1.5 Data Sources

The basis of this study is a wide spectrum of historical cases. The research conducted for these cases relies on a mix of secondary and primary source materials. As a first step, an extensive reading of most reliable historical accounts will be gathered and evaluated. The analysis will rely primarily on the available literature on US foreign policy towards the Middle East. There are numerous sources of this kind of data, e.g.: the British library, the library of the University of Liverpool, and the publications of the Congressional Research Service.

Why depending mainly on Secondary Data?

(1) Secondary data is a vital method of getting information regarding historical events where the direct collection of data is impossible. As Colin and Miriam Elman put it 'political scientists, especially those engaging in multilingual, multistate comparative analyses, are forced to rely on secondary material, which often consists of monographs produced by historians.'[54]

(2) This study seeks to make theoretical contribution in the first place; this required performing more analysis of the data. Collecting secondary data leaves more time for making in-depth data analysis. Moreover, Secondary data are available which is

---

[54] Colin Elman; Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries", *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1. (Summer 1997), pp. 5-21.

entirely appropriate to draw conclusions and answer the questions proposed in this study.

(3) Re-analysis of the existing secondary sources offers different insights regarding the traditional analysis by focusing on certain variable or concept from a different angle. In this study, the concept of stability which has usually been equated with peace in most of IR literature will be re-analysed in an attempt to discover other original meanings of it.

Though sufficient to accomplish most of research objectives, relying on secondary data, however, is not without its problems. The historiography on recent US-Middle East relations, as Stephen Walt has correctly noticed, is uneven-because of the difficulty of archival research and the obvious biases with which many accounts are written.[55] 'Historians do not produce an unproblematic background narrative from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited for the framing of problems and the testing of theories.'[56]

One way to compensate for this problem is to document events and arguments as extensively as possible, drawing upon multiple sources and the most widely accepted historical accounts. An additional strategy employed in this study is to supplement the research for the historical cases through conducting some archival research. In this study, US department of state office of historian represents the major source of archival data referenced.

The analysis also makes use of other primary data sources such as presidential speeches, department of state releases, and other unofficial data such as press releases, congressional records, media reports, US government websites, and polling data. I also utilize reports issued by think tanks and major international organizations, including reports issued by the United Nations. The majority of the primary research is web-based and easily accessible in English.

---

[55] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 15.
[56] Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory," pp. 5-21.

1.6 Definitions

This study is based mainly on three essential concepts; 'Middle East', 'intervention' and 'stability'. In the following I illustrate how these concepts are defined in most general and fundamental sense and how they are going to be used in this thesis.

1.6.1 Middle East

Fawaz A. Gerges, a prominent scholar of the Middle East, notices that a student who is introduced to the field of Middle East international relations encounters several methodological difficulties, the most important of which is the question: is there a 'Middle East', and if so where is it?[57] Indeed, 'no point on the globe is more *middle* than any other' according to Arthur Goldschmidt who argues that the term makes little sense geographically. 'What is *east* for France and Italy is *west* for India and China.'[58] Elaborating on this difficulty, G. Pearcy, contends that the Middle East is 'an indefinable region', according to him, 'despite the extensive use of the term by a host of scholars, periodicals and media, no standard boundary delimitation exists by which a Middle East region can be precisely located geographically.'[59]

The ambiguous and vague nature of the term, however, should come as no surprise because the 'Middle East' is not a term 'middle easterners' coined. Rather it is an artificial abstraction imposed from without during the colonial period of the region's history. Pinar Bilgin rightly contends that there is 'nothing natural or neutral about geographical assumptions and language. Throughout history the driving purpose behind the identification and naming of geographic sites has always been military and strategic interests.'[60] The Middle East is no exception; the term was invented by the colonial powers and reflected the interests of those powers in the region.

---

[57] Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Study of Middle East International Relations: A Critique," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1991), pp. 208-220.
[58] Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), ed., p. 3.
[59] George Etzel Pearcy, "The Middle East: An Indefinable Region," *Department of State Publication, 6806, Near and Middle Eastern Series*, Vol. 39 (1959).
[60] Pinar Bilgin, "Whose Middle East? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security," *International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2004), p. 26.

In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century the Middle East was strongly linked to the British colonial presence.[61] The British coined the term to describe the region which was half-way between the United Kingdom and India; the Far East (the East here is relatively defined according to the position of London on the world map). According to Beverley Milton-Edwards, common usage of the term can be located in the Second World War when the British military established a Middle East Command in the area under the authority of the War Office.[62] The Middle East term was, hence, a military necessity, but it remained long after British influence in the region declined and was replaced by competition between the US and the former USSR. It was not until after the Second World War that scholars and policy makers alike in the West began to employ the term——though without any consensus on its geographical boundaries.[63]

Given the complex historical background of the term, defining the boundaries of the Middle East is not an easy task. Numerous, and even contradictory, attempts to define the Middle East have been introduced. Some analysts define the Middle East to include Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel and, of course, the Arab states. Other observers equate the Middle East with the Arab world to the exclusion of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and Israel.[64] To some, the Middle East means the Islamic world with its vast territories, including Morocco in the west and Bangladesh, India and Russian Turkistan in the east.[65] Still others recognize that the Middle East may be more a psychological than a geographical area. Anthropologists define the region as a culture area extending from Morocco to Mali, from Russian Turkistan to

---

[61] From a historical point, of view the invention of the region is attributed to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, US naval officer and author of key works on naval strategy. In an article published in The National Review in 1902 Mahan suggested that Britain should take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the (Persian) Gulf and its coasts – the 'Middle East' – so that the route to India would be secured and Russia kept in check. See Bilgin, "Whose Middle East?," However Richard Haass sets earlier points for the emergence of the Middle East, according to him, there are two possible birth events for the Middle East; the first is the 1774 signing of the treaty that ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia; the second, which presents a stronger case from his point of view, is the Napoleon's relatively easy entry into Egypt in 1798, which showed Europeans that the region was ripe for conquest. This era ended with World War I, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and the division of the spoils of war among the European victors. See Richard N. Haass, "The New Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 6 (November/December 2006), pp. 2-11.

[62] Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 7.

[63] Gerges, "The Study of Middle East International Relations, A Critique," pp. 208-220.

[64] See, for example, Nader Fergany, "Critique of the Greater Middle East project: the Arabs sorely need to refuse a reform from abroad" (in Arabic), *Al-Hayat*, (19 February 2004).

[65] See Völker Perthes, "Key Issues for Dialogue," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XI, No. 3, (2004), pp. 85-97.

West Pakistan.[66] The definition of the World Bank usually puts the 'Middle East and North African' countries in one basket called (MENA).[67] There are some who exclude the Maghreb countries and Libya from their definition of the Middle East, so that the African wing of the term would include Egypt only,[68] and sometimes the Sudan and the Horn of Africa countries are added to it.[69]

The first official use of the term 'Middle East' by the United States government was in the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine.[70] For a time, the 'Near East' was the term used by US officials for the Levant--Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan--while 'Middle East' applied to Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[71] In 1958, the State Department explained that the terms 'Near East' and 'Middle East' were interchangeable.[72] However, US officials gradually gave more credence to the 'Middle East,' which is used now to describe the area extending from Egypt in the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east. This study follows this US *unofficial* definition of the region. Accordingly, the term 'Middle East' in this thesis will include Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, as well as some other territories in the Gulf (including Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and UAE).[73]

---

[66] Beverley Milton-Edwards noticed that: those from outside the region who had an interest in it referred to it, or parts of it, using different descriptions such as: the Near East, the Orient, the Levant, the Maghreb, Zion or the Holy Land. These terms have encouraged a particular association of ideas or a view of the region which is often simplistic and the product of crude reductionism and stereotyping. The Orient, for example, was a term which grew out of European fascination with the Middle East, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Oriental society, however, was portrayed in a negative manner and seen as symbolizing everything the West was not ...Other terms and labels, such as Zion and the Holy Land, were used to convey a romanticized and seductive vision of certain parts of the region which had as much to do with a utopian vision of redemption for Jew and Christian alike and resonated with Islamo-phobic memories of the Crusades, see Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East*, pp. 6-7.
[67] See World Bank definition of the region at:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,menuPK:247619~page PK:146748~piPK:146812~theSitePK:256299,00.html
[68] Emil Lengyel, *The Middle East: World Without End* (New York: The John Day Company, 1953), Bernard Reich et al., *Israel and the Eastern Arab States: A Strategic Source Book* (Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1968).
[69] Goldschmidt, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, p. 3.
[70] On his coining of the phrase "Middle East," see Roderic H. Davison, "Where is the Middle East?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, no. 4 (July 1960), pp. 667–68.
[71] Afghanistan and Pakistan are also considered Central Asian countries. See Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2006/eng/01/mreo0506.pdf
[72] 'Near East' Is Mideast, Washington Explains, *The New York Times*. 1958-08-14
[73] The Middle East is not clearly delimited, so other configurations of the region are still possible.

Figure 1.1 **The Middle East**

1.6.2   Intervention

The conceptual definition of intervention suffers from a lack of clarity. There is considerable dispute in the literature about how to define the concept precisely.[74] At one end of the range of available definitions are narrow conceptions which identify intervention with 'coercive interference' by a state in the political affairs of another state. This conception of intervention usually implies 'the use or threat of force aimed at changing the structure of political authority in another state against its will.'[75] A direct coercive intervention includes one or a combination of such activities as: dispatch of combat personnel to the conflict zone, actual combat action, aerial bombing of targets, or naval assistance.[76]

At the other end, some analysts argue that intervention refers to any event between two or more states,[77] ranging from verbal statements, economic assistance or the withholding of economic assistance, initiation or increase of arms supply, to actual military engagement in combat operations.[78] Thus, this concept involves both non-military and military activities. Even the absence of action, according to this

---

[74] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 72.

[75] Ibid., p. 72.

[76] Mi Yung Yoon, "Explaining US Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (August 1997), pp. 580 - 602.

[77] See Carl P. Close, Robert Higgs, (eds.), *Opposing the Crusader State Alternatives to Global Interventionism* (CA: Independent Institute, 2007).

[78] Yoon, "Explaining US Intervention," pp. 580-602.

definition, is regarded in some situations as a sort of intervention if it contributes to determining the outcome of the situation decisively. [79]

In practice, there has long been a prohibition on coercive intervention; intervention which is conducted without the request or consent of the state in which it is taking place. Following from the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) between Catholics and Protestants in Europe, many states sought to ensure that the Pope could not interfere in their internal politics and consequently the principle of non-intervention was established, meaning that the internal politics of each state should be respected by other states.[80]

This prohibition is closely related to the principle of state sovereignty[81] which is now the basis of international law given that unless states agree to respect the sovereignty of other states it will become difficult to co-exist as equals in the international system.[82] The state derives its sovereignty from the people, and it exercises that sovereignty on the people's behalf. Loss of sovereignty would therefore imply the assumption of authority and jurisdiction in the national territory by some body or organization other than the state.[83]

After the Second World War non-intervention was routinely endorsed in major treaties, such as the Charter of the United Nations.[84] According to article 2(4) 'All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other

---

[79] Ibid.

[80] For a different point of view see Stephen D. Krasner who argues that: The norm of non-intervention in internal affairs had virtually nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia. According to Krasner the Principle of non-intervention was not clearly articulated until the end of the eighteenth century. See Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 20.

[81] Steven Haines, "Military Intervention and International Law," in Trevor C. Salmon, ed., *Issues in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 102.

[82] Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach, *International Relations, The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 125.

[83] Stephen D. Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty, Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 70.

[84] Ibid., p. 12.

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nation's.[85] Weaker states have always been the strongest supporters of the rule of non-intervention.[86]

After the cold war, however, the consensus over the illegality of intervention began to erode in the face of massive violations of human rights that were taking place in Yugoslavia and numerous African states. The eruption of ethnic conflicts in the 1990s prompted some international figures (such as Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations), to argue that sovereignty might have to be conditioned on respect for human rights. In addition, public opinion in the United States and much of Western Europe demanded that governments do something to bring an end to what appeared to be a growing list of internal conflicts.[87] Since traditional peacekeeping missions were often ineffective, many observers argued that the time had come to enlarge the scope of legitimate use of force to include humanitarian intervention. It was argued that, in the absence of any normative justification for state sovereignty, it can function as a shield behind which states may systematically abuse the human rights of their own people.[88] This was the starting point of the new concept of humanitarian intervention.[89]

However, it is impossible to imagine that states will always place humanitarian concerns ahead of their national interest. There was not one single instance of humanitarian intervention where the motive to intervene was not one of a number of goals. More important, humanitarian intervention was usually implemented in an

---

[85] See: Archie Simpson, "Nations and States", in Trevor Salmon and Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations*, p. 51.

[86] Krasner, *Sovereignty Organized Hypocrisy*, p. 21.

[87] Martin Griffiths et al., *International Relations, The Key Concepts*, p. 149.

[88] Ibid.

[89] The international law relating to humanitarian intervention is still in an unsatisfactory state of development. Clearly, intervention authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is considered lawful. But in the absence of such a mandate, it is far from clear whether a coalition of states could lawfully intervene. Some argue that an unauthorized intervention would be lawful on grounds related to the international community's 'responsibility to protect'. The responsibility to protect", known as R2P, is an international norm intended to establish an international obligation to protect populations from grave crimes. The concept entails the idea that sovereignty is a responsibility and that the international community had the responsibility to prevent mass atrocities by using tools such as mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctioning, and chapter VII powers. See Trevor C. Salmon and Mark F. Imber, eds., Issues in International Relations (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, (2001) published by the International Development Research centre and available at: http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, UN, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005, New York, available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book.pdf.

inconsistent manner.[90] Sovereign state remains the key actor in international relations. States are still keen to 'guard their sovereignty, autonomy and independence of action in the modern world, and such factors offer as many constraints and stimuli to the international actions of states as they ever did.'[91]

- **US Intervention in the Middle East**

In this study, intervention is the US entry into Middle East crises to support or oppose a certain party. It entails different levels of actions ranging from economic assistance (Jordan 1957 and Lebanon 1958), intelligence operations (Iran 1953) arms supply (Israel 1973), deployment of combat personnel (Jordan 1957, Lebanon 1958, 1982, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 1991), to actual military engagement in combat operation (Kuwait, 1991, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003).

A comprehensive model of US intervention in the Middle East system which is intended to be precise in every respect needs over-exhaustive analysis and thus it is impractical. It is more convenient, thus, to explore different historical models of intervention with simplifications concerning other details. However, these models must be rich enough to reveal the essential complex features of the system of interactions.

This study categorizes the US intervention in Middle East affairs into four models; (1) pre-emptive, (2) post-hoc, (3) regime change and (4) pro-Israel. Pre-emptive intervention aims at protecting the status quo and preventing a perceived threat before it materializes. Post-hoc intervention, aims at restoring preferred regional arrangements after being disrupted, this pattern includes two sub-categories, intervening to oust anti-US governments and intervening to reverse the effects of a military action that took place to the detriment of US regional interests. The third pattern, regime change model of intervention, aims at imposing what can be called 'hegemonic stability'. Finally, the pro-Israel intervention reflects US foreign policy

---

[90] For example, in Central Africa, the great powers did not see it as part of their responsibility (nor of their interests) to use force to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide, nor –later– to separate refugees from the military and political elements in the Zairean and Tanzanian camps, nor –in 1996 – to help humanitarian agencies rescue hundreds of thousands of refugees scattered in the rainforest during the Zairean civil conflict. See Martin Griffiths et al., *The Key Concepts*, p. 150

[91] Salmon and Mark Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations*, p. 164.

reaction when the violation to regional stability is committed by Israel. This model of intervention reflects two foreign policy forms (1) overlooking Israel's disruption to regional stability,[92] and (2) aligning with Israel instead of confronting it.

These models of intervention grow out of the strategies of stability discussed earlier ('the status quo strategy', 'the hegemony strategy', and 'the surrogate strategy'). In their present form the models may be less complex than the real patterns to which they refer. In addition, they do not exhaust the possibilities for all forms of US intervention in the Middle East. However, they permit for some meaningful organization of existing knowledge.

Figure 1.2 **Models of Intervention**

- Pre-emptive Intervention
- Post-Hoc Intervention

Status Quo Strategy | Status Quo Strategy

Hegemony Strategy | Surrogate Strategy

- Regime Change Intervention
- Pro-Israel Intervention

1.6.3 Stability

Stability is an important concept in many IR theories. Some theories argue that stability can be achieved through hegemony (hegemonic stability theory) while others suggest that stability can be sought through balancing strategies (balance of power theory) both types are classified as belonging to neorealism. Some theories advocate economic interactions, institutional arrangements and/or democratic values as the best

---

[92] According to the wide definition adopted in this study for intervention, the absence of action can be regarded as a sort of intervention if it contributes to determining the outcome of a certain situation decisively

guarantee of stability (neoliberalism), while other theories stress common norms and shared values as a basic pre-requirement for stability construction (constructivism).

Since the term is used in many ways, the first part of this dissertation (chapter two) will be a theoretical analysis of different types of 'stability'.[93] Robert Ayson argues that the concept of stability—like a number of other important and frequently used ideas in international relations such as 'security', 'national interest' and 'balance of power'—seems to allow for a variety of understandings in a range of settings.[94] McCoy and Shrader propose that one reason why it is difficult to define stability in a precise manner is that it is closely related to certain other concepts, such as 'equilibrium', 'balance', and 'homeostasis'.[95]

Indeed, there is a close relationship between stability and the above concepts. However, these concepts are not identical. The concept of balance refers to a situation, in which different system components exist in an acceptable relationship against each other, (they do not seek to change their balanced configuration). Equilibrium implies an additional meaning; it stands for 'the condition of equal balance between opposing forces.'[96] It entails that for every force there is a counterforce; forces thus tend to equalize each other.[97] Systems at equilibrium state are not static or wholly isolated from their environment; rather, their essential principle is homeostasis. They return towards their general or ground state, and homeostasis is the mechanism that helps the system restores equilibrium. Homeostasis, thus, is the property that maintains system's internal equilibrium by

---

[93] On conceptual analysis and concept formation, see David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: a Conceptual Analysis," *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 471-506.

[94] Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," pp. 190-213.

[95] E. D. McCoy and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Community Ecology, Scale, and the Instability of the Stability Concept," *PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, Vol. 1, Contributed Papers, (1992), p. 190, Sven Ove Hansson And Gert Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," *Synthese*, Vol. 136, 2003, pp. 219-235.

[96] Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "An Outline of General System Theory," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (August 1950), p. 156, Cynthia Eagle Russett, *The Concept of Equilibrium in US Social Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[97] In the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'equilibrium' is explained as 'a state of adjustment between opposing or divergent influence or elements', and 'a state of balance between opposing forces or actions', see Oxford English Dictionary, 'equilibrium', Second edition. 1989.

adjusting its physiological processes. These processes include maintaining the values of key systemic variables within certain limits.[98]

Figure 1.3 **The Relationship between Stability and other Related Concepts**

The concept of stability comprises all the previous concepts; it can be defined in terms of the ability of a system to contain disturbances. In the words of Ross Ashby, 'stable system has the property that if displaced from a state of equilibrium and released, the subsequent movement is so matched to the initial displacement that the system is brought back to the initial state of equilibrium.'[99] Any stable system should be able to cope with the challenges it encounters through processes of feedback. By feedback I refer to a state when one point of experience in a system influences the next. Feedback can be positive or negative. Together, these feedback mechanisms can explain why systems preserve a given form, and how this can be elaborated and transformed over time.[100]

However, containing disturbances or restoring equilibrium can be thought of in two different ways: namely (1) forcing the elements to restore the same point of equilibrium, and (2) self-coping with disturbances by restoring a new point of equilibrium.[101] This study emphasizes this differentiation through putting it under different categorization, namely, simple stability, of closed systems, and dynamic stability[102] of open or dissipative systems.[103]

---

[98]Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 33.

[99] W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1960), p. 54.

[100] Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986), p. 46.

[101] See Hansson and Helgesson, "What Is Stability?" pp. 219–235. Similarly Adler discussed complex systems' ability to absorb changes, giving it the title resilience.

[102] Open systems are those which are in continuous relationship with its environment.

- **Simple Stability**

Simple stability entails that specified variables remain unchanged (within given limits), despite external disturbances, as a consequence of changes in still other variables of the model. It is the tendency of interconnected and interdependent elements in any closed system to maintain the status quo. There must be a structure that persists over time; the stable system, in this case, can be described, and an explanation of its functioning can be offered.[104] This kind of stability is characterized by constancy and simplicity. It is constant in the sense that it is based on preserving *one* (balanced) pattern of interactions among system elements. And it is simple in the sense that it is controllable, predictable, and reversible. When applied to social (open) systems, this model of stability is usually *imposed* by one actor (or a small group of actors) on the rest of the system components in a top-down style.

The simplistic conception of stability is deeply rooted in IR theory (as I will illustrate in chapter three); and it is also rooted in the practice of international politics by some political leaders. According to Emanuel Adler, this led to many negative effects on policymaking and international politics because:

> When decision-makers are driven in their decisions and actions by simple stability, by the idea, perception, and expectation of reversibility, by the idea that equilibrium can be created, they are likely to omit from their cognitions the element of time, the cross-catalytic influences across time, and the long-range future implications of their actions. In one word they omit the complexity of international and political systems.[105]

This complexity of international and political system in general and of US-Middle East system of relations in particular is what drives toward searching for an

---

[103] A dissipative structure is an open, out-of-equilibrium, unstable system that maintains its form and structure by interacting with its environment through the exchange of energy, matter, and entropy. See A. Sengupta, ed., *Chaos, Nonlinearity, Complexity, The Dynamical Paradigm of Nature* (New York, Springer, 2006), p. 271.

[104] The example most often given to this kind of stability, as Morton Kaplan noticed, is that of a thermostat: If the temperature in a house exceeds established boundaries, sensors signal the heating or cooling mechanism to turn on until the temperature reaches the opposite boundary. See Morton A. Kaplan, "Study of International Relations by Quincy Wright," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1958), p. 337.

[105] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, p. 35.

alternative conception of the term. This study, following Emanuel Adler, suggests the concept of 'dynamic stability'.

- **Dynamic stability**

According to Emanuel Adler, the main characteristic of dynamic stability is that disturbances are self-accommodated so as to bring back the process of interaction between system components, not to where it was when disturbed but to where it would have progressed if left undisturbed.[106] The dynamic stability of complex (self-organizing) systems assumes a position between two extreme system states: deterministic stability and chaotic instability.[107] Self-organization entails that the components of any complex system have the ability to restore a new equilibrium point if disrupted by an external factor. According to this model, a system is said to be stable when it has the ability to *self-accommodate* perturbations to reach a new equilibrium state. Perturbations can be viewed as differences effected in the actual state of the system.[108] According to Adler, 'it is a measure of the ability of the system to absorb change-driving variables and parameters and survive.'[109]

The concept of 'dynamic stability' has been used elsewhere with different meanings, mostly, however, to refer to a simplistic perception of the term. For example, from the 1990s some European politicians used the term 'dynamic stability' in reference to their perception of the best formula of Euro-Mediterranean relations based on 'change within continuity' projects.[110] These projects, as noted by Said Haddadi, translated a cautious yet ambiguous approach to security and democracy promotion in the region. 'The reason of this ambiguity is the conflict between the urgent need to ensure

---

[106] Ibid., p. 45
[107] Chris Noell, "A look into the Nature of Complex Systems and Beyond Stonehenge Economics: Coping with Complexity or Ignoring it in Applied Economics?" *International Association of Agricultural Economists*, Vol. 37 (2007), pp. 219–235.
[108] Erica Jen, "Stable or Robust? What's the Difference?," *Santa Fe Institute Working Paper*, January 7, 2003, http:// www.santafe.educationlsfilpublications/working-papers/02-12-069.pdf.
[109] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, p. 46.
[110] See Said Haddadi, "Political Securitisation and Democratisation in the Maghreb: Ambiguous Discourses and Fine tuning Practices for a Security Partnership," *IES Working Paper*, No. AY0403-23 (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of European Studies, 2004), p.1, Bernabé López García and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, 'Spain and North Africa: Towards a 'Dynamic Stability", *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002) 170-191.

political stability and the desire to promote democracy as vectors for building a security partnership in the region.'[111]

The word dynamic in these attempts is used only to refer to the fact that this kind of stability entails the possibility of change. However, this meaning is covered in this study by the concept of simple stability. Indeed, social stable systems cannot be static— wholly isolated from their environment, because stable system should have the ability to return towards its general or ground state via certain processes. This ability comprises performing some processes to maintain the values of key systemic variables within certain limits.

Dynamic stability in this study refers to a process of self-organized changes. The additional meaning included in the term 'dynamic stability', as being used in this study, is the fact that stability emerges, in a bottom-up style, as a result of multiple and overlapping interactions between system (most often, local) elements.[112] According to this definition, a system is described as stable when its (local) actors have the ability to cope with disturbances.[113] Coping with disturbances refers to local actors' ability to find a new point of equilibrium after a stimulus has been imposed.[114]

Conversely, simple stability is used in this dissertation to refer to the cases in which change takes place in a top-down manner, or being forcibly imposed on system elements in a reductionist style. This is why I prefer *simple* to *static* because the latter negates any possibility of change, while the first refers to the possibility of change which does not necessarily emanate from system dynamics but rather comes as a result to external actor(s)' top-down/forcible/reductionist intervention, as is the case

---

[111] Haddadi, "Political Securitisation and Democratisation in the Maghreb" and see R. Gillespie, "Spain and the Western Mediterranean," Working Paper, *ESRC Research Programme on 'One Europe or Several?* (Brighton: University of Sussex, 2001).
[112] Emergent refers the fact that the resultant stability cannot be calculated from the partial interactions between system elements because these interactions are usually nonlinear. By non-linearity I refer to the un-proportionality between inputs and outputs of any system.
[113] See Hansson And Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," pp. 219–235, and Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Apr., 1964), pp. 390-406.
[114] The idea that stability is a system property that emerges out of local interactions among system's local components has been dealt with in the fields of management, biology and information theory, but it does not receive the same attention in the field of IR. See José Fonseca, *Complexity and Innovation in Organizations* (London: Routledge, 2002), Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi, Banita Lal, Michael D. Williams, Scott L. Schneberger, *Handbook of Research on Contemporary Theoretical Models in Information Systems* (Pennsylvania: IGI Global snippet, 2009), Mehdi Snene, Jolita Ralyté, Jean-Henry Morin, *Exploring Services Science: Second International Conference, IESS 2011* (Springer, 2011).

with the US stability-driven strategies of interventions in the Middle East (to be discussed in the following chapters).

1.7 The Plan of the Dissertation

The initial stage of this study covers the scholarship associated with the two leading paradigms of stability, the Newtonian paradigm and the complexity paradigm. This means, as a first step, careful readings of the respective notions of both paradigms. The analysis then builds conceptual models of stability types (simple and dynamic) derived from these paradigms and illustrates the main features of each model.

The contributions made by conventional IR theories to the analysis of the concept of stability are illustrated in chapter 3. In this chapter I demonstrate the broad statements of (neo) realism, (neo) liberalism, and constructivism, then, I seek to capture the basic intuitive notion of stability as defined by each perspective. Finally, I discuss the main shortcoming of these contributions, namely, their over-concentration on the peaceful connotation. The elucidation of how IR theories define stability is by no means an idle review of literatures, but an effective way, I argue, to apprehend the very essence of the concept as being used by IR scholars.

Chapter 4 begins telling the story of US involvement in Middle East politics. The analysis addresses the question why stability of the Middle East is important to the US The analysis details the evolution of US involvement in the region and the factors that accelerated that involvement. The chapter also shed some light on the tools Washington employed to pursue its regional interests (such as foreign aid, political alliance, military intervention and regime change).

Armed with the conceptual model derived from complexity theory, I turn to the empirical case studies of the US intervention in the Middle East (1953-2008). Taken together, these case studies explain the process of stability emergence/imposition. This stage consists of qualitative case study analysis—the subject of chapters 5–8. Each chapter is devoted to discuss a certain model of intervention and is designed to stand alone, with a summary, a historical background, and an evaluation. But each chapter also touches on a broader aspect of what this study argues to be simplistic US strategies towards the Middle East with relevance beyond the chronicle narration.

In chapters 5 and 6 I trace the cases that witnessed an US intervention based on a status quo-based strategy. I distinguish between pre-emptive and post-hoc models. In chapter five, I examine the first model; the preemptive. The target of this model is to prevent the emergence of a perceived threat before it materializes. In the cases that witnessed this kind of intervention, regional stability remained intact. However, the US intervention took place to gain a strategic advantage before the circumstances change to the detriment of US interests. The cases classified under this category include the United States intervention in Jordan to protect King Hussein in years 1957, 1958 and 1971, the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958 to protect the client regime of Camille Chamoun in response to the Abdel Kareem Qasim-led revolution in Iraq, and the US intervention in Saudi Arabia at the outset of the Gulf War in 1991, to protect the Saudi regime from threats posed by Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.

The model of intervention discussed in chapter 6, the post-hoc, is one through which the US administrations attempted to *restore* regional stability after being disrupted. This model includes: interventions to overthrow anti-US governments and interventions to reverse the effects of undesirable military actions unleashed by regional (and in some cases international) actors. Examples of the first type include: the United States intervention in Iran in 1953 to overthrow the democratically-elected government of Mohamed Mossadegh, and examples of the second type include: (1) US intervention to reverse the effect of the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, (2) intervention to defend Israel in the wake of the successful Egyptian-Syrian attack in the October/Yom Kippur War in 1973, and (3) intervention in Kuwait in 1991 to counteract the Iraqi invasion.

Chapter 7 introduces the hegemony strategy which is translated into a regime change model of intervention, and discusses the implications of this model. This strategy was adopted neither to maintain nor to restore the existing status quo. Rather, it was employed to *impose* a new stability formula. Stability here is more radicalized; it is identified with concepts like democracy promotion and regime change than with status quo and regional integrity. During the Cold War era, the United States did not practice this pattern of intervention except when international balance tilts, unmistakably, to its favour. After the Cold War, the US ability to intervene, unilaterally, doubled. In the Middle East, the Bush administration utilized this pattern

in Afghanistan and Iraq, toppled the regime in both cases, and supervised the 'election' of pro-Western governments in them.

Chapter 8 introduces the regional surrogate strategy. This strategy involves backing a regional ally in order to serve US interest of regional stability. In the case of Middle East system, Israel has been chosen to play this role. The most tangible expression of this strategy in US foreign policy was the hesitant US response to Israel's regional adventures. As a general rule, Washington was always ready to intervene to address any violation to the status quo in the Middle East except when this violation was committed by Israel. In this chapter I shed light on four examples that reflect this model of intervention (the US reaction to the Israeli-led Six-Day-War in 1967, the US reaction to the state of no-war-no-peace that preceded the October War, 1973, the US reaction to the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Nuclear reactor in 1981, and the US reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982).

Chapter 9 summarizes the results of the descriptive chapters then proceeds to analyze the main aspects of the US strategies, which include seeking to: (1) control the Middle East system's actors; by identifying acceptable actors and excluding undesirable ones, (2) control the Middle East system's interactions, by determining the acceptable patterns of interaction and invalidating inappropriate patterns, and (3) control the Middle East system's ideologies; by identifying the acceptable ideologies and denouncing unacceptable ones. Finally, the chapter elucidates how a different strategy framework (based on empowering local actors) would allow for a more sustainable form of stability in the Middle East.

Chapter ten presents the final conclusions generated by the thesis. The chapter has three significant parts. The first part reflects on the research context and establishes the research niche which the thesis fills, and the original contribution of the research. The second part establishes the theoretical and empirical research findings against the research aims and objectives and shows in what way focusing on the difference between simple stability and dynamic stability helps account for several anomalies in the historical account. The third, and final part, discusses potential future research directions.

Figure 1.4 **The Structure of the Thesis**

Objectives	Chapters	Methodologies
Objective 1 Distinguishing between Stability Types	Introduction	Research Design
	Chapter 1: Methodology	
	Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework	Conceptual Analysis
Objective 2 How IR Theory defines stability	Chapter 3: IR Theory and the Concept of Stability	Literature Review
Objective 3 Determining the type of stability pursued by U.S. administrations over the course of their intervention in the Middle East, evaluating the consequences of American intervention in the Middle East and attributing these consequences to the pattern of stability adopted	Chapter 4: The Evolution of US Interest in the Middle East	
	Chapter 5: Preemptive Intervention	
	Chapter 6: Post-Hoc Intervention	Historical Case Study analysis
	Chapter 7: Hegemonic Intervention	
	Chapter 8: Pro-Israel Intervention	
Objective 4 Analyzing causes of failure and introducing an alternative stability formula	Chapter 9: US strategies of Intervention A Critique	Complexity Methodology
	Chapter 10: Conclusions	

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

2.1   Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to differentiate between two types of stability:
(1) simple stability which is based on perpetuating some sort of balance, pattern of
behaviour in the domestic, regional or international level, preventing, as far as
possible, any spontaneous or unplanned change, and (2) dynamic stability which
is an emergent property that emerges as a result of multilevel, non-linear, and
large scale interactions among system(s) components. I explore the premises of
each type, present illustrative examples, consider the implications of both types
for system performance and outline the conditions under which the behaviour
predicted by each should be expected.[1]

In order to give substance to the above illustration, I place stability types in a
more general theoretical framework. Two broad frameworks are identified; the
Newtonian perspective and the complexity perspective. The basic logic of each
paradigm, its main concepts and assumptions are illustrated. Addressing these
aspects of both perspectives is helpful to grasp the differences between stability
types and as a prelude for the next chapter which discusses the contributions of IR
theories (mostly, Newtonian-Based) in defining the concept of stability.[2]

2.2   Two Frameworks to Understand Stability

There are, arguably, two main theoretical frameworks by which stability can be
understood; the Newtonian and the complexity perspectives. According to the

---

[1] Karl Deutsch and David Singer introduced a different stability typology in Karl W. Deutsch, J.
David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16,
No. 3 (April 1964), p. 391.
[2] This study argues that many IR theories adopt, with different degrees, the notions of the
Newtonian perspective (trying to emulate the certainty of the natural sciences), Accordingly, it is
necessary to review the arguments of this paradigm here to justify the need to search for a new
conceptual framework to examine complex phenomena such as U.S. stability-driven strategies
towards the Middle East.

Newtonian perspective, stability refers almost entirely to a system's tendency towards equilibrium; it is the tendency of interconnected and interdependent elements in any closed system to maintain/restore the status quo. This kind of stability is characterized by constancy and simplicity. It is constant in the sense that it is based on preserving *one* (balanced) pattern of interactions among system elements, and it is simple in the sense that it is controllable, predictable, and reversible. When applied to social systems, this type of stability is usually *imposed* by one actor (or a small group of actors) on the rest of the system components in a top-down style. I call this type of stability 'simple stability'.

The other way to conceive stability is that derived from complexity theory. Stability here refers to a dynamic process of self-organized changes. According to this definition, a system is described as stable when it has the ability to cope with disturbances.[3] Coping with disturbances refers to system's ability to find a new equilibrium point after a stimulus has been imposed. This type of stability emerges, in a bottom-up style, as a result of multiple and overlapping interactions between system (most often, local) elements. The resultant stability cannot be calculated from the partial interactions between system elements because these interactions are usually nonlinear.[4] This type of stability is best described as 'dynamic stability.'[5]

In the following section I start by briefly illustrating the main notions of both the Newtonian and the complexity perspectives. I am primarily concerned with the basic logic of each perspective, its main concepts and assumptions.

---

[3] See: Sven Ove Hansson And Gert Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," *Synthese*, Vol. 136, 2003, pp. 219–235, and Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," pp. 390-406.

[4] By non-linearity I refer to the un-proportionality between inputs and outputs of any system. For more elaboration see chapter three.

[5] Jochen Fromm distinguished between stability and flexibility, and argued that a complex adaptive system must have both components: 'without flexibility, a system would be rigid and fixed, without stability, it would not be complex. Adaptation without learning is just changing.' Jochen Fromm, *The Emergence of Complexity* (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004), p. 51. This study combines the two properties in what it calls dynamic stability.

2.2.1 The Newtonian Paradigm[6]

Among many other things, physicist and mathematician Isaac Newton (1642–1727) concluded the well-known three universal laws of motion. These laws were intended mainly to describe the motion of physical bodies. However; it turned out that the methodology produced by the application of these laws could be applied in a perfectly general way. This broader application of Newton's findings is what referred to as the Newtonian Paradigm.[7]

The ontological base of the Newtonian paradigm is materialistic in nature as it assumes that all phenomena, whether physical, biological, or mental, are ultimately constituted of matter.[8] For Newton, 'nature was taken as being atomistic in the sense that all of its phenomena are being made up of the same small, material, solid, indestructible particles, which existed within an absolute space of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry.'[9] F. Heylighen and P. Cilliers conclude that 'the position in space' is the only property that fundamentally distinguishes system particles according to the Newtonian ontological base. 'Apparently different systems are merely different arrangements in space of equivalent pieces of matter. Any change, development or evolution is therefore merely a geometrical rearrangement caused by the movement of the components'.[10]

Academics in all the major fields of social 'science' welcomed the Newtonian certainty and predictability with open arms and started borrowing much of their vocabulary from hard sciences, for instance, equilibrium, stability, elasticity,

---

[6] The paradigm, according to Thomas Kuhn, refers to a connected set of beliefs or basic assumptions, or a dispositional stance about the nature and organization of the world, together with beliefs about how best to investigate it. See T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1st. ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 168. Lesley Kuhn, "Why Utilize Complexity Principles in Social Inquiry?," *World Futures*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2007), pp.156 – 175.
[7] Later this way of thinking will be referred to as the scientific paradigm. See Lesley Kuhn, Why Utilize Complexity Principles in Social Inquiry?, pp. 156 – 175.
[8] Francis Heylighen, Paul Cilliers and Carlos Gershenson, "Complexity and Philosophy," in Bogg, J. and R. Geyer, eds., *Complexity, Science and Society* (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing), 2007.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

expansion, inflation, contraction, flow, force, pressure, resistance, reaction, movement, friction, and so on.[11] As Robert Geyer notices:

> Economics, politics, sociology all became "sciences", eager to copy the success of the natural sciences. Moreover, this desire was institutionalised through the development of modern universities which created and reinforced the disciplinarisation and professionalization of the social sciences.[12]

It was claimed that the findings made by these 'sciences' would sooner or later be reduced to the Newtonian mechanical laws.[13] For example, neoclassical economics which is widely considered the dominant explanation of economic phenomena presented an 'economic science' after the model of Newtonian mechanics. 'Economic actors are assumed to be rational in their pursuit of undefined, subjective self-interest. Their behaviour is assumed to be an objectively rational response to external forces such as the level of supply and demand of goods and services.'[14] Similarly, 'Karl Marx wedded his vision of class struggle to an analysis of the capitalist mode of production to create what he considered the immutable and deterministic laws of capitalist development.'[15]

In the following section I shed light on some of the main concepts of the Newtonian paradigm; namely: reductionism, predictability, equilibrium, determinism, linearity and simplicity.

- **Reductionism**

The main principle behind the Newtonian paradigm is that of *reductionism*: to

---

[11] Klaus Mainzer, *Thinking in Complexity, The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind* (New York: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007), pp. 316, 317

[12] Robert Geyer, "European Integration: The Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2003), pp. 15-35.

[13] Russ Marion, "Complexity in Organizations: A Paradigm Shift," in A. Sengupta, ed., *Chaos, Nonlinearity, Complexity: The Dynamical Paradigm of Nature* (New York, Springer, 2006).

[14] Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 6, 7.

[15] Geyer, "European Integration," pp. 15-35

understand/control any complex phenomenon, one needs to analyse it to its separate components or break it down into ever smaller and simpler elements. For example 'the properties of gases can be reduced to the mathematically describable motion of their atoms or molecules.'[16] Comprehensive understanding of any phenomenon can be fulfilled by observing the behaviour of its parts. According to the Newtonian paradigm, it is thought that there is no logical obstacle to dismantling any physical phenomena while keeping its very essence in hand. No surprises are hidden within any physical system; the whole is the sum of the parts, no more and no less. Applying reductionist research methods, all physical/social phenomena are assumed to be based on a few core laws, change in a smooth and predictable manner and demonstrate high levels of order and predictability.[17]

- **Predictability**

System behaviour, according to the Newtonian paradigm, is governed by the rule of 'predictability'. For example, if one knows the initial positions and velocities of the particles constituting a system, together with the forces acting on those particles, then he can predict the further evolution of the system with complete certainty and accuracy.[18] Accordingly, once global behaviour of any phenomenon is defined, the future course of events can be predicted by application of the appropriate inputs to the model. This assumption rests on the previous notion of reductionism which gives the ability to predict the whole from any representative part.[19]

- **Equilibrium**

Newtonian systems are usually static and tend to equilibrium.[20] Without an input of energy, information or resources a simple system can remain largely unchanged

---

[16] Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics*, p. 6.

[17] Geyer, "European Integration," pp. 15-35.

[18] Heylighen, et al., "Complexity and Philosophy," in Bogg, J. and R. Geyer, eds., *Complexity, Science and Society* (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing), 2007.

[19] William Rasch, "Theories of Complexity, Complexities of Theory: Habermas, Luhmann, and the Study of Social Systems," *German Studies Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1991), pp. 65-83.

[20] Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics*, p. 4.

for long periods. For example, 'the automobile is a static system that remains in equilibrium if no energy (for example, gasoline and human control) is added to the system.'[21] Equilibrium refers to 'the condition of equal balance between opposing forces.'[22] It entails that 'for every force there is a counterforce; forces thus tend to equalize each other. In other words it refers to that state in which the forces acting upon the system, or those of them which are taken into consideration, are so arranged that their resultant at every point is zero.'[23]

- **Determinism**

The classical notion of determinism (everything that happens must happen as determined by the conditions of its occurrence),[24] though not new, was given empirical power because of the success of Newton's predictions. Newtonian processes flow along orderly and predictable paths that have clear beginnings and rational ends. This assumption is closely related to the logic of 'necessary causality' which refers to the assumption that: given causes lead to known effects at all times and places, and that these logical causes and effects could be noticed and measured.

- **Linearity**

Linearity implies that the size of the change is correlated with the magnitude of the input to the system. A small input will have a small effect and a large input will have a large effect in a linear system. Newtonian systems are linear, that is, a given input to a system will produce a given output, with perfect proportionality.

---

[21] Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics*, p. 4.

[22] Equilibrium is a main property of closed systems which must eventually reach a state of equilibrium, according to the second law of thermodynamic. See Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "An Outline of General System Theory," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (August 1950), p. 156, Cynthia Eagle Russett, *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[23] In the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'equilibrium' is explained as 'a state of adjustment between opposing or divergent influence or elements', and 'a state of balance between opposing forces or actions that is either static (as in a body acted on by forces whose resultant is zero) or dynamic (as in a reversible chemical reaction when the velocities in both directions are equal)', see Oxford English Dictionary, 'equilibrium', Second edition. 1989.

[24] See Alexander Goldenweiser, "The Concept of Causality in the Physical and Social Sciences," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 3, No. 5 (October 1938), p. 634.

The operation of a linear system is entirely governed by its initial state and its environment.[25] Robert Geyer notices that based on this linear thinking:

> many social scientists assumed that society and social institutions had an "end-state" towards which they were evolving. Hence, economic interaction, democracy, fundamental social orders (communism, capitalism, development), etc. all had final stages towards which they were evolving. Nation-states, societies and even individuals could be positioned along this linear pathway and policies could be devised to help them towards the next level.[26]

- **Simplicity**

The philosophy of Newtonian science, in essence, is one of *simplicity*. Being totally materialistic, the Newtonian world can be described objectively without taking account of the role of the human observer and all that happens is seen to have a definite cause, giving rise to a definite effect, which can be measured, controlled, reversed and accurately predicted.[27] According to the Newtonian thinking the complexity of the world is only apparent; to deal with it one needs only to analyse the specified phenomenon into its simplest components. Having done that, the evolution of any phenomenon will turn out to be perfectly regular, reversible and predictable.[28] This way of perceiving the world and the belief that simple components compose the 'ostensibly' complex universe is what caused the Newtonian paradigm to be described as a simplistic perspective.

The Retreat of the Newtonian Paradigm

The Newtonian paradigm was gradually challenged by successive 'scientific'

---

[25] Malcolm Williams, *Science and Social Science* (Oxon: Routledge, 2000), p. 126.

[26] According to Geyer, the notable success of Francis Fukuyama's book which claimed that history had reached its endpoint demonstrated the continued influence of the linear framework. See Geyer, "European Integration," pp. 15-35.

[27] Lesley Kuhn, "Why Utilize Complexity Principles in Social Inquiry?" pp. 156 – 175.

[28] Compare this view with Milan M. Cirkovic, "Is the Universe Really That Simple?" *Foundations of Physics*, Vol. 32, No. 7 (July 2002), 1141-1157.

findings. During the 20th century the natural sciences began to experience a 'paradigm shift' that propelled them beyond the confines of the Newtonian linear paradigm.[29] Einstein's Relativity, Gödel's theorem, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Planck's Quantum theory and Bohr's Quantum mechanics and the work of many others expanded the limits set by the Newtonian paradigm. The simple linear/deterministic/predictable causality proposed in Newtonian theories of the behaviour of matter does not always hold. Matter can behave unpredictably, and new patterns can emerge without deterministic causes.

This new knowledge has implications for how world phenomena can be examined, and understood. The illustration of these findings is beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is worth mentioning here is that these discoveries 'managed to delimit the boundaries of determinism and seriously affected the notion that: science can predict and control all aspects of the real world.'[30] Nature is proved to be nonlinear in many aspects and it is enough for small changes in initial states to lead to exponential numbers of different kinds of later interactions and consequently very different outcomes. To trace back a natural system to its initial conditions is equally difficult, because each of those conditions would itself have a huge number of earlier antecedent conditions.[31] The new ways of doing science gradually dismantled the Newtonian notions and prepared the way for the 'complexity turn.'[32]

2.2.2 The Complexity Paradigm[33]

Complexity theory derives a lot of its notions from developments in natural sciences such as physics, biology, mathematics, chemistry, ecology and

---

[29] Geyer, "European Integration," pp. 15-35.
[30] Steven E. Phelan, "A Note on the Correspondence between Complexity and Systems Theory," *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1999), pp. 237-246.
[31] Williams, *Science and Social Science*, p. 126.
[32] John Urry, "The Complexity Turn," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2005), pp. Brian Castellani and Frederic William Hafferty, *Sociology and Complexity Science, A New Field of Inquiry* (MI, Springer, 2009), pp. 20-21.
[33] For the purposes of this study; the following terms: paradigm, perspective and theory will be used interchangeably.

economics, forming an interdisciplinary field of research.[34] Complexity introduces a world view that stands in sharp contrast to the Newtonian paradigm based on reductionism, determinism, and objective knowledge. It has been thought of to challenge the simplistic, linear and deterministic explanations of scientific phenomena developed in traditional scientific theories.[35]

There is no exact point in time that can be referred to as the starting point of complexity science. However, since the late 1940s, according to Warren Weaver, it has become commonplace, at least in certain circles, to see science evolving from a science of simple systems to a science of complex systems.[36] The process of transformation accelerated when researchers from various fields became increasingly interested in phenomena that consisted of numerous interacting components to influence the whole system in a manner that could not be discerned by observing the activities of the internal elements themselves. Such phenomena were referred to variously as *nonlinear, dissipative, dynamical* or *complex* systems, to highlight particular aspects of their behaviour.[37]

According to complexity theory the universe consists of a hierarchy of nested

---

[34] To review a counter-argument that complexity theories have limited use in the study of society, and that social processes are too particular to be rigorously modelled in complexity terms, see Peter Stewart, "Complexity Theories, Social Theory, and the Question of Social Complexity," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 31 No. 3 (September, 2001), pp. 323-360.

[35] Adrian Little, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p. 22.

[36] In his famous article of 1948, Science and Complexity, Warren Weaver argued that seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century science succeeded in solving problems of simplicity (inventing the telephone, the automobile, and the moving pictures), while the science of the first half of the twentieth century learned, by means of statistical analysis and probability theory, to deal with problems of disorganized complexity (problems that include large number of variables varying simultaneously). Weaver contended that the task of the latter half of the twentieth century was to develop means of investigating the dynamics of organized complexity; complexity not characterized by random behaviour and therefore not explicable by the rules of probability. See Warren Weaver, "Science and Complexity," *American Scientist*, Vol. 36 (1948), pp. 536-44, Rasch, "Theories of Complexity," pp. 65-83.

[37] What distinguishes Complexity science, according to Christopher G. Langton, is its focus on phenomena that are characterized neither by order—like those studied in Newtonian mechanics and systems science, nor by disorder—like those investigated by statistical mechanics and postmodern social science, but that are situated somewhere in between, in the zone that is commonly called the edge of chaos, see Christopher G. Langton, "Computation at the Edge of Chaos: Phase-Transitions and Emergent Computation," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1990), Geyer, "European Integration," pp. 15-35.

complex systems. A complex system can be described as a collection of mutually interacting elements or components that are all connected and interdependent. Complexity theory seeks to understand how large numbers of relatively simple entities organize themselves into a collective whole that creates patterns, uses information, and, in some cases, evolves and learns.[38] In other words it seeks to draw the attention towards the fact of the emergence of certain macroscopic phenomena (like stability) via the nonlinear interactions of microscopic elements in complex systems.[39]

Complexity theorists often focus on the way in which local actors interact to give rise to global properties and the ways in which those local interactions act to maintain and increase the complexity of the system. A crucial consequence of complexity theory is that knowledge is inherently local rather than universal.[40] This paradigm is characterized by the idea that life is holistic, unpredictable, far from equilibrium, sensitive to initial conditions, nonlinear, self-organizing, and emergent. In the following I will shed some light on these concepts.

- **Holism**

A key feature of complex systems is holism.[41] Holism suggests that the whole system cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. The system as a whole is said to have qualities or properties that the parts do not have. These properties are known as emergent properties. These emergent properties appear very different from the individual elements that make up the system. One could say that these emergent properties are governed by their own laws or rules. As Donald C. Mikulecky put it

> The essence of the ontology of complexity is in the existence of 'something' that is lost as the system is reduced to its parts. The idea complexity connotes is that when the whole exists; the parts are now

---

[38] Melanie Mitchell, *Complexity: A Guided Tour* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 4.
[39] Mainzer, *Thinking in Complexity*, p. 14.
[40] David Byrne, "Complexity, Configurations and Cases," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2005), pp. 95–111.
[41] Ibid., p. 3.

arranged in a more complicated way and this new arrangement gives rise to something real that the whole possesses.[42]

• Unpredictability

Complex systems are unpredictable. An illustrative depiction of this feature is presented by Emanuel Adler who said:

> Suppose you toss a rock into the air. It can make only a simple response to the external physical forces that act on it. But if you throw a bird into the air, it may fly off into a tree. Even though the same physical forces act on the bird as on the rock, a massive amount of internal information-processing takes place inside the bird and affects its behaviour.[43] Now if it is imagined to take a group of people, a nation or various nations and metaphorically toss them in the air. Where they go, how, when and why, is not entirely determined by physical forces and constraints.[44]

The ranges of possible paths for a social complex system are dramatically wide. Decentralized decision-making and diversity among components permits a wide range of agent actions and openness to changes in environmental conditions (the state of other complex systems), and the prevalence of positive feedback loops inject further uncertainty into the system under study.[45]

• Non-Equilibrium

Equilibrium, according to Melanie Mitchell, is a situation in which 'several things that have been interacting, adjusting to each other and to each other's adjustment,

---

[42] Donald C. Mikulecky, "The Emergence of Complexity: Science Coming of Age or Science Growing Old?" *Computers and Chemistry*, Vol. 25 (2001), pp. 341–348.

[43] M. Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 232, quoted in Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), p. 90.

[44] Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," p. 319.

[45] Harrison, "Complexity in World Politics," p. 5.

are at last adjusted, in balance, at rest'.[46] Complex systems theory offers a paradigm that explicitly rejects the concepts of idle equilibrium and stasis that seem inappropriate in dealing with social phenomena. Complex systems operate far from equilibrium since they are dissipative (they take energy from their environment to maintain the organization of the system and to ensure its survival). Energy flows drive the system away from a current equilibrium position towards new successive points of equilibrium.[47]

- **Sensitivity to Initial Conditions**

Sensitivity to initial conditions refers to the fact that small differences in the initial condition of a dynamical system may produce large variations in the long term behaviour of the system. This phenomenon is also referred to as the Butterfly effect; a butterfly's wings might create tiny changes in the atmosphere that may ultimately delay, accelerate or even prevent the occurrence of a tornado in a certain location. The flapping wing represents a small change in the initial condition of the system, which causes a chain of events leading to large-scale alterations of events. Had the butterfly not flapped its wings, the trajectory of the system might have been vastly different. While the butterfly does not 'cause' the tornado in the sense of providing the energy for the tornado, it does 'cause' it in the sense that the flap of its wings is a vital part of the initial conditions resulting in a tornado, and without that flap that particular tornado would not have existed.[48]

There are many examples of this phenomenon in the field of IR. Perhaps the most obvious, according to James Rosenau, concerns the way in which an assassination in 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria triggered the outbreak of World War I. Numerous other more recent illustrations can also be cited, according to Rosenau again, 'it is not difficult to reason that the end of the Cold War began with the election of a Polish pope, just as the release of Nelson Mandela from

---

[46] Mitchell, *Complexity: A Guided Tour*, p. 25.
[47] Chris Lucas, "The Philosophy of Complexity," at: http://www.calresco.org/lucas/philos.htm
[48] See for example: Williams, *Science and Social Science*, p. 131.

prison was arguably (and in retrospect) an event that triggered the end of apartheid in South Africa'.[49]

- **Nonlinearity**

The idea of non-linearity is central to complexity theory; this is because it suggests that systems do not obey the simple rules of addition.[50] A nonlinear system is one in which the whole is different from the sum of the parts. Elements *interact* to create something new; the final product can not be predicted. Mutual interference between the parts requires that we analyse the system in a holistic way.[51] Nonlinearity also guarantees that small causes can have large results, and vice versa. Complex systems are nonlinear in the sense that their outputs are not proportional to their inputs. The size of the outcome may not be correlated to the size of the input. In many non-linear systems, one cannot accurately predict the effect of the change by the size of the input to the system.

- **Self-Organization**

Complex systems are often said to be 'self-organizing'. Self-organizing systems are able to organize themselves to higher levels of complexity. A complex system spontaneously arranges its components and their interactions into a sustainable, global structure that tries to maximize overall fitness.[52] Order is created out of disorder, upending the usual turn of events in which order declines and disorder (or entropy) increases. By this meaning complex systems seem to work against the second law of thermodynamics which provides that in closed systems the entropy (disorder) always increases to its maximal value.[53] The explanation of this

---

[49] James N. Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics, Volume 1: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 113.
[50] Little, *Democratic Piety*, p. 28.
[51] Robert Jervis, *System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 6.
[52] Heylighen, "Complexity and Philosophy," p. 12.
[53] The second law of thermodynamics describes the irreversible movement of closed systems toward a state of maximal entropy or disorder. Closed systems, without any exchange of energy and matter with their environment, develop to disordered states near thermal equilibrium. The degree of disorder is measured by a quantity called 'entropy'. The second law says that in closed

phenomenon is that the second law applies only to isolated closed systems, while complex systems, by definition, are open dissipative systems, in the sense that they need a constant and continuous input of energy from their environment.[54]

- **Emergence**

Complex systems entail that simple rules produce complex behaviour in hard-to-predict ways; the macroscopic behaviour of such systems is, thus, called emergent. 'A large-scale property (e.g., market balance), emerges from microscopic property (e.g., competition).'[55] Global chaotic structures can suddenly emerge from simple local deterministic interactions with no external source of randomness.[56] Although the emergent properties of a system cannot be captured by studying the system's parts, emergence is real.[57] The comment of Donald C. Mikulecky can be cited again here. According to Mikulecky:

> The essence of the ontology of complexity is in the existence of 'something' that is lost as the system is reduced to its parts. The idea complexity connotes is that when the whole exists; the parts are now arranged in a more complicated way and this new arrangement gives rise to something real that the whole possesses.[58]

The notion of emergence, as Adrian Little put it, helps to differentiate complexity from complicatedness.[59] 'If a system despite the fact that it may consist of a huge number of components can be given a complete description in terms of its

---

systems the entropy always increases to its maximal value. For instance, when a cold body is brought into contact with a hot body, then heat is exchanged so that both bodies acquire the same temperature. See Mainzer, *Thinking in Complexity*, p. 62.

[54] Fromm, *The Emergence of Complexity*, p. 8, Mitchell, *Complexity: A Guided Tour*, p. 40.

[55] Mitchell, *Complexity: A Guided Tour*, p. 48.

[56] Ibid., p. 13.

[57] Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics*, p. 33.

[58] Donald C. Mikulecky, "The Emergence of Complexity: Science Coming of Age or Science Growing Old?" *Computers and Chemistry*, Vol. 25 (2001), pp. 341–348.

[59] Little, *Democratic Piety*, p. 24.

individual constituents, such a system is merely complicated'.[60]

• Locality

According to complexity theory, local interactions between simple local actors are essential, as they can give rise to global properties and increase the complexity of the system. Paul Cillers emphasised the role of local interactions and local actors in holding the system together and in creating self-organised stable global patterns in the description he made to complex systems. In any complex system, according to Cillers, large numbers of actors, with no central internal or external control, and simple rules of operation interact *locally*, in what looks like a state of anarchy, to give rise to complex collective behaviour, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.[61]

---

[60] Paul Cilliers, *Complexity and Postmodernism, Understanding Complex Systems* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 165.
[61] Cilliers, *Complexity and Postmodernism,* p. 142.

Table 2.1 the Newtonian Paradigm vs. the Complexity Paradigm

Newtonian Paradigm	Complexity Paradigm
Newtonian ontology entails that all phenomena, whether physical, biological, or mental, are ultimately constituted of matter.	Complexity ontology entails that abstract relations, not only material particles, are the building blocks of reality.
Reductionism: To understand any complex phenomenon, one needs to analyse it to its separate components or break it down into ever smaller and simpler elements.	Holism: The system as a whole is said to have properties that the parts do not have. These emergent properties appear very different from the individual elements that make up the system.
Predictability: Once global behaviour is defined, the future course of events could be predicted.	Unpredictability: Diversity among agents and prevalence of positive feedback loops inject uncertainty into the complex systems.
Equilibrium: Without an input of energy, a simple system can remain largely unchanged for long periods.	Non-equilibrium: Complex systems operate far from equilibrium since they are dissipative (they consume energy to maintain the organization of the system and to ensure its survival).
Determinism: Newtonian processes flow along orderly and predictable paths that have clear beginnings and rational ends.	Sensitivity to initial conditions: Small differences in the initial condition of a dynamical system may produce large variations in the long term behaviour of the system.
Linearity: A given input to a system will produce a given output, with perfect proportionality.	Nonlinearity: Small causes can have large results, and vice versa.
Simplicity: The evolution within any system is perfectly regular and reversible.	Emergence: Global structures and phenomena can suddenly emerge from simple local interactions, system interactions are not reversible.
The possibility of Controlling: Newtonian Systems are controllable systems. Social phenomena (like stability) do not emerge spontaneously; rather they are imposed on system elements.	Self-organization: Complex systems spontaneously arrange their components and their interactions into a sustainable, global structure that tries to maximize overall fitness, without need for an external or internal controller.
Control: usually one actor (or a small group of actors) controls the rest of the system components in a top-down style.	Locality: local actors interact to give rise to global properties and the ways in which those local interactions act to maintain and increase the complexity of the system

2.3   Two Models of Stability

In the following I differentiate between two models of stability derived from the paradigms discussed above: (1) simple stability, derived from the Newtonian perspective, and (2) dynamic stability, derived from the complexity perspective. In the rest of this chapter I explore the logic of each model, its premises, and outline the conditions under which the behaviour predicted by each should be expected.

2.3.1   Simple Stability

Simple stability is based on perpetuating some sort of balance, resting place, pattern of behaviour, or organizational arrangement, preventing, as far as possible, any spontaneous change or unplanned alteration. In the field of international relations, a system is said to be stable (according to the previous meaning of stability) when 'it is able to obtain and maintain an equilibrium point whether that be a specific balance of power between two or more states or a particular system of government (or even a particular government itself).'[62] Simple stability is usually imposed on system components in an intentional manner (e.g. military intervention, regime change, autocratic rule, etc.). As a result of its artificial nature, this pattern of stability is expected to hamper the intrinsic ability of system components to evolve or to self-adapt with changes emanating from the surrounding environment.

At state-level, simple stability is more common in underdeveloped countries with autocratic ruling regimes. It is employed to justify lack of social liberties, absence of democracy, and retardation of economic reform and slow rates of development. Political elites in these regimes promote claims that the achievement of development and democracy cannot be fulfilled except in a 'stable' atmosphere. The meaning of stability is linked—in the minds of those elites—to ossified political, social, economic and cultural domains. Any idea to change the status

---

[62] See Robert Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Security,* Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 2005), p. 192.

quo is considered a threat that has to be resisted.

2.3.1.1 The Assumptions of Simple Stability

As it usually flows in a top-down direction, and does not emerge spontaneously from system local interactions, most of the premises of simple stability, with regard to both system units and processes, have to do with the key (political, economic, and military) actors who adopt and hence impose this model on their respective systems. These premises, therefore, reflect more how those key actors perceive stability than the very essence of the concept of stability itself.

- **System Units**

In respect to the nature of system components, the assumption here is consistent with the Pareto principle,[63] which states that for any social system there are two groups of components: a trivial many, characterized by an irrational nature and a vital few who are expected to assume the burden of controlling the trivial elements.[64] This assumption is implicit in some of IR theories which invite powerful actor(s) to control other system elements to prevent possible threats; such as the hegemonic stability theory, the central idea of which is that the world needs a single dominant state to create and enforce the rules of free trade among the most important members of the system.[65] Applying the notions of the hegemonic stability theory, some analysts argue that concentration of power contributes to stability, 'i.e. where there is a hegemon there is stability. If the

---

[63] The Pareto principle was suggested by Business management thinker Joseph M. Juran who preferred to name it after the Italian economist Vilfredo Federico Pareto (1848 –1923).

[64] This assumption is consistent with the principles of modelling in the Newtonian paradigm. Newtonian models are based on the assumption that it is possible to exclude the trivial elements in any physical system without affecting the preciseness of the measurements of the model results. Long distance planets, for example, are not taken into consideration when measuring the intensity of gravity between the earth and the sun, not because these planets are not there, but because their effect is considered too marginal to be measured.

[65] See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), a similar contribution yet in the field of economics is found with the economist Charles Kindleberger who claims that 'for the world economy to be stabilized there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.' See Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 305, quoted in Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 15.

hegemon is absent, so is stability.'[66]

• System Processes

The main assumption underlying the simple stability model with respect to system processes is that changes taking place outside the ordinary pattern of system functioning, whatever their sources are, are possible threats, and hence should be prevented, resisted, and fought if necessary, using all possible means (state force, institutions, client regimes, etc.). At the nation-state level, un-patterned interactions are deprived from legitimacy or negatively classified as anti-order disturbances. In the case of Middle East autocratic systems (1953-2008), measures taken to maintain simple stability ranged from preventing the establishment of new parties and civil society organizations (including secular ones) to preventing peaceful marches and demonstrations.

On the level of international relations these measures included preventing non-nuclear powers from seeking nuclear technology, resisting the formation of new alliances or economic blocs and de-recognizing certain political groups (e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, Muslim brotherhood) or even de-classifying some political regimes (Cuba, North Korea, Syria i.e. 'rogue' states).

2.3.1.2 Related Concepts

Simple stability is strongly related to other conventional IR concepts such as: status quo, national security, national interest and balance of powers. In many cases these concepts are employed in a way that reflects the premises of simple stability as discussed above.

• Status Quo

Simple stability is another term for maintaining the status quo.[67] To maintain the

---

[66] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, pp. 34, 35.
[67] On the concept of status quo see Paul Seabury, "The Idea of the Status Quo" in Paul Seabury, ed., *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965).

status quo is to keep things the way they currently are. In his attempt to differentiate between the three main patterns of foreign policies, Hans Morgenthau argued that the first pattern; defending the status quo, is based on 'maintaining stability' (in terms of the overall distribution of power).[68] Similarly, Waltz reified the status quo of a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union as the best guarantee for 'international stability'.[69] Alexander Wendt defined 'status quo state' as the one that has no interest in conquering other states, redrawing boundaries, or changing the rules of the international system; in other words the one that has no interest in changing the status quo. When Wendt explained how this type of state-interest was constituted; he attributed it to basic material human needs for security and stability.[70]

From the previous quotes we can conclude that: both status quo and (simple) stability are referring to maintaining an existing point of system equilibrium. This association between stability and the status quo, however, neglects the fact that the starting point in any system may refer to an imbalanced equilibrium, whereby the status quo may actually be unstable. Maintaining the status quo, thus, is not a guarantee of maintaining stability, even in its simple form.

- **National Interest/Security**

Theories of national interest, prevalent in American strategic thinking since the 1950s, are based on the concept of simple stability.[71] The concept is usually used in two related ways. On the one hand, the word *interest* implies a need that has, by some standard of justification, attained the position of an acceptable claim on

---

[68] The other two patterns are: imperialism, which refers to trying to change the status quo; and prestige, which involves impressing other nations with the extent of one's power. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979), p. 42.

[69] Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 32.

[70] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 124.

[71] Hans Morgenthau defined national security as the integrity of the national territory and its institutions, but the concept remains ambiguous and used in many different ways, see Arnold Wolfers "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1952), pp. 481-502.

behalf of the state. On the other hand, the national interest is also used to describe and support particular policies. 'The problem is how to determine the criteria that can establish a correspondence between the national interest expressed as a principle and the sorts of policies by which it is advanced.'[72]

The national interest of any state is multi-faceted.[73] However, it is primarily defined in terms of state's stability and security. The term 'national interest' is very much related to classical realists, who are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they advocate is dictated by the national interest.[74] Since the end of the Second World War several US administrations valued American national interests over other objectives (like democracy promotion) in the Middle East, and made clear their willingness to sacrifice local citizens towards this end. This policy established a strong relationship between Washington and most despotic regimes in the region.

In the same vein, though on the level of domestic policies, it is under the banner of national security considerations that system components can be easily deprived from their rights. For example, after the assassination of President Sadat in Egypt, security measures took a priority in President Mubarak's domestic policy. For the sake of national security, civil rights had been violated regularly, something similar to what happened in the US after the events of September 11, when many civil rights were restricted in order to keep (simple) stability. The loss of some liberties was portrayed then as the price paid for maintaining domestic national security.[75]

---

[72] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan and Steven C. Roach, *International Relations, The Key Concepts* (Oxon: Routledge, 2002).

[73] Arnold Wolfers referred to the problem of the concept; he argued that national interest may not mean the same thing to different people. It may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus it may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name, see Wolfers, "National Security," pp. 481-502.

[74] In this respect Hans Morgenthau stated that national interest should be the central concept of international relations theory. See Ghazi A. R. Algosaibi, "The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics," *Background*, Vol. 8, No. 4. (Feb. 1965), pp. 221-256.

[75] On a detailed discussion on the effect antiterrorism legislation has had on American freedoms in the wake of September 11, see Mark Sidel, *More Secure, Less Free? Antiterrorism Policy & Civil*

- **Balance of Power**

There is an obvious connection between "balance of power" ideas and simple stability. A balanced system implies that changes occurring are within tolerable limits, that is, not threatening the overall stability (in terms of system equilibrium). One of the definitions presented to 'balance of power' in international relations assumes that balance exists when there is stability between competing forces.[76] Most IR theorists believe that 'balance of power' is a useful predictor of how states will behave. States seek to increase their powers through internal growth and external alliances. According to Joseph Nye, balance of power predicts that 'if one state appears to grow too strong, others will ally against it so as to avoid threats to their own independence. This behaviour, then, will preserve the stability of the system.'[77] Although Nye differentiates between several other meanings of the term, the sense of homeostasis (restoring the same point of equilibrium) remains crucial in almost all of these definitions.

Each stable system comprises a point of equilibrium. Stability itself refers to the capacity of the system to restore the point of equilibrium if deviated from it due to some external disorder. The difference is that the simple model of stability is based on maintaining the system at its balanced state (the same point of equilibrium forever), while the dynamic pattern refers to the ability of the system to refine the existing point of equilibrium.

Liberties after September 11 (MI, University of Michigan Press, 2004), David Lyon, *Surveillance after September 11* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). On the definition of American National Security see Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, *U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment* (Washington, DC: the Institute for International Economics, 2006).

[76] Ernst Haas discussed the varying senses of the term in a famous article see Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda", *World Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Jul. 1953), pp. 442-477.

[77] The term balance of power is sometimes used not as a prediction of policy but as a description of how power is distributed, that is to refer to an evenly balanced distribution of power, like a pair of hanging scales, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp.184-185. According to Stuart J. Kaufman some scholars use 'balance of power' descriptively to refer to a 'balance of power' in favour of some state –in other words, to refer to some form of hegemony. That is clearly the minority position however; for most American scholars trained in the Cold War era it refers descriptively to equilibrium, or relative equality of power between two or more states, see Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, William Curti Wohlforth, *The Balance of Power in World History* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 3.

2.3.1.3 Possible Consequences of Simple Stability

- **Dependency**

The actors, in systems stabilized according to the simplistic model, are expected to be fully dependent on an external controller for guidance. In the case of the disappearance of this guidance, the actors feel massive vulnerability. For example, after being stabilized through this pattern during the 1950s and 1960s, Nasserist Egypt lost much of its internal dynamism and was vulnerable to the massive defeat of 1967. Nasser depended more on his charismatic personality than on improving the dynamic capabilities of the Egyptian society. This led the Egyptian system to be too handicapped to face external threats.

- **Non-Adaptability**

When imposed on complex systems, this pattern of stability is expected to hinder the inherent ability of actors to evolve or to cope with changes emanating from the environment. Externally-imposed stability hampers the natural evolution of complex systems and drives their components to a state of stagnation (which causes them to increase their dependency on the controller). However, the simple stability model can produce some positive outcomes when imposed on simple systems (artificially created systems), which usually depend on external sources of power to protect their existence.

2.3.2 Dynamic Stability[78]

Dynamic stability is an emergent property; it emerges as a result of multilevel, non-linear, and large scale interactions among system components. It reflects a system process (system's ability to cope with disturbances) rather than a system state (peacefulness or equilibrium). It is a property of the system as a whole,

---

[78] There are few references to the concept of dynamic stability in the available literature on U.S.-Middle East relations, or in literature of international relations theory, however, useful discussions on the concept are found in Paul Cilliers, *Complexity and Post-modernism, Understanding complex systems* (London: Routledge, 1998), and Robert Jervis, *System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1997).

determining its capacity to move from one point of equilibrium to a new one which provides for a more adaptive pattern of behaviour. The main feature of dynamically-stabilized systems is their ability to accommodate disturbances affecting their functioning in a bottom-up way.[79]

Unlike the simple-stability model which assumes that equilibrium is the default state of all phenomena, the dynamic-stability model suggests that non-equilibrium is the default state of any complex system. Dynamic stability does not refer to the retention of the current point of equilibrium. Rather it refers to the ability to move to successive points of equilibrium. The trick then is for the system to be able to handle a shift from the existing pattern of interactions to a new pattern without a major disintegration, in other words, without losing its physical existence.[80] Assessing dynamic stability of a complex system entails making judgments about how resilient it is in the face of disturbances. According to John Ikenberry:

> It is necessary to look at the durability of the system in the face of threatening forces from both within and outside. It is also necessary to look within the system to see what sort of mechanisms are at-work that allow it to adjust and stabilize itself in the face of such disturbances. Does the system's stability hinge on continuous and difficult-to-accomplish manoeuvring, or is the system's stability rooted in a wider set of more durable and resilient structures?[81]

However, it should be noted that neither durability nor peacefulness is sufficient evidence of dynamic stability. Many political systems managed to stay in peace for several years without being stable. As Robert Jervis put it, a system could last a long time, not because it was stable, but because it happened to exist during

---

[79] See Jervis, *System Effects*, p. 95.

[80] For example, the Shah regime of Iran ceased to exist after the eruption of the revolution of 1979, so it cannot be said that the Iranian system had simply moved from one point of equilibrium to another, rather, it could be argued that the shah regime had failed in the test of dynamic stability.

[81] John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order* (Princeton: NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001), p.45. Ikenberry uses the term order instead of system which I have chosen in this citation.

propitious times.[82] The average life span of many Middle East regimes (in the period 1953-2008) was several decades, but this was no indicator of the stability of these regimes which suffered from many serious deficiencies in almost every ruling domain.[83]

Conversely, a system could be stable but short-lived if it had the bad luck to be quickly confronted by a large or unusual shock.[84] On the other hand, some political systems might resort to violence in their search for stable patterns of behaviour. Morton Kaplan noted that 'periods of transitional adjustments may represent attempts to find new patterns of stable behaviour after the old patterns have proved unstable for some reason.'[85] In short, to judge any system as dynamically stable, this system should be able to successfully overcome unexpected disturbances in a bottom-up, emergent style. Longevity and peacefulness per se are insufficient indicators of stability.

2.3.2.1 The Assumptions of the 'Dynamic Stability' Model

The dynamic stability model is based on two main assumptions with regard to both 'system units' and 'system processes'

- **System Units**

The dynamic stability model is based on the assumption that any complex adaptive system has a holistic nature in the sense that it cannot be reduced to separate elements without being distorted. In other words, decomposing a complex system and analysing its sub-parts does not necessarily give a clue of the behaviour of the whole. Complexity ontology entails that abstract relations, not

---

[82] Robert Jervis, *System Effects.*
[83] The time-frame explored in this study (1953-2008) does not incorporate the events of the "Arab Spring" which began on Saturday, 18 December 2010, and included a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that occurred in countries of North Africa and Middle East (e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen).
[84] For an example see Paul Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the International System," *International History Review,* Vol. 6, (February 1984), pp. 20–22.
[85] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and process in international politics* (Colchester: ECPR, 2005), p. 22.

only material particles, are the building blocks of reality.[86] Thus, a complex system is not constituted merely by the sum of its components, but also by the complex relationships between these components.

The spontaneous emergence of 'macro properties' out of 'micro interactions' are typical of complex systems. Accordingly, the emergence of 'dynamic stability', as a macro property, in complex systems is not a result of the purposeful behaviour of the elements or the influence of a central organizing authority. Rather, such a property is a product of some sort of self-organization.[87] Stability in complex systems is the result of rule-based interactions between actors at the local level of the system. 'These rules evolve - adapt - under the influence of the experience and the learning abilities of the actors constituting the system, and as a result of the development of the structure of the complex system.'[88]

- **System Processes**

Any dynamically stabilized system should be able to cope with the challenges it encounters through processes of feedback. By feedback I refer to a state when one point of experience in a system influences the next. Feedback can be positive or negative. Together, these feedback mechanisms can explain why systems preserve a given form, and how this can be elaborated and transformed over time.[89] Through processes of feedback, complex systems accommodate external changes to reach a new point of equilibrium. Complex systems are characterized by a high degree of adaptive capacity (positive feedback); this property gives these systems resilience in the face of perturbation. In such kind of systems, atypical interactions are necessary for the evolution of both elements and relations. Systems with positive feedback have not only a single, but several states of equilibrium which

---

[86] Francis Heylighen, "Complexity and Philosophy," p. 121.

[87] Ingo Piepers, "Dynamics and Development of the International System: A Complexity Science Perspective," *arXiv.org*, Cornell University. At: http://arxiv.org/ftp/nlin/papers/0604/0604057.pdf

[88] Ibid., p. 1.

[89] Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986), p. 46.

are not necessarily optimal.[90]

The current international system appears, according to Robert Ayson, to have had a measure of dynamic stability in terms of its ability to make a reasonable transition from the Cold War bipolar structure to the current phase of American unipolarity. It seems that the system managed to reach a new point of equilibrium without falling into comprehensive chaos.[91] Accordingly, it can be argued that the inquiry about the most stable power distribution, in terms of durability, is misleading. Changes are part and parcel of any complex system (like that of the international system); the crucial point for any system is to be able to accommodate these changes not to prevent them altogether.

2.3.2.2 Related Concepts

Dynamic stability is related to other concepts such as locality and bottom-up reform. In many cases these concepts are employed in a way that reflects the premises of dynamic stability as discussed above.

- **Locality**

The dynamic stability model is strongly connected to the concept of locality. Dynamic stability (as a system property) stems from interactions at the local level and shows in turn, high sensitivity to the tiny changes in local conditions.[92] In complex system, local actors are much better suited to respond to local conditions. This allow for flexibility and adaptability.[93] Accordingly, there is always a good chance for dynamic stability to emerge in complex systems as long as local components are healthy enough to accommodate challenges.[94]

The assumptions that social systems are essentially uniform and that local details

---

[90] Mainzer, *Thinking in Complexity*, p. 328.
[91] Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," p. 192.
[92] Ibid., p. 57.
[93] Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010), p. 73.
[94] Roger Lewin, *Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 13, 14.

do not matter for the behaviour of a system on larger scales are not generally valid for complex systems.[95] In a complex system stability emerges at local levels, it is driven by internal dynamics that involve vast number of actions and interactions, and where results cannot be retraced back to specific causes. One of the main ideas behind complexity theory is that the emergence of global properties in complex systems (such as dynamic stability) can be attributed to the evolution of microscopic interactions between local elements of a system during learning strategies.

A comprehensive account of local actors (that generates stability) in any complex system is inconceivable, according to Geyer and Rihani, 'any description [of complex system components] claiming completeness must be as complex as the system itself.[96] However, the strength of local elements (in their entirety) is a good guarantee of the strength of the whole system.' As Geyer and Rihani put it 'The delicate balance between local interactions and global stability is a key factor in enabling a dynamic system, with a nonlinear mode of operation to survive through continual adaptation, steering, as it does so, an uncertain path between deathly order and rampant chaos.'[97]

- **Bottom-Up Reform**

Complexity theory expects dynamic stability to emerge out of bottom-up interactions. This is why the dynamic stability model is very close to the democratic model which is, by nature, an indigenous, bottom-up form of government. There is little doubt that democracies provide more stable welfare for their people than do autocracies.[98] A bottom-up democratic approach focuses more on developing ways to strengthen citizens' participation in an effort to make the government more responsive to citizens' concerns. This approach typically

---

[95] Yaneer Bar-Yam, *Dynamics of Complex Systems* (MA: Perseus Books, 1997).
[96] Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," paper presented at the *Political Studies Association Annual Conference* London, 10-13, April, 2000.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Francis Fukuyama, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?," *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 2007-2008), pp. 23–45.

relies on efforts to develop the civil society which should direct the development process. Local structures will emerge as the major arena for the exercise of governance.[99]

Most of the notions of dynamic stability are thus consistent with democratic peace assumptions. The main difference between the 'democratic peace' conception of stability and the one adopted in this study is that, while the dynamic stability model implies that stability is an emergent property that evolves intrinsically in any open system, democratic peace theorists argue that democracy can be imposed via military intervention and deliberate regime change.

2.3.2.3 Consequences of Dynamic Stability

The first consequence of the 'dynamic stability' model is that elements are never homeostatic; they are usually moving through several points of equilibrium. However, these points are usually brief in time and unique. They are brief because the continuous interactions of system elements drive the system away from the current point of equilibrium, and they are unique in the sense that, each point of equilibrium is a product of different conditions and interactions. Neil Harrison used illustrative examples to clarify these two consequences of dynamic stability. According to him:

> In both markets and world politics the frequent and temporary equilibrium points are always distinct phenomena. Each state of balance is a fleeting event within a specific set of conditions, a point on a path of change. The dynamic European system [for example] has found several momentary points of balance between myriad forces Though power was balanced in Europe before World War I and in the Cold War, the conditions were unique to each period.[100]

The second main consequence of the 'dynamic stability' model is that units in

---

[99] Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss, (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), p. 223.
[100] Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics*, p. 11.

complex systems usually gain practical experience via facing more than one pattern of interactions. This helps system components to cope with successive and rapid changes and to acquire self-reliance. Also, the elements will gain adaptability that enables them to keep up with unexpected and untypical changes. To sum, being exposed to a dynamic environment; system elements, evolve and gain properties of self adaptation over time.

2.4   Domestic Catalysts for both Kinds of Stability

Given that the following chapters will discuss the external factors (mainly US intervention) that affect Middle East stability, the following section will be devoted to discuss some of the domestic factors that work inside Middle East sub-systems and influence stability. These factors include: the type of political system, the state of war and the state of peace, state power, and the type of the mainstream culture.

- **The Type of Political System**

Typically, authoritarian regimes have an extremely tight grip on power. Simple stability is purchased through tyranny and terror.[101] As Theodore M. Vestal argues, authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power structures, in which political power is generated and maintained by a repressive system that excludes potential challengers and uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the government.[102] Authoritarian systems, hence, find it easier to impose a simplistic pattern of stability on their societies, rather than enhancing a dynamic pattern of interactions amongst system (local) actors.

Terry O'Callaghan and others notice that in the large majority of cases, authoritarianism is justified with reference to its supposedly positive sides of

---

[101] Martin Griffiths, et al., *International Relations: The Key Concepts*.
[102] See Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jan., 2004), pp. 139-157

creating e.g. order, welfare, growth, and stability.[103] Authoritarian leaders cannot trust civil society, opposition, ballots, in one word, cannot trust 'dynamism'. Therefore they use every possible tool to maintain a simple stability. These tools include: control over and support of the military, a pervasive bureaucracy staffed by the regime, control of internal opposition and dissent and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization.[104]

- **The State of War and State of Peace**

The context in which stability models are adopted affects which specific pattern prevails. Simple stability is more likely to be adopted during periods of wars. Wars present the standard milieu to impose martial and emergency laws in any society. For example, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the US administration imposed a right-wing dictatorship, headed by Field Marshall Badoglio and the King Victor Emmanuel III, in southern Italy to assure a 'stable' Italy in the face of the Communist threat.

- **State Power**

In general, the weaker the state the more likely it is to adopt a 'simple stability' model, rather than a dynamic model of stability. This situation occurs because weaker states do not have the resources or the abilities that make them prepared to accommodate dynamic changes. Leaders in weak states prefer a stability model that enables them to control the path and the amount of change taking place. By contrast, strong states usually have the ability to manipulate the unexpected outcomes of a dynamic pattern of interactions.[105] Using complexity theory's

---

[103] Martin Griffiths et al., *International Relations: The Key Concepts.*
[104] Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia, 1994-2010
[105] The factor of state power is highly affected by the type of leadership, which has always been more important in Middle East societies than the type of political institutions or the level of state power. P. J. Vatikiotis noticed that 'the tradition of centralized authority in most Arab countries breeds charismatic qualities in the ruler, whoever he may be'. In contrast with many Western nations where the political party plays a primary role in determining a nation's policies, in many Middle Eastern countries the personality of the leader is of over-riding importance. Most Middle East Arab societies are based more on networks of tribal cultures that rely on personal and family honour and loyalty than on rules and institutions which are necessary for the functioning of a

terminology, simple stability suits artificial systems (systems that depend on external force to protect their existence). By contrast, dynamic stability suits complex systems (systems that emerge through a long process of dynamic and spontaneous interactions between multi-level variables). Imposing simplistic stability arrangements on complex systems scores less success.

- **The Type of Mainstream Culture**

The simple stability model tends to prevail in systems with conservative cultures. Conservative cultures perpetuate specific norms and values and fear that new dynamic arrangements might present a possible challenge to this body of norms and values. These conservative patterns of thinking devaluate political protests, criminalize rebellions against the ruler, downgrade demonstrations or any act of political dissent. The spread of this type of thinking in many Middle East sub-systems facilitated external intervention in its affairs and contributed in perpetuating patterns of political stagnation.

2.5   Conclusion

This chapter distinguishes between two different models of stability and between the theoretical paradigms from which these models are derived. It is argued that there are two models of stability, (1) simple stability, derived from the Newtonian perspective and (2) dynamic stability, derived from the complexity perspective. The difference between the two models is that the first equates stability with preserving a pre-defined equilibrium/status quo, while the second considers stability as an evolutionary self-ability of accommodating disturbances. In other

---

dynamic stability model. Samir Mutawi concluded some reasons for the dominating role played by one individual, including: 'the absence in the Middle East of a popular consensus on the nature of political processes, the close relationship between the ruler and the means of coercion, and the absence of a historical tradition of popular participation in political life. The assumption that there should be a leading figure in religious, civil and political affairs remains implicit in many Arab communities'. See P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics, Pattern for New Nations?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 229. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 16. Samir A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 war* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 1.

words, the second model refers to a more dynamic pattern of stability, in which the system is restored to a balanced state through internal processes of self-organization, not through external power that imposes status quo arrangements on system components. It is also concluded that the mere durability or peacefulness of a particular equilibrium is not a sufficient indicator of system stability. Stability requires the system to be able to cope with external shocks. There is also a need to consider that any particular equilibrium may only be suitable for a particular set of circumstances which may not themselves be durable. Based on the above illustration I will try, in the following chapter, to elucidate how the concept of stability has been utilized in the field of IR theory.

Table 2.2 **Simple Stability vs. Dynamic Stability**

	Simple Stability	Dynamic Stability
Main Conditions (A system is said to be stable when...)	...it is able to obtain and maintain an equilibrium point whether that be a specific balance of power between two or more states or a particular system of government (or even a particular government itself)	...it has the ability to accommodate disturbances affecting its functioning and the capacity to move from one point of equilibrium to a new one which provides for a more adaptive pattern of behaviour.
Main Features	Forcibly imposed, in a top-down manner, by internal (or external) force, in a reductionist base.	Emerges, in a bottom-up manner, out of spontaneous interactions among local actors.
Main Assumptions	System Units: any system consists of a few vital, and many trivial units (Pareto's principle). System Processes: unplanned change is possible threat and hence should be prevented as far as possible.	System Units: any complex adaptive system is a distinct rational entity. It has a holistic nature in the sense that it cannot be reduced to separate elements without being distorted. System Processes: benefit from changes through different patterns of feedback.
Related Concepts	Status Quo, Balance of Powers, National Security/Interests	Locality, Bottom up Reform in Democratic models.
Consequences (for system elements)	Elements remain in a homeostatic state and characterized by dependency and non-adaptability.	Elements move through several points of equilibrium, which are usually brief and unique. Elements are characterized by adaptability and self-reliance.
Catalysts	Common in authoritarian regimes and weak systems with conservative mainstream culture, especially during periods of War.	Common in developed (democratic), strong regimes with open cultural atmosphere.

Chapter 3

IR Theory and the Concept of Stability

3.1   Introduction

The primary aim of this chapter is to examine how traditional IR theory defines stability. In this chapter I illustrate the statements of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. I seek to capture the basic intuitive notion of stability as defined by each perspective. Finally, I discuss the main shortcoming of these contributions, namely, their over-concentration on the peaceful connotation of the concept of stability. It will be shown that stability in the international context is treated as a synonym to peace, or the absence of violence.[1] I will start by briefly reviewing the main arguments of each theory. Then, I will address how they define stability and use it as an analytical concept. I will finish by discussing the main shortcoming of these perspectives with regard to defining stability, namely, their identification of stability and peacefulness.

3.2   IR Perspectives and their Definitions of Stability

IR theory has paid reasonable attention to the stability of the international system. The contributions of intellectual schools in this regard are numerous though similar in essence. Neorealists have explored, in depth, the relationship between power polarity and stability.[2]   Some realists promoted unipolarity,[3] others advocated multipolarity,[4] but bipolarity was the type of system structure that

---

[1] See for example John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994-1995), p. 7.

[2] If power is concentrated in the hands of a single state in an international system, the system is unipolar. If two states of roughly comparable capability stand far above the rest, the system is bipolar. If power is more widely distributed, the system is multipolar. The nineteenth century European system was multipolar; the Cold War period (1945–89) was bipolar; and the contemporary system of American dominance is unipolar, see Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010), pp. 51, 52.

[3] William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.

[4] Karl Deutsch, J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), p. 390.

gained prevalent recognition as a reliable guarantee of international stability.[5] Neoliberals, on the other hand examined how nation-state, with given interests and identities, make use of institutions/democratic norms/economic cooperation to advance international stability.[6] Last but not least, constructivists investigated how collective norms and values can facilitate stability in terms of sustainable patterns of interactions among actors.[7]

The common (usually implicit) assumption amongst these diversified contributions is that the international system is homeostatic.[8] Disturbances are perceived as temporary and the international system tends to return to a balanced state. Accordingly, it can be concluded that conventional IR perspectives equate stability with the Newtonian conception of physical equilibrium (illustrated in chapter 2). World politics theories, as John Gerard Ruggie put it, are 'reposed in deep Newtonian slumber.'[9] Current theories of world politics assume that stability is a deterministic phenomenon, one that can be achieved linearly. The criterion chosen by these theories as an indicator of international stability is the 'absence of warfare', the international system can be described as stable as long as it did not witness an all-out war.

However, defining international stability in terms of physical equilibrium, with peace as the only proof of it, involves an internal contradiction, I argue. A very damaging war might be considered a perfect equilibrium in some situations (like the devastating Iran-Iraq war which lasted for 8 years, but in spite of that presented an effective way, from the perspective of the American administrations, to dually contain both countries, and was thus a war that promoted regional stability). Peace, though a possible symptom of stability does not fit as a synonym

---

[5] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979).
[6] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).
[7] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[8] Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 4.
[9] John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-74.

to it. Stability includes other dimensions that may and may not be peaceful. In the following illustration it will be revealed, however, that most IR scholars equate stability with peacefulness, still others focus on durability, but only a very few are interested in system's ability to recover after being disrupted. This later aspect of systems' properties remains uncommon in most of the literature that I was able to check as the next sections will illustrate.

3.2.1 Realism

The realist school of thought goes back to Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BCE. [10] However, it is widely accepted that modern realism began as a serious field of research in the United States during and after World War II.[11] After the failure of idealism and the international law to prevent the aggressions of the 1930s, Morgenthau's book 'Politics Among Nations', first published in 1948, led a resurgence of realist thinking.[12]

Through the Cold War realism then neorealism[13] was the dominant theoretical tradition,[14] because 'it provided simple explanations for common international phenomena (for example, war, alliances, and obstacles to cooperation) and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.'[15] Realism has many versions,[16] however, the

---

[10] Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010), p. 38.

[11] JE Dougherty, RL Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (London: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 81.

[12] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 38.

[13] Linked to the name of Kenneth Waltz who made a distinction between what he called 'systems level' and 'unit level'. According to Waltz any theory that sought to account for an international system had to concern itself only with the characteristics of system level. The reason for this is that international systems imposed their own limits upon state action, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 5-58.

[14] Mainly, thanks to Hans Morgenthau's works, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

[15] Stephen Walt, "One World: Many Theories," in Richard Little, Michael Smith, eds., *Perspectives on World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

[16] We can distinguish within realism between classical realism (which argues that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others) and neorealism (which ignores human

assumptions that states are the main actors and that they focus in the first place on their own security are central to most.[17]

Power, according to realists, is the main explanatory concept of IR phenomena. It is defined in terms of state capabilities (military power, natural resources, the population, etc.).[18] The distribution of countries power/capabilities determines system polarity, this polarity, in turn, explains most outcomes in international affairs especially stability (or instability) of the international system.[19]

For most realists, anarchy, in conjunction with uncertainty about the intentions of other states, has enormous consequences. It induces insecurity and a continuous competition for power, which makes the international system inherently conflictual. According to Levy and Thompson, 'anarchy does not automatically lead to war, but it creates a permissive environment for war by creating a system of insecurity, conflicts of interest, and international rivalries.'[20] Given omnipresent threats, political leaders tend to focus on short - term security needs and adopt worst-case thinking. They often utilize coercive threats to advance their interests, influence the adversary, and maintain their reputations. Realists tend to have a grim picture of the international system, 'and they tend to be sceptical of grand schemes for creating and maintaining a peaceful international order'.[21]

---

nature and focused on the effects of the structure of the international system), and within neorealism between offensive realism (which posits a Hobbesian world wherein states seek to maximize what little security they have) and defensive realism (which assumes that states can deal with most external threats by changing the power balance). Some add to this list another branch; neoclassical realism which rejects the assumption that states' sole aim is security. Rather, they assume that states attempt to use their power to direct the international system towards their own goals and preferences, see Richard Little, Michael Smith, eds., *Perspectives on World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

[17] Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 980.

[18] On different attempts at defining power, see Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, *Power in World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

[19] For example, the distribution of power at the end of World War II, according to realists, would have enabled to predict the rivalry that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, and would have enabled, according to neorealists, a prediction of the stability/peacefulness that this bipolar system was characterized with for almost half a century, see Ole. R. Holsti, *Making American Foreign Policy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 318.

[20] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 29.

[21] Ibid.

3.2.1.1 Realism and Stability[22]

Although war (or at least the possibility of it) is a fundamental part of the anarchical IR system according to the classical and the neo-realist models,[23] stability is thought to be achievable under certain circumstances. It can be further argued that stability is a unifying interest for the various realist endeavours. Richard Ned Lebow notices that realist approaches examine how balances of power, the distribution of power, and hegemonies generate stability among states.[24] The fundamental realist claim in this respect is that stability is created and maintained by state (most often, military) power.[25] Realists elevate military power to a preeminent position in preventing an outbreak of hostilities, deterring the use of force, and maintaining stability.[26]

Most realists define stability in terms of preserving the status quo. According to Duncan Bell, Realism 'defends the status quo, prioritizing great power stability and order above the pursuit of other values. It is a form of international conservatism, insisting that the immutable character of politics renders significant change undesirable, even dangerous.'[27]

Built on this understanding, realism—and its neorealist revisions—offer two

---

[22] When reviewing realist literature it can be noted that stability, balance, equilibrium concepts are employed interchangeably.

[23] According to both realism and the neo-realism under the conditions of international politics, war recurs; the only way to abolish war is to abolish international politics, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), p. 41.

[24] See Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, The End of The Cold War, and the Failures of Realism," *International Organization*, Vol. 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 249-77.

[25] See Berenskoetter and Williams, *Power in World Politics*.

[26] Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," *International Organisation*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), p. 487.

[27] Duncan Bell, ed., *Political Thought and International Relations, Variations on a Realist Theme* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008), p. 16. Similarly, Richard Ned Lebow noticed that prominent realist practitioners (for example, Henry Kissinger) and academics (for example, John Gaddis) valued stability over other values (like human rights), and had made clear their willingness to sacrifice Eastern Europe towards this end, they even regret the passing of the Cold War because of the uncertain and unpredictable nature of the world that was emerging in its place. See Richard Ned Lebow, "Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change," in Michael C. Williams, ed., *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 245.

relatively distinct methods of stability formation in world politics, the first is based on maintaining stability/status quo through deterrence, reflected by hegemonic stability theory and the second is based on preserving stability/status quo via balancing tools reflected by balance of power theory.[28]

- **Hegemonic Stability**

Hegemonic stability is one of the most important theories of the 1970s in the area of international relations that accounts for the development and demise of international systems.[29] Hegemonic stability theorists establish a strong relationship between power politics and stability. According to them stability is created and maintained by a hegemonic power, which uses its power capabilities to organize relations among states. The preponderance of power by a state allows it to offer incentives, both positive and negative, to the other states to agree to ongoing participation within the hegemonic order.[30] In this meaning power becomes the variable that introduces stability and prevents change from occurring.[31]

Hegemony can create peace/stability by overawing potential rivals. A hegemon might well have an interest in enforcing peace/stability for the sake of commerce or investments or as a means of enhancing its prestige or security, Although far from perfect and certainly precarious, United States hegemony, as Raymond Aron notes, 'might account for the interstate peace in South America in the post-war period during the height of the cold war.'[32]

According to Robert Gilpin, a stable international system is, at any particular moment in history, the reflection of the underlying distribution of power of states

[28] John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 11.
[29] Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 34.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 34.

within the system:

> Over time, this distribution of power shifts, leading to conflicts and splits in the system, hegemonic war, and the eventual reorganization of order so as to reflect the new distribution of power capabilities. It is the rising hegemonic state or group of states, whose power position has been confirmed by war, that defines the terms of the postwar settlement and the character of the new system.[33]

Hegemonic stability theorists advocate *inequality* of power which has often led, according to them, to 'peace and stability' because there was little point in declaring war on a dominant state or a hegemon. Gilpin has argued that Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security.[34] But the question, as J. Nye put it, is how much and what kind of inequality of power is necessary – or tolerable – and for how long? Employing his dichotomy of soft and hard power J. Nye suggested that

> if the leading country possesses soft power and behaves in a manner that benefits others, effective counter-coalitions may face difficulties. On the other hand, if the leading country defines its interests narrowly, and uses its weight arrogantly, it increases the incentives for others to coordinate to escape its hegemony.[35]

The hegemon, according to the theory, supports the system and maintains its stability, so long as it is in its interests. However, the hegemon would begin to undermine the institution when it is not in its interests. The system is created, shaped and maintained by coercion. With the decline of a hegemon, the system

---

[33] Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, (Spring 1988), p. 609.

[34] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Future of American Power", in Chandra Chari, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 38.

[35] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 15.

descends into instability.[36]

• Balance of Power

The balance of power is one of the oldest theories in international politics. Traditional realists consider the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the "golden age" of the balance of power, and they occasionally apply the concept to other historical systems and to the contemporary era as well. Kenneth Waltz, one of the strongest supporters of this concept, has argued that balance of power is the most developed theory in international politics.[37]

The concept, however, is quite ambiguous. Emerson Niou et al. argued that:

> No concept causes more difficulty or is a greater source of confusion in discussions of international relations than the concept of balance of power. Scholars are uncertain about whether this term refers to a theory of conflict and coalitions, to a description of international systems, to the goals of key decision makers, or to a normative prescription about how international systems ought to achieve peace.[38]

Similarly, Robert O. Keohane argued that the concept of balance of power had lost much analytical value because it had been used in many confusing ways.[39] 'The balance of power has been used to refer to the actual distribution of power in the international system, to a distribution of power favourable to one's own state, or to any distribution of power.'[40] However, all balance of power theories share the basic core assumptions of realist theory: the system is anarchic, the key actors

---

[36] Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", *International Organization* Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614, Isabelle Grunberg, "Exploring the 'Myth' of Hegemonic Stability," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 431-476.

[37] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, p. 33.

[38] Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 28.

[39] Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 1, (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27

[40] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 38.

are states who aim to maximize their power and/or security, and they act rationally to promote those goals.[41]

Balance of power theorists argue that balance is the essence of the international system. In an anarchic international system, states which are at a disadvantage in the balance of power will (or at least should) take measures to enhance their ability to restrain a possible aggressor.[42] Incentives exist for those states to balance, that is to try to prevent the rise of a hegemon.[43] At its core, the concept of balancing expresses the idea of a counterweight, specifically, the ability to generate sufficient material capabilities to match—or offset—those of a would-be, or actual, hegemon.[44] According to Waltz,

> Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.[45]

Balancing against hegemonic threats is the one thing that all balance of power theorists agree upon. Balance of power theorists specify two general strategies

---

[41] Ibid., p. 39.

[42] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 17.

[43] In response, hegemonic stability theorists criticised balance-of-power theory for not telling anything that would happen once a country establishes a position of a hegemon. For example, the relative economic and military power of the United States is historically unprecedented, yet no great power balancing coalition has formed against it. This is a puzzle for many scholars, who argue that balance of power theory predicts balancing in such situations. According to Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth 'All the historical experience of balancing from the seventeenth century until 1991 concerns efforts to check a rising power from upsetting the status quo. Consequently, for three centuries no balance-of-power theorist ever developed propositions about a system in which hegemony is the status quo'. See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World out of Balance, International relations and the Challenge of American primacy* (Princeton: Princeton university press, 2008), p. 35.

[44] T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, (eds.), *Balance of Power, Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

[45] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 126-27. However, there is another branch within the neorealistic thinking argues that states may tend to balance threat instead, by allying with the hegemon, rather than allying with other states to balance against him, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990).

86

that states can adopt against a potentially hegemonic state; "external balancing" and "internal balancing." The former involves the formation of counterbalancing alliances in order to block the expansion of an aggressor or to deter a potential aggressor from initiating aggressive policies. Internal balancing is the internal mobilization of military power and a build - up of the economic and industrial foundations of military strength.[46]

Balance of powers theorists predict that balances disrupted will be restored. 'Just as the neoclassical market continually returns to equilibrium between demand and supply, the international system returns to a balance between many forces.'[47] 'A limitation of the theory, a limitation common to all social science theories, is that it cannot say when.'[48]

Balance-of-power theory explains stability as a 'product of an ongoing process of balancing and adjustment of opposing power concentrations or threats among states under conditions of anarchy.'[49] Balance-of-power realists argue that the process of competing over power between individual states and groups of alliances leads to stability at the system level. They argue that one of the virtues of a balance-of-power stability is precisely that it requires so little agreement, normative consensus, or shared characteristics among the units. According to them stability is a spontaneous side-effect of states balancing each other by acting separately.[50] Different balance of power theorists then add empirical content to these basic assumptions by suggesting additional assumptions and hypotheses. This leads to different versions of balance of power theory, some with conflicting propositions (about the relative stability of bipolar and multipolar systems, for example) as I will illustrate in the following.

---

[46] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 40.

[47] Neil E. Harrison, "Thinking in the World We Made", in Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics*, 11.

[48] Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," p. 27.

[49] John Ikenberry argued that 'students of balance-of-power differ over how explicit and self-conscious the rules of balance tend to be. Stability that emerges is thus either the unintended outcome of balancing pressures or a reflection of learned and formalized rules of equilibrium and balance', see Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 11, Harrison, "Thinking in the World We Made", p. 11.

[50] see Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 23.

3.2.1.2 System Structure and Stability

Realists generally accept the hypothesis that a primary determinant of international stability is the distribution of power in the international system or the system structure.[51] According to neorealists the type of the system structure is the main factor that affects stability (in terms of peacefulness).[52] There is intense debate on whether a particular distribution of power (multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar) is more prone to stability/peace. The frequently asked question in this regard is: will international politics be more or less 'peaceful and stable' if power is more or less closely concentrated?[53]

Different conceptions of power, however, led to different predictions about the results of particular system structure.[54] A wide range of opinions on which structure/distribution of power/polarity is the most stable/peaceful is available. Advocates of each system (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity) have their logical arguments. They have agreed, as Patrick James and Michael Brecher put it, to disagree.[55]

- **Multipolarity**

Multipolarity is perceived by many scholars as a distribution of power which is more stable over the longer term. IR theorists often use the term multipolarity to imply the return to a balance among a number of states with roughly equal power resources, analogous to that of the nineteenth century.[56] In their major work on stability in international systems, Karl Deutsch and David Singer addressed the 'relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system', where

---

[51] See Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (March 1970), pp. 98-123.

[52] According to Kenneth Waltz structure refers to how units stand in relation to one another and how they are arranged or positioned, See Waltz, *Theory of International politics*, p. 80.

[53] Ibid., p. 14.

[54] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 29

[55] Patrick James and Michael Brecher, "Stability and Polarity: New Paths for Inquiry," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1988), pp. 31-42.

[56] See Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power in the Global Information Age from Realism to Globalization* (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), p. 69.

the latter refers to 'the frequency and intensity of war.'[57] They concluded that multipolar systems are the most stable form of international systems. They employed sophisticated mathematical techniques to help determine the stability of international systems composed of varying numbers of great powers, and concluded that a multipolar system composed of at least five great powers was historically more stable than those that contained fewer great powers but were prone to structural instability. This is because, on the basis of chance alone, a four-to-one coalition rather than a three-to-two coalition is likely to occur at some point, and such overwhelming strength in one coalition of great powers is likely to lead to the destruction of the system.[58] The Deutsch-Singer's theory has been the basis of a tremendous amount of productive research, however, as Michael Haas put it, it is rather too limited if one is searching for a comprehensive understanding of stability.[59]

- **Bipolarity**

Structural realists' dominant assumption is that a relatively even distribution of power can operate as a deterrence system making war too costly an option to contemplate for any country. Kenneth Waltz, pointing to the relatively peaceful international arena since World War II, argued that an international system dominated by two poles is the best guarantee for international stability.[60] Waltz argued that the bipolar structure of the international system that had emerged in

---

[57] Deutsch and Singer defined system stability as the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics (that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur). See Karl Deutsch, J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), p. 390.

[58] Ibid. In Addition to Deutsch and Singer many other IR scholars advocated multipolarity as a guarantee for international stability, such as Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1948), Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), and Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

[59] Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 1 (March 1970), pp. 98-123, Sven Ove Hansson, Gert Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," Synthese, Vol. 136, (2003), p. 195.

[60] It should be noted that the realist argument in this respect is that bipolar stability discourages polar or superpower wars, not proxy or small-power wars. See Cox, American Democracy Promotion, p. 35.

1945 was highly stable in terms of being more peaceful than the multipolar structure had been in effect between roughly 1650 and 1945.[61]

According to Waltz, bipolarity is inherently more stable than multipolarity for the following reasons:

> first, the two blocs have a shared interest in a global balance of power, and the bloc patron-leaders have the capability of achieving this goal, secondly, there is less danger of miscalculation, of both capability and intent, thirdly, while crises would recur, their escalation to war could be more effectively prevented than in a multipolar structure, and finally, other states on the periphery would be less able to destabilize the international system.[62]

The main logic behind the previous arguments is that change/transformation is not expected to take place within the international system without the eruption of war. And because a bipolar system is inherently peace-prone (for the reasons mentioned earlier), bipolarity is presented as the most stable power structure. Waltz, further contends that stability of bipolar structure is reinforced by the prudence which nuclear weapons engender at the level of the individual states. In terms of expected utility theory, a major nuclear war should be very difficult to start. There would be no political goals which leaders could hold proportionate with the magnitude of destruction that their nations would suffer.[63]

The sudden and peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, however, put into question

---

[61] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3, *Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism* (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; idem, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 215-31. In addition to Waltz, bipolarity is favoured also by many others like, for example, Raymond Aron, "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs," in Stanley Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (NJ: Engle-wood Cliffs, 1960), pp. 79-9, Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 69-70.

[62] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 915-916. On the other hand, Waltz is not in favour of unipolarity which he considers as the least stable of all structures because any great concentration of power threatens other states and causes them to take action to restore a balance and thus move the system back to bi- or multipolarity.

[63] Nye, *Power in the Global Information Age*, p. 18.

Waltz's argument. The bipolar international system ceased to exist without the eruption of a major war, and for almost two decades now, the international system does not show any evidence that it will regain the attributes of bipolarity. Waltz has replied to his critics by arguing that stability has been misunderstood to mean duration rather than peace, and that the bipolar system was indeed more stable in the latter sense. However, this logic does not solve the problem of defining stability, nor solve another sounding criticism, confirming that there has been only one bipolar system as defined in Waltz's theory, 'thus he has to test his conclusions about stability against evidence drawn from a sample of one'[64] which is, statistically, an unrepresentative sample.

- **Unipolarity**

Last, but not least, we have the opinion that a unipolar international system is the most stable pattern (in terms of both peacefulness and durability).[65] The disintegrating of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 and the growing material pre-eminence of the U.S. throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium is believed by the advocates of this view to have caused a fundamental shift in the structure of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity. This presumed shift in structure, as Joseph M. Grieco put it, means that unipolarity might be an even stronger force for peace and stability among the great powers.[66]

According to William C. Wohlforth[67] unipolarity is prone to peace/stability.

---

[64] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (January 1988), p. 28.

[65] For analyses of the dynamics of the contemporary unipolar system under American primacy, see John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences" *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009): pp. 1–27.

[66] Joseph M. Grieco, "Structural Realism and the Problem of Polarity and War," in Felix Berenskoetter, M. J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics*, p. 64

[67] William Wohlforth devoted much of his argument for the proposition that American hegemony and unipolarity are likely to be both stable and durable, given the huge margin of superiority the United States enjoys, the way this discourages competitors, and the advantages of geography. See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance, International relations and the Challenge of American primacy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) and Robert J.

Wohlforth has constructed his argument on the current version of the international system with United States on the top of its hierarchy.[68] The raw power advantage of the United States, as Wohlforth put it, means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: 'hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system.'[69] No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that puts it in confrontation with the United States. None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused hostility of the United States. At the same time, according to Wohlforth, unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great powers:

> As the system leader, the United States has the means and motive to maintain key security institutions in order to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition among the other major powers. For their part, the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive.[70]

However, in contrast with Wohlforth conclusions, other IR scholars (John J. Mearsheimer) argue that unipolarity is not such a stable power structure, for that if the hegemon feels secure in the absence of other great powers and pulls most of its military forces back to its own region war is likely to break out in the regions it abandons. On the other hand, the hegemon might think that its superior position

---

Lieber, *The American Era: Power And Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 31.

[68] For a counter-argument which believes that unipolarity is just a temporary arrangement see Christopher Layne who argues that in unipolar systems, states do indeed balance against the hegemon's unchecked power, the question, according to Layne, is not whether new powers will rise and balance, but when. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51.

[69] William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," pp. 7-8.

[70] Ibid., pp. 7-8. Wohlforth has extended his argument with empirical evidences in William C. Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in World History* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

creates an opportunity for it to use its awesome military power to reorder the politics of distant regions but this, also, will not facilitate world peace.[71]

Comment

Realists' theory deals with structural stability, yet stability here refers to change within a similar pattern rather than the absence of change itself (without any change there would be no reason for theories). However, to catch the essence of change within a pattern realists portrayed a concept of change that strikingly resemble Newtonian universe. Newton had taken the international system as absolute, in the sense of existing objectively and of being independent of the content of units and their attributes. Realists, according to Emmanuel Adler, have portrayed a predictable and static hegemonic/balance-of-power system, in which movement is linear. Emphasizing equilibrium, realists have looked for the recurrent, stressing material power alone, overlooked the capacity of individuals to influence powers relations through their dynamic interactions, which occurs at the unit level—the ultimate source of systemic change.[72]

Equally important, realists have identified stability with peace or with preserving the status quo, without clarifying the conditions or consequences of a peaceful status quo. However, just because a system avoids conflict, as Robert Ayson put it, does not necessarily render it stable.[73] A very damaging war might be considered a perfect equilibrium in some situations. On the other hand, peace though a relevant symptom of stability does not fit as a single synonym to it. The meaning of stability includes other dimensions that may and may not include peacefulness. The question that should have been asked here, I argue, is whether a certain system has the ability to recover if encountered with unexpected disturbances or not. Stability should be based on a dynamic criterion, one that is

---

[71] See John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p 80.

[72] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, p. 64.

[73] Robert Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific: Towards a Conceptual Understanding," *Asian Security*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 2005), p. 195.

tested in action, not on a static basis. Accordingly, the empirical evidence should be taken into consideration when evaluating the stability of a certain international system.

3.2.2 Liberalism

The liberal perspective emerged in the period of Enlightenment and reached its height as a systematic approach to international relation with Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, intended to form the basis of the post-World War I peace.[74] Liberal theorists argue that 'international behaviour and outcomes recognize a multiplicity of motives, not merely the imperatives of systemic power balances.'[75] They accept the anarchic nature of world politics but reject realism's emphasis on power and the struggle for survival. They, rather, put great faith in the ability of international actors to behave rationally and cooperate in creating meaningful international laws and organizations.[76]

Liberalism, according to John M. Owen, distinguishes between states according to regime type and economic ideology: it holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behaviour. These preferences vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. This is in contrast to neo-realism, which distinguishes states according to power capabilities.[77]

Liberal theorists believe that the great powers of today are less able to use their traditional power capabilities to achieve their purposes than in the past. Although

---

[74] John MacMillan, "Liberal Internationalism", in Martin Griffiths, ed., *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 21.

[75] Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of International Relations", in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 63.

[76] Glenn Hastedt, *Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004), p. 414. Robert Axelrod examined this assumption empirically. Using a computerized model of a prisoner's dilemma, he proved that actors would move voluntarily toward a state of mutual cooperation if they just follow a simple rule of trial and error, see Robert Axelrod, Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 226 – 254.

[77] John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace?," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn 1994), p. 95.

force may sometimes play a role, traditional instruments of power, according to liberals, are hardly sufficient to deal with the new problems of world politics. New power resources, such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions may prove more applicable.[78] War, according to liberals, will remain a remote possibility. However, an order of international law and organization could provide collective security, which would replace the need for self-help inherent in the security dilemma of the realist thought.[79]

Liberals introduce 'soft power' as a refinement to the realist conception of material (hard) power. According to a neo-liberal authority (Joseph Nye)

> if a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. Similarly, if its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power.[80]

3.2.2.1 Liberalism and Stability

There are no major differences between liberals and realists with regard to the meaning they assign to stability. Liberals, also, adopt the 'peaceful connotation' when referring to stability. For example, in his discussion of the post Cold War era, Joseph Nye argued that the old world order (The Cold War system) provided a 'stability' of sorts. The examples he used to explain this point showed his belief in the synonymity between stability and peace. The stability of the Cold War system, according to Nye, disclosed itself through preventing the eruption of mass wars, 'thanks to the presence of the Soviet Union, all the conflicts of that period were either brief or under a tight lid, and this is stability as liberals understand

---

[78] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 80 (Autumn 1990), pp. 153-171.
[79] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," pp. 235-251.
[80] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," p. 167.

it.'[81]

The main difference between the two paradigms (realism and liberalism) lies in their answer to the question: how stability could be achieved. Neo-realists (as I have already illustrated) stress the importance of the type of polarity as a determent factor of system stability, while liberals emphasize the role of economic interdependence, international institutions and democratic norms. There is an intrinsic optimism in liberalism; liberals feel that security fears are not constant; they are a product of certain conditions that can be overcome. They believe that gains from commercial transactions/institutional norms/democracy promotion would overcome the problems inherent in the security dilemma and make war too expensive. So, unlike the neorealists who considered stability/peace as an exception to the rule, neoliberals contend that it is reasonably possible to prevent wars, and hence to achieve stability among nations.

3.2.2.2   Variations of Liberalism

Liberal perspective is not monolithic. There are, within the liberal field of IR theory, a range of variations to the mainstream.[82] Three main branches can be mentioned: (1) Commercial liberalism or economic interdependence, which argues that economic interdependence would discourage states from using force against each other because warfare would threaten each side's prosperity. (2) Institutional liberalism which argues that international institutions could help

---

[81] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 83-96.

[82] See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Independence and Interdependence," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 22 (Spring 1976), pp. 130-161, idem, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 80, Twentieth Anniversary, (Autumn 1990), pp. 153-171, idem, "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 177-192, Robert O. Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729–757, Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Two Cheers for Multilateralism," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 60 (Autumn 1985), pp. 148-167. Robert Axelrod, Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 226-254. Robert O. Keohane, "The Neorealist and His Critic," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000-01), pp. 186-203, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997).

overcome selfish state behaviour, mainly by encouraging states to give up immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation, and (3) Democratic Peace theory or republican liberalism which builds upon the notion that democratic countries virtually never go to war with one another. In the following I address these branches, distinguishing between them on the basis of how they conceptualize the concept of stability.

- **Commercial Liberalism (Economic Interdependence)**

In the 1960s and 1970s many scholars thought that realism needed to be modified to account for the increase in the level of economic interdependence among states.[83] Keohane and Nye argued that economic interdependence challenge realism in at least three ways. First, realists focused only on relations among nation states, but trans-governmental economic activities significantly affected states and weakened their capacity to act autonomously in international relations. Second, realists adopted the idea that there was a hierarchy of issues among states and distinguished between the 'high politics' of security and the 'low politics' of economics. Keohane and Nye argued that this distinction was out of date. Finally, Keohane and Nye argued that in an era of economic interdependence military power was becoming less usable and less important as a policy option.[84]

The basic idea of commercial liberalism, or economic interdependence, entails that economic interdependence is the most effective way to growth and stability. Commercial liberals argue that cooperation and interdependence produce grounds for stable, trusting relationships between states.[85] According to this branch of liberal thought free trade is a means of providing economic benefits and uniting people and perhaps attenuating their political loyalties to the nation-state.[86]

---

[83] Griffiths et al., *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, p. 269.
[84] Ibid., p. 161. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, J. *Power and Interdependence* (MA: Addison Wesley, 2000).
[85] Trevor C. Salmon, and Mark F. Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).
[86] Griffiths et al., *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, p. 190

Benefits will flow from the market discipline to all parts of the world.[87] Liberals believe that trade based on specialization and comparative advantage could create an ever-expanding pie that would make all states better off. On the contrary, the imposition of tariffs, quotas, and any other forms of interference with market mechanisms reduces economic prosperity and consequently increases the likelihood of war.

For many liberals the chief motive for liberalising international trade is peace/stability. Many commercial liberals argue that the interdependence of the world's economies is an important constraint on their going to war.[88] Liberals argue that, a major incentive for the founders of the post-1945 trading system was to prevent a recurrence of World Wars. Finally, free trade reduces the value of territorial control as a means to generate wealth, thus removing one of the traditional incentives for war among states.[89]

Liberal theorists suggest a number of causal mechanisms to explain why economic interdependence promotes peace/stability. One of the most influential is the "economic opportunity cost" hypothesis discussed in the work of Jack S. Levy, and William R. Thompson "the Causes of War". According to this hypothesis, trade generates economic advantages for both parties based on specialization, efficiency, and comparative advantage. Political leaders anticipate that war will disrupt trade and lead to a loss or reduction of the benefits of trade, and this loss of the gains from trade deters them from initiating militarized conflict. On the other hand, lower levels of trade between states generate fewer economic opportunity costs of war and consequently reduce economic incentives for political leaders to avoid war.[90]

---

[87] Thomas Christiansen et al., *The Social Construction of Europe*, (London: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 170.
[88] Martin Griffiths et al., *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, p. 118
[89] Ibid.
[90] Levy, and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 72.

Comment

The main criticism posed to commercial liberalism comes, as expected, from realists who argued that trade and other forms of economic interdependence can actually increase the level of instability rather than reduce it. Among other things, economic interdependence creates increased opportunities for conflict, the greater the interdependence between states, the greater the number of things to argue about. Critics of commercial liberalism's hypothesis that interdependence promotes stability/peace often refer to WWI as an obvious anomaly in the liberal argument, since this war took place in spite of high levels of interdependence between the conflicting parties.[91]

In addition, whereas commercial liberals argue that economic interdependence creates mutual dependence and incentives to avoid war (the main challenge to stability), realists argue that interdependence may also be unbalanced. Each party might be dependent on the other, but the degree of dependence is uneven. The less dependent party may be tempted to use economic coercion to exploit the adversary's vulnerabilities and influence its behaviour relating to security as well as economic issues. These can lead to retaliatory actions, conflict spirals, and war.[92] The temptation to exploit asymmetries of interdependence is enhanced by the realist view that political leaders are concerned more with 'relative gains' than with absolute gains and that they aim to maximize their power relative to that of their adversaries.[93]

---

[91] Ibid., p. 76.
[92] Ibid., p. 73
[93] Ersel Aydinli, James N. Rosenau, eds., *Globalization, Security, and the Nation-State Paradigms in Transition* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

- **Institutional Liberalism**[94]

Liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced and cooperation cannot occur unless states have a significant interest in it.[95] Institutionalists, thus, typically combine both a description of international politics as increasingly characterized by the role of international institutions and a recommended course of action in line with their beliefs. They prioritize collaboration via the United Nations and through other emerging areas of global governance to address common world problems.[96]

The general argument of institutional liberalism can be summed up as follows: the establishment of the institutions is an effective means to achieve peace and stability. Liberal institutionalists suggest a number of causal mechanisms to explain how institutions come into being and in what way they promote peace and stability. One of the leading attempts in this respect is that of John Ikenberry in his important book, "After Victory: *Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War*," which provides a richly provocative theory about how international order emerges and has evolved over time. In the following, I will illustrate the main aspects of Ikenberry's theory, considering it as a representative model of the institutionalist thinking.

According to Ikenberry's theory, each leading state has three alternatives how to make use of abundance of power after each international war: it can *dominate—*

---

[94] The liberal literature on international institutions and regimes is large, see for example: Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 491–517; Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995), Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729–757, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984).

[95] Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 39.

[96] Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era*, p. 32.

use its commanding material capabilities to prevail in the endless conflicts over the distribution of gains. It can *abandon*—wash its hands of postwar disputes and return home. Or it can try to *transform* its favourable postwar power position into a durable stability that commands the loyalty of the other states within the post war order. To achieve this outcome, it must overcome the fears of the weaker and defeated states that it will pursue the other options: domination or abandonment.[97]

According to Ikenberry, institutions are the means the victorious states resort to in order to hold onto that power and make it last. Leading powers, across the great postwar settlements, have increasingly used institutions after wars to 'lock in' a favourable postwar position and to establish sufficient 'strategic restraint' on their own power as to gain the consent of weaker and defeated states.[98] According to Ikenberry, the type of stability that emerges after great wars depends on the ability of states to restrain power institutionally and bind themselves to long-term commitments. Leading postwar states might ideally want to tie other states down to fixed and predictable policy orientations and leave themselves institutionally unencumbered. But in seeking the institutional commitment of less powerful states—locking them into the postwar order—the leading state has to offer them something in return: some measure of credible and institutionalized restraint on its own exercise of power.[99]

Ikenberry argues that the incentives of hegemon states to employ institutions as mechanisms to achieve stability are influenced by two variables: the extent of power disparities after the war and the types of states that are party to the settlement. The more extreme the power disparities after the war, the greater the capacity of the leading state to employ institutions to gain stability. Likewise, democratic states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions, and

---

[97] Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 4.
[98] Ibid., p. xi.
[99] Ibid., for a counter-argument see Randall Schweller, "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 161-186. Schweller argues that institutions cannot be both autonomous from the hegemon's power and interests and capable of checking its exercise of power. Moreover; the simultaneous presence of a durable set of multilateral institutions and hegemonic restraint does not necessarily indicate that the former is a cause of the latter.

thereby reassure the other states in the post-war settlement, than non-democracies.[100]

Historically, according to Ikenberry, leading states at the great postwar settlements have had incentives to take the institutional course, but the means and ability of doing so has changed over time.[101] In the settlements of 1815 and 1919, the leading states made increasingly elaborate efforts to institutionalize the postwar security relations between the major powers. Rather than rely simply on balance-of-power strategies or preponderant power, they sought to restrain power, reassure weaker potential adversaries, and establish commitments by creating various types of binding institutions. The strategy was to tie potentially rival and mutually threatening states together in alliance and other institutions.[102]

Similarly, this institutional logic explains, according to Ikenberry, the remarkable stability of the post-1945 order among the industrial democracies. 'More than in 1815 and 1919, the circumstances in 1945 provided opportunities for the leading state to move toward an institutionalized settlement'.[103] The democratic character of the leading states after the Second World War has facilitated the further growth of intergovernmental institutions and commitments and created deeper linkages between these states. These post-war institutions did not only solve functional problems or facilitate cooperation, they also served as mechanisms of political control that allowed the leading state (at least to some extent) to lock other states into a favourable set of postwar relations and establish some measure of restraint on its own exercise of power, thereby alleviating the fears of domination and abandonment.[104]

Comment

It is clear that this school of thought deals with stability as a synonym to

---

[100] John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 5.
[101] Ibid., p. 4.
[102] Ibid., p. 8.
[103] Ibid., p. 5.
[104] Ibid., p. 5

'immutability of international system structure', or, again, 'the absence of major wars', and that is why the international system that prevailed after the Second World War is considered the longest and the most stable. The indicator used in Ikenberry's theory to confirm the stability of the international system in the aftermath of World War II, is 'the absence of any big post-Cold War attempt to re-balance the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union', in other words, the absence of any case of violation of the state of peace by engaging in a conflict with the dominant pole. But, again, this study adopts a thesis that consider stability and peace two different things for argument that will be illustrated shortly.

The other problem with Ikenberry's theory emanates from the rather contradiction at its core, as the theory, according to Randall Schweller, 'prescribes liberal idealist means to achieve Machiavellian realist ends.'[105] On the one hand, Ikenberry's basic institutional argument is entirely consistent with liberal idealism. Ikenberry believes that the hegemon can establish a constitutional-like order among democratic states that is governed by the rule of law and viewed as legitimate by all its members, who therefore willingly take part in it and abide by its rules and principles. However, on the other hand, the purpose of this institutional order is to lock in the hegemon's advantage well after it has reached its peak in actual power. For the hegemon, the aim of the grand strategy is primacy while the means are institutional arrangements that lock in advantageous returns for him. The key to the success of this rather deceptive strategy, according to Schweller:

> is for the hegemon not only to appear benign but to make all others believe that its order is in their best interests. Accordingly, the hegemon's constitutional order must be continually extended to achieve universal legitimacy. Otherwise, powerful revisionist states will emerge to challenge the established order, and the system's touted

---

[105] Randall Schweller, "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay," p. 185.

stability will be lost.[106]

• Republican Liberalism (Democratic Peace)

Republican Liberalism or democratic peace theory focuses on the domestic political characteristics of states and the type of government. In this respect, Samuel P. Huntington stressed that both government and opposition in democratic societies have fewer incentives to use violence against each other. In democracies, according to Huntington, change rarely occurs violently, it is always moderate and incremental. Accordingly, 'democratic systems are much more stable in terms of being immune to major revolutionary upheaval than authoritarian ones.'[107]

Given these peaceful characteristics, democratic peace theory provides that democratic political systems never (or rarely) go to war with other democracies. Theory advocates agree with Jack S. Levy's observation that 'absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.'[108] Democratic peace theorists argue that if democratic regimes ruled all countries, conflicts between states would be less likely. Other commentators argue that democracies are *not* inherently more peaceful than autocratic states, and are not less war-prone than non-democracies. 'Democracies seem to fight wars as often as other states, however, they rarely, if ever, fight one another, and when democracies come into conflict with one another, they only rarely threaten to use force.'[109]

Among the several explanations offered for this tendency, we can distinguish

---

[106] Ibid.

[107] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 25.

[108] Quoted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones et al, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MA, MIT Press, 1996).

[109] To explain why democracies do not fight each other whereas democracies and non-democracies do, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman contended that the non-democracy may assume that the democracy is reluctant to use force as they face domestic constraints to using force, and attacks, believing that the democracy will capitulate. Also it is possible that the democracy fears that the non-democracy will try to exploit its reluctance to use force and chooses to pre-empt attack the presumed aggressors, thereby obtaining the first-strike advantage. See Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 159-160.

between the structural and normative views. The normative explanation contends that democratic political systems embrace norms of compromise that account for the fact that they do not fight or threaten other groups espousing similar principles. According to Bruce Russett, the democratic norms explanation holds that 'the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries'.[110] Democratic states assume both that other democracies adopt peaceful methods of regulating political competition and resolving disputes, and that others will apply these norms in their external relations with fellow democracies. In other words, democratic states develop positive perceptions of other democracies.[111]

The institutional constraints model of the democratic peace emphasizes checks and balances, the dispersion of power, and the role of a free press. These institutions preclude political leaders from taking unilateral military action, ensure an open public debate, and require leaders to secure a broad base of public support before adopting risky policies. 'As a result, leaders are risk-averse with respect to decisions for war and can take forceful actions only in response to serious immediate threats.'[112] Michael Doyle, argues that democratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their citizens. 'Citizens pay the price for war in blood and treasure, if the price of conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to electoral retribution'. Moreover, Doyle added, 'in democratic states, foreign policy decisions carrying the risk of war are debated openly and not made behind closed doors, which means that both the public and

---

[110] Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace," in Michael Brown et al., *Debating the Democratic Peace*, p. 161.

[111] Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn 1994), pp. 5-49, Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48.

[112] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 110. T. Clifton Morgan, and Sally Howard Campbell (1991) "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35 (June 1991), pp. 187 – 211.

policymakers are sensitized to costs of fighting.'[113]

Advocates of democratic peace theory promote an optimistic perception regarding the evolution of world politics and the role played by democracy. Francis Fukuyama has suggested that the Western form of liberal democracy can be recognized as the only truly historically viable and legitimate form of government. Hence, the fall of the Soviet Union and the continuous march of democratization represent, according to Fukuyama, the 'end of history.'[114] Other analysts have been more cautious in their assessment, while nevertheless at the same time maintaining a heavily pro-democratic bias. In his book The Third Wave of Democratization, Samuel Huntington makes the argument that beginning with Portugal's revolution in 1974, there would be a third wave of democratization which described a global trend in the world.[115]

Comment

Democratic peace assumptions are consistent with most of the notions of dynamic stability; it stresses the importance of mutual recognition, the role of bottom-up interactions, and the value of participation. There is little doubt that democracies provide more stable welfare for their people than do autocracies.[116] The main difference between the democratic peace conception of stability and the one adopted in this study is that the democratic peace perception of stability is linear in essence. Stability, according to most of theory advocates, is believed to be a calculable and predictable phenomenon that can be imposed in a controllable pattern on any system. Based on to this linear perception, stability is formulated in a predictable algebraic form. James Lee Ray argues that:

---

[113] Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Parts I and II, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205-235 and Vol. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 323-353. For a counter-argument see Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 9.

[114] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992).

[115] Tom Pierre Najem, "State Power and Democratization in North Africa: Developments in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya", in Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. Democratization in the Middle East, Experiences, struggles, Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), p. 184.

[116] Francis Fukuyama, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?," The Washington Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 2007-2008), pp. 23–45.

it is possible to describe a democratic peace research program according to a deterministic model, the 'hard core' of which consists of stipulations roughly analogous to the core of Newton's gravitational theory, and can be summed in the following formula: $P = (1 - [d1*d2])/(Re + 1)$, where P = the probability of war between two states, $d1$ = the degree of democracy in State 1, $d2$ = the degree of democracy in State 2, R = the distance between State 1 and State 2, and e = a geographic constant.[117]

Another aspect of difference is that, while this study argues that stability is an emergent property that evolves intrinsically in any open system, democratic peace theorists argue that democracy can be promoted via military intervention and deliberate regime change. One of the major advocates of the theory, Francis Fukuyama, advised the American administrations, for the post-Bush era, to *force* other nations to adopt democracy or, in his words, to talk softly and carry a big stick, according to him:

> There are four broad approaches that U.S. foreign policy can take in the post-Bush era. America can talk loudly and carry a big stick [...], talk loudly and carry a small stick [...], talk softly and carry a big stick, or talk softly and carry a small stick. My own preference is for talking softly and carrying a big stick.[118]

3.2.3 Constructivism

There is a bit of an overlap between constructivist and liberal approaches. Jack Snyder notices that,

> The constructivist's argument that social stability arises from common

---

[117] James Lee Ray, "A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program," in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory, Appraising the Field*, p. 209.

[118] Francis Fukuyama, "Soft Talk, Big Stick," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead The World American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 204.

understanding and shared norms and the need for dialogue across cultures about the appropriate rules of interactions between different systems' elements, these prescriptions rephrase liberalism's emphasis on establishing an agreed international constitutional order.[119]

Similarly, Steve Smith argues that social constructivism in its dominant (mainly North American) form is very close to the neo-liberalist wing of the rationalist paradigm.[120] On the other hand, constructivism shares some 'realist/neo-realist' assumptions:[121] that international politics is anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, wish to survive, and are rational. The Constructivist perspective has also the same realist/neo-realist commitment to states as units of analysis, and to the importance of systemic theorizing.[122] Where neorealist and constructivist structuralisms really differ, however, is in their assumptions about what structure is made of. Neo-realists think it is made only of a distribution of material capabilities, whereas constructivists think it is also constructed by social relationships.[123] According to Alexander Wendt, the realist conception of anarchy does not adequately explain why conflict occurs between states. The real issue is how anarchy is understood.[124]

Constructivists further contend that their theory is deeper than rationalist theories

---

[119] Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy,* Vol. 145, (November-December, 2004), p. 61.

[120] Steve Smith, "Social Constructivisms and European Studies," in Thomas Christiansen et al., *The Social Construction of Europe,* p. 191. Similarly the constructivist emphasis on a community of nations with shared values and/or international norms is often referred to as "sociological liberalism." See Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010), p. 80.

[121] Constructivism is perceived by some scholars as being a member of the family of Critical/ reflectivist IR theories which include, apart from it: postmodernists, neo-Marxists, feminists, and others, see S. Walt, "One World: Many Theories," in Richard Little, Michael Smith, *Perspectives on World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), while others argue that constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalist approaches (whether realist or liberal) and critical approaches, and creates new areas for theoretical and empirical investigation, see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 3 (1997), p. 319.

[122] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security,* Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 72.

[123] Ibid., p. 73.

[124] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization,* Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

(realism and liberalism) because it explains the origins of the forces that drive those theories. According to constructivists, whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas, norms, values, knowledge, and culture, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or 'inter-subjective' ideas and understandings on social life.[125] And instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that states seek to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as 'a highly malleable product of specific historical processes.'[126]

From a constructivist perspective, the central issue in the post-Cold War world is how different groups conceive their identities and interests, how identities are created, how they evolve, and how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situation. According to Wendt, whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but of the shared culture created through discursive social practices. Anarchy has no determinant 'logic,' only different cultural instantiations,[127] in Wendt's words, 'Anarchy is what states make of it.'[128]

Constructivist analysis, thus, is concerned with how world politics is 'socially constructed' and which role the 'human consciousness' plays in formulating international relations. Constructivism, as described by John Gerard Ruggie, holds that the system of states is embedded in a society of states, which includes sets of values, rules, and institutions that are commonly accepted by states and which make it possible for the system of states to function.[129] Therefore,

it matters whether Europeans define themselves primarily in national

---

[125] Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 4 (2001), pp. 391–416.

[126] Stephen Walt, "One World: Many Theories," p. 40.

[127] Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Fall 2000), pp. 187–212.

[128] Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of It", pp. 391-425.

[129] John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 11.

or continental terms, whether Germany and Japan redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active international roles, and whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as global policeman.[130]

3.2.3.1 Constructivism and Stability

The most important thing to note about constructivists' usage of 'stability' is the lack of clarity. Constructivism offered unique manipulations of a number of central themes of international relations theory, the concept of stability, however, did not receive equal attention. Constructivists argue that cultural factors such as ideas and identities are the underlying factors shaping international system, but they do not directly focus on stability. Constructivists rarely offer an explicit definition of the concept which has not been an important analytic term for most of them.[131]

Generally speaking, constructivists have arguably added very little to the neorealist definition of the term. One possible reason for this phenomenon is that many constructivists define themselves as adherents to scientific realism. According to Wendt, 'constructivists are modernists who fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence'.[132] Ole Holsti notices that unlike many 'postmodernists', constructivists work within the theoretical and epistemological premises of the social sciences, and they generally seek to expand rather than undermine the purview of other theoretical perspectives.[133]

---

[130] Stephen Walt, "One World: Many Theories," p. 392.

[131] I have failed to locate a single constructivist's work that explicitly examines the meaning of stability and that offers a clear reasoning of how system stability can be socially constructed.

[132] Alexander Wendt has distanced constructivism from critical theories, which are -in general- sceptical about the possibility of objective knowledge. Unlike most of the critical theorists, Wendt believes that 'deterministic predictions can be made with regard to the outcomes of certain interactions in international relations'. This is why Wendt is often cited as an example of the more top-down, state-oriented strand of constructivism, concerned very much with how the 'structure' of such ideas impacts 'downwards' on individual state units see Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," pp. 72, 75, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 21.

[133] Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of International Relations," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, p. 67.

110

This is not to say that constructivists' references to the concept cannot be found altogether. Stability, in terms of perpetuating certain characters or attributes, has been implicit in many constructivists' discussions of international relations. For example, in their emphasis on the construction of social reality, constructivists stress the fact that the social gives meaning to the material, in this meaning they argue that norms affect stability (in terms of durability). They do not attribute social stability to material factors only but also to the prevalence of common values and norms (mutual recognition and non-intervention). Jack levy and William Thompson argue that constructivists are less accepting of the analytic distinction among levels of analysis in the international system. They emphasize instead that structure and agency are mutually constituted and incapable of really being defined without the other. Stability thus is not a product of a certain international structure rather constructivists argue that it is a product of the constitutive relationship between variables at different levels of the international system.[134]

The other reference to stability in constructivists' literature can be found in their theorizing of identities. The constructivists' world is one in which certain social features are indeed given, and in which identities are stable (reflecting permanent characters). Alexander Wendt defines identities as 'relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self, by participating in collective meanings.'[135] Identity is 'a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions.'[136] Identities are significant because they provide the basis for interests.[137] According to constructivists, the stability of identities is necessary in international politics and domestic society alike in order

---

[134] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 219.

[135] Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it, p. 397.

[136] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 224.

[137] Stefano Guzzini, Anna Leander, *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 95. Constructivists contend that identities are socially constructed. This means that states attach certain characteristics to themselves vis-a-vis other states. States can also have multiple identities, depending on whether it is assumed from relations to domestic society ('liberal,' 'democratic') or from international society ('hegemon,' 'balancer'). Based on the assumed identity, states will have prescribed interests and actions. Identities can also be changed through social processes. See Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), p. 385.

to ensure the minimal level of predictability and order. Ted Hopf argues that 'durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behaviour.'[138] It can be concluded that by stability here constructivists refer to the minimal changes not the absolute absence of changes or as Wendt himself puts it, 'identities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone.'[139]

Likewise, constructivists define institutions as stable, in terms of reflecting a recognizable pattern of rules and related practices. Constructivists 'do not view institutions as necessarily a product of conscious choice and design but rather as a consequence of patterned interactions and allows for the possibility that institutions, as a potential source of state interests and identities, can generate order among actors'.[140] According to Nicholas Onuf, 'rules are related to agents' practices, and to each other, through the consequences that agents intend their acts to have. Whether by accident or by design, rules and related practices frequently form a stable (but never fixed) pattern suiting agents' intentions. These patterns are institutions.'[141] Institutions make people into agents and constitute an environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally.

Apart from these references, constructivists have used 'stability' in accordance with the traditional definition equating it with peace and durability. Michael Barnett, for example, adopted the peaceful connotation when discussing the emergence of order/stability in the Arab states system, as he considered 'stability' as equivalent to absence of violence.[142] Another constructivist, John Gerard

---

[138] Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 174.
[139] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 21
[140] Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," *International Organisation*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), p. 487.
[141] Nicholas Onuf, "A User's Manual," in Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, eds., *Constructivism: International Relations in A Constructed World* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 1998).
[142] Barnett built on constructivist statements to trace how patterned interactions among Arab states led to the consolidation of sovereignty and a sovereignty-friendly conception of Arab nationalism-that is, nothing less than the development of new state identities, roles, and interests, which in turn facilitated the emergence of relatively stable expectations and shared norms that are associated

Ruggie, used 'stability' in the sense of durability, or absence of changes when he was referring to economic stability.[143] In sum, constructivists have paid little attention to 'stability' as a scientific concept and have frequently used the term in its more simplistic meaning. If the term 'durability' is substituted for 'stability' each time it appears in the constructivist literature, this point will become clear.

Comment

Most of the theoretical conclusions of constructivist analyses are consistent with the evidence presented by complexity theory. Constructivism, like Complexity theory, is an inherently dynamic view of the world. The notion of mutual constitution of agents, and structures upon which it rests, puts all the parts of social life in motion. Constructivism argues that states are able to mutually transform their identities and interests through systemic-level interaction. Agents are dynamic, as they are affected by the changing (sometimes slowly) context in which they find themselves.[144] During the course of interaction, norms, rules and ideas are created which can be an effective form of power. Through socialisation, states become fully internalised with the rules and norms which then become a part of the state's identity.[145]

'Structures are also dynamic as the rules of the game and notions of appropriateness are instantiated only by the actions and interactions of the agents—even status quo or robust structures require continual action in their reproduction.'[146] The growing 'constructivist' movement in political science stresses the evolution of ideas and institutions.[147] As in the natural sciences,

---

with sovereignty. See Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," pp. 479-510.
[143] John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998).
[144] Hoffmann, *Ozone Depletion and Climate Change*, p. 37
[145] Lawrence Ng, "Conditions for Peace and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July-September 2000) at:
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_3/8.htm
[146] Hoffmann, *Ozone Depletion and Climate Change*, p. 37.
[147] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History, How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 61.

Alexander Wendt explains, the emphasis is on 'explaining why one thing leads to another, and how [. . .] things are put together to have the causal powers that they do.[148]

In a similar vein, many complexity theorists advocate a postmodern definition of complexity science based on the logic that the irreducibility of complex systems implies infinite ways of understanding the world. Complexity perspective provides a model of agent behaviour and a feedback process that dynamically links the internal understandings that agents have of their context with the context itself.[149] This view is perfectly compatible with the constructivist philosophy of science which attacks the notion of objective science and argues, instead, that scientific 'facts' are 'socially constructed.[150]

Another angle to see the relationship between constructivism and complexity through is that many scholars, given the 'complexities of studying complexity', acknowledge that defining a system as complex is both an act of the researcher and a property of the system itself. It is therefore standard practice in complexity science to adopt a constructivist epistemology of one sort or another.[151]

Also, constructivism meets with complexity theory notions in their emphasis on the importance of the role of individuals in formulating system stability. According to constructivism, groups become more stable if individuals can convince others to adopt their ideas and norms. Similarly, complexity theory contends that stability emerges among local-level actors. Complexity theory, however, offers a more detailed description of the processes inherent within and between agents and the processes that link agents and structures.[152]

---

[148] Alexander Wendt, "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 5 (1998), pp. 101-118.
[149] Hoffmann, *Ozone Depletion and Climate Change*, pp. 40-41.
[150] Steven E. Phelan, "What Is Complexity Science, Really?," *Emergence*, No. 3, No. 1 (April 2001), pp. 120 – 136.
[151] Brian Castellani and Frederic William Hafferty, *Sociology and Complexity Science: A New Field of Inquiry* (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 124.
[152] Hoffmann, *Ozone Depletion and Climate Change*, pp.40-41.

Where constructivist and complexity theory really differ, as far as the topic of this dissertation is concerned, is in their assumptions about the essence of stability. By making 'state' the key decision-maker of international anarchy, constructivism contradicts its own argument that interests are always in flux. It allows that the interests of states, conflictual or cooperative, change. But by making the character of international anarchy dependent upon what states decide to make it, constructivism produces the identity of the state as decision-maker, and this identity cannot be changed.[153]

Complexity theory perception of stability does not include lack of changes. Complexity stresses the changing nature of system structure and relations, this contradicts with the constructivist theory which is based on the necessity of some steadiness in identities, institutions and even processes. Constructivists believe that we can not theorize about 'processes' of social construction unless such processes have exogenously given relatively stable platforms. This simplified conception of stability is one factor why this dissertation, while benefited from the constructivist analysis in many parts, did not adopt it as a theoretical framework for analysing the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

3.3 The Peaceful Connotation

The traditional perspectives of IR have been criticized on a wide range of topics.[154] However, I am not concerned to dwell on such critiques here. Rather, I seek only to provide a critique that focuses on the concept of stability and how it has been dealt with in these contributions.

One unifying factor amongst the previous contributions is their perception of stability as an equivalent to 'absence of war' and 'continuity of peace'. As Robert Ayson put it, 'the idea of stability as a measure of the tendency to major interstate war is embedded in much of the international relations literature, which simply

---

[153] Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 60.
[154] Robert E.Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, *A New Handbook of Political Science*, (New York, Oxford, 1996), p. 432.

assumes stability to be a measure of the probability of war in the given system under consideration'. According to Ayson, 'concern about the possibility of interstate war has in fact been an abiding consideration for IR perspectives interested in international system stability'.[155]

Identifying stability with peace was taken for granted in most of the literature of traditional IR theories - with the exception of balance of power theory (which contends that war is the instrument by which stability is produced). For example, Hans Morgenthau believed that 'the preservation of peace and the maintenance of international stability' depend on the attitudes and the internal characteristics of states.[156] Similarly, Henry Kissinger argued that it is the legitimacy of international order (being accepted by major powers) that drives the international system toward 'stability and peace', while 'international instability and war' are caused by the existence of revolutionary states.[157] Other scholars used definitions that are related to peace, but without mentioning it by name. For example, Richard Rosecrance, argued that 'an international system is conceived to be stable if its outcomes fall within limits generally 'accepted' by the major participants in the system', whilst Robert Gilpin contends that 'a stable system is one in which changes can take place if they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby cause a war among them.'[158] In an essay on East Asian strategic relations entitled 'Set for Stability,' Thomas Berger defines stability 'as the absence of a direct military conflict or the build-up of military forces in anticipation of such a conflict.[159]

Possible reason for identifying stability with peace, according to Robert Jervis, is that wars are likely to produce a great deal of speedy violent change. John Herz's definition of stability stressed this point: A system is stable, according to Herz,

---

[155] Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," p. 194.
[156] See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 62.
[157] Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 316-20.
[158] These definitions are discussed in Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 95.
[159] Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," p. 195.

where changes are relatively slow, gradual, and peaceful, unstable, where they tend to be sudden, far-reaching in impact, and frequently violent.[160] But these definitions, as Robert Jervis noticed, conflate instability with the causes of war. It is reasonable to argue that states are likely to fight when their vital interests are at stake or when the outcomes will be unacceptable if they do not resist. But it is not helpful, according to Jervis, to transform these propositions into a definition.[161] In the following I introduce some further evidences in support of the thesis that stability should not be identified with absence of inter-state wars at least according to the meaning adopted in this dissertation for stability, namely, the ability of complex systems to accommodate disturbances.

3.4 Critique of the "Stability is Peace" Perspective

The first straightforward problem with identifying stability with peace is that it is 'superfluous'. Using two terms to refer to the same phenomenon invites confusion as it reflects a failure in discriminating between the two terms. Robert Jervis has rightly pointed to this meaning when he stated that 'peace is a perfectly good word, so why do we need another one that means the same thing?'[162]

Secondly, not all IR scholars agree that wars contradict stability. Balance of power theorists, for example, believe that war is necessary to maintain the overall stability of the international system.[163] According to balance theorists a stable international system does not imply that there are no conflicts; the balance choices of decision makers may be to go to war. Amongst the several definitions presented for 'balance of power', there is one that refers to the prevailing distribution of power. In this case, stability can entail the use of force to secure the durability of the particular system at hand. Balance of power theorists argue that

---

[160] John Herz, "The Impact of the Technological-Scientific Process on the International System," in Abdul Said, ed., *Theory of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 115. Quoted in Jervis, *System Effects*, p. 94.
[161] Robert Jervis, *System effects*, p. 95.
[162] Ibid., p. 94
[163] See, for example, Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-23, Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, William C. Wohlforth, *The Balance of Power in World History*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

117

the goal of peace is conditional on the avoidance of hegemony. If this goal is threatened, states are often willing to go to war if necessary to secure their interests.[164]

Thirdly, in complex social systems (like that of the international system) the occurrence of relatively minor conflicts might actually be promising from a 'stability' point of view. Conflicts, according to Robert Ayson, could be part of a transition from a semi-stable pattern of behaviour to a more stable one. A certain conflict might be a means of deterring much more serious wars. Periods of transitional disturbances may represent attempts to find new patterns of stable behaviour after the old patterns have proved unstable for some reason.[165]

The above conclusion 'stability is not equivalent to peace' remains valid even on the nation-state level, for the following reasons:

Firstly, absence of wars is a neutral factor among system's attributes; this factor may and may not refer to system's ability to cope with disturbances, that is, to stabilize. Most Middle Eastern regimes, for example, have not experienced major wars since gaining their independence (till 2008), however these systems cannot be considered stable in any logical sense (except in the sense of keeping citizens out of politics, which is better referred to as stagnation). Other sources of instability (poor economic performance, absence of public participation, problems of minorities) are common in these countries.

Secondly, historically, war-making and state-constructing have been closely interrelated. Lisa Anderson argues that war is not, in itself, necessarily deleterious to the construction of strong, flexible, and stable states. In early modern Europe,

---

[164] Levy and Thompson, *Causes of War*, p. 28. Martin Griffiths confirms this meaning when he argued that the term 'stability' can refer to both meanings, 'it can mean peace but it can also refer to the endurance of a particular distribution of power regardless of how peaceful it is.' Similarly, Robert Ayson argues that war avoidance is but one of several stability types. A very damaging war, according to Ayson, might be considered a stable equilibrium in some situations, 'as might have been seen on the western front in the First World War for example', see Martin Griffiths et al., *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, p. 19, Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," pp. 190 – 213.
[165] Ayson, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific," p. 196.

Anderson argues, 'it was the demands of war that generated the domestic tax systems, civilian bureaucracies, and the institutions of government accountability that we associate with the modem state.'[166] Similarly, Thierry Gongora argues that the emergence of (stable) states in the western world can be attributed to war as an important factor in the development of the modem state.[167] Charles Tilly summed up this meaning in one sentence: 'war made the state, and the state made war.'[168]

One of the most successful attempts to explain the confusion between stability and peace is that of Robert Axelrod. Axelrod's argument is based on distinguishing between the political usage and the systemic usage of stability in the field of IR. According to Axelrod:

> The concept of stability has carried over into political and strategic usage with two important modifications. First, the scientific usage does not imply a lack of change, but only the ability to restore the system after a perturbation. In political usage this distinction is often blurred. Second, in strategic usage stability usually refers to the maintenance of peace, rather than any other possible state of the system. Thus, in political usage the concept takes on a positive connotation: stability is assumed to be a good thing. This connotation is so strong that often the meaning of the term gets lost and the word is simply used to indicate approval of a policy by saying that it promotes stability.[169]

Following Axelrod, this study argues that traditional theories' perception of stability should be revised to account for the way through which systems deal with disturbances. Within this framework, I will analyse, in the following chapter,

---

[166] Lisa Anderson, "Remaking the Middle East: The Prospects for Democracy and Stability," *Ethics & International Affairs,* Vol. 6, No. 1 (30 August 2006), p. 166.
[167] Thierry Gongora, "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 29, No. 3 (August 1997), pp. 323-340.
[168] Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 42.
[169] Robert Axelrod, "The Concept of Stability in the Context of Conventional War in Europe," *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 27, No. 3 (August 1990), p. 248.

the American involvement in the Middle East to decide under which stability type U.S. interventionist foreign policy in the Middle East can be classified.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter tackled how IR theories define the concept of stability. The contributions of IR intellectual schools, in this respect, turned out to be similar in essence. The unifying assumption among these contributions is that the international system is homeostatic. Disruptions are perceived temporary and the international system tends to return to a balanced state. It is, thus, argued that stability is a deterministic phenomenon, one that can be achieved linearly. The criterion chosen by these perspectives as an indicator of stability is the 'absence of warfare'. However, it was concluded that peace, though a possible symptom of stability does not fit as a synonym to it. Stability includes other dimensions that may and may not be peaceful. I have introduced some arguments in support of the thesis that absence of war should not be confused with stability at least according to the meaning adopted in this dissertation, namely, the dynamic ability of complex systems to accommodate disturbances.

Emanuel Adler has rightly noticed that traditional IR theories perceived international systems and their components as Newtonian elements, 'suspended in space'; time has little to do with them and movement and change are linear, according to Adler:

> This kind of theory studies international relations and international phenomena according to the metaphors of equilibrium. It looks for 'simple stability,' and tries to predict the future from past events. International Relations theory thereby fails to grasp the nature of the phenomena it tries to describe and explain, which are in flux and evolution.[170]

---

[170] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, p. 64.

Table 3.1 **IR Theory and the Concept of Stability**

	Neorealism		Neoliberalism			Constructivism
	Hegemonic Stability	Balance of Power	Commercial Liberalism	Institutional Liberalism	Democratic Peace	
Define stability in terms of	Defending Status Quo (preserving the hegemonic order).	Defending the existing Balance (preventing the rise of a hegemon).	Peacefulness.	Peacefulness.	Peacefulness.	Minimal changes in Identities, Institutions, and Processes
Tools employed to attain stability	Power capabilities used by the hegemon to maintain and organize relations among states and to deter possible opponents.	Entering into treaties, Joining alliances or waging wars to restore the disrupted balance.	Self-regulating mechanisms (Classical Liberalism), or state intervention in Economy (Social-welfare liberalism).	Institutional rules and norms are used to Prevent wars.	Preventing Wars among democracies and waging wars against undemocratic systems to change autocratic regimes.	Common values, norms and ideas affecting social stability.
Compared to the definition of complexity theory	Static, Top-down.	Static.	limited to peacefulness, Over concentrating on the economic aspect.	Limited to peacefulness, influenced by super powers' interests.	Limited to peacefulness, top-down and linear approach.	Over-concentrating on non-materialistic factors.

Chapter 4

The Evolution of U.S. Interest in the Middle East

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will trace the evolution of American interest in regional stability of the Middle East, the factors that accelerated this interest (the discovery of oil, the creation of Israel, and the Cold War)[1] and the evolution of the different strategies through which the U.S. has perceived and approached regional stability. I will also illustrate the tools that Washington has employed to secure its interests (foreign aid, military alliances, military intervention and regime change). But I will start by discussing the nature of superpowers' influence on Middle East's stability.

4.2 The Influence of Super Powers on the Middle East

The Middle East was always a region of great significance to the IR major powers in general and to the US in particular. Henry Kissinger attributed this significance to Middle East's strategic importance, as 'it provides the energy on which much of the world depends, this led outside powers to involve themselves in its conflict, often competitively.'[2] The rivalry for influence became obviously intense in the wake of the Second World War. But, 'whereas the two European powers [Britain and France] steadily lost influence, the two extra-European powers steadily gained influence.'[3] The Soviet Union and the United States became increasingly engaged in a more active role in the Middle East.[4] After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the dominant superpower that has a deep concern for Middle East stability.

---

[1] The Cold War factor provoked a host of premium interests for the US such as: denial of Soviet control of the area, maintenance of the independence of the Middle East moderate nations, and prevention of situations which could lead to nuclear war. See John C. Campbell, "The Middle East: A House of Containment Built on Shifting Sands," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1981), pp. 593-628, and beside the aforementioned interests some add promoting democracy and human rights, see Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment In The Middle East Conflict, Stability and Political Change* (PA: Rand, Project Air Force, 2004).

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1979), p. 285, quoted in: Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 13.

[3] Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The Cold War and the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 280.

[4] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 52.

Lisa Anderson has classified the debate on the influence exerted by Super Powers on Middle East politics into two broad categories:[5] on the one hand, there are those who argue that Middle East politics, like its boundaries, are a direct product of superpowers' interventions.[6] On the other, there are those who believe in the exceptional nature of this region of the world; that the region reflects characteristics which are fully independent of the impact of any external superpower. In the following I will illustrate the main arguments of both views.

4.2.1 The Middle East as a Dependent Actor

According to the first school, local politics in the Middle East is no more than a reflection of western conspiracies to mislead regional politicians and hinder regional development. For those who adopt this interpretation, the Egyptian Primer Gamal Abdel Nasser was brought to power in 1952 by the Americans to get rid of the British influence but then he himself was lured into the Six-Day-War in order to get rid of the Arab nationalist threat.[7] Similarly, Saddam Hussein was provoked to invade Kuwait so as to provide a justification to dismantle the Iraqi military establishment.[8] Even the events of September 11, according to this perception, were planned by the Bush-neoconservative team in order to find an excuse to wage the war on terrorism and hence subjugate the Muslim World.[9]

This way of conceptualizing the region's affairs is a plain translation of 'conspiracy theory', according to which all historical or current events are explained as the result of a secret plot weaved by external conspirators. However, the tendency to look at the region only from the outside rather than from the inside, as Fawaz Gergs correctly

---

[5] Lisa Anderson, "Remaking the Middle East: The Prospects for Democracy and Stability," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (August 2006), pp. 163 – 178.

[6] Richard Haas, for example, argues that there was always an external influence in shaping the historical evolution of the Middle East. Proceeding from this conviction, he divided the region's history into three eras associated, in their beginnings and ends, to the role of external factors. See Richard N. Haass, "The New Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 6 (November/December 2006), pp. 2-11. Similarly, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt assume that U.S. foreign policy shapes events in every corner of the globe, and that nowhere is this truer than in the Middle East, which is—they assert—a region of recurring instability and enormous strategic importance, see John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and the U.S. Foreign Policy," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 29–87.

[7] See, for example, Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations, The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970).

[8] Anderson, "Remaking the Middle East," pp. 163 – 178.

[9] See a discussion on this point in Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era, Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 27.

concluded, distorts the study of Middle East international relations by focusing attention on the foreign policies of the superpowers to the detriment of a more complex explanation that focuses on the interplay between national, regional and international variables.[10]

4.2.2 The Middle East as an Exceptional Actor

The other way of conceiving Super Powers-Middle East relations, according to Lisa Anderson, contends that Middle Eastern politics reflect such unique and deeply rooted cultural and religious traditions that they are hardly amenable to influences of any kind from outside the area. Thus, benign efforts of outsiders to broker peace and advance prosperity founder in the irredeemably tribal and reactionary politics of the area. Proponents of this view would refer to 'the absence of democracy in most Middle East countries and the region's lack of success in economic and social development, in addition to the persistent state of conflict as evidences of an incorrigible regional vulnerability to corruption and tyranny.'[11]

The problem with this view is that it draws heavily on the controversial notion of Middle East *exceptionalism*. Exceptionalism, according to Byron Shafer is the notion that 'a phenomenon should be understood, essentially, in terms of itself. That is, it must be understood with regard to its own creation and its own evolution, rather than as an adjusted version of familiar variables and trends.'[12] Middle East exceptionalism, thus, is the notion that the region embodies qualitative differences from other nations. Understanding other nations will not help in understanding it; understanding it will only mislead in understanding them.[13]

---

[10] Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Study of Middle East International Relations: A Critique," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1991), pp. 208-220.

[11] Anderson, "Remaking the Middle East," p. 163 – 178, Beverley Milton-Edwards adds that the contemporary Middle East is usually portrayed as mysterious, 'a region of intrigue and war, the cradle of terrorism, religious extremism and barbaric rule', see Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

[12] For an in-depth discussion on the concept of exceptionalism, see Byron E. Shafer, "American Exceptionalism," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 445 – 63.

[13] Many factors are introduced to explain the alleged Middle East exceptionalism, e.g., historical circumstances, religious philosophy, political culture, great-power politics, and oil economics. See Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), pp. 139-157, Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 2.

However, the Middle East is similar to other developing regions in the world, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. It suffers, in part, from similar problems such as the effects of modernization, lack of political participation, poor economic growth, foreign indebtedness to the West, the competition for arms and increasing urbanization. All of these features are common problems to other regions.[14] As such, there is no logic to consider that the Middle East represents an exceptional case or to consider that it is not affected by external influences of any kind.

4.2.3 Evaluating the Two Theories

Apart from those two extreme theories there is a significant body of literature in the field that bridges the two schools of thought. This study will be based on this middle-ground literature which accepts the fact that the Middle East acquires characteristics of both of the above categories.[15] On the one hand, there is little doubt that the superpowers exercised an influential role in almost all the articulated events in the region (Suez Crisis, Six-Day-War, Gulf Wars, etc.). However, the complex internal dynamics of the region disclosed themselves repeatedly. This was particularly clear during the Cold War when regional regimes showed in many cases an ability to

---

[14] Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East.* This conclusion has been further confirmed by empirical analysis which demonstrates that there is no reason to posit any such regional exceptionalism in the Middle East, see Mirjam E. Sørli, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Strand, "Why is There so Much Conflict in the Middle East?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (February 2005), pp. 141-165.

[15] See, for example, Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), Gilles Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom, The Future of The Middle East,* Translated By, Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis, The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (MA: Beacon Press Publish, 2009), Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East, The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), Beverley Milton-Edwards, Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance, The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (London: Yale University Press, 2007), William B. Quandt, *Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and University of California Press, 2005), Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd, 2002), Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The Cold War and the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Alan R. Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble, The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine, Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (California: University of California Press, 1999), William L. Cleveland, and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009).

manoeuvre, bargain, and even deceive the superpowers. Richard Haass argued that during the Cold War superpowers played a dominant role in the Middle East. But the very nature of U.S.-Soviet competition gave local states considerable room to manoeuvre.[16] In October 1973, for example, Egypt and Syria surprised the superpowers and launched an astonishing attack against Israel. In a different context, Sadat's decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977 took Washington by surprise.[17] Also, in 1979, the Iranian Revolution managed to bring down one of the main pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the region. More recently, Hamas' victory in the parliamentary elections of 2006 in the Palestinian occupied territories, demonstrated clearly that the United States and other superpowers, if any, do not control all the threads of the Middle Eastern game as is widely perceived. John Agnew summarized this meaning:

> For all their weakness, however, Middle East countries could not be treated as passive objects. They had to be wooed, and often they resisted. This limited the ability of the superpowers to extend their influence. Unlike in the nineteenth century, the world map was no longer a "vacuum" waiting to be filled by a small number of Great Powers. But the boundaries and integrity of existing states were protected by the military impasse between the superpowers. Any disturbance of the status quo threatened the hegemony of each within its respective sphere of influence. When this happened, as, for example, in 1956, 1967, and 1973, the Cold War always threatened to heat up.[18]

The Middle East, thus, is not a passive actor in world politics. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will concentrate more, in the following chapters, on the way through which U.S. strategies have influenced regional stability. In doing so, I do not underestimate the impact of internal dynamics which have an undeniable share in the overall instability of the region; rather, I do try to tighten the focus of this study by concentrating on what I consider as the most relevant factor with regard to Middle East stability. This study is, thus, undertaking a first step in a multi-dimensional

---

[16] See Haass, *The New Middle East*, pp. 2-11.
[17] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 227.
[18] John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), pp. 129-130

research endeavour that should include other factors that affect Middle East stability in future works.

4.3 The Evolution of U.S. Interest in the Region

Historical records show that Washington had perceived no vital interest in the Middle East and had hardly played any role in influencing *regional stability* prior to World War II.[19] The U.S. had no colonies in the Middle East, and, prior to the 1930s, little economic or political interest. Its first diplomatic interaction was with Oman, then a regional maritime power, in 1833, when a ship loaded with spices sailed from Muscat to New York, but this was, practically, a marginal engagement.[20]

The first real engagement with the Middle East was made by American missionaries and archaeologists, who had special interest in the region in which most of the events of the Old and New Testaments took place. Beside this missionary/archaeological interest in the region, a host of factors encouraged Washington to deepen its involvement in the Middle East, the most important amongst which were: the discovery of oil in the 1930s, the creation of Israel in 1948 and the American-Soviet contest in what would be known as the Cold War (1947-1991). In the following, I shed light on these factors, exploring the way in which they affected U.S. interest in regional stability.

4.3.1 Missionary and Archaeological Interest

The initial concern of the U.S. in its early contact with the region was almost missionary. The leading American missionaries arrived in the Middle East around 1820, fourteen years later they founded their first Arabic press in Lebanon.[21] In 1863 American missionaries established Robert College (later renamed Bosphorus University) which was the first American higher education institution founded outside the United States, and American Women's College, both in Constantinople. In 1886

---

[19] Warren I. Cohen, *America's Failing Empire: U.S. Foreign Relations Since the Cold War* (MA: Warren I. Cohen Books, 2005), p. 5.

[20] The U.S. developed economic relations with the spice-rich sultanate of Muscat and signed a treaty on October 1833. The treaty granted most-favoured nation status to American commerce, see Carl C. Hodge and Cathal J. Nolan, eds., *U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy, from 1789 to the Present* (New York: ABC-Clio, 2006), p. 69, Amir Taheri, "The United States and the Reshaping of the Greater Middle East," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2005), pp. 295 - 301.

[21] See Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 314.

the equally famous American Protestant College (the Syrian Protestant College) was opened in Beirut, later to become the American University of Beirut, and in 1919 the American University in Cairo was founded, in addition to other numerous secondary schools.[22]

Shortly after the onset of the missionary work, the archaeological exploration in the region started to acquire similar significance. American archaeology arose in the form of biblical endeavour; 'the quest for physical and scientific evidence to reinforce a Christian faith under challenge from the new biblical higher criticism,'[23] which questioned the historicity of the sacred texts, and from materialistic theories such as Darwinism.[24] Beginning in 1838, the prominent Biblical scholar and explorer, Edward Robinson, initiated an important program of historical explorations, aided by an ardent missionary and distinguished Arabic scholar; Eli Smith. They attempted to match biblical names with contemporary sites. Their success encouraged other American scholars and researchers to study the Levant.[25]

The interest in biblical sites, whether secular or religious, was typical of American researchers, however, other major projects of the era involved prehistoric, Byzantine, and Crusader remains. The erection of the grand Palestine Archaeological Museum (known also as the Rockefeller Museum, opened in 1938)[26] in Jerusalem by an American scholar (James Henry Breasted) and American capital acknowledged the importance of the field and provided fertile resources for those interested in archaeological studies, regardless of their scientific background.

---

[22] Emil Lengyel, "A World Without End: The Middle East," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 288, No. 1 (1953), p. 348, Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East, The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 114, Douglas Little, "Gideon's Band: America and the Middle East Since 1945," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (June 2007), pp. 513 – 540.

[23] Higher criticism is a historical approach to scripture that investigates the 'composition, date, and authenticity of scripture in order to determine its place in history'. See Nigel M. de S. Cameron, *Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defence of Infallibilism in 19ᵗʰ Century Britain* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987).

[24] Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History, Vol. I: A – F*, (California: ABC- CLIO, Inc., 2008), p. 144.

[25] Emil Lengyel, "A World without End: The Middle East," p. 348.

[26] Officially, it was called the Palestine Archaeological Museum, but from the outset it was known as the Rockefeller Museum. It was founded by James Henry Breasted, the director of the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute, who was on a visit to Palestine in 1925 when he discovered that Jerusalem lacked a proper archaeological museum to house important regional finds. Breasted approached American philanthropist John D. Rockefeller, who agreed to donate the sum of two million dollars. The cornerstone of the new museum was laid on June 19, 1930, although it only opened to the public on January 13, 1938. See Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopaedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 144

4.3.2 Oil

The story of real American involvement in the Middle East begins with oil. The discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf tempted the American leaders to expand America's involvement in the region whose stability seemed now to go hand in hand with access to relatively inexpensive supplies of oil.[27] The basic facts about oil in the region are easy to understand:

> Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, along with the small states of the Persian Gulf littoral, possess two-thirds of the known low-production-cost reserves of oil in the world. Saudi Arabia alone contains a quarter of the world's total proven reserves; Iraq has the second largest reserves in the world, possessing more than 10 percent of the world's total; and Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait contain about 9 percent each.[28]

After the First World War, American oil companies (with the backing of the U.S. government) were eager to have access to the region's flourishing oil industry.[29] At that time, British and French oil companies dominated production in Middle Eastern countries under British or French control as well as in Iran where British interests were predominant, and U.S. oil companies usually remained junior partners. However, in the early 1930s U.S. oil investors managed to have a foothold in Saudi Arabia, then a poor country whose king was desperate for additional revenue, but, later, turned out to have the biggest oil reserves in the region. U.S. companies played the leading role in developing Saudi oil industry, reaping vast profits in the process.[30]

Sustained oil exploration began in 1933 when the Saudi government signed a concession agreement with Standard Oil of California, the future Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Oil was not discovered until 1938, and the outbreak of World War II delayed the development of the Saudi petroleum industry until the late

---

[27] Michael J. Hogan, *America in the World, The Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations since 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[28] Nora Bensahel, Daniel Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment In The Middle East Conflict*, p. 3.
[29] Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, p. 118.
[30] Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, p.115, Thomas W. Lippman, *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (Colorado: Westview, 2004), p. 13.

1940s.[31] Since then, a symbiotic relationship developed between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis kept the oil flowing and the Americans offered protection from radical Arab regimes, such as that of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and then the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.[32]

The U.S. (and the industrialized West in general) became heavily dependent on Middle East oil. American import needs began to grow from the early 1970s on. The U.S., despite successful conservation measures and reduced imports since the peak year 1977, remained heavily dependent on foreign energy sources, of which the most important by far is Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in general.[33] Nowadays, approximately 20 percent of U.S. oil comes from the Middle East. This means that the continued availability of Middle East oil, in adequate quantity and on bearable terms, presents a constant objective of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.[34]

4.3.3 The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab–Israeli conflict contributed to a growing U.S. involvement in the region. Most U.S. leaders chose to throw their weight behind Israel.[35] Stability was in the heart of the relationship between the two countries. Washington looked to Israel to stabilize the Middle East in the face of both Arab nationalism and Soviet encroachment, especially after the erosion of British influence.[36] 'Although the US has no treaty commitment to the preservation of Israel's security, there is a long-standing national consensus that Washington has a basic interest in Israel's survival.[37]

---

[31] William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado: Westview, 2009), p. 233.

[32] Warren I. Cohen, *America's Failing Empire*, p. 5.

[33] Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 51.

[34] Agnew, *Hegemony*, p. 30

[35] Israel is a pro-Western country that has a special relationship with the U.S. For ideological or electoral reasons many high-ranked Americans politicians and Congress men strongly back Israel, making its security an important political issue for any administration. See Nora Bensahel, Daniel Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment In The Middle East*, p. 4.

[36] Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine, Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (California: University of California Press, 1999), p. 96.

[37] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 2 Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret.

130

After 1945, Britain proved unable to maintain control in Palestine or to find a political solution to the problems between the country's Arab majority and its Jewish minority led by the Zionist movement. The Arabs sought the independence of Palestine as an Arab state, while the Zionists fought for limitless Jewish immigration and land purchases and the creation of a Jewish state in as much of Palestine as possible.[38]

The United States was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the idea of a Jewish state in part of Palestine. Washington took a deep interest in the implementation of the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of Israel[39] and President Harry S. Truman did play a key role in supporting the establishment of a Jewish homeland when he decided to back the UN partition plan in 1947 and to recognize Israel immediately after its declaration of independence in May 1948.[40]

From 1967 on onward, the American commitment towards Israel developed into a central feature of American strategy in the Middle East. Starting from the Johnson administration, it seemed that the United States was intervening more for the sake of Israel's security than for achieving regional stability. That support, according to William Quandt, was rooted in a sense of moral commitment to the survivors of the holocaust, as well as in the intense attachment of American Jews to Israel.[41] Seth P. Tillman explained this trend by arguing that the basis of the American interest in Israel was not, in any case, strategy but affiliation.[42]

---

[38] Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, p. 117.

[39] The declaration was made in a letter from Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community. The letter reflected the position of the British Cabinet, as agreed upon on October 1917. The statement was issued through the efforts of Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, the principal Zionist leaders based in London; as they had asked for the reconstitution of Palestine as 'the' Jewish national home. The 'Balfour Declaration' was later incorporated into the Sèvres peace treaty with Turkey and the Mandate for Palestine. See Lawrence Davidson, *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001).

[40] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 24.

[41] Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 13.

[42] Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East*, p. 52. On Different explanations of the U.S. Commitment to Israel See: John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Efraim Karsh, ed., *Israel: The First Hundred Years, Volume IV, Israel in the International Arena* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine, Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*, Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The Origins of the American–Israeli Alliance, The Jordanian factor* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), Janice J. Terry, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

However, Israel is also claimed to be a strategic asset to the US and it is argued that generous U.S. aid is a bargain given the benefits it produces for the United States. Steadfast support for Israel is said to be a reflection of America's overarching strategic interests: the United States backs Israel because doing so supposedly makes all Americans safer and secures regional stability necessary for US interests.[43] A different opinion arguing that Israel is not much of an asset when it comes to maintaining stability or preserving the status qup in the region and has repeatedly frustrated U.S. efforts to deal more effectively with region's problematic issues is to be illustrated in the following descriptive chapters.[44]

4.3.4 The Soviet Challenge (The Cold War)

Despite being allies during the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the U.S. disagreed about political ideology and the configuration of the post-war world. The US and its allies had seen communism as a threatening ideology. They used containment as a main strategy, whereby through alliances such as NATO and military presence the U.S. government committed itself to maintaining the political status quo. The competition for hegemonic power between the US and the Soviet Union gave birth to the Cold War.

The Middle East was the first theatre of this extended conflict when Joseph Stalin, in 1946, delayed in removing all Soviet troops on schedule from Iran, where pro-Soviet autonomist regimes had been set up. The Russians had indicated, both at the Tehran Conference and the Potsdam Conference that they would withdraw at the war's end. However, in response to growing U.S. interest in the Iranian oilfields and separatist movements in the region, in December 1945 they established pro-Soviet provincial governments in Azerbaijan and neighbouring Kurdistan. Stalin also obtained a northern oil concession and convinced the Iranian prime minister, Qavam as-Saltaneh, to appoint three communists to his cabinet.[45]

---

[43] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 49.
[44] Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 67.
[45] Joan Hoff, *A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, Dreams of Perfectibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008), p. 107.

The crisis helped to convince the American President that the Soviets were intent on a policy of expansionism that should be resisted. Accordingly, the United States exerted diplomatic pressure both directly and through the United Nations and also increased the U.S. naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Truman further encouraged Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, who had succeeded his father to the Iranian throne in 1941, to dismantle the pro-Soviet separatist regimes and to refuse to ratify the Soviet oil deal.[46] Faced with this opposition and promised oil concessions in Iran, Soviet forces withdrew in April 1946.[47] After this crisis, U.S. officials started devoting weapons supply, security assurances, and military and economic aid to befriend states of the Middle East to prevent Soviet expansion.[48]

The objective of containing the Soviet attempts to gain the upper hand in the Middle East and to access the region's strategic facilities and vital resources required the United States to maintain stability in the region.[49] Stability was defined by American officials as maintaining the status quo and preventing any development that could benefit the Soviets in the region. American administrations believed that they had to be deeply involved in the Middle East because, in terms of global strategic interests, they did not wish the land mass, population and resources of the eastern Arab world to fall under Soviet domination.

4.3.5 Shielding Moderate Regimes

In addition to its long-standing ties to Israel, the United States has developed close relations with some *moderate* regimes in the region. Moderate regimes are those regimes who served as regional stabilizers for the benefit of the US policy in the region. The US searching for moderate allies in the Middle East, rather than nationalistic ones, was a major consequence of the Suez Crisis when the American

---

[46] Ibid., p. 107.
[47] See Neil A. Wynn, *Historical Dictionary of Roosevelt-Truman era* (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2008), p. 51.
[48] Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, p. 67.
[49] Alan R. Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), pp. 49-50.

attempt to manipulate the Egyptian President Nasser into abandoning "nonalignment" in return for financing the Aswan Dam failed.[50]

During the Cold War years Middle East moderate allies checked the penetration of Soviet influence in the region and contained the activities of pro-Soviet regional actors. They largely agreed with the United States on major issues such as the need for stable oil production, the desirability of Arab-Israeli peace, and the need to contain ambitious regional actors who might undertake local adventures.[51] These regimes were tasked with serving America's interest in a "stable Middle East". They were thus known as status-quo regional allies and included 'the Shah of Iran, the al-Saud dynasty, Jordan under the late King Hussein and his son King Abdullah II, and, beginning in the 1970s, Egypt under Anwar Al Sadat and his successor, Hosni Mubarak.'[52] According to Alan Taylor:

> strengthening these moderate regimes was a key U.S. strategy to encounter the Soviet penetration in the Middle East during the Cold War. The doctrine of recruiting regional partners grew out of the attempt to preserve the territorial and political status quo. The principle theme in this respect was to bring as many of the regional states as possible into a cooperative venture designed to minimize the influence and leverage of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.[53]

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union moderate regimes found other tasks to undertake on behalf of the U.S., such as preventing the Islamists from reaching power, safe-guarding Israel's security, and ensuring other logistic facilities such as waterways, airspaces, in addition to hosting American military bases in the region. However, after the events of September 11, the Bush administration reached a radical conclusion, the core of which was that the U.S. alliance with these moderate regimes

---

[50] John Agnew, *Hegemony,* p. 130, Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace, Israel and the Arabs 1948–2003* (Princeton: New Jersey Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 186.
[51] Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 30.
[52] After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States augmented security ties to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Although these states' possession of, or proximity to, large oil reserves was the initial reason for U.S. efforts to build ties, these relations have taken on a life of their own. See Bensahel and Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment in the Middle East,* p. 4, Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March,* p. 16.
[53] Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East,* p. 51.

helped them to achieve domestic stability while at the same time harmed U.S. strategic interests. The evidence included the invasion of Kuwait by an American ally threatening the supply of oil to the United States, al-Qaeda attack on the American cities of New York and Washington, and the continuing disputes in the occupied territories were recorded as a failure of the Saudi and the Egyptian regimes,[54] the main moderate allies of U.S. policy in the region.[55] The Bush administration decided, thus, to launch a new strategy for change in the Middle East in order to foster a more firm stability. The Bush revolution, however, was short-lived; after the side effects of the new strategy started to reveal the administration quickly retreated to its status quo traditional strategy. These transformations in US stability-driven strategies toward the region will be further illustrated in the following section.

4.4 The U.S. Changing Perception of Middle East Stability

Broadly speaking, the course of American intervention in the Middle East (1953-2008) went through three major stages: the Cold War, the Post-Cold War, and Post-September 11. The goal of securing regional stability was served differently in each of these phases. In the first phase (1945-1990) stability was sought through preventing Soviet penetration into the region (this required the American administrations to pursue a status-quo strategy). In the second phase (1990s) advancing stability took the form of economic integration and 'restricted' promotion of democracy (in this period American administrations were hesitant between status quo and hegemonic strategies). In the third phase (2000-2008) stability was translated into fighting terrorism, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and forcibly promoting democracy (these objectives required the American administration to pursue a

---

[54] The Americans used to look at Egypt's involvement in peace process as a vital aspect of any Palestinian-Israeli agreement. Egyptian leadership has helped overcome several crises, both by preventing escalation of violence and by restoring a negotiating environment. Similarly, Saudi Arabia was brought in to undertake some gesture to make it easier for Palestinian negotiators to complete certain deals in peace process. See Rachel Bronson, *Thicker than oil, America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2006)

[55] When President Bush assumed office, six months after the beginning of al-Aqsa Intifada, he defined the fighting as a regional problem that should be solved locally. He encouraged Saudi Arabia and Egypt, along with other Arabs, to adopt a more proactive foreign policy before asking for American help. 'The U.S. stance reflected its dissatisfaction with the allies' reluctance to seriously engage during Camp David talks, when a problem emerged around sovereignty of the holy city of Jerusalem.' See Abdel Moneim Said Aly and Robert H. Pelletreau, "U.S.-Egyptian Relations," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. viii, No. 2, (June 2001), pp. 45-58.

hegemonic strategy and regime change). In the following, I illustrate briefly the main features of these three phases.

4.4.1 The First Phase (1947-1990): Preventing the Soviet Penetration.

In this phase U.S. involvement in the Middle East grew gradually in reaction to the growing soviet influence. In this context, maintaining/restoring *status quo* strategy was the dominant thread in American foreign policy. The United States intervened fairly consistently to support anti-Soviet allied regimes in the Middle East (and elsewhere).[56] In this phase the U.S. administrations exercised continuous efforts to promote regional stability and to keep the existing balance in the face of the Soviet attempts for penetration. These efforts led the United States, and its allies, to become 'status quo states.'[57] Promoting regional stability was initially interpreted as keeping the established political order in place as much as possible, on the assumption that any change in the form of power in the region could open the door before Soviet expansion. It was believed that the prevention of radical change would keep the Russians at bay and facilitate American ascendancy in the area.[58]

Obsession with the Soviet threat, whether real or imagined, led Washington to embrace all enemies of communism. As a steady rule; American presidents would often back any dictator if he seemed to be serving as a rampart against Soviet inroads in a strategically vital region.[59] Thus, in the name of regional stability, the United States regularly and overtly, provided diplomatic, military, and economic assistance to autocrats in the Middle East. Ex-secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, summarized this policy in a simple formula: 'We (the U.S.) supported authoritarian regimes, and they supported our shared interests in regional stability.'[60]

---

[56] Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 56.

[57] Taheri, "The United States and the Reshaping of the Greater Middle East," pp. 295 - 301.

[58] Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, p. 51.

[59] For example the United States provided significant military and economic support to Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and, until the late 1980s, turned its head from Marcos's embezzlement of government funds and abuses of human rights. Also, in Latin America the United States backed right-wing governments in Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. See Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. x.

[60] Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 2-26.

This policy raised contradiction between the desire to export 'American values' of liberal democracy and the pragmatic decision to make alliances on the basis of a shared commitment to anti-communism. The American foreign policy choice, however, was usually resolved in favour of the second alternative. Tamara Coffman rightly noticed that 'nowhere has the disjuncture between American values and America's foreign policy been as great, and as consistent, for as long as in the Middle East.'[61]

4.4.2 The Second Phase (1990s): Democracy Promotion and Economic Integration.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Washington was freed from obsessions with struggle over global power. In this period of sole American dominance, the United States was strong enough to promote its regional interests in the Middle East without depending on status quo strategy. During this phase much US rhetoric stressed the universal commitment to democracy. The Clinton administration actively worked to promote democracy in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. At the same time, Washington did not want to appear completely indifferent to political reform and human rights in Middle East countries. The United States urged Arab governments' to take reformist moves. It offered verbal and diplomatic support to countries such as Yemen, and Jordan that allowed their citizens increased political space.

Under U.S. pressures, local regimes carried out some economic reforms, but they did not respond positively to U.S. political demands. For its part, Washington did not exercise huge pressures on its regional allies. Several US policy statements cautioned that democracy promotion in the Middle East should not undermine regional stability, or become 'an absolute imperative', and that efforts should be confined to advancing democracy where this was most viable, and most tailored to immediate US interests.[62]

Amy Hawthorne argued that the faded reforms led by the US in this phase were not intended to signal a transition to democracy, but to prolong the life of those regimes and to advance economic liberalization that help integrate Middle East regimes into

---

[61] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 16.
[62] Richard Youngs, *The European Union And The Promotion Of Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 48.

the global economy. According to Hawthorne 'the main aim behind these reforms was to bolster the unpopular leaders, improve the environment for much-needed economic reforms, and dilute the appeal of Islamist groups, which emerged as a major political force in the 1990s, challenging both Middle East regimes and United States policy.'[63]

Thereafter, into the post-Cold War period, it was argued that US came more to seek a change only in the form, not substance of political structures in despotic regimes. Americans were seen as actively supporting the installing of heavily truncated forms of democracy built on the same logic of control and stability as soft authoritarianism, but simply with a formally democratic façade. 'Low intensity' democracy would retain considerable state autonomy for economic liberalization while tempering unrest due to its ideological legitimacy and credibility with local populations.[64]

It can be concluded that the roots of the American hesitancy towards reform in the Middle East emerged in this phase. Washington did not press for bolder reforms out of concern for regional stability and fear of Islamist opposition gains. 'Occasionally, some officials would recommend a more proactive policy, but were rebuffed by those who argued— compellingly—that the undemocratic status quo was the best the United States could hope for under the circumstances.'[65] The final outcome was that: the United States did not go far in the pressure it exerted on the Middle East regimes and bid more on the traditional formula of exchanging democracy with stability (in terms of status quo).[66]

4.4.3 The Third Phase (Post 11-09-2001): Regime Change then Balancing Again.

Whereas the 'status quo' strategy, adopted wholly during the first phase and partially during the second, was a problem primarily for the peoples of the region (who had to live without freedom), it has become, after September 11, a problem for Americans themselves. Philip H. Gordon explained this point by arguing that

---

[63] Amy Hawthorne, "Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?," *Current History*, (January 2003), pp. 21, 22.

[64] Richard Youngs, *International Democracy and the West The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004), p. 16.

[65] Hawthorne, "Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?"

[66] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 32.

for decades prior to 11 September 2001, the United States basically had a deal with repressive governments throughout the Arab world: they could run their countries more or less however they wanted, as long as they were willing to sell oil at reasonable prices to the West, act as strategic allies of the United States and not threaten the Middle Eastern stability. With the 11 September terrorist attacks, however, this deal has come into serious question.[67]

The September 11 attacks put an end, as Amy Hawthorne put it, to Washington's illusion that the shortage of democracy in the Middle East was not pressing as long as regional stability was maintained.[68] The attacks led the U.S. government to questioning the long-term benefit of its status-quo policy—and awoke American policymakers to realities in the region that had been growing slowly for a long time and were creating increasing internal pressures for change in Middle East politics.[69]

The G. W. Bush team became convinced that the 'status quo', the United States worked so hard for six decades to preserve in the Middle East, produced a fragile regional stability, one that was more in the interest of regional leaders than to U.S. Change in the Middle East became, thus, an urgent demand in the American foreign policy towards the region. The debates which took place in that phase were 'not on whether change is needed, but on how best the U.S. can be an agent of it.'[70] Robert Satloff summarized the new trend within American foreign policy by stating that:

Historically, the pursuit of stability has been a central feature of U.S. Middle East policy. But George W. Bush was the first president to argue that stability was itself an obstacle to the advancement of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Triggered by the events of September 11, the administration has since pursued what can be termed a policy of constructive instability, based on the notion that the protection of U.S. citizens and the security of U.S. interests are best served by fundamental

[67] Philip H. Gordon, "Bush's Middle East Vision," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 155–165.

[68] Hawthorne, "Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?"

[69] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 26.

[70] See: P. W. Singer, "The 9-11 War Plus 5: Looking Back and Looking Forward at U.S.-Islamic World Relations," *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World*, at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/09islamicworld_singer/singer20060901.pdf

change in Middle East regimes toward welcoming rather than stifling the full participation of their citizenry in political and economic life.[71]

Accordingly, the Bush administration sought a different strategy that came under various headings such as 'reform' 'democratization' and 'change', but was centred on one idea: the necessity of giving up the old concept of stability based on preserving the status quo towards a more hegemonic form of stability based on forcible change. American pressures managed to produce some changes in regional countries. Egypt held its first-ever competitive presidential ballot (marred though it was by state harassment of opposition candidates and repression of voters). In Yemen the president committed the government to a new anticorruption drive and allowed a significant degree of competition in his re-election bid.[72]

U.S. enthusiasm for reform, however, declined severely. A swift backlash against democracy promotion swept Washington following several alarms: (1) the resistance of America's client regimes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to reform, (2) the election of a Hamas government in the Palestinian territories, (3) the strong showing by Hezbollah in the Lebanese elections in 2005 (4) the Muslim Brotherhood's significant gains in Egyptian elections in the same year, (5) the security dilemmas in Iraq and Afghanistan and (6) the massive increases in oil prices.[73]

These repercussions minimized the Bush administration enthusiasm for the reformist policy and pushed it to return to the strategies based on maintaining the status quo, tolerating repressive rulers and turning a blind eye to the brutal practices held by regional clients against their peoples.[74] The change in the administration's attitude was reflected in a shift in the U.S. policies and language which reconsidered the political regimes earlier defined as 'autocratic' into 'moderates' again and ceased to use the banner of 'the New Middle East'. This conversion, as Marina Ottaway put it,

---

[71] Robert Satloff, *Assessing the Bush Administration's Policy of 'Constructive Instability'* (Part I): *Lebanon and Syria*, The Washington Institute for Near, 2005.
[72] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 11.
[73] Ibid. pp. 24, 25
[74] See Martin S. Indyk and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Back to Balancing in the Middle East: A New Strategy for Constructive Engagement," at: http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=347&MId=16

showed that the United States has little stomach for the risks entailed in a true political transition towards a more complex strategy.[75]

4.5   U.S. Foreign Policy Tools in Affecting Middle East Stability

In the following I demonstrate some of the key foreign policy tools utilized by American governments in the period from 1953 to 2008 to accomplish regional stability in the Middle East. These tools represent a combination of soft and hard power.[76] Under the first category, tools such as economic aid and political alliances are illustrated, while military intervention and regime change come under the second. Practically, these tools are overlapping, however, for the sake of simplicity; I illustrate them separately in the following section.

4.5.1 Foreign Aid

By foreign aid I refer to any monetary assistance distributed by the U.S. government to foreign states and institutions for the purpose of serving U.S. foreign policy aims. 'Aid, like diplomacy, propaganda, or military action, is an instrument of statecraft. Aid policy has been a component of diplomacy and ultimately a sophisticated instrument of control or at least influence.'[77] According to Mark McGillivray and Howard White 'from the donor's point of view, aid is seen as an instrument of foreign policy, serving to: promote political and diplomatic relations with developing countries; enhance stability within countries of strategic importance.'[78]

During the Cold War, foreign aid was dispensed for the broad purpose of containing communist expansionism. The logic behind aid programs was to promote economic development in third world countries to bring about political stability (by deterring

---

[75] For lengthy discussion on this point see Marina Ottaway, "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring Credibility," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief,* No. 60, (May 2008), pp. 1-8, Pierre Noel, "The New U.S. Middle East Policy and Energy Security Challenges," *International Journal,* Vol. 62, (Winter 2006-2007), pp. 43-54.

[76] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

[77] Louis A. Picard and Robert Groelsema, "U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities Goals for the Twenty-First Century," in Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss, eds., *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), p. 7. The U.S. government spent generously on foreign aid in the late 1940s and early 1950s, mostly on the Marshall Plan, which sparked the economic recovery of war-torn Europe. See Wynn, *Historical Dictionary of Roosevelt-Truman era,* pp. 27, 28.

[78] Mark McGillivray, and Howard White, "Explanatory Studies of Aid Allocation among Developing Countries: A Critical Survey." *Working Paper Series* No. 148 (April 1993), p. 1-86.

these countries from 'going' communist). According to Lawrence Korb, American 'policymakers, from Truman through the first President Bush, believed that these aid would create stable political systems that could reduce the attraction of citizens of those states to communist ideology and thus block Soviet political and military advances into western Europe, Asia, and the developing world.'[79]

In the 1950s, US aid was heavily status quo-oriented and consisted primarily of economic and military assistance to bolster governments friendly to the United States. In the 1960s, economic development rose as a priority of US aid, both as a goal in itself and as an objective tied to US security interests. The Peace Corps, Food for Peace, the Alliance for Progress, and economic aid for underdeveloped nations and for the dissident communist regimes of Yugoslavia and Poland were programs inaugurated by Washington as part of its aid strategy in the Cold War.[80] In the second half of the 1970s human rights emerged as a goal of US foreign policy, this led to some diplomatic initiatives that could be interpreted as pro-democratic. In 1978, Congress enacted Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizing the use of assistance funds for projects to promote human rights. 'Some small efforts were undertaken in this direction but they were at most a minor footnote to the overall portfolio of US aid.'[81] At the end of the Cold War, there was a brief period when the relationship between foreign aid and stability appeared to separate. This caused a decrease in aid worldwide after 1992. However, since September 11, 2001, the two appear to be merging together again.[82]

Foreign Aid to Middle East

Foreign aid has been a popular policy instrument in the Middle East which received the bulk of U.S. foreign assistance. Since 1955, both superpowers had provided extensive economic aid to a variety of states in the region.[83] Before 1970, U.S. foreign aid to the Middle East was modest compared to that to other regions (especially Latin

---

[79] Lawrence Korb, "Foreign Aid and Security A Renewed Debate?," in Picard et al., *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century*, p. 27.

[80] See Joseph M. Siracusa and Richard Dean Burns, *Historical Dictionary of Kennedy-Johnson Era* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2007), p. 185.

[81] Michael Cox, John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 182.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 218.

America). In 1950–1970, aid to the Middle East reached $7.8 billion, with Iran ($2.1 billion) and Israel ($1.3 billion) the top recipients. Aid to the region declined sharply in the late 1960s as Arab states severed relations with the United States during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and as the Vietnam War consumed U.S. resources.[84]

In the 1970s, the United States took renewed interest in the Middle East after Egypt avoided Soviet assistance and made peace with Israel.[85] To facilitate a complete cessation of hostilities and Israel's return of the Sinai Peninsula, the United States provided a total of $7.5 billion to both parties in 1979. The 'Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-35) provided Israel[86] and Egypt with military and economic grants at a ratio of 3:2, respectively, making those states the top two recipients worldwide.'[87] The U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt helped convince both countries that the United States was committed to creating stability in the Middle East.[88]

During the 1980s, the United States was heavily backing Iraq in its war against Iran, although for a while the United States had provided some limited aid to Iran (under an arrangement that came to light as the Iran-Contra scandal).[89] In the 1990s the United

---

[84] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 58.

[85] After assuming power in 1970 (following Nasser's death), President Anwar Al Sadat enhanced his countries' relations with the Soviet Union. He signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets who provided Egypt with massive levels of military assistance. Moscow's support to Egypt reached a peak during its War with Israel in 1973; this enabled the Egyptian President to achieve a great political victory. Nevertheless, after the war Sadat decided to forsake his alignment with Moscow and turn to the United States for support. Sadat main objective was to force Israel to return the lands it had occupied. The Soviet Union, fearing a confrontation with the United States and believing that Egypt would lose any further war with Israel, decided not provide Sadat with the capability to end the Israeli occupation. Moscow's unwillingness to do what was necessary to extricate Sadat from the continuing stalemate increased the domestic opposition to Sadat's regime and eventually led him to dissolve the Egyptian-Soviet alignment. Sadat realized that the United States, not the Soviet Union, was the only great power willing and able to force an end to the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. See Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256.

[86] Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, and is the largest cumulative recipient since World War II. See U.S. Agency for International Development, Overseas Loans and Grants, published annually [http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html], Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," *Congressional Research Service*, Washington, D.C., The Library of Congress (April 26 2005).

[87] Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," *Congressional Research Service*, Washington, D.C., The Library of Congress, (December 4 2009), p. 19.

[88] Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request", *Congressional Research Service*, Washington, D.C., The Library of Congress (July 17 2009), p. 1, Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

[89] For more elaboration on Iran-Contra scandal, see: Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (London: Random House, 2004).

States extended special incentives to other Middle East states such as forgiving $6.7 billion in Egypt's debts as a reward for its support of American objectives in the Gulf War (1991),[90] subsidizing Israel's absorption of immigrants from former Soviet territory to the tune of $9.2 billion, and allocating several hundreds of millions of dollars to various states as incentives to make peace.[91]

In reaction to 9/11, the United States also increased aid to such countries as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Jordan for the purpose of advancing counterterrorism objectives.[92] After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, that country became the recipient of the largest annual foreign aid share. A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq since mid-2003, garnering some $18.5 billion in reconstruction aid in 2004.[93]

Critics of U.S. aid policy in the Middle East contend that U.S. foreign aid exacerbates tensions in the region. Many commentators insist that U.S. assistance to Israel indirectly causes suffering to Palestinians by supporting Israeli arms purchases.[94] Another common critic asserts that U.S. foreign aid bolsters autocratic regimes with similar strategic interests to the United States.[95] Some observers have called U.S. aid policy "contradictory," accusing the United States of bolstering its ties with autocratic regimes through military assistance, while promoting liberalization in the region with less funds dedicated to reform and development aid.[96]

4.5.2 Military/Political Alliance

The United States has always preferred temporary coalitions to more formal alliances. The wartime coalitions of World War I and World War II were examples of this trend. However, during the Cold War, the United States developed more formal and

---

[90] In the wake of President Mubarak's support for the West during the Gulf War, Egypt was granted the biggest rise in aid—a threefold increase over the first half of the 1990s—as well as a $20 billion debt write-off. See Richard Youngs, *The European Union And The Promotion Of Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) package.

[91] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 58.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Curt Tarnoff, "Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance," *Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress*, (August 7, 2009), p. 3.

[94] Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," *Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress* (December 4, 2009), p. 2.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

144

permanent alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),[97] which was transformed from being 'a political alliance into a standing military organization due to the circumstances of the struggle between the two Super Powers.'[98]

The U.S. could also be considered the leader of the virtual alliance of Western countries; a position that used to be occupied by Great Britain until 1956. However, the Suez Crisis served as the diplomatic-military straw that broke the British supremacy in the Middle East and created the conditions for the United States to assume the full responsibility and costs of leading and protecting the interests of the Western alliance in the region and in opposition to the expansionist Soviet policies there.[99] The U.S. took practical steps to serve these purposes; such as inducing the establishment of the 'Baghdad Pact'.

The Baghdad Pact originated in a quest by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration to build an anti-Soviet defence alliance in the Middle East. American officials eyed countries on the so-called Northern Tier of the region after Egypt had spoiled earlier U.S. plans to base a defence alliance in the Suez Canal area. Under American encouragement, Iraq and Turkey signed a 'Pact of Mutual Cooperation' in Baghdad on 24 February 1955, and Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran joined it before the end of

---

[97] NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a mutual defence organization established by treaty in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and 10 Western European allies to contain Soviet expansion in Europe during the Cold War. The heart of the alliance was a collective security principle that an attack on any member state would be considered an attack on all. It then transformed into a broad security body that undertook a range of operations outside of its traditional geographic area in Western Europe. The alliance expanded to include Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain. While the superpower conflict continued, NATO preserved the American defence commitment to Europe and provided a mechanism to coordinate defence policy among the Allies. Afterwards, with the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials sought to maintain the centrality of NATO to transatlantic security. NATO invoked its collective security proviso for the first time ever in reaction to the 9/11 attack on the United States. In August 2003, NATO became involved in Afghanistan, its first major operation outside Europe. NATO officials also opened a dialogue with countries of the southern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions about the prospects for future political and military cooperation. See Tom Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War* (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), p. 184.

[98] Mark R. Brawle, "The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory," in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., *Balance of Power, Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 89.

[99] Leon Hadar, *Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 21.

the year. The signatories pledged to cooperate on security matters, and invited other Middle East states to join.[100]

The end of the Cold War and the concurrent demise of the Soviet Union reduced the main security threat to America and the need for lasting alliances. Thus, the administration of President George H. W. Bush sought to build ad hoc coalitions when confronted by new threats to American interests, including the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[101] The administration created a 'coalition of the willing' that allowed states to participate at different levels. The coalition numbered some 35 countries. Members sent aircraft, equipment, and about 150,000 troops to support about 500,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. The British sent a large combat contingent; other nations, including France, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, contributed combat units to help drive Iraqi occupiers from Kuwait. Coalition members also financed most of the cost of the 1991 war. Contributions from Coalition member nations ranged from: direct military participation, logistical and intelligence support, specialized chemical/biological response teams, over-flight rights, humanitarian and reconstruction aid, to political support. [102] This 'coalition', however, was based on America's ability to exert pressure on other nations. The coalition was in fact, as one observer noted, 'an exercise in unilateralism, with a few friends.'[103]

The use of coalitions of the willing declined during the administration of President William J. Clinton (1993 - 2001). Through this period, the United States relied on formal alliances such as NATO or undertook unilateral action.[104] However, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, George W. Bush created another coalition of the willing for 'Operation Enduring Freedom.' Washington sought to develop an

---

[100] The 1955 Bandung conference, which gathered African and Asian countries representing more than one billion people, was directly stimulated as an objection to the system of western alliances spreading across the Middle East, and mainly the Baghdad Pact. In this conference, Egyptian nationalist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, realized the potential for the Afro-Asian world to achieve the independence that it desired as it confronted the imperial powers. See Hahn, *Historical dictionary of United States-Middle East relations*, p. 23. Brent M. Geary, A Foundation of Sand: U.S. Public Diplomacy, Egypt, and Arab Nationalism, 1953-1960 (PhD), November 2007, Ohio University, Steven Gary Galpern, Britain, Middle East Oil, and the Struggle to Save Sterling, 1944-1971, 2002, The University of Texas at Austin
[101] Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 76.
[102] Source: Operation Iraqi Freedom, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html, What Is the "Coalition of the Willing?", at: http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot1_032803.html
[103] Richard Crockatt, "Anti-Americanism and the Clash of Civilizations," in Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, eds., *The Rise of Anti-Americanism* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 35.
[104] Ibid., p. 76.

alliance that would allow states to offer military assistance, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, or diplomatic support, depending on the interests and abilities of each participant. During the Afghanistan intervention, more than 30 nations offered military support to the United States, while another 50 provided intelligence-sharing and law-enforcement collaboration.[105]

The Bush administration's efforts to build a coalition of the willing prior to the 2003 Iraq War were less successful. Only Australia, Poland, and Great Britain contributed troops during the initial phase of the invasion. The United States could not persuade the rest of the world to believe in Saddam's 'dire threat' and support its military undertaking. Ultimately 27 countries provided some troops for the occupation force in Iraq, but the majority of these deployments were symbolic and relatively small in number.[106]

4.5.3 Military Intervention and Regime Change

The history of US foreign policy is to a great extent the history of American intervention abroad. There are many examples in recent American history of campaigns directed against leaders and regimes at odds with the United States. American leaders often considered regime change to be a legitimate objective of US foreign policy, even if they usually hid that sentiment from the public.[107] According to Joan Hoff, 'between 1945 and 1999, the United States unilaterally attempted to overthrow forty foreign governments; and it intervened at least thirty times to squelch nationalist movements organized against tyrannical rule.'[108] If we extend the time limit through the end of the second term of President Bush, the total number of American military interventions will increase by at least two other cases (Iraq and Afghanistan).

The Middle East has had a considerable share of American interventionism (as I will illustrate in detail in the following chapters). For example, in 1953 President

---

[105] See Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008).
[106] Ibid.
[107] David Ryan and Patrick Kiely, eds. *America and Iraq, Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 5.
[108] Joan Hoff, *A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, Dreams of Perfectibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 168.

147

Eisenhower used covert methods to overthrow Iran's nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, on the grounds that he showed some kind of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. In 1958 Eisenhower, again, ordered U.S. Marines to occupy Lebanon to protect the pro-Western Lebanese President, Camille Chamoun, from the Nasserite opposition and from the effects of the General Abdel Kareem Qasim-led revolution in Iraq. During the episodes of Black September in 1971, President Nixon delivered Phantom jets to Israel, and made preparations for possible U.S. intervention, by ordering the U.S. Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean and sending air transport and combat aircraft to a base at Incirlik in Turkey to protect the life of King Hussein of Jordan.

The U.S. returned in force to the Middle East in 1980, after the Shiite revolution against the pro-U.S Shah of Iran. A troop and bombing raid to free U.S. Embassy hostages held in downtown Tehran had to be aborted in the Iranian desert.[109] In 1982, after the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, U.S. Marines were deployed in a neutral 'peacekeeping' operation. They instead aligned themselves with the pro-Israel Christian government against Shiite rebels, and U.S. Navy ships rained enormous shells on Lebanese civilian villages.[110]

The U.S. Navy also intervened against Iran during its war against Iraq in 1987-88, sinking Iranian ships and 'accidentally' shooting down an Iranian civilian jet airliner. In the following years, the U.S. deployed forces in the Persian Gulf after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which turned Washington against its former Iraqi ally, Saddam Hussein. The U.S. supported the Kuwaiti and Saudi monarchies against the Iraqi regime. In January 1991, the U.S. and its allies unleashed a massive bombing assault against Iraqi government and military targets.[111]

In 31 October 1998 Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which made regime change a foreign policy goal of the United States and authorized covert and financial

---

[109] Zoltán Grossman, "A Century of U.S. Military Interventions: From Wounded Knee to Iraq, in Carolyn Baker," ed., *U.S. History Uncensored*, (iUniverse.com, 2006).
[110] Shiite rebels responded with a suicide bomb attack on Marine barracks, and for years seized U.S. hostages in the country.
[111] Grossman, *A Century of U.S. Military Interventions*.

support for anti–Saddam Hussein groups.[112] Nearly $100 million of support was authorized for Iraqi political opposition, principally the Iraqi National Congress, and direct operational military support for opposition forces was stepped up again in the late 1990s. In 2001 a further $50 million was given to anti-regime forces and the United States began to engage more strongly in organizing the fractious set of Iraqi opposition movements.[113]

After the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. intervened militarily in Afghanistan, to depose the Taliban regime. A US-led coalition, consisting mainly of U.S. Air and Special Forces, allied to anti-Taliban elements known as the Northern Alliance[114] succeeded in retaking most of Afghanistan from the Taliban regime during Operation Enduring Freedom.[115] In 2003 the same American administration occupied Iraq, whom it accused of promoting anti-U.S. 'terrorism', supporting al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; possessing weapons of mass destruction, and, presenting a tyrannical dictatorship from which the Iraqi people deserved to be liberated.[116]

4.6   Conclusion

This chapter illustrates a host of factors which combined together to make Middle East stability a vital target of U.S. foreign policy. The United States has exercised a steadily increasing role in Middle East system since World War II, driven initially by oil, then by anticommunism and, over time, by its growing relationship with Israel. Based on a chronological criterion, it was concluded that the U.S. stability-driven

---

[112] See Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 73, Richard Youngs, *International Democracy and the West The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004), p. 45

[113] Ibid.

[114] Also known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF).

[115] Previously known as 'Operation Infinite Justice,' but this name was discarded on religious grounds. See Michael Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), p. 11.

[116] After the occupation of Iraq, most of the reasons propagated by the Bush administration to justify the war turned out to be invalid; no weapons of mass destruction were discovered, no relationship with al-Qaeda organization was established, and the reason of spreading democracy in Iraq seemed very fragile given the United States' close ties with most of the dictatorial regimes in the region before and after the war. The most plausible explanation is that the overthrow of the Iraqi regime was part of larger plan for redrawing the political map of the Middle East that several pundits of neo-conservatives in the Bush administration had advocated even before they had joined the administration. It is thus argued that "regime change" in Iraq was planned even before the attacks of September 2001, and before the beginning of President Bush's term of office. See Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative* (Surrey: Legacy Publishing Ltd., 2007), p. 78, and see chapter Seven of this dissertation.

strategies in the Middle East, had developed through three different phases. During the Cold War period (1945-1990) stability was sought through maintaining the status quo and preventing the Soviet penetration into the region, in the post-Cold War period (1990s), U.S. administrations were hesitant between promoting change and maintaining the status quo. In the third phase (2000-2008) regional stability was approached through imposing regime change. In each phase, the U.S. has employed one or a combination of foreign policy tools to achieve stability, the most important among these tools were: foreign aid, political/military alliances, military intervention and regime change. Promoting Israel as a regional surrogate, tasked with securing regional stability, presented a steady feature of US foreign policy since the Six-Day-War of 1967.

Four models of intervention grew out the above strategies; they include (1) preemptive intervention, (2) post-hoc intervention, (3) hegemonic intervention and (4) pro-Israel intervention. As I will illustrate in the following chapters, both preemptive and post-hoc models aim at securing the status quo via preventing a perceived threat before it materializes or restoring an equilibrium point after it has been disrupted. Hegemonic intervention aims at imposing what can be called 'hegemonic pattern of stability' on system components. Finally, pro-Israel intervention refers to the situations in which Washington backs Israel as a regional surrogate in order to serve American interest of regional stability. These models of intervention are the subject of the following chapters.

Chapter 5

Preemptive Intervention

5.1 Introduction

The pre-emptive model branches from the status quo strategy which entails maintaining an existing point of equilibrium.[1] The main assumption underlying this strategy with respect to system processes is that changes taking place outside the ordinary pattern of system functioning, are possible threats, and hence should be prevented, resisted, and fought if necessary, using all possible means. Preceding from these assumptions the United States intervened on favour of some of its allied regimes in order to maintain the status quo. The US logic behind adopting this strategy was that: without the help of those status-quo regimes, anti-Western groups (e.g. nationalists, communists and Islamists) would come to power and negatively affect US interests. The stability of those regimes and the stability of US interests were thus considered two faces of the same coin.[2] The model of intervention derived from this strategy is described as pre-emptive because it aims at protecting regional stability (status quo) by eliminating a perceived threat (allegedly unavoidable) before it materializes.[3] In most of the cases that witnessed this kind of pre-emptive intervention, regional stability remained intact; however, US intervention took place to gain a strategic advantage before the circumstances tilted against US interests and against the regional client who was tasked with maintaining the status quo on behalf of the US.

In the cases that witnessed this model of intervention, the US identified 'its regional interests' with 'the stability of regional allies.' Accordingly, the US intervened to maintain the stability of those allies, given the strategic services they offered to US interests in the Middle East. These services included (a) confronting the tide of Arab nationalism, (b) confronting the Soviet penetration, and (c) securing oil flows to the

---

[1] For more elaboration on this point refer to the introduction of this thesis.

[2] Steve Smith, "US Democracy Promotion: Critical" in Michael Cox et al. eds., *US Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 63.

[3] On the concept of pre-emption see Seyom Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century* (MA: The Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 113- 142.

West. However, by this the end of this chapter, it will be revealed that the US had only achieved a simplistic pattern of stability. This model is characterized by constancy and simplicity. It is constant in the sense that it is based on preserving one (balanced) pattern of interactions among system elements (the status quo), and it is simple in the sense that it is controllable, predictable, and reversible. This type of stability is imposed by one actor (in this case, the US) on the rest of the system components in a top-down style. The cases classified under this category include: (1) the United States intervention in Jordan to protect King Hussein in years 1957, 1958 and 1971, (2) the US intervention in Lebanon to protect the client-regime of Camille Chamoun in 1958, and (3) the US intervention in Saudi Arabia at the outset of the Gulf War, to protect the Kingdom from the perceived threats of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein (1991).

5.2 Intervention in Jordan (1957, 1958 and 1971)

US policy towards Jordan was made clear on many occasions. US administrations took at face value the Jordan statements that the Hashemite Kingdome was determined to preserve regional stability (in terms of the status quo) and to resist communist efforts to subvert and take over Jordan. This understanding had been one of factors underlying the US decision to provide economic and technical assistance to King Hussein to assist Jordan strengthening its internal and regional stability.[4] However, continuous US support to the Jordanian King caused him to be viewed by Arab nationalist leaders and by vast sectors of the Jordanians themselves as a client of 'Western imperialism' in the region. This accusation led to an increase in the Nasserism[5] within the Jordanian army and to a growing nationalist opposition to the King between the Jordanian officers. Washington performed several pre-emptive interventions in Jordan to maintain regional stability through protecting its troubled client in the Levant. The successfulness of these US attempts to maintain regional stability (in terms of enabling the Jordanian regime to accommodate subsequent disturbances) is addressed in the following illustration.

---

[4] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 50. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, Washington, *December 12, 1956—11:38 a.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–256. Top Secret.
[5] Arab nationalism a la Nasser of Egypt

5.2.1 The First Intervention (1957)

Summary

In the spring of 1957, the US president sent US naval ships into the eastern Mediterranean and an emergency grant of $10 million-dollar, with considerable latitude in the spending of it, was assigned to Jordan to help King Hussein suppress an expected rebellion among pro-Egyptian army officers.[6] Proceeding from a top-down style of intervention, Washington aligned itself with Hussein while ignored local actors and showed only little interest in exploring their preferences. The US intervention, therefore, did not manage to stabilize the troubled king who remained dependent on external help to face domestic and regional challenges.

Historical Background

In the autumn/winter of 1955, Jordan became the battleground between Britain and Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser as the latter orchestrated a campaign to prevent other Arab states (after Iraq) from joining the Baghdad Pact.[7] The problem started when the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden tried to bring Jordan into the Pact. The Egyptian President, who viewed Iraq's participation in the British-led defence organization as a betrayal of the Arab League's authority in collective Arab security, strongly objected to this step. Nasser saw the British attempt as a breach of the assurance given to him by the British Prime Minister that the Baghdad Pact would not be extended to other Arab countries. The Egyptian President feared that if Jordan joined the pact, other Arab states would follow, and Egypt would lose its regional status as a leader of the

---

[6] Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), p. 51.

[7] Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952–1967, From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 4. To counteract, Nasser joined leaders of nonaligned states such as Communist China, Indonesia, India, and Yugoslavia in the city of Bandung and publicly declared Egypt's neutrality in the Cold War. See Brent M. Geary, *"A Foundation of Sand: US Public Diplomacy, Egypt, and Arab Nationalism, 1953-1960,"* (Ph.D. dissertation, the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, 2007), p. 120, and for more elaboration on the Baghdad Pact refer to page 143.

Arab world. He therefore intensified his propaganda campaign against Britain and its client, King Hussein.[8]

Against his will, King Hussein acquiesced to Arab (mainly Egyptian) demands to keep his country out of the Baghdad Pact and, as a gesture of goodwill to Arab nationalists, he dismissed Sir John Glubb (the un-crowned King of Jordan, as named by Western media), who had long commanded the renowned Jordanian 'Arab Legion', and dismissed most other senior British officers in March 1956.[9] Hussein's actions during the following months showed that he was aware of the dangers of Nasser and Arab nationalists, but he also loved his new popularity after ousting the British commander.

Glubb's dismissal, which was seen by Jordanians as a blow to British prestige in the Middle East, gave Hussein an opportunity to attain some internal stability based on domestic satisfaction for some time.[10] The King made other gestures to enhance his domestic and regional stability, the most important of which were: Arabizing the newly established Jordanian army (the Arab Legion was changed to the Jordan Arab Army)[11]; giving Hashemite names to the military formations, and adapting ranks to their Egyptian and Syrian counterparts.

But, in spite of all these proactive measures, when Jordanian elections were held in October 1956 it resulted in a popular front cabinet (led by Sulaiman Nablusi).[12] Three communists, running on a National Front ticket, were elected, in addition to four other

[8] See Behçet Kemal Yesilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact Anglo-US Defence Policies in the Middle East 1950–1959* (Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005).

[9] When Sir Charles Duke saw the King in the second of March 1956 requesting reasons for action. The King explained his decision by his discovery of insufficient stores and supplies of ammunition, deficiencies in proper assignment of officers in Legion and further that Glubb had not helped him against Egypt. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 19, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State. *Amman, March 2, 1956—1 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3–256. Confidential.

[10] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 23. *Amman, March 16, 1956—4 p.m.* Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–1656. Confidential.

[11] Dann Uriel, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 35.

[12] After he took office Nablusi announced that Jordan would develop closet relations with the Soviet Union and accept Soviet aid if offered. Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and US Dominance in the Middle East* (MA.: Beacon Press, 2009), p. 192, William Blum, *Killing Hope U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*, (London, Zed Books, 2003), p. 89.

nationalists. 19 of the total 40 members of the new Parliament were classified as anti-Western. At the same time, the pro-Western elements elected were considered weak.[13]

More important, nationalist and pro-Nasser officers, within the Jordanian army, began replacing royalists. A "Free Officers" pamphlet was being circulated calling for complete freeing of Arab Legion from British officers. The British Foreign Office had thereafter telegraphed the British Ambassador in Amman confirming that these developments appeared very dangerous not only for the U.K. position in Jordan, but also for the King.[14]

The crisis escalated in early April 1957 when an attempted coup (led by Lt. Col. Ali Abu Nuwar, the Chief of Staff) threatened to seize Hussein's palace. A few days later, 13 April, the King was informed that the nationalists tried to capture a major military base in the city of Zarqa, he rushed to the base and personally took command. His timely action ended the rebellion. On April 25, he proceeded to dismiss the popular front cabinet, dissolve parliament. On the same day, King Hussein placed Jordan under martial law, declared a curfew in several urban areas and set up what amounted to be a royal dictatorship.[15]

The domestic crisis in Jordan triggered regional confrontations. Pronouncements and troop movements indicated that Syria, with its brigade stationed near the city of Irbid might intervene in Jordan to help the nationalist rebels. In response, Saudi troops in Jordan and Iraqi troops in Western Iraq were prepared to support Hussein upon his request to defend the kingdom. At the same time, a reported partial mobilization by Israel

---

[13] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 40. Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins), Washington, *October 25, 1956.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10–2556. Secret.

[14] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 24. Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Washington, *March 28, 1956.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–2856. Top Secret.

[15] See Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Lawrence Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2006), p. 315, Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan A Hashemite legacy* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 34, Miriam Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 20. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 61 Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State. Amman *April 13, 1957—6 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1357. Secret. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 74, Editorial Note.

revealed that it might seize the West Bank if Jordan disintegrated. Syria criticized Israel's mobilization and Israel charged that Syria in partnership with Egypt aimed to take over Jordan.[16]

The US Stance

Although the United States never joined the organization of Baghdad Pact (for fear of alienating nationalist leaders like Nasser of Egypt),[17] the US government responded swiftly to the needs of King Hussein. Washington was convinced that the Hashemite King represented a stabilizing force in a radical nationalist milieu and an important barrier to the spread of radical Arab influence and communist infiltration. US officials concluded that

> the maintenance of a government in Jordan favourably disposed to the West depends upon the life and continuing resolution of the King and upon the loyalty and effectiveness of an army subjected to divisive strains. The loss of Jordan to the leftist Egyptian-Syrian camp would be a setback to US interests in the area. [18]

---

[16] Peter L. Hahn, "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957," *Presidential Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 2006), p. 42. The size of foreign forces in or near Jordan were approximately as follows: *Syrian*—3,000 located in north Jordan, with an additional brigade just across the frontier in Syria; these troops are approximately 45 miles from Amman; *Iraqi*—at H3, 4,500 troops about 250 miles from Amman; *Saudi Arabian*—at Aqaba and other points, 6,000 to 7,000 approximately 200 miles from Amman. (A battalion at Jericho is about 40 miles away). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 68, Editorial Note.

[17] On January 11, 1956 at a news conference, Secretary Dulles was asked several questions concerning the Baghdad Pact. He mentioned US sympathy toward its formation and his own personal interest. He then said, "On the question of its further development, the United States has no particular views. We have not urged any other countries to join the pact." Regarding US membership, the Secretary said, "I think we would consider joining the Baghdad Pact if and when it seemed in doing so it would be a contribution to the general stability of the area." The State Department has objected to US adherence to the Pact on the grounds that Congressional approval could not be obtained because of the objections by Israel; that Israel would demand a security guarantee which in turn would be unacceptable to certain Arab countries. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq. Document 90, Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Document 153, Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), *Washington, November 30, 1956.* Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret.

[18] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 72, Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Unified and Specified Commanders, Washington, *April 24,*

Applying his own doctrine, President Dwight Eisenhower took the decision of intervention in Jordan to maintain regional stability and declared that Jordan's territorial integrity was a vital US interest.[19] On April 29, American and Jordanian representatives exchanged a series of notes regarding economic and technical assistance. In response to a Jordanian request for help, the United States agreed to guarantee the "freedom" of Jordan and to maintain its "economic and political stability" and agreed to extend $10 million in economic assistance. The proposed aid was to be provided in 'Mutual Security Aid' funds with considerable latitude in the spending of it.[20] Later, in the early summer of 1957 this supportive policy was further materialized in the payment of another $30 million and in a modest airlift of military hardware. These massive US payments were, beyond their financial significance, an obvious gesture that the United States had taken Britain's place, as Jordan's patron.[21]

Beside the monetary help, the US President ordered the Sixth Fleet to sail to Eastern Mediterranean, stationed the Amphibious Task Group in Beirut,[22] two destroyers were positioned near Massawa–Aden area. In addition, two Joint Chiefs of Staff considered possible movements of certain ground and air units from Europe to staging bases in Turkey or Lebanon.[23] At the same time, strong representations were made to Israel to

---

1957—7:10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) SSC.57. Secret.

[19] The US aid to the Jordanian system came under what was then known as the Eisenhower Doctrine; a major security policy in the Middle East adopted in an address to Congress in January 1957 as a consequence of the shrinking of the Anglo–French influence in the Middle East and the rising of the Soviet interest in the region. The doctrine declared that the United States would distribute economic and military aid and, if necessary, use military force to contain communism in the Middle East. Congress reluctantly approved it two months later. Although never formally invoked, the Eisenhower Doctrine guided US policy in three controversies. Under it, Eisenhower bolstered King Hussein against a domestic revolution by discontented army officers, encouraged local states to resist political radicalism in Syria, and ordered US Marines to occupy Beirut in July 1958 to stabilize its government against revolutionary forces. On a detailed discussion of Eisenhower Doctrine, see Hahn, "Securing the Middle East," pp. 38-47, idem, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 53.

[20] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 81. Telegram 1542 to Amman, April 27, a joint State– ICA message, authorized the exchange of notes, transmitted the text of an approved announcement, and provided additional instructions as to the use of funds, (Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/4-2757). See also 8 UST 1064. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 81, Editorial Note.

[21] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism,* pp. 48, 62.

[22] Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 236.

[23] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 72, Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Unified and Specified Commanders, Washington, *April 24,*

keep hands off.[24] The US deterrent measures enabled the pro-Western ruler to beat back the nationalist threat to the Jordanian throne.[25] The outcome of this heavy military show was immediate, Jordan's nationalist neighbours hesitated, and the fragile Jordanian king survived.

Evaluation

According to the definition adopted in this study, dynamic stability does not refer to the retention of the status quo. Rather it refers to system's self-ability to handle a shift from the existing point of equilibrium to a new one without a major disintegration, in other words, without losing its physical existence.[26] In the case of Jordan, serving this target required repeated US interventions to help Hussein, who was always unable to stand up to internal and external threats by his own capabilities.

The US pre-emptive intervention did manage to save Hussein's life and enabled him to stay in power; however, the US forcible/reductionist/top-down measures did not succeed in enabling the fragile ally to self-stabilize even in the very short run. The Jordanian King did not manage to cope with subsequent disturbances and the US had to re-intervene to help Hussein stand up to later internal and external threats. The King remained unable to self-adapt with the impeding dangers to his country (his nationalist neighbouring regimes). One consequence of maintaining a simplistic strategy in the case of Jordan was to cause the regional ally to be fully dependent on US support for maintaining domestic stability. The most serious test to the King's stability came from Iraq where Gen. Abdel Kareem Qassim staged a coup against Hussein's cousin only a year after the first US intervention in Jordan. In this crisis, as I will illustrate shortly, the young King proved unable again to survive the turmoil without external help.

1957—7:10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) SSC.57. Secret.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Goldschmidt and Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, p. 315. Douglas Little, *US Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), p. 92, Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 97.

[26] For example, the Shah regime of Iran ceased to exist after the eruption of the revolution of 1979, so it cannot be said that the Iranian system has simply moved from one point of equilibrium to another, rather, it could be argued that the shah regime has failed in the test of dynamic stability.

On the other hand, the American intervention in Jordan reflected a *reductionistic* attribute in terms of ignoring the Jordanian people's stance. The US intervened in support of the King in spite of the fact that broad sectors of the Jordanian people were in favour of nationalist ideas presented by Nasser. According to William Blum:

> The simplistic and polarized view of the world implicit in the Eisenhower
> Doctrine ignored [...] currents of nationalism, pan-Arabism, neutralism and
> socialism prevalent in many influential quarters of the Middle East. The
> framers of the resolution saw only a cold-war battlefield and, in doing so,
> succeeded in creating one.[27]

At the same time, many Jordanians were hostile to the United States role in their country, and were convinced that the US administration was behind the King's decision to dismiss the government. Angry student demonstrators heaped abuse and blame on US for causing the fall of Nabulsi Government. Demonstrators carried banners denouncing Eisenhower Doctrine and Baghdad Pact and shouted anti-monarchy epithets.[28] The US administration did not pay enough attention to this local-level opposition and aligned itself with the King who was perceived by US officials as the locus of power. The US ambassador to Jordan, Lester D. Mallory, justified this *top-down* policy when he told Washington that 'even if [King Hussein] lacked popular support, [he] would be able to *maintain control* as long as the Jordanian army stood behind him.' (Emphasis added)[29]

This stance showed that a simplistic (top-down/reductionist/forcible) conception of stability was prevailing within the US decision-making circles, according to which the most important concern was to maintain the (fragile) status quo. This perception led to serious problems both for the pro-Western regime of King Hussein—who remained unable to cope with regional disturbances (as it was revealed after a few months of the first US intervention in his country) and for the US regional interests—which were

---

[27] Blum, *Killing Hope*, p. 89.
[28] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 61 Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State. Amman *April 13, 1957—6 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-1357. Secret.
[29] Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2004), p. 140, quoted in Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan*, p. 19.

affected by increasing public disaffection and antagonism directed towards US foreign policy seen as allied with political despotism.

5.2.2 The Second Intervention (July 1958)

Summary

After learning that Gen. Abdel Karim Qassim and a group of revolutionary elements that called themselves the 'Free Officers' had toppled the Iraqi section of the Hashemite monarchy on July 1958,[30] and after a clamouring for help by King Hussein to save his throne, the US co-intervened with Britain to protect the King from the spreading impact of the Iraqi revolution. Both President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan moved swiftly to isolate the Iraqi revolution and to prevent the Jordanian regime from meeting a similar fate,[31] in a scene that disclosed how fragile the stability established by the US in its first intervention, a year earlier, was.

Historical Background

In view of the lack of political and economic viability of the Jordanian regime the US administration was advised by the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, William M. Rountree to promote a peaceful integration of the country into one or more of the territories of neighbouring states friendly to the West like Iraq. Rountree criticized the status quo paradigm and suggested that

> a United States program aimed solely at maintaining the status quo in Jordan would be unrealistic, in view of the lack of political and economic viability of the state. United States activities in Jordan should be aimed at the ultimate peaceful integration of the country into one or more of the

---

[30] After seizing power in July 1958 during a bloody military coup that toppled a pro-Western regime in Baghdad, Colonel Abdel Karim Qassim moved his country steadily leftward, see Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 62.

[31] See Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 202.

territories of neighbouring states friendly to the West. A first step in this process could be the fostering of augmented Iraqi influence in Jordan.[32]

The assistant secretary added that:

> The administration was aware that the dynastic and treaty relationship between Jordan and Iraq is overshadowed by mutual distrust between ruling elements in the two countries as well as Iraqi unpopularity among the mass of Jordanians. However they were convinced that Iraq is probably the only Arab country which was in a position to enter into long-standing economic and military aid relationships with Jordan.[33]

In what turned out later to be a swift response to this US desire, King Hussein and his cousin, King Feisal of Iraq, signed an agreement in February 1958 to join their two kingdoms and create an Arab Union. Membership in the Jordanian-Iraqi Arab Union was planned to be open to other Arab states. Each ruler retained constitutional authorities in his own kingdom, but Iraq's Feisal was designated to serve as the head of the Union.[34] 'The federation agreement expressly kept Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact, although, obviously, it did not affect the position of Iraq.'[35] It was argued then that the new union presented an effort to counter-balance the highly threatening union between Egypt and Syria (and in particular President Nasser's growing influence),[36] however, the above memorandum gave evidence that the creation of the union reflected, mainly, an US pressure excreted on the fragile King to maintain regional status quo.

---

[32] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 47. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State, *Washington, November 26, 1956*. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 58 D 398, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S June-Dec. Secret.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan*, p. 21.
[35] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 79.
[36] Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The Origins of the US–Israeli Alliance, The Jordanian Factor* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 32.

The US-sponsored Union was destined, however, to be very brief. In early July 1958, King Hussein was warned by the US diplomatic mission at Amman[37] of an impending military coup against him, engineered by Lieutenant Colonel Mahmud Rusan, who acted in collaboration with several senior Syrian army officers. Rusan plan was to assassinate Hussein in the palace and then to proclaim a republican regime in Jordan. It seemed that accession to the UAR had not been part of the plan, although there was a predisposition in its favour.[38]

Profoundly alarmed by the threat to his throne (and to his life), the Jordanian King appealed to the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, to reinforce the Iraqi military contingent in Jordan as an additional protection against Syria.[39] In response to Hussein's appeal, Nuri al-Said decided to send a brigade to Jordan in addition to that stationed in the east of the kingdom.[40] Ironically, it was the Twentieth Iraqi Brigade scheduled to move to Jordan in defence of the Hashemite Kingdom which, on the same day, carried out a bloody coup in Baghdad.[41]

On 14 July 1958, a secret military group, inspired by the Egyptian Free Officers (who ousted the Egyptian King in 1952), overthrew the monarchy in Iraq. The revolutionary forces led by General Abdel Karim Qassim declared the downfall of the Iraq's Hashemite monarchy, and proclaimed a republic. The leading members of the royal regime were executed, including King Faisal, along with Prime Minister Nuri al-Said who was discovered while fleeing in disguise toward the Iranian border.[42]

King Hussein was in a state of panic by the killings in Iraq.[43] He hurried to meet with the British and US charges d'affaires in Amman. The King explained that he had information that a coup to topple his regime was planned for the following day and made an explicit

---

[37] Demoted from the status of embassy because of the birth of the Arab Federation, with embassies placed at Baghdad.
[38] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 87.
[39] Ben-Zvi, *The Origins of the US–Israeli Alliance*, p. 33.
[40] A Iraqi brigade was sent to Jordan after the domestic Lebanese situation had deteriorated in May 1958.
[41] Ben-Zvi, *The Origins of the US–Israeli Alliance*, p. 33.
[42] Gokhan Bacik, *Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 99.
[43] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 88.

request for an immediate military assistance from both London and Washington. The US diplomat described his meeting with Hussein:

> At 1900 hours local time King Hussein summoned British Charge Mason and myself to his Palace where in presence was Prime Minister Rifai, he announced "in view of the critical situation facing Jordan as a result of the Lebanese crisis, the rebellion in Iraq and on basis of information obtained from most reliable sources that UAR inspired coup d'état scheduled to take place within 24 hours, I have decided on advice from Prime Minister and Commanding General of Jordan Army to formally request [help from] the Governments of US and UK in accordance with their pledges previously given and in order to guarantee Jordan's independence and integrity.[44]

Hussein then announced to a joint session of the National Assembly, and then to the army and the people, 'what may have been the most humiliating decision of his public career: his appeal for the return of Western troops.'[45] The Egyptian regime seized the opportunity and tried to instigate the Jordanians against their King. Radio Cairo broadcasted Egypt's strong objections to the return of western troops to Jordan. As a result of these broadcasts, which affectively influenced the Jordanian street, Jordanian security men confiscated radios located in coffeehouses and arrested listeners.[46]

The US Stance

US officials evaluated the situation in Jordan as rapidly becoming extremely dangerous. They had information of a planned attack against King Hussein on July seventeenth. A severe petrol shortage existed, because the Jordanians were not getting their normal

---

[44] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 179, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, *July 16, 1958, 11 a.m.* Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.
[45] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 89.
[46] Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan*, p. 22.

supplies from Iraq, and had no storage.[47] The top State Department, Pentagon, and CIA officials believed that the United States must respond swiftly for several reasons: (1) the Hashemite monarchy represented a reliable ally that the Western world could rely on for thwarting Soviet advances, (2) Hussein's violent deposition would mean a deadly blow to what remained of Western prestige in the Middle East, and (3) the US feared that a chain reaction would occur throughout the Middle East, where the governments of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran would be doomed.[48] US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, expressed his consciousness of the possibility of Soviet troops being sent to Syria at the request of the UAR, and sent a telegram to the US Ambassador to Jordan, asking him to inform the King that [the US] was examining the feasibility of sending a flight of US military aircraft over Jordan, including West Bank, Amman, and North Jordan as a demonstration of support to the King in light of the information regarding possible developments.[49]

The initial plan in Washington was that if it were necessary to go into the Levant, (as Lebanon was at the gates of civil war), the United States and the United Kingdom would go in with approximately equal numbers of troops. But with the eruption of the crisis of 14 July in Jordan, the US thought that it might be better if the United Kingdom left Lebanon for the US and formed a reserve for use in Jordan. Accordingly, following the overthrow of King Feisal's regime in Baghdad, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan worked out an arrangement providing for the dispatch of British troops to Jordan.[50] The first elements of the British Sixteenth Parachute Brigade began arriving at Amman airport in the morning of the 17th of July, and took up positions around the airfield. The remainder of the brigade, however, was turned back to Cyprus by Israeli fighters which fired on the British transports crossing Israeli airspace without permission. The British request for permission was pending in Tel Aviv at the time, and the

---

[47] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 179, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, *July 16, 1958, 11 a.m.* Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

[48] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 89.

[49] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 183, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, Washington, *July 16, 1958—6:42 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–1658. Top Secret.

[50] Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite legacy*, p. 114.

remainder of the brigade was delayed on Cyprus for over 5 hours until the United States, at British request, intervened with the Israeli Government and secured permission for the over-flight of British forces into Jordan.[51] By the evening of 17 July, two battalions of the British Sixteenth Independent Parachute Brigade, together with supporting units and fighter aircraft, were deployed at Amman airport.[52] The British troops were used to protect the capital city, the person of King Hussein, and Western interests in Jordan.

The United States did not send US soldiers to Jordan in this crisis. However, Washington agreed to assist the British operation in every necessary and possible way.[53] President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered for transport logistic supplies to British forces occupying Jordan to save King Hussein.[54] The US Secretary of state confirmed that:

> The United States Government supports the action of the Government of
> the United Kingdom in responding affirmatively to the urgent appeal of
> Jordan for assistance in the defence of Jordan's independence and
> integrity. The United States believes that this is a justified exercise of the
> inherent right of nations to call for assistance when threatened.[55]

In response to a question from the British foreign Secretary Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on the assistance the US was prepared to render to British forces in Jordan the Secretary of State confirmed that the US was prepared to provide any logistic assistance. However, Secretary Dulles added that he did not expect to provide US operational help unless the situation developed to a critical point. Dulles was not inclined to favour a combined operation but he confirmed that 'if the Jordan operation should require further operational

---

[51] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 185. Editorial Note.

[52] Uriel, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 89.

[53] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 64, Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 134. Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan*, p. 23.

[54] Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-US Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," *The International History Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 284-303.

[55] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 186. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 17, 11:30 a.m, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–1758. Secret.

assistance the US would study the possibility with an open mind.'[56] Fortunately, the crisis was settled without a physical US intervention in Jordan, but this was exactly what disturbed the Jordanian King who continued to feel insecure and unstable. Hussein was not happy that the US would not intervene physically in Jordan, and his Prime Minister Rifai was furious when he learned that the US would not dispatch its troops, he accused US government of having failed in fulfilling its commitments towards Jordan. He contrasted the US attitude with the British who had "rushed to our side in moment of peril." and referred to the psychological effect of having only British troops in Jordan .[57]

In response to these accusations the US charges d'affaires in Amman (Thomas K. Wright) reminded the Jordanian official of the substantial economic and military support which was given to Jordan (totalling approximately $50 million). The US diplomat pointed out to the heavy concentration of US land/sea/air power in Lebanon and other nearby countries which effectively guaranteed Jordan from external attack. He tried to convince the Jordanian Prime Minister that placing US forces within Jordan would therefore not appreciably increase its defensive capability.[58] The US ambassador further expressed his fears that if disorders broke out, with US troops stationed in Jordan, there would be a distinct possibility they might be called upon to shoot down Arab civilians. Al Rifai admitted this possible but insisted on his conviction that the US should have intervened physically.[59]

Evaluation

The US measures managed to temporarily enhance the fragile King. The swift US (and British) intervention did succeed in securing King Hussein from the effects of the Iraqi revolution. However, the Jordanian King continued to feel insecure and unstable to the

---

[56] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 187. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 17, 2:30 p.m. Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63D 123, CF 1050, Memoranda of Conversation, Lloyd's Visit July 17–20. Top Secret.
[57] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 190, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, *July 18, 1958—10 p.m,* , Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7-1858. Secret
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

extent that would lead him to seek military alliance with his regional enemy, Gamal Abdul Nasser, before the eruption of the June war of 1967 to protect himself from a domestic revolution that would have overthrown him had he not joined the nationalist preparation for war. Repeated US intervention in favour of Hussein caused him to be fully reliant on external patrons and hence to lose any self-ability to cope with domestic and regional challenges alone. The most shocking feature of King's incapability to cope with disturbances would appear in his seeking of help from Israel (which was occupying lands subjected to Jordanian sovereignty at that time, the West Bank) to protect him from his nationalist neighbours during the crisis of Black September (1971), as I will illustrate shortly.

To sum up, although it managed to save the King's life, the American intervention in the above case reflected simplistic characteristics, as it generally was: (1) top-down oriented (tried to bolster a regional client and did not try to boost the Jordanian system's local actors and local interactions), (2) linear (sought to balance the union between Egypt and Syria with an equivalent union between Jordan and Iraq), (3) simplistic (did not succeed in enabling the fragile ally to self-stabilize. Hussein's regime remained in need of further external help).

5.2.3 The Third Intervention (1971)

Summary

The United States intervened, with help of its regional ally, Israel, to protect King Hussein of Jordan, during the crisis of Black September. Clashes started in September 1970 between King Hussein's army and various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). With Washington's blessing, Hussein struck back hard. He imposed martial law and sent the Jordanian army into the refugee camps around Amman to disarm the Palestinian fighters and capture their leaders.[60] The confrontations led afterwards to fighting between Jordan and Syria. The struggle did not end until July 1971, when the

---

[60] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 105.

PLO was permanently expelled from Jordan and relocated to Lebanon.[61] During the crisis, US officials encouraged King Hussein's suppression and expulsion of the PLO, and secured a commitment from Israel, with the consent of Hussein, to help the King survive the ordeal if necessary.[62]

Historical Background

The phase that preceded the Black September conflict was characterized by increasing tension in the relationship between King Hussein's regime and the PLO fighters. During the 1960s King Hussein had allowed the PLO to launch raids into Israel from Jordan. This policy became gradually costly because PLO attacks on Israel frequently resulted in Israeli retaliation against Jordan.[63] In his visit to US in 1969, King Hussein acknowledged that a confrontation with fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) in Jordan was inevitable and indicated that his government was preparing for it.[64]

For their parts, PLO members showed open defiance for the authority of the Jordanian King. They set up unauthorized roadblocks and conducted their own military operations. They sought to create a state within a state or what they called a "progressive regime" in northern Jordan. The Fedayeen were operating independently of the King's authority, establishing their own administrative networks in the refugee camps, and generally behaving as though their organizations were exempted from the jurisdiction of the Kingdom.[65] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) called, openly, for

---

[61] Spencer C. Tucker, (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History, Vol. 2* (California: ABC- CLIO, Inc., 2008), pp. 223-224, Milton-Edwards, Hinchcliffe *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, p. 130, idem, *Jordan: A Hashemite legacy*, p 40, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 31.

[62] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 111.

[63] Ibid., p. 31

[64] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, Washington, April 23, 1969, 0008Z. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1. Secret.

[65] William L. Cleveland, Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009), 4th edition, p. 362, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 31.

the overthrow of the Arab monarchies, including the Hashemite regime in Jordan, arguing that this was an essential first step toward the liberation of Palestine.[66]

Jordan's King did not look favourably on such developments and came to believe that the PLO threatened his hold on the country and, as a result, threatened the kingdom. Hussein took measures to prevent Palestinians from launching raids on Israel from Jordanian territory. The King's decisions angered the PFLP,[67] which responded by hijacking four civilian airliners on September 6, 1970 and a fifth airliner three days later. One plane was forced to land in Cairo and another hijacking failed, but the three other planes -one US, one British, and one Swiss- were taken to Dawson Field, a portion of Jordan that the PFLP defined as 'liberated territory', thirty miles outside Amman. The Hijackers demanded the release of Palestinians held in Israeli, British, Swiss, and West German jails. As the Jordanian army stood helpless, the PFLP threatened to blow up the planes and kill the hostages if any attempt was made to interfere. A few days later (12 September) the hijackers released their hostages -many of whom were USs- unharmed and then blew up the aircraft while television cameras were broadcasting directly. The hijackings and their aftermath seemed to prove that King Hussein did not have any control over his own country and deeply embarrassed him.[68]

King Hussein was faced with two options: 'either to break the power of the guerrillas or tolerate the further erosion of his authority and the probable takeover of his kingdom by Palestinians.'[69] The King, as he had done on previous occasions, chose to preserve his throne. On September 15, 1970, the Jordanian army whose officers were enraged by the activities of the Fedayeen and repeatedly urged the King for a free hand in dealing with them, was finally directed to restore order and the operation 'Black September' began on September 17 to rout the PLO fighters.

---

[66] Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite legacy,* p. 46.

[67] Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Cathal J. Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy, from 1789 to the present* (New York: ABC-Clio, 2007), p. 309.

[68] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East,* p. 362, Tucker, *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict,* pp. 223-224, Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy,* p. 309, Little, *US Orientalism,* p. 105.

[69] Cleveland, *A History of Modern Middle East,* p. 362.

During the operation, the Jordanian army directed all its force against the Palestinian presence in the country. Making no distinction between civilians and armed guerrillas, and featuring house-to-house battles, the Jordanian troops bombarded the refugee camps in and around Amman and the city of Irbid and relentlessly pursued the Palestinian fighters throughout the country.[70] The offensive was supposed to take two days but quickly transformed into a war of attrition because of firm Palestinian resistance and Jordanian tactical errors.[71] When a cease-fire was finally arranged on September 25, more than 3,000 Palestinians had been killed.

The US Stance

As King Hussein deployed tanks to take over the Palestinian camps in Jordan and to force the PLO out of his country, the pro-Soviet regimes in Syria threatened to oppose him. On September 19, 1970, Syria sent an armoured column of 300 tanks and 16,000 troops, but no air cover (Al-Assad, who was then defence minister and commander of the air force, was not willing to have his air force devastated by the Israelis), into northern Jordan to assist the PLO.[72] The Syrians won the initial engagement against the Jordanians. Fearful of Syrian invasion, King Hussein requested intervention by air and land from any quarter against the assailant tanks.

The United States had been concerned, as usual, about Hussein's stability. US officials thought that this moderate Arab state might well be taken over by Arab radicals. On June 17 a National Security Council meeting was held to discuss the possibility of US military intervention if Jordan should be threatened. The Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), a high-level committee of the National Security Council convened in times of crisis chaired by Kissinger, met to plan for these Middle East contingencies. According to William Quandt, the conclusions of the committee were sombre:

> Without access to bases in the eastern Mediterranean, the United States
> would find it difficult to send a sizable ground force into the area. The Sixth

---

[70] Ibid.
[71] Tucker, *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 223-224.
[72] Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 309, Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 106.

170

Fleet could provide some air support if it was on station, but otherwise US military capabilities were not impressive. If a serious military option was required, Israel was far better placed to provide both ground forces and air cover, particularly on short notice, but that issue, of course, was politically sensitive.[73]

The US President approved this interventionist course on the part of Israel as the optimal way of preventing the imminent collapse of the Hashemite Kingdom.[74] Nixon agreed to put US troops on alert to protect Israel from Egypt and the Soviet Union if the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, helped Hussein maintain his authority.[75] Concurrently, he announced that he was delivering eighteen Phantom jets to Israel and made preparations for possible US intervention to save King Hussein from defeat.

On September 10 Nixon team recommended placing the airborne brigade in Germany and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on a higher-alert status, six C-130 transport planes were also flown from Europe to Incirlik air base, where they could be available for evacuation of US from Jordan. A reconnaissance plane flew from a carrier to Tel Aviv to pick up targeting information and to signal that US military action might be nearing. The following day units of the Sixth Fleet began to leave port as part of what the White House termed "routine precautions in such a situation for evacuation purposes." Four more C-130s, escorted by twenty-five F-4 jets, were flown to Turkey. That same day the fedayeen blew up the aircraft and moved the remaining fifty-four hostages in their hands, thirty-four of whom were USs, to an undisclosed location.[76]

---

[73] William Quandt, *Peace Process: US diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 77.

[74] This posture, in turn, was fully consistent with the spirit of the 'Nixon Doctrine,' which had been predicated upon the notion that local allies of the US superpower, rather than US troops, should carry the main burden of confronting and challenging Soviet proxies in third-area crises and conflagrations, and was thus adopted by the president in the immediate aftermath of the Syrian invasion as a less risky course (in terms of its potential to escalate into an eventual superpower confrontation) than a direct US intervention. See Ben-Zvi, *The Origins of US-Israeli Alliance*, p. 78.

[75] Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 309, Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 106.

[76] Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 79.

With the assurance that Israel and the United States were behind him, [77] Hussein ordered his own small air force on 22 September to attack the Syrian tanks around Irbid. Hussein's army managed to turn back the Syrians out of Jordan—possibly aided by Soviet pressure on Damascus to back down—and reasserted Jordanian control. [78] While discussing the crisis with Rogers and Kissinger in the Oval Office, Nixon received the news that all Syrian tanks had left Jordan. A statement was soon released from the White House welcoming the Syrian withdrawal, and an assurance was obtained from Israel that they would make no military move.

Fighting between Jordan and the PLO eased after Arab leaders compelled Hussein and Arafat to reach a cease-fire agreement during a meeting in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The agreement failed to end the fighting, however. After the death of Nasser, the main sponsor of the truce, hostilities resumed in November 1970, and continued until the crushing defeat of the Fedayeen in July 1971, at which point the PLO withdrew and re-positioned itself in Lebanon. [79] Arafat set up his headquarters in Beirut. A new chapter in the Palestinian struggle had started. [80]

Approximately 600 Jordanians died in the fighting, while more than 1,200 were wounded. Palestinian casualties ran into the thousands, but the exact figures are unknown. Thousands of Palestinian guerrillas and their families were driven out of Jordan. Many of them, ironically, sought refuge in Israel in preference to being captured by the Jordanians. [81] Palestinian fighters were forced back across the border into Syria, which had supported their battle against the Hashemite monarch. The Damascus regime, fearful its former allies would try to establish a state within a state on Syrian soil, as they had tried to do in Jordan, quickly pushed the Palestinians into trucks and shipped them to

---

[77] Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 309. In the ensuing dispute, Asad's Syrian rivals charged him with responsibility for Syria's defeat and humiliation. He settled the issue in November by staging 'the corrective movement' and seizing full power in Syria. See Itamar Rabinovich, *The Brink of Peace, The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 25.

[78] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 106.

[79] Lawrence Pintak, *Seeds of Hate, How America's Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the Jihad* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 16.

[80] Mehran Kamrava, *Modern Middle East A Political History since the First World War*, (California: University of California Press, 2005) p. 124.

[81] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 106.

172

Lebanon. Jordanian forces effectively scattered and defeated the PLO, and US officials expressed relief at this outcome.[82]

Evaluation

The immediate goal of the United States' intervention in the Black September crisis, the protection of King Hussein of the Syrian and the Palestinian threat, had been achieved perfectly. The King, not only survived the revolt, but also managed to get rid of all the PLO fighters.[83] As William Quandt put it:

> From the standpoint of the US administration, the Jordan crisis was successfully handled: King Hussein remained in power; the militant fedayeen were crushed; US-Israeli relations were strengthened; and the Soviet Union was forced to back down, reining in its Syrian clients under US-Israeli pressure.[84]

However, the US intervention did not manage to put an end to the continued threat posed to the fragile Kingdom and did not manage to empower the troubled King to deal with domestic and regional challenges. Repeated intervention in favour of Hussein caused him to be fully reliant on external patrons and hence to lose any self-ability to cope with domestic and regional challenges alone. Moreover, applying simplistic strategies to stabilize the region had undermined US regional interests. The above strategy of bolstering unpopular regional client proved counter-productive as it negatively affected the US immediate target of securing the status quo. Regional stability remained elusive, and both the King and the US interests remained under threat. This time from a new militant organization, emerged after the events, and was named after the bloody turmoil; the Black September Organization (BSO).

---

[82] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 31.
[83] The events of Black September were not without regional impacts. It has resulted in ruling King Hussein out of the talks held between the Egyptian and Syrian sides in preparation for their joint military strike against Israel in October 1973. The two leaders did not trust the King who appeared closer to Israel and America than to the Arabs. This mistrust was confirmed by the Jordanian King himself, when he boarded his private jet and flew to the Israeli Capital, Tel Aviv, to warn the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir of an imminent attack by his two Arab fellows, Sadat of Egypt and Asad of Syria.
[84] Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 76.

In the wake of the US-Israeli intervention in Jordan, a secret cell named Black September was formed from members of the PLO, and attempted to topple the monarch in Jordan and to get revenge on the United States for its role in supporting the Jordanian regime during the events of Black September. This militant organization carried out armed operations, directed against King Hussein (assassination attempt of the king while he was attending an Arab summit meeting in Morocco in 1974), Jordanian officials (assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in 1971), and against US officials, as in the process of Khartoum in March 1973 on which I will shed some light in the following.

The Process of Khartoum

In the early evening hours of 1 March 1973, eight Black September Organization gunmen seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum as a diplomatic reception honouring the departing United States Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) was ending. After slightly wounding the United States Ambassador and the Belgian Charge d'Affaires, the gunmen took these officials plus the United States DCM, the Saudi Ambassador and the Jordanian Charge d'Affaires as hostages.

In return for the freedom of the hostages, the captors demanded the release of various individuals, mostly Palestinian guerrillas, imprisoned in Jordan, Israel and the United States. Initially, the main objective of the attack appeared to be to secure the release of Fatah leader Muhammed Awadh (Abu Da'ud) from Jordanian captivity. Information acquired subsequently revealed that the BSO leaders did not expect Awadh to be freed, and indicated that one of the primary goals of the operation was to strike at the United States because of its role in empowering the Jordanian monarch during the event of Black September.

Negotiations with the BSO were conducted primarily by the Sudanese Ministers of Interior and of Health. US negotiators seemed confused as to how to best respond to the captors' demands. The US President Richard Nixon said that the United States would 'not pay blackmail'. Nixon seemed to believe that the gunmen would give themselves up

in exchange for safe passage. The captors extended their deadlines three times, but when they became convinced that their demands would not be met and after they reportedly had received orders from Fatah headquarters in Beirut, they killed the two United States officials and the Belgian Charge. They demanded a plane to take them and their hostages to the United States, which was rejected by both the Sudanese and US governments. The Sudanese government continued to negotiate with the captors, and thirty-four hours later, upon reception of orders from their headquarters in Beirut, the gunmen released the remaining hostages unharmed and surrendered to Sudanese authorities.[85]

Given this tragic consequences, the American intervention in Black September crisis can be evaluated as: (a) reductionist (the United States had been concerned only about King Hussein's stability and thus approved him in his harsh policies towards the PLO members), (b) top-down (the US did not consider the Palestinian refugees who were targeted by Hussein forces), and (c) forcible (US officials promoted regional stability through encouraging King Hussein's suppression and expulsion of the PLO and secured a commitment from Israel to intervene militarily to help the King survive the ordeal for the same purpose).

The Jordanian Regime after the Crisis of Black September

During the early 1980s King Hussein enjoyed a kind of artificial (simplistic) stability, largely due to adopting status-quo policies (through the enforcement of martial law and security crackdown). The suspension of constitutional provisions did, however, lead to a wide wave of opposition among student movements, Islamist bodies and professional associations.[86] Furthermore, status-quo measures led, by mid 1980s, to increase political tensions in the country at large and particularly among the younger generation—who by this point posed a considerable demographic threat to the stagnant royal regime. The most serious illustration of domestic unrest took place in 1986 when demonstrations broke out at the University of Yarmouk, as students protesting a rise in university fees engaged in a

---

[85]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 217, Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, June 1973 Department of State, Khartoum Embassy Files: Lot 80 F 170, Box 3, POL 23-8 Terrorism. Tucker, "*The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict.*"
[86] Milton-Edwards, and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan, A Hashemite legacy*, p. 45.

pitched battle against the police and army.[87] The eruption of the Palestinian intifada in 1987 added additional threat to the stability of the Hashemite regime especially on the West Bank. To avoid further domestic unrest the king took the decision of giving up the Jordanian supervision of the West Bank. This decision granted the Hussein some kind of domestic (dynamic) stability because of the positive engagement of Palestinians with this political manoeuvre. King Hussein wanted the West Bank for himself; however, it was the mounting economic difficulties at home and the uncontainable popular uprising among the West Bankers that led him to renounce his claims to the West Bank.

Similarly, King Hussein managed to gain some domestic (dynamic) stability during the 1990s, this was not because of the US support, but because he kept close ties with his people. During that period the Jordanians were pleased with their king and angry with Washington who had transformed what they considered to be an inter-Arab dilemma (Gulf Crisis) into an international conflict. Jordanians employed in the Gulf States appreciated the Iraqi leader's call to share Arab wealth and considered Saddam Hussein their leader on the road to unity and the sole Arab State likely to deter Israel.[88] To please his people King Hussein accepted the argument of Saddam that there ought to be a connection between the settlement of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This idea reflected the opinion of the majority of his Palestinian population. During an Arab League meeting of foreign ministers, the king opposed a resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion.

Jordan's refusal to join the international coalition against Iraq was motivated, mainly, by self-interest. King Hussein, always one step ahead of his domestic and foreign opponents, knew well that he could not risk further antagonizing his subjects, who had only recently taken part in troubling "bread riots." Among Americans, Jordan's image was tarnished only temporarily, but among Arab peoples it was enhanced. However, after the US-led

---

[87] Hussein tried to introduce some appeasing measuring to absorb the public anger, the most important among which was the new electoral law which enfranchised women for the first time, and raised the number of deputies to the House of Representatives from 60 to 142. According to the law there was further allocation of seats along sectarian/ethnic/national lines, reserving seats in the Parliament for refugees, Christians, Circassians and Chechens. Many Jordanians, however, questioned the usefulness of a new electoral law when political parties were still banned and full elections had not been held in the country since the late 1950s. Milton-Edwards, and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan, A Hashemite legacy*, p. 45.
[88] Joyce, *Anglo-US support for Jordan*, p. 144.

war against Iraq the King felt that he cannot continue his people-oriented policies. He was afraid of the US and the Israeli anger and became increasingly concerned about what action Israel would take against him.[89]

The troubled King secretly invited Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to meet with him in London. The King wanted to obtain a guarantee that Israel would not violate Jordanian territory when war began. For his part, the Israeli Prime Minister was fully aware of Jordan's importance as a regional moderate regime, located on its eastern border, and separating it from Iraq, he therefore agreed that Israel would not violate Jordanian airspace and King Hussein promised to ban passage of Iraqi planes through his airspace and to refuse to allow Iraqi forces to enter Jordanian territory.[90]

Until the end of his reign, Hussein's policy remained dependent on a mix of Western support and skilful appeasement to contain threats to his fragile regime. The Jordanian King kept in need to his powerful patrons and was unable to self–adapt to domestic disturbances without external support from the US administrations. On the other hand the US investment in the Jordanian regime was a classical application of a top-down strategy to maintain autocracy-based status quo in allied regimes, even though they did not have the necessary requirements for stability. The US seemed reluctant to accept the fact that only the development of a self-organized complex system could, in the long-term, secure sustainable stability. In retrospect, it can be argued that the United States should have worked to help Hussein to acquire complex-systems' attributes, given that social systems with higher complexity stand a good chance of being stable in a dynamic way, but this was exactly what the US did not pursue in the case of its intervention in Jordan.[91]

---

[89] It is worth mentioning that aid to Jordan was reduced significantly (nearly 75% overall decrease) after King Hussein had refused to join the allied coalition against Iraq. See Sharp, Jeremy M., "US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request," *Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress* (July 17, 2009).

[90] Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan*.

[91] Complex systems spontaneously arrange its components and their interactions into a sustainable, global structure that tries to maximize overall fitness, without need for an external or internal controller. See Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," *paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, London, (10-13, April, 2000).

5.3   Intervention in Lebanon (1958)

Summary

Under the cover of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged aid to victims of Soviet (or any other) aggression in the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration sent nineteen thousand US Marines to Lebanon to stabilize the region which was at the brink of chaos, and to sustain the weakening position of President Camille Chamoun who was under fire from pro-Nasser candidates.[92] The concept of the US operation was limited to Lebanon and the use of the minimum force necessary to re-establish effective control over the country by the Lebanese Government.[93] The direct incident that prompted the US administration to intervene in Lebanon was the coup led by General Abdul Karim Qasim against the Hashemite King Faisal in Iraq on 14 July 1958. However, domestic unrest, resulting from acts of protest against the pro-Western Lebanese President, swept Lebanon even before that date. The ousting of a pro-Western government in Iraq's, along with the internal instability in Lebanon, caused the US administration, after a period of hesitancy, to respond positively to the Lebanese President's call for assistance. The American intervention did succeed in securing the status quo in Beirut without firing a shot; however, it contributed to perpetuating the simplistic nature of the pro-West Lebanese governments which continued to feel insecure in its position and looked to the United States for protection and economic and military aid.

Historical Background

In May 1958 unrest swept Lebanon; Lebanese nationalists, influenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, protested against Camille Chamoun's pro-Western orientation. Chamoun, who was bidding for a second term, denounced Egyptian interference in his country's affairs. The Lebanese government accused Egypt of interfering before both the United Nations and the Arab League. President Eisenhower was aware that the Lebanese

---

[92] Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 281, Little, *US Orientalism*, pp. 134, 135, Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), p. 53.

[93] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 40, Editorial Note.

had overstated Egypt's involvement in the civil war;[94] however, the bloody coup that rocked Baghdad convinced him to order US Marines to occupy Beirut in July 1958, to *stabilize* its government against revolutionary forces and to prevent a copycat strike against it.[95] According to Secretary of State Foster Dulles it was much cheaper to try to hold the situation than to try to retrieve it.[96]

Factors of Instability

Apart from the Iraqi revolution, there were other factors that led together to the domestic disturbances that swept Lebanon in the late sixties. These factors included: the union between Egypt and Syria; the Lebanese president's attempt to amend the constitution; and the public demand to modify the national pact. In the following, I will shed light on these factors.

- ### The Union between Egypt and Syria

The union between Egypt and Syria had been a main cause for troubles on the part of other Arab rulers. Nasser was strongly convinced that all Arab countries should abandon the Western agenda and follow his nationalist project. He exercised pressure on Lebanon to join with Egypt and Syria in a larger Arab federation.[97] In response, President Camille Chamoun took an anti-nationalist stance and shifted to a pro-Western position, endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine, which allowed the US government to give military aid to Middle Eastern regimes that requested it.

The Lebanese regime propagated that the unification between Syria and Egypt was equal to ending Lebanese independence. On 6 June, Chamoun's Foreign Minister, Charles Malik, submitted to the Security Council that the United Arab Republic was actively

---

[94] It seems that Eisenhower was aware that the troubles of Chamoun in Lebanon were largely of his own making. The US President realized that although Nasser was reacting skilfully to events, he had no master plan for the region and he was both surprised and perplexed by the changes in Iraq. See Martin Woollacott, *After Suez: Adrift in the US Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 111, Joel Gordon, *Nasser Hero of the Arab Nation* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), p. 287.
[95] Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 140.
[96] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 17, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, May 2, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret.
[97] Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, p. 97, Goldschmidt, *A Brief History of Egypt*, p. 140.

179

subverting the independence of Lebanon, unless the West, represented by the United States, actively opposed Nasser.[98] He contended that the union would increase anti-Western Arab nationalist intransigence, and create a new balance of power in the Middle East that favoured the Soviet Union and increased pressure on Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. He warned that without outside help, Lebanon would not survive.[99]

In retrospect, it could be easily concluded that the Lebanese fears were exaggerated. The unity between Egypt and Syria did not represent a threat to Washington and did not give any advantage to Moscow. On the contrary, the unity, as noted by Rashid Khalidi, had weakened the Syrian Communist Party which was obliged to dissolve in March 1958. President Nasser of Egypt though a close ally to the Soviets, was not in agreement with the communists. This caused the communist influence to shrink rather than to grow as a result of the union of Egypt and Syria.[100] But in spite of that, the US administration used the argument of the Soviet and Arab Unity threats to justify its interference in the Lebanese issue.[101] In a telegram to the Department of State, the US ambassador in Lebanon Robert A. McClintock confessed that:

> In all objectivity it cannot be said this is a black and white issue of UAR aggression against Lebanon. Although evidence of UAR infiltration and subversion is conclusive, in my judgment root cause of Lebanon's present difficulties was of domestic origin. It was Chamoun's determination to stand for a second six year term in office which provided pretext for this near rebellion, although Nasser and his henchmen were quick to take advantage of issue thus presented.'[102]

---

[98] A UN Observation Group went to Lebanon in June at the request of Foreign Minister Malik and reported that they found no evidence of UAR intervention of any significance. A second UN report in July confirmed this finding. McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power*, p. 123, Blum, *Killing Hope*, p. 95.

[99] Roby Carol Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), p. 51.

[100] For more elaboration on this point refer to chapter 9.

[101] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 141.

[102] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 56, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, June 2, 1958—7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–258. Top Secret; Priority.

- **Elections**

The second factor that affected Lebanon's domestic stability was president Chamoun's desire to push through a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run for re-election in 1958, and serve a second six-year term. In order to do so, the Lebanese president tried to influence the course of the parliamentary elections of 1957 to get a majority capable of passing the amendments.

In this regard, it became widely confirmed that the US administration had provided the Lebanese president with substantial funds to bribe his way to achieving this majority.[103] According to William Blum, 'the CIA provided funds to support the campaigns of President Camille Chamoun and selected parliamentary candidates; other funds were targeted against candidates who had shown less than total enchantment with US interference in Lebanese politics.'[104] US policymakers calculated that Soviet and Egyptian money and influence were guiding the actions of the Lebanese opposition to Chamoun, therefore Washington supported the Lebanese President with political money. Thanks to this US assistance, Chamoun was able to secure the required majority in one of the most notorious elections in Lebanese history.

The president's devious methods angered the opposition and provoked a wave of political protest and violence against his government. The disorder soon developed into a full-scale civil war.[105] The protesters were portrayed in conventional accounts as pro-Nasserist anti-US "rebels," however; they were neither anti-US nor rebels. They were, according to Irene Grendzier, hostile to Chamoun's domestic policies. At the same time, they were opposed to his unconditional support for US regional policies, which they regarded as detrimental to Lebanese national interests.[106] The irony was that, when the Eisenhower administration took the decision to intervene in Lebanon, Vice President, Richard Nixon, advised the US President to justify the US action to the world by saying

---

[103] See William Blum, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (Berkshire: Cox and Wyman, 2002), p. 144, Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 21, Ziauddin Sardar, Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd, 2002), p. 110.

[104] Blum, *Rogue States*, p. 143.

[105] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 12.

[106] Irene L. Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 9.

that: 'We go into Lebanon because we were invited in and because here is a man, Camille Chamoun, who was freely elected leader in his country [and] who finds his country infiltrated by corruption, subversion and bribery.'[107]

- **The National Charter**

President Chamoun was seen by many of his opponents as violating the domestic delicate balance between the Maronite office of president and the Sunni office of prime minister, which was prescribed by the confessional provisions of the 1943 National Pact.[108] Lebanese Muslims, citing changes in the country's demographics, demanded revisions to the National Pact.[109] Sunni and Shi'ite opponents launched an uprising that threatened to bring a pro-Nasser Muslim government to power in Beirut.[110]

It should be mentioned, however, that when violence broke out in 1958, the opposition was not Muslim dominated. A considerable part of the protesters were non-Muslim. The opposition was led, among many others, by the Maronite patriarch, Cardinal Meouchi, and the leading Maronite politician of the north of Lebanon, Hamid Franjieh, neither of them was a Muslim. In addition there was some Greek Orthodox, who joined the opposition fearing that Chamoun's pro-Western inclination would expose the position of Christians in the Arab world.[111]

The US Stance

Convinced that moderate (pro-Western) elements in Lebanon would soon meet the same fate as their counterparts in Iraq, especially when the war seemed to tilt in favour of the pro-Nasser camp, the American President agreed to send US troops to Beirut to maintain regional stability.[112] President Eisenhower commented on the situation by saying that 'to

---

[107] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 139, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Vice President (Nixon), White House, Washington, July 15, 1958, 9 a.m., Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
[108] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, pp. 95. 194.
[109] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 95, Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 281.
[110] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 234.
[111] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 195.
[112] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 134.

lose this area by inaction would be far worse than the loss in China, because of the strategic position and resources of the Middle East.'[113] US officials were convinced that if they did not accept the risk more countries would submit to the Soviets. The secretary of state stressed that 'if we do not respond to the call from Chamoun, we will suffer the decline and indeed the elimination of our influence—from Indonesia to Morocco.[114]

Accordingly, at 9 a.m. on July 15, President Eisenhower released a statement to reporters at the White House, timed to coincide with the landing of the first elements of the Marine units at Beirut, announcing and explaining the basis for the US military intervention in Lebanon. The statement outlined the request from President Chamoun for military support, and indicated that a contingent of US forces had been dispatched to Lebanon in response to the request in order "to protect US lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defence of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity.[115] The US administration justified intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon with its fear of the Soviet encroachment. However, the alleged Soviet connection to Lebanese turmoil was moot justification; Eisenhower and Dulles well knew the political instability within the country was the result of a combination of other factors that had nothing to do with any communist agents seeking to unseat a pro-Western government.[116] The president summarized the real target of his administration decision of intervention in a talk with his vice president:

> Since 1945 we have been trying to maintain the opportunity to reach vitally
> needed petroleum supplies peaceably, without hindrance on the part of any
> one. The present incident comes about by the struggle of Nasser to get
> control of these supplies—to get the income and the power to destroy the

---

[113] Ibid.
[114] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 14, 1958, 10:50 a.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.
[115] White House Press Release, July 15; US Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 959–960.
[116] Irene Gendzier's suggested a different explanation of the US intervention. According to him, the 1958 Lebanon Crisis was just another excuse for the United States to support the business and political elites with whom it had collaborated in the past. Hence, US intervention was due less to the threat of communist infiltration and more to the desire to protect the oil pipeline running through Lebanon and to support the ruling party that helped ensure the smooth flow of oil out of the region. See Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, p. 5.

Western world. Somewhere along the line we have got to face up to the issue.'[117]

Eisenhower framed the Lebanese issue to the public in terms of a US ally facing communist revolt in order to justify US military intervention in a country itself remote to the main Soviet-US contest.[118] When the Vice President asked what public reason would be given for US intervention, Secretary Dulles said it would be "to protect US lives and property at the request of Lebanon." The President added as a further reason, 'the increasing danger to the West from these developments.'[119] Indeed, the presence of the US troops had 'successfully' intimidated the domestic opposition. However, this did not help the situation too much. Regional circumstances compelled the Eisenhower administration to sacrifice Camille Chamoun for another candidate. One who was more accepted by the nationalist forces.[120] Chamoun was refused another unconstitutional term, which he had originally sought with the support of Washington. Under the marines' watchful eyes, General Fuad Chehab, who displayed a more neutral diplomatic disposition and who was opponent to the US intervention,[121] was elected president of Lebanon.[122]

Evaluation

The Lebanese crisis found rapid, though *temporary*, solution after the landing of US forces in Beirut. The damage done by US intervention in service of Cold War objectives, based on a complete misreading of the Lebanese domestic and regional situations, was not restricted to the rigging of the 1957 elections. The pro-West Lebanese governments continued to feel insecure in its position and looked to the United States for economic

---

[117] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 139, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Vice President (Nixon), White House, Washington, July 15, 1958, 9 a.m., Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
[118] David W. Lesch, *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 210. Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 281.
[119] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 134.
[120] Gordon, *Nasser Hero of the Arab Nation*, p. 287.
[121] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 141, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, July 15, 1958—4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1558. Secret.
[122] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 95.

and military aid. Rashid Khalidi rightly concludes that the US intervention had a negative long-term impact on Lebanon, because:

> While it resolved the constitutional crisis, preserved the confessional system by providing for somewhat broader prerogatives for the Sunni prime minister, and eased tensions within the country, it also taught the lesson that Lebanese crises could not be resolved by the country's political system. It taught the further lesson that Lebanese crises could only be dealt with by external powers, which held the keys to Lebanon's stability, reinforcing beliefs among many Lebanese that had persisted since the nineteenth century'.[123]

The deal established a dangerous precedent that was to be repeated in 1969, when a crisis over the PLO presence in Lebanon was resolved in Cairo by the Egyptian president. The same precedent was repeatedly invoked during the bloody Lebanese war of 1975–90, which was finally brought to an end via accords negotiated at Taif in Saudi Arabia. It was repeated once again with the resolution of a governmental crisis in May 2008 by the Amir of Qatar in Doha. Long after the Cold War has ended, as Rashid Khalidi put it, many Lebanese today still await a resolution from without to their internal problems, because of this precedent set in large part as a result of great-power blindness to the complexities of the regional system.[124] Accordingly, it could be said that US did succeed in preserving the status quo in Beirut without firing a shot, but this had not changed a simple truth that the Lebanese regime remained incapable of self-confronting any further crises. According to the definition adopted in this study, dynamic stability does not refer to the retention of the status quo. Rather it refers to system's self-ability to handle a shift from the existing point of equilibrium to a new one without a major disintegration, in other words, without losing its physical existence.[125] In this sense, the Lebanese system could not be said to be dynamically stabilized as a result of the US intervention in the above crisis. Moreover, the US campaign did not manage to boost the US picture among

---

[123] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 45

[124] Ibid., p. 197.

[125] For example, the Shah regime of Iran ceased to exist after the eruption of the revolution of 1979, so it cannot be said that the Iranian system has simply moved from one point of equilibrium to another, rather, it could be argued that the shah regime has failed in the test of dynamic stability.

the region's citizens. As the US marines waded ashore in Lebanon, President Eisenhower, who was aware that the people were on Nasser's side, admitted this fact in a discussion with Vice President, Richard Nixon. According to the US President 'The trouble is that we have a campaign of hatred against us, not by the governments but by the people.'[126]

The main features of US intervention in the Lebanese crisis (1958) can be summed as: (a) reductionist—aimed at boosting the allied regime of Camille Chamoun, while neglected other system components, (b) coercive—employed military forces to impose Chamoun regime on the rest of the system components, (c) top-down oriented—entailed clear contempt of the Lebanese people and a lack of confidence in their political choices. The US administration did not consider local-level opposition to Chamoun regime, and enforced the Eisenhower Doctrine for his benefit in the face of widespread opposition to it within Lebanon.

5.4 Intervention in Saudi Arabia: Desert Shield Operation (1991)

Summary

Proceeding from a top-down perception of regional stability, the (senior) Bush administration sent thousands of US soldiers to Saudi Arabia which *seemed* vulnerable to conquest by Iraq during the second Gulf war (1991). President George H. W. Bush interpreted Saddam Hussein's aggression as a threat to international and regional stability and resolved to confront it by forcible means.[127] The US intervention, however, was not without destabilizing repercussions. The stationing of the US troops in Saudi Arabia put it into confrontation with the Islamist fighters, and ended the truces which lasted throughout the 1980s between the two parties. More important, al-Qaeda organization, which was formed around 1988, started to target the US interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. Somehow the threat posed by al-Qaeda to regional stability turned out to be greater than the threat posed by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.

---

[126] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 139, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Vice President (Nixon), White House, Washington, July 15, 1958, 9 a.m., Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
[127] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States Middle East Relations*, p. 126.

Historical Background

At 2:00 AM, August 2, 1990, Iraq translated its complaints about Kuwaiti overproduction of oil (as well as other concerns with Kuwait's practice of horizontal drilling and their occupation of the oil fields that were disputed in al-Rumaylah and the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan)[128] by moving 1800 tanks of the Iraqi Army towards Kuwait. Iraqi forces rumbled across the Iraq-Kuwait border heading southward towards the capital, routed scattered resistance, and occupied all of Kuwait by 7:00 AM.[129] When the invasion began, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, fled with his extended family into Saudi Arabia.[130]

Two hours and twenty minutes after the beginning of the invasion, the senior Bush administration, strongly condemned the Iraqi attack as a naked act of aggression and a violation of the U.N. Charter, and called for unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces.[131] The US (together with Kuwait) called for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council. The United States then assumed a leadership role in securing twelve related United Nations Security Council resolutions.[132] One of the main concerns to the Bush administration was the 'alleged' threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi leader used to have a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. These grievances dated back to his war with Iran when the Saudis backed Iraq and lent it some 26 billion dollars.[133] After the war, Saddam felt he should not have to repay the loans due to the help he had given the Saudis by fighting Iran. When the US started to send troops to the Kingdom, Saddam started to publicly condemn the Saudis and describe the Kingdom as an US protectorate unworthy of governing the Holy Places.[134] Apart from these verbal condemnations, there

---

[128] For more elaboration on the causes that led Iraq to take the decision of invading Kuwait, refer to chapter six of this dissertation.
[129] J. E. Peterson, *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia* (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2003), pp. 10, 34.
[130] Donald E. Schmidt, *The Folly of War: US Foreign Policy 1898-2005* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 295.
[131] Goldschmidt and Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, p. 401, Alastair Finlan, *Essential Histories, the Gulf War 1991* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 29.
[132] Carol K. Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 97.
[133] Mainly because they feared the influence of Shiite Iran's revolution on its own Shiite minority
[134] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: the trail of political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2006), p. 206.

was no solid evidence that Saddam was going to overrun the Kingdom. However, US officials were convinced that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was but a prelude to an attack on Saudi Arabia. [135] The US were actually worried about the stability of their oil requirements, they calculated that 'Saddam directly controlled 20 per cent of the world's oil supplies and could threaten another 20 per cent in Saudi Arabia, and that would render the US subjected to the will of the Iraqi leader.'[136]

Neoconservative figures within and close to Bush administration played a leading role in promoting the US intervention on the Gulf. They managed to mobilize popular and congressional support for their cause. They further managed to push the topic of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction—its chemical weapons and its fledgling nuclear arsenal to the top of the administration's priorities.[137] War hawks emphasized that America's war objective should not be simply to drive Iraq out of Kuwait but also to destroy Iraq's military potential, especially its capacity to develop nuclear weapons.[138] US allies in the West were also highly alarmed and needed little persuasion to join forces with Washington in confronting the Iraqi regime – initially via the UN Security Council and subsequently in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm military coalition.[139] Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria, and the smaller states along the Persian Gulf, also joined the growing coalition, fearing that even if Iraq's conquests stopped at Kuwait, Iraq could still threaten the rest of the region.

---

[135] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 480.

[136] Finlan, *Essential Histories*, pp. 14, 15.

[137] After the Iran/Iraq war ended in August 1988 with an inconclusive ceasefire, Iraq's development and use of chemical weapons drew increasing criticism in the United States, especially in Congress. By November 1988 both houses of Congress had passed legislation that would have had the effect of imposing sanctions on Iraq. Israel and the Israeli lobby in the US looked upon the Iraq military build-up as a dire threat to its military supremacy in the Middle East, for it appeared that Iraq was developing the capability to counter Israel's superior arsenal of conventional, chemical, and nuclear arms. Reacting to congressional protests of Saddam's threat to use chemical weapons against Israel, Secretary of State Baker correctly noted the defensive context of the threat in testimony before the Senate appropriations subcommittee on April 25, 1990, and even went so far as to insinuate that it was appropriate for Iraq to have such weapons as a defensive deterrent. Baker said that while the Bush administration regarded the use of chemical weapons as "disturbing," Saddam only threatened to use "chemical weapons on the assumption that Iraq would have been attacked by nuclear weapons see Brown, *The Illusion of Control*, p. 159.

[138] Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal, The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008), p. 70.

[139] Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, pp. 103, 104.

The Saudi Stance

Because they were militarily weak, despite the billions of dollars they spent on weapons, it was expected that the Saudis would rush to ask for US help. However, the main obstacle to the US intervention was King Fahd who had repeatedly refused to permit the Pentagon to deploy Western soldiers inside his kingdom which possessed the holiest sites in the Muslim world, Mecca and Medina. The Saudi King worried about repercussions in the Muslim world if he allowed Western troops on sacred Islamic soil.[140] The Saudi monarchy, along with other Arab leaders, especially King Hussein of Jordan, was initially not disposed to the use of force against Iraq, preferring instead to rely on compromise to encourage Saddam to remove his forces from Kuwait.[141] In addition to this religious cause, King Fahd of Arabia, though known as America's strongest ally in the gulf, thought of two precedents that made him sceptical of the US desire of intervention: the first was President Carter's failure to defend the Shah in 1979, and the second was President Reagan's disaster in Lebanon in 1982.[142]

To win King Fahd's support, therefore, the Bush administration not only relied on diplomatic pressure but even resorted to exaggeration. The administration exaggerated the threat of what it called an imminent Iraqi armed invasion of Saudi Arabia, through the use of 'manipulated' satellite pictures, in order to panic the Saudis into accepting both US troops on their territory and eventual military action against Iraq.[143] A high-level delegation comprising the Secretary of Defence Cheney, the deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates and the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) Norman Schwartzkopf arrived in Saudi Arabia on 6 August with satellite intelligence photos showing Saddam Hussein had moved some seventy thousand troops to positions along the border and had missiles pointed toward Saudi Arabia. King Fahd, after a brief

---

[140] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 257, Finlan, *Essential Histories*, p. 29.
[141] Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 69.
[142] Finlan, *Essential Histories*, pp. 14, 15, Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008* (London: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 298.
[143] Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 69.

discussion with his advisers, agreed to the deployment of US forces.[144] The **Saudi** government issued a formal invitation to the United States to send troops to defend **the** kingdom and Operation Desert Shield was set in motion.[145]

Getting a green light from the Kingdom, US President George H. W. Bush announced that the US would launch a 'wholly defensive' mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. The US Army's 82nd Airborne and two US Air Force tactical fighter wings were sent to Dhahran, three US Navy carrier battle groups were ordered into the Persian Gulf. A total of 48 US Air Force F-15s landed in Saudi Arabia, and immediately commenced round the clock air patrols of the Saudi–Kuwait–Iraq border areas to discourage further Iraqi military advances. During the next ten weeks the Pentagon would airlift and sealift nearly 2 million tons of military hardware and war supplies to Saudi Arabia.[146] Military build-up continued from there, eventually reaching 543,000 troops. After a punishing, forty-two-day air campaign, followed by 100 hours of fierce ground assault by US and allied forces fighting under a U.N. mandate Saddam's army had been routed.[147] The Kingdom was protected and Saddam was deterred but the region as a whole remained unstable. A new player appeared on the stage, namely, al-Qaeda organization.

Evaluation

The US intervention managed to protect Saudi Arabia; however, this intervention had also led to some negative repercussions with regard to both the stability of the Kingdom and US regional interests. The existence of US troops and allied forces on the Saudi soil during and after the war earned the Saudi royal family the condemnation of al-Qaeda organization, because it violated Muslim principles against the presence of non-Muslims

---

[144] Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions of War, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 167, Finlan, *Essential Histories*, pp. 14, 15. Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 257.

[145] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 480.

[146] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 257.

[147] Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), p. 4. For more elaboration on the Gulf War, refer to chapter six of this dissertation.

troops in Muslim holy lands.[148] As a result al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, waged organized attacks designed both to oust US troops from Saudi territory and to destabilize the Saudi monarchy that had welcomed them.

Al-Qaeda had its origins in the Afghan war of the 1980s, with the Afghan Marxists and the allied Soviet troops on one side and the Islamic mujahideen (fighters) on the other. In this period Osama bin Laden and other foreign fighters had combined with indigenous mujahideen to break the Soviet occupation of the country. After the eviction of the Soviets from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to his home country in Saudi Arabia where he was received as a hero.[149] He gathered around him a following of young associates and created al Qaeda as a guerrilla army dedicated to aiding Muslims who were coming under pressure from outside forces.[150] The group sought to use the military training and weaponry from the anti-Soviet struggle to aid other Islamic groups involved in insurgency movements.

Some Analysts reckon that al-Qaeda was formed in 1988,[151] however, the enmity between al Qaeda organization and the US exacerbated from the date of the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia during and following the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. Al-Qaeda bombed US military facilities in Saudi Arabia in November 1995 and June 1996 when they attacked a US Air Force housing complex in the city of Khobar, in Saudi Arabia, killing 26 US personnel. In August 1998, bin Laden orchestrated simultaneous bombings

---

[148] Tucker, *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 352. After the end of the War, Riyadh was convinced to support international sanctions against Iraq by permitting the basing of Western air force detachments in the kingdom to enforce the no-fly zones in southern Iraq, see Peterson, *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia*, p. 10.

[149] Michael Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm, Apocalyptic Religion and US Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), p. 33.

[150] Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad, America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), p. 267.

[151] Notes of a meeting of bin Laden and others on August 20, 1988, indicate al-Qaeda was a formal group by that time: "basically an organized Islamic faction, its goal is to lift the word of God, to make His religion victorious." A list of requirements for membership itemized the following: listening ability, good manners, obedience, and making a pledge to follow one's superiors. According to Wright, the group's real name wasn't used in public pronouncements because "its existence was still a closely held secret." His research suggests that al-Qaeda was formed at an August 11, 1988, meeting between "several senior leaders" of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abdullah Azzam, and bin Laden, where it was agreed to join bin Laden's money with the expertise of the Islamic Jihad organization and take up the jihadist cause elsewhere after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 133.

of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 257 people, including 12 Americans. In October 2000, al-Qaeda members detonated a bomb adjacent to the USS Cole as it refuelled in Aden Harbour, Yemen, killing 17 US sailors. In May 2003 bin Laden struck at a housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 35 people, including eight Americans.[152] The September 2011 attacks, however, constituted bin Laden's most devastating assault on the United States. On 9/11 2001 al-Qaeda conducted spectacular assaults on Washington, D.C., and New York City killing some 3,000 persons and scarring the psyche of the US people.[153]

With regard to the Saudi regime, although not directly targeted, it was badly affected by al-Qaeda attacks. Osama bin Laden repeatedly condemned the royal family for its allowing the United States to establish military bases in the Kingdom. Several terrorist attacks had been conducted inside the Kingdom. The operations included suicide attacks, assassinations, bombings, and kidnapping. Al-Qaeda-affiliated attacks were mainly directed at foreign workers on whom the Saudi economy partially relies. However, between September 2001 and June 2004, there had been twenty separate attacks against native security personnel, leading to the deaths of at least fifty and the wounding of many more.[154]

Al-Qaeda also targeted other US allies in the region, especially Egypt, for attack. Egyptian extremists had devoted most of their energies to topple the pro-Western regime of Hosni Mubarak. From 1991 until 1996 there were over 1,000 murders. Extremists managed to assassinate the speaker of the parliament in 1990. In 1995, they attempted to kill the Egyptian President in Addis Ababa. And at the same year the Egyptian Embassy

---

[152] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, pp. 6, 30.
[153] Ibid., pp. 29, 30.
[154] Al-Qaeda also targeted other US allies in the region, especially Egypt, for attack. Egyptian extremists had devoted most of their energies to topple the pro-Western regime of Hosni Mubarak. From 1991 until 1996 there were over 1,000 murders. Extremists managed to assassinate the speaker of the parliament in 1990. In 1995, they attempted to kill the Egyptian President in Addis Ababa. And in the same year the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan was exploded. In 1997 the extremists performed their biggest massacre, killing 59 Western tourists in Luxor. See Robert S. Snyder, "Hating America: Bin Laden as a Civilisational Revolutionary," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), p. 332, John R. Bradley, "Al Qaeda and the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 139–152.

in Pakistan was exploded. In 1997 the extremists performed their biggest massacre, killing 59 tourists in Luxor.[155]

The pre-emptive model of intervention proved counter-productive in the case of operation Desert Shield. This model negatively affected the US immediate target of securing regional stability in addition to affecting the other components of the regional system. Despite the heavy American involvement in Saudi Arabia, the elusive goal of regional stability had arguably not been achieved. The historical evidence showed that the Gulf remained one of the most volatile regions of the World in spite of the repeated American intervention in its affairs. On the other hand, the problems that the United States faced in the region did not lessen as a result of its recurring intervention; indeed, they might well have grown worse.

The main features of the American pre-emptive intervention in Saudi Arabia can be summed as (1) forcible—the US sought to maintain stability through the deployment of massive numbers of troops in the Arabia, (2) top-down—the intervention was based on bolstering regional client in order to secure regional stability, while ignored other local actors and interactions, and (3) simplistic—the US pre-emptive intervention in Saudi Arabia did not consider the domestic repercussions that might result from sending non-Muslim foreign troops to the Islamic Kingdom. In addition, the US policy toward the Saudi Kingdom has never emphasised democratization as a major element of stability. Rather US policy focused mainly on maintaining reliable 'status-quo allies,' who were thought capable of securing US regional interests.

5.5   Conclusion

American administrations adopted different answers when addressing the question: How can the US maintain stability in the Middle East in a way that supports American interests in the region? In this respect several strategies have been embraced; one of them was that of the status quo strategy. Since the end of the Second World War several U.S. administrations valued US interest in regional stability (in terms of maintaining the status

---

[155] Ibid.

quo) over other objectives (like democracy promotion) in the Middle East, and made clear their willingness to sacrifice local citizens' interests towards this end. This policy established a strong relationship between Washington and most despotic regimes that were considered able to serve US interests in the ever so vital region.

Washington tasked those allies with maintaining simple stability in terms of checking the penetration of Soviet influence in the region and containing the activities of pro-Soviet regional actors (during the Cold War years). They largely agreed with the United States on major issues such as the need for stable oil production, the desirability of Arab-Israeli peace, and the need to contain ambitious regional actors who might undertake local adventures. The US pre-emptively intervened in the region to secure those regimes. The logic behind adopting this pre-emptive strategy was that without the help of those autocratic regimes (in securing the status quo), anti-Western groups would come to dominate the region and affect US interests.[156] The stability of those regimes and the stability of US interests were thus considered two faces of the same coin.

The main feature of the above model of intervention was its lack of complexity; it included a simplistic perception of stability based on imposing some fixed arrangements on Middle East system through some despotic allies. Each complex system comprises a point of equilibrium. Stability refers to the capacity of the system to restore the point of equilibrium if deviated from it due to some external disorder. The difference between simple and dynamic stability is that the simple model of stability is based on maintaining the system at the same balanced state (through top-down means), while the dynamic model refers to the ability of the system to refine the existing point of equilibrium through bottom-up techniques.

The above illustration revealed that US administrations had adopted a simplistic model of stability. Through enhancing certain regional clients and imposing certain patterns of interactions in a top-down style on system dynamics, Washington sought to simplify a complex regional system and reduce it to some *key* actors (power-holders) and allied

---

[156] Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 2 – 26.

itself with them. Proceeding from the same reductionist perspective, the US administrations did not assign sufficient consideration to local actors or low-level interactions in the Middle East system. In the cases discussed above, Washington was not keen to explore the preferences of local actors. In two out of the three cases (the cases of Jordan and Lebanon), the citizens were clearly not in favour of the US intervention. In the third case, (intervention in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War), the US administration did not appear aware of local-level consequences of sending troops to Arabia. Washington focused only on the official actors and neglected the popular reactions to its policies. On the other hand, the US dependence on power-holders and its exclusion of local actors is responsible, I argue, for a delay in the political evolution of the Middle East towards a more complex system that is able to self-stabilize.

The US pre-emptive intervention managed in most cases, save the Lebanese case, to secure the US regional clients. However, this type of intervention, because of the above features, did not help these troubled regimes to acquire dynamic stability. That is, to cope with subsequent disturbances with their own capabilities. Rather, the US allies remained in need of further external help to face domestic and regional crises.[157] As was argued in chapter two, one consequence of maintaining simplistic strategies is to cause regional allies to be fully dependent on external support for maintaining domestic stability. Repeated US intervention in favour of specific regional clients caused those clients to be fully reliant on external patrons and hence to lose any self-ability to cope with domestic and regional challenges. This dependency led, in many cases, regional actors to request US intervention instead of resisting it.

On the other hand, the failure of those allies to cope with regional changes negatively affected the US which had to re-intervene in subsequent crises to defend its interests. At the same time, maintaining some autocratic rulers with only limited popular support caused anti-US sympathies to increase among local citizens. Unfortunately for the United States, its support for those regimes (which Washington saw as "moderate" and its

---

[157] The actors stabilized in such a simplistic way, became fully dependent on the external controller for guidance. In the case of the disappearance of this guidance, the actors feel massive vulnerability. for more elaboration on this point, please refer to chapter two.

opponents deemed "reactionary") fuelled a growing tendency for many Arabs to see it as the heir to Britain's former imperial role.[158] 'Many Middle Easterners saw the United States as directly responsible for the frustration of their own political aspirations. The real-politik calculations on which U.S. foreign and security policies have been based have seldom found congruence with the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East.'[159] The repression and sense of marginalization, caused by US allies led to radicalization. People lost their identification with their states and tried to wrap themselves around some radical organizations.[160] Many of these radical organizations adopted an anti-American stance; because of the long-term legacy of U.S. support for those status-quo autocratic regimes. Mehran Kamrava notices that:

> American political patronage in the Middle East has been additional fuel for anti-Americanism. The patron-client relationships between the United States and pro-Western Middle Eastern leaders have cost the United States a lot. When it works, patronage has its advantages. But when it fails, those who feel wronged by the client may turn on the patron. [161]

---

[158] John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 54.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Blake Hounshell "We Need To 'Keep Kicking Their Behinds': Mohamed Elbaradei On His New Life Of Protest", An Interview with Mohamed Elbaradei, in Marc Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, A Special Report from Foreign Policy, 2011.

[161] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 198.

Table 5.1 **Pre-emptive Intervention**

	Immediate Target	Immediate Outcome	Consequences
Intervention in Jordan 1957	Suppressing a rebellion among pro-Nasser Jordanian officers threatening to topple King Hussein.	The US intervention managed to save Hussein's life and enabled him to stay in power.	The US measures did not succeed in enabling the fragile ally to self-stabilize. Hussein's regime remained fragile and in need of further external help. US regional interests were affected by increasing public disaffection and antagonism directed towards US foreign policy seen as allied with political despotism.
Intervention in Jordan 1958	Securing the Kingdom from the effects of the Iraqi revolution led by Gen. Abdel Karim Qassim	The swift US (and British) intervention did succeed in saving the King's life.	The King proved unable to cope with disturbances without external help. The Jordanian King continued to feel insecure and unstable. The US became convinced that their regional client lacking economic and political viability, and that they would have to re-intervene to defend him whenever necessary.
Intervention in Jordan in 1971	Protecting King Hussein during the crisis of Black September. (US secured a commitment from Israel, with the consent of King Hussein, to help the King survive the ordeal)	The King survived the revolt, and expelled the PLO fighters from Jordan.	The US/Israeli intervention did not put an end to the continued threat posed to the fragile King and to the US interests in the region. Regional stability remained elusive, and both Hussein's regime and the US interests remained under threat, this time from the Black September Organization which attempted to topple the monarch in Jordan and to get revenge on the United States for its role in supporting

197

			the Jordanian regime during the events of Black September.
Intervention in Lebanon (1958)	Sustaining the weakening position of President Camille Chamoun who was under fire from pro-Nasser candidates.	The US intervention helped bolster the fragile regime of Camille Chamoun though temporarily.	Regional circumstances compelled the Eisenhower administration to sacrifice its regional client, Camille Chamoun for another candidate. The Lebanese Governments were taught the lesson that Lebanese crises could only be dealt with by external powers, which held the keys to Lebanon's stability. The US campaign did not manage to boost the US picture among the region's citizens.
Intervention in Saudi Arabia (1991)	Protecting Saudi Arabia which seemed vulnerable to conquest by Iraq during the second Gulf War.	The Kingdom was protected from Saddam's adventure.	The existence of US troops and allied forces on the Saudi soil during and after the war earned the Saudi royal family the condemnation of al-Qaeda organization which waged several organized attacks designed both to oust US troops from Saudi territory and to destabilize the Saudi monarchy that had welcomed them. The threat posed by al-Qaeda turned out to be greater than the threat posed by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.

Chapter 6

Post-Hoc Intervention

6.1 Introduction

Middle East stability represents a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining US interests in the region.[1] These interests include the continuous flow of oil and gas to the West, facilitating the movement of U.S. naval and commercial traffic from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, and (until 1991) containing Soviet influence in the region.[2] Whenever this vital regional stability was disrupted Washington hurried to bring it back via a post-hoc model of intervention. This model of intervention branches from the status quo strategy, which assumes that any changes taking place outside the ordinary pattern of system functioning, whatever their sources are, are possible threats that should be resisted. Applying this strategy in the Middle East required the United States, in some cases, to help some disloyal regimes and to oppose some of its traditional allies (as in the case of the Suez crisis when the US supported the nationalist leader of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser and confronted France, Britain and Israel).

The post-hoc model, as pursued by US administrations, included two types of intervention: (1) intervention to oust anti-American governments and (2) intervention to reverse the effects of undesirable regional adventure(s) to change the status quo. Examples of the first type included the United States' intervention in Iran in 1953 to overthrow the democratically-elected government of Mohamed Mossadeq.[3] Examples of the second type included: (1) US intervention to reverse the effect of the tripartite

---

[1] Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal, The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008), p. 59.

[2] Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March, America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 16.

[3] Some historians add to this category the American intervention in Iraq in 1963 to support the coup which ousted General Abdul Karem Qassim. According to Douglas Little, the Kennedy administration played an important role in encouraging dissident army officers to seize power in Iraq after General Qassim had issued Public Law 80 on 11 December 1961, a decree that would, if implemented on schedule in February 1963, strip the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) of 99.5 percent of its concession, impose taxes that the American companies regarded as confiscatory, and establish a state-owned Iraq National Oil Company to oversee the Iraqi petroleum industry. See: Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), p. 62.

199

aggression against Egypt in 1956, (2) intervention to reverse the effects of the successful Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel in the October/Yom Kippur War in 1973, (3) intervention in the Gulf to reverse the Iraqi attack against Kuwait in 1991. In the following I shed light on these cases and evaluate the outcomes of the US stability-driven strategy in each case.

By the end of this chapter, it will be revealed that the US had targeted a simplistic pattern of stability in the above cases. This model is characterized by constancy and simplicity. It is constant in the sense that it is based on preserving one (balanced) pattern of interactions among system elements (the status quo), and it is simple in the sense that it is controllable, predictable, and reversible. Moreover this type of stability is imposed by one actor (in this case, the US) on the rest of the system components in a top-down style.

6.2   Intervention in Iran (1953)

Summary

In August 1953 the Eisenhower administration (in cooperation with Britain) used covert methods to overthrow anti-Western Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, who was democratically elected by the Iranians, on the grounds that he made his country ripe for communist exploitation and in retaliation for his nationalization of the Iranian oil. The US intervention managed to *restore* regional stability in terms of bringing back to power the pro-Western Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and returning the oil industry to foreign ownership, with the US and Britain each getting 40 percent share.[4] But despite the ostensible stability the Shah regime enjoyed after the US intervention, American's strongest regional ally was dramatically overthrown by the Khomeini-led revolution in 1979. The remarkable point in the Iranian revolution was that the revolutionary movement was still offended by the United States' overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq and the years of support for the Shah's rule. The legacy of Eisenhower's pro-Shah intervention, which took place 25 years earlier, aggravated anti-American sentiment

---

[4] William Blum, *Rouge States, A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (London: Zed Books, 2006), pp. 111, 112, Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 21.

of the revolutionary movement that captured control of Iran.[5] Revolutionaries carried portraits of former Prime Minister Musaddiq, symbolizing their determination to take revenge for the 1953 coup.[6] In the above case the US administration tried to simplify the complex by imposing certain arrangements on the Iranian system to restore a preferred equilibrium point (the rule of the pro-Western Shah and the Western ownership of the Iranian oil). The US administration reduced the Iranian complex system to the powerful Shah, who was thought capable of serving the Western interests, and threw its weight behind him. The Iranian people were out of the US formula altogether, and this would turn out to be a destabilizing, rather than a stabilizing, foreign policy.

Historical Background

After the Second World War, Soviet forces remained in occupation of northern Iran, where they supported a secessionist movement, notwithstanding their acceptance of the 1942 agreement that required them (with the British) to evacuate completely all troops within six months of the cessation of hostilities.[7] American leaders pressured and managed to force the Soviets to withdraw, enabling Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to restore sovereignty.[8] In the following years, the United States developed a strategic partnership with Iran, which controlled half of the coast of the region where 70 percent of the world oil exports were in transit at that time.[9]

Proceeding from a Cold War perspective, Washington did not allow the growth of a communist movement in Iran nor did it permit the country being ruled by an unfriendly government.[10] On these grounds, the US did not support the 'progressive' project of Mohammed Mossadeq, the Iranian nationalist Prime Minister, who had been elected to

---

[5] Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), p. xxx.
[6] Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, p. 266.
[7] Michael Doran, *Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 26.
[8] In 1941The British forced the pro-German Reza Shah to abdicate. His son Mohammed Reza Shah succeeded him. Mohammed Reza Shah then presided over an authoritarian regime until the Khomeini-led Revolution in 1979. See Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p.69.
[9] Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne, eds., *With U.S. or Against U.S., Studies in Global Anti-Americanism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 192-193.
[10] Ibid.

his position by a large majority of parliament.[11] Mossadeq was not a communist; however, he gradually became dependent on the local communist (Tudeh) Party for political support.[12] In a Cold-War dominant atmosphere, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, automatically, decided that Mossadeq's policy would threaten American interests and would lead his oil-rich state into the communist camp.[13]

At that time, the Anglo-Iranian oil company (AIOC) was dominating Iranian oil. Anglo-Iranian registered £250 million profit between 1945 and 1950, while the Iranian government received only £90 million in royalties. The British monopoly of oil industry engendered widespread nationalist sentiments.[14] Mossadeq was convinced that, 'the source of all the misfortunes of this tortured nation is the oil company'.[15] He pledged to throw the company out of Iran, reclaim the country's vast petroleum reserves, and free Iran from subjection to foreign power. There was a strong official opposition to the motion for nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company (mainly from the Prime Minister and Army Chief of Staff, General Razmara). However, when Mossadeq became the new prime minister a nationalisation law was passed easily in Iranian both champers and went into effect on 1 May 1951.

Protracted and bitter negotiations followed with Britain over the fate of AIOC, which Mossadeq now replaced with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In the end, the negotiations were to no avail.[16] In retaliation for the nationalization, the British prime minister, determined to save Britain's lucrative oil monopoly, imposed an economic embargo of Iran and backed it with a naval a blockade on the export and sale of Iranian

---

[11] Blum, *Rouge States*, pp. 111, 112.

[12] The opinion that Mossadegh was against Tudeh and communists in the beginning but gradually depended on their support is addressed in Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 73.

[13] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 105.

[14] The British government, since the early years of the twentieth century, had enjoyed a fantastically lucrative monopoly on the production and sale of Iranian oil. The wealth that flowed from beneath Iran's soil played a decisive role in maintaining Britain at the pinnacle of world power while most Iranians lived in poverty; see Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men, An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*,(New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p. 2.

[15] John Rees, *Imperialism and Resistance* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 77.

[16] Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War* (California: University of California Press, 2005), p. 143.

oil, resulting in a drastic deterioration of the country's economy.[17] For two years, Iran faced British-led efforts to undercut its oil policies.[18] In October 1952, Mossadeq declared that Britain was an enemy to his country. He ordered the British embassy closed and cut all diplomatic relations. He declared that he would "rather be fried in Persian oil than make the slightest concession to the British."[19]

In response, in November and December 1952, British intelligence officials suggested to American intelligence that the Iranian prime minister should be ousted. The British government managed to convince the US administration by emphasizing the communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry. A communist Iran was in fact quite a far-fetched prospect, given the relative weakness of the pro-Soviet Iranian communist party (the Tudeh), the breadth of the nationalist coalition that supported Mossadeq, and the fear with which Iranian nationalists across the political spectrum regarded Russia, tsarist or Soviet. Nevertheless, the spectre of Iranian 'reds under the bed' was enough to scare Washington, which finally went along with British urgings.[20]

The US administration under Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed to work together with the British government under Winston Churchill toward Mossadeq's removal. Washington had identified Mossadeq as a potential communist sympathizer and interpreted his anti-Western policies as a source of instability that would impede the US goal of establishing an anti-Soviet pact among states along the Soviet Union's southern border (what would be known later as the Baghdad Pact).[21] Accordingly, Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to draft plans to bring down the democratically-elected prime minister who dared to endorse the 1951 nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.[22]

---

[17] Ibid., p. 145.
[18] Irene L. Gendzier, *Notes From the Minefield, United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 39.
[19] Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, p. 3.
[20] Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis, The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (MA: Beacon Press Publish, 2009), p. 172.
[21] Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, pp. 3, 4. For more elaboration on Baghdad Pact, refer to chapter four, p. 143.
[22] Andrew Downer Crain, *Ford Presidency* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009), p. 124. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 103.

In the leaked CIA document titled, *Clandestine Service History – Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran – November 1952-August 1953*. It was mentioned that among the reasons that prompted the US administration to take the decision of overthrowing the Mossadeq government were:

> [T]hat it was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal, deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for personal power; was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (communist) Party of Iran.[23]

Based on these factors, the report concluded that:

> Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East. No remedial action other than the covert action plan set forth below could be found to improve the existing state of affairs.[24]

In this way the secret coded-name AJAX operation (to oust the democratically-elected Prime Minister) was set into motion.[25]

---

[23] http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/iran-cia-intro.pdf

[24] http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-intro.html

[25] Recent research has shown that Operation AJAX was delayed to coincide with the advent of the Eisenhower administration, which was expected to be a more reliable partner in this project than its predecessor. During the Truman administration, the British had repeatedly importuned the United States to join in a sharp rejoinder to the intolerable of Mosaddeq. Harry Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, had resisted the idea. But with Eisenhower in office, the Dulles brothers fell in with the plan, and convinced President Eisenhower of the necessity of this drastic step. See Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, p. 39.

Operation AJAX

In full cooperation with the British Secret Intelligence Service, the CIA initiated operation AJAX. The plot hinged on orders signed by the Shah to dismiss Mossadeq and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi. General Zahedi, through a CIA-arranged secret press conference and through CIA covert printing facilities, announced to Iran that he was legally the Prime Minister and that Mossadeq had staged an illegal coup against him. CIA agent assets disseminated a large quantity of photographs of the decree, appointing Zahedi prime minister and dismissing Mossadeq. However, owing to a security leak in the Iranian military the plan of ousting Mossadeq failed. The chief of the Shah's bodyguard, assigned to seize Mossadeq with the help of two truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers, was overwhelmed by superior armed forces who had Tudeh sympathies. The balance of the military plan was thus frustrated for that day.[26]

After the failed coup, the Shah hastily left Iran. He flew first for Baghdad and then for Rome. General Zahedi remained in hiding in CIA custody. With his key officers, he eluded Mossadeq's security forces which were seeking to apprehend the major opposition elements. Tudeh Party leaders urged Mossadeq to issue a decree stating that the monarchy had ended in Persia, and had been replaced by a republic. They assured him that he would be elected as the first president of the Persian republic. However, Mossadeq opposed the suggestion.[27]

In the meanwhile Mossadeq had undermined his own popularity by holding an unconstitutional referendum for the closure of the Parliament and the election of new deputies. Western intelligence exploited the schism made by this decision by provoking anti-Mossadeq demonstrations in Tehran. On the 19th August 1953 a crowd of about 3,000 men armed with clubs and sticks started an anti-Mossadeq and pro-Shah demonstration in the Southern part of the town. They roamed through the streets shouting "Long Live the Shah" and "Death to Mossadeq the traitor". Most of these men had

---

[26] The Question of Military and Economic Assistance to Iran; Interest of the United States in The Settlement Of The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, British Memorandum, Top Secret 2 September 1953, Persia, Political Review of The Recent Crisis, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Volume X, No. 368, p. 782.

[27] Ibid., p. 783.

obviously been hired for the purpose; among them there were a large number of unemployed persons and many well-known hooligans. However, there were also small spontaneous demonstrators, and a few clerics who were worried about the possibilities of a rise in anticlericalism.[28] About the same time, the Chief of Police issued orders that demonstrators should not be interfered with.[29]

When it became evident that police officers were directing the movement of demonstrators Mossadeq at once dismissed the Chief of Police and ordered his arrest. Mossadeq also instructed the army to send tanks and armoured cars to disperse the demonstrators. But the Western intelligence had recruited key units of the pro-Shah military commanders to seize the local radio station and challenge Mossadeq.[30] By noon of that day it was clear that Tehran, as well as certain provincial areas, were controlled by pro-Shah street groups and Army units. The headquarters of three pro-government political parties, and offices of half a dozen newspapers supporting Mossadeq were ransacked by demonstrators and set on fire. The mob then attacked the offices of the Tudeh newspapers, where they met some resistance, which was soon overcome. The speaker announced that Mossadeq had fled. It was false news, however, it had an immediate effect throughout the capital and the country and demoralised supporters of the government who might have wished to resist.[31]

On 20 August, a large crowd attacked Mossadeq's house, by this time heavy Sherman tanks arrived on the scene, and started bombarding the house. The defence of the house was given up, and the gate was broken down. The crowd then entered the house, looted all its contents and set fire to it.[32] A royal decree was issued dismissing Mossadeq and appointing general, Fazlollah Zahedi, as a new Prime Minister. The next day, Mossadeq who had earlier escaped to a safe location surrendered himself to the police, and was detained under house arrest until his death in 1967.

---

[28] Many of the Shiite Ulama (religious scholars) saw threats of republicanism and communism arising from the Musaddiq movement. See Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 146.
[29] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The Question of Military and Economic Assistance to Iran, p. 784.
[30] Glenn Hastedt, *Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004), p. 243.
[31] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The Question of Military and Economic Assistance to Iran, p. 785.
[32] Ibid., 786.

With Mossadeq out of the way, Iran's elected, constitutional, parliamentary regime was replaced with the despotism of Mohammad Reza Shah.[33] Anglo-American oil companies had prevailed and had shown what they were prepared to do to anyone who tried to challenge their mandate.[34]A new era, one of monarchical absolutism, dawned in Iranian politics.[35] The loyal Shah returned with US military and security backing to his throne. In return, the Shah gave the oil contracts to US companies (and did not return the assets to the British companies that Mossadeq had nationalized). The Shah became one of the key guardians of US interests in the Middle Eastern oil region[36] and granted US personnel in Iran the legal right of extraterritoriality (diplomatic immunity from Iranian law).[37]

The US was seeking to maximize its ability to control the Iranian system, and because the ability to control is higher in simple systems (where the role of the people, the impact of local, emergent, non-linear interactions can be ignored), the US chose the status quo strategy which presented an easy way to imagine that a complex system (like that of the Iranian system) can be controlled through managing one variable (the Shah). However, the US-stabilized Shah remained unable to self-adapt to system's dynamics or stand up to internal and external threats. According to the definition adopted in this study, dynamic stability does not refer to the retention of the status quo. Rather it refers to system's self-ability to handle a shift from the existing point of equilibrium to a new one without a major disintegration, in other words, without losing its physical existence.[38] In the case of the Iran, serving this target required the US to intervene to help the Shah restore his authorities. The Shah's stability hinged on difficult-to-accomplish manoeuvring rather than on a set of more durable and resilient structures.[39] The American intervention though appeared successful in terms of bringing back to power the pro-Western Shah, and

---

[33] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 172.

[34] William Engdahl, *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 97.

[35] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 146.

[36] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford, 2005), p. 28.

[37] Roby Carol Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), p. 15.

[38] For example, the Shah regime of Iran ceased to exist after the eruption of the revolution of 1979, so it cannot be said that the Iranian system has simply moved from one point of equilibrium to another, rather, it could be argued that the shah regime has failed in the test of dynamic stability.

[39] John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order* (Princeton: NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001), p.45. Ikenberry uses the term order instead of system which I have chosen in this citation.

returning the oil industry to foreign ownership, led later to wide-range dramatic instabilities. The ultimate illustration of these instabilities was the Shah's failure to overcome the events of 1979, which ended up with completely overthrowing the strong American ally.

The Iranian Revolution

The Iranian revolution had emerged as a result of multilevel and large scale interactions among local-components; however, there was an iconic actor who triggered it, namely, Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini, who can be considered as the oppositional focal point, returned to Iran on February 1, 1979, after fifteen years in exile, and was cheered there by millions of Iranians. He led the movement that managed to overthrow the pro-Western Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and disrupt the regional stability which was secured for more than two decades by the American client. The Khomeini-led revolution was a clear application of the principle of 'sensitivity to initial conditions,' which refers to the fact that small differences in the initial condition of a dynamical system may produce large variations in the long term behaviour of the system. Khomeini, through cassette tapes, was able to lead the Iranian peoples to a massive blow against the Shah. The revolution changed the 'stability formula' in the Gulf by drawing Iran away from the Western camp.

The revolution adopted an anti-American stance; in part because of the long-term legacy of US support for the autocratic Shah and in part because of President Carter's attempts to prevent the revolution.[40] It is worth remembering that President Carter, in his visit to Iran in 1977, had publicly supported the Shah, referring to Iran as 'an island of stability' and congratulated the Shah for earning the 'admiration and love' of the Iranian people. One year later, however, riots and demonstrations broke out and the Shah responded by declaring martial law. President Carter urged the Shah to remain firm; however, continued unrest compelled him to flee outside Iran on January 16, 1979.[41] After Carter, the Iranians continued 'to view Washington as a threat—not necessarily a direct military

---

[40] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 38, Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 156.
[41] Hastedt, *Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy*, p. 246.

threat but a political threat stemming from America's refusal to accept Iran's revolution and thus Washington's determination to jump on every opportunity to reverse it.'[42]

For their part, the Americans saw the revolution as a disaster; 'in the midst of the Cold War, they lost a critical ally tasked with maintaining regional stability in the ever so vital Persian Gulf region and with keeping the Soviets out.'[43] Washington was convinced that Khomeini, though known as disdainful of the doctrine of atheism in Moscow, would move, sooner or later, towards the Soviet orbit.[44] Accordingly, the American administration did not express friendly feelings towards the new regime and at the same time accepted hosting the ousted Shah. The revolutionaries' response to the US policies was swift and painful; the hostage crisis.

The Hostage Crisis

After President Carter had admitted the fallen Shah to the United States to undergo surgical treatment, a mass of 3 million persons gathered in Tehran to march past the U.S. embassy and condemn the United States as the 'Great Satan'. The surprise was that the revolutionary movement was still offended by the United States' overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq and the years of support for the Shah's rule. Revolutionaries carried portraits of former Prime Minister Musaddiq, symbolizing their determination to take revenge for the 1953 coup.[45] On November 4, hundreds of revolutionary students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and seized the Foreign Service officers and marines on duty there.[46] Khomeini applauded the action and indicated that he would release the captives in exchange for the Shah.[47]

---

[42] Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 90.
[43] Ibid., p. 89.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, p. 266.
[46] Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War*, p. 156. On a detailed account of the hostage crisis see: Carol K. Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 37-64.
[47] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 71, Hastedt, *Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy*, p. 246.

President Carter's policy toward the hostage crisis developed in stages. Initially, he froze Iranian assets (worth about $10 billion) in U.S. banks, expelled Iranian diplomats and students from the United States, isolated Iran diplomatically and organized international financial sanctions, secured a censure of Iran's actions by the International Court of Justice, and, finally severed diplomatic ties with Iran on April 7, 1980.[48] When he concluded that chances for progress were unlikely, Carter told his National Security Council on April 11, that he planned to proceed with a military rescue mission to extract the hostages from Tehran.[49]

But in contrast to the first US intervention (to oust Musaddiq) when 25 years passed before Washington realized how disastrous its decision to support the Shah was, the failure of American intervention in the hostage crisis was more immediate. The US forcible mission, which travelled to Tehran on 24th of April 1980, ended in catastrophe. Due to mechanical problems, only five of the eight helicopters arrived at the target location. Having previously determined that six helicopters would be minimally necessary for a successful rescue Carter ordered the mission aborted. In the haste of evacuation, one of the helicopters and one of the transport planes collided and exploded. Eight U.S. soldiers were killed. The military evacuated the rest of the officers on the remaining transport planes and left behind helicopters, weapons, equipment, and classified documents.[50]

In spite of this tragic end, the crisis was solved later due to two factors (1) the natural absence of the Shah, and (2) Iran's war with Iraq.[51] These factors convinced Khomeini to resume talks with the Americans. Through back-channel negotiations arbitrated by Algeria, U.S. and Iranian officials negotiated a deal in which the hostages would be released in exchange for unfreezing Iranian financial assets. However, the agreement came on effect only in January 1981, after U.S. voters elected Ronald Reagan president.

---

[48] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 71, Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism*, pp. 37, 38.

[49] Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism*, p. 37.

[50] Ibid., pp. 37, 38.

[51] Some observers believe that US anger with Iran led the US to embolden Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, and to aid Iraq after the war turned against Iraq. See Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," *Smithsonian magazine*, October 2008 at: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/iran-fury.html#ixzz1K4rvizo1

'As a final snub to Carter, Khomeini delayed the release of the remaining fifty-two American hostages until moments after Reagan's inauguration on 20 January, 444 days after the embassy takeover'[52]. The hostage ordeal proved to be one major factor causing Carter's loss in the presidential election. Conversely, the hostage crisis benefited the Iranian regime. Miroslav Nincic correctly noticed that 'By concentrating Iranian attention on the past and present misdeeds of the U.S. in Iran, the American hostage crisis united the nation, and strengthened the radicals within the regime at the expense of the moderates.'[53]

Evaluation

Assessing the applicability of a certain strategy of stability on a disturbed system entails making judgments about how resilient that system becomes in the face of further disturbances. It is necessary to look at the reactivity of that system in the face of threatening forces from both within and outside. Dynamic stability as discussed earlier does not refer to perpetuating the current point of equilibrium. Rather it refers to the ability to move to successive points of equilibrium. The trick then is for the system to be able to handle a shift from the existing pattern of interactions to a new pattern without a major disintegration, in other words, without losing its physical existence, but this was exactly what the Shah had failed in. The Shah regime ceased to exist altogether after the eruption of the revolution of 1979. It could not be said that the Iranian regime had simply moved from one point of equilibrium to another, rather, it could be argued that the shah regime had failed in the test of dynamic stability, this was partially because of US measures in enhancing the Shah.

Iran was one of the strongest pro-Western allies, and one in which the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had invested huge amounts of money and military aid. However, the secular regime of the Shah had been overthrown by a popular revolution led by a traditional clerk who managed to access the Iranian

---

[52] Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism*, pp. 37, 38, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 72.
[53] Miroslav Nincic, *Renegade Regimes: Confronting Deviant Behavior in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 92.

people. The simplicity with which Khomeini managed to overthrow the Shah indicated the fragility of the strategy maintained by successive US administrations in Iran before 1979. The US applied linear/deterministic/simplistic strategy to control a complex system from without. The speed through which the regime of the Shah of Iran collapsed in spite of its apparent firmness is readily understood when we recall the extrinsic "top-down" approach through which the Iranian regime had been stabilized.

Given this top-down nature, the American-led intervention hampered, rather than enhanced, the intrinsic ability of the Shah regime to evolve or to self-adapt to changes emanating from the surrounding environment. It was clear that the simplistic stability model adopted by the US in its intervention in Iran hampered the natural evolution of Shah Regime and drove it to a state of stagnation (which caused the Shah to increase his dependency on the US administration).The Shah regime lasted for a long time, not because it was stable, but because it happened to exist during propitious times.[54] The forcibly-imposed Shah showed serious inability and was incapable of coping with domestic challenges without continuous US help. The US had empowered the Shah regime and neglected the massive popular resistance to his rule. US policymakers turned blind eyes to the local opposition inside Iran and preferred to view Iran as a simple system that could be controlled via a reliable client. However, the Iranian revolution showed how poor the ability to predict the future or control the evolution of complex systems is.

The American policy of purchasing the services of the Shah at the expense of the Iranians' political rights did not succeed in maintaining regional stability. The U.S. intervention, as Peter L. Hahn put it, ostensibly stabilized the Shah for two decades and secured the Western interests for a generation, but it also planted the seeds of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Mossadiq's legacy, Hahn added, inspired Iranians who later rebelled against the Shah and criticized the United States.[55] Andrew Crain correctly concluded that:

---

[54] Robert Jervis, *System Effects*.
[55] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 52.

By deposing Mossadegh in favour of the Shah, the United States eliminated a moderate path to reform in Iran and an example of democracy for the rest of the Middle East. After the coup the only alternative to the autocratic Shah was the theocratic ayatollah, and Iran would become a *destabilizing* force in the region. [emphasis added]. [56]

The overthrow of the Shah proved Iran to be a complex system. Complex systems (i.e. systems that emerged through a long process of dynamic and spontaneous interactions between multi-level variables such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) could not be stabilized through simplistic strategies (neither be controlled from without nor be stabilized in a top-down style). The Iranian revolution disclosed that 'peoples' represent an important factor in the framework of any stability formula. The Iranians proved willing and ready to bear the sacrifices necessary for a comprehensive revolution. Although the reaction to the 1953 coup came a bit late, its magnitude was so impressive and affected both regional stability and US interests in a decisive way.

It can be concluded that the main features of the US intervention in Iran included: (1) reductionist—the US administration did not pay enough attention to local-level opposition to the Shah and aligned itself with the King who was perceived by US officials as the locus of power and did not take into consideration the reaction of local actors to the secret plot. (2) top-down oriented—as the US administration aligned itself with the Shah and excluded other national forces, (3) coercion; as the US administration used the force of Shah's Army to oust Mossadeq.

6.3   Intervention in the Suez Crisis (1956)

Summary

For the second time within few years, a Middle Eastern leader nationalized a vital facility to Western interests—the Suez Canal. But this time, surprisingly, the United States chose not to attack him but, rather, intervened in his favour. The restoration of regional stability in this case did not include the overthrow of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser,

---

[56] Crain, *Ford Presidency*, p. 130.

as was the case with the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh when he nationalized the British Oil Company in 1951. Rather, the United States condemned the tripartite attack and forced Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their troops from Egypt, to cut the road to the Soviet Union and to gain more followers in the region. The outcome of the crisis, with U.S. pressure on its allies, showed clearly who was in charge of "western" policy in the Middle East and emphasised the fact that the new superpower was a strong advocate of *status quo* policies and ready to intervene even against its allies to maintain regional stability. As it will be revealed by the end of this analysis, in the Suez crisis Washington attitude was in harmony with the notions of 'complex systems theory', as it did not consider the changes made by Nasser (the action of nationalization of the Canal Company) harmful to regional stability of Middle East system. Moreover, in this case the US adopted a holistic perspective in the sense that it did not try to reduce the regional system to its power holders; rather, the American administration took into consideration the popular stance of Middle East peoples. The other positive point in the American intervention in 1956 was that in this crisis Washington adopted a relatively balanced policy towards the conflicting parties (compared to its reductionist policies in other crises), including its closest regional ally, Israel.

Historical Background

The indirect cause of the 1956 crisis was the U.S. refusal to fund the Egyptian project to build the Aswan Dam, [57] a project that Egypt needed for irrigation and for electricity.[58] American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that no American aid for the building of the Dam would be forthcoming, and that American and British participation in financing the High Dam of Aswan through the World Bank was not feasible in the circumstances. This meant that Washington had reversed its previous pledge made on

---

[57] Robert McNamara presented a detailed account of the Suez Crisis in Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952–1967, From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
[58] William L. Cleveland, Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009), 4th edition, p. 311.

December 16, 1955, to help fund this project. It had done so because of Nasser's growing links with the Soviet Union and his aggressive campaign against the Baghdad Pact.[59]

Following American withdrawal of the offer, Nasser announced that his government had decided to nationalize the Anglo-French company that was operating the Suez Canal,[60] claiming that its revenues were necessary to support the Aswan Dam project. At that time canal traffic was carrying two-thirds of Europe's oil supply and the majority of canal tolls were going to European shareholders of which the largest was the British government.[61] Under that arrangement, Egypt received about $17 million a year in proceeds from the Canal, while the Company made a total of about $31 million a year in profit.[62]

The Tripartite Attack

The British considered Nasser's action to nationalize the Suez Canal Company as a unilateral decision that breached the concessions and affected the rights and interests of many nations.[63] While the French, who were having trouble with their colonials in Algeria because of Nasser's support of the insurgency, likened Egyptian seizure of Suez Canal to seizure of Rhineland by Hitler.[64] Both countries saw the seizure of the Canal as prelude to the complete loss of their colonial positions in the African and Asian worlds.[65] The two powers thought that with Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company they would be dependent for their supplies of oil not on an international waterway over

---

[59] Ahron Bregman, *Israel's Wars: A History since 1947* (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 36.
[60] The Suez Canal was built in the 1860s and by the late 1880s came under British and other foreign control (via a number of shareholders), maintained by British occupation of Egypt. The British saw the canal as an essential element in their control of the main sea route to India. The Canal physically exits within Egyptian territory, but the Company that handled the operations of the Canal was owned by an international group that functioned under the Constantinople Convention of 1888. When Nasser nationalized the Canal, there was no international legal recourse for the British or French to oppose his action as long as he continued to operate the Canal efficiently. See Beverley Milton-Edwards, Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 14, Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics, Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*, (Michigan, the University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 136.
[61] Rees, *Imperialism and Resistance*, p. 78.
[62] McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics*, p. 137.
[63] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 2, Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, July 27, 1956—5 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7-2756. Top Secret.
[64] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 4, Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. Paris, July 27, 1956—5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7-2756. Top Secret.
[65] McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics*, p. 136.

which they used to have direct control, but on Nasser's goodwill.[66] They started to raise doubts about the ability of the Egyptians to run the Canal and about their readiness to abide by the international commitments governing its operation. In a message to President Eisenhower, the British Prime Minister Antony Eden claimed that:

> Apart from the Egyptians' complete lack of technical qualifications, their past behaviour gives no confidence that they can be trusted to manage it with any sense of international obligation. Nor are they capable of providing the capital which will soon be needed to widen and deepen it so that it may be capable of handling the increased volume of traffic which it must carry in the years to come. We should, I am convinced, take this opportunity to put its management on a firm and lasting basis as an international trust.[67]

Contrary to what the British PM argued, however, the Egyptians managed to run the Canal effectively, and Nasser promised to pay remuneration to the shareholders as well. There was no international legal recourse for the British or French to oppose the action as long as the Egyptians continued to operate the Canal efficiently. But, in spite of those facts, the British and French secretly conspired with Israel to launch an attack on Egypt with the aim of recovering control of the Suez Canal and its operations and ousting Gamal Abdul Nasser. The plan was drawn as follows: Israel would invade the Sinai, Britain and France would issue ultimatums ordering Egyptian and Israeli troops to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone, and when Nasser (as expected) rejected the ultimatums, the European powers would occupy the Canal Zone and depose Nasser.[68]

Indeed, on 29 October 1956, the Israeli army launched 'Operation Kadesch' against Egypt; Israeli forces crossed the border and entered the Sinai desert. Over a period of five days they approached the Suez Canal. In a message sent to the American President the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion attributed the aggression to Nasser's expansionist policy that has

---

[66] Ibid., p. 37.

[67] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 5. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

[68] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 154.

demolished the foundations of security and good will, led to unprecedented tension in the area, acquired vast quantities of arms from Soviet sources which together with lesser quantities from Western sources have converted the Egyptian army into a force of great magnitude by Middle Eastern standards.[69]

The European powers, as prearranged, issued an ultimatum, calling on Israel and Egypt to stop all hostilities, withdraw troops ten miles from the Suez Canal, and allow occupation of the Canal Zone by Anglo-French forces in order to keep the peace. 'If these conditions were not met, Egypt would face allied military intervention.' The ultimatum stated. The Israelis accepted a ceasefire on the condition that the Egyptians accept it as well. But the Egyptians refused to pull their troops back from the canal.[70]

Britain and France used Egypt's refusal of the ultimatum to launch 'Operation Musketeer'.[71] During the early evening of October 31, British and French forces began their bombardment of Egyptian airfields in the vicinity of the Suez Canal Zone. They bombed Egyptian targets and sent their troops to occupy cities of Port Said and Port Fuad on the pretext of protecting them from hostile action, paratroopers landed along the Suez Canal on 5 November 1956.[72] Meanwhile, Israeli Defence Forces continued to advance in the central portion of the Sinai Peninsula and on November 1 began their movement in northern Sinai toward Al Arish. That same day the Egyptian Government recalled most of its forces from the Sinai Peninsula to defend the Canal Zone. At the same time the Egyptian Government broke diplomatic relations with the British and French Governments.

---

[69] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 414 Message From Prime Minister Ben Gurion to President Eisenhower, London, July 27, 1956. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

[70] Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, p. 14, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 14.

[71] Michael J. Cohen, *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East 1954–1960, Defending the Northern Tier* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 159.

[72] Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, p. 14, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 154.

The American Stance

The tripartite attack was met with an immediate condemnation from President Eisenhower, whose administration failed to discover the collusion. Before the outbreak of the attack Eisenhower encouraged Britain, France, and Israel to use diplomacy rather than force to resolve their problems with Nasser. He directed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to pacify the crisis through public statements, negotiations, international conferences, and deliberations at the United Nations. Dulles tried to persuade the Israelis that there was no threat from Egypt, and that they, therefore, should not take the initiative to wage war on their neighbours. By late October 1956, however, these efforts proved without avail when British warplanes started bombing Egypt, destroying camps and airfields and brutally killing more than one thousand civilians living in the Canal Zone.[73]

The U.S. President was particularly upset at the action of three of his country's close allies and took the position that none of them could be allowed to gain any benefit from the use of force.[74] The American President was also worried about regional stability, given that the Soviets were eager for seizing any opportunity to strengthen their presence in the region. On October 31, the American President went on the air and announced:

> The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance. As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right, if our judgment dictates, to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise and proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes. The action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed [....] In all the recent troubles in the Middle East, there have indeed been injustices suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of injustice—

---

[73] Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 195, idem, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 53.
[74] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 312.

war— is the remedy for these wrongs. There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends[75]

The following step was that concrete actions were taken in response to the attack: (1) Sixth Fleet Carrier Strike Force and Amphibious Force were directed to proceed towards vicinity Cyprus. (2) Hunter-Killer Group and two submarines in Rotterdam were directed to proceed to Eastern Mediterranean to report communications with Sixth Fleet. (3) One Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was directed to CINCEUR area, one RCT in zone of interior (ZI) and one C–124 wing in ZI alerted for possible movement.[76] The Joint Chiefs had taken the following additional steps to improve overall military readiness: (1) moved the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) command to USS *Pocono* in the Mediterranean; (2) cancelled the amphibious exercise in the Atlantic and issued instructions to plan for loading out one Marine battalion landing team; (3) authorized the loading of additional atomic weapons in CV As *Forrestal* and FDR and placed them on short notice for possible movement; and (4) indicated intent to move U.S. Naval forces west of Crete as soon as evacuation of U.S. nationals was completed.[77]

In addition to these military measures, Eisenhower tried a variety of political and economic steps to halt his allies' offensives and to urge them withdraw from Egyptian territory. His administration imposed sanctions on the colluding powers and achieved a United Nations cease-fire resolution (through the General Assembly).[78] At the same time, American officials made huge efforts to convince the Egyptian that they did not incite the

---

[75] Halford Ross Ryan, *U.S. Presidents as Orators: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook* (London: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 198, 199.

[76] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 415, Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Certain Specified and Unified Commanders, Washington, October 29, 1956—9:38 p.m. Source: JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) Sec 47 RB. Top Secret.

[77] Ibid.

[78] At the United Nations, the Soviet delegation joined the American in excoriating the invaders, a remarkable and rare instance of Moscow-Washington cooperation. See Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Cathal J. Nolan, *U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy, from 1789 to the present* (Santa Barbara, CA.: ABC-Clio, 2006), p. 281.

Israelis to make this move.[79] Finally, and under tremendous US and Soviet pressures,[80] the UN-brokered cease-fire agreement took effect on 7 November, and tensions gradually eased. The Anglo-French powers withdrew their forces in November/December; the Israelis did likewise, though they remained in Sinai until March 1957.[81]

Possible Causes of American (Counter)-Intervention[82]

The first possible cause behind Eisenhower's decision of intervention (against his allies) was that the allies had not given him advance notice of their plans. Anthony Nutting, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, described the American reaction to the Tripartite Attack by saying:

> Nobody was kept more completely in the dark than the President of the United States. After Eden's initial confession that he wanted war had provoked Eisenhower to indignant protests, the President was treated as an unreliable ally. The more he warned Eden that American and world opinion would not support him if he appeared to be trying to browbeat a smaller nation into submission, the more determined Eden became to conceal his hand from the Americans. And after the decision to gang up with Israel had been taken, Eisenhower was told nothing at all.[83]

Eisenhower was furious at Britain and France for acting without consultation, and this meant, as Rashid Khalidi put it, that the two ex-imperial powers did not know their place

---

[79] See for example Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 410, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 29, 1956 Washington, October 29, 1956 , Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Secret.

[80] Soviet leaders threatened to intervene in the fighting and to retaliate against London and Paris with weapons of mass destruction. Prudently, Eisenhower ordered the Pentagon to prepare for world war even as he increased pressure on the colluding powers to desist. See Hahn, Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations, p. 154.

[81] A special UN emergency force was stationed in Gaza to act as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. See Hodge and Nolan, U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy, p. 281, Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, p. 312.

[82] See Robert McMahon, The Cold War, A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 66 – 67.

[83] Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London: Constable, 1967), p. 111.

in the post WWII world, where all important decisions were made in Washington.[84] However, 'the outcome of the crisis, with U.S. pressure forcing Britain and France to withdraw their troops after their intervention against Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, showed who was in charge of "western" policy in the Middle East.'[85]

Secondly, President Eisenhower feared that this regional conflict could have quickly expanded into a broader international war. During this crisis there was an effective mechanism of feedback. By feedback I refer to a state when one point of experience in a system of interactions influences the next. By the outbreak of the crisis, the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, threatened to expel the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion by direct force, which, he suggested, might entail nuclear attacks on London and Paris. Khrushchev also made preparations to send Red Army units to Suez to assist his Egyptian ally.[86] In his communication with the American President on November 5, the Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin made a clear reference to possible use of nuclear power against Britain and France if they failed to withdraw from the Suez Canal.[87] Bulganin stated in his letter that:

> Soviet Union and U.S. are permanent members of Security Council and are two great powers possessing all contemporary forms of armaments, including atom and hydrogen weapons. On us lies special responsibility to put stop to war and to restore peace and tranquillity to area of Near and Middle East.[88]

Eisenhower clearly considered the risk of nuclear war with the Soviet Union to be a real one. In that volatile atmosphere when a minor war between two minor members of the rival blocs might have induced a nuclear World War III, President Eisenhower decided

---

[84] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 26.
[85] John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), p. 130.
[86] Hodge and Nolan, *U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 281, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 154.
[87] Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, p. 86.
[88] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 505. Letter from Prime Minister Bulganin to President Eisenhower Moscow, November 5, 1956. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11-556. Secret.

that his administration could not tolerate independent war-provoking actions by its allies.[89] Through processes of feedback, the Eisenhower administration accommodated the Soviet challenges and managed to reach a new point of equilibrium in the Middle East.

Thirdly, it was clear to the Eisenhower administration that the U.S.S.R stood in a good position to gain from the poor image of the U.S. that such action might encourage. Eisenhower was very concerned about the infiltration of Soviet influence into the region during the crisis. Eisenhower's trepidation about the Soviet Union using this crisis to gain access to the region in ostensible defence of Egypt was one of the main reasons Eisenhower wanted to pre-empt further conflict in the area.[90] The United States, despite its opposition to the Anglo-French intervention, vehemently rejected Soviet proposals for joint action in the region. Eisenhower planned to summon international troops, with no troops from the big five, to prevent the Soviets from having the lion's share in the troops. In a letter sent to Secretary Dallas, President Eisenhower confirmed this meaning by saying that the soviet 'must be prevented at all costs from seizing a mantle of world leadership through false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations.'[91]

Evaluation

The tripartite attack on Egypt negatively affected the regional stability (the status quo) that Washington was careful to establish in the wake of World War II. In this phase US interests in the Middle East grew gradually in reaction to the growing soviet influence. In this context, status-quo strategy was the dominant thread in American foreign policy.[92] The U.S. administrations exercised continuous efforts to keep the existing balance in the face of the Soviet attempts for penetration. These efforts led the United States to become

---

[89] Seyom Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 63.

[90] McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics*, p. 142.

[91] Transcript of Conversation Between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Anthony Eden Regarding Cease-Fire during Suez Crisis, 11/06/1956 ARC Identifier 594708 quoted in Richard Crockatt, *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 182.

[92] Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 56.

a 'status quo power.'[93] Promoting regional stability was initially interpreted as keeping the established political order in place as much as possible, on the assumption that any change in the form of power in this region could open the door before Soviet expansion. It was believed that the prevention of radical change would keep the Russians at bay and secure American interests in the area.[94]

Obsession with the Soviet threat, whether real or imagined, led Washington to intervene to restore the status quo after the Tripartite Attack on Egypt. In doing so, Eisenhower was no exception from the rest of U.S. presidents; however he was perhaps the only U.S. president who was forced to enter into a clash with America's allies for that end. The U.S. President did not fancy throwing America's weight behind regional nationalist like Nasser, but he felt compelled to if anyone was going to take American policy seriously in the future.[95] Eisenhower also calculated that the United States had to take a dominant stance in the region to boost the positions of its remaining pro-Western governments before revolutionary movements backed by the Soviet Union swept the Middle East to the detriment of U.S. interests.[96]

The real irony in the Suez Crisis was that both the US and the tripartite attack perpetrators were seeking to restore regional status quo, however, they disagreed on how to achieve this goal. The cause of this disagreement, according to Rose McDermott, was that Britain and France were operating from a different reference point than the United States was. Britain and France were trying to return to the old status quo; they assumed the situation would get worse unless Nasser was removed from power, the canal was returned to the Western powers held controlling interest of the Canal Company. Contrary to the allies' position the US assessed the Canal dispute and the stakes mainly in relation to its efforts to contain Soviet expansion. For America, the new status quo (after the nationalisation of the Canal) was really no different than the old in terms of direct

---

[93] Amir Taheri, "The United States and the Reshaping of the Greater Middle East," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (2005), pp. 295 - 301.

[94] Alan R. Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991). p. 51.

[95] Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble, the White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2009), p. 28.

[96] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 51.

national interest; payments for tolls would go to Egypt instead of Britain and France, but Western ships would continue their unimpeded transit through the Canal just as well.[97] The American leadership realized that U.S. interests were not going to be greatly affected by Egypt's decision to nationalise the Canal, as long as it continued to function efficiently.

Consciously or unconsciously, Washington attitude was in harmony with complex system dynamics according to which changes are considered integral part of any complex system; as long as the system is able to accommodate these changes. Accordingly, the changes made by Nasser were not considered harmful to regional stability of Middle East system. Moreover, President Eisenhower expressed his conviction that the action of nationalizing the canal was not the same as nationalizing oil wells (as was the case of Iran in 1951), since the latter exhausted a nation's resources while the Canal was more like a public utility, building them up. Furthermore the Egyptian action was not a violation of international agreements; it might violate the concession contract but the latter was not a treaty between Egypt in one side and Britain and France on the other.[98]

More important, there was an American concern about the adverse effect of an attack held by American allies on the attitudes in the Arab and Muslim worlds towards the Americans and their interests in the region. Eisenhower feared that the tripartite attack would produce anti-Western feelings across the region. In this case the US administration dealt with the Suez crisis as a complex system that had a holistic nature in the sense that it could not be reduced to separate elements without being distorted. The American administration took into consideration the popular stance of Middle East peoples and opposed the invasion for fear of inflaming Arab sentiment and raising the prospect of allowing the Russians further popular influence in the Middle East. It was clear that in this crisis the US administration did not follow the assumption that the Middle East system was uniform and that local details did not matter for the behaviour of a system on larger scales. This interest in local actors had caused the resultant stability to be more

---

[97] McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics*, pp. 148, 149.
[98] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 3, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 27, 1956, 8:30 a.m, Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret.

viable. American officials realized that the US battle with the Soviets over the popular support in the Middle East was going to be greatly affected if it aligned itself with the tripartite attackers.[99]

The other positive point in the American intervention in 1956 was that in this crisis Washington adopted a relatively balanced policy towards the conflicting parties (compared to its reductionist policies in other crises), including its closest regional ally, 'Israel'. In spite of the fact that the first step taken by the American President after the tripartite attack was to make sure that Egypt would not counterattack and hold the Israeli forces in the desert 'where they would have difficulty maintaining themselves',[100] and in spite of his statement that 'if the American did anything against the Israelis, then they had to do something against France and Britain,[101] the American President was, at least, able to take the decision of opposing the Israeli aggression against Egypt. He knew that the Israelis were trying to make use of the fact that the American administration would be stymied at the pre-election period, but he did not care whether he would be re-elected or not. Eisenhower felt it was incumbent upon the US to redeem its word about supporting any victim of aggression.[102] In addition he believed that the American people would not throw him out in the midst of a situation like this, 'but if they did,' he said, 'so be it.'[103] This balanced policy towards regional actors cleverly de-escalated an international crisis and rendered the system in a better equilibrium for a while.[104]

---

[99] Charles Tripp, *Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 95.

[100] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 411. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, Washington, October 29, 1956, 7:15 p.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

[101] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 454, Editorial Note.

[102] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 412. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1956, 8:15 p.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

[103] Ibid.

[104] In his message to the Israeli Prime minister to encourage the latter comply with the UN resolution of withdrawing the Israeli troops from Sinai the American President's concern was on the phrase "Impair the friendship and cooperation between our two countries." The sentence was corrected to read "to impair the friendly cooperation ". See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 550. Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. Washington, November 7, 1956. Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–756. Confidential.

6.4 Intervention in October/Yom Kippur War (1973)

Summary

In October 1973, the US administration intervened to help Israel reverse the attack made by Egypt and Syria, and to restore the status quo that preceded the eruption of war. In addition to the fact that Israel was a close ally to the US, the assumption that underlined the American intervention in this case was that the Egyptian/Syrian course of actions violated the US-approved system's configuration and hence should be prevented using all possible means. The American intervention in the October war was a prelude to a deeper involvement in the peace negotiations that followed. The period that followed the October war did not witness an outbreak of new conflicts between Israel and Egypt. Rather, the two countries went through peace negotiations. However, the American-guided settlement led to the isolation of Sadat's regime, and it also raised a strong domestic opposition in Egypt that was directed at both the American role and the Egyptian President. The drama ended up with the assassination of President Sadat in the wake of his famous visit to Jerusalem.

Historical Background

The October War originated in the unstable truces that followed the Six-Day-War of 1967 and the War of Attrition. The affected Arab parties (mainly Egypt and Syria) rejected the idea of acknowledging the fragile settlement that followed the war. Inside Egypt the situation was very tense. After the negative reaction of Washington to his initial peaceful initiatives, President Sadat became pessimistic about the prospects of diplomacy.[105] The Egyptian President was also depressed because of the growing détente in U.S./U.S.S.R relations which meant that the superpowers were unlikely to make a major breakthrough in the Middle East for fear that this negatively affected their

---

[105] American officials understood that the pressures on President Sadat were great and that he could be overturned if there was no solution to his dispute with Israel, however, they were not concerned with Sadat peaceful initiatives. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 155, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 21, 1971, 4:15 p.m. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret. For more elaboration on this point, refer to chapter eight of this dissertation.

improving relationship.[106] Sadat had repeatedly pressed Moscow for the means to regain his territory militarily, but the Soviets had resisted Sadat's several pleas for offensive weapons in the interests of Brezhnev's new "positive" approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.[107] Détente, in Sadat's eyes, was a negative situation likely to reduce the Middle Eastern crisis to a negligible item on the international agenda and perpetuate an unacceptable 'status quo' between Egypt and Israel.[108]

Sadat calculated that he could serve his cause by coordinating with Syria an attack on Israel.[109] The purpose of which was to change the political context of the Arab-Israel conflict by provoking a crisis between the superpowers and increasing the costs of perpetuating an unstable status quo. Sadat intended, through the use of force against Israel for limited military objectives, to urge the superpowers to intervene positively and to demonstrate to them that a stagnate status quo could be dangerous to them, not only intolerable to him.[110]

Indeed, on October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israel on two fronts; the Sinai and the Golan Heights. This was the fourth Arab-Israeli war, known in the East as the October/Ramadan war and in the West as the Yom Kippur War, and witnessed the largest tank battle since World War II.[111] The attacks took Israeli forces by surprise as Israeli intelligence had failed to detect the months of secret preparations by Egypt and Syria. According to John Richard Thackrah, neither the Israelis nor the Americans believed the Egyptians had the military capacity to cross the Suez Canal in sufficient force to take on the Israelis effectively, however, Thackrah contends, 'the army of Egypt

---

[106] For more elaboration of the American resistance to positively response to Sadat's initiative refer to chapter eight of this dissertation.

[107] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 231. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, Washington, May 16, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 484, President's Trip Files, The President, Issues Papers—USSR, III, [Part 1]. Top Secret.

[108] Bregman, Israel's Wars, 1947–93, p. 70, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 171.

[109] Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, p. 152, Hahn, Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations, p. 15.

[110] Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, p. 152.

[111] Hodge and Nolan, U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy, p. 314.

showed sophistication and intelligence in its planning for this war and, once engaged, its troops fought with tenacity and bravery.'[112]

During the first few days of the war, which lasted for nineteen days, Egypt and Syria secured considerable victories in the Sinai and the Golan. In the south, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and overran the Israeli military's extensive defences, forcing the Israelis back. The Israelis did not fare better in the Golan Heights. Israeli positions in the eastern Golan fell to the advancing Syrian army. With a lack of tanks and manpower, Israeli troops had to withdraw from many positions in the southern sector of the Golan Heights.[113]

The American Stance

The Egyptian–Syrian attack caught Nixon administration by surprise. It missed several warning signs that Egypt contemplated offensive military action to recover the Sinai. President Nixon was completely distracted by several other problems— the war in Vietnam, the pursuit of détente in Beijing and Moscow, and the unfolding Watergate crisis at home in 1972–1973. On the other hand, the application of the Nixon Doctrine for the Middle East, the idea that American national security interests were best served by relying on militarily strong allies (such as Israel and Iran), effectively closed out a search for a comprehensive peace settlement.[114] Convinced that it was not an urgent priority, Nixon delegated the whole file of the Middle East to the National Security Advisor (then, Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger.[115]

For his part, Kissinger, who entered the State Department just two weeks before the October War,[116] was well known of his bias to the Israeli side, to the extent that

---

[112] John Richard Thackrah, *Military Conflicts since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 273.
[113] Mark A. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 467.
[114] Jussi Hanhimaki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 305, 306.
[115] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 112.
[116] Henry Alfred Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State on September 21 by President Richard M. Nixon and served in the position from September 23, 1973 to January 20, 1977. With his appointment, he became the first person ever to serve as both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, a position he had held since President Nixon was sworn into office on January 20, 1969. However, on November 3,

prevented him from seeking a viable settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[117] According to Douglas Little, Kissinger considered Israel as an intensely personal issue that cannot be dealt with neutrally. Little quoted Kissinger grimly noting: 'I could never forget that thirteen members of my family had died in Nazi concentration camps [...] I had no stomach for encouraging another holocaust by well-intentioned policies that might get out of control.'[118]

Kissinger was also a strong advocate of the balance-of-power theory, according to which it was a necessity *not* to tolerate the Soviets allies, or to let down U.S. friends. He convinced Nixon to adopt Israel as a regional client that would balance the Soviet influence among radical Arabs.[119] After the eruption of the October War, Kissinger was keen to restore a balance that would ensure the superiority of Israel. He advised Nixon to accept the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's appeal to airlift everything possible to replace the war materiel destroyed by the Arabs. Nixon embraced Kissinger's position and instructed the Pentagon to offer Israel a full-scale airlift of military equipment on October 10. By the time the airlift ended on 15 November 1973, U.S. Air Force had flown nearly 700 sorties and had ferried 11,000 tons of military hardware to Israel.[120] This U.S. assistance served to replenish Israeli forces. Israel was thus able to launch an offensive that retook most of its territorial losses and even gained some ground against both the Egyptians and Syrians. Thanks to this massive American airlift, Israel eventually managed to reverse the early Arab gains.

On October 25, the Soviet Union urged that a joint Soviet-American force go to Egypt to save the Egyptian Third Army from Israeli encirclement and to maintain the peace and warned that without American cooperation Moscow might choose to act unilaterally. Nixon ordered a global alert of most U.S. forces, raised the Defence Condition of the

---

1975, President Gerald R. Ford removed him from his National Security Adviser position while keeping him as Secretary of State. See Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Henry Alfred Kissinger at: http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-a
[117] Kissinger successfully convinced Nixon to resist the initiative of Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the efforts of United Nations to promote an Arab–Israeli peaceful settlement in the Middle East on compromise terms. See Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, pp. 91, 92.
[118] Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 33.
[119] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 111.
[120] Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 106.

U.S. Army to Level 3, and set U.S. forces in the Mediterranean at Defence Condition 2. He then informed Moscow that there was no need for a joint Soviet-American force and that the United States would not accept unilateral Soviet action. Fearing that the situation might escalate into global conflict, the Americans applied some pressure on Israel to obey the cease-fire.

OPEC Oil Embargo, 1973-1974

In response to the U.S. support to Israeli during the war Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to restrict oil production, first by a 10-percent cut, followed by an embargo on all oil exports to the United States and other allies of Israel. The decision was taken by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and Algeria against the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in an effort to destabilize their position on the Middle East. Other OPEC states such as Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela did not join the embargo but imposed steep price rises. The embargo befuddled American's daily life and hit hard the economies of the targeted countries. [121]

'The decision to use the oil weapon was a direct response to Nixon's decision to provide Israel with $2.2 billion of emergency military assistance during the war, and it ultimately did significant damage to the U.S. economy.'[122] The price of oil per barrel doubled, and then quadrupled, leading to increased costs for consumers world-wide. Since the embargo coincided with a devaluation of the dollar, a global recession appeared imminent. 'The embargo and production decrease cost the United States some $48.5 billion in 1974 alone (equal to roughly $140 billion in 2000 dollars), due to higher petroleum costs and an estimated 2 percent reduction in GDP. The oil crisis also led to serious strains in America's relations with key allies in Europe and Asia.'[123] U.S. allies in Europe and Japan had stockpiled oil supplies and thus had a short term cushion, but the longer term

---

[121] See Hodge and Nolan, *U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 315, Stefano Guzzini, Robert Gilpin, "The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power," in Iver B.Neumann and Ole Wæver, eds., *The Future of International Relations Masters in the Making* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 129.
[122] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 54.
[123] Ibid.

possibility of high oil prices and recession created a strong rift within the Atlantic alliance. 'European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the U.S. Middle East policy. The United States, which faced growing oil consumption and dwindling domestic reserves and was more reliant on imported oil than ever before, had to negotiate an end to the embargo from a weaker international position.'[124]

Post-War Negotiations

Following the military confrontation and the Arab oil embargo at the end of the war, the United States began to re-examine its policy in the Middle East. Settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict became a top priority for the United States. After the end of the war, Henry Kissinger appeared as a pivotal figure in arranging the discussions among the Israelis and the Egyptians that took place in Geneva on December 21, and constituted the first in a series of negotiations that returned borders in the Middle East to their condition as of October 5, 1973. Although he did not succeed in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, he did achieve disengagement agreements signed between Israel and Egypt. In early January of 1974, he began a process of negotiation and consultation between the Israeli and Egyptian governments, the beginning of 'shuttle diplomacy,' that led by January 18 to the disengagement of belligerent forces along Israel's borders with Egypt and Syria (in May 1974), the restoration of U.S.–Egyptian diplomatic relations, the end of the Arab oil embargo and a five point plan for peace in the Suez region, including American aerial surveillance of the area.[125]

Evaluation

The United States had succeeded through its involvement in the October War, and the subsequent peace negotiations, in transforming Egypt to a stabilizing force rather than a revolutionary force as was the case during the era of Arab nationalist Jamal Abdel Nasser. As Tamara Cofman put it, America was able [after intervening in 1973] to solidify its dominant position in the region, break Israel's regional isolation, facilitate

---

[124] Milestones: 1969-1976, OPEC Oil Embargo, 1973-1974, at: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/OPEC
[125] Hodge and Nolan, *U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 315.

Egypt's hesitant moves toward a market economy, and consolidate Egypt's shift from regional adventurer to regional stabilizer.[126] However, this intervention had led also to serious disorders not only in the oil market (in terms of triggering an Arab oil embargo and production decrease that quickly sent world oil prices soaring and imposed significant economic costs on the United States and its allies) as discussed above but also in the regional balances between Arabs and Israel. Two aspects of the above disorders are discussed in the following.

Favouring the Israeli Side

Within certain limits US diplomacy during and after the war followed a reductionist course and favoured Israel in a way that hampered the emergence of viable stability in the region. From the early days of American intervention in the October crisis, Kissinger handled the cease-fire negotiations (most notably his talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow on October 21) with an eye toward preserving Israel's freedom of action until the final stages of the war. According to Mearsheimer and Walt:

> President Nixon had instructed Kissinger to tell Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev that the United States wanted to use the war to impose a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, but in Moscow Kissinger successfully pressed for a simple cease-fire that would leave Israel with the upper hand and facilitated subsequent efforts to exclude the Soviet Union from the peace process.[127]

When the cease-fire resolution, calling for an end to all fighting within twelve hours, was passed in the Security Council, Kissinger permitted Israel to violate it in order to consolidate its military position. He told Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz that Israel would be "well-advised" to use the time afforded by his trip to Moscow to complete its military operations, and according to the 'National Security Archive' Kissinger secretly

---

[126] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 17.
[127] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 44.

gave Israeli authorities a green light to breach [the] ceasefire agreement in order to buy time for Israeli military advances despite the impending ceasefire deadline.[128]

After the end of hostilities and the beginning of disengagement negotiations, American officials did not exercise real pressure on Israeli officials to accept equitable settlement. Although there was considerable hard bargaining during the subsequent "step-by-step" diplomacy leading to the 1975 Sinai II disengagement agreement, the United States favoured Israel's interests. In addition to giving Israel increased military aid, the United States pledged to "concert action" with Israel when preparing for a subsequent peace conference and gave Israel a de facto veto over PLO participation in any future peace talks. In continuation of the exclusionary policy, Kissinger promised the Israelis that the United States would not recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 (the cease-fire resolutions that ended the 1967 and 1973 wars, respectively, and called for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories along with acknowledgment of its sovereignty and independence), a pledge that Congress codified into law in 1984.

Overlooking Domestic Outrage in Egypt

The leading US role in managing the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement after 1973 was perceived as a major diplomatic victory for Washington;[129] however, the American administration did not pay enough attention to *local-level* outrage which was increasing rapidly in the Egyptian society against the 'peace process' and against President Sadat himself. Many Egyptians were stunned that Sadat had entered into an American-supervised agreement with Israel without consulting or involving other Arab nations. A strong domestic opposition in Egypt was directed at both the Egyptian President and the Americans who supported him.

Since a peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 America has sponsored the Egyptian regime, providing it some $2 billion in military aid annually, this was seen

---

[128] Ibid.

[129] Leon Hadar, *Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 38.

as an aggravating humiliation for ordinary Egyptians, who opposed this deal. Many Egyptians saw the US aid a bribe for maintaining a cold peace with the Jewish state.[130] However, the American administration which was convinced that transforming Egypt to a stabilizing force would be a strategic asset decided to keep boosting Sadat and provided him with huge monetary and military aid in spite of the popular opposition to his rule. American officials ignored the fact that Sadat was not reflecting the Egyptian public opinion, and the fact that his regime was restraining free expression, using presidential decrees to push through legislation, and preventing political parties from gaining significant presence in the parliament.[131] In practice, the United States had focused more on 'stability' than on democratization, with just a selective focus on some basic rights and individual human rights cases, based on the view that stability in the Arab–Israeli conflict was needed before regimes could afford to loosen their grip.[132] On this ground, American administrations pressed for limited improvements in human rights protection, but at the same time maintained cooperation with Egyptian regime on more traditional, defensive approaches to security and stability.

But, in spite of the American support to his rule, Sadat became deeply unpopular. He was viewed by wide sectors of the Egyptians as a "yes-man" to the United States.[133] The policies pursued by Sadat in support of U.S. regional interests contributed deeply to the unpopularity of his regime. A spontaneous macro outrage emerged out of accumulated 'micro tensions'. Domestic tensions escalated notably throughout 1980 as it became clear that the peace process went nowhere and Egypt's isolation from the rest of the Arab

---

[130] Arthur Goldschmidt noted that many Egyptians condemned Egypt's peace with Israel not out of hatred for Jews but because it freed the Israeli government to bomb civilian neighbourhoods of Beirut (1982), destroy Iraq's nuclear reactor (1981), increase Jewish settlements on the West Bank, and oppress the Palestinians. Egypt, isolated from other Arab states (because of the peace treaty), could not stop it. See Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p. 210.

[131] There is a contiguous debate in US foreign policy circles over using foreign aid to Egypt to achieve greater respect for democracy and human rights in that country. Some officials urge that aid should be conditioned on demonstrable progress in extending full political and economic rights. Many others, however, asserted that the overt use of aid — or the threat of aid reductions — to promote democracy and reform in the Middle East region could lead to a backlash against the United States. See Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request," *CRS Report for Congress*, February 17, 2005.

[132] Richard Youngs, *International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society and International Business* (New York: Oxford, 2004), p. 49.

[133] Susan Muaddi Darraj, *Modern World Leaders, Hosni Mubarak* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), p. 51.

world grew deeper. The religious opposition decided that the Egyptian President had tilted too much to the U.S. which associated itself with Israel,[134] and their reaction to this rapprochement was bloody. On October 6, while attending a military parade, President Sadat was shot by members of Al-Jihad group. Among the charges they made against him was his orientation toward the US and his involvement in the American-led peace process with Israel.[135]

The lesson that was overlooked in the above case was that stability in complex systems emerges as the result of rule-based interactions between actors at the local level. These rules evolve - adapt - under the influence of the experience and the learning abilities of the actors constituting the system, and as a result of the development of the structure of the complex system.[136] Accordingly, the emergence of stability, as a macro property, in complex systems is not a result of the purposeful behaviour of the elements or the influence of a central organizing authority (in this case, the US). Rather, such a property should come into being as a product of some sort of self-organization.[137] The US overlooked these rules and intervened to maintain simplistic formula in a complex milieu. The resultant stability was thus (1) reductionist—based on favouring Israel's interests over regional stability, (2) simplistic—sought to restore a status quo which was itself unstable, and (3) top down oriented—ignored local outrage which was increasing rapidly in Arab societies against US policies.

6.5   Intervention in the Gulf 'Operation Desert Storm' (1991)

Summary

In August 1990 Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait and easily ousted its fragile ruling regime. Although Kuwait had backed Iraq during its war with Iran 1980–1988, Saddam concealed a grudge about the wealth Kuwait had accumulated while his country had spent its own resources on the battlefields. Saddam also accused

---

[134] Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East,* p. 151.

[135] Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt,* p. 210.

[136] Ibid., p. 1.

[137] Ingo Piepers, "Dynamics and Development of the International System: A Complexity Science Perspective," arXiv.org, Cornell University. At: http://arxiv.org/ftp/nlin/papers/0604/0604057.pdf

Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from well fields near the border and deflating oil prices to the detriment of Iraq.[138] Within days, President George H. W. Bush, in conjunction with a broad international coalition, launched 'Operation Desert Storm' to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to restore regional stability.[139] The US intervention managed to liberate the tiny Sheikhdom and defended it from the threat posed by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. However, there was no evidence that the post-war arrangements were the best for system elements, nor was there any indication that the regional system gained the ability to cope with future disturbances after the American intervention. In other words, there was no evidence that the system was able to self-stabilize in the face of further crises. These conclusions were further evidenced by the eruption of the domestic uprisings inside Iraq.

Historical Background

In August 2, 1990 Saddam took the decision of invading Kuwait and easily routed its tiny army. Saddam's desire to control Kuwait was not unique for an Iraqi leader. Iraq had never accepted the loss of Kuwait as one of its governorates and had long regarded it as an integral part of the Iraqi national homeland. Middle East historians explain that:

> The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was based on an interpretation of history dating to the time when the area comprising the modern states of Iraq and Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman Empire. Kuwait had been a district in Basra Province, which together with two other Ottoman provinces had been reconstituted as the nation of Iraq in 1932. By that time, however, Kuwait had become an 'independent sheikdom under British protection.'[140]

Iraq had claimed Kuwait from the moment it gained full independence from Britain in 1961. In 1963 Iraq's then president, Abdel Kareem Qassim, had asserted the Iraqi claim to Kuwait, leading to a small British deployment of a detachment of regular troops in the

---

[138] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 126, Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 66.

[139] Thomas H. Henriksen, *American Power after the Berlin Wall* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 35.

[140] Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War*, p. 162.

emirate to deter any action. Afterwards, Iraq grudgingly recognized the new state. However, the issue was never completely settled.[141]

When Saddam took power in 1979, he found new reasons for thinking in annexing Kuwait. Iraq was in a strong economic position in the late 1970s, but eight years of war with Iran turned it into a net debtor. Iraq had been bankrupted by the conflict and for much of the period was largely dependent on foreign assistance. From the West and Japan, Iraqi debts stood at $25-$35 billion; from the Soviet Union, $10 billion; and from the Gulf states (mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), $50-$55 billion.[142] Thus Iraq's total foreign debt stood at something close to $100 billion.[143] Despite government attempts to promote the private sector and domestic agriculture, Iraq remained in a weak position even after the end of the war.[144]

Trying to solve his financial dilemma, Saddam demanded that Kuwait pay Iraq $10 billion as a compensation for Iraq's defence of Arab interests in that war and cancel the debt it had incurred during the war with Iran. At the meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council in February, Saddam was reported to have said, "I need $30 billion in fresh money, and if they [the Kuwaitis] don't give it to me, I will know how to get it."[145] Hussein concealed a grudge about the wealth Kuwait had accumulated while his country had spent its own treasures on the battlefields.[146]

In addition to its refusal to assist him financially, Saddam had accused Kuwait with many other charges. The most serious among them was the accusation that both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had been waging economic warfare against Iraq by overproducing oil well beyond the quotas laid down by OPEC since 1981 and so pushing down the price of oil to the detriment of Iraqi interests. Saddam believed that both countries had less

---

[141] Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies, America Confronts the Middle East* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), p. 216. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 126, Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal,* p. 66.
[142] Milton-Edwards, Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945,* p. 97.
[143] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 84.
[144] Fred Halliday, "The Gulf War and Its Aftermath: First Reflections," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 2. (April 1991), pp. 223-234.
[145] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East,* p. 183.
[146] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations,* p. 126.

interest in a high price and had deprived Iraq of oil revenues, needed to sustain its economic and military surge. In mid-July 1990, just prior to an important OPEC council meeting, Iraq warned that it might take military action against countries that continued to exceed oil quotas.[147] Saddam also claimed that Kuwait was illegally occupying and exploiting the Rumeila oil field which straddles the two states' frontier. He accused Kuwait of stealing $2.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil near and across the border through practicing horizontal drilling.[148]

Another issue for Iraq's concerns was the Kuwaiti refusal to lease, or otherwise hand over, the two strategic islands of Warbah and Bubiyan at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab waterway which would have been of considerable military value against Iran during the first Gulf War by allowing Iraq an access to the Gulf. Kuwait rejected the Iraqi demands in this respect and sought to use Iraq's economic vulnerabilities to impose a final settlement of the boundaries between the two states to its advantage.[149] Saddam saw that the seizure of Kuwait offered a solution to the above grievances. He warned Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the emir of Kuwait on 18 July 1990, that there would be serious trouble. After few weeks two Iraqi divisions (30,000 troops) moved towards the border with Kuwait and occupied the small country.[150]

The American Stance

After President Ronald Reagan took over in January 1981, Washington's choice was to seek good relations with Iraq. The Reagan administration found the US interests in backing the Iraqi regime. Reagan administration viewed Iraq as a good bulwark against the revolutionary regime in Iran.[151] When, in fall 1983, a National Security Council study had determined that Iran might defeat Iraq, which would be a major catastrophe for American interests in the Gulf in its threat to the flow of oil, the United States took the

---

[147] Milton-Edwards, Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, p. 99
[148] Halliday, "The Gulf War and Its Aftermath: First Reflections,", pp. 223-234, 226
[149] Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 211.
[150] Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, p. 102.
[151] David Ryan, Patrick Kiely, eds. *America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 60.

decision of providing further assistance to Iraq to prevent that risk from materializing.[152] The United States provided Iraq with export credits, covert military assistance (dual-use technology), and battlefield intelligence information while doing what it could to harass Iran.[153] Furthermore, the United States deployed in the Gulf the largest naval force it had assembled since the Vietnam War, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting oil tankers, but which engaged in serious attacks on Iran's navy.[154] Iraq was removed from the American list of terrorist states in 1982, and diplomatic relations, which had been severed in 1967, were restored in 1984.[155] The Americans had no doubt that Saddam was a dictator, but, proceeding from the traditional status quo perspective, they believed he was able to serve US interests through maintaining regional stability. Reagan's advisers were more fearful of Iran's fundamentalism that might affect the status quo than of Saddam's despotism which did not contradict with regional stability perspective.[156]

When the new administration of President George Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, assumed control of U.S. foreign policy on 20 January 1989, they continued the Reagan administration's special relations with Iraq, providing it with military hardware, advanced technology, and agricultural credits. Washington apparently counted on Saddam to maintain stability in the Gulf, and believed that Saddam Hussein's need for Western help in rebuilding Iraq's war-torn economy would have a moderating effect on him.[157] The Bush administration opposed congressional sanctions on Iraq for its appalling human rights abuses. Instead, the United States extended credit guarantees for American grain exporters to Iraq. According to Henriksen 'this was a Cold War way of doing business, when Washington backed regional dictators so long as they were anticommunist.'[158]

But, in spite of these good relations between the US and the Saddam regime, President Bush responded swiftly after the Iraq's invasion of its neighbour, Kuwait. The American

---

[152] Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 61.
[153] Warren I. Cohen, *America's Failing Empire: U.S. Foreign Relations Since the Cold War* (MA.: Warren I. Cohen Books, 2005), p. 22.
[154] Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 61.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Cohen, *America's Failing Empire*, p. 22.
[157] Little, *American Orientalism*, pp. 227, 252. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 64.
[158] Henriksen, *American Power After the Berlin Wall*, p. 38.

President immediately condemned the assault, froze Iraqi assets in the United States and prohibited trade with Baghdad. He also succeeded in having the United Nations Security Council vote for an economic embargo against Iraq, with support of all the permanent members, including the Soviet Union and China.[159] And when such diplomacy failed to have the desired effect, Bush began to prepare for military action to liberate Kuwait. By early October U.S. war planners began considering steps to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait.[160]

In the meanwhile, President Bush managed to secure UN Security Council Resolution no. 678, which ordered Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 and authorized member states, if Iraq remained defiant, to use 'all necessary means' to achieve that outcome.[161] According to Rashid Khalidi, the United States made a unilateral decision as to what action to take. Although the UN was involved, it was in a strictly subordinate capacity. What facilitated this American monopolization of decision making was the weakness of the declining Soviet Union and its incapacity to project power into the Middle East. Washington took advantage also, Khalidi added, of the hostility that the Saddam Hussein regime inspired in virtually all its neighbours and most of the rest of the world, to formulate a United Nations–sanctioned coalition to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.[162] Bush convinced leaders of 28 countries to contribute troops in an international coalition to challenge Iraq's position in Kuwait through political, legal, and economic means.[163] The Kuwait campaign was, as Khalidi put it, an American-directed, American-controlled effort, albeit operating under the flag of a Security Council resolution.[164]

After securing international and domestic legal sanctions to wage war, and two days after the expiration of the January 15 deadline, coalition forces launched Operation Desert Storm. Bush ordered the start of offensive military action against Iraq on 17 January 1991. Under Operation Desert Storm, U.S. and allied aircraft conducted a massive aerial bombardment against Iraq targets, destroying much of Iraq's military (and civilian)

---

[159] Cohen, *America's Failing Empire*, p. 23.
[160] Nincic, *Renegade Regimes*, p. 139.
[161] UN Security Council Resolution 678 is available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement
[162] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 91.
[163] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p, 127.
[164] Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 91.

infrastructure and wiping out most of the major achievements of the Ba'ath regime since the mid-1970s.[165] On 22 February, Bush issued an ultimatum that Iraq must leave Kuwait within 24 hours. When Hussein refused to comply, the US-led coalition, directed by Colin Powell, launched a major ground offensive on 24 February against Iraqi troops in Kuwait, unleashing a multinational attack that outgunned, outnumbered, and outwitted Saddam Hussein's army. The Iraqi army collapsed quickly; the allied powers destroyed the bulk of Iraqi armour and artillery; On February 28, President Bush declared a cease-fire. Kuwait was liberated in a 100-hour combat operation.[166]

The rapid success in Kuwait raised speculations that Bush would seek to occupy Baghdad and oust Saddam Hussein. Indeed, many American hardliners, mainly neoconservatives, tried to convince the President that danger loomed as long as Hussein remained in power.[167] But Bush decided to end the offensive at that stage and to leave Saddam Hussein in power in Baghdad. The decision not to directly remove Hussein was the result of a prior agreement with the US allies on the issue and the desire not to be bogged down in a prolonged occupation in Iraq.[168] Bush decided that ousting Saddam would exceed the authority granted by the United Nations, shatter the coalition, and destabilize the Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the Bush administration, it was not clear that leaving a weakened Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq was a bad outcome. [169]

Bush might also have calculated that Hussein's military defeat would undermine his hold on power in Baghdad. In May 1991, Bush signed a presidential finding directing the CIA to create the appropriate conditions for the overthrow of Saddam. As it emerged later, the plan consisted largely of supporting propaganda and Iraqi dissidents who came to form the Iraqi National Congress. There was also an American hope that members of the Iraqi military would turn on their leader. Yet Saddam was able to rout domestic plots and to

---

[165] Anderson and Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq*, p. 87.
[166] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, pp. 33, 34, Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 230.
[167] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p. 127.
[168] Dean Baker, *The United States Since 1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 117.
[169] Ibid., p. 128. Some observers referred also to the fact that the president might have been aware of how difficult it had been to locate Noriega in the immediate aftermath of the American assault on Panama, a far smaller nation. James T. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 236.

consolidate his rule.[170] Though was soundly defeated in the 1990–91 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein had stayed in power for another 12 years before he was finally overthrown during the 2003 American intervention in Iraq.[171]

Evaluation

The 'containment versus regime change' debate that dominated US policy calculations during and after the Gulf War was not framed primarily around consideration of which strategy would most encourage or impede 'dynamic stability', but rather in terms of which might restore the regional status quo at less dangerous level. This kind of stability was characterized by constancy and simplicity. It was constant in the sense that it is based on preserving *one* pattern of interactions among system elements, and it was simple in the sense that it was sought to be controllable and predictable. Empowering the elements of the regional system to self-stabilize against subsequent crises was not what the Bush administration was intervening for, rather the restoring of a critical stability that prevailed before the Gulf war. By stability here the Bush administration was referring to a particular status quo that would secure its regional interests. As Stephen J. Sniegoski put it: 'when Saddam Hussein upset the balance in the Middle East by invading Kuwait in 1991, the elder Bush went to war not to create a new configuration in the region but to restore the status quo ante.'[172]

The Bush administration did not take into consideration the fact that the starting point (before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) referred to an imbalanced equilibrium, whereby the status quo was itself unstable. A system can be described as stable only when it has the ability to cope with disturbances.[173] Coping with disturbances refers to system's self ability to find a new equilibrium after a stimulus has been imposed. This type of stability emerges, in a bottom-up style, as a result of multiple and overlapping interactions

---

[170] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, p.75, Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 74.

[171] Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010), p. 125.

[172] Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 74.

[173] See: Sven Ove Hansson And Gert Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," *Synthese*, Vol. 136, 2003, pp. 219–235, and Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," pp. 390-406.

between system (most often, local) elements. The US intervention in the Gulf targeted instead to maintain an autocracy-based status quo, which was not a guarantee of attaining regional stability. The US intervention reflected linear perception of stability based on a conviction that restoring the status quo ante would, in itself, ensure regional stability.

Similarly, there was no evidence that the post-war arrangements were the best for system elements, nor was there any indication that the regional system gained the ability to cope with future disturbances after the American intervention. In other words, there was no evidence that the system was able to self-stabilize in the face of further crises. This conclusion was further evidenced by the eruption of the domestic uprisings inside Iraq as I illustrate in the following.

The Sectarian Uprisings

After the liberation of Kuwait the Gulf remained unstable, mainly because of the domestic uprisings in Iraq. Encouraged by expectations of US support, two major uprisings started in the northern and southern parts of Iraq, where the Kurds and the Shiites predominated, respectively.[174] Iraq's two main religious and ethnic minorities tried to seize the opportunity to rebel against Saddam and his state as the cease-fire took effect.

The Shiite uprising

The Shiite uprising broke out on February 28 in some Sunni towns in the south, but soon spread to the Shiite strongholds of Basra and several other southern cities. This was not a coordinated rebellion, but rather a series of spontaneous and violent eruptions. The targets of resentment were the symbols and personnel of the Ba'athist regime.[175] The rebels gained control of most of the southern Iraq, but, after two weeks, the Iraqi Republican Guard reasserted Saddam's authority.

Although the United States imposed a "no-fly" zone that prohibited Saddam from using his air power in the southern part of the country, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, approved

---

[174] Henriksen, *American Power After the Berlin Wall*, p. 27.
[175] Anderson and Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq*, p. 88.

243

an exception to permit Iraqi helicopter flights which Iraqi commanders said they were necessary to rescue wounded soldiers.[176] These military helicopters with tanks and other heavy weaponry were ruthlessly used to shoot up the streets of the southern cities and suppress the Shiite revolt.[177] Beginning in early March, Iraq's forces managed to regain the south from the rebels.[178]

The Shiite groups expected support from U.S. forces in southern Iraq. However, they were disappointed. 'When Saddam moved to crush the rebellions, the Americans were slow to interfere.'[179] Bush ordered American forces not to engage the Republican Guard. Without the foreign assistance they had believed would be forthcoming, the Shiite rebels, with little military training and poorly equipped, quickly succumbed to Saddam's forces. Within a month after the cease-fire, as Americans were preparing to evacuate southern Iraq, their camps were being inundated by fleeing Shiites, who desperately sought food and medical care. By the end of March, some thirty thousand refugees were receiving US help.[180]

Since the United Nations lacked facilities to protect the refugees, the allies airlifted over ten thousand Shiites to Saudi Arabia or Iran, while other Shiites scattered throughout the region. The real fear for the US was that radical Shiite groups would step in to fill the void, thus transforming the entire complexion of the uprising. The US officials, who were not prepared to deal with regional complexities, hastily concluded that successful rebellions would fragment Iraq and allow Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf and its vital oil supplies.[181] The Americans preferred to sacrifice the loyal rebels for fear of losing control on regional stability.

The Kurdish Rebellion

Simultaneously with the Shiite rebellion, the Kurds of northern Iraq revolted against Saddam. The Kurds captured control of a large area with the objective of establishing an

---

[176] Baker, *The United States Since 1980*, p. 117.
[177] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, Penguin Books, 2007), p. 5
[178] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 181.
[179] Cohen, *America's Failing Empire*, p. 25.
[180] Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War*, p. 217.
[181] Cohen, *America's Failing Empire*, p. 25.

autonomous state. The Kurdish uprising was better organized, largely because the Kurds had a long history of resistance to Baghdad's authority, they were fighting for their independence as guerrillas. United under the banner of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), the two major Kurdish political forces—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—imparted some coherence to the rebellion, and by March 19, southern Kurdistan was in Kurdish hands. Within weeks of the cease-fire, Kurdish rebels had gained control over twelve major towns and cities.[182]

The aspirations of the Kurds were shattered, however, when Saddam Hussein, after crushing the Shiites, shifted Republican Guard units to the north. With overwhelming military superiority, the Iraqi Republican Guard's lethal warfare smashed the rebellion and forced thousands of Kurds to seek refuge in neighbouring Turkey which received 450,000 and Iran which received 1.4 million. Neither of those countries welcomed the Kurds, as both feared the political consequences of increasing the size of their already sizable Kurdish minorities. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together took in some 35,000; others escaped to Syria and Jordan. By the month's end, most of the north was also recaptured, but not before an estimated one hundred thousand Kurds had been killed and the total number of Kurdish refugees to neighbour countries reached 10 percent of Iraq's population.[183]

The devastating attacks elicited considerable international sympathy, but little more. The Kurds pleaded with Bush to stop Iraqi use of helicopter gunships, but the Bush administration continued the traditional concern of American foreign policy for stability in the Middle East.[184] The Americans were unprepared for the Kurdish uprising against Saddam. It was clear that regime change on the back of a grassroots revolution was not what the US had in mind at least in this phase.[185] Bush accepted the proposition that US interest in the stability of the Middle East necessitated Iraq's survival as a political entity,

---

[182] Anderson and Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq*, p. 88.
[183] Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War*, p. 217.
[184] Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 76.
[185] Anderson and Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq*, p. 88.

245

meaning that, while he authorized some assistance to the beleaguered Kurds, he would not support their political aspirations[186].

Middle East regional regimes had shared the United States its desire not to violate the status quo formula. America's coalition partners, such as Syria and Egypt, feared a disruption of the fragile 'balance' in the Middle East. Worried that unrest in Iraq would expose and threaten the stability of their regimes; Arab leaders opposed a wider mission that might have toppled Hussein from power.[187] The logic behind such a stance was that the existence of the Iraqi leader was considered necessary for maintaining the status quo. The regional system has not been tested under different configurations. It was feared, therefore, that any other arrangements in the Gulf might open the door wide to chaos.

Conclusion

The post-hoc model of intervention reflects important aspects of the US simplistic conception of stability. Applying this model the US managed in restoring the status quo ante, but caused, at the same time, grave distortions to the Middle East system. The initial association between stability and the status quo neglected the fact that the starting point in the concerned systems referred in many cases to an imbalanced equilibrium, whereby the status quo may actually be unstable. Maintaining the autocracy-based status quo, thus, was not a guarantee of maintaining stability even in its simplistic definition.

In the case of Iran, the American post-hoc intervention managed to forcibly restore the Shah to his throne, but it had planted, at the same time, the seeds of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Successive US administrations aligned themselves with the autocratic regime of the Shah, and underestimated the possibility of any retaliatory reaction by the local actors. This caused popular stance then to be against the US special relationship with the Shah; this negative stance was revealed abruptly after the Iranian revolution through the events of the hostage crisis which revealed the fragile nature of the US-imposed regional stability.

---

[186] Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War*, p. 219.
[187] Patterson, *Restless Giant*, p. 236.

Similarly, The United States succeeded, through its intervention in the October War, and its subsequent involvement in peace negotiations in accomplishing an Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement that was perceived as a major diplomatic victory for Washington. However, the American administration did not pay enough attention to *local-level* outrage which was increasing rapidly in the Egyptian society against 'peace process' and against President Sadat himself, equally important, U.S. diplomacy during and after the war favoured Israel in a way that hampered the emergence of viable stability in the region.

In the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush went to war to restore the status quo ante, but there were no sign that the regional system had gained any ability to self-stabilize in the face of future disturbances. The American intervention in the Gulf incorporated some simplistic features such as (1) coercion—the intervention included a massive use of power, (2) linearity—the American course of action during this intervention was based on a linear conviction that restoring the status quo ante would ensure regional stability, (3) reductionism—the US administration ignored the local-level interactions such as the domestic uprisings in north and south Iraq. It was evident that regime change on the back of a grassroots revolution was not what the US had in mind at least in this phase.

The only exception to the above grim picture was the case of US intervention in the Suez Crisis. The positive point about this case is that the American administration took into consideration, for the first time, the popular stance. There was an American concern about the adverse effect of an attack held by American allies on attitudes in the Arab and Muslim worlds towards the Americans and their interests in the region. This interest in local actors has caused the resultant stability to be stronger. The other good point in the American intervention of 1956 was that in this crisis Washington adopted a more balanced policy towards the conflicting parties, including its closest regional ally 'Israel'. This crisis represented the first time for a U.S. administration to pressure Israel to relinquish territorial gains (the Sinai desert). This balanced policy rendered the Middle East system in better equilibrium and cleverly de-escalated an international crisis.

Table 6.1 **Post-hoc Intervention**

	Immediate Cause	Immediate Outcome	Consequences
Intervention in Iran (1953)	The decision made by Iranian Prime Minister to nationalize the British Oil Company in 1951.	The American (secret) intervention managed to restore to power Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and restored the oil industry to foreign ownership, and ousted the democratically elected Prime Minister.	The American intervention managed to stabilize the Shah only ostensibly. The Shah regime showed serious incapability of coping with domestic challenges without external help. At the end of the day, the strong US regional ally was dramatically overthrown in 1979. On the other hand, the legacy of the American intervention aggravated anti-American features of the revolutionary movement that captured control of Iran and sponsored the hostage crisis.
Intervention in Suez Crisis (1956)	The tripartite attack on Egypt, after the decision made by Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal.	Under tremendous U.S. pressure, the Anglo-French powers withdrew their forces; the Israelis did likewise, though they remained in Sinai until March 1957.	Obsession with the Soviet intervention and concern about the adverse effect of an attack held by its allies on attitudes in the Arab and Muslim worlds towards the Americans and their interests in the region led the US to counter-intervene to curb the aggressors, including its closest regional ally 'Israel'. This balanced policy cleverly de-escalated an international crisis and rendered the Middle East system in a better equilibrium.
Intervention in October/Yom Kippur War (1973)	The attack made by Egypt and Syria against Israel. The American intervention in the October war was a prelude to a deeper involvement in the peace negotiations that followed.	The attack was reversed. Egypt was gradually dissociated away from its traditional ally, the Soviet Union, and consolidated from regional adventurer to regional stabilizer.	The American-guided settlement favoured Israel in a way that hampered the emergence of viable stability in the region and at the same time led to the isolation of Sadat's regime. The un-balanced terms of the settlement raised strong domestic opposition in Egypt. Many Egyptians were angry that Sadat had entered into an American-supervised agreement with Israel without consulting or involving other Arab nations. Sadat became deeply unpopular. He was viewed by wide sectors of the

			Egyptians as a "yes-man" to the United States. The drama ended up with the assassination of President Sadat, in the wake of his famous visit to Jerusalem.
Intervention in the Gulf (1991).	The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.	Kuwait was liberated and regional stability (in terms of a particular status quo) was restored.	The American intervention managed to restore a critical status quo. Not all the involved parties were satisfied with post-war arrangements. Regional situation remained tense and there was no evidence that the post-war arrangements were the best for system elements, nor was there any indication that the regional system gained the ability to cope with future disturbances after the American intervention. Maintaining an autocracy-based status quo was not a guarantee of attaining regional stability. This conclusion was further evidenced by the eruption of the domestic uprisings inside Iraq. These uprisings proved that the US was not prepared to deal with regional complexities. It was clear that a grassroots-driven change was not what the U.S. had in mind.

Chapter 7

Hegemonic Intervention

(Regime Change)

7.1   Introduction

The hegemonic model of intervention reflected US determination to use its military superiority to enforce stability and to punish any *rogue* state that failed to comply with US foreign policy preferences. In many cases, US decision makers saw their country as being in an appropriate position to forcefully intervene to disrupt the existing balance and to impose a new stability formula that favoured US interests. Hegemonic status was precisely the condition under which this kind of intervention surfaced and had an impact on the choices of different US administrations, because there was less constraint forced by the international system. Hegemony, according to John Agnew, refers to 'the mix of coercion and consent that allows a state to set the rules for political, economic, and military interaction and movement over space and through time.'[1] Hegemony is said to create stability by overawing potential rivals; any regime that is identified as a threat to the hegemon runs the risk of becoming a target for violent retribution.[2]

US hegemony mixes both the hard power of military capabilities with the soft power of democratic ideas and liberal institutions.[3] US military dominance is both absolute and relative. In absolute terms, 'the US has military capabilities that can supposedly defeat the adversary while its own forces are sheltered from the inherent dangers of war. In relative terms it is apparent that no other power can remotely match US power

---

[1] John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005).

[2] Adrian Little, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

[3] Robert J. Lieber, *The US Era, Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 33.

capabilities.'[4] On the other hand, it was under the banner of exporting the US values that Washington intervened in several countries to disrupt the existing balance and advance a new stability formula based on the US model of liberal democracy.

US strategy of hegemonic intervention stems from the argument that hegemon can be essentially benign and bring public goods to the world by providing collective security and economic prosperity. US hegemony, by this logic, assures not only a safer United States, but also a more stable/peaceful world. US hegemonic power is introduced as a tool necessary to manage international problems, and to change the world for the better. It justifies the exercise of intervention in the affairs of other states to promote values and concepts based on asymmetrical hierarchies in international relations, and the superiority and uniqueness of US model compared to most other models.[5]

During the Cold War era, the United States pursued this model of intervention when the international balance tilted in its favour. This had been the case during the 1980s, when the Reagan administration felt that the Soviets had become too weak to defend their clients and decided to consolidate the US influence in the countries that devolved to the Soviet orbit through a deliberate process of *regime change*.[6] In the early days of his first term, it appeared that President G. W. Bush, following a realist course of action, was determined to retreat from the interventionist foreign policy adopted by his predecessors. The events of 11 September 2001, however, led the American President to declare a new 'hegemonic' series of wars. A new 'Reaganite' logic reappeared in US foreign policy, linking democracy promotion directly to US interests, transforming US foreign policy

---

[4] Kanti Bajpai and Varun Sahni, "Hegemony and Strategic Choice," in Chandra Chari, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in A Globalized World: The Changing Balance Of Power in The Twenty First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 95.
[5] Joan Hoff, *A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, Dreams of Perfectibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008), p. 15
[6] The US administration managed to consolidate its influence in Panama, Nicaragua and Chile. In Africa, Ethiopia was snatched from the Marxist Mengistu Haile Mariam and Angola from Samora Machel. In the Middle East, Reagan tried to get rid of the Iranian revolutionist regime by supporting Saddam Hussein's eight-year-war. Reagan tried also to liquidate Muammar Gaddafi because of the anti Western tendency of the Libyan leader. He gave orders to carry out a number of military operations to topple Gaddafi. The United States used military force, sinking several Libyan patrol boats in the Gulf of Sidra and bombing Tripoli and other military sites in April 1986. See Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), pp. 174-175.

into one of global interventionism on a scale that was not seen since the height of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union.[7]

The Bush administration adopted the notion of "a balance of power that favours freedom," found in the September 2002 policy-planning document 'The National Security Strategy of the United States.'[8] This expression represented a call for global US military dominance, or an imbalance of power that "favoured" the United States especially in the Middle East.[9] According to this new approach President George W. Bush sought to reshape the political map in the Middle East by 'delivering it from despotism'.[10]

The fact that the 9/11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other authoritarian countries led to a revaluation of America's status quo-based strategy. It was concluded that maintaining the autocratic-based status quo was no longer a guarantee of stability in the Middle East. The main proponents of the new strategy of promoting 'hegemonic stability' included the neoconservative team in the Bush administration who advocated the argument that destabilizing the entire old despotic regimes would be a more direct route to weakening terrorism and stabilizing the Middle East (for the benefit of US interests in the region).[11]

Neoconservatism is a political ideology that glorifies the virtues of US hegemony—and sometimes even the idea of an US empire—and contends that US power should be used to encourage the spread of democracy and discourage potential rivals from even trying to pose a threat to the United States.[12] The neocons are linked to a network of think tanks,

---

[7] Paul Wilkinson, *International Relations: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), p. 31.

[8] The first reference to this strategy appeared in President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address, 2001, published in January 20, 2001.

[9] Andrew Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War", *Security Studies*, Vol.15, No. 2 (2006), pp. 310-352.

[10] See Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, November 6, 2003, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html

[11] John Brenkman, *The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy, Political Thought since September 11* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[12] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 129.

journals, and foundations. They actively developed their main idea in the 1990s, claiming that 'the US have come to take the fruits of their hegemonic power for granted' in the absence of 'a visible threat to US vital interests or to world peace'.[13]

Neoconservatives believe that America's democratic system ensures that it will be seen as a benign hegemon by most other countries, and that US leadership will be welcomed provided it is exercised decisively. They also believe that military force is an extremely useful tool for shaping the world in ways that will benefit America. 'If the United States demonstrates its military prowess and shows that it is willing to use the power at its disposal, then allies will follow US lead and potential adversaries will realize it is futile to resist and will decide to "bandwagon" with the United States.'[14]

Neoconservatives tend to be sceptical of international organizations (such as the UN, which they regard as a constraint on America's freedom of action) and wary of many US traditional allies (especially the Europeans, whom they see as free-riding on the Pax Americana).[15] They believe that US leadership is "good both for America and for the world," and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle".[16] 9/11 events gave them a golden opportunity to provide the White House with their own foreign-policy agenda which presented a radical departure from the traditional US commitment to preserving the 'status quo' arrangements.[17]

The Bush administration policies were consistent in many aspects with what neoconservatives were arguing, without regard to its practicability. Guided by the above ideas, the Bush administration inverted traditional U.S. strategy in the Middle East in a drastic fashion.[18] The new strategy rested on two *linear* beliefs: a) the best way to ensure U.S. security is by maximizing America's freedom to unilateral action, without

---

[13] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Toward a Neoreaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18- 32.
[14] Mearsheimer and Walt, *Israeli Lobby*, p.129
[15] For more elaboration on the neoconservative view of Europe see Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).
[16] Mearsheimer and Walt, *Israeli Lobby*, p.129
[17] Wilkinson, *International Relations A Very Short History*, p. 22
[18] Brenkman, *The Cultural Contradictions Of Democracy Political Thought*, p. 169.

depending on others for protection; and b) America should use its strength to replace (not to maintain) the status quo in the region.[19] This interventionist foreign policy was justified by claiming that 'because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were directed at targets in the United States; the U.S. government had the right to police the globe in pursuit of all those it decides may have a connection to future terrorism potentially directed at the United States.'[20]

Based on those two convictions the Bush administration gave up the US traditional commitment to preserving the 'status quo' arrangements[21] and intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq to topple the regimes and supervise the elections of pro-US governments in both cases. Bush vowed to spread liberty to every corner of the globe; his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, declared in a major 2005 speech in Cairo: "For 60 years, the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East—and we achieved neither."[22] From this standpoint, a hegemonic America served as responsible for reshaping new stability formula and was entitled to defend its primacy from both latent threats and open acts of defiance.[23]

The question addressed in this chapter is: has the shift from the traditional US strategy of preserving the status quo to that of hegemonic intervention been in the direction of a more dynamic form of stability? The answer that will be revealed by the end of the chapter is: not necessarily, because the new strategy, instead of allowing stability to emerge out of systems' local interactions, imposed it on system components in a forcible way. The "regime change" model, applied by the US in both Afghanistan and Iraq, inherits most of the shortcomings of the hegemonic strategy which include: simplicity— under-estimating the complexities of the concerned systems (ousting Taliban and Saddam Hussein would guarantee regional stability), reductionism—ignoring the role of local-actors in influencing system dynamics (chaos, insurgency, and the rise of anti-American

---

[19] Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: the Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings institute, 2003), p. 13.
[20] Agnew, *Hegemony*, p. 19.
[21] Robert Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29 (2006), pp. 7-19.
[22] Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest - American Realism for a New World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, (July/August, 2008), pp. 2-26.
[23] Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", p. 332.

sentiment), coercion—imposing stability by force and military occupation on other systems, and linearity—contending that massive power will automatically lead to decisive outcomes.

This strategy of "simplifying the complex" turned out to be workable only in terms of attaining some sort of political hegemony, however, the dangers of such a strategy included an increase in public disaffection and antagonism against the US as domestic stability was accompanied by US occupation. In the following, I will illustrate two cases in which this pattern was adopted; namely, (1) the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and (2) the invasion of Iraq (2003). It will be shown that the occupation of both countries and the associated harms (torture, excessive force, extraordinary chaos, etc.) have caused demonstrable increase in anti-Americanism.

7.2   Intervention in Afghanistan (2001-?)

Summary

The core of this operation was the military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda organization, but it also included a wide range of special operations missions. The campaign was launched after al-Qaeda members had conducted dramatic assaults on Washington, D.C., and New York City on September 11, 2001, killing some 3,000 people. These terrorist attacks made Americans acutely conscious of a vulnerability that they had only been slightly aware of before.[24] President George W. Bush responded by ordering the US invasion of Afghanistan to depose the Taliban regime which had provided shelter to al-Qaeda's founder the Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden. A US-led coalition, consisting mainly of US Air and Special Forces, allied to anti-Taliban elements known as the Northern Alliance within Afghanistan,[25] succeeded in retaking most of Afghanistan from the Taliban regime during the coded-name operation

---

[24] William B. Quandt, *Peace Process, US Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and University of California Press, 2005), p. 393.
[25] Also known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF).

Enduring Freedom.[26] This Operation began on 7 October 2001, with the launch of air strikes and cruise missile attacks on the Taliban regime, and officially ended on 2 May 2003. However, at the end of the time-frame explored in this thesis (2008), the insurgency movement was still able to strike and the Afghani pro-US government was still unable to control the country.[27] It could be concluded that stability remained a far-fetched target for both the Americans and their loyal government in Afghanistan.

Historical Background

Following the Gulf War (1991), a Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden, was enraged by the stationing of US troops on Saudi soil. On religious grounds, he denounced Saudi Arabia's dependence on the US military, and offered King Fahd of Arabia help to defend the kingdom with his mujahideen. The Saudi rulers refused his proposal, and, fearing his increasing militancy, they forced him to leave the kingdom in 1992 and stripped him of his citizenship in 1994. Bin Laden lived in the Sudan from 1992 to 1996, when, after pressure from the Khartoum government, he left for Afghanistan[28] which was then under the control of the Taliban regime.[29]

Having identified the United States as the principal backer of Israel and secular despotic rulers, bin Laden held America responsible for the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, and in almost everywhere else. From Afghanistan, Bin Laden embarked on a universal campaign against US interests and targets around the world. The campaign included: the suicide bombing of the Khoper military tower in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; the attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998; the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, in 2000. The decisive blow, however, came on September 11, 2001, when 19 al-Qaeda members hijacked commercial airliners and crashed them into the World

---

[26] Previously known as 'Operation Infinite Justice,' but this name was discarded on religious grounds. See Michael Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and US Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), p. 11.

[27] Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), p. 6, Beverley Milton-Edwards, Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 122.

[28] William L. Cleveland, Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009), 4th edition, p. 202.

[29] Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 2.

Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The attacks killed 2,657 Americans and 316 foreign nationals. A few days after the attack, US officials concluded that bin Laden had master-minded it. Because he and his al-Qaeda network had settled in Afghanistan with the full support of the Taliban, Afghanistan became the immediate target of a potential military response.[30]

From 1994 to 1998, the United States supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite, and a possible pro-Western ally. The United States provided an estimated $113 million in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in 2000 and a comparable sum in 2001 prior to September 11. This huge amount of humanitarian aid helped to prop up the Taliban regime. US support of the Taliban was envisaged to be a vehicle of sustained and directed US involvement in the region.[31] With the advent of the Bush administration in 2001, President Bush greatly expanded US efforts to come to terms with the Taliban on the issues of oil and terrorism. US officials conducted extensive negotiations with Taliban diplomatic representatives, meeting several times in Washington, Berlin, and Islamabad. But the Taliban balked at any pipeline deal. US negotiations with the Taliban broke down in August after a US negotiator threatened military action against the Taliban, telling them to accept the US offer of "a carpet of gold, or you'll get a carpet of bombs."[32]

Evidence indicated that United States policy was considering military action, in cooperation with other countries, to remove the Taliban regime if negotiations failed.[33] The September 11 attacks provided the United States with the golden opportunity to intervene in Afghanistan on a major scale and thus go far to achieve its hegemonic goal

[30] Fred I. Greenstein, *The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 122, Carol K. Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 155, Spencer C. Tucker, (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History, Vol. 2* (California: ABC- CLIO, Inc., 2008), p. 491. William Engdahl, *A Century of War: Anglo-US Oil Politics and the New World Order* (London, Pluto Press, 2004), p. 253.

[31] Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, *The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked, September 11th, 2001* (California, Tree of Life Publications, 2002), p. 44

[32] Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008), p. 134.

[33] Ibid.

in the region. Achieving such a goal, according to Stephen Sniegoski, required more than just ousting the Taliban regime but also using US power to impose a new stability formula in the region. 'The United States did the first, but any effort at establishing stability in Afghanistan was irretrievably undermined by the shortcomings that resulted from the War.'[34]

On September 17, Bush met with his advisers and signed a memorandum outlining plans for war against Afghanistan. The memorandum adopted a multidimensional strategy that included (1) leading a worldwide effort to freeze the financial assets of more than sixty organizations with alleged links to al-Qaeda, (2) pressuring Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the UAE (the only three countries to have recognized the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan) into breaking off diplomatic relations, and (3) supporting members of the Northern Alliance with US ground and air forces in a military operation designed to capture or kill bin Laden and al-Qaeda leadership.[35]

On September 20, Bush appeared before Congress and formally accused al-Qaeda of carrying out the attacks. He demanded that the Taliban government of Afghanistan surrender members of al-Qaeda in their country or face retribution.[36] In his speech, Bush warned the US people that they would face a lengthy war against terrorism. He also spoke to nations around the world, saying they had a decision to make: either they were with the United States or they were with the terrorists.[37] The American President declared a war that would not end 'until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.'[38]

When the Taliban refused to turn over bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda members operating on Afghan soil, the Bush administration added the removal of the Taliban regime to its objectives. The problem that faced the administration was that the Pentagon had no detailed plans for invading Afghanistan, which was not classified as one of the

---

[34] Ibid.
[35] Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism*, p. 156.
[36] Greenstein, *The George W. Bush Presidency*, p. 123, Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p. 105.
[37] Veda Boyd Jones, *Modern World Leaders, George W. Bush* (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), p. 101.
[38] Congressional Record, V. 148, Pt. 13, September 20, 2002 to October 1, 2002

rogue states.[39] George Tenet, the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, proposed that CIA and Special Operations forces provide direct support to the Northern Alliance, the main Afghan opposition forces, and any other Afghan warlords seeking to overthrow the Taliban regime.[40]

On October 7, US and British forces began a military campaign designed to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al-Qaeda's sanctuary.[41] Some other countries offered assistance to the US. Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5), which declares that 'an attack on one member state is an attack on all members.' In addition, the organization of US States and the Australia–New Zealand–United States treaty also activated defensive clauses. Some 500 special forces and Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary officers attacked Taliban strongholds around Kabul and other major cities in partnership with fighters of the indigenous Northern Alliance and other opposition forces, which had long resisted Taliban authority.[42]

On November 9, the first major Taliban stronghold in the north, Mazar-i-Sharif, fell, providing control of major highways and two airports. The fall of this strategic town caused the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces to rapidly collapse. Within four days (November 13) the capital of Kabul was captured by indigenous forces with heavy US support. Meanwhile, anti-Taliban tribes rose in rebellion in the southern areas of Afghanistan, and conventional forces were deployed. By December 17, the last cave complex had been taken and their defenders overrun. The Northern Alliance forces took control of all of

---

[39] It is especially interesting that the Taliban regime, against which the United States waged a full-scale war because it harboured Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda training camps, did not make the rogue list prepared by the U.S. State Department before the events of September 11, 2001, not even the list of states sponsoring terrorism. This raises complex questions about the nature of the standard by which the United States classified regimes as rogue or friendly. See Miroslav Nincic, *Renegade Regimes: Confronting Deviant Behaviour in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 12.

[40] Greenstein, *The George W. Bush presidency*, p. 122. However, there was a degree of US wariness about getting too tied to the Northern Alliance and the ambitions of its constituent warlords. The best-known of its leaders, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was murdered by bin Laden's agents just two days before 9/11. In addition to their dubious histories, the remaining warlords were Uzbeks and Tajiks and not Pashtuns, and thus unacceptable to the majority of the Afghani population, and certainly the Pakistanis. See Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 389.

[41] Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism*, p. 156.

[42] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 4.

Afghanistan's major cities. Indeed, the US managed to overthrow the Taliban regime within the strategic framework of massive air power and minimal commitment of ground troops only because the militias of the Northern Alliance could be relied on to do the heavy fighting.[43]

After the end of the hostilities, it the Taliban and al-Qaeda were defeated; however, as later history was to show, they were not routed.[44] The second man of al-Qaeda organization, Ayman al-Zawahiri, said later that 'rather than being defeated, as the Americans claimed, the Taliban had simply fallen back to the villages and the mountains, where the real power is.'[45] Most of al-Qaeda leaders remained at large, probably in the remote tribal mountains area along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The Taliban fighters had not given up; they gradually regained their confidence and regrouped in the mountains. The fighters established sanctuaries among tribal protectors in Pakistan from which they began launching cross-border raids on US forces. They used 'hit and run' tactics, opening fire on the US and Afghan forces and then retreating back into their caves and bunkers in a style similar to that of the Mujahideen who battled Soviet forces during the 1980s.[46]

Evaluation

A simplistic black-and-white understanding of international politics blurred the Bush administration in its handling of the September 11 crisis. This position was typified by the US president's oft-cited warning to other countries after the attacks: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[47] From the beginning, President Bush vowed to

---

[43] See Brenkman, *The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy Political Thought*, p. 40, Daalder and Lindsay, *The G. Bush Presidency*, p. 11, Tucker, *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 491, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, pp. 4, 30-31, Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 548, Greenstein, *The George W. Bush Presidency*, p. 123, Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, p. 122.

[44] Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 236.

[45] Gilles Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of The Middle East*, Translated By Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 123.

[46] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), p. 111.

[47] President G. W. Bush, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the US People, September 20, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

find the culprits and bring them to justice. In his speech on the evening of September 11 he said that the United States would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them."[48] The US would "go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world."[49] The following day, he adopted the language of war. In the war on terror, President Bush proclaimed, "you are either for us or against us,"[50] "it is a battle of good against evil, and America would rally the world."[51]

Andrew Flibbert rightly notices that, the president's invocation of these ideas was not merely a rhetorical effort to mobilize Americans' support for war in Iraq, or a rationalization hiding other motives. 'Unlike his father during the Gulf War George W. Bush appeared to believe his own stark depiction of an US battle with the forces of darkness.'[52] The president declared shortly after September 11, "We will rid the world of evil-doers"[53] in "this crusade, this war on terrorism."[54] President Bush's harsh declarations had caused the US foreign policy to retreat to the simplicity of Cold War notions.[55] The idea that every nation must take sides between America and "a mighty coalition of civilized nations,"[56] on one hand, or the "terrorists" and their "rogue hosts", on the other 'caused a Manichean sense of right and wrong that shaped the Bush administration's definition of threats to US interests afterwards.'[57]

The "with us or against us" simplistic framing of the war on terror had catastrophic implications. A 2003 survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project showed that

---

[48] Bush addresses Nation, 12 September 2001, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1539328.stm
[49] Ibid.
[50] President Welcomes President Chirac to White House, 6 November 2001, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html
[51] President George W. Bush, in an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
[52] Flibbert, 'The Road to Baghdad, pp. 310 — 352.
[53] Remarks by the President Upon Arrival, 16 September 2001, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html
[54] Ibid.
[55] Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Complexity and Conflict Resolution" in Neil E. Harrison, (ed.), Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
[56] Remarks by the President on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th Attacks11 March 2002, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html
[57] Michael Hirsh, At War with Ourselves, Why America is Squandering its Chance to Build a Better World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 57.

the United States had lost a propaganda war for the hearts and minds of millions of Arabs spurred by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon. President George W. Bush's strident declaration had alienated many US Arabs and Muslims, who feel threatened and victimized by governmental security services. According to Robert Singh what was self-evident to the Bush administration seemed simplistic to many non-Americans.[58]

Another feature of simplicity was represented by US reliance on coercion to promote its model of stability. The massive air power of the United States succeeded in ousting Taliban from power in Afghanistan and disrupted al-Qaeda networks, yet a review of the evidence suggested that the war's broader objectives had by no means been achieved. At the end of the time-frame explored in this thesis (2008), stability was still a remote prospect.[59] Afghanistan was still an unstable country, unable to handle its domestic problems and unfit to serve US interests in the region. There was much evidence for reaching such a conclusion, such as: the massive civilian causalities, the fragile pro-Western Afghani government, and the continued movement of insurgency, to name but a few.

- **Massive Civilian Casualties**

There are no official statistics for the overall number of innocent civilians killed by the war which was launched to oust the Taliban regime. However, estimates for specific years or periods have been published by a number of organizations.[60] The invasion of Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians directly from military action, as well as the deaths of possibly tens of thousands of Afghan civilians indirectly as a consequence of displacement, disease and exposure, lack of medical treatment, and crime and lawlessness resulting from the war. Because humanitarian assistance was

---

[58] Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, (eds.), *The Rise of Anti-USism* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 36.

[59] See Noam Chomsky, *Pirates and Emperors: Old and New International terrorism in the Real World* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002), p. 12.

[60] See for examples: http://wikileaks.org/, Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan, Civilian Deaths From Airstrikes at: http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/09/08/afghan19766.htm, Humanitarian News and Analysis (IRIN) AFGHANISTAN: UNAMA raps new report by rights watchdog http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82502

disrupted by US military strikes, millions of Afghans were at grave risk of starvation.[61] Very few people in Afghanistan had been unaffected by the armed conflict there.

The issue of civilian casualties was recognized as a problem at the highest levels of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command. In a September 2009 report, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of ISAF, wrote: 'civilian casualties and collateral damage to homes and property resulting from an over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged ISAF's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.'[62] Failure of the United States to avert this humanitarian crisis caused anti-U.S. sentiment to increase among local actors, while helped anti-US elements to influence public opinion in neighbouring Pakistan and in other parts of the Muslim world.[63]

- **Fragile Pro-Western Government**

The Afghanistan War produced a weak national government, unable to self-stabilize without US help. After the war, the United Nations sponsored talks among Afghan factions in Bonn, Germany, leading to the signing on 5 December of an agreement to write a new constitution for the country, appoint a transitional government and hold elections by 2004. On 22 December 2001, an interim, coalition government was inaugurated. The new government was led by exiled resistance leader Hamid Karzai.

In June 2002, the Grand Council of Afghanistan agreed on blueprints for a new government, and Karzai was appointed interim president. The Afghan people elected Karzai president in a national election in October 2004.[64] Despite his 'election' as president of Afghanistan, Karzai has been relying entirely on the US forces located in his

---

[61] Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Winter 2001/02), pp. 79-93.
[62] COMISAF Initial Assessment, *The Washington Post*, 21 September 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.
[63] Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia", pp. 79-93.
[64] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 4

country,[65] he proved unable to achieve control over all the country, and remnants of the deposed Taliban regime continued military resistance against the government in Kabul.[66]

On April 27, 2008, a few months before his re-election for a second term, President Karzai barely escaped an assassination attempt at a military parade in Kabul. This operation was a reminder of the capacity of revamped Taliban groups to strike at the heart of the pro-Western Afghan government and a sobering sign of the military and political weakness of the Karzai government.[67] The continued reliance of the Afghani government on the US presence and the inability of the 'elected' pro-US regime offered a fresh evidence for the fragility of his regime and confirmed the negative side-effects of the US strategy of hegemonic stability pursued in Afghanistan.

- **Failure in Defeating the Taliban**

While US-led coalition forces managed to overthrow the Taliban 'regime' in a relatively short period of time, they failed to defeat neither the Taliban ideology nor the Taliban affiliates. A Taliban-led insurgency continued in Afghanistan after Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld declared an end to major combat operations on 2 May 2003. Shortly after the occupation of Afghanistan, the Taliban fighters managed to regroup and began the first of several rounds of fighting with the coalition forces. The very fact that foreign troops continued to occupy Afghanistan provided a rallying cry for the local resistance, facilitating al-Qaeda leadership's efforts to attract dedicated recruits to its mission.[68] Columnist Maureen Dowd captured the frustration: 'We're sophisticated; they're crude. We're millennial; they're medieval. We ride B-52's; they ride horses. And yet they're out-manoeuvring us.'[69]

---

[65] Lieber, *The US Era*, p. 21.
[66] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, pp. 4, 34.
[67] Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom*, p. 18.
[68] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 562.
[69] Maureen Dowd, "That Yankee Music," *New York Times*, 4 November 2001, quoted in Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 389.

The US approach of imposing stability by force in the Afghani case ignored the role of local actors in influencing the development of such a complex system.[70] Observers started to use the word 'quagmire' and made comparisons with Vietnam.[71] Afghanistan's long-term political stability remained uncertain.[72] In November, 2009, Malalai Joya, a former member of the Afghan Parliament and now an activist and a dissident, revealed the multiple concerns for the future of Afghanistan in her book 'Raising My Voice'. According to Joya, the Afghani people are crushed between two powerful enemies. From the sky, occupation forces bomb and kill civilians and on the ground, the warlords continue their attacks, 'it is better that they leave my country; my people are that fed up. Occupation will never bring liberation, and it is impossible to bring democracy by war.'[73]

It can be concluded that the September 11 attacks provided the United States with a pretext to intervene in Afghanistan on a major scale to achieve stability. However, achieving such a goal was undermined by the simplicity of the model of intervention applied. This simplicity was manifested through many shortcomings, such as: 1) under-estimating the complexities of the Afghani social and cultural system, 2) ignoring the role of local-actors in influencing the development of the Afghani system, and 3) imposing stability by force and military occupation which lasted till the time of this writing.[74]

The Afghani system represented a complex system and as such it could not be stabilized through simplistic strategies (strategies based on top-down, forcible and reductionist methods). Following complexity theory notions,[75] stability is an emerging property;[76] it evolves dynamically through free interactions among system (most often, local) components. In this view, stability in the Afghani system can best be achieved in a

---

[70] Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010).
[71] Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 391.
[72] Greenstein, *The George W. Bush Presidency*, p. 125.
[73] See Malalai Joya, *Raising My Voice* (London: Random House, 2010), a book Review by Mike Whitney at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16524
[74] Ibid.
[75] To be illustrated in the next chapter
[76] In the context of complexity theory, 'emergence' can be defined as: 'the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems. See Peter A. Corning, "The Re-Emergence of 'Emergence', A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory," *Complexity*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2002), pp. 18-30, at:
http://www.complexsystems.org/publications/pdf/emergence3.pdf

bottom-up style. But as the above case illustrated the Bush administration had dealt with the Afghani case as a simple rather than a complex system and this was responsible for a considerable amount of the instabilities that followed the American intervention.

7.3   Intervention in Iraq (2003-?)

Summary

Proceeding from a linear perception of regional stability, the United States launched a comprehensive war against Iraq to *impose* a new stability formula in the region in the context of the 'war on terrorism'. Washington's approach to achieve this target was simplistic in nature; overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein and supervising the election of a more co-operative regime. As far as the definition of dynamic stability—based on system's self-ability to cope with subsequent disturbances, is concerned; the US intervention was counterproductive. In sharp contrast to the quick military victory, the US occupation of Iraq presented the region with further instability and the Americans with serious problems. Iraq experienced a wave of chaos and looting, and the invaders encountered a massive insurgency that killed more Americans than the initial combat and eroded public support for the ongoing US war on "terrorism."[77] More important, a growing Islamic antagonism directed at the US all over the world, and a strong domestic opposition to the decision of war raised the costs of the conflict, including military operations, the occupation, reconstruction and economic assistance. At the end of the time-frame explored in this thesis (2008) it was risky to judge that the system that emerged out of the US intervention in Iraq would be able to deal with existing and potential sources of turmoil in post-Saddam Iraq. Evidence showed that stability, in terms of system's self-ability to accommodate disturbances, would remain an elusive target in the short and medium run, in light of the growing Iraqi resistance to the U.S. occupation and the shaky political system that had resulted from it.

---

[77] See Tom Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War* (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), p. 143, Paul Rogers, *A War Too Far: Iraq, Iran and the New US Century* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. viii, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 76.

Historical Background

The Iraq War in 2003 was one of the most controversial military conflicts initiated by the United States in the Middle East and elsewhere. Depending on just some unconfirmed evidences, the Bush administration turned its attention after Afghanistan towards Iraq. Although it was expected that the US would pursue the perpetrators of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the Bush administration chose to invade and occupy a country that had hardly anything to do with the assault.[78]

Immediately after the events of September 11, Bush and his advisers met to consider their options. It was clear to them that bin Laden and his organization al-Qaeda were responsible for the attacks. So an obvious first step was to go after bin Laden, but some within the Bush administration—especially Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz at the Department of Defence—argued that Iraq should also be targeted.[79] The president accepted this proposition and prompted his counterterrorism coordinator to look for a link between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist attacks.

At National Security Council meetings shortly thereafter, Bush reportedly declared, "Many believe Saddam is involved [. . .] He probably was behind this in the end." Again on 29 January 2002 the US President identified, in State of the Union address,[80] Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as part of an 'axis of evil' that sought to destabilize the global order (disrupt the status quo).[81] In this address, Bush began redirecting national attention from al-Qaeda to a newly *rogue states* and contemplated a pre-emption doctrine (later known as the Bush Doctrine)[82] and warned that these rogue states might face military

[78] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 229.

[79] Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 393.

[80] President Delivers State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html

[81] Bob Woodward, *Bush at war* (New York: Thorndike Press, 2003), p. 283.

[82] The Bush Doctrine was enunciated in a single speech, delivered to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. It was then clarified and elaborated in three subsequent statements: Bush's first State of the Union address on January 29, 2002; his speech to the graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1, 2002; and the remarks on the Middle East he delivered three weeks later, on June 24. It includes assurances of the US readiness to using military force in a unilateral pre-emptive way; it also included the idea that every nation must take sid between America and 'a mighty coalition of civilized nations', on one hand, or the terrorists and their rogue hosts, on the other. The Bush Doctrine 'may have been declared in the wake of 9/11, but the intellectual groundwork for it was laid years before by the

strikes, unilaterally if necessary, as a means to prevent imminent attacks on the United States. Bush concurrently authorized increased covert operations to destabilize the Saddam regime in accordance with the Iraq Liberation Act.[83] Fourteen months later, the commander in chief ordered an unprecedented invasion of Iraq, setting in motion the single most important foreign policy initiative of his first term in office.[84]

Preparation for the War

The Iraq war was launched with bipartisan congressional approval and substantial domestic support, but it remained problematic on the international level.[85] The US President did not succeed in getting a UN resolution to allow for using force to attack Iraq. Most of the permanent members of the Security Council refused to accept the US story of the Iraqi connections to al-Qaeda. With French and German support, Russia announced that it would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.[86] Blocked at the UN, Bush asserted that Washington did not need a new resolution, since Resolution 1441 (issued on November 8, 2002) already allowed action 'if Iraq did not comply with previous UN decisions and readmit weapons inspectors.'[87]

Domestically, President Bush and his neo-conservative advisers managed to build a public case for war against Iraq; Bush convinced most of the Americans that the Iraqi leader possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that Saddam had been

editors, pundits, academics, and think tank denizens who call themselves – and are now widely recognized as –neoconservatives'. See Hoff, *A Faustian Foreign Policy*, p. 168, Gary Rosen, *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 1, Hirsh, *At War with Ourselves*, p. 57.

[83] The Iraq Liberation Act was signed by President Clinton in September 1998, the act called for the United States 'to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein,' the administration allocated $97 million for subsidizing and training Iraqi political opposition, principally the Iraqi National Congress, and direct operational military support for opposition forces was stepped up again in the late 1990s. In 2001 a further $50 million was given to anti-regime forces and the United States began to engage more strongly in organizing the fractious set of Iraqi opposition movements. See William R. Polk, *Understanding Iraq, A Whistlestop Tour from Ancient Babylon to Occupied Baghdad* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005), p. 161Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 101, Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 143, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 76.

[84] Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", pp. 310 — 352.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, pp. 144, 145.

[87] See: Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement

involved in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.[88] In his second State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, he described the kinds of WMDs Saddam possessed, spoke of his efforts to buy uranium in Africa and accused him of harbouring al-Qaeda terrorists.[89] By the time of the invasion in March 2003, public opinion polls showed that most of the public actually thought that Hussein had been involved in the September 11 attack.[90] Other polls suggested that 59 per cent of the Americans endorsed the Bush administration's position that Saddam Hussein intended to produce WMDs. [91]

Secretary of State Powell was ordered to try again to win UN support for military action against Saddam. On 5 February 2003 he made his now infamous speech, replete with US reconnaissance photographs of alleged Iraqi weapons facilities, asserting that Saddam was on the verge of developing nuclear capabilities.[92] Powell's task was to demonstrate that the case against Iraq held up, despite the growing doubts, and that the inspectors were being fooled.[93]

The Bush administration then initiated a diplomatic campaign to gather international support for military action to overthrow Saddam, based on the 'coalition of the willing' that it had formed in 'Operation Enduring Freedom'. The US-led coalition had 315,000 troops, including 45,000 British, 2,000 Australian, and 200 Polish troops. In addition, Spain and Denmark fielded soldiers who provided support but did not participate in combat.[94]

On 16 March 2003, Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Portuguese Prime Minister José-Manuel Durão Barroso held a press conference in which they demanded Iraqi compliance. On 18 March 2003, the US President issued an ultimatum to Hussein

---

[88] Wilkinson, *International Relations: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 20.
[89] State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003, available at:
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
[90] Dean Baker, *The United States Since 1980* (New York: Cambridge, 2007), p. 179.
[91] O'Connor, Griffiths, *The Rise of Anti-USism*, p. 181.
[92] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 464, Speech of secretary of state Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/powelltext_020503.html
[93] Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 252.
[94] Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 145.

that he must leave Iraq within 48 hours or face the wrath of the US military.[95] Hussein defied the ultimatum and the 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was set into motion on 20 March.[96]

The United States and its coalition partners' forces opened their campaign against Iraq with massive air strikes directed against military and political targets throughout the country. The following day, ground forces went on the offensive and scattered the Iraqi army. On 9 April, US forces captured Baghdad, Much of the Republican Guard in which Saddam placed his trust ran away in the face of US firepower. Having captured the Iraqi capital, the Americans pressed on to overrun the rest of Iraq. On 13 April, Tikrit, the last major Iraqi stronghold, was overrun. Saddam and the regime's senior leadership went into hiding.[97]

On 1 May, aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, Bush declared an end to major combat operations and proudly proclaimed victory.[98] Saddam Hussein remained at large until 13 December 2003, when a US Army patrol discovered him hiding in a crude cellar on a farm near Tikrit. He was tried and convicted in an Iraqi court for crimes against humanity and crimes against the Iraqi people, and hanged on 30 December 2006.[99]

Causes of Intervention

The most fundamental question following the above illustration is: how did the Bush administration justify its invasion of Iraq? The Bush administration eventually offered several distinct justifications for its military intervention in Iraq, shifting emphasis over time but retaining common elements; first, the 'fact' that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was in the process of building more, second, that Iraq was 'linked' to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and third, that Iraq was a tyrannical dictatorship

---

[95] Bush Ultimatum to Saddam, March 18, 2003, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2859269.stm
[96] Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 145.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Karen De Young, "Bush Proclaims Victory," *Washington Post*, 2 May 2003.
[99] Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 65.

from which the Iraqi people deserved to be liberated.[100] The next section discusses, briefly, the validity of the three arguments.

- **Stop WMD proliferation**

Although the September 11 attacks did not include the use of any WMDs, the neo-conservative team within the Bush administration adopted the idea that 'Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to use them against other countries.'[101] Should these programs reached fruition, they assumed, the safety of US troops in the region, of friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil would all be put at danger and even if he did not use such weapons himself then there was the possibility that he would pass them on to terrorists who would attack America or its allies. The Bush administration sought, according to Lee Marsden,

> any scrap of information that would confirm their hypothesis. Using information from Iraqi defectors, anxious to impress their new benefactors, and from intelligence services, eager to deliver what their employers were looking for, misinformation was accumulated and manipulated in briefings, documents and UN briefings in an attempt to bypass international law, which rules out regime change.[102]

Some pieces of the collected evidence turned out not to be an intelligence report but 'a class paper by a British graduate student examining Iraq's ability to process weapons of mass destruction.'[103] Building upon this controversial substantiation, the pro-war team managed to build support for military action to 'overthrow the Iraqi leader and, in the

---

[100] Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative* (Surrey: Legacy Publishing Ltd., 2007), p. 78.
[101] Rosen, *The Right War.*
[102] Lee Marsden, *For God's Sake, The Christian Right and the US Foreign Policy* (London: Zed Books, 2006), p. 226.
[103] Baker, *The United States Since 1980,* p. 180.

271

meantime, conduct sharp military responses to his violations of the sanctions imposed against his regime.'[104]

President Bush highlighted the implications of this assessment on many occasions. In his 2002 State of the Union address, the president declared, 'We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.'[105] He continued, 'The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.'[106] '[rogue] states [...] and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.'[107]

However, the above accusations were difficult to reconcile with the United States' past support for Iraq. The United States backed Iraq during the 1980s—when Saddam was gassing Kurds and Iranians—and helped Iraq use chemical weapons more effectively by providing it with satellite imagery of Iranian troop positions. The Reagan administration also facilitated Iraq's efforts to develop biological weapons by allowing Baghdad to import disease-producing biological materials such as anthrax, West Nile virus, and botulinal toxin.[108] A central figure in the effort to court Iraq was US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was then President Ronald Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East. He visited Baghdad and met with Saddam in 1983, with the explicit aim of fostering better relations between the United States and Iraq. Moreover, in October 1989, about a year after Saddam gassed the Kurds, President George H. W. Bush signed a formal national security directive declaring that "normal relations between the United States and

---

[104] Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), pp. 313, 314.

[105] The President's State of the Union Address, 29 January, 2002, at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid., see also Jeremy Pressman, "Power without Influence," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009), pp. 149–179.

[108] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2003).

Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East."[109]

In any case, after the US occupation it was revealed that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons or even an active program to develop them. UN inspections, during the 1990s, had managed to eliminate Iraq's nuclear program and eventually led Saddam to destroy his biological and chemical weapons stockpiles as well. The absence of any evidence of weapons of mass destruction undermined the credibility of the Bush administration's justification for the attack and made his decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, thus, difficult to fathom.[110] Hussein, according to specialists, 'was clearly a brutal tyrant with worrisome ambitions—including a desire to obtain WMD—but his own incompetence had put these dangerous objectives out of reach.'[111] The Bush administration had reacted to the absence of WMDs in Iraq by using an ex-post rationale according to which lack of possession of WMDs did not 'prove' that Saddam Hussein did not intend to acquire them if he was given an opportunity to do so.[112]

- **Iraq-Al-Qaeda's Virtual Link**

Following the attack of September 11, the neoconservative team within the Bush administration, serving, according to William R. Polk, a previous agenda,[113] encouraged the belief that there were certain ties between al-Qaeda and the regime of Saddam Hussein. This argument became, then, a favourite topic for debate within the intelligence community.[114] In September 2002, an intelligence briefing entitled 'Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda'[115] was presented in the White House. Relying on what they described as 'good intelligence', the briefers concluded (1) that the religious terrorist network was working hand in hand with the secular Iraqi regime according to a

---

[109] Ibid.
[110] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 246.
[111] Ibid.
[112] O'Connor and Griffiths, (eds.), *The Rise of Anti-USism*, p. 81.
[113] According to William Polk, the neo-conservatives used the emotional reaction to the al-Qaeda attack to implement their program of attacking Iraq. Effecting a 'regime change' in Iraq was secretly adopted as US policy the day after al-Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001, and was openly espoused by 2002, Polk, *Understanding Iraq*, p. 167.
[114] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, p. 89.
[115] Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/04/feithslides.pdf

mature and symbiotic relationship, (2) that there were 'multiple areas of cooperation' between the two, (3) that both shared an interest in pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and (4) that there were 'some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al-Qaeda specifically related to 9/11.'[116] After announcing the end of major combat operations in May 2003, the US officials intensified their affirmation of a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda; President Bush declared that 'the liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al-Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding.'[117]

The fact that bin Laden and Saddam both were Sunni Muslim Arabs who defined themselves politically by their opposition to the United States, have ostensibly reinforced the fragile view of administration officials.[118] But the main evidence that proponents of a link between Hussein and bin Laden put forward hinged largely on an alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta, the leader of the September 11 hijackers, and Iraqi intelligence agents in the Czech Republic. Most intelligence experts, however, believe that such a meeting never took place.[119] Furthermore, the information available on the alleged relations between Saddam and al-Qaeda are not trusted. Charlie Savage claimed that torture had been employed on some Islamists to eviscerate their recognition of the existence of these relations. One of the examples he mentioned was that of a Libyan trainer for al-Qaeda named Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libbi. CIA interrogators believed that he might have information of al-Qaeda involvement with the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein. al-Libbi protested that he knew of no Iraq connection. al-Libbi was then subjected to increasingly harsh abuse for several weeks. Seeking to please his interrogators, al-Libbi told them what they wanted to hear, admitting that Iraq had offered to train al-Qaeda operatives in chemical and biological weapons. Al-Libbi's statements became a key basis of the Bush administration's claim and in Secretary of State Colin Powell's pre-war United Nations Security Council presentation.[120] But even if we assume

[116] Charlie Savage, *Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of US Democracy* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007), p. 219.
[117] Remarks by President George W. Bush from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, at Sea off the coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003. White House transcript.
[118] Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", pp. 310-352, 339
[119] Baker, *The United States Since 1980*, p. 179.
[120] Savage, *Takeover*, p. 219.

the correctness of the previous evidence on the alleged contacts, the mere existence of such contacts, as Francis Fukuyama puts it, does not prove that there was substantive collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda, that Iraq planned the September 11 attacks, or that Iraq would donate WMD to al-Qaeda.[121]

Moreover, when Iraq was invaded in March 2003, no convincing links between Saddam and Osama bin Laden were discovered. US-Middle East experts ridiculed any connection on the grounds of mistrust and incompatible ideologies.[122] 'Iraq was a hostile regime for al-Qaeda. Saddam Hussein was ideologically and politically the kind of leader that bin Laden and his followers hate.'[123] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States – commonly known as the '9.11 Commission' –concluded that Mohammed Atta, leader of the attacks, was convinced that Saddam was an enemy and 'a stooge' of the Bush administration.[124] Mearsheimer and Walt correctly noticed that:

> The lack of evidence of any genuine connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda is not surprising because relations between Saddam and al-Qaeda have been quite poor in the past. Osama bin Laden is a radical fundamentalist (like Khomeini), and he detests secular leaders like Saddam. Similarly, Saddam has consistently repressed fundamentalist movements within Iraq. Given this history of enmity, the Iraqi dictator is unlikely to give al-Qaeda nuclear weapons, which it might use in ways he could not control.[125]

Ironically, however, after the invasion what the United States was afraid of happened in reality. Iraq was steadily infiltrated by al-Qaeda fighters bent on harming US interests wherever and however possible.[126] Many elements of al-Qaeda moved to the Iraqi territory, and a lot of Iraqis adopted the ideology of the radical organization. Al-Qaeda leadership perceived that the US invasion of Iraq would be a replication of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Resources and fighters were concentrated in Iraq following the

---

[121] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads,* p. 89.
[122] Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations,* p. 462.
[123] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby,* p. 229.
[124] 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 61, 161.
[125] Mearsheimer and Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy.*
[126] Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War* (California: University of California Press, 2005), p. 209.

US invasion. Meanwhile, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966–2005), a Jordanian militant who ran a paramilitary training camp in Afghanistan, merged his fighters with al-Qaeda in 2004 and emerged as the Emir (leader) of al-Qaeda organization in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi oversaw a dramatic increase in the use of suicide attacks on Iraqi civilian and governmental targets as a means to undermine the pro-US government. After he was assassinated during an US attack on 7 June 2006, Al-Zarqawi was quickly replaced by Abu Ayyub al-Masri (also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) who was also killed in 2010, but this did not prevent al-Qaeda from continuing its insurgency operations in Iraq. At the end of the day, Iraq became a major haven for al-Qaeda which worked tirelessly to disrupt the fragile pro-Western Iraqi governments and to establish a base in Iraq to launch terrorist attacks on 'moderate' neighbouring regimes.[127]

• Democracy Promotion

After the ceasing of "major combat operations," and the subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the administration, and especially the neoconservative wing among it, fell back on its principal justification for the war being the bringing of freedom and democracy to Iraq through the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein.[128] The Bush administration's rhetoric changed; and the stress was on the idea that "after decades of oppression," as the president told a press conference in July, "the people of Iraq are reclaiming their country and are reclaiming their future."[129]

Neoconservative advisors in the Bush administration contended that; the root of the 'anti-US terrorism' in the Middle East was the almost complete absence of democracy. Autocratic regimes in the Middle East provided no outlet for political protest. One consequence, neoconservatives claimed, was that anger at the corrupt rulers inevitably flew amongst the desperate individuals, wrapping itself in the idiom of radicalism. When young militants started causing trouble, they were viciously repressed by the authorities, imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes exiled. The angry protest movements that were

---

[127] Wilkinson, *International Relations: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 21.
[128] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, p. 79.
[129] President Bush Discusses Top Priorities for the U.S., Press Conference of the President July 30, 2003, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030730-1.html, and see Justin A. Frank, *Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President* (New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 118.

repressed in the Arab Middle East spilt across international borders. Unable to attack their local autocrats successfully, local militants adopted an indirect strategy, assailing their rulers' distant sponsor, namely the United States.[130] 9/11 was a blatant show of anger that those frustrated did not manage to express in their own countries.

The neocons' solution to this dilemma was to wage a world-wide democratization campaign to eradicate the terrorist threat.[131] Neocons believe that democracies hardly ever fight each other, thus, if the US can help create a world populated exclusively with democracies, there would be no war. 'If every state in the international system looks like democratic America, the global population will live in a comprehensively peaceful world.'[132] According to this logic, America needs to be involved in international affairs and actively promotes its ideas and values. In case of Iraq, Bush neocons advisors thought in terms of the Cold War's domino theory, they believed that ousting Saddam would have a cascading effect in the Middle East. The first Arab countries to embrace democracy would serve as models for others.[133] In a speech on September 12, 2002, at the United Nations, Bush explained:

> The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time.[134]

[130] Stephen Holmes, *The Matador's Cape: America's Reckless Response to Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 197, 198.

[131] F. Fukuyama, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 2007-08), pp. 23–45.

[132] John Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism vs. Neo-conservatism," *Open Democracy*, http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/2522.pdf, p. 3.

[133] Pressman, *Power without Influence*, pp. 149–179, Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War"

[134] Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html, and see Marina Ottaway et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Policy Brief, No. 20 (October 2002).

However, the United States made very tiny progress in promoting democracy in the region. The few positive changes were directly correlated with the introduction of US soldiers in Iraq, and even there, democratic progress had been very limited. Democratization by force proved un-replicable beyond Iraq. In addition, a number of Bush's policies and U.S. actions—including working with dictators, seeming to condone human rights abuses, and undermining democratically elected governments—made the United States appear hypocritical to the most of peoples of the Middle East.[135]

Evaluation

After the intervention in Iraq, most of the reasons propagated by the Bush administration to justify the war turned out to be invalid; no weapons of mass destruction were discovered, no relationship with al-Qaeda organization was established, and the reason of spreading democracy in Iraq seemed very fragile given the United States' close ties with most of the dictatorial regimes in the region before and after the war. Perhaps the most plausible alternative explanation was that the invasion was part of larger plan for redrawing the political map of the Middle East that several pundits of neoconservatives in the Bush administration had advocated even before they had joined the administration. Neoconservatives have always believed that the current international system was built not around a balance of power but around US hegemony. By hegemony, they referred to the concentration of power in the United States and the capacity of it to use that power to project and sustain its power. [136]

Saddam Hussein had long challenged US designs for hegemony in the Middle East and Iraq had the potential resources (in the form of oil) to subsidize its own liberation by U.S. forces.[137] In other words, according to John Agnew, it was Saddam's lack of acceptance of US hegemony, his resistance to US norms of political and economic conduct, along with the other "rogue states" of Iran and North Korea in what President G.W. Bush called the "axis of evil" in world politics that led him to be principal target of the neocons.[138]

---

[135] Pressman, *Power without Influence*, p. 151.
[136] Hirsh, *At War with Ourselves*, p. 243.
[137] Agnew, *Hegemony*, pp. 18-19.
[138] Ibid.

Accordingly, regime change in Iraq was, arguably, planned even before the attacks of September 2001, and before the beginning of President Bush's term of office.[139]

The historical account confirms this conclusion, in 1998, eighteen members of the Project for a New US Century, a conservative think tank and an advocacy group for an interventionist Republican foreign policy, including many neoconservative pundits such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, Robert Zoellick, and John Bolton, (and several others who would move into government three years later), authored a letter to President Clinton deploring the decline of the US position in the Gulf, and urging the US President to take "regime change" in Iraq seriously.[140] The signatories expressed themselves to be "fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy," but they believed "the dangers of failing to do so are far greater."[141]

Neoconservatives had always believed that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with. They argued that the policy of containment of Saddam (maintaining the status quo in the Gulf) was a very costly strategy. "Diplomacy is clearly failing [...and] removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power [...] needs to become the aim of US foreign policy." The alternative, they concluded, would be "a course of weakness and drift." "The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing." In sum, they had openly called for using military force to overthrow Hussein.[142]

After the attacks of September 11, 2001 neoconservative pundits found a new opportunity to complete their unfinished task from the 1991 Gulf war of ending Hussein's rule and implementing their long-desired hegemonic strategy in the Middle East. On September 20 the neoconservative team sent a new letter, this time to President Bush arguing that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was essential to "the eradication of

---

[139] See for example Baker, *The United States Since 1980*, p. 178, Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, pp. 313, 314.
[140] Hal Brands contends that this idea affected U.S. planning well before 9/11. Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, p. 313, 314.
[141] Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 399.
[142] Neoconservatives letter to President Clinton on Iraq at: http://www.newUScentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm

terrorism," even if Saddam were revealed to have had no connection to al-Qaeda and no hand in the attack.[143] The pro-war faction believed that removing Saddam would improve America's and Israel's strategic position and launch a process of regional transformation that would benefit the United States and Israel alike. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, Israeli officials and former Israeli leaders supported these efforts, because they were eager to see the United States topple one of their main regional adversaries—and the man who had launched Scud missiles at Israel in 1991.[144] In the following years the neoconservatives cultivated close relations with the Iraqi National Congress, a long-time advocate of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.[145]

What the pro-war team failed to estimate was the consequences of the US hegemonic intervention. 'When the war started in March 2003, there was a high expectation that the 'shock and awe' bombing tactics and a sense of liberation from most ordinary Iraqis would lead to a very rapid collapse of the regime followed by an early transition to peace and stability.'[146] But in sharp contrast to the quick military victory, the US occupation of Iraq presented the Americans with serious problems and the region with further instability. Iraq experienced a wave of chaos, and the invaders encountered a massive insurgency of all kinds in all Iraqi cities. A growing Islamic antagonism directed at the US all over the world, and a strong domestic opposition to the decision of war raised the costs of the conflict, including military operations, the occupation, reconstruction and

---

[143] Here is the entire passage from the open letter to the President "But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism." http://www.newUScentury.org/Bushletter.htm

[144] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that the war was motivated in good part by the Israeli lobby. According to them a proper account of the lobby's role in encouraging the war is ultimately a question of evidence, and there is considerable evidence that Israel and pro-Israel groups—especially the neoconservatives—played important roles in the decision to invade. See Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israeli Lobby*, pp. 230, 231.

[145] Baker, *The United States Since 1980*, William Kristol and Zalmay Khalilzad, "We Must Lead the Way in Deposing Saddam," *Washington Post*, (November 9, 1997); PNAC Statement of Principles available at the Project for a New US Century website, www.newUScentury.org/statementof principles.htm; Woodward, *Bush at War*, pp. 349–50. Stefan A. Halper, Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 201–31. On the public relations campaign by neoconservatives and administration officials to win public support for war against Iraq see Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The US Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 13–28.

[146] Roger, *A War Too Far*, p. 1.

economic assistance. In the following I will shed light on some of these negative repercussions that resulted from the US intervention in Iraq.

- **Chaos**

The US forces seemed ill prepared for the occupation that followed their military intervention in Iraq. They apparently had made no plans to maintain order as the security forces of Hussein's regime collapsed.[147] The invaders, despite numerous warnings from diplomats and others experts, failed to foresee or prevent chaos. It soon became apparent that the careful US planning for the invasion had not been extended to include the occupation period. According to John Cooley, the invaders were keen in providing guards only for the Iraqi Oil Ministry. 'This led commentators around the world to repeat their earlier claims that the war was fought mainly to seize Iraq's oil.'[148]

As a result, in the first days following the collapse of the regime, there was a massive wave of looting in much of the country. The looters targeted banks, shops, offices, government buildings, and museums. Parts of entire buildings were dismantled.[149] Public buildings, including schools and hospitals, were stripped of much of their furniture and equipment. Museums were also pillaged, 'and many priceless antiquities were seized by looters. Priceless treasures of art and archaeology, from the Babylonian period up through the Islamic centuries, were stolen from the National Museum. Senior US officials up to the level of Defence Secretary Rumsfeld, were either silent, or when pressed, declared that the invasion had freed the Iraqi people and that "in war, bad things happen.' The U.S. forces eventually did restore order, 'but this initial period of lawlessness did not get the occupation off to good start.'[150]

---

[147] Baker, *The United States Since 1980*, p. 181.
[148] John K. Cooley, *An Alliance Against Babylon, The U.S., Israel, and Iraq* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 212.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Baker, *The United States Since 1980*, p. 181.

- **Insurgency**

Although President Bush declared, only within weeks of Saddam's overthrow, that major combat in Iraq was over, US commanders on the ground soon admitted to having a full-blown urban guerrilla war on their hands.[151] US assumptions that Iraqis would greet the US troops as liberators and garland them with flowers proved seriously misplaced. The White House and the Pentagon did not allow for the possibility of serious and prolonged resistance to the US occupation and chose to take no notice of warnings from the State Department, the CIA, and other parts of the US government where there was expert knowledge on Iraq and the Middle East generally.[152] As the occupation of Iraq continued, the US-led coalition forces were suffering more casualties than during the war itself.

As the Iraq invasion showed, the US capacity to conquer was unmatched, the US capability to deter and to punish was guaranteed. Where the US military capability had thus far been shown to have serious weaknesses was in policing the Iraqi cities. Donald E. Schmidt noticed that: 'it is proving more difficult to control the towns and cities than to defeat Saddam's Army.'[153] The Iraqi resistance took full advantage of this weakness and made the US occupation forces bleed. It was therefore not surprising that Washington was desperate to sub-contract this vital military task to other states. Against this background of continued insurgency in Iraq and a collapse of support for the occupation at home, according to David Ryan, the issue became 'how the US is going to extract itself from Iraq, not if it can afford geo-politically to do so.'[154]

- **Anti-Americanism**

The invasion had disastrous consequences for US influence in the Middle East, if not throughout the world.[155] The war antagonized the Muslims everywhere and brought more adherents to the anti-US cause. The US invasion of Iraq 'transformed the United States

---

[151] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 209.
[152] Wilkinson, *International Relations: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 19.
[153] Donald E. Schmidt, *The Folly of War: US Foreign Policy 1898-2005* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 342.
[154] David Ryan and Patrick Kiely, eds., *America and Iraq: Policy-making, Intervention and Regional Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).
[155] Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, p. 476.

from a country for which there was enormous sympathy in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 9.11 into an overextended, intensely disliked, [and] quasi-pariah country.'[156]

The United States lost much of its "face" because of the events at Abu Ghraib scandal with its well-publicized brutality and torture. US prestige and credibility were undermined in the Muslim world when 'images of degrading and humiliating treatment of prisoners by US personnel were broadcast through the world.'[157] This sadistic behaviour was contrary to everything the Americans claimed to represent. The images of sexual abuse sent a clear message that, behind the grand slogans of the war on terror, the reality of the US invasion was foreign domination and Muslim humiliation.[158] 'From that point on, the United States' claim that it had freed the Muslim world from a cruel dictatorship would fall on deaf ears.'[159] These results have increased anti-American sentiment and rendered the achievement of US long-term stability more problematic.[160]

- **Domestic Opposition**

Mounting insurgency and instability in Iraq heightened popular reservations in the United States about the original decision to go to war.[161] Opponents of military action, inside the US, accused the Bush administration of abusing its economic and military power and of unilateralism. Public opinion polls showed increasing opposition to the invasion.[162] Similarly, many Americans became convinced that the Iraq war did not made America safer from terrorists. A mid-year 2007 report by the U.S. government's National Counterterrorism Centre, 'al-Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West,' acknowledged the increased danger from that terrorist group. At the end of the time-frame explored in this thesis (2008), the blood was still flowing in Iraq, leading one of the advocates of the

---

[156] Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, p. 459.
[157] Lansford, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War*, p. 143, Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal*, p. 354.
[158] Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom*, p. 33.
[159] Ibid.
[160] See O'Connor and Griffiths, *The Rise of Anti-USism*, p. 84.
[161] Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", pp. 310–352.
[162] See, for example, "The War on Iraq," at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/Iraq.aspx#4, Bootie Cosgrove, Mather Poll: "Talk First, Fight Later, Americans Want Weapons Evidence before Starting War with Iraq," at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/23/opinion/polls/main537739.shtml, NEW YORK, Jan. 24, 2003, Dalia Sussman, "Poll Shows View of Iraq War Is Most Negative Since Start," at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/25/washington/25view.html?_r=2&oref=slogin, May 25, 2007

ouster of Saddam Hussein to conclude that 'the US project to replace [Saddam Hussein] with the Middle East's first democracy is in new peril, and the road ahead may yet be more hazardous than the distance already travelled'.[163] It is worth remembering that several months before the eruption of Iraq War John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt wrote:

> If the United States is, or soon will be, at war with Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight. Even if such a war goes well and has positive long-range consequences, it will still have been unnecessary. And if it goes badly—whether in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and Islamic world—then its architects will have even more to answer for.[164]

From a complexity theory point of view, the American intervention in Iraq reflected simplistic conception of stability, the main attributes of which included: (1) linearity (the perception that massive power would lead to decisive outcomes), (2) simplicity (the conviction that ousting Saddam regime would guarantee regional stability), (3) reductionism (not taking into consideration the domestic factors, chaos, insurgency that killed more US than the initial combat, and the rise of anti-Americanism).

It can, thus, be concluded that the shift in US foreign policy from the status-quo strategy in the case of Iraq war had not been in the direction of a more dynamic form of stability. According to the adopted simplistic strategy, stability instead of being allowed to emerge out of systems' local interactions was simply imposed on system components in a forcible way. This strategy of simplifying the complex turned out to be workable in terms of attaining limited political hegemony, however, the dangers of such an approach included an increase in public disaffection and antagonism as domestic stability was accompanied by US occupation.

---

[163] John F. Burns, "The Road Ahead May be Even Rougher," *New York Times*, 7 April 2004.
[164] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2003).

The simplistic perception of 'stability through invasion' as applied in the 'hegemonic stability' model missed its target in the case of Iraq. Stabilizing complex systems cannot be achieved through military force and invasion. The wars launched for this purpose exposed the weaknesses of this hegemonic strategy and underlined the uncertainties of imposing stability by force. The results of these wars are unlikely to be seen by future historians in a positive light, and there are many doubts surrounding the ability of the 'hegemonic stability' model to survive if the US administration decided to withdraw its troops, leaving the 'democratic' regime in Iraq to face its fate alone.

7.4 IR theory and the US Intervention in Iraq

Unlike previous cases, the US intervention in Iraq 2003 was based more on theoretical justifications, than on valid factual causes.[165] In this case, it was very clear how theoretical ideas, rather than concrete facts, drove policy. Most of the ideas meant here are the neoconservative ones which guided US foreign policy after the events of September 11. The interventionist, democracy-promoting, benevolent hegemony position taken in Iraq had come to be seen as a product of the role played by neoconservatists and their ideology based on crusading democratic model.

The neoconservative version of democratic-peace theory, instead of focusing on international institutions, cooperation, and interdependence, sought to use US military power (hegemony) to impose its preferred stability formula on the world.[166] This model of intervention illustrated an extreme case of translating theoretical ideas into actual policies. It flew from a doctrinaire understanding of the centrality of regime and that successful regime change would in the long run have a positive effect on the habits and

---

[165] Most of the reasons propagated by the Bush administration to justify the war in Iraq turned out to be invalid; no weapons of mass destruction were discovered, no relationship with al-Qaeda organization was established, and the reason of spreading democracy in Iraq seemed very fragile given the United States' close ties with most of the dictatorial regimes in the region before and after the war.

[166] The neocons believe that regimes that treat their own citizens unjustly are likely to do the same to foreigners. Accordingly, the nature of the regime would affect the external behaviour of a society. This idea is implicit in international relations theories about "democratic peace": nation-states are not black boxes or billiard balls that indifferently compete for power, as realists would have it; foreign policy reflects the values of their underlying societies. However, some neocons (Charles Krauthammer) prefer to define their school of thought as "Democratic Realism". See Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Democratic Realism", *The National Interest*, (Fall 2004); pp. 15-25.

mores of the society. This obsessive emphasis on regime change and the implicit assertion of American exceptionalism that gave Washington not just the right but the duty to take care of this problem was one reason why the US intervention in Iraq was ideologically controversial.

Neoconservatism, however, is only one of different approaches to understand American foreign policy after September 11. There are, in addition to neoconservatives, "realists", who respect power and tend to downplay the internal nature of other regimes and human rights concerns; there are liberal internationalists, who hope to transcend power politics altogether and move to an international order based on law and institutions; and there are constructivists, who trace Iraq war and other outcomes in international relations to ideational phenomena and social processes such as norms, identities, and culture. In the following, I will shed some light on how these IR theories evaluated the hegemonic intervention adopted by the Bush administration in the case of Iraq.

7.4.1 Neorealism

The democratic enterprise of neoconservatives contrasts sharply with the realist contention[167] that a prudent maintenance of the balance of power best preserves stability.[168] Realists are, arguably, united in their opposition to imposing 'democratic' model on other nations. They do not believe that liberal democracy is a universal form of government or that the human values underlying it are necessarily superior to those underlying nondemocratic societies. Indeed, they tend to warn against crusading democratic idealism, which in their view can become dangerously destabilizing.[169] Realists, according to John Mearsheimer, tend to believe that the most powerful political ideology is 'nationalism', not democracy. Nationalism, Mearsheimer argues, usually

---

[167] In contrast to the neocons ideas of crusading democratic idealism, Basic Realism, as defined in international relations theory, begins with the premise that all nations, regardless of regime, struggle for power. Realism can at times become relativistic and agnostic about regimes; realists by and large do not believe that liberal democracy is a potentially universal form of government or that the human values underlying it are necessarily superior to those underlying nondemocratic societies. Indeed, they tend to warn against crusading democratic idealism, which in their view can become dangerously destabilizing.

[168] The neoconservatives managed to sideline both the institutional liberals and the realists in the Bush's administration who were sceptical about the rationale for the war on Iraq. See Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", pp. 310-352.

[169] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, p. 37.

286

makes it terribly costly to invade and occupy countries in areas like the Middle East, where people believe fervently in self-determination, which is the essence of nationalism, and they do not like US running their lives.[170]

Realists, thus, have criticized the Bush pro-democracy adventure in the Middle East. They thought that it was irrational 'to think that the United States could invade and occupy Iraq and other countries in the Middle East for the purpose of altering their political systems in ways that would make them friendly to America.'[171] John Mearsheimer argued that almost all realists in the United States –except for Henry Kissinger – opposed the war against Iraq.[172] In the run-up to the war, 'several prominent realists signed a public letter criticizing what they perceived as an exercise in US hubris. And in the continuing aftermath of that war, many prominent thinkers called for a return to realism. A group of scholars and public intellectuals even formed the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, which calls for a more modest and prudent approach.'[173] Many supporters of that war are now having second thoughts, 'since it is becoming increasingly clear that US troops are stuck in an open-ended conflict from which there seems to be no exit.'[174]

7.4.2 Liberal Institutionalism

The main challenge to the neoconservative justification of intervention in the Middle East comes from traditional liberal analysts. The hegemonic enterprise (based on a belief in the importance of the nature of the regime) contrasts sharply with the liberal

---

[170] Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War", p. 4.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Realists who supported the attack were convinced that the reason for overthrowing Saddam Hussein was not to bring democracy to Iraq but to remove a challenge to US hegemony. They believe that the democracy promotion slogan was just a superficial title that was used only when the other justifications for the war proved hollow. Similarly, the Bush administration invaded Afghanistan, they believe, to destroy an enemy and that enemy's ally, the Taliban, that had attacked the United States. Promoting democracy was not the primary motivation. See Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War", Marsden, *For God's Sake*, p. 94, Fukuyama, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?," pp. 23–45.
[173] Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, No. 145, (Nov-Dec., 2004), p. 56.
[174] Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War."

institutionalist view that multilateralism is more efficacious.[175] In spite of the fact that after World War II, realism became the dominant theoretical perspective for studying world politics in the United States, the liberal strand of thought in US foreign policy never vanished entirely. Frustrations with the Vietnam War and the energy crisis of the 1970s, among other factors, gave rise to renewed interest in liberalism as an alternative to realism.[176] In contrast to realists' emphasis on the idea of struggle for survival in the anarchic international system, liberals emphasize shared values and common purpose in studying U.S. foreign policy.[177]

US (neo) liberals strongly opposed the Bush administration policies of unilateralism as well as strategies that emphasize pre-emption, the use of force, and the deliberate maintenance of primacy. They contend that America can continue upholding its Middle East policy in a more cost-effective fashion, by working together with its allies. US liberals contend that emphasis in foreign policy must be placed on cooperation with other countries and in the reinforcement of international institutions. Based on the previous convictions, liberal internationalists strongly criticized the Iraq War and the ideas of hegemonic stability. They believed that promoting democracy by force was full of practical and moral dangers.[178]

7.4.3 Constructivism

Constructivism traces war and other outcomes in international relations to ideational phenomena and social processes such as norms, identities, and culture. Constructivists challenge existing notions of the national interest by moving beyond the materialist and rationalist premises of the leading theoretical paradigms. One constructivist attempt to explain U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, argued that the ideas of policy intellectuals affected political outcomes in consequential ways. These ideas shaped and defined US interests, eventually becoming

---

[175] The neoconservatives managed to sideline both the institutional liberals and the realists in the Bush's administration who were sceptical about the rationale for the war on Iraq. See Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", pp. 310-352.
[176] Glenn Hastedt, *Encyclopedia of US Foreign Policy* (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004), p. 221.
[177] Ibid., p. 132.
[178] Marsden, *For God's Sake*, p. 86.

embedded in the institutions of the post–September 11 national security structure. They affected administration assessments of every major aspect of the Iraq war, beginning with its necessity and justification. Policy ideas diffused throughout the country to help generate a pro-war ideational community that included a majority of US, acquiring enough discursive hegemony to sustain the US march to war from 2001 to 2003.[179] Constructivists stressed that ideas are not the sole factors setting the course of US foreign policy, however they are essential to explaining an otherwise puzzling administration decision like that of invading Iraq.[180]

7.5   Conclusion

The hegemonic model of intervention reflected US determination to use its military superiority to enforce stability and to punish any *rogue* state that failed to comply with US foreign policy preferences. Guided by this model President Bush sought to reshape the political map of the Middle East by forcibly promoting a new stability formula based on some simplistic assumptions: destroying al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and eliminating the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq would induce the birth of democracy throughout the Middle East. Democracy would undermine authoritarian Middle East regimes. Under the benevolent hegemony of the United States, Arabs and Muslims would see their interest in recognizing the right of Israel to exist. With cheap oil flowing from the Persian Gulf to irrigate the world's economy, the entire planet would bloom with the promise of a new US century.[181] This way of perceiving the region and the belief that simple policies can solve its complex problems is what caused the American foreign policy in the Middle East to be described as simplistic.

The "regime change" model of intervention inherits most of the shortcomings of the hegemonic strategy which include: simplicity—under-estimating the complexities of the concerned systems (ousting Taliban and Saddam Hussein would guarantee regional stability), reductionism—ignoring the role of local-actors in influencing system dynamics (chaos, insurgency, and the rise of anti-American sentiment), coercion—imposing

---

[179] Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad", pp. 310–352.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom*, p. 1.

stability by force and military occupation on other systems, and linearity—contending that massive power will lead to decisive outcomes.

These simplistic assumptions, turned out to be inconsistent with the complexities of both the Afghani and the Iraqi systems. Stabilizing complex systems, like that of Iraq and Afghanistan, cannot be achieved through military force and invasion. Complex system, according to Adrian Little, should not be regarded as merely complicated because the nature of interaction between their elements cannot be disentangled:

> Therefore, not only is forceful democratisation an overly simplistic strategy for establishing a political future for post-conflict societies, it is also impossible to identify the kinds of dangers that may emerge from the employment of democratisation as a driving force in the 'war on terror'. These problems are already apparent in Afghanistan and Iraq and are likely to deteriorate rather than improve with the course of time.[182]

The distance between democracy as the 'will of the people' and elite-driven processes of democratisation imposed by outside agencies manifested the simplistic dimension at work in US hegemonic strategy in the Middle East. This simplistic perception of 'imposing stability through invasion' missed its target and caused further disturbances.[183] The two wars launched for this purpose exposed the weaknesses of US hegemonic strategy and underlined the shortcomings of imposing 'stability' by force. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the shift from the traditional US strategy of preserving the status quo to that of hegemonic intervention (under the banner of democracy promotion) had not been in the direction of a more dynamic form of stability. Moreover, the results of this strategy are unlikely to be seen by future historians in a positive light, and there are many doubts surrounding the ability of the resultant artificial stability (in both Iraq and

---

[182] Little, *Democratic Piety*, p. 69.
[183] Ibid., p. 54.

Afghanistan) to survive if the US administration decided to withdraw its troops, leaving the 'democratic' regimes in both countries to face their fate alone.[184]

Table 7.1 **Hegemonic Intervention**

	Immediate Causes	Immediate Outcome	Consequences
Intervention in Afghanistan (2001)	The intervention took place after al-Qaeda organization had conducted catastrophic assaults on Washington, D.C., and New York City on 9/11, killing some 3,000 persons.	Taliban movement (which provided shelter to al-Qaeda) was defeated and the capital of Kabul was captured by indigenous forces with heavy US support.	Afghanistan remained an unstable country, unable to handle its domestic problems and unfit to serve US interests in the region. At the end of the time-frame explored in this thesis (2008), the insurgency movement was still able to strike very hard, and the Afghani pro-US government was unable to control the country or secure regional stability.
Intervention in Iraq (2003)	The Bush administration based its case for war with Iraq on three arguments: first, the 'fact' that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was in the process of building more; second, that Iraq was linked to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; and third, that Iraq was a tyrannical dictatorship from which the Iraqi people deserved to be liberated	U.S. forces captured Iraq; Hussein was tried and convicted in an Iraqi court for crimes against humanity and crimes against the Iraqi people, and hanged.	The invasion resulted in huge Iraqi causalities and an insurgency that killed more US than the initial combat and eroded public support for the so-called U.S. war on terrorism.

---

[184] Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance, International Relations and the Challenge of US primacy* (Princeton: Princeton university press, 2008), p. 214.

Chapter 8

Pro-Israel Intervention

8.1 Introduction

The Pro-Israel model of intervention branches from the surrogate strategy. This strategy involves backing a regional surrogate tasked with maintaining simple stability (i.e. perpetuating the status quo and preventing, as far as possible, any spontaneous or unplanned change to regional configurations). The regional surrogate is expected, according to this strategy, to maintain regional stability, even if its acts contradict with the interests of other actors in the system.

Many US foreign policy advisors, intellectuals, and political analysts nominated Israel to play this role in the Middle East. They argued that Israel could provide a cheap and reliable way to maintain US interests of containing Soviet expansionism (before 1991) and assuring Western freedom of access to area's vital materials, markets and investment. In this respect, Martin Kramer argued that 'supporting Israel secures a low-cost way of keeping order in part of the Middle East.'[1] Similarly, the Israeli strategist Efraim Inbar argued that 'the case for the continued US support of Israel as an important strategic ally due to its strategic location and political stability, as well as its technological and military assets, is very strong.'[2]

Gradually, the Israel's surrogate utility came to be accepted as an absolute dogma in the conventional wisdom of US political science culture.[3] The US conviction of Israel's surrogate utility in the Middle East was supported by the Jewish state's military victory in the Six-Day-War and further enhanced by its mobilization in support of Jordan in 1970.[4]

---

[1] Martin Kramer, "A Realist Case for the US-Israel Alliance," *The US Interest*, Azure 5767, No. 26, (Autumn 2006), pp. 24-25.

[2] Efraim Inbar, "Still a Strategic Asset for the US," *Jerusalem Post*, October 8, 2006, quoted in John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 50.

[3] Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the US National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 188.

[4] Ibid.

After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Israel's advocates managed to maintain the perception of Israel as a strategic asset to the US.

The institutionalization of the surrogate strategy was facilitated by the extensive and effective propaganda disseminated by pro-Israeli groups whose influence with numerous sectors on the US domestic scene expanded greatly since the 1980s.[5] The neoconservative Project for the New US Century (PNAC), for example, praised Israel as 'America's staunchest ally against international terrorism,' and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) confirmed that, 'US-Israel strategic cooperation is a vital component in the global security equation for the United States.'[6]

Proponents of the surrogate thesis argued that this strategy required the US to invest heavily in Israel by ensuring its absolute military superiority through providing it with unlimited arms supplies and economic assistance. According to those advocates this would make Israel secure and therefore increasingly flexible with regard to comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[7]

But Israel, in many cases, instead of maintaining regional stability on behalf of the US, had destabilized the regional system and violated the status quo, either by attacking neighbouring countries (the Six-Day-War in 1967, and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982), or by insisting on occupying others' territories, or by establishing a veil of secrecy on its nuclear activities, or by launching pre-emptive strikes against perceived threats (operation Babylon to destroy the Iraqi reactor 1982), to name but a few of Israel's regional adventures.

The Israeli adventures, however, were either condoned or even approved by the US administrations. These reactions comprise what this chapter addresses as a pro-Israel model of intervention. This model represents the US reaction to violations of regional stability committed by Israel. As a general rule, Washington was always ready to intervene to address any violation to the status quo in the Middle East except when this

---

[5] Rubenberg, *Israel and the US National Interest*, p. 188.
[6] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 50.
[7] Rubenberg, *Israel and the US National Interest*, p. 188.

violation was committed by Israel. The US, as Mearsheimer and Walt put it, consistently favoured Israel over its neighbours and rarely put pressure on it to stop its violations to regional stability.[8]

The pro-Israel model of intervention included two (overlapping) US reactions (1) overlooking Israel's disruption of regional stability,[9] and (2) aligning with Israel in its adventures (instead of confronting it). In both cases, US refrained from using its foreign policy tools decisively to prevent a specific violation to an existing balance or to restore a disrupted status quo. In the following, I shed light on four cases reflecting this pattern of intervention: (1) the US reaction to the Israeli-led Six-Day-War in 1967, (2) the US reaction to the state of no-war-no-peace that preceded the October War, 1973, (3) the US reaction to the Israeli nuclear program and its attack on the Iraqi Nuclear reactor in 1981, and (4) the US reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

8.2   The US Intervention in The Six-Day-War

Summary

In spite of its prior knowledge of Israel's intention to launch a pre-emptive attack on Egypt and Syria, the Johnson administration abstained from intervening in due course to prevent the outbreak of the Six Day War.[10] Given its confirmed interests in regional stability in the Middle East, it was expected that the Johnson administration would take a strong stand at the outset of the crisis. However, the US behaviour was 'cautious, at times ambiguous, and ultimately unable to prevent a war that was clearly in the offing.'[11] This vague US reaction raised serious doubts about the role Washington played in the attack. Many argued that Israel launched this war on behalf of the Johnson administration which was not happy with Nasser nationalist project in the region. This study, however, adopts

---

[8] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 7.

[9] According to the wide definition of intervention adopted in this study, the absence of action can be regarded as a sort of intervention if it contributes to determining the outcome of a certain situation decisively.

[10] See Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), p. 82.

[11] William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: US diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and University of California Press, 2005), pp. 24, 25.

the innocent interpretation, which holds that the Johnson administration did not induce Israel to the war, though it turned a blind eye to the Israeli preparations and refrained from preventing Israel from going ahead with it. The US behaviour in this crisis was reductionist in nature as it overlooked the Israeli violation to regional stability arrangement and put no pressure on the Israelis to withdraw from the territories they had occupied. In the following, I illustrate briefly the broad details of this crisis, and try to extract the US share of responsibility for the instability that resulted from it.

Historical Background

In 5 June 1967, Israeli leaders launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt and in subsequent days engaged in hostilities with Jordan and Syria as well, inaugurating the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (5–10 June). In this conflict Israel intentionally disrupted the status quo; attacked three Arab countries and occupied enormous portions of their territory. Israeli troops overran the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, captured the West Bank of the Jordan River and East Jerusalem from Jordanian forces, and seized the Golan Heights on the Syrian border. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 234 calling for a cease-fire on June 6. Jordan had agreed immediately then Egypt and finally Syria on June 10. Israel agreed to the cease fire on June 11.[12]

Before the outbreak of war the escalation between the various parties reached its utmost degree. The status quo ante was very fragile, and the atmosphere was full of mutual accusations, it seemed that no actor was keen in keeping the things in the way they were. By 1966 Nasser's reluctance to confront Israel directly was being attacked by the neo-Ba'ath radicals in Syria and by King Hussein of Jordan. Nasser's conservative opponents accused him of 'hiding behind the skirts' of the UN peace-keeping force in the Sinai. This criticism seriously challenged Nasser's status as leader of the Arab world. He therefore signed a formal defence treaty with the neo-Ba'ath regime in Syria in November

---

[12] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, pp. 82, 14.

1966. By allying with the Syrians, Nasser sought both to retain his leading role in the Arab world and to restrain dangerous Syrian and Jordanian provocations.[13]

For its part, Israel shared its opponents their desire not to maintain the regional status quo; the Israeli government sought to impose new regional arrangements to serve its interests but not necessarily that of the US (maintaining regional stability). The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) began a series of extensive reprisals against Syria.[14] On April 7 1967, a skirmish on land turned into a major air battle. An Israeli tractor pushed into the demilitarized zone and was fired upon by Syrians. Levi Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister, authorized the Israeli air force to respond, the resulting battle involved exchanges of tank and mortar fire, and Israeli warplanes buzzed over Damascus. An aerial dogfight battle then erupted in which six Syrian MIG aircraft were shot down over Mount Hermon on the Golan Heights.[15]

On May 13, Nasser received a secret message from the Soviet Union informing him that Israel had massed troops on the Syrian border. This convinced Nasser that an Israeli attack on Syria was imminent. Nasser took immediate steps in order to effectuate the joint defence agreement between Egypt and Syria.[16] On May 14, he mobilized his army and two days later he ordered his troops into the Sinai. Simultaneously, on May 17, he asked United Nations Secretary General U Thant to remove the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) that had been stationed on the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh since the end of the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956.[17]

In response to Nasser's request, the UN spokesman's announced that:

> The UNEF went into Gaza and Sinai over ten years ago with the consent of
> the government of the UAR and has continued there on that basis. As a

---

[13] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 169.
[14] Ibid., p. 100.
[15] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Document 402. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, April 7, 1967, 9:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential.
[16] Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Cathal J. Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy* (New York: ABC-Clio, 2007), p. 298.
[17] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 100, Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 41.

peacekeeping force it could not remain if that consent were withdrawn or if the conditions under which it operates were so qualified that the force was unable to function effectively.[18]

By the evening of May 18, U Thant responded positively to the formal request of the Egyptian President[19] who became under great pressure to return the situation to its pre-1956 status which Israel had long considered a casus belli.[20]

In light of these escalating circumstances, it was expected that the United States would take some action to prevent the complete removal of the UNEF. But historical record shows no sign of an urgent approach to UN secretary general U Thant on this matter. As William B. Quandt put it, 'a strong warning by the United States about the consequences of its closure might conceivably have influenced Nasser's next move.'[21] During the early days of this crisis Nasser seemed deterrable. From May 19 until midday on May 22, he took no action to close the strait, nor did he make any threat to do so. In the meanwhile UN spokesperson announced that no troop movements or concentrations along any of the lines which should give rise to undue concern. 'Presumably, Nasser was waiting to see how Israel and the United States would react to withdrawal of the UNEF. However, the US administration made no direct approach to Nasser until May 22, the day Nasser finally announced the closure of the strait to all shipping both to and from Israel.'[22]

In retrospect, it could be easily concluded that the US administration was aware of the causes that led Nasser to take escalating measures. In a memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Walt Rostow) to President Johnson, Rostow stated that:

---

[18] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 10, Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 17, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential.
[19] Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 26, 27.
[20] In 1957, in order to obtain Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, the Eisenhower administration had given Tel Aviv assurances of US support for continued Israeli access to the Gulf and its entrance through the Strait of Tiran. See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 26, 27.
[21] Ibid., p. 27.
[22] Ibid.

The UAR's brinksmanship stems from two causes: (1) The Syrians are feeding Cairo erroneous reports of Israeli mobilization to strike Syria. Regrettably, some pretty militant public threats from Israel by Eshkol and others have lent credibility to the Syrian reports. (2) Nasser probably feels his prestige would suffer irreparably if he failed a third time to come to the aid of an Arab nation attacked by Israel. Moderates like Hussein have raked him over the coals for not coming to Jordan's aid in November or to Syria's when Israel shot down 6 of its MIG's last month.[23]

The US administration was also aware that Nasser had no desire to go into a real conflict. On May 31 after a meeting with Nasser, former Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson, a businessman who had known Nasser for many years, reported that Nasser wanted to send UAR Vice President Zakariya Mohieddin to Washington on June 7 to discuss a resolution that would permit the regulation of the Tiran Straits issue.[24] More important, the Johnson administration was convinced that Israel was militarily superior to its Arab adversaries and was exaggerating the danger of an Arab attack. But, in spite of all these facts, Johnson did not put any pressure on his allies in Israel to give up their plan of attack and did not seek effectively to prevent the outbreak of war.[25]

Some analysts explained the Johnson's position in light of US involvement in Vietnam,[26] while others promoted the idea that the Johnson had colluded with the Israelis and subtly approved the Israeli decision to strike pre-emptively in order to limit the power of the Egyptian President. Regardless of the real explanation of the President's position, the Israelis must have concluded that the Johnson administration would not be unduly upset

---

[23] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Washington, May 17, 1967.Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 1. Secret.

[24] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 145. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State, Cairo, June 4, 1967, 1925Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret.

[25] Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 41.

[26] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 42.

if they took action and disrupted the regional status quo.[27] In retrospect it could be argued that the Israeli government valued its national interests over the US objectives (maintaining regional stability), and made clear its willingness to sacrifice the status quo towards its own ends.

The Outbreak of War

The war began when Israeli airplanes attacked the Egyptian air force and destroyed many airfields. Between June 5 and June 11, Israeli Defence Forces led onslaughts against Egyptian forces in Sinai and Gaza, and against the Jordanian military in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The conflict ended with significant battles against Syrian forces on the Golan Heights between June 9 and 10. By June 11, Israel controlled territory previously held by the Arabs in the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

To avoid any condemnation from the Americans, the Israelis claimed that they were responding to a movement by the Egyptian air and armoured forces toward Israel which they interpreted as an attack. An Israeli army spokesman announced that the Egyptians opened an air and land attack, their armoured forces moved at dawn toward southern Israel and that Israeli forces went out to meet them. He also claimed that the Egyptian jet aircraft were seen on radar coming toward Israel's shores, and that a similar air movement was occurring along the Sinai border. Air clashes, according to the Israeli fabricated narrative, developed when Israeli planes flew to meet them.[28] Israeli Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador Barbour that the Egyptian ground forces began the fighting by shelling Israeli border villages. An official Israeli report passed to the US Embassy said that Egypt's 4th armoured division plus a mobile task force had teamed up "with the apparent intention" of striking across southern Israel toward Jordan. The report said that Israel armoured forces had moved to confront the Egyptian armour. However, in the first

---

[27] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/summary

[28] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 169, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Current Intelligence,Washington, June 5, 1967.Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Situation Reports. Top Secret;

day of the war the Americans realized that the Israeli allegations were all false, and that Israel was certainly the party that launched the war.

The news that war had broken out between Israel and Egypt reached Washington in the early hours of June 5. Johnson issued a press statement calling on all parties to support the UN Security Council in bringing about a cease-fire, and sent a message to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko declaring US readiness to cooperate with the Security Council. At about 8 a.m., Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara called the President with the news that a message from Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin was coming in on the Moscow hot line. Kosygin's message assured Johnson that the Soviets wanted to bring an end to the Middle East hostilities and urged US to act for that purpose.

During the fighting the United States gave Israel no military assistance and cut off military shipments to both sides,[29] no new munitions licenses were approved for shipments to Israel or any Arab nation at war with Israel. But, at the same time, Washington did not exercise any pressure on Israel to halt the fighting until it had emerged victorious.[30] Proceeding from a simplistic perception of regional stability, the Johnson administration refrained from pressuring Tel Aviv to abandon the conquered territories and in December 1967, sold Israel fifty F-4 Phantom jets.[31]

America's tendency to side with Israel extended to peace negotiations that followed the end of the hostilities. The United States played a key role in the abortive peace efforts that followed the Six-Day War. In sharp contrast with the 1956 Suez War, the American administration did not want to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the captured territories, as President Eisenhower had pressed them to withdraw after the Suez crisis.

---

[29] See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Consultant (Bundy), Washington, June 8, 1967. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 225, Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Military Aid. No classification marking.

[30] In June 6 Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol sent a message to President Johnson hoping that the USs would not take any action that would limit Israeli aggression. In retrospect, it seems that the US President has agreed to Eshkol's request in full. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 176, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Washington, June 6, 1967, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3.

[31] Hodge and Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy*, p. 298.

The US objective, instead, was a comprehensive settlement in which Israel would exchange the captured territories for peace and security. President Johnson embraced this position and spoke out later against any permanent change in the legal and political status of the Israeli-occupied territories and emphasized that the Arab land should be returned only as part of an overall peace settlement that recognized Israel's right to exist. In his message to Soviet Prime Minister Johnson explained his position:

> President Eisenhower, in 1957, was faced with the problem of obtaining the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai. In pressing for a withdrawal which was earnestly desired by Egypt, President Eisenhower committed the United States to international passage of the strait. President Nasser's declaration of May 22 that he would close the strait runs squarely into a commitment we undertook while supporting Egypt, quite apart from our interests as a maritime nation.[32]

The principle of 'land for peace' was embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 adopted in November 1967. This resolution called for a peace settlement including the Israeli withdrawal from territories it had occupied following the 1967 war in exchange for peace with its neighbours and Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist as a state. The land for peace formula served as the basis for future Middle East negotiations. But the US-sponsored UN resolution did not present a solid base for sustainable stability as it included two crucial stumbling blocks: (1) it provided that Israel would withdraw from 'territories' rather than 'the territories,' a loophole that gave Israel legal footing to claim permanent retention of some of the land it had occupied in June 1967; and (2) the resolution failed to specify whether Israeli withdrawal should precede or follow Arab recognition. The resolution proved ineffective at advancing

---

[32] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 175. Message From President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, Washington, June 6, 1967, 10:21 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5–10/67. Secret.

sustainable/dynamic stability in the region and was one of the causes that led to subsequent crises.[33]

Consequences

Washington utilized the surrogate strategy to control the outcomes of regional interactions in the Middle East and chose Israel to play the role of regional surrogate. But Israel, in 1967 war, instead of maintaining regional stability on behalf of the US, served its own interests which were not, systematically, consistent with that of the US. It was, thus, supposed that Washington would intervene swiftly to address the imbalances caused by its regional surrogate. However, the US overlooked the Israeli preparation of War and abstained from taking any positive step to prevent the violation. Moreover, following the end of the hostilities, the Johnson administration increased arms supplies while doing relatively little to encourage Israeli concessions in the various peace talks that occurred during this period.[34]

Israeli leaders, who repeatedly emphasized their potential value as an ally, assumed that their stunning victory in the Six-Day-War in 1967 would strengthen these claims by offering a vivid demonstration of Israel's military prowess. In subsequent years, however, the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories turned out to be a major cause of regional instability. The Israeli behaviour hampered US interest in maintaining regional stability in terms of a continued contention between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as between Israel and the Palestinians, in particular, after between 100,000 to 260,000 Palestinians fled from their homeland to Jordan and Lebanon.[35]

But the immediate negative outcome of the Six-Day war and the following diplomatic stalemate caused by resolution 242 was the so-called War of Attrition along the Suez Canal.[36] This War seriously affected the stability of the region and drew the United States

---

[33] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 83.

[34] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 43.

[35] Ibid., p. 99.

[36] Not all observers reckon that this conflict was a 'war,' which accounts for the fact that some refer to the October War of 1973 as the 'fourth' and others as the 'fifth' Arab-Israeli war, see Edgar O'Ballance, *No Victor No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War* (CA.: San Rafael, 1978), p. 5.

into indirect confrontations with the Soviet Union, and increased the total amount of tension in the region.

The War of Attrition

In an attempt to disrupt the status quo that resulted from the Six-Day War President Jamal Abdul Nasser initiated a war of attrition across the Suez Canal to compel Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai. He tried to prevent the Israelis turning the Canal into their de facto border with Egypt. The War began virtually as soon as the Egyptian armed forces had regrouped and had received more Soviet material. The Egyptian army, though badly beaten, had not been destroyed in the 1967 war, nor did the Egyptian leadership lose the desire to reorganize itself to hit back at the Israelis.[37]

For their part, the Israelis were aware of the growing frustration of Arab governments; but in spite of that, they decided to perpetuate the flawed status quo that followed the June war and placed heavier emphasis on the importance of military superiority as the only basis of regional stability. The Israelis believed that if Egyptians wanted to get Sinai back, they would have to enter direct talks, recognize Israel, and forgo their claim to lead the Arab countries. Nasser viewed these conditions as a surrender to the Johnson administration, which seemed to have abandoned the Arabs, and, thus, decided to resume the hostilities.[38]

The conflict started with Egyptian attacks on the cease-fire line along the Suez Canal, and eventually spread to the Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese fronts.[39] Nasser's tactics were aimed at making the cost of the occupation/status quo to Israel, in human lives and manpower losses, unbearably high, and to convince Washington that it must force its surrogate to withdraw from Sinai.[40] Nasser was right in assuming that the highly-

---

[37] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 150, 151, Ahron Bregman, *Israel's Wars: A History since 1947* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 61.

[38] Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007), p.184, Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 163.

[39] Richard Bordeaux Parker, *The October War a Retrospective* (FL.: University Press of Florida, 2001), p. 2.

[40] Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 131.

sensitive-to-casualties Israeli society could hardly sustain a long and bloody contest in which it would lose soldiers on a daily basis. The Egyptian plan was to hit at the Israelis not only militarily, but also psychologically.[41]

According to academic Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'this was not the kind of war that the Israelis were used to. Political constraints, however, ruled out what Israel would have otherwise done given its military doctrine of offensive defence – counterattacking to capture the east bank of the Canal'. Instead, Ben-Ami added:

> Chief of General Staff Chaim Bar-Lev opted for the erection along the Canal of a line of fortifications that immediately bore his name. But Israel soon realised that she could not allow herself the luxury of a static, inconclusive war where the Egyptians had an evident edge in manpower and in their capacity to sustain casualties.[42]

The Israelis responded by using their air force against Egyptian domestic positions. The Israeli attacks included demonstrations of its ability to send tanks up and down the Suez Gulf coast, and later against strategic and civilian targets deep inside Egypt,[43] capture a new Soviet radar installation from a Red Sea island, buzz over Cairo at dawn with jet planes, and drop bombs on a factory in al-Maadi district and an infant children school in the Delta.[44]

By this point, the Egyptian-Israeli skirmishes had developed into a destabilizing conflict that had been largely subsumed into the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. It became apparent that neither the Americans nor the Soviets could afford to let their clients down, since by now the prestige of both superpowers was fully engaged.[45] President Nixon admitted that the situation in the Middle East had become 'terribly dangerous,' adding that 'it is like the Balkans before World War I where the two

---

[41] Bregman, *Israel's Wars*, p. 62.
[42] Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace*, p. 131.
[43] Ibid., p. 131.
[44] Goldschmidt, *A Brief History of Egypt*, p. 184.
[45] Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and US Dominance in the Middle East* (MA.: Beacon Press Publish, 2009), p. 28.

superpowers could be drawn into a confrontation that neither of them wants because of the differences there.'[46] An US-sponsored cease-fire was negotiated in the summer of 1970.[47] However the imbalances caused by the continuing Israeli occupation of the Arab territories remained unsolved. The Egyptians used the ceasefire to move anti-aircraft missile batteries up to the canal,[48] and the Nixon administration agreed to supply Israel with new Phantom and Sky-hawk aircraft and provided it with advanced electronic countermeasures against Egypt's Soviet-supplied antiaircraft missiles.[49]

In the context of this fragile US-brokered settlement the landscape was frozen in the Middle East, the region entered in a stalemate to be known later as the state of no-war-and-no-peace. These arrangements reflected an unstable status quo approved only by Washington and Israel, while rejected by the rest of the concerned Arab parties, especially the Egyptian President Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat, as I will illustrate in the following section.

8.3   The State of No War/No Peace (1971-1973)

Summary

Proceeding from a simplistic perception of regional stability, President Nixon did not seek to produce any softening of Israel's tough positions following the Six-Day War, and continued to strengthen it militarily. This pro-Israel perspective impeded the Nixon administration from seizing the opportunity to correct the imbalances that resulted from the Six-Day War.[50] For example, the US administration misread repeated Sadat's signals to negotiate the opening of the Suez Canal to international navigation, as a prelude to

---

[46] Ibid., p. 122.

[47] When the War of Attrition ended on 7 August 1970, it was very much a 'drawn' contest. However, Israel's politicians and generals, with few exceptions, insisted that they had prevailed in the War, as Israel had shown itself capable of withstanding significant military pressure in a long war. However, it could also be said that the Egyptian side had managed to ease the Israeli aircraft out from the air space over Egypt and forced the Israeli activities to be confined to the Suez Canal Zone, see Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 175, O'Ballance, *No Victor No Vanquished*, p. 5.

[48] Parker, *The October War a Retrospective*, p. 2.

[49] The increase in US aid to Israel was consistent with Nixon and Kissinger's belief that steadfast support for Israel would reveal the limited value of Soviet aid and eventually convince Moscow's Arab clients to realign with the United States. See Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 175, Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israeli Lobby*, p. 37.

[50] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israeli Lobby*, p. 53.

breaking the stalemate that followed the war and the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (known as the state of no war and no peace). Nixon seemed as not interested in more than maintaining the flawed 'status quo' that followed the War. US officials were aware that President Sadat could initiate a limited military action; (at least to avoid being overthrown domestically), that could complicate US position in the area and that would further complicate US-Soviet relations, but in spite of that, they did not intervene to pressure Israel to start negotiating with Sadat who made several initiatives for this purpose.[51]

Historical Background

In 1969 a US national security study memorandum admitted that the US position in the Middle East (and particularly in the Arab world) has deteriorated and was in some jeopardy. The memorandum suggested that 'the best chance of improving [the US] position lies in an early Arab-Israeli settlement.'[52] The Busy President Nixon administration, however, did not prefer to intervene personally to correct the imbalances resulted from the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories (since the Six-Day-War) and delegated the Middle East file to his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger who was himself busy bringing about a cease-fire in the war in Vietnam, easing tension with the Soviet Union and making a breakthrough with China, had not paid special attention to the Middle East. He felt that the state of 'No War-No Peace' could last for the time being and could be dealt with in due course.[53]

In the meanwhile, Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat, who was eager for a better basis for regional stability, expressed a strong desire for a friendly relationship with United States and repeatedly showed his support for a political solution to the conflict with Israel. During a speech in the parliament shortly after his inauguration as president, he

---

[51] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 178.
[52] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 2, Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, Washington, January 30, 1969.NSCIG/NEA 69–1B (Revised)National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret.
[53] O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, p. 169.

offered to extend the Egyptian–Israeli ceasefire and reopen the Suez Canal, which had been closed since 1967, in exchange for Israel's partial withdrawal from the Sinai (to the Mitla and Giddi Passes; about 48km east of the Suez Canal). Sadat suggested this as the first stage of a timetable which would be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution 242.[54]

Although Sadat explicitly rejected the complete normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel, he repeatedly expressed his interest in a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.[55] During a meeting with the US Ambassador, the Egyptian President expressed his readiness to sign a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel, if it withdrew from territories occupied in 1967. It was the first time an Arab leader declared his willingness to reconcile with Israel. Equally noteworthy was Sadat's willingness for Israel's withdrawal to be accomplished in stages, a departure from the standard Arab interpretation of Resolution 242.[56]

Sadat also showed his readiness to reduce relations with the Soviet Union if there could be a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the US.[57] To further persuade the United States that he was serious about opening a dialogue with Israel, and to hint that the key for such a dialogue lay in Washington rather than in Moscow, Sadat abruptly expelled, on 18 July 1972, most of the Soviet military advisors in Egypt. Those advisers had been working in Egypt since the War of Attrition (and exactly following Nasser's visit to Moscow in January 1970), and played a crucial role in the Egyptian army, and even took direct part in aerial dogfights with the Israelis. Although the expelling of the Soviet experts did not terminate the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, it was the first step toward a major realignment of Egypt's relations with the superpowers. The dismissal of the Soviet advisers weakened Egypt's military capabilities, a risk Sadat was prepared to take in

---

[54] Nigel J. Ashton, ed., *The Cold War in the Middle East, Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967–73* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), Bregman, *Israel's Wars*, p. 67.
[55] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 151.
[56] Ashton, *The Cold War in the Middle East*.
[57] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 155, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 21, 1971, 4:15 p.m. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret.

order to demonstrate to the United States his independence from the Soviet Union and his willingness for an active US diplomatic involvement in Egypt's conflict with Israel.[58]

Sadat had also requested a number of regional leaders to use their influence to persuade President Nixon to take effective steps to put pressure on Israel. In early July 1971 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia made a trip to Cairo where he talked with President Sadat. The King thereafter wrote a letter to President Nixon on his impressions from Cairo. The King confirmed to the US President that there was a body of opinion inside Egypt striving for peaceful settlement and that this viewpoint was supported by the group which holds the reins of government in Egypt. However, the King added, 'this group reprove the US for its silence in the face of Israeli abstinence. They were convinced that if the US sincerely wanted peace, it could achieve that goal. If Israel rejected US advice, the US could withhold aid.'[59]

Similarly, the Shah of Iran wrote to the US President that Egypt was 'genuinely seeking peace and can be trusted' and was 'in a position to conduct constructive negotiations.' The Shah explained that 'the positive attitude adopted and the initiative taken by the Egypt as well as the sound and reasonable approach of the Sadat's regime, reaffirms the view that Egypt is determined to follow a moderate course towards peace'. The Shah concluded that 'it is now for Israel to abandon her obstinate attitude or a good opportunity for peace will be missed'. The Shah finally confirmed that 'every effort should be exerted to persuade Israel to refrain from following this dangerous policy and respond constructively to the genuine endeavours that are being made.'[60]

---

[58] William L. Cleveland, Martin Bunton, *A History of The Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview, 2009), p. 364, Bregman, *Israel's Wars,* p. 69, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary,* p. 15.
[59] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 154, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 17, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1971, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abdal-Aziz Al Saud, 1971. Secret.
[60] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 128, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 26, 1971, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. Secret.

Sadat had hoped that the US administration would react positively to these steps by pressuring Israel to accept the partial withdrawal. However, he was due for a disappointment.[61] The Nixon administration calculated Sadat's steps differently; the US officials thought that by ousting Soviet advisers and technicians, Sadat seemingly weakened his country's ability to fight, and therefore, there would be no need, from Washington's view, to appreciate Sadat's movement. US officials underestimated Sadat's warnings that Egypt might attack Israel to create a crisis that would force the superpowers to intervene. They recalled his 'empty threats' about the 'year of decision'; and considered him incapable of decision, either to wage war or to make peace with Israel.[62] The Nixon administration seemed as not interested in more than maintaining the 'status quo' that followed the Six Day War, Nixon neglected Sadat's initiatives, resisted a peace plan on the basis of UN Resolution 242 proposed by UN mediator Gunnar V. Garang in 1971,[63] and continued a policy of bolstering Israel as the only US regional surrogate in the Middle East. Furthermore, a memorandum of understanding in 1972 committed the United States to provide planes and tanks on a long-term basis. In that memorandum Nixon and Kissinger pledged to consult Israel before offering any new peace proposals. By doing so, as Mearsheimer and Walt notice, one of the world's two superpowers had in effect given Israel a quasi veto over subsequent diplomatic initiatives.[64]

Israel's Position

For its part, Israel dealt with Sadat's initiatives with obstinate spirit. The Israeli government rejected Sadat's conditionals initiatives and stated that peace would come only through direct negotiations without prior conditions. The Israelis also insisted that Israel would not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines, which sounded for the entire world like a prior condition.[65] Israel was willing to conclude a limited agreement involving an Israeli withdrawal to a line ten kilometres east of the canal, but the

---

[61] Bregman, *Israel's Wars*, p. 107. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 69.
[62] Arthur Goldschmidt, *A Concise History of The Middle East* (CA.: Perseus Books, 2005), p. 335.
[63] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 15.
[64] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 43.
[65] Salim Yaqub, "The Cold War in the Middle East", in Nigel J. Ashton, ed., *The Cold War in the Middle East*, p. 44

agreement could not be linked to a final settlement. And in the event of a final settlement, the Israelis insisted that they must keep Sharm al-Shaykh and an access road to it, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and substantial portions of the West Bank.[66]

Israel's politicians and generals, with few exceptions, insisted that they had prevailed in the War of Attrition. Israel had shown itself capable of withstanding significant military pressure in a long war and had resisted Egyptian, as well as international, pressure to withdraw from the Sinai without compensating political concessions. Some of Israel's leaders recognized the growing frustration of Arab governments and peoples, but, in response, placed an even heavier emphasis on the importance of military superiority as the basis of deterrence.[67]

In reaction to the inflexible stance of both the US and the Israelis, President Sadat sought other means to achieve his objectives. The Egyptian President calculated that he could serve his interests by coordinating with Syria an attack on Israel.[68] The flawed status-quo that prevailed before the war had given the President of Egypt a strong incentive to try to break the 'no war, no peace' stalemate by engineering an international crisis, the purpose of which was to create a situation of *instability* that would urge the superpowers to intervene positively.[69] Sadat intention was to increase the costs of perpetuating the status quo and to demonstrate to the superpowers that the continued stagnation could be dangerous to them, not only intolerable to him.[70] In retrospect it seems that Sadat had succeeded in his cause but at the expense of the regional stability which was badly needed by the Americans to maintain their regional interests.

Evaluation

The surrogate strategy, based on unequal conduct of regional actors, reflected a reductionist foreign policy according to which US administrations consistently supported Israel over the Arabs and rarely put pressure on the Jewish state even if its adventures

---

[66] Ibid., p. 44.
[67] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 151.
[68] For more elaboration on 1973 War, please refer to chapter 6 of this dissertation.
[69] Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 106, Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 16.
[70] Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 152.

harmed US interests. The Nixon administration refrained from intervening positively to support Sadat's initiatives out of a conviction that aligning with Israel was better for regional stability in terms of maintaining the status quo. The US stance came in accordance with the Nixon doctrine, laid out in 1969, which assumed that US interests would be preserved not through direct military intervention but through regional surrogates. The two acknowledged 'pillars' of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East were the Shah of Iran, who with US weapons and support was tasked with ensuring the status quo in the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia, which, though militarily weak, had lots of cash (and a degree of Islamic legitimacy) with which to bolster conservative and pro-US governments and political forces.[71] The Nixon-Kissinger team adopted Israel as a third pillar to US regional strategy and this entailed necessarily moving away from Sadat, and neglecting his proposals of regional settlement.[72] The harmful outcomes of adopting this course of policies included, (1) increasing Soviet influence and presence in the Middle East, (2) provoking repeated US-Soviet confrontations, and (3) increasing Arab hostility towards the US and significantly undermining the US credibility as an impartial peace broker. This reductionist US strategy caused many frustrations amongst the peoples of the Middle East who increasingly became unfavourable to any US role in the region.[73]

8.4 The Israeli Nuclear Program and Operation Babylon (1981)

Summary

Contrary to what was expected from the US policy-makers, who used to consider regional stability a top priority, the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel deepened significantly in the time when the nuclear program in Israel was proceeding steadily—that is, in the time of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The US policy of tolerating the Israeli nuclear project contributed to destabilizing the

---

[71] Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East, The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 162.
[72] The embrace of Israel as central to the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East also entailed US opposition to the PLO, which officials in Washington saw as a radical and destabilizing force which was to be marginalized, if not destroyed – a stance Israel greatly appreciated, since in those years it adamantly rejected any recognition of Palestinian national rights and was prepared to negotiate only with Arab governments, see Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, p. 162.
[73] See Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 48.

311

region through provoking other regional states to keep up with the Israeli activities. The Israeli nuclear program, has given several of Israel's neighbours a powerful incentive to seek nuclear capabilities themselves, such as Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, Washington's indecisive policy in this respect has created a credibility problem between regional actors and the United States, given the latter's unequal pressure on the region's countries to give up their nuclear programs.

8.4.1 Historical Background

With French support, Israel constructed its first nuclear reactor at Dimona in the Negev. The Dimona reactor was successfully concealed from the US, which was led to believe that the reactor was, at first, a textile factory, then a water-pumping station and finally a desalination plant.[74] Although 'a US spy plane managed to photograph the reactor, subsequent inspections failed to reveal its true purpose. Israeli officials constructed false walls at the site to prevent inspectors from accessing sensitive areas.'[75] However, in September 1960 US intelligence established that a significant atomic installation was in fact being built near Beersheba.[76] By 1970, Israel's status as a nuclear-weapon state became an accepted fact.[77] In the mid 1980s Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli former nuclear technician, revealed the Israeli program to the world, becoming an enemy of the state of Israel as a result.[78]

Applying a stability-driven analysis, it was expected that the US administrations would take immediate actions to rectify this development before it would affect the stability of

---

[74] Jonathan Cook, *Israel and The Clash of Civilizations* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

[75] Ibid., p. 95.

[76] Israel's Atomic Energy Activities, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 5, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, January 30, 1961, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.1901/1–3061. Secret. Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 264.

[77] Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 1.

[78] The information provided by Mordechai Vanunu appeared, for the first time, in Peter Hounam and others, "The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal Revealed," *Sunday Times* (London), 5 October 1986, p. 1. Vanunu was lured by a Mossad agent named Cheryl Bentov into flying to Italy where he was captured by Israeli agents, Vanunu was smuggled to Israel and put on trial on charges of treason and espionage. He was released in 2004 but is not allowed to leave the country and is subject to numerous other restrictions including a ban on speaking to foreign journalists. See Times Online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4794714.ece, accessed at 5 May, 2010.

the Middle East system as a whole. The acquisition of an Israeli nuclear weapons capability was expected to aggravate the existing Israel-Arab tensions, and to aggravate the Arabs who were expected to blame the United States for Israeli accomplishments and to condemn the actions as a further manifestation of Western double standards. However, the US reactions in this respect did not reach the level of deterring Israel. In the following I illustrate the reactions of three US presidents who experienced the evolution of the Israeli Nuclear program, namely, President Dwight Eisenhower, President John Kennedy, and President Lyndon Johnson.

- **Dwight Eisenhower**

Compared to those who came after him, President Dwight Eisenhower is remembered as the US president with the most audacious attitude towards the Israeli nuclear activities. In 1955 under the "Atoms-for-Peace" program the United States undertook to assist Israel with its atomic energy development program. Subsequently a one megawatt research reactor was built with US aid at Nahal Rubin, near Tel Aviv.[79] However, Eisenhower did not encourage Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons for fear of igniting a nuclear race between the Arabs and Israel, and hence losing regional stability. Moreover, Eisenhower feared that the Israeli nuclear project might spark the Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser into a pre-emptive move.

Eisenhower's fears of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East were about to materialize when Nasser declared in December 1960 that if Israel built an atomic bomb, the 'UAR would get one, too, at any price.'[80] The United Arab Republic (UAR) had a nuclear research program in operation, based on a two megawatt Soviet-supplied research reactor constructed following an agreement concluded in 1956. This reactor posed no military threat. However, since the disclosure of the Israeli reactor site at Dimona, UAR press

---

[79] Israel's Atomic Energy Activities, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 5, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, January 30, 1961, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.1901/1–3061. Secret.
[80] Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, p. 264

313

statements had implied that future UAR nuclear development might be of a military nature.[81]

UAR's declarations disturbed Eisenhower who confirmed again to the Israelis his rejection to developing nuclear weapons in the Middle East and his determination that Israel should allow international inspections to confirm Israel's claim that the Dimona reactor was devoted to peaceful purposes. In a Telegram from the Department of State to the US embassy in Israel in December 31, 1960 the US administration confirmed its policy as unequivocally opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities and that this policy was based on US conviction that threats to peace would be intensified as nuclear weapons capabilities were proliferated.[82]

The Eisenhower administration was aware that embracing Israel too closely would jeopardize relations with the Arab world and provide the Soviet Union with enticing opportunities to gain influence in the Middle East.[83] The administration was also aware that the USSR and the Arab countries would undoubtedly interpret the Israeli nuclear activity as intended for the production of weapons, and that the Arab reaction to the Israeli facility would be particularly severe.[84] Israeli requests for a US security guarantee were politely rejected and in 1961, Eisenhower demanded the Israelis to declare unreservedly that they had no plans to manufacture atomic weapons, but the Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion declined to give a clear pledge, insisting, instead, that the reactor was necessary to meet Israel's growing energy needs.[85]

[81] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 95, A Strategic Analysis of The Impact of The Acquisition By Israel of A Nuclear Capability, Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, undated. JCSM-523–61, Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5611/8–1461. Secret.

[82] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, December 31, 1960, Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5611/12–3160. Secret; Priority (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960 Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Document 181

[83] Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, p. 24.

[84] Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960 Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. December 8, 1960 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Document 177.

[85] Douglas Little, US Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), p. 94.

- **John Kennedy**

As described by historian Alan R. Taylor, President Kennedy never really tried to construct an alternate system of alignments or to repair the one that was passed on to him, preferring, instead, to emphasize the simplistic strategy of maintaining the status quo in the Middle East.[86] This status quo-oriented foreign policy might be responsible for Kennedy's indecisiveness in opposing the Israeli nuclear weapons program. This policy threatened to undermine the stability of Middle East system because the status quo that the Kennedy administration sought to maintain was not, in itself, stable.

As it was illustrated above, news of the construction of Israel's Dimona reactor led the Arabs to fear the creation by Israel of a nuclear weapons capability. This led the Kennedy administration to ask for arranging an inspection of the Israeli nuclear facility by US scientists, on the basis of whose visit Washington would reassure the Arabs that the reactor was designed for peaceful purposes. This inspection was first promised to US officials by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on January 4 1961.[87] The US State Department had been reminding the Israel Government at approximately weekly intervals of the importance of an early "quiet" visit by US scientists to Dimona.[88] President Kennedy expressed his concern to Ben-Gurion during a meeting in May 1961, but, the Israeli Prime Minister repeatedly denied that his country had a weapons program. Finally he expressed his initial agreement to international visits to Israel's nuclear installations by neutral scientists.[89] The US visit, took place on May 18, 1961, and involved just two

---

[86] Alan R. Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 61.
[87] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Washington, June 30, 1962. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 314, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/6–3062. Secret.
[88] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 28, Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy, Washington, March 30, 1961, Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A45/3–3061. Secret.
[89] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 57, Memorandum of Conversation, New York, May 30, 1961, Department of State, Central Files, 033.8411/5–3061. Secret.

American scientists. The visit lasted only four days, only one of them spent at the Dimona site, which was not enough to inspect the facility thoroughly. [90]

The subject was raised with Ben-Gurion a year later, in August 1962. At the same time a presidential envoy, Myer Feldman, Kennedy's informal liaison to the US Jewish community, flew to Tel Aviv to offer the Israelis the antiaircraft Hawk missiles they coveted in exchange for fresh assurances regarding nuclear non-proliferation. Again, Ben-Gurion agreed that Israel would permit US physicists, to 'visit' -but not inspect- the Dimona nuclear reactor complex in the Negev. [91]

The issue of the nuclear reactor was raised for a third time in April 1963, the same month the Hawk sale was concluded. The sale of Hawk air defence missiles was the first major weapons system provided to Israel by the United States and this would be only the beginning. In exchange for fresh oral pledges not to go nuclear, the Israelis started to receive generous compensation in the form of huge economic and military aid from the Kennedy administration. [92] The Hawk sale opened the door to several additional weapons deals, most notably the sale of more than two hundred M48A battle tanks in 1964, but this deals took place during the presidency of Kennedy's successor; President Lyndon Johnson. [93]

- **Lyndon Johnson**

In a memorandum to the US President on April 20, 1967, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow, said:

---

[90] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 35.

[91] Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), p. 66, Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 95.

[92] According to Stephen Walt the United States' decision to increase its commitment to Israel was based on several factors (1) the desire to maintain a regional balance of power given growing US support for its Arab clients and Soviet support for Egypt, (2) the enhanced role of pro-Israeli forces within the Kennedy administration, (3) the need to minimize domestic opposition to the rapprochement with Nasser, (4) Kennedy's own sympathies for the Jewish state, (5) the effort to persuade Israel to respond favourably to US initiatives for a permanent peace settlement. This informal security commitment, however, was linked to Israel's promise to refrain from developing nuclear weapons, a pledge that Kennedy and his advisers regarded as suspect. Thus, Israel obtained the advantage of a special relationship with the United States in exchange for a pledge with which it has never complied. See Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 95.

[93] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 25.

Israel has never levelled with us on its nuclear intent. Our intelligence people have scattered—but as yet unconfirmed—evidence that Israel is quietly but steadily placing itself in a position to produce nuclear weapons on short notice. We also know that Israel is investing large sums in a French built surface-to-surface missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead. I must emphasize that we do not know exactly what Israel is doing or what its position on the NPT will be. But we know enough to be seriously concerned. Therefore, it may be wise to take special care with each step this year.[94]

In spite of the indications brought to him by his advisors and in spite of the general awareness, among his administration, of the Israeli potential nuclear capabilities, President Johnson settled for Tel Aviv's oral pledges not to be the first to acquire nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Furthermore, when CIA Director Richard Helms came to the White House to inform Johnson that US intelligence had concluded that Israel had in fact acquired a nuclear capability, Johnson told him to make sure that nobody else was shown the evidence, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara. Johnson did not want to know what the CIA was trying to tell him, because, as Mearsheimer and Walt put it, once he accepted that information, he would have to act on it. But, the President had non-intention of doing anything to stop the Israeli nuclear project.[95]

Johnson, like his predecessor, welcomed holding more arms deals with Israel. A strong Israel, Johnson believed, would be less likely to go nuclear. Pro-Israel State Department officials confirmed to the president that 'if Israel is unable to obtain its valid conventional arms requirements, those in Israel who advocate acquisition of nuclear weapons will find a much more fertile environment for their views.'[96] The Johnson era, therefore, was characterized by a massive flow of arms and economic aid to America's ally. It could be

---

[94] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Document407. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,Washington, April 20, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret.
[95] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, pp. 35-36.
[96] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 99.

concluded that although the growing relationship between the two countries was not without strains, US overlooking of Israeli adventures during Johnson's term was greater than ever.[97]

US officials were aware that Israel's desire to keep the Arabs guessing was highly dangerous: In a memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in May 1964, the US official said that:

> without in any way implying that Israel is going nuclear, one has to admit that a functioning secret breeder reactor plus an oncoming missile delivery system add up to an inescapable conclusion that Israel is at least putting itself in a position to go nuclear. This could have the gravest repercussions on US-Israeli relations, and the earlier we try to halt it the better chance we have.[98]

In retrospect, it can be concluded that this advice had not been listened to. Israel remained an exception in the US policy in the region, although the general line in US policy was to prevent any regional party from changing the equation of regional stability and to eliminate any pretext that could be utilized by the Soviet Union to intervene in the region. Israel's nuclear activities had been condoned or, at best, had not been given the due sufficient concern by successive US administrations.

Consequences

Washington's indecisive stance towards Israel's nuclear activities led to a series of destabilizing crises. The most important of which was that it provoked other regional parties to follow the same course. The obvious case was that of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who, during the 1970s, attempted to develop the Iraqi nuclear capabilities and acquire a nuclear reactor. The Iraqi dream ended, however, with an Israeli forcible attack. In an explicit violation to regional stability, Israel waged an aerial strike against Osirak,

---

[97] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 98.

[98] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, Washington, May 28, 1964.Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Document 63, Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64. Secret.

the Iraqi reactor, and destroyed it. The point of interest for this study is that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, though negatively affected regional stability, had not been given sufficient concern by the US administration which preferred to maintain unstable 'status quo' than to intervene to deter its reckless client.

8.4.2 The Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Israeli Attack (Operation Babylon)

In 1962, Iraq began constructing its first research reactor, supplied by the Soviet Union. The Tuwaitha site, located about 30 kilometres south of Baghdad, became the first Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre after it was chosen as the location of the Soviet reactor and its associated facilities.[99] In the 1970s, France replaced the Soviets in supporting Iraq's nuclear program and agreed to provide it with its first nuclear reactor.[100] In June 1974, a professional delegation from Iraq travelled to Paris to negotiate the purchase of the reactor. The French dubbed the reactor Osirak, a mix of the words Osiris[101] and Iraq. The Iraqis, however, called the reactor 'Tammuz-1,' after the month when the Ba'ath party came to power in 1968. Iraq also contracted for a second lower power reactor called Tammuz-2 (designated Isis by the French).[102] On 10 September 1975, Saddam Hussein (Iraqi Vice President then) travelled to Paris to meet with the French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to negotiate the export of the two research reactors to Iraq. Prior to his trip to Paris, Hussein told the Lebanese news magazine *Al Usbu Al-Arabi* (The Arabic Week) that the agreement was 'the first concrete step toward the production of the Arabic atomic weapon' and that Iraq should be helped to obtain nuclear weapons in order to balance the Israeli nuclear arsenal.[103]

---

[99] Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz, at: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html; David Albright, Corey Gay and Khidhir Hamza, Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What if the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery? Institute for Science and International Security, at: http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/development-of-the-al-tuwaitha-site-what-if-the-public-or-the-iaea-had-over/9

[100] Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, *Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda* (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 81.

[101] Osiris is the ruler of the Afterlife, the underworld and the dead in the Egyptian old mythology.

[102] Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz, nuketesting.enviroweb.org/ hew/ Iraq/ IraqAtoZ.html; Hamza and Stein, *Saddam's Bombmaker*, pp. 22, 80-83.

[103] Quoted in: Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz The Nuclear Weapon Archive (27 December, 2001) at: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html; Hamza and Stein, *Saddam's Bombmaker*, p. 105.

For its part, Israel has always considered Iraq an enemy, but it became especially concerned about it in the mid-1970s, after France had agreed to provide Baghdad with nuclear reactors.[104] The Israeli officials believed that Israel's security could be achieved only through monopolizing nuclear capability, according to Ephraim Inbar, head of the Jafee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, 'it's quite clear, that we're not going to wait for a threat to be realized [...] For self-defence we have to act in a pre-emptive mode.'[105] Applying this proactive thinking on the issue, the Israelis sought to prevent Iraq from completing its nuclear reactor by all means.

In 1979, after Iraq signed a contract with an Italian firm to provide the reactor with the plutonium separation and handling facilities,[106] bombs went off in the company.[107] Following the attacks in Rome, threatening letters were sent to other European scientists in France, Italy and even Iraq who were involved in the project.[108] On 6 April 1979, the reactor cores for Tammuz I (Osirak) and Tammuz II (Isis) were subjected to damage by saboteurs in an explosion while they were awaiting shipment to Iraq in a warehouse in a French Mediterranean town. British and US intelligence officials concluded that the bombing was done by professionals and suspect that the raid was the work of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad. The French informed the Iraqis that manufacturing new reactors would take at least two years. The Iraqis, unwillingly, accepted the damaged reactors.[109] In continuation of its pre-emptive strikes, Israeli intelligence elements assassinated Dr. Yehya al-Meshad, an Egyptian physicist working for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, while he was in Paris to supervise the shipment of nuclear fuel to

---

[104] Ibid., p. 81.

[105] Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008), pp. 259, 260.

[106] On 15 January 1976, an agreement was signed between Italy and Iraq, according to which the Italians agreed to supply the Iraqis with the equipment and technical know-how of a vast field of nuclear problems, including the recycling of nuclear fuel and a particular system for reprocessing radiated nuclear fuel. Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, Uri Bar-Joseph, *Two Minutes over Baghdad* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 39.

[107] Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 252, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz", *The Nuclear Weapon Archive* (27 December, 2001).

[108] Perlmutter et al., *Two Minutes over Baghdad*, p. 57.

[109] Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p 251, Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb; the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East* (New York: Times Books, 1981), pp. 227-233; Hamza and Stein, *Saddam's Bombmaker*, p. 110.

320

Iraq. In 13 June 1980, hotel security personnel found the scientist dead and bloodied with multiple stab wounds.[110]

Finally, Israel initiated 'Operation Babylon' on 7 June 1981, a large aerial attack by eight F-16 fighter bombers using 2,000 lb bombs with six F-15s acting as top cover, on Iraq's nuclear-weapons plant at Osirak and completely destroyed it. This attack retarded the development of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons programme by several years.[111] Israel justified the raid on the grounds that the Iraqis would soon devote the reactor to building weapons.[112] The Osirak raid was recognized worldwide as a provocation and was severely condemned:

> The Soviet news agency called it a 'barbarous' act. The British Foreign Office called it a grave breach of international law which could have the most serious consequences. The French were enraged. United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim pronounced it a 'clear contravention' of international law. Arab leaders said Israel was taking advantage of its access to US weapons to strike the Arab world, violating Jordanian, Saudi, and Iraqi airspace in a blatant and unprovoked act of war.[113]

The US Stance

President Ronald Reagan was convinced that Israel had to tell him before the implementation of the strike, but given that the strike had taken place the US would not take punitive action against Israel for the sake of Iraq. Some analysts argued that the US administration not only turned a blind eye to the preparation for the attack but also helped Israel to perform it, albeit, indirectly. According to Mearsheimer and Walt:

> The United States, in the early 1980s, gave Israel access to certain forms of intelligence that it denied its closest NATO allies. In particular, Israel received almost unlimited access to intelligence from the sophisticated KH-

---

[110] Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p 251.
[111] Alistair Finlan, *Essential Histories: The Gulf war 1991* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), p. 2.
[112] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 135.
[113] Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 255.

321

11 reconnaissance satellite (not only the information, but the photos themselves, according to the head of Israeli military intelligence).[114]

Some historians tried to justify the weak US response to the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor by referring to some internal problems concerning the lack of coordination between the successive administrations. Patrick Tyler argued that the threat of war over the Osirak reactor got lost in a chaotic transition from the Carter to the Reagan administration. According to Tyler, the Osirak episode reiterated the shortcomings of US diplomacy, which had never looked so incompetent in the loss of continuity from one president to the next:

> Alexander Haig, acknowledged that he only discovered after the fact that the Carter administration had received from the Israelis a detailed warning about the Iraqi reactor, about its potential to make [atomic] bombs, and about the Israeli requests to the US and French governments to take action to prevent this result. However, from the time he was sworn in as secretary, it was never discussed with the Reagan administration.[115]

However, historical evidence regarding similar incidents of pre-emptive attacks carried out by Israel (Six-day war, invading Lebanon, attacking PLO in Tunisia) shows that even when there was sufficient information and coordination, few measures were taken to deter Israel from materializing its offensive plans. This study claims that failure in curbing regional adventures of Israel was one of US foreign policy setbacks in general and was a main negative feature of the Reagan administration, in particular.

Reagan was no admirer of Saddam Hussein; he might have found, then, some justification for Israel to pursue this offensive approach. The rebuke chosen by the Reagan administration as a reaction to the Israeli violation of regional stability was as poor as 'postponing the delivery of four F-16s that were due in Israel that summer.'[116] Shortly afterwards, however, the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister Begin

---

[114] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 34.
[115] Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 255.
[116] Ibid., p. 258.

unveiled a new Israeli-US memorandum of understanding, on 30 November 1981, heralding a 'mutual security relationship' designed to 'enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union' in the Middle East.[117]

The Israeli bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor, however, made Iraq more determined to continue working on its nuclear program, though in dispersed and secret locations.[118] After the Israeli attack in 1981, Iraq took the 'solid decision to go full speed ahead with weaponization. Some analysts estimated that it would have taken Iraq decades to obtain the required amount of weapons-grade material, had the program not been sharply accelerated as a result of the bombing.[119] Kenneth Waltz concluded that 'Israel's action increased the determination of Iraqis to produce nuclear weapons.'[120] Israel's strike, far from foreclosing Iraq's nuclear career, gained Iraq support from some other Arab states to pursue it.[121]

Evaluation

The US government has pressed dozens of states to sign the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but American leaders did little to pressure Israel to halt its nuclear program and sign the agreement.[122] The US undecided stance led to the eruption of numerous crises which had negatively affected regional stability and deepened a 'lack of confidence' among regional actors towards the US, and led Israel to be seen as above accounting. The irony, according to Walt and Mearsheimer is that:

> The United States has pressured many other states to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), imposed sanctions on countries that have defied US wishes and acquired nuclear weapons anyway, gone to war in 2003 to prevent Iraq from pursuing WMD, and contemplated attacking Iran and North

---

[117] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 108.
[118] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 233.
[119] Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival, America's Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), p. 15.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Peace, Stability and Nuclear Weapons," *UC Berkeley: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation* (1995) Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4cj4z5g2
[122] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 35.

Korea for the same reason. Yet Washington has long subsidized Israel whose clandestine WMD activities are well-known and whose nuclear arsenal has given several of its neighbours a powerful incentive to seek WMD themselves.[123]

Emmanuel Adler correctly concludes that since the Middle East conflict is between Israel and several Arab countries, even a small systemic fluctuation can push the whole system to the brink of nuclear war.[124] It can be concluded that, the Israeli decision to go nuclear was unlikely to lead to a stable Middle East. Instead, it made the Middle East much less stable, an outcome which was neither in the interest of the US nor the peoples of the region.[125]

8.5 Intervention in Lebanon (1982)

Summary

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in a debilitating US occupation of Beirut in 1982–1983. The United States came to Israel's aid once again following its ill-conceived invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The US intervened twice throughout the Lebanon crisis; the objective of the first intervention was to supervise the withdrawal of Israel's enemy, Yasser Arafat and the PLO out of Beirut, while the objective of the second intervention was to remedy the consequences of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in which hundreds of civilians were slaughtered by the Lebanese Christian Militiamen close to Israel. During the following months the size of the US force to Beirut grew and its activities escalated from peacekeeping to irregular involvement in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of Israel. The situation turned problematic for the American forces when they undertook tasks such as propping up the Christian government installed and secured by Israel during its invasion. Reagan administration tried to create an US-Israeli client regime in Lebanon, and to tie Lebanon to Israel by a peace treaty imposed on it while it was under Israeli occupation. As a result of this ill-advised strategy the US soldiers

---

[123] Ibid., p. 36.
[124] Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005).
[125] Ibid.

324

quickly became the target of attacks of pro-Syrian guerrillas. The most infamous attack took place in October 1983 with a suicide truck bombing that killed 241 marines. The attacks on US interests broke the political will of President Reagan who soon took the decision to withdraw US forces from Lebanon without achieving regional stability. US intervention lacked a clear mission and was based only on rectifying what its surrogate had violated.[126] For its part, Israel did not win explicit US support during its offence in Lebanon, but it was not opposed or threatened, either.

Historical Background

Because Egypt and Syria had imposed restrictions on guerrilla activities from their territory, it became vital for the PLO's leaders to establish an independent base in Lebanon, where many Palestinians already lived, (following Cairo agreement 1969[127] which established the right of the Palestinian residents of Lebanon to engage in the armed struggle, and following the events of 'Black September' which forced thousands of Palestinians to fled Jordan towards Lebanon). From their new position, which unquestionably affected Lebanon's domestic stability,[128] the PLO fighters launched guerrilla operations against Israel.

Ironically, the incident that eventually brought the Lebanon war took place neither in Lebanon nor in Israel, but in London. On 3 June 1982, terrorist gunmen of the Abu Nidal group shot Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador, and injured him. The PLO denied complicity in the attack. There was no reason, thus, 'why such an incident should turn into a cause and necessitate a massive Israeli invasion to eradicate the PLO in Lebanon,

---

[126] Lawrence Pintak, *Seeds of Hate, How America's Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the Jihad*, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. xi.

[127] Cairo agreement was an agreement reached in November 1969 between the Supreme Commander of the Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in an effort to regulate the relationship between the Lebanese government and the PLO, and the latter's activity in and from Lebanon. See David Seddon, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of The Middle East*, (New York, Europa Publications, 2004), p. 123.

[128] Stability in Lebanon was dependent on a constitutional compromise by which a succession of Maronite Christians held the presidency, the prime minister was a Sunni Moslem and the speaker of Parliament was a deviationist Shia Moslem. The arrival in Lebanon, from September 1970, of waves of Palestinians, mostly Moslems, had accentuated the traditional rivalry between left-leaning Moslems and rightist, mainly Maronite, Christians. One of the demands of the PLO and its allies was to reform the political system to make it equitable to Moslems, who now – largely because of the arrival of so many of them from Jordan – formed a majority in Lebanon. See Bregman, *Israel's Wars*, pp. 95-96.

given that Abu Nidal was a sworn enemy of the PLO and its leader Arafat and had even sent his people to assassinate him.'[129]

However, on 6 June the Israeli forces under the direction of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon started operation 'Peace of the Galilee' to vanquish the PLO once and for all. Israel's publicly stated objective was to push PLO forces back 40 kilometres (25 mi) to the north. However, Israeli forces pushed in from Southern Lebanon to the Lebanese capital Beirut which was shelled for ten weeks, killing both PLO members and civilians. Other objectives behind the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as were planned by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, included: to eradicate the Palestinian organizations, neutralize Syrian forces, and empower the pro-Israel Maronite leader Bashir al Gemayel in the hope that he would sign a peace treaty with Israel.[130]

Some evidence suggested that the US Secretary of State Alexander Haig indirectly encouraged Israeli belligerence. According to the testimony of Patrick Tyler in his richly detailed account of US policy in the Middle East; when Begin told Alexander Haig at Sadat's funeral (October 1981) that Israel might send an army into southern Lebanon and destroy the PLO presence, Haig responded pointedly: 'If you move, you move alone. Unless there is a major, internationally recognized provocation, the United States will not support such an action.'[131] But, according to Tyler, the inverse was also true: if the Israelis made the case that PLO threatened Israel, the United States could, in this case, support military operations.[132]

President Reagan, who seemed unaware of the Israeli preparations for invading Lebanon, was deeply moved by images of civilian suffering. He strongly criticized the Israelis and Haig's apparent support of them. In June 1982, he dispatched US forces to Beirut to help

---

[129] Ibid., p. 158.

[130] Ariel Sharon believed the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 would lead to the creation of a pro-Israel Christian state there and vanquish the PLO once and for all, thereby cementing Israel's control of the Occupied Territories. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, pp. 98, 135, Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 257.

[131] For a good analysis of Alexander Haig's personality see: James Chace, "The Turbulent Tenure of Alexander Haig," *The New York Times*, 22 April 1984, at: http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/22/books/the-turbulent-tenure-of-alexander-haig.html?&pagewanted=4

[132] Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 269.

end fighting between Israeli and Palestinian forces there. He also sent veteran envoy Philip Habib to broker a settlement. On 25 June, Reagan dismissed Haig from office. However, he did not threaten to cut off Israel's supply of US weapons if they were used offensively in Lebanon. Israel did not win explicit US support during its offence in Lebanon, but it was not opposed or threatened, either.[133]

The First US Intervention

With Beirut in ruins and the Israelis intensifying the pressure, the siege became unendurable and the Lebanese government sent Chief of Intelligence Jonny Abdo to the PLO leader Yasser Arafat as a special envoy, demanding that Arafat should leave Beirut with his men in order to end the Israeli aggravation of the Lebanese. Without the support of the government of Lebanon, and with the Israeli siege tightening around him, Arafat came to realize that this was the end of the game in Lebanon. He acquiesced to the Lebanese government's demand, and deposited a letter to this effect in the hands of Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan.[134]

The US President proposed sending a contingent of US troops to Beirut as part of a multinational force to help restore stability. Reagan disregarded the Pentagon's misgivings at the behest of secretary of state, George Shultz. By escorting Yasser Arafat and the PLO out of Beirut and by safe-guarding the Palestinian non-combatants left behind in the refugee camps just outside the Lebanese capital, Shultz argued, US troops would pave the way for a speedy Israeli withdrawal and would thus restore regional stability.[135]

An agreement was reached on 12 August 1982, according to which US, French, and Italian troops, known as the Multinational Force in Lebanon, arrived in Beirut to supervise the relocation of Palestinian fighters out of the country to various Arab states e.g. Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, both North and South Yemen, Greece, and Tunisia (which became the new PLO headquarters). Arafat left on 30 August 1982, and 5,200 Syrian

---

[133] The US response was very light, Washington sanctioned Israel only by postponing the delivery of four F-16s that were due in Israel that summer. See Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 258.
[134] Bregman, *Israel's Wars*, p. 114.
[135] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 246.

troops also departed, the evacuation was completed by 1 September.[136] Philip Habib provided an assurance to the PLO that the Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps would not be harmed. However, the United States Marines departed West Beirut two weeks before the end of their official mandate. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger insisted that the marines had accomplished their mission and convinced President Reagan to redeploy them offshore aboard the vessels of the Sixth Fleet on 10 September.[137] The result was a fresh round of sectarian violence, culminating in the massacre of Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in which several hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed by the Lebanese Christian Militiamen, linked to Israel, known as the Phalangists.

The Second US Intervention

After the assassination of president-elect Bashir Al Gemayel,[138] by Habib Shartouni of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party,[139] Israeli troops marched into Beirut again and took up positions there to 'restore stability'. The Israeli command authorized the entrance of a force of approximately 150 Phalangists fighters into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, claiming there was a remaining force of approximately 2000 PLO elements in the camps.[140] The Christian militias massacred a large number of Palestinians over a period of three days. Meanwhile, Israeli troops surrounded the camps with tanks and checkpoints, monitoring entrances and exits. Estimates of death tolls ranged from 800 to

---

[136] PLO Leader Forced From Beirut, *BBC News*, 30 August 1982, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/30/newsid_2536000/2536441.stm

[137] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 246.

[138] Since 1976 Israel had cultivated Lebanon's Christian leadership. The elders of the Christian community, Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun, reached out to their Israeli counterparts to help them in the civil war. To the Israelis, Bashir Gemayel, Shiekh Pierre's youngest son, was the best hope to reunify Lebanon. He is a tough national figure who could share power with the Muslim and Druze communities and who could crush the PLO ministate and expel Arafat's Palestinian government in exile. The young Bashir returned home and transformed the Phalange militia (founded by his father) into the most powerful armed force in the country with covert assistance from Israel and the United States, secretly authorized by Reagan. Gemayel saw the PLO presence in Lebanon as a cancer. His dream was to drive all Palestinians out of the country. Bashir Gemayel was assassinated on 14 September. He was elected President of Lebanon on 23 August; and should have taken office on 23 September. His assassination was a mortal blow to Sharon's plan in Lebanon, for he had invested enormously in Gemayel and hoped he would sign a peace treaty with Israel. See Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 272.

[139] Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), p. 391.

[140] Flashback: Sabra and Shatila massacres, *BBC News Online*, 24 January 2002, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1779713.stm

3,500 people. The killings were considered the worst atrocity of Lebanon's 15-year civil war and perhaps during the entire Middle East conflict.[141]

As chaos engulfed Lebanon, President Reagan decided to resend US forces to the Lebanon Capital, Beirut. On 20 September 1982 Reagan announced that the United States was sending the marines back to Lebanon to re-join French and Italian troops as peacekeepers. During the following thirteen months the size of the US force to Beirut grew to 1,200, its activities escalated from peacekeeping to irregular involvement in the Lebanese civil war.[142]

The US forces took sides in Lebanon's ongoing civil war, supporting the right-wing Christian government (installed by Israel during its invasion but many Lebanese regarded as illegitimate) fighting Lebanese forces backed by Syria. As a result of its involvement in the civil war, US forces became a prime target for the Lebanese Shiite groups. In April 1983, a car bomb demolished the US embassy in Beirut, killing 63 persons (among them seventeen Americans, including the CIA's leading expert on the Mideast, Robert C. Ames). In response, President Reagan ordered US Navy ships from the Sixth Fleet to launch air strikes against several Shiite strongholds.

The US reaction deepened the impression among ordinary Lebanese that the US forces were acting not as impartial peacekeepers but as allies of the Israelis and the right-wing Christian Phalangists. Six months later on 23 October 1983, a huge truck bomb at a barracks killed 241 US marines (as well as 58 French soldiers) and injured more than 100 others.[143] It was the deadliest single overseas attack on US military forces since the

---

[141] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 246, Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 45. Further Israeli investigation by the Kahan Commission of Inquiry found that Ariel Sharon bears 'personal responsibility' for failing to prevent the massacre, and for failing to act once he learned that a massacre had started. The Kahan Commission recommended that Sharon be removed as Defence Minister and that he never hold a position in any future Israeli government. Sharon initially ignored the call to resign, but after the death of an anti-war protester following an anti-war protest, he did resign as Israel's Defence Minister, however, he remained in Begin's cabinet as a Minister without portfolio. He later became Prime Minister of Israel (2001 to 2006). See The Kahan Commission at: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html
[142] Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 246.
[143] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary*, pp. 156, 93, Little, *US Orientalism*, p. 247, Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, pp. 228, 229, Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 45.

Second World War.[144] As Mearsheimer and Walt noticed "The suicide bombers are to blame for these deaths, but the loss of life was part of the price the United States had to pay in order to clean up the situation that Israel had created."[145] After the deadly attack President Reagan offered an emotive tribute to the fallen marines, but no convening explanation of their mission or the reason for their deaths was given.[146]

Day by day it became clear that the US intervention in Lebanon had failed to achieve its objectives. There was huge pressure on Reagan administration to halt the air strikes, pull the marines out of Beirut, and scale back US intervention in Lebanon before it escalated into something far more serious. After a six-week search for a face-saving way out of the Lebanese quagmire and on 7 February 1984 Reagan announced the 'redeployment of the Marines from the Beirut Airport to their ships offshore' as soon as possible.[147] The withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon was exactly what those who planned the attacks hoped to achieve. The withdrawal was a severe blow to the Reagan administration which also banned travel by Americans to Lebanon in 1987–1997 and closed the US embassy in Beirut in 1989.[148] Reagan soon ended the US military presence in Lebanon (the last US Marine departed from Beirut on 26 February 1984) without achieving stability.[149]

As for Israel, it was eighteen years (after 1982) before the IDF finally left Lebanon, and it was the Hezbollah group (which was created as a direct response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982)[150] that drove them out. The IDF had fought Hezbollah in Lebanon between 1982 and 2000, Hezbollah had not only survived, but it eventually forced Israel to withdraw in 2000. Israel and Hezbollah remained bitter enemies even after Israel withdrew, and occasional skirmishes continued to take place along the Israeli-Lebanese border. It was just such a skirmish on July 12, 2006, that erupted into Israel's second war

[144] Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008* (London: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 160.
[145] Mearsheimer and. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,* p. 56.
[146] Kyle Longley et al., *Conservative Mythology and America's Fortieth President* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2007), p. 21.
[147] Little, *US Orientalism,* p. 248.
[148] Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East,* pp. 228, 229.
[149] Little, *US Orientalism,* p. 147.
[150] Many believe that Hezbollah was responsible for the devastating attacks on the U.S. embassy and marine barracks that cost more than 240 American lives. See Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,* p. 56.

in Lebanon.[151] The 34-day military conflict between the Israeli forces and Hezbollah paramilitary forces started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon. The war has been a disaster for the Lebanese people, as well as a major setback for the United States and for Israel.[152]

Evaluation

Although US officials—including President Reagan himself—were upset by Israel's conduct during its invasion of Lebanon, they did not try to punish Israel for its actions.[153] "The United States despite verbal protestations and other gestures and occasional genuine irritation, lent Israel the political support that enabled it to proceed with the war for an unusually long time."[154] Instead of sanctioning Israel for invading a neighbouring country, Congress voted to give Israel an additional $250 million in military assistance in December 1982, over the strong objections of both President Reagan and his new secretary of state, George P. Shultz.[155]

In this case, as in so many others, the US pro-Israel intervention has been harmful to US as well as to regional stability. On contrast to its first intervention which reflected, to some extent, a balanced position towards the conflicting parties, the second US intervention in the Lebanese crisis was fraught with errors. The United States failed to remain neutral, aligned itself with Israel's regional interests and engaged in domestic hostilities. The Reagan administration failed to exert any real pressure on its regional ally

---

[151] Although the Second Lebanese War (July/August 2006) falls within the time frame of this study, it was not included as a separate case study, given that the war's repercussions continued to take place after the end of the time frame of the study. More important, there was not much information in the public record about the decision-making process that led President G. W. Bush to back the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in his attack on Lebanon—an attack that killed more than one thousand Lebanese, most of them civilians and that was harshly criticized by almost every country in the world except for the United States.

[152] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 308

[153] John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 45

[154] Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon 1970-1985*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 146.

[155] Mearsheimer and. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 46.

after its invasion of Lebanon. This inability to confront Israel represented a constant feature of US policy towards Israel's regional adventures.

Theoretically speaking, the US intervention in Lebanon represented a process of positive feedback in which each new decision led to an action that differed from the original intention. After a certain period of time, actions, and consequently events, occur that were not intended in the first place.[156] Emanuel Adler summarized US problematic situation in Lebanon by saying:

> The US foreign policy that originally set out to restore stability became after a while involved in unwanted belligerent acts and intervention, involve other nations in these actions, produce responses in other parts of the world, and cause reactions to the policy that may eventually affect its own outcome.[157]

To sum up, in the Lebanon war the United States had undertaken policies that reflected Israel's preferences rather than the American interests. The US unequivocal support for Israel resulted in some destabilizing repercussions that were hardly good for either Washington or the regional system. For its part, Israel would have been much better off if the United States had told it that its military strategy for intervening in Lebanon was doomed to fail, rather than reflexively endorsing and facilitating it.

8.6   Conclusion

Proceeding from a simplistic perception of regional stability, Washington utilized the surrogate strategy to control the outcomes of regional interactions in the Middle East and chose Israel to play the role of regional surrogate. But Israel, in many cases, instead of maintaining regional stability on behalf of the US, served its own interests which were not always consistent with US interest in regional stability. The Israeli violations, however, were either condoned or even approved by the US administrations. These reactions comprised what this chapter addressed as a pro-Israel model of intervention.

---

[156] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations*, p. 42.
[157] Ibid.

The pro-Israel intervention represented the US foreign policy reaction when the violation to regional stability was committed by Israel. The cases discussed above were evaluated against the US reaction to Israel's regional behaviour; in terms of whether the Israeli behaviour served or hampered US interest in maintaining regional stability and whether or not the US opposed Israel when it acted in ways that the United States deemed undesirable. It was concluded that, as a general rule, Washington was ready to intervene to address any violation to the status quo in the Middle East system except when this violation was committed by its regional surrogate. Israel had contributed directly in destabilizing the Middle East system (pushing the system out of its equilibrium point) in several cases, four of which have been discussed above. These crises, in spite of their negative effect on regional stability, witnessed minimal US reaction.

For example, in the Six-Day-War and the volatile period that followed it; known as the phase of no war and no peace, it was supposed that Washington had a definite interest in intervening swiftly to address the imbalances caused by its regional surrogate. But the US reaction in both cases was only post factum. Washington overlooked the Israeli violation to the regional stability and put no pressure on the Israelis to withdraw from the territories they had occupied. The United States increased its arms supplies while doing relatively little to encourage Israeli concessions in the various peace talks that occurred during this period.[158]

Similarly, the US was expected to intervene in a decisive way to prevent Israel from proceeding in its WMD plans, but it did not. In contrast to Washington's long-standing opposition to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the United States had practically supported Israel's effort to maintain regional military superiority by turning a blind eye toward its various clandestine WMD programs.[159] Even when the US administration decided to intervene to restore regional stability disrupted by its surrogate, as was the case in 1982 when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its complicit role in the massacre of innocent Palestinians by a Christian militia at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps

---

[158] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 43.
[159] Ibid., pp. 34,35.

made the region less stable, the US aligned itself with the pro-Israel groups and engaged in a civil war that had nothing to do to the US interests in the region.

The analysis of the above cases illustrated the weakness of the surrogate strategy and the fact that the model of intervention that grew out of it (the pro-Israel model) was arguably counter to US interest in securing regional stability. Backing Israel constantly might have resulted in some positive developments in terms of broader America's Cold War concerns, but it had hardly yielded helpful outcomes in terms of maintaining regional stability. Israel's adventures (meddling in neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Syria) had resulted in many negative repercussions for the United States and for the region. On the one hand the Israeli behaviour repeatedly complicated US efforts to maintain regional stability and rendered US officials unreliable mediators in the eyes of many Arabs, and on the other hand its own nuclear programs and frequent willingness to use force had encouraged other Middle Eastern states to desire WMD of their own. According to Mearsheimer and Walt:

> No two countries will always have the same interests. It is just not the way international politics works. There have been instances in the past, and there will be more in the future, where American and Israeli interests were at odds. For example, it made good strategic sense for Israel to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1960s, but it was not in America's interest to have Israel go nuclear. Nor is it in the US national interest when Israel kills or wounds innocent Palestinian civilians (even if only unintentionally) and especially not when it uses American-made weapons to do it. One sees a similar divergence of interests in Israel's decision to invade Lebanon in 1982.[160]

It could be concluded that Israel was not much of an asset when it comes to maintaining dynamic stability or even preserving the status quo in the region and has repeatedly frustrated US efforts to deal more effectively with region's problematic issues. The outcomes of pursuing the pro-Israel model of intervention included several aspects of instability (as being defined by US administrations) such as: increasing Soviet influence

---

[160] Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p. 148.

and presence in the Middle East, provoking repeated US-Soviet confrontations (during the Cold War), and increasing Arab hostility towards the US and significantly undermining the US credibility as an impartial peace broker. Broad majorities of the population in most of Middle East countries angrily denounced both the Israeli destabilizing interventions and the US for the positions it took in line with the Israeli adventures. According to Mearsheimer and Walt again:

> Washington might find it easier to address Middle East crises were its policies not constrained by the prior commitment to Israel. Israel looks first and foremost to its own interests, and it has been willing to do things contrary to US interests when it believed that doing so would advance its own national goals.[161]

Moreover, US support for Israel is a significant source of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. There is in fact abundant evidence that the combination of unstinting US support for Israel and Israel's prolonged occupation of Arab territory have encouraged anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world and has fuelled the rage of anti-American radicals.[162] The "special relationship" with Israel, which basically meant unqualified US support for Israel, contributed in making US interests more magnetic targets for outraged groups. This relation is not the only grievance of these groups, of course, but it is a central one, and it makes advancing other U.S. interests more difficult.[163]

However, it is worth mentioning that this general rule of US inactiveness in the face of the Israeli adventures was broken only once, namely, in the Suez Crisis, when the US intervened to address the imbalances caused by the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, and forced Israel to relinquish the territories it had occupied; the Sinai desert. During this crisis President Eisenhower credibly threaten to withhold US aid to Israel after the Suez War. This balanced policy towards the conflicting parties rendered the

---

161 Ibid., p. 72.
162 Mearsheimer, and Walt, *The Israel Lobby.*
163 Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution, A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 127.

Middle East system in a better equilibrium and cleverly de-escalated an international crisis. [164]

Table 8.1 **Pro-Israel Model**

	The Israeli Action	The US Reaction	Consequences
The Six Day War (1967).	Israel, instead of maintaining regional stability, on behalf of the US, launched an attack on its Arab neighbours, and destabilized the regional system.	The US overlooked the Israeli preparation of War and abstained from taking any positive step to hinder the violation. Following the end of the hostilities, the Johnson administration made no pressure for an Israeli withdrawal.	In subsequent years, the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories would become the major cause of regional instability in terms of a continued contention between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as between Israel and the Palestinians.
The Phase of no War no Peace.	Convinced that it had prevailed in the War of Attrition the Israeli government insisted on its occupation of Arab territories and rejected Sadat's peaceful initiatives. Israel's politicians emphasised military superiority, rather than peaceful negotiations, as a basis of regional stability.	The USs did not seek to produce any softening of Israel's tough positions; they did not put any pressure on Israel to start negotiating with Sadat and continued to strengthen it militarily. The Nixon administration misread repeated Sadat's signals to break the stalemate that followed the Six-Day-War. The Nixon administration seemed as interested in maintaining the 'status quo' which favoured Israel's interests.	In reaction to the inflexible stance of both the USs and the Israelis, President Sadat coordinated with Syria an attack on Israel. The eruption of October/Yom Kippur War (1973) complicated US position in the area and further complicated US-Soviet relations.
The Israeli Nuclear Project	Ample evidences accumulated confirming Israel's status as a nuclear-weapon state. The possible	Although the general line in US policy was to prevent any regional party from changing the equation of regional stability and to eliminate any pretext that could be utilized	The US policy of tolerating the Israeli nuclear project has contributed to destabilizing the region through provoking

---

[164] See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 550. Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–756. Confidential.

	acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel aggravated the Israel-Arab tensions, and led the Arabs to condemn the Israeli actions as a further manifestation of Western (mainly US) double standards.	by the Soviet Union to intervene in the region. Israel's nuclear activities had been condoned or, at best, have not been given the due sufficient attention by successive US administrations. The US reaction in this respect did not reach the level of deterring Israel.	other regional states to keep up with the Israeli behaviour. Washington's indecisive policy in this respect has created a credibility problem between regional actors and the United States, given the latter's unequal pressure on the region's countries to give up their nuclear programs.
The Israeli Intervention in Lebanon	Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in destabilizing outcomes. The Lebanese capital was put under unendurable siege and ended up in ruins because of the Israeli intensifying pressure.	In this crisis the US has intervened in Lebanon in an attempt to rectify the negative effects of the Israeli adventures. However, the activities the US forces escalated from peacekeeping to irregular involvement in the civil war on behalf of Israel. The US supported the right-wing Christian government (installed by Israel), fought Lebanese movements, tried to create an US-Israeli client regime in Lebanon, and to tie Lebanon to Israel by a peace treaty.	The situation turned problematic both for the regional system and for the USs. The US failure to remain neutral and its engagement in hostilities made the USs a target of attacks of pro-Syrian guerrillas. The US forcible reaction deepened an impression among ordinary Lebanese that the US forces were acting not as impartial peacekeepers but as allies of the Israelis and the right-wing Christian Phalangists.

337

Chapter 9

US Strategies-of-Stability
A Critique

9.1   Introduction

In the descriptive chapters I introduced evidence that US strategies of stability reflect simplistic characteristics; they were based on *imposing* stability (in terms of certain status quo arrangements) on Middle East system through despotic allies, military invasion or regional surrogate, instead of cultivating the conditions that enable local actors to self-stabilize by their own. The majority of US administrations (1953-2008) did not count on the ability of Middle East sub-state actors to change/challenge the status quo and hence did not invest heavily in them. Apart from a number of limited initiatives to support civil society and promote democracy, the United States did not play a pivotal role in empowering the local citizens in the region to take the lead for change.

In the following I summarize the main results of the descriptive chapters. Then I illustrate the main aspects of US strategies of stability pursued in the Middle East. These aspects include: (1) controlling the actors—by identifying the acceptable actors and excluding uncooperative ones, (2) controlling the interactions—by determining the acceptable patterns of interactions and invalidating inappropriate patterns, and (3) controlling the ideologies—by identifying the acceptable ideologies and denouncing unacceptable ones. I briefly address each of these aspects and give illustrative examples. Finally, the chapter elucidates how a different strategy (based on empowering local actors) allows for a more sustainable form of stability.

9.2   Summarizing the Results of the Descriptive Chapters

Regional stability presents one of America's core objectives in the Middle East.[1] However, US stability-driven policies towards the region have achieved little success. US decision-makers irreversibly affected their immediate target (regional stability) in ways that are inconsistent with their interests in the region. The Middle East remains one of the most volatile regions of the world in spite of the repeated US stability-driven intervention in its affairs.

The argument of this thesis is that most of the US administrations (1953-2008) have pursued simplistic strategies in their course of intervention in the Middle East. The US administrations did not seek to boost the dynamism of the Middle East system or enhance its local actors' ability to self-stabilize. Rather, US interventions have contributed to deepen either the state of political stagnation through maintaining the status quo, or the state of chaos through forcibly ousting uncooperative regimes.

The hypothesis of this dissertation is correct should the Middle East regional system(s) remain unable to cope with disturbances after the US intervention in its/their affairs. When the outcome of a certain intervention negatively affects the US interest of regional stability in addition to harmfully affecting the concerned regime's ability to cope with disturbances, this increases the likelihood that the outcome of the US intervention is destabilizing, especially if the intervention appears as a permanent rather than a temporary action; such outcome enhances confidence in the accurate characterization of a given US intervention. In the model of pro–Israel intervention the cases were evaluated against the US reaction to Israel's regional behaviour; in terms of whether the Israeli behaviour served or hampered US interest in maintaining regional stability and whether or not the US opposed Israel when it acted in ways that the United States deemed undesirable.

After addressing a number of historical instances (15 historical case-studies) of US intervention in the Middle East it can be concluded that the above hypothesis is valid. By

---

[1] Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March, America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 16.

analysing the consequences of US intervention in each case, it appeared that the United States had succeeded in achieving only a(n) temporary/ostensible regional stability and did not succeed, in most of these cases, in helping the Middle East's sub-systems to accommodate subsequent challenges. That is to dynamically self-stabilize. This conclusion is manifested by comparing the immediate outcomes of each intervention with its later repercussions.

In most of the cases of intervention the US regional interests were negatively affected as a result of its application of top-down/forcible/reductionist strategies in the Middle East. The US interests were also affected as a result of overestimating the role of Israel as a regional surrogate. As was illustrated in the descriptive chapters, Israel had contributed directly in destabilizing the Middle East system (pushing the system out of balance) in at least four cases. These cases, in spite of their negative effect on regional stability and on US interests, witnessed minimal US reaction. In the following I summarize the main shortcomings of each strategy of intervention adopted by the US (1953-2008).

- **The Status quo Strategy**

According to this strategy the United States physically intervened (either pre-emptively or reactively) to protect some of the most undemocratic regimes in order to secure regional stability (necessary for its regional interests).[2] The logic behind adopting this strategy was that: without the help of those autocratic regimes, anti-Western groups will come to dominate the region and affect US interests.[3] There was a strong belief that any pressure on those moderate regimes to yield power at home would lead those governments to loosen or even abandon their strategic alliances with Washington. Adopting this strategy revealed the fact that the democratic agenda was not the principal framework that guided US policy deliberations in the region.

The US status-quo strategy managed in most cases, save the Lebanese case, to secure US regional clients. However, this strategy did not help the troubled allies to acquire

---

[2] Steve Smith, "US Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions" in Michael Cox et al. eds., *US Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 63.
[3] Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, (July/August 2008), pp. 2 – 26.

dynamic stability in terms of being able to cope with subsequent disturbances alone. Rather, they remained in need of further US help to face domestic and regional crises. The concerned regimes retained equilibrium by external intervention, not by their own capabilities, without any guarantee that these regimes would be able to deal with subsequent crisis in the future.

The initial association between stability and the status quo neglected the fact that the starting point in the concerned regimes referred in many cases to an imbalanced equilibrium, whereby the status quo may actually be unstable. Maintaining autocracy-based status quo, thus, was not a guarantee of maintaining stability even in its simplistic definition. At the same time, the status-quo strategy negatively affected US interest in the region. Maintaining some autocratic rulers with only limited popular support caused anti-US sympathies to increase among local citizens.

- **The Hegemony Strategy**

Hegemony is said to create stability by overawing potential rivals; any regime that is identified as a threat to the hegemon runs the risk of becoming a target for violent retribution.[4] Employing this strategy, Washington intervened in several countries to disrupt the existing balance and advance a new stability formula under the banner of promoting the US model of democracy. Adopting this strategy presented a departure from the traditional US foreign policy based on maintaining the status quo and system equilibrium. Hegemonic status was precisely the condition under which pro-democracy intervention surfaced and had an impact on US choices, because there was less constraint forced by the dynamics of the international system.

The shift from the status-quo strategy, however, has not been in the direction of a more dynamic form of stability. According to the new strategy, stability instead of being allowed to emerge out of systems' local interactions was simply imposed on system components in a forcible way. This strategy of simplifying the complex turned out to be workable in terms of attaining some political hegemony in countries that witnessed the

---

[4] Adrian Little, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

application of this strategy like Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the dangers of such an approach included an increase in public disaffection and antagonism as stability was accompanied by US occupation.

The simplistic perception of 'stability through invasion' or 'hegemonic stability' missed its target in the case of Middle East system. Stabilizing complex systems, like that of Iraq and Afghanistan, cannot be achieved through military force and invasion. The two wars launched for this purpose exposed the weaknesses of this hegemonic strategy and underlined the uncertainties of imposing stability by force. The results of these wars are unlikely to be seen by future historians in a positive light, and there are many doubts surrounding the ability of the 'hegemonic stability' strategy to survive if the US administration decided to withdraw its troops, leaving the 'democratic' systems in Iraq and Afghanistan to face their fate alone.

- **The Surrogate Strategy**

According to this strategy the US identified itself with a regional surrogate in order to serve its interest of regional stability. Starting from the 1967 war, Washington chose Israel to play this role. Proponents of the surrogate strategy argued that Israel was capable of maintaining US interests of promoting regional stability and preventing war. However this required the US to invest heavily in Israel by ensuring its absolute military superiority through providing it with unlimited arms supplies and economic assistance. The adoption of this strategy explains the steadfast US support for Israel; the United States backs Israel because doing so supposedly serves US interest in regional stability (by countering Soviet penetration, nationalist fervour, and Islamist movements). In exchange of these strategic services Washington overlooked Israel's regional adventures and abstained from intervening decisively whenever regional instability was caused by the Jewish state.

However, backing Israel unreservedly has yielded negative outcomes both for regional stability and for US regional interests. Israel's meddling in neighbouring countries (Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Syria) has repeatedly complicated US efforts to maintain regional

stability. In addition, its clandestine nuclear activities have encouraged other Middle Eastern states to seek WMDs. Similarly, Israel was not much of an asset when it comes to maintaining stability or preserving balance of power in the region and had repeatedly frustrated US efforts to deal more effectively with region's problematic issues. Mearsheimer and Walt correctly concluded that 'Israel looks first and foremost to its own interests, and it has been willing to do things contrary to US interests when it believed that doing so would advance its own national goals.'[5] Supporting Israel unconditionally rendered the US unreliable peace brokers and complicated the United States' efforts to achieve the important and urgent goal of peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

9.3 America's Simplistic Strategies

US administrations used to give simplistic answers to the question: how can the US maintain stability in the Middle East in a way that supports US interests in the region? The way in which Washington intervened in the Middle East and the policy tools it utilized reflected a simplistic perception of the region. Middle East system was treated as a linear system that can be manipulated by controlling its *major* components. Local changes, development or evolution were therefore considered merely a marginal rearrangement caused by top-down decisions. The behaviour of the masses (local-level actors) was thought to be predictable and controllable through influencing the behaviour of the ruling regimes.

US strategies tried to perpetuate the feature of simplicity on the Middle East because it was easier to predict and control simple systems. US decision makers focused their attention on maintaining stable allies (or replacing them with more stable ones), and were convinced that regional stability had little to do with minor interactions taking place between system local agents. This top-down way of viewing the region contributed to deepening regional imbalances and hampered the natural evolution of system dynamics.

More important, this policy put the US in a state of hostility with the peoples of the region. Washington did not trust the attitudes of the masses and tried to isolate them from

---

[5] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

participating in political life. During the Cold War, US officials used to have a fear of the leftist trends of the region's citizens. One of Middle East experts, Edmund A. Gullion of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, argued in 1953 that 'the peoples of the region provided tinder for communist conflagrations, because they were poverty-stricken, suspicious of the West, animated by a fierce nationalism, [and] divided by political disputes and religious and racial differences.'[6] After the Cold War, the peril turned green (green being the colour of Islam), and US officials became worried about the Islamic tendencies of the masses of the region.[7] Except for the Suez crisis, successive US administrations (1953-2008) were not interested in exploring public attitudes in any of the cases that witnessed US intervention. This may explain why US foreign policy toward the Middle East was generally unwelcomed by local citizens. The US aligned itself, in most cases, with autocratic regimes whom it tasked with securing its regional interests and intervened more in favour of preserving the status quo than for sponsoring political reform.

This was the case in Iran in 1953, when the United States and Britain plotted with the unpopular and despotic Shah of Iran to overthrow the democratically elected, but left leaning, Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq. Successive US administrations aligned themselves with the Shah, and underestimated the possibility of any popular reaction by the local citizens. The popular stance then was certainly against the US

---

[6] Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East, US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961*, 2004, p. 151.
[7] Compare this attitude with that of President Wilson, in the Paris Conference 1919, when he secured British and French approval for the creation of a special Commission to survey popular opinions, and ascertain whether the Arab peoples were ready for self-government. The Commission was headed by two Americans, Henry Churchill King, president of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, a Chicago businessman and a trustee of Robert College in Constantinople. They visited Middle East territories stripped from the Ottoman Empire and filed a report on their own authority. The King-Crane Commission had virtually no impact on diplomacy, as Great Britain and France proceeded with bilateral plans to assign Palestine and Iraq as British mandates and Syria (including Lebanon) as a French mandate. However, it marked the US government's first ever, high-level official inquiry into political conditions and more importantly, public opinions in the Middle East. See Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), Lawrence Davidson, *America's Palestine, Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), Douglas Little, *American Orientalism, The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003).

special relationship with the Shah; this negative stance was revealed abruptly afterwards by the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis.

Similarly, the US support of King Hussein of Jordan did not take into consideration bottom-up factors. It was easy to conclude that broad sectors of the Jordanian public were in favour of nationalist ideas presented by Nasser. In spite of that, the US administrations aligned themselves with the King, and were not keen in paying attention to the Jordanian domestic opposition. The US ambassador to Jordan, Lester D. Mallory, summarized this position when he told Washington that 'even if [King Hussein] lacked popular support, [he] would be able to maintain control as long as the Jordanian army stood behind him.'[8] This stance was just an example of the simplistic conception of stability that was prevailing within the US decision-making circles, according to which the most important thing was to keep the status quo through allying with actual power holders regardless of the positions of their citizens.

Likewise, the US forcible intervention in Lebanon entailed clear contempt of the Lebanese people and a lack of confidence in their political choices. This had been disclosed when the Eisenhower administration intervened to pave the way for his ally, Camille Chamoun, to win the elections in order to secure a second term in presidency. The US did succeed in securing the status quo in Beirut without firing a shot, however, this did not change a simple truth that Eisenhower himself had recognized as the marines waded ashore in Lebanon: 'The trouble is that we have a campaign of hatred against us, not by the governments but by the people.'[9]

Even when the US intervened under the banner of 'democracy promotion' in Iraq and Afghanistan the 'people factor' was regrettably absent. When US officials revaluated their status quo-based strategy, after the attacks of 9/11, towards a conclusion that autocracy-based status quo is no longer a guarantee for regional stability and that a 'pro-democracy' strategy should be adopted, the peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan were

---

[8] Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2004), p. 140. Quoted in Miriam Joyce, *Anglo-US Support for Jordan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 19.
[9] Douglas Little, *US Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), p. 136.

negatively, rather than positively, affected by the new strategy. Empowering the local elements of the regional system to self-stabilize against subsequent crises was not what the US administrations was intervening for.

In the Iraqi case the 'containment versus regime change' debate that dominated US policy calculations was not framed primarily around consideration of which strategy would most empower local actors (achieve dynamic stability), but rather in terms of which might create a more reliable regional status quo. This explains why in the US invasion of their country in 2003, ordinary Iraqis did not welcome US soldiers as liberators. The Iraqi peoples might have been unsatisfied with the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein, however, they were not happy to replace it through an external occupation of their country, given that the main power that led the invasion was the one that was responsible for the siege they suffered from for more than a decade, and for accusations that all turned out to be false.

Similarly, in the Afghani case, the US approach of imposing stability by force ignored the role of local agents in influencing the development of such a complex system, and ignored the interplay between various complex systems across different levels.[10] The very fact that foreign troops continued to occupy Afghanistan provided further evidence that the US intervention was not successful at enabling the indigenous actors to resume the tasks necessary to run their country.[11] There are multiple concerns for the future of Afghanistan; the Afghani people are crushed between two powerful enemies. From the sky, occupation forces bomb and kill civilians, and on the ground the warlords continue their attacks. Failure of the United States to avert peoples' humanitarian crisis caused anti-American sentiment to increase, while helped anti-US elements to influence public opinion in many parts of the Muslim world.[12]

---

[10] Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010).
[11] Fred I. Greenstein, *The George W. Bush Presidency, An Early Assessment* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 125.
[12] Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Winter 2001/02), pp. 79-93

The following table summarizes the simplistic features of the US cases of intervention in the Middle East (1953-2008)

Table 9.1 **Features of US Intervention in the Middle East (1953-2003)**

Intervention	Year	Features of US intervention
Intervention in Iran	1953	**Reductionist** (the US did not take into consideration the reaction of local actors to its secret plot), **Top-down** (the US foreign policy aligned itself only with the Shah and excluded other national forces). **Forcible** (the US *preferred to* use the force of Shah's Army to oust Mossadeq and later used *its own forces to solve the* hostage crisis).
Intervention in Egypt	1956	**Local-level oriented** (the US officials considered the reactions of the Egyptian and Arab peoples to the tripartite attack), **Balanced—non reductionist** (Washington adopted a relatively balanced policy towards the conflicting parties, including its closest regional ally, 'Israel'). **Non-forcible** (the US intervention in the Suez Crisis included a threat of using power but without physically using it).
Intervention in Jordan	1957	**Top down** (the US aligned itself with the King who was perceived as the locus of power and did not consider the popular stance, which in great part was in favour of Nasser nationalism), **linear** (based on the conviction that the material assistance—monetary and militarily, would be sufficient to enhance the troubled King). **Forcible** (included moving naval warships to boost the position of the fragile king)
Intervention in Jordan	1958	**Top-down** (the US intervention was based on the use of military force to boost the fragile regime of King Hussein) **Equilibrium-Based** (US officials sought to balance the union between Egypt and Syria with an equivalent union between Jordan and Iraq). **Simplistic** (The US measures did not succeed in enabling the fragile ally to self-stabilize. Hussein's regime remained fragile and in need of further external help).
Intervention in Lebanon	1958	**Reductionist** (the US intervention aimed at preserving only one actor— the allied regime of Camille Chamoun).

347

		Forcible (used military forces *to impose* Chamoun regime on the rest of the system components). **Top-down** (did not consider local-level opposition to Chamoun regime).[13]
(Non)-intervention in Six-Day-War	1967	**Reductionist** (the US overlooked the Israeli violation to regional stability and put no pressure on the Israelis to withdraw from the territories they had occupied).
Intervention in Jordan	1971	**Reductionist** (The United States had been concerned only about Hussein's stability and thus approved him in his harsh policies towards the PLO members). **Top-down** (did not consider the Palestinian refugees who were targeted also by Hussein forces). **Forcible** (US officials encouraged King Hussein's suppression and expulsion of the PLO and secured a commitment from Israel to intervene militarily to help the King survive the ordeal if necessary).
(Non)-intervention in Arab-Israeli stalemate (state of no-war-no-peace)	1971-1973	**Reductionist** (favoured Israel's interests over regional stability). **Simplistic** (US officials thought of regional stability as equivalent to static equilibrium).
Intervention in October/Yom Kippur War	1973	**Reductionist** (favoured Israel's interests over regional stability). **Simplistic** (the US Intervention sought to restore a status quo which was itself unstable). **Top-down** (US policy makers ignored local outrage which was increasing rapidly in Arab societies against US policies)
(Non)-intervention after operation Babylon	1981	**Reductionist** (the US administration favoured Israeli interests over regional stability which was disrupted out of the Israeli clandestine nuclear program. Similarly the US tolerated the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor in spite of its destabilizing effect)
Intervention in Lebanon	1982	**Reductionist** (the US calculated that Lebanese complex crisis could be solved by aligning itself with Israel and the Lebanese movement allied with it—the phalangists, while antagonizing others—the Palestinian and the Shiite). **Forcible** (the US activities in Lebanon escalated from peacekeeping to irregular involvement in the Lebanese civil war).

---

[13] However, the dynamic process of self-organized changes in the Lebanese society compelled the US to sacrifice Chamoun and accept Fouad Shehab as a new President of Lebanon.

348

Intervention in Saudi Arabia	1990	**Forcible** (sought to maintain stability through the deployment of massive numbers of troops in the Arabia). **Top-down** (based on bolstering regional client in order to secure regional stability). **Simplistic** (the US intervention in Saudi Arabia did not consider the domestic repercussions that might result from sending non-Muslim foreign troops to the Kingdom).
Intervention in Kuwait	1991	**Forcible** (included a massive use of power). **Linear** (based on a conviction that restoring the status quo ante would ensure regional stability). **Reductionist** (the US ignored the local uprisings in north and south Iraq. It was evident that regime change on the back of a grassroots revolution was not what the US had in mind at least in this phase).
Intervention in Afghanistan	2001	**Simplistic** (the complexities of the Afghani system were under-estimated). **Top-down** (ignored the role of local-actors in influencing the development of the Afghani system). **Forcible** (the US approach was based on imposing stability by force and military occupation, which remains till the time of this writing)
Intervention in Iraq	2003	**Linear** (US officials contends that massive power will lead to decisive outcomes), **Simplistic** (was based on the conviction that ousting Saddam regime would guarantee regional stability). **Top-down** (did not take into consideration the domestic factors, chaos, insurgency that killed more US than the initial combat, and the rise of anti-Americanism).

9.4 Main Aspects of US Strategies of Stability

As illustrated in chapter two, complexity theory attributes the emergence of dynamic stability to nonlinear/spontaneous interactions of micro-elements (local actors) in complex systems. The theory emphasises the role played by local actors to give rise to stability and the ways in which local interactions act to maintain and increase the complexity of the system.[14] This paradigm argues that social systems are unpredictable,

---

[14] David Byrne, "Complexity, Configurations and Cases," *Theory, Culture & Society,* Vol. 22, No. 5 (2005), pp. 95–111.

far from equilibrium, sensitive to initial conditions, nonlinear, self-organizing, and emergent.

On the contrary to most of the previous notions, the US tried to stabilize the Middle East through linear/deterministic/simplistic strategies. These strategies were imposed on Middle East system components in a top-down/forcible/reductionist style in order to control the region from without. This included: (1) controlling the actors; by sponsoring the acceptable actors and excluding the uncooperative ones, (2) controlling the interactions; by determining the acceptable patterns of interactions and invalidating the inappropriate patterns, and (3) controlling the ideologies; through identifying the acceptable ideologies and denouncing the unacceptable ones. In the following, I briefly illustrate the first two categories while devote more discussion to the third as it was not covered in length in the previous chapters.

9.4.1 Identifying Acceptable Actors

US strategies to secure Middle East stability were proved to be *reductionist* in essence. A major objective of US intervention in the Middle East system (1953-2008) was to sponsor some regional actors and to exclude some others. US officials calculated that regional stability in the Middle East system could be achieved by embracing a number of 'moderate regimes' who would serve as regional stabilizers to secure US interests. The logic behind adopting moderate regimes was that: without the help of those regimes, anti-Western groups (e.g. nationalists, communists and Islamists) would come to power and cause instability. The US searching for "moderate regimes" in the Middle East was a major consequence of the Suez Crisis when the US attempt to manipulate the nationalist Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser into abandoning "nonalignment" in return for financing the Aswan Dam failed.[15] According to Alan Taylor:

> The doctrine of recruiting regional partners grew out of the attempt to preserve the territorial and political status quo. The principle theme in this

---

[15] John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), p. 130, Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace, Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003* (Princeton: New Jersey Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 186.

respect was to bring as many of the regional states as possible into a cooperative venture designed to minimize the influence and leverage of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.[16]

During the Cold War years, 'moderate' agents secured the US target of Middle East stability through checking the penetration of Soviet influence in the region and containing the activities of pro-Soviet regional actors. They aligned themselves with the United States on major issues such as the need for stable oil production, the desirability of Arab-Israeli peace, and the need to contain ambitious regional actors who might undertake destabilizing adventures.[17]

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union moderate regimes found other tasks to undertake on behalf of the US, such as preventing the Islamists from reaching office, safe-guarding Israel's borders, and ensuring other logistic facilities such as international waterways, airspaces, in addition to hosting US military bases in the region. Moderate agents played an important role in simplifying the complex system of the Middle East and keeping the ranges of possible paths for its evolution narrow enough to maintain US regional interests. Centralization of decision-making processes and stereotyping system's components permits a limited range of local-agents' ability to evolve.[18]

On the other hand, Washington excluded, or agreed to the exclusion of, other actors. For example, it helped in ousting Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli through a military coup in 1949,[19] approved the Free Officers' movement, in 1952, to overthrow the Pro-Britain King of Egypt, intervened indirectly to help overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, in the 1953 coup, agreed to the exclusion of the Lebanese President Camille Chamoun in 1958, encouraged dissident army officers to seize power

---

[16] Alan R. Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 51.
[17] Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 30.
[18] Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 5.
[19] The operation was that of Husni Al-Za'im coup of March 30, 1949. See the details of this covert operation in Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), p. 50.

in Iraq in 1963,[20] agreed to routing Nasser regime in 1967, intervened to remove the Taliban from power in 2001, and intervened to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003. This reductionist foreign policy caused considerable distortions to the natural evolution of the Middle East system and resulted in several unintended consequences that harmed both Middle East system and US interests.

In many cases, the excluded actors turned out to be vital for the effective operation of the Middle East system. For example, till the late 1980s, Washington considered most of the Palestinian resistance movements (gathered under the banner of Palestinian Liberation Organization; PLO) as terrorist groups. President Ronald Reagan, for example, stuck to a firm policy of refusing to deal with the PLO unless it recognized Israel's right to exist. However, Washington, fearing of the growing weight of Islamic resistance movements (like Hamas) in the Palestinian territories, had to recognize the PLO in the late 1980s and to accept it in the Peace Process as the only representative of the Palestinian people.

9.4.2 Identifying Acceptable Interactions

Since 1953, Washington has intervened repeatedly in the Middle East to control (maintain or to disrupt) a wide range of its interactions. As a general rule, Washington did not accept regional adventures, especially when proved disturbing to the status quo. In case of an outbreak of any regional dispute, to the detriment of its interests, Washington would intervene to restore the status quo and deter the party that provoked that change. Examples include: intervention to reverse the effects of the tripartite attack against Egypt (1956) intervention to negate the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel (1973), and intervention to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1991). In all these cases the US acted as an ideal status quo superpower, it intervened to restore the disrupted regional configuration regardless of the party that induced the regional instability and regardless of being an ally or not (e.g. the Suez Crisis).

---

[20] On February 8, 1963, an armed military coup overthrew the regime of Abdul-Karim Qassem. The Ba'ath Party took power under the leadership of General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr (prime minister) and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (president).

Proceeding from a simplistic perception of regional stability, Washington has utilized foreign policy tools, especially foreign aid, linearly, to control patterns of regional interactions. For example, the Eisenhower administration withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan Dam to influence Egypt's revolutionary behaviour and inhibit its growing ties with the Soviet bloc. Similarly, during the 1960s, President Johnson stopped the food aid to Egypt, in order to punish Egypt for its un-cooperative foreign policy (intervention in Yemen, continued rivalry to Israel and Nasser's support for revolutionary nationalists in Asia and Africa). Conversely, when Egypt aligned itself with Washington, starting in the 1970s, she got huge US economic and military aid. The US sought to encourage Sadat's abandonment of the Soviets and invest in his willingness to make peace with Israel under US auspices. Similarly, the US gave Syria *almost $500 million in economic aid in 1974 and 1975 to provide Syrian leaders with an incentive to adopt a moderate approach in the peace process.*[21]

In some cases, Washington turned a blind eye to violations committed by its local clients when these violations seemed necessary to secure 'regional stability'. For example, during the Eisenhower Administration, Washington helped its regional client, Camille Chamoun, to win a comfortable majority sufficient to ensure him an additional term in office, at the time that the Lebanese society of Muslims and Christians was against the re-election of Chamoun.[22] It was widely confirmed that the US provided the Lebanese president with substantial funds to bribe his way to achieving this majority.[23] 'Other funds were targeted against candidates who had shown less than total enchantment with US interference in Lebanese politics.'[24]

9.4.3 Identifying Acceptable Ideologies

Washington presented itself to the Middle East system as the premium advocate of liberal democracy while gradually rejected both nationalism and Islamism. Part of the US

---

[21] Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 221, 224.
[22] Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis, The Cold War and US Dominance in the Middle East* (MA.: Beacon Press Publish, 2009).
[23] See: William Blum, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (Berkshire: Cox and Wyman, 2002), p. 144, Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, p. 21, Ziauddin Sardar, Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd, 2002), p. 110.
[24] Blum, *Rogue States*, p. 143.

opposition to these ideologies was based on their perceived hostility to the US and its liberal model.

- **Democratic Liberalism**

Broad consensus existed among America's foreign policy experts that, in the long term, democracy in the Middle East would work in America's favour and in the interest of regional stability.[25] Based on this conviction US foreign policy included several initiatives of democracy promotion in the Middle East. However, prior to 1991, anti-communism had led Washington to support or at least acquiesce in the rule of a number of authoritarian states on the grounds that these governments were the lesser of two evils. Democracy promotion initiatives and organizations were not numerous during this period. However, we can still mention some organizations such as USAID, which was created in 1961 to 'extend a helping hand to people struggling to make a better life, recover from a disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country.'[26] Similarly there was the National endowment for democracy (NED) which was set up in 1983 as an anti-communist organization intended to promote democracy. NED was administered as a private organization, however, its funding came almost entirely from a governmental appropriation by Congress and it was created by an act of Congress. The United States Congress created two other party-affiliates organizations; the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI).[27] The combined projects of USAID, the NED and its affiliates, and the privately financed organizations such as Ford Foundation made the United States the most generous national provider of democratization funds to the region.[28]

The availability of grant money opened up opportunities for old and new research-advocacy groups to get into the democracy brokerage business, most of them were non-profit organizations and fall into the so-called Internal Revenue Service category of non-

---

[25] Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative* (Surrey: legacy Publishing Ltd., 2007), p. 9, 10
[26] USAID Official Website, at: http://www.usaid.gov/
[27] Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10," *Foreign Policy*, No .95, (Summer 1994), pp. 123-129.
[28] Sheila Carapico, "Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in The Arab World," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 379-395.

profit corporations: for instance, the US Bar Association, the National Council of Negro Women, the global charity CARE, the Middle East academic exchange agency AMIDEAST, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES, founded in the early nineties with a USAID grant). Scores of other US non-profit agencies, a handful of corporate contractors, and a few government agencies like the Library of Congress worked on democratization projects in Egypt, Palestine, and elsewhere.[29]

With the tempering of the Cold War, the perceived risk of promoting democracy diminished and the United States increasingly used its influence to promote its model of liberal democracy.[30] Anti-communism has been replaced by an explicit pro-democracy stance that seeks to 'encourage or impose' free-market democracy on all nations.[31] The USAID developed a Democracy and Governance branch, while the State Department set up a bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour that is now overseen by the undersecretary for global affairs.[32] By the end of the 1990s United States administrations supported the efforts of a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the Carter Center, Democracy Watch, IFES, Freedom House, and the Eurasia Foundation in developing sophisticated techniques for monitoring the fairness of elections taking place under semi-authoritarian circumstances.[33]

Starting in 2005, the Bush administration made democracy promotion the centrepiece of its regional policy in the Middle East. In his inaugural address in January 2005,[34] President Bush called for the sweeping adoption of democratic rule in autocratic countries. The US President and his administration pressed for aid to the Middle East to go, at least in part, to groups supporting change in their societies. The following agencies were involved in implementing the freedom agenda of G. W. Bush: the Office of Democracy and Governance at the US Agency for International Development (as well as USAID's regional bureaus), the National Endowment for Democracy and institutes like

[29] Ibid.
[30] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads,* pp. 134, 135.
[31] Lee Marsden, *For God's Sake, The Christian Right and the US Foreign Policy* (London: Zed Books, 2006), pp. 18, 19
[32] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads,* p. 134.
[33] Ibid., pp. 135-136
[34] President Sworn-In to Second Term http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html#

the NDI and the IRI that operate under its umbrella; and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)[35] and the Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour (DRL) at the Department of State. There was no overall coordination between the activities of these different agencies, meaning that many of them were duplicative, uncoordinated, and frequently at cross purposes.[36]

In spite of all the above efforts, still many US officials are convinced that while democracy promotion may serve to advance US interest of regional stability in the Middle East, it is not always good for America.[37] Several Middle East experts argue that democracy is an unreliable process[38] and might yield governments unfriendly to the United States.[39] This argument is embraced by wide sectors of US officials who believe that a real risk exists that a transition to democracy will produce threats to key US interests or to internal or regional stability in the Middle East system.

This explains why many US policymakers, while endorse democracy in theory, tend to prefer order to freedom and stability to choice in practice, and do not overly concern themselves with the political nature of certain rather undemocratic regimes.[40] Steve Smith confirmed this meaning by saying that 'for many parts of the world the US has not historically stood for the promotion of democracy but instead for resistance to it. The two

---

[35] MEPI is a presidential initiative to promote democracy and reform in the Middle East and North Africa through diplomatic efforts and through aid to individual nations. A key element of MEPI is creating links and partnerships with Arab, US, and global civil society governments and private sector businesses to jointly achieve genuine and lasting reforms at the local level. See Jerry Martin Rosenberg, *Reawakening: the new, broader Middle East* (Lanham, University of America, 2007), p. 151.

[36] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, pp. 150, 151.

[37] Randall Schweller, "US Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections," in Michael Cox et al., eds., *US Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[38] According to Tamara Wittes, an uncertain campaign for free Egyptian politics will upset this carefully constructed apple cart. If, for example, the US Congress conditioned aid to Egypt on steps toward political reform, they warn, Hosni Mubarak might respond to undue US pressure for democracy by rejecting the nearly $2 billion in annual military assistance he now receives from the Pentagon and turning, as Nasser did, to Russian equipment and training—or perhaps to Chinese. See Wittes, *Freedom's unsteady march*, p. 20.

[39] Steven Cook, "Political Instability in Egypt," *Contingency Planning Memorandum*, No. 4 (August 2009), p. 5

[40] Michael Cox et al., eds., *US Democracy Promotion*, p. 4.

obvious areas of the world, according to Smith, are Latin and Central America, and the Middle East.'[41]

Even in the 1990s, when the democratization tide spread across the world it trod lightly in the Middle East. US efforts during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton focused first on stability in the face of rising Islamist popularity and second on advancing economic liberalization and integration of Arab states into the global economy.[42] The United States response to rising regional pressures for change in key allies such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia did not emphasize democratization as a major element of desirable Arab reforms. *Democracy promotion programs thus were* limited in scope, carried out only when allowed by incumbent regimes, and dropped quickly when governments objected.[43] Tamara Cofman noticed that 'the US government's reform efforts in the Arab world during the 1990s were undertaken in full consultation with the targeted governments, and emphasized technical assistance to government institutions rather than support for nongovernmental social groups.'[44]

Similarly, the junior Bush administration approach to advance democracy in the region reflected a strong desire to avoid conflicts with autocratic allies. This feature blunted and diverted the new efforts and ensured the marginality of their effects.[45] Bush's freedom agenda achieved considerably less than they might. There was always a gap between the commitment to the promotion of democracy and the reality of US foreign policy in the region; when free elections brought unpleasant results to the Bush administration, the freedom agenda receded. For example, the success of Hamas in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Authority was portrayed as an impediment to the process of democratisation in the Middle East. Ironically, the democratic decision of the people was renounced because it did not coincide with the *reformist* US agenda in the region. 'US's uncompromising response to Hamas's success undermined its democracy promotion

---

[41] Steve Smith, "Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions," in Michael Cox et al., eds., *US Democracy Promotion.*
[42] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March,* p. 25.
[43] Marina Ottaway, et al. "The New Middle East, Washington," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* 2008, p. 22
[44] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March,* p. 25.
[45] Ibid., p. 85.

programs by showing other Islamist groups that it only accepts the outcome of free and fair elections if the victor suits them.'[46] This was a blatant example of the causes that led the US efforts in promoting the democratic model in the Middle East to fail, in the following I shed light on some other possible shortcomings in the US efforts.

To sum, the US record in democracy promotion the Middle East is mixed: there are a few successes and a large number of failures. There are multiple reasons why US initiatives to promote democracy in Middle East countries did not work especially well:

(1) In most cases, US democracy assistance programs were simplistic in nature; they were not adapted to fit the local context, relied rather on a US-centric model, a 'one model fits all' syndrome. They did not consider a great deal of variance in the process of assisting democracy despite very different political, economic, and social contexts. [47] A US strategy for promoting democracy cannot hope to be effective unless it starts with an accurate assessment of how regional actors see their own circumstances.

(2) In many cases, bottom-up programs of democracy promotion in Middle East countries and the aid allocated to support these projects were not openly presented as being directed towards promoting democracy.[48] US policy-makers focused on civil society groups not working directly for democratic reform. This ambiguity gave the Middle East leaders flexibility to foster democratic principles without taking them beyond the discursive level and to selectively adopt only changes that do not jeopardise their position, if not consolidate it.[49] The US stated strategy was to enhance 'democratic' without launching a frontal assault on Arab regimes.[50] Overt democratic conditionality was not applied to semi-authoritarian regimes such as Egypt and Tunisia, or against resolutely authoritarian states like Syria. The indecisiveness of US discourse on

---

[46] Adrian Little, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 54, 55.
[47] Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss, (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), p. 220.
[48] Bernabé López García, and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, 'Spain and North Africa: Towards a 'Dynamic Stability", *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002), pp. 170 — 191, 172
[49] Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11, 12.
[50] Ibid., p. 48.

democracy promotion in the Middle East had been exploited by autocratic regimes of the Middle East, leading to further suppression of political freedom and the delay of sensitive and genuine reforms.[51]

(3) US democracy programs declined to support certain opposition groups. US initiatives were invariably restricted to support certain NGOs fulfilling an information gathering and monitoring role while excluded other groupings like the religious ones.[52] The Clinton administration expressly declined to support professional syndicate organizations as these were taken over by Islamists.[53] Indeed, in the mid-1990s the United States offered some support to Islamist-oriented pro-democracy groups but it shortly ceased such efforts after an angry reaction from Arab leaders, in particular President Mubarak of Egypt.[54]

- **Nationalism**

The emergence of nationalism in the Middle East posed a challenge to US regional interests. During the Cold War era the region witnessed a revival of both Arab and

---

[51] Richard Youngs, *International Democracy and the West The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004), p. 49.

[52] Ibid, p. 37.

[53] Ibid., p. 49

[54] Compare these US democracy-promotions programs with that of the EU which are argued to be more local oriented. The EU became formally involved in the project to create regional stability with the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), first mentioned in the Barcelona declaration 1995. The EMP is intended to establish a space for trans-Mediterranean dialogue and potential future cooperation among the southern partners. The political element of the Barcelona declaration includes a list of principles concerning respect for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, the right of self-determination, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. It also stipulates cooperation to combat terrorism. On the economic front, it provides for a regional partnership to promote economic development by means of a free-trade zone to be created by the year 2010. The main shortcoming of the Barcelona Process, however, has been the assumption that economic development inevitably leads to democratization and social and political stability. This perception has not led to the achievement of the goals put forth in the human-dimension pillar of the EMP. The failure of the EMP to approach reform in the southern Mediterranean from the bottom up by placing democratic reform, civil society, and human rights at the forefront of Euro-Med relations has led to little change in the region's overall lag in popular representation, freedom of speech, political opposition, and women's rights. See Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean partnership, available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_pa rtner_countries/r15001_en.htm, Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 221, Richard Gillespie, "Regionalism and Globalism in the EMP: The Limits to Western Mediterranean Co-operation", Paper to be presented at the Conference on 'The Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region', hosted by the Fundação Oriente, Lisboa, at the Convento da Arrábida, Setúbal, 6-9 June 2002, Thomas Diez, et al., ed., *The European Union and Border Conflicts, The Power of Integration and Association,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Iranian nationalisms. This thesis has shed light on the circumstances that led to the confrontation between US administrations and Iranian nationalists when discussing the US covert operation to overthrow Iran's nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.[55] The following paragraphs will be devoted, thus, to discuss the US reaction to Arab nationalism.

Arab nationalist ideology pursued a pan-Arab course that opposed foreign intervention in the Middle East and promoted neutralism.[56] Arab nationalist regimes were virtually the world's only non-communist forces aligned with Moscow during the Cold War.[57] The Arab states proved to be nearly unreceptive to Moscow's ideological appeal. However, despite ideological differences, the Soviets continued to provide support for Arab nationalists.[58] The involved parties, motivated by their own interests, distinguished between ideology and politics.[59]

In Egypt, for example, President Nasser made it clear that his type of socialism was different from Marxist communism and continued his harsh campaign against internal communists.[60] The USSR turned blind eyes on Nasser's actions and declared no intentions of interfering in Egypt's internal affairs. In 1956, Khrushchev was frank in expressing the cynical real-politik relations between the two countries when he declared that 'the USSR supported Nasser although Nasser even put communists in jail.'[61] Likewise, Dimitri Shepilov, the Soviet foreign minister, in his official visit to Cairo in June 1956, declared that the USSR was not going to protest against Nasser's anti-communist policy insofar as the relations between the two countries were based on

---

[55] Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), p. xxx

[56] Matthew f. Jacobs, "The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (September 2006), pp. 705-739.

[57] Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, *Hating America, A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 166.

[58] Not only to Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser but also to its allies in Syria, Iraq, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) see Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 99.

[59] Rami Ginat, "Nasser and the Soviets, A Reassessment", in Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler eds., *Rethinking Nasserism, Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt*, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004), p. 236.

[60] Similarly, Iraq nationalist leader Abdel Kareem Qasim at first used Communist support to counterbalance his opponents; then, when it appeared that the Communists were about to take over the state, he turned against them.

[61] Ginat, "Nasser and the Soviets, A Reassessment", p. 236.

"principles of equality in rights, mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs."[62]

But, in spite of that heavy external support, Arab nationalism failed to deliver prosperity to the Arab peoples. Instead, Arab nationalists run the most repressive regimes in the region; they intimidated their opponents, and claimed that their own doctrine represented the people's will and that anyone who disagreed was a US stooge.[63] The totalitarian Bathist governments in Syria and Iraq, and Nasser's authoritarian regime, reacted to any domestic criticism by an escalation in the use of repressive measures. Political repression in states with Pan-Arab legitimacy stripped Arab nationalists of much of the mass base and gradually demonstrated that these regimes and their ideologies are in fact a barrier to a transformation of the Arab region.[64]

The defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 deprived the nationalist project of much of its credibility and starting in the 1970s the popular appeal of nationalist secular ideologies declined among Middle East peoples who became more inclined to a religious ideology. In addition, the oil boom was fostering unprecedented economic and industrial growth and consequently dizzying social change.[65] The uneven distribution of the oil revenues among the Arab states, and their uneven participation in the conflict with Israel, placed new pressures on inter-Arab relations.[66] 'Increasingly, the governments of the individual states pursued their separate interests and purposes, sometimes to the point of open and even of armed conflict between them.'[67] Nonetheless, it was the negotiation of the Camp David Accords following the October War of 1973 which finally broke nationalists' back.[68] President Sadat put an end to the nationalist project by his accepting to make

---

[62] Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, p. 69.
[63] Barry and Judith Rubin, *Hating America*, p. 165.
[64] Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 215.
[65] Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War* (California: University of California Press, 2005), p. 321.
[66] Bernard Lewis, *From Babel to Dragomans, Interpreting The Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 179.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Andrea Teti and Andrea Mura, "Islam and Islamism," in Jeffrey Haynes, *Routledge handbook of religion and politics* (Oxon, Routledge, 2009), p. 99.

peace with Israel, the country which occupation of Arab territories was always considered the spark that preserved the nationalist ideology.[69]

Washington's stance towards Arab nationalism swung in the beginning but moved steadily afterwards toward hostility. After World War II the US government saw in the nationalist movements a progressive force likely to triumph against puppet regimes. The Truman administration was aware that the Soviet Union could claim to be the champion of nationalist regimes. The way to counter this was to enhance nationalist leaders who had populist appeal but also 'understood the superior merits of the US as against the Soviet system'. [70] Subsequent US administrations, however, did not throw their weight entirely behind Arab nationalists, nor did they support the calls for Arab unity (especially the Egyptian-Syrian unity).[71] Arab nationalism, incarnated by Nasser was perceived by most US administrations as a dangerous potential ally of the communists. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was particularly irritated by Nasser's support for anti-colonialism and his embrace of the nonaligned movement. The decisive point came when Nasser decided that he needed to build up his forces with Soviet help to cope with Israel.[72]

Following the 1956 crisis, US officials started to consider 'Arab nationalism' vulnerable to the communist influence in the Middle East and stick, instead, with the conservative 'moderate' rulers, even if their claims to power rested on weak foundations. US administration further decided that their interests rested in intervening for the benefit of those regimes. However, US interventionism against nationalist aspirations on behalf of its moderate allies drove more state and sub-state actors to the Soviet side and then to religious ideologies than it attracted them to its own.[73]

---

[69] Trevor C. Salmon and Mark F. Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 227.

[70] Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies, America Confronts the Middle East* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), p. 18.

[71] The exception was President Kennedy who realized that Arab nationalism was largely hostile to Soviet Communism; the United States began to grant assistance more widely to provide these countries with an alternative to large-scale Communist aid. See Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 78.

[72] Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies*, p. 40

[73] Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation," p. 38

Islamism

Islamism refers to a set of political and social ideas and movements aiming to return Islam to all aspects of life. This translates into demands for changes in the law, in political leadership and in foreign policy. The US stance towards Islamism changed over time; historical account reveals that the US attitude towards Islamism was not hostel from the beginning of its involvement in the region. During the Cold War, Washington tried to employ the religious sentiment in the Middle East in several occasions. For example, during the Eisenhower administration, some advisors of the US president advanced the idea of promoting a 'Moslem Billy Graham'[74] to mobilize an Islamic religious fervour against communism and to face the spreading nationalist and socialist trends.[75] Similarly, following the defeat of the nationalist project in June 1967, Washington sought to employ the religious fervour to confront the communist tide.[76]

An opportunistic rapprochement between Washington and Islamists took place during the 1980's when President Ronald Reagan's administration tried to 'roll back' communism by supporting anti-Soviet Islamist mujahideen in Afghanistan and turned with massive aid to the Afghan resistance.[77] Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other wealthy conservative monarchies in the Gulf contributed to the jihad operations. All were glad to join the United States' effort to keep the Soviet Union out of their backyard, while providing an outlet for all the Islamists who represented a threat to the stability of their regimes.[78]

With the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist challenge, some influential US commentators declared Islam as the new menace to global peace and stability.[79] Notions of 'Green Peril' which date back to the

---

[74] Billy Graham is an US evangelist who rose to celebrity status because of his sermons, the crusades, which was broadcasted on radio and television. See Paul Johnson, *A History of the US People* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997).

[75] Copeland, *The Game of Nations*, p. 58.

[76] With the failure of secular nationalist project after the Six-Day-War of 1967, the revolutionary rhetoric of identity has turned to Islamism.

[77] Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 157.

[78] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2002), p. 68, quoted in Angel M. Rabasa et al., *The Muslim world after 9/11* (CA.: Rand, 2004).

[79] See for example Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49.

aftermath of the Iranian revolution were revived in the early 1990s.[80] In this period the relationship between the West and Islamic world was described as being based on military conflict. Islam and the West were portrayed in many writings as coherent communities that face each other with suspicion and hostility.[81]

The most famous among these writings was that of Samuel Huntington who sparked a debate that brought religion to centre stage in debates about international relations.[82] In 1993 the influential US academic declared that 'Islam and the West are on a collision course.'[83] Huntington suggested that the ideological conflict of the Cold War was likely to be replaced by cultural conflict between civilizations. In Huntington's view civilizations were shaped by their religious traditions, and he saw the immediate and most likely source of tension being that emerging between the West and Islam – and Islam as a whole, not just fundamentalist Islam. Huntington perceived Islam as presenting 'a triple threat: political, civilisational and demographic.'[84] This image drew strength, according to Zachary Lockman, from the selective reading of relations between Islam and Christianity in the past, including the legacies of the Crusades, of colonialism and of the Cold War. 'This image blends religious with political identities, but it is also interwoven with the politics of development.'[85]

In the same period of the 1990s, when Islamists made some political advances in Algeria, the senior Bush administration barely reacted. The Algerian elections were cancelled by the military to stop a victory by an Islamist party; the US administration was content to let France take the lead, which meant in practice supporting the secular generals. The US

---

[80] See Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," *Foreign Affair*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 43-56. For a counter argument see Leon T. Hadar, What Green Peril?, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 27-42.

[81] Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan, *Contending Images of World Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Macmillan, 2001).

[82] John Anderson, "Religion and International Relations", in Trevor C. Salmon, and Mark F. Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008),

[83] Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), p. 25. However, the banner "clash of civilizations" was in fact borrowed from another influential article published in 1990 by Bernard Lewis who wrote of Muslim rage against America and modernity, based on the revival of "ancient prejudices" among extremists. See Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic*, September 1990.

[84] Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993).

[85] Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East, The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 15.

decided that the Islamists' views 'were so averse to what [the Americans] believe in and what they support, and to the national interests of the United States.'[86] The administration saw the potential for Algeria to become another Iran.

In the early months of the administration of G. W. Bush, it seemed that the new president would pursue a realistic approach in his dealing with Islamists. This conclusion was enhanced by the administration's attitude towards the Islamists of Afghanistan. Indications suggested that there was cooperation between the Taliban regime and the United States, in spite of the ideological contradiction between the two parties.[87] Moreover, when the Bush administration considered Iraq, Iran and North Korea as rogue regimes, it was not interested in setting Taliban regime among them. However, after the attacks of September 11, the Bush administration decided clearly that the pattern of political Islam was no longer commensurate with its objectives and launched its war on 'terrorism' with the stated objective of trapping the Islamists all over the world.

President Bush and his neoconservative advisors framed the conflict as an ideological warfare. According to one of the neoconservatives 'September 11 reminded us rudely that history had not ended, and we found ourselves in a new existential struggle, this time with an enemy even more fanatical, fatalistic, and indeed undeterable than in the past.'[88] According to this neoconservative activist, this enemy is radical Islamism. US officials were convinced that the attackers did not oppose particular US foreign policy; but rather 'they contested the fundamental defining characteristics of US culture.'[89] The 9/11 Commission agreed that the threat the United States faced had become an ideologically driven enemy. The commission explained the nature of the new threat: Islamic terrorism is an immediate derivative of Islamism.[90]

---

[86] Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies,*p. 282.
[87] Rachel Bronson, *Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 9.
[88] Charles Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," in Rosen, Gary, *The Right War, The Conservative Debate on Iraq* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 199.
[89] Winkler, Carol K., *In the Name of Terrorism, Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
[90] Ibid

9.5   Possible Features of A Bottom-Up Strategy.

Dynamic Stability in this dissertation refers to a continuous process of self-organized changes. According to this definition, a system is described as stable when it has a self-ability to cope with disturbances.[91] Coping with disturbances refers to finding a new equilibrium point after a stimulus has been imposed. This type of stability emerges, in a bottom-up style, as a result of multiple and overlapping interactions between system's local elements. A crucial consequence of the previous definition is that system properties emerge from local interactions.[92] Consequently, stability (as a system property) is strongly connected to the concept of locality; it emerges at local levels; and is driven by internal dynamics that involve vast number of local actions and interactions. Local actors are much better suited to respond to local conditions. This fact allows for flexibility and adaptability.[93] The stability of complex systems, thus, stems from interactions at the local level and shows in turn, high sensitivity to the tiny changes in local conditions.[94]

Throughout the descriptive chapters it has been illustrated that the US involvement in Middle East regional crises did not succeed, in most cases, in enabling the concerned systems to cope with subsequent crises. Rather it caused a fair amount of negative repercussions both for the regional systems and for the US interests in the region. This study attributes these shortcomings to the simplicity of the strategies adopted by US decision-makers to attain regional stability. A common factor among these strategies was that they all overlooked the role of local actors and local interactions and sought to *impose* stability (through allied regimes, regime change, or regional surrogate) on the concerned systems. The United States seemed to have little stomach for the risks entailed

[91] See Sven Ove Hansson And Gert Helgesson, "What Is Stability?," *Synthese*, Vol. 136, (2003), pp. 219–235, and Deutsch and Singer, Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability, pp. 390-406.

[92] David Byrne, "Complexity, Configurations and Cases," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2005), pp. 95–111.

[93] Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010), p. 73.

[94] Ibid., p. 57.

in maintaining a strategy of dynamic stability in the Middle East,[95] and declined to promote bottom-up strategies.[96]

But US-Middle East politics can no longer be sustained on the basis of simplistic strategies. Tamara Cofman summarized the situation in the current Middle East system as follows:

A perfect storm is uniting local factors such as population growth and internal corruption with external factors such as the globalization of capital markets and information flows to produce an undeniable challenge to the stability and viability of today's status-quo Arab regimes. An imbalance between demographics, economics, and government capacity is producing a generation of frustrated, urbanized young people with decent educations but few available jobs in their chosen fields and few prospects for marriage or other means of social advancement. This imbalance, combined with the effects of new technologies and globalization in media and culture, is also slowly breaking down the basic social contract—the bargain between citizens and state—that has long sustained America's Middle East partners.[97]

The ranges of possible paths for the evolution of the Middle East (as a complex system) are dramatically wide. Interactions and diversity among components permits a wide range of agent actions and openness to changes in environmental conditions (the state of other complex systems), and the prevalence of positive feedback loops inject further uncertainty into the system.[98] System elements *interact* to create something new; sub-state actors are becoming more and more connected with each other and with events occurring around them because of technology. These new generations are rightly demanding that their governments become more effective, more responsive, and more open.

---

[95] Marina Ottaway, "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring Credibility," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief,* No. 60 (May 2008), p. 4.

[96] Amy Hawthorne, "Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?" *Current History,* (Jan., 2003), pp. 21-26, Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal, The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008), p. 59.

[97] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March,* p. 31.

[98] Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics,* p. 5.

Accordingly, any attempt to stabilize the Middle East system, I argue, should be based on enhancing local actors. The appropriate method to achieve complex systems' stability should be bottom-up rather than top-down as building from the bottom up helps to promote stability. A bottom-up approach focuses more on developing ways to strengthen citizens' participation in an effort to make the government more responsive to citizens' concerns. This approach typically relies on efforts to develop the civil society sector which should direct the development agenda. Local structures will emerge as the major arena for the exercise of governance.[99] Only the enhancement of local-level actors in the Middle East system will, in the long term, secure the advancement of regional stability. Dynamic strategies, thus, should be geared towards allowing local freedom of action and participation. According to Geyer and Rihani, 'the crucial factor is to ensure that political structures, allows for largely uncoordinated processes at local level which actors other than leaders are able to undertake in order to deal with particular issues.'[100]

Assistance to local actors can focus on infrastructural matters, such as developing the legal framework for civil society and supporting and ensuring legal protection for independent media. A bottom-up approach might involve civic education directed toward enhancing citizens' understanding of and ability to access and use information that allows them to hold the government more accountable. A related approach seeks to shift authority and power away from the central government to the regional and local governments through decentralization.[101]

Dynamic stability can also be enhanced through supporting international cooperation between local authorities as a means to establish concrete links between peoples; involving civil society in any political initiative in order to respond to, and reflect, changes in the region and to enhance the dialogue between regional governments and civil society; making education and training a key focus of any political initiative in the region; tackling high levels of illiteracy and unemployment, especially among young people;[102] encouraging student mobility and foster greater educational and research

---

[99] Picard, et al., (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*, p. 223.
[100] Geyer and Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century."
[101] Picard et al., *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*, p. 223.
[102] Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, p. 120

linkages between universities; making vocational training labour-market oriented to help modernize the regional economies; exchanging practices on programmes enhancing the skills of unemployed people; giving support to the promotion of freedom of expression, including the critical role of media and the internet in contributing to the democratisation of societies; training local government officials to enhance their capacity to govern effectively and accountably; placing emphasis on stimulating political participation at the local level; supporting the right to practise religious faith in safety and security without fear of violence and repression.[103]

On the other hand, it is quite reasonable that if regional governments are to be responsive to the above initiatives, they must have the resources and capacity to do so. This requires not only helping local actors, but also working at the national level in support of initiatives (new laws and administrative regulations, even constitutional reforms) to transfer more power, authority, and resources to the local level. This not only develops active citizenship but also helps to make government more responsive to citizen needs and concerns. To sum up: bottom-up strategies of stability must connect local dimension with the national dimension. Reform of state structures must proceed in tandem with empowerment of civic participation, and vice versa.

It should be understood, however, that evolution toward dynamic stability in the Middle East, as in all other complex systems, does not lead to an optimal end-state.[104] Stability is an open-ended process by which a structure evolves by means of small effective improvements and through interaction with its environment to deliver a better performance.[105] Better performance can be measured in terms of the increase in the system's ability to accommodate unexpected problems; if the system gains an additional capability to face problems then it can be said that the system has become more stable. However, this improvement in system's abilities does not include an entire disappearance

---

[103] Some of these recommendations were discussed at Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Spring, G8 Summit, May 26-27, 2011, Deauville, France at: http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/declaration-of-the-g8-on-the-arab-springs.1316.html

[104] Geyer and Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century."

[105] Peter Coveney, Roger Highfield, *Frontiers of Complexity: The Search for Order in a Chaotic World* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1996), p. 118.

369

of problems. Comprehensive stability does not exist. Any complex system is in a continuous process of interacting with disturbances.[106]

Conclusion

Top-down strategies proved inadequate to trigger sustainable stability. Washington did not take into account local actors/interactions in any of the above strategies of stability. Indeed, in some cases top-down strategies led to some balance; however, historical evidence showed that artificially-stabilized systems were not able to stand in the face of serious disturbances. The resultant stability, therefore, was of a very fragile quality. Only the development of a self-organized complex system in the Middle East will, in the long-term, secure sustainable stability. The United States, or any other power with a genuine interest in stabilizing the Middle East, should work to help this region restore complex-systems' attributes, given that social entities with higher complexity stand a good chance of being stable in a dynamic way.[107] However, if the Middle East is to be more complex, the inevitable process of change must be managed mainly by local actors.[108]

---

[106] Ibid.

[107] Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," *paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, London, (10-13, April, 2000).

[108] Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington: The Brookings institution, 2008), p. 32.

Chapter 10

Conclusions

10.1 Introduction

In this chapter the final conclusions generated by the thesis are presents. The chapter has three significant parts. The first part reflects on the research context and establishes the research niche which the thesis fills, and the original contribution of the research. The second part establishes the theoretical and empirical research findings against the research aims and objectives. The third, and final part, discusses some potential future-research directions.

10.2 Research Context, Methodology and Original Contribution

The principal aim of this research is to answer the question why US strategies of stability have achieved little success in the Middle East (1953-2008)? Originality is added to the thesis through the research methodology employed. Using a qualitative variant of complexity theory, this dissertation introduces the concept of dynamic stability as an alternative to the traditional—top-down/forcible/reductionist—version of the term which I refers to as 'simple stability'.

A detailed historical account was employed to explore different strategies pursued by US administrations to achieve stability in the Middle East. I explored the repercussions of US involvement in several cases. Through analysing the selected case studies, different stability-driven strategies emerged. These strategies included: the status quo strategy, the hegemony strategy, and the surrogate strategy. The unifying factor among these strategies was their simplistic nature; they represented top-down, forcible and reductionist patterns that underestimated the impact of local actors and local interactions on system functioning.

The methodology of historical-case-studies was relevant to the topic as it helped discern the emergence of US strategies of stability toward the Middle East. Data was gathered through a thorough review of relevant literature on US-Middle East relations in addition to a review of relevant sources of primary data derived from the US

department of State Archive. I also reviewed theories of international relations and explored how they defined and employed the concept of stability in their theorizing about IR phenomena.

This study argued that the lack of success of the US in the task of stabilizing the Middle East could be explained by its adoption of simplistic strategies. This argument was evaluated through both conceptual model derived from complexity theory and historical case study analysis. The dynamic/simple stability framework, enhanced by three strategies of stability and four models of intervention, structured the case study analysis. Each case study represented a model of US intervention in Middle East affairs and each model of intervention branched from a certain strategy of stability. The conclusion was based on whether US intervention had enabled the Middle East (sub-)system(s) to self-stabilize in the face of subsequent crises or not.

10.3 The Research Question/Objectives Revisited

In support of the aim of answering the question: why US strategies of stability had achieved little success in the Middle East (1953-2008)? four substantive objectives are defined: (1) identifying what the possible types of stability are, (2) examining how traditional IR theory defines stability, (3) analysing the US stability-driven foreign policy in the Middle East after WWII (analysing the consequences of US intervention and attributing these consequences to the type of stability adopted in each intervention), (4) defining the main aspects of US strategies of stability in the Middle East and outlining an alternative strategy based on empowering local actors and boosting local interactions.

In order to address the first objective—examining stability types, I distinguished between two models of stability; simple stability; referring to a top-down/forcible/ reductionist model of stability, and dynamic stability; referring to the ability of complex systems to recover after being disrupted in a bottom-up style. I explained that simple stability entailed that system agents were brought together (by some external force) in a framework of a specific pattern of interactions, which did not need to be the best configuration for all elements. The dynamic stability, on the contrary, comprised that self-organization could help the system find a new equilibrium point when it deviated from its current balanced state.

In order to give substance to this categorization, I examined two theoretical paradigms; the Newtonian paradigm; from which the simple model of stability was derived, and the complexity paradigm; from which the dynamic model of stability was derived. I then explored the logic of each stability model, its premises, presented illustrative examples, considered the implications of the two models for system performance and outlined some domestic conditions under which the behaviour predicted by each should be expected.

In order to address objective two— exploring the contributions of conventional IR theory in defining 'stability,' a wide range of literature on IR theory was reviewed. The concept of stability was analysed according to various intellectual schools in the field of international relations, namely (neo) realism, (neo) liberalism and constructivism. The contributions of these intellectual schools were argued to be similar in essence. The unifying assumption in these theoretical contributions is that the international system is *homeostatic*. Disturbances are perceived as temporary and the international system tends to return to a balanced state. Accordingly, it was proved that conventional IR perspectives equated stability with the Newtonian conception of physical equilibrium, expressed practically in the international context, in terms of peace or absence of violence.[1] It was further concluded that peace, though a possible symptom to stability, does not fit as a synonym to it. I introduced some arguments in support of the thesis that absence of war should not be confused with stability at least according to the meaning adopted in this dissertation, namely, the ability of complex systems to accommodate disturbances.

Research objective three—analysing the US stability-driven foreign policy in the Middle East, was addressed through an intensive historical case study investigation of US intervention in the Middle East (1953-2008). I firstly illustrated two opposing views on the influence of Super Powers (including the US) on Middle East politics. Then I traced the evolution of US interest in the Middle East and the factors that accelerated this interest (the discovery of oil, the creation of Israel and the Cold War). I also illustrated the tools that Washington employed to secure such interests (such as foreign aid, military alliances, military intervention and regime change). According to

---

[1] John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994-1995), p. 7.

the strategy of stability adopted in each phase, three different phases were identified over the period under study. The first phase, the Cold War (1953-1991), was characterized by the predominance of a status quo perspective. The second phase, the post Cold War (1990s) was characterized by hesitancy in promoting change and giving up the status quo strategy. The third phase, the post September 11, was characterized by a clear shift from status quo-driven strategy to a hegemonic strategy (under the banner of democracy promotion). Promoting Israel as a regional surrogate, tasked with securing regional stability, presented a steady feature of US foreign policy especially since the Six-Day-War of 1967. This theoretical framework was then applied to the US foreign policy toward the region in the period of study (1953-2008). A typology of US models of intervention in the Middle East was offered. It included preemptive, post-hoc, regime change, and pro-Israel models of intervention. This extended typology drew on the above three strategies (the status quo, the hegemony, and the regional surrogate), and reflected on the stability patterns that the US administrations targeted.

In the descriptive chapters I introduced evidence that US strategies of stability reflected simplistic characteristics. Most of these strategies resorted to *imposing* stability on Middle East regimes (sub-systems) through either (1) despotic allies, or (2) military invasion or (3) regional surrogate, instead of cultivating the conditions that enable local actors in these regimes to self-stabilize by their own. The majority of US administrations did not count on the ability of Middle East sub-state actors to change the status quo and hence did not invest heavily in them. Apart from a number of limited initiatives to support civil society and promote democracy, the United States did not play a pivotal role in empowering the citizens in the region to take the lead for change. In investigating the historical account of US foreign policy toward the Middle East, it was evident that the strategies the US employed have achieved little success in stabilizing the region. The concerned regimes (that witnessed the US intervention) remained fragile, unable to self-organize, and in almost every case of intervention the US itself suffered from later negative repercussions out of its top-down/forcible/ reductionist intervention.

In order to address objective four— analysing the main aspects of US strategies in the Middle East and outlining an alternative method to stabilize the region, the study

addressed three aspects: (1) controlling the actors—by identifying the cooperative actors and excluding uncooperative ones, (2) controlling the interactions—by determining the acceptable patterns of interactions and countering inappropriate patterns, and (3) controlling the ideologies—by identifying the acceptable ideologies and denouncing unacceptable ones. The study then elucidated how a different strategy (based on empowering local actors) could allow for a more sustainable form of stability in the region.

US simplistic strategies proved inadequate to trigger sustainable stability in the Middle East. Indeed, in some cases, US strategies led to balance; however, historical evidence showed that the resultant balance was of a very fragile quality that couldn't hold in the face of disturbances. Only the development of a self-organized complex system(s) in the Middle East could, in the long-term, secure sustainable stability. The United States, or any other power with a genuine interest in stabilizing the Middle East, should work to help this region restore complex-systems' attributes, given that social entities with higher complexity stand a good chance of being stable in a dynamic way.[2]

10.4 Theoretical and Empirical Research Findings

This research offered a unique examination of the concept of stability. The research was conducted with the help of insights derived from complexity theory. The evidence presented in this dissertation demonstrated the value of the dichotomy of simple/dynamic stability. As discussed in detail in chapter two, whereas simple stability refers to an externally-imposed pattern of stability aiming at maintaining/restoring the same point of equilibrium, dynamic stability refers to a system's self-ability to find a new point of equilibrium. The distinction between the two types is subtle but important. Equilibrium is vital for any system, but changes that push away from the equilibrium point are part and parcel of complex systems which are usually described as being at the edge of chaos. Accordingly, the main point in any complex system is how to self-accommodate changes, not how to forcibly

---

[2] Complex systems spontaneously arrange its components and their interactions into a sustainable, global structure that tries to maximize overall fitness, without need for an external or internal controller. See Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," *paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, London, (10-13, April, 2000).

perpetuate an idle status quo. Social systems, including the Middle East, are complex systems, moving from equilibrium to chaos and once again to equilibrium. The domestic interactions in complex systems do not evolve in a linear way. Stability cannot be imposed from without. Rather, the system's local actors should be empowered to achieve their balanced and natural functioning. Accordingly, the best strategy for any complex system (like that of the Middle East) is not to resist (or to be helped to resist) these changes but to develop (and to be encouraged to develop) the necessary capabilities to accommodate them.

On the empirical level, this dissertation provided original explanations of backlashes in US foreign policy towards the Middle East system. The cases researched allowed a range of stability-driven strategies to be investigated. The criterion used demonstrated that whilst these strategies differed in detail, they all reflected a top-down/forcible/reductionist perception of stability. This simplistic perception of stability resulted in many problems both to the regional systems and also to US interests in the Middle East. The Middle East was proven to be a complex system and as such it could not be stabilized using simplistic strategies based on excluding/imposing certain actors, interactions or ideologies in a top-down way. The stability of complex systems, like that of the Middle East and its sub-systems, stems from interactions at the local level and shows in turn, high sensitivity to the tiny changes in local conditions.[3] Local actors are much better suited to respond to local conditions.[4] Local actors, accordingly, should be helped, empowered and equally recognized, as long as they accept the fundamental rules of system existence.[5]

It is also concluded that stability and peacefulness are not the same thing and that the mere durability of a particular equilibrium is not a sufficient indicator of system stability. Peace, though a possible symptom of stability does not fit as a synonym to it. Stability includes other dimensions that may and may not be peaceful. In this sense,

---

[3] Ibid., p. 57.

[4] Kai Enno Lehmann, "Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics," (Ph.D dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2010), p. 73.

[5] Fundamental rules of any complex system refer to the rules that sustain the primary goals of the system. They reflect the governing arrangements in the system, including, for example, its constitution, moral principles, and institutions that define the core relationships between system components. These rules guarantee the social order. When they are overturned, contested, or in disarray, order has broken down; when they are re-established, order has been recreated. See John Ikenberry, *After Victory, Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).

war and stability are not necessarily incompatible as the common use of the concept of stability suggests. Stable states can go to war without losing their stability (their ability to cope with disturbances), and weak regimes can live in peace for decades while bearing the seeds of instability. There is also a need to consider that any particular equilibrium may only be suitable for a particular set of circumstances which may not themselves be durable. Many Middle Eastern regimes, for example, are prone to collapse when facing the first real challenge to their artificial stability.

10.4.1 Stability Types and US Foreign Policy Anomalies

Addressing the differences between stability types helped account for several empirical anomalies in the historical account of US intervention in the Middle East. *The first anomaly was the speed* through which the regime of the Shah of Iran collapsed in spite of its apparent firmness. This collapse is readily understood when we recall the extrinsic "top-down" approach through which the Iranian regime had been stabilized. The US had empowered the Shah regime and neglected the massive popular resistance to his rule. US policymakers turned blind eyes to the local opposition inside Iran and preferred to view Iran as a simple system that could be controlled via a reliable client. President Carter had once referred to Iran as 'an island of stability', and congratulated the Shah for earning the admiration and love of the Iranian people. However, the Iranian revolution showed how poor the ability to predict the future or control the evolution of complex systems is. One year after Carter's comments, riots and demonstrations broke out in Tehran streets and the 'stable' Shah regime turned out to be heavily turbulent.

An even more intriguing anomaly was the difficulty the US faced when seeking to stabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the US had obvious interests in settling the dispute, it was surprisingly incapable of mediating an effective solution. This anomaly can be explained, again, in terms of the "reductionist" perception of stability adopted by US administrations, based on favouring a certain regional surrogate and overlooking its destabilizing adventures. Many US officials adopted the notion that Israel's role was important for US strategic regional interests. They were reluctant to curb Israel even when it did not consult US government before violating regional stability—bombing Iraq, annexing the Golan Heights, invading Lebanon and laying siege to Beirut, expanding settlements on the West Bank, and rejecting most of the

377

peace plans suggested by Washington. Each of the previous steps obviously contradicted US interest in maintaining regional stability, but US administrations preferred a regional strategy based on maintaining a special relationship with one of the Middle East system's actors (Israel), to a more complex strategy based on equal recognition of all parties of the regional dispute.[6] The only exception to the previous conclusion was the Eisenhower approach in the Suez Crisis which sought to fit US foreign policy toward Israel within the overall framework of maintaining stability in the region. In that crisis Washington adopted a relatively balanced policy towards the conflicting parties, including its closest regional ally, Israel. The US President was able to take the decision of opposing the Israeli aggression against Egypt. Eisenhower felt it was incumbent upon the US to redeem its word about supporting any victim of aggression.[7] This balanced policy towards regional actors cleverly de-escalated an international crisis and rendered the Middle East system in a better equilibrium.[8]

Addressing the differences between stability types also helped account for the state of dependency which characterized many Middle Eastern 'moderate' regimes. As was argued in chapter two, one consequence of maintaining simplistic strategies was to cause regional allies to be fully dependent on external support for maintaining domestic stability. Repeated US intervention in favour of specific regional clients caused those clients to be fully reliant on foreign intervention and hence to lose any self-ability to cope with domestic and regional challenges. This dependency led, in many cases, regional actors to request US intervention instead of resisting it (Jordan 1957, 1958, 1971, Lebanon 1958, Kuwait 1991). In Lebanon, for example, the US intervention confirmed the notion that Lebanese crises could not be resolved by the country's own political system. The first US intervention of 1958, founded a precedent that was to be repeated in several other domestic crises that Lebanese crises

---

[6] See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 272.
[7] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 412. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1956, 8:15 p.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.
[8] Stephen J. Sniegoski, added another situation of US balanced policy towards Israel, this was during the Bush/Baker administration. The senior Bush administration saw Israel as the unstable element and was convinced that if the Jewish state would make territorial concessions to Arabs, tensions would subside across the entire Middle East, for it was the Israeli occupation of Palestinians' land that created a major Arab grievance exploited by anti-US destabilizing elements in the region. See Stephen J. Sniegoski, *The Transparent Cabal, The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008).

could only be dealt with by external powers. Long after the Cold War ended, many Lebanese today still await a resolution from without to solve their internal problems.[9]

Ironically, when US decision-makers declined to physically intervene in some crises, regional actors exercised tough efforts to persuade Washington of the inevitability of intervention. For example, the Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai was furious when he learned that the US government was not going to dispatch troops to Jordan during the crisis of 1958. He accused US Government of failure to fulfil its commitments. During this crisis the US government offered substantial economic and military support to Jordan. There was heavy concentration of US land/sea/air power in Lebanon and other nearby countries to protect Jordan from any external attack. However, the fragile Jordanian regime was not concerned with outside aggression only but also with the psychological effect of not having US troops in Jordan.[10]

10.4.2 Simple Systems vs. Complex Systems

'Simple stability' strategies are proved to score some partial success in simple systems.[11] These systems, given the circumstances associated with their creation, are heavily dependent on external powers to protect their existence and continuity. The US intervention had thus achieved some 'success' in: (1) Jordan (1957, 1958, 1971), as it managed to save King Hussein's regime in several occasions, (2) Lebanon (1958), as it managed to maintain the domestic balance and helped US client (Camille Chamoun) survive a domestic ordeal and (3) Kuwait (1991) as it managed to liberate the tiny Sheikhdom and defended it from the threat posed by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.

On the contrary, complex systems (i.e. systems that emerged through a long process of dynamic and spontaneous interactions between multi-level variables such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) could not be stabilized through simplistic strategies. The US achieved little success in these regimes. In Iran, which was one of the strongest pro-Western allies, and one in which the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon,

---

[9] Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis, The Cold War and US Dominance in the Middle East* (MA: Beacon Press Publish, 2009), p. 197.

[10] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 190, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, *July 18, 1958—10 p.m*, , Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7-1858. Secret.

[11] By simple systems I refer to artificially created regimes, like that of Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait

Ford, and Carter administrations had invested huge amounts of money and military aid, the secular regime of the Shah had been overthrown by a popular revolution led by a traditional clerk who managed to access the Iranian people. The simplicity with which Khomeini managed to overthrow the Shah indicated the fragility of the strategy maintained by successive US administrations in Iran before 1979.

Similarly, in Egypt, the Carter administration succeeded in reaching a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in late 1970s. The US role in managing the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement after 1973 was perceived as a major diplomatic victory for Washington.[12] However, the US administration did not pay enough attention to *local-level* outrage which was increasing rapidly in the Egyptian society against the peace process and against President Sadat himself. Egyptian citizens were stunned that Sadat had entered into an agreement with Israel without consulting or involving other Arab nations. Many in Egypt saw Sadat's odd behaviour as a result of his close relationship with the United States. As further American-led negotiations ensued, Sadat became increasingly unpopular, and was viewed as a "yes-man" to the United States.[13]

Likewise, the US intervention in Afghanistan produced unstable 'national' government, unable to exercise power without US help.[14] The 'elected' president of Afghanistan, Hamis Karzai has been relying entirely on the US forces located in his country.[15] Karzai proved unable to achieve control over all the country and remnants of the deposed Taliban regime continued military resistance against his government in Kabul.[16] The continued reliance of the Afghani government on the US presence and the inability of the 'elected' regime of Karzai to deal with internal challenges offered a clear evidence for the fragility of the ruling regime and confirmed the negative side-effects of the US simplistic strategy pursued in the complex Afghani system.

---

[12] Leon Hadar, *Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 38.
[13] Susan Muaddi Darraj, *Hosni Mubarak* (New York, Chelsea House, 2007), p. 53.
[14] Peter L. Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), p. 4.
[15] Robert J. Lieber, *The US Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 21.
[16] Hahn, *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*, pp. 4, 34.

Last but not least, the simplistic terms, according to which US intervention in Iraq took place; missed its target and caused further disturbances.[17] The US occupation of Iraq presented the Americans with serious problems and the region with further instability. Iraq experienced a wave of chaos, and the invaders encountered a massive insurgency of all kinds in all Iraqi cities, a growing Islamic antagonism directed at the US all over the world, and a strong domestic opposition to the decision of war raised the costs of the conflict, including military operations, the occupation, reconstruction and economic assistance.

10.4.3 The Legacy of US Simple Strategies

The American strategies of "simplifying the complex" turned out to be usable in terms of attaining simple/artificial stability, however, the backlashes of such strategies included an increase in public disaffection and antagonism against the US as stability was accompanied by supporting of despotic regimes/ military occupation/ or double-standard policy in favour of a certain regional surrogate. US simplistic strategies antagonized the peoples of the region and brought more adherents to the anti-American cause. To better understand the causal relationship between American strategies and the prevalence of anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, we should look more closely at the consequences of each American strategy of intervention in the region.

The Status Quo Strategy

America's interest in maintaining regional status quo—to check the influence of the Soviets and ensure the open flow of oil to the West—have meant close support for and alliance with Middle Eastern leaders who have not always been terribly popular at home.[18] Unfortunately for the United States, its support for those 'moderate' regimes fuelled a growing tendency for many Arabs to see it as the heir to Britain's former imperial role.[19] Many Middle Easterners saw the United States as directly responsible for the frustration of their own political aspirations. The real-politik calculations on

---

[17] Little, *Democratic Piety*, p. 54.
[18] Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War* (California: University of California Press, 2005).
[19] John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 54.

which US foreign and security policies have been based have seldom found congruence with the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East.[20] Moreover, the repression and sense of marginalization, caused by US allies led to radicalization. People lost their identification with their states and tried to wrap themselves around some radical organizations.[21] Many of these radical organizations adopted an anti-American stance. Mehran Kamrava notices that

> American political patronage in the Middle East has been additional fuel for anti-Americanism. The patron-client relationships between the United States and pro-Western Middle Eastern leaders have cost the United States a lot. When it works, patronage has its advantages. But when it fails, those who feel wronged by the client may turn on the patron. [22]

The Hegemony Strategy

Similarly, hegemonic intervention has fostered anti-Americanism. According to this strategy, stability instead of being allowed to emerge out of systems' local interactions was simply imposed on system components in a forcible way. This strategy of simplifying the complex turned out to be profitable in terms of attaining some political hegemony in countries that witnessed the application of this strategy, however, the dangers of such an approach included an increase in public disaffection and antagonism as domestic stability was accompanied by American occupation. It can be concluded that in the cases in which this strategy has been applied (Iraq and Afghanistan) the simplistic perception of 'stability through invasion' or 'hegemonic stability' missed its target. Failure of the United States to avert peoples' humanitarian crisis caused anti-American sentiment to increase, while helped anti-US elements to influence public opinion in many parts of the Muslim world.[23] The peoples of both countries might have been unsatisfied with their regimes; however, they were not happy to replace them through an external occupation of their countries. Francis Fukuyama summarized the setbacks of the hegemony strategy by saying that 'by

---

[20] Ibid.
[21] Blake Hounshell "We Need To 'Keep Kicking Their Behinds': Mohamed Elbaradei On His New Life Of Protest", An Interview with Mohamed Elbaradei, in Marc Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, A Special Report from Foreign Policy, 2011.
[22] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 198.
[23] Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Winter 2001/02), pp. 79-93

talking loudly and carrying a big stick, the United States has fostered a high degree of anti-Americanism throughout the region and stimulated opponents everywhere to think about how to constrain and limit U.S. influence.'[24]

The Surrogate Strategy

US support for Israel is a significant source of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. There is in fact abundant evidence that the combination of unstinting US support for Israel and Israel's prolonged occupation of Arab territory have encouraged anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East and has fuelled the rage of anti-American radicals.[25] The "special relationship" with Israel, which basically meant unqualified US support for Israel, contributed in making US interests more magnetic targets for outraged groups. This relation is not the only grievance of these groups, of course, but it is a central one, and it makes advancing other U.S. interests more difficult. [26]

The expansion and deepening of US-Israeli relations in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the rise of anti-Americanism across the Middle East. According to Mearsheimer and Walt "animosity increased as U.S. support for Israel grew and was compounded by Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Sinai, Gaza, and the Golan Heights in 1967 and by its subsequent repression of the Palestinian Arabs living in what came to be known as the Occupied Territories."[27] There was a widespread perception that the Palestinians have been wronged, that their rights and aspirations have been constantly trampled on by Israel, and that the United States directly contributes to the injustice meted out to them on a routine basis. 'To the average Middle Easterner, American foreign policy has become a primary cause of the plight of the Palestinians.'[28]

Adopting autocratic regimes, military invasion, and special relation with Israel provided no opportunity for building good relations with the peoples of the region. One consequence was that anger at American intervention inevitably flows amongst

---

[24]Francis Fukuyama, "Soft Talk, Big Stick," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead The World American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 205.

[25] Mearsheimer, and Walt, *The Israel Lobby.*

[26] Virginia Tilley, The One-State Solution, A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 127.

[27] Mearsheimer, and Walt, *The Israel Lobby,* p. 54.

[28] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East,* pp. 200, 201.

the angry individuals, wrapping itself in the idiom of anti-Americanism. Conversely, positive attitudes toward local actors and local interactions will, in the long term, strengthen the U.S. ability to diminish the local support for hostile ideas. Rectifying past mistakes in these strategies would produce more good than harm.[29]

10.4.4 US and Bottom-Up Reform

Throughout its involvement in Middle East system the US was seeking to maximize its ability to control system outputs, and because the ability to control is higher in simple systems (in which the impact of local, emergent, non-linear interactions can be ignored or excluded), the US thus pursued the strategies that facilitated this target. Accordingly, the US persistence on simplistic strategies can be explained in light of the fact that simplistic strategies presented an easy way to imagine that a certain complex system (such as that of the Middle East) can be controlled through managing few variables. Adopting any dynamic/complex strategy, on the contrary, would have included that the US administration should consider the people factor; an alternative that Washington used to avoid either for ideological or practical reasons.

From an ideological perspective, many American officials, especially during the Cold War, used to have a fear of the leftist trends of the region's citizens. One of Middle East experts in the Eisenhower administrations, Edmund A. Gullion of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, reflected this meaning when he argued that 'the peoples of the region provided tinder for communist conflagrations, because they were poverty-stricken, suspicious of the West, animated by a fierce nationalism, [and] divided by political disputes.'[30] After the Cold War, the peril turned green (green being the colour of Islam), and many US officials became worried about the Islamic tendencies of the masses of the region. From a practical perspective, most of US administrations preferred to have only one telephone number to call in each Middle East country, instead of dealing with dozens of political personalities to get things done.[31]

---

[29] Samantha Power, "Legitimacy and Competence," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead The World American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 138.

[30] Hahn, Peter L., *Caught in the Middle East, US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 150.

[31] Robert D. Kaplan, "The New Arab World Order," in Marc Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, p. 173

The US did not seem to believe in the self-organization capabilities of the Middle East system. Proceeding from this simplistic perception, only limited attention was paid to the many, multifaceted differences within the various Middle Eastern countries and communities. In most cases, US foreign policy did not take into consideration differences, both between and within the regimes and the peoples. Rather, US decision makers used to focus their attention on maintaining stable allies (or replacing them with more stable ones), and were convinced that regional stability has little to do with minor interactions taking place between system local agents. Unfortunately for the US and to the peoples, this top-down way of viewing the region has contributed to deepening regional imbalances and hampered the natural evolution of system dynamics.[32]

Overlooking the people's factor explains why even when bottom-up strategies, such as democracy promotion initiatives, were pursued the outcome was not always positive. Real democracy equals complexity while US administrations have tried through a wide variety of means to help promote some partial reforms, but not people-oriented democracy since that would risk having their allied regimes voted out of power.[33] There are further reasons why US democracy promotion programs in Middle East countries did not work especially well. First of all democracy promotion co-operation with Middle East countries and the aid allocated to support these projects were not openly presented as being directed towards promoting democracy.[34] 'US administrations used to favour the kind of semi-democracy that many would suggest combined the most destabilizing elements of both democracy and authoritarianism.'[35] The indecisiveness of the US discourse on democracy promotion (especially when compared to US democracy assistance programs in Eastern Europe) has often been exploited by autocratic regimes of the Middle East, leading to further suppression of political freedom and the delay of genuine reforms. More important, the ambiguity of

---

[32] Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 19.
[33] Marc lynch, "The Wages of Arab Decay," in Marc Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, A Special Report from Foreign Policy, 2011
[34] Bernabé López García, and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, 'Spain and North Africa: Towards a 'Dynamic Stability", *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002), pp. 170 — 191, 172
[35] Richard Youngs, *International Democracy and the West The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004), p. 37.

US position in this respect gave the Middle East leaders flexibility to selectively adopt only changes that do not jeopardise their position, if not consolidate it.[36]

Other reasons that US democracy assistance programs didn't work well included the fact that US administrations invariably restricted themselves to funding certain NGOs fulfilling an information gathering and monitoring role. Western donors in general and the US in particular chose not to support non-secular groupings.[37] A related shortcoming was the 'one model fits all' syndrome, where the democracy assistance programs were applied without sufficiently adapting to the local context. US programs were not adapted to fit the local context and relied on a top-down US-centric model where style did not match substance.

10.5 Suggestions for Future Research

The findings of this dissertation leave open several areas for further research which ought to be addressed as part of the ongoing process of applying complexity theory to international relations phenomena:

- Although the concept of 'dynamic stability' contributes to the body of knowledge in the field, more needs to be done in employing other concepts, derived from complexity theory, in the observation of international relations and in examining US foreign policy towards the Middle East. For example, within a qualitative inquiry guided by complexity theory, it is useful to explore concepts like 'sensitivity to initial conditions,' 'entropy,' and 'chaos'. Other suggestions for future researches include several other methodologies, such as constructing dynamic models to explore the emergent phenomena in the context of US-Middle East relations, simulating the local-level interactions (through social network websites for instance) to understand the influence that local actors can pursue on social systems' stability. There is a pressing need to do more research on how local actors can secure or disrupt system stability through minor and low-level interactions.

- Furthermore, other historical case studies, apart from those examined in this dissertation, could be explored, especially, that of the US involvement in Middle East

---

[36] Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11, 12.
[37] Youngs, *International Democracy and the West*, p. 37.

peace process. Such a case study will help in elucidating the strategies US adopted in mediating a complex system of interactions like that of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Equally important, this study has focused on some material factors that affect stability, such as foreign aid, political alliances, regime change and military intervention. It does not examine how non-material factors, such as cultural system, social values and religious norms may affect regional stability. These topics present fruitful areas for future research.

- The geographical scope of this study is restricted to focus on the Middle East (based on the American definition of the term). Accordingly, countries of North Africa and the Horn of Africa are not included. Extending the scope to include US interventions in these countries will add to the value of the analysis through challenging the argument presented in this thesis. For example the US intervention in Morocco which took the shape of providing help to the monarchy during the Green March into the former Spanish Sahara and the subsequent military struggle against Polisario, and the country's recent political evolution has shown transition away from an authoritarian regime. This case might introduce some challenging conclusions that need to be investigated in future work.

- The dichotomy of simple/dynamic stability has proved useful in explaining many shortcomings of US interventionist foreign policy in the Middle East. It needs, however, to be expanded to include internal factors as well. A suggested piece of research needs to investigate the role played by regional actors, namely political regimes, in affecting Middle East stability. Far from being mere puppets, political regimes have great agency, they chose when and where to cause regional crises— crises that forced the US into the region in many cases. To ascribe all that happened in the Middle East to US foreign policy and to blame it on its intervention (or non-intervention) is methodologically incorrect. The Middle East is not a passive actor in world politics. If, for the purposes of this thesis, I concentrated on US strategies of stability and how they influenced the region's stability, in doing so, I did not underestimate the impact of internal dynamics which have undeniably influenced the overall stability of the region. Rather, I did try to tighten the focus of this study by concentrating on what I considered the most relevant factor first. This study

undertook a first step in a multi-dimensional research endeavour that should include other factors that affect Middle East stability in future works.

- Given that the EU became formally involved in the project to create 'regional stability' in the Middle East and North Africa and initiated for this purpose the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995, more investigation of the factual problems encountered by European actors when using strategies involving bottom-up approaches is needed. Similarly, more research is needed to elucidate the methods used by authoritarian regimes to thwart bottom-up activities pursued by those actors. Analysing how these initiatives were frustrated by authoritarian regimes in countries such as Tunisia, Syria and Egypt would help tighten the evaluation of the merits of bottom-up strategies which this thesis suggests that the US should have pursued.

- Another research-worthy topic is the 'Arab Spring' which has already toppled the false edifice of stability that had masked the furious changes sweeping across the region.[38] After years of stagnation, the long-dormant Arab street has finally awakened.[39] The "Arab Spring" began on Saturday, 18 December 2010, and included a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that occurred in countries of North Africa and the Middle East (e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen). It took just under a month for protesters to dislodge Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and only 18 days for Egyptian demonstrators to drive their leader of three decades, Hosni Mubarak, from power. Both men were once thought to be pillars of the American-backed "stability" in the region, and bulwarks against terrorism and chaos. Few months later, presidents Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen were added to the list of ousted leaders. The obvious lesson of Arab Spring is that: local actors and local interactions can demolish apparently stable regimes. It is research-worthy to investigate how these changes will affect the US-Middle East system of relations.[40]

- Equally important, the Obama administration's reaction to the Arab Spring deserves some investigation. In the early months of his term the main problem with President Obama and his diplomacy towards the Middle East was that it has changed too little. The Obama administration has too often remained locked in the Bush administration's

---

[38] Marc Lynch, "The Wages of Arab Decay," in Marc Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World.*
[39] Blake Hounshell, "So Much to Be Angry About," in Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World,* p. 5.
[40] Ibid.

policies and has failed to truly take advantage of the opportunities offered by energetic new local actors in the region.[41] It is true that the Obama administration discarded Bush's crusading moralism in favor of "engagement," but this new policy dictated a more respectful stance toward despotic regimes of the Middle East.[42] It could also be said that the Obama administration have tried through a wide variety of means to help promote reform, but not really democracy since that would risk having their allied regimes voted out of power. This caused a growing Arab disenchantment with Obama administration which many believed it has not changed very much from the Bush years despite the improved rhetoric.[43] Any future work on the choices facing the Obama administration should include the following questions: What lessons does the Arab Spring hold for U.S. efforts to promote democratic change in the Arab world? Is the US going to back the allied regimes to the hilt, in the conviction that a change of leadership would likely endanger its regional interests? Or is the US going to side with the opposition—either because it agree with US goals or simply because the US want to be on the "right side of history" (and in a better position to pursue policy objectives)?

- At the onset of Arab Spring it was clear that the Obama administration was slow to realize what was happening in the Middle East. It was not until Jan. 14, 2011—the day Tunisia's strong-man President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled to Jeddah—that President Obama issued a statement on the month-long uprising in Tunisia. In Egypt, President Obama did not call openly for Mubarak to leave;[44] and the US administration was slow to side fully with the protesters.[45] Until it became obvious to all that Mubarak was going down, the Obama administration looked as if it was still trying to balance its strategic ties to the regime with the desire to see the Egyptian people's aspirations fulfilled. In the end, those positions proved impossible to

---

[41] Marc Lynch, "June 2010: The Hollow Arab Core," in Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, p. 18.

[42] James Traub, "RIP, Engagement," in lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, p. 170.

[43] Lynch, "June 2010: The Hollow Arab Core," in Lynch et al., *Revolution in the Arab World*, p.18.

[44] President Obama told the Americans that "When President Mubarak addressed the Egyptian people tonight; he pledged a better democracy and greater economic opportunity. I just spoke to him after his speech and I told him he has a responsibility to give meaning to those words, to take concrete steps and actions that deliver on that promise." See Transcript: President Obama's Remarks on Egypt, Time Magazine, Friday, Jan. 28, 2011 at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2045085,00.html

[45] beginning with Clinton's assessment (on Jan. 25, 2011, the day Egypt's revolt began) that Egypt was "stable," and was looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people, continuing through Vice President Joseph Biden's refusal to call Mubarak a 'dictator'[45] and the statements of Frank Wisner, the White House envoy—later disavowed—who said it was "crucial" that the Egyptian leader stay in power.

reconcile. The Obama tried to repair some of its previous mistakes by taking a major part in NATO intervention in Libya to topple the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The success that this US intervention has achieved can be traced back to its being a response to a local-level request for foreign assistance. This bottom-up top-down convergence helped the US intervention to succeed in the Libyan case, though this needs to be further investigated in a separate future work.

Bibliography

Archival Documents
_____

Congressional Record, V. 148, Pt. 13, September 20, 2002 to October 1, 2002.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, , The Question of Military and Economic Assistance to Iran; Interest of the United States in The Settlement Of The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, Persia, Political Review of The Recent Crisis, No. 368, 2 September 1953, Source: British Memorandum, Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Document 153, Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), *Washington, November 30, 1956.* Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 19, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State. *Amman, March 2, 1956—1 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3–256. Confidential.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 23. *Amman, March 16, 1956—4 p.m.* Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–1656. Confidential.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 24. Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Washington, *March 28, 1956.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–2856. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 40. Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins), Washington, *October 25, 1956.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10–2556. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 47. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State, *Washington, November 26, 1956.* Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 58 D 398, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S June-Dec. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 50. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan,

Washington, *December 12, 1956—11:38 a.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–256. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 61 Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State. Amman *April 13, 1957—6 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1357. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 72, Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Unified and Specified Commanders, Washington, *April 24, 1957—7:10 p.m.* Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) SSC.57. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 81. Telegram 1542 to Amman, April 27, a joint State– ICA message, authorized the exchange of notes, transmitted the text of an approved announcement, and provided additional instructions as to the use of funds. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.5-MSP/4–2757)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 2, Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, July 27, 1956—5 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–2756. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 3, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 27, 1956, 8:30 a.m, Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 4, Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. Paris, July 27, 1956—5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–2756. Top Secret

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 5. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 410, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 29, 1956 Washington, October 29, 1956 , Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 411. Memorandum of a Conference with the President,

Washington, October 29, 1956, 7:15 p.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 412. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1956, 8:15 p.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 414 Message From Prime Minister Ben Gurion to President Eisenhower, London, July 27, 1956. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 415, Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Certain Specified and Unified Commanders, Washington, October 29, 1956—9:38 p.m. Source: JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) Sec 47 RB. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 505. Letter from Prime Minister Bulganin to President Eisenhower Moscow, November 5, 1956. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–556. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 550. Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. Washington, November 7, 1956. Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–756. Confidential.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 17, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, May 2, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 56, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, June 2, 1958—7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–258. Top Secret; Priority.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 14, 1958, 10:50 a.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 139, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Vice

President (Nixon), White House, Washington, July 15, 1958, 9 a.m., Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 141, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, July 15, 1958—4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1558. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 179, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, *July 16, 1958, 11 a.m.* Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 183, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, Washington, *July 16, 1958—6:42 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–1658. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 186. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 17, 11:30 a.m, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–1758. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 187. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 17, 2:30 p.m. Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63D 123, CF 1050, Memoranda of Conversation, Lloyd's Visit July 17–20. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 189. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, *Washington, July 17, 1958—8:36 p.m.* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–1658. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 190, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, *July 18, 1958—10 p.m,* , Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–1858. Secret

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Document 177, Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960, Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Document 181, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, December 31, 1960, Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5611/12–3160. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 314, Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Washington, June 30, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/6–3062. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 5, Israel's Atomic Energy Activities, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, January 30, 1961, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.1901/1–3061. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 28, Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy, Washington, March 30, 1961, Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A45/3–3061. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 57, Memorandum of Conversation, New York, May 30, 1961, Department of State, Central Files, 033.8411/5–3061. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 95, A Strategic Analysis of The Impact of The Acquisition By Israel of A Nuclear Capability, Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, undated. JCSM-523–61, Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5611/8–1461. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962, Document 314, Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Washington, June 30, 1962., Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/6–3062. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Document 63, Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, Washington, May 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Document 402. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, April 7, 1967, 9:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Document 407. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,Washington, April 20, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)

to President Johnson, Washington, May 17, 1967.Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 10 Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 17, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 145. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State, Cairo, June 4, 1967, 1925Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 169, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Current Intelligence, Washington, June 5, 1967.Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Situation Reports. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 175. Message From President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, Washington, June 6, 1967, 10:21 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5–10/67. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 176, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Washington, June 6, 1967, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 225, Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Consultant (Bundy), Washington, June 8, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Military Aid. No classification marking.

Foreign Relations of The United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 269. Notes of A Meeting of The Special Committee Of The National Security Council, Washington, June 12, 1967, 6:30 P.M., Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes And Notes.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 231. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, Washington, May 16, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 484, President's Trip Files, The President, Issues Papers—USSR, III, [Part 1]. Top Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 2, Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, Washington, January 30, 1969.NSCIG/NEA 69–1B (Revised)National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, Washington, April 23, 1969, 0008Z. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 128, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 26, 1971, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 217, Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, June 1973 Department of State, Khartoum Embassy Files: Lot 80 F 170, Box 3, POL 23-8 Terrorism.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 154, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 17, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1971, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abdal-Aziz Al Saud, 1971. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 155, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 21, 1971, 4:15 p.m. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 2, Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, Washington, January 30, 1969. NSCIG/NEA 69–1B (Revised)National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret.

Foreign Relations of the United States,1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 68.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 74.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 81.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Document 90.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 454.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 40, Editorial Note.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Document 185. Editorial Note.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 178. Editorial Note.

Books and Dissertations

Adler, Emanuel, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005).

Agnew, John, *Hegemony The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005).

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, *The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked, September 11th, 2001* (California, Tree of Life Publications, 2002).

Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997).

Alteras, Isaac, *Eisenhower and Israel, U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993).

Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Ashton, Nigel J., ed., *The Cold War in the Middle East, Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967–73* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Axelrod, Robert, *The Complexity of Cooperation, Agent-Based Models of Competition And Collaboration* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997).

Ayalon, Ami, *The Press in the Arab Middle East, A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Aydinli, Ersel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Globalization, Security, and the Nation-State Paradigms in Transition* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

Bacik, Gokhan, *Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East, The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Baker, Dean, *The United States Since 1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Barrett, Roby Carol, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War, US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007).

Bar-Yam, Yaneer, *Dynamics of Complex Systems* (MA: Perseus Books, 1997).

Beitz, Charles R., *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Bell, Duncan, ed., *Political Thought and International Relations, Variations on a Realist Theme* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008).

Ben-Ami, Shlomo, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace, The Israeli-Arab Tragedy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Bensahel, Nora and Daniel L. Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment In The Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change* (CA: Rand, Project Air Force, 2004).

Ben-Zvi, Abraham, *The Origins of the American–Israeli Alliance, The Jordanian Factor* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Berenskoetter, Felix and M. J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Berger, Peter L. and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Many Globalizations, Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Bernard Reich et al., *Israel and the Eastern Arab States: A Strategic Source Book* (Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1968)

Black, Jeremy, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony, The world order since 1500,* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Blum, William, *Rogue States, A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (London: Zed Books, 2006).

Bogg, Jan and Robert Geyer, eds., *Complexity, Science and Society* (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2007).

Brands, Hal, *From Berlin to Baghdad, America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008).

Bregman, Ahron, *Israel's Wars, A History since 1947* (London: Routledge, 2002).

Brenkman, John, *The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy, Political Thought since September 11* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007).

Bronner, Stephen Eric, *Blood in the Sand: Imperial Fantasies, Right-wing Ambitions, and The Erosion of American Democracy,* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2005).

Bronson, Rachel, *Thicker than Oil, America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance, International Relations and the Challenge of American primacy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton university press, 2008).

Brown, Michael Edward, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (MA, MIT Press, 1996).

Brown, Seyom, *The Illusion of Control, Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

Burns, Richard Dean and Joseph M. Siracusa, *Historical Dictionary of the Kennedy-Johnson Era* (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2007).

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Byrne, David, *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, An introduction* (London: Routledge, 1998).

Cameron, Nigel M. de S., *Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defense of Infallibilism in 19th Century Britain* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987).

Case, Karl E. and Ray C. Fair, *Principles of Economics* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994).

Castellani, Brian and Frederic William Hafferty, *Sociology and Complexity Science, A New Field of Inquiry* (MI, Springer, 2009).

Chari, Chandra, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World, The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Chesters, Graeme and Ian Welsh, *Complexity and Social Movements, Multitudes at the Edge of Chaos* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11, The Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).

Chomsky, Noam, *Hegemony or Survival, America's Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003).

Chomsky, Noam, *Pirates and Emperors, Old and New International Terrorism in the Real World* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002).

Christison, Kathleen, *Perceptions of Palestine, Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (California: University of California Press, 1999).

Cilliers, Paul, *Complexity and Post-modernism, Understanding Complex Systems* (London: Routledge, 1998).

Cleveland, William L. and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009).

Close, Carl P. and Robert Higgs, eds., *Opposing the Crusader State Alternatives to Global Interventionism* (CA: Independent Institute, 2007).

Cohen, Avner, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

Cohen, Michael J., *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East 1954–1960, Defending the Northern Tier* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

Cohen, Warren I., *America's Failing Empire, U.S. Foreign Relations since the Cold War* (MA: Warren I. Cohen Books, 2005).

Cook, Jonathan, *Israel and The Clash of Civilizations* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

Cooley, John K., *An Alliance Against Babylon, The U.S., Israel, and Iraq* (London: Pluto Press, 2002)

Copeland, Miles, *The Game of Nations, The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1970).

Coveney, Peter and Roger Highfield, *Frontiers of Complexity, The Search for Order in A Chaotic World* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1996),

Cox, Michael, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Crain, Andrew Downer, *Ford Presidency* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009).

Crockatt, Richard, *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order* (London: Routledge, 2003).

Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound, the Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings institute, 2003).

Dallek, Robert, *Nixon and Kissinger, Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

Dann, Uriel, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Darraj, Susan Muaddi, *Modern world leaders, Hosni Mubarak* (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007).

Davidson, Lawrence, *America's Palestine, Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001).

Dawoody, Alexander, *U.S. Policy toward Iraq within the Context of Complexity Theories* (Ph.D. dissertation: Western Michigan University, 2004).

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and David Lalman, *War and Reason, Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992).

Diez, Thomas, et al., ed., *The European Union and Border Conflicts, The Power of Integration and Association,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Divine, Robert A., *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

402

Doran, Michael, *Pan-Arabism before Nasser, Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Dougherty, JE, RL Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).

Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories, Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Dwivedi, Yogesh Kumar, Banita Lal, Michael D. Williams, Scott L. Schneberger, *Handbook of Research on Contemporary Theoretical Models in Information Systems* (Pennsylvania: IGI Global snippet, 2009).

Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *International Relations Theory, Appraising the Field* (Cambridge: Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2003).

Engdahl, William, *A Century of War, Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

Etzioni, Amitai, *Political Unification* (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1965).

Finlan, Alistair, *Essential Histories, The Gulf War 1991* (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2003).

Fonseca, José, *Complexity and Innovation in Organizations* (London: Routledge, 2002).

Frank, Justin A., *Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President* (New York: Regan Books, 2004)

Freedman, Lawrence, *A Choice of Enemies, America Confronts the Middle East* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).

Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

Fromm, Jochen, *The Emergence of Complexity* (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004).

Fry, Greg and Jacinta O'Hagan, *Contending Images of World Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Macmillan, 2001).

Fukuyama, Francis, *America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative* (Surrey: legacy Publishing Ltd., 2007).

Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992).

Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Landscape of History, How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Geary, Brent M., *A Foundation of Sand: U.S. Public Diplomacy, Egypt, and Arab Nationalism, 1953-1960* (PhD dissertation: the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, 2007).

Gendzier, Irene L., *Notes From the Minefield, United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Gerring, John, *Case Study Research, Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007),

Gerring, John, *Case Study Research, Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Goldschmidt Jr., Arthur and Lawrence Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2006).

Goldschmidt Jr., Arthur, *A Brief History of Egypt* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007).

Goodin, Robert E. and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, *A New Handbook of Political Science*, (New York, Oxford, 1996), p. 432.

Gordon, Joel, *Nasser Hero of the Arab Nation* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006).

Gowa, Joanne S., *Ballots and bullets, The Elusive Democratic Peace* (NJ., Princeton University Press, 1999).

Graham, Edward M. and David M. Marchick, *US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment* (Washington, DC: The Institute for International Economics. 2006).

Gray, Colin S., *War, Peace and International Relations, An Introduction to Strategic History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Greenstein, Fred I., *The George W. Bush Presidency, An Early Assessment* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

Griffiths, Martin and Terry O'Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach, *International Relations, The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2008).

Griffiths, Martin, ed., *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

404

Griffiths, Martin, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics, A Reinterpretation* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Gulick, Edward V., *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955).

Hadar, Leon, *Sandstorm, Policy Failure in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Hahn, Peter L., *Caught in the Middle East, US Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

Hahn, Peter L., *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007).

Hall, Mitchell K., *Historical Dictionary of the Nixon–Ford Era* (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2008).

Halper, Stefan A., Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order,* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Hamza, Khidhir and Jeff Stein, *Saddam's Bombmaker, The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda* (New York: Scribner Press, 2000).

Hanhimaki, Jussi, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Harrison, Neil E., ed., *Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

Harvey, David, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford, 2005).

Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Hastedt, Glenn, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004).

Henriksen, Thomas H., *American Power after the Berlin Wall* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).

Herkhuis, Dale J., et al., eds., *International Stability, Military, Economic and Political Dimensions* (New York: John Wiley, 1964).

Hess, Gary R., *Presidential Decisions for War, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf* (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

405

Hinnebusch, Raymond, *The international politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

Hirsh, Michael, *At War with Ourselves, Why America is Squandering its Chance to Build a Better World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh and Cathal J. Nolan, *US Presidents and Foreign Policy, from 1789 to the present* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2006).

Hoff, Joan, *A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, Dreams of Perfectibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008).

Hoffmann, Matthew J., *Ozone Depletion and Climate Change Constructing a Global Response* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Hogan, Michael J., *America in the World, The Historiography of US Foreign Relations since 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Holmes, Stephen, *The Matador's Cape, America's Reckless Response to Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Holsti, Ole R., *Making American Foreign Policy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Hopwood, Derek, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

Ikenberry, John, *After Victory, Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order* (Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001).

Jen, Erica, Robust Design, *A Repertoire of Biological, Ecological, and Engineering Case Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Jervis, Robert, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Jervis, Robert, *System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

Johnson, Paul, *A History of the American People* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997).

Johnston, Charles, *The Brink of Jordan* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972).

Jones, Veda Boyd, *Modern World Leaders, George W. Bush* (New York: Chelsea House, 2007).

Joya, Malalai, *Raising My Voice* (London: Random House, 2010).

Joyce, Miriam, *Anglo-American Support for Jordan, The Career of King Hussein* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Judt, Tony and Denis Lacorne, eds., *With US or Against US, Studies in Global Anti-Americanism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Jupp, Victor, *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 2006).

Jupp, Victor, *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 2006).

Kagan Robert, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

Kamrava, Mehran, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War* (California: University of California Press, 2005).

Kaplan, Morton A., *System and Process in International Politics* (Colchester: ECPR, 2005).

Karsh, Efraim, ed., *Israel, The First Hundred Years, Vol. IV, Israel in the International Arena* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

Kaufman, Stuart J., Richard Little and William Curti Wohlforth, *The Balance of Power in World History* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Keohane, Robert O. and J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (MA: Addison Wesley, 2000).

Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Kepel, Gilles, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom, The Future of The Middle East*, Translated By, Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).

Kepel, Gilles, *Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2002).

Khalidi, Rashid, *Sowing Crisis, The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (MA: Beacon Press Publish, 2009).

Kindleberger, Charles, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry, Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Kinzer, Stephen, *All the Shah's Men, An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*,(New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

Kirschen, Daniel and Goran Strbac, *Fundamentals of Power System Economics* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2005).

Kissinger, Henry A., *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown&Co, 1979).

Kissinger, Henry, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

Kothari, C. R., *Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques* (New Delhi: New Age International (P) Ltd., 2004).

Krasner, Stephen, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).

Kubálková, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, eds., *International Relations in A Constructed World* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 1998).

Kuhn, T. S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

Langton, Christopher G., *Computation at the edge of Chaos, Phase-Transitions and Emergent Computation* (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Michigan, 1990).

Lansford, Tom, *Historical Dictionary of US Diplomacy since the Cold War* (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007).

Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994).

Lebow, Richard Ned, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Leffler, Melvyn P. and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead The World American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Lehmann, Kai Enno, *Using Complexity Theory to Suggest a New Framework to Deal with Crises in International Politics* (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Liverpool, 2010).

Lesch, David W., *Syria and the United States, Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010).

Lewis, Bernard, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic*, September 1990.

Lewis, Bernard, *From Babel to Dragomans, Interpreting The Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Lieber, Robert J., *The American Era, Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Lippman, Thomas W., *Inside the Mirage, America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (Colorado: Westview, 2004).

Little, Adrian, *Democratic Piety, Complexity, Conflict and Violence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

Little, Douglas, *American Orientalism, The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003).

Little, Richard and Michael Smith, eds., *Perspectives on World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Lockman, Zachary, *Contending Visions of the Middle East, The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Longley, Kyle et al., *Conservative Mythology and America's Fortieth President* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2007).

Lyon, David, *Surveillance After September 11* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

Mainzer, Klaus, *Thinking in Complexity, The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind* (New York: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007).

Marsden, Lee, *For God's Sake, The Christian Right and the US Foreign Policy* (London: Zed Books, 2006).

Martin, Lisa L., *Democratic Commitments legislatures and International Cooperation* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

McCulloch, Allison, *Seeking Stability amid Deep Division: Consociationalism and Centripetalism in Comparative Perspective*, (PhD dissertation, Queen's University-Ontario, 2009)

McDermott, Rose, *Risk-Taking in International Politics, Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*, (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998).

McMahon, Robert, *The Cold War, A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

McNamara, Robert, Britain, *Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952–1967, From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

Migdal, Joel S. et al., eds., *State Power and Social Forces, Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Migdal, Joel S., *Strong Societies and Week States, Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Miller, Raymond C., *International Political Economy, Contrasting World Views* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan, A Hashemite legacy* (London: Routledge, 2001).

Milton-Edwards, Beverley, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

Milton-Edwards, Beverley, Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Mitchell, Melanie, *Complexity, a Guided Tour* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Morgan, Gareth, *Images of Organization* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986).

Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1948).

Muasher, Marwan, *The Arab Centre, The Promise of Moderation* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008).

Nincic, Miroslav, *Renegade Regimes, Confronting Deviant Behavior in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

Northcott, Michael, *An Angel Directs the Storm, Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004).

Nutting, Anthony, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable, 1967),

Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Power in the Global Information Age, From Realism to Globalization* (Oxon: Routledge, 2004).

Nye Jr., Joseph S., *The Paradox of American Power, Why The World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Nye Jr., Joseph S., *The Powers to Lead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

O'Ballance, Edgar, *No Victor No Vanquished, The Yom Kippur War* (CA: San Rafael, 1978).

O'Connor, Brendon and Martin Griffiths, eds., *The Rise of Anti-Americanism* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Oren, Michael B., *Six Days of War, June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Parker, Richard Bordeaux, *The October War a Retrospective* (FL: University Press of Florida, 2001).

Parsi, Trita, *Treacherous Alliance, The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (London: Yale University Press, 2007).

Patterson, James T., *Restless Giant, the United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Paul, T. V., James J. Wirtz, and Michel, eds., *Balance of Power, Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Perlmutter, Amos and Michael I.Handel, Uri Bar-Joseph, *Two Minutes over Baghdad* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).

Peterson, J. E., *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia* (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2003).

Picard, Louis A., Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss, eds., *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008).

Pintak, Lawrence, *Seeds of Hate, How America's Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the Jihad* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

Polk, William Roe, *Understanding Iraq, A Whistlestop Tour from Ancient Babylon to Occupied Baghdad* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006).

Pollack, Kenneth, *The Persian Puzzle, The Conflict Between Iran and America* (London: Random House, 2004).

Quandt, William B., *Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and University of California Press, 2005).

Rabasa, Angel M. et al., *The Muslim world after 9/11* (CA: Rand, 2004).

Rabinovich, Itamar, *The Brink of Peace, The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon 1970-1985*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985).

Rabinovich, Itamar, *Waging Peace, Israel and the Arabs 1948–2003* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Rees, John, *Imperialism and Resistance* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Rengger, N.J. *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order Beyond International Relations theory* (London: Routledge, 2000).

Ricks, Thomas E., *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, Penguin Books, 2007).

Rittberger, Volker, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Robertson, David, *International Economics and Confusing Politics* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006).

Roger, Paul, *A War Too Far, Iraq, Iran and the New American Century* (London: Pluto Press, 2006).

Rosen, Gary, *The Right War, The Conservative Debate on Iraq* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Rosenau, James N., *The Study of World Politics, Volume 1, Theoretical and Methodological Challenges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Rosenau, James N., *The Study of World Politics, Volume 2, Globalization and Governance* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Rosenberg, Jerry Martin, *Reawakening: the new, broader Middle East* (Lanham, University of America, 2007).

Rubenberg, Cheryl A., *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1986).

Ruggie, John Gerard, *Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998).

Russett, Cynthia Eagle, *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

Ryan, David and Patrick Kiely, eds., *America and Iraq, Policy-making, Intervention and Regional politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

Ryan, Halford Ross, *U.S. Presidents as Orators: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook* (London: Greenwood Press, 1995).

Saikal, Amin and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *Democratization in the Middle East, Experiences, struggles, Challenges* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003).

Salmon, Trevor C. and Mark F. Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Sardar, Ziauddin and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd, 2002).

Savage, Charlie, *Takeover, The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007).

Sayigh, Yezid and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The Cold War and the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Schmidt, Donald E., *The Folly of War, American Foreign Policy 1898-2005* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005).

Seabury, Paul, ed., *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965).

Seale, Patrick, Asad, *The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988).

Seddon, David, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of The Middle East*, (New York, Europa Publications, 2004).

Sengupta, A., ed., *Chaos, Nonlinearity, Complexity, The Dynamical Paradigm of Nature* (New York: Springer, 2006).

Sheehan, Michael, *Balance of Power, History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Sidel, Mark, More Secure, *Less Free, Antiterrorism Policy & Civil Liberties after September 11* (MI, University of Michigan Press, 2004).

Siracusa, Joseph M. and Richard Dean Burns, *Historical Dictionary of Kennedy-Johnson Era* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007).

Snene, Mehdi, Jolita Ralyté, Jean-Henry Morin, *Exploring Services Science: Second International Conference, IESS 2011* (Springer, 2011).

Sniegoski, Stephen J., *The Transparent Cabal, The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel* (Washington, D.C.: Ihs Press, 2008).

Taffet, Jeffrey F., *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Taylor, Alan R., *The Superpowers and the Middle East* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

Terry, Janice J., *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

Thackrah, John Richard, *Military Conflicts since 1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

Thomas Christiansen et al., *The Social Construction of Europe* (London: Sage Publications, 2001).

Tibi, Bassam, *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).

Tillman, Seth P., *The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

Tilly, Charles, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Tilley, Virginia, *The One-State Solution, A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2005).

Tripp, Charles, *Contemporary Egypt, Through Egyptian Eyes* (London: Routledge, 1993).

Tucker, Spencer C., ed., *The Encyclopaedia of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, A Political, Social, and Military History, Vol. 2* (California: ABC- CLIO, Inc., 2008).

Tyler, Patrick, *A World of Trouble, The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).

Vatikiotis, P. J., *The Egyptian Army in Politics, Pattern for New Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961).

Waddington, C.H., *Tools for Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

Waldrop, M. Mitchell, *Complexity, The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992).

Walt, Stephen M., *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990).

Waltz, Kenneth N., *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics, The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).

Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics* (MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979).

Weber, Cynthia, *International Relations Theory, A Critical Introduction* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010).

Weissman, Steve and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb; the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East* (New York: Times Books, 1981).

Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Wilentz, Sean, *The Age of Reagan, A History, 1974-2008* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).

Wilkinson, Paul, *International Relations, A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007).

Williams, Malcolm, *Science and Social Science* (London: Routledge, 2000).

Williams, Michael C., ed., *Realism Reconsidered, The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Winkler, Carol K., *In the Name of Terrorism, Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

Wittes, Tamara Cofman, *Freedom's Unsteady March, America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008).

Wohlforth, William C., Stuart J. Kaufman and Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in World History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Woodward, Bob, *Bush at War* (New York: Thorndike Press, 2003).

Woollacott, Martin, *After Suez, Adrift in the American Century* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006).

Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

Wright, Quincy, *A Study of War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942).

Wynn, Neil A., *Historical Dictionary of Roosevelt-Truman Era* (Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2008).

Yaqub, Salim, *Containing Arab Nationalism, The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2004).

Yesilbursa, Behçet Kemal, *The Baghdad Pact, Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East 1950–1959* (Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005).

Youngs, Gillian, *Global Political Economy in the Information Age, Power and Inequality* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Youngs, Richard, *International Democracy and the West The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004).

Youngs, Richard, *International Democracy and the West: the role of governments, civil society and International Business* (New York, Oxford, 2004).

Book Chapters

Aron, Raymond, "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs", in Stanley Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (NJ: Engle-wood Cliffs, 1960).

Bensahel, Nora, "Political Reform in The Middle East", in Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, Conflict, Stability, and Political Change* (CA: RAND, 2004).

Brawle, Mark R., "The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory", in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., *Balance of Power, Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Chabat, Jorge, "The International Role of Latin America after September 11, Tying the Giant", in Chandra Chari, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World, The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Crockatt, Richard, "Anti-Americanism and the Clash of Civilizations", in Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, eds., *The Rise of Anti-Americanism* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Gillespie, Richard, "Regionalism and Globalism in the EMP: The Limits to Western Mediterranean Co-operation", Paper to be presented at the Conference on '*The Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region*', hosted by the Fundação Oriente, Lisboa, at the Convento da Arrábida, Setúbal, 6-9 June 2002.

Gillespie, Richard "Spain and the Western Mediterranean," Working Paper, *ESRC Research Programme on 'One Europe or Several?* (Brighton: University of Sussex, 2001).

Ginat, Rami, "Nasser and the Soviets, A Reassessment", in Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler eds., *Rethinking Nasserism, Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt,* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004)

Grieco, Joseph M., "Structural Realism and the Problem of Polarity and War", in Felix Berenskoetter, M. J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Grossman, Zoltán, "A Century of U.S. Military Interventions, From Wounded Knee to Iraq," in Carolyn Baker, ed., *U.S. History Uncensored* (iUniverse.com, 2006).

Guzzini, Stefano and Robert Gilpin, "The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power", in Iver B.Neumann and Ole Wæver, eds., *The Future of International Relations Masters in the Making* (London: Routledge, 2005).

Harrison, Neil E., "Thinking in the World We Made," in Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics, Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

Heylighen1, Francis, Paul Cilliers and Carlos Gershenson, "Complexity and Philosophy", in Bogg, J. and R. Geyer, eds., *Complexity, Science and Society* (Oxford Radcliffe Publishing, 2007).

Holsti, Ole R., "Theories of International Relations", in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Kanti Bajpai and Varun Sahni, "Hegemony and Strategic Choice," in Chandra Chari, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in A Globalized World: The Changing Balance Of Power in The Twenty First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008)

Korb, Lawrence, "Foreign Aid and Security A Renewed Debate", in Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss, eds., *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008).

Krauthammer, Charles, "In Defense of Democratic Realism," in Rosen, Gary, *The Right War, The Conservative Debate on Iraq* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Lebow, Richard Ned, "Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change", in Michael C. Williams, ed., *Realism Reconsidered, The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

MacMillan, John, "Liberal Internationalism", in Martin Griffiths, ed., *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Marion, Russ, "Complexity in Organizations, A Paradigm Shift", in A. Sengupta, ed., *Chaos, Nonlinearity, Complexity, The Dynamical Paradigm of Nature* (New York: Springer, 2006).

McClintock, Charles G., et al., "A Pragmatic Approach to International Stability", in Herkhuis et al., eds., *International Stability, Military, Economic and Political Dimensions* (New York: John Wiley, 1964).

Mearsheimer, John J., "Structural Realism", in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories, Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Najem, Tom Pierre, "State power and Democratization in North Africa, Developments in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya", in Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *Democratization in the Middle East, Experiences, struggles, Challenges* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003).

Nye Jr., Joseph S., "The Future of American Power", in Chandra Chari, ed., *War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World, The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Onuf, Nicholas, "Constructivism, A User's Manual", in Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, eds., *Constructivism, International Relations in A Constructed World* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 1998).

Picard, Louis A. and Robert Groelsema, "U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities Goals for the Twenty-First Century", in Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema, and Terry F. Buss eds.,

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Lessons for the Next Half-Century (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008).

Ray, James Lee, "A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program", in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory, Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003).

Russett, Bruce, "Why Democratic Peace?", in Michael Edward Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MA, MIT Press, 1996).

Satloff, Robert, *Assessing the Bush Administration's Policy of 'Constructive Instability'* (Part I): *Lebanon and Syria*, The Washington Institute for Near, 2005.

Schweller, Randall, "US Democracy Promotion, Realist Reflections", in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Seabury, Paul, "The Idea of the Status Quo", in Paul Seabury, ed., *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965).

Simpson, Archie, "Nations and States", in Trevor C. Salmon and Mark F. Imber, eds., *Issues in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

Smith, Steve, "Democracy Promotion, Critical Questions", in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion, Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Steve Smith, "Social Constructivisms and European Studies", in Thomas Christiansen et al., *The Social Construction of Europe* (London: Sage Publications, 2001).

Teti, Andrea, Andrea Mura, "Islam and Islamism", in Jeffrey Haynes, *Routledge handbook of religion and politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

Tilly, Charles, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making", in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: N.J., Princeton University Press, 1975).

Walt, Stephen, "One World, Many Theories", in Richard Little, Michael Smith, *Perspectives on World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Yaqub, Salim, "The Cold War in the Middle East", in Nigel J. Ashton, ed., *The Cold War in the Middle East, Regional conflict and the Superpowers 1967–73* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Adler, Emanuel, "Seizing the Middle Ground, Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1997), pp. 319-363.

Ahmed, Samina, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Winter 2001/02), pp. 79-93.

Algosaibi, Ghazi A. R., "The Theory of International Relations, Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics", *Background*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (February, 1965), pp. 221-256.

Aly, Abdel Moneim Said and Robert H. Pelletreau, "U.S.-Egyptian Relations," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. viii, No. 2, (June 2001), pp. 45-58.

Amineh, Mehdi Parvizi and Henk Houweling, "IR-Theory and Transformation in the Greater Middle East, the Role of the United States", *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, Vol. 6, No. 1-3, (2007), pp. 57-86.

Anderson, Lisa, "Remaking the Middle East, The Prospects for Democracy and Stability", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Aug., 2006), pp. 163 – 178.

Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy, Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1, (Oct., 1985), pp. 226-254.

Ayson, Robert, "Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific, Towards a Conceptual Understanding", *Asian Security*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Apr., 2005), pp. 190-213.

Baldwin, David A., "Interdependence and Power, A Conceptual Analysis", *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Autumn 1980), pp. 471-506.

Barnett, Michael N., "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System", *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3, (Summer, 1995), pp. 479-510.

Belle, Douglas A. Van, "Balance of Power and System Stability, Simulating Complex Anarchical Environments over the Internet", *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 51, No. 1, (Mar., 1998), pp. 265-282.

Bellin, Eva, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East, Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Jan., 2004), pp. 139-157.

Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, "An Outline of General System Theory", *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Aug., 1950), pp. 134-165.

Beyerchen, Alan, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War", *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90.

Bilgin, Pinar, "Whose 'Middle East'? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security", *International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2004, pp.25-41.

Brumberg, Daniel, "Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem)", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (Winter, 2005-06), pp. 97–116.

Byrne, David, "Complexity, Configurations and Cases", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5, (2005), pp. 95–111.

Campbell, John C., "The Middle East, A House of Containment Built on Shifting Sands", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 3, (1981), pp. 593-628.

Carapico, Sheila, "Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in The Arab World," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 379-395.

Carothers, Thomas, "The NED at 10," *Foreign Policy*, No .95, (Summer 1994), pp. 123-129.

Cirkovic, Milan M., "Is the Universe Really That Simple?" *Foundations of Physics*, Vol. 32, No. 7, (Jul., 2002), pp. 1141-1157.

Conant, Melvin A. "Middle East Stability, A View from the USA," *Energy Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 11, (Nov., 1992), pp. 1027-1031.

Cook, Steven, "Political Instability in Egypt," *Contingency Planning Memorandum*, No. 4 (August 2009), pp. 1-7.

Copeland, Dale C., "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Fall, 2000), pp. 187–212.

Davison, Roderic H. , "Where is the Middle East?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, no. 4 (July 1960), pp. 665-75.

Deutsch, Karl and J. David Singer, "Multi-polar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Apr., 1964), pp. 390-406.

Doyle, Michael W., "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4, (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169.

Doyle, Michael, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts I," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer 1983), pp. 205-235.

Doyle, Michael, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts II," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 323-353.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock, The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 4, (2001), pp. 391–416.

Flibbert, Andrew, "The Road to Baghdad, Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (April–June, 2006), pp. 310–352.

Fukuyama, Francis, "Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1, (Winter 2007-08), pp. 23–45.

Gaddis, John Lewis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 5-58.

García, Bernabé López and de Larramendi, Miguel Hernando, "Spain and North Africa: Towards a 'Dynamic Stability'," *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2002), pp. 170—191

Gerges, Fawaz A, "The Study of Middle East International Relations, A Critique," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1991), pp. 208-220.

Geyer, Robert and Samir Rihani, "Complexity Theory and the Challenges of Democracy in the 21st Century," *paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, London, (10-13, April, 2000).

Geyer, Robert, "European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2003, pp. 15-35.

Gilpin, Robert, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, (Spring 1988), pp. 591-613.

Goldenweiser, Alexander, "The Concept of Causality in the Physical and Social Sciences," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 3, No. 5, (Oct., 1938), pp. 624-636.

Gongora, Thierry, "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Aug., 1997), pp. 323-340.

Gordon, Philip H., "Bush's Middle East Vision," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 1, (Spring, 2003), pp. 155–165.

Grunberg, Isabelle, "Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No 4, (Autumn 1990), pp. 431-476.

Haas, Ernst B., "The Balance of Power, Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," *World Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Jul., 1953), pp. 442-477.

Haass, Richard N., "Regime Change and its Limits," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 4, (Jul, Aug., 2005), pp. 66-78.

Haass, Richard N., "The New Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 6, (Nov. - Dec., 2006), pp. 2-11.

Hadar, Leon T., What Green Peril?, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 27-42.

Haggard, Stephan and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, (Summer, 1987), pp. 491–517.

Hahn, Peter L., "Securing the Middle East, The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, (March 2006), pp. 38-47.

Hansson, Sven Ove and Gert Helgesson, "What is Stability?" *Synthese*, Vol. 136, 2003, pp. 219–235.

Hawthorne, Amy, "Can the United States Promote Democracy in the Middle East?" *Current History*, (Jan., 2003), pp. 21, 26.

Hoffmann, Matthew J. and D. Johnson, "Change and Process in a Complex World," *Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association* (18–21 March 1998).

Hopf, Ted, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Summer, 1998), pp. 171-200.

Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49.

Inbar, Efraim, "Still a Strategic Asset for the US," *Jerusalem Post*, October 8, 2006.

Jacobs, Matthew f., "The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (September 2006), pp. 705-739.

James, Patrick and Michael Brecher, "Stability and Polarity, New Paths for Inquiry," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Mar., 1988), pp. 31-42.

Jervis, Robert, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn, 1998), pp. 971-91.

Jervis, Robert, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Summer, 2006), pp. 7-19.

Jervis, Robert, Realism, "Neo-liberalism, and Cooperation, Understanding the Debate," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Summer, 1999), pp. 42-63.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Two Cheers for Multilateralism," *Foreign Policy*, No. 60, (Autumn, 1985), pp. 148-167.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Summer, 1995), pp. 39-51.

Keohane, Robert O., "The Neorealist and His Critic," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.3, (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 186-203.

Kramer, Martin, A Realist Case for the U.S.-Israel Alliance, *The American Interest*, Azure 5767, No. 26, (Autumn 2006), pp. 24-25.

Kristol, William and Robert Kagan, Toward a Neoreaganite Foreign Policy, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18- 32.

Kuhn, Lesley, "Why Utilize Complexity Principles in Social Inquiry?" *World Futures*, Vol. 63, No. 3, (2007), pp.156 – 175.

Laszlo, Ervin, "The Ideal Scientific Theory, A Thought Experiment", *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 40, No. 1, (Mar., 1973), pp. 75-87.

Layne, Christopher, "Kant or Cant, The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Autumn, 1994), pp. 5-49.

Layne, Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion, Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-51.

Lengyel, Emil, "A World Without End, The Middle East," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 288, No. 1, (1953), pp. 326-56.

Lind, Michael, "A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World", *Parameters*, Vol. 38 (Autumn 2008), pp. 48-60.

Little, Douglas, Gideon's Band, "America and the Middle East since 1945," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Jun., 2007), pp. 513–540.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Summer, 1995), pp. 5-38.

Mark McGillivray, and Howard White, "Explanatory Studies of Aid Allocation among Developing Countries: A Critical Survey." *Working Paper Series* No. 148 (April 1993), pp. 1-86.

Mark, Clyde R., "Israel, U.S. Foreign Assistance," *Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress*, (April 26, 2005).

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization,* Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn, 1998), pp. 729–757.

Mastanduno, Michael, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment, Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security,* Vol. 21, No. 4, (Spring, 1997), pp. 49-88.

McCoy, E. D. and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Community Ecology, Scale, and the Instability of the Stability Concept," *PSA, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,* Vol. 1, (1992), pp. 184-199

Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and the U.S. Foreign Policy," *Middle East Policy,* Vol. XIII, No. 3, (Fall, 2006), pp. 29-87.

Mearsheimer, John, "Back to the Future, Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security,* Vol. 15, No. 1, (Summer, 1990), pp. 50-51.

Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 64, No. 1, (March 1970), pp. 98-123

Mikulecky, Donald C., "The Emergence of Complexity, Science Coming of Age or Science Growing Old?" *Computers and Chemistry,* Vol. 25, 2001, pp. 341–348.

Miller, Judith, The Challenge of Radical Islam, *Foreign Affair,* Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 43-56.

Moravcsik, Andrew, "Taking Preferences Seriously, A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization,* Vol. 51, No. 4, (Autumn, 1997), pp.513-553.

Niou, Emerson M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Stability in Anarchic International Systems," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 84, No.4, (December, 1990), pp. 1208-34.

Noel, Pierre, "The New US Middle East Policy and Energy Security Challenges," *International Journal,* Vol. 62, (Winter 2006-2007), pp. 43-54.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., "Independence and Interdependence," *Foreign Policy,* No. 22, (Spring 1976), pp. 130-161.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics,* Vol. 40, No. 2, (Jan., 1988), pp. 235-251.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy,* No. 80, (Autumn 1990), pp. 153-171.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 105, No. 2, (Summer 1990), pp. 177-192.

Nye Jr., Joseph S., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, (Spring 1992), pp. 83-96.

Ottaway, Marina et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief*, No. 20, (October 2002).

Ottaway, Marina, "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East, Restoring Credibility," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief*, No. 60, (May 2008), pp. 1-8.

Ottaway, Marina, et al. "The New Middle East," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2008).

Owen, John M., "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Autumn 1994), pp. 164–175.

Pearcy, George Etzel, "The Middle East, An Indefinable Region," *Department of State Publication, 6806, Near and Middle Eastern Series*, Vol. 39, (1959), pp.407-16.

Perthes,Völker, "America's Greater Middle East and Europe, Key Issues for Dialogue," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XI, No. 3, (2004), pp. 85-97.

Phelan, Steven E., "A Note on the Correspondence Between Complexity and Systems Theory," *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1999), pp. 237-246.

Phelan, Steven E., "What is Complexity Science, Really?" *Emergence*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (April 2001), pp. 120-136.

Pressman, Jeremy, "Power without Influence," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4, (Spring 2009), pp. 149–179.

Rasch, William, "Theories of Complexity, Complexities of Theory, Habermas, Luhmann, and the Study of Social Systems," *German Studies Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Feb., 1991), pp. 65-83.

Rice, Condoleezza, "Rethinking the National Interest - American Realism for a New World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, (July/August, 2008), pp. 2-26.

Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," *The International History Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (May, 1994), pp. 284-303.

Robinson, Keith, "Towards a Metaphysics of Complexity," *Interchange*, Vol. 36, No. 1-2, (2005), pp. 159-177.

Ruggie, John Gerard, "Territoriality and beyond, Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (Winter 1993), pp 139-174.

Schweller, Randall, "The Problem of International Order Revisited, A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1, (Summer, 2001), pp. 161-186.

Shafer, Byron E., "American Exceptionalism," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2, (Jun., 1999), pp. 465-491.

Sharp, Jeremy M., "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," *Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress* (December 4, 2009).

Sharp, Jeremy M., "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request," *Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress* (July 17, 2009).

Snidal, Duncan, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 4, (Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614.

Snyder, Jack, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, No. 145, (Nov-Dec., 2004), pp. 52 – 62.

Snyder, Robert S., "Hating America, Bin Laden as a Civilisational Revolutionary," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 65, No. 4, (Autumn 2003), pp. 325-349.

Sørli, Mirjam E., Nils Petter Gleditsch And Håvard Strand, "Why is There so Much Conflict in the Middle East?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 1, (February 2005), pp. 141-165.

Spiro, David E., "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Autumn 1994), pp. 50-86.

Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jan., 1991), pp. 233-256.

Stewart, Peter, "Complexity Theories, Social Theory, and the Question of Social Complexity," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 31, No. 3, (September, 2001), pp. 323-360.

Taheri, Amir, "The United States and the Reshaping of the Greater Middle East," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (2005), pp. 295-301.

Tarnoff, Curt, Iraq, "Reconstruction Assistance," *Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress*, (August 7, 2009).

Urry, John, "The Complexity Turn," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 5, 2005, pp. 1-14.

Walt, Stephen M., "International Relations, One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, (Spring 1998), pp. 29-46.

Walt, Stephen M., "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4, (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48.

Waltz, Kenneth N., "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No.4, (December 1997), pp. 913-34.

Waltz, Kenneth N., "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.

Waltz, Kenneth N., "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3, (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909.

Watkins, Eric, "The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 73, No. 1, (Jan., 1997), pp. 1-14.

Weaver, Warren, "Science and Complexity," *American Scientist*, Vol. 36, 1948, pp. 536-44.

Webb, Michael C. and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory, An Empirical Assessment," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Special Issue on the Balance of Power, (Apr., 1989), pp. 183-198.

Wendt, Alexander , "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 5, (1998), pp. 101-118.

Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is what States Make of it, The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, (Jun., 1994), pp. 384-396.

Wendt, Alexander, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.

Wohlforth, William C., "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.

Wolfers, Arnold, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, (Dec., 1952), pp. 481-502.

Yoon, Mi Yung, "Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (Aug., 1997), pp. 580-602.

Young, Oran R, "Intervention and International Systems," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1968), pp. 177—187.

On Line Papers and Articles

Albright, David, Corey Gay and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site, What if the Public or the IAEA Had Overhead Imagery?" *Institute for Science and International Security*, (April 26, 1999), at, http,//www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html.

Burns, John F., "The World: Miles to Go; The Road Ahead May be Even Rougher," *New York Times*, 7 April 2004, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/07/weekinreview/the-world-miles-to-go-the-road-ahead-may-be-even-rougher.html

Chace, James, "The Turbulent Tenure of Alexander Haig," *The New York Times*, (April 22, 1984), at, http,//www.nytimes.com/1984/04/22/books/the-turbulent-tenure-of-alexander-haig.html?&pagewanted=4.

Corning, Peter A., "The Re-Emergence of Emergence, A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory," *Complexity*, Vol. 7, No. 6, (2002), pp. 18-30, at, http,//www.complexsystems.org/publications/pdf/emergence3.pdf.

Cosgrove, Bootie, Mather Poll, "Talk First, Fight Later, Americans Want Weapons Evidence before Starting War with Iraq", *CBS News*, at, http,//www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/23/opinion/polls/main537739.shtml, NEW YORK, Jan. 24, 2003,

Fergany, Nader, "Critique of the Greater Middle East Project, The Arabs Sorely Need to Refuse A Reform from Abroad (in Arabic)," *Al-Hayat*, (19 February 2004), http://www.daralhayat.com/

Hounam, Peter and others, "The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal Revealed," *Sunday Times* (London), 5 October 1986, at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4794714.ece

Hounam, Peter et al., "The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal Revealed, *Sunday Times*, (October 5, 1986), at: http,//www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4794714.ece.

Indyk, Martin S. and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Back to Balancing, The American Interest, A New Strategy for Constructive Engagement,", *The American Interest*, at, http,//www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=347&MId=16.

Jen, Erica, "Stable or Robust? What's the Difference?," *Santa Fe Institute Working Paper* (January 7, 2003), http// www.santafe.educationlsfilpublications/working-papers/02-12-069.pdf.

Kinzer, Stephen, Inside Iran's Fury, *Smithsonian magazine*, (October 2008) at: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/iran-fury.html#ixzz1K4rvizo1

Lucas, Chris, "The Philosophy of Complexity", *Calresco,* at, http,//www.calresco.org/lucas/philos.htm.

Mearsheimer, John, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War, Realism vs. Neo-conservatism," *Open Democracy.* At, http,//www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/2522.pdf

Ng, Lawrence, "Conditions for Peace and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Jul.- Sep., 2000), at, http,//www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_3/8.htm.

Piepers, Ingo, "Dynamics and Development of the International System, a Complexity Science Perspective," *arXiv.org, Cornell University.* At, http,//arxiv.org/ftp/nlin/papers/0604/0604057.pdf.

Risen, James, How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53, at: http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-intro.html

Singer, P. W., "The 9-11 War Plus 5, Looking Back and Looking Forward at US-Islamic World Relations," *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World*, at, http,//www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/09islamicworld_singer/singer20 060901.pdf.

Sussman, Dalia, "Poll Shows View of Iraq War Is Most Negative since Start," *New York Times*, at, http,//www.nytimes.com/2007/05/25/washington/25view.html?_r=2&oref=slogin, May 25, 2007.

Waltz, Kenneth N., "Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons," *UC Berkeley, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation*, (1995), at, http,//www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4cj4z5g2.

Young, Karen De, "Bush Proclaims Victory," *Washington Post*, 2 May 2003. at: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/04/feithslides.pdf

Afghanistan Civilian Causalities, at: http,//wikileaks.org/,

Arab Human Development Report, at, http,//www.arab-hdr.org/index.aspx.

Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Henry Alfred Kissinger at:
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-a

Bush Strategy, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
September 2002, at, http,//whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

COMISAF Initial Assessment, The Washington Post, September 21, 2009, at,
http,//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.

Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Spring, G8 Summit, May 26-27, 2011, Deauville,
France at: http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/declaration-of-the-g8-on-
the-arab-springs.1316.html

Department of Defense, Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida, at,
http,//www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/04/feithslides.pdf.

Flashback, Sabra and Shatila massacres, BBC News Online, 24 January 2002, at,
http,//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1779713.stm.

Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan, Civilian Deaths From Airstrikes at,
http,//www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/09/08/afghan19766.htm,

Humanitarian News and Analysis (IRIN) AFGHANISTAN, UNAMA raps new report by
rights watchdog, at, http,//www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82502

Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program, From Aflaq to Tammuz The Nuclear Weapon Archive
(27 December 2001) at, http,//nuclearweaponarchive.org/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html.

Milestones: 1969-1976, OPEC Oil Embargo, 1973-1974, at:
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/OPEC

Neoconservatives letter to President Bush on Iraq at:
http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm

Neoconservatives letter to President Clinton on Iraq at:
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm

Operation Iraqi Freedom, at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html

Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/iran-cia-intro.pdf

President George W. Bush, in an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

President Sworn-In to Second Term, at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html#

Remarks by President George W. Bush from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, at Sea off the coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003. White House transcript. At: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/01/iraq/main551946.shtml

Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement

Speech of secretary of state Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/powelltext_020503.html

State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003, at, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

The Green Book, U.S. Agency for International Development, Overseas Loans and Grants, published annually, at, http,//qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 9/11 Commission Report, at, http,//govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

The War on Iraq, at, http,//www.gallup.com/poll/1633/Iraq.aspx#4,

The Kahan Commission, at, http,//www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html.

Times Online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4794714.ece, accessed at 5 May, 2010.

UN Resolutions, at, http,//daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement

UN Security Council Resolution 678 is available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement

What Is the "Coalition of the Willing?", at:
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot1_032803.html

World Bank Definition of the Middle East, at,
http,//web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,menuPK,
247619~pagePK,146748~piPK,146812~theSitePK,256299,00.html.