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**THE SIMON REVIEW
PAPER #65**

**THE 2022 MID-TERM
ELECTIONS IN ILLINOIS:
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OR THE
WAVE OF THE FUTURE?**

JOHN S. JACKSON AND JOHN L. FOSTER

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SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
**PAUL SIMON
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The Simon Review

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The 2022 Mid-term Elections in Illinois: Unfinished Business or the Wave of the Future?

Abstract

Part I of this paper provides a description of the Democratic and Republican Primaries in Illinois for the mid-term elections of 2022.

Part II then turns to the general election campaigns focusing on the governor's race between incumbent Democrat J. B. Pritzker and his Republican challenger, State Senator Darren Bailey.

The race for the U. S. Senate between the incumbent, Tammy Duckworth, and Kathy Salvi, and the state's Constitutional Offices are also analyzed. The unit of analysis utilized is the county-level aggregate data voting returns. Part III deals with the aftermath of the November election with a focus on the SAFE-T Act and the assault weapons ban, at the end of November since the veto session agenda was an extension of the preceding election.

The results show how the state races were inextricably set into the context of the national tides that had produced a deeply polarized America and how this played out in the traditionally blue state of Illinois. These prominent issues continued to rile Illinois and national politics, and helped define the major differences between the two parties. The debate over them continued immediately after the election and started to set the stage for the second Pritzker administration and the beginning of the 2024 national election. In addition, the vote on the new amendment to the Illinois constitution providing protection for the rights of organized labor is analyzed.

Extensive economic data are presented, differentiating the counties which voted for the amendment and those which voted against it. Those counties are also compared to the Pritzker vs. Bailey counties.

Part I

Introduction

The 2020 presidential election was not over, and the 2024 presidential race had already started when the 2022 mid-term elections were held. These elections were conducted in the contentious context of millions of Americans looking back in anger and suspicion while millions of others were looking forward with a mixture of optimism and apprehension because of the impact of 2020 and its aftermath.

To a degree unparalleled in American history, the specter of the 2020 presidential election still hung over the mid-term elections in 2022, as it will do again for the 2024 elections. The results of the 2020 presidential election were still being constantly challenged by former president Donald Trump and his supporters who had not accepted his defeat. Joe Biden's victory was not acknowledged or was disputed not only by the former president but also by a big majority of the Republicans in the U. S. House of Representatives and some in the Senate (Riccardi, September 8, 2022).

The polls showed that tens of millions of ordinary Trump voters still believed that the election was stolen as the former president insisted that Joe Biden had not been duly elected to the presidency. For example, an Associated Press/NORC poll taken in October of 2022 found that 58% of Republicans said that Biden's victory was not legitimate (AP/NORC, October, 2022; McKinney, September 29, 2022; Jones and Saad, November 1, 2022). The Congress and the nation were then even more deeply divided by the question of what happened on January 6, 2021, at the U. S. Capitol as the Pro-Trump demonstration became a mob and stormed the capitol building itself and threatened the safety of the members of Congress who were seeking to ratify the electoral college votes from the states as was required by the Constitution. In the

aftermath, dozens were injured, including several officers from the Capitol Police and District of Columbia police. Six people subsequently died from causes attributed directly or indirectly to the riots, and one of the rioters was shot and killed as she tried to break into the House (Miller and Boak, 2022; Knowles, Dawsey, and Weigel, August 17, 2022; Peoples, August 11, 2022).

During the spring of 2022, the House Select Committee was busy at work investigating the events of January 6, 2021. Public hearings took place during the summer when the primaries were being held in the states, including Illinois. This focus on 2020 was the backdrop for the mid-term elections in that the aftermath of that election heavily influenced the people who decided to run for the various seats, what they discussed as the major issues, and the outcomes of the primaries especially. Many of the Republican primary elections for Congress and some state races were viewed as a contest between the pro-Trump and neutral or anti-Trump factions.

Those candidates who found favor with the former president and got his support, especially his personal visit to a campaign rally, were among the most important factors in the campaign. This was what happened in the Illinois Republican Primary, where both the governor's race, and the race for the 15th Congressional District, which featured two pro-Trump Republican incumbents, certainly appeared to be influenced by the imprimatur of Trump's support and his late campaign visit to a campaign rally just outside Quincy.

The midterm elections turned into a referendum not only on the Democrats and the Republicans, but also on the contending factions, especially inside the Republican Party, and to a lesser extent, the Democratic Party. Party factionalism, especially the division between the progressives and the more moderate wing, was also present in some Democrat Primary races, especially for Congress. Still, this conflict was not as prominent within the Democrat primaries. It was not led

by any prominent Democrat anywhere near to being as dominant as Trump in the Republican Primaries.

In Illinois, there were contests for the governor and lieutenant governor and all the other constitutional offices on the ballot. In addition, all the U. S. House seats and one Senate seat were contested. All the Illinois House and Senate seats were also being held under a new map.

The Republican Primary

Our focus initially will be on the Republican Primary. The odd Janus-like quality of the 2022 mid-term elections in Illinois was especially displayed in the race for Governor and the other constitutional officers in the Republican primary. This intra-party fight had to be settled to determine who specifically would win, and by implication, which faction would then face the Democrats in the general election. With multiple candidates in several high-profile positions, the prospects for a divisive primary were very high for the Republicans. At the end of the primaries, it was not clear to what extent the Republicans could heal their intra-party wounds in preparation for the fall race.

The Republicans had not achieved much success in statewide races since 2014, when Bruce Rauner defeated the Democratic incumbent governor Pat Quinn (Jackson, 2015). Rauner went on to serve one controversial term, which was riddled with conflict with the Democrats in the General Assembly. For the Democrats, the legislative leaders were long-time Speaker of the House Michael Madigan and the Senate President John Cullerton (Jackson, 2018). They fought Rauner on his entire policy agenda, which he termed “the Turn-around Agenda” (Leonard, May, 2017). The Democrats saw Rauner’s agenda as especially targeting unions to reduce their power and as being especially harsh on the more disadvantaged in society. The fight came to be centered on the state budget.

This partisan donnybrook was notable for the fact that the state went without an official budget for two fiscal years because of the inability of the Democratic legislature and the Republican governor to find grounds for compromise on even this most basic function of government and the necessity for agreeing on a budget for the greater good of the state and those who are directly dependent on the state budget. Coming off this impasse, Rauner was decisively defeated for re-election in 2018 by J. B. Pritzker, who then ran for re-election at the head of the Democratic ticket in 2022.

The overhanging presence of the 2020 election on the 2022 mid-term elections in Illinois was especially focused on the race for governor and the other constitutional officers in the Republican primary. The Republican candidates for these offices had to be settled before they could take on the Democrats. The Democrats were the incumbents in all of those offices. All were running again except the secretary of state, where the long-time incumbent, Jesse White, was retiring after twenty-four years, making that the only state-wide open seat in the fall contests.

There were six Republican candidates for governor, the most high-profile race in the primary. Each of them was eager to make the case as to why they were the best person to challenge Governor Pritzker and to become the leader of the Republican Party in November (Hancock and Nowicki, June 26-27, 2022, 1-A).

These candidates included:

(1) Richard Irvin, Mayor of Aurora, who is an African American, a former prosecutor and defense lawyer, and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan.

(2) Darren Bailey, a State Senator and farmer from Xenia, a small town in Marion County in eastern Illinois. He is a leader of the so-called “Eastern Block,” a group of deeply conservative state legislators, as well as Congresswoman Mary Miller from the 15th Congressional District.

(3) Jesse Sullivan, a businessman from Petersburg in northern Illinois. He founded Alter Globa, a venture capitalist fund based in San Francisco. Sullivan had the advantage of having raised over 10 million dollars from his colleagues in Silicon Valley by the time of his first announcement that he was running.

(4) Gary Rabine, who was head of a family asphalt business and a number of other small businesses in northeast Illinois. He touted these as “small blue-collar” businesses.

(5) Paul Schimpf, a one-term state senator from St. Clair County in the Metro-east area near St. Louis. He had previously run against then Attorney General Lisa Madigan in 2018 and lost decisively.

(6) Max Solomon, a community activist and conservative African American from Chicago. He was generally unknown outside some precincts in Chicago and received very little attention.

At the beginning of the race, none of these candidates was well-known statewide. Three of the six had not held any prior public office. Only three had significant funding, either from their own resources or from wealthy benefactors. Not surprisingly, the three best-funded candidates also finished as the top three vote getters and received by far the most total votes. Those top three in the order of their finish were Senator Bailey, Jesse Sullivan, and Mayor Irvin.

From the beginning, the media and the experts largely treated this contest as a two-person race between Bailey and Irvin. At the outset, Irvin got the most attention and was treated as the presumptive front-runner. This was because of his extraordinary position as the candidate chosen

to benefit from the backing of Illinois' richest man, the mega-billionaire and CEO of the venture capital company Citadel, Ken Griffin (Pearson, January 16, 2022, A-1; Channick, July 8, 2022, A-3).

Griffin was very well-known in Illinois political circles because of his wealth and commitment to political action in generous support of candidates and causes he believed in and wanted to promote. Recently, he was especially well-known for his energetic criticism of Governor Pritzker and his policies. Griffin was coming off a singular victory over Governor Pritzker in the 2020 election.

Pritzker developed an elaborate plan to fundamentally change the funding of the Illinois government from a flat rate income tax to a graduated income tax, more like what the federal government and thirty-two states use. The flat rate income tax was enshrined in the 1970 Illinois Constitution, so this change would require a constitutional amendment with an extraordinary sixty percent majority needed to pass (Jackson and Foster, 2022, 52-58).

While Governor Pritzker was not on the ballot personally in 2020, this was his signature policy proposal, and he energetically supported the change. Pritzker spent over \$50 million in support of the graduated income tax, which his forces termed the "Fair Tax," while Griffin spent \$53.6 million in spirited opposition (Ibid).

Pritzker suffered a crushing defeat with the vote of 54.27% in opposition and 46.73% in favor of the graduated income tax. The governor's plan carried the majority vote in only two counties, Cook and Champaign. The other one hundred counties voted against the change (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2020; Jackson and Foster, April 2022, 55-56).

Undoubtedly emboldened by this resounding victory, Griffin seemed eager to take on Pritzker again in 2022. He promised to spend whatever it takes to defeat Pritzker and elect a Republican governor. He ultimately invested over \$50 million dollars in that quest (Burnett and O'Connor, June 28, 2022; Pearson, July 21, 2022, A-3).

For his standard bearer, Griffin chose Aurora Mayor Richard Irvin, who was generally unknown outside his home city. There was no known prior relationship between Irvin and Griffin. He had been an attorney who served as both an Assistant State's Attorney in Cook and Kane Counties from 1998 to 2003, prosecuting those accused of crimes. Following that stint, he was a defense attorney representing the accused for 15 years, the longest period of employment on his resume. However, in the campaign, he emphasized his prosecutor's record and ignored his defense record, presumably to buttress his tough-on crime and criminals campaign theme, which he featured as the number one issue in this election.

To his critics, this spin on his personal record provoked what became a central question in the Irvin campaign: who was Richard Irvin really and did his campaign match his prior record? More importantly, did the spin on his record on fighting crime represent a more fundamental question about his core values and character? (Gorner and Jones, February 20, 2022, Sec. 1, 6; Pearson, May 26, 2022, 1A).

Before announcing his candidacy for governor, Irvin had a reputation as something of a moderate of uncertain party allegiance, although many thought he was probably a Democrat. He had taken Democratic ballots in several primaries. Occasionally he had also said positive things in public about some Democrats, including President Barack Obama and Governor Pritzker. The fact that he was also an African American made some observers, perhaps stereotyping, expect he was probably a Democrat.

Irvin had governed in a pragmatic style which made him similar to most mayors who are more interested in what works and what will improve their city rather than ideology and party loyalty. Mayors and city officials work hard to address the challenges of their cities, the delivery of public services, and meeting the everyday needs and demands of their people. That also seemed to be Irvin's interest and style until he ran for governor.

Irvin's campaign got off to a very quick start, mostly thanks to the fact that it was so generously fueled by Griffin's money. Griffin made a down payment of \$25 million contributed to Irvin's campaign. He later made a second tranche of \$25 million also available to the mayor's campaign. This freed the candidate from the initial compelling focus on the need to raise millions of dollars just as the campaign is getting underway, which is the hardest time to raise campaign money. Unlike most other candidates, this generous funding base allowed Irvin's campaign to come out quickly with an extensive advertising campaign which featured a series of hard-hitting commercials on television and social media. These were the typical ads for a newcomer, introducing the candidate to a new audience, telling them his personal biography, background, and work experience, and his plans for the office if elected. In short, they were designed to introduce Irvin to a wide audience who had never heard of him.

The ads gave a quick summary of his professional experience emphasizing his status as a combat soldier and then touting him as the no-nonsense mayor of Aurora who had acted decisively and swiftly to fight crime and bring law and order back to his city. The mayor blasted the former Speaker of the Illinois House, Mike Madigan and Governor Pritzker, alleging that they had been soft on crime and the sources of corruption in the Illinois government. He adopted the populist stance of blaming "the elites" for the ills of the state and nation. Irvin's tagline was, "what they

fear most is somebody who looks like me and thinks like you.” This was apparently a case of playing the race card in reverse for a new statewide audience.

Irvin also had an entire slate running with him. They were Avery Bourne for Lt. Governor, a State Representative who had been identified as an up-and-coming young star in the Republican ranks, Steve Kim for Attorney General, John Milhiser for Secretary of State, Shannon Teresi for Comptroller, and Tom Demmer for Treasurer. (Pearson, January 16, 2022, Sec. 1, p. 3).

These candidates, too, benefitted from Griffin’s money. However, they never received campaign funds at the level Irvin enjoyed and at the level they probably hoped and expected when they signed on.

For Illinois primaries, this form of slate-making was not exactly unprecedented, but it was highly unusual, especially in Republican primaries. It was reminiscent of the days ~~back~~ in the 1960s and 1970s when Mayor Richard J. Daley and the state Democratic Party would support a slate they endorsed as the party’s official slate for the primaries. Those slated candidates usually won.

Irvin got off to a quick start. He had an expansive flight of early ads that looked to be very professionally produced, and they ran all over the state. He also attracted quick endorsements from Republican luminaries like former Governor Jim Edgar and Republican House leader, Jim Durkin. There seemed to be no doubt that Mayor Irvin was the party establishment candidate. He also got good media coverage, at least at the outset. His campaign was well-positioned to get a quick lead and then become the odds-on-favorite.

That game plan reckoned without the opposition of Senator Bailey who had quite different plans. He was a leader of what has come to be popularly known as “the Eastern Block” or more officially as the “Freedom Caucus” in the General Assembly. This loose-knit group includes State Representative Chris Miller of the 55th District, Brad Halbrog of the 51st District, Blaine

Wilhour of the 54th District, and Dan Caulkins of the 51st District (Moore, February 28, 2021, A-5; Handbook of Illinois Government, 2019, 2020).

At the federal level, it includes Congresswoman Mary Miller from the 15th Congressional District who was in her first term. She is married to Representative Chris Miller. They are super conservatives who resemble the old Tea Party at the grassroots level who got their start in 2009-2020 as they reacted vociferously against President Barack Obama and his policies. They also championed a bill in the General Assembly which would have divided Illinois into two states, Chicago and the rest of Illinois (Jackson and Foster, April, 2022). Taking the initiative without waiting for the state legislature, twenty-four downstate County Boards had already voted in favor of this separation from Chicago. As evidence that this movement has staying power downstate, two more County Boards, Brown and Hardin, voted to place a referendum on their ballots for the November election, as did parts of Madison County (Miller, August 23, 2022).

Members of the Eastern Block also railed against the “Elites” they identified as being dominant in many places in American life and culture including the media, entertainment, business, and the federal government. This influence extended even to the Republican Party, where they identified their opponents as “RINOs”, or Republicans in Name Only. Clearly, they wanted to wrest control of the Republican Party away from the RINOs, an aspiration they shared with Donald Trump who gave that label to almost anyone who opposed him for control of the national party.

The Millers were also proud supporters of Trump and are members of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) populist movement across the country. The Eastern Block in the Illinois General Assembly is the counterpart to the Freedom Caucus in Congress, and they are conjugally united in Congresswoman Miller and Representative Miller.

Darren Bailey was the most prominent state leader of this group. He had been a State Representative for one term. Then he stepped up to the Illinois Senate in 2021 upon the retirement of former Senator Dale Righter. Bailey quickly became an outspoken critic of Governor Pritzker. His first big cause was the Covid virus and the governor's plans for fighting it. Bailey energetically opposed almost all the steps the governor and the Illinois Department of Public Health employed to try to control the virus and protect the Illinois healthcare system. Pritzker had an ambitious and detailed plan for a statewide attack on the virus and its spread. He announced the plan and then stuck with it doggedly. Beginning in mid-March of 2020, every day with the assistance of Dr. Ngozi Ezike, Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, Pritzker was at a microphone and standing before the cameras giving the report on how many new cases there were the day before, how many hospitalizations, and how many new deaths. They went into details such as how much personal protective gear was available to the front-line health care workers and how many patients were on ventilators. He and Dr. Ezike constantly emphasized what the state was doing to counter the virus and treat its victims. They consistently claimed to be following the science and the guidelines coming from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Pearson, August 21, 2021, 1-A). From March 2020 through June of 2020, the federal government's reaction under the Trump Administration seemed to vacillate in the face of Trump's idiosyncratic behavior and meandering pronouncements, with no apparent national strategy. This left the states to fend for themselves and to develop their own plans. They did this according to their own political cultures and essentially what the governors wanted. Thus, the state-level plans ranged the gamut from those mostly red states, where the emphasis was on leaving most of the planning up to the local areas

while working to open up the economy as soon as possible, to the mostly blue states, where the governors developed elaborate plans with a heavy emphasis on what the CDC guidelines provided and following the science regarding what local jurisdictions were supposed to do. The latter was the Pritzker method, and it became one of the hallmarks of his first administration. Pritzker had the state divided into geographic zones, each with its own metrics to meet and be measured by. Like most Democratic governors, and several Republicans in other states, Pritzker had a plan which he pursued consistently and aggressively. He also pursued the spotlight in making the plan public and standing ready to defend it.

There was almost immediate opposition from Republican officials at the state and local levels. The fight over the guidelines and their application quickly became heated with significant opposition developing in several geographic areas, especially downstate. The deeper you go into central and southern Illinois, the more vehement the opposition to Pritzker's plan and policies grew.

Senator Bailey led the opposition in east and central Illinois, and he actively pursued this opposition in the courts and the court of public opinion. In this fight, he was joined on the legal front by attorney, Thomas DeVore, who represented a conservative legal group, the Thomas More Society, which opposed most governmental regulation in general, especially if it involved religion in any way. They quickly transferred their objections to the Covid regulations into an attack on their freedom of religion since many of those who were objecting to the vaccinations claimed that they should be exempt on religious belief grounds. They also claimed that the regulations were hampering the rights of local businesses to decide how they would respond to the challenges posed by trying to protect the public from the spread of the virus.

Bailey and DeVore won an early victory in one circuit court in Bailey's legislative district.

Bailey then touted this victory in his ads for his campaign for governor by claiming that he had taken the governor to court over the Covid restrictions and won. He did not disclose that the circuit court ruling was quickly overturned by the appellate court. In general, the various courts that heard these Covid cases upheld the state and the governor's rights to make plans and issue orders based on the state's rights and obligations to provide for the health and safety of its citizens.

Bailey's fight against the Covid restrictions reached a symbolic high point in garnering publicity when he refused to wear a mask on the floor of the Illinois House when it first went back to sessions in person. The House Speaker, Chris Welch, had him escorted from the House chamber for violating a rule the entire House had adopted. Bailey also pointedly refused to say whether he had been vaccinated or not. He returned to the House floor the next day, this time wearing a mask, but he still did not reveal his vaccination status, let alone urge others to get vaccinated.

In summary, in this anti-state regulations campaign, Darren Bailey was reaching out during the Covid crusade to an audience much bigger and wider than his senate district in east-central Illinois. He had not announced any statewide political ambitions by that time. Still, he was clearly developing a reputation among his legislative colleagues and political observers as an aggressive populist, and he started to attract much wider media attention.

When he announced the Republican nomination for governor, he had an image among his colleagues and the media. Whether he had much statewide name identification or a well-formed public image, was doubtful at this stage. His campaign was designed to fill in the blanks in terms of who Bailey was and to introduce him to the statewide audience he was now seeking.

It turned out that Bailey had a knack for gaining free media. He got a lot of coverage when he appeared at local events with his populist message emphasizing grievances against the government, cultural elites, and urban areas. In his campaigning against crime, he called Chicago a “hellhole” while decrying their crime rate and the fact that crime had spread to the downtown loop as well as into some suburban areas. It was clear from the start of this campaign that Republicans nationally, and especially in Illinois, were going to run aggressively against crime and they were going to blame Democrats from the president to the governor, down to the local mayors, especially the mayor of Chicago. This fear of crime and appeal to law and order had some appeal in Chicago and the collar counties, but it had particular appeal downstate.

Bailey also went on a very public quest to gain the support of Donald Trump. Bailey was running a campaign that shared many thematic similarities with a Trump rally or campaign. The former president had not publicly commented on the governor’s race, although he had endorsed Congresswoman Miller and held a fundraiser at Mar-a-Lago for her early on in her campaign. Miller prominently displayed her MAGA credentials and association with Trump in her advertising.

Senator Bailey worked to gain that same support and endorsement so he could ride the Trump Train in the governor’s race. He went down to Mar-a-Lago to attend a fundraiser and attempt to get Trump’s attention. With all this early effort as a foundation, Bailey’s campaign started slowly but soon started to gain considerable traction powered by his free and paid media efforts. In the effort to gain momentum statewide, he was materially aided by generous financial support from another Illinois multi-billionaire, Richard Uihlein, who was the owner of an office supply company euphonicly named, Uline, which had made him very wealthy although not in the league with Ken Griffin. Uihlein provided nine million dollars in support of the Bailey

campaign. Since Bailey raised just under \$12 million in the primary campaign, this meant that one person had funded approximately three-fourths of the total for that stage (Pearson, June 21, 2022, A-2). Later in the general election, following weeks of speculation about his plans, Uihlein chipped in an additional one million dollars at a time when Bailey desperately needed money (Miller, August 30, 2022, 1).

In his quest for greater name identification and more media exposure, Bailey also got assistance from another well-known billionaire, Governor J. B. Pritzker. Pritzker gave \$24 million to the Democratic Governors Association, some of which they used in trying to influence, maybe subtly, the results of the Republican primary. They took out advertisements that called Darren Bailey “the most conservative candidate” in the Republican race (Pearson, July 24, 2022, 3). The ads also said that Bailey was far out of the mainstream and too far to the right for Illinois.

Ostensibly Pritzker’s campaign thought Irvin was the strongest Republican candidate for the general election, and so they tried to put a thumb on the scale by indirectly helping Bailey. But first, Irvin had to win the Republican primary, which he failed spectacularly to do (Ibid).

Initially, Bailey’s ads went head-to-head with Irvin’s ads, and the two often were aired in the same time slot. As the Bailey momentum grew, the Irvin campaign seemed to recognize they were in trouble. Near the end, thirty days from the primary date, the Irvin campaign announced that they were withdrawing their ads and reassessing their basic campaign strategy. Although at that time they announced that they would be back soon, the Irvin campaign seemed to go dark on television. As the primary campaign wound down in the last four weeks, Irvin and his running mate, Avery Bourne, continued to make sporadic personal appearances trying to gain some free media, but the overall game plan appeared to simply stall out. The Irvin campaign never regained its footing in the last thirty days of the race.

Meanwhile, the Bailey campaign had a prominent calendar date to focus its attention on. That date was Saturday, June 25th, the weekend before the vote on June 28th. That was the day Trump promised to be in Illinois for a campaign rally just outside of Quincy. There he was expected to tout his support for Congresswoman Mary Miller. Bailey wanted to be included in that blessing by the former president, and he got it.

If the Bailey campaign was already gaining momentum, it got a big boost with the widely publicized Trump endorsement. Trump may have only been getting to the front of a parade which had already started, but he strongly praised both Miller and Bailey, and after they won their races, he claimed credit. The statewide media coverage was immediate and extensive for both candidates as they embraced Trump's support. It was crucial timing for both campaigns as only two days remained before the primary on June 28th.

The Democratic Primary

Governor J. B. Pritzker entered the 2022 race with lots of advantages and plentiful resources. Just being the incumbent affords the candidate the advantage that almost any official actions or appearances are newsworthy and will be covered by state and local media outlets. In addition, Pritzker had personal resources as a multi-billionaire which allowed him to spend \$170 million on his 2018 campaign, and he was expected to spend a comparable amount in 2022. He spent a reported \$62 million in this primary and gave \$24 million to the Democratic Governors' Association (Pearson, July 21, 2022, A-3; Pearson, July 24, Sec. 1, 3).

After almost four years as governor, Pritzker had a very high level of name identification and a well-defined image in the minds of the voters. The polls also showed that Pritzker was a popular governor, with a majority of the voters approving of the job he was doing. A poll from Morning

Consult of 14,258 registered voters published in the third week of July showed Pritzker's job approval at 51 percent with a disapproval rating of 43 percent (Nowicki, July 22, 2022, A-3).

The Major Campaign Issues

The Budget

This positive job approval rating meant that Pritzker's campaign could concentrate on touting his first term record and then give some attention to what he planned for a second term. The Pritzker campaign was not shy about claiming that he was eager to run on his record and defend it. Their general theme was that after four years of gridlock between former Governor Rauner and the General Assembly, including two years when the state had to operate without a formally adopted budget because of legislative gridlock, Pritzker could boast about his good relationship with the Democratically controlled legislature that alleviated the gridlock. He said he had inherited a long list of problems which had not been addressed for decades, and his administration helped produce legislation and budgets that allowed the state to start functioning again with a unified government and a more normal way of doing business.

Pritzker and the Comptroller also inherited a \$17 billion backlog of overdue bills, which was paid down to a routine thirty-day turnaround since they had been in charge. This turnaround dramatically reduced the accumulated interest the state was paying on the delinquent bills.

Addressing one of the greatest long-term problems of the Illinois budget, the state continued to pay the state's portion of the pension systems' annual requirements. In years past, back in the Blagojevich era, the state took "a pension holiday." They simply refused to pay the state's share into the various state pension systems, or they borrowed the money on a short-term basis by issuing bonds which then had to be paid back in subsequent years. Pritzker continued this positive trend of paying the state's share, which had started under former governor, Pat Quinn.

The Pritzker administration made a \$500 million payment toward the pension systems' accumulated debt, which was the first time that had been done since the original pension payment plan had been promulgated in the Edgar years after 1994 (Miller, August 30, 2022, 1). In addition, the state put aside substantial funds of one billion dollars into the Budget Stabilization Fund or more popularly called the "rainy day fund" for emergencies. Pritzker claimed that he and his administration, working with the legislators, had been competent and effective in managing the state's finances and balancing the budget.

There were objective indicators and accomplishments that the campaign could point to in support of these claims. The immediate budget crisis of the Rauner years had been temporarily alleviated in 2017 when the Democrats in the General Assembly, under the leadership of the Speaker of the House Michael Madigan, and President of the Senate President John Cullerton, had overridden Rauner's veto and finally passed a budget with the crucial assistance of a handful of Republicans in the House and the Senate which ended the stalemate.

This bit of bipartisanship allowed the start of the budget recovery process and the adoption of the normal order of doing business in the legislature, which then continued when Pritzker took office in January 2019. Pritzker inherited this positive development in Illinois finances, the first in years, and built on it by developing and maintaining generally good relationships with the General Assembly and its leaders. This cooperation continued when both the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate positions changed to new leaders in the first two years of Pritzker's Administration.

In the spring of 2019, the governor proposed a new Capital Budget provision of \$48 billion, which was the first major capital budget bill since Pat Quinn's \$33.2 billion in 2009. The capital budget would provide for a long list of traditional capital projects for every corner of the state,

including streets, roads and highways, bridges, airport improvements, ports, university and community college buildings, water, sewer, ports, etc. It also included such 21st century projects as increased broadband, especially in the rural areas, enhanced telemedicine facilities, again especially for the rural areas, and money to enhance the building of charging stations along the major highways for many more Electric Vehicles (E V's). The bill was so attractive that it attracted a bipartisan vote of 48 to 9 in the Senate and 83 to 29 in the House (Nowicki, August 10, 2022, 1).

The bill was paid for by increased taxes, which many Republicans ordinarily instinctively opposed. Its major components included a doubling of the state tax on gasoline from 19 cents to 38 cents per gallon, with an added provision of an automatic incremental increase each subsequent year to keep up with inflation. It also increased the price of licenses for automobiles, trucks, and, most controversially, trailers. The trailers provision was particularly unpopular in the rural areas where they are much more common than in the cities. But at that time, gas was averaging well below three dollars per gallon, so the overall increase did not attract strong or sustained opposition.

That changed later in 2022 when gas increased to over five dollars per gallon, and gas taxes became a hot topic in the 2022 elections when the Republicans ran on people's fears of inflation, especially when it came to be focused on the price of gasoline. The Pritzker Administration responded in their FY2023 budget plan by proposing a one-year delay in the three-cent gas tax increase that had been scheduled for the next fiscal year (Moore, February 1, 2022).

Pritzker acknowledged the power of the inflation complaint and defended his administration as taking this concrete step and several others including, most importantly, the temporary elimination of the state sales tax on groceries, to help alleviate the damage the price increases

were doing to the budgets of ordinary Americans. He pointed out that governors do not have much power to alleviate inflation, but he claimed these modest steps as one thing that would help consumers, at least at the margins of their budgets.

The New York bond houses, Standard and Poor, Fitch, and Moody's took note of what was happening in Illinois regarding budget management and acted accordingly. During the budget impasse, the state's bond rating had fallen to just one increment above the dreaded "junk bond" status. The bond houses raised the state's bonds ratings three times before the Illinois primary in June, 2022 (Nowicki, April 22, 2022, 1; Miller, July 3-4, 2021). They also wrote analyses of the state's short-term and long-term budget conditions. They praised the positive developments which had required strong political will, a quality notably absent in previous decades. The bond houses also looked at the budget out years and declared that the state had to continue to exhibit budget discipline to continue to maintain or improve its credit rating.

Not surprisingly, the Pritzker campaign, along with the Comptroller and the Treasurer, took credit for their leadership in making these positive budgetary developments happen. Governor Pritzker made responsible fiscal management one of the centerpieces of his argument for a second term. Budgets are boring subjects for most people, and most voters do not know much detail about them. At best, they may have a general knowledge of the state's budgetary situation and structural deficit, especially since it has been a recurring story for many years. The condition of the budget and questions of taxes and how to raise the necessary revenue was widely debated regarding Illinois budgets going back to 1969, with Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie taking the lead in advancing the new personal income tax and totally revising the way Illinois had been funded going back to the 1870 Illinois constitution.

The prevailing narrative since the Jim Edgar administration has been that Illinois was living beyond its means every year and that the state had a structural deficit which governors and legislators of both parties had ignored, or just finessed for the whole of the 21st century. The general narrative tended to be dominated by Republican charges that the Democrats were principally responsible for the budgetary problems because they insisted on funding more programs and services than the people wanted to pay for. Pritzker and his administration set out to reverse that narrative through their budgets, starting with the first one passed in the spring of 2019 covering the FY2020 budget. Every subsequent year the Pritzker Administration advanced what they insisted was a balanced budget, and every year, after considerable wrangling, the legislature passed what they creditably called a balanced budget as the state constitution required.

Governor Pritzker and State Comptroller Susann Mendoza publicized these claims and the changes made in the state's budget on their watch. They regularly cited positive statistics, which in July of 2022 indicated that Illinois had an increase in state revenue that was almost five billion dollars more than the Governor's Office of Management and Budget and COGFA had expected for FY2022. They also noted for the first time in the state's history, Illinois had taken in over \$50 billion in one fiscal year. The administration noted that this provided enough income for a budget surplus at the end of the FY2022 budget, allowing them to record a surplus at the end of the year of \$ 444 million which was the second year the state could book a budget surplus (Hancock, April 20, 2022, A-3). They claimed this gave them enough flexibility to provide \$1.8 billion in temporary tax cuts for FY23 to fight inflation and provide some property tax relief.

The Republicans pointed out that a substantial part of the FY2022 revenue was due to federal funds that Congress had passed to fight the pandemic and stimulate the economy as it tried to

recover from the losses taken during the pandemic's worst days. The Grand Old Party (GOP) candidates also charged that the governor's tax cuts were mostly centered on groceries and gasoline, the most politically charged items driving inflation. Thus, both permanent tax increases of the past and temporary tax cuts for the immediate future became a part of the political dialogue and conflict in the primary election, which also ensured that these would be major issues in the general election campaign in the summer and fall of 2022.

Crime

The other major issue in the campaign was crime and what to do about it. The Republicans, especially Senator Bailey and Mayor Irvin, went on the attack immediately after they announced the Republican nomination. Chicago was their number one target, as the city had struggled with a rash of gun deaths over the past several years. That violent reputation and record grew markedly in the aftermath of the death of George Floyd on Memorial Day of 2020. Then President Donald Trump frequently aimed at Chicago when he called out the Democrats, especially big city Mayors, for being responsible for the urban crime, as Trump explained it. Both Mayor Irvin and Senator Bailey continually raised crime as a major threat to the people of Illinois, just as the national party was making crime and law and order Republican issues in races throughout the nation.

The fact that crime in Chicago had spilled over into the Loop and the Gold Coast areas of downtown and then into the once seemingly safe and more affluent suburbs made crime a potent issue for the Republicans and a dangerous one for the Democrats in general and for Pritzker in particular. The Republicans took off on Pritzker and laid crime directly at his feet. Curiously, they did not focus so much on Mayor Lightfoot, whose administration had been struggling with crime in the city continually, and the Chicago Police Department was on the front lines every

day in the fight against crime. In general, crime in the city is a city problem much more than a state problem, but that reality was not reflected in the political rhetoric.

The Democrats in the General Assembly had handed the Republicans on an especially easy-to-exploit talking point, charging that the Democrats were soft on crime as epitomized by their passage on January 13, 2021, the Pretrial Fairness Act, more popularly known as the SAFE-T Act (House Bill 3653). This legislation was driven most notably by the Black Caucus in the House and Senate. This act included a number of social equity policy innovations designed to ensure that minorities were not targeted by the police and discriminated against by the courts. The most prominent and controversial was the elimination of the cash bond system, which required the accused to put up a financial bail to get out of jail while awaiting trial. Critics of this system claimed that this discriminated against the poor and minorities who often had trouble raising the bond money and had not even been convicted of a crime yet. There were many anecdotal horror stories about prisoners who languished in jail for months, even more than a year before their guilt or innocence could be determined in a trial. The critics, which included many law enforcement, claimed that putting up the cash bond ensured potentially violent people were not let out of prison while awaiting trial, freeing them to go out and commit other felonies. There were plenty of cases on record they could cite where that had happened (Gorner, September 20, 2022, A-3).

Numerous downstate officials and some in the collar counties publicly opposed the SAFE-T Act. States' Attorneys, Sheriffs, and State Legislators raised important issues about the bill's wording regarding who could be held without bail if they were a threat to the public or other individuals, like a battered spouse, or a risk of flight.

Some critics also claimed they would be required to open the jailhouse doors on January 1, 2023, the day the law took effect. Others, especially some sheriffs and police chiefs, claimed that they could only ticket trespassers but would have no power to arrest them and remove them from private property.

Supporters of the bill retorted that these were distortions of the law. They pointed out that prosecutors would be required to file a report with the court recommending whether the accused should or should not be held depending on whether they posed a threat to public safety. Then a judge would have to rule on the matter. Thus, the final decision was up to a judge, but how much discretion to give the judges was still a contentious issue.

Governor Pritzker was often challenged by the media and the Republicans to spell out his position on the SAFE-T Act. At first, he demurred. Then he adopted the position that some places needed clarification or change. Still, he contended that there were “trailer bills” already filed doing just that, and such follow-on laws for complex legislation were routine. He resisted the pressure to be more specific, although he did finally say that the bill filed by downstate Democratic Senator Scott Bennett of Champaign was a promising route for the lame-duck session. However, this did not quell the criticism, and crime remained at the top of the list of important issues in the campaign and election.

So, the issue of law and order, and a focus on crime in general, especially gun violence, was inevitably going to be a salient issue in the fall campaign. It was raised early and often by the Republicans in the 2022 primary, and they saw it as a winner for them. This issue was perfectly designed to put the Democratic candidates in general, and Governor Pritzker in particular, on the defensive. The Democrats countered that they were interested in trying to address the systematic

economic and social inequalities at the roots of crime, but that was a harder argument to make when crime seems to be growing.

In the use of this narrative about the Democrats being soft on crime, the Republicans were taking a page out of the national Republican Party playbook which for generations has included Republican candidates for the whole range of offices running hard against crime and blaming the Democrats for passing policies that encouraged it. For long-time observers, 2022 looked a lot like the-Richard Nixon campaign against Hubert Humphrey in 1968, when the soft-on-crime narrative was effectively used in Nixon's successful campaign to defeat Humphrey in the presidential race. The issue has been on the nation's agenda steadily since then. Still, the events of 2020 attendant the death of George Floyd and the sometimes violent and destructive responses to it, especially in big cities like Chicago, seemed to lend new urgency to the controversy. It inevitably became one of the most pervasive issues of 2022 in races for the governor's office on down to state legislator and county sheriff and positions.

The Other Constitutional Offices

The Democrats started with the advantage of having incumbents in almost all the statewide races. The only open-seat statewide contest the Democrats faced was the Secretary of State's Office, where the long-time and popular Jesse White was retiring after six terms in office. There were four candidates to take his place. The Democrats nominated in the primaries appeared to have gotten out of their races with a more united party than was the case with the Republicans when it was all over. While the Democrats had some factional fights, especially in Chicago, the primary wounds did not seem as severe as within the Republican Party when the primaries were completed.

Pritzker's Democratic Primary Strategy

One of the early indicators of Pritzker's strength in the governor's race was that he drew no significant opponent in the Democratic Primary. There was little speculation about any well-known primary opponent in the wings. When the papers were filed with the State Board of Elections, Pritzker had one official opponent, Beverly Miles, a nurse and a community activist from Chicago's west side. She had no name identification, no significant resources, and did not mount a very visible campaign. She seemed to be in the race simply to raise a protest voice and to ensure that those who opposed Pritzker could have an alternative.

In adopting an aggressive and expensive campaign strategy for the primary, although he had only token opposition, the Pritzker camp was undoubtedly keenly aware of the previous mid-term primary experiences of his two immediate predecessors. Both Bruce Rauner in 2018 and Pat Quinn in 2014 were severely injured by the party's primary election outcomes. Both won their primaries; however, their races were closer than expected. Both were running against a token candidate in the case of Quinn and an underfunded state representative, Jeanne Ives, who was from the right wing of the party in the case of Rauner. Rauner especially was shown to be very vulnerable for the fall campaign when he won by only four percentage points over his poorly financed opponent (Jackson, January, 2015; Jackson, January, 2019).

Quinn was also shown to be especially vulnerable downstate when he faced an unknown protest candidate from Chicago. In fact, because of these divisive party primaries and other attendant factors, Illinois has not had a governor elected to and completed a second term since Jim Edgar in 1991-1998.

The Pritzker campaign knew they could be hurt in the primary and that the fall campaign was already on, although their Republican opponent had not been chosen yet. They acted

accordingly. They took out 30 million dollars on television and social media advertisements touting Pritzker's first-term record.

The Pritzker campaign also made sure that the governor was out and about, frequently visiting the Chicago suburbs, other major cities of the state, small towns, and rural areas of downstate. Wherever the governor showed up for a public event, he was using the office for a "Bully Pulpit" at the state level just as surely as the oval office provided the same advantage for the president since Theodore Roosevelt coined the term at the beginning of the 20th century.

And Pritzker did not just confine himself to state politics in his public comments. When national news was made about significant events or policy issues, Pritzker was quick to comment. For example, when the *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* 597US (2022) case was announced, which reversed *Roe v. Wade* 410 U S 833 (1973) on abortion, Pritzker was quick to condemn the decision. He promised that Illinois' strongly Pro-Choice policies would not change, and he took some incremental steps to make them even stronger in defense of the Pro-Choice position. For example, he announced that Physicians Assistants would be allowed to perform abortions in a clinical setting. In several other states they already had those privileges.

Despite pressure from his more progressive base, though, the governor did not advocate that Illinois should provide personal financing for women from other states where abortions were outlawed to come to Illinois for abortions, although it was evident that the rates of this happening were going to increase notably since the state is a pro-choice island in a sea of surrounding states who have very restrictive anti-abortion laws. The later versions of the law gave additional protections to Illinois providers and to out-of-state women who travel to Illinois seeking an abortion here (Conolly, January 6, 2023; McKinney, January 6, 2023; Miller, November 30, 2022, 3).

Pritzker and Governor Gavin Newsom of California got considerable national coverage for their aggressive denouncement of the *Dobbs* decision and promised that their states would remain solidly Pro-Choice and would always protect women seeking an abortion.

This aggressive, early position-taking was widely interpreted as an attempt to strengthen the governor's national image in preparation for a future run for the White House in 2024 or, more likely, in 2028. The governor was quick to dismiss such speculation. However, he and his staff undoubtedly understood that a mid-June trip to New Hampshire and another speaking trip to Florida in mid-July would only increase such speculation (Spearie, June 14, 1; Petrella, July 13, 2022, 1). In his Florida speech, Pritzker attacked Republican Governor Ron DeSantis, a man with his own national aspirations. The news accounts reported that the Pritzker speech was well received by his partisan Florida audience, so the speculation continued (Ibid).

Darren Bailey and his supporters vigorously criticized most of Pritzker's record, claiming that the governor's policies had seriously damaged Illinois, continuing what they saw as the state's long period of decline. They presented themselves as angry outsiders who railed against "the elites" in both parties and the media. The endemic populist uprising nationally, which had found a voice with Donald Trump in 2015 when he announced for the Republican presidential nomination, had come to Illinois, although somewhat belatedly. This was the familiar blue states vs. red states dichotomy at the national level now reduced to the county and regional levels in state politics. Much of the base and energy of the Bailey campaign was centered on his home-style appeal in the rural areas, fueled by the same "rural resentment" which has propelled the populist movement in other states and nationally back through the "Tea Party" uprising against Obama in the 2010 mid-term elections (Crammer, 2016; Foster and Jackson, 2021, May; Jackson and Foster, 2022, April).

The Results of the Primary

Turnout

The first thing to note is that 2022 was a very low turnout primary compared to earlier Illinois primaries. Table 1 presents those results. One hypothesis regarding this low turnout would be that Illinois voters were accustomed to a primary held in the third week in March. The 2022 primary was held at the end of June, which was very late by the state's ordinary electoral calendar.

Another explanation was that the Republican Primary had almost all of the hotly contested races and the Democrats had only one, that is, the race for Secretary of State. And even though that is a very important office for the party organizations, and it touches the lives of most people because it is in charge of the state's motor vehicle and driver's licenses facilities, it is still an unobtrusive office that has been quietly managed for six terms under the leadership of the non-controversial Jesse White. Accordingly, the race between Alexi Giannoulias and Anna Valencia was a low-key affair compared to the race for governor and the other constitutional offices on the Republican side.

Thus, Democratic turnout statewide was off substantially. The last comparable race for the governorship was in the 2018 primary when the mirror image of the 2022 race occurred with six Democrats running for governor in a high-profile primary contest which J. B. Pritzker won handily. This victory then launched his resounding 54.5% to 38.8% victory over Republican incumbent Bruce Rauner, in the fall (Illinois State Board of Elections, March 2018; Jackson, January 2019). Table 1 provides the turnout results comparing the two most recent primary races for the statewide offices.

Table 1: Turnout in the 2022 and 2018 Primaries

		Democrat Votes for Governor	Republican Votes for Governor
2022			
<u>Total # Registered</u>	8,107,797		
Vote Total	1,787,872	882,693	797,029
Two-Party Vote Total	1,679,722		
Turnout %	21.66		
2018			
<u>Total # Registered</u>	7,666,763		
Vote Total	3,569,960	1,324,548	722,162
Two-Party Vote Total	2,046,710		
Turnout %	46.56%		

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, June 28, 2022, 8-14

These turnout results show that more attention was focused on the Republican primary than on the Democratic primary. There were far more candidates for governor as well as the constitutional offices on the Republican side. The media was mostly focused on the Republican side except for the Democratic Secretary of State contest. The governor’s race is the premiere draw for the media and voters, and that was almost entirely a Republican contest.

Compared to the 2018 primary, which was the opposite of the one in 2022, with most of the attention that year on the Democratic side, the Democratic results in 2022 were down markedly, as was the total turnout rate. In 2018, the turnout was 46.56% compared to 21.66% for 2022.

Even with that marked reduction in total turnout and numbers of those who voted in the Democratic primary, the Democrats still outnumbered the Republicans when the ballots were counted statewide. The Democratic Primary for Governor attracted 882,693 total votes. The Republican Primary for Governor attracted 797,029. This meant that the Democrats had an

advantage in votes cast in the primary of 85,664, even though all the action seemed to be in the Republican Primary.

J. B. Pritzker got 13,960 votes, more than the half-dozen Republican gubernatorial candidates combined. He got 352,887 more votes than Bailey received when winning his dominating victory in the Republican primary. This result reflects the much larger Democratic party base in Illinois compared to the Republican base. It also reflects the very advantageous position that Pritzker held as the general election race contest opened and the challenge that Bailey faced as he entered the fall campaign. Table 2 provides details on the results for both parties’ candidates in the primaries.

Table 2: Results of the 2022 Primaries by Party

Candidate (R)	Total Votes	% of the Party Primary Vote
Darren Bailey	458,102	57.48
Jesse Sullivan	125,094	15.70
Richard Irvin	119,592	15.00
Gary Rabine	52,194	6.55
Paul Schimpf	34,676	4.35
Max Solomon	7,371	<1.00
Candidate (D)		
J. B. Pritzker	810,989	91.88
Beverly Miles	71,704	8.12

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, June 28, 2022, 8-14

Bailey had momentum coming out of the late June primary with such a resounding victory on the Republican side. That victory showed that his movement had grown to something larger than the original base in the rural and small towns and had captured the Republican Party's base in some of the suburbs and even within parts of Cook County. It was a victory propelled by the Republican base and, even then, only a part of that base.

Bailey lost 42.52 percent of the vote in the primary. Strategically he needed to regain all of that primary base and add to it from the more moderate Republican voters plus the lion's share of the independents and perhaps even attract a decent percentage of disaffected Democratic identifiers to have any chance of beating Pritzker in the fall. In short, he had to appeal to a much larger audience than the primary afforded, and his options to accomplish this objective were limited.

The traditional route to such a goal is to move to the center and to appeal to a more moderate public; however, Bailey's record and rhetoric up through the end of the primary were such that it would be very hard for him to modify his appeal and image very much by the fall, and even if he tried, he risked losing the sense of authenticity and consistency that his followers had found to be so appealing and that had served him well so far.

Like most such populist campaigns, it was much easier to see what and who the Bailey campaign was running against than defining what specific policies and programs they were for. Bailey had the momentum coming out of the primary with such a resounding victory statewide in the primary. It was a victory, however, propelled by the Republican base and especially the enthusiastic Trump supporters. Whether that momentum could be transformed into a statewide victory in the fall remained to be seen and was much more problematic.

At the beginning of the general election campaign, Governor Pritzker had to be rated as the odds-on favorite for the fall. Clearly, there were headwinds blowing against the Democrats nationally.

It was well-known and understood that the party in the White House almost always lost seats in Congress in the mid-term elections. Joe Biden's low job approval record and the low regard that Congress was held in seemed ominous for the Democrats nationally. When there was a large swing against the party in the White House in earlier mid-term elections, not only members of Congress but also state legislators and even local officials of the same party could be swept out of office in what is called a "wave election."

A Republican wave could even threaten well-entrenched governors if it were strong enough. It would take a giant Republican national wave to erode Pritzker's solid standing in Illinois. The governor's campaign faced the challenge of "decoupling" their campaign from whatever tides may have been moving against the Democrats nationally. **Part II of this paper recounts and analyzes the extent to which Pritzker was able to separate himself from that national tide and build a wall between him and what was happening to the Democrats nationally.**

The Campaigns in July and August

Everyone who participates in an American campaign, and all who study them, knows that the calendar provides the dominating context, an unyielding set of given deadlines that must be met as the strategy is planned and executed. It also provides tight constraints when new and unexpected events appear and must be dealt with immediately, even as the clock is ticking inexorably toward that final act on the second Tuesday after the second Monday in November. The following analysis will be organized according to the very short calendar that defined the official campaign between the primary on June 28th and the general election on November 8th. July and August were particularly brutal months for the Bailey campaign. He was just coming off the commanding victory in the June 28th Republican primary, which could have provided the launching pad for the general election strategy to get established and deliver on the positive

narrative that Bailey's campaign needed to drive the fall campaign. He had the solid support of one major component of the Republican base, and he had vanquished handily five other candidates in the primary. Now was the time to start closing ranks and unifying the party for November.

This was the time to start reaching out to a much bigger statewide audience. This objective was particularly important for Bailey since the turnout was so low in the primary. This was when it was imperative that the campaign introduce Bailey to all those Republicans who did not vote in the primary or did not vote for him. More importantly, now was the time to introduce Bailey to the independents and even to the disaffected Democrats who might be won over for the general. The old adage "you only get one chance to make a good first impression," is apt for the situation the Bailey campaign faced immediately after the primary.

It was also the opportunity to meet and handle the challenge of dealing with a much bigger and more aggressive statewide media environment. They were the channels that would carry his message to the now much larger and more diverse statewide audience. It is not necessary to subscribe to the currently popular conspiratorial views of the media to understand that they are not just the neutral conduits of the information contained in the free media. It is necessary to recognize that what the media chooses to cover as news goes a long way toward defining what the most important issues are in the campaign. This is what is termed "the agenda-setting" function of the media. Three of the nation's leading experts on the role of political communications in American campaigns defined it as follows:

"The three types of horse-race stories can be contrasted with...stories centered around the articulation and prioritization of political issues. These are referred to as agenda-setting stories

because they have been shown to have the ability to influence the priority the public assigns to issues” (Kaid, Gerstle, and Sanders, 1991, 122).

What the media covered and served up for the Illinois audience to think about the Bailey campaign and who he was as a person was not positive and helpful for Bailey in July and August. He already had a history of unfortunate public statements and malaprop comments on the record, which received attention before the primary ended. However, those seemed not to hamper him with the core Republican primary voters. For example, he had called Chicago “a hell hole” while speaking to a downstate audience well before the primary. He had also been one of the original sponsors of a bill introduced into the Illinois General Assembly promoting the division of Illinois into two states, Downstate and Chicago. None of that was well designed to have broad appeal to Chicagoland outside the city, much less inside the city itself.

The 4th of July, six days after the primary, brought the glare of national attention to Illinois with the tragic bloodbath in Highland Park. At a 4th of July parade where hundreds lined the parade route, a gunman on a downtown rooftop killed seven and injured over thirty more with a semi-automatic rifle. Chaos ensued, and the media instantly halted or interrupted whatever story they were covering to give instant attention to a parade in Highland Park that ordinarily would have gleaned the attention of only those in the immediate community.

Later that day, the Bailey campaign released a statement in the candidate’s name saying that he deplored the violence, deaths, and injuries and offered prayers and sympathy for the victims. But he then went on to add that everybody else should get on with celebrating the national holiday. The response in Illinois and nationally was swift and uncomplimentary. The next day, Bailey put out a clarification saying that in no way was he minimizing the seriousness of this tragedy that

Highland Park had suffered. But, in any campaign, when you are clarifying what you were trying to say the day before and attempting to “walk it back,” as the phrase goes, you are losing in the game of trying to control the narrative and get your own word out.

Next, in the parade of bad free media coverage for Bailey, at the beginning of August, a Jewish publication, *Forward*, unearthed a Facebook video quoting Bailey in October of 2017 when he made his first run for State Representative in his eastern Illinois district. The statement was on the subject of abortion and Bailey’s staunch opposition to it. The subject was especially relevant at the time because then Republican Governor Bruce Rauner had signed a resolution passed by the Illinois General Assembly stating that abortion was a constitutional right that would be protected in Illinois no matter what the U. S. Supreme Court might do in the future to limit abortions as a federally protected right. Bailey’s stance on abortion would have been attractive to a majority in his downstate district then, but his add-on of a comparison with the Holocaust was not a necessary or judicious coda. Bailey’s statement said:

“The attempted extermination of the Jews in World War II doesn’t even compare on a shadow of the life that has been lost with abortion” (Pearson, August 3, 2022, A-5).

The statewide reaction was swift and generally negative from the media, the Pritzker campaign, and even some Republican officials. **As a general rule, campaigns and candidates would be well-advised to steer clear of using the Holocaust or Hitler, or the Nazis to make their points about contemporary politics.** Representative Mary Miller’s comments about Hitler and the training of young people right after she was first elected to the U. S. House was a recent example of how such analogies are likely to backfire and bring unwelcomed publicity to a

campaign or office holder. Once again, when Bailey was confronted with the clear evidence that he had made a mistake in the earlier statement, he tried to clarify or walk it back. The next day he said:

“The Holocaust is a human tragedy without parallel. In no way was I attempting to diminish the atrocities of the Holocaust and its stain on history. I meant to emphasize the tragedy of millions of babies being lost” (Ibid).

Bailey then gratuitously added that he was friends with many Jewish leaders and, “The Jewish community themselves have told me that I’m right” (Pearson, August 11, 2022, A-3).

When pressed by the media for specific names in the Jewish community, Bailey retreated into generalities and obfuscation. His creditability with the media was already low and his handling of this newest controversy further exacerbated that relationship, at least with the mainstream journalists.

Beyond the specific comments on controversial subjects, the Bailey campaign was the vehicle for him to talk frequently and openly about his deep-seated Christian faith and how it informed his political views and values and sustained him and his wife Cindy personally. This was an ever-present theme as he traveled the state in his campaign bus and advanced his general theme of “Restore Illinois” at every stop. Veteran journalist Rick Pearson of the *Chicago Tribune* wrote the following in early September:

“More than any other statewide candidate in recent times, Bailey has placed his faith front and center in his campaign for governor, displaying the evangelical, charismatic Christianity that is commonly found throughout rural Illinois.”

He opens campaign events with a prayer. The door to his campaign bus is adorned with ‘Ephesians 6:10-19,’ a Biblical exhortation to wear the ‘armor of God’ to stand against the devil and ‘against the principalities, against the powers, against the world rulers of this present darkness against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places’” (Pearson, September 4, 2022, Sec. I, 1).

These examples indicated that Bailey was not a seasoned campaigner at this level. His undoubtedly sincere beliefs and values were narrow and parochial for a statewide audience. **At this point, when an image is being built and a fundamental narrative about who this candidate is and what his or her core values and commitments are, this is not the picture that a competitive candidate in Illinois wants to become a major part of the public mosaic that is being formed.**

Governor Pritzker’s campaign and his allies reacted quickly and aggressively to Bailey’s use of the Holocaust in any comparison with abortion and women’s rights. Pritzker is Jewish and has a long history of support for Jewish organizations and causes. He and his wife had funded the Holocaust Museum and Educational Center in Skokie. Pritzker took this all very personally, and it showed in the tone and emotion of his remarks. Representative Bob Morgan, who is the Chair of the House Jewish Caucus issued the following statement:

“Darren Bailey’s extremism knows no bounds. Comparing a woman’s right to choose to the catastrophic loss of life during the Holocaust in unconscionable and quietly frankly, disqualifying. It is demeaning to the legacies of those we’ve lost to reduce their suffering to a political talking point” (Pearson, August 3, 2022, A 5).

Pritzker had proven in his 2018 campaign and the 2022 primary that he was not shy about attacking his opponents aggressively when he thought it was warranted or strategically advantageous. Illinois politics is always rough and tumble, and Pritzker proved in his first campaign in 2018 that he was up for the brawl. By 2022 he was a seasoned player at the highest level in Illinois politics. Temperamentally he was a reminder of the late Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was always described as “The Happy Warrior”. Senator Humphrey would have recognized Governor Pritzker as a kindred spirit both in his progressive politics and the attitude he adopted on the campaign trail. But he could also take off the gloves and pound the opponent when the opening was presented.

Both Bailey and other Republican figures like his ally, Donald Trump, provided Pritzker’s campaign with lots of openings, in which the Democrats took advantage of. The Pritzker campaign knew that Bailey was still introducing himself to the wider public, and they were happy to assist with those introductions.

September and October

There is some deference still given to the hoary tradition that the general election gets started in earnest on Labor Day. That was supposed to be the start of the fall campaign because the voters were less likely to pay much attention during the summer vacation season. For over a hundred years, Illinois has had the exception provided by the Illinois State Fair in Springfield, which is

held in mid-August. It is followed then by the DuQuoin State Fair, which starts on Friday night of the last weekend in August and runs through Labor Day. These State Fairs have always provided an opportunity for intense campaigning by the candidates and the two parties. A special day is set aside for each party when they parade their office holders and candidates before the audience inside the fairground and the larger media audience covering it extensively statewide. That is where the candidates can make their pitch and try to fix their narrative firmly in the voters' minds. In 2022, J. B. Pritzker and Darren Bailey tried to take advantage of that opportunity to gain a lot of free media, especially at the Springfield Fair and later in southern Illinois at the DuQuoin Fair.

Pritzker went first with Democratic Day at the State Fair held on Wednesday, August 17th, where he and the party adopted “Democrats Deliver” as their message (Nowicki, August 18, 1-A).

There they touted the theme that President Biden and the Democrats in Congress had produced a strong record of economic and jobs growth and innovative legislation, including incentives for chip manufacturers to produce their products in the United States. Some of it had even been bipartisan, most notably the massive infrastructure plan Biden had gotten through Congress and the much less ambitious attempt to reduce gun violence. Other votes had required going at it alone, such as in the Inflation Reduction Act passed in August, including long deferred Democratic policy objectives in both the health care and climate change areas. This bill passed with no Republican support and no Democratic defections.

Pritzker and all the Democratic constitutional officers pushed the same theme regarding Illinois, boasting about their record in running state government. Pritzker was eager to claim his record during his first term and to contrast it with his predecessor, Bruce Rauner.

The state fairs celebrate agriculture and its premier place as one of the major drivers of the economy of the entire state. Pritzker could not claim personal experience with running a farm the way Bailey could; however, Pritzker was appealing in person to those inside the fairgrounds. But he was also appealing to the statewide media, as well as to the larger statewide audience who would see the media coverage. That is probably the reason he then went after Bailey, depicting him and his supporters as being far out of the Illinois mainstream. He referred to Bailey and the Republicans who backed him as “the lunatic fringe” and said the Democrats were “the coalition of the sane.”

These characterizations were then picked up and amplified across the state by the media, who were out in force at the fairgrounds that day. On the more negative side, there was also some media focus on the intra-party fight that had developed between Governor Pritzker and Senator Dick Durbin over whether to retain the current Democratic Party State Chair, Robin Kelly, or to elect a new chair, Elizabeth “Lisa” Hernandez, which Pritzker won. It was hard to determine at the time, but the Democrats seemed to get out of this with some internal damage but not enough to dissuade them from their pursuit of the “unified campaign,” which was necessary for the party to support all of their candidates in the fall election (Moore, August 9, 2022, A-3.)

The next day, Thursday, was Republican Day at the state fair. They had their opportunity to get their message out for Bailey. He gave a well-crafted speech with a theme that focused on the metaphor of his hands, the hands of a hard-working farmer, and contrasted them with the life of privilege he said Pritzker had always enjoyed. He used the metaphor of the governor’s appearance with the famous butter cow encased in its comfortable air-conditioned locker compared to his photo op of milking a real cow. If he had left it there, he could probably have enjoyed generally good coverage from the media.

Bailey then segued to his attack mode reiterating his earlier law and order theme, describing Chicago as a “hellhole” again in an apparent attempt to reinforce his claim that crime was rampant in the city and that it was the fault of Pritzker and the Democrats in the General Assembly (Hancock, August 19, 2022, 1; Moore, August 20-21, 2022, A-8). As Brenden Moore of the Lee Enterprises newspaper chain described the speeches by Bailey and other Republican leaders:

“The Democratic governor was described as a ‘leftist,’ ‘tyrant,’ and ‘king,’ among other derisive terms used by the agglomeration of Republican leaders who spoke...” (Ibid.).

The media fixed on these more controversial statements and the reiteration of Bailey’s doubling down and repeating his earlier ominous depiction of Chicago. They also covered their attempts to get other major Republican leaders to say specifically if they were publicly supporting the Bailey candidacy. This accent on the more incendiary rhetoric and the intra-party divisions was not the narrative the Bailey campaign needed in that crucial period when he was trying to introduce himself to the larger public he now needed to appeal to if he was going to be competitive in the fall.

The report card on the Bailey campaign at the end of the first two months of the general election campaign was not a good one if judged by the polls available. On August 31st, Channel 7, ABC News, in Chicago reported on a poll taken August 25th through 28th. It had Pritzker with a wide lead of 57% to 37%, with 6% undecided. On September 6th, Shia Kapos of *Politico: Illinois Playbook* published a poll with Pritzker at 46.5% and Bailey at 35.8% (Kapos, August 31, 2022, 1).

National Politics Intrude on the State Campaign

On September 1st, President Biden made a prime-time address to the nation from the steps of Independence Hall in Philadelphia. He adopted a refrain that he had emphasized earlier on “the Soul of America,” which he maintained was being threatened by “the MAGA Republicans.” He claimed that extremist elements of the Republican Party “fanned the flames of political violence.” Indeed, he warned that American democracy itself was in jeopardy because of the actions of that wing of the Republican Party, which was dedicated to the advancement of Donald Trump. However, he emphasized that this faction of the party probably was not a majority and that he was not indicting what he called “the mainstream of the Republican party” (Miller and Boak, September 2, 2022; Associated Press, September 2, 2022).

During his entire time in the White House, Biden had carefully avoided using Trump’s name specifically, substituting vague euphemisms like “my predecessor” and “the last administration.” This time he gave up all of that pretext. He came out repeatedly against Trump and his followers and challenged their actions as being detrimental to both American democracy and even the soul of America itself. He cited Trump’s refusal to accept the results of the previous election and the fact that earlier that week, Trump had posted a new claim that the election had been stolen and that it should be rerun or that he should be summarily declared to be president as his exhibit number one.

Biden also took umbrage at the many instances where threats of violence had been made against law enforcement agents, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and against poll workers and officials in charge of elections. He stressed that “this is not normal” and that it was a dangerous trend toward using violence rather than letting elections settle our many differences.

Biden insisted that you cannot be a supporter of our system of electoral democracy only when you win.

These charges by Biden were also made against the backdrop of the constant news after August 8th when the FBI conducted raids at the former president's home at the Mar-a-Lago private club where he lives in Florida. There they found a trove of government documents and, more seriously, classified documents that Trump still held despite the fact that earlier trips to the mansion had resulted in the FBI carting off multiple boxes of material containing more than 10,000 documents said to belong to the government which included 18 classified documents marked top secret, 54 secret, and 31 confidential. They had already seized 184 documents identified as classified, which they recovered in January. The Department of Justice (DOJ) maintained that these documents should have gone directly from the White House to the National Archives before Trump left the White House on January 1, 2021 (Madhani, September 6, 2022, A-2).

In addition, Trump's lawyer had earlier assured the DOJ that they had already turned over everything they were required to do. When the DOJ learned, apparently from a confidential source at Mar-a-Lago, that the classified documents remained, the DOJ went to a federal judge in Florida, one appointed by Trump, and obtained a warrant which resulted in the raid.

Trump and his supporters were outraged at this intrusion on the former president's private residence and issued a barrage of charges about how mistreated he had been. Republicans across the spectrum in Congress joined in the outcry. It became a powerful tool for Trump to mobilize his supporters by claiming that the charges were all overreach by the DOJ and the FBI.

Biden referenced this whole controversy in his September 1st speech, defending what the DOJ and FBI had done and insisting that the White House had nothing to do with it.

On that same day, on a conservative radio broadcast, Trump said that he had recently met with a group of those who were at the insurrection at the U. S. Capitol on January 6th and that he was helping some of them with their legal expenses. He also added that he would strongly consider a full pardon for the January 6th participants who had been convicted of various federal crimes. The election of 2020 and its aftermath on January 6th continued to roil American politics and influence the actions and rhetoric of both sides as the mid-term elections were just barely over two months away. This hangover became a crucial part of both parties' strategy for the fall.

The overhang of the 2020 elections was now being utilized by the president and the Democrats to stir their base and to try to motivate them to take the mid-term elections seriously because of the existential threats they maintained were posed by the Trump wing of the Republican Party. The well-publicized and ominous-sounding narrative trickled down to the statewide and local races across the country, including Illinois. When Bailey and other GOP candidates were asked about Trump and some of his claims, they mostly pivoted immediately to their agenda, which was attacking Biden, Pritzker, and the Democrats as being responsible for inflation, the price of gasoline, the threatened upcoming recession, radicals controlling the content of K-12 and university curricula, and crime.

The leader of the Republicans in the House, Kevin McCarthy, preempted Biden's speech by delivering a blistering response to the speech that had not been made yet (Associated Press, September 2, 2022). He charged that Biden had consistently sown division the entire time he had been in office. McCarthy said that Biden should start his speech that evening with a profound apology to the tens of million good patriotic Americans who had voted against him and who had been slandered by the president. He then referred directly to a recording in what was supposed to be a private fundraiser held earlier in the week when Biden had said that the MAGA Republicans

were fascists. Biden had ignored the maxim that it is perilous to invoke any of the charged words from Germany and World War II and its grim legacy on the campaign trail. McCarthy adeptly used Biden's words against him, and he got almost equal coverage along with the president's major speech in the next day's news. Other prominent Republican officials took up the theme that it was Biden and the Democrats who were causing the deep divisions in the nation and who were using inflammatory language.

These national divisions were painfully evident in American politics, and the fires of partisanship were burning hot as the leaders of the two parties jockeyed for position for the upcoming elections. **This illustrates how completely American politics have been nationalized in the 21st century and how much the narrative established by the national party leaders comes to dominate the state and local races.** The 2020 campaign and election had not gone away and were still a major part of the national political conversation. The Democrats were now relitigating the case just as avidly as the Trump supporters and the Republican Party had been doing. However, their take on what had happened in the prior election and who was responsible for the threats to our electoral democracy in its aftermath were diametrically the opposite.

Bailey's Campaign After Labor Day

At the end of the state fair season, the two campaigns were off and running for their fall contests. Their dominant messages were largely fixed by now, and the overarching narrative for each campaign was in place. It turned out that the narrative for September and October did not change much, and the die was set for the November 8th vote by the time the two state fairs were over. On September 12th, Bailey was campaigning in a Chicago suburb, Bridgeview, and committed another unforced error. He seemed to revive the issue of his relationships with the Jewish community and his basic understanding of modern Middle East politics. While speaking to a

Palestinian group and discussing their rights, he stood before a prominently displayed map of modern Israel and its surrounding areas. The map, however, had all of Israel marked as Palestine. Bailey also delved into the issue of how to entice Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians and at least seemed to side with the Palestinians. That is, he raised the issue of the constitutionality of whether the Illinois law which bans public funds, such as pension funds, from being invested in firms that boycott Israel, for example, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream (Pearson, and Gorner, September 13, 2022, 1).

The media immediately seized on his interpretation of the issues embedded in this fraught and fragile environment and raised the issue of how well he understood the issues, much less how he got along with Jewish voters and leaders. This was not a resurrection of a controversial issue that Bailey needed to raise. He needed to put it to rest rather than reinforcing it.

The SAFE-T Act

Throughout the campaign, Pritzker and the Democrats were given fits by the Republicans' constant harping on the passage of the SAFE-T Act, which reduced the use of cash bail, and provided for some reforms in police procedures, such as requiring the statewide use of body cameras (Gorner, September 20, 2022, A-3). Effective statewide support for the Republicans came all over from Sheriffs and County level State's Attorneys, who constantly raised issues over whether they could keep certain prisoners when January 1st came. This claim was hotly disputed by the Democrats who pointed out that a judge, in most cases, had to decide whether an accused was a flight risk or a danger to the community if released without bond. Most detainees accused of bodily injury crimes were eligible to be held in jail until the trial if the judge determined that they should be kept off the streets.

The other major substantive issue in the SAFE-T Act, which gained traction downstate and in some of the suburbs, involved the question of what the police could do with trespassers when they found them. The critics maintained that the police could only write them a ticket but then had to release the offenders on the spot. Thus, it was alleged that if a trespasser was camped out on the homeowner's front porch or in the lobby of the condo, the police had no power to remove them or hold them.

The authors of the bill strongly challenged that interpretation; however, the wording was ambiguous enough that the Republicans, especially State Attorneys downstate, and some in the suburbs, including some Democrats, continued to press for changes. The revised language of the bill made it explicit that law enforcement people had the right to remove trespassers from private property. In the end, this issue was worked out, at least to the satisfaction of some of the interest groups involved.

In addition, a number of other points were clarified at the suggestion of some of the most consistent critics, and at least some supported the final bill or removed their public opposition. However, the final bill was passed on a party-line vote and with no Republican votes, and the Democrats used their supermajority to just muscle the bill through without Republican support. At the same time, Democrats who wrote the bill, were also busily trying to draft new language which would provide amendments where the wording still needed to be clarified and changed. This is what they called "tweaks" to the law, and they maintained that this often happened to complicated legislation which had to be adjusted in the veto session after it had passed. The Democrats in the legislature then claimed that they would take up the bill again in the veto session, as will be discussed in Part III of this paper.

Part II

The Mid-term General Election Results and the National Context

At the outset of this paper, the basic thesis was adopted that the presidential election of 2020 loomed over the 2022 mid-terms providing a context for both federal and state elections in a way unprecedented since the election of 1862, which was held at the mid-point of the Civil War. That aftermath was especially evident in the regular and high-profile hearings

of the U. S. House Select Committee on the January 6th demonstrations and insurrection. In the summer and again in October, those hearings provided riveting testimony from participants, mostly Republicans, who were involved especially with former President Trump as he tried to decide what to do while the capitol was being trashed and the members of Congress hid out at a safe location. Vice President Pence was sequestered in a loading dock underneath the capitol building while the mob searched for him.

On August 8th, the FBI made their now famous raid on Trump's private home at Mar-a-Lago in Florida in search of government documents. That raid produced an additional trove of governmental documents, some clearly marked Secret or Top Secret, which the government had been trying to get returned for months as Trump's lawyers claimed had already been returned.

The impasse produced headlines and then a spate of legal cases which ensured that the story would continue to be a major one throughout the fall campaigns. That incident probably worked for both parties in that it simply reinforced the negative opinion that Democrats and some Independents had about Trump. Those who saw our democracy as being under attack saw Trump as the most basic and even existential threat to the basic tenants of that democracy. At the same time, the Mar-a-Lago search seemed to outrage and energize the Republican base and gave pause to those Republicans and Independents who were uncommitted or opposed to Trump's continuation as the titular leader of the party. The polls during the campaign season showed that

Trump was still the Republicans' most popular figure within the party base and the leading candidate for the 2024 nomination. Trump then started campaigning for his hand-selected candidates for high-profile federal and state offices. He re-started his personal appearances at mass campaign rallies, which had become his signature way to reach his base and play to a larger mass audience. Trump constantly pounded on the now well-worn themes that the presidency had been stolen from him in 2020 and that his current legal problems were just proof that the DOJ, the FBI, the White House, and the "Deep State" were still out to get him, as they had always worked against him when he was president. Millions of Trump's supporters throughout the country believed him or continued to support him.

Trump's increasing prominence in the fall campaign coverage meant that statewide candidates, like Darren Bailey, were constantly asked about his position on Trump and his controversies. Bailey, by then, took a more measured approach to his past support and courtship of Trump and his endorsement. Whenever a reporter asked him about Trump, he would side-step with anodyne remarks saying that he was just focused now on his own campaign. Other Republican candidates for the constitutional offices followed Bailey's lead.

At this juncture, Governor Pritzker's campaign was not about to let the voters forget how closely Bailey had tied himself to Trump during the Republican Primary. Pritzker constantly attacked Bailey as "an extremist" who was well outside the norm for the Republican Party of the past in Illinois and was likely to try to lead Illinois in a drastically different direction. Pritzker also adopted the issue of abortion and the U. S. Supreme Court's overturning of *Roe v. Wade* and promised to strengthen Illinois' already strong protections for the right to abortion since the Supreme Court had returned the whole fight to the states. Those themes seemed to work well for Pritzker and the other statewide Democratic candidates as they won significant victories when

the general election votes were counted (Miller, November 30, 2022, 4). The results of the governor’s race are provided in Table 3. Also, see Appendix A and Map 1. This race and its results were very much like the races for governor in other major states such as Arizona, Nevada, Maryland, Michigan, and Massachusetts.

Table 3: Results of the Illinois Governor’s Race

	Number of Votes	Percent	Number of Counties
J. B. Pritzker	2,253,748	54.91%	12
Darren Bailey	1,739,095	42.37%	90
Others	111,793	2.72%	0

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Canvass, General Election, November 8, 2022, 9.

There was no “red wave” nationally in the election returns from November 8th. However, there was what could be legitimately called a statewide blue wave in Illinois when the election returns came in that evening. The Biden Administration’s policies and performance undoubtedly benefitted the Illinois Democrats overall and helped form the national context for the elections to play out across a variety of candidates and their campaigns, especially in the cities and suburbs. However, the national Democrats also proved to be an anvil around the necks for lots of downstate Democratic candidates as they tried to hold onto their seats or to win newly drawn district-level races. These results graphically reflect the national patterns, as is to be expected in a state that is as representative of the nation as a whole as is Illinois.

In Illinois, Governor Pritzker and Senator Duckworth led the ticket and helped many legislative candidates, especially in Cook and the vote-rich Collar Counties, as well as in

districts where there was at least one large or medium-sized city. The Republicans were dominant in the rural and small town or small city areas.

As seen from this table, Governor Pritzker was handily re-elected on November 8th. He took 54.91 percent of the statewide vote. This margin was slightly higher than his 54.53 percent victory in his first term in 2018. He won 12 counties compared to 16 counties won in 2018. The counties lost in 2022 included Jackson and Alexander, in southern Illinois, Knox and Fulton in west central Illinois, and Winnebago in northern Illinois. However, Pritzker won McClean County, which he had lost in 2018, thus leaving him with a net loss of 4 counties when 2022 is compared to 2018. This loss is partially compensated by his small gain in the 2022 popular vote. Pritzker and his supporters undoubtedly would have liked to have done even better since he and they firmly believed that Pritzker had a remarkably successful first term. He and the Democratic-dominated General Assembly had broken the legislative gridlock that crippled the Bruce Rauner years of 2015-2019. The Democrats had addressed the budget crisis of those years by passing balanced budgets for all four of Pritzker's years in office. They had paid down the accrued backlog of unpaid bills and had made progress on paying down the pension deficit. At least some of the time, they had returned the legislative process to what had been a more normal order of holding hearings and taking testimony about pending legislation, even though Republican lawmakers often complained that whatever input they had was often ignored in the final legislation. Or, they were not offered a meaningful role in the hammering out of the provisions of the particular bill under consideration.

All of this was accomplished in the middle of the Covid-19 crisis, during which the Pritzker Administration demanded some of the most stringent measures to contain the spread of the virus, even though that entailed strict demands on the private sector, including governmental

shutdowns and a slower re-opening of private businesses than Illinois' neighboring states.

During the anti-Covid campaign, Governor Pritzker sought and received most of the attention as the state's Chief Executive who used the full extent of the powers of his office, sometimes going well beyond what his opponents believed to be his to exercise. Opponents generally wanted the state legislature and the local authorities to take a much more active and prominent role in fashioning the state's response. That critique captured the core of the Republican candidates' argument, which was led by Darren Bailey, who had been the most prominent and effective critic during the height of the state fashioning its response to the pandemic.

The result of the governor's race, more than any other statewide race, indicated a clear victory for Governor Pritzker's approach to this important core issue of how the state should respond to similar public health crises in the future. Covid provided Pritzker with the ability to claim that he had gladly accepted his leadership role and made the most of it in driving the state's plan, which he maintained had succeeded when compared to surrounding states' per capita death rates.

Pritzker also claimed a mandate to keep going in the general policy and budget directions that he had laid out during the first term of his administration. Whether the voters meant to endorse all of Pritzker's policies is doubtful, given the public's generally low level of knowledge about particular policies. However, the voters did provide Pritzker with the most important mandate of all that is produced by American electoral politics, that is, they provided the governor with the renewed license to stay in office another term and to keep the powers of the office for four more years. **This is the essence of America's representative or republican, form of government and the crucial role that our elections play in maintaining democracy.**

The rest of the statewide Democratic ticket enjoyed the same privilege growing out of their own victories in the general election. Senator Tammy Duckworth got her renewal of her federal

license to remain in the U. S. Senate for six more years. Her victory was even more widespread and convincing than the governor's, which Table 4 and Appendix B indicate.

Table 4: Results of the U.S. Senate Race

	Number of Votes	Percent	Number of Counties
Tammy Duckworth	2,329,136	52.82%	13
Kathy Salvi	1,701,055	41.50%	89
Others	68,705	1.68%	0

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Canvass, General Election, November 8, 2022, 5-8.

This was a very personal victory for Senator Duckworth. She was re-elected with a resounding margin of votes cast. In doing so, she demonstrated that she was by all measures a widely popular and respected U. S. Senator across much of the state. Her margin of victory improved somewhat on her first election in 2016. Then she took 54.88 percent of the vote. This time she did better by taking 56.82 percent of the total vote (Jackson, and Foster, April 2022, 67).

Duckworth carried all 12 counties that Pritzker had won and added Jackson County for her 13 county total.

During the ensuing six years, she had been an effective voice in the Senate and was respected by her colleagues. On the national stage, she was a steady and constant critic of Trump and his administration. As a grievously wounded veteran of the war in Iraq, she was a highly creditable source of experience on defense policy and a strong voice for veterans. By the end of her first term, she was also a familiar face to millions of Illinois voters and one who had grown to considerable stature in state politics. The results in Table 4 and Appendix B demonstrate how Duckworth has become one of Illinois's most substantial political figures.

The Constitutional Offices and the Illinois Supreme Court

As noted in Part I of this report, the Democrats who controlled the constitutional offices were all incumbents except for Giannoulias, who was running for Secretary of State to replace the veteran, Jesse White. These incumbent candidates were all well-recognized people who had successfully navigated the electoral maze multiple times. Even Giannoulias had run statewide twice and won once when he was elected State Treasurer in 2006 at thirty.

Table 5: Results of the Constitutional Offices Races in 2022

	Percent	Number of Counties Carried
Attorney General		
Raoul (D)	54.35%	11
DeVore (R)	43.45%	91
Secretary of State		
Giannoulias (D)	54.28%	10
Brady (R)	43.59%	92
Comptroller		
Mendoza (D)	57.08%	11
Terelsi (R)	41.04%	91
Treasurer		
Frerichs (D)	54.29%	11
Deemer (R)	43.48%	91

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Canvass, General Election, November 8, 2022, 16-31.

The results in Table 5 indicate the advantages of being an incumbent when the state government was working well, according to feedback from various polls (Miller, November 2, 2022, 4). The Democratic incumbent candidates for the whole range of constitutional offices achieved victory

margins which ranged from 54.28 % (Ginnoulas) to 57.08 % for Mendoza. Each of the Democratic incumbents ran successfully on their records or their widespread name recognition, and governmental and political experience to win handily. See Appendices C-F.

Notably, Ginnoulas had the most competitive race and achieved his victory with the closest margin. This is not particularly surprising since he had not held a statewide office since 2011 when he left the treasurer's office. However, he had stayed politically active in more narrowly defined capacities in Chicago.

Just as important Representative Dan Brady from Normal was currently serving the state legislature in the 53rd District. He was generally considered to be a serious and effective legislator and a member of the Republican mainstream. He had not been a part of the Irvin/Griffin slate. He had the credentials that, in the past ambitious candidates had used to make the next step up in Illinois politics, at least in more normal times in the era before Trump upended the political order in the Republican Party nationally, with significant spill-over to Illinois. The fact that Brady fell short probably reflected more of the national and state tides connected with the Trump influence and image rather than any professional or personal shortcomings for Brady. He essentially got the Republican base in Illinois plus a share of the independents to achieve his total vote.

The rest of the Republican list, which was challenging the Democratic incumbents, were not well-known statewide and had much thinner resumes for the offices they were seeking. Of those, probably the best-known figure statewide was Tom DeVore, who was running for Attorney General against Kwame Raoul. Raoul was seeking his second term and had been highly visible in the Chicago area, having held Barack Obama's seat in the State Senate after Obama left for Washington in 2009.

To the extent that DeVore had any statewide recognition, it was a result of his close alignment with Darren Bailey when Bailey was a State Representative and then State Senator. As noted in Part I of this report, DeVore was Bailey's attorney as they teamed up to challenge Pritzker's Covid-19 plans at every turn. They won one legal victory in a friendly downstate county circuit court before that ruling was overturned on appeal. Like Bailey, DeVore was clearly and proudly a part of the anti-establishment and pro-Trump segment of the Illinois Republican Party both in the primary and general election. DeVore's results, along with those tallied by Bailey, are a good measure of how extensive that segment of the party is currently in Illinois.

Overall, it is interesting to observe just how similar these constitutional office race results were on both the Democratic and Republican sides. The variations in both percentages of the vote and total counties won were very similar, as can be gleaned from Table 5. See also Appendices C-F. Incumbent Comptroller Susanna Mendoza was the highest vote-getter in this group. She got 57.08% of the popular vote and carried 13 counties. This was one county more than Pritzker carried and her advantage was based on her victories in Jackson and Sangamon Counties, but she lost McClean, which Pritzker carried.

Attorney General Kwame Raoul got 54.35 % of the vote in his race with Tom DeVore. He carried 11 counties. His slightly different results compared to Pritzker was based on his carrying Jackson County but losing Peoria and McLean from the Pritzker twelve.

Alexi Giannoulis got 54.28% of the popular vote against challenger Dan Brady who received 43.59%. Giannoulis won ten counties total, and his different results from the governor were based on his losing Peoria and McClean counties.

Incumbent treasurer Michael Frerichs won 54.29% of the vote compared to 43.48% for Republican Tom Demmer. He won a total of 11 counties. compared to the Pritzker results, Frerichs carried Jackson and Sangamon, but he lost DeKalb, Kendall, and McClean for a net of 11 counties.

The margins of victory or defeat were very similar across these four races, encompassing eight candidates from very different backgrounds. The range for the Democrats was from 54% to 57%. For the Republicans, the range was from 41% to 43% in losing. Candidates in both parties were almost in lockstep in terms of what percentage of the votes they received and which counties they won. **These races indicate how little split ticket voting there was, as well as how powerful the pull of party identification was in influencing these very disparate races. It is also a clear indication of how much the national polarization has now spread downward to these lower-profile races.** The maps in the appendices graphically show that party identification at the national level is driving the election results all the way down to the 102 county courthouses in Illinois and by extension throughout the United States, where similar results were obtained. **These results, and others from recent Illinois elections, indicate that each county has its own unique political culture, and for most counties, these dominant cultures and enduring party allegiances mean that there is much continuity for all but a handful of marginal or swing counties from election to election.** The same pattern was found for the red and blue states each election cycle. The old adage that “All politics is local” attributed to former Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill has now been reversed to “All politics is now national in scope” (Winter, 2019).

The Judicial Races

These same results are also important explanations in the two other very important races, which would have statewide import for decades. These were the vote on a constitutional amendment and the races for seats on the Illinois Supreme Court from the 2nd and 3rd Judicial Districts. These districts were newly re-drawn based on the results of the 2020 Census. Despite what would seem to be the clear import of *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U. S. 186 (1962) and its progeny, Illinois' Supreme Court judicial districts had not been redrawn since 1965, before the then new constitution which was adopted and promulgated in 1970 (Schmitz, March, 2023).

In preparation for these races, the Democrats, who had super-majorities in the House and Senate, used their power to draw judicial district maps, which were likely to go to the Democrats or were competitive but leaning their way. The Democrats won both of these judicial races handily, as is evident from Table 6. This produced a 5 to 2 Democratic majority which will be difficult for the Republicans to change in the foreseeable future.

Table 6: Judicial Races in Districts 2 and 3

	Second Judicial District		Third Judicial District
Elizabeth Rochford (D)	55.23%	Mary Kay O'Brien (D)	51.13%
Mark C. Curran (R)	44.77%	Michael J. Burke (R)	48.87%

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Canvass, General Election, November 8, 2022.

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The Constitutional Amendment

The other big race of statewide importance and prominence was the referendum vote on the proposed “Workers’ Rights” amendment to the state constitution. This amendment had been approved by mostly party-line votes in the General Assembly. As the Illinois Constitution requires, the amendment was sent to the people for their final decision. The fight for this

amendment was a direct legacy of the Bruce Rauner administration, which the unions considered to be aggressively anti-labor. Rauner’s Turn Around Agenda included several items designed to reduce union power, especially at the local jurisdiction level where prevailing wage laws had been enforced often over the objection of the Republicans (Leonard, May, 2017).

The amendment was also the Illinois reaction to a number of surrounding states and similar industrial states like Michigan, which had adopted right-to-work laws. In addition, the U. S. Supreme Court in the landmark *Jaros* decision, which originated in Illinois, had been decided in 2018 (*Jaros v. State, County, and Municipal Employees*). It eliminated the “union shop” and the ability of the unions to require dues from those who worked in union shops. Previously even if they didn’t join a union, such workers could be forced to pay agency fees or their “fair share,” as the unions called it, as the price they extracted for their services in negotiating and administering the contracts for all the employees who benefitted from the agreements they struck in collective bargaining.

As a result of the *Jaros* decision and the Rauner Administration’s perceived hostility toward the unions (Rauner supported the *Jaros* case), Governor Pritzker and his allies in the General Assembly presented this amendment as a counter to the tide of anti-union policies, which seemed to be the dominant trend nationally. The amendment was adopted, although somewhat narrowly, as Table 7 indicates.

Table 7: Results of the Constitutional Amendment Proposal for the Proposed Amendment

	Percent Yes Cotes Ballots Cast	Percent Yes Votes Cast
Totals	53.42%	58.72%

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Canvass, General Election November 8, 2022.
4.

Amendments to the Illinois Constitution need to receive either 60% of the votes cast on the constitutional question or a majority of those voting in the election. The amendment carried a majority on both constitutionally required benchmarks; however, it did not make the required 60 percent threshold for the percent of votes cast on the measure itself, but it did make it over the simple majority on the percent of votes cast in the election overall.

The amendment proposal won in 18 counties. These counties included the 12 counties won by Governor Pritzker including eight counties, Fulton, Grundy, Jackson, Kankakee, Knox, Madison, Sangamon, and Stephenson, that the governor lost. The constitutional amendment narrowly lost in two large counties, DuPage (48.32%) and McLean (49.88%), that the governor won. See Map 2 and Appendix F. The referendum carried in 13 of the top twenty counties in terms of population and four of the top five, losing only DuPage.

At the very least, this victory for organized labor represented a significant comeback in their power and in their ability to get things done through the electoral process in Illinois since the nadir was reached soon after the *Jaros* decision was rendered. There are also some signs of at least modestly increased power for unions nationally as they recently have been involved in union organizing votes in new private sector businesses such as Starbucks and Amazon and a variety of nonprofit organizations (Rendon, February 17, 2023, C-1).

In addition, the Gallup poll has documented the rise and fall and rise again pattern of the public's approval of unions. The most recent poll found that 71 % approved of unions, which is the highest since 1965 (McCarthy, August 30, 2022).

However, nationally the pushback against the unions has been vigorous, and there have also been some high-profile losses in other cases in the same areas of success. In Illinois, the resuscitation of organized labor seems clear as they have joined forces with the Democrats in general and the

Pritzker Administration in particular to pass this constitutional amendment which is only the 15th amendment to be added to the 1970 state constitution.

The Economic Data Analysis

We will now look at the economic characteristics of the counties broken down by 2022 gubernatorial and amendment election results. Given the close connection between the Democratic Party, the Pritzker campaign, and organized labor, we would expect great overlap between a vote for Pritzker and a vote for the Worker's Rights Amendment. And, conversely, a vote for Darren Bailey and against the amendment. A quick look at statewide totals is consistent with this hypothesis. As noted above, Governor Pritzker received 54.9% of the total vote cast, while the amendment received 53.4%. And 92 of Illinois' 102 counties voted either Democratic and for the amendment or Republican and against.

Of course, to accurately answer the question of did the same people vote for the amendment at the top of the ballot and J. B. Pritzker for governor on the next line, we would need survey data on individual voters, which we do not have. However, there is evidence in the county-level aggregate data to indicate there was some vote splitting, at least in parts of the state. That is, some Pritzker/Democratic voters voted against the amendment. And some Bailey/Republican voters voted for it. Some splitting seems reasonable as the choice of the governor for the next four years is not the same decision as whether to enact long-term protections for organized labor. Gubernatorial elections involve candidate personalities and the hot-button issues of the day. An amendment vote would seem driven more by economics and whether one sees themselves as in or supportive of the "working class." Quite likely, some downstate voters voted for Bailey because of rural resentment, religious reasons, or a cultural war issue; but at the same time, they see themselves as working class and the recent Rauner Administration as a threat to the union

movement. Similarly, there must be many well-off suburban professionals who were quite comfortable with Pritzker's first term but see no need for the constitutional protections of unions. Ten counties split on the governor/amendment votes in 2022. They can be roughly divided into two groups. The first group is six counties which have recently changed partisan preference but where long-term attitudes towards unions may still prevail. DuPage and McLean County flipped from being majority Pritzker counties in the gubernatorial race to "no" vote counties on the amendment. Four other counties (Fulton, Jackson, Knox, Madison) flipped the other way. That is, each was carried by Darren Bailey in the governor's race, but flipped to being "yes" vote counties on the amendment. In the case of all six, the vote on the amendment was consistent with their political history.

This ticket splitting may say something about the nature of partisan realignment in Illinois-- and likely the nation. DuPage and McLean Counties were historically Republican strongholds that have become reliable blue counties in the past few election cycles. But sympathy and votes for union causes have apparently not followed to the same degree. Fulton, Jackson, Knox, and Madison were long-time Democratic counties but tipped Republican either the last or the last few elections. But enough pro-union sentiment apparently remains that all supported the amendment. The second group of Bailey for governor/yes on the Workers' Rights amendment have very different political histories. Grundy, Kankakee, Sangamon, and Stephenson have been, and remain, reliable Republican counties in statewide partisan races. Yet each supported the pro-union position on the amendment. Perhaps this is an indication of partisan realignment to come? The following four sets of tables look at the differences between the counties in the 2022 gubernatorial and amendment elections and may help us understand more about party realignment.

Table 8 A shows a sharp contrast between the 12 urban-suburban counties carried by Pritzker and the 90 primarily rural Bailey counties. The results are quite similar to the differences we found between Biden and Trump counties in the 2020 election (Jackson and Foster, April, 2022). The blue counties accounted for almost three quarters (72.8% in the 2020 census) of Illinois population and had a 23% higher per capita income. The percentage of residents over 65 was significantly lower in these counties (14.5% to 18.6%).

There is also a significant difference in population movement. Illinois population loss has been a regular talking point for Republican candidates for some time. Table 8 A, based on the original 2020 census numbers, shows a small statewide population drop of about 19,000 people (-.1%). However, this loss actually turned out to be a slight gain when adjusted figures were released a year later. But more important for this analysis, the population loss was all in the 90 Bailey counties, which dropped -4.0% as a group. The 12 Pritzker counties, in contrast, showed a modest 1.4% gain in population in the last decade.

Table 8 A: Demographic Traits of Pritzker vs. Bailey Vote Counties

	N	Income/ Capita	Population % Over 65	Population 2010	Population 2020	Population Change
Pritzker Counties	12	\$36,376	14.5%	9,202,856 71.7%	9,236,466 72.8%	1.4%
Bailey Counties	90	\$29,421	18.6%	3,628,716 28.3%	3,483,861 27.2%	-4.0%
Total	102	\$34,477	15.6%	12,831,572	12,812,508	-0.1%

Table 8 B repeats the same analysis but compares the 18 counties supporting the “Workers’ Rights” amendment with the 84 counties opposing it. In brief, the differences between counties are all in the same direction in this table. But they are **much smaller**. The “no” vote counties make up a slightly larger share of the population and have a much higher per capita income than the Bailey counties as a group. They also had a significantly smaller population loss between 2010-2020.

Table 8 B: Demographic Traits of Yes vs. No Vote Amendment Counties

	N	Income/ Capita	Population % Over 65	Population 2010	Population 2020	Population Change
Yes Vote Counties	18	\$35,075	14.7%	8,944, 748 69.7%	9,028,233 70.2%	.9%
No Vote Counties	84	\$33,069	17.8%	3,886,824 30.3%	3,784,275 29.8%	-2.6%
Total	102	\$34,477	15.6%	12,831,572	12,812,508	-0.1%

Tables 9 A and 9 B expand the economic analysis of different groups of counties by looking at county GDP from 2015 to 2018 in constant 2012 dollars. Thus, these tables show “real growth” with the effects of inflation removed. In 9 A, we see that the 12 Pritzker counties accounted for about four-fifths of the economic activity in the state. Much of this difference, of course, results from a greater population. But the blue counties' share of GDP is even greater than their share of population as the result of greater wealth.

Real economic growth also differs between the two groups. The 12 blue counties grew steadily over this period ending 2015-18, with modest increases each year and total real growth of 3.8%. The 90 red counties, in contrast, had negative growth of \$1.5 billion from 2015 through 2016-17.

These two years—probably not coincidentally--were the period of the state budget stalemate and a sharp drop in state expenditures which hit red counties harder, as we will see in the next section. However, we see economic recovery in the red counties for 2018, after the budget stalemate ended, and they finished 2015-18 with 1.7% total real growth. Nevertheless, even with the 2018 recovery, the red counties ended this four-year cycle accounting for a slightly smaller percentage of Illinois’ total GDP.

Table 9 A: GDP by Pritzker vs. Bailey Vote Counties

N		Billions of constant (2012) dollars			
		2015	2016	2017	2018
Pritzker Counties	12	\$594.0	\$597.9	\$604.5	\$616.7
% of total		79.8%	80.0%	80.2%	80.1%
Bailey Counties	90	\$150.5	\$149.0	\$149.0	\$153.0
% of total		20.2%	20.0%	19.8%	19.9%
Illinois Total	102	\$744.5	\$747.1	\$753.6	\$769.8

Dividing the counties by amendment vote in Table 9 B produces a similar pattern to what we saw in Tables 8 A & B above. That is, the differences between the two categorizations of counties are in the same direction for both partisan and amendment votes. But the differences are much smaller when we separate by amendment vote. The 84 “no” vote counties accounted for \$55.7 billion (7.5 percentage points) more economic activity in 2015 than the 90 Bailey counties. And their growth rate was somewhat more even. The “no” counties show a \$.7 billion drop in GDP for one year, 2016. But there was some recovery in the next two years. For the entire 2015-

2018 period, the “no” counties had 2.2% real growth. However, the yes” counties experienced a larger 3.9% real growth and thus accounted for a somewhat larger share of total state product at the end of the period.

Table 9 B: GDP by Yes vs. No Vote Amendment Counties

		Billions of constant (2012) dollars			
		2015	2016	2017	2018
	N				
Yes Vote Counties	18	\$538.2	\$541.4	\$546.6	\$559.1
% of total		72.3%	72.5%	72.5%	72.6%
No Vote Counties	84	\$206.2	\$205.5	\$206.9	\$210.7
% of total		27.7%	27.5%	27.5%	27.4%
Illinois Total	102	\$744.5	\$747.1	\$753,6	\$769,8

We will continue the economic analysis in Tables 10 A-B, this time with Illinois General Funds revenue and expenditures across the various categories of counties. The data for this table was originally presented in our earlier papers (Foster and Jackson, May, 2021; Jackson, and Foster, April, 2022) which contain an extended discussion of data limitations. In brief, there is no original source of state revenue and expenditure data broken down by county or region. The Illinois Department of Revenue publishes income tax data by county through 2017 on its website. Sales tax revenues can be traced through the return of the local portion to counties and municipalities. But this is a significant data management task given that the state has 1,298 municipalities receiving funds spread across 102 counties. Lottery sales are recorded by zip code. Federal Medicaid reimbursement, which accounts for over 10% of state revenue, can only be traced by the home county of recipients.

On the disbursement side, records are kept by different agencies using their organizational units. For example, the general formula and mandated categorical aid to K-12 education is recorded by the 921 districts or separate units across the state rather than the 102 counties. Similarly, the state aid to community colleges data available on the Illinois Community College Board website is categorized into 39 separate districts. State higher education aid expenditures are available in the Illinois Board of Higher Education records and distributed to the 12 universities. This is attributed to the counties in which they are located, although their effects obviously spill over county lines.

A series of reports by the Illinois Commission on Governmental Forecasting and Accountability (CoGFA) is by far the most extensive effort to resolve these data problems. Using 2013-16 tax and budget records, CoGFA undertook a massive data management task and was able to trace from 69% to 81% of the tax revenue and from 65% to 76% of expenditures from the General Funds to each of 102 Illinois counties. Our first paper on this topic was based on 2013 data released in October 2015 (Legislative Research Unit, 2017; See also Legislative Research Unit, 1989). FY 2014, 2015, and 2016 updates were released in February 2020 and appeared in our second and third papers and below.

The major portion of the tax revenues to the General Funds “traceable to counties” consisted of the individual income tax, the state share of sales tax, and the federal match for Medicaid. Much smaller revenue sources included lottery profits, insurance taxes, and estate tax. The traceable disbursements in order of size included Medicaid, K-12 education aid including the mandated categorical programs, state operations, state payroll, Local Government Distributive Fund (LGDF), and state aid to public universities and community colleges.

The “untraceable to county” data primarily falls into two major categories. On the revenue side are corporate income taxes. The CoGFA staff noted that while these taxes are filed in the home county of the corporation, the business generating the tax usually is done across several counties, in other states, or even other countries. Multi-state corporations are taxed on sales in Illinois without a record of the county. On the disbursement side, the largest single item not traceable to counties is contributions to the various public pension systems, which have grown to over 20% of the General Funds. Pension contributions from the state are recorded in the counties (Champaign and Sangamon) housing the system headquarters. Later these funds, plus employee contributions and investment returns, are disbursed as payments to pension recipients again across the state, nation, and sometimes other countries.

Tables 10 A & B below show traceable revenue and disbursements in the first row for each category of county and an “adjusted” figure in the second row. The adjusted figure is the traceable amount divided by the traceable percentage for that year. For example, in 2014, 79.1% of total revenue was traceable. Thus, we divided the \$21.65 billion directly traceable to Pritzker Counties by .791 to reach an estimated \$27.37 billion total revenue. This assumes that the non-traceable revenue and expenditures are divided across the red and blue counties in the same proportions as the known data.

The second bit of calculated data in Tables 10 A & B is the ratio for the years of 2014 and 2016. This was calculated by dividing the disbursement for that year by revenue. Hence it measures the percentage of state expenditures received by state taxes paid. A ratio of 1.0 would mean tax revenue going to the state equals state expenditures in that category of counties. Values above 1.0 indicate more state spending than taxing.

Table 10 A: State Revenues and Disbursements by Pritzker vs. Bailey Vote Counties

	Ratio* 2014	Selected 2014 Revenue	Selected 2014 Disbursements	Ratio 2016	Selected 2016 Revenue	Selected 2016 Disbursements
Pritzker County						
Total	0.76	\$21,653,356,880	\$16,445,167,570	0.80	\$18,413,450,557	\$14,483,650,164
Adjusted	0.79	\$27,374,661,037	\$21,695,471,728	0.86	\$22,648,770,673	\$19,474,337,088
% of Total		77.1%	59.1%		77.5%	62.3%
Bailey County						
Total	1.77	\$6,438,887,456	\$11,402,487,521	1.66	\$5,353,986,587	\$8,887,989,317
Adjusted	1.85	\$8,140,186,417	\$15,042,859,526	1.79	\$6,585,469,357	\$11,787,784,240
% of Total		22.9%	40.9%		22.5%	37.7%
Illinois Total		\$35,514,847,454	\$36,738,331,255		\$29,234,240,030	\$31,262,121,328

- Ratio equals disbursements divided by revenue for that year.

We chose 2014 and 2016 for this table to illustrate the effects of the state budget stalemate. 2014 was the last “normal” year before a previous income tax increase was sunset, and Governor Rauner and the General Assembly were unable to agree on a new budget. All of 2016 was during the shutdown when tax revenue dropped by \$6.3 billion and state spending by \$5.4 billion. More details on the stalemate are covered in our two previous papers.

For now, several generalizations may be drawn from Table 10 A. First, the Pritzker counties pay a significantly larger share of total state taxes than the Bailey counties, just as we found with the 2020 Biden-Trump counties in our last paper. This is expected given the greater economic activity shown in Table 9 A in the blue counties.

However, the share of the tax burden carried by the two categories does not quite match their income. In 2016, the 12 blue counties accounted for 80% of state GDP but only 77.5% of the total tax load. Conversely, the red counties accounted for 20% of GDP in 2016 but paid 22.5% of taxes. Presumably, this is the result of a somewhat regressive state tax system. Illinois relies on a

flat-rate income tax with very modest personal exemptions off the top and a sales tax on goods (but not services) for most of its income. Flat-rate income taxes tax rich and poor at the same rate, while sales taxes are generally considered to tax lower income groups more heavily. This effect is likely exacerbated by excluding services from sales taxation, although it is moderated somewhat by taxing groceries at a lower rate.¹

The second generalization is that the 90 Republican counties, as a group, receive significantly more in state expenditures than they pay in state taxes, regardless of whether one looks at the traceable or adjusted figures. The ratio figures in Table 10 A for the red counties range from 1.66 to 1.85, depending on year and adjustment. The same figures for the blue counties are .76 to .86.

This means that the red counties, in the aggregate, are getting back between \$1.66 and \$1.85 in state expenditures for each dollar sent to Springfield in taxes, while the blue counties are getting back somewhat under one dollar.

Third, this discrepancy in disbursement/revenue ratios narrowed slightly during the budget stalemate 2016. The red counties' ratio declined from 1.85 to 1.79 as adjusted total expenditures in their area dropped from \$15.0 to 11.8 billion. In the blue counties over this same period, the adjusted ratio rose from .79 to .86. Blue counties did lose about \$2.2 billion in expenditures, but also had their tax bill reduced by \$4.8 billion as the state individual income tax rate dropped from 5% to 3.75% (a 25% drop) during the budget stalemate period.

Table 10 B repeats this analysis, but again, after dividing the counties by their vote on the Workers' Rights Amendment. And we see the same pattern that appeared in previous

¹ Illinois voters had the opportunity to opt for a different tax system in 2020 with a constitutional amendment to permit a graduated rate income tax on upper-income earners as is used in 32 other states. But this amendment failed badly, receiving only 46.7 % of the total vote and losing in 100 of 102 counties. The only two counties where it carried were strongly Democratic Champaign and Cook. It lost in every Republican County, which is now paying a somewhat heavier tax load, as discussed in this paragraph.

comparisons. That is, the differences between “yes” and “no” counties are in the same direction as the differences between Pritzker and Bailey counties. But the differences are much smaller.

The amendment “no” vote counties contributed 28.3% of total revenue before and during the budget stalemate, which was only a little more than their 27.5% share of state GDP in 2016.

They also received a much smaller share of state expenditures (32.3% to 40.9%) than the Republican vote counties in 2014.

Consequently, the revenue/disbursement ratios in Table 10 B are much closer than they were in Table 10 A. In 10 B, the ratios for the “yes” vote counties range from .94 to 1.02 depending upon the year and adjustment for non-traceable expenditures. That indicates these 18 counties as a group received about the same amount of money from the state expenditures as they sent to Springfield in taxes. The same ratios for the “no” vote counties are slightly higher, ranging from 1.1 to 1.18. But this is much less than the 1.66-1.85 ratios of the Bailey vote counties in Table 10

A.

Table 10 B: State Revenues and Disbursements by Yes vs. No Vote Amendment Counties

	Ratio* 2014	Selected 2014 Revenue	Selected 2014 Disbursements	Ratio 2016	Selected 2016 Revenue	Selected 2016 Disbursements
Yes Vote County						
Total	0.94	\$20,132,750,102	\$18,854,478,144	0.95	\$17,043,521,765	\$16,189,936,906
Adjusted	0.98	\$25,452,275,729	\$24,873,981,720	1.02	\$20,963,741,408	\$21,472,064,862
Percent of Total		71.7%	67.7%		71.7%	68.7%
No Vote County						
Total	1.13	\$7,959,494,234	\$8,993,176,947	1.10	\$6,723,915,379	\$7,381,702,575
Adjusted	1.18	\$10,062,571,724	\$11,864,349,534	1.18	\$8,270,498,621	\$9,790,056,466
Percent of Total		28.3%	32.3%		28.3%	31.3%
Illinois Total		\$35,514,847,454	\$36,738,331,255		\$29,234,240,030	\$31,262,121,328

- Ratio equals disbursements divided by revenue for that year.

The final tables in this section combine the GDP data in Table 9 with the revenue/disbursement data in Table 10. We divided the 2016 county adjusted revenue and disbursement figures by the 2016 county GDP and then separately categorized them by gubernatorial vote and amendment vote. This gives an indication of how hard counties are hit by state taxation and how dependent their economies are on state expenditures.

Table 11 A results are consistent with the previous discussion. The twelve 2022 Democratic vote counties--while they paid over three-quarters of total state taxes—**they actually paid a smaller percentage of their total GDP in state taxes than their Republican counterparts (3.8% to 4.4%) in 2016. At the same time, the blue counties were far less dependent upon state spending than the red counties.** State expenditures in the 90 Bailey vote counties accounted for 7.9% of total GDP or about one in 12 dollars of economic activity before the multiplier effect is calculated.² This is almost 2.4 times the dependence of the Pritzker counties, which was a modest 3.3%

Table 11 A: 2016 Adjusted State Revenues and Disbursements as Percentage of GDP by Pritzker vs. Bailey Vote Counties

	2016 Revenue as a Percent of GDP	2016 Expenditures as a Percent of GDP
Pritzker Counties (N=12)	3.8%	3.3%
Bailey Counties (N=90)	4.4%	7.9%

But, once again, most of this difference disappears when we divide the counties by amendment vote instead of partisan vote for governor. The revenue as a percent of GDP, or relative tax burden, figures are almost the same (3.9% to 4.0%) for the “yes” vote and “no” vote counties

² A multiplier effect of about 5.0 is a common assumption in economic analysis. That is, one dollar brought into a community is assumed to circulate about five times as it is spent and respent for different purchases, stimulating additional economic activity. Under this assumption, direct state expenditures of 7.9% of GDP would indirectly account for almost 40% of total economic activity.

meaning they are essentially indistinguishable as a group. The difference in the dependence upon state expenditures is a little larger (4.0 “yes” counties to 4.8% “no” counties). But this is nowhere near the 2.4 times difference found when we divided along partisan outcome lines.

Table 11 B: 2016 Adjusted State Revenues and Disbursements as Percentage of GDP by Yes vs No Vote Amendment Counties

	2016 Revenue as a Percent of GDP	2016 Expenditures as a Percent of GDP
Yes Vote Counties (N=18)	3.9%	4.0%
No Vote Counties (N=84)	4.0%	4.8%

The conclusions we can draw from this section are partly similar to those from *Biden, Trump, Durbin, and Taxes*, our 2020 analysis of the presidential race in Illinois despite a slightly different mix of counties on the Democratic and Republican sides (Jackson and Foster, April, 2022). In brief, there are clear differences between the counties that make up the respective bases of the two parties when we focus on partisan outcomes. **The 90 red counties carried by Darren Bailey cover most of the surface area of Illinois (Map 1). But the blue counties carried by J. B. Pritzker have a bit more than 70% of the state’s population. The Republican base counties, in addition to having a smaller population, have a significantly (19.1%) lower per capita income and a larger percentage of elderly, and accounted for all the state’s population loss from the 2010 to 2020 censuses.**

On the economic side, the Democratic base counties account for more of the state GDP than expected based on population and pay a large percentage of the state’s tax revenue, although not quite as much as would be expected from their greater wealth. At the same time, state

expenditures strongly favor the Republican base counties, who received as much as \$1.85 in state expenditures for every tax dollar paid in 2014, the last year before the two-year state budget stalemate. **Consequently, when state expenditures were sharply cut during FY 2015-16, the red counties received a disproportionately large share of the reduction or about \$3.25 billion of a total \$5.5 billion cut.** This no doubt created more economic pain in these counties as they are about 2.4 times more dependent upon state government than their blue counterparts. These generalizations stand when we change focus from the vote on the governor's race to the vote on the Workers' Rights Amendment, which was essentially an indication of voters' opinion of unions and the organized labor movement. Most (N=92) counties voted as we would expect, given the close ties between organized labor, the Democratic Party, and the Pritzker campaign. That is, most counties carried by Pritzker voted yes on the amendment, and most counties carried by Bailey voted no. But ten counties, including several larger ones (e.g. DuPage, Kankakee, McLean, Madison, Sangamon) split their vote, going either for Pritzker but no on the amendment or for Bailey but yes on the amendment.

These findings point toward key battleground counties that should be of keen interest to candidates and strategists for both parties in future campaigns. These counties could also provide possibilities for additional re-alignment favoring the Democrats, which has happened already in DuPage and McLean. In contrast, Madison has gone in the opposite partisan direction recently. As a result, we found different results when dividing counties by vote on the amendment than dividing by partisan vote for governor. The broad generalizations outlined in the paragraphs above hold for the amendment vote results. The "yes" vote counties are larger, wealthier, and younger than the "no" vote counties. They also pay more taxes (although, not as much as greater

wealth might suggest) and are less dependent upon state programs. **But the differences between “yes-no” vote counties are much smaller than between the Pritzker-Bailey counties.**

Partisan elections now seem to create two groups of counties that are quite different. The Workers’ Rights Amendment vote, in contrast, created two groups of counties that are much less distinguishable. Part III turns to what happened after the election in the veto session and beyond when issues, important in the primary and general elections, continued to reverberate through Illinois with the deep partisan and geographic differences remaining the major fault lines in Illinois government and politics.

Part III

The Veto Session

The veto session was intrinsically an extension of the issues and narratives which had started in the primaries and extended through the fall campaigns. The two parties’ positions had been staked out clearly and vigorously debated, and the voters then had their say. The votes were counted and duly certified by the county clerks and other local election boards. They were then certified by the Illinois State Board of Elections. Some won, others lost, but there were no significant challenges to the vote, and no charges that the election was stolen. The major battles moved to the legislature and then to the judicial branch.

The newly reelected legislature had very little time to savor their victories because there was work to be done before the end of 2022. Their work in the veto session was essentially an attempt to deal with unfinished legislative issues aired in the just-completed campaign. It was also the opening salvo in the 2024 elections.

The legislature reconvened in Springfield in the last two weeks of November. Their first order of business was addressing the issues related to the SAFE-T Act, which had been so prominently

stressed by the critics during the raucous debate it had engendered during the fall election. The agenda also included addressing two issues Governor Pritzker and many of his Progressive allies had run on and had promised to deal with during their campaigns, that is, a ban on assault weapons and providing more specific state protections for those seeking abortions in Illinois. These two highly polarizing issues were guaranteed to produce spirited debate in Springfield and across the state, which they did.

In the end, the Democrats used their strong numbers in both the House and Senate to prevail. The Republicans offered vigorous opposition to these proposals; however, the Democratic majorities and Governor Pritzker prevailed. The Republicans were reduced to going back to their districts and holding rallies against gun control and abortion access and appearing frequently in their local media. They served notice that the conflict did not end with the governor's signature, and they promised lawsuits and various forms of civil disobedience where there were numerous sympathetic sheriffs who said they would not obey the new laws. The Republicans also promised that these issues would not go away and would be on the front burner in the 2024 campaigns and elections.

For their part, the Democrats had said they would take up the SAFE-T Act in the veto session, and they made good on that promise, at least in their view. They met with State Attorneys and other critics, where they hammered out a significant number of wording changes which clarified and refined the circumstances under which an accused could be held, with special attention given to those defendants that a prosecuting attorney and then a judge deemed to be a threat to others or a potential flight risk which had been the most prominent sticking point for the critics of the original statute. The final bill added to the list of crimes which gave judges the authority to deny pretrial release (Nowicki, December 1, 2022, 1-A; Nowicki, December 8, 2022, 1-A; The Civic

Federation, February 15, 2021). The scene then moved to the courts. The Republicans and the bill's opponents had promised lawsuits, which were filed quickly.

On December 28th, Circuit Judge Thomas Cunningham of Kankakee County ruled that the elimination of cash bail, the most controversial provision of the SAFE-T Act, was unconstitutional. This ruling was in response to a case brought by the States' Attorneys in 64 counties who had challenged the act on multiple grounds. The judge held that the cash bail provision of the act violated the Illinois constitution's requirement that "...all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties," except in some circumstances. Cunningham also ruled that this bill violated the basic separation of powers principle because the bail bonding system was an "administrative function" (Nowicki, December 30, 2022, A-1; Quig and Buckley, January 1, 2023).

Attorney General Kwame Raoul immediately filed an appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court arguing against the Cunningham ruling. On December 31st, the Supreme Court issued a temporary stay that suspended the act's implementation regarding cash bail until they could have time to formally review it. In effect, the current practices with regard to bail were left in place. The court wanted to "...maintain consistent pre-trial procedures throughout Illinois" (Gorman and Buckley, December 31, 2022,1; Quig and Buckley, January 1, 2023, 1). Understandably they did not want to create a situation where there would be no bail bonding in 38 counties, which had not joined the lawsuit, while it would remain in effect in the 64 counties covered by the Kankakee judge's ruling, thus creating a two-tiered system in terms of how the accused were treated. This ruling was immediately hailed by the States Attorneys who had brought the suit.

After the earlier vote was taken on the revisions and again after the Supreme Court's ruling, the Republican Party leadership in the General Assembly and many of their downstate rank-and-file legislators, kept up their drumbeat of opposition and criticism of the SAFE-T ACT. This act and their heated opposition were undoubtedly seen as an important investment in future campaigns for the Republicans. We can expect that the issue of crime and whose responsibility it is will be hotly contested again in the 2024 elections (Nowici, December 1, 2022, A-1; Petrella and Gorner, December 4, 2022, 1; Moore, January 3, 2023, A-1; Nowicki, December 30, 2022, A-3; Gorner and Buckley, December 31, 2022, 1; Quig and Buckley, January 1, 2023; 1).

The SAFE-T bill was undoubtedly one of the major issues which worked for the Republicans in the mid-term elections, and it gave them an effective talking point in their various races against the Democrats from the governor on down through state legislative and county races. The results in downstate, especially in the more rural sections of the state, where hard-nosed opposition to crime and harsh treatment for criminals is always popular, indicate that the historic geographic divisions in the state remained and even intensified in the mid-term elections of 2022.

Thus, the year of 2023 opened with Illinois and the nation clearly and deeply polarized on the issues of crime and punishment and how justice is administered, as well as a wide variety of other issues. In the debate on crime and punishment, the Republicans offered full-throated support for an aggressive law and order platform and for law enforcement officers. This was one of their major appeals in the mid-term elections in the national campaigns and in Illinois. This was a strong tradition in the GOP with deep roots going all the way back to Richard Nixon and his presidential campaign in 1968 where one of the major themes was the need for law and order. The Democrats historically placed more emphasis on trying to get at the roots of crime and addressing the social and racial inequalities that contributed to increases in the incidences of

crime, particularly in minority and disadvantaged communities. They also placed more emphasis on specific rules and procedures designed to monitor the behavior of the police and to hold them accountable if they violated the rights or safety of the accused. For example, it is Democratic legislators who have pressed much more aggressively for the requirements that the police have and use body cameras to record their actions while making an arrest. This was one of the major provisions of the SAFE-T Act.

This debate and conflict became even more timely with the death of Tyre Nichols in Memphis, Tennessee, on January 10, 2023. In many ways, this was a familiar story with a young Black man reportedly stopped by the Memphis police for reckless driving. Then in the subsequent melee that developed, he was brutally beaten by five Memphis policemen, and died three days later. However, this was not the usually predictable racial situation because the five policemen were all Black. It was also notable that the video from the body cameras worn by the policemen was released quickly by the Memphis Police Department, and the images from that film instantly became a key part of the national dialogue. While this incident happened in another state, the SAFE-T Act included more widespread use of body cameras in Illinois jurisdictions by mandating that all law enforcement agencies use them by 2025.

The debates surrounding the Nichols case immediately became about the fundamental questions of police training and culture and how to proactively prevent crime while protecting the rights of the individuals was thrust back on the national agenda. At the same time, Illinois was already deeply involved in that same conversation. In Illinois, these debates included serious efforts to try to understand crime and punishment, law enforcement, and the judicial process, which can help protect communities while at the same time guaranteeing the rights of the accused.

Regarding the ban on assault weapons, many of those same issues are involved, but the debate also adds to the stark issues of gun violence in America today. In January of 2023 alone, when the governor signed the bill, there were more than forty mass shootings in the United States. They ranged from a six-year-old in Virginia who took a gun to school and seriously wounded his first-grade teacher to two disgruntled senior citizens who killed co-workers at a mushroom farm in one case and the patrons of a dance hall he frequented in the other case. These cases were different from the tragedy in Highland Park, Illinois, on July 4th of 2022 because the alleged shooter in Illinois was more typical in that he was young and used a semi-automatic rifle with a large magazine, which was just the type of crime that the new Illinois law was designed to try to control. The Highland Park tragedy gave real impetus to the passage of this bill (Sheridan and Petrella, January 11, 2023, 1).

The gun control act came for vigorous criticism and organized opposition from the National Rifle Association, Republican legislators, and the Illinois Sheriffs Association, all of whom kept up a drumbeat of opposition to the act. Multiple lawsuits were filed almost immediately after the governor signed the law on January 10, 2023. The suits were filed mostly in circuit courts in counties where the likelihood of finding a friendly judge was very high. The earliest decision came in a ruling by Circuit Judge Josh Morrison in Effingham County that the law was unconstitutional and issuing a temporary restraining order saying that the law could not go into effect (Gorner, Meisner, and Petrellia, January 15, 2023, Sec. 1, 1; Hancock, January 24, 2023, A-3).

Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul immediately filed an appeal in the appellate court. Then the Illinois Rifle Association filed a suit challenging the weapons ban in federal court. Among the many plaintiffs was State Senator and recently defeated governor candidate Darren Bailey.

They were intent on getting this issue into the federal court system, where they expected a much more positive outcome if the case went to the U. S. Supreme Court. This calculation was predicted on the 6-3 conservative majority vote in *National Rifle Association v. Bruen* case 597 U S, 2022. That ruling, relying on the *Heller v. Washington* 554 U S 570 case from 2008, which struck down the New York law requiring that people who wanted to carry a gun had to fit a number of specifically defined criteria for needing one for self-protection. The court ruled that this violated their 2nd Amendment rights. This then put almost all state and local ordinances, which tried to limit the access of private citizens owning and carrying guns, especially in public, under judicial scrutiny (Hancock, January 19, 2023, A-2).

These are complicated and fraught issues in a diverse society, and they are easily caricatured by polemics on both sides and frequently are. Such issues are not easily addressed in a thoughtful way by bumper sticker slogans like “Back the Blue,” “Black Lives Matter,” or “All Lives Matter.” However, such sloganeering is often the major component of our public debate and by the campaigns of all too many who run for office using only the most blatant emotional appeals.

The debate goes on, but it is not always characterized by thoughtful advocacy using the kinds of dispassionate analysis that these complex issues demand if the objective is rational public policy-making based on empirical research and practical program solutions, which are also based on evidence.

The debate that Illinois had over the SAFE-T Act, and the gun control bill which continues, sometimes met very high standards with serious legislators, law enforcement people, and policy experts utilized to try to understand the plague of gun violence, the issues of crime and punishment, and how social and racial inequalities impact the need for law and order to be

carefully implemented in the administration of justice system. At other times, the debate fell far short of such ambitious policy making ideals.

Conclusion: Lessons Learned

There are several large-scale generalizations that can be drawn from the mid-term election in Illinois. **The first is to emphasize just how partisan and how polarized these elections were.**

At the macro or aggregate data level, there were very low percentages of split-ticket voters. In the 1970s and 1980s, political scientists wrote well-researched tomes about the rise of split-ticket voters (DeVries and Tarrance, 1972). The discipline interpreted this phenomenon to indicate how much disenchantment with both major parties had developed along with a rising tide of people who considered themselves to be Independents rather than identifying with either of the major parties.

Three decades later, among pollsters and academics, the voters who respond to the first poll question on party identification that they are Independents are routinely given a follow-up question as to which party they usually vote for are identified and assigned to the “leaners” category. It turned out that these leaners behave very much like the weak partisans and, in some elections, like the strong partisans.

There is a residue of “Pure Independents” in the poll data that usually rests at nine to ten percent when the leaners are assigned to the party identifiers. The reduction of split-ticket voting in the aggregate data confirms that most Americans, or about nine in ten, are rather consistent partisan loyalists and vote accordingly.

Those who are disgruntled by the two major parties often raise the possibility of building a new third party in the United States. In the past, third parties have come and gone from the partisan lineup and have influenced some specific election results. However, few have shown long-term

staying power (Rapport and Stone, 2008). The last new party to come on the scene and have the successes necessary to become one of the two governing parties was the Republicans in 1854-1860. Others, such as the various iterations of Socialist parties, have shown some staying power but have rarely won elections except in narrowly defined geographic areas. Some, like the American Party of George Wallace or the Reform Party of Ross Perot, have been mostly the instrument of one man's quest for power, and they have failed after one or two elections. In both cases, the third parties were important through only two presidential campaign cycles.

In Illinois, the Green Party, a force in some European countries, achieved enough success in the 1990s and early 2000s to reach the five percent threshold required by state law to be guaranteed a place on the ballot in the next election. There has not been a Green Party line on the statewide ballot since 2016, and there was not one in 2022. This downward trajectory also seems to be the trend for the Greens nationally.

Thus, J. B. Pritzker and Darren Bailey had the partisan imprimatur largely to themselves in the 2022 governor's race. Between them, they got 97.28 per cent of the total vote. There were Libertarians on the governor's line and the other constitutional officers' lines, but they only got between one and two percent of the vote. **In short, this was a very partisan election dominated by the two traditional parties, as were most of the others across the nation.**

One cannot conclusively prove the high-level of partisan voting by aggregate data alone; however, the hypothesized high correlation argument is firmly supported by the geographic distribution of the vote as well as by such polling data as is available (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2020). Illinois has long been divided regionally between the City of Chicago, the suburbs, and downstate. Those divisions were very notable and even intensified in 2022. Pritzker won 12 counties in 2022 compared to the 16 he carried in 2018. Pritzker lost five counties in 2022 that

he carried in 2018, Jackson, Alexander, Knox, Fulton, and Winnebago. He picked up McClean in central Illinois compared to 2018 for a net loss of four. Thus, Illinois' regional and urban divisions continued and even grew in 2022. **In sum, we are deeply partisan and deeply polarized in Illinois and throughout the nation** (Lieb, June 16, 2023).

The second broad generalization is that these mid-term elections were more profoundly driven by the national tides and the unfinished conflict left over from the 2020 presidential election than any other mid-term election since the 1862 mid-point of the Civil War. That election was halfway through Lincoln's one completed term, and the rebel South was essentially left out of the election. However, the debates over both preserving the union and the abolition of slavery had given way to armed conflict with all the disruptions the war brought.

The mid-terms of 2022 were not plagued with civil war levels of conflict; however, those who were "election deniers" and enthusiastic supporters of Donald Trump were very large factors in the outcome of the Republican primaries in many states, as they were in Illinois. On balance, the Trump faction was the dominant majority in the Republican Primary held on August 28th, where they won handily, and in the general election held on November 8th, where they lost badly. This was also the pattern nationally, especially in such crucial swing states as Arizona, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, although they won in Ohio and won a partial victory in Wisconsin.

Trump and the MAGA movement are still with us nationally and in Illinois. At both levels, a good deal of soul-searching is currently taking place about the future of the Republican Party. In Illinois, that debate has been centered on the post-election politics and meetings of the Illinois Republican Party (Pearson, December 13, 2022, A-1). Its Chair, Don Tracy, and the Executive Committee have taken the brunt of criticism about the party's performance in November, and much of that criticism has come from the disgruntled, anti-establishment wing of the party which

supported Bailey. That intra-party debate and strife over the party's future and who will control it is likely to continue for the foreseeable future as we head into the 2024 presidential election build-up.

In the General Assembly, there has also been a shakeup in the party's leadership with the election of Leader Tony McCombie of Savanna in the House and Leader John Curran of Downers Grove in the Senate (Hancock, November 18, 2022, A-1). The early indicators are that these two new legislative leaders want a less confrontational style and more pragmatic positions for the GOP that could provide a more promising route to becoming competitive again, especially in the Chicago suburbs.

Rick Pearson of the *Chicago Tribune* has reported extensively on the internal battles in the state Republican Party which intensified after their very poor showing in the mid-term elections of 2022. The two sides have very different interpretations of the causes of the Republican defeats in Illinois in 2022. The "party establishment" led by the state chair, Don Tracy, has tried to analyze what went wrong and what they should learn from those results. When the state party leadership met in mid December, they were strongly criticized and blamed for the November losses by a dissident group who represented the hard right, who were the enthusiastic supporters of Darrin Bailey. They also blamed the suburban Chicago voters and the party organizations in those collar counties, especially DuPage, for not supporting the party nominees enthusiastically enough. The mainline party leaders defended themselves and their voters by pointing out the problems in the Bailey strategy and campaign and his much too narrow appeal in the Illinois of today. That battle was heated with both sides citing their own facts and drawing conclusions that the other side needed to change (Pearson, December 28, 2022, A-1: and Pearson, December 13, 2022, A-3).

This same debate is also taking place in national Republican Party circles, although it is not clear where the Republican National Committee will stand. Their last formal internal party debate and study resulted in the “Autopsy” on the 2012 election results, which was commissioned by the Republican National Committee Chair, Reince Priebus. The report recommended that the party become more diverse and that it should move toward the center rather than the right (Jackson, 2014, 32-38). This is the opposite of the subsequent direction the Republicans took under Donald Trump. So, this debate is not a new one in the GOP.

As for the Democrats, this same internal debate is taking place, although more low-key, as a result of their having dodged the much anticipated “red wave” and doing so much better than the history of mid-term elections clearly suggested going into 2022.

Nevertheless, the familiar fault lines are still there between the Progressive wing and the more moderate wing of the Democratic Party. That is an old schism nationally and in Illinois as well. It goes all the way back to George McGovern vs. Edmund Muskie in 1972 in the presidential primary of that year. Basically, the Progressives and McGovern won that primary fight and have been the dominant majority of the national party since that time. The moderates were once represented by a strong contingent of the more moderate wing, “the Blue Dog Democrats,” both in Congress and many state legislatures, including Illinois. Now in the South, where the Blue Dogs once dominated, the moderates have been replaced by very conservative to right-wing Republicans. The story is increasingly the same for southern and much of central, eastern, and western Illinois. The sea of red, which has predominated in this century, has become even more stark in 2022. See Map 1. This map should be a sobering lesson for state Democrats even though they won the state vote handily in 2022.

Although people count more than geography, as the Supreme Court demanded in the landmark redistricting cases, geography is also important when it comes to forming county-level governments and electing state legislatures. **Democrats holding these offices outside the urban and suburban levels were already a rare breed, and they are threatened with extinction in many of the ninety counties which voted for Darren Bailey in 2022, in spite of or because of his relatively far-right views and record and his less than competent campaign.**

The wide-ranging policy successes, some of which were bipartisan, and the budgetary accomplishments of the first Pritzker administration led to his resounding re-election. The same could be said for Tammy Duckworth at the federal level and the Democratic incumbents in the constitutional office races. Even Alexi Giannoulias, the one exception to being a current incumbent, had already served one term in a previous constitutional office. This was no “throw the rascals out” election, although that was certainly the battle cry of Bailey and his co-religionists. There was no red wave nationally or statewide in Illinois, but if one looks at Map 1, there is a vast ocean of red, which only got deeper in much of downstate, especially in rural Illinois. **This vision should make Illinois Democrats much more concerned for the long-term health of the party and the state than their very successful results for 2022 might tempt them to enjoy without further examination and careful consideration.**

The current leaders of the Democratic Party would do well to consider those long-term trends as the nation and Illinois prepare for the 2024 elections, which are just around the corner.

In conclusion, we come full circle back to the question posed in the title. Was the mid-term elections “Unfinished Business or the Wave of the Future?” By now, it is clear that it included important elements of these two profound trends in American history. It included all of the temporal agenda-setting functions of all elections, such as the driving demands of the calendar

and the election laws. However, this particular election was much more heavily burdened by the Trump presidency, which came before, and left so many issues which are usually settled by the election unsettled by this one. The former president and his followers were determined to force these onto the agenda of the 2022 campaign and election. Some serious observers sounded the alarm claiming the nation faced a crisis of democracy where the basic system was endangered. Others talked about the possibility of a new civil war (Walker, 2022; Applebaum, 2020). After all the votes were counted and the new officials were sworn in, the nation was still polarized. The new congress and the new state officials were sworn in, and the government at both levels continued to function. However, many issues remained unsettled and large problems continued to need to be resolved. The debt ceiling loomed as a threat to the basic health of the nation's economy as the first test of the new divided government. Long-term issues like immigration, gun violence, crime, police reform, inequality, racial strife, and America's role in the world continued to be debated and struggled over in Congress and state legislatures. 2024 promises to be a rerun of many of those debates.

Ordinarily, the tides of history move down familiar channels in any particular campaign and election. However, in some cases, they burst out of those channels into extraordinary and unique territory. That was the case in 2016, 2020, and 2022. Whether we can move on in 2024 past the recently raised threats to electoral democracy remains to be seen and will be determined by those who seek to win power in that election and whether they choose to play by the rules of the game or try to bend and break those rules for their own benefit. Finally, it will also be determined by the American voters whether they choose to reward those leaders who honor the Constitution, the electoral laws, and well-settled democratic norms or those who simply seek power for power's sake and for their own benefit.

An Epilog on Political Science Theory and Political Parties

The races covered in this paper have significant implications for one of the most influential theoretical academic positions about the role of political parties and the importance of elections in the entire discipline of political science. The governor's race, most notably, but also the other races, with their strong messages and close adherence to what unites the parties internally and divides the two major parties from each other so deeply, were major features of the mid-term elections of 2022. These elections were simply the most recent culmination of trends that had been afoot in the United States, starting back in the 1960s. The shorthand for these trends describes the parties as becoming "polarized," that is, they are very different across all three of their basic components, "the parties in the government," "the parties in the electorate," and the "party organizations" (Sorauf, 1968, Chapter 1). These disparate Illinois elections in 2022 are vivid case studies of what American parties have evolved to and what the party system has become in the first two decades of the 21st century.

The conceptual or theoretical position regarding the parties has developed around what is termed the "Responsible Parties" model of organization. It leads to what is called "Party Government." This terminology originated with a famous study commissioned by the American Political Science Association (APSA) in the 1950s, which was then advanced by multiple major scholars since that time. The APSA committee brought back a report which provided a scathing critique of the two parties of that era. Their major complaint was that the conservative Republicans plus the southern Democrats formed the "conservative coalition" and prevented Congress from getting major national problems addressed, most notably, civil rights.

The committee maintained that what the party system required was more homogeneous and disciplined parties, along the lines of the British Parliamentary system (Shattschneider, et al., 1950). Such parties would have the following characteristics:

1. They would have a party platform and systematic stances on major issues.
2. When elected, those candidates must work to get those policies and programs enacted into law and policy.
3. The candidates then run on and defend those policies and programs in the next election.
4. The elections then become a referendum on the party and how it performed in government in addressing the major issues (Schattschneider, 1950).

In the United States, we, of course, do not have a parliamentary government. The executive branch does not grow out of the legislative branch, and it is not selected by the card-carrying members of the party organization as in the case of Great Britain. Our parties must work through not only Congress but also the system of presidential government and the separation of powers system. Some modern scholars say that we have moved significantly toward the Responsible Parties model, and what we have now developed in our much more polarized system is a “Conditional Party Government,” which is superimposed on the separation of powers system (Mann and Ornstein, 2012). The two parties now serve to weld the two houses of Congress together, where the majorities can enact legislation and send it to the president. In addition, when we have a unified government, as we did in 2017-2018 under the Republicans or in 2021-2022 under the Democrats, the majority could pass a good deal of legislation as the Democrats did in Biden’s first two years. Sometimes the major legislation passed with some help from the Republicans, as in the case of Biden’s bipartisan infrastructure plan, but often it meant going it alone. That unified government period came to an end, and we shifted to a divided government

in 2023, with the capturing of the U. S. House of Representatives majority by the Republicans. This means that it will be much harder in the next two years, if not impossible, to get major policies adopted, as the debate over lifting the debt ceiling in the opening months of the new House majority clearly demonstrates.

In Illinois, we have had a unified government since Pritzker was elected in 2018. During his first term, 2019-2020, Pritzker was able to work with the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate to get a wide array of legislation passed. Occasionally, as in the 2019 Rebuild Illinois capital bill, he was able to get bi-partisan support on major legislation. It is notable that one of the most significant policy areas where both Biden and Pritzker were able to build winning bi-partisan majority coalitions was in infrastructure building and repair, and Pritzker's success there preceded Biden's. Thus, Illinois was in an advantageous position to integrate the federal funds into the plans that IDOT had already developed.

It was this record that Pritzker successfully ran on in his 2022 campaign. The voters of Illinois gave him, and the Democrats in the legislature, their approval by wide electoral margins. This is a classic case of how the Responsible Parties model is supposed to work and is now working in one large and predominantly blue state. There are many more red states where unified governments are working in the opposite direction to pass and implement Republican policies with little or no influence exerted by the Democrats. The whole fight over abortion graphically illustrates this perspective from both sides.


As we have seen, geographically, there were wide swaths of disapproval of Pritzker, and the Democrats registered across downstate Illinois. Nevertheless, with the governor's comfortable majority re-election and with their supermajorities in the House and Senate, the Democrats got the right to continue in power and to pursue the policies they can agree on internally in 2023 and



2024. Unified government and the uniquely American form of the Responsible Parties model have come to Illinois, and, given the current majorities the Democrats control in the General Assembly, the chances are good that it will stay that way, at least through a second Pritzker term. The topic of Responsible Parties and their relationship to democracy has become one of the dominate concepts of the discipline since the release of the famous Schattschneider Report in 1953. It was recently revisited and updated by the APSA with an important new report issued in 2023 (American Political Science Association, 2023).

The original report emphasized that elections made the governing officials responsible to the people and periodic elections with the peaceful transfer of power were the defining marks of electoral democracy. **The new report adds to this a sense that the parties also should be responsible for maintaining and defending the norms of democracy and controlling extremism in their ranks and especially in leadership positions. There should also be respect for the opposition and support for the necessity for compromise especially in a separation of powers system. The recent APSA report maintains that recognizing and respecting those norms is not being supported vigorously by the two parties in this era of polarization. Most notably many of the party officials and elites are not living up to those responsibilities. So, this report is a timely and important stocktaking exercise now seventy-one years after the original report was issued.**

Map 1



2022 Election Results: JB Pritzker vs. Darren Bailey



	Pritzker Counties N = 12 Pritzker %=54.91
	Bailey Counties N = 90 Bailey %= 43.37

Map 2

2022 Election Results: The Workers Rights Constitutional Amendment



Appendix A: Pritzker Counties

Champaign

Cook

DeKalb

DuPage

Kane

Kendall

Lake

McLean

Peoria

Rock Island

St. Clair

Will
N = 12

Appendix B: Duckworth Counties

Champaign

Cook

DeKalb

DuPage

Jackson

Kane

Kendall

Lake

McClellan

Peoria

Rock Island

St. Clair

Will
N = 13

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, November 8, 2022

Appendix C: Raoul Counties

Champaign

Cook

DeKalb

Jackson

Kane

Kendall

Lake

McLean

Rock Island

St. Clair

Will

N=11

Appendix D: Giannoulis Counties

Champaign

Cook

DeKalb

DuPage

Kane

Kendall

Lake

Rock Island

St. Clair

Will

N = 10

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, November 8, 2022

Appendix E: Mendoza Counties

Champaign
Cook
DeKalb
DuPage
Jackson
Kane
Kendall
Lake
Peoria
Rock Island
Sangamon
St. Clair

Will
N = 13

Appendix F: Frerichs Counties

Champaign
Cook
DuPage
Jackson
Kane
Lake
Peoria
Rock Island
Sangamon
St. Clair

Will
N = 11

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, November 8, 2022

Appendix G: Constitutional Amendment Counties

Majority Percent Yes Ballots Cast

Champaign	Sangamon
Cook	St. Clair
DeKalb	Stephenson
Fulton	<u>Will</u>
Grundy	N = 18
Jackson	
Kane	
Kankakee	
Kendall	
Knox	
Lake	
Madison	
Peoria	
Rock Island	

Source: The Illinois State Board of Elections, November 8, 2022

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