

The Impacts of Hostile Events on Partisan Evaluation in East Asia

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The Impacts of Hostile Events
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Abstract

This research focuses on how foreign influence, such as threats to national security and financial crises, changes the attitudinal patterns of citizens. Specifically, this research empirically examines the effects of information on individuals' motivated reasoning. A long-term evaluation of citizens' attitudinal changes in East Asian countries using ordinal logistics regression and multi-level analysis reveals that attentive individuals tend to alter their partisan routine if they are concerned with the growing tension of a threat. Results also show that a party's reputation mitigates the information effects on individual evaluation of government performance.

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0.1. Do Threatening Events Affect Partisan Effects on Government Evaluation?

When do electorates change their political support? This dissertation examines whether security concerns in South Korea and Japan prompt citizens to defect from their preferred party. It also examines if the party reputation has any impacts on evaluations of government.

Conventional wisdom in political science says that partisan loyalty affects the evaluation of government performance (Tilley & Hobolt, 2011; Popescu, 2013). However, even though partisan attachment influences one's political support, information that individuals collect from the observed environment would matter as much as the partisan affection (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). If the information conflicts with the partisan-based support, it is possible that these people defect from the party. Recent work had shed lights on the various factors that involve with the individual respondents, particularly when partisanship conflicts the perceived environment (Basinger & Lavine, 2005; Parker-Stephen, 2013). Can party loyalty outweigh the information if the perceived environment disagrees with the group attachment? This study suggests that the partisan consequences of political issues depend on how partisans perceive the hostility of environment. I argue that concerned partisans will detach from their group identification and give the incumbent government a negative response for not being able to redress the security concern.

I also argue that the domestic-level reputation of parties either reinforces or weakens the partisan bias. Retrospective images of parties dominating an issue or lacking an ability to solve growing security concerns can possibly either mitigate the punishing behavior of citizens if the incumbent party is known to be competent or expedite it if the party holding the office is viewed as incompetent. The issues that political parties take a similar position

are known as valence issues (Stokes, 1963). Compared to this, parties may take distinct approaches to issues to appeal to their party base. By contrasting threats that parties take converging position (e.g. valence issues, economic crises) to threats that specific parties have reputations over (e.g. positional issues, national security issues), this research suggests that partisan effects weaken/reinforce if the threatening events are relevant to party reputation, and remain influential if the threats are not associated with any reputations.

This research makes contributions in several aspects. First, previous literature has been mostly focused on the impacts of economic conditions on partisan loyalty (Parker-Stephen, 2013; Evans & Andersen, 2006; Chzhen, Evans, & Pickup, 2014; Pardos-Prado & Sagarzazu, 2016). Yet, little is known about the impacts of security threats on partisan effects (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). This study systematically examines generalized scope of impacts from military tension to financial crisis on changing partisanship of East Asian electorates. Second, by adopting models that are relevant to the context of Western European and American politics, this study not only examines specific patterns of East Asian partisans but also examines the generalizability of knowledge developed from the politics of advanced democracies. Third, it demonstrates that domestically internalized and politicized security concerns can undermine supportive attitudes of citizens. In American political context, security issues often mobilize support for the incumbent political leader (J. R. Lee, 1977; Baker & Oneal, 2001). If the issue is consistent enough to generate politically diverging emotions of citizens, it may differently affect the behavioral patterns of citizens. South Korea and Japan are relevant to the scope of this project because there have been security issues that pose consistent threats to the region: the North Korean hostile actions. This issue is relevant to party platforms in South Korea and Japan, whereas South Korean leftist parties are known for friendly attitudes towards North Korea, and conservative parties are obstinate and refuse to negotiate with North Korea. Similar to South Korea, the Japanese conservative party is known for their support for revising the constitution to

fight back the expansion of North Korean threats. This study examines the impacts of such reputations of political parties on government evaluation. Besides the national security, East Asian countries have been exposed to the economic fluctuations due to internal and external reasons, such as the regional Asian Monetary crisis in mid-1990s, sky-rocketed unemployment rate of South Korea after the International Monetary Fund adjustment program in late 1990s, and the global financial crises in 2007. These macroeconomic crises had greatly affected the support for incumbent government, and it is necessary to take these elements into account.

Organization of this study is as follow. First section discusses the conceptualization of partisan effects and hypotheses for the empirical examination. Second section covers model specification and measurements of concepts for the hypotheses testing. Last two sections empirically examine the hypotheses that are laid out in the first section. This study concludes with remarks on empirical findings and its political implications.

0.1.1. Impacts of Threats on Partisan-based Evaluation

There are three factors that can affect evaluative choices of citizens: partisanship, party reputation, and the threatening environment. Even with psychological attachment to a political party, people collect information through various channel. In the case of facing crises or threats that one cannot easily solve, the concerns on the growing threats may push people to reconsider their political routine and alter their behavior based on how they perceive the environment and political solutions.

Literature on the public opinion argue that there are two prominent factors that affect the political attitudes of electorates. One of the foremost assertions comes from the psychological attachments of electorates towards parties, which is measured by self-identified political affiliation (Converse, 1964; Campbell, 1980; Gerber & Green, 1998). Political

self-identification has a meaningful implication. It not only implies one's selection of political parties, but also reflects respondents' political bias that favors one party over others. Gerber and Green (1998) even claim that the party identification is analogous to the presidential approval ratings (Gerber & Green, 1998, p.795), an assertion that strongly supports the interpretation of partisan identification as an anchor of party support.

Yet, there are many other factors that have meaningful and critical impacts on the voter behavior and political attitudes. As briefly noted above, partisan attachment indicates one's possible political bias, and it is argued by scholars that it often affects how the electorates interpret the meaning of information (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007; Taber & Lodge, 2006). However, it is hard to say that partisan bias is a sole driving force of attitudes of citizens. At the individual voter level, it is a combination of all elements including partisan-based bias and the rational evaluation based on the information that electorates individually gather (Parker-Stephen, 2013). This theoretical argument is found in a work by Leeper and Slothuus (2014). The concept of motivated reasoning (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Taber & Lodge, 2006) reflects how and when the parties influence electorates. In addition to this, Leeper and Slothuus (2014) argued that parties and personal factors both facilitate and motivate the electorates to make choices. For instance, once voters perceive growing security threats, they more want to learn about the threats instead of solely relying on partisan cues. If an individual pays attention to the parties taking positions on specific issues, this person is less likely to rely on group attachment and more rely on the ideas that parties represent. If this individual is prone to follow the cues from parties that mobilize the supporters, it is more likely that this person follows the partisan direction. These motivations of voters are categorized by Leeper and Slothuus (2014) in a twofold way. First, accuracy motivation occurs if people who are willing to obtain political information achieve their goal by observing and learning what parties represent and how close the party stance is to their perspectives. Second, the directional motivation refers to the motivation that en-

courages citizens to adopt issue positions consistent with their partisanship. As Campbell (1980) argued, the electorates who pursue group identity or value that conforms to their supporting parties are more likely to adopt what the party tells the supporters. These two types of motivations that are suggested by Leeper and Slothuus (2014) are summarized in Figure 1. This study adopts these two types of motivations and develop a model that ties motivations to the presence of threats.




Figure 1: Types of Motivations

Why do threats such as military tensions and financial crisis urge citizens to alter their mind? There are studies arguing that negative emotions caused by threatening environment, such as anxiety and fear in particular, have politically meaningful impacts on behavior of electorates (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Druckman & McDermott, 2008). According to these studies, personal feelings condition how the electorates rely on preconditioned determinants of political supports. Marcus et al. (2000) examine two types of subsystems of political choice: dispositional and surveillance subsystems. Dispositional subsystem is based on the personal habits and experiences, such as the habitual routines, positive feedback from previous experiences, and parental influence that generates strategies to cope with the situation. If the environment is familiar and matches the habitual routines, it is more likely for individuals to rely

on the dispositional subsystem and adopt familiar patterns of behavior. In short, a normal status of life does not alarm the individuals.

In contrast, in an environment of high urgency, the situation generates a great deal of uncertainty for individuals, and the individuals are more concerned about the uncertainty and feel anxious about the consequences of threats that cannot be easily solved by one's ability. Surveillance subsystem refers to the cognitive process of individuals seeking solutions when they face such threatening circumstances. Novel and threatening environment increases a level of uncertainty to one's life. Dealing with this uncertainty would require a new set of tools composed of credible information. Thus, unfamiliarity of environment urges one to consider changing routines, as the old habits - such as relying on familiar predispositions to judge political events - might be insufficient to handle the issues. In short, the information on hostile environment can potentially direct people's attention away from their partisanship to the threatening issue-at-hand.

In addition to the cognitive factors, the political sophistication of individuals can push individuals to seek accurate information. Political knowledge and sophistication were examined as mediators of punishing/rewarding behavior of citizens for economic performance of incumbent government (Fearon, 1999; Gomez & Wilson, 2001; Duch, 2001; De Vries & Giger, 2014). According to studies, it can mediate voting behavior of citizens in various ways. For instance, Gomez and Wilson (2001) argue that the sophistication may diminish the probability of economic voting because sophisticated voters know that they cannot blame the incumbent party for global economic crisis and only the retrospective, self-evaluation of current economic status is associated with the performance evaluation. Moreover, Duch (2001) examined the impacts of information acquisition on intention to vote for incumbent government in post-communist countries and argued that people with better information are more likely to engage in voting against the current government. These results of Gomez and Wilson (2001) and Duch (2001) suggest that sophisticated cit-

izens and people who are aware of dire economic status are more likely to spot who truly is responsible for the undesirable environment and decide to hold incumbent government accountable for mishandling the fault. The same logic can be applied to security concerns, as the crisis at the international level can danger citizens' life. Sophisticated, better informed citizens are more likely to know whom to blame for growing tension that posits threats to their security. Overall, the more people are attentive to the threats based on the knowledge and better access to information, the more likely these people break their political habits and refuse to conform to party cues.

How does the partisanship affect the attitudes of individuals when the individuals face an uncertainty due to security concerns? Even if partisanship generates biased attitudes towards governments, threatening environments can undermine the partisan effects on political choices. As argued earlier, if the level of concern is high, it is more likely that citizens detach from the partisan favoritism and make more accurate decisions that match the perceived hostile environment: punishing the incumbent government for not redressing a problem. Moreover, if the individuals have sufficient knowledge to see who is responsible for the turmoil, an accurate evaluation is more likely. Table 1 shows how the presence of threats and the level of emotional and sophisticated impulse affect the direction of the evaluation. The upper row of Table 1 shows how the partisans react to the presence of threatening issues. If they are concerned and better informed, even the politically biased citizens negatively evaluate the government to punish the administration for the threats to national security. People who politically support the incumbent party, without an intervention, are usually positively biased. However, with an event intervening like international crises, interpretation of the fact of partisan-ins (people who identify with the incumbent party) needs to be updated and reflects the concerning issues that are not properly addressed and solved by the incumbent government. As Table 1 shows, partisan-ins with a high level of personal impulse to pursue accurate information are likely to give a negative

evaluation to the incumbent parties despite their partisan identification. Unlike partisan-ins, partisan-outs (people who oppose to incumbent party) with an accurate motivation can easily punish the current holder of the government. These individuals do not have incentives to blur responsibility of the incumbent government. Consequently, the average level of evaluation of partisan-outs clearly reflects their grievances and dissatisfaction.

Table 1: Conditional Effects of Personal Impulse on Government Evaluation

Event Types	Co-partisanship	Direction of Evaluation
Threats Present	Partisan–ins	Negative (–)
	Partisan–outs	Negative (–)
Threats Not Present	Partisan–ins	Positive (+)
	Partisan–outs	Neutral (–/+)

If threats do not exist, as the bottom row of Table 1 shows, people who have partisan loyalties behave differently from people who are neutral to the government. Partisan-ins have a positive bias towards government performance because they do not have prominent reasons to deter what they believe based on their political habit. Consequently, partisan-ins follow the habitual routines to evaluate the incumbent government: a positive direction of evaluation. In contrast, people without such partisan bias are indifferent to the government performance. Moreover, they are driven by other factors such as the popularity of candidates or any individual characteristics that compose the individual attitudes. As a result, unlike the strong support of partisan-ins, partisan-outs and independents are versatile in their attitudes under non-threatening circumstances. If they are negatively inclined to the government due to partisanship (partisan-outs), they negatively evaluate the government. Individuals who identify themselves as politically independent will either positively or negatively evaluate the government. Aggregating these differing behaviors, the evalu-

ative direction of partisan-outs and independents may cancel each other out and become neutral to the incumbent government.




Figure 2: Effects of Crises on Partisan Evaluation

Finally, Figure 2 puts all the pieces together by developing empirical implications of conditional effects of partisanship, personal motivation and the presence of threats. Considering the conditional effects of the level of concern and sophistication, people who share co-partisanship with the incumbent government can be influenced by the threatening issues if they are susceptible to the threats. The graph on the left-hand side depicts a level of government evaluation when partisan-ins are concerned about the presence of risk to national security. Note that the intercept of evaluation of citizens who support the incumbent party is more favorable than that of the people who do not. Even if there is a threat, the absolute value of evaluation of people with partisan bias is higher than the people who are psychologically neutral to the government. However, the concern modifies the partisan effects on government evaluation. The more the partisans are informed, the more likely these people

negatively evaluate the government because they have more information about an objective threat to counter their bias induced partisanship. The slope for evaluation line of partisan-ins, as Figure 2 shows, is negative ($\Delta_{Partisan-ins_A} < 0$). As the level of knowledge and concerns increases, partisan-ins evaluate the government more negatively. A similar yet more dramatic pattern of evaluation is observed in people who have no psychological reasoning to support the government. Compared to the partisan-ins, the slope of partisan-outs is negative and steeper ($\Delta_{Partisan-outs_A} < 0$, $\Delta_{Partisan-outs_A} > \Delta_{Partisan-ins_A}$). This implies that people who do not have any preconditioned beliefs to positively evaluate the government will be harsher in their evaluations of the government, and they easily demonstrate their dissatisfaction through a negative evaluation. Eventually, the gap between partisan-ins and partisan-outs widens as the level of knowledge in threats increases.

Let us now consider a situation when the environment is friendly and favorable (right-hand side in Figure 2). In this case, partisans now have reasons to stick to their old habit. As Marcus et al. (2000) argue, if the environment is familiar, one will "behave very much like personality traits" dictate (Marcus et al., 2000, p.51) and rely on the preconditioned partisan affiliation. In this scenario of the right-hand side of Figure 2, the slope of partisan-ins without facing any threats is constant ($\Delta_{Partisan-ins_B} = 0$), which implies that the level of knowledge does not condition the government evaluation. A similar pattern is observed in partisan-outs. On average, the evaluative direction of partisan-outs is complex and differs by many personal traits. It is not necessary for these individuals to seek accurate information relevant to the environment. Any individual or social determinants will drive the evaluation of partisan-outs, and eventually, differing factors off-set the direction of evaluation and make the slope constant ($\Delta_{Partisan-outs_B} = 0$). The gap between partisan-ins and partisan-outs still exists. The intercept of partisan-ins is higher than partisan-outs, because partisan-ins rely on habitual favoritism of partisanship. This gap is larger when threats are not present, because the average level of support (intercept) is susceptible to the

presence of threats. Once threats occur, the average level of support drops and partisan groups converge into similar level, as the left-hand side of Figure 2 shows. If there is no threat, the gap reflects the original habitual difference between these groups and widens.

To summarize, if threats do not exist, partisan effects are critical to the government evaluation. In contrast, under novel circumstances where a level of uncertainty is higher than usual, the level of concern and sophistication mitigates the partisan effects and lowers the government evaluation of partisan-ins.

Summing up the points that are addressed above, first hypothesis below tests if the level of knowledge in growing tension has negative impacts on the government evaluation.

H1. When the intensity of threat is high, the knowledge of growing tension negatively influences government evaluation.

Second hypothesis tests the impacts of partisanship on government evaluations.

H2. Partisans who support the incumbent party are relatively less susceptible to knowledge of the threats than opposition groups and independents.

0.1.2. Do Party Reputations Matter?

In addition to the partisan effects, this study suggests two types of threats that are relevant to party reputations. Table 2 shows the types of threats based on the long-term party reputation.

First, several threats can be relevant to the reputation of parties. These *partisan-relevant* or *reputation-relevant* threatening issues are positional in nature due to its historical connotation attached to the issue, and divide the citizenry based on political ideology (De Sio &

Table 2: Sources of Political Knowledge Based on Party Competence

Types of Threats	
Reputation-relevant Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threats are relevant to party competence - Citizens are divided based on retrospective reputation of parties on the threatening issue - Parties either positively dominate the issue or lack a reputation - Accompanied with a long-term party competition over the issue
General Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threats are not relevant to party competence - Popular among electorates (Partisan division does not exist) - All parties are expected to be good at solving regardless of ideology

Weber, 2014). Large literature in political science has been argued that parties own specific issues or have reputation over issues (Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003), and salience of such issues matters at the individual-level decision-making process (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008). The theory of issue ownership of parties asserts that political parties can be known for handling specific issues better than competitors. An example can be found from the conservative party in U.S. that is known for better at handling tax issues and government spending, and the leftist party is better at solving social welfare issues and cultural diversification. These ownerships of parties are based on the reputations of parties that are established for a long time at handling controversies and solving it in a way that distinguish them from competitors. Pertinence of issues matters as well, because the salience of it fluctuates over time. As such, parties sometimes selectively put emphasis on their owned issues that are perceived salient to the parties (Budge, 2015) to give cues to electorates, and the voter-level salience conditions the political choice of electorates (Rabinowitz, Prothro, & Jacoby, 1982). Either ways, both the salience and party reputation are essential for understanding political attitudes of electorates.

As previously discussed, parties' issue competence is deeply rooted in the past of par-

ties. Parties acquire such reputations over time by successfully resolving the grievances. It can be used as a tool to attack the opposition parties if the opposition parties lack such reputations. The past of parties is obviously easy to 'see' for citizens as the parties had already proven it throughout the history. Consequently, the initial attitudes of citizens largely anchor on the past of parties and the reputation of parties handling the issues, plus their partisanship. It gets complicated when it comes to evaluate the incumbent parties, because the evaluation involves the prospect of people on the future government policies. Several factors can complicate the government evaluation. First, the incumbent parties have an accountability. Incumbent parties take a responsibility for their performance in the office, and opposition parties mostly focus on holding the government accountable (Green & Jennings, 2012). Second, politically biased reasoning of voters can blur this accountability of incumbent parties. Due to the partisan based bias, it is possible that the initial level of support of people who support the incumbent party can be higher than independents and opposition party supporters, even if the threatening events are present. If the incumbent party is known as good at handling the threats, citizens may rely on the positively motivated, prospective evaluation of the incumbent party. The positively motivated prospective evaluation of citizens can offset the impulse to negatively evaluate the government when the intensity of threat increases. This would be more influential on people who are already positively biased toward the incumbent party, and eventually, the impulse to negatively evaluate the government cancels out. People who support the opposition government will be still harsh on the incumbent government because of their partisanship, even if the incumbent government holds reputation over the threats. Eventually, the positive prospect does not offset the impulse to hold the incumbent party accountable.

There is also a possibility that opposition parties mobilize the citizens on incompetence of the current government. With enough reasons of individuals to feel anxious about the growing level of threats, it is possible that lack of competence of government lead partisans




Figure 3: Extended Model of Individual Political Choices

to deviate their political routine and negatively evaluate the government.

Figure 3 extends the general model introduced above, by considering the presence of valence and positional threats and party competence. There are four possible conditions based on types of threatening events and the competence of incumbent party. Condition A refers to the situation where the present threat is relevant to positional issues and the incumbent party has a positive reputation over handling the threats. If positional threats exist, electorates will be driven by a directional emotion toward the incumbent party that is attached to the history of incumbent party and expect it to solve the problem again. This expectation of electorates that is based on party reputation mitigates the individual motivation of pursuing accurate information about responsibility of the government. As a result, partisan-ins are more likely to be either neutral or even slightly positive on evaluating government performance. Contrarily to partisan-ins, people who do not have a psychological

attachment to the incumbent government (partisan-outs) pursue the accurate motivation. Incumbent party's reputation might have off-setting effects on impulse of electorates seeking accurate information, but the effects of reputation is not sufficient to overcome personal impulse. Eventually, partisan-outs will negatively evaluate the government to demonstrate their disagreement. Condition B explains a situation where the incumbent government has a long-term history of worsening the situation, or citizens are aware of the negative reputation of the incumbent party. In this case, electorates are more likely to punish the government due to the incompetence of the government. Even the partisan-ins negatively evaluate the incumbent government, because partisan-based bias will not hinder their needs for accurate information. Partisan-outs have reasons to harshly evaluate the government for grievances caused by the threats. Due to this, the evaluation of partisan-outs for the incumbent government that is incapable of solving the issue will be negative for opposition electorates. Condition C describes a scenario where the present threats generate demands for solutions from all parties. These valence threats do not create a political division among electorates. Parties generally fail to have an advantage over other parties at handling the valence issues, because electorates always want the government to be successful at handling it regardless of ideologies or partisan-driven sentiments. Due to this, partisan-based bias has less impacts on concerned individuals pursuing accurate information. As a result, both partisan-ins and -outs will negatively evaluate the incumbent government. Condition D shows a situation where threats do not affect political decision-making process of electorates. When there are no threats for electorates to worry about, electorates will return to their preconditioned belief system to get information. Instead of acquiring accurate information, it is more likely the partisans rely on directional motivation and gather information that is given by parties or the group identification that they are attached to. This will make partisan-ins be positively biased when evaluating the government performance. Partisan-outs will be either negative or positive about the evaluation, as a variety of factors drive their attitudes. On average,

partisan-outs will have neutral attitudes when it comes to evaluating the government.

The discussion on party reputation leads to the third hypothesis. Since citizens evaluate the incumbent government based on the previous behavior of parties that hold the office, the party reputation over the threat can condition the direction of government evaluation. If the incumbent party has proved to be incompetent in dealing with the threatening issues at hand, it is possible that citizens across all partisan groups more likely to harshly punish the incumbent government, and vice versa. Having a positive reputation over handling the threats will positively bias the citizens, which will lessen the probability of harsh evaluation. This leads to the third hypothesis.

H3. If the incumbent party has a reputation of incompetence at handling threats, citizens who know about this reputation are more likely to harshly evaluate the government.

There are threats that do not generate the partisan bias. These *general* threats, which is laid out in Table 2, are usually not associated with partisan bias of electorates and do not generate directional emotions of electorates nor incur commitment of party loyalties. These issues are categorized by De Sio and Weber (2014) as valence issues (see also Stokes (1963)), issues that receive wider support from citizens regardless of the party affiliation. For instance, better quality of life or economic stability would be more appealing to general audience than issues that generate ideological debates. In his article, De Sio (2010) points out that the valence issues in political arena can be illustrated as issues that require a “general agreement” (see page 3), which in turn expedites a party competition based purely upon the quality of performance. These valence issues are generally associated with the level of satisfaction of citizens, not necessary with neither ideological orientation nor historical background of party stance. If present threats are relevant to these valence issues, it means that parties are equally expected to be good at handling it. Instead of expecting a

specific party to be good at treating grievances generated by threats, electorates in general demand all parties to be better at redressing it. Consequently, at the individual level, salient valence threats are less likely to cause bias based on the partisanship, thus lowering the odds of motivated reasoning. The last hypothesis examines the impact of general threats on the government evaluation.

H4. If the intensity of threats that do not incur directional emotion of citizens increases, concerned citizens punish the government regardless of types of incumbent party.

Figure 4 depicts expectations of four possible scenarios based on the partisan effects and party reputation. The top two graphs of Figure 4 show expected evaluations of partisan-ins and -outs conditional on the personal level of information for pursuing accuracy motivation. When the political issues generated by threats are relevant to the party reputation, it is likely that partisan-ins are influenced by it. Particularly, if the incumbent government can solve such threatening events, this reputation reinforces the partisan effects. Even though individuals are concerned about the threats at present, incumbent party's reputation on handling such issues mitigates the effects of these concerns. As a result, the average evaluation of partisan-ins is either slightly negative or neutral. Note that the slope of partisan-ins of condition A ($\Delta_{A_{ins}}$) is almost close to zero. This implies that the impacts of personal impulse on government evaluation is mitigated by the party competence. Compared to partisan-ins, people who are free from partisanship negatively evaluate the government and are more likely to be affected by the level of personal impulse. The slope of partisan-outs ($\Delta_{A_{outs}}$) is larger than partisan-ins ($\Delta_{A_{ins}} < \Delta_{A_{outs}}$), because partisan-outs are susceptible to the personal impulse for information on who to blame. Also, the average evaluation level of partisan-ins is larger than partisan-outs ($\beta_{0A_{ins}} > \beta_{0A_{outs}}$), which reflects the pre-conditioned partisan bias that drives partisan-ins. When the incumbent government is not good at redressing the threats, both partisan-ins and -outs do not hesitate to punish the gov-




Figure 4: Conditional Effects of Personal Impulse on Government Evaluation, by Threat Types

ernment for not solving the problem. Incumbent party is already proved to be a bad solution for the threats at hand, due to the lack of a reputation. Consequently, partisan-ins who are concerned about the threat will reflect their concerns on the incompetent party. Similarly, partisan-outs who are concerned will be harsher on evaluating the incompetence of the government. Note that the slope of partisan-ins in condition B is negative, yet smaller than that of partisan-outs ($\Delta_{B_{ins}} < \Delta_{B_{outs}}$). The knowledge on the incompetence of incumbent party pushes partisan-outs to become harsher on showing their anxiety through the evaluation.

When it comes to the valence threats, impacts of specific party reputation are not expected to emerge. This implies that the dissatisfaction caused by upheavals of threatening events will purely guide both partisan-ins and -outs. However, several scholars had pointed out that even the individual macroeconomic perceptions can be blurred or colored by partisan bias (Evans & Andersen, 2006; Tilley, Garry, & Bold, 2008). Taking this consideration into account, it is possible that the expected outcome for condition C will look very similar to the condition A: a situation where party competence blurs partisan-ins' impulse for accuracy motivation. The only difference between condition A and C is that, it is the directional sentiment that drives the attitudes of individuals in the case of valence threats. Even if there exists a possible economic downturn, partisan loyalties substitute the perception of economic condition and make it more positive than it actually is. Yet, this does not mean that partisanship completely substitutes the individual ability of collecting relevant information. Even if there is an economic downturn, concerned partisan-ins have a lower level of susceptibility to the concern than people without partisanship. Contrarily to the scenarios where threats are present, if threatening events do not exist, the slopes of partisan-ins and partisan-outs become zero ($\Delta_{D_{ins}} = \Delta_{D_{outs}} = 0$) because electorates do not need to associate the concern to their political attitudes. Rather, they stick to the old habit of political behavior and rely on partisan-based group attachment. This makes them more likely to be driven by the directional motivation. Due to these partisan effects, the average level of

evaluation of partisan-ins is higher than partisan-outs ($\beta_{0D_{ins}} > \beta_{0D_{outs}}$).

Next chapter discusses the application of arguments laid out above in the East Asian politics and introduces political connotations of North Korean hostility in the region as a positional issue and economic crises as valence, general threats. A discussion on model specification for the empirical examination of these four hypotheses and operationalization is followed.

0.2. Partisan Evaluation in East Asia

Previous chapter discussed how the presence of threats and knowledge of electorates on party competence affect partisan effects of political decisions. To empirically examine these impacts, it is important to find adequate examples of political issues that electorates are either opinionated (positional issues) or generally agree on a single goal (valence issues). Also, a discussion on the operationalization of concepts such as the impulse of citizens to collect more politically accurate information is essential. This chapter starts with discussing relevance of cases, particularly the historical backgrounds of North Korean security issues being a politically positional issue in South Korea and Japan, and economic development and macroeconomic status being a political valence issue. The discussion includes a descriptive analysis of the ideological divisions of voters on these issues and track the trend over time to show that reputation of political parties creates a long-term, sustainable divisions among electorates based on the political orientation. It also focuses on the operationalization of key concepts like individual-level impulses to pursue information on party capability of dealing the issues. Measurements of factors like the level of security concern is crucial for conducting the empirical analysis of the proposed hypotheses. Therefore, this chapter focuses on a demonstration of these key concepts and discusses how the concepts are operationalized and measured. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how to properly fit the suggested model.

0.2.1. Examining Political Issues in East Asia: Economic and National Security Threats

As noted earlier, this study focuses on the East Asian politics to examine impacts of threats on public opinion and political attitudes. Two types of issues are selected as cases of va-

lence and positional threats: economic crises and national security issues. Regionally and historically, South Korea and Japan are exposed to various threats. Due to economic interdependence between South Korea and Japan, both countries had been exposed to global economic crises that are originated from the American banking crisis in 2007. In addition to that, Japan and South Korea separately suffered from domestic economic problems, such as the increasing unemployment rates and recession caused by unstable global financial environment. Besides the economic crises, both countries have regional security concerns due to the North Korean hostility since the end of the World War II. After the World War II, South and North Korea were involved with many military provocations after the Korean war. Also, North Korea was claimed to be responsible for abduction of Japanese people from 1960s. Due to these incidents, the North Korean issue creates a fundamental cleavage in South Korean society, and North Korea's hostile actions had impacted the Japanese politics in various ways. The regional security threats of North Korea generate political divisions among electorates based on the political ideology and party reputation. While the national security issue causes directional emotions of citizens, demands for better economic status are popular among people regardless of the ideological orientation. Following section explains how these two types of threats play a political role in South Korea and Japan and discusses why these cases can be classified as valence and positional threats.

Positional and Valence Issues in East Asia

In South Korea and Japan, security issues cause politically meaningful tensions. Especially in South Korea, the security tension created by North Korea is associated with various political issues, such as the issues of national identity and reunification. South Korean right-wing parties are known for their assertive stance against North Korean hostile actions, and they insist on putting more pressures on North Korea. South Korean left-wing parties,

on the other hand, are known for conciliatory policy on South-North Korean relationships (Moon, 2001). These variant political stances taken by South Korean parties largely stem from the different ideological standpoints on the nationality. One side of South Koreans try to embrace North Korea as a part of the country, while the other side does not welcome this idea. In most cases, South Korean conservative parties represent the people who do not see the North Korean government trustworthy, and the conservatives refuse to accept the idea of North Korea's inclusion in the nation unless they have the North Korean government goes through a meticulous scrutiny. Importantly, this resentment and aversion toward North Korea of conservatives is an important political driving force. According to the recent study on South Korean voters' behavior (N.-Y. Lee & Han-Wool, 2007), it is argued that one of the strongest factors that prevents South Korean conservative supporters from dealigning is the perception on the national identity. Conservatives rally around an understanding of national identity that excludes North Korea. This perception of conservatives has been reinforced by the multiple charges of collusion between the North Korean government and several South Korean liberal politicians. One of the well-known examples of this suspicion over liberal politicians is the conservative's critic on the Sunshine policy of liberal parties in late 1990s and early 2000s. Many package deals had been attempted by liberal administrations, such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) that is established in 1994 after the agreement between United States and North Korea to peacefully freeze the North Korean nuclear program and help them with obtaining better sources of energy. These attempts were led by the first democratic president Kim Young Sam, and the liberal president Kim Dae-Jung tried to complete the program and pushed forward as the strongest supporter of the program. One of the problems of these attempts by liberal politicians is that conservatives criticized the KEDO program for it not only helping North Korea with launching missile tests in 1998, but also in playing a role of buying time for the North Korean government to weaponize the nuclear power. This suspicion on the KEDO

financially supporting North Korea to maintain a nuclear program was redirected to the liberal politicians who advocated the program, and it eventually put heavy political pressures on the liberal party after multiple North Korean nuclear tests and long-range missile tests (Wit, 1999). Furthermore, the level of suspicion on liberal political figures had reached its peak in 2013 when the pro-North, far-left Unified Progressive party was dissolved due to the charge of collusion with North Korea. Series of investigation conducted by the special prosecutor unraveled that prominent liberal politicians had been connived to assist the North Korean invasion and overthrow the South Korean government in case of domestic conflicts between North and South Korea. This political incident impacted the conservative supporters by reinforcing their negative perception of liberal parties, particularly in a way that toughens the suspicion on any types of engagement between South and North Korea.

Like South Korean right-wing parties, Japanese conservative parties have been dominating the issues over dealing with security concerns as well as the territorial disputes on conflictual islands with neighboring countries to boost the sense of national identity (Horowitz & Kim, 2017). As a conservative party, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) holds the majority in the congress with an opposition of a left-wing party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), even though the majority was flipped in September 2009. The major issue division between LDP and DPJ largely comes from how the party handles the revision of constitutions (Easley, Kotani, & Mori, 2010) and how to handle the security threats of North Korea. As Easley et al. (2010) argue, DPJ tried to minimize the role of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and insisted on limiting its operation to mediating regional stability for the purposes of self-defense, following the original constitution of Japan written after the end of the Second World War. LDP had tried to repeal the constitution that sets limitations on the role of JSDF to face growing regional tensions of the North Korean provocation and conflicts with the mainland China. Another political issue is the missing

Japanese people who are illegally abducted by North Korea. Samuels (2010) compared the political impact of an abduction issue in South Korea and Japan and asserted that it is more politicized in Japan than it is in South Korea. Since the first incidence in 1977, numbers of Japanese had reported as missing and reeducated by North Korean agents to advocate the North Korean political ideology. As Samuels (2010) points out, this incidence did not get public attention until the families of abductees deliver their messages to the congress through the conservative politicians who wanted to impede the normalization of a relationship between Japan and North Korea. Since then, Japanese conservative parties represent the sympathizers of abducted Japanese, which gave them a leverage against DPJ on issues related to North Korea. As such, dealing with a foreign hostility might generate a political division in citizens in both South Korea and Japan due to the historical connotation attached to the issue as well as the sharp distinction that exists among parties.

The political impacts of economic issues are sensitive to the level of concerns on economic instability. As countries that heavily rely on export-oriented trade and financial market, global economic crises usually have huge impacts on the domestic stability and sustainability of South Korean and Japanese economy. As noted earlier, South Korea and Japan have been exposed to the global economic crises, such as the Asian monetary crisis in 1997 that is originated from the huge devaluation made in Thailand currency exchange rate. During this period, Japanese annual export rate had dropped from 13.9% to -0.6% from 1997 to 1998 (*Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010*, 2010), and the aftershock of the drop had remained until early 2000. Similarly, in South Korea, it is reported that the unemployment rate had skyrocketed from 2.6% in 1997 to 6.8% in 1998 (*Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2001*, 2001). The concern on economic crises has huge political impacts on performance evaluation of the incumbent party, as the citizens eventually look back how the incumbent government handled these issues. Due to the political responsibility caused by economic crises, it negatively impacts the approval ratings of the incumbent

government. Burden (2015) quantitatively examines the relationship between economic grievances and political support. Even if there is a possibility that multilevel government system of Japan obscures the clarity of economic responsibility (Anderson, 2006), Burden (2015) finds that there is a modest yet statistically significant negative association between major indicators of economic grievances and support for the prime minister, and eventually the incumbent party. Unlike the North Korean issues, it is unclear if there is any historical background that forms a long-term party reputation over handling the economic grievances, even though the left-wing parties can be possibly known for their focus on social welfare and issues on granting broader pensions. Even if so, economic grievances after the economic crisis might not be attached to the long-term, systematic political divisions because the negativity of the crises is meaningful regardless of the political orientations.

Perspective Attributes of Positional and Valence Issues

A preliminary overview is conducted to demonstrate a division among citizens based on their perception on the party reputation and ideological orientations. The initial check for the political division is done by pulling the survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 3 data set that is released in 2015 (*The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems*, 2015). The third module of CSES has a set of questionnaires covering topics related to a party competence and salient issues that serves the purpose of this section well. A same or a similar set of questionnaires was asked cross-nationally, and the surveys asked the respondents about their perceptions on the most important political issues the nation is facing and the parties that can handle the issues the best. Tables 3 and 4 show the responses on the most important political issues in the nation from the Japanese survey that is collected in 2007. Among various economic topics, the pension is the most popular issue for Japanese citizens, followed by the employment and tax. Among

the security issues, three topics stood among others: the issue of constitutional revision, foreign affairs, and the general defense issues. In addition to the economic and security issues, Table 3 indicates that Japanese citizens in 2007 paid their attention on issues related to political reform, such as corrupt politicians and the quality of government performance.

It is worth to note that the Japanese party competence of major economic topics are equally distributed along the major parties, while the perception on security competence relatively depends on the context of the issue. Table 4 shows the perception of Japanese respondents in 2007 on which party is the best for handling the issue. Concerns on the pension and social welfare are, as Table 4 shows, largely leaning toward the liberal party DPJ. Approximately 67% of 140 respondents thought that DPJ is better at solving the social problems related to the pension. Perception on the welfare issue looks very similar to the responses on the pension (65% for DPJ). This maybe the case because both the pension and welfare issues are attached to the leftist's ideology that is dominated by DPJ. Scholars suggested that the loss of LDP in 2009 election was due to the failure of LDP subsidizing their traditional clientelistic network from 2005 to 2008 (Reed, Scheiner, & Thies, 2012; McElwain, 2012; Noble, 2010). LDP has largely been dependent on clientelistic aid program that compensate local agricultural community. This particularistic policy lost its power over programmatic demands due to aging Japanese society and growing unemployment rate after the global economic crisis, the issues that LDP has failed to properly redress (Noble, 2010). Therefore, DPJ took strong opposing stance over nationalized economic topics, such as unemployment issues (75.5%), pension (67,1%) and welfare (65.2%). Other than these, issues on better living standards (untroubled living conditions, aging society, public safety) were evenly divided.

Contrary to the economic issues, the perspectives on security issues are largely divided

Table 3: Most Important Issues, Japan (2007)

Issue Names	Type	Frequency	Percent
Employment issues	Economic Issues	80	7.8
Pension	Economic Issues	220	21.5
Tax	Economic Issues	71	6.9
Economic Stimulus Package	Economic Issues	15	1.5
Economic Issues	Economic Issues	23	2.3
Untroubled Living Conditions	Economic Issues	19	1.9
Welfare	Economic Issues	36	3.5
Aging Society	Economic Issues	27	2.6
Public Safety	Economic Issues	16	1.6
Constitutional Revision	Security Issues	86	8.4
Foreign Affairs	Security Issues	75	7.3
War in Iraq	Security Issues	8	0.8
Abduction by North Korean Agents	Security Issues	24	2.3
Defense	Security Issues	55	5.4
Administrative reform	Political Reform	37	3.6
Evaluation of Minister	Political Reform	33	3.2
Change of Government	Political Reform	12	1.2
Corruption	Political Reform	102	10.0
Political Reform	Political Reform	7	0.7
Public Work	Political Reform	1	0.1
Agriculture	Others	4	0.4
Eductation	Others	33	3.2
Birth Dearth	Others	20	2.0
Environmental Issues	Others	18	1.8
Total		1,022	100%

Table 4: Party Competence In Japan, 2007

Economic Issues						
Issue Names	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)		Political Parties Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Employment issues	12	24.5%	37	75.5%	49	100.0%
Pension	46	32.9%	94	67.1%	140	100.0%
Economic stimulus package	5	62.5%	3	37.5%	8	100.0%
Economic issues	12	60.0%	8	40.0%	20	100.0%
Untroubled living conditions	5	55.6%	4	44.4%	9	100.0%
Welfare	8	34.8%	15	65.2%	23	100.0%
Aging society	11	55.0%	9	45.0%	20	100.0%
Public safety	6	54.5%	5	45.5%	11	100.0%
Total	105	37.5%	175	62.5%	280	100.0%

Security Issues						
Issue Names	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)		Political Parties Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Constitutional revision	13	29.5%	31	70.5%	44	100.0%
Foreign affairs	39	79.6%	10	20.4%	49	100.0%
War in Iraq	2	50.0%	2	50.0%	4	100.0%
Abduction by North Korean agents	16	88.9%	2	11.1%	18	100.0%
Defense	21	67.7%	10	32.3%	31	100.0%
Total	91	62.3%	55	37.7%	146	100.0%

based on parties. In particular, it seems that several issues are dominated by the conservative party (LDP) with few exceptions. If the issues involve with the general defense and North Korea, large number of respondents say the LDP is the better option than DPJ. Almost 89% of respondents said LDP is better at handling the abduction of Japanese by North Korean agents, while only 11% of people preferred DPJ. As noted earlier, this is because the conservative politicians took a political leverage against DPJ by representing sympathy for the families of abductees. As such, the reputation that had accumulated over 30 years gave the LDP a distinct advantage over DPJ. General foreign affairs are also dominated by LDP, as approximately 80% of respondents said LDP is preferred over DPJ.

South Korean respondents had shown a similar pattern in 2008. In 2008, the issue that most respondents found important was the economic problem, followed by the issues on the social equality and government policy. Table 5 shows how the views are allocated along the

Table 5: Most Important Political Issues In South Korea, 2008

Issue Names	No.	%
Economy	260	34.0%
Political Justice	97	12.7%
Party Competition	134	17.5%
Political Corruption	63	8.2%
Social Equality and Government Policy	160	20.9%
Diplomacy and North Korean issues	51	6.7%
Total	765	100.0%

types of issues. In the 2008 CSES survey, 34% of South Korean respondents said that issues such as rising prices, better living standards, unemployment, and economic stability is the most important issue. Second largest category was the social stability and equality as well as the general policy issues, which include issues related to social instability, polarization, regional disparity, and welfare programs. More than 20% of respondents said that the issues related to social stability and equality are the most important political issues that the nation faces in 2008. Approximately 7% of respondents thought that the diplomatic issues including the North-South relationship is the most important issue that the country faces in 2008.

Table 6: Party Competence In South Korea, 2008

Economic Issues							
polbroad	Parties						
	United Democratic Party		Grand National Party		Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Economic Recovery and Development	20	15.6%	108	84.4%	128	100.0%	
Improving Living Standard	16	30.8%	36	69.2%	52	100.0%	
Social Welfare and Equality	3	30.0%	7	70.0%	10	100.0%	
National Security and Diplomacy	6	16.7%	30	83.3%	36	100.0%	
Total	45	19.9%	181	80.1%	226	100.0%	

Table 6 shows the party reputation on handling the economic and security issues. It seems that the conservative Grand National Party tends to dominate the general economic

concerns. On the first row of the Table 6, approximately 84% of respondents said that the Grand National Party is better at resolving economic problems, problems that are related to economic stability, recovery, and development. This trend is due to the power transition from the liberal president Roh Moo-Hyun to conservative president Lee Myung-Bak in 2008. From late 1990s to 2007, the leftist party stayed in the office. During this period, an issue of social inequality and a huge income gap caused by the bailout program of IMF had remained unsolved. As a leader of the opposition party, Lee Myung-Bak paid great efforts on economic growth and development to solve the economic grievances caused by financial crises. As the survey response is collected right after the presidential election that was held in December 2007, it is possible that Lee's presidential campaign positively impacts the perceptions on Lee's conservative Grand National party. Taking a closer look at other economic issues, such as the issues on improving living standard of people, it seems that people have not given up hope for the liberal United Democratic party. Approximately 31% respondents said that the liberal party is better than the conservative party solving the issues related to income disparity, stabilization of ordinary people's living, and tax burdens. Moreover, issues related to the social welfare and equality, such as polarization, welfare program, and problems of educational and medical disparity are relatively evenly distributed across parties. Again, given the fact that this survey was conducted shortly after the political transition from the liberal to conservative administration, the numbers in the table might reflect feelings that is biased toward the newly elected administration. Despite this bias, it is worth to note that the proportion of people that favors the liberal party over issues related to improving living standards and social equality exceeds the overall support for the United Democratic party (19.9%). Moving on to the positional issue, there is a clear distinction between liberal and conservative parties. For the issues on national security and diplomatic concerns, such as issues of national reunification, nuclear problems, and general diplomatic relations, more than 83% of respondents said that Grand National party has the

best solution to it.

It is important to examine if these patterns sustain over time. The patterns demonstrated above vary a bit by when the surveys are conducted, as the South Korean case had shown. To demonstrate the distribution of electorates on these two different issue domains, responses of electorates on questions about the government expenditures are examined. It is expected to see the patterns where popularity of valence issue (economic security) is highly skewed, while the popularity of positional issue (national security) is evenly distributed. For the examinations, survey questionnaires are retrieved from Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) (Kim, 2003) and Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS) (Tanika, Iwai, Nitta, & Sato, 2000). These two survey data sets asked respondents if the society is spending enough resources on improving quality of certain issue areas, such as the public welfare, national defense system, subsidizing re-employment programs, and public infrastructures. Among these various issue dimensions, questions on the national security issues and economic welfare of citizens are selected. Table 7 demonstrates how the Japanese and South Korean citizens are opinionated on two issue dimensions.

Political Issues ^a	Japan			South Korea		
	Too Much	About Right	Too Little	Too Much	About Right	Too Little
2000						
National Security	16.4%	51.7%	32%	-	-	-
Social Security and Pensions	4%	26.5%	69.5%	-	-	-
Employment Supporting Programs	3.7%	25.7%	70.6%	-	-	-
2003						
National Security	15.2%	45.3%	40%	33.6%	50.7%	15.7%
Social Security and Pensions ^b	4%	21.8%	74.2%	1.9%	21.6%	76.4%
Employment Supporting Programs	2.6%	17.8%	79.6%	-	-	-
2006						
National Security	13.8%	45.6%	40.6%	-	-	-
Social Security and Pensions	3.22%	18.5%	78.3%	-	-	-
Employment Supporting Programs	4.73%	30.2%	65.1%	-	-	-

^aResults are based on valid observations

^bGovernment spending on social welfare in South Korea

Table 7: Public Opinion on Government Expenditure, Japan and South Korea

According to the left-hand side of Table 7, it seems that the public opinion of Japanese electorates is almost equally divided over national security spending. More than 51% of respondents thought in 2000 that the government spent enough resources on national security. Contrast to this, issues on pensions and subsidizing employment are popular among electorates. This trend has been maintained from 2003 to 2006, and popularity of government spending on social security and re-employment programs had remained above 70% for four years. Similar patterns are observed in South Korea. On the right side of the Table 7, more than 76% of South Koreans thought that the government is not spending enough on social welfare in 2003. Respondents were asked about increasing social expenditure to improve quality of life, and most respondents found South Koreans are not putting enough efforts on social welfare (76%) and improving nation's health (65%). Unlike improving welfare and living standard, few had responded that the government needs to spend more on national security and defense (16%). More than 50% of respondents wanted to maintain the current level of spending on defense. The disparity in regards to the government expenditures indicates that citizens in Japan and South Korea want their governments to more focus on the improvement of living standards and the stabilization of job market, and they are largely indifferent to the national security issues.

Political ideology of respondents matches these patterns. Electorates are divided based on ideology over national defense spending, and conservatives, in particular, are more likely to support national security issues in South Korea and Japan. On the other hand, most electorates regardless of their ideology had supported spending on social welfare and subsidizing employment program. In 2000, most Japanese conservatives said that the government needs to spend more on national security (30%) while only 21.6% of liberals had replied so. Relative to the ideological division on national security issue, the gap on social security and pensions was not big. Approximately 27.2% of conservatives said that the government needs to spend more on pensions, and 25.2% of liberal had agreed on this. Both

conservatives and liberals responded that the government needs to more spend on welfare programs. Also, 27% of Japanese conservatives and 24% liberals preferred more spending on re-employment programs. Overall, it seems that only the national security issue has an ideological division that slightly leaning toward conservatism, and economic welfare issues are generally popular for both liberals and conservatives. Also in 2006, 28.4% Japanese conservatives favored more spending on national defense, while 20.3% of liberals supported it. While the ideological gap between conservative and liberal respondents on national security is approximately 8%, only a marginal ideological gap was observed in social welfare issues. In 2006, both liberals and conservatives were equally distributed over issues of social security and pensions (25.9% vs. 22.3%) and employment programs (25.3% vs. 22.6%). The gap between liberals and conservatives on economic security did not exceed 3% point.

In South Korea, the gap between liberals and conservatives on national defense looks more crystal clear. Approximately 28.5% of liberals responded that South Koreans need to spend more on improving national defense system, while more than 50% of South Korean conservatives favored it. The gap between liberals and conservatives on national security issue is almost 21.5%, which means that there exists a partisan gap on this issue that favors conservatism.

Overall, in both South Korea and Japan, issues related to economic performance and dealing with national security threats are different in terms of popularity and how it relates to the political ideology of citizens. Better economic performance of government is widely favored by electorates regardless of their ideological backgrounds (valence issue), while concerns on handling national security issue divides electorates based on their political ideology (positional issue). In general, conservative respondents are more likely to favor government spending on national defense, while liberals are either indifferent or dislike it.

0.2.2. Case Selection

In the earlier chapter, four hypotheses regarding impacts of threats and government reputation on evaluative attitudes of citizens are discussed. This section focuses on how the empirical examinations of these four hypotheses will be conducted. As explained above, South Korea and Japan have two major parties that are divided over ideology and political issues, particularly on dealing with national security concerns caused by North Korea. Both South Korean and Japanese leftist parties are known for being reluctant to take resolute actions against the provocation of North Korea, and conservative parties are known for their unbending attitudes toward North Korea. Unlike the national security issues posed by North Korea, no political party owns an advantage over the quality of economic performance. Examination of hypotheses needs to consider these reputations of administration as well as the types of threats. Keeping these conditions in mind, this section focuses on the case selection process and discusses the measurements for conducting hypotheses testing in the context of South Korean and Japanese politics. The primary sources for testing hypotheses is the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) that were conducted from 2000 to 2012, and the Japanese Nation-wide Longitudinal Survey Study on Voting Behavior in an Age of Political Change (JES IV Research Project, 2016) that ranges from 2007 to 2011 conducted on 493 individuals over 4 different time periods (2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011). The Japanese survey data is a panel study that covers cases where both types of administration were in office, and I adopt a multilevel analysis using year-level and individual-level predictors. For South Korean case study, a general model is examined over different conditions to verify expectations assigned for the conditions using the same questionnaire over cases.

North Korean Hostility and Global Financial Crisis in 2007

To examine the impacts of national security tension on government evaluation, the North Korean provocations in South Korea and Japan are selected as a case of positional threats. Particularly, cases where the level of North Korean threat is at its highest level are selected and compared based on the ideological orientations of incumbent parties. This section first discusses how the level of hostility is measured, and then move to the discussion of each case for the examination.

Table 8 shows hostile actions taken by the North Korean government that specifically target South Korea and Japan from 1993 to 2017. All events are selected from BBC (2018) country profile of North Korea. As Table 8 shows, the North Korean provocation in 1990s had mostly focused on South Korea due to the technological shortage. The North Korean government at that period of time did not have a nuclear technology, so the incidents caused by North Korea were mostly concentrated nearby the border lines between North and South Korea. However, the North Korean government later acquired technology in building ballistic missiles that can pose threats to neighboring countries. North Korea had launched several ballistic missiles in 1993 and 1998, and one of the long-range missiles launched within North Korean territory flew over the sea and reached close to the Japanese territory. It caused domestic tensions in Japan due to the possibility of Japan being a target of North Korean military operation. From early 2000s, the scale of North Korean threats had enlarged enough to become potential threats to all neighboring countries. After the withdrawal from the Non-proliferation treaty in 2003, the North Korean government started developing its own nuclear program. The North Korean government conducted their first nuclear test in 2006, and they kept putting their efforts on minimizing nuclear warheads. The nuclear fear of North Korea had amplified with the long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles that can mount minimized nuclear warheads. These actions had increased the level

of regional tensions over time and put both South Korea and Japan in a great danger.




Figure 5: Physical Threats Posed by DPRK to South Korea and Japan (1979-2017)

Additionally, Figure 5 shows changes in the level of North Korean provocation that is based on the data retrieved from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) project (Leetaru & Schrod, 2013). The dotted vertical lines in the graphs indicate the time period that survey data sets are covering in both countries. GDELT project focuses on automatically updating world events of various actors, such as governments, groups or organizations with specific goals and attributes, that are actively involved with incidents and events on daily basis, by analyzing verbal usage of worldwide mass media that covers not only English-based channel but also the translation of more than 60 foreign languages. GDELT project categorizes actions taken by actors by adopting the CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) (Gerner, Schrod, Yilmaz, & Abu-Jabr, 2002) twenty verbal actions codes. Among these action codes, any types of military actions targeting South Korea and Japan are adopted to count frequencies of such actions. Specifically, root verbal code numbers 15 ('Exhibit Military Posture'), 19 ('Fight'), and 20 ('Engage in Unconventional Mass Violence') are used. These root event codes include hostile actions of North

Table 8: Major Regional Crises Caused By North Korea^a

Date	Hostile Actions
1993	North Korea fired its first Rodong ballistic missile
1996. 9.	A North Korean submarine dispatched and 26 North Korean soldiers on board killed 17 South Korean civilians
1998. 8.	Launched a long-range rocket that flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean
2002. 6.	North and South Korean naval vessels engaged a gun battle, thirty North Korean and four South Korean sailors are killed
2003. 1.	North Korea withdrew from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
2006. 7.	Fired seven missiles including long-range Taepodong-2
2006. 10.	Launched its first nuclear weapon test
2009. 4.	Test fired a long-range rocket that mounts a communication satellite
2009. 5.	Second underground nuclear test conducted
2010. 3.	A North Korean naval vessel sank South Korean warship Cheonan
2012. 4.	Launched allegedly another satellite rocket
2012. 12.	Successfully launched a satellite-mounted long-range rocket, which can be converted into a intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile
2014. 3.	Fired two medium-range Rodong missiles
2016. 1.	North Korean government announced its first hydrogen-bomb test
2017. 7.	Another long-range ballistic missile is test-fired, which potentially reaches Alaska

^a Events selected from BBC North Korea Profile

Korea showing their willingness to fight and use of force (CAMEO 152), mobilization of armed forces (CAMEO 152), actual use of conventional forces (CAMEO 190), combats using light arms (CAMEO 193), and any kinds of use of unconventional weapons of mass destruction (CAMEO 20). The frequency of each action recorded in the GDELT world data set is pulled out and added to get the total number of events. Proportions of the cases that North Korea specifically targeting either South Korea or Japan are then calculated to measure the relative intensity of hostility.

The level of hostility shown in Figure 5 is ordered by a rank to select cases for testing the first and second hypotheses. I argued earlier that, when the national security issue is salient and the ideology of incumbent party is conservative, it is more likely that partisan bias upholds for partisan-ins (conservatives) and neutralizes the individual impulse for seeking accurate information involved with responsibility of the government. Their knowledge in reputation of conservative parties solving the issue - taking a firm standing to North for wrongdoings or revising the constitutions to activate overseas operation of JSDF - strengthens the loyalty of partisan-ins to the government. In 2006, the prime minister Koizumi Junichiro of Japanese conservative majority party (LDP) had held the congress until the other conservative candidate Yasuo Hukuda succeeded the congress in 2007. During the succession, the level of threats posed by North Korea targeting Japan reached a high level due to the launch of Taepodong-2 and other long-range missiles that can reach Japanese territory. Similar to Japan, South Korea was undergoing threats from North Korea in a various way. In 2008, the South Korean conservative party leader Lee Myung-bak was elected and stayed in the office until early 2013. In 2010, a South Korean naval vessel was sunk by a torpedo, and the North Korean submarine was allegedly responsible for this assault. The level of military tension between both Koreas had skyrocketed after the South Korean navy lost almost 46 seamen as a result of this hostile incident. A survey that was conducted in 2009 in South Korea (Kim, 2009) when the conservative Lee administration

was still in the office may reflect the high level of tension created by the North Korean hostility while having a conservative incumbent government.

To examine the second condition, cases with a high level of North Korean hostility and liberal incumbent governments are selected. From 2009, the Japanese liberal party DPJ acquired its status as a ruling party of the House of Representatives after liberal candidate Yuko Hatoyama succeeded the office from conservative prime minister Taro Aso. While the liberal party for the second time in Japanese political history became the majority party in the congress, North Korea increased the level of its hostility in the region by launching a science satellite that is mounted in a rocket using the same technology that North Korea built their long-range ballistic missiles. Unlike the previous failures, this technological advancement of North Korea implied a possibility of missiles physically hitting the Japanese territory. The second underground nuclear test after the launch of long-range rockets increased the level of alarm in Japan, due to a possibility of rockets flying with a nuclear warhead instead of a satellite. The Japanese panel survey data was conducted while the liberal party continues its role as a majority party in the congress, and it is adopted for this research. For the South Korean case study, a survey that is conducted in 2003 is adopted. In January 2003, North Korea declared that she will withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty that they were in part since 1985. For more than 30 years after North Korea first joined the nonproliferation regime, the North Korean government and neighboring countries kept negotiating over how to permanently and irreversibly freeze the North Korean nuclear program that North Korea had yearned for. Despite the long-time regional efforts, North Korea secretly had their hands on ballistic missiles and reprocessed uranium that they had collected from nuclear reactors. Despite the regional efforts through series of six-party talks and bilateral talks, North Korea declared that they are stepping out of the nonproliferation treaty in 2003. At that time, the liberal South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun had succeeded the government from previous liberal leader Kim Dae-jung. The conciliatory

deals made by the precedent liberal government such as the ‘Sunshine policy’ and the aid programs for building nuclear reactors through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) were inherited from president Kim Dae-jung to Roh Moo-hyun. Due to this continuation in political stance of liberal government, it is possible that growing tension created by North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT influences liberal supporters.

The third condition is about the impacts of valence threats on partisan effects. This study adopts economic crises in South Korea and Japan as cases to examine the impacts of financial grievances on the government support. To measure the level of macroeconomic economic hardship, the misery index and the GDP growth rate are used. The misery index is calculated by using the total unemployment rate and the inflation rate (consumer price). These indicators are retrieved from the World Bank data bank (World Bank, 2018).



Figure 6: Financial Crisis in Japan and South Korea (1990-2017)

Figure 6 shows the level of misery index and GDP per capita growth from 1990 to 2017. The time periods that surveys in both countries cover are marked in the graphs. The South Korean general social survey covers from 2003 to 2012 (dotted lines), and the Japanese panel survey ranges from 2007 to 2011 (dotdash lines). As the graph shows, the overall

rate of economic grievances of South Korea had hit its highest level after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Unlike Japan, South Korea suffered harder from the crisis, and had to rely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) emergency bailout programs for reconstruction of the economic structure. Until President Kim Dae-jung declared that South Korea cleared most major debts in 1999, the South Korean economy underwent hardship due to high inflation and unemployment rates caused by a rapid depression. After the country escaped the bailout program of IMF in 1999, it regained the economic stability in general until late 2010s with several exceptional cases. The global plummet in an economic growth had affected the economic growth rates of South Korea and Japan in 2008. This global financial crisis in 2007 is originated from the United States real estate banking crisis, and it had put the economy of South Korea and Japan in a recession. The annual percentage changes of consumer price in South Korea were increased by 2% from 2007 to 2008, and the unemployment rate had slowly moved up due to the recession. In Japan, the impact of global financial crisis in 2007 was mostly concentrated on the growth rate. Sato et al. (2009) argues that the financial crisis in 2008 did not do a fundamental damage to the Japanese domestic economy. Unlike the crisis in 1990s when Japan had faced economic instability caused by the domestic housing bubble, the 2008 global crisis caused exogenous harmful effects mostly contained in the export-oriented sectors that eventually harmed the GDP growth rate and the stock market (Kawai & Takagi, 2011). As Figure 6 shows, the GDP per capita had plummeted around 2007 and 2008 in both countries. This implies that financial crisis not only had impacts on domestic consumers but also on the global competitiveness of both countries. To examine its impacts on government evaluation, this study uses survey data that are collected in mid-2008. More specifically, South Korean case study adopts the two cases based on the administration type where the government faced the highest level of misery index. Japanese case uses the panel data sets by adopting the GDP growth rate and personal-level perception on economic status as primary explanatory variables. Using

these survey data sets will reflect the public opinion when the level of economic hardship is at its highest level in both countries.

Non-threatening Conditions

Finally, cases that are not involved with any prominent threats are selected for comparison. Since Japanese case is examined using a panel survey, control cases are selected only for the South Korean case studies. For the Japanese case, this is done by accounting for the mean-centered annual rate of international hostility. The year of 2005 for South Korea was peaceful and at ease in terms of security concerns. North Korea did not take any prominent hostile actions against South Korea in 2005. The South Korean ministry of unification was dispatched in June to negotiate a peaceful solution for the nuclear tension in the area, and this had promoted a further discussion on possibility of the second national summit between two Koreas. Even if South Korea was facing growing nuclear tension after North Korea declared their willingness to continue working on nuclear programs for self-defense, it was at the peaceful moment until North Korea launched test fires of missiles in July 2006. For financial crisis, two surveys are selected and compared to the cases where the level of financial instability is relatively high. Korean general social survey conducted in 2006 and 2012 are selected. The level of misery index was at a low level compared to other period of time during this periods, and the cases differ by the type of administration. In 2006, there was a liberal government of president Roh in South Korea. Amidst of a global financial crisis from 2007 to 2008, a presidential election in South Korea had changed the leadership from liberal to conservative party in 2008. The conservative party of South Korea continued to hold the office in the next presidential election after a conservative politician Park was elected as the next president in 2012. During this time, the level of economic hardship was relatively lower than usual. This study adopts these surveys to examine the partisan effects

on government evaluation when the level of threat is low.

0.2.3. Operationalization for Empirical Examination

Political attitudes toward incumbent governments

The dependent variable in this study is a government evaluation. In survey questionnaires, respondents are asked to evaluate the quality of performance of the government. If these questions are asked during or shortly after the crisis when the crisis gets its highest level of public attention, the evaluation potentially contains valuable information on how respondents politically react to the concerning issues. If the level of concern that the individual respondent having on the issue is high, it is more likely that the concerns will be reflected in the individual evaluation of incumbent government.

In Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), there are a variety of questionnaires asking respondents about their confidence and trust level in the incumbent government. The question that directly asks respondents about their level of evaluation on government performance is adopted. From its earliest survey data in 2003 to the most recent one in 2012, this question was asked as one of the core questionnaires and available across all KGSS survey data sets. The scale of responses ranges from 1 (“Very Poor”) to 5 (“Very Good”).

Japanese panel survey dataset (JES IV Research Project, 2016) continuously asked respondents their level of support for the current administration. For instance, in 2007 panel survey, respondents were asked to evaluate the Abe cabinet at the time of the Upper House election. Also in 2009, the survey asks respondents about the degree of their support for the Aso administration. The evaluation level ranges from 1 (“Hardly Support”) to 4 (“Very Supportive”). This question was asked to respondents over 4 time periods from 2007 to 2011 with the same ordinal scale. This is adopted as a dependent variable.

Personal Impulse for Accuracy Motivation

As noted earlier, it is important to discuss the conceptualization and implication of the factors that push individuals to alter their political attitudes. By using the term the impulse, it does not mean the alteration made in their political behavior, such as the changes in patterns of individual voting behavior or on which party the individuals cast their ballots. Rather, it is the instant decision that individual citizens reflect their disaffection and grievances they feel about the government performance. Particularly, this research focuses on the internal changes that are versatile and instantaneous in nature, mostly spurred in response to the fearful and unfamiliar national incidents. This study defines the political alteration as any switches in one's political attitudes that break the political routine of individuals attached to the self-identification due to perceptions on growing tensions. Political routine, in this case, means the attitudes of citizens that correspond to their political self-identification. As discussed in the previous chapter, self-identification creates a strong psychological bias that favors the attached political party, which results in the political favoritism in behavioral patterns. Unlike changes in voting behavior, alteration in attitudes that is measured in a form of levels of preferences can capture the dynamics in one's mind in timely manner.

Factors that push the shifts in minds of citizens are closely related to how individuals perceive the events. Any factors that increase the odds of individuals deviating their political routines are the individual impulses for political alteration. As discussed in the previous chapter, anxiety that people feel about a growing level of threats may push people to seek for accurate information. If the perceived reality based on the collected information disagrees their political routine, they eventually alter the attitudes. Due to this, it is important to carefully operationalize the personal impulse for pursuing the accurate information. It is previously discussed that the accurate information is the better quality of information about the responsibility of the incumbent government. Broadly speaking, the concern that people

have about threats that are not properly handled by the government is one of prominent driving forces for the political alteration. Furthermore, at the personal-level, there can be various factors that impact the anxiety level. For instance, if a country is going through a severe economic recession, individuals who have reasons to be concerned about the growing level of economic grievances will be more likely to feel anxious about the threat and will more pay attention to the government performance. It is also possible that general knowledge in political events and the level of exposure to the information gathering process can increase the odds of someone pursuing the accurate information.

Let us consider the types of impulses that increase the level of anxiety. Two major types of factors are discussed. First, there are general factors that are related to the preferences of individuals for being exposed to the information gathering process. These factors are not issue-oriented. Rather, it relies on how people build up their habit of collecting information. For instance, a frequent exposure to the information is likely to affect the odds of individuals gathering information on how the event develops and if the incumbent government mitigates the growing concern. Once the odds of being exposed to the factual information increases, it is more likely that the level of anxiety grows. Studies suggest the possibility of biased interpretation of the facts (Gaines et al., 2007; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Gaines et al. (2007) examined how the partisanship blurs a relationship between factual beliefs and the proper interpretation of the fact. Their model supports an explanation that, even if people gather the factual information, partisanship blocks the interpretation of the facts and makes it hard to form an opinion based on the factual belief. Even with this possibility, it is still possible that individuals with reasons to feel anxious about the surrounding environment, and it may push these concerned individuals to break the influence of partisanship and reveal their 'true' feelings about the incumbent government. As Gaines et al. (2007) point out, even if partisanship possibly blurs the interpretation, it does not completely eliminate the factual beliefs of the politically opinionated people. People with a habit getting exposed

to the various types of information still possibly gather the information that they can rely on when the uncertainty grows. Another possible factor is the individual level of political knowledge. A person with a high level of education is more likely to have a habit of gathering better quality of information, such as a habit of reading newspaper and books. If an individual has this kind of habitual routine, it is more likely that the individual exposes him/herself to the information that is critical to recall the government handling the growing level of uncertainty due to threatening events.

Second, there are issue-oriented factors. These factors are issue specific, meaning that they are associated with the individuals' contextual inclination of getting anxious about the growing level of threats. Relative to the general population, these people with the issue-oriented impulses have personal reasons to be concerned about the threats and are more likely to have willingness to learn about the facts. In the case of economic crises, people who are vulnerable to the job insecurity and economic decline would need better information about how the economic crises will affect their life. For instance, if one had lost his or her job prior to the crisis, and if the economic crisis is eminent, it is likely that the re-employment of these people will be jeopardized. Their concern for re-employment and growing concern on economic crisis can push these people to gather better quality of information, and eventually, they will consider breaking their political routine. An issue-oriented factor for the positional issue in East Asia is the level of concern for the North Korean threats in South Korea. Feelings of individuals about the issue that the level of tension grows might give individuals enough reasons to reconsider their political habit, such as keeping support for incumbent government.

To measure the level of general impulse, this study uses the mass media coverage of threats, such as watching television and reading newspapers. It has been reported by scholars that the mass media coverage of violence and brutality has distinctive emotional impacts on individuals (Slone, 2000). Experiments using media coverage of national security

threats such as a terrorism had revealed its psychological impacts on emotional status of individuals who did not experience such violence described in the news media. If citizens are exposed to the potential violence from the media that can generate national insecurity, it is likely these individuals become more attentive to the threats. South Korean general social survey asks respondents how often they gather information from the mass media. The questions on frequency of respondents reading newspapers is adopted for the hypotheses testing.

For Japanese case study, changes in the level of North Korean provocation are retrieved from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) project (Leetaru & Schrodtt, 2013). GDELT project automatically updates world events of various actors, such as governments, groups, and organizations with specific goals and attributes that are actively involved with incidents and events on daily basis, by analyzing verbal usage of worldwide mass media that covers English and sixty foreign languages based news feed. GDELT project categorizes actions taken by actors using the CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) (Gerner et al., 2002) verbal actions codes. Among these action codes, any types of military actions targeting Japan are adopted to count frequencies of such actions. The frequency of each action recorded in the GDELT world data is retrieved to get the total number of events. Proportions of the cases that North Korea specifically targeting Japan are then calculated to measure the relative intensity of North Korean hostile actions toward Japan.

Second factor measures the issue-relevant, personal susceptibility. This factor is largely dependent on personal susceptibility to the growing level of tension created by the threats. For the Korean cases, I use indicators on the level of hostility that respondents feel about North Korea as a measurement for threat perception which I assume related to one's emotional impulse. One of the core questionnaires of KGSS asks respondents about how they see the North Korean government: either as a foe or a friend. This variable is in ordinal

scale that ranges from 1 (“A Country to Support”) to 5 (“A Country to Fight Against”). This questionnaire is adopted as an issue-oriented factor that pushes individuals to feel anxious about the threats. Also, for the financial crisis, employment status of respondents is adopted as personal factors to have concerns about economy.

Party Affiliation and Partisanship

To measure the partisanship, all respondents are categorized based on their party affiliation. If a respondent supports the incumbent party when the survey is conducted, this individual is categorized as partisan-ins. Other respondents who do not politically support the incumbent party are labeled as partisan-outs. This implies that, if the incumbent party is liberal, partisan-ins will be the liberals, and the conservatives are sorted into the partisan-out group. Respondents who do not associate with any particular parties are categorized as independents. In Japanese case study, supporters of majority coalition are labeled as an in-group. People who attach themselves with the opposition coalition are grouped as partisan-outs. Also, people who support the parties that are in neither majority nor opposition coalition are grouped as the ‘other’ group. Questionnaires about party affiliation is available in all data sets. These variables are matched to the incumbent party and generate indicator variables.

Control Variables

Political ideology of respondents is adopted as a control variable, as it can affect the evaluative attitude of respondents. This variable is available in South Korean data set. Since the scale is ordered backwards in South Korea (1 refers to progressive), I convert the variable to make the highest value indicates how much the respondents are politically liberal. Other personal level of factors that might have impacts on evaluation of government are controlled

and examined as well. The gender of respondents, the level of household income, and the age are possibly influential on the evaluation of incumbent governments. These personal political attributes are included in the model as personal-level control factors. Models will control for these factors that can affect the government evaluation, and set these variables at their means for the marginal effects.

0.2.4. Model Specification

So far, operationalizations and measurements of response and explanatory variables are discussed. To examine the statistical association between the government evaluation and personal impulse to learn about facts and the partisan affiliation, this research adopts a general model and compares the results over different conditions. Attached below is a general model that is going to be examined.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Evaluation} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1\textit{Impulse} + \beta_2\textit{Copartisanship} + \beta_3\textit{Impulse} * \textit{Copartisanship} \\
 & + \textit{Controls} + \epsilon
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

As Equation 1 denotes, the government evaluation of electorates is examined as a function of a level of personal impulse for accurate information and the party affiliation, and the partisanship moderates the impact of impulse on the government evaluation.

For the South Korean case study, this study uses the ordinal logistic regression to test hypotheses. The model above includes an explicit interaction term of the personal level of impulse for being anxious about incidents and a partisan group variable. Since this model is examined with the ordinal logistic regression that is non-linear in nature, the improvements made by including an interaction term needs to be cross-checked with the model without

an interaction term (Karaca-Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012; Ai & Norton, 2003). Many scholars had pointed out a possible bias of a direct interpretation of the sign and statistical significance of the interaction term in non-linear models. Unlike the models with continuous dependent variables, interpretation as well as hypothesis testing of interaction terms in non-linear models is not straightforward because the meaning of estimated factors of interaction terms in non-linear models are not equivalent of the interaction effects of linear models. Even if the interaction term in ordinal logistics models is not significant, it does not mean that there are no conditional effects (Ai & Norton, 2003).¹ Due to this, it is often suggested to compare the models with and without an interaction term, or visually plot the predicted probabilities over the range of interest variables (Greene, 2010). Even though the model does not have an interaction term, the coefficient of independent variables in non-linear models can capture multiplicative magnitudes of its explanatory power. This study adopts this advice, and focuses on visually plotting the expected probability over a range of explanatory variables.

For the Japanese case study, a multilevel-analysis (n=493, N=4) using 4 waves of panel surveys from 2007 to 2011 is conducted (JES IV Research Project, 2016). The models fitted for the hypotheses testing include cross-level interaction terms to allow the models to account for the level specific variations. Specifically, the interaction terms are included to examine the conditional effects of year-level predictors on the individual-level factors. The equation 9 is a random intercept model with level-1 and level-2 predictors along with cross-level interaction terms. For the examination of security threat, the annual hostility of North

¹According to Ai and Norton (2003), the interaction effect of independent variables in a linear model is straightforward and can be tested with a single t-test. However, as Ai and Norton (2003) show, the interaction effect in non-linear models that use either the logistic or probit distributions does not have single element that can be tested with a statistical test. This implies that, even if the interaction term (say, $\beta_{12}x_1x_2$) is set to zero, its actual expected value does not need to be zero. A traditional hypothesis testing process based on the z-score and standard error of a coefficient can be misleading, as the software packages automatically test a single factor instead of all products of derivatives of the expected value of the dependent variable (e.g. $\beta_{12}\Phi'(\cdot)$ with two explanatory variables, instead of $\beta_{12}\Phi'(\cdot) + (\beta_1 + \beta_{12}x_2)(\beta_2 + \beta_{12}x_1)\Phi''(\cdot)$). For the mathematical exposition of this equation, see Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004)).

Korea is centered at the average hostility level that ranges from 2007 to 2011. Also, for the financial crisis, annual level of economic grievances such as the GDP per capita is centered at its means.² The variance reduction rates by adding the interaction predictors are tested against the original empty mean models (the models without any predictors, also known as an unconditional model) to verify the addition of these predictors makes any statistically significant improvements in reducing level-specific variances (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013).

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Level1 : } Support_{ti} = & \beta_{0t} + \beta_{1t}(Threat - \overline{Threat})_{ti} + \beta_{2t}Partisangroup_{ti} \quad (2) \\ & + \beta_{3t}Admintype_{ti} + \beta_{4t}Partisangroup_{ti} * Admintype_{ti} \\ & + \beta_{5t}Partisangroup_{ti} * (Threat - \overline{Threat})_{ti} + \epsilon_{ti} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Level2 : } \beta_{0t} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0i} \quad (3)$$

$$\beta_{1t} = \gamma_{10} \quad (4)$$

$$\beta_{2t} = \gamma_{20} \quad (5)$$

$$\beta_{3t} = \gamma_{30} \quad (6)$$

$$\beta_{4t} = \gamma_{40} \quad (7)$$

$$\beta_{5t} = \gamma_{50} \quad (8)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Composite : } Support_{ti} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}(Threat - \overline{Threat})_{ti} + \gamma_{20}Partisangroup_{ti} \quad (9) \\ & + \gamma_{30}Admintype_{ti} + \gamma_{40}Partisangroup_{ti} * Admintype_{ti} \\ & + \gamma_{50}Partisangroup_{ti} * (Threat - \overline{Threat})_{ti} + U_{0t} + \epsilon_{ti} \end{aligned}$$

Intraclass correlation by adding random effects in the model reports how much the inclusion of random effects contribute to the study. The empty models for the means of government support with a random intercept for individuals indicate that approximately 8.6% variance comes from the between year, while more than 90% of variance comes from the level-2 residual variance. This study adopts a model with a random intercept for the individuals because the addition of the random intercept for individuals significantly

²Using grand-mean-centering in multilevel analysis does not complicate the testing hypothesis. Rather, it helps a nuanced interpretation of the result by setting the intercept at a meaningful point (average). For detailed discussions, see Enders and Tofghi (2007).

improves the model fit ($\Delta - 2\loglikelihood(\Delta - 2LL) = 62.2$ with $\Delta df = 1$, $p < 0.01$) and examines the full models that include cross-level interaction terms between individual and year level predictors.

0.3. North Korean Provocation as Positional Issue in East Asian Politics

Previous chapters discussed operationalization of positional and valence issues in the East Asian political context. As noted above, North Korean provocation plays a role of continuous and explicit threats to national security concerns of South Korea and Japan, and parties in both countries had historical bases of taking distinctive stances over handling the issue. Consequently, parties obtain reputations over conflictual nature of solving North Korean threats, and the reputations they obtained were consistent for citizens to recognize parties' role based on retrospective party behavior. It was expected in the earlier chapter that the parties' reputation based on a long-term, historical context often mitigates the effects of grievances on attitudes of citizens toward incumbent governments, while the non-existence of such retrospective connotation of handling the issue would not prompt changes in ones' habitual routine. This chapter empirically examines the claims laid out in the previous chapters by using surveys conducted in South Korea and Japan after the occurrence of threatening events. In particular, the impacts of positional issues, specifically the North Korean threats in East Asian political context, are examined. The empirical examinations of impacts of North Korean hostility on attitudes of domestic electorates will be cross-checked with cases where the level of salience of such threats are at a relatively lower level. A discussion on its political implications is followed.

0.3.1. South Korean Case

The impact of threatening issues that divide citizens on parties' reputations over handling the threats were discussed in the previous chapter where a specific party is known substantially a long time for being better at solving the issue and represents very strong and

distinctive viewpoints over the issue. The North Korean threats in South Korea and Japan generate such strong and unique party bases for party elites as well as for citizens, as it is deeply associated with the national unification issue in South Korea and the issue of finding and bringing back Japanese abductees. Since the conservative governments were more assertive on handling such issues, it is likely that citizens retrospectively expect the incumbent conservative party will take a firmer and more decisive actions on the threat. Due to this, even if a person is concerned about the growing level of intensity, it is likely that the party reputation mitigates the impacts of concerns of individuals on their evaluative attitudes. I hypothesized in the previous chapter that the level of knowledge in threats will have limited impacts on the evaluation of the incumbent government, if the incumbent party is competent.




Figure 7: Government Support by Security Threat and Administration (South Korea, 2003-2012)

Figure 7 plots the average government support of partisan groups over 10 years from 2003 to 2012, based on the hostility level of North Korea measured by the GDELT data and the administration type in South Korea. Firstly, it is important to point out that the average level of hostile actions taken by North Korea is higher when there is a conservative regime in South Korea. The conservative administration has an average of 0.29 % (SD=0.058) of entire hostile actions targeting South Korea, while the liberal government has 0.16 % (SD=0.042) of the hostile actions. This relatively higher level of military tension between North Korea and the conservative administration indicates a strategic display of military actions of North Korea to coerce the conservative administration for the lack of complaisant manner. Secondly, in relation to this higher tension between North Korea and conservative regime, it is worth to note that all partisan groups more positively evaluate the conservative regime even if the level of tension increases. On the left-hand side of Figure 7, the average support level for the conservative administration increases as the level of threat increases. There is an u-shaped dip in government support once the threat exceeds the average level by 0.1%, and then it rapidly jumps across all three partisan groups. Compared to the conservative administration, Figure 7 shows that the support level for the liberal government slightly increases and plummets once the threat level increases. There is a bouncing pattern for the liberal administration when the hostility level is close to the average level. This may due to the rally-round-the-flag effects for the liberal government once the threat level is about to hit the average. During the period when the threats are lower than the average level of 10 years, the increase in the hostility level decreases the government support level in all three political groups. Given the lower level of threats toward the South Korean liberal administrations, decreasing pattern of support indicates a possibility of punishing behavior of citizens specifically for the liberal incumbent party.

An empirical examination is conducted by using selected survey data from 2003, 2009, and 2005. Surveys in 2003 and 2009 were conducted a month or several months after

Table 9: Impacts of Information on Government Evaluation (South Korea)

	Model I Incompetent (2003) Coef./Std.e	Model II Competent (2009) Coef./Std.e	Model III Control (2005) Coef./Std.e
Reading Newspapers	-0.361* (0.166)	-0.368* (0.144)	-0.0441 (0.192)
Hostility toward North Korea	-0.153* (0.0646)	0.0285 (0.0574)	-0.113 (0.0634)
Independents	-0.982*** (0.153)	-1.317*** (0.134)	-0.936*** (0.156)
Partisan-outs	-0.947*** (0.168)	-1.546*** (0.146)	-0.944*** (0.158)
School Year	-0.0635 (0.0538)	-0.0148 (0.0467)	-0.170*** (0.0446)
Political Ideology	-0.153** (0.0592)	0.178*** (0.0541)	-0.242*** (0.0590)
Prospect on Economy	-0.303*** (0.0555)	0.456*** (0.0623)	-0.483*** (0.0586)
Household Income	-0.0115 (0.0104)	-0.0135 (0.0113)	-0.0409** (0.0133)
Age	-0.000138 (0.00486)	0.0193*** (0.00422)	-0.00459 (0.00420)
Male=1	-0.280* (0.119)	-0.0485 (0.101)	0.0596 (0.105)
cut1	-4.935	0.281	-6.115
cut2	-2.883	2.016	-3.867
cut3	-1.291	3.853	-1.724
cut4	1.681	6.082	2.220
Observations	1040	1394	1339
Pseudo R^2	0.046	0.084	0.057
AIC	2688.7	3538.1	3178.0
BIC	2758.0	3611.4	3250.8

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

the major threatening events of North Korea. Table 9 shows the results from the ordinal logistic regression using the level of confidence in incumbent government as a response variable.³ Both two exposure cases with a high level of North Korean hostility and a control case without any prominent threats are examined and reported in Table 9. The liberal administration in 2003 was labeled as incompetent government due to their reputation of financially supporting the North Korean nuclear program. The conservative administration in 2009 is labeled as competent government for their assertive manner toward dealing with the North Korean hostility. The patterns on the table show that the information obtained by reading newspapers is negatively and significantly associated with the probability of respondents positively evaluating the incumbent government when the country is facing a threat to national security. One unit change in reading newspapers decreases the odds of higher outcome compared to lower level of response by a factor of 1.43 ($\exp(0.361)$, $p < 0.05$) in 2003, and by a factor of 1.44 ($\exp(0.368)$, $p < 0.05$) in 2009.⁴ Note that these negative associations only appear when there are provocative actions of North Korea in 2003 and 2009. When the level of threat is lower than previous two cases as shown in Model III, the reading habit of respondents do not have any significant associations with the evaluative attitudes of South Koreans.

Also, it seems that the reputation of incumbent party has impacts on government evaluations. The hostility level of respondents towards North Korea is negatively associated only with the liberal government evaluation that is known to be friendly to North Korea. Model I in Table 9 shows that the level of hostility towards North Korea is negatively associated with the government evaluation, where one unit change of the hostility level decreases the odds of positive response compared to lower level of response by a factor of 1.17 ($\exp(0.153)$, p

³Tests for the partial proportional odds model (Williams, 2006) is conducted for all three cases, and the Wald tests indicate that the models do not violate the parallel lines assumption.

⁴The raw coefficients are obtained from the standardized score of reading newspapers with a min-max normalization.

< 0.05). This negative association disappears when there is a conservative government in 2009. Even if a threat that is posed by North Korea exists, the same variable that was once significant becomes insignificant if the incumbent party is known for being assertive on the North Korean provocation. Comparing this pattern to a control case that had a liberal incumbent party, it seems that the existence of threats does have an impact on the government evaluation as the association disappears when there are no prominent threats.

Moving onto the differing behavioral patterns of partisan groups, I argued that people who support the incumbent party will be positively biased due to preconditioned reasoning, while the opposition party supporters will be harsher on evaluating the incumbent party when the nation faces a threat to the security. Figure 8 shows the marginal effects of predicted probability of evaluating government positively (5) or negatively (1) based on the intensity of exposure to the threats via news media, while holding the control variables at their means. The two lowest categories (“Very Poor” and “Somewhat Poor”) in Figure 8 are marked with thicker lines to highlight the patterns. There are two points that are worth to mention.

First, the evaluative attitudes of partisan-ins towards the government is either neutral or slightly negative across all cases. The highest category that partisan-ins fall into is the “Neutral”, followed by the “Somewhat Poor”. Compared to partisan-ins, opposition party supporters are always harsher on the incumbent government. The highest probability of government evaluation of partisan-outs is “Somewhat Poor”, followed by either “Neutral” or even “Very Poor”. These patterns of partisan-ins and -outs support the second hypothesis that the preconditioned reasoning of party attachment affects the direction of government evaluation. Under all conditions controlling the models for the level of exposure to news media, partisan-ins are positive about the government performance, while partisan-outs negatively evaluate the government, as one would expect it.

Second, the reputations of incumbent parties do have impacts on the predicted prob-




Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Government Evaluation (South Korea)

ability of government evaluation. The bottom of Figure 8 shows a difference between partisan-ins and opposition supporters (Outs-Ins). What is worth to point out is the slope of each categories. Unlike the case in 2009, the liberal incumbent party in 2003 was criticized for being partially responsible for the growing nuclear tension in the region. This negative reputation allowed the citizens to hold the incumbent liberal government accountable for military incidents between North and South Korea in 2002 and North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in January 2003. As the flat slope of differences in 2003 shows, the gap of susceptibility between partisan-ins and opposition supporters was not big. It implies that both partisan-ins and partisan-outs behaved similarly by finding the liberal incumbent party responsible for the threatening incidents, and punished the government by negatively evaluating it in a similar manner. The slope gets bigger and more distinguishable once there is a conservative incumbent party in 2009. Note that the slope of category "Very Poor" of partisan-outs in 2009 increases rapidly. Also note that the biggest gap between opposition supporters and conservatives in 2009 can be found in the lowest category, "Very Poor". As the second and the bottom row of Figure 8 show, partisan-outs are more likely to say that they think the performance of government was very poor, and the gap between partisan-outs and partisan-ins increases as respondents get exposed to the intensity of threats via mass media. It implies that the susceptibility level of partisan-outs with information is larger than the partisan-ins. Exposing to the same information, people who identify with the conservative party are more reluctant about saying negatively about the government. Unlike these partisan-ins, partisan-outs are more susceptible to the intensity of security threats and more give a bad evaluation (e.g. "Very Poor") to the government.


Encapsulating patterns from the South Korean case, both party groups are susceptible to a growing concern on threats, and give a negative response to the government performance. Also, the liberal party with a negative retrospective image associated with the North Korean

issue received a more negative evaluation from both groups. Unlike the liberal incumbent government, the conservative government in 2009 was slightly free from the burden and mobilized more support from the conservatives.

0.3.2. Japanese Case

Similar to the South Korean case study, Japanese citizens punish the incumbent government when the nation faces threats to national security. Figure 9 is a trellis graph of government support that is retrieved from randomly selected sixteen individuals, plotted over the annual hostility level of North Korean actions toward Japan from 2007 to 2011. As it shows, there is a gradual decreasing trend in the government support as the level of hostility of North Korea toward Japan increases, which implies that the more people get exposed to the national security threats the more likely these people negatively evaluate the government.

Figure 9: Government Supports and DPRK Threat toward Japan (2007-2011)



To further examine the effects of administration and the individual-level attributes on

evaluative attitudes toward administrations, a multilevel analysis is conducted⁵. To examine if there are any significant individual-level variances that contribute to the total variance, likelihood ratio tests using empty means models with a random intercept is conducted. Also, the inclusion of cross-level interaction terms of the year-level predictors (annual GDELT hostility levels and administration type) and the individual-level political affiliation yielded a *pseudo* - R^2 reduction of level-1 variance by 75.7% and the residual variance by 25.2% compared to the model for the empty means with a random intercept ($\Delta - 2LL = 289.37, p < 0.01$). This means that compared to the random intercept model, nested models with newly added predictors more contribute to the fitness of the model (for the detailed discussion on model comparison in the multilevel modeling, see Holden, Kelley, and Agarwal (2008)). Thus, cross-level interaction terms are added to examine the impacts of partisan affiliation on the level of government support, conditional on the level of mean-centered security threat and the type of administration.

Table 10 shows the results from the multilevel model. There are two patterns that need to be noted. First, it seems that the party-based bias exists. Model I indicates that partisan-ins are positively biased (1.023, significant at $p < 0.01$) toward the incumbent government compared to people without any affiliated parties. People who support the opposition party more negatively evaluate the government performance compared to the group without a political affiliation. This means that, controlling for the annual level of threats and administration type, people who support the incumbent party are more likely to positively evaluate the government while opposition party supporters are more likely to negatively evaluate government. This supports the argument that partisans who support the incumbent party are more likely to have positive views on the government performance compared to people who are neutral to the incumbent party.

⁵All models are fitted with unstructured covariance structure using the restricted maximum likelihood estimation.

Table 10: Government Support (Japan, 2007-2011)

	Model I	Model II
Annual Threat (Mean Centered)	-3.368 (2.757)	-3.479 (2.838)
Partisan-ins	1.023*** (0.0770)	0.981*** (0.0770)
Partisan-outs	-0.251*** (0.0882)	-0.297*** (0.0882)
Others	-0.321* (0.185)	-0.333* (0.184)
DPJ Administration	0.215 (0.239)	0.204 (0.247)
Partisan-ins X Annual Threat (Mean Centered)	-3.028* (1.550)	-3.042** (1.540)
Partisan-outs X Annual Threat (Mean Centered)	-0.0560 (1.739)	-0.0000808 (1.729)
Others X Annual Threat (Mean Centered)	2.095 (3.470)	2.157 (3.449)
Partisan-ins X DPJ Administration	-0.507*** (0.134)	-0.524*** (0.133)
Partisan-outs X DPJ Administration	0.0666 (0.150)	0.0487 (0.149)
Others X DPJ Administration	0.304 (0.301)	0.285 (0.299)
Age(Centered at Age 19)		0.00608*** (0.00125)
Constant	1.950*** (0.140)	1.750*** (0.150)
var(_cons)	0.0180*** (0.0136)	0.0194*** (0.0145)
var(Residual)	0.582*** (0.0186)	0.575*** (0.0183)
<i>AIC</i>	4567.9	4546.5
<i>BIC</i>	4646.2	4630.3
Years	4	4
Observations	1972	1972

Standard errors in parentheses


* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Second, it is important to point out that the level of hostility and the administration type have statistically significant conditional impacts on the government evaluation. Note the cross-level interaction terms of the level of North Korean hostility with partisan affiliation and the administration type have statistically significant simple effects on government support. Result shows that people who associate themselves with the incumbent party negatively evaluate the government when the level of threat increases. In model II of Table 10, it seems that one unit change in threat greater than the average level over five years from 2007 to 2011 decreases the government support of partisan-ins by 3.042 (significant at $p < 0.05$). Also, partisan-ins negatively evaluate the DPJ government that is known for the conciliatory gesture toward North Korea (-0.524, significant at $p < 0.01$). These results support the argument that even if the partisan-based favoritism exists, the threats to the national security and the reputation of an incumbent party holding the office have impacts on the evaluation of government.

Figure 10 shows the marginal effects of the fixed portion of Model II, holding the control variable (Age) at the mean.⁶ The graph on the left-hand side illustrates a partisan-based government evaluation plotted over the mean-centered hostility level of North Korea when there is a DPJ administration. Conforming to the results in Table 10, the predicted support level for the DPJ administration conditioned by the North Korean hostility is lower than the LDP administration. This suggests that the average evaluative attitudes of citizens toward the administration based on North Korean hostility is lower when the incumbent party is known to have a weaker stance to the threatening security environment. In the case of Japan, the pacifist history associated with the leftist DPJ party may have lowered the average level of government performance evaluation. Note also the pattern of partisan-ins in DPJ administration looks very similar to other partisan groups. Their evaluation of

⁶Result from Model II is selected and used as it has a lower level of Akaike information criteria (4567.9 vs. 4546.5) and Bayesian information criteria (4646.2 vs. 4630.3)

Figure 10: Predicted Government Supports by Administration Type (Japan, 2007-2011)



government is significantly higher than other groups when the level of threat is lower than the average. Marginal effects of Model II yield a significant mean difference of government support level for the DPJ government between partisan-ins and outs by 0.614 ($p < 0.01$) and a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.890 ($p < 0.01$) when the level of threat is at the average. This means that, when the level of North Korean hostility is about the average rate, partisan-ins are positive about the incumbent government compared to opposition supporters and independents. Once the hostility level exceeds the average, partisan-ins of DPJ administration join the other party groups and hold the incumbent government accountable by negatively evaluating the government performance. Setting the threat level at 0.1% above the average, the model yields an insignificant mean difference between partisan-ins and partisan-outs by 0.401 ($p = 0.072$, insignificant at 0.05), and an insignificant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.153 ($p = 0.481$). There was an insignificant predicted mean difference between partisan-outs and independents by 0.248 ($p = 0.304$) in government support level for the DPJ administration. It means that once the hostility level exceeds the average level by 0.1 percentage point, the expected support level of partisan-ins for the DPJ government becomes insignificantly different from independents and partisan-outs. With the North Korean hostility level that is higher than the usual, liberal supporters stop being relatively positive about the government performance and join the other political groups in terms of the punishing behavior.

In comparison to the DPJ government, the LDP government does not have a reputation of being friendly toward North Korea. Due to this, they are relatively free from the responsibility for the hostile actions of North Korea. Right-hand side of Figure 10 indicates that the overall evaluative patterns of citizens toward LDP administration differs from the DPJ administration, in which partisan-ins have a higher level of government evaluation compared to the other partisan groups even if the hostility level exceeds the average. When the threat level is at the mean, there is a statistically significant mean difference between

partisan-ins and partisan-outs by 1.278 ($p < 0.01$), and a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.981 ($p < 0.01$). Setting the threat level above the average by 0.1%, the model yields a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and partisan-outs by 0.974 ($p < 0.01$), a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.677 ($p < 0.01$), and a significant mean difference between partisan-outs and independents by 0.297 ($p=0.026$, significant at $\alpha = 0.05$). Recall that the predicted level of government support for DPJ government of the partisan-ins became statistically insignificantly different from partisan-outs when the threat level was set at 0.1% above the average level. The fitted government support level for LDP administration indicates that LDP supporters do NOT join the other party group and hold the incumbent administration accountable.

Summing up the results from Table 10 and Figure 10, it seems that the supporters of DPJ administration turn their backs on the incumbent government when the level of threat exceeds the average level, and join the other political groups by negatively evaluating the government for ongoing threats to the national security. Supporters of LDP government, on the other hand, remain relatively loyal to the government even though the growing level of tension eventually deteriorates their loyalty. It supports the earlier argument that the reputation of incumbent party conditions the susceptibility of people who are politically prone to favor the government and reverse the tendency of favoring the government if the threat at hand is alarming.

0.3.3. Political Implications

Conventional wisdom in political science is that the approval ratings of political leadership often spikes when the nation faces imminent threats to security. This study shows that the domestic political context conditions the rally-round-the-flag effects of security threats.

Empirical examination is conducted using two East Asian democratic nations that are exposed to frequent hostility from North Korea. Results show that the level of exposure to threatening events via news media negatively influences the evaluation of incumbent government in South Korea and Japan. Moreover, the incumbent party that has a bad reputation associated with the threats is more likely to get a negative evaluation when threats intensify. In both countries, the evaluative behaviors of citizens are largely conditioned by the level of knowledge of concerning security issue obtained via the mass media and reading newspapers, and their previous attitudinal knowledge of the threat. Also, there were different behavioral patterns of citizens observed based on the retrospective reputation of the incumbent government. If the incumbent government is nominally responsible for the threats to national security, citizens decide their attitudes based on their knowledge on the reputation of the incumbent party. Due to this, the impacts of knowledge vary by the administration.

0.4. Impacts of Economic Crisis on Evaluative Attitudes of Partisan Groups

In the previous chapter, impacts of security threats on government evaluation were discussed and empirically examined. People in South Korea and Japan tried to hold government accountable for the growing tension by negatively evaluating the incumbent government, and this pattern of behavior of citizens was largely conditioned by the party affiliation of individual citizens and the reputation of the incumbent party. In addition to the impacts of threatening events that are relevant to long-term party reputations, it is necessary to discuss the cases where the incumbent governments are equally expected to be good at handling the uncertain events. Unlike previous cases where parties hold specific and consistent reputations over dealing with the grievances, global financial crises and aftermath economic instability in East Asia caused grievances that are largely free from the positional stance of parties. This chapter focuses on the financial crisis as a valence issue and analyzes its impacts on evaluative attitudes of citizens.

0.4.1. South Korean Case

South Korea has a domestic market that is dependent on global demands, and the international financial crisis had large impacts on the South Korean economic stability. Due to this vulnerability of Korean economy to external factors, keeping the healthy economic environment is vital for political popularity of the administration. As such, if the level of financial grievance increases, it is likely that the incumbent government loses popular support of citizens.

Figure 11 shows that the level of government support goes downward as the level of financial misery index increases. Once the misery level (sum of unemployment rate and




Figure 11: Average Government Support (South Korea, 2004-2012)

consumer price index) passes the average of time periods from 2004 to 2012, the level of support for government decreases in all three partisan groups. There is a small peak in conservative administration right after the level of misery exceeds the average, but the support level goes back to the plummeting trend as the misery level increases. Same pattern is observed when there is a liberal administration. On the right-hand side of Figure 11, it seems that the level of government support decreases once the misery level exceeds the average. Overall, both administrations have less support of citizens once the financial instability level exceeds an average point, and this punishing behavior is observed in all partisan groups.

To empirically test the hypothesis that economic grievances have negative impacts on the government support regardless of party affiliation and administration type, models us-

Table 11: Government Support by Crisis Intensity and Administration (South Korea, 2004-2012)

	Liberal		Conservative	
	2004 (High) Coef./Std.e	2006 (Low) Coef./Std.e	2008 (High) Coef./Std.e	2012 (Low) Coef./Std.e
Not employed	-0.272* (0.122)	0.242* (0.109)	-0.0866 (0.113)	0.310** (0.115)
Prospect for future economy	0.482*** (0.0617)	0.460*** (0.0569)	0.515*** (0.0529)	0.263*** (0.0581)
Total monthly household income (category)	-0.0163 (0.0169)	-0.0163 (0.0131)	-0.0277* (0.0122)	-0.00714 (0.0119)
Partisan-ins	1.121*** (0.156)	1.261*** (0.173)	1.049*** (0.145)	1.012*** (0.143)
Partisan-outs	0.187 (0.133)	-0.160 (0.116)	-0.247 (0.143)	0.0403 (0.138)
R: age	-0.00191 (0.00474)	-0.0217*** (0.00440)	0.0137*** (0.00410)	0.0125** (0.00414)
Male	0.142 (0.120)	-0.178 (0.108)	-0.134 (0.110)	-0.0108 (0.112)
R: highest level of schooling attended	-0.0633 (0.0503)	-0.207*** (0.0473)	-0.0478 (0.0451)	-0.0205 (0.0461)
cut1	0.00524	-1.251	0.948	0.620
cut2	2.099	0.713	2.826	2.096
cut3	3.883	2.746	4.819	3.926
cut4	7.295	5.546	7.382	5.672
Observations	1078	1385	1329	1162
Pseudo R^2	0.053	0.057	0.094	0.051
<i>AIC</i>	2645.0	3309.7	3165.7	3132.0
<i>BIC</i>	2704.8	3372.5	3228.0	3192.7

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

ing personal employment status and prospect for future economic status as explanatory variables are tested. Models from I to IV in Table 11 differ by the administration type (Liberal and Conservative) and the intensity of financial grievances (High and Low). The individual factor (employment status) is partially significantly associated with the government support. Note that when the intensity is high, people who reported that they are not currently employed negatively evaluate the liberal administration. Compared to ones who are employed, the odds of unemployed people more negatively evaluate the liberal administration increases by a factor of 1.31 ($\exp(0.272)$, $p < 0.05$), holding other variables at their means. In addition to the employment status, partisan group matters as already argued in the previous chapter. Partisan-based bias of partisan-ins exists and statistically significantly impacts the government support controlling the model for other variables. Compared to independents, people who respond that they support the incumbent government are more likely to positively evaluate the government performance. The odds of partisan-ins positively evaluating the government compared to the independents increases by a factor of 3.07 ($\exp(1.121)$, $p < 0.01$), holding other variables at their means.

When the level of financial instability is relatively lower in 2006, the support level for the liberal government is positively associated with the unemployment status. The second model of liberal administration in Table 11 shows that the unemployment status has significant and positive impacts on the government evaluation. The odds of unemployed citizens compared to people with jobs positively evaluating the government increases by the factor of 1.27 ($\exp(0.242)$, $p < 0.05$) holding other variables at their means. Partisan-based evaluation still exists when the financial status is relatively better. The odds of partisan-ins positively evaluating the government compared to independents is 3.53 ($\exp(1.261)$, $p < 0.01$) holding other variables at their means.

Table 12 shows the predicted probabilities of people supporting the liberal government when the financial crisis is present. Firstly, the predicted probability of partisan-ins who are

Table 12: Predicted Probabilities (Liberal, High)

Employment	Party Group	Very Poor	Somewhat Poor	Neither Good nor Poor	Somewhat Good	Very Good
Yes	Partisan-ins	0.089	0.353	0.383	0.168	0.007
Yes	Independents	0.230	0.478	0.227	0.062	0.002
Yes	Partisan-outs	0.199	0.469	0.255	0.074	0.003
No	Partisan-ins	0.113	0.396	0.351	0.134	0.005
No	Independents	0.282	0.479	0.189	0.048	0.002
No	Partisan-outs	0.246	0.480	0.215	0.058	0.002
No-Yes	Partisan-ins	0.025	0.043	-0.032	-0.034	-0.002
No-Yes	Independents	0.052	0.001	-0.038	-0.014	-0.001
No-Yes	Partisan-outs	0.047	0.010	-0.040	-0.017	-0.001

employed saying that government performance is “Very Poor” is 0.089 holding other variables at their means. Compared to this, partisan-ins who are *not* employed saying that the government performance is “Very Poor” is 0.113. The gap between partisan-ins who are not employed and employed saying they are not satisfied with the quality of government performance is 0.025 ($p=0.034$), which means that partisan-ins who are not employed are more likely to say that the government performance is “Very Poor”. On the similar note, both unemployed independents and partisan-outs are more likely to say that the quality of government performance is “Very Poor” (independents=0.052, $p=0.029$, partisan-outs=0.047, $p=0.028$) compared to employed peers. Overall, the unemployment status has negative impacts on government support in all party groups.

Compared to the liberal administration, the employment status does not have a statistically significant association with the support for conservative administration when the financial crisis is present. Even though it is not statistically significant, it is worth to note that the direction of government support level is negative. This insignificant result may due to the political campaign of conservative party amid financial instability in 2007 and

2008. During this period, conservative party put emphasis on market-driven measures, such as easing regulations on the business sector and launching a massive economic stimulus package. Also, the survey was conducted during the electoral transition from a liberal to conservative administration. It is possible that even though there was a financial crisis from 2007 to 2008, the expectation on the newly elected conservative administration might have off-set the negative impacts of financial grievances on the government evaluation. When the macroeconomic indicator is normalized in 2012, as indicated in Table 11, the unemployment status regained its statistically significant positive association with the government support. In addition to the employment status, the result in Table 11 indicates that there is a partisan-driven evaluative pattern in citizens. Compared to political independents, people who support the conservative administration are more likely to positively evaluate the government by the factor of 2.75 ($\exp(1.012)$, $p < 0.01$).

Overall, the results imply that financial status conditions the probability of unemployed citizens positively evaluating the government, while partisanship remains as a meaningful factor of the government evaluation under any circumstances. When there is a financial grievances, it is likely that unemployed people penalize the government by negatively evaluating the quality of performance. Even though the negative direction of evaluation for conservative government was not statistically significant, it is possible that the transition effects of newly elected conservative government mitigate the impacts of financial crisis on evaluative attitudes of citizens. Under favorable financial conditions, unemployed citizens are more likely to positively evaluate both governments.

The individual perspectives on future economy are statistically significantly associated with the government support under any circumstances. As Table 11 shows, the prospect for future economy is positively associated with government support under any financial status with any administration type. This implies that perceived economic status consistently plays a role as a factor for one's evaluative attitudes toward administration, controlling for




Figure 12: Predicted Probability of Government Support by Partisan Group (South Korea)

party affiliation, employment status and economic conditions. Figure 12 shows a predicted probability conditional on the perceived future economy status when the intensity of financial crisis is in its highest level. In both administrations, the predicted probability of partisan-ins saying that they evaluate the government performance as “Somewhat Poor” is high when they say the prospective future economic status will be much worse (1 out of 5). The upper row of Figure 12 shows that the dotted-line (“Somewhat Poor”) is at the highest level when the level of prospect for future economy is low and slowly goes down as the level of perceived future economic status goes up. Partisan-based favoritism still remains. Compared to partisan-ins, people who support the opposition party are more likely to say that the government performance is “Very Poor” when the prospect for future economy is low. The biggest difference between partisan groups is the predicted probabilities of them saying that government performance is “Very Poor”, as the bottom row of Figure 12 shows. This supports the partisan-based behavioral pattern where partisan-outs are more likely to negatively evaluate the government compared to partisan-ins, while the conditional effect of perceived future economy prevails.

The results on the whole support the argument that individual employment status and perception for future economy have impacts on evaluative attitudes of citizens regardless of their party affiliation and the administration type. When there are financial grievances, people who are not employed are more likely to penalize the government for growing financial instability via performance evaluation. This evaluative attitude is observed in both administration, even though there is no statistically significant association with support level for conservative administration. As argued above, this might be due to the political campaign of conservative party during the financial downturn that blames the incumbent liberal government for failing to redress it. The prospect for future economy is always positively associated with the government evaluation under any financial conditions and any administration types. In addition to these individual and prospective indicators, partisanship plays

a significant role in the performance evaluation. Partisan-driven bias, controlling the models for employment status and future prospect on economy, affects the level of government support. As argued earlier, partisan-ins are relatively positively biased than political independents and partisan-outs in both administrations under any financial conditions. This means that even with worsening financial environment, people who support the incumbent government are positively biased compared to other groups, regardless the administration type.

0.4.2. Japanese Case

Similar to South Korea, Japanese domestic market is dependent on the global financial environment. Due to this, it is possible that domestic financial stability has impacts on the government support of citizens. Figure 13 is a trellis graph of randomly selected 16 out of 493 individuals' government support level plotted over the financial indicators. On the left-hand side of the Figure 13 shows a trend of support for government conditional on the GDP growth rate. It seems that some individuals differ in terms of government support when the macroeconomic status improves, but the overall pattern indicates that support for government goes up when the macroeconomic status is in a positive trend. Average level of confidence in economy also has positive impacts on the government support. On the right side of Figure 13 is the randomly selected 16 individuals' government support level conditional on the year-mean confidence level in economy. It seems that the level of confidence in economy increases the government support level of most individuals, even though there are couple of exceptions.

To further empirically examine the association between financial grievances and government support based on the party-based sentiment, this study fits the multilevel models with two financial indicators. To report how much the inclusion of new predictors con-




Figure 13: Government Support and Financial Indicators (Japan, 2007-2011)

tributes to the fitness of the model, a proportion of reduction in variances between the baseline model (random intercept model) and the models with new predictors is calculated and reported as the pseudo- R^2 (Holden et al., 2008). First financial indicator is the mean-centered GDP growth rate. Inclusion of fixed predictors reduces the pseudo- R^2 of level-1 random intercept variance by 89.7% and the residual variance by 23.3% ($\Delta - 2LL = 263.2$, $\Delta df = 9$, $p < 0.01$). Adding cross-level interaction terms reduces the level-1 variance by 85.4% and the residual variance by 25.58% ($\Delta - 2LL = 270.414$, $\Delta df = 13$, $p < 0.01$). Second indicator is the individual-level perspective on economic status. When the fixed predictors are included in the model, the pseudo- R^2 of level-1 random intercept variance reduces by 76.8% and the residual variance by 27.2% ($\Delta - 2LL = 312.813$, $\Delta df = 7$). Inclusion of cross-level interaction terms yields reduced pseudo- R^2 in level-1 random intercept variance by 72.8% and in residual variance by 28.2% ($\Delta - 2LL = 314.011$, $\Delta df = 14$). The models with cross-level interaction terms are fitted to examine impacts of financial indicators on government support level.

Table 13: Government Support (Japan, 2007-2011)

	Model I	Model II
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GDP Growth Rate (Mean-centered)	0.0528** (0.0218)	
Confidence in Economy (Centered at 3)		0.190*** (0.0412)
Year-mean-centered Confidence in Economy		0.454 (0.279)
Partisan-ins	0.944*** (0.0658)	0.857*** (0.0731)
Partisan-outs	-0.301*** (0.0744)	-0.278*** (0.0880)
Others	-0.223 (0.150)	-0.217 (0.174)
DPJ Administration	0.243 (0.149)	0.611*** (0.169)
Unemployed (Self)=1	-0.0331 (0.0464)	-0.0645 (0.0456)
Partisan-ins X GDP Growth Rate (Mean-centered)	0.0336** (0.0150)	
Partisan-outs X GDP Growth Rate (Mean-centered)	-0.00681 (0.0164)	
Others X GDP Growth Rate (Mean-centered)	0.00213 (0.0304)	
Partisan-ins X DPJ Administration	-0.468*** (0.103)	-0.253*** (0.0863)
Partisan-outs X DPJ Administration	0.0553 (0.113)	-0.0280 (0.0911)
Others X DPJ Administration	0.0867 (0.207)	0.0716 (0.165)
Age	0.00664*** (0.00144)	0.00551*** (0.00142)
Partisan-ins X Confidence in Economy (Centered at 3)		0.0616 (0.0515)
Partisan-outs X Confidence in Economy (Centered at 3)		-0.0274 (0.0564)

Others X Confidence in Economy (Centered at 3)		-0.0168 (0.103)
Constant	1.590*** (0.121)	0.763 (0.614)
var(_cons)	0.0112*** (0.0176)	0.0201*** (0.0301)
var(Residual)	0.583*** (0.0188)	0.559*** (0.0180)
<i>AIC</i>	4539.1	4453.9
<i>BIC</i>	4628.2	4548.5
Years	4	4
Observations	1934	1934

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Model I of Table 13 shows the results from fitting the GDP growth rate as a macroeconomic indicator of financial status with interaction terms. First, it seems that the macroeconomic indicator has impacts on the level of government support. One unit change in the mean-centered GDP growth rate increases the government support by 0.0528 ($p < 0.05$), which implies that GDP growth rate has a positive influence on the predicted level of government support. Partisan-ins compared to people who do not support any specific party are more likely to support the government by 0.944 ($p < 0.01$), and partisan-outs are less likely to support the government compared to the independents by 0.301 ($p < 0.01$). Employment status (Not employed=1) has insignificant negative impacts (-0.0331) on the government support, which implies that the current employment status does not have significant impacts on the evaluative support level for governments. Second, the cross-level interaction term of partisan group and the GDP growth rate shows the possibility of partisan-based favoritism conditional on the macro-level changes. Compared to the political independents, people who support the government are more likely to positively evaluate the government

by 0.0336 ($p < 0.05$) when the GDP growth rate increases. Also, there is a negative and significant effect of partisan-ins evaluating the liberal government compared to independents, as Model I indicates. Compared to independents, partisan-ins during the DPJ administration are less likely to support the government by 0.468 ($p < 0.01$) controlling for other variables. Based on these simple effects of predictors, I calculated the expected government support level over various conditions. Model I yields a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and partisan-outs for DPJ government by 0.722 ($p < 0.01$), and a difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.476 ($p < 0.01$) when the GDP growth rate and individual age are set at their means. This implies that when the GDP growth rate is at an average rate, the average aged partisan-ins are more likely to positively evaluate the government than other party groups. Also, there is a statistically significant mean difference between partisan-ins and partisan-outs in support for LDP government by 1.246 ($p < 0.01$), and a difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.944 ($p < 0.01$). Overall, the predicted support level for the incumbent government in both administrations controlling individual predictors and the GDP growth rate at means is higher for people who support the government compared to other party group, as previously argued. Comparing the predicted government support level based on the administration type over partisan groups, there is an insignificant mean difference between partisan-ins by 0.221 ($p=0.131$), an insignificant mean difference between partisan-outs by 0.309 ($p=0.043$, insignificant at $\alpha < 0.01$), and an insignificant mean difference between independents by 0.235 ($p=0.111$). These insignificant differences based on the administration type between partisan groups support the idea that there is no differing pattern in evaluative attitudes between two administrations among party groups.

Figure 14 shows the predicted simple mean of Model I conditional on the GDP growth rate. There is a gap between partisan-ins and other party group in both administrations. Partisan-ins are almost always positively biased compared to people who support the op-

Adjusted Predictions of Government Support (CI 95%)




Figure 14: Impacts of GDP Growth Rate on Government Support

position party or people who do not affiliate themselves to any specific party. Moreover, the economic growth rate has positive impacts on all three groups. In addition to this, the positive impacts of macroeconomic indicator hold in both administrations. As such, the predicted level of government support fitted by Model I indicates that GDP growth rate positively affects the government support level regardless of the administration type and the party affiliation.

Model II of Table 13 shows the impacts of individual perspectives on economic status. Since the individual confidence level varies over time, a year-mean centered confidence in economy is included in the model to account for its within-year effects (Hoffman, 2015).

Also, the level of confidence is centered at the middle to make the interpretation more nuanced. Like the macroeconomic indicator, the individual-level perception of economy has positive impacts on the government support level. There are significant and positive simple effects of confidence in economy, which indicates that a score increase in confidence in economy increases the support level by 0.19 ($p < 0.01$). The within-year effects of confidence level in economy are not statistically significant. Partisan-based differences exist in Model II as well. Compared to people who are politically independent, incumbent party supporters are more likely to positively evaluate the government. There is a simple effect of co-partisanship by 0.857 ($p < 0.01$) compared to independents, and a simple effect of opposition party affiliation by -0.278 ($p < 0.01$) compared to people without a party affiliation. The simple effects of administration type have statistically significant impacts on the government support level. Compared to LDP administration, DPJ administration is more likely to have a higher government support by 0.611 ($p < 0.01$). This implies that, controlling the model for other variables at their means, the expected level of support for DPJ administration is higher compared to the support for the LDP government. A cross-level interaction term between partisanship and administration type has statistically significant effects on the government support. The result in Model II indicates that partisan-ins of DPJ administration have a significant and negative simple effect for government support by 0.253 ($p < 0.01$) compared to the independents in the same administration.

Based on the results of Model II in Table 13, expected level of government support is calculated over various conditions. There are significant mean differences among party groups, especially between partisan-ins and partisan-outs. This implies that there are partisan-driven evaluative attitudes among citizens, especially partisan-ins positively evaluating the administration compared to people who support the opposition party. Moreover, the partisan-driven evaluative pattern is observed in both administrations. Calculating the predicted mean differences of unemployed respondents while setting the economic confi-

dence at 3 and the age at the mean, Model II of Table 13 yields a significant mean difference between unemployed partisan-ins and partisan-outs in government support level for LDP government by 1.136 ($p < 0.01$). There is also a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.857 ($p < 0.01$), and a significant mean difference between partisan-outs and independents by 0.278 ($p < 0.01$). A similar partisan-based evaluative pattern of LDP government exists in the DPJ administration. Partisan-ins are more likely to positively evaluate the DPJ government compared to other party groups. The predicted government support for DPJ administration of unemployed partisan-ins is statistically significantly higher than partisan-outs by 0.911, and higher than independents by 0.605. The expected government support level of partisan-outs is statistically significantly lower than independents by 0.306. Also, these evaluative patterns of party groups do not converge even though the confidence level increases in both administrations. This means that even with a higher level of confidence in economic status, party groups do not converge into a similar evaluative pattern. Rather, they maintain their partisan-based attitudes toward the governments. The predicted government support level for DPJ administration of unemployed citizens setting the confidence level at 4 ("Somewhat Good") yields a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and partisan-outs by 1 ($p < 0.01$), and a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.666 ($p < 0.01$). A similar pattern is observed in LDP government. The predicted support level setting the confidence level at 4 ("Somewhat Good") for LDP government of unemployed citizens produces a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and partisan-outs by 1.225 ($p < 0.01$) and a significant mean difference between partisan-ins and independents by 0.919 ($p < 0.01$). This consistent gap between partisan-ins and other party groups implies that people who do not have a co-partisanship with the incumbent party do NOT join the partisan-ins even though they see the current economic status is pretty satisfactory. The results overall support the idea that even with a growing level of confidence in economy, citizens in both

administrations largely maintain their partisan-based habit.




Figure 15: Impacts of Prospect for Future Economy on Government Support

Figure 15 shows the marginal effects of Model II of Table 13 plotted over the confidence level in economy. As previously mentioned, it seems that the confidence in economy is positively associated with the predicted level of government support. In both graphs, positive changes in the confidence level increases the expected level of government support across all party groups. This trend holds even the confidence level in economy is less than “Neutral(3)”. Also, it seems that the predicted level of government support of partisan-ins is significantly differently higher than other party groups in both administrations, as reported above. Overall, the results support the idea that macroeconomic status and individual-level

perception on financial status are significantly positively associated with the government support level in all party groups regardless of the administration type.

0.4.3. Political Implications

Financial stability plays an important role as a factor of government support level. This study examined if people with a co-partisanship with the incumbent government hold the government accountable when the domestic market environment is hostile regardless of types of administration. In both countries, it seems that the perception on economy such as the confidence in future and current economy and macroeconomic status have impacts on the evaluative attitudes of citizens regardless of their party affiliation and the administration type. In South Korea, the prospect for future economy is always positively associated with the predicted probability of positively evaluating the government support in all party groups across administration types. In Japan, the macroeconomic status was positively associated with the government support in all party groups. People who politically support the incumbent party is positively biased compared to other party groups, and the gap between partisan-ins and other groups remain statistically significantly different as the level of macroeconomic indicator increases. This pattern of evaluative attitude was observed in both administration types, which means that there is a consistent partisan-based attitudinal difference even though perception on economic status improves.

In addition to this, an individual-level factor like unemployment status has negative impacts on the government evaluation in South Korea when the economic status is not favorable. South Korean citizens who are not employed tend to negatively evaluate the liberal government when the intensity of financial grievances is higher than usual. Even though there was an insignificant negative impacts of unemployment on evaluation for South Korean conservative administration, it is possible that the electoral transition as well

as market-driven political campaign of conservative party during financial crisis have mitigated the negative effects of job insecurity on evaluative attitudes.

0.5. Concluding Remarks

So far, this research examined how international grievances affect domestic politics, especially the approval ratings of the administration. This chapter explains the moving parts of the theory of partisan evaluation and reviews the major findings from the East Asian cases. It concludes with political implications of the results and suggestions for the future research agenda.

Globalization lets people get access to various resources. Countries are dependent on global market competition than ever before, and consumers now enjoy freedom in choices due to the market competition. Cars are assembled abroad for a cheaper labor market, and the materials for assembling a single car requires imported goods from other countries. The expansion of international cooperation is a boon to domestic consumers and business sectors. However, the frequent exposure to foreign influences due to globalization opens room for new grievances.

There are various types of international threats. Traditionally, international threats involved with military tensions, such as a strategic deployment of troops close to borderlines or any types of military operation that can harm the territorial sovereignty. With globalization, the types of tensions expand to various issues. Frequency of terrorist activities is rapidly growing, and the terrorist organizations are now reaching out to the international recruitment using various social networking services. As a consequence of growing threats of terrorist activities and possibility of domestic conflicts, an issue of asylum seekers is emerging as well. Many countries receive increasing numbers of refugees crossing borders not only by boats or unregistered cargo ships but also coming through flights via international airports. We also witness domestic job markets fluctuate due to financial instability originated from foreign exchange markets. In early 2000s, many South Koreans had to lose their job because of the economic downturn started in Thailand. Also, in 2007, citizens in

Japan financially suffered from a crisis started in the United States. Outside of East Asian countries, the European Union had to deal with the financial difficulty of Greece and other members of European Union because of the deteriorating economic status. The chain reaction of financial crisis originated from the United States had put many countries in national debt crises and it had greatly damaged financial integrity of the European Union. In addition to the grievances due to financial interdependence, we witness multiple occasions of global pandemic crises. At the earliest, there was an influenza epidemic in 1918 that infected more than 500 million people and costed approximately 50 million lives worldwide. In early 2000, multiple cases of respiratory diseases such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome and H1N1 flu spread across more than 29 countries and caused multiple deaths. In late 2019, public health experts and epidemiologists expect that the novel coronavirus might infect up to 214 million people in the United States and danger lives of 200,000 to 1.7 million Americans (Fink, 2020). The threats to public health in nowadays are enlarged due to the increasing number of international interactions such as travels and businesses, and it will continue growing as globalization sustains.

0.5.1. Partisanship, Information, and Party Reputation

What are the political consequences of these newly emerging global threats? There are many factors of international threats that can be associated with the domestically politicized issues. First factor would be political parties that represent citizen's political needs. Parties hold consistent and distinctive stances over social issues and ideology, and the parties try to connect themselves to the newly emerged global threats if the threats are relevant to their political position. This way, parties can reinforce their traditional position and reach out to more supporters by addressing new concerns. Second factor is the incumbent government that is responsible for redressing any current grievances of citizens. Since in-

cumbent parties have accountability for the policy output, it is easy for citizens to see who is responsible for the growing level of tensions. If the citizens perceive a threat to their life and the threat will not be properly solved by the incumbent government, they are more likely to negatively evaluate the government to reflect their grievances. Third factor is the information and knowledge that citizens obtain about the threats. Unlike the traditional political environment where citizens solely rely on party cues on contemporary issues, citizens in recent days have access to various informational channels ranging from traditional news media to personal podcast services that provide people with more nuanced information. Even though it is possible that people selectively access to information that strengthen their previous beliefs, the possible access to news media with differing views on the event give room for update of personal beliefs to cope with the uncertainty that the threats generate. The access to various informational channels due to technological advancement makes it possible for citizens to more learn about what is happening and how the threat will affect their life.

Keeping these factors that affect the process of evaluative behavior of citizens in mind, this study empirically examined how people's perceived threats affect their political attitudes toward government. In what process these issues are politicized at the domestic political arena? How do people politically embrace these issues? What are the impacts of global threats on domestic politics, especially in terms of evaluative attitudes of citizens toward the incumbent government?

My dissertation examined two questions. First, do the external threats to national security and financial stability have impacts on the government evaluation? It is reported by scholars that threats to national security, such as intensifying level of military operations of neighboring countries may have temporal boosting effects on the presidential approval ratings. In American political context, we know of rapid boost of approval ratings for the president Bush after the terrorist attacks on the world trade center in early 2000. The

logic of the rally-around-the-flag effects suggest that once citizens perceive a potential enemy to the national interest, they call citizens together for an action to defeat the enemy. This psychological attachment gives the leadership a temporal boost in the level of support (Baker & Oneal, 2001; Baum, 2002). However, there are possibilities that national security instability may cause domestic grievances, as it increases possibility of country initiating wars or getting involved with costly warfare. It may also negatively affect the stock market because foreign investors can withdraw their invested funds out of the market for the upcoming military operations. Either way, getting the country exposed to constant security threats can negatively affect the political approval ratings of incumbent government. In addition to this, there are other types of security uncertainties caused by various matters, threats that cause a great deal of concerns in one's financial situation. For instance, it is possible that countries with domestic markets that are highly dependent on global financial stability may experience grievances once the global market stability gets deteriorated. In this case, people who are on the verge of losing job security might want to know more about the damages that the financial crisis can do for the job market. In addition to this, people who pay attention to the macroeconomic status will be concerned about the future of national economy. For these people who are willing to pay attention to the growing level of threats and who have personal reasons to learn more about the threatening events may penalize the government if the perceived status is unsatisfactory or if they do not feel comfortable with the government dealing with such events.

Second, to what extent does political affiliation affect the government support when the level of threat increases? Conventional wisdom in political science says that partisanship is one of the most important factors that defines one's political attitudes. Yet, there are other factors that one must not dismiss: individual knowledge on threatening events and the judgment based on that knowledge. It is true that many behavioral patterns anchor on the psychological attachment. Yet, it is possible that if individuals either pay enough attention

to the global threats or have personal reasons to be concerned about the threats, they change their mind and deviate the previous psychological attachment. Moreover, the knowledge in political reputation of parties matters when one makes his/her political decisions. As such, this research examined the partisan effects on government evaluation and argued that political knowledge of individuals conditions the evaluative attitudes toward the satisfactory level of government performance when the perceived environment is not favorable.

To examine the conditional impacts of party reputation on partisan effects, two types of threats are conceptualized. First, there are threats that cause positional response of citizens, in a way that citizens acknowledge the reputation of the party holding the office and decide if the party has either a positive or negative reputation over the handling of the threat. If the incumbent party has a reputation of not dealing well with the threatening event, it is likely that even the people with co-partisanship with the incumbent party break away from the habitual routine and reconsider their usual behavior. In this case, partisan effects on government evaluation would not help the current government and partisans (people with co-partisanship) join the opposition to hold the incumbent government accountable for growing intensity of threat. Second, threats that are not associated with a party reputation do not cause positional responses of citizens, because parties are equally expected to be good at handling it or parties simply do not have time to develop a long-term reputation. In this case, citizens who are concerned about the tension solely rely on their perceived environment and take the government accountable if they have reasons to penalize it. Examination of these threats is meaningful in a way that it shines lights on the association between external factors (international threats) and the domestic party competition. With the intensification of globalization, political decisions of citizens cannot be completely separated from uncertainties originated from the outside of country.

0.5.2. Threatening Events in East Asia

The theory discussed in the research suggests a possibility that people change their mind if their political habit does not conform to the perceived environment. Empirical examination using East Asian cases suggested that partisan effects sometimes do not hold depending on the knowledge of individuals and party reputations as well as the nature of the threats.

East Asian countries launched democratic systems after the end of the World War II and continue to consolidate the democratic system by holding regular elections with a development of the civic society. Even though Japan and South Korea differ in the electoral system, in which Japan adopted the parliamentary system and South Korea adopted the presidential system that is close to that of the United States, the party system in these countries have been developed anchoring on various social issues that reflect historical context and a long-term division among citizens. One of the issues that generates a consistent political division was the defense issue. Since the end of the Korean War, both South Korea and Japan had to develop a coping measure to handle the existence of a constant security threat in the region posed by North Korea. As such, the liberal parties in South Korea and Japan hold party platforms that embrace the North Korean government and try to mitigate the military tension within the region via engagement. Against the pacifying approach of liberal parties, conservative parties in East Asia took assertive stances over the issue. Due to this, there exists a distinctive party program between two major parties in the congress, and the parties constantly compete over the intensity of a security threat related to North Korea.

Empirical examination using surveys conducted in these countries when the hostility level of North Korea is at its highest level indicates that people who support the government eventually join the other political groups if the level of security threat increases and the incumbent government lacks a competent stance. In South Korea, conservative parties

are free from the burden of easing off sanctions on the North Korean nuclear program. Citizens associate the liberal party with financially supporting the nuclear program of North Korea and know who is responsible for the nuclear incidents that the North Korean government is blamed for: the liberal party. The association between security threat and negative reputation of incumbent party consequently affects the evaluative attitudes of citizens who are politically biased, and the North Korean hostile actions such as nuclear tests and military operations push these liberal supporters to negatively evaluate the liberal government. As argued earlier, conservative parties when they are holding the office did not have supporters turning their backs on the party loyalty even if the tension aggravates. It implies that the North Korean hostility, due to the history of parties taking distinctive stances over the issue, generates differing evaluative responses of South Korean citizens.

In Japan, the annual North Korean hostility level toward Japan, which is measured by the news media coverage of such events, negatively influenced the level of government support. In addition to this, people who support the liberal party had joined the other political groups to punish the incumbent government when they get more information on growing tension. The DPJ party in Japan is known for their reputation of protesting the attempt of conservative party revising the constitutions and is politically active as the biggest supporter of the idea of containing military operations within the territory. This reputation as a pacifier in the region might not help with the growing level of security tension posed by the North Korean military operation. As a consequence, the results indicate that supporters of DPJ party changed their attitudes and negatively evaluated the DPJ government. This penalizing behavior was not observed with the conservative incumbent parties. North Korean threats in East Asian countries, with its long-term historical influences on the national security issue in the region, had created distinctive party platforms. Due to these party reputations, citizens in East Asia who are aware of the growing tension took differing attitudinal behaviors based on their knowledge in the history of parties.

Threats that are not associated with a distinctive party stance in East Asia are related to any threats to the financial stability, which is measured as macroeconomic status and individualistic reasons to be concerned about the domestic economic status. In both countries, results show that there was an evaluative pattern of either rewarding or punishing the government depending on the financial status across all political groups. Financial crisis in East Asia from 2007 and 2008 had greatly influenced the growth rate and job markets, which had negative impacts on the government support level if citizens are concerned about it. This punishing behavior was observed in all three groups, and the party reputation did not have any significant impacts on the evaluative attitudes of citizens. This implies that, as it is argued, no political parties had themselves attached to the financial issues as they constantly compete over it without taking distinctive positions. All parties try to portray their positive images of being able to revive the national economic status, such as reducing unemployment rate, stabilizing consumer prices, and restoring economic growth rate. Due to this competition over financial stability in East Asian countries, citizens evaluated the government performance based on what they know about the economic status and how they feel about it.

0.5.3. The Light and Shadow of Globalization: Global Threats and Its Political Impacts

The globalization has its pros and cons. The positive impacts of globalization in our daily life are countless, and the impacts of it range from the grocery prices to stock market investment. The interconnectedness of globalization has its negative impacts as it can cause chain-reactions across nations. A crisis in a country can result in a bigger problem in other countries because countries share resources and materials. In the light of these many aspects of globalization, this research tried to unpack how the international threats politically

affect citizens.

What Did We Learn?

There are three lessons that we learned from the East Asian cases. First, the party reputation plays a role in the changes of evaluative behaviors. In addition to the partisanship, the reputation of parties has mitigating effects on the evaluative attitudes of citizens. As discussed earlier, citizens in South Korea and Japan tend to have a similar behavioral pattern to the scenario of threatening environments when the incumbent party has a reputation of handling the threat in a proper manner or if it is hard to hold the incumbent party accountable for the growing intensity of threat. These types of threats that incur a division in citizens due to a long-term party stance sometimes mitigate the negative effects of threats on government evaluation if the party in the office holds an advantage over the issue. This finding implies that the context of party programs in countries matters when one examines the political impacts of global threats. If parties can associate their long-term party stance with the threatening issues, they will get the upper hands over it. In this case, one may need to understand the issues that parties compete over and associate the contrasting party stances to the consequences of international threats.

Second, a frequent exposure to the news media and accumulating knowledge through such media outlets affect evaluative attitudes of citizens. In both South Korea and Japan, the level of exposure to media coverage is significantly associated with the government support level. As it is discussed in detail above, the empirical results indicate that citizens tend to penalize the incumbent government when they have better knowledge about the growing tension or have personal reasons to get anxious about such threats. This tendency of penalizing the government was observed even in the group that supports the government. It means that with a sufficient level of knowledge and reasons to know more and better

about the hostile environment, even the people with political bias change their mind and join the other political groups to punish the government. It is unclear though if this pattern is a newly emerged evaluative pattern due to the diversifying media environment. As noted earlier in this chapter, globalization had expedited the inter-connectivity of international media outlets so that citizens in any countries can share the same quality of information almost simultaneously. With technological and cultural expansion in the global era, it is more likely that people enhance their ability of knowing compared to the period when most people do not have such variety in access to the information. This calls for the examination using a longer period of survey data to compare citizens after globalization to people in the pre-globalization era.

Third, as it is argued above, partisanship affects the political attitudes of citizens. One of the important findings of this research is that the partisanship plays a significant role when citizens make their political decisions, particularly in the evaluative decision as a driving force of the direction and magnitude of the evaluation toward the incumbent government. Incumbent party supporters are positively biased toward the government, while opposition party supporters consistently give a negative evaluation under any circumstances. This pattern of evaluative attitudes stands in both types of threats, which implies that with or without party reputations, people with partisanship tend to stick to their old political habit and remain loyal to their political cause.

How Would It Affect Us?

What do we learn from the findings that are discussed in this research? The biggest lesson of the findings is that citizens with knowledge can change their mind. Even though people try to remain where they are psychologically anchored on, knowledge in the environment and the past of party performance can alter the direction and magnitude of such political

attachment. There are several political implications of these findings.

First, the rally-around-the-flag effects do not hold if perceived level of threats increases and is not well addressed. Unlike the previous beliefs that threats mobilize domestic political support for the administration, the findings suggest that this would not work depending on how citizens perceive the threats. Getting more information through mass media coverage encourages people to make a fairer decision in performance evaluation in regard to the global threats. Technological advancement and globalization connect the international media outlets and expedites the share of cross-checked information faster than before. These changes allow citizens to be better informed or it opens room for the possibility of learning through various media venues. Consequently, citizens who are concerned reach out to get more information and hold the government accountable for the threatening issues. This behavior of concerned citizens can be found in countries with political system where the incumbent government have an accountability and responsibility. It is worth to examine this penalizing behavior of citizens cross-nationally in response to the growing global threats depending on the domestic political context.

Second, partisanship sometimes does not hold if citizens feel anxious about the events. With access to various information channel, people now have ability to pursue what they truly need to know about the events if they feel it is necessary. There still remains a possibility of people selectively exposing themselves to the information that strengthen their beliefs, or interpret the information to accommodate their political inclination, as Gaines et al. (2007) argued. Even with these possibilities, the average accuracy of information and frequency of exposure to this information encourage citizens to update their beliefs and change their political habit. The results of this study largely indicate that even the politically loyal groups can negatively evaluate the quality of performance conditional on how much they acquire information and how much they are concerned with the threatening issue.

Third, another important aspect that researchers need to consider is the prospect of citizens on how the administration will handle the issue. If a country faces a novel threat that no party has a consistent stance over, the only information that citizens can rely on is their perception on how the government concurrently handles the threats. For instance, the epidemic of corona virus in 2019 has differing impacts on approval ratings of administrations. Unlike the conventional wisdom that threats to national interests generate temporal boosts in the support for the administration, the boosting impacts of pandemic in the United States remained marginal and waned immediately. The reason for the decline in rally-around-the-flag effects in reaction to the epidemic is the consistently low level of support for the Trump administration's handling of events and the failure to contain the nationwide infections at the early stage. In other countries where citizens perceive the preparedness of government is at the satisfactory level and the measures that government implemented successfully mitigated the spread of disease took a different path. For instance, a general election conducted amid of the pandemic in South Korea had resulted in a massive landslide for the opposition party, giving the largest seat share in the national assembly to the incumbent party that enables the rapid agenda processing to the leftist party coalition. The concurrent performance evaluation of citizens on measures taken by the administration is beyond the scope of this research, and it is worth to be taken into account for the future research agenda.

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