



Norwegian University  
of Life Sciences

**Bachelor's Thesis Spring 2023 15 ECTS**

Faculty of Landscape and Society  
NORAGRIC

# **Slipping through the cracks: effects of the peace accords – a case study on Putumayo, Colombia**

**Selma Amundsen Otterlei**

International Environment and Development Studies

## Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>BACKGROUND: COLOMBIA .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>CASE STUDY: PUTUMAYO.....</b>	<b>9</b>
4.1	PRE-ACCORD CONFLICT .....	10
4.2	POST-ACCORDS.....	12
4.3	THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE: DEFORESTATION .....	12
4.4	CONTINUED DEPENDENCE ON COCA .....	14
<b>5</b>	<b>ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION .....</b>	<b>15</b>
5.1	ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS .....	16
5.2	COCA RELATED CONFLICT AND INSECURITY .....	18
5.3	CRIMINALISING CAMPESINOS .....	21
5.4	WHO BENEFITS FROM THE ACCORDS? .....	22
5.5	THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND PEACE BUILDING .....	23
<b>6</b>	<b>CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>27</b>

# 1 Introduction

Colombia is a biodiverse and resource-rich country north in South America. A portion of the Amazon rainforest stretches from the Ecuadorian border in the west to the Venezuelan border in the east and is home to an abundance of plant and animal species and several indigenous and rural communities. The country is also known for its history of violent conflict, stemming back to the 1940s and a period known as ‘La Violencia’ (Molano, 2000). Colombia suffers from high levels of inequality, unequal land distribution, and poor government reach in rural areas, which have been drivers for conflict (Suarez et al., 2018).

The lack of local governance means that large parts of the Amazon have historically been hotspots of armed conflict. For instance, the Amazonian departments of Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare were all former strongholds for the FARC guerrilla group (Krause, 2020). The forest is beneficial for armed groups as it provides cover from the state military, in addition, to cover for illicit activities. Moreover, poor state governance means the armed groups can act as local governance, thereby implementing taxes on rural farmers or incentivizing them to grow coca.

Colombians saw 2016 as the start of a new era of peace when the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement (Negret et al., 2019). The agreement led the FARC to put down arms and demobilise, while the government were to provide previous conflict zones with livelihood security and decrease inequality (Government of Colombia, 2016). Subsequently, Colombia is now in a transitional justice process, as they are working through a past of violence toward a future of peace (Martin & Pedraza, 2022).

Internationally, the Colombian peace accord has been credited for being holistic and inclusive. However, although the accord includes six comprehensive items, the peace accord does not include environmental protection (Paarlberg-Kvam, 2021). Simultaneously, deforestation and environmental degradation have increased since it was signed – especially in remote, resource-rich regions such as Putumayo (Krause, 2020). The question is if there is a link between the peace accords and increased deforestation. In post-conflict transitions, governments prioritise restoring socio-economic conditions. However, this can often come at

the cost of environmental sustainability, which has been the case in Colombia, where in 2017, deforestation in the Amazon region more than doubled (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2020).

Scholar Roa-García wrote in 2016, “there will not be peace in the territories without environmental peace” (Roa-García, 2016: 9). Therefore, I want to look further into how things are for rural peasant farmers, known as *campesinos*, after the signing of the peace accords and whether the holistic and inclusive peace accords have benefitted them. Campesinos are poor, subsistence-based, rural farmers, primarily of mestizo ethnicity. Mestizos are the majority ethnicity in Colombia and refer to people of mixed European and Indigenous American ancestry (World Atlas, 2019). In Colombia, campesinos have a history of being marginalised through unequal land distribution and ownership. Therefore, political ecology will be a helpful tool, as it explores the impacts on marginalised communities in conflicts of access to and control over resources. The question this thesis aims to answer is: What effects do the peace accords have on rural campesino communities in Putumayo?

To help answer the research question above, I will look at (1) how rural communities in Putumayo have experienced insecurity before and after the signing of the peace accords, (2) whom the peace accords benefit the most, (3) if the accords have succeeded in ensuring peace and security in Putumayo. This thesis is based on a literature review. Therefore, I will review second-hand literature to write this thesis and answer the research question. The literature ranges from academic journals, reports, research papers and books to newspaper articles. Furthermore, I will use political ecology to guide my analysis because it integrates environmental and social issues and aims to understand questions about conflict, environment and society (Robbins, 2012).

To start, Chapter 2 will give an overview of political ecology as the conceptual framework. Chapter 3 will provide a brief background on the situation in Colombia and the consequent peace agreement, while Chapter 4 will provide context for the local scale and case study on Putumayo. To do this I will review relevant literature around life in Putumayo, deforestation, extractive industries, the government and the peace accords in Colombia. Then I will follow this up in Chapter 5 with an analysis and discussion where I reflect on my findings and how the results from the signing of the peace accords have affected the locals in Putumayo. Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude my thesis with a summary of the most important findings of my analysis and answer the research question.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

### Political Ecology

A political ecology framework will guide my analysis, as it provides a valuable framework for analysing the social impacts of the Colombian peace accords. Political ecology is a critical approach that holistically explores how nature and society (culture, power and politics) are produced together (Blaser et al., 2023; Robbins, 2012). It examines the intricate relationships between politics, power and the environment. The ecological aspect relates to the environment, while the political aspect demonstrates how various forms of power play a role in environmental degradation and struggles over resources (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021; Le Billon & Duffy, 2018). In other words, in political ecology environmental change is considered embedded in political and economic structures, thus, it aims to provide an alternative way of studying environmental issues by critically analysing power relations (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021).

While several scholars have defined political ecology, Colombian scholar Arturo Escobar (2006) captures the essence and defines how “political ecology looks at conflicts over access to, and control over, natural resources – particularly as a source of livelihoods, including the costs of environmental destruction” (Escobar, 2006: 8). This is relevant, as this thesis will discuss the effects of the accords on local livelihoods as a result of conflict stemming from control over and access to resources. Moreover, political ecology critically examines how power relations intersect to create these conflicts, which will help reveal differences and inequalities in how costs and benefits are distributed (Robbins, 2012). The attention generally lies on marginalised communities at a local scale, which makes political ecology a fitting lens considering this thesis focuses on the impacts on rural peasant farmers, known as campesinos (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021).

### The concept of power in political ecology

Power is central to political ecology, especially the different types of power and power resources. Firstly, actor-oriented power entails an actor’s ability to produce actions that achieve intended effects, despite resistance from others (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021). Secondly, economic structures also influence power, and those who own the means of production (e.g. regarding natural resources) generally have more power than those who don’t (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021). Thirdly, social structures play a significant role, as powerful

actors can get others to do things they wouldn't choose to do (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021). This is important, as in the case of Colombia, not all those who contribute to negative effects do so intentionally.

Furthermore, within political ecology, different actors have and use a range of power resources (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021). These are often unequally distributed between actors based on ethnicity, gender, age and nationality or based on class, as is central to this thesis on campesinos (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021). Some power resources established by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2021) are economic resources (financial capital or ownership of business), ownership, control over and use rights to land and natural resources (land-grabbing), political resources (influence over policies, laws and public budgets), knowledge (production of and access to information) and violence and coercion by the State (forced relocation to allow extraction, the militarisation of conservation) (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021). These power resources play an important role in the analysis of this thesis.

### Violence

Violence plays a central role concerning access to and control over resources in Colombia and will be discussed frequently in this thesis. The Cambridge Dictionary defines violence as “actions or words that are intended to hurt people” and “extreme force” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). However, with political ecology, this definition is narrow and does not encompass the many ways marginalised communities experience violence. Violence can be expressed in more forms than just physical violence. A political ecology lens also considers structural forms of violence, such as poverty, neglect and marginalisation (Le Billon, 2003). Le Billon and Duffy (2018) explain violence as “a situated and multidimensional process taking many forms and working throughout the various ‘phases’ of conflicts” (Le Billon & Duffy, 2018: 252). Using political ecology, this thesis will work with Le Billon and Duffy’s understanding of violence.

### Useful elements from political ecology

To answer the research question “what are the effects of the peace accords on local communities in Putumayo”, a political ecology framework can help uncover winners and losers, hidden costs, and the uneven power relations that lead to social and environmental outcomes (Robbins, 2012). Several significant actors influence the situation in Colombia and power relations are key. To assess what is happening between the government, different

armed groups and campesinos, it is helpful to look critically at the power relations occurring at different scales within the country.

The Colombian conflict is rooted in unequal access and distribution of land for the rural population with limited power. To understand conflicts, political ecology examines the causes and impacts of unequal power dynamics surrounding natural resources and the environment (Le Billon & Duffy, 2018). Therefore, political ecology is a valuable tool when critically analysing these uneven power relations and their consequent effects. A political ecology perspective will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the complex interactions between politics, power and the environment that shape the outcomes of the Colombian peace agreement.

### Focus of thesis

Colombia is a country with many interlinked and complex factors. However, due to the limited length of this thesis, I am unable to touch on all the intertwined dynamics that make peace, economic stability and environmental sustainability difficult in Colombia. Therefore, I am focusing my thesis on Putumayo, and using it as a case study to explore the possible intended and unintended consequences of the accords in rural areas. Moreover, the thesis primarily focuses on the situation of rural campesinos and their communities in Putumayo. Putumayo also has a significant indigenous population with their own dynamics who may also experience possible consequences from the peace accord. However, due to the limited space, this thesis will not discuss their situation. I have chosen to explore campesinos, as their experiences and marginalisation relate to the roots of the conflict and the formation of the FARC.

Therefore, I will look at the role of access to and control over resources. As well as, how environmental degradation and dependence on coca impacts campesinos and their livelihoods. Then, within the umbrella of environmental degradation, I will look at extractive industries, as they are prevalent in Putumayo and play a role in the funding of the peace accords, and the effects of land grabbing, as the FARC's demobilisation has left several rural areas ungoverned.

### 3 Background: Colombia

Colombia has a long history of civil conflict, going back to the 1940s (Molano, 2000). As a result, Colombia has the second most internally displaced people in the world, with close to 7 million internally displaced people (McNeish, 2017; Paarlberg-Kvam, 2021). Poor land governance and highly unequal land distribution and ownership have fuelled the majority of civil unrest and conflict in Colombia (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2020). 81% of Colombian land belongs to 1% of the population, consisting of large landowners, while the remaining 19% of Colombia's productive land is distributed between the 99% of small landholders (Krause, 2020). These inequalities in land ownership, the lack of legal land rights and poor land distribution and governance have fuelled armed conflicts in Colombia (Krause, 2020). The armed conflict has primarily taken place in rural areas in the Amazon region (Suarez et al., 2018)

The Amazon region of Colombia covers about 45% of the country and covers the departments of Amazonas, Vaupés, Caquetá, Guainía, Guaviare and Putumayo (Arroyo, 2016). Many rural campesinos and indigenous people depend on the Amazon for its provisioning (providing food, raw materials and medicinal resources) and regulating services (e.g. climate regulation and preventing soil erosion) to sustain their livelihoods (Ramirez-Gomez et al., 2015). The cultural value of the forests is also important. However, Colombia has high levels of deforestation, which is partly due to Colombia's decentralised system and weak local governance, especially in remote rural areas (Bonilla-Mejía & Higuera-Mendieta, 2019). Poor local governance makes it challenging for the government to enforce environmental laws in remote rural areas (Bonilla-Mejía & Higuera-Mendieta, 2019). As a result of minimal state presence, these remote areas attract a wide range of illegal activities, from illegal logging or mining to coca and drug production (Arias-Gaviria et al., 2021).

#### [The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia](#)

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group formed in 1964 by some campesinos (BBC News, 2016). They were unhappy with the unequal distribution of land and the government's failure to address the needs of rural populations (Molano, 2000). The FARC wanted an agrarian reform and wanted to defend campesinos who experienced violence from large landowners and the State (Molano, 2000). During their years of operation, they were involved in and funded by a range of activities,



including drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion (Saab & Taylor, 2009). The group controlled significant portions of rural Colombia and had strongholds in several areas in the Amazon, including Putumayo (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020).

### Peace accords

November 12<sup>th</sup> 2016 marks when the historically inclusive peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government was ratified, leading to the group's demobilisation. The agreement has a 10-15 year time frame and contains six key items: comprehensive rural reform; political participation; end of the conflict; illicit drugs; victims; implementation and verification (Government of Colombia, 2016). Colombia has been praised due to the accord's inclusivity of gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality (Paarlberg-Kvam, 2021). However, the peace agreement does not include concrete provisions for environmental protection (Government of Colombia, 2016).

Access to land is a cornerstone of the peace agreement (Krause, 2020). The agreement includes a comprehensive rural reform that emphasises creating conditions that ensure the health and well-being of the rural population, as well as strengthening the state's presence in rural areas (Government of Colombia, 2016). This item is especially important, as unequal land ownership is a root cause of conflict in Colombia. The rural reform consists of creating a land fund to ensure the free distribution of land to rural people with insufficient or without land (Government of Colombia, 2016). Moreover, the agreement states that areas most affected by the conflict, higher poverty levels, institutional weakness and illicit crops will be prioritised when the reform is implemented (Government of Colombia, 2016). The rural reform's goal is to close the gap between urban and rural and create conditions that ensure the conflict does not repeat itself in order to build stable peace (Government of Colombia, 2016).

In addition to the rural reform, the accords include a National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS) as a solution to the problem of illicit drugs (Government of Colombia, 2016). PNIS is essentially a program for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, where campesinos agree to substitute coca crops without replanting them or engaging in activity related to drug trafficking (Government of Colombia, 2016). In return, the government gives monthly subsidiary payments and provides technical support to ensure that the campesinos who signed up for voluntary substitution find alternatives that provide them with legal long-term livelihoods (Nilsson & Marín, 2021).

Furthermore, those who did not sign up for voluntary substitution were subject to forced eradication (Nilsson & Marín, 2021).

Implementing such a comprehensive and aspirational peace agreement comes with a price. There are varying estimates regarding the cost of the peace agreement but the general consensus is that it will cost the equivalent of 2% of Colombia's GDP per year for the 10-15 years of implementation (Arnson, 2004). This was estimated to be approximately \$16.8 billion (USD) over ten years (Davis & Trinkunas, 2016). However, more recent estimates put the overall cost at up to \$45 billion (USD) (McNeish, 2017; Serrano, 2017). The Government funds the accords, along with financial support from the U.S., the EU and Norway (Isacson, 2021; Reuters, 2019; The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Among other things, these costs will fund the creation of a new comprehensive system of judicial mechanisms for transitional justice, as well as victim's reparations, building infrastructure, financial support for the FARC's transition into legal political life and everything within the comprehensive rural reform (Government of Colombia, 2016).

#### 4 Case study: Putumayo



Putumayo map from: OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Putumayo is a department in the southern part of Colombia where it shares a border with Ecuador and Peru. The department is characterised by its diverse topography, including the Amazon rainforest, the Andes Mountains and the Putumayo River. Moreover, Putumayo is culturally diverse and home to several indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians (ACAPS, 2022). Due to its location, the region has a rich biodiversity, as well as an abundance of natural resources (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Furthermore, Putumayo is a primarily rural and sparsely populated region where the State has been absent (Tate, 2015). Consequently, Putumayo is a hotspot for deforestation and an epicentre for political violence and illicit activities (Tate, 2016; Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Historically, it is a tumultuous region with a high presence of non-state and criminal actors wanting to govern the region (Tate, 2015). As a result, Putumayo has faced challenges related to poverty, lack of access to basic services, and armed conflict related to drug trafficking and extraction (Tate, 2015).

### Economy

The economy in Putumayo is largely based on agriculture; thus, a majority of the population relies on agriculture for subsistence (Barbosa, 2020). Furthermore, natural resource extraction represents a significant part of the department and country's economy. Putumayo has several oil reserves and is an important producer of crude oil, which represents 63% of Putumayo's GDP (Deacon, 2018). Simultaneously, the oil industry has had negative impacts on the area, through environmental degradation and social conflicts, and the national importance of oil has led the other sectors of the economy in Putumayo to be far less developed (Deacon, 2018). In addition, since the 1980s, the economy in Putumayo has become strongly tied to coca production, which has been the source of a lot of conflict in the department (Tate, 2015).

#### 4.1 Pre-Accord Conflict

The FARC settled in Putumayo in the 1980s during the rise of coca cultivation in Colombia and took control of most of the social and economic aspects of the area (Tate, 2017). As the FARC began growing in size they needed more funding. Therefore, they began cultivating coca (the key ingredient in cocaine) and expanded the industry in Putumayo (Molano, 2000). Due to its location bordering both Peru and Ecuador, it is a tactical region for illicit activities such as drug trafficking. Coca cultivation was beneficial as coca was a profitable and easy plant to grow (Molano, 2000). Additionally, it provided subsistence to campesinos (Van

Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). As a result, Colombia entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the world's largest producer of coca, with more than 40% of the coca coming from Putumayo (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020).

At the same time, however, conflict in Putumayo intensified as paramilitary forces entered the area and fought to gain control (Tate, 2017). The paramilitary were non-state armed groups formed by right-wing economic and political elites and former drug traffickers in opposition to left-wing guerrillas (Garcia, 2022; Saab & Taylor, 2009). They had ties to the military and government but the extent of these ties is up for debate (Álvarez, 2003; Hanson, 2008). However, the paramilitary forces had connections to the counterinsurgency efforts of local military commanders, as well as to the Medellin and Cali cartels (Tate, 2015). Their target was taking over control of coca cultivation areas and the FARC's taxation of coca production (Tate, 2015). In reaction to the presence of paramilitary, the FARC also increased their violent activities. Consequently, this put the campesinos cultivating the coca in the middle of two armed groups.

As a result of the increase in violent conflict and coca production, in 1999, Colombia partook in an antidrug and counterinsurgency campaign funded by the US (Mejía, 2016). This campaign was known as Plan Colombia, and Putumayo became the campaign's primary target (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Plan Colombia's goal was to enable recovery of state control from the FARC, specifically by eradicating coca cultivation, as it was the source of the FARC's funding (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020).

The main strategy for the campaign was aerial fumigation of coca with herbicides to kill the plantations (Mejía, 2016). However, areal fumigation also harmed the soil and the environment, which destroyed other subsistence crops and thereby caused displacement, as campesinos could not sustain their livelihoods (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Aerial fumigation also harmed human health (Acero & Thomson, 2022). Furthermore, Plan Colombia involved manual eradication campaigns, where workers, along with the Armed Forces and National Police, manually destroyed the coca crops (Mejía, 2016). As a result, Plan Colombia led to increased violence between the FARC and the State – with campesinos caught in the middle again.

## 4.2 Post-Accords

In 2016, signing the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC led to the group's demobilization and transformation into a political party (Government of Colombia, 2016). With the FARC demobilised, visible violence between the FARC and the State decreased. However, the demobilisation of the FARC left a power vacuum in their previous strongholds where they had been the dominant local authority (Negret et al., 2019). With Colombia's decentralised system and subsequent weak local governance in rural areas, the State failed to fill in the absence of the FARC (Bonilla-Mejía & Higuera-Mendieta, 2019). According to some scholars, this resulted in de-regulation, as the FARC's governance and what has been termed 'gunpoint conservation' was no longer in place, nor was it replaced by State presence (Martin & Pedraza, 2022). This left the area open and ungoverned.

Furthermore, the State has been slow in implementing the items in the peace agreement, particularly items aimed at rural areas and populations, such as Putumayo (Krause et al., 2022). The slowness is partly because the accords are underfunded, but also because those in government have varied in their willingness to prioritise it and follow through (Isacson, 2021). As of 2020, only 2% of the 104 commitments within the rural reform regarding access to land were accomplished (Krause, 2020). The promised assistance for the chapter of the accord involving a program for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops has also fallen behind (Isacson, 2021). Consequently, the State's inadequacy after they signed the peace accords has led to increased deforestation and coca cultivation in Putumayo.

## 4.3 The Environmental consequences of peace: deforestation

Forests interact with peace and the Colombian conflict in several ways and there is a high correspondence between armed conflict and forests (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). On one hand, armed conflict can increase deforestation through illicit activities such as timber, mining and illicit crops (Hoffmann et al., 2018; Negret et al., 2019). On the other hand, there is also a link between peace and deforestation, as the presence of some armed groups positively influenced forest cover, largely because forests function as financing or cover for armed group operations (Arias-Gaviria et al., 2021; Negret et al., 2019; Sánchez-Cuervo & Aide, 2013).

The FARC unintentionally and intentionally preserved forests. On one hand, they established rules that governed land use. For instance, one rule required that campesinos preserve 30% of their farms as forests (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2020). Thus, the FARC were able to ensure forest cover and protection from Colombian military attacks (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2020). They also prohibited logging, mining and cattle grazing in several areas (Liévano-Latorre et al., 2021). On the other hand, the FARC's presence unintentionally preserved forests by creating areas inaccessible to governments or companies, which kept extractivist development projects at bay (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2020).

Therefore, after the signing of the peace agreement in 2016, there was a 44% increase in deforestation in the Colombian Amazon region, predominantly in former FARC strongholds (Krause, 2020; Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al., 2021). When the State failed to fill the void after the FARC, the area opened up for other powerful non-state actors (e.g. drug cartels, paramilitary, outside investors, large landholders), as well as to land-grabbing and extractive industries (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2020). Land grabbing is when actors acquire land by legal or illegal means and squeeze out local smallholders, and it is the biggest driver of deforestation in the Amazon (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021; Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al., 2021). While extractive industries, cattle ranching and coca production also drive deforestation in interlinked ways (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020).

#### Land grabbing and the expanding agricultural frontier

Land grabbing has intensified since the FARC demobilised (Ganzenmüller et al., 2022). In the Amazon region, land grabbing is mainly done to expand the agricultural frontier (Clerici et al., 2020). When FARC left the area, their land use rules no longer applied. Therefore, both campesinos and large-scale landholders took the opportunity to expand their land by removing forest cover (Krause, 2020). In 2019, the Supreme Court found that illegal land grabbing was responsible for 60-65% of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon region (El Espectador, 2019). However, some land grabbing is also a result of campesinos transitioning from coca to licit activities (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020)

Large amounts of cleared land are used for cattle ranching (Martin & Pedraza, 2022). Amid a history of coca cultivation among campesinos, the Colombian government and the World Bank have promoted cattle ranching as economically productive land use in the Amazon region (Krause, 2020). Furthermore, due to Colombia's poor land distribution and

governance, cattle have historically been used as placeholders to claim ownership over land (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). However, cattle ranching drives deforestation because it expands into forest areas at the agricultural frontier (Krause, 2020).

### Extractive industries

Another main driver for forest cover loss and environmental degradation is resource extraction (Murad & Pearse, 2018). With the demobilisation of FARC, several areas have become available for extractive projects. Some extractive projects are legal and spearheaded by the government, while others are illegal or the result of land grabbing (Martin & Pedraza, 2022). Regarding deforestation, illegal mining is often considered a primary driver, yet after the signing of the peace accords, there has been a significant increase in deforestation due to legal mining (González-González et al., 2021). This means that both legal and illegal mining negatively impact forest cover.

Extractive industries are a significant part of economic growth and development in Colombia (EITI Colombia, 2020). Therefore, the Colombian government believes that extractive industries can pay for peace and have increased extractive projects to finance the comprehensive and costly peace accords (Suarez et al., 2018). Consequently, due to Putumayo's abundance of resources, the signing of the accords has intensified the presence of extractive industries in the region (Tate, 2018). Additionally, because the Government sees extractive industries as integral to the peace process, they have reclassified Putumayo as a mining district rather than a protected Amazon region (Tate, 2018).

#### 4.4 Continued dependence on coca

Coca is another major driver for deforestation in the Colombian Amazon (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2023). The FARC were central actors in the drug trade in Putumayo. However, despite the FARC demobilising, there has been a continuous increase in coca cultivation in Putumayo since the signing of the peace accords (UNODC, 2017). Due to the slow implementation of the accords' rural reform to improve rural economies, many campesinos still depend on coca (Isacson, 2021). Although some have been able to transition into cattle ranching, a lack of infrastructure and state support makes cattle unfeasible in many rural areas (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). The distance and lack of infrastructure in rural areas also impact the viability of cultivating other crops, as they often go bad by the time they reach the market

(Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Moreover, coca is a resilient crop that is easy to grow (Acero & Thomson, 2022). This makes it more viable than other crops considering the loss of soil fertility from previous aerial fumigation. Therefore, it becomes harmful to the environment when campesinos with no other options than coca have to clear forests for coca cultivation.

In addition to the rural reform, the accords included a program for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops. However, the initiative has fallen short due to a lack of funding and slow implementation. Isacson (2021) found that by the end of 2020, only 1% of families that had signed up for a two-year crop substitution program had received the full payments, thereby leaving several campesinos without sufficient resources for the transition from coca cultivation to licit livelihoods. Furthermore, the government has continued forced eradication for those who do not sign up for PNIS or who fail to remove coca crops. All of this has several consequences for the campesinos, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

## 5 Analysis and Discussion

The above chapter has presented the unintended results of the peace accords and the FARC's demobilisation: increased deforestation and coca cultivation. The following chapter will discuss and analyse how these struggles over resources impact the campesinos in rural Putumayo and explore hidden costs. The chapter is first divided into three sections categorising the different impacts related to the environment, coca cultivation and how the State has responded. These three sections will critically discuss how different forms of power and power resources affect the lives of marginalised campesinos in Putumayo. Lastly, there will be a discussion surrounding who is benefitting from the peace accords based on the chapter's exploration of how costs and benefits are distributed.

As Chapter 4 shows, it is not the peace accords themselves that are the issue; rather it's the government's failure in implementing the agreements of the accord and lack of rural state presence that has led to increased environmental degradation and coca cultivation. This, in turn, has caused several issues for the locals in Putumayo. For one, they are impacted by several actors as victims of violence from armed groups and as enemies of the state. Furthermore, environmental degradation increases their vulnerability. Consequently, when the



locals in Putumayo slip through the cracks it leads to issues and insecurities for them that have both short-term and long-term consequences.

## 5.1 Environmental Conflicts

After the signing of the peace accords, the Government has prioritised peace projects that contribute to funding the accord and socioeconomic recovery (Suarez et al., 2018). However, according to Krause (2020), an unintended outcome has been environmental degradation and negative impacts on marginalised communities. The peace accords were made under a neoliberal government in an extractive resource-dependent country and do not include environmental protection (Krause, 2020; Paarlberg-Kvam, 2021). As a result, environmental objectives fall into the background. Consequently, environmental degradation, due to extraction and deforestation, has increased in Putumayo after the peace accords were signed and is a driver for social insecurity for the rural population in Putumayo.

### Overexploitation of resources

The peace accords have led areas to open up to external actors who want to appropriate Putumayan land and natural resources. The extractive industries generate a large amount of wealth for Colombia, therefore the State gives them power. However, Putumayans see few of the benefits from this wealth and more than half of the region's rural population lives in poverty (Deacon, 2018). Instead, the wealth benefits multinational companies and those in larger urban areas (Deacon, 2018). Meanwhile, in addition to living in poverty, Putumayans also face the negative consequences of extraction, such as conflict and environmental harm (Deacon, 2018). This creates a paradox of extractive industries paying for peace nationally; all the while causing an increase in conflict and environmental degradation locally.

Despite the peace agreement, violence and criminal activities related to extractive industries endure (McNeish, 2021). Extraction is frequently linked with armed conflict, especially in rural areas where criminal activities are higher, as armed actors are interested in taxation or power over the extractive frontier (McNeish, 2021). In Putumayo armed groups have bombed pipelines to steal the oil and have kidnapped oil company workers for ransom (Deacon, 2018). Consequently, locals in Putumayo experience violence and an increase in regional militarisation due to extraction-related attacks (Deacon, 2018). Furthermore, protests against extraction are criminalised and activists regularly face violence or in some cases death

(Deacon, 2018; Monroy et al., 2020). McNeish (2021) found that in rural regions, areas of extraction correspond with areas of killings of land defenders. Despite the government promising to take responsibility for investigating these assassinations, in 2021, no arrests had been made (McNeish, 2021). In addition, extraction causes environmental degradation, which then impacts the lands, health and food security of Putumayans (Le Billon, 2001).

Despite the Colombian Constitution stating that extraction must involve the participation of social leaders, extractive projects regularly take place without prior consultation with local communities (Jaskoski, 2020). This is because in Colombia extraction is considered of national interest, thus, the Constitution also declares mineral resources as government property (Krause, 2020; McNeish, 2021). Therefore, even when communities have protested the lack of prior consultation they have been shut down by the Court due to Putumayo's resources having value for national development (Jaskoski, 2020). Political ecologists, such as Le Billon (2001), consider suppressing people's right to determine their use of their environment as a form of violence (Le Billon, 2001). Without local communities supporting extraction, these rights are infringed on and violence is expressed, which is the case in Putumayo, where the majority of locals oppose extractive projects due to their concern over the environmental impacts, as well as the social implications (Deacon, 2018; Paarlberg-Kvam, 2021). In addition, according to Paarlberg-Kvam (2021), the government have labelled people who are anti-mining as being anti-peace due to the extractive industry's role in funding the peace accords.

### Deforestation causing insecurity

Extractive industries, land grabbing and coca cultivation contribute to Putumayo having the country's fifth-highest regional deforestation (Zimmermann, 2017). Forests play an important role in regulating water and loss of forest cover causes soil erosion, which exacerbates the risks and impacts of natural hazards (Murad & Pearse, 2018). Therefore, deforestation increases people's vulnerability to landslides and floods, which are the most frequent natural hazards in Putumayo (Murad & Pearse, 2018). For instance, in 2017, a landslide killed 254 people in Mocoa, the capital city of Putumayo and an area with high levels of deforestation (Zimmermann, 2017). Furthermore, a study done on Putumayo found that floods are more frequent in areas with considerable deforestation (Murad & Pearse, 2018). In total, floods and landslides affected more than 48,000 people in Putumayo in 2021, impacting their access to

shelter, food and water (ACAPS, 2022). The increase in deforestation can therefore increase the vulnerability of local communities, especially those along rivers.

### Long-term effects of environmental degradation

In the long-term, environmental degradation can be a barrier to Putumayo becoming an ecotourism region, which there has been hope for in the post-conflict period (Tate 2016). Areas previously inaccessible due to the conflict are now accessible and can be involved in regional development that can help low-income communities (McClanahan et al., 2019). Expanding ecotourism could contribute to a shift from the current coca and extraction-based economy by providing jobs and investment in the region, as well as a shift to using Putumayo's natural resources in a way that does not only benefit armed groups or big companies (Tate, 2016). This requires ecotourism done with a bottom-up approach rather than as a perpetuation of capitalism and green-washing (McClanahan et al., 2019). During the conflict, many national parks were relatively untouched, with clean rivers and lush forests (Tate, 2016). However, this is changing because the increase in extraction and deforestation causes environmental degradation and biodiversity loss.

Furthermore, climate change is a current and pressing issue that disproportionately impacts the most marginalised and low-income communities (UN, 2016). While powerful actors are degrading the environment through activities that benefit them, Putumayans are becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate change. Climate change causes an increase in extreme weather and subsequent natural hazards, which has caused the number of global environmental refugees to rise (UNHCR, 2022). This could become the case in Putumayo, where high numbers of internally displaced people are already putting pressure on the region (Suarez et al., 2018). Furthermore, for a region with high poverty levels, the frequent rebuilding of infrastructure and communities post-disaster can keep them trapped in a cycle of poverty.

## 5.2 Coca related conflict and insecurity

Contrary to what should be the results of a peace agreement, violence has persisted in Putumayo since the peace accords were signed (ACAPS, 2022; Gomez, 2022). The demobilisation transformed violent conflict rather than ending it (McNeish, 2021). When the FARC demobilised, new armed groups formed and there was an expansion of illegal

paramilitary and drug trafficking groups, which led the State to increase militarisation in the area. Therefore, as long as coca cultivation fuels the economy and State support is weak, Putumayans face insecurity and are vulnerable to violence from various actors.

### Livelihood insecurity – be a criminal or go hungry

There are two main reasons campesinos grow coca, (1) because it's the only profitable crop they can grow, (2) due to threats and pressure from armed groups. This creates a double-edged sword where they are at risk of violence from state and non-state actors. On one hand, the campesinos are criminalised for cultivating the only crop that can easily provide them sustenance. Nilsson and Marín (2021) found that a campesino can make five times as much from coca than other crops, thus coca cultivation provides a higher standard of living and constitutes an important part of rural economies. Furthermore, since the voluntary substitution program is underfunded and slow they receive little to no support from the State to transition to other licit livelihoods (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Instead, the State focuses on the eradication of the crop through the use of military forces (Isacson, 2021). While on the other hand, armed groups use violence to force communities to keep growing coca.

### Increased violence

The continued importance of coca for the rural economy and campesino livelihoods attracts violent conflict. After the demobilisation of the FARC, Putumayans saw a shift from violence by the FARC, to violence from other armed groups (Turkewitz, 2022). These armed groups took advantage of the power vacuum and began fighting for control of the region's coca production (ACAPS, 2022). Putumayo especially attracts conflict due to its lucrative location for drug trafficking across the border. The armed fight for territorial expansion creates a violent environment for local Putumayans caught in the crossfire of armed conflict or displaced (Nilsson & Marín, 2021). According to ACAPS, homicides and six massacres killed 41 civilians in Putumayo between November 2020 and March 2021 – four years after the peace accords were signed (ACAPS, 2022). Furthermore, the presence and activity of armed groups cause increased intervention by military forces, which adds to the tension and again puts campesinos in the middle. Such as in March 2022, when a government military raid killed 11 people, several of them civilians (Daniels, 2022).

Furthermore, criminal organisations benefit from the coca industry. Therefore, armed groups use violence to force campesinos to cultivate coca (Nilsson & Marín, 2021). They have also

murdered environmental defenders who oppose cutting trees to plant more coca (Griffin, 2021). Moreover, armed groups have used violence to sabotage crop substitution programs by threatening or killing campesinos who join these initiatives (Bristow, 2022; Tate, 2018). Putumayo has one of the highest rates of murders related to social leaders promoting the crop substitution program (Krause et al., 2022). As a result, locals are at risk from armed actors if they resist engaging in illicit coca cultivation.

In addition, armed groups and violence lead to more armed groups forming (Turkewitz, 2022). According to security officials interviewed by Turkewitz (2022), over 30 armed groups have formed since 2016. Some join local armed groups for protection from, or to protect against, other armed groups (Turkewitz, 2022). While some join armed groups because it provides a source of income, which the Government has failed to do. Turkewitz (2022) also found that an armed group in Putumayo offered a wage nearly twice Colombia's monthly minimum salary. The drug industry continues to fund these groups that are perpetuating violence and coercive power in rural communities (ACAPS, 2022).

### Forced eradication

Forced eradication is subject to those who do not sign up for voluntary substitution of crops. However, with forced eradication outpacing substitution, many campesinos are at risk from state and armed actors (Isacson, 2021). Due to the slow implementation and payoff for substitution, many campesinos have only gradually removed their crops to ensure some livelihood security, and others have been forced to replant due to missing payments (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Furthermore, Nilsson & Marín (2021) argue that the state overlooks those threatened by armed actors, as they eradicate coca without offering any options or security to those under threat. As a result, many campesinos are forced to choose between voluntarily eradicating crops and risking violence from armed actors or keeping coca crops, which the military can forcefully eradicate (Nilsson & Marín, 2021). Either way campesinos' livelihoods are at risk and their vulnerability and insecurity increase.

Furthermore, according to some campesino leaders, the lack of rural state presence and support for illicit crop substitution alternatives means the state is only visible to them through coca crop eradicators and military forces (Isacson, 2021). Due to its role in funding armed groups and criminal activities, the Colombian military has considered illicit crop cultivation as Colombia's primary security concern (Nilsson & Marín, 2021). The military presence and

forced manual eradication operations intensify conflicts between campesinos cultivating coca and the armed forces working to eradicate the crops (Isacson, 2021). Acero & Thomson (2022) argue that forced eradication is an attack on campesinos' livelihoods. This is especially true when they are not offered sufficient crop substitution. Being left behind by the slow implementation of peace accords keeps campesinos trapped in a vicious cycle where they need to continue coca cultivation; which exposes them to violence; which is what the accords were meant to stop to begin with.

### 5.3 Criminalising campesinos

After signing the peace accords, the government has increased militarisation in many areas. On one hand, the government's response to the increase in deforestation after the signing of the peace accords has been a militarisation of conservation (Tarazona & Parra De Moya, 2023). This involves criminalising deforestation, which has been described as a national security problem (Martin & Pedraza, 2022). Military and state forces are now in place to enforce conservation and target those who deforest (Tarazona & Parra De Moya, 2023). While on the other hand, the State considers resource extraction as necessary for national security due to its part in the economy. Consequently, Martin & Pedraza (2022) have found that the government has also imposed a militarisation form that aims to protect resource extraction. As discussed earlier, an increase in militarisation often causes an increase in violence, especially when related to extraction.

By criminalising deforestation, the government are inadvertently targeting campesinos as forest destroyers. Furthermore, declaring deforestation a crime does not address the structural reasons behind deforestation or offer alternatives to those who deforest out of necessity. Some clear land to graze cattle in a transition away from cultivating illicit crops, while others clear land to claim it due to poor land distribution and land ownership policy (Van Dexter & Visseren-Hamakers, 2020). Moreover, conflict has displaced many campesinos and forced them into forest frontier regions where removing forest cover is necessary for survival (Krause et al., 2022). While those who clear land for coca cultivation usually do so because there are no alternative livelihoods for them (Acero & Thomson, 2022). When the State disregards the factors behind deforestation, many campesinos have little choice but to continue deforesting, which puts them at risk of being targeted by military forces.

Furthermore, militarising conservation ignores that those clearing the forests are often not the architects. Social structures of power allow powerful actors to influence the more vulnerable. Therefore, despite many campesinos physically removing forest cover, most do so on behalf of large-scale deforesters such as armed groups connected to drug trafficking, big domestic landholders and multinational corporations (Furumo & Lambin, 2020; Krause et al., 2022). Instead of going after the powerful big deforesters, the militarisation of conservation goes after the most marginalised (Tarazona & Parra De Moya, 2023). By going after campesinos rather than big-scale deforesters, the government are sending the wrong message, and large-scale deforesters face no consequences for their activities. Large landowners' political and economic power allows them to continue, while campesinos are vulnerable to military attacks and displacement (Krause et al., 2022). Moreover, Furumo & Lambin (2020) argue that militarised conservation that bears down hard on contracted campesinos, rather than the large companies, landholders or armed groups behind it, has limited potential in addressing deforestation.

Additionally, there is a contradiction in the government criminalising deforestation due to environmental harm, yet supporting extraction projects that also cause environmental harm. According to Martin & Pedraza (2022), anyone vocally opposed to extractive projects due to its environmental impacts can be considered enemies of the State or as standing in the way of development. Therefore, campesinos cannot deforest to sustain their livelihoods and cannot oppose other projects that deforest either. Moreover, multinational oil companies can remove forest cover on other's land, while campesinos are criminalised for removing trees on their own land (Acero & Thomson, 2022). In addition, roads built by rural communities due to a lack of state-provided public infrastructure are illegal while the State continues to allow road building and infrastructure for the extractive industry (Acero & Thomson, 2022; Tate, 2018). However, the State targeting campesinos is not uncommon, as one Putumayan community leader said, "everything campesinos do is illegal" (Acero & Thomson, 2022: 1).

#### 5.4 Who benefits from the accords?

As discussed, the local communities in Putumayo are still struggling and facing violence, hardship and insecurity after the signing of the peace accords. This points to an uneven distribution of costs and benefits and leads us to question who the peace accords actually benefit. When the government and the FARC signed the peace agreement, the FARC's

demobilisation was an immediate benefit for the government, as it ended a decade-long national war. Furthermore, former president Juan Manuel Santos received a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the war, earning him international prestige (Nobel Institute, n.d.) In addition, the Colombian government could strengthen their military and police forces, as Isacson (2021) found that approximately half of the billions of dollars Colombia received as assistance from the U.S. went to the military and police. Moreover, with the signing of the peace agreement, the government could expand the extractive sector, justifying it as funding for the peace accord.

On the other hand, the rural communities in Putumayo experienced a shift in insecurity regarding their livelihoods and their physical safety. The government offered them few feasible alternatives to sustain their livelihoods. Therefore, conflict persisted due to continued dependence on coca cultivation and thus, the presence of armed groups increased. Furthermore, the decentralised government failed to fill the void after FARC relinquished control over rural areas and forests. As a result, land grabbing led to deforestation, which, along with environmental impacts from extraction, contributes to trapping locals in a cycle of insecurity.

### 5.5 The political ecology of conflict and peace building

By using political ecology to look at relationships between politics, power and the environment the analysis has found several hidden costs of peace. These are both social impacts and environmental impacts that are inextricably linked. The poor reach and slow implementation of the accords have further marginalised campesinos. Thus, they face poverty and manage nature in a way that will best support their livelihoods, whether that is illegal coca or deforestation for cattle. Either way, they cause environmental harm. However, environmental harm is both a cause and effect of social marginalisation.

The peace accords seem holistic and inclusive because they include gender, race and ethnicity and address rural communities and victims of the conflict. However, they are based on funding from within a capitalist framework of extraction and resource exploitation, which entails environmental degradation. This has also contributed to further marginalising campesinos and displacing campesinos in Putumayo – the same campesinos who are victims of the conflict the accords intend to protect. The relationship between development, peace and



sustainability is complicated. However, there is a contradiction in having extractive powers pay for peace as extraction comes at a high cost for already marginalised campesinos. Therefore, some transitions in Colombian peace building have been violent because they perpetuate poverty and marginalise campesinos.

Furthermore, regarding conflicts over access to and control over resources, following Escobar's (2006) emphasis on natural resources as a source of livelihoods, the analysis has emphasised resources that are source of livelihoods for campesinos. Coca crops are the resources that primarily ensure a viable livelihood for campesinos. However, coca is also involved in conflict where several armed groups and the State are fighting to gain control over the resource. In contrast, campesinos rarely have control over the coca cultivation, but are given access by powerful armed groups who also benefit from campesinos cultivating the crop. Overall, the analysis has shown that campesinos have little control over which resources they have access to, especially related to securing their livelihoods.

The Colombian conflict was partly rooted in the unequal distribution of land. However, even after the peace accords, land and its resources are still divided unequally. Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2021) divide environmental governance into three aspects: use, conservation and distribution. Campesinos are criminalised for growing coca, as the State sees coca as bad for the environment and conservation. However, unequal land distribution leads them to cultivate coca and deforest in order to use nature in a way that satisfies their livelihood needs. Big landowners and companies are the ones who gain from uses of nature, both through agricultural production and extraction – while campesinos see less economic gains from the abundance of resources in Putumayo.

Additionally, political ecology provides a framework for exploring how different forms of power and power relations intersect to create conflicts surrounding resource struggles. The thesis has explored how the power of illegal armed actors and the government intersect to marginalise campesinos and limit their access to resources that can sustain their livelihoods. State power usually comes in the form of military control with the intent to grant security. However, military presence often leads to insecurity for rural communities by creating a violent environment. Power also plays a role in environmental degradation, especially concerning extraction, where extensive resource extraction degrades environments to benefit

those with economic power. Yet, campesinos who degrade the environment on behalf of those with economic power, or to sustain their livelihoods, are criminalised.

## 6 Conclusion

This thesis aimed to answer what effects the peace accords have on the rural campesino communities in Putumayo, and in short, it is complicated, but there have been several injustices.

The factors unleashed in the Colombian post-conflict transition are interlinked and complex. Colombia has an extraction-dependent economy and extractive industries are vital in funding the peace accords. However, extraction attracts violence and causes environmental degradation. Colombia's weak local governance in rural areas led to increased land grabbing and deforestation after the FARC demobilised. While campesinos have also increased deforestation in their transition to or expansion of legal activities such as cattle ranching.

The Government created the peace accords intending to provide security to all those who suffered during the decades long armed conflict. However, some rural communities still face insecurity in the form of poverty, exposure to violence and livelihood insecurity. A red thread throughout all these issues has been the government's failure to implement items of the accord that address the root causes of the conflict. They have been insufficient in supporting rural campesinos and ensuring them sustainable livelihoods.

Furthermore, several forms of violence have persisted in rural Putumayo. There is violence against those opposed to extraction and land defenders who refuse to cultivate coca. There is structural violence from state actors in the form of marginalisation and physical violence through increased militarisation. The formation of several new armed groups has increased violence in areas with extraction or those strategic for drug trafficking where armed groups are fighting for control.

In conclusion, although visible violence between the FARC and the State has disappeared after the signing of the peace accords, the rural campesinos in Putumayo still experience physical and structural violence from various powerful actors. Furthermore, many have little

sovereignty when they have to choose between being criminal or going hungry. Lastly, there is a significant link between peace and environmental protection. Social marginalisation both causes and is caused by environmental harm. Roa Garcá (2016) appears right in stating, “there will not be peace in the territories without environmental peace.”

## 7 References

- ACAPS. (2022). *Colombia: Escalation in violence between non-state armed groups in Putumayo* [Risk Report]. ACAPS. <https://www.acaps.org/special-report/colombia-escalation-violence-putumayo>
- Acero, C., & Thomson, F. (2022). ‘Everything peasants do is illegal’: Colombian coca growers’ everyday experiences of law enforcement and its impacts on state legitimacy. *Third World Quarterly*, 43(11), 2674–2692. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1971517>
- Álvarez, M. D. (2003). Forests in the Time of Violence; Conservation Implications of the Colombian War. *Journal of Sustainable Forestry*. [https://doi.org/10.1300/J091v16n03\\_03](https://doi.org/10.1300/J091v16n03_03)
- Arias-Gaviria, J., Suarez, C. F., Marrero-Trujillo, V., P, J. C. O., Villegas-Palacio, C., & Arango-Aramburo, S. (2021). Drivers and effects of deforestation in Colombia: A systems thinking approach. *Regional Environmental Change*, 21(4), 91. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-021-01822-x>
- Arnson, C. J. (2004). *The social and economic dimensions of conflict and peace in Colombia*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program.
- Arroyo, P. (2016). *Land Rights, Conservation, and Peace in the Colombian Amazon* [Land Rights and Conservation Issue Brief 2016]. MOORE foundation for IUCN.
- Barbosa, C. V. (2020, April 14). Mocoa no tiene siquiera indicador de pobreza. *El Espectador*. <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/mocoa-no-tiene-siquiera-indicador-de-pobreza-article-688037/>
- BBC News. (2016, June 23). Who are the Farc? *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769>
- Benjaminsen, T. A., & Svarstad, H. (2021). *Political Ecology: A critical engagement with global environmental issues*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Blaser, M., Escobar, A., Adamson, I., Gleason, W., & Pellow, D. (2023). *Political Ecology*.
- Bonilla-Mejía, L., & Higuera-Mendieta, I. (2019). Protected Areas under Weak Institutions: Evidence from Colombia. *World Development*, 122, 585–596. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.019>
- Bristow, M. (2022, September 1). World’s Biggest Cocaine Producer Rethinks the War on Drugs. *Bloomberg.Com*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09->

- 01/world-s-biggest-cocaine-producer-rethinks-the-war-on-drugs-q-a
- Cambridge Dictionary. (n.d.). Violence. In *Cambridge Dictionary*. Retrieved May 13, 2023, from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/violence>
- Clerici, N., Armenteras, D., Kareiva, P., Botero, R., Ramírez-Delgado, J. P., Forero-Medina, G., Ochoa, J., Pedraza, C., Schneider, L., Lora, C., Gómez, C., Linares, M., Hirashiki, C., & Biggs, D. (2020). Deforestation in Colombian protected areas increased during post-conflict periods. *Scientific Reports*, *10*(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-61861-y>
- Daniels, J. P. (2022, April 13). Colombia urged to investigate botched army raid that left four civilians dead. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/apr/13/colombia-army-raid-putumayo-investigation>
- Davis, C., & Trinkunas, H. (2016, March 24). *The Colombian peace process deadline passes with no accord. What's next?* Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/24/the-colombian-peace-process-deadline-passes-with-no-accord-whats-next/>
- Deacon, H. (2018). Colombia's Oil Wealth – A Resource for Conflict or Peace?: Putumayo's Natural Resources Extraction in Phases of Conflict Transformation. *Sicherheit Und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace*, *36*(4), 208–213. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26630054>
- EITI Colombia. (2020). *EITI Colombia Report 2019* (p. 238). EITI: Iniciativa para la Transparencia de las Industrias Extractivas. <https://www.eiticolombia.gov.co/es/informes-eiti/informe-2019/>
- El Espectador. (2019, April 3). Compromisos tras fallo que entregó derechos a la Amazonía “no se traducen en acciones.” *El Espectador*. <https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/compromisos-tras-fallo-que-entrego-derechos-a-la-amazonia-no-se-traducen-en-acciones-article-848355/>
- Escobar, A. (2006). Difference and Conflict in the Struggle Over Natural Resources: A political ecology framework. *Development*, *49*(3), 6–13. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100267>
- Furumo, P. R., & Lambin, E. F. (2020). Scaling up zero-deforestation initiatives through public-private partnerships: A look inside post-conflict Colombia. *Global Environmental Change*, *62*, 102055. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102055>
- Ganzenmüller, R., Sylvester, J. M., & Castro-Nunez, A. (2022). What Peace Means for Deforestation: An Analysis of Local Deforestation Dynamics in Times of Conflict and

- Peace in Colombia. *Frontiers in Environmental Science*, 10.  
<https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.803368>
- Garcia, I. (2022, September 5). *Peace and Pesos: How Colombia's Peace Treaty is Impacted by its Developing Economy*. Harvard International Review.  
<https://hir.harvard.edu/peace-and-pesos/>
- Gomez, L. M. (2022, March 2). Violence persists in Colombia's Putumayo 5 years after peace deal. *La Prensa Latina Media*. <https://www.laprensa-latina.com/violence-persists-in-colombias-putumayo-5-years-after-peace-deal/>
- González-González, A., Clerici, N., & Quesada, B. (2021). Growing mining contribution to Colombian deforestation. *Environmental Research Letters*, 16(6), 064046.  
<https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abfcf8>
- Government of Colombia. (2016). *Summary of Colombia's Agreement to End Conflict and Build Peace* [Summary]. <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/summary-colombias-agreement-end-conflict-and-build-peace>
- Griffin, O. (2021, September 13). Killings of Colombia environmental activists hit record, NGO says, despite gov't promises. *Reuters*.  
<https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/killings-colombia-environmental-activists-hit-record-ngo-says-despite-govt-2021-09-13/>
- Hanson, S. (2008). *Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-right-wing-paramilitaries-and-splinter-groups>
- Hoffmann, C., García Márquez, J. R., & Krueger, T. (2018). A local perspective on drivers and measures to slow deforestation in the Andean-Amazonian foothills of Colombia. *Land Use Policy*, 77, 379–391. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.04.043>
- Isacson, A. (2021). *Implementing Colombia's peace accord after five years*. WOLA.  
<https://www.wola.org/analysis/a-long-way-to-go-implementing-colombias-peace-accord-after-five-years/#ftnt10>
- Jaskoski, M. (2020). Participatory Institutions as a Focal Point for Mobilizing: Prior Consultation and Indigenous Conflict in Colombia's Extractive Industries. *Comparative Politics*, 52(4), 537–556. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26976025>
- Krause, T. (2020). Reducing deforestation in Colombia while building peace and pursuing business as usual extractivism? *Journal of Political Ecology*, 27(1), Article 1.  
<https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/JPE/article/view/23186>
- Krause, T., Clerici, N., López, J. M., Sánchez, P. A., Valencia, S., Esguerra-Rezk, J., &

- Dexter, K. V. (2022). A new war on nature and people: Taking stock of the Colombian peace agreement. *Global Sustainability*, 5, e16. <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2022.15>
- Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. *Political Geography*, 20(5), 561–584. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298\(01\)00015-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00015-4)
- Le Billon, P. (2003). The Political Ecology of War and Resource Exploitation. *Studies in Political Economy*, 70(1), 59–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07078552.2003.11827130>
- Le Billon, P., & Duffy, R. V. (2018). Conflict ecologies: Connecting political ecology and peace and conflict studies. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 25(1), Article 1. <https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/JPE/article/view/22704>
- Liévano-Latorre, L. F., Brum, F. T., & Loyola, R. (2021). How effective have been guerrilla occupation and protected areas in avoiding deforestation in Colombia? *Biological Conservation*, 253, 108916. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2020.108916>
- Martin, H. M., & Pedraza, O. (2022). Extinction in transition: Coca, coal, and the production of enmity in Colombia's post-peace accords environment. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 28(1). <https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.4780>
- McClanahan, B., Parra, T. S., & Brisman, A. (2019). Conflict, Environment and Transition: Colombia, Ecology and Tourism after Demobilisation. *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, 8(3), 74–88. <https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v8i3.1246>
- McNeish, J.-A. (2017). Extracting justice? Colombia's commitment to mining and energy as a foundation for peace. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 21(4), 500–516. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2016.1179031>
- McNeish, J.-A. (2021). *Sovereign Forces: Everyday challenges to environmental governance in Latin America*. Berghahn Books.
- Mejía, D. (2016). *Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs* [Foreign Policy]. Brookings.
- Molano, A. (2000). The Evolution Of The Farc: A Guerrilla Group's Long History. *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 34(2), 23–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2000.11722627>
- Monroy, K., David, O., & Fernández Muñoz, M. A. (2020). Putumayo, Colombia. *The State of Jurisdictional Sustainability*.
- Murad, C. A., & Pearse, J. (2018). Landsat study of deforestation in the Amazon region of Colombia: Departments of Caquetá and Putumayo. *Remote Sensing Applications: Society and Environment*, 11, 161–171. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rsase.2018.07.003>

- Murillo-Sandoval, P. J., Dexter, K. V., Hoek, J. V. D., Wrathall, D., & Kennedy, R. (2020). The end of gunpoint conservation: Forest disturbance after the Colombian peace agreement. *Environmental Research Letters*, *15*(3), 034033. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab6ae3>
- Murillo-Sandoval, P. J., Kilbride, J., Tellman, E., Wrathall, D., Van Den Hoek, J., & Kennedy, R. E. (2023). The post-conflict expansion of coca farming and illicit cattle ranching in Colombia. *Scientific Reports*, *13*(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-28918-0>
- Negret, P. J., Sonter, L., Watson, J. E. M., Possingham, H. P., Jones, K. R., Suarez, C., Ochoa-Quintero, J. M., & Maron, M. (2019). Emerging evidence that armed conflict and coca cultivation influence deforestation patterns. *Biological Conservation*, *239*, 108176. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2019.07.021>
- Nilsson, M., & Marín, L. G. (2021). Colombia's Program to Substitute Crops Used for Illegal Purposes: Its Impact on Security and Development. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *15*(3), 309–326. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2021.1921546>
- Nobel Institute. (n.d.). *The Nobel Peace Prize 2016*. NobelPrize.Org. Retrieved May 12, 2023, from <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/santos/facts/>
- Paarlberg-Kvam, K. (2021). Open-pit peace: The power of extractive industries in post-conflict transitions. *Peacebuilding*, *9*(3), 289–310. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2021.1897218>
- Ramirez-Gomez, S. O. I., Torres-Vitolas, C. A., Schreckenber, K., Honzák, M., Cruz-Garcia, G. S., Willcock, S., Palacios, E., Pérez-Miñana, E., Verweij, P. A., & Poppy, G. M. (2015). Analysis of ecosystem services provision in the Colombian Amazon using participatory research and mapping techniques. *Ecosystem Services*, *13*, 93–107. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.12.009>
- Reuters. (2019, October 24). EU to help fund Colombia peace process for additional four years. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-idUSKBN1X32PT>
- Roa-García, M. C. (2016). Environmental Democratisation in Post-War Colombia. *GIGA Focus Latin America*, *No 5*, p 1-13. <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/environmental-democratisation-in-post-war-colombia>
- Robbins, P. (2012). *Political Ecology: A critical introduction* (Second). J. Wiley & Sons.
- Rodríguez-de-Francisco, J. C., del Cairo, C., Ortiz-Gallego, D., Velez-Triana, J. S., Vergara-Gutiérrez, T., & Hein, J. (2021). Post-conflict transition and REDD+ in Colombia:



- Challenges to reducing deforestation in the Amazon. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 127, 102450. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2021.102450>
- Saab, B. Y., & Taylor, A. W. (2009). Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(6), 455–475. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902892570>
- Sánchez-Cuervo, A. M., & Aide, T. M. (2013). Consequences of the Armed Conflict, Forced Human Displacement, and Land Abandonment on Forest Cover Change in Colombia: A Multi-scaled Analysis. *Ecosystems*, 16(6), 1052–1070. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10021-013-9667-y>
- Serrano, F. (2017, August 30). The Economics of the Colombia-FARC Peace Accord. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2017-08-30/economics-colombia-farc-peace-accord>
- Suarez, A., Árias-Arévalo, P. A., & Martínez-Mera, E. (2018). Environmental sustainability in post-conflict countries: Insights for rural Colombia. *Environment, Development and Sustainability*, 20(3), 997–1015. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-017-9925-9>
- Tarazona, D., & Parra De Moya, J. (2023, April 27). Operation Artemis: Colombia’s failed military operation to stop deforestation. *Mongabay Environmental News*. <https://news.mongabay.com/2023/04/operation-artemis-colombias-failed-military-operation-to-stop-deforestation/>
- Tate, W. (2015). The Aspirational State: State Effects in Putumayo. In *State Theory and Andean Politics: New Approaches to the Study of Rule*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Tate, W. (2016). A Peaceful Putumayo? | NACLA. *NACLA*. <https://nacla.org/news/2016/07/11/peaceful-putumayo>
- Tate, W. (2017). Post-Accord Putumayo. *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology*, 22(1), 164–173. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jlca.12267>
- Tate, W. (2018). A Precarious Peace in Putumayo. *NACLA*. <https://nacla.org/news/2018/05/04/precarious-peace-putumayo>
- The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022, July 6). *The peace process in Colombia* [Redaksjonellartikkel]. Government.No; regjeringen.no. [https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways\\_engagement/peace\\_colombia/id2522231/](https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/peace_colombia/id2522231/)
- Turkewitz, J. (2022, April 20). Deep in Colombia, Rebels and Soldiers Fight for the Same Prize: Drugs. *The New York Times*.

- <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/world/americas/colombia-comandos-armed-groups.html>
- UN. (2016, October 3). Inequalities exacerbate climate impacts on poor. *United Nations Sustainable Development*.  
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/report-inequalities-exacerbate-climate-impacts-on-poor/>
- UNHCR. (2022, July 19). *Displaced on the frontlines of the climate emergency*. The UN Refugee Agency: storymap.  
<https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/065d18218b654c798ae9f360a626d903>
- UNODC. (2017). *Summary Fact Sheet—Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 2017*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2018/September/coca-crops-in-colombia-at-all-time-high--unodc-report-finds.html>
- Van Dexter, K., & Visseren-Hamakers, I. (2020). Forests in the time of peace. *Journal of Land Use Science*, 15(2–3), 327–342.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1747423X.2019.1699614>
- World Atlas. (2019, July 18). *Ethnic Groups Of Colombia*. WorldAtlas.  
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-colombia.html>
- Zimmermann, M. L. (2017, April 20). A foreseen environmental disaster in Colombia? *Mongabay Environmental News*. <https://news.mongabay.com/2017/04/a-foreseen-environmental-disaster-in-colombia/>



**Norges miljø- og biovitenskapelige universitet**  
Noregs miljø- og biovitenskapelige universitet  
Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Postboks 5003  
NO-1432 Ås  
Norway