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Self-report personality measures of fake good in employment selection

Adam D. Weilbaecher

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Adam D. Weilbaecher entitled "Self-report personality measures of fake good in employment selection." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.

John W. Lounsbury, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

Michael G. Johnson, John Peters, Eric Sundstrom

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To the Graduate Council:

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
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
Interim Vice Provost and
Dean of the Graduate School

SELF-REPORT PERSONALITY MEASURES OF FAKE GOOD

IN EMPLOYMENT SELECTION

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Adam D. Weilbaecher

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ABSTRACT

Self-report personality inventories are widely used for psychological assessment purposes. However, a common objection to their use, particularly in employment selection, is that individuals may deliberately distort or fake their responses, and research has demonstrated that the results of many psychological instruments are vulnerable to faking. Researchers, though, disagree on how best to operationalize the construct, and results are inconclusive regarding whether faking attenuates the validity of personality measures. The present study provides empirical support that fake good may not just reflect artifact and contamination but individual differences in personality and impression management motivation.

The current study investigated the relationship between fake good, job performance, and personality variables, using a work-based measure of personality, the Personal Style Inventory (PSI). Examining populations of production workers, restaurant managers, and sales representatives ($N = 503$) in four different organizations using correlational and multiple regression analyses, fake good was positively related to job performance in one population.

The tendency to respond to fake good items was consistently related to agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness across all job-types and organizations included in this study. Results also indicate that the relationship between fake good and other work-based measures of personality (i.e., work drive, customer service orientation, orderliness, and selling enthusiasm) appeared dependent on job type or perceived job demands. Removing the effects of fake good from personality measures

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did not enhance criterion-related validity of personality constructs for predicting job performance.

Study results provide further evidence that fake good reflects individual differences in personality. Results also suggest that the role of fake good in the prediction of job performance may be dependent on organizational culture and job type. Results confirm previous research in which correction procedures have failed to enhance validity. As an individual differences variable, correcting for fake good may partial out meaningful trait variance—fake good reflects overlap in variance with personality predictors.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the 1920s the self-report questionnaire became one of the most popular techniques in psychological research and assessment. Self-report measures were developed for many different forms of psychological inquiry, including applied psychological and personality theory and trait development (Cattell, 1973). They are often an expedient, inexpensive means of psychological testing but typically require voluntary participation and a cooperative attitude on the part of the participant.

A common objection to the use of self-report personality inventories in psychological assessment is that people deliberately distort or fake their responses, and the vulnerability of personality instruments to response bias is well documented in the literature (e.g., Furnham, 1990; Burbeck & Furnham, 1984; Gudjonsson & Adlam, 1983). Researchers have offered various terms for the faking of self-report measures, including response distortion, impression management, dissimulation, self-enhancement, and social desirability (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996).

The possibility of intentional response distortion in self-report measures is a major criticism against the use of personality measures in employment selection decisions (Hough et al., 1990). Recently, some researchers (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996) have asserted that individual distortion of self-report measures does not attenuate criterion validities and that faking does not seriously affect the outcome of personality

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measures. In addition, there is some concern in the literature that correcting scores on self-report measures for faking may decrease validity coefficients.

Some research has demonstrated that individuals who respond more desirably or fake good on self-report personality measures are less neurotic, more conscientious, and more favorably evaluated by their peers (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989). Such results can be interpreted as indicating that faking good may not just reflect response contamination or artifact. Consequently, some researchers (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1983) view response biases as measures of substantive traits. The correlation between impression management and personality measures may reflect content overlap that enhances rather than lowers validity (McCrae & Costa, 1983; Nicholson & Hogan, 1990).

Faking good to some extent may be appropriate for job candidates. The lack of effort to manage impressions may have personality correlates with negative consequences for organizational outcomes. For example, many sales jobs require frequent social interaction and consistent demonstration of emotional stability and extraversion. Also, the social group with whom an individual identifies or is associated may either encourage or discourage impression management behaviors. In some job settings, social influence and conformity is important (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987).

The present study investigates the relationship between fake good and job performance and personality traits. It addresses the issue of whether controlling for fake good enhances criterion-related validities and which personality traits compose faking. An additional goal of this study is to explore the nomological validity of faking, particularly how faking relates to work based measures of personality. Self-report

measures used for applied assessments (e.g., employment selection) may introduce error into the self-presentation process if respondents have difficulty connecting item content with a work role or context (Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995).

A final goal is to identify job and organizational factors that may influence the role of fake good in predicting performance using multiple organizational samples. This should advance our understanding of occupational settings and job-types that may be more susceptible to faking.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Psychological testing generally requires voluntary participation and a cooperative attitude on the part of the participant (Cattell, 1973). However, many participants consciously or unconsciously attempt to present misleading responses, and individuals' reports of their own interests, attitudes, traits, and behavior often involve systematic biases that distort measurement of content variables (Paulhus, 1991). Mills and Hogan (1997) characterized test-taking behavior as a form of social interaction closely resembling social behavior in general. During test sessions, as during most social intercourse, individuals manage the impression that others are forming of them. Therefore, self-report responses may represent factual communications about the self (self-disclosure) or how an individual wishes to be regarded (self-presentation) (Johnson, 1981).

The results of many psychological instruments are vulnerable to faking by respondents attempting to deliberately distort their responses. Gordon and Gross (1978) noted that fakeable instruments allow the respondent to emphasize socially desirable personal characteristics while concealing other aspects of his or her real character. Thus, fakeable instruments may provide inaccurate measurements of a respondent's interests, attitudes, and personality.

Faking can take one of three forms: deliberate sabotage by random, patterned, or meaningless responses; motivational distortion to achieve a particular, desired profile; or self-deception and ignorance, whereby the respondent lacks self-insight and

understanding and is unable to accurately report his or her attitude, beliefs, or behaviors (Furnham, 1990). In the literature, researchers have offered various terms for the faking of self-report measures, including response distortion, impression management, dissimulation, self-enhancement, and social desirability (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Lautenschlauger, 1994; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Korbin, 1995).

Social Desirability

People learn to behave in socially desirable ways in their everyday life, and desirable activities occur more frequently than undesirable activities (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989). Further, people regularly monitor their behavior during social encounters to maintain a positive public persona. Presenting a socially desirable persona underlies social interaction. Hence, skills in social communication and interaction have important consequences for social behavior and the organization of a person's life. The impressions that people make on others often have implications for how others perceive, evaluate, and treat them. They also have implications for desired outcomes, self-esteem, and self-identity (Leary & Kowalski, 1990).

Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) is the term for a form of response bias used in the literature to refer to a manner of presenting oneself in a favorable light, typically referred to as faking good (Furnham, 1986). Social desirability appears to be multi-faceted, including both self-deception—the respondent actually believes his or her positive self-reports—and impression management—the respondent consciously dissembles or fakes a positive self-report (Paulhus, 1984).

A Two-Factor Model of Social Desirability

Factor analytic studies conducted in the 1960s (e.g., Block, 1965; Wiggins, 1964) demonstrated support for a two-factor model of SDR, with impression management and self-deception components. More recently, Paulhus (1984) conducted a series of studies, including exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, as part of the development of a new SDR instrument, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). The BIDR consists of an Impression Management (IM) factor and a Self-deception (Sd) factor. The item content of the IM sub-scale centers on overt socially desirable behaviors, while the Sd sub-scale consists of items characterized by threatening thoughts and reported insecurity (Paulhus, 1984). Roth, Snyder, and Pace (1986) offered a somewhat different interpretation of the two-factor model in which item content is either threatening (e.g., questions about sexual behaviors) or non-threatening.

Impression Management

Schlenker (1980) defined impression management as "the attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions" (p. 6). It represents purposeful manipulation to create the most positive social image to present the particular impression of a person who is socially conventional and dependable (Paulhus, 1991). The fundamental assumption is that people regularly monitor their impact on others and will alter their behaviors to affect others' impressions of them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). In social situations, individuals attempt to manage a variety of impressions about themselves, including trustworthiness, intelligence, sincerity, and motivation (Snyder & Copeland, 1989). Impression management has been viewed as strategic dissimulation

(i.e., for advantage or instrumental value), as a motive (i.e., need for approval), and as a skill (i.e., self-monitoring) (Paulhus, 1985).

Evidently, the tendency to manage impressions will depend upon the interaction of situational demands, motives, and personal characteristics. The motive to distort impressions will be high in situations for which there are implications for outcomes, self-esteem, or identity (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Impression management allows an individual to present positive attributes while concealing negative personal characteristics that might jeopardize the opportunity to obtain valued outcomes (e.g., being selected for a job or desired role). Individuals differ in their ability to manage impressions as well as their view of what is socially desirable for a given role or situation. Impression management tends to be a more salient concern for individuals who are other-directed and view themselves as social objects.

Self-Deception

Self-deceptive responding involves the protection of self-beliefs, including the maintenance of self-esteem (Paulhus, 1986). Self-deceptive responding involves unconscious self-defensiveness, and it is highly related to anxiety, self-esteem, repression, and psychological adjustment (Paulhus, 1984, 1986). Consequently, many psychological measures of self-deception have a psychoanalytic basis or influence. Well adjusted individuals tend to have a positively biased view of themselves, which facilitates self-confidence and optimism as well as avoiding negative thoughts and playing down criticisms and failures (Paulhus, 1986, 1991). However, Roth et al, (1986) found that an unrealistic positive self-bias was more effective for maintaining psychological well being

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than a tendency to deny negative aspects of the self. Individuals with a high need for approval tend to employ defensive behaviors, similar to self-deception, to avoid negative personal evaluations. They are also inclined to avoid recognizing socially unacceptable aspects of their behavior (Adams, Beatty, & Behnke, 1980). Self-deception depends on the clarity of one's self-image and social role-playing skills. Therefore, self-report inconsistency may be a function of an ill-defined social identity or lack of skills in social communication and interaction (Johnson, 1981). In contrast to impression management, since self-deception is confounded with psychological adjustment, it should not be considered a contaminant in self-report assessments.

In contrast to impression management, self-deception does not appear to be contextually bound and is independent of the testing situation as well as the purpose of assessment (Mersman & Shultz, 1998). For example, self-deceptive behaviors are typical of psychologically well-adjusted individuals with positive self-biases as well as of individuals who lack self-awareness. Another key distinction between impression management and self-deception is intentionally. Self-deceived individuals are unaware of their motives; intentionally is therefore associated with conscious efforts to manage impressions but not with self-deception (Sackeim & Gur, 1978).

Operationalization of Response Distortion

There is disagreement in the literature regarding the conceptualization of response distortion. Some view social desirability bias as a personality trait (Edwards, 1957, 1970; McCrae & Costa, 1983), others as a response set (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Nicholson

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& Hogan, 1990). Still others have considered it as a source of method variance (Block, 1965; Wiggins, 1968).

Social Desirability Bias and Personality

Edwards (1957) viewed social desirability—the tendency to endorse favorable self-descriptive statements that appear representative of actual individual characteristics—as a personality trait. Researchers have noted that self-report measures of social desirability are correlated with personality measures, principally emotional stability and conscientiousness (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reis, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1983). Mills and Hogan (1977) showed that individual differences in empathy were associated with the congruence between a person's scale scores, self-ratings, and peer ratings. Thus, socially desirable responding may indicate relatively stable individual differences in the ability to project a self-image.

Early research on social desirability indicated a close relationship between endorsement of SD items and psychological adjustment (e.g., Heilbrun, 1964; Crown & Marlowe, 1960). Heilbrun (1964) concluded that the dimensions of psychological health and SDE were one and the same. Measures of social desirability consistently correlate with measures of emotional stability and conscientiousness (e.g., Furnham, 1990; Hough et al., 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1983). Ross, Bailey, and Millis (1997) found that the factors of neuroticism and conscientiousness on the NEO-PI-R were most sensitive to positive self-presentation effects—neuroticism was negatively related and conscientiousness was positively related to self-presentation. Additionally, peer reports as

well as self-reports indicate that individuals who describe themselves in socially desirable ways are less neurotic and more conscientious (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989).

Stricker (1969) noted that people vary widely in their success in faking and proposed a measure of test-wiseness as a moderator of socially desirable responding; test-wiseness involves several abilities, including the ability to respond in accordance with a prescribed role in completing a personality questionnaire. Stricker (1969) found that when he eliminated, by partial correlation procedures, the shared variance between measures of emotional stability, test-wiseness, and social desirability, the correlation between test-wiseness and social desirability was markedly attenuated.

Social Desirability as a Response Set

Crowne and Marlowe (1960) viewed SD as a response set or a need for approval. Response sets refer to tendencies to respond to test item content with consideration to portraying a certain self-presentation (Rorer, 1990). In this light, SD is not merely a distortion of test responses but a motivational state that arises from an awareness of being evaluated (Tulkin, Muller, & Conn, 1969). McGee (1967) noted that individuals have exhibited response sets in perception (e.g. of ambiguous pictures), method of solving verbal reasoning problems, rate of learning a serial discrimination, and even judging the size of coins. Personality traits have also been conceived of as response sets—a readiness to respond to a variety of stimuli in relatively consistent ways. In fact, scores on scales designed to measure many personality traits are correlated with scores on scales designed to measure socially desirable response set (Nicholson & Hogan, 1990).

Response Distortion as Contamination

Socially desirable responding reflects contamination when the construct that it represents is unrelated conceptually to the constructs of interest (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). From this view, individuals' reports of their own interest, attitudes, traits, and behavior may involve systematic biases that distort measurement of relevant content variables (Paulhus, 1991). There are also other situations for which responses reflect contamination. For example, random responding is a response pattern in which responses appear disengaged from the content of test items. Observed sources of random responding include scoring errors, problems in understanding the items or instructions, or a lack of willingness or ability to respond to item content (Lanning, 1989). In some assessment situations, respondents may be uncooperative and simply lie or consciously deceive.

Self-Report Measures of Social Desirability

Meehl and Hathaway (1946) provided a practical research method and set of techniques for addressing distortion on personality measures. They developed three techniques for measuring and correcting both conscious and unconscious self-deception on personality instruments, reviewing previous research strategies and incorporating the findings from their own research. Their research set the standard for subsequent work in the development of validity scales for objective personality inventories (Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991).

The first technique that Meehl and Hathaway (1946) recommended consisted of strategies to eliminate deliberate disintegrity, such as instructions to respond honestly, the repetition of items, and disguising items. Another technique involved methods to detect or measure sources of error and to adjust personality test scores accordingly on the basis of the error sources. This led to the development of the Lie scale (L scale) for the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) by Meehl and Hathaway (1946). The final technique involved the development of personality scales by empirically deriving test items (i.e., empirical keying). Meehl and Hathaway (1946) compared differences in item endorsements of hospitalized, behavior-disordered patients (i.e., alcoholics and psychopaths) and a group of normal subjects to develop the K scale for the MMPI. This scale detects less extreme, conscious tendencies to fake good and is related to Paulhus' (1984) Self-deception Factor.

Edwards constructed a personality inventory, the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) that attempted to eliminate socially desirable responding by presenting respondents with response dyads that are equally matched in social desirability (Orpen, 1988). Edwards used an SD scale consisting of items from the MMPI judged to be either socially desirable or undesirable. Based on a consensus of group judgments, items were given an SD scale value (SDSV) indicating the location of the item on the SD continuum (Edwards, 1960). Factor analyses (Wiggins, 1964; Paulhus, 1984) show that Edwards SD scale is a measure of self-deception, in the same vein as the MMPI K scale and the Self-deception Questionnaire (SDQ) developed by Sackeim and Gur (1979).

The majority of instruments developed to assess individual differences in social desirability appear to measure impression management, focussing on conscious, purposeful deception that is instrumental in attaining some goal (e.g., a new job, impressing a supervisor or the test administrator) (Paulhus, 1985). The MMPI Lie scale was developed for this purpose, as were the Eysenck Personality lie scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), the Faking scale for the 16PF (Winder, O'dell, & Karson, 1975), and the Other-deception Questionnaire (ODQ) (Sackeim & Gur, 1978). Other measures focus on impression management as a goal in itself—to get people to like them—and include Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) Need for Approval scale and Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring scale (Paulhus, 1985). The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and the BIDR (Paulhus, 1984) measure both impression management and self-deception, though only the latter has distinct sub-scales.

Measurement Consequences of Correcting SDR

Some research has demonstrated that individuals who respond more desirably on self-report personality measures are less neurotic, more conscientious, and more favorably evaluated by their peers (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989). Therefore, socially desirable responding may not just reflect contamination that should be controlled. The correlation between an SD scale and a personality measure may reflect content overlap that enhances rather than lowers validity (McCrae & Costa, 1983; Nicholson & Hogan, 1990). In fact, correcting for SD reduces validity coefficients.

Hough et al. (1990) have reviewed several strategies for addressing intentional response distortion. For example, the forced-choice question format was developed to reduce faking by making respondents choose between equally desirable or undesirable statements; the method involves pairing statements judged to be similar in social desirability. Another strategy is the use of subtle items, in which the underlying construct or content variable is not obvious. Though research (e.g., Alliger, Lilenfield & Mitchell, 1996) has found that subtle items are less easily faked than more transparent ones, subtle items tend to be less valid, and their use may reduce scale validity. Further, self-report measures with subtle items also lack face validity and can lead to negative reactions from respondents. Endorsement of subtle items has also been associated with psychological sophistication, such that respondents scoring lower on psychological mindedness (using the CPI Py Scale) endorsed more obvious scale items (Burkhart, Gynther, & Christian, 1978).

Finally, warning respondents that the accuracy of their responses will be verified has been shown to be an effective method for reducing intentional distortion on self-report measures (Hough et al., 1990). For example, with the bogus pipeline technique, respondents are told that their attitudes can be directly assessed through physiological measures. As a test of self-insight, they are asked to guess a machine's reading for each attitude question, presumably responding more honestly to avoid embarrassment. The efficacy of the bogus pipeline technique and modified versions of it has been documented; its increases admissions of undesirable behaviors, such as racist and sexist attitudes, and prior knowledge of test answers (Paulhus, 1991).

SD may be seen as a property of scales and items, with systematic differences in the desirability of their responses, or it may be seen as an individual difference variable (McCrae & Costa, 1983). In the former case, various techniques have been offered to correct this problem, including the selection of items with neutral SD, the use of forced choice formats, and informing respondents that their integrity will be checked (McCrae & Costa, 1983). Additional techniques include the use of subtle scale items and of special detection scales of methods for suspicious self-descriptions (Hough et al., 1990). As an individual difference variable, however, correction techniques are problematic. The literature has repeatedly shown that well-adjusted people have positively biased self-images, which contribute to stress tolerance and self-esteem and protect against anxiety and depression (Hogan, 1991). In addition, the amount of faking is likely to depend on aspects of the test-taking situation, particularly the perceived value of the outcome (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994). In employment selection situations, response validity scales may be positively related to performance and correcting for faking may partial out meaningful trait variance. There may also be different patterns of distortion based on varying perceptions of which traits are more favorable for a given job (Christiansen et al., 1994).

Measurement of Response Distortion

A common objection to the use of personality inventories is that people distort their responses on all self-report measures, and the vulnerability of personality instruments to response bias is well documented (e.g., Funham, 1990; Burbeck &

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Furnham, 1984; Gudjonsson & Adlam, 1983). Additionally, researchers have shown that respondents are capable of faking good when instructed to do so (Hogan, 1991; Hough et al., 1990). However, the evidence for faking is primarily indirect and dependent on aspects of the test-taking situation (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994).

Faking typically has been investigated by having groups of individuals, usually college undergraduates, complete self-report inventories under instructions which encourage them to either fake good, pretend to apply for a particular kind of job, or be honest and accurate (Thumin & Barclay, 1993). Most faking studies are simulations that involve respondents faking good to produce a socially desirable profile. However, this method may have relatively low ecological validity because faking in one context may not be equivalent to faking in another (Furnham, 1990).

Orpen (1988) found less faking by a job applicant sample in an actual employment selection situation compared with a student sample in a simulated selection situation. Therefore, situations contrived in psychological experiments may not represent a random sample of all real-life situations (Ameland & Borkenau, 1985). In applied testing settings, the extent of faking appears to depend upon the motivation of a given population. Rather than assuming that faking is an inevitable outcome of using self-report measures, Corr and Gray (1995) recommend establishing the degree of actual response bias in particular instruments and for given populations. They further recommend against relying on global measures of faking, an important point considering the validity consequences of correcting self-report measures.

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The possibility of intentional response distortion in self-report measures is a major criticism of the use of personality measures in employment selection decisions (Hough et al., 1990). Many self-report measures of personality used for personnel selection (e.g., the Adjective Checklist, the CPI, and the Hogan Personality Inventory) contain response validity scales designed to detect faking. Measures of social desirability, notably the Crowne-Marlowe, are widely used for detecting faking. However, there is some concern in the literature that correcting scores on self-report measures using such methods may decrease validity coefficients. Further, the use of corrected scores in personnel hiring decisions may result in the rejection of some candidates who may actually be good performers (Christiansen et al., 1994; Barrick & Mount, 1996). Ones et al. (1996) conducted a meta-analysis that examined the impact of response distortion on personality testing and concluded that the use of social desirability scores to correct personality scale scores significantly decreased measure variance and failed to improve validity. The results of a field study conducted by Christiansen et al. (1994), using assessment center candidates, revealed negligible differences in the multiple correlations associated with corrected and uncorrected scores. In addition, they found that partialing of faking scores failed to improve validity over using uncorrected scores.

Barrick and Mount (1996) examined the effects of both impression management and self-deception on the predictive validity of a Big Five measure of personality. Using applicant samples, they found that respondents inflated their scores on the personality measure but without significant impact on predictive validity. Ones et al. (1996) obtained

comparable results in their meta-analysis and concluded that regardless of how social desirability is conceptualized—whether as impression management or as self-deception—the outcome from a personnel selection perspective is the same. An important caveat regarding these results is the use of omnibus SD scales to detect general SDR rather than desirable responding aimed towards a particular job (Ones et al., 1996).

Faking good to some extent may be appropriate for job candidates. The lack of effort to manage impressions may have personality correlates with negative consequences for organizational outcomes. This is an especially salient concern given the research linking faking good with emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. In some job settings, social influence and conformity are important (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Managing impressions is a major component of sales and customer service roles where knowledge of what is socially desirable may be related to job success. Burbeck and Furnham (1984) provided evidence that candidates for a metropolitan police department faked good on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), but successful candidates were more stable and extraverted than unsuccessful ones. Another research study demonstrated that the best used-car salesmen presented an exaggerated profile of desirable personality traits (Furnham, 1990). Hence, predictive validity may remain intact for at least some testing contexts, despite problems with face validity.

Furnham (1990) demonstrated that when instructed to fake good, job candidates could provide a particular personality profile based on their perceptions of an occupation. However, there was no consensus regarding the ideal profile, and Furnham concluded

that the lack of agreement on desirable responses is why self-report measures remain valid despite candidates' attempts to fake. Jeske and Whitten (1975) showed that respondents could distort particular personality factors on the 16PF personality inventory. When instructed to fake good and presented with job qualifications describing the ideal candidate as outgoing, stable, assertive, venturesome, and self-assured, respondents distorted pertinent factors of the 16PF (i.e., they positively distorted factors A, C, E, and H, while decreasing their O score).

In personnel selection contexts, there are several plausible interpretations for respondents scoring high on measures of impression management. Individuals may be displaying high motivation regarding a particular content variable, which may represent true individual differences in social desirability. However, it may also represent a temporary response set, where respondents present a good impression that is unlikely to predict future behavior (Paulhus, 1991). If the first explanation is correct, then chronic impression managers may continue to be motivated and may be high performing employees.

It is apparent that the demand characteristics of pre-employment testing provide motivation for job applicants to fake good. Respondents also vary in the ability to fake, which may reflect an applicant's knowledge of job qualifications (e.g., based on previous experience in a similar position). In some cases, faking may reflect stable personality traits or personal characteristics, and it may be useful to treat faking scores as a predictor variable, if valid (Christiansen et al., 1994; Gudjonsson, 1990).

Based on her review of the response distortion literature, Rynes (1993) concluded that one can find empirical evidence and theoretical support for the proposition that distortion reduces validity, enhances it, or makes little difference. Results regarding response distortion are inconclusive; therefore, further study of the effects of distortion and socially desirable responding is needed, with emphasis on factors responsible for differences across studies and participants.

Current Study

The first goal of the current study is to determine whether faking is related to performance, and if so, to investigate the organizational factors (viz., job type and organization) that may influence the relationship. Using a correlational analysis, measures of fake good and performance will be examined. Study participants are incumbents from four different organizations, which allows comparison of job and organization factors.

A second goal of this study is to investigate whether controlling for faking, in an applied selection context will enhance the validity between personality measures and job performance ratings. Specifically, Big Five personality constructs are examined after controlling for faking to determine whether or not this increases criterion-related validity. In many studies that use personality measures to predict job performance, faking is controlled by partialing out the effect of faking using multiple regression or partial correlation techniques (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). The use of faking-corrected scores presumes that irrelevant trait variance is removed from predictors, thus enhancing their

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relationship with a criterion (Christiansen et. al, 1994). This study will investigate whether the partial correlation approach enhances criterion-related validity.

A third goal of the current study is to clarify the meaning of faking by investigating which personality traits are uniquely and jointly associated with faking. To do this, faking will be treated as a dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis using Big Five and other personality constructs as predictors in an effort to see how much of the variance they account for in faking. Though past research has related faking to global personality dimensions such as emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness, it is unclear which facets of these personality traits may account for individual differences in faking. Therefore, this study will utilize the 16PF personality inventory as well as a personality instrument based on the Big Five personality dimensions.

A final goal of this study is to explore the nomological validity (Messick, 1989) of faking by relating it to other personological characteristics relevant to work settings including customer service, teamwork, and work motivation. This will be accomplished by means of a correlational analysis.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1
Fake good scores are positively related to supervisor ratings of job performance.

Hypothesis 2
Partialing fake good scores from personality scale scores will enhance criterion-related validity.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3a: Fake good scores are positively correlated with agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness.

Hypothesis 3b: Fake good scores are positively correlated with work-based personality measures of customer service orientation and sales orientation.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Overview

The data for this study come with permission from a secondary data source (Breakwell, Hammond, & Fife-Schaw, 1995). The original populations are drawn from four different validation studies in four different organizations performed by Resource Associates, Inc., an industrial/organizational psychology consulting firm. The job selection battery consisted of a composite measure of cognitive ability and the Personal Style Inventory (PSI), a personality inventory contextualized to organizational settings and based on the Big Five dimensions of personality—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness. In addition, all participants were administered a fake good scale to examine whether faking has any effects on the criterion validity of the selection test battery to predict performance ratings. All measures were developed and validated for selection purposes by Resource Associates, Inc. (Lounsbury & Gibson, 2000). Supervisors were asked to rate the participant's job performance, which served as the criterion measure of performance. All participants were employed in their present positions for at least one year, thereby reducing the situational motivation to fake, a major demand characteristic of pre-employment selection testing.

Participants

Participants were employees from four different companies who participated in company-sponsored validation studies during their first year of employment. The total

population consisted of 189 production workers in population 1, 78 production workers in population 2, 91 sales representatives in population 3, and 145 restaurant managers in population 4. Each of the four populations is described in more detail below.

Population 1

One hundred and eighty-nine production workers participated in a concurrent validation study at a production facility in the southeastern U.S. This U.S.-based Japanese company is an international subsidiary of a major automotive parts manufacturer. Worldwide, the company employs more than 60,000 workers. This production facility is the company's largest in North America, with more than 2,500 employees. Although it is a Japanese company, it hires American employees at each of its U.S. plants. Participants ranged in age from 22 to 61 years (mean = 32.2), and 71% were male. Additionally, 92% of participants were Caucasian, 6% were African American, and the remaining 2% were Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian.

Population 2

Seventy-eight production workers participated in a concurrent validation study at a production facility in the southeastern United States. This U.S.-based company is one of the world's largest multimedia providers of information for travel planning, navigation, and geography education. The company employs approximately 1,000 people at facilities in four states and Canada, in addition to a nationwide sales staff at retail stores. The 78 production workers represent a broad cross-section of employees in that job category and

location. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 59 years (mean = 35.9), 65% were male, and 72% were Caucasian while 28% were African American.

Population 3

One-hundred and forty-five restaurant managers participated in a concurrent validation study at company offices located in the southeastern United States. The company is a major restaurant franchise in the U.S. and operates convenience stores and travel centers in 36 states. The company declined to provide demographic information for the study.

Population 4

Ninety-one sales representatives participated in a concurrent validation study at corporate offices located in the midwestern United States. The company is a global research-based pharmaceutical corporation, with more than 29,000 employees worldwide. The company has research and development facilities in nine countries and markets it products in 161 countries. Participants ranged in age from 24 to 62 years (mean = 35.8), 56% were male, and 86% were Caucasian, while 24% were African American.

Procedure

The original validation data were collected as part of company-sponsored pre-employment test validation studies administered by Resource Associates, Inc. (RA).

Participants had been incumbents in their positions for at least one year and were informed of the study and scheduled for a time to be tested by their organization's respective human resources staff. All participants completed a personality inventory, the Personal Style Inventory (PSI), as well as several timed cognitive ability measures. RA personnel administered all the tests for the validation studies, and the completed answer sheets were entered, scored, and analyzed by RA industrial/organizational psychologists.

Measures

Personal Style Inventory

The Resource Associates Personal Style Inventory (PSI) was developed to measure personality in the context of work. It consists of the Big Five personality dimensions—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness. It also includes measures of work drive, customer service orientation, fake good, and teamwork. Additional PSI measures assess cognitive aptitude, managerial style, and sales potential. The reliability and validity of the PSI have been demonstrated in a variety of work settings (Lounsbury & Gibson, 2000).

Agreeableness. This scale assesses an individual's propensity to work with others, facilitating interdependence and cohesion within a work group. The measure consists of 15 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .80.

Conscientiousness. This scale assesses a person's dependability, reliability, and rule-following orientation. The measure consists of 15 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .81.

Emotional stability. This scale assesses an individual's overall level of adjustment and resilience, and it is indicative of one's ability to function effectively under conditions of job pressure and stress. The measure consists of 15 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .82.

Extroversion. This scale assesses the tendency to be sociable and energized by other people and by social interaction in the workplace. The measure consists of 16 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .84.

Openness. This scale assesses an individual's willingness to try new ideas or procedures in the workplace and general acceptance of innovation and change. The measure consists of 15 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .84.

Fake good. This scale assesses the tendency to present oneself in a favorable light and to attempt to make a positive impression on others, even if such an impression is not realistic or warranted by facts. Individuals high in fake good tend to avoid disclosure of negative information about themselves or their work records. Population items include "I have sometimes/never felt dissatisfied with how my job was going," "I have never/sometimes worried about a problem while at work," and "I never/sometimes have negative thoughts about people I work with." Each item has a five-point Likert response format, with response dyads (see Appendix A). The measure consists of 12 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .81.

Achievement motivation. This scale assesses the motivation to strive, achieve, and excel in the workplace. Individuals scoring high on this scale tend to measure success in terms

of attainment of goals and outcomes. The scale consists of eight items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .80.

Competitiveness. This measure reflects a disposition for competing with others. High scorers tend to make comparisons between themselves and others and to demonstrate that they are performing at a higher level than their peers. Low scorers do not tend to be interested in competing with and measuring their performance against work peers. This measure consists of 11 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .75.

Customer service orientation. This scale assesses an individual's propensity to provide responsive, personalized, quality service to external and internal customers. The measure consists of 18 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .77.

Integrity. This measure refers to job behavior that reflects prosocial, ethical values, honesty, personal integrity, and adherence to societal norms for "good" conduct. High scores reflect a lower likelihood and low scores reflect greater likelihood of engaging in antisocial and delinquent acts on the job (e.g., theft, pilferage, sabotage, embezzlement, larceny, misrepresentation, falsification of information, cheating, etc.). This measure consists of 12 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .74.

Image management. This scale is derived from the self-monitoring construct and reflects a person's disposition to monitor, observe, regulate, and control self-presentation and image. The measure consists of 12 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .79.

Initiating structure. This scale assesses an individual's orientation toward planning, scheduling, monitoring, and organizing the work environment. The measure consists of 15 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .82.

Orderliness. This measure refers to a person's tendency to be precise, orderly, exacting, detail-minded, and compulsive in his or her work habits. Low scorers tend to be more spontaneous and adaptable to change but also more careless, error-prone, and disorganized. The measure consists of 12 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .75.

Sales savvy. This scale reflects situational choices about sales techniques, presentations to customers, and general selling strategies. The measure consists of eight items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .62.

Selling enthusiasm. This scale refers to enthusiasm and confidence about sales prospects, selling, and sales outcomes in one's work. The measure consists of 10 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .75.

Teamwork. This scale assesses one's propensity for working as part of a team, contributing to interdependence and cohesion in a work group. The scale consists of 15 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .77.

Work drive. This scale assesses the disposition towards investing one's time and energy into a job and career, working long hours, and extending oneself to succeed in work. The measure consists of 12 items with a coefficient alpha reliability of .79.

Cognitive Ability

This measure consists of a linear composite of the following four standardized cognitive tests:

Mechanical reasoning. This test examines an individual's understanding of basic physics and mechanical principles and their application to everyday situations.

Pattern series test of abstract reasoning. This is a test of basic mental ability and is useful for predicting how quickly individuals learn and utilize knowledge.

Math test for industry. This test contains mathematical problems similar to those found in industrial and organizational settings, including addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, fractions, and interpretation of charts and graphs.

3-D spatial reasoning. This test examines a person's ability to think in three dimensions and understand how solid objects fit together.

Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16 PF)

The 16 PF is a 185-item measure of normal personality, first published by Catell in 1949. The measure is composed of 16 primary factor scales and five global factor scales developed via factor analysis of the primary scales (Conn & Rieke, 1994). The 16 PF has been applied in research as well as a variety of applied settings, including industrial and organizational, clinical and counseling, and educational. The technical manual (Conn & Rieke, 1994) reports average coefficient alpha reliabilities for the 16 primary factor scales ranging from .68 to .87.

The 16 PF contains a 12-item scale of impression management (IM) , reflecting both self- and other-deception. The scale has been validated using the Self-Deception Enhancement and Impression Management (Other-Deception) subscales of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1990) and the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). Conn and Rieke (1994) report an alpha coefficient reliability of .63 for the 16 PF IM scale.

Performance Index

An overall job performance composite was calculated by aggregating various performance dimensions. Since data were obtained from four different validation studies, there were slight differences in the performance dimensions.

Population 1. Performance data were collected annually by the company. The performance composite combined supervisor ratings of employees for a three year period using the following dimensions: communications, conformity, initiative, job knowledge, judgment, Kaizen activity, planning, quick action, technical skills, use of time, 5-S, and overall job performance. There were 17 statements with a 5-point Likert-style response format.

Population 2. Performance data were collected as part of a concurrent validation study sponsored by the company. The performance composite combined supervisor ratings of employees evaluating the following dimensions: productivity, quality of work, openness to new experience, safety-mindedness, teamwork, relationships with co-workers, relationships with supervisors, dependability and reliability, ability to function under stress, and attendance and timeliness. There were 10 statements with an 8-point Likert-type response format.

Population 3. Performance data were collected as part of the company's standard annual performance review; job performance ratings were made by supervisors. Although 34 separate ratings were made, owing to their high intercorrelation, just one rating of overall job performance served as the job performance criterion of interest for the present study.

Population 4. Performance data were collected as part of a concurrent validation study sponsored by the company. Based on a job analysis, a set of performance rating dimensions was developed. The performance composite combined supervisor ratings of employees evaluating the following dimensions: ability to learn, reasoning ability, manages operations effectively, builds sales, maximizes financial performance, demonstrates strong leadership, and overall performance. All ratings were made on an 8-point scale with an option for unfamiliarity.

In addition, employees responded to the question "overall, how satisfied are you with you job?" Responses were made using a 5-point Likert type format (1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = somewhat dissatisfied; 3 = neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4 = somewhat satisfied; 5 = very satisfied).

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Examination of Assumptions

The data from each population were examined for violation of the assumption of multivariate normality. Tables 1–4 display the descriptive statistics for each population, including values for skewness and kurtosis. Measures that deviated more than 2.5 times the standard error for skewness and kurtosis (Morgan & Griego, 1998) were transformed to improve the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of residuals. Most population measures were approximately normally distributed. In some cases, logarithmic, square root, and reciprocal transformations were performed as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). For population 3, measures of extroversion, openness, customer service, and work drive were transformed to approximate normality. However, in other populations, transformations exacerbated the skewness of the distribution, and, in these cases, no transformations were made. No variables dramatically departed from normality and most inferential statistics are robust and insensitive to violations of normality (Morgan & Griego, 1998).

Hypothesis 1

The aim of the first research question was to determine if the relationship between faking and performance is moderated by job type. Zero-order correlations among mean predictor scores, fake good scores, and the performance criterion are presented for each research population in Tables 5-8. As can be seen in Table 5 (population 1), fake good

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Population 1 Scales

Scale	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Skew	Kurt
Agreeableness	186	3.8	.51	2.2	4.9	-.38	.34
Conscientiousness	186	3.9	.62	1.8	5.0	-.36	-.27
Emotional Stability	186	3.6	.63	1.7	4.8	-.35	-.11
Extroversion	186	3.6	.61	1.9	5.0	-.33	-.03
Openness	186	3.8	.57	2.0	5.0	-.30	-.07
Work Drive	188	3.2	.63	1.7	4.7	.17	-.52
Customer Service	186	2.8	.23	2.0	3.4	-.34	.83
Cognitive Ability	187	10.2	4.30	0.2	20.2	-.18	-.47
Fake good	187	2.7	.64	1.2	4.7	.18	.22
Job Performance	130	17.2	2.10	12.9	22.3	.53	-.30

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Population 2 Scales

Scale	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Skew	Kurt
Agreeableness	79	3.6	.39	2.7	4.4	-.10	-.27
Conscientiousness	79	3.5	.52	2.1	4.8	.30	.32
Emotional Stability	79	3.4	.58	2.1	4.8	-.02	-.42
Extroversion	79	3.4	.48	2.1	4.4	.03	-.04
Openness	79	3.5	.52	2.1	4.8	-.12	.05
Work Drive	79	3.2	.55	1.8	4.9	.27	.40
Cognitive Ability	79	7.8	5.00	-1.7	19.8	.02	-.70
Fake good	79	2.7	.53	1.6	3.9	.33	-.61
Job Performance	76	29.4	4.60	17.0	40.0	.07	-.13

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics for Population 3 Scales

Scale	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Skew	Kurt
Agreeableness	145	3.9	.49	1.8	5.0	-.58	1.90
Conscientiousness	147	4.1	.54	2.3	4.9	-.85	.78
Emotional Stability	146	4.0	.49	2.1	5.0	-.44	.82
Extroversion	145	4.2	.52	1.1	5.0	.28	.67
Openness	144	4.1	.50	1.3	5.0	-.03	.74
Work Drive	145	3.9	.58	1.4	5.0	.11	.02
Orderliness	146	3.8	.58	2.1	5.0	-.32	-.12
Initiating Structure	145	3.9	.61	1.5	5.0	-.67	1.00
Teamwork	146	4.0	.56	1.9	5.0	-.62	1.00
Fake good	145	2.4	.64	1.0	3.9	.22	-.47
Job Performance	206	3.6	.92	1.4	6.4	.53	.06

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics for Population 4 Scales

Scale	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Skew	Kurt
Agreeableness	91	3.9	.32	2.9	4.5	-.30	-.41
Conscientiousness	91	3.8	.68	1.7	4.9	-.75	.22
Emotional Stability	91	3.7	.51	2.3	4.7	-.31	-.32
Extroversion	91	4.2	.46	2.8	5.0	-.66	.55
Openness	91	3.7	.37	2.7	4.5	-.21	-.19
Work Drive	91	4.1	.53	2.6	5.0	-.45	.06
Orderliness	91	3.6	.81	1.6	5.0	-.55	.25
Customer Service	91	4.4	.34	3.4	5.0	-.66	.46
Competitiveness	91	3.4	.59	1.9	4.9	-.20	-.28
Achievement Motivation	91	4.0	.75	2.0	5.0	-.40	-.34
Selling Enthusiasm	91	4.1	.48	2.7	5.0	-.56	.10
Image Management	91	3.1	.66	1.5	5.0	.12	.15
Integrity	91	4.0	.42	2.9	4.9	-.13	-.13
Sales Savvy	91	3.7	.43	2.6	4.9	.37	.21
Fake good	91	2.9	.47	2.1	4.2	.30	-.39
Job Performance	91	3.2	.83	1.2	5.0	-.09	-.29

Table 5

Correlation Matrix for Population 1 Mean Predictor Scores, Fake good Scores, and Job Performance Criteria

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Agreeableness	.75									
2. Conscientiousness	.53**	.83								
3. Emotional Stability	.69**	.59**	.88							
4. Extroversion	.63**	.45**	.54**	.85						
5. Openness	.58**	.46**	.54**	.65**	.81					
6. Work Drive	.49**	.58**	.46**	.48**	.47**	.78				
7. Customer Service	-.09	-.07	-.15*	-.15*	-.09	.05	.77			
8. Cognitive Ability	.01	.09	.14	-.03	.12	.02	.09	.91		
9. Fake good	.44**	.54**	.60**	.34**	.34**	.54**	-.11	.03	.78	
10. Job Performance	.15	.19*	.19*	.08	.06	.46**	.05	.32**	.24**	.89

Note. $^* p < .05$; $^{**} p < .01$.
Coefficient alpha reliabilities are displayed along the diagonal.

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Table 6

Correlation Matrix for Population 2 Mean Predictor Scores, Fake good Scores, and Job Performance Criteria

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Agreeableness	.74								
2. Conscientiousness	.55**	.82							
3. Emotional Stability	.68**	.62**	.89						
4. Extroversion	.20	.21	.15	.84					
5. Openness	.27**	.36**	.26*	.51**	.80				
6. Work Drive	.28*	.39**	.32**	.43**	.38**	.80			
7. Cognitive Ability	.16	.24*	.19	.15	.28*	.26*	.79		
8. Fake good	.35**	.47**	.57**	.00	.20	.33**	-.02	.76	
9. Job Performance	.29**	.19	.24**	.12	.09	.27**	.31**	.10	.81

Note. $^* p < .05$; $^{**} p < .01$.
Coefficient alpha reliabilities are displayed along the diagonal.

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Table 7

Correlation Matrix for Population 3 Mean Predictor Scores, Fake good Scores, and Job Performance Criteria

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Agreeableness	.71											
2. Conscientiousness	.52**	.78										
3. Emotional Stability	.53**	.63**	.85									
4. Extroversion	.48**	.46**	.58**	.84								
5. Openness	.32**	.54**	.51**	.51**	.80							
6. Work Drive	.38**	.52**	.48**	.39**	.41**	.82						
7. Orderliness	.37**	.61**	.54**	.39**	.46**	.50**	.74					
8. Initiating Structure	.47**	.50**	.44**	.55**	.38**	.49**	.56**	.82				
9. Teamwork	.56**	.46**	.45**	.71**	.46**	.30**	.45**	.49**	.81			
10. Cognitive Ability	-.08	.10	.16*	.01	-.16*	.02	.04	-.17*	.04	.82		
11. Fake good	.14*	.21**	.28**	.03	.19**	.22**	.36**	.18*	.08	-.09	.73	
12. Job Performance	.19*	.24**	.30**	.12	.11	.15	.20*	-.07	.28**	.23**	.08	.94

Note. $^* p < .05$; $^{**} p < .01$.

Coefficient alpha reliabilities are displayed along the diagonal.

Table 8

Correlation Matrix for Population 4 Mean Predictor Scores, Fake good Scores, and Job Performance Criteria

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Agreeableness	.64																
2. Conscientiousness	.04	.74															
3. Emotional Stability	.40**	.40**	.87														
4. Extroversion	.48**	.03	.22*	.81													
5. Openness	.37**	-.05	.38**	.48**	.82												
6. Work Drive	.11	.20*	.01	.35**	.12	.85											
7. Orderliness	-.02	.96**	.36**	-.02	-.02	.19*	.87										
8. Customer Service	.13	.13	.15	.31**	.26*	.10	-.03	.78									
9. Competitiveness	.10	.15	.34**	.20	.27**	.23*	.16	.13	.76								
10. Achievement Motivation	.29**	.20	.34**	.28**	.30**	.15	.17	.08	.77**								
11. Selling Enthusiasm	.28	.25*	.54**	.45**	.40**	.38**	.20	.30**	.42**	.44**	.76						
12. Image Management	-.21*	-.08	-.18	.03	.04	.19	-.05	.11	.32**	.10	.04	.80					
13. Integrity	.42**	.34**	.30**	.33**	.28**	.08	.25**	.33**	-.03	.14	.37**	-.17	.67				
14. Sales Savvy	.25*	.01	.23*	.18	.30**	.27*	.05	.37**	.33**	.25*	.42**	.23*	.04	.71			
15. Fake good	.41**	.50**	.49**	.20	.28**	.23*	.44**	.03	.21*	.30**	.52**	-.14	.42**	.22	.73		
16. Job Performance	-.23*	.12	-.02	.03	.06	.30**	.13	.05	.26**	.14	.20*	.23*	-.17	.25**	.03	.80	
17. Job Satisfaction	-.04	.01	-.11	.02	.07	-.10	.06	.06	-.18*	-.15	-.23*	-.06	-.04	-.10	-.23*	-.16	.84

Note. * *p* < .05; ** *p* < .01.

Coefficient alpha reliabilities are displayed along the diagonal.

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had a significant correlation with the performance criterion ($r = .24$). However, fake good had small, non-significant correlations with performance in the remaining populations. Cognitive ability, emotional stability, and agreeableness were positively related to performance across most populations. In addition, work drive had a significant, positive correlation to performance in populations 1 and 4, while teamwork, conscientiousness, and orderliness also had significant positive correlations with performance in population 3. In population 4, there were significant positive correlations for competitiveness, sales savvy, image management, and selling enthusiasm.

For population 1, a hierarchical regression was performed to determine if fake good scores improved prediction of performance beyond that afforded by work drive, cognitive ability, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. Fake good was added to the regression in step 2 following the other predictors in step 1. Results of the regression show there was no significant increment in R^2 ($R^2 = .003, p > .05$).

Hypothesis 2

To test whether controlling for faking enhances criterion-related validity, partial correlations were computed between the performance criterion and the predictor variables, controlling for the effects of fake good scores. Table 9 displays the partial correlations (one-tailed) along with the zero-order correlations between the criterion and predictor variables. As can be observed in the table, there were small decreases across populations in several of the correlation coefficients when faking was controlled. Comparing the zero-order correlations versus the partial correlations, for population 1,

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Table 9

Correlation Matrix of Predictor Variables and Performance Criteria Controlling for Fake good Scores

Scale	Population 1		Population 2		Population 3		Population 4	
	r	*Partial*	*r*	*Partial*	*r*	*Partial*	*r*	*Partial*
Agreeableness	.15	.05	.29**	.28**	.19*	.19*	-.23*	-.27*
Conscientiousness	.19*	.07	.19	.16	.24**	.23**	.12	.11
Emotional Stability	.19*	.06	.24**	.23*	.30**	.29**	-.02	-.04
Extroversion	.08	.00	.12	.12	.12	.11	.03	.03
Openness	.06	-.02	.09	.08	.11	.10	.06	.05
Work Drive	.43**	.40**	.27*	.25*	.15	.14	.30**	.30**
Cognitive Ability	.32**	.32**	.31**	.31**	.23**	.24**	--	--
Customer Service	.05	.08	--	--	--	--	.05	.05
Competitiveness	--	--	--	--	--	--	.26**	.25*
Teamwork		--	--	--	.28**	.28**	--	--
Initiating Structure		--	--	--	-.07	-.08	--	--
Orderliness		--	--	--	.20*	.18*	.13	.13
Achievement Motivation		--	--	--	--	--	.14	.13
Selling Enthusiasm		--	--	--	--	--	.20*	.21*
Image Management		--	--	--	--	--	.23*	.24*
Integrity		--	--	--	--	--	-.17	-.20
Sales Savvy		--	--	--	--	--	.25**	.25*

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

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there was a small decrease in the correlation between work drive and performance, while there was no observed difference in correlation between cognitive ability and performance. However, the correlations with performance for emotional stability and for conscientiousness were markedly decreased and no longer significant. For population 2, there were small differences in the correlations of the performance criterion with agreeableness and emotional stability, while there was no observed difference in correlation with cognitive ability. For populations 3 and 4, there were small differences in the correlations of the performance criterion across most predictors. For population 3, the biggest difference was for orderliness ($r = .20$, *part* $= .18$), and for population 4, the biggest difference in correlations was for agreeableness ($r = -.23$, *part* $= -.27$) and for integrity ($r = -.17$, *part* $= -.20$).

Hypothesis 3

The goal of the third research question was to examine which personality traits and work-related personological characteristics are related to faking. Tables 5–8 display the correlation matrices for the personality measures and fake good scale. Of the Big Five personality dimensions, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability had significant correlations with fake good scores across all four populations, while openness significantly correlated in all populations except population 2; there were no significant correlations for extroversion in any of the populations. In addition, the work drive measure had significant correlations with fake good scores across all four populations. There were additional predictor measures in populations 3 and 4, and some had

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significant correlations with fake good scores—orderliness and initiating structure in population 3, and achievement motivation, competitiveness, integrity, and selling enthusiasm in population 4.

To assess which personality traits and characteristics predict fake good, stepwise multiple regression analyses with fake good serving as the dependent or criterion variable were performed for each population. Results for each population are presented below.

Population 1

Table 10 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, and R^2_{CHANGE} for the analysis. To determine how much variance in fake good is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with mean fake good scores as the dependent variable and seven predictor variables: agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, and customer service. As shown in the table, after three series of analyses, emotional stability, work drive, and conscientiousness were the only significant predictors of fake good, $R = .68$, $F (3, 184) = 50.55$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with emotional stability in the equation, $R^2 = .36$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 183) = 102.19$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with work drive added to the equation, $R^2 = .44$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 182) = 27.46$, $p < .01$. Addition of conscientiousness to the equation with emotional stability and work drive results in $R^2 = .46$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 181) = 4.46$, $p < .05$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—emotional stability ($sr^2 = .09$), work drive ($sr^2 = .05$), and conscientiousness ($sr^2 = .01$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, emotional stability was twice a

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Table 10

Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for

PSI Variables Predicting Mean, High, and Low Fake good Scores—Population 1

Dependent Variable	Step	Predictor Variables	R	R^2	R^2_{CHANGE}	β	sr^2 (unique)
Mean	1	Emotional Stability	.60	.36	.36	.38***	.09
Fake good	2	Work Drive	.67	.44	.08	.27***	.05
	3	Conscientiousness	.68	.46	.01	.16**	.01
High	1	Work Drive	.41	.17	.17	.32***	.04
Fake good[a]	2	Emotional Stability	.47	.22	.05	.22***	.08
	3	Customer Service	.49	.24	.02	-.13**	.02
Low	1	Emotional Stability	-.37	.14	.14	-.40***	.10
Fake good[b]	2	Openness	-.37	.17	.02	.23***	.04
	3	Work Drive	-.28	.15	.03	-.20**	.03

Note. [a]High Fake good is upper 20% of score distribution.

[b]Low Fake good is lower 20% of score distribution.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

better predictor of fake good than work drive and nearly five times a better predictor of fake good than was conscientiousness.

To determine what effects the level of faking has on the relationship between personality traits and fake good scores, as well as the prediction of fake good, the distribution of mean fake good scores was divided into high and low scores. The top 20% and bottom 20% of the population distributions were treated as high and low, respectively. To determine how much variance in high fake good scores is accounted for by the predictor variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as the dependent variable and with the seven predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, and customer service. Table 10 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE} for the analysis. As shown in the table, after three series of analyses, work drive, emotional stability, and customer service were significant predictors of high fake good scores, $R = .49$, $F(3, 184) = 18.70$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with work drive in the equation, $R^2 = .17$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 183) = 37.63$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with emotional stability added to the equation, $R^2 = .22$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 182) = 11.43$, $p < .01$. Addition of customer service orientation to the equation with emotional stability and work drive results in $R^2 = .24$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 181) = 4.04$, $p < .05$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—work drive ($sr^2 = .08$), emotional stability ($sr^2 = .04$), and customer service ($sr^2 = .02$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, work drive was twice a better predictor of fake good than emotional stability and five times a better predictor of fake good than conscientiousness was.

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To determine how much variance in low fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as the dependent variable and the seven predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, and customer service. Table 10 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE} for the analysis. As shown in the table, after three series of analyses, emotional stability, openness, and work drive were significant predictors of low fake good scores, $R = .43$, $F(3, 182) = 13.42$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with emotional stability in the equation, $R^2 = .14$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 181) = 28.35$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with openness added to the equation, $R^2 = .16$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 180) = 4.35$, $p < .05$. Addition of work drive to the equation with emotional stability and openness results in $R^2 = .18$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 179) = 6.09$, $p < .05$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—emotional stability ($sr^2 = .10$), openness ($sr^2 = .04$), and work drive ($sr^2 = 03$).

Based on proportions of squared beta weights, emotional stability was more than three times a better predictor of fake good than openness and four times a better predictor of fake good than conscientiousness was.

The relationship between fake good scores and 16PF personality constructs was also examined. The zero-order correlations among the 16 personality factors and mean fake good scores are presented in Table 11. Many of the factors were significantly correlated with fake good scores. The factors of emotional stability (C) and perfectionism (Q$_3$) had moderately high positive correlations with fake good, .49 ($p < .01$) and .48 ($p < .01$), respectively, while rule-consciousness (G) and social boldness (H) had moderate,

Table 11

Correlation Matrix for 16PF Scores and PSI Fake good Scores

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Warmth (A)																	
2. Reasoning (B)	-.23																
3. Emotional Stability (C)	.29**	-.07															
4. Dominance (E)	.29**	-.03	.35**														
5. Liveliness (F)	.21	-.04	.27*	.40**													
6. Rule-Consciousness (G)	.24**	.10	.37**	-.04	-.19												
7. Social Boldness (H)	.40**	.12	.56**	.58**	.58**	.12											
8. Sensitivity (I)	.10	-.09	-.23*	-.13	-.25*	-.07	-.15										
9. Vigilance (L)	-.06	.27	-.20	-.09	-.11	-.15	-.23**	.03									
10. Abstractedness (M)	-.29**	.36	-.37**	-.20	.05	-.47**	-.28*	.11	.35**								
11. Privateness (N)	-.44**	.45	-.41**	-.42**	-.53**	-.17	-.59**	.01	.34**	.21							
12. Apprehension (O)	-.03	.16	-.39**	-.40**	-.32**	.10	-.49**	.13	.31**	.24*	.28*						
13. Openness to Change (Q$_1$)	.10	-.02	.17*	.34**	.35**	.04	.25*	-.25*	-.05	.09	-.25*	-.03					
14. Self-Reliance (Q$_2$)	-.50**	.21	-.39**	-.55**	-.39**	-.32**	-.55**	.08	.24*	.43**	.58**	.27*	-.14				
15. Perfectionism (Q$_3$)	.47**	.26	.33**	.23*	.04	.50**	.31**	-.11	-.15	-.49	-.27*	-.08	.04	-.46**			
16. Tension (Q$_4$)	-.26*	.27	-.59**	-.09	-.18	-.26*	-.31**	.20	.27*	.39	.33**	.30	-.33**	.46**	-.42**		
17. Impression Management	.28*	-.15	.31**	.02	-.18	.44**	.04	.14	-.29**	-.44**	-.25**	-.09	.04	-.24*	.44**	-.45**	
18. Fake good	.25**	-.04	.49**	.02	.06	.34**	.23*	-.13	-.23*	-.26*	-.26*	-.18	.05	-.28**	.48**	-.58**	.37**

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

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positive correlations with fake good, .34 ($p < .01$) and .23 ($p < .05$), respectively. Tension (Q_3) had a moderately high, negative correlation ($r = -.58, p < .01$) with fake good. There were also negative correlations with self-reliance (Q_2) ($r = -.28, p < .01$), privateness (N) ($-.26, p < .05$), abstractedness (M) ($r = -.26, p < .05$), and vigilance (L) ($r = -.23, p < .05$). In addition, the PSI fake good scale had a significant correlation with the 16PF Impression Management Scale ($r = .37, p < .0$).

To determine how much variance in fake good is accounted for by the 16 PF primary factor scales, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with mean fake good scores as the dependent variable and with the 16 PF personality scales—warmth, emotional stability, dominance, liveliness, rule-consciousness, social boldness, sensitivity, vigilance, abstractedness, privateness, apprehension, openness to change, self-reliance, perfectionism, and tension. Table 12 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, and R^2_{CHANGE}. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after three series of analyses, tension, rule-consciousness, and perfectionism were significant predictors of fake good, $R = .66$, $F (3, 80) = 19.87, p < .01$. After step 1, with tension in the equation, $R^2 = .34$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 79) = 40.42, p < .01$. After step 2, with rule-consciousness added to the equation, $R^2 = .41$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 78) = 9.70, p < .01$. Addition of perfectionism to the equation with tension and rule-consciousness results in $R^2 = .44$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 77) = 3.38, p < .10$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—tension ($sr^2 = .17$), rule-consciousness ($sr^2 = .03$), and perfectionism ($sr^2 = .03$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, tension was

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Table 12

Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for

16 PF Variables Predicting Mean, High, and Low Fake good Scores

Dependent Variables	Step	Predictor Variables	R	R^2	R^2_{CHANGE}	β	sr^2 (unique)
Mean	1	Tension	.58	.34	.34	-.45***	.17
Fake good	2	Rule-Consciousness	.64	.41	.07	.20**	.03
	3	Perfectionism	.66	.44	.03	.19*	.03
High	1	Privateness	.32	.11	.11	-.25**	.05
Fake good[a]	2	Tension	.39	.16	.05	-.24**	.05
Low	1	Perfectionism	.41	.17	.17	-.37***	.12
Fake good[b]	2	Dominance	.46	.22	.05	.23**	.04
	3	Emotional Stability	.53	.28	.06	-.31***	.07
	4	Liveliness	.55	.31	.03	.19*	.03

Note. [a]High Fake good is upper 20% of score distribution.

[b]Low Fake good is lower 20% of score distribution.

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$.

nearly six times a better predictor of fake good than rule-consciousness and perfectionism.

To determine what effects the level of faking has on the relationship between personality traits and fake good scores, as well as the prediction of fake good, the distribution of mean fake good scores was divided into high and low scores. The top 20% and bottom 20% of the population distributions were treated as high and low, respectively. To determine how much variance in high fake good scores is accounted for by the predictor variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as the dependent variable and with the 16 PF personality scales—warmth, emotional stability, dominance, liveliness, rule-consciousness, social boldness, sensitivity, vigilance, abstractedness, privateness, apprehension, openness to change, self-reliance, perfectionism, and tension. Table 12 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE}. As shown in the table, after two series of analyses, privateness and tension were significant predictors of high fake good scores, $R = .39$, $F(2, 80) = 7.17$, $p < .01$. After step 1, privateness in the equation, $R^2 = .11$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 79) = 9.26$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with tension added to the equation, $R^2 = .16$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 78) = 4.66$, $p < .05$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—privateness ($sr^2 = .05$) and tension ($sr^2 = .05$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, privateness and tension were equally good predictors of fake good.

To determine how much variance in low fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as

the dependent variable and the 16 PF personality scales—warmth, emotional stability, dominance, liveliness, rule-consciousness, social boldness, sensitivity, vigilance, abstractedness, privateness, apprehension, openness to change, self-reliance, perfectionism, and tension. Table 12 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE}. As shown in the table, after four series of analyses, perfectionism, dominance, emotional stability, and liveliness were significant predictors of low fake good scores, $R = .55$, $F (4, 80) = 8.33$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with perfectionism in the equation, $R^2 = .17$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 79) = 15.77$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with dominance added to the equation, $R^2 = .22$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 78) = 4.84$, $p \leq .05$. After step 3, with emotional stability added to the equation, $R^2 = .53$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 77) = 6.40$, $p \leq .05$. Addition of liveliness to the equation with perfectionism, dominance, and emotional stability results in $R^2 = .31$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 76) = 3.23$, $p < .10$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—perfectionism ($sr^2 = .12$), dominance ($sr^2 = .04$), emotional stability ($sr^2 = .07$), and liveliness ($sr^2 = .03$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, perfectionism was approximately 1.5 times a better predictor of low fake good scores than emotional stability, nearly three times a better predictor than dominance, and 3.5 times as better a predictor than liveliness.

Population 2

To determine how much variance in fake good in this population is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with mean fake good scores as the dependent variable and six predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, and work drive. Table

13 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, and R^2_{CHANGE} for the analysis. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, one regression equation yielded emotional stability as the only significant predictor of fake good, $R = .57$, $F(1, 78) = 37.81$, $p < .01$. $R^2 = .33$.

To determine what effects the level of faking has on the relationship between personality traits and fake good scores, as well as the prediction of fake good, the distribution of mean fake good scores was divided into high and low scores. The top 20% and bottom 20% of the population distributions were treated as high and low, respectively. To determine how much variance in high fake good scores is accounted for by the predictor variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as the dependent variable and the six predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, and work drive. Table 13 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE}. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after two series of analyses, emotional stability and work drive were significant predictors of high fake good scores, $R = .56$, $F(2, 78) = 17.56$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with emotional stability in the equation, $R^2 = .26$, $F_{\text{CHANGE}}(1, 77) = 26.35$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with work drive added to the equation, $R^2 = .32$, $F_{\text{CHANGE}}(1, 76) = 6.78$, $p < .05$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—emotional stability ($sr^2 = .16$) and work drive

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Table 13

Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for

PSI Variables Predicting Mean, High, and Low Fake good Scores—Population 2

Dependent Variable	Step	Predictor Variables	R	R^2	R^2_{CHANGE}	β	sr^2 (unique)
Mean Fake good	1	Emotional Stability	.57	.33	.33	.57**	.57
High Fake good[a]	1	Emotional Stability	.51	.26	.26	.42**	.16
	2	Work Drive	.56	.32	.06	.26*	.08
Low Fake good[b]	1	Emotional Stability	.23	.05	.05	-.23*	.23
	2						

Note. [a]High Fake good is upper 20% of score distribution.

[b]Low Fake good is lower 20% of score distribution.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

(sr^2 = .06). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, emotional stability was 2.5 times a better predictor of fake good than work drive.

To determine how much variance in low fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with low fake good scores as the dependent variable and the six predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, and work drive. Table 13 displays the summary statistics for the regression analysis. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of values from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, one equation yielded emotional stability as the only significant predictors of low fake good scores, R = .23, $F(1, 77)$ = 4.26, $p < .05$, R^2 = .05.

Population 3

To determine how much variance in fake good in this population is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with mean fake good scores as the dependent variable and nine predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, orderliness, initiating structure, and teamwork. Table 14 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, and R^2_{CHANGE} for the analysis. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, one regression equation yielded orderliness as the only significant predictor of fake good, R = .36, $F(1, 143)$ = 21.48, $p < .01$. R^2 = .13.

To determine what effects the level of faking has on the relationship between personality traits and fake good scores, as well as the prediction of fake good, the

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Table 14

Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for

PSI Variables Predicting Mean, High, and Low Fake good Scores—Population 3

Dependent Variable	Step	Predictor Variables	R	R^2	R^2_{CHANGE}	β	sr^2 (unique)
Mean Fake good	1	Orderliness	.36	.13	.13	.36***	.36
High Fake good[a]	1	Openness	.32	.10	.10	-.27***	.05
	2	Emotional Stability	.36	.13	.03	.27***	.04
	2	Extroversion	.39	.15	.02	.17*	.02
Low Fake good[b]	1	Orderliness	.22	.05	.05	-.32***	.08
	2	Extroversion	.32	.10	.05	-.25***	.05

Note. [a]High Fake good is upper 20% of score distribution.

[b]Low Fake good is lower 20% of score distribution.

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$.

distribution of mean fake good scores was divided into high and low scores. The top 20% and bottom 20% of the population distributions were treated as high and low, respectively. To determine how much variance in high fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as the dependent variable and the nine predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, orderliness, initiating structure, and teamwork. Table 14 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE}. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after three series of analyses, openness, emotional stability, and extroversion were significant predictors of high fake good scores, $R = .39$, F (3, 143) = 8.11, $p < .01$. After step 1, with openness in the equation, $R^2 = .10$, F_{CHANGE} (1, 142) = 16.20, $p < .01$. After step 2, with emotional stability added to the equation, $R^2 = .13$, F_{CHANGE} (1, 141) = 4.64, $p < .05$. With the addition of extroversion to the equation, $R^2 = .15$, F_{CHANGE} (1, 140) = 2.81, $p < .10$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—openness ($sr^2 = .05$), emotional stability ($sr^2 = .05$), and extroversion ($sr^2 = .02$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, openness and emotional stability were equally good predictors of fake good and more than twice as good as extroversion.

To determine how much variance in low fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with low fake good scores as the dependent variable and the nine predictor variables—agreeableness,

conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, orderliness, initiating structure, and teamwork. Table 14 displays the summary statistics for the regression analysis. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of values from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after two series of analyses, orderliness and extroversion were significant predictors of low fake good scores, $R = .32$, $F(2, 143) = 7.95$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with orderliness in the equation, $R^2 = .05$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 142) = 7.05$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with extroversion added to the equation, $R^2 = .10$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 141) = 8.48$, $p < .01$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—orderliness ($sr^2 = .08$) and extroversion ($sr^2 = .05$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, orderliness was approximately 1.5 times a better predictor of fake good than extroversion.

Population 4

To determine how much variance in fake good in this population is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with mean fake good scores as the dependent variable and fourteen predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, orderliness, customer service, competitiveness, achievement motivation, selling enthusiasm, image management, and sales savvy. Table 15 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, and R^2_{CHANGE} for the analysis. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after four series of analyses, selling

Table 15

Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for

PSI Variables Predicting Mean, High, and Low Fake good Scores—Population 4

Dependent Variable	Step	Predictor Variables	R	R^2	R^2_{CHANGE}	β	sr^2 (unique)
Mean	1	Selling Enthusiasm	.52	.27	.27	.39***	.11
Fake good	2	Conscientiousness	.64	.41	.15	.40***	.14
	3	Agreeableness	.71	.50	.09	.37***	.10
	4	Extroversion	.72	.52	.02	-.17*	.02
High	1	Agreeableness	.41	.17	.17	.44***	.14
Fake good[a]	2	Orderliness	.53	.29	.11	.27***	.07
	3	Selling Enthusiasm	.58	.33	.05	.31***	.07
	4	Extroversion	.60	.36	.03	-.22**	.03
Low	1	Conscientiousness	.34	.12	.12	-.33***	.11
Fake good[b]	2	Agreeableness	.46	.21	.09	-.31***	.10

Note. [a]High Fake good is upper 20% of score distribution.

[b]Low Fake good is lower 20% of score distribution.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

enthusiasm, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and extroversion were significant predictors of fake good, $R = .72$, $F (4, 90) = 22.02$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with selling enthusiasm in the equation, $R^2 = .27$, $F_{\text{CHANGE}} (1, 89) = 32.35$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with conscientiousness added to the equation, $R^2 = .41$, $F_{\text{CHANGE}} (1, 88) = 21.90$, $p < .01$. After step 3, with agreeableness added to the equation, $R^2 = .50$, $F_{\text{CHANGE}} (1, 87) = 14.78$, $p < .01$. Addition of extroversion to the equation with selling enthusiasm, conscientiousness, and agreeableness results in $R^2 = .52$, $F_{\text{CHANGE}} (1, 86) = 4.46$, $p < .10$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—selling enthusiasm ($sr^2 = .11$), conscientiousness ($sr^2 = .14$), agreeableness ($sr^2 = .10$), and extroversion ($sr^2 = .02$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, selling enthusiasm, conscientiousness, and agreeableness were nearly equally good predictors of fake good and nearly five times better predictors of fake good than extroversion was.

To determine what effects the level of faking has on the relationship between personality traits and fake good scores, as well as the prediction of fake good, the distribution of mean fake good scores was divided into high and low scores. The top 20% and bottom 20% of the population distributions were treated as high and low, respectively. To determine how much variance in high fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with fake good as the dependent variable and the fourteen predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, orderliness, customer service, competitiveness, achievement motivation, selling enthusiasm, image management, and sales savvy. Table 15 displays the standardized regression coefficients

(β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE}. The p-value criteria for inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after four series of analyses, agreeableness, orderliness, selling enthusiasm, and extroversion were significant predictors of high fake good scores, $R = .60$, $F(4, 90) = 12.19$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with agreeableness in the equation, $R^2 = .36$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 89) = 18.39$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with orderliness added to the equation, $R^2 = .29$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 88) = 13.95$, $p < .01$. After step 3, with selling enthusiasm added to the equation, $R^2 = .33$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 87) = 6.10$, $p < .05$. Addition of extroversion to the equation with agreeableness, orderliness, and selling enthusiasm results in $R^2 = .36$, $F_{CHANGE}(1, 86) = 4.08$, $p < .05$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good—agreeableness ($sr^2 = .14$), orderliness ($sr^2 = .07$), selling enthusiasm ($sr^2 = .07$), and extroversion ($sr^2 = .03$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, agreeableness was nearly three times as good a predictor of high fake good scores as orderliness and nearly twice as good as selling enthusiasm. Agreeableness was nearly four times as good a predictor of high fake good scores as extroversion was.

To determine how much variance in low fake good scores is accounted for by the personality variables, a series of stepwise regressions was performed with low fake good scores as the dependent variable and the fourteen predictor variables—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extroversion, openness, work drive, orderliness, customer service, competitiveness, achievement motivation, selling enthusiasm, image management, and sales savvy. Table 15 displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr^2), R, R^2, R^2_{CHANGE}, and F_{CHANGE}. The p-value criteria for

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inclusion and removal of variables from the equation were .10 and .15, respectively. As shown in the table, after two series of analyses, conscientiousness and agreeableness were the only significant predictors of low fake good scores, $R = .46$, $F (2, 90) = 11.60$, $p < .01$. After step 1, with conscientiousness in the equation, $R^2 = .12$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 89) = 11.55$, $p < .01$. After step 2, with orderliness added to the equation, $R^2 = .19$, $F_{CHANGE} (1, 88) = 10.43$, $p < .01$. Each variable contributed uniquely to prediction of fake good— conscientiousness ($sr^2 = .11$) and agreeableness ($sr^2 = .10$). Based on proportions of squared beta weights, conscientiousness and agreeableness performed equally well as predictors of low fake good scores.

Summary

Results from the four research populations reveal that job type or organizational demands for population 1 may moderate the relationship between fake good and performance. No relationship was found between fake good and performance in the other three populations.

The results also reveal that controlling for fake good scores had a small impact on validity coefficients across the four research populations. When comparing the zero-order correlations with the partial correlations for predictor variables and the performance criteria, there were generally small decreases in validity coefficients after controlling for fake good scores. However, after partialing fake good scores from the criterion in population 1, correlations with performance for emotional stability and for conscientiousness were markedly decreased and no longer significant. The coefficients

for agreeableness and emotional stability decreased slightly after partialing fake good scores in the remaining three populations. In addition, three populations included a measure of cognitive ability, and there were no observed differences in the correlation with performance after controlling for faking.

Several personality variables were positively related to fake good scores in the current study—agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and work drive; openness was positively associated with fake good in all but one population (population 2). Additionally, there were no significant correlations between extroversion and fake good in any of the populations, and the results reveal no relationship between cognitive ability and fake good scores.

Stepwise regression analyses were performed to determine the best linear combination of personality variables for predicting fake good. For population 1, work drive, emotional stability, and customer service were the best set of predictors, while in population 2, only emotional stability was a significant predictor of fake good. Orderliness was the only significant predictor of fake good in population 3, while the best set of predictors of fake good for population 4 were selling enthusiasm, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and extroversion.

To determine what effects the level of faking has on the relationship between personality traits and fake good scores, as well as the prediction of fake good, the distribution of mean fake good scores was divided into high and low scores. The top 20% and bottom 20% of the population distributions were treated as high and low, respectively. Stepwise multiple regressions were performed for each population. For

population 1, higher scores on work drive and emotional stability as well as lower scores on customer service predict higher levels of fake good, while lower scores on emotional stability and work drive as well as higher scores on openness predict lower levels of fake good. For population 2, higher scores on emotional stability and work drive predict higher levels of fake good, while lower scores on emotional stability predict lower levels of fake good. For population 3, higher scores on emotional stability and extroversion as well as lower scores on openness predict higher levels of fake good, while lower scores on orderliness and extroversion predict lower levels of fake good. For population 4, higher scores on agreeableness, orderliness, selling enthusiasm as well as lower scores on extroversion predict higher levels of fake good, while lower scores of conscientiousness and agreeableness predicted lower levels of fake good.

Additionally, the relationship between fake good and the 16 PF personality constructs was examined. Results reveal moderate to moderately high, positive correlations between fake good and the 16PF factors of emotional stability (C), perfectionism (Q_3), rule-consciousness (G), and social boldness (H). Results reveal moderate to moderately high, negative correlations between fake good and tension (Q_3), self-reliance (Q_2), privateness (N), abstractedness (M), and vigilance (L). In addition, the 16 PF Impression Management Scale had a significant, positive correlation with the PSI Fake good scale ($r = .37, p < .01$).

Results of a stepwise multiple regression reveal that rule-consciousness, perfectionism, and tension were the best set of predictors for mean fake good scores. The distribution of mean fake good scores was also divided into high and low scores to

determine what effects the level of faking has on the prediction of fake good. Additionally, lower scores on privateness and tension predict higher levels of fake good, while higher scores on dominance and liveliness and lower scores on perfectionism and emotional stability predict lower levels of fake good.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The present study addressed four questions regarding faking in employment selection: a) Does faking predict job performance? b) Does partialing fake good from personality scale scores enhance criterion-related validities? c) Which personality traits account for individual differences in faking? d) And how does faking relate to work-based measures of personality?

The results of this study indicate that the role of fake good in the prediction of job performance may be dependent on job or organizational factors. Using populations of production workers, restaurant managers, and sales representatives in four different organizations, fake good was positively related to job performance in only one population, a group of production workers at a U.S.-based Japanese manufacturing organization. Similar results were observed in an additional validation study recently conducted at the same organization on a different subset of workers. One possible factor responsible for this difference in populations may be the culture of the organization in which fake good was related to performance. This particular organization selects and rewards workers who possess energy, a strong work ethic, and who adapt well to new ideas and work practices. It is likely, then, that the organization has a culture which favors fake good. In fact, fake good was strongly related to work drive, conscientiousness, and openness in this population.

A second finding of this study is that removing the effects of fake good from personality measures does not enhance criterion-related validity of personality constructs

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for predicting job performance. These results are consistent with previous research (i.e., Christiansen et al., 1994; Ones et al., 1996), which also used populations from actual employment settings.

In general, partialing fake good from personality measures does not appear to have any significant impact on the criterion-related validities of Big Five personality variables. However, in population 1, the correlations with performance for agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and extroversion were markedly decreased, and no longer significant in some cases. This is the same population in which fake good was correlated with job performance. In addition, including fake good as an additional predictor in a regression analysis did not improve prediction. Together, these results suggest that, in general, faking neither significantly enhances nor attenuates the criterion-related validity of personality measures. However, in cases where faking is related to job performance, the effects of correcting fake good on criterion-related validity may be serious. For example, the use of corrected scale scores may lead to selection decisions that would be difficult to defend, especially without evidence that the corrections improve criterion-related validity and in the absence of overt faking (Christiansen et al., 1994).

The results of the present study provide further evidence that faking reflects individual differences in personality traits. The tendency to respond to fake good items was consistently related to agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness across all job-types and organizations included in this study. This finding is consistent with previous research in which self-report measures of social desirability were positively

correlated with emotional stability and conscientiousness (e.g., Furnham, 1990; Hough et al., 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1983). Findings from this study confirm these conclusions, and provide further support for the relationship between agreeableness and individual differences in fake good.

Additionally, openness to new experiences was related to fake good in all but one population; this population consisted of production workers in an American-owned facility, where emotional stability was the most important predictor of fake good scores. Fake good was consistently unrelated to extroversion, suggesting no real relationship between the constructs.

In addition to the Big Five measures, several work-based measures of personality were related to fake good. However, the relationship between fake good and other work-based measures appeared dependent on job type. Work drive—the tendency to work hard and for long hours, investing one's time and energy in the job—was consistently correlated with fake good scores in this study, though it was only a significant predictor of fake good for production workers. A low customer service orientation was an additional predictor of high fake good scores for the Japanese manufacturer. In addition, restaurant managers with relatively low fake good scores tended to have lower orderliness scores, while sales representatives with relatively high fake good scores tended to have higher scores on orderliness and selling enthusiasm. In the population of sales representatives, fake good scores were also negatively associated with a measure of job satisfaction.

There were minimal to near zero correlations between cognitive ability and fake good across research populations. These results support findings from a meta-analytic review by Ones et al. (1996), which also found a negligible relationship between social desirability measures and cognitive ability. Apparently, the ability to fake good, as measured by self-report inventories, is unrelated to general mental ability.

Results relating fake good and the 16PF factor scales provide additional insight regarding individual differences in personality. The tendency by respondents to fake good was positively related to emotional stability (C), perfectionism (Q_3), rule-consciousness (G), and social boldness (H). Fake good was negatively related to tension (Q_4), self-reliance (Q_2), privateness (N), abstractedness (M), and vigilance (L). The correlations between the PSI fake good scale and 16PF factor scales were nearly congruent with those for the Impression Management scale from the 16PF. The only differences were an additional moderate correlation between the PSI fake good scale and social boldness (H) and somewhat higher correlations between the PSI fake good scale and emotional stability (C), rule-consciousness (G), and tension (Q_4). These results demonstrate further validity evidence for the PSI fake good scale.

The 16 PF Factors G, Q_3, and Q_4 were the most important predictors of fake good. Factor G, rule-consciousness, refers to the extent that one possesses and adheres to an internalized set of rules. High scorers are characterized as determined, disciplined, dutiful, and responsible (Cattell, 1989). Factor Q_4, perfectionism, taps the self-concept and involves the capacity to evaluate one's desired social image versus an internalized, perceived self-image. Characteristics of high scorers include being socially precise,

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compulsive, controlled, and demonstrating exacting will power (Cattell, 1989). Factor Q_4, tension, refers to a relatively enduring temperament characterized by the presence of absence of unpleasant sensations. High scorers are tense, frustrated, and easily upset (Cattell, 1989).

Moreover, lower scores on privateness (N) and tension (Q_4) were associated with high levels of faking. Privateness, also known as self-presentation, refers to one's shrewdness in social situations, and ability to exercise tact, politeness, and diplomacy in interpersonal relations. High scorers tend to be socially aware, astute, and emotionally detached, whereas low scorers are characterized as genuine but socially unaware, gregarious, trusting, and lacking in self-insight.

Overall, the results relating fake good and the 16PF personality constructs are congruent with the above results using Big Five measures. The tendency to fake good appears to reflect individual differences in low negative emotionality and facets of conscientiousness, including discipline, orderliness, and dutifulness. Perhaps the most interesting finding, though, is that higher levels of faking were predicted by lower scores on privateness. This suggests that shrewdness in social situations is different from concern with one's social image, represented by factor Q_3, perfectionism. Further, high levels of faking may indicate a lack of social awareness and self-insight. This is in contrast with a moderate amount of concern with presenting a positive impression, reflected in perfectionism predicting mean levels of fake good.

Implications

Collectively, these findings indicate that faking may have a role in the prediction of on-the-job behavior as well as in employment selection and assessment in general. Rather than treating scores on fake good scales or related response validity scales as indicative of mere response distortion of content measures, they may be more practically useful as reflecting individual differences that relate to important job outcome measures, including performance and job satisfaction. In the present study, faking was related to performance for production workers in an organization where the culture encourages socially desirable self-presentation or impression management. The research literature has demonstrated that the social group with whom an individual identifies or is associated, may either encourage or discourage impression management behaviors. Bolino (199) noted that an organizational culture that expects and rewards good citizenship behavior will facilitate impression management, especially by those who are already predisposed. Moreover, in some job settings, social influence and conformity is important (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). To the extent that such behavior is valued and rewarded by organizations, especially supervisors rating job performance, faking contributes to the prediction of on-the-job behaviors.

Second, as an individual difference variable, correcting for faking may partial out meaningful trait variance—fake good reflects overlap in variance with personality predictors. Results of the present study confirm previous research in which such correction procedures have failed to enhance validity. Therefore, practitioners are

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recommended against applying partialing techniques, unless evidence can be found that it enhances criterion-related validity.

Further, though fake good did not add significantly to the prediction of performance, one must consider the other predictors in the equation. When using a Big Five inventory for selection, the variance explained in the criterion by fake good is largely redundant with that explained by the other predictors. However, this is true for other predictors subsumed under the Big Five system of personality. As a unique predictor, though, fake good may reveal information regarding how much a potential employee may be able to manage impressions as well as his or her level of social awareness and self-insight. The findings from this study suggest that higher levels of faking may indicate that a potential employee has poor self-insight, lower social awareness, and tends to be more emotionally undisciplined, tense, and easily frustrated. In this light, one can see why fake good may be negatively associated with job satisfaction and why it may yet serve as a useful selection variable for screening and follow-up purposes.

Contribution to the Literature

Researchers have speculated about the impact of faking on personality measures, and some have criticized the use of self-report personality inventories because they are susceptible to response distortion. This study provides support for using fake good scales as individual difference variables in employment selection. It further provides additional

insight into the nomological validity of the fake good construct, using actual job incumbents.

In a laboratory study investigating the effects of various self-presentation strategies on personality profiles, Paulhus et al. (1995) found elevated correlations for several Big Five dimensions when respondents were instructed to fake good. Conscientiousness was most affected by deliberate faking, followed by agreeableness, extraversion, and emotional stability; there was no observed difference for openness between honest and fake conditions. Using archival data reflecting actual job incumbents participating in concurrent-validation studies in four different organizations, the results of the present study reveal a somewhat different fake good profile. Emotional stability was a more important predictor of fake good than conscientiousness, as demonstrated in unique variance contributed and significant beta coefficients. In addition, there were no observed correlations between extroversion and fake good, and it was only a significant predictor of fake good for the population of restaurant managers. Further, as mentioned earlier, openness was associated with fake good for the population of production workers at a Japanese-owned manufacturing organization. Paulhus et al. (1995) noted in their study that the desirability of openness-related traits for an unspecified job was apparently more ambiguous than for the other Big Five dimensions. Comparing the results of this laboratory study with the present study, it is apparent that in the context of employment, individuals may adapt their self-presentational styles in a way that is perhaps best viewed as job-desirable responding rather than socially desirable responding.

Finally, several researchers have noted a close relationship between endorsement of social desirability items and psychological adjustment (e.g., Heilbrun, 1964; Crown & Marlowe, 1960), and it is widely accepted in the literature that well-adjusted people tend to have positively biased self-images. The findings of the present study provide additional insight into the relationship between psychological adjustment and faking good. By examining fake good across multiple occupations and organizations, the study also contributes to identifying the factors responsible for differences in faking across studies and participants.

Limitations of the Study

The most salient limitation to this study is the lack of an experimental manipulation for faking. Laboratory studies abound in the literature comparing the results of student participants instructed to fake their best as if they were real job applicants. This study was exploratory in nature and attempted to investigate the construct of fake good in multiple organizational settings. As such, fake good data consisted of scale scores without knowing for certain if the respondent's predictor scores were distorted in any way. Thus, it is unclear whether fake good scores are truly reflective of individual differences in personality versus deliberate lying or manipulation. The latter is unlikely, though, considering the populations consisted of job incumbents rather than applicants. This criticism, however, remains a challenge for researchers attempting to perform field research while lacking desired experimental control.

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A second limitation of the study is the use of concurrent validation studies using incumbents rather than job candidates. This is not equal to studying candidates taking tests to get a job, where presumably fake good scores would be more salient.

Another limitation is the reliance on supervisory ratings for a criterion measure. Such measures have been criticized as too subjective and wrought with potential biases. However, since the study consisted of company-sponsored validation studies using incumbents, a voluntary expense of time and resources by the participating organizations, there may not be serious criterion deficiency.

Finally, though the study included the 16PF and additional work-based measures as an added means of exploring and building a nomological net for the fake good construct, they were not always consistently applied. Due to the fact that the data were archival, the 16PF was included in only one population, the same one for which a relationship between fake good and performance was observed. Hence, there were differences in this population that may not generalize to the other populations. Further, the work drive scale was included in all four research populations, but other measures, including customer service, selling enthusiasm, and teamwork were included in certain populations, depending on their job relevance.

Note for Future Research

Several questions remain for future researchers investigating fake good. First, relevant demographic factors may moderate the relationship with fake good, personality traits, and on-the-job behavior. There is little research controlling for sex, age, previous job experience, and tenure. In addition, future research should continue to identify job

and organizational factors that may influence the role of fake good in predicting performance. This should aid in compiling information on occupational settings and job-types that may be more susceptible to faking.

Research treating fake good as an individual difference variable is relatively recent. Continued research exploring the nomological validity of the construct is needed. Future research should also include other Big Five inventories widely used in research and industry as well as other work-based personality measures relevant to employment settings. Finally, future research might employ 360 feedback techniques as well as additional criterion measures of on-the-job behaviors. This is a more sophisticated approach to performance assessment as well as personality assessment that will likely provide additional insight into the nature of fake good in the context of work.

In summary, the present study has contributed new information concerning the construct validity of fake good in employment research. Hopefully, future research will confirm and extend the present findings.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

PSI FAKE GOOD SCALE

1. I have sometimes felt dissatisfied with how my job was going.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I have never felt dissatisfied with how my job was going.

2. When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have sometimes made an excuse just to get out of it.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have never made an excuse just to get out of it.

3. I have occasionally felt tense or uncertain when thinking about the future of my career.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I have never felt tense or uncertain when thinking about the future of my career.

4. I have never had a headache while working.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I have sometimes had a headache while working.

5. I have been upset with other people at work from time to time.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I have never been upset with another person at work.

6. I have never worried about a personal problem while at work.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I have sometimes worried about a personal problem while at work.

7. The quality of my work is always perfect.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

The quality of my work is far from perfect on occasion.

8. It is always clear to me what I should do next in my life.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

It is not always clear to me what I should do next in my life.

9. When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have sometimes made an excuse just to get out of it.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have never made an excuse just to get out of it.

10. I thoroughly read every piece of mail which is sent to me.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I do not thoroughly read every piece of mail which is sent to me.

11. I always look forward to going to work.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I don't always look forward to going to work.

12. I never have negative thoughts about people I work with.

□□□□□
1 2 3 4 5

I sometimes have negative thoughts about people I work with.

APPENDIX B

DISTRIBUTION OF FAKE GOOD SCORES

## Distribution of Responses for PSI Fake Good Scale
Sample 1

#	Left statement	1	2	3	4	5	Right statement
1.	I have sometimes felt dissatisfied with how my job was going.	31%	33%	25%	9%	2%	I have never felt dissatisfied with how my job was going.
2.	When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have sometimes made an excuse just to get out of it.	2%	13%	18%	36%	31%	When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have never made an excuse just to get out of it.
3.	I have occasionally felt tense or uncertain when thinking about the future of my career.	17%	30%	27%	18%	8%	I have never felt tense or uncertain when thinking about the future of my career.
4.	I have never had a headache while working.	22%	26%	29%	15%	8%	I have sometimes had a headache while working.
5.	I have been upset with other people at work from time to time.	29%	36%	15%	15%	5%	I have never been upset with another person at work.
6.	I have never worried about a personal Problem while at work.	35%	39%	17%	7%	2%	I have sometimes worried about a personal problem while at work.
7.	The quality of my work is always perfect.	29%	38%	19%	10%	4%	The quality of my work is far from perfect on occasion.
8.	It is always clear to me what I should do next in my life.	6%	8%	20%	52%	14%	It is not always clear to me what I should do next in my life.

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Distribution of Responses for PSI Fake Good Scale
Sample 1

	1	2	3	4	5	
9. When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have sometimes made an excuse just to get out of it.	12%	28%	33%	16%	11%	When asked to help out with somebody else's project at work, I have never made an excuse just to get out of it.
10. I thoroughly read every piece of mail which is sent to me.	24%	31%	22%	13%	10%	I do not thoroughly read every piece of mail which is sent to me.
11. I always look forward to going to work.	18%	21%	25%	28%	8%	I don't always look forward to going to work.
12. I never have negative thoughts about people I work with.	17%	27%	32%	15%	9%	I sometimes have negative thoughts about people I work with.

APPENDIX C

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF FAKE GOOD

A conceptual model of fake good showing relationships with personality traits, organizational culture, and job variables.

VITA

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