5-2000

Individual support for violent group action : why people lend support to nationalist paramilitary movements

Daniel Masters

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Daniel Masters entitled "Individual support for violent group action : why people lend support to nationalist paramilitary movements." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Yang Zhong, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

Robert Peterson, Michael Johnson, Anthony Nownes, Jeffrey Berejikian

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Daniel Masters entitled "Individual Support for Violent Group Action: Why People Lend Support to Nationalist Paramilitary Movements." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Yang Zhong, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
And recommend its acceptance:

Anthony Nownes

Michael R. Fitzgerald

Accepted for the Council:

Associate Vice Chancellor and
Dean of the Graduate School

Individual Support for Violent Group Action:
Why People Lend Support to Nationalist Paramilitary Movements

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Daniel Masters
May 2000

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife that I love so very much

Joann K. Bernát

Thank you for your patience and support throughout.

Acknowledgements

Abstract

This study is designed to analyze potential solutions to the collective action problem. The collective action problem refers to the social dilemma that individuals face when deciding between short-term individual interests and long-term group goals. The assumption is that individual interests are likely to outweigh those of the group. Thus, in order to resolve the dilemma researchers are forced to seek out solutions that identify different factors that will entice the individual to sacrifice their short–term interest in favor of group goals. This study analyzed this question within the context of nationalist rebellion, and focused on three potential explanations. The first is the Relative Deprivation Model relying on the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis as the model of the individual. This explanation was found to be logically and empirically weak, and was hence dismissed as a useable explanation. The second explanation is the collective action model, which relies on a rational actor assumption of individual decision making. The third explanation is a modified relative deprivation theory, which relies on a prospect theory assumption of individual decision-making. Both of these explanations are logically sound, but they lack empirical evaluation. Therefore, the latter two models were subjected to empirical tests using evidence gathered from individuals in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The data gathered from individuals regarding their decision processes provided falsifying evidence for the collective action explanation, and provided confirming evidence for the modified relative deprivation model.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Mobilization Theory and Support for Nationalist Rebellion

Introduction

Over the last fifty years nationalist-separatism has become one of the most common forms of conflict observed around the world, threatening domestic and, in some cases, regional political stability. This trend appears to be on the rise in the Post-Cold War era as witnessed by the struggles in Former Yugoslavia, and in Russia. The effort of national and ethnic groups to seek independence fundamentally threatens the political establishment of states. This often forces governments to adopt suppressive strategies in order to thwart the efforts of rebels. The result is an environment where individuals engage in increasing risky behavior in order to achieve an uncertain goal of national liberation. The question is why do individuals lend support to nationalist rebel movements.

The focus in this study is on individual and group support for nationalist rebellion. Support is broadly defined as individuals that are actively involved in military operations, or provide aid for military operators, or provide moral succor to the campaign of a rebel organization. National rebel groups are the focus because they represent a special type of social movement. They involve large group(s) pushing for widespread social and political change by using violent tactics. Included in this category would be the campaigns of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, and Fateh or Hamas in the

1

West Bank and Gaza Strip. These groups are distinguishable from the actions of lone actors engaging in violent activities (e.g. Timothy McVeigh). Also domestic rebels are discernible from the activities of groups that operate solely in the international arena (e.g. Abu Nidal). This does not imply that the actions of lone actors and international terrorist groups are unimportant. Instead, these activities represent a different type of phenomena within the broader category of rebel activity (Guelke 1995: 15; Merkl 1986: 21). The motivating conditions and organizational supports differ vastly from those of domestic rebel groups.

Explanations that attempt to resolve the question of why people support rebel movements typically rely on models of individual decision-making. These models identify key factors of mobilization that would induce the potential rebel (or rebel supporter) to forgo high individual level costs in favor of the uncertain goals of the group. The Relative Deprivation (RD) Model employs a social psychology explanation using structural conditions to explain the rise of rebellious action. RD argues that in conditions where an individual is deprived of certain necessities relative to their expectations political violence is likely (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962; Feierabend et al 1969). RD also predicts that if a frustrating circumstance is introduced into an environment where there are high levels of group identity and cohesion that the likelihood of rebellion is high. Thus, RD attempts to explain group action and individual behavior by referring to structural conditions. Meanwhile, the collective action model uses microeconomic rationality to explain rebellious action. The decision to support rebel activity is a function of the group's ability to provide an incentive structure that will alter the individual's existing cost structure thereby increasing the worth of potential benefits

2

(Lichbach 1995). This is accomplished through the use of positive (material) incentives, purposive (psychic gratification) benefits, and negative (coercive) sanctions. Finally, prospect theory is cognitive psychological explanation that can be used to understand why people lend support to domestic rebel movements. Prospect theory examines individual decisions within a larger environmental context. The context surrounding the decision influences an individual's perceptions of acceptable risks, which in turn alters the preference order of alternatives (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). In relation to rebel movements, an individual's perception of the social situation will influence his/her willingness to accept the risks associated with support for rebel activities.

In the sections that follow I will outline basic elements of the social psychology approach, or the Relative Deprivation Model. Next I will discuss rational choice and prospect theory models of decision making. Each model is used to construct a mid-range theory for why people support rebel movements. Rebellious collective action for the former, and a modified relative deprivation model for the latter.

Individual Choices Regarding Rebel Support

Models that explain why individuals lend support to rebel groups need to address the following question: 'what influences individual decisions to support a group when the risks are high and the payoff is uncertain?' This question is important because the decision to support a rebel campaign represents a social dilemma. In a social dilemma the parameters of the decision represents a conflict between individual "short term" incentives and long-term group goals (Sell and Son 1997: 118). In the short term, we

3

assume individuals are concerned with survival and security above all else. Support for a rebel movement involves increased risks to survival and basic security. There is risk because states are likely to respond to rebel activity with suppression, which leads to decreased individual and group security. In exchange for their support individuals expect a return of social and political improvement. However, rebel groups cannot ensure success (Gurr 1988, cited in White 1991: 120). Thus, the risks are high and payoffs are uncertain.

A.   Social Psychology: The Relative Deprivation Model

Relative Deprivation is a theory of revolution that views the social setting as the determinant of individual and group action. This explanation is derived via the Frustration-Aggression (FA) hypothesis. The argument is that frustration creates feelings of anger that predispose people to violence (Sederberg 1994: 117). James Davies (1962) argues that frustration among groups of people derives from structural conditions in the socio-political and economic systems of a given state (Sederberg 1994: 115). Feierabend et al (1969) adds to this by explaining that social expectations are patterned by the past performance of the system. If the system is stable it will guide appraisals for the future.[1]

---

[1]   Stability in the objective patterns does not assume that the pattern will be one of constant increase. The pattern can be one of constant deprivation, which would lead people to expect consistently low performance by the system. In a case like this an improvement would be the destabilizing change that may lead to frustration and anger.

Abrupt changes in objective circumstances create gaps between expectations and performance. This becomes the antecedent to political violence (Ibid. 505).[2] Ted R. Gurr (1970) explains the linkages between systemic factors and individual actions by stating that relative deprivation is the "actors' perception of discrepancy between their *value expectations* and their environment's *value capabilities* (Gurr 1968a: 252 emphasis in the original). In this sense RD remains rooted in the perceptions of the individual, meaning that relative deprivation is based on personal perceptions of the objective conditions. The primary thesis linking RD to political violence is: "[T]he occurrence of civil violence presupposes the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial numbers of individuals in a society; concomitantly, the more severe the deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence." (Gurr 1968a: 254).

The link between structural conditions and feelings of frustration is achieved by understanding that dissonance emerges from a socio-political system of differential and unequal access for groups (Sandole 1993: 11). If change occurs in this system it creates a strain on the individual psyche and can lead to crisis in the social order. "This 'bewilderment' *may* find its expression in turmoil and social violence" (Feierabend et al 1969: 498, emphasis mine). The changes that bring about such discontent are rooted within the socio-economic and political structures of society. Since people experience changes in the ecological, social, or political universe, we can assume that changes preventing people from attaining their goals will be simultaneously felt by members of the social aggregate (Ibid. 499). Therefore, we can logically infer that frustration is

---

[2]   This expands the classes of situations in which frustration may arise thereby giving researchers a more generalizable theory to explain the emergence of political violence.

produced within the structures and processes of the socio-political system (Ibid.). From this we can extrapolate that other parts of the state (individuals and groups) that interact with (and within) these systems will be influenced by the changes,

There is, however, a very basic problem related to the link between structural conditions and group actions. Namely, the frustration-aggression hypothesis fails to account for variation in individual behavior. This problem then flows over into RD as we try to extrapolate from micro (individual) states of mind to macro (group) actions. To overcome this problem more variables are added to the model to the to explain group cohesion and decision making. These extra variables relate to political culture and include norms, justifications, and utility expectations. Justifications and expectations reinforce each other developing into a social norm that may indicate willingness by the community to engage in political violence (Sederberg 1994: 120). That is to say: "if people believe that violence works, they will convince themselves of its rightfulness. If they believe in the moral justifications for violence, they often expect it to work (Ibid.)." Add in the intensity or scope of the justification and we can refer to the prevalence of social support for political violence. However, to include social support in the model more variables are added. These variables relate to socialization, density of aggressive symbols in the media, history of political violence in the community, the regime's ability to handle RD, and success of other groups in relieving RD through political violence (Ibid.).

The expanded explanation leads to other problems. The main concern is that the potential for collective violence becomes independent of individual level frustration. RD theory would explain political violence as the outcome of social forces that have little

relation to individual states of mind. At the same time the primary claim of RD is that the individual based F-A hypothesis explains why groups engage in political violence. By reverting to the individual level frustration-aggression hypothesis as the source of group action we assume the group thinks and acts the same as individuals. However, the frustration-aggression hypothesis does not provide evidence to support this claim. In fact, there is evidence to show that in some instances, where RD is assumed to exist, there was little or no group violence (e.g. the Civil Rights movement in the United States). In other cases where there was no objective reason to assume relative deprivation there was group violence (e.g. Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany). It is because of these failures that the frustration-aggression hypothesis was supplemented with the cultural variables. By adding the cultural variables to relative deprivation the model remains viable as an explanation for political violence. However, by turning to cultural factors to explain variation in group behavior we resort to "catch-all" variables. If we look at political violence over time nearly every culture has some violence. If these cultural/historical examples do not exist, revolutionary leaders can manufacture reasons and justifications (See, for example, Lustik 1995). Thus, culture provides an ad hoc hypothesis that makes falsification of RD very difficult.

To summarize, relative deprivation argues that perceptions of structural conditions are important for understanding the emergence of political violence. However, the model of the individual used to explain group action is flawed. While we can link structural conditions to individual states of mind, we cannot draw that same link for group decision-making processes. In other words, relative deprivation may be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient for explaining group action. Instead, cultural

forces and social tolerance levels mold group actions. Given these weaknesses relative deprivation (as it is currently formulated) cannot sufficiently explain why people lend support to rebel movements.

B.   Microeconomic Rationality: A Rebellious Collective Action Model

Collective action theory implies that grievances are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the occurrence of political violence (Lichbach 1995: 283). The gist is "no matter how discontented people are they cannot engage in political action unless they are part of a minimally organized group" (Tilly cited in Skocpol 1979: 10). Thus to explain cleavage and conflict (social disorder) in society, we must be able to explain consensus and cooperation (order) among dissident groups (Lichbach 1995: xii). To address the problem of cooperation among individuals, collective action theory relies on the assumptions of microeconomic rationality.

The assumption is that individuals make decisions to optimize their values (Simon 1986). That is to say all peoples' utility functions are invariant; people have knowledge of an exhaustive set of alternative strategies; they are aware of the probability distribution of outcomes in all scenarios; and there is always one utility maximizing policy (Moore 1995: 422). Furthermore, rationality is directed by a person's given values and beliefs. Consequently the agent's actions are *instrumental* in achieving or advancing their aims in relation to their values (Taylor 1988: 66).

In applying these assumptions to political behavior in collective action situations Mancur Olson (1965) indicates that given the nature of collective benefits, in most

8

situations it is not rational for an individual to participate in collective action. This is because collective goods, by their nature, cannot be withheld from individuals who do not participate in obtaining them and the value is inelastic to the number of people participating in its achievement (Olson 1965, 35). Therefore, the tendency to "free ride" is strong as individuals seek ways to reduce their costs while enjoying the benefits of the collective good obtained by others.

Extending this logic to political violence it is argued that the outcome of a rebel movement represents a collective benefit. Moreover, there are high costs involved with social dissent and the payoffs are uncertain. Given this uncertainty, the collective benefits of rebellion are not enough to force people to act, and the costs are enough incentive for people not to act (Lichbach 1995: 7). To overcome this social dilemma collective action theory asserts that people will adopt revolutionary action as part of a bargaining process between entrepreneurs and combatants (Ibid.). That is to say, the only way to solve this dilemma is for entrepreneurs (rebel leaders) to provide incentives that will override the costs of collective political violence. Olson (1965) states "Only a *separate and 'selective' incentive* will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way" (1965: 51, emphasis in the original). Incentives provide entrepreneurs with tools for altering the parameters of individual decision-making (Oliver 1980: 1357). The selective reward increases the benefit of support by offsetting the costs. Meanwhile, coercion applies a cost to free riding (Ibid. 1368).

Another way entrepreneurs' address the free-rider phenomenon is by co-opting the community to create social pressure on individuals. This way an entrepreneur can manipulate the actor's rationality by altering the social costs and changing the beliefs or

values of a community of individuals (Taylor 1988: 64; Popkin 1979: 259, 262). This is done through the promotion of traditional values and the provision of an ideological reason for participation. In addition the entrepreneur and his/her collective group may use the force of community pressure to push people into action (Lichbach 1995: 21). This can create either bandwagon effects in the community, or "tipping" in which individuals are swept up in a flow of events that temporarily overrides their private interests (Moore 1995: 420).

This applies to support building for rebel groups in several ways. First, the benefits of goods sought by rebel organizations cannot be denied to anybody. Second, it is understood that some people will value the public good and will take actions necessary to achieve that public good. This leaves individuals with some choices: For example, electoral politics (if available), or military action. Given these options, electoral politics is the most rational because it entails low costs and potentially high benefits. Thus military action is, by virtue of the choices offered, irrational. In order for the rebel group to get people to support their movement they must offer some sort of incentive to individuals.

Incentives can take three forms: Material rewards, purposive benefits, or negative sanctions. These incentives need not be mutually exclusive. Material rewards are offered to individuals who willingly join the group and get involved in military activities. Purposive benefits are used to promote emotional benefits for participation playing upon the notion of psychic gratification individuals will receive for being members of the group. Coercion is typically used to sway non-supporters. Furthermore, incentives need not be restricted to individual level benefits. Focusing strictly on the individual may be

10

wasteful. Organizational efficiency may require that the group try to enlist entire communities to gain support from individuals (Lichbach 1995).

There are problems with collective action theory. First, there is no satisfactory explanation for how public goods seeking groups can attain sufficient selective incentives to assure their survival (Hector 1982: 36). This point holds particularly strong for rebellious groups. Most rebel organizations are very limited in terms of resources, and those resources are typically reserved for the military campaign. Thus, rebel organizations may not be able to offer the necessary material rewards needed to make participation rational. This means that either the group will fail to gather support, or that people involved in the rebellion decide to join for reasons other than select incentives. If we assume people join the group for other reasons then we are forced to assume that non-rational factors like group solidarity, ideologies, symbols, and emotions become important. These non-rational sentiments can be powerful tools used for the organization of groups, especially those that are political in nature (Collins 1992: 24). However, these factors are often excluded within the logical system of rational choice models.

A second problem with collective action theory is the role of negative sanctions. While this method of garnering support is cheap, it is only so when support is already high (Oliver 1980:1370). Relying on coercion to organize a large-scale movement provides a weak basis of support (Moore 1995: 428). People tend to react negatively to sanctions thus creating trouble in maintaining support as people may seek to defect whenever the opportunity presents itself (Oliver 1980: 1370).

Despite these possible logical flaws in the rational choice model, a more troubling issue relates to empirical testing. Collective action theory itself has undergone extensive

individual level empirical testing in many different situations (See, for example, Finkel and Muller 1998; Finkel, Muller and Opp 1989; Finkel 1987; and Finkel and Opp 1991). However, the tests on rebellious collective action have not undergone individual level analysis. Instead we are most likely to see studies of rebel organizations that refer to evidence of selective incentives derived from secondary sources and accounts. In using this approach the researcher must first establish the existence of the incentives and then rely on assumptions that link these factors with individual states of mind (see, for example, Popkin 1979). There are some obvious problems with this approach though. Rational choice models are entrenched in the psychological machinations of individuals. Measuring rational choice through macro characteristics does not properly tap into the psyche of individuals (Opp 1989: 146). The same critique that Finkel and Rule (1986) lay out for relative deprivation applies to collective action in rebellious situations. They state that strong statistical evidence to support a correlation between the existence of relative deprivation [in this case, selective incentives] and violent action "does not necessarily indicate a linkage...[to] the felt psychic state'" (cited in Opp 1989: 147).[3] In short, collective action theory faces potential logical limitations, and the traditional method of evaluation has not provided a true test of the theory. Thus we cannot be certain of the theory's empirical validity.

---

[3]   Finkel and Rule (1986) were referring to Relative Deprivation Theories, but the same argument applies to tests of rational choice/collective action theories.

C.   Cognitive Psychology: Prospect Theory and a Modified RD Model

The decision to support rebel groups involves high risks for individuals. If we assume individuals behave rationally this would mean (i) people will support rebel groups when the selective incentives outweigh the costs of support; or (ii) people that support rebel groups are irrational. On the first claim, there is no compelling empirical evidence that groups offer selective incentives, or that incentives necessarily sway one's decision to support rebel groups (Moore 1995). Secondly, there is some empirical evidence to support the irrational claim, but that evidence is cursory, it suffers from a lack of cross-national validation, and there is a body of contradictory evidence (Reich 1990; Arthur 1990). Meanwhile, accumulating empirical evidence from experiments in cognitive psychology suggests that individuals systematically violate the assumptions of rational behavior (Quattrone and Tversky 1988: 720). From these experiments Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1982) developed Prospect Theory as an empirical model of decision making under risk.

The core of prospect theory lies in the observation that there is a diminishing return to the value of increasing gains and losses. For example, an individual will value a $100 gain more if it they had no money than if that $100 were added to a $1,000. This forms a value function that is concave in shape where the value of each additional unit diminishes in its subjective worth to the individual. This phenomenon is similar for losses where the shape of the value function is convex. The difference in the shape of the value function for losses and gains indicates a contradiction to rational choice theory,

which assumes that individuals appraise both losses and gains against a single value function (See Figure 1.1).

The S-shaped curve in this figure indicates the diminishing value of the objective gains and losses in terms of their subjective worth to the individual. An important point is that the value function of the losses curve is steeper than the gains curve. This highlights the observation that individuals tend to subjectively overweight the value of losses more than they do gains of correspondingly equal objective value (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). This indicates that individuals tend to be loss averse. Loss aversion means that individuals will work harder to avoid a loss than they will to secure gains of equal value. Furthermore, people will continue in efforts to avoid losses longer than what is considered rationally acceptable. This claim is consonant with the observed *endowment effect* where individuals consistently overvalue what they already possess and will avoid the pain of letting it go (Levy 1997: 89).

The result of loss aversion is that individuals routinely fail to make maximizing decisions. For instance, when an individual is presented with a choice between (a) losing a sure $80 or (b) gambling with an 85% chance of losing $100 they are more likely to accept the gamble. This choice, however, is non-maximizing because the objective value of the gamble (.85 x -$100 = -$85) is greater than the value of the sure loss (-$80). Empirical evidence gathered from numerous experiments, using similar scenarios, corroborate this finding (See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Furthermore, this finding confirms the hypothesis that "Low probabilities are commonly overweighted but intermediate and high probabilities are usually underweighted relative to certainty" (Kahneman and Tversky 1982: 163). The tendency to overweight the smaller probability

14

Source: Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. (1982). "The Psychology of Preferences." *Scientific American*. 246: 160-173
The dotted line represents the Subjective Expected Utility Curve..

Figure 1.1: Prospect Utility Curve

of success and underweight the greater probability of failure "reduces the threat of possible losses relative to sure ones" (Ibid.). The failure of individuals to maximize their values contradicts the core rational choice assumption—that individuals will chose value maximizing alternatives.

Another important point about individual decision making relates to how people "define the consequences of their choices" (Kahneman and Tversky 1981: 164). Similar decisions can be "framed" in different ways leading to different chosen alternatives (Ibid.). This introduces the *framing effect* where an individual's assessment of acceptable risks changes with the frame (gains or losses) through which the decision alternatives are viewed. The frame through which individuals assess a decision extends from the reference point (represented by the intersection of the axis in figure 1). The reference point is subjectively derived from aspirations, or some condition deemed "normal" (possibly even imagined) (Ibid. 166). The choices facing an individual will be assessed in terms of gains or losses based on this reference point. Prospect theory predicts that individuals are risk averse when facing choices over gains, and risk acceptant with choices over losses (Ibid. 162). This "preference reversal" is contradictory to the prediction of rational choice, which claims that individuals are consistent in their preferences.

As we move from individual to group level decision-making experimental data indicates that the framing effect remains robust. A common belief is that individuals employ multiple frames in a group setting thus allowing them to overcome the effects observed in prospect theory (Whyte 1993: 434). However, evidence indicates that group processes exacerbate individual level framing biases. Groups demonstrate a greater

16

tendency to escalate risky commitments when facing losses than did unconnected individuals. Thus, within social settings groups accept greater risks in order to avoid losses (Ibid.). Why this occurs is speculative. Glen Whyte (1993) argues that uniformity pressures within the group moves people towards a majority position, and that polarization within group discussion weakens the moderate position (435). Alternatively, individuals in a group share the cost associated with risk. This alone can reduce the perceived costs or risk to any one individual. Furthermore, groups offer increased anonymity for individuals thereby decreasing the chances of being singled out for risky, illegal, or dangerous behavior (Hector 1982: 16). Thus, groups offer increased security against the ill effects of the worst outcome for a risky option.

Given that group pressures may lead to increasing risk acceptance for individuals, we should not automatically assume that all individuals would accept similar levels of risk when facing losses. A simple extrapolation of the logic prospect theory explains why some individuals take more risks than others will. Individuals will accept risk in a losses frame as a result of the convex shape of the value function. Because of the convexity of the value function the subjective value of the sure loss (-$50) is seen as greater than the objective value of the gamble (.65 x -$100). The perception that the value of the sure loss is greater than the value of the gamble means that the individual is more willing to accept the gamble rather than accept the sure loss. It would be wrong to assume this condition holds for increasing risks associated with the gamble. In fact increasing the probability of the worst outcome may lead to situation where the individual rejects the gamble (see figure 1.2). By holding the value of the sure loss constant (-$50) and increasing the risk factor for the gamble (from .65 to .85 x -$100) the

17

Figure 1.2: Acceptable and Unacceptable Risks

objective value of the gamble exceeds the subjective value of the sure loss. In this case the individual will avoid the gamble and accept the sure loss. In short, when facing losses individuals are more likely to accept risk, however individuals will not accept any risk in an effort to avoid losses (some risks are more acceptable).

To explain the variation in the amount of risks individuals will accept requires exploration of the changes increasing losses create on risk acceptance. It stands to reason that if some risks are more acceptable at one level of losses, then individuals would be more risk acceptant when the value of those losses increases (see figure 1.3). In this

Figure 1.3: Acceptance of Increasing Risks

figure the value of the sure loss increases (from -$50 to -$75). As in figure 1.2 the convex shape of the curve makes the subjective value of the increased loss appear greater than the objective value of the higher risk gamble (.85 x -$100). And as with the previous scenario when the subjective value of the sure loss exceeds the value of the gamble the individual is more likely to accept the greater risk in order to avoid the sure loss. In short, as the value of perceived losses increase, the amount of risks individuals accept to avoid those losses will also increase.

In sum, prospect theory provides an alternative model of the individual based on subjective decision making. Decisions are seen as contextually dependent meaning that

19

conditions surrounding the decision matter.[4] This claim is empirically supported with evidence gathered from numerous experiments in cognitive psychology. Through these experiments, the predictions of prospect theory have remained robust under varied conditions and in cross-cultural settings (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Levy 1997).[5] Furthermore, evidence indicates that the framing effect found among individuals does not diminish in group settings. Instead the framing effect is stronger among groups than among unconnected individuals (Whyte 1993: 434). Finally, Prospect Theory also offers an explanation for individual acceptance of increasing risks when facing choices over losses. The logic of risk acceptance can be extrapolated very easily to demonstrate that as perceived losses increase, individuals may become more willing to accept greater risks.

How can we use prospect theory to explain support mobilization for rebel movements? This model of the individual can be inserted into the relative deprivation framework in place of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This allows us to maintain the same predictions as before (structural conditions facilitate rebellious action) while removing the weaknesses between individual motivation and group action. In other words, prospect theory allows us to recast relative deprivation in terms that explain individual motivation and group action under conditions of risk.

---

[4]   Rational choice theories claim that context is not an important factor in individual decision-making. More specifically, the context surrounding decisions will not influence the order of preference alternatives.

[5]   Conversely, the assumptions of rational choice are consistently violated even in situations where individuals were given strong inducements to behave rationally.

A theory of rebel support mobilization using prospect theory offers predictions of behavior that are similar to those found in the original relative dperivation model. Relative deprivation argues that when individual expectations about the social condition are met or execeeded by their perception of those conditions people *will not* be frustrated, thus they *will not* rebel (see figure 1.4). Conversely, when individual expectations about the social condition are *not* met by their pereptions of those conditions frustration will occur and people are *likely* to rebel (see figure 1.5).

Similarly, prospect theory would predict that if the status quo (subjectively perceived conditions) approximates (meets or exceeds) the reference point people are in a gains frame. This means individuals will not take the chance on a rebellion that may

Figure 1.4: Relative Deprivation prediction of No Rebellion

Source: Ted R. Gurr. (1970). *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Figure 1.5: Relative Deprivation Prediction of Rebellion

improve conditions since there is also a chance that conditions will get worse (sure gains over risky gains). Conversely, "if the reference point is not congruent with the status quo...[it] is destabilizing and reinforces movement away from the status quo." (Levy 1997:91) . This condition indicates that people would perceive the status quo in terms of losses. Hence individuals are more likely to accept rebellion even though there is a high chance of failure.

The following illustrations are useful here. In countries (A) and (B) we have significant minority groups that hold expectations of autonomy and/or self-determination. This expectation would form the reference point against which a decision to act is evaluated. In country (A), the government extends rights and privileges to the minority

22

group, granting local autonomy. If a rebellious organization were to push for self-determination the minority group is likely to view the action in terms of a risk that could compromise the gains they have already received. In other words they would have to choose between the certain gain of limited local autonomy and the risk of self-determination through a rebellion that could fail. Prospect theory predicts that the minority group would be risk averse and the rebellious group would fail to gather support for its movement.

In county (B), the minority group lives under the domination of a political system that is imposed on them (not self-determined) and there is little effort by the government to address the concerns or aspirations of this group. In this case the status quo conditions fall behind the reference point of autonomy and/or self-determination (a losses frame). In this situation the minority group has two choices. First, it can take no action and accept the status quo condition (sure losses). Second, they can take a risk by supporting a rebellion to achieve self-determination (gamble for improved conditions). Prospect theory would predict that the group is likely to accept the latter choice even though the probability of failure is very high.

These examples demonstrate that in similar situations, where similar ideological goals were being pursued, the groups choose different alternatives. Why did this occur? The difference results from the experiences and perceptions of individuals, the connectedness between the individuals resulting in a solidary group, and coherence between perceptions and the ideological frame presented by the rebellious group.

The individual level factors relate to one's proximity to the conflict zone, socialization, and the impact of significant incidents. The *proximity to the conflict zone*

refers to whether or not the individual is directly affected by the conflict. The more the conditions of the conflict are felt by individuals the more likely they are to perceive the situation in a losses frame, thus making them more likely to engage in political violence. *Socialization* refers to the role of families in influencing one's perception of losses. Families that have a long history of support for rebel activity would make an actor more subject to a losses frame because he/she are likely to have been raised with an interpretation of how the structural conditions represents a loss. This would make the individual more likely to accept the risk of rebellion in order to change the situation. Finally, *the impact of specific events* plays a role. In conflict situations there are likely to be certain events (e.g. massacres) that mobilize large numbers of people into action. These events temporarily intensify the losses frame thereby increasing the number of people willing to accept risk.

If these experiences and perceptions are concentrated among individuals that share common links as a solidary group then individual perceptions are likely to spill over into group perceptions. Specialized groups (e.g. national groups) occur when individuals perceive themselves to be members of an imagined community leading to the social construction of "we" and to the emergence of group interests (Hall 1993: 50-51). If these interests are threatened, it will provoke a group response, not an individual response. This is particularly pertinent when the basis solidary group is national or ethnic identity. Such cultural identities create stronger, more enduring, linkages between individuals (Gurr 1996: 63). If the cultural group experiences shared grievances about unequal treatment it is likely to galvanize the community thereby making mobilization of individuals in the community easier (Ibid.). Thus, when a solidary group exists, the

potential for organized group response to perceived losses increases. Furthermore, prospect theory predicts that when groups are facing losses they are more willing to escalate commitments and accept greater risks in order to avoid loss. At the same time, if the perceptions of losses occur among a disparate mass of individuals that do not share links to a solidary group then the potential for organized group action decreases. Hence we are most likely to observe successful rebellions emerging from areas where group identity is high prior to the outbreak of violence.

Experience and perceptions of poor conditions and group cohesion are necessary but not sufficient to provoke a rebellious action. The rebellious group must construct a "worldview" that presents the existing social structure as worse than a "normal" past (or imagined normal condition) (Berejikian 1992: 653). For example, nationalist ideologies construct arguments about the historical uniqueness and territorial integrity of the nation, and they appeal to the claims that the people within that territory have the innate right to self-determination (Haas 1997: 43, 45). If this ideology is infused into an environment where there is a high degree of nationalist sentiment then the ideological claim is consistent with individual and group perceptions. The ideology can then be used to successfully frame rebellious choices. As demonstrated in the cases above the minority groups were faced with a choice (a) accept the current condition, or (b) rebel for self-determination. The choices were framed by a nationalist ideology that made claims of group uniqueness, and rights to self-determination. In case B the rebellious group successfully framed the choices based on ideological claims that were consistent with the perceptions of loss among members of the minority group. In this case the group was more likely to accept the risk associated with supporting a rebellion. In case A the

rebellious group failed to frame the choices in terms of losses since the ideological claims of the group was inconsistent with the perceptions and experiences of individuals in the minority group. Hence the minority group chose the sure gain over the risk of rebellion. Thus, ideology is important for framing rebellious choices, but the ideology must in someway be consistent with reality for legitimization (Berejikian 1992: 653).

Finally, we cannot assume that membership in a solidary group and successful ideological framing of alternatives will necessarily mobilize all individuals to engage in rebellion. Often in conflict situations there are large segments of national groups that do not support rebellion. This does not mean that non-supporters do not perceive the social conditions as a loss. Instead, they may not perceive the loss to be as great. In other words, the perception of the value of losses can vary among members of a solidary group. This variation in loss perception is likely to emerge from the experiences and socialization of individuals, and perceptions of historical events within the conflict situation.

As we can see the conditions leading to rebellion are nearly identical for both prospect theory and relative deprivation. However, the emotional states that motivate individuals to engage in rebellion is different. Relative deprivation places the motivation on feelings of frustration among individuals arising from a systemic inability to obtain a desired goal. This frustration then leads the individual to act aggressively. Prospect theory places motivation on fears of loss. This loss may stem from the denial of self-determination, systemic restrictions on economic advancement, or the denial of perceived "inalienable" rights. This perceived loss creates biases in an individual's assessment of acceptable risks and the probability of success for risky options.

The advantage of prospect theory is that we can overcome the weaknesses of the frustration-aggression hypothesis used in the original relative deprivation model. The F-A hypothesis is an individually based explanation for violent behavior that lacks empirical import at the group level. This creates a weakness as we move from individual motivation to group action (the inability to explain behavioral variation among groups). To overcome this weakness relative deprivation brings in many other variables (e.g. cultural symbols). The end result is that group actions become independent of the more micro social forces that motivate individual actions. By using prospect theory we reconfigure relative deprivation in such a way as to explain individual motivation and group action devoid of the weaknesses that plague the original RD explanation.

Prospect theory not only creates a stronger RD model, but it also offers a strong alternative to collective action theory. As stated above, the costs of engaging in rebellious activity are very high for individuals and groups. The ultimate price one may pay would be the loss of life, injury, or imprisonment. At the same time the potential payoffs are uncertain since the rebellious group cannot guarantee they will succeed in achieving their goal (the public good). Collective Action theory assumes that individuals are rational egoists who seek to defend their interests over those of the group. Thus, individuals seek to maximize their individual benefits. This leads to free riding since the individual costs of free riding are very low compared to the very high costs of participation. The free rider problem is overcome when a group offers individuals selective incentives to override the costs associated with participation. When groups overcome the free rider problem, rebellion is more likely to occur.

27

In the context of rebellious collective action this argument is problematic. The logic rests on Olson's *by product* theory of collective goods, which is useful for explaining the initial rise of an organization. But, most rebellious situations involve long drawn out campaigns of violence and risk. As Berejikian (1992) argues: "revolutionary struggles require increased popular action—therefore contributions—above and beyond that which was initially sufficient for the organization to emerge and prosper." (651).

Meanwhile, prospect theory claims that individual risk acceptance changes to favor risk-seeking behavior in a loss frame. The result of this loss averse behavior is that individual and group decisions routinely fail to maximize their values. That is to say individuals and groups will make choices that are non-maximizing in order to avoid the pain associated with losses. Furthermore, individuals and groups will overweight the small probability of success and underweight the higher probability of failure associated with risky options. In terms of rebellious action this would mean that individuals in a losses frame who face the choice of (a) do nothing (accepting sure losses) or (b) rebel (gamble for improved conditions) would choose to rebel. This choice is more likely even though the probability that the rebellion will fail or that grave harm could come to the individual is high. In other words "certainty of a positive payoff is no longer a necessary condition for participation" (Ibid. 654).

Furthermore, collective action theory claims that decisions are based on individual cost-benefit calculations—it does not matter if individuals face poor conditions. The degree to which individuals have been treated poorly does not decrease the costs involved with supporting armed struggle, nor does it increase the positive payoff individuals receive for participating. Thus, conditions associated with the structural

28

situation do not play into the decisions individuals will make. Prospect theory though places perceptions of the social condition at the heart of individual decision-making. The degree to which individuals perceive the decision in terms of gains or losses significantly impacts the willingness of that individual (or group) to accept risk.

There are problems associated with this new relative deprivation model that need addressing. Namely, in order to assess the validity of this model we need to test it (as we do with collective action) at the individual level. Both collective action and prospect theory make claims about individual motivation and behavior that can only be partially assessed via aggregate indicators. To critically examine each theory we need to move to individual level analysis and gather information directly from people within social groups that support (or do not support) rebel movements. If collective action theory is correct we should expect that an individual's motivation to support a rebel movement be based on the receipt of material benefits, non-material rewards, or negative sanctions offered by the group. If prospect theory is correct then individuals (and groups) are motivated by their perceptions of social conditions, and they decide to act based on the biases these perceptions create in their assessment of the probability of success associated with risky options.

Conclusion

The primary argument advanced here is very simple—support is essential if rebel organizations are to survive against the suppressive actions of states. Complications arise in the various explanatory systems used to understand why people lend support. Relative

deprivation advances the claim that structural conditions are vitally important for motivating individuals to engage in rebellious action. Problems with this claim are apparent in the inability to determine the linkages between individual psychic states and group actions. In response to this difficulty collective action theory claims that structural conditions matter very little in an individual's decision to support rebel action. Instead individuals are motivated by specific incentives offered them via the group or by social pressure. This claim is also weak in that it cannot account for why people lend support when incentives are absent. The modified relative deprivation theory using the prospect theory model of individual decision making offers an alternative that allows us to retain the role of structural conditions in the decisions of individuals as a force that alters individual risk assessment. Prospect theory advances relative deprivation claims on the importance of structural conditions, and offers a viable alternative to collective action theory.

The outline of this project will follow as such. Chapter Two details the methodology used in this study. Chapter Three provides the historical context of each case. The information will focus on the conditions that have led to the emergence of nationalist movements in Northern Ireland and Palestine. Chapter Four discusses the role and structure of support in rebel movements. This chapter outlines the various levels of support and their role in the survival of the organization

Chapter Five provides the first results of the empirical tests on the prospect theory and collective action models. These tests rely on intensive case studies of Northern Ireland and Palestine. The interview data provides rich qualitative information regarding decision-making among individual supporters of armed struggle. Meanwhile, Chapter

30

Six explores variables related to variation in risk acceptance among individuals within the same national grouping. That is to say, this chapter explores the prospect theory approach with more detail in order to explain why people from the same national group opt for different actions to resolve the same situation. The goal is to determine if individuals perceive losses and gains differently even though the objective conditions are roughly similar for everyone involved.

Chapter Seven explores the policy implications of a reformulated relative deprivation theory. The claim advanced here is that most states adopt counter-terrorist policies based on a rational choice logic (increasing costs to make support more costly). Policies designed in such a way may lead to the opposite outcome desired by states. In situations where large segments of the population perceive social conditions as a loss are likely to see cost increasing policies as reinforcing the perception of losses. This may make some individuals more resolute in their original decision to support rebel efforts. Hence the policies of the state may drive more people to support the rebel organization. Conversely, when the frame being promoted by the rebel group is *not* shared by a large segment of the population we are likely to observe popular acceptance of suppressive policies of the state, thereby allowing the state to weed the organization out of society with little cost or effort.

Chapter 2

Research Design

Introduction: The Most Different Systems Approach

Traditional studies of political violence have relied on the standard single-shot case study, or (on occasion) the comparative case study method. The case study method utilizes systemic or group level data drawn from the histories of a conflict(s) to demonstrate the validity of an explanation (see, for example, Popkin 1979). While imperfect, this method is a compromise we are often forced to make to avoid the risks associated with field research on political violence (Muller 1980: 70). However, this means that direct theoretical testing of individual level theories is often sacrificed meaning that we risk glossing over relevant information that may falsify a theory.

To overcome this problem researchers need to use information gathered at the individual level. This is best accomplished by extending the case study to include information drawn directly from individuals involved in the conflict. This allows us to move away from the standard case-study approach and employ a new method. This approach is referred to as the "Most Different Systems" approach (Przeworski and Teune 1982). In using this research design the researcher moves past the system or group level to the individual level of analysis. This has two advantages. First, the study can focus specifically on individual behavioral processes to provide a better test of the theories outlined in chapter 1. Second, the study can include more cases in a cross-regional

approach. As Przeworski and Teune (1982) state: "Systemic factors [culture, or social setting] are not given any special place among possible predictors of behavior" (34). The assumption underlying this approach is that individuals are drawn from the same population regardless of specific country or regional origin. This assumption is tested through the course of cross-systemic research. The study can remain at the intrasystemic level so long as the data do not indicate that systemic factors must be considered (Ibid. 35). In other words, by using the most different systems approach we can test explanations at the individual level, and in a cross-regional setting.

The Most Different Systems research design is not the only approach to the study of political violence. However, for the class of theories being tested here the Most Different Systems approach is optimal. Consider the following. The single-shot case study is perhaps the most common methodological approach to the study of political violence. The case study approach provides an intensive analysis of one state for the purpose of theoretical testing. In this approach, we can use a theory to explain an existing case, generate testable hypotheses, confirm or falsify a theory, or critically analyze a theory through a deviant case (Lijphart 1971:691). No matter how the case study is used its general purpose remains the same—to generalize a set of observed results to a broader theory (Yin 1994: xiii). The case study is not used to generalize results to a broader population (Ibid. 10). Given this purpose then, one could construct quality case studies without leaving the library, *depending on the topic* (Ibid. 14, emphasis mine).

This approach can be useful for studies such as this one. However, the nature of theoretical testing would have to change. To use the standard case study method I would

simply establish the theoretical assumption (i.e. individuals behave rationally). The assumption generates theoretical implications that can then be observed in order to test the theory. For example, if individuals behave rationally they calculate costs and benefits in order to make decisions. From here the investigator need only comb the empirical data (case histories and personal accounts) to unearth evidence that benefits were offered to individuals for their support. This evidence then becomes confirmation of the theoretical assumptions. However, this study does not rely on theoretical assumptions to generate observable implications. Instead this study goes to the very assumptions about human behavior and decision-making processes. The behavioral factors being studied involve internal processes of human decision-making. A study cannot assess the rational decision processes by simply pointing to the existence of benefits. These benefits may be offered simply as propaganda tools, not for altering the decision parameters of individuals. Thus, the standard single-shot case study does not offer the type of information needed to conduct the type of test being conducted.

The standard alternative to the case study is the Comparative-Cases Method or the "Most Similar Systems" design (Lijphart 1975, 1971; Przeworski and Teune 1982). In this approach the investigator maximizes the similarities between cases in order to minimize the number of relevant variables in the study. Ideally the only remaining difference would be the subject of the study (Lijphart 1975: 160). Using this approach allows the investigator to isolate and account for the influence of differing variables as possible explanatory variables. For example, this study could select two or more cases of nationalist movements. Ideally all cases would share certain similarities (i.e. cultural characteristics like religion or language, political similarities like democratic political

34

systems). The variation between cases is that one or several movements have succeeded over time, while others failed. Relative deprivation theories explain that the ability to organize a sustained movement is related to the relative degree of disparity between the in-group and out-group in the country. The evidence may indicate that in countries where the nationalist movement failed, the government was better able to accommodate nationalist demands and thus defuse the social conditions leading to the conflict.

This approach may seem viable for this study. However, it has many weaknesses that make it less than desirable. The first problem is similar to the one found in the single-shot case study. Information used in the study is typically drawn from the systemic or group level, meaning that individual level data is lost. Without the individual level data the investigator is forced to rely on systemic level data in order to explain individual behavior. Variation in individual behavior across systems is then attributed to differences in system level characteristics. This has been a problem that has plagued relative deprivation studies over the years. We cannot rely on systemic level data to explain variation in individual or group behavior. This can lead to the type of inconsistencies discussed in Chapter 1, where in some cases we find evidence of relative deprivation and no violence (e.g. the United States during the Civil Rights Movement) or we find violence with no evidence of relative deprivation (e.g. RAF in Germany). The result has been to add to the relative deprivation model to include more system level factors to the theory. This weakness has also opened the door for challengers to claim that perhaps the variation in behavior is better explained by the ability of groups to offer incentives to individuals that outweigh the cost of participation.

A second weakness is that the most-similar systems design forces investigators to adopt an area studies approach. This means that all cases are selected from a region of the world that is somewhat culturally homogenous. To include more cases from other regions would entail adding more variables thus hindering standard theoretical constructions such as parsimony. Thus, the area study approach assumes culture somehow plays an important role in explaining the behavior of individuals. In this study, such an assumption is tantamount to claiming that decision processes are culturally determined. That is to say, individuals in one region of the world make decisions based on one model (i.e. rationality), while others rely on different models (i.e. non-rationality). Any way this assumption is presented it implies cultural bias.

Conversely, the most different systems design minimizes cultural similarities because it assumes that cultural variables are irrelevant to explaining individual level phenomena like decision processes. This does not imply that cultural symbols like religion and national identity are unimportant. Indeed groups may use such symbols to manipulate decision processes (see chapter 1). Instead, it implies that culture does not determine decision processes. At the same time, the most different systems approach does test for cultural variation. If the data collected indicates that differences existed within decision processes between individuals from different regions, then we can return to culture as an important explanatory variable. The difference with this design is that we do not assume cultural variation in the beginning, instead we test for it.

In sum, this study will proceed by employing the most different system design. I will expand upon the standard case study to include qualitative data gathered from interviews with individuals involved in two different conflict situations. This should

yield a greater range of information that can be used to critically test the competing explanations. The following sections outline the approach and how it was employed in this study.

The Cases

This study relies on two cases of rebellion—Northern Ireland and Palestine. These cases were selected primarily because the are representative of a specific type of rebel movement—nationalist-separatism.[1] The nationalist content of the conflict means that the rebelling groups seek some form of self-determination. Also, the social division in both conflicts is between two culturally distinct groups—an established settler community and an indigenous population. Finally, both cases share a common British imperial imprint on their pasts. These similarities, however, exist only in the broadest sense. Each conflict situation is vastly different.

The differences in the conflict situations are most noticeable in the geographical location and cultural background of the conflicting parties, the length of the conflicts, the number of opposition groups, and the goals of the conflicting groups. Each conflict demonstrates broad similarities especially in the division between two culturally distinct groups. Upon closer examination, however, we find that the social division in Palestine is much greater than in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland the conflict is between the indigenous population (Irish) and a created settler community (Non-Irish). The settler

---

[1] Both cases share another similarity. Both are involved in peace processes to end the conflict. This similarity is only note worthy in that it made both ideal candidates for field research.

community is comprised of descendents from Scotland, Wales and England. These settlers were brought in by Britain to dilute the indigenous population and create a loyal population in Ireland. Though these two communities are different in basic ethnographic factors (language, social tradition, religion) the group boundaries are not entirely distinct. First, the language barrier is loosely maintained through the revival of Gaelic (technically a dead language). Most inhabitants of Northern Ireland (and Southern Ireland) speak English as a first language. In terms of social and political tradition, both the Irish and Non-Irish communities rely on socio-political traditions inherited from Britain through an extended common history. In terms of religion, both communities are Christian. Unionists are predominantly Protestant and Nationalists are predominantly Catholic. So while the communal divisions in Northern Ireland appear vast, upon closer review they are not. The conflict comes down to a fight between one group that possesses socio-political dominance and another group that seeks to alter the existing political loyalty of the six counties, which would fundamentally alter the dominance relationship.

In Palestine the difference between the warring communities is much greater. Palestinians are Arabic people sharing similar social traditions (language, social order, and religion). The Jewish community is comprised of two groups. One is indigenous to the region (Oriental Jews), while the other is a settler community comprised mostly of Europeans. The two Jewish communities are distinct in terms of social traditions, while the entire Jewish community is distinct from the Palestinian community in terms of social tradition, language, and religion. The only common history between the Palestinian and Jewish communities derives from a relatively short relationship of distrust and military

domination. The conflict is in many ways about the ability of both communities to exist within the territory defined as a homeland.

Other differences between the two cases lie in the length of the conflicts. The Northern Ireland conflict is nearly 400 years old, while the Palestinian conflict is only 70 years old. Differences also lie in the complexity of the conflict situation. In Northern Ireland there are several rebel groups operating on both sides. However, the dominant group in the entire conflict is the Provisional Irish Republican Army. In Palestine the situation is more complex. There are seven or more groups operating on the Palestinian side of the conflict. Among these groups four are dominant (Fateh, Hamas, Democratic Front, and the Popular Front). A final difference lies in the goals of each nationalist group. In Northern Ireland, the Republican Movement is based on a combined separatist-irridentist goal. In Palestine the goal varies by group. Fateh and the Democratic Front favor separatism, while Hamas and the Popular Front favor irridentism.

To summarize, the cases used in this study were chosen because they are representative of nationalist rebellions. The similarities between the cases are fundamental. Each case concerns a conflict between two culturally distinct communities, in which one community is a dominant settler community and the other is a repressed indigenous community. Despite this basic similarity there are vast differences in the cases. In Northern Ireland the ethnic distinction between the two communities is minor and artificially maintained, the conflict has lasted for several centuries, and there is only one dominant rebel group. In Palestine the ethnic division between the communities is vast, the conflict has lasted decades, and there are many different rebel groups in operation with differing goals and motivations.

These cultural and social dissimilarities, however, are irrelevant to the nature of this study. The research design implies that the individuals are drawn from a single sample, and cultural variation ultimately does not constitute an explanatory variable to determine which decision model individuals are employing. The next section will outline the steps taken to acquire the sample.

The Sample

In each case respondents were chosen from two populations. Both populations share certain goals (nationalist aspirations). However, one population supports the use of armed struggle, while the other does not. There were 42 respondents from Northern Ireland, and 41 respondents from Palestine, for a total of 83 (71 supporters and 11 non-supporters).

Respondent selection followed a non-probability design referred to as a convenience sample. A "snowballing" technique was used (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). This method utilizes whatever sampling units are available and then moves out to include other units that have been referred to the researcher. This sampling technique was a compromise made to accommodate the need for trust between the researcher and the respondents. In rebel support networks individuals will not openly discuss their activities and beliefs with individuals they do not know or trust. Thus, researchers must make contacts with individuals that will vouch for their integrity. Respondents are more willing to discuss sensitive topics with a researcher if a person they trust has referred them.

This technique sacrifices external validity (Groves 1989; Zeller and Carmines 1980). In other words, the survey results cannot be generalized to the larger populations of Northern Ireland or Palestine. Furthermore, the results cannot be generalized to a larger population of rebel supporters worldwide. However, these limitations do not mean that internal validity is weak (Zeller and Carmines 1980). That is to say, the results of the survey should present an accurate test of the theoretical models discussed in Chapter 1.

In Northern Ireland 42 respondents (33 supporters and 9 non-supporters) were selected. Party leaders in Sinn Féin and the Social Democrat and Labour Party made the initial selection of respondents. Additional respondents were included when referred to the researcher. All respondents in this portion of the study are located in Belfast and the surrounding environs. Given the dominance of the PIRA in Northern Ireland it is safe to assume that responses from individuals in Belfast would be similar to those in Derry, Portadown, or County Fermanagh. In Palestinian 41 respondents were chosen (39 supporters and 2 non-supporters).[2] The selection of respondents proceeded in a similar manner with members of the various groups (Fateh, Hamas, the Democratic Front and Popular Front) providing the initial list of interviewees with additional respondents included when referred to the researcher. Interviewees were selected from a larger geographic area than in Northern Ireland. This was done because certain groups have stronger bases of support in specific regions and little support in others. Ultimately, respondents came from: Nablus, Beir Zait, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jabalya Refugee Camp, Gaza City.

---

[2]   Non-supporters were not as easily identified in Palestine as they were in Northern Ireland.

By selecting individuals associated with specific groups information can be gathered that is relevant to both individual level experiences and perceptions, and group level perceptions. Information can be extracted relating to the nature and worth of incentives offered by the group. Also, we can gather data on individual level perceptions of the social condition and the degree to which those conditions are viewed in terms of losses or gains. Individuals can also identify their group affiliation and define the factors of group identity. This information is useful for determining allegiance to a solidary group and to ascertain traits that would exclude members from the group. Furthermore, group perceptions can be derived via individual responses to questions. If there is substantial coherence between answers given by various individuals within a group regarding their perceptions on the worth of selective incentives and their view of the social conditions (in terms of losses or gains) we can infer that these views are representative of group perceptions.[3]

Data Collection and The Survey

The data for this study comes from direct face-to-face interviews. The interview schedule is divided into five sections (see Appendix A: Interview Schedules). One section deals with simple demographic information on gender, education, occupation, and religious affiliation (results are reported in Chapter 5).

---

[3] There is a possibility of discontinuity between group and individual perceptions, especially within hierarchical organizations. However, the discontinuity should be minimal within organizations such as rebel groups since the degree of discipline and allegiance required of group members typically minimizes disagreements between members and leaders. While there may be discontinuity, the variation is expected to be very low.

The next section deals with information regarding identity (See Appendix A section I). Identity is useful for determining the existence of a solidary group and indicating connectedness among various individuals. Thus, national identity is one characteristic that helps to define sides in the conflict, goals of the conflict, and notions of an ideal state of existence for the group. The questions in the schedule are designed to elicit individual responses regarding their own identity, define factors that characterize members of their group, and to define factors that would exclude individuals from this national group.

The next section of the schedule relates to group support, goals, and an individual's "frame" of the social condition (See Appendix A, section II). In Northern Ireland it is assumed that individuals are supporters of either the Republican Movement (supporters of Sinn Féin) or the Nationalist Movement (supporters of the SDLP).[4] As such, questions referring to group support are close-ended with respondents being asked to evaluate a statement of Republican goals. In Palestine the number of groups operating in the conflict required that questions be open-ended. Individuals are asked which group they supported, and then to explain the goals of that group. The next set of questions in this section relates to individual perceptions of the current social context in relation to the goals of their group. More specifically the questions ask individuals to assess whether of not the ongoing peace processes have fundamentally altered the socio-political context of the conflict, thus bringing the group closer to achieving its goals. These questions are useful for ascertaining individual frames of reference in terms of gains or losses.

---

[4] This assumption held up for the most part with 37 of the 41 respondents supporting either SF or the SDLP. Four respondents demonstrated support for other groups (3 supported Continuity IRA, and one supported the Irish National Liberation Army [INLA]).

The respondents are required to declare whether or not they supported the armed struggle as a way to achieve their group's goals. Individuals that indicate support for the armed struggle are asked to identify their level of support ([a] activists; [b] active supporters; [c] passive supporters) (See Appendix A). The level of support does not have any theoretical import. Instead, it was useful for arranging questions in reference to costs and benefits.[5] Individuals that oppose armed struggle are asked to indicate optional tactics that could be used to achieve their group's goals (e.g. negotiation, democratic political processes, etc.).

The next two sections of the interview schedule concern the decision-making models outlined in Chapter 1. The section on collective action is divided into two major parts, one on costs, the other on incentives. The section on incentives asks about material benefits, non-material benefits, and coercive sanctions. In the second part, respondents are asked to identify any benefits they may have received in exchange for their support, and how these benefits may have influenced their decisions (See appendix A, section III part 2). A benefit is defined as any positive reward the individual receives in exchange for his/her support. Similarly, respondents are asked to identify any type of non-material rewards they receive for their participation and how these benefits weigh on their decisions to get involved (See Appendix A, Palestine Survey section III part 3). Finally, passive and active supporters are asked to indicate if the rebel group commonly uses negative sanctions in the past, and how these sanctions have influenced their decisions (See Appendix A, section III part 4). Negative sanctions are defined as the use of

---

[5]   We cannot assume that individual at lower levels of support incur the same costs as those at higher levels of support, or that benefits will be equal for all levels of support.

coercion or intimidation to influence one's decisions to support the group.[6] This is determined by how (a) noticeable the group is in local communities, (b) whether or not the presence of the group makes one feel uncomfortable. Sanctions also refer to (c) if the group members or other people in the community attempt to forcibly persuade people to support the group.

The prospect theory section is divided into four parts—reference point estimation, framing effect, certainty effect, and frame change. The part on framing is subdivided into three series of questions relating to factors that may influence individual perceptions about the social condition. The first task is to assess the individual's reference point (or aspirations), and determine if the current conditions approximate that reference point. To assess the reference point (See Section II of the survey in Appendix A) respondents are asked to explain the goals of the group they support, and whether or not the current conditions approximate those goals. Then, individuals are asked to indicate whether or not they support armed struggle.

The next set of questions concerns framing effects (See Appendix A, Section IV). These questions are used to determine the degree to which individuals experience the social condition of the conflict situation and the degree to which they are taught to view the social condition in terms of losses. My contention is that individuals that are taught to see the situation in a losses frame, and then subsequently have experiences related to this perceived condition, are more likely to accept the risk of supporting armed struggle. Individuals that are taught that the social condition does not represent a loss, or do not

---

[6]   Negative sanctions often involve sensitive topics and can make people very uncomfortable. Thus questions relating to sanctions must be worded in a way as to tap into the feelings of insecurity or threat caused by these sanctions without directly asking someone if they have been intimidated or harassed.

45

have individual experiences related a losses frame will not view the social condition in terms of losses. In this section respondents are asked three series of questions relating to (a) personal experiences, (b) socialization by family, and (c) significant events in the history of the conflict (e.g. massacres, moral victories, mass uprisings) (See Appendix A, section IV parts 1-3).[7]

The next series of questions relates to the certainty effect. Prospect Theory claims that individuals are more willing to accept risk if the conditions surrounding a decision are viewed in a losses frame. The willingness to accept risk is even higher when individuals are certain that the losses they perceive will continue or deteriorate unless some action is taken. In this series of questions, individuals are asked to comment on the utility of violence to achieve their goals, to assess the importance of their individual contribution to the armed struggle, and to predict what would happen if they decided not to contribute (See Appendix A, section IV part 4).

The final part of this section revisits individual perceptions about current social conditions. It is likely that in the past many individuals viewed the socio-political conditions as a loss. But what about the current situations where peace processes are ongoing? If the peace process represents a shift in the social condition, then individuals should be less willing to support political violence. However, if the peace processes do not represent a shift in existing social conditions, individuals should indicate a willingness to continue the armed struggle. Therefore, this series of questions ask individuals to assess the changes that have occurred, if these changes have effected their

---

[7] These questions were formalized in the Palestine study. In Northern Ireland I did not include formal questions on significant events, but individuals often spoke of these events on their own.

willingness to support armed struggle, and if they would support renewed violence (and under what conditions) (See Appendix A, section IV part 5).

Data Analysis

The interviews are expected to yield a wealth of qualitative data relating to the factors that influence an individual's decisions to support, or not support, a rebel group. This data can then be used to assess whether or not individuals base their decisions of support on the quality and worth of incentives offered by the group, or if individual risk assessment was influenced by their perceptions of structural conditions.

Obviously the data are qualitative in nature. Though many responses can be categorized into affirmative or negative categories, the vast majority of responses cannot be quantified. This does not imply that the research is non-scientific, or that the data cannot produce accurate 'objective' results (Morse 1994: 3). It simply means that the data cannot be used to produce statistical correlations. Instead, qualitative data require a different set of criteria to establish objective credibility. Leissinger (1994) argues that objective credibility for qualitative data are best achieved through the following: prolonged observation, repetition, establishing the meaning of responses through social contexts, observation of repetitive patterns over time in similar contexts, exhaustive exploration, and transferability of the data into similar contexts (pp. 105-106). Most of these criteria are met in this study by the replication of the original case (Northern Ireland) in the second case (Palestine).

The objectivity of the data is more difficult to establish. The primary concern relates to 'coder reliability' (Kvale 1996: 64). Coder reliability is established when different people code the same data. This ensures that information is undistorted by personal bias. Another form of checking against coder bias is by "Letting the object [in this case the respondents] speak for itself" (Ibid.). That is how the information is presented in this study. In each section of the data analysis (Chapters 5 and 6) questions will be explored using quotes from different respondents. Given the need for anonymity the source of each quote is provided via a three to six digit alphanumeric code. The first letters of the code refer to the case study (NI for Northern Ireland; P for Palestine). The second part of the code is a number indicating if the respondent is a (1) supporter, or (0) a non-supporter. The third part refers specifically to supporters—a letter denoting the level of support (a-activist, b-active supporter, c-passive supporter). The final parts of the code are numbers that refer to the specific respondent (1-42).

Conclusion

By convention the study of political violence has proceeded through the use of the single-shot or comparative case study method. In this approach researchers lay out an explanation regarding political violence and then refer to systemic or group level histories to provide data to test the explanation. This approach is often accepted because of the limitations we face in conducting studies of violent movements. However, this approach lacks the certainty needed to appropriately test different theories on political violence, especially when the theories concern cognitive processes at the individual level.

To overcome these weaknesses, this study employs the most different systems research design. This research design allows a researcher to perform two tasks simultaneously. First, data is drawn at the individual level; meaning that competing theories on why individuals support political violence can be more rigorously tested. Second, this approach allows for multiple cases to be included in a format where systemic factors (e.g. culture and social condition) can be marginalized until the data indicates that systemic factors are important. In short, the most different system design does not require lengthy case histories or constant systemic level comparisons to denote the similarities and differences between the cases.

The data in this study are largely qualitative, and drawn from a non-random sample. The non-random sample is used due to constraints relating to trust between the researcher and respondent. This drawback simply means that the results of the study cannot be generalized to the entire population. Instead, results are used to test theories. The reliance on qualitative data does hinder the use of statistical correlations meaning that quantitative certainty cannot be obtained. However, this does not mean the data is non-scientific or subjective. It means that we cannot obtain the same level of certainty that a randomized sample with quantitative data would allow. Despite this weakness, this piece still provides a large step forward in the study of political violence.

Chapter 3

Background on the Nationalist Movements in Northern Ireland and Palestine

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background on each conflict. While the information is generally limited in terms of theoretical utility, it is useful for understanding many of the comments made by respondents in later chapters. Therefore, the information in these case histories provides a foundation for the empirical studies that follow. At the same time, the information provided in these case histories is very useful for identifying information that is relevant to the modified relative deprivation model. In particular, the information helps to identify potential reference points for individuals in both cases (i.e. the 1921 partition of Ireland, and the 1948 war that established Israel or the 1967 seizure of the Occupied Territories in Palestine). Furthermore, the information is useful for developing a picture of the social conditions both minority groups live within in order understand why current conditions are likely to be viewed as a loss. In other words, the denial of civil rights, economic and political disenfranchisement, and community suppression are not likely to lead nationalists in Northern Ireland to view conditions since partition as ideal. The same holds for Palestine. Individuals are not likely to perceive the military occupation, deportations, and refugee problems as a good outcome of the establishment of Israel, or the occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus, while the information is limited in its theoretical utility, it is useful for

50

understanding the context surrounding individual decision to support rebellion in these cases.

The next chapter looks more closely at the organizational efforts of the various paramilitary groups to gather support. Evidence from this chapter will be used to further analyze the influence of independent organizational efforts and the influence social conditions have on the support building efforts of paramilitary groups.

Northern Ireland

The republican movement in Northern Ireland is an extension of the original struggle for Irish independence that started in the 17th century and lasted until the early 20th century. The nationalist factions believe that Ireland should be a united and independent state. The Unionist opposition is comprised of a migrant population that opposes any notion of Irish Home Rule or a *unified* Irish state.

Historically nationalists used two tactics to resolve the issue of united home rule. The first is *Constitutionalism,* in which groups would use the existing political structures of the English Parliament to further their cause (Hughes 1994: 12). Often Irish (and Northern Irish) political parties held disproportionate power in Parliament making them essential members of governing coalitions. This enabled nationalists to dominate the home rule debate during the 19th century, while Unionists have held disproportionate power in the 20th century. The second tactic is *Fenianism* or "physical force nationalism" (Ibid.). Given the historical limitations on nationalist political power, the violent approach gained substantial currency in the 19th century. Since this time the Fenian

51

strategy has become a central feature of the nationalist struggle. Throughout the struggle for independence the constitutional and Fenian approaches have often been at odds. However, Sinn Fein and the paramilitary wings of the nationalist movement have periodically combined the two tactics as a singular strategy to achieve the desired goal of a unified Ireland. Today this combination of tactics is referred to as the *Ballot Box and the Armalite*.

The following section will discuss the historical evolution of the Northern Ireland conflict. Within this historical overview there are two features that that are worth noting. The first is the garrison mentality among the migrant group (especially in the North) and the marginalization of the indigenous population by the colonizing elite (especially in the North). Second has been the inconsistency of British counter-insurgency policy in (Northern) Ireland. The British have routinely reacted harshly to nationalist paramilitarism, while ignoring and/or aiding the actions of Unionist paramilitarism. Both features found in Irish history are essential to our understanding of the problem today.

From Colonization and Partition to "The Troubles"

The modern conflict in Northern Ireland is directly related to a 17th century plantation policy designed to clear the native population and resettle the island with "reliable" immigrants (Hughes 1994: 7). The first comprehensive plantation scheme started in the Ulster province (the Northern Province of Ireland) in 1609 following an uprising. After the rebellion the 'Flight of the Earls' left Ulster leaderless and the indigenous population defenseless (Clark 1995: 190). This made Ulster vulnerable to a

plantation policy that would allow England to transform the perennial trouble spot into a loyal region.

By using plantations England attempted to remake the population by transferring loyal immigrants into the area and segregating the population in order to increase control. A whole new society was created that transformed the native character and traditions (Ibid. 192; Hughes 1994: 8). Twenty-three new towns were created as a network of strong points to control the entire province. By 1622, nearly 21,000 English, Welsh and Scottish nationals were settled in Ulster (Hughes 1994).

Plantation and segregation did not succeed as planned, however. Segregation was never completed leaving the native Irish as urban laborers and farmers holding the worst lands. The urban areas were dominated by a migrant upper class and the rural areas were pocketed with an embittered and degraded native population (Clark 1995: 192). This situation left the early settlers frightened by the people whose land they had taken, leading to the emergence of a siege mentality among the immigrants (Hughes 1994: 7).

The disenfranchisement created by this situation led to a new rebellion. The Irish (Ulstermen in particular) rejected English rule and used the Civil Wars of 1641 to take advantage of the divisions in England. The plan was for a simultaneous rebellion in Dublin and Ulster. The Dublin phase failed before it started, but the Ulstermen continued in their fight. The English finally defeated the rebellion in late 1642. At the end of the rebellion came "Cromwell's Revenge"—a historical myth of indiscriminant brutality and resettlement against the Irish. In reality, Cromwell's armies punished only the few leaders of the rebellion, and continued the older plantation policies (Clark 1995: 202-03). Further plantations were established and Ulster was once again the primary region of

settlement. The degree of resettlement after the 1641 rebellion, however, never reached the proportions intended by the earlier policies (Ibid. 203).

The Jacobite War (1689) offered the Irish another opportunity to equalize their relationship with the English. The attempt to displace the Protestant King William and restore James II as a Catholic Monarch to the throne began with armed resistance in Enniskillen and Derry (in Ulster) (Simms 1995: 217). The settler population in Ulster (predominantly Protestant) quickly rallied to support the Williamite forces in Derry making the city the primary front in the struggle. The Siege of Derry eventually failed and Williamite forces won in 1690. The failure of James II to regain the throne also set the stage for the 'Popery Codes' or the Penal Laws, beginning the Age of Ascendancy for the Protestant population in Ireland (Wall 1995: 217; Hughes 1994: 8).

The *Age of Ascendancy* was marked by the establishment of a parliament dominated by Protestant and the enactment of the Penal Laws designed to "keep Catholics in a state of permanent subjection." (Wall 1995: 218). These actions were never viewed as "Irish on Irish" discrimination. Given that the English parliament held the power to strike down any legislation passed in Ireland, the Penal Laws were seen as a British technique to divide and conquer the Irish people (Ibid.). The laws themselves were designed to (a) strip land wealth from Catholics and transfer it to Protestants, (b) prevent Catholics from holding any political power, and (c) create cultural hegemony for the Anglican landowning class.

The cultural hegemony quickly died as the laws against certain religious worship fell into disuse by 1716 (Ibid.). Meanwhile, the political laws prevented any Catholic from holding an elected or appointed political office (Wall 1995: 218; Hughes 1994: 9).

54

By the middle of the 18th century, alternative social orders emerged as nationalists encouraged rural non-cooperation with the ruling authorities (Wall (1995: 227). The 'Whiteboy' codes provided Irish nationalists with local authorities to guide rural social policy while the Irish Parliament did the same for Protestants. The political laws remained in place until the Catholic emancipation in 1829. Finally, the land laws were relatively effective in stripping wealth from rural Catholics. Death for Catholics meant that their lands were divided up evenly among their children leaving smaller plots for each succeeding generation (Hughes 1994: 9). This policy quickly forced small farmers to relinquish their lands. Meanwhile the laws regarding the purchase of land strongly favored Protestants. These laws, however, did little to affect the large landowning Catholics, who remained relatively unharmed and politically powerful.

The Penal Laws created social and economic equality gaps between the minority migrant groups and the majority indigenous population. The inequality resulted in struggles between the two groups (Wall 1995: 231). Attempts at constitutional reform failed or were stymied in England, which provided an impetus for radical movements in the late 18th century. Nationalists quickly developed secret military societies and sought military aid from England's enemies' abroad (McDowell 1995: 242). The result of this maneuvering was the Rising of 1798.

The rising represented a shift in the content of nationalism in Ireland. Prior to the Penal Laws Catholics in Ireland remained loyal to the British crown while opposing domination by the migrant classes. After the Penal Laws, nationalists quickly associated the dominance of the migrants as an extension of English domination. This led to a perception among the majority that union with Britain was a constant source of

55

disappointed hopes, grievances, denied liberty, and poverty. Meanwhile, the migrant minority saw the union as representing economic advantages and political supremacy. This was most evident in Ulster where the Protestant community benefited from industrial developments that were unmatched elsewhere on the island (Moody 1995: 276). The 1798 Rising was the first time the Irish turned on the British crown (Hughes 1994: 10). Britain responded to the rising by organizing counter military units in Ireland and suspending *habeas corpus* to allow for greater suppression of the nationalist movement (McDowell 1995: 243).

The rebellion and counter-insurgency quickly divided the island. The Irish rising signaled a threat to Protestant Ascendancy and prompted a new wave of sectarian violence in Ulster (Hughes 1994: 11). Many Ulster Protestants viewed the Irish rising as an attempt to exterminate Protestantism on the island. Thus, they responded by forming the 'Orange Order' to protect and celebrate Protestant Ascendancy (Ibid.) The English used the Orange Order as the basis of their military counter-insurgency. The use of local loyal military units to suppress the Irish rising created more support for the nationalist cause (McDowell 1995: 244). The result was a particularly difficult period for Anglo-Irish relations in the 19th century.

With the shift in nationalism prompted by the rising, political goals changed from redemption for past wrongs to national independence. During the 19th century, the nationalist movement was able to gather strength so long as it remained focused on a specific grievance rather than on vague notions of national independence (Hughes 1994: 12). The specific issue of land reform fueled the separatist movement during this period (Moody 1995: 275). The two methods used to achieve nationalist aspirations were

Constitutionalism and rebellion. Neither approached fared well by itself, but the combination of extremist agitation and constitutional maneuvering did bring a conclusion to the land issue in 1879.

The shift to constitutional approaches was an outcome of the 1798 Rising. The failure of the rising signaled the Irish that militarism might not be the best method for achieving national goals. Thus, in the 19th century constitutional methods gained strength. However, given the limitations on Catholic political power (imposed by the Penal Laws) the constitutional movement quickly failed by the 1850's (Hughes 1994: 13).

The Fenian movement emerged in the 1850's. The Fenians organized for rebellion using the argument that Britain would never relinquish control of Ireland except through force (Moody 1995: 278). They quickly built a solid base of support. Soon after the Fenian Movement emerged, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) was organized (1858) and garnered an estimated membership of 30,000 (Hughes 1994: 13). By 1865 thousands more were joining their ranks.[1] The militarist strategy was to instigate a rebellion to create an independent, democratic Irish Republic; any deviation from this goal was viewed as dangerous to the cause (Moody 1995: 278; Hughes 1994: 13). The outcome of this militarist movement was the Fenian Rising of 1867. Britain responded by offering political concessions on land tenure and political participation, and wholesale suppression of Nationalist communities (Hughes 1994: 14). The Fenian Rising was a

---

[1] Despite the growing numbers of supporters for Fenianism the movement never involved much beyond a select minority of the entire nationalist movement.

futile gesture overall, but it did mobilize many more people into the armed faction of the nationalist movement (Moody 1995: 279).

The failure of Fenianism led to a resurgence of constitutional approaches in the late 19th century. Nationalists organized and consolidated their political power through the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). The primary goal of the IPP was to win home rule for Ireland. They first approached the issue of home rule through conciliatory practices designed to win support through kindness (Moody 1995: 282). The election of 1874 shifted the constitutional practices of the IPP to favor obstruction in the House of Commons in an attempt to force Parliament to deal with the issue of home rule. The persistence of the IPP never paid off, and the IRB officially condemned the constitutional tactics.[2]

By the late 1870's, the IPP added land reform to the issue of home rule. By turning to the specific grievance of migrant landlord-native tenant abuse,[3] the IPP was able to unite disparate groups in Ireland and draw upon Fenian tactics to support the constitutional reforms. The basis for this move was the economic crisis of 1878-79, which threatened many tenant laborers with bankruptcy. The Fenians agitated with local farmers to prevent foreclosures while Charles Parnell (leader of the IPP) sought land reform in parliament (Moody 1995: 285). The IPP eventually won the 'Land War' and the landlord system was progressively dismantled. The victory in the 'Land War'

---

[2] Though the IRB officially condemned the constitutional movement, in secret they supported the efforts of Charles Parnell to bring about home rule.

[3] The claims that the landlord system was based on migrant domination of the native population were largely mythical. In reality many of the abusive landlords in Ireland were themselves Irish. The myth though did provide a unifying factor for various groups in Ireland (Hughes 1994: 17).

resolved the final tangible grievance in Ireland, leaving the 'vague notion of national independence' as the only unresolved issue.

Once home rule became the primary issue for Nationalists, changes occurred within the political landscape of Ireland. First was the resurgence of militant Ulster Unionism. Second was the attempted resurrection of Irish culture as a basis for the nationalist movement. The resurgence of Ulster militarism was a result of changes in way the leadership of the British Liberal party set about to resolve the Irish problem. Prime Minister Gladstone began to emphasize humanitarian issues during his term as the British leader. This led the party to view a policy of devolution as the optimal solution for the Irish question. The intent was to establish limited independent power in an Irish Parliament. Three unsuccessful attempts were made for Irish Home Rule in 1886, 1893, and 1912 (McCracken 1995: 313; Hughes 1994: 20). Each time the bills were defeated by organized Unionist opposition. Unionist MP's had obtained promises from Conservatives in Parliament to prevent home rule and eventually secure partition of Ireland (Hughes 1994: 25). Meanwhile, as Home Rule debates carried on in Parliament new wave of militant Unionism began in Northern Ireland.[4]

The long established goal of militant Unionism was to preserve the Protestant religious identity and secure the British way of life in Ireland (Ibid.). This was built upon a tradition of sectarian terrorism rising from secret societies established in the 1770's. The Loyal Orange Order was established in 1795 after open battles with Irish Catholics in

---

[4]   Ulster Unionism had developed a unique character by the 18th century. An economically dominant Presbyterian middle class controlled the industrial centers in the North. This gave the Unionists cause to see themselves as superior to the native Catholic population. Furthermore, it provided an established interest in the preservation of the union with Britain.

Armagh (Ibid. 26). The 1798 Irish Rising strengthened the Orange Order out of fear of Catholic emancipation. When emancipation did occur in 1829, waves of violence spread throughout Ulster. Voting acts, like the Franchise Act (1850), were used to consolidate Unionist political power in Ulster (Ibid.). To prevent factionalism within the Unionist camp Protestant elites began to 'play the orange card' (use fear of Catholics) to solidify the Loyalist masses in Ulster (Ibid.). Militant Unionism was revitalized in the 1840's to counter the revival of Irish Nationalism. The movement grew large in Ulster as home rule debates started in the late 19th century. In the face of this challenge Unionist made it very clear they would oppose any devolution of power both constitutionally and physically (Ibid. 27).

The attempt to pass a Home Rule Bill in 1912 led to the organization of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). This private army was set up to resist home rule by force. The original covenant contained 218,000 signatures, and the UVF garnered a membership of approximately 100,000 people (McCracken 1995: 313; Hughes 1994: 30). The army received training and supplies from the British military and sympathizers (Ibid.). Meanwhile, the official British inaction against militant Unionist strengthened militarist factions of the nationalist camp as well (Hughes 1994: 30). The garrison mentality quickly spread to England as the British saw their interests being threatened by an eminent rebellion. Constitutional compromises were being worked out to satisfy Nationalist and Unionist demands. The ultimate resolution appeared to be either partition of the island or home rule enforced by the British military (Ibid. 34).

Irish nationalists during this time turned to efforts to resurrect Irish culture in order to provide a unifying force for the nationalist movement. With the demise of

60

tangible grievances (e.g. Land Reform) the nationalist movement was threatened with internal malaise. To prevent this from occurring, nationalist leaders began focusing on the cultural distinctions between the Irish and English. The Gaelic League was established as an institution for teaching the Irish language to inhabitants of Ireland. Similarly, the Gaelic Athletic Association revitalized traditional Irish games on the island. Neither organization was political in nature. However, they did provide a basis for a 'new look' nationalism that strengthened the claims that Ireland was culturally distinct from England (McCartney 1995: 297).

The 'new look' nationalism gained force behind the writings of Patrick Pearse and the political organization of Sinn Féin (Ourselves). Pearse claimed that every generation of Irish needed to make a blood sacrifice to redeem the Irish Nation. He called bloodshed "a cleansing and sanctifying thing" (McCartney 1995: 298). Meanwhile, Sinn Féin proclaimed the Act of Union between Ireland and Britain (1800) as illegal. Any participation of Irish MP's in the British parliament was viewed as aiding a criminal act (Ibid.). In place of the current political arrangement, Sinn Féin established a shadow government to rule Ireland. In the beginning, Sinn Féin could not break the domination of the IPP. However, they link-up with the IRB, thereby uniting passive resistance with physical force (Ibid. 299). This combination of tactics proved effective over time, slowly taking support away from the IPP.

With the rise in militant Unionism and the reorganization of Irish nationalism the stage was set for a major battle. Constitutional efforts were renewed in England to prevent war in Ireland. From 1911-1914 various compromises on Irish home rule were discussed. The most popular and politically expedient solution was the partition of

61

Ireland. By 1914 the idea of partition had gained wide acceptance, moving debate from partition as an issue to the exact boundaries of the Home Rule Exclusion area (Hughes 1994: 36). The outbreak of World War I in 1914 forced parliament to 'shelve' the issue until after the war.

The delay of home rule gave the militarized factions of the nationalist movement the boost they needed to begin their campaign. They began by establishing different paramilitary groups (Hughes 1994: 37). The core military unit was the Irish Volunteer Force (IVF), which was primarily founded to defend Ireland against foreign invasion during the war. The IRB infiltrated the IVF, creating an elite command group (Ibid. 38). Once the IRB was in control plans were made to establish a republic by force. These plans were realized in the *Easter Rising* of 1916 (For details see De Rosa 1990).

The rebellion failed within five days amidst severe British retaliation. Britain instituted martial law and systematically executed the leaders of the rising (McCartney 1995: 310; Hughes 1994: 40). The harsh response led to mass revulsion in Ireland and strengthened the resolve of the nationalist movement. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Asquith proposed a new home rule bill with partition. He slowed introduction for a vote because of questions over whether partition would be a long-term or short-term solution (Hughes 1994: 43).

The increased strength of the nationalist movement and relative inaction by Britain aided Sinn Féin and the IRB after the rising. In 1919 Sinn Féin went into action through the Dáil Éireann (the shadow government) pledging to establish an Irish Republic through passive resistance (McCartney 1995: 310). Meanwhile, under the leadership of Michael Collins, the IRB (now the Irish Republican Army, or the IRA)

proceeded with the 'Black and Tan' war using guerrilla tactics and terrorism against British institutions in Ireland (Ibid. 311). Britain responded by terrorizing Irish towns and rural areas to suppress the 'flying columns' of the IRA (McCartney 1995: 311; Hughes 1994: 48-49). Two years of fighting between Britain and the IRA resulted in a standoff.

Britain finally ended the war with the Treaty of 1921. This established the Irish Free State and gave Ulster the choice of opting out of the home rule agreement. Six of the nine counties of Ulster (Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and Tyrone) remained within the Union thereby partitioning Ireland (See Map 3.1). The partition created a small statelet where 60% of the population remained loyal to Britain and 40% remained loyal to the nationalist cause (Hughes 1994: 70).

The details of the 1921 Treaty indicate that partition was planned as a temporary solution to Irish Home Rule. Two home rule governments were established (Dublin and Belfast) which would in turn be ruled by the Council of Ireland. The Council would serve to ease the problems of eventual unification. However, Unionists held the power to prevent unification since they would have to agree to any future coupling of the two areas (Hughes 1994: 50). This provided Unionists with a virtual 'iron clad' agreement on partition since the nationalist community did not form an organized opposition to partition (McCracken 1995: 316). The Council of Ireland fell into disuse by 1924. Meanwhile, the Unionists took advantage of the disorganization among nationalists to marginalize Catholics in local government and social policy making in the Northern Ireland Parliament.

Source: Tim Pat Coogan. (1996). *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace*. Boulder: Roberts Rinehart Publishers

Figure 3.1: Northern Ireland (1922-Present)

In Ireland, Michael Collins (leader of the Provisional Government) publicly stated that unification of the Ireland could only occur by persuading the Unionist. Any attempts to unify Ireland by force would be unacceptable. Privately, however, Collins continued to supply factions of the IRA that were attacking the north (Hughes 1994: 55-56). The campaign of the IRA diminished any attempt for Unionist toleration of the nationalist community in the six counties, thus strengthening the siege mentality of Unionist leaders.

Internally, Unionist turned their attention to methods of control over Northern Ireland. They set up a political system that benefited the Unionist franchise, and a security system that would minimize troubles from the nationalist community (Crighton and Mac Iver 1991: 130). Politically, control was maintained through a strong party machine that tolerated liberal democracy so long as it did not threaten Unionist social and political control (McCracken 1995: 317). The nationalist community was disenfranchised from the political system through gerrymandering practices and the use of artificial franchises to favor Protestants. The policies were so effective that Unionist parties would win elections even in areas where they were the numerical minority (Coogan 1994: 264).

For security purposes the Stormont government (Northern Ireland's Parliament) organized the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The core of the RUC was the B-specials; a part time police unit that employed Protestants only. The B-specials became a reminder of Protestant domination in Northern Ireland as they would aggressively police Catholic areas by using preemptory and heavy-handed tactics. This led to more tensions and disenfranchisement among nationalists. The resulting conditions were riots and

65

terrorism from the nationalist community, and Unionists discriminating against the Nationalists while engaging in provocative "triumphalist"[5] behavior. The effects of social division in Northern Ireland became apparent during a rebellion (1956-62). The goal of the rebellion was to address issues of discrimination against Catholics. The Unionist community, however, saw the violence as another attempt to destroy the union. A garrison mentality had won out making future attempts at political and social reform difficult.

On the political front, the nationalist community was disenfranchised through employment and housing discrimination (Hughes 1994: 72). During the period of 1921-1966 individuals could vote only if they owned a home or a business. If one owned a business he/she would possess a vote for every employee, thereby increasing the number of votes for certain individuals. In Northern Ireland the Protestant community controlled virtually all industry. To further strengthen the domination over nationalist communities Unionist businessmen instituted an unofficial Anti-Catholic employment policy to prevent wealth dispersion into Catholic communities (Coogan 1994: 264). Housing discrimination occurred through housing councils, which were established by Protestants to control where Catholics would live and the number of Catholics that could own homes (Ibid.). By controlling housing, the Protestant community strengthened segregation and controlled the number of Catholics that could vote. Both policies undermined political power for the Nationalist community. It was these grievances that became the focal point of nationalist political activism in the 1960's.

---

[5] Triumphalism includes activities designed to celebrate the historical dominance of the Protestant community, while also purposely degrading the Nationalist community.

The Civil Rights movement in the 1960's strove for reform within the union (Hughes 1994: 82). The goal was to dismantle social discrimination and institute fair housing policies in Northern Ireland (Whyte 1995: 343). In 1967, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was established to petition against discrimination in housing and employment (Hughes 1994: 82). In the spring of 1969, Protestants attacked a civil rights march en route from Belfast to Derry. The police responded by attacking Catholics in Derry. The garrison mentality had won out again as Protestants viewed any attempt at change within Northern Ireland as an attack on the union (Whyte 1995: 344). Nationalists responded to the police attacks with rioting, first in Derry, then in Belfast.

Rioting continued throughout the summer of 1969. In August of that year a riot in the Falls Road area of West Belfast finally forced British intervention (Hughes 1994: 83). Britain responded with military force and political reforms. The nationalist community cheered the military intervention at first, while both communities shunned the attempts at political reform. The reforms were viewed as a "sell out" by the Protestant community, while nationalists saw the action as "too little, too late" (Whyte 1995: 344). As for the military phase of the intervention, the initial good will of the nationalist community disappeared. The military and the RUC responded to the rioting and violence with an extensive internment program that specifically targeted nationalists (Republicans) and ignored Unionist provocation and violence (Ibid. 345). Further problems arose from the military's tendency to imprison people without a trial. Many innocent people were being sent to prison and some were being abused.

Meanwhile, the Irish Republican Army reorganized in 1969 as a defensive unit to protect Catholic areas. Immediate dissent occurred within its ranks. This led to the rise

of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in 1970 (Ibid.). The PIRA quickly shifted the campaign from a defensive effort to an offensive campaign against the British military. The goal was to force unification with Ireland by force. The PIRA's campaign benefited from degrading social conditions (e.g. booming population in the Catholic ghettos), strong organizational efforts (e.g. the ability to gain access to steady supplies of financial and military supplies), and community support emerging from military and police miscues (e.g. British massacre of unarmed civilians in Derry [also known as Bloody Sunday]) (Whyte 1995: 346; Coogan 1994: 260).[6]

On the political front, the British attempted to reform the government in Northern Ireland. The reforms, however, were makeshift solutions that failed to address the long-term problems in the six counties. For instance, the Downing Street Declaration granted equal rights in local government, but no attempt was made to change the election laws. Employment policies were not changed, nor was the housing council system (Coogan 1994: 264). In the end, the political reforms were viewed as an attempted to appease some of the nationalist grievances but deny Republican aspirations for unification with Ireland (Ibid.).

Britain attempted to gain control over the situation by dissolving the Stormont government in Northern Ireland and establishing direct rule in 1972 (Whyte 1995: 247). Immediately violence increased. From 1972-74 the PIRA stepped up its campaign against the British military. Meanwhile, the Ulster Defense Association and the UVF initiated a counter campaign to defend the Unionist position. The immediate effect was

---

[6] The unilateral internment policies and unofficial support for Unionist galvanized nationalist opinion that union with Britain would only mean continued discrimination (Ibid.).

economic decline and dis-investment in Northern Ireland and increasing security costs for the British Government.

During the tumultuous period of 1970-1980 the nationalist community finally committed to political organization. Political organization among nationalists led to an immediate split within the larger community. The Nationalist faction turned to constitutional approaches for unification. The Social Democrat and Labor Party (SDLP) led by John Hume, organized as a non-violent voice for Irish unification. The SDLP's purpose was to create a settlement for unification by consent among the nationalist and Unionist communities (Whyte 1994: 351). Meanwhile, the more radical Republican faction organized behind Provisional Sinn Féin (SF) and the leadership of Gerry Adams. In the early phase of "The Troubles", SF maintained policies similar those used during the Easter Rising. This meant that SF would continue the old passive resistance tactics, while the PIRA would continue using physical force.

Political success for Sinn Féin was very limited early on. This situation changed in the late 1970s. Britain attempted to alter the status of political internees to that of "criminals." Internees had not been tried, or had been tried in the juryless 'Diplock' Courts. This meant that normal civil rights were not being applied evenly in Northern Ireland. The decision to treat internees as criminals sent a wave of outrage through the Republican and Nationalist communities. Internees responded with the 'Dirty War', Brown Blanket Parties, and hunger strikes (See Keena 1990; Coogan 1994; for details). This response captured widespread media attention as hunger strikers began to die. Meanwhile, the political fortune of SF changed in 1981 when Bobby Sands won a seat in the elections for Westminster while in prison on a hunger strike.

The Bobby Sands incident led to an upswing in support for SF. The success was rather limited but it did represent a shift within Nationalist politics in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin had become a major political force and threatened to legitimize armed conflict as a supporting political tactic to normal constitutional methods (Coogan 1994: 383). Internally, Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams agitated to change the abstentionist policy of the party to support candidates taking the seats they won. This issue was resolved in Adams' favor at the 1986 *Ard Fheis* (Ibid. 384). The new phase of Republican politics ushered in the era of the *Ballot Box and the Armalite*. The Republican movement now gained strength through political offices and armed conflict. Political opposition responded with moves to undermine Republicans.

Britain responded to the new Republican threat by politically neutering Sinn Féin, and stepping up counter-terrorism measures in Northern Ireland. The 1986 Prevention of Terrorism Act denied any political party that supported terrorism (i.e. the IRA) from holding political office. This prevented Sinn Féin from engaging in obstructionist action in Parliament, thus keeping the political end of the Republican movement in Northern Ireland. Strategically Britain instituted a 'supergrass' informant network where suspected terrorists could be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of paid informants (Ibid. 395-97). Britain also stepped up unauthorized home searches to uncover IRA weapons, and increase the level of coercion in Catholic communities. The IRA eventually moved its bombing campaign from Northern Ireland to England. This increased domestic pressure on the British Parliament to end the conflict.

The cycles of provocation and violence waxed and waned many times in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1994, Britain entered into secret negotiations with the IRA, which

led to a cease-fire. After seventeen months of stalled progress the IRA broke the peace and renewed its campaign. Under pressure from the United States a new cease-fire was negotiated in 1996. U.S. sponsored 'proximity talks' resulted in the Good Friday Agreement (1998), which was ratified through a referendum with 75% approval in May 1998.

The Good Friday Agreement reestablishes limited home rule to a Northern Ireland parliament, increases the active role of Ireland in social and economic policy making, and ensures a referendum on union status every seven years (See Appendix B).[7] The agreement was initially put into action through the Assembly elections of June 1998. The Proportional Representation elections ended by fulfilling the worst fears of the Unionist political camp. Splits occurred between the moderate (semi) pro-agreement Ulster Unionist Party and the extremist anti-agreement Democratic Ulster Party. Meanwhile, the nationalist camp faired much better than expected with the pro-agreement SDLP placing second in the vote count, and the uncommitted Sinn Fein placing fourth (two seats behind the DUP). Currently, the implementation of the agreement is stalled and Westminster has resumed direct political control over Northern Ireland over the issue of weapons decommissioning by the IRA. The IRA is not required to turn over weapons until May of 2000. However, Unionist factions want the IRA to hand over some weapons before any further progress is made towards peace.

---

[7]   The agreement is very similar to the failed Sunningdale Plan (1974).

Palestine

The goal of the Palestinian National Movement is "The Return"—to reclaim the Israeli occupied lands of Palestine. Opposition to the return are proponents of Zionism; namely the State of Israel. Zionism was a movement to reclaim the ancient lands of Israel in modern day Palestine. By 1948 the Zionist movement won out leading to rise of Israel and the demise Palestine. Further trouble commenced in 1967 when a regional war between the Arab states and Israel left more Palestinian Territory under Israeli control. The resulting Palestinian Diaspora led to the rise of radical paramilitary movements in and around Israeli territory.

The Palestinian struggle (unlike the Irish struggle) has been based largely on a military strategy. This pattern has held for both Israeli and Palestinian factions. Any corresponding political movements have been tied directly to military action. The primary difference between the two sides is that Israel acts in a unified manner with established legal and semi-legal military units backed by a political mandate. Palestinian groups are rather disparate—they operate illegally, cross-nationally and internally, and without a recognized political mandate. The goals of the national movement are not universal among the different groups, and considerable infighting has occurred among the different Palestinian groups.

The proceeding section will outline the history of the Palestinian National Movement. Notable elements include the region(s) of operation, goals of the various regionally based groups, and the role of international actors. For the majority of the struggle military factions under the umbrella Palestinian Liberation Organization

72

conducted operations from states surrounding Israel (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). By 1982 staging posts were progressively closed to Palestinian military operations. By removing the PLO (based primarily among Palestinians in the refugee camps surrounding Israel) from direct contact with Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, the style of the military campaign and the goals of the nationalist movement shifted. The Intifada (1987-1993) represented a transition from guerrilla/terrorist operations across the Israeli border to active resistance within the 1967 Occupied Territories. The Intifada also shifted the goals from an irridentist ideology (reclaim all of former Palestine) to a separatist movement (establish a separate Palestinian State alongside Israel). Despite the shift in goals and the conduct of the movement, progress towards a lasting solution have been slow to come. The lack of progress was due partially to the influence of international actors that have aided and defended Israel. The role of international actors cannot be underestimated within this conflict. Unlike the Irish case, the Palestinian problem was created largely by international interference in the area (Britain during World War I), and it has been perpetuated by international interference since then (the US during the Cold War).

From Zionism to "The Return"

The Palestinian National Movement was a response to the Zionist movement (1880-1948). Zionism was a secular movement to spur self-reliance among Jews and to prevent the rampant discrimination Jewish communities were facing in Europe. The movement grew out of a wave of discrimination during the Russian Pograms (1881-1884)

73

where the government attempted to belittle and expel the Jewish community altogether (Ibid. 27-28). In response the early Zionist movement emerged first under the leadership of the BILU organization and then the more radical *Hovevei Zion* movement. The movement evolved slowly in Russia gaining followers through Y.L. Pinsker's treatise *Autoemancipation* (1881) which called for the restoration of *Eretz Israel*. Pinsker claimed that Jews must emancipate themselves by acquiring land outside of Russia to escape persecution (Ibid. 29)[8]

The Zionist movement emerged in Western Europe during and after the Dreyfus Case in the 1890's. This was a treason case involving a French-Jewish officer that many believed was falsely accused of his crimes (Ibid. 30). The case opened the Jewish community to attack from the nationalist right-wing political groups. In response to the growing anti-Semitism in France Theodore Herzl writes his manifesto *Der Jundenstaat* (The State of the Jews). In this seminal work Herzl calls for an end to anti-Semitism through the establishment of a Jewish State (Ibid.).[9]

The World Zionist Organization (WZO) was established in 1897, and immediately sets out to create a Jewish state. Palestine was chosen as the site for the Jewish State because of the ancient religious and historical significance of the region. European Jewry claimed that they were direct descendants of the Jews expelled from Judea by Rome in 135 AD. The lands of ancient Judea lay inside Palestine.

---

[8] The early writings of Zionists did not favor a return to Palestine, so much as they favored a Jewish homeland somewhere.

[9] Herzl like Pinsker does not call for a return to Palestine. Instead Herzl believed that Jews needed to organize politically and financially to purchase land needed to create a state (anywhere in the world).

The proclamation of the WZO was rejected by Ottoman Leaders opposed the creation of a new self-ruled nationality within its territory (Ibid.). Laws were passed preventing the sale of land in Palestine to Jews in Europe. Local Jews easily circumvented these laws by purchasing land in Palestine for incoming immigrants. In 1901 the Jewish National Fund was established to expand the purchase of land in Palestine. Once the land was in Jewish hands it became "inalienably" Jewish, meaning that the land *could not* be resold to non-Jews (Ibid. 31).

Arab response to the Jewish intrusion was slow. Limiting factors were the lack of organized local leadership, and the weakness of the Ottoman rulers. Arabs within the region viewed themselves as Ottoman subjects not as Palestinians. This meant that opposition to the Jewish intrusion rested with the Ottoman administration, not with local leaders. The declining power of the Ottoman Empire during this time resulted in feeble response to Jewish intrusions. As a result of this weakness Palestinians began viewing themselves differently. They saw their lands being taken away without any defense from the Ottomans. As such Palestinians began to see themselves as the only line of defense against the Jewish intrusion. This perception led to the evolution of a new identity and rise of a national leadership (Ibid. 36).

The onset of World War I presented a unique opportunity for the regional Arab population, the international Zionist movement, and the major European powers (namely Britain). Britain saw the war as an opportunity to expand its colonial possessions in the Middle East. This would mean shorter trade routes and access to important natural resources. To gain a foothold in the region Britain needed to dismantle the Ottoman

Empire. To attain this goal Britain reached out to local Arab leaders in the Middle East to gain support for a rebellion against the Ottomans.

The British Secretary in the Middle East acquired Arab support for a rebellion by assuring the leaders that Britain did not possess any designs on Arab lands following the war. In return for rebellion against the Ottomans, Britain promised to facilitate the independence of the Arab people (Ibid. 42). This promise would end with the British attempts to fulfill agreements made with France (the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement), which sought to divide the region between the two.

British interest in Zionism also grew during this time. Humanitarian concerns over the plight of Jews in Europe weighed heavy with leaders like PM David Lloyd George. Also, military administrators viewed Zionism as a potentially useful tool for instigating rebellion in Germany, and to drive up support for the war in Russia and the United States (Ibid. 50). To play this card Britain issued the Balfour Declaration in November of 1917. In this declaration Britain promised to support the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine (Ibid. 54).[10]

At the end of the war Britain had to mete out the various agreements established during the war. Immediately Britain moved to amend the Sykes-Picot Agreement to incorporate more land than previously agreed to by France. Britain was able to take control of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq.[11] Britain also rejected Palestinian demands for self-determination, thus deciding to favor promises made to the Zionist leaders in the

---

[10] It is important to note that Britain did not promise Zionists a Jewish State in Palestine.

[11] The original agreement gave France control over the Mosul region of Iraq. By expanding their sphere of control in Iraq Britain gained access to valuable petroleum reserves.

Balfour Declaration. This settlement ultimately bound Britain to Zionist demands as part of its Mandatory Administration over Palestine (Ibid. 59-62). The settlement set the stage for the next phase of the Zionist movement. During this phase (the inter-war period 1919-1939) Zionist leaders set out to consolidate and expand upon the gains they received during the war. Meanwhile, Palestinians attempted to organize and prevent further losses.

Hostilities between the Jewish and Palestinian communities developed quickly. The main source of tension was the level of privilege granted to Jews and the lack of agreement between the Mandate administration and London leadership. Zionists quickly set out to establish a Jewish state that would alienate the indigenous population. One way the Zionists excluded Palestinians was in the political administration of the Mandate. Though Britain controlled the area local people were used for everyday administrative duties. Zionists requested that many of those administrative positions be set aside specifically for Jews. Zionists also demanded that the Hebrew language be given equal status as the indigenous Arabic language[12] and that Jews be given more pay for equal government work.[13] Further antagonisms included the right of Jews to fly the Zionist flag while Palestinians were forbidden from flying theirs (Ibid. 68).

Two trends dominated the British administration of Palestine. Most British administrators within Palestine developed sympathy for the Arab population (Ibid. 69). Zionists constantly made abrasive demands on the British, often to the expense of the

---

[12] This demand was made even though Jews constituted less than 5% of the population during the interwar period.

[13] The argument was that as Europeans, Jews required a higher pay to accommodate a higher standard of living.

Arab population.[14] This created sympathy for the Arab people, and led to efforts by the British to deny Zionist demands. Meanwhile, Zionists would counter sympathy on the ground by appealing directly to London to override local decisions. Zionist supporters in London quickly undermined the authority of Mandate administrators substantially, which weakened the Arab position within the mandate.

Continued Jewish immigration into Palestine increased tensions in the region leading to violence in 1921. Britain responded with a White Paper (1922) that partially reversed the Balfour Declaration; stating that Britain did not wish to turn Palestine into a Jewish National Home. In 1923 Britain made further attempts to resolve the problem by establishing a Home Rule scheme that would give Arabs control over decision-making. Palestinians rejected the idea because it would force them to support the original Balfour Declaration and continued Jewish immigration (Ibid. 74). To the nascent Arab leadership, this agreement would fundamentally undermine their right to self-determination (Ibid.).

The use of violence by Zionist groups gained currency in the face of what appeared to be British acquiescence to the Arab population. At first violence was targeted at the local Arab population and against Jewish immigrants that were believed to be collaborating with the Arabs (Ibid. 79). As the violent movement gathered strength, the focus of Zionist attacks shifted from the Arab population to the British administration. Zionist groups dressed in Arab garb and attacked British officials (Nasr 1997: 26). The goal was to turn the British against the Arabs thus allowing the Zionists to expand their franchise (Smith 1992: 80). In short, Zionists, like the Arabs, had rejected any notion of

---

[14]   This trend dominates in the Mandate region even when British officials visited from London.

joint rule over Palestine. The only acceptable state of existence would be Arab acquiescence to Jewish hegemony in Palestine (Ibid.) The organization of the economy and society clearly reflected this notion.

In the 1930s Zionists continued to hold the upper hand in Palestine with the backing of sympathetic leadership in London. Additional benefits were extended to Jews in the form of military service (Ibid. 81). This became very important for violent Jewish groups like *Hagana* (the Jewish Defense Force). By serving in the military Hagana was given access to arms, which enabled them to build weapons caches all over Palestine. The developing attitude among Zionists was that Palestine was a Jewish country and that Britain would serve to facilitate the acquisition of land (Ibid. 82).

Despite the overwhelming political power of the Zionist organization in Palestine, Arabs still held the majority of the land in the region. This substantially undermined the ability of Zionists to claim control. The Jewish National Fund stepped up its efforts to alter this situation through purchase and Judiazation[15] of the land. The JNF was aided in its efforts by the willingness of Arab landowners to sell their land in order to gain access to hard currency. The sale of the land complicated the situation in Palestine because many of the landowners did not work the land. Peasants in the area did. Once the land was sold to Zionists the peasants were forcibly removed. This led to the displacement of nearly 8,000 people in the mid-1920s (Ibid. 86).

Another outbreak of violence occurred in 1929 over religious control of the Wailing Wall. Jewish immigrants in Jerusalem attempted to exert control over the Western Wall surrounding the Dome of the Rock. Both places were deemed as Holy

---

[15] Judiazation refers to making land inalienably Jewish by refusing resale of the land to non-Jews.

sights for Muslims and Jews. Arabs responded to the Jewish moves by attacking. This spate of violence forced Britain to again rethink its policy regarding the Mandate. Investigations absolved Arab leaders of any responsibility and focused instead on the underlying causes of the violence (Ibid. 90). The Shaw Report placed responsibility on Zionist immigration and land acquisition practices. The landlessness of the Arabs created fear among Palestinians that they would lose their livelihood and be forced to live under the economic domination of the Zionists. The report called for a suspension of Jewish immigration into Palestine (Ibid. 91).[16] However, before the decision could be implemented, the McDonald Government in London overturned the Shaw report and reopened immigration. Continued efforts to establish Arab Home Rule in Palestine were routinely rejected. Zionists successfully maneuvered within the British government to pressure many elected officials to declare that the land problem did not exist and that the labor practices were fair.

Meanwhile, secret military societies emerged among the Arab population. The Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood moved into Palestine (Abu-Amr 1993, 1994), and al-Husayni established the Holy War Organization (Smith 1994: 96). Al-Husayni's group purchased arms in preparation for a revolt. The Muslim Brotherhood remained largely dormant with the exception of a few rouge individuals that participated in raids on Jewish villages. The radical movements gained substantial support leading to the Arab revolt of 1936.

---

[16] These findings were bolstered by the Hope-Simpson Report, which blamed Zionist land practices and exclusionary labor practices for the unrest among Palestinians.

The Arab revolt was to be conducted in two stages. First was an attempted strike against Jewish businesses. This stage failed quickly (Ibid. 97). The second stage was a guerrilla war in the rural areas. Palestinians received aid from surrounding Arab states in an effort to fight off what was perceived as Western Imperialism. By the fall of 1936, nearly 20,000 British troops arrived in Palestine and quickly quelled the rebellion.

In the wake of the rebellion, Britain established the Peel Commission. The commission concluded that the Mandate could not be sustained. The mutual animosity between the two communities combined with the mutual claims for independent statehood made the situation ungovernable. The solution offered was an Irish style partition of the Mandate with Britain retaining control over the Holy Places (Ibid.). Arabs rejected the plan immediately for two reasons. First, the Jewish population was given the most fertile lands. Second, Arabs constituted nearly 50% of the population in the areas being given to the Jews. The Palestinian position was supported by a unified Arab voice in the Middle East (Ibid. 99). Meanwhile, the Zionists remained cautious of the plan, and held out for more territory (Ibid.).

The situation quickly disintegrated and a second revolt occurred from 1937-39. This time Arabs began targeting British officials. As the fighting wore on the Palestinians began losing. This led to a collapse of the national leadership and devolution of political and military control to local leaders. Zionists remained quiet for the most part. Hagana did, however, engage in limited operations in retaliation for attacks on their communities. Britain stepped up efforts to control Palestinian violence, and allowed Hagana to arm itself. The Irgun emerged during this time to advocate terrorism against Arabs, thus ratcheting up the levels of communal violence (Lustick 1995: 524).

Britain responded with harsh countermeasures. Attempts to be evenhanded with Zionist groups led to increased violence. Irgun turned its efforts from Arab to British forces thus making the situation worse. The revolt collapsed in 1939 (Smith 1992: 101). The vacuum of leadership among Palestinians became important to Jewish commando leaders, like David Ben-Gurion, who were able to strengthen Zionist positions in the Mandate.

World War II changed the situation again. Despite the apparently strengthened position of the Zionists, Britain opted to restrict immigration. The policy was an attempt to guarantee an Arab Palestine within ten years (Ibid. 101). Britain believed that by placating Palestinians they would gain the support of the all Arabs during the war. Thus, Britain proposed to establish an independent Palestinian state with a Jewish National Homeland within its borders. Both groups would share certain political powers (Ibid. 102). Both the Palestinians and Zionists rejected the plan (Ibid. 105).

As the war progressed in Europe, the situation began to change within the Middle East. The Holocaust greatly renewed Zionist efforts and created support from the international community to address Zionist goals. This undermined British efforts to resolve the problem in favor of the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Britain faced renewed efforts by Zionist paramilitary groups to drive the British out and establish a Jewish state.

Britain began looking for solutions. Partition Plans were explored (Ibid. 119). To fulfill these plans immigration was halted. In response to the suspension of immigration, LEHI rose up, adding to the mixture of the Jewish paramilitary organizations. LEHI adopted a radical military position and began assassinating British officials in Palestine

(Lustick 1995: 524).[17] Meanwhile, Irgun shifted its efforts to attacking British military as well (Smith 1992: 119). Between 1942 and 1944 terrorism subsided as the leaders of Irgun and LEHI were killed or imprisoned. In 1943 Manachem Begin took control of Irgun and prepared for renewed assaults on British troops (Ibid. 126). LEHI was taken over by Nathan Yellin and Yitzhak Shamir. Shamir increased the levels of violence, seeing it as the best way to mobilize the will of the Jewish people (Lustick 1995: 527). By 1944 the two organizations began collaborating on their campaigns. The leaders stepped up their military efforts and shifted their goals from a Jewish state within Palestine, to a Jewish state that included all of Palestine, Jordan, and parts of Lebanon and Syria. By 1945 Hagana reasserted its control over the campaign and force LEHI and Irgun to cease operations.

During this time, Palestinians reorganized after the collapse of their leadership. By 1945, the Palestine Arab Party emerged as the major Palestinian voice (Smith 1992: 122). Immediately the new leadership rejected any plans to create a Jewish state. Furthermore, they rejected any Jewish presence in Palestine beyond that which was in existence prior to 1917. In support of the renewed leadership the newly formed Arab League (1944) proclaimed:

> "That the plight of the Jews in Europe is deplorable and regrettable. *But*...The question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression then solving the problem of the Jews in Europe by another injustice, that is, by inflicting injustice on the Palestinian Arabs..." (Ibid.)

---

[17] The Irony of LEHI was that in order to gain access to the weapons needed they collaborated with Germans and Italians (Ibid. 120).

Following this proclamation, the Arab league spelled out provisions to defend Palestine from Zionist aggression.

Britain succumbed to international pressure to create an independent Jewish State in Palestine following the war. Efforts to draw the US into the situation failed. By 1946, Irgun and LEHI have renewed their operations. British losses amounted to £4 million, 18 killed and 101-wounded (Ibid. 128). Meanwhile, Arabs remained intransigent on the issue of a Jewish National Homeland. The situation drew to a stalemate.

In 1947, Zionists abandoned all efforts to negotiate with Britain and set out to create a state by force. By using violence to fight the British, Zionist leaders fulfilled a notion that since Judea fell in violence to the Romans the only way it could be restored was through violence (Lustick 1995: 520). Palestinian groups quickly adopted similar measures. Finally, Britain abrogated its responsibility and handed the problem over to the newly formed United Nations. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) developed a resolution based on Britain's partition idea. By November of 1947 a majority of the UN adopted the plan and Britain began to withdraw (Ibid. 137).

The war that ensued caught the Arabs off guard, while the Zionists possessed the weapons and training to fight a protracted conflict. Irgun, LEHI and Hagana initiated a terror campaign on the Palestinian population. Within the first year (1948) 15,000 Palestinians were forced to flee, creating a massive refugee problem. Hagana quickly established control over the UNSCOP designated areas and began expanding its sphere of control. Incidents like the massacre at Dayr Yasin[18] became propaganda tools used to force Palestinians to leave their land (Ibid. 143). The effort was successful as 50,000

---

[18]   250 men, women and children were slaughtered and their bodies were shoved into wells.

more Palestinians left within three days. In the end, the terror campaign forced nearly 300,000 Palestinians to flee while the entire war forced nearly one million refugees out of Palestine and into the surrounding states, into the Gulf States, and across the globe (Cobban 1984: 8). Entire villages were left in tact for Jewish settlers.

In that same year (1948), David Ben Gurion declared the State of Israel. Immediately the neighboring Arab states engaged in a war to reverse the situation. The Arabs lost, but the remaining Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were reclaimed by Arab states (Jordan and Egypt respectfully). Meanwhile, Israel drove into the Egyptian controlled Negev, incorporated it into Israel. This gave the new state access to the Gulf of Aquaba (See Map 3.2). By the end of 1948, only 15% of the original Palestinian population remained within the borders of Israel. The refugee population moved to Arab held lands in Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. The Palestinians became a stateless people, and the Palestinian problem became a regional Arab problem.

The Palestinian National Movement began in earnest following the 1948 war. The refugee problem was the primary concern. Israel refused to discuss any return of refugees before a peace settlement was reached. Meanwhile, Arab states tied resolution of the refugee problem to any peace settlement. The time spent haggling over the details proceeding a settlement offered Israel the opportunity to consolidate control over its new territory—they set about to "create facts on the ground."

Figure 3.2: Israel including the "Green Line" Territory and the Occupied Territories

The major problem facing Israel was the 150,000 Palestinians remaining within the "Green Line" (the armistice lines demarcating Israel from the surrounding Arab states). This population was transformed from an indigenous majority to a suspect minority overnight (Cobban 1984: 185). Immediately, Israel placed the Arab Israelis under military rule and suspended all democratic practices within these militarized regions (Rouhana 1987: 40). To reduce the potential threat of this minority population Israel set about to Judaize the land by taking control over all territory abandoned during the war (Smith 1992: 154; Cobban 1984: 185). Israel further isolated the Arab communities by denying development and social services to Arab areas. Instead, resources were diverted to Jewish communities (Smith 1992: 154). The new government

86

also set out to transform the Arab population from peasant farmers into bottom-rung workers within the nascent Israeli industrial economy (Cobban 1984: 186). Finally, Israel disrupted any potential for organized resistance to the new government by deporting nearly all qualified Arab leaders (Ibid. 185). This move weakened community organization and made the population more amenable to occupation. Israel's policies also effectively severed links between the Arab Israelis and Diaspora Palestinians living under Arab regimes outside Israel. This essentially destroyed their sense of identity as Palestinians.

Conditions for the Diaspora Palestinians were no better in the post-1948 period. First, the group lost access to its homeland. Second, the political leadership of the Palestinians was destroyed. Third, the dislocation substantially undermined social organization of Palestinian society. This meant that traditional clan loyalty disintegrated and new leaders would have to emerge relying on different social mechanisms for power. Finally, Palestinians lost all independence, and were forced to live under the auspices of foreign political systems that did not share the same political goals as the refugee population. In short, the Palestinian problem was subject to the winds of the neighboring Arab countries.

This condition was most evident within Palestinian territories occupied by Jordan and Egypt (the West Bank and Gaza). In 1950, Jordan annexed the West Bank, taking advantage of the situation to expand its borders (Cobban 1984: 169). Meanwhile, Egypt maintained tight control over Gaza to prevent commando raids by Palestinians that might threaten the armistice. The heavy-handed policies of Gamel Abd al-Nasser forced the

Muslim Brotherhood underground, and many student leaders to flee to the Gulf States (Abu-Amr 1993: 7; Cobban 1984: 180).[19]

Regionally, relations between Israel and the Arab states remained hostile. Israeli PM Ben-Gurion utilized provocative preemptive strikes against the Arab states to force attacks, which justified harsh reprisals (Smith 1992: 157). The tactic was used to keep Arab leaders afraid of the Israeli military capability. Meanwhile, Arab leaders set about to repair their domestic position following the war. The humiliating loss threatened instability in many of the regimes. Efforts were made to shore up domestic support. Thus, while Israel attempted to maintain a state of fear in the region, the Arab states tried to disengage.

Disengagement was quickly undermined in 1956 as Nasser adopted a more radical nationalist position in the Middle East. Attempts to prevent any aggression by Egypt led Ben-Gurion to order preemptive strikes into Gaza. Nasser responded by approving Palestinian raids into Israel (Smith 1992: 165). Once Palestinian commandos were unleashed, Nasser quickly adopted the refugee problem as a major regional issue. Israel rejected any discussion of the refugees until Egypt accepted Israel's current borders. Meanwhile, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. This prompted an international reaction from Britain and France who were immediately joined by Israel.[20] In October 1956, Israel invaded Gaza and the Sinai. The United States responded by pressuring Israel to end hostilities and return the land.

---

[19]   The students that left for the Gulf eventually formed the backbone of the Fateh organization.

[20]   Israel responded more to the closing of the Straits of Tiran which closed the Gulf of Aquaba.

Following the Suez Crisis, the situation changed for Palestinians. They shrugged off their belittled positions in the surrounding Arab states and turned the refugee situation into the foundation for the organization of a liberation movement. Political organization emerged in three separate movements: The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM); al-Fateh; and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

The Arab Nationalist Movement gathered support among refugees in Syria and Lebanon. The movement used the dominant regional ideology of Pan-Arabism (the restoration of single Arab State in the Middle East).[21] The ANM believed that Palestine could only be liberated by uniting all Arab states into single union to fight Israel (Cobban 1984: 141). During the interim period of 1956-1967 the AMN fell apart due to conservative political shifts within the leadership and generational shifts within the lower ranks. This created tensions within the group leading to a split (Ibid.). To avoid obsolescence within the nationalist movement the ANM shifted its from a Pan-Arabist stance to a "Palestine first" position. The ANM then became the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (NFLP). The NFLP stepped up its role within the liberation struggle by conducting commando raids against Israel 1966-67 (Ibid. 142). Despite the attempt to remain timely, the NFLP waned behind the surging leadership of al-Fateh.

Students at Cairo University organized Harakat al-Tahir al Filastiniyya (al-Fateh) in the 1950s. By 1956, Fateh developed commando groups and aided Egypt by conducting raids against Israel during the Suez crisis (Ibid. 22). After the crisis Egypt clamped down on commando groups in Gaza. This forced the leadership of Fateh to flee

---

[21]   The Pan-Arabist ideology was chosen over the revolutionary ideologies of Communism because the leaders believed that Communism was too divisive and may drive supporters away.

to Kuwait. While in the Gulf the leaders rebuilt the organizational framework of the group and amassed financial resources needed to conduct a sustained military campaign.

The primary goal of Fateh was to liberate Palestine through armed struggle. Fateh believed that self-organization and self-reliance was the way to achieve their goals. The group would cooperate with friendly Arab states and friendly international forces. At the same time, the organization vowed to avoid any interference in the internal political situations of host Arab states. The ideological code of the group remained simple. It focused strictly on nationalist goals, avoiding any other ideological positions that could create tensions and division (Ibid. 25). Fateh also took the position that liberation of Palestine could not be achieved through a simple "lightening war" by Arab states. Instead, liberation would occur through a guerrilla movement coming from all Palestinians in all Arab lands. The process would be slow and require dedication (Ibid. 28-30).

The Syrian government provided training camps and equipment for the group in the 1960s, making the initiation of the violent campaign easier. Fateh conducted its first raids at the beginning of 1965. The assaults caused little damage to Israel, but they did become a source of irritation and aroused security concerns (Smith 1992: 185; Cobban 1984: 33). The raids also became a rallying point and created hope among the Diaspora communities (Cobban 1984: 34).

While independent Palestinian groups were emerging and adopting radical military practices, the Arab leadership set out to create an organization that would operate as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Egyptian leaders founded the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 (Smith 1992: 187). The leader was

selected specifically because of his loyalty to Nasser. Nasser hoped that by controlling the PLO he could prevent provocative commando raids that threatened the fragile peace in the Middle East. However, the leadership lacked any support from the Palestinian communities (Cobban 1984: 34). This was apparent in the relatively low popularity of the PLO vis-a-vis Fateh. As the 1967 war became reality, the PLO fractured and weakened as it failed to provide any substantial support for the war.

In 1967, Fateh stepped up its operations to create a state of fear in Israel. Border clashes along the Golan Heights ensued to stave off the raids from Syria. Jordan attempted to remain neutral during this time. However, pressure mounted from Egypt, Iraq and Syria to get involved. In May of 1967, Egypt stepped up its role by closing the Straits of Tiran, effectively closing the Gulf of Aquaba. Israel prepared for a war, while the Arab states engaged in a game of taunts leading to increased militarization in the region. In June, Israel attacked Egyptian forces thus starting the war. Within six days the war ended with Israel holding the Golan Heights, Gaza, the Sinai, and the West Bank.[22]

The post-1967 period began a new phase of reorganization for the nationalist movement. The PLO was weakened, offering the Palestinian movement the opportunity to increase its independence from Arab tutelage (Smith 1992: 200). Meanwhile, a new refugee problem emerged as over 100,000 more Palestinians are forced off lands they held in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, a new class of Palestinians arose in the aftermath of the war—Occupied Palestinians joining the ranks of the Arab Israelis and the Diaspora Palestinians. Once the Occupied Palestinians come under control of Israel,

---

[22] The United Nations passed Resolution 242 demanding Israel return territories occupied during the war. However, Arab refusal to negotiate a land-for-peace deal undermined efforts to regain the territory.

the Arab Israelis suddenly awoke and began to develop a stronger national identity. This created a potentially explosive situation for Israel and forced the government to step up efforts to control the situation within the Green Line and in the Occupied Territories.

The Palestinian movement outside Israel reorganized for the future. Fateh expanded its military operations with support from Arab governments (Cobban 1984: 37). The new focus was in the West Bank and Gaza. Efforts were stymied by the previous rule of Jordan and Egypt, which had been very successful in limiting the organization of guerrilla movements. Thus, Fateh had to build from scratch[23] first by establishing commando units and then training the population for passive resistance to Israeli aggression (Cobban 1984: 38). Israel responded quickly and harshly to undermine Fateh's activities, forcing Yassir Arafat (Fateh's leader) to capitulate by early 1968.

Despite this failure, Fateh continued to conduct military operations and train new recruits in the refugee camps. Israel launched an assault on Palestinian positions in Jordan in 1968 to end the hostilities. The Battle of al-Karameh was a major offensive in which 15,000 Israeli troops fought 300 Fateh guerrillas. Though Fateh lost, they did inflict heavy damage on the Israeli invaders (Nasr 1997: 46; Smith 1992: 212; Cobban 1984: 42). This event became a major beacon for Palestinians in the refugee camps sending nearly 5,000 new recruits to Fateh within forty-eight hours (Cobban 1984: 42). Over the next two years, the guerrilla groups flourished in Jordan and Lebanon paving th way for increased raids.

---

[23]   Despite Jordan's previous efforts to crush the guerrilla movement they quickly aided Fateh hoping Israel would withdraw from the West Bank allowing conditions to return to normal (Smith 1992: 212).

Meanwhile, in 1967 the NFLP disintegrated and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was formed (Nasr 1997: 45). The PFLP adopted the older Pan-Arabist ideology of the ANM and added Marxist elements to its ideology. The PFLP also carved out a different position than Fateh in regards to its relations with Arab regimes. The Pan-Arabist ideology seemingly required the PFLP to get involved with the internal politics of its host states. This led to substantial trouble in Jordan in 1970, and in Lebanon (1976-82) (Cobban 1984: 145). Internally the group was weak and it faced two splits within two years. The PFLP-General Command broke off in 1968, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) split off in 1969 (Nasr 1997: 45).[24] Despite the proliferation of guerrilla groups, the Palestinian National Movement maintained its coherence and Fateh's leadership remained relatively unchallenged (Cobban 1984: 41).

During this time, the PLO continued to disintegrate. Fateh took advantage of the situation and took control of the PLO's institutional structures. The PLO provided new tools to promote the national movement among the Diaspora Palestinians, and in the Occupied Territories. Immediately Fateh made amendments to the Palestinian National Charter of the PLO. The following sections were added: Article 9: liberation could only be achieved through armed struggle; Article 21: any solution short of total liberation was unacceptable (favoring an irridentist ideology); and Article 28 increased independence of Palestinians by rejecting any form of intervention, trusteeship, or subordination to other Arab regimes (Cobban 1984: 43). Once in control Fateh reached out to other guerrilla

---

[24] The DFLP was able to carve out a significant position within the national movement making itself an important partner to Fateh throughout the 1970's and 80's.

93

groups to make the PLO a representative organization for all the Palestinian groups (Ibid. 44). By being inclusive Fateh knew it could undermine challenges to its authority and increase the stability of the organization. The gamble paid-off as Fateh did not receive any substantial threat to its leadership until the Intifada (1987-93).

Conditions within Israel were drastically different than the growing power and hopes of the Palestinian National Movement outside Israel. The 1967 war left 1.2 million more Palestinians within the borders of Israel. The question of survival became important to many in the Occupied Territories. In the West Bank, Palestinian leaders refused to accept Israeli occupation and immediately called for a strike. Israel responded by deporting a total of 671 individuals and two entire tribes, crushing the established leadership in the region. The lack of a negotiated settlement led to disappointment among the Palestinians. Added this was the 1968 annexation of East Jerusalem, and military occupation to pave the way for Jewish resettlement (Cobban 1984: 170). With the occupation, Israel initiated emergency measures, which allowed for the internment and deportation of several thousand Palestinians. The deportations created stronger links between the Occupied Palestinians and the PLO.[25] This strengthened PLO organization and grounding in Israel, making the Israeli efforts to create alternative leadership impossible.

In Gaza the conditions were much worse. Israel set about to pacify the region "with a vengeance" (Cobban 1984: 182). Deportations were stepped up to include all

---

[25] Deported Palestinians were granted special representation in the PLO through the Palestinian National Front (PNF) in order to facilitate links between the Diaspora and Territories leadership.

94

established political leadership and most males between the ages of 16-40 (Ibid.).

Despite the harsh conditions, Gazans continued to resist Israeli occupation for another

four years. By 1971, Israel adopted a "shoot first" policy against anyone suspected of

links to the armed resistance (Ibid.). As with the West Bank, the Israeli policies forged

stronger links between the PLO and Gazans, preventing any attempt to craft loyal

leadership in the region.

Finally, Arab Israelis became a renewed issue for Israel. Prior to the 1967 war,

Israel had effectively destroyed any sense of national identity among Palestinians left

behind the Green Line. However, Israel passed up the opportunity to instill an alternative

Israeli identity among the Arab people (Rouhana 1987: 45). This reinforced the notion

that the Arabs did not belong, and that Israel would always seek to exclude them from the

social and political system. After the war, the outlook of Arab Israelis shifted. They

were brought into contact with intact Palestinian communities in the Occupied

Territories, which had the effect of mobilizing their suppressed identity (Cobban 1984:

186). This sudden resurgence of identity brought about an awareness of the exclusion the

Arabs faced in Israel (Rouhana 1987: 46). Slowly, social and political organization

developed among the Arab peoples. Often the organization occurred despite strong

attempts to prevent it. The advantage that many Palestinians had within Israel was the

alternative political course they chose. The Israeli Arabs opted for reform within Israel

rather than to destroy Israel (Ibid.).

The 1970s and 1980s were a tumultuous period for the National Movement. On

the one hand, the PLO was renewed under the leadership of Fateh and the PLO quickly

developed a new level of legitimacy in the Middle East. Fateh leaders gained Saudi

Arabian support for the "liberation tax" on Palestinians, which brought in millions in needed financial resources. And the PLO gained recognition from Libya and Egypt (Cobban 1984: 45). On the other hand, the effects of protracted guerrilla attacks on Israel were beginning to have an effect on the stability of Arab regimes in the Middle East. The growing presence and popularity of Palestinian groups in Jordan and Lebanon threatened to spark waves of Palestinian Nationalism, which threatened the internal balance of power in these states (Ibid.). Furthermore, increased PLO attacks invited Israeli responses, which created greater security problems. By 1969, Lebanon relinquished control over the refugee camps, granting the PLO autonomy over the Palestinian population (Ibid. 47-48). In Jordan, however, the situation decayed resulting in a civil war. The guerrilla groups did not uphold Fateh's non-intervention policy. The PFLP and DFLP intervened to topple the Hussain regime. In 1970, Hussain authorized a military purge of Palestinian guerrillas. In the ensuing 'Black September' over three thousand people were killed and the refugee camps were destroyed. PLO forces withdrew from Jordan and moved their center of operations to Lebanon.

The move hurt the National Movement by denying the PLO access to the longest geographic border with Israel (Smith 1992: 222). Thus military operations had to be altered to accommodate the new situation. While changes were being made, brief shifts in the military strategy occurred. The terrorist attacks against Israel continued. However, these attacks occurred through an expanded sphere of operation—attacking Israeli targets outside the Middle East (Smith 1992: 222; Cobban 1984: 54-55). The use of international terrorism by Palestinians brought needed international attention to the Palestinian problem. However, the "war of spooks" had limited success. More often

96

than not the terrorist events created negative responses among Western states. After the 1972 Olympic kidnapping in Munich, Fateh severed all links to groups engaging in international terrorism (Cobban 1984: 59). Soon afterwards the PFLP ceased all international operations as well.

During the "war of spooks" Egypt and Syria rebuilt their militaries and began preparations for another war. Growing frustration over the lack of progress on UN mandated land transfers (Resolution 242) forced Egypt and Syria to take matters into their own hands to regain the territory lost during the 1967 war. Thus, in October of 1973 an offensive was launched that caught Israel by surprise. In conjunction with the attack, the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on the West. By the end of October Israeli forces quickly regained control over the situation and the war ended. Promises for an international peace conference led to a suspension of the oil embargo.

With the stage set for international negotiations the political maneuvering of the PLO, the Arab states, and Israel began. First, in preparation for the conference, the Arab League granted the PLO full authority as the representative of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories (Smith 1992: 231). This effectively severed any claim that Jordan and Egypt had to the West Bank and Gaza (Cobban 1984: 60). Second, in return for participation in the negotiations, the DFLP and Fateh agreed to unofficially scale back PLO demands from the irridentist solution of liberating all of Palestine to the creation of a Palestinian mini-state in the Occupied Territories. Third, Syria agreed to suppress Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel (Smith 1992: 230). Thus, as the war ended and negotiations began the PLO gained greater autonomy from the Arab regimes in the

97

Middle East, and its leadership toned down its demands. But the PLO lost another major front of operation.

As the peace preparations wore on further setbacks occurred. First, the PFLP led a charge against Fateh. The rise of the "Rejection Front" was designed to oppose any negotiated solution, especially one that sacrificed parts of Palestine to Israel (Cobban 1984: 62). The movement gained substantial grassroots support in the refugee camps, which undermined Fateh's original base of support. Second, The PLO refused to accept UN Resolution 242 as a precondition for participation. Arafat believed that the resolution conceded too much to Israel and undermined nationalist claims the PLO with regards to the Occupied Territories. Third, Israel refused to enter negotiations that included the PLO. The United States backed this position. Thus, PLO exclusion was a condition for the conference. In the end the conference failed and occupation of the territories continued.

The situation declined further for the PLO in the aftermath of the failed peace conference. Civil War erupted in Lebanon as the Muslim majority sought to alter the existing political arrangement to reflect the true balance of community political power.[26] The presence of PLO groups exacerbated the situation and conditions quickly deteriorated. Israel jumped into the fighting seeing the chaos created by the war as an opportunity to crush the PLO and its guerrilla factions. In 1982, a full invasion occurred as Israel drove to the outskirts of Beirut. In response the PLO agreed to the Riyadh Accords, requiring a PLO withdraw from Lebanon (Smith 1992: 248). They agreed to the solution as a tradeoff for US sponsored protection of the Palestinian refugee camps in

---

[26] The Balance of power was structured to favor the Marionite minority.

southern Lebanon (Cobban 1984: 128). As nearly 8,000 PLO commandos moved out, Israeli forces worked in conjunction with the Marionite factions to orchestrate a massacre of refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps. Nearly 3,000 of 20,000 residents were killed and Arafat's credibility was greatly damaged (Ibid.). Immediately there was a civil war within the ranks of Fateh to remove Arafat. A rally of support from the PFLP and DFLP propped up Fateh in the short term, which allowed the organization to rebuild.

In the end, the Lebanese civil war forced the PLO to relinquish its remaining contiguous border with Israel. Political operations were moved to Tunis where the PLO leadership began reorganizing. The military personnel spread out in the Arab world and ceased to be a direct sustained threat to Israel. Meanwhile, on the international stage, problems continued for Palestinians, this time from a regional partner.

In 1977, Egypt opened negotiations with Israel to regain control over the Sinai. The result was the 1979 Camp David Accords, which established a land-for-peace deal where Israel relinquished the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for recognition of its borders. As this negotiation ended Israel hoped the format would be used with other Arab states (Jordan and Syria) to create a ring of security and leave the PLO isolated. This piecemeal peace program presented Israel with other advantages too. It offered Israel the time it needed to carry out an internal policy of resettlement in the Occupied Territories. The resettlement plans were designed to "create-facts on the ground," making the West Bank predominantly Jewish. This would weaken PLO claims to the territory as inherently Palestinian.

During the 1980s Palestinian society in the Occupied Territories began to rebuild. Traditional social organization disintegrated and new social orders developed behind

younger professionals. With this change the older attitudes of passive resistance within the Occupied Territories lost their appeal among the younger generations (Hunter 1993: 35), and a new cycle of violence begins in 1981. Meanwhile, Israel began to implement its settlement policy in full force. Land confiscation increased, and all political expression was deemed subversive and punishable by prison terms. Furthermore, the political, social, and economic infrastructure of Palestinians was destroyed to restrict Palestinian development and making people dependent on the Israeli economy. Movement was restricted, deportations and detentions increased. Israel setout to make occupation permanent and Palestinians began to openly resist.

Throughout the occupation, institution building became the best way to resist Israeli rule (Ibid. 22). But building social and political institutions was often difficult and required ingenuity to overcome Israeli barriers (Ibid.). The organizations that did develop acquired a grass-roots character, which further broke down traditional social structures.

Aiding organizational development and linkages between Occupied Palestinians and the PLO was the experience of many Palestinians in prison. About 25% of the Palestinian population were subjected to some sort of detention or internment (Ibid. 26). The common experience of humiliation and beatings built feelings of resentment. This environment provided fertile ground for recruitment and training for the resistance movement. Once released from prison, individuals would return to their villages and either begin building new social organizations, or aid the efforts of existing groups. All prison releasees would have strong links to one of the PLO groups, which aided the entrenchment of the PLO in the territories (Ibid. 27).

Despite the prevalence of the PLO in the territories, the Nationalist Movement in the territories did acquire a new ideological character. Most people focused on the immediate goal of ending occupation, not liberating Palestine (Ibid. 28). Thus, the prominent idea was for the achievement of a truncated state within the territories—a separatist ideology. This ideological stance ran counter to the official PLO policy to reclaim all of Palestine.[27]

While the separatist ideology tended to dominate in the territories, it did not engulf the entire society. A counter movement emerged in Gaza, anchored in the Islamic resistance movement (Ibid. 34). The Muslim Brotherhood had remained a strong force in the Occupied Territories throughout the occupation. The Brotherhood maintained an irridentist ideology—that Palestine is an Islamic *Waaf* that is to be protected by Muslims. To cede any territory to Israel meant recognition of the illegitimate conquering of Muslim land (Abu-Amr 1993: 23). To throw off Israeli rule required a complete transformation of the Arab society in Palestine and the Middle East. Once everyone accepted Islamic rule, the Jihad could commence to liberate all of Palestine from foreign rule (Ibid. 28).

The Brotherhood began to promote its ideology as an alternative to the "failed" nationalist rhetoric of the PLO during the early-1980s (Ibid. 29). However, the ideology required social transformation before resistance. This position often marginalized the Brotherhood within the Palestinian National Movement. In response to this, Islamic Jihad broke off in 1983-84 and initiated a new military campaign against Israel (Abu-

---

[27]   As early as 1973 Fateh and the DFLP were showing sings of scaling back their goals to adopt a separatist position. Therefore, the dominant goal of the national movement appeared to contradict the goals of Occupied Palestinians, but in reality the separatist logic had already gained substantial support within the PLO.

Amr 1993: 8). Islamic Jihad reoriented the philosophical stance of the Brotherhood to place Palestine as the first order of action. Islamic Jihad quickly developed a cordial relationship with the PLO (Ibid. 9). The movement was successful early. However, Jihad faced severe repression and collapse by 1986. The movement began to buckle under a series of deportations that removed over 450 Islamic resistance members from Gaza (Robinson 1997: 159).

The damage inflicted by Islamic Jihad is difficult to measure. While the organization did little in terms of property damage to Israel, it did spark the imaginations of many Palestinians. It appears to have broken down the cognitive barriers of fatalism and opened the possibility of successful opposition (Ibid.). Israel countered with a series of strikes into Palestinian villages, which created more anger and retaliation. In December 1987, emotional strains reached a limit. During a funeral, a riot broke out in Jabalya refugee Camp, in Gaza. This began the Intifada (1987-1993).

Rioting quickly spread from Gaza to the West Bank, and community organizations emerged to control the events. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) set standards of operation for the street resistance. Restrictions were imposed to prevent the use of weapons by protestors. The belief was that by using stones against armed Israelis, Palestinians would be better able to influence world opinion (Smith 1992: 296). In 1988, the UNLU conveyed its political agenda without PLO approval. The leadership called for the establishment of an independent Palestine in the Occupied Territories led by the PLO. This statement forced the PLO to alter its charter to reflect the goals of the Intifada. Thus, the PLO relinquished its official call for the

liberation of all of Palestine and adopted the separatist goal of a National Authority in the Occupied Territories (Ibid. 297).

Meanwhile, Israel effectively suppressed Islamic Jihad. Fearing that by not participating in the uprising, the Islamic resistance movement might get caught on the wrong side of the Intifada, another splinter group emerged—*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (Hamas). Hamas used the Intifada to further the Islamic resistance movement. Officially Hamas remained separate from the Muslim Brotherhood to offer the Brotherhood deniability if the Intifada went poorly (Abu-Amr 993: 11). By the end of 1988, Hamas had become an important force within the national movement, and the PLO could not afford to ignore it. In 1989, the PLO extended an invitation to Hamas to join the organization. Hamas did not directly refuse, but requested such a large percentage of representation within the political council that the PLO was forced to refuse them (Ibid. 12). By remaining aloof of the PLO, Hamas was offered the opportunity to base itself as an 'unofficial' alternative to the PLO (Ibid. 12).

There were many different dimensions to the Intifada. Virtually all age groups and social classes were mobilized (Brynen 1991: 7). Overall, much of the economic dependence between Palestinians and Israelis was broken. Similarly, many of the traditional social power structures (e.g. Clan organization) of Palestinian society also disintegrated. Within the Occupied Territories, the UNLU was able to retain control over the conduct of protests until the 1990s. Boycotts of Israeli goods were enforced[28] and PLO sanctioned strikes were carried out to halt Israeli industry. Meanwhile, Hamas

---

[28]   Many Palestinians began growing gardens to promote self-reliance and demonstrate support for the Intifada.

relied upon the Brotherhood's extensive network of social services to gain access to a support base, used Mosques as places to organize operations, and enforced many strikes on their own. The competition between the PLO and Hamas waxed and waned throughout the uprising with periodic cease-fires and renewed hostilities.

Outside the Occupied Territories the political situation for the PLO remained precarious. The Intifada renewed the PLO by shaking off the malaise that had engulfed the organization since the Lebanese civil war. However, the decision by Arafat and the PLO political council to opt for a truncated Palestinian state led the PFLP to once again organize a charge against Fateh's leadership. This time the PFLP was strongly supported by Hamas, which commanded substantial support within the territories. Further problems arose when Arafat decided to support Iraq in the Gulf War (1991). The position he took was a gamble to side with any world leader promoting the Palestinian cause. The result was a loss of support from the United States. In place of the PLO the US promoted PLO-affiliated groups to negotiate with Israel (Keylor 1996: 512). However, by 1992 the situation changed and the Shamir Government agreed to talks with the PLO to end the Intifada.

Within Israel the Intifada entailed a great cost. Prior to the uprising, Israel had structured the occupation so that the costs were minimal to Israeli society. This entailed excessive taxation on Arabs in the territories, limited social services (reserved primarily for Israelis), and underpaid Arab labor to subsidize industry (Smith 1992: 292). In total the occupation paid for itself. By 1992, the Intifada had reversed this situation and the costs of the occupation were placed primarily on the Israeli citizens. The constant threat of violence and increased security precautions (i.e. closures of the territories) was

burdening Israeli social and economic life. In the elections of 1992 the Likud Party lost to the more peace oriented Labour Party under Yitshak Rabin. Rabin immediately froze settlement construction and looked for solutions to end the Intifada (Ibid. 512). Despite quickly organized opposition among settlers in the West Bank, the situation favored settlement with the PLO.

The US-sponsored peace talks waned while the power transition from the Bush Presidency to the Clinton Presidency took place. Israel opted to enter into secret negotiations with the PLO sponsored by Norway. In 1993, Israel and the PLO unveiled the Oslo Accords (See Appendix C). In this agreement the PLO agreed to recognize Israel and officially reject violence. The agreement established a Palestinian Authority over Gaza, Jericho and the surrounding environs (See Maps 3, 4 and 5 Appendix C). The PA was to assume control over internal affairs, while Israel maintained control over foreign affairs and the settlements. A Palestinian police force assumed control and Israeli military forces withdrew. Jerusalem remained open for future discussion, as did the issue of refugees (Keylor 1996: 514). In 1995, Oslo II expanded Palestinian control to over 70% of the West Bank. Area A gives the PA direct authority over 24% of the territory, Area B sets aside another 67% of the territory to be jointly administered by Israel and the PA, and Area C establishes three other areas to be handed over to the PA in the future (Robinson 1997: 175).

Once the Accords became public the internal dynamics of the national movement transformed. The PLO had the task of establishing control over a population that it had no direct political experience with. To gain control over the population they had to cultivate an elite that would be loyal. This meant marginalizing the elite that emerged

during the Intifada (Ibid. 177). The PLO achieved this by promising Israel that it would end the Intifada. Arafat organized multiple police and security units to repress any opposition to PLO rule. Furthermore, the PA organized a large bureaucracy in Gaza to create support for the PA through patronage (Ibid. 178). Arafat recruited members of the old elite to take positions within the government. This way political leaders would be loyal to Arafat, and the PA could break down any organized opposition (Ibid.).

Meanwhile, Hamas tried to find a new *raison d'etes*, while the PA tried to co-opt their leaders to prevent a civil war. Initially, Hamas continued with military operations to demonstrate the PA's lack of control (Ibid. 191). The PA could not physically crush the organization out of fear of a rebellion. Efforts were made to bring the leadership of Hamas into the PA. Hamas resisted. By 1995, the PA initiated a six-month purge of Hamas in Gaza. The move was successful. Arafat ended the repression and opened dialogue with Hamas. By 1996, Hamas opted to end all military operations and debated entering the 1996 PA elections (Ibid. 193). This led to an immediate split within the organization as a radical wing continued military operations. This caused shock in the PA region and quickly eroded support for Hamas (Ibid. 195).

The Palestinian elections of 1996 appeared to be the necessary event to calm the situation in the PA area. The PFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the DFLP boycotted the elections. They claimed the "winner-take-all" elections would produce unrepresentative results that would benefit Fateh over the other groups that enjoyed support on a more national level (Ibid. 196-97). Fateh chose this system over the more representative Proportional Representation system precisely because it would benefit and stability could

be achieved. In the end, Fateh enjoyed little organized opposition and claimed control over the PA. However, 1996 proved important for another reason.

The assassination of Yitshak Rabin and the ensuing Israeli elections dramatically altered the context of the peace process. The Likud Party returned to power in a narrow victory at the polls. The New Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, set about to stall as much of the peace plan as possible. Immediately, Israel renewed construction of settlements in the West Bank. Planned withdraws of military forces were postponed, and transfers of authority to the PA were stalled. Netanyahu justified most of these moves as responses to the PA's inability to prevent Hamas terrorism against Israel. Conditions began to deteriorate under the new Israeli leadership and the position of Arafat and the PA appeared precarious. In May of 1999, new elections were held in Israel. Prior to the election, Arafat threatened to declare a Palestinian state. The move garnered substantial international support. However, the US pressured Arafat to hold off on the declaration. This move greatly enhanced the chances for a defeat of Likud and Netanyahu. On 17 May, 1999 the elections produced a resounding loss for Likud and victory for Labour. Currently, the new leadership under Ehud Barak appears to be more amenable to the peace process, but has yet to make any substantial progress towards final status negotiations.

Conclusion

Each case presented here demonstrates a complex evolution. Both nationalist movements had to overcome several setbacks, reorganization, repression, and internal

malaise. The initial efforts to achieve social and political goals were stymied by colonial efforts to maintain control. In Palestine, the incompetence of Ottoman rule allowed the initial wave of Jewish migrants to enter Palestine. Later the British used support for Arab political autonomy and Jewish migration to further their colonial goals in the Middle East and to end the war in Europe. Zionist support in the London government prevented the establishment of equitable political organization in the Mandate. In sum, British influence undermined Arab claims to traditional land rights and aided the expulsion of many Arabs from their land. In Ireland, the nationalist movement was prevented from achieving its political goals by an intransigent minority in Ulster that gathered substantial support in Parliament. The Unionist groups constantly prevented Irish home rule until an acceptable partition plan could be worked out to satisfy the minority population in Ireland.

The partition plans in each case created disorganization among the nationalist groups undermining the ability to mount a response. The disorganization stymied efforts for a solution and perhaps extended the length of each conflict substantially. In Ireland, regional leadership in Ulster had been relatively weak prior to partition. Once partition took place, Unionist political leaders erected a political system that guaranteed political dominance. The political power was maintained through a strong security apparatus. The security units suppressed nationalist groups, thereby increasing tensions between the two communities. The political and security situation enabled Unionist to deepen communal divisions by excluding nationalists from the economy and segregating the communities through the housing councils. In short, the disorganization that occurred among nationalists following partition enabled the Unionist to isolate the nationalist

108

community. In Palestine the proposed British and United Nations partition plans failed to satisfy either group (Zionists or Arabs). However, the Zionists held an advantage over the Arabs because they had weapons and training. Thus, when partition occurred and war ensued, Zionists gained the quick advantage. The result was a Diaspora that sent Palestinian Arabs flooding into the countries surrounding the new State of Israel (formerly Palestine). The resulting disorganization weakened the ability of Palestinians to respond. It took the intervention of Arab sponsors and nearly two decades before the various Palestinian national groups could formulate any sort of organized response. Once a response was organized, it took nearly three decades of sporadic fighting for a solution to appear.

Each rebel movement had to fight off internal malaise. Slow internal dissolution is perhaps the biggest problem facing most large social and political movements. The situation occurs under conditions of sustained disappointment and continual setbacks. As Robert Hunter (1995) notes, continued disappointment leads to feelings of fatalism among individuals within the support system. Most often the rebirth of a movement was spurred by repressive actions by the opposition. The repression spurred a new wave of anger that mobilized a new generation of guerrillas to take action. In Palestine, the Islamic Jihad's military campaign occurred at a point when the PLO was in decline and support within the Occupied Territories was declining. The ability of Islamic Jihad to sustain a military campaign over a period of six to seven years had two lasting effects. Psychologically it demonstrated to Palestinians that resistance to Israeli rule was possible, and could even be successful. Motivationally, the harsh reprisals by Israeli security forces increased tensions and anger among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

When rioting finally erupted in the Intifada, community groups built upon existing internal PLO support systems and revived the external PLO structures as a major player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Northern Ireland, malaise set in after years of suppression by the Unionist political system. The segregation of the community in the North and the lack of effort by Southern political leaders to address the Northern Ireland issue led to fatalism and acquiescence in the nationalist community. By the 1960s, life appeared to normalize behind the veil of deeply divided communities. Increasing education for Catholics and the lack of corresponding economic and political opportunity led to civil rights protests. Unionist security forces responded harshly, creating anger within nationalist communities. By 1969, the situation disintegrated and riots broke out in Derry and Belfast. This led to a resurgence of the defunct IRA and renewed a military campaign that had been quiet for over a decade.

Chapter 4

The Role, Structure and Process for Acquiring Support

Introduction

The information in Chapter 3 appears to provide support for a simple formula to explain mobilization of nationalist rebellion. That formula looks something like this: combine (i) a population that possesses a distinct national identity (ii) with a prohibition of nationalist aspirations (self-determination) and (iii) a sustained armed struggle will ensue. This formula, however, does not work. For instance, the Quebecois in Canada, the Basques in Spain and the Chechens in Russia are distinct national groups that have been prevented from achieving national independence. In each case (with limited exceptions) there has not been a sustained struggle to achieve nationalist goals.[1] In fact, most rebellions are relatively short-term affairs that fail to achieve their goals (Gurr 1988: 35). In short, there is a factor missing in this equation. That factor is support.

Support for armed struggle is essential if a long-term campaign is to occur. Support enables a rebel organization to refresh its financial and personnel reserves. Support also makes the conduct of a campaign easier in terms of resisting suppression by state security forces. The question is: 'Why do individuals provide support for a long-term armed campaign?' Does the group motivate individuals through a system of

---

[1] In Spain the ETA has maintained a semblance of a rebel struggle, but the campaign has been very inconsistent since the 1970's.

incentives? Or are individuals motivated by the social conditions within which the armed struggle is embedded?

This chapter explores the literature on the role of support in rebel movements, and the ideal structure of support surrounding nationalist rebel movements. Then I will revisit the two competing explanations of how rebel groups acquire support. Some of the mechanisms to acquire support are provided directly by the groups. Others are derived via the social embeddedness of the conflict. Finally, this chapter will move from the literature to the empirical by comparing the theory relating to support with practice as observed in the IRA, and the Palestinian groups.

The Conceptual Context: Rebel Movements

The focus here is on support for nationalist rebel movements. That is to say the primary emphasis is on individuals that are actively involved in military operations, or provide aid for military operators, or provide moral succor to the military campaign. The discussion of support is couched within a specific type of armed struggle—nationalist conflict using paramilitary tactics. In a rebel movement the military units are irregular (non-state personnel) components patterned on a military command structure. The number of combatants is typically smaller than in regular military units, and the available resources are typically inferior to those of regular state military units. Most often, rebel units utilize tactical operations that conform to their irregular status. This means that military operations are not conventional. Instead, most operations involve guerrilla or rebel tactics.

The military operation of a rebel campaign is to attack the primary target through secondary targets. In other words, rebels often target objects in society that have little direct relation to their goals. The purpose is to create a state of fear and anxiety through which the state may be forced to take ill-advised actions to suppress the rebel activities (Evans 1979: 29-31; Prunckun 1995: 23). The ultimate goal is to create social backlash that raises support for the group (Evans 1979: 31). By raising support a rebel group can access new resources and expand its campaign (Long 1990: 112). If the group cannot keep the resources flowing into its organizational structure it will collapse. The question is, 'why is support important?'

The Role of Support

There are two primary functions of a support base. First, support provides material resources. The support base is a constant source of new recruits and financial resources (White 1991: 123). These material resources aid the group's campaign by keeping it refreshed and revitalized over the long term (Long 1990: 114). Personnel are necessary due to the nature of rebellion. The violent nature of rebellion creates a suppressive atmosphere in society as the state searches for ways to undermine the ability of the group to act. This suppression often leads to the capture or death of people in the rebel campaign. This means that new combatants are needed to continue the military putsch. At the same time, rebel campaigns are never short-term affairs (Gurr 1979).[2] As

---

[2] Ted Gurr (1988) does assert that rebel campaigns are not the dominant form of terrorism observed in the world. Instead most rebel groups are small organizations that die out within 18 months of their initiation (35).

such, the rebels are in constant need of revenue for the purchase of munitions. Supporters in society often provide basic financial assistance, enabling the group to purchase these munitions.[3] In short, the material resources enable the campaign to be carried out.

The second role of a support base is to provide passive resistance. Passive resistance is when individuals in society acquiesce to the government's security measures while refusing to aid those efforts (i.e. by conveying information on the identities or actions of the group's personnel). In short, passive resistance is a protection measure afforded rebels by the support base in the community where the group operates. When passive resistance is strong and stable the rebel group and the community coexist in a symbiotic relationship (Bremer 1993). This provides the necessary social cover (or societal cloak) for the organization. This protection enables the group to maneuver and "hide in plain sight" from state security forces. Such protection measures make planning and conducting operations easier.

In sum, support for a rebel campaign is essential. Support provides needed material resources that keep the organization afloat. Support also provides members of the organization protection from government security forces. Both roles must be fulfilled if the rebel group is to sustain its campaign over a long period of time. In order for both roles to be fulfilled the rebel group must have a sizable support structure (Gurr 1979: 35)

---

[3] Society provides basic financial support, but it is limited. Groups often access larger financial reserves among various states and nationals living abroad.

The Structure of Support

How much support is required? What type of support is needed to sustain a large and long-lasting violent campaign? On the former question, the exact size of the support structure may vary by case. Jonathan White (1991) estimates that on average rebel groups require 35-50 people per combatant "in support" of the military activity in order for the operations to succeed (126). Groups that lack the necessary supportive structures will collapse. This proposition, however, is virtually impossible to test. Instead we are forced to estimate.

On the latter question, there are three levels of support identified with rebel organizations. There are activists (including the command structures), active supporters, and passive supporters (White 1991: 123).[4] The top level of the organization (activists) is the smallest, yet most essential part. This class includes the military planners and foot soldiers of the organization. The activist level is typically organized in self-contained cells of two to three combatants. Using the cell network minimizes contacts between combatants and reduces the potential for infiltration by security forces. The disadvantage of cellular organization is that it minimizes contact between individual combatants and the community. One possible result is estrangement from the community. This is where the second level becomes important.

---

[4]   Jonathan White cites Fraser and Fulton (1984) in their discussion the structure of rebel groups, which identifies four levels of support. I have collapsed command and active cadres into one group of active combatants because the level of devotion between the two groups is essentially identical. The only real difference is in the specific aspect of the military activities the two groups carry out.

The second level of the organization includes a larger number of people—active supporters. This group helps keep the rebel group afloat by providing supplemental services. People at this level gather information, provide safe houses, maintain open communication lines between all segments of the rebel support structure, and provide supplemental logistics for various attacks (White 1991: 123). In short, active supporters allow the organization to maintain a campaign as opposed to a string of unrelated acts of violence. The active support group is also the class from which new activists are drawn (Long 1990: 114).

The final level of support includes passive supporters. This group comprises the largest segment of the rebel organization and is in many ways uninvolved in the campaign. Passive supporters provide a favorable environment for military operations (White 1991: 124). They provide cover for rebels (the societal cloak) by keeping quiet. So long as passive support is strong, the organization can rely on continuous cover from the community. However, if passive support dwindles, local communities may quit protecting the members of the organization. This will in turn aid government efforts to weed out the rebels (Bremer 1993).

The flow of support between the passive support, active support, and activist levels is upward. The lower bases of support are larger—they provide resources and a base of potential recruits for higher levels (Long 1990: 114). This provides a picture of support in the shape of a pyramid (see figure 4.1). The shape assumes that few people progress from the lower echelons of the support structure to the higher levels. The logic

116

Figure 4.1: Structure of Support for Rebel Organizations

is that fewer people move upward because there are more requirements at the higher levels. More requirements entail higher costs to individuals. As the commitments increase, the number of participants is likely to decrease.

Acquiring Support

It is unwise to assume that a conflict situation emerges with a structure of support in place. Indeed, support must be acquired. Building support though is a complex affair. The literature discussed in Chapter 1 highlights two potential explanations for how

117

support is mobilized. Which one is correct? Does support emerge from a group's active efforts to draw in individuals? Or do rebel groups benefit from support raised by the social conditions surrounding the conflict situation? It is entirely likely that a combination of organizational efforts and socially conditioned mechanisms come into play in the acquisition of support. Nonetheless, for simplicity the two aspects of acquiring support need to be kept separate.

a. Organizational Mechanisms: Altering the Incentive Structure

Explanations that emphasize organizational mechanisms for support mobilization focus on the activities rebel groups engage in to draw people into the support structure. This category of explanations is based on a rational choice assumption and often utilizes the logic of Collective Action Theory. The operative assumption is that the organization, as an entity, exists independent of society and is trying to direct the actions of others within society. In other words, the group is operating as an external force to create an incentive structure among individuals that will make support for a rebel conflict rational.

The logic is that organizations utilize mechanisms to appeal to egoist (self-interested) individuals. Since the goals of rebels are generally beneficial to most (or all) members of the target (national) group, egoists are likely to view the good as a non-exclusive collective benefit (i.e. they perceive the individual benefit to be low). Furthermore, the costs of attaining those goals are typically very high—death or imprisonment. Thus, the rational egoist will not participate in achieving the goal. Instead, he/she will free ride on the efforts of others to achieve the non-exclusive benefit.

118

Given this individual logic, groups can use various incentives as tools for altering the parameters of individual decision-making (Oliver 1980: 1357). It is believed that groups can alter the cost-benefit analysis of individuals through three types of incentives—material rewards, purposive benefits, and/or negative sanctions—offered through two different mediums (direct to the individual or through community structures).

To alter the incentive structure of individuals rebel groups can use material incentives to increase the worth of potential benefits by creating exclusive rewards for participants. Since people will adopt revolutionary action as part of a bargaining process between entrepreneurs and combatants (Lichbach 1995: 7), the selective reward increases the benefit of support to offset costs. The purposive benefit adds to the cost-benefit analysis by increasing the social value of participation, thereby making it desirable to participate. Alternatively the group can use coercion directed at the individual to apply costs to free-riding; thus decreasing the costs of support (Oliver 1980: 1368).

The tendency to focus on individuals in a framework where "private interests" always overwhelm the drive to achieve the collective good can lead to inefficient uses of group resources (Lichbach 1995: 21). Alternatively, groups can address the free-rider problem by co-opting the community. This in turn allows a group to manipulate individual rationality by altering the attitudes of society and changing the beliefs or values of a community of individuals (Taylor 1988: 64; Popkin 1979: 259, 262). To achieve this the groups will build community support by offering benefits to an entire neighborhood. By offering services, the community becomes dependent on the rebel organization. Once that dependent relationship is developed the community becomes a

119

source of pressure to push people into action (Lichbach 1995: 21). In short the community makes efforts to defend the organization and maintain the dependent relationship.

To summarize, groups offer incentives directed at individuals and the community. At the individual level, these incentives can take the form of material rewards, emotional benefits, or sanctions. At the community level activities are designed to fulfill the role of dispensing social services. These activities lead to dependency between the support community and the rebel movement. In doing so the rebel group can undermine the authority of the government and build a stronger support base. These incentives though are only part of the support building process. Groups often benefit as much from the social condition as they do from the incentives offered.

b. Social Embeddedness: Motivating Perceptions and Support

The alternative explanation for support mobilization focuses on the social conditions and how they effect the perceptions of individuals and their willingness to incur risks associated with support for the larger movement. This category of explanations is based on either a social or cognitive psychological model of decision-making, relying on Relative Deprivation logic. The driving assumption is that the rebel group coexists with society (not independent of it). As such, we are interested in how groups operate within the conflict setting to mobilize support. This form of support building relies on the ability of the group to create worldviews that support their position, or benefit from widespread perceptions of loss within the target community. In other

120

words, groups attempt to frame social conditions in such a way as to draw people into their structure of support. The key distinction between social condition mechanisms and organizational mechanisms is that the rebel group has little independent control over the social condition. The primary factors of social embeddedness are the social condition, individual experience, and organizational worldviews (group ideology and propaganda) (Gurr 1968; Feierabend et al 1969).

The social condition of the conflict situation refers to two related conditions. On the one hand there is the *social condition of the target (nationalist) community*. This refers to the general observation that within nationalist conflicts one self-defined community is generally suppressed, isolated and/or marginalized within the larger social context of the state. This condition reinforces notions of distinctness, isolation, and domination quite often causing a galvanizing effect within the community (Gurr 1996).

The other aspect of the social condition is the *social condition within the conflict situation*. To halt rebel activity states often resort to suppression in the communities where operations take place. By suppressing the community, the state fails to differentiate between members of the community and the rebels. Thus, the state appears to place blame for rebel activities on the whole community (Evans 1979:31). One result of community suppression is that the community will galvanize behind the rebel group (Ibid. 29). The state becomes the enemy of the community while the rebels emerge as the only alternative. At this point, the government is in competition with the rebels for control over segments of the population. The existence of both conditions would imply a consistency of perceived losses among all members of the nationalist community.

Another aspect of the social embeddedness of the conflict is the individual experiences of people from the target (nationalist) community. Violent conflicts create a situation where uninvolved individuals are often brought into the conflict. For example, individuals that have remained passive in the past may increase their participation or support for a violent conflict if they have been arbitrarily arrested, or if their family members have been killed. Groups can use these experiences as a motivating factor to draw individuals into a violent movement. The more individuals experience the ill effects of the conflict, the more likely the rebel group will benefit with increased support.

A final aspect of social embeddedness refers to the role of the group's ideological position and communication with the support community. Ideology solidifies links between activists and supporters to sustain a movement (Sederberg 1994: 237). Organizations (leaders primarily) forge simple and broad ideologies to reflect beliefs about the social and political world, offer views of the way the world should be, and outline the process of how to achieve their ideal view (Ibid. 239). In order to be effective an ideology must correspond with the experiences of potential followers, promise to overcome the sense of alienation felt by the target community, and offer a viable alternative to the existing social order (Ibid. 241-243). Ideological systems that do not correspond with reality, fail to draw in an identifiable community, and fail to offer genuine alternatives to the existing order will not convince followers (Ibid.)

Ideology is very useful in appealing to a support base. However, communication between the rebel group and the supporters is just as vital. Rebel groups that have developed adjutant socio-political counterparts are better able to keep lines of communication open with the people in the support communities. This function enables

122

the rebel group to conduct propaganda and information dispersion, both of which are important for keeping locals informed of group activities (Cremlinsten 1987; Gurr 1988). Furthermore, open lines of communication allow the group to alter its tactics if its actions move beyond acceptable tolerance levels of the community (see Wieviorka 1993: 3 for discussion on unchecked increases in violence).

To summarize, this explanation argues that social embeddedness factors are vital for the acquisition of support. The rebel group has little independent influence over the social condition. However, since they are embedded within these conditions they often benefit. Social conditions create group identity and solidarity making it easier for a group to mobilize a specific population. Social conditions also create anger and intolerance among individuals in the target population providing fertile grounds for recruitment. The group can then use their organizational apparatus to broadcast their ideology to draw in supporters. Once a support base is gathered the group will use its organizational apparatus to maintain coherence between group activities and community goals.

To conclude, the literature explains that support is essential to a rebel organization. It provides needed material resources, and social protections that make the conduct of military operations possible. Support also has a distinct structure. Three different levels of support exist (passive and active supporters, and activists) within a pyramidal shape (passive supporters being the largest level and activists being the smallest level of support). Within this pyramid, recruits are drawn from lower levels to higher levels progressing from one level to the next. Finally, the acquisition of support may occur through one of two possible avenues. First, the group may act as an

independent unit that tries to redefine the parameters of individual decisions in order to make the decision to participate rational. Second, the group exists within the parameters of the conflict situation making the group a beneficiary of the social conditions. These conditions lead to perceptions of loss or frustration among large groups of people making recruitment of potential rebels easier. The question that must now be considered is: 'How do these descriptions and explanations stand up to the empirical record?' In the next section I will address this question by drawing from the evidence provided by the Northern Ireland and Palestinian cases.

Findings

The previous sections discussed various aspects of support. That is to say I outlined the role of support in a rebel campaign, the structure of support, and two explanations on the mobilization of support. In this section these aspects of support are analyzed by drawing upon the evidence provided by the Northern Ireland and Palestine cases. The findings suggest that the role of support is consonant with the literature, but the structure of support varies to differing degrees. Meanwhile, the data on the acquisition of support fails to provide any definitive conclusions.

a.   The Role of Support

In terms of the role support plays, evidence from the case studies confirms the descriptions of the role support plays in rebel movements. That is to say, supporters play

distinct roles within the rebel campaign such as passive support and providing needed resources. Furthermore, rebel groups are concerned with ensuring that support exists. This is best demonstrated by the following comment: "[P]assive support is the woman down the street that just closes the door and minds her own business. Even though we are right there taking on the 'Brit.'... you are also trying to win the wee woman over to the common cause" (NI1A3). In short, there is no variation to speak of in terms of the role support plays.

b.   The Structure of Support and Mobility of Recruits

Perhaps the greatest variation in terms of support is in reference to its structure and the movement of supporters through that structure. As described above, the pyramid structure is used to describe support for a rebel organization. Within this pyramid recruits flow from lower levels of support to higher levels, with fewer individuals moving from one level to the next (Long 1990: 114). The data from the cases loosely conforms to this description, albeit the exact structure and flow of support does vary substantially.

First, in practice support does not appear to flow from passive support to active support and on to activists. Instead, it appears as though most or all supporters begin as passive supporters. From that level some individuals become active supporters, others become activists, while some remain passive supporters. In other words, there is no progression from one level of support to the next (See Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: The Flow of Recruits through Rebel Organizations

Second, the pyramidal structure of support described by Jonathan White (1991) appears to be inclusive of pure rebel organizations (e.g. Germany's Rote Armee Fraktion). In Northern Ireland and Palestine however, we observe variation in the structure of support. Both follow the basic pyramidal structure in some way, but the structure is altered to account for realities observed in larger nationalist rebel movements.

For instance, when the rebel group is part of a larger social movement to create change the group typically becomes a wing within the larger organization. This means that resources must be shared with other wings of the movement. This is the case in Northern Ireland where the PIRA operates as the military wing, and Sinn Féin operates as

126

the political wing, of the Republican Movement (see Figure 4.3). In this case, the pyramid is divided into two sections. One section includes the support structure of the military wing. The other section entails the political wing, which has an identical form.

This structure provides negative and positive ancillaries. On the negative side, all financial resources and many personnel resources are shared between the two groups. This stretches limited assets and creates tensions between the two wings as each vies for dominance within the movement (Keena 1991). Furthermore, the dual requirements of personnel at higher levels (political and/or military) can be burdensome, thus winnowing

Figure 4.3: Structure of the Republican Movement in Northern Ireland

the number of people moving into the higher echelons of the movement. On the positive side, the combination of a political and military campaign brings a high level of legitimacy to the rebel movement. The PIRA has a voice that is socially and politically legitimate. This makes them a force that is not easily challenged within the nationalist community or by the opposition. Furthermore, the military backing of Sinn Féin often leads opposition political factions to give greater weight and consideration to the demands of the group (Coogan 1994). Thus, the political weight of Sinn Féin often outstrips the actual social support they have within the entire nationalist community.

The structure of the Republican Movement, however, is not common among nationalist rebel movements. More often the whole movement lacks homogeneity, meaning that more than one rebel group is operating at the same time. The existence of multiple organizations forces all groups to carve a stable niche of support within a single base. For example, in the Palestinian National Movement, there are seven or more groups engaged in the armed struggle against Israel. Of these seven, four are major power brokers. The Palestinian support is large and diverse, thus enabling these various groups to draw support. The support is divided on the basis of group goals and ideology (see Figure 4.4). The PLO-based groups share a common secularist outlook. However, division occurs along the line of the group's nationalist aspirations. The Democratic Front and Fateh pursue a separatist goal (creating a truncated Palestinian state next to Israel). Meanwhile, the Popular Front is committed to an irridentist national goal (reclaim all of former Palestine) (Cobban 1984). The Islamic Resistance groups show no variation in goal or outlook. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad maintain a religious outlook to the Palestinian conflict (reflecting the outlook of the parent Muslim Brotherhood

PLO Based Groups   Islamic Resistance Movement

Fateh

DFLP

PFLP

The Muslim
Brotherhood
(Hamas
and
Islamic Jihad)

←----------Nationalist-Separatist----------►◄----------Irridentist----------------------→

Support Base

←----------Secularist Based----------→◄----------Religious Based----------→

Figure 4.4: Structure of the Palestinian National Movement

organization) (Abu-Amr 1994). Both organizations are similar to the PFLP in preferring (or demanding) the reclamation of Palestine from Israel.

As with the structural variation in the Republican Movement, the situation in the Palestinian National Movement also has its negative and positive ancillaries. On the negative side, by creating the different niches, groups must ward off dissolution through competition. The competition for support often leads a group(s) to attack each other. Infighting occurs in one of two situations: (i) to ward off competitors fighting for access to another group's support niche, or (ii) to create a niche within an existing support base. The problem is that infighting can become disruptive to the nationalist campaigns and

make suppression by the state easier (Gurr 1996: 66). This was demonstrated when Hamas and Fateh engaged in direct military confrontations in order to seize control over the Palestinian National Movement (circa 1989-92).

On the positive side, the diversity of the national movement can become a source of strength. All groups vary to some degree in their final vision of an independent Palestine.[5] Despite the differing visions of a future Palestine, all groups are in agreement on the need to oppose Israeli occupation. If the groups can organize into a coalition (i.e. the PLO) they can mobilize an overall larger segment of the population (Ibid.). A single group may draw in a large base of support, but many individuals may not support the group because they oppose its ideological position. In this way a single group can become a limiting force that holds the movement back. With many different groups representing many different ideological positions, the pool of supporters expands. So long as all groups remain united on certain short-term goals, the difference in long-term visions can be overlooked. Thus, diversity has enabled the Palestinian National Movement to build a large and stable base of support.

To summarize, the literature on support indicates that there are three levels of support arranged in a single pyramid shape. Members within these levels of support progress from the lower echelons to the higher ones progressively. The empirical evidence loosely supports this conclusion. First, individuals do not move from one level of support to the next in a progressive fashion. Instead people generally start off as

---

[5] The Islamic groups envision an Islamic based society residing within the traditional borders of Palestine (Abu-Amr 1993). The majority of the PLO factions (Fateh and the DFLP) favor the establishment of a secular democratic society within the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The other PLO groups (PFLP, PFLP-GC, and Saiqa) favor a secular democratic state within the borders of traditional Palestine (Cobban 1984: 139-167).

passive supporters. At some point they make a decision regarding their involvement. Some remain as passive supporters. Others decide to increase their involvement becoming either active supporters or activists. Second, the single pyramidal structure of support needs to be amended when applied to nationalist rebel *movements*. Looking at Northern Ireland we observe a situation where the military wing operates as an adjunct unit to a semi-autonomous political unit. This means that the pyramidal structure is divided between two coexisting groups. In the Palestinian case we observe many different rebel groups operating off a single base of support. In this situation, there is a multi-modal pyramidal structure.

c.   **The Acquisition of Support**

As discussed, there are two potential explanations for the acquisition of support. That is to say support acquisition occurs either through independent organizational efforts, or as a result of social conditions. Empirically, both explanations appear valid. For instance, the case studies provide ample evidence to support the claims that groups engage in independent activities to build support. Both the Republican and Palestinian groups offer some form of material incentives to activists within the support structure. For example, the PIRA pays individuals active in the military cells, and they compensate families of people killed in combat or taken prisoner (Coogan 1994). Similarly, Fateh and the PLO offer some form of monetary compensation for participation (Cobban 1984).

As for negative sanctions, the PIRA has used the Defense Action Against Drugs (DAAD) wing of its organization to police and/or coerce people engaged in illegal

131

activities in Catholic areas and to intimidate individuals working within the informant system (Keena 1990). The Palestinian groups generally avoided coercion of collaborators until the Intifada. A family would likely interpret an assault on a collaborator as an assault on the family, thus requiring a hostile response (Cobban 1984).

Turning to community-based efforts, we observe increased roles for the adjunct social or political organization of the rebel movements. For example, Sinn Féin runs many different social programs ranging from community activities, to housing programs, job programs, and cultural revival events (Coogan 1994, Keena 1990). In addition, Sinn Féin operates a series of advice centers in the community. These centers provide information on legal recourse for police abuse, and information on housing and jobs. Within the Palestinian National Movement the PLO has developed social organizations as well. Among the active groups are the Red Crescent Society, which operates hospitals and clinics in Syria and Lebanon; the Sons of Martyrs, which operates manufacturing industries; the Planning Center, which conducts social research and develops school curricula for refugees; and the Social Affairs Organization, which manages social welfare programs for Palestinians (Cobban 1984: 14).

This evidence indicates that groups offer incentives directed at individuals and the community. Most often the material reward is used to acquire participants at the higher levels of the support structure. Sanctions are used to prevent individuals from 'defecting' (aiding government counterinsurgency efforts). Often the sanctions are targeted and specific, and typically wielded in a "stop-gap" fashion. The community activities are designed to fulfill the role of dispensing social services. These activities lead to dependency between the support community and the rebel movement. Dependency

132

arises because the group is typically fulfilling a need that the existing government is either not providing or under-providing. In this way, the rebel movement replaces the government in the communities offering support. In doing so, the group further undermines the authority of the government and builds a stronger support base.

Turning to the alternative explanation we observe equally ample evidence to support the claim that rebel groups benefit from their embeddedness within the conflict situation. In reference to the social condition of the nationalist community the case histories demonstrate that both the Irish and Palestinian communities have faced suppression by the government. For instance, In Northern Ireland the Unionists set up a political system that benefited the Unionist franchise, and a security system that would minimize troubles from the nationalist community (Crighton and Mac Iver 1991: 130). The nationalist community was disenfranchised from the political system through gerrymandering practices and the use of artificial franchises to favor Protestants (Coogan 1994: 264). For security, Unionist police forces would aggressively police Catholic areas by using preemptory and heavy-handed tactics.

In Palestine, after the 1967 war Israel deported 671 individuals and two entire tribes, crushing the established leadership in the West Bank. Added to this was the 1968 annexation of East Jerusalem, and military occupation to pave the way for Jewish resettlement (Cobban 1984:170). With the occupation, Israel initiated emergency measures allowing the internment and deportation of several thousand Palestinians. In Gaza the conditions were much worse. Israel set about to pacify the region "with a vengeance" (Ibid. 182). Deportations were stepped up to include all established political leadership and most males between the ages of 16-40 (Ibid.).

133

Both cases demonstrate that efforts have been made to disenfranchise the nationalist communities, while government policies were designed to give another community distinct advantages. The policies taken by the British and Israelis have resulted in a galvanizing effect within the nationalist communities. This effect is most evident in Palestine. Prior to the mass colonization efforts of the Zionist movement, the indigenous people of the region did not display an identity that was distinct from the broader Arab identity. The Palestinian national identity emerged during the British mandate period (1919-1947) as Zionist immigration into Palestine increased and the indigenous population was marginalized (Smith 1992).

Looking at the social condition within the conflict situation we observe many incidents where the state security apparatus of Israel and Northern Ireland have used community suppression to control rebel action. In Northern Ireland, the British government routinely used arbitrary internment and detention to control political violence in the six counties (Whyte 1995: 344). Similarly, in the Occupied Territories, Israel imposed policies such as curfews, deportation, internment, and detention in order to control Palestinian violence (Smith 1992; Cobban 1984). Did these policies have any effect on the outlook of individuals? One respondent indicates that it had to:

> "The British respond by getting the bomb makers off the street. But they were not sure who the bomb makers were so 'we will get all guys that look like bomb makers to get the bomb makers.' The British did not have the legal technicalities to get the bomb makers, so they would get them through internment...You would be arrested and taken to places like Springfield and Castlereigh...The situation structures the way you think and then you seek historical and cultural justification for what you will do." (NI1a2).

134

As outlined above, the conflict situation also creates a situation where individuals are likely experience the ill effects of a conflict. Groups can use incidents like arbitrary arrest or a death in the family, to recruit and motivate individuals into taking violent action. Consider the following:

> "Say your eight years old and your father has just been murdered [by the British], by the time your fifteen the IRA know who to go for. They'll go up to him and say: 'listen lad your dad was murdered, are you going to do something about it?'" (NI01).

Furthermore, prisons become very fertile grounds for recruitment efforts by rebel groups. Individuals that have been arrested or detained often experience a strong injustice thus motivating them to get involved (Coogan 1994; Hunter 1993: 19).

> "I was already involved in the Intifada before I knew anything about the National Movement. What I learned about the different groups I learned after I was arrested and put in jail. That was when I joined Fateh. They explained to me what the Intifada was about, and what the armed struggle was about." (P1a1).

Turning to ideology, rebel groups have utilized a general form of nationalist self-determination. The picture of the world is simple; the social condition is bad because X group (Unionists or Israelis) is preventing Y group (Irish or Palestinians) from determining their own future. The way to resolve the poor social condition is to alter the current socio-political arrangement (i.e. create an independent state where the deprived national group can exercise self-determination, or change political sovereignty to another state). Finally, the only way in which the situation can be corrected is through violent struggle to overthrow the existing social order and establish a new one. This basic format

135

exists within the ideological framework presented by all the rebel groups. Those groups that have had success in gathering larger bases of support (the PIRA and Fateh) have maintained a simplistic ideology. Groups that have added to this simple framework have correspondingly less support (the PFLP added a Pan-Arabist philosophy, DFLP added communism, and Hamas added Islam).

In conclusion, the empirical evidence relating to the acquisition of support is inconclusive. From contextual data we can provide evidence that supports both explanations for how support is built. This means that in order to draw more definitive conclusions on why individuals lend support to rebel movements we must look for other, more intensive, forms of analysis.

Conclusion

This chapter looked into support for rebel movements. The first section outlined the role of support within rebel movements. Here it was discussed that support provides essential functions--material resources and passive resistance. Both aspects of support are essential if a group is to maintain a long-term campaign. Support bases also have a structure. The structure entails three different, yet interconnected levels. Typically this structure is arranged in a pyramid shape with fewer people in the upper echelons and increasing numbers in the lower echelons. Finally, I outlined the different explanations relating to the mobilization of support. The assumption is that support is not automatic, and must be acquired. To that end I discussed the independent role of the organization, and the role of social embeddedness of the conflict for building support.

The second section took from the literature and compared the descriptions and explanations regarding support to the Northern Ireland and Palestinian cases. As for the role of support, there is no evidence to contradict the claim that support bases provide material resources and passive resistance. In relation to the structure of support the evidence demonstrated that the simple single pyramidal shape of support structures is not entirely accurate. Looking at nationalist rebel movements we observe situations where the military wing operates as an adjunct unit to a semi-autonomous political unit. Meanwhile, in other situations we observed many different rebel groups operating off a single base of support. While this situation can thin out resources it can also draw in greater numbers of supporters by appealing to a diverse population with diverse ideological positions. Finally, as for the acquisition of support, there is sufficient evidence from both cases to support the notion that groups try to create a rational decision for individuals to participate, and that social conditions may induce individuals to accept greater levels of risk regardless of the costs involved. The conclusion regarding mobilization is that more testing is needed. Future tests should include information drawn at the individual level focusing on people in the conflict situations. By directly testing both theories we can properly assess which most accurately reflects reality.

Chapter 5

Test Results Part 1: Supporters

Introduction

The previous chapter examined how support is mobilized for long term nationalist conflicts. As discussed, the evidence drawn from case histories does not provide a clear indication of whether rebel groups gather support by manipulating the decisions of individual actors, or if the organization benefits from social conditions that motivate individuals to get involved. This chapter utilizes a more rigorous testing method for these models of mobilization.

The evidence in this chapter is gathered from individual supporters of the nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and Palestine. These individuals were presented with a series of questions relating to their decision to support conflict. The questions are designed to yield information about the value of costs and benefits, as well as the socio-political conditions found in each conflict situation. The evidence is rather clear in demonstrating that despite the high costs of participation; few received direct material rewards for their participation. As for non-material incentives, many individuals acknowledge the importance of duty, respect, and camaraderie. But many also argue that these factors had little relation to their decision to *support* the conflict. Meanwhile, perceptions about the social condition do appear to weigh heavily in individual decision-making.

In the sections that follow, I will discuss three different aspects of the field study. First, I will develop a picture of the sample. In this section I will outline the composite in terms of sex, education, professional status, and religious affiliation. I will also draw a picture of national identity as defined by the interviewees. I will also outline the structure of support found within the sample. Second, I analyze the decision to support nationalist-armed conflict in terms of the rational decision-making model. This section follows the assumption that the goal of the rebel movement represents a public good that benefits all members of the target national group. Given this assumption, I will then proceed to assess the interviewees' answers regarding costs, and the value of material and non-material incentives. Finally, I will analyze the decision to support armed struggle in terms of the prospect theory model of decision-making. The assumption is that if individuals perceive their socio-political conditions in terms of losses, then they are more predisposed to risk-seeking behavior. Interviewee answers are analyzed in terms of their "frame" of the socio-political condition, whether or not they were certain conditions would not change unless action was taken, and if the respondents overweighted the probability of success for the risky option. Analysis of the differences in decisions between supporters and non-supporters will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Sample

As discussed in Chapter 2, this study follows the "Most Different Systems" approach. This means that despite drawing two separate samples from two different regions of the world, all responses will be treated as though they are drawn from the same

139

sample. Only when a factor(s) demonstrate case-specific findings will the system be reintroduced as a relevant variable.

The sample includes 83 people from Northern Ireland (42) and Palestine (41). These respondents were selected through a non-random process referred to as a convenience sample (See Chapter 2). Of these individuals 31 (37.3%) are female and 52 (62.7%) are male. Twenty-one people (25.3%) have less than a college education while 62 (74.7%) have a college education[1], and 41 people (49.4%) work in non-professional jobs while 42 (50.6%) have professional level jobs.[2] Finally, 77 people (92.8%) claim to be affiliated with the dominant religion of the nationalist group (Catholic for Northern Ireland and Muslim for Palestine) while 6 (7.2%) claim to be affiliated with a non-dominant religion within the nationalist group (Protestant for Northern Ireland and Christian for Palestine).

Turning to identity, the sample included 69 people (83.1%) who claimed affiliation with the assumed dominant national identity (Irish for Northern Ireland and Palestinian for Palestine) while 14 (16.9%) claimed a non-dominant identity (Northern Irish or British for Northern Ireland and Arab Palestinian or Arab for Palestine). The survey includes questions about factors that would include or exclude an individual in the self-defined identity group. The overwhelming response to questions of inclusion referred to one's birthplace. This means that most respondents believe that an individual is a member of the identity group based on their territorial place of birth.

---

[1] A college education refers to those individuals with a Bachelors degree or higher, and those in the process of completing their college education.

[2] Students were counted as non-professional laborers.

For Palestinians, this response was qualified by the claim that individuals born in the refugee camps surrounding Israel also qualified as Palestinians. As for *other* factors that include individuals within the identity group some referred to specific cultural elements as a determining factor, while others claim self-definition was the determining factor. Consider the following comments from Northern Ireland:

"There is a tight line between nationalism and Roman Catholicism. It is rather difficult to separate them, yet they are different. There are people who are Protestants that are also nationalists, and there are Catholics that are British. But the main of the people that are Catholic in Northern Ireland would also have nationalist aspirations…"(NI1a2)

"Look at our schools…the way kids are dressed, you will not see people that have red, white or blue trousers. Color is a symbol. They are what I call cultural symbols that identify nationalism and religion." (NI1a2).

"A sense of belonging to the community. I don't think that being born here makes you Irish. Being born in the country and knowing the culture of the country…the Gaelic tradition…would make you Irish." (NI1a36).

"Actually I am English and British, but that would not be a totally accurate way of describing my political position. I mean, I married an Irish woman, my children are Irish and British. Although myself, I am not Irish by birth I consider myself an Irish person." (NI05).

As for the factors that exclude individuals from an identity group, most respondents claim that exclusion was self-defined, and should not be imposed upon others:

"Anybody from the Loyalist community would not consider themselves Irish. They would consider themselves British." (NI1a20).

"The Protestants want to call themselves British or Northern Irish, well then that's their personal choice. We consider them Irish since they were born in Ireland, but I would not impose that on them." (NI1b24).

"…Some people would take the view that if you are not a Catholic you are not really Irish. It is probably true that it you are Protestant by definition you

cannot be Irish, you must be Ulster British or something. I think you define yourself...I do recommend that people define themselves and don't have people tell them." (NI037)

The issue of identity grows difficult when we turn to the Palestinian case. To differentiate a Palestinian from an Israeli is rather easy and did not require questioning. Israelis come from a different religious background, they speak Hebrew and/or English, and most are either settlers or descendent from settlers that came from Europe, the United States, or Ethiopia. Palestinians, on the other hand, are part of the Arab World, which entails a relatively homogeneous language, similar religion, and cultural traits. The problem of identity relates to the distinction between Palestinian Arabs and other Arabs. Historically, Israelis have claimed that Palestinians are not Palestinians (Smith 1992). Instead, Palestinians are Arabs and as such should be integrated into the different Arab states in the Middle East leaving Israel to the Israelis. On the claim that there is no difference between Palestinians and Arabs, most Palestinians agree. For example, "We are part of the Arab Nation. There is no difference between us. We have our culture, our language, and religion." (P1b4); "I myself, and a lot of other Palestinians believe that we are Arabs first, then we are Palestinians. This is how we were educated, and this is how we feel." (P1a2).

These comments denote a lack of distinction between Arabs and Palestinians, which on the surface appears to make identity difficult to determine. After all, if Palestinians are not Palestinian, but Arab, then why persist in trying to reclaim Palestine? Why not integrate with other Arabs? The reason for this persistence is that a lack of cultural distinction between Palestinians and Arabs does not imply there are no

142

differences. Instead, historical circumstances have led to divisions between Palestinians

and the rest of the Arab World. When questioned about differences between Palestinians

and other Arabs most respondents referred to the borders imposed by Britain that have

led to the separate development of Arab states and/or the condition of occupation, which

most other Arabs have not experienced:

> "Identity depends on the geographical place where one comes from. But
> don't forget one thing, before 1916 this whole area was one country that was
> divided by the Sikes-Picot treaty following the war. Palestine was here, but it was
> called Syria at the time." (P1a38)

> "To separate us by religion or nationality does not describe us.
> Occupation has made us different...Our official identity is against occupation and
> for independence. Our Palestinian history gives us a unique experience. We are
> Palestinian and at the same time Arabs, but we have a special problem." (P1a5)

Thus, to a Palestinian, identity is not linked to specific cultural traits like language and

religion. Instead, identity is a product of historical experience relating to the division of

the Arab world following World War I and the occupation of Palestine by Israel starting

in 1948. Therefore, Palestinian identity is more likely to resemble that of a sub-cultural

grouping within the larger Arab cultural identity.

The final factor is support for the rebellions waged in the recent past. Of the

respondents 72 (86.7%) claimed to support the armed struggle, while 11 (13.3%) did not.

Among the supporters 36 (50%) claimed to be high level activists (involved with the

military or political campaigns), 19 (26.4%) claimed to be active supporters, and 17

(23.6%) claimed to be passive supporters.

Before moving on to the discussion of the decision models it is worthwhile to take

some time to determine if the specific demographic characteristics have any relation to

support or non-support for the armed struggles. Beginning with the entire sample, by cross-tabulating the demographic characteristics with support/non-support, it appears that there is little relation between most of these characteristics and support. The only glaring exception to this finding is related to education and religion. The evidence from the sample indicates that no individuals with less than a college education claimed non-support for the armed struggle (significant at the .05 level). Thus, on the surface the data appear to indicate that as education increases the likelihood individuals will support armed struggle decreases (See Table 1). Is this a valid claim? There are two reasons why this finding may not be valid. First, the number of individuals with a college education that *do* support armed struggle is sufficiently high to claim that level of education bears little relation to support/non-support. Second, there was a large working class base among non-supporters in both cases. However, because I was forced to rely on convenience sampling, I was unable to gain access to this group.

As for religion, it appears as though membership in the dominant religious group is related to the likelihood that an individual will support armed struggle (significant at the .05 level). This finding is to be expected. Religion is one among many different cultural characteristics. Since the conflicts are nationality based, thus entailing cultural distinction between the rebel group and the dominant nationality, we should expect a cultural trait like religion would be prominent. Does this mean that religion is a prominent causal factor in the conflict? It is not likely that religion would be anything more than a coincidental factor related to national distinction rather than a causal factor of conflict. After all, the majority of groups involved do not place religious issues at

144

Table 1: Cross Tabulation of Demographic Factors and Support for Armed Struggle

Demographic Factors	Support	Non-Support	Total (n) X^2(df) sig.
Sex:			
Male	47	5	52
Female	25	6	31
Total	72	11	83 1.602(1) .206
Education:			
College	51	11	62
No College	21	0	21
Total	72	11	83 4.295(1) .038*
Occupation:			
Professional	34	8	42
Manual	38	3	41
Total	72	11	83 2.483(1) .115
Religion:			
Dominant Religion	69	8	77
Non-Dominant Religion	3	3	6
Total	72	11	83 7.596(1) .006*
Identity:			
Dominant Identity	60	9	69
Non-Dominant Identity	12	2	14
Total	72	11	83 .016(1) .901
n=83 * Significant at the .05 level			

the center of the debate over nationalist claims. Thus, religion is probably more indicative of national distinction and less a causal factor.

Moving from the entire sample to the specific case studies, the evidence changes in regards to the relationship between the demographic factors and support/non-support for one case. For instance, in Northern Ireland there are significant relationships between education, occupation, religion, identity (all significant at the .05 level) (See Table 2, part A). Meanwhile, in Palestine the only significant relationship is between religion and support (see Table 2, part B). Is this finding telling? For Northern Ireland, the relationship between education and occupation and level of support, I would argue, is not telling. As stated above, there was a sizable lower class (working class) base for non-supporters in both cases. However, because of the convenience sampling methods used, I was not able to include members of this community in the sample. They do exist, only they were not interviewed.

Turning to identity the data indicates that members of the non-dominant identity group are less likely to support armed struggle in Northern Ireland. This finding is telling in some ways. As stated in Chapter 3, the nationalist movement began to emphasize cultural distinction between the nationalist community and the Unionist community to shore up support for nationalist goals in the late 19th century. As the movement shifted from the population of the entire island to Northern Ireland it is likely that identity based distinctions remained strong within the nationalist community, ultimately finding the most receptive audience among those supporting the Republican movement in the 20th century. Meanwhile, those individuals pursuing Nationalist goals (non-violent nationalists) looked at unification through peaceful resolution. The primary way to

Table 2: Demographic Factors and Support for Armed Struggle by Case

A. Northern Ireland

Factors	Support	Non-Support	Total (n) X^2 (df) sig.
Sex:			
Male	13	3	16
Female	20	6	26
Total	33	9	42 .110(1) .740
Education:			
College	14	9	23
No College	19	0	19
Total	33	9	42 9.462(1) .002*
Occupation:			
Professional	13	7	20
Manual	20	2	22
Total	33	9	42 4.172(1) .041*
Religion:			
Dominant	33	7	40
Non-Dominant	0	2	2
Total	33	9	42 7.700(1) .006*
Identity:			
Dominant	32	7	39
Non-Dominant		1	2 3
Total	33	9	42 3.927(1) .046*
Total for all categories n=42 * Significant at the .05 level	33	9	42

Table 2 Continued...
B. Palestine

Factors	Support	Non-Support	Total (n) X^2 (df) sig.
Sex:			
Male	34	2	36
Female	5	0	5
Total	39	2	41 .292(1) .589
Education:			
College	37	2	39
No College	2	0	2
Total	39	2	41 .108(1) .743
Occupation:			
Professional	21	1	22
Manual	18	1	19
Total	39	1	41 .011(1) .915
Religion:			
Dominant	36	1	37
Non-Dominant	3	1	4
Total	39	2	41 3.868(1) .049*
Identity:			
Dominant	28	2	30
Non-Dominant	11	0	11
Total	39	2	41 .771(1) .380
Total for all categories	39	2	41
n=42			
* Significant at the .05 level			

achieve this goal would be to downplay cultural distinction, and highlight cultural similarities between the Nationalist and Unionist communities. Therefore, this finding is to be expected, given the history of Northern Ireland.

As for the issue of religion, the relationship did not change from the entire sample to the individual cases. That is to say, religion remained a significant factor between support and non-support within the sample, and within both cases. Therefore, I can claim that the arguments (discussed above) relating to religion as a symbol of identity would hold within both cases. However, I would neglectful in not pointing out that the relationship between religion and non-support was much stronger in Northern Ireland than in Palestine. This appears to indicate that an individual's membership with a specific religious group appears to be more important in Northern Ireland. Why is this so? An argument can be made that individuals from the Protestant community crossing over to the nationalist side are less likely to engage in armed conflict with their co-religionists. Instead the crossovers may simply support nationalist issues without seeing the need to engage in violence. The evidence does appear to support this explanation in Northern Ireland, but not in Palestine. In Palestine, we observe that members of the non-dominant religious group are likely to be Christian, not Jewish. This would mean there is fewer crossovers between the conflicting communities. At the same time, Christians are more likely to become involved with the Palestinian National Movement because the Christian community is also Arab, and thus faces similar nationalist problems as Muslims.

In sum, the demographic characteristics demonstrate some significant relationships with individual support or non-support. That is to say factors relating to

149

wealth (education and occupation) and factors relating to nationality (religion and identity) are related to individual level support or non-support within the entire sample, or within the case sub-groups. However, these relationships should not be interpreted as meaningful in terms of alternative explanations relating to individual decisions to support or not support armed struggle in the respective cases. First, the relationship between factors of wealth (education and occupation) and support are likely to have resulted from the limitations caused by the convenience sample. That is to say, there is a sizeable base of non-supporters that come from working class (lower class) communities that were not accessed for this study. Had these people been included, factors relating to wealth may disappear. As for the nationality factors (religion and identity) the relationship does not provide any new information beyond what can expected within nationalist conflicts. That is to say religion and identity are identifiers of nationality in both cases, and should demonstrate a relationship between support and non-support. Perhaps the interesting finding was that identity and religious boundaries were more stable between supporters and non-supporters in Northern Ireland than in Palestine. This indicates that non-supporters from the Nationalist community downplay issues of communal division, while issues relating to communal division remain strong among members of the Republican community.

The Rebellious Collective Action Model

This model of collective action rests on the assumption of rational actors. The rational actor is an individual that calculates the costs and benefits associated with a

particular decision. To make a decision rational, individuals will select alternatives that maximize individual benefits and minimize individual costs relative to their order of preferences. If we insert the rational actor into a political decision-making scenario (to participate or not to participate in a group activity) adjustments are made regarding the value of the public good—the assumed goal of political groups. The public good is generally perceived has having a lower value than a private good. We make this assumption because the benefit from the public good is inelastic to the number of people receiving the good, and non-exclusive. If the benefit does not increase with increased participants, then in the eyes of most individuals there is little reason to participate; especially when the benefit will extend to all even when they do not participate (Olson 1965: 37). This leads to the "free rider" problem as people forgo the higher costs of participation in an effort to maximize the value of the benefit. To overcome the free rider problem—mobilize supporters to achieve the public good—the group must create an incentive structure that includes exclusive benefits for individuals in order to increase the total value of benefits received for participating.[3] Once the value of these "selective incentives" increases to a point where their value exceeds the cost of participation, the rational actor is more likely to join the group.

This basic argument is carried over into models of rebellious collective action on the grounds that the goals of a rebel organization generally represent a public good for

---

[3] The Collective Action Model does generally except the amendment that some individuals will value the public good so much that they will incur greater costs in order to achieve it. This number of individuals though is generally assumed to be small meaning that the incentive structure is needed to increase the support base for the group.

the target population.[4] Given that the value of the public good is held as lower than a private good we can assume that a free rider problem will ensue in this situation. For rebel movements the cost for individual participation typically exceeds the benefit of group oriented success (potential costs being death, injury, or imprisonment). Thus, the organization must alter the incentive structure to make the benefits of participation exceed the costs. This can be achieved through the use of selective incentives in the form of material rewards (pay or leadership positions within the political/military units, and social services for passive and active supporters). The group can also use non-material incentives (individual sense of duty, respect from the community, camaraderie with others in the movement). Alternatively, the group can use negative sanctions to prevent individuals from defecting from the group (coercion, intimidation, harassment, and punishment).

The question facing us is the degree to which individuals actually calculate the costs and benefits involved with their decisions? We know from numerous studies involving formal models, decision trees, and game theory, that this explanation is logically sound. But is it empirically sound? Consider the following: In rebel situations those involved incur many types of costs. There is the prioritizing of causes behind the rebel movement (e.g. national liberation versus social improvement). Second, involvement in rebellion represents an opportunity cost to the participants (e.g. lost wages). Finally, participation involves behavior considered dangerous since most

---

[4] Target population refers to the nationalist community that will benefit if the rebellion succeeds in their secessionist goals.

governments will seek to maim, kill or arrest individuals and/or groups perceived as a threat (Lichbach 1995: 7).

A. Costs

To ascertain the value of costs individuals were asked questions regarding time, threats to personal safety, the legality of their actions, and how these costs relate to their decision to support their respective national movements. When asked about the time involved with their participation and/or support for the national movement respondents indicate that involvement often consumes considerable time both physically and mentally. The following comments demonstrate the typical ways in which support consumes one's time:

> "The amount of time spent engaged in IRA activities, or in preparation for activities? On a daily basis it was not much. But overall I would spend months preparing for an operation, and I had to be available on a moment's notice to perform the operation. While not much time was taken up with activities in the IRA, a substantial amount of time was taken up with preparation and readiness to conduct operations." (NI1a6)

> "You either agree with an ideology or you don't. You don't spend fifteen minutes a day thinking about it. I am a Republican, I cannot quantify the time I spend thinking about it or doing things to support it. (NI1c38)

> "I am not involved in the military wing of the movement. But my support did take much of my time in devotion to the movement." (P1c21)

> "I started when I was thirteen years old and all of my time is spent with activities in the movement." (P1a32)

> "Most of my time, I devoted to this organization. I was a teacher in the refugee camps, and when I was off I would do everything. All morning and sometimes until midnight I would do things." (P1a38)

153

These responses indicate that individual supporters perceived their actions or support as very time consuming. This condition holds for all levels of supporters, although many passive supporters indicate that they generally did not devote as much time (physically) to the movement as did active supporters and high level activists. For example, activists (NI1a6, P1a32, and P1a38) indicate that the actual time taken to conduct of military activities is often minimal. However, preparation is time consuming and often forces individuals to devote their lives to the movement. On the other hand, passive supporters (NI1c38 and P1c21) indicate that support did not entail high quantities of time. Instead time is related to personal devotion to the movement in terms of personal beliefs, which often means the individual will devote extra time perhaps in terms of protesting, and promoting the ideas of the movement to others within their communities.

Did the time taken up by the movement entail an opportunity cost to supporters? Respondents indicate that had they not been involved they could have pursued many other activities that were financially or personally rewarding. The following comments are indicative of those elaborating on this topic:

> "You deliberately put careers off till you have indulged your political work. A lot of very articulate people in the Republican movement gave up major careers." (NI1a2)

> "Once I worked as a milkman, another time I ran my own business. The jobs I worked had to be flexible to my ability to travel and conduct operations." (NI1a6)

As these comments demonstrate, the time taken to participate in the movement is often so consuming that individuals had to craft work schedules to conform with their obligations

154

to the military movement, or give up careers in order to fulfill their duties to the movement.

What about the other costs associated with support for armed resistance? Respondents were asked about the legality of their activity and/or support for armed struggle. It stands to reason that if respondents believe their actions or support were not legal than they would consider this as a potential cost associated with support. All respondents answered this question in the negative—stating that they did not believe their support or activity in the nationalist movements in Palestine or Northern Ireland was illegal. The following comments demonstrate perhaps the best summary of individual views regarding the legality of rebel support:

"It is not our law. In this country we were not for the law imposed on us. We went against the law of Israel. If you have a history, culture, or nationality under occupation then you do not accept the law." (P1a5)

"If you have a perception that the law is not here to protect you, but is there to defend what is alien to you, then you do not have a rebel problem that is against the law. What has happened in Northern Ireland, the people have decided for themselves what is right and wrong. The law and the laws of the community are divorced. The institutions to enforce the law have become divorced from the community as well. Then you have the laws themselves; they became instruments of state terror. The law in itself became an institution of power." (NI1a2)

The highest cost involved with support entails threats to one's personal safety. Lichbach (1995) argues that participation involves considerable risk to safety because of the response that governments take to a rebel movement (7). Respondents in both cases concur with this assessment. As for the amount of risk faced per level of support, individuals vary in their responses. Some individuals perceive the level of risk as

155

consistent over all levels of support, while others acknowledge that individual risk varies

by their level of activity. Consider the following comments:

> "If you support something that opposes the government you face risk. But it depends on the degree of, or nature of, your support also. Clearly the more involved you are the more danger you face. I think the more trouble you face in life takes you down the path of the armed struggle. It gets more intense as you go along. It is the nature of violence. But I think that as long as people's perceptions are mistrustful and deceptive because of the criminalization and demonization of Sinn Fein and the Republicans in general so much so that even to support the Republican movement becomes dangerous." (NI1c35)

> "There is danger for Republicanism in particular, not the armed struggle alone. Sometimes children are shot dead because of their parent's work. Nationalists are targeted in general, but Republicans are targeted more by the death squads that have received information from the RUC. This counts for members of the armed struggle and political struggle. Being a Nationalist is very dangerous. As for that matter so is being Catholic as well. If you are Catholic they say you are IRA." (NI1b13)

> "During the armed conflict we were facing risks all the time. We have to do our best to achieve our goals despite the risks involved. If you are in the military and throwing a bomb or if you write anything you are under Israeli threat to be arrested...The people are always under threat whether they are women or children." (P1a11)

> "One of the curses of being Palestinian is the risks." (P1a26)

> "If you are a Republican you will be shot dead or you will stay a long time in jail." (NI1a25)

> "One day I will be arrested, or injured, or killed." (P1a13)

As these comments indicate, respondents acknowledge the risks to personal safety that

accompanies their decision to support armed struggle. Activists (NI1a25, P1a26, and

P1a13) all state that their participation comes with understood risks to individual safety.

The comments indicate a sense of fatalism associated with support, in that these

respondents (as do most other activists) claim that the result of death is likely. Passive

156

and active supporters (NI1c35 and NI1b13) speak of broader forms of security concerns related to the suppressive environment in which they live. Though support entails certain levels of risk, these respondents (as do most others) indicate that security threats exist almost independent of support.

In sum, the collective action model is correct in stating that support for rebel movements entails high costs for individuals. Individuals did indicate that involvement meant that time had to be sacrificed and that personal safety was at risk. Furthermore, the costs do vary by level of support in terms of time devoted to the movement or direct threats to one's personal safety.

The question we must ask, however, is how much these costs factor into individual decisions to support the movement. Did individuals discount these costs? Did these costs bear any weight on their decision to get involved? When questioned as to whether these costs/risks mattered in one's decision to support the armed struggle the respondents answered with a qualified no. That is to say that among all respondents claiming to support armed struggle, 47 (56.6%) said the costs and risks involved with support did not factor into their decision to support. Meanwhile, 15 (18.1%) state that the costs were considered, but only in the most transitory sense, meaning that individuals considered the costs briefly but quickly discounted them. Of the 71 respondents[5] only nine indicate that they fully considered the costs involved with their support. Looking at the information from a level of support point of view, no

---

[5]   One interview from Palestine has missing data regarding this question, and the answer could not be inferred from other answers in the survey.

discernable relationship appears between level of support and consideration of costs (See Table 3A). Furthermore, if the information is dissected by case and level of support no distinct relationship appears between case, level of support, and cost consideration (See table 3B).

What about those individuals that did consider the costs? Did the costs dissuade them from increasing their involvement? Did the costs ever make them reconsider their decisions? Respondents that indicate they considered the costs of involvement were asked follow-up questions about the way in which costs influenced their decisions. Consider the following:

> "When people decide to join the IRA, the IRA will usually send them away at least once, and often they will send them away two and three times. The IRA wants to make sure that people think the decision through and that it is carefully planned and they understand everything involved. Many people do take all these different risks into consideration, they do think about what they are doing and then they proceed to get involved." (NI1a6)

> "Yes it has to be a consideration, so long as you take into consideration your family and children… You have to think about the risks and maybe take a different direction sometimes. But the limit is because of your family, not concern for yourself." (NI1a25)

> "Yes I did think about the risks. I found the risks were very high at the time. I think it's always difficult to take the risks and get involved with things like that. You try to avoid things that will expose you to risk. So it almost puts you off, unless your principles are strong. I suppose at the end of the day it [the risks] did influence me. I went to the level of support I was comfortable with. Ultimately I don't know what level I could have gone to. If I had pressure put on me by circumstances or my feelings of what was happening to me. Basically I wouldn't do things because of the risks." (NI1c35)

158

Table 3: Cost Consideration

A: Cost Consideration by Level of Support

Level of Support	Did Not Consider	Considered Somewhat	Fully Considered the Costs	Total
Passive Supporter	10	3	3	16
Active Supporter	11	5	3	19
Activist	26	7	3	21
Totals*	47	15	9	71

B: Cost Consideration by Case and Level of Support

Northern Ireland				
Level of Support	Did Not Consider	Considered Somewhat	Fully Considered the Costs	Total
Passive Supporter	3	0	2	5
Active Supporter	7	4	2	13
Activist	11	4	0	15
Totals	21	8	4	33
Palestine				
Level of Support	Did Not Consider	Considered Somewhat	Fully Considered the Costs	Total
Passive Supporter	7	3	1	11
Active Supporter	4	1	1	6
Activist	15	3	3	21
Totals*	26	7	5	38
*Missing Cases: 1				

"When I graduated from the university I was nearly six years in the movement and in my military training. I was an eyewitness to the killing of many Palestinians, and I was painfully aware of the risks involved with my decision. I was arrested in Jordan and I was injured twice in Jordan. I have fragments in my hand and in my head. I saw the risks with my own eyes and experience, regardless of this I did not question my involvement for one day, and I think thousands of Palestinians feel the same way." (P1a29)

"We thought about it every time we went out. I thought I would get killed. But I still did it. Every time I would go [for an operation] I would say goodbye to my family, goodbye to my kids in case I did not come back." (P1a37)

The following comments represent a wide dispersion of cost consideration. The first respondent, NI1a6 indicates that the rebel organization displayed an interest in ensuring that individuals wishing to join the movement considered the risks and costs involved with this decision. This demonstrates that the IRA (in this case) wants to make sure its members were aware of the risks involved, and that members are committed to the cause and will not end their involvement at the first sign of trouble or danger. Ultimately, as the respondent states, people do consider these costs and then proceed to get involved. The second quote indicates that the costs of involvement need to be considered not in terms of individual level costs. Instead they need to be considered in terms of others that may be affected by the worst outcome of the decision (death or imprisonment). In other words, consideration of the costs should be done in terms of their impact on families and dependents, not based on self-interested notions of personal safety.

Looking at the fourth and fifth quotes (P1a29 and P1a37) it is clear both respondents fully understood the costs involved with their decision. Respondent P1a29 states that the social conditions were a constant reminder of the costs involved with participation. Meanwhile, P1a37 states that he/she fully understood the costs so well that

he/she did not expect to return from any operations. However, as both respondents indicate, these costs did not dissuade them from getting involved. The costs/risks were a understood requirement for participation and thus did not ultimately factor into their decisions.

The only respondent to indicate that the risks did directly effect their decision to get involved was NI1c35. This person opted for lower levels of support based on a combination of lacking commitment and a fear of risk. The respondent explained that the risks he/she faced exceeded the normal level of risks. He/she came from a family that was strongly opposed to the armed struggle. This means that a higher level of support could risk family relations. Furthermore, NI1c35 admitted to having a brother in the RUC, which would place extra pressure on the brother within a predominantly Protestant police force that has been committed to suppression of the armed struggle. The respondent explaines:

> "When I was younger it was very difficult to sustain my Republicanism with my family background, which was SDLP. Even though I have a Catholic background I have a brother in the RUC and strong SDLP alignment within the family." (NI1c35)

Thus, the costs associated with involvement did influence this respondent's decisions. However, the costs of increased involvement were higher than the standard costs identified with support for rebellion.

In short, the costs of support for rebel movements are high. The exact value of costs, however, varies with level of support. All respondents indicate that their decision to support involves threats to personal safety, sacrificed time, and opportunity costs.

161

These costs are considered by some of the respondents, but most routinely dismissed the costs. In other words, the costs were discounted. This finding does not contradict the collective action model. The qualifier is that individuals discount the costs in favor of various benefits they receive.

B.   Benefits

The selective incentives offered to individuals take on many different forms. The most common form of incentive discussed in the literature on collective action is the material benefit or some form of tangible reward given to individuals for their support. Material benefits make a cost-benefit analysis easier. The individual can assess the value of the benefit versus the expected costs, and can determine which is higher. If the individual values the tangible benefit more than the costs then the decision to offer support is rational.

Relying solely on material benefits can become limiting for many rebel groups. Many political groups lack the resources necessary to provide material benefits (Hector 1987). Given this obvious limitation, groups can opt to employ different types of incentives in order to increase the value of participation. Mark Lichbach (1995) refers to these alternatives as "community" and "hierarchy" based incentives (20). Community incentives are purposive benefits that play upon individual emotions and the need for social acceptance, belonging, and respect. If a rebel group can co-opt communities of support within its organizational framework it can manipulate individual cost-benefit analyses by creating higher social values for involvement. If the community places a

162

higher value on support than on non-support it generates social pressure towards conformity between individual and community values. In such cases, individuals may assign higher values to support and participation leading people to devalue the costs involved with support. If an individual assigns a high enough value to participation then purposive benefits may be sufficient for making a decision rational.

A hierarchy-based incentive works in the opposite direction as material incentives or community incentives. Instead of providing extra benefits for individual involvement the hierarchy-based approach seeks to increase the costs of *not* participating or supporting. Without hierarchy based incentives, individuals incur few if any costs if they decide to free ride on the actions of others. Yet these individuals will reap the reward of the public good if the group succeeds. By adopting a system of coercion, intimidation, or harassment against individuals that do not support the rebel group, the group assigns a cost to non-participation. In this case, an individual will not free-ride because non-support would entail a cost as high, or possibly even higher, than the costs associated with support. If the costs of non-support exceed those of support, the decision to support becomes rational.

These claims are tested in both cases by posing questions to individual supporters on the types of benefits they receive, the threat of coercion, and the degree to which these benefits or potential extra costs influence their decision to support the national movements. As the evidence indicates, few material benefits were offered that would exceed the value of costs. In addition, non-material benefits exist but often had little relation to one's decision to support armed struggle. Finally, sanctions are virtually non-existent.

163

1. Material Benefits

Looking at the material benefit, respondents were asked questions about various rewards they have received for their support. The type of material reward is assumed to vary by level of support, so different sets of questions were used for different levels of support. For activists, the following respondents provide basic descriptions of the various schemes of compensation available:

> "If you were arrested your family got £5, if you were single £3 went to your mother. That's your compensation. If you are a full time member of the Republican movement and you can't go to work or be given a job you go and get your social security and they [the IRA] would give you £20 ($33US) a week on top of that. To be involved in the Republican movement was an automatic loss of financial reward." (NI1a2)

> "At that time they [Fateh] offered 15JD(Jordanian Dinars) ($45US) per month. You cannot compare this amount with pay for other jobs; it was much less. If you worked somewhere else, say as a teacher, with a low salary you could get at least 50JD ($90US). I could get more if I did other things. Even for manual labor this pay was very low." (P1a24)

These respondents outline the structure of material support offered to individuals. As both respondents indicate, the amount of compensation received was substantially less than one could receive if they pursued other forms of work. This indicates an opportunity cost. Thus, direct compensation for militants is not high enough to outweigh the costs of participation. Direct pay was not the only form of compensation offered. Many respondents indicate that groups offer compensation in a way that may ease the opportunity costs involved with participation. Consider the following comments:

"In the end if they [The Popular Front] had some money they would give it to the soldiers. But it was not much; it was not enough to sustain you. You would get a little, a very little. They would give some money to help with food or something. They would most often give money to help pay for a job we had to do." (P1a11)

"After I was put in jail I was supported by the Democratic Front. They would send me cigarettes and books, and they introduced me to others in the Democratic Front in jail. After I got out of jail they gave my family money for my lawyer. Otherwise everything depends on you. If you are active you will move up. But they did not promise anything to anyone." (P1a22)

This form of compensation was not to influence individuals to join the movement, but rather to ease the burden of getting involved. In other words, monies were not used to manipulate decisions—but were used as a form of gratitude or aid to individuals that were sacrificing for the movements. In order for this form of compensation to operate as an incentive the organization would need to have made it evident to the potential participant prior to their decision to get involved. Otherwise this compensation cannot be considered a factor for manipulating decisions.

Was it common for activists to take advantage of these rewards? Activists insist that compensation was available. But the majority of respondents said they would not take it. Instead, most respondents mention that they gave money to the movement. For example, "There is no money, we pay 2-5% of our salary when we join." (P1a15). Or,

"When I joined I was a teacher and I got paid 62(JD) per month for this work. I used to pay almost all of it to the movement. For us it was a shame to get paid for struggling for your home. We used the money to settle the problems of others in the movement that did not have any source of income." (P1a29)

These comments indicate a more altruistic position on the part of activists. This type of response to questions of compensation was very common among activists especially in

165

Palestine. Individuals routinely spoke about paying the group instead of being paid by the group. The pay given was often in the form of purchasing supplies, transportation, and equipment to conduct operations. Did any activists receive any compensation for their activity? Yes, one respondent indicates that he/she was offered direct material compensation: "I was promised a scholarship for my involvement in the Intifada." (P1a18). However, this was only one of the 36 activists interviewed that admitted to receiving any direct form of compensation. The previous respondent indicates that this reward was promised prior to the decision to get involved. The question is then: 'do material incentives have any relation to the decision to get involved?' The answer to this question is rather obvious. All respondents stated that the material rewards had no relation to their decision to participate.

The issue of material rewards is different for active and passive supporters. Supporters within the passive and active ranks are not fully committed to the armed struggle as an active participant. Instead, active and passive supporters offer peripheral aid to rebel groups. Active supporters provide ancillary services like safe houses, transportation, or information. Passive supporters offer passive resistance or moral support to the group. Given the lower levels of participation we can assume the structure of material rewards will be different. It is assumed that passive and active supporters are more likely to receive rewards in the form of various social services rebel groups may offer. Examples of this would be the advice centers run by Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, or the health care systems and education services offered by the PLO and Islamic groups in Palestine.

Individuals were asked if they had taken advantage of these services offered by the different groups and if these services had any relation to their decision to support the group. Among the 36 active and passive supporters, 20 (56%) state that they had *not* received any of the services offered by the groups. Sixteen (44%) state that they had taken advantage of them. The types of service individuals used included Housing Councils, advice centers, and job services in Northern Ireland, and Health Care and Education services offered in the Occupied Territories. The respondents were asked a follow-up question to determine if they would still support their respective group if they did not offer these services. Among those responding, 33 (92%) state they would still support their group, while 3 (8%) state they would not support the group. One such respondents notes: "Part of the reason I support them is they provide needs that were being ignored by everyone else. I think it is part of the whole dynamic of Sinn Fein—they have a grassroots presence in the community" (NI1c35). Given this data, we can conclude that the provision of social services was not important to most active and passive supporters. In addition, material incentives had little relation to the decision to support the national movement.

2.   Purposive Benefits

Another plausible explanation for why individuals discount costs is related to community-based, or purposive incentives. Among these types of incentives would be social pressures of conformity, feelings of duty, respect, and camaraderie. If the individual places high values on these emotional benefits then he/she may discount the

167

costs of armed struggle. To explore this possibility supporters were posed questions regarding the emotional benefits they receive for being involved.[6]

For activists, respondents were asked about feelings of duty, respect, and camaraderie, along with questions about group pressures to stay involved. According to the respondents in Palestine twelve (92%) state that they did not feel pressure to stay involved in the movement. The following comments demonstrate the general outlook regarding pressure to stay involved: "Others would not care. They would think I was a weight if I stayed when I wanted to leave" (P1a15). Or,

> "I ended my involvement because I was in jail. They did not mind that I moved to another movement after I left jail. The armed struggle is for kids, political and social struggle is for the older people." (P1a24)

> "From our experience, there are many people that would change their minds and go a different way. But we still speak to them. We learned to keep good relations with people that stopped activity in the movement because in the future we may need them again, after the revolution." (P1a5)

When asked how their participation in the armed struggle made them feel, 18 respondents stated that support made them feel good about themselves. When asked as to why they felt this way, all respondents referred to strong beliefs and a sense of duty. These sentiments are best represented by the following:

> "We were occupied, our houses violated. So no Palestinian would get involved without being convinced that he had something to believe in. Because we have something to believe in it helps us to fight." (P1a4)

> "We felt that we were doing something, we would translate our love for our homeland this way. We love our homeland very much." (P1a24)

---

[6] Questions in this section of the survey were posed to respondents in the Palestine case only.

Twelve people indicate that they received respect from the community for their participation in the armed struggle. Meanwhile, seven respondents state that the community did not afford them any respect. When asked about how respect factors into their decision to support the movement, all respondents state that respect could not be a major factor in their decision-making since the community would not know of their involvement until they had been arrested for their actions. So, respect followed participation, but did not motivate participation. These quotes are typical to the comments offered by respondents:

> "I believe in the cause. People respect you of course, but it did not effect my decision. For individuals the life [in the movement] is complex. When you are in school the people get out in the demonstration to get the girls to see them. But these people do not stay involved. If you do not get respect you will not do it. It is like in business, if you succeed you will do it. If you do not succeed you will not. But respect is not the only reason." (P1a5)

> "The people did not know I was involved until I was arrested. It made me feel happy that people respected me, but it did not make me get involved." (P1a11)

> "The national community is about supporting the fighters. So everyone that fights against the occupation gets more respect. I was respected more than others that did not fight. In Palestine, however, fewer people did not fight against the occupation—so everyone was respected." (P1a32)

As for camaraderie that accompanies participation, all activists acknowledge strong friendship among participants. Many respondents state that this was important. Typical comments referred to feelings of brotherhood. At the same time most respondents did not say that friendship motivated them to participate, but rather affected

which group they would join. The following comments were typical to those provided by respondents:

> "It did not make your involvement easier, it made you more careful. We are not soldiers in an army; this is not how a revolution works. Under occupation the institution was informal. This made us more close and friendly. When people feel that you care for them, that you love them, they are more careful." (P1a5)

> "The men influenced me to join Fateh over Hamas." (P1a7)

> "It affected my decision on which organization to join." (P1a31)

When asked how these non-material benefits relate to their decision to get involved, eighteen respondents state that they had little bearing. Only two indicate that feelings of friendship, respect, and duty played a role in their decision. Thus as with material rewards, it appears that the non-material (or community based) incentives did not affect the decision to participate at the higher levels of the national movement.

Turning to active and passive supporters, individuals were posed similar questions. When asked if support made them feel good, fourteen of fifteen answered yes. When asked to explain why support made them feel good the respondents generally referred to feelings of duty, and personal beliefs. For example:

> "If I did not believe, then why would I have stayed involved for 42 years? I have not got any [sic] credit in the bank. I have not received anything. I believe in my people, I believe in my nation, and I believe in the others to fight. I hope my sons will follow the same way to fight for the benefit of their people." (P1b2)

> "I felt I was doing something for the movement. I was doing something, and it was like a dream for me. When you were throwing stones, you felt like you were doing this for your country." (P1b17)

As these comments suggest, these active supporters saw support (no matter how minimal) as their duty. They were fighting for their beliefs, fulfilling their duty to their people, and fulfilling personal needs.

Social pressure refers to notions of obligation individuals feel to get involved. In many ways it speaks to emotional benefits such as belonging and social acceptance. Questions on social pressure referred to family and peer group pressure. Respondents were asked if their decision to support the national movement made their families and friends upset, and if they were ever encouraged to support the movement by others. Here we see a split among the respondents. Eight of the respondents state that their families were upset with their decision, meanwhile seven said that their families were *not* upset with their decision. In regards to encouragement to get involved, seven state that their families and friends did *not* encourage them to get involved, while eight respondents indicate that their families *did* encourage their involvement. Most respondents indicating family opposition said it was related to a fear of getting injured or killed:

> "My family did not like me becoming a socialist, although they tolerated it. My uncles would say things about me when I was not around. They said I was hurting their family reputation. In those days it was not easy to be a communist or socialist. They encouraged me of course." (P1b2)

> "My friends were trying to get me involved and my family was angry that I got involved. They did want me to get involved because I might get killed." (P1b6)

> "They were not upset, but they were afraid. My father would always talk to me to make sure that I was safe. My whole family was this way; my sister and my brothers were really worried about me...They [friends and people in the community] respected people that got more involved, so I was challenged to get more involved. It gave me more energy." (P1b17)

171

"I tried to make all my friends come with me. But, I have many friends from other movements, so we did not talk about it too much." (P1c20)

These responses speak to various forms of social pressure at work on individuals living in Palestine. The first comment (P1b2) speaks to covert family pressure. Overall, the family was not upset about this individual's decision to support the national movement, instead they were upset with the specific group he/she supports.

The second and third comments (P1b6 and P1b17) speak to family pressures concerning non-involvement. Here the respondents spoke about family concerns regarding safety. This indicates a type of pressure to stay away from the movements. At the same time these respondents speak about broader social pressures coming from friends and peer groups. The respondents indicate that feelings of belonging and acceptance may have been involved with their decision to get involved. As P1b17 states: "They respected people that got more involved, so I was challenged to get more involved. It gave me more energy." This indicates a type of social pressure based on notions of community respect and acceptance.

Finally, respondent P1c20 speaks about the desire to place pressure on others to get involved. In this situation the respondent (a Hamas supporter) displays a desire to draw others in and make the movement more broad-based. However, this person also indicates a sphere of respect for those that do not support his/her specific group and says he/she avoids confrontations with friends that do not believe the same way.

In the end, when asked if purposive benefits had any relation to the decision to support the armed struggle most (13 of 15) answered no. When combined with the responses from activists some disconcerting findings emerge. The negative response is

172

somewhat ambiguous and contradictory. The large number of people who spoke about feelings of duty, beliefs, and social pressure clearly suggests that purposive benefits did have some relation to individual decisions. Thus, it may be best to reconsider the argument surrounding purposive benefits.

How can rational choice models address the issue of subjective valuation of "psychic gratification" derived via exogenous sources? Including purposive benefits within a rational choice model seems to introduce theoretical tautology (Green and Shapiro 1994: 51). That is to say, people will decide to support the nationalist movement simply because the benefits of doing so must outweigh the costs of involvement in order for the decision to be rational. The way to create the needed benefits is to introduce emotionally charged dividends such as civic duties, obligation, and the need to conform. But such benefits are "exogenous appendages to the rational choice model…[that] raises more empirical problems than it solves" (Ibid. 52). For instance, if civic duty or obligation now constitute a benefit, then should we not speak of non-supporters as irrational for forgoing the higher value of the psychic dividend? How can we account for the variation in level of support when the maximum benefit is derived from the highest level of participation, not the lower levels such as moral support? Would not passive supporters constitute a class of potentially irrational participants?

Perhaps it would be best to evaluate purposive benefits from an alternative point of view. The notion of duty and obligation are socially constructed, not endogenously derived. One cannot feel a sense of duty or obligation unless others bestow them. Why would a sense of duty or obligation be bestowed on an individual in a situation where he/she must engage in or support activities that advocate the destruction of other people?

173

It is possible that notions of duty and obligation are constructed to blunt the razor sharp edge of advocating violence. For the most part, individuals are raised with social lessons that value life and respect others. Rebellion flies in the face of these lessons. Thus, to override this contradiction, the notion of duty and obligation are constructed to offer exclusionary rules to our understood social norms. These notions will become particularly strong if individuals combine these notions with an image of the enemy that has been constructed through experience. Consider the following:

> "We are not a bloody people, this situation was imposed on us. Most of the action taken was a reaction to Israeli violation. Some actions were taken by the people without the group. They attacked my home to find out something we did not know. They found a bottle of water and threw it in the face of my friend…It was my duty. We were occupied, our houses violated. No Palestinian would get involved *without being convinced* he had something to believe in. We have something to believe in to help us fight." (P1b4, emphasis mine)

> "At the personal level I would feel good about what they [the rebels] were doing. *Killing soldiers is good.* But on the other hand what we saw from the occupation, you would feel sometimes like you had to do this action. The occupation forces would never distinguish between a child, a man, a woman, or a civilian." (P1b17, emphasis mine)

These comments demonstrate that feelings of duty, obligation, and the belief in a just cause did not motivate individuals to get involved. Instead, the "psychic gratification" appears to flow from a feeling that violence was needed and/or required in the situation. This explains the contradiction between respondent answers about the role of purposive benefits and declarations that the benefits had no relation to their decision to get involved. In short, purposive benefits provide ad hoc justification for individuals to make advocacy of violence more acceptable.

This poses a new question. If material rewards did not prompt support, and emotional feelings of belonging, the pressure to conform, or sense of duty cannot logically constitute a benefit, then why do people offer support to the national movement? Perhaps the various rebel groups subjected individuals to coercive pressure or intimidation.

3. Negative Sanctions

To address the role of coercion we must make some simple qualifications. First, sanctions against individuals cannot constitute an incentive for participation at the highest levels. The commitment at the activist level is far too high for coercion to build a stable membership (Oliver 1980). Second, coercive tactics are typically reserved as a punishment device to prevent people from becoming collaborators against the rebel movement. At the same time this forms broad-based pressure in the community to offer moral support to the movement in order to avoid the costs associated with being perceived as a defection. Given this, questions about coercive pressures were targeted specifically at passive and active supporters rather than activists.

Respondents were presented with a series of questions designed to gauge various forms of subtle and overt social and organizational pressure. The first two questions ask respondents if members of the rebel groups were noticeably present in their communities and if their presence translates into feelings of unease or threat. Respondents were fairly open in answering these questions. All respondents in Northern Ireland reporting taking notice of members of the IRA or other groups in their community: "Yes they are in the

175

area, they come from the communities" (NI1b36). And, "You walk into an area and you know it's a Republican area. The murals and other things would tell you" (NI1c38). Finally, "Yes they were here, but they did not intrude on your life. We had a lot of problems in the area so they were around." (NI1c42)

As for the Palestinian case, people were not as open, typically stating that the military groups are more clandestine and will not expose themselves to the public. The following comments demonstrate this point best:

> "They were not an army. They were probably there with you but you did not know they were fighters. If the people knew who they were, then the occupation forces could come in and arrest them." (P1b2)

> "Actually the military commandos, the numbers are secret, no one knows who they are. I was a member of the cultural office so I never knew them to be around." (P1b4)

> "The military wing of Jihad is completely separate from what we do, and we do not know of anything they do. Even if somebody does know, they are not likely to tell you." (P1c21)

> "Usually the military people were secret so you would not see them too much. The action against the occupation was hidden. We would see action against collaborators. These people were dealt with." (P1b17)

So the presence of military commandos was not as overt in Palestine as in Northern Ireland.

Respondents were then asked if the presence of the rebel groups made them feel uneasy or threatened in any way. Most respondents answered with a qualified no. For the most part people did not feel any threat by the rebel groups. Instead many report feeling safe because the groups were in the community. Some did indicate that the presence of the groups made them uneasy because it meant that occupation forces would

176

patrol the area more forcefully. And others felt uncomfortable with the presence of the rebel groups because they fully understand the situation. The following comments demonstrate these points:

"They made me feel comfortable and safe." (NI1c42)

"You knew the public could be hurt, the community was used as cover for the IRA, which meant that the entire community was in danger from the security forces." (NI1b36)

"Some of there actions were taken against people that were not supposed to be killed. But some of them had to be killed, especially if you are talking about revolution where you do not have a state or law or prisons for these people. We did not have the institutions to handle collaborators. This was the only way we could get rid of them." (P1b17)

"Yeah it did make me feel uncomfortable. I was uninformed as to why they were there and I was a bit freaked out. But there presence was very low-key so it did not bother me too much." (NI1c35)

"You know, I was scared of them. I have to admit that. I did not know what it was about, I thought it was good, but I was really scared and sad. They trusted me. I remember once I went to a friend's house and I saw them with their weapons. They told me to keep quiet. They said 'you are a little girl and you do not understand this. We trust you not to tell anyone.' But I did tell everyone I saw this." (P1b25)

As these comments demonstrate, the presence of rebel groups in local communities did not translate into direct fear. Instead fears were directly related to (a) ignorance, (b) increased threat from state security forces, or (c) problems related to policing. None of the respondents indicate a direct fear of the group. Therefore, there was no subtle pressure placed upon people by the presence of the groups in the community.

This finding does not exclude the possibility of other forms of subtle pressure or overt coercion. Instead, it is likely that groups and communities did place substantial

pressure on people to support the movements, or at least to keep quiet about the activities of the groups in the area. To determine if this was the case, respondents were presented with a series of questions about pressure and threats placed upon non-supporters by people in the community or by people in the rebel groups. When presented with these questions, respondents generally indicate that individuals were free to make up their own minds. Consider the following:

> "Nobody really approaches you, they just leave you to yourself." (NI1c9)

> "No, everyone is free to make up their own mind. Another girl in the community does not support the IRA and nobody bothers her. It just goes to show that I am completely different from her. I still think she is okay." (NI1b11)

> "We try to win the hearts and minds of the people, but we do not force them to support." (NI1b23)

> "I have a daughter, she does not like the things the IRA does, but she does not get bothered by anyone. She has her own opinions on things and I don't try to change her mind." (N1b17)

When respondents did refer directly to the issue of "pressure" they spoke about it in broad terms of arguments to persuade people, or in many cases, to the broader social conditions as an instrument of pressure, rather than the community or the rebel groups. For example:

> "Not pressure-pressure like being forced to change their mind. There was indirect pressure. In a Republican community people that did not support would not speak out against the armed struggle. But I don't think that there was any kind of intimidation. If there is something on the ground like Drumcree or the slaughter of Catholics you will find the people's support for military response is quite high and activity starts up." (NI1b24)

"Personally I have not felt any pressure from anybody connected with the armed struggle or connected with Republicanism to change, accept for reasoned argument in a civilized way." (NI1c35)

"The issue of Republican politics was always present and the political choices would present themselves rather strongly at certain times of the year. If people are pressured into a decision...it is from other sources. It is because of the broader situation. I would say that is what makes people side with the Republican movement, not so much other Republicans, but the Republican ideology that appeals to people." (NI1c38)

"Not for the armed struggle, but for the political movement. But it is through arguing. During the marching struggle it changes and many people support the republican movement during those times. I know going to rallies there is community pressure to support. People are not pressured personally, but the situation will pressure people." (NI1c42)

"I think that some would get pressure from arguments with friends, but I do not think there was any pressure." (P1c35)

"I did not personally feel any pressure. It was the atmosphere of the Intifada that would create pressure. It was strange not to see anyone involved. But of course it depended on the opinions of people in the refugee camps." (P1b17)

"It was arguments and persuasion." (P1b19)

"It is not that they are pressured, it is like the young people, you can change their minds easily. You are not forcing them." (P1c20)

As these comments indicate, social pressure did exist in various forms within each conflict situation. However, the pressure the respondents spoke about was not in the form of the arm-twisting coercion associated with hierarchy-based incentives. That is to say, individuals did not indicate the existence of costs assigned to individuals for their non-support. Instead, individuals would attempt to add pressures of social conformity to the mix to increase the support base. This form of incentive speaks to the same issues related to the purposive incentives discussed earlier. Therefore, we can conclude that the

hierarchy-based incentive (the negative sanction) does not appear to affect an individual's decision to support rebel movements.

C.   Summary

To summarize, the collective action model argues that individuals are rational. In regards to decisions relating to public goods, the value of the public good is generally perceived as low, which requires groups to offer selective incentives in order to make the decision to participate in a group rational. This section of the study empirically tests these claims in Northern Ireland and Palestine. Respondents were presented with questions regarding the value of costs, and the worth of potential benefits when making their decision to support the nationalist rebel movements.

The evidence demonstrates that individuals understood and appreciated the value of the opportunity cost and threats to personal safety associated with their decision to support the movement. These costs were readily discounted—a finding that is consistent with the collective action model. What was not consistent with the model is that individuals did not appear to discount the costs in favor of various incentives offered by the groups.

Looking at material rewards, the activist group suggests that the value of the material reward typically does not match or exceed the value of the opportunity costs or the threats to personal safety. Active and passive supporters did not always take advantage of the social services offered by groups, and they routinely stated that they would continue support for the groups even if the services were not offered.

180

Turning to purposive benefits, activists routinely spoke about the value of duty and respect. However, they also indicate that these factors influence their decisions only in the most minimal way—typically determining which group to support rather than whether or not to support. Active and passive supporters also spoke about duty, obligation, and social pressures, but again state that these benefits had little relation to their decision to support. This leads to the conclusion that purposive benefits may not constitute a true benefit used to discount costs. Instead purposive benefits may be ad hoc explanations used to justify support for the morally repugnant activities associated with rebellion.

Finally, we looked at the use of coercive tactics used to create costs for non-participation. Here the respondents acknowledge the existence of rebel groups in their communities, but often spoke about their presence as a safety factor that made people feel comfortable. For those that did indicate discomfort with the group's presence in the community, the respondents would typically refer to ignorance or increased threat from occupation forces as the source of their unease, rather than any tangible threat coming from the rebel groups themselves. As for other forms of direct pressure or intimidation from the community or groups, respondents indicate that coercion never occurred. Instead, people in the communities would offer up social pressure in the form of argumentation and persuasion, while others state that the broader social conditions tends to be the force of pressure. Thus, individuals do not indicate the value of negative sanctions as the source of their decision to support the rebel movements.

Given these findings, I conclude that the core of the collective action argument does not stand up to the empirical evidence gathered in this study. Individuals discounted

the costs associated with support for rebellion, but they did not discount them in favor of various benefits they received. Instead many people appear to agree with the following comment:

> "I can tell you [based] on my individual experience that all the factors work. But what is the main thing that gets you involved? Will I do this because of my friends? No...When you live under occupation, the culture, the memories, your relatives, all things around you remind you of the occupation." (P1a5)

This respondent implies that the various benefits may work their way into a decision, but the most important ingredient in the decision calculus is related to the social condition. This is the claim that is tested in the next section.

Modified Relative Deprivation Model

The core of the modified relative deprivation model is the prospect theory model of decision making. This is a contextually based decision model that argues individual assessments of acceptable risks are related to perceptions of loss or gain. The model predicts that the individual is likely to avoid risk when facing choices over gains, and will pursue risks when facing choices over losses. In either case, the individual is *not likely* to make a value maximizing decision. The frame (gains or losses) through which decision alternatives are viewed is based upon a comparison between a subjectively derived reference point (some condition deemed normal or desirable) and the context surrounding the decision. When the conditions of the decision meet or exceed the reference point, individuals are in a gains frame and likely to pursue risk averse alternatives. They will

pursue sure gains over risky gains. If the conditions fall short of the reference point the condition is seen as destabilizing and forces individuals to adopt risk-seeking behavior in order to restore the ideal condition. In this situation, individuals chance the risk of greater losses rather than accept sure losses.

In relation to rebel situations, prospect theory predicts that if the status quo (subjectively perceived conditions) approximates (meets or exceeds) the reference point people are in a gains frame. This means that individuals will not take the chance on a rebellion that may improve conditions since there is also a chance that conditions will get worse (sure gains over risky gains). Conversely, "if the reference point is not congruent with the status quo...[it] is destabilizing and reinforces movement away from the status quo." (Levy 1997:91) . This condition indicates that people would perceive the status quo in terms of losses. Hence individuals are more likely to accept rebellion even though the chance of failure is high.

The question we face here is similar to the one above: are individual decisions to support rebellion based on perceptions of the social condition? We know from numerous laboratory experiments that the generalizations of prospect theory are empirically valid. Furthermore, numerous studies have been presented using prospect theory as a model to analyze historical decisions (See for example, McInerney 1992; Farnham 1992; McDermott 1992; Weyland 1996; Berejikian 1997). However, these generalizations have never been directly tested outside the experimental environment. Thus, we cannot be certain that the generalizations of prospect theory hold up in the real world unless we conduct such tests. The empirical evidence gathered here did not falsify the expectations of prospect theory. In the end, the evidence appears to corroborate the findings that

183

individual decisions to support rebellion are related to their perceptions of social conditions.

A.   Reference Point Estimation and the Social Frame

Consider the following: prospect theory predicts that when individual reference points are not congruent with the status quo it is destabilizing and reinforces movement away from the status quo. The problem we face in this study is attempting to objectively define individual reference points and determine social frames. In the laboratory researchers insert a reference point, which simplifies estimation. This allows for simple observation of individual decision process based on a manufactured set of conditions. However, in the empirical world we cannot replicate the structured environment of the laboratory setting (Levy 1991: 98). The situations are complex, meaning that reference point estimation is difficult at best.   "If we cannot identify the reference point independently of the behavior we are trying to explain, then prospect theory...cannot be tested" (Ibid.). While this argument does raises concerns about efforts to test prospect theory, we cannot let it deter us from attempting to conduct such tests.[7]

What we must do is have individuals define their reference point and provide an assessment of the social condition via the reference point devoid of the rebellious behavior. One route to this objective is to use the goals of rebel groups as an indicator of

---

[7]   Levy's arguments are valid for any general non-experimental test of prospect theory. However, the arguments made were in reference to studies of international decisions where access to individual decision-makers typically does not exist, and the researcher is forced to assume a reference point for the decision maker.

the reference point. Goals by themselves do not indicate the need for a risky option such as rebellion. They merely speak to some condition that is deemed ideal or normal for the group. Admittedly, goals will always indicate the presence of perceived losses for the individual, because goals always speak to the attainment of future objectives. Thus, by using the goal we must not overestimate its utility as an indicator. It simply provides rough estimation. Further estimation must occur via assessment of past and present social conditions to determine movement towards or away from the goal.

To this end individuals were asked to define their reference point and then to determine if current social conditions met that reference point. This provides a basic, albeit weak, indicator to determine the existence of a gains frame or a losses frame. Respondents in the two cases were presented with differing sets of questions relating to their individual reference points. In Northern Ireland there is only one dominant group operating on the Nationalist side of the conflict. Respondents were asked to assess this basic statement of Republican goals.

> *To be a Republican means that I believe the only acceptable state of existence is a thirty-two county (United) Ireland. Anything less is unsatisfactory and should be opposed.*

Respondents were asked if the statement was accurate for Republicanism in general, and if it was reflective of their personal views. In Northern Ireland, all agree that this statement accurately reflects the core belief of the Republican movement. Some respondents continued by appending extra issues; none of which directly contradict the core statement. For example:

185

"I would say that 99% of the nationalists are prepared to accept equality now, and a united Ireland ten years from now, rather then no equality and a united Ireland. It was the equality issue that brought the nationalist issue to the forefront...When the civil rights movement was attacked then there was a general belief that the only thing that would cure the problems of equality was a united Ireland. That is how the linkage came about. People saw the British as basically protecting the Unionist community. The people saw the British as opposed to a united Ireland, opposed to equality; can a Catholic get equality within the system as it is? This means that the nationalist question comes up again because we tried to get change within the system, and we did not get it. The only way we are going to get it is through restructuring of the entire system, which has to be in the form of a united Ireland." (NI1a2)

"It is more than a geographical definition of territory. It would encompass all ideologies that oppose monarchical systems. In the case of this country it involves a breaking of imperialism. To end a colonial situation." (NI1c38)

As for the Palestinian case, assessment of individual reference points is more difficult. The existence of many different groups, none of which are dominant, indicates the potential existence of many different reference points. Despite this condition the fact that all groups focused their primary attacks against Israel indicates the possible existence of a single core reference point that is modified by the specific goals of the each group. In fact, this appears to be the case. Respondents were asked to identify the group they supported, and then asked to define the goals of that group in their own words. In the end, all respondents spoke of one single issue that could serve as the reference point—a liberated Palestine. All individuals with all groups (Fateh, PFLP, DFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, etc.) spoke to this specific issue over all others. Beyond the issue of national liberation each respondent then provides details relating to the way Palestine should be administered after the liberation occurs:

"Fateh is not an ideological party or movement. This group is not related to religion or ideology. It is a movement for national liberation, to bring back our identity. National liberation is the first and only goal right now." (P1a3)

"[For the DFLP] The main goal is the freedom of Palestine. But we also have future goals about how we should live and solve problems...we see one country in all of Palestine, one country-one people, Jewish or otherwise." (P1a5)

"[For the Islamic Groups] One of the main goals is to worship one god. Palestine has a special condition; the Israelis occupy us. If we are to worship one god we need peace. So we seek to bring back the land to the Palestinian people under our religion. This land is only for the people that believe in god." (P1c8)

The primary goal of liberation is consistent for all respondents from all groups. The same holds even for those individuals that did not claim support for any particular group (Supporters of the PLO or the National Movement in general).

Using the stated goals as an indicator of a reference point, individuals are then asked to assess the current conditions in relation to their stated goals. All respondents, in both cases, state that the current conditions fell short of their stated goals (i.e. their reference point). Therefore, individuals perceive the status quo as incongruent with their reference point, thus indicating the presence of a losses frame.

Ironically most individuals persist with this perception of losses despite the recently negotiated peace agreements in both countries (The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the Oslo Accords in Palestine). For example, when asked to assess changes towards their goal since the peace agreements, most respondents state that the agreements have not brought any change in the situation. Many state that the agreement has actually taken them further away from their goals. For example:

"What peace agreement? No there has been no change overall. In fact I would say we are further away." (NI1a14)

187

"The current agreement is not what we are after. There is no question about it, it does not address Republican goals, it does not address the goal of a united Ireland, which is what we are after." (NI1c16)

"I am very concerned at this moment about articles two and three of the constitution. Actually I am quite concerned about union status because it deviates from our Republican goals." (NI1a25)

However, there were four respondents in Northern Ireland that did see the agreement as a step forward. Most recognize the shortcomings of the agreement, but saw it as a starting point:

"I think we were further away from our goals before the agreement. I think this cautiously though; I do have reservations about whether Republican goals are going to be realized within the agreement. But I hope, and would like to think, that we have come closer." (NI1c35)

Palestinians were asked similar questions about the Oslo Accords. Respondents provided very similar responses to those from Northern Ireland:

"Oslo actually sacrificed part of historical Palestine. It legitimized Israeli supremacy and terrorism over the occupied lands. Oslo also aimed to legitimize the historical claims of Zionism by distinguishing the reality of Israel, while also promoting the view that Arabs were not equal to the Jews." (P1a1)

"It is the minimum for our ambition. It frees about 1 million people. But there are still 3 million in the West Bank, one million inside the green line, 6 million in the diaspora. This is the main problem. Most of our people are still in the diaspora. Until we find a solution to this we are not finished." (P1b4)

"Our objective has not been achieved. It will take time and we will have to be very careful. But as far as Oslo is concerned it does not bring me closer to my goals, it has taken me further away." (P1c21)

"It's relation to the struggle is minimal. How could Israel end the Intifada? By tying the PLO away from its political coalition and making it responsible to Israel for Israeli security. They do this through Oslo." (P1a29)

188

And just as in Northern Ireland, seven respondents saw the Oslo Accords as a step in the right direction. Though, these respondents do acknowledge that Oslo's advantage is that it puts an end to violence, not to the conflict:

> "It has created changes in the political conditions. In the beginning it was the armed struggle and now it is not. For me the armed struggle is not the way now. We should try the peace process to achieve our goals." (P1a7)

> "Oslo is a beginning. We have reached this point to end the fighting. We are moving into a new phase. There was a need to put an end to the armed conflict on the ground. This kind of conflict could not achieve its goals. A conflict between two 'states' will be easier to conduct." (P1a3)

In sum, individuals in both cases identify a reference point that is not congruent with their perceptions of the ideal world—hence a losses frame. The perceptions of loss remains strong among the majority of respondents (61) despite the existence of negotiated peace plans. The few respondents (11) that did recognize change stemming from the peace processes indicate that changes took the form of altering the conduct of the conflict, not resolving the issues of the conflict. Consequently, 66 of the respondents indicate that they will continue to support the armed struggle if a new round of violence erupted. Only six respondents state that they *will not* support a continuation of violence. Among those indicating continued support, most generally made arguments that were congruent with the following comment:

> "The armed struggle is a strategy within the whole, and it should take a back seat to the political struggle at the moment, which is moving forward. I personally would like to see the political struggle keep working, and because of my kids I do not want them to go through what I had to. But at the same time, if all efforts of a peaceful strategy are ignored or refused...then it is inevitable for

189

the armed struggle to continue, whether it be five years or ten years from now. It is only a matter of time before the armed conflict starts up again." (NI1b13)

B.   Overweighting the Likelihood of Success

The next task is to ascertain elements of certainty about the perceived losses and how these perceived losses would translate into support for nationalist rebellion. The element of certainty works on two related levels. First there is certainty as it relates to the continuation of perceived losses if no action is taken. The second level concerns the comparison of a certain loss to the assessment of probabilities that a risky option would succeed. Prospect theory suggests that "Low probabilities are commonly overweighted but intermediate and high probabilities are usually underweighted relative to certainty" (Kahneman and Tversky 1982: 163). The tendency to overweight the smaller probability of success and underweight the greater probability of failure "reduces the threat of possible losses relative to sure ones" (Ibid.).

Applying this certainty effect to the empirical study of rebellion is difficult. The exact probabilities regarding successful rebellion are unknown. We know that historically rebellion is unsuccessful. And we know that rebel forms of rebellion are less likely to succeed than broad based rebellions (Gurr 1988:35). However, the success or failure of rebellion in other cases has little if any bearing on the probability of success or failure for rebellion in Palestine or Northern Ireland. Cases of rebellion are not linked into a unitary game where success can be determined to occur once in every six tries. Therefore, we must extrapolate from what is known about the likelihood that rebellion

190

will succeed, and use this as a base line for assessment of the likelihood that rebellion would succeed in these cases. Given the history of rebellion we can safely assume that rebellion is a high-risk option simply because the history of rebellion tells us it is likely to fail.

To determine if this "certainty effect" took place individuals were asked if they believed that the losses they faced were certain to continue unless action was taken. Respondents were then asked if rebellion would succeed in recovering their perceived losses. To determine if individuals believed losses were certain, I presented respondents with a hypothetical question:

> *"If you did not support the armed struggle, In your opinion would conditions improve, remain the same, or get worse?"*

When asked this question all respondents indicate that they believe conditions would have stayed the same. Given that all respondents indicate that social conditions represent a loss to begin with, this suggests that individuals believed that existing losses were certain. A few respondents indicate that in terms of the entire situation conditions would not change, but on a personal level they believe conditions would be worse. None of the respondents indicate that conditions would improve. Thus, certainty of losses was present among those interviewed.

Did this perception of certain losses translate into a belief that armed struggle would succeed? To ascertain the overweighing of probabilities for success related to the risky option (rebellion), individuals were asked if they believed the armed struggle would succeed in achieving their goals. Forty-six of 71 respondents (64.8%) gave a firm yes to

this question. Eighteen respondents (25.3%) answered with a qualified yes, stating that the armed struggle was not *the entire* strategy, but was one tactic used within a larger political movement. The following comments are representative of those given by this group of respondents: "Not by itself. The armed struggle was always part of a larger political movement. It was never meant to be the only part of the movement" (NI1a2). And, "Any soldier knows that war will not do anything by itself. Negotiations are needed" (P1a37).

In short, 64 respondents indicate that they believed the armed struggle would succeed or be part of a successful strategy, while only 7 state that they did not believe the armed struggle would succeed. Those stating they did not believe the armed struggle would not succeed generally saw the use of violence for an alternative purpose. Consider the following: "It was never used to achieve anything, it was a reaction. If you are having this [occupation] forced on you day in and day out, everyday of your life sooner or later you have to do something" (NI1a7). This statement is not consistent with the prospect theory model, instead it hints more at the assertions made in the original relative deprivation model, where violence is a reaction to anger and frustration rather than towards the achievement of a specified goal (See Chapter 1).

Does the fact that individuals believed armed struggle would succeed necessarily mean they overweighted the probability of success. Perhaps they did, but we cannot know for certain. We know rebellion is historically unsuccessful. The rates of success drop substantially when the form of rebellion shifts from broad-based rebellion to rebel conflict relying on terrorist or guerrilla tactics (Gurr 1988:35). Both cases cited in this study rely on rebel strategies as the core of their military operations. This indicates that

192

the chance for success *may* be low based on historical precedent, but *it does not necessarily suggest that rebellion will fail in these cases in the future.*

Perhaps the best evidence to suggest respondents overweighted the likelihood of success comes from their own experiences. Most respondents (84.7%) in this study indicate that in their own cases the armed struggle has not achieved the goals they set out to—hence the persistence of perceived losses in the face of ongoing peace processes. Most respondents indicate that the peace deals offered by their opposition fell well short of their goals; meaning that armed struggle did not achieve the ultimate goal of national liberation or unification. Thus, in these cases we could say the armed struggle, to this point, has failed. In fact, most respondents (84.7%), said they had experienced failure associated with armed struggle. Yet an overwhelming majority (91.7%) state that they would continue to support armed struggle in the future to achieve their goals.

C.   Summary

To summarize, the data gathered in Northern Ireland and Palestine failed to falsify the predictions of the modified relative deprivation model. Using the goals of the rebel groups as an indicator of a reference point, respondents indicate a losses frame. Respondents also indicate that they believed these losses would persist unless action was taken. Finally, most respondents suggest that they may have overweighted the probability of success for the risky option—rebellion.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to provide a rigorous test of the mobilization models outlined in Chapter 1. This chapter summarized data gathered from individuals that claimed support for the armed struggles in Northern Ireland and Palestine. Respondents were presented with a series of questions on the value of costs and benefits associated with support for nationalist rebel movements. Respondents were also presented with questions relating to their perceptions of losses, certainty of perceived losses, and the likelihood of success for rebellion.

In reference to the collective action model, the data provide disconfirming evidence. The data suggests that individuals understood the value of costs associated with their decision to support the nationalist movements. However, respondents discounted these costs. The discounting of costs did not occur relative to selective incentives offered by the various rebel groups. The material incentives offered by the groups failed to meet or exceed the value of the costs of support, and most individuals indicate that they did not receive any material rewards for their participation. Furthermore, the respondents state that they would continue to support the groups even if the rewards were not offered. As for purposive benefits, respondents provide contradictory answers to the value of the emotional benefits, and how these benefits relate to their decision to support the national movements. This led to a reassessment of the role of purposive benefits in decision-making. Instead of operating as a motivating benefit, purposive benefits are more likely used as ad hoc explanations to justify support for a morally repugnant activity such as rebellion. Finally, respondents were questioned

on the role of negative sanctions. The respondents indicate that they never experienced any form of coercion coming from the rebel groups or the community. Instead, most spoke of social and personal pressure to "win the hearts and minds" of people in the community, but ultimately that individuals were free to make their own decisions.

Turning to the modified relative deprivation model, the data provides corroborating evidence. Respondents refer to the perception of loss in their social condition by outlining a reference point that was not congruent with their perceived ideal condition. Respondents also indicate that they believed these losses were certain to continue unless action was taken. Respondents also suggest that they may have overweighted the likelihood of success for the rebellious option. Ironically, the respondents claim that their respective armed struggles have failed to achieve their stated goals. Despite the recent experience with failure, most respondents indicate that they would continue to support the armed struggle in the future.

The conclusions in this chapter are fairly clear—rigorous testing of the models indicates that the modified relative deprivation model is more accurate for explaining why individuals lend support to the nationalist rebel movements in Northern Ireland and Palestine. However, we should not rely on this simple test to make any claims of certainty. In the next chapter, I will provide a critical test of these models by comparing the decision processes of supporters against the decision processes of non-supporters.

Chapter 6

Test Results Part 2: Non-Supporters

Introduction

Despite the findings of the previous chapter we should not be too quick to dismiss the collective action model, nor willingly accept the claims of prospect theory. Instead, the findings indicate that both models require further examination. In this chapter I compare the decision processes of supporters with non-supporters. Specifically, I ask: 'did non-supporters make a rational decision by opting out of the rebel support structure?' That is to say, did non-supporters weigh the costs of support and then decide that the costs exceeded any benefits that could be offered by the rebel group. I also ask: 'did the decisions of non-supporters indicate the existence of an alternative frame or a different reference point?' What is the nature of the frame? Are non-supporters in a gains frame, or do they also perceive conditions as a loss? If non-supporters see conditions in terms of losses, can we reconcile this with prospect theory?

In this critical assessment I turn to the interviews conducted with non-supporters.[1] The respondents were presented with a series of questions relating to perceived costs associated with support for the rebel movement. As in the last chapter, respondents were

---

[1] The number of non-supporters is lower than the number of supporters. This creates problems for generalizability. But since this project is designed to test theories we should overlook these shortcomings.

asked questions relating to the use of coercion by the rebel groups. Also respondents were presented with questions on their reference point and frame. In conjunction with questions on framing, all respondents were asked about the various social, political, and family experiences that may have led to the development of their frames and reference points. The chapter will proceed by delving into these questions and allowing the respondents speak for themselves whenever possible.

The first section of the chapter evaluates the collective action model to determine if the respondents did indeed make rational decisions. The next section delves into the modified relative deprivation model to compare the reference point and frame of individual non-supporters to that of supporters. Finally, I will refer to arguments made in Chapter 1 regarding the perception of increasing losses and willingness to accept greater risk. The purpose is to demonstrate that individual level experiences and socialization may be associated with the differing perceptions on the value of losses.

Collective Action Model

When testing the collective action model with non-supporters I must first define what 'non-supporter' means. In the most basic definition, a non-supporter is an individual that is withholding any type of support from the rebel movements. The non-supporter generally agrees with broad nationalist goals and would like to see those goals accomplished, but is avoiding all costs of support. Thus, the non-supporter is a free rider. The question is: 'is the non-supporter free riding on the efforts of others in order to

maximize the benefit of the public good (nationalist aspirations) while minimizing their individual level costs?' The evidence provided here does not support this claim.

Respondents were presented with questions relating to the costs they associate with support and the degree to which these costs influence their decisions to support the movements. For perceived costs, all non-supporters indicate that the armed struggle was a risky option. However, when posed with the follow-up question: 'did you consider these risks when making you decision to not support the movement?' all respondents said no. This finding appears somewhat contradictory considering that non-supporters view armed struggle as a risky option, but then indicate that the risks did not influence their decision. However, looking at the responses given to these questions we observe that individuals spoke of risks beyond the individual level. That is to say, respondents spoke of instrumental costs at the group level. Consider the following comments:

> "It is a high risk alternative to achieving nationalist goals. It does not work. If it does not work it is risky. After 35 years it has proven impossible to use armed struggle." (NI05)

> "Not in terms of personal risk. More so I never have been taught to believe that you can force your opinion on anyone...It might in the short term gain you a few steps, but in the long term it is gonna cause you harm." (NI039)

> "They could have put the gun down in the past and come to an agreement in the past. But they did not. It has proven that in the last thirty years the armed struggle did not work. That is why they met secretly in Norway" (PO16)

> "There was a more negative side to it. We do not need to kill other people to get our point across. This did more to prevent a solution than it did to help." (PO28)

These comments demonstrate the overall view of non-supporters on the issues of risks associated with rebellion. Individuals did not evaluate their decisions not to support

198

armed struggle in terms of individual level risks. Rather, they evaluated it in terms of group level instrumentality. To the non-supporter, armed struggle was more likely to drive opposing communities apart rather than bring about a lasting solution.

Is this finding consistent with the collective action model? If the goal of this project was to determine group rationality, as defined by Charles Tilly (1978) or by William Gamson (1990) we could answer in the affirmative. In this "group rationality" perspective we would speak of "The collective goals of political actors rather than the personal goals of members..." (Gamson 1990 cited in Lichbach 1995: 8). The decision to participate in rebellion is based on weighing costs and benefits based on available alternatives, with the group selecting a value maximizing option (Crenshaw 1990). However, Mark Lichbach (1995) argues that to take such an approach violates the core of the collective action research program, which is to answer the question: 'why do *people* rebel?' (8, emphasis mine). In short, Lichbach states that such views on group rationality speak to an alternative model or explanation. The problem is that the data indicate that respondents did not consider costs at the individual level, but rather considered the costs in terms of group goals. Thus, these respondents do not fit the collective action model as defined by Lichbach.

To proceed with the individual level of analysis of the collective action model at this point would be fruitless. Individuals did not base their decisions to forgo support for the nationalist movements based on individual-level costs. That is to say, non-supporters do not display characteristics associated with free riders. Rather these individuals support nationalist goals, but oppose the rebel struggle. Given this, it not likely that non-supporters would seek selective incentives from groups they oppose. As for negative

199

sanctions, it is still possible that the rebel groups attempt to apply costs to non-supporters in order to force them to support the movement. However, none of the respondents indicate experiencing any form of subtle or overt pressure to change their minds. Instead, most speculate that groups did apply pressure. But they also readily admit they had no evidence to support such a claim. The following comments best demonstrate this point:

> "I *think* some people are intimidated by the paramilitaries and others in the community. I think some are pressured. People unwittingly lend support to the armed struggle even if they don't mean to."
> *(Are people pressured into changing their minds?)*
> *I don't know the answer to that.* I would say people in the armed struggle are professional and they tend to follow the tactics of coercion." (NI027, emphasis mine)

> "There are rumors around all the time. But no one has come up to me. Last year there were three teenagers that attacked the police station and were chased by the police and shot at. People were angry because they *felt* the paramilitaries set those three teenagers up because they wanted bodies before the election to increase support for the Republican movement. That's the kind of story you hear about pressure being used to get people involved. But I don't have actual proof of it." (NI030, emphasis mine)

> "I think that this is a choice you make and no one cared what I believed. Of course some people would pressure you to change your mind, but those that did, did so because of the occupation." (P028)

A final caveat to consider relates to individual efficacy. Arguments have been made (Popkin 1979) that rebel leaders may divide the goals of a group into several necessary components in order to make individuals feel as though their contribution is important to the accomplishment of the larger objective. By doing so, rebel leader can convince free-riders that their contributions are necessary, and thus mobilize them into action (Moore 1995: 435-436). If efficacy matters in terms of individual decision making then supporters should indicate that their contribution (support) for the rebel movement

was important, while non-supporters should indicate that their lack of contribution did not matter in the accomplishment of nationalist goals.

When asked to assess whether or not their contribution affects the accomplishment of group goals the majority of supporters (48, 67%) answered no. Supporters generally indicate that their individual role had little impact on the entire movement, thus entailing a minimal contribution. For example: "If I decided not to support it, the armed struggle is strong enough that it would survive" (NI1a2). Or, "Myself, I do not think any one individual's support matter all that much. So I do not think the movement would fall apart if I decided not to support it" (NI1a8). And, "I was one of thousands, so what I did is nothing" (P1a12). Other supporters spoke of their individual contribution as minimal; however, they also indicate that if the entire group did not participate then the movement would fail. Thus, these respondents emphasize the importance of group participation rather than individual participation. For example:

> "I think it is a collective effort. As an individual I do not do anything special. But only as individuals can we work together as a group. So my participation would be as part of a whole unit." (NI1b13)

> "I believe that people have to be involved in the movement, but it is also a general movement where individually we do not matter much." (P1a5)

Meanwhile, non-supporters were asked if they believe their lack of contribution negatively affected the attainment of their goals. A slim majority of six respondents (54%) stated that their decision to withhold support did not effect the accomplishment of the group goals. Meanwhile, a slim minority of five respondents (46%) felt that their decision to withhold support did effect the achievement of group goals. These findings,

201

however, are misleading to a degree. Since most non-supporters indicate that they did not support rebel tactics to achieve nationalist goals, we can assume that the decision to withhold support was not tied to individual feelings of efficacy towards the rebel movement. Instead, withholding support was tied to the belief that by not supporting the rebel movement the group was more likely to achieve their group's alternative goals. Consider the following comments:

> "I think the armed struggle itself is an obstacle to the achievement of my definition of nationalist goals—realization of equality and identity. I think those goals have been impeded by the armed struggle. What ever the actions of the IRA it has impeded the actualization of nationalist goals." (NI05)

> "I think it [withholding support] helps to accomplish these goals. Sure the armed struggle is the easy way out, but it does not help the situation at all. It would help to have the SDLP and Sinn Féin sitting down and helping each other, instead of having one use politics and the other using armed struggle." (NI028)

> "They could have put the gun down in the past and come to an agreement in the past. But they did not. It has been proven that in the last thirty years the armed struggle has not worked." (PO16)

Overall, efficacy appears to matter little in the decision of individuals to either support or withhold support from the nationalist rebel movements.

In sum, the collective action model does not appear to apply to non-supporters. First, non-supporters do not fit the classification of free-riders—that is to say they did not forgo support out of consideration of individual level costs. Second, non-supporters did not acknowledge the use of coercion against them. Third, supporters and non-supporters did not indicate that feelings of efficacy mattered in their decisions. Supporters generally understood that they were one of many people involved and that their role mattered very

little or that participation was more important at the group level rather than the individual level. Non-supporters generally believe the tactics of the rebel group were unacceptable, thus by withholding support, the non-supporter was not hurting the attainment of their group's goals. Rather they were helping their group. These findings fail to confirm the expectations of the collective action model. However, they do not necessarily disconfirm the potential for a rational choice explanation at the group level. But since the focus of this study is individual level decision-making, I cannot offer further evidence for the claims on group rationality.

Modified Relative Deprivation Model

When discussing social embeddedness of a conflict situation in Chapter 4 two interdependent realities were brought to the forefront. They were (a) social condition of the target (nationalist) community, and (b) social condition within the conflict situation. The social condition of the target community refers to the general condition where a self-defined community is marginalized within the larger social context of the state. The social condition within the conflict situation refers to suppression of communities to undermine rebel activity. I argued that both realities in the entire conflict situation are likely to create a homogenization of individuals within the community thus galvanizing all members into one cohesive group. If this situation occurs, we should observe all members of the target community demonstrating similar perceptions with regards to gains or losses, thus making all individuals equally risk averse or risk acceptant. This claim is consistent with Glenn Whyte's (1993) findings that "Groups demonstrate a

greater tendency to escalate risky commitments when facing losses"(434). Whyte argues that uniformity pressures move the group towards a majority position, which often weakens the moderate position (435). However, this likely outcome is not always the case. Hence the existence of two groups within the nationalist communities—one that supports rebellion, one that does not. The question is: "what is the nature of the deviation between the two groups coming from the same community?"

Prospect theory models individual level decision-making. While small working groups may exacerbate framing biases, we cannot assume that this condition would hold for more diffuse groups such as national communities. Connections between individuals are loose, which means that group pressures are not the only factors shaping individual perceptions of social conditions. Instead prospect theory assumes that reference points are individually determined by the events that one experiences or imagines (Kahneman and Tversky 1981: 166). This would mean that individuals may vary substantially in terms of their perceptions. The "point of reference is a ubiquitous phenomenon. The same tub of tepid water may be felt as hot to one hand and cold to another if the hands have been exposed to water of different temperatures" (Ibid. 165). If we take this as a point of departure, we can begin to determine why some individuals coming from the same national group were risk averse, while others were risk acceptant.

The expectation of prospect theory is that individuals will forgo the risky option when facing choices over gains (sure gains over risky gains). With this expectation in mind the goal is to determine if individuals within the same nationalist community demonstrate alternative reference points that would indicate the existence of a gains frame for some individuals and a losses frame for others. We know from the previous

chapter that respondents from the supporter group viewed social conditions in terms of losses. Supporters state that in the past they had not achieved their goal of a united Ireland (i.e. prior to the peace process), and in the present, the majority (84.7%) indicate the peace process had brought no change to the situation. Therefore, we can safely state that supporters view the social conditions in terms of losses. What about the non-supporters, did they view past social conditions in terms of losses or gains? Has their perception of the social condition changed with the ongoing peace processes?

As with supporters in the previous chapter, non-supporters were presented with questions about the goals of their group.[2] In Northern Ireland, nationalists (SDLP supporters) state a wide array of goals that center on a general set of principles. Among these principles are: equality (social and political); communal peace and unity; and an agreed resolution concerning the governance of Ireland (unified or not). The following comment best represents the views of non-supporters in Northern Ireland:

> "...The establishment of political structures on the island of Ireland which would rule the whole to take sovereign responsibility of their own future and as much as you can in a globalizing world. I would see a nationalist goal as building structures on the island, which would rule the people with cooperation and agreement to benefit everyone. That may mean of course one parliament or it could mean three parliaments, it could mean a parliament in the North and in the South, and then an overall federal type structure...Certainly we support Irish unity by consent. And I believe that is what the people want. I would not see myself as a staunch territorial supporter. We need some form of constitutional arrangement on the basis of consent for unity." (NI037)

---

[2]   Non-supporters in Northern Ireland were given an open-ended question as opposed to the closed-ended question given to supporters. The questions on reference points did not change for Palestine.

As with supporters in Palestine, non-supporters came from various groups and indicate differing sets of goals. However, those interviewed did indicate one common goal—national reconciliation:

> "I think that our goal is for national reconciliation. A state for Palestine. We can have this state and our rights within the boundaries of Israel. I believe that the Jews can and would live under a state that was Palestinian controlled." (P028)

Respondents from both Northern Ireland and Palestine argue for consent between people from the warring communities. Respondents generally believe that the conflict is less territorial and more political, while supporters from both conflicts generally indicate that the primary goal is territorial in nature.

If we take these goals as the reference point of non-supporters, and ask them to assess social conditions based on their goals, we can determine both a past and present frame. Of the 11 non-supporters, 9 state that the current conditions (post-peace agreement period) are closer to their desired goals of social equality, peace and self-governance. This assessment includes a comparison with pre- and post-peace agreements. Only two non-supporters indicate that the current agreement did not bring any change (as opposed to 84.7% of supporters that stated no change):

> "We were at a position of strength and we made too many concessions to Israel. Surrender. I feel that those who negotiated the settlement should have discussed, or gotten a consensus from the population about what things should be talked about before going." (P016)

> "It depends on the functioning of the new institutions and the economics within them. If they really change things then we will have seen change. It really depends on the future development within the agreement." (NI015)

This finding is telling. First it indicates that the vast majority of respondents are currently in a gains frame, meaning that they would accept the current condition over supporting a rebellion that may or may not bring about future change. At the same time, the respondents also indicate that the current conditions are closer to their goals, which would then imply that they were further away from their goals in the past—hence a losses frame. The following comments demonstrate this point best. For example: "Given the agreement, we could say that nationalist goals are nearer now than they were in the past" (NI037). Or, "In my terms we were further away before than we are today. We are closer than we were in the past" (NI05). As for Palestine, "Partly yes. I know that it [Oslo] has not given us everything we want, and I know that we cannot reverse everything at once. I think it has achieved part of our goals" (P028). Finally, "There has been some change. The situation here is tenuous. We think we have come a long way, we have some agreement, we have the Assembly" (NI029).

On the one hand, this finding is concordant with assumptions made in Chapter 4 regarding the social conditions of the target community and within the conflict situation. On the other hand, this finding is somewhat troubling. If we observe from the point of the agreement into the future, we may be able to determine that non-supporters in the nationalist community forwent rebellion because they viewed the social conditions in terms of gains (making them risk averse). However, responses indicate change towards gains in the recent past. Thus they indicate a perception of losses at a time when many individuals would have made a decision regarding support for the nationalist movement.

Given this evidence, we cannot conclude that individuals choose not to support rebellion because they were in a risk averse frame of reference.

The question is whether this finding can be reconciled within the framework of prospect theory in such a way as to maintain the core assertions of the model. As I noted in Chapter 1, we should not assume that all individuals would accept similar levels of risk when facing choices over losses. Instead, we know that individuals facing losses are *more likely* to accept risk. However, as demonstrated by figure 1.2 (p. 18) individuals will not accept any risk in an effort to avoid losses (some risks are more acceptable). Variation in risk acceptance hinges on value of perceived losses. When the subjective value of the sure loss exceeds the value of the risk it means that the individual is more likely to accept the greater risk in order to avoid the sure loss, as demonstrated by figure 1.3 (p.19). However, the value of the sure loss is not objectively identical between all individuals. Instead, individuals may place a different subjective weight on the value of the sure loss than others will based upon their perceptions of the context surrounding the decision.

How is this reconciled with the case studies at hand? If we can determine that the value of losses perceived by non-supporters is lower than those perceived by supporters, we can conclude that individual perceptions of the value of losses is the source of difference between the risk averse and risk acceptant behavior displayed by both groups. How is this determined? The value of losses is tied to the reference point of individuals as compared to perceived social conditions. That is to say, if the reference point differs between individuals, then the value of losses perceived by individuals should also differ. While the reference points of individuals are subjectively derived we can discern a few bits of information regarding the value of losses. First, we cannot assume that the goals

of supporters and non-supporters are mutually exclusive. Instead each goal listed by the group is additive and can be used to derive an assumed value of losses. For example, non-supporters in both cases indicate the following goals for their groups: equality (social and political); communal peace and unity; and an agreed resolution concerning governance between the two warring communities. Supporters in both cases never indicate that these goals are unacceptable. Instead they include an additional goal—territoriality. For the Republican movement individuals desire a united Ireland as part of the package of goals. For PLO and Islamic groups, a liberated Palestine is part of the package. This would translate into the following representation of group goals (i.e. reference points):

$$(G_1 + G_2 + G_3) = \text{Reference Point of Non-Supporters (RP}_1)$$

and
$$(G_1 + G_2 + G_3)*(G_4) = \text{Reference Point of Supporters (RP}_2)$$

With this in mind we can conclude the value of losses is greater for supporters. This claim can be made because supporters tie the value of the territorial claim to all other goals. In other words, if the territorial claim is resolved then the other issues are also likely to be resolved. Consider the following. Supporters in both cases claim the issues of equality, peace and governance are important. However, all supporters also claim that the only way to resolve these secondary issues is by resolving the territorial issue first. Meanwhile, non-supporters generally hold territorial claims as a secondary issue that can be sacrificed in the short-term over the more pressing issues of equality, peace, and self-governance. Hence, ordering of preferences is different and the subjective value of

preferences is also weighted differently by the degree to which the territorial issue remains central among the group's goals. For example, consider the comments from a non-supporter:

> "Our goal is to have the people on the island as a whole to live under one government. Whatever that government is. Should it be a thirty-two county republic, or what we have at the moment. It is whatever the people of the island want." (NI039)

Compare this to the comment of a supporter from the same case:

> "The people saw the British as opposed to a united Ireland, opposed to equality; can a Catholic get equality within the system as it is? This means that the nationalist question comes up again because we tried to get change within the system, and we did not get it. The only way we are going to get it is through restructuring of the entire system, which has to be in the form of a united Ireland." (NI1a2)

Neither comment contradicts the other. The primary difference is that the supporter places the territorial issue at the center of the goals being pursued, while the non-supporter sacrifices this core goal and hence does not value losses of the past social condition as high as the supporter.

Further evidence to support this claim is found when we compare how both groups viewed the social condition after the negotiated peace agreements. Supporters on average did not see the peace processes as harbingers of success. Over eighty percent state that no change had occurred since the peace deals were signed. While 90% of non-supporters suggest that there has been change. Why do these groups differ? Supporters are likely to view the peace deals as a letdown because they essentially sacrifice the territorial imperative being pursued in each case. The *Good Friday Agreement* in

Northern Ireland places union status on hold for seven years, and then ties the decision over the union status to a referendum to take place every seven years thereafter. For Republicans, this sacrifices the core goal of a united Ireland. For nationalists this solution is good because it offers the "agreed upon" governance of the island. The *Oslo Accords* (I & II and the subsequent negotiations) turns over Gaza and limited territories in the West Bank to Palestinian control. The agreement sacrifices nearly 90% of historical Palestine, and offers no movement regarding Jerusalem (the historical capital of Palestine), or the issue of Palestinian refugees. To supporters, this agreement was more of a surrender than a peace deal. However, for non-supporters, an argument could be made that the agreement transfers limited control over limited territory and is thus a step towards the desired goals of self-rule.

In sum, previous discussion about the social embeddedness of the conflict situation referred to the existence of a solidary group loosely linked together by national identity. I argued that the links within the group were strengthened by the social conditions of the target group wherein they were marginalized in their respective states. Linkages between the members of the group are further strengthened by the social condition within the conflict situation stemming from suppression by the state to thwart rebel activities. These pressures create strong links between members of the solidary group. This in turn leads to the assumption that all members of the group will perceive social conditions through a similar losses frame, thus making individuals within the group more likely to adopt risk seeking behavior. This conclusion appears false at first. Within the nationalist communities we find two distinct groups engaging in behaviors that are diametrically opposed. One group favors risk-seeking behavior, while the other

opts for risk averse behavior, thus suggesting that two different frames were operating within the nationalist community.

Further analysis of the data failed to confirm this apparent finding. Instead the data indicate that in the current situation (post-agreement), non-supporters view social conditions in terms of gains, while supporters continue to view conditions in terms of losses. Before the agreement however, both supporters and non-supporters viewed the social conditions in terms of losses. While this finding rescues the core assumption outlined above, it presents a potentially troubling finding for the prospect theory model.

In an effort to reconcile these findings with the predictions of prospect theory I argue that the existence of losses in and of itself does not necessarily translate into risk-seeking behavior. Instead, I demonstrated that the level of risk individuals would accept varies by the value of losses perceived by individuals. As the value of losses increase, the probability that individuals will accept greater risks also increases. The evidence from the two cases confirms this prediction. The goals of non-supporter and supporters (the reference point) are similar on many issues (equality, peace, and self-governance), which indicates a similarity in perceived losses. However, supporters include the goal of the territorial imperative to their list of goals. The territorial imperative is not simply added to the list of goals. Instead the majority of supporters indicate that the territorial issue is linked to all other goals, thereby increasing the value of perceived losses. This goal is deemed so central to the goals of supporters that when the peace processes offered movement on the issues equality, peace, and governance and sacrificed territorial concessions it did not translate into a frame change. Meanwhile, the peace processes did translate into a substantial change for non-supporters, thereby placing them in a gains

212

frame. The difference was that non-supporters did not place a high value on the territorial imperative.

The question that we are faced with now is why individuals within the same solidary group differ in their perception on the value of losses. That is to say: why does the tub of tepid water feel hot to one hand and cold to the other? The answer is due to the temperature of the water the hand was previously exposed to.

Explaining the Differences in the Value of Perceived Losses

Discussions of the social embeddedness of the conflict situation have, to this point, remained on the level of broad social conditions—marginalization of the national group, and suppression of the group to thwart rebellion. While this line of discourse is useful for determining similarities among group frames and basic differences between group reference points, it does not offer much to a discussion of why differences in the perceived value of losses exist. Instead, the degree to which individuals *feel* the social embeddedness of the conflict situation is likely to explain why one group of individuals perceives losses as being greater or lesser.

We cannot assume that all individuals within the conflict situation will have similar experiences, or that all individuals will necessarily be raised with identical perceptions of the conflict situation. Hence, the variation in perceived losses between groups are likely to be linked to individual level factors concerning the degree to which the conflict situation is personally felt, or subjectively viewed by members of the broader national group. These various individual level factors were outlined in Chapter 1. They

refer to proximity to the conflict zone, socialization, and the impact of specific events. All of these factors may intensify the perceptions of losses for individuals thereby increasing the number of people willing to accept risk.

Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to these individual level factors to determine if they have any relation to the differing perceptions on the value of losses. The data gathered confirms that supporters came from families with a history of support, had substantial experiences with suppression, and hold strong personal feelings about significant historical events. In contrast, non-supporters were more likely to come from families that did not support rebellion, to have little experience with suppression, and will often cheapen the significance of historical events.

To determine the impact of socialization, I presented respondents with questions on family and peer group support or non-support for armed struggle, and the ways in which families described the history of the conflict. In Northern Ireland, respondents were presented with a simple question about families and peer group support for the armed struggle. Among supporters, 26 out of 33 said their families support the armed struggle, 4 stated that some of their family and/or friends support the armed struggle, and 3 stated that their family and/or friends did not support the armed struggle. As for non-supporters, 8 out of 11 claim that their family and friends did not support the armed struggle, while only 1 states that some of their friends and/or family support the armed struggle. This finding is somewhat telling in that we see relative consistency between family positions regarding support/non-support for armed struggle and respondent positions. This finding is further bolstered by comments such as the following: "There is

an oral history that is passed down in the Republican communities for generations that gives the folklore of Republican heroes." (NI1a2)

Turning to Palestine, respondents were presented with a set of questions designed to assess the type of information families would give their children about the social condition. The indication is that supporters will indicate negative interpretations of the past, while non-supporters are likely to offer family descriptions that downplay the negative, and search for the positive. Respondents were asked to explain how their families described the outcome of the 1948 war and the 1967 war. In reference to the 1948 war, most supporters were consistent in stating that their families would characterize this event as the "Nâck'beh" (the disaster):

> "I used to hear how my family was sent to Gaza or Lebanon and forced to stay away from Israel. They would tell us about the massacres and deportations of men. How in Haifa they would put men on ships and send them out to sea. Israel would block all exits to Haifa except the sea and force people to leave." (P1a1)

> "This was always talked about by my grandfather. He would tell me about how the people moved from their lands if they thought the Jews would attack. They were afraid for their families. They heard that the Jews raped the women and they were afraid this would happen to them. But they were hoping to come back. Most of the people kept the keys to their house because they thought they could come back in a few days. I know some people in my village that still have their keys." (P1c6)

> "My family told me about how they had to leave their homes in the middle of the night. Many were killed during this time. My aunt died trying to carry her child for many kilometers." (P1b19)

> "They said the Israelis tortured them and prevented them from going to their land. They felt it was awful. They would show me movies about it so I would know what happened." (P1b25)

> "We were refugees so we experienced the Nachbeh. We were forced from our house and our village. It was difficult for my father to find a job. It was

Nachbeh—disaster. We left our family and home, we had to live in a church until we could find a home. Nachbeh was a part of our life so we were always talking about it. This is why the children (myself) carried the idea of liberation." (P1a38)

As for the 1967 war and the occupation that followed, many supporters carried a similar assessment of the conditions, indicating that occupation was essentially a continuation of the past:

"We had a home and we brought people in. Just the women and children because the men were fighting. I remember the bombs exploding overhead. Everyday at five the Israeli troops would impose a curfew and shoot anyone outside. I was ten years old." (P1b4)

"My father was 18 when this happened. My village was destroyed during the war. My father went into the mountains and lived in a cave. He lived without food or water and would have to go to the village 14km away just to get something to eat. My father was afraid and tried to protect his family." (P1c6)

"My family was forced out in 1948 and 1967, they moved to the West Bank from Gaza. My family still tries to live the way they did in Israel. My mother wants to feel that she still has her land." (P1b17)

"All of the family said it was like 1948. People would have to flee their home to Jordan. People were put in camps. It was bad." (P1b19)

"My grandfather would tell me that it was hard for all the people. They [Israelis] would kill and beat people. They would remove the people from their villages. For example when they reached a village they would remove the people and kill many. They would allow 2 or 3 to escape so they could tell others what happened. People started fleeing." (P1c34)

These comments demonstrate in no uncertain terms that supporters did not learn a positive view of the social condition from the families. All characterizations are stated in negative terms, and most indicate that these learned images had a direct relation to their perceptions of the social condition and with their decision to support the national movement:

216

"The Palestinian struggle had to start. It was our heritage. Not only my family, all the people, all Palestinians. It was part of our national learning. I also teach my children the same things as my parent taught me." (P1a32)

"I can't live with this, I feel that I have to change it even if it means I will lose more and more." (P1b17)

"Our fathers talk unconsciously about what happened. But we memorize it; we remember what has happened. So it does influence us to participate in the national movement." (P1c12)

"Yes of course it influences you. It creates hatred of the Jews. They always talked about Palestinian liberation. They taught me more and more about liberation." (P1a26)

Turning to non-supporters, we find that respondents were taught a different point

of view or were not taught about the social condition at all:

"Before the Intifada I never really knew why the soldiers were here. My family never spoke of it. Once the Intifada started I knew there was oppression in the area." (P016)

" I know of the stories about the war, how they took the land and the killings. Of course they [the Israelis] were pushed by the Arab armies. My family would explain about the loss of land, and they would also explain how the people used to live in peace. They would talk about good relations before 1948. And they would talk about how they had very good relations with Jews in the area. I was not until the people came in from Europe and the United States that things changed directions." (P028)

The first respondent (P016) indicates that his/her family did not attempt to teach him/her

about the social conditions. The individual states quite clearly that he/she was ignorant

about the occupation after 1967. It was only when the Intifada erupted that this

respondent began to understand the nature of the social condition. The second

respondent, however, demonstrates that his/her family highlighted the positive conditions

217

before the 1948 war. The conditions stemming from the war were a result of Arab attacks rather than overt Israeli aggression. This perception of the social condition is diametrically opposed to those views of supporters, who claim that the 1948 and 1967 wars were unprovoked.

To push the point of socialization further, I posed a follow-up question to two activists who had been involved in the early phases of the conflict (circa 1967). These individuals had been highly involved early on, and have since moved into other areas of the national movement (political and social activities). I asked these respondents how they would explain the social conditions to their children. Both state that they did not discuss the situation with their children. Instead, they hope that by avoiding the topic they may prevent their children from making the same choices they made. As the comments indicate, the outcome in one case is uncertain, while the other did not have the desired effect:

> "I have not told my children about it. I was arrested, and I do not want my children to repeat the same story. I tell them to study very hard. They can do their duty by learning and then telling the people of the world about this situation. I do not want my children to experience what I did. I really suffered for my actions. So I tell them first to study hard, to love your home, but be careful about what you do." (P1a24)

> "I do not tell my children. I do not want the to hear the stories I had and to do the things I had. But they lived the occupation. And I noticed they learned the history without me telling them about it." (P1a38)

The second respondent went on to explain that his/her children had gotten involved in the Intifada.

218

Finally, I was able to present questions to one supporter in Northern Ireland that came from a background of non-supporters. I asked this respondent to comment on the differences between non-supporters and supporters in an effort to ascertain why this respondent went against his/her family socialization. When asked to compare his/her family position with his or her own, the respondent stated:

> "They are a middle class family that saw equality as the main issue. To me it ran much deeper in the status of the union. Sinn Féin spoke to these issues. I saw the hunger strikes and how the SDLP reacted and I knew I could not support them. The hunger strikes really changed my mind when I was young. I decided to support Sinn Féin. They spoke to the people and got involved with the people. The SDLP does not do that as well." "I think the SDLP is satisfied with the status quo and cooperation between the communities. I need more than simple cooperation. They want equality for them, the middle class, they do not care about the lower classes." (NI1c40)

This comment indicates that the supporter was at odds with his/her family over the fundamental issues of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The apparent source of this disagreement had little if anything to do with family socialization. Instead this respondent indicates that his/her perception of historical events had the greatest impact on their decision to change from the socialized pattern. This suggests that while family background is important for the majority of respondents, socialization can be overcome by factors such as personal experiences and perceptions of history, leading individuals to pursue different paths. While this case is interesting and does provide a unique finding, we should not overweight it in favor of the rather solid evidence that family background does hold substantial weight as to whether or not respondents will support armed struggle.

In sum, socialization appears to matter. In the broader context, we find that in Northern Ireland families that support the armed struggle are likely to have children that support it as well. The same holds for non-supporters in the reverse direction. Looking at the effects of socialization in a more detailed fashion the evidence indicates that Palestinian supporters were likely to have learned stories about the social condition that painted a very negative view of the world. Meanwhile, non-supporters were either not taught about the conditions, or were taught a differing perspective than supporters. However, evidence presented within this discussion of socialization speaks to factors beyond lessons learned from family members. As respondent P1a38 indicates, his/her children lived through the occupation and has subsequently learned a perspective of the social condition not linked to stories of the past. Instead it may be linked to personal experiences within the conflict situation. Furthermore, respondent NI1c40 demonstrates that perspectives of historical events can also be important and may overcome the effects of family socialization. This leads to the following comment:

> "I believe 80% of what you do is a reaction to things on the ground. The situation structures the way you think and then you seek to back it up with historical and cultural justification." (NI1a2)

Looking at proximity to the conflict zone, the goal is to determine if individual experiences with state suppression were related to the decision to support the armed struggles. The contention is that the more individuals experience the deleterious effects of the conflict situation (harassment, imprisonment, and family deaths), the more likely they are to support the armed struggle. Conversely, individuals that do not have these experiences are less likely to support the armed struggle.

To test these assertions, respondents were presented with questions about their personal experiences within the conflict situation. They were then asked if these experiences had any relation to their decision to support the armed struggle and if their experiences had any influence on their view of the social conditions. The evidence indicates that supporters did indeed have more direct—and in many cases intense—experience with the conflict situation than did non-supporters. However, many respondents state that these experiences did not directly influence their decision to support the armed struggle. As for influencing perceptions of their social conditions, many respondents state that these events did not change their perceptions so much as they reinforced what they already believed.

As for direct experiences, respondents were asked a series of questions about harassment, detention, and deaths in the family at the hand of opposition forces. Among the supporters, 64 (88.8%) state that they have been harassed by the oppositions forces (British military or the RUC in Northern Ireland and Israeli forces in Palestine). Forty-four individuals claime to have been detained, interned, or arrested for some period of time (ranging from a few days or weeks to years). And 58 (80.5%) report that members of their family or close friends had been killed or injured during the armed struggle.[3] The following comments demonstrate some of the typical experiences of individuals in the conflict situation:

> "The police knew me, the car I drove, and the members of my family. They knew everything about me. I was never arrested because they never caught me doing anything. However, if my brother went to visit the South he would be stopped at the border and asked questions about my activities. When I sold my

---

[3]   The only experience that demonstrates any relation to level of support is detention, interment, or arrest. All other factors have little relation to an individuals level of support.

car the police stopped the man driving it to check it out, then they added the information to my file." (NI1a6)

"When I was arrested I had been caught with a bomb in the boot. So they put me in jail. My cell mate though had been arrested for an unknown murder, at an unknown location, at an unknown time." (NI1a9)

"It was Easter Sunday and we were being given a lift to the graveyard when the army stopped us. They found IRA uniforms in the boot and arrested us. They put us in Castlereigh for three days because of the uniforms. They assumed the uniforms belonged to us." (NI110)

"To give you a feel of it, the Orange Order say when a Catholic dies that it was only a Feinian. They were only Feinians, like 'there only Jews, or their only Niggers'." (NI1c26)

"My family got a visit from the RUC telling them that their "file" had gone missing. This was a subtle code to tell them that they had handed information over to the Loyalist death squads and that they had been placed on a hit list." (NI1c30)

"My grandfather was once beaten because there had been activity near our village and the Israelis had imposed a curfew. We were coming back from the Mosque when he was caught. The Israelis started beating him. I thought: 'how could they do this to an old man?' It was the first moment that I saw the Israelis with their ugly faces. At the time I had no idea what was going on, but I knew I would do anything for revenge. I started to listen to the radio and follow the Fedayeen movement. It made me want to join." (P1a24)

"You are not arrested because of anything in particular, but because they have information on you. They know you intend to do something. If anything happens they are quick to round up the people they suspect without any evidence of guilt. You are harassed because you are Arab. You may go to prison for ten or twenty years for no reason." (P1a5)

For non-supporters, we find the degree to which the social conditions of the conflict situation were felt varies substantially from that of supporters. Only 6 out of 11 non-supporters report being harassed during the armed struggle, only 2 report being detained for any period of time (over a few hours), and only 2 report that family members or friends had been killed by opposition forces. Interestingly, two non-supporters did

claim that nationalist groups had killed family members during the struggle. Examples of perceived harassment and its influence on non-supporters include:

> "Once I remember that the soldiers pulled me from a car and put many of us in front of them so that the rocks being thrown by children would not hit them. They thought it would stop the children from throwing the rocks. During times like this you want to change your mind and you want to get a gun. But after some time I calmed down and realized that my reaction was normal." (P028)

> "It depends on what you mean by harassment. I have had soldiers with their sights trained on me. I suppose that's intimidation. But they do that to everybody. So I don't consider it intimidation because they do that to everybody. When it happens though you begin to think about the armed struggle, but you dismiss it after a while." (NI030)

Supporters were then asked to explain if these individual level experiences have any relation to their decision to support the armed struggle. Of the 72 supporters interviewed 37 state that these events played a role in their decision to support the armed struggle, while 35 state that the experiences with suppression had no relation to their decision. This presents an odd and inconclusive finding. Despite some of the horrific stories, respondents claim that these events were not the primary factor influencing their decisions. Why is this the case? There are two possible answers. First, many of the personal experiences—such as arrests and harassment—were likely to follow a decision that had already been made. Hence personal experiences are a result of the decision, not a motivator for the decision. Second, these experiences were not likely to contradict the individual's notion of the social condition they learned from their families. Hence, the personal experiences with suppression are likely to reinforce an individual's perception of the way things are to begin with. This second explanation is verified by a follow-up question asking respondents if their experiences changed their perception of the social

condition. The majority of respondents (65.3%) state that their experiences did not their change perceptions of the social condition. Meanwhile, 34.7% respondents state that their experiences influenced their perception of the social condition. If we delve more deeply into the answers given by respondents, we observe similar content among the comments of both groups:

> "No, I would say I was stronger for what they had done. I felt anger, a lot of anger for what they did." (NI1a31)

> "Yes, I grew up to not respect the government. They came in and abused us, threw us in prison. They burned homes to the ground. That is when I started to look at the armed struggle as a tactic to use here." (NI1b36)

> "Yes, it made me more resolved in my beliefs. I think the feeling of discrimination was more intense and made me more resolute." (NI1c42)

> "No, It is part of our life. If you look at the history of this conflict you see it all the time. It creates a big sense of loss about the life that we are forced to live. Why does this happen, why does this not end?" (P1a9)

> "No, It reminded me so much that the occupation was bad." (P1a23)

These comments all speak to the way individual experiences influence the perceptions of supporters. As we can see, explanations for how these experiences influence one person's perception are similar to explanations for how these experiences did not influence an individual's perception. In other words, personal experiences are more likely to reinforce an individual's perception of the social conditions.

In short, it appears that individual level experiences had limited influence upon individual perceptions of the social condition and upon individual decisions to support armed struggle. This is rather apparent in the empirical results, which show that the

majority of supporters claim to have experienced incidents of suppression. Furthermore, P1a24 clearly demonstrates that the experience of seeing his/her grandfather being beaten directly influenced his/her decision to support the armed struggle. However, the influence is limited. Many supporters indicate that individual experiences had little relation to their decision to support the armed struggle, and had little influence over their perception of the social condition. Why is this case? First, experience with suppression was likely to follow the decision to support armed struggle, not proceed it. Second, the experiences individuals have with suppression are not likely to contradict preconceived notions of the social condition. This finding does not mean we should discount the influence of one's "proximity to the conflict zone" altogether. Clearly some non-supporters indicate that when they did have experiences with suppression, their immediate response was to consider the merits of the armed struggle. While NI030 and P028 admit that they quickly dismissed these thoughts, their comments nonetheless indicate that when personal experience contradicts preconceived notions of the social condition, the "gut response" is towards violence.

Turning to the impact of major events, the goal is to determine the degree to which major historical events have shaped individual perceptions of the conflict situation and the degree to which these events may motivate individuals to support armed struggle. Is there any reason to believe that major historical events have motivated individuals to support the armed struggles? Looking at the historical record, the evidence demonstrates that in the wake of major events (e.g. the massacres in Derry (1972), or Sabra and Shatila (1982)) rebel groups experienced major bumps in the number of people trying to join (See for example Coogan 1994, and Cobban 1984). Bad events were not the only

motivating forces. In Palestine the ranks of Fateh and other groups swelled by nearly 5,000 after the proclaimed victory over Israeli forces at Al-Karameh (1968) (Cobban 1984). Similarly, the IRA was forced to turn people away during the Hunger Strikes of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coogan 1994). Given this evidence, I contend that major historical events affect individual decisions to support armed struggle. Tragic events intensify individual perceptions of injustice and loss, while positive events influence the belief that risky options, such as rebellion, may succeed.

To test this claim, I presented respondents with a series of questions about major events in the history of the conflict and asked them to explain what the event means to them. These questions were followed up with a question about other events that the respondent remembers from the history of the conflict. Then respondents were asked if these events had any relation to their decision to support the armed struggle. The evidence is clear that many supporters share a common view of historical injustices and historical victories. Meanwhile, non-supporters often downplay the perception of past victories, and in some cases cheapen the value of past travesties. The evidence on the relationship between perceptions of past events and support is rather ambiguous, as was the data regarding individual experiences and support. Hence, as with individual experiences we can claim that historical events reinforce perceptions of loss, and only offer minimal motivation to get involved.

In Northern Ireland, respondents were not presented with formal questions about historical events. However, many mentioned events during the interviews, which indicates that events some how played a role in their perception of the social condition and decision to support. The most common events mentioned were: Bloody Sunday

226

(1972), the Falls Road riots (1969-1972), and the Hunger Strikes (Late 1970s to early 1980s). However, other events were also included:

> "In 1964 you have the Divis Street riots because [Ian] Paisley tried to stop a Catholic from displaying a tri-color [Irish Flag] in a window on the Falls road. !972 was the real emergence of the armed struggle. There was an attitude that we should give the British a chance when they came in. But Internment (1970) and Bloody Sunday (1972) changed all that and gave life to the Republican Movement." (NI1a2)

> "I lived on the Lower Falls Road in 1969, it was the wee boy on my block that was shot dead in his bed by the British." (NI1a7)[4]

> "On August 14, 1969 I walked down the Falls Road at four in the morning and sat and cried when I saw all the beautiful homes burnt. I was at work when the marchers went by. The next thing we heard, the RUC had started shooting at them. They murdered the marchers." (NI1c9)

> "I did get a shock when I walked down on the Falls Road in August 1969 and heard the children screaming and seeing the houses being burned out. I remember it like it was yesterday. I knew things would never change unless we took action. At the time the Republican Movement had died, and we looked for other ways. It became very much a war at that point." (NI1a25)

> "I remember during the Hunger Strikes Gerry Adams led the Negotiations. When everyone said there was no way the British would give up the prisoner status or allow prisoner of war status for the IRA prisoners. He stuck to his five points and won. It was a total victory." (NI1c26)

> "I saw the hunger strikes and how the SDLP reacted and I knew I could not support them. The hunger strikes really changed my mind when I was young and I joined Sinn Fein." (NI1c40)

These comments speak to a variety of events that occurred during "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland. All supporters mentioning these events often spoke of how they influenced their perceptions or decision to support the armed struggle. What about major events for non-supporters? In general, most non-supporters would not mention these

---

[4]   See Colm Keena (1990) for a recounting of this event.

events. On the rare occasion that one did mention an event, the respondent would debase the meaning of the event:

> "At Bloody Sunday thirteen people were murdered. The British claim that an IRA man was in the crowd and shot the first bullet. There is no evidence of this, but it is the kind of thing the IRA does to get support from the people. It wouldn't surprise me if this is what happened." (NI01)

Moving on to Palestine, respondents were presented with a set of questions about major historical events and other minor events they recall, and asked to explain what the events meant to them. The events included Dayr Yasin, the 1967 War, Al-Karameh, Sabra and Shatila, and the Intifada. Again, supporters demonstrate a consistent set of perceptions about these events as either horrific or black events (Dayr Yasin, 1967 War, and Sabra and Shatila) or as great victories or positive events (Al-Karameh, and the Intifada).

> "Dayr Yasin is the origin of the conflict. It gives you the beginning of everything. It is a symbol of grief in our history." (P1a5)

> "The Intifada is a national movement that convinces you that everything is working. It was the main event that changed Israeli policy. It made them pursue apolitical solution because they could not stop the Intifada. When Israeli soldiers were walking the streets they had to watch everywhere, they never knew where an attack would come from, everyone was the enemy." (P1a5)

> "Al-Karameh means a small light in the darkness after the 1967 war. We were defeated and suddenly this happens. This gives us hope that they can be conquered." (P1c10)

> "The tunnel under the Al-Oksa Mosque showed that the Israelis did not care. There is no way to compare this atrocity." (P1a15)

> "Al-Karameh is the most beautiful image for Palestinians. At the time a group of people armed with small weapons could resist the Israeli army. I remember the Fedayeen were weak. It was a proud image at that time." (P1a24)

"The first thing was my friend. We were throwing stones together and the next thing he has a bullet in his head. He died." (P1a26)

"In Jabalya 1994 six people from Fateh were shot after a meeting to discuss the peace process. There was no mercy in this killing and there was no apology from Israel. This is the image of occupation we have in our minds." (P1a32)

"In a village in Israel the soldiers came in and placed everyone under curfew. This was in 1976. The farmers were in the field when the curfew was imposed. As soon as they heard about it they left the fields to go home. On the way home the soldiers killed them. Another incident was the Hebron Mosque in 1994. People were praying on Friday and a man went in and shot the people while they prayed." (P1b33)

"The Intifada is another point of hope in our history. It was the pinnacle of our efforts in the past. The Intifada let the world know that we would not accept this condition." (P1a38)

"I remember that Sabra and Shatila was when women were being raped and people being killed. The one image I remember the most was when they put animals in the graves with people. We saw a picture with a donkey in the grave with the people that had been killed. It motivated many people to get involved, and it is still one of the most important images of our history." (P1a24)

These comments demonstrate a consistent point of view that supporters perceive these events as either horrific occurrences that confirmed their perceptions of the occupation or as great events that demonstrated community strength and hope. Was there any great difference between the perceptions of supporters and non-supporters? The evidence is mixed. For the events that represent loss or defeat, most non-supporters shared the same view as supporters:

"Dayr Yasin is where an entire village was murdered and their bodies were thrown into wells. I guess that specific event causes the most fear among refugees." (P016)

229

However, non-supporter viewpoints change when the incident refers to a perceived victory for the armed struggle: "Al-Karameh is seen as a victory for Arafat and the Fedayeen movement. However, in reality it was a defeat" (P016). This comment demonstrates the tendency to downplay incidents that are perceived as positive to supporters of the armed struggle. Non-supporters, in general, would not give any positive indication that the armed struggle had a chance to succeed. This view was consistent among non-supporters in reference to an event like Al-Karameh, but it did not hold for the Intifada. Even non-supporters viewed the Intifada as a positive event: "The Great Awakening. The unification of Palestinian people and an eye-opener for the world. The Intifada was the zenith of all Palestinian's struggle" (P016). Why did non-supporters take this view towards the Intifada? The Intifada began as a non-violent mass movement against Israeli occupation. It was not until the later phases that commando groups tried to take control of the Intifada and ratchet the level of military activity to higher levels. Thus, most non-supporters perceive the Intifada as a positive event because it demonstrate that change could be initiated without the use of violence.

Did individual perceptions of historical events have any relation to respondents' views of the social condition? Among supporters, 26 out of 39 state that the events mentioned did have some relation to their decision to support. Others indicate that major events did not, but that other events (Hebron, Al-Oksa, etc...) did. The most commonly mentioned event that influenced individual decisions was the Intifada. Since the Intifada had been broad-based, many respondents recall feeling proud of the event or recall specific atrocities related to Israeli suppression of the Intifada. In either event, the Intifada appears to motivate the majority of respondents in Palestine.

Did these major events have any impact on individual perceptions of the social condition? Here the evidence is less clear. The majority of supporters (63.9%) mention that these events influence their perceptions of the social condition. However, the comments given with the question are similar to those given with individual level experiences. That is to say, these events are less likely to have changed one's view of the social condition and more likely to reinforce the perception individuals already possessed. Thus, we can conclude that major and minor historical events demonstrate influence over individual perceptions.

The goal in this section was to offer an explanation for why individuals within the same nationalist communities differed in their perceptions on the value of perceived losses, which would then explain why some engaged in risk seeking behavior while others did not. To this end, I identified three factors that may relate to individual perceptions of the social condition—socialization, individual level experiences, and the impact of historical events.

Of these individual level factors, socialization appears to be the most important in determining support or non-support. In the broad picture, the Northern Ireland case demonstrates that supporters generally came from families that support the armed struggle while non-supporters did not. The Palestine case provides more detailed information on the types of information respondents received about the social conditions. Here I discover that supporters received information that generally painted the social conditions in very negative terms, thus likely transferring perceptions of loss to their children. Meanwhile, non-supporters indicate that their families would either not discuss

the social condition or would highlight different aspects of the social condition (often downplaying the negative in favor of a positive view).

The other two factors (experiences and historical events) appear less important in relation to individual level perceptions, although they did appear important to individual motivations to support. In general, experiences and historical events were not likely to change individual perceptions of the social condition for supporters. Instead, the individual experience and the historical events were likely to be consistent with preconceived notions of the social condition that had been developed through family socialization. Thus, experience and events did not contradict what individuals already believed. In terms of motivation, the individual experiences and historical events may have been as important as family socialization in that these factors added to notions of perceived loss. Thus, we find that when socialization is reinforced with experience and social history, the likelihood that individuals will support armed struggle increases. Keep in mind, that non-supporters often had similar (not equal) experiences and observed many of the same historical events yet did not support. Why is this the case? Socialization was not consistent with that of supporters. This indicates that individual experiences and historical events are not sufficient for motivating most individuals to support armed struggle. As was demonstrated above, non-supporters that experienced suppression acknowledge their tendency to consider armed struggle, but readily dismissed it. Major events were known, but often non-supporters would provide alternative explanations to downplay the event, or as many in Northern Ireland indicate, they did not place value on the event as demonstrated by their lack of discussion about the event. Meanwhile, supporters were generally quick to bring the historical events up in the discussion.

In short, socialization appears to matter most. When perceptions of loss are transferred from one generation to the next and bolstered by individual experiences and historical events we see support increasing. When socialization moves away from support, personal experiences and historical events lose their influence on individuals as demonstrated by non-supporters.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to provide a critical examination of the two competing models of mobilization. To that end, I evaluated the decision processes of non-supporters. For the collective action model, the prediction was that non-supporters represent a group of free-riders forgoing individual level costs while hoping to reap the public good offered by rebel groups. The evidence from the case studies failed to confirm this. Instead, non-supporters oppose the use of armed struggle and saw the tactic as risky to group goals, not individual safety. While this finding indicates the potential for a rational choice explanation at the group level, it does not provide evidence to support the collective action model. Given that individuals did not support the armed struggle, we cannot assume they considered the value of benefits offered by the group. Furthermore, the data indicate that negative sanctions did not factor into individual level decisions. Finally, supporters and non-supporters did not appear to place any weight on the notion of individual efficacy. Thus, the data do not support a collective action explanation in the cases presented in this study.

Turning to the modified relative deprivation model, the predictions were that non-supporters engage in risk averse behavior, which indicates they may be in a gains frame, while supporters are in a losses frame. Again the evidence failed to support this conclusion, indicating that individuals from both groups within the nationalist community were in a losses frame. This finding is consistent with assumptions made in Chapter 4, stating that social embeddedness of the conflict situation is likely to result in a consistent set of perceptions about the social condition for members of the solidary (national) group. However, this finding appears to contradict the primary predictions of prospect theory.

This contradiction in the evidence was explained away by expanding the logic of prospect theory to demonstrate that two individuals within a losses frame can vary in their willingness to accept risk based on their perception of the value of losses. As the value of perceived losses increases, the probability that individuals will accept risk also increases. The evidence from the two cases confirmed this logical explanation. It was discovered that supporters and non-supporters held a consistent set of goals relating to equality, communal peace, and governance. This indicates a probability that the value of losses would be similar. The difference between the two groups was related to territorial claims. This goal was not simply an issue added to the mix of other issues, but was directly tied to all other issues. This means that supporters could not accept any resolution of the conflict unless it entailed territorial concessions. The data upheld this conclusion in that the peace processes offered some movement on the issues of equality, peace and self-governance, while sacrificing many (if not all) territorial concessions. This movement within the peace process translated into a frame change for non-

supporters (pitching them into a gains frame), but failed to translate into a frame change for supporters—hence a continuation of perceived losses.

The final part of this chapter was designed to offer an explanation for why there was a difference in perceived losses between the two groups. To that end, I discussed the roles of family socialization, proximity to the conflict zone, and the impact of historical events. The data gathered indicate that family socialization was the primary factor relating to support/non-support. In the broad picture, evidence from Northern Ireland confirms that supporters came from families with a history of support, while non-supporters did not. Going into more detail, evidence from Palestine demonstrates that the perceptions of the social conditions varied by family background. That is to say, supporters generally indicate learning negative interpretations of the social conditions, while non-supporters learn more positive views, or were not taught about the social conditions at all. As for individual experiences and historical events, we observe that experiences and interpretations of historical events for supporters were more likely to be consistent with preconceived notions of the social condition. Consistency between socialization, experience, and perceptions of historical events translates into a higher likelihood of support. However, when socialization was inconsistent with experience, non-supporters demonstrated a willingness to discount their experiences and to offer alternative explanations for historical events.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Summary

The goal of this study was to address the question, why individuals will support a group when the risks are high, and the payoff is uncertain. While this question speaks to a wide variety of political behaviors, this study focuses on nationalist rebellion. I argue that by understanding the factors that determine support for nationalist rebellion, we can begin to understand issues related to group survivability in the face of severe repression by a state. This in turn allows us to better understand the relative threat that states face from internal challenges related to nationalist movements.

There are many plausible explanations for support mobilization. This study outlines three potential explanations, and ultimately offered empirical tests of two of them. The first explanation discussed is the Relative Deprivation Model (Gurr 1970). This explanation is based on the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, which argues that when goal oriented individuals are prevented from achieving their goals they will act aggressively to remove the barriers to goal achievement. This model holds that the gap between individual expectations about system performance (value expectation) and reality (value capability) can result in feelings of frustration among individuals leading to an increased potential for violent activity. Once a group or entrepreneur organizes individuals, the potential for political violence can turn into manifest political violence,

hence the initiation of rebellion. This explanation proved weak both logically and empirically. First, the model failed to account for non-violent behavior when conditions indicate relative deprivation. Second it could not account for violent action when conditions did not indicate relative deprivation. In the end, the RD model failed to account for linkages between individual level factors related to mobilization (frustration-aggression) and group action. To shore-up this weakness Gurr (1970) adds in other variables related to cultural symbols and social tolerances for violence, which essentially remove the explanation for group rebellion from the core assumptions on individual behavior. In short, the original relative deprivation model was built upon a weak foundation.

The second explanation comes from the collective action model (Lichbach 1995). This model assumes individuals are rational actors who calculate the costs and benefits associated with various alternatives. The alternative chosen by the individual will be the one that maximizes individual benefits while minimizing individual costs. The model holds that a public good generally has a low benefit to most individuals because it is non-exclusive and its value is inelastic to the number of people trying to achieve that good. Given this, most individuals will free ride in order to avoid the costs associated with participation. To overcome this "free rider" problem, a group must offer some form of selective incentive that is exclusive to those that participate.

In this study I apply this model to rebellious collective action by assuming that the goal of a rebel group is a public good, with a low perceived value when compared to the costs of participation. To overcome the free rider problem, the group must offer some benefit(s) to individuals. These benefits may include material rewards (tangible

237

benefits), purposive benefits (psychic gratification rewards), and/or negative sanctions (the attempt to assign costs to non-participation). In short, this explanation treats the rebel organization as an entity abstracted from its social environment. The mobilization goal of the organization is to manipulate the decisions of individuals within society by creating an incentive structure that will overcome the high costs of participation. In other words, the group must encourage individuals to overlook the costs of support that are imposed by social conditions.

The only potential weaknesses with this explanation are empirical. First, there is little evidence to suggest that political groups have the resources needed to offer benefits to individuals (Hector 1987). This may indicate that benefits cannot enter into an individual's decision calculus because they are not readily available. Secondly, is it possible to create an incentive structure that will provide benefits with high enough value to outweigh the incredibly high costs of supporting rebellion (death or imprisonment)?

The third explanation came from a modified relative deprivation theory. Here we develop a model of the individual premised on a prospect theory assumption of individual decision-making (First applied to rebellion by Berejikian 1992). The prediction of prospect theory is that an individual's propensity to accept risk is influenced by his/her perception of the conditions surrounding the decision alternatives. If the individual perceives the alternatives through a gains frame, he/she is less likely to accept risk. However, if the individual perceives the alternatives through a losses frame, he/she is more likely to accept risk. The frame through which decision alternatives are viewed is based on an individually derived reference point (some condition deemed normal or desirable) that is compared with the status quo. If the status quo conditions are not

congruent with the reference point it is destabilizing and forces movement away from the status quo. Empirical evidence from group experiments has found that framing biases grow stronger within group settings, meaning that the predictions hold firm from the individual level to the group level.

This model is used to explain rebellious action by plugging it into the relative deprivation framework in place of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The predictions of the original and modified relative deprivation models are consistent. Only now, the entire model is strengthened because individual level and group level behavior is consistent meaning that we can remove many of the extraneous variables added to the original model. That is to say, we can determine the likelihood of rebellion based on the existence of perceived losses among individuals within a solidary group. So long as group ideology is consistent with the perceived frame of individuals in society, the potential for rebellion remains high. If the group's ideology and the frame of individuals in society are inconsistent, the potential for sustained rebellion remains low.

What is likely to influence the perception of losses among individuals? By referring to the social embeddedness of the conflict situation, we speak to the issues of the social condition of the target community and social condition within the conflict situation. Conditions of the target community refer to whether or not the nationalist community is treated as a marginalized "second class" minority within its state. Conditions of the conflict situation refer to the degree of suppression the nationalist community faces as a result of the rebel campaign. These two factors create stronger linkages between individuals in the community, which often leads to the development of similar perceptions of the social condition.

Does this mean that all individuals will necessarily perceive losses or gains equally? In terms of the broad national group, perceptions of the social condition are likely to be consistent in terms of losses or gains. At the individual level people are likely to vary in terms of the exact value of perceived losses or gains. This means that the propensity to accept risk will vary among members of the national group despite the overall view of losses. This was explained by using an extension of the prospect theory logic. I argued that a willingness to accept greater risk is tied to an individual's perception on the value of losses or gains. As the value of perceived losses increases, so does the willingness to accept greater risk.

This argument was tied back into the modified RD model by explaining that variation in perceived losses or gains is linked to family socialization, individual experiences, and interpretation of historical events. Individuals that accept greater risks are likely to come from families that support rebellion. When this family background is combined with personal experiences with suppression, and a tendency to value historical events individuals are more likely to support rebellion. Whereas individuals that avoid risks are likely to come from families that do not support rebellion. This background of non-support is often combined with a lack of experience with suppression, and a tendency among individuals to devalue historical events.

In short, the modified relative deprivation model reintroduces the social context as a motivational force that influences individual decision making. Thus, it places the rebel group back into the social context as a force that creates bad conditions for the target community, and also benefits from those conditions. Thus, the group and social condition operate in a reifying structure that will motivate many (but not all) individuals

240

within a target community to accept the greater risks associated with supporting rebellion.

The potential weaknesses of this explanation are similar to those of the collective action model. That is to say we lack empirical confirmation of the explanation. It may be that individuals do not perceive conditions as a loss. Even if individuals do perceive conditions through a losses frame, it may be that they do not overweight the probability of success for the risky option—a prediction of prospect theory. Furthermore, we may find that non-supporters and supporters alike are consistent in the perceptions regarding the value of losses, meaning that decisions to accept risk are tied to more than framing. Simply stated, prospect theory has been tested numerous times in experimental settings. However, we have not seen the model tested outside of the controlled experimental environment.

The empirical portion of this study is designed to gather evidence from individuals in two long-term conflict situations, and ascertain their decision processes in terms of the collective action and modified RD models. The research design follows the "most different systems" approach, which allows the researcher to conduct cross-regional research at the individual level. In other words, we do not assume that cultural variation is an important explanatory variable. The samples were chosen from two different countries in two drastically different regions of the world. These samples were then combined, and respondents were treated as part of a single population—suppressed minorities in a rebel situation. Due to security constraints, any sample selected in these two cases could not conform to typical standards of randomness. Instead, I was forced to rely on convenience samples by using respondents that had been referred by others, and

241

"snowballing" to include more people. Admittedly, this creates problems in terms of generalizability. However, it does not preclude theoretical generalizations. The respondents were presented with a series of questions designed to ascertain if they decided to support rebellion based on a cost-benefit analysis, or if framing biases influenced their decision processes.

The results of the empirical testing provide rather unambiguous results. First, in Chapter 4 I demonstrate how we could not rely on contextual data to accurately test these explanations. The reason is, the contextual histories provide confirming evidence for both explanations. Since we can confirm both based on contextual data, we cannot properly determine the true validity of either unless we go to the individual level of analysis.

Turning to Chapter 5, I demonstrate that when moving to the individual level of analysis the data failed to confirm the collective action explanation and provided confirming evidence for the modified relative deprivation explanation. In more specific terms, individuals from both Palestine and Northern Ireland indicate that they understood the value of costs associated with their decision to support the armed struggle. This cost consideration was consistent in terms of opportunity costs and risks to personal safety. The evidence also confirms that individuals discounted the value of the costs—a finding that was consistent with the collective action model. What was not consistent with the model is the finding that individuals did not discount costs in terms of benefits received.

The material rewards are not valued high enough to outweigh the threats to personal safety, nor do they cover the opportunity costs individuals face by deciding to support the national movements. Even more condemning was the fact that the majority

of respondents (activists, active supporter, and passive supporters) did not receive any of the benefits offered, thus indicating that they could not have discounted costs via material benefits. Turning to purposive benefits, respondents did indeed place a high value on the emotional benefits of duty, respect, and obligation. However, when asked if these benefits influenced their decision to support the national movements, the vast majority stated they did not. This led to a reassessment of the role of purposive benefits wherein I argue that purposive benefits are less likely to constitute a true benefit (in terms of cost-benefit analysis). Instead, purposive benefits operate more as an ad hoc justification used to blunt the sharp edge of advocating behavior seen by many as morally repugnant. Turning to the negative sanction as an incentive, many respondents indicate that rebel groups did not present any form of threat to them in the community. Instead, respondents argue that the groups offered a sense of security. As for social pressure, some respondents indicate that social persuasion was used to convince non-supporters to switch sides. However, they do not acknowledge the existence of the "arm-twisting" coercion we often assume when speaking of negative sanctions. In sum, the discounting of costs did not occur via selective incentives.

Turning to the modified relative deprivation model, the data gathered provided confirmation that individual level framing biases were in operation and appeared to influence individual decisions to support risky behavior. That is to say, respondents indicate a reference point that was not congruent with status quo conditions—a losses frame. Respondents supported rebellion. Respondents also suggest that they did overweight the likelihood that rebellion would succeed. Furthermore, individuals openly stated that the current peace processes have not brought about the desired changes they

243

were seeking—indicating past failure and a continuation of perceived losses. And the majority of respondents indicate that they would continue to support (and in some cases hope for the return of) rebellion in the future to achieve the goals they are seeking.

While these findings were rather explicit, we should not be quick either to dismiss collective action or accept modified relative deprivation. Instead, Chapter 6 presents a rigorous examination of both models by comparing the decision processes of non-supporters and supporters. Again the evidence in this chapter did not confirm the predictions of collective action, but it did offer confirming evidence for the modified relative deprivation explanation. The prediction from collective action theory is that non-supporters represent a class of free-riders that are attempting to avoid the costs of support while hoping to reap the benefits of group success. Respondents did not provide evidence to confirm this prediction. While they did indicate cost consideration, they did so in terms of group risks in reference to group goals. These responses indicate that cost consideration did not occur in terms of individual level risks, thus they did not constitute individual level costs. Given this, we could not assume that individuals weighed the costs versus benefits offered by the groups since they did not support the rebellious groups. Furthermore, none of the non-supporters indicate any attempt by the rebel groups or their supporters to coerce or intimidate them. Finally, most respondents indicate that notions of efficacy did not matter in their decisions to support or not support the rebel movements. Hence, the evidence does not support a collective action explanation for individual support of violent group action. However, this does not preclude the possibility of a group rationality based explanation. But this explanation was not tested in this study.

In terms of the modified relative deprivation model I unearthed several interesting findings. First, non-supporters indicate that in the past they were in a losses frame, just like supporters. While this is consistent with assumptions about the similarity in perceived frames among members of the nationalist groups, it presents a potentially troubling finding for prospect theory which would assume that non-supporters are risk averse because they perceive conditions in terms of gains not losses. This troubling conclusion was put to rest by logically demonstrating that individuals may perceive decision alternatives in a losses frame, but still avoid risks when the value of the sure loss does not exceed the value of the risky option. As the value of the sure loss increases, the probability that an individual will accept greater risk will also increase. This logical argument is bolstered by the data from respondents who indicate that the goals of supporters and non-supporters were similar on many issues (equality, peace, and governance) but supporters attached high value to the issue of territory than non-supporters. Thus, supporters perceived losses as being greater than non-supporters did. This was confirmed by the finding that the current peace processes in both cases represented a frame switch (from losses to gains) for non-supporters, but not for supporters.

Finally, I offered an attempt to explain why non-supporters and supporters vary in their perceptions regarding the value of losses. The data indicate that while supporters typically came from families that supported rebellion, non-supporters did not. Furthermore, supporters were likely to learn an interpretation of the past from their families that characterized the social conditions negatively. Meanwhile, one non-supporter indicates he/she did not learn about the social condition from their families, and

the other indicates that his/her family taught them to focus on the positive and overlook the negative. The data also indicate that supporters were more likely to experience the social condition of the conflict situation more directly than non-supporters would have. This experience did not translate into a change in views among supporters; it merely reinforced lessons learned from their families. Similarly, supporters were more likely to place higher value on the significance of historical events such as massacres or perceived victories, while non-supporters would downplay them or devalue the meaning of these events.

In sum, the data produce a relatively clear finding. The evidence fails to support a collective action explanation for why individuals lend support to nationality rebel movements. Meanwhile, the evidence confirms the predictions of prospect theory, and hence provides confirming evidence for the modified relative deprivation explanation.

Implications

The implications of this study operate on two levels. First there are the theoretical implications. Second, there are the potential policy implications. A Lakatosian evaluation of these findings would suggest that a research program could not be rejected because of disconfirming evidence. Instead, only a superior research program can replace it (Cohn 1999). Using this statement as a framework for discussing the theoretical implications of this study, I can claim to have provided an example of disconfirming evidence for the collective action model, while providing confirming evidence for an alternative explanation. Do any of the findings presented in this study mean that one

research program should be rejected and the other accepted? The evidence implies that the rational choice research program, in particular the collective action model, does not hold up empirically. However, this finding is limited. The type of political behavior that was examined is extreme in nature. That is to say, political violence includes high individual level costs, with high levels of uncertainty regarding potential success. Thus, the high cost alternative means that there is a level of severity involved with this type of behavior that is not observed in most other political behavior. That is to say, politically violent behavior may be a class of political behavior for which the boundaries of an individual level rational choice explanation fall apart. Hence, other research programs (i.e. the modified relative deprivation model) may be more suited to explaining this type of political behavior.

Can we use the evidence to make a certain claim that collective action does not hold, or that the modified relative deprivation model does? If we consider certain limitations with this study then we could not make such a claim. This study focuses on one form of rebellion. Furthermore, this study focuses on only two case of this form of conflict—Northern Ireland and Palestine. Finally, because of limitations in the way this study was performed (non-random sampling) we understand that we cannot provide evidence that can be generalized to a larger population in either case much less to a larger population of individuals involved with nationalist conflict. The two former limitations are easily remedied through follow-up research. The latter limitation is one that is unlikely to be resolved in the near future given the very real security concerns surrounding the safety of those being interviewed and those doing the interviewing. However, the latter limitation (non-random sampling) should not be viewed as a

247

limitation to the conclusions of this study. This study did not attempt to generalize to a larger population. Instead, it generalizes to the theoretical claims made by each explanation. In light of this, I conclude that the evidence provides falsifying evidence of the collective action research program as it applies to rebellious action and provides rather solid confirming evidence for the modified relative deprivation explanation. However, to make a certain claim of these findings will require follow-up research.

Do these findings imply that rational choice explanations (as a whole) are invalid, or that prospect theory explanations (as a whole) are valid in reference to studies of nationalist conflict? This study cannot answer this question. There was evidence in Chapter 6 to indicate that a group rationality perspective may plausibly explain why violence is used by one group and not another. Similarly, experimental data involving prospect theory has demonstrated that framing biases remain strong within group settings. Since these explanations were not tested here I cannot speak to the validity of either. A final caveat to consider is that the test on prospect theory is a prototype. This model has never been formally tested outside the experimental environment. As such, the tools used to capture the nuances of framing biases and probability assessments for risky options are crude at best. This is an obvious limitation that must be considered. Prospect theory provides predictions of human behavior that are easily captured in the experimental environment, but are very difficult to capture in the real world. Thus, despite the appearance of solid confirming evidence, we should keep in mind that this is only a first attempt at capturing the predictions of a rather complex model of decision-making. Follow-up studies are needed to refine questions and to triangulate theoretical concepts more accurately.

Turning to the potential policy implications I would speak primarily to the utility of suppressive tactics to undermine rebel groups. The general logic underlying a suppressive strategy is that of rational choice—increase the costs of support to such a level that no benefit could outweigh the costs. Logically, this strategy is very sound. Moreover, it is somewhat validated empirically. For example, in Mark Lichback and Ted R. Gurr's (1981) study of *"The Conflict Process"* the authors discover that as coerciveness of a regime increases from low to medium levels, this tends to discourage rebels from taking future action (24). This finding, however, is empirically limited. First, Lichbach and Gurr state that the linkage between coercion and rebel action only holds to medium level intensity. As the intensity increases from medium to higher levels, rebellious action continues over time (Ibid.). On logical grounds, this finding appears to contradict the core rational assumption by indicating that as costs continue to increase the desired effect disappears and rebel groups generally move in the opposite direction.

Can we explain this odd empirical finding by using a prospect theory model of individual decision-making? Experimental studies involving prospect theory have been constructed to add extra incentives to individuals to remove the preference reversal effect or framing biases. The evidence from these studies indicate that even with the added incentives framing biases remained robust, albeit the rate was lower (Levy 1997: 94-95). What does this tell us? If individuals are already in a losses frame, the addition of extra incentives to alter that frame may not have the desired effect. Instead of pushing people into a position of viewing the status quo in terms of gains, the increased suppression is likely to push individuals into perceiving greater losses, or more resolute in their decision to support rebellion. Evidence from Northern Ireland and Palestine provides loose

confirmation of this. Individuals state that their experiences with suppression did not change their perception of social conditions, but did make them feel more certain that they had made the right decision by supporting rebellion.

What about low to mid-level coercion and the subsequent reduction in rebel action? We can speculate that in some rebel situations we may observe the endowment effect. The endowment effect (described in Chapter 1) occurs when individuals overvalue what they already posses and act to avoid the pain of letting it go. For this effect to occur, we must assume that individuals are in a gains frame rather than a losses frame. This would imply the rebellious potential in society is very low—not much support for rebel action. Increased coercion by the state related to rebel activity, is likely to produce the endowment effect among individuals. This leads people to acquiesce to the state and aid efforts to thwart terrorism in order to restore the previous status quo. It is likely, though untested, that the endowment effect would suffice as an explanation for why rebel activity subsides in the face of low to mid-level suppression. While this argument is speculative it is testable. Furthermore it does not contradict the conclusions of Lichbach and Gurr (1981) who stated that their findings were inferred from aggregate data and require further testing with longitudinal data from specific countries (24). Some potential case studies could include the FLQ in Canada, the RAF in Germany, and the ETA in Spain.

In short, using prospect theory we can logically explain that suppressive counterinsurgency strategies have limited utility depending on the case in which it is employed. When substantial segments of society perceive social conditions in terms of losses, suppressive strategies are likely to have the opposite effect—spurring increased

250

and sustained violence. When substantial segments of society perceive conditions in terms of gains, suppressive strategies are likely to have the desired effect of deterring future rebellious action because society will work to avoid the pain of the losses caused by rebel action in the first place. This explanation, however, is speculative, and requires empirical testing.

Future Directions

It would be nice to conclude that there is no future research needed. However, this study is a social scientific analysis of human behavior, and as we know, social science is woefully unrefined and relatively lacking in certainty. Thus, we must speak of future directions and develop a legacy for this study.

Perhaps the most obvious direction for future research is replication of this study in similar contexts. This avenue of research offers the best opportunity for verifying or falsifying the findings presented here. There is no dearth of nationalist conflicts throughout the world. Perhaps the most intriguing case is Chechnya's separatist rebellion. While this case is interesting in many ways, the conflict zone is still very hot and may not be the optimal case at this point. One case that appears to be approaching resolution—thus providing an optimal case for field research—is the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey. The normalization of relations between the Kurdish community and the Turkish government during the 1990s may have placed a comfort zone in the area where field research could be conducted with relative security to both the researcher and participants in the study.

Similarly, critical cases should be considered. A critical case would be one wherein the nationalist rebellion failed to mobilize a broad base of support to sustain long term, high intensity conflict. Two possible examples of this would be the Quebecois rebellion during the 1970s, and the Basque rebellion from 1970s to the present. The advantage to these cases is that they offer the researcher the opportunity to assess the effect of framing biases in a situation where the whole community did not share an expansive perception of losses. This may present a better opportunity to determine what factors matter most in the development of a losses frame among individuals, and the ability of a group to manipulate individual level framing when conditions are not necessarily consistent with the frame presented by the rebel group.

Nationalist conflicts represent only one form of rebellion in the world. Another class of rebellion that needs addressing is ideological rebellions observed in Latin America and Europe. The advantage of studying ideological rebellion is that we cannot assume the existence of a solidary target group for the rebel organization. This means that the rebel group must construct a target group, which is inherently more difficult when natural bonds such as national identity are absent. Optimal cases to consider are Sendero Luminoso in Peru (1980-1993), and the various right and left wing rebel movements in Colombia. A critical case to consider is the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany. This group was able to sustain a military campaign for nearly twenty years, but the movement never established a broad base of support and never reached the level of high intensity conflict.

Another potential avenue of research is along the lines of that suggested in the previous section—the utility of suppression to thwart terrorism. Following the advice of

Lichbach and Gurr we should endeavor to look at the use of suppressive tactics on a case-by-case basis. This may allow the researcher to construct an appropriate test of a prospect theory explanation to determine when suppression will be useful and when it will fail. For example, we may be able to use the prospect theory model to explain why suppressive tactics have failed in Northern Ireland, Palestine, and Chechnya, while also determining why suppression succeeded in Canada, Germany and Peru.

In short, this study has shed some light in the world of conflict studies. However, that light is rather dim and narrowly focused. Much more work is needed before we can illuminate the entire universe of conflict studies.

References

References

Abu-Amr, Ziad. (1994). *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

_____. (1993). "Hamas: Historical and Political Background." In *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 22(4): 5-19.

Arthur, Paul. (1990). Republican Violence in Northern Ireland: The Rationale. In John Darby, Nicholas Dodge, and A.C. Hepburn eds. *Political Violence: Ireland in a Comparative Perspective*. Belfast: Appletree Press.

Berejikian, Jeffrey. (1997). "The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice." *American Political Science Review*. 91(4): 789-806.

_____. (1992). "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem." *American Political Science Review*. 86(3): 647-657.

Bremer, L. Paul. (1993). "The West's Counterterrorism Strategy." In Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crenlinsten eds. *Western Responses to Terrorism*. London: Cass Publishers.

Clarke, Aidan. (1995). "The Colonisation of Ulster and the Rebellion of 1641." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

Cobban, Helena. (1984). *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohn, Jonathan. (1999). "Irrational Exuberance: When did Political Science Forget about Politics." *New Republic*.

Collins, Randall. (1992). *Sociological Insight: An Introduction to Non-Obvious Sociology, 2nd ed.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Coogan, Tim Pat. (1996). *The Troubles: Northern Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers

_____. (1994). *The IRA: A History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

Crenshaw, Martha. (1990). "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a product of Strategic Choice." In Walter Reich ed. *The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crighton, Elizabeth and Marths Abele MacIver. (1991). "The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Lebanon and Northern Ireland." *Comparative Politics*. 23(2):127-142.

Davies, James C. (1962). "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review*. 27(1): 5-19.

De Rosa, Peter. (1990). *Rebels: The Irish Rising of 1916*. New York: Fawcett Columbine.

Edelstein, J. Davies and Malcolm Warner. (1975). *Comparative Union Democracy: Organisation and Opposition in British and American Unions*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Farnham, Barbra. (1992). "Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory." *Political Psychology*. 13(2): 205-233.

Feierabend, Ivo K., Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nisvold. (1969). "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-national Patterns." In Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr eds. *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives vol. II*. Washington DC: A report to the national Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Fournier, Louis (1984). *FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*. Toronto: NC Press Limited.

Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. (1994). *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Groves, Robert M. (1989). *Survey Errors and Survey Costs*. New York: Wiley.

Guelke, Adrian. (1995). *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

Gurr, Ted Robert. (1996). "Minorities, Nationalities, and Ethnopolitical Conflict." In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall eds. *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. Washington DC: United States Institutes of Peace Press.

_____. (1988). "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and how it might be Improved." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl eds. *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: MacMillan Press.

_____. (1979). "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960's" in Michael Stohl ed. *The Politics of Terrorism*. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc.

256

_____. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. (1968a). "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." *World Politics*. 20(2): 245-278.

Haas, Ernst (1997). *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress; volume 1: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hagopian, Mark N. (1975). *The Phenomenon of Revolution*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.

Hall, John A. (1993). "Ideas and the Social Sciences" in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hector, Michael. (1987). *Principles of Group Solidarity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hughes, Michael. (1994). *Ireland Divided: The Roots of the Modern Irish Problem*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hunter, F. Robert. (1993). *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means*. Berkley: University of California Press.

Jervis, Robert. (1992). "Political Implications of Loss Aversion." *International Society of Political Psychology*. 13(2): 187-204.

Johnson, Nels. (1982). *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism*. London: Kegan Paul International.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. (1982). "The Psychology of Preferences." *Scientific American*. 246: 160-173.

Keena, Colm. (1990). *Biography of Gerry Adams*. Chester Springs: The Mercier Press.

Keylor, William R. (1996). *The Twentieth Century World: An International History, 3rd edition*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kurz, Anat. (1993). "Palestinian Terrorism—The Violent Aspect of a Political Struggle." In Yonah Alexander ed. *Middle East Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects*. Aldershot: Dartmouth University Press.

Kvale, Steinar. (1996). *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

257

Leininger, Madeleine. (1994). "Evaluation Criteria and Critique of Qualitative Research Studies." In Janice M. Morse ed. *Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Levy, Jack S. (1997). "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly*. 41(1): 87-112.

_____. (1992). "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems." *Political Psychology*. 13(2): 283-309.

Lichback, Mark Irvin. (1995). *The Rebels Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

_____, and Ted Robert Gurr. (1981). "The Conflict Process." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 25(1): 3-29.

Lijphart, Arend. (1975). "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research." In *Comparative Political Studies*. 8(2): 158-177.

_____. (1971). "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review*. 65(2): 682-693.

Long, David E. (1990). *The Anatomy of Terrorism*. New York: The Free Press.

Lustick, Ian S. (1995). "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences." In Martha Crenshaw ed. *Terrorism in Context*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University.

McCartney, Donal (1995). "From Parnell to Pearse." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

McCracken, J.L. (1995). "Northern Ireland, 1921-1966." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

McDermott, Rose. (1992). "Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission." *Political Psychology*. 13(2): 237-263.

McDowell, R.B. (1995). "The Protestant Nation." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

McInerney, Audrey. (1992). "Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards Syria, 1966-1967." *Political Psychology*. 13(2): 265-282.

Merkl, Peter H. (1986). "Approaches to the Study of Political Violence." In Peter H. Merkl ed. *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Moody, T.W. (1995). "Fenianism, Home Rule, and the Land War." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History.* Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

Moore, Will H. (1995). "Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem." *Political Research Quarterly.* 48(2): 417-454.

Morse, Janice M. (1994). "Qualitative Research: Fact or Fantasy." In Janice M. Morse ed. *Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Muller, Edward N. (1980). "The Psychology of Political Protest and Violence." In Ted Robert Gurr ed. *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research.* London: The Free Press.

Nachmias, David and Chava Nachmias. (1996). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Nasr, Komed B. (1997). *Arab-Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence 1936-1993.* Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc. Publishers.

Oliver, Pamela. (1980). "Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations." *American Journal of Sociology.* 86(6): 1356-1375.

Olson, Mancur. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Opp, Karl-Dieter (1989). *The Rationality of Political Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Rational Choice Theory.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Popkin, Samuel. (1979). *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam.* Berkley: University of California Press.

Prunckun, Henry W. (1995). *Shadow of Death: An Analytic Bibliography on Political Violence, Terrorism, and Low-Intensity Conflict.* Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. (1982). *The Logic Of Comparative Social Inquiry.* Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company.

Quattrone, George A. and Amos Tversky (1988). "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analysis of Political Choice." *American Political Science Review.* 82(3): 719-736.

Robinson, Glenn E. (1997). *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rouhana, Nadim. (1989). "The Political Transformation of Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge." *Journal of Palestine Studies.* 18(3): 38-59.

Roy, Sara M. (1993). "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration." *Journal of Palestine Studies.* 22(4): 20-31.

Sandole, Dennis J. (1993). "Paradigm, Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or Confusion." In Dennis J. Sandole and Hugo Van der Merwe eds. *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Schmid, Alex P. (1993). "Terrorism and Democracy." In Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crenlinsten eds., *Western Responses to Terrorism.* Cass Publishers, London.

Sederberg, Peter. (1994). *Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Sell, Jane and Yeongi Son. (1997). "Comparing Public Goods with Common Pool Resources: Three Experiments." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 60(2): 118-137.

Shehadeh, Raja. (1991). "Israel and the Palestinians: Human Rights in the Occupied Territories." In Rex Brynen ed. *Echoes of the Intifada: Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Simms, J.G. (1995). "The Restoration and the Jacobite War." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History.* Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

Skocpol, Theda. (1979). *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slovic, Paul Baruch Fischoff, and Sarah Lichenstein. (1982). "Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risks." In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky eds. *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Charles D. (1992). *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Stauss, Anslem L. (1987). *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tamari, Salim. (1991). "The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 20(2): 57-70.

Taylor, Michael ed. (1988). *Rationality and Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Torrence, Judy M. (1986). *Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. (1981). "The Framing of Decisions and Psychology of Choice." *Science*. 211: 453-463.

Wall, Maureen. (1995). "The Age of the Penal Laws." In T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

Weyland, Kurt. (1996). "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory." *International Studies Quarterly*. 40(1): 185-208.

White, Jonathan R. (1991). *Terrorism: An Introduction*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishers.

Whyte, Glen (1993). "Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision-Making: A Prospect Theory Approach." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*. 54: 430-455.

Whyte, J.H. (1995). "Ireland, 1966-1982" in T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin eds. *The Course of Irish History*. Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publishers.

Wieviorka, Michel. (1993). *The Making of Terrorism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Yin, Robert K. (1994). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods 2nd edition*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Zeller, Richard A. and Edward G. Carmines. (1980). *Measurement in the Social Sciences: the Link between Theory and Data*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendices

Appendix A

Interview Schedules

Northern Ireland

I.   Identity:

1.   The Literature concerning Northern Ireland tends to group people in terms of their identity. For example, distinctions have been made among identities such as Ulster British, Northern Irish, and Irish. Given these distinctions, which of these best describes you?

2.   What factors would place another person in your identity group (ex. religion, language)?

3.   What factors would exclude a person from your identity group?

II.   Identifying Goals, Macro Losses Frame and Levels of Support:

1. Consider the following statement: "To be a Republican (Nationalist) means that I believe the only acceptable state of existence is a thirty-two county (United) Ireland. Anything less is unsatisfactory and should be opposed." Explain whether or not you feel this statement accurately describes Republican (Nationalist) attitudes, and whether or not this statement accurately reflects you opinions or feelings on the issue.

2. Considering the past condition (pre-Peace agreement) in Northern Ireland, were you closer to, or further away from, the Republican (Nationalist) goals?

3. In the current situation (post-peace agreement) are you closer to, or further away from, the Republican (Nationalist) goals?

4. Do you now, or have you in the past, support(ed) the armed struggle as an appropriate tactic for resolving the "Troubles"? What other tactics could one use to restore a United Ireland?

If yes, go to questions on the following pages
If no, go to questions starting on page 2 (Costs)

1. Listen to the following categories of support and tell me which most accurately describes you.

I strongly support Republican goals and the use of armed resistance to achieve those goals. But I have not taken any direct action to achieve those goals. For the most part I keep quiet on activities and do not take any action that would endanger my life or the lives of those involved in the armed struggle.

I strongly support the future achievement of Republican goals through the armed struggle. I have given time, money, or other types of support to the cause. Furthermore, I have participated in activities when either asked to do so, or on my own accord. However, I have not in the past, nor do I plan to become an active participant in the armed struggle in the future to attain Republican goals.

I strongly support the future achievement of Republican goals. I have taken it upon myself to become actively involved in either the political or the armed struggle or both. I consider it my duty to do what I can to achieve a United Ireland regardless of the personal risks involved.

III.   Collective Action Theory

1.   Costs

A.   (**Supporters**) How much of your time is consumed with your activities to support armed conflict?

B.   Do you consider your support/or use of armed conflict to be a violation of the law?

C.   Do you feel there a high risk of being arrested, injured, or killed for your support of armed conflict?

D.   (**Non-supporters**) What types of activities do you engage in/or support for achieving Nationalist goals?

E.   In your opinion, is the armed conflict alternative a high or low risk alternative for achieving Nationalist goals?

F.   Does armed conflict have a positive or negative impact on the attainment of nationalist goals?

G.   (**All respondents**) How does your perception of the risks involved with armed conflict effect your decision to support its use to achieve your goals of a United Ireland?

2.   Material Incentives:
A.   **(For Active and Passive Supporters Only)** It is widely reported that Sinn Fein offers various social services for Catholics in Northern Ireland. Among these services are language education programs, housing programs, job placement, etc. Have you taken advantage of these programs in the past? If so, which ones (be as specific as possible)?

        If yes,
1.   Is there any way to receive these types of benefits other than through Sinn Fein?

2.   If these benefits were not offered, would you be less likely to support Sinn Fein?
        If no,
3.   What reason can you give for not taking advantage of these programs?

a.   Did not know about them.
b.   These programs offer nothing you can use directly.

B.   **(For Activists Only)** Do you receive compensation for your service to the Political/armed struggle?

1.   In what ways are you compensated? (e.g. pay, health care, family protection) .
2.   If you were not involved in the armed/political struggle, what type of job would you likely hold?
3.   Is the compensation you currently receive equal to, less than, or more than the type of compensation you would receive if you were employed elsewhere?

C.   (For all supporters) In what ways do these benefits influence your decision to support the armed struggle?

3   Negative Sanctions:
(Active and Passive Supporters, and non-supporters only!)
If the following questions make you feel uncomfortable at any time, please let me know and I will move onto the next section.

A.   Is the IRA, DAAD, or the INLA noticeably present in your community? Does their presence make you feel uncomfortable or unsafe in any way? (explain)
B.   Is support for the paramilitaries high, low, or in between in your community?
C.   Do your family, friends and neighbors support the armed struggle?
D.   For people who do not support the armed struggle, would you say they are pressured to change their mind by other people in the community?
E.   For people who do not support the armed struggle would you say they are pressured to change their mind by people in the armed struggle?
F.   If you decided to withdraw support for the IRA would people in your community take notice?

G.   Do people move away from the neighborhood because of pressure to support the armed struggle? (About how many?)

H.   Would you still support the armed struggle if the paramilitaries were not noticeable in your neighborhood or if the neighborhood's support were not so high?

IV.   Prospect Theory:

1.   Framing Effect:
(For All Respondents)

A.   Have you ever been intimidated or harassed by the British Security Forces or the RUC? (Explain the nature of this/these incident(s)).

B.   Have you ever been imprisoned or interned by the British or the RUC? (If so was it related to the armed struggle in any way?)

C.   Has anyone in your family, or anyone close to you, been injured or killed by the British, the RUC, or Loyalist Paramilitaries?

D.   Did this/these event(s) happen prior to your decision to support (not to support) the armed struggle? (If so, which ones?)

E.   Did this/these event(s) change your perception of the problems in Northern Ireland? (If so, in what way did your perceptions change?)

F.   Did this/these event(s) influence your decision to support the armed struggle? (If so, did it influence you to support, or did it cause you to turn away from the armed struggle?)

G.   If the IRA were disbanded today (through capture or agreement) would you consider this a positive or a negative development?

2.   The Certainty Effect:

Consider the following statement: "If I do nothing I am certain that things in Northern Ireland will not change. If I do something things may get better, but there is also a good chance they will get worse. Given this choice, I will take action."

(Supporters Only)
A.   Does this statement accurately reflect your position regarding the situation in Northern Ireland?

B.	Do you feel the armed struggle will succeed in achieving Republican goals?

C.	How risky do you think it is to support the armed struggle?

D.	How risky do you think it is for any other individual to support the armed struggle?

E.	Do you feel that your support for the armed struggle effects the accomplishment of Republican goals?

F.	What would happen if you did not support the armed conflict? In your opinion would conditions: improve, remain the same, or get worse?

G.	Is it not likely that you could get harassed, arrested, or killed if you continue to support the armed struggle? (Does this influence your decision to support armed conflict?)

(Non-supporters Only)

A.	Does this statement accurately reflect your position regarding the situation in Northern Ireland?

B.	Do you feel your lack of support for the armed struggle negatively effects the accomplishment of Nationalist goals?

C.	Would you consider it too risky to support the armed struggle? (Why or why not?)

D.	In your opinion would political options be more likely or less likely to accomplish Nationalist goals?

3.	Frame Change and Support for Armed Resistance:

A.	Given the current peace settlement, are you now less likely to support armed resistance to achieve Republican (Nationalist) goals?

B.	If the IRA decided to initiate a round of violence, would you continue to support their efforts? If so, under what conditions?

C.	Is the current peace agreement bring Northern Ireland closer to achieving Republican (Nationalist) goals?

Extraneous Questions: Activists Only
A.	Think back to the day you joined the paramilitaries, did you honestly believe *you would see* a day would come when a viable peace accord would be signed?
B.	What was going through your mind when you decided to up arms and fight?

V.   Demographics:
Sex: Female_____   Male_____

Education: (Number of Years)   _____
Occupation: _____
Average Income: _____
Religious Affiliation: _____

I.   Palestine

I.   **Identity**:

1. What is your national background? Arab, Palestinian Arab, or Arab Israeli

2. What factors would place another person in your identity group (ex. religion, language)?

3. What factors would exclude a person from your identity group?

II.   **Identifying Goals, Macro Losses Frame and Levels of Support**:

1. What group do you support? (Hamas, Al Fatah, PFLP, DFLP)

2. Could you define the goals of the group you support?

3. Do you feel the Oslo Accords (1993/95) brought your group closer to realizing their goals?

4. Did you support armed struggle to achieve your group's goals?

   a. *What other tactics could be used to achieve the group's goals?*

If yes, go to questions on the following pages
If no, go to questions starting on page 2 (Costs)

(Those Answering Yes =1)
(Those Answering No=2)

Classifying Support:

Listen to the following categories of support and tell me which most accurately describes you.

How would you characterize your involvement in the Palestinian National Movement? Were you (c) highly involved, (b) somewhat involved, or (a) uninvolved?

Answer_____

III. Collective Action Theory

A. Costs:
(1)

1. How much of your time was involved with your activities to support armed conflict?

2. Do you consider your support/or use of armed conflict to be a violation of the law?

a. What is the Official group stance on the armed struggle?

3. Is a high risk of being arrested, injured, or killed for your support of armed conflict?

(2)

4. What types of activities did you engage in/or support for achieving your group's goals?

5. In your opinion, was the armed conflict an effective way to achieve the goals you were pursuing?

6. In your opinion, did armed conflict have a positive or negative impact on the attainment of nationalist goals?

(1&2)

7. How did your perception of the risks and costs involved with armed conflict affect your decision to support its use to achieve your goals?

B. Material Incentives:
(1 A&B Only)

8. It is widely reported that the many different PLO groups and Hamas offer social services for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
    a.   Have you received any of these services yourself?
    b.   What benefits have you received?

If yes,
    1.   Is there any way to receive these types of benefits other than through that group?
    2.   If these benefits were not offered, would you be less likely to support that group?

If no,
    c.   What reason can you give for not taking advantage of these programs?

(1 C Only)
9. What types of compensation did you receive for your service to the Political/armed struggle?

10. (If you receive this compensation) was this benefit higher than compensation you would receive elsewhere (compared to other types of work you could be doing)?

C.   <u>Non-Material Incentives</u>
(2)
    1.   Did you feel that there is no reason to support or participate in the armed struggle because you believe it ultimately fail?

(1 A&B)
    1.   Did your support for armed resistance make you feel good about yourself?

        a.   Because you stood up for something you believe in?
        b.   Because you feel it was just?

    2.   Did your support for armed resistance make any of your friends or family uncomfortable, or upset?

3.   Did others around you (neighbors, or group members) encourage or discourage you to continue supporting armed resistance?

4.   Have you ever disagreed with the actions taken by your group during the armed struggle?

a. How did others around you react to your disagreement?
b. Were you more likely to keep your disapproval to yourself rather than tell others how you feel?

5.   Did you believe the armed struggle was the only way you can create change in Palestine?

(1 C Only)

6.   If you ended your support for the armed struggle, how would others in the group react?

7.   Did your involvement in the armed struggle make you feel good about yourself?

8.   Was it your duty to Palestine (or to anyone else) to fight Israel?

9.   Did people in your community treat you with more respect since you joined the armed struggle?

10.   Was there a strong sense of camaraderie among the people involved with the armed struggle?

       a.   Did this group interaction make participation in the armed struggle more tolerable?
       b.   What types of non-military activities did you and the others engage in?
       c.   Was the network of friends you had with others in the armed struggle important to you?

(1 AB&C Only)
       11. In what ways did these benefits or incentives influence your decision to support the armed struggle?

D.   Negative Sanctions:
(1 A&B, and 2)

Read Again

272

The following section contains some questions that are more sensitive in nature. If any questions make you feel uncomfortable at any time, please let me know and I will move onto the next section.

Armed conflict in Palestine has been carried largely at the community level. This would mean that group organization is centered in local communities, and many activities (up to and including military action) take place within local communities.

12. In your experience do you take notice of the members of military based groups in your community?

13. Does their presence make you feel uncomfortable or unsafe in any way? (explain)

14. Is support for the paramilitaries high, low, or in between in your community?

    a. Did you feel pressured to support the armed struggle by others?
    b. Whom applied this pressure?
    c. For people who did not support the armed struggle would you say they are pressured to change their mind by people in the armed struggle?
    d. If you decided to withdraw support for the armed struggle would people in your community take notice?
    e. Did people move away from the neighborhood because of pressure to support the armed struggle? (About how many?)

15. Would you still support the armed struggle if the paramilitaries were not noticeable in your neighborhood?

16. Would you still support the armed struggle if the neighborhood's support were not so high?

IV. *Prospect Theory:*

A.   <u>Framing Effect</u>: Personal Experience, Socialization, and Major events
(1 AB&C and 2)
Personal Experiences:

    1.   Was it difficult to attend political events because of Israeli intervention?

    2.   Compare your current ability to be involved in political activities with conditions in the past. Have conditions improved or gotten worse over the years?

    3.   When you attended political events, did you worry about being identified by the Israeli security forces?

4. **Did restraints on your ability to be politically active relate to your decision to support the armed struggle?

5. Have you ever been intimidated or harassed by the Israeli Military, or Palestinian Security Forces? (Explain the nature of this/these incident(s)).

6. Have you ever been imprisoned, interned, or detained by the Israeli or Palestinian Authorities (If so was it related to the armed struggle in any way?)

7. Has anyone in your family or anyone close to you, been injured or killed by Israeli forces?

8. Have you witnessed any attacks by Israeli forces on the Arab population?

   a. Why did these attacks occur?
   b. How did these attacks affect your view of Israeli Occupation?
   c. Have the Palestinian security forces been as harsh in their handling of security?
   d. How do you view Israeli security actions versus Palestinian security actions?

9. How did these events have any relation to your decision to support the armed struggle?

Socialization:
10. What did you parents or family members tell you about the establishment of the State of Israel, and the initial wars for Israeli independence?

11. When your family speaks about Israeli Occupation, how do they characterize it (positively or negatively)?

12. Did the way your family or friends speak about the conditions in Palestine have any relation to your decision to support the armed struggle?

Significant events:
13. Explain what the following events mean to you:
    a. Dayr Yasin
    b. Al-Karameh
    c. 1967 War
    d. Sabra and Shatila
    e. Intifada

14. Can you tell me of any other events that have shaped your opinion of Israeli Occupation?

15. Did you personally experienced any of these events?

16. Did this/these event(s) change your perception of the problems in Palestine? (If so, in what way did your perceptions change?)

17. Did these events have any relation to your decision to support the armed struggle?

18. If the armed struggle ended today would you consider this a positive or a negative development?

B. The Certainty Effect:
(1 AB&C Only)

19. Did you feel the armed struggle would lead to the creation of an Independent Palestine?

20. Is it risky for you to support the armed struggle? (How?) Do these same risks apply to others that support the armed struggle?

21. How important is your contribution to the armed struggle?

22. If you did not support the armed struggle, would conditions: improve, remain the same, or get worse?

(2)

23. Do you feel you are better aiding the Palestinian cause by not contributing to the armed struggle? (Why?)

24. Would you consider it too risky to support the armed struggle? (Why or why not?)

25. In your opinion would non-violent political action be more likely or less likely to accomplish Palestinian goals?

C. Frame Change and Support for Armed Resistance:
1 (AB&C only)
1. Are you less likely to support armed resistance today given the singing of the Oslo Accords?

2. Are you less likely to support armed struggle given the results of the past election?

3.   If a new round of violence were initiated would you continue to support it?

Extraneous Questions: Activists Only

1.   What was going through your mind when you decided to up arms and fight?

V.   **Demographics:**

Sex: Female_____   Male_____

Education: (Number of Years)   _____

Occupation: _____

Religious Affiliation: _____

Appendix B

The Good Friday Agreement

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will:

(i)   recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;

(ii)   recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;

(iii)   acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;

(iv)   affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish;

(v)   affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities;

(vi)   recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish

citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.

2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.

ANNEX A: DRAFT CLAUSES/SCHEDULES FOR INCORPORATION IN BRITISH LEGISLATION

1. (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1.

(2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.

2. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 is repealed; and this Act shall have effect notwithstanding any other previous enactment.

SCHEDULE 1: POLLS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1

1. The Secretary of State may by order direct the holding of a poll for the purposes of section 1 on a date specified in the order.

2. Subject to paragraph 3, the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.

3. The Secretary of State shall not make an order under paragraph 1 earlier than seven years after the holding of a previous poll under this Schedule.

4. (Remaining paragraphs along the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 of existing Schedule 1 to 1973 Act.)

ANNEX B: IRISH GOVERNMENT DRAFT LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION

Add to Article 29 the following sections:

1. The State may consent to be bound by the British-Irish Agreement done at Belfast on the day of 1998, hereinafter called the Agreement.

1. Any institution established by or under the Agreement may exercise the powers and functions thereby conferred on it in respect of all or any part of the island of Ireland notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution conferring a like power or function on any person or any organ of State appointed under or created or established by or under this Constitution. Any power or function conferred on such an institution in relation to the settlement or resolution of disputes or controversies may be in addition to or in substitution for any like power or function conferred by this Constitution on any such person or organ of State as aforesaid.

1. If the Government declare that the State has become obliged, pursuant to the Agreement, to give effect to the amendment of this Constitution referred to therein, then, notwithstanding Article 46 hereof, this Constitution shall be amended as follows:

    i.   the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish text:

    2. [Irish text to be inserted here]

    3. [Irish text to be inserted here]"

    ii.   the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the English text:

Article 2: It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.

Article 3: (1). It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognizing that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted by the Parliament that existed immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution.

    (2). Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective responsible authorities for stated purposes and may exercise powers and functions in respect of all or any part of the island."

iii.   the following section shall be added to the Irish text of this Article:

8. [Irish text to be inserted here]

and

iv.   the following section shall be added to the English text of this Article:

8. The State may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in accordance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

4. If a declaration under this section is made, this subsection and subsection 3, other than the amendment of this Constitution effected thereby, and subsection 5 of this section shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter, but notwithstanding such omission this section shall continue to have the force of law.

5. If such a declaration is not made within twelve months of this section being added to this Constitution or such longer period as may be provided for by law, this section shall cease to have effect and shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter.

STRAND ONE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.

The Assembly

2. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing Westminster constituencies.

3. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this agreement.

4. The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a cross-community basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities.

Safeguards

5. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including:

(a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in proportion to party strengths;

(b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission;

(c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland;

(d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis;

(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;

(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other cases such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority of Assembly members (30/108).

(e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote equality of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem between the two main communities, and to investigate individual complaints against public bodies.

Operation of the Assembly

6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other – for the purposes of measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above.

7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a cross-community basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above.

8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the d'Hondt system. Membership of the Committees will be in broad proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the opportunity of Committee places is available to all members.

9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is associated, and will have a role in initiation

of legislation. They will have the power to: consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of the overall budget allocation; o approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant primary legislation; o call for persons and papers; o initiate enquiries and make reports; o consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its Minister.

10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be established as may be required from time to time.

11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the power to call people and papers to assist in its consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the cross-community consent procedure.

12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting on a cross-community basis.

13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. If this fails to achieve support on a cross-community basis, as in 5(d)(i) above, the special procedure shall be followed.

Executive Authority

14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities.

15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according to 5(d)(i) above.

16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d'Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly.

17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.

18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, inter alla, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships.

19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritizing executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships).

20. The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmer, subject to approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-community basis.

21. A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as a Minister or may subsequently change its nominee.

22. All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister. All Ministers will liaise regularly with their respective Committee.

23. As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex A) undertaking to discharge effectively and in good faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office.

24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole.

25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter alla, those set out in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions.

Legislation

26. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to:
   (a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant legislation null and void;
   (b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision on a cross-community basis is required;
   (c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental Committee;
   (d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish Parliament, to ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, between the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament;

(e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament, especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g. social security, company law).

27. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary control.

28. Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts.

29. Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a Minister.

Relations with other institutions

30. Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level and in dealings with other institutions, will be in accordance with paragraph 18, and will be such as to ensure cross-community involvement.

31. Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives and the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective co-ordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including on EU issues.

32. Role of Secretary of State:
    (a) to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, subject to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers;
    (b) to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly legislation on reserved matters;
    (c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet;
    (d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation.

33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for Northern Ireland would remain unaffected) will:
    (a) legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of Parliament;
    (b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom's international obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland;
    (c) scrutinize, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by

agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.

Transitional Arrangements

35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organization, without legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and make preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies. In this transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers.

Review

36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly's procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the interests of efficiency and Fairness.

Annex A

Pledge of Office

To pledge.

(a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office;
(b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means;
(c) to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with the general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent discrimination;
(d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a programme for government;
(e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed within the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly;
(f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all decisions of the Executive Committee and Assembly;
(g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct

Code of Conduct

Ministers must at all times:

- observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving impartiality, integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship of public funds;
- be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the Assembly, for the activities within their responsibilities, their stewardship of public funds and the extent to which key performance targets and objectives have been met;
- ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users of services and individual citizens are complied with; and that Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an open and responsible way;
- comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds;
- operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of treatment;
- follow the seven principles of public life set out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life;
- not use information gained in the course of their service for personal gain; nor seek to use the opportunity of public service to promote their private interests;
- ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and hospitality that might be offered;
- declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with their responsibilities. The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests. Individuals must ensure that any direct or indirect pecuniary interests which members of the public might reasonably think could influence their judgement are listed in the Register of Interests;

STRAND TWO: NORTH/SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

1. Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas, a North/South Ministerial Council to be established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South.

2. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Northern Ireland to be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and any relevant Ministers, the Irish Government by the Taoiseach and relevant Ministers, all operating in accordance with the rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively. Participation in the Council to be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the two Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish Government and the First and Deputy First Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able to make alternative arrangements.

3. The Council to meet in different formats:

(i) in plenary format twice a year, with Northern Ireland representation led by the First Minister and Deputy First minister and the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach;

(ii) in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each side represented by the appropriate Minister;

(iii) in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral matters (including in relation to the KU) and to resolve disagreement.

4. Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the two sides, but it will be open to either to propose any matter for consideration or action.

5. The Council:

(i) to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-operating on matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Administrations, North and South;

(ii) to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and all-island benefit, and which are within the competence of both Administrations, North and South, making determined efforts to overcome any disagreements;

(iii) to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the competence of both Administrations, North and South;

(iv) to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island and cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be established as set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

6. Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place for co-ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction. Each side to remain accountable to the Assembly and Oireachtas respectively, whose approval, through the arrangements in place on either side, would be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of those attending.

7. As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the British/Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. All three institutions will meet regularly and frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus operandi.

8. During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the Northern Ireland transitional Administration and the Irish Government operating in the North/South Ministerial

Council will undertake a work programme, in consultation with the British Government, covering at least 12 subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 October 1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for mutual benefit will take place. Such areas may include matters in the list set out in the Annex.

9. As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at least 6 matters for co-operation and implementation in each of the following categories:
    (i)   Matters where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for co-operation in each separate jurisdiction;
    (ii)   Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed implementation bodies on a cross-border or all-island level.

10. The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other enabling preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that these bodies, which have been agreed as a result of the work programme, function at the time of the inception of the British-Irish Agreement and the transfer of powers, with legislative authority for these bodies transferred to the Assembly as soon as possible thereafter. Other arrangements for the agreed co-operation will also commence contemporaneously with the transfer of powers to the Assembly.

11. The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They will implement on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed in the Council.

12. Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in the Council and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Oireachtas, subject to the extent of the competences and responsibility of the two Administrations.

13. It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually inter-dependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other.

14. Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format described at paragraph 3(iii) above or in the plenary format. By agreement between the two sides, experts could be appointed to consider a particular matter and report.

15. Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that the Council and the implementation bodies constitute a necessary public function.

16. The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service.

17. The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmed and proposals under consideration in the EU framework. Arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings.

18. The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider developing a joint parliamentary forum, bringing together equal numbers from both institutions for discussion of matters of mutual interest and concern.

19. Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues.

ANNEX

Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the following:
1. Agriculture - animal and plant health.
2. Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges.
3. Transport - strategic transport planning.
4. Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste management.
5. Waterways - inland waterways.
6. Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of cross-border workers and fraud control.
7. Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development.
8. Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and their successors.
9. Inland Fisheries.
10. Aquaculture and marine matters
11. Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-border issues.
12. Urban and rural development.

Others to be considered by the shadow North/ South Council.

STRAND THREE: BRITISH-IRISH COUNCIL

1. A British-Irish Council (BIC) will be established under a new British-Irish Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands.

2. Membership of the BIC will comprise representatives of the British and Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, when established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.

3. The BIC will meet in different formats: at summit level, twice per year; in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side represented by the appropriate Minister; in an appropriate format to consider cross-sectoral matters.

4. Representatives of members will operate in accordance with whatever procedures for democratic authority and accountability are in force in their respective elected institutions.

5. The BIC will exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations. Suitable issues for early discussion in the BIC could include transport links, agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues, education issues and approaches to EU issues. Suitable arrangements to be made for practical co-operation on agreed policies.

6. It will be open to the BIC to agree common policies or common actions. Individual members may opt not to participate in such common policies and common action.

7. The BIC normally will operate by consensus. In relation to decisions on common policies or common actions, including their means of implementation, it will operate by agreement of all members participating in such policies or actions.

8. The members of the BIC, on a basis to be agreed between them, will provide such financial support as it may require.

9. A secretariat for the BIC will be provided by the British and Irish Governments in co-ordination with officials of each of the other members.

10. In addition to the structures provided for under this agreement, it will be open to two or more members to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements between them. Such arrangements could include, subject to the agreement of the members concerned, mechanisms to enable consultation, co-operation and joint decision-making on matters of mutual interest; and mechanisms to implement any joint decisions they may reach. These arrangements will not require the prior approval of the BIC as a whole and will operate independently of it.

11. The elected institutions of the members will be encouraged to develop interparliamentary links, perhaps building on the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body.

12. The full membership of the BIC will keep under review the workings of the Council, including a formal published review at an appropriate time after the Agreement comes into effect, and will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations.

BRITISH-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

1. There will be a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships. It will establish a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which will

subsume both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985 Agreement.

2. The Conference will bring together the British and Irish Governments to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Governments.

3. The Conference will meet as required at Summit level (Prime Minister and Taoiseach). Otherwise, Governments will be represented by appropriate Ministers. Advisers, including police and security advisers, will attend as appropriate.

4. All decisions will be by agreement between both Governments. The Governments will make determined efforts to resolve disagreements between them. There will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government.

5. In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals. These meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and cross-border co-operation on non-devolved issues.

6. Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or cross-border aspects of these matters.

7. Relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Administration will be involved in meetings of the Conference, and in the reviews referred to in paragraph 9 below to discuss non-devolved Northern Ireland matters.

8. The Conference will be supported by officials of the British-Irish Governments, including by a standing joint Secretariat of officials dealing with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters.

9. The Conference will keep under review the workings of the new British-Irish Agreement and the machinery and institutions established under it, including a formal published review three years after the Agreement comes into effect. Representatives of the Northern Ireland Administration will be invited to express views to the Conference in this context. The Conference will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations but will have no power to override the democratic arrangements set up by this Agreement.

RIGHTS, SAFEGUARDS AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

Human Rights

1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular:

- the right of free political thought;
- the right to freedom and expression of religion;
- the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;
- the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;
- the right to freely choose one's place of residence;
- the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;
- the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and
- the right of women to full and equal political participation.

United Kingdom Legislation

2. The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.

3. Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British Government intends, as a particular priority, to create a Statutory obligation on public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependents; and sexual orientation. Public bodies would be required to draw up statutory schemes showing how they would implement this obligation. Such schemes would cover arrangements for policy appraisal, including an assessment of impact on relevant categories, public consultation, public access to information and services, monitoring and timetables.

4. The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 5 below) will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and - taken together with the ECHR – to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the issues for consideration by the Commission will be:

- the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and

- a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors.

New Institutions in Northern Ireland

5. A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be established by Westminster legislation, independent of Government, with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and promoting awareness of human rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the new Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so.

6. Subject to the outcome of public consultation currently underway, the British Government intends a new statutory Equality Commission to replace the Fair Employment Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission (NI), the Commission for Racial Equality (NI) and the Disability Council. Such a unified Commission will advise on, validate and monitor the statutory obligation and will investigate complaints of default.

7. It would be open to a new Northern Ireland Assembly to consider bringing together its responsibilities for these matters into a dedicated Department of Equality.

8. These improvements will build on existing protections in Westminster legislation in respect of the judiciary, the system of justice and policing.

Comparable Steps by the Irish Government

9. The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction. The Government will, taking account of the work of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the Report of the Constitution Review Group, bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights. These proposals will draw on the European Convention on Human Rights and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights and the question of the incorporation of the ECHR will be further examined in this context. The measures brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Government will:

- establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to that within Northern Ireland;

293

- proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities (already ratified by the UK);
- implement enhanced employment equality legislation;
- introduce equal status legislation; and
- continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for the different traditions in the island of Ireland.

A Joint Committee

10. It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.

Reconciliation and Victims of Violence

11. The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation. They look forward to the results of the work of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission.

12. It is recognized that victims have a right to remember as well as to contribute to a changed society. The achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence. The participants particularly recognise that young people from areas affected by the troubles face particular difficulties and will support the development of special community-based initiatives based on international best practice. The provision of services that are supportive and sensitive to the needs of victims will also be a critical element and that support will need to be channelled through both statutory and community-based voluntary organizations facilitating locally-based self-help and support networks. This will require the allocation of sufficient resources, including statutory funding as necessary, to meet the needs of victims and to provide for community-based support programmed.

13. The participants recognise and value the work being done by many organizations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions, in Northern Ireland and between North and South, and they see such work as having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement. Accordingly, they pledge their continuing support to such organizations and will positively examine the case for enhanced financial assistance for the work of reconciliation. An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a

culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing.

RIGHTS, SAFEGUARDS AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

Economic, Social and Cultural Issues

1. Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life.

2. Subject to the public consultation currently under way, the British Government will make rapid progress with:

    (i)   a new regional development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration in due course by a the Assembly, tackling the problems of a divided society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas, protecting and enhancing the environment, producing new approaches to transport issues, strengthening the physical infrastructure of the region, developing the advantages and resources of rural areas and rejuvenating major urban centres;

    (ii)   a new economic development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration in due course by a the Assembly, which would provide for short and medium term economic planning linked as appropriate to the regional development strategy; and

    (iii)   measures on employment equality included in the recent White Paper ("Partnership for Equality") and covering the extension and strengthening of anti-discrimination legislation, review of the national security aspects of the present fair employment legislation at the earliest possible time, a new more focused Targeting Social Need initiative and a range of measures at combating unemployment and progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the two communities by targeting objective need.

3. All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.

4. In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it:

- take resolute action to promote the language;
- facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand;
- seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language;
- make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints;
- place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education;
- explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige in Northern Ireland;
- seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and
- encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the community.

5. All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what action might be required.

DECOMMISSIONING

1. Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted on 24 September 1997 "that the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the process of negotiation", and also recall the provisions of paragraph 25 of Strand 1 above.

2. They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the Governments in developing schemes which can represent a workable basis for achieving the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups.

3. All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement.

4. The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular intervals.

6. Both Governments will take all necessary steps to facilitate the decommissioning process to include bringing the relevant schemes into force by the end of June.

SECURITY

1. The participants note that the development of a peaceful environment on the basis of this agreement can and should mean a normalization of security arrangements and practices.

2. The British Government will make progress towards the objective of as early a return as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland, consistent with the level of threat and with a published overall strategy, dealing with:

(i)   the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed in Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful society;
(ii)   the removal of security installations;
(iii)   the removal of emergency powers in Northern Ireland;
and
(iv)   other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful society.

3. The Secretary of State will consult regularly on progress, and the response to any continuing paramilitary activity, with the Irish Government and the political parties, as appropriate.

4. The British Government will continue its consultation on firearms regulation and control on the basis of the document on 2 April 1998.
5. The Irish Government will initiate a wide-ranging review of the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-85 with a view to both reform and dispensing with those elements no longer required as circumstances permit.

POLICING AND JUSTICE

1. The participants recognise that policing is a central issue in any society. They equally recognise that Northern Ireland's history of deep divisions has made it highly emotive, with great hurt suffered and sacrifices made by many individuals and their families, including those in the RUC and other public servants.

They believe that the agreement provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole. They also believe that this agreement offers a unique opportunity to bring about a new political dispensation which will recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland. They consider that this opportunity should inform

and underpin the development of a police service representative in terms of the make-up of the community as a whole and which, in a peaceful environment, should be routinely unarmed.

2. The participants believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable, both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and co-operative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms. The participants also believe that those structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and order including responding effectively to crime and to any terrorist threat and to public order problems. A police service which cannot do so will fail to win public confidence and acceptance.

They believe that any such structures and arrangements should be capable of delivering a policing service, in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels, and with the maximum delegation of authority and responsibility, consistent with the foregoing principles. These arrangements should be based on principles of protection of human rights and professional integrity and should be unambiguously accepted and actively supported by the entire community. .

3. An independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread community support for these arrangements within the agreed framework of principles reflected in the paragraphs above and in accordance with the terms of reference at Annex A. The Commission will be broadly representative with expert and international representation among its membership and will be asked to consult widely and to report no later than Summer 1999.

4. The participants believe that the aims of the criminal justice system are to:

• deliver a fair and impartial system of justice to the community;
• be responsive to the community's concerns, and encouraging community involvement where appropriate;
• have the confidence of all parts of the community; and
• deliver justice efficiently and effectively.

5. There will be a parallel wide-ranging review of criminal justice (other than policing and those aspects of the system relating to the emergency legislation) to be carried out by the British Government through a mechanism with an independent element, in consultation with the political parties and others.

The review will commence as soon as possible, will include wide consultation, and a report will be made to the Secretary of State no later than Autumn 1999. Terms of Reference are attached at Annex B.

6. Implementation of the recommendations arising from both reviews will be discussed with the political parties and with the Irish Government.

7. The participants also note that the British Government remains ready in principle, with the broad support of the political parties, and after consultation, as appropriate, with the Irish Government, in the context of ongoing implementation of the relevant recommendations, to devolve responsibility for policing and justice issues.

ANNEX A: COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Terms of Reference

Taking account of the principles on policing as set out in the agreement, the Commission will inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and, on the basis of its findings, bring forward proposals for future policing structures and arrangements, including means of encouraging widespread community support for those arrangements.

Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen as an integral part of, community as a whole.

Its proposals should include recommendations covering any issues such as restraining, job placement and educational and professional development required in the transition to policing in a peaceful society.

Its proposals should also be designed to ensure that:

- the police service is structured, managed and resourced so that it can be effective in discharging its full range of functions (including proposals on any necessary arrangements for the transition to policing in a normal peaceful society);
- the police service is delivered in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels with the maximum delegation of authority and responsibility;
- the legislative and constitutional framework requires the impartial discharge of policing functions and conforms with internationally accepted norms in relation to policing standards;
- the police operate within a clear framework of accountability to the law and the community they serve, so:
- they are constrained by, accountable to and act only within the law;
- their powers and procedures, like the law they enforce, are clearly established and publicly available;
- there are open, accessible and independent means of investigating and adjudicating upon complaints against the police;

- there are clearly established arrangements enabling local people, and their political representatives, to articulate their views and concerns about policing and to establish publicly policing priorities and influence policing policies, subject to safeguards to ensure police impartiality and freedom from partisan political control;
- there are arrangements for accountability and for the effective, efficient and economic use of resources in achieving policing objectives;
- there are means to ensure independent professional scrutiny and inspection of the police service to ensure that proper professional standards are maintained;
- the scope for structured co-operation with the Garda Siochana and other police forces is addressed; and
- the management of public order events which can impose exceptional demands on policing resources is also addressed.

The Commission should focus on policing issues, but if it identifies other aspects of the criminal justice system relevant to its work on policing, including the role of the police in prosecution, then it should draw the attention of the Government to those matters.

The Commission should consult widely, including with non-governmental expert organizations, and through such focus groups as they consider it appropriate to establish.

The Government proposes to establish the Commission as soon as possible, with the aim of it starting work as soon as possible and publishing its final report by Summer 1999.

ANNEX B: REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Terms of Reference

Taking account of the aims of the criminal justice system as set out in the Agreement, the review will address the structure, management and resourcing of publicly funded elements of the criminal justice system and will bring forward proposals for future criminal justice arrangements (other than policing and those aspects of the system relating to emergency legislation, which the Government is considering separately) covering such issues as:

- the arrangements for making appointments to the judiciary and magistracy, and safeguards for protecting their independence;
- the arrangements for the organization and supervision of the prosecution process, and for safeguarding its independence;
- measures to improve the responsiveness and accountability of, and any lay participation in the criminal justice system;
- mechanisms for addressing law reform;
- the scope for structured co-operation between the criminal justice agencies on both parts of the island; and

- the structure and organization of criminal justice functions that might be devolved to an Assembly, including the possibility of establishing a Department of Justice, while safeguarding the essential independence of many of the key functions in this area.

The Government proposes to commence the review as soon as possible, consulting with the political parties and others, including non-governmental expert organizations. The review will be completed by Autumn 1999.

PRISONERS

1. Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners, including transferred prisoners, convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland or, in the case of those sentenced outside Northern Ireland, similar offences (referred to hereafter as qualifying prisoners). Any such arrangements will protect the rights of individual prisoners under national and international law.

2. Prisoners affiliated to organizations which have not established or are not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit from the arrangements. The situation in this regard will be kept under review.

3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time frame and set prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners. The review process would provide for the advance of the release dates of qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be taken of the seriousness of the offences for which the person was convicted and the need to protect the community. In addition, the intention would be that should the circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody two years after the commencement of the scheme would be released at that point.

4. The Governments will seek to enact the appropriate legislation to give effect to these arrangements by the end of June 1998.

5. The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training and/or re-skilling, and further education.

VALIDATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

Validation and Implementation

1. The two Governments will as soon as possible sign a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, embodying understandings on constitutional issues and affirming their solemn commitment to support and, where appropriate,

implement the agreement reached by the participants in the negotiations which shall be annexed to the British-Irish Agreement.

2. Each Government will organise a referendum on 22 May 1998. Subject to Parliamentary approval, a consultative referendum in Northern Ireland, organised under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations, etc.) Act 1996, will address the question: "Do you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?" The Irish Government will introduce and support in the Oireachtas a Bill to amend the Constitution as described in paragraph 2 of the section "Constitutional Issues" and in Annex B. as follows: (a) to amend Articles 2 and 3 as described in paragraph 8.1 in Annex B above and (b) to amend Article 29 to permit the Government to ratify the new British-Irish Agreement. On passage by the Oireachtas, the Bill will be put to referendum.

3. If majorities of those voting in each of the referendums support this agreement, the Governments will then introduce and support, in their respective Parliaments, such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to all aspects of this agreement, and will take whatever ancillary steps as may be required including the holding of elections on 25 June, subject to parliamentary approval, to the Assembly, which would meet initially in a "shadow" mode. The establishment of the North-South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and the assumption by the Assembly of its legislative and executive powers will take place at the same time on the entry into force of the British-Irish Agreement.

4. In the interim, aspects of the implementation of the multi-party agreement will be reviewed at meetings of those parties relevant in the particular case (taking into account, once Assembly elections have been held, the results of those elections), under the chairmanship of the British Government or the two Governments, as may be appropriate; and representatives of the two Governments and all relevant parties may meet under independent chairmanship to review implementation of the agreement as a whole.

Review procedures following implementation

5. Each institution may, at any time, review any problems that may arise in its operation and, where no other institution is affected, take remedial action in consultation as necessary with the relevant Government or Governments. It will be for each institution to determine its own procedures for review.

6. If there are difficulties in the operation of a particular institution, which have implications for another institution, they may review their operations separately and jointly and agree on remedial action to be taken under their respective authorities.

7. If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the range of institutions, or otherwise require amendment of the British-Irish Agreement or relevant legislation, the

process of review will fall to the two Governments in consultation with the parties in the Assembly. Each Government will be responsible for action in its own jurisdiction.

8. Notwithstanding the above, each institution will publish an annual report on its operations. In addition, the two Governments and the parties in the Assembly will convene a conference 4 years after the agreement comes into effect, to review and report on its operation.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND

The British and Irish Governments:

Welcoming the strong commitment to the Agreement reached on 10th April 1998 by themselves and other participants in the multi-party talks and set out in Annex 1 to this Agreement (hereinafter "the Multi-Party Agreement");

Considering that the Multi-Party Agreement offers an opportunity for a new beginning in relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands;

Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union;

Reaffirming their total commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence which have been fundamental to the multi-party talks;

Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of partnership, equality and mutual respect and to the protection of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights in their respective jurisdictions;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The two Governments:

(i)   recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;

(ii)   recognize that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to

exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;

(iii)   acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;

(iv)   affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish;

(v)   affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities;

(vi)   recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.

ARTICLE 2

The two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement. In particular there shall be established in accordance with the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement immediately on the entry into force of this Agreement, the following institutions:

(i)   a North/South Ministerial Council;
(ii)   the implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) of the section entitled "Strand Two" of the Multi-Party Agreement;
(iii)   a British-Irish Council;
(iv)   a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.

ARTICLE 3

(1) This Agreement shall replace the Agreement between the British and Irish Governments done at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985 which shall cease to have effect on entry into force of this Agreement.

(2) The Intergovernmental Conference established by Article 2 of the aforementioned Agreement done on 15th November 1985 shall cease to exist on entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

(1) It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that:

    (a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of implementing the provisions of Annex A to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement;

    (b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement shall have been approved by Referendum;

    (c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to establish the institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.

(2) Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so far as it is concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the receipt of the later of the two notifications.

(3) Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish Government shall ensure that the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement take effect.

In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

ANNEX 1

The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Talks

ANNEX 2

Declaration on the Provisions of Paragraph (vi) of Article 1 In Relationship to Citizenship For the Government of Ireland

The British and Irish Governments declare that it is their joint understanding that the term "the people of Northern Ireland" in paragraph (vi) of Article 1 of this Agreement means, for the purposes of giving effect to this provision, all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on their period of residence.

The Oslo Accords

Declaration of
Principles
on
Interim Self-Government
Arrangements

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the JordanianPalestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim SelfGovernment Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III

ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex 1, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

INTERIM AGREEMENT

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The interim Agreement shall include arrangements—to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article Vl above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX

LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X

JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint IsraeliPalestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex lil and Annex IV.

Article XII

LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These

arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII

REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article Vlil above.

Article XIV

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex 11.

Article XV

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

.,The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993

VITA

Daniel Masters was born in Kankakee, Illinois on May 24, 1969. graduated from Herscher High School in 1987. After a two-year enlistment in the United States Army Dan entered college first at Davidson County Community College, and moved on to Appalachian State University in Boone, North Carolina. In 1992, he received his Bachelor of Science Degree in History and Political Science and entered the Master of Arts program in Political Science at Appalachian State University. While completing the MA Dan moved to Orlando, Florida where he began working as an adjunct instructor at the University of Central Florida, Seminole County Community College, and Valencia Community College. In 1995, Dan was hired for a one year visiting instructor position at the University of Central Florida. Dan received his MA in Political Science from Appalachian State University in May, 1995. In 1996, Dan was married to Joann Bernát of Orlando, Florida and he entered the Doctoral Program in Political Science at the University of Tennessee. The Doctoral Degree was received in May, 2000.