

THE SIX ARROWS OF ATATÜRKISM, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN

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Article	Abstract
<p>Keywords: Ataturkism; Legal History; Kemalism, Nationalism, Republic of Turkey, Europe, Reformism.</p> <p>DOI: 10.28946/scls.v1i1.2768</p>	<p>Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, figures in Turkish history, and he did not earn this title without reason. The reforms and innovations he brought to Turkey brought about real change in theory and natural social and political terms. One of the most striking manifestations of these reforms was the so-called 'six arrows' system, which effectively summed up Atatürk's political essence and ideas. In this paper, I will describe the elements of the 'six arrows' system, examining their social and political implications, particularly the steps taken to achieve women's equality. I have chosen impact analysis as the research method, as I considered it appropriate in the context of women's emancipation, given the many social impacts of introducing new legislation in Turkish society. In my thesis, I have greatly emphasized the historical overview of the right to marry freely - primarily from a legal-historical perspective- to obtain a genuinely complex picture of the six arrows system as manifested in law practice. In choosing the research method, I proceeded from the assumption that the various disciplines and applied sciences now make it possible to predict the expected consequences of legislative decisions with varying degrees of reliability, and to examine the results of decisions already taken after the event, comparing the facts with the anticipated effects. Suppose we accept that the purpose of legislation is to produce some consequence. In that case, an impact assessment is a prominent tool for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of individual legislative products and the legislative process.</p>

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A. INTRODUCTION

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was a distinguished soldier, reformer, founder, and first President of the Republic of Turkey. Two parallels emerge from press reports about Atatürk: "Atatürk the dictator or Atatürk the Napoleon-like soldier."¹ Although Atatürk established the modern Turkish Republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe".² He was the president of the country's only political party, the Republican People's

¹ Katalin Siska, "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi? Thoughts on Ataturkism," *Scientific Bulletin of Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian College of Higher Education* 1, 7 (2020): 84.

² *Ibid.*

Party. In World War I, he achieved several military successes that created the opportunity to create a republic by abolishing the previous form of government.³ "The motifs of the Turkish flag were developed during the Ottoman Empire, but some believe that the finalized, modern form is associated with the name of Atatürk. During the Turkish War of Independence, Atatürk caught a glimpse of the reflection of the crescent moon and the star while standing by a pool of blood."⁴ From war hero to head of state, Atatürk set about building a republic almost immediately. "Atatürk's oratorical talent touched the hearts of young Turks. His courage was an example to all young Turks."⁵

He gave women equal rights, almost completely excluding religion from government and limiting Islam's power to purely religious matters.⁶ Using dictatorial methods, Atatürk almost forced society's modernization and women's emancipation in the country.⁷ "The reason for the general recognition was undoubtedly his successful modernization policy, his balanced foreign policy (including the agreement with Soviet Russia), a successful attack against Versailles Peace Treaty, and his social policy."⁸ The present essay deals with one aspect of his successful modernization policy mentioned earlier – and one symbolic element– the six arrows of Kemalism. In my thesis, I will explore what the six arrows symbolize practically and ideologically and what social effects and developments can be attributed to these symbols. In the first part of my thesis, I have explicitly dealt with the system of the six arrows from an impact perspective. Then, following this logic, I have tried to shed light, primarily from a legal-historical perspective, on the manifestations of Kemalism in actual legal practice, with particular reference to women's equality.

B. RESEARCH METHOD

As I have written in the abstract, in choosing the research method, I proceeded from the assumption that the various disciplines and applied sciences now make it possible to predict the expected consequences of legislative decisions with varying degrees of reliability, and to examine the results of decisions already taken after the event, comparing the facts with the anticipated effects. Although the pursuit of sound legislative implementation is centuries old, even millennia, the explicit, proclaimed, systematic use of impact assessment in legislation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Many countries worldwide have more or less developed their impact assessment regimes; the example of the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, United States, United Kingdom) stands out for its rich tradition and significant impact assessment achievements dating back up to 40-50 years. In Hungary, the Ministry of Justice started to lay the methodological foundations, launch training courses and publish a manual in 2002, and enact the principles and expected process of impact assessment into law.

The criticisms of impact assessment as a method are twofold: on the one hand, the professional soundness of impact assessment projects is called into question by the inevitable elements presented below or the often biased, commissioned, one-sided studies that draw predetermined conclusions. Other opponents argue that impact assessment is an over-industrialization of legislation and that legislative decisions should instead be based on stakeholder consultation mechanisms and the personal responsibility of politicians. In our view, the first objection is based on the acceptance of trade-offs inherent in impact assessment and the at least mitigated by ensuring the independence of the impact assessment. The second

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Adrienn Prieger, "Halhatatlan Atatürk," *Valóság Társadalomtudományi Közlöny*, 2018, 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Siska, "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi? Thoughts on Atatürkism." *Op. Cit.*

⁷ Katalin Siska, "A Török Nők Emancipációja," *Lélektan És Hadviselés* 1, no. I (2019): 73.

⁸ Siska, "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi? Thoughts on Atatürkism." *Op. Cit.*

criticism, the impact assessment, could be more helpful in the reliability of consultation and other policy-making processes rather than a competing method.

This is precisely why I have chosen this method, because without the spread of Kemalism, without its approach being translated into legal practice, the drive towards women's equality in legal practice would not have got off the ground or would have gotten off the ground only with great difficulty. Since impact assessment itself as an interdisciplinary activity is not specifically a legal task - not even the impact assessment of legislation - the lawyer involved in the preparation of legislation may be involved in impact assessment projects primarily in a coordinating or commissioning capacity. This is why, before analyzing the results in terms of actual legislation, I felt it necessary to present the Six Arrows of Kemalism partly from a political and partly from a legal-historical perspective in order to be able to interpret the actual results by linking the two at the end of the thesis. To do so, however, it is necessary to provide a general overview in addition to the impact assessment.

C. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

1. The Six Arrows of Kemalism

When the contracting parties signed the peace document guaranteeing the independence of Turkey on July 24, 1923, in Lausanne, Switzerland, the country showed the most terrible devastation.⁹ To obtain complete and unconditional sovereignty, the only direction for the new political forces of the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, was modernization, an idea based on secularism and the idea of the nation-state.¹⁰ The main spiritual unifying force of the republic was the "Turkish consciousness" based on the triple unity. Thus, it is understandable that the new administration viewed ethnic and religious minorities as carriers of the potential danger of separatism.¹¹ The six guiding principles first appeared officially in 1931 in the programme of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP in Turkish), the first political party in Turkey, founded by Atatürk in 1923 and symbolically displayed on its logo as six arrows shot out.¹² The party was the political expression of the Turkish War of Independence (Turkish: Kurtuluş Savaşı or İstiklâl Harbi) (19. May 1919 - 29. October 1923) and was established to achieve national unity and integration, and as the dominant (1923-1945) political organization, it played a decisive role in defining Turkish citizenship.¹³ The primary and practical purpose of the "six arrows" is to present the aims of the Republican People's Party and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in a kind of "shorthand".¹⁴ "The arrows symbolically show the historical development of the Central Asian Turks, metaphorically suggesting that the rapid ejections of the Arrows - which together are Turkey itself - directly in time and space, seamlessly and quickly move on to a clean path, which is defined by the "great shooter", Mustafa Kemal Atatürk."¹⁵ These "six arrows", practically a kind of solid political programme, clearly summarise the set of principles that posterity has called

⁹ Katalin Siska, "A Kisebbségi Jogok Alakulása Törökországban, Különös Tekintettel a Lausanne-i Szerződés Rendelkezéseire," *Iustum Aequum Salutare* 12, no. 3 (2016): 173-84.

¹⁰ Katalin Siska, "The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey - The Legal Oddity," *PRO PUBLICO BONO - Magyar Közigazgatás*, no. 3 (2017): 118-31.

¹¹ Cagaptay Soner, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?*, New York, Routledge, 2006, 33.

¹² Mango Andrew, *The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*, London: Overlook Press, 2002, 21.

¹³ Katalin Siska, "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Hatása a Török Identitása És Állampolgárság Konceptiójára, Különös Tekintettel Az Alkotmányjogi Szabályozásra," *Jog Állam Politika: Jog-És Politikatudományi Folyóirat*, no. 2060-4580 (2016): 61-75.

¹⁴ Siska, "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi? Thoughts on Atatürkism.", *Op. Cit.*, 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Atatürkism.¹⁶ The principles included the homeland, the nation, the constitution of the state, and civil rights.¹⁷ The "Altı Ok" summarises the principles of Atatürk's reformist efforts, symbolized as six arrows, which are echoed in the coat of arms of the Cumhuriyet Halkı Partısı (Republican People's Party), which he founded and led, and which he called Kemalism.¹⁸ "Atatürk did not found the Turkish Republic as a military state."¹⁹ While still a student at the military school in Monastir, Atatürk read the works of Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu in French and studied with no bit of enthusiasm the history of the French Revolution, which had a profound influence on his world view of society and the state.²⁰

The six principles of Atatürkism are Republicanism, Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Ethatism, and Reformism. I agree with Katalin Siska that the "six arrows" are not ideology but boundary markers, the primary standard concepts, principles and ideas of the Turkish government and social transformation, which, together with the President's speeches, were the main features of the programme.²¹ On February 5 1937, in the 14th year of the Republic of Turkey, the "arrows" were included in the 1924 Constitution in a constitutional amendment. Article 2, Section 1 of the 1924 Constitution was thus amended to read, "Turkey is republican, nationalist, committed to the people, interventionist, secular and revolutionary."²² In what follows, I will present the six principles I have just listed. I will begin with republicanism, which I consider one of the most essential elements of Atatürk's policy.

2. Republicanism

"Atatürkism is special because the idea of republicanism has usually had a hard time coping with the idea of nationalism, but Atatürk has solved this problem perfectly."²³ Since October 29 1923, Turkey has been a republic. The last ruler of the Ottoman Empire was exiled, and the parliament elected Mustafa Kemal as president of the republic." The possibilities of Turkey formed in 1923, were determined by the Ottoman imperial past and the first president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, tried to defend it by proclaiming the principle of *yurttasulh, cihandasulh*/peace in the homeland, peace in the world," indicating that the intentions of the new state are peaceful, it does not want the restoration of the old Empire.²⁴ Sovereignty belongs unconditionally and without limit to the nation. Executive and legislative power is embodied in the parliament, which is the exclusive and true representative of the nation. Republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*) was seen as the only possible solution in the search for a way forward for the survival of the Ottoman-Turkish state after World War I. After the promulgation of the 1924 constitution, it meant not only the irreversibility of the process and the exclusion of the slightest possibility of the return of the Ottoman house but also the reorganization of the whole Turkish society on a new basis. It is true that attempts were made to build a multi-party democratic structure. Still, the excessive diversity of historical experience and visions for the future, which threatened to create chaos, weakened the functioning of the fledgling state and led to the republic remaining a one-party dictatorship for decades.²⁵

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Prieger, "Halhatatlan Atatürk.", *Op. Cit.*, 2.

¹⁸ István Flesch, *A Török Köztársaság Története*, Budapest: Corvina, 2007, 16.

¹⁹ Ahmed Akgul, "The Case of Atatürk Reforms in Early Turkish Republic Between 1923-1946 From an Educational Perspective," *Master's Thesis, Harvard Extension School*, 2019, 58.

²⁰ Kemal Gözler, "Türk Anayasa Hukuku," 2021.

²¹ Katalin Siska, "Az Atatürkizmus Hat Nyíla," *Iustum Aequum Salutare* 1787-3223 (2017): 202.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Siska, "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi? Thoughts on Atatürkism.", *Op.Cit.*, 90.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁵ M. Sükrü Hanioglu, "Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography," *New Jersey, Princeton University Press*, 2011.

The two concepts can be summed up in one word: republic." Mustafa Kemal Atatürk officially founded the Republican People's Party (Turkish Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) on September 9 1923, as a political expression of the Turkish War of Independence, and it aimed to achieve national unity and integrity.¹²⁶ In addition to Atatürk's words, the essential features of the republic, according to the CHP's 1935 programme, are popular sovereignty, the rule of law, cyclical parliamentary elections, the election of officials, separation of powers, and constitutional limits. These criteria fully justify the symbolic and real social repercussions of the "six arrows" system. Besides republicanism, the other most crucial principle of the six is nationalism, which played a key role in Atatürk's political integration.

3. Nationalism

"Atatürk saw nationalism as an ethnically cohesive force, a kind of patriotism that bound the otherwise ethnically diverse Turkish citizens to Anatolia."¹²⁷ Atatürk's nationalism aimed to create an independent, strong country free from foreign influence." What I expect from all the people, without exception, is total submission to the orders of the government. The whole people accepted the principles I had promulgated, and it was clear anyone who opposed the principles or even my person would have no chance of being elected as a national representative."¹²⁸

It is clear from this speech that Atatürk saw the creation of the nation-state as the basis of modernization.¹²⁹ In Atatürk's plan to create and maintain national consciousness and increase a sense of pride in national belonging through his political statements, revolution and liberation were only the first step.¹³⁰ In a 1923 speech, he noted, "However great victories a nation may have won on the battlefield, victories can only bring lasting results through the efforts of an army of teachers."¹³¹

The above statements showed Atatürk's conviction that the struggle for the nation's independence was far from over when independence was won.¹³² Only independence could lead to the establishment of a republic, which would pave the way for the modernization that was the ultimate goal of his revolution.¹³³ It is in the programme of Atatürk's party: "Today's Turkish community (national, political and social) is made up of patriots and citizens who have become the targets of propaganda from the Caucasian, Kurdish, Laz and Bosnian nations. This propaganda is a misrepresentation that is the result of previous despotic centuries. They do not affect the individuals of our nation, only the enemy agents and foolish reactionaries who cause our people grief and sorrow. The individuals of our nation are members of an integrated and united Turkish community with a common past, a common history, a common morality and a common right."¹³⁴ The CHP's 1935 party platform on nationalism states, "The party attaches importance to the preservation of the special character and the fully independent identity of the Turkish social community." Atatürk nationalism was

¹²⁶ Katalin Siska, "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Effect on the New Concept of the Turkish Identity and Citizenship in Particular the Constitutional Regulation of the Young Turkish Republic," *Forum, Acta Jurid. Polit.* 6, no. 1 (2016): 139–149.

¹²⁷ Siska, "Sic Transit Gloria Mundi? Thoughts on Atatürkism.", *Op.Cit.*, 90.

¹²⁸ Katalin Siska, "Fear Not...!* Turkish Nationalism and the Six Arrows System - A State in Search of a Nation," *Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies* 57, no. No. 3 (2016): 275–288.

¹²⁹ Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi. Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli*, Türkiye: Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1981, 21.

¹³⁰ Siska, "Fear Not...!* Turkish Nationalism and the Six Arrows System - A State in Search of a Nation.", *Op.Cit.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Afet Inan, "Atatürk and the History Thesis," *Bellekten* 10, no. 3 (1939): 243–246.

not directed against others. It was not aggressive and not expansionist." It was a common theme of Turkish nationalism of this period to claim a Central Asian origin for the Sumerians and, hence, the Mesopotamian civilization."³⁵

Turkish nationalism aims to create and consolidate unity, strengthen the country through cohesion and eliminate separatist movements that threaten the unity of the state. Atatürk accepted the Pan-Turkic line ideologically but saw it more as a question of capabilities. He was realistic enough to recognize that his country was not yet strong enough, especially for a confrontation with the Soviets, which would have been an inevitable part of the expansion of Central Asia.³⁶ Atatürk nationalism was not racist, but it did not recognize any nation other than the Turks in the country to achieve assimilation. All citizens living in the territory of the Turkish Republic were considered Turkish by nationality, regardless of whether they were ethnically Greek, Kurdish, Armenian or Jewish. Atatürk nationalism tried to create cohesion by bypassing religious and ethnic issues – they removed them from the official definition of a nation. Instead, they were based on cultural and linguistic unity, a shared past and morality, and hoped that the policy of Turkification would successfully integrate ethnic groups that had not yet been fully assimilated into the Turkish nation.³⁷ Following the overview of nationalism, if the logical arc of the "six arrows" system is to be followed, I believe secularism should be discussed further.

4. Secularism

Two main types of secularism are historically distinguished: the French and the American models. The French type of secularism, rooted in the French Revolution, virtually banishes religion from public life into private life. It prohibits using religious symbols in public buildings, thus trying to remain neutral.³⁸ In contrast, American secularism is pluralistic. It does not elevate irreligion above religiosity – or vice versa – nor one religion above another. The U.S. Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; nor the right of peaceful assembly of the people..."³⁹. Atatürk's secularism, if we want to compare the two models, is closer to the French model. It is closer to the French model because the word *laiklik*, taken from the French word *laïcité*, is used to express the concept in language. Atatürk's secularism needs some interpretation in the context of nationalism.⁴⁰

Atatürk rejected the caliphate, which he considered nothing more than an object of ridicule in the eyes of the civilized and educated world. Religious orders and titles were banned in the name of secularism and converted church schools into secular schools.⁴¹ According to Andrew Mango, secularism followed naturally from Atatürk's rationalist philosophy. On the occasion of Nutuk, Mango noted that secularism was the least emphasized principle of the six arrows and that Atatürk did not need to stress the importance of secularism since it is only essential in a modern state of modernization that takes place without it. In his speeches, however, Atatürk urged Turks to purify their emotions and knowledge "in the light of actual science", thus preventing the imaginative ideas of the Islamic tradition that could threaten the nation's survival." For Atatürk, secularism becomes a means

³⁵ İlker Aytürk, "Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004): 1-25.

³⁶ J. Willard Marriott Digital Library, "The University of Utah," n.d.

³⁷ Paul Dumont, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, Turkey: Westview Press, 1984, 13.

³⁸ István Vásáry, "The Chances of Muslim Democracy in Turkey," *Piliscsaba, Acta et Studia*, 2008.

³⁹ *1st Amendment to the Constitution of the United States*, n.d.

⁴⁰ Siska, "Fear Not...!* Turkish Nationalism and the Six Arrows System - A State in Search of a Nation.", *Op.Cit.*, 6

⁴¹ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk*, London: John Murray, 2004, 32.

to show the world that Turks are not a primitive nation that has sunk to the level of prejudice and superstition."⁴² In this respect, it can be said that the caliphate is guilty because it is trying to sacrifice the Turkish nation to a mere whim and fantasy. In Atatürk's view, the republic can nevertheless be seen as progress, a desire for progress that is virtually identifiable with the Turks themselves." Secularism is portrayed as a natural trait of the republic, necessary for national survival and development, and like evolution," a nation must move with the times, or it will die."⁴³ Our greatest strength and authority in the eyes of the world is the new form and character of our system," he opined.⁴⁴ The "six arrows" system has brought about fundamental social changes beyond a purely symbolic role. To such social changes, populism comes into force.

5. Populism

The critical words of populism in the Kemalist sense are equality and solidarity. The Turkish War of Independence could only be successful with the cooperation of different social classes. Atatürk aimed to maintain this unity after the war.⁴⁵ In practice, equality meant, among other things, the abolition of privileges inherited from the Ottoman Empire, such as various titles, name reform and granting of women the right to vote in 1934. Atatürk populism can be seen from another angle as a reaction against the Bolshevik ideology slowly percolating across the border. This Turkish form of populism emphasized the pointlessness of class struggle through solidarity. The Kemalists were convinced that if society were to be shaped so that all occupational groups were in solidarity, there would be no need for the endless class struggle of "social Darwinism". The CHP's 1935 party platform states the following about populism: the source of sovereignty is the nation; everyone is equal before the law; no privileges are recognized; and the existence of Turkish social classes. Farmers, craftsmen, artisans, tradesmen, merchants, civil servants and other occupational groups are "indispensable to life and the well-being of others and the community". The word 'halk' (people) in the CHP's name shows that they do not represent class interests but the people's interests as a whole. It was also a good way of legitimizing the existing one-party system. Since there are no classes in Turkish society, there is no need for parties to defend sectional interests. The CHP is a mouthpiece for everyone, representing the whole nation.⁴⁶ There is apparent unity in all six principles, a desire for equality and a need for fundamental reforms and their implementation. However, this inevitably requires state intervention in the functioning of society. In this context, the next element is Ethatism.

6. Ethatism

In a Kemalist context, the word devletçilik (etatism) has two distinct but related meanings. Generally, it refers to a strategy in which the state intervenes in social, economic, cultural and educational activities. In the words of Atatürk: "The etatism we practice, while giving priority to individual work and effort, involves state intervention in all spheres where the general interest or the interest of the nation requires it. With the least possible delay, we aim to lead the country towards prosperity and well-being." In general, therefore, etatism is the paternalistic attitude of the state. It is a system where the state is responsible for the organization of the nation's life and where it is the state's task to find solutions to all

⁴² Siska, "Fear Not...!* Turkish Nationalism and the Six Arrows System - A State in Search of a Nation.", *Loc. Cit.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Suna Kili, "Atatürk Devrimi. Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli," *Türkiye, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları*, 1981.

⁴⁶ Dumont, "Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey.", *Op. Cit.*, 7.

problems.⁴⁷ Most references to etatism in the context of Kemalism, however, refer to the economic policy of the Ankara government, which was used to reorganize the Turkish economy after the trauma of the First World War and to mitigate the adverse local effects of the Great Depression in the 1930s, and which was undoubtedly a successful reform." Ethatism came to fruition after the Great Depression when the crisis caused the collapse of the Turkish agricultural market, and the Turkish government introduced a planned economy based on the Soviet model in 1934.⁴⁸ The sixth and final element of reform is reformism.

7. Reformism

Inkılâpçılık is one of the most challenging concepts in the Kemalist toolkit to translate into Western languages. It is usually translated as revolutionism or reformism. However, the real meaning of the word is somewhere in between. The inkılâpçılık have overlaps with both *islahat* (~reform) and *ihtilal* (~revolution). While inkılâp and *islahat* agree in the sense that change is not the result of a sudden, chaotic revolutionary fervour, inkılâp goes beyond simple reform (*islahat*) in terms of the extent of transformation. Inkılâp corresponds to the concept of *ihtilal* in the grandeur of change but is more orderly in how it is brought about. The word inkılâp, then, as understood above, is perhaps best translated as a broad, comprehensive transformation.⁴⁹ The essential characteristic of transformation in Kemalist terminology denotes a conscious policy, a consciously planned implementation of comprehensive reforms, rather than a spontaneous process. The concept also extends to the future: it was considered necessary that the country's leaders remain reformists to cope with the problems that would arise in the future.⁵⁰ Concerning reformism, in the next chapter of my thesis, I have dealt with some of the more important reforms from the point of view of Atatürkism as the concrete social manifestations of the principles of the 'six arrows' system.

8. The Atatürk Reforms

After an overview of the six arrows, I would like to illustrate their effects through concrete jurisprudence. As I mentioned in my introduction, I have tried to illustrate the impact of Kemalism on the practice of law through the impact assessment. This is why a theoretical overview of the six arrows was necessary. In the next part of my thesis, I will present the process of women's emancipation, thus demonstrating the impact of the six arrows on the practice of law. After Atatürk came to power, he began a series of reforms to transform Turkey radically. In parallel with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, there was a constant drive to adopt the 'Western way' from the 19th century onwards, particularly from the reforms of Tanzimat. In 1913, Abdullah Cevdet, who greatly influenced Atatürk, among others, put it as follows. There is no second civilization. Civilization is not civilization.⁵¹ The aim was not primarily to achieve calm but to achieve modernization - the (only) way to achieve modernization is through calm. A wide range of reforms were carried out.

For women, one of the most important demands, apart from the right to marry freely, equality under the law and the right to education, was the right to vote. Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, supported the advancement of women in all areas, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election. Universal suffrage was

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Szigetvári Tamás, "Az Iszlám Jelenléte a Török Gazdaságban," *Műhelytanulmányok. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet*, no. 79 (2008): 23.

⁴⁹ Dumont, "Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey.", *Op. Cit.*, 7.

⁵⁰ Artun Ünsal, "Realization of an Utopia by a Realist," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations. AÜSBF Yayınları XXVIII* (1979): 27-57.

⁵¹ Abdullah Cevdet, "Şime-i Muhabbet: Celal Nuri Beyin Geçen Nüshadaki Şime-i Husûmet Makalesine," *Cevap.İçtihat*, 1913.

introduced in 1934. Turkey granted women the right to vote in local elections as early as March 20 1930. In 1933, they were also given the right to participate in the village mayors' elections and be elected to village councils. On December 5 1934, women in Turkey gained the legal right to vote and stand for election in parliamentary elections.⁵²

On February 8 1935, Turkish women who participated in the first general elections won 18 seats in the Turkish parliament. In addition, Atatürk's decisive step towards women's emancipation was the removal of Islam from the legislature and the creation a new concept of citizenship that included women, setting the course for the transition from a monarchical to a republican system. These played a major role in the process of modernization following Western models. Turkey became a model of a 'secular Muslim' country, with reforms that made women equal to men before the law in the public sphere, in some family law provisions, but still far from equal to their male counterparts. The patriarchal family model persisted, and the importance of names (sexual purity, morality, untouchability) continued to justify restricting women's freedoms. Officially imposed policies were not implemented in all areas. Not even in the field of education. Most rural and poor urban girls did not attend education beyond primary school. 28% of women could not read or write. They were also under-represented in decision-making positions and politics. In the 1935 elections (the first time women were eligible for parliamentary elections), 18 women were elected to the Grand National Assembly, representing only 4.6% of the total.

Gender segregation has affected not only family life but also work life. Most of the domestic work was done by Turkish women. While it is true that the professions of doctor, university teacher and civil servant were popular among women, only 15.5% of women (23.1% of men) had a higher education qualification.⁵³

One of the most controversial reforms was the abolition of polygamy. The ban and penalization of this centuries-old institution were finally introduced by the new Civil Code of 1926. Under the law, a Turkish man could not marry more than one wife. Anyone who broke the law committed a crime and was punishable by one to five years imprisonment. This did not mean, however, that monogamy was now in force in Turkey. Those who had taken several wives in the past could not throw away their surplus women overnight. Only in the case of an infertile marriage was polygamy allowed by law. It allowed Turkish citizens to marry two wives if the first marriage was childless. However, even in such cases, the permission to marry was subject to strict conditions and always depended on the court's judgment.⁵⁴

The law was only passed after a lengthy debate. A large part of the National Assembly was vehemently opposed to the change in the traditional order. Mustafa Kamal Pasha had to use his authority to push through the unpopular proposal. After the bill was passed, the relevant ministries issued strict orders, leaving it to their subordinate authorities to implement the monogamy proposal ruthlessly. They instructed the authorities to check old harems to see if any surplus women had been dismissed while at the same time ensuring that no one circumvented the law and set up a new harem.

The implementation of the law has encountered many obstacles. The Turks refused to see the point of this "European folly". But Mustafa Kamal Pasha refused to hear of the restoration of the harem. However, abolishing harems was no easy task from an administrative point of view. The Turkish government ordered the harems to be counted in 1930. In Constantinople, there were about a hundred of them, but there must have been more in the countryside, where the modern spirit had not yet taken hold. Counting wives was accompanied by a statement of

⁵² Katalin Siska, *Kamal Atatürk Reformjainak Megítélése a Korabeli Magyar Sajtó És a Kormánypárti Török Cumhuriyet Tudósításai Körében*, Debrecen, Debrecen University Press, 2020, 19.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

their exact age, which also showed whether they had broken the age requirements for marriage. In this case, the husbands were severely punished. The abolition of harems naturally also affected Sultan's harems, and by President Kamal Atatürk, the once most famous harem in Constantinople - the harem of the Aga Hadji - was converted into a maternity clinic. However, monogamy was only the first step in marriage reform. The government did not want to lag behind Western countries in this respect, and it was ahead of them. On September 1 1926, a government decree issued a marriage regulation stating that Turkish subjects could no longer marry at will. Indeed, the main sections of the Regulation provide as follows:⁵⁵

1. If a Turkish subject wishes to marry, he must notify the mukhtar (the town magistrate) of his intention.
2. After this announcement, the *mukhtar* orders the person wishing to marry to appear with his or her chosen person on a certain day.
3. On the appointed day, the *mukhtar* establishes the identity of those wishing to marry in a way that cannot be doubted by applying a seal to their arms.
4. After establishing their identity, he tells them to go to the doctor and examine themselves.
5. The doctor will issue a certificate of the examination results, which must be presented to the inspector.
6. If the certificate states that the person wishing to marry is unfit, the *mukhtar* will not give permission. The certificate will also state whether they are unfit to marry only between themselves or unfit to marry anyone.
7. If the certificate shows no obstacle to their marriage, the mukhtar will grant the licence, and they can marry under the existing law.

Turkey's educated men and women welcomed this provision as a pledge of a more wholesome future for humanity. Another major reform affecting women was the granting of the right to vote. The Turkish Minister of the Interior issued a decree (March 20 1930), based on a law passed by the Grand National Assembly, instructing the authorities to include women on the electoral roll. According to the decree, women's right to vote was, for the time being, limited to municipal elections, when women were not only eligible but also entitled to stand for election. The Minister of Interior has announced that Turkish women will soon be able to participate in the National Assembly elections. In 1933, they were given the right to participate in the magistrates' election and be elected to village councils. Turkish women had already held municipal and other local administrative posts. In 1938, there were women candidates for mayor in Turkish municipal elections for the first time.⁵⁶ On December 5 1934, women gained the legal right to vote and stand for election in parliamentary elections in Turkey. The first Turkish woman to participate in the general elections of February 8 1935, won 18 seats in the Turkish Parliament.

Regarding impact assessment, it is essential to point out that the emancipation of women, completed by 1938, had unintended side effects. Turkish girls showed less and less inclination to marry. The Ministry of the Interior tried to promote marriage and family formation through various measures. A whole series of Home Office decrees were issued to this end. All administrative and legal fees were waived for married couples. A government decree obliged private companies to employ married men wherever possible. Civil servants married by a certain age were promoted immediately to public offices, while unmarried people found it harder to get ahead. There were also plans to set up a government fund for marriage to help poor married couples settle down.

⁵⁵ Emile Durkheim, *Critical Assesments*, London: Routledge, 2004, 20.

⁵⁶ Siska, "Kamal Atatürk Reformjainak Megítélése a Korabeli Magyar Sajtó És a Kormánypárti Török Cumhuriyet Tudósításai Körében.", *Op.Cit.*, 30

Finally, to justify the impact assessment, I would like to highlight the most extraordinary "idea" of the proposals, which has reached the legislative level. The government has submitted a legislative proposal to the Grand National Assembly of Angora. The proposal was to impose a tax on all non-disabled men over 25 who were not already married. The tax would have been 25 Turkish pounds per year on a minimum income of 1000 Turkish pounds per year and would have increased progressively with income up to a maximum of 500 Turkish pounds per year. The same legislation also stipulated that married but childless Turkish citizens over 25 must pay child tax. However, the proposal was so vehemently opposed by the Ankara House of Representatives that the plan was ultimately not implemented. Concerning the reforms listed above, if we apply the impact assessment method, we can undoubtedly find the embodiment in the practice of the six arrows of Kemalism.

D. CONCLUSION

The primary goal of my thesis was to provide a general overview of the "six arrows" system of Atatürkism, both theoretically and in terms of the six principles, including their actual social implications. To prove this, I used the impact assessment as a research method to prove that the six arrows of Kemalism appeared not only at the theoretical level but also in legal practice. During my research - in my opinion, this was confirmed since the theoretical effects of the six arrows can be found in almost all of the legislative reforms described in the thesis - especially concerning women's equality. In any case, it can be said that the six principles brought ideological change and had accurate results - social, political, economic, and moral. All six principles fully reflect the desire for civilization, cooperation with other peoples, and the foundations of a republic. More than a century later, their relevance is indisputable and should definitely be followed.

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