

A Thesis for the Degree of Ph.D. in Engineering

Soft Power Architecture:
Mechanisms, Manifestations and Spatial Consequences of
Embassy Buildings and Exported Ideologies

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Abstract:

Architecture can be viewed as a system of circumstance structuring that does not exist independently from the contextual occurrences. It captures, constructs and legitimizes oftentimes conflicting societal realities and ideologies. One of these aspects is observable within the concept of soft power, defined as the capability to attract and persuade without coercion and payments. Additionally, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction but cannot always be measured or have tangible physical manifestations.

What happens when soft power does have spatial manifestations? Soft power architecture is viewed an amalgamation of processes and outcomes that must be examined and explained as an indissoluble structure, throughout its lifespan. This research focuses on understanding, mapping and classifying the state-sponsored (re)production processes for spaces aimed at the communication of the officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity. Placement of embassy buildings is observed as the representative model for this research. Six exploratory case studies of embassy buildings in Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia confirm the necessity for the re-examination of the politics of space-making for diplomatic-consular headquarters.

The findings dispute the initially presumed discrepancies between the proclaimed values, implementation strategies and examined spatial manifestations. Embassy architecture, with its privileges and realization process, vary significantly depending on the interpretation of ideological narrative-building. The relevancy of architectural design is of secondary importance, while the examined conceptualization and management processes are more indicative of spatial (re)production and freedom and control in urban spaces.

Apart from providing an applicable methodology and method for examining soft power architecture, this research offers relevant data primarily for architects and urban planners, putting forward strategies for communication of identity for exported architectural typologies. Furthermore, the universality of these typologies allows their spatial consequences to be examined in various urban matrices and cross-referenced with points of interest for individual case studies.

Keywords: embassy, ideology, identity, soft power, spatial production

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Dedication:

It is my wish to humbly dedicate my work embodied in this thesis to the people of Japan.

The final stages of writing my thesis and residence in Japan in spring 2020 coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, rendering me unable to return to my home country of Serbia, stranding me in Tokyo from March 24 to July 1, 2020. Being in a precarious position, both the Government of Japan and Keio University ensured I was kept safe, via the MEXT Emergency Fund Scholarship, although they had no obligation to do so. My deepest gratitude goes out to the remarkable staff at the International Student Services at Keio University, namely Ms. Kimura Moe, Ms. Sato Yukiko, Ms. Shimamoto Eri and Ms. Yasukawa Hinako, who, with their constant support and much needed empathy in times of strife made me soldier on.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Architecture is a political art because it synthesizes public life, generally accepted social values and long-term goals. It is therefore much more than other arts associated with very specific societal contents. It is literally involved into the public life. (Jencks, 1973, pp. 40-41)

State governments, policymakers, architectural professionals and scholars alike are unable (or unwilling) to holistically approach the issues surrounding conceptualization, implementation and operation of architectures utilized as a public diplomacy tool. Thusly presumed attitude stems from the complexity of the matter at hand, being wholly interdisciplinary, long-term diplomatic and spatial investments with uncertain outcomes and lack of awareness of professionals and policymakers alike. These claims will be examined and substantiated through an exploration of official public policies and foreign policy standpoints of countries in regard to conceived and implemented spatial manifestations.

This thesis seeks to examine and amalgamate the theoretical frameworks of ideology, identity and (spatial) governance, observing how the application of their subsequent mechanisms transfer onto exported architectural typologies utilized as a communication tool. The main presupposition is that these typologies will be imbued with a different set of meanings (e.g. cultural, ideological, etc.) and/or a set of goals to be achieved in the environments where placed, producing observable spatial effects.

At its core, this research is an examination of the freedom and control of production and reproduction modes of identity and subsequent spatial consequences for exported architectural spaces aimed at the communication of the officially endorsed images/messages of cultural identities.

Throughout history, exported architectural typologies have had many incarnations, from the ones intended to facilitate subjugation, rejecting the idea/culture of dialogue, consideration and cultural sensitivity, with a multi-level network of detrimental, tangible (as well as intangible) effects onto the urban tissue. For example, a byproduct of colonial architecture can be observed in the destruction of native vernacular architectural typologies and/or established urban patterns, replacing them with “desirable” manifestations. On the other hand, one can observe exported architectural typologies intended to (strategically) project benevolent intent, with typologies used to ostensibly establish and/or project mutual understanding between nations.

A note must be made of the awareness that spatial consequences for any type of exported architecture conceptualization (projected and/or perceived *malevolent* or *benevolent* consequences) can have either beneficial or adverse effects onto the urban city matrices, unrelated to its original intentions (intention vs. reality debate). This is especially important for the introduction of the *time* component, as it plays a crucial role in defining and implementing the type of exported architecture of the sending state. The time component, in this sense, will be considered as a definitive benchmark utilized for review and interpretation of the effects of exported architectures vis-à-vis perception and their tangible spatial effects in urban environments.

The placement of the diplomatic-consular headquarters typology and soft power architecture in the host cities' urban matrix is equally significant. This project will not deal with examples that are placed in a pre-planned urban matrix designated specifically for the examined typologies. To clarify, designed clusters of embassy buildings will have different spatial consequences than the typologies placed in matrices not primarily intended for such functions. The interplay of freedom and control in these two spaces will be much different. Examples of e.g. the Embassy row in Washington, DC, Canberra, Australia and Brasilia, Brazil, will not be taken into consideration for this particular project, but are recognized as a worthwhile endeavor for future comparative studies on spatial consequences. Interestingly, random (non-predetermined) placement of embassy typology in the city matrices will trigger future grouping of new developments, creating clusters, ultimately changing the public space function and usage dynamics. For further discussion on the introduction of these elements into the urban structures see Chapter 5.1.1.

In order to better grasp the complex and oftentimes ambiguous nature of various concepts, goings-on and their surrounding process and interlinks, this thesis will endeavor to use *precise definitions* as an *effective research tool apparatus*. Such formulations will be produced in the context of this specific research, but it is not presumed that different academic inquiries will not develop their research term vocabularies. The previous notation may be considered superfluous, but the complexities of the research matter demand an outstanding rigor in the processes of its conceptualization, examination and written expression.

Exported architecture utilized as a communication tool is a neutral, appropriate term that will be utilized for this research, subsuming spatial manifestations for both types of intent, projected knowingly or unknowingly. Both architectures with detrimental effects on cities, its inhabitants and presumably, by extension, bilateral relations, as in a show of supremacy or the ones for the strategic strengthening of

bilateral ties, endeavor to communicate particular messages and certain patterns of their inception and implementation can be observed.

To further refine the nomenclature of research typologies, a new term, previously unavailable in academic research will be introduced: *soft power architecture*. Soft power architecture, in the context of this research, is considered to be any state-sponsored work of architecture exported outside the borders of its country of origin (e.g. embassies, consulates, cultural centers... etc.), built purposefully, as a new object, from the ground up, with a clear intention of enhancing the relations (on different levels and scales) between the sending and receiving states, with or without ulterior motives on one or both sides.

This study will particularly focus on exported architectural typologies that are utilized for diplomatic-consular purposes, tentatively placed within the scope of soft power architecture, namely embassy buildings and their formation, implementation processes and spatial consequences. This typology was deemed the most appropriate for this research due to several reasons:

Firstly, the partial approach of previous academic research, namely examining processes of conceptualization, implementation and operation for this typology individually, but never been brought into an active connection between said concepts and following-up on the spatial consequences of these architectural typologies onto cities and its inhabitants.

Secondly, examined diplomatic-consular building typology construction processes operate under the legal auspices of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations (abbreviated: VCDR), granting a special status of extraterritoriality to these buildings. This privilege alone carries its own set of challenges, from legal framework for construction in host countries, to effective disengagement of various stakeholder groups, eliminating the culture of active idea exchange, discussion and zoning hearings, to name a few.

Thirdly, although comparatively rarely built when compared to other typologies, embassy buildings and other spatial manifestation for diplomatic-consular purposes will ostensibly have the most profound impact on cities and its inhabitants, especially if one notes that the mitigation of potential adverse effect is severely limited.

Lastly, since there are no long-term strategies in place to address the examined exported architectural typology utilized as a communication tool, the findings of this research will give general pointer and guidelines to commence strategic thinking of an all-encompassing policy when dealing with embassy building typologies.

As this research differentiates between the state of origin and the state that receives exported architectural typologies utilized as a communication tool, these terms will be clearly defined, expanding Berridge's (2015) classification:

Sending state – a state of origin for any architectural and non-architectural manifestations that are specifically formulated, manufactured and promoted with the sole purpose of export and/or achieving a specific set of goals outside of the sending states' borders.

Receiving state – a state that acts as a host for any architectural and non-architectural manifestation of the sending state, ostensibly granting special privilege e.g. preferential treatment, land management or favorable media coverage (either obligatory or individually motivated), with the presupposition that the receiving state operates within its own set of ideological, architectural and spatial rules and processes.

The main difference when referring to other academic works dealing with architecture as a tool for the construction of identity, ideological representation and ideological confirmation is that they are usually set in a pre-established context of society or architecture (within a state) with the interpretation being somewhat limited, due to the nature of forces that place and govern these processes.

Similar observations can be made for previously mentioned colonial architecture, as the producers of said spatial manifestations will wield the majority of power when compared to the various actors and stakeholders in occupied (host) countries.

Other instances of exported architecture refer to specific situations that have a *limited lifecycle*, e.g. international conventions, exhibitions, expos and other manifestations that require an architectural/spatial intervention. Those events are also specific in nature (Debord, 2002), and will not operate under the same set of rules during their conception, implementation and in situ processes.

With soft power architecture, however, this can change, as interpretative stratagems can act and evolve differently within the diverse context and produce dissimilar consequences and meanings, not necessarily in synchronization with original intentions, as it happens with the export of architecture/ideology. One must underline that these "mutation" effects are applicable for any projected type of exported architecture, the ones communicating power and supremacy of the sending state *and* soft power architecture, representing the willingness for (an outward) display of deepening mutual understanding between countries. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on the exported architecture that, in its conception, implementation and spatial consequences stages had the latter case of conceptualization, as

the mechanisms that govern these processes are deemed to be more complex, when compared to the former.

Furthermore, implementation, monitoring and follow-up processes, if handled with care, either separately or as a set, can produce and/or sustain effects that are in line or differ from the original intentions. Again, the underlying value of management processes through inception, implementation and management cannot be stressed enough.

One must note, however, that soft power architecture alone cannot be used to fully examine and define ideologies and stratagems of the sending country, as its manifestations abroad are shaped both by internal processes and factors native to that environment and in many cases, ideological images and spatial manifestation must be amended to facilitate the requirements of foreign environments (even with the privileges awarded by the VCDR). Architecture is a system of construction of circumstances that do not exist independently from the contextual occurrences. Architecture, in fact, does not capture the entirety of, but rather constructs and legitimizes every societal reality and ideology (Ignjatović, 2007). Thusly, soft power architecture should be viewed as a *snapshot* (Czarniawska, 2002) of the conceptualization and implementation processes and policies of every actor involved, as well as its produced spatial effects.

Architecture that will be examined and that is defined as the architecture of soft power will be the one forged with the original intention to facilitate and enhance the sender country's interests abroad, with or without ulterior motives. The architecture of intimidation¹, showpieces of supremacy and might, will be removed from this research, and a clear set of indicators will be put in place to separate and classify these typologies.

To investigate the newly coined and introduced the term of soft power architecture, this thesis will particularly focus on three aspects deemed crucial for obtaining relevant and applicable results:

¹ Such as totalitarian architecture and subsequent urban planning felicitating its commonly exaggerated dimensions, designed to elicit feelings of subservience and demonstrate power, e.g. Ceausescu's "urban renewal" of Bucharest, Romania (Feffer, 2014).

1. Mechanisms of soft power architecture are considered to be all official and officially endorsed policies and processes of the sending state that shape, in different capacities, its spatial and non-spatial manifestation for export and/or implementation abroad.

2. Manifestations of soft power architecture are considered to be all purposefully built architectural manifestation (e.g. embassies, consulates...etc.) in the receiving state that are outwardly *adjusted* (ideologically, culturally and spatially) to fit the requirements of the host environments, whilst also being in sync with ideological tendencies of the sending state. *Adjustment* refers to any conscious or purposeful molding of manifestations intended for export, in order to maximize potential success rate for an intended set of goals.

3. Spatial consequences are considered to be all physical and intangible, measurable effects caused by the placement of soft power architecture within the urban context of the receiving state. Some of the factors that can be used as indicators are occurrences in urban matrices such as accessibility, perceived personal safety, real estate and land prices, bilateral economic and cultural exchange...etc. Further discussion on the chosen set of indicators and benchmarks will be elaborated upon in the following chapters.




Figure 1. Interconnectedness between three key facets of research

This research will focus on the abovementioned conceptual and theoretical frameworks, with the following overarching ambitions:

1. To position and develop a general methodological approach for research and monitoring the implementation and different lifecycle points² of soft power architecture placed in urban environments, as this particular methodology, holistic in its core, is currently unavailable.
2. Apply the newly designed methodology to examine a number of soft power architecture typologies, noting the produced spatial consequences.
3. Discuss how the findings of spatial consequences in urban environments can be utilized to inform the policies (a mechanism) that govern the spatial production (manifestation) of soft power architecture.

An exceptionally important point that ought to be underlined is that the newly developed methodology and investigative method will be applicable in a wide variety of global contexts, owing to the specific nature of processes governing the spatial production of soft power architecture typologies, mainly the extraterritorial privileges.

It is imperative to note that the extensive literature review has been utilized as a research apparatus in the sense of creating a methodological approach. Undertaken interdisciplinary approach, with various theoretical concepts being cross-referenced and overlapped, was utilized to recognize valid causalities and make relevant conclusions. Thusly formed methodology, in turn, informed the definition of the research method, namely the chosen indicators for explorative case studies presented in this project. Most notably, the methodological approach informed the three main components through which the concept of soft power architecture was explored: mechanisms, manifestations, and spatial consequences.

Finally, the case study of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia is utilized in several chapters (see e.g. Chapter 4.7) of this thesis, due to its specific construction process and architectural/spatial particularities, as well as the author's personal involvement in its implementation. It is specific in both the mechanisms

² For this research understood as the cycles of conception, implementation and (spatial) management, until its repurposing or demolition.

implemented for its construction, as well as its potential for further academic investigation, due to the spatial particularities of new architectural developments in its close vicinity.

1.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

The main hypothetical assumption of this thesis is the discussion is conducted within a framework of (sending) state's-controlled mechanisms of (spatial) production of national identity. In such structure various stakeholders, largely unintentionally, utilize processes to inculcate mechanisms (and exported, state-endorsed images/messages of identities deemed desirable) with a specific set of values (e.g. cultural and/or ideological), with those values declaratively or expressly presented and promoted outside of its borders.

Furthermore, one of the main premises of this research is that various meanings are embedded in the process of declarative, desirable identities projected onto exported spatial manifestation. Subsequently, an additional hypothetical assumption is that the value of soft power architecture can be observed in its *processes*, from its conceptualization and mechanisms for its reproduction and dissemination, to its implementation and management. By taking this stance, this thesis confirms that the “finished product” will not always be an accurate reflection of the prevailing (primarily ideological) narratives of the sending state, due to the involvement of multiple actors and shaping forces, but nonetheless, these products will have a spatial impact and consequences onto the urban tissues of placed environments in host countries.

Moreover, it is anticipated that the changes in dominant state ideological processes can be clearly noted and mapped for exported architectural manifestations utilized to project said ideology and/or a desirable set of values. Likewise, ideological turns will not be only visible in exported spatial typologies, but also in state policies, as well as internal (in-state) mechanisms for ideological reproduction and confirmation.

An important point ought to be made that soft power architecture, even if placed within a framework of thought-out policies, implementation and management strategies, will most likely be a side-effect at any given point in time. As the emphasis is on the processes shaping these typologies and their spatial consequences, these categories are changeable through time.

Furthermore, this project will endeavor to explore the possibility of fusing the presented concepts of soft power architecture and the currently dominant and examined diplomatic-consular headquarters typologies.

The goal is to examine whether the evolution of the current typological characteristics of primarily embassy buildings into those with soft power architecture characterizes is possible. Moreover, the question of alteration for all the subsequent processes for the embassy building typology (mechanisms, implementation and spatial consequences) into those analogous to the soft power architectural typologies is achievable and/or feasible.

After careful consideration of the theoretical and conceptual approach for the examined subject matter, research questions in the service of further study were formulated:

1. Are there identifiable mechanisms (political, cultural, legal, architectural, etc.) that are utilized for production of space and meaning for exported typologies, as a manifestation of ideology(-ies)?
2. Are spatial consequences of exported architectural typologies observable and/or quantifiable in the public space?
3. What are the alternative spatial generators of values recognized for the conceptual framework of soft power architecture?

Hypotheses are thought of as neither too specific nor too general, unconcerned with moral or ethical questions, but rather serving as a prediction of consequences. It ought to be clarified that the ascertained attitudes regarding “limited awareness” and “insufficiently clear perception” are not dwelling upon the issues that may be considered moral or ethical in nature. Although Chapter 4.4.1 addresses the moral and ethical obligations of architects in the production of exported typologies, said research was conducted in the service of mapping the placement of the producers of soft power architecture in a complex system of spatial production. The motivations (ideological or otherwise) of the studied group were not hypothesized. Rather, by examining the causes and effects recognized as pertinent for this research, objectivity is to be kept and consequences of examined actions predicted i.e. “what if” scenarios are researchable.

Proposition and more specific research hypothesis of this thesis are as follows:

1. Official governing bodies tend to possess limited awareness of the possible positive effect that soft power architecture can ensue and consciously choose to disregard its potential (if such awareness exists), either under the guise of ensuring the safety of its constituent living and working abroad or through justifications found in a variety of factors (political, economic,

diplomatic... etc.), with positive effect generators sought elsewhere (discussed on pp. 83-89, leading to pertinent conclusions on p. 282) and/or

2. Official governing bodies, to an extent, tend to possess an insufficiently clear perception that they ought to invest in soft power credit abroad via architecture with accompanying functions and content it can provide, but the lack of interdepartmental synchronization of governmental offices and absence of long-term strategies (for both the host and sending states) hinder these goals (discussed on pp. 127-134, leading to pertinent conclusions on p. 282) and/or

3. Spatial consequences of thusly formed spaces, if not carefully managed throughout their conception, implementation and monitoring process [lifespan], produce effects that are adverse to the original ideas, concepts and intentions (if any are in place to begin with) and have tangible and measurable manifestations in urban city matrices (discussed on pp. 180-202, leading to pertinent conclusions on p. 282).

4. If there are any affirmative initiatives and/or beneficially produced spatial qualities, these factors will be either a byproduct of a combination of previously implemented policies and the climate (e.g. geopolitical, economic, cultural, bilateral... etc.) of the examined point in time, or these factors will arise as a direct consequence of individual efforts (from key policymakers, diplomats, activists... etc.). These particular facets are discussed on pp. 245-252, leading to pertinent conclusions on p. 282.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

Contribution of this thesis can be viewed as multifaceted: specific points of interest may be independently extricated and utilized, with its ambitions being, as follows: apart from adding to the overall archeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1982), its main purpose is to map and examine a lifespan/lifecycle of ideological processes, from its inception, its mechanisms for reproduction, produced spatial manifestation, having that manifestation transplanted into an environment with a different set of (ideological/architectural/planning) processes/values and ultimately, how the built manifestation affects said environment and vice versa. Having understood these processes and their various outcomes onto the built environment, different professional groups can make an effort to mitigate certain negative aspects that ideological reproductions will expectedly make, or to obtain a more thorough knowledge of the

development process. In doing so, it becomes possible to intervene at certain crucial junctures, in order to presumably shift the perception of various interest groups and lessen the undesirable spatial effects.

Interested readers and professionals alike, that have an intention to possibly implement certain findings or apply specific conclusions of this text should be aware of its temporal and contextual component. This thesis provides a lasting tool for acquisition, consolidation and ultimately opening of relevant information for further research, in particular critical analysis through the lenses of architecture, urban planning, political science, international relations and cultural studies. Successful professionals are always attuned to their environment, circumstances and the context in which they are creating, so in order to achieve the full potential of initial intentions and the desired outcome, one must view the findings of this thesis as a set of guidelines applicable for a specific case. This project provides a pertinent starting point, a methodological outline of how one should view and research the phenomena that surround the exported ideological manifestations and its effect onto the built environments. Whilst ideologies are oftentimes ruled by the cyclical nature of processes (birth, maturity and decay) surrounding them, a buildup of similar narratives can be noted, for ideologies and their spatial manifestations, as well as the constant presence and interaction with outside forces that inadvertently shape them.

There is not a singular possible use and application of this thesis; professionals from various fields, such as architects, designers, urban planners, government officials, diplomats and others that are involved in bilateral relations and subsequent place-making decisions can pick and choose certain parts of this text. Some of the potential applications may be straightening positions vis-à-vis urban planning commissions, long-term soft power diplomatic strategies utilizing architecture as a catalyst to achieve these goals, as well as serving as an informational tool for users of spaces in cities, empowering them and reaffirming the importance to the notion of the right to the city or at least, providing an understanding of underlying processes for an informed reader.

To underline, the author of this text is not a political scientist or an expert in the matters of governance and public diplomacy. As such, all presented theoretical particularities will be utilized to strengthen the legitimacy of claims and hypotheses, ultimately bringing everything back to a spatial dimension of architecture and urban planning.

1.3 Limitations and Potential

As previously underlined, the examined academic sources will serve to inform and shape the methodology of research of soft power architecture and ultimately translating it into spatial terms. These effects, propositions and extricated guidelines, therefore, fall under the purview of the author's expertise i.e. architecture and urban planning. Great potential for educating the general professional audiences (of various affiliations) is consequently possible, as the majority of interest groups, as will be shown throughout this research, are not aware of the multitude of possible outcomes these architectural typologies will have, both intangible (spatial) and intangible (e.g. soft power) terms.

Supplementary inquiries will address the issue in relation to *when* does an exported spatial manifestation aimed at the communication of officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity *becomes* soft power architecture? The author will argue, analogously with the "finished (architectural/spatial) product", pinpointing the exact moment when said architecture transforms into another is *irrelevant*, but rather the *process* of conversion. However, this research will draw attention to several factors deemed important when coming together and making a cross-disciplinary network, will inadvertently depict the commencement of *becoming* processes of soft power architecture.

One can provide an attempt at the explanation for the previously under-researched field of soft power architecture: a proposed holistic approach (of governments, policymakers, stakeholders, scholars, architects and urban planners) can become, at times, overly complex and time-consuming. This fact, especially for the groups of actors dealing with the ever-changing realities in the global arena of international relations (as this is where soft power architecture is positioned by default) will not provide an additional attraction for further pursuit of this area of knowledge.

As previously noted, when dealing with the issues of soft power architecture, its conceptualization, implementation and management stages, a *moving target* metaphor is apt. This factual state, therefore, requires an ever-shifting approach and ultimately there cannot be a unified theoretical approach, but rather, a set of guiding theory and practice-based theories, to be applied and adjusted, with caution, to every individual case. It goes without saying this facet is *conditio sine qua non* for implementation of presented findings, as universally applicable to any other responsible practice. The ultimate and desired goal is that future findings will be further refined in the coming years of academic research and practical application.

The challenges facing future soft power architecture pursuits can be summarized in a single word: *unpredictability*. This represents a factual state for this research, which will be further elaborated and expanded upon in the following text: when one considers such an abstract concept, it entails and signifies unpredictability of approaches, processes, outcomes, as is the case with exploring the future(s) of any complex system. Every individual field of the study presented in this project, as well as the interwoven, multilayered network of actors and activities is in a constant state of flux. Accordingly, one can strive to make well-researched and argued, reliable *snapshots* of particular times and activities, overlapping them, introducing the time component and subsequently make an informed projection or, more likely, a set of informed projections – some of which might be contradictory to each other³, as well as potentially emerging patterns.

Not limited only to the scope of this research, the issue, presented as a conceptual pair of meanings i.e. *intention vs. reality* is an additional, pertinent actuality that ought to be examined and presented. As made known, especially in architectural/spatial terms, this quandary is ever-present and presents a challenge for architects and urban planners. Adding a complex, multilayered network of actors and activities to this conceptual pair, the discrepancy between planned and achieved outcomes can gain significantly in prominence. Nonetheless, most of the professionals operating in architectural and urban planning spheres are knowledgeable of this fact; additionally, it is not limited only to spatial practices, but also to any professional undertaking that has its objectives set in the future, to be materialized. Although with additional complexity, the gap between intention and reality can become more prominent, by utilizing findings and guidelines presented in this research, the majority of adverse effects can be mitigated, significantly, if not avoided completely.

Continuing with the notion of dualities, the following is also necessary to note, as a factor contributing to the overall quality of discussion of the outcomes of this research: *generalized vs. particular* in soft power architecture. Namely, the potential for a further application can be found in both terms: generalized, in terms of this research, will be the findings on the transference mechanism applied for exported architectural typologies. By understanding these patterns, it will be even possible to reverse-engineer previous spatial manifestations' intended meanings and point out the particularities of examined processes.

³ in the sense of “Conflictual character of *the urban*” (Lefebvre, 2009)

Additionally, by understanding applied patterns, one can draw relevant conclusions in relation to any particularities for examined case studies, as the main premise of this research is that, ultimately, every future soft power architecture development must utilize an individualized approach.

In addition, the obtained knowledge base in the literature review of this research was predominantly founded upon the theoretical/academic school of thought conceptualized within the Western scholastic narrative. As the author of this research has had an aspiration of making an interdisciplinary inquiry that would, in its core, present a transnational meta-narrative in shaping exported spatial manifestation, it is only reasonable to acknowledge that the examined sources may not be sufficient, but the method introduced by this project allows for the inclusion of transcultural nuances. Although there cannot exist a singular, “objective” truth, providing a universal answer, the inclusion of multiple academic standpoints may serve to enrich and strengthen the presented arguments.

Continuing in a similar vein and considering that the most prominent case studies and theoretical postulations examined in this research were those of Japanese origin, the language issue/barrier must be addressed. As the vast majority of obtained and reviewed sources are written in the English language or translated into English, it must be noted that an entire corpus of knowledge written in Japanese (and other) language(s) was inaccessible and therefore not included within the scope of this project. Although one can argue that the most prominent and influential works of Japanese (and other nationalities’) scholastic works have been translated to English and circulated within the academic circles, future inclusion of non-English texts (particularly those written in Japanese) will add an immensely valuable contribution to the overall argument and therefore the field of knowledge.

Last but not least, the question of utilizing the concept of *extraterritoriality* within this research must be elaborated upon: although it provided a valid basis for cross-comparison between different spatial contexts (i.e. Belgrade, Serbia and Tokyo, Japan) within the scope of this research, nonetheless, the importance of varied urban matrices and positioning of soft power architecture within cities cannot be stressed enough. Although extraterritoriality can give legitimacy (most notably in legal terms, under the auspices of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations), for abstracting the surrounding spatial context of host cities, this can occasionally provide somewhat skewed findings. Placement of soft power architectures will also provide an increasingly important input factor for refining one’s argument: exported spatial manifestations will presumably have different mechanisms of conceptualization, implementation and management based on their surrounding spatial context. Different strategies will arise

depending on the spatial context, such as for those placed in dense urban matrices, on the city periphery (e.g. requirement for new U.S. embassy buildings) or within pre-determined, pre-planned plots of land, allocated for the diplomatic-consular use, either by an urban plan (e.g. Washington, DC, Canberra and Brasilia) or spontaneously, clustering building with similar function together (e.g. Belgrade).

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis, as per its title, is divided into seven (7) Chapters, with three distinct sections (Mechanisms, Manifestations, Spatial consequences), each serving as an individual building block for the concept of soft power architecture. As previously noted, any individual section can be viewed as a standalone subdivision, if the reader has the notion that all of the presented theoretical literature review and subsequent discussions will ultimately translate into the spatial dimension i.e. soft power architecture.

Chapter 1, titled *Introduction*, sets the research framework for this project, noting its hypothesis and research questions, discusses its limitations and potential, giving a brief overview of the entire content presented in this research.

Chapter 2, titled *Conceptual Framework*, introduces and problematizes the conceptual framework and places emphasis on the necessity for a multidisciplinary approach when dealing with exported architectural typologies. Four major concepts (ideology, identity, architecture and urban planning and international relations) are be interlinked to create a base for further examination of the previously non-researched field of soft power architecture. The concept of risk and its implications on the urban structure is elaborated.

Chapter 3 of the thesis deals with *Mechanisms* and buildup processes that, in the majority of cases, will have influence onto the examined architectural typology of soft power architecture. Chapter 3 is comprised of six individual sub-chapters, covering topics pertinent for further development of the presented argument.

Chapter 3.1, titled *Identity*, presents the conceptual postulations of identity and its transference onto architecture. Theoretical approach of organizational identity is expanded upon, elected for its relevancy for this project. Special consideration is given to the overview of the layered identity theory in international relations, focusing on the Japanese case.

Chapter 3.2, titled *Ideology*, focuses at the theoretical development of the concept of ideology. This section of the thesis will also make an active connection between ideology, architecture and architectural propaganda, drawing upon the theoretical postulations of Louis Althusser. This section elaborates how utilization of spatial manifestations can serve to construct, reinforce and/or legitimize certain ideological standpoints.

Chapter 3.3, titled *Ideology and Identity*, links the two concepts, showcasing how the examined combination can, most frequently, lead to transmission of prevailing ideas and/or concepts onto various fields of scholarly research, ultimately having a tangible manifestation embodied in architecture. The concept of Japanese uniqueness, embodied is the concept of *Nihonjinron* is discussed.

Chapter 3.4, titled *Public Diplomacy: An Overview*, presents the differentiation between the concepts of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange. An example of the evolution of Japan's concepts of cultural diplomacy in the XX century is presented.

Chapter 3.5, titled *Soft Power*, presents the concept of *Soft Power*, arguing how its relevancy within the context of international relations and the impact it has on policymakers and architectural professionals. Overview of the Japanese soft power potential is presented, arguing its importance for subsequent spatial manifestations.

Chapter 3.6, titled *Extraterritoriality*, elaborates upon the theoretical implications of this concept, recognized as an important spatial feature of the examined diplomatic-consular building typologies for this project.

Chapter 4 of the thesis will deal with *Manifestation* of previously examined theoretical and conceptual postulations; chosen examples depict specific realms in which various goings-on form either intangible (e.g. policies) or tangible (e.g. embassy building typologies) manifestations of a multi-layered, multidisciplinary, cross-disciplinary nature. Chapter 4 is comprised of seven individual sub-chapters, covering topics pertinent for further development of the presented argument.

Chapter 4.1, titled *Production of Images*, presents a case study of the Japan House project, as an indicative example how officially sanctioned/desirable images of national and cultural identity are conceptualized and disseminated for consumption.

Chapter 4.2, titled *Cultural Relation Policies*, examines the theoretical postulation of international, interdisciplinary, multi-actor network in international relations, building a framework for future examination of the implementation processes for spatial manifestations of soft power.

Chapter 4.3, titled *Legal Framework* gives an overview of the important facets of the codified postulations of the diplomatic law i.e. the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations [VCDR], noting its particularities related to spatial characteristic of the diplomatic missions. Concrete implementation and the consequences of examined legal framework are further elaborated in the case of Serbia, presenting the discrepancies between the host country's laws regarding the construction processes of embassy typology and the VCDR.

Chapter 4.4, titled *Architectural Professionals and Soft Power Architecture*, makes an inquiry into the issues of ethics in architectural practices and examines the relationship between ideology and its influence on the architects' communicative processes. Special attention is given to the conceptualized notion of 'architects as identity entrepreneurs'.

Chapter 4.5, titled *Architectural Typologies: Diplomatic-consular Outposts*, presents and builds upon the theoretical postulations for various spatial manifestation of the predominantly embassy building typologies, noting its specificities and further expanding the presented concepts.

Chapter 4.6, titled *U.S.'s Embassies*, presents the guiding principle, architecture and urban planning particularities of the U.S. embassy Standard Embassy Design program, as well as its necessary architectural requirements, arguing universally applicable nature of the examined processes.

Chapter 4.7, titled *Spatial Branding*, presents this concept as one of the methods for branding exported architectural identities and its subsequent spatial manifestations, presenting a case study of the spatial branding processes for Block 11a, New Belgrade, Serbia.

Chapter 5 titled *Spatial Consequences* and by developing the theoretical framework for its investigation, this section illustrates the far-reaching consequences embassy typologies have on the urban structure and its users. Furthermore, this chapter, divided into three subchapters serves as an overview of six exploratory case studies noting and discussing the points of interest in this project, for Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia.

Chapter 5.1 underlines the importance of the concept of spatial consequences and its implication on the urban matrices of the host cities, most notably discussing the concept of freedom and control in public spaces.

Chapter 5.2, titled *Method of Analysis*, presents the developed methodological approach for the study of soft power architecture. Multiple indicators and theoretical concepts pertinent for this project are explored, ultimately examining the methodological implication of thusly developed framework.

Chapter 5.3, titled *Exploratory Case Studies*, presents the examination of a total of six embassy typologies in Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia (three each), chosen for their spatial and conceptual specificities, investigated through the previously developed methodological apparatus.

Chapter 6, titled *Discussion*, elaborates upon the relevant findings and expands upon the implication of the obtained data for future academic research. The meaning, importance and relevance of the assembled results is explained, relating it to the previously presented literature review and research questions.

Chapter 7, titled *Conclusion*, summarizes the presented research, states the answers to the posed research questions, making recommendations for future scholastic investigations. Furthermore, demonstration is given on the new contribution to knowledge, giving a clear understanding of the main arguments how the research on the mechanisms, manifestations and spatial consequences of soft power architecture has advanced the profession of architecture and urban planning.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Positioning the field(s) of interdisciplinary research

The ambition of this project is to interweave various disciplines, concepts and themes relevant for this study. In order to do so, the first step is to deliberate upon ontological fields one wants to operate within and extricate pertinent concepts, scaling them down to keywords. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ontology⁴ as a set of concepts and categories in a subject area or domain that shows their properties and the relations between them. Additionally, for the purposes of this research, the term *relational ontology* will be presented as the most appropriate one, on a number of accounts. Relational ontology is the philosophical position that what distinguishes subject from subject, subject from object, or object from object is *mutual relation* rather than substance (Yannaras & Russell, 2011).

In order to commence placement within the framework of the previously researched archeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1969), the author typically elects the appropriate terms for their research. In the case of this thesis, the initial proposition of terms that would further inform and guide the research process was the following: Embassy; Ideology; Identity; Soft power; Cultural nationalism; Cultural identity; Representation; Place branding; Cultural policies; Japan; Diplomacy; International relations [IR] and many others. The next step was to decide which terms would accurately reflect the research aims; the following four keywords were chosen for their specificity and the potential of their respective relational ontological connections:

- Ideology
- Identity
- International Relations [IR]
- Architecture and urban planning

⁴ ontology. (n.d.). The Merriam-Webster.Com Dictionary. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ontology>

The core concept of this research, defined as soft power architecture is defined and positioned within the intersection of the four abovementioned key concepts, i.e. International Relations, Ideology, Identity and Architecture and Urban Planning. The proposition of this project is that, when dealing with spatial manifestation of thusly combined key concepts, soft power architecture or its variations will be identified, without exception.

To provide a graphic illustration of the projected interrelations between the concepts to be examined, a conceptual four-set Venn diagram was chosen (see: Figure 2). This diagram clearly presents, includes and codifies the chosen concepts and their ontological relations. The main four concepts have been codified as: Ideology [A]; Identity [B]; International Relations [C] and Architecture and Urban Planning [D], with the main point of investigation, soft power architecture, determined within the intersection i.e. [ABCD].

The permutation of the codified concepts is presented in the Table 1; special attention is given to the three-component combinations, namely ABC, BCD, ACD and ABD, as they give more specific point of interest within the framework of interrelations and interpretation, when compared to the soft power architecture concept.




Figure 2 . Four-set Venn diagram, with codified key concepts: Ideology [A]; Identity [B]; International Relations [C] and Architecture and Urban Planning [D].

Keyword combination	Codification
Ideology, identity, IR	ABC
Ideology, identity, architecture	ABD
Ideology, identity	AB
Ideology, IR, architecture	ACD
Ideology, IR	AC
Ideology, architecture	AD
Identity, IR, architecture	BCD
Identity, IR	BC
Identity, architecture	BD
IR, architecture	CD

Table 1. Interrelations between the codified key concepts: Ideology [A]; Identity [B]; International Relations [C] and Architecture and Urban Planning [D].

When elaborating the issue of interrelations, in the context of this research, one cannot go without adding another layer of *dual* political controls, or rather *duplication*, *two sets* of everything: ideologies, processes, forms, formats. In this sense, it is extremely pertinent to view and consider all examined goings-on in *the plural*. Such duality and/or plurality can be directly applied to exported architecture i.e. for ideologies, processes, jurisdictions, obligations ... etc. This primarily refers to the bilateral relations between the host (receiving) and sending countries, but these relations will gain further complexity with presupposition that the duplication will also occur *within* the said countries, respectively.

Firstly, it is necessary to provide an adequate method to calculate all the possible combinations of between the previously codified key concepts A, B, C and D. To do so, the combinations were chosen;

combinations are a way to calculate the total outcomes of an event where order of the outcomes does not matter. To calculate combinations⁵, we will use the formula:

$$C(n, r) = \frac{n!}{r!(n-r)!}$$

where n represents the total number of items, and r represents the number of items being chosen at a time, for $n \geq r \geq 0$.

The formula show the number of ways a sample of r elements can be obtained from a larger set of n distinguishable objects where order does not matter and repetitions are not allowed. It is important to note that:

[1] The number of ways of picking r unordered outcomes from n possibilities.

[2] Also referred to as r -combination or "n choose r" or the binomial coefficient. In some resources the notation uses k instead of r so you may see these referred to as k-combination or "n choose k."




Figure 3. Conceptual diagrammatic representation of the interrelation between concepts (an illustrative diagram)

⁵ Combinations Calculator (nCr). (n.d.). CalculatorSoup.
<https://www.calculatorsoup.com/calculators/discretemathematics/combinations.php>

By utilizing the combinations formula, the following 45 (forty-five) combined pairs utilizing previously defined 10 (ten) combinations (ABC; ABD; AB; ACD; AC; AD; BCD; BC; BD and CD) for Ideology [A]; Identity [B]; International Relations [C] and Architecture and Urban Planning [D]:

ideology-identity-IR	ideology-identity-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	ideology-identity
ideology-identity-IR	ideology-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	ideology-IR
ideology-identity-IR	ideology-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	identity-IR
ideology-identity-IR	identity-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	IR-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	ideology-identity
ideology-identity-architecture	ideology-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	ideology-IR
ideology-identity-architecture	ideology-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	identity-IR
ideology-identity-architecture	identity-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	IR-architecture
ideology-identity	ideology-IR-architecture
ideology-identity	ideology-IR
ideology-identity	ideology-architecture
ideology-identity	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-identity	identity-IR

ideology-identity	identity-architecture
ideology-identity	IR-architecture
ideology-IR-architecture	ideology-IR
ideology-IR-architecture	ideology-architecture
ideology-IR-architecture	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-IR-architecture	identity-IR
ideology-IR-architecture	identity-architecture
ideology-IR-architecture	IR-architecture
ideology-IR	ideology-architecture
ideology-IR	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-IR	identity-IR
ideology-IR	identity-architecture
ideology-IR	IR-architecture
ideology-architecture	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-architecture	identity-IR
ideology-architecture	identity-architecture
ideology-architecture	IR-architecture
identity-IR-architecture	identity-IR
identity-IR-architecture	identity-architecture
identity-IR-architecture	IR-architecture
identity-IR	identity-architecture
identity-IR	IR-architecture
identity-architecture	IR-architecture

Table 2. Pairings for previously defined [A], [B], [C], [D]

Three-component pairings with <i>architecture</i> as a keyword	
ideology-identity-IR	ideology-identity-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	ideology-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-IR	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	ideology-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-IR-architecture	identity-IR-architecture

Table 3. Three-component pairings with architecture as a keyword

Three-component pairings with <i>double architecture pairs</i>	
ideology-identity-architecture	ideology-IR-architecture
ideology-identity-architecture	identity-IR-architecture
ideology-IR-architecture	identity-IR-architecture

Table 4. Three-component pairings with double architecture pairs

Keywords chosen for this thesis are: *ideology*, *identity*, *international relations* [IR] and *architecture and urban planning*. These specific word and concepts have been recognized as the most pertinent and pervasive when dealing with the issues of the newly coined term *soft power architecture*. Thusly dubbed concept conflates all the aforementioned keywords, reifying this new field within the discourse of interdisciplinary studies.

For the requirements of the Thesis, complex interrelations and interconnectedness of various research aspects will be illustrated utilizing graphs with rules rooted in graph theory. A *graph* is a pair (V,E) , where V is a set of objects called *vertices* and E is a set of two element subsets of V called *edges*. So a graph is defined purely in terms of what its vertices (points) are, and which vertices are connected to which other vertices. Each edge (line) is defined by its two endpoints.

The relation of constitutive terms of Soft Power Architecture (Mechanisms, Manifestations and Spatial Consequences) has been illustrated by a *complete graph*. A *complete graph* is a simple graph in which

every vertex is adjacent to every other vertex. Formally, a complete graph K_n has vertex set $\{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$ and edge set $\{v_i v_j : 1 \leq i < j \leq n\}$. This type of a graph was chosen because of the said vertex adjacency, i.e. the interrelation and influence between all presented segments. This graph is to be utilized as an addition to the already presented 4-set Venn diagram, for further (graphic) clarification of the thesis aims.




Figure 4. Complete graph examples




Figure 5. A complete graph of Soft Power Architecture

Any time a graph “contains a cycle” it has a subgraph that is a cycle (see: Figure 6). Any time a graph “contains a path” (see: Figure 6) or “contains a cycle”, it means that it has a subgraph that is a path or a cycle. Examples of a path and a cycle in a graph are highlighted below.



Figure 6. Example of *paths* and *cycles*




Figure 7. Graphs *containing a cycle* for Manifestations and Spatial Consequences




Figure 8. Graph *containing a path* for Manifestations and Spatial Consequences

A subgraph that is a complete graph is called a *clique*. It is a subgraph in which every vertex in the subgraph is adjacent to every other vertex in the subgraph. Mechanisms contain both *cliques* and *cycles* as it is recognized as the most complex one. Manifestations and Spatial Consequences both contain a cycle, as there are two vertexes (tangible and intangible manifestations/spatial consequences).




Figure 9. Example of *cliques* and *cycles*

The interrelation between vertexes for Mechanisms, Manifestations and Spatial Consequences is represented for both the *cliques* and *cycles* of respective elements.




Figure 10. Graphs *containing a cycle* (left) and *containing a clique* (right) for Mechanisms




Figure 11. Graphs *containing a cycle* (left) and *containing a clique* (right) for a specific point of research (A = Spatial consequences – intangible; C = Manifestations – intangible; F = Mechanisms – Architecture+Urbanism; H = Mechanisms – Internal Relations)

The graph of the importance of SPA in international (bilateral) relations is depicted as a tripartite complete graph (see: Figure 13), with the mutual influence of all depicted elements is shown, both for the sending and receiving countries (every component will influence any other component transitionally). All the relations are viewed as two-way.




Figure 12. Example of complete bipartite graphs




Figure 13. Tripartite complete graph of bilateral interrelations between elements

2.2 Defining the Research Framework for Soft Power Architecture

Researching influence of ideology, identity and international relations onto architecture and its subsequent exported spatial manifestations (soft power architecture) are proposed as follows: by utilizing determinants:

- (1) designed lifespan component;
- (2) spatial effect component and
- (3) time component,

within a three-dimensional Cartesian plane (1=X; 2=Y; 3=Z), successful mapping of the desired processes can be achieved (see: Figure 14). It is also possible to use a two-dimensional projection of the X-Y axis, excluding the time component [Z], but its inclusion is advised whenever possible, guaranteeing an additional layer of data validity, providing for sound conclusions and discussion, as previously presented.




Figure 14. Three-dimensional Cartesian plane diagram of transformative and temporal qualities of exported architectures

To reiterate, soft power architecture, in the context of this research, is considered to be any state-sponsored work of architecture exported outside the borders of its country of origin, built purposefully, as a new object, from the ground up, with the intention of enhancing the relations (on different levels and scales) between the sending and receiving states, with or without ulterior motives on one or both sides. Soft power architecture is viewed as architecture with a permanent component (designed lifespan) because of the measurability of its influence/impact of the spatial environment through time.

This newly defined type of architecture is recognized to be found within and described by two qualities: its *permanent* conception for designed lifespan component [X] and its *positive* effect for spatial effect component [Y] (see: Figure 15). Its starting point can be found within different quadrants and its movement/transformation/repurpose can be attributed to transformative and temporal qualities (see: Figure 15). The end point, however, if discussing soft power architecture, as defined by this research, will always be found within the previously mentioned positive components.




Figure 15. Diagram of transformative and temporal qualities of exported architectures

When discussing soft power architecture, coordinates [0-0-0] are the place of its conception, if such a defining moment can be captured, before implementation. Before conceptualization of soft power architecture, all the gathered data will be formulated; one can argue that the *process of obtaining information* can be a *policy in itself*, but as pertinent as it is, it will not be the subject of this research.

Additionally, one can be curious about the indicators for measuring the change in time component/spatial effects/designed lifespan. A flexible approach, best suited for particular research should be implemented for any investigation utilizing this methodology. Indicators for each category are varied and should be left to the researchers' discretion. A standing discussion and a valid point can be made about measuring certain processes and/or occurrences, what Radović (2015) refers by *measuring the non-measurable*. Unquestionably, not all aspects can be quantified, but certain facets can be extricated and utilized for one's research. An important question that will undoubtedly emerge with further research is to what degree are those aspects (seen or promoted as) “important” only because they can be subjected to measurement? As previously noted, two points must be reiterated: firstly, as the methodology further develops, individual researchers will best determine which aspects/parameters are most pertinent to their research and ought to be left to their own discretion. Secondly, given the complexity of the topic projected in this research, it is highly unlikely that only quantifiable aspects will be taken into account (or take precedence in the hierarchy by default), as it would be considered reductive in the extreme. Measurable aspects cannot always reflect actuality, even though their importance in contribution to academic research is indisputable. For example, when exploring changes in the spatial effects, certain indicators can prove to be useful and quantifiable: urban flows, accessibility, security... etc.

Furthermore, two additional points must be made, to differentiate between types of exported architecture utilized as a communication tools: Transformative spatial qualities of exported architecture and Temporal qualities of exported architecture.

Transformative qualities: When researching exported architectures, one must be aware that the nature of such typologies is changeable within the parameter of time. For example, previously built colonial architecture, with its symbolic connotations can, in time, be integrated within the physical and mental landscapes, altering its (originally intended) identity (see: Figure 17). An example that can be pointed at is the inclusion of the Former Daehwajo Office Building, in Incheon Port (see: Figure 16), west of Seoul (Japanese colonial architecture), to South Korea's list of cultural assets, by the Cultural Heritage Administration⁶ as it is the only Japanese *machiya*⁷ that remains in the Incheon Harbor area, experts

⁶*Japanese Colonial Era Buildings Named Korean Cultural Heritage*. (2017).
<https://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/923306/japanese-colonial-era-buildings-named-korean-cultural-assets>

recommended that the Daehwajo building be restored rather than remodeled, after carrying out extensive historical research⁸.



Figure 16. Daehwajo building, Seoul, South Korea (center), image capture: May 2018, Google Maps, © 2020 Google

<https://www.google.rs/maps/@37.4738257,126.6204776,3a,90y,52.4h,94.91t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1skZABoVvLwQYhIg9RxNgOOQ!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en&authuser=0>

Of course, such transformation implies that the sending country is no longer utilizing that particular piece of architecture as a communication tool, but rather, the host country has absorbed and repurposed it, inscribing other cultural and ideological patterns within the typology (for more on the management of Japanese colonial heritage in South Korea see: Lee, 2019). Furthermore, new developments can change the image and physical environment of cities, e.g. construction of new embassy buildings that can:

⁷ Machiya (町屋 and/or 町家) are traditional wooden townhouses found throughout Japan and typified in the historical capital of Kyoto.

⁸ The Legacy of Incheon Harbor: Incheon's Former Daehwajo | Seoul Metropolitan Government. (n.d.). Retrieved October 19, 2019, from <http://english.seoul.go.kr/legacy-incheon-harbor-incheons-former-daehwajo/>

a. Have a positive (attractive) effect, with neighboring communities viewing the newly planned typologies as a sign of increased prestige, leading to e.g. increased real estate values, the opening of new businesses, reinvention of neighborhoods or

b. Have a negative (repelling) effect, where due to particular bilateral relations or cultural patterns, the newly planned typologies are perceived as undesirable in some manner, so the opposite effect takes place, leading to a discontinuity in urban life patterns and having detrimental effects on cities.

A note ought to be made, regarding positive and negative effects, external influences e.g. (un)favorable media coverage, propaganda, geopolitical situation ...etc. can shape the overall perception and manipulate the perceived effects.




Figure 17. Transformative quality change conceptual diagram (time component as planar projection)

Temporal qualities of exported architectural typologies are equally significant; it is important to separate architecture utilized for communication of officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity into two categories i.e. planned and implemented to be: a. permanent typologies and b. temporary typologies.

a. **Permanent typologies** can be considered to be any exported architectural typologies intended as a communication tool with the *intention* of permanent placement within the host country.

These manifestations include but are not limited to: diplomatic-consular headquarters, diplomats' residences, cultural centers... etc. A significant point (in architectural terms, subsequently influencing the management processes and effects) ought to be made: within permanent typologies, there will be a differentiation between those (1) occupying already existing spaces and (2) newly constructed buildings.

b. Temporary typologies are planned, implemented and managed with a limited lifespan in mind. The time factor can vary, from several weeks to several years, depending on the particular project. One point remains constant: all activities are planned to end eventually. Examples can be found in e.g. exhibition pavilions, pop-up cultural centers, fair booths... etc.

A point was made about the nature of newly formed architectural typologies i.e. whether they occupy already existing or create new spaces. These two types will produce different effects, as the former will most probably not disturb the functional patterns of pre-existing frameworks with its inscription. The latter, however, will produce new relations with its environment, function, and activities and as such, must be carefully conceived, planned, implemented and managed. The goal for newly built soft power architectures would be not to disturb the already established urban patterns in host countries and not to allow e.g. security concerns overflowing onto the public space.




Figure 18. Transformative and temporal qualities change conceptual diagram (time component as planar projection)

Referring back to the transformative and temporal qualities, it is important to note that both are changeable within their respective categories, as well as cross-category (see: Figure 18). For example, when examining changeability within categories, certain spatial manifestations can initially have negative (detering) effects, but if managed properly, they can change to possess positive (attractive) effects. Similarly, a quantity of temporary spatial manifestation, although initially planned for a limited amount of time, due to e.g. their success or through public engagement, can become a permanent fixture in host countries, if the sending country ascertains that such action would be beneficial vis-à-vis cultural relation policies. Alternatively, an example of cross-category changeability would be the transformation of temporary typologies, producing negative effects into permanent, producing positive effects. This change can be achieved with close bilateral cooperation and the will to promote cross-cultural understanding. Other cross-category changeability scenarios are possible but less probable.

One of most prominent French culture theorists whose work is significant for this project, Paul Virilio (1991), is widely known for his concepts of “dromology” (“science” of speed). He is also famous by his declaration that the logic of acceleration lies in the heart of organization and transformation of the contemporary world. Nevertheless, Virilio is often misunderstood by postmodern culture theorists; his works exist outside of postmodernism and are necessary for examination of phenomena such as “hyper-modernism”.

The importance of Virilio’s work is found in assumption that, in war-dominated cultures, military industry and machinery represent one of the main generators of city place-making and spatial organization of its cultural life. In “Speed and Politics” (2006), for example, he claims that the “war model” is responsible for expansion of contemporary cities and development of human society.

Unlike Marx (1998), Virilio claims that the transition from feudalism into capitalism is not marked by economy transformation, but by military, spatial, political and technological metamorphosis. Widely viewed, if Marx spoke of materialistic concept of history, Virilio addressed military concept of history. In his work “Lost Dimensions” (1991) Virilio, fan of Mandelbrot’s fractal geometry, claims that cultural theory must take into account disruptions in rhythm of human consciousness and morphological disruptions in physical dimension. Utilizing the concept of “picnolepsy” (often visual displacements) and Einstein’s relativity theory, he suggests that the vision of contemporary city is a product of military power and time-based cinematic technology of emergence. Although political and cinematic aspects of cityscapes are also present, they are necessary for distinction of technological disappearance. According

to Virilio, Mandelbrot's fractal geometry reveals the appearance of "overexposed" city as a set of morphological gaps between space and time, in a series of visual interruptions. (Virilio 1991, pp. 9-28). The theoretical background given above serves for, if not justification, then for better understanding of the requirements in the world of 'security-obsessed urbanism'.

Issues of safety of contemporary embassy buildings are equally an overly important point of consideration for this thesis; for example, the case studies observed in Belgrade, Serbia, are recognized as one of the key investigations of this project (see: Chapter 5.3.3) are two-fold: the idea of a new embassy building in dense urban areas is usually well-accepted by citizens who view new construction as a chance for their neighborhood to receive additional security and prestige, not necessarily risk. On the other hand embassy buildings of certain countries pose a security risk: this was most evident during the riots of Belgrade in 2008, when several embassy buildings of countries perceived as 'hostile' were attacked and set on fire. This occurrence was partially responsible for speeding up the process of moving embassy buildings into less dense urban areas, to so-called 'safe' or 'defensible' spaces, a trend seen for most diplomatic and consular outposts in other countries.

Interestingly, newly-constructed embassy buildings in dense urban areas (e.g. the Japanese Embassy in New Belgrade, Block 11a, completed in March 2015) do not always deteriorate the urban matrix, but rather provide a hub of additional safety measures that spread out onto the neighborhood. If Loeffler (2005) talked about the relocation of risk, the situation in parts of Belgrade urban matrix is quite different: communities that are within the radius of a new diplomatic outpost feel the benefit of additional security, since their neighborhood is now located in an 'important' area. This prestige also comes with an increase of apartment value, but it also signifies that people living in these areas can be affected with negative effects of this type of building, if the constructed political image shifts and represents the embassy's country as an "enemy". This is a real risk, and although, due to the influence of social media and accessibility to various media outlets, an Orwellian scenario cannot take place, it can still affect the citizens and their neighborhoods.

2.3 Protection or Openness?

The process of globalization, which involves the technological, political, economic, and cultural diminution of boundaries between countries across the world, has insinuated a self-interested, inexorable, corrupting market culture into traditional communities. Many see these forces as threatening their way of life. At the same time that globalization has provided a motivation for terrorism, it has also facilitated methods for it. (Morgan, 2004. p. 37)

This section will open up a pertinent question, borne out of examination of official U.S.'s stance on embassy buildings, deemed as the most demonstrative governing body necessary for citation for further development of this project. After all reviewed aspects, one might have an enquiry: "Is architectural design really relevant when designing embassies?" All argumentation would point otherwise, to the irrelevancy of design for these architectural typologies; the imperative is to provide "safe, secure and functional" places and to ensure preservation of human lives. Theoretical framework also gives us an explanation of the circumstances that led to reinstatement of fortress urbanism and "security-obsessed" mindset. Still, it is relevant how embassy building portray their country of origin, although in terms of intended/unintended, original/acquired meaning, those typologies will always convey *a* message. As the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003) notes, "public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror." (Loeffler, 2005, p. 49) Assumption made by the Overseas Building Operations (OBO) that it is "not easy to operate effective cultural programs out of embassies that look like citadels" (Loeffler, 2005, p. 49). Instead, it is proposed to make a network of cultural corners, libraries and other small publicly accessible locations that would improve relations and serve as mediating centers.

One of more vocal advocates demanding architecture excellence and openness was Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former Ambassador of United States to India in the 1970s. He stated: "Architecture is inescapably a political art, and it reports faithfully for ages to come what the political values of a particular age were," he declared at a symposium sponsored by the State Department and the General Services Administration in 1999. "Surely ours must be openness and fearlessness in the face of those who hide in the darkness," Moynihan said. "Precaution, yes. Sequester, no." (Loeffler, 2005, p. 49).

Additionally, even now there are firm stances that it is necessary to re-examine the politics of space-making when designing embassies. At the same symposium held in 1999, one of the participants was Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. At the time he said that it

is necessary to “[...] understand the importance of openness, to understand that it makes an enormous difference both symbolically and practically if a public building is welcoming to the public or if it shuts itself off in a fortress.” (Loeffler, 2005, p. 50). One of the examples of building with necessary level of openness was his own workplace, the Supreme Court building, as noted by Loeffler (2005):

The Supreme Court is open, with its public plaza, its accessible hallways and its open courtroom — a place Americans can and should visit to learn about the legal system. Like other major public buildings, he says, the Supreme Court must remain open despite the challenges that may pose.
(p.50)

3.1 IDENTITY

3.1.1 Identity and Architecture

How can architecture participate in creating a nation's image, its territoriality, history, character and values? In which way, through a certain historical period, encompassed in a more or less coherent ideological perspective [...] one constructs visual and architectural narration on national, ethnic, race or political identities? (Ignjatović, 2007, p. 18)

Adding upon the opening quoted text and posing another pertinent question for this project: What are the ways in which architecture – as a discipline, cultural institutionalized practice, a text and a theory – is involved in the creation of the contents of identities?

Every identity represents a part of the cultural denotation system, simultaneously representing the social life and categories of social politics. This duality is one of the most important factors in every examination of society and culture, based upon which different theoretical approaches to investigate collective identities were formed (Ignjatović, 2007).

Ignjatović (2007) point out how the examinations of identity within the scientific fields such as sociology, social anthropology and social psychology have a long developmental track record. However, only recently the theorists dealing with identity have developed a critical and self-reflective scientific apparatus that enabled stepping out of strict framework of conservative and traditionally antagonistic positioning of research areas. An overwhelming challenge in identity research lies in the fact that every identity is, in a sense, a construct of the scholar investigating its incidence. In point of fact, an identity is not an inherent characteristic of a community (which possesses varied and complex modes of identification), but a theoretical analysis tool to be utilized in order to enhance knowledge or confirmation of certain ideological, political or other ideas. This does not mean, however, that identities are only and simply analytical constructions of researchers, not testifying on societal relations, culture and politics (Eriksen, 2010).

Traditional sociological determination of identity is based on examining social relations and its structures, in which personal and collective and intertwined, through the knowledge of a “singular collective feeling” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Sociological theories, among other postulations, insist on identity as a process, rather than a condition, emphasizing the importance of collective self-identification and identification of others through the system of culture as a “grammar of social life” (Golubović, 1999). A number of scholars commence with a base assumption of two, mutually independent dimensions of identity, nominal and virtual, that are not static but dynamic and subjected to continuous interaction. These two dimensions are “united in continuous production and reproduction of identity and its borders. Distinction nominal-virtual will admittedly confirm that [...] social identities are – practical accomplishments, and not static forms” (Jenkins, 1997). Writing on the connection between architecture and identity Ignjatović (2007) offers an observation:

This signifies that architecture as well, as an important segment of culture, participates in establishing collective identities in the same way as political science practices, theology, philosophy, history, medicine, psychology or natural sciences, Extensive succession of sociological scholarly investigation on identity is, therefore, of an immeasurable value for every research of processes of identity construction in the discourses of architecture. (p. 19)

Likewise, Ignjatović (2007) notes three factors of any socially constructed identity: contents, borders and context. *Contents* represent a base element of any cultural identification, having an explicit role of symbolization or construction of notions on inherent characteristics of a certain group or community and its characteristics. In fact, the contents of identity are represented by the corpus of knowledge that ideologies institutionalize and around which its discourses are created. The selection of identity contents is always motivated by the **borders** in relation to others, which a specific identity ought to establish in both political and cultural environments. The selection of borders is dependent on the **context** in which the identification process is being conducted. Borders, however, do not provide a framework for entire groups of people, specific cultures, or social identities – rather, identity is always constructed through an arbitrarily, chosen knowledge base, with regard to other, conflicting identities.

Moreover, special consideration ought to be given to the relations between culture and identity i.e. problematization of *contents* and *borders* within the construction processes of social identities. Particular contents, culture, architectural or an art text are not inherent features of a particular identity, but in fact, said identity is built through the processes of *selection* and *interpretation* in a system with the

characteristics of a continuous relational processes, rather than a closed system (Ignjatović, 2007). Subsequently, one cannot claim that the borders of identity draw a line around and frame a particular set of cultural contents that exist independently, but more precisely, to note that borders as well as contents of identity are subjected to change (Eriksen, 2017). Consequently, equating a particular set of cultural contents with identity is not possible. Their interrelation is motivated, organized and regulated by ideology (Ignjatović, 2007, p. 21).

It is imperative to underline the existence of various theoretical approaches examining identity, making an effort to illuminate the problems of constructing identity differentiations, forms of social interaction, as well as mobilization of culture in the processes of construction and representation of social identities. Depending on the initial presuppositions and attitudes, as well as the nature of factors that contribute to the identity manifestation, development and transformation (e.g. political, economic, cultural, psychological factors) the humanities have settled on a number of theoretical perspectives, some of which are mutually exclusive. This, in turn, signifies impossibility for creating a uniform, singular theory on identity. On the other hand, the quantity and divergence of various theories have testified that every enquiry on culture and power are a singular project of knowledge as a social and political power, and that “within every scientific perspective, there are certain forces of coercion at play”. ((Ignjatović, 2007, p. 22).

Some of examined theories include the one of *primordialism* (or *perennialism*), claiming that nations are ancient, natural phenomena (Hayward et al, 2003), additionally arguing that social identities are borne from the processes of “primordial attachment”, stemming not from a number of interaction between subjects, but rather through a presumably natural, intrinsic connection between members of a limited community (for more on primordialism see: Shils, 1957). These theorists argue that social identities (racial, ethnic and national) are a given, intangible and “natural”, representing a contrast to historical identities, such as cultural or class.

In opposition to primordialism and socio-biological theories of social identities, standard constructivist theories, although dissimilar in certain aspects, have a shared postulation that “every identity is socially constructed and culturally conditioned category” (Ignjatović, 2007, p. 23). This signifies that identity does not form and develop outside of culture, but rather, is constructed depending on political, economic and cultural mechanism in place within a certain community. If one claims that identity is a singular resource of cultural content, symbols and ideologies, appropriate for mobilization in order to achieve political,

economic or other goals, then it signifies instrumentalist and mobilizing theories, arguing that social identities are always politically motivated (Poutignat, P. & Streiff-Fénart, 2017).

Regardless whether the starting point is the assumption that identities are constructed as means of certain political coercion or a struggle for economic dominance, which, for example, is present in relations between the societies' periphery and center, these theories put forth the notion of "mechanism based on which contemporary societies construct or impose identities through a system of cultural differences, utilized as a basis for achieving power" (Ignjatović, 2007, p. 23).

Identity is constructed with specific cultural contents and symbols, but always in relation to a specific context. This effectively signifies that identity is not a rigidly defined aggregation of "cultural materials" and "contents", features or characteristics, but strategies of establishing differences in relation to another identity, differences that are announced by mobilizing certain (not all) segments of culture of a specific ethnic, national or other relevant groups. In this particular interpretation, culture ought to be understood as defined by Geertz (1973), a symbolic signifying context that enables understanding of situations or goings-on or as a type of interaction and the context of said interaction. Moreover, Geertz (1973) described culture as "a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (Geertz, 1973, p. 89)

3.1.2 Layered model of identity in international relations

Identity first became the explicit focus of IR research related to Japan in the 1990s. Thomas U. Berger, and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara tried to resolve the 'abnormality' which they saw at the heart of Japan's foreign and security policy by attributing to it a 'pacifist' or 'antimilitarist' identity (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2014, p. 4).

This segment will present the importance of identity vis-à-vis international relations and policy-making processes of a country. For this particular enquiry, the author will build upon the theoretical works and positioning of Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) and their postulates of *relational identity* and the *layered model of identity*, elaborating upon these practices for the Japanese case. By adoption of the layered framework, the authors examine how identity constructions are maintained and their potential for transformability (Wæver, 2002).

Moreover, the examined research and theoretical model will inform the future positioning of soft power architecture and related processes within the context of Japan and its international relations narrative. The goal of this section is to provide with a potential starting point for introducing the notion of soft power architecture and its impact into the state-governing mechanisms.

Identity, in the context of international relations [abbr. IR] has become a highly-researched topic, especially within the constructivism narrative, which is the main focus of this thesis. However, the concept of identity in IR research has been contested on multiple occasions due to its “vagueness” and “slipperiness” (Chafetz et al, 1998, Kowert 1998). Japan, as a country has been ascribed the identity of an “economic great power/superpower” (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2014, p.3).

These researchers tried to ascribe new identities to Japan through their research, most notably those of ‘peaceful cultural norms’ (Katzenstein 1996a; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993) and “antimilitarist culture” (Berger 1993, 1996, 1998). True value of these contributions lies in the fact that competing ideas about what Japan *is*, or is on the verge of *becoming*, fundamentally boil down to descriptions and predictions of identity (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2014).

Referring to the theory of constructivism in international relations, its hypothetical proposition claim that neither object nor concepts have any necessary, fixed or objective meaning; rather, their meanings are constructed (*co-constructed*) through social interaction (Mingst, 2013, p.95).

As Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) note, the influence of the early ‘norm constructivists’ on the analysis of Japan’s international relations cannot be overestimated, with follow-up studies echoing the previously researches sets of data (Ashizawa 2008; Catalinac 2007; Oros 2008; Rozman 2012; Singh 2008). Norm constructivists argue that identity matters primarily as a determinant of national interest, which they in turn believe to function as a source of foreign and security policy (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Hopf 2002; Katzenstein 1996b; Wendt 1999). An extremely important point is made that: “[...] norm constructivists, in turn, regard interests as socially constructed rather than given, and again consider norms, culture and identities as ideational ‘stuff’ involved in that social construction”. (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2014, p.4)

As Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) note, their presented points require a rather different concept of identity – a ‘relational’ understanding where demarcations between domestic and international, identity

and difference, or Self and Other are exactly what constitute identity (Campbell 1994, 1998; Connolly 1991; Neumann 1996; Rumelili 2004; Wodak et al 2009).

Interestingly, the presented findings by Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) note the duality of identities, to be presented and/or consumed both internally and externally:

The literature on Japan, which adheres to this concept, has identified a number of Others – both external ones, such as the West, Europe, the US, Asia, China, North Korea and South Korea, and internal ones, such as the outcast group at the bottom of Japan’s social order – burakumin, the Ainu people (often described as ‘indigenous’), Okinawa and the Korean minority in Japan – and it has analyzed how these Others have been juxtaposed with Japan to emphasize what Japan is, and hence to construct Japanese identity (Befu 2001; Bukh 2009, 2010; Guillaume 2014; Gustafsson 2011; Hagström 2014; Klien 2002; Morris-Suzuki 1998; Oguma 2002; Schulze 2013; Tamaki 2010; Tanaka 1993). (p.5).

The presented viewpoint reinforces the hypothesis that [Japanese] identities ought to be viewed through a multidimensional network and framework of their intended audiences. Furthermore, armed with this knowledge, it will be interesting to review whether there are any implemented architectural strategies in place, when dealing with exported spatial typologies aimed at communication of officially sanctioned images of national identity.

In addition, Hagström and Gustafsson (2014), citing the works of Berger (1993) and Katzenstein and Okawara (1993), that Japan’s identity is to remain stable, because if it “[...] were completely fluid it would not carry enough meaning to function as an analytical device” (p. 6). Similar thoughts were promoted by Emanuel Adler, noting that, “if constructivism is about anything, it is about change” (Adler, 2002, p. 102).

“The question of continuity and change is closely related to the issue of agency vs. structure” (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2014, p.6). To clarify, *structure* is the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available and *agency* is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. In the social sciences there is a standing debate over the primacy of structure or agency in shaping human behavior. The structure versus agency debate may be understood as an issue of socialization against autonomy in determining whether an individual acts as a free agent or in a manner dictated by social structure (Barker, 2003). Clarifying the interrelation between

various conceptual terms pertinent for this research, Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) observe the following:

One way to analyze how change and continuity relate to agency and structure within the same analytical framework is to treat identity as layered, and simultaneously constituted on mutually interacting levels of inter-subjective meaning making. In such a framework, identity change in the less institutionalized layers interacts with and builds on layers that are more institutionalized – whether they too change or not (p.6).

The main presuppositions being that “fundamental” layers of identity are “more solidly defined and more difficult [for actors] to politicize and change” (Wæver, 2002, p. 31), with said layers being the ones that influence the less sedimented ones, additionally providing turns in identity construction, but such change is usually interdependent (Wæver, 2002, pp. 33-42).

When it comes to examining the case of Japan, it is constructed through its differentiation from Others, who are alternately understood as inferior or superior to Japan (Hagström, 2014). ‘Othering’ is often associated with a negative and dichotomized imagination of difference (Lebow, 2008) but this is not necessarily the case (Rumelili, 2004). There are various ways of relating to difference, including comparison and integration (Abizadeh, 2005; Guillaume, 2014).

A critical realist, Tamaki (2010) assumes that identity becomes resilient through reification, and he has argued elsewhere that the notion of *kokutai* (‘national polity’) embodies a resilient Japanese identity, namely, a ‘hierarchic worldview’ and an ‘associated sense of Japanese “uniqueness”’. Xavier Guillaume, operating within the field of relational ontology, agrees that *kokutai* has been a ‘key narrative matrix’ in Japanese identity construction (Guillaume, 2014, pp. 63-99). Relational ontology is the philosophical position that what distinguishes subject from subject, subject from object, or object from object is mutual relation rather than substance. Ontologically, substance refers to the essence or nature of a being (Schaab, 2013).

The next layer of the Japanese institutionalized identity, as proposed by Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) is the middle layer, where the more exact distinctions and demarcation between Self and Others are negotiated. The authors note that “at this level, we find multiple identities that describe the Others and consequently also the Self” (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2014, p.7). Some identities are more important in certain contexts and in relation to particular Others (Lupovici, 2012; Murray, 2010).

Lastly, the final layer of Japanese segmented identity is described by Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) as the place where:

[...] policies and specific political issues are discussed and where agents operate. The way in which bilateral problems are discussed and understood in this layer is constrained by and has consequences for identity constructions in the other layers, particularly identity constructions in relation to specific others in the middle layer. If the behavior of several Others is similarly interpreted in relation to a number of issues, it may affect multiple middle-layer identities. (p.7).

One of the inquiry points of this thesis is that any policies and/or initiatives aimed at codifying and/or institutionalizing soft power architecture will happen within the least institutionalized layer, possibly also reaching the middle layer (an ostensible bottom-up approach). Granted, and noted by the previous research, it is expected that these policies will be influenced by the prevalent narratives promoted within the other layers of segmented identity. However, owing to the dynamism and changeability of the identity, it is assumed that soft power architecture can have the potential to ultimately influence the most sedimented layers and propose a new method of representing the Japanese identity outside of the country, via spatial manifestations.

An important note must be made, nonetheless, that the theorized sphere of influence in the theoretical layers is a best-case scenario, presuming that the actors involved in drafting and renegotiating these policies, translating them into architectural discourse are not overly influenced by the internalized narratives of Japanese uniqueness. This is why the author proposes a transnational, multidisciplinary network of actors and stakeholders, to be involved in the drafting and decision-making processes. The question of the objectivity⁹ of actors within the country of origin for architectural policies aimed at exported architectural typologies will be discussed in the following section.

⁹ In this instance, the theoretical assumption of “transnational” and “multidisciplinary” network does not automatically denote or lead to the loss of (representational) identity and/or diversity, as the proposed actors involved will be acutely aware of said issues

3.2 IDEOLOGY

3.2.1 Introduction

Nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology [...] because the term 'ideology' has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with each other. (Eagleton, 2007, p.1)

This section will briefly overview the various perspectives and prevalent theoretical approaches and narratives on ideology, ultimately drawing connection between architecture, identity and ideology and placing soft power architecture within such established context.

In its essence, the idea of ideology can explain why people hold certain beliefs that may appear antithetical to their material position i.e. examining the belief that continuing with one system [of operation] is beneficial, even though certain actors are not benefiting from the system in place. Moreover, the notions of ideology can explain how “culture” is structured in such a manner which enables the groups holding power to have maximum control with the minimum of conflict.

An important note ought to be made; underlining that ideology is not necessarily materialized in processes and/or practices contributing to direct oppression. Although such scenarios may exist, this is not a matter of various groups purposely planning to oppress people or alter their consciousness, but rather a matter on how the dominant institutions and actors in societies work through:

- values;
- worldviews (concepts of the world) and
- symbol system

in order to legitimize and/or maintain/reinforce the current ideological order in place.

This legitimization is managed through the widespread social adoption of ideas about the way things are currently in place, worldviews (oftentimes through “us versus them” narrative) and what is the desired

order of things. These ideas are often imbedded in cultural practices or promoted to the people in such a manner they accept the current state of affairs, their sense of what is “innate” or “natural” and the understanding of pre-determined roles in societies.

In order to further understand theoretical foundations of ideology, this section will present the general postulations of the Marxist approach and the key concepts of two prominent theorists who dealt with the questions of ideology, Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci. A particular relevance from these two authors for this project lies in Althusser’s postulations on Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), viewed as producers of soft power architecture and Gramsci’s notion of *cultural hegemony*, which describes how the state and ruling capitalist class – the bourgeoisie – uses cultural institutions to maintain power in capitalist societies.

3.2.2 Louis Althusser

A concept is [...] more of a practice than a state of mind - though we have seen that Louis Althusser risks bending the stick too far in this direction, *reducing* concepts to social practices. (Eagleton, 2007, p. 194)

A prominent theorist who further developed the critique of the Marxist approach to ideology was Louis Althusser (1918-1990). One of his main presupposition is the notion that Modernity is different from other periods of time, in the sense that the changes that took place during Modernity enabled for the acquirement of a degree of independence from the [ideological] base. Thusly, the newly established superstructure develops above and beyond the determinants of the base. Consequentially, according to Althusser, researchers and scholars ought to look beyond the basic economic relations and extend their analysis to the other aspects of society. In order to explain e.g. inequalities, other disciplines such as culture and media should be examined as well.

In order to understand Althusser, it is necessary to review the shortcoming of the Marxist models and compare with the thoughts put forth. Essentially, the Marxist model proposes that ideology (ideologies) is (are) false, misrepresenting reality, a veil drawn over the reality of things. For them, the underpinning ideology is the *genuine* concealed world (e.g. the “real” economic relations of production). As the general populace is unable to observe such presumed realities, the Marxist contend that they have “pulled back the curtain” to show the falsity of Modernity and presented us with the adder beneath the rose. As it

happens, if people are aware of such conditions, they will awaken from the lulled sleep and false consciousness.

Whilst discussing basic Marxist assumption, this group of theorists is primarily concerned with the question “how dominant social groups are able to reproduce their social and economic power” (Taylor & Willis, 1999, p. 29). This thought trails back to the original considerations of Marx. In their work *The German Ideology* (1998), Marx and Engels note that the ideas of the ruling class in every epoch are the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is the same time its ruling intellectual force. The most notable feature of these thoughts can be summarized as economic determinist: the economic system determines the forms of society. Simply put, all aspects of culture in a given society are dependent on, and derived from the relations of production of the system of the particular mode of production. The particular mode of production of an era formed the base structure of society; all other aspects including culture, religion and values are simply a superstructure, a consequence of the economic structure.

According to Marx, ideology naturalizes, historicizes and eternalizes the economic system. In other words, the [economic] system appears to be “natural”, being a logical conclusion of the evolution of historical developments and ultimately assuming that the current [natural] state of affairs has been reached, things will remain as such, barring regression. To illustrate, the assumption that the free market is the political system best suited to the nature and aspirations of humans, the entire historical developments led to this moment. The main point being that, once all nations achieve free market, they will continue to operate within them forever, unless they erode. In summations, these assumptions represent ideology. On the other hand, critical overview of this position ought to be presented: more recent theories tend to examine how elements of society contribute to the maintenance of the [ideological] system in place. Moreover, cultural life is not just a result of economic life, it helps maintain it, contributing and accelerating its processes.

However, Althusser’s ideas add a layer of complexity to this kind of thought processes, arguing that ideology is not a “false consciousness” but rather, ideology structures what we do and produces our reality. As a scholar of structuralism, Althusser argues we cannot exist outside of culture or ideology; simply put, the system in our lives provide us with meaning. The most poignant point made is that we have no reality beyond our ideology – we “adopt” an identity from a shared set.

For Althusser, it is impossible to access the “real conditions of existence” due to our reliance on language: the language structures our worldviews and experience and our language is a consequence of the social world. There is no way to engage with the world apart from language. If this is the case, because of people being inside the languages, there is no possibility to objectively interpret the external realities, only the ideological interpretations of it i.e. we can only see the representations of reality, not reality itself.

Nevertheless, through a comprehensive study of economics, history and sociology, we can come closer to perceiving ideological systems and how we are placed in a specific set of relations by those systems.

To further systematize his thoughts and findings, Althusser presented the concept of ideology and ideological state apparatuses that promulgate said ideological narratives. His key ideas will be presented in the following section.

3.2.3 Althusser’s Concept of Ideology

This segment will build upon and further develop the theoretical postulations developed by Althusser, presented by Karabegović (2017, pp. 56-61). This particular interpretation has been chosen due to the precise methodological and theoretical approach for the examined topic, namely the *symptomatic approach* to ideology that reviews the goings-on central and constitutive for ideological functioning, simultaneously being central and constitutive for its critique as well. Both researches could not be carried outside of their respective ideological contexts, also cannot function without reviewing its key stances. Consequently, by clarifying theoretical postulations this research can del deeper into interpreting the ideological matrix for exported narratives and desired (officially sanctioned) messages/images of national identity. With said interpretation, this research will be able to more precisely position the concepts of soft power architecture within the examined matrix, ultimately developing a set of its possible meanings (Karabegović, 2017).

Symptomatic theory of ideology is primarily based on Althusser’s critique of Marxist interpretation of ideology, the stance which understands ideology as “pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness”, i.e. imaginary construction whose “status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud” (Althusser, 1970, p. 28). Ideology is, according to Althusser’s interpretation of Marx, an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the ‘day’s residues’ from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence (Althusser, 1970).

Althusser concludes this approach to ideology is the consequence of the thesis that ideology does not have history, which is “a purely negative thesis” and postulates the thesis that ideology has its own history or does not have a history at all in absolutely positive sense, which is correct if the structure and functioning of ideology are its feature that make it “non-historical reality or rather an *omni-historical* reality”, in the sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call history (Althusser, 1970). He, in fact, presents the theory of “a theory of ideology *in general*, in the sense that Freud presented a theory of the unconscious *in general*”, utilizing the term ideology “to simply the phrase” and assuming that ideology is “eternal, i.e. omnipresent in its immutable form throughout history (the history of social formations containing social classes) (Althusser, 1970, p. 30)”

Before presenting the problematic of Althusser’s central thesis on structure and functioning of ideology, i.e. the key point in which Althusser defends the stance of abstractness of ideology, it is necessary to underline two theses. According to his first thesis, “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1970). This thesis refers to the object that is represented in the imaginary form of ideology or more precisely “world outlooks” that, according to most interpretations, are considered to “constitute an illusion” and “do not correspond with reality” and as such, according to Althusser, ought to be interpreted as “to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of that world” (Althusser, 1970). These interpretations thus take literally the thesis which they presuppose, and on which they depend, i.e. that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i.e. their real world (Althusser, 1970, p. 32).

[...] it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. (Althusser, 1970, p. 32)

According to Althusser, this relation is in the center of ideological representation of the real world and contains the ‘cause’ which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the ideological representation of the real world, which, is in fact, the *imaginary nature of this relation* which underlies all the imaginary distortion that we can observe [...] in all ideology (Althusser, 1970). He then expounds upon this thesis and questions, from a Marxist standpoint, if the representation of the real conditions of existence of the

individuals occupying the posts of agents of production [...] are deriving from the relations of production (Althusser, 1970) he notes the following:

[...] all ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production (and the other relations that derive from them), but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live (Althusser, 1970, p. 32).

Althusser considers that the question of “cause” must be replaced by a different question: why is the representation given to individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation? (Althusser, 1970) The second thesis is that “Ideology has a material existence” and considers the materiality of ideology. Although he is aware of discussing “hypothetical thesis of the not spiritual but material existence of ‘ideas’ or other ‘representations’” (Althusser, 1970, p. 33), such considerations are necessary to advance the analysis and provides the opinion that “an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material” (Althusser, 1970, p. 33).

At this juncture it is necessary to provide additional explanation regarding the concept of apparatus and its practices. In Althusser’s overview of the Marxist theory of state; the state has no meaning “except as the function of *state power*” where the entire class struggle is aimed at the state, or rather gaining state power, which determines the difference between the state power, “preservation of state power or obtaining state power” on the one hand and the goals of political class struggle and the state apparatus on the other. Based on these findings, Althusser concludes that, according to the Marxist theory the state is a repressive state apparatus and that the state power and state apparatuses must be differentiated. The goal of class struggle is pertinent to state power and as consequences has the utilization of state apparatuses, by the classes that possess class power, in the function of class goals and that the proletariat must obtain the state power to be able to destroy the existing bourgeois state apparatus, in order to, in later stages, initiate the process of destroying the state. Althusser actually proposes supplementing the existing Marxist theory of

state, for which he considers, is already found in theory¹⁰ and introduces the term Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), under which he assumes “a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions” (Althusser, 1970, p. 14). ISAs should not be confused with the (repressive) State apparatus that contain the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, and where Repressive suggests that the State Apparatus in question ‘functions by violence’ – at least ultimately (since repression, e.g. administrative repression, may take non-physical forms) (Althusser, 1970.).

At this juncture, it important to very briefly present the theoretical postulations of Antonio Gramsci, as they were informative for Althusser’s thought development, as well as the overall importance for this project, which will be elaborated upon at the end of this section.

3.2.4 Antonio Gramsci

Gramsci is best known for his theory of *cultural hegemony*, which describes how the state and ruling capitalist class – the bourgeoisie – uses cultural institutions to maintain power in capitalist societies. The bourgeoisie, in Gramsci’s view, develops a hegemonic culture using ideology rather than violence, economic force, or coercion. Hegemonic culture propagates its own values and norms so that they become the “common sense” values of all and thus maintain the status quo. Hegemonic power is therefore used to maintain consent to the capitalist order, rather than coercive power using force to maintain order. This cultural hegemony is produced and reproduced by the dominant class through the institutions that form the superstructure. Because people mostly concur with these beliefs, disseminating them in the process, they subsequently contribute to their maintenance. In these processes, we can note that, rather than having a passive public, it gives consent to power systems. Thusly, the ruling groups present themselves as the group best equipped with the task of providing the means to others, in order to pursue their needs. Furthermore, one of the strategies of the dominant groups, in their pursuit of maintaining power, is to constantly realign themselves, adopting different critical concerns. With this framework in

¹⁰ Althusser notes that: “... (Antonio) Gramsci [...] had the ‘remarkable’ idea that the State could not be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but included, as he put it, a certain number of institutions from ‘civil society’: the Church, the Schools, the trade unions, etc. Unfortunately, Gramsci did not systematize his institutions, which remained in the state of acute but fragmentary notes (cf. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, 1971, p. 12, 259, 260-3) Althusser, 1970, p. 50

mind, ideology is viewed as unfixed and inconstant, but rather in a constant state of flux. “Hegemony ... is not universal and “given” to the continuing rule of a particular class. It has to be won, reproduced, sustained. Hegemony is as Gramsci said, a “moving equilibrium containing relations of forces favorable and unfavorable to this and that tendency”” (Hall, 1978) In short, hegemony is about getting people to actively agree to a system of oppression. Ideology itself is not imposed, but rather a *system* of choices and ideas; these are grouped together into a set which we *choose* to adhere to. The media plays a part in justifying oppression by making it seem legitimate; this concept was further developed in the works of Herman and Chomsky (2002) as they propose that mass media outlets are:

[...] effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function, by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, and without overt coercion. (p. 306)

When discussing the exported images and spatial manifestations, the network of actors and activities gains complexity; there is a difference in internal control of (desirable) images that are deemed appropriate to be exported and controlling images and spaces within a foreign context. The difference can be clearly noted in the examples of the Japan House (Chapter 4.1.1) versus the official communiqués pertaining to the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade (Chapter 5.3.3.1).

For further discussion and comparative review of presented architectural images shaping the ideological narrative for exported architectures utilized as a communication tool see: Chapter 4.7.3, *On Spatial Branding*, noting the stark contrast between the public relations strategies employed during the construction stage (May 2013 – March 2015) of the Japanese diplomatic headquarters and its neighbor, the Chinese Cultural Center (still under construction as of October 2020).

The main difference between the three presented views on ideology is that ideological Marxism stresses the importance of culture and values, Althusser sees people as subjects, whereas Gramsci labels them as willing if not complicit participants in their own subjectification.

3.2.5 Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs)

It is important to note that Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses present beliefs/ideology to the populace, transmitting ideology. ISAs can be multifaceted, some of the examples including: family, education, media, religion, culture and the arts. More precisely, our [perceived] consciousness emerges from these apparatuses. We exist in a system of beliefs, internalizing them and, in turn, we play a part in reproducing them. The people, actors and stakeholders produced by these systems become the ideological subject, facilitating the economic systems.

Educational ISA, in particular, as elaborated by Leitch et al (2001) assume a dominant role in a capitalist economy, and conceal and mask the ideology of the ruling class behind the "liberating qualities" of education, so that the hidden agendas of the ruling class are inconspicuous to most teachers, students, parents and other interested members of society.

In some instances, when ISA fail to transmit desired ideological narratives and/or the subjects are not receptive to the messages of desired behavioral patterns, there are other systems in place to ensure appropriate backup, most commonly found in Repressive State Apparatus (RSA). Some of the examples of RSAs include: police, judiciary systems, armed forces and occasionally medicine, more precisely psychiatric medicine, just to name a few. Subjects opposed and uncooperative to the works of state apparatuses are oftentimes labeled, among others, a terrorist, and dealt with accordingly. This will be an important point to be elaborated further, as terrorists and terrorisms are one of the main facets shaping different actors' approaches to soft power architecture.

The basic, social function of the RSA (government, courts, police and armed forces, etc.) is timely intervention to politics in favor of the interests of the ruling class, by repressing the subordinate social classes as required, either by violent or non-violent coercive means. The ruling class controls the RSA, because they also control the powers of the state (political, legislative, armed) (Leitch et al, 2001, pp. 1483-1496).

The differences between the RSA and the ISA are:

1. The repressive state apparatus (RSA) functions as a unified entity (an institution), unlike the ideological state apparatus (ISA), which is diverse in nature and plural in function. What unites the disparate ISA however is their ultimate control by the ruling ideology.

2. The apparatuses of the state, repressive and ideological, each perform the double functions of violence and ideology. A state apparatus cannot be exclusively repressive or exclusively ideological. The distinction between an RSA and an ISA is its primary function in society, respectively, the administration of violent repression and the dissemination of ideology. In practice, the RSA is the means of repression and violence, and, secondarily, a means of ideology; whereas, the primary, practical function of the ISA is as the means for the dissemination of ideology, and, secondarily, as a means of political violence and repression. The secondary functions of the ISA are affected in a concealed and a symbolic manner. (Leitch et al, 2001)

In short, what distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses “function by ideology”. (Althusser, 1970, p. 16). According to Althusser (1970), there is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus.

Thus Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to ‘discipline’ not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family.... The same is true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc. (p. 16)

Althusser further develops his thesis, stating that, in every case, ideologies recognize, despite its imaginary distortion, that the ‘ideas’ of human subject exist in their action or ought to exist in their actions. In his view, ideology talks of action and actions inserted into *practices*. Moreover, practices are governed by *rituals* in which these practices are inscribed, within the “material existence of an ideological apparatus” (Althusser, 1970. p. 35).

Furthermore, the Althusser’s (1970) conclusion follows:

[...] where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject. (p. 36)

Althusser (1970) regards that ideas have disappeared as such, noting that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus, subsequently explaining how:

[...] it appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief. (p. 36)

At this point, Althusser presents two additional thesis: 1. There is no practice except and by an ideology; and 2. There is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects, leading to his central thesis: Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects (Althusser, 1970). The explanation of said thesis lies in the stance there is no ideology except for concrete subjects and this is only made possible by the subject, i.e. by the *category of the subject* and its functioning (Althusser, 1970). Althusser then concludes that *all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects*, by the functioning of the category of the subject (Althusser, 1970, p. 40).

To clarify the newly introduced term of *interpellation* – a process of an individual adopting a set of beliefs or ideology from a system of beliefs. The key observation of this concept can be found in the inherent internationalization of beliefs and their subsequent interpretation as our own, authentic systems, presupposing they originated from us. One way to interpret individuals' beliefs can be found in their thinking that said beliefs emerge from a conscious decision, stemming from the free will to choose. Conversely, Althusser argues that these sets of beliefs are really not our own, but rather, they are social; we, as participants in social life are taking part in shared societal ideas but hold the belief these are own private understandings. Simply put, we absorb societal beliefs and perceive them as our own. This can be partially explained by the accompanying processes of internalization, i.e. our mind is structured by the wider social world: Althusser utilizes psychoanalytic theory drawn from the works of Jacques Lacan (1977) in order to explain this phenomena.

Karabegović (2017, p. 59), states that “the relation of ideology/subject should be viewed as a two-way process” in which ideology is “individual function in material existential forms of said functioning” in ideological apparatuses. The conclusion can be drawn that the base purpose of ideology is that it “imposes obviousness”, that “we cannot not recognize”, which in turn acts as “ideological interpellation/hailing” as one of the two ideological functions. More precisely, the ritual of ideological recognition is always

practiced by a concrete, individual, different and (naturally) irreplaceable subject, as it guarantees his existence, but does not offer “the knowledge of mechanism of this recognition”. Moreover, “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” by the functioning of the category of the subject (Althusser, 1970, p. 40). Such proposition entails the process of distinction between concrete individuals on the one hand and concrete subjects on the other, although at this level concrete subjects only exist insofar as they are supported by a concrete individual. In this way, ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals and that the existence of ideology and interpellation of individuals as subjects are the same thing (Althusser, 1970, p. 40). Consequently, Althusser (1970) adds:

[...] what thus seems to take place outside ideology [...] in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am ideological’. (p. 41)

The conclusion drawn by Althusser (1970) is that ideology *has no outside* (for itself), but at the same time *that it is nothing but outside* (for science and reality) (p. 41). As such, ideology interpellates individuals as subjects i.e. *individuals are always-already subjects*. They “work by themselves” in a number of cases, through ideology, whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State Apparatus, by insertion into practices governed by the rituals of the ISAs or with intervention and repression of some parts of the State Apparatus. Moreover, the term subject, according to Althusser, can signify free subjectivity, a center of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions, and a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is thereof stripped of all freedom except of freely accepting his submission (Althusser, 1970, p. 45-46). This meaning is, according to Althusser (1970), the meaning of ambiguity, which produces:

[...] the individual *is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection*, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’. *There are no subjects except by and for their subjection*. That is why they ‘work all by themselves’ (p. 46)

The reality existing in this mechanism and that is, according to Althusser, “necessarily unrecognized in its recognition form” is actually the reproduction of production and its subsequently derived forms, and on

the other hand can only be considered as a “class undertaking” that is realized through class struggle that opposes the ruling class to the exploited [class]. Furthermore, if there is any truth in the mechanisms of ideology, the mechanism must remain “abstract in relation to every real ideological formation”, so the state and its apparatuses make sense only from the aspect of class struggle, which, in turn, does not exist without antagonistic classes (Karabegović, 2017, pp. 60-61). Subsequently, ISAs are not the realization of ideology *in general*, nor even the conflict-free realization of the ideology of the ruling class (Althusser, 1970, p. 49). The ideology of the ruling class becomes the ruling ideology the installation of the ISAs in which this ideology is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology (Althusser, 1970, p. 49).

It is only from the point of view of the classes, i.e. of the class struggle, that it is possible to explain the ideologies existing in a social formation. Not only is it from this starting-point that it is possible to explain the realization of the ruling ideology in the ISAs and of the forms of class struggle for which the ISAs are the seat and the stake. But it is also and above all from this starting-point that it is possible to understand the provenance of the ideologies which are realized in the ISAs and confront one another there. For if it is true that the ISAs represent the *form* in which the ideology of the ruling class must *necessarily* be realized, and the form in which the ideology of the ruled class must *necessarily* be measured and confronted, ideologies are not ‘born’ in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc. (Althusser, 1970, p. 49)

At the end of this section, referencing the investigative tools provided by Karabegović (2017) the presented findings had clearly set goals to diagnose proclaimed ideological goals, which will be later reiterated and examined for the case of image production of the Japan House (Chapter 4.1.1), the ideological narrative-building of the Japanese uniqueness via public diplomacy (Chapter 3.4.2) and the prevailing construction processes and narrative of the new Japanese embassy building in Belgrade, Serbia (Chapter 5.3.3.1). It is important to note that, by examining the Japanese post-WW2 approach to disseminating desirable images of itself for external consumption, meant building vastly intricate and complex matrix of Japanese-ness and its undisputed notions of uniqueness. As is the goal for Althusser (1970), the purpose of this project is not to uncover objective or true realities, but rather, by providing insight into the central constitutive ideological narrative-building of officially sanctioned images/messages of Japanese identity outside its borders, review the exported architectural typologies and their subsequent processes (conceptualization, implementation, management) as the production of identity

and space that Japan utilizes to create its (ideological) subjects (including architects) who replicate the provided ideology in their practices as the desirable model of the Japanese identity meant for external consumption.

3.2.6 Ideology and Architecture: Architectural Propaganda

Architectural propaganda is the use of architecture, intentionally or unintentionally, to communicate an attitude or idea in a persuasive manner, often for an explicitly propagandistic purpose. The use of architecture for propaganda purposes in order to influence attitudes, opinions, and feelings of the target audience can be found in many cultures across history. Since architecture itself is an expression of culture, the propaganda element of architecture can organically flow from the structure by nature of its being.

The fact that something may be used for propaganda is not a values statement about the thing itself. It is a simple truism that people are influenced by things around them and therefore, when those things around include architecture, people will be influenced by it as a part of an environment. This inherent quality of architecture then can be used by those with the desire to do so. This use is what transforms the architecture from a simple influence into a piece of propaganda.

The psychological dimension of architecture and propaganda means that even when a group or government has no direct intent to use architecture for propaganda purposes, the architecture itself becomes an expression of the larger opinions of a cultural or social group which may then be impressed upon others. By virtue of observation of an architectural work, an individual may come to understand something about the original builder and his or her culture. Thus, even with no prior intent, architecture by its very nature has a built-in propaganda value.

In his work, Mayo (1996) suggests that, by their nature, political ends are future-oriented, but to accomplish them, the means must precede the ends. In this sense, a differentiation ought to be made regarding the positioning in the future timelines: some goals are set in the near, other in the distant future. With soft power, the goals are set in the distant future, which, in terms of political motivation, will greatly influence the shaping of means to reach these particular ends.




Figure 19. Causal tendencies between general contingencies. Mayo (1996, p. 82)

The contingencies between the architectural practice and political spheres, Mayo (1996) writes, provide a theoretical terrain, but the relationships between these contingencies are more than taxonomical divisions. Ideology, function, process, and design are not independent of each other (p. 82).

Furthermore, Mayo (1996) further addresses the relation between contingencies:

Although the illustrated propositions are causal, the structural diagram describes tendencies rather than absolute determinants. Two warrants help to support this theoretical structure. First, political proscriptions as constraints commonly precede any implemented prescriptions that architects may choose. Second, the nonmaterial and material aspects of the architectural sphere can be interpreted as means (nonmaterial) and ends (material). (p. 82)

Manuel Castells (1977) argues that ideologies have a causal effect on the cultural forms (including architecture) that societies produce. Castells (1977) also notes that the expression of ideology in cultural form recognizes and legitimizes it. The implication he makes is clear: the political means-end relationship between politics and cultural forms. A similar thought was previously articulated by Ignjatović (2007) stating that: "...architecture does not capture, but rather constructs and legitimizes every societal reality and ideology". In both instances ideology uses different means to achieve its ends i.e. utilizing architecture or cultural forms to construct, legitimize or reinforce its standing.

The structural model, as conceptualized by Mayo (1996) in Figure 19, displays the general relationships, but a more active middle-range theory and set of resulting actions are more realistically found in the subcontingencies (see: Figure 20). Mayo (1996) concludes that an architect can filter a set of social actions through each of these four taxonomies (p. 82).

Political Sphere		Architectural Practice Sphere					
		Nonmaterial			Material		
Proscriptive		Ideology			Function		
	Freedom	Low Equality	High Equality	Political Constraint	Practical Power	Instrumental Power	
	High	Capitalism	Socialism	Structural	Culture	Economics	
	Low	Fascism	Communism	Situational	Current issues	Programming	
Prescriptive		Process			Design		
	Process Orientation	Individual Action	Collective Action	Time Orientation	Focused Agenda	Broad Agenda	
	Structural	Role choice	Institution	Future	Propaganda	Utopia	
	Procedural	Work cycle	Communication	Present	Advocacy	Convention	

Figure 20. Middle-Range Theory--Contingent Relationships within Political and Architectural Practice Spheres (in Mayo, 1996, p. 77)

Another scholar famous for his progressive thinking and the term *the right to the city*, Henri Lefebvre (2009), makes an important point in claiming that political control directly affects what form the designed [architectural] space will take. When discussing this issue, in the context of this research, one cannot go without adding another layer of *dual* political controls, or rather *duplication*, *two sets* of everything: ideologies, processes, forms, formats. In this sense, it is extremely pertinent to view and consider all examined goings-on in *the plural*. Such duality and/or plurality can be directly applied to exported architecture i.e. for ideologies, processes, jurisdictions, obligations ... etc.

As defined by Mayo (1996), both Castells and Lefebvre accept a means-ends relationship between ideology and built form; they temper their views by accepting a *contingent* rather than an absolute relationship between the two.

So, in practice, if urban regulations can change, the standing question is on the power of the professions within negotiations and preserving the best interest of the development of cities. Ostensibly, the governmental agencies were not used as a mere rubber stamp tools, the problem remaining - what sort of power did the official have, remembering the anecdotal saying that one negotiates from a position of strength. Other issues have arisen, most notably, the ban on photographing the premises (façade and exterior of the embassy), even if an individual is located within the public space. Such actions question the *right to the city* postulated by Lefebvre (Butler, 2014) and generally have a deeper significance of abolishing freedom of movement of users of space, which is precisely why these typologies ought to be under scrutiny by the professional and official, from its inception, throughout its lifespan, to avoid misuse of power.

Akira Iriye (1997), a Japanese diplomatic historian defined culture as “structures of meaning”, including “memory, ideology, emotions, lifestyles, scholarly and artistic works”. Production of ‘structures of meaning’, when institutionalized, is possible to follow, map and interpret in different manners. One fact remains constant; however, these structures depict prevailing ideologies that shape them and can serve as a *slice* of historical research of cultural policy enquiries. These layers can be overwhelmingly indicative when viewed in the context of soft power architecture, inadvertently exposing the multifaceted nature of processes and ideologies in place at the time of their constitution and implementation.

Previously defined exported architectures (see: Chapter 1), with the added distinction of being state-sponsored and state-controlled, with all of the accompanying processes, form an informative database, especially for examining bilateral relations between sending and host countries. One of the interests for this research is, specifically, the spatial projection of society of the sending country, which is equally reflective for the host country. Shifting of power dynamics examined through time perspective, for architecture, can be enlightening when studying cultural relations policies, as one can argue that policies are a *mechanism* for ideological reproduction and exported architectures are their *manifestations*.

3.3 IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY

[...] ideology represents a body of knowledge that, through various cultural patterns, is imposed as an organizational method, semiotic attribution and providing meaning to reality (Ignjatović, 2007, p. 33)

When investigating the relations between societies and culture, ideology and identity are tightly interwoven. If ideologies are viewed as complex and structured systems of knowledge, then identities are the methods of representation of certain knowledge, with a number of additional roles, dependant on every singular context. For example, Japanese images and narratives for export, as well as internal consumption are centered on the notion of “uniqueness”, which is the prevailing theme in the ideological narrative, produced and reproduced (for further discussion on Japanese uniqueness narrative exploration see: Chapter 3.3.2). Similarly, American embassy building programs in the 1950s had clear spatial guidelines, portraying the US as an open, modern society, taking on its role as the world leader after WW2 (for further discussion see: Chapter 4.6.2). Certain aspects of these occurrences, among other, will

be examined, extricated and codified (theoretically and spatially) to define the methodology examining soft power architecture (see: Chapter 6).

Although within the humanistic sciences narratives, from Marx to present day, ideology was often “ideologized” and value-determined, it, as well other sciences, operates within a framework of empirical requirements vis-à-vis societal conditions and transformations. To illustrate, Edward Shils (Parsons & Shils 1951) describes ideologies through a number of predetermined characteristics: dualistic, alienating, indoctrinating, totalitarian and futuristic. Talcott Parsons (Parsons & Shils 1951) identifies ideology as a dissonance between the things believed and the things that determined as being scientifically correct. Commencing from a value-neutral standpoint stating that ideology is a normative system that governs social and political attitudes of a group [...] or society as a whole (Biti, 1997), the current overview of ideology in construction of societal identities is based on the legacy of “structural Marxism” ascertained by Louis Althusser (see: Chapter 3.2.2). If ascribed with such perspective, ideology can be likewise defined as a system of preconceptions comprised of ideas, terms, myths and images, within which people live out their imaginary relations with regard to factual existential conditions (Biti, 1997). According to Ricoeur (1986) ideology has the power to provide organization, determination and understanding of the world, with creating metaphors and symbolic representations, by establishing categorical world order, thusly constructing identities.

Consequently, one can claim that ideology represents a body of knowledge that, through various cultural patterns, is imposed as an organizational method, semiotic attribution and providing meaning to reality (Ignjatović, 2007, p. 33). Shape, visualization and the “realness” of said reality are regulated by various cultural concepts formulated through a system of societal identities ((Ignjatović, 2007, p. 33). Putting forth pretensions in relation to what *is* the world, and more importantly, what it *ought* to be (Jenkins, 2008), ideologies systematically constitute various identities, both in hierarchical and lateral terms.

3.3.1 National Ideology and Identity

National ideology and identity are fundamental anchors and frameworks not only for individual behavior but indeed for the nation-state. (Larsen et al. 1995, p.168)

The presented findings are ordered to reflect the highly structured overview of this topic provided by Larsen et al. (1995, pp. 166-168), given the complexity of the subject matter. This theme is significant for

this project, as well as the wider global context for a variety of reasons: the hopes of achieving true internationalism seem to be lost, as the identity vacuum and new virulent forms of mini nationalism and ethnic chauvinism are experienced worldwide. Subsequently, academic research on this topic clearly ought to devote more attention to understanding the ideological and identity components of the national outlook (Larsen et al. 1995).

Discussing national ideology, Smith (1993) writes that after the modern nation-states came out of their traditionalist moorings, the nation shifted the emphasis for immediate kinship relationships and cultural heritage to territorial images, educational and legal functions. Consequently, national ideology developed from historic memories, territories and social ties facilitated by modern communication (including a shared economy and common legal rights). In this process, the nation-states became not only the accepted basis for world order, but the source of law, authority and belief (Smith, 1971). Similarly, Lee (2019) notes that “national identity formation is based on the construction of a national narrative” (p. 25).

Larsen et al. (1995,) quoting Snyder (1964) note how:

Nationalism as an ideology has become increasingly prevalent and dominant the more it has responded to the fundamental needs of a post-medieval society. As industrialization and science created modern society from the old, national ideology provided security which substituted for the lost kinship relations of previous generation. This national ideology responds to the universal human need to belong and to be secure. (p. 166)

The discussion of “kinship relations” is of particular importance in this discussion, when addressing the Japanese national polity and discussions on the concept of Japanese-ness, with these relations hailed as one of the linchpins and source of uniqueness and endurance of the Japanese society and culture (for further debate see: Chapter 3.3.2)

In other words, to endure as national entities the nation-states put forth a new ideology based on group standards. Ruling hierarchies looked for the ways to reinforce the political state so that it provides a cohesive force of common values and beliefs. Since these values were often reinforced by ethno-centric symbolism some questioned whether we were facing a political religion (Larsen et al. 1995). Smith (1971) argued that national ideologies have a place alongside religion as a sub-type of the broader category of belief systems. Larsen et al. (1995) conclude that:

[...] national ideologies concern themselves with issues such as social norms, laws, constitutions, opinions and the citizen's role in the larger national entity. The primary functions of national ideology are: to justify national policy (including aggression and war), to boost national morale, and to create and maintain national solidarity. These functions enable society to remain integrated and cohesive. (p. 166)

Further examining the term of national identity, it is noted that the ideological role overlaps with the functions of national identity (Larsen et al. 1995). It served the cohesive need of the state if it can appeal to a sense of common identity (Orridge, 1981). Subsequently, Smith (1971) similarly notes that people are more conscious of a variety of identities, as a consequence of modernization and communication, including national and ethnic ones. Developing the previously presented concepts, Larsen et al. (1995) conclude that national identities are partly based on memories and partly on the symbols and myths of a national culture. Present-day cultural goings-on and history shape the national character; ideology again overlaps with identity, because a fundamental belief of nationalism is that people can only be self-actualized and can only obtain full freedom within the nation-state. The strengthening of the nation-state is a precondition to global freedom and harmony, as well as personal fulfillment (Larsen et al. 1995, p.166).

In Palumbo and Shanalan's (1981) view, nationalism prospered because it drew from the historically-driven emotions and gave sense to the individuals in what is often seen as a futile existence. Considering such perspective, Larsen et al. (1995) speculate that national can be understood as the determination to assert national identity while providing quasi-religious loyalty to the state. Such provided individual meaning is based on the historical identity, with the notion that the past epochs are always present. In some cases language mediates identity and similarly religion and territory are treated as a nation resource; identity can be also found in aesthetic relationship through which people achieve self-actualization (Larsen et al. 1995). Usage of common symbols such as the flag and anthem provides an identification process and in turn, according to Smith (1971) gives nationalism room for a gradual growth in identity, through the transmission of collective memories and happenings. National sentiment is equally recognized as one of the key component of identity (Larsen et al, 1995); from the perspective of national identity it serves the need to belong. Therefore, significant importance is given to nationalism as the means to defend a threatened identity and ensure the survival of cultures (Larsen et al. 1995).

Conversely, Mastnak (1991) asserted that analysis cannot discover or create identity, as it is unconscious. One of the arguments he provided was that political changes in Eastern Europe in the 1990s have challenged the very logic of what constitutes a political identity. However, according to Csepeli (1989), self-identification with a nation is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. In a wide-ranging assessment of national identity Schlesinger (1987) concluded that despite the importance of concepts like national or transnational identities, researchers generally lack a coherent view about how such collective identities are formed or altered.

Haas (1986) similarly addressed the concept that national identity is infused into the sense of loyalty for perceived legitimacy of social structures and national territory. Hayes (1960, p.2) similarly illustrated nationalism as “a fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality”. For Larsen et al. (1995, p. 167) the political origin of national identity probably began as a simple in-group/out-group distinction (compare with Chapter 3.1). For Forbes (1985) in-groups formed when people believed they held things in common. Making a striking claim Breuilly (1994) noted that nationalism was a parasitic movement and ideology shaped by what it opposed. When Breuilly’s (1994) theories of national identity, Larsen et al. (1995) interpret them in the following manner:

The nationalist approach does not attempt to explain the origins or cause of national identity, but asserts the current existence of a nation with an explicit and peculiar character whose interest takes priority over all other interests and values (transcending family, church, race, gender, etc.). [...] Nationalists insist on the primacy of nation over all other categories, and nationalism is said to override all other obligations. The communications approach sees national identity as a consequence of internal communication which creates a sense of common identity. Marxists generally viewed national identity as a by-product of capitalism which should be replaced by a classless society. Finally, the psychological or functional approach asserts that national identity replaces previous identities which have been underlined. This approach makes the assumption that people have a basic need to identify with something greater than themselves. (p. 167)

Smith (1988) however noted that the new emerging global identities are vulnerable to ethnic and national aspirations. His proposal is to make a joint inquiry utilizing the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism and transnationalism to help clarify the theoretical foundations of current collective identity.

To conclude the theoretical overview of the concepts of national ideology and identity, Larsen et al. (1995) make an insightful observation:

National symbols activate national ideology and identity, national rituals require uniformity of obedience, and represent strong models for social cohesion and conformity. As the individual forms a self-concept a sense of nationality is a strong component. The individual not only forms a self-identity, but also belongs to an in-group with shared values and expectations. National ideology and identity are fundamental anchors and frameworks not only for individual behavior but indeed for the nation-state. (p. 168)

This section was instrumental in explaining how the processes of national identity and ideology-building permeate through various, if not all facets of societies. Therefore, considering the primary research topic of this project, it is indisputably concluded the examined building typologies and their subsequent processes of conceptualization, implementation and management process will be imbued with a set of ideological meanings.

3.3.2 Nihonjinron: the discussions on Japan(ese)-ness

Thus intellectuals write Nihonjinron as prescription for behavior. The government turns it into a hegemonic ideology, and the corporate establishment puts it into practice. (Befu, 2001, p. 81)

This section will overview the concept of *Nihonjinron* (Japanese: 日本人論), ‘the question of Japan(ese)-ness’, recognized in this thesis as a prevailing national policy utilized by the governmental bodies and the cultural elites to shape the Japanese image for predominantly external consumption. This concept fuses the questions of identity and ideology pertinent for this project, as its output processes similarly trickle down to architectural practices and surrounding processes, most notably observed in the implementation of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia (for full discussion, see: Chapter 5.3.3.1).

The notion of the duality of the concept of Nihonjinron is presented by Befu (2001), with the notion that there is Nihonjinron by Japanese and Nihonjinron by foreigners. He describes that “...the former is a self-portrait [...] the latter is a portrait of an Other” (p. 8). Subsequently “... the motives behind the criticism are quite different depending on whether the object of criticism is the Self or the Other” (p. 9). This viewpoint confirms the previously hypothesized *duality* or rather *duplication of processes* noted for this research. Ideological narratives, apart from being transplanted onto spatial/architectural manifestations will differ depending on the intended context i.e. for internal or external consumption, with the targeted groups also being varied.

Ball (1993) notes that policies operate as exercises of power through the production of truth and knowledge as discourses. Such reading signifies that policies as discourse do not simply identify the objects about which they talk, but rather they are practices which, in their articulation, constitute and create phenomena about which they talk (Foucault, 1982).

Liddicoat (2007), whose overview structure and sources for examination of policies will be presented, underlines that policy discourses therefore create the discursive contexts in which they will be implemented. However, they are themselves shaped by the discursive context in which they are produced: policies can be seen as both context-shaped and the context-renewing. Policies are context-renewing because they shape the context in which they are implemented and affect the actions that follow from policy and influence actions (Liddicoat, 2007). They are enacted as a way of transforming the world on which they act and in terms of construction of that world, the primary effect of policies is discursive: it creates the contexts in which the concepts it contains are understood and thought through (Foucault, 1969). In policy, therefore, Liddicoat (2007) concludes, context is dynamic and is renewed at each point; meaning that policies are fundamentally ideological constructs which grow out of ideological positioning and (re)create, promote and reinforce ideological positioning. Vološinov (1973) similarly makes a compelling argument that policies express ideas which are linked to the ideological processes and reveal the perceptions and evaluation of realities in the socio-cultural context in which they are constructed. Considine (1994) likewise notes that policies, as authoritative texts, ratify and transmit the ideologies which they contain by defining and encoding what is valuable and what is valued by those engaged in policy-making. Policy discourses, therefore, reveal the ideological framings of the concepts they encode and create the meanings of those concepts which will become the ideologies transmitted (Bakhtin, 1981; Vološinov, 1973).

Liddicoat (2007) writes that the key dimension of Japanese ideologies of identity is *Nihonjinron*, the question of the Japanese people, which can be seen as an effort to create the parameters of a distinctive Japanese cultural and national identity (Befu, 1993, 2001; Dale, 1986; Yoshino, 1992; Miller, 1982). A core element in *Nihonjinron* is that Japan is linguistically and culturally homogenous; that is, the Japanese are a homogeneous people (単一民族 *tan'itsuminzoku*) who constitute a racially unified nation (単一民族国家 *tan'itsuminzokukokka*). Consequently, Sugimoto (1999) writes:

Nihonjinron defines the Japanese in racial terms with *nihonjin* comprising most members of the Yamato race and excludes, for example, indigenous Ainu and Okinawans as groups who are

administratively Japanese, but not 'genuinely' so. Furthermore, when Nihonjinron analysts refer to Japanese culture, they almost invariably mean Japanese ethnic culture and imply that the racially defined Japanese are its sole owners. (p. 82)

In spite of the underlying diversity within Japan, Nihonjinron makes a fundamental equation between nationality, ethnicity and culture, which privileges the Yamato Japanese as the sole Japanese group (Liddicoat, 2007). This concept attempts to frame the Japanese identity in terms of distinctive characteristics which constitute Japanese-ness (Liddicoat, 2007). One aspect has been to stress the distinctiveness of the Japanese people and society, which are constructed as not only unique, but also as being 'uniquely unique' (Gjerde & Onishi, 2000; Yoshino, 1992; Mouer & Sugimoto, 1986). Asserting this singularity is manifested through comparative generalization between 'Westerners' and the 'Japanese', with special properties being ascribed to the Japanese brain, social customs and language (Maher & Yashiro, 1995; Miller, 1982).

How does this prevailing narrative of uniqueness then influence policies that pertain to exported architectural typologies? To answer that particular question, mechanism of wider implementation of Nihonjinron as a national policy will be elaborated upon. It is presumed that such an all-encompassing policy will trickle down into multiple facets of narrative-building for officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity. Subsequently, patterns of identity-building for export emerge, which are also most prominently noted in the construction/building processes of the Japanese diplomatic-consular outposts.

For Yoshino (1992) one of the most sticking concepts hailed as an advantage that led to the preservation of the Japanese society against the negative aspects of industrialization is the familistic concept of state, 国家 (kokka) – meaning both "nation" and "state". This dual meaning is indicative of the historical process in which the state came to be identified with the nation as symbolized by the central political and social-cultural authority, the Emperor, as well as the inclusion of state Shinto, to be differentiated from the folk Shinto (Yoshino, 1992). In pre-industrial societies, order is usually understood to the result from conscious collective or solidarity of resemblance (Durkheim, 1984). Consequently, this principle was extended to industrial society of Japan, underlining the importance of the concept of solidarity (Yoshino, 1992). The concept of enterprise-as-family has been extrapolated from the previously lauded Japanese interrelations between 親分 (oyabun) – boss, chief / player of the father role and 子分 (kobun) – a follower, an underling, a protégé / player of the child role (Yoshino, 1992). With these relations being

undisrupted by the processes of modernization, cities became “secondary villages with migrations” (Yoshino, 1992). Kamishima (1961) notes that "The city turned into a mere gathering of people and could not provide the prototype of a [new] order [in modern Japan], which was found in the natural village (primary village)". This viewpoint is valuable when framed into the context of the urban scale of contemporary Japanese cities, as the urban spaces of Tokyo have historically had low-rise and high-density spatiality (Radović, 2015).

Befu (2001) writes that it is only a short step from Nihonjinron as a prescriptive model to Nihonjinron as an ideology. He writes it is instructive to analyze the report submitted to the Prime Minister Oohira Masayoshi. This report titled *Bunka no Jidai* (The Age of Culture) (Bunka no Jidai Kenkyuu Guroupu 1980) is subtitled 'Reports of the Policy Group of Prime Minister Oohira - Number One.' It was prepared by a committee of Nihonjinron advocated appointed by Oohira. The committee was chaired by Yamamoto Shichihei, also known as Isaiah Ben Dasan, author of the three-million-copy best-seller, *Nihonjin to Yudayajin* in 1970, and included a number of other well-known Nihonjinron writers, such as the Tokyo University professor Kumon Shumpei, one of the co-authors, along with two other Tokyo University professors, of an erudite Nihonjinron treatise (Murakami et al, 1979), that argues for the familistic basics of Japanese society. Another notable member of the committee was Komatsu (1977), one of the best-known science fiction and mystery writers and author of another Nihonjinron piece.

The committee report hails Japanese culture for its emphasis on harmonious human relations - contrasting such relations with the self-centered individualism of the West - on members of society knowing their station in life, and on Japanese tradition in general. For the first time after the war, Kawamura (1982) observes, Nihonjinron thus formally entered politics and became a handmaiden of the political establishment, which saw fit to endorse Nihonjinron as an officially sanctioned and this hegemonic ideology (Befu, 2001).

Befu (2001) continues to note that it is no surprise to find the Department of Comprehensive Policy Studies of Chuo University adopting analysis of Nihonjinron as a major approach to formulation of comprehensive national policy. Moreover, the department organized a two-year graduate seminar on Nihonjinron, with the participation of some twenty-five faculty members, the results of which were published in 2000 (Chuo Daigaku Daigakuin Sougou Seisaku Kenkyuuka Nihonjinron Inkaikai ed. 2000). These intellectuals write Nihonjinron as prescription for behavior. The government turns it into a hegemonic ideology, and the corporate establishment puts it into practice.

It should come as no surprise that the hegemonic ideology of Nihonjinron is maintained and supported by the state in many and varied forms. The government's annual award of cultural medals to those who excel in traditional artistic fields is one. Governmental designation of an artist as a "Human Cultural Treasure" is another. These medals and designations are given out to only a handful of individuals each year. Because they are given in fields of traditional arts and crafts, these awards indicate state endorsement of traditional Japanese aesthetic values incorporated in Nihonjinron, such as *yuugen*¹¹ (幽玄), *wabi*, and *sabi* (Befu, 2001, p. 81).

Giving an example of the institutionalization of Nihonjinron Befu (2001) writes about national museums. These typologies often serve to reinforce the sense of cultural and national identity, as these monuments often attempt to assert a sense of cultural uniqueness. Among such monuments, I might mention state-run museums. The Historical and Folklore Museum (歴史民俗博物館 *Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan*), exhibiting the essence of Japanese history, is a veritable showcase of cultural nationalism. The National Museums of Art, in Tokyo and Kyoto, accomplish the same objective, namely, to impress upon visitors that which is unique to Japanese culture and history - the very essence of Nihonjinron. These museums help assert Japan's unique identity by housing artifacts unique to Japan. This insistence on uniqueness, or rather dissimilarity and incomparability to any other culture is the cornerstone of Japanese-ness and is different to comparable examples (in this case - museums) (Befu, 2010, pp. 81-82).

The concept of apolitical nature of culture removes the obligation to the State. The only remaining responsibility is to the nation, it being undisputed, as belonging to a nation is an indisputable issue and is not a part of the political process (Gavrilović, 2011, p.45). However, in the case of Japan, obligation to the state and vice versa is tightly interconnected, with the added nuance that the notions of "nation" and "race" are oftentimes blurred in the Japanese cultural narrative.

The Japanese government has taken upon itself the task of promoting and propagating the official Nihonjinron overseas. This overseas propagation of Nihonjinron should be seen as an integral part of the Nihonjinron phenomenon, for it is in large part because of Japan's internationalization and globalization

¹¹ subtle grace; hidden beauty; mysterious profundity; elegant simplicity; the subtle and profound; the occult

that *Nihonjinron* has become a burning issue among Japanese (Befu, 2001). The question remains: what are the models for effective propagation of one's unique culture overseas?

First of all, as Parmenter and Tomita (2000) note, it is necessary to develop a nationalistic adherence to a particular conceptualization of Japanese identity, which is unique, homogenous, monolithic, rather than engaging with the complexities of identity as it is revealed in internationalized contexts. However, when culture is presented explicitly, it is inevitably a condensed image of the relevant cultural context (Liddicoat, 2010) The intercultural is usually presented as a dichotomous opposition between Japan and the English speaking world in which each is stereotypically depicted as being in opposition to the other (Wada, 1999).

In assessment of such narratives, Liddicoat (2010) examines the 2004 appeal to the Japanese Prime Minister about the international study of Japanese, the document that argues that: "communicating about Japan in English is inadequate for representing Japan on the world stage and that communication in Japanese is necessary and strategic in disseminating Japanese culture and ideas" (Liddicoat, 2010, p. 13). In examining another example of the dissonance between the proclaimed uniqueness and its accurate presentation to the world, Liddicoat (2010) quotes the study of 日本事情 *Nihonjijou* or Japanese way of life. *Nihonjijou* was established officially by the Ministry of Education in 1962 and covers a syllabus of a general introduction to Japan, Japanese history, culture, politics, economics, nature, science and technology (Liddicoat, 2010, p.16). While the scope of *Nihonjijou* is not as restricted to purely Japanese practices, the approach is criticized for presenting an ethnocentric and stereotypical view of Japan which reinforces a view of the society as monoethnic, monocultural and monolingual (Nagata, 1995). The teaching of Japanese culture for overseas learners of Japanese therefore focuses on a reductive version of the culture and is conducted in a way which emphasizes the distinctiveness of Japanese culture in conformity to the *Nihonjinron* ideology (Liddicoat, 2010, p.17).

3.4 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: AN OVERVIEW

While the term was new, the activity was old. States had sought to engage foreign publics for centuries. The core practices of public diplomacy – listening, advocacy, cultural and exchange diplomacy, and even international broadcasting – all had deep roots in the statecraft of Europe and Asia. It is easy to see the Roman practice of educating the sons of ‘friendly kings’ on their borders as the forebear of modern educational exchange programmes; or the Greek construction of the great library of Alexandria as a forerunner of the U.K. Council on Confucius Institute; or the newsletters circulated by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II as a medieval ‘World Service’.

Public diplomacy activity is less a new chapter in the history of foreign policy than an element of foreign policy – identifiable in all times and places – which has simply become more prominent with the increased role of the public in the affairs of state and the proliferation of mechanisms for communication. (Cull, 2009, p.18)

Nicholas J. Cull (2009) makes several interesting observations: public diplomacy efforts (albeit used under different pretenses) are not new and the cornerstone of this type of communication was primarily cultural exchange. In the following section the author will give some remarks on the differentiation between the terms ‘cultural diplomacy’ and ‘cultural exchange’ as they are often confused. Furthermore, public diplomacy ought to be viewed as an element of foreign policy and going back to official policies of the Government, it is possible to make meaningful conclusions.

To be engaged in pure public diplomacy, ideally, organizations providing these efforts should be free of any type of official or governmental oversight. Since this is rarely possible, almost all public diplomacy efforts have an undercurrent of official politics.

This was true as far back as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, when Baron Kaneko Kentarō (金子堅太郎) was sent to the U.S. to gain support of the American public and use his personal acquaintance with then President Theodor Roosevelt to persuade him to serve as an intermediary during the Russia-Japan peace negotiations. If one studies (Matsumura, 2009) the speeches and policies Baron Kaneko used there is a clear undertone of official Japan politics, with a hint of propaganda (using the model of Monroe doctrine to put forth the notion of “Asia for the Asians” or presenting Japan as the natural leader of Asia). While the Baron’s actions are understandable (he was representing the interests of the Japanese

Government) this just goes to show how it is challenging to separate the official policies when engaging in public diplomacy.

Furthermore, Cull (2009) addresses the notions of ‘propaganda’ and ‘public diplomacy’: both are dealing in the sphere of ‘influence’, but unlike propaganda, public diplomacy is not a one-way street to the intended audience:

At its best, public diplomacy is a two-way street: a process of mutual influence whereby a state (or other international player) facilitates engagement between publics or tunes its own policies to the map of foreign public opinion. In the ideal case, public diplomacy treats the foreign public as an active participant – not just as a flock of sheep waiting to be ideologically shorn. (p. 18)

Additionally, the term ‘new public diplomacy’ ought to be examined: this term deals with changes in context and practice of public diplomacy. Several changes are most prominent: expansion of international actors, such as NGOs, international organizations and corporations, new technologies that give real-time reporting capabilities and the rise of theoretical models derived from marketing, such as place branding. Interestingly, none of these changes represents more of a challenge than reorientation of public diplomacy away from the top-down communication patterns. The emphasis and challenges in ‘new’ public diplomacy lie in greater emphasis on people-to-people contact, especially given the age of social media; this does not, however, negate the past lesson but rather increases their significance. (Cull, 2009)

Cull (2009) similarly made a remark on impatient politicians requesting measurable results of soft power initiatives, comparing them with people living in a forest, rushing out every morning to check how much the trees have grown overnight. One does simply do not expect fast return of investment when engaged in public diplomacy schemes.

3.4.1 Differentiation of Terms: Public Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange

“In many countries, particularly in Japan, the terms cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange policies are often confused. [...] Cultural diplomacy is the use of cultural means to enhance a nation’s political influence. As part of a nation’s foreign policy, it naturally carries political implications. International cultural exchange, meanwhile, is not necessarily linked to a nation’s political intentions or strategies, at least in the short term. Under this concept, cultural activities are undertaken not as a political means to bolster a nation’s image but as creative endeavors valid

in their own right—that is, for the purpose of mutual inspiration through international exchange.”
(Ogura, 2009, p. 2)

If these concepts are examined, it can be concluded that it is challenging, even for cultural exchange to be without political implications. An organization conducting these activities ought to be without political ties to the government, to be an independent entity, set up through endowments or donations and most importantly without oversight from any governmental institutions that ever so often shape the cultural and intellectual exchange according to its own agenda.

The Japan Foundation (abbreviated: JF) example is the one that may confirm the hypothesis that it is not always possible for any organization to be fully independent, without external influence. JF was founded in 1972 as an organization affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and became an Independent Administrative Institution in October 2003. It is necessary to underline that the JF is still under some form of MOFA’s supervision.

Public diplomacy refers to a national government’s efforts to influence international opinions on its national or foreign policies through public relations activities or intellectual exchange targeting the media or citizens’ groups. Public diplomacy is therefore not the same as cultural diplomacy, in that the former is always closely associated with a well-defined political objective and aimed at certain pre-determined targets while the latter is not necessarily linked to a specific political objective. The two sometimes overlap in the sense that the forms public diplomacy takes include efforts to improve the nation’s image by means of cultural activities. But even in this case, there is a subtle difference between the two because public diplomacy is usually linked with an effort to improve the nation’s image for some specific strategic purpose. (Ogura, 2009, pp. 2-3)

The abovementioned quote demonstrates the dilemma surrounding the notions of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange: it is almost impossible to define one without the other, the overlap in activities happens very often and the lines of “job description” often get blurred. Additionally, the political component or some form of official governmental influence is always present, in all instances.

3.4.2 Evolution of Concepts of Japan's Cultural Diplomacy in the XX Century

What kind of national image has Japan sought to project to the world through its cultural diplomacy? Ogura (2009, p. 3)

Japanese diplomacy efforts can be divided into several stages, each one introducing important time for development of the country in terms of cultural exchange and laying groundwork for soft power development. One can observe that the Japanese cultural diplomacy policies have changes with the changing times and relevant economic and political issues of the day. Furthermore, throughout its developmental stages of cultural diplomacy Japan has shown adaptability and evolution that followed benefited the country in terms of its image in the global arena.

Roughly four stages of Japanese diplomacy can be noted, as proposed by Ogura (2009) and will be examined for the sake of making meaningful observations regarding the efforts of official Japanese (public) diplomacy.

a) 1945 – late 1960s

- Transform the image of a country into a peace-loving one, to oppose the perception gained during WWII of an aggressive, militant country
- Joining UNESCO in July 1951
- San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951
- Engaging in cultural activities overseas, the Japanese government emphasized such traditions as the tea ceremony and ikebana
- Search for a new national identity to abandon the image of military state was urgently needed to restore national pride and international credibility. "Construction of a culture state" (PM Tetsu Katayama)

It must be noted that until the early 1970s, Japanese language education abroad was not actively encouraged because many Japanese intellectuals, as well as citizens of former Japanese colonies in Korea and China, recalling Japan's prewar efforts to propagate the Japanese language in Asia, still felt a connection between such efforts and Japanese imperial ambitions (Ogura, 2009).

b) 1970s – early 1990s

- 1980-1990 the "bubble years"

- After the Tokyo Olympics of 1964, emphasis shifted from projecting an image of a “peaceful Japan” to painting a picture of an economically advanced Japan. The country deployed a more positive cultural diplomacy in place of the “reactive” diplomacy aimed at dispelling its pre-war militaristic image.

- 1970 EXPO in Osaka

- The two Nixon shocks (1971 and 1972)

- The establishment of the Japan Foundation in 1972

- Rise of an anti-Japanese sentiment in Asia in the 1970s (“Faceless Japan” or “Banana Japan”)

- Establishment of Ohira School in China to promote Japanese studies (1980)

- The launch of the JET Programme (1987)

c) 1990s – mid 2000s

- The “lost decades”

- As the Japanese economy matured and the country’s importance on the international stage increased, expectations for Japan to make more contributions as a responsible partner in the international community began to grow.

- Opening in 1990 of the Japan Foundation ASEAN Culture Center

- Era of “Japan bashing” and “Revisionist thinking” (Enigma of Japan)

- Japan creates a special fund within UNESCO in the early 1990s for the purpose of preserving the cultural heritage of developing countries.

- Center for Global Partnership (CGP) in 1992, with the goal of promoting new types of cultural and intellectual exchange with the United States (to combat America’s concerns of the Japanese “threat” which characterized it as an alien society whose fundamental nature would never change)

- Murayama Statement on August 15th 1995

- “Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative” (Murayama Initiative) in 1995

d) 2005 – today

- Increasing difficulty of mobilizing financial resources for overseas cultural activities (feasibility and benefits that can be used as explanation for taxpayers and stakeholders)

- Increasing notion that the Japanese culture does not belong exclusively to Japan any more, but is rather a heritage of all humanity.

- Using “soft power” to mitigate possible international disputes, as was the case when Japan-Iraq relations were in danger due to Japan’s cooperation with America.

3.5 SOFT POWER

3.5.1 Concept and applicability

Despite its growing importance around the world, a universal definition of soft power is yet to be found, except that it is a form of national power based on ideational and cultural attractiveness which is intentionally or unintentionally utilized by actors in international relations to achieve strategic imperatives. (Lee, 2018, p. 2)

This segment will build upon the scholarly works systematizing the concept of soft power, more precisely, the works of Nye (2004) and Lee (2018), with the former introducing the concept of soft power and the latter giving a concise overview of its historical development and implications, which will be utilized as the necessary outline in this Chapter.

Soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, is the ability to attract and convince others without oppression and payments. Although military force and economic prosperity typically serve as the backbone of national power, such hard power does not always mirror its influence. For instance, the U.S, world's superpower has spent a defense budget larger than that of other nations and it is the world's largest economic body. However, U.S's image and its influence dwindling, mainly due to its failure in seeking a global consensus on how best to pursue counterterrorism approaches and to address potential global challenges such as climate change. There have been many calls both within and outside the United States to restore its leadership through "smart" blending of hard and soft power (Lee, 2018, p. 1).

Other countries also increasingly recognize the importance of soft power tools, such as diplomacy, foreign (economic) assistance and communication in the processes of rousing support and enhancing one's national image. Western European countries have a longer tradition and spend more time on their respective public diplomacy approaches, useful as a supplementary strategy of soft power, exhibited in actions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian mission, international cultural relations and immigration policies. Japan, for example, has embraced the concept of soft power as an instrument of its foreign affairs and security policy under its constraints on the use of hard military power. Most countries in general tend to attempt increasing their capacity to "strengthen soft power and integrate it with hard power and economic strength" (Lee, 2018. pp. 1-2).

Lee (2018) gives clear theoretical perspectives on soft power starting with the concept of power itself, defined as the ability to influence others to produce the outcomes one desires. According to Dahl (1957), A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do. Traditionally, a nation's power has been determined by the capabilities to influence the behavior of other states through coercion and economic incentives. The sizes of population, territory, military force, national resources and economic strength have therefore been key factors in assessing national power. Countries have tended to heavily rely on "the use of hard power that rests on force and inducements (sticks and carrots metaphor), because it was the most direct and tangible way of enforcing dominance in international relations" (Lee, 2018, p. 3).

While acknowledging the importance of military and economic power, Nye (1991) added a third concept pertinent in the global arena of international relations, *soft power*. Soft power is the ability to attract and convince, not just command and coerce. It enables a nation to appeal to others' values, interests and preferences rather than being dependent on utilizing force and inducements. Nye (1991) argues that:

[...] if a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow [...] In short, the universalism of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical. (p. 33)

In summary, compatibility with other nations' set of values and interests is as important as the exercise of hard power to obtain the desired goal (Lee, 2018). According to Nye (2004), in the global information age, all three sources of power – military, economic and soft – remain relevant, although in different degrees in different relationships. However, Nye argues that the importance of soft power is ever-increasing and gaining traction as countries engage in competitive policies of attraction, legitimacy and credibility. Nye suggests there are three major resources of a nation's soft power: culture which attracts others, political values, when it lives up to those values, both internally and externally, and its foreign policies when others appreciate them as legitimate and moral (Lee, 2018).

Lee (2018) makes an observation that Nye's conceptualization is not the only or the definitive explanation of power. To illustrate, prior to the works of Nye, Boulding (1990) utilized the terms "threat", "exchange" and "integrative" power for similar purposes, highlighting that, while the realists focus on the threat power of coercion, "the evidence is very strong that integrative power is the most important of the three." From this perspective, threat power is coercive and destructive and exchange power is based on the

dynamics of trade, mutual contracts and reciprocal cooperation, while integrative power has a more emotional and organic base, where human relationships extend beyond respect into friendship and even love (Lee, 2018).

Similarly, Carr (1964) discussed the importance of "power over opinion" and its close connection with the military and economic power of the nation. Similarly, one of Morgenthau's (1963) ways of exercising national power lies in the politics of prestige, offering a hint for understanding the implications of soft power in the world of anarchy. Power, in itself, is not the end of the nation-state, but a means to achieve prosperity and guarantee survival. The state not only implements its will towards others by taking measures that follow the drive of resources on foreign soil, but also by relying on an international reputation that has sufficient intention and ability to use its power. Morgenthau (1963) stated that "in the struggle for existence and power, what others think of us [the image in the mirror of the minds of others] is as important as what we actually are." (p. 73)

Unprompted compliance to one's will is the ultimate goal a state should aim to achieve in international relations. Waltz (2010) notes that, even under the two core assumptions of the realist approach, "international anarchy" and "state as a unitary actor", the exercise of material power is not always the most efficient way to realize a nation's definitive goal. Morgenthau (1963) similarly highlights that states ought to possess varied means to confront diverse threats in different sectors and be alert to international morality and world public opinion to maintain its international standing.

A diversion of the "traditional" approach to international relations led by international institutions makes this point clearer. Accepting the realist assumption of international anarchy, institutionalists do not consider the states unitary actors (see: Keohane & Nye, 2012). International relations are conducted through a complex web of interaction among diverse actors in different sectors. Different "layers" exist in interstate relations, such as military, economy, energy and environment, with some states possessing more leverage for certain layers, although their hard (military) power is weaker than others. Under complex interdependence, resources other than those found in hard power can be more influential, depending on time period, sectors and issues. In this condition, soft power functions as a "tool" to achieve national imperatives by creating positive international context by inducing willing acquiescence of other states to a country's own intention. This soft power potential of a country would likely expand if that country espouses a multilateral approach based on a win-win mentality in its foreign policy (Oğuzlu, 2007).

To illustrate, if a state, particularly a hegemonic one, can persuade other nations through diplomatic, cultural, ideological and moral methods, this soft power is what makes other countries accept the rules and norms of a system primarily designed and operated by the hegemon and its allies, as well as what allows a hegemonic system to function without continuously relying on force, inducements and/or violence (Lentner, 2005). Consequently, the notion of soft power is developed under the research program stemming from the realists' theory¹². It is a form of power purposefully utilized by actors in international relations to accomplish national strategic imperatives (Lee, 2018).

In recent years, Lee (2018) argues that the idea of soft power has been further scrutinized by scholars and practitioners because of its possibility to function as a new means to increase the state's influence in international affairs and to upgrade its status. Lee (2018) notes that:

In the age of globalization and information, winning others' hearts is crucial for the enhancement of international influence. For this, acquiring legitimacy in the pursuit of a nation's foreign and security policy should be prerequisite. Military force is essential to defeating states, but without legitimacy, a state is guilty of the misuse of hard power, alienating much of the world. Therefore, soft power, which rests on legitimacy and values, is regarded as an indispensable complement to hard power. (pp. 5-6)

However, it is hard to formulate a universally accepted definition of soft power, as Lee (2018) observes due to the following reasons:

Firstly, it is necessary to obtain more evidence prior to making a final judgment to whether a nation wields (can wield) soft power without the prior existence of its hard power, or if the enhancement of soft power requires strong hard power or if the state's hard power potentially decreases its soft power. Nye (2004) stated that although hard power and soft power are closely interconnected, the former may or may not increase the latter, and vice versa. Still, history shows that a state with sizable hard military and economic strength has often neglected soft power by exercising coercive measures to achieve its desired

¹² Realism reflects a view of the individual as primarily fearful and power seeking. States act as individuals might, meaning that each state acts in a unitary way in pursuit of its own national interest, defined in terms of power. Power, in turn, is primarily thought of in terms of the material resources necessary to physically harm or coerce other states: in other words, to fight and win wars (Mingst, 2013, p. 76).

outcomes. For example, the Bush administration was criticized for disregarding U.S.'s soft power in its war on terrorism and conflict with Iraq.

Conversely, some realist theoreticians (see: Huntington, 2011) argue that possession of national hard power (e.g. economic success and influence) is the foundation of its soft power of culture and ideology. For some realists "it is safer to be feared than loved" but Lee (2018) notes that, given that significant hard power does not always translate into global influence, the success of any power resources depends on "context" and trends of international relations. As noted in the commission report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which were co-chaired by Armitage and Nye (2007), "it is better to be both feared and loved."

Secondly, going back to the difficulties of formulating a singular definition of soft power, different countries have different objectives and strategic priorities in employing soft power tools. While all states possess certain aspects and amount of soft power, they manifest it differently under diverging international environment and domestic political and economic developments. States will tend to seek soft power in areas where they found comparative advantage. If the U.S. soft power was one based on its global hegemony, aiming for the restoration of its inspirational leadership, other states found their attractiveness in their economic competitiveness, leadership in international institutions, or culture and the way of life (Lee, 2018, pp. 6-7). That is, those countries that are militarily and economically powerful, like the U.S. enhance cultural, ideational and institutional resources to produce more influence and take steadfast leadership in the global arena, while less powerful countries employ these resources to make up for the lack of soft power (Akaha, 2005). Additionally, soft power can supply the pursuit of ensuring peace by offering ideological and cultural means to help absorbing new powers into the established systems and reduce the possibility of violent conflicts between the hegemonic power and the challengers (Lentner, 2005).

Lee (2018) criticizes Nye's concept of soft power for its overemphasis on soft power as "the superpower's means to success in world politics". It is argued that being heavily invested on how the U.S. enhances its international influence, Nye failed to adequately address the issues surrounding soft power, faced by countries deemed less powerful, that, by default, have different goals and strategies (Kim, 2005).

Thirdly, the power of attraction in international relations is still elusive. Despite its rising significance in national policy agendas globally, elected political officials and policymakers often find it taxing to apply soft power as an efficient tool in foreign policy (Lee, 2018). Compared to hard power, soft power is less

direct and perceptible source of a nation's authority and consequently is a power that has considerable difficulty in projecting its immediate outcomes in dealing with global and regional challenges because it is "an accumulative effect of political, economic, social, and cultural developments over many generations" and needs long-term investment of human and material resources (Akaha, 2005, p. 66). Moreover, there are limitations on successful realization of soft power due to the divergence between what a nation believes to be an effectual projection of soft power and what other nations recognize it to be. For example, the U.S. humanitarian and state-building support in war-torn societies is often perceived as an effort to legitimize its hard power operations in international security pursuits (Lee, 2018, pp. 7-8)

Additional challenge in the pursuit of soft power is connected to the appearance of various actors in international relations. Dealing with the post-Cold War fallout, the role played by "unofficial" actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly important, rivaling official actors, such as governments. While hard power resources come predominantly from governments, soft power is largely exerted by various actors including private sectors and civil societies. This is particularly relevant when a nation's "attractive power" such as movies, publications and consumer products, is drawn from citizens and commercial sectors, which are often beyond the control of political leaders and policy makers (Lee, 2018, p. 8)

Fourthly, the concept of soft power can provoke reservations over the viability of the operational implementation of the concepts since measuring a nation's soft power capacity is not straightforward (for discussion on quantitative methodologies of soft power see: Chapter 3.5.2). Soft power amount to more than mere cultural power and includes its political values and ideas, educational and socio-economic systems as well as official national policies as recognized by other nations and people (Lee, 2018). Nye (2004) highlighted the science and technology as a key condition of soft power because they provide effective ways of promoting specific conditions of a country. As Lee (2018) notes:

There have been academic endeavors to measure countries' images and influence in international relations through multinational surveys of public opinions. Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)'s reports on global views, in partnership with Asia Society and Japan Economic Foundation, as well as the ongoing joint research by the CCGA, the Korea Foundation, and East

Asia Institute, are good examples of attempts to assess soft power through a study of U.S. and Asian public opinion and its implications for international order¹³. (p. 8)

Lee (2018, pp. 8-9) underlines the notion there are three major dimensions – cognitive, affective and normative – in measuring a nation’s image, prestige and influence. The *cognitive* dimension refers to how other nations evaluate a state’s image and standing in international affairs through the level of education, science and technology, attractiveness of mass culture, rich cultural heritage, tourism, social equality, political stability and social order, governmental transparency, environmentally sustainable practices, availability of modern medicines and treatments, openness of opportunity to succeed, human rights, friendliness, multiculturalism, religious freedom, etc. The *affective* dimension relates to whether other nations like or dislike a state despite its political, economic, military strength or weakness. The *normative* dimension relates to whether or not other countries deem a state’s policies and global positioning as acceptable. Lee (2018) gives an illustrative example based on personal involvement with the Korea Foundation, and East Asia Institute (EAI), ongoing project on Korea’s Soft Power:

For instance, although some observers argue that the U.S. war on Iraq is wrong (normative), they still can like the U.S. culture and political ideals (affective). Those who criticize U.S. foreign policy as unilateral (normative) and do not like the United States as a whole (affective) can still wish to have their children receive their college education in the United States since it is the most influential country in the world (cognitive). (p.9)

Despite the presented academic efforts to form viable criteria for establishing a country’s reputation and influence, Lee (2018) notes that a number of questions will arise: how to describe coercive vs. persuasive military (hard) power (if the latter can be argued to exist) and quantify dimensions of a nation’s foreign policy to incite admiration for its ideals and ensnare others? How can the level of soft power be quantified, for attractiveness of a nation’s culture, political ideas and policies? How can the global community generate universally applicable norms and practices that benefit and are supported by all nations and

¹³ The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) and Asia Society, *The United States and the Rise of China and India: Results of a 2006 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2006); The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Japan Economic Foundation, *The United States and Japan: Responding to the Rise of China and India: Results of a 2006 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion*; and The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA), the Korea Foundation, and East Asia Institute (EAI), ongoing project on Korea’s Soft Power.

people? These questions inadvertently lead to the conclusion that, while the search for an adequate definition of soft power is important, an understanding of the limitations and challenges of developing strategic thoughts, resource bases and tool kits to increase soft power potential of a country is much more pertinent.

In summary, making an insightful conclusion, Lee (2018) notes that soft co-optive power enables countries with strong military and economy to reinforce their hard power and weaker countries to compensate for their deficiencies in the same field. In both cases, soft power cannot be overlooked until hard command power has been managed. Just like the soft power of a country with slight hard power is not recognized, a country with no soft power has restrictions in utilizing hard power. This is why the emerging academic and policy community began to emphasize what is dubbed as “smart power”, integrating both hard and soft power into a strategic plan for implementing foreign policy goals.

3.5.2 Quantifying Soft Power

Inquiries of successful deployment of soft power and the follow-up processes, noting its results presents a challenge for scholars and policymakers alike. The main question remains: can soft power be effectively quantified? This segment will provide a brief overview of an approach from a think tank Soft Power 30, in partnership with the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy, endeavoring to deliver practical insights on soft power, public engagement and digital diplomacy. USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy brings academic rigor to the discipline of public diplomacy, and translates cutting-edge research into actionable insights for diplomats, policymakers and academics alike (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 12).

An important note is to be made at this juncture: the presented data on the Soft Power 30’s attempt to codify and quantify a country’s soft power potential does not extend into the spatial realm. Architecture, for example has not been addressed as one of the factors, only widely interpreted as one of the facets of the sub-index “culture”. As this project develops, drawing from the theoretical postulations for quantification of soft power, the presented method (see: Chapter 5.2) will delve into the spatial manifestation of soft power, providing a framework for its spatial examination. The purpose of providing the theoretical concepts of soft power quantification in this segment is to illustrate the attempt to measure a concept that cannot be easily placed within the realm of definitely quantifiable data.

Countries most adept in using soft power facilitating positive collaboration will be better equipped to deal with the current uncertainty and geopolitical instability and ultimately shape global events. Referencing Nye’s (2011) model of conversion of soft power into a desired outcome comprises of five steps (see: Figure 21). As depicted, the process must start with a clear account of available resources and an understanding of where they will be effective. It is at this first hurdle – measurement – that most governments stumble. This, however, is understandable as the difficulty of measuring soft power is well documented (Trverton, 2005).

Nye (2004) has previously pointed to three primary sources of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policy. The Soft Power 30 framework builds on Nye’s three pillars, capturing a broad range of factors that contribute to a nation’s soft power. The given index assesses the soft power resources of countries by combining both objective and subjective data (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 30).

The objective data is drawn from a range of different sources and structured into six categories, with each category functioning as a sub-index with an individual score (see: Figure 22). The six sub-indices are: Government, Culture, Global Engagement, Education, Digital, and Enterprise. The framework of categories was built on a survey of existing academic literature on soft power (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 30).




Figure 21. (left) Soft Power Conversion Process. Source: Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 29

Figure 22. (right) The Sub-Indices of Soft Power. Source: Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 30

For the *Government* sub-index, the Soft Power 30 Report (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 30) uses the postulations of Haass (2014), assessing a state's political values, public institutions and major public policy outcomes. Together with measures such as individual freedom, human development, violence in society, and government effectiveness, the Government sub-index measures the extent to which a country has an attractive model of governance and whether it can deliver broadly positive outcomes for its citizens.

Similarly, Nye (2004) argues that, when discussing a country's culture, if it promotes universal values that other nations can identify with, it makes said countries naturally attractive to others. The reach and volume of cultural output is important in building soft power, but mass production does not necessarily lead to mass influence. As a result, the Soft Power 30 index includes measures of culture that serve to capture both the quality and the international penetration of a country's cultural production. The *Culture* sub-index includes measures like the annual number of visiting international tourists, the global success of a country's music industry, and even a nation's international sporting prowess (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 30).

Another sub-index, the *Global Engagement* is utilized to measure a country's diplomatic resources, global footprint and contribution to the international community. It captures the state's ability to engage with international audiences, initiate collaboration and ultimately shape global outcomes. This sub-index includes metrics such as the number of foreign mission abroad, membership in multilateral organizations and overseas development aid (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 30).

For the next sub-index *Education*, the Report (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, pp. 30-31) argues that the ability of a country to attract foreign students, or facilitate exchanges, is a powerful tool of public diplomacy, even between countries with a history of animosity. Similarly, Atkinson (2010) while presenting research on educational exchanges gives empirical evidence on accumulation of reputational gains for a host country when foreign student return to their country of origin. Moreover, Olberding J. and Olberding D. (2010) discuss how foreign student exchanges have been shown to have positive indirect 'ripple effects' when returning students advocate on behalf of their host country of study. Metrics in the Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report (p. 31) for this sub-index include the number of international students in a country, the relative quality of its universities, and the academic output of higher education institutions.

Enterprise sub-index is noted as, not a measure of economic power or output, but rather, aiming to capture the relative attractiveness of a country's economic model in terms of its competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and ability to foster enterprise and commerce (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report). The Report section dealing with this sub-index that economic might is more often associated with hard power, but economic factors can contribute to soft power as well.

Lastly, the *Digital* sub-index is hailed as bringing an important new component to the measure of soft power. As technology has massively impacted our daily lives and ways of interaction, the same can be said for foreign policies, practices of public diplomacy and soft power. This sub-index aims to capture the level of countries implementing technology, its connectedness to the digital world and their usage of digital diplomacy through social media platforms (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report).

Soft Power 30 group's Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report (p. 31) particularly addresses the difficulties of interpreting the *subjective data* for soft power; one of the biggest challenges is its inherently subjective nature. Rather than attempt to design against subjectivity, The Soft Power 30 index embraces such approach. Its inaugural report, launched in 2015, was the first to combine objective data and international polling. The following year (2016), adhering to the previously set framework, specially commissioned polling across 25 countries was utilized to analyze the subjective data for this index.

Drawing from the existing pool of academic literature of soft power, a series of short questions was developed, providing data on international perceptions based on the most common 'touch point' through which people interface with foreign countries. International polling for the index ran across a range of the world's major regions. In 2016 the polling was expanded to 25 countries, up from 20, and taking our sample size from 7,200 to 10,500. In 2017, the Soft Power 30 group ran polling of the general public in the same 25 countries. (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, pp. 31-32).

The following factors were covered in the polling (each rated on a 0-10 scale, where 0 represented a very negative opinion, and 10 represented a very positive opinion):

- Favorability towards foreign countries;
- Perceptions of cuisine of foreign countries;
- Perceptions of how welcoming foreign countries are to tourists;
- Perceptions of technology products of foreign countries;

- Perceptions of luxury goods produced by foreign countries;
- Trust in foreign countries' approach to global affairs;
- Desire to visit foreign countries to live, work, or study;
- Perceptions of foreign countries' contributions to global culture.

These eight metrics were used to develop a regression model, where "favorability towards foreign countries" was the dependent variable, and the remaining questions were independent variables. This measured the extent to which the remaining perceptions predict favorability towards a country in the dataset (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 34).

Soft Power 30 group acknowledges that the presented composite index, as it is expected for any index of this nature, the presented data comparably has its limitations and shortcomings. Moreover, the subjective nature of soft power is highlighted, making comparison across all countries difficult. Moreover, the total complexity of the dynamics of inter-state relations – where soft power is brought to bear – cannot be fully rendered by a comparative global index (Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017 Report, p. 36).

3.5.3 Japanese Soft Power

This section will overview the concept of soft power for a specific country, in this case Japan. Japan has been previously chosen as a country with a clear set of ideas and narratives to be disseminated for internal and external consumption. Presented ideas remain largely unchanged in their core, although Japan has utilized different tactics and had a flexible approach in the historical and placement context. The presented overview of the Japanese soft power will build upon the works of Lee (2018), Watanabe (2015) and Yano (2013, 2015) chosen for their scholarly achievements and theoretical matter advancement.

Lee (2018, p. 16) quotes Nye (2004) in stating that Japan has the greatest potential soft power resources in Asia [...] it already has a rich reservoir of soft power. Its economic phenomenon is an object of appreciation all over the world. Since the late 1970s, Japan has also attempted to increase its international influence by providing a great amount of official development assistance (ODA) to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Japan was the first state that attracted the West with its high-tech products; Japanese art, music, design and food has served to expand the countries soft power assets by combining Japan's distinctive cultures. Popular culture has similarly amassed many international fans and enthusiasts. Japanese economic success became a driving force for the resurgence of poverty-stricken Asia in the late 20th century. The Japanese developmental model, which is based on state-initiated economic planning, was first adopted by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and then by Southeast Asian countries (Nye, 2004).

Lee (2018) quotes Sohn (2005) in addressing the issue that, in fact, Japan's soft power on the whole falls far below in terms of achieving its desired policy outcome i.e. promoting its national image and influence. Making a note at this juncture, Lee does not elaborate in relation to which countries Japan is falling short in promoting its influence. It is presumable that the reference is made to other Southeast Asian countries, which are less receptive to Japan's influence due to the historical context. In contrast, however, Japan has significant soft power potential, albeit largely untapped in e.g. Serbia (for discussion on Japan's soft power influence in Serbia see: Chapter 4.7.3). This fact reaffirms the claim made throughout this thesis on the importance of the time component and the contextual circumstances of the sending and receiving countries. Ogura (2004) states that Japan's "cash diplomacy" both for ODA (Official Development Assistance) and global peacekeeping activities did not successfully galvanize Japan's international reputation and influence. The perceived realities are largely associated with the country's culture and society, tending to be inward-looking compared to that of the United States and other developed countries.

The following sections will briefly overview the issues Japan faces in communicating the desired image and soft power to its neighbor, counterpart and rival – China. Previously noted historical and contextual circumstances play an important factor in shaping the viewpoints of respondents in both countries and ought to be reviewed carefully in terms of mutual soft power potential examination. This section illustrates the issues that can potentially hurt and hinder targeted soft power initiatives in a broader context. The Genron NPO and China Daily¹⁴, 2014 writes:

¹⁴ *Japan-China Public Opinion Survey: How Should Its Findings Be Read?* (2014). The Genron NPO. https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5252.html

During July and August this year [2014], The Genron NPO and China Daily conducted joint opinion polls targeting the citizens of Japan and China. This is the 10th annual opinion poll; these polls have been jointly conducted since 2005 when Japan-China relations were at their lowest. The objective of the survey is to continuously monitor the state of mutual understanding and perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese public toward each other, and their changes over time. The Genron NPO and China Daily have conducted annual polls since 2005 and used the results as the basis for discussion during the Tokyo-Beijing Forum in order to contribute to a dialogue aimed at closing the gaps in communication and mutual understanding between the two nations.

This particular poll has been chosen for its relevancy, large body of answering population and covering multiple issues pertinent to this research. Some of the questions include perception of national character, relations with other countries of the world, questions of mutual understanding and economic cooperation... etc. Target audiences were men and women over the age of 18 (excluding high school students), by the placement (self-administered) test method, with gathered samples of 1000 and 1539 people in Japan and China, respectively.

In terms of the future of Japan-China Relations Poll, 83.4% of the Japanese respondents believed that Japan-China relations are “bad” and “relatively bad.” The figure surpassed the 79.7% of 2013 which had been the worst result during the past nine years. For the Chinese counterparts, the negative evaluation of the China-Japan relationship (“bad” and “relatively bad”) declined from 90.3% in 2013 to 67.2%. Chinese public perception of bilateral relations between China and Japan has slightly improved since Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands. This year’s [2014] 67.2% is higher than the 54.9% in 2005. The worsening relations between Japan and China have not substantially improved.

Pessimistic views about prospective Japan-China relations prevailed in two countries. The percentage of Japanese expecting even worse bilateral relations in the years ahead increased to 36.8% from 28.3% last year. Only 8.0% (13.1% last year [2013]) of Japanese polled believed the Japan-China relations “will improve” or “will probably improve.” The negative evaluation of prospective China-Japan relations on the Chinese side also grew to 49.8% from 45.3% in 2013. This figure was higher than the worst record of 46.6% in 2005. 17.7% of Chinese believed that bilateral relations “will improve” or “will probably improve,” which slightly increased from 15.1% last year [2013].

【Future of Japan-China Relations】




Figure 23. Future of Japan-China Relations Chart 2014, source: http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5252.html

The Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019, drafted by The Genron NPO, discussing the current and future Japan-China relations notes the following:

While last year's [2018] survey results showed the percentage of Japanese who view current Japan-China relations as bad falling to under 40% for the first time in 8 years, this year [2019] showed a worsening of views. Up 6 points from last year, 44.8% of the Japanese view current Japan-China relations as bad. On the other hand, Chinese who view bilateral relations as bad decreased again, falling below 40% (35.6%) for the first time in 8 years. At the same time, over 30% (34.3%) of the Chinese see current relations as good.

In terms of changes in bilateral relations over the past year [2018], most of both countries' respondents (around 50% of both) replied that there has not been any change. The view that

relations have worsened, however, increased 13 points among the Japanese to 31.8%, while for the Chinese, it dropped slightly from last year, showing differing understandings among the two countries' peoples. (p. 8)




Figure 24. Current Japan-China Relations Chart. Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019, p.8, The Genron NPO. Available at: <https://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/191024.pdf>

Make note of years 2006, 2008, 2012 and 2014 in Figure 23 – if you cross-reference it with the political and economic situation at the time, you will have a clear image of the relationship between the two countries, or at least, the forces that have shaped it. Regarding the Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations Poll, the biggest concern perceived by Japanese is the “territorial issue,” but it dropped to 58.6% from 72.1% in 2013. “China’s anti-Japanese education” was considered as the second highest concern (42.9%). “Lack of trust between the Japanese and Chinese governments” (35.0%) and “lack of

trustful relations between Japanese and Chinese people” (25.5%) are regarded as the major barriers to bilateral relations.

64.8% of Chinese respondents believed that the “territorial issue” was the biggest concern. This result is consistent with previous surveys. However, it dropped by 12 percentage points from 77.5% in the year 2013. 31.9% of Chinese showed concerns on “Japan’s historical understanding and historical education.” It dropped slightly from 36.6% last year. Similarly to Japan, “Lack of trust between the Chinese and Japanese governments” (25.4%) and “lack of trustful relations between Chinese and Japanese people” (15.5%) were regarded as major barriers to bilateral relations.

The Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019, discussing the obstacles to building Japan-China relations notes the following:

While the majority most common answer choice of the respondents from both countries continues to be “territorial issues,” which they thought as the greatest obstacle to building Japan-China relations, but this percentage has dropped from last year for both countries. For the Chinese, it continues to be followed by “economic frictions,” “disputes over marine resources” and “lack of trust,” both “between governments” as well as “between nationals.” The percentage of those who selected “nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment,” however, rose 15 points from last year’s 5.4% to 20.4%. Among the Japanese, those who cite the “lack of trust between governments” rose to over 40%. Additionally, the responses “economic frictions” and “China’s reinforcement of military forces” also showed increases from last year. Meanwhile, the percentage of Japanese who cite the “lack of trust between nationals” fell to under 30%, down 8 points from last year. (p. 9)




Figure 25. Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations Chart, Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2014, source: http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5252.html




Figure 26. Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations Chart. Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019, p.9, The Genron NPO. Available at: <https://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/191024.pdf>.

Lee (2018) makes an insightful conclusion regarding the Japan-China relation:

In short, both China's and Japan's soft power strategies are closely associated with their long-standing goals, i.e., the attainment of regional leadership. Both countries regard soft power as a vital complement to its hard power capabilities in expanding their respective spheres of influence. Accordingly, Sino-Japanese rivalry over soft power, together with a military arms race on both

sides seems inevitable, further complicating the regional dynamics. It is thus important to find and expand areas of cooperation where China and Japan could work together to promote regionalism, and more ideally, a regional community, which in turn benefits the two countries' domestic and foreign policy goals in promoting peace, stability and prosperity. (pp. 18-19)

Furthermore, Lee (2018) highlights one of the issues for Japan and its perception is the reluctance to receive immigrants. Japan is described as a country with “closed door” immigration policies (Oishi, 2012). However, due to an ageing population and an ever-smaller cohort of young workers supporting the welfare system, there has been a push to invite more highly skilled professionals from abroad (Tsuda, 2008). Despite this, the Japanese government, seemingly adhering to the myth of an ethnically homogenous Japan (Dale, 1986), for example, continues to spur on nationalism and exclusionist views towards the neighboring China and South Korea (see: Koichi, 2016; Saaler, 2016), and still claims that Japan has never been a country of immigration. Some notable changes were nonetheless made regarding the admission and acceptance of highly skilled immigrants into the country, one of them being the Highly Skilled Foreign Professional (HSFP) visa created in 2012, with a point-based system for determining eligibility (Green, 2017). This visa makes it possible for professionals to obtain permanent residency faster than the usual 10 years, within 5, or even 3 years, if they accumulate enough points, along with certain other benefits (i.e. faster and smoother family reunification) not offered to low-skilled workers.

Ogoura (2009, pp. 51-53) notes that Japan is confronted with the following challenges: one is the increasing difficulty of mobilizing financial resources for overseas cultural activities. This difficulty is equally echoed by Cull (2009), addressing the lack of support of policymakers for initiatives that do not give immediate and/or quantifiable payback. As Ogoura (2009) continues developing his argument, there is a feeling that any cultural exchange programme should be able to demonstrate immediate benefits that can be explained to taxpayers and other stakeholders. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to channel resources to projects of which the outcome can be verified after longer periods of time. He gives the example of intellectual exchange while describing this category of projects. Moreover, the decline in activities of numerous think tanks in Japan is the direct consequence of this trend, but also has exacerbated the decrease in Japanese participation in international discourse. In a related trend, Ogoura (2009) continues, there are growing calls in the political circles to gear the diplomacy towards

propagation of Japanese idea, culture and traditions to the rest of the world¹⁵. Interestingly, the author makes a worthwhile remark (and a rare one, in terms of the prevailing narrative of the dissemination of Japanese culture) of the inherent flaw of this approach, as it is based on the assumption that Japanese culture and traditions belong fundamentally to Japan and the Japanese and that Japan should make other understand its cultural traits.

In an increasingly globalized world, each nation's "unique" culture is becoming progressively more indistinguishable from those of other countries. Cultural goods and services are being internationalized in the global market; some "Japanese" cultural products may be better produced or performed by non-Japanese (Ogoura, 2009). Given these considerations, many actors engaged in contemporary Japanese cultural diplomacy, including the Japan Foundation, have adopted the policy of viewing "Japanese" cultural traditions not solely as Japan's property, but as the heritage of all humankind. This approach implies that Japanese cultural diplomacy should not only propagate all things Japanese to the world but also strive to introduce non-Japanese culture to Japan to enrich the cultural heritage of the world. Such actions help in preserving cultural diversity, contributing to the maintenance of a rich cultural environment for all mankind (Ogoura, 2009).

Ogoura (2009) notes "soft power" as another concept that has come to influence Japan's cultural diplomacy; although this concept ought to be handled with care it has become a central argument for those in Japan who advocate for a more aggressive cultural diplomacy. Some policy measures have already been taken that can be characterized as concrete application of this concept. One of the examples is the Japanese approach in Iraq: distribution of picture books to elementary school children in areas where SDF (Self-Defense Forces) were stationed, invitation to the Iraqi national football team and broadcasting of Japanese football-themed anime on Iraqi TV are some of the examples of Japan using its soft power to maintain its positive image in the Arab world. Some other products of the Japanese postmodern culture are not particularly suited for government-sponsored initiatives, as they include, in some case, anti-social or anti-establishment elements. Consequently, the Japanese "ultramodern appeal", Ogoura (2009) notes is not easy for the Japanese authorities to utilize as an instrument of cultural

¹⁵ The report published in 2005 at the end of the deliberations of the Discussion Group on the Promotion of Cultural Diplomacy emphasized the "growing importance of the diplomatic aspect of international cultural activities" and advocated the strengthening of the "capacity for propagation" (Ogoura, 2009, p. 54).

diplomacy. Although the author notes that Japan must think beyond the traditional patterns of cultural diplomacy, such as “Japan is not what you think it is”, such underlying messages remain present in the contemporary narrative of the Japanese cultural exchange efforts and promoting its image overseas (for more detailed discussion about this particular issue see: Chapter 3.1.2).

While discussing Japanese soft power, Watanabe (2015) notes “winning the hearts and minds of [the] public or public opinion in a foreign country”; talking about the public diplomacy, most notably its soft power branch, he notes two layers of public diplomacy: top layer, representing the ultimate goal: 1. Achieving policy goals (setting agendas or making rules or building institutions, e.g. TPP) and the bottom layer, 2. Securing optimal socio-cultural environments (building a sense of intimacy, trust and mutual understanding). The bottom layer ultimately gets more complex and costly, no matter how much information is passed around or how loudly you speak out (Watanabe, 2015). Moreover, intimacy does not signify automatic support for specific policies, meaning that if you come to Japan as a MEXT scholar and make Japanese friends, it will not mean you support specific Japanese policies. But if you understand Japan “deeply”, you will be less likely to fall under the influence of soundbites or conspiracy theories, so the bottom layer is quite important, according to Watanabe (2015). The author does not specify what he assumes *deep* understanding signifies or how to achieve such attributes. The only important note Watanabe makes is that the success of soft power heavily relies of the receptive power of others. His focus is on the bottom layer of public diplomacy issues, which he elaborates in more detail.

When soft power of Japan is discussed, Watanabe (2015) notes, the public focuses mainly on “cool Japan” phenomenon (games, anime, manga), but [Japanese] soft power is much broader than pop culture. Furthermore, to explain such viewpoints, means of public diplomacy are classified as following:

1. Fast information i.e. quick to disseminate (policy advocacy [press releases, press conferences or official governmental publications], international broadcasting [BBC or NHK]) and
2. Slow information (slow to accumulate and therefore difficult to evaluate) (exchange diplomacy [policy dialogue or international dialogue or various types of public symposiums or fellowship programs], cultural diplomacy [language education, art exhibitions, film, literature, music and sports]).

The term public diplomacy, Watanabe notes, has been officially adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004, but the notion existed long before. For instance, in 1867 the Tokugawa shogunate was

invited to the Paris Expo and six years later, the Meiji government allocated as much as 1% of its total state budget in order to participate at the Vienna Expo 1873. Forty-one (41) Japanese officials and government interpreters, as well as 6 Europeans in Japanese employ, came to Vienna to oversee the pavilion and the fair's cultural events. 25 craftsmen and gardeners created the main pavilion, as well as a full Japanese garden with shrine and a model of the former pagoda at Tokyo's imperial temple¹⁶. Apart from the collection of regional objects, which focused on ceramics, cloisonné wares, lacquerware, and textiles, the displays also included the female golden shachi from Nagoya Castle and a papier-mâché copy of the Kamakura Buddha. Comparable importance of presenting Japan in exposition of such caliber was also noted in 1904 St. Louis World Fair (The Louisiana Purchase Exposition), which was closely related to securing U.S.'s support in brokering a peace treaty following the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05), with heavy involvement of Baron Kentaro Kaneko (1853-1942) during his public diplomacy campaign (Matsumura, 2009).

These efforts, Watanabe (2015) notes, shifted towards propaganda during the wartime; because of the outcome of WW2, Japan's public diplomacy became very inactive and reserved. Postwar Japan faced the challenge of transforming its reputation as a militaristic aggressor into that of a democratic, peace-loving nation. Since the 1960s, as the Japanese economy started to take off, there is a change in the prevailing narrative, it now being assertive, reactive, based on the notions of uniqueness, which was emphasized in order to defend Japan's institutions and behaviors. This is the point where *Nihonjinron* became prevalent and very dominant in the Japanese public diplomacy. Watanabe mentions the works of Nakane (1970; 1972) as one of the books that were popular at the time, translated into 13 languages. Nakane's work focuses on cross-cultural comparisons of social structures in Asia, notably Japan, India, and China; characterizes Japan as "a vertical society" where human relations are based on "place" (shared space) instead of "attribute" (qualification). Watanabe (2015) also mentions Japan's involvement in the Gulf War (1990-91) and how the country was criticized for its "checkbox diplomacy" in the 1990s and since then, the emphasis of Japan's public diplomacy shifted more towards the common global agenda or shared experiences.

¹⁶ - トーハク-, 東. (n.d.). 2. ウィーン万国博覧会 近代博物館発展の源流. Copyright © 2004-2011. https://www.tnm.jp/modules/r_free_page/index.php?id=145

Japan's recent [2015] focuses in public diplomacy are now in the domains of: human security, infrastructure and services (methods for treating sewage water, school physical education curriculum, "Kumon" method for individualized learning, etc.), tourism, creative industries (including pop culture) and (then planned) 2020 Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics (Watanabe, 2015). Watanabe (2015) also makes a clear distinction between actors of public diplomacy:

1. State/Public Actors (MOFA, Japan Foundation, NHK World, Japan Tourism Agency) and
2. Non-state/Private Actors (foundations, think tanks, universities, museums, athletic clubs, NGOs, religious organizations, corporations and individuals [celebrities, bloggers] etc.).

Furthermore, Watanabe (2015) notes some of the challenges facing Japanese soft power: women's social advancement, LGBTQ+ issues, hate speech (particularly cyber bullying), immigration and refugee policies, English language proficiency and higher education (for the issues facing Japanese higher education see e.g. McVeigh, 2002). One of the biggest challenges noted is found in the issues of accountability and evaluation, as it is necessary to justify why one is involved in cultural diplomacy, especially to politicians and bureaucrats who want to cut the budget and the first victim tend to be public diplomacy initiatives related to cultural affairs (Watanabe, 2015). Global competition became more intensified, with a possible danger of it becoming just another power struggle, using culture as a soft weapon, so it is necessary to keep in mind that soft power is not necessarily a zero-sum game, it could be a positive sum, a win-win situation (Watanabe, 2015). Watanabe (2015) hails this competition as an important and necessary component in international relations that is not automatically disruptive. However, collaborative and/or cooperative approaches should be sought; otherwise the countries will just end up in another power struggle.

Following the Soft Power 30 methodology (see: Chapter 3.5.2) for quantification of the soft power potential of a country, this segment will briefly overview Japan's 2019 score. All the presented findings can be reviewed in the Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019 Report:

Japan falls out of the top five to eighth [place], the result of a slide in its performance in the international polling. However, Japan continues to place highly across the Engagement, Digital, and Enterprise sub-indices, and saw a significant leap up the Culture sub-index, placing it ahead of neighboring China and South Korea. The Japanese government has had a busy year with the start of the Reiwa era, and as the host of the G20 Summit in June. But it has also been a

challenging year for Japan abroad. Relations with South Korea have seen a steady decline with no sign of a resolution in sight. Moreover, the resumption of commercial whaling by Japan for the first time in 30 years was greeted with wide-spread international criticism. But looking to the near future, the 2019 Rugby World Cup and upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics are two important opportunities to welcome the world and make a positive impact on global perceptions of the country. (pp. 53-54)

When giving an overview of Japan's strengths and weaknesses¹⁷, the Soft Power 30 group gives the following conclusions:

Strengths: Japan sees a noteworthy improvement in the Culture sub-index, jumping an impressive eight spots to reach 6th place. Hosting high-profile international events proved to be a blessing to Japan, indicating that Japan knows exactly how to leverage its wide-ranging cultural assets. The 2019 Rugby World Cup and G20 Summit were opportunities to build up and strengthen Japan's soft power reserves. With the 2020 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games approaching, Japan has already garnered favorable conversation around its efforts to keep the games sustainable and eco-friendly. As sports diplomacy has proven to be a tremendously useful tool, we wait expectantly to see how Japan uses this event as a platform to project contemporary Japanese culture around the world with its penchant for ingenuity.

Weaknesses: Japan ranks relatively low in the Government sub-index, with low scores for trust in government and gender equality. Gender discrimination in Japan came to the fore as the #KuToo movement made waves on social media this year. Japanese women came together to petition for a ban on company dress codes requiring female employees to wear high-heeled shoes on the job. As gender discrimination and equality become issues that are increasingly discussed, the government could offer to hold public consultations to build a society where all citizens are respected, and strengthen trust in government.

¹⁷ Soft Power Comparative Overview for Japan (2019). (2019, October 23). Soft Power.
<https://softpower30.com/country/japan/>

3.6 EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The following section will introduce the notion of extraterritoriality, exceptionally pertinent for this research, as well as its position within the scope of international law. This concept has been chosen to be examined in detail because its direct influence on spatial configuration of exported architectural typologies, for all stages (conceptualization, implementation and management).

Defined by Berrige and Lloyd (2012), exterritoriality, sometimes spelled ‘extraterritoriality’ is defined as:

[...] the fiction that in law diplomatic agents abroad remain at home and certainly outside of the territory of the state to which they are accredited. The term itself probably originated with an observation of Grotius in his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625). Now a quality most commonly associated with diplomatic premises and still sometimes believed, or at least pretended, not least by professional diplomats, to be an important explanation of diplomatic privileges and immunities, exterritoriality is in fact no more than a very loose description of them. As Vattel wrote in *Le Droit des Gens* in 1758, ‘this is only a figurative way of expressing his [the ambassador’s] independence of the jurisdiction of the country and his possession of all the rights necessary to the due success of the embassy’. [...] it remains, as has been said, a ‘striking image’ and thus a useful political buttress to diplomatic immunity. (pp. 145-146)

This term has likewise been connected to the functional approach¹⁸ viewpoint that diplomatic privileges and immunities are accorded and justified because they permit the effective execution of diplomatic functions (Berrige & Lloyd, 2012, p. 160).

Another informative definition given by the Encyclopedia Britannica¹⁹ describes the term as:

¹⁸ The functional approach advocates building on and expanding the habits of cooperation nurtured by groups of technical experts outside of formal state channels (Mingst, 2013, p. 211).

¹⁹ *Extraterritoriality / international law*. (n.d.). Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/extraterritoriality>

Extraterritoriality also called exterritoriality, or diplomatic immunity, in international law, the immunities enjoyed by foreign states or international organizations and their official representatives from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are present. Extraterritoriality extends to foreign states or international organizations as entities and to their heads, legations, troops in passage, war vessels, mission premises, and other assets. It exempts them, while within the territory of a foreign sovereign, from local judicial process, police interference, and other measures of constraint. The term stems from the fiction that such persons or things are deemed not to be within the territory of the sovereign where they are actually present.

Privileges of extraterritoriality for properties officially utilized by the members and mission of the diplomatic corps are codified within the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This law has the right of precedence over other, local laws, but is nonetheless open for interpretation (see Chapter 4.3.2 and the discussion on the discrepancies between the VCDR and the Serbian Law on Planning and Construction). The given immunities, at least in theory, must be unequivocally applied in host countries.

According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, this immunity extends both to the family of the diplomatic agent and to his staff. The mission and residential premises of diplomatic agents are immune not only from process by creditors but also from being entered by the police and other law enforcement officers. Whether and under what conditions they may be used to grant asylum to outsiders is controversial. An Inter-American Convention from 1954 sanctions diplomatic asylum for political offenders and refugees.

Concept of extraterritoriality is one of the linchpins that the VCDR is based upon: simply put, the premises of the diplomatic mission are untouchable. As stated before, there are two types of extraterritoriality concept interpretation, one being that it is an actual, reality-based, tangible concept and the other claiming it is only a set of privileges awarded by the host countries. Article 23 of the VCDR is clear in its phrasing:

1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.

Equally important when defining inviolability for diplomatic mission is Article 30, defining the same privileges for the diplomats' place of residence:

1. The **private residence** of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the **same inviolability and protection** as the premises of the mission.

The **inviolability of the mission** leads to an interesting paradox and a whole other set of challenges: for example, if a fire breaks out on the premises, in theory (and very much in practice) firefighters are not allowed to enter, without the abovementioned consent of the head of the mission. As such issues are present, for the sake of future-proofing and providing a sense of security to the staff of the mission, as well as (and equally important to) its neighbors and users of space, it is recommended to establish a contingency plan with appropriate city departments. In practice, for the given example of fire emergency, one of the more prudent course of action would be to make a sort of operational plan, in collaboration with the firefighting department (or other relevant authorities), providing necessary information for this type of crisis management. This recommendation would be on voluntary basis, with the diplomatic mission "calling the shots" i.e. how much information will it choose to make known for the purposes of collaboration with relevant city departments.

When dealing with the **issues of crisis management**, a more proactive approach ought to be pursued, primarily by the municipal and/or city government, mainly because of the influence such events can have on the city as a whole. Such accountability must be present even in the instances of state emergencies and/or crisis, ensuring continuation of legally binding obligations prescribed by the VCDR, as well as providing legal accountability for any possible misuse of power by either party. As unfortunately witnessed during the riots in Belgrade in 2008²⁰, the state failed to adequately respond, failing to "[...]

²⁰ Widespread protests and riots in Serbia and North Kosovo followed the proclamation of independence by the Republic of Kosovo on February 17, 2008. On that date approximately 2,000 Serbs protested and stoned, then entered Slovenian embassy in which they made major damage (Slovenia was the governing country of EU at the time), burnt down portions of the United States and Croatian embassy in Belgrade, with some throwing stones and firecrackers at the building before being driven back by riot police. ("Kosovo declares independence". *International Herald Tribune Europe*. 2008-02-17)

protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity”. Serbia has dealt with these issues in a legal capacity, albeit after a significant period of time and in a manner that was not recognized as timely or satisfactory by the injured parties.

In a similar vein, Article 45 deals with the same issues, primarily with breakdown of a functional government and cutting the diplomatic ties between two states:

If diplomatic relations are broken off between two States, or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:

- (a) The **receiving State must**, even in case of armed conflict, **respect and protect the premises of the mission**, together with its property and archives;
- (b) The **sending State may entrust the custody of the premises** of the mission, together with its property and archives, **to a third State** acceptable to the receiving State;
- (c) The sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State.

4. MANIFESTATIONS

4.1 PRODUCTION OF IMAGES.

4.1.1 Case Study: The Japan House

The Japan House is a project started by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (the first JH opened in São Paulo on April 30, 2017²¹), as an incentive to help Japan engage effectively with overseas audiences by enhancing their understanding in the cultural, social and economic spheres. This goal will be achieved using: 1. informing audiences of Japan's diverse attractions as well as presenting an *accurate* image of Japan; 2. deepening knowledge and understanding among friends of Japan, both traditional and modern. Furthermore, there's an explanation that:

The JAPAN HOUSE is an overseas hub established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to showcase and communicate Japan with the international community in 3 cities of the world as part of efforts to strengthen strategic global communication. Its purpose is to communicate the various attractions, policies, and efforts of Japan to a wide range of people including people who know very little about Japan, and to enlarge the base of the people who are interested and well-versed in Japan²².

We can observe the basic principles of 'strengthening strategic global communication' and recognize future potential of the Japan House. However, one must be careful when taking these statements into consideration. 'Place branding' and subsequently 'nation branding' will be examined more thoroughly as these terms must be handled with great care.

²¹ *Opening of Japan House São Paulo*. (2017, April 7). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001542.html

²² Japan House. (2020, February 21). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/pd/pds/page25e_000145.html

Places certainly have their brand images; but the extent to which they can be branded is still, quite properly, the subject of intense debate. The idea of nation as brand has created much excitement in the public sector, thanks to the tantalizing but largely illusory prospect of a quick fix for a weak or negative national image. Many governments, most consultants and even some scholars persist in a naive and superficial notion of ‘place branding’ that is nothing more than ordinary marketing and corporate identity, where the product just happens to be a country, a city or a region rather than a bank or a running shoe.

It’s easy to see why governments are attracted by the idea of branding. Admiring glances have often been cast by the public sector at the creativity, speed, efficiency and lack of ceremony with which companies appear able to hire and fire, restructure, reinvent themselves, build and implement strategies, raise and spend capital, develop new products and get them to market, respond to competition and react to disasters. What really impresses politicians, as they struggle to squeeze a few extra votes from an increasingly apathetic electorate, is the apparent ability of certain companies to shape public discourse, to manipulate their own images at will, and to inspire unwavering respect, loyalty, even love for their brands. (Cull, 2009, pp. 32-33)

In its core, the Japan House is a middle ground for the public to meet, promote their knowledge of Japan and offer their views on the country’s culture, both classical and contemporary. A strong emphasis is placed on involving the local community and actors, in order for the Japan House to become adapted to new circumstances and societal requirements more quickly. In fact, in an interview for the Japan Times titled “*Ministry touts cultural, industry promotion with Japan House diplomacy hubs*²³” Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Kawamura Yasuhisa gave the following statement:

“[Kawamura] explained the operations at each facility will be outsourced to the private-sector, with the secretariat and steering committee set up locally. “Such core posts as executive director, planning chief and public affairs manager at the secretariat will be hired locally. We’d like to hire local people who are familiar with local needs and situations.”

²³ Kameda, M. (2016, March 25). Ministry touts cultural, industry promotion with Japan House diplomacy hubs. The Japan Times. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/25/national/ministry-touts-cultural-industry-promotion-with-japan-house-diplomacy-hubs/#.V3j8Zbh96hd>

Previously examined points give way to a number of questions most importantly: who will hold the decision-making power to choose what is considered adequate for the purposes of promoting Japan and its 'brand'? An organizational chart from MOFA's March 2015 release gives us some clue of the hierarchy: dual Steering Committee (in host country and in Tokyo) will cooperate and closely communicate. One can notice the duality of these Committees: both have non-governmental actors, but the main assumption is that MOFA will have the final say in the process of decision-making. This further complicates the notion of "pure" cultural exchange efforts, since it is indeed closely related to the Government and its official policies. This is why a distinction between cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange was made in Chapter 3.4.1: founding of the Japan House in mid-2017 has some political implications. Hypothetically, if plans were made to hold an exhibition, for example, in the Japan House, which differs greatly with the official views and politics of official Tokyo it is most likely that it will not be given the go-ahead. This is why both Steering Committees should have a clear set of rules and regulations what are possible topics that can be presented and/or discussed in the Japan House. Examined officially available rules (e.g. in the application for exhibition subjects in the JH) only censor themes that would be "inappropriate" for exhibiting, largely dealing with Japan's wartime and colonial past. There are presumably other instructions given to the curators of every individual Japan House, limiting the scope of exported images to those deemed appropriate by the Steering Committee, communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

However, when making conjectures based on available data, one must be cautious in making definitive claims, as the officially available materials will not always provide the "full picture". Hypothesis presented in this project intend to go beyond an entitled opinion/educated guess category and draw sound conclusions based on the available records. Nevertheless, when dealing with subject matter that can be limited in its availability, it is presumed that some of the provided hypothesis may prove to be false, which is adequate in terms of academic research, but a note must be made on these facts, due to the particular nature of the researched facts in this thesis.

But, as this project operates within architectural (spatial) and urban planning term, the issue of architectural representation must be taken into account first and foremost, with all previously demonstrated research serving a purpose of explaining the spatial planning policies and consequences. Since the Japan House is planned to be implemented into already existing buildings, this takes the guesswork out of the process.

Describing the Japan House project in São Paulo, Brazil, completed by Kengo Kuma in 2017, Maggiora (2017) notes its particularities, as reported by the designers:

The Japan House Sao Paulo opened as the first case of the “Japan House Project,” led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that aims to promote various aspects of Japanese culture in the world. The building was formerly a bank located at Paulista Avenue, which is Sao Paulo’s city center. We repaired it by designing a wooden façade and the interior using washi (Japanese paper). Sao Paulo is a typical city of business in the world, but we added a place like a warm “house” for people to it. The façade is made of wired Kiso hinoki cypress supported by carbon fiber, which were put together to express a forest that emerged in the big city. The main material in the interior is metallic mesh in washi style – an expanded aluminum metal soaked in liquefied paper mulberry. Combination of the traditional and the new material helped create a modern and transparent space that could convey another Japanese style. With its facilities such as a museum, lecture hall, shop and a restaurant, the Japan House has also become a new sightseeing spot in Sao Paulo and attracts lots of people.



Figure 27. The Japan House’s exterior, São Paulo, Brazil © Tatewaki NIO, available from: https://www.archdaily.com/923091/japan-house-sao-paulo-kengo-kuma-and-associates-plus-fgmf/5d54f164284dd13c95000075-japan-house-sao-paulo-kengo-kuma-and-associates-plus-fgmf-photo?next_project=no

4.2 CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICIES

“Cultural policy” refers to a wide range of governmental initiatives, programs, and discourses designed to promote the country’s culture, tradition, language, or art. The purpose of cultural policy varies greatly: it can be the dissemination of certain values and traditions the state chooses to articulate, the construction of a national community through the endorsement of shared symbols and narratives, a tool of control to legitimate a regime and mobilize the population by emphasizing their cultural similarities and by convincing them they share similar legacies, or a way to articulate the country’s culture and ideas for diplomatic or economic purposes. Cultural policy is usually initiated and implemented by the state, but it can also be the product of a bottom-up process brought by individuals and private organizations. These initiatives, however, may later be rejected, contested, endorsed, or co-opted by the state. (Otmazgin, 2012, p. 6)

Whilst discussing the exported architecture, in terms of cultural relations policies, the following questions arise:

Why is the importance placed on *exported* typologies in this project? and

Why is it important *who* implements the export process (who is the instigator of such export) and who is expected to profit from it?

The previously noted difference between typologies when referring to other academic works dealing with architecture as a tool for the construction of identity, ideological representation, and ideological confirmation is that such projects are usually set in a pre-established context of society and/or architecture. Furthermore, the considered effects can be placed in a finite number of scenarios, or considerably less compared to the exported architectural typologies, due to the dynamic nature of implementation and control for these processes.

With soft power architecture, however, interpretative stratagems can act and evolve differently for architectural typologies utilized for ideological representation within a distinctive context and produce diverse consequences and meanings, not necessarily in sync with original intentions, as it happens for the export of architecture/ideology. One must underline that these ‘transmutation’ effects are applicable for

both malevolent and benevolent projected types of exported architecture (defined in the Chapter 1, Introduction), e.g. colonial architecture, depicting power and supremacy of the sending state and soft power architecture, representing the willingness for deepening mutual understanding between countries. An exceedingly important point to be made is that the policies ought to be flexible in the sense of anticipating changes to happen and, if need there be, to carefully monitor them, not immediately nipping them in the bud.

In this Chapter, the focus will be on the exported architecture that, in its conception, implementation and spatial consequences stages had the latter case of conceptualization (positive), as the mechanisms that govern these processes are deemed to be more complex when compared to the former (negative).

A note must be made of the awareness that spatial consequences for any type of exported architecture conceptualization (desired malevolent or benevolent projections) can have either beneficial or adverse effects in the urban city matrices, unrelated to its original intentions. This is especially important for the introduction of the time component, as it plays a crucial role in defining and implementing the type of exported architecture of the sending state (for further discussion on Defining the Research Framework for Soft Power Architecture see: Chapter 5.2). In short, the time component can play an important catalyst in *changeability* of perceived projections for exported architectural typologies utilized for ideological reproduction, as the external circumstances of spatial development influence them inadvertently.

When it comes to the question of *who* implements the export process (who is the instigator of such export) and who is expected to profit from it, the answer is not clear-cut, especially for the latter. Although the network of actors in international cultural relations is extensive and cannot (and should not) be segmented, in the context of this research, this project will explore the state actors i.e. the official governing bodies and their policies.

The analogy of *producers* and *consumers* of exported cultural resources, postulated by Yoshino (1992) may be correspondingly implemented as a theoretical postulate in this research. The question officials presumably pose, when conceiving their cultural relation policies and strategies, would be – whom are they intended for? Continuing in a similar vein, when pondering the questions of soft power architecture, another layer of complexity must be added: reproducing the established architectural and urban patterns of the host country, having a simple footing in the desire to maximize the gains. To do so, to reach as many *consumers* as possible, utilizing soft power architecture, the *producers* of said architecture ought to be aware of the intricacies required to achieve their goals. Granted, when dealing with intangible and

unknown factors of a newly established category of soft power architecture, it usually does not bode well for result-oriented bureaucrats.

The aims of official governments are, by default, multifaceted, but for this research, we shall focus on policies with the end goal of establishing mutually beneficial bilateral relations. When it comes to soft power architecture, however, it is evident that the officials possess limited knowledge of these pertinent issues, since the knowledge base is currently insufficient.

Another important point that ought to be made about these specific typologies is they can serve as facilitators of international cultural relations, highlighting the multidimensionality of culture and cultural sensitivity between actors.

Chosen spatial manifestations of cultural relation policies that will be examined will be in the sphere of soft power architecture, i.e. spatial cultural resources to create *ostensibly* positive effects in international cultural relations. The author has chosen to italicize the word ‘ostensibly’ as the main questions remain whether the cultural policy researchers, legislators, and professionals are aware of the impact that soft power architecture may have within the arena of international relations, as will be demonstrated in the case study.

Kawamura (2018a) defines CRP as:

[...] a policy or activity by the state of managing, maintaining and developing icr [international cultural relations] involving different actors, and has been called by various terms, such as international cultural policy, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, international cultural exchange, etc. (p.2).

Reviewing this definition, soft power architecture has the greatest impact not only in ‘external’ cultural policy (exemplified by traditional cultural or public diplomacy) but also in broader ‘outward’ cultural policy or nation branding (Kawamura, 2018a). However, the effects of soft power architecture can also be felt (and amplified by policies) in ‘inbound’ and ‘inland’ cultural policies i.e. embassies and/or cultural centers as places that will attract future visitations to the sending country, as well as facilitating intercultural education and diversity management.

It is necessary to underline the importance of processes as an extension of policies (see: Figure 28): while the ‘end product’ will not always live up to its potential and/or expectations, there is value to be observed

in the *process*, as an epitome of cultural relations policies. In this particular facet, the communicative practice and transparency in addressing e.g. the general public of the host country are crucial in mitigating any expected negative effects, as will be discussed in the case study of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia (Chapter 5.3.3.1).

In the context of this particular research, special attention is given to the notion of process(es), specifically, the realization process, as it is deemed as one of the crucial means to achieve a particular, desirable end. It is worthy to note that, to achieve a specific soft power outcome, the means cannot remain static, but rather, must be flexible and shift alongside the circumstance to compensate for any discrepancies that arose during the period necessary to achieve the ends. A *moving target* metaphor, both in approach and handling the changing situation(s) is apt for this assessment.

In this sense, previously defined building lifespan and monitoring processes (before and after building completion) stand out as the most obvious means, often disregarded, with the hypothesis that, if enough consideration is to be given to these aspects, ends can be achieved more effectively, lessening undesirable spatial consequences.

This section will offer a methodology for researching cultural relation policies, its conceptualization, implementation, management and monitoring of soft power architecture, in this particular case, embassy buildings. Every given aspect of stages for soft power architecture can be researched individually, from different perspectives (global and local perspectives, bilateral relations, international relations policies, cultural exchange ... etc.).




Figure 28. Conceptual diagram of implementation of cultural relation policies for soft power architecture (inspired by Kawamura 2018a, adapted by the author)




Figure 29. Conceptual diagram of interconnectivity and spatial consequences for soft power architecture. (Left: Interconnectivity, cooperation, output and engagement between various actors and policies; Right: Spatial consequences and interaction of SPA onto/with the environments of host countries)

Transnational movements (international relations at a societal level, private activities of international exchange, fostered by SPA); International governmental policies (orthodox international relations); External governmental public relations/PR (traditional public diplomacy; a state's approach to the other states, in order to create favorable public opinions)

If we try to follow the process of implementation of cultural relation policies (see: Figure 30) the process goes as follows:

CRP for soft power architecture creation: Cultural relation policies are co-created by the State B, utilizing a network of state and non-state actors (Residents of State B and Residents B living in State A), to foster good bilateral relations with the State A.

In architectural terms, the chosen location for the new soft power architecture, its spatial context, activities, and specificities must inform the policies. Architecture and urban planning professionals from State B are encouraged to make a preliminary report/feasibility study for the location in State A. As architecture for different spatial dispositions is highly contextual, apart from some general policies and guidelines, it is highly suggested these reports be made for every new development (e.g. in States C, D, E ... etc.)

Preparation for implementing soft power architecture: The most important segment in cultural relations policies aimed at architecture. Bilateral dialogue between Governments, State and non-State Actors of both countries is encouraged. The emphasis is placed on implementing the local know-how and the contextual nature of the construction process. Some recommendations may clash with the official CRP and/or governmental policies of both states, so compromise is proposed, due to the sizable impact of the new development, as well as the far-reaching consequences (spatial, reflecting on bilateral relations) this architecture can produce.

Implementation of soft power architecture: Local experts are employed to ensure smooth development and completion of the project. The general public of the host country [State A] is introduced to the project, through various means (public debate on the new construction, media outlets, official statements from the sending country ... etc.) It is imperative to manage expectations and control the official narrative of the new construction process. This is why close communication between all state actors of the sending country [State B] (both in sending and receiving countries) is required.

Management and monitoring of soft power architecture: After successful implementation stage, the sending state [State B] ought to continue to be involved with activities, communicating closely with state and non-state actors of the host country [State A], as well its residents [Residents B] in State A. As the contextual nature of every environment was previously stressed, it is recommended that cultural exchange experts be employed by the embassy to create and implement the program best suited for the host country. Furthermore, the assumption being (if CRP successfully and fully implemented), that the embassy will become a node for other state [B] actors in the host country [State A], as well as for Residents A and other actors of State A.




Figure 30. Preparation and data gathering processes for formulation of soft power architecture Cultural Relation Policies [CRP]

4.3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This Chapter will elaborate and discuss the specificities found within the legal framework (diplomatic and building laws and regulations) pertinent for this topic. This research recognizes the need for contextualization established in the examined legal structures, as these configurations will determine and codify the awarded privileges (the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations) and their consequent interpretations (e.g. the Serbian Law on Planning and Construction) of spatial manifestations. Discrepancies borne from these interpretations will be further investigated, noting how the individual understanding of the diplomatic and building laws in a host country influences primarily the implementation process for the diplomatic-consular architectural typologies. Additionally, the legality of control in the public space (prohibition of photography and/or recording) in this thesis is discussed for the cases of Japan (pp. 230-252) and Serbia (pp. 252-271).

4.3.1 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

4.3.1.1 General Provisions

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations²⁴ of 1961 is an international treaty that defines a framework for diplomatic relations between independent countries. It specifies the privileges of a diplomatic mission that enable diplomats to perform their function without fear of coercion or harassment by the host country. This forms the legal basis for diplomatic immunity. Its articles are considered a cornerstone of modern international relations. As of October 2018, it has been ratified by 192 out of 193 states.

Berrige and Lloyd (2012) give an additional definition of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations:

²⁴ *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*. (n.d.). United Nations Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en

The outcome of lengthy multilateral negotiations culminating in a conference held in Vienna at which 81 states were represented. Their object was to codify and clarify the existing customary international law regarding diplomatic agents and diplomatic missions exchanged between states, particularly their privileges and immunities. The convention entered into force in 1964; virtually every sovereign state has become a party to it; and it is also generally regarded as expressive of customary international law on its subject matter. It must be noted, however, that the convention's formal acceptance by a state does not necessarily mean, and in practice very rarely means, that its provisions automatically take effect within that state's municipal law. For a municipal legal system to give effect to the exceptional expectations of diplomats arising from the privileges and immunities which the convention says they should have, domestic legislation is almost invariably required. Only after such legislation has embodied these rules in a state's municipal law will its courts take formal notice of them. Contrary to the implication of the convention's title, it says virtually nothing about diplomatic relations²⁵. (p. 117)

This segment will focus on regulations within the VCDR aiming at the concept of properties of the sending state and subsequently awarded privileges to said property. As previously noted, such regulations are codified within the regulations and by default, the VCDR ought to supersede any and all laws and regulations dealing with property in the receiving/host state. This practice can lead to certain discrepancies and possible abuse of power by either party, but presuming that the sending and receiving countries are in amicable relations, suggestions for peaceful resolution and mediation shall be ascertained.

Seven articles (Articles 1, 21, 23, 24, 30, 34, 45) of the VCDR have been selected by the author to highlight (sometimes conflicting) realities in practice, especially when it comes to the architectural practice, as well as the laws that govern it in the host country. The author acknowledges that interpretation of international law and regulations is outside of his professional scope, nonetheless, by pointing out inconsistencies and problem they cause in the built environment, it is suggested that said issues can be rectified, if architectural and urban planning professionals are sufficiently educated about

²⁵ 'diplomatic relations': defined by Berrige and Lloyd (2012, p. 114) as: "The situation enjoyed by two states that can communicate with each other unhampered by any formal obstacles".

these issues. Moreover, raised issues and observations stem from the author's professional engagement during the construction process of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade, the Republic of Serbia (May 2013 – March 2015). Further exploration of relevant subject matter is thusly influenced by realistic practice concerns vis-à-vis land use and urban planning regulations.

4.3.1.2 Premises of the Mission

Article 1 deals with the issue of ownership: previously, it was customary for diplomatic mission to lease properties and/or land for 99 years in Serbia, but with implementation of the new Building and Planning Law in 2013, diplomatic missions i.e. foreign governments now have the option of owning the land/property as in private property. To clarify, when referring to “private property” the author specifically means properties used for the purposes of diplomatic mission, not private property obtained by private individuals in diplomatic service/diplomats residing in host countries. Such property is covered under different regulations of the VCDR and will not be the subject of this study. That being said, Article 1 specifies that:

- (i) The “premises of the mission” are the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, **irrespective of ownership**, used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the mission [emphasis in bold added by the author, here and throughout the text in this Chapter].

In this instance “ownership” ostensibly refers to the proprietorship concept of the land utilized for diplomatic mission, be it privately owned or leased. As such, the notion of “premises” refers to the plot boundaries, marking the extent of the extraterritoriality of the land. The issue up for interpretation, as well as possible source of loopholes is the “part of the building” phrasing. As such, it is proposed that any building with allocated parts for the diplomatic mission will enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the one used in entirety for the same function. One of the examples is previously occupied floor of the NBGP (ex-Genex) Apartments in New Belgrade, housing the Embassy of Japan, prior to the missions move to the new building. This type of micro division ought to be handled delicately, as diplomatic mission and surrounding residents are more vulnerable to possible malevolent intentions. Abusing privileges and turning immunity into impunity is not unheard of, so it is recommended to have an advisory panel in place to avoid such misuse of power and provide feasible solutions for both countries.

4.3.1.3 Acquisition of Land for the Diplomatic Mission

Having noted that assistance and control is crucial for the host countries and ensuring continuity of the urban matrix and safety of the users of space, Article 21 of the VCDR gives the following regulation:

1. The receiving State shall either **facilitate the acquisition on its territory**, in accordance with its laws, by the sending State of premises necessary for its mission **or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation** in some other way.
2. It shall also, where necessary, assist missions in obtaining suitable accommodation for their members.

When it comes to serving as a facilitator/mediator in obtaining the land for sending states, the host states are engaged in a delicate dance: making sure to reach an optimum solution which oftentimes becomes obscured in more immediate political concerns and which can lead to severe spatial consequences that take time to rectify. It is recommended to have a professional advisory team comprised of architects and urban planning professional, offering their opinion on the feasibility for proposed e.g. locations for new diplomatic mission, as well as the ways to manage negative effects it may produce on the urban matrix, primarily considering its continuity and the safety and wellbeing of the users of space. Of course, this would be an ideal case scenario and as it is impossible to be unaware of different forces at play when dealing with such issues, a compromise of sorts will most probably be made. The important thing is to raise awareness on such issues to ensure that professionals are aware these issues exist and not just give an automatic rubber stamp for anything put in front of them.

4.3.1.4 Fees and Duties of the Mission

Other provisions that are directly relevant for the building process of embassy typology in host countries are fees and taxes payable to municipal and city authorities for new developments. This point is crucial when researching this topic, as the VCDR is expected to supersede any other laws and regulations dealing with the same issues, but it is not always the case and provides the most significant discrepancy in the embassy building process. More precisely, it is one of the aspects that this project recognizes as posing a significant challenge for any sending states that elect to follow the standard building procedure (as it was the case for the Government of Japan in Belgrade). Simply put, the Serbian legal system is not equipped to deal with such contingencies and it is always presumed that the foreign states will fully utilized the privileges awarded by the VCDR. Additionally, as the cases of transparent embassy building process and

the embassy typology building process in general are rare, it was presumed there was no need to be equipped for such a scenario, in a legal capacity. This can lead to significant improvisation from both parties, with varying results, most notably oftentimes conflicting interpretations of the laws and regulations in place. As the building process of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade has set a precedent for such activities, it ought to be researched in detail, in order to formulate recommendation for future endeavors of similar nature and empowering the city architectural professionals and offices.

One of possible points of contempt between states, if one chooses to go into in-depth of legalities could be the payment of fee for urban land development (Serbian: *naknada za uređenje gradskog građevinskog zemljišta*). This subject will be covered in more detail within the part of the research dealing with Serbian laws and regulation, but it is also necessary to examine them in association to the VCDR. Article 24 of the Convention clearly states that:

1. The sending State and the head of the mission shall be **exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, whether owned or leased**, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.

2. The exemption from taxation referred to in this article shall not apply to such dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the sending State or the head of the mission.

Similar provisions are given for individuals and properties in Article 34:

A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except:

(b) Dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

It is interesting to note that, in Serbian building and planning laws, exemption of payment of land development fees is one of the rare instances when the Law specifically mentions diplomatic and consular headquarters, but also add a sort of footnote regarding bilateral relations and choosing them as a touchstone to determine whether the sending state can exercise their right for fee exemption. This can prove to be problematic, as the main assumption is that the VCDR ranks higher than the host country's own laws and regulation, i.e. privileges and immunities are *inviolable*.

An important point that must be made is that, if a diplomatic mission elects to forego its privileges guaranteed by the VCDR, as is was the case with the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, there are no mechanisms in place to cater to the desire for a transparent construction process. When such instance happens, the building and plot revert to “normal” and as such are susceptible to regular construction process and control. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the security concerns and requirements of a modicum of secrecy, construction process will, oftentimes more than not, neither here nor there, when it comes to implementing a transparent procedure.

4.3.2 Serbian Law on Planning and Construction For Diplomatic Outposts

Serbian laws are underequipped to deal with embassy construction: only two articles in over twenty Serbian construction laws, by-laws, rules and regulations mention diplomatic-consular outpost, i.e. Articles 133 and 135 of the Amendments of the Law on Planning and Construction, 2014. Underrepresentation can be explained with the specific nature of these rarely built architectural typologies, as well as the presumed utilization of the full scope of extraterritorial privileges awarded by the VCDR for the construction of diplomatic-consular outposts. However, such law-making stance and the absence of a long-term strategy proves to carry a detrimental effect on the urban matrix, as well as prove challenging for new developments, as was the case during the author’s professional engagement in the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, the Republic of Serbia. These articles define bilateral agreements as the cornerstone for reciprocity and exemption from payment of fees, a right that is already guaranteed by the VCDR and Serbia, as its signatory, is obligated to follow its regulations. Namely, Articles 133 and 135 state the following:

Article 133. (Regarding issuance of the building permit by the Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure)

5) stadium for 20 000 or more spectators, facilities with construction range of over 50, buildings over 50m in height, silo with capacity exceeding 20 000m³ of facilities correctional institutions, facilities for official use of diplomatic consular representative offices of foreign countries, or offices of international organizations in the Republic of Serbia, if it is prescribed by the bilateral

agreement, as well as multi-family residential complexes housing when the investor is the Republic of Serbia "

Article 135.

For construction or execution of works on construction building for official use of diplomatic consular representatives of foreign countries, or offices of international organizations in the Republic of Serbia, if it is prescribed by the bilateral agreement, **the investor has no obligation to provide the evidence on the regulation of relations** in terms of the contribution of building land development, if there is reciprocity with the foreign country, of which the certificate shall be issued by the ministry in charge of foreign affairs.

In practice, if the sending state elects to undergo the procedure for issuing the building permit, this entails submission of complete architectural documentation, in order to be verified by professionals working at the Ministry. Whether these conditions are acceptable for the sending state remains to their own discretion, but effectively, there are no regulations to stop any developments (*or* supersede the VCDR) on the land intended for diplomatic headquarters, as the host country will have no jurisdiction there. Furthermore, the main jurisdiction in communication with foreign mission lies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, as it ought to serve as an intermediary for all official communication. If the sending country chooses to implement transparent procedure, it will pose more challenging than claiming its privileges: this has happened in the Japanese embassy case and will be examined further in subsequent part of this thesis.

Important point that ought to be made is the possibility (and willingness) to alter Belgrade's General Urban Plan 2021 (GUP 2021) to facilitate necessary changes in the urban matrix for new diplomatic-consular headquarters. This was more than evident in the case of preparation and construction process of the new United States' embassy in Belgrade, when the GUP 2021 was amended in order to suit the new development, changing the land use designation and projected numbers regarding plot occupancy and neighborhood development. Legal explanation of this amendment, which was, to underline, legal and in line with the laws, was found in the fact that the updates and amendments of the GUP can be done in phases (Article 1.3. *Legal basis*), as it was done in this case. Other particularities were not disclosed in the given document ("Official Gazette of the city of Belgrade" Year LI, number 34, dated October 17, 2007).

So, in practice, urban regulations can change, the main question remaining on the power of the professions within these negotiations and preserving best interest of the development of the city of

Belgrade. Ostensibly, the governmental agencies were not used as a mere rubber stamp tools, the question remaining what sort of power did the official have, remembering the old saying that one negotiates from a position of power, if comparing the U.S. and Serbia, on many different levels. Other issues have arisen, most notably, the ban on photographing the premises (façade and exterior of the embassy), even if an individual is located in the public space. Such actions question the *right to the city* postulated by Lefebvre (2009) and generally have a deeper significance of abolishing freedom of movement of users of space, which is precisely why these typologies ought to be under close scrutiny by the professional and official, from its inception, through its lifespan, to avoid such blatant misuse of power.

Inspection, review and negotiations with sending states are not new, and it is possible to establish a true rapport, if the architectural officials of the receiving states are established and determined to follow the regulations previously set to ensure best for the city's urban development. One such example was found in the development process of the new American embassy in the 1950s in The Hague, Netherlands (Loeffler, 2011, p.206), when the city official actually turned down the plans for the new embassy development on the account of the building's lack of integration into the city matrix. Such thing could have been expected, but it is surprising that it was not pushed by the American, *especially* if one recalls the extraterritoriality clause (that was *not* invoked). So, ultimately, control of the city's development can be achieved.

4.4 ARCHITECTURAL PROFESSIONALS AND SOFT POWER ARCHITECTURE

4.4.1 Architects and Ethics

Architects have a structural orientation when they perform in defined roles and their work is bounded by their professional institutions. Their orientation is procedural when their social processes emphasize a sequence of decisions in their work cycle or when it is furthered by a continuous dialogue through communication. [...] In stark contrast, architects may choose a pragmatist, "give 'em what they want" role. (Mayo, 1996, pp. 79-80)

Nowadays, architects work in an increasingly complex environment; now, more than ever it is of paramount importance to be responsible to others, ethically, morally and professionally. It is simply no longer possible to exert one's vision since the produced spaces can have far-reaching consequences. This fact was notable in the case aforementioned of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, greeted by the general population with a sense of dissatisfaction, stating that such compound was constructed due to the fact that the Japanese "no longer feel safe" in Belgrade and Serbia. This in turn, as a consequence, had one of the most dominant questions rising about the authorities "handing over" a "prime piece of real estate" for such an "architectural atrocity" ("Politika" daily newspaper printed article "Urban planning failure" [Serbian: "Urbanistički promašaj"] by Mr. Branislav Jovin, engineer, dated March 3, 2015 [in Serbian]). Aside the fact that the embassy building passed regular inspection and legal procedure it is curious to perceive how this architectural representation influenced the general image Japan has in Serbia. The plain fact is, although much attention is paid to Japan's public diplomacy, the lack of synchronization between various department led to the undermining of those efforts, resulting in total discrepancy between proclaimed values and factual states of affairs.

It was not enough to educate wider audiences, because preconceived notions were ingrained in expected behavioral patterns on the Japanese, namely to provide spaces that are both open and esthetically pleasing. These notions are in turn constructed and influenced by the narratives deemed appropriate for export, disseminated by the Japanese officials. This is one of the facets of the ideological apparatus that is utilized for construction and reaffirmation of the Japanese identity abroad, which likewise leaves its marks in spatial terms, in formal terms and in building implementation processes as well. Simply put, any external

preconceived notions are carefully constructed and inextricable from the producers of the narratives on Japanese uniqueness.

Of course, this is not possible with consular/diplomatic outpost, and though the embassy building itself if open (compared to other buildings of the comparable typology in Belgrade), expectations outweighed reality. This also has to do with the image of Japan in Serbia: since the perception is that of a benevolent nation, with established relations.

If we try to establish a framework of reference for architectural professionals dealing with embassy/consular buildings typology, it becomes evident that it is not solely based in architectural design and urban planning. This typology in particular is subjected to influence of a wide array of disciplines including, but not limited to, international relations, politics, economy, sociology, psychology and others. The full extent of the architects' decisions and the impact of embassy buildings on the city matrix ought to be researched in-depth. As stipulated before, the most important thing that architects take into consideration whilst designing these buildings is the notion of – safety.

Argument of providing security is a valid one, non-negotiable in the sense of protection of human life, but the emphasis here is shifting to awareness of effects it causes, both on the built environment and on the bilateral relations. If policy makers are aware of these outcomes, they can employ more subtle strategies to avoid loss of soft power and beneficial perception in host countries. Several suggestions can be made to rectify the situation, from educating the general public on necessity of certain typology, to implementing various activities (predominantly cultural) encouraging citizens' participation.

Great responsibility also lies in the hands of architectural professional, who need to negotiate their design between stringent guidelines given by the (sending) government and moral and ethical obligations of the profession and end users. This notion is not limited only to functionality of the building, but also includes thoughts on city dwellers living in the proximity of the newly planned consular outpost. Involvement of the community is crucial, even if the utmost secrecy is required – it will provide beneficial input and establish connection and respect between the actors, as neighbors and hosts.

One of the most insightfully articulated notions of architects' responsibility when designing these typologies was given by Muratovski (2014):

Like politicians, designers and architects often use ideologies (self-invented or borrowed) to shape their communicative and creative processes. It is their beliefs and dialogues that condition

what ideals may lead to a better society and how these ideals can be put into practice—often for the benefit or to the detriment of the society at large. In most cases these practices are juxtaposed with moral and ethical issues that are too great to be ignored. [...]

The ethical dilemma for the designer or the architect might be whether the political behavior that will result from the design will be beneficial to the broader society or not. From this position, the designer's willingness to engage in a political project could only be understood as stemming from one of two perspectives: (1) the designer is accepting the legitimacy of the ideology and feels that the design is contributing towards the fulfillment of that ideology, or (2) the designer decides to proceed with the work as a professional, but abdicates him- or herself from social responsibility. However, when a designer does not fully understand the purpose and the eventual outcomes of the ideology (for example, one ideology might attempt to limit the freedom of the society, while another might attempt to preserve it), the designer works superficially within a pluralistic context. (pp. 46-47)

4.4.2 Architects and Ideology

4.4.2.1 Identity entrepreneurs? Positioning architects in identity-(re)building processes

When an artist uses power, he puts himself at its disposal and agrees to serve it. With a clear conscience no less, because he doesn't even think he's betraying his art in that way. In that instance, the artist becomes a supporter. He is engaged in the service of one goal, he is loyal to the party and ultimately to its leadership. Subjectively, he can live in the belief that he is free, freely accepting that dictation as well. Objectively, the artist loses the freedom that is sought for her. (Dufrenne, 1982, pp. 142-147)

The above-cited quote is illustrative for getting the point of interconnectedness of arts and politics across, yet Dufrenne (1982) does not breach the moral and historical issues required to understand the attitudes of artists who stand for political ideas. Instead, he tries to objectively view the matter, which is a mistake,

given the complicated interrelations of terms, with often equation of the artist and society by art critics and art history (Mitrović, 2018).

This section shall briefly overview the theoretical postulations and consideration of those members of society who are tasked with dissemination of ideas of national identities and its distinctiveness. The goal is to determine how architects and urban planners of both the sending and host countries are positioned in thusly presented societal structure. The question remains whether such individuals hold any influence in shaping the spaces that communicate the officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity for exported architectural typologies.

Making a salient point, Hagström and Gustafsson (2015, p.8) note the actors involved in identity building seem to be aware of the politics of identity and its stakes, dubbing them *identity entrepreneurs*. The authors go onto to underline the works of previous scholars, explaining how [...] Bukh (2010), Gustafsson (2014), Hagström and Hanssen (2013), and Suzuki (2007) all show, identity entrepreneurs are political actors who promote their desired versions of [Japanese] identity through the discursive representation of issues and actors. Hagström and Gustafsson, (2015) similarly note:

These entrepreneurs operate most obviously at the least sedimented layer where agency is less constrained by structure. Their representations are likely to influence identity constructions in relation to Others in the middle layer. In addition, identity entrepreneurs do not merely reproduce but also seek to alter identities. Oros is also concerned with the agency exercised by actors, who at the same time promote different identity conceptions and security policies, but his focus is on ‘domestic institutions and electoral politics’. (p. 8)

Furthermore, although some scholars speculate that identities can be manipulated (Kowert & Legro 1996, p. 493), others question the extent to which it is possible for actors to be autonomous of identity narratives (Campbell 1998, p. 218; Suzuki 2007, p. 27). The latter view implies that there is a limit to how far identity discourses can be ‘actorised’, and that identity entrepreneurs are not cynical, rational actors who tamper with identities in an instrumentalist and strategic way in order to achieve their purposes without themselves being under the influence of identities (Wodak et al, 2009, pp. 31-32).

This point could be rephrased by saying that two kinds of power are at work in the construction of identities. Discursive, narrative or productive power works to produce and maintain identity constructions, or to transform them when discourses are pitted against each other (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Digeser,

1992). At the same time, a relational understanding of power suggests that actors at times play a privileged role in the formation, maintenance and transformation of identities (on 'relational power' see Baldwin, 2013; Hagström, 2005).

While discussing the notions of cultural nationalism and its relation to the intelligentsia who disseminate the notions of uniqueness, Yoshino (1992) notes that it:

[...] normally involves the dual process by which intellectuals (or thinking elites) formulate ideas of national distinctiveness and by which the intelligentsia (intellectuals or highly educated people as a group, especially when regarded as possessing culture and political influence) respond to such ideas, thereby diffusing ideas of national distinctiveness. (p. 133)

Moreover, citing the works of Edward Shils (1972), Yoshino (1992, pp. 166-167) writes about the categories of identity producers and their core members, the intellectuals, dividing them into several categories:

1. 'Productive intellectuals' – who produce intellectual works;
2. 'Reproductive intellectuals' – (who engage in the interpretation and transmission of intellectual works);
3. 'Consumer intellectuals' – who read and concern themselves receptively with such works.

To give an example, while discussing the impact of the business elites on the promulgation of the ideas of *Nihonjinron*, Yoshino (1992, p. 167) notes that: “[...] in reality, it is not usually possible to draw a clear line their productive and reproductive activities or to identify where the business elites have reproduced ideas borrowed from academics and there they have produced their original ideas”. This is an interesting standpoint, given that Befu (2001) noted that intellectuals write *Nihonjinron* as prescription for behavior, while the government turns it into a hegemonic ideology and the corporate establishment puts it into practice. This can be understood as existence of a certain freedom of interpretative processes for the ideological narrative-building relations between the intelligentsia (productive intellectuals), the government disseminating the ideological ideas and, in this case, businessmen (productive and/or reproductive and/or intellectuals).

While discussing the mechanisms of propagation of the *Nihonjinron* ideology, Yoshino (1999) noted how “[...] ideological manipulations may have occurred between certain sections of the population” (p. 17). Moreover, the author argues how: “Certain sections of the political, economic and cultural elite may have

consciously propagated an ideology which stresses a sense of cultural pride and victory” (Yoshino, 1999, p. 17). Although the conclusion is that: “Cultural nationalism in contemporary nationalism cannot adequately be explained in terms of ideological manipulations alone” (Yoshino, 1999, p. 17), it is important to question the roles of architects in the disseminations of the narratives of cultural nationalism (see e.g. Isozaki, 2006).

When discussing the quest of identity for the Japanese National Diet building (opened in 1936), Tansman (2009) noted how various authors campaigned for a style that “accurately reflected the contemporary Japanese national spirit” and the subsequent “intense debate within the architectural community over the issue of style” (p. 264).

The question of positioning of architecture and urban planning professional in analogous processes for soft power architecture will be even more complex.

To understand these complex relations Eisenstadt (1972) points out the importance of analyzing the role of ‘reproductive’ intellectuals in the social construction and transmission of traditions. ‘Reproductive’ or ‘secondary’ intellectuals can be defined either in terms of quality of their intellectual work or in terms of their occupational roles as teachers, civil servants, journalists, etc. One particular observation made is very relevant: “[...] through their activities in teaching, entertainment and communication, who serve as channels of institutionalization, and even as possible creators of new types of symbols of cultural orientations, of traditions and of collective cultural identity” Eisenstadt (1972).

So, where do the groups pertinent for this research (architects and urban planners) fit in, in the context of this research? The answer gains considerable complexity when transferred into the framework of soft power architecture; since the theoretical assumptions of this project operate under the supposition that all exported architectural typologies aimed at communication of officially endorsed images/messages of national identity will be under the purview of governmental agencies, the hypothesis is there will not be room for identity (re)negotiation, outside of parameters set by the said identity (re)producers. As there are too many variables, a complex network of actors, activities and intricate, unpredictable spatial consequences at stake, architectural expression will be edited.

Possibility of renegotiation of the desired cultural identities and ideologies for exported typologies can be found in rethinking the function i.e. spatial operation of these buildings and its interaction with the urban matrices of host cities. However, this niche for personal expression is difficult if the sending country has a

predetermined set of architectural elements and urban design elements that ought to be implemented for the sake of efficiency (U.S.'s Standard Embassy Design programme). Simply put, architect and urban planners for exported architectural typologies will be rarely 'primary/productive' intellectuals, but rather 'secondary/reproductive' intellectuals. The reasoning is simple: even if there are professional who are able to provide a paradigmatic shift for (in this case) diplomatic-consular headquarters typologies, other considerations (e.g. security) will always take precedence.

This topic alone is worth exploring in future academic investigations; the role of architects and urban planners as secondary intellectuals employed in the reproduction of ideological narratives into spatial dimension for exported typologies aimed at communication of officially sanctioned/desirable messages/images of national identity is thoroughly under-researched. The question that ought to be asked is whether it is at all possible to position architects as primary/productive intellectuals for the e.g. embassy building typology, as it is heavily constrained by a variety of factors and actors, making it near-impossible to offer an alternative scenario for conceptualization, implementation and management of this typology.

4.5 ARCHITECTURAL TYPOLOGIES: DIPLOMATIC-CONSULAR OUTPOSTS

4.5.1 Introduction

In short, embassies were a worthless liability and should be abolished. (Berridge, 2015, p. 118)

In order to develop the understanding of the examined typologies it is firstly necessary to introduce the terms of the *diplomatic mission*. Berridge and Lloyd (2012) give a concise explanation of the term *embassy*:

The diplomatic entity which permanently represents a sending state in a receiving state, although some or all of a mission's members may be resident outside it. Diplomatic missions are almost always established in the capital of the receiving state, although occasionally local circumstances may result in this not being so. Of the members of a diplomatic mission, only the diplomatic staff

enjoy diplomatic status. Unless specific agreement has been reached to the contrary, the receiving state may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits which it deems reasonable and normal. This is particularly likely to happen where a mission is believed to have been involved in espionage or terrorism. Of course, such a requirement is likely to lead to reciprocal action by the sending state. Permanent missions to an international organization and special missions are also diplomatic missions, in the sense that they are engaged on diplomatic tasks and are largely staffed by diplomats. But official diplomatic language²⁶ tends not to refer to them as diplomatic missions. There is reason for that, as the legal regimes which apply to them differ from those which applies to missions accredited to foreign states and their roles are also somewhat different. Accordingly [...] the term 'diplomatic mission' is applied only to a mission accredited to a foreign state. Permanent and special missions are referred to as such. (pp. 107-108)

To advance one's understand on the diplomatic-consular (primarily embassy) buildings, it is necessary to initially understand the classification of the most common types, which in turn will be translated into spatial terms and its subsequent spatial consequences. This section will give a brief overview and expand upon Berridge's (2015) classification of embassy buildings, with additional consideration to the types observed to be significant for this project, noted during the course of investigation.

Resident embassies are the normal means of conducting diplomacy between any two states (Berridge, 2015, p. 115). It is significant to note that theoretical overview of the embassy typology in this section deals with the concept of a normal embassy, with additional exploration of its most significant variations of the norm: the fortress embassy, the mini-embassy and the militarized embassy (Berridge, 2015). An additional variation, noted in this research will be added to the list, namely the virtual embassy.

Resident embassies were a natural response to perils of travel of temporary envoys, with narrowly defined tasks, with the letter of "full powers" *plenipotestas* – origin of the word plenipotentiary – to negotiate on of and bind his principal. Resident embassies not only minimized the risks of travel but also aided political reporting and the more discreet preparations, conduct and the following up of negotiations. In the

²⁶ *The technical words and phrases of the craft of diplomacy*. Berridge and Lloyd (2012, p. 105)

beginning, most states were reluctant to tolerate such missions for obvious reasons, nations thinking of spies and harboring and inciting traitors, and some countries because of complacency regarding their own omnipotence (e.g. Ottoman Empire did not establish embassies until 1793 and the Chinese not for almost another century). Nonetheless, by the XVI century resident missions were an established institution of major significance. This was reflected in the customary law of nations and the slow but sure professionalization of the diplomatic craft (Berridge, 2015, pp. 115-116).

In time, it was gradually accepted that diplomats, along with their domestic families, staff, communications, means of transportation and buildings require special "privileges and immunities" from local criminal and civil law. This only extended to the ambassador, as the 'full' representative of the sovereign, but did not apply to any others. As for the resident embassies, some argued that they were an extension of the territory of the sending state. Accordingly, the functional theory (also: functional approach) gained ground (Berridge, 2015, p. 116).

In 1961 with assistance with the UN's International Law Commission (ILC) diplomatic laws were codified into the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). This clarified the customary rules and adjusted them to modern conditions, mostly for countries that were the most apprehensive about the potential misuse of diplomatic missions, e.g. Yugoslavia in the context of the Cold War or ex-colonial nations fearful of neo-colonialism. VCDR strengthened certain privileges already in place, namely formulating flat-out that agents of the receiving state cannot enter the premises of the mission without the previous consent from the mission chief, and by placing a special duty on the receiving state to protect them. The receiving states were also given the prerogative of insisting on slimming down the missions thought too large. VCDR is currently signed by 191/193 countries members of the UN (February 2017) (Berridge, 2015, pp. 116-117).

The professionalization of embassy occupation developed slower than the diplomatic law; the interest of all diplomats upholding the rules encouraged a sense of professional identity. Consequently, this can be seen as the point of the rise of *corps diplomatique* (diplomatic body), not long after the establishment of the resident embassy (Berridge, 2015, p. 117). Berridge and Lloyd (2012) give the definition of the term *diplomatic body*:

The body of diplomats of all states, including attachés, who are resident at one post. The term is a corruption of the French phrase *corps diplomatique*, which translates correctly as 'diplomatic body'. The designation 'body' is appropriate since, however insubstantial this may now be,

diplomats posted in the same capital still have a corporate existence founded on a common interest in defending their privileges and immunities. The diplomatic corps is led by the dean, has its own meetings, and is seen en masse at ceremonial occasions. (p. 102)

Prior to modern communication tools, an occupational hazard would be that diplomats would either 'go native', losing the touch with sentiments back home or, worst case scenario, become just a mouthpiece of the government that accredited them. Awareness of this occupational hazard ultimately leads to the rotation of diplomats every three or four years (Berridge, 2015, p. 117).

After the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, with a predominantly upheld view that a more 'open' multilateral system was need and despite the rhetoric on "new diplomacy", embassies remained numerous and important in the inter-war years., After WW2, the alleged obsolesce of embassies was once again noted, supported by the three chief arguments:

1. Direct contact between political leaders and experts was made possible by the dramatic improvements in travel and communication;
2. Embassy political reporting had been overtaken by the expansion of the international mass media;
3. With a constantly changing geopolitical landscape and increased cultural divisions, there was a strong chance of embassies actually becoming hostages of hostile receiving states, as shown by the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 (hostages for 444 days) (Berridge, 2015, p. 118).

Size and scope of the diplomatic missions and embassies is ever-changing, which means that some missions are shrinking and others are expanding, such as China, which now has over 160 missions²⁷, almost as many as the U.S (Berridge, 2015). Interestingly, it is possible that the number of Chinese missions that can be broadly referred to as "diplomatic" is larger; for instance, the new Chinese cultural

²⁷ As of September 2020: *Missions Overseas*. (n.d.). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/

center in Belgrade, Serbia, is designed to also house the diplomats' quarters, signifying that the regulations of inviolability of the premises, as per the VCDR will be upheld.

Embassies were different in size and scope, but these differences became more pronounced, as working conditions in certain countries meant heavy adjustment, not limited to the political climate at home. Several new models emerged, as previously noted, but it is necessary to review the *normal embassy* type, in order to determine in which way these conceptual *deviations* happened and to what extent (Berridge, 2015).

4.5.2 The Normal Embassy

The one assumed by the provisions of the VCDR; gives it functions, among others, of representing the sending state and protecting its interests in the receiving state, while gathering information about the latter state, and negotiating and promoting friendly relations with it - all within the limits of international law, as per the Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, the Convention adds that receiving states can insist that missions are kept to a size regarded as: "[...] reasonable and normal, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission' (Article 11)" (Berridge, 2015, p. 119)

In diplomatic law, the embassy's premises include the residence of the chief of mission as well as the business part of chancery even though they are often physically separate. Where other sections exist, it is oftentimes to reflect the particularities of national diplomatic service and priorities of a particular relationship (French embassy in Delhi has a nuclear energy section and the US one in Mexico City two dealing with narcotics and another handling customs and border protection) (Berridge, 2015).

Internal organization and hierarchy dictates that the rank held by a section head varies in size and importance of that particular mission, but is rarely below first secretary. Section that require a more specialized skill set are staffed by personnel employed by agencies and ministries other than the foreign ministry, including one or more intelligence officers under 'diplomatic cover'. One of the main challenges of managing the staff is creating a "one team mentality", as embassy sections can become silos, unresponsive to each other and the ambassador. Locally engaged (LE) staff numbers have likewise greatly increased, even in more sensitive roles, however, they do not have any legal protection and can be

subjected to harassment and even put under arrest, in turbulent political times, as it happened with Iranian LE staff of the U.K. embassy in Tehran in June 2009 (Berridge, 2015, p. 119).

When discussing representation of an embassy, it is immensely important, as Berridge (2015) gives an anecdotal explanation: “As representative of a state, the embassy has value even if the ambassador never gets out of bed” (p. 119). The explanation of this stance can be explained just by the very existence of a foreign mission, highlighting the sending state’s recognition of the receiving state and the attached value to keeping mutual normal relations (Berridge, 2015). Here, Berridge (2015) makes an important observation, noting that, if the embassy is designed and built by the sending state, it may also symbolize values or aspirations to which the sending state attaches great importance. The given example is the Turkish embassy, designed by NSH Architekten (see: Figure 31) opened in Berlin in October 2012, consisting of two halves, separated by a copper-cover archway, symbolizing Turkey’s position as a bridge between Europe and Asia (Berridge, 2015, pp. 120-121).



Figure 31. Turkish Embassy in Berlin, NSH Architekten. Photography © Bernardette Grimmenstein. Available at: <https://www.archdaily.com/photographer/bernardette-grimmenstein>

The existence of a resident embassy also broadens a state’s representative options and thus its repertoire of non-verbal signals. [...] For representational purposes, resident missions are generally of special importance to new states and established ones in declining circumstances. Berridge (2015) argues how:

[...] the normal embassy seeks simply to be as well networked as possible: to cultivate extensive social contacts, especially in influential quarters; to honor local customs and mark important local events, in so far as these are compatible with its own values; and, in the process, avoid giving gratuitous offence if some unpleasant message has to be delivered to the host government, a newspaper editor, or anyone else. By these means it is easier to gain influence and gather information, and the embassy is better placed to handle a crisis in relations should one subsequently develop. (p. 121)

Berridge (2015, p. 122) notes that, closely related to negotiating, is lobbying by the embassy: encouraging those with influence in the receiving state to take a favorable attitude to its country's interests on particular issues. Other activities mentioned as conducted by the normal embassies include, but are not limited to:

1. Administration of foreign aid;
2. Diplomatic cover for the traditional intelligence officer;
3. Intervention in the political affairs of the receiving state (illegal subsidiary);
4. Conducting relations between hostile states on the territory of a third.

However, Berridge (2015) fails to recognize the architectural characteristics of the diplomatic-consular headquarters as a facilitator for achieving such goals. It must be recognized that certain spatial characteristics and consequences have the power to sway the host state's general public's viewpoints, as it was the case after the construction of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia.

Likewise, the interconnectedness between various organizations wielding soft power in the host state (e.g. cultural centers, think tanks, etc.) and the official mission is lacking for Berridge's theoretical considerations. The author mentions the hub-and-spoke model, as well as the mini-embassies, but these examples are both examined in the functional view of a 'full service' mission.

In this project, the majority of the examined case studies are broadly classified as the normal embassy type (the UK embassy in Tokyo, the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo, the Japanese embassy in Belgrade and the Chinese embassy in Belgrade). The term "broadly" has been employed in this instance to note the

specificities i.e. deviations from the originally presented term of the “normal embassy” typology, noted in the conceptualization and implementation the Japanese and Chinese embassies in Belgrade) and management processes (the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo). The UK embassy in Tokyo’s specificity is found within its ideological representation and symbolic projection of identity, all within the propositions of the “normal embassy” typology, but contextually specific in this project.

4.5.3 The Fortress Embassy

This section will provide an overview of what Berridge (2015, p. 125) refer to as the most *spectacular* and *controversial* deviation from the normal embassy. Forerunners of the examined typology could be found in the ‘compounds’ of early Western embassies in the East and in the-redesigned defenses in Beijing following the Boxer uprising in 1900, but the genuine fortress embassy is a development of recent years (Berridge, 2015).

Traditionally, embassies occupied existing residential locations/properties that were neither deigned or position for defense, but proved adequate for the sending state's requirements, as oftentimes these locations were rented or sometimes bought, as finding vacant, desirable land where a building could be built was not always easy to find. Renting or purchasing of office or residential properties remains common to this day (Berridge, 2015). In the XIX century, some countries began to build their outpost in states with stable or beneficial relations, and these buildings were designed to be comfortable, serviceable and fireproof as well as provide an outward appearance that showed off national characteristics - including wealth (Berridge, 2015). It should be highlighted that Berridge (2015) first uses considerations about the exterior projection of the embassy in this section, recognizing the importance of conveying certain set of meaning through architecture. He notes that, after WW2 the U.S. lavished considerable sums on embassies featuring glass walls, visual openness and easy access to the public (Berridge, 2015, p. 126). For further discussion on the U.S.’s embassy programme and its architectural implications see: Loeffler (2011).

Berridge (2015, p. 126) further elaborates how the embassies were previously exposed to any form of unrest, both by their physical characteristics and location, being usually located centrally and close to the street, turning for safety to token guards, service attaché (if they had one) and reciprocity stated in VCDR, in fact that a "special duty" was placed on the receiving stated to take all appropriate steps to protect them

(VCDR Art. 22.2) - receiving states proved sometimes unable and sometimes unwilling to uphold this duty. Moreover, until the 1950s attacks on diplomatic and consular missions were comparatively rare. This changed with suicide bomber attack on the American embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983, and other diplomatic missions with less developed bilateral relations or national sentiment are more likely to be in some sort of turmoil (Israeli embassies of pro-Palestinian factions, notably in Buenos Aires in 1992, embassies of Turkey attract attention of Armenian organizations). Other missions that have close ties to the U.S. are also targeted, as it was with Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 (Berridge, 2015).

Consequently, after repeated developments of act of terrorism and/or urban violence, a new, security-driven design and building standard for its diplomatic properties was drafted by the United States and then replicated, in full or partially by other states (Berridge, 2015). The Inman report (see: Chapter 4.6.1) established new set of rules for safe embassy design:

- Spacious sites set back at least 100 feet from any surrounding streets;
- Concentration on the 'compound' of all non-military personnel;
- Blast-proof construction;
- High perimeter walls;
- Vehicle arrest barriers and (should all else fail)
- Strengthened safe rooms resembling the 'keep' in Norman castle to which all personnel might retreat.

Expectedly, this typology divided opinions among diplomats; for the opponents, such buildings do not longer symbolize attractive values, instead advertising lack of trust in the local authorities. Massive costs of these compounds severely limit any other investment of financial support provided to the receiving country by the Foreign Ministry of the sending country. Interestingly, the guiding ideas of reducing the potential threats to the staff actually increase it in other ways. Forbidding aspect also puts off any local visitors and constant movement to and fro can be identified and pose a security risk (Berridge, 2015, p. 127).

On the other hand, supporters of the fortress embassy typologies cite the previously imperative of care for the safety of the mission staff, the majority of whom are usually not diplomatic officers anyway. However, it is recognized that most often remote locations hinders the usual diplomatic business. Claims are also made that there is no firm evidence that the unwelcoming appearance of the fortress embassy puts off

local visitors (see: Pietrowicz, 2013). Lastly, if the fortress embassy is a "hub" that provides support to other missions in the region, it is essential for *regional* diplomacy, even though if not well suited to *local* diplomacy (Berridge, 2015, p. 127).

Berridge (2015) concludes the discussion on the fortress embassies with the notion that, sensibly enough, risk *management* rather than risk *avoidance* has become the watchword when it comes to recent developments, citing the newly developed, centrally located and architecturally innovative U.S. embassies in Berlin (designed by Moore Ruble Yudell²⁸, opened in July 2008) and Beijing (designed by SOM, opened in August, 2008, received "Good Design is Good Business" China Award²⁹).

Within the context of this research, the two examined U.S. embassies in Tokyo and Belgrade are positioned within the fortress embassy type, primarily because of the official approach to the construction of these typologies, rooted in the previously mentioned concept of risk management.

4.5.4 The Mini-Embassy

This embassy type is typically defined as a diplomatic mission with no more than four home-based staff, principally diplomatic (foreign ministries tend not to distinguish between diplomatic officers and administrative and technical staff reporting on these posts). These posts will frequently be supported by a larger number of the local staff, so the term 'mini-embassy' or 'micro-mission' is often misleading (Berridge, 2015, p. 128). This type of embassy is relatively inexpensive to set up and is considered to be a more practical proposition, taking into consideration of recent advances in diplomatic communication. A number of countries, irrelevant of their status, previously accustomed to wide-spread representation, are recently suffering from ever-decreasing foreign affairs budgets. Therefore, this typology is a good device

²⁸ *United States Embassy, Berlin* / Moore Ruble Yudell Architects & Planners. (n.d.). <https://www.moorerubleyudell.com/projects/united-states-embassy-berlin-0#>

²⁹ Jordana, S. (2017, September 14). *SOM wins 2010 "Good Design is Good Business" China Award*. ArchDaily. <https://www.archdaily.com/52459/som-wins-2010-good-design-is-good-business-china-award>

to maintain presence in some countries, such as Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, when the rising powers of China and Turkey are extending their diplomatic reach (Berridge, 2015).

The examined typology has the virtue of being able to be set up quickly as a response to rapidly changing circumstances (Berridge gives the example of a Ikea-styled mini-embassy for countries experiencing tumultuous circumstances, as Baghdad [Battle of Baghdad, a part of the invasion of Iraq in 2003]) and conversely quickly evacuated. It is also a good training ground, for it provides a more varied experience and earlier responsibility for its junior offices (Berridge, 2015).

The opposed to the mini-embassy (e.g. Jazbec, 2011, p. 182), note this typology has many disadvantages and some consider it to never be advisable for implementation. Berridge (2015) further notes that the mini-embassies provide no scope for specialization and what it can actually do is severely limited. Moreover, politicians of the sending state might state grandiose claims, aimed at asserting their ambitions for the region, just by the virtue of having a ‘presence’ there. The most significant drawback of this typology is its unsuitability for deployment in countries where security is a major issue, combined with the inevitable and excessive reliance on the local staff.

Some of these issues can be rectified if like-minded states group together, e.g. Sweden in Astana, Kazakhstan with similar Finnish and Norwegian missions. Additionally, regular inspections can provide early warning of any staffing problems. Or mini-embassy can be supported by a larger one, e.g. U.K. embassy in Stockholm that backs up five much smaller missions in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s ‘Nordic-Baltic network’. Possible variations include what Berridge (2015, p. 129) identifies as rapid-deployment teams.

Headed by a senior diplomat, composed of staff with a variety of skills, and complete with its own communications and security, this is designed to reinforce speedily any mission in a consular crisis, but is particularly valuable in sustaining the viability of the mini-embassy.

4.5.5 The Militarized Embassy

Berridge (2015) classifies the militarized embassy as “a wartime embassy that, to a significant extent, displays a military outlook and style without necessarily being a fortress embassy” (p. 129). One of the

prominent features of this typology is found in its experience, of depending chiefly on the nature of the military conflict in which its country's frontline ally is engaged. Specificities of this typology in a conventional war are noted in stripping of non-essential functions of the mission and non-essential personnel are usually sent home. Consequently, the embassy is stripped for action and focussed almost completely on supporting the war effort (Berridge, 2015, p. 129).

Furthermore, Berridge (2015) notes the particularities in operation of this typology:

[...] it has numerous other duties to perform once fighting has started. These include advancing plans for the evacuation of any remaining expatriates and, in the meantime, offering advice on how they might protect themselves; handling hordes of VIP visitors and journalists; and, if they have any time left, offering advice on post-war affairs, including a war-termination strategy (p. 130).

Concerns about this particular embassy typology are similarly addressed by Berridge (2015), as the consequences of embassy militarization can be serious, regardless of the observed conflict in host countries. It is noted that “insensitive behavior is more likely to occur and might cause local alienation; strong local suspicion about the mission's intentions might be aroused, even if they are in fact benign” (Berridge, 2015, p. 130). Consequently, if the conflict intensifies, the militarized embassy will be more probably attach priority to the demand for more troops and equipment than to search for a political solution.

4.5.6 The Virtual Embassy

Government officials should also consider investing in places that are not in the physical realm, as it was the case with Sweden and their virtual Embassy in Second Life, a massive online community on the World Wide Web (Bengtsson, 2011). The Swedish Institute's work with Sweden's image and its activities in international development cooperation go hand in hand. The institute's overarching goal was to create mutual relationships with other countries around the world, whether the issue is culture, politics, trade, or development cooperation. However, in order to achieve this goal, awareness of, and interest in Sweden must first increase. (Bengtsson, 2011). Although the project was ultimately unsuccessful, due to dwindling interest and lack of content update in the virtual embassy, it laid the groundwork for other ventures of similar nature.

Bengtsson (2011) makes an insightful observation of this complex virtual typology, firmly rooted in concepts of nation branding:

[...] as soon as mainstream media looked elsewhere, the hole in the membrane of the virtual world gradually closed and the magic circle became magic again. Kücklich (2009) argues that the ideology of current virtual worlds is primarily ludic, and that they hold an ideology of play (see also Pearce and Artemesia 2011). For a government organization like the Swedish Institute, being associated with this ideology of play and the ludic culture of the virtual world successively became a burden. For the Swedish Institute, the nation-branding part of the project was completed shortly after the inaugural press conference had turned off its lights. Second Life was only regarded as “the future” as long as mainstream media were watching. (p. 25)

Brief overview of this typology was given only to illustrate the existence of comparable manifestation in the virtual realm. However, due to the nature of this research, operating within the spatial parameters of the physical realm, attention will be diverted to physical manifestations of the diplomatic-consular architectural typologies. Further research on virtual embassies and subsequent ideological narratives is highly encouraged, but will not be the topic of consideration in this project.

4.6 U.S.'s EMBASSIES

This notion is mostly visible in the construction process of the U.S.'s embassies; a release made by Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) United States Department of State declares:

Use of the SED [Standard Embassy Design] reduces the overall duration of a project up to 34% from the initiation of site selection to project completion. This enables the Department to provide new facilities to a greater number of diplomatic posts in a shorter period of time. Savings of \$63 million, achieved on the Fiscal Year 2002 projects and reinvested in the capital program, allowed OBO to plan for one additional facility. (AIA Best Practices, 2007)

Great importance is also given to the notion that all place making decisions are in line with "Federal Asset Management Principles":

Prior to initiating a new building for an embassy or consulate, OBO undertakes a lengthy and exhaustive process to evaluate the best solution for a post. This process is considered in conjunction with other U.S. Government agencies that participate in the development of OBO's Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan. A NEC is considered only after OBO determines that renovating existing buildings will not provide suitable facilities."(Standard Embassy Design; Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations)

To reiterate the past concept: certain ideology may be applied and structured within the architectural design process. This applies to the OBO's construction plan for all consular headquarters that are to be built. Some of the standards include:

- Assurance that safety, security, and functional requirements are met
- Reduced time in preparing Requests for Proposals
- Reduced time to prepare contract documents and negotiate with contractors
- Reduced time for Integrated Design Reviews
- Less room for error or omission
- Simplified budget process
- Organizational efficiency

All of the above-mentioned construction properties elevate the same principles: safety, functionality and effectiveness. These are also the presumed values to be transferred onto the concept of American embassy buildings. Architecture design process governed by the ideal of society that is based on functionality must produce likewise buildings; this is the main identity trait imprinted into architectural design. Whether this is really the case, we will find out by closer examination of various aspect of architectural concept and design process of embassy buildings. If a “shift” in design has been made, one must research historical events that led to that kind of change of perspective. This is why it is necessary to take a closer look at record of American embassy design development, as well as the actions that shaped it.

4.6.1 Why (U.S.’s) Embassies?

Diplomatic facilities abroad are more than just offices, residences, and places of assembly and refuge. They are the physical presence of the United States beyond its borders. U.S. embassies are symbols of the values and aspirations of the American people. (The American Institute of Architects, 2009, p. 3)

Embassy buildings in general are one of the most probable targets of terrorist attacks and/or riots (e.g. in Beirut 1985, Kenya, 1999, Serbia 2008, etc.), so the requirement for providing safe environment for staff and equipment is understandable. Jane C. Loeffler (1990, 2005, 2011), an expert on U.S. embassy buildings research, makes an interesting observation, stating that providing security is not a piece-by-piece process, but more of a *sequential* challenge. Once one type of building is secured, danger transfers to another, which only provides the relocation of risk, which is not a long-term solution when dealing with any kind of threat.

Since the 1980s and 1990s, when terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities multiplied, America’s foreign presence has been undergoing a profound makeover. This agenda was outlined in the Inman report after the bombing in Beirut in 1985. That report called for a seven-year plan to replace 126 posts (out of 262) with walled compounds, and it proposed stringent new security standards, minimums for setbacks, maximums for windows and other rules that constrained architectural choice. Noted security recommendation unfortunately were not implemented, and after another devastating attack in 1999 in

Nairobi, new report was drafted (the Crowe Report), largely based on previously drafted Inman Report. The most important thing mentioned in the Crowe Report was that "...safety had to outweigh considerations of convenience, history or symbolism." (Loeffler 2005, p. 47) These measures turned to design-build production, and created an Industry Advisory Panel that represents the corporate side of the construction industry. With a core pre-approved for security, new projects have a 24-month timetable, start to finish.

This kind of mass production of architecture was disapproved by some but, as enunciated to the House International Relations Committee, Congress' only concern is "to keep embassies from being blown up". Therefore it is not likely that anyone will urge Overseas Building Operations department to make "design excellence" a higher priority.

U.S. embassy buildings are particularly interesting for this research; the United States of America is a country that has a firm stance when it comes to war on terrorism and the protection of its diplomatic-consular headquarters from any possible terrorist attack. One excerpt of the report titled: "9/11 Commission Report", drafted by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, gives clear insight why the USA was chosen for research process:

In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the twenty-first century. In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests "over there" should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America "over here." In this same sense, **the American homeland is the planet.** (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2003, pp. 361-362)

Without making any further assumption of political agenda and plans of the country in question, this project has the intention to point out that U.S. embassies will provide sufficient, relevant and accurate data for future research. To specify, obtained information presented in the following sections will be instrumental in further exploring the presented case studies in this project. Clear comparison between the implementation processes will be elaborated, evident in legal construction terms, where Japan and the U.S. had a starkly different approach to the construction of their respective new diplomatic-consular

headquarters in the Republic of Serbia. Moreover, the following sections present a clear overview of important facets for construction of examined architectural typology and the approach of one country (the U.S.) to its conceptualization, implementation and management stages. When cross-referenced with the legal frameworks of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (see: Chapter 4.3.1) and within the context of Serbian construction laws and regulations (see: Chapter 4.3.2), valid conclusions can be drawn and important points for future research uncovered. Apart from accessibility to most information in connection with this typology of buildings, it is important to note that procedures and recommendations for U.S. embassy building design, issued by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations have heavily influenced the construction process of other nations' embassy buildings, thus shaping the city matrix structure.

4.6.2 Examination of Proclaimed Values of U.S. Embassies

Embassies and consulates serve as the front door for US diplomacy. The safety and security they provide to our personnel are the first priority, but they must also reflect our national values of openness and ingenuity. Embassies and consulates must exemplify the best of American architecture, environmental stewardship, and innovation. (Watkins, 2014)

These values are however only declarative; primary concern of United States embassies designers is *safety*. Aesthetic category, apart from being a very individual aspect, is often hidden behind the security perimeter gate. These walls are not built without reason. After several deadly attacks to US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, Congress implemented a series of security constraints on design, including street setbacks and fortification against explosions (Watkins, 2014). Also, Congress restored the program which intended to replace 180 facilities with substantial security defects. During the presidential term of George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, the State Department commenced an overseas construction program which was viewed as most important since the period of 1954-1960 (Loeffler, 1990, p. 251).

An internal State Department report, voiced concern that the new design program increases security risk. According to the report, the design program will result in fewer embassies being built and longer design

and construction time “*leaving more personnel exposed in inadequate facilities for longer periods of time.*” (Watkins, 2014)

Additionally, it is curious how proclaimed values are inconsistent with official documents drafted by Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) – United States Department of State, explaining Standard Embassy Design (SED). If we review abovementioned statements given by Mr. Kerry and the official SED explanation leaflet we can note a significant discrepancy. In the document titled “Adapting Standard Embassy Design to Specific Sites” the most important heading states: *Building Safe, Secure Embassies*. No mention of architecture excellence. Furthermore, it goes in stating that “[...] the SED documents identify prescriptive requirements and illustrate required architectural and engineering concepts to ensure that new facilities are safe, secure, and functional.”

These proclaimed values are set as an imperative. However “the best of American architecture” has not made the cut. These principles are probably found in the engineering and sustainability concept of the design. The following illustrates this statement:

The SED consists of three prototype designs of varying size that serves as a starting point for the design of embassies and consulates in places such as Cape Town, South Africa, or Tashkent, Uzbekistan—places that do not typically receive the same level of design attention and funding as embassies in major world capitals such as Beijing, London, or Paris. (AIA Best Practices, 2007)

How is it possible that architectural design of such an important edifice as an embassy can fall under the “one size fits all” category? Or in this case, S, M, L. Apart from obvious justification of efficient construction, reduced funds and ever-present security threats, this program does not in any way explain the lack of responsible architectural design when building in different urban contexts.

On February 23, 2010, the U.S. government announced that a team led by the firm of Kieran Timberlake has won the competition to design the new embassy building and surrounding green spaces. The winning design resembles a crystalline cube, with a semi-circular pond on one side (called a “moat” by the Times) [“US embassy sold to Qatari group”. BBC News. 2009-11-03] and surrounded by extensive public green spaces.

The new US embassy in London – designed by Philadelphia-based Kieran Timberlake – is the [SED] program’s first embassy of such scale. ”In contrast to high perimeter walls and fences, security requirements are achieved through landscape design—such as the large pond, low garden walls with bench seating, and differences in elevation that create natural, unobtrusive barriers” a release by Kieran Timberlake states (Watkins, 2014). This project dubbed “Billion Dollar Baby” raises some concerns mainly in connection to funding; manufacturing challenges with the six-inch-thick blast-proof glass have caused the project to be \$100mn over its \$1bn budget, further raising concerns from critics, reported by CBS News.

On the other hand the American side, namely OBO has different view on the matter, as highlighted by Namm (2011):

In the vanguard of Design Excellence is the design concept for our planned new embassy in London. The architectural firm Kieran Timberlake, which won the design competition for London, has put forth a design that provides a street-level experience that respects the urban texture of the existing landscape and contributes to the development of the public realm. At the same time, the design will minimize the impact of security measures on the surrounding streets and will actually create new public spaces. The new London embassy will demonstrate exceptional environmental leadership that is at or beyond the current leading edge practice. Kieran Timberlake and OBO’s shared goal is to provide a facility that is carbon neutral, with photovoltaic panels built into the scrim and a self-sufficient water system. These features will allow OBO to apply for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Platinum certification with the US Green Building Council and BRE Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) Outstanding certification, the UK counterpart to LEED. (p. 25)

4.6.3 Guiding Principles of Design Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities

The fearful stance assumed by isolated, walled compounds that represent the United States abroad is cause for concern. At a time when administration officials including Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are touting the urgent need for better public diplomacy, the State Department is building embassies that do not reflect that agenda. In fact, the

inaccessibility of these buildings, coupled with the new standardized design, may be harming efforts to portray America as an open society. (Loeffler 2005, p. 44)

One of the most helpful resources for this research was the article titled “*Constructive Diplomacy: The US Department of State’s Overseas Building Program*” written by Adam E. Namm, Acting Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, United States Department of State for the Spring 2011 issue of the *Ambassadors Review* magazine. It also provided us with interesting commentary on the new American Embassy in London (overlook given in the previous chapter), as well as the rundown of design principles of new consular outpost. These principles are quoted in entirety and commentary will be provided after careful consideration.

This section provides an overview of points of interest provided by Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (2010) Design Excellence Guiding Principles:

The Guiding Principles of a new Department of State program, based on the 1962 Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture, are articulated below. These Principles will serve as the foundation of a comprehensive effort that will include, in the coming months, the development of a Strategic Plan which, in turn, will be the basis for OBO Design Excellence Policies and Procedures.

Delivering Design Excellence is a comprehensive process that seeks to utilize the best methods, technologies and staff abilities. Each office, person and action in OBO will contribute to the realization of this goal. If the guiding principles below are applied, OBO will produce facilities that are outstanding in all respects. OBO project teams are challenged to apply all of these principles, coordinate their efforts and deliver built embassy complexes that represent the best of American architecture, engineering, technology, art and culture.

◆ **Purpose and Function:** Embassies and consulates have two essential purposes: to be safe and functional and inspiring places for the conduct of diplomacy and to physically represent the US government to the host nation. A facility that represents the best of American architecture, design, engineering and construction will be an appropriate workspace, and will also be contextually appropriate and become a respected landmark—representing the best of American government, enterprise and culture—in the host nation.

◆ **Site:** The site and location of an embassy has practical as well as symbolic implications. OBO will develop sites that best represent the US government and its goals, and enhance the conduct of diplomacy. Whenever possible, sites will be selected in urban areas allowing US embassies and consulates to contribute to the civic and urban fabric of host cities. Special attention will be paid to the general ensemble of surrounding buildings, streets and public spaces of which embassies and consulates will form a part.

◆ **Design:** The design of buildings and sites is a comprehensive process of understanding and balancing requirements and incorporating them into a thoughtfully conceived cohesive and coherent whole. OBO will evaluate designs on the basis of their success in skillfully balancing requirements and on how well the design represents the United States to the host nation. Designs are to be functionally simple and spatially flexible to meet changing needs and be enduring over time. An official embassy style will be avoided. Buildings are to be welcoming while representing dignity, stability, innovation, humanity and openness. Ostentation is not appropriate. Designs will be cost effective, employing an economy of means and methods. The design will be responsive to its context, to include the site, its surroundings, and the local culture and climate. The design will make use of contextually appropriate and durable materials. The grounds and landscaping will be as important as the architecture and together are to be conceived as an integrated whole. The grounds will be viewed as functional and representational space, and will be sustainable, include indigenous plantings and incorporate existing site resources, such as mature trees.

◆ **Engineering:** The engineering of facilities will incorporate the most advanced methods, systems, technologies and materials appropriate to the facility and local conditions, including the site, climate, natural hazards and the practical reality of construction, operations and maintenance in the host nation.

◆ **Safety and Security:** The safety and security of staff and visitors is paramount. Designs and construction will meet or exceed all security and safety standards and specifications. Architects and engineers will be challenged to design and develop ever improving methods, materials and solutions and to thoughtfully integrate these into overall designs.

◆ **Sustainability:** Buildings and grounds will incorporate sustainable design and energy efficiency, and these features will be integrated into their design. Construction, maintenance and

operations practices will be sustainable. Particular attention will be given to the climate, context and site conditions.

◆ **Architectural and Engineering Professional Services:** OBO will seek to hire the highest quality of American architects and engineers to produce the best designs. Their selection will be based on the quality of their design achievements and portfolio of work; and the selection methodology will be open, competitive and transparent.

◆ **Construction:** Construction professionals are partners in Design Excellence and will be engaged throughout the process to ensure the best possible design and implementation. OBO is committed to using the best construction practices and craftsmanship possible and every effort will be made to utilize the most qualified building contractors with a record of delivering high quality projects.

◆ **Operations and Maintenance:** Operations and Maintenance professionals are also partners in Design Excellence and will be engaged throughout the process. Buildings and sites will be economical to operate and maintain and will utilize equipment and materials that are durable, dependable and suitable. Designs will be based on life-cycle analysis of options that take into account long-term operations and maintenance concerns. Design intent and features will be maintained throughout the life of the facility, using the best stewardship practices.

◆ **Art:** Embassy buildings and grounds are an opportunity to showcase the best of American and host nation art and culture. OBO is committed to integrating such art into its facilities such that each property will be both an individual expression of design excellence and part of a larger body of work representing the best that America's designers and artists can leave to later generations.

◆ **Historically, architecturally or culturally significant properties and collections:** OBO is committed to preserving the Department's historical, cultural and architectural legacy. The Secretary of State's Register of Culturally Significant Property is the official listing of important diplomatic overseas architecture and property that figure prominently in our country's international heritage. OBO is also committed to the development of a world class stewardship program, dedicated to the proper conservation and maintenance of the Department's culturally significant historical properties and assets. (pp. 1-2)

4.6.4. Importance of LEED for U.S. Embassy Program

A significant emphasis on newly constructed American embassies design (in accordance with SED – Standard Embassy Design) is put on the LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) as one of the cornerstones of successful architectural representation.

In 1999 there was a new effort to standardize embassy criteria, which included sustainable design requirements using LEED as the pilot reference standard. The effort was titled, Standard Delivery System (SDS) and integrated LEED reviews and deliverables within the design process concluding with LEED Certification. The design/construction process at this time was design for bridging documents, which then set the basis for the design-build contract. (McIntire, 2013, pp. 5-8)

The uncommon goals of security and the environment have found common ground in synergies between the technologies and strategies implemented in the SED. Adding environmental goals to already weighted list of requirements might appear to many as overburdening the building program, but upon detailed review several strategies have surprising benefits to both these aims.

Site

Green roofs recommended in the SED guidelines and specifically encouraged under LEED Credit 7.2: Landscape to Reduce Heat Island Effect, have the added benefits of providing a thermal blanket for the building and protecting the roofing from degradation from UV rays. They also store about 70% of rainfall for slow release or transpiration simulating the ground plane. They can also camouflage and disguise the building location, form, and mass from aerial attacks.

Water

According to an article in Business Week, May 1, 2003 by Jane Black in New York, the new U.S. Homeland Security Dept. is investigating ways of using reverse osmosis to protect the nation's water supply from bioterrorism. SED requires that only potable water be connected to plumbing fixtures supplying water for drinking, culinary use, washing (people or laundry), or processing food. Where local water or well water systems do not meet National Primary and Secondary Drinking Water Regulations 40 CFR Parts 141 – 143 and Safe Drinking Water Act (PL 93-523, PL 104-182, etc.), as amended, SED requires water to be treated and stored for use.

Storm and Wastewater

In many areas of the world municipal sewer and storm drains are not available or are of insufficient capacity to accommodate additional outfall from the new SED compound. In these cases SED requires on-site retention and/or treatment for controlled release. Rainwater catchment, drip irrigation, green roofs, and grey water reuse are recommended in the SED guidelines. These strategies can save significant cost on storm water infrastructure and are of particular importance in countries where water is a precious and often scarce resource that is actively conserved and protected.

Energy

LEED Energy and Atmosphere Credits 1 and 2 require optimum building energy system performance and encourage the development of on-site renewable energy sources. Achieving these environmental goals increases security by reducing dependence on local power providers. In Geneva, Switzerland, OBO has committed to adding photovoltaic (PV) to the south elevation of the chancery as part of a façade repair and protection. The local power provider has offered to purchase the power generated for five times the current rate. The first candidates for renewable power applications would be posts where distributed power is unreliable, expensive, or difficult to access.

Indoor Air Quality

LEED Indoor Environmental Quality (EQ) Prerequisite 1: Minimum Indoor Air Quality Performance requires the building HVAC system design to meet ASHRAE 62-1999. Given the security requirements related to precautions to contain and control the spread of a chemical or biological threat, system technologies enhance indoor air quality by significantly exceeding this standard by adding additional levels of filtration and pressurization to the building ventilation system.

Indoor Environmental Quality

EQ Credit 8: Daylight and Views requires an achievement of a minimum Daylight Factor of 2% in 75% of all spaces occupied for critical visual tasks. Blast resistance requirements for the building envelope significantly increase the cost of glazing (SED requires the façade to be a

minimum of 20% glazed) and increase the thickness of the glazing, both of which result in limiting the amount of light transmittance to the space. To compensate for this an atrium was added to SED allowing large areas to be exposed to diffuse daylight.

Acoustics

Although LEED does not address the aspect of acoustics and its effect on the indoor environmental quality, SED requires many acoustical enhancements for security, which result in added privacy, eased concentration, and general increased occupant well-being.

Design-Build Process

While the design-build world is driven by first cost, sometimes that can work to the advantage of integrating an innovative or new technology. The Sofia design-build team recommended that waterless urinals be substituted for all flush urinals for no cost and to earn the team the LEED Water Efficiency Credit 3.2. Now this is a requirement of the SED. They also recommended substituting a pulsed-power technology for the SED prescribed chemical treatment of cooling tower water. The system is being considered due to a myriad of benefits, including; consistent reduced Total Suspended Solids and bacterial count, energy savings, water use reduction, reduced maintenance, and possibly a LEED Innovation point for eliminating the release of ~1,052 gallons industrial-strength chlorine bleach to the environment each year. Chlorine or some other biocide is commonly used to control biological activity and reduce pathogens. Most of the chlorine added to the system is rapidly discharged to the atmosphere as chlorine gas. (McIntire, 2013, pp. 5-8)

4.6.5 Architectural Requirements and Guidelines for U.S.'s Embassies

McIntire (2013) gives further, detailed explanation of requirements for American embassy design; The SED compound guidelines prefer a 10-acre relatively flat site, accessible to the public they serve. A site close to mass transit is preferred. Consideration of site accessibility, good soils, existing utilities, emergency services, neighboring properties, and environmental factors such as site elevation and potential flooding are also factored into a detailed real-estate study performed prior to acquisition of the property to determine the best match with these parameters.

STANDARD EMBASSY DESIGN: SMALL*



Estimated construction cost:	less than \$47 million†
Approximate size:	4,300 gross square meters (gsm)
Estimated planning time:	6 months
Estimated design-build acquisition time:	6 months
Estimated design-construction time:	15 months
Estimated commissioning time:	2 months
Estimated total project time:	29 months

Figure 32. Standard Embassy Design: Small. Source: AIA Best Practices, 2007, p. 1


STANDARD EMBASSY DESIGN: MEDIUM*



Estimated construction cost:	more than \$68 million†
Approximate size:	4,300–7,400 gsm
Estimated planning time:	6 months
Estimated design-build acquisition time:	6 months
Estimated design-construction time:	24 months
Estimated commissioning time:	2 months
Estimated total project time:	38 months

Figure 33. Standard Embassy Design: Medium. Source: AIA Best Practices, 2007, p. 1

STANDARD EMBASSY DESIGN: LARGE*



Estimated construction cost:	less than \$88 million†
Approximate size:	greater than 7,400 gsm
Estimated planning time:	6 months
Estimated design-build acquisition time:	6 months
Estimated design-construction time:	28 months
Estimated commissioning time:	2 months
Estimated total project time:	42 months

Figure 34. Standard Embassy Design: Large. Source: AIA Best Practices, 2007, p. 2

The main building and focal point of the compound is called the chancery and is supported by a utility building, warehouse, and service building often containing the commissary (store) selling American goods (see Figure 35). Most recently United States Agency of International Development (USAID) offices are being collocated on the compound and are typically in a detached building due to separate funding sources and schedules. The Marine Service Guard Quarters (MSGQ), a residential facility, is also collocated on the compound to provide security with minimum response time. Occasionally, the Ambassador's residence is located within the compound, but this element hosts many social functions that are more appropriately located off of the embassy compound.

There are typically three controlled access points to the compound; one for pedestrians visiting the consulate, one for vehicular service and deliveries, and one for the main entry which is a combined vehicle and pedestrian entrance for employees and visitors. Typically an outdoor garden area is provided as a waiting area for the consular. Staff and visitor parking are remotely located, outside the established compound perimeter wall or fence. Only official vehicles are permitted within the compound.

The chancery building houses the offices of the State Department including: Executive Office (Ambassador), General Administration, and other federal agencies having presence in the country, Community Liaison, Cafeteria, and Health Unit (see Figure 36). The office of public affairs is typically a

significant resource for the community and includes a large multi-purpose room equipped with video conferencing, WorldNet viewing, and library with US and local periodicals/publications and historical reference materials. One of the most important functions the chancery houses is the consulate, where Americans and locals come to process travel papers including visas and passports. This section has heavy public pedestrian traffic and therefore requires physical separation from the rest of the compound.

4.6.6 What Security Measures Are Required For SED Compounds?

The compound has layers of security beginning with the perimeter wall, which is anti-ram. Inside the anti-ram barrier, or combined into one physical element, is a 2.75 meter high, anti-climb fence or wall. A clear-zone is required inside the fence/wall for visual security and this area has specific lighting requirements. Utility buildings such as warehouses, water treatment facilities, or central heating/cooling plants can be set up to the clear-zone. Buildings that do not require permanent offices and are used intermittently can be set up to 20 meters (60 feet) from the perimeter wall and all office buildings must be outside a 30-meter (90 feet) setback from the perimeter wall. Office buildings require forced entry and ballistic resistant facades and pedestrian access control points for entry. Within the office hardened walls and acoustic partitions separate buildings classified versus unclassified work areas. Controls obscuring direct line of sight are also required for classified areas. Interior building areas are pressurized to contain, isolate, and control the airflow of a potential chemical or biological contamination.




Figure 35. Typical embassy compound site plan, drawing by Zimmer, Gunsul, Frasca, Inc.




Figure 36. Chancery, ground & first floor plans; drawings by Zimmer, Gusul, Frasca, Inc.

4.6.7. On Architectural Policies for Embassy Buildings

This section will briefly conclude the discussion on architectural policies (or lack thereof) for diplomatic-consular headquarters typology, primarily embassy buildings. Effectively, there are no relevant architectural policies for embassy buildings. The hierarchy of findings is presented, noting that all findings led to other pertinent questions and findings regarding architectural policies for embassy typologies in this Thesis. The most important conclusions:

1. Embassy buildings are built comparatively rarely, so there is no requirement for a comprehensive state-based strategy for these buildings, heavily influenced by
2. The complete lack of oversight and input both within the sending country (e.g. status of state-secret, not to be viewed and examined by the general and professional public) and the host country (e.g. public review of the plans, feasibility study, impact study... etc.) due to the privileges awarded by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (abbr. VCDR).

In short, extraterritorial privilege is utilized as a justification for the absence of any type of responsibility, both to the sending country's constituents and the host country's users of public space.

To illustrate: there was no competition or discussion about the design (architectural and urban) of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia in the Japanese professional architecture/urban planning community. Likewise, there is no mechanism for the Serbian professional architecture/urban planning community to review the design of the Japanese embassy in detail (e.g. professional and public hearing/review) and ascertain whether it is appropriate for it to be incorporated within the urban matrix of Belgrade.

This approach is common for host countries with newly planned embassy developments deemed not important enough to be taken into consideration by the sending country (stated point-blank in the U.S.'s Standard Embassy Design). Additionally, it is relevant what kind of power does the sending country wield and/or exert onto the host country (e.g. U.S.'s requests led to the changing of the entire General Urban Plan 2021 of the city of Belgrade, to facilitate the requirements of the U.S. Government and their new embassy development).

The U.S. Standard Embassy Design [SED] is an exception (as in the existence of a policy) BUT:

- Security concerns take precedent and the building (if specially designed) cannot communicate intended values behind high walls and significant setbacks;
- If not deemed important enough, the host country will receive a generic, pre-designed, prefabricated spatial manifestation (SED's design based on the plot size – S, M, L).

Therefore, a connection between embassy typology architecture and its corresponding policies cannot be established, primarily because the lack of additional policies for comparative analysis.

Extremes of open embassy typology (e.g. the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo) are an accidental byproduct of various factors (bilateral relations, lack of safety concerns, freedom of architect and his expression, etc.) and not a rule.

Furthermore, it is postulated that architecture (spatial manifestation) will not (cannot) play a conclusive role of soft power architecture (currently), as the rigid legal framework already defines what and how will be built.

Simply put, architecture (spatial manifestation) does not play a particularly important role in the study of soft power architecture (as observed in the case of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia).

4.7 SPATIAL BRANDING

4.7.1 Branding Urban Identities of Exported Architectural Identities

[...] a network of associations in the consumers' mind based on the visual, verbal, and behavioral expression of a place, which is embodied through the aims, communication, values, and the general culture of the place's stakeholders and the overall place design. (Zenker et al., 2017, p. 5, on place brand)

Spatial branding has been recognized as an indicative feature in the context of this research theoretically divided into two major categories:

1. Spatial branding implemented *prior* to the construction, viewed as a *mechanism* and
2. Spatial branding is either implemented or produced *post*-construction, viewed as a *spatial consequence*.

In the first category, processes of spatial branding are utilized to instill the spaces and adjoining areas with a set of meanings/images/concepts ("preparing the terrain"), in order to achieve smooth implementation and subsequent integration of the new structure into the (foreign) context of urban matrices, accomplishing a pre-determined set of goals. In the second category, spatial branding processes post-construction can either be viewed as separate processes, planned or occurring spontaneously and/or simultaneously, with the two intended meanings/images/concepts not necessarily being equivalent and the output being dissimilar from the primarily intended meaning (if planned). This category is more changeable in the context of time, so it is necessary to continuously monitor and maintain the desired spatial identity by utilizing spatial branding affirmative strategies. The theoretical considerations of these strategies will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.7.3, noting the particularities of the continuous flux of spatial branding for Block 11s, New Belgrade, Serbia, with the actors of Japanese embassy and the Chinese cultural center, as well as the spatial users and other involved parties wrestling over defining the block's spatial identity.

Construction and branding of urban identities for exported architectural typologies is an intricate production of meanings because of the inscription of new, projected values onto the already existing multi-layered network, as well as the continuous generation of consequences these typologies have on the

multi-scale level of cities, as well as the city brand in general. In order to understand such complex interrelations, theoretical review will be presented in the following section.

Although some places embrace and utilize the concept of corporate branding (see: Ashworth & Kavaratzis 2009; Kavaratzis 2009), Muratovski (2012) warns of the risk that will become 'homogeneous, empty communication devices inscribed with certain characteristics regardless of their contextual environment'. This is specifically relevant for the discussed typologies within this project, as there are no mechanisms in place that could limit adverse effects on the city matrix and provide a platform for any input from various groups. In such a state, an approach for research and implementation of spatial branding ought to be reconceptualized.

In this particular context, we can build upon the notion of an 'empty communication device' and add Baudrillard's (1994) concept of hyperreality, as a representation, a sign without an original referent. Baudrillard (1994) believes hyperreality goes further than confusing or blending the 'real' with the symbol which represents it; it involves creating a symbol or set of signifiers which represent something that does not exist. In the instance of exported ideologies and/or identities, it is presumed that similar processes take place: desired cultural and spatial patterns are exported with a specific set of goals. These goals supersede any other, often conflicting realities, as the need for a quick return of investment is usually high. This is why place branding will often be unsuccessful if such structures of power and their spatial manifestations are introduced. Moreover, being aware of such conditions, various stakeholders can take their stand, preventing at least some of the expected adverse effects.

Formation of policies aimed at spatial branding of exported architectures largely hinged on the aspect of "power", added to the fundamentals of architectural propaganda that has now taken the form of urban branding (Muratovski, 2012). These *powers* link the narrative with the place (Jensen, 2007) and are described in plural, as it is presumed that different stakeholders have at least some modicum of executive power.

Muratovski (2012) describes place branding as a 'complex, socio-political construct composed of a multi-contextual understanding in spatial and temporal dimensions, multi-leveled interaction among actors and by a legal, political and aesthetic process'. Interaction is the keyword if one is to achieve successful place branding: optimal spatial brands ought to be co-created. The idea of brand co-creation has been previously researched (e.g. Hatch & Schultz, 2010), underlining collaborative processes involving a

multitude of actors who encounter and appropriate said brands. Similarly, Ind and Bjerke (2007) discussed the importance of internal audiences and highlight the dialogue between stakeholders.

If place promotion can be historically aligned with local governance (Ashworth, 2006), then the same principle applies to the promotion of exported ideologies manifested in architectural form. Exported typologies were strategically utilized to communicate and project-specific messages, be it of desired cultural patterns and/or ideologies. These typologies can have both affirmative and adverse effects on city development and will be explored in more detail in the following sections.

For soft power architecture branding and exported typologies aimed at the communication of certain images/messages it is important to consider the political dimension of (newly planned) places (e.g. Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2014). Spatial politics, as an extension of official policies between actors, will translate into the branding processes and spatial outcomes. By realizing the complexity of this interplay, as well as the necessity to monitor its subsequent processes, one can make informed decisions and research the issue in-depth.

Exported architectural typologies, more specifically state-sponsored exported architectural typologies will almost certainly be political in nature: they will be used as communicative tools for the ‘phenomenon of architectural communication’ as postulated by Venturi et al. (1977). Since the entirety of the process becomes highly acontextual and commercial in nature, one can discuss what Venturi referred to as the power of ‘commercial persuasion’ (Horowitz, 2012). Even if such notions were to be challenged by the host countries, legal mechanisms limit their involvement and input, giving the sending country privileges, under the VCDR. However, if the various stakeholders of the host countries are strong, there is room for negotiation, even if extraterritorial privileges are in place. One such example was found in the previously noted construction process of the American embassy in the 1950s in The Hague, Netherlands (Loeffler, 2011, p. 206) when the city officials turned down the proposed plans, on the account of the building's lack of integration into the city matrix.

Although the discussion has slowly shifted toward a more strategic-based approach to place branding (Braun, 2008), it has not yet made its way into the discussion for soft power architecture. The premise is simple: extraterritoriality and international law i.e. the VCDR give the sending state immunity to any type of hands-on control; conflicting ideologies; assuring and exhorting one’s vision at the expense of urban continuity and developmental potential; power and influence that sending countries wield. Adding upon

the concept of exported ideologies and their processes, place branding will undoubtedly gain complexity, as an interdisciplinary mode of identity construction and confirmation (Hankinson, 2010).

The main presupposition is that the place identity should be viewed as a process of identity construction, rather than a specific outcome of the said process (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). Similarly, place identity is a process of dialogue between stakeholders (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). In the case of soft power architecture identity branding, this hypothetical dialogue should be twofold:

1. Dialogue between stakeholders within the sending country, determining the best way to develop place identity and place brand in the host country. Every manifestation of SPA for different host countries must be approached individually.
2. Negotiation between stakeholder of the sending and receiving countries: although legally (as in the VCDR) and often politically, the sending country is not obligated to discuss any particularities of place-making process with the host country, both countries ought to come together, if for nothing else, then for the benefits and backlash both can suffer, if these issues are not addressed properly.

How to approach these challenges and how to successfully brand soft power architecture? For Kavaratzis (2009) place branding processes commence with formulating a vision for the place, which ought to be discussed with groups responsible for branding, the local population, and all potential partners. Consequently formulated visions ought to be communicated both within the sending country, before the implementation of stratagems for exported architectural typologies and the messages they ought to convey within the sending country. When pondering these processes, a preliminary consultation/communication with other stakeholders of the host country is desirable, as to ensure the synchronization of visions and/or goals or to become aware of the future challenges that will become apparent if a certain strategy is pursued. Educating different actors of the host country on the severity of effects external spatial branding can have on the city's developmental strategies and immediate neighborhoods is the first step in empowering various professionals and setting more stringent standards if the space-making visions clash.

4.7.2 Branding Soft Power Architecture: A Snapshot Analogy

It is impossible to show the whole of it, even in a fleeting moment but it is possible to show fragments of its continuous construction. It is also possible to make some simplifications, rendering the picture more comprehensible. Yet, this picture is made even more complex by setting it in motion: these processes do not take their turns in time or place but happen simultaneously, in connection, possibly, within the same organizational practice. Czarniawska (2002: 15)

If one accepts the proposition that the process of place branding for soft power architecture is difficult to pinpoint and measure, as place brands are networked and dynamic (Bellini & Pasquinelli, 2016), then any conducted observational research gives only a *snapshot* of the current interplay of produced spatial characteristics. It is necessary to subsequently examine and monitor changes, to develop pattern recognition and make amendments to any possible future spatial branding policies.

Moreover, constant management and mapping are a must, as places are composed of different types of users, audiences, dwellers, and stakeholders (Lichrou et al, 2008). In this sense, as micro and macro shifts on a multitude of levels are constantly ongoing, the emphasis on the importance of management processes is reaffirmed.

Rosenbaum-Elliott et al. (2018) state that brands in general 'exist in the mind of the market and so brand management is the management of perceptions'. Consequently, policymakers and stakeholders ought to be aware of other activities that form the brand. Exemplified in different soft power actions, these goings-on can play a crucial role in facilitating and making it possible to implement a certain spatial vision or at the very least, give a leg-up during negotiations. Such was the 'soft power credit' accumulated by Japan in Serbia, through various activities, that gave it a more than favorable starting position.

A similar claim of the importance of diversified actions and object, often directly linked to the creation of the desired (spatial) brand, was articulated by Kavaratzis (2004), while other actions may not be directly aimed at previously mentioned goals, but will still have a significant impact on desired spatial brands. This can be said for Japan's grassroots involvement in Serbia and also accounts for the received backlash when the public's expectations did not match with spatial realities.

While researching spatial branding for soft power architecture, one should be aware of several components and activities of place brands, to comprehend the agents, relationships, and interactions (Hanna & Rowley, 2011). This will be a considerable undertaking, especially for exported spatial projections, but it is the only way to understand the forces, various sub-processes, and interlinks that governs them. In a similar vein Kalandides (2011) argues that the 'place identity is a process, never immobile or fixed'.

Interaction, mutual influence, and feedback are one of the questions highlighted in the research by Lucarelli and Berg (2011), their inquiry being how brands and space mutually shape each other. To reiterate, spatial branding processes and management for exported identities and brands are by default in a place of constant flux. Therefore, stakeholders and other various actors ought to be aware of these facts while formulating strategies and making future amendments to facilitate the foreseeable shifts and changes. Furthermore, future researchers ought to be aware that their ability will most likely be limited to capturing and theorizing about the current state of being, with future projections and hypotheses being in the speculative realm. It is possibly naive to think that one, single (architectural) identity can be distilled and exported or as Mayes (2008) noted: 'the key, interlinked assumptions underpinning this practice [spatial branding] are that there is a single core identity that can be identified, portrayed, supported, reflected and that this identity pre-exists the place branding of a given place'.

For Govers and Go (2009) the crucial aspect found in place branding is 'the link between identity, experience and image'. Adding to this statement, for research precision, correct phrasing ought to be in *plural* i.e. 'the link between projected identities, experiences and desired images'. This is closely related to the notion of 'conceived, perceived and lived' space, as defined by Lefebvre (2009). Noting that previously rephrased definition utilizes plural forms (identities, experiences, images), one must be aware of the multiplication and the plurality of exported identities (internal vs. external).

If Proshansky et al. (1983) have defined place identity as a substructure of self-identity, consisting of cognitions about the physical world, this claim gains complexity for examined typologies. Inscription of new, oftentimes conflicting identities will inadvertently influence said place identity and by extension self-identities and identification. To clarify: this is a two-way process, at least for soft power architecture. Main presumption of such typology is the desire to achieve a set of goals utilizing affirmative spatial projections. To do so, the creators and stakeholders must be sensitive to the environment they are creating; otherwise, the effects will be subpar. Furthermore, it is no longer feasible to exert one's vision

but to also carefully manage new developments after completion. Being sensitive to the changing circumstances, taking into account the dynamic nature of places and place identities, as previously researched (e.g. Creswell & Hoskins, 2008; Kalandides 2011; Knez, 2005) is of paramount importance.

One of the more salient points dealing with place identity, defined by Kalandides (2011) is recognized as significant for this research: *institutions* (laws, relations, organizations, etc.) and *relations* (of power, class, production, etc.). For this particular research, institutions are significant as all processes of research typologies are rigidly institutionalized and produced in a multi-level relation of power. Kalandides (2011) comments that place identities are processes rather than outcomes; indeed, this is also true for soft power architecture, bearing in mind these processes are in a continuous interactional loop. This consideration is in line with Gustafson's (2001) claim that places are 'continually produced and reproduced in interaction with their surroundings'.

For Kavaratzis and Hatch (2003) 'the place brand and place identity are formed through a complex system of interactions between the individual and the collective, between the physical and the non-physical, between the functional and the emotional, between the internal and the external, and between the organized and the random'. Hatch and Schultz (2009) define identity as an interaction of 'internal' and 'external' views where 'culture is the context of internal definitions of identity' and 'image is the site of external definitions of identity' so subsequently how these two influence each other is the process of identity. Commenting upon the definition of 'image': there is a strong tendency to project an image that would be perceived as beneficial, especially so for soft power architecture. There is a trend of treating culture as a set of commodities, as defined by Byrne (2001). Desirable cultural patterns, representations and images are packaged and exported with the purpose of engaging audiences and target groups. One of the main specificities of the urban spatial branding of soft power architecture is that it will reach unintended consumers or consumers-by-default.

Academic research has drawn importance to the formation of cities in people's minds through the 'processing of perception and images' (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2009). Subsequently, cities can be considered to be a product, a multi-layered accumulation of identities, ideologies, architectures, and processes. If the city is a product, it will, by extension, have consumers and corresponding targeted strategies aimed at maximizing the gains of various stakeholders. These strategies can be successfully examined through the lens of place branding.

If the city takes its form in people's minds, the same technique ought to be employed for exported architecture programs. Presupposing that the general populace has a basic grasp on embassy buildings' influence on cities (e.g. increased security concerns, spatial sequestration, etc.) it is prudent to take those impressions into account when designing and implementing said typology. However, even if such plans exist, it will be challenging to fully implement them, as shown in the example of the construction process of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade and subsequent spatial branding processes of Block 11a.

Whether the intention to communicate certain values and ideals is there or not, the final product, as it were, will undoubtedly transmit certain messages, inevitably shifting the existing urban patterns. Being aware of such outcomes, architects, designers, urban planners and policymakers on either side should be cautious of the magnitude of potential effect, especially when dealing with soft power architecture. This typology uniquely has its own set of rules and privileges (e.g. extraterritoriality) for all its developmental stages (conceptual, implementation and management). Ultimately, compromises must be made on both sides, presupposing that the intention of exported typologies is that of cooperation. In these allowances, strategies, loopholes and interdisciplinary cooperation lies the true potential of these typologies, as the communication process extends not only to the spatial users that will experience the built environment, but also the professional involved in the creation of said spaces.

The branding process for soft power architecture ought to be both internal and external (architecture and urban scales) as brand specialists that operate within this field [urban branding] need to look into the architecture and urban design literature for resources on the construction of urban identities (Muratovski, 2012). An important note that ought to be raised is that urban branding will most probably go hand in hand with the branding/construction/realization processes. These aspects form an integrative part of policies and their implementation have standalone values to be observed.

The main argument being that the urban identity can be viewed as the “unique selling proposition/point”, as defined by Muratovski (2012): this observation can provide backing of the hypothesis that the processes of urban identity construction and implementation are exceedingly relevant. If one were to ask what are the distinctive, identifiable differences of soft power architecture, apart from the end product being architecturally, culturally and contextually sensitive, true value can also be found in the *processes* enabling previously mentioned qualities. If the process is established as a characteristic of exported architectures, apart from being a communicative tool, it should be also communicated and promoted as a value and/or brand of a particular development.

When it comes to exported architectural typologies, lack of orientation, purpose, strategies and a master plan of a sending state will always be obvious within the surrounding public space. The produced spatial effect will be a clear indicator of any inconsistencies or lacking direction. Even if one were to oppose the misuse of power, extraterritorial privileges and sequestration of the public space, the question would be – how? The issue of jurisdictions (plural) then becomes prevalent, as different institutions and levels of authority will frequently admonish their influence in pursuit of other short- and long-term goals. True resolution of any outstanding issues will happen through dialogue between various actors, but more importantly, with foresight during the planning and implementation stages of these typologies.

Finally, Kavaratzis and Hatch (2003) make an insightful observation:

As Aitken and Campelo (2011) discuss, ‘interacting with the culture and the environment, a brand engages in an expanded ‘multilogue’ with a variety of stakeholders’. Therefore, stakeholders become the most important element of place branding. This reinforces the idea of Houghton and Stevens (2010) about the importance of stakeholders and resonates to a great extent with the call of Hanna and Rowley (2011) for a better understanding of stakeholders’ engagement in place branding. (p. 82)

It is argued that the policymakers and stakeholders are not using the full scope of place-based strategies that draw on the current understandings of the “imaginary” and “cultural” narratives (Muratovski, 2012). Implementation of exported architectural communicative forms and their subsequent spatial branding is a dialogue: professionals from both sides will cooperate to achieve their own goals. In this sense, great responsibility lies in the hand of the receiving (host) country, as it will, at least partially, manage the spatial branding processes. The process of the inscription of ideological and communicative values of the sending state into the pre-established urban context of the receiving state is taxing. Therefore, both parties ought to be prepared for open negotiations and compromise, especially when discussing actors (countries’ stakeholders) are on a similar developmental level. All of this is under the assumption that the original architectural intent will be benevolent, to establish and foster mutual understanding and cooperation between nations, providing generally favorable spatial effects for most groups.

4.7.3 Spatial Branding Case Study: Block 11a, New Belgrade, Serbia

4.7.3.1 Setting the stage: Japan's brand power in Serbia

The date promoted as the initial diplomatic correspondence between the two countries is 1882, between then Emperor Meiji and the Serbian King Milan Obrenović I³⁰. Serbian embassy in Japan lists 1952 as the year of re-establishment of bilateral relations³². The earliest document listed as by the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the one from 1957 (November 14, 1957), 'Agreement (exchange of notes) on elevating diplomatic representative offices to the rank of embassies with Japan'³³. Data from the Japanese embassy in the Republic of Serbia notes May 20, 1997 as the date of establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan does not list the year of establishment of bilateral relations, only basic data³⁴.

Still, the perception of Japan in Serbia is overwhelmingly positive: many soft power initiatives, grassroots projects, donations, cultural exchange, and scholarship programs have helped to maintain this pristine image. One of the most notable donations of Japan were 93 buses for Belgrade's public transportation system in 2003, fondly dubbed 'the Japanese' by Belgradians, with their recognizable sticker 'Donation from the people of Japan'. As an active donator and creditor, since 1999, the Government of Japan has pledged over 508 million Euros in total to the various project in Serbia. It has been very involved in

³⁰ *Bilateralni odnosi sa stranim državama* [Bilateral Relations with Foreign States]. (2018, November 28). <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-politika/bilateralni-odnosi/117-bilateralni-odnosi/11400-japan?lang=lat>

³¹ *Ambasada Republike Srbije u Japanu*. (n.d.). Embassy of the Republic of Serbia in Japan. <http://www.tokyo.mfa.gov.rs/lat/ambasadortext.php?subaction=showfull&id=1364521570&ucat=116&template=DefaultLat&>

³² *Bilateral Relations*. (n.d.). Embassy of the Republic of Serbia [in Japan]. <http://www.serbianembassy.jp/ENGLISH/BilateralRelations.html>

³³ *Međunarodni bilateralni ugovori* [International Bilateral Contracts] (n.d.). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/images/stories/bilateral_ugovori/japan.pdf

³⁴ *Japan-Serbia Relations (Basic Data)*. (n.d.). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/serbia/data.html>

ongoing Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP) project³⁵, funding 224 projects (89 for healthcare, 80 for education, 32 for environmental protection, for 23 social developments), totalling 14 million Euros since 1999³⁶. The Embassy of Japan has also collaborated with the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade, most notably when, in February 2014, the Faculty's library received a sizable donation of books on Japan³⁷. Furthermore, after completion of the new embassy headquarters, it houses Japanese cultural initiatives, hosting movie projections, oratory competitions, visits from kindergarteners and elementary school children, MEXT scholar's alumni yearly gathering and many other activities.

4.7.3.2 Embassy Construction: Semi-transparent process

In recent years, Japan has started to expand its foreign policy presence in the form of constructing new diplomatic-consular headquarters. For example, during fiscal 2015, then Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Finance Minister Taro Aso had agreed to open six new embassies and two consulates under the fiscal 2015 budget. The main motivation found in the statement: "[...] Japan is trying to enhance its diplomatic influence and better communicate its views overseas...in the year [2015] that marks 70 years since the end of World War II".³⁸ It is important to note that the Foreign Ministry [of Japan] originally requested nine new embassies and six new consulates.

Be it out of a desire to show respect to its host country of Serbia, to increase its already impressive soft power credit or due to long-term geopolitical strategy, Japan elected to implement a transparent

³⁵ *Donacije [Donations]*. (n.d.). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.yu.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_sr/donacije.html

³⁶ *Japanska podrška institutu za zdravstvenu zaštitu majke i deteta Srbije "dr Vukan Čupić"* [Japanese aid to the Institute for Healthcare of Mother and Child of Serbia "dr dr Vukan Čupić"], (n.d.). <https://www.yu.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000484744.pdf>

³⁷ Faculty of Architecture Website Editor. (2014, February 21). *Donacija Ambasade Japana studentima arhitekture [Donation of the Embassy of Japan to the students of architecture]*. Univerzitet u Beogradu - Arhitektonski Fakultet [University of Belgrade - the Faculty of Architecture]. <http://www.arh.bg.ac.rs/2014/02/21/donacija-ambasade-japana-studentima-arhitekture/?pismo=lat>

³⁸ Kyodo News. (2015, January 12). *Kishida wins funding for six new embassies, two new consulates*. The Japan Times. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/12/national/politics-diplomacy/ministers-give-ok-six-new-embassies-two-consulates-open/#.XPTwWogzZPY>

construction procedure for its new diplomatic headquarters/embassy, located in Block 11a of New Belgrade. The embassy plot was acquired by the Japanese government in the 1990s, but owing to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the construction was postponed indefinitely. The entirety of Block 11a was, in its early, conceptual stages, designed to house various diplomatic missions and their corresponding residences (Blagojević, 2007). Due to speculative urbanism and land-use machinations, this particular place lost its original purpose, except for the Chinese embassy, until it was damaged and abandoned during NATO intervention in FR Yugoslavia in 1999.

Ultimately, the new embassy building was completed and moved into during March 2015. Interestingly, the response from the general public was negative, having predominantly commented on the aesthetic characteristics of the building (high perimeter fence, absence of openings, lacking in *Japan-ness*), linking these failings with feelings and/or relationship that the Japanese have in lieu of their perception of Serbia and its people.

An example of a (un)intentional soft power practice during the construction of the new Japanese embassy was the inclusion of architecture students in painting large-scale murals on the site's perimeter fence. Painting workshop was a two-day initiative in June 2013, the brief being to depict Japan-associated imagery. A competition followed, awarding prizes and books about Japan. This was an overwhelmingly affirmative activity, which can serve as an example of the interconnection of different groups and increasing a country's soft power. This action had direct consequences, giving new spatial identity to the site and its neighborhoods. Normally, perimeter fences are left blank or are rented for commercial purposes.



Figure 37. Painted motifs on the Japanese embassy construction fence ©Beobuild

An interesting by-product of successfully implemented soft power architecture can be perceived in *spatial branding*. Comparable to nation branding when done correctly, soft power architecture can bring an added layer of spatial identities to the placed environments. Previously known for its Chinese embassy, the urban identity of New Belgrade's Block 11a has slowly changed to that of the Japanese embassy. It is, however, necessary to highlight that new place identification is still without any connotation: whether it will develop into positive or negative perception, subsequently influencing spatial (and bilateral) relations, remains yet to be seen. Interestingly, these processes can be, to an extent, influenced by well thought-out cultural relation policies. It is important to note that new soft power architectures are a reflection of its time, namely the complex geopolitical situation and international relations. Serbia's geographical location makes it a gateway to Western Europe for China's New Silk Road initiative³⁹, so new [architectural] developments can be viewed as calculated. Moreover, recent high-ranking visits, possibly corroborate this claim, as Serbia has received delegations including the President of the PRC, Mr. Xi Jinping (June 2016),

³⁹<https://www.ft.com/content/003bad14-f52f-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608>

the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Shinzo Abe (January 2018) and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Taro Kono (August 2019).

4.7.3.3 Ongoing shifts of the spatial brand of Block 11a

As place brands are networked and dynamic (Bellini & Pasquinelli, 2017), the transformation of Block 11a is still ongoing. Several snapshots of attempted (and disordered) spatial branding, happening and interacting simultaneously with the Japanese development, will be presented: from the adjacent and previously destroyed Chinese embassy, its hibernated state as *terra nullius*, and rebirth as the largest Chinese cultural centre in the Balkans, with subsequent bouts of spatial sequestration. As previously noted, New Belgrade's development was based on modernist manifestos and concepts (Blagojević, 2007). However, this developmental intention changes significantly in the latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s, a time of political transition in Serbia. Block 11a was, in its early, conceptual stages, designed to house various diplomatic missions and their corresponding residences (Blagojević, 2007). Due to speculative urbanism and land-use machinations, this particular place lost its original purpose, except for the Chinese embassy. After sustaining significant damage during the NATO campaign in 1999, the building was gutted but remained standing.

During 2006, the ruin still stood intact, in a more than attractive location - in the center of New Belgrade. Revolted, the residents of the surrounding buildings claim that the former Chinese embassy has become a gathering place for drug addicts and "suspicious types", as well as bypassing this place at night. After the exchange with the Chinese, the building became the property of the Republic of Serbia. It is currently under the jurisdiction of the Republic Directorate for Property, which gave it for use to the Belgrade Directorate for City Construction Land. In June 2004, when an unexploded plane bomb was removed, the then director of the Directorate, Mr. Siniša Nikolić, announced the sale of this space, adding that there were buyers interested in opening a business center there. Two years since then, nothing of what was announced has been achieved. Some time ago, the Directorate for City Construction Land asked the owner, the Republic Directorate for Property, for consent for the sale by public tender. This request was being considered, the Property Directorate says that a decision will be made in a timely manner and that a

public auction will be held, at which not only the price but also the type and purpose of the future facility will be considered and finally resolved⁴⁰.



Figure 38. Block 11a: Bird's eye view of the damaged Chinese embassy and the Japanese embassy plot, the mid-2000s. Bing maps, ©Microsoft

Subsequently, the building was razed, leaving terra nullius in its wake; there were no indicators of extraterritoriality (China's ownership), except a commemorative plaque noting the loss of Chinese lives in the bombing. Somewhat morosely, a children's playground was built in the middle of the plot (see: Figure 39). One of the reasons may be that the Block 11a became a place of high-end development, boasting some of the most expensive apartments in Belgrade, occupied by celebrities, sportspeople and politicians.

⁴⁰ Gligorijević, J. (2006, November 9). *Kineska ambasada: Završni radovi* [The Chinese Embassy: Finishing works]. Vreme Magazine. <https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=470725&print=yes>



Figure 39. Commemorative plaque, children’s playground and the Japanese embassy, image capture: May 2015, Google Maps⁴¹, ©2019 Google

On the other hand (and right across the street), the plot intended for the new Japanese embassy was fenced and closed off. Almost simultaneous to the start of its construction, there was news that the Chinese plan to build a cultural centre at the former location of their embassy. During construction of the Japanese embassy, Chinese diplomats and Belgrade's city officials were in negotiations, resulting in the appropriation of public space, signifying Serbia governing echelon’s goodwill to foster the new Chinese development.

This piece of land became the “Square of Chinese-Serbian friendship” with the newly erected statue of Confucius. Conversely, the place adjacent to the new Japanese embassy was designed for a Japanese-style garden and several cherry trees were planted, with more planned. That space was designated as a “Square of Japanese-Serbian friendship”.

⁴¹<https://www.google.co.jp/maps/@44.8249772,20.4190847,3a,64.2y,300.88h,92.64t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1scxDVe gaXrNZXv5ZnGfRntw!2e0!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en&authuser=0>




Figure 40. Block 11a and its new building developments: 1. Embassy of Japan; 2. Chinese cultural center (under construction), previously the site of the Chinese embassy; 3. Square of Chinese-Serbian friendship; 4. Mix-used, high-end residential building; 5. Square of Japanese-Serbian friendship and Japanese garden (planned); 6. Falkensteiner hotel

Block 11a thusly became a place where neighboring spaces were appropriated, facilitated by the Belgrade city officials. It is very important to note, however, that during and after the completion of the new Japanese embassy, there were no special requirements vis-à-vis security concerns and disruption of established urban patterns and movements. This did not insulate the Japanese development from the backlash it received, due to the general publics' expectations.

One of the issues that added to unrealistic expectations, which could have been managed, was the lack of any imagery of the appearance of the completed building. Normally (and regulated by the Serbian Law on Planning and Construction, Article 149), before the start of construction, the investor is obligated to provide information about the new building on the construction board. In this instance, claiming intellectual copyright properties of the 3D visualization company, there were no officially circulated

images of the final embassy building's appearance. Apart from one frontal façade rendering (Figure 41), there were no graphic representations, adding to the mystery and expectations.



Figure 41. The only available graphic representation of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade during its construction (May 2013 – March 2015) ©Arhi.pro⁴²



Figure 42. Rendering of the new Chinese cultural center. ©Beobuild

⁴²<https://www.arhipro.com/en/references/design/embassy-of-japan>

After the completion of the Japanese embassy, the new Chinese cultural centre started its construction: towering over the Japanese outpost, boasting its importance and planned multipurpose use⁴³. Its building was heavily publicized, followed by a multitude of eye-catching 3D renderings (compare Figures 41 and 42), in contrast to the Japanese development. This is partly because of China's increased presence in Serbia in recent years. At the time of writing this segment (October 2020), the building was still under construction.

Last but not least, Belgrade's city officials added the final touches to the spatial branding kerfuffle: renaming the surrounding street to placate its Chinese occupants. A part of the street previously named Cherry Blossom Street (Serbian: ulica Trešnjiog cveta) was now renamed to Confucius' Street (Serbian: ulica Konfučijeva). Interestingly, by insight into the cadastre data provided by the Republic Geodetic Authority (Serbian: Republički geodetski zavod), the new street name is not to be found in the database as of October 2020. This signifies that, more than anything, the whole process of street renaming was a publicity stunt, making sure that the current government remains in close relations with the Chinese officials, its (proclaimed) largest trading partner.

Both Japanese and Chinese developments are now (imaginarily) flanked with both streets, questioning which spatial brand will claim supremacy in the spatial branding battle of Block 11a?

⁴³ *The Chinese Cultural Center is being built in Belgrade.* (2017, August 29). Belgrade Beat. <https://belgrade-beat.com/magazine/2017/08/the-chinese-cultural-center-is-being-built-in-belgrade>



Figure 43. View onto the plots of the Chinese cultural center and the Japanese embassy. ©Beobuild




Figure 44. Change in the streetscape of Block 11a: green – newly renamed Confucius' Street, red – Cherry Blossom Street. Previously all Cherry Blossom Street.

This example goes to show that host countries, if left without any master plan or strategy for urban development and/or spatial branding, will cater to the needs of other, more powerful stakeholders, at the expense of urban matrix continuity. This is precisely why the host country's professionals ought to be aware of such abuse of power and form a strategy on how to deal with present challenges. Sending countries must also be aware of such realities, especially for the instances of unstable bilateral relations. Cities of host countries must not become a playground or a battlefield for anecdotal muscle flexing or showing one's political and economic supremacy.

An instance of possible exertion of the political influence of the sending country was apparent in 2007 when Belgrade's General Urban Plan [GUP 2021] was amended to fit the requirements of the new U.S. embassy development. Main alterations were found in the land use designation, as well as the security considerations. The legal remedy of this modification was found in the fact that the updates and amendments of the GUP can be done in phases. Other particularities were not disclosed in the given document (“Official Gazette of the City of Belgrade” Year LI, number 34, dated October 17, 2007⁴⁴).

Additionally, the significance of various stakeholders in equally addressed for the location where spatial branding is taking place: it is of great importance to acknowledge the complexities of the place as a brand, including, but not limited to the lack of control over the branded entity and the conflicting interests of the stakeholder groups (Zenker & Braun, 2010). The latter is probably one of the most outstanding issues when dealing with the branding of exported architectures: conflicting realities and goals of various stakeholders. As underlined in previous research (e.g. Houghton & Stevens, 2010), stakeholders, their processes and interactions are of great significance for place branding. However, in the case of negotiations between different parties for soft power architecture, some will have an upper hand. The sending state will often have the backing of international law and political clout, which can be (ab)used if the respective stakeholders' visions do not align.

⁴⁴ Available at: <http://sllistbeograd.rs/pdf/2007/34-2007.pdf#view=Fit&page=1> [in Serbian]



Figure 45. Chinese public diplomacy on Twitter; a sneak peek into the new Chinese cultural center, as reported by H.E. Ms. Chen Bo, the current (October 2020) Ambassador of PRC to the Republic of Serbia: “The Chinese Cultural Center is nearing its completion. It has a library, a classroom for Chinese language, martial arts and kitchen, also a 200-seat hall where concerts can be organized etc. Let me show you some images and we wait until for our center to be finally open”⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ Available at:
https://twitter.com/AmbChenBo/status/1290332485834989568?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1290332485834989568%7Ctwgr%5Eshare_3%2Ccontainerclick_1&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gradnja.rs%2Ffilipovic-znacaj-ambasada-kao-soft-power-arhitekture%2F

5. SPATIAL CONSEQUENCES

5.1 Introduction

[...] control is a discipline handed down from power institutions, legal provisions or even social values. Control is an outside action that restricts our behavior and reduces our feelings about freedom. An authoritative institution may forbid behavior that has a negative effect on an individual, other users, the environment or its own benefit. While some controls imposed on public spaces seem reasonably balanced, some prevent balance altogether. (Zhao & Siu, 2014, p. 609)

This section will develop a theoretical approach to examine the introduction of a "disruptive element" within a spatial matrix and how the notion of an ontological pair "freedom and control" influences such a viewpoint. Moreover, the theoretical term of "affordances" in public space and its functioning, as an explanation of the rigidity and the inability of the external factors to spontaneously adapt, due to the continuous control of any deviation from the prescribed parameters of control.

Firstly, it is necessary to elaborate upon the term "disruptive element", explain and provide examples for such nomenclature. In order to define this term, for the examined diplomatic-consular architectural typologies, must be viewed in pair with "affordances". The reasoning behind such a decision is based upon the existence of awarded spatial privileges i.e. affordances for this typology. These concessions are primarily codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, giving the diplomatic mission extraterritorial status and ensuring the inviolability of the mission. Diplomatic privileges almost certainly cause disturbances in the pre-established context and functioning of urban matrices in host cities. The main difference between this particular typology and others with similarly awarded privileges is the improbability of said affordances being altered to ensure the undisturbed resumption of activities for various groups in the public space.

Therefore, the "disruptive element" naming is apt: once placed into the urban context of host cities, diplomatic-consular architectural typologies will not allow for any further modification in activities if said alterations are not in the service of providing additional (spatial) gains for this typology. Likewise, the loss of freedom in the public space may not always have a purely spatial dimension; other, more subtle cues of the modified usage of public space may be found in the e.g. photography ban in the vicinity of the

building. Such actions may not always have a completely legal basis (as discussed in the Case study section, Chapters 5.3.2 and 5.3.3). In short, the nature of the introduction of disruptive elements (in this case an embassy building) into the urban structure will result in affordances that will hinder any presumed interpretative stratagems from the users of the public space, aiming for either reversion to the previous modes of operation in said space or modified versions of necessary activities, adjusted to the requirements of the introduced element.

However, the question of the rigidity of affordances for the examined typology is largely dependent on the attitudes of the sending state, as well as the strength of local and professional communities in the host cities. For example, additional affordances were not requested by the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, resulting in largely undisturbed modes of functioning in the public space. Similarly, the Japanese embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam (see Figure 46) has not disturbed the public space usage, even though the observed activity and its operational methods are the most distinctive of all goings-on in the public space presented in this research.

5.1.1. Freedom and control in public space

[...] freedom and control are diverse concepts but they are also dependent on each other.
Tannenbaum (1962)

Ensuring egalitarian⁴⁶ use of public space for various actors and activities requires a delicate balance of *freedom* and *control* (viewed as an ontological pair in this context) for said space. Cambridge dictionary (2020) defines the term *freedom* as “the condition or right of being able or allowed to do, say, think, etc. whatever you want to, without being controlled or limited⁴⁷” whereas *control* is defined as “the act of controlling something or someone, or the power to do this⁴⁸”. Merriam-Webster dictionary (2020) adds

⁴⁶ Defined as the idea that people are equally important and should have the same rights and opportunities (Cambridge dictionary, 2020)

⁴⁷ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/freedom>

⁴⁸ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/control>

further distinction to the term control: “to exercise restraining or directing influence over: Regulate.”⁴⁹ When added to the considerations that the public space has correlative influence on our everyday activities (see: Carr 2010, Lynch, 1990.) the notion of balance of freedom and control in the public space, as well as the potential elements that may disrupt this delicate balance, should be an important consideration of scholastic research. Similarly, definitions of *freedom* are always connected with *control* and *liberty* (Lynch & Carr, 1990; Siu, 2011). Carmona et al. (2008) state that, regardless of the function or location of the space, public access is always unrestricted.

Among other typologies deemed high-risk (in the sense of disruption of the continuity of urban tissue) embassy buildings and diplomatic-consular outposts will, by default, have a profound effect on the processes and goings-on in the public realm, with tangible spatial consequences (for discussion on methodology to note and measure spatial consequences see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the produced effects can have long-lasting and mutable manifestations through time as well as various developmental stages, dependent on the contextual circumstances of the city development. Moreover, the examined typologies themselves can dictate and influence the (un)changing nature of urban matrix development, especially for its vicinity, due to extraterritorial privileges. These affordances provide the sending state with the power to be indifferent to urban development strategies of the host state: 1. If the host state's professional community is under coercion (foreign or domestic); 2. If the sending state does not have a clearly formulated strategy on spatial production of exported architectural typologies utilized for ideological reproduction and 3. If the sending state abuses its privileges and/or exerts pressure onto the host state, utilizing (most often) its political power as leverage in order to achieve its set of goals.

The *time component* in this research is heavily featured and repeatedly underlined as one of the key factors on formulating a long-term and flexible strategy (for sending and host countries alike) when dealing with the planning, implementation and management of these typologies. Both sides and their subsequent interdisciplinary network of professionals must remain vigilant throughout the management stage of the building's lifecycle, noting and correcting implemented policies (e.g. city development, public space usage, public diplomacy, etc.) if need there be.

⁴⁹ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/control>

Furthermore, urban development decisions made prior to an embassy building typology construction ought to be placed under scrutiny, ideally free of any external coercion or political influence from the structures of power (for discussion on power structures see Chapter 3.2.5), either domestic (the host state) or foreign (the sending state). The great emphasis therefore must be put on architecture and urban planning professional, as awareness must be raised about the notion that certain spatial decision can have detrimental effects on the neighboring areas and moreover, produce a ripple effect that damages the city tissue, its urban matrices and functions, hindering the planned city development schemes. The expected developmental *carte blanche* for the examined typologies, in an ideal case, must be rescinded.

To put it in overly simplified terms, if the promoted vision for a new embassy building clashes with one's long-term strategy for city development or if doesn't fit within the context of urban tissue, one should be able to say *no* to a proposal. One demand must remain constant, regardless of the situation in the inevitable architectural and political power struggle: professional from various disciplines (e.g. architecture, urban planning, public policy, international relations, public diplomacy, etc.) from both sides ought to come together, coordinate and draft a strategy to approach these issues. Conversely, if such feat is unlikely, professional from the host state (as it is presumed it will be the injured party) should be aware of the challenges the "no-strategy" approach will bring and develop necessary contingencies and stratagems to contain and/or minimize the projected adverse spatial effects.

One of the necessary questions, when dealing with issues of freedom and control in public spaces is: What are the types of behavior that will be deemed (in)appropriate in public space after the introduction of an element that will inherently change the perception of (un)desirable spatial activities and functions? In this particular project, embassy buildings are examined as imported factors that facilitate the change of types of activities in the public space deemed appropriate within the vicinity of the new buildings. The radius for the reach of an altered perception of certain activities depends on multiple factors, which is why the wider context of new diplomatic-consular typology development must be examined. The one factor that will be universally affected is public access: Carmona et al. (2008) note that, no matter the function and the location of the space, public access is always unrestricted. With embassy typology, however, calling upon security concerns, be it legitimate or not, public access will be restricted and will inherently lead to the loss of freedom of various actors in the public space.

Several scholars (see: Cox, 2012; Herbert & Thomas, 1997) underline the importance of freedom in the public space; without freedom, space cannot be called public space, as it has no content. Consequently,

the main question is whether the spaces in the vicinity of embassy buildings can be called public space? There are no clear-cut answers; this issue will very much depend on multiple factors, such as the requirements of the sending state, laws, regulations and the accommodating nature of the host state, strength of various actors, both professional and communities... etc. There are examples for both, most notably the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, where pedestrian access in the (formerly) public space is severely restricted and controlled. On the other hand, the perimeter fence of the Japanese embassy in Hanoi in Vietnam serves as an anchor for badminton net, with a court outlines on the pavement (see: Figure 46). One factor that is constant for the examined typologies, which can be utilized to explain the examined goings-on but is also universally applicable is the interplay of freedom and control in the public space.

Freedom and control are normally present in public space, and their respective implications change according to particular situations and locations (Kwok, 1998; Lynch, 1990). Freedom is used to define control and vice versa: this will be particularly important while examining the effect onto the public space presented in the Chapter 5.1.1. While Tannenbaum (1962) indicates that freedom and control are diverse concepts, they are also dependent on each other.

The issues of freedom and control can most notably be examined through the lens of actions: one user's behavior may threaten another user's sense of freedom or result in other negative feelings (Prendergast, 2004). This interaction in behavior can also influence the state of freedom and control, which is a constant balancing act. Such an approach, pondering the ways how to conceptualize and/or document the balance freedom and control is increasingly important while examining spatial consequences.

Zhao and Siu (2014) underline that the concepts of freedom and control are constantly interacting in public space; freedom must be manifested in a carrier, such as public space. Without freedom, space cannot be called "public space" as it has no content. Similarly, by the introduction of disruptive elements that require curbing freedom in public spaces, such as the embassy building typology, reestablishment of the content and by extension, freedom, in the public space can be hindered indefinitely. It is likewise important to note that freedom and control are diverse concepts, yet dependent on each other (Zhao & Siu, 2014).

Lynch's (1990) makes an argument that the public space needs skillful management to keep the expression of one group from inhibiting the expression of others in public space. This viewpoint may prove to be challenging for embassy building typologies, due to the complex nature and interplay of various actors and multiple facets, most notably the relation of the host and sending countries, as well as

the previously noted contextual and time context in which these typologies are conceptualized, implemented and managed. As Massey (1994) observes, space is not just a container, but the production of society. As previously noted, interrelations, interdependence and duplication of processes additionally shape and complicate the examined spatial production.

If Lefebvre (2009) spoke of space as a product of society, can the same viewpoint be taken when discussing the spatial production and consequences of embassy building typologies? These exported architectural manifestations, due to their specific nature and privileges, can be examined as space with a different set of ideological rules, inscribed into a different spatial context. If there is a clash or abuse of privileges impacting the spaces in the placed environments, can we talk about balancing freedom and control or is it a doomed endeavor?

Naturally, any showcase of power in the public space for embassy building typology is necessarily enabled with the collaborative support of the host country's official/institutional support; De Certau (1984) defines authoritative institutional controls as "strategies". Siu (2001) claims that these strategies are used to maintain a city in an orderly way, by the means of planning and measuring, per the authority's will and anticipation. The question of reciprocal strategies employed by aggrieved actors/users of public space ought to be similarly examined. If there are strategies of institutional control, conversely there are strategies aimed at circumventing the imposed/prescribed methods of utilizing the public space. However, these actions may not have a favorable influence on the public space; as Ooi (2004) notes, a territory can be constructed as a political action over space and a complex outcome of human relationships.

This project argues and views the placement of embassy building typologies as the instigation of conflict and disruption of the (presumed) balance of freedom and control in the public space by default. This is the reason why the stress of this thesis has been continuously placed on the processes deemed crucial for the examined typologies: conceptualization, implementation and management. Methods are ensuring the prevention of conflict in public space, but such methods must be implemented consensually, carefully and constantly, throughout all the previously mentioned stages. Previously mentioned methods will be examined and theoretically implemented in the following chapters, however, the stress is on the spatial/contextual and time component circumstances. Researchers and practitioners alike ought to be aware of specificities for every individual case, although there are universalities that will be discussed and can be employed for any case study.




Figure 46. Sports game next to the Japanese embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam, February 2020. Notice how the net is anchored into the embassy's perimeter wall. Photo: ©Sanja Žonja.

5.2. Method of analysis

5.2.1 Introduction

This segment will present the tool for re-conceptualizing outmoded methodologies in urban planning practice for embassy buildings, focusing on new ways of envisioning sustainable, safe, smart cities of the future. Typologies recognized for their unquestionable potential in generating drastic changes within urban environments are found in diplomatic-consular outposts. Implementation of new approaches will be suggested and those approaches will be tested, ensuring quality of urban environment during and after the construction processes of embassy buildings.

Any typology that is considered high-risk⁵⁰ (including embassies) can have a detrimental effect on the urban tissue, its continuity and morphology. This fragility warrants the city spaces to be approached with the utmost care by architects and planning professionals, both with ethical and moral responsibilities and considerations.

When it comes to innovative practices for state-sponsored overseas development (e.g. diplomatic and consular outposts) Japan is shifting the paradigm on how the construction process ought to be handled, from its inception, management stages, to produced effects in public spaces.

Although comparatively rarely constructed, the aforementioned typologies have potential of producing the most severe effects onto cities, so re-thinking processes in place must be considered. Furthermore, by definition, these buildings are exempt from any planning laws and regulations, due to their extraterritorial privileges (see: Chapters 3.6, 4.3). Not to be mistaken for an architectural *carte blanche*, these facts ought to serve as an invitation for opening an active dialogue between architects and urban planners.

Case study of the new Japanese embassy building in Belgrade, Serbia (completed in 2015) will be utilized as a starting point/benchmark, with experiences and lessons learned from this process studied, presenting

⁵⁰ The category of high-risk can also refer to fire protection regulations for residential buildings, but in the context of this research, high-risk is an attribute appointed to building with potentially disruptive spatial consequences on the urban matrix, as well as its neighborhoods

how they should be considered a new developmental model. The author of this text was employed as an architect – assistant coordinator for the duration of the construction process, so any gained insight has derived from first-hand experiences. This writing aims to combine theoretical background with a report on the building process of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, thusly drawing importance to the change in methodology that Japan is now spearheading.

5.2.2 Indicators

Observing valid indicators for assessment of soft power architecture, in its initial research stages, presents a challenging task as one must endeavor to strike a balance between quantitative and qualitative indicators. The following list of indicators is presented as factors that are practical and indicative of the impact these typologies have on the urban matrices and vice versa. A note must be made that, depending on the contextual circumstance of examined case studies in future scholastic research, this list, alongside the methodology used in this thesis, can be expanded and adjusted to fit the specific needs of said research.

The following indicators are given as guiding points for the investigation of soft power architecture:

- Pedestrian movement
- Parking
- Bomb radius
- Protests / civil unrest
- Police / fire dept. ETA
- Public space appropriation
- Desirability / non-desirability
- Visual identity
- Vistas
- Real estate prices

The abovementioned indicators serve as a starting point for further development of their necessity for inclusion in the research of soft power architecture. Variations of their core concepts are further developed and elaborated upon, building a methodological framework for soft power architecture research.

5.2.3 Bomb radius as an indicator: Oklahoma City Bombing

As this project discusses and focuses on architectural/spatial typologies in dense urban city matrices, possible physical damages incurred by a possibility of a terrorist attack, in this case, car-bomb was carefully considered. As noted by Davis (1999), car-bombs will become the main weapon of crime and terror. Due to their mobility and the very possible threat such weapons may pose on the endangerment of lives and property, this parameter was elected as one of the most easily quantifiable, in terms of the scale of possible spatial damage.

One occurrence in particular that was elected most indicative was the Oklahoma City bombing, a domestic terrorist truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, United States, on April 19, 1995. The bombing happened at 9:02 am and killed at least 168 people, including many children⁵¹, injured more than 680 others, and destroyed more than one third of the building, which had to be demolished⁵². The blast destroyed or damaged 324 other buildings within a 16-block radius, shattered glass in 258 nearby buildings, and destroyed or burned 86 cars⁵³, causing an estimated \$652 million worth of damage⁵⁴. In response to the bombing, the U.S. Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which tightened the standards for habeas corpus in the United States⁵⁵. It also passed legislation to increase the protection around federal buildings to deter future terrorist attacks. Until the September 11 attacks in 2001, the Oklahoma City bombing was the

⁵¹ "Victims of the Oklahoma City bombing". USA Today. Associated Press. June 20, 2001.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20120215065450/http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001-06-11-mcveigh-victims.htm>

⁵² Shariat, Sheryll; Sue Mallonee; Shelli Stephens-Stidham (December 1998). "Oklahoma City Bombing Injuries". Injury Prevention Service, Oklahoma State Department of Health.
https://web.archive.org/web/20140518063448/http://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/OKC_Bombing.pdf

⁵³ *Case Study 30: Preventing glass from becoming a lethal weapon*. Safety Solutions Online.
https://web.archive.org/web/20070213112339/http://www.safetysolutions.net.au/safety/ss/ss_30.asp

⁵⁴ Hewitt, Christopher (2003). *Understanding Terrorism in America: from the Klan to al Qaeda*. Routledge. p. 106;
<https://archive.org/details/understandingter0000hewi/page/106/mode/2up>

⁵⁵ Doyle, Charles (June 3, 1996). "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary". FAS.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110314140833/http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm>

second deadliest terrorist attack in the history of the United States. It remains the second deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history.



Figure 47. Aerial photo of the wider urban destruction around the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building (<https://i.pinimg.com/originals/1f/be/d3/1fbed3197b43b2a7f046f16249bc22e0.jpg>)

One third of the building was destroyed by the explosion⁵⁶, which created a 9.1 m wide, 2.4 m deep crater on NW 5th Street next to the building⁵⁷. The blast destroyed or damaged 324 buildings within a 4-block

⁵⁶ "The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management After Action Report". Department of Central Services Central Printing Division. 1996. p. 77.

radius (approximately 500 m), and shattered glass in 258 nearby buildings. The broken glass alone accounted for 5 percent of the death total and 69 percent of the injuries outside the Murrah Federal Building. The effects of the blast were equivalent to over 2,300 kg of TNT⁵⁸, and could be heard and felt up to 89 km away⁵⁹. Seismometers at the Omniplex Science Museum in Oklahoma City, 6.9 km away, and in Norman, Oklahoma, 25.9 km away, recorded the blast as measuring approximately 3.0 on the Richter magnitude scale⁶⁰.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20140121223730/http://www.ok.gov/OEM/documents/Bombing%20After%20Action%20Report.pdf>

⁵⁷ City of Oklahoma City Document Management (1996). *Final Report*. p. 10–12.

⁵⁸ Mlakar, Sr., Paul F.; W. Gene Corley; Mete A. Sozen; Charles H. Thornton (August 1998). "The Oklahoma City Bombing: Analysis of Blast Damage to the Murrah Building". *Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities*. 12 (3): 113–119

⁵⁹ "Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City and Beyond: Chapter I, Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building". U.S. Department of Justice. October 2000.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20101105193322/http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/respterrorism/cha p2.html>

⁶⁰ Holzer, T. L.; Joe B. Fletcher; Gary S. Fuis; Trond Ryberg; Thomas M. Brocher; Christopher M. Dietel (1996). "Seismograms Offer Insight into Oklahoma City Bombing". *Eos, Transactions American Geophysical Union*. 77 (41): 393, 396–397.




Figure 48. Oklahoma City Bombing damage radius; several buildings within this radius collapsed or suffered structural damage from the explosion

The collapse of the northern half of the building took roughly 7 seconds. As the car-bomb exploded, it first destroyed the column next to it, designated as G20, and shattered the entire glass facade of the building. The shockwave of the explosion forced the lower floors upwards, before the fourth and fifth floors collapsed onto the third floor, which housed a transfer beam that ran the length of the building and was being supported by four pillars below and was supporting the pillars that hold the upper floors. The added weight meant that the third floor gave way along with the transfer beam, which in turn caused the collapse of the building⁶¹.

⁶¹ "The Bomb in Oklahoma City" ("Oklahoma City"). *Seconds From Disaster*.



Figure 49. April 19, 1995 aerial file photo, the north side of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (<https://www.ksla.com/2020/04/19/sunday-marks-th-anniversary-oklahoma-city-bombing/>)

In the weeks following the bombing the federal government ordered that all federal buildings in all major cities be surrounded with prefabricated Jersey barriers⁶² to prevent similar attacks⁶³. As part of a longer-term plan for United States federal building security most of those temporary barriers have since been replaced with permanent and more aesthetically considerate security barriers, which are driven deep into the ground for sturdiness⁶⁴. Furthermore, all new federal buildings must now be constructed with truck-resistant barriers and with deep setbacks from surrounding streets to minimize their vulnerability to truck

⁶² A Jersey barrier, or Jersey wall, is a modular concrete or plastic barrier employed to separate lanes of traffic. Jersey barriers are also used to reroute traffic and protect pedestrians and workers during highway construction, as well as temporary and semi-permanent protections against landborne attack such as suicide vehicle bombs.

⁶³ Manjoo, Farhad (August 26, 2006). "Cityscape of fear". *Salon*.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110218065059/http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/08/22/architecture>

⁶⁴ Hill, John (2004). "Changing Place/Changing Times". *Invisible Insurrection*.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110112232644/http://www.archidose.org/writings/insurrection.html>

bombs⁶⁵⁶⁶⁶⁷. FBI buildings, for instance, must be set back 30 m from traffic⁶⁸ (equal to the setback from the perimeter wall for embassy buildings). The total cost of improving security in federal buildings across the country in response to the bombing reached over \$600 million⁶⁹.

In June 1995, the DOJ issued Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, also known as The Marshals Report, the findings of which resulted in a thorough evaluation of security at all federal buildings and a system for classifying risks at over 1,300 federal facilities owned or leased by the federal government. Federal sites were divided into five security levels ranging from Level 1 (minimum security needs) to Level 5 (maximum)⁷⁰. Among the 52 security improvements were physical barriers, closed-circuit television monitoring, site planning and access, hardening of building exteriors to increase blast resistance, glazing systems to reduce flying glass shards and fatalities, and structural engineering design to prevent progressive collapse⁷¹.

⁶⁵ "Safeguarding Building Perimeters For Bomb Attacks". Security Management Consulting. <https://web.archive.org/web/20110716030021/http://www.secmgmt.com/safeguarding-building-perimeters-for-bomb-attacks/>

⁶⁶ Dixon, David (October 2002). "Is Density Dangerous? The Architects' Obligations After the Towers Fell". *Perspectives on Preparedness*. <https://web.archive.org/web/20131224113813/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is%20density%20dangerous.pdf>

⁶⁷ Nadel, Barbara A. (March 25, 2002). "High-risk Buildings Placed in a Class All Their Own". *Engineering News-Record*. <https://web.archive.org/web/20110416232540/http://enr.construction.com/features/Buildings/archives/020325c.asp>

⁶⁸ Markon, Jerry (October 25, 2006). "FBI's Fairfax Agents Packing For Pr. William". *The Washington Post*. https://web.archive.org/web/20121110120452/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/24/AR2006102401239_pf.html

⁶⁹ Linenthal, Edward (2003). *The Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory*. p. 29.

⁷⁰ WBDG Safe Committee (October 31, 2008). "Security for Building Occupants and Assets". Whole Building Design Guide. https://web.archive.org/web/20110315081503/http://www.wbdg.org/design/provide_security.php

⁷¹ Nadel, Barbara A. (March 25, 2002). "High-risk Buildings Placed in a Class All Their Own". *Engineering News-Record*. <https://web.archive.org/web/20110416232540/http://enr.construction.com/features/Buildings/archives/020325c.asp>

5.2.4 Architectural Design Process and the Concept of “Defensible Spaces”

The link between architecture and ideology is situated in an attempt to identify the extent to which social values and practices can be negotiated through architectural space: its concept, materialization and representation. (Vasiljević Tomić et al. 2013, p. 114).

Diplomacy efforts and tactics take various forms, both tangible and intangible, but are most pronounced in areas that use architecture and urbanism as a negotiating tool i.e. embassy buildings and urban planning practices serving as a facilitator for their integration. These typologies can communicate values the sending country wants to project, but can also have negative impact on relations and perception between various actors.

If we try to establish a framework of reference for architectural research for embassy/consular buildings typology, it becomes evident that it is not solely based in architectural design and urban planning. This typology in particular is subjected to influence of a wide array of disciplines including, but not limited to international relations, politics, economy, sociology, psychology and others. The full extent of impact of embassy buildings on the city matrix must be researched in-depth. As previously observed, these typologies inadvertently devastate the city matrix, producing hyper-private spaces of secrecy. As stipulated, the most important facet that architects take into consideration whilst designing these buildings is the notion of *safety*.

Argument of providing safety/security is a valid one, non-negotiable in the sense of protection of human life, but the emphasis here is shifting to awareness of effects it causes, both on the built environment and on the bilateral relations. If policy makers are aware of these outcomes, they can employ more subtle strategies to avoid loss of soft power and beneficial perception in host countries. Several suggestions can be made to rectify the situation, from educating the general public on necessity of certain typology, to implementing various activities (predominantly cultural) encouraging citizens' participation.

Great responsibility also lies in the hands of architectural professional, who need to negotiate their design between stringent guidelines given by the Government and moral and ethical obligations of the profession and end users. This notion is not limited only to functionality of the building, but also includes thoughts on city dwellers living in the proximity of the newly planned consular outpost. Involvement of the

community is crucial, even if the utmost secrecy is required – it will provide beneficial input and establish connection and respect between the actors, as neighbors and hosts.

A point of interest in this project is the investigation that will be discussed is that of extreme urban forms driven by providing safety, with the elaboration how this approach has had detrimental effects on the city's matrix. Such extreme forms are also utilized for providing safe and secure spaces for the typologies in question, so it is necessary to re-conceptualize their form, in architectural and urban planning terms.

The concept of risk is commonly used to characterize the likelihood of the occurrence of an unwanted outcome or event. It is commonly associated with terrorist threats, especially if the intelligence or past experience indicates that terrorists target a particular type of facility. (DHS 2009, p. 11)

The goal of the risk assessment process is to determine which protective measures are required to achieve the level of protection sought in a particular building. Decrease in risk for urban areas can be achieved by a multitude of applied methods, most commonly by implementing architectural strategies.

During the 1970s Belfast became a laboratory for radical experiments of "fortress urbanism". One of the most historically explicit examples of such measures were seen in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and 1980s where 'fortress architecture' and principles of 'defensible space' were used, by the security forces, to territorially control designated areas. This was most notably around the central shopping area in Belfast where access to the centre was barred, first by concrete blockers and barbed wire, and then later by a series of high metal gates which became known as 'the ring of steel'. (Coaffe, 2004)

Urban structure research topic often mentioned in the 1990s, especially focused on Los Angeles, where a correlation has been made with urban model implemented in Belfast. Whilst envisioning the future of LA, Mike Davis noted that in crime-infested future, car-bomb will become the main weapon of crime and terror, and suggested for the city authorities to prevent this situation and apply "steel ring fortress" model. (Davis 1992) This would ideally prevent future terrorist attacks. Although the concept "Fortress LA" became the vision of future city in 1990s, it is important to understand there are many ways to interpret urban planning of Los Angeles. Davis' critics, for example, argue that his 'prophecies' were likely fear-motivated, rather than emergence of real criminal activities (Friedman, 1998). Similar thoughts on 'fortress urbanism' were common after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

9/11 terrorist attacks were unique in the sense of applied tactics - simultaneous airplane hijacking and targeting of iconic buildings - as well as for the damages incurred during these attacks. These events have also sparked concerns about different types of 'postmodern' or 'catastrophic' terrorism (Laqueur, 1996) and society based on terrorism dangers infused life (Ewald, 1993).

After terrorist attacks of 9/11 and after re-conceptualization of the risks that attacks cause, new, dramatic changes in urban structure take place, as a reaction to terrorism threats; 'fortification' methods used in Belfast and Los Angeles are applied, as well as usage of sophisticated military technology. September 2002 issue of "International Journal of Urban and Regional Research", section "Debates and Achievements" underlines how the events of 9/11 influenced technological and physical infrastructure of affected cities so much that "*urban flows can be examined through military perspective, so that imminent weakness that they produce could be significantly decreased*". (Graham, 2002, p. 589)

Presented findings underline the changing nature of urban planning approaches in contemporary practice. Furthermore, they highlight that, when introduced to a potentially disruptive variable, urban planning will revert to its most basic form, overlooking far-reaching spatial consequences in favor of providing quick solutions.

5.2.5 Safety Considerations and Its Effects in Urban Environments

The city and urban space are for us the privileged place for reading the relations of architecture-society. (Radović, 1998, p. 43)

Every age in history has its trepidations; nowadays we live in a day and age of constant vigilance due to potential terrorist threats in cities. This trend is not new, but it gained significant expansion after 9/11. Aside from the media that constantly inform on the dangers of everyday living, politics have great influence on the usage of fear, as it was proven that fear has best controlling potential in political discourse (Hristić Danilović, 2013.)

Nonetheless, issue of safety in cities is not new: it represents an ever-evolving process that is characteristic to all urban areas. These processes are inadvertently the same: communities (especially marginalized ones) and its people who do not know each other will seek safety in their own houses. If

there is additional outside ideological stimuli of racism and xenophobia, a city or its parts will become vulnerable. This vulnerability is reflected in the feeling of neglect of the city or its part, which then gives way to potential negative occurrence in those areas. (Hristić Danilović, 2013)

Researching the “ecology of fear” Mike Davis also examined the changes in urban form that have occurred in the face of fear of urban violence, as well as the change in social relations and citizens’ behavior. Examining the examples of Los Angeles, CA and Orlando, FL, it is determined that different social milieus are capable of developing individual strategies and mechanisms, mainly in the form of isolating themselves from other social groups, especially the ones they perceive as a threat. This is the birthplace of “gated communities” and security gains more significance in the process of designing urban spaces. Cities are divided into enclaves (portion of territory within or surrounded by a larger territory whose inhabitants are culturally or ethnically distinct) in which the inhabitants live without personal contact. In the world of informatics age when the world is interconnected by the means of the Internet, in which seemingly all boundaries, differences and spatial obstacles have been conquered, this occurrence becomes absurd. (Hristić Danilović, 2013)

5.2.6 Japanese Planning Model: Construction Practices as a Soft Power Tool

This segment will underline the importance of architecture and urban planning as a public diplomacy tool, recognized and utilized by Japan. By engaging in an open dialogue, respecting its hosts, during the embassy construction process, goals of securing cooperation were ensured.

Nicholas J. Cull (2009), a scholar on international relations, makes several interesting observations: public diplomacy efforts (albeit used under different pretenses) are not new and the cornerstone of this type of communication was primarily cultural exchange. Furthermore, public diplomacy ought to be viewed as an element of foreign policy – having this in mind, and always going back to official policies of the Government, we can make meaningful conjectures. By extension, one can view construction process as a form of foreign policy, which was the case for the new embassy building in Belgrade, Serbia.

Furthermore, Cull (2009) addresses the notions of ‘propaganda’ and ‘public diplomacy’: both are dealing in the sphere of ‘influence’, but unlike propaganda, public diplomacy is not a one-way street to the intended audience:


Moreover, PD [Public Diplomacy] does not always take the form of an immediate attempt to influence a foreign public. It is also part of public diplomacy to listen to a foreign public and change your approach or even your high policy as a result. Similarly the contact need not be related to the image of the international actor, it might be the promotion of an idea (such as international cooperation on climate change) which the actor considers an important element in foreign policy. In all cases the method is some form of engagement with a foreign public and the aim is the same—the management of the international environment. (p. 12)

By examining previously collected data, conclusion can be drawn that the Japanese government, using a transparent construction procedure and open dialogue for its new embassy building, has engaged in a mode of public diplomacy, embodied in a transparent construction procedure. The results of such approach, in architectural and urban planning terms, will be examined in the following section.

5.2.7 Examination of Projected Impact onto the Urban Environment

These sections will overview the finding of examination of the impact of urban environment. Several key factors will be examined and discussed how urban planning practice can benefit or suffer from the (in)correct usage of said factors. These factors were chosen as a direct consequence of the author's experience and subsequent academic research on the topic. It is important to underline that the approach taken by the Government of Japan is not commonplace.

1. **Preparatory process**— indicating the level of willingness for collaboration between professional vis-à-vis urban planning and architectural laws and regulations. Given feedback will be utilized during the design stages, in order to fit the new structure to the particular context in which it will be built.




a)

b)

Preparatory process. Consulting with local professional, contextual design, permeable boundary.

2. **Contextualized design** – indicating how the specific morphological aspects of the built environment were observed and implemented into the final design. To ensure visual and aesthetic continuity of an ambient whole of the built environment, this is an imperative for any new development. This can include the overall built aspect ratio, floor height, materials, style ... etc.



a)

b)

Figure 51. Contextual design diagram. a) Disregarding the urban context (height, building aspect ratio, materials...) b) Implementing the existing context into the harmonized design.

3. **Accessibility** – examining whether the new development fits into the established movement patterns of the built environment. Closely related to indicators 4 and 5.




Figure 52. Accessibility diagram. a) Multiple access/checkpoints oftentimes usurping the public space. b) Secure checkpoint utilizing the existing access roads and points.

4. **Security**– as consular headquarters are protected under international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations, the host country is obligated to provide assistance when required and the newly built structure will be considered high-risk.




Figure 53. Security diagram. a) Security perimeter extending beyond the plot, CCTV cameras in public spaces. b) Security perimeter within the boundaries, checkpoint CCTV surveillance.

5. **Disruption of established urban patterns** – signifying limitation of freedom for users of public spaces e.g. controlled movement (pedestrian and vehicular), claiming adjoining pieces of public space for official usage, imposing a ban on taking photography ... etc.




Figure 54. Disrupting of established urban patterns diagram. a) Prohibited pedestrian and vehicular movement, prohibited parking. b) No special security requirements, limited within the embassy compound.

6. **Change in urban structure**– similar to 5, but signifies removal of existing buildings/paths/urban furniture for the sake of new development.




Figure 55. Change in urban structure diagram. a) Usurping public spaces for security purposes, disruption of movements. b) Extension of activities (e.g. Japanese garden) with clear boundaries.

7. **Long-term development potential**– refers to the new development being introduced into the existing urban tissue in such a way that it will allow for a natural progression of the city development. This means following the urban planning strategies in place and not disturbing them.




Figure 56. Long-term development process diagram. a) Disruption of normal development, pushing away any possible interventions. b) Designing within the boundaries, allowing for unhindered development.

5.2.8 Methodological implications

Primarily, it is essential to stress the significance of the public interest any country implementing this methodological approach can achieve. By implementing a transparent construction procedure and having an open conversation with architects and urban planning professional from, one can only increase its soft power potential abroad and ensure achieving its geopolitical goals more effectively.

It is necessary for the urban planning profession to be aware on the potential severity of impact of certain typologies deemed high-risk (including, but not limited to embassy and diplomatic-consular headquarters typologies), proceeding with research and development stages accordingly. One option is to conceptualize a diplomatic typology cluster and although this concept has some drawbacks, like any other, they can be managed relatively simply, with involvement of other groups and professionals.

When dealing with typologies within dense urban environments, there should exist a clear overview of spatial disposition and usage, and then identify triggers of discontinuity of the urban tissues. Focusing on

the wider context, then zeroing on the specific space, with its own set of problems, will greatly help in providing solutions that will be viable for the long run, giving back the right to the city to its users. By having a subtle approach in dealing with these issues, images of a defensible city/spaces and rings of steel can be avoided: e.g. using heavy urban furniture that limits vehicular movement only highlights existing issues and can be re-conceptualized if properly handled.

One of the suggested tools that can be used, during the inception phase, is behavior modeling software (see: Piga et al., 2017, p. 968): computer generated data can be instrumental in determining e.g. pedestrian flows and if/how imposing movement limitations affects the quality of spatial usage. This software modeling is normally utilized to examine and amend public space designs, such as squares and plazas. Main focus generally lies in identifying possible places of [pedestrian] congestions and *bottlenecks*, but in the case of an embassy building the methodology in place would be somewhat different. If the new embassy building requires certain security interventions within the public space [limitation of pedestrian movement, prohibition of parking... etc.] a virtual simulation can be made to examine how such interventions in the public environment affect the everyday life of spatial users. By extension, any noted negative effects can be mitigated with careful intervention within the built environment.

In a similar vein, additional layer can be overlapped with users' experience, layer of security. This layer can include routes to be utilized in cases of emergency (fire, medical, riots, evacuation... etc.) as well as possible extremes and subsequent damages to the urban environment (terrorist attacks, car bombs, gun violence... etc.). Having possession of a number of most likely and/or extreme scenarios, professionals, with obligatory public review and input, can elect the best course of action when building these typologies or mitigating possible negative effects in already built environments. The necessary number of scenarios of spatial usage is to be determined either by observing the extremes or most probable ones, keeping in mind that their number is not finite and not all contingencies can be foreseen.

Future challenges and recommendations that can be extricated from the previously presented material are focused on instruction of architecture and urban planning professionals in host countries. The intent is not to uproot or unconstructively question the diplomatic laws and conventions, but rather to draw attention to the notion of accountability for typologies under its jurisdiction. Embassy buildings will inherently have the power to change urban spatial usage dynamics, and as such, must be put under closer scrutiny by professionals and the general public, that ought to be educated on this pertinent topic.

5.3. Exploratory case studies

5.3.1 Introduction

Although this thesis in its core proposes a *snapshot* analogy for reviewing its case studies, as well as the possibility of examining only the embassy plot and its objects, pursuant to extraterritorial privileges, this particular approach will vary for every individual case. In some instances, a historical overview of construction development for diplomatic-consular headquarters in host cities is necessary, as well as a historical overview of bilateral and diplomatic relations between countries, presumably influencing the spatial decision for both sending states' architectural policy and receiving states' architectural and urban planning practices. These instances have been noted for the future development of the proposed methodology, as the e.g. multiple *snapshots* of construction and bilateral histories can be cross-referenced within a complex network of desirable factors for examination (e.g. urban planning policies, prevailing architectural trends and narratives, etc.).

In this research Exploratory (or pilot) Case Studies are viewed as condensed case studies performed before implementing a large scale investigation. The case study's goal is to prove that further investigation is necessary. Additionally, their basic function is to help identify questions and select types of measurement prior to the main investigation. A shortcoming of this type of study is that initial findings may seem convincing enough to be released prematurely as conclusions. However, it is important to underline that none of the conclusion of the Thesis were presented as conclusive and the limitations of the findings were discussed extensively in the Discussion Chapter.

This project will map out the current state of embassy buildings, arguing that opting to omit in-depth historical research will not prove to be detrimental to this project's bottom line, namely pointing out particulates of the embassy building typology in various city matrices and its spatial consequences. The main presumption is that mechanisms, manifestations and spatial consequences of soft power architecture are not necessarily interconnected and directly correlated to one another. Operating under such an assumption, one method to check ascertained claims are to view the previously presented methodological postulated as a closed system, to be examined interdependently. After a review of six case studies, three each for Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia, through the proposed methodological apparatus, it is

expected that certain patterns will emerge and that instructive observations, utilized for refinement of the proposed methodology, will be noted.

Both cities were chosen for their distinctiveness in spatial production and management, in addition to the characteristic urban fabric where most data can be collected, as well as the candidate's previous involvement in the construction process of the new Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia and his extended residence in both cities. When discussing Tokyo, several characteristics are observable: its low-rise, high-density urban matrix and similarly contested usage of the term "public space". As Sano et al. (2020) note, "in Japan, the notion of 'public [space]' is a relatively new, imported construct" (p. 68).

As Maki et al (2019) write: "The reason why today's Japanese people don't utilize open spaces is that outward urban planning (that does not take into account Japanese cultural background) is forced to apply" (p. 145). Belgrade, on the other hand, has been chosen due to the lack of comprehensive legal urban planning strategies for diplomatic-consular outposts, resulting in the unpredictability of maintaining the continuity of urban tissue i.e. avoiding disruptions in urban flows and appropriation of public spaces. It is important to note that, due to the limitation of safety concern in the public space for these typologies, a number of images had to be taken virtually, via the Google Street View platform.

Exploratory case studies for this research have been selected based on the following criteria:

The unifying, general factor for all case studies was the concept of extraterritoriality.

The following selection criteria were:

- Existence of codified policies (if any) for embassy construction (U.S. embassies);
- Extremes of open/closed spatial manifestations (open – the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo, Japan; closed – the U.S. embassies both in Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia);
- Specific (symbolic) positioning and manifestation in the urban matrix of host cities (the U.K. embassy in Tokyo, Japan);
- Embassy buildings located in non-predetermined urban matrices for this typology (e.g. the Embassy row in Washington, DC, U.S.) but rather within "regular" urban matrices of host cities;

- Embassy buildings with construction procedures being determined as divergent from the approach normally implemented for this typology (the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia).

It was postulated, examined and confirmed that the proposed indicators can be effectively used to study other future embassy typologies. To reiterate, exploratory case study's goal is to prove that further investigation is necessary.

5.3.2 Case studies: Tokyo

5.3.2.1 The U.K. embassy

The U.K. embassy in Tokyo is located at No 1 Ichibancho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; this area is consistently ranked as the most exclusive and expensive residential area in Tokyo (and in Japan).⁷² The compound has been elected to be studied for a number of contributing factors: its symbolic location in close proximity to the Imperial Palace, the size of the plot, measuring approximately 35.000m² (corresponding to four adjacent city blocks), as well as previous historical and contextual relations in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Britain (for overview of the wider surrounding urban matrix see: Figure 57). Although the latter factor will not be taken into deeper consideration, it is unquestionable that all three case studies in Tokyo have received some special consideration, when it comes to the location and the importance of bilateral relations. A separate, in-depth study investigating the historical and political context is recommended for future research, but will not be a part of this assignment, as it deals with spatial particularities, as well as architecture and urban planning.

All on-site observations were previously documented and presented as a part of the Design and Social Change Workshop, fieldwork organized by the author in April 2015, for the student of co+labo Architecture and Urban Design Research Laboratory, headed by Professor Darko Radović, Ph.D, at the Faculty of Science and Technology, Keio University, Japan. The presented findings and the students' answer to the provided questionnaire was utilized as a basis for further refinement of the applied methodology for this research. The keywords and concepts explored during the workshop and implemented in the theoretical and methodological approach dealt with the notions of open/enclosed space, feelings of safety/unsafe, noting disruption of urban flows and the adaptability of users' activities in the public space.

⁷²日本最高額の住宅地は千代田区！地価1位のエリアに建つマンションとは (The most expensive residential area in Japan is Chiyoda Ward! What is a condominium built in the area with the highest land price?), available at: <https://magazine.aruhi-corp.co.jp/00000450/>




Figure 57. UK embassy in the wider urban area of Tokyo

Oklahoma City Bomb Radius

A theoretical consideration of the devastation similar to that of the Oklahoma City bombing was examined: any particular part of the plot would be susceptible to damages from the projected 500m blast diameter. Elevation between the street and plot level observed for the north, south and west boundaries would serve as a natural barrier to ensure protection from heavy damages. Moreover, significant setbacks for almost all buildings on the compound would serve as a protective measure to ensure preservation of human life within the embassy. Unmanned car bombs are an unlikely scenario due to the openness of the surrounding streetscape, as well as the CCTV system covering the entirety of the perimeter wall of the embassy. If a theoretical suicide car bomber is introduced however, the projected damages to the surrounding urban tissue would be substantial. At least nine adjoining blocks would suffer extensive damage, with a projected loss of life, depending on the time of day for a potential terrorist attack. This

scenario is unlikely, due to a multitude of factors, but ought to be theoretically considered; the majority of the damage would be inflicted onto the neighboring properties, not necessarily at the embassy.




Figure 58. Oklahoma City Bomb Radius for the UK embassy in Tokyo

Preparatory process

It is safe to conclude that the compound of the U.K. embassy was not designed to blend and conform to the prevalent urban matrix of the neighboring structure and that of Tokyo. If the proposed parameters for the lack of preparatory processes are inward-looking structures, ignoring the existing matrix and a solid boundary, the embassy compound was not built in order to conform, but quite the opposite. In this instance, it is safe to conclude that the building was constructed as a showcase of power and influence of the former U.K. Empire, both in ideological and identity senses. It is necessary to mention, however, that

for historical buildings (this site was occupied in 1904), it is necessary to examine other facets of construction e.g. whether there was sufficient industrial development in the host country to enable production of the desired materials and accommodate preferred construction techniques. These aspects are noteworthy, as the U.K. embassy compound in Tokyo is the oldest out of the examined case studies. Similarly, the Old University Library at Mita campus of Keio University, recognized as an Important Cultural Property by the Japanese Government⁷³, constructed in 1912 has its cast iron works imported, as there was no industry to support its creation in then-Japan. Consequently, there can be discussion about a preparatory construction process, but in this instance of a logistics nature, not including architectural/urban particularities of the host city, to be incorporated into the building planning.

Contextual design

As noted in the previous section, due to the point in time when the U.K. embassy in Tokyo was constructed, there cannot be a real discussion about implementation of contextual design per se. In late XIX and early XX century, embassy buildings were utilized as a showcase of power and as often as not employed as showcases of power and intimidation in the host countries. This section raises the issue of a more precise set of meanings to be examined for both the “preparatory process” and “contextual design”. For instance, planning and construction to accommodate for e.g. the climate requirements or seismic conditions and other specificities of the host country can fit into both categories. To clarify and refine for future iterations of this research “preparatory process” examines the communication process between the professional and governing bodies of the host and sending countries, whereas “contextual design” deals with adapting the building and subsequent construction processes to the specificities of the territory the new diplomatic-consular headquarters will be erected. Further subdivision for both categories can be *obligatory* and *non-obligatory* actions: for the “preparatory process” some bureaucratic communications will be necessary, but the majority of legal particularities on the diplomatic law are coded within the VCDR. Likewise, for the “contextual design”, some aspects pertaining to the climate and structural security of the new building will be obligatory, while others are elective, such as the urban context, building aspect ratio, height, materials, etc, as the privilege of extraterritoriality renders these facets unnecessary i.e. non-obligatory.

⁷³ *Mita Campus: Keio University*. (n.d.). Keio University. <https://www.keio.ac.jp/en/about/campus/mita.html>

Accessibility

The particularities of the examined factor of accessibility are primarily focused on studying the effects of presumed multiple entry checkpoints for the compound and its subsequent, presumed sequestration of the public space. During the fieldwork, no usurpation of the adjoining public space for the entry requirements onto the compound of the embassy was noted. Although there are multiple points of entry, depending on the function, the spatial configuration allows for it, without any outstanding impact onto the surrounding urban environment. Noted retractable columns at the main entrance fit into the existing urban layout, not disrupting the function or the flow of the space. Other entry points are similarly within the boundaries of the perimeter fence and do not extend past the plot line. As a consequence, accessibility to the building is ensured, especially for the east perimeter wall, with a covered path leading next to it, with the greenery setback separating it from the outer street pavement. The access to the building, as a pedestrian in the public space, was therefore unrestricted, which is in stark contrast to the particularities noted for the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, which will be noted in detail during its case study examination.



Figure 59. Main entrance to the UK embassy in Tokyo. Image capture February 2020. ©2020 Google.

https://www.google.com/maps/@35.6867741,139.7447756,3a,75y,285.07h,91.82t/data=!3m7!1e1!3m5!1s3s89E0nbzGYaiGVTVSHP4A!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo3.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpanoid%3D3s89E0nbzGYaiGVTVSHP4A%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tactile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D27.722605%26pitch%3D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i16384!8i8192

Security

The vicinity of the U.K. embassy has no extraordinary security measures i.e. no security measures that hinder the public space users' experience. Noted security features were CCTV cameras in operation around the perimeter wall of the compound, a “keep out” sign at the back gate and a uniformed guard at the main entrance. Other than the noted elements, there were no limitations in terms of walkability⁷⁴ around the embassy and taking photos of the building. The group of students participating in the workshop was not halted or reprimanded in any way for capturing architectural and urban planning particularities of the neighborhood, as again contrasted with the particularities noted for the U.S. embassy.



Figure 60. Western perimeter boundary of the UK embassy in Tokyo. Image capture February 2020. ©2020 Google. <https://www.google.com/maps/@35.6880052,139.7435011,3a,75y,157.37h,104.45t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1s-n4yW8aqv30sGQp2KIW8sA!2e0!7i16384!8i8192>

⁷⁴ Defined as the measure of how friendly an area is to walking. Florida, R. (2014, December 11). *Walkability Is Good for You*. Bloomberg CityLab. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-11/walkability-is-good-for-you>

Disruption of established urban patterns

To reiterate previous methodological postulations for this category, it signifies limitation of freedom for users of public spaces e.g. controlled movement (pedestrian and vehicular), claiming adjoining pieces of public space for official usage, imposing a ban on taking photography ... etc. For the U.K. embassy, there were no observable elements of disruption of established urban patterns at the times of the mapping; pieces of public space were not claimed, nor the movements of different categories of actors controlled or restricted. To illustrate, claiming the adjoining public space will oftentimes entail claiming parts of pavement in the public space, forbidding parking in certain places close to the building or shutting down public parking spaces in close proximity. Movement can be similarly restricted, for pedestrians and vehicular traffic, as well as a ban of photography enforced (for discussion on photography ban in the public space see the U.S. embassy in Tokyo Case Study). Freedom of movement around the building compound was total, with the possibility of circling around the premise without any issues in the public space.

Change in urban structure

This category deals with the e.g. the removal of existing buildings/paths/urban furniture for the sake of new development. In this particular case, this instance was likewise not observed. Usually, when discussing removal of previously established urban patterns, some traces will linger in the public space, until new patterns are established. These processes were not observed in the neighborhood of the building. However, when discussing this particular parameter and making a note for future research and refinement, this factor can be implemented into the research methodology primarily for new developments. Mapping is suggested prior, during and after the completion of the new structure, to note in detail whether any significant changes in urban structure occurred. These findings may prove to be in direct correlation with the previous category of studying disruption of established urban patterns, as it is highly likely these two categories are interconnected.

Long-term developmental process

One of the equally important categories for examining soft power architecture refers to the new development being introduced into the existing urban tissue in such a way that it will allow for a natural progression of the city expansion. This particular category represents the combination of all previously examined as the presented fact is that, if there are limitations and disruption in the urban matrix with the

introduction of the new embassy building typology development, the urban tissue will be affected long-term, with the ripples of spatial consequences being felt for the foreseeable future. For instance, new urban planning regulations are introduced to e.g. land usage or limit urban developments in the vicinity of the diplomatic-consular headquarters, to ensure its safety. Such legislative limitations ought to be placed under close scrutiny by the architectural professionals and users of the space, as it certain that, if the sending country has a vested interest for certain legislations to pass, it will exert influence beyond of that guaranteed by the provisions of the VCDR and international law. This is why interdisciplinary cooperation between various actors, as previously noted is crucial. For the concrete example of the U.K. embassy, its particular placement in the urban fabric of Tokyo is unlikely to inhibit any long-term developments. This area, as previously noted, being one of the more established ones will have, by default, strong *machizukuri*⁷⁵ community, which will carefully assess any potential disruptive future developments, in the sense of adverse spatial consequences for the entire neighborhood.

⁷⁵ *Machizukuri* is a method of inter-community dialogue, aiming to build community capacity and cooperation between residents, while also encouraging engagement between community members and local government officials. Hein, C. (2002) Toshikeikaku and Machizukuri in Japanese Urban Planning, *Contemporary Japan*, 13(1), pp. 221 - 252. Available at: https://www.dijtokyo.org/doc/dij-jb_13-hein.pdf

5.3.2.2. The U.S. embassy




Figure 61. USA embassy in the wider urban area of Tokyo

Oklahoma City Bomb Radius

As noted in previous research and especially highlighted for the U/S. embassy building programme, the country has experienced repeated terrorist attacks, both foreign and domestic, so it is highly unlikely that a full set of precautions is not implemented in securing the safety of the diplomatic staff and property. The embassy building and its adjoining Ambassador's residence are not morphologically updated to conform to the SED standards, yet it is safe to conclude that additional security features were added since the terrorist attacks since the 1980s, most notably after 9/11. As Tokyo is additionally considered one of the safest cities in the world, the threat of a car bomb is less likely to occur. If this were the case, southwest corner of the compound, near the entrance to the residency is the most vulnerable, as the clearing forms a piazzetta of sorts. The projected blast diameter of 500m would destroy the surrounding

buildings around this point completely, causing considerable damage to the property of the embassy, but not destroying it, as the current setback is sufficient to conserve the building and prevent the loss of life. Moreover, out of the three case studies in Tokyo, it is argued that the sustained damages to the urban structure would be comparatively smallest, as the urban density is not as pronounced in this location. As a central business core, its predominant feature is the high-rise, low-density configuration, primarily. Detonation of a theoretical car bomb at north, northeast and southeast boundaries of the plot are less likely to occur due to the implemented security measures, resulting in appropriation of the public space (see further discussion in the following sections).




Figure 62. Oklahoma City Bomb Radius for the U.S. embassy in Tokyo

Preparatory process

During the term of U.S. Ambassador W. Cameron Forbes, a three-story white Embassy building, Ambassador's residence, and two adjacent apartments are built at the Embassy's current location (1-chome, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo). The new Embassy building (the current building) is completed in August, 1976, and it is opened on September 6. The building was designed by César Pelli and Norma Merrick Sklarek of Gruen Associates of Los Angeles and constructed by Obayashi Corporation. The construction required 400 kilometers of electrical and telephone wiring, 13 kilometers of walls and partitions, 40,000 square meters of carpets, and 20,000 tons of concrete. All of the materials, except for the concrete, came from the United States. The Embassy staff moved into the completed building on Labor Day. A time capsule commemorating the new building was buried during a ceremony on the evening of September 22. The time capsule, a copper box, had been originally buried in the ground when the old Embassy building was completed in 1931. The contents included Japanese coins, a list of foreign diplomats, and newspapers from that time. In addition to these items, U.S. bicentennial commemorative coins, Japanese coins, the day's newspapers, and other objects were added to the box to commemorate the completion of the new building. The time capsule was buried under the cornerstone at the base of the American flag at the main entrance to the Embassy⁷⁶. The provided information confirms previous stipulations about the cooperative nature for the construction process for this typology: logistical nature of the construction processes is an overwhelmingly important facet of soft power architecture, as well as cooperation between the host and sending countries.

Contextual design

At it is already noted that the current U.S. embassy building was completed in the 1970s and taking into consideration the importance of the diplomatic mission in Japan, as well as the profile of architects who designed the building, the conclusion is that contextual and architectural circumstances were taken into

⁷⁶ U.S. Embassy Reference Service. (2010, March 16). *History of U.S. Embassy Buildings*. アメリカンセンター JAPAN.

<https://americancenterjapan.com/aboutusa/usj/4737/#:~:text=The%20history%20of%20the%20U.S.,Perry's%20hips%20arrived%20in%20Japan.&text=After%20the%20Embassy%20building%20was,1931%2C%20the%20Emba ssy%20was%20rebuilt.>

account. As this project is making a snapshot of the present point in time, the embassy building fits well in the predominantly high-rise neighborhood of Minato-ku.

Accessibility, Security and Disruption of established urban patterns

For the purposes of analyzing particularities pertaining to these categories, the abovementioned types have been combined, as for this particular case study, there are certain overlaps and interconnectedness between the observed specificities. To illustrate, accessibility is limited due to the security concerns, disrupting urban patterns. These facets can be examined separately, but in order to grasp the complexities of spatial consequences in this case study, these categories are combined. The main feature is the lack of accessibility to the pavement within the public space realm, encircling the north, northeast, southeast and south boundaries (perimeter wall) of the plot. Traffic cones and security guards are utilized to discourage any undesirable behavior in the adjoining public space. During the fieldwork for the workshop in April 2017, while taking photograph of the building in the public space (at the traffic light in Figure 64), the group was immediately approached by a Japanese police officer, noting that photography was prohibited. The sign on the opposite side of the street was not visible, so the group was allowed to keep the photographs, let off with a reprimand. As that particular pedestrian crossing at the traffic light was not sectioned off by the traffic cones (see Figure 63), the group wanted to cross the street, intending to walk around the building. The same police officer inquired whether there was any official business in the embassy to have and after hearing a negative response, the group was instructed on the prohibition of usage of the public space adjoin to the embassy, without an official appointment in the building. When inquired about the reasons such measures were implemented in the public space on the opposite side of the street, the law enforcement could not give any response. Fieldwork then continued, without any further disruptions.

This leads to an interesting conundrum, connected to the previously highlighted issues of freedom and control in the public space. Question pertaining to this issue arises: who own the wall? When discussing the legality of control, broadly speaking, private citizens may not detain unless they have witnessed a felony, and law enforcement officials may detain only if they have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot. Neither private citizens nor law enforcement officials have the authority to require that you delete your photographs or relinquish your equipment (including film or memory cards) except when acting in accordance with a court order or in conducting of an arrest. In Washington DC, for example, photography is permitted but tripods are prohibited on the Capitol grounds, national memorials, most

Smithsonian museums, and the Metro system (other than the Pentagon station, where photography is prohibited entirely).

In Japan, violating the "confidentiality" (機密, kimitsu) of a US Army base by providing "documents, diagrams, etc" with a "purpose" of harming the Army is punishable by up to ten years in prison⁷⁷ (from *Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty* under Article VI: *Facilities and Areas and the Special Criminal Act Attendant upon the Enforcement of the Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan*⁷⁸). It is possible to take pictures of any buildings when in a public place, and can freely use such photographs without consent of a owner or designer of that building [Japan Copyright Act, Article 46]. External appearance of buildings in U.S. Armed Forces facilities are not confidential under US-Japan Security Treaty and related statutes enacted in Japan.

Finally, discussing the reestablishment of disrupted urban patterns will be virtually impossible, as they will be unable to assert themselves, due to the extremes of control in the public space, as well as the constant reinforcement of desirable behavioral patterns and activities in this space.

⁷⁷ Text in Japanese: 日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約第六条に基づく施設及び区域並びに日本国における合衆国軍隊の地位に関する協定の実施に伴う刑事特別法

第六条

合衆国軍隊の機密（合衆国軍隊についての別表に掲げる事項及びこれらの事項に係る文書、図画若しくは物件で、公になつていないものをいう。以下同じ。）を、合衆国軍隊の安全を害すべき用途に供する目的をもつて、又は不当な方法で、探知し、又は収集した者は、十年以下の懲役に処する。

⁷⁸ <https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/654/what-buildings-are-people-not-allowed-to-take-photographs-of-in-japan-from-pub/656>



Figure 63. Anti-terrorism signboard near the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, reading (the English version): “Dear pedestrians, the road is closed on this side as security against terrorism. Thank you for your kind attention.” Google Street view image capture, February 2020, available at: https://www.google.com/maps/@35.6689387,139.7439818,3a,18.9y,200.34h,83.91t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sJ_vhmxtJdjoQ7xbn17s4CQ!2e0!7i16384!8i8192



Figure 64. Disruption of public space usage: sectioned off pedestrian crossing in front of the U.S. embassy building, with a police officer standing guard. Note that the traffic light is still in function. Google Street view image capture, February 2020, available at: https://www.google.com/maps/@35.6689387,139.7439818,3a,68.9y,88.9h,88.63t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sJ_vhmxtJdjoQ7xbn17s4CQ!2e0!7i16384!8i8192

Change in urban structure

To examine this parameter, assumption will be made that the observed elements limiting the movement and disrupting established urban patterns have been placed in the public space for a significant amount of time (e.g. over six months). This period of time has been allotted with a theoretical assumption of the minimum period of time necessary for changes in urban structure to take on permanent status in the mental landscape of users of the public space in the vicinity of an examined building. Moreover, for embassy building typologies disrupting established urban patterns and changing the urban structure it is important to note that preferred modes of behavior in the adjoining public spaces will be constantly reinforced, either indirectly (with e.g. signs and boards) or directly (with e.g. private security or law officers interacting with the users of public space). For the latter case, behavioral modification patterns are expected for actors frequenting these spaces, but the former will be effective only if prominently displayed and visible/readable. Expected changes in urban structure for the case of the U.S. embassy are theoretically postulated to be virtually non-existent, as security concerns clearly dictate lack of any unforeseen change in the urban structure, as it potentially endangers the safety measures of the building.

Long-term developmental process

When considering long-term developmental potential for the U.S. mission in Japan, several observations are to be made: firstly, there are already security measures in place, reconfiguring the urban matrix in the vicinity and ensuring additional layer of safety for the embassy building. In this instance, it is unlikely that the introduction of any additional measures will hinder further development of the neighborhood, unless a viable threat, in terms of function, is recognized by the U.S. government, eliciting a discussion with urban planning officials. Secondly, taking into account the contemporary preferred method of the U.S. government for dealing with the embassy building typologies, the SED, it is highly probable that the main functions of the mission will be allocated to a larger peripheral compound adhering to the present-day requirements of a diplomatic mission, should the need arise. Furthermore, given the historical importance of the current U.S. embassy and residence's location, these buildings will presumably remain leased by the U.S. government, with an altered function, in line with the long-term geopolitical strategy.

5.3.2.3. The Brazilian embassy




Figure 65. Brazilian embassy in the wider urban area of Tokyo

Oklahoma City Bomb Radius

The Brazilian embassy in Tokyo would potentially suffer the most disastrous effect of a terrorist attack involving a car bomb. To illustrate, since the building has no perimeter fence and is accessible from north and east, the projected crater alone, 9.1m wide would account for the entirety of the access plateau and the entrance staircase. Similarly, the devastation of the surrounding urban tissue would be vast; since this particular location has the densest urban configuration; a projected 500m radius blast would cause wide-scale destruction, with some type of damage incurred within at least twenty (20) surrounding blocks. As a result of this projected factor, loss of life would be equally overwhelming. The configuration of the Brazilian embassy and its placement in the urban tissue, although possessing architectural and morphological traits that are exceptionally positive, exposes the vulnerability of this typology

configuration and the adjoining urban matrix, if subjected to a terrorist attack. Such openness and chosen location can come at a high cost. Although the chosen parameter of the Oklahoma City bombing presents an extreme act or urban violence, it is an exceptionally useful and illustrative in showcasing the necessity of balancing the architectural and urban planning decisions for this typology, in order to protect the lives and property of host cities, when discussing the embassy building typology. Conversely, the same can be said for any other typology in dense urban matrices deemed high-risk, but diplomatic-consular headquarters are particularly susceptible to acts of urban terrorism actions. An important point that ought to be made is that bilateral relations are not the only indicator of potential threat; in a globalized world, targets are chosen for their convenience or symbolic conveyance of a particular message, for targeting iconic buildings (e.g. the WTC) or buildings representing certain identities. A balance between openness and sequestration should be strived for, and the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo is a clear benchmark of why.




Figure 66. Oklahoma City Bomb Radius for the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo

Preparatory process

By analyzing the previously proposed parameters for the lack of preparatory processes, described as producing inward-looking structures, ignoring the existing matrix and a solid boundary, the conclusion is that said factors do not apply for the examined case study. The structure incorporates harmoniously into the existing building structure and urban matrix, offering additional qualities to the streetscape, which will be discussed in more detail in the section Change in urban structure. As the most modest development in the Tokyo case studies section (by plot size and building(s) on the compound) and considering the structure's architectural characteristics, it is assumed that the preparatory and construction processes were completed in Japan in their entirety. Any particularities of this construction would warrant an in-depth historical research of the planning, implementation and construction processes, which will not be the subject of this particular study, but are noted as important facets, to be researched by future scholars.

Contextual design

Designed by the Brazilian architect Ryu Ohtake (b. 1938) and completed in 1982, The Embassy of the Federative Republic of Brazil is characterized by its curved façade and a yolk-yellow volume organized around a small square in front of the building⁷⁹. The volume in question is constantly changing, utilized as a canvas for murals/street art, that referring and representing various facets of Brazilian culture and the embassy's cultural programs. This is a very effective communication tool, adding to the spatial brand of the embassy building and creating a mental attachment of nearby residents. A similar approach was utilized by the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, during the construction stages, when the building site fence was painted with different motifs on the topic of Japan, in collaboration with the students of the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade (see: Figure 37). In formal terms, the shaping of building volumes announces its importance in the existing streetscape, with its raised level accessible by a wide staircase and its curved main volume, physically and visually widening the street section. A more subtle approach, usually avoided in embassy typology design is utilized; one explanation can be the urban context of the building placement, as well as bilateral relations between Japan and Brazil, making the construction process less challenging, but this is a conjecture that ought to be verified.

⁷⁹ <https://architecturetokyo.wordpress.com/2017/02/13/1982-embassy-of-brazil-ryu-ohtake/>



Figure 67. The access plateau and the streetscape in front of the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo. <https://www.google.com/maps/@35.6707172,139.7146863a,85.8y,332.23h,110.49t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sMNJeif3iGzWaG4Vpiu47Q!2e0!7i16384!8i8192>

Accessibility

Without any question, the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo is the most accessible out of all the case studies examined in this project. Such accessibility stems from the fact that typologically, the surveyed building does not fit into typical categorization for the diplomatic-consular headquarters (in accordance with Berrige's [2015] classification). The building's southeast front is open and accessible, via the staircase leading to the access plateau. Interestingly, this plateau is utilized as an extension of the embassy's activities, with frontal glass panels utilized as an exhibition space, providing information on various presented Brazilian cultural features.

Security

This particular case study is additionally and seemingly the one most unbothered by stringent security concerns; the embassy is easily accessible, without perimeter fence or any special security measures in place. Security concerns, as previously noted, will have the most observable impact on the disruption of established urban patterns and the change in urban structure (to be elaborated upon in the following section). However, ostensible lack of security, considering the building typology may also have negative consequences; embassy buildings are by default high-risk buildings, probable targets of urban violence

act and/or terrorist attacks. Having this fact in mind, a delicate balance of security and openness must be achieved, similarly as the concepts of freedom and control in the public space. Interestingly, for the examined typology there is such a thing like *too* open or *lacking* in security. There is no accurate way to classify the feeling of personal safety (see Chapter 5.2.5), but the examined lack of more observable security measures can have a detrimental effect in the minds of the users of space, especially when taking into consideration the vulnerability of the building for the previously examined Oklahoma City Bomb radius.

An additional social experiment, based on the grounded theory was conducted by the author: dressed in all-black, with sunglasses, a baseball cap and a duffel bag, the author spent a considerable amount of time (30+ minutes, from 2PM) on April 18, 2017, sitting on the embassy's steps, walking around the access plateau, carefully examining the artwork in the front façade and the mural painted on the anterior volume and taking photographs of the building from all available angles. There was absolutely no reaction from the embassy's staff or security for the duration of the experiment, which was thoroughly unexpected (compare with the experience of the student workshop, with a 50+ meter distance from the U.S. embassy).

Disruption of established urban patterns and Change in urban structure

When discussing disruption of urban patterns and changes in examined urban matrices the main assumption is that said modifications will be, by default, negative, which is observable for most embassy typologies. However, the observed changes do not always have to be negative or adverse to the neighboring structures and actors. For this particular case study, these two indicators were joined together, illustrating the possibility of affirmative active engagement of an embassy, utilizing its spatial and morphological characteristics in its entirety. The Brazilian embassy is one of the examples showing commitment in engaging the users of public space, by actively using its exterior space, enabled by the buildings configuration. One of the more illustrative examples was a temporary pavilion for the 2014 World Cup in front of the embassy, designed by Shigeru Ban. The structure was made of high-strength recycled cardboard tubes, and occupies the front patio of the chancellery of the embassy building. The project was partially constructed by the Brazilian community, and was dismantled soon after the football tournament ended. Over the 40-day duration of the pavilion's lifetime, a variety of events are held in relation to the world cup as well as generally to culture. For example, small live bossa nova shows, film screenings, workshops, and other informal and free programs are open to the public. Additionally, on every day that Brazil had a match coffee is served in the morning during the games, along with juices and

cheese bread⁸⁰. On July 9, 2014, a seminar, moderated by Professor Darko Radović (Keio University), Head of the co+labo Architecture and Urban Design Laboratory, titled “Global Sport Events and Quality of Urban Space – from Brazil World Cup 2014, to Rio Olympics 2016 and Tokyo Olympics 2020” also took place at the pavilion of the Brazilian embassy⁸¹. Moreover, co+labo’s research pavilion previously set up in Jiyugaoka, Tokyo, the “co+labo cupboard” became co+laboworldcup+board, a place for collecting opinions of the visitors about the transformative capacity of global sports events, especially when it comes to quality of open public spaces⁸². Similar temporary activities aimed at engagement of the local community were likewise noted in the case study of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, with the construction site fence painting. The case of the Brazilian embassy is singular because of its architectural features that facilitated the planned activities. As previously mentioned for the Security indicator, such openness might pose a problem for that particular line of inquiry, but when examined through the lens of (temporary) changes in established urban patterns and urban structure, this case study clearly stands out.



Figure 68. World cup pavilion by Shigeru Ban at the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo. image © Embassy of Brazil in Tokyo

⁸⁰ world cup pavilion by shigeru ban at the brazilian embassy in tokyo:

<https://www.designboom.com/architecture/world-cup-pavilion-shigeru-ban-brazilian-embassy-tokyo-06-26-2014/>

⁸¹ an update on co+labo Urban Research Cup+Board @ the Brazil Embassy:

<https://colaboradovic.blogspot.com/2014/07/co-laboradovic-update-on-co-labo-urban.html>

⁸² co+labo Urban Research ... cupboard becomes the World cup+board:

<https://colaboradovic.blogspot.com/2014/06/co-laboradovic-co-labo-urban-research.html>

Long-term developmental process

Given the particular form of the building, its location and previous activities, it is not expected that it will pose any threat for future developments in the area. This particular case study, examined through the indicators aimed at informing on any particularities that might pose a hindrance of the neighboring urban matrix developments, has not given any conclusive evidence that it will obstruct future construction. One unlikely, extreme scenario is that the building and its neighborhood suffer extensive damages in an act of urban violence, rendering previous mode of operation unfeasible. In such instance, if the chancellery were to remain at this location, more severe security measures will be implemented, changing the urban structure and established urban patterns significantly. Alternatively, if the diplomatic mission moves out of the building, its future owner would already have the advantage of its unique structure and positive associations in the mental landscape of the public space users.

5.3.3 Case studies: Belgrade

5.3.3.1 The Japanese embassy




Figure 69. Japanese embassy in the wider urban area of Belgrade

During the past decade, Japan has started to expand its foreign policy presence in the form of constructing new diplomatic-consular headquarters. For example, during fiscal 2015, then Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Finance Minister Taro Aso had agreed to open six new embassies and two consulates under the fiscal 2015 budget. The main motivation can be found in the statement that: “...Japan is trying to enhance its diplomatic influence and better communicate its views overseas...in the year [2015] that marks 70 years since the end of World War II.” (the Japan Times online, January 12, 2015) It is important to note that the Foreign Ministry [of Japan] originally requested nine new embassies and six new consulates. This is telling of the status and importance of embassy building construction and promotion of Japan’s interests overseas.

Ultimately, through its many trial and tribulations, the new embassy building was completed and moved into March 2015. Interestingly, the response from the general public was negative, having predominantly commented on the aesthetic characteristics of the building (high perimeter fence, lack of openings, lack of aesthetic appeal and the sense of Japan-ness), linking these failings with feelings and/or relationship that the Japanese have in lieu of their perception of Serbia and its people.

Oklahoma City Bomb Radius

When discussing the vulnerability to a potential terrorist attack using a presumed method of a car bomb, the Japanese embassy in Belgrade is one of the most exposed examples in these case studies, after the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo. Free access to all four corners of the building and particularly the informal parking and public garbage containers located along the plot's northern border pose a grave security threat. Although the main building itself is located at the center of the plot, with an estimated 10m setback from all sides, it would still suffer considerable damage in a theoretical act of urban violence. Moreover, proximity (9 meters) of a nearby 6-story residential building would receive extensive damage and loss of life in such a scenario. Although the pedestrian flow is not as pronounced in other case studies, especially the ones in Tokyo, the proximity of several multistory residential buildings poses a great threat. The northern boundary of Block 11a separates its predominantly office building typology (the major exception is the upscale residential complex on the Embassy west side) from the principally residential typologies of Block 12. Increased densities, therefore, are a point to be noted, with the 500m diameter blast engulfing the entirety of Block 11a, which only illustrated the potential devastation.




Figure 70. Oklahoma City Bomb Radius for the Japanese embassy in Belgrade

Preparatory process

The new Japanese embassy, prior to its design, obtained necessary guidelines for construction in the New Belgrade area. Additionally, the plot was visited by designers, in order to fully understand the built environment and implement specific findings into their design. With such obtained data, combined with the requirements of the Government, the preparatory process was thorough and gave a good starting point for the building construction. Be it out of a desire to show respect to its host country of Serbia, desire to increase their already impressive soft power credit, or due to long-term geopolitical strategy, Japan elected to implement a transparent construction procedure for its new diplomatic headquarters/embassy, located in Block 11a of New Belgrade.

The plot itself was acquired by the Japanese government in the nineties, but owing to the volatile situation at the time in the Balkans, the construction was postponed indefinitely. The entirety of Block 11a was, in its early, conceptual stages, designed to house various diplomatic missions and their corresponding

residences and diplomats' accommodation. Due to speculative urbanism and land-use machinations, this particular place lost its original purpose, with the exception of the Chinese embassy, that occupied the plot opposite the street until it was damaged and abandoned during NATO intervention in FR Yugoslavia in 1999. After an extensive preparation period, the Japanese government gave green-lighted the new development, starting in May 2013. The construction procedure implemented was that of transparency, or to be more precise, the idea of implementing a transparent construction process. Design plans were re-worked to fit Serbian regulations (handled by "Arhi.pro LLC" in its inception stages), as Japanese construction regulations (expectedly) differ from Serbian. This was particularly obvious for fire protection design, part of the design documentation that was notoriously under heavy scrutiny to follow the stringent Serbian regulations to the letter.

Contextual design

For the case study, the new embassy building has followed all the given prescriptions and regulations pertaining to the urban planning for new buildings at this location; built aspect ratio was adjusted for the built environment/density of New Belgrade, floor height similarly reflected the height of the neighboring buildings and architectural style and materials were the same as the ones utilized in the inception phase of the urban environment. The embassy could have been built significantly higher, considering the neighboring office buildings and the predominantly five-story residential complexes in the vicinity, but the design was tailored to the embassy compound's specific requirements. It would be expected that a diplomatic-consular headquarters servicing two countries (Serbia and Montenegro) would be larger, but apparently, all requirements on these issues were met.

Accessibility

The building in question utilized the available access paths, without closing or compromising parts of the streets. As is customary for this typology, there are two access points, one main pedestrian and vehicular, and the other service entrance. What is important and previously discussed is that, even when a new diplomatic outpost utilizes existing entry points inherited from previous urban disposition, security concerns override established urban patterns and place additional physical barriers, disrupting the previous state. Since the security measures are not and cannot be flexible, when discussing projected danger assessment, the user experience cannot rectify newly developed disruption in the public space and spontaneously revert to the previous state. An overwhelmingly important note that ought to be made, pertaining to the Accessibility criteria are that various security checkpoints can and should be planned

within the plot parameters. On occasions where the sending country's risk assessment demands for a more stringent approach to the compound access, said concerns oftentimes have a profound impact on the adjoining public spaces, appropriating various parts of its surface area. Consequently, security checkpoints begin to extend outside of the perimeter so the boundary becomes blurred and difficult to draw but more importantly, the issues of jurisdiction are the most prominent issues at play. Extraterritoriality gives the jurisdiction of the sending country's task force (if on-site), but past the plot boundary lines, the authority lies in the host country's law enforcement. The only instances this instance is questioned is when the host country provides the diplomatic mission with additional privileges, but this approach can be disputed, primarily in its legality and more importantly, in violating the right to the city for users of public space in host countries.

Security

The new Japanese embassy has not made any interventions in the existing urban environment to increase its level of protection (CCTV cameras, conspicuous security, boulders ... etc.). Security cameras placed on the perimeter fence do not extend beyond the plot boundaries. Another important point that is relevant for all embassy building typologies is coordination with the host country's emergency response teams for cases of urgency. To illustrate, the VCDR regulations on the inviolable nature of the mission forbids the e.g. firefighters to enter the premises in case of an emergency without the consent of the Ambassador or the appointed mission head. Similarly, if there are elements on the plot that might facilitate the fire spreading to neighboring buildings (e.g. trees or power lines), the diplomatic mission is under no obligation to remove these elements and there is no legal mechanism for the host country to demand special precautionary measures to be taken. Although such attitudes of lacking cooperation are extreme, it should be noted that said matters may pose a real threat to the safety of the adjoining public spaces, buildings and its inhabitants. One mechanism ensuring protection for both the diplomatic mission and its neighborhood is drafting an operational chart/map in cooperation with the city's Emergency Situations Task Force; in such a document, any dangerous elements with e.g. fire transmitting potential would be noted, planned staff evacuation route and all exists noted. The emergency response team can be given the authority to enter the premises in case of an emergency (the definition of such occurrence would be drafted by the diplomatic mission). However, due to security concerns and since there are no legal mechanisms to protect such documents (e.g. labeling them "top secret") in official city agencies, some embassies will either have an extensive network of fire protection equipment on-premises, with the staff

passing repeated fire drill instructions or an understanding with the appropriate emergency response services, censoring the information deemed unnecessary for the processes of emergency protection.

Disruption of established urban patterns

The new Japanese embassy building did not impose any restrictions on the surrounding urban environment, it remains of the rare examples of typology that people can freely access, walk around and view from all sides. Especially and previously noted, informal parking alongside the building's northern parameter and garbage disposal containers are still present at the location, although resending significant security risk. It would have been expected for the diplomatic of the mission to request the removal of these elements, citing security concerns and would most likely have these demands approved. However, without such intervention, there were no significant disruptions of established urban patterns.



Figure 71. Undisturbed parking alongside the northern parameter wall of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade. Image capture May 2015. ©2020 Google.

<https://www.google.com/maps/@44.8260344,20.4189409,3a,75y,210.86h,94.38t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sj6YdzPe6iNhgg1NLHqsvag!2e0!7i13312!8i6656>

Change in the urban structure

The examined case study has not damaged the built environment, however, it had intervened on its plot (which is within its purview and only mentioned as a curiosity) and removed significant greenery

(evergreen and deciduous trees). Due to the proximity of the neighboring residential building, there were some altercations, as the tenants have mentally mapped the greenery as their own. However, legally speaking, this was not the case, and the Japanese government has reimbursed the city of Belgrade via the greenery cutting/removal fee, which is a matter of public record. Additionally, the diplomatic mission had no obligation to do so, in line with extraterritorial privileges, but elected to proceed with implementing a procedure that is fully equal to that in place for any other commercial development in Belgrade. Temporary changes in the urban structures were caused during the construction of the Japanese embassy, with the workshop aimed at painting motifs in relation to Japan on the building site fence. This particular activity changed the urban imagery of the site during its constructions, as well as other announced events (design for a Japanese-style garden in the vicinity of the building and planting several cherry trees in the adjoining green surfaces).

Long-term developmental process

The examined case study, by its placement and previous construction processes, has enabled this urban development progression to take its course naturally, and will not pose any obstacle for future developments. This conjecture was confirmed from March 2015 through October 2020, with new developments taking place on the neighboring plot, with the development of the new Chinese cultural center (for further discussion of its construction processes see: Chapter 4.7.3). As a diplomatic-consular headquarters, the Japanese embassy official could have expressed their concerns about future developments in close vicinity of the premise of their mission but elected not to undertake such steps. There are no codified legal mechanisms for the sending county to interfere in the urban planning processes and architectural developments of the host country. However, subtler, the more diplomatic approach can be utilized to achieve one's intentions, as was discussed for the case of the U.S. embassy in Belgrade, when the General Urban Plan 2021 was changed in 2007 to specifically meet the requirements of the new U.S. embassy development. The outcome of the spatial interaction and consequence of the two buildings of particular importance in this area remains to be seen and presents a worthy topic of future academic investigation.

5.3.3.2 The Chinese embassy




Figure 72. Chinese embassy in the wider urban area of Belgrade

Oklahoma City Bomb Radius

Due to the specificities of the examined location, most notably the urban disposition and decreased density, compared to other case studies, for the case of the Chinese embassy, the Oklahoma City Bomb Radius would be comparatively less destructive. Since the examined area is comprised of predominantly single-family residential villas (Senjak and Dedinje municipalities are historically inhabited by the upper classes) population density and floor aspect ratio are notably lower than for the other case studies. Moreover, lush greenery in this particular neighborhood, especially the adjacent plots to the Chinese embassy, is expected to partially absorb the initial bomb impact. Furthermore, since this neighborhood's street grid and predominantly residential function does not allow for foreign or suspicious elements to go unnoticed, the presumed response time of emergency services would be shorter than for other case studies.

Damages incurred by the projected 500m blast diameter would be comparatively lesser than compared to the other case studies. The embassy complex itself has significant (20+ meters) setback for the presumed main building in the plot center, which would decrease the chance of serious damages i.e. the collapse of a building or significant loss of life. It is also important to note that, compared to other examined embassy buildings in Belgrade the Chinese diplomatic-consular headquarters is the most vulnerable (see Figure 73), due to its morphological disposition and compound organization.




Figure 73. Oklahoma City Bomb Radius for the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

Preparatory process

In 2004, the Chinese embassy in the Republic of Serbia obtained a plot previously owned by the Republic Property Directorate (Serbian: Republička direkcija za imovinu), designated by the Government,

exchanged for the building in Trešnjinog cveta Street, the previous Chinese diplomatic headquarters. After the heavy damage the Chinese embassy building in Block 11a suffered during the NATO military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, the diplomatic mission temporarily moved into a villa in Belgrade's Dedinje municipality in 2001. The possibility of a permanent relocation seemed plausible, as the Belgrade's Assembly adopted the Regulation Plan in 2002, which changed the designation of a park nearby the present-day embassy location into that of the land for urban development. The Chinese government was presented with this location and although the necessary procedure was followed to the letter (active consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Justice, Regulation Plan and Belgrade Land Development Public Agency), there was a significant backlash from the general public regarding the plan to demolish a park in favor of an embassy building. There were speculations who requested the location in question to be converted into the urban development land and the adoption procedure of the disputed Regulation Plan. The overall conclusion was that the Regulation Plan in question passed the legislation process due to internal political turmoil, although various parties noted its severe deficiencies.

When the plan in question passed in February 2002, backlash from the communities of Dedinje and Senjak municipalities was instantaneous: the park in question is over a hundred years old and approximately 5.2 hectares in surface. If the City officials decided to go through with the plan, over three hundred (300) trees would have been cut down. Civil protests lasted around three months and were supported by a number of architects and urban planning professionals. Finally, in late May 2002, when massive protest at the plot in question were announced, High Delegation of the Embassy of the PR of China visited the Belgrade Land Development Public Agency and informed the officials they are giving up the location in question and that their diplomatic headquarters would have to be constructed elsewhere. As justification for their withdrawal, the Delegation cited "technical problems that would be encountered in the construction of such an important facility".

Permanent residency for the Chinese diplomatic mission was determined in August 2003, when the Government of Serbia passed a bill on exchange of properties, the plot in Užička Street 25 to be traded for

the building damaged in the NATO bombing. The Contract on the exchange of properties was concluded with the Chinese Government by the Republic Property Directorate⁸³.

Contextual design

The embassy compound is comprised of buildings that contextually adhere to the neighboring urban disposition; single or two-story villa type residences are present on the plot, stylistically configured to fit cohesively into the built environment context. When discussing the size of the plot occupied by the Chinese embassy complex, it is important to note it is significantly larger than a typical plot in this area i.e. approximately 7,500 square meters for the embassy plot vs. approximately 3,500 square meters for a regular plot in its vicinity.

Accessibility

The Chinese Embassy complex's intended mode of transpiration is vehicular, as its location in the predominantly upscale residential neighborhood allows for pedestrian access, but not as a primary mode of access. Multiple security checkpoints are expected upon entering the complex, but these concerns do not extend onto the adjoining public spaces.

Security

The neighboring state villa in Užička 23 Street is currently occupied by the former Serbian President, Mr. Tomislav Nikolić. Similarly, another state villa n Užička 23 Street is utilized for housing of EU officials. One particular security feature is a “forbidden photography” symbol on a signpost, noted between plots 23 and 25 (see: Figure 74). This warrants additional discussion on the Serbian laws and regulation on the unauthorized photography and recording of buildings in Serbia (compare with analogous regulations in Japan). Milutinović (2018) cites the Article 144 of the Criminal Code⁸⁴ of Serbia:

Unauthorised Photographing

Article 144

⁸³ <https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=470725&print=yes>

⁸⁴ <http://www.zakon.co.rs/tekstovi-zakona-na-engleskom-jeziku.html>

(1) Whoever without authorisation makes a photographic, film, video or other recording of another thereby significantly violating his personal life or who delivers such recording to a third party or otherwise enables him to familiarise himself with contents thereof, shall be punished with a fine or imprisonment up to one year.

(2) If the offence specified in paragraph 1 of this Article is committed by an official in discharge of duty, such person shall be punished with imprisonment up to three years.

Milutinović (2018) argues that interpretation of Article 144 does not specifically mention or imply photographing public buildings and surfaces and that it only states and refers to the invasion of the privacy of an individual, but not the publicly observable performance of an individual's business, but only their private life. In this regard, for example, a specific service may, if pointed out by its assessment, under this Regulation, order the application of a measure or action in order to achieve preventative protection of a building. Moreover, in this case (in connection with photography) the competent public utility service is tasked with the placement of signpost, reading "prohibited photography" or "recording". Only then does the security officer have the right to warn about this ban and continue to act according to the previously drafted security study and his/her authorization (Milutinović, 2018).



Figure 74. Forbidden photography sign in front of the Chinese embassy.

<https://www.google.com/maps/@44.7830633,20.4535575,3a,46.4y,14.77h,98.78t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1szuhC7apy s!TBz66bKOFsDQ!2e0!7i13312!8i6656>

Another question surrounding this topic is what is the envisaged sanction, as the penalties are not specified and it remains unclear - how to sanction such an "act". This imposes the conclusion that such an act would not be considered a misdemeanor or a criminal offense, but only serves as a justified basis for the operational processing of the person who made such a recording, i.e. made the photograph a sufficient basis for further undertaking certain measures and actions (Milutinović, 2018).

It is the common practice and understanding of police and security officers that it is enough to instruct something must not be filmed or photographed, e.g. various governmental facilities, embassies, consulates, etc., and the instruction act ensures legality. The issue remains, however, whether the security or law enforcement has the grounds to "forbid" someone to photograph a building in the absence of any sign or sign that such an act is prohibited. Therefore, the question is: What particular requirements need to be met for that ban to be valid i.e. legally binding? There is one characteristic that summarizes and explains everything: objects of strategic importance and for which a decision is made based on the Decree on determining the security protection of certain persons and facilities ("Official Gazette of the RS" no. 72/2010), drafted by the Government of the Republic of Serbia, must have a prominent "no photography" signpost, represent the clearest and unambiguous warning sign of the existence of said prohibition. Any other "bans" are not based in the legal system of the Republic of Serbia and therefore cannot be considered legal or legally binding (Milutinović, 2018).

Disruption of established urban patterns, Change in urban structure and Long-term developmental process

For the investigation of the Chinese embassy, the last three indicators were grouped together to indicate the lack of any outstanding characteristics. As the examined municipality also houses a number of state-owned residencies, any disrupted urban patterns and changes in urban structures have reconfigured themselves to facilitate the changed realities. As the area is not mixed-use, with a negligible number of public spaces for larger groups of people, the previously theorized concepts of the struggle of freedom and control in public space are not noted. Control is achieved by a simple virtue of spatial branding of the area, having clear association in the mental imagery of the users of space in the city of Belgrade. As for the Long-term developmental process indicator, it is unlikely that the compound of the Chinese embassy will influence future developments, as previously noted primary functions and activities found in this area dictate future functions to be analogous to the existing state. Alternatively, the Chinese government might opt for a larger plot, but that option is not feasible, as it already has a separate location for the Consular

headquarters (Augusta Cesarca 2v) and the new Chinese cultural center (Trešnjinog cveta 11) is designed with additional apartments for the diplomatic staff and will be utilized for official embassy functions.

5.3.3.3 The U.S. embassy




Figure 75. U.S. embassy in the wider urban area of Belgrade

Oklahoma City Bomb Radius

When discussing the Oklahoma City Bomb Radius or protection against any acts of urban violence or terrorism, U.S. diplomatic-consular headquarters are the most equipped to deal with such challenges. As previously noted, since the 1980s and 1990s, when terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities multiplied, its foreign presence has been undergoing a profound makeover. The Inman report after the bombing in Beirut in 1985 called for a seven-year plan to replace previous posts with walled compounds, stringent

new security standards, minimums for setbacks, maximums for windows and other applicable rules. Since the guidelines of the Inman report were not implemented, only after another devastating attack in Nairobi in 1999, the Crowe Report, largely based on the previously presented guidelines was drafted. Since then and especially following the devastation of 9/11, U.S. diplomatic-consular headquarters are particularly equipped to deal with potential terrorist attacks. Consequently, the U.S. embassy in Belgrade is designed adhering to the SED guidelines, noting a minimum of a 100-foot setback for all buildings. Furthermore, the disposition of the compound ensures it suffers minimum damage to the property and loss of life in the case of a car bomb attack. The specificities of the architectural disposition of the U.S. embassy compound ensure there would be minimum damages sustained to the main building, while the possibility of structural failure is virtually impossible.




Figure 76. Oklahoma City Bomb Radius for the U.S. embassy in Belgrade

Preparatory process

As previously discussed, the U.S. embassy's development in Belgrade warranted an amendment of the General Urban Plan of the city of Belgrade (GUP 2021). Having had a particular list of requirements, in order to fit the demands of the SED, this location was negotiated and settled upon by the two governments. Moreover, since the violence aimed at the previous U.S. diplomatic headquarters (sold in 2016, demolished and currently in redevelopment stages) in Belgrade in 2008, security concerns were understandably a top priority. The compound was opened in 2013, with the floor plan of the main building measuring approximately 17,000 square meters, with an investment value of 117 million US dollars (in 2013). The total investment in this project was approximately 149 Million US dollars⁸⁵. The embassy complex's spatial and disposition is highly readable (compare with Figure 35). For further discussion on the specificities of the preparatory process universal for all U.S. overseas developments, as well as the architectural and functional features, including the U.S. embassy in the Republic of Serbia, see Chapter 5.3.3.3.

Contextual design

An important point that ought to be noted is that the U.S. embassy, comparably to the U.K. Embassy in Tokyo is in the close vicinity of the former royal residence and royal complex/estate. The palace complex occupies an area of 135 hectares and within it is the Royal Palace, also known as the "Old Palace" and the "new" White Palace. In 2010, the Government of Serbia declared the Palace Complex in Dedinje a cultural asset, with all its movable items having a special cultural and historical significance. The symbolic value of such proximity to a previously prominent part of Belgrade's urban structure and social milieu must be noted. As for the buildings in the compound, as previously discussed, are parts of the SED programme; since the Republic of Serbia did not warrant an iconic architectural design, as it is practice for other strategic collaborating countries of the U.S. Although the embassy building is the first LEED-certified building in Serbia, its structure and "the best of American design" is obscured by the perimeter walls and blurred in Google Street View.

⁸⁵ Conić, I. (2013, July 1). *Kako izgleda unutar nove ambasade SAD u Beogradu [How does the interior of the new U.S. embassy look like]*. Gradnja. <https://www.gradnja.rs/kako-izgleda-nova-ambasada-sad-u-beogradu/>

Accessibility

The embassy complex has vehicular access on the northern and southern corners of the parameter, while the main pedestrian access is on its eastern border. In this particular case study, contrasting the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, security concerns did not influence the qualities of accessibility and disruption of established urban patterns. To clarify, the latter claim ought to be investigated in more detail, possibly interviewing the residents of the building cluster near the embassy's northeastern corner. Placed security restrictions probably influence the daily lives of residents.

Security

One particularity in security terms was noted only for the U.S. embassy in Belgrade: in the virtual space of Google Street View the entirety of the compound is blurred. This finding was surprising, as normally such occurrences are comparatively rare. Examination of a possibility for similar approach for U.S. diplomatic missions in major cities of former Yugoslavia (Ljubljana, Slovenia; Zagreb, Croatia; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Podgorica, Montenegro; Skopje, Northern Macedonia [formerly: FYR of Macedonia]), as well as Bucharest, Romania and Sofia, Bulgaria (as additional countries constituting the geographical determinant of the Balkans) confirmed that Belgrade, Serbia, was the only city with blurred images of the U.S. embassy in Google Street View. Reviewing Google's Street View Policy it is noted that the blurring of the compound was requested by the U.S. authorities, as "...if you would like us to blur your entire house, car, or body, submit a request using the "Report a problem" tool". Other particularities noted as "Inappropriate Content" (Intellectual property violations, Sexually explicit content, Illegal, dangerous, or violent content, Harassment and threats, Hate speech, Terrorist Content, Child endangerment, Personally identifiable information) that would warrant blurring of the entirety of the building were not met, as interpreted by the explanation given. The same view is visible from Šolina Street, running perpendicular to the main street of Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karađorđevića, overlooking the embassy compound (see: Figure 77). Interestingly, the only non-blurred depiction of the embassy is at the very end of a cul-de-sac of Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karađorđevića Street (see: Figure 78), but no discerning characteristics of the compound may be observed from this particular angle (which was possibly the reason why it was left untouched). Interestingly, of the view on Google Maps is switched from 2D to 3D, one will have a 360-degree angle overview of the complex and a very clear notion on the volumetric disposition of the buildings on the compound, as well as its façades.



Figure 77. The entirety of the U.S. embassy's compound in Belgrade, Serbia, blurred on Google Street View. Taken from Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karađorđevića Street.

<https://www.google.com/maps/@44.7719126,20.4544029,3a,75y,330.98h,93.36t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sXP1Stp5rgkRQWDb5V6s31Q!2e0!7i13312!8i6656>



Figure 78. Non-blurred images of the U.S. embassy is at the very end of a cul-de-sac of Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karađorđevića Street. Google Street View.

https://www.google.com/maps/@44.7734423,20.4543621,3a,75y,235.97h,104.15t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sG9oCFKpLNRt1HHjX4f_M0A!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

Disruption of established urban patterns, Change in urban structure and Long-term developmental process

Comparable to the previous investigation of the Chinese embassy, it was decided to examine the above-listed indicators as a cluster, since the theoretical implications and conceptual overlap is significant. As this development is acontextual, per the SED guidelines, there cannot be a discussion about any significant disruption of urban patterns. Considerable changes in urban structure have happened, especially when considering the plot size (comfortably fits five Japanese embassy plots), but the size is justifiable when all the functions on-site are taken into account. Finally, it is theorized, given the U.S.'s influence, based on hard power, as well as exertion of its influence to change the GUP 2021, that all developments deemed hazardous (in spatial terms) for the existing U.S. embassy compound will be discouraged. Additionally, as the completed embassy complex adheres to the SED guiding principles, it is unlikely that the U.S. diplomatic mission will move for the examined location any time soon.

6. DISCUSSION

This chapter will examine the meanings, importance and relevance of the obtained results, focusing on and evaluating the acquired data. Firstly, in order to concisely report and discuss the major findings, theoretical implication, limitations and recommendations for future research, it is necessary to reiterate the previously posed hypotheses. After providing the initial suppositions, a general comment will be presented, followed by a more extensive discussion.

The main hypothetical assumption of this thesis was that its operation logic and discussion are found within a framework of (sending) state-controlled mechanisms of (spatial) production of national identity. In such a structure various stakeholders utilize processes to instill the applied mechanisms with a specific set of values, with those values declaratively or expressly presented and promoted outside of its borders.

This particular assertion, for all the conducted processes, is dependent on the individual case study i.e. its sending country and particularities of contextual circumstances (between countries and its stakeholders, users of public space, the newly introduced spatial manifestation and the existing urban matrices, etc.). This claim could not have been made without the previous examination of the multiple complex themes surrounding the production of the investigated spatial manifestations. Countries with clearly defined policies regarding their exported building programmes, such as the U.S. (see Chapter 4.6), as well as Berridge's (2015) classification, express the officially proclaimed values explicitly in policy terms, but declaratively in spatial/architectural terms.

The additional inquiry of whether the promoted values translate into the spatial realm of the host environments and targeted audiences was out of the scope of this project, but it is highly encouraged as an additional scholarly pursuit. The conclusion remains indisputable: the processes will be instilled by a specific set of values, but since this research operates within a complex network of various stakeholders, the question remains on the surrounding processes that promote a specific value(s) as a dominant trait. As previously ascertained, the "finished product" will not always be an accurate reflection of the prevailing narratives of the sending state, due to the intricacy of said processes, but will have significant spatial consequences onto the urban matrices in host countries.

The given and research questions and hypotheses (all first introduced on pp. 21-23) and provided responses, positioned as a base for further discussion are presented as follows:

Research questions:

1. Are there identifiable mechanisms (political, cultural, legal, architectural, etc.) that are utilized for production of space and meaning for exported typologies, as a manifestation of ideology(-ies)?

During the course of this research it was ascertained that there indeed are discernable mechanisms (political, cultural, legal, architectural, etc.) that are utilized in a variety of ways, for the production of space and meaning for the examined typologies. For instance, observed and investigated political mechanisms were noted in cultural relation policies, cultural in narrative-building within the sending countries, prior to export and to be additionally used internally, legal under the auspices of the diplomatic law noted in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as well as its adjoining laws and regulations (showcased for the Serbian construction laws), as well as architectural strategies for disseminating desirable images/messages of national identity, It is important to note that, due to the heterogeneity of cultural meanings and the intricate contextual circumstances, it was noted that all observed facets pertinent for this research were of conflicting and contradictory nature, breaking the dominant (academic) narrative. This was not surprising, as the novel concept of soft power architecture was not previously researched in the capacity presented by this project.

2. Are spatial consequences of exported architectural typologies observable and/or quantifiable in the public space?

It was concluded that it is possible to observe and/or quantify spatial consequences of exported architectural typologies in the public space. Noted spatial particularities are primarily manifested in the sense of spatial sequestration, ensuring elevated security of the examined diplomatic-consular architectural typologies. It is possible to quantify e.g. the surface area of the public space usurped by the examined building. Other aspects that cannot be measured, however, add complexity to this particular research question; the issue of e.g. “wall ownership” and the ban on photography, its ambiguous rootedness in the legal practice remains one of the aspects that influence the spatial consequences although themselves are not directly found within the spatial realm. Other spatial consequences for extreme scenarios of urban violence (utilized benchmark: Oklahoma City Bombing) are noted, addressing security concerns and the lives and wellbeing of users of the public space, as well as the hypothetical damages to the property and the urban matrix in the vicinity of examined typologies.

3. What are the alternative spatial generators of values recognized for the conceptual framework of soft power architecture?

This particular inquiry, as presented in this research, will not depend solely on the spatial manifestation i.e. its physical form, but more importantly, the applied processes during its conceptualization, implementation and management stages. Showcased in the case study of the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo, various activities can serve as an additional incentive to achieve goals of the sending state. However, it is important to note that the examined embassy's spatial configuration and bilateral relations between the sending and receiving states greatly impacted its ability to transmit the desired messages in an effective way. Otherwise, when discussing typologies analogous to soft power architecture, it is unlikely there will be any to fit the exact criteria of its spatial manifestation, so it is suggested for this research question to be rephrased as: What are the alternative *methods/processes that will generate spatial values* recognized for the conceptual framework of soft power architecture? In this instance, the discussion can be opened to other spatial manifestations similar to soft power architecture, but without special privileges associated to the embassy typology that will hinder the goals of the sending state, as well as limit the scope of future scholastic research.

Research hypotheses:

1. Official governing bodies tend to possess limited awareness of the possible positive effect that soft power architecture can ensue and consciously choose to disregard its potential (if such awareness exists), either under the guise of ensuring the safety of its constituent living and working abroad or through justifications found in a variety of factors (political, economic, diplomatic... etc.), with positive effect generators sought elsewhere.

Mayo (1996) suggests that, by their nature, political ends are future-oriented, but to accomplish them, the means must precede the ends. The obtained data indicate that there is awareness about the importance of exported architecture, but this does not include the previously defined soft power architecture. Awareness is therefore confirmed to be limited, although this can be interpreted as expected, since the concept of soft power architecture is still new and to be achieved, has to be theoretically and spatially separated from the primarily examined architectural typology of diplomatic-consular headquarters i.e. embassy buildings. Subsequently, it is confirmed that the positive effect generators will be sought elsewhere, mostly in policies and activities, but rarely in a permanent spatial term, more likely if spatial manifestations are a temporary extension of the examined activities and policies. Furthermore, if positive generators are

sought elsewhere, e.g. by employing soft power, one must recall Trverton (2005) and the documented difficulties of measuring soft power. Simply put, as noted by Mackinnon (2020), embassy architectural typologies are still the simplest way of conveying symbolic meaning and the means to control another country's sphere of influence.

2. Official governing bodies, to an extent, tend to possess an insufficiently clear perception that they ought to invest in soft power credit abroad via architecture with accompanying functions and content it can provide, but the lack of interdepartmental synchronization of governmental offices and absence of long-term strategies (for both the host and sending states) hinder these goals.

The analyzed data suggest that the lack of awareness and not only the lack of interdepartmental but also bilateral synchronization will indeed hinder the goals of hypothetical soft power architecture. This observation ties in with the previously expressed conclusion that, due to the legally codified privileges of diplomatic-consular architecture, it must be extricated from the notion it can become or even be combined with soft power architecture typologies. Additionally, governing bodies will possibly utilize some spatial projections in order to achieve their short or long-term goals, but not architectural typologies defined as soft power architecture, in the context of this research. To reiterate the previously cited works of Hagström and Gustafsson (2014) and their 'relational' understanding where demarcations between domestic and international, identity and difference, or Self and Other are exactly what constitute identity (Campbell 1994, 1998; Connolly 1991; Neumann 1996; Rumelili 2004; Wodak et al 2009).

3. Spatial consequences of spaces conceptualized as soft power architecture, if not carefully managed throughout their conception, implementation and monitoring process [lifespan], produce effects that are adverse to the original ideas, concepts and intentions (if any are in place, to begin with) and have tangible and measurable manifestations in urban city matrices.

The provided analysis confirms that the examined typologies have tangible effects on the urban city matrix, which can be measured and quantified in the majority of cases. The quantification will depend on the chosen indicator for studying the observed spatial effect: some indicators will be able to provide data that is quantifiable, but it must be compensated for other, numerous spatial and otherwise theoretically observed facets that may taint the validity of the obtained data. Correlations between the proclaimed values (in e.g. architectural or culture relations policies) and their spatial manifestation can be more accurately observed, as the interdependence between the conception and implementation stages and the

observed spatial manifestation is more unambiguous. The monitoring process will require heavier compensation for external factors and a longer period of observation to obtain a valid dataset.

4. If there are any affirmative initiatives and/or beneficially produced spatial qualities, these factors will be either a byproduct of a combination of previously implemented policies and the climate (e.g. geopolitical, economic, cultural, bilateral... etc.) of the examined point in time or these factors will arise as a direct consequence of individual efforts (from key policymakers, diplomats, activists... etc.).

To reiterate Ignjatović's (2007) observation, architecture does not capture the entirety of, but rather constructs and legitimizes every societal reality and ideology. The study demonstrates a correlation between theorized beneficially produced spatial qualities as a byproduct of architectural morphology, geopolitical circumstances at the time of the examination and individual efforts (if any). The main takeaway for this particular examined theoretical problem is that soft power architecture, as defined in this study, cannot produce a beneficial spatial effect in the host environments unless carefully conceptualized, implemented and managed, which will often be in direct opposition to the requirements of diplomatic-consular architectural typologies.

One of the key findings of this project is that, contrary to the previously hypothesized association and presumed potential for successful integration between the diplomatic-consular architectural typologies and the hypothetically presented soft power architecture typology, the two will be incompatible and unlikely to combine. In short: theoretical and/or practical fusing of spatial configurations for diplomatic-consular headquarters and soft power architectural typologies cannot happen, nor can these typologies have a symbiotic relationship (spatial interconnectedness).

How to explain this incompatibility? By reviewing the presented data for the legal coding and legality of construction, implementation and management of diplomatic-consular headquarters i.e. embassy building, a clear correlation between the two was observed. As these typologies, based on their primary functions, have special privileges and restrictions throughout their lifespan (inception, implementation and dismantlement), the theoretical values and theorized affirmative spatial effect of soft power architecture to be produced onto the host urban matrices are highly unlikely to be achieved. It is indisputable that special legal protection is necessary for the context of the diplomatic corps and its operative structure, but this legality, as observed, will have an adverse spatial effect (spatial consequences) on cities. Placement of the examined typologies is equally important: even if the newly implemented typology is conceived as a

compound, located in less dense and central urban structures of host cities (e.g. the U.S. embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, see: Chapter 5.3.3.3), its primarily adverse spatial consequences will be tangible.

The question of risk (e.g. Davis, 1999) is equally important when discussing the unlikelihood of an effective merging of these two typologies. As embassy buildings are deemed high-risk, vulnerable to the acts of terrorism or urban violence because of their primary symbolic function, the risk component will be ever-present for any typology remotely recognized as an embassy or, in broader terms, an exported architectural typology utilized for the malevolent projection of images/messages of ideology and/or identity of the sending state. The subjective interpretation and perception of exported spatial manifestations by host actors and spatial user groups is a category that warrants further investigation, which will not necessarily have its foundation and/or outcome in the study of architecture and urban planning (see: Hristić Danilović, 2013). Moreover, when discussing the risk component, it ought to be underlined that risk is a category constantly present for the observed typologies, regardless of the safety of the host nation/cities and/or close bilateral ties. Nowadays, terrorism threats and motivation for targeting a specific spatial typology cannot be directly linked: terrorism poses a global threat and its point of origin, as well as that for any other destructive act of urban violence, will not necessarily be linked to the host country. Targets can be chosen randomly, reasoning (if any) based either on the impact (spatial and otherwise) the attack on a specific architectural/spatial configuration will have.

One exception to the hypothesized incompatibility of the embassy and soft power architecture typologies is the case study of the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo (see: Chapter 5.3.2.3). Surprisingly, this building operates in a manner closest to the theoretical considerations of the soft power architecture typology. The explanation for its exception from the obtained dataset for all other case studies in Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia, can be found in the following considerations: Primarily, the buildings' spatial disposition, its placement and urban-morphological characteristics make it an atypical representative of the embassy typology. However, its function and operations are conducive to that of a diplomatic-consular headquarters. Its spatial characteristics act as a catalyst for active engagement of the environment and various actor groups. Conducted and observed activities were facilitated by its architectural disposition and urban placement and disposition. Additional factors of observed close bilateral and historical ties have had an influence on its success as well, which brings to the discussion on limitations of this and any future studies of soft power architecture.

Another key finding of this project provides new insight into the particularities of the relationship between freedom and control in the public space. As noted in Chapter 5.1, definitions of freedom are always connected with control and liberty (Lynch & Carr, 1990; Siu, 2011). The previously awarded spatial privileges and specificities of diplomatic-consular typologies can significantly disrupt the balance of freedom and control in the public space. Moreover, the question remains whether this balance can be restored, as particular spatial considerations, primarily pertaining to the security aspects, are constantly reinforced upon the adjoining urban structure and the user of the public space. Loss of the e.g. freedom of movement, usurpation of public space, or photography bans are processes borne out of the requirements of security i.e. control and will not allow for previous freedoms until the particular spatial manifestation that requires said control is removed. Normally, users of public space find ways to circumvent or bend the rules, but for the examined typologies of diplomatic-consular headquarters that is less likely to occur, even if the legality of particular bans is questionable. It can be argued that, due to their particular status and security considerations, embassy buildings can be viewed as a disruptive element for maintaining the balance of freedom and control in the public space and once placed, it may prove to be challenging to reestablish said balance.

Other findings of this thesis, focused on examining the previously posed question of modification of all processes for the embassy building typology (mechanisms, implementation and spatial consequences) into those analogous to the concepts of soft power architecture, are the following: It is possible for every individual process or a combination of processes to become as those theorized for soft power architecture. However, the outcome, in a particular examined snapshot may not be the one in line with the conceptual values of soft power architecture. For example, the U.S.'s embassy building programme in its conceptualization (mechanism) stages introduces the notions of "design excellence" and providing the "best of American architecture". However, in its implementation and management stages, these values are not recognized by the users of public space in the host cities. Similarly, the case study of the Japanese embassy in Belgrade depicts a transparent implementation process during the construction of the building, but the outcome was not greeted as intended for the projected values. Finally, the management processes of the Brazilian embassy in Tokyo are in line with those theorized by the soft power architecture concepts. However, an incompatibility between safety concerns for the embassy typology and activities was noted, confirming the incompatibility of the concepts of soft power architecture and diplomatic-consular headquarters typology. Ultimately, even though certain observed processes for embassy architectural typologies can correspond to the concepts of soft power architecture, this compatibility is limited to a

fragment of the building's lifespan or carries safety implication on the structure of urban matrices, its activities and actors. Therefore, even if soft power architecture processes are observed, viewing them in the totality of the building's lifespan and through continued snapshot mapping, the ultimate conclusion of non-sustainability for said processes will be noted.

Another finding, based on the perspective of research, a difference in approach must be noted for the defined "exported" vs. "imported" spatial manifestation. Conversely to the "exported" spatial manifestations, chosen for research for their observable and examinable facets, "imported" spatial manifestation is somewhat different. Firstly, to clarify, imported spatial manifestation, their processes and spatial consequences are not simply a mirror image of the exported variety. Their procedures are in some cases analogous to the theoretical considerations of exported architectural typologies, but in general, require the development of a separate methodological apparatus for their examination. Furthermore, these particular typologies have a more complex relationship between various stakeholders and users of public space in host cities, as they will be more impacted by spatial consequences, directly or indirectly, when compared to their exported architectural counterparts. This relation should be the primary consideration when developing the methodological apparatus for the examination of imported spatial manifestations and will differ significantly from the one presented and utilized in this research. It is, however, a potentially fascinating field of study, especially if the outcome would be a comparative study of the spatial consequences of exported vs. imported spatial manifestations utilized for ideological reproduction of officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity.

Lastly, one of the noted particularities of this project rests in the theoretical challenges for mapping the processes surrounding soft power architecture is the difficulty in finding the definitive *ground zero* of its constitution: the previously noted fluidity of processes and their complex interconnectedness makes this pursuit nearly unattainable. Possible difficulties stem from the fact that constitutive points may be found in the mechanisms of typology-making (conceptualization processes), but can be equally observed in the remaining implementation and management processes, constituting points of distinctiveness ascribed to soft power architecture. One of the possible manners to address this issue is to view the individual processes separately, within a closed system of one of the processes, but nonetheless acknowledging the possibility of an incomplete image i.e. the drawback of such an approach.

The anticipated changes in dominant state ideological processes can be clearly noted and mapped for exported architectural manifestations utilized to project said ideology and/or a desirable set of values.

Likewise, ideological turns will not be only visible in exported spatial typologies, but also in state policies, as well as internal (in-state) mechanisms for ideological reproduction and confirmation. Interestingly, even if there is a change, it is probable that the underlining question will remain on “how dominant social groups are able to reproduce their social and economic power” (Taylor & Willis, 1999, p. 29). As Hagström & Gustafsson (2014) remarked, “the question of continuity and change is closely related to the issue of agency vs. structure” (p. 6). Changes in dominant state ideologies are observable but are most explicit in the conceptualization stages for officially sanctioned exported architectural typologies. The later stages are not indicative of an ideological turn because:

1. Implementation process' time component is negligible if discussing changes in dominant ideology, even more so for exported architectures of considerable importance (e.g. embassies) which will rarely allow for the changes to be experienced in host countries during said implementation.
2. Management processes, although indicative of a hypothetical ideological change, noted over a period of time, are nonetheless constricted by the (spatial) structures, conceptualized and provided by the previously dominant ideologies. Therefore, operating within a thusly remaining spatial framework, with previously caused spatial consequences (either positive or negative) to the host urban structures is limiting for study. A separate academic study for this particular scenario is warranted, with variations on the inherited and previously inflicted adverse and beneficial spatial consequences.

While previous research has focused on the individual facets of conceptualization, implementation and management of embassy building typology, the results obtained by this study demonstrates the possibility of a holistic investigation approach. By being aware of the presented findings, it is now possible to utilize the theoretical and methodological apparatus to examine these particular typologies and their spatial impact and consequences on the urban matrix of cities. Flexibility in the provided research method gives freedom to future researchers for adjustments and improvements of the presented methodology, which is encouraged. However, it must be noted that, due to the lack of data of multiple snapshots i.e. repeated investigation in prescribed time intervals, the results cannot confirm or reliably establish any spatial patterns and/or consequences that the examined typologies have on the urban matrix, its functions and usage. To develop a fully reliable pattern hypothesis, extended research is encouraged, with multiple snapshots noted for all or any particularly noted indicators. As Lichrou et al, (2008) noted, constant

management and mapping are a must, as places are composed of different types of users, audiences, dwellers, and stakeholders. Ideally, after obtaining multiple readings and establishing a hypothetical pattern for a particular spatial facet, it is suggested the findings to be cross-referenced with analogous data for the same indicator in a different environment. Only by combining two or more case studies over a longer period of time can the hypothetical spatial patterns be noted and presented (see: Figure 79).




Figure 79. Diagrammatic representation of recommendations for future comparative study flow

The generalizability of the results is limited by the complexity, interconnectedness and changeability of the examined spatial manifestation for the subject matter. The previously noted “moving target” metaphor is apt in this instance. Apart from the undisputed intricacy and sheer volume of the theoretical and practical considerations, the constant flux and variableness of the examined processes, it will be challenging to make universal declarations. The suggested course of action, decreasing the potential margin for error is focusing on a particular aspect of the presented methodological apparatus, developing it further, being aware of the complexity of the formerly presented and noted processes. The elected concept of extraterritoriality, likewise a factor of universality, was chosen as a basis for a cross-comparison of case study in Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia. This concept gives an opportunity for evaluation of any diplomatic-consular headquarters, but the obtained results will not be fully comparable if the examined surrounding spatial matrices of host cities do not share some modicum of similarity. This is why it is important to differentiate various typologies, as a subset of the universal diplomatic-consular

architectural manifestation, to refine the results of future studies. The discussion on extraterritoriality, in terms of acontextual building privilege, is additionally encouraged to be addressed by future academic investigations, as any typology should not be endowed with such, over time, disruptive advantage.

Utilized methodological choices, designated as adequate at the time, during the course of this investigation have been noted to be in need of further refinement. The overall suggestion is to further balance out the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the chosen indicators. Furthermore, the chosen case studies represent the atypical examples for the examined architectural typology, with one or more of their characteristics being distinctive.

This research has endeavored to identify different perspectives for conceptualization, implementation and management of officially sanctioned images/messages of national identity, to be exported, having spatial manifestations and consequences. The resulting conclusion for researched identification processes is that exported architectural typologies intended for ideological confirmation will be present only if interconnected with the complex processes of politically motivated knowledge shaped by ideology and simultaneously, depending on the individual contextual circumstances, with broader societal and architectural narratives, employed to articulate certain aspect of exportable images of national identity.

It is beyond the scope of this study into the particularities of disciplines that do not directly pertain to an architectural and urban planning investigation. The presented complex themes of international studies, political science, legal science, cultural studies, etc. were conducted in the service of this particular research, without any pretensions of claiming complete proficiency and mastery in any of them. However, knowledge of the intricacies of certain subjects is crucial in understanding particular decisions for the production of space, meaningfully interpreting and connecting them to the existing body of knowledge of architecture and urban planning studies.

Future studies should take into account the challenges and limitations of a field study for this particular architectural typology. Previously noted field notes and presented legal restrictions for photographic documentation can impact the processes of the said data gathering and its subsequent usage and interpretation. Active collaboration between a diplomatic-consular headquarters and other research institutions is encouraged, in order to obtain data otherwise inaccessible to a researcher, all within the scope of available records, within the security and/or confidentiality parameters.

7. CONCLUSION

To provide and concisely discuss the contribution of the thesis, the following processes will be explained:

Problem Identification → Problem Analysis → Problem Improvement Suggestion.

Problem Identified:

1. Lack of awareness (and possibly care⁸⁶) of the impact of the embassy typology in the public space;
2. Lack of a comprehensive method and methodology to study the embassy typology and its impact (one of the key contributions of this Thesis);
3. Lack of involvement and the possibility of input of architecture and urban planning professionals (due to the legal aspects).

Problem Analyzed:

1. Positioning of processes (mechanisms) within theoretical (intangible) and architectural (spatial/tangible) procedures, with an aim to ascertain causal relationships producing these issues. For example: examining how a country's different ideologies (internal and external) influence manifestations (tangible and intangible);
2. The link (interrelation) between the examined processes and their (spatial) manifestations. For example: how does the interplay of identity and ideology (intangible) have an influence on architectural manifestations (spatial/tangible);
3. The types of the spatial impact of examined case studies (Tokyo, Japan and Belgrade, Serbia). Types of spatial impacts are: a. Tangible (e.g. usurpation of public space due to security concerns presented in the study method) and b. Intangible (e.g. ban on photography in the public space).

⁸⁶ As there is no **reason** to care, in purely administrative sense, as the VCDR legally facilitates this approach.

Problem Improvement Suggestions:

In its current state, the problem of negative spatial consequences cannot be solved, only mitigated and observed (“observed” for the purpose of advancing towards more successful mitigation strategies and ultimately, solutions [discussed as theoretical suggestion to solve these issues long-term]).

Suggestion will be presented in two major categories, **Practical** and **Theoretical**:

Practical

1. Awareness: Educating architecture and urban planning professional on the importance of the topic and their involvement in the long-term consequences of city development potential, if these issues remain unchecked
 - In that sense, this Thesis provides guidelines (that can be framed in an educational curriculum, e.g. a Masterclass) to various parties (architects, urban planners, policymakers, scholars... etc.) for both host and sending states. The uncovered processes and their spatial manifestations offer an insight for possible corrections in the conceptualization (bilateral consultation between e.g. policymakers of the sending country and urban planning professional of the host country), implementation (respecting the urban planning and architectural regulations and guidelines of the host country) and management stages (ensuring minimum disruption of the urban matrix in the host cities due to e.g. security concerns);
2. Urban planning: if embassy typology is to be constructed, to be implemented into a pre-determined urban matrix with special considerations (as per the VCDR requirements)
 - In that sense, this Thesis provides guidelines for urban planning professionals in host cities, informing them on the impact newly developed embassy typology will have on the long-term city development. With this tangible impact, observable in the public space of host cities in case studies, it is recommended for all new embassy developments to be constructed in pre-planned urban neighborhoods/matrices, with special safety and/or other [e.g. size of the plot, vicinity to the important city nodes, etc.] consideration, minimizing the negative impact on the public space and overall city development.

3. *Illusion* of openness (achieved with softer architectural and spatial manipulations; “good” soft power architecture was recognized and practically applied as the one providing convincing *illusion* of openness and accessibility)

Theoretical

1. Global shift of a privileged embassy **to** that of a soft power architecture typology.
 - In that sense, this Thesis provides guidelines for gradual transition to implementing a more transparent construction procedure (e.g. the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia was built without usual privileges guaranteed by the VCDR) and management processes (e.g. the Japanese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, although perceived as “closed” by the general public changed this initially negative perception with numerous cultural activities [movie showings, art exhibitions, etc.] and “open door” policy [visits from kindergartens and elementary school children, educational seminars on various aspects of the Japanese life and culture, etc.]).
2. NOT within the spatial dimension – abolish VCDR privileges in the current scope (some privileges and right may be retained but reinterpreted in a way to avoid negative spatial consequences).
3. WITHIN the spatial dimension: spatial dispersion of the diplomatic mission in multiple locations in host cities OR its placement in a controlled environment (pre-determined urban matrix).

As an overall conclusion, it is postulated that architecture (spatial manifestation) will not (cannot) play a conclusive role of soft power architecture (currently), as the rigid legal framework already defines what and how will be built.

This research aimed to identify the particularities of mechanisms, manifestations and spatial consequences of the conceptually presented typology of soft power. This architectural manifestation was defined as exported architecture utilized for ideological reproduction i.e. dissemination of officially sanctioned/desirable messages of national identity. Based on the provided research framework for this typology and presented case studies, it was concluded that theoretical and/or practical replacement or evolution of currently utilized diplomatic-consular headquarters, in both conceptual and spatial terms is unlikely. The results indicate that security considerations and specific privileges awarded to these

typologies greatly influence its impact onto the urban environments of host cities and limit the normally guaranteed freedoms in the public space.

While the unvarying flux of the surrounding processes limits the generalizability of the results, this approach provides new insight into the complexities of ideological narrative-building and formation of identity, to be exported and presented as a permanent spatial manifestation in a foreign context. The requirement of complexity (of themes, methodologies and discussion) in this project has proven to be of paramount importance, as otherwise, the complexities of the examined themes would irrevocably suffer from reductionism and oversimplification.

This research clearly illustrates the requirements of safety consideration for this particular typology, but it also raises the question of legality and justification for limiting or abolishing the freedoms previously present in the public spaces of host cities.

Based on these conclusions, architects and urban planning professionals, especially the ones in the host countries, should consider advocating for a more involved approach in dealing with these typologies. Although comparatively rarely built, diplomatic-consular headquarters typologies can prospectively cause profound and long-lasting spatial consequences, potentially hindering the planned development of urban environments where placed. Ideally, a transnational, interdisciplinary network of architects, urban planners, policymakers and various stakeholders ought to be created before construction of the examined typologies and the overall awareness of the expected spatial consequences increased.

To better understand the implications of these results, future studies could address the variety of urban matrices and different subsets within the examined diplomatic-consular typology. It is expected that by building a more complex and informative investigational network, the obtained results and subsequent recommendations (e.g. for architectural policies and other pertinent bilateral policies) will have broader applicability and be more easily disseminated.

Further research is needed to determine and interpret the involvement of architecture and urban planning professionals in the processes of conceptualization, implementation and management of soft power architecture. The question of ethics was previously breached, as special privileges awarded to the examined typologies oftentimes supersede relevant urban planning laws and the justification for certain actions of architecture professionals ought to be examined in more detail.

As official governing bodies tend to possess limited awareness of the possible positive effect that soft power architecture can ensue and/or the lack of interdepartmental synchronization hider these goals, this research is a step towards providing a clear explanation of the necessity for a holistic approach and long-term effects soft power architecture can have in both spatial and policy terms.

The comprehensive literature review exploring the main concepts and topics related to the theories of ideology, identity, international relations, policymaking, architecture and urban planning, to name a few, have been utilized to address the current gap in knowledge. Previous studies have not made an active connection between the impacts of exported architectural typologies onto the host urban environments in this scope, as previous studies focused on individual aspects of conceptualization, implementation and management of these typologies, but did not approach these concepts holistically.

As the notion of soft power architecture is new, the main purpose of this study is to provide a starting point and a comprehensive overview of the all various facts important for its academic investigation. Its additional function is to serve as a basis for further development and refinement of the provided methodology. The presented general methodological approach for research and monitoring the implementation and different lifecycle points of soft power architecture placed in urban environments will hopefully be used to highlight the necessity for controlling the potential limitation of freedoms in the public space.

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