

BASIC TENETS OF RHETORICAL PRAGMATICS

Prof. Dr.

Fareed Hameed Al-Hindawi

Lect. Dr.

Hussain Hameed Mayuuf

Asst.Lect.

Waleed Ridha Hammoodi Al-Juwaid

University of Babylon

Abstract:

This study tackles the basic tenets of Rhetorical Pragmatics. It starts with a brief idea about Rhetoric; its relationship with Dialectics, Communication, and Pragmatics. The study adopts Leech's(1983) model of communication which involves explaining Interpersonal Rhetoric with its components: the Cooperative , Politeness, Irony and Banter principles. An idea concerning Textual Rhetoric is also presented by this work through highlighting some of its significant aspects and principles. The paper also deals with rhetorical pragmatic strategies, types of arguments, figures of speech and tropes. The paper ends up with a brief idea about Strategic Maneuvering in argumentation.

Keywords: Rhetoric, Pragmatics, Argument, Argumentation, Cooperative principle, Tropes and Strategic maneuvering.

1 Rhetoric

1.1 Historical Background

Rhetoric has its roots in the culture of Greece and Rome as a system of persuasive techniques. Rhetoric is defined as "the ability to see, in any given case, the available means of persuasion". Rhetoric is the convincing use of language. This discipline flourished by the appearance of Aristotle's Rhetoric in the 4th century (BC.) by the work of the famous Roman teachers of rhetoric such as Cicero and Quintilian.

Aristotle made a distinction between the following major channels of persuasion:

- 1- Appeal via emotion
- 2- Appeal via reason
- 3- Appeal by ethics

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This distinction is seen in the three-fold category of styles:

- 1- **Logos**: persuasion through reasoning. (The use of logical arguments)
- 2- **Ethos**: persuasion by stance and personality. (speaker as truthful, reliable, trustful and worthy person)
- 3- **Pathos**: persuasion by affecting emotions. (in the audience)

(See sections: 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 below)

Arabs were also inspired by this art. Their rhetoric began by the publication of Al-Jirjani's famous books; (اسرار البلاغة Asrar-al-Balagha) "The Secrets of Rhetoric" and (دلائل الاعجاز - Dla'il al-I'jaz) "Miraculous Evidences". Al-Sakkaki also is celebrated for his role in organizing Arabic rhetoric.

Arab rhetoricians divide علم المعاني ، علم البيان ، علم البلاغة into three parts: علم البديع.

(For more detail see: Ramadan, 2003; Al-Qizweeni, 739/2000; Al-Atheer, 637/1984; Abu Ali, 1999).

Currently, rhetoric is developing once more. Leech (1983: 15) makes clear that the importance of rhetoric stems from the emphasis it "places on a goal oriented situation, in which speaker (s) uses the language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of hearer (h)." Leech follows Halliday in classifying rhetoric into INTERPERSONAL and TEXTUAL rhetoric. Each consists of two principles: the politeness principle (PP) and the cooperative principle (CP). These principles, in turn, consists of a set of maxims and sub-maxims (See figure (2) below).

Rhetoric is an argument designed to persuade a specific audience. In other words, it (i.e., Rhetoric) is the study of persuasion. Rhetoric uses language in such a way to attract and/or alter people's decisions by both rhetorical figures of speech (See sec. 5.3 below) and argumentative appeals (See sec. 5.2 below) (Dave, 2008).

Kennedy (2007) considers rhetoric as "the energy inherent in emotion and thought transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions or actions. When we express emotions and thoughts to other people with the goal of influencing (persuading) them, we are engaged in rhetoric."

Lakoff (1982) defines persuasion to be a non-reciprocal effort or aim of one person to modify the intentions, behavior, feelings, or viewpoint of another person using a means of communication. Persuasion can be recognized "as a directive speech act" where the purpose of the speaker is to commit the hearer to him/herself to do some course of action. Hence, persuasion is a try to make the world match the words.

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Thus, according to Larrazabal and Korta (2002: 1) "it is quite difficult to "marry" such an ancient discipline as rhetoric with such a new discipline as pragmatics, if we do not put both in the same "register level", i.e. in the level of intentionality."

1.2 Pragmatics and communicative Intentions

Pragmatics focuses mainly on the communicative use of language that is regarded as an intentional human act. Communicative intentions mean that:

"A intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention".

(Grice, 1989: 220.)

Grice (Ibid.) indicates that communicative intentions are meant to produce some effect on the addressee. It seems that what the speaker usually intends by his or her communicative action is to modify the addressee's mental states. The speaker's intention when saying, for example, "It is raining" can be to persuade the "addressee to believe that it is raining" (Ibid.).

Recent work in Pragmatics considers linguistic perception a process of recognizing the communicative intentions of speakers. Addressees rely heavily on extra-linguistic and linguistic information for arriving at that recognition. Typically, pragmatic studies neglect the perlocutionary effects on the audience whether they are intended or not intended by the addressee. Here lies the contribution of Rhetoric. Perlocutionary intentions, such as persuading, convincing, etc., are taken to comprise the foundation of rhetorical studies (Ibid.).

1.3 Rhetoric and Dialectic

Some earliest scholars, such as Aristotle think that rhetoric and dialectic are synonymous. In fact this is not the case because there are fundamental differences between the two fields in what they do and how they do it. One basic difference between the two is that dialectic has two participants taking turns; the proponent makes a move and then the respondent makes a move responding to a prior one. Dialectic always takes as its framework of an argument a connected sequence of moves. Rhetoric, on the other hand, does

not appear to fit in this model. In the rhetorical argument, Ss / Ws are seen as making a presentation to Hs/Rs without expecting mutual communications (Walton, 2007:17 [underlined items are mine]).

Another difference is that dialectic proceeds by question and answer in a logical sequence while rhetoric uses continuous exposition by all

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means of persuasion. The differences between rhetoric and dialectic can be summarized in table (1) below:

Table (1) Differences between Rhetoric and Dialectic

Rhetoric	Dialectic
One participant	Two participants
One-way communication	Two-way communication
All means of persuasion	Question and answer moves

Adopted from Al-Tamimi (2011: 37)

1.4 Rhetoric and Communication

Rhetoric does not appear to fit two participants taking turns, rather Ss / Ws are seen as making a presentation to Hs/Rs without expecting mutual communications(Walton, 2007: 17).

Rhetoric does not proceed by question and answer in a logical sequence but it uses continuous exposition by all means of persuasion. One-way communication is designed more to manipulate (influence) than to inform (Smith, 2002).

The classification of language with respect to communication technologies in terms of one-way versus two-way communication leads to four possibilities which are introduced in the table below:

Communicative Way	Examples
Two-way non-mediated communication	face-to-face conversation
Two-way mediated communication	telephone, email
One-way non-mediated communication	Lecture
One-way mediated communication	print, radio, internet, ads

(After Fairclough, 2003:77)

Rhetoric is preferably employed when there is no chance of mutual communication and information exchange.

1.5 Rhetorical Pragmatics

The most striking difference between Rhetoric and Pragmatics is the fact that Pragmatics is typically descriptive while Rhetoric is prescriptive*. The most important similarity between Rhetoric and Pragmatics is, of course, the focus on the use and function of language and the role of language in different activities. Also, both disciplines try to give account for non-explicit or non-verbal information in discourse, such as implicatures and gestures respectively. Speech act theory considers some of the main functions of rhetoric under the label of perlocutionary speech acts, e.g. convince, judge and defend. It seems reasonable to say that pragmatics has a wider coverage than, and subsumes the subject matter of rhetoric (Larsson, 1998: 9).

The concept of rhetorical pragmatics is referred to by Walton (2004:21) as using a proposition to fulfill a "goal in an argument or to make the language very effective within a particular context as through the use of figures of speech." One common and important type of goal is to successfully convince or persuade a respondent.


The relationship between pragmatics and rhetoric is deeply rooted, since the time of Aristotle, rhetoric as a discipline has been the primary source of pondering about persuasion. According to Booth (2004:31), the fundamental aim of rhetoric is to find out the most successful language to communicate a thought in a certain situation, and then to change its expressions to be suitable for various situations. This makes rhetoric fall within the scope of pragmatics [as stressed above] because, as Sadock (2006:318) asserts, the suitability of language within a particular situation regarding various contextual factors is the main area of pragmatics. In this regard, many linguistic strategies (choices) are at hand in rhetoric for communicating thoughts ranging from explicit to implicit and from argumentative to figurative strategies.

Walton (2007:18) argues that Ss/Ws resort to rhetoric to consider;

- (1) the way to create reasonable emotions in audience (pathos), the way to display a trustworthy character (ethos), and the way to give the available facts and arguments (logos); and
- (2) the linguistic options of using metaphor and irony, for instance, to ornament the language and attract the attention of Rs/Hs.

The relationship of rhetoric, argument and persuasion in rhetorical pragmatics may be shown in figure (1) below:

Figure (1) the relationship of rhetoric, argument and persuasion in rhetorical pragmatics



Adopted from Walton (2007: 18)

2. Leech's Model of Communication

Leech (1983: 56-59) adopts Halliday's concept of the functions of language, but treats them differently. Halliday (1973) proposes three functions of language, and treats them as being intrinsic to grammar. The three functions are presented below:


The ideational function: language functions as a means of conveying and interpreting experience of the world.

The interpersonal function: language functions as an expression of speaker's viewpoints and impact upon the hearer's attitudes and behavior.

The textual function: language functions as a means of constructing a text, such as the spoken or written realization of language.

Leech interprets the ideational function as grammar (such as phonology, semantics, and syntax), but the interpersonal and the textual functions as pragmatics. Leech states that the interpersonal rhetoric and the textual rhetoric are characterized as "input constraints" and the "output constraints" of grammar respectively in the speaker's point of view of encoding process, while in the point of view of the hearer, the textual rhetoric constrains the input, and the interpersonal rhetoric constrains the output in the decoding process. To show how the linguistic communication is realized in a means-ends analysis, Leech proposes a diagram in which Halliday's three functions of language form hierarchy of components.

The figure above indicates that the discourse is by means of the
 (Leech's(1983: 59) Model of Communication)
)mCommunication, 1983)



message, which is by means of the text. The communication is successful when the speaker's intended proposition or illocutionary force in state 1 is understood by the hearer in state 6. To achieve this goal, the speaker needs to transfer his interpersonal rhetoric into a message (state 1 to 2) which is encoded into the text (state 2 to 3). This process imposes the speaker's ability of grammar, i.e. phonology, semantics, and syntax, to transfer a thought into the physical form of language. The hearer who receives the text (state 3 to 4) starts to interpret it in the opposite process of decoding which goes from the state 4 to 5 to 6.

(For more details on how the Textual Rhetoric fits into the total communicative process, see Leech, 1983: 59ff)

3. Interpersonal and Textual Rhetoric

Leech (1983), on a survey of the interpersonal rhetoric, differentiates between two sorts of rhetoric: the interpersonal rhetoric and the textual rhetoric, as shown in figure 2 below:




Figure (2) Leech's (1983) Interpersonal Rhetoric and Textual Rhetoric

3.1 The Interpersonal Rhetoric

3.1.1 The Interpersonal Role of the Cooperative Principle

Grice (1975) is famous for having discovered the "Cooperative Principle".(See Grice , 1983 for more elaboration on Grice's Maxim)

Leech (1983) expanded the scope of Grice's CP by making endeavors to explain the operation of social rationale in communication. Lakoff's "Rules of Politeness" (1973) puts forward two major rules about the notion of politeness: be clear and be polite. Lakoff (Ibid.) suggested that there are three rules for speakers to follow:

- 1) Donot impose.
- 2) Give options
- 3) Make the addressee feel good, i.e., be friendly

Later on, Leech (1983) goes a step further beyond these simple suggestions and developed his theory by adding the Politeness Principle (PP), to emphasize the idea that "politeness is an important missing link between the Gricean CP and the problem of how to relate sense to force" (Leech, 1983: 79).

3.1.2 The Interpersonal Role of the Politeness Principle

Leech (1983) manages to bring pragmatics and rhetoric together.He(Ibid.: 16) asserts that cooperation and politeness are required

as regulative factors for preserving the fruitful path of the conversation that is realized. Hence, he(Ibid.: 17) places these important pragmatic notions (i.e. the Cooperative Principle (CP) and the Politeness Principle (PP)) with the rhetorical principle of irony and principle of interest within a more general framework of Interpersonal Rhetoric.

(For more elaboration the reader may make a recourse for Leech's six maxims in Leech, 1983: 131-9, chapter 6)

3.1.3 The Interpersonal Role of the Irony Principle

Leech (1983: 102, 142) proposes the Irony Principle(IP) as a higher-order principle. According to Leech, the CP and the PP have direct role in promoting effective interpersonal communication whereas the IP is parasitic (depending on, clinging) on the CP and the PP and its function "can only be explained in terms of other principles." In Leech's view, the IP "enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming to be polite" (Leech, 1983: 142).

The speaker performs irony by insincere politeness. The insincerity may take the form of a breach of the maxim of Quantity or more often a breach of the maxim of Quality.

Example (1): That's all I wanted!

Example(2): Bill wanted that news like he wanted a hole in the head.

(Leech, 1983.142)

These two examples are non-observance of the maxim of Quality, used ironically, example (1) means "That's exactly what I did not want," In example (2), the insincerity of the speaker's opinion is clear from the absurdity.

Leech observes that when performing an irony, "speaker appears to make an innocent assumption which is observably untrue, and by that means implicates that the opposite assumption, which is impolite, is true." (Leech, 1983: .143) The IP provides a method of avoiding direct criticism, insults, threats, etc.

3.1.4 The Banter Principle

According to Leech (1983: 144), irony is a friendly way of being offensive; however, banter is the opposite. It is an offensive way of being friendly. The Banter Principle is expressed as follows:

In order to show solidarity with the hearer, say something which is obviously untrue.

obviously impolite to the hearer.

The implicature that is derived from the banter principle is "what the speaker says is impolite to the hearer and is clearly untrue. Therefore

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what the speaker really means is polite to the hearer and true." (Leech, 1983:144).

Banter often appears in casual linguistic conversation, particularly among young people. For instance, in a chess game, one player could say jokingly to another:

"What a mean, cowardly trick!" denoting a particular witty maneuver, or when two pals greet each other with comments like:

"Here comes trouble!" or

"Look what the cat's brought in !"

The Banter Principle is based on the fact that the more intimate the participants are, the less polite they seem to be. Thus, lack of politeness may be an indication of intimacy and the participants may establish and maintain such a close relationship by bantering.

3.2 The Textual Rhetoric

The textual pragmatics has been chiefly illustrated by the Maxim of End-focus. Slobin (1975) has proposed a scheme for the Textual Rhetoric in which there is a set of four principles, and each principle can be subdivided into maxims. The four principles are:

a-Be clear

b-Be humanly processible in ongoing time

c-Be quick and easy

d-Be expressive

Slobin (Ibid.) purports that "these precepts are observed by languages themselves, rather than by the users of languages". Thus, under conditions of change, languages will always tend to change in directions which preserve these principles.

Slobin (Ibid.) presents that these principles are actually at work in languages themselves: such arguments are consonant (in line) with the case for regarding grammars as being "under the functional influence of pragmatics". However, Slobin's principles should be labeled, according to Leech (1983: 65-67) as follows:

3.2.1 The Processibility Principle

The processibility principle designates that the text be introduced in a way that makes it easier for the addressee to interpret in time. There are three types of decisions which are interrelated:

1. The way to segment messages into their units, .
2. The way to assign degrees of subordination or prominence to various portions of the message.
3. The way to order the parts of the message.

For example:

That Simon will resign is on the cards.

It is on the cards that Simon will resign.

Many movement transformations (e.g., the rule of extraposition) serve what is called the Maxim of End-weight by helping to ensure that complex constituents are positioned in the final position of a sentence or clause (Leech, 1983: 65).

3.2.2 The Clarity Principle

The Clarity Principle applies to different levels of coding, but in general it may be split into two maxims, (a) a Transparency Maxim: It retains a direct and transparent relationship between semantic and phonological structure (i.e. between message and text). (b) Avoid ambiguity: For instance,

The morning came at last when we were due to leave.

The separation of the modifying clause- when we were due to leave from its head morning obscures the relationship between argument and predicate. The requirement to avoid ambiguity is closely connected with transparency, but it can be important in its own right (See Leech, 1983: 66-7).

3.2.3 The Economy Principle

This Principle means "Be quick and easy". If a text can be shortened without impairing the message, the amount of time and effort involved, both in encoding and in decoding, will be reduced.

On the phonological level, for example, economy favours elisions, assimilations, and other abbreviating and simplifying processes. Similarly, on the syntactic level, Leech(1983: 67) mentions that the "Economy Principle has a contributory Maxim of Reduction which might be simply enunciated as "Reduce where possible". However, the reduction should not be used where it results in ambiguity. The processes which are subsumed under the heading of 'reduction' here are

(a) pronominalization,

(b) substitution by other pro-forms, e.g.: do, so,.. etc.

(c) ellipsis (or deletion). (Leech, *ibid.*)

For example, the following sentence is an example of injudicious (inadvisable) pronominalization: in order to avoid ambiguity in this case, S would have to sacrifice economy by reusing the noun "milk", e.g.,

-If the baby won't drink cold milk, **the milk** should be boiled.

(*Ibid.*)

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The pragmatic point about reduction is that it abbreviates the text, and often simplifies its structure, while maintaining the re-coverability of the message. It is when, for some reason, the message's recoverability is impaired that reduction comes into conflict with the Clarity Principle.

3.2.4 The Expressivity Principle

This Principle deals with effectiveness that embraces "expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication", rather than simply with "efficiency". For example, an Iconicity Maxim (which invites the user, all other things being equal, to make the text imitate aspects of the message) should be included in it (Leech, *ibid.*: 68), (See also: Bolinger, 1980: Ch. 3; Leech and Short, 1981: 233-42). We may note the influence of the Expressivity Principle in inhibiting reduction:

- John Brown was guilty of the crime, and John Brown would have to pay for it.
- They put in the best they had' and we put in the best we had and we beat them and beat them bad.

In each of these examples, it would be possible to abbreviate the text without causing ambiguity. The fact that the Economy Principle does not operate, although it is not inhibited by ambiguity, suggests that some other principle is in play. We can reasonably argue that these examples are cases of expressive repetition. This emphasis has some rhetorical value, for example, impressing, surprising, or stimulating the interest of the hearer. Thus, the repetition of "*John Brown*" seems to carry the implicature: 'John Brown and no one other than John Brown would have to pay for it.'

4. Rhetorical Pragmatic Strategies

Rhetorical pragmatic strategies include argumentation appeals and pragmatic figures of speech. Rhetorical pragmatic strategies are powerful tools because of the deviation that characterizes rhetorical means combined with pragmatic devices.

4.1 Rhetoric, Argument and Argumentation

Rhetoric and argument are related to each other through their aim of persuasion. An argument, as O'Keefe (1997: 121-8) puts it, has two senses. The first "refers to a kind of utterance or a sort of communicative act". To put it in a simpler way, an argument is something that **a person makes**. Commands, apologies, promises, etc., are all instances of argument. By contrast, the other sense of argument "refers to a particular kind of interaction". It is something that **people have or engage in**, as in bull sessions, quarrels, discussions, etc.

4.1.1 Pragmatic Reasoning of Argument

An argument is using language for specific purposes, such as to attract or persuade (Walton, 2004:5), and it is categorized under the rubric of rhetorical pragmatics. The term "argument" is differentiated by Walton (2006:2) from "argumentation" in that the latter is a broad concept that denotes a dynamic process of connecting arguments together in a dialogue. It includes many arguments and participants in a dispute.


There are two types of arguments: monological and dialogical (Besnard and Hunter, 2008:10). The former is the construction of S's/W's argument for and against a particular conclusion (claim). It is a reasoned process of one-way-communication viewed as an internal process for S/W with perhaps a tangible output (e.g., sentence, article, etc.) intended to persuade. In this type of arguments, there is no representation of a dialogue between agents or entities. The latter is a set of Ss/Ws or entities that interact to construct an argument for and against a particular claim.

If Ss/Ws offer an argument, one or more of the other agents may dispute the argument (Cf. Holmes, 2005:81).

Besnard and Hunter (2008:11) introduce some examples of monological arguments and the kinds of agents or entities that are responsible for producing them:

- A newspaper article by a journalist.
- A political speech by a politician.
- A magazine advertisement by an advertiser.

All monological arguments are either one-to-many argument or auto-argument. One-to-many argument is the one that distributed by S/W or entity for other Hs/ Rs or entities, as in, a magazine ad by an advertiser, a lecture by a scientist, or a speech by a politician. Auto-argument, on the other hand, is done by S/W identifying "key arguments and counterarguments for their own use", such as for problem analysis prior to making a decision. **For example, when someone buys a house s/he has a limited budget, a list of features s/he likes, and a list of features s/he dislikes.** It is not directed toward specific Hs/Rs or entities (ibid.). The following figure summarizes the aforementioned argument types in relation to the communicative form discussed above:



Figure(3) Represents Argument Types in Relation to the Communicative Form (After Al-Tamimi, 2011)

Two important differences between the monological and dialogical arguments are needed to be explained here. First, the dialogical argument, according to Eemeren et al. (2009:2), proceeds or succeeds by refuting and justifying a proposition between a protagonist and an antagonist. By contrast, for the monological argument, where no antagonistic answer is expected, an appeal to pathos, ethos or logos is the key notion of the proceeding or success of the argument. Second, the structure of the dialogical argument includes four stages(1): Confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, concluding stage , while it includes a one-stage in the monological argument.

(1)See Walton (2006: 299) and Van Eemeren (2009:47) for more details on the four stages of the dialogical argument.

4.1.2 Pragmatic Structures of Argument

Toulmin's (2003:87) model identifies the content of the argument as made by one stage direction, viz., not confronting to four stages argument. His (ibid.) structure of the argument is pragmatic in the sense that: (a) what determines the structure is the situation in which Ss/Ws, propositions, and context do work together; (b) the propositions support one another in their content but not in their syntactic structure; (c) the structure may contain only one proposition supported by other propositions that could be implicit and inferred from the context. He (ibid.) recognizes three primary premises or propositions of the pragmatic structure of the argument. They are data, warrants, and claims. He (ibid.) explains them as follows:

Data (grounds) are facts appealed to as a foundation for the claim. They are the "fact" or subject matter on which the argument is based. They may include the proof of expertise, statistics, authorities, etc. For example:

- Over 70% of all people over 65 years have a hearing difficulty.

Warrants are inferences that link data to the claim. Rs/Hs depend on the warrant to believe or react to the conclusion. Warrants may be explicit or

unspoken and implicit. They answer the question "Why should we believe or react to the claim?" For example:


- A hearing aid helps most people to hear better.

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Claims (conclusions) are propositions Ss/Ws ask other people to accept and respond to. They include arguing information to be believed as true or actions to be reacted to. For example:

-You should use a hearing aid.

Toulmin's (2003:87) model can be diagrammed as follows:



**Figure (4) Propositions of the Pragmatic Structure of the Argument.
(After Toulmin, 2003: 87)**

The pragmatic structure of data, warrant and claim is not obligatory. It may include one or two propositions depending on the way Ss/ Ws want to present their arguments. Walton (2004:142) expands on Toulmin's model by adding the notions syllogism and enthymeme.

4.1.2.1 Syllogism

The complete pragmatic structure of data, warrant, and claim represents a structure of an argument Walton (2004:146) calls the deductive argument or "Syllogism". He (ibid.) states that a syllogism is an argument in which the three propositions are spelled out. The data and warrant provide a guarantee for the truth of the claim. For example:

All xs are y, and

Z is an x,

Therefore, z is a y.

-All plants are living things.

All trees are plants.

Therefore, all trees are living things.

Walton's (2004:106) syllogistic argument includes the three propositions of Toulmin's (203:87) model. But, once it misses a proposition (whether a datum or warrant), it would turn to be "enthymeme".

4.1.2.2 Enthymeme

The incomplete pragmatic structure of arguments is referred to as an inductive argument or "Enthymeme". An enthymeme is an argument: with (an) implicit proposition(s). In rhetorical reasoning, the enthymeme is a truncated syllogism in which one or two propositions are left out and assumed by Hs/Rs. It makes the logic harder to test because the whole argument is not spelled out . The structure of the enthymemic argument

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is either a single proposition (claim) or two propositions of claim plus data or warrant . For example:

1 - A sole claim argument:

-Save 20% (BBC Focus Magazine, 2011)

This is an enthymemic argument which includes a sole claim that requires Hs/Rs to respond and save 20% of their account.

2- A two-proposition argument of data and claim:

-Walking Festival Guide 2011

-Find the perfect walking festival near you.

(BBC Countryfile Magazine, 2011)

4.2 Argumentative Appeals (Rhetorical triangle)

4.2.1 Ethos

Ethos refers to the credibility or ability to carry out an argument. The aptitude to persuade is influenced by the credibility of the document. Boone and Kurtz (1994: 41) delineate credibility as the "degree to which a statement, a person, and/or a company is perceived to be ethical, trustworthy, and sincere". It is strongly connected to the perception of audience of how "believable a speaker" is (Ibid.).

4.2.2 Pathos

The term Pathos refers to emotional appeals, which are intended to make hearers feel compassionate, afraid, angry, proud, reverent and shameful, or the like. Thus, the appeal to pathos is directed towards the emotions of the audience. In many situations, emotion remains the most powerful persuasive factor. When logical arguments occasionally fail, emotions frequently have the ability to motivate people to respond (Boone and Kurtz, 1994:42).

4.2.3 Logos

The third pragmatic strategy of the argument is the appeal to reason or logic (logos). It denotes the message internal consistency, the clarity of the claim, the logic of its reason and the effectiveness of its confirming proof.

Appealing to reason do not infringe the ethics of strict logic; these ethics are only logic adaptations. Thus, "the syllogism and induction" are the forms that reasoning takes in logic while "the enthymeme and the example are the forms that reasoning takes in rhetoric" (Corbett, 1990).

4.3 Figures of Speech

Propositions can be expressed in a variety of ways. One way is to use rhetorical figures of speech, such as metaphor, understatement, pun, etc.

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These rhetorical figures of speech deviate from the norm by flouting (a) maxim(s) of "conversational interaction" (Levinson, 1983: 110).

Figures of speech are of two types: **Schemes**(1) and **Tropes**. A figure of speech in the schemata mode involves a deviation from the typical patterns or arrangement of words(Schemata). It is a change in the standard word order or pattern. For example, repetition, ellipsis, etc. By contrast, in the tropic mode a figure of speech involves a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of words. For example, pun, hyperbole, etc (MacQuarrie and Mick, 1996: 3).

(1)Schemes will not be dealt with throughout this presentation as they are out of the scope of this presentation).

4.4 Tropes(Rhetorical Devices)

A trope twist words away from their usual meanings or collocations.A trope refers to "language used in a figuration way for a rhetorical purpose". For example, Mark Antony's speech from Julius Caesar:

Friends, Romans and Countrymen, lend me your ears...

The phrase "lend me your ears" is used figuratively for rhetorical ends, hence, it is a trope. It carries more powerful impact than "listen to me for a moment", for instance. There are two kinds of tropes:**Destabilization** and **Substitution** tropes.

4.4.1 Destabilization Tropes

The rhetorical operations of destabilization is seen to involve the use of an expression whose meaning is indeterminate in its context. In the destabilization trope, one means more than is said, and relies on the recipient to develop the implications.

4.4.1.1 Metaphor

The rhetorical pragmatic strategy of metaphor depends on flouting the maxim of quality. It necessitates comparing two things X and Y, in which X is completely recognized with Y as if X is Y itself. This comparison between two different entities aims to arouse imaginative interpretation of one in the light of the other.

In metaphor the convention of truthfulness is deliberately violated. For example:

- **Computer is a brain.**

4.4.1.2 Simile

Simile is an explicit comparison (using "like" or "as") between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common (Cruse, 2006: 165).

- She walks like a proud peacock.

Harris et al (2005: 3) argue that a metaphor and simile are structurally the same except for the presence of the explicit comparison markers such as 'like' and 'as'. Similes and metaphors are also very similar in meaning.

- Her eyes were like diamonds.
- Her eyes were diamonds (Ibid.: 3).

4.4.1.3 Irony

Irony is defined as a discrepancy between what a speaker says and what he or she believes to be true, as in the utterance “What a sunny day!” during a storm (Xiang Li, 2008: 5).

From a pragmatic perspective, irony is seen as sub-strategy of a broader category of indirect speech acts as well as conversational implicatures, on which it entirely relies (Attardo, 2001: 165).

To conclude, irony is a complex rhetorical pragmatic strategy, which engages speakers and hearers on various levels, if they appreciate it, they feel themselves to be part of the ‘in-group’ addressed, and are therefore not only entertained, but flattered. Consider exchange below between two college students. The piece of conversation took place in the students' apartment. The conversation focused on some ‘unwelcomed’ visitors who were invited to stay with them by another obnoxious roommate:

Anne: "By the way, were our wonderful guests still here when you came out and ate lunch?"

Dana: "I had a sandwich and ..."

Anne: "Isn't it so nice to have guests here?"

Dana: "Totally!"

Anne: "I just love it, you know, our housemates. They bring in the most wonderful guests in the world and they can totally relate to us."

Dana: "Yes, they do" (Gibbs and Colston, 2001: 189)




Figure (5): A Continuum of Some Rhetorical Tropes (After Mendoza and Peña, 2007)

4.4.1.4 Pun

A pun involves using a word in two different meanings resulting in two different interpretations of the same statement. A pun is an ambiguity; specially, a fore-grounded lexical ambiguity. A pun is substitution based on accidental similarities. Pun can be divided into four terms, they are:

1. Pun (Homonym)

One word can be taken in two senses. For example:

- The right contacts,
- How to make a home run.

2. Pun (Antanaclasis)

Repeating a certain word in two different meanings or repetition of the same word or form or sound but in different senses. For examples:

- Today's Slims at a very slim price, and Skin things that do

3. Pun (syllepsis)

A verb takes on a different sense as clauses it modifies unfold. For example:

- He drives a car fast, a bargain hard, and mowers to distraction.
- Built to handle the years as well as the groceries.

4. Pun (resonant)

A phrase is granted a different meaning by its co-occurrence with a picture. For example:

- Will bite when cornered [picture of car splashing up water as it makes a turn]

4.4.2 Substitution (Emphasis) Tropes

Tropes, such as overstatement and understatement, are intended to exercise emphatic effect on interlocutors; accordingly they are labelled as emphasis tropes (Harris, 2008: 5).

The rhetorical operations of substitution decides on an expression that needs an adjustment by the addressee so as to get the intended meaning. Within destabilization, the meaning may go different, while in substitution it sways in a scale. Types of substitution tropes include: overstatement (hyperbole), which refers to cases where the description of the speaker is more effective than when it is warranted by the described state of affairs; **understatement** (litotes), which denotes the opposite of hyperbole and rhetorical questions (**strong/weak assertive force**).

4.4.2.1 Rhetorical Questions

A rhetorical question flouts the quality maxim and does not expect an answer. Pragmatically speaking, rhetorical questions (henceforth RQ) possess the illocutionary force of an assertion with a polarity that is

opposite from what is seemingly asked. This means a negative RQ possess an illocutionary force of a positive assertion and a positive RQ owns an illocutionary force of a negative assertion. Besides, RQs often generate conversational implicatures, and tend to involve the maxim of quality or manner so as to validate certain claim or persuade others of one's attitude or belief (Black, 2006: 26).

When a speaker wishes to assert that somebody, who is known to her audience and her, is a weird person, she may do so by benefiting from an RQ emphasis trope which implies a conversational implicature that is generated by means of breaching the quality maxim, as illustrated in the following exchange:

A: John is a nice guy to hang with.

B: Right!! Didn't he behave mysteriously lately??

B's utterance reads as "John is not the right person to hang with due to his enigmatic behaviour".

4.4.2.2 Overstatement (Hyperbole)

Overstatement is the superordinate term which encompasses hyperbole and other phenomena related to amplification, excess, and superfluity (Ruiz, 2006: 791). In the present work hyperbole is employed to refer to overstatement. It is a type of extremity. It is an exaggeration that either minimizes or magnifies some real state of affairs. Apart from metaphor, hyperbole is the most widespread trope (Sert, 2008: 3). It is a rhetorical pragmatic strategy which Leech (1983: 145) considers as a case where Ss/Ws description is stronger than the actual situation. It is detected from the flouting of the maxim of quality, for example:

- It made my blood boil. (Leech: *ibid.*)

Boiling is essentially assigned to water and other liquids but not to blood.

Hyperbole embraces intended exaggeration for pragmatic effect to increase impact on interlocutors, forming attitudes and opinions and even impressing the others' attitudes and opinions to certain persons.

4.4.2.3 Understatement (Litotes)

Understatement is a statement of quantity or intensity of something that is less than what its natural states are. It is the opposite of overstatement but similar in the flouting of the maxim of quantity (Cruse, 2006: 186). For instance,

- He was a little intoxicated.

When said of a man who has broken all the furniture.

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An understatement is conspicuously less informative than some other statement. In other words, it is a by-product of flouting the maxims of quantity and quality.

Interlocutors are constantly more satisfied to find out a thing better than promised rather than less than promised. A person who is modest of his own talents typically wins his/her audience admiration more easily than the one who is egotist or biased. Alternatively, Harris (2008: 9) assures that understatement intentionally communicates an idea as less important than it is, either for ironic emphasis or for expressing politeness and tactfulness. More importantly, understatement ought to be used as a device for tactfulness and modesty. Consider the following:

- The girl next door is little bit naughty. (Gibbs and Colston, 2001: 5).

It seems that all the rhetorical tropes surveyed in this sub-section are of value to the process of expanding locutions. This value is derived from the power of persuasion they have on the one hand, and the pragmatic devices (CP maxims and PP maxims) they are combined with to form more complex pragma-rhetorical-strategies on the other hand. Eventually, these rhetorical principles (strategies) open the channels of communication but they do not provide the main motivation for talking.

It is Leech's Cooperation and Politeness principles that keep these channels of communication open.

5.Strategic Maneuvering

Strategic Maneuvering is described as advocates' attempts to exploit the available opportunities in the "dialectical situation" to rhetorically steer the discourse in the direction that best serves their own interests (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2001: 151). There are two strategic maneuvers:

1. Maneuvers involving the same arguments

This strategic maneuver entails contrasting gain-framed appeals, those who emphasizes the favoured facet of compliance with the adopted view) and loss-framed appeals, those who emphasizes unwanted aspects of non-compliance. The gain-framed appeal stresses the advantages of advocating the communicator's recommended standpoint. The loss-framed appeal asserts the disadvantages of not approving the advocated view.

At least, five different maneuvers may involve the messages which offer identical argumentative considerations:

- gain-loss appeal framing,
- identified versus unidentified information sources,

explicit versus implicit conclusions,
figurative versus literal expressions.
complete versus incomplete (enthymematic) arguments, and
For example,
Television has harmful effects.
Television is poison.

The two messages introduce identical underlying arguments;
however, when one message utilizes a more literal language (i.e.,
"television has harmful effects"), the other one uses a figurative
expression (i.e., "television is poison").

2. Maneuvers involving the different arguments

By comparison, consider the contrast between one-sided and two-
sided persuasive messages; and culturally-adapted versus unadapted
value appeals (O'Keefe, 2009: 289):

The one-sided message presents supporting arguments only, i.e., the
arguments that supports the view of the advocated; a two-sided message
presents both supporting arguments and discusses opposing arguments.
"The contrast between one-sided and two-sided messages is thus a
contrast that involves different arguments in the two messages." (Ibid.).

ملخص البحث

يُعدُّ البحث الحالي بدراسة المبادئ والنظريات الأساسية للتداولية البلاغية. يبدأ
البحث بفكرة ملخصة عن علم البلاغة وعلاقته بالجدلية وبالتواصل والتداولية. تتبنى
الدراسة نموذج التواصل لليتش (١٩٨٣) الذي يشتمل على بلاغة التفاعل مع
الآخرين ومكونات هذه البلاغة: أصول التعاون والتأدب والتهكم والمزاح. ويقدم البحث
أيضا نبذة مختصرة عن بلاغة النص وبعض مبادئ المهمة وتناقش الدراسة استراتيجيات
تداولية بلاغية وأنواع من المحاججة وأساليب أدبية كالاستعارة والتشبيه والمجاز. تنتهي
الدراسة بفكرة مختصرة عن المناورة الاستراتيجية في الحجاج.

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