Reading the Ideology of Salafi Da'wah: Media Technology Perspective

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Abstract: *Salafi expand da'wah using various media technologies. The use of various media as a means of Salafi da'wah shows that Salafis accept the presence of media technology well and use it to build an ideological da'wah movement. The discourse in this study was completed by qualitative research using a literature study approach, data analysis techniques using flow techniques with data reduction, data display, and formulating conclusions with data analysis. This study concludes that da'wah using media technology causes ideological conflicts with external parties, especially with traditional da'wah groups (eg Nahdlatul Ulama/ NU). The Salafi da'wah ideology can be accepted by the wider community because it uses new media as a place of work. New media for salafis is not only a place of preaching work but also a place to fight for their ideological authority. Salafi constructs ideological constructions through various digital images. The construction of Salafi ideology in digital images actually illustrates that the ideology of Salafi da'wah is not monolithic.*

Keywords: *Ideology, Da'wah, Salafi, Media Technology.*

A. Introduction

The focus of this research is to analyze the ideological preaching of Salafi using various media technologies. This research is considered important because Salafis have expanded their da'wah using various social media.[1] This justifies the thesis that Salafis do not reject the presence of media technology but utilize it in building ideological da'wah movements.[2] Salafis actually accept positively the presence of new media (read: internet) in four ways: strategic, contextual, polemical, and ideological.[3] It is this latter acceptance (ideological) that does not change the Salafi da'wah movement even though the era has entered the digital era.

Salafi build various da'wah narratives so that their ideology can be accepted by the global community.[4] Salafi da'wah tries to enter into various social networks by way of infiltration, agitation, and propaganda.[5] Salafi build ideological framing using various media, for example currently the popular ones are *Rodja TV* and *Rodja Radio*.[6] Borrowing Adeni's thesis, the fundamentalist da'wah communication built by Salafi is actually paradoxical because the Salafi da'wah methods themselves are not quite right.[7]

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[1] M. Sultan Latif Rahmatullloh dan Durotul Ngazizah, "Tafsir Salafi Online di Indonesia; al-Walā' wa al-Barā' sebagai Landasan Pergerakan Salafi Jihadis," *Journal of Islamic Civilization 3*, no. 2 (2022): 160-161, https://doi.org/10.33086/jic.v3i2.2650.

[2] Jamil Ammar dan Songhua Xu, "Yesterday's Ideology Meets Today's Technology: A Strategic Prevention Framework fo Curbing The Uses of Social Media by Radical Jihadist," *Journal of Science and Technology 26*, no. 2 (2016), https://www.albanylawscitech.org.

[3] Asep Muhamad Iqbal, "Agama dan Adopsi Media Baru: Penggunaan Internet oleh Gerakan Salafisme di Indonesia," *Jurnal Komunikasi Indonesia 2*, no. 2 (2017): 77, https://doi.org/10.7454/jki.v2i2.7834.

[4] Alexander Thurston, "The Salafi ideal of electronic media as an intellectual meritocracy in Kano, Nigeria," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion 83*, no. 4 (2015): 1058–1083, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfv054.

[5] Zaini Tamin AR dan Riduwan, "Resistensi Dakwah Salafi terhadap Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah di Sidoarjo," *SANGKéP: Jurnal Kajian Sosial Keagamaan 3*, no. 1 (2020): 51, https://doi.org/10.20414/sangkep.v3i1.1881.

[6] Lukman Al-Hakim, "Framing Dakwah Salafi Rodja TV di Media Sosial Youtube," *Islamic Communication Journal 6*, no. 2 (2021): 177–190.

[7] Adeni, "Paradoks Komunikasi-Dakwah Fundamentalis Salafi: Kasus Masjid Nurul Jam'Iyah Jambi," *Jurnal Dakwah Risalah 31*, no. 1 (2020): 48, https://doi.org/10.24014/jdr.v31i1.8882.

Regardless of the notion that Salafi is a radical Islamic movement,[8] in fact Salafi is accepted by some Indonesian people, especially in urban areas.[9] An important factor why Salafi can be accepted by some Indonesian people is because Salafi preach their ideology massively offline and online. Technological media is only one of the many methods used by Salafis in preaching online or using the internet network. Offline, Salafi built many Islamic boarding schools and various educational institutions which are sometimes considered to be contrary to local culture.[10]

The success of Salafi in preaching their ideology in the media and in several Islamic boarding schools proves that Salafi is really serious about preaching with the strength of his ideology. The success of preaching the Salafi ideology perhaps justifies Jahroni's assumption that Salafis in Indonesia have a charitable network with Saudi Arabia. If this assumption is correct, of course, it still needs to be investigated further, how this relationship continues.[11] This description illustrates that the propagation of Salafi ideology is not monolithic because it uses many methods. Starting from Islamic boarding school education, international cooperation, using media technology and so on. This Salafi missionary strategy that uses many methods can be traced to Chozin's writings, which read about the rise of Salafi in Indonesia since the Reformation Era.[12]

The Salafi acceptance of media technology that is not monolithic justifies Iqbal's thesis that the presence of internet technology provides various opportunities for fundamental movements. The

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[8] Rubaidi, "Variasi Gerakan Radikal Islam di Indonesia," *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman 11*, no. 1 (2011): 33, https://doi.org/10.24042/ajsk.v11i1.607.

[9] Muhammad Irsyad Suardi, "Pemurnian Islam Dakwah Salafi Diterima Masyarakat Kota Padang" (Tesis S2, Magister Sosiologi, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Andalas, Padang, 2022).

[10] Nafik Muthohirin, Muhammad Kamaludin, dan Fahrudin Mukhlis, "Salafi Madrasas: Ideology, Transformation, and Implication for Multiculturalism in Indonesia," *Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan 10*, no. 1 (2022): 81–100, https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v10i1.14380.

[11] Jajang Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and The Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 58*, no. 1 (2020): 35–62, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.35-62.

[12] Muhammad Ali Chozin, "Strategi Dakwah Salafi di Indonesia," *Jurnal Dakwah 14*, no. 1 (2013): 1–25.

internet is a public space that is used to build the vision, mission and ideological goals of the fundamental Salafi movement.[13] The presence of the internet, which is cheap and easy, has become a place for authority and religious ideological contestation between modernists and conservatives.[14] Salafis as part of the trans-national movement do not want to miss opportunities. The massive use of the internet by the Salafi ideology rejects the views of Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel, who think that in the era of globalization, religion is no longer rational and lacking in interest.[15] This thesis seems to fail because using media technology, religion with its ideological practices undergoes a unique transformation. Salafi religious ideology which is considered conservative is not dead but lives on using media technology.[16]

The theory used to answer the problem of Salafi da'wah uses media technology, namely the theory of technology developed by Branston and Stafford. Media technology theory can be elaborated with 4 (four) key concepts: technology and conflict focus, changes in media technology, smart technology and the workplace, digital imaging. Technology includes facilities designed in such a way as to facilitate transactions and human work, especially media technology. If we look at the revolution, in the past, humans were only able to express themselves, their culture, and their groups through paintings on cave walls. Nowadays, humans are very free to express themselves

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[13] Asep Muhamad Iqbal, "Penggunaan Internet oleh Salafi di Indonesia Kontemporer," in *Internet dan Gerakan Salafi di Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Awal*, ed. oleh Sepa Labqi (Sleman: Diandra Kreatif, 2019), 72.

[14] Hasse Jubba, *et.al.*, "The Contestation between Conservative and Moderate Muslims in Promoting Islamic Moderatism in Indonesia," *Cogent Social Sciences 8*, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2022.2116162.

[15] Christopher Adair-toteff, *Max Weber's Sociology of Religion* (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 1-10; See also Emile Durkheim, *Emile Durkheim The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, ed. By. Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free Press, 1995); See also Dominika Motak, "Georg Simmel's Concept of Religion and Religiosity," *Studia Religiologica 45*, no. 2 (2012): 109–115, https://doi.org/10.4467/20844077SR.12.008.0824; See also Georg Simmel, "Religon and Modernity," in *Essay on Religion*, ed. oleh Horst Jurgen Helle, Ludwig Nieder, dan Philip E. Hammond (London: Yale University Press, 1997), 1-20.

[16] Abd. Rachman Assegaf, "Gerakan ransnasional Islam dan Globalisasi Salafi di Islamic Center Bin Baz Yogyakarta," *Millah: Jurnal Studi Agama 16*, no. 2 (2017): 147–172

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in the media. Advances in technology have changed the way we work and opened up creative freedom and opportunities. In the economic context, digital technology also offers space for transactions to audiences that can be pursued as promotional media.[17]

Iqbal's research explains that although orthodox in attitude and doctrine, Salafis have managed to make very good use of media technology (especially the internet). Salafi use the internet network to build an ideology to fight their enemies such as liberal Islam, Syiah, and so on.[18] Adeni and Hasanah's research proves that Salafis, who are considered to have a radical ideology, have turned into traditional moderates. Salafis want to be moderate by leveraging media technology such as the Rodja community network.[19] Research Sanjaya et al. actually found that Salafi ideology was accepted by the wider community by utilizing new media along with the interests of capitalism. Salafi produces and distributes religious content on Rodja TV's Instagram which is used for aggregation of Salafism followers.[20]

The various research results above are interesting to develop, of course, with other perspectives and other theories, especially the theory of media technology. This study seeks to analyze the Salafi da'wah which succeeded in expanding its da'wah network using various media. This research is different from some of the studies described above, because the research above has not used media technology theory. The results of the research discussed above have not succeeded in concluding Salafi preaching in the perspective of media technology, technology and conflict focus, changes in media technology, smart technology and the workplace, digital imaging. This research is certainly a new finding in explaining why Salafi preaching can be successful using media technology.

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[17] Gill Branston dan Roy Stafford, *The Media Student's Book*, 3 ed. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 422-442.

[18] Asep Muhamad Iqbal, "Internet, Identity and Islamic Movements: The Case of Salafism in Indonesia," *Islamika Indonesiana 1*, no. 1 (2014): 81.

[19] Adeni dan Silviatul Hasanah, "Considering the Moderate Da ' wah Path of the Purist Salafism: Rodja TV Community Case," *International Conference on Religion, Spirituality and Humanity 6*, no. 2 (2019): 163–180.

[20] Makroen Sanjaya, *et.al.*, "The Practice of Digital Capitalism and The Commodification of The Salafi Community On Instagram Rodjatv," *International Journal of Environmental, Sustainability, and Social Science 3*, no. 3 (2022): 577–591, https://doi.org/10.38142/ijesss.v3i3.248.

This study uses qualitative research with a literature study approach. This research offers a paradigm of da'wah communication or Islamic communication. This approach was developed from several Islamic communication studies built by Andi Faisal Bakti.[21] In this study, communication theory originating from Western theory is then elaborated with da'wah theory. Data is also collected from various relevant literature, especially books and journals. The data analysis technique is the flowing technique with data reduction, data display, and formulating conclusions used as the final process, data analysis. The nature of the data analysis used is descriptive analytic, by interpreting or interpreting the obtained literature data.[22]

B.   Salafi Media and Its Conflict Focus

According to Branston and Stafford, in media technology theory, the first thing that is discussed is that the presence of technology gives rise to class conflict.[23] This theory can be elaborated to discuss ideological conflicts that arise because the Salafi da'wah movement will certainly continue to experience academic debate.[24] In line with the rise of the Salafi da'wah itself which is indeed very homogeneous in the midst of a globalized world.[25] However, globalization has made it easier for Salafis to spread their da'wah ideology using studies outside the network and massively using various media networks.

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[21] Andi Faisal Bakti, *Communication and Family Planning in Islam Indonesia: South Sulawesi Muslim Perceptions of a Global Development Progam* (Jakarta: INIS, 2004); See also Andi Faisal Bakti, "Paramadina and its Approach to Culture and Communication: an Engagement in Civil Society," *Archipel 68*, no. 1 (2004): 315–341, doi:10.3406/arch.2004.3840; See also Andi Faisal Bakti, "The Contribution of Islamic Communication in Indonesian National Integration," in *Islam in Various Perspectives* (Yogyakarta: LPMI, 1995).

[22] Ajat Rukajat, *Pendekatan Penelitian Kualitatif (Qualitative Research Approach)* (Sleman: Deepublish, 2018); See also Meinarini Utami dan Suci Ratnawati, "Asbabun Nuzul Ayat Al-Qur'an Berkaitan Produktivitas dan Media Pembelajaran Online," *Studia Quranika: Jurnal Studi Quran 6*, no. 2 (2022): 217–239, https://doi.org/10.21111/studiquran.v6i2.5464.

[23] Gill Branston dan Roy Stafford, *The Media Student's Book*, 3 ed. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 423.

[24] Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century By Henri Lauzière* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 1-22, https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/ety017.

[25] Richard Gauvain, *Salafi Ritual Purity: In The Presence of God* (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 5-10.

Salafi da'wah, which should be considered radical conservative, can be accepted, especially by urban communities.[26]

The acceptance of Salafi da'wah by urban communities is supported by the growth of transnational media networks starting from the Middle East region.[27] This Salafi da'wah movement continues amidst the growing notion that the presence of Salafi da'wah actually creates conflict and resistance with the community.[28] Conflicts with the government, for example, Salafi Jihadists and Salafi Haraki who clearly reject the democratic system because they are considered *kufr*.[29] The conflict between the Salafi group and other Islamic community groups, for example, is caused by the interpretation of which group has the most right to be considered as *ahlu sunnah wal jama'ah*.[30]

In addition to the explanation above, the conservative textual Salafi ideology that triggers this ideological conflict is faced with moderate Islamic groups.[31] In the end, the ideological conflict caused by this Salafi da'wah cannot stop the penetration of Salafi da'wah ideology using various media networks. Although not many people know that within the Salafi community there has been a lot of competition over what being a Salafi should be like.[32] In fact, the

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[26] Chris Chaplin, "Salafi Activism and the Promotion of a Modern Muslim Identity: Evolving Mediums of Da'wa Amongst Yogyakartan University Students," *South East Asia Research 26*, no. 1 (2018): 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X17752414.

[27] Raihan Ismail, *Rethinking Salafism: The Transnational Networks of Salafi 'Ulama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia*, *Rethinking Salafism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 47-53, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190948955.001.0001.

[28] Hasbialloh, "Eksistensi Lembaga Pendidikan Salafi di NTB (Kajian Resistensi dan Konflik Keyakinan Serta Motivasi Masyarakat Memilih Lembaga Pendidikan Salafi)" (Doctoral Dissertation, Pascasarjana Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram, 2021), 247.

[29] Abdul Jamil Wahab, "Membaca Fenomena Baru Gerakan Salafi di Solo," *Dialog: Jurnal Penelitian dan Kajian Keagamaan 42*, no. 2 (2019): 221, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v42i2.335.

[30] Mona Abdel-Fadil, "The Islam Online Crisis: A Battle of Wasatiyya vs Salafi Ideologies?," *Cyber Orient 5*, no. 1 (2011): 4–36.

[31] Arif Zamhari, Muhamad Ibtissam Han, dan Zulkifli, "Traditional Religious Authorities in New Media: A Study of the Cariustadz.id Platform as an Alternative Cyber Fatwa and Da'wah Media Among the Middle-Class Urban Muslims," *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah 21*, no. 1 (2021): 65, https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v21i1.20300.

[32] Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff dan Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani, "Contemporary Salafism in Singapore," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 41*, no. 1 (2021): 157–178, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2021.1894389.

internal competition of the Salafis is caused by activities to gain authority. Each group that wants to be perceived as a true Salafi uses a strategy of delegitimizing and discrediting other Salafi groups.[33] This division within the Salafi body was caused by the presence of new media which in the end they had to choose what Salafi preaching was like. Borrowing the idea of Conscience that Salafis in one situation experience a *moral panic*.[34]

In the ideological context, Salafi preaching is fragmented rather than cohesive and solid. Salafi da'wah uses media that are considered conservative even though they do not reject capitalism. Salafi radio da'wah broadcasts try to fight for their ideology while still uniting transnational Islamism and local culture.[35] Penetration of Salafi ideology in the local context then encouraged the change of commercial radio into the form of Salafi da'wah radio. The change from commercial to Salafi da'wah carried out by Batam radio, Sella FM, Radioqu Big FM, and Hang FM occurred due to changes in the spirituality of the owners and the religious needs of the Batam Muslim community.[36] This description provides important information that ideological class divisions are caused by technology, which actually leads to conflict both vertically and horizontally. Salafi da'wah utilizes media technology to voice its conservative ideology, shifting the traditional ideology of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The rise of Salafi da'wah using radio has led to various conflicts with the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) group.[37]

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[33] Sunarwoto, "Salafi Dakwah Radio: A Contest for Religious Authority," *Archipel: Études interdisciplinaires sur le monde insulindien*, no. 91 (2016): 229, https://doi.org/10.4000/archipel.314.

[34] Shinta Nurani, "Media Baru dan Moral Panic: Studi Atas Majlis Al-Khidhir," *Jurnal Aqlam: Journal of Islam and Plurality 4*, no. 1, (Juni 2019): 134–149.

[35] Masduki, *et.al.*, "Islam on the Air: The Struggle for Salafim through Radio in Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 12*, no. 1 (2022): 60, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i1.59-84.

[36] Media Zainul Bahri, "Islamisme Terselubung Versus Moderat Islam: Mencermati Geliat Radio-Radio Dakwah di Batam," in *Suara Salafisme: Radio Dakwah di Indonesia*, ed. oleh Din Wahid dan Jamhari Makruf (Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta dan Prenada Media Group, 2017), 58.

[37] Tasman Rozalia, "Radio Rodja: Kontestasi Ideologi Salafi di Ranah Siaran," *Jurnal Kajian Dakwah dan Kemasyarakatan 22*, no. 2 (2018): 151, http://doi.org/10.15408/dakwahv22i1.12066.

According to Branston and Stafford, media technology actually has its own gender. For example, in broadcasting production in the mass media, women are not given a proper place as professionals.[38] In some cases, for example at Salafi Islamic boarding schools, the use of technology (eg gadgets) is strictly prohibited for use by students. This prohibition is based on the reason that the use of media technology by female students will affect the morals of the female students, for example in terms of manners. There are also Salafi Islamic boarding schools which use media technology integrally in the learning process. The technology used by Salafis, for example, is by utilizing social media Instagram which is supported by the convenience of the internet. Apart from the debate over the acceptance of this media technology, in fact many new media have been used by networks of Salafi groups to seek ideological cadres.

Salafis use various terminologies that are popular for the younger generation of Muslims, for example hijrah, khilafah, intolerance, jihad, and others.[39] Globalization then encourages the growth of the role of women in several radicalism practices. Women are elevated in rank but instead their position is used to build a radical movement collectivity.[40] This provides information that actually technology itself for Salafis is not only used as a medium for ideological propaganda. Technology forms a new space of authority for Salafis to continue voicing their identity which was previously considered anti-modern.[41] In essence, the development of media technology for the Salafi group is to provide various fortunes.

Modernity and the presence of technology have finally opened opportunities for Salafi women to bring themselves into the public

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[38] Gill Branston dan Roy Stafford, *The Media Student's Book*, 3 ed. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 422-442.

[39] Siti Mufida dan Mustolehudin, "New Media dan Konflik Ekstrimis Perempuan Indonesia," *Jurnal Bimas Islam 13*, no. 2 (2020): 345–370, https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v13i2.231.

[40] Sityi Maesarotul Qori'ah, "Keterlibatan Perempuan dalam Aksi Terorisme di Indonesia," *Sawwa: Jurnal Studi Gender 14*, no. 1 (2019): 31, https://doi.org/10.21580/sa.v14i1.2967.

[41] Richard A. Nielsen, "Women's Authority in Patriarchal Social Movements: The Case of Female Salafi Preachers," *American Journal of Political Science 64*, no. 1 (2020): 52–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12459.

space.[42] So far, Salafi women seem to be closed off from the public sphere because they are asked to recite qona'ah as proof that they are pious.[43] For the Salafi group, women who are considered shalihah are those who wear the veil and mostly hide themselves in the house. When leaving the house, a Salafi woman must cover her entire body and only reveal her face.

Most Salafi women can be identified using the veil as an ideological symbol of being closed. Aligning Dzuhayatin's ideas who suspect that the niqab or veil does not only function as a cloth covering the face and a symbol of piety but becomes a Salafi ideological doctrine.[44] The presence of technology then opened up the opportunity to challenge the domestication practices of Salafi women.[45] They use media technology to reject the domination of gender that has been practiced by their group. It is now very easy to find Salafi women wearing stylish veils on their social media. This provides evidence that actually Salafi women practice a Western consumerist lifestyle.[46]

All of the descriptions discussed above are based on literature review, media technology for Salafis can be formulated into two views. The first is that Salafis use media technology to manage their ideological conflicts both internally and externally. Internally, for example, technology has opened up divisions within their group. Some groups want to be recognized as the legitimate authority holders as Salafis. They use the media to preach as well as make claims about who should be considered a true Salafi.

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[42] Alexander Thurston, "The Salafi ideal of electronic media as an intellectual meritocracy in Kano, Nigeria," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion 83*, no. 4 (2015): 1058–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfv054.

[43] Tobibatussaadah, Dharma Setyawan, dan Dwi Nugroho, "The Economics of Salafi Feminism: Portrait of Social Construction and Entrepreneurship of Salafi Women in Lampung Indonesia," *Inferensi: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 15*, no. 2 (2022): 217, https://doi.org/10.18326/infsl3.v15i2.217-236.

[44] Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, "Islamism and Nationalism Among Niqabis Women in Egypt and Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 10*, no. 1 (2020): 50, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.49-77.

[45] Khotijah dan Ahmad Madkur, "Domestikasi Perempuan Salafi: Konstruksi Sosial Perempuan Salafi di Kota Metro Lampung," *Kafa`ah: Journal of Gender Studies 8*, no. 2 (2018): 197, https://doi.org/10.15548/jk.v8i2.219.

[46] Kristin M. Peterson, "Hybrid Styles, Interstitial Spaces, and the Digital Advocacy of the Salafi Feminist," *Critical Studies in Media Communication 37*, no. 3 (2020), 254–266, https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2020.1786142.

Internally, the use of media technology opens up a new space of authority for Salafi women who have been confined to conservatism. Salafi women use media technology to be present in public spaces openly. They are prohibited from socializing openly, but they use technological media (eg social media) to socialize. The domestication of Salafi women has again been challenged by the presence of more modern media technology.

C. Media Technology as a Salafi Workplace

Branston and Stafford note that there are two human ideas when it comes to media technology. There are several groups of people who are anti-technology or called *technophobia*. However, there are also other groups that accept the presence of media technology, called *technophiles*.[47] This theory can be used to see how Salafis accept media technology and why they accept it. Although considered a radical group, Salafis have never rejected the presence of media technology. In the case of Indonesia alone, Salafi da'wah is popular using various media platforms.

Salafi in Indonesia is an ideological Islamic group that has independent television networks, *Rodja TV* and *Rodja Radio*.[48] This information is only a fraction that can be counted, in fact there are still many local media that are ideologically managed by Salafi. Several local media belonging to Salafi, for example *Bass FM Radio* in Salatiga,[49] *Majas Radio* and *ICBB Radio* in Yogyakarta,[50] and various other local media networks managed by Salafi.

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[47] Gill Branston dan Roy Stafford, *The Media Student's Book*, 3 ed. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 434.

[48] Andi Faisal Bakti, "Media and Religion: Rodja Tv's Involvement in The Civil Society Discourse for Community Development," *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication 34*, no. 3 (2018): 226, doi:10.17576/JKMJC-2018-3403-13. See also Tasman Rozalia, "Radio Rodja: Kontestasi Ideologi Salafi di Ranah Siaran," *Jurnal Kajian Dakwah dan Kemasyarakatan 22*, no. 2 (2018): 151, http://doi.org/10.15408/dakwahv22i1.12066.

[49] Khoirin Nisai Shalihati, "Islam Puritan Dan Otoritas Agama: Dakwah Radio Bass FM Di Salatiga," *Jurnal Dakwah Risalah 30*, no. 2 (2019): 168, https://doi.org/10.24014/jdr.v30i2.8227.

[50] Rifqi Muhammad Fatkhi, *Islamisme di Balik Layar dan Kontestasi Dakwah di Udara Yogyakarta* (Jakarta: Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2017).

Another case shows that *Radio Rodja* in Bogor is a Salafi radio station spreading Islamic puritanism which in several ways rejects the values of modernity. *Radio Rodja* speakers seem unwilling to use modern ideas such as democracy, human rights, women's rights, arts and education.[51] Perhaps this is what Wahib calls the puritanization of Salafi in Indonesia. They want to be Salafi in Indonesia, but are stuck only in using various symbols. Being a Salafi means that all rules of life must return to the Al-Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet by rejecting modernity and traditionality. This puritan ideology built by Salafi actually creates a distance with other Muslims.[52] It shouldn't be seen as a contest, because technology is also used by Salafis in building their social interactions. Technology is not value-free, information technology, especially social media, is actually used as a medium for building Salafi networks locally.[53]

The presence of new media initiated by the internet has further popularized Salafi da'wah which is considered conservative. Salafi integrates conventional media that they once had with online media. *Rodja TV* broadcasts that used to be difficult to access because they use FM frequencies are now available on YouTube.[54] *Rodja Radio,* which previously was also limited in broadcasting because it had to use AM or FM frequencies, is now easy to find. Because *Rodja Radio* has transformed using a digital network. Many experts or observers have concluded that the Salafi missionary movement is conservative. But with the presence of this media technology, the thesis built by these scholars can be broken. Salafi is growing and being accepted by

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[51] Ayang Utriza Yakin, "Salafi Dakwah and the Dissemination of Islamic Puritanism In Indonesia: A Case Study of the Radio of Rodja," *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies 22*, no. 2 (2018): 205, https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v22i2.335.

[52] Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, "Being Pious Among Indonesian Salafis," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 55*, no. 1 (2017): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.551.1-26.

[53] M. Ali Syamsuddin Amin, "Interaksi Sosial Pengikut Salafi di Kabupaten Majalengka," *Jurnal Komunikasi 53*, no. 9 (2018).

[54] Rodja TV Live Streming is a YouTube channel owned by Salafi, which was created on March 3, 2020. When the researcher accessed the Rodja TV YouTube channel, it had already published a total of 4,342 preaching videos. The videos on this YouTube channel have also been watched by more than 3 million viewers. You can check out the Rodja TV YouTube channel, "RodjaTV Live Streaming," accessed on August 3, 2022, at *https://www.youtube.com/c/MenebarCahayaSunnah/channels*.

society driven by the use of new media. Although there is resistance to technology, it is usually only a small part of the Salafi group. Salafi groups who reject the use of gadgets against students in several educational institutions because they do not support facilities and policies that prohibit the use of internet technology.[55]

In addition, social media is also not spared from the da'wah built by Salafi. As an example, there are several studies on *YouTube* which popularize Khalid Basalamah's da'wah. Another Salafi preacher who is also popular on *YouTube* social media is Syafiq Basalamah. If you search *YouTube*, you will find many channels that popularize Salafi da'wah besides Khalid Basalamah.[56] Media technology has finally changed the workplace of Salafis who used to be conservative outside the network, now it is very popular to use media technology.[57] Which Islamic group is easily accepted among migrating celebrities, the Salafi group or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The answer, although subjective, is that Salafi preaching is more easily accepted by the urban Muslim middle class.[58] Symbolically, the urban Muslim middle class who emigrated adopted many Salafi styles, for example beards, cropped trousers, and study themes carried out in urban areas.[59]

In fact, new media opened up the discourse of Salafi da'wah which is increasingly popular in the international community.[60]

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[55] Athiyatul Ulya, Feby Artwodini Muqtadiroh, dan Ahmad Muklason, "Identifikasi Faktor Resistansi Guru Terhadap Teknologi Sebagai Pendukung Pembelajaran di Pondok Pesantren Salaf," *Jurnal Nasional Teknologi dan Sistem Informasi 7*, no. 1 (2021): 18, https://doi.org/10.25077/teknosi.v7i1.2021.18-26.

[56] MGI TV, "Hukum Pidana Islam Bagi yang Melakukan Zina-Ustadz Suryana," accessed on August 5, 2022, *https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVhHooOHXRw*.

[57] Jeudi Aneigia Branchais dan Agus Machfud Fauzi, "Aktivitas Dakwah Gerakan Salafi pada Masa Pandemi Covid-19," *Al-Mutharahah: Jurnal Penelitian dan Kajian Sosial Keagamaan 18*, no. 1 (2021): 52, https://doi.org/10.46781/al-mutharahah.v18i1.225.

[58] Oki Setiana Dewi dan Ahmad Khoirul Fata, "Beragam Jalan Menjadi Salih," *Jurnal Bimas Islam 14*, no. 1 (2021): 1–32, https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v14i1.325.

[59] Sunaryanto dan Ahmad Rofi Syamsuri, "Hibriditas Keislaman Generasi Z dan Fenomena Hijrah Pop," *Ulumuna: Jurnal Studi Keislaman 8*, no. 1 (2022): 61–85; See also Sunaryanto, Sofyan Rizal, dan Zulkifli, "Religious Bourgeois Lifestyle of Celebrity Hijrah: Reading the Resurrection of the Muslim Middle Class Based on Cultural Imperialism and Global Economic Factors," *Muharrik: Jurnal Dakwah dan Sosial 5*, no. 1 (2022): 63–87, https://doi.org/10.37680/muharrik.v5i1.1209.

[60] Marius Linge, "The Islamic Network: A Case Study of How Salafi Da'wa Emerges, Mobilizes and Tranfsorms in a Norwegian Context" (Thesis Master, Faculte Des Letters et des Science Humaines Departement D'Historie-Relationns Internationales, Unversite Saint-Joseph, 2013).

During the television era, Indonesian people were once popular with Kyai One Million People or KH. Zainuddin MZ. The typology of da'wah built by the preachers of a million people is very traditionalist and moderate. As a Betawi preacher, Zainuddin MZ often criticizes the government with comedic satire. People in that era knew the figure of a cultural preacher who could unite the lower middle class. Currently, the era of digital technology has shifted the authority of traditional scholars and even raised ideological contestation between internal Salafi as a transnational movement and traditional Islamic movements.[61] As an example, there has been ideological enmity between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Salafi by utilizing various new media to gain congregations.[62]

Apart from Indonesia, it is also necessary to look at the development of international Salafis in using media technology as an ideological workplace. This fact needs to be explained to make a hypothesis that the Salafi da'wah is ideologically very popular through new media networks. The presence of new media has encouraged Salafi da'wah to shift its way of preaching from offline to massive online networks.[63] In line with Sorgenfrei's research findings that working Salafi preachers use social media *influencers* to spread Salafi messages and products, interpret and claim religious authority, and propagate Salafi ideology or authentic Islam.[64] All of these explanations lead to an important point that Salafis, although they are considered ideologically conservative, they utilize media technology as a workplace. In particular, social media is a public space that provides an advantage for Salafis in building their ideological network.

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[61] Jajang Jahroni dan Andi Faisal Bakti, "Contestation and Representation: New Forms of Religious Authority in Disruptive Indonesia," *Epistemé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman 17*, no. 2 (2022).

[62] Dewi Masyitha, "Aswaja Commodity a Conflict Study Between NU and Salafi in Pasuruan City," *Indonesian Journal of Social Sciences Volume 11*, no. 01, (Januari-June 2019): 19.

[63] Rüdiger Lohlker, "Fundamentalism and The Internet," *Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society 2*, no. 2 (2016), https://doi.org/10.14220/23642807-00202004.

[64] Simon Sorgenfrei, "Branding Salafism: Salafi Missionaries as Social Media Influencers," *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 34*, no. 3 (2021): 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341515.

D. Construction of Salafi Ideology through Digital Images

According to Branston and Stafford, in media studies it is important to analyze the impact of technological change and the differences between attitudes developed in photography and cinema. So to discuss digital images as a representation of Salafi da'wah ideology we will analyze two forms, images that are spread on the internet, Salafi *YouTube*, and films that represent Salafi ideology.

Kulsum and Darajat's writings can be used to open the initial debate as to how Salafis represent their ideology using social media. So far, Salafi has always been regarded as a group that builds radical da'wah. But the findings of Kulsum and Darajat's research reveal that Khalid Basalamah preaches using Instagram in a moderate way. However, the #(hastaq) that was used used the word Salafi to gain mass and proved successful in its use. Da'wah themes on the *Instagram account* @khalibasalamahofficial actually use Islam that feels light, for example marriage, home, household and history of the Prophet. The important conclusion is that preaching with Salafi using Instagram can be accepted by the wider community.[65]

Media technology (eg social media) is a place to represent various ideologies. In fact, it is not only a space for ideological representation, social media can also be a space for ideological interpellation, for example Salafi. By using digital images on Instagram, the Salafi group then builds a re-interpretation and *reimitation* to the next follower. The series of *re-interpellations* and restrictions eventually formed the Salafi da'wah and the ideological order of Salafus Salih.[66] This provides information that actually the representation of Salafi ideology is not objectivated as a conservative ideology. Salafi ideology on social media, for example, can actually give birth to a new ideology that seems to be in the form of a hybrid.

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[65] Umi Kulsum dan Deden Mauli Darajat, "Strategi Konten Dakwah Salafi di Instagram," *Al-Mubin; Islamic Scientific Journal 4*, no. 1 (2021): 9, https://doi.org/10.51192/almubin.v4i1.91.

[66] Makroen Sanjaya et al., "Reinterprellation and Reimition of Convervative Ideology Salafi Through The Mediatization of Religion on Instagram Rodjatv," *Eduvest-Journal of Universal Studies 2*, no. 10 (2022): 1985–1997, https://doi.org/10.36418/eduvest.v2i10.615.

As if to harmonize the above ideas, Salafis often reject some cultures that Salafis themselves consider to be unclean. Misbah in his writings reveals what is referred to as a rejection of pleasure. Salafis use *Instagram* social media, for example, to reject music that is considered haram with the hastaq *#musikharam*. Although it is not concluded as a radical activity, the Salafi movement rejecting music by the Salafi is a Salafi strategy to expand its ideological network.[67] Contesting the meaning of hadith, this terminology can perhaps be used to understand Salafi rejection of music using *#hastaq that music is haram*. It needs to be understood, so far basically the Salafi movement has acted in the name of the Sunnah. Refusing music to use social media is a movement for the contestation arena of Salafi with other Islamic movements using hadith.[68] The contestation of the use of hadith by Salafi can also be found in the popularity of the *cinkrang* pants hadith meme on social media. This cingkrang pants meme with hadith narration is an attempt by Salafi to build their identity and ideology. As a space for ideological context, social media seems to be put to good use by Salafis to continue building their da'wah ideology.[69]

Why can the findings of all the descriptions above regarding Salafi ideology be said to be textual and subjective. Branston and Stafford themselves stated that something that exists in digital images is a construction of reality. Digital image is a representation of not actual reality, which means a constructed reality.[70] In the context of the ideology of Salafi da'wah using digital images, of course the meaning is text which is subjective because it is constructed. From textual to subjective, it is a narrative built by several social media

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[67] Aflahal Misbah, "Fun and Religious Authority: Socializing Anti-Music on Instagram," *Jurnal Masyarakat & Budaya 21*, no. 2 (2019): 149–68.

[68] Syahridawaty dan Saifuddin Zuhri Qudsy, "The Contestation of Hadith Memes on the Prohibition of Music Kontestasi Meme Hadis Keharaman Musik," *Journal of Hadith Studies 2*, no. 1 (2019): 23–36, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.32506/johs.v2i1.530.

[69] Miski, "Hadis Celana Cingkrang dalam Media Sosial," *Jurnal Harmoni: Multikultural dan Multireligius 16*, no. 2 (2017): 291–306, https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v16i2.7.

[70] Gill Branston dan Roy Stafford, *The Media Student's Book*, 3 ed. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 422-442.

accounts with the Manhaj Salaf. Gender construction tends to be biased and discriminatory. In this case, the discrimination carried out by the Manhaj Salaf account is in the form of stereotypes such as negative labeling of women's identities.[71] Think of the meaning of gender or the role of women in the online public space today as not monolithic. The hadith about the role of women is contested in the social media space by textual and contextual groups. How women are interpreted in the online public space will continue to be debated because each group uses its own perspective, textual and contextual.[72]

On the aspect of identity, Salafi seems to also try to use social media in constructing their ideological construction. The use of digital space by Salafi women provides creative space to speak up and show their agency. Digital images don't just stop as a space for expression because Salafi women are trapped in the practice of hybridity, mimicry, and dis-identification in the space of Western culture.[73] So in general, the practice of Salafi preaching in the social media space sometimes does not change the substance of the Salafi ideology itself. Salafi only use social media as a space for preaching with various ideological constructions

Jama'ah or people who see Salafi preaching content on social media still understand active reception. They can accept or reject the Salafi ideology created in da'wah content on various social media.[74] How then social media is used as a construction of Salafi ideology is certainly not monolithic. The construction of Salafi ideology on social media is sometimes also unrelated to discussions of conservative political ideology. Salafis want their group, even if

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[71] Muhammad Mundzir, "Gender Construction in Manhaj Salaf's Account: A Study of Hadith Content on the Existence of Women in Public Sphere," *DINIKA: Academic Journal of Islamic Studies 6*, no. 2 (2021): 235–262, https://doi.org/10.22515/dinika.v6i2.4073.

[72] Nurun Najmatul Ulya, "Perdebatan Peran Perempuan di Ranah Publik Berdasarkan Hadis dalam Sosial Media," *An-Nawa: Jurnal Studi Islam 2*, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.37758/annawa.v3i1.200.

[73] Kristin M. Peterson, "Hybrid styles, interstitial spaces, and the digital advocacy of the Salafi feminist," *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 2020, 254–266, https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2020.1786142

[74] Umi Kulsum, Arief Subhan, dan Deden Mauli Darajat, "Praktik Dakwah Online di Media Sosial (Studi Kasus Pada Akun Instagram @Khalidbasalamahofficial)," *Virtu: Jurnal Kajian Komunikasi, Budaya, dan Islam 1*, no. 1 (2021).

covertly, to be a moderate movement. The desire to be moderate by this Salafi group can be seen from the successful use of internet media for their da'wah activities.[75]

What is the representation of Salafi ideology in a number of films that have become its propaganda media? Purnama and Hapsarani, for example, found that a children's series entitled Salman and Hamzah actually represented Salafi ideology. The piety of children, for example, being diligent in worship, having good behavior, and being obedient to people, turns out to be nurtured based on Salafi ideology. Even though the Salafi referred to in this film is a concept that goes back to the Al-Qur'an and As-Sunnah. The research does not discuss further about the political conservative Salafi ideology.[76] Today's Salafists can be said to be modern Salafi groups or accommodative Salafi groups because they use internet technology to build their ideological networks.[77]

E. Conclusion

Salafi builds his da'wah ideology using various media, especially new media. The Salafi da'wah movement is often accused of being a movement that carries a radical conservative ideology. This condition led to the emergence of various ideological conflicts with external parties, especially with local da'wah (eg Nahdlatul Ulama/NU). The Salafi da'wah ideology can be accepted by the wider community because it uses new media as a place of work. The Salafi da'wah ideology that used to be spread outside the network, is currently very massively spread using various online media. New media for salafis is not only a place of preaching work but also a place to fight for their ideological authority. Salafis also construct ideological constructions

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[75] Adeni dan Silviatul Hasanah, "Considering the Moderate Da'wah Path of the Purist Salafism: Rodja TV Community Case," *International Conference on Religion, Spirituality and Humanity 6*, no. 2 (2019): 163–180

[76] Muhammad Deden Purnama dan Dhita Hapsarani, "The Construction of Pious Children in Serial Salman dan Hamzah," in *The Second Annual International Conference on Language and Literature, KnE Social Sciences*, 2019, 477–493, https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v3i19.4879.

[77] PPIM UIN Jakarta, "Ringkasan Eksekutif: Hasil Penelitian Tren Keberagamaan Gerakan Hijrah Kontemporer" (2021), 21.

DOI: http://doi.org/10.24042/ajsk.v23i1.14466

through various digital images. The construction of Salafi ideology in digital images actually illustrates that the ideology of Salafi da'wah is not monolithic. The construction of Salafi ideology through digital images sometimes resembles moderate Islam and sometimes conservative Islam appears.

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