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POLICYMAKERS TELLING THEIR STORIES: EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF EVIDENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICIES IN NIGERIA

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POLICYMAKERS TELLING THEIR STORIES: EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF EVIDENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICIES IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study examines policymakers' perceptions of the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. Specifically, it explores the kind of information, data, and ideas that policymakers in Nigeria utilise in policymaking, the relative importance that the policymakers attach to the different kinds of evidence, and the contextual political factors that influence not only the utilisation of evidence but the policy process. A major justification for this study is that while significant progress has been recorded in the use of evidence in policymaking in developed Western nations, there is a noticeable paucity of such literature in Africa. The situation is, however, gradually improving and there is an increasing awareness of the concept of evidence-based policymaking (EBP) leading to a rise in scholarly attention. Nevertheless, a significant number of the burgeoning Afrocentric literature focuses on the relationship between research and policy, with only a few empirical research dealing with the notion of evidence. In Nigeria, studies on the use of evidence in policymaking focus largely on health policies and the use of evidence in the development of non-health policies is an under-researched area.

This study seeks to answer the main question: *“What is the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria?”* The study adopts an exploratory, inductive, multiple-case study design to examine the development of four federal government policies. Data collection was based on triangulation. First, 36 respondents (nine for each policy) were purposively selected and interviewed using a semi-structured interview method. A total of 20 of the interviews were conducted face-to-face while 16 were done through the telephone. Second, online questionnaires were administered to the 36 respondents after the completion of all the interviews. Third, policy documents, including reports on policy successes, failures, and remedial actions were analysed.

Findings showed that contrary to the dominant view, a wide range of evidence is used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. This study identified nine kinds of evidence used in policy formulation: research evidence, previous policies evidence, media evidence, internet evidence, residual knowledge of policymakers' evidence, MDA (Ministries, Departments, and Agencies) evidence, local consultants' evidence, ideology evidence, and external stakeholders' evidence. Interestingly, the last four types of evidence were identified for the first time by this study as substantive types of evidence used in policymaking in Nigeria. A hierarchy of

evidence, showing the relative priority the policymakers attach to the nine kinds of evidence was developed based on data. The findings further identified three venues where the different kinds of evidence were integrated - advisory/technical committees, stakeholders' meetings/workshops, and the legislature.

Findings also showed that the government did not only play a central role in policymaking, but it also controlled the process. And even where the government decided to allow non-state actors to 'lead' the policy process, it still controlled the process from the shadows. Consequently, while different kinds of evidence are available to policymakers, the utilisation of evidence in the policy process largely depends on political considerations. So, although evidence-based policymaking is often contrasted with policymaking based on "ideology", the true picture appears to be considerably more nuanced. The study concludes by suggesting that stakeholders desirous of impacting policies should be aware of the nuances of policymaking and leverage the policymaking venues to provide relevant evidence.

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CHAPTER 1

1.0. INTRODUCTION

Democratic governments all over the world strive to improve the lives of their citizens through the development and implementation of appropriate public policies. Policymaking is, however, a complex process. As a result, seas of inks have been expended and a great deal of effort is ongoing to improve policymaking. One of the most contemporary efforts of public sector reformers in the past half-century to promote the effectiveness of policymaking is the birth of evidence-based policymaking (EBP) (Howlett, 2009). The central objective of the concept is to determine what government policies or interventions work, and why they work (Blunkett, 2000). This thinking is in response to the hitherto ideologically driven policymaking style that dominated the 1980s and the early parts of the 1990s (Banks, 2009; Davies et al., 2000a; Kay, 2011). The dominant conception of EBP involves the use of research knowledge to improve policymaking (Boaz, et al., 2008; Clarence, 2002; Head 2008; Nutley et al., 2007). A burgeoning minority view, however, argues that in addition to research knowledge, EBP encompasses other forms of ‘evidence’ including expert knowledge, stakeholder inputs, and politics (Banks, 2009; Head 2008; 2010; Kay 2011; Maddison 2012).

Notwithstanding the foregoing definitional debate, interest in EBP and its popularity has continued to grow among scholars and practitioners. Yet, while the EBP is relatively well-entrenched in developed countries (Head, 2010; Marston and Watts 2003), it remains an evolving field in developing countries (Onwujekwe et al., 2015).

1.1. Background and Rationale

My desire to undertake this study was inspired by my professional experience. Before I commenced the study, I worked in three policymaking departments at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for 14 years, cumulatively. Across these departments, I was involved in the development of numerous policies designed to regulate, and influence the behaviours of, financial institutions under the regulatory purview of the CBN in furtherance of its mandates.

In my last department, the Consumer Protection Department, I was the acting head of the Standards Development Office (SDO), responsible for the development of consumer protection policies, which are regarded as technical financial policies. In the development of policies, we typically obtained “particular sets of information...from relatively narrow circles

of actors” (Head, 2008, p.4) suggesting a fairly “closed” policy arena. To illustrate, in the development of the “Consumer Protection Regulations” (CPR) we obtained consumer protection inputs from a few sources: the internet, financial institutions, other departments in the CBN, consumer protection associations, and the World Bank. As the acting head of the SDO, I was directly involved in the entire policymaking process, including the generation and integration of the few forms of evidence obtained. Beyond my department, I was also involved in the development of other financial policies in the CBN. Based on my experiences, I have wondered how evidence generation and integration are undertaken in the development of social policies since the arena is markedly different and involves a broad range of policy actors operating in an “open” policy arena. Young et al. (2002, p.288) tell us that this arena is “messy, uncertain, unstable and essentially political”. Consequently, I wanted to find answers to the following important questions: What kinds of evidence do policymakers use in the development of social policies in Nigeria? What level of priority do the policymakers attach to the different kinds of evidence they use and why? What influence do governments exert in the policy process?

To gain insights into the concept of evidence within the broader discourse of EBP, I studied relevant literature and explored previous empirical research. This enhanced my understanding of the phenomenon and exposed me to the interesting scholarly discussions and debates surrounding it (O’Leary, 2014) some of which I present in subsequent paragraphs.

The idea that evidence should be the basis of public policy has become a popular refrain around the world and many scholars (for example Harding, 2008; Head, 2010, 2008; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012; Marston and Watts 2003) have affirmed that evidence enriches policymaking. As emphasised by Marston and Watts (2003, p.144), “It is difficult to imagine anyone arguing that policy should be based on anything but the best available evidence.”

Unpacking the concept of evidence, however, highlights deep tension and contradictions. The determination of what is considered evidence is highly contentious (Dobrow et al., 2004; Head, 2008; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012). Thus, while it is settled that the use of evidence improves policy, there are fundamental disagreements among scholars regarding what is considered evidence.

The dominant view in the literature is that evidence is information acquired through systematic research (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Kay, 2011). This position is, however, criticised by

other scholars (e.g., Gray, 2004; Head, 2008; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012) who argued that stakeholder inputs, expert knowledge, and political considerations are all part of evidence. This demonstrates that within the EBP discourse, the concept of evidence is ‘both useful and problematic’ (Tenbensel, 2008, p.2).

In addition to the debate about what is considered evidence, there is an equally important debate about the relative value of the different kinds of evidence. Of particular interest is the fact that policymakers are considered rational and as such, they prioritise certain forms of evidence over others (Cairney and Oliver, 2017). Yet, “the most fiercely debated notion in EBP is the claim...that there is an ‘evidence-hierarchy’” (Head, 2010, p.82). Consequently, scholars differ on the weight policymakers (should) accord research evidence (Marston and Watts 2003; Tenbensel, 2008), stakeholder evidence (Onwujekwe et al., 2021), expert knowledge (Lawrence et al., 2017), and ideology (Head, 2010). Indeed, there is rarely any consensus among scholars and practitioners on the value of any particular evidence (Alliance for Useful Evidence, 2015; Boruch and Rui, 2008; Hansen, 2014; Haynes et al., 2012; Leigh, 2009; Nutley et al., 2013). Notwithstanding, studies on the relative importance policymakers give to the different kinds of evidence are limited (Onwujekwe et al., 2015).

Beyond the nature of evidence, the other related key element of the EBP is the way policies are developed (Young et al., 2002). It is, therefore, useful to determine “the ‘venues’ in which policymaking takes place” (Cairney and Oliver, 2017, p.5) and the way the different players, especially governments, impact the process (Banks, 2009; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Head 2008; 2010; Kay 2011; Maddison 2012). It has been long established that policymaking is inherently political, making Nutley et al. (2002), recommend the use of ‘evidence aware’ or ‘evidence influenced’ to reflect the dominance of government in the policy process and to moderate expectation of what can be achieved. Indeed, governmental authority is critical in the determination of policy problems and their solutions (Marston and Watts 2003). A number of scholars, however, argue that in the last few decades, private-sector policy players have marginalised governments in policymaking (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Rhodes, 2017; Ryser et al., 2021).

In all, the continuous debates highlighted above deserved to be looked at from a completely different perspective to enhance understanding of the evidence phenomenon and to address gaps in the literature.

1.2. Addressing Gaps in the Literature

The extensive literature review I undertook revealed the following gaps in the literature. First, previous studies on the nature of evidence used for the development of public policies have largely focussed on developed OECD countries such as Australia, Canada, the USA, and the United Kingdom, and could be termed as predominantly Western in outlook (See for example Bennett and Holloway, 2010; Boswell, 2014; Head 2008, 2010, 2014; Lester 2018; Maddison 2012; Marston and Watts 2003; Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021; Nutley et al., 2002). Therefore, there was a noticeable paucity of evidence literature on Africa, particularly on Nigeria, which was the focus of this research. Indeed, there has been a striking difference between the level of EBP adoption and EBP capacities between the developed OECD countries and their developing countries counterparts (Head, 2010). Thus, there was a need for a study located in developing countries to address the identified gap and enhance understanding of evidence and EBP. In that regard, research organisations like the Africa Evidence Network (AEN) and the Africa Centre for Evidence (ACE) were established in the last decade to promote the use of evidence in both public and private sectors in Africa. These organisations continue to intervene in significant ways to address existing gap in evidence knowledge. For instance, in 2021, the South Africa-based Africa Centre for Evidence (ACE) contributed evidence to tackle Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1 - 17 in the continent (Africa Centre for Evidence, 2021). During the same period, the Africa Evidence Network organised the Africa Evidence Week (AfEW) which brought together 600 delegates that participated in over 100 activities tailored to promote the adoption of evidence-based policymaking (Rajagopal, 2021).

Quite surprisingly, research efforts to address the gap in evidence knowledge and promote the use of evidence in the continent fail to focus much on Nigeria despite it being a leading country in terms of economy, population, and history. For example, an influential book on the use of evidence in Africa titled “Using Evidence in Policy and Practice: Lessons from Africa”, edited by Ian Goldman and Mine Pabari (2020) examines the use of evidence in five African countries (Benin, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and West Africa) excluding Nigeria. Thus, empirical studies on the use of evidence in policymaking in Nigeria remain significantly inadequate (Akinbinu and Tiamiyu, 2016; Onwujekwe, et al., 2015).

Second, although Nigeria is gradually embracing EBP leading to increasing awareness and scholarly attention, most of the Afrocentric studies located in the country have predominantly explored the relationship between research evidence and policy (Uzochukwu et al., 2016) with

only a relatively small amount dealing with other forms of evidence. Furthermore, many of the few studies that examined other forms of evidence focussed on health policies (Onwujekwe et al., 2015; Uneke et al., 2018) resulting in much less attention being paid to non-health policies. This situation has presented me with an opportunity to contribute to a burgeoning body of knowledge by examining four non-health policies.

Third, research on the EBP has largely focused on the nature and role of evidence in policymaking with scant attention given to where and how different forms of evidence are integrated into the policy process. Another related under-researched aspect of EBP is the influence of governments in the policy process. Drawing from Young et al. (2002), it means scholarly attention has been concentrated on one key element of the EBP (the nature of evidence) at the expense of the other key element (the way policies are developed). It is clear, therefore, that an empirical study to bridge the identified gap and contribute more insights into the EBP discourse is due.

1.3. Research Aims

This exploratory study aimed to critically interrogate the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. It also aimed to explore the influence of governments in the policy process.

1.4. Research Objectives

To achieve the aims of the study, I will:

1. Identify the types of evidence policymakers use in the development of public policies.
2. Analyse policymakers' perceptions of the relative usefulness of the types of evidence they use in policy development and develop an empirical hierarchy of evidence.
3. Ascertain the sites where the different kinds of evidence are integrated into the policy process.
4. Identify the meta-governance practices employed by governments in the policy process.

1.5. Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the nature and hierarchy of evidence used by policymakers in the development of public policies in Nigeria?
2. Where are the different kinds of evidence integrated into the policy process?
3. How do governments influence the policy process?

1.6. Significance of the Study

This qualitative study is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will contribute to the body of evidence-based knowledge and provide empirical insights into the progress (or lack of progress) Nigeria has recorded in EBP. In this sense, the study becomes part of the growing literature on evidence-based policymaking in Nigeria and Africa.

Secondly, the study will evaluate policymakers' perceptions of the relative usefulness of the types of evidence they use in policy development and develop an empirical hierarchy of evidence based on the fieldwork data to serve as a contribution to existing knowledge in the area. This study will, therefore, provide respondents an opportunity to reflect on, and better understand, the policymaking process, especially the under-discussed area of evidence utilization.

Thirdly, it is hoped that the study would provide a strong incentive for increased citizen participation in policymaking in tandem with the democratic ideals of plurality and accountability. In that regard, the study could potentially assist policymakers to develop more inclusive, effective, and implementable policies considering relevant socio-political factors.

Fourthly, by elucidating the benefits of EBP, it is also hoped that the study would engender the use of evidence as an imperative in policy development, enhance policy implementation, and promote good governance.

Finally, the study will provide relevant information to future researchers who wish to study EBP, either within the Nigerian policymaking environment or in similar contexts.

1.7. Research Context

The study was undertaken as an exploratory, inductive, multiple case study approach and examined four federal policies developed from 2015 to 2019 in Nigeria. A wide range of policymakers, representing different interests within the public and private sectors participated in the development of the policies. This research is, therefore, an inquiry into the perspectives of the respondents regarding the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policy in Nigeria. The research also inquired into the respondents' perspectives on how different kinds of evidence are integrated into the policy process and the influence of government in the process.

1.8. Identity Positioning

My interest in evidence and EBP is based on my personal experience as a policymaker. Having participated in the development of numerous policies, and the conception of some of them, it is natural that I have one or two biases.

My major bias is that I am an advocate of the use of multiple evidence in policy development. I have a strong belief that each form of evidence offers something different to the policy process and synthesising these disparate forms of evidence promotes inclusion, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness. Notably, of all the different forms of evidence, my personal priority is the inputs of those who would be directly affected by a policy - whom I refer to as direct stakeholders - because they provide remarkable value to the policy process on account of their lived experiences, which the policymakers rarely possess. My support for obtaining the inputs of direct stakeholders extends into the development of 'financial regulations' which are seen as technical policies. It is worth stressing that technical policies are developed to address bounded problems (Head, 2008). Notwithstanding, I have consistently advocated that for any policy, all stakeholders should be invited to the table to the extent practically possible, and their views should be considered. Also as explained in section 1.1, I have reasonable experience in policymaking.

Taken together, these biases are both an asset and a challenge (Glesne, 2006). They are an asset because I was familiar with the policy process and could ask relevant questions. They, however, represented a challenge because they could influence interpretation and analysis of data. To address that I ensured that I remained aware of these biases and framed questions in a neutral

way and listening carefully so that I allowed the data to speak. I also triangulated my data (Noble and Heale, 2019).

1.9. Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is structured into 11 chapters as follows.

Chapter one

Chapter one provides the introduction of the study and covers the research topic, the research problem, the research aims and objectives, the context of the research, and my location in the research.

Chapter two

Chapter two critically reviews relevant literature and comprises six sections. Section one introduces the concept of public policy. Section two covers selected policymaking models and theories. Section three gives an overview of evidence-based policymaking (EBP). Policymaking venues are analysed in section four. Finally, section six evaluates the governance approaches to highlight the metagovernance functions in the policy process.

Chapter three

Chapter three analyses policymaking in Nigeria and is structured into four sections. The first section provides a brief history of Nigeria. The second section discusses policymaking in Nigeria under military and democratic dispensations. The third and fourth sections cover evidence-based policymaking in Nigeria and its prospects in the country, respectively.

Chapter four

Chapter four discusses the research methodology adopted for this study, including the philosophical assumptions underpinning the study. It also outlines the data collection and analysis methods used.

Chapters five, six, seven, and eight

Chapters five, six, seven, and eight present the findings of the four case studies examined in the study.

Chapter nine

Chapter nine presents the cross-case analysis of the main findings, highlighting the congruities and incongruities among the cases.

Chapter ten

Chapter 10 analyses the main findings of the study within the context of the relationship between the findings and existing theories.

Chapter eleven

Finally, chapter 11 concludes the thesis by answering the research questions, providing the study's contributions to knowledge, limitations of the study, and opportunities for future research.

CHAPTER 2

PUBLIC POLICY: CONCEPTUALISING EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING

2.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter introduced the study in terms of its background, aims, objectives, and significance. This chapter, which is one of two literature review chapters, critically reviews relevant extant literature and is structured into six sections. Section one introduces the concept of public policy highlighting some definitions, typologies, prospects and constraints. Section two covers selected policymaking models and theories, and highlights some of their strengths and weaknesses. Section three gives an overview of evidence-based policymaking (EBP), focusing on its history, successes, and failures. Section four contextualises the concept of evidence and examines the hierarchy of evidence. Drawing from the literature, especially the iron triangle model, section five conceptualises policymaking venues. Finally, section six evaluates the governance approaches to highlight the metagovernance functions in the policy process.

2.1. PUBLIC POLICY: SOME DEFINITIONS

Like any concept in social and political science, public policy is without a generally accepted definition. Scholars and practitioners view the term from the prism of their experiences, orientation, or biases. The attempt to define it has only been partly successful as the concept is still regarded as elusive and vague (Colebatch, 2009; Hill, 2013). Thus, there still exists confusion regarding what it is and what kind of evidence is used in policy development. Interestingly, despite the difficulty in understanding it, people expect their governments to employ policies to solve their personal and collective problems.

In defining public policy, Althaus et al., (2007, p.5) state that the term is used in reference to “an authoritative statement by a government about its intentions.” This definition covers only the articulated plans of governments which makes it narrow and simplistic. Meanwhile, Richards and Smith (2002, p.1) define the term as “a formal decision or a plan of action that has been taken by, or has involved, a state organization.” This definition, like the one by Althaus et al., (2007) emphasizes the formal articulation of governments’ decisions, in addition to actions of governments in furtherance of those decisions. The foregoing definitions are,

therefore, overtly state-centric and presume that evidence from non-state actors may not be necessary in policymaking.

In terms of governments' actions to implement their intentions or decisions, majority of scholars concur with Richards and Smith and believe public policy is not just about intentions or decisions, but crucially, also about actions designed to implement the intentions or decisions of governments. In one of the earliest definitions of policy, Easton (1953, p.130) describes it as "a web of decisions and actions that allocates values." Easton affirms that decisions are mere expression of intention and as such should be recognised as the first phase of a policy while the actions to implement the decisions represent the second and more important phase of a policy. Elaborating on this definition, Hill (2013) observes that it raises some interesting perspectives including a notion that a policy involves a series of micro decisions which culminate into a macro decision; and that an action taken overtime invariably qualifies to be called a policy even if such action was not based on any formally prescribed decision.

Easton's perspective is a pragmatic one in that it stresses the need to situate the twin elements of authority and action in the policy frame. Expressing similar sentiment, Dearlove (2011, p.2) views public policy to mean "the substance of what government does; to the pattern of resources, they actually commit as a response to what they see as public problems or challenges warranting public action for their solution or attainment." On why he disregards governments' decisions or intentions in his definition, he explains:

"...I do not consider that goals, intentions, principles, decisions, wishes, objectives or anything else that has been seen as constituting a public policy represents an appropriate usage of the term."

Notwithstanding, the use of evidence in policymaking remains a debatable issue in the literature.

Returning to the definition of policy, Considine (1994, p.3), offers two interesting definitions. The first one, which he calls the 'standard view' refers to "an action which employs governmental authority to commit resources in support of a preferred value" while the 'alternative definition' involves "the continuing work done by group of policy actors who use available public institutions to articulate and express the things they value" (Considine, 1994, p.4). The standard view is state-centric in nature as it views policy as a manifestation of governmental power in the allocation of resources to achieve specified goals - a top-bottom

approach in which governments could undertake policymaking without evidence from non-state actors.

This approach, according to Maddison and Denniss (2009) has the following four major characteristics:

- a. It is designed to achieve a specific outcome.
- b. It considers both the end and the means to achieve it.
- c. It may comprise action or inaction either of which is based on knowledge derived from experience.
- d. Efforts should have been devoted to implementation regardless of the outcome.

Indeed, the standard definition bears some resemblance with the definitions offered by Althaus, et al., (2007) and Richards and Smith (2002); both state that policies are made by governments, who may wish not to obtain evidence from non-state actors.

In contrast, the alternative definition stipulates that policy is arrived at through interactions among different players within the policy environment and involves cooperation and compromise (Maddison and Denniss, 2009). This view, according to Richard and Smith (2002, p.2):

“...sensitises us to the ever-increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy. Thus, it demands that we consider all the actors and locations beyond the ‘core executive’ involved in the policy-making process.”

Richard and Smiths’ reminder is timely. The literature of governance is replete with debates about the centrality of states in governance. Whereas the dominant view is that government has been ‘hollowed out’, there is a growing school of thought that rejects that notion claiming that the hierarchical authority of governments is alive and well. Even the most ardent advocates of states’ hierarchical power, however, agree that governments now adopt partnership with the private sector to undertake public policy using what Bell and Hindmoor (2009, p.2) refer to as a “state-centric relational” approach to governance. The main argument of the alternative definition is that in the development of policies, different kinds of evidence, provided by both state and non-state actors, are used. Nevertheless, governments still maintain exclusive right in the development of policies on national defence, foreign affairs (Hogwood and Gum, 1984) and monetary policy (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). This means the use of evidence varies based

on the type of policy in question. For instance, where a policy is statutorily the exclusive reserve of governments (like monetary policy) or borders on national security or the sovereignty of the governments, the use of evidence may be restricted to those provided by the state actors who have specialist knowledge and experience. However, where a policy is meant to address social problems like education and health, the search for evidence is usually extended to a wide range of non-state actors.

From a broad perspective, all the foregoing definitions of public policy focused, one way or another, on “what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes” (Dye, 2017, p.1). There are some theorists, nonetheless, who, in addition, consider what governments refuse to do as part of public policy. In this category, we have Hecl (1972, p.85) who suggests that a policy should “be considered as a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions or actions.” Thus, public policy is “what government, acting on our behalf, chooses to do or not to do” (Birkland, 2016, p.242).

Explaining the inaction dimension, Hill (2013) states that often there is an incentive for political leadership to maintain the existing situation, thereby making inaction a preferred course of action. Inaction is therefore an “implicit” policy since it involves the refusal of governments to recognize a problem in contrast to an “explicit” policy where governments make decisions or undertake actions (Birkland, 2016, p.10). Inaction may also arise when governments decide not to use their resources to address identified problems, believing that either the problem would run its course or non-state actors may eventually address them. The inaction perspective therefore suggests that public policy should be viewed from a broad standpoint, including both actions and inactions of governments.

According to Maddison and Denniss (2009, p.4), the numerous definitions of public policy can generally be grouped into two complementary viewpoints; firstly, policy arises from an “authoritative choice” – government making policy based on its hierarchical powers; and secondly, policy results from “structured interaction” – whereby different participants come together to make policy through cooperation and concession. Colebatch (2009, p.120) adds another dimension, “social construction”, to the two strands identified by Maddison and Denniss to form what he referred to as the “three accounts of the policy process.” He explained that the social construction strand deals with the development and framing of a convincing narrative to support the development or change of an existing policy.

Whereas the “authoritative choice” views policymaking from a top-bottom perspective, the “structured interaction” and “social construction” viewpoints see policymaking as an intricate phenomenon involving interactions among different actors within the policy environment. Based on its hierarchical nature, the “authoritative choice” viewpoint generally advocates the use of evidence sourced by the government often without contributions from non-state actors. Yet, policymaking from this perspective may sometimes be characterized with some degree of incoherence because, even within a government, there may be interplays among different actors, who may have different views and pursue different interests (Sabatier, 1999; Weible, 2017). Owing to their society-centred paradigm, the “structured interaction” and “social construction” viewpoints, provide policy location for disparate perceptions, knowledge and interests leading to multiple inputs and a significant degree of incoherence (Maddison and Denniss, 2009).

So, in effect, my use of the word “government” in this discourse, and the entire study, is not in reference to a monolithic unit but rather a complex system of individuals and institutions, often with different perspectives. The assumption that government is a unified system is false as different actors within government or within a government agency are involved in “pulling and hauling” to reflect their standpoints and interests (Colebatch, 1997, p.11). This development mirrors the argument that “conflicts may take an organizational form...higher officials vs. lower officials, departments vs. departments, ministers vs. ministers, and so on.” (Minogue, 1997, p.15).

Generally, policy actors, whether within or outside governments interact both formally and informally, generating conflicts in the process as each actor attempts to promote their policy preferences (Howlett et al., 2009; Maddison and Denniss 2009; Sabatier 1999). The ensuing policy debate provides a platform for contestation of ideas and values which are harmonized one way or another. Thus, notwithstanding the viewpoint in operation, the policy making process is predominated by “diversity and constraint” and what is ultimately produced is a “bargained outcome.” (Gordon et al., 1997, p.7).

To sum up, while there are significant similarities in the different definitions of public policy, there are considerable areas of differences. One view is that in the development of public policy, governments decide what is to be done and how to do it using its hierarchical power and resources. The other view, however, suggests that public policy is a result of participation of various stakeholders including the private sector. In terms of the use of evidence, while the

first view involves the use of limited kinds of evidence from the governments, the second view deals with evidence from multiple sources.

Considering that the policy domain is not value-neutral, coupled with the need to allow participants some room for manoeuvre to articulate their inputs, it is not possible to arrive at a generally acceptable definition for the term. What is important is the recognition of nuances of public policy, including the tension created by disparate stakeholder interests, to assist in improving policy formulation and implementation. Consequently, I would provide the next stream of literature, the typologies of public policy, to deepen theoretical understanding.

2.2. TYPOLOGIES OF PUBLIC POLICY

Policies are organized into different classes to enable policy makers predict stakeholder interests and influence, potential conflicts in policy making and how to address them (Birkland, 2016; Parsons, 1995). Contemporary policy classification began with Theodore Lowi's policy typology in 1964 (Birkland, 2016; Parsons, 1995).

In his seminal work, Lowi (1964) classified policy into three broad categories as follows:

- Distributive policy, dealing with allocation of resources across particular interest groups or identified demographics. For example, policies on land, subsidies and road construction are distributive in nature.
- Regulative policy, focusing on the control of individuals and businesses to influence their behaviours. This includes standardization policy, consumer protection policy and competition policy.
- Redistributive policy, concerned with changing the pattern of prevailing resource allocation. Examples are policies on income tax, social security, and grants.

A fourth category was later introduced by Lowi in 1972 which he labeled "Constituent" policy, dealing with the creation or reorganization of government agencies. The abolishment of the Financial Services Authority (UK) and the splitting of its responsibilities between two agencies - the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority - is a classic example of a constituent policy.

A central argument of the Lowi classification is that "policies determine politics" and not the other way round (Lowi, 1972, p.299) meaning the kind of policy being contemplated gives rise

to the resulting political relationships, conflicts, and choices. Thus, it is policy type that, for instance, determines whether government applies its coercive authority or not (Simon, 2007).

Thus, it is the policy type that determines the kind of evidence to be sought and utilised. For instance, while distributive and redistributive policies, on account of their impact on the whole society, may require obtaining evidence from a wider range of sources, regulative policies tend to do the opposite: obtaining evidence from limited sources. This is because as regards regulative policies, governments often apply their coercive authority (Simon, 2007). Consequently, policymakers tend to obtain and utilise soft evidence for distributive and redistributive policies while hard evidence types are more suitable for regulative policies.

Lowi's pioneering typology has been acclaimed as revolutionary. "No single theoretical construct has been more important to the development of public policy studies than Lowi's categorization scheme" (Greenberg, et al., 1977, p.1534). Reinforcing the impact of Lowi's scheme, Sabatier (1991, p.149) affirms that "of all the work in public policy over the last two decades, Lowi's (1964, 1972) argument that political behaviour varies across policy types - distributive, redistributive, regulatory - has probably had the greatest effect on the discipline of political science."

However, Lowi's typology has come under attack (Heclo, 1972; May, 1986; Steinberger, 1980). His central argument has been criticized as "over-simplistic and methodologically suspect" (Parsons, 1995, p.132). In addition, the classification of policies into categories has been questioned on the grounds that some policies have overlapping attributes (Birkland, 2016; Steinberger, 1980). Moreover, by Lowi's admission, in the long run, every policy possesses redistributive and regulatory attributes. This is easy to see as at the core of every policy, no matter how named, is an intention to alter existing resource allocation or to control behaviour. Flowing from such premise, the claim by Lowi (1964, pp.689-90) that each policy develops "its own characteristic political structure...and group relations" suddenly makes his typology, to borrow the words of Heclo (1972, p.105), "very difficult to operationalize and use." Similarly, the testability of the typologies has been criticized (Parsons, 1995) suggesting that the different policy types contemplated by Lowi were not empirically derived but subjectively constructed.

In addressing the limitations identified in Lowi's typology, Wilson (1995) established a typology that takes into account the extent to which costs and benefits of a particular policy

affect either one interest group or many interest groups. To clarify, where an issue promises benefit to a particular interest group, the interest group would push for the formulation of an appropriate policy, but there is a likelihood of conflict where the cost of that policy is to be borne by a different interest group. This explains why redistributive policies are highly contentious because a gain by one group is associated with a loss by another (Birkland, 2016; Howlett et al., 2009).

On his part, Steinberger (1980) developed an alternative scheme using a phenomenological approach. Considering the complex nature of public policy, Steinberger argued that the policy types contemplated by Lowi are subjectively derived by groups based on their understanding of the objective and potential impact of such policy, which may be totally different from the understanding, hence definition of another group. In this regard, he concludes that the typology advanced by Lowi should not be considered as an “objective” policy characterization but as a “plausible” policy guide (1980, p.189). The merit is to afford participants the freedom to define policy types based on their socially constructed worldviews.

Meanwhile, Anderson (2003) outlines a broad categorization of policies adopted by scholars with relevant examples as follows:

- Substantive and Procedural policies. Substantive policies, he explained, deal with what government is required to do for good governance which confers advantages or disadvantages on the citizens, like building roads, paying subsidies, or prohibiting smoking in designated areas. Procedural policies on the other hand, focus on how substantive policies are going to be enforced and who is responsible to act. An example of an important procedural policy, according to Anderson is the US federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1964 which stipulated the procedures to be used by agencies in informal rulemaking.
- Distributive, Regulatory, Self-regulatory and Redistributive policies. These are explained earlier except for self-regulatory policies which are described as policies formulated by groups to protect the interest of the group, for example a code of conduct by a peak body to regulate the behaviour of its members.
- Material and Symbolic policies. Material policies provide either tangible benefits to the citizens or impose obvious disadvantages on citizens that are adversely affected. Examples are minimum wage policies or policies to augment farmers’ income.

Symbolic policies, in contrast, do not provide any material advantage or disadvantage to the citizens but rather appeal to their sense of values. All anti-drug campaigns fall under the symbolic policies category.

- **Collective Goods and Private Goods policies.** Collective goods policies are concerned with the provision of goods beneficial to the society and the consumption of such good by an individual would not preclude it to others. Examples include policies on national defence, public safety, and clean air. Private goods policies on the other hand, are policies formulated to deal with goods provided in the marketplace by the private sector and as such only individuals that purchase them benefit. Examples include policies on the provision of social services by the government like postal services, entrance into parks and museums, which have some attributes of private goods.

A key message of policy typologies is that they play an important role in the determination of the use of evidence in policymaking. While governments exclusively source for evidence themselves in the development of some policies, they allow non-state actors to contribute inputs in the development of others. Notwithstanding, policymakers are advised to be flexible in view of the changing or overlapping nature of most policy types. As eloquently averred by Birkland (2016, p.265), each typology should be understood as “a continuum and not as separate absolute.”

2.3. PROSPECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY

Citizens believe the function of governments is essentially to identify and solve problems through policies (Colebatch, 1997) but the story of public policies is a mixture of success and failure. Unlike the phenomenon of policy failure, policy success has received little interest in the public policy literature (Birkland, 2011; Howlett et al., 2009; McConnell, 2015). And to confound the issue, the determination of which policy is successful, and which is not is inherently subjective (Howlett et al., 2009; McConnell, 2015). Nevertheless, there are some documented examples of policy success.

To illustrate, the free basic education policy in the UK has generally been considered successful. Prior to the mid-1970s, the UK education policy is regarded as ‘a good thing’ and it can be argued that the reforms during the Thatcher regime were genuine attempts to improve the sector (McVicar, 1990, p.131). Indeed, state education in the UK since after the Second World War has been successful (Chitty, 2005).

The National Health Service (NHS) in the UK is another example of what is adjudged as a policy success. The NHS regarded as the flagship of the health policy (Dorey, 2005) has largely lived to its founding philosophy of efficient service delivery and cost containment (Kendall and Moon, 1990). And although there still exists recurring challenges including funding the programme, the policy has received “public admiration and electoral support” (Jones, 2005, p.92). Overall, the policy has made UK citizens healthier with an improved life expectancy (Jones, 2005).

In Nigeria, since after the banking crisis in 2009, the government has succeeded in ensuring that no bank is allowed to fail (Sanusi, 2009). To achieve this, the Nigerian government, through the Central Bank of Nigeria, provides financial support to bailout banks experiencing illiquidity or insolvency and replaces the leadership of such banks to engender public confidence in the system (Sanusi, 2010). So, what are the drivers of policy success?

Firstly, the use of evidence in public policy has been recognized to enrich policymaking (Head, 2010; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012). Although what is recognised as evidence is contentious (Dobrow et al., 2004; Head, 2008; Kay, 2011), it is inconceivable that policies would be developed without the use of the best evidence policymakers could obtain. (Marston and Watts 2003). The use of evidence is, therefore, critical to effective public policy.

Secondly, political commitment and partisan consensus also significantly contribute to policy success (Dorey, 2005). Whereas political commitment mobilises the resources required for the success of a policy, partisan consensus reduces inter-party wrangling around a policy area and as such improves the chances of achieving set policy objectives. In the UK, both the Conservative and Labour parties have long agreed that the state should play a key role in the provision of education and health (Savage and Robins 1990).

Thirdly, the level of consensus among the policy actors is an important determinant of policy success. Across many policy areas in the UK, major interest groups play key roles “either on a consultative or participatory basis” (Savage and Robins, 1990, p.1). For instance, in the UK education policy domain, a policy community comprising Ministry of Education, National Union of Teachers, LEAs and the Association of Education Committees are discernible akin to what you have in the health policy community where British Medical Association (BMA) and the Department of Health working very closely (Dorey, 2005). Thus, the extent of democratization of the policy process (Hendriks, 2015; Howlett et al., 2009) improves trust

(Lane, 1997), the capacity of governments to solve problems (Hendriks, 2015) and as such improves public policy (Dorey, 2005).

Lastly, policy learning provides policy actors a platform to learn and improve. A high level of learning culture within a particular policy domain, therefore, promotes policy development skills with a potential for effective policies. Given the chaotic nature of the policy process, the need for policy learning is most crucial in of implementation (Birkland, 2011), evaluation and generally improves the chances for policy success (Howlett et al., 2009; Marier, 2015). Specifically, the policy environment serves as a laboratory from which policy makers could learn lessons from successful policies to improve the effectiveness of their policies (Volden, 2006). Within the context of the use of evidence in policymaking, the more receptive of learning a policy environment is, the more likely is the use of multiple kinds of evidence, and vice versa if the opposite is the case.

2.4. CONSTRAINTS TO PUBLIC POLICY

In contrast to the scant attention to policy success in scholarly literature, policy failure is the holy grail. This is probably because policy scientist, like journalists, love bad news (Birkland, 2011). Consequently, the story of public policy we hear is often “a story about constraints” (Goodin et al., 2006, p.24). In this regard, Dye (2017) identifies eight limits of public policy as follows:

1. Problems that are defined in relative instead of absolute terms may not be solved by public policy. As an example, he stated that if poverty line is benchmarked against, say, one-fifth of a population then the problem will perpetually exist. This kind of problem definition normalizes an unwanted end and as such makes it impossible to address (Rein, 2006).
2. Public expectation is often higher than government capability and as such there would always be unmet expectations. Public policy makers continuously face complex, at times, intractable challenges (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Considine, 2005), yet institutional capacities are often organized to “produce standard responses to non-standard problems” (Bovens et al., 1998, p.206).

3. Policies are often a zero-sum game i.e. by solving problems of one group, they may create problems for another group. A classic example is redistributive policies which take resources from one group and give to another group. Often, governments deal with mutually exclusive interests from various groups and as such impossible to satisfy every interest group (Bovens et al., 1998; Howlett et al., 2009).
4. In some instances, governments may be incapable of engendering social change no matter their efforts. For example, Dye reasoned that governments may not be able to address settlement patterns of whites and blacks regardless of policies to engender integration. In this case, the government may only embark on a symbolic policy to give the impression of doing something (Parsons, 1995).
5. People rationally adopt adaptive behaviours in response to some public policies in a manner that compromises the efficacy of public policy. For example, paying welfare support to people may create a dependency mentality thereby frustrating the policy (Sefton, 2006). A significant constraint of policy is the unwillingness of people to do what the policy encourages them to do.
6. Some problems may have several causes and a particular policy may be ineffective to address them. Most of what is described in the literature as ‘wicked problems’ belongs to this category. They are called wicked problems because they are deeply entrenched on the social fabrics of the society with multiple underlying causes, and a lack of consensus on how to solve them. It is difficult to solve problems which do not have specificity of definition, with many causes and whose solution cannot be reasonably quantified (Nair, 2018).
7. The cost of solving some problems may be costlier than the problem. As an example, Dye suggested that the cost of eradicating a public disorder may involve both financial resources and repressive policies which a democratic government may consider too high a cost. In this case, governments may likely either refuse to act or engage in symbolic public policy to appease the citizens.
8. The political system is not value-neutral and as such is incapable of rational public policy. The most significant constraint to public policy is the “sheer selfishness of

entrenched interests” to promote particular viewpoints (Goodin et al., 2006, p.23). Thus, the sum effect of the often-divergent interests may produce ineffective policies or policies that may only satisfy sectional interest at the expense of other interests.

Meanwhile, Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p.197) identify three broad reasons why policies fail: “bad execution, bad policy, or bad luck.” Likewise, Bovens and ‘t Hart (1996) remind us that the reason for policy failure could be either programme-related or political. Programme-related failure, they say, occurs because of technocratic, informational or strategic deficits in implementation. Political failure, on the other hand, is caused by the inability of a policy to engender the required political support for its sustenance.

Quite instructively, the causes of policy failure discussed above permeate the whole spectrum of governments at all levels thereby engendering a precautionary approach to the virtues of public policy.

2.5. POLICY THEORIES AND MODELS

2.5.1. The Stages Approach

The stages approach to policymaking, referred to as a theory by some, and a model by others, consists of sequential stages that delineate the policy process into distinct phases (Howlett et al., 2009; Knill and Tosun 2012; Weible, 2017). The importance and use of evidence within the different stages vary based on the nature of the stages.

In his path-breaking treatise, Lasswell (1956), decomposed policy-making process into seven distinct stages (Knill and Tosun 2012). Lasswell’s seven stage approach comprised: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal.

The policy stages serve as a heuristic tool that simplifies an otherwise complex process (Hill, 2013). Since, the policy-making process is complex and chaotic, the degree of order provided by the stages model engender comprehension of the policy process (John, 2013). The model also provides a structure within which much policy research could be situated (Howlett et al., 2016).

Although it is considered by many as the best in illuminating the policy process, it is largely an inadequate framework as it lacks causal relationships within the different policymaking

stages (Gultekin, 2014). It fails to explain complex interactions among policy actors and within the different policy phases, affecting its ability to adequately explain the policy process. It is also accused of practical incompatibility as only a few policies align with its sequential prescription in real life (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; John, 2012). In other words, it erroneously views all policies from the same standpoint and sequential logic. It is also considered misleading as it disregards the political tension within the policy-making process (Anderson 2015; Howlett et al., 2009; Knill and Tosun, 2012; Smith and May, 1997).

Overall, despite its weaknesses, the stage model is one of the most popular models in explaining the policy process. As a heuristic device, the model provides a very practical and insightful/compelling account that simplifies a complex and abstract process.

Since the emergence of policy process as a field of political science in the 1950s (Howlett and Geist, 2015; Weible, 2017), the policy stages, has become enduring (Deleon, 1999; Knill and Tosun, 2012;). Consequently, Lasswell's model has inspired a number of other rational models including Brewer (1974), Bridgman and Davis (2000), Anderson (1983), Simmons et al. (1974), and Hogwood and Gunn (1984). Yet, the five-stage model has been embraced by a number of scholars including Howlett (2011), Howlett ,et al., (2009), Anderson (2015), and Hill and Hupe (2014). The model consists of five stages:

1. Agenda-Setting
2. Policy formulation
3. Decision-making
4. Policy Implementation
5. Policy Evaluation

The depiction of the policy process within a five-stage model has become popular and widely adopted (Howlett 2011; Howlett and Geist. 2015). The policy-making stages above reflect the key milestones a successful issue goes through in its life. An important stage that is omitted from the five-stage model is the Policy Maintenance, Succession, and Termination (Cairney, 2019).

In what follows, I will discuss the five policy stages model, plus the maintenance, succession, and termination stage.

2.5.2. Agenda Setting

Agenda setting is a very crucial theme in public policy as at one time or another, one would have wondered how issues become worthy of government attention leading to efforts at addressing them. Corollary to this is the question of why some problems get government attention while others do not (Anderson, 2015; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Majone, 2008; Knill and Tosun, 2012).

The first stage in the policy making process is agenda setting which deals with the identification of problems by policy actors (Anderson, 2015). Put differently, it involves how problems attract or fail to attract the interest of governments (Birkland, 2011). The mere attraction of government to a problem does not, however, guarantee that a problem will be solved; it only means it has gained entrance into the agenda for consideration among many other problems (Howlett et al., 2009).

The classic model of agenda setting in a democracy is through discussion which starts with expression of worries by policy actors (Majone, 2008). Early literature in agenda setting assume that objectivity shapes the problem identification exercise in agenda setting, but later works acknowledge that problems are socially constructed (Howlett et al., 2009). Often, agendas are set through “systematic distortion, misrepresentation, or selective presentation of information” (Zahariadis 2003, p.18). This development blurs the line “between manipulating and shaping the agenda” Majone, (2008, p.230).

Kingdon (1984, 2014) developed a framework to examine agenda setting in the real world. He theorized that three streams – problem, policy, and politics – interact to produce the “greatest agenda change” (Kingdon 2014, p.87). The problem stream describes the identification of undesirable situations requiring government attention. The policy stream refers to the experts that examine the nature of problems and recommend solutions. The political stream deals with realities in the political environment that facilitate or engender the need for a policy such as pressure from an influential interest group. This means that the presence of evidence and the use of such evidence for policymaking is more prevalent in the policy stage of Kingdon’s framework where policymakers generate feasible solutions to address identified policy problems.

He contends that an issue finds its way on the agenda where the streams intersect or where policy entrepreneurs assembled the three streams. Crucially, policy window – ‘the opportunities for action’ opens rarely and for a short time; policy entrepreneurs must, therefore, recognize when a window opens and couple the streams together else, they must wait for another opening (Kingdon, 2014, p.166).

Kingdon’s work has attracted significant plaudits. It has been described as a ‘path-breaking’ framework (Howlett et al., 2009, p.92) ‘that has captivated many political scientists’ (Anderson 2015, 98). It has, nevertheless, been criticized for situating agenda-setting entirely on “timing and luck” which ignores the salient element of predictability and order (Anderson, 2015, p.99).

On their part, Hogwood and Gunn (1984), state that an issue gets on the agenda if it satisfies one or more of the following conditions: one, the issue has attained a crisis level and as such cannot be ignored. A good example is the bailout the US government offered troubled private institutions including banks which demonstrates how a crisis can make government undertake what is hitherto considered unacceptable (Birkland, 2011); two, the issue has achieved distinctiveness in exemplifying larger governance issues. This could take a peculiar form like street protests by antiabortionists, gays, and lesbians (Anderson 2015); three, the issue has a ‘human interest angle’ and thus attracts the attention of the media; four, the issue is considered to likely impact on a wide audience. As an example, the French government, in 1998, halted the administration of hepatitis B vaccination on school children based on public outcry that the vaccine could lead to other diseases like multiple sclerosis (Knill and Tosun, 2012); and finally, the issue has become very popular or politically salient. Invariably, the more of the above conditions an issue satisfies, the more likely it is to get on the agenda.

Similarly, Birkland (2011) presents four different levels problems pass through to merit government consideration. He explains that the first level, agenda universe, is the largest level, and consists of all items that could be discussed within a political system or in the society. From the agenda universe some items graduate into the systemic level, which contains items that the stakeholders in the policy process view as deserving the authoritative attention of governments. Thereafter, items that are successful move to the institutional agenda, which comprises items that are for the serious consideration of policy makers. Any item in this level guarantees government action and as such only a small percentage of the items reached the institutional level (Howlett et al., 2009). Finally, a select few items move to decision agenda, the level consisting of items that the policy makers will act upon.

Movement within the levels do not however occur automatically. They are deliberately enabled by policy actors using persuasion, advocacy, and manipulation. The policy actors use different kinds of evidence to advance their policy preferences, depending on a number of factors including the nature of the policy and the prevailing governance arrangement. Then clearly, policy-makers actors occupy an influential position in the policy-making equation. But who are the key policy actors at this stage of the policy process? Knill and Tosun (2012) identified four major actors:

1. Elected public officials and judges: Based on their position, they place issues on the policy agenda depending on the type of government in operation. In a presidential system of government, elected public officials provide a significant amount of evidence to influence the movement of items within the different levels, whereas in a parliamentary system, it is the parliamentarians, relying on their law-making powers that largely undertake such responsibility. In a number of countries, the judiciary possesses agenda-setting powers as they decide on contentious political issues or stimulate political debates with the possibility of policy change.
2. Bureaucracy: In addition to its traditional role in formulation and implementation of policies, the bureaucracy also plays a key role in agenda setting. This is possible on account of the wide-ranging evidence (information and technical skills) within the bureaucracy which enables it to initiate a policy or frame policy options to the legislature, which often relies on the former for information.
3. Mass media: The media impacts the agenda-setting process through the level of coverage it accords issues which instigates both interest and concern. Usually, political actors react to sustained media coverage to demonstrate to the electorates that they are working hard, hence improve their electoral value.
4. Interest groups: Like the mass media, interest groups generate awareness and frame issues to attract the attention of governments. Interest groups employ lobbying as a key agenda-setting tool but their ability to influence agenda-setting depends on some factors including resource availability and access to bureaucrats and politicians.

To ensure that their preferred items are on the agenda, or their perspective on an item triumph over that of others, these actors compete and in some few instances collaborate. Consequently, in what advocates of broad-based agenda setting would find depressing, Birkland (2011) states

that often the agenda setting battle is not won by stakeholders that make the most theoretically or technically convincing arguments but by groups that have more resources or better rhetoric.

2.5.3. Policy Formulation

Upon the recognition of a problem at the agenda-setting stage, the next stage is the determination of appropriate solutions to address the problem (Howlett, 2011). Owing in part to the unclear and unpredictable nature of the agenda setting stage, problems may still be hazy, inchoate, or loosely identified at that stage and as such requires further fine-tuning. Problems identified at the agenda-setting stage are, therefore, refined and streamlined at the policy formulation stage (Howlett et al., 2009). Based on the close relationship between agenda setting and policy formulation, they are, together, called pre-decision phase of the policy process (Anderson, 2015; Majone, 2008).

Basically, policy formulation deals with the development of proposals designed to address public problems (Anderson, 2015; Hill and Hupe, 2014). At this stage, various policy options are generated and assessed. Usually, stakeholders, including bureaucrats and private sector players, offer contending proposals resulting in competition against one another to ensure that their options are favourably ranked (Anderson, 2015; Howlett and Giest 2015). As far as the use of evidence is concerned, this stage is the most significant since this is the stage where feasible options are generated for consideration.

Policy formulation does not, however, always end in a new or a reviewed policy as policy makers may decide not to take any action or may disagree on how to proceed (Anderson, 2015). Policy makers during the Reagan administration failed to agree on how an executive order on affirmative action relating to hiring by government contractors should be revised, and the prevailing order was maintained (Anderson, 2015). Thus, policy formulation is primarily concerned with a determination of what is to be done in the face of a problem, including a decision as to whether the status quo should be maintained.

Anderson (2015) examines those involved in policy formulation at the federal level in the US and posits that the president, his advisers and chief aides lead in the use of evidence to initiate policy proposals, with the governors playing similar role at the state level. In addition to the office of the Executive President, Anderson (2015) enumerates other actors that participate in the policy formulation stage.

- Governmental agencies, covering civil servants and appointed officials: By virtue of their technical expertise and continuous working with numerous programmes and projects of government, these officials identify weaknesses in existing policies and offer proposals to address them. Depending on the nature of the proposals, some proposals are concluded by the executive arm, while some have to be transmitted to the Congress for approval.
- Presidential organisations: These are temporary bodies, sometimes called ‘ad hoc committees’ or ‘ad hoc agencies’ created by the president to develop proposals on particular policy areas. They include presidential commissions, inter-agency committees, task force, and other similar arrangements.
- Legislators: On account of their personal or ideological interests coupled with their legislative duties, which includes receiving suggestions and inputs from stakeholders, legislators formulate policy proposals. The congress has done much of the formulation in specific policy areas – agriculture, welfare reform, environmental protection and energy conservation.
- Interest groups: Interest groups play a key role in policy formulation, often providing the executive or legislature with specific proposals. A well-known example is the Israeli lobby, which has been influential in shaping America’s financial support to Israel.

Thus, the main location for policy formulation is dependent on the system of government in operation. Yet, owing to the range of disparate actors and locations involved, policy formulation in a democracy encompasses a series of activities including stakeholder engagements, lobbying and other similar actions to build support around respective proposals.

Tracing the policy formulation process in the Lithuanian higher education domain, Thomas (2001) identified four phases - appraisal, dialogue, formulation and consolidation.

1. Appraisal dealt with stakeholder seminars and meetings for the identification of critical policy issues. These meetings provided context and created a shared understanding of the issues that need government attention. They also created an opportunity for the consideration of stakeholder inputs and evidence.

2. Dialogue was concerned with the facilitation of communication between stakeholders with different viewpoints regarding the issue in question and possible solutions. Like in the appraisal

phase, dialogue also involved seminars where representatives of stakeholder groups or experts were invited to provide evidence and discuss their preferred solutions. Position papers prepared by select committees, discussions from previous stakeholder meetings were fed into the first draft policy.

3. Formulation involved strengthening the draft policy with additional evidence and more awareness of political imperatives. Being a legislative policy, a draft law was developed and circulated to relevant stakeholders for comments. The feedback from the stakeholders was, however, negative, indicating disenchantment with the draft law. This led to the establishment of a nine-man committee, comprising public and private stakeholders, and chaired by the deputy minister responsible for higher education. Consequently, a revised draft law was issued inviting response from stakeholders.

4. Consolidation involved another seminar to consider responses from the consultation process. It emerged that there were still outstanding issues which necessitated another meeting, after which an advisory team was established for comments on a number of provisions in the draft law. The team found the draft law was fit for purpose. Thereafter, a national conference was held which endorsed the draft law, highlighting that the policy formulation process assisted to involve a wide range of stakeholders in the policy process.

In the assessment of proposals, policy formulators consider many factors including the soundness of proposals, costs, political acceptability, legality, and compliance with extant laws and regulations (Anderson, 2015). Perhaps, the most important consideration is the political and technical limitations - “substantive or procedural constraints” - on the policy makers (Howlett et al., 2009, p.112). The authors described substantive constraints as constraints that are inherent in the problem being addressed which limits options of policy makers. For instance, to reduce poverty, policy makers can not consider printing of money to distribute to the poor as that will cause inflation and offset the impact of the distribution. On the other hand, they defined procedural constraints as the processes required to carry out a policy option. They gave an example of procedural constraint as the constitutional right of US citizens to bear arms which imperils handguns control efforts.

2.5.4. Decision Making

Decision making involves the adoption of a particular recommendation by government upon analysis of proposals (Howlett and Giest 2015). It is simply concerned with choosing a solution to address identified problems (Hill and Hupe, 2014).

Decisions can however be either ‘positive’, where they are intended to impact the status quo, or ‘negative’, in which case governments resolve not to do anything to maintain the status quo (Howlett et al., 2009).

At the stage of decision-making, the number of policy actors reduces significantly because the task involved is substantially that of governments (Knill and Tosun, 2013). Unlike the agenda setting and policy formulation stages, which permit more diverse participation, the decision-making stage is for a select few. This is because only those who have authority to make valid decisions participate (Knill and Tosun, 2013).

Whereas Howlett, et al., (2009) argue that private actors are essentially excluded from participating in this stage except as lobbyist, Anderson (2015) posits that private stakeholders do participate in decision-making, even though the recognized authority for decision-making lies with four classes of public officials: executives, legislators, judges, and administrators. Bell and Hindmoor (2009) agree with Anderson (2015) that private stakeholders participate in decision-making, and policymaking in general even though governments still retain the authority to take upturn the decisions or even alter prevailing governance arrangement (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). Thus, the decision-making stage is concerned with the selection of a solution from the usually numerous forms of evidence and options presented at the policy formulation stage.

In democracies, public decision-making authority is largely dependent on the type of government in practice. In most countries, the authority is concentrated on the legislature, on account of their designation as the representatives of the people (Anderson, 2015). The executive and to some degree, the judiciary however play far more dominant role in the decision-making of other countries (Howlett et al., 2009).

Knill and Tosun (2012) provide an illustration of public decision-making in the four main English-speaking countries: UK, Canada, Australia, and the US.

The UK practices a parliamentary democracy and as such the responsibility for public policymaking resides with the prime minister and Cabinet members (drawn from the members of the parliament), supported by bureaucrats who provide guidance on policy decisions. The UK parliament has two Houses: The House of Lords and the elected House of Commons, which “fulfils the ‘classical’ parliamentary tasks” of law-making (Knill and Tosun 2012, p.139). Although the House of Commons proposes new laws, only few bills of private members get to become legislation. This is attributable to the strong party cohesion in the House of Commons which makes members of parliament to vote with their party even when they disagree with the position of their party leadership. The prime minister, as the leader of the ruling party, therefore, greatly influences public decision-making, restricting the parliament to a marginal role in decision-making. More importantly, the government (when it has a majority in parliament) frames and controls the policy agenda.

Like its UK counterpart, in Australia, the prime minister and cabinet members are drawn from the same source which causes the executive to dominate the workings of the parliament. But unlike in the UK, public decision-making is done at three major locations, namely: the parliament, which makes laws; the state and federal governments, having powers to make policies on specific issues; and the judiciary, which undertakes judicial review to appraise the actions or policies of the executive or legislature.

Canada practices a Westminster system alongside federalism. The prime minister forms a Cabinet, comprising ministers, which makes public decisions, for which the whole cabinet bears collective responsibility. Like the UK, the Canadian parliament consists of the elected members of the House of Commons while the governor general (representing the Canadian monarch) appoints members of the senate. Although the senate has a veto power, it hardly rejects bills passed by the House of Commons due to its democratic deficit.

The US operates a federal structure which consists of the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature (congress and senate). Legislative decision making is remarkably influenced by federal character of the US and the relationship between the president and the Congress. It should be noted that many of the decisions of the president require the approval of both the senate and the congress. Also worthy of note is that the cabinet, which assists the president in decision making, is an informal body. Thus, the policy preferences of the president and the partisan composition of the two Houses are critical in decision making. In this regard, interest groups lobby the congress and not the president or his cabinet.

Generally, the parliamentary system of government concentrates decision-making power in the hands of the executive and the existing bureaucracy, while in the presidential system, the power is extended to the legislature and judiciary (Howlett et al., 2009). Thus, in Australia, Canada, the UK and other parliamentary democracies, the executive and bureaucracy are usually responsible for making decisions on public policies. Whereas in the US, and a host of other presidential systems, the cabinet and bureaucracy are often responsible for policy decision-making even though some decisions require legislative approval (Knill and Tosun 2012).

In all, collective decision-making can take three forms (Anderson, 2015). They are:

- Bargaining: This relies on discussion, negotiation and compromise to achieve a generally acceptable decision.
- Persuasion: This involves the use of arguments and logic to build support for a preferred course of action.
- Command: This deals with the deployment of hierarchical authority to make decisions and may involve the use of sanctions and penalties.

An important point to note is that in democracies, even though the authority and procedure for public decision-making is provided by law, regulations or convention, most decisions are negotiated. This applies to even situations where a party dominates, because there may exist factions within the party that need to be pacified for consensus building (Anderson, 2015). Notwithstanding the kind of government in place, it is worth mentioning that there has been a shift in the governance landscape and decisions are generally made by policy communities comprising the government, and the private sector (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes 1994; Stoker 1998).

2.5.5. Policy Implementation

The fourth stage of the policy process is implementation, where governments administer their chosen decisions. It is concerned with the application of the selected solution to achieve specified outcomes (Hill and Hupe, 2014; Knill and Tosun). Specifically, it attempts to reinforce or alter the distribution of resources in a way that is consistent with the expectations of policymakers (Howlett and Giest 2015).

To a casual observer, implementation is a lot easier than the other stages because, as the thinking goes, the hard work has been done and implementation is just to administer what has

been agreed. This, of course, is naïve and misleading. Policy implementation is one of the most difficult and problematic stages in the policy cycle (Birkland, 2015; Knill and Tosun, 2012). Unsurprisingly, implementation also has the distinction of being the most impactful stage of the policy process because it is the essence of policymaking. As Madisson and Denniss, (2009) rightly noted, a policy is nothing unless it is implemented.

As a result, governments commit significant resources - funding, personnel, rules, procedures and crucially, a combination of policy tools – for the implementation of policies. Policy tools, also referred to as governing instruments or policy instruments, are devices or mechanisms used by governments to implement policies (Howlett, et al., 2009).

There exists a rich list of policy instruments in the policy implementation literature and scholars have attempted to group them for clarity and analysis. Consequently, Howlett (2011) provided the following classification of policy instruments:

- **Organizational Implementation Tools:** These are concerned with the use of public institutions and personnel to implement policies. This involves the creation or reorganization of government departments or agencies and their processes as well as the use of employees of governments in policy implementation.
- **Authoritative Implementation Tools:** They involve the use of coercive power of governments to control behaviours. Laws (including law enforcement agencies) and regulations are the major sub-instruments used in this category.
- **Financial Implementation Tools:** These techniques are used by governments to transfer financial resources or treasures to or from other players to either encourage or discourage them from acting in a particular way. Examples include grants, subsidies, excise taxes, provision of seed money, etc.
- **Information-based Implementation Tools:** These are efforts of government to use knowledge and information to influence the behaviour of consumers and service providers in line with governments' aspirations. They include the use of the mass media, statistical agencies, judicial inquiries, and moral suasion.

In most jurisdictions, policy implementation is formally undertaken by different levels of bureaucracy (Anderson, 2015; Knill and Tosun, 2012). In other words, policies are usually implemented in ministries and departments within government with the “salaried civil servants” being the most significant actors (Howlett et al., 2009, p.161). Often, the civil

servants are statutorily responsible for policy implementation and the day-to-day administration of service delivery. The civil service represents the administrative laboratory for the conversion of precepts into service.

Sometimes, autonomous agencies are created outside the mainstream bureaucracy to carry out specialised policies. In 1970, the US, established the Environmental Protection Agency to implement environmental policy (Knill and Tosun, 2012). Other countries like the UK and Nigeria had since followed suit. At other times, the courts function as policy implementers. A key example of the court's policy implementation function is in bankruptcy and naturalization proceedings (Anderson, 2015).

Policies may also be implemented by multiple entities within a government. For instance, policies on drugs usually require collaboration of different ministries owing to its cross-cutting nature, which involves such fields as finance, education, trade, and criminal justice (Knill and Tosun).

The multiplicity of policy implementation sites and personnel demonstrates that unlike the shrinking of participants during the decision-making stage, the implementation stage often witnesses an expansion of policy actors (Howlett et al., 2009). But like in the other stages of the policy process, different actors within the implementation stage may have different preferences concerning how the policies are to be implemented which may cause conflicts and tension along the implementation chain as individuals within an organization or agencies may operate at cross-purposes. (Knill and Tosun, 2012). Where the preferred options of actors in the policy implementation stage were not selected during the formulation stage, they may see the implementation stage as an opportunity to settle score thereby frustrating the implementation process. In the same vein, influential groups affected by policies can support or oppose the implementation of those policies (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009).

The policy implementation literature indicates that there are various ways of implementing policies. Scholars have, however, made efforts to identify and classify them based on certain salient characteristics. On this note, Knill and Tosun (2012), Birkland (2011) clarify on three approaches to policy implementation:

- Top-down approach which deals with the extent of compliance between policy objectives and actual outputs.

- Bottom-up approach, where the effectiveness of a policy is no longer based on set objectives but based on the preferences of policy actors.
- The hybrid approach, seeking to blend advantages of the top-down and bottom-up approaches for improved effectiveness.

Although the literature generally views the policy stages approach as a sequential process with distinct stages, some scholars, including Colebatch (1997), and Hill and Hupe (2014) have separately called for caution in delineating decision making and implementation. Colebatch states that it is wrong to see the two as distinctively sequential activities because implementation is not a stage that comes at some point in the cycle but rather as “an awareness which pervades every part of” the stages (1997, p.134).

In their analysis, Hill and Hupe (2014) argue that empirical observation on policy implementation does not support the normative description of the stages policy approach as a set of activities including implementation. They reason that in practice, policy is treated as a final output while implementation is seen as a different activity employed to administer the output.

While the two arguments proffered by the scholars go against the grain of dominant thought about the stages policy approach, they, nevertheless, have merit. The first assists policymakers to constantly keep their eyes on the impact-value of policymaking whereas the second reinforces the importance of implementation in the policy process.

2.5.6. Policy Evaluation

Once a policy has been implemented, the next activity is to determine whether it achieves its goal. Policy evaluation is the stage in the policy process in which the impact of public policies is examined to ascertain their effectiveness (Howlett and Giest, 2015; Knill and Tosun, 2012). In a nutshell, it is about ‘monitoring results’ (Hill and Hupe, 2014, p.119).

Policy evaluation can be carried out by both state and non-state actors (Howlett and Giest, 2015). Traditionally, the responsibility for policy evaluation rests with governments (Howlett, et al., 2009) but non-state actors - the media, university scholars, private research institutions, and the public - are now undertaking most of the policy evaluation (Anderson, 2015) thereby increasing the number of participants.

However, although policy evaluation is primarily intended to assess the effectiveness of policies and to usher in learning, evaluation is sometimes employed to achieve other ends. This may include to strengthen a particular ideology (Bovens and T'Hart, 1996), improve or tarnish the image of governments (Knill and Tosun, 2012), or in response to political pressure (Knill and Tosun, 2012). Then, clearly, like the other stages, policy evaluation is a political activity although with a technical element (Howlett et al., 2009).

Like the broader policy process, evaluation is viewed from two diametrically opposed points of view (Knill and Tosun, 2012). The positivists view it as a systematic and neutral exercise to ascertain the effectiveness of policies (Howlett et al., 2009; Knill and Tosun, 2012). The post-positivists, also called social constructivists, argue that evaluation is entirely subjective (Knill and Tosun, 2012). This age-long debate is analogous to that between positivism and interpretivism in social research; the former prescribing technical and quantitative methods to solve problems, and the latter favouring humanistic, practical, and qualitative methods. But as I have demonstrated earlier, the debate is purely an academic one and instead of mounting any academic high ground, what is important is to be aware of the two approaches and to learn from each one.

Meanwhile, Howlett et al., (2009) identified 3 broad types of policy evaluation:

- a. Administrative evaluation: This is usually undertaken by governments, specialized agencies of government or consultants appointed by the governments to determine efficiency of service delivery. Specifically, the main objective of the evaluation is to reach a judgment as to whether “value for money” has been achieved.
- b. Judicial evaluation: This deals with the legality of how policies are formulated and implemented. It also deals with whether procedures or standards of operations are being complied with. It is carried out by the judiciary either on its own volition or based on a complaint against a particular policy.
- c. Political evaluation: This is undertaken by individuals or groups interested in governance and politics. Consequently, in contrast to the two other evaluations, political evaluations are neither scientific nor systematic. Owing to their political nature, they are often elastic and biased.

In addition, Knill and Tosun (2012) identified a fourth type of policy evaluation – scientific evaluation – conducted by neutral experts to determine the effectiveness of a public policy.

Based on its focus, scientific evaluation requires resources including time, research skills and subject expertise. In this category is university scholars who conduct policy research, mostly to make contributions to policy knowledge (Anderson, 2015).

A further classification, developed by Scriven (1967), was provided by Knill and Tosun (2012) which distinguishes two types of evaluation, namely:

- Formative evaluation, which takes place during the lifespan of a policy and seeks to offer advice to implementing actors to foster internal improvement; and
- Summative evaluation, which is conducted at the end of a policy implementation to ascertain whether a policy has achieved its objectives.

The implication of the formative evaluation is that evaluation can take place at any point during the life of a policy, and not only after implementation (Anderson, 2015). Regardless of the type in focus, evaluation is a complex activity. According to Knill and Tosun (2012), some of the factors that make it complex are:

1. identification of goals.
2. definition of performance measures.
3. isolation of effects of policies from other factors.
4. political environment.

They suggested that while addressing the first three factors would require a well-crafted research design, the last factor cannot be fully addressed. This, they argue, is because whereas policymakers often need immediate information regarding effects of a policy, such effects take time to manifest. Thus, evaluators or researchers may be constrained to forecast effects rather than measure them. They may also be influenced by their own biases.

In all, evaluation is a critical component of evidence-based policymaking as it assists policymakers understand “what works out and what does not.” (Knill and Tosun, 2012, p.193). Perhaps, the most important benefit of evaluation is not the judgment on the level of success or failure of policies but the learning it provides to policymakers for improvement (Howlett, et al., 2009). This way, evaluation provides policymakers and other stakeholders with evidential resources to support or oppose prevailing policies. In this regard, the nature of the evaluation

and the motives of the evaluators significantly determines the kinds of post-evaluation evidence on offer and the importance policymakers may attach to them.

2.5.7. Policy Maintenance, Succession, and Termination

At the end of an evaluation exercise, policy makers determine the relationship between planned target and actual target. The outcome of that enquiry will assist policy makers in determining whether to maintain the status quo, review the policy process, or bring it to an end (Howlett, et al., 2009). Thus, this stage is considered notionally as the final stage in the policy process (Cairney, 2019).

2.6. POLICY PROCESS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

As we have seen demonstrated with the policy stages, it provides a rich explanatory account of how policies are made and how the utilisation of evidence could vary based on a number of factors including the type of policy in question, the stage of policymaking, and the kind of government or governance arrangement in place. The public policy literature is, however, rich in terms of alternative explanations. John (2012) identifies five broad explanations approaches of how policies are made.

1. Institutional approaches, which holds that political organisations like bureaucracies, legal systems, and parliaments develop public policies.
2. Group and network approaches, where informal relationships both within and outside government, influence policy outputs and outcomes.
3. Exogenous approaches, which view that policy outputs and outcomes are determined by factors outside the political system.
4. Rational actor approaches (also known as rational choice), which holds that the policy preferences of actors and their bargaining capacity shape policy decisions.
5. Ideas-based approaches, in which ideas on how to solve policy problems gain influence on account of their own merit, leading to policy decisions and outcome.

John argues that although each of these approaches offers a strong explanation of the policy process, the explanation of each approach is contextualised and thus fails to provide an adequate explanation of policy development. He, therefore, proposes that a better way to

explain the policy process is through “a theory that integrates the five approaches in such a way that the causal relationships between them are clear” (John 2012, p.14). Consequently, the advocacy coalition framework, the policy streams, and punctuated equilibrium represent powerful alternatives on account of their ability to view the political system as one whole unit (John 2012). These three theories focus on policymaking in multiple sites and emphasise the impact of bounded rationality and subsystems (Cairney, 2019).

2.6.1. Advocacy Coalition Framework

Sabatier (1988) developed the Advocacy Coalition Framework that integrated many features of public policy, such as the interaction of policy coalitions, changes in socioeconomic conditions, and institutional rational choice. Notably, the framework has three theoretical foci: advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem, policy-oriented learning, and policy change (Pierre et al., 2017).

Central to ACF is the assumption that policy actors from within and outside government share some basic beliefs, principally policy goals, and that they attempt to manipulate governmental rules to achieve the goals (Sabatier, 1991). The framework stresses that relationships within policy sectors are critical to understanding how policies are developed (John, 2012). To operationalise the ACF, policy actors, form coalitions with like-minded actors who share similar beliefs within a subsystem to influence the attainment of their preferred policy outcomes (Cairney, 2019). This means the generation of evidence under the framework is undertaken by the coalition by way of presenting their preferred views and positions. However, evidence is only useful if it has the power to change the beliefs of policymakers (Ritter, et al., 2018).

The framework is a response to the stages heuristic which has become ineffective in explaining the policy process because it is not a “causal theory” (Sabatier, 1991, p.147). Policy scholars have determined that effective policy theories need to integrate some critical knowledge including those of institutions, political behaviour, and policy communities (Sabatier, 1991). He argues that understanding the policy process requires looking at the entire policy community, comprised of bureaucrats, interest groups, legislature, researchers, journalists, and not a single institution or unit. The framework suggests a minimum period of 10 years to understand a policy change. Although the ACF bears some resemblance to the policy network

paradigm, the ACF involves more policy actors than the former and even more than the traditional policy triangle (John, 2012).

The ACF has been hailed on account of its contribution to the understanding of the policy process. The ACF synthesizes several insights from different accounts the policy process, such as policy subsystems, institutions, policy actors, and policy analysis (Cairney, 2019; John, 2012). According to Cairney (2019), the ACF provides new insights into four important aspects of the policy process. One, it rejects the notion of an ‘iron triangle’ where a few policy actors control the policy process. Instead, it identifies a wider range of actors, including academics and journalists to underscore their value. Two, it also rejects the policy stages model and the distinctions between the stages. Three, it builds on models that emphasise the value of structural or external factors and their impact on the attitudes of coalition members. Lastly, it emphasises the significance of beliefs.

Yet, the ACF has been accused of a number of flaws. First, it is incapable of fully explaining policy change (John, 2012). A key assumption of the framework is that relationships within subsystems are largely stable, which means the framework explains only policy stability. In that regard, its power to demonstrate how different kinds of evidence are used or who uses the evidence is limited (Ritter, et al., 2018).

Second, the framework does not adequately explain the decision-making process and “decisions simply emerge from the contestation of advocacy positions” (Howlett et al., 2016, p.69). Third, it has also been accused of not been as integrative as its advocates claim as it largely neglects individual choices and institutions (John, 2012). Fourth, the policy style advocated by the ACF with a wider range of disparate actors is rarely applicable outside the US, considering that in majority of Western European countries, closed policy communities are the order of the day (John, 2012).

2.6.2. Multiple Stream Theory

The multiple streams theory is another influential theory within the policy field and many studies of policy development have been examined using it. The theory was developed by John Kingdon (1984) and focuses predominantly on how some issues gain the attention of policymakers while others fail.

According to Kingdon, the policy process involves three streams: problem, policy and politics. The problem stream deals with identification of unpleasant issues and their framing with a view to attracting the attention of policymakers. It involves a change in the perception of the public or the elite regarding an existing problem which requires government action (Gultekin, 2014). Three factors determine whether a problem gets the attention of policymakers – rising unfavourable statistical indicators; emergence of a prominent event; and feedback on existing policies (Gultekin, 2014). The Policy stream deals with a range of possible solutions to problems identified in the first stream. It provides a platform for the emergence of policy ideas from the policy community including researchers, bureaucrats, politicians, and interest groups (Gultekin, 2014). Lastly, the politics stream considers the existing democratic arrangement, pressure group, public mood, and other political interests within which the policy environment is located (Quirk, 1986). Within this stream, three elements are critical: national mood, indicating the general sentiments existing at the time; pressure groups, in terms of whether they support or oppose the development of policies; and legislative and administrative turnovers, which speaks to the emergence of a new government or a major shift in the legislative arm of government (Gultekin, 2014). The importance of evidence across the different stream, however, varies. Policymakers do not view the different kinds of evidence as useful in the problem and political streams as in the policy stream since that is where policy alternatives are identified (Apollonio and Bero, 2017).

According to Kingdon, only when these three streams happen at the same time or are coupled together by policy entrepreneurs, within a policy window (opportunity for a policy change) does a particular policy proposal stand a good chance of being adopted.

The most important quality of the multiple streams theory is its capacity to predict policy change where the three streams come together (John, 2012). Its ability to explain causal relationships in policy development is also an important quality of the theory (Gultekin, 2014). The theory, therefore, allows for the interrogation of the interrelationships within and across the three streams. For instance, it enables asking relevant policy questions such as: how does a problem get accepted as a problem? How do policy proposals emerge? How do existing political arrangements affect the policy process? These questions are at the heart of much policy research and the ability of the theory to provide a persuasive explanation on these issues is largely responsible for its wide application in different policy settings.

However, while the multiple streams theory provides a sound theoretical lens to understand the complex interactions in the policymaking endeavour, scholars have been critical of it for a number of reasons. A key criticism is that the framework views policymaking as based on luck thereby detracting from the mostly deliberate actions that policymaking is (Anderson, 2105). This suggests that the theory is weak in articulating who provides evidence, and how evidence is used. The theory is also not suitable to explain policy variations and differences in policy development across national boundaries (John, 2012). Additionally, it does not represent all the stages policies go through as it focused on only the agenda setting stage of the policymaking process, making its application on other policy dimensions suspect (Gultekin, 2014).

In defence of the theory on its alleged limitation to only the agenda setting stage, John (2012) argues that it is inappropriate to differentiate factors that shape agenda setting from those that shape other stages of policy including implementation and evaluation. He states that the same factors are at play at each stage of the policy process suggesting that the three streams are useful not only in shaping the agenda setting stage but are equally useful in influencing the other policy stages.

Consequently, the theory offers a useful structure that allows for the investigation of policymakers' perception of problems and the contributions (and importance) of different evidence sources to the policymaking process. The framework is also strong in explaining the importance of institutions and the complex political interactions in the policymaking process and how the interactions influence evidence and policies.

2.6.3. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

The policy process is generally composed of two distinct periods - a period of stability and a period of change. While a vast majority of policy theories explain policymaking in the former, the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory captures the twin dynamics of policy stability and policy change (John, 2012; Kuhlmann and van der Heijden, 2018). The theory, developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), argues that policymaking comprised of long periods of policy stability punctuated by intermittent periods of policy instability. In a way, the long periods of stability denote bounded rationality, while the periods of instability relate to agenda setting (Cairney, 2019). This implies that the generation and utilisation of evidence is more feasible in the latter period than in the former because while the latter period throws up problem(s) requiring government attention, the former is a period of equilibrium where no policy action is

needed. However, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) explain that the so-called stability does not denote perfect equilibrium but instead it means a relatively long period of stability in which policy change can occur incrementally.

Policy stability is achieved when policy actors with vested interests maintain a monopoly on a given policy domain which invariably limits entrance into the policy subsystem (Cairney, 2019). Thus, during periods of stability, entrenched interests control and dominate particular policy domains. This dominance is threatened when new interests seek to exert influence in the policy domain in question, upsetting the prevailing stability and leading to instability (Cairney, 2019). Since the theory explains the interactions of interests, institutions, ideas, and policy actors (John, 2012), the ensuing instability is exacerbated when other policy players, particularly the media, and policy entrepreneurs join the fray. Indeed, intense attention to some policy problems may engender new ways to address the problems (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cairney, 2019). This development expands the range of interested policy players, potentially resulting in the alteration of the balance of power (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; John, 2012). Interestingly, “the forces that create stability during some periods are the same that combine during critical periods to force dramatic and long-lasting changes during other periods” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, p.237). This means that the same structure that limits policy change during stability is the same structure that “disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary punctuations” (Gersick, 1991, p.2).

Clearly, one of the greatest contributions of the PET to the policy literature is its ability to challenge the dominant account of policymaking that focuses on the stability of policy. By integrating the two broad policy periods into a single theory, the PET is seen as one of the best ways of analysing public policy (John, 2012). Consequently, PET has been used to examine different policymaking situations across different contexts (Flink, 2017; Purcell et al., 2022; Wordliczek, 2021).

Nonetheless, the theory has some limitations. Chiefly, by the admission of the authors, the theory is largely descriptive (John, 2012). Also, the theory, harbours ambiguity regarding how evidence is generated and used (Cairney, 2014). Further, the theory is based on the questionable claim that public opinion and media debates influence outputs and outcomes (John, 2012).

2.7. TWO APPROACHES TO POLICYMAKING: RATIONAL AND INCREMENTAL

As we have seen, there is a rich collection of theories to illuminate the policy process. Indeed, the literature is replete with a wide array of interesting policymaking stories to strengthen the value of different theories. Remarkably, some scholars have taken a helicopter view of the policy process and came up with a useful classification. Broadly speaking, the policy-making process is viewed from two approaches: rational and incremental (Knill and Tosun, 2012; Smith and May, 1980). The policy stages is an example of the rational approach. As we have seen, the approach consists of sequential stages that stipulate how policies should be formulated (Knill and Tosun 2012; Weible, 2017; Smith and May, 1980). The approach favours a standardized prescription for policy development. Based on its instrumentalist dimension, it is presented as scientific and problem-solving (Knill and Tosun, 2012) and is consistent with the policy science orientation, invented and promoted by Harold D. Lasswell (Torgerson, 2015). Thus, the approach privileges scientific evidence and generally advocates a direct nexus between evidence and policy. Invariably, not all kinds of “evidence” are used in policymaking using this approach. In addition, the use of evidence differs across the different stages of the approach with some stages more amenable to the use of evidence than others.

A key virtue of the rational approach is that it transforms policy making from an abstract construct into a coherent exercise. This way, the approach opens the “black box” of policy making thereby improving the comprehension and analysis of the policy process (Birkland, 2011, p.27). Indeed, the approach is considered as the best way to explain the policy process (Cairney, 2019).

However, inherent in these virtues are the criticisms of the approach. Two of the criticisms are fundamental. One, the approach has been criticized as being too narrow as it disregards the fact that policymaking is inherently a political process (Anderson 2015; Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009; Knill and Tosun, 2012; Smith and May, 1997). Policymakers work in a politically contested environment which limits their capacity for rationality. Second, the approach is silent on the issue of causality and does not offer an explanation on who drives a policy through the stages (Gultekin, 2014).

The incremental approach, on the other hand, views policy making from the point of gradual improvement of existing policies (Anderson, 2015; Kingdon, 2014; Lindblom, 1959).

Originated by Lindblom (1959), the approach holds that policymaking entails only incremental or marginal changes. The author provides the essence of the incremental approach as follows:

“Policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly. Policymaking is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under consideration....A wise policymaker consequently expects that his policy will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid”(Lindblom 1959, p.86).

Lindblom calls the improvement of policy over time “succession of incremental changes” (1959, p.86). This means the approach is consistent with the path-dependence theory whose central argument is that history matters (David, 2001). The approach involves series of engagements by various stakeholders in the policy environment each having different information, time availability, and technical capacity (Knill and Tosun, 2012). An example of the approach is the multiple stream theory. The approach is considered more realistic (Anderson, 2015) as it recognises the bounded nature of policymakers’ rationality (Lindblom 1959; Smith and May, 1989). This means the approach appreciates the chaotic nature of the policy environment, especially in pluralist and democratic settings where there is routine pressure on policymakers amidst resource deficits. It is concerned with what is politically possible and not what is desirable (Howlett et al., 2009); and emphasises that in policy development, policymakers start with “the policies currently in force” (Smith and May, 1989, p.150) because the hard work has been done (Lindblom, 1959).

In a nutshell, based on the messy policy environment coupled with the bounded rationality regarding policymakers, multiple kinds of evidence are utilised in this approach. This means different stakeholders try to influence policy decisions by providing the kinds of evidence that strengthen their preferences. The immediate implication of this scenario is that values, and more broadly politics, play a far greater role in policymaking than scientific evidence.

However, like its rational approach forerunner, the incremental approach has been subjected to criticism. The approach has been accused of being restrictive as it involves only short-range changes in existing policies thereby discouraging innovation (Anderson, 2015; Smith and May, 1997). Related to this is that the approach assumes the existence of a policy, which may not be the case. It, therefore, does not explain how to proceed regarding the development of new policies. Further, based on its iterative orientation and the absence of a technical bias, the approach is accused of lacking clearly set goals (Howlett et al., 2009). Finally, and

paradoxically, it is argued that the approach may be more expensive than the rational approach it seeks to supplant (Smith and May, 1997). Explaining this point, Smith and May points out that the costliness of the incremental approach is hidden in its reluctance to allow policymakers to explore radical choices, which may be the better choices. Thus, the rational approach is predominantly prescriptive, stipulating how policies should be made, whereas the incremental approach is descriptive, explaining how policies are made (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Knill and Tosun, 2012).

However, despite the well-documented debate between advocates of the rational and incremental approaches, in more ways than one, the “debate is an artificial one” because the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but complementary (Smith and May, 1997, p.172). What is important is to develop an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to guide policy makers leading to improved policy making. As lucidly put by Sabatier (1999, p.6): “knowledge of several different perspectives forces the analyst to clarify differences in assumptions across frameworks, rather than implicitly assuming a given set”.

The foregoing discussion on different kinds of policy theories and models has highlighted the concept of evidence and its use in the policy process. Over the years, evidence-based policy (EBP) has continued to dominate discourse in the public policy discipline regarding what it means, its feasibility, and importantly, questions are being asked about how evidence is used in the policy process. In the next section, the concept of EBP is examined.

2.8. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY

2.8.1. Evidence-based Policymaking as a Concept

Evidence-based policymaking is not an easy concept to define. Scholars and practitioners have defined it differently, often based on their ideological leaning and orientation. The term can be defined from either a narrow or broad perspective (Nutley et al., 2007). From a narrow perspective, EBP is viewed as the use of systematic reviews and experimental research in the development and implementation of public policies (Boaz et al., 2008; Slavin, 2004). It is also concerned with ascertaining the effectiveness of policy interventions using scientific methods (Nutley et al., 2007). The foregoing, which privileges scientific evidence, is the dominant view of EBP (Ferrandino, 2014), and ignores values, beliefs, and politics (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009). Thus, it involves “the depoliticisation of the policy process” and policy decisions are

seen to be based on scientific research and not politics and values (Clarence, 2002, p.5). It is argued that within this tradition, methods for the generation of evidence are required to be “accountable, replicable, and updateable” (Oakley, 2002, p.280). This suggests a standard way of acquiring research evidence that could be translated into quantitative data, and policy outcome are expected to be predictable. Taken together, EBP is seen as a rational and technical exercise involving the systematic acquisition of particular kind of evidence to address identified public problems.

A broad definition, however, considers EBP as an approach that facilitates development of policies using a wide range of information sources including scientific research and evaluation, expert knowledge, stakeholder input, values, and politics (Banks, 2009; Head 2008; 2010; Kay 2011; Maddison 2012). In this regard, Head (2008) argues that evidence is obtained from three sources namely: political evidence comprising information obtained from lobbying, negotiation, and values; scientific evidence from experiments, systematic research and interdisciplinary knowledge; and practical evidence from practitioner knowledge and skills. In addition to these three types of evidence, Kay (2011) posits that transactional evidence, dealing with issues of distributive and redistributive functions of policy are also critical. This broad definition invites policymakers to look beyond the confines of scientific research and instead obtain the best available evidence from multiple relevant sources. It also shows that EBP is neither neutral nor objective (Clarence, 2002; Head 2008; 2010; Kay 2011).

The preceding definitional debate has shown that what counts as evidence is contentious (Head, 2008; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012). Fundamentally, it indicates that the status of evidence in the policy process is contested as what is recognised as an evidence in the two schools of thought differs. The debate is consistent with the long-standing conflict in social research between the positivist and interpretivist approaches to research (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009). Situated within the EBP discourse, the positivists favour the narrow definition, while the interpretivists advocate the broad one. This thesis adopts the broad definition for two main reasons. Firstly, the broad definition is more feasible as it recognizes the influence of politics on the policy process. Whereas scientific evidence is useful, its utilization is a political decision. Ultimately, “no matter how strong the evidence is”, it is very unlikely to solely influence adoption as other factors have to be favourable (Nutley and Davies, 2000a, p.328). Secondly, the limit of scientific research is well documented in the literature, and as such the multiplicity of evidence accepted in the broad definition potentially improves the quality of

policy decisions. Indeed, policymaking should be driven by the best available evidence regardless of source (Head, 2008, 2010; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012; Marston and Watts, 2003).

Meanwhile, (Pawson, 2006) argues that EBP has become a buzz word and many phenomena are wrongly perceived as EBP. He, thus, explains that the following do not qualify as EBP-making:

- Positioning: where former politicians transmute to providers of evidence considering the high likelihood that the ‘evidence’ they offer may be based not on objectivity but ideology.
- Portals: which is not intended to obtain evidence but to harnesses information within the context of knowledge management.
- Polling: comprising information obtained from opinion poll and other similar arrangements like focus group.
- Partnership: where researchers and practitioners agree to work together to figure out a solution to a practical problem as in co-participatory research.
- Partisanship: which recognizes and prioritizes solutions in favour of those oppressed by the system.
- Punditry: involving policy analysts, special advisers, think-tanks and other similar arrangements designed to provide data and information in “support of politically favoured and pre-established policy lines” (Pawson, 2006, p.7).

On their part, Davies et al., (2000b) argue that EBP may not be suitable in certain circumstances, including where:

- Generating evidence is costlier than the likely benefits derivable from the use of such evidence.
- There is only one realistic way to proceed or there is a consensus on how to proceed.
- Political expediency overrides the use of evidence.
- There is unavailability of the research capacity required for the creation of relevant evidence.
- The issue under investigation is not researchable, perhaps owing to unclear objectives, immeasurability of outcomes or rapid technological change.

- It is impossible to assemble relevant evidence based on fundamental constraints like ethical considerations.

The view of Davies et al., (2000b) above suggests they subscribe to the narrow definition of EBP – idealistic and devoid of politics. But as we have seen, the policy making process is ultimately political and policy decisions should be arrived at not from the use of a particular type of evidence but rather from the utilisation of the best available evidence. In recognition of this view, Nutley et al., (2007) reviewed their stance and endorsed the broad definition. In support, they argued that EBP does not only deal with what works, but also interrogates the problem, why it happened and how it could be solved.

2.8.2. A Brief History of EBP

EBP is generally believed to have originated from evidence-based medicine which involves searching for, and incorporating, clinical evidence into medical interventions (Larkin, 2006). Subsequently, it was adopted in other fields like education, criminal justice, healthcare, transport, urban renewal, housing, welfare and social care (Nutley and Davies, 2000a) and, lately, accounting (Leuz, 2018).

There are, however, other accounts that suggest that EBP existed in some ways much earlier than its connection to the field of medicine. The Royal Commission of the Poor Law (1832-34) which was founded in England and developed a framework to enhance the relationship between research and policymaking is an example of EBP in action (Nutley and Webb 2000). Citing Finch (1986), Nutley and Webb (2000), summarise the key aspects of the framework as follows:

- The need to collect and use accurate facts as a basis for policy making.
- A recognition of quantitative data as important components of such facts.
- A preference for a model that provides for a direct interface between knowledge and reform.

Consequently, the framework adopted a simplified, uncomplicated approach where scientific evidence is seen to have a direct impact on policy.

On his part, Parson (1995) traced the origin of EBP to the 1930s when social scientists advocated the use of better information to address public problems. After the Second World

War, the notion that research should influence policy objectives of governments gained prominence until the 1970s and 1980s when social research was considered ineffective (Nutley and Webb, 2000; Nutley et al., 2007). The attendant discontent, therefore, gave rise to EBP's "second coming" reinforced by the need to ascertain what works in public service delivery (Pawson, 2006, p.8).

The renewed prominence of EBP, and its refinement is attributable to the Labour government of Tony Blair which won a general election in the UK in 1997 (Davies et al., 2000a). The government had popularised the 'what matters is what works' slogan. The key message in the slogan is that public problems would be defined and resolved using empirical evidence. This is a rejection of the previous ideologically driven governments of the 1980s and the early parts of the 1990s (Banks, 2009; Davies, et al., 2000a; Kay, 2011). These governments particularly that of Margaret Thatcher distanced themselves from, or even dismissed, research in policymaking (Nutley and Webb, 2000). The new Labour government, therefore, pledged to make evidence the cornerstone of its policymaking as disclosed by one of Blair's ministers:

"Social science should be at heart of policy making. We need a revolution in relations between government and the social research community – we need social scientists to help to determine what works and why, and what types of policy initiatives are likely to be most effective" (Blunkett, 2000 in Nutley et al., 2007, p.10).

To operationalize its vision, the new Labour government issued a number of documents which included: *Modernising Government*, *Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century*, *Better Policy Making*, and *Adding It Up* (Clarence, 2002). The common denominator of these documents is that public policies should be based on evidence. In furtherance to this, a *Professional Skills for Government* (PSG) framework was developed which required civil servants to have EBP knowledge (Boaz, Grayson, Levitt and Solesbury, 2008). Consequently, various initiatives were launched by the government to promote the generation and utilization of evidence in public service delivery (Nutley and Webb, 2000).

Globally, EBP has become part of a burgeoning movement aimed at improving service delivery in the public sector. As a result, developed nations have overtime developed significant institutional capacities for the promotion of EBP (Head, 2010). In this regard, the Anglophone countries, e.g., the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand lead the way (Boaz, Grayson, Levitt and Solesbury, 2008) but Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Southeast and East Asia have also embraced it in varying degrees (Datta and Jones, 2011).

The increasing use of evidence in policymaking and practice is attributable to many factors. Davies et al., (2000a) itemized some of the reasons as: the rise in the number of well-educated publics; the availability of different kinds of data; the improving capacities of researchers and research organisations; an increasing importance of the concepts of efficiency, competitiveness and accountability in government; and public scepticism of the public servants (Pawson, 2006).

2.8.3. Successes and Failures of EBP

The increasing prominence of the EBP has motivated a debate about the extent to which it has achieved its goal. The determination of the success and failure of EBP is, nevertheless, a difficult exercise. This is because the literature to answer the question of whether EBP works is limited and because of difficulty in ascertaining research impact (Nutley et al., 2007). Indeed, outcome of evaluation of government policies are often mixed (Bryson et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the impact of EBP can be ascertained either by the level of “changes to the business of government and public services” (Boaz, et al., 2008, p.234) or by policy outcomes (Nutley et al., 2007). These two parameters would be used to highlight instances of the successes and failures of EBP in the literature.

The EBP has had a significant impact in the UK, influencing fundamental changes in the funding, provision, and delivery of public services in the UK (Nutley et al., 2007). Budgets for analytical purposes of departments and agencies have increased and allocation for research and development enhanced (Boaz, et al., 2008). The outcomes of such policy changes have in turn been evaluated leading to newer research to find better ways of doing things (Nutley et al., 2007). For instance, the Cross-cutting review of science and research and the Science and innovation investment framework introduced important changes in the UK civil service. Specifically, the latter introduced the requirement for “scientific advisers and strategic innovation reviews in each department” with a view to improving the impact of science and evidence in governance (Boaz, et al., 2008, p.234).

Furthermore, social researchers have been organized as an official cadre within the UK government in the same manner as economists (Boaz, et al., 2008). At the employee level, the Professional Skills for Government (PSG) initiative has emphasized the need for EBP knowledge for civil servants to improve their effectiveness (Boaz, et al., 2008). Based on the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that EBP has changed the face of the UK civil service.

Outside the UK, EBP has impacted governance in different countries. In Australia, tariff making was, for many years, informed by evidence contained in reports produced by the country's Tariff Board and thereafter, its successors (Banks, 2009). These reports, Bank explains, had changed overtime from reporting the impacts of the tariff on selected industries to expanding the scope to cover other industries and the economy at large. Other key policies that were based on evidence include, the inflation targeting policy in 1993; the National Competition Policy reforms of the 1990s; the financial market liberalisation of the 1980s; the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and the provisions of 'Lifetime Community Rating' in private health insurance regulation (Banks, 2009, p.109).

Also, the tariff reform and the regulation of the gambling industry in Australia owed their success to the use of evidence (Banks, 2009). In the former, Banks explains, evidence provided by a government agency was used by potential beneficiaries to vigorously push for a reform. In the latter, the deregulation of the gambling industry was based on the myth that doing so would create numerous jobs with tolerable adverse social impacts. Using evidence, it was soon revealed that in the long run, gambling did not generate significant jobs but instead increased adverse social impacts, leading to the regulation of the regulation. Thus, the evidence ameliorated political impediments and made the reform and regulation possible (Banks, 2009). Often, changes in stakeholders' thinking could strengthen their position and feed into policy debates (Nutley et al., 2007).

In the US, the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, in 2010, launched Results First, an initiative designed to assist states and local governments to promote the use of evidence in their policymaking (Lester, 2018). This is bolstered by the fact that policymakers in the US are more interested in the practice of public policy as against political theory (Leigh, 2003). By the end of 2016, Pew-MacArthur reported that policies in all the fifty states in the US were, in varying degrees, guided by evidence (Lester, 2018). By all standards, this is a significant achievement because considering the pre-eminence of the US in the field of public policy, it is highly probable that such initiative would be adopted elsewhere. The notion of diffusion of innovation is that ideas and practices that are considered beneficial are often adopted elsewhere (Nutley et al., 2007). Thus, it is highly probable that this type of partnership would be replicated in other jurisdictions, thereby deepening EBP.

Notwithstanding the relative success of EBP, there have been numerous instances where the adoption or implementation of EBP has failed to achieve its goal. For instance, in 1999, the

UK government committed £400 million to the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) to consistently reduce crime rate (Maguire, 2004). The programme represented “the biggest single investment in an evidence-based approach to crime reduction which has ever taken place in any country” (Home Office, 1999 in Nutley et al., 2007, p.18). In addition, the government allocated £250 million for external evaluations of the programme (Maguire, 2004). The CRP soon became enmeshed in a number of problems including unrealistic timelines, bureaucratic lethargy and capacity issues (Maguire, 2004). Upon review, the programme was adjudged to have failed to achieve its goal (Hope, 2004; Maguire, 2004) which explained its termination in 2002 (Maguire, 2004; Nutley et al., 2007).

On a larger scale, Nutley and Davies (2000a) reviewed findings of a multi-sectoral research on the role of evidence in seven policy areas in the UK: education, healthcare, transport, urban renewal, housing, criminal justice, welfare and social care. Although, the different policy areas recorded varying levels of adoption of EBP, the review generally indicated disappointing impact on both policy and practice across the different policy areas.

The failure of EBP is also reported within the US criminal system. The evidence-based Sentencing Guidelines designed to guide judges’ sentencing decisions in the state’s courts was adjudged as a failure (Stuart and Sykora, 2011). The Guidelines, developed by a Guidelines Commission, carefully articulated sentences for identified offences to substantially reduce growing disparities and to impose sentences consistent with offender’s crime. Thirty years later, disparity still thrived largely because elected officials applied pressure for stiffer penalties and judges amended the sentences to suit their whims (Stuart and Sykora, 2011).

Similarly, an EBP research commissioned by the World Bank in 2008/09 to influence policy in the Ethiopian tourism industry was reviewed and considered a failure (Mitchell and Font, 2017). According to them, failure of researchers to consider the political dynamics of the environment and a lack of engagement with the local policy makers accounted for rejection of their recommendations. They concluded that for research and evidence to impact policy making:

“...researchers should be alive to the fact that they are operating in a politically contested space. Failing to take the political economy of policymaking into account, and allowing this knowledge to influence the shape of the research process itself, risks generating research and policy recommendations which will not resonate with local decision-makers and may have damaging implications if implemented.” (2017, p.134).

In conclusion, the literature of EBP implementation is an interesting mix of successes and failures. But why did some EBP succeed while others failed? Empirical studies have demonstrated that the use of evidence in policymaking is not as straightforward as it is often presented. Usually, it is “a subtle and complex process...resulting in equally subtle and complex outcomes” (Nutley et al., 2007, p.33). In addition to the fact that what is considered acceptable evidence is contested and differs across different domains, evidence may be flawed, fundamentally modified, or even rejected by policymakers, leading to unanticipated outcomes (Head, 2010). Thus, while a consideration of prevailing contextual political economy is important to enhance the chances of EBP success, it is impossible to guarantee any particular outcome considering the messy policy environment.

2.8.4. Evidence: Definition, Hierarchy and Utilisation

2.8.4.1. What is Evidence?

A key presumption in the EBP discourse is that evidence is important in the policymaking process and contributes to the development of more effective policies (Clarence, 2002; Head, 2008; Kay, 2011; Maddison, 2012; Marston and Watts, 2003). What counts as evidence is, however, contentious and contested (Alliance for Useful Evidence, 2015; Bennett and Holloway, 2010; Freiberg and Carson, 2010; Head, 2008; Head 2014; Kay, 2011; La Caze and Colyvan, 2017; Maddison, 2012) in part because evidence is fluid and is interpreted based on an individual’s understanding and biases (Clarence, 2002). Like the definition of the broader EBP, the term ‘evidence’ can mean different things to different people ranging from personal knowledge and experience to scientific research findings (Nutley et al., 2007). Thus, the term can be viewed from a narrow or broad viewpoint (Hansen, 2014) leading to a growing debate among scholars and practitioners.

Conventionally, evidence refers to knowledge obtained through systematic research, conducted by either governments or non-government organisations (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Head, 2010; Kay, 2011). The mainstream EBP movement favours “scientific evidence (arising from research) as the form best suited to inform policymaking” (Parkhurst, 2017, p.16). In this regard, only a particular type of evidence - research-based knowledge - is considered evidence, thereby narrowing its scope and depth. This narrow definition is the dominant view of evidence and is invariably the preference of EBP champions (Hansen, 2014). To corroborate, the US National Research Council (2012) advocates scientific research evidence stating that:

“Science identifies problems – endangered species, obesity, unemployment, and vulnerability to natural disasters or bioterrorism or cyber-attacks or bullying. It measures their magnitude or seriousness. Science offers solutions to problem, in some instances extending to policy design and implementation, from improved weapons systems to public health to school reform. Science also predicts the likely outcomes of particular policy actions and then evaluates those outcomes, intended and unintended, wanted and unwanted. In these multiple ways, science is of value to policy, if used” (Parkhurst, 2017, pp.16-17).

Providing further clarification, Hansen (2014) suggested that within the evidence movement, two factors are critical in the determination of evidence:

1. Synthesised knowledge derived from reviews.
2. Continuous update of reviews to reflect results from new primary studies.

The movement, thus, embodies the notion that evidence is derived from research knowledge and comprises “streams rather than individual study results” (2014, p.12). Similarly, Nutley, et al., (2013) argue for the use of evidence exclusively derived from research rather than from other sources like expert knowledge or stakeholder inputs. They justified their choice on the basis that the systematic way of conducting research, including methodology, peer review and external assessment enhances the trustworthiness and validity of findings.

The foregoing characterization of evidence has, however, been criticized as being too narrow and unrealistic and several scholars including Greenhalgh and Russell (2009), Head (2008), Maddison (2012) have argued that evidence comes not from a single source but from a variety of sources. (Rutter, 2012). Echoing this sentiment, the Cabinet Office Strategic Policy Making Team (SPMT) defined evidence as:

“Expert knowledge; published research; existing statistics; stakeholder consultations; previous policy evaluations; the Internet; outcomes from consultations; costings of policy options; output from economic and statistical modelling” (cited in Nutley et al., 2002, p.2).

The above definition is comprehensive and encompasses a wide range of information sources. This leads to the democratisation of the policy process as different kinds of evidence are considered and utilised for policymaking. However, while the comprehensiveness of the definition has merits, particularly the consideration of stakeholders’ inputs, it also has its share of demerits. A key challenge of adopting the definition is the determination of how the different kinds of evidence can be prioritized (Nutley et al., 2002). This is in addition to the fact that it is expensive and time-consuming to collect, synthesise and eventually utilize evidence owing

to the plurality of information sources. That is why despite its avowal for a wide evidence base, in practice, the UK public sector utilizes a narrow evidence-base, particularly, systematic research, statistics, economic modelling, policy evaluation and expert knowledge (Nutley et al., 2002).

Meanwhile, Head (2008) posits that three kinds of evidence and knowledge are important in the development and implementation of policies. They are:

- Political know-how.
- Rigorous scientific and technical analysis.
- Practical and professional field experience.

He explained that political know-how deals with the knowledge and judgement of relevant political actors and the major activities undertaken in this area include agenda setting, setting priorities, persuasion, communication and trade-offs. This evidence-base is, therefore, anchored on persuasion, stakeholder engagement, and a consideration for fairness and equity as opposed to rationality. Scientific and technical analysis, he argues, involves the use of systematic research and analysis to generate valuable policy-relevant information. The randomized controlled trial and systematic review are often used in this regard, with the latter, considered the ‘gold standard’ in medical intervention, gradually being adopted in social policy (2008, 6). Practical knowledge, on the other hand, comprises the practical expertise of professionals and managers who directly impact policy or provide support services. Their training and actions are often related to best practices for improved efficiency. Head (2008, p.9) therefore argues that these evidence sources represent the ‘three lenses’ that are especially important in informing and influencing policy.

Similarly, Kay (2011) argues that policy ‘evidence’ emanates not from a single rationality but from four rationalities, that often differ on account of varying contexts. She identified the rationalities as: political rationality wherein evidence is arrived at through democratic consensus-building, equity, stakeholder engagement and communication; technical knowledge in which evidence is obtained from scientific research and analysis; practical rationality concerned with the pragmatic manifestation of what has been proven to work or have worked in the past instead of relying only on experts’ recommendations; and transactional rationality which deals with the intervention of policymakers to ensure that policies perform their

functions. The implication of these multiple rationalities, she concludes, is that no evidence is superior to the other as each one represents a critical element in the policymaking process.

The ensuing divergence about evidence is not new in the literature. It corresponds with the age-long debate in social science broadly between the positivists and the interpretivists (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009) with each camp underpinned by assumptions on knowledge generation. The debate can be viewed as a continuum with the positivists at one end advocating that research plays a key role in policy development and the interpretivists at the other end insisting that research plays a minor role (Cook, 2001 cited in Martson and Watts, 2003). The debate tells us that the two schools of thought have significantly different conceptualisations of evidence, further demonstrating that evidence is contested in the policymaking environment. To emphasise, whereas advocates of the majority view of evidence would only place evidential value on research evidence, their opponents would insist that in addition to that, evidence also comes from other sources like stakeholders, the internet, and political values. This corroborates the view that evidence means a different thing to different people leading to a remarkable difference in the way it is used.

However, some scholars have argued that the research-politics divide is unfeasible as policymakers and practitioners recognize and utilize the strength of each camp (Nutley et al., 2013; Parkhurst, 2017). Thus, majority of policymakers and practitioners are found “somewhere near the middle of this continuum” (Martson and Watts, 2003, p.145). In this regard, Parkhurst (2017, p.107) recommends “an improved use of evidence” which “ensures fidelity to scientific good practices, that applies evidence to achieve social goals and also ensures that evidence-informed policy decisions remain democratically representative of the public’s values.” This sounds not only theoretically appealing but also practicable and aligns with Boswell’s (2014) views that the debate about evidence is not to be seen as negative but as a critical part of deliberative democracy in decision-making. “The centrality of evidence, and willingness of proponents of competing narratives to justify their claims in these terms, legitimates the decision-making process and provides a basis for ongoing contestation” (Boswell, 2014, p.363).

2.8.4.2 Hierarchy of Evidence

EBP originated from evidence-based medicine which, according to Marston and Watts (2003, 146), is “the process of systematically finding, appraising, and using research findings as the

basis for clinical decisions”. Contemporary evidence-based medicine (EBM) came to limelight in the early 1970s even though its origin is traceable to 1662 when Jan Baptista van Helmont used randomized controlled trial (RCT) to treat people with fever (Doherty, 2005 cited in Gugiu 2015). The major objective of EBM was to address the growing unscientific trend in medicine at the time when medical decisions were based on experience and instinct (La Caze and Colyvan, 2017).

In this regard a hierarchy of evidence was developed to enhance medical intervention by ranking selected evidence based on their strength because, as the argument goes, not all types of evidence have equal validity (Evans, 2003; Milano, 2015; Murad et al., 2016; Shaneyfelt, 2016; Tomlin and Borgetto, 2011). The hierarchy of evidence was first promoted in 1979 by the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination (Evans, 2003) but became more prominent in the early 1990s (Murad et al., 2016).

Thereafter, scholars have developed numerous hierarchies of evidence most of which show systematic reviews and meta-analysis at the top of the hierarchy; followed by RCTs, cohort studies, case control studies, and finally studies with weak design (like case control and case series) at the bottom (Murad, et al., 2016; Rosner, 2012) as indicated in Figure 1 below.




FIGURE 1: A SAMPLE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

Source: Murad et al., (2016, p.125)

The main purpose of the hierarchy is to underline the importance and preference of some evidence above others with the lower ranked evidence invariably requiring more time and expertise to apply (Murad et al., 2016). This means the search for a solution to a medical issue starts from the top, coming down to lower levels until the best solution is obtained (Shaneyfelt, 2016). Thus, the hierarchy is intended to provide medical practitioners with high quality information for taking medical decisions.

The validity of the hierarchy has, however, been questioned. A major limitation of hierarchies is that they are exclusively concerned with effectiveness – the capacity to achieve set target - at the expense of other important considerations (Marston and Watts 2003), particularly consumer's value (Evans, 2003; Rosner, 2012). In this regard, Evans (2003, p.79) proposed that hierarchies should focus not just on effectiveness but on appropriateness, including client's value, because regardless of how effective an intervention is, "its value is questionable" if it is "unacceptable to the consumer". Rosner (2012, 42) also notes:

“...the canonical pyramid of EBM excludes numerous sources of research information, such as basic research, epidemiology, and health services research. Models of EBM commonly used by third party payers have ignored clinical judgement and patient values and expectations, which together form a tripartite and more realistic guidelines to effective clinical care.”

The scholar, therefore, advocated a more “ecumenical approach” with more elements in the hierarchy and which recognizes the need of users (Rosner, 2012, p.48).

On his part, Milano (2015) observes that the graphic representation of evidence in a hierarchy has unconsciously created not just a ranking of output but also of producers of the outputs such that researchers whose work qualifies to be at the top are considered better researchers whereas those whose work are placed at the bottom are viewed as mediocre researchers. The scholar cautions that the hierarchy should not be viewed as “a ranking of the best and the worst” but rather as a framework comprising complementary components with each level being a critical prerequisite for the level above (2015, p.101). What the hierarchy does is simply to provide practitioners an indication of the progression of research efforts and the current state of research in a particular area.

Questions are also being asked about the primacy of RTCs in the hierarchy (Murad et al., 2016). The RTCs are generally regarded as the ‘gold standard’ in the (traditional) hierarchy of evidence (Bennett and Holloway, 2010; Evans, 2003; Marston and Watts, 2003) based on their ability to drastically reduce error (Evans, 2003; Gugui, 2015; La Caze and Colyvan, 2017). Being the settled gold standard, one question that seems compelling is what happens when RTCs are poorly carried out? Or put another way, is a poorly conducted RCT better evidence than a well-conducted cohort study or case control study on the same issue? (Shaneyfelt, 2016).

Considering these weaknesses, particularly the RCTs, researchers have called for their modification (Rosner, 2012) recommending various proposals among which are:

- Pragmatic Clinical Trials (PCTs) which deals with the practical questions about costs, benefits and risks.
- Whole System Research (WSR) which makes use of observational knowledge including quantitative and qualitative research.
- Patient-oriented evidence that matters (POEM) which focusses only on what is considered important and encouraging practitioners to disregard what is not (Rosner, 2012).

Meanwhile, based on the legacy relationship between EBM and EBP, the latter is often viewed through the lenses of the former. EBM serves as the precursor of EBP and historically, the two concepts owe their development and popularity to the goal of dislodging the use of ideology and intuition in medical and social policy intervention. This relationship has instigated a call for the adoption of the hierarchy of evidence in the social policy domain (Head, 2010; Hansen, 2014; Parkhurst, 2017). To justify the call, reference was made to the overarching idea behind the concepts – the attempt to improve outcomes by answering the question of what works under what context (La Caze and Colyvan, 2017). Reference was also made to the perceived triumph of the EBM in improving the quality of intervention in the medical domain thereby making the ‘medical model’ attractive to social policy (Parkhurst, 2017, p.15). The call for such adoption cuts across various policy domains including education (Davies, 1999), crime prevention (Welsh and Farrington, 2001) and social work (Kazi et al., 2011).

At another level, some scholars promote the use of particular methods within the traditional hierarchy of evidence for social policy intervention. Young et al., (2002) for instance, advocate the use of systematic review because it undertakes a wide-ranging approach to search for evidence. Specifically, it identifies “all the relevant research, not just the best known, well promoted and successful” (Young, et al., 2002, p.220). In the same vein, Haynes et al., (2012) strongly support the use of RCTs in social policy. They say:

“Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are the best way of determining whether a policy is working. They are now used extensively in international development, medicine, and business to identify which policy, drug or sales method is most effective” (Haynes et al., 2012, p.4)

Subsequently, they proposed a “test, learn and adapt” approach has follows:

- Test: to ensure that robust measures are put in place to ascertain the effectiveness of an intervention.
- Learn: to analyse the outcome of interventions to identify ‘what works’.
- Adapting: to adjust interventions based on the learnings from the previous stage.

Generally, several organisations have developed various kinds of hierarchies to suit their operations (Hansen, 2014). The objective is to provide guidance to decision makers on the strength to be attached to the types of evidence at their disposal. It helps decision makers not only to avoid biases (Boruch and Rui, 2008) but also enables them to decide the value of different kinds of evidence (Alliance for Useful Evidence, 2015). For instance, the UK Cabinet

Office developed a hierarchy (below) for policymakers' intervention in respect of vulnerable individuals (Leigh, 2009).

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Systematic review — Synthesis of results from several studies2. Randomised controlled trial — Population allocated randomly to groups3. Quasi-experimental study — Similar populations compared4. Pre-post study — Results compared before and after intervention |
|---|

FIGURE 2: THE UK GOVERNMENT'S EVIDENCE HIERARCHY FOR POLICYMAKERS

Source: Leigh (2009, 31)

The search for evidence begins from level 4 (the least reliable evidence) where baseline results are compared with results after an intervention, then the search moves up to Quasi-experimental study (level 3), RCTs (level 2), and finally systematic review (level 1) which is the most reliable evidence.

Whereas medical practitioners generally conform to the guidance espoused in the EBM hierarchy, policymakers in the social policy domain often view the EBP hierarchy inversely with scant recognition accorded to research evidence (see the view of a former deputy Chief Social Researcher in the UK central government below.

1. Expert evidence (including consultants and think tanks).
2. opinion-based evidence (including lobbyists/pressure groups).
3. Ideological evidence (party think tanks, manifestos).
4. Media evidence.
5. Internet evidence.
6. Lay evidence (constituents' or citizens' experiences).
7. Street evidence (urban myths, conventional wisdom).
8. Cabbies' evidence.
9. Research evidence.

FIGURE 3: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF POLICYMAKERS' HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

Source: Phil Davies, Former Deputy Chief Social Researcher, 2007 In Nutley et al., (2013, p.21)

The call for the adoption of hierarchy of evidence in social policy has elicited a sustained debate. The claim that in EBP, like in medical research, there is a hierarchy which ranks evidence based on their validity is the most debatable notion in the EBP discourse (Head, 2010). It is widely believed that unlike the medical sciences, the answer to the question of 'what works' in social policy is contextual (Nutley et al., 2002).

So, despite the similarities between the two, La Caze and Colyvan (2017, p.6) argue that there are "two main areas of disanalogy" that make the two markedly dissimilar, especially in RCT. First is the science behind medicine and policy. They argue that while medicine possesses adequate "causal knowledge" required for the design, analysis and application of RCTs, the social sciences have significant limitation in that regard. Thus, it is easier to generate causality in life sciences than in social sciences and considering the place of causality in RCTs, one understands the difficulty in conducting RCT for policy issues. Second, RCT and indeed the entire EBM are concerned with comparing two or more sufficiently understood interventions, whereas EBP is interested in policy outcomes for which policymakers often do not have adequate knowledge and as such difficult to assess.

Drawing from three closely related fields of policy studies (where policies involves politics); sociology (where ideology and social norms influence knowledge creation) and philosophy of sciences (dealing with causality and generalisability), Parkhurst (2017) argues that hierarchies of evidence should not be used as an exclusive source of evidence but rather as part of a tripod with the two other legs being values and context.

Head (2010) itemized the challenges confronting the adoption of a hierarchy especially the RCTs in social policy development as:

1. The difficulty of applying RCTS in the social policy, especially sensitive areas.
2. The difficulty of transferring experimental results to intricate large-scale programmes.
3. The tendency that hierarchies would downplay the specialized and contextual experience of professionals.

Based on these challenges, Head (2010) argues that the main area of contention is the importance of ‘qualitative’ evidence – reflecting the values and perception of stakeholders. He observes that unlike the medical sciences, the premium attached to qualitative evidence vary across the different disciplines in the social sciences and as such disciplines like history and anthropology assign greater importance to qualitative evidence than disciplines like economics that privilege behavioural generalisations. Thus, in the social policy domain, understanding the prevailing context is critical and as such the search for evidence should not be based on some rigid construct but rather on different methods that best provides answers to policy challenges (Head, 2010).

To summarise, the disparate hierarchies highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs clearly reiterate that the status of evidence is contentious to policymakers and practitioners even where they belong to the same camp. The differences in the hierarchies show that despite the growing commitments of governments and non-state EBP champions in the social policy domain, the status of the different forms of evidence is far from settled as policymakers attach values to evidence based on their subjective world views and orientations.

2.8.4.3 The Use of Evidence in Policymaking

The way evidence influences policy has received significant scholarly attention. Consistently, social scientists and policymakers are becoming more interested in the place of evidence in policy and practice. The two demographics, however, differ in their basic orientation. While

social scientists are interested in making their research more impactful to policy development, policymakers are concerned with making more effective policies in the face of the resource limitations they face.

Interestingly, despite the generally held view that evidence enriches policymaking, and the continuous commitments of promoters of the use of evidence in policymaking, instances of full utilization of evidence in policymaking are rare. Rather, the literature is replete with commentaries of how evidence is either partially used or fully ignored sometimes to the dismay of the producers of such evidence (Head, 2010). In some cases, evidence is only partially used in the development of policies even after such policies are designated as evidence based. The statement of Michael Howard at the conference of the Conservative Party in 1993 that “‘prison works’ was based on flimsy evidence at best” is seen in this light (Nutley and Davies, 2000a, p.105).

In other cases, evidence is used to legitimize an idea or a proposal, or to provide political support to an already decided issue (Clarence, 2002). This reality is responsible for the pejorative term ‘policy-based evidence’ (Banks, 2009, p.114), the idea that often evidence is used for political or symbolic purposes to support a pre-selected policy decision or action. Also, many at times, policies are developed in direct conflict with available evidence. For instance, in the education sector, the UK government in an attempt to improve learning outcomes, specified minutes to be spent per evening on homework by pupils/students of primary and secondary respectively even though the trials conducted did not show benefits for primary school pupils (Fitz-Gibbon, 2000). The conclusion of Jonathan Breckon, Director of the Alliance for Useful Evidence, that despite having a world-class social research base, research evidence plays a minor role in the development of UK policies reflects these realities (Dunton, 2016).

However, while disappointments about the inability of EBP to fulfil the promises of its promoters are real and useful in interrogating the factual value of EBP in policymaking, some of the disappointments often arise from an exaggerated expectation of the benefits of evidence, and more specifically, research evidence, in the policymaking process. A key lesson for all those involved in EBP is that while evidence is a key factor in the policy-making process, alone it is incapable of determining policy outcomes (Beerken, 2018; Freiberg and Carson, 2010; Nutley and Davies, 2000b). Evidence is, therefore, employed by policymakers with due regard to the prevailing circumstances which outsiders, including researchers, may not be privy to.

Nutley, et al., (2007, p.303) brilliantly echo this thinking when they remarked that available forms of evidence are not adopted but instead “adapted to fit local concerns and needs.” Commenting in a similar way, the intervention of Geoff Mulgan and Jill Rutter is apt:

“Democratically elected politicians have the right to ignore evidence, and it may be wise to disagree with the experts. It is Parliament, not professors, that is sovereign. But we think it would be healthy to cultivate a climate in which politicians should have to say why they ignore evidence, or decide to go against it. The key is that although decision makers are entitled to ignore evidence, they are not entitled to be ignorant of it.” (Alliance for Useful Evidence, 2015, p.5)

As we have stressed so far, the policymaking environment is inherently contested and messy, precluding linear evidence – policy equation. The policymaking environment is for most part in a state of flux, involving a mixture of objectivity, rationality, politics, and values. Policymaking often involves advocacy and compromises with only a negligible part of decisions based on technical evidence (Weiss, 1979). Consequently, “the study of the use of evidence in policy varies from negative to positive advocacy, from simplistic to complex understandings of the processes involved, from uncritical technical approaches to highly cynical commentary” (Oliver et al., 2014, p.2).

Meanwhile, Nutley et al., (2002) argue that four requirements are necessary for evidence to impact policy and practice:

1. Shared understanding on what is considered evidence.
2. A robust approach for the creation and preservation of evidence.
3. Effective evidence transfer and the development of mechanism to provide wide access to evidence knowledge.
4. Initiatives to promote the utilization of evidence.

The extent to which evidence contributes to policy largely depends on the policy domain in question (Head, 2008; 2014). Where a policy issue is ‘technical’, it is most likely that evidence would play a more contributory role than where the issue is general (Beerkens, 2018). In such technical areas, evidence is provided and used by the core policymakers and the integrity of the information largely depends on judgements arrived at on the basis of specialised knowledge and experience (Head, 2014). These ‘closed’ areas include national defence and foreign affairs (Head, 2014; Hogwood and Gum, 1984) and monetary policy (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

Other related areas are science and technology, information technology, medicine, and pharmaceuticals (Head, 2014).

In contrast, some policy domains are considered less technical, such as education, social security, citizenship, and community health, where there are multiple sources of evidence including the public (Head, 2014). Most of the evidence-based social research conducted in the UK, US, Australia, and New Zealand falls within these socially and politically contested areas where values are often more influential than research evidence (Head, 2014). These problems are sometimes called ‘wicked’ problems in the literature partly because stakeholders view them differently in terms of causes and possible solutions (Johns, 2008) and partly because they have a relatively long history (Ferlie et.al., 2011). As a result, the use of limited evidence to address wicked problems has proved unsuccessful and recognition of broad stakeholder input is seen as a more viable alternative (Turnpenny et al., 2009). Generally, “our ideas about ‘evidence-based’ policy may change character as we move from a technical approach towards a more relational approach” (Head, 2008, p.2). This means the more technical a policy domain is, the less open and amenable it is to multiple stakeholder participation, and the reverse is the case where a policy area is less technical.

2.8.4.4 Typology of Research Utilisation

So far, this thesis has demonstrated that various factors influence the use of evidence in policymaking and the entire policy process in general. One of the most discussed topic in the literature is the influence of research on policy. Indeed, it has long been established that the notion that research influences policy in a linear manner is naïve and as such inadequate to explain the relationship between research and policy (Freiberg and Carson, 2010). In this regard, a number of scholars have rejected the notion that research should be the cornerstone of policy and practice. One of the most prominent scholars in this class is Martin Hammersley (2005a, 2005b). He argued that policymaking and practice cannot realistically be based on research, in part because researchers and policymakers possess contrasting orientation. Explaining further, he states that what the two parties consider as useful knowledge are often sharply different which makes EBP unattainable. This limitation has been recognized in the literature (Head, 2010) and can be addressed through the adoption of consensual research approach where policymakers and researchers agree on what the issue is and how it can be tackled (Nutley et al., 2007). Nevertheless, Hammersley (2005b) further argued that researchers do not have the capacity to provide all the information policymakers need while

policymakers do not have the luxury of time required for rigorous research, thereby creating a fundamental mismatch. Central to Hammersley's caution is the concept of bounded rationality which emphasizes that often policymakers are restricted to obtain only limited information before they make policies or decisions. Thus, it is questionable whether EBP minimizes the formulation of wrong policies or improves decision making (Hammersley, 2005a).

He further cautioned that while making policy research-based provides some benefits to both the research community and up takers of research, it risks distorting research in the following ways:

- The abuse of research to support preferred policies.
- Reduction of funds for research not related to policy priority areas.
- Increase in the number of research that attempt to answer unrealistic questions.
- Reduction of turn-around times for research with the associated decline in research quality (Hammersley, 2005b)

He, therefore, concludes that:

"...the notion of research-based policymaking and practice is a myth. Of course, it may be a myth that many researchers feel it is in their interests to preserve. But they are wrong. The medium term, and perhaps even the short term, consequences of this myth are likely to be damaging, not only for research but also for policy and practice" (Hammersley, 2005b, p.328).

For Atkinson (2000) as for Elliott (2001) a focus on 'what works' ignores the role theories play to shape policy and practice. Elliott (2001) argues that the 'positivistic assumptions' inherent in the EBP is an attempt to substitute the 'enlightenment model' of research with the 'engineering model' with a potentially negative implication on socialization, which is a critical success factor in social policy and practice. In the educational sector, what the 'engineering model' does is to disregard the socio-cultural peculiarities in the teacher-student relationship which closes "the door that leads to new possibilities" (Atkinson, 2000, p.328). He further argues that contrary to the assumptions of EBP advocates, it is not evidence but theory that influences pedagogy and teachers' actions.

Atkinson (2000) maintains that most of the notable educational theorists did not conduct empirical research neither can their research be classified as a search for 'what works', yet their work continues to shape educational policy and practice. Yet, for all its rhetoric, EBP, is

incapable of generating research evidence that is “decisive and conclusive” in the future (Elliott, 2001, p.556).

Generally, many empirical studies have demonstrated that the use of research and evidence in policymaking is not as straightforward as it is presented. Often, policies are impacted in subtle and delicate ways (Nutley et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the main goal is to provide a more informed and a more reliable information for the use of policymakers and practitioners (Head, 2010). Consequently, Nutley et al., (2007, p.36) highlight the distinction between instrumental and conceptual research utilization. They argue that instrumental utilization “refers to the direct impact of research on policy and practice decisions”. They explained that this way, it attempts to isolate the impact of a specific research in shaping a specific policy or practice. This notion of direct research-policy nexus is the dominant view in the literature (Freiberg and Carson, 2010; Weiss, 1979). Conceptual utilization on the other hand is a far-reaching description of research use, covering a variety of indirect ways through which research impacts the attitude and aptitude of policymakers and practitioners (Nutley et al., 2007). This is generally a “consciousness-raising” research role which is nevertheless as important as, and empirically more feasible than, the role played by the instrumental research utilization in policy development (Nutley et al., 2007). Interestingly, policymakers have emphasized the “conceptual value of evidence” by way of improving their understanding of critical issues, challenging accepted knowledge, promoting informed debate, and engendering more effective policies (Nutley et al., 2007, p.37).

Weiss (1979) has developed a highly influential and sophisticated typology of research utilization which offers links between research and policy as follows:

1. The knowledge-driven model: In this model, research is conducted in anticipation of utilization in the policy community. The notion is that research leads policy (Freiberg and Carson, 2010; Young et al., 2002) meaning research generates knowledge that motivates uptake in the development of policy and practice. An “element of scientific inevitability” exists with the expert ‘on top’ driving the transformation of research into policies or practice (Young, et al., 2002, p.216). This model is thought to be more suitable for research into science and technology innovations (Nutley et al., 2007; Young, et al., 2002).
2. The problem-solving model: Under this model, research provides the knowledge to solve an identified problem. Research in this model follows policy and as such it is

policy that informs research priorities (Freiberg and Carson, 2010; Young, et al., 2002). Unlike the knowledge-driven model, here, experts are 'on tap', contributing to policy development and practice (Young, et al., 2002). Policymakers and researchers agree on the expected outcome and research provides ideas to achieve that outcome.

3. The interactive model: This involves a complex kind of interconnectedness among numerous participants in the policy community. Policymakers search for knowledge from multiple sources including researchers, politicians, planners, friends, journalists, and interest groups. The process is not linear but consultative, iterative, and chaotic with progress expectedly gradual (Nutley et al., 2007). Any member of the policy community can be influential, depending on the value they are bringing to the table, and often it is difficult to identify who is more influential (Young, et al., 2002).
4. The political model: In this model, research is used by policymakers to strengthen decisions already taken, or in some cases, to falsify the position of the opposition. Thus, research "becomes ammunition for the side that finds its conclusions congenial and supportive" (Weiss, 1979, p.429). This politically motivated use of research is in part responsible for the evolution of the pejorative term "policy-based evidence" (Marmot, 2004, 906).
5. The tactical model: Unlike other models, the goal of this model is only to show that research is being conducted. For instance, where a government is inundated with calls for a particular action, it may respond by saying: "We're doing research on it right now" (Weiss, 1979, p.429). By conducting research or funding one, government may avoid taking any action on an issue (Nutley et al., 2007). This model, therefore, bears some resemblance with the political model as both are used one way or another to strengthen position of governments or their inaction (Young et al., 2002).
6. The enlightenment model: For this model, research findings are not meant to directly influence policymaking but to, overtime, provide conceptual and theoretical perspectives which policymakers imbibe and use to shape their thinking of policy problems and solutions. "It seems to promise that, without any special effort, truth will triumph" (Weiss, 1979, p.430). For this reason, this model is more aligned with the notion of 'evidence informed', than 'evidence-based', policy making (Young, et al., 2002, p.217).
7. Research as part of the intellectual enterprise of the society: The final model of research utilization is where governments provide funds for research into new issues of societal interest, particularly those that become fashionable. Researchers are, therefore, invited

to “develop and reconceptualise the issue” (Nutley et al., 2007, p.40). This way, research and policy are mutually influencing with each being influenced by the larger social context (Weiss, 1979).

The typology has demonstrated that the extent to which research, and more generally evidence, influences policy varies based on the nature of the policy in reference and the attitude of the policymakers. Thus, contrary to the widely held notion that research (and evidence) influence policy in a linear way, many studies have found that they do so indirectly (Nutley et al., 2007). Indeed, research evidence is deployed based on the need of policymakers which invariably means it is used in different ways. To illustrate, the value of research evidence in the problem-solving model is remarkably different from its value in the political model. As explained by Nutley et al., (2007, p.59), translating research evidence into policy or practice often requires “refinement and adaptation.”

2.9 POLICYMAKING VENUE

2.9.1. An Overview of the Iron Triangle Model

The iron triangle model, developed in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s tells a story of how a triumvirate of legislators, bureaucrats, and interests groups cooperate to develop public policies (Gais et al., 1984; Jordan, 1981). The group secure mutual benefits from the arrangement and as such is incentivised to maintain the status quo which means dominating and controlling the policy process (Gais et al., 1984). As a result, gaining access into the triangle is difficult even by a president (Jordan, 1981). For instance, the perceived incompetence of president Carter was largely based on his inability as an “outsider” to access the established iron triangle in Washington; the same triangular relationship “came as a rude shock” to President Nixon (Gais et al., 1984, p.161). Under the iron triangle arrangement, policies are segmented into different domains suggesting that policies are made in “subsystems” (Jordan, 1981, p.99). The triangle, therefore, highlights those who generate and utilise evidence in policymaking.

According to Freeman (1955), the model illustrates mutually beneficial relationships: the legislators cultivate a good relationship with the interest groups to gain electoral support; the bureaucrats provide information and expertise to politicians in return for increased budgetary allocations; interest groups are appeased by bureaucrats in exchange for improvement in the

provision of public goods. In all, the “triangle” is responsible for problem definition and collation as well as the analysis of evidence (Hayden, 2002).

In the event of a disagreement among the members of the triangle, they try to arrive at a compromise to avoid attracting external intervention.

2.9.2. Bureaucracy

The bureaucracy is an integral part of modern government all over the world. It has become “a widespread, almost universal, phenomenon covering democracies as well as communist and right-wing authoritarian regimes” (Subramaniam, 1985, p.199). The importance of the bureaucracy to the policymaking process has increased over the years because of the role it plays in policymaking and implementation. The unprecedented rise in governmental obligations and the inadequate capacity of elected politicians to fulfil those obligation has invariably led to the growing involvement of the bureaucracy in policymaking (Rowat, 1985). Whereas the poor demand more governmental responsibility in the provision of housing, education, health, and employment, the rich require more state subsidization and other forms of interventions (Subramaniam, 1985). Although bureaucrats are formally considered as subservient to the elected politicians, the question is often asked as to whether they are “on top rather than on tap” because of the significant influence they wield in policymaking (Rowat, 1985, p.89).

This has led to tension and an ongoing debate about whether the rise and expansion of the bureaucracy is a good thing (Rashid, 2014). It has been argued that the rise is antithetical to representative democracy since bureaucrats develop policies instead of elected politicians (Lowi, 1969). Supporters of big governments, however, argue that the increasing demand of public goods by the citizens have necessitated the need for a large bureaucracy (Bell and Hindmoor, 2019). Regardless of the ideological debate, what is not in doubt is that the bureaucracy has become a central figure in the generation of evidence for policy development and implementation on account of superior expertise and the inability of elected officials to meet the growing demands of the citizens. Yet, the bureaucracy and the legislature may use the same evidence differently owing to the difference in their orientation and goals.

2.9.3. Legislature

The legislature is one of the components of the iron triangle model. In a democracy, the constitution bestows important policymaking functions on the legislature as the direct representatives of the people. The legislature has over time developed its policymaking mechanisms, one of which is the committee system. Committees reflect what legislatures consider as strategic policy domains and are responsible for the detailed consideration of policy alternatives. A committee can be either a standing (permanent) one with ongoing responsibilities or a non-standing (ad hoc) one created to address a specific matter (Mattson and Strøm, 1995)

Although committees are answerable to the larger legislature and do not have the final authority on Bills, they are very influential in deciding whether a Bill is ultimately passed or not. They are responsible for drafting proposals and fine-tuning them to fit available evidence and reality; and undertake oversight on the executive arm of government (Halligan, 2008).

Using specific comparative time series datasets from the US (1956 to 2011) and the UK (1997 to 2014), Bevan et al., (2019) demonstrate that the committees respond to problems across various policy domains. They also found that the committees are not encumbered by the constraints obtainable in other policymaking venues. The emergence and expansion of organised interest groups, however, weakens the influence of the legislature on policymaking as the legislators are compelled to yield to some of their policy preferences (Hendriks and Kay, 2019).

2.9.4. Interest Groups

According to Gilens and Page (2014), the theories of interest groups originated from James Madison's argument that struggles among the different groups in a republic would ultimately lead to policies that represent the interests of the whole citizenry and defeat oppressive policies. The importance of interest groups in policymaking has continued to rise in the last few decades with governments granting more access to well-organised interest groups (Lowi, 1969; Gilens and Page, 2014; Jordan, 1981). In their policymaking responsibilities, the bureaucracy obtains expertise and feedbacks from interest groups to improve policymaking. Usually, interest groups are 'experts' in their traditional areas of concern and the bureaucrats and the legislature tend to depend on this expertise since it is costly for them to acquire such expertise (Culpepper,

2010). In addition, legislators tend to be amenable to interest groups for electoral support (Freeman, 1955).

In a loose sense, there are two types of interest groups: the public interest group which represents the interests of all citizens, and the sectional interest group, where the interests of a specific group of people dominate (Gilens and Page, 2014). Interest groups could also be classified along other characteristics such as profession, location, and sex. It is worth noting, however, that both the bureaucracy and particularly the legislature reserves the right to accept, amend, or even reject the evidence provided by the interest groups since the ultimate responsibility for policymaking rests with them.

2.9.5. Criticisms of the Iron Triangle

Although the iron triangle presents a simple and insightful story about how three influential policy actors shape the policy process and outcome within a rigidly controlled environment, it has come under intense criticism. One major criticism is that it oversimplifies the policy process to the point of trivialising it (Browne, 1995). It has been argued that even earlier literature acknowledged more complexity in policymaking than described by the iron triangle model (Jordan, 1981). Commenting on the model, Heclo attacked the model as being “disastrously incomplete” (Gais et al., 1984, p.162). He argued that “...Looking for closed triangles of control, we tend to miss the fairly open networks of people that increasingly impinge upon government”, suggesting networks theories as alternative explanation to how policies are made. Of course, other theories have sprung up to illustrate the waning influence of the iron triangle and to offer convincing alternatives. To be sure, theories like the ACF, PET, and the multiple streams (discussed in earlier parts of this section), have all offered credible alternative explanations to the policy process. The key message of these alternatives is that policies are developed not by the triad of legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups but rather by a wider and more variegated policy actors in a complex political environment.

2.10. EVIDENCE INTEGRATION SITES

The concept of evidence integration sites is not common in the EBP literature. However, literature suggests a number of “‘venues’ in which policymaking takes place” (Cairney and Oliver, 2017, p.5). For instance, Bevan, et al. (2019, p.1562) tell us that the legislative committees “gather and assimilate evidence on issues that are currently on the decision-making

agenda”. Other scholars who view legislative committees as policymaking venues are Hendriks and Kay (2019) and Goodin (2005, p.188) with the latter mentioning that legislative committees undertake “creative, cooperative work”. In addition, some scholars point to stakeholder meetings as policymaking venues. Fraussen et al. (2020) and Onwujekwe et.al (2021) agree with Nabatchi (2012, p.704), that stakeholder meetings give “voice to multiple perspectives and different interests, allowing for more thoughtful decisions (Beierle and Cayford 2002; Sirianni 2009)”. Advisory committees have also been identified as policymaking venues. Groux et al., (2018, 1) assert that “in the era of evidence-informed decision making, policymakers increasingly seek scientific advice via scientific advisory committees (SACs)”. Onwujekwe et.al (2021) and Lavertu and Weimer (2011) have also expressed similar sentiments.

On the strength of the foregoing, coupled with some insights from the various models and the theories we have examined so far in the literature review (for instance, iron gate triangle identifies legislative committees as a key site for evidence integration; punctuated equilibrium theory sees ideas as important in bringing about policy change; advocacy coalition framework is a multi-stakeholders approach to policymaking), I tease out the following sites of evidence integration for further analysis: advisory committees, legislative committees, stakeholder meetings. These sites are some of the important places “where the action is” (Cairney and Oliver, 2017, p.5).

2.10.1. Advisory Committees

Governance and policy literature indicates that governments adopt different strategies, mechanisms, and tools to govern (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). One of the fastest-growing tools of modern policymaking is the use of advisory committees (Lavertu and Weimer 2011). Advisory committees are established to provide policy advise and evidence to government in particular policy domains. They are classified based on different characteristics such as functions and composition and are generally divided into scientific advisory committees (SACs) and hybrid advisory committees (HACs).

The SACs, which are the more popular of the two, comprised solely of academics who offer research-based advice to policymakers (Krick 2015). Groux et al., (2018), however, expand the personnel for the SACs to include non-academics provided they possess the required expertise,

and their advice is based on research evidence. Non-academics can also be members of SACs if in addition to their expertise, they are non-partisan (McComas et al., 2015).

It has been argued that SACs are an offshoot of the ongoing push for the entrenchment of evidence in policymaking. The main function of the SACs is, therefore, to provide expertise and research-based evidence to improve policymaking. To enhance understanding, Groux et al., (2018) developed a typology of SACs that categorises them along six main dimensions as follows:

- The sectoral dimension differentiates SACs based on the different fields they operate in such as food, health, and environment. Other fields include education, trade, human rights etc.
- Level of operation: This identifies the jurisdiction: subnational, national, or international.
- Permanence: This highlights variation in terms of longevity, for example whether the SACs are established as ad hoc committees or as standing committees.
- Target audience, which deals with whether the final user of the committees' advice is the commissioning institution or another external institution.
- Degree of independence, which categorises SACs based on their level of autonomy. Are they influenced by non-scientific considerations or external influence?
- Nature of advice, distinguishing SACs that offer prescriptive advice from those that offer descriptive advice.

Generally, SACs offer scientific and technical evidence to governments based on research. Considering the expertise and experience of SACs, which governments lack, their evidence are respected and often utilised by governments in policy development. It is important to point out that beyond giving advice, SACs also develop and issue policies on behalf of governments or the commissioning institution (Burda, et al., 2014).

The HACs, on the other hand are established by government and comprises scholars, societal representatives, and government representatives (Lavertu and Weimer, 2011). Unlike the SACs, the HACs give policy-making guidance and advice based on experience, reasoning, discussions, debates, and political considerations (Ashford, 1984; Brown, 2008). Two main versions of hybrid advisory committees are identified in the literature: full hybrid advisory

committees comprising public and private sector players, and quasi-hybrid advisory committees, composed of public sector players from different departments (Krick, 2015).

The use of both the hybrid and quasi-hybrid advisory committees have increased in the last decade. Krick (2015) analysed four empirical case studies from Germany to demonstrate the growing influence and dynamics of HACs. They are also becoming widely used in developing countries. Onwujekwe et.al., (2021) reviewed the development of 25 policy documents relating to urban development in Nigeria and found that HACs were used in the development of some of the policies.

Like the SACs, the HACs are established essentially to give value-adding advice and evidence to policymakers. Unlike the SACs, however, the advice and evidence offered by HACs are not entirely based on research or technical knowledge as political considerations and inputs from interested stakeholders are considered by SAC members. In that regard, they provide the government or the commissioning institution with multiple forms of evidence with a view to selecting appropriate options (Ashford, 1984; Brown 2008). Consequently, hybrid committees, on account of the different interests of members, contribute to improving the legitimacy and acceptability of policies (Ashford 1984; Brown 2008; Rowe and Frewer, 2000). It has been observed that to improve the quality of their advice and input in the policy process, advisory committees create sub-committees within them to either serve as working groups or engender better focus (Krick 2015; Onwujekwe et.al., 2021). While the sub-committees have the autonomy to work independent of the larger committee, final decisions are arrived at by consensus (Coleman, 1994; The LSE GV314 Group, 2018).

To summarise, the SACs and the HACs, regardless of whether they are hybrid or quasi-hybrid, are established to give advice and evidence in respect of policymaking, or to develop policies themselves (Burda, et al., 2014; Krick, 2015; Winickoff and Brown, 2013). Also, while SACs offer scientific evidence to governments based on research, HACs provide more generic and politically sensitive evidence. Since governments lack the expertise of SACs, their evidence is often accepted as the “gospel truth” by the government to reduce cost and to escape liability if something goes wrong.

2.10.2. Legislative Committees

A settled notion in legislative literature is that the legislators play a key role in the development of policies (Geys, 2013; Phadnis 2021; Wonka, 2017). Elected legislators play three crucial roles: policymaking, legislative oversight, and performing constituency service (Piscopo and Franceschet, 2022). Part of the legislators' tasks is to be responsive to the demands and aspirations of their constituencies. As enunciated by Fenno (2013, p.8), "representing a constituency requires work by each elected politician in identifying problems and in negotiating relationships that are attentive to, and supportive of, constituent habits, expectations, and preferences".

In doing this, legislators obtain and utilise a large amount of variegated evidence for their policymaking duties. Whereas they personally obtain some evidence by themselves, a large amount of the evidence is provided by interested stakeholders or organisations commissioned by the legislators to do so.

For example, Sanni et al.'s (2016) research shows that both federal and state lawmakers in Nigeria personally obtained and harmonised numerous types of evidence in the production of their desired policies. Similarly, an empirical study by Mosley and Gibson (2017) found that an influential stakeholder organisation provided an array of scientific and non-scientific evidence to legislators in the development of foster care laws policies in California in 2010. With such abundant information, limited time and scarce financial resources, the legislators need to prioritise some problems over others (Bevan et al., 2019). Committees play an important role in this regard hence they have become a central topic in the study of political economy (Berry and Fowler, 2018; Bevan, et al., 2019).

Also, committees are responsible for drafting proposals and fine-tuning them in a meticulous manner (Halligan, 2008). Although the committees constitute "a site of formal elite deliberation", they consider the voices of those who are neither experts nor influential in their deliberations and as such work with different kinds of contradictory evidence (Hendriks and Kay 2019, p.28). The complexities and uncertainties surrounding policymaking (Ravetz 1999) and the absence of any formal process for committees to determine what is valid evidence and what is not (Turnpenney et al., 2013) make their work challenging but impactful (Goodin, 2005). This means the committees play a critical role in not only obtaining evidence from a variety of

sources but also in the determination of which evidence and proposals are to be accepted or rejected (Goodin, 2005).

Notwithstanding the highlighted importance of the legislature, particularly the committees in policymaking, a large tranche of literature argues that political parties are the most influential institutions in shaping legislative outcomes in what is generally known as partisan theories (Patterson 1963; Peabody, 1967). The overarching thesis of the theories is that political parties have a significant hold on their legislators' behaviour in relation to policymaking (Owens, 2003).

In this regard, the legislators are seen as purposive - they uphold the preferences of the party as "part of an explicit exchange process that trades off individual preferences against the organizational goal of greater unity" (Crowe, 1986, p.165). Party leaders are recognised to have the power to reward acceptable conduct of legislators and punish unacceptable conducts (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Crowe 1986). The implication of this is that legislators vote along party lines regardless of what the evidence says to them. This impacts the legislators' behaviours in the evidence generation and integration process which invariably affects policy outcomes.

A number of empirical studies support the purposive thesis. They include Opello's (1986) study of the Portuguese national legislature and Crowe's (1986) examination of the British House of Commons. The common finding of these studies is that parties are the major determinants of legislative outcomes. For emphasis, Opello (1986, 313) argued that political parties "have gradually conquered more and more of its terrain and have come to control its every operation". For Crowe, (1986, p.181), "party loyalty remains the most important norm" within the legislature. Similarly, Cox and McCubbins (2005) noted that parties are tools for re-election and have the power to persuade or coerce legislators into submission. A counter argument to the notion of purposiveness is contained in the pivotal politics theory (PPT) which presumes that policymakers vote sincerely (Dziuda and Loeper, 2018) and presents the parties as weak (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Thus, the texture of legislators' behaviours as regards the generation of evidence changes as we move from the partisan theories to the pivotal politics theories.

Another insightful explanation of the factors that shape lawmakers' behaviour in policymaking can be found in the assumptions of the public choice theory. The theory 'applies the techniques

and analytic apparatus of modern economics to the study of political processes' (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, pp. x–xi). Its central argument is that the political person, whether legislator, voter or bureaucrat, behave in a self-centred manner, hence Buchanan's description of the theory as "politics without romance" (Buchanan, 2003, p.16). This means the legislators, voters, and bureaucrats, are typically not driven by noble ideals but the pursuit of their self-interest (Oudenampsen and Mellink, 2022). This suggests that these players attach less importance to evidence and more to their self-interest. It also suggests that they are more likely to accept an evidence that suits their self-interest even if it goes against the public good. As such it may not be surprising if they discountenance a piece of evidence that the majority views as useful once it conflicts with their self-interest.

Thus, at the base of the theory is the notion that people acting politically behave in the same way they do when they act economically - they are concerned about rational self-interest. The major motivation of legislators, the argument goes, is not to develop policies for the good of the electorates but to achieve their self-interested objectives (Buchanan, 2003; Immergut, 2008; Leeson and Thompson 2021; Karadimas, 2022; Phadnis 2021). As McCarthy (2021, p.113) points out, what the legislators do is to "formulate policies to gain office" and not the other way round.

Like other theories, the public choice theory has received its fair share of criticisms. A recurring criticism is that it disregards the power relationship in both the markets and politics in defence of prevailing societal injustice (Meadowcroft, 2014). It has also been criticised for being ideologically biased (Buchanan, 2003). Some scholars have also argued that contrary to the public choice arguments, there exist other assumptions that privilege human rationality in policymaking leading to the development of policies for the good of society. To these scholars, self-interest "is not the only 'rationality' available to human beings" (Mamman, et al., 2022, p.7). In all, the public choice theory has remained enduring, and its assumptions have engendered a rethink in respect of the factors that drive political persons.

2.10.3. Stakeholder Meetings

Contemporary policymaking is increasingly anchored on the consultation of various stakeholders from both the public and private sectors (Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2011; Head 2008; 2010; Howlett et al., 2009; John 2013; Kay 2011; Knill and Tosun, 2012; Maddison 2012; Thomas 2001; Fraussen et al., 2020; Onwujekwe et al., 2021; Sen, 2001). The rise in

popularity and usage of stakeholder consultations in policymaking is as a result of a recent development model which proposes a new cooperative role for governments to enhance inclusiveness, consensus, and legitimacy (Sen, 2001). Stakeholder consultation is also regarded as a key feature of good governance (Fraussen et al., 2020). Beyond these, it embodies instrumental advantages. As explained by Nabatchi (2012), the practice gives opportunity for robust discussions which encourages more effective policymaking. In summary, stakeholder involvement is envisaged to contribute to the generation of more information, different perspectives, and more extensive buy-in leading to more effective development and implementation of policies (Sen, 2001).

A key concern about stakeholder consultation is the risk of elite capture, especially by business interests (Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Hanegraaff and Berkhout, 2019). This concern becomes even more worrisome since bureaucrats tend to largely require technical knowledge which businesses are more capable to provide (Fraussen et al., 2020).

Fraussen et al. (2020) identify three types of consultation approaches: open, closed and hybrid. The scholars explain that in an open approach, every person or organisation that wishes to participate in the consultation process is given the opportunity to do so. The close approach focuses on the selection of desirable players and involves the use of tools such as workshops, meetings, seminars, and expert groups. Hybrid approach, as the name indicates, involves the use of both open and close consultation tools. The scholars further explained that the open approach tends to attract a more diverse group of stakeholders compared with the closed approach, yet even in the closed approach, policymakers could involve a wide range of stakeholders to ensure that different interests are recognised, and relevant concerns are addressed.

Like Fraussen et al. (2020), Nabatchi (2012) differentiate two types of participant selection. Stakeholder selection, where participation is restricted to only those who have a legitimate interest in a policy issue on account of their professional status or involvement in a formal organization. Public selection, on the other hand, offers open participation to all residents of a particular community. For Fraussen et al. (2020), as for Nabatchi (2012), the recognition of different perspectives and concerns, in part, speak to the value of stakeholder consultation in the policy process, regardless of the type.

However, while the consultation approach seems more desirable, the closed one is more focused (Fraussen et al., 2020). A recurring tool in the closed stakeholder consultation approach is the stakeholder meetings, including workshops, seminars, and expert groups. An important rationale for advocating these meetings is that they offer policymakers opportunities to process various evidence types and consider different policy options (Onwujekwe et al., 2021; Thomas, 2001). Further, such meetings represent avenues to refine policy proposals and arrive at consensus (Fiest, et.al., 2022). The implication of the foregoing is that in addition to being consistent with the notion of good governance, and offering stakeholders a platform to ventilate their views, stakeholder meetings serve as venues where evidence from different sources is integrated into the policy process (Turnpenny et al., 2013). Yet, as we have seen, the way evidence is generated and utilised varies significantly across the different consultation approaches. While the open consultation potentially produces more evidence than the close consultation, governments often attach more value to the evidence that emanates from the close consultation based on the expertise and experiences of members. Participants in the close consultation are also more organised and influential.

Although stakeholder consultation generally enriches the policy process, governments often tend to ignore its pronounced benefits (Rhodes, 2011). There are many instances when the UK government ignored the input of interest groups or even excluded them from policymaking (King and Crewe, 2014; Richardson, 2018). Consequently, it is appropriate to describe the UK policy style as “impositional” (Leiren et al., 2021, p.35). The “Westminster Model” or “British Political Tradition” where policies are typically developed in a hierarchical manner is, however, a myth and represent “what does not happen in British politics” (Cairney, 2012, p.231).

Notwithstanding Cairney’s (2012) caution, the disregard for stakeholder views is not peculiar to the UK. Yadav and Bhaduri (2021) discover the absence of any interactive forum for government consultation with stakeholders when the government of India developed a rare new disease policy. Many scholars have expressed similar sentiments regarding the development of policies in Nigeria (see for example Ibrahim, 2004; Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021; Ajakaiye, 2007). It has been argued that the reason for poor or lack of consultation is that the exercise is costly, time-consuming, and conflictual (Irwin, 2006).

In contrast, a tranche of the stakeholder literature document instances of extensive stakeholder consultation in the policy process. Marais et al., (2020) reported that the South African Mental Health Policy Framework and Strategic Plan was approved in 2013 after wide consultation with stakeholders without any government influence on either the method or use of consultation inputs. In a related vein, Solorio et al., (2022) shows ample evidence of indigenous consultation in the development of two clean energy policies in Mexico and identified the government, indigenous communities, and corporations as the three main stakeholders. Similarly, Mah and Hills (2014) analysed the 2007 nuclear consultation exercise in the UK and observed that although the exercise was large in scale, it involved an extensive consultation process.

Overall, the policy literature has mixed evidence of stakeholder consultation which requires us to be circumspect in our conclusion. In this respect, it is appropriate to moderate “extreme pictures of policymaking” and instead pay more attention to the factors that facilitate or constrain policy development (Cairney, 2012, p.231). It is important to recognise the politics behind the consultation process especially governments’ power to invite or select stakeholders that would participate in the process. Also worthy of recognition is that governments maintain the responsibility to decide which evidence to project and which to mute.

2.11. GOVERNANCE APPROACHES

The term ‘governance’ is being used in various ways to describe a number of circumstances and activities. In the last few decades, scholars have focussed on the transformation from “government to governance” to denote the claim that governments have been “hollowed out” or “decentred” in public policymaking and implementation (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p.xiii). Flowing from this claim, Rhodes (2017, p.158) defines governance as “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks”. Koch (2013, p.398) describes it as “modes of political steering and integration dominated by networks, overlapping roles of political and societal actors, low institutionalization, and a general blurring of bureaucratic demarcations”. These two definitions are emphasising the role of the society in governance. Other scholars view the concept differently. Bell and Hindmoor (2009, p.2) see governance as “the tools, strategies, and relationships used by governments to help govern”. The authors identify three approaches to governance: society-centred, state-centric, and state-centric relational.

The society-centred approach is the dominant approach and proclaims that in the last few decades, non-state actors have substantially marginalised governments in policymaking and implementation (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Rhodes, 2017; Ryser et al., 2021). In the words of Salamon (2002, p.1): “the heart of this revolution has been a fundamental transformation not just in the scope and scale of government action but in its basic forms”. Under this arrangement, the state loses its steering capacity which is replaced by “pluricentric negotiations among relevant and affected actors” (Sorensen and Torfing 2009, p.236). Rhodes (2017, p.168) famously describes the development as “the hollowing out of the state” and stresses that policy networks make policy decisions autonomously, indicative of the move from government to governance. In this arrangement, the bulk of the evidence comes from non-state actors who dominate the governance process. Thus, while the state provides the governance platform, participating non-state actors control and direct the process.

The second approach which is in stark contrast to the first one is called the state-centric view in which governments are said to govern in a hierarchical manner, imposing their policy preferences on society (Hysing, 2009). Although, there are different shades to this account, the common denominator is that governments “operate in splendid isolation from the society they govern” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p.xiii). Advocates of this view argue that policymaking is embedded in the political environment and controlled by a largely impervious government hierarchy (Beer, 2014; Ryser et al., 2021). Some scholars have described this kind of government as the “strong state” in which policies are made in a traditional command and control manner (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p.25). Therefore, the state, which is insensitive to the views of non-state actors, serves as the only provider of evidence in policy development.

The third approach is the state-centric relational, which is recently gaining more scholarly attention (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). The main argument here is that although governments still undertake policy development and implementation through a hierarchical way, they have developed strategic partnerships with non-state actors to enhance their capacity and achieve their goals (Hysing 2009; Pierre and Peters 2000). This means the approach endorses the hierarchical control of the state-centric approach but also accepts the relational aspects of the society-centred account which focuses on a mutually beneficial relationship between the state non-state actors. Therefore, this view is a “portmanteau” of the state-centric and society-centred views and asserts that the choice between the two is a false one (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). A major feature of this approach is that governments create opportunities for stakeholder

consultations: open, closed or hybrid to improve policy outputs and outcomes (Fraussen et al., 2020). As a result, evidence is provided by both state and non-state actors with the state having more influence in the relationship.

In sum, the key area of contestation among the different governance approaches is the extent of governments' steering capacity. Demonstrably, while a large body of literature holds that the state has been "decentred" or "hollowed out" (Sorensen and Torfing 2009; Rhodes, 2017; Salamon, 2002), an opposing view has been advanced by other scholars (Marinetto, 2003; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; and Davies, 2011) who argue that the steering capacity of the government is alive, and in some instances expanding. This means that governments possess the capacity to steer and row (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).

2.11.1. Metagovernance

Like the term governance before it, governance scholars differ on what metagovernance means and what it says about the balance of power between governments and non-state actors (Stark, 2015). According to Sørensen and Torfing (2009, p.245), "metagovernance refers to higher-order governance transcending the concrete forms of governance through which social and economic life is shaped, regulated, and transformed". They explained that it is a pragmatic mechanism by which policy players control various socio-economic practices to achieve predefined goals. Whitehead (2003, p.8) views it as "practices and procedures that secure governmental influence, command and control within governance regimes".

To be clear, metagovernance means the way disparate policy actors are coordinated to achieve set goals of policy networks or partnerships. Yet, policy scholars differ on who should undertake metagovernance. Whereas state-centric, and state-centric relational scholars assert that metagovernance is an exclusive responsibility of governments, interactive governance scholars argue that metagovernance must not necessarily be performed by governments but instead any actor that possesses the right resources can perform metagovernance (Stark, 2015). Because of this conceptual divergence, the former sees metagovernance as the "government of governance" (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009 p.46), while to the latter, it is the "governance of governance" (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009, p.245).

2.11.2. Core Elements of Metagovernance

Bell and Hindmoor (2009) identify six core elements of metagovernance - the functions performed by governments in governance arrangements: steering, effectiveness, resourcing, democracy, accountability, and legitimacy.

2.11.3. Steering

The steering function involves the general strategic management of the governance arrangement especially as it relates to goal and rule setting, selection of participating actors, allocation of tasks, organisation, and coordination (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Kjaer 2011). Within any governance arrangement, governments can change the power dynamics to reflect their preference (Doberstein, 2013; Jessop 1997).

2.11.4. Effectiveness

The effectiveness of any governance arrangement to achieve its desired policy goal and requires two key related tasks. The first is the establishment or approval of the said goal. The second involves monitoring, including identifying instances of policy drift and taking necessary remedial actions where and when necessary (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). Indeed, “network effectiveness is most likely in a resource-rich environment and is least likely in a resource-scarce environment” (Milward and Provan, 2000, p.368).

2.11.5. Resourcing

The provision of adequate resources, both financial and non-financial, is a key element of metagovernance. Notably, not all the required resources are expected to come from governments, considering that lack of adequate resources is the main reason for the establishment of policy partnerships (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). The goal of metagovernance is best achieved through a powerful and well-resourced player (Milward and Provan, 2000). Governments’ relatively huge financial resources and access to an extensive professional bureaucracy suggest that governments supply most of the governance resources (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Rysera, et al., 2021).

2.11.6. Democracy

Compliance with democratic norms is a fundamental aspect of metagovernance. Although including non-state actors in governance is viewed by some as undemocratic (Bell and

Hindmoor, 2009), an alternative understanding indicates that such practice can strengthen democracy since it encourages broader public participation in policymaking, enhances the quality of policies, and checks potential abuse by centralised power (Fung and Wright 2003; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009).

2.11.7. Accountability

Accountability is a crucial feature of metagovernance since it embodies responsibility and control. This need becomes more compelling when non-state actors participate in governance arrangements (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). Notwithstanding the horizontal nature of policymaking in the network arrangements, governments are held accountable by the electorates which in turn empowers governments to hold others within the governance arrangement accountable (Doberstein, 2013; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

2.11.8. Legitimacy

The legitimacy element deals with public perception of the degree of fairness of both the policy processes and the outcomes (Doberstein, 2013). In that regard, governance arrangements that are seen as fair, gain more support, than those that are viewed as unfair. Indeed, governments can enhance the input legitimacy by ensuring that political choices reflect the wishes of the people while the output legitimacy requires that the governance arrangement performs creditably (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

2.12. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to conceptualise public policy, examining the difficulty in defining it. Broadly speaking, public policy was defined from two perspectives, the narrow one and the broad one. The narrow one involves governments making policies in a hierarchical manner, oblivious of societal interests. The broad one, on the other hand, deals with governments making policies through cooperation with non-state actors. The chapter also highlighted the lack of consensus regarding the typologies of public policy, and how scholars view them from the lenses of their orientations and biases. Although the theoretical debate around both concepts (public policy and typologies of public policy) complicates efforts to illuminate them, the debate serves an important instrumental purpose as it provides a leeway to capture a wide range of salient issues relating to policy and policymaking.

The chapter also examined four models and theories of public policy (the policy stages, advocacy coalition framework, multiple streams theory, and punctuated equilibrium theory), and discussed some of their notable strengths and weaknesses. Importantly, the chapter highlighted how evidence is generated and utilised under the models and theories. The discourse showed that the generation and utilisation of evidence could vary based on a number of factors including the type of policy in question, the politics of evidence, and the stage of policymaking. To illustrate, evidence plays a more influential role in technical policies (closed policies) than in policies that are regarded as general (open) owing to the need for more specialised knowledge in the former. Thus, only core policymakers provide evidence for technical policies with a wider range of players providing evidence for non-technical policies. As per the politics of evidence, the chapter demonstrated that governments largely reserve the power to select or invite the stakeholders they wish to participate in the stakeholder consultation process, which gives them a measure of control in respect of the provision and use of evidence. Regarding the stages, the policy formulation stage is where the highest number of evidence is generated in the policy process since it is the stage where policy options are considered while the decision-making stage is only concerned with the selection of solutions presented at the policy formulation stage.

In addition, the chapter offered an overview of the EBP movement and critically examined the concept of evidence. Indeed, central to any analysis of EBP is understanding the term ‘evidence’ which has remained highly contentious despite numerous scholarly attempts to define it. The term ‘evidence’, like ‘public policy’ was also viewed from narrow and broad perspectives. The narrow perspective, which is the dominant view, considers evidence as research-based knowledge obtained by either governments or non-governmental organisations for policymaking. In the broad perspective, evidence is viewed as a wide spectrum of knowledge and information obtained from both scientific and non-scientific sources including expert knowledge, media, and stakeholders’ inputs for policymaking. This thesis adopts the broad definition not only in recognition of the limit of scientific evidence but also because of the belief that values, and politics play a key role in the policy process.

The hierarchy of evidence, a notion that advocates ranking of evidence based on their perceived importance, was also examined in the chapter. From its beginning in the medical field, hierarchies of evidence have extended into the social policy domain. Several scholars have established one kind of hierarchy or the other. Yet, glaring differences exist in the hierarchies showing that the status of the different forms of evidence is contested as policymakers attach

values to evidence based on their subjective worldviews, orientations, and prevailing circumstances.

Further, the chapter conceptualised evidence integration sites drawing from reviewed models and theories. It identified three sites: advisory committees, legislative committees, and stakeholder meetings. These sites play a critical role in generating and synthesizing different forms of evidence with a view to determining which evidence is to be accepted, refined, or rejected.

Finally, the chapter highlighted the use of evidence in three governance approaches: society-centred, state-centric, and state-centric relational. Under the first approach, much of the evidence is obtained from non-state actors who control and dominate the governance process. For the state-centric approach, the state monopolises the responsibility for the generation of evidence, and policies are developed in a hierarchical manner. Lastly, in the state-centric relational approach, evidence is provided by both state and non-state actors. The state is, however, significantly more influential than non-state actors in the relationship.

In all, the chapter examined public policy, policy models and theories, EBP, and attempted to demonstrate the contested nature of evidence in the policymaking environment. It also attempted to show how the use of evidence varies based on a number of factors and circumstances.

The next chapter focuses on policymaking in Nigeria.

CHAPTER 3

POLICYMAKING IN NIGERIA

“Nigeria is so peculiar and dramatic. Even talking about the potentials before we talk about the negativities, Nigeria is a nation for perpetual study. I think in Nigeria, it is the potential which hits people and makes them believe in Nigeria. It tends to make them react when they see potentials being wasted and it is a tragedy to see potentials wasted. But paradoxically, it is a realization of the existence, that positive, that keeps many Nigerians and even foreign people going.”

- Wole Soyinka

3.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented an overview of policymaking, and particularly the twin concepts of evidence and EBP. It also examined salient themes in the EBP literature for elucidation. This chapter focuses on policymaking in Nigeria, which typifies a black box (Birkland, 2011). This chapter interrogates the dynamics of policymaking in Nigeria starting firstly with a brief history of the country. It then discusses policymaking in Nigeria under military and democratic dispensations. Next, evidence-based policymaking within the Nigerian context is examined. Finally, the prospects of the evidence-based movement in Nigeria is analysed.

3.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NIGERIA

Before the advent of British colonial rule at the turn of the twentieth century, the area referred to as Nigeria today was a collection of about 300 diverse communities, with different levels of centralization (Awe, 1999). These pre-colonial communities had their distinct systems of governance including economic management and conflict-resolution mechanisms. In 1900, Britain placed the area under its control. The control involved the unification of the Niger Coast Protectorate with territories controlled by the Royal Niger Company to establish the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Usman, 1996). Six years later, the protectorate and the Colony of Lagos were united to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Umoden, 1992; Usman, 1996). At this time, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was a distinct British protectorate that covered the northern part of the future Nigeria (Umoden, 1992). In

1914, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were amalgamated to establish a single colonial entity called Nigeria.

So, technically, there were three different amalgamations, in 1900, 1906 and 1914, with the last being the most prominent because it was the last administrative step to create Nigeria (Usman, 1996). These amalgamations were situated within the larger colonial objectives of Britain to exploit the resources of its colonies. The main aim of the amalgamations was therefore economic exploitation (Awe, 1999) and administrative convenience (Umoden, 1992). Explaining further, Usman (1996) argued that the amalgamations were predicated on the need to secure cheap and stable source of raw materials, a market for British industries, capital for investment in Britain, and cheap human resources for economic and military purposes. He further explained that the British colonialists observed that it was more efficient to amalgamate the disparate colonial entities than to administer them separately.

Nigeria got her independence from Britain in 1960 sequel to sustained liberation struggle by the country's political elite. The struggle was part of a wider independence movement across Africa at that time and the British colonialists realized that they risked forcing Nigerians to take arms, as some Africans had done, if the country was not granted independence as quickly as possible (Usman, 1996). After Independence, Nigeria adopted a parliamentary system of government with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa becoming the first prime minister. The country transformed into a republic in 1963 and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe became the country's first president. Amidst sundry allegations against the political leadership of the country, the First Republic was truncated by a bloody military coup in January 1966 resulting in General Johnson Aguiy-Ironsi becoming the country's first military head of state (Ojo, 2006).

The action of the coup plotters was to open a floodgate of many coups and coup attempts in Nigeria with significant impact on the country's growth and development. It heralded the politicization of the Nigerian military and the bastardisation of governance. Ojo (2006, p.262) captured the foregoing sentiment rather succinctly:

"Their coup, apart from sounding the death knell of the First Republic (1960-1966), effectively brought the men in "khaki" into the murky waters of Nigerian politics, thus desecrating their neutrality and professionalism inherited from colonial days. Having tasted what a newsmagazine called the "forbidden fruit," the military lost its innocence, and treachery, ethnic loyalty, and power mongering became its hallmark."

Six months after the first coup, a counter coup was staged by Northern military officers who felt the first coup largely targeted and killed Northern politicians. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the military head of state and a Southerner was killed in the coup and Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner, emerged military head of state. Gowon ruled Nigeria from 1966 to 1975. Thereafter, Nigeria had six military rulers: Murtala Mohammed (1975 - 1976); Olusegun Obasanjo (1976 – 1979); Muhammadu Buhari (1983 – 1985); Ibrahim Babangida (1985 – 1993); Sani Abacha (1993 – 1998) and Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998 - 1999). This means since after the ill-fated January 1966 coup, the country was in the shackles of military dictatorship for about 29 years with a brief period of democracy in the Second Republic from 1979 to 1983 and a short-lived interim government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan that lasted 82 days (Ojo, 2006).

Abdulsalam Abubakar midwifed the country's return to democracy and in 1999, he handed over power to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the winner of the country's presidential election. Subsequently, Nigeria has achieved significant mileage in its democratic journey and for the first time in its chequered history, the country had successive civilian to civilian transfer of power with Umar Musa Yar'adua (2007 – 2010); Goodluck Jonathan (2010 - 2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015 – 2023). Indeed, each of these successful civilian transfers had strengthened belief about the survival of democracy in the country. The emergence of Muhammadu Buhari as the president of Nigeria in 2015 was instructive and reinforced this belief. Buhari was a member of the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) and defeated the incumbent at the time, Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), the party that had been in power since the return of democracy in 1999. So, the victory of Buhari demystified the 'power of incumbency' argument in Nigeria. The term is a pejorative one which suggests that incumbents will not lose elections because they use their power, influence, and every trick in the book, including all manner of illegalities, to retain power or to make their anointed candidate to win an election.

3.2. POLICYMAKING IN NIGERIA

Nigeria operates a three-tier government structure – federal, state and local governments. The federal government comprises a bicameral legislature, a federal judiciary and an executive organ encompassing the presidency, federal ministries, departments and agencies. The country has 36 states and a centrally located capital. Each state is divided into local governments for administrative convenience (Sanni, et al., 2016) with 774 constitutionally recognized local governments. The three tiers have power to make laws or policies as specifically provided in

the constitution, depending on whether the subject is on the exclusive, concurrent, or residual list. The focus of my research is policies developed by the federal government, otherwise known as national policies.

Following Nigeria's independence in 1960, the country designed and implemented various policies to improve socioeconomic growth and development (Yagboyaju, 2019). Like in other parts of Africa, majority of these strategies and policies were inspired by, and in many cases, developed by the international community especially United Nations agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community (Ajakaiye, 2007; Ayuk and Marouani, 2007). One of the most notable examples of such externally dictated policies is the World Bank/IMF prescribed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which many African countries implemented during the 1980s and 1990s. In Nigeria, SAP was adopted in 1986 as a free-market tool aimed at improving the country's resource allocation and economic competitiveness (Umoden, 1992). Thus, the generation and utilisation of evidence for the development of SAP and other national policies that were inspired by the international community were done with little or no input from Nigerian policymakers.

To strengthen the point about foreign influence on African countries, El-Rufai (2013) stated that in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, letters of intent of Nigeria and other African countries seeking IMF debts were drafted by the IMF itself indicating that the process was more of an imposition than cooperation. It could then be argued that countries that benefitted from the financial or technical support of these supranational bodies were forced to design their sundry national policies to conform with the conditions attached to the support given to them by their benefactors. The undue influence of the international community had resulted in some adverse policy outcomes. In many instances, the conditionalities were unfeasible, largely because they did not recognize local peculiarities and as such benefitting countries failed or refused to implement the conditions or the reform they promised (El-Rufai, 2013).

There was the notion, however, that the unavailability of local capability was a key reason for the imposing disposition of the international community. Consequently, the international stakeholders became unwilling to accept views that were inconsistent with their criteria for technical or financial support to the African countries (Ayuk and Marouani, 2007). This development did not go unchallenged. While some skeptics argued that the international community's lack of, or limited knowledge of the country's peculiarities considerably

undermined policy outcomes, others accused them of harbouring some hidden agenda (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021).

In response, the international community has begun to accord more priority to local peculiarities by recognizing the inputs of local interest groups. For instance, a collaborative effort between the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) and Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Water Resources led to the development of Nigeria's National Water Resource Master Plan in 1995 (Doro, Ehosioko and Aizebeokhai, 2020). In the same vein, the International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC) and Nigeria's Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources spearheaded the development of the country's National Fertilizer Policy in 2006, after an initial draft by a team of technocrats and researchers, with inputs from a broad spectrum of civil society stakeholders (Aberman et al., 2009). These two examples suggest that the policy space is opening, and the international community is beginning to welcome more evidence in the development of policies they are interested in.

Notwithstanding, the literature on policymaking shows a disconnect between research findings produced in Nigeria and policies developed in the country to improve service delivery (Ajakaiye, 2007). This indicates that research evidence produced by local researchers are not duly utilised despite the convincing dictum that local peculiarities should be considered in policy development. The asymmetry between research and policy in Nigeria is curious because the country ostensibly has a significant capacity for research. With more than 80 institutions dedicated to policy research and training (Yagboyaju, 2019), Nigeria had one of the highest numbers of such institutions in Africa (Aberman, et al., 2010). A number of reasons have been advanced for the disconnect between research and policy in Nigeria, notably unhealthy rivalry between statutory research institutions and 'in-house' research outfits; inadequate funding; policy initiation gap following presentation of research findings; and poor policy environment (Olomola, 2007).

On his part, Ibrahim (2004) viewed public policymaking in Nigeria mainly within the confines of the Nigerian civil service. He observed that prior to independence and up till the 1980s, public policymaking in Nigeria was done by a civil service that acted professionally and independently. Indeed, the country inherited an effective and a non-political civil service from Britain which remained so for a long time (El-Rufa'i, 2013). Some scholars, however, argued that the Nigerian civil service was created by the British colonialists not for service delivery but to facilitate the exploitation of the Nigerian colony and to maintain law and order (Fatileet

al., 2015). This suggests that the Nigerian civil service was not attuned to policymaking and its transformation into one anchored on service delivery was in response to the developmental challenges of post-independent Nigeria.

Notwithstanding, policymaking in Nigeria can be broadly divided into two epochs: the military era and the democratic one.

3.2.1. Policymaking During Military Dictatorship

One of the most telling features of the military era is the suspension of the constitution and the formal structures of democratic governance, and their policymaking functions. Notably, successive military governments established a powerful body whose name was altered from time to time with the responsibility for policymaking and implementation (Ibrahim, 2004).

Overtime, the military rulers, using the self-reinforcing elements Joseph (1991) described as clientelism and prebendalism, accumulated and consolidated vast powers which they used for their selfish purposes. Policies were, therefore, based on the whims of military rulers instead of evidence. In that regard, the rulers and their acolytes became the sole providers of “evidence” with no one challenging or even interrogating their choices. In some instances, “evidence” was provided by interest groups sympathetic to the rulers or by organisations commissioned by them. This way, the resultant policies were ostensibly arrived at after a consideration of “evidence” from critical stakeholders.

Worthy of note is the concentration of government responsibilities, particularly policy formulation and implementation, under the Presidency and newly created parallel public organisations by the military regimes (Ibrahim, 2004). Economic crisis and socio-political tension were, however, also considered as the reasons for the creation of the parallel organisations (Bangura, 1994). By and large, the practice under military regimes in Nigeria was to create new organisations and appoint loyal technocrats to head them. Invariably, the heads of these organisations remained subservient to the rulers with the concomitant outcome that all policy decisions had to be sanctioned by the rulers. Doubtless, the civil service during this period was made pliable with its policy development and implementation function threatened or taken over by appointees of the military rulers. As a result, the military rulers, their appointees, and even their families were exclusively responsible for policymaking in Nigeria (Bangura, 1994).

A notable instance of such personalization of governance was during the regime of Sani Abacha when formal meetings for policymaking were gradually stopped and instead ministers and top government officials sought personal audience with Abacha, his wife, or his children to discuss state matters and take decisions (Ibrahim, 2004).

Viewed within the context of the use and interpretation of evidence in policymaking, it can be said that those responsible for policymaking during that period viewed (or were forced to view) the value of 'evidence' from similar standpoint as the military rulers. Also, the process of using the 'evidence' was hierarchical since only one form of 'evidence' - the one favoured by the military was used in policymaking.

The personalisation of governance, thus, largely contributed to the weakening of institutional capabilities including the mainstream civil service along with its policymaking function interventions (Jerome, 2007). Although, Ibrahim (2004) traced the weakening in the civil service to the military regime of Babangida which superintended a fundamental transformation of Nigeria's public administration, the weakening in the civil service, the ineffectiveness of the country's civil service predated that regime. As an example, the Murtala regime had attempted to reform the public service in the mid-1970s, resulting in the sack of over 11,000 public servants (Joseph, 1991) whereas the military regime of Obasanjo had a policy to reform the local government administration in the country (Shehu Musa Yar'adua Foundation, 2004).

The need to improve the civil service in part or in whole has been a recurring decimal in Nigeria from pre-independence era up until the demise of military rule in Nigeria as can be seen from the following reform commissions: Tudor Davis Commission (1945-1946); Morgan Commission (1963); Simeon Adebo (1971); Jerome Udoji (1972); Dotun Phillips (1986); and Allison Ayida Panel (1995). In 1999, the new civilian government inherited a civil service that was largely driven by personal interests rather than national interests, "short-term in vision, self-centred in policy formulation and corrupt in programme implementation" (El-Rufa'i, 2013, p.323).

Expectedly, the personalization of governance and the weakening of the civil service had an increasingly considerable impact on the generation of evidence and policy making generally. Critical policy requirements such as the provision of multiple forms of evidence, intellectual rigour in synthesising them, and stakeholder consultations were either missing or significantly insufficient in the policymaking process. Consequently, the policies developed were neither

based on evidence nor developed to cater for the need of many but rather to satisfy the greed of a few, and in many cases, to perpetuate the status quo. Consequently, the country experienced the rise of a patrimonial state, wide-spread corruption, a burgeoning deterioration of institutional governance, an inefficient civil service with a cumulative adverse impact on public policy and allocation of public goods (Ibrahim, 2004; Lewis, 1996).

3.2.2. The Return of Democracy

The return of democracy in 1999 offered a new hope that policymaking would be accorded a place of pride in the Nigerian public administration. During Obasanjo's first tenure (1999 – 2003), there were deliberate efforts to improve the policymaking process by making research more influential, incorporating various stakeholders particularly policy experts and academics into the process (Aberman et al., 2009) and strengthening democratic structures to engender “efficacious policymaking and policy implementation” (Ibrahim, 2004, 11). The government also established the Bureau of Public Service Reform in 2003 to undertake an overhaul of the service for optimal performance. From 1999 up to the creation of the bureau, the government was so serious about the reform that a cabinet minister for civil service was created (El-Rufai, 2013). The government's attempt was designed to improve the civil service and the bureaucracy for effective service delivery. This is quite significant given that historical evidence shows that bureaucrats and the civil service were important policy players even when the policy environment was hostile (Fatile et al., 2015).

With the return of democracy, three organs are largely responsible for national policymaking namely, the Federal Executive Council, the National Council of State and the National Assembly (Jerome, 2007). The Federal Executive Council (FEC) comprises the President, Vice-President, and all ministers while the National Council of State (NCS) consists of the President, Vice-President, all former Presidents and Heads of Government, all former Chief Justices of the country, heads of the two federal legislative houses, all the Governors of the states and the Attorney-General of the Federation. The National Assembly on the other hand comprised the senators and the House of Representative member. Policies can also be developed by individual ministries with inputs from other MDAs and other organised interest groups. FEC approval is, however, required where a policy is beyond the authority of a minister with selected standing committees within the FEC ensuring that relevant MDAs are consulted (Cabinet Affairs Office, 2014).

Notwithstanding these formal policymaking processes, the development of some national policies was still largely dictated by foreign experts with scant knowledge of the Nigeria's aspirations and peculiarities resulting in a disempowerment of local expertise. Thus, contrary to the expectation that the return of democracy with the formal policymaking structure would usher in a robust policymaking arrangement, the international community still controls the process, including the generation of evidence.

"The process of policy review is also more formal than real and a questionable cyclical trajectory has emerged. The process starts with supporters of the "new" policy from the international partner community paying for foreign experts to write the new policy for the MDA. Government then approves the new policy and then gets the international partner to pay for a stakeholder's conference to obtain "local ownership" by stakeholders. The stakeholder Conference is presented the new policy in the morning and is usually required to give its seal of approval the same day, in a context in which the stakeholders have not really had an opportunity to study and debate the document. Having secured "stakeholder support", the new policy document is then published and circulated. The process ends with presentation of the policy paper to the President in front of blazing lights and television cameras with the anti-climax being depositing the copies in the store of the Office of the Secretary of the Government - a funeral rite". (Ibrahim, 2004, p.12).

This position, as scathing as it is, has been strengthened by the views of other scholars. Sesan and Siyanbola (2021) for example, mentioned an instance when an individual consultant was contracted by the Ministry of Power to produce a draft energy policy which was then given to an inter-ministerial committee for review with a stakeholder suggesting that the policy was probably a mimicry of a similar policy in another country. Commenting on the same policy, another stakeholder was reported to have stated that:

"...We got an almost— 70 percent—ready document...Consensus building is one of the biggest challenges, across ministries, within ministries. Very difficult. If you can build consensus across several parameters, half the battle is done" (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021, p.5).

Both Ibrahim (2004) and Sesan and Siyanbola (2021) spoke to a growing trend in policymaking in Nigeria which discourages the generation of evidence from multiple sources. In fact, more often than not, ideological conflicts, debate and intellectual rigour are viewed as unnecessary distractions that should be avoided. The justification for adopting the "fast track" approach seems to be the desire to circumvent the normative chaos inherent in policymaking by blunting conflicting perspectives. In other word, quality is sacrificed for speed. Perhaps, more disturbing

is Ibrahim's (2004) description of the end of the policy process as "a funeral rite" presupposing that policies developed were not intended to be implemented.

Another key concern regarding policymaking in Nigeria is the notion of policy discontinuation. It is commonplace for a new government to discard policies of its predecessor notwithstanding the impact of such policies. Indeed, it does not matter whether the successive governments belong to the same political party. For example, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) initiated by the Obasanjo administration to run from 2004 to 2011 was jettisoned by Yar'adua when he became president in 2007; in its stead, he introduced the 7-point agenda which suffered the same fate when he died in office in 2010 as the new president, Goodluck Jonathan, discontinued the programme and announced a new programme, the Transformation Agenda (Yagboyaju, 2019). Interestingly, the three presidents belonged to the same party, the Peoples' Democratic Party, and one would have expected that they were united by the party ideology and manifesto.

Policymaking and allocation of public goods in Nigeria since independence have considerably been affected by a lack of evidence (Ibrahim, 2004), deceit (Ajakaiye, 2007) clientelism and prebendalism (Joseph 1991), resulting in the personalization of the policy process and elevation of ad hoc interventions (Jerome, 2007).

Culture has also been identified as a contributory factor in shaping Nigerian policymakers' perspectives (Osemeke and Osemeke, 2017). As elucidated by Chuka (2012, 272), "one's actions, attitude towards things and indeed the whole of one's world view is measured by how much the culture of the person is able to influence him". The way culture influences the perspectives of policymakers, however, varies depending on a number of factors. One key factor is the degree of humanness inherent in the policymakers. In this regard, a burgeoning tribe of scholars argues that Nigerian policymakers are culturally predisposed to develop altruistic policies for the betterment of society, inspired by the *Ubuntu* philosophy (Mamman et al., 2023). This means that the policymakers are, based on the dictates of their culture and morals, motivated to develop and implement effective policies. In contrast, culture has instigated the development and implementation of unconventional policies as was seen during the Goodluck Jonathan's administration when huge sums of money were allocated to prayers to fight the Boko Haram insurgency. Being very religious, Nigerian policymakers have "a tendency to place every existential authority to God" (Chuka 2012, 273). The other side of the coin, however, is that on many occasions, they supplicate to God without sufficient application

on their part. Hofsted's (1984) thesis provides an interesting dimension suggesting that the high-power distance prevailing in Nigeria, breeds a docile citizenry that disincentivises stakeholder consultation in policymaking.

In addition to the cultural constraint highlighted above, other constraints militating effective policy formulation in Nigeria are structural and ideological (Thomas et. al., 2008). Structural constraints relate to poor development capacity, financial challenges, and conflicting institutional mandates (Thomas et. al., 2008). Poor development capacity means policymakers lack the requisite policymaking knowledge which hampers their ability to develop effective policies. Financial challenge is concerned with a government not able to mobilise funds to develop or implement policies. Conflicting institutional mandates relates to different MDAs having overlapping functions, thereby causing policy chaos.

Ideological constraints in Nigeria occur when government disregards evidence from stakeholders to pursue its policy preferences (Agbazuere, 2020). In that regard, the government devotes its resources on what it has promised to deliver or what is ideologically associated with it even if the evidence suggests otherwise. The ability of a government to do so is, however, reduced where the evidence from the stakeholders relates to a politically salient issue. Also, sometimes, state governments refuse to key into the development objectives of the federal government based on differences in ideology (Agbazuere, 2020). Ideological constraints may, therefore, make policymakers use evidence in different ways. These challenges make the generation of evidence, and the development of policies, more difficult in Nigeria, and Africa.

For Ibrahim (2004), Nigeria's policy problem started when the country discarded the policy process it inherited from Britain without developing a new one. The process, his argument goes, involved four stages:

- 1) **GREEN PAPER:** This dealt with extensive consultations involving ministries, departments and agencies intended to analyse the need for a policy, including the weaknesses of existing policy or policies, as well as resource availability. At the end of the consultations, a Green Paper, articulating the new policy direction would emerge.
- 2) **STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS:** At this stage, the Green Paper would be widely circulated to stakeholders including research centres, universities, the media and other interested parties for inputs.

- 3) **WHITE PAPER:** This encompassed a review session by government to consider stakeholders' inputs with a view to enhancing the Green Paper which would be adopted and issued as a White Paper.
- 4) **ACT:** The final stage comprised the conversion of the White Paper into an executive bill, which would be transmitted to the parliament for enactment as a law including implementation modalities and financing.

3.3. POLICY CLASSIFICATION IN NIGERIA

In Nigeria, whereas some policies are subject to legislative input or approval, others are not and are instead developed at ministry levels with inputs from other government institutions and other stakeholders (Cabinet Affairs Office, 2014; Jerome, 2007). So, in effect, there are two major types of policies in Nigeria:

1. Policies that do not require legislative input/approval (Administrative policies); and
2. Policies that require legislative input/approval (Legislative policies).

To clarify, policies in the first category are mostly policies that are developed in ministries and other non-regulatory arenas in furtherance to their mandates. Culpepper (2011, p.180) described these arenas as “sites of informal institutionalisation.” Such policies often do not need budgetary provision from the legislature for their implementation. In contrast, policies in the second category receive the intervention of the legislature either in the form of inputs to the policies or in passing a Bill to become a law (Ibrahim, 2004). The two types of policies require the inputs of stakeholders to make them evidence-based (Cabinet Affairs Office, 2014).

Considering their status, legally sanctioned policies are laws that should be implemented. Democratic governments in Nigeria have, in many instances, however, weakened the role of the legislature in policymaking by not carrying it along even though it ought to be the most important policymaking body in a democracy (Ibrahim, 2004).

It should be noted, however, that strengthening a policy with the force of law does not guarantee implementation as it may suffer what Ajakaiye (2007, p.24) calls “official announcement illusion”, referring to making an announcement to pacify stakeholders even though the government does not intend to implement the policy. It is a symbolic gesture governments frequently use for politically salient issues they are neither willing nor capable to address

(Parsons, 1995). Unsurprisingly, one of the biggest challenges of policy making in Nigeria is government's abysmal policy implementation level, which is well-documented (Alinno and Ikwegbe, 2012; Ibrahim 2004; Phillip and Peter, 2013). This creates a problem for advocates of EBP in Nigeria: of what use is a policy, no matter how much its grounded in evidence if it will not be implemented? (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021).

3.4. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING IN NIGERIA

There is a compelling need for Nigerian policymakers to formulate policies based on evidence to enhance the country's socio-economic development. Documentary evidence from around the world, whether from developed or developing economies buttress the need for evidence-based policymaking (Yagboyaju, 2019). To recall, EBP is a Western concept and while developed economies have over the years developed robust frameworks to promote it (Head, 2010), the concept is only beginning to be embraced by developing economies.

In Nigeria, the dominant view is that public policies are neither driven by evidence, nor is there a substantial demand for evidence (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). The poor data culture in the country is considered as one of the main reasons for the low adoption of EBP (Sanni et al., 2016). It is important to note that an exhaustive amount of quantitative data exists in the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), a government agency that generates and maintains official macrolevel data on a wide range of subjects (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). Equally important is the presence of numerous research institutions in Nigeria created to improve the link between policy and research and to promote the use of evidence in policymaking. With 66 government research institutions, many university-based research institutes and numerous research-generating NGOs, Nigeria has the highest number of research institutions in Africa (Aberman et al., 2009).

Yet, it has been posited that the link between policymaking and research in Nigeria is considerably weak and as a result, research knowledge seldom influences policymaking (Ajakaiye, 2007; Ayuk and Marouani, 2007; Olomola, 2007; Yagboyaju, 2019). Requests for data from the NBS are almost exclusively statistical and in few areas: agriculture, banking, economics and petroleum, indicating a limited utilization of evidence (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). Paradoxically, the notion of the limited influence of research evidence in policymaking is not peculiar to Nigeria but is rather a universally acknowledged weakness of the EBP movement (Beerkens, 2018; Head, 2014; Turnpenny et al., 2009; Weiss, 1979).

Notwithstanding this weakness, the popularity of the use of research evidence in policymaking continues to grow (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). In fact, many scholars have argued that the non-utilisation of research evidence has adversely affected policy outcomes. It is widely believed, for instance, that one of the key reasons why SAP failed in Nigeria was because the programme was not based on national research evidence (Ayuk and Marouani, 2007; El-Rufai, 2013). The relegation of research (and other forms of) evidence in the policy process every so often leads to “policy inconsistencies, confusion and instability which are the bane of development in the country” (Olomola, 2007, p.183). The sentiment expressed in this quotation finds concurrence with the views of four past Directors General of the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER), one of the foremost policy think tanks in Nigeria. In 2010, during the 60th anniversary celebrations of the institute, three past Directors General and the current one at the time, were interviewed on policymaking in Nigeria. They all lamented the poor or non-utilisation of research evidence in public policymaking in Nigeria. For emphasis, “the commonest point of convergence in their responses is that policies in the country are hardly research based, while many research outputs are merely ‘hit and run’ as they lack strong evidence of rigour” (Yagboyaju, 2019, p.5). Such remarks from successive heads of government’s top policy institution do not offer encouragement regarding the use of research evidence in the development of public policies in Nigeria.

Poor funding has been identified as the main factor militating the achievement of the institution’s mandate. To elucidate, although the NISER was responsible for the “policy side” of the 2017 Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) of the country, owing to poor funding and the attendant inadequate institutional capacity, the task was undertaken by few influential individuals (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). This indicates that limited evidence, produced by a few elites, was used for the development of the ERGP because of the reported lack of funding. In addition to the funding challenge, poor research quality was identified as another major reason for the low uptake of research in Nigeria (Aberman, et al., 2009). It is important to stress that although these challenges are not peculiar to Nigeria, they are not at a worrisome level in Western countries. Investments in research constitute a significantly high expenditure item for virtually all Western countries engendering innovation and growth (World Economic Forum, 2021). Also, the quality of research produced in the West has consistently been ranked among the best in the world. Relatedly, OECD countries possess considerably higher EBP capacities (Head, 2010) unlike Nigeria. EBP studies conducted in the West are, therefore, incapable of explaining Nigeria’s policy story.

The disregard of research in the policy process is causing significant disillusionment among Nigerian researchers. Consequently, many have changed their focus from impacting policy to self-satisfaction and pursuing their personal interests (Yagboyaju, 2019). In this regard, researchers conduct research either to fulfil academic requirements for career growth or just for the pride of concluding research.

Beyond research evidence, other forms of evidence are also either ignored or suppressed by policymakers. Ajakaiye (2007) enumerated three main sources of evidence during the policy process in Nigeria: political office holders and bureaucrats; sundry interest groups, including labour unions and business groups; and the international community. Yet, national policymakers defer to the international community for fear of repercussion such as withholding financial and technical support. It has also been argued that Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises (SMEs) policies in Africa are developed “on the foundation of policies and theoretical assumptions of the Western developed countries” (Mamman, et al., 2019, p.305). To confer respectability on externally inspired policies, affected governments in concert with the international community describe such policies as “home grown” (Ajakaiye, 2007, p.25). This label, the argument goes, is therefore meant to hide the reality that the governments have surrendered their policy sovereignty to the international community in exchange for continued funding of selected government activities or programmes. This means that in the development of the policies in question, the international community remained the sole or major provider of evidence.

International stakeholders are not the only culprits accused of dominating the policy process in Nigeria thereby diminishing the evidence content of policies. Take the case of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) which is one of the most ambitious policies in Nigeria since the return of democracy in 1999, aimed to address the socio-economic decline in the country. The development of such historic document was undertaken by five technocrats, “The Dream Team”, complemented by a few academics without consulting ministries who had earlier produced policy positions on the issues covered in NEEDS (Ibrahim, 2004). The NEEDS policy was developed by a few individuals, but the government deceived the world into believing that it was a product of a rigorous process (Usman, 2004). Importantly, the limited stakeholder consultation conducted was not to obtain diverse inputs but to “sell (the) policy decided by the dream team to a wider audience” (Ibrahim, 2004, p.19).

Likewise, the universal basic education policy (UBE) was developed by the executive without the input of the legislature and the various state governments even though the implementation of basic education in Nigeria is statutorily the responsibility of the state governments (Ibrahim, 2004). The NEEDS and UBE policies, thus, provide fitting description of policies that were based mainly on the beliefs and opinions of a few (Doro, Ehosioke and Aizebeokhai, 2020) which privileged individual positions over institutional ones (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). Thus, “The Dream Team”, complemented by a few academics and the executives were responsible for producing and synthesising evidence for the development of the NEEDS and UBE policies, respectively. By and large, the disregard for critical evidence in the development of social policies potentially affect both the quality and implementation of policies. Afterall, a good social policy utilizes evidence from a variety of sources including primary and secondary sources (Akinbinu and Tiamiyu, 2016).

There exists a counter argument to the notion that policies in Nigeria are not based on evidence. At a casual level, some military regimes were credited with engaging critical stakeholders to develop policies. Babangida regime’s decision to invite Nigerians of all walks of life, through a national ‘IMF debate,’ to decide whether the government should accept an IMF loan to bolster the foundering economy was considered by some analysts as an indication of government’s deference to different sources of evidence. Following Nigerians’ rejection of the loan, a position which the government accepted, one analyst remarked, “... history will acknowledge the courage and honourableness of a military leader who has not allowed the authoritarian attitude of his office to subvert the will and judgement of the majority of the citizens on an issue dear to their heart” (Ogunbanjo, quoted in Umoden, 1992, pp.72-73). The rejection of the IMF loan by the regime was, however, a facade as the president unveiled an economic adjustment package that contained the conditionalities attached to the rejected loan a few weeks after the public repudiation of the loan in what Lewis (1996, p.83) described as “a deft policy turnaround.”

The point needs to be stressed that notwithstanding the charge of using guile against Babangida, his regime did not take the loan as generally favoured by majority of Nigerians. Though a military regime, it adopted a relatively extensive public consultation in its policymaking (Umoden, 1992). Likewise, the military regime of Obasanjo obtained inputs from various stakeholders including the military governors of states, traditional rulers and other interested parties which formed the nucleus of the regime’s local government reform (Shehu Musa

Yar'adua Foundation, 2004). This means that some policies during the military regimes in Nigeria, had limited stakeholder consultation.

The decades following the return of democracy in the country have engendered a more diverse and rigorous stakeholder consultation. Examples of such consultations abound in several policy domains such as agriculture (Aberman, et al., 2009) poverty reduction (Taylor, 2012) and energy (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). Critical stakeholders were therefore consulted for the development of these and many other national policies in Nigeria. Whether the consultation process was robust enough is, however, an area that needs to be further interrogated. But suffice to say that research on EBP including the use of evidence in policymaking has increased in Nigeria since the return of democracy.

For example, Sanni, et al. (2016), conducted an empirical study to examine Nigerian lawmakers' access and utilization of science, technology, and innovation (STI) advice and the impact of such advice on their legislative and policymaking responsibilities. Noting that scientific evidence was only one source of evidence, the study identified eight kinds of evidence employed by the lawmakers comprising expert opinion, internet, evidence from seminars, newsletter, policy brief, academic journals, public opinion polls and legislative resolutions in that order.

Similarly, Akinbinu, and Tihamiyu (2016) conducted research on 166 civil servants responsible for policymaking in seven ministries of Lagos State and found out that civil servants obtained evidence from many sources including: government publications, internet, newspapers, ministry's expert knowledge, academic research, previous policies. The research further showed that participants perceived previous policies, internet, government publications and ministry's expert knowledge as the most frequently used sources of evidence in policymaking largely due to ease of access.

To sum up, these two studies (Sanni et al., 2016 and Akinbinu, and Tihamiyu, 2016) alongside the stakeholder engagements in different policy domains highlighted above offer an insight into the range of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria.

3.5. PROSPECTS OF EBP IN NIGERIA

Nigeria has come a long way regarding public policymaking and the use of evidence in policymaking. The nature and depth of evidence used in policymaking in Nigeria, especially

since the return of democracy in 1999, can be described as chequered, alternating between hope and despair. Taken together the divergent views aforesaid, particularly the growing awareness and adoption of EBP, it would appear the country has a significant potential to deepen the adoption leading to improved public service delivery and democratic governance. I situate the discourse on the prospects of EBP in Nigeria within the iron triangle schema of legislature, bureaucrats, and interest groups, for analytical clarity (Gais et al., 1984; John 2012).

Firstly, the return of democracy in Nigeria has undoubtedly freed the once constricted governance space and the demand for accountability and inclusiveness. Of particular importance is the return of the parliament, which is “the highest expression of policy formulation in a democracy” (Ibrahim 2004, p.20). The parliament in Nigeria is functional and serves as the medium through which the disparate voices of the people are ventilated by their representatives, strengthening the presumption of national ownership of government policies. As we have seen, federal parliaments in Nigeria consult a wide variety of sources in their policymaking activities (Sanni, et al., 2016). In addition, as the representatives of the people, they obtain evidence from their constituent members and conduct public hearing to enhance inclusiveness and the quality of laws and policies. The return of democracy and legislative arm of government would therefore potentially improve robust policymaking and make development of policies based on the whims of policymakers more difficult.

Secondly, the civil service is projected to reclaim its key role in policy formulation and implementation. Although it is still bedevilled by corruption and poor service delivery, the government continues to attempt its reform. To be clear, several reforms have been implemented with relatively poor outcomes (Anazodo et al., 2012; El-Rufai, 2013; Mark and Zainuddin 2018). Nevertheless, the civil service reform and implementation strategy launched in 2017 by the federal government of Nigeria represented the first time that government had come up with a detailed plan of how to revive the service and make it a result-oriented one (Abdullahi, 2019). The 3-year strategy ended in December 2020 and the government has begun the development of a successor 5-year strategy plan to cover the period 2021 – 2025 (Independent, 2021). The overarching goal of the strategy is to reposition the civil service by building the capacity of bureaucrats and enhancing their welfare (The News, 2021).

Thirdly, interest groups have, historically, played significant roles in policymaking in Nigeria as demonstrated by the studies of Sesan and Siyanbola (2021), Taylor (2012), and Aberman et al., (2009). Nigeria is a relatively open society and different interest groups covering diverse

areas such as agriculture, health, business, and education are exerting pressure on policymakers to influence policies (Ajakaiye, 2007; Bangura 1994). For instance, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) is a critical player in all negotiations for the review of civil servants' salaries in Nigeria. Also, the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), is an influential group that contributes policy ideas to promote the country's private sector.

Supplementary to the foregoing, the existence of many research institutions in Nigeria is envisioned to support the adoption of EBP in the country. Although this has not been the case for a long time, interest in the use of evidence in policymaking in the Nigerian public service is gradually increasing (Sanni, et al., 2016). It is expected that this interest would galvanise a rise in the demand and utilization of evidence in policymaking. Indeed, there is a growing interest in knowledge co-production within the policymaking space in Nigeria, which if sustained, can improve policymakers' understanding and utilization of variety of evidence in policymaking (Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). It is important that these initiatives are sustained so that EBP would become the norm rather than the exception in the Nigerian public service.

3.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that policymaking in Nigeria, like in other countries, can take different forms and shapes and it is difficult to depict it in a definite predictable pattern. In other words, the exercise is characterized by uncertainties and a lot of muddling through.

The chapter showed that Nigeria's policymaking story can be told in two epochs, the military, and the democratic periods, each with different dynamics. Policymaking under the military regimes were patrimonial, swift, uncomplicated albeit suboptimal. This is understandable considering that the legislature, a critical policymaking institution was suspended during successive military regimes. The civil service, another important policymaking organ, was made ineffective as its policymaking function was routinely taken over by new organisations created by the military who installed their acolytes as heads of the organisations. Consequently, the development of policies during these times was largely based on the whims of the military rulers, their families, or based on "the evidence" provided by those who the military rulers had hand-picked to head new organisations. Invariably, the value of 'evidence' was uncontested, and 'evidence' was used in a hierarchical manner consistent with the preferences of the military

juntas. Instances of public consultations under military rule were few, far in-between and generally tangential, as illustrated in the chapter.

Another interesting feature of policymaking under the military regimes was that the generation and use of evidence for the development a number of national policies was largely influenced by the international community with little or no input from Nigerian policymakers.

As regards policymaking in a democracy, the chapter identified two types of policies in Nigeria. The first one is the administrative policy, developed by MDAs and which does not require legislative input/approval. The second one is the legislative policy which requires legislative input/approval. To be effective, the two types of policies require the generation and use of multiple kinds of evidence to enhance their effectiveness. Relatedly, the chapter showed that the return of democracy in 1999 heralded the return of formal democratic institutions like the legislature, which has assumed its policymaking responsibilities. The chapter also showed that Nigeria's democratic governments have undertaken measures to make national policies more evidence-based including incorporating various stakeholders into the policy process, making research more influential, encouraging policy debates, and reforming the civil service.

Notwithstanding these measures, the chapter revealed that the development of some national policies was still largely influenced by the international community which provided significant evidence even though in many cases it demonstrated insufficient knowledge of the country's peculiarities. Also, contrary to expectations that the return of democracy would signal the end the personalisation of policymaking, incidences of few elites such as the famed "Dream Team" developing national policies without the required inputs from critical stakeholders still subsists.

Generally, two schools of thought have emerged regarding the use of evidence in policymaking in democratic Nigeria. The dominant school, the cynics, argue that policies are not developed based on research or multiple kinds of evidence but are rather based on either the whims of a dominant president using the expertise of a few technocrats, or the opinions of a small clique of influential bureaucrats. Those who make this argument are not short of examples with the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) being a prominent one.

The second school of thought, the optimists, holds that policymaking in Nigeria is not fundamentally different from what obtains in developed countries to the extent that it is based

on a process that involves a careful selection of a course of action based on a plethora of evidence. Advocates of this school draw attention to the continuous demand and supply of evidence within the policy environment in Nigeria and some empirical studies in support of their argument (eg. Akinbinu and Tiarniyu, 2016; Sanni, et al., 2016).

The chapter argued that policy constraints shape and limit policymaking and implementation in Nigeria, and Africa, highlighting three major constraints: structural, ideological, and cultural. The way these constraints influence policymaking, however, vary across settings. For instance, while culture may engender a sense of altruism in policymakers leading to the development of effective policy, culture could also induce the development and implementation of unconventional, suboptimal policies as demonstrated during Jonathan's government when humongous amounts of money were allocated to prayers to fight the Boko Haram insurgency.

In terms of the prospect of EBP in Nigeria, the chapter adopted an optimistic stance. Firstly, the return of the legislature, rightly seen as the "the highest expression of policy formulation in a democracy" (Ibrahim 2004, p.20) is expected to improve the generation of evidence from a wider source, especially from legislators' constituencies, to make national policies more evidence-based. Secondly, it is anticipated that the civil service reform undertaken by the government will make it more professional in policymaking including obtaining evidence from multiple sources. Finally, considering that democratic Nigeria is a relatively open society, coupled with the fact that interest groups have assumed a more influential role since the return of democracy, they are projected to continue on that trajectory and add their voices to the policy discussions pertaining to their domains of interest.

The next chapter examines the research methodology used for this study to empirically interrogate the validity of the claims of the two schools of thought discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter covers policymaking in Nigeria within the context of its history and institutions. This chapter presents the philosophical and methodological framework adopted for the collection and analysis of data. It also presents the justifications for adopting the framework and the key activities undertaken by the researcher in conducting the research.

4.1. THE RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY: ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

In addition to the literature reviewed in the preceding chapter, a key factor that influences social research is an understanding of the philosophical orientation guiding research (Bryman and Bell, 2015; O’Leary, 2014; Snape and Spencer, 2003). Essentially, the idea is for every researcher to articulate their conception of reality, what they view as acceptable knowledge, and how these two impact research. The philosophical discourse primarily deals with ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Bryman and Bell, 2015).

4.1.1. Ontology

Ontology deals with the study of reality – assumptions researchers make about things that exist and how such things are understood and categorized by the researchers (Bryman and Bell, 2015; O’Leary, 2014). The central question ontology seeks to address is “What type of things actually exists?” (O’Leary, 2014, p.5). Thus, the main concern of ontology is whether social phenomenon exists objectively and independent of human interpretation or whether they are based on the subjective construction of observers (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Snape and Spencer, 2003). Technically, ontology comprises two opposite themes: Objectivism and constructionism (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Objectivism as an ontological position postulates that social phenomena exist independent of social actors’ perceptions (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Put another way, it asserts that reality is out there regardless of the ability (or lack therefrom) of social actors to see and recognize it (O’Leary, 2014). Constructionism on the other hand holds the view that social reality is socially constructed and as such they are created by the perceptions and interpretations of social actors (Bryman and Bell, 2015).

4.1.2. Epistemology

Logically following ontology is epistemology, which is concerned with the nature of knowledge, specifically, what should be considered as sound knowledge (Bryman and Bell, 2015). It focuses fundamentally on how research should be conducted and interrogates researchers' assumptions about procedures for the generation of knowledge. Within the social sciences, epistemology asks important questions including: "How can we know about reality and what is the basis of our knowledge?" (Snape and Spencer 2003, p.13), "What are the rules for discovering what exists?" (O'Leary 2014, p.5). Epistemology like ontology comprises two contrasting themes: positivism and interpretivism (Bryman and Bell, 2015).

Positivism as an epistemological position advocates the use of scientific methods to study social phenomena and as such is rooted in an objectivist ontology (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The assumption under the positivist epistemology is that results from a research endeavour should be value-free, objective, and replicable (Snape and Spencer, 2003). As a result, numbers are a key part of the positivist epistemological positioning.

As the name implies, interpretivism is an alternate epistemology that views knowledge as resulting from the meanings and interpretations attached to phenomena by human actions (Bryman and Bell, 2015). This perspective is therefore informed by a constructionist ontology (Bryman and Bell, 2015) and researchers' subjective interpretation of the phenomenon is considered as the source of factual knowledge (O'Leary, 2014).

Gradually, a hybrid epistemology, mixing positivism and interpretivism in a single study is emerging. Some researchers are advocating greater pragmatism in using an appropriate mix of qualitative and quantitative methods as part of a "toolkit" (Snape and Spencer 2003, p.15) rather than a "slavish attachment and devotion to methods" (Janesick as quoted in O'Leary, 2014, p.9).

4.1.3 Methodology

The term methodology is used in reference to a systematic way to conduct research (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Kothari, 2004). Generally, two research methodologies are discernible, the quantitative and qualitative, each based on peculiar philosophical underpinnings and assumptions.

The quantitative methodology is a research tradition rooted in the belief that the study of social phenomena should be undertaken in the same way as the study of the natural sciences (O’Leary, 2014). It is influenced by scientific methods, deductive reasoning, hypothesis testing, and quantification of data which forces researchers to embrace objective standards while discarding personal whims (O’Leary, 2014). Quantitative methodology is generally underpinned by positivist epistemology and a rejection of interpretivist epistemology (Bryman and Bell, 2015).

In contrast, the qualitative methodology is a research tradition, focussed on the generation of an in-depth knowledge of the social world through the interpretation of the experiences and perspectives of participants (Snape and Spencer, 2003). Qualitative methodology privileges theory building and recognition of values (Bryman and Bell, 2015). This kind of research therefore “appreciates subjectivities, accepts multiple perspectives and realities, recognizes the power of research over both participants and researchers; and does not necessarily shy away from political agendas” (O’Leary, 2014, p.130). This eclecticism of qualitative research, therefore, stands as a critique of the positivist epistemology (Bryman and Bell, 2015; O’Leary, 2014).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the two dominant methodologies owe a commitment to different epistemological and methodological positions. Flowing from this, researchers for the most part stick to the quantitative-qualitative divide in conducting investigations with some traditionalists arguing that the two cannot be mixed (O’Leary, 2014). There is, however, a growing advocacy for a mixed methodology - the employment of the two traditions in one study based on the belief that such an endeavour could potentially enhance research (O’Leary, 2014; Snape and Spencer, 2003). This line of argument is instructive considering that both qualitative and quantitative methods can be either inductive or deductive.

In particular, (O’Leary, 2014) argues that the key argument for the adoption of a mixed methodology is because it:

- Helps researchers obtain the best of the two traditional methodologies.
- Allows the use of deductive and inductive logic.
- Enables researchers to develop phased research protocols.
- Facilitates multiple perspectives.
- Allows for triangulation.

Taken together, this research is an inquiry into the perspectives of policymakers regarding the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in policymaking and the impact of politics on evidence and policies. Implicit in this inquiry is the need to understand the policymaking process. On account of its focus on the perspectives of participants in terms of “what they see as important and significant”, this study is characterized as largely qualitative research underpinned by an interpretivist epistemology (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p.376). Importantly, there is a quantitative element in the research in the sense that participants would provide their perspectives, through numerical ranking, on the priority attached to the different kinds of evidence used in the development of the policies under investigation. The quantification of data is to answer a key research question and lends the study to a pragmatic paradigm that utilizes numbers while maintaining the “underlying assumptions of the qualitative tradition” (O’Leary, 2014, p.148).

This means the philosophical underpinnings of the study and its methodology are inspired by the research questions. In all, the qualitative part of the research assumes an interpretivist epistemology, whereas the quantitative element assumes a contrasting positivist epistemology (Yin, 2014). For emphasis, three of the research objectives in this study are qualitative while one is quantitative, making the study a predominantly qualitative one with a complementary component of quantitative data (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Hussein, 2009; Jick, 1979; O’Leary, 2014).

4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

Defined as a framework for empirical investigation, Bryman and Bell (2015) argue that a research design drives the entire process of data collection and analysis to answer research questions. For this study, the case study research design was used as the empirical framework to guide the execution of the research. A case study is a comprehensive investigation of an event in a real-life context (Yin, 2014). Case studies are a very popular research design and they have been used for all kinds of studies, whether quantitative or qualitative. The wide usage of case studies especially in social inquiry is predicated on their unique characteristics and the value they add to empirical investigations. Consequently, the case study research design was adopted for this research for three major reasons.

One, the case study offers important in-depth insights into many aspects of the subject of investigation (O’Leary, 2014; Thomas, 2011). By looking at the phenomenon from different directions, digging deeper, and hearing from different people, each with their personal, often

different perspectives, a richer understanding will emerge. The key question at each point of the inquiry will be: “What is going on here?” (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011, p.53). As Yin (2014, p.4) rightly states, “...the distinctive need for case study research arises out of the desire to understand the complex social phenomenon.”

Second, a case study allows the use of multiple methods (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011; O’Leary, 2014) and diverse epistemological orientation (Yin, 2014) to facilitate answering research questions. Bearing in mind that multiple methods, interviews, and surveys, each with different epistemological assumptions will be used for data collection in this research, the case study represents an appropriate research design for the study.

Finally, adopting the definition of a theory as “an explanatory model”, the case study design is strong in generating a theory to illuminate what is being researched. This means it enables the development of theoretical arguments and ideas from findings in tandem with the inductive tradition of research. A necessary caveat is apt at this point: the findings, conclusions, and theories generated from a single case study can only be particularized and not generalized (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011; Thomas, 2011) meaning they can only be applicable to the case in question and not to the universe (Yin, 2014). To improve generalizations, however, multiple case studies are becoming more widely used within the social sciences.

4.3. MULTIPLE-CASE DESIGN

The multiple-case research design has become increasingly popular in social inquiry. The paucity of knowledge around my research question necessitates the adoption of an exploratory multiple case study design. Specifically, four policies were examined in this research. Bryman and Bell (2015) believe the key merit of multiple case study is in its ability to improve the theory-building process through engagement with more cases and obtaining more evidence than in a single case study.

Moreover, the adoption of multiple case study enables researchers to develop deeper subject knowledge and engender more conceptual generalizations (O’Leary, 2014; Yin, 2014). As a consequence, findings from multiple case studies are potentially more robust and more likely to be useful in settings other than those in which the study is conducted. Generally, the theoretical conclusions offered by multiple case study are more authoritative than those from a single case study (Yin, 2014).

Also, the multiple case study allows for comparison between cases such that similarities and differences are identified and critically examined (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011; Thomas, 2011) which also contributes to theory building (Bryman and Bell, 2015).

4.4. CASE SELECTION

In 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressive Party (APC) assumed office as the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria following a historic election where an incumbent president lost an election for the first time in the country's democratic history. The new government subsequently singled out public sector reform as a major policy issue, promising a radical shift in governance and service delivery. Many policies were formulated and implemented during the first tenure of the Buhari's government (2015-2019) spanning education, economy, social security, energy, water resources and so on.

The aim of this study is to understand the nature and hierarchy of evidence used by policy makers in Nigeria in formulating public policies during the period 2015 – 2019. In doing so, four policies were examined:

1. National Social Investment Programme (NSIP)
2. Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM)
3. National Tax Policy (NTP)
4. National Water Resources Policy and Strategy (NWRP)

These policies represent the two broad types of policies in Nigeria: Policies that require legislative input or approval, referred to as legislative policies, and policies that do not require legislative input or approval, termed as administrative policies. Two policies were selected for each policy type as shown in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF POLICIES

Legislative policies	Administrative policies
1. National Social Investment Programmes 2. Nigerians in Diaspora Commission	1. National Tax Policy 2. National Water Resources Strategy and Policy

The selection of the policies was done in line with O’Leary’s (2014) guidance:

1. Pragmatics: I had a contact person in all the cases, directly known by me or introduced by someone I knew, which facilitated access that would have otherwise been difficult (Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2014).
2. Purposiveness: There was a variation in the cases to increase understanding, improve making generalization and enhance theory generation (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The selected policies required different kinds of approvals. The first two policies required the approval or involvement of federal legislators, while the last two did not. Consequently, in this study, the former is called legislative policies, while the latter is called administrative policies.
3. Intrinsic Interest: The cases are strategic policies that were part of a public sector reform of the Buhari government. For instance, the NWRP was developed to address the historic misuse of water resources in Nigeria and the failure of the “top-down and supply-side approach” of previous water resources policies (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016, p.1). The NTP aimed to diversify the revenue generation capacity of the government, by widening the country’s tax base in the face of high dependence on crude oil (and a decline in its price) and poor fiscal buffers (Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017). At N500,000,000,000 funding, the third case study, the NSIP is Nigeria’s most ambitious social welfare programme (ActionAid Nigeria, 2018) and impacted 57 million direct and indirect poor beneficiaries in Nigeria (National Social Investment Office, 2019). Finally, the NDC was chosen because, with one of the largest African diaspora populations in the world (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011), the Nigerian Diaspora presents huge opportunities for national development (Wapmuk et al., 2014).

Additionally, a coverage period of 2015-2019, the first tenure of Buhari, was chosen to allow comparison of policies developed within a single government considering that different policy styles are often adopted by different governments, even from the same political party.

4.5. CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH

This section presents the manner the study was conducted and the factors that shaped the study. It, therefore, deals with issues such as the sampling technique used, the categories of respondents, and the data collection methods. It is important at this point to state that the location of the study was Nigeria, which required travelling from the UK to Nigeria to conduct face-to-face interviews. This study was, however, caught up in the Covid-19 pandemic. The first set of face-to-face interviews (10) was conducted shortly before the outbreak of the pandemic, and the consequent travel restrictions informed the use of the telephone to continue the data collection phase of the study. Towards the end of 2021, with 16 telephone interviews conducted, it became clear that the telephone interviews were not proceeding at the expected pace in part because of respondents' fatigue (Carr and Worth, 2001). Specifically, inadequacy of time to get the right information during a call was repeatedly observed which required multiple calls to individual respondents with the attendant costs to me, and inconvenience to the respondents. Related to this was the fact that the subject of the study, policymaking, was a complex phenomenon that required iterative, and detailed explanations (Howard, et al., 1988; Colombotos, 1969). Subsequently, in January 2022, I travelled to Nigeria and conducted the remaining 10 interviews, face-to-face.

In generating data from respondents, interviews and on-line questionnaires were used. Prior to the commencement of interviews, I had six types of evidence that emerged from the reviewed literature which shaped the interview questions. During the interviews, respondents were asked to confirm whether those evidence were used in the development of the policy they participated in and to mention any additional kinds of evidence used. In all, they identified three additional types of evidence, making a total of nine types of evidence. Having obtained the nine types of evidence, an online questionnaire was developed and sent to the same respondents requesting them to rank the nine types of evidence in terms of how useful they thought they were in the policy-making process with 1 being the most useful and nine the least useful. It means that in this research, the interview served as a precursor to the questionnaire.

4.6. SAMPLING OF PARTICIPANTS

For this study, purposive (non-probability) sampling was used in the data collection stage to identify individuals who were involved in the development of the policies under investigation. Purposive sampling is where the researcher deliberately selects items in the population that will constitute a sample (Kothari, 2004). This kind of sampling method was chosen because it

allowed me to select respondents that possessed the skills and knowledge required to answer the research questions. This kind of sampling has two other advantages. One is to ensure that major components of a research topic are covered and two, it encourages deliberate diversity in research participants (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam, 2003).

To operationalize the sampling, a mapping of individuals that participated in the development of the policies was conducted. For the legislative policies, respondents were selected from three categories – bureaucrats, legislators, and interest groups – described as iron triangle on account of their influence on power and policymaking (Gais et al., 1984; John 2012). For the administrative policies, owing to the absence of legislators in the policy process, bureaucrats were divided into top-level and middle-level bureaucrats to give recognition to the latter group which does a lot of policy making (Stevens, 2011). Indeed, ‘there is a great deal of critical evidence held in the minds of ... front-line staff’ (SPMT, 1999, cited in Nutley et al., 2002, p.2).

A categorisation of the respondents who participated in the study is provided in table 2 below.

TABLE 2: CATEGORISATION OF RESPONDENTS

Respondent type	Case Study 1 (NSIP)	Case Study 2 (NiDCOM)	Case Study 3 (NTP)	Case Study 4 (NWRP)	Total
Legislator	3	3	-	-	6
Top level Bureaucrat	3	3	3	3	12
Interest Group	3	3	3	3	12
Middle level Bureaucrat	-	-	3	3	6
Total	9	9	9	9	36

4.7. DATA COLLECTION

To gather data for each case study, nine respondents were interviewed with the respondents later completing on-line questionnaires. Policy documents were also analysed.

Respondents were generally anonymised for ethical reasons and to protect their identity. In a few instances, I provided the job designations of respondents for elucidation and context, where

such disclosure would not reveal the identity of participants. I, however, deliberately avoided providing any detail if that could lead to their identification. To answer the questions of this research, a triangulation was adopted using the three complementary approaches: semi-structured interview, on-line questionnaires, and policy documents.

4.8. SEMI-STRUCTURED, FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEW

The interview is a very popular method of data collection in social research as it allows a useful interaction between the researcher and the participant (Yin, 2009). In total, 20 of the 36 interviews were conducted face-to-face while 16 were carried out by telephone. Although the initial plan was to conduct all the interviews face-to-face, the outbreak of the 2020/21 Covid-19 pandemic and the attendant travel restrictions informed the use of telephone to conduct 16 interviews.

Interviews can be structured, unstructured, or semi-structured. In a structured interview, the researcher asks standardised pre-determined questions; the unstructured interview, on the other hand, is more of a conversation, while the semi-structured interview is a mix of the two, combining order and flexibility, and enjoying “the best of both worlds” (Thomas, 2011, p.163). The semi-structured interview therefore requires a written schedule to guide the researchers on areas to cover with the guide being flexible enough to allow the researcher to direct the interview (Legard, Keegan and Ward, 2003). A major appeal of the semi-structured interview is that it allows participants the freedom to express themselves in their own words which may enable the evolution of unanticipated responses (Yin, 2009). Semi-structured interviews are particularly useful in interrogating complex phenomena (Ritchie, 2003).

A semi-structured interview can either be face-to-face or using telephone. In addition to the advantages listed above, the face-to-face interview elicits non-verbal cues (O’Leary, 2014; Novick, 2007). It has been argued that respondents tend to be more cooperative in face-to-face than where they do not see the interviewer (Howard, Meade, Booth and Whall, 1988). Face-to-face interview remains the gold standard for qualitative research interview and is generally considered superior to telephone interviews (Novick, 2007; Burke and Miller, 2001).

Semi-structured interviews, however, have some challenges. Access to respondents may be difficult which impacts data collection (Kothari, 2004). To address this, I secured the commitment of contact persons in all the cases, who intervened when I had some access

challenges. Another challenge is that semi-structured interview generates a large set of data which makes processing not only labourious but increases the potential for error (Bryman and Bell, 2015). In response to this, I received adequate training on qualitative research and the use of the Nvivo software which helped in conceptualizing data and in simplifying qualitative analysis.

4.9. TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

As stated earlier, a total of 16 of the 38 interviews were conducted by telephone occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic, which made face-to-face interviews impossible.

A telephone interview is an approach used for obtaining research data using the telephone and without meeting face-to-face. There has been an appreciable rise in the use of telephone interviews in the last few decades owing to its flexibility and convenience (Burke and Miller, 2001). Another advantage of telephone interviews is that they may relax participants and encourage them to reveal sensitive information (Novick, 2007). Compared with face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews are reputed to have good response rate (Howard, Meade, Booth and Whall, 1988), save cost and facilitate a wider geographical coverage (Colombotos, 1969). Fundamentally, the issue of researcher safety, and the need to avoid dangerous or unsafe settings, have also been emphasized as key merits of telephone interviews (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004). This last point stood out as regards the Covid-19 pandemic.

Telephone interviews do have some limitations. They are seen as suitable only for shorter (Howard et al., 1988) and straightforward issues (Colombotos, 1969). Fundamentally, there exist legitimate concerns that telephone interviews sacrifice visual cues which may compromise data quality (Carr and Worth, 2001; Novick, 2007). Telephone interviews thus deny researchers non-verbal and contextual insights. Relatedly, it has also been reported that where a telephone interviewer is unknown, a lack of cooperation from participants has been observed (Howard et al., 1988). Limitation on the length of time for telephone interviews before participants' fatigue sets in is yet another disadvantage of telephone interview (Carr and Worth, 2001).

Findings on the comparison of the impact of telephone interviews with face-to-face interviews are mixed (Novick, 2007; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). Jordan et al., (1980, pp.218-19) found instances of "missing data on family income, more acquiescence, evasiveness, and extremeness

response bias, and more and somewhat contradictory answers to checklist questions” in telephone interviews. In contrast, Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) conducted research whose original design was for face-to-face interviews, but due to some data collection exigencies, half of the interviews were eventually by phone. They reported no significant difference between the two kinds of interviews.

Several scholars have posited that the two can successfully substitute each other without reducing the quality of participants’ responses (Carr and Worth, 2001; Novick, 2007; Sturges and Hanrahan 2004). Key limitations, however, need to be accounted for and mitigated. To counter the concern of absence of visual cues, I devised appropriate techniques to establish rapport and elicit rich responses (Novick, 2007). Information and consent forms, alongside key interview questions, were communicated to the participants in good time to facilitate rapport (Burke and Miller, 2001). To avoid participants’ fatigue, I ensured that length of the telephone interview did not exceed 45 minutes (Lavrakas, 1987 as cited in Carr and Worth, 2001).

Irrespective of the mode of the interview, I developed relevant information documents before the fieldwork, which helped respondents for the interviews (Saunders et al., 2012). Respondents were initially contacted by phone or email and upon receipt of an affirmative response, an information pack, comprised of a letter of invitation, a Consent Form, and an Information Sheet was sent to them. The Information Sheet provided key details of the research including, the research topic, sponsors of the study, confidentiality issue, the importance of participants’ participation, how the data will be saved and used, and the duration of the interview (Burke and Miller, 2001). Upon receipt of the completed Consent Form, the interview venue (for the face-to-face interview), date, and time were agreed. During interviews, I made use of a tape recorder with the consent of the participants. The interviews lasted between 25 minutes and 55 minutes.

4.10. QUESTIONNAIRE

In addition to semi-structured interviews, questionnaires formed part of the tools used for data collection. Questionnaires are data collection instruments that request research participants to answer a set of pre-determined questions in a particular order (Kothari, 2004). For this study, online questionnaires were administered to participants that had earlier been interviewed to collect quantitative data on the ranking of evidence. Online questionnaires offer certain

advantages including computational and economic advantages (Merten and Ruch, 1996) and the ability to measure the length of time it takes to complete it (Furnham, et al., 2013).

As mentioned earlier, the questionnaires were developed and administered after the completion of all 36 interviews. The questionnaires were administered to the same respondents who were interviewed. They were informed they were free to decide the number of evidence they felt were used and as such they were not obligated to rank all the evidence available. Two reasons accounted for the use of the on-line questionnaires. The first was to allow the respondents to first identify the types of evidence used in the development of the four policies under examination before they were asked to rank them. Secondly, asking respondents to rank the different kinds of evidence in an interview would have denied them time to reflect considering the analytical thinking required for such a task (Burke and Miller, 2001). In this regard, the questionnaires were designed to generate empirical quantifiable data which the interviews were ill-suited for (O’Leary, 2014).

One of the key limitations of using the questionnaire is lower rate of response which potentially increases bias (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Kothari, 2004). The inability of a researcher to probe participants either to clarify an answer or to follow an interesting line of conversation in the respondent’s answer is another limitation of the questionnaire instrument (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The first limitation was countered by the fact that the interviews earlier conducted helped in creating a good rapport between me and the respondents. On the second limitation, I had pre-informed and obtained all the respondents’ consent to complete the questionnaires after the interviews, and I explained to them in detail what they were expected to do. Nevertheless, they were encouraged to contact me should they need further clarification. At the end of the exercise, only one respondent called for that purpose.

4.11. REVIEW OF POLICY DOCUMENTS

The third data collection approach was document analysis, described as a “systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents - both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009, p.27). In this regard, a systematic review of relevant policy documents was conducted to provide information on the policymaking processes for the development of the policies under examination. The review educated me on the policymaking trajectory of each policy and enabled me to know the specific questions to

ask. The review also served to corroborate data from other sources (Yin, 2009). As Bowen (2009, pp.30-31) aptly remarks:

“In sum, documents provide background and context, additional questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means of tracking change and development, and verification of findings from other data sources.”

Like other approaches, however, document analysis has limitations. O’Leary (2014) and Yin (2009) note that documents used for analysis are printed for purposes other than the research at hand exposing them to inherent bias. Researchers should therefore proceed with care. While it may be appealing to view policy documents as containing the truth, “if you do, you need to ask whose truth.” (Yin,2009, p.251). Also, Bowen (2009) notes that online documents sometimes suffer from low retrievability, where document retrieval is difficult or where access is blocked by document producers.

To address the first limitation, I employed interviews and questionnaires as the two key data collection approaches with document analysis playing a supportive, corroborative role. As per the second limitation, I obtained physical policy development documents from the organisations that developed the documents. Luckily for me, none of the online policy development document was irretrievable.

4.12. TRIANGULATION

Triangulation is the combination of different theories, data collection methods or data sources in single research to improve the credibility of research findings (Noble and Heale, 2019). Four kinds of triangulation are proposed by Patton in Yin (2014, 120) namely: (1) data triangulation, which deals with multiple sources of data; (2) theory triangulation, which is concerned with the use of different theoretical perspectives to interpret the same data set; (3) investigator triangulation, which involves the use of many researchers in a study; and (4) methodological triangulation, which encourages the use of many data collection approaches.

Some scholars (e.g., Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2014;) claim that the use of a single data collection approach is inconsistent with the principles of a case study research design as triangulation is a key strength of the case study design. The use of triangulation offers certain advantages to social research. The most important merit is the evolution of “converging lines of inquiry” which makes a finding “more convincing and accurate” (Yin, 2014, p.120). This strengthens

the validity and credibility of the findings (Ritchie, 2003). Secondly, which is related to the first point, triangulation assists researchers to validate or falsify findings or conclusions (Hussein, 2009; Noble and Heale, 2019; Thomas, 2011). This leads to the review of old theories or the development of new ones (Jick, 1979).

Thirdly, researchers use triangulation for completeness purposes to show a fuller picture of a phenomenon (Hussein, 2009). This is akin to the “multiple realities” referred to by Yin (2014, p.122) but it goes beyond that and speaks more of the capacity of triangulation to resolve the difficulty of one method’s inability to provide perspectives that are critical to answering a research question (Noble and Heale, 2019). This point is of great importance to this study in that whereas semi-structured, in-depth interviews is my major data collection method, it was inappropriate for the generation of data on respondents’ perception of the relative importance of the different kinds of evidence used in policy development, hence the use of questionnaires.

Despite its numerous advantages, triangulation is not without some criticisms. First, there is a philosophical criticism of the validating function of triangulation (Noble and Heale, 2019; Ritchie, 2003). Ontologically, the argument goes, there are different conceptions of reality and as such attempting to unify the conceptions is fruitless; on the other hand, the received wisdom of epistemology is that different methods yield different kinds of data making it improbable to generate complementary data sets (Ritchie, 2003). Furthermore, triangulation imposes a greater need for both time and cost (Hussein, 2009; Jick, 1979; Yin 2014) which impacts its use by researchers.

The first limitation is countered by the pragmatic epistemological position adopted in this research. Predominantly underpinned by interpretivist epistemology, recognition is accorded the positivism inherent in the quantitative element of the research. Like Yin (2014), Jick (1979), and other scholars, I believe it is possible for the two epistemological positions to work in a complementary way. Essentially, my attitude is that triangulation is more important in assisting to create the whole picture rather than a more definite one (Ritchie, 2003). On the second limitation, I was satisfied that I would be able to shoulder the additional cost to improve the credibility of this study.

4.13. DATA ANALYSIS

Described as the “most difficult phase in case study research” (Rahman et al., 2003, p.34), data analysis is surprisingly one of the least discussed in the research literature (Thorne, 2000; Yin,

2014). Surely, making sense of the rich data that emerged from the 36 interviews, 36 completed questionnaires, and document analysis was a huge challenge to me. Considering the mixed nature of this study, both qualitative and quantitative data analysis approaches were used.

4.14. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Thematic analysis was used to uncover relevant and significant themes at different levels of textual data to facilitate interpretation and understanding (Attride-Stirling, 2001). I chose this method of analysis based on its recognition as the “foundational method for qualitative analysis” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.78).

There are no generally agreed procedures for the conduct of thematic analysis (Spencer, Ritchie, and O’connor, 2003) making it flexible and applicable to a variety of research paradigms (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Clarke and Braun 2017; Nowell, et al., 2017). This flexibility is important to this study as it agreed with its epistemological and methodological commitment as predominantly qualitative research with complementary quantitative elements.

Before the commencement of interviews, I had a list of themes that emerged from the reviewed literature which shaped the interview questions. I was guided by the reflections of Braun and Clarke (2006, p.82) who posit that “a theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.” This guidance ran through the data collection process. I, therefore, had an idea of what I was searching for in the data. Notably, other themes emerged, which alongside the themes from the literature, undergird my data collection. Regarding the kinds of evidence used in policy development as per the literature, six types stood out for me as follows: research evidence, previous policies evidence, media evidence, ideology evidence, internet evidence, and residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence. My interviews with the respondents unearthed three more types of evidence, namely, MDA evidence, local consultants’ evidence, and external stakeholders’ evidence, making nine types of evidence in total.

For clarity and context, I provide below the nine types of evidence and how they were used in this thesis.

1. Research evidence: This means data, information, knowledge, or ideas obtained from research conducted purposely to aid the development of a particular policy.

2. Previous policies evidence: These are existing or erstwhile government policies, laws, regulations, guidelines, plans, and ideas issued by the government. These resources need to be documented to qualify as evidence.
3. MDA evidence: This is the written submission of MDAs aimed to contribute to policy development. It also includes the verbal contributions of representatives of the MDAs during policy deliberations, or stakeholder engagements.
4. Media evidence: This encompasses news items, articles, interviews or any material or resource obtained from the electronic or print media.
5. External stakeholders' evidence: This comprises inputs and views of foreign stakeholders including multilateral organisations located either in Nigeria or outside Nigeria. It also includes the inputs and views of Nigerians or Nigerian organisations based abroad.
6. Ideology evidence: This refers to party manifestos and campaign promises made by a political party or its flag-bearers to the electorates.
7. Residual knowledge of policymakers' evidence: This is the expert knowledge or skills of the policymakers derived from their training and/or experience. This largely relates to the 'conceptual' change in the behaviour of policymakers.
8. Internet evidence: This is digital information and data obtained from the Internet, especially regarding policy issues from different jurisdictions. While this is not a perfect classification, it is a pragmatic response to the way policymakers approach evidence.
9. Local consultants' evidence: This consists of the views of local consultants, whether as formal input submitted to policymakers or as verbal contributions during policy deliberations or stakeholder engagement sessions.

The qualitative data generated for this study was analysed in three interrelated stages (Neuman, 2014). Generally, the analysis commenced with the data collection process as I listened to participants during interviews (O'Leary, 2014). This is the first stage of the analysis. This gave

me “some initial analytic interests or thoughts” which enabled me to have a reasonable understanding of the data from the very beginning (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.87).

Although I had intended to use the NVivo to facilitate the development of codes, themes, and categories (Yin, 2014), I settled for a manual analysis (Adams et al., 2014) in the belief that it would make me more familiar with the data (Riger and Sigurvinsdottir, 2016). After the interviews, the voice recordings were transcribed by me verbatim (Bryman and Bell, 2011). I then listened to the transcribed interviews carefully once to confirm the accuracy of the transcription and to prepare myself for coding (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

To be immersed in the data, I read the data repeatedly to search for meanings, emotions, and patterns (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and took note of possible coding categories that may be developed further in subsequent analyses (Riger and Sigurvinsdottir, 2016).

The second stage of the data analysis was the use of open coding which involved the conversion of raw data into concepts or themes (Neuman, 2014; Holton and Walsh, 2017). At this stage, I went through all the transcripts word by word and line by line and highlighted important themes that emerged. I also highlighted other themes that promised to be important. This iterative process was done for each of the 36 transcripts to discover incidents in the data (Holton and Walsh, 2017). Throughout the open coding process, these questions were at the back of my mind: “What is actually happening in the data?” and “What category does this incident indicate?” (Holton and Walsh, 2017, p.82). By asking these questions, and highlighting key and promising themes, I was able to unearth themes that were not very ‘visible’ within the raft of rich data (Neuman, 2014).

Thirdly, I used axial coding (Neuman, 2014) to get a broad view of the responses of all the respondents against the various theme. This was helpful to me as it provided a general overview of the respondents’ views and thoughts against each of the themes. Importantly, it enabled me to see the whole picture of each respondent easily and clearly in terms of their category, and their opinion about the theme in reference, for example, regarding kinds of evidence used in policy development. The coding also showed the interdependence and interconnectedness among the identified themes and the underlying conditions that gave rise to them (Saunders et al., 2012).

Finally, selective coding was used to obtain more detailed responses from the respondents which engendered a more extensive overview of the entire picture. At this stage, I went back to the data relating to each theme and organised them coherently to develop an empirically consistent account (Braun, and Clarke, 2006). This was to further strengthen the relationships in the data. Thus, concepts or themes that were not connected to the emerging account were disregarded (Chametzky, 2016) to create a “single storyline around which all else is draped” (Van der Merwe and De Villiers (2011, p.371).

4.15. QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Quantitative data analysis is the use of numerical data to assist the researcher to draw conclusions (Albers, 2017). For this study, quantifiable data were collected through on-line questionnaires and analysed to determine the relative importance respondents attached to the nine kinds of evidence collectively identified by the respondents and me. As explained earlier, an on-line questionnaire was sent to the respondents requesting them to rank the evidence they believed were used in the development of NSIP in terms of how useful they thought they were in the policy-making process with 1 being the most useful and 9 the least useful.

Rankings of individual evidence by respondents were scored in such a way that the higher an evidence was ranked, the higher it was scored in line with Table 3 below.

TABLE 3: RANKING AND SCORE USED

Ranking	Score
1	9
2	8
3	7
4	6
5	5
6	4
7	3
8	2
9	1

The table above shows that a ranking of 1 (the most useful evidence) was scored 9 (the highest possible score); a ranking of 2 was scored 8 (the second highest score); a ranking of 3 was scored 7; a ranking of 4 was scored 6; a ranking of 5 was scored 5; a ranking of 6 was scored 4; a ranking of 7 was scored 3; a ranking of 8 scored 2; and a ranking of 9 (the least useful evidence) was scored 1 (the lowest possible score).

This ranking exercise, however, has two main limitations. First, it does not recognise the relative distance between the different types of evidence. For instance, one evidence may be overwhelmingly preferred more than the next preferred, yet the first one can only score one point more than the other, thereby obfuscating the real value of the two kinds of evidence.

Secondly, some evidence types have overlapping characteristics and can be associated with two or more sources. The Internet is the main evidence in this regard. For example, how would a previous policy obtained from the Internet be classified? Previous policies evidence or Internet evidence? For clarity, where any of the other kinds of evidence was obtained from the Internet, the Internet was simply seen as a conveyor. Although this was explained to the respondents, the possibility that some evidence with overlapping characteristics might have been misclassified existed.

For each case study, the total score for each of the nine types of evidence was computed to show respondents' aggregate perception of the relative importance of each of the nine kinds of evidence. A hierarchy of evidence reflecting the respondents' perceptions was developed for each of the case studies.

To determine respondents' aggregate perception of the relative usefulness of each of the nine types of evidence across the four policies (in other words, the most useful evidence type overall), the total score for each evidence in all the case studies was computed. The results were used to develop a hierarchy of evidence showing the evidence with the highest total score at the top and then cascading down to the one with the least total score at the base of the hierarchy. The hierarchy, therefore, captures the respondents' aggregate perception of the relative usefulness of the nine types of evidence in a descending order with the most useful evidence at the top and cascading to the base of the hierarchy where you have the least useful evidence.

My research adopted a component framework for analysis as such data from the qualitative and quantitative methods maintained their originality with conclusions consolidated at the end

(Greene et al., 2011). This way, research questions were answered in a more focused manner since each method was meant to answer specific question(s). The consolidation weaved together conclusions from the two methods and presented a whole picture of the phenomenon investigated.

4.16. ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

Ethical research protects both the researcher and the subjects of the research (Cousin, 2009). This study was guided by ethical guidelines since it involved human participation (Saunders et al., 2012). Approval for the conduct of this research was obtained through the King's College London's Ethics Committee. Consistent with the approval, all respondents were availed of the Information Sheet which provided details of the research. The respondents also signed the Consent Form to indicate their willingness to participate in the study.

4.17. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated the methodological framework used in the conduct of this study. It shows an engaging use of triangulation to obtain data. It also demonstrated how I used both the qualitative and quantitative research methods in a systematic way for data analysis using the component framework for integration.

The next four chapters present findings for Case Study 1 (NSIP), Case Study 2 (NiDCOM), Case Study 3 (NTP), and Case Study 4 (NWRP).

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDY 1: THE NATIONAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT PROGRAMME (NSIP)

5.0. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter presents findings from the fieldwork in respect of the first case study, the NSIP. The findings will attempt to answer the questions of this study. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a background to the case. Second, it presents findings against the themes that emanated from the literature and the data. Finally, it concludes by highlighting the major findings from the fieldwork.

5.1. BACKGROUND

Over the years, Nigeria has experienced dire developmental challenges including extreme poverty, pervasive income inequality, limited economic opportunities, imbalanced access to social services, and significant infrastructural deficits. It has been argued that the causes of these challenges are predominantly economic and structural exemplified by the country's high dependence on crude oil for foreign exchange earnings, unemployment, corruption, and ineffective public spending regimes. The results are predictable. About 44% of the country's population of over 191 million lives in extreme poverty with more than 10 million children, the majority of them girls, out of primary school, and a primary school drop-out rate of 30% (ActionAid, 2018). At the end of the 4th quarter of 2015, unemployment rates were 19.0% and 11.4% for youths aged 15-24 and 25-34 respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). To alleviate these challenges, particularly to lift people out of poverty, successive governments have implemented various social protection programmes with different degrees of success.

Consequently, leading up to the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria, the All Progressives Congress (APC), which was the main opposition party to the then ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) campaigned on the strength of a "Change Agenda" that rested on a tripod: tackling corruption, improving security, and revitalising the economy. A key feature of the "Change Agenda" as consistently articulated by the party throughout the campaign period was the creation of a social safety net programme to provide succour to poor and vulnerable Nigerians (The Nation, 2015).

Following its success at the polls in 2015, the APC led government created the National Social Investment Programmes (NSIP) aimed to combat poverty and unemployment by empowering the poor and vulnerable through direct support. The programme, which was created in 2015 and launched in 2016, was derived from the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP). The NSPP is a broad policy framework that promotes social justice, poverty alleviation and inclusive growth (National Social Protection Policy, 2017). The NSIP therefore underscores the vision of the APC government towards poverty eradication and grass-root economic empowerment.

The NSIP has four components:

5.1.1. Job Creation Programme (N-Power)

The focus of the N-Power Programme is to help unemployed young Nigerians acquire life-long vocational skills that would improve their income and employability. Specifically, it targets 100,000 non-graduates and 500,000 graduates, providing them with skills development trainings and paid work placement as teachers, health workers, social welfare workers, agriculturalist etc. The long-term objective of the programme is to engender sustainable large scale skill development and productivity.

5.1.2. Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP)

The Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP) provides food to primary school pupils with a view to encouraging enrolment into primary schools and retaining pupils in the schools. The targeted beneficiaries of the programme are 4 to 8 years old children who are not in school and those who are in school but are likely to abandon school to support their parents eke out a living. Other beneficiaries of the programme include local small farmers who supply the farm produce for the food and the cooks who prepare the food.

5.1.3. Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)

The Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme is targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable households. The main purpose of the programme is to pull 5 million households out of poverty through the provision of a monthly cash transfer of N5,000 to the households. Further, the programme seeks to build the capacity of beneficiaries in the areas of basic financial management, hygiene, and nutrition.

5.1.4. Government Enterprise Empowerment Programme (GEEP)

Through the Government Enterprise Empowerment Programme (GEEP), financial support and training are provided to micro, small and medium enterprises that often encounter significant challenges to access credit. The programme targets small scale farmers, workers in the agricultural value chain, market women, artisans, traders, industrious youth, and women co-operative societies. Specifically, the programme aims to provide interest-free loans of N10,000 to eligible Nigerians to boost their businesses.

5.2. TYPES OF EVIDENCE

This section analyses participants' responses regarding the kinds of evidence policy makers felt were used in the development of the NSIP.

First and foremost, the respondents I interviewed demonstrated a good grasp of evidence as a concept and its importance in policy making and implementation. Majority of them spoke with a commendable amount of understanding. A number of them stated that they had used or had participated in the use of evidence in policymaking. One of them said:

Data helps you to understand things better. You need reliable data to plan before you start spending money. It helps you to achieve value for money...evidence tells you what you need to consider in policymaking (R9, Top-level Public Servant).

It was observed, however, that the majority of them had a romantic view of evidence. They saw it as a panacea for ineffective policymaking and implementation. While this simplistic and overwhelmingly optimistic view of evidence is contrary to the reality that it is an acutely contentious concept, the respondents, nonetheless, demonstrated a good understanding of the varieties of evidence.

Relying on the background presented above, my interviews and informal interactions with respondents, it is evident that quite a significant amount of evidence was used in the development and implementation of the NSIP. This position is buttressed by the fact that numerous stakeholders, representing different interests, participated in the development and implementation of the NSIP including legislators, MDAs, consultants, interest groups, and external organisations. Findings suggest that the diverse stakeholder participation was not an accident but a deliberate attempt to enable a wider utilisation of evidence. A top-level bureaucrat who had spent 10 years on the desk of Social Protection Human Capital

Development Division in the Ministry of Budget and National Planning, and who participated in the development of NSIP, had this to say:

A comprehensive consultation actually took place...The Governors' Forum was key...and so was the National Assembly (federal legislators). And then we had a few line ministries that were key too – such as the labour and employment ministry, the education ministry, and the health ministry. UNICEF and the world bank played very huge roles...we conducted desk-research and university professors also provided inputs in form of research, so the amount of evidence was quite commendable (R3, Top-level Public Servant).

The statement above represented the general feeling of most respondents regarding their perception that multiple evidence was used in the development of the NSIP. The majority of the respondents expressed satisfaction with the adequacy of the range of evidence used to develop the policy under reference. Importantly, even non-state actors were “*satisfied with the level of consultation*” (R8, Management Consultant) that took place. This is laudable and suggests a robust consultation process. Deeper scrutiny revealed that the government determined from the beginning that the implementation of the programme should be scientific and based on “inputs from the field” (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). The Vice President of Nigeria, who chaired the NSIP steering committee, clearly conveyed the government’s determination to the National Social Investment Office (NSIO) which was responsible for the implementation and coordination of the NSIP nationwide. Thus, the generation of primary data for the development and implementation of the NSIP, and indeed, the extensive consultation exercise for the programme was based on a deliberate attempt by the government to make the programme evidence-based.

On that note, respondents identified nine different kinds of evidence they felt were used in the development and implementation of the NSIP as presented below.

TABLE 4: TYPES OF EVIDENCE USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NSIP

Respondents	Evidence								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policy makers' evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants' evidence	External stakeholders' evidence
R1	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R2	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R3	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓
R4	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x
R5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R6	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	x
R7	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R8	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R9	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Total	8	9	8	4	8	9	7	6	7

The table above shows that the policy benefited from data and information from different sources. It also reveals a diverse participants' perception of the kinds of evidence used in the development of NSIP. The percentage of people that identified the different kinds of evidence used in the development and implementation of NSIP are as follows:

TABLE 5: TYPES OF EVIDENCE BY PERCENTAGE (NSIP)

Evidence type	Total percentage (%)
Research evidence	88.9
Previous policies evidence	100
MDA evidence	88.9
Media evidence	44.4
Ideology evidence	88.9
Residual knowledge of policy makers' evidence	100
Internet evidence	77.8
Local consultants' evidence	66.7
External stakeholders' evidence	77.8

The Table above shows that all the participants (100%) reported that 'previous policies evidence' and 'residual knowledge of policy makers evidence' were used in the development of NSIP. The main previous policy used in the development of the NSIP was the National Social Protection Policy (2017) which provided broad social protection principles. Inputs were

also obtained by the policymakers from the constitution of the country, alongside many relevant policies authored by different MDAs relating to social welfare. In terms of ‘residual knowledge of policy makers evidence’, a number of the respondents stated that policymakers used a lot of the knowledge and skills they have garnered over the years during the development of the policy.

In contrast, only four of the nine respondents (44.4%) felt ‘media evidence’ was used in the development or implementation of the NSIP. Majority of the respondents explained that the media were not formally consulted and that their inputs were not influential because policymakers did not consider them as adding real value to the process because they mostly dwell on “juicy negative stories” (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). Historically, policymakers in Nigeria see the media as armchair critics who condemn policies without offering recommendations.

A respondent went on to further explain:

We have journalists who see nothing good in what we are doing, and they write just to tarnish what we are doing. When they write by just seeing their names, I know them. Some of it is politics, right? But as I often say even with the worst ever report, we have learned something to improve the NSIP (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive).

Considering that similar programmes have been largely unsuccessful in the past, with some hijacked by powerful private interests, the media were expected to play a more influential role in the development and implementation of the NSIP. Across the respondents, the dominant view was that the media failed to set a positive agenda to situate the NSIP but instead favoured stories that put the NSIP in a bad light. Although a lot of the respondents did not feel that media evidence was used in the policy development, their admission that the media reported negative news regarding the NSIP meant that, indeed, the media performed their responsibility. And as we will see later, the so called “juicy negative stories” instigated a review of the policy and reshaped its implementation.

While the general feeling of respondents about the media was negative, a few respondents held a favourable sentiment about the media and mentioned it as a source of evidence. One of such respondents stated that the media was a critical partner in the implementation of the NSIP and argued that the success recorded so far was partly because of the role played by the media to bring up issues that needed attention.

Actually, the media are playing their role of raising issues that need government attention. I believe they helped in influencing the (NSIP) policy by providing useful information to policymakers (R8, Management Consultant).

One thing that is clear in all this is that although the government made deliberate efforts to get all stakeholders to contribute to the development and implementation of the NSIP, the media were not formally invited. Considering that various other interest groups were invited, the absence of the media was curious. This absence was responsible for the perception of majority of the respondents who felt that ‘media evidence’ was not used in the development of the NSIP. It also contributed to the continuous tension that characterised the relationship between the policy drivers and implementers on the one hand and the media on the other hand.

Notwithstanding the tension, however, the media drew considerable attention to the NSIP particularly when things went wrong. While they may not have offered realistic recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the programme, they fairly undertook their monitoring jobs, which led to the review of the NSIP.

5.3. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

This theme examines the relative importance respondents attached to the nine types of evidence. Respondents were requested to rank the nine types of evidence in order of how useful they were in the development of the NSIP. The respondents were guided by the information in Table 6.

TABLE 6: Ranking Table (NSIP)

Ranking	Interpretation
1	Most useful evidence
2	2nd Most useful evidence
3	3rd Most useful evidence
4	4th Most useful evidence
5	5th Most useful evidence
6	6th Most useful evidence
7	7th Most useful evidence
8	8th Most useful evidence
9	9th Most useful evidence

This means the respondents ranked the most useful evidence as ranked 1; the second most useful evidence was ranked 2; the third most useful evidence was ranked 3; the fourth most useful evidence was ranked 4; the fifth most useful evidence was ranked 5; the sixth most useful

evidence was ranked 6; the seven most useful evidence was ranked 7; the eight most useful evidence was ranked 8; and the ninth most useful evidence was ranked 9.

Respondents' rankings for each of the nine types of evidence are provided in Table 7 below.

TABLE 7: RANKING FOR EACH OF THE NINE TYPES OF EVIDENCE (NSIP)

Respondents	Ranking								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policy makers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R1	4	3	5	-	1	2	6	8	7
R2	2	6	7	8	1	4	9	5	3
R3	6	7	3	9	1	2	8	5	4
R4	5	2	-	6	1	3	4	-	-
R5	9	3	4	7	1	6	8	5	2
R6	-	1	2	-	-	3	-	-	-
R7	2	1	4	8	9	6	7	5	3
R8	6	2	4	9	1	3	8	7	5
R9	7	6	4	8	1	5	9	2	3

Respondents' rankings of the nine kinds of evidence were turned into scores to reflect the relative weight the respondents accorded each type of evidence. This was done in such a way that the higher an evidence was ranked, the higher it was scored in line with Table 8.

TABLE 8: RANKING AND SCORE (NSIP)

Ranking	Score
1	9
2	8
3	7
4	6
5	5
6	4
7	3
8	2
9	1

The total score for each of the nine types of evidence is computed and presented in Table 9 below.

TABLE 9: THE TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH TYPE OF EVIDENCE (NSIP)

Respondents	Individual Score								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R1	6	7	5	-	9	8	4	2	3
R2	8	4	3	2	9	6	1	5	7
R3	4	3	7	1	9	8	2	5	6
R4	5	8	-	4	9	7	6	-	-
R5	1	7	6	3	9	4	2	5	8
R6	-	9	8	-	-	7	-	-	-
R7	8	9	6	2	1	3	3	5	7
R8	4	8	6	1	9	7	2	3	5
R9	3	4	6	2	9	5	1	8	7
TOTAL	39	59	47	15	64	55	21	33	43

The Table shows the total score for each of the nine kinds of evidence. The higher the score of a type of evidence, the more useful it was considered by the respondents. A review shows that the total scores for the nine types of evidence from the highest to the lowest are as follows:

TABLE 10: TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH EVIDENCE IN A DESCENDING ORDER (NSIP)

EVIDENCE	TOTAL SCORE
Ideology evidence	64
Previous policies evidence	59
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	55
MDA evidence	47
External stakeholders evidence	43
Research evidence	39
Local consultants evidence	33
Internet evidence	21
Media evidence	15

The total scores were used to develop a hierarchy of evidence showing the evidence with the highest total score at the top and then cascading down to the one with the least total score at the base of the hierarchy as shown in figure 4 below.




FIGURE 4: HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE BASED ON DATA (NSIP)

A review of the pyramid shows that ‘ideology evidence’ had the highest total score meaning respondents considered it as the most useful evidence. Eight out of the nine respondents ranked it as their number one (the most useful) evidence. This finding is not surprising considering that social safety and poverty alleviation were major campaign promises made by the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC), when it was seeking the votes of the electorates.

A legislator who was part of the senate committee responsible for poverty alleviation confirmed this position:

Government ideology and party manifesto relate to the promises made to the electorates and citizens during electioneering campaigns, and the economic direction the government wants to pursue. The government had promised the people it would pursue that policy prior to it being elected to power. These postures – the programmes, manifestoes and the economic and political direction of the ruling party had endeared the party to the people during election campaign which the government now pursues (R4, Legislator).

Other respondents mentioned that in the development and implementation of the NSIP, the party manifesto was undoubtedly the most useful evidence. They argued that it was the promise

by government during the campaigns that served as the basis for the development of the NSIP. For example:

The party manifesto represented the foundational basis for the programme. The programme was derived from that (the party manifesto) (R 8, Management Consultant).

Evidence abounds that one of the main selling points used by the party during its campaign was poverty alleviation and investment in human capital. Electorates soon became aware of it and embraced it. Interestingly, the ruling party then, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) did not use that as a campaign issue but rather harped on other areas.

The social orientation ideology of the APC's presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, also played a role in reinforcing the promises of the party. All through his public life, Mr. Buhari was seen as an honest and frugal leader who fought to improve the lives of the masses, particularly in areas of security and the economy. Buharinomics, his economic blueprint includes increased state investment in social welfare to lift the poor and the vulnerable out of poverty. Thus, the social democratic aura of Mr Buhari played a role in the party adopting the welfare ideology as its key campaign promise.

In support of this argument, it was found that the N5000 quoted by Buhari when he was campaigning to be elected president was the exact amount ultimately adopted as the amount of support for the poor and vulnerable under the Conditional Cash Transfer component of the NSIP indicating a connection between Mr Buhari's personality, the party's manifesto and the NSIP. This point was alluded to by a respondent:

...When President Buhari as a contestant was touring the country, he really made the point that a lot of Nigerian people were poor and he promised to distribute N5000 to them if elected (R7, University Professor).

Thus, the amount prescribed under the Conditional Cash Transfer “*was tied to that proclamation*” (R2, Supranational Organisation) which policy makers simply ratified. Thus, in addition to the campaign promise, the new government was very determined to ensure that its welfare promise was fulfilled. This is because no matter how well advocates had justified the need for NSIP, it would have amounted to nothing if the government did not throw its political weight behind the proposal - a point reinforced below.

I do believe that when it comes to policies no group has the ability to create policy without the political will of elected political leaders. So I could say there was significance influence from the political manifesto and political goal of the administration which influenced the policy. The

programme was influenced by what the administration has set out to achieve (R2, Supranational Organisation).

In contrast, media evidence was considered the least useful evidence. This is an interesting finding, and it aligns with the finding in the previous theme where media evidence was reported as the least used source of evidence in the development and implementation of the NSIP. So, it means media evidence was both the least used and the least useful evidence in the development and implementation of the NSIP. Many respondents admitted that they:

Were sceptical about the input of the media because majority of them were either sensational or not contextual. So, if you want specific, contextual and unemotional input, the media is probably not the first place you would go (R3, Top-level Public Servant).

The statement above largely captures the approach of most media outfits in Nigeria. Whereas they are reasonably effective in identifying problems, they are poor in providing solutions to the problems they identify. In that regard, their interventions turned out not very helpful to the policymakers who had to look elsewhere for solutions often from individuals or organisations. When the reality of “bounded rationality” is added to the mix, it becomes clearer why the policymakers would rather get their evidence from sources other than the media.

Evidence from the findings, therefore, suggests that while respondents considered government ideology and party manifesto as the most useful evidence, they were sceptical of media input which resulted in that evidence type not considered very useful during policy development and implementation. Thus, the consensus that ideology was the most useful evidence in the development and implementation of the NSIP was largely because the party made it its main campaign promise which the electorates accepted. Little wonder that once inaugurated, the NSIP was one of the first policies the new APC government implemented. In contrast, the media was seen as the least useful evidence by the respondents partly because of the historical tension between Nigerian policymakers and the media, which manifested in the media not being formally invited to contribute to the NSIP. The inability of the media to engage in robust editorials to offer credible recommendations to the NSIP challenges also contributed to the poor ratings of the media by the respondents. Yet, as we will see shortly, evidence from the media played an influential role in engendering a review of the programme.

5.4. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE

The previous section examined the relative importance respondents attached to the different kinds of evidence they identified as having been used in the development and implementation of NSIP. This section discusses the way the different evidence types were integrated in the policy process.

This study found out that the NSIP was a government-driven policy developed through a continuous collaboration between state and non-state actor. The collaboration involved consultation, discussions, arguments, iteration, and integration of the different evidence types. The study also found that the collaborations took place on three formal sites. These were the sites where the various types of evidence were considered for possible integration into policy proposals.

The first site was an inter-ministerial steering committee comprising ministers of Health, Education, Finance, Budget and Planning, Labour and Employment, and Women Affairs. This high-level committee was responsible for synthesising and refining the various evidence types into a fairly recognisable policy proposal. It also had policy oversight responsibility on the implementation of the entire programme. The steering committee, chaired by the Vice President of Nigeria, undertook the integration of the various evidence types and the design of an implementation plan to guide the administration of the entire NSIP. The calibre of the members of the committee meant that the committee possessed significant influence which it used to achieve its objectives. This was important because NSIP was a cross-cutting programme that affected different ministries; and to succeed, all the ministries had to play their part. The Vice President, whose office coordinated the NSIP, was very involved in the activities of the committee and ensured that other minister members participated fully.

The VP took it as his project and he made sure everything went well, he led by example. And because he was fully involved, all the ministers also got involved fully (R3, Top-level Public Servant).

The committee met severally, and discussions were tailored to determine the best way to address the identified problem. Although it was an inter-ministerial steering committee, with focus on inputs from the MDAs, some inputs were obtained from outside the MDAs. To further improve the instrumental dimension of the steering committee, a technical sub-committee was

established to give civil servants that had cognate experience an opportunity to make contributions as mentioned by a respondent:

One of the things they also suggested at the steering committee meeting was, why don't you nominate civil servants who had done some works in this area, maybe grants or employment issues and lets have a technical advisory committee so that you can consult them....so we set up a technical advisory committee (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive).

Part of the responsibilities of the technical advisory committee was to employ the knowledge and experience of its members to determine which suggestions were more practically feasible with a view to improving policy outcomes. Members of the technical committee were senior civil servants who had considerable requisite experience. It was unsurprising that the committee played a key role in the design and implementation phase of the programme. During those periods, the inter-ministerial steering committee requested advice on a number of issues including budgeting, funding options, and empowerment. To arrive at a decision, or advise the inter-ministerial steering committee, the technical committee considered all available inputs and engaged in robust deliberations. This indicates that the technical committee served as a sub-integration site that fed the larger inter-ministerial steering committee.

A member of the technical committee explains:

In the technical committee when we started, like in the N-power (Job Creation Programme), we brought people from Ministry of Labour which I was part of, then Ministry of Works, National Planning Commission, people from National Directorate of Employment, and all the MDAs that were directly related to the programme. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Investment, and (the Ministry of) Women Affairs...they brought their inputs which we put together to solve the social menace (R3, Top-level Public Servant).

The second site for integration of evidence was found in the various stakeholder workshops and meetings held at the instance of the steering committee. Respondents reported that although the executive arm of government drove the process, it was largely effective. For example:

The evidence gathered were validated across stakeholder workshops at the national and sub-national governments. Deliberations in the workshops were usually very robust and rigorous. During deliberations, the different evidence types were considered, and viable ones accepted or refined so one can say the texture of the NSIP was formed at these workshops. (Thereafter) consensus was built and a final document was adopted and launched (R3 Top-level Public Servant).

Another respondent agreed:

Policy makers as well as relevant stakeholders both local and international had regular brainstorming sessions that were driven by the executive arm of government. (R9, top-level public servant).

It was noted that the various stakeholder workshops and meetings provided an opportunity for both the generation and integration of evidence. Indeed, many stakeholders, including academics and supranational organisations (UNICEF and the World Bank), offered technical support in the form of expertise and guidance during these engagements. Some consultants and academics conducted primary research that provided raw data and recommendations which were analysed at the workshops and meetings.

Further, some prospective beneficiaries of the NSIP were engaged to obtain their views. This is salutary because it was the first time that such engagement took place as far as social investment programmes in the country is concerned. It also affirms the government's determination to avoid the mistakes of the past when such programmes were formulated and implemented without recourse to critical stakeholders including prospective beneficiaries. The point also needs to be stressed that although the media were not formally invited to contribute their inputs despite their known criticism of previous social welfare programmes (as is the case with some national policies in Nigeria), commentaries in the media contributed to shaping the development, implementation, and review of the NSIP.

The final integration site was found in a platform for the review of the NSIP when the government realised weaknesses in the original NSIP, after about one and half years of implementation. The review exercise involved selected stakeholders, with a local consulting firm leading the exercise. From 2016 and 2020, the firm was actively involved in supporting the National Social Investment Office (NSIO) which was established to coordinate NSIP nationwide. In that role, the firm designed program-related strategies relating to digital technology, program delivery, operational efficiency, and coordination.

A respondent from the firm explains:

So, the initiation (for the review) started from the government and the right stakeholders were pulled into the room at different times including private firms which were my team and two other teams, one local one foreign, government representatives, donors, and academics (R8, Management Consultant).

Driven by the lead firm, the stakeholders undertook a holistic review of the NSIP ascertaining what had worked and what had not worked. In the process, previous information was interrogated, and new ones obtained, considered, refined, and utilised. At this point, the programme had elicited different kinds of comments in the country. Many of the beneficiaries of the programme applauded the government and expectedly turned themselves into the programme's most ardent defenders. A few of the beneficiaries, and in some cases supposed beneficiaries, however, complained particularly about lack of, or delay in payment of their stipends. A lot of commentators also gave credit to the government with others pointing out areas that needed to be improved. A few others, however, condemned the programme in its entirety. These comments in the media were responsible for the review of the policy, especially its implementation as recalled by a respondent who participated in the review.

As we move into execution (of the NSIP), certain realities cropped up that started to let us know that there was more that we needed to do to straighten the policy, to evolve the policy, so that it would be more realistic when it comes to execution. So, in addition to existing information from the original policy, we got primary information from several interviews, from beneficiaries, from everyone. We (then) brought everyone back into the room... The academics and government stakeholders... So we will take that information as feedback to update and review what we have done. We can't move pass any issue until we have agreed on it, that means we were not doing it out of our own understanding without the experts also in the room (R 8, Management Consultant).

The government's reason for appointing a private firm to lead the review was to improve NSIP's effectiveness considering that the programme was already being implemented. To let the civil service to undertake or lead the review would have exposed it to bureaucratic bottlenecks which the government could ill-afford. Yet, the government knew that the civil service needed to be part of the review to provide critical information and support. The civil service played its part to the satisfaction of the firm and contributed to the success of the review.

In a nutshell, the firm undertook the following three important interrelated tasks during the review of the NSIP.

1. Conducted new primary research to obtain additional information and new insights to assist in the review exercise.
2. Led the redesign of the NSIP to address identified shortcomings of the subsisting one.

3. Participated in the implementation of the programme.

The general idea regarding the integration of evidence was that various stakeholders came together and deliberated which led to a “granular cross-fertilisation of ideas” (R9, Top-level Public Servant). Indeed, each of the three integration sites highlighted provided a platform on which different kinds of evidence were integrated, leading to the development and implementation of the NSIP.

5.5. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

For this study, the NSIP is seen as a legislative policy since it needed the input and approval of the legislative arm of government (Ibrahim, 2004). Indeed, the two arms of the Nigerian legislature (Senate and House of Representatives) played important roles in shaping the policy and its outcome. For one, the implementation of the policy involved appropriation of public funds which is a constitutional responsibility of the legislature. The sum of five hundred billion Naira annually which was “*the first time money of that amount*” was invested in any social empowerment programme in the country, was appropriated by the legislators (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). Although the NSIP and the required budgetary approval received the overwhelming support of the legislators, the devil was in the details. Findings show that many legislators had vested interests in the NSIP. All the respondents that had an engagement with the legislators alluded to a growing tension in the relationship between the managers of the NSIP and the legislators. A respondent gives an insight into the relationship:

We had some of them that understood what we were trying to do, but many of them were like, “we are the grass roots people so we should know what is happening, you should come through us.” They think, why are you going and selecting people from our constituencies without coming through us? Many of them say “no, we cannot appropriate money at federal level for you to spend at state level.” ...You know it’s not really about Nigeria, it is about how it is going to impact on somebody’s popularity...But the President and Vice President have been very clear about this, maybe they are not typical politicians they say these programmes are about Nigerians, whether they voted for them or not they are entitled to the impact of government so it is about the social contract between every citizen irrespective of your class, political affiliation, your culture or religion (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive).

In hindsight, many of the legislators felt the state governors were getting all the credit and the potential electoral benefits while they got nothing even though they were the ones doing the appropriation. So, clearly, the legislators were more concerned about how their constituencies would benefit from the programme through them to improve their chances of getting re-

elected. The argument of the National Social Investment Office (NSIO) for a centralised federal arrangement that would treat all eligible people equally and improve the transparency of the process fell on deaf ears.

Indeed, many legislators who were members of the committee for poverty alleviation, which had oversight on the NSIP, were not favourably disposed to the NSIP as currently developed. They would rather the money was used for direct investment in their constituencies, to be supervised by them. A legislator who was a member of the committee in the Senate offered a different viewpoint on how the N500b should have been spent:

When we met the VP (Vice President of Nigeria), I advised that the N500b should be divided to the 774 local governments which would translate into N649 million for each state and divided by three, you have N215m (which) could be used to establish a cottage industry the 3 senatorial districts in each state. I did my research and found that N180m could build a cottage industry. But they did something else which I am not in support of (R4, Legislator).

While the policy preference of the legislators may have been driven by research and constituency considerations, it also indicates the possibility that it was in furtherance of their self-interest. This is because the Nigerian National Assembly, with the knowledge of the executive arm of government, has long devised a ‘constituency project’ arrangement where legislators identify critical constituency projects for funding with the legislators undertaking “legislative oversight” on the project. The said oversight includes determining the contractor or vendor to handle the project. Expectedly, the arrangement has been described as an aberration and as such has continued to receive increasing public backlash.

Meanwhile, other legislators wanted each legislator to be given the welfare amount to be distributed to their constituencies to enhance their chances of being re-elected. One of the legislators asked pointedly: “*you did not come through us how can we be elected next time?*” (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). The legislators’ attempts to control the NSIP is, therefore, motivated by their self-interest including their desire for influence to enhance their chances of re-election. This line of reasoning represented the sentiments of majority of the legislators.

Unsurprising, significant tension was evident in the relationship between the managers of the NSIP and the legislators. Most of the legislators, while not openly condemning the programme for fear of electoral backlash since majority of the citizens were happy with it, antagonised the managers of the programme in the parliament, away from the public.

A high-ranking member of the NSIP executive team reflects:

The parliament gives us money and I still have apprehension when I appear before them and they still don't understand. I have argued with them many times. They said I would come round to their way of thinking. I said just get me out of the job because I won't come round to your way of thinking because if it's politics you like to play, go and get a politician. I cannot. It's like asking me to speak Spanish I cannot speak Spanish, I don't have that sense at all, I don't know how to integrate into your...(R1, NSIP Top Management Executive).

Findings suggest that the legislators' viewpoint was predicated on how similar programmes in the past were managed (actually mismanaged). They were thus fixated on the old ways of welfare distribution in Nigeria where resources were mostly given to elected or executive members of the government for onward distribution to citizens. This hangover still lingers and was at the core of the tension between the NSIP managers and the legislators. Clearly, the legislators could not understand why there should be a change in the way such programme are administered. Understandably, there were significant pressures from them to hijack the programme or to at least change the implementation to suit them. In a sense, the attitude of the legislators underscores the thinking of typical politicians who usually sacrifice national interests for their personal ones.

All through the battle between the NSIP officials and the legislators, the President and the Vice President supported the former, which was why the programme achieved the success it did. Like the President, the Vice President was also passionate about the unemployed, the weak, and the vulnerable in society. He did not shy away from brandishing these credentials and supported the implementation of the NSIP as conceived by the National Social Investment Office (NSIO).

The tension between those who supported the implementation of the NSIP as conceived by the NSIO, including the President and the Vice President, and the legislators, was largely based on differences in motives. While the legislators wanted to see the NSIP as part of their "constituency project" for which they should undertake "legislative oversight", the President and his tribe preferred the NSIP to be seen and implemented as a national social intervention designed to empower deserving Nigerians irrespective of political, religious, or tribal affiliations. Sadly, the battle continued to fester with noticeable implications. Principally, the NSIO continued to battle the legislators for the control of the programme, and considering the constitutional power of the legislators, they were able to exert influence. They put the managers of the programme under constant legislative searchlight and continued to seek concessions

from not only the managers of the NSIP but also from the executive arm of government. Of course, these actions negatively impacted the efficiency and effectiveness of the NSIP.

5.6. GOVERNING THE POLICY PROCESS

The previous section has provided an insight into the tension between federal legislators and the managers of the NSIP and other stakeholders in a way that is quite revealing even if unsurprising. This section will further provide the thoughts of respondents regarding the way the government influenced and governed the policy development process.

All the respondents I interviewed strongly believed that the government was “*largely responsible*” for the policy development process (NSIP Top Management Executive). The policy development process shows that the government controlled the process in three main ways. First, the government decided which stakeholders to invite which means it had the power to include stakeholders sympathetic to it and exclude those it felt would not support its vision or be antagonistic to it. In other words, the government reserved the power to decide who it invited to the table. This practice is common and remains one of the most enduring features of governments’ influence on the policy process. From the collective explanations of some respondents, it was apparent that there was a discussion about whom to invite. Invitations to participate in the policy development were extended to only those regarded as friendly to the government’s policies. The omission of the media in the process is seen in this light and affirmed the government’s control. The statement of one of the respondents who thought in that line is apt:

The government and the media are always at each other’s throat so why invite someone you knew would cause you one or two problems? (R9, Top-level Public Servant)

However, a few respondents saw it differently. They believed the government did not need to formally invite the media to derive the benefits of extending an invitation since the views of the media are an open secret. One of those who shared this view commented:

I am not sure the government deliberately omitted the media...they did not need to be physically present, but their messages and commentaries were useful during the exercise, especially the review and implementation of the policy (R 8, Management Consultant).

Whatever might have been the case, the fact remains that the government decided not to formally invite the media to the table, reinforcing the argument that it had the power to select the stakeholders to participate in the policy process. Notwithstanding, the media contributed significantly to the policy, especially in review. The continuous monitoring of the implementation of the programme and its critical stand on some parts of the implementation no doubt provided a fillip for a review.

Second, the government provided ‘terms of reference’ (ToR) to the various committees and organs that were established to deliver specific deliverables. Starting with the inter-ministerial steering committee, then the technical committee and finally the review committee, the government specifically ensured that they all were aware of, and abided by the scope and limitations of the work they were required to do. The ToR spelt out what they could do and what they could not. A respondent provided insights into what the government achieved with the ToR:

The idea was to give every stakeholder the right to contribute meaningfully to the emerging policy but within the limits allowed by the strategic objectives of government (R3, Top-level Public Servant).

The statement above confirms that although the government made use of multiple sources of evidence and encouraged increased stakeholder participation in policy development and implementation, it still restricted the breath of evidence by determining what should be “on the table” and what should be “off the table”. For instance, the government ensured that all stakeholders recognised that equity was a major concern to ensure the success of the policy. Both the President and the Vice President were strong advocates of embedding equity in the NSIP. As a result, at every available occasion, policymakers were reminded by the Vice President to ensure that the development and implementation of the policy were based on equity. One of the respondents reflected on the influence of the Presidency:

From day one, it was something the Vice President said to us, we needed to be guided by equity, because one of the things that could shut down our programmes is if there is no equity. As I say to people equity and inclusiveness from the very beginning were things we sought... We were clear that if we didn’t address some of those weaknesses (of lack of equity in the past),

our programmes would slide back into what was happening before and we will not go round (cover Nigeria) (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive).

Consequently, the stakeholders bought into government's vision and made equity and inclusiveness central features in all the four interventions within the NSIP suite. In furtherance to that, the policymakers adopted an innovative methodology using a community-based, self-identification approach to determine who qualified for some of the interventions. Supported by the World Bank, the policymakers went to the field and obtained data directly from the targeted communities regarding who was poor and deserving of the NSIP empowerment.

A respondent who was a key player in the use of the methodology confirmed how it was used:

Based on what the government wanted, we went to the community and asked them, it was also like a self-assessment. The question is always how do you know who is poor? In the past that question has always been answered incorrectly and has actually been the reason why we had a lot of exclusion errors in targeting...the idea was to get it right from the targeting. So, the community themselves nominated people, that way people can counteract...when all have agreed then there was an initial list and a testing approach by World Bank methodology for testing the poorest. We made use of the methodology as against the criteria listed, and the national cut off of defining the poor from the NBS (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics) (R2, Supranational Organisation).

It is evident from the quote above that embedding equity in the NSIP was an “order” the government gave to all stakeholders who participated either in the policy development or implementation to ensure that mistakes of the past were avoided. The main story here is that the policy is a government policy and the government provided direction and guidance on how it should be designed. Within the senior civil servants, several respondents agreed that the regular reminders by the Vice President and the ToR were useful in setting contexts and limits. Beyond political control, however, the ToR performed a very critical instrumental function. They ensured that policymakers only expended their energy on those things that were important and useful in pursuit of the government's objectives.

The third and final way the government controlled the policy development process was by making itself the final gatekeeper in the process. Whereas the policymakers and the committees were able to make recommendations and take smaller decisions, only the government had the power to approve major decisions. In other words, the government was the final approving authority for both the development and implementation of the policy. The overriding influence of the government was noticeable even where it gave non-state actors the opportunity to participate in, or even lead some aspect of the policy process. In that regard, the non-state actors

were obligated to submit their reports or recommendations for the consideration and approval of the government. Of course, recommendations or decisions that were not in line with the government's vision or strategic objectives were not allowed to see the light of day. A case in point is the review of the NSIP led by a local consulting firm where the government had to amend a few things in the draft reviewed policy to reflect what the government wanted.

It is apposite to mention that one of the main reasons why the government made use of non-state actors in the policy process was lack of sufficient expertise in some policy areas. Nonetheless, sovereignty lies with the government and not the non-state actors, hence the government protected its sovereign authority by ensuring that the actions of the non-state actors were consistent with the government's vision. As aptly captured by a respondent:

The government wanted the programmes to succeed and invested a lot of resources. But you know government has limitation as regards technical stuff so it invited the private sector to provide its expertise...yet the government supervised (the private sector)...so that things went right (R3, Top-level Public Servant).

In the development and implementation of the policy, three state players were the most influential. The first one was the inter-ministerial steering committee, which was a high-level committee responsible for determining the broad principles of the policy. The committee was also responsible for administrative oversight on the implementation of the NSIP. The second one was the National Social Investment Office (NSIO), responsible for the actual implementation of the policy as well as its coordination across the country. The last one was the legislators who were responsible for budgeting and legislative oversights. As can be clearly seen, each of these state players exerted significant controlling influence within its "jurisdiction". Yet, it is when their responsibilities are aggregated that their impact on controlling the policy process becomes apparent. Together, they worked in a complementary way and shaped the policy process within a rigidly controlled policy environment.

5.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter presented empirical findings from the first case study of this research, the National Social Investment Programmes.

The findings from the chapter show that respondents exhibited a good knowledge of evidence and its importance in policymaking. Findings also show that multiple sources of evidence were

used in the development of the NSIP debunking widely held view that policy making in Nigeria is evidence deficient.

Evidence from the chapter reveals that ‘ideology evidence’ was considered the most useful evidence with eight out of the nine respondents ranking it number one. The high value of the ideology of the government in policy development and implementation was because the programme was based on the campaign promises of the APC political party and the social democratic credentials of the president. In contrast, ‘media evidence’ was considered the least useful evidence largely on account of the scepticism regarding its relevance and accuracy. Yet, findings from the collective responses of the respondents show that media evidence played a major role in highlighting weaknesses in the implementation process which led to a review of the policy.

Findings indicate that the different evidence types gathered were integrated at three formal sites. The first one was an inter-ministerial steering committee, chaired by the Vice President of Nigeria, comprising ministers of health, education, finance, budget and planning, labour and employment, and women affairs. The second site was various stakeholder workshops and meetings held at the instance of the steering committee. The last integration site was the various sessions held for the review of the NSIP when the government realised the need for amendments to the original NSIP to make it more effective, after about one and half years of implementation.

The Findings also indicate that the federal legislators played a key role in both the development and implementation of the NSIP. In addition to their constitutional role of fund appropriation for the implementation of the NSIP, they also provided ideas and oversight functions for the programme. However, there were evidence of significant tension between the managers of the NSIP and the legislators. Respondents who engaged with the legislators reported that many legislators attempted to maximise their self-interests particularly their electoral value in the process of developing and implementing the programme. The continuous battle for the control of the NSIP, manifested in a number of ways particularly in the passage of the programme’s budgets and in seeking concessions from the implementers of the programme. This invariably affected the smooth running of the programme.

Finally, this section shows that even though multiple stakeholders participated in the development of the policy, the government had the largest influence in governing the policy process to suit its strategic objectives. The non-inclusion of some stakeholders and

government's power to change the policy during implementation reinforced the notion that the government largely controlled the policy process. Notwithstanding, it was evident that the government made effort to ensure that equity was embedded in the development and implementation of the NSIP which differentiated the NSIP from similar programmes in the past where social welfare was used as a tool for selfish political purposes.

The next chapter will present findings on the second case, the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission policy (NiDCOM).

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDY 2 – THE NIGERIANS IN DIASPORA COMMISSION (NIDCOM)

6.0. INTRODUCTION

The Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) is an agency established by the Nigerian government to protect the Nigerian diaspora community's interest and provide a formal platform for engagement between the government and the diaspora community for the benefit of Nigeria. The commission was established in 2019 pursuant to the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (Establishment) Act, 2017.

The history of the Nigerian government's engagement with the diaspora community is long and episodic. As a background, the evolution of the Nigerian diaspora community is attributable to certain political and economic factors. Indeed, years of military dictatorship and a growing national economic crisis instigated a deluge of emigration from Nigeria (Adebayo, 2011). Thus, like in many countries, Nigeria's emigrants left the country either to escape a hostile political environment or to enjoy the economic incentives offered by developed countries (Hunger 2002, 1).

Invariably linked to emigration from Nigeria is the issue of brain drain as most of the emigrants are trained professionals like doctors, nurses, engineers, and academics (Adebayo, 2011). Brain drain as a concept is believed to have emerged on the global scene in the 1960s to describe the migration of European professionals to the United States of America for greener pastures (Adebayo, 2011; Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011). With time, Latin America and Asia were affected by the brain drain bug followed closely by Africa (Adebayo, 2011). The issue of brain drain occupies a particularly important place in Nigeria's development efforts because it is widely seen as a key contributory factor to Nigeria's underdevelopment (Fagite, 2018; Nwozor, e al., 2022).

Scholars' perception of brain drain has come full circle. Earlier literature largely views brain drain exclusively from the lenses of losses to the countries of the emigrants (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011; Hunger 2002). This is the main argument of the brain drain theory, which holds that brain drain depletes the human capital stock of the emigrants' home countries, thereby adversely affecting the countries' quest for economic development (Adebayo, 2011). Indeed,

modernisation and dependence theories consider brain drain as “one of the most important causes of under-development in the Third World” (Hunger, 2002, p.1).

As argued by Artuç et al., (2015, p.6) many home countries, especially developing countries “are deeply concerned about retaining their most skilled workers, whose absence ultimately impinges upon their long-term economic and political development.” In that regard, some hard-line proponents of this notion are of the view that to address the issue and stimulate the economic growth of affected countries, emigrants must remigrate to their home countries (Adebayo, 2011).

During the 1990s, however, a new school of thought emerged within the brain drain discourse. Champions of this school contend that migration of skilled workers should not be seen only in terms of loss but as a potential gain for the home countries of the migrants in what is referred to as brain gain (Hunger, 2002). Brain gain according to Adebayo (2011, p.71), is when “the negative effects of brain drain are reversed, rolled back, and turned into great advantage.” In other words, the emerging literature argues that emigration can be used to accelerate a country’s growth and development.

In a well-written article in response to the growing argument that emigration “has almost exclusively negative impacts on the Third World” (Hunger 2002, p.1), Clemens and Sandefur (2014) demonstrate how migration is beneficial not only to the national economies of home countries of emigrants but also to the world economy. They reported that a World Bank study estimates that in 2012, remittances from migrants to developing economies were over \$400 billion with such flow accounting for over 20% of the GDP of small economies such as Nepal and Liberia. According to them, research has shown that upon migration from a developing country to a developed one, the economic value of migrants rises by a minimum of 60 per cent thereby increasing the size of the global economy. On his part, Hunger (2002) uses the example of the IT industry in India to show how remigration could significantly contribute to a country’s economic development. Indeed, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the migration of Indian IT professionals to the US raising serious concerns for the Indian government at that time but the migrants started returning to India in the year 2000 largely because of a slump in the US IT sector leading to significant growth in the Indian IT industry (Chacko, 2007).

Bacchi (2016) summarises three avenues through which brain gain can be achieved. The first is when migration by highly skilled citizens motivates the remaining population to acquire

marketable education to improve their chances of migration which could potentially be useful to the home country regardless of whether they eventually migrate. The second is when migrants' remittances support household expenditures while the third occurs when migrants return home to use their skills, knowledge, and experiences for the betterment of their country.

Back to Nigeria. Long before the emergence of the brain drain discourse in the 1990s, the Nigerian government recognized the need to engage its diaspora community for national development. As a result, in the 1970s, the government started collaborating with the diaspora community to enhance national economic development (Nigerians in Diaspora Commission n.d.) and promote Nigerian foreign policy (Wapmuk et al., 2014).

While the government's efforts achieved some relative success, the efforts were largely unstructured, and it was not until the 1990s, when the issue of brain drain and migration of skilled workers from developing countries to their developed counterparts became a global issue, that Nigeria began to take the engagement more seriously (Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, n.d.). Consequently, more engagements took place between the Nigerian government and the Nigerian diaspora community, culminating in the establishment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) in 2001 as a non-profit-making organization (Wapmuk et al., 2014). The broad objective of the organisation was to provide an effective platform for technocrats, policymakers, intellectuals, and all Nigerian citizens in the diaspora to contribute to national growth and development (Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, n.d.).

To make NIDO more effective, the government provided it with an office in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011) and directed all foreign missions to support the growth of the organisation (Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, n.d.). NIDO also established a presence in Nigerian embassies abroad (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011). Ultimately, the organisation became the single body recognised by the Nigerian government as the umbrella body for all Nigerians in the diaspora (Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, n.d.).

In addition to NIDO, the government established the Nigerian National Volunteer Services (NNVS), under the office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation to among other things address the issue of brain drain (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011). Also, the National Migration Policy, an administrative policy, was developed in 2015 to serve as an overarching document in the management of migration and diaspora in Nigeria (International Organisation for Migration, 2015).

In all, the government's desire to organize its engagement with its diaspora citizens was motivated by the positive experiences of other countries, such as China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and India, that leveraged their diaspora communities to promote national economic growth (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011). India, for instance, used the expertise, networks, and assistance of its diaspora citizens to become a renowned global giant in information technology (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011). Nigeria, therefore, drew inspiration from India and other countries that adopt the philosophy of turning brain drain into brain gain. This development is described in the diffusion literature as international policy diffusion where national policy decisions are conditioned by policy choices made by other countries (Simmons et al., 2006).

So far, the results have been encouraging for Nigeria as the country's share of diaspora-driven financial and non-financial contributions to national economic development show. Between 2017 and 2020, Nigeria had an annual diaspora remittance of more than \$25bn which was one of the highest in Africa (Jackson-Obot, 2020). In the non-financial aspect, there has been increasing collaboration between the diaspora professionals and their Nigerian counterparts in various fields including academics, business, and science, thereby contributing to national development (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2011).

The establishment of NiDCOM in 2019 was, therefore, a very strategic move by the government to systematically deepen its relationship with the diaspora community and extract as much gain as possible from the growing brain drain phenomenon. By its establishment, Nigerian policymakers have heeded the advice of Hunger (2002, 1-2) that brain drain should not be "seen as the (dead) end of a negative development that intensifies the economic and social crises of developing countries" It should rather be seen, he continued, as "a temporary stage within a long-term process with the possibility of a final resource profit for the developing country." This line of argument finds alignment with the point made strongly by Clemens and Sandefur (2014) that while it is true that developing countries need to convince their highly trained professionals to stay back and contribute to economic development until that is done, they should make the best of the situation by maximizing the benefits accruable to them on account of their citizens being abroad.

NiDCOM is without a doubt the most strategic and ambitious effort of the government to streamline its engagement with the country's diaspora community and to derive significant gain from the country's growing emigrants.

The key objectives of the commission included to:

- develop policies as the commission may determine from time to time.
- execute policies and programmes that will complement the federal government's efforts toward accelerated development.
- strengthen the administrative structure of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO).
- co-ordinate all the continental NIDOs.
- advise the government on diaspora-related matters.
- establish a worldwide council (comprising local, regional, and continental leadership).
- reach out to socio-cultural and professional Nigerian diaspora groups or communities for collaboration and development.
- articulate and communicate government plans and programmes for the benefit of the diaspora communities (Nigerians in Diaspora Commission n.d.).

6.1. TYPES OF EVIDENCE

This section examines respondents' responses on the types of evidence they felt were used in the development of the NiDCOM policy.

My empirical engagement with the respondents indicates that various types of evidence were used in the development of the policy. This finding is underscored by the existence of a wide range of participants in the policy process and the use of different types of evidence by the participants. Thus, although the policy was an Act enacted by the legislative arm of government, a sizeable state and non-state actors contributed to the policy development.

Historically, the diaspora community did not feature in Nigeria's development plan until the 1970s but since then there has been a growing engagement between the two parties. The establishment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) in 2001, however, changed the dynamics with the organisation becoming more visible and relevant. Over time, the question of how best to streamline the community into national development became a politically salient issue with many interest groups contributing.

A respondent, who was knowledgeable about the issue commented as follows:

I think the entire idea of the diaspora initiative became very relevant and a lot of interest groups, a lot of members of the Nigerian diplomatic corps, the diaspora community, and a lot

of other stakeholders all took part and contributed. Some actually conducted research and presented papers on the issue. We the legislators also did a lot of research. For example, I did a lot of 'googling.' I researched the Bangladesh model, as well as studied part of the Israeli diaspora system and the Indian system (R11, Legislator).

The comment above mirrors respondents' views on the multiplicity of evidence sources used in the development of the NiDCOM policy. Interestingly, majority of the respondents came across as knowledgeable about what evidence is and its importance in the policy process. Like the respondents in the NSIP, many of these respondents also placed a lot of faith in EBP. To most of them, the use of evidence determines whether a policy achieves its objective or not, not minding other important socio-political and cultural factors. This sentiment was pervasive and is captured by the response of one of them:

Evidence-based policymaking is the best way to go because if a policy is formulated with sufficient data, you are not talking based on assumptions, you are dealing with real-life indicators and implications that suggest whether a policy will achieve its purpose or not. It is also important for proper planning...so in today's world, evidence is key in policy formulation (R 13, Top Civil Servant).

A few of the respondents, however, recognised the limits of evidence and provided their comments within the context of these limits. Some of them mentioned that even though the use of evidence potentially improves the quality of policy, evidence can only be used when it is possible to use it, because as one of them said "*it is not only the data, it is also what is practical, what is doable*" (R19, Legislator). Statements such as this, when juxtaposed with the earlier one, underscore a significant difference in the way the respondents evaluated evidence in the policy process. While the majority had a strong, often unrealistic, faith that the use of evidence automatically improves policymaking, a few respondents recognised that whether evidence improves policymaking, and the extent of the improvement depends on the prevailing circumstances. Nonetheless, findings show that the respondents were aware of the different kinds of evidence used in policymaking.

Data obtained from respondents regarding the kinds of evidence used in the development of the NiDCOM policy are presented below:

TABLE 11: TYPES OF EVIDENCE USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIDCOM POLICY

Respondents	Evidence								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policy makers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R11	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R12	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R13	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x
R14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R15	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x
R16	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
R17	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R18	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R19	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Total	6	9	9	7	6	9	7	9	7

The table above shows that multiple evidence types were used in the development of the NiDCOM policy. ‘Research evidence’ and ‘ideology evidence’ were considered by respondents as the least used evidence in the development of the NiDCOM policy (6) while ‘previous policies evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’, and ‘local consultants evidence’ (9) were considered as the most used types of evidence.

A review of the table above shows that the percentages of respondents that identified each source of evidence as having been used in the development of the NiDCOM policy are as follows:

TABLE 12: TYPES OF EVIDENCE BY PERCENTAGE (NIDCOM)

Evidence type	Total percentage (%)
Research evidence	66.7
Previous policies evidence	100
MDA evidence	100
Media evidence	77.8
Ideology evidence	66.7
Residual knowledge of policy makers evidence	100
Internet evidence	77.8
Local consultants evidence	100
External stakeholders	77.8

This means all the respondents (100%) reported that ‘previous policies evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, ‘residual knowledge of policy makers evidence’ and ‘local consultants evidence’ were used in the development of the NiDCOM policy.

It was not surprising that all the respondents believed these four kinds of evidence were used in the development of the NiDCOM. In terms of ‘previous policies evidence’, the erstwhile National Migration Policy (NMP), developed in 2015 to streamline the issue of emigration in Nigeria, provided significant inputs to the NiDCOM. The inadequacy of the NMP was responsible for the birth of NiDCOM. For ‘MDA evidence’, collective responses of the respondents indicate that all relevant MDAs were requested to provide inputs into the policy and most of them did provide them. Relatedly, quite a large number of the state and non-state actors that participated in the development of the NiDCOM, had earlier participated in the development of the NMP. In fact, it was reported that about 18 MDAs and other stakeholders took part in the development of the NMP in 2015. These policymakers, therefore, possessed cognate knowledge and experience which served them well during the development of the NiDCOM. Finally, a few local consultants were engaged by the legislators at different times to provide technical support for the policy development process.

In contrast, ‘research evidence’ and ‘ideology evidence’ were identified as the least used evidence (66.7%). Considering that some respondents suggested that primary research contributed greatly to the development of NiDCOM, with one respondent saying that some academics ‘came with their research’ (R19, Legislator), it was surprising that some respondents did not think ‘research evidence’ was used as a form of evidence. The discrepancy between respondents’ accounts may be attributed to the fact that different engagement sessions took place at different phases of the policy development each with pre-selected demographics. Also notably, ‘ideology evidence’ was not considered by some respondents to have provided evidence because they believed the diaspora issue pre-dated the government under whose administration the policy was finalised and issued. Also, successive governments did not make any worthwhile commitment to it. To such respondents, the development of the policy followed the traditional bureaucratic process which was not dependent on the ideology of a government.

6.2. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

This theme examines the relative importance respondents attached to the nine types of evidence. Respondents were requested to rank the nine evidence in order of how useful they

were in the development of the NiDCOM. The respondents were guided by the information in Table 13 below.

TABLE 13: RANKING TABLE (NIDCOM)

Ranking	Interpretation
1	Most useful evidence
2	2nd Most useful evidence
3	3rd Most useful evidence
4	4th Most useful evidence
5	5th Most useful evidence
6	6th Most useful evidence
7	7th Most useful evidence
8	8th Most useful evidence
9	9th Most useful evidence

This means the respondents ranked the most useful evidence as 1; the second most useful evidence was ranked 2; the third most useful evidence was ranked 3; the fourth most useful evidence was ranked 4; the fifth most useful evidence was ranked 5; the sixth most useful evidence was ranked 6; the seven most useful evidence was ranked 7; the eight most useful evidence was ranked 8; and the ninth most useful evidence was ranked 9.

Respondents' rankings for each of the nine types of evidence are provided in Table 14 below.

TABLE 14: RANKING FOR EACH OF THE NINE TYPES OF EVIDENCE (NIDCOM)

Respondents	Ranking								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policy makers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R11	2	5	6	3	4	1	7	8	9
R12	7	1	2	6	8	5	3	4	9
R13	-	3	2	-	-	4	-	1	-
R14	5	8	9	4	1	7	3	6	2
R15	-	2	1	-	-	3	-	4	-
R16	3	2	1	8	-	4	6	5	7
R17	3	2	1	8	4	5	9	6	7
R18	5	2	1	6	9	3	7	4	8
R19	3	8	4	6	9	5	7	2	1

Respondents' rankings of the nine kinds of evidence were turned into scores to reflect the relative weight the respondents accorded each type of evidence. This was done in such a way that the higher an evidence was ranked, the higher it was scored in line with Table 15.

TABLE 15: RANKING TABLE (NIDCOM)

Ranking	Score
1	9
2	8
3	7
4	6
5	5
6	4
7	3
8	2
9	1

The total score for each of the nine types of evidence is computed and presented in Table 16 below.

TABLE 166: THE TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH TYPE OF EVIDENCE (NIDCOM)

Respondents	Individual Score								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policy makers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R11	8	5	4	7	6	9	3	2	1
R12	3	9	8	4	2	5	7	6	1
R13	-	7	8	-	-	6	-	9	-
R14	5	2	1	6	9	3	7	4	8
R15	-	8	9	-	-	7	-	6	-
R16	7	8	9	2	-	6	4	5	3
R17	7	8	9	2	6	5	1	4	3
R18	5	8	9	4	1	7	3	6	2
R19	7	2	6	4	1	5	3	8	9
TOTAL	42	57	63	29	25	53	28	50	27

The Table shows the total score for each of the nine kinds of evidence. The higher the score of a type of evidence, the more useful it was considered by the respondents. A review shows that the total scores for the nine types of evidence from the highest to the lowest are as follows:

TABLE 17: TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH EVIDENCE IN A DESCENDING ORDER (NIDCOM)

EVIDENCE	TOTAL SCORE
MDA evidence	63
Previous policies evidence	57
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	53
Local consultants evidence	50
Research evidence	42
Media evidence	29
Internet evidence	28
External stakeholders evidence	27
Ideology evidence	25

The total scores were used to develop a hierarchy of evidence showing the evidence with the highest total score at the top and then cascading down to the one with the least total score at the base of the hierarchy as shown in figure 5 below.




FIGURE 5: HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE BASED ON DATA (NIDCOM)

Figure 5 above shows that ‘MDA evidence’ is at the peak of the pyramid meaning it had the highest total score. Put another way, it indicates that it is the most useful evidence in the development of the NiDCOM policy. Of the nine respondents, four ranked it as their number one (the most useful) evidence. The status of ‘MDA evidence’ as the most valuable is anchored on the role it played in the development of the NiDCOM itself and its precursor, the National Migration Policy (NMP). The NMP was developed in 2015 by a committee comprising 18 MDAs and other stakeholders. As regards the NiDCOM Act, based on the request of the House of Representatives, a number of MDAs made written contributions to the technical committee that worked on the bill. They provided their contributions based on their knowledge and experiences, especially those relating to the development of the NMP. Therefore, ‘MDA evidence’ played a pivotal role in development of the NiDCOM in two main ways. The first one was in the development of the NMP, which served as an important resource for the NiDCOM. The second one was in the development of the NiDCOM where MDAs provided useful inputs. In addition, the legislators also utilised the structure and process knowledge of the MDAs as explained by another respondent:

Traditionally, the civil service is responsible for the development of government policy, right? So, it is not surprising that the National Assembly leaned on the civil service to enrich the NiDCOM law because the MDA representatives were the ones on the field handling migration and diaspora issues (R13, Top-level Civil Servant).

The status of the ‘MDA evidence’ in the development of the NiDCOM reflects a common policymaking approach in Nigeria where the government selects experienced experts from the MDAs to develop policies, like in the case of the NMP, or where the legislators (or other policymakers) request the inputs of the MDAs based on their specialised skills and knowledge, as in the case of the NiDCOM. Often, this happens where the policy domain in question needs more specialised skills and less ideology. Indeed, the legislators that worked on the formulation of the bill that translated into the NiDCOM found the input from the MDAs “critical and very useful” (R19, Legislator). It is, therefore, understandable that majority of the respondents chose ‘MDA evidence’ as the most useful kind of evidence in the development of the NiDCOM.

In contrast, respondents deemed ‘ideology evidence’ as the least useful evidence. This finding can be explained by looking at the history of the NiDCOM policy which is traceable to the country’s return to democracy in 1999. None of the governments from 1999 identified the diaspora issue as a guiding ideology or as part of their party’s manifesto even though two major parties in the country had won general elections. Nevertheless, successive governments had

undertaken routine measures to advance the cause of the diaspora community as part of the traditional bureaucracy. Thus, no government stood out ideologically in respect of the development of the NiDCOM policy.

In the words of one respondent:

The policy formulation had no bearing with the party in power or its manifesto. The issue of diaspora started during the Obasanjo regime. It was (the) EU that helped Nigeria in that regard because all the resources being used were from the EU and other donors like the German government, the Swiss government, and what have you. Truth is the Nigerian government had a lukewarm attitude towards the issue of migration. The reason government is now taking special interest in the diaspora is because of their contributions to the Nigerian economy in so many ways. In 2017 Nigerians in diaspora remitted almost 27 or 29 billion dollars into the country, which was the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The money being remitted back home is having multiple effects on the Nigerian economy (R13, Top-level Civil Servant).

The statement above confirms that unlike in the NSIP, where government ideology served as prominent evidence, the opposite was the case in the development of the NiDCOM. The majority of the respondents alluded to the insignificant influence of government ideology on the development of the NiDCOM. To them, governments did not see the diaspora issue as “a valued initiative” (R18, Representative, Diaspora Community).

Looking at NiDCOM through the lenses of successive Nigerian governments reveals a lack of ideology to explain its development. In hindsight, no government made the diaspora issue a campaign issue or even a matter of urgent national concern. As a result, it becomes clear that the development of the policy was not based on any desire of bureaucrats to translate ideology into policy. Consequently, the history of the evolution of NiDCOM, and the collective comments of the respondents provide a convincing explanation on why ‘MDA evidence’ and ‘ideology evidence’ were the most useful and least useful kinds of evidence, respectively, in the development of the NiDCOM.

6.3. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE

The previous section explored respondents’ perceptions of how useful the different kinds of evidence were in the development of the NiDCOM policy. This section will examine how the different kinds of evidence were integrated into the policy process. As has been demonstrated thus far in this thesis, the policy environment is conflictual. To demonstrate, stakeholders provide different, often competing, kinds of evidence to influence policy. Therefore, an

understanding of how the different types of evidence is harmonised by policymakers provides a useful insight into the policy process.

Findings of this study show that being a legislative policy, the NiDCOM policy was conceived by the legislature with significant input from legacy policies and other sources. Spurred by the need to exploit and harness the economic benefits of streamlining migration into the country's national life, federal legislators in the House of Representatives started the process that led to the establishment of the NiDCOM. The legislators resolved that their intervention was needed in this regard and subsequently established a committee on diaspora to advise the house on the best way to achieve that goal. A legislator who participated actively in the process leading to the development of the policy explained:

First and foremost, the identification of the diaspora population as a critical partner for national development was conceived by the government as far back as the years 2000, and 2001....(then) the NASS (National Assembly), specifically the House of Reps in 2011 established a house committee on diaspora which Hon. Abike Dabiri, the current chairman of the commission was given the responsibility to chair. I was fortunate to be a member of that committee. The committee got inputs from different sources including MDAs, the private sector, and some international organisations (R11, Legislator).

The forgoing statement means that the development of the NiDCOM policy involved continuous collaboration among members of the policy community for the provision and utilisation of evidence. As might be expected, different stakeholders provided various inputs, some of them contrasting, which the house considered. For instance, as we will see later, while some stakeholders advocated the establishment of a ministry in charge of migration issues, some suggested the establishment of an agency. Therefore, one of the major tasks the legislators undertook was to consider the different stakeholder inputs alongside their own with a view to integrating them into the policy being developed. This study deduced that the integration took place in three formal sites, where the various evidence provided by the different stakeholders were refined and integrated into policy proposals.

Firstly, considering that the NiDCOM policy drew reasonably from the diaspora section of the National Migration Policy (NMP) developed in 2015, the initial integration site was the inter-ministerial committee that developed the NMP. Membership of the committee was drawn from 18 MDAs and private organisations (International Organisation for Migration, 2015). The NMP was developed by the government with inputs from other non-state actors including civil society groups and development partners. Based on my interaction with the respondents, the

government had anticipated from the outset that a law would “*eventually be passed*” to achieve a sustainable solution to the migration problem (R18, Representative, Diaspora Community). The NMP, therefore, served as the forerunner of the NiDCOM.

A major qualification for membership of the NMP development committee was knowledge and/or experience of migration issues to enhance robust contributions. The committee was grouped along thematic lines and each thematic group developed a draft report which was scrutinised and refined by the larger committee to produce the draft NMP. The draft NMP was then extensively reviewed and endorsed by an enlarged stakeholder group at a national conference on migration (International Organisation for Migration, 2015).

A respondent provided further comment on the way the integration occurred:

We had the National Migration Policy which served as the overarching policy on all migration issues including the diaspora. It had thematic areas such as labour migration, diaspora, and the rest. The thematic areas had working groups that conducted research, obtained various data and information from different sources, then submitted their report to the Technical Working Group (TWG) for review. So, you see the policy (National Migration Policy) provided some materials for the diaspora Act (R14, Top-level Civil Servant).

Members served on committees they had a comparative advantage in terms of skills and experiences. That way, members made contributions to the development of sections of the draft policy from the point of knowledge. Each sub-committees met, examined the issues that were germane to their section, and wrote a report. At the plenary, each of the committees made a presentation to the larger group which examined and harmonised the entire work. While a few of the provisions presented by the various sub-committees were accepted by the plenary, most of them ignited discussions and disagreements with members providing justifications for the position they have taken. Based on the ensuing discussions, contending provisions were clarified and integrated into the policy.

Secondly, the legislature also served as a site for the integration of evidence. To recap, the Nigerian House of Representatives in 2011 established a house committee on diaspora which Hon. Abike Dabiri as chairman. This development underscored the fast-growing importance the House attached to diaspora issues. Subsequently, a House bill was initiated by Hon. Dabiri and presented before the House of Representatives in 2011. Deliberations on the bill involved persuasions and debates both within and outside the legislature “to expand the options and possibilities” (R17, legislator). A legislator elaborated:

The bill was presented, and it went through the first reading, second reading, then it went for a public hearing where different stakeholders advanced their positions. At all these points, the bill was scrutinised and updated; contentious positions harmonised....so, at this point, the idea was to consider the best way to address the problem...for this bill, most of the documentation that justified the basis for the establishment of the commission was presented and considered. (R11, Legislator).

The bill was presented in the House of Representatives and as usual, went through the policymaking process in the house which included presentations and debates. The diaspora community provided very useful inputs for consideration. Interestingly, two camps emerged regarding the solution to the problem. While the first camp advocated the creation of a full ministry, the second camp suggested the establishment of a government agency with full powers to address the problem. Each camp provided justifications for their chosen preference. Many respondents admitted that a lot of arguments, counterarguments, and lobbying took place during this phase with a view to producing a robust policy. In the end, legislators settled for the establishment of a government agency instead of the creation of a ministry.

Finally, a review committee was found to be the last integration site. The committee was mandated to review the draft bill developed by the house committee on diaspora. Membership of the technical committee included representatives of the International Organisation on Migration (IOM), Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMFA), Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO), Nigerian National Volunteer Scheme (NNVS), Directorate of Technical Aid Corps in Africa (DTACA), and the National Assembly Policy Analysis and Research Project (NAPARP), which is the research and documentation arm of the Nigerian legislature.

The nature of the organisations that formed the technical committee suggests a commitment for a more technocratic policymaking process as the functions and mandates of all the organisations related to migration in one way or another. Also, the representatives of these organisations were knowledgeable and experienced which enabled them to offer useful advice and suggestions. Also, based on their residual knowledge of the subject matter, they were able to decipher which inputs were more suitable and feasible.

The integrating function of the committee is highlighted by a legislator:

The technical committee reviewed the draft Bill. However, most of them were also involved in developing the initial Bill which started during the 7th Assembly (201-2015) but it lived through

the 8th Assembly (2015-2019) and it was passed in 2017. The review was to see if certain provisions or ideas needed to be changed, whether the information was adequate, whether we needed more (information) and how they can make the law more effective (R11, Legislator).

The committee was divided into sub-committees with each sub-committee allocated specific theme(s) to review. Based on the insight above, each sub-committee had the power to make amendments on proposed provisions and introduce additional ideas subject to the approval of the house committee on diaspora. Thus, each sub-committee interrogated and refined the evidence types related to its theme. Thereafter, the technical committee cross-checked the work of the sub-committees to establish that the “information from each sub-committee” was “fit for the purpose” (R19, Legislator). A respondent offered the following insights:

Much of the work of the technical committee took place in their volunteered themes made up of around 7 to 30. The committee examined issues in detail: the working documents, advantages, and disadvantages of certain provisions, and how they compared with other nations. The committee refined many things like the legal framework, to topics like the composition of the board members and their responsibilities (R18, Representative, Diaspora Community).

The technical committee, therefore, undertook significant work in confirming that the entire content of the policy aligned with the mandate it was given. Considering the calibre of people and organisations in the committee, the HoR attached a lot of premium to the committee’s work and instances of the legislators disagreeing with the committee were rare. This is understandable since the committee members possessed expertise that the legislators lacked. The technical committee, in the words of a respondent, approximates “a high-level clearing house” with the responsibility to apply “finishing touches” to the NiDCOM policy (R14, Top-level Civil Servant).

6.4. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

The establishment of NiDCOM is a classic example of a ‘constituent’ policy as it involved the creation of a government agency by the legislators (Lowi, 1972). To reiterate, the NiDCOM policy was initiated in the House of Representatives (HoR) as a House bill. Upon receiving the concurrence of the senate, the bill was passed and assented to by the president leading to the establishment of the NiDCOM. Understandably, most of the discussions, deliberations, and debates concerning the policy were held on the floor of the HoR. It was also in the house that

a technical committee was established to review the draft bill developed by the house committee on diaspora.

Findings, however, showed that majority of legislators in the diaspora committee did not participate fully in deliberations because the committee was considered non-lucrative in terms of potential financial benefits to members. The financial benefits thesis is captured in the following statements by a legislator who was a member of the committee.

I remember back then in the house it was a committee of 36 members from each state of the federation but of course (laughing), it was not a committee you would call a juicy committee (continued laughing); it was barren. Very few people attended meetings, not exceeding six, seven members but she (Abike Dabiri) took it and eventually made it one of the most prominent committees of the house. There was a committee for petroleum, a committee for finance, a committee for budget but she made it (committee on diaspora) to become almost at the same level with those committees due to her personal commitment and passion, and because the media was her constituency, she leveraged her capacity and the opportunities that her (former) media colleagues could afford her, and she gave it all the necessary prominence, to a larger extent, single-handedly (R11, Legislator).

Similarly, being a constituent policy, its implementation did not require the appropriation of significant public funds that legislators could benefit from. This seems to provide a further explanation for members' poor participation considering that the likelihood of financial benefit potentially influences members' behaviour.

Furthermore, there was the electoral benefit thesis. It could be argued that the poor participation of many committee members may not be unconnected with the realisation that the development of the diaspora policy had no electoral value to them, at least in the short term. This is because the main beneficiaries of the policy - Nigerians in the diaspora - were constitutionally not allowed to vote from diaspora and their lack of electoral value meant they were dispensable. A representative of the diaspora community who participated in the development and review of the policy lamented:

The government didn't take seriously to the request of the diaspora community (for diaspora voting)...the commission is still tracking its path to be sustainable to become more useful for the benefit of diaspora interests (R18, Representative of the Diaspora Community).

Some few exceptions existed, though. Legislators in this category might have been inspired by their personal commitments to the cause of the diaspora community or by their expectation of future recognition or benefits (Kingdon, 1995). Clearly, a few legislators worked assiduously for the establishment of NiDCOM. Drawing from Kingdon, it was probable that these legislators were motivated by the possibility that the establishment of NiDCOM could give

them an opportunity to play a pivotal role in the administration of the new agency. This argument is strengthened by the fact that some legislators ended up being part of the top management of the newly created NiDCOM and contributed to setting it up and leading it in its formative years.

From the foregoing, two sets of legislators that worked on the establishment of NiDCOM are identifiable. The first set comprised legislators in the diaspora committee of the HoR who fully participated in the development of NiDCOM either based on their personal interests or the interests of the diaspora community. The second set, on the other hand, consisted of legislators whose participation in the development of NiDCOM was at best, partial, and at worst dispiriting. This set of legislators did not commit to the development NiDCOM because there was no motivation for them to do so, whether financial or otherwise.

6.5. GOVERNING THE POLICY PROCESS

The previous section highlights some of the hidden influences of legislators during the development of the NiDCOM policy. This section provides an insight into respondents' perception of how the government governed the policy development process.

From the collective responses, it was evident that despite the participation of many stakeholders in the policy development process, “the government regulated” the process to achieve the policy objectives (R13, Top-level Civil Servant). All through the development process, incidents of governmental control are discernible.

First and foremost, the policy was a Bill initiated by an influential House of Representatives member of the ruling party, Hon. Abike Dabiri, which suggests that the draft contents of the Bill were consistent with the ideology and objectives of the government as reflected by a respondent:

NiDCOM was a House bill and to that extent one could say it reflected the mindset of the APC government. And there is sufficient evidence of government support of the Bill (R16 Civil Society).

Although the APC government did not make the migration challenge a campaign issue, it nevertheless, lent its total support to the development of the policy. In that regard, the government used a number of avenues to demonstrate its support for the policy. And unlike some instances where some government functionaries or legislators may give contradictory

messages regarding a policy, there was no evidence of such in this case. Furthermore, the House of Representatives, particularly the house committee on diaspora developed the report that was considered in the plenary based on the engagements with many stakeholders giving it additional gate keeping powers. This point was articulated by a legislator:

After the public hearing, the committee responsible went back and developed a report based on the engagements and any other memorandum that was presented to the committee. So, in the end, the committee believed that the reasons were cogent enough, that it was a critical sector of Nigeria's national development and thus needed to be considered by the parliament. Then, it got the concurrence of the senate on the need to establish the commission, and eventually, in 2017 the bill was passed and assented to by the president to establish the commission (R11, Legislator).

A key finding was that a technical committee was established by the house committee on the diaspora to add value to the bill being considered and several respondents believed the committee, comprising many stakeholders, made significant inputs that shaped the NiDCOM policy. Importantly, the technical committee comprised policymakers, both public and private, who were knowledgeable in migration issues. This demonstrates a desire to give prominence to technocracy as against ideology in the policy process. Further, the technical committee was dominated by MDAs who used their numerical and strategic influence to nudge the committee one way or another.

Further, two respondents suggested that the so-called robust stakeholder consultations that took place were symbolic; that they were designed to legitimate a decision that has already been taken. They argued that although the technical committee and the larger stakeholders offered inputs, the inputs were useful to the extent they aligned with the vision of the house committee. One of them argued that:

It is true that all critical stakeholders contributed to the Bill, but I believe the house has already taken a position. They have, ab initio, decided to establish a commission so the consultations were, in my opinion, to give credibility to the process. It wouldn't make them to accept other options (R 16, Civil Society).

On paper, the statement above sounds inaccurate. My interview with the two respondents, including an informal discussion with one of them, however, revealed that there are grounds to suggest that was the case. The two respondents argued that the emphasis of the legislators from the outset was for the establishment of an agency to address the migration issue and it was clear what the outcome would be. In addition, when the government developed the NPM in 2015, it

knew that a law would eventually be passed to “permanently” address the migration issue. This implies that the NPM was designed as a placeholder pending the establishment of the NiDCOM.

In sum, several respondents believed that although the government engaged various stakeholders in the development of NiDCOM, it controlled the process from the shadow, an action that seems to sit well with the respondents because its their “constitutional responsibility” (R18, Representative, Diaspora Community).

6.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented empirical findings from the second case study of this research, the NiDCOM policy. The chapter started by providing a background to the case study highlighting the evolution of the NiDCOM.

The chapter demonstrated that respondents understood the concept of evidence and its importance in the policy-making process. The respondents identified multiple sources of evidence used during the development of the NiDCOM policy. Evidence from the chapter indicated that ‘MDA evidence’ was considered the most useful evidence based on its importance in the development of the National Migration Policy (NPM), the precursor to the NiDCOM. MDAs also provided considerable input in the development of the NiDCOM. In contrast, ‘ideology evidence’ was considered the least useful evidence largely because no successive governments used it as a campaign issue or even made it an important one.

Findings showed that the multiple evidence identified by respondents were integrated at three formal sites. First was an inter-ministerial committee established for the development of the NMP, which was a precursor to the NiDCOM policy with membership drawn from about 18 MDAs and organisations. Second was the committee on diaspora in the House of Representatives (HoR) where various inputs were collected, analysed and refined. Lastly, a technical committee established by the HoR comprising national and international stakeholders served as the last site for the integration of evidence.

Findings further showed that in the HoR, where the policy was developed, legislators’ participation, or lack of participation, was largely influenced by self-interest: financial, electoral, or entrepreneurial. Generally, the development of the NiDCOM revealed two sets of legislators. The first set comprised legislators that fully participated in the development of the

policy either based on their personal interests for recognition or the interests of the diaspora community. The second set consisted of legislators who did not fully participate in the process because they lacked the motivation, financial or otherwise.

Lastly, findings indicated that even though the government accorded numerous stakeholders the opportunity to contribute inputs to the policy, it still controlled the process. The fact that the bill for the development of the NiDCOM was a legislative one, coupled with the numerical dominance of government representatives in the various committees that collectively developed the policy reinforced the notion of governmental control. Indeed, there was considerable ground to argue that the policy preference of the government from the outset was for the establishment of a commission, a mission it accomplished based on the significant influence it wielded in the policy process.

The next chapter will present the findings on the third case study, the National Tax Policy.

CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDY 3 – NATIONAL TAX POLICY 2017 (NTP)

7.0. INTRODUCTION

The first National Tax Policy (NTP) in Nigeria was developed in 2012 as part of the government's efforts to entrench an effective tax system in the country (National Tax Policy, 2017). Prior to the birth of the NTP, the government has undertaken a number of measures to improve the country's tax system.

Indeed, the evolution of Nigeria's tax system is traceable to the economic reform initiated in the early 20th century by Sir Fredrick Lugard, the High Commissioner of the erstwhile Northern Protectorate, who issued the Stamp Duties Proclamation and the Native Revenue Proclamation in 1903 and 1906 respectively (Okauru, 2012). As part of the provisions of the Native Revenue Proclamation, Northern emirs and chiefs were required to surrender 25 percent of the revenue they collected to the Protectorate administration, while the outstanding 75 percent was used for public works and for the payment of the fixed personal income of the emirs and chiefs (Adebayo, 1995).

When the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated in 1914, the Native Revenue Proclamation was re-issued as the Native Revenue Ordinance in 1917 even though the application of the ordinance in the western and eastern territories was delayed until 1918 and 1927 respectively (Okauru, 2012). Notwithstanding, the collection of colonial tax in the Protectorates was enforced for the most part by the police using intimidation and force (Adebayo, 1995). In 1935, Frank G. Lloyd was appointed as the Commissioner of Income Tax for the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under the supervision of Walter B. Dare, the Commissioner of Income Tax for Anglo-phone West Africa (Okauru, 2012b). In 1943, the Nigerian Inland Revenue Department (NIRD) was carved out of the Anglo-Phone Inland Revenue Department (AIRD) and renamed the Federal Board of Inland Revenue (FBIR) in 1958 (Okauru, 2012).

After independence, the government set up several committees to investigate and improve the country's tax system, especially policy development and restructuring of the country's tax architecture. The committees included the Shehu Musa Task Force (1978) whose recommendation led to the introduction of withholding tax in Nigeria; the Emmanuel Edozien

Study Group (1991) responsible for the creation of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS); the Sylvester Ugoh Study Group (1992) that recommended the introduction of the Value Added Tax in 1993; and the Dotun Phillips Study Group (2002) which “identified the need for a National Tax Policy to redress the imbalances and shortcomings in the Nigerian tax system” (Okauru, 2012, p.74).

The NTPs of 2012 and 2017 are therefore in continuation of the government’s efforts to revitalise the country’s tax system. Scholars and practitioners have argued that the non-implementation of the 2012 policy was responsible for its review leading to the development of the 2017 policy (Adebayo, 1995). The broad objective of the 2017 policy is to stimulate economic growth by setting clear principles to regulate tax administration in Nigeria. The policy is designed to:

1. “Guide the operation and review of the tax system.
2. Provide the basis for future tax legislation and administration.
3. Serve as a point of reference for all stakeholders on taxation.
4. Provide benchmark on which stakeholders shall be held accountable.
5. Provide clarity on the roles and responsibilities of Stakeholders in the tax System” (National Tax Policy, 2017).

7.1. TYPES OF EVIDENCE

This section examines respondents’ responses on the types of evidence used in the development of the 2017 NTP.

To start with, the respondents demonstrated a good understanding of the concept of evidence-based policymaking including what evidence is and why it is useful in the policy process. They affirmed that evidence enriches policymaking and provides a basis for the development and review of policies. One respondent conveyed this sentiment as follows:

Policies should and must be based on evidence if they are to be useful. Everything that was done with respect to this policy (NTP, 2017) was evidence-based. You have to obtain relevant data sets and use them to enrich your policy...It is all about openness, government should be open and allow citizens to participate (R 23, Top-level Civil Servant).

Most of the respondents supported the use of multiple sources of evidence in the development of the 2017 NTP. They believed that the more evidence policymakers have, the better equipped they are to make optimal policy choices. As one respondent put it, more evidence sources ‘*potentially produce the best policy possible*’ (R 27, Representative, NGO).

Some of the respondents were of the view that multiple evidence sources reduce biases because usually, each type of evidence says a different thing and harmonising them requires some degree of rigour. Yet, while the majority of the respondents were satisfied with the adequacy of evidence used in the development of the NTP, a number of them were not. One of them bemoaned that *“the paucity of relevant data at critical points”* made policymakers resort to their *“individual knowledge”* (R26, Professional Accountant). While this criticism sounds credible and seems to question the notion that multiple sources of evidence were used in the development of the NTP, in fact it does not. Within the frame of this research, *“individual knowledge”* represents a form of evidence labelled *“residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence”*. To be clear, it comprises the policy knowledge and expertise policymakers possess on account of their experiences and training. So, in a way, the criticism strengthens the argument that, indeed, multiple sources of evidence were used in the development of the policy.

Yet, a few respondents drew attention to the limits of evidence. They contended that while evidence is important in policymaking, it is not a *“silver bullet that automatically makes policies more effective”* (R 23, Top-level Civil Servant). Such cautious statements are important reminders to policymakers especially those who have an overwhelming faith in EBP. Of course, the literature recognises that part of peoples’ disillusionment with the EBP is the high expectation associated with the concept.

Notwithstanding, my engagement with the respondents shows that various types of evidence were used in the development of the 2017 NTP. There was, thus, a constellation of participants spanning both the public and the private sector, as explained by a respondent:

So, to mention the stakeholders I will say the government and private sector. In the government, we have the ministry of finance, the Federal Inland Revenue Service, and the Joint Tax Board which we can still classify as government too. On the side of the private sector, we have some private sector players like accounting and auditing firms. We also had a consultant from the University of Lagos - a professor of law. He was one of the key players that participated. Then we had lawyers, interest groups, the media, and so on (R 22, Mid-level Civil Servant).

Data obtained from respondents regarding the kinds of evidence used in the development of the NTP are presented below:

TABLE 188: TYPES OF EVIDENCE USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NTP

Respondents	Evidence							
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence
R21	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
R22	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R23	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R24	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R25	X	X	X	X	X	X	✓	✓
R26	X	✓	X	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
R27	X	✓	✓	X	X	X	✓	✓
R28	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
R29	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TOTAL	5	8	6	5	7	6	7	9

The table above indicates that eight types of evidence were used in the development of the 2017 NTP. Respondents considered ‘local consultants evidence’ as the evidence type that was used most (9). In contrast, ‘research evidence’ and ‘media evidence’ were considered the least used evidence types (5).

A review of Table 18 above shows that the percentages of respondents that identified each source of evidence as having been used in the development of the 2017 NTP are as follows:

TABLE 199: TYPES OF EVIDENCE BY PERCENTAGE

Evidence type	Total percentage (%)
Research evidence	55.6
Previous policies evidence	88.9
MDA evidence	66.7
Media evidence	55.6
Ideology evidence	77.8
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	66.7
Internet evidence	77.8
Local consultants evidence	100

The table shows that all the respondents (100%) reported that ‘local consultants evidence’ was used in the development of the NTP, 2017. Interestingly, that was the only kind of evidence that all the respondents believed was used in the development of the NTP. This is anticipated and confirmed because the literature emphasises the leading role of local consultants in the development of the NTP.

Contrastingly, ‘research evidence’ and ‘media evidence’ were identified as the least used evidence (55.6%) each. The poor use of ‘research evidence’ in policy development is a universal challenge which this research has so far confirmed. As regards ‘media evidence’, the majority of policymakers in Nigeria have a pessimistic view of them. They are usually seen not as credible providers of evidence but rather as creators of sensationalism to advance their business interests.

7.2. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

This theme examines the relative importance respondents attached to the eight types of evidence. Respondents were requested to rank the eight types of evidence in order of how useful they were in the development of the NTP. The respondents were guided by the information in Table 20 below.

TABLE 20: RANKING TABLE (NTP)

Ranking	Interpretation
1	Most useful evidence
2	2nd Most useful evidence
3	3rd Most useful evidence
4	4th Most useful evidence
5	5th Most useful evidence
6	6th Most useful evidence
7	7th Most useful evidence
8	8th Most useful evidence

This means the respondents ranked the most useful evidence as 1; the second most useful evidence was ranked 2; the third most useful evidence was ranked 3; the fourth most useful evidence was ranked 4; the fifth most useful evidence was ranked 5; the sixth most useful evidence was ranked 6; the seven most useful evidence was ranked 7; the eighth most useful evidence was ranked 8.

Respondents’ rankings for each of the eight types of evidence are provided in Table 21 below.

TABLE 21: RANKING FOR EACH OF THE EIGHT TYPES OF EVIDENCE (NTP)

Respondents	Ranking							
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence
R21	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	2
R22	4	1	2	7	8	3	6	5
R23	8	6	5	2	4	1	7	3
R24	5	6	3	4	1	8	2	7
R25	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1
R26	-	2	-	5	4	3	-	1
R27	-	3	4	-	-	-	2	1
R28	5	1	6	-	2	7	3	4
R29	8	2	5	7	3	6	4	1

Respondents' rankings of the eight kinds of evidence were turned into scores to reflect the relative weight the respondents accorded each type of evidence. This was done in such a way that the higher an evidence was ranked, the higher it was scored in line with Table 22.

TABLE 22: RANKING AND SCORE (NTP)

Ranking	Score
1	9
2	8
3	7
4	6
5	5
6	4
7	3
8	2
9	1

The total score for each of the nine types of evidence is computed and presented in Table 23 below.

TABLE 23: THE TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH TYPE OF EVIDENCE

Respondents	Individual Score							
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence
R21	-	8	-	-	6	-	-	7
R22	5	8	7	2	1	6	3	4
R23	1	3	4	7	5	8	2	6
R24	4	3	6	5	8	1	7	2
R25	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	8
R26	-	7	-	4	5	6	-	8
R27	-	6	5	-	-	-	7	8
R28	4	8	3	-	7	2	6	5
R29	1	7	4	2	6	3	5	8
TOTAL	15	50	29	20	38	26	37	56

The Table shows the total score for each of the eight kinds of evidence. The higher the score of a type of evidence, the more useful it was considered by the respondents. A review shows that the total scores for the eight types of evidence from the highest to the lowest are as follows:

TABLE 24: TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH EVIDENCE IN DESCENDING ORDER (NTP)

EVIDENCE	TOTAL SCORE
Local consultants evidence	56
Previous policies evidence	50
Ideology evidence	38
Internet evidence	37
MDA evidence	29
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	26
Media evidence	20
Research evidence	15

The total scores were used to develop a hierarchy of evidence showing the evidence with the highest total score of 56 (local consultants) at the top of the pyramid, followed by the evidence with the second highest score of 50 (previous policies evidence) and this continued down to the evidence with the lowest total score of 15 (research evidence) which is placed at the base of the hierarchy as shown in figure 6 below.




FIGURE 6: HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE BASED ON DATA (NTP)

Figure 6 above shows that ‘local consultants evidence’ is at the peak of the pyramid meaning respondents considered it the most useful evidence in the development of the 2017 NTP. Of the nine respondents, four ranked it as their number one (the most useful) evidence. Many of the respondents justified their ranking by describing the input of the consultants as the most critical in policy development. During all the policy development sessions, the consultants not only fully participated but made telling contributions. By virtue of their decades of experience as consultants to both the government and the private sector, they have garnered deep knowledge and understanding of the Nigerian tax landscape.

As such, the main reason why the consultants occupied such a prime position in the development of the policy was their technical knowledge. Clearly, they were the most knowledgeable group during the sessions both in terms of theory and practice, which made their contributions well respected. On occasions where there were controversies or arguments, the consultants often served as arbiters. The view expressed below by a respondent aptly captures the feeling of most of the respondents:

Their (consultants') impact was great, perhaps the greatest of any demographic...so, they had ideas of which areas (of the policy) needed to be changed, and where the government needed to come in because of that professional experience that they brought to bear. Those experiences were extremely useful in revising the tax policy (R 21, Top-level Civil Servant).

The use of consultants in developing technical policies in Nigeria is gradually rising largely because of their expertise. Their ability to deliver on tight schedules, as seen in the case of the NTP, has also increased their popularity. This contrasts with the delays and bureaucratic bottlenecks associated with the development of policies by the civil service. In the development of the NTP, the consultants approached the issue with private sector mentality including setting targets and measuring progress which helped to fast-track the policy process. Accordingly, the policy development process was biased in favour of technocracy, underscored by the significant emphasis on the expertise of consultants.

Contrariwise, respondents considered 'research evidence' as the least useful evidence. Although academics served on the tax review committee, their impacts in terms of research were minimal. A respondent lamented that he was "*disappointed with the academics*" who did not live up to general expectations (R26, Professional Accountant). Considering the technical nature of the policy domain in question - tax - and the leading role played by consultants in the development of the policy, this finding is surprising. The limited time available for the committee to deliver the policy contributed to the poor showing of the academics on the committee as explained by a respondent from the Federal Ministry of Finance who coordinated the review process:

The policy delivery was set on a very tight deadline and given the time frame for the review and submission, there was not sufficient time to conduct new research. Like I told you, membership of the tax policy review committee, was largely made up of people from academia and professional bodies, and the committee was headed by a professor of tax law, so maybe he was able to gather some input from some of his colleagues...(but) it wasn't a research that took so long like you go back and consult the literature, no. (R 21, Top-level Civil Servant).

Based on the comment above, a key reason for the poor ranking of "research evidence" was timing. The academics did not have sufficient time to undertake research to contribute to the policy, making the academics and policymakers to operate in two different communities. This challenge is well documented in the literature with scholars making several recommendations to bridge the existing gap between the two.

Another reason was the attitude of Nigerian policymakers that did not attach the desired importance to research during the policy development process. A respondent reflected:

Unlike in other climes where research drives policy, here, we are not there yet. We hardly undertake primary research or government commissioning research purposely for policy development (R 27, Representative, NGO).

Although timing has been recognised as a major issue, the history of policymaking in Nigeria suggests that the perception of policymakers in terms of the value of research in policymaking was a contributory factor. The contributions of research findings to policymaking in Nigeria have been miserable over the years. Rarely do governments in Nigeria commission research purposely for policymaking. Considering that the country has always had a big government, the poor uptake of research by the government continues to adversely affect the use of ‘research evidence’ in policymaking.

In the case of the NTP, the government failed to commission research or encourage academics to conduct research to enrich the policy. This speaks volumes about the government’s attitude to the use of research in policymaking. And as anticipated, the researchers were unable to provide the required ‘research evidence’ to influence the development of the NTP. The bottom line is that as long as the government does not support research, research evidence would continue to be less influential in policymaking in Nigeria.

7.3. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE

The previous section examined the perceptions of respondents on the usefulness of the eight kinds of evidence they believed were used for the development of the 2017 NTP. This section will analyse how the different kinds of evidence were integrated into the policy process.

As we have seen so far, the 2017 NTP involved the use of numerous evidence types and collaboration among members of the policy community for both generation and utilisation of evidence. As a result, an examination of how these multiple types of evidence were integrated is germane to enhance our understanding of the 2017 NTP policy process. Findings shows that the integration took place in two formal sites: the National Tax Policy Review Committee, created by the then minister of finance, and stakeholders’ engagement meetings.

The review committee represented the first integration site where numerous evidence types were sourced and utilised. The committee’s main deliverable was to ‘aggregate diverse views

and draft the policy’ (R 29, a mid-level civil servant). Membership of the committee was drawn from the public and private sectors and understandably, there were residual biases based on differences in members’ orientation. The committee was ‘multi-sectoral’ and provided an avenue for ideological contestation with members using evidence to ‘rally support for their arguments and point of views’ (R 27, Representative, NGO). One respondent noted:

The policy was committee driven. At the committee level, we held meetings from time to time to get the work done. We took the existing national policy as a framework as a guide; We took the topics in the old document item by item, what we needed to delete, we deleted, what we needed to include based on current realities, we did. We had debates on each topic, subject by subject. Members used statistics, persuasion and what have you to convince the meeting as to why a position should be taken. Other members who might have contrary views would then provide counter arguments (R 28, Top-level Civil Servant).

The foregoing statement indicates that the discussions in the committee were productive. As we have highlighted earlier, the membership of the committee was diverse and represented various interests. Considering that tax is usually one of the most polarising and ideologically charged public policy issues, it was not surprising that the committee represented a site for robust deliberations and debates. The major debate revolved around the appropriate level of tax for different taxpayers. Expectedly, while the business community generally advocated low taxes to encourage production and investment; representatives of the government and civil society, on the other hand, argued that the elites should be taxed higher to fund investment in infrastructure and to support the government’s welfare programmes. Another issue that instigated a sustained debate was whether the SMEs were overtaxed or not. Consequently, each demographic used data, information, and moral suasion to persuade other members of the committee. The committee looked at all contending issues in detail with members taking positions based on their convictions or interests. As a result, issues were determined based on the level of support they received. Owing to their expertise and experience, the tax consultants were respected, and their views carried significant weight. In most cases, their interventions settled contentious issues and provided a direction for the committee.

Interestingly, all through the committee’s deliberations, there existed a good relationship between the consultants and the representatives of the Ministry of Finance, which in the first place was responsible for the engagement of the consultants. Findings show that the relationship pre-dated the development of the NTP in 2017. Findings also show that the

consultants offered their services at no cost based on the company's policy of undertaking selected free consultancy services for public interest.

The committee also received, considered, and analysed inputs from selected professional and business groups who had been requested to provide inputs. These inputs were critically examined to ascertain their usefulness and feasibility. One respondent mentioned that:

Lots of people gave in evidence of what they felt, either specific part of the policy that they felt was unfair to them or they felt generally that the policy was not clear or any way they thought it would be improved. The committee decided what to accept or reject (R 25, Tax Consultant).

It was found from the collective responses of the respondents that a vast amount of inputs was collected from other stakeholders. In some instances, the inputs supported or controverted existing arguments in the committee. These inputs, alongside the evidence obtained by the committee members themselves were analysed to arrive at most of the provisions in the 2017 NTP.

To streamline the activities of the committee and engender specialisation, sub-committees were created to focus on different subjects. Each sub-committee synthesised the types of evidence at its disposal and developed a report. The report of each sub-committee was then further reviewed by the main committee as mentioned by a respondent:

Then we had the committee broken down into sub-committees and we had different thematic areas, so what we did was look at the different thematic areas. Some of the members were able to go back to do their own personal research and come back with input which was fed into the different sub-committee and at the end of the day it was submitted to the larger committee for a review (R 28, Top-level Civil Servant).

This means the integration in the committee was done at two levels. The micro level, the level of the sub-committees and the macro level, which was the larger committee. The membership of the sub-committees was done with consideration of members' expertise and interests. The sub-committees considered themes in more detail and where necessary, consulted other sub-committees or even obtained further inputs from external sources. Thereafter, the sub-committees analysed the whole gamut of evidence at their disposal, deciding what needed to be included in, or excluded from the policy. Finally, the sub-committees developed reports which they submitted to the larger committee.

The larger committee, on its part, considered and analysed all the reports from the sub-committees and determined the appropriateness and feasibility of the positions taken by the sub-committees. This involved more analysis and the synthesising of the positions or arguments presented by the sub-committees. Ultimately, the policy was updated to reflect the collective decisions of the larger committee.

The other integration site were the stakeholders' engagements otherwise referred to as 'town hall meetings' with each meeting taking "3 to 4 hours of robust discussions" (R 27, Representative, NGO). The engagements were held across the 'geo-political' zones of the country to enhance coverage and acceptability. During the engagements, different interest groups participated either physically or in the form of sending inputs. A respondent recalled:

They (interest groups) all sent in their inputs and participated in a series of stakeholders' physical engagements where relevant issues were discussed and harmonised (R 29, Mid-level Civil Servant).

The discussions and harmonisation involved considering the inputs of stakeholders and accepting them, refining them or rejecting them. This means that the meetings provided a platform for members to share ideas and scrutinise the various kinds of evidence provided by stakeholders.

One of the most fundamental features of the 'town hall meetings', as the name implies was that various stakeholders were invited, and all participants were free to express their views. Although formal in nature, the meetings were organised and handled in a semi-formal way to make the participants feel confident. This encouraged participants to make useful suggestions that were considered at the meetings.

Further, the draft NTP was exposed to the stakeholders during these engagements to secure their buy-in and support. Like in the first integration site, the inputs and positions of the stakeholders were considered and scrutinised. This led to the acceptance of some of the inputs and the rejection of others. As anticipated, the meeting turned out to be a critical part of the policy development, and all outstanding issues were resolved at the meetings leading to the amendment of the policy. A respondent noted:

There was a committee that was set up, people sent in their inputs, and we came up with a draft document. It was exposed to the public through stakeholder engagements. Eventually, the final

document was arrived at which was finally approved by the ministry. It also went to the national economic council for their endorsement before it became a document (R 23, Top-level Civil Servant).

Like the first integration site, stakeholders were broken into different groups along thematic lines with each group required to critique the themes in the draft policy allocated to it after which the teams collectively critiqued the entire draft policy. A respondent explained:

Like I told you, there were sub-committees for different subject matters, so what we tried to do was break the stakeholders into four groups and have these four different was presented to the stakeholders' plenary, and it's now for all members of the stakeholders to critique the work of each of the four groups that we broke into four. So, at the end of the day whatever we did not agree with, it was agreed, the committee would decide (R 23, Top-level Civil Servant).

To make the meetings more organised and obtain the best outcome therefrom, the draft policy was broken down into chapters, and participants were requested to indicate their interest regarding which group they wanted to belong to. This was to enable the participants to choose parts of the policy they were more experienced or had more interest in. It was found that a number of the stakeholders came to the meetings well-prepared and made convincing arguments in support of their preferences. This arrangement worked very well as participants made rich contributions that enriched the 2007 NTP. Generally, the two integration sites in this case study offered stakeholders involved in policy development an opportunity to synthesise different kinds of evidence as part of the policy process.

7.4. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

The 2017 NTP is considered an administrative as it did not require the input or approval of the legislative arm of government (Ibrahim, 2004). Findings, however, indicate that the input of the federal legislators was sought for strategic reasons.

A respondent elucidated the rationale behind their invitation:

A tax system typically is supposed to have three legs. The policy, administration, and law. The law is with the national assembly; the policy is with the ministry while the administration is with the tax authority...it is important to have synergy and that was the thinking for inviting the National Assembly (R22, Mid-level Civil Servant).

Since the legislature is responsible for making laws and the 2017 NTP was developed to guide the tax system in Nigeria, the invitation of the input of the legislators was to achieve two

objectives. The first one was to acquaint them with the knowledge of the subsisting tax policy framework to guide them in their legislative functions on tax administration in Nigeria. The second one was that being the representatives of the people, their participation would give them an opportunity to contribute to the development of the tax policy which was meant to affect their constituencies.

Thus, the invitation of the legislators was in part to *'prepare and enlighten them'* regarding major issues in the Nigerian tax administration (R 28, Top-level Civil Servant). Importantly, the development of the policy was seen as a major component of a tax system, and as such collaboration among the critical stakeholders was seen as a way to improve the effectiveness of the tax system as well as improve synergy. The need for synergy is a commendable objective. This is especially so because over the years, the relationship between the legislative arm of government and the executive has, for most part, been frosty. A case in point was the unfriendly and uncooperative relationship we saw in chapter five between the Social Investment Office (NSIO) and the legislators which adversely affected the development and implementation of the NSIP.

Yet, the legislators did not participate in the policy development owing to their disagreement with the executive arm of government at the time. A respondent recalled:

The National Assembly did not play a major role I think partly because at that time the relationship between the executives and the National Assembly was not very smooth, so when we were told as part of this process to go to the National Assembly, they just said to the minister don't bother coming...So, I think I was disappointed with the National Assembly (R26, Professional Accountant).

The attitude of the legislators further highlights the often-uncooperative relationship between Nigerian legislators and the executive arm of government, particularly the MDAs. In many instances, as the NSIP case demonstrates, the dispute between the two is not based on principle but on selfishness. The non-participation of the National Assembly impacted the policy in two broad ways. Firstly, it potentially detracted from the quality of the policy. This is because as critical stakeholders, the input of the NASS could have added value to the policy based on their knowledge base, experience, and influence. This sentiment is shared by most respondents, with one of them stating:

The (National) tax policy is a landmark policy and I think many people would tell you that all the critical stakeholders participated except the National Assembly. For sure, the participation

of the National Assembly would have expanded the sources of evidence with the potential for value addition in the policy process (R26, Professional Accountant).

Secondly, the non-participation impacted the synergy among the three key players in the Nigerian tax system - the legislators, the ministry, and the tax authority. While the last two players fully participated in the development of the 2017 NTP, the legislators failed to participate. Considering the importance of collaboration and cooperation in policy development and implementation, it is easy to decipher that the lack of participation of the legislators impacts the required synergy.

In sum, although the 2017 NTP is an administrative policy not requiring the input of the legislators. Nonetheless, the legislators were requested to participate in the development of the policy to add value and improve synergy among the key stakeholders. As we have seen, the legislators refused to participate. By spurning the invitation to contribute to the policy, the legislators have compromised the *'robustness of the policy both in terms of policy formulation and implementation'* (R 27, Representative, NGO).

7.5. GOVERNING THE POLICY PROCESS

A major finding under this variable is that the National Tax Policy Review Committee was established by the Minister of Finance who appointed a professor of tax law to head it. This demonstrates the minister's overwhelming influence in the formation of the committee. It also demonstrates that the minister determined the membership and leadership of the committee. A respondent confirmed that:

The tax draft committee was established by the minister (of finance) and the committee comprised public servants, various professionals and practitioners with a professor of tax law being the chairman of the committee (R 22, Mid-level Civil Servant).

Two outstanding features are discernible from the statement above. One, which was anticipated, was that the government included its representatives on the committee to ensure that government's interests were protected and advanced. Also, the representatives of government had numerical advantage which ensured that working together, they influenced proceedings and decisions more than any other bloc. The second feature, which was not entirely anticipated was that the minister made a private sector person to head the committee. The reason for the minister's choice was both technical and political. The technical dimension related to the personal expertise and experience of the head, being a professor of tax law. This,

together with the inclusion of other experts on the policy development committee confirms that the process was relatively technocratic. The political dimension, on the other hand, was to enhance the legitimacy and acceptability of the policy. Choosing a respected academic to head the committee, engendered some degree of confidence in the minds of Nigerians who rarely trust the government. Yet, the minister chose someone she could work with; someone whose personal ideology was consistent with what the minister wanted. Herein lies a subtle element that influenced the policy process and demonstrates the government's considerable control of the policy process. To emphasise, the two features above taken together underscore the steering influence and capacity of the government.

Findings indicate that several of the private sector members of the committee had a good "*understanding with the ministry*" (R 28, Top-level Civil Servant). A few of them had worked with the ministry on some national projects relating to tax, budget, and fiscal expenditure. For instance, the consultants had a good relationship with the ministry which might be largely responsible for offering free consultancy services. Nevertheless, the consultants' participation at no cost was also pursuant to their internal policy of undertaking some gratuitous consultancy services. Notwithstanding, the good relationship the ministry had with many of the private sector members of the committee ensured that they did not strongly disagree with the ministry, and even where that happened, the issue was resolved amicably.

Another significant demonstration of the government's steering capacity is that it reserved the right to review the committee's draft policy. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the government established the NTP review committee, and put in place some mechanisms to ensure that it significantly influenced the policy process. Yet, upon completion of the review, the committee submitted the draft policy to the ministry for approval to issue. The draft policy was then reviewed by the ministry and ensured that it was consistent with the ministry's vision as captured by a respondent's comment:

Yes, the committee was given a free hand to produce the policy and they obtained information from different stakeholders, but you know they also need to ensure they are comfortable with the committee's work before it (policy) was approved (R 23, Top-level Civil Servant).

The gatekeeping responsibility articulated by the comment above represented the government's final measure to control the policy process. It meant that after all said and done, the government maintained the ultimate authority to accept or amend the draft policy before issuance. Although

the government's action in this regard might be considered as undue influence by some, the government reserved the right to ensure that all its policies aligned with its broad vision.

7.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter presented findings from the empirical research conducted on the 2017 NTP, which is the third case study in my research. The chapter provided a background to the case study highlighting its historical underpinnings.

The chapter showed that respondents had a good understanding of the term evidence and how useful it is in the policy-making process. Further, the respondents identified multiple types of evidence for the development of the NTP policy. Finding indicates that 'local consultants evidence' was considered the most useful evidence while 'research evidence' was seen as the least useful evidence. The ranking of 'local consultants evidence' as the most useful was based on the superior technical knowledge and expertise of the consultants who played the most significant role among all the other experts. As a result, the policy process was largely technocratic substantially utilising the skills and experiences of various experts. In contrast, 'research evidence' was considered the least useful evidence largely because no primary research was done to provide input to the policy.

Findings also indicated that the integration of the multiple types of evidence identified occurred in two formal sites. These were the National Tax Policy Review Committee with membership drawn from the public and private sectors; and the stakeholders' engagement meetings which were held across the country. These sites provided avenues where various forms of evidence were presented and analysed with a view to accepting, refining or rejecting them. The sites, therefore, served as venues for discussions and debates.

Findings confirmed that although the 2017 NTP is an administrative policy which did not require the approval of the legislative arm of government, the inputs of legislators were sought to improve their understanding of tax issues and to help them in their legislative duties. The legislators, however, did not participate in the policy development mainly because they had a fundamental disagreement with the executive arm of government at the time. As a result, it was believed that the non-participation of the legislators potentially impacted not only the development of the policy but its implementation, as well. It is also believed that their lack of participation adversely affected the potential for cooperation and synergy among the key players in the tax system in Nigeria.

Lastly, the chapter showed that the government's steering capacity influenced the policy development process in a few ways. First, the government established the tax development committee with membership drawn from the public and private sectors. It also chose an academic as the head of the committee. Second, it ensured that its representative had a numerical advantage which influenced deliberations and the decisions of the committee. Lastly, the government had the final authority for the approval of the policy after its submission by the committee. Indeed, the Ministry of Finance reviewed the draft policy and ensured that it agreed with the government's broad policy objectives.

The next chapter will present the findings on the fourth case study, the National Water Resource Policy and Strategy (NWRP).

CHAPTER 8

FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDY 4 – NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES POLICY (NWRP)

8.0. INTRODUCTION

The cliché that water is life has been around for ages. Indeed, water is generally recognized as central to survival and civilization. It is one of the five basic needs - others are food, health, peace, and education - and is a common denominator in the other four needs (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). Water has therefore assumed critical importance for both domestic and industrial use. As articulated by Hakima El Haite, former minister of environment of Morocco, “Water connects everything...it is crucial for human development, it is crucial for education, it is crucial for health, it is crucial for stability and food security” (Marrakech, 2016).

Indeed, the absence of potable water has been a major concern for policymakers in the last five decades. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN-Habitat, the number of people that die from poor water quality is more than those that die from all forms of violence including wars (Corcoran et al., 2010 cited in Zawahri et al., 2011). Every year, 1.5 million people die, mostly in developing countries, due to diarrhoeal disease caused by unsafe water (Weststrate et al., 2018).

The issue of improving access to clean water in developing countries has therefore become a politically expedient one. The importance of water as a critical resource is further stressed by its finite nature as a natural resource and the attendant growing pressure on it. Some analysts have speculated that the pressure could potentially be a major cause of conflicts around the world (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004).

To address the issue, especially as it relates to developing countries which are understandably the worst hit, numerous events and conferences have been held at the international level. The first conference that focused on water was the UN Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 (United Nations, 1973). Others included: the International Drinking Water Decade Conference in Mar del Plata in 1977; the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin in 1992; the Drinking Water and Environmental Sanitation Conference for the implementation of Agenda 21 in Noordwijk in 1994; and the First World Water Forum in Marrakesh in 1997 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). A major turning point was the

United Nation's Millennium Development Goals (MDG) campaign. Launched in 2002 and endorsed by 189 countries, the campaign ran from 2002 to 2015 to improve access to potable water (Zawahri et al., 2011). Target 7c of the MDG aimed to halve the population without sustainable access to water (Onda et al., 2012; Weststrate et al., 2018).

Drawing from the global response to the water issue, Nigeria has increasingly undertaken efforts to manage its water resource to ensure optimal utilization. Although Nigeria has abundant water resources, poor water governance amid a fast-rising population has made water inaccessible to many citizens (Enyidi, 2017; Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). As a result, many Nigerians depend on rivers, streams, and boreholes for their water needs (Enyidi, 2017) even as the country's constitution provides that every citizen is entitled to adequate water and sanitation (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016). Indeed, water is considered "Nigeria's most unique and indispensable natural resource" (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016, p.11).

Nigerian water resources come from two main sources: rivers and lakes on the one hand, and rainfall on the other hand. One key challenge in managing the Nigerian water resource is the unequal distribution of the resource. To illustrate, there exists temporal variation in water availability across the country with Northern Nigeria having low precipitation of around 500mm and the Southern part of the country having precipitation of 4,000 mm (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). This has manifested in flooding and salt-water intrusion in the Southern part and persistent drought in the Northern part for more than four decades (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016).

In addition, water is the most misused and mismanaged resource in Nigeria leading to acute scarcity in many parts of the country, which in turn culminates in a threat to livelihoods and the country's quest for economic growth and development (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016). This situation is even worse among the rural areas in Northern Nigeria where many people resort to the use of unclean water from the river or stream with the attendant health risks. In urban areas, the health risks are mostly from the purchase of sachet water, some of which are unfit for consumption (Enyidi, 2017).

To address these challenges, preserve the country's water resource, and have a holistic approach to managing the water resource, the government has undertaken a couple of steps, some dating back to the colonial era. For instance, in the 1950s, the colonial government conducted a geological survey to understand the country's groundwater resources

(Nwankwoala, 2014). Subsequently, the Nigerian government has implemented various measures designed to provide potable water to the Nigerian people.

The government's first major effort to develop the country's water resources after independence was the creation of the River Niger and Lake Chad Basin Commissions as part of the first National Development Plan (1962-1968), followed by the establishment of the Sokoto-Rima Basin Authority in 1973 and the Chad Basin Authority in 1974 to provide the citizens with potable water and to boost agriculture (Nwankwoala, 2014). In the 1970s and early 1980s, armed with the oil boom proceeds, the country made significant investments in the water resources development, especially in the construction of dams to control floods, provide water for both domestic and industrial use, and hydro-power generation, among others (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004).

These measures achieved limited success in part because of the absence of a framework to drive the country's efforts in the sector, and because the country's water management responsibility is simultaneously performed by the three tiers of Government - federal, state and local governments leading to duplication and lack of cohesion (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004; Nwankwoala, 2014).

In response, the government developed the first National Water Policy in 2004 based on the philosophy of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016) which is a process that prescribes a coordinated management of water and other related resources equitably, and for the benefit of the present generation without compromising the potential benefit of future generations (GWP 2000, cited in Cho et al., 2021). The policy is aimed to address identified challenges and achieve:

- “Clear and coherent regulation.
- Clear definitions of the functions and relationship of sector institutions.
- Coordination Finds solution to the problem of dwindling funds.
- Reliable and adequate data for planning and projections.
- Decentralization in order to boost efficiency, performance and sustainability.
- Autonomy of water supply agencies.
- Regard water as an economic good.
- Create public awareness about water conservation and management.
- Provision of stable and adequate power supply.
- Accountability.

- Technical and financial capacity building to efficiently manage water delivery system.
- Human resource development” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004, 6).

New developments in the water sector especially the existence of a Water Resources Master Plan developed in 2013 and the need to adopt a more participatory approach to policy formulation led to the review of the 2004 policy in 2016 (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016). Thus, the 2016 policy is aimed to reflect emerging realities in the sector and to adopt a participatory, demand-driven approach to water resource management instead of the top-down, supply-driven approach that “has failed for many reasons including poor community and other stakeholders’ participation” (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016, 1).

The objectives of the 2016 policy are to:

1. “Optimise the use of Nation’s water resources at all times, for the present generation without compromising the existence of the future generations.
2. Foster Integrated Water Resources Management which will lead to:
 - Managing the water resources for equitable and sustainable water related sub-sector development and environmental protection.
 - Promoting stakeholder participation (governments, communities, Civil Societies and Private Sector) in the water sector development to meet rapidly growing demand for domestic and industrial water supply, sanitation, irrigation and drainage, food and erosion control, hydropower generation, inland transportation, inland fishery, livestock farming and other uses).
 - Improving River Hydrological Area Management by adopting hydrological boundaries as the basic units of water resource management and regulating activities within the Hydrological Areas units.
3. Managing the water resources for the purpose of eradicating poverty while enhancing and improving public health.
4. Improve and expand the delivery of water services in an equitable manner.
5. Foster the conservation of water and increase systems efficiencies.
6. Promote rain water management with sustainable drainage as a method of household water supply, drainage and flood control.
7. Prevent the over-exploitation of groundwater and protect its quality.

8. Promote national and international cooperation and increase the mutually beneficial use of shared water resources within Nigeria and with its neighbouring countries.
9. Facilitate the exchange of water sector information and experience.
10. Improve governance, institutional development, capacity development and the advancement of gender mainstreaming in the water sector.
11. Conserving the quality of both surface and ground water resources while promoting the protection of the environment and associated aquatic ecosystems to ensure long term sustainability.
12. Development of dams and institutionalizing proper dam's management as a means of mitigating flood and erosion.
13. Position Nigeria on a road map to achieving international and national goals and targets in water resources development.
14. Harness the power generation potentials of dams across the country.
15. Mitigate the impacts of climate change especially on desertification, flooding, coastal inundation and rapid drying up of lakes and rivers" (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016, pp.14-15)

8.1. TYPES OF EVIDENCE

This section examines respondents' responses to questions on the types of evidence used in the development of the NWRP.

My interactions with the respondents showed that they had a good understanding of the concept of evidence-based policymaking and how it enriches policymaking. They all accepted the statement that:

Policymaking today is scientific in that you need to search for data and information and use them to make good policies (R39, Mid-level Civil Servant).

All the respondents stated that different kinds of evidence were used in the development of the NWRP. This finding is consistent with earlier findings regarding the previous policies examined in this thesis. It has been established that policymakers in Nigeria make attempts to obtain different kinds of evidence in policy development. Indeed, the majority of the respondents confirmed that they had obtained and used evidence in the development of policies in their careers. Generally, the respondents had an optimistic view of the impact of evidence in

policymaking with some of them suggesting that the use of various types of evidence guarantees effective policymaking and implementation.

One respondent, a consultant, however, issued a note of caution.

I have been in the business long enough to know that while evidence is good, and nobody can argue about that, evidence is often over-hyped. Practitioners need to moderate their expectations. A lot of people see evidence as the panacea for ineffective policies but evidence is just one of many factors that affect policies. So, all stakeholders need to be aware of this reality (R37, Consultant).

Although the above intervention was incongruent with the sentiments of majority of the respondents, it was a necessary one as it draws attention to the limit of evidence. Majority of the respondents seemed to believe EBP is a silver bullet that cures all policy maladies. They talked about EBP, particularly evidence, with passion and belief. The literature, however, tells us that evidence is a contentious subject and getting the right types, or sufficient evidence is difficult. Fundamentally, evidence is just one of the many factors necessary for effective policymaking, and the impact of evidence is significantly nuanced.

Notwithstanding, findings reveal that various types of evidence were used in the development of the NWRP. A respondent noted:

The policy review actually started with the ministry...which established a technical team to review the policy...Then you have the consultants, and development partners like the EU funding the review. Then you have the ministry of water resources, which...provided most of the materials and knowledge for the formulation of the policy. Then agencies under the ministry, other ministries, academic and...yes, the national water council (R32, Top-level Civil Servant).

The quote above highlights some of the stakeholders that provided the evidence used in the development of the NWRP. Indeed, findings show that the policy benefited from a wider range of evidence than the respondent mentioned.

Data obtained from respondents regarding the kinds of evidence used in the development of the NWRP are presented below.

TABLE 25: TYPES OF EVIDENCE USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NWRP

Respondents	Evidence								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R31	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R32	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
R33	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R34	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R35	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	✓
R36	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R37	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	X
R38	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	X	✓	✓
R39	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Total	8	9	9	7	8	9	7	8	7

The table above confirms that various kinds of evidence were used in the development of the NWRP. Respondents considered ‘previous policies evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, and ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ as the most used types of evidence (9) while ‘media evidence’, ‘internet evidence’ and ‘external stakeholders evidence’ were the least used evidence (7).

A review of the table above shows that the percentages of respondents that identified each source of evidence as having been used in the development of the policy are as follows:

TABLE 26: TYPES OF EVIDENCE BY PERCENTAGE

Evidence type	Total percentage (%)
Research evidence	88.9
Previous policies evidence	100
MDA evidence	100
Media evidence	77.8
Ideology evidence	88.9
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	100
Internet evidence	77.8
Local consultants evidence	88.9
External stakeholders evidence	77.8

Thus, all the nine respondents (100%) reported that ‘previous policies evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, and ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ were used in the development of the policy. As regards ‘previous policies evidence’, all the respondents believed that erstwhile policies, principally the National Water Policy, were used in policy development. Also, all the respondents identified ‘MDA evidence’ as having been used because they believed that the Ministry of Water Resources, some agencies under the ministry, and other ministries played a huge role in the provision of the data and information used in the policy development. In terms of respondents’ collective mention of ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’, all the respondents alluded to at least one instance where policymakers used their skills or knowledge impromptu, to intervene during the policy development process.

In contrast, only seven respondents (77.8%) thought that ‘media evidence’, ‘internet evidence’, and ‘external stakeholders evidence’ were used in the policy development process. Like in the other three policies, a significant number of the respondents did not believe that ‘media evidence’ and ‘internet evidence’ were used in the development of the NWRP. This was largely because many of the respondents did not utilise them in their search for evidence. However, the responses of a few of the respondents that ‘external stakeholders evidence’ was not used in policy formulation came as a surprise because findings show that development partners, especially the EU, did provide evidence. Thus, the two respondents (22.2%) that reported that ‘external stakeholders evidence’ was not used in the development of the policy were probably not aware of the participation of the development partners.

8.2. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

This theme examines the relative importance respondents attached to the nine types of evidence. Respondents were requested to rank the nine types of evidence in order of how useful they were in the development of the NWRP. The respondents were guided by the information in Table 27 below.

TABLE 27: RANKING TABLE (NWRP)

Ranking	Interpretation
1	Most useful evidence
2	2nd Most useful evidence
3	3rd Most useful evidence
4	4th Most useful evidence
5	5th Most useful evidence
6	6th Most useful evidence
7	7th Most useful evidence
8	8th Most useful evidence
9	9th Most useful evidence

This means the respondents ranked the most useful evidence as 1; the second most useful evidence was ranked 2; the third most useful evidence was ranked 3; the fourth most useful evidence was ranked 4; the fifth most useful evidence was ranked 5; the sixth most useful evidence was ranked 6; the seven most useful evidence was ranked 7; the eight most useful evidence was ranked 8; and the ninth most useful evidence was ranked 9.

Respondents' rankings for each of the nine types of evidence are provided in Table 28.

TABLE 28: RANKING FOR EACH OF THE NINE TYPES OF EVIDENCE (NWRP)

Respondents	Ranking								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R31	6	1	7	8	2	3	9	5	4
R32	1	2	3	7	6	5	4	-	-
R33	1	2	4	9	6	7	5	3	8
R34	1	5	2	9	8	6	7	3	4
R35	-	1	3	7	4	2	-	6	5
R36	7	1	2	9	4	3	8	6	5
R37	6	1	2	-	5	4	3	7	-
R38	4	2	1	-	3	5	-	6	7
R39	2	1	4	2	-	3	6	5	7

Respondents' rankings of the nine kinds of evidence were turned into scores to reflect the relative weight the respondents accorded each type of evidence. This was done in such a way that the higher an evidence was ranked, the higher it was scored in line with Table 29.

TABLE 29: RANKING AND SCORE (NWRP)

Ranking	Score
1	9
2	8
3	7
4	6
5	5
6	4
7	3
8	2
9	1

The total score for each of the nine types of evidence is computed and presented in Table 30 below.

TABLE 30: THE TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH TYPE OF EVIDENCE (NWRP)

Respondents	Individual Score								
	Research evidence	Previous policies evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants evidence	External stakeholders evidence
R31	4	9	3	2	8	7	1	5	6
R32	9	8	7	3	4	5	6	-	-
R33	9	8	6	1	4	3	5	7	2
R34	9	5	8	1	2	4	3	7	6
R35	-	9	3	7	6	8	-	4	5
R36	3	9	8	1	6	7	2	4	5
R37	4	9	8	-	5	6	7	3	-
R38	6	8	9	-	7	5	-	3	4
R39	8	9	6	2	-	7	4	5	3
TOTAL	52	74	58	17	42	52	28	39	30

The Table shows the total score for each of the nine kinds of evidence. The higher the score of a type of evidence, the more useful it was considered by the respondents. A review shows that the total scores for the nine types of evidence from the highest to the lowest are as follows:

TABLE 31: TOTAL SCORE FOR EACH EVIDENCE IN DESCENDING ORDER (NWRP)

EVIDENCE	TOTAL SCORE
Previous policies evidence	74
MDA evidence	58
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	52
Research evidence	52
Ideology evidence	42
Local consultants evidence	39
External stakeholders evidence	30
Internet evidence	28
Media evidence	17

The total scores were used to develop a hierarchy of evidence showing the evidence with the highest total score placed at the top of the pyramid and then cascading down to the one with the least total score at the base of the hierarchy as shown in figure 7.

**FIGURE 7: HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE BASED ON DATA (NWRP)**

Figure 7 above shows that ‘previous policies evidence’ is at the peak of the pyramid. This means respondents widely considered it the most useful evidence in the development of the NWRP. Interestingly, five of the nine respondents ranked it as the number one (most useful) evidence among all the evidence used in making the policy. The explanation of one respondent is insightful on this choice:

A policy was already in existence which was redone to conform with global trends and make it more effective. So, it was the first and most useful source of evidence. You know the new policy was not entirely new per se. And as is traditional in policymaking, where you have an old policy, it should be the first choice in terms of evidence (R31, Consultant).

The erstwhile policy referred to by the respondent above was the National Water Policy (NWP) which was developed in 2004 to regulate the country’s water system. The NWP soon became inadequate to address emerging challenges in Nigeria’s water sector. To address those challenges and develop a policy that is participatory and demand-driven, the government established a committee to review the old policy. Expectedly, the principles and provisions of the NWP served as the baseline information for the new policy, the National Water Policy Resources Policy (NWRP), which was developed in 2016. Other relevant policies and even the constitution of the country was also used and thus, provided further evidence. Indeed, the policymakers ensured that the NWRP was consistent with the Nigerian constitution especially regarding the rights and responsibilities of all stakeholders in the water ecosystem.

Notably, in the development of the NWRP, new issues like funding and financing, the relationship between water and key economic activities in Nigeria, principles of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and the institutional arrangement to achieve the IWRM targets were introduced. Notwithstanding, the policymakers used the NWP as the overriding template which they updated with the generated evidence accordingly. In accordance with the incremental policymaking philosophy, the use of the NWP as the main source of evidence for the development of the NWRP was, therefore, to build on the existing policy in force because a lot of work has gone into it.

Conversely, respondents widely believed that ‘media evidence’ was the least useful evidence in the policy development. Findings show that in the development of the NWRP, the media role was very minimal. During the policy development, there was no formal engagement with the media; none of the respondents disclosed the use of media as evidence in policy development. This finding is surprising considering that the media in Nigeria has over the years

been very critical of many government policies. And unlike during the military regimes, the media in democratic Nigeria have significant freedom. Yet, 'media evidence' has consistently ranked poorly in the respondents' perception in this thesis mainly because they believed the media often resorted to sensationalism to boost their readership and increase their bottom line.

Specific to the NWRP, 'media evidence' was the least useful because the media offered very little in terms of coverage and recommendations. Water resources issues have not been politically salient in Nigeria in the last three decades or so, and as such media attention to them have been scant and tentative. In fact, even where adverse events like flooding occurred, the media tended to gloss over it and identified the problems without proffering solutions. Generally, the media failed to pay sustained attention to water resources issues hence the paucity of 'media evidence' in the development of the NWRP.

A respondent stated:

The media in Nigeria especially the print, in order to sell they look for sensation and (water) policy issues are not sensational...editorials about policy issues are not common here. (R31, Consultant).

As a consequence, respondents felt 'media evidence' played a far less role than other kinds of evidence in the development of the NWRP. The role of the media, however, increased marginally after the development of the NWRP when they broadcast the policy. As expected of the media after the release of a policy, they carried the story as a news item for informational purposes.

8.3. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE

The previous section discussed respondents' perceptions of the relative usefulness of the different kinds of evidence used in the development of the NWRP. This section will examine how the different kinds of evidence were integrated into the policy process.

This study maintains that the policy environment is replete with chaos. Part of the chaos is that different players in the policy environment provide different, often contradictory, evidence for consideration. It is, therefore, useful to analyse how the different kinds of evidence were integrated into the policy process.

This study found out that the integration took place in two formal sites where the various types of evidence generated were harmonised.

The first integration site comprised the technical committee established by the Ministry of Water Resources to review the erstwhile National Water Policy (NWP). The committee developed the first draft of the policy. The team, initially led by consultants, obtained information from different sources which it scrutinised and harmonised. The staff of the Ministry of Water Resources in the team provided a considerably high amount of information and data on account of their access to the ministry's database. They provided invaluable institutional memory, underscored by their knowledge of the ministry's policies and processes. Other agencies and parastatals of the ministry, and staff of other ministries also participated in the process and provided information concerning their operations and how to make the policy effective. In addition to the generation of evidence, staff of the MDAs ensured that the NWRP was in synergy with the ministry's specifications and the country's peculiarities.

The committee held many meetings in which they considered the multiple evidence on offer. The first task the committee undertook was to analyse the current policy which enabled members to be abreast of its content. The committee then received inputs from other stakeholders. Findings show that the committee had a considerably large array of inputs from diverse sources as explained by a respondent:

(We) got so much information from various sources which we had to prioritise based on quality and feasibility. So, we interrogated all the data and of course those that didn't meet those criteria we had to jettison while some were in the grey area and we had to tweak to make them useful. So, we took many decision as we proceeded but we had to keep going back and forth to reflect new information (R37, Consultant).

The statement above highlights the way the committee analysed and integrated the different kinds of evidence generated for the development of the NWRP. Specifically, the integration involved a few stages across the policy development process. First, the old policy was projected, and the committee members went through it line by line and examined every provision. Second, the inputs received from the stakeholders were analysed. Committee members provided inputs (particularly information and data) to support their preferences. Third, the consultants cleaned up the document and projected the updated document in a technical committee meeting. This was to obtain the validation of members regarding the updated provisions. The committee synthesised the various types of evidence available and then made a judgement as to what should be in the policy and what should be excluded. Instances of disagreements or discrepancies were addressed in one technical meeting or the other through extensive discussion and deliberations. Finally, a draft policy was produced which was largely based on the various inputs received and considered.

While the highlights of the integration presented a seemingly straightforward exercise, in truth, it was a relatively arduous task. To buttress, the development of the policy including the integration of the various kinds of evidence led to the production of six drafts before the final one. Simply put, the integration involved extensive discussion and deliberations by members as regards how each type of data and information fit into the policy being developed. This was done through what a respondent described as “*separating the wheat from the chaff*” (R39, Mid-level Civil Servant).

The separating the wheat from the chaff analogy indicates the team’s effort to determine which evidence went into the policy and which did not - an integration function. As expected, there were debates around the usefulness and feasibility of the evidence types, supporting the characterisation of the technical committee as a site where different kinds of evidence were integrated into the policy process.

The second integration site was the stakeholder meeting. Many of the meetings, with some called “zonal workshops” took place in the six geo-political zones in the country and the nation’s capital to obtain the views of stakeholders. This process was undertaken by the technical committee with the consultants playing a lead role. The main stakeholders in the meetings were the directorate cadre in the Ministry of Water Resources from all the 36 states of the federation and the National Water Resources Council, which is the highest policymaking body in the Nigerian water sector, comprising all the state commissioners responsible for water resources in the country.

At this stage, the draft policy developed by the technical committee was ready. Each of these meetings was, therefore, to present the draft to water resources policymakers across all the states of the federation and the apex water resources policymaking body. The key objective of the meetings was to obtain the perspectives and endorsement of the stakeholders. Considering that the states have their peculiarities, and are at different levels of development, the meetings were valuable in gauging how suitable the provisions of the draft policy were to the states. It is also worth mentioning that although a federal policy, the states would be responsible for the implementation of a number of the provisions in the policy, hence the need for their buy-in.

Findings reveal that several participants identified areas that needed amendments, especially areas they felt were inconsistent with their states’ peculiarities. They, therefore, offered

recommendations, backed by evidence, to address the perceived inconsistencies. The workshops analysed these concerns and recommendations and arrived at collective decisions.

A respondents recalled:

One interesting thing about the workshops was that stakeholders' inputs were discussed and debated and a decision reached on whether an input should be accepted or not. And I would say the workshops were quite useful in bringing consensus in a lot of the contentious issues (R34, Representative, Development Partner).

The stakeholder meetings, like the technical committee served as a site for the integration of various kinds of evidence. Indeed, the stakeholders made valuable contributions regarding the appropriateness of various provisions in the policy and the quality of the whole policy. These inputs were discussed and, in some instances, intensely debated to arrive at decisions. In the end, the stakeholders endorsed the policy for issuance, having been largely satisfied with it.

8.4. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

The NWRP is an example of an administrative policy since it did not need the input or approval of the federal legislature. As a result, the developers of the policy did not seek the inputs of the federal legislators as confirmed by respondents.

This is not a law that needed the approval of the legislature. It is only a policy initiated by a ministry to achieve its mandate so there was no need for legislative approval (R34, Representative, Development Partner).

The statement above is correct and underlines the fact that the inputs of the legislators were neither invited nor expected in the development of the policy. Having said that, recent developments in the water sector indicate that the involvement of the legislators would have been valuable.

In 2017, the executive arm of the government introduced a bill to, among other things, regulate the use and management of water resources in a sustainable and equitable manner. The bill was titled 'A Bill for An Act to Establish a Regulatory Framework for the Water Resources Sector in Nigeria, Provide for the Equitable and Sustainable Redevelopment, Management, Use and Conservation of Nigeria's Surface Water and Groundwater Resources and for Related Matter.'

The bill was passed in the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate for concurrence. Some senators, however, truncated the bill insinuating that it was an attempt by some powerful interests to take control of the country's water resources. Subsequently, the Senate refused to pass the bill.

Considering the nexus between policy and legislation in Nigeria which was demonstrated in the case of the establishment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) in 2019, where the National Migration Policy (NMP) developed in 2015, played a significant role, the involvement of federal legislators in the development of the NWRP would have improved the understanding of legislators and potentially elicited their support for the bill. It suggests, therefore, that where policymakers envisage that a policy might be strengthened by a legislation in the future, they should endeavour to engage legislators to enlighten and lobby them.

8.5. GOVERNING THE POLICY PROCESS

Findings revealed that many respondents believed that the government was alive to its responsibility of “coordinating and managing” the entire policy process (R32, Top-level Civil Servant). To start with, it was the Ministry of Water Resources that established the technical committee that reviewed the erstwhile National Water Policy (NWP). As we have stated previously, members were drawn from the Ministry of Water Resources, parastatals under the ministry, other ministries, development partners, and consultants. The Ministry of Water Resources, therefore, selected all the members, except the representatives of the development partners. The power to select the members of the committee was clearly one of the most influential decisions in the development of the policy.

Secondly, the ministry provided the technical committee with Terms of Reference (ToR), stipulating the scope and objectives of the assignment as indicated by a respondent:

The government was...in charge of the policy process. Based on its sovereignty, the government set the rule and hold the committee accountable (R35, Top-level Civil Servant).

The clear implication of the statement above is that the committee was required to function within the bounds set by the ministry. Even though the committee had diverse membership and multiple types of evidence at its disposal and was given relative independence to deliver on its mandate, the ToR guided its operations. Also, representatives of the Ministry of Water Resources ensured that all through the process, the committee's work was in line with the ministry's specifications and the country's vision.

I think the ministry did very well in the area of consultation and consideration of stakeholders' inputs. In fact, some people said there was consultation overload (laugh)...so, the ministry did well to ensure that the process was not hijacked by stronger interests (R38, Top-level Civil Servant).

Thirdly, findings show that the consultants selected by the ministry had a healthy professional relationship with the ministry, which indicates that the two could work together amicably. The two did work together amicably until *"some disagreements emerged"* that could not be resolved (R31, Consultant). As a result, the appointment of the consultants was terminated by the ministry who replaced them with another set of consultants. This capacity to hire and fire possessed by the ministry was an unquestionable manifestation of the saying he who pays the piper calls the tune. Within the context of governing the policy process, it underlines the ministry's power and influence.

Fourthly, findings further show that for most part, the ministry funded the policy process especially the numerous stakeholder engagements even though *"some development partners helped in the technical areas"* (R35, Top-level Civil Servant). Based on the funding, the ministry had considerable leverage and shaped the engagements in terms of scope, level of participation, and timing.

Finally, like in all the other policies, the government reserved for itself the exclusive right to approve the policy. Specifically, the draft policy was submitted to the Federal Ministry of Water Resources who ratified the policy before seeking the approval of the Federal Executive Council, which is the cabinet of the country.

8.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter presented empirical findings from the fourth and last case study of this research, the National Water Resources Policy (NWRP). First, the chapter provided a background to the case study, highlighting national and international dimensions to the evolution of the policy.

Findings showed that respondents had a good understanding of EBP and the importance of evidence in policymaking. A few respondents expressed caution over the high hope EBP elicits, nevertheless. Although this is an interesting finding, it was not the focus of this study.

The research identified nine kinds of evidence used in the development of the NWRP with 'previous policies evidence' as the most useful evidence. The choice of 'previous policies evidence' as the most useful evidence was predicated on the fact that the NWP, which served

as the forerunner of the newly developed NWRP, provided most of the information used in policy development. Conversely, ‘media evidence’ was the least useful evidence because the media did not consider water resources issues as politically salient and as such provided very limited coverage and recommendations for the issues.

Findings also showed that the multiple evidence identified by respondents were integrated at two formal sites. These were the locations where the various inputs collected were considered for inclusion in the policy. The first site comprised the technical team established by the Ministry of Water Resources including representatives of the government, consultants, and development partners, which reviewed the old policy. The team played a significant role in the generation and harmonisation of the various forms of evidence. The second site were the zonal workshops, many of which took place in the country’s six geo-political zones and the nation’s capital. The main stakeholders that participated in the workshops were the directorate cadre in the states’ ministries in charge of water resources, and the National Water Resources Council, which is the highest policy making body in the Nigerian water sector, comprising all the state commissioners responsible for water resources in the country.

Evidence from the chapter indicated that the NWRP is an administrative policy and policymakers did not seek the inputs or approval of the federal legislators. This research holds the view that considering the far-reaching impact the policy is expected to make in the country’s water resources sector, and the plan to enact a water resource law to guide the sector, federal legislators ought to have been involved as stakeholders to iron out grey areas and solicit their support.

Lastly, findings showed that although the development of the NWRP involved a wide range of policy actors from both the public and private sectors.

The next chapter will present cross-case analysis of the major findings of the four case studies.

CHAPTER 9

CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

9.0. INTRODUCTION

The last four chapters presented the findings from the field in respect of the four policies used as case studies for this study. This chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the cases and aims to explore their similarities and dissimilarities with a view to supporting empirical conclusions. The analysis of the findings is presented within the context of the four cross-data themes adopted in the analysis of the individual policies. It is apposite to mention that the themes are part of an interrelated policymaking process and as such some overlaps will be noticed.

For ease of reference, the four case studies are presented as follows in this section:

TABLE 32: CASE STUDIES AND ACRONYMS

Case Study	Acronym used in this section
National Social Investment Programmes	NSIP
National Tax Policy	NTP
Nigerians in Diaspora Commission	NiDCOM
National Water Resources Policy	NWRP

9.1. TYPES OF EVIDENCE

The first theme addresses my first research question on the kinds of evidence used in the development of the four policies selected for this research. Importantly, although the four policies are different with disparate background stories and objectives, they share a lot of similarities in terms of the kinds of evidence used in their development. Thus, a comparable set of evidence types were anticipated and confirmed as highlighted in Table 33.

TABLE 33: TYPES OF EVIDENCE USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOUR POLICIES

Policy	Evidence								
	Research evidence	Previous policies' evidence	MDA evidence	Media evidence	Ideology evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers' evidence	Internet evidence	Local consultants' evidence	External stakeholders' evidence
NSIP	8	9	8	4	8	9	7	6	7
NIDC OM	6	9	9	7	6	9	7	9	7
NTP	5	8	6	5	7	6	7	9	-
NWRP	8	9	9	7	8	9	7	8	7
Total	27	35	32	23	29	33	28	32	21

As Table 33 highlights, the respondents identified nine types of evidence used in the development of each of the policies, except in the case of NTP where ‘external stakeholders evidence’ was not mentioned as a source of evidence by any of the respondents. For each policy, the table shows the number of participants, from a sample size of nine, that reported the use of each type of evidence in the development of that policy.

Starting with the NSIP, a review of the findings above shows that all the nine respondents reported that ‘previous policies’ evidence’ and ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ were used as evidence. Other responses are as follows: eight respondents mentioned that ‘research evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, and ‘ideology evidence’ were used; seven respondents stated that ‘internet evidence’ and ‘external stakeholders evidence’ were used; six respondents said ‘local consultants’ evidence’ was used, and four respondents reported that ‘media evidence’ was used.

As per the NiDCOM, the responses are as follows: all the nine respondents reported that ‘previous policies evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ and ‘local consultants evidence’ were used as evidence; seven respondents ‘internet evidence’, ‘media evidence’ and ‘external stakeholders evidence’. Meanwhile, six respondents mentioned that ‘research evidence’ and ‘ideology evidence’ were used as evidence.

For the NTP, the responses are as follows: all nine respondents stated that ‘local consultants evidence’ was used as evidence; eight reported that ‘previous policies evidence’ was used; seven reported that ‘ideology evidence’ and the ‘internet evidence’ were used; six mentioned that ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ and ‘MDA evidence’ provided evidence. Lastly, five respondents stated that ‘research evidence’, and ‘media evidence’ were used as evidence.

Finally, as regards the NWRP, the responses are as follows: all nine respondents mentioned that ‘previous policies evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’, and ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ were used as evidence. Eight respondents reported that ‘research evidence’, ‘ideology evidence’ and ‘local consultants evidence’ were used as evidence while seven respondents affirmed that ‘media evidence’, ‘internet evidence’, and ‘external stakeholders evidence’ were used as evidence.

A key finding in this theme is that there were a lot of commonalities in terms of respondents’ perceptions of the kinds of evidence used in the development of the four policies. At least four respondents reported that each of the nine types of evidence was used in policy development, except for the NTP where no respondent mentioned ‘external stakeholders evidence’ (this is discussed shortly).

Notwithstanding these similarities, the findings show a recognisable level of differences in respondents’ perceptions and responses. For instance, while six respondents reported that ‘ideology evidence’ served as an evidence in the development of the NiDCOM policy, three respondents did not think so. This finding was anticipated and confirmed. The reasons for this disparity include the subjective nature of the phenomenon and the difference in the positioning of the respondents. A civil servant who participated in the invitation of other stakeholders, and collated the various evidence types would have a helicopter view of the issue while a respondent who represented an interest group on the policy development committee would probably have a restricted view.

As pointed out earlier, in terms of the NTP, respondents did not mention that ‘external stakeholders evidence’ provided evidence. This is because unlike in other policies, the government did not invite or got input from ‘external stakeholders evidence’. One respondent explained that the high level of tax evasion and tax default in the country compelled the government to involve only local stakeholders to address what was considered a problem that can only be efficiently addressed with local inputs. A number of respondents considered the 3 months policy development period as being too short to enable the inclusion of ‘external stakeholders evidence’ as evidence.

Findings across the four policies demonstrated the pre-eminence of ‘previous policies evidence’ as it received the highest mention in total. In aggregate, of the 36 respondents in the whole study, 35 mentioned that ‘previous policies evidence’ was used in the development of the four policies. The evidence with the second highest aggregate mention was ‘residual

knowledge of policymakers evidence’ (33) jointly followed by ‘local consultants evidence’ and ‘MDA evidence’ with 32 each. Others include: ‘ideology evidence’ (29), ‘internet evidence’(28), and ‘research evidence’ (27).

At the bottom, ‘external stakeholders evidence’ received the least aggregate mention, closely followed by ‘media evidence’. Whereas 21 respondents mentioned the former, the latter was mentioned by 23 respondents. The ‘external stakeholders evidence’ had the least aggregate mention because it was not used as an evidence in the development of the NTP.

When considering the types of evidence used in the development of the four policies examined in this study, it has emerged that all the nine kinds of evidence were used by the respondents. Indeed, it was found through the interviews that except for the NTP, where eight types of evidence were used, all the nine types of evidence were used in the development of the other three policies. Notably, while differences in perception existed in terms of the kinds of evidence respondents felt were used in the development of each policy as shown by the non-mention of some evidence types by some respondents, what is not in contention is the fact that all the respondents considered the use of multiple evidence as non-negotiable and wondered how policies could be developed otherwise. Thus, considering the four policies chosen for this study represent the two broad policy types in Nigeria, it is logical to assert that policies in Nigeria are developed with most or all of these nine types of evidence.

9.2. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

Like in the previous theme, there are a number of similarities and differences regarding respondents’ perceptions of the importance they attached to the different kinds of evidence used in the development of the four policies.

One prominent similarity is that all the respondents recognised that although all evidence types are useful, some are more useful than others. Their perceptions of the relative usefulness of each type of evidence are, however, different in some instances in a remarkable way. Take for instance respondents’ rankings of the nine types of evidence used in the development of the NSIP. Seven of the nine respondents mentioned ‘ideology evidence’ as the most important evidence, one respondent believed it did not serve as an evidence while the remaining one considered it the least useful evidence ranking it ninth which translates into the lowest score of one point. He justified his ranking by explaining that Nigeria does not “*implement ideology*”

and although ‘ideology evidence’ could have been “*politically said...it was not a major driver of the (NSIP) policy*” (R7, University Professor).

He, however, admitted that the APC “*campaign was strong on*” the social protection of vulnerable Nigerians which means the party ideology actually served as an evidence. His decision to view ‘ideology evidence’ as the least useful evidence might have been influenced by a historical bias where policies of previous governments were not known to be ideologically driven. Thus, context and the orientation of respondents influenced their perception leading to an interesting aggregate of respondents’ views as captured in Tables 34, 35, 36, and 37.

TABLE 34: AGGREGATE RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NSIP

	NSIP								
	Ideology evidence	Previous policies’ evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence	MDA evidence	External stakeholders’ evidence	Research evidence	Local consultants’ evidence	Internet evidence	Media evidence
Total Score	64	59	55	47	43	39	33	21	15
Ranking	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th	8 th	9 th

Table 34 shows that in the development of the NSIP, the nine respondents, on aggregate, considered ‘ideology evidence’ as the most useful evidence with a total score of 64, followed by ‘previous policies evidence’ having a total score of 59. Findings also show that respondents ranked ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ as the third most useful evidence (55 total score); ‘MDA evidence’ was ranked fourth (47 total score); ‘external stakeholders evidence’ was fifth (43 total score) and ‘research evidence’ as sixth (39 total score). The remaining ones are: ‘local consultants evidence’ was ranked seventh (33 total score), ‘internet evidence’ was ranked eighth (21 total score), and finally, ‘media evidence’ was ninth with a total score of 15.

TABLE 35: AGGREGATE RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIDCOM

	NIDCOM								
	MDA evidence	Previous policies’ evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence	Local consultants’ evidence	Research evidence	Media evidence	Internet evidence	External stakeholders’ evidence	Ideology evidence
Total Score	63	57	53	50	42	29	28	27	25
Ranking	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th	8 th	9 th

Table 35 illustrates that in the development of the NiDCOM policy, the nine respondents, on aggregate, ranked ‘MDA evidence’ as the most useful evidence with a total score of 63. The respondents ranked the other types of evidence as follows: ‘previous policies evidence’ was second with a total score of 57; ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ was third (53 total score); ‘local consultants evidence’ was fourth (50 total score); ‘research evidence’ was fifth (42 total score); ‘media evidence’ was sixth (29 total score); and ‘internet evidence’ was seventh (28 total score). The respondents ranked ‘external stakeholders evidence’ as the second least useful evidence with a total score of 27 and ranked ‘ideology evidence’ as the least useful evidence with a total score of 25.

TABLE 36: AGGREGATE RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NTP

	NTP							
	Local consultants’ evidence	Previous policies’ evidence	Ideology evidence	Internet evidence	MDA evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence	Media evidence	Research evidence
Total Score	56	50	38	37	29	26	20	15
Ranking	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th	8 th

As shown by Table 36, the nine respondents, on aggregate, believed ‘local consultants evidence’ was the most useful evidence in the development of the NTP, having a total score of 56. This is followed by ‘previous policies evidence’ which has a total score of 50 and ‘ideology evidence’ with a total score of 38. Further, the respondents ranked ‘internet evidence’ as the fourth most useful evidence (37 total score), and ‘MDA evidence’ as the fifth (29 total score). The other types of evidence, as ranked by the respondents are: ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ was ranked sixth (26 total score); ‘media evidence’ was ranked seventh (20 total score); and lastly ‘research evidence’, ranked eighth with a total score of 15.

TABLE 37: AGGREGATE RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NWRP

	NWRP								
	Previous policies’ evidence	MDA evidence	Residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence	Research evidence	Ideology evidence	Local consultants’ evidence	External stakeholders’ evidence	Internet evidence	Media evidence
Total Score	74	58	52	52	42	39	30	28	17
Ranking	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	3 rd	4 th	5 th	6 th	7 th	8 th

Finally, Table 37 shows that the nine respondents, on aggregate, viewed ‘previous policies evidence’ as the most useful evidence in the development of the NWRP with a total score of 74 and ‘media evidence’ as the least useful evidence, ranked eighth with a total score of 17. In between the two, they ranked ‘MDA evidence’ as the second most useful evidence (58 total score); ‘research evidence’ and ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ as the joint third most useful evidence (52 total score) and ‘ideology evidence’ as the fourth most useful evidence (42 total score). The others are: ‘local consultants evidence’ ranked fifth (39 total score); ‘external stakeholders evidence’ ranked sixth (39 total score); and ‘internet evidence’ ranked seventh (28 total score).

Thus, a major finding is that respondents’ perceptions of the relative usefulness of the various kinds of evidence differ significantly. To buttress, there existed no commonality in what respondents, on aggregate, considered the most useful evidence across the policies. For instance, using the aggregate figures, respondents for the NSIP, ranked ‘ideology evidence’ as the most useful evidence. Their counterparts for the NTP, reserved that status for ‘local consultants evidence’. Meanwhile, NiDCOM respondents believed ‘MDA evidence’ trumped other types of evidence. Lastly, respondents for the NWRP viewed ‘previous policies evidence’ as the most useful evidence.

Respondents’ thoughts on the least useful evidence across the policies are not any different. Whereas respondents for the NSIP, on aggregate, believed ‘media evidence’ was the least useful evidence, respondents for the NTP felt ‘research evidence’ was the least useful evidence. As per NiDCOM, ‘ideology evidence’ was seen by respondents as the least useful evidence while respondents for the NWRP ranked ‘media evidence’ as the least useful evidence. Thus, as far as the respondents’ rankings for the most useful and least useful evidence are concerned, there is consistency in only one area which is the ranking of ‘media evidence’ as the least useful evidence by the respondents for the NSIP and the NWRP.

To estimate the relative usefulness of the nine types of evidence across the four policies, I have aggregated the total score for each evidence (based on respondents’ ranking) as presented in Table 38.

TABLE 38: TOTAL RESPONDENTS' VIEW FOR THE FOUR POLICIES

	Case Studies					
	NSIP	NIDCOM	NTP	NWRP	GRAND TOTAL	Position
Previous policies evidence	59	57	50	74	240	1st
MDA evidence	47	63	29	58	197	2nd
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	55	53	26	52	186	3rd
Local consultants evidence	33	50	56	39	178	4th
Ideology evidence	64	25	38	42	169	5th
Research evidence	39	42	15	52	148	6th
Internet evidence	21	28	37	28	114	7th
External stakeholders evidence	43	27	-	30	100	8th
Media evidence	15	29	20	17	81	9th

As outlined in Table 38, ‘previous policies evidence’ has the highest total score suggesting that it was, on aggregate, the most useful evidence across the four policies examined in this study. The majority of respondents believed ‘previous policies evidence’ represents the foundation of the policies they participated in developing and it provided them with baseline resources to build on.

A synthesis of the respondents’ responses on this variable shows that the success and (mostly) the failure of previous policies provided invaluable learning points to the respondents in the development of new policies. For example, in the cash transfers component of the NSIP, the “*weaknesses and strengths...(of) about twenty-six*” previous policies were studied aimed to “*build on the strengths and address the weaknesses*” of the said policies (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). As per the extant NTP, respondents mentioned that the poor stakeholder consultation conducted for the development of the previous NTP motivated the incorporation of many new players. For some respondents, however, it was simply a matter of policy pragmatism:

“...as is traditional in policymaking, where you have an old policy, it should be the first ...and most useful source of evidence” (R31, Consultant).

Discussions with the respondents conclusively shows that they placed a high premium on previous policies owing to their inherent learning capabilities and the depth of legacy information they possess. In terms of learning, respondents leveraged policy successes and learnt lessons from policy failures to avoid recurrence. To most of the respondents, previous policies are the most strategic and convenient types of evidence in policy development.

In contrast, the respondents, on aggregate, considered ‘media evidence’ as the least useful evidence. Their reasons are for the most part closely relates to the ‘media evidence’ being more sensational than objective in their reportage, making their input less welcome. In fact, some respondents were of the view that media organisations in Nigeria “*discredits everything for whatever reason*” (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive), likening it to throwing away the baby with the bath water.

It was unmistakable from the interviews that most of the respondents had a negative view of the influence of media evidence. A number of them clearly mentioned that they were reluctant to use information from the media as useful evidence for policymaking because the media were mostly sensational and speculative without providing alternatives for consideration. Some other respondents felt the reason for this is because the media were more concerned about attracting readers’ patronage for profit than positive policy outcomes. Within the context of the findings of this study, the media in many ways, is seen as less useful and even unhelpful to most of the policymakers.

Returning to the total score presented in Table 38, the relative usefulness of the other kinds of evidence are as follows: ‘MDA evidence’ (2nd), ‘residual knowledge of policymakers evidence’ (3rd), ‘local consultants evidence’ (4th), ‘ideology evidence’ (5th), ‘research evidence’ (6th), ‘internet evidence’ (7th), ‘external stakeholders evidence’ (8th).

Consequently, I have developed an empirical hierarchy of evidence to show the “usefulness” of each evidence, in descending order, as illustrated in Figure 8.



FIGURE 8: AN EMPIRICAL HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE ENTIRE STUDY BASED ON RESPONDENTS' VIEWS

9.3. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE

A notable feature of all four policies is that although they are public policies, they were developed through continuous collaboration between numerous state and non-state actors. The collaboration involved consultation, discussions, iteration, and integration of the different evidence types. A summary of the key players that participated in the development of the policies is presented in Table 39.

TABLE 39: KEY PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICIES

	NSIP	NiDCOM	NTP	NWRP
Key participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Office of the Vice President of Nigeria ● Federal legislators ● MDAs ● National Union of Teachers ● The Governors' Forum ● UNICEF ● World Bank ● Local consultants ● EU ● Targeted audience (the poor) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation ● Federal legislators ● MDAs ● Civil Society Organisations ● Directorate of Technical Aid Corps in Africa ● National Assembly Policy Analysis and Research Project ● Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation ● The International Organisation on Migration ● Local consultants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Professional accountant firms ● Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria ● Organised private sector ● Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria ● Federal Ministry of Finance ● Federal Inland Revenue Service ● Local consultants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Local consultant ● EU ● MDAs ● Civil Society Organisations ● UNICEF ● National Water Resources Council

The table above shows that a wide range of players, representing different interests within the public and private sectors participated in the development of the policies.

A key similarity across all the policies is the participation of two stakeholders across all the policies suggesting their importance in policymaking in Nigeria. The first one, the MDAs, are anticipated and confirmed based on their mandatory responsibility of public policy formulation and implementation. Their participation is, therefore, to add value to the policies, enhance policies' alignment, facilitate implementation, and most importantly present the position of the government. Indeed, the development of each policy required the involvement of ministries and agencies that were relevant to the policy being developed. For instance, in the case of NSIP, which was mainly to empower deserving citizens through conditional cash transfer, vocational training, or paid work placement as teachers, agriculturalists, social welfare workers, health workers, and the rest, the federal ministries of education, agriculture, health, labour and employment, and a host of related departments and agencies participated.

The second stakeholder group that participated in the development of all the policies was the local consultants. In terms of the NWRP, respondents confirmed that the first draft of the NWRP was developed by consultants. Also, the NTP was not only driven by local consultants,

but respondents agreed that they (the local consultants) played the most significant role among all the stakeholder groups in policy development. Similarly, respondents reported that local consultants drove the review of the NSIP when the government faced some teething implementation challenges. Regarding the NiDCOM, although the role of local consultants was not as influential as the other three policies, they participated actively, nevertheless.

As the findings demonstrate, three of the four policies had external participants with the NTP being the odd one. None of the respondents mentioned external participants as a kind of evidence because as the respondents revealed, there was neither external influence nor support in the development of the policy.

One key difference across the policies was that federal legislators, especially the relevant legislative committees, participated in the development of the two legislative policies (NSIP and NiDCOM) in fulfilment of their constitutional responsibilities but not in the development of the administrative policies (NTP and NWRP). In the same vein, stakeholders' participation as outlined in Table 39 shows that the participation of stakeholders was based on their relevance to the policy domain under reference. For instance, the National Union of Teachers, the only trade organisation that participated in the development of any of the policies was involved in the development of the job creation component under the NSIP because their expertise was needed in respect of the plan to deploy graduates as teachers in secondary schools. The participation of the National Water Resources Council in the development of the NWRP, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria in the development of the NTP, and the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps in Africa in the development of NiDCOM was all based on their relevance hence the lack of uniformity in stakeholders' participation.

In terms of the integration of the different kinds of evidence into the policy process, findings indicate a high degree of similarity as presented in Table 40.

TABLE 40: EVIDENCE INTEGRATION SITES

EVIDENCE INTEGRATION SITES	NSIP	NiDCOM	NTP	NWRP
	1. Inter-ministerial steering committee	1. Inter-ministerial committee (that developed the NMP, the precursor of the NiDCOM)	1. Technical committee	1. Technical committee
	2. Stakeholder workshops and meetings	2. Technical/ advisory committee	2. Stakeholder meetings/ ‘town hall meetings’	2. Stakeholder meetings/ “zonal workshops”
	3. The legislature	3. The legislature		

As the findings show, a key similarity across the policies is that all the policies were either wholly or significantly developed by advisory committees. Notably, two of the policies, the NTP, and the NWRP were developed by technical committees while for the NSIP, the policy proposal was developed by an inter-ministerial committee. As per the NiDCOM policy, its precursor, the National Migration Policy (NMP), was developed by an inter-ministerial committee. It was found that the NiDCOM policy draws substantially from the NMP. Also, the draft NiDCOM Bill was reviewed by a technical committee that “*worked diligently on the NiDCOM Bill*” (R17, Legislator). This means that the committees not only served as providers of evidence but as aggregators of evidence as well. Within the context of the integration variable, the functions of the committees include the examination of the multiple types of evidence obtained to “*make a judgment as to their suitability*” (R17, Legislator).

Findings also show that the technical committees operated as advisory committee. Two respondents used the words “advice” and “advising” respectively to describe the responsibilities of the technical committees to the government. A number of respondents confirmed this position.

Another key similarity is that except for the NiDCOM policy, the other three policies involved the integration of evidence at sub-national levels. Indeed, findings indicate that stakeholder workshops and meetings were held in the country’s six geo-political zones for the development of the NTP, the NWRP, and the NSIP. For the NSIP, respondents reported that such workshops were held more frequently across the country. Respondents affirmed that the workshops provided avenues for the generation and integration of multiple pieces of evidence from a wide

range of individuals and groups. The odd policy is the NiDCOM policy where there was no evidence of either generation or integration of evidence at the sub-national levels.

As regards the legislature, it was expected and confirmed that the two legislative policies (NSIP and NiDCOM) were subjected to legislative interventions at different periods of their development. Both the Senate and House of Representatives had committees on poverty alleviation and diaspora matters for the development of NSIP and NiDCOM, respectively. For the two policies, the integration, therefore, occurred in plenaries, but mostly, in the relevant committees on the floors of the houses where competing types of evidence were presented and evaluated. Discussions in both houses, for both policies, involved a whole gamut of issues, particularly issues relating to funding, equity, structures, and sustainability.

9.4. GOVERNING THE POLICY PROCESS

As the findings indicate, the government's steering capacity was a prominent feature in the development of the four policies. Generally, the government steered the policy processes in similar ways which is anticipated considering the tendency for a government to use the same policy style and because the policies were developed within a comparable time frame. Notwithstanding, there are a few areas of notable dissimilarities in the way the government steered the process.

One of the key similarities across the four policies is that they were all developed wholly or partly by committees established by the government. The establishment of the committees by the government indicates that the government is influential. Additionally, findings show that the government set the ground rules for the committees, including the use of 'terms of references' to guide deliberations. These two points suggest some degree of hierarchical imposition in support of a strong steering capacity of the government.

Building on these similarities, the government, in all cases, was able to determine who served on the policy development committees and whose contributions were sought outside the committees. There is ample evidence of the government inviting individuals and organisations that they had prior relationships with to either be part of the committees or to participate as critical stakeholders in the policy process. Evidence also shows that the government chose the leadership of the committees.

Importantly, a key difference is identified regarding the leadership of the committees. Whereas two of the committees (for the NTP and the NWRP) were led by members of the private sector, the NSIP was headed by an elected public officer. For the NiDCOM policy, the inter-ministerial committee that developed the NMP, the precursor of the NSIP, was headed by a public servant, while the technical committee that reviewed the draft NiDCOM Bill was headed by a member of the private sector. A significant number of the respondents believed the power to choose the leadership of these committees gives the government significant influence.

Another common feature across the committees is that they offered technical knowledge to the government, often beyond what the government possessed. This point resonates with several respondents across the policies. They suggested that the committees added significant value to the policy process which is the key reason why the government patronised them. Across the policies, there are, however, a few respondents who, while not undermining the contributions of the committees, suggested that the contributions of the committees, and indeed all stakeholders, were only useful if they strengthened the government's pre-determined policy preferences. Beyond that, however, respondents alluded to the committees and the larger stakeholders enhancing the legitimacy and acceptability of policies.

It is found that the government was largely responsible for funding the entire policy development process, especially the various stakeholder consultations. This suggests the likelihood of governmental influence in the policy process. Findings indicate, however, that some international development partners offered technical support in the development of the NSIP and NWRP. This finding may suggest that the development partners may have had some modicum of influence in the policy process.

Another key similarity across the policies is that the government was the final approving authority regardless of the dynamics of the policy development. In that regard, the committees submitted draft policies to the government for consideration. Respondents suggested that even where the government conceded some authority to private sector actors, the ultimate power to approve a proposal resided with the government.

The findings under this variable have significant implications within the context of the government's steering capacity. It demonstrates, in support of the arguments espoused by state-

centric relational scholars, that although numerous private sector players were involved in the development of the four policies examined in this study, the government still remained by far the most influential player in the policy process. Invariably, the findings contradict, in important ways, the state-centric account of policymaking, which privileges a hierarchical policymaking process, and the society-centred account which argues that in policymaking, governments have been substantially marginalised by the private sector actors.

9.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter presented a cross-case analysis of key findings on the four policies examined in this study. The analysis has shown that there are more similarities than differences in many perspectives of the policies which is not surprising considering that the policies were developed by the same government and within a comparable time frame. Notwithstanding, the analysis demonstrates some interesting dissimilarities. The key findings that emerged from the analysis are presented in the following paragraphs.

All the nine types of evidence jointly provided by the researcher and respondents were used in the development of each of the policies, except the NTP where ‘external stakeholders evidence’ was not used. This means for the NTP, eight types of evidence were identified. Despite these similarities, a reasonable level of disparity was found in respondents’ perceptions of the kinds of evidence used. To illustrate, while six respondents reported that ‘ideology evidence’ served as an evidence in the development of the NiDCOM policy, three respondents felt they were not used. On aggregate, ‘previous policies evidence’ was returned as the most frequently used evidence (35 of the 36 respondents mentioned it as used across the four policies). In contrast, ‘external stakeholders evidence’ has the least aggregate mention (with 21 out of 36 mentions) largely because it was not used as evidence in the development of the NTP.

In terms of the hierarchy of evidence, the different kinds of evidence had different weights as far as their relative usefulness is concerned. In other words, even though all the evidence types are useful, some are more useful. The findings show that ‘previous policies evidence’ was also considered as the most useful evidence in the development of the four policies investigated, whereas ‘media evidence’ was seen as the least useful evidence.

Regarding the integration of evidence, three integration sites were identified as follows: technical/advisory committees, the legislature, and stakeholder meetings otherwise referred to as either “town hall meetings” or “zonal workshops”. It was found that in the development of each policy, at least two of the three sites were used to integrate evidence. Interestingly, all the policies were either fully or partly developed by committees, bringing to the fore the importance of committees in policy development in Nigeria. The legislature was found, as anticipated, to have participated in the integration of evidence regarding only the two legislative policies (NSIP and NiDCOM) in plenary and in the relevant house committees consistent with their statutory responsibilities. Further, the integration of evidence also took place across the country’s six geo-political zones except in the case of the NiDCOM.

Finally, the findings show that the government had a significant capacity to steer the policymaking process in respect of the four policies. Broadly speaking, the government was able to achieve that in four ways. First, the government established the technical/advisory committees and chose the leadership of the committees. There was evidence to suggest that some of the stakeholders the government invited were ‘friends’ with the government, with a likelihood that they would not be antagonistic to the government’s vision. Second, it set the ground rules to guide the policymaking process by issuing ‘terms of references’ to the committees. There was no evidence to show that the committees or other stakeholders went contrary to the terms. Third, although some international development partners offered technical support in the development of the NSIP and NWRP, the government was largely responsible for financing the policy development process especially the numerous stakeholder consultations. Fourth, the government was responsible for approving the draft policy irrespective of the policy development arrangement in place. As a result, the government was able to amend or refine some part of the policies being developed. Should it desire to reject an entire policy, the government, indeed, had the power to do so. This, alongside the other points on the government’s steering capacity, means that the government’s steering capacity in the development of policies in Nigeria is alive and well.

The next chapter presents a discussion of the cross-case analysis within the context of existing literature.

CHAPTER 10

DISCUSSION

10.0 INTRODUCTION

The last chapter presented a cross-case analysis of findings for the four policies, highlighting their similarities and dissimilarities. This chapter discusses the findings and evaluates how they fit in with existing knowledge on the topic. The discussion is presented in line with the four cross-data themes adopted in the analysis of the individual case studies.

10.1. GENERALISATION OF FINDINGS

This study is built on the premise that the multiple case study approach, on account of its engagement with more cases, engenders better knowledge of a phenomenon and improves the theory-building capability of research (Bryman and Bell, 2015; O’Leary, 2014; Yin, 2014). However, we must also recognise the limitations imposed by the subjective and largely context-dependent responses of the respondents. Our objective (in this chapter) is to summarise the key themes emerging from the cases to facilitate understanding of our findings and present some hypotheses regarding their generalisability.

Thus, my “goal is not to produce a standardised set of results that any careful researcher in the same situation or studying the same issue would have produced” Schofield (2000, p.71). Instead, it is to simplify a complex phenomenon by describing the four cases in “sufficient descriptive narrative so that readers can vicariously...draw their own conclusions” which may not be the same as mine (Stake, 1994, p.243).

10.2. TYPES OF EVIDENCE

Existing literature on what constitutes evidence in policymaking is varied (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Head, 2008, 2010; Kay, 2011; Maddison 2012; Parkhurst, 2017). The dominant perspective espouses that evidence means research-based knowledge obtained through systematic research (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Head, 2010; Kay, 2011). In other words, it is scientific and recognises only empirical data that is replicable. Proponents of this narrow characterisation of evidence disavow non-scientific evidence such as stakeholder inputs or residual knowledge of policymakers (Greenhalgh and Russell 2009; Kay 2011; Oakley 2002).

Opponents of this narrow definition of evidence, however, assert that in addition to research-based knowledge, evidence in the policy context encompasses the views and values of stakeholders, debates, and the prevailing political dynamics (Greenhalgh and Russell 2009; Head 2008; Maddison 2012). Accordingly, evidence comes from “politics, judgement and debate” instead of “being deduced from empirical analysis” (Head 2008 p.1). The two positions highlighted above demonstrates conclusively that the determination of what is evidence is contested. The findings of this research underline the contested nature of evidence as differences exist in respondents’ responses regarding the kinds of evidence used in the development of the policies examined in this research.

A key finding in this theme is that nine kinds of evidence, comprised of research evidence, previous policies’ evidence, MDA evidence, media evidence, ideology evidence, residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence, internet evidence, local consultants’ evidence, and external stakeholders’ evidence, were used in the development of three policies (NSIP, NIDCOM, NWRP). On the other hand, eight of the nine types of evidence, excluding external stakeholders’ evidence, were used in the development of the other policy (NTP).

These findings have opposite implications for the two perspectives of evidence. It is incongruent with the dominant school of thought that advocates that research evidence should be the only kind of evidence to drive policy. Granted that research evidence was part of the nine types of evidence used in the development of the four policies, it was not the only evidence type used. In fact, as we have seen in the cross-case analysis chapter of this study, on average, respondents consider research evidence as the 6th most useful evidence, suggesting the relative importance policymakers attach to it. In specific terms, these findings go against the recommendation of positivist theorists such as Oakley (1998) and Slavin (2004) that scientific experimentation should be the standard in social policymaking.

On the other hand, the findings align with the minority notion that evidence should come from different sources. Thus, the variety of evidence sources used in the development of the four policies of this study is congruent with the claim of the interpretivist scholars. It is worth noting that the findings are also congruent with the prescription of the UK Cabinet Office Strategic Policy Making Team (SPMT) which is used for comparison based on its experience in policy praxis. The SPMT itemises nine types of evidence in use in the UK public sector as presented in Table 41.

TABLE 41: SPMT'S HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

S/N	Types of Evidence
1	Expert knowledge
2	published research
3	existing statistics
4	stakeholder consultations
5	previous policy evaluations
6	the Internet;
7	outcomes from consultations
8	costings of policy options
9	output from economic and statistical modelling

Source: Nutley et al., 2002

It is interesting to note that nine types of evidence are identified by SPMT, the same number that is identified in this study. Beyond this, however, the similarities between the two sets of evidence are limited. The highlight of the similarities is that there are two kinds of evidence that are clearly like for like - previous policies, and the internet. This suggests the two are recognised as evidence in both the Nigerian and the UK public services. Notably, some of the evidence types proposed by the SPMT and the ones used in this study bear a close resemblance. For example, “published research” (as per SPMT) approximates ‘research evidence’ (as per this study), the key difference being that the former requires research to be published to qualify as evidence while in the case of this study, research needs to be conducted purposely to address an identified policy problem. Also, SPMT’s “expert knowledge” seems to encompass this study’s ‘local consultants evidence’ and “Residual knowledge of policymakers’ evidence. It is observed that the SPMT’s “stakeholder consultations” is extensive because it is meant to cover engagements with all stakeholders whereas this study disaggregates stakeholders into two clusters, namely, the media, and external stakeholders. While SPMT’s categorisation is convenient, it blurs the nature and influence of the different kinds of stakeholders in the policy process.

Incongruities are, however, observed in two types of evidence adopted for this study – ‘MDA evidence’, and ‘ideology evidence’ - which are not part of the evidence types identified by SPMT. By the same token, “existing statistics”, “outcomes from consultations”, “costings of policy options”, and “output from economic and statistical modelling” are not among the types

of evidence adopted for this study. These evidence types are, however, not as disparate as their labels suggest. Indeed, on a closer scrutiny, most of them share similar features with some of the evidence types adopted for this study.

For instance, considering the policy capacity of the UK civil service (Head, 2014) and the huge amount of data in its possession (Stevens, 2010), it is reasonable to believe that the four SPMT evidence types: “existing statistics”, “outcomes from consultations”, “costings of policy options”, and “output from economic and statistical modelling” are provided or collated by the civil servants in the UK. Flowing from this assumption, one can see further similarities between the four types of evidence as per SPMT and this study’s ‘MDA evidence’.

The absence of ‘ideology evidence’ in the SPMT listing, however, remains. Remarkably, this evidence is identified by Phil Davies, the former Deputy Chief Social Researcher in the UK (Nutley et al., 2013). Within the frame of this study, the ideology of a government or its manifesto is presented as a source of evidence. This is because policymakers are sometimes inspired by, and get policy information from, what the government promises the citizens during campaigns, the government’s communication with citizens, or the political beliefs of the government in power.

In all, there are a number of similarities and differences between the types of evidence adopted for this study and the ones identified by SPMT as shown in Table 42

TABLE 42: COMPARING THE EVIDENCE: CURRENT RESEARCH VS. SPMT

	Current Research	SPMT
Exact evidence types	1. Previous policies evidence	1. Previous policy evaluations
	2. Internet evidence	2. Internet
Similar evidence types	3. Research evidence	3. Published research
	4. Local Consultants evidence	4. Expert knowledge
	5. Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	
	6. External stakeholders evidence	5. Stakeholder consultations
	7. Media evidence	
	8. MDA evidence	6. Existing statistics 7. Outcomes from consultations 8. costings of policy options 9. Output from economic and statistical modelling
Different evidence types	9. Ideology evidence	

Regarding policymaking in Nigeria, the findings of multiple types of evidence are incongruent with the prevailing notion that policymaking in Nigeria is not based on evidence but instead on the whims of policymakers, particularly the elites (Ayuk and Marouani, 2007; El-Rufai, 2013; Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021; Ibrahim, 2004; Usman, 2004; Sanni et.al, 2016). Curiously, the findings do not fit in with the views of past Directors General of the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER), a foremost policy think tank in Nigeria, who in 2010 expressed displeasure over the non-utilisation of evidence, especially research evidence, in policymaking in the Nigerian public sector (Yagboyaju, 2019).

In more specific terms, the empirical findings are contrary to the sentiments expressed by many policy theorists and practitioners who claim policymaking in Nigeria is anything but evidence-based. As a result, they have described the country's policymaking in pejorative terms: "self-centred" (El-Rufai, 2013, p.323), a "smokescreen" (Usman, 2004, p.108), "hit and run" (Yagboyaju, 2019, p.5) and developed by a "Dream Team" – a metaphor for a few members of the elite (Ibrahim, 2004, p.19). On account of the use of research knowledge as evidence in this study, the findings are also contrary to Sesan and Siyanbola's view that the lack of policy

structures in the country means the utilisation of research knowledge in policy formulation is dependent on “individual ‘champions’” (2021, p.9).

The findings are, however, congruent with a burgeoning minority view that advocates that policymaking in Nigeria is done using multiple types of evidence. To illustrate, Onwujekwe et.al (2021) identified seven types of evidence used in the development of urban development policies in Nigeria, namely, policy evaluation, lessons from other countries, previous policies, situation analysis, literature review, theoretical knowledge, and policy evaluation.

Additionally, this study’s findings highlight empirical congruency with the findings of Akinbinu, and Tiamiyu (2016) that civil servants in Nigeria used numerous types of evidence to develop policies across different domains. The scholars identified 14 types of evidence: internal files and documents, academic books, colleagues or superiors, the internet, newspapers, government publications/annual reports, academic journals, research reports, committees, research libraries, indexes, researchers in the universities/polytechnics, researchers in research institutes, and students’ thesis and dissertations. Notably, there are some notable similarities between the evidence types they identified and those adopted for this study with two, the internet and newspapers (media), being alike. Others are not alike but bear some resemblance. In this category, there are government publications, research reports, academic journals, research libraries, researchers in the universities/polytechnics, researchers in research institutes, and students’ theses and dissertations which could be collapsed into ‘research evidence’ as used in this study.

Also, internal files and documents could be closely related to ‘previous policies evidence’ as used in this study because previous policies and the processes that birth them are usually documented and stored in internal files. Government publications could also fit with the ‘previous policies evidence’ used in this study. Furthermore, colleagues or superiors could be considered as part of ‘MDA evidence’ (as per this study) since Akinbinu, and Tiamiyu’s (2016) participants are civil servants. It may, however, be more useful to see ‘MDA evidence’ as a distinct type of evidence considering the significant impact it had on the four policies used for this study and the fact that it was a well-structured and deliberate type of evidence representing the official position of a ministry, department or an agency unlike the personal input of some random “colleagues or superiors”. The findings are also congruent with the following specific evidence types identified in Onwujekwe et al., (2015) relating to the development of health

policies in Nigeria: previous policies, research evidence, consultants' evidence, and policymakers' opinions and experiences.

A further empirical congruency is found in Sanni et al. (2016). Their study identified eight kinds of evidence employed by Nigerian federal and state lawmakers in the discharge of their policymaking functions. The eight types of evidence comprised expert opinion, the internet, evidence from seminars, newsletters, policy briefs, academic journals, public opinion polls, and legislative resolutions. One important dimension worthy of note is that the evidence classification by Sanni et al. (2016) is well-structured and deals with policy development at both the federal and the state level unlike Akinbinu, and Tiamiyu (2016) that focuses entirely on policy development at the state level. These characteristics, thus, make it a better fit from a comparative point of view.

TABLE 43: COMPARING THE EVIDENCE: CURRENT RESEARCH VS. SANNI ET AL., (2016)

	Current Research	Sanni, et al., (2016)
Exact evidence types	1.Internet evidence	1.Internet
Similar evidence types	2.Media evidence	2.Public opinion polls
	3.Local consultants evidence	3.Expert opinion
	4.Research evidence	4.Academic journals
Different evidence types	5.Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence 6.Previous policies evidence 7.MDA evidence 8.Ideology evidence 9.External stakeholders evidence	5.Seminars 6.Newsletters 7.Policy brief 8.Legislative resolutions

As seen in Table 43 above, the two sets of evidence are exact in only one area, the internet evidence. They are, however, similar in three other areas notwithstanding the differences in nomenclature: media (public opinion polls), local consultants (expert opinion), and research findings (academic journals). For instance, the media encompasses the entire gamut of contents including editorials, news item and public opinion polls so to that extent, public opinion polls as used in Sanni et al., (2016) is a subset of the 'media' as used in this study. Also, expert opinion (as per Sanni et al., 2016) seems like an omnibus type of evidence that could comprise

many stakeholders including civil servants, academics, and consultants (Meling, 2022). Thus, under this premise, MDAs, local consultants, and even external stakeholders as used in this study could conveniently be called experts, further showing a similarity between the two sets of evidence. Finally, research findings in the current study can be compared with academic journals as Sanni per et al. (2016) even though as regards the contextualisation in this study, ‘research evidence’ refers to only research conducted for the purpose of developing a particular policy.

Additionally, seminars as used in Sanni et al. (2016) are closely related to the workshops and other stakeholder engagements used to generate and integrate evidence as found in this study. Similarly, newsletters as periodic bulletin to share relevant information to members of an organisation (legislators in this case) can be seen as part of the media as used in this study. There also exists a relationship between policy briefs and previous policies to the extent that to prepare a brief, government officials often articulate a ‘problem definition’ highlighting the weaknesses of existing policies.

Ideology evidence was, however, not identified in Sanni et al. (2016) as a type of evidence in Nigeria even though the current study identifies it. Akinbinu, and Tiamiyu’s (2016) empirical study also fails to accord ideology evidence such recognition. Other studies located in Nigeria such as Onwujekwe et al., (2015) fail to mention ‘ideology evidence’ as an evidence used in policymaking in Nigeria. The current study, however, agrees with Phil Davies, the former Deputy Chief Social Researcher in the UK who mentioned it as a type of evidence in the UK (Nutley et al., 2013). Majority of the respondents mentioned that ‘ideology evidence’ is a critical factor in policymaking in Nigeria, with a number of them claiming that it is the most useful type of evidence, where it exists. Some even suggest that policymakers routinely use the government’s “body language” as an evidence.

Another type of evidence that has emerged from this study which previous empirical studies do not adequately characterise as such is ‘local consultants evidence’. A review of the literature suggest that scholars subsume ‘local consultants evidence’ into ‘expert evidence’, ‘expert opinion’ or similar sounding concepts which weakens its centrality and impact on policymaking. In this regard, a tranche of the literature advocates that ‘local consultants evidence’ could comprise inputs from academics, civil servants, and consultants (Meling, 2022). Notwithstanding, the significant and fast-growing contributions of consultants to the

four policies of this study suggest the need for ‘local consultants evidence’ to be recognised as a distinct type of evidence in the literature (Gunter et al., 2015; Lapsley et al., 2013).

Also, although theorists and practitioners have espoused that foreign influence impacts policymaking in Nigeria, empirical research on the country have not identified ‘external stakeholders evidence’ as a substantive type of evidence. For instance, Akinbinu and Tiaminu (2016) and Sanni et al., (2016), do not consider it as a type of evidence in their studies. Meanwhile, Onwujekwe et al., (2015) mentions “lessons from international experience” which exclusively relates to the acquisition of knowledge through policy transfer. Elsewhere, Steven (2011) highlights “various kinds of reports from abroad” as a source of evidence in the UK public service. Yet, Phil Davies (cited in Nutley et al., 2013) does not recognise it as a type of evidence.

This study, however, found evidence of an active and structured influence of external stakeholders, particularly development partners, in the development of three of the four policies under examination. The development partners did not only provide funds in support of two of the policies (NSIP and NWRP) but provided technical input, as well, indicating a deliberate effort to significantly influence the policy development. In the case of NiDCOM, the Nigerian Diaspora community actively participated in the policy development and provided significant inputs based on their experiences. As a respondent (R18, Representative, Diaspora Community) explained, the ultimate decision to establish a commission rather than a ministry to handle the diaspora issue was “favoured” by a section of the diaspora community who lobbied for it. On this note, three of the four policies had external participants with the NTP being the odd one.

A probable explanation for why external stakeholders’ evidence is rarely seen as a type of evidence is the dearth of empirical research on evidence in Nigeria. Indeed, studies on the types of evidence used in policymaking disproportionately have a Western focus. The relatively high political and economic independence these Western countries enjoy, coupled with their advanced policy capacity, make them less vulnerable to external influence in domestic policymaking. In the case of developing countries, however, theory suggests the influence of external stakeholders in domestic policy development (Ayuk and Marouani, 2007; El-Rufai, 2013; Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021). This resonates with the findings of this study which found that external stakeholders serve as a type of evidence in three of the four policies examined. Notably, respondents explained how external stakeholders provided evidence in the

development of the three policies. In the development of NSIP, a key respondent (R3, Top level Public Servant) emphasised the role played by the UNICEF and the world bank to “*guide and aid*” policy development including funding some study tours which exposed policymakers to good practices on social investment programmes. For the NiDCOM policy, the “*EU and other donors like the German government, the Swiss government*” provided input and support (R13, Top-level Civil Servant) with the EU “*funding the review*” of the NWRP (R32, Top-level Civil Servant).

Strikingly, in all the four policies, the government ensured that the primary targets provided inputs. To elaborate, the Nigerian diaspora community was actively involved in the development of the NiDCOM. In fact, a former chairman of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, North UK chapter was the chairman of the technical committee that reviewed the NiDCOM Bill prior to its passage into law. The case of the NSIP is illuminating. To get the views of the poor and the vulnerable, who were the target beneficiaries of the Conditional Cash Transfer component of the NSIP, the government visited numerous villages and other locations of the target beneficiaries to get their inputs which were recorded and utilised in the policy development.

Yet, there were a few instances where inputs and evidence seemed to have been used for political reasons only; to justify the position already favoured by the government. The most prominent case was in the development of the NiDCOM policy where findings suggested that the government had “*already taken a position*” (R 16, Civil Society) to establish an agency to address the migration issue and still called for inputs from stakeholders. Two major solutions were offered by the stakeholders: the establishment of a ministry, and the establishment of an agency. The government, therefore, used the latter option as an “ammunition” since it was “congenial and supportive” of its preference (Weiss, 1979, p.429).

Notwithstanding, it is evident from the findings under this variable that policymakers in Nigerian employ a wide range of evidence to develop public policies. For each of the policy examined in this study, findings revealed the use of multiple sources of evidence by policymakers. Notably, almost all those interviewed cited multiple forms of evidence, often five or more; and in the discussions, it was clear that they were very reluctant to make decisions without referring to multiple forms of evidence. These findings contrast with some theoretical discussions that assume that policymaking in Nigeria is devoid of the use of multiple forms of

evidence. The findings are also in contrast to the romantic notion that research evidence should be the only evidence to drive policy development. Truth is while the ‘only research’ evidence mantra is theoretically appealing; no real-world policymaker thinks you can develop a policy from only research evidence. The findings, therefore, support and build on the minority view that “a wide breath of evidence” is used in the development of public policy in Nigeria (Onwujekwe et. al 2015, p.10).

10.3. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

Existing literature proclaims that policymakers attach different levels of importance to various kinds of evidence used in policy development (Boruch and Rui, 2008; Davies, 1999; Hansen, 2014; Head, 2010; Kazi et al., 2011; Leigh, 2009; Haynes et al., 2012). The findings of this study have confirmed this view with interesting participants’ perspectives.

Findings across the four policies show that participants’ perspectives vary, often in a dramatic way, and do not follow any distinctly recognisable pattern. This situation is observed within each policy and across the four policies, reminding us of the subjective nature of respondents’ views. On aggregate, there is no commonality in what respondents considered the most useful evidence across the cases. For instance, respondents for the NSIP, ranked ‘ideology evidence’ as the most useful evidence. Their counterparts for the NTP viewed ‘local consultants evidence’ as the most useful evidence while NiDCOM, respondents believed ‘MDA evidence’ is the most useful evidence. Last but not the least, respondents viewed “previous policies evidence” as the most useful evidence in the development of the NWRP.

Respondents’ perceptions on the least useful evidence across the policies, on aggregate, are not significantly different. Whereas respondents for the NSIP believed ‘media evidence’ is the least useful evidence, respondents for the NTP reserved that title to ‘research evidence’. As per NiDCOM, ‘ideology evidence’ is seen by respondents as the least useful evidence while respondents for the NWRP felt ‘media evidence’ is the least useful evidence. Thus, as far as the respondents’ ranking for the most useful and least useful evidence is concerned, there is consistency only in the ranking of ‘media evidence’ as the least useful evidence by the NSIP and the NWRP respondents.

The inconsistency in the level of importance policymakers attached to different kinds of evidence is not a peculiar phenomenon. Rather, the finding fits in with existing knowledge on the topic to the effect that scholars and practitioners have different opinions on which evidence is the most useful and which is as least useful (Alliance for Useful Evidence, 2015; Boruch and Rui, 2008; Hansen, 2014; Haynes et al., 2012; Leigh, 2009; Nutley et al., 2013). On a whole, there are more differences than agreements in respondents' perceptions of the relative importance of the nine types of evidence for this study.

The total score of each type of evidence is tabulated below.

TABLE 44: TOTAL SCORE PER EVIDENCE

	NSIP	NiDCOM	NTP	NWRP	TOTAL
Research evidence	39	42	15	52	148
Previous policies evidence	59	57	50	74	240
MDA evidence	47	63	29	58	197
Media evidence	15	29	20	17	81
Ideology evidence	64	25	38	42	169
Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	55	53	26	52	186
Internet evidence	21	28	37	28	114
Local consultants evidence	33	50	56	39	178
external stakeholders evidence	43	27	-	30	100

I reproduce below the hierarchy of evidence showing all the respondents' perception of the relative usefulness of the nine kinds of evidence for comparison.



FIGURE 9: AN EMPHIRICAL HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE ENTIRE STUDY

10.4. COMPARING DIFFERENT HIERARCHIES

To provide more insights into the hierarchy developed from respondents' ranking, I compare it with the hierarchy of Phil Davies, former Deputy Chief Social Researcher in the UK (cited in Nutley et al., 2013) and that of Akinbinu and Tiaminu (2016) writing on Nigeria's civil service.

TABLE 45: A COMPARISON OF THE THREE HIERARCHIES OF EVIDENCE

	Current Study' s Hierarchy	Phil Davies' Hierarchy	Akinbinu and Tiaminu' s Hierarchy
1	Previous policies evidence	Expert evidence (including consultants and think tanks)	Internal files and documents
2	MDA evidence	Opinion-based evidence (including lobbyists/pressure groups)	Government publications, reports etc
3	Residual knowledge of policymakers evidence	Ideological evidence (party think tanks, manifestos)	Internet
4	Local consultants evidence	Media evidence	Colleagues or superiors
5	Ideology evidence	Internet evidence	Committee
6	Research evidence	Lay evidence (constituents' or citizens' experiences)	Research libraries
7	Internet evidence	Street evidence (urban myths, conventional wisdom)	Newspaper
8	External stakeholders evidence	Cabbies' evidence	Academic Books
9	Media evidence	Research evidence	Research reports
10			Academic journals
11			Researchers in research institutes
12			Researchers in tertiary institutes
13			Indexes
14			Students' thesis and dissertations

It is important to state upfront that each of the three views under comparison presents a mixture of common and unique evidence types. The common types, which the three views share, are internet evidence, research evidence, and media evidence (which Akinbinu and Tiaminu referred to as newspaper evidence). The unique ones are many and vary significantly. From Phil Davies' perspective, the unique evidence types are expert evidence (including consultants

and think tanks), street evidence (urban myths, conventional wisdom), opinion-based evidence (including lobbyists/pressure groups), lay evidence (constituents' or citizens' experiences), and cabbies' evidence. Akinbinu and Tiaminu on their part have government publications and reports, input of colleagues or superiors, committees, research libraries, academic books, academic journals, researchers in research institutes, researchers in tertiary institutes, indexes, and students' theses and dissertations as unique evidence types. For this study, the unique evidence types are: 'MDA evidence', 'residual knowledge of policymakers evidence', 'local consultants evidence' and 'external stakeholders evidence'.

Essentially, the way each view ranks different evidence types in terms of their usefulness offers an interesting discussion. The three views are predominantly different with no consensus across any single evidence type. Put another way, the three views are not in agreement as regards, for instance, which is the most useful evidence, which is the second, third, fourth most useful, and so on. The closest in terms of a consensus regarding the usefulness of evidence is in two areas where two views are consistent. The first one relates to Akinbinu and Tiaminu's internal files and documents vs. this study's "previous policies evidence".

Although Akinbinu and Tiaminu did not define what internal files and documents are, from my personal experience in policymaking in Nigeria, they probably mean all general files and related documents regarding a particular field of an organisation's operations including previous policies and policy development materials. With this assumption, one can say there is a similarity between this study and Akinbinu and Tiaminu that previous policies are the most useful evidence in policy development. Phil Davies, however, considered expert evidence (including consultants and think tanks) as the most useful evidence.

The other consensus is Phil Davies' view on 'research evidence' which coheres with Akinbinu and Tiaminu's research report. This means that both accounts place 'research evidence' as the ninth most useful evidence in policy development. This study, however, adjudges 'research evidence' as the sixth most useful evidence.

These findings, therefore, fit with the theory that policymakers' perceptions of the usefulness of various kinds of evidence used in policy development differ. In corollary, and as confirmed by Table 45, there is no agreement between the evidence types in this study and those of both Phil Davies and Akinbinu and Tiaminu except in one area, ('previous policies evidence' in this

study and Akinbinu and Tiaminu's "internal files and documents" after interpreting the latter to mean the former).

A plausible explanation for the difference in perception relates to context, which played a key role. A few examples are appropriate here. Take the NSIP as a case in point, respondents felt that the government ideology and party manifesto is "*the foundational basis for the programme*" (R 8, Management Consultant) and having clearly promised the people a social welfare programme during campaigns, majority of the policymakers considered government's promise as the most useful evidence. To strengthen this line of argument, this study found that the N5,000 welfare support promised by the APC political party during the campaign session was the amount approved for distribution to the poor and vulnerable under the Conditional Cash Transfer component of the programme.

Another example is that the development of the NTP was driven by local consultants at the instance of the Minister of Finance who provided them with all the support they needed. All the respondents generally believed the consultants' "*impact was great, perhaps the greatest of any demographic*" (R 21, Top-level Civil Servant). This explains why 'local consultants evidence' evidence' was generally adjudged by respondents as the most useful evidence in the development of the NTP.

In contrast, respondents viewed 'ideology evidence' as the least useful evidence in the development of NiDCOM policy because, since the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, no political party or government has made the diaspora issue a cornerstone of its programmes. As admitted by a respondent, NiDCOM has no bearing with any particular political party or government and successive Nigerian governments "*had a lukewarm attitude towards the issue of migration.*" (R13, Top-level Civil Servant).

As regards, the NWRP, respondents considered 'media evidence' as the least useful evidence in the policy development because the ministry did not consider them as a value-adding partner. According to a respondent "*in the process of formulating the policy itself, we didn't interface with the media at all*" (R35, Top-level Civil Servant).

In all, this study found that context is of utmost importance in the determination of the relative priority policymakers attach to the different kinds of evidence on offer, supporting the findings of previous studies including Onwujekwe et. al (2015) and Sesan and Siyanbola (2021).

Returning to the empirical hierarchy developed from the findings of this study, the hierarchy shows that on aggregate, “previous policies evidence” is the most useful evidence in the development of the four policies of this study. This finding lends credence to the incremental policy theory which emphasises the improvement of previous policies in the development of new ones (Anderson, 2015; Kingdon, 2014; Lindblom 1959). As the findings demonstrate, policymakers consulted and benefited from previous policies to develop all four policies of this study. In fact, one respondent stated that previous policies represented the “*first and most useful source of evidence*” (R31, Consultant) which confirms the findings of this study. Many respondents advanced a number of reasons to justify why they thought previous policies’ evidence was the most useful in policy development. The phrase ‘legacy policies’ was mentioned by some respondents in reference to how policymakers used previous policies as “*the baseline for the new policy*” (R37, Consultant). In this regard, policymakers benefit from extant thinking, principles or practices, usually arrived at after rigorous deliberations. Considering that policymakers are unendingly bounded rationally, it is easy to understand their pragmatism (Anderson, 2015).

Further, a few policymakers stated that the success of previous policies provided necessary learning points for them in terms of what to emulate. The failure of previous policies, however, provided the most learning according to many respondents. Since policy development is a response to policy failure, many respondents reported that policy failure provided an extremely useful insight into what went wrong and the lessons to be learnt to avoid recurrence. Put differently, the findings indicate that one of the key reasons respondents believed previous policies were the most useful kind of evidence was because they embody the pitfalls that policymakers wish to address. In a nutshell, in the development of the four policies the respondents considered the “progress, and setbacks experienced” in relation to the implementation of previous policies (Onwujekwe et.al 2021, 529). This thinking is supported by the arguments of policy scholars including Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Bovens, and ‘t Hart (1996) who argued that policies mostly fail because they are either not based on the right information (evidence) or they are not effectively implemented. As clearly stated by some of the respondents, their recourse to previous policies was to avoid informational deficit and

enhance policy implementation. Another perspective to the respondents' prioritisation of previous policies is the path dependence theory which stresses that history matters - policymakers are constrained by institutions to make only limited changes to existing policies hence their cautious approach to their decision-making. Within the context of the findings of this study, respondents alluded to how their behaviours aligned with the path dependence theory. For instance, in reference to their policy development responsibilities, many respondents mentioned that they were guided by the vision of the government. In fact one respondent stated that their role was not to "*re-invent the wheel*" (R13, Top-level Civil Servant), consistent with the theory.

To underscore the importance of 'previous policies evidence', an empirical study by Onwujekwe et. al (2015, 7) considered it as the third most useful evidence out of 10 forms of evidence behind "findings from national surveys" (1st), and "research publications" (2nd) in the development of three different health policies. Although the positioning of previous policies as per Onwujekwe et. al (2015) contradicts the findings of this study, the study, nevertheless, highlights the importance of previous policies in policy development in Nigeria consistent with the incremental policy theory.

The empirical hierarchy also shows that media evidence was the least useful evidence, confirming some arguments in the existing literature. For instance, Kingdon (1995) argues that the media hardly influences policy. Further to this, Irwin and Kiereini (2021) conducted an empirical study and found limited use of media evidence in policymaking in developing countries. Their study asserts that policymakers were skeptical of stories carried by the media as they tend to be sensationalistic and inaccurate even though many of the policymakers acknowledged that in some instances the media drew their attention to issues they were unaware of.

In support of this notion, a high number of the respondents were of the view that the media dwell more on what one respondent called '*juicy negative stories*' at the expense of serving as a source of evidence (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). Other respondents stated that they ignored media evidence because the media is often divided along ideological or sentimental lines such that a medium sympathetic to a particular policy will locate its reportage in a friendly frame whereas a medium that is antagonistic to the policy will do the opposite to make a policy change more likely (Crow and Lawlor, 2016).

Contrastingly, the findings are against a tranche of the literature that proffers that ‘media evidence’ plays a key role in influencing policy (Kiage and Njogu, 2015; Mwangi, 2018; Russell et. al, 2016; Head, 2014). The findings are also inconsistent with the belief of British politicians that the media significantly influence legislative debates often leading to policy changes (Davis, 2009).

10.5. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE

Existing literature espouses that policymaking involves the participation of many players at different stages of the policy process (Anderson, 2015; Cairney, 2012; Head, 2008, Head, 2010; Howlett et al., 2009; Johns, 2008; Kay 2011; Knill and Tosun, 2012; Lindblom, 1959; Maddison 2012; Yadav and Bhaduri 2021). The findings of this study show that the development of the policies investigated involved various players within and outside government, consistent with the literature. The findings also show that the integration of the different types of evidence are done in three evidence integration sites, namely, committees, stakeholders’ meetings/workshops, and legislature as articulated in the cross-case analysis chapter.

10.5.1. Advisory Committees

One of the fastest-growing instruments of modern policymaking is the use of advisory committees (Lavertu and Weimer, 2011). One tranche of the literature classifies hybrid committees into full hybrid committees (comprising public sector and private sector players), and quasi-hybrid committees (composed of public sector players from different departments) (Krick, 2015).

Across the four policies examined in this study, the presence of either a hybrid or a quasi-hybrid advisory committee is evident in line with the literature (Krick 2015; Onwujekwe et.al 2021). In terms of the hybrid advisory committee, this study found that in the development of the NTP, and the National Migration Policy, which was the precursor on which the NiDCOM policy was built, the government established a traditional hybrid advisory committee that comprised interested groups: government representatives, experts, and other stakeholders (civil society organisations in the case of the NiDCOM policy, and businesses in the case of the NTP)

while for the NWRP, a hybrid committee was established by the government with membership drawn from government representatives and experts (Krick 2015; Lavertu and Weimer, 2011).

On the other hand, the quasi-hybrid advisory committee established in relation to the development of NSIP was composed of only government employees (Krick, 2015). To clarify, an inter-ministerial steering committee was established comprising ministers of health, education, finance, budget and planning, labour and employment, and women affairs with a responsibility to synthesise and refine the various evidence types into a proposal for the consideration of the legislators.

Theory proposes that a committee, whether hybrid or quasi-hybrid, is established to develop a policy or contribute to the development of one (Krick, 2015; Winickoff and Brown 2013). Evidence indicates that whereas the committees established by the government in relation to the NTP and the NWRP developed draft policies, those established for the NSIP and NiDCOM contributed to policy development consistent with existing literature.

Further, the committees were established by the government to perform a number of important functions. One of their most important functions is that they provided the government with a pool of expert knowledge in one location and involved the interrogation of different policy ideas with a view to selecting appropriate options (Ashford, 1984; Brown 2008). To recall, all respondents acknowledged the contribution of technical knowledge and experience by the committees which added significant value to the policies. For each policy, several respondents mentioned that the policy development committee extensively considered and refined different types of evidence as well as stakeholders' inputs. In addition, the committees provided their services to the government at relatively low costs (Ashford, 1984; Brown 2008). The consultants that participated in the development of the NTP, offered their services in "*public interest*" (R 22, Mid-level Civil Servant) and "*at no cost*" (R 23, Top-level Civil Servant). The international development partners that provided financial and technical support for the development of the NWRP and the NSIP also did so at no cost. Even the quasi-hybrid committee used in the development of the NSIP seemed to have saved the government time considering that a longer policy development period would have been used if the NSIP was allowed to go through the traditional bureaucracy of policymaking (Stevens, 2010).

The hybrid committees performed political or public participation functions which improved legitimacy and acceptability (Ashford 1984; Brown 2008; Rowe and Frewer 2000). It is to be noted that members of the hybrid committees represented different competing interests and by including them in the development of policies, the government democratised the policymaking process and promoted the potential for consensus (Ashford 1984; Haas 1992). As reported by many respondents, the inclusion of many, a few say all, critical stakeholders in the development of the four policies, gave the people a representation and the opportunity to influence policies that would affect them. The idea was to “*get the buy-in and support of all stakeholders*” is how one respondent put it which conveys the general feeling of the respondents in this study (R14, Top-level Civil Servant).

Implicit in the committees are sub-committees that served as working groups for smaller decision-making and to deal with allocated themes (Krick 2015; Onwujekwe et.al 2021). The findings are partly consistent with the espoused literature. For the NiDCOM and the NTP, sub-committees were created along thematic or functional lines to focus on specific issues. For example, in the development of NIDCOM, “labour migration” and “diaspora” sub-committees were created to develop appropriate contents based on research and the experiences of members of the sub-committees (R14, Top-level Civil Servant). For the NTP, the main committee was “*broken down into sub-committees*” with each sub-committee looking at a particular theme allocated to it and “*agreeing on next steps*”. (R 28, Top-level Civil Servant). There was, however, no evidence of such an arrangement in the development of NSIP and NiDCOM indicating incongruence with the literature. Instead, the main committees were responsible for the development of the two policies at the substantive committee levels.

Policy theorists advocate that the decisions of hybrid advisory committees are made by consensus (Coleman, 1994; The LSE GV314 Group, 2018). This resonates with the findings of this study. Findings show that the decision-making process in the committees was based on consensus and decisions were reached only when there was no major objection from any member (Coleman 1994; Krick, 2013). On this note, a respondent (R37, Consultant) observed that during the development of the NSIP, consensus was the watchword. He felt that the need for consensus was so critical that for contentious or complex issues, decisions were reached only when committee members were comfortable with an input or proposal. On such occasions, he said, “*we can’t move pass any issue until we have agreed on it.*” Across, the other policies, similar sentiments were expressed by many respondents suggesting conformity with the

literature. In all, majority of the respondents recognised that the committees served as tools for both the generation and refinement of ideas. It was especially found that committee discussions were, in most cases, robust and very engaging.

10.5.2. Stakeholders' meetings

The place of stakeholder consultation in the existing policy literature is well-documented. There has been a deluge of literature on the issue with many scholars contributing either theoretically or empirically (Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2011; Head 2008; 2010; Howlett et al., 2009; John 2013; Kay 2011; Knill and Tosun, 2012; Maddison 2012; Thomas 2001; Fraussen et al., 2020; Onwujekwe et al., 2021; Sen, 2001). The common thread running through the scholars' theses is that policymaking involves engagements between the government and a host of stakeholders in various forms including workshops, conferences, and other kinds of formal and informal meetings.

The literature classifies policies along different lines one of which is the functional classification. In this regard, policies are broadly divided into technical and general. Technical policies, are policies that require specialised knowledge and skills for their development while general policies are those policies that are socially and politically contested, prioritising values over science (Head, 2014)

It should be noted that the four policies examined in this study are general policies suggesting consultation of various stakeholders. This was anticipated and identified. Some aspects of the stakeholder engagements identified in the four policies are both congruent and incongruent with the existing literature.

First, and as has been reported repeatedly, the development of the policies involved many state and non-state players that contributed to the policy process. Findings show that for each of the policies, multiple meetings were held at different times and at different locations during the policy development, consistent with the closed consultation approach (Fraussen et al. 2020; Mah and Hills, 2014). In the development of the NTP, in addition to the inputs sent in by stakeholders, "*three stakeholder engagements - two in Abuja and one in Lagos*" were held (R21, Top-level Civil Servant). Regarding the NWRP, "*workshops were held in many states of the federation*" to obtain the inputs of stakeholders (R39, Mid-level Civil Servant). In the

same vein, various technical and stakeholder meetings were held at the instance of the house committee on diaspora (R11, Legislator) and the senate committee on poverty alleviation (R4, Legislator) for the development of the NiDCOM and NSIP, respectively.

Second, in line with the espoused literature, the meetings were held to process various evidence types and consider different policy options (Onwujekwe et.al 2021; Thomas 2001). As asserted by Nabatchi (2012, p.704), the meetings provided platforms to give “voice to multiple perspectives and different interests, allowing for more thoughtful decisions...(Beierle and Cayford 2002; Sirianni 2009)". Majority of the respondents reported that the meetings involved debates and discussion around various policy proposals especially the inputs to be incorporated into draft policies, consistent with literature (Sen, 2001). A respondent who participated in the developmet of the NTP affirmed: “*(in the meetings), we gave all stakeholders the chance to express their views and defend them. If a view gets the right support it goes, if not it doesn't*” (R 21, Top-level Civil Servant). His colleague that participated in the development of NWRP concurred. “*The meetings were robust....sometimes it got heated when people hold on tight to their positions and other people are criticising them (the positions)....sometime we refine the positions and there is peace. Other times, we vote and sometimes the chairman takes a position*” (R 31, Management Consultant). Thus, the meetings served as venues where different kinds of evidence were considered for incorporation into policy drafts.

Third, findings revealed the government made deliberate and conscious efforts to include as many stakeholders as possible in the development of the four policies of this study to enrich the policy options. For the NSIP, the views of poor and vulnerable Nigerians who were the major target of the Conditional Cash Transfer component of the NSIP were not only considered but indeed the policymakers (including government officials and some private sector persons) went to meet them in their places of abode, including villages that were difficult to access. This finding is also in line with the closed consultation approach (Fraussen et al. 2020; Mah and Hills, 2014). As a respondent put it, governments effort is an attempt to get the views of the targeted group to “*understand what poverty means*” to them with a view to identifying those who were genuinely in need of the government’s support, (R3, Top-level Civil Servant). In the case of NIDCOM, “*all critical stakeholders contributed*” to the policy (R16, Civil Society) including Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, (NIDO), migration-related civil society organisations and academics. Most of the NiDCOM respondents agreed that a wide range of stakeholders participated and contributed to the policy development.

As per the NTP, the government “*wanted diverse inputs*” and invited the public to participate through the “publications in 3 national dailies with widespread readership” (R21, Top-level Civil Servant). This finding corresponds with the open consultation approach since every person that wished to participate in the consultation process was given the opportunity to do so. On the NWRP, the policy process revolved around the need to adopt a participatory approach instead of the top-down approach that has failed (Federal Ministry of Water Resources, 2016, 1). A consultant offered that the emergence of new players in the water resources ecosystem provided additional motivation for the “*robust stakeholder consultation*” the government superintended and “*all those who should be invited were invited*” (R31, Consultant). This finding is congruous with the closed consultation approach since only selected people were invited to participate in the process (Fraussen et al., 2020).

The practice of deliberate and elaborate stakeholder consultation is steep in conflicting narratives as far as existing literature is concerned. There is a tranche of literature that theorises that governments are normally not favourably disposed to sufficient stakeholder consultation (Rhodes, 2011, Cairney, 2012). The findings of this study, therefore, contradict the assertions of Rhodes (2011) and Cairney (2012). The findings also contradict the empirical finding of Yadav and Bhaduri (2021) that found that the government of India refused to undertake any consultation with stakeholders when it was in the process to develop a new rare disease policy. In summary, the findings of this study under this variable, are incongruent with the “muscular” policy style that fails to recognise non-state actors in policymaking (Cairney, 2012, p.231).

In contrast, the findings affirm the centrality of stakeholder consultation in policymaking consistent with the empirical findings of Marais et al., who found that the South African Mental Health Policy Framework and Strategic Plan benefited from a wide consultation with stakeholders. The findings also support the claim of Solorio et al., (2022) that extensive consultation took place in the development of two clean energy policies in Mexico. They are also congruent with the findings of Mah and Hills (2014) that robust consultation was undertaken during the 2007 nuclear consultation exercise in the UK. In sum, all the three empirical studies found evidence of extensive stakeholder engagement in policy development. The findings support the assertions of Cairney (2012) and Sheer and Hoppner (2010) that the UK has a long history of stakeholder engagements between the state and non-state policy players, further indicating an area of congruence.

Worthy of mentioning is that Mah and Hills (2014) found that the stakeholder engagement used for the 2007 nuclear consultation exercise in the UK comprised both written inputs and meetings. The findings of this study show that the consultation for the four policies of this research involved the two main consultation components reported by Mah and Hills (2014).

An analysis of the findings of this study has shown that the development of the four policies involved the consultation of a broad array of stakeholders representing different interests. Findings indicate that all the respondents were aware of this fact, and discussions with them revealed that they considered stakeholder consultation as an integral part of the normal policy process. Important to note is that the stakeholder meetings represented platforms for constructive dialogue and evaluation of the different kinds of evidence provided by the stakeholders. As we have seen, the dialogue resulted in the acceptance, rejection, or amendment of the evidence types on offer.

10.5.3. Legislative Committees

The iron triangle theory espouses that the legislators, alongside bureaucrats and interest groups, are the three key players in the policy process (Gais et al., 1984; Jordan, 1981). An alternative explanation of the policy process, however, stresses that policies are made by the bureaucracy and involve numerous clusters of interconnected actors without the input of the legislature (Jordan, 1981; Stevens, 2010; Rose 1980). For this study, I call policies developed under the first arrangement legislative policies, while those that fall in the second arrangement, I refer to as administrative policies.

This study has identified two types of policies - legislative, and administrative, corroborating the espoused literature on the issue. Federal legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups, participated in the development of NSIP and NIDCOM, consistent with the iron triangle literature. The participation of the legislators is also consistent with a central notion in legislative literature which reiterates that the legislators are the most crucial players in the development of legislative policies (Geys, 2013; Phadnis 2021; Wonka, 2017). By the same token, the legislators did not participate in the development of the NTP and the NWRP since they are administrative policies.

In respect of legislative policies, policy theorists maintain that legislators require and utilise varying degrees of evidence in their policymaking duties (Krehbiel, 1992; Varone et al., 2020). The legislature, therefore, provides a location for the consideration of different types of evidence leading to development of policies. A number of empirical studies found that legislators utilise a deluge of evidence for their policymaking duties. For example, Sanni et al.'s (2016) research shows that both federal and state lawmakers harmonise numerous types of evidence in the production of their desired policies. Sanni et al.'s (2016) finding, therefore, agrees with the findings of this study which shows that, in total, the legislators use nine types of evidence which they used in the development of the NiDCOM and the NSIP policies. Likewise, an empirical study by Mosley and Gibson (2017) found that legislators used an array of scientific and non-scientific evidence in the development of foster care laws policies in California in 2010. The findings of this study are, therefore, congruent with those of Sanni et al.'s (2016) and Mosley and Gibson (2017).

The findings are also consistent with a large body of legislative literature that emphasises the critical role legislative committees play in legislative policymaking (Bevan et al., 2019; Halligan 2008; Hendriks and Kay 2019, 28). As has been established, the bulk of the policymaking was done in the committees, both in the Senate and the HoR. Consistent with the literature, a number of the kinds of evidence in the committees' possession contradict one another (Hendriks and Kay, 2019), and it was in the committees that most of the contradictory kinds of evidence were evaluated and considered for acceptance, amendment or rejection. This suggests that the committees are the main venue for interactive dialogue, hence where "where the action is" (Cairney and Oliver, 2017, p.5). To exemplify, in the development of the NiDCOM policy, the legislators considered all the "information and pieces of evidence" in their possession (R18, Representative, Diaspora Community). This is evidenced by the fact that while a section of the diaspora community advocated the creation of a ministry dedicated to issues of diaspora, another section preferred the establishment of a commission. The two sections provided evidence in support of their preference. For the NSIP, the legislature examined many "*conflicting interests and perspectives*" to reach a compromise in terms of the distribution of the NSIP fund (R5, Legislator).

A further congruity with the literature is found in the committees' consideration of the voices of stakeholders that are neither elites nor experts (Halligan 2008; Hendriks and Kay 2019). In the development of the NiDCOM policy, it was found that the different factions of the diaspora

community were consulted by the legislative committees. On a few occasions, they were invited to the parliament to ventilate their views. It was also found that direct beneficiaries of the NSIP were consulted by policymakers (including government officials and some private sector persons) to get their inputs. Indeed, part of the data collection process involved policymakers visiting targeted beneficiaries in their houses, majority of which were in remote areas. NiDCOM policy

A large body of literature holds the view that political parties are the most important mechanisms in shaping legislative outcomes in line with partisan theories (Patterson 1963; Peabody, 1967). As a consequence, legislators are considered purposive - which means they sacrifice their individual preferences and uphold the preferences of their party (Crowe, 1986, 165). In furtherance of their purposiveness, legislators vote along party lines regardless of the evidence at their disposal. This affects the legislators' behaviours in not only the integration of evidence but in the way they approach policymaking generally.

The literature documents several empirical studies that support the purposive thesis. Opello's (1986) study of the Portuguese national legislature and Crowe's (1986) examination of the British House of Commons are examples. The studies found that political parties have the biggest influence on legislative policy outcomes. In the same vein, Cox and McCubbins (2005) stressed that parties are tools for re-election and have the power to persuade or compel legislators to behave in a particular way.

Findings regarding the actions of many legislators are, however, at variance with the literature on purposiveness and instead partially supports the pivotal politics theory (PPT) which presents the parties as weak (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). For instance, one of the legislators of the ruling party said he did not "*support*" the NSIP because the executive "*did something else*" after refusing to accept their proposal that the monies for the NSIP should be distributed through them (R4, Legislator). The legislator revealed that the action of the executives might have impacted his contributions, and those of a few of his colleagues, to the policy. This suggests that the legislators' apathy weakened the effectiveness of the evidence integration process.

It will be recalled that N500 billion was earmarked by the government for the implementation of the NSIP. Findings reveal that a number of the legislators wanted to personally control the

distribution of the funds meant for their constituencies. The literature suggests that the quest to enhance their re-election influenced their behaviours. In validation of this notion, one of the legislators that participated in the development of the NSIP rhetorically asked some of the public servants responsible for the implementation of the NSIP: *“you did not come through us how can we be elected next time?”* (R1, NSIP Top Management Executive). As far as the NSIP is concerned, the need for re-election appears to be at the root of the behaviours of many legislators and goes to illuminate “why pork-barrel politics dominated the attention of (the) legislators” (Buchanan 2003, p.18).

In contrast, NiDCOM policy is a constituent policy that did not require the investment of financial resources in the legislators’ constituencies making the policy less attractive to them financially. In consequence, majority of the legislators in the diaspora committee of the House of Representatives consistently refused to participate in the committee work because the committee, in the words of one of them, was *“barren”* and not *“juicy”* (R11, Legislator). Also, the focus of the NiDCOM policy is the diaspora community who are not constitutionally able to vote, rendering them not useful to the legislators. These two reasons account for the legislators’ participation apathy as seen in the low attendance to committee meetings which a legislator put at only six or seven at a time as against the 36 members in the committee.

Thus, the behaviours of the two sets of legislators mean that the legislators failed to uphold the preferences of their party contrary to the argument in the purposive literature, (Owens, 2003). The incongruity of some legislators’ behaviour with the literature on purposiveness is even more striking considering that they belonged to the ruling party which strongly supported the NSIP and NiDCOM in fulfilment of its promises. Within the context of the policy integration process, it is clear that the discussions and debates that accompanied the NSIP and NiDCOM could have been more robust, which might have impacted the policy outputs and outcomes regarding the two policies.

Their behaviours are, however, congruent with the public choice theory. Indeed, public choice theory offers a solid theoretical explanation for the legislators’ behaviours (Mayhew, 2004; Karadimas, 2022). Theoretically, legislators represent the dual interests of their constituencies and their political parties yet, empirical findings indicate that the likelihood of pecuniary and electoral benefits trumped their avowed desire to promote the dual interests (Phadnis 2021). Thus, far from being public servants concerned about the common good, the legislators were

primarily concerned with how to maximize their personal interests (Buchanan, 2003; Immergut, 2008; Leeson and Thompson 2021; Karadimas, 2022; Phadnis 2021). On the whole, the legislators' behaviours confirm Eskridge's (1988, p.285) argument that the recourse to their self-interest leads to the production of few laws in pursuance of "public goods" and many laws to advance their "rent-seeking" interests.

10.6. GOVERNING THE POLICY PROCESS

Extant literature presents three broad accounts of approaches to governance in the pursuit of common goals: society-centred, state-centric, and state-centric relational. The society-centred approach, which is the dominant one, holds that in the last few decades, non-state actors have substantially been "hollowed out" - marginalised in policymaking and implementation (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Rhodes, 2017; Ryser et al., 2021). The state-centric on the other hand, argues that governments govern in a hierarchical manner and impose their policy preferences on society (Hysing, 2009; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). The last approach, the state-centric relational, asserts that although governments still undertake policy development and implementation through hierarchical control, they have developed strategic partnerships with non-state actors to enhance their capacity and achieve their goals (Hysing 2009; Pierre and Peters 2000).

Generally, there are two dimensions to the three policymaking accounts: the level of stakeholders' participation in policymaking (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009) and the degree of government's capacity to steer (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Hysing 2009; Ryser et al., 2021).

In terms of participation, the findings indicate that multiple stakeholders participated in the development of the policies in this study. They also indicate that several platforms were created to engage the stakeholders. The findings, therefore, do not fit with the state-centric account of policymaking because the government did not "operate in splendid isolation from the society they govern" (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, xiii) or in a traditional command and control manner (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In contrast, the findings align with the state-centric-relational account which accepts the participation of government and society in policymaking.

As findings indicate, the development of the policies involved mutual exchanges and co-operation between state and non-state actors with the latter group contributing more capabilities

to the policy process than the state could operating unilaterally (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Keating 2004 Pierre and Peters, 2000). The central idea of incorporating private sector actors in the development of the four policies was to improve access to relevant knowledge, enhance legitimacy and promote political credibility (Ashford 1984; Brown 2008; Rowe and Frewer 2000). In accordance with the state-centric-relational tradition, the government specifically adopted workshops and other formal consultation techniques in obtaining the input of stakeholders in the spirit of partnership and mutuality (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

The findings also align with the relational aspects of the society-centred account in that both state and non-state actors participated in the development of the four policies examined (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Kjaer 2011; Rhodes 1994; Stoker, 1998). Consequently, while the participation coheres with a mild version of the literature on the society-centred account since government actively participated in the policy process, it is inconsistent with the radical version which prescribes the absence of government in the process, a scenario generally described as “governance without government” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Schout and Jordan 2005; Sorensen and Torfing 2009).

Findings for the most part, are contrary to the claims of the society-centred and state-centric accounts but instead corroborate the state-centric relational account. In the first place, the development of the policies examined was not done in an excessively hierarchical way in the manner suggested in the state-centric account (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). They were also not products of autonomous, self-organizing networks (Rhodes, 2017). Instead, they were developed by a policy community comprising key stakeholders, including the government, and the private sector (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Pierre and Peters, 2000). Yet, the government was able to steer and guide the process because the exchange relationship between the government and private policy actors was unequal and predominantly in favour of the government in line with the state-centric relational account (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Pierre and Peters, 2000). The asymmetries of influence and power privileged the government and manifested through three meta-governance elements: steering, resourcing, and accountability (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

In terms of steering, it was the government that decided the mechanisms to employ to address the policy problems, the key persons or institutions that were invited to participate in the policy process, and the ground rules (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Kjaer 2011). To illustrate, while the

government chose to contract out the development of the NWRP to local consultants, supported by a few senior staff the Ministry of Water Resources for guidance, it established an inter-ministerial steering committee, chaired by the Vice President of Nigeria, to develop the NSIP policy proposals for the consideration of the legislature. In the case of NWRP, the government decided to use a hybrid committee, led by local consultants for policy development. In all these, the government provided 'terms of reference' to guide deliberations. Also, the legislature superintended the development of NiDCOM policy and ensured that the policy was consistent with the government's strategic objectives. It is worth mentioning that when the government encountered challenges during the implementation of the NSIP, the government changed the subsisting mechanism and engaged a local consulting firm to address the issue which indicates the steering power of the government (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

Further, contrary to the claim of the proponents of the society-centred account, the leadership of the committees that developed the policies examined did not emerge from members' negotiation but were chosen by the government which also decided the terms of reference of the committees (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). Crucially, even though all the policies had significant inputs from the private sector actors, who in some cases headed the policy development committees, the policies were ultimately approved by the government. This means the involvement of many non-state actors did not result in them taking "over the business of government" (Stoker, 1998, 23) as the society-centred account claims. Findings, therefore, build on the conclusion of many scholars, including Marinetto (2003), Pierre and Peters (2000), Bell and Hindmoor (2009), and Davies (2011) who all argue that the steering capacity of the government is alive and well. As famously put by Osborne and Gaebler (1992), in the development of the four policies in this study, the government has demonstrated a clear capacity to steer and row.

As per resourcing, the government used its vast resources to meta-govern its relationship with the private sector actors. The entire consultation and stakeholder meetings that took place during the development of the policies were funded by the government (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). It is reasonable to say, therefore, a failure of the government to adequately fund the consultation process and meta-govern well could have frustrated the process (Doberstein 2013; Rysera et al., 2021). Also, as the findings show, the government used a reasonable number of its civil and public servants to add value as well as protect its interest in the policymaking process (Milward and Provan, 2000). Indeed, the government's bureaucracy brought policy

expertise, and institutional memory to the table (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Rysera, et al., 2021). A private sector actor who was widely considered one of the most influential in the development of the NTP reported that the government representatives on the policy development committee were “*very knowledgeable*” and “*technically sound*” (R26, Professional Accountant). Also, in the development of the NWRP, a team of consultants was contracted to guide the process, but they received most of the “*materials*” and “*information*” they needed from the representatives of government on the policy development committee (R38, Top-level Civil Servant). Clearly, by bringing to bear the needed financial resources and professional bureaucracy, the government was able to significantly control the policymaking process.

As regards the third metagovernance element, the government guaranteed accountability in two main ways. Firstly, it made its representatives members of the policy development committees and maintained a reasonable degree of oversight on the committee’s activities (Doberstein, 2013; Gertler and Wolfe 2004). Considering that the representatives were knowledgeable and technically sound with robust institutional memory, it is reasonable to assume that they were able to make strong arguments and skilfully sold the government’s vision to the committee (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

The draft policies for NTP and NWRP were submitted to the ministers of finance and water resources respectively before the policies were presented to the National Executive Council for approval. In the case of the NSIP, once the legislature has approved the programme’s budget, the implementation plans are decided by the inter-ministerial steering committee headed by the Vice President of Nigeria. In a similar vein, the NiDCOM policy revised by a technical committee was submitted to the House Committee on Diaspora. This means the ministers of finance and water resources and the house committee have the power to alter or refine provisions of the policies before their presentation to National Executive Council for approval. Also, the inter-ministerial steering committee has the privilege to make implementation plans and to interpret the NSIP policy. Ultimately, these organs serve as the final gatekeepers for the policies. Indeed, they were the ones “controlling the gates and making the decisions” (Steele, 2018, p.234) and indicated where the “buck stops” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p.51).

As has been stated all through this thesis, a broad range of players participated in the development of the four policies. The respondents were unanimous that although all the players

exerted some degree of influence in the policy process, the government was by far the most influential player in the process. A few of them mentioned that the process would not have been successful if the government had not guided it and provided all the needed resources. So, these findings demonstrate a correlation with the state-centric relational account of governance but contradict the society-centred and state-centric accounts.

10.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study examined policymakers' perspectives on the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. It also examined the role of three major players in the policy process and how their roles impact policy dynamics. This study's literature review and empirical findings have clearly shown that the policymaking environment is fluid and chaotic, suggesting that a cocktail of factors determines the policymakers' perspectives, the policy style, and the final policy. As anticipated, the empirical findings have shown a number of congruities and incongruities with the existing literature. The summary of this chapter will be presented based on the congruities and incongruities found in the four key variables that emerged from the study.

As regards the nature of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria, this study identified nine kinds of evidence: 'research evidence', 'previous policies evidence', 'media evidence', 'ideology evidence', 'internet evidence', 'residual knowledge of policymakers' evidence', 'MDA evidence', 'local consultants' evidence', and 'external stakeholders' evidence'. Thus, this study questions the dominant view in the literature that policymaking in Nigeria is largely devoid of the use of evidence. In corollary, it has conclusively shown that, indeed, policymakers use a wide range of evidence in the development of public policies. This finding is particularly important because it strengthens the burgeoning minority view that offers a more empirically compelling explanation on the use of evidence in policymaking in Nigeria. Considering that there have been very limited empirical studies on the use of evidence in the Nigerian policymaking environment, the novel findings justified the need for this study.

More significantly, the study identified three types of evidence that previous studies have not identified as substantive types of evidence: 'local consultants evidence', 'MDA evidence' and 'external stakeholders evidence'. These three types of evidence highlight the peculiarity of the

Nigerian policy environment. Also, the study identified 'ideology evidence' for the first time as a type of evidence used in policymaking in Nigeria even though Western literature has long recognised it as such. Clearly, the discovery of the four kinds of evidence invites us to pay attention to them when we analyse policymaking in Nigeria.

Policymakers' striking differences in their perception of the hierarchy of evidence are consistent with the literature which affirms that the differences are 'normal'. Theorists and practitioners have consistently presented different, often significantly different, views about the usefulness of various types of evidence. This notion is clearly demonstrated by the apparent lack of agreement in the three 'models' of hierarchy used for comparison.

The empirical hierarchy developed based on the ranking of the different types of evidence by the respondents shows that on aggregate, 'previous policies evidence' is the most useful evidence in the development of the four policies examined in this study. This finding is complimentary with the incremental policy theory that prioritises the use of previous policies in the development of new ones. Contrariwise, the least useful evidence is "media evidence." This finding has a contradictory relationship with existing literature. While it coheres with some tranche of the literature that asserts that the media has, at best limited impact on policy, and at worst does not influence policy at all, it goes against the notion that the 'media evidence' significantly influences policy.

With reference to the integration of evidence, three evidence integration sites were identified in this study – advisory committees, stakeholder meetings, and the legislative committees – with each site providing some congruities and incongruities with existing literature. Committees are fast becoming modern policymaking tools as advocated by theorists. Within the context of the integration of evidence, an important function of the committees is to aggregate various pieces of evidence and make a judgement as to their suitability for the policy being developed. In terms of congruities, all four policies assessed in this study were either developed by a committee or a committee provided significant input in the policy development process. The use of such committees is not a recent phenomenon in the Nigerian public service as a number of legacy policies that served as precursors to the policies examined in this study were developed by committees. Another congruity is in decision making which was based on consensus among the committee members. A further congruity is in the establishment of sub-

committees for the NiDCOM and the NTP. The absence of such committees for NSIP and NWRP, therefore, represents an incongruity with existing literature.

Regarding stakeholder meetings, the major congruent feature is that the development of all four policies in this study involved continuous and robust engagements between the government and a number of private sector players. The meetings provided policymakers an avenue to process various evidence types and consider different policy options. Flowing from this is the government's efforts to include as many stakeholders as possible in the development of the four policies of this study. This practice is incongruent with a tranche of existing literature that argues that governments are not favourably disposed to sufficient stakeholder consultations. However, the practice corroborates the argument of the other tranche of existing literature that affirms that governments encourage and support stakeholder consultation in policymaking.

Consistent with the literature, this study found that legislators, particularly legislative committees participated in the development of legislative policies but not administrative policies. Policy theorists espouse that legislators utilise and evaluate a substantial amount of evidence in their policymaking duties. The findings of this study are congruent with the literature in this regard.

Beyond their 'integration' functions, however, the literature stresses that one of the most important functions of legislators is to translate their party's manifesto into policies. Related literature affirms that legislators' political parties are the most influential players in shaping policies owing to their power to reward and punish their legislative members. In this regard, legislators are considered purposive, meaning they sacrifice their individual preferences to uphold the preferences of their party. The behaviours of many legislators are, however, incongruent with the literature in this regard. They were largely not purposive and subordinated their party's preferences to their selfish ones. Interestingly, their behaviours confirm the thesis of the public choice theory, which views them as inherently selfish and desirous of only promoting their personal interests particularly the desire to be re-elected. To reiterate, this study characterises the three integration sites as venues where policies are made and are, therefore, of great value to stakeholders desirous of influencing policies.

Regarding the state's steering capacity in governing the policy process, there is congruency in how the government is responsible for deciding the tool to address the identified policy

problem, the players to involve, and the rules to guide the policy process. These meta-governance practices are present in the way the government handled the policy processes that produced all four policies of this study. Further, the government's deployment of its relatively vast resources – financial, technical, and personnel - to ensure the successful development of the policies serves as another congruency. A final congruency is found in the fact that the government played the role of the final gatekeeper for all draft policies before they were approved. According to the state-centric relational theory, which best fits the state's behaviour, these practices strengthen the state's steering capacity and demonstrate that the state significantly influenced the policy process to suit its vision.

This study has identified various kinds of evidence generally used in the development of public policies in Nigeria, contrary to the widely held view that policymaking in Nigeria is largely based on the whims of policymakers. Within the context of Nigeria, four of the evidence types are novel since previous studies failed to identify them as substantive kinds of evidence. Findings showed that 'previous policies evidence' is the most useful evidence largely on account of its being the first and often the most convenient evidence policymakers obtain. On the other hand, media evidence is considered as the least useful evidence because of its inability to provide valuable recommendations to policymakers. The study explored three sites where the different kinds of evidence are integrated into the policy process and emphasised that in all the sites, the government wielded significant influence either directly or indirectly leading to the development of only policies that the government favoured.

This study has, thus, provided significant insights into key themes in the Nigerian policymaking environment and recommends that stakeholders should take advantage of the findings on the relative priority policymakers attach to the different kinds of evidence and the policy venues to impact policies. Equally important is the fact that the study has enriched our understanding of the progress Nigeria has achieved in evidence-based policymaking and provided broader insights into the sophisticated way policies are made in the country.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

11.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented a discussion of the key findings of this study, identified congruities and incongruities between the findings and existing literature, and developed an empirical hierarchy of evidence based on respondents' ranking of the nine evidence types adopted for this study. This final chapter will conclude this study and is structured into five sections. The chapter starts by recalling the objectives of this study. Secondly, it evaluates how the objectives of the study have been achieved using key findings. Thirdly, it outlines the contribution to knowledge, including the implication to policymakers. Next, it highlights the limitations of the study. Finally, it proposes opportunities for further research.

11.1. RECALLING MY RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

This exploratory study aimed to critically interrogate the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. To achieve the aim of the study and answer the research questions, four objectives were formulated.

Research Objectives

1. To identify and evaluate the types of evidence policymakers use in the development of public policies.
2. To explore policymakers' perceptions of the relative usefulness of the types of evidence they use in policy development and develop an empirical hierarchy of evidence based on the fieldwork data to serve as a contribution to existing knowledge in the area.
3. To ascertain how different kinds of evidence are integrated into the policy process.
4. To assess the meta-governance practices used to govern the policy process.

Using a multiple case study approach, these objectives were achieved using the empirical findings from the fieldwork data. In the following paragraphs, I highlight how these objectives were achieved.

11.2. ACHIEVING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES USING KEY FINDINGS

1. To identify and evaluate the types of evidence policymakers employ in the development of policies.

To achieve this objective, I undertook a critical review of the literature to understand the types of evidence identified by previous studies such as Akinbinu, and Tihamiyu (2016), Nutley, et al., (2002), Onwujekwe et al., (2015), Sanni et al., (2016), Stevens (2011), and Taylor (2012).

Consequently, I came up with six types of evidence that stood out in terms: of 1) their recurrence in the literature, and 2). My belief that they were used in policymaking in Nigeria. The six types of evidence are:

- a). Research evidence
- b). Previous policies evidence
- c). Media evidence
- d). Ideology evidence
- e). Internet evidence
- f). Residual knowledge of policymakers' evidence

Subsequently, I conducted interviews with the respondents and provided them with the working definition of evidence and the six types of evidence mentioned above as examples. This was to illuminate their understanding of the focus of my study and to provide them with baseline information. I then asked them to confirm whether, in the development of the policy they participated in, they used any of the six types of evidence and to mention any additional evidence they used. For each of the four policies examined in this study, majority of respondents stated that the six types of evidence were used. In all, the 36 respondents identified three more types of evidence:

- a). MDA evidence
- b). Local consultants' evidence

c). External stakeholders' evidence.

By recognising the three types of evidence provided by respondents, in addition to the six I extracted from the literature, this study has identified nine types of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. Following this, I argue that the three types of evidence provided by the respondents have not been identified by previous studies as distinct types of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. I also argue that 'ideology evidence', though long recognised in the literature as a type of evidence, has not been so recognised by previous studies that focussed on public policymaking in Nigeria.

2. To explore policymakers' perceptions of the relative usefulness of the types of evidence they use in policy development and develop an empirical hierarchy of evidence based on the fieldwork data to serve as a contribution to existing knowledge in the area.

This objective was achieved by the administration of an on-line questionnaire where respondents were requested to rank the nine types of evidence in terms of their relative usefulness in the development of the policy in which they participated. Each ranking was scored and consequently, the total score for each type of evidence was computed. Thereafter, an empirical hierarchy of evidence was developed for each policy showing the relative importance of the different types of evidence. To determine the relative usefulness of each of the nine types of evidence across the four policies, I aggregated the total score for each evidence (based on respondents' ranking) and developed a global empirical hierarchy of evidence which was one of the major deliverables of this study.

The hierarchy shows that 'previous policies evidence' is the most useful kind of evidence in the development of the four policies examined in this study. This is followed by 'MDA evidence', 'residual knowledge of policymakers evidence', 'local consultants evidence', 'ideology evidence', and 'research evidence'. Others, in terms of usefulness, are 'internet evidence', 'external stakeholders evidence' and lastly, 'media evidence' which is considered the least useful evidence.

It is worth stating that the finding that 'previous policies evidence' was the most useful kind of evidence did not come to me as a surprise. As a senior public servant in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), I have participated in the development of a number of policies, and 'previous

policies evidence’ has always been the first and often the most useful evidence during policy development, except where a policy is a completely novel one, which is a rarity. And even where that is the case, related or complementary policies are used to generate baseline information. The finding on ‘media evidence’ as the least useful was, however, surprising. Policymaking departments in many MDAs in the Nigerian Public Service keep track of media reportage, particularly the print media, that affect their mandate and operations with a view to developing or reviewing policies where necessary. In fact, monitoring newspaper reportage was one of the first tasks I undertook when I joined the services of the CBN, and I am aware that several policies were developed or reviewed on the strength of such monitoring.

Equally surprising is the relatively poor showing of ‘internet evidence’ which has gradually become a major source of policy information for public servants, especially in the areas of novel policies or where there is the need to assess jurisdictional experiences or good practices. Personally, I have benefited from the internet on many occasions while participating in the development of sundry policies. Also, a number of the respondents emphasised that they found internet very crucial in the policy development.

I did not have strong expectations regarding the relative usefulness of other types of evidence at the beginning of this study. My attitude to them was more of a “let’s wait and see” and as such their positions are neither confirmatory nor surprising.

3. To ascertain how the different kinds of evidence are integrated into the policy process.

This objective was achieved by synthesising the responses of respondents to questions relating to the integration of the different types of evidence. Findings show that each of the policies was developed by a group of policymakers that collaborated continuously. Findings also show that the integration of the different kinds of evidence involved the policymakers considering each piece of evidence on its merit and making a judgment as to whether the evidence should be accepted, refined, or rejected.

The findings further indicate that the consideration of the different types of evidence was done at different sites depending on the type of policy in question. For the administrative policies (NTP and NWRP), integration took place in two uniform sites: technical committees and stakeholder meetings. In terms of the legislative policies (NSIP and NiDCOM), integration

took place in three largely uniform sites. For the NSIP, the sites were: an inter-ministerial steering committee, stakeholder meetings, and the legislature. For the NiDCOM, integration took place in an inter-ministerial committee (which developed the National Migration Policy, the precursor of the NiDCOM), the technical committees, and the legislature.

Drawing from the foregoing, I argue that the integration of the different kinds of evidence used for the development of these policies entailed the determination by policymakers of what information or data should be incorporated into policy proposals and what should be rejected. I also argue that, in all, four sites, namely, inter-ministerial committees, stakeholder meetings, technical committees, and the legislature served as evidence integration sites for the four policies examined.

4. To assess the meta-governance practices used to govern the policy process.

This objective was achieved by synthesising the different responses of the respondents on the meta-governance practices that governed the policy process. Findings conclusively indicate that the government was responsible for the meta-governance of the policy process, which it carried out using three practices: steering, resourcing, and accountability.

Regarding steering, findings show that for all the policies, the government determined the mechanisms, rules, and key personnel to address the policy problems. To draw home this point, findings show an instance where the government changed an existing policy development mechanism which demonstrated its authority to meta-govern.

In terms of resourcing, findings indicate that the government deployed its huge human and financial resources to control the policy process. Further, findings indicate that the government's decision to utilise highly intelligent and technically sound public servants did not only add significant value to the process but also protected its interest.

The key finding in respect of accountability is that regardless of the policy mechanism used, all the draft policies were presented to the government for approval. Specifically, the draft of the NTP and NWRP, which are the administrative policies were presented to the relevant ministers for approval before they were taken to the National Executive Council for final approval. In the case of the legislative policies (the NSIP and the NiDCOM), findings show that they were largely controlled by the legislature.

Consequent to the foregoing findings, I argue that the government was exclusively responsible for the meta-governance of the policy process which it undertook through three interrelated elements, namely steering, resourcing, and accountability. In addition, I further argue that contrary to the claims of the proponents of the “hollowing out” thesis, the steering capacity of the state, as extensively demonstrated by the findings, is not diminished. The government still controls the policy process from the shadows even where it allows non-state actors to ‘lead’ the policy process.

11.3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE

The aim of this study was to critically interrogate the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. The achievement of this aim necessitated the formulation of four objectives which were represented at the beginning of this chapter. As the previous section has shown, the objectives have been achieved. This section highlights the contributions of this study to academic knowledge.

This study has made six significant contributions to knowledge. First, the preponderant of previous policy research on Nigeria has focused on the relationship between research and policy (Akinbinu and Tiamiyu, 2016; Sesan and Siyanbola, 2021; Uneke, et al., 2018; Uzochukwu et al., 2016; Yagboyaju, 2019) with only a small amount conducted on evidence (Onwujekwe, et al., 2015; Onwujekwe et al., 2021; Sanni et al. 2016). This study supports the minority view that multiple kinds of evidence are used in the development of public policies in Nigeria. In contrast, it shows that the dominant view that policymaking in Nigeria is devoid of the use of evidence is unjustified. This study, therefore, extends the range of the existing literature on the use of evidence in policymaking.

Second, based on empirical evidence, this study reveals new types of evidence used in the development of public policy in Nigeria. Previous studies on Nigeria failed to identify ‘local consultants evidence’, ‘MDA evidence’ and ‘external stakeholders evidence’ as substantive evidence in the Nigerian policy environment. Also, previous studies located in Nigeria failed to identify ‘ideology evidence’ as a type of evidence even though it has long been identified as a type of evidence in developed democracies where governments are largely differentiated based on ideology (Nutley et al., 2013). In terms of ‘external stakeholders evidence’, it is quite curious that although theorists and practitioners have suggested the influence of external stakeholders in policymaking in Nigeria, no empirical study, to the best of my knowledge, has

identified it as a kind of evidence within Nigeria's policymaking environment. Consequently, based on the findings of this research, it is clear that the four kinds of evidence are influential types of evidence in policy development in Nigeria and should be recognised as distinct and substantive kinds of evidence in the Nigerian policy environment.

Third, this study has developed an empirical hierarchy of evidence to show the usefulness of the nine kinds of evidence identified in the study. 'previous policies evidence' is considered the most useful evidence. In contrast, 'media evidence' is identified as the least useful evidence. The relative usefulness of the other types of evidence are as follows: 'MDA evidence' (2nd), 'residual knowledge of policymakers evidence' (3rd), 'local consultants evidence' (4th), 'ideology evidence' (5th), 'research evidence' (6th), 'internet evidence' (7th), 'external stakeholders evidence' (8th). These findings and the hierarchy developed are important because they help policymakers to 'see' how different kinds of evidence are prioritised thereby broadening their understanding. The findings also help scholars to gain more insights into the ways policymakers prioritise the various forms of evidence to enable the scholars to know how best to exert influence.

Fourth, this study demonstrated an exploratory and interpretive streak by exploring the way multiple evidence types are integrated into the policy process in Nigeria. The findings strongly suggest that stakeholder meetings, technical/advisory committees, and the legislative committees in the legislature represent evidence integration sites. These sites provide venues where multiple types of evidence are interrogated leading to their acceptance, refinement, or rejection.

Fifth, dominant studies on governance have claimed that central governments have been "hollowed out" and marginalised (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Rhodes, 2017; Ryser et al., 2021; Salamon 2002). The findings of this study challenge this claim and instead confirm the argument of the alternative state-centric relational school of thought that asserts that despite the change in the policymaking dynamics and the participation of a wider range of players from the private sector in policymaking for mutual benefit, governments retain the power to control the policy process to reflect their vision. Thus, contrary to popular opinion, my study indicates that governments occupy a pre-eminent position in the policy process.

Finally, this study has responded to the call by a number of policy scholars including Akinbinu and Tiamiyu (2016) and Onwujekwe, et al., (2015) for Nigerian-based research to illuminate

understanding of the the dynamics of evidence: what constitutes evidence, the range of evidence policymakers could use, and the influence of the various policy actors. Thus, unlike many previous studies that focused on the relationship between research (evidence) and policy, this study examined the broader evidence landscape and provided useful insights into the evidence phenomenon. The study, therefore, attempted to fill the theoretical and empirical gaps suffered by previous studies.

11.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

This study, which is largely a qualitative one, comprised four case studies, and 36 respondents. As explained at the beginning of the discussion chapter, the goal of this study is not to generate standardised findings but to sufficiently describe the phenomenon in question to enhance readers' understanding. Invariably, the implications of the findings of this research are constrained. Nonetheless, a number of potential implications for practice have emerged which could make policymaking in Nigeria and in other similar contexts more evidence-based.

One, policymakers should be aware that there are numerous kinds of evidence in the policy environment with each one possessing significant value-adding potential. While the scientific evidence is being touted by its advocates as the 'gold standard', this study has demonstrated that non-scientific evidence, especially evidence from critical stakeholders, assists in the generation of new ideas, data, and perspectives. The use of multiple types of evidence enhances an in-depth understanding of the issue at hand and offers a wider range of options for policymakers. Thus, policymakers need to be aware of the different kinds of evidence, how to get them, and their impact on policy development.

Two, the recognition of previously unidentified or inadequately recognised evidence types: ideology, external stakeholders, local consultants, and MDA, expands the frontiers of evidence and gives policymakers additional resources to improve the robustness of evidence, the policy process, and ultimately, the quality of policies. These 'new' types of evidence offer a deluge of policy-relevant information and data that policymakers can ill-afford to ignore. For instance, policymakers could use ideology, being the beliefs and values of the ruling political parties or politicians, to rally political support for both policy development and implementation. External stakeholders, where they are present, often offer technical support or funding. Also, the stock of local consultants has risen sharply in recent times based on their strategic importance while the MDAs are very useful in the area of policy alignment and also because, being on the field,

they boast of experience and hands-on knowledge. Thus, the use of these types of evidence, in addition to those already documented in the literature would potentially improve policymaking.

Three, policymakers need to be conscious of their perceptions and those of other policymakers in terms of the usefulness of the various kinds of evidence on offer. This awareness draws attention to multiple perspectives and potentially leads to an improved understanding of the value of different kinds of evidence. Within the context of this study, ‘previous policies evidence’ is considered the most useful evidence, highlighting its value and pervasiveness. This does not, however, suggest the underestimation of other evidence types, as context plays a major role in the determination of both the kinds of evidence to use and the importance to attach to them. Policymakers are, therefore, invited to exercise reasonable judgement in the prioritisation of evidence types.

Finally, policymakers should have more faith in the policy process and be innovative in creating new types of evidence where evidence gaps exist. A very effective way to achieve this is to be open-minded and work collaboratively and horizontally with other stakeholders to identify the kinds of evidence required to fill in the evidence gaps. Policymakers could also liaise with the potential primary targets or beneficiaries of proposed policies to understand their perspectives, which will no doubt serve as very useful evidence.

11.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study which aimed to critically interrogate the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria has three key limitations.

Firstly, as previously stated, the goal of this study is not to make theoretical generalisations but to engender a more grounded understanding of the phenomenon in a sufficient and engaging way. The qualitative research element of the study, comprised of in-depth interviews with 36 respondents, provided a wealth of detailed material and insight on the policymaking process, but of course is not representative (and was not designed to be so) of hundreds of thousands of policymakers in the Nigerian public service (Arabi, 2022). The subjective responses of the respondents and the restriction on the number of policies examined to only four also add to the limitation of the findings of the study. Consequently, although the study adopts a multiple case studies approach which is seen as more reliable than a single case study, generalisation of findings is still a significant issue as admitted by many case study scholars (Stake, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 2009).

Secondly, the periodisation of the study (2015 to 2019) is another limitation. The study examined public policies developed in Nigeria in the referenced period, which is a unique period in the country's development. It was the first tenure for a government from whom much was expected having defeated an incumbent in a general election, the first time such event happened since the country's return to democracy in 1999. The government also promised to do things differently and emphasised that its intention was to 'change' the way government business was conducted. Thus, the period of the study may have been an outlier making the findings applicable only to the period covered by the study.

Lastly, the research design of the study was initially to collect data through face-to-face interviews, followed by a survey. The initial plan was for me to travel to Nigeria three times for data collection. However, after my first trip to Nigeria, the Covid-19 pandemic emerged and the country like many other countries was 'shut down'. This made it impossible for me to make the other subsequent trips as planned which affected my ability to get the pre-requisite data needed to proceed with the administration of the on-line questionnaire. After about a year, the face-to-face interviews was modified to telephone interview which I used to interview 16 of the 36 respondents. Yet, I had to make a trip to Nigeria in November 2021 to get the remaining interviews when it became clear that my presence was important in getting the remaining interviews. This oscillation of data collection techniques from face-to-face to telephone and back to face-to-face affected my findings in at least two ways. The use of the telephone denied me the opportunity to capture important verbal and non-verbal cues. On the other hand, a recurring impediment during the face-to-face interviews was disruptions by colleagues and staff of the respondents which in a couple of cases affected the thought process of the respondents. There were a few instances when respondents, cut off by such disruptions, had to make a 'detour' in their explanations, indicating attempts to recall what they had meant to say earlier. In addition, the analysis of respondents' responses obtained from two different data collection methods on the same information created a bit of a comparison challenge.

11.6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study focused on the perception of policymakers in respect of the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the development of public policies in Nigeria during the first tenure of the All Progressive Congress government (2015-2019). The findings of the study represent an important effort toward understanding the phenomenon under study. Yet, I see four dimensions for future research in the area.

First, this study has a limited scope (2015-2019) and although this has enabled a proper contextualisation of the phenomenon and enhanced the validity of the findings, it has also constrained the application of the results beyond the research period. Future research with a broader scope is, therefore, needed in this area to allow comparison across periods.

Second, a subsequent study in this area would benefit from a larger sample of respondents. Introducing additional respondents and more variations in demographics would result in improved datasets and more robust findings. This would also enable meaningful comparisons, especially regarding the prioritisation of evidence types by policymakers.

Third, this study identifies ‘MDA evidence’, ‘local consultants evidence’, and ‘external stakeholders evidence’ as distinct kinds of evidence for the first time, which suggests that research is urgently needed to confirm their credibility as types of evidence used in both the Nigerian policymaking environment and in similar contexts.

Lastly, a more extensive study could be conducted to investigate the criteria policymakers use to decide which evidence to accept, refine or reject. This is critical because it will provide further insight into the thinking of policymakers regarding evidence. It will also be particularly useful to those interested in promoting the utilisation of evidence in policymaking, enhancing the implementation of policies, and improving the policy evaluation process.

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APPENDIXES

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.



Title of Study: Exploring the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the formulation of public policy in Nigeria from 2015 to 2019.

King's College Research Ethics Committee Ref: MRS-18/19-13969

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

Please tick or initial

I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one element I may be deemed ineligible for the study.

☐

I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 26/08/2019 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which have been answered to my satisfaction.

Please tick or

☐

1. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study and understand that I can refuse to answer questions and I can withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason. ☐
2. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me in the Information Sheet. I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the General Data Protection Regulation. ☐
3. I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes. ☐
4. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify me in any research outputs ☐
5. I consent to my data being shared with third parties which are outside the EU for the purpose of manual transcription service as outlined in the participant information sheet. ☐
6. I agree to be contacted in the future by King's College London researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. ☐

7. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I would be given a copy of it if I request it.

☐

8. I consent to my interview being audio recorded.

☐

Name of Participant

Date

Signature

09/07/2019

Sani Mohammed

Dear Sani

The nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the formulation of public policy in Nigeria from 2002 to 2012

Thank you for submitting your Research Ethics Minimal Risk Registration Form. This letter acknowledges confirmation of your registration; your registration confirmation reference number is MRS-18/19-13969

Ethical clearance is granted and you may now commence data collection for this project.

Please note: For projects involving the use of an Information Sheet and Consent Form for recruitment purposes, please ensure that you use the KCL GDPR compliant [Information Sheet & Consent Form Templates](#)

Be sure to keep a record your registration number and include it in any materials associated with this research. Registration is valid for **one year** from today's date. Please note it is the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that any other permissions or approvals (i.e. R&D, gatekeepers, etc.) relevant to their research are in place, prior to conducting the research.

Record Keeping:

In addition, you are expected to keep records of your process of informed consent and the dates and relevant details of research covered by this application. For example, depending on the type of research that you are doing, you might keep:

- A record of the relevant details for public talks that you attend, the websites that visit, the interviews that you conduct
- The 'script' that you use to inform possible participants about what your research involves. This may include written information sheets, or the generic information you include in the emails you write to possible participants, or what you say to people when you approach them on the street for a survey, or the introductory material stated at the top of your on-line survey.

- Where appropriate, records of consent, e.g. copies of signed consent forms or emails where participants agree to be interviewed.

Audit:

You may be selected for an audit, to see how researchers are implementing this process. If audited, you will be expected to explain how your research abides by the general principles of ethical research. In particular, you will be expected to provide a general summary of your review of the possible risks involved in your research, as well as to provide basic research records (as above in Record Keeping) and to describe the process by which participants agreed to participate in your research.

Remember that if you have any questions about the ethical conduct of your research at any point, you should contact your supervisor (where applicable) or the Research Ethics office.

Feedback:

If you wish to provide any feedback on the process you may do so by emailing rec@kcl.ac.uk.

We wish you every success with this work.

With best wishes

Research Ethics Office

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Ethical Clearance Reference Number: MRS-18/19-13969



YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET

Title of study

Exploring the nature and hierarchy of evidence used in the formulation of public policy in Nigeria from 2015 to 2019.

Invitation Paragraph

I would like to invite you to participate in this research project which forms part of my PhD research. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

What is the purpose of the study?

The purpose of the study is to critically investigate the nature of evidence (information, data and ideas) used by public policymakers in developing policies in Nigeria and to identify the relative importance policymakers attach to the different evidence sources. To achieve this, a few policies have been selected for examination including the Revised National Tax Policy 2016 (NTP).

Why have I been invited to take part?

You are being invited to participate in this research because you have been identified by the researcher, through purposive sampling, as a key participant in the development of the NTP and as such you possess the knowledge required to take part in this study.

What will happen if I take part?

You will be interviewed to provide your personal perspectives on the development of the NTP and as such there is no right or wrong answer. The interview is semi-structured and would be audio recorded with your permission. Specifically, the interview will cover the sources of evidence used in the development of the NTP.

To illustrate, I provide below examples of the questions you will be asked:

1. In the development of the National Tax Policy 2016 (NTP), please mention the evidence that were used (**By evidence, I mean information or data used in the development of policies. They may, for instance, include previous policies, research findings, input from the media, government ideology/party manifestos, expert knowledge of the policymakers, ideas from the internet).**

2. Could you please explain to me how evidence was generated and used in developing the policy?
3. Could you tell me how the policy got started?
4. To what extent would you say subjective factors like equity, fairness, or the values of the people were considered in the development and/or implementation of the policy?
5. Was there a person or an organisation that stood out for you during the policy formulation process?
6. Do you subscribe to the adoption of evidence-based policy in the Nigerian public service? If yes why and if no why not?

The interview will be conducted **via the telephone** and it is expected to last not more than 30 minutes.

Do I have to take part?

Participation is completely voluntary. You should only take part if you want to and choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in anyway. Once you have read the information sheet, please contact me if you have any questions that will help you make a decision about taking part. If you decide to take part we will ask you to sign a consent form and you will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

There are no direct benefits for participants except that it will articulate their contributions to the policymaking process of the NTP and may provide learning points for them.

Data handling and confidentiality

Your data will be processed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR).

- Data will be stored in a secure online storage repository.
- Participants will remain anonymous
- Data will be retained up to one year after completion of the researcher's study.
- Data may be shared with a third party for a manual transcription service (with participants consent) and the researcher will ensure that a data transfer agreement is in place.

How is the project being funded?

This study is being funded by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

What will happen to the results of the study?

The results of the study will be used in my PhD thesis and I will communicate to you how to obtain a copy upon completion.

Who should I contact for further information?

If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact me using the following contact details:

Sani Mohammed

Department of Political Economy

King's College, London

WC2R 2LS, UK

(sani.mohammed@kcl.ac.uk)

What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong?

If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and information:

Professor Jonathan Portes

Department of Political Economy

King's College, London

WC2R 2LS, UK

+44 (0) 7766 441148

(jonathan.portes@kcl.ac.uk)

Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this research.