



# Social Justice and the Justification of Social Inequalities

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## Introduction

Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice? (Martin L. King Jr., 1963)

In this quote, famous civil rights activist Dr. Martin Luther King questions how people deal with injustice, arguing for two types of reactions: creating a more just society (through peaceful protest for change) or the persistence of gross social inequalities (through extreme negligence and inertia). This quote came from a letter he wrote in 1963 in the midst of the US civil rights movement that battled against racial segregation and severe injustices carried out primarily against people from African American descent. Yet, this insight is still relevant today when explaining people's varying reactions to injustice. In the current chapter, we will focus on explaining these divergent reactions, but first we introduce the social science of theory and empirical research on social justice. Justice is seen as a great virtue for individuals as well as

for societies. At the individual level, people want to be treated in a just manner and to receive just outcomes, but they also care deeply about justice done to others, especially those with whom they strongly identify (Greene, 2013; Lind & Tyler, 1988). At the societal level, people want to live in a just society where members adhere to rules and regulations that do justice to everyone (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1999). As such, social justice and solidarity are closely related self-transcending motives. Both justice<sup>1</sup> and solidarity reach beyond the individual level and are focused not only on what we want for the self, but also what we value for others. If solidarity, as explained in Chaps. 2 and 3 (this volume), sets the boundaries for who we care about and are willing to share resources with, considerations of justice provide the framework through which we can do so.

Scholars from different fields of research, and especially philosophy, including great minds such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls, have been studying questions of justice for a long time. Philosophical questions focused primarily on what constitutes a just society (e.g., Rawls, 1971) or on how people can live a moral and virtuous life (e.g., Beauchamp, 2001) or a good life (Sen, 1999; see also Chap. 5, this volume). Legal scholars also study questions of justice, focusing

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<sup>1</sup>The terms justice, referring to perceptions of justice, and social justice are used interchangeably in this chapter.

on “black-letter-law”, which refers to law as it is written in legal codes and enacted by legislators (Finkel, 2000). They study how laws and legislation should work and how their workings can be improved. Both philosophical and legal perspectives on justice are mostly *normative*, that is, focusing on questions of what a just society or individual *ought* to be and do. The social sciences, on the other hand, are more concerned with *descriptive* questions pertaining to justice, focusing not on what ought to be, but on what *is*. Within psychology and sociology, questions such as “What do people consider just and unjust?” and “What happens when people are confronted with injustice?” are studied. One could argue that psychology is more concerned with discerning general trends in what people think, feel, and do regarding justice issues, whereas sociology tends to focus more on institutional, historical, and cultural trends in issues of justice (for a more thorough description, see, e.g., Cohen, 1986). The differences between psychological and sociological approaches notwithstanding, it is oftentimes difficult to tease the two apart. Indeed, part of the reason why social justice is exciting is because it can be considered an interdisciplinary field of study, where the social sciences intersect, and normative and descriptive insights may be more strongly related to each other than is often realized. For example, concerns that something in society is fundamentally wrong and unjust can drive societal protest (Klandermans, 1997). Repeated failure to improve conditions of perceived injustice may even provide impetus to various forms of radicalization (Bal & Van den Bos, 2017; Van den Bos, 2018). For this reason, the combined normative and descriptive study of social justice is fundamental.

A brief look at the philosophical account on the normative question of what a just society should entail and how this forms the foundation for ‘appropriate’ social policy responses to social problems is presented in Chap. 5 (this volume). In the current chapter, we focus on the descriptive study of social justice from a social sciences perspective. Descriptive questions on what people consider (un)just and how

they react to unjust situations have led to a wealth of theories and research, an overview of which will be presented here. We start by looking at the distinction between different forms of justice in social justice theorizing. First, a classical distinction is made between **distributive justice** (i.e., the just allocation of burdens and benefits, inputs, and outcomes), and **procedural justice** (i.e., the fairness of the processes and treatment leading up to these decisions). Later, more forms of justice were differentiated. Notably, **justice as recognition** focused not on *what* (distributive justice) or on *how* (**procedural justice**), but on the question of *who* should be considered in these questions of justice. This tripartite distinction of different forms of justice (distributions, procedures, recognition) will be used as the basis of the first part of this chapter. We will then continue with a discussion of the existence of justice and injustice in daily life, focusing on why and how social inequalities and other injustices are sometimes justified.

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### What Is a Just Distribution of Burdens and Benefits?

Most classical research on social justice focused on questions regarding the fair allocation of burdens and benefits (i.e., distributive justice). A seminal theory on distributive justice is equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1978). The basic premise of **equity theory** is the proportionality principle, which postulates that people are assumed to judge an outcome as just or fair when their own outcome-to-input ratio equals a referent outcome-to-input ratio. Put simply, people prefer equal outcomes for equal inputs in a comparison to others. That this is truly a justice motive which extends beyond egoistic tendencies, is exemplified by the research finding that people dislike being disadvantaged, but they also dislike unfair advantage (Van den Bos et al., 1997). To judge whether outcomes are proportional, people can make both temporal and social comparisons; they can compare current outcomes to outcomes obtained for similar inputs in the

past or they can compare their outcomes to those of similar others respectively.

These social comparisons have been the focus of the theory of individual and group-based relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966; Crosby, 1976). **Relative deprivation** refers to the feeling of angry resentment invoked by the judgment that a person or a group of persons are unfairly disadvantaged compared to a relevant other individual or group. Stouffer et al. (1949) introduced the term in the 1940s to explain why pilots in the army were less satisfied with their rapid promotion prospects than the military police were with their slower promotion prospects. According to Stouffer, this could be explained by the comparison referents (i.e., the point of comparison) that were available to these different groups. That is, pilots compared themselves to pilots from the air force who were promoted more often and more rapidly. As a result, the army pilots felt relatively disadvantaged. In contrast, members of the military police compared themselves to other military police members and felt less disadvantaged as all their peers were similarly slowly promoted to higher ranks. As these two groups rarely came into direct contact with each other, these intergroup comparison referents were not available to them.

Relative deprivation consists of four elements. It is a combination of (1) a *comparison process* of which (2) the *outcome is unfavourable* to the self (or one's group), which results in (3) a *label of unfairness* as well as (4) negative emotions of *angry resentment* (i.e., anger in combination with holding a grudge against the advantaged person or group or the system in which these inequalities persevere; Smith et al., 2012). Feelings of relative deprivation, and especially feelings of relative group deprivation, have been found to play an important role in people's willingness to engage in protest behaviours against social inequalities (Klandermans, 1997; van Zomeren et al., 2008). While relative deprivation has been studied extensively, its counterparts of relative gratification (i.e., feeling relatively advantaged in comparison to other groups or individuals) and visceral relative deprivation (i.e., sympathizing with groups or individuals who are relatively disadvantaged) have received much less attention (Bal, 2014; Bal

& Van den Bos, 2017), although these feelings may also play important roles in the persistence and reduction of social inequalities, especially when focusing on intergroup or inclusionary outgroup solidarity (Chaps. 2 and 3).

In answering the question *what* a just distribution of burdens and benefits is, equity theory focused on proportionality as a distributive justice principle. In later theorizing, two additional distributive justice principles were distinguished: equality and need (Deutsch, 1975). Which distributive justice principle is applied will differ both situationally and dispositionally (i.e., between individuals). Proportionality may be the default principle in many (Western) societies, where an economic orientation is pervasive, and hard work, efficiency and effectiveness are all rewarded with higher outcomes. Equality and need may be more suitable in solidarity-oriented and care-oriented settings respectively. When the primary goal is to build or maintain enjoyable social relationships (e.g., when working in a team or amongst friends), individual contributions may matter less than people's shared group identity, and people often opt for an equal division of outcomes. In situations in which people want to foster personal development (e.g., parents caring for their children), or situations primarily concerned with another person's welfare (e.g., when supporting victims of a natural disaster), people are willing to sacrifice some of their own benefits or resources on the others' behalf and will be most concerned with providing for those who are in need. Importantly, which distributive justice principle is chosen to judge a situation will also determine which redistributive policy measures are deemed necessary or acceptable.

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### **How Can We Create a Just Decision-Making Process?**

While much seminal work has been devoted to studying questions of distributive justice, in the 1980s and 1990s the study of procedural justice gained significant ground (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987, 1989; Van den Bos, 2005, 2015). This shift led away from a focus on outcomes

towards research and theorizing about the processes leading up to these outcomes. Studies of procedural justice commenced in the courtroom, where influential initial work showed that the perceived fairness of legal procedures influenced people's evaluations of both the verdict and the decision-makers (e.g., lawyers and judges; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Subsequently, studies have extended beyond legal decision-making and have shown that at times, the decision-making process is deemed even more important for people's satisfaction with the outcome, their trust in authorities, and the legitimacy of the system more generally than the outcome itself (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 2001). A fair process is therefore essential when people must deal with outcomes that are disadvantageous for the self. This positive effect of procedural justice on outcome judgments is called the **fair process effect**.

Scholars have tried to specify what aspects of a decision-making process are vital for procedural justice. Studies have shown that an important determinant of procedural justice judgments is whether people have a voice in the process and whether their opinions were also considered in the decisions being made (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 1996). While the majority of studies focused on these effects of voice, there are additional procedural aspects that contribute positively to people's judgments of procedural justice. These encompass consistency (decisions need to be stable across situations and over time), impartiality (decision-makers need to be unbiased), decision quality (decisions need to be made based on accurate information), correctability (there needs to be an opportunity to correct mistakes in the decision-making process), and ethicality (the decision-making process needs to uphold moral and ethical standards; Leventhal et al., 1980). While some of these factors may weigh more heavily in certain circumstances (Leventhal, 1980), together, these procedural aspects of decision-making processes demonstrate that people need to feel they are duly considered to judge procedural justice as high. This combined effect of procedural aspects is known as the **due consideration effect**.

Some organizational justice scholars (i.e., those focusing on fairness in the workplace) distinguish between formal procedures on the one hand and informal interactions on the other and talk about interactional justice when focusing on the latter (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; see also Chap. 8, this volume). According to this perspective, procedural justice is about to what degree rules were followed correctly in coming to a decision, whereas interactional justice is about how you were treated by decision-makers in this process. Studies making this distinction have shown that procedural justice judgments were more related to organizational outcomes (e.g., commitment to the organization), while interactional justice judgments more strongly related to evaluations of the decision-makers (Colquitt, 2001). However, other scholars consider this distinction to be artificial, arguing that interactional justice is a facet of procedural justice judgments and, more specifically, that they are already included in due consideration determinants. Indeed, it seems that the term "procedural justice" captures the informal way in which people are treated in various decision-making processes, and is not limited to formal procedures (Van den Bos, 2005).

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### **Who Is Included in Our Justice Judgments?**

To date, most empirical work within the field of social justice focused on distributive and procedural justice. However, important theorizing both within sociology and psychology has been done focusing on *who* is included in our justice considerations (i.e., who is recognized, acknowledged, and included as a stakeholder). Justice as recognition was coined as a countermovement against the focus on mainly distributive justice in classical research and theorizing (Fraser, 1998; Honneth, 2004). According to scholars within this field, the justice of a situation should not be judged based on the distribution of burdens and benefits or how many goods a person should have (i.e., distributive justice). Rather, it should be focused on the degree to which individuals and groups are recognized

and respected and on status differences between societal groups (i.e., justice as recognition). They argue that social inequalities cannot be resolved through redistribution (alone) but should be addressed by fully recognizing disadvantaged groups and their group members. Scholars taking a justice as recognition approach feel the only way to provide full autonomy for individuals to pursue the lives they value and equally participate in public life is through this process of creating mutual recognition and respect for equal dignity.

Clear examples of a growing emphasis on justice as recognition and a shift away from a distributive justice focus are provided by analysing different waves of social rights movements (e.g., Fraser, 1995). For instance, looking at the women's rights movement in Western countries, the first wave focused on gaining essential rights, such as the right to vote and the right to work. Hence, these efforts were focused mostly on increasing distributive justice. A subsequent wave focused on recognizing differences and compensating inequalities (e.g., through affirmative action programs), thereby combining issues of maldistribution and misrecognition. Currently, a shift from recognizing differences to valuing or even celebrating differences is occurring (e.g., valuing unpaid work in the home and creating equal opportunities to participate in care for both men and women). This can be seen as an increased focus on obtaining equal respect and mutual recognition. Similar processes are taking place in other social rights movements as well. These shifts away from a focus on gaining equal rights (thereby reducing blatantly unfair distributive differences), to recognizing blatant and more subtle differences, to valuing and celebrating differences (thereby creating equal respect and dignity), could be viewed as an increased focus on justice as recognition.

While the term justice as recognition is more common outside of psychology, within psychology, ideas on the scope of justice have been postulated regarding the *who*-question of justice (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Opatow, 1996). According to these ideas, justice judgments intersect with questions concerning identity in such a way that justice judgments always concern specific groups. People are oftentimes most con-

cerned about their in-group and justice considerations apply specifically to them (e.g., citizens of their country). What scope people consider and who should thus be included in justice considerations is therefore dependent on identification processes (see also Chap. 3, this volume). For instance, sometimes distributive and procedural justice concerns encompass all of mankind and sometimes they are focused much more narrowly on one's closest friends. Increasing the scope of justice may be a viable route to decreasing specific social inequalities.

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### How Do People Justify Injustice and Inequalities?

Thus far, we have discussed social science theorizing and research about different forms of justice. How these rather theoretical notions of distributive, procedural, and scope of justice, as well as justice as recognition, have played out in welfare state development over time, is discussed in Chap. 5 (this volume). In this second part of the chapter, we focus on how people (at times) justify inequalities and injustice as well. We began our chapter with the notion that people care about justice. Yet, injustices occur daily, and social inequalities persist. How can these two facts – people striving for justice and the existence of injustice – be reconciled? In what follows, we take a look at two theories that have focused on this question: just-world theory (Lerner, 1980) and system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Both theories focus on explaining why people sometimes justify unjust situations and argue that these justifications can be caused by motivated reasoning and sense-making processes.

As noted in the introduction of this book, justice is an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1955). This means that, on average, people value justice to a great extent and have an intuitive sense for signalling injustice. However, while we generally agree on the importance of justice, it is more difficult, if not impossible, to define it unambiguously. As such, there is great philosophical as well as public debate on what justice should entail and how it can best be achieved (e.g., through adopt-

ing different principles of equity, equality or need; or by focusing on redistribution or recognition; see also Chap. 5, this volume). Importantly, because of its' contested nature, justice is very much in the eye of the beholder, meaning similar situations can be viewed as just by one person, but considered to be a grave injustice by someone else. This subjective element in justice judgments opens avenues for these judgments to be influenced by personal motives, as we will see in our discussion of just-world theory and system justification theory.

### Just-World Theory

In the 1980s, Lerner (1980) was puzzled by the fact that victims of injustice are sometimes blamed for what happened to them. In just-world theory, he posited that victim blaming was the paradoxical result of a deep concern for justice. More specifically, people want to believe that they live in a just world, in which people get what they deserve. This deservingness principle is necessary to provide meaning to the social world and to trust that one's efforts will pay off in the end (Bal & Van den Bos, 2012). Put differently, investing in the future and focusing on long-term goals for which outcomes are often uncertain only makes sense when the world is just. A victim of injustice threatens this belief in a just world (BJW), and to deal with this threat, people blame the victim, especially when more benign options to deal with the threat (e.g., helping, supporting, or compensating the victim) are difficult or costly.

Subsequent empirical studies focused primarily on explaining victim blaming and on factors determining the degree to which victims were blamed for their misfortune (for an overview, see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). These studies showed that some characteristics of the situation determined how much victims were blamed for the event. When situations posed a higher BJW threat to the observer, the victim was blamed more (e.g., victim innocence, victim proximity, and a perpetrator not being caught; Bal & Van den Bos, 2010, 2012; Correia et al., 2007; Hafer, 2000). Studies also showed that some factors on the observer side can increase victim blaming. For instance, studies

showed that a stronger BJW, a focus on the self, and a strong future-orientation all increase victim blaming (Bal & Van den Bos, 2012, 2015; Correia et al., 2007; Hafer, 2000). Later, different reactions, such as the belief in ultimate justice (seeing a silver lining to the victimization) or immanent justice (attributing the victimization to prior misdeeds) were studied as well as factors increasing more benign reactions to innocent suffering (e.g., support; Callan et al., 2006; Harvey & Callan, 2014; Bal & Van den Bos, 2015).

People are known to vary in the degree to which they endorse the BJW (Sutton & Douglas, 2005). In research, a higher BJW has been related to better well-being, positive affect, optimism, and effective coping with stress (for an overview, see Furnham, 2003). These positive consequences of the BJW seem to be related mostly to the belief in a personal just world (e.g., "I get what I deserve"; Sutton & Douglas, 2005; Sutton et al., 2008). The BJW for others (e.g., "People get what they deserve"; e.g., Bègue & Bastounis, 2003) and victim sensitivity (i.e., being sensitive to perceiving situations as unfair for the self; Gollwitzer et al., 2013; Schmitt et al., 1995), in contrast, have been related to defensive reactions and negative attitudes towards disadvantaged groups.

### System Justification Theory

In the 1990s, justice research was complemented with the introduction of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Similar to just-world theory, system justification theory proposed that people are motivated to see the existing system in which they live as good, fair, and just, and that perceptions of social inequalities pose a system threat that needs to be resolved. In this theory, focus shifted from explaining reactions to individual cases of victimization to explaining reactions towards disadvantaged groups in society. According to system justification theory, stereotypes (see Box 4.1) can be used to justify social inequalities, because stereotypes can provide reasons for the disadvantaged positions of certain groups and the advantaged position of others. As such, system justification theory provided a motivated reasoning for the use of stereotypes.

#### Box 4.1 Stereotypes and the Stereotype Content Model

People hold stereotypes towards different social groups, which contain the perceived prototypical attributes of members of these groups. According to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Cuddy et al., 2009), these group stereotypes are based on two core dimensions: competence and warmth. In social interactions, people want to be able to determine the other's intent and capability. For this purpose, they ask themselves, (1) does this person want to harm me? (i.e., warmth), and (2) are they capable of doing so? (i.e., competence). As such, competence and warmth can be considered the basis of stereotypes people hold towards different groups in society and this stereotype content will determine how people feel towards these groups. People feel envious towards groups considered high in competence, but low in warmth (e.g., the rich) and they feel paternalistic towards groups considered high in warmth, but low in competence (e.g., the old). While the majority of groups is categorized as high(er) in one dimension and low(er) in the other, some groups are considered to be low in both competence and warmth (e.g., the homeless), which may lead to them being derogated. Finally, mainstream society and the in-group are usually considered relatively high on both dimensions.

Initial research on system justification theory focused on finding support for the idea that status-congruent stereotypes can indeed serve as justifications for the disadvantaged status of certain groups in society (Jost et al., 2004; Kay et al., 2009; Friesen et al., 2019). Studies showed that presenting people with a threat to the system led to a higher endorsement of negative stereotypes for disadvantaged groups (Kay & Friesen, 2011). Moreover, an important and controversial hypothesis tested in this regard was that if people are indeed motivated to jus-

tify the current status quo, including existing social inequalities, this must also be true for people belonging to disadvantaged groups themselves. And indeed, the more importance these people placed on the belief that society was fair, the more likely they were to blame themselves for their disadvantaged position in society by endorsing negative stereotypes about their own group (Laurin et al., 2011).

More recently, the idea of complementary stereotypes was introduced (Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay et al., 2007). **Complementary stereotypes** are stereotypes in which positive and negative characteristics are balanced out within and between groups (e.g., poor but happy; lazy but sociable; low IQ but athletic). These stereotypes can justify existing social inequalities, while at the same time leaving people's perception of the system and the self as fair and just intact, as the system produces balanced end-results in which no group has it all. However, the positive characteristics used cannot be causally related to the disadvantaged position (Kay et al., 2005). For instance, economic disadvantage cannot be compensated for with being perceived as hard-working, as these two are causally related. However, perceptions of economic disadvantage can be related to perceptions of greater happiness.

In line with just-world theory, people also differ in the degree to which they defend the current status quo (e.g., Kay & Jost, 2003). This has been related to individual differences in political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003) as well as cognitive rigidity, a resistance to change in beliefs, attitudes, or personal habits (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Nevertheless, people's tendencies to defend existing social systems and the status quo, including current social inequalities, will always be influenced by a combination of personal, social, and contextual factors.

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## Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of social scientific research and theorizing on social justice and on the justification of social inequalities. We discussed different forms of justice that together try to provide answers to the question: Who is

deserving of what by whom? Distributive justice focuses mainly on *what* can be considered just, procedural justice studies *how* these just outcomes can best be achieved, and justice as recognition is mostly concerned with the *who*-question. It is important to note that it is impossible to fully disentangle these different forms of justice. For example, questions of distributive justice cannot be answered without considering who is involved and studies about justice as recognition also need to consider the processes through which recognition is achieved or denied. As such, the differentiation of the various forms of justice is mostly a useful theoretical distinction. In practice, these different forms of justice need to be considered in an integrative way, focusing on the ways in which these forms combine to impact people in various ways across different societal contexts. A complicating factor in determining what is just in practice, is that unjust situations are oftentimes justified through processes of motivated reasoning. By introducing and discussing just-world theory and system justification theory, we have provided insight into two seminal theories that focus on these justification processes to explain why those people who are treated unjustly are, at times, blamed for their misfortune and why social inequalities can persist through the endorsement of negative and complementary stereotypes.

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## Glossary

**Complementary stereotypes:** group stereotypes in which positive and negative characteristics are balanced out within and between groups.

**Distributive justice:** the just allocation of burdens and benefits, inputs, and outcomes.

**Due consideration effect:** the positive effect of procedural aspects of having voice, consistency, impartiality, decision quality, correctness, and ethicality on people's procedural justice judgments.

**Equity theory:** a theory of distributive justice postulating, as a central premise, the proportionality principle (sometimes called: equity

principle), which holds that people are assumed to judge an outcome as just or fair when their own outcome-to-input ratio equals a referent outcome-to-input ratio.

**Fair process effect:** the positive effect of the decision-making process on people's satisfaction with the outcome, their trust in authorities, and the legitimacy of the system.

**Just-world theory:** a theory focused on how people deal with a confrontation with an innocent victim and that can explain victim blaming by postulating that people hold on to a deservingness principle. This principle holds that we live in a just world in which people get what they deserve, and that innocent victims pose a threat that needs to be resolved.

**Justice as recognition:** a countermovement against the focus on mainly distributive justice in classical research and theorizing, in which the focus is on the degree to which individuals and groups are recognized and respected and on addressing unfair status differences between societal groups.

**Justice principle:** the principle (or rule) chosen to judge the distributive justice of a given situation. In addition to the equity principle (see equity theory), an equality principle and a need principle can be distinguished.

**Procedural justice:** the fairness of the processes and treatment leading up to outcome decisions.

**Relative deprivation:** the feeling of angry resentment invoked by the judgment that a person or a group of persons are unfairly disadvantaged compared to a relevant other individual or group.

**Scope of justice:** the range of people or groups included in people's justice judgments.

**Status-congruent stereotypes:** group stereotypes that align with the status of that group in society.

**Stereotype content model:** a model that proposes that group stereotypes are based on competence and warmth.

**Stereotypes:** public images containing the perceived prototypical attributes of members of a social group.



**System justification theory:** a theory focused on explaining derogatory reactions towards disadvantaged groups in society by postulating that people are motivated to see the existing system in which they live as good, fair, and just, and that perceptions of social inequalities pose a system threat that needs to be resolved.

### Comprehension Questions

1. What makes equity theory a theory of distributive justice (instead of merely a theory of preference or a theory about procedural justice)?
2. According to Deutsch, distributive justice principles are pluralistic, consisting of at least equity, equality and need. He argues that each principle will be applied in different types of situations or relations. Which are these?
3. What do the fair process effect and the due consideration effect entail and how do they differ from each other?
4. Why can we consider justice as recognition to be a countermovement to distributive justice research and theorizing?
5. How do just-world theory and system justification theory both contain a form of motivated reasoning?

### Discussion Questions

1. Is it possible to come up with a universal theory of justice? Why or why not?
2. According to system justification theory, stereotypes can help us see the status quo as good, fair, and just. The stereotype content model further explains which stereotypes we hold towards certain groups, based on the core dimensions of competence and warmth. Combining these insights, do you think that stereotypes can also be used to create resistance against an unfair status quo (i.e., social inequalities)? What might be ways through which such resistance could be achieved?

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