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The export of know-how at the (semi-)peripheries: the case of Yugoslav–Iranian industrial collaboration and labor mobility (1980–1991)

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ABSTRACT

The paper explores experiences of temporary labor migration that entailed Yugoslav export of know-how (highly skilled knowledge and expertise) between 1980 and 1991, a result of industrial collaboration between Mining and Smelting Combine Bor, a state-owned copper-processing ‘giant’ in former Yugoslavia, and the biggest copper company in Iran, National Iranian Copper Industries Company. Based on interviews with individuals engaged in the Yugoslav project, supplemented by analysis of documents and historic newspapers from that period, the paper analyzes everyday practices of managerial bureaucratic improvisations and improvisations at work. The article shows how such improvisations helped overcome excessive and rigid Yugoslav socialist bureaucracy and made Yugoslav entrepreneurial capitalist ventures possible. Moreover, it argues that the export of know-how was constitutive of silent acceptances of reproduction of capitalist relations, which helped consolidate the process of liberalization of the socialist market in the late 1980s. We argue that such temporary labor migration and the often improvised work carried out by the Yugoslav workers cannot be seen as a resistance or alternative to the Western/Northern hegemonies. Rather, we argue that such practices were facilitators of the capitalist ventures at semi-peripheries.

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Introduction

This paper analyzes experiences of Yugoslav self-management embedded within the transnational understanding of the dynamics of the Yugoslav economic crisis in the 1980s (Bernard, 2019). In particular, we inspect narrated experiences of Yugoslav workers who were engaged in temporary labor migration and who exported industrial know-how to the Iranian metallurgical industry in the period of 1980–1991. While looking at the mobility of highly skilled Yugoslav workers, we show how their often-improvised work was a facilitator of the capitalist relations in the Yugoslav copper-processing company amid the economic crisis and the crisis of Yugoslav self-managed socialism.

The paper is based on four in-depth interviews with workers in the town of Bor (Serbia) who were engaged in this project during the decade of this industrial collaboration. Our interlocutors were the most important workers on the project. The interviews were carried out in March and April 2020. They provided an in-depth understanding of the project’s managerial aspect (the interview with the former director of the Copper Institute at that time) and of the experiences of the workers.¹ In

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addition to this, by using travel logs from this period (Pomežanski, 1986) and through insights gained from press clippings from the *Kolektiv* newspaper of Mining and Smelting Combine Bor (RTB) and the local gazette *Borske novosti*, we managed to reconstruct a possible sequence of events that preceded this collaboration. In the paper, we focus on experiences of temporary labor migration that occurred between 1980 and 1991 as a result of industrial collaboration between the Copper Institute Bor, a scientific copper research institute that used to be part of the biggest state-owned copper-processing complex in former Yugoslavia, called RTB Bor (Mining and Smelting Combine Bor, hereafter: RTB), and the largest state-owned copper-processing company in Iran, named National Iranian Copper Industries Company (NICICO). In this period, around 150 highly skilled workers from Yugoslavia, mainly engineers and technicians, became part of the big project that exported know-how to this Iranian national company. Most of the workers from Yugoslavia were employed at RTB Bor and the Copper Institute, located in a copper-processing and mining town in the east of Serbia. RTB in Bor was considered to be a Yugoslav mining, metallurgical, and copper-processing 'giant'. Yugoslav workers who worked at RTB in this period travelled to the southeast of Iran to a copper complex located 160 km southwest of Kerman and 50 km south of Rafsanjan to finish setting up a newly built smelter on one of Iran's most important mining sites, Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex. This smelting system in Iran had been designed and built by companies from the U.S.A² which were expelled from Iran after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Due to the sudden change in this project, the Iranian workers needed additional training and skills that would help them become equipped to operate the smelter, already 95% complete. The business agreement between the Yugoslav Copper Institute of Bor to deliver such a task and NICICO was signed in July 1980 (Knežević, 1991). In this exchange, a great number of Iranian workers were also hosted in the town of Bor, mostly in the early 1980s, and they attended various training courses at RTB Bor (Knežević, 1991).

The socio-historical aspects of the Yugoslav project of 'transferal' of know-how that occurred between Yugoslavia and Iran, located at the (semi-)peripheries (Blagojević, 2009; Laron, 2014; Pantić, 2021; Wallerstein, 1976), helps us throw a different light on (Western) understandings of the regulation of international labor within the Cold War dynamics. Although embedded within the economic crisis of the 1980s and the Yugoslav period of stabilization, this industrial collaboration was to a great extent framed within the attempts of the Yugoslav state to position itself internationally in the global economy. Moreover, the collaboration was also facilitated through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in which Yugoslavia played a key role and was considered to be an example of modernization. We argue that such Yugoslav transnational industrial collaborations do not so much illustrate resistance and/or the alternative to the Western/Northern hegemonies. Rather, the paper shows how the collaborations and the often improvised work of Yugoslav workers were facilitators of the capitalist relations at the semi-peripheries.

Transitional global flows and the Yugoslav self-managed copper 'giant'

When Tito split from Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia introduced third-way self-managing socialism, which was characterized by a unique mixture of socialist and market-economic principles, a liberal socialist system of government, and borders open to goods, people, and ideas from across the world (Greenberg, 2011). This was an exceptional socialist principle that combined a limited market and relative freedoms, such as the freedom to travel abroad, with relatively high living standards. Yugoslavia introduced the workers' self-management form of socialism, different from the socialism in all other Eastern Bloc countries, which were characterized by central planning and centralized management of their economies. Workers' self-management was based on the idea of transferring management and decision-making over to the workers (through workers' councils) in the enterprises and other spheres of life and separating the state from industry (although this was never completed in practice; cf. Simmie & Dekleva, 1991). Self-management was conducted in several ways. In general, redistribution of the workers' contributions (*samodoprinosi*) was carried out by taking a percentage of RTB workers' salaries to contribute to infrastructural development at the federal, state, and local

levels. The workers were included in decision-making about distribution of funds through the workers' councils and *mesne zajednice* (local communities). In addition, self-managing 'communities of interest' (*samupravne interesne zajednice – SIZ*) made decisions about the distribution of financial funds, which also made up part of the state and federal budget.

The creation of a large mining and metallurgical system in Bor, which gradually united industrial systems of extraction and processing of copper and production of final copper products in one company, was initiated by the revolutionary socioeconomic processes and changes in property relations after World War II. With the nationalization of property after World War II, the privately owned pre-war French mining company, along with French concessions for the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources that the company owned in Bor, became the property of the Yugoslav state and the broader political organization of the People's Front (Kostić, 1962; Simić, 1969). This also marked the foundation of the town's self-managed government. On 1 September 1950, the first elections for the workers' council were held in the Bor Mine (Stanković, 1970, p. 89). The Workers' Council in the company consisted of 120 members, 80 of whom were from the list of union candidates (workers from direct production, four technicians, seven officials, and nineteen members of other professions) and there were 50 members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Stanković, 1970, pp. 97–109). The overall characteristic of workers' self-management was the unification and connection of the processes of industrial production and urbanization and the unification of the spheres of work and life. Such connection was materialized through the planned industry and workers' self-management, which made the copper-processing company become a single unit of complex organization and production. These socioeconomic arrangements comprehensively influenced the development of the town of Bor and its social political institutions of social (public) interest. The convocation of the workers' council 'was the first in the Yugoslav practice of self-management to introduce a referendum' (Stanković, 1970, p. 96) as a decision-making system for the distribution of the social wealth of the 'fund for independent disposal' (Stanković, 1970, p. 96). At these first referendums in the period from 1951 to 1953, decisions were made about the surplus fund for salaries, the purchase of buses, improvement of living standards, financial aid to the Yugoslav government for the purchase of food products from abroad due to the crisis caused by the drought, and improvement of the social standards of single workers in Bor (Stanković, 1970, pp. 95–99). Moreover, at the referendums, decisions were made about the construction of roads, the expansion of production facilities, greater investment in facilities ('expanded reproduction'), and preparations for the construction of mines in the neighboring town of Majdanpek (Stanković, 1970, pp. 95–99). The workers could take part in such decision-making, including decisions about the distribution of flats through workers' councils. In practice, however, these flats were never equally distributed but were to a great extent allocated to privileged individuals within the working class or to white collar workers and management, who were more likely to receive them than other workers (Archer, 2013, 2016).

The elections held in September 1950 marked a change in the company's ownership. The company became socially owned in accordance with the proclaimed goals of the socialist revolution. The bronze memorial plaque placed on the building of the Mining Directorate, which stated 'Today 3. IX. 1950, we workers overtook the mine' (Stanković, 1970, p. 89), reflected the change made in social and economic relations and marked the beginning of workers' self-management of the Bor Mines. The decision-making through the workers' councils remained a practice in the coming decades.

The collectivized and decentralized self-governed planned economy of SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) from 1945 to 1963, was initially based on the Soviet model of five-year planning. RTB had always been a target of Yugoslav developmental plans and played a significant role in the state economy. With the phased development, the mines of Bor underwent serious transformations, the plants were expanded and renovated, and rapid urbanization of the town occurred. The so-called first and second phases of the mine construction and reconstruction were preceded by two five-year plans for the period from 1947 to 1957. This was the period when the First

Phase program was adopted and launched, during which new equipment for pit and surface ore mining was acquired (Erić, 1975). The First Phase of the mine construction and reconstruction lasted from 1957 to 1961. At the end of the first phase, along with the establishment of many metallurgical institutions for research, such as the Faculty of Mining and Metallurgy, the scientific research unit Copper Institute Bor was founded as part of RTB. Its main aim was to develop scientific research projects in the fields of geology, mining, metallurgy, and technology, to provide special programs and projects of interdisciplinary character for the technological development of scientific research infrastructure, and to carry out research in the field of mining the deposits and processing the metallic and non-metallic minerals (Kostov, 2012). The second phase of the mine reconstruction and construction (1966–1971) was the phase of expansion and development, and in addition to economic investments, it included important infrastructural and non-economic investments (Erić, 1975, pp. 113–130).

From the mid-1960s, important economic and social transformations started to occur which impacted how RTB operated on the market. After the pro-market economic reforms from the 1960s onwards and after the constitutional changes in 1963, the Yugoslav economy relied more on market allocation of social services to increase its competitiveness on the international market (Mihaljević, 2019, p. 40). The 1965 economic reform package propelled Yugoslavia's involvement in the international division of labor. These reforms were driven by the idea of equally producing good quality goods as in 'the West' and, at the same time, competing on the global market. Hence, this argument was used to 'legitimize the liberalization and marketization of the Yugoslav economy, also confirmed in the resolution of the Party's 1969 Congress' (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 415). The changes date back to the change of the very Constitution. Paragraph four of Article 22 of the 1963 Constitution legalized the classic rental relationship in 'enterprises of a group of citizens' that were founded on its basis, in contrast to the paragraph three of the same Article stating that 'the employment of other people's labor for the purpose of earning income is prohibited' (Vratuša, 2012, p. 160). According to Vera Vratuša's (2012) analysis of this period, this contradiction found in the content of paragraphs three and four of Article 22 of the 1963 Constitution testified that among the framers of the Constitution there was a covert struggle between the advocates of preserving the socialist ideology and the advocates of capitalist transformations (which Vratuša calls 'restoration of capital relations' (Vratuša, 2012, cf. Močnik, 2018). These changes, among others, accelerated the process of privatization of social property, according to her, 'through business cooperation with its unofficial group of private owners, leaders of economic and non-economic self-governing organizations and socio-political communities' (Vratuša 2012, pp. 160–161). In addition, Branko Horvat notes that in the mid-1960s, Yugoslavia allocated an enviable share of 33% of its GDP to reinvestment in the Yugoslav economy (compared to 30% in Japan, 23% in Canada, and 16% in the U.S.A). (Vratuša, 2012, p. 152). In this period, occupational cleavages and hierarchies between white-collar workers and the higher working class stratum, as well as discrepancies between ordinary workers' salaries and directors' salaries, started to become visible (Mihaljević, 2019, p. 33; Musić 2021).

By trying to achieve the same quality of products and efficiency as capitalist production, Yugoslavia entered into international competition in the late socialist period. The broader trends were reflected at RTB, which was in this period increasingly under the influence of market logic and global competition. The material we analyze in this paper is embedded in such social, economic, and political transformations in late socialism. Like many profitable companies, RTB at this point also became a globally oriented enterprise, 'outward-looking, export-oriented' (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 414), with a 'globally imagined business culture' (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 414). RTB was certainly the biggest producer of copper and precious metals (Cvetanović, 2005), but was also an exporter as well. According to the company's official factory newspapers, the export of copper was officially approved in 1967, and the company sold copper on the London Stock Exchange and has traded since then on the global market (Kolektiv, 1967). However, the very official statistics on RTB's exports remain unclear. For example, in the *SFRY Federal Bureau of Statistics Statistical Yearbook* (1989), there is no trace of the export activities from 1946 until 1987, when according to the

Yearbook, very limited exports started (SFRJ Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1989, p. 312). Unfortunately, the existing in-depth analyses of RTB production, like those of many other fields of RTB's social, political and economic life, still remain extremely limited (cf. Jovanović & Đurđević, 2005; Pajić & Kojdić, 1997).

As Spaskovska and Calori (2021) identify, a process of creation of a global identity occurred among the Yugoslav workforce in the late socialist period (1976–1991). Yugoslav self-managed corporations found their place in the global economy and their role in the international division of labor. According to them, by the late 1970s, Yugoslav foreign trade and hard currency revenue 'was boosted by a number of globally oriented corporate entities' (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 414). Moreover, the goal was to 'compete with, or even overtake, the West and engage with the developed world as an equal partner, eschewing asymmetric relationships of inferiority and dependence' (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 417). With such business orientation of RTB, this period was also marked with collaborations with the West as much as with the East. Yugoslavia's leading position within the NAM became instrumental in the companies' global outreach (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 416).

Apart from the transformations delineated above, it is important to mention that Yugoslavia's position in the NAM provided important institutional and ideological frameworks that created various paths for the circulation of raw materials and industrial products but also expertise, people, and labor (Kulić, 2014; Sekulić, 2017). The NAM was founded in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961 as a political effort to create new alliances to challenge the bipolar division during the Cold War and to create direct economic relations between the member states (Zimmerman, 2014). Yugoslavia remained a member until 1992. Iran, on the other hand, joined the NAM after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, remaining a member until 2013. The goal of Iran after the Revolution was to join the NAM (1) to achieve autonomy in foreign policymaking, (2) to avoid a costly involvement in the American-Soviet rivalry, (3) to end Iran's dependence on one ideological camp, and (4) to improve ties with all states (except Israel and the former South African regime) (Sadri, 2001, p. 31). While investigating Bor's collaboration with Iran, propelled both by the transformations of Yugoslav self-management during late socialism and Yugoslav positioning in the international division of labor and by the NAM frameworks, this paper shows the very specific fabric of such circulations within the field of metallurgical enterprises.

The collaboration of RTB Bor with the Iranian company was preceded by several other collaborations carried out in the mid-1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, which was how RTB also came to be involved in the industrial transformations to join the global competition. In this period, RTB collaborated with the 'West', but it also carried out profitable projects of construction of numerous infrastructural works in Africa, for example, in Zambia, and in the 'East', Burma and India, for instance. In 1980, according to RTB's company periodical *Kolektiv*, contacts were made with the Ambassador of the Union of Burma, where RTB was supposed to train engineers, upon the completion of a copper mine there, built by RTB Bor (*Kolektiv*, 1980a, p. 2). There were also possibilities of collaboration with experts and representatives of the metal industry of Pakistan on the construction of the Saindak copper complex (*Kolektiv*, 1980d, p. 1). In the 1980s, the Deputy Minister of Metallurgy and the Deputy Minister of Economy of the People's Republic of China were also guests in Bor, where they came to agree to continue scientific and technical cooperation in the field of mining and metallurgy. RTB made a conceptual design for the Lala Copper-Polymetallic Mine in Sichuan, China (*Kolektiv*, 1980b, p. 3). RTB also collaborated with companies located in Libya, Zambia, Peru, Angola, Uganda, Jordan, Iraq, and India in the late 1970s and the 1980s. In Iraq, for example, exploration of lead and zinc ore has been conducted by RTB. Furthermore, there were also collaborations with companies in Western countries too. Such collaborations mostly took place through the Yugoslav Republic Institute for International Technical Cooperation and the Federal Chamber of Commerce. RTB mostly obtained modern technology through such collaborations. The company collaborated extensively with some German companies (such as Lurgi and Siemens, regarding the choice of modern technology for the copper alloy foundries and training) as well as French companies. RTB employees

working at the Copper Institute were trained at the Finnish company Oerlikon Balzers and there were also collaborations with companies in United Kingdom and the U.S.A (Kolektiv, 1980e, p. 8).

After Yugoslav market reforms in 1974, the companies became independent Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (BOALS) in 1976.³ Such organizations enabled greater autonomy for decision-making processes with the approval of the companies. In the early 1980s, when the collaboration with Iran took place, Yugoslavia was experiencing a serious debt crisis. In this period, international organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank intervened in Yugoslav social and political processes and requested the introduction of capitalist market-orientated transformations as a condition for their assistance (Horvat, 1984). Previously, for more than a decade, the ruling coalition had disintegrated into local coalitions of political and cultural bureaucracies and economic technocracies that adapted to the new situation: under the double pressure from below (working classes, alternative social movements) and from above (global capitalism), they decided to keep the ruling position (Močnik, 2018). The government increasingly started to take out foreign loans to keep industrial production going, thus increasing foreign debt, which further prompted austerity measures (Archer and Musić, 2019). The economic 'stabilization' that had been in place since 1979 had a goal of stopping the rise of foreign debt and addressing the foreign trade deficit. Market relations within socialist enterprises took place largely free from state intervention. The export-oriented business cultures internalized by the Yugoslav workforce mentioned earlier further led to shifts in the late 1980s towards challenging the legitimacy of self-management and transformation of social ownership. Although it could be said that RTB had been ahead of many reforms that affirmed a liberalized market-based economy in the 1980s, the literature on this period (and all others, too) concerning RTB's operations has not yet been systematically and critically addressed. The case of Bor analyzed in this paper is embedded within such dynamics of a transnational flow in the period of late socialism, which was later followed by a discontinuity with the ideological-political normative system of self-management and the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Learning from Bor's social history of labor

So far there has been great interest in scholarship on the mobility of Yugoslav workers conditioned by economic crisis. In social history and historical anthropology, the research has so far mostly focused on temporary and permanent migrations from Yugoslavia to the European countries, which usually targeted economically and industrially more stable capitalist countries (Bernard, 2019; Brunnbauer, 2019; Krstić, 2011; Le Normand, 2016, 2021). This body of literature focused on the role of 'guest workers' (*gastarbajteri*⁴) and showed how the 'transnational Yugoslav working class' (Le Normand, 2016, 2021) enabled a better understanding of historical, social, and political dynamics. The example from Bor that we bring in this paper fills in the gaps in this body of literature by describing so far less explored aspects of the migratory flows of labor that facilitated the exchange of expertise, skills, and knowledge from Yugoslavia to the Global South. The flow of Yugoslav temporary workers shows a different example whereby the workers were going into an instable region after the Islamic Revolution (1979) which was also seriously disrupted by economic crisis during and after Iran's war with Iraq (1980–1988). In fact, a very large portion of work had been finished in Iran in the period between 1982 and 1984, when around 40–50 experts and workers were sent from Bor (Knežević, 1991). Exploring the conditions that enabled mobility of not only people, but also expert skills and knowledge, to take place during the Cold War allows us to understand different power dynamics, inflected also by the very type of work and services provided, that were involved in transnational economic cooperation established through the NAM framework. Hence, we offer a unique insight that challenges dominant hegemonic power relations (and the primacy of the West) and throws a different light on the 'core – periphery' relations (Stubbs, 2023).

While *gastarbajteri* were indicative of 'more symbolic politics of out-migration' (Brunnbauer, 2019, p. 418) which denoted Yugoslav deficiency (Brunnbauer, 2019), these highly skilled and educated workers were a privileged part of the working class whose position was conditioned not just by the

state support for the particular metallurgical enterprise in Yugoslavia but also by the attempt to export know-how in order to join the global competition through the very type of highly skilled profitable work they performed. Such an international workforce that consisted of experts such as engineers and construction workers had an important role in the business endeavors of the Yugoslav corporate giants abroad (Henig & Rasza, 2023). While joining recent historiography that has recognized the role of Yugoslav work in the construction sector and architecture in widespread socialist locations across Africa and the Middle East (Baker, 2018; Spaskovska and Calori, 2021; Kulić, 2014; Sekulić, 2017; Spaskovska, 2018), the paper looks at the effects of the bilateral temporary migration relations in the specific geopolitical and historical context of Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Hence, the paper shows how this specific migratory labor flow and the export of know-how, as tacit knowledge, specific abilities, and exchanged experiences, were part of and constitutive of the increasingly neoliberalized global market and how Yugoslav global enterprises were also a driver of (temporary) migrations, and we contribute to the new history of labor of Southeast Europe (Archer & Musić, 2017; Le Normand, 2021; Rutar, 2014). Thus, we point to the complex global geopolitical power at work but also to the very practices of improvisations that were a constitutive part of the capitalist transformations.

Moreover, the paper explores still under-researched aspects of Yugoslav and international Cold War labor history and joins recent attempts to 'deprovincialize the Yugoslav economic experiment' (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021, p. 424). The focus on Yugoslav involvement in the transnational flow of highly skilled metallurgical know-how, conducted in the conditions of global trade and interdependence in late socialism, helps us to accomplish such a task. The paper provides so far still less extant details on the very work of the engineering class, the stratum of the working class that contributed to the involvement in global frameworks, and joins recent efforts to do so (Spaskovska and Calori, 2021; Spaskovska, 2018). Thus, the paper offers insight into the significance of the often improvised work performed by the workers that was constitutive of such global shifts. Moreover, by adding more details about this industrial social stratum that was significant to the Yugoslav economic and social development in a global perspective, we add more nuances to approaches to the Yugoslav 'working class', often approached in studies as homogenized and entrenched between the 'blue-collar' workers (cf. Musić, 2021) and the very management of the Yugoslav enterprises. Hence, we provide more nuance to the recent broader understanding of the Yugoslav working class (Archer, 2014; Mihaljević, 2019; Musić, 2021).

Finally, the story about temporary labor migration and the export of know-how from Bor goes beyond Yugoslavia and the NAM. The paper brings a new perspective on the practices of improvisation as an allegedly unique feature of Yugoslav experts which occurred within the much broader context of the economic exchanges between the so-called 'Second and Third Worlds' during the Cold War (Wallerstein, 1976; Laron, 2014). Our paper uncovers fine-grained details about the role of improvisations brought through those flows and how such practices impacted the shifts in social labor relations in the late 1980s.

Everyday work of the Yugoslav team in the Sarcheshmeh copper complex

The task of the skilled workers from Yugoslavia in the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex in Iran was to complete the copper assembly and start the smelter. This was not an easy task. The workers worked on electricity and automation, but there were no big machines or major electric works to be finished, our interlocutors told us. The Yugoslav project was related only to the mine, the flotation plant, and the smelter, and other companies from Belgium and Germany were simultaneously present to finish the job around the electrolysis. Bor was selected by Iran mostly because of the political climate of the NAM alliances and because RTB Bor was a renowned company that sold good quality copper on the London Stock Exchange. However, the decision that RTB would enter into collaboration with NINICO was even more complex. The prices of the services that RTB could offer were very competitive in that part of the world. Bor offered moderate pricing in comparison to what other European

companies offered on the market. According to the former director of the Copper Institute in Bor, with whom we carried out an in-depth interview and who negotiated the whole process, in comparison to companies from the U.S.A, the Yugoslav project was affordable but also not the cheapest on the market. Since RTB enjoyed great support in the Chamber of Commerce and other bodies in Yugoslavia, RTB also 'had information about how much Western Europe charged' (Č. Knežević, interview, April 2, 2022), according to the former director Čedomir Knežević. Therefore, the company knew exactly what prices to set in order to get RTB's involvement in the project. In addition, the compatibility of Bor's copper technology with the technology that was implemented in Iran was crucial too (hence, there was compatibility of expertise and knowledge to operate the technology). This business deal was highly lucrative until the very end of the project. The workers' councils at RTB received and adopted reports about these operations in the hope that RTB would be able to join even 'more operations despite the state of war there' (Kolektiv, 1987).

Era (80), a retired smelter and metallurgist (with engineering qualifications), and later a legal officer, worked in the smelter until 1974, from where he was transferred to the Copper Institute. Era was regarded by the team as a knowledgeable expert. At first, he worked at the Copper Institute, and he was one of the rare workers who spoke English. Previously, he had worked in India and Iraq on projects conducted by RTB and the Copper Institute. Era emphasized that he did not get the job through connections and nepotism, which he saw as an entrenched practice in many Yugoslav firms (cf. Archer & Musić, 2017). He was included in this project from its very beginning and was, as he argued, aware of what seemed to him to be the illogical redistribution of social income: 'What are we going to talk about in the workers' council?' he remembered his colleague saying. 'Let's talk about how to enjoy fruits of our labor' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022). He quoted his former colleague to illustrate the frequent quandary of the workers and their desire to be more in charge of the redistribution of income. He pointed out that the quality of his work was most important, along with his 'qualifications' and experience, which made him a valuable worker. In his narrative, the sense of meritocracy as a value (which he embodied) was present. He was a strong criticizer of the socialist system, he claimed, and provided his political observations about its inconsistencies and illogical functioning. At the same time, he pointed to the advantages, such as the great appreciation of the expertise that RTB workers had at that time.

Era, like some of his colleagues, described how German workers who were also working at this complex at that time benefited from all the good conditions for work. For instance, he remembered that German workers had secluded and fenced chalets, a swimming pool, and a chef who made all the workers' meals. 'Here one could see the relation between capitalism and communism very clearly' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022), he said, indicating a difference from the standards and conditions that the workers from Yugoslavia enjoyed. 'Those who saw it could see that difference clearly. They had all the conditions like in Germany' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022). Yugoslav workers lived in the accommodation that had been built for the American workers, which was luxurious and spacious and even included parts for servants (which the Yugoslav team did not have). For some time, the Yugoslav team paid the German company to eat with the German workers (lunch and dinner). Through the German workers they also managed to get products made from pork, which was unavailable in Iran. Yugoslav workers socialized with the Iranians, visited their homes, and had very good relationships.

This project also included workers who were not only employed at RTB. Bor's Copper Institute also hired other construction workers across former Yugoslavia. The workers went intermittently to Iran. For instance, when around 100 Iranians returned from Bor to Iran in 1983, groups of workers from Bor then travelled to the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex. They stayed there for six months and then returned, and they repeated their journey when needed. The workers, according to the former director of the Copper Institute, usually spent forty months abroad in total, with breaks and interruptions that could last up to a year. When the Yugoslav team entered the complex, Iran was in economic decline and was under economic sanctions imposed by the U.S.A due to the war, the workers remembered. However, the workers did not recall any crisis in their own company, as the

Copper Institute operated very well. The mechanization the Yugoslav team found in Iran was, according to all our interlocutors, the best in the world. The workers did transfer knowledge and skills, but they gained less knowledge from the Iranian workers. This stay was in their interest, according to the former director, to get to know the top technology and equipment. 'We sold them the know-how and nothing more' (Č. Knežević, interview, April 2, 2022), the former director argued. However, other kind of economic exchanges occurred as well. According to an internal document that the former director wrote as a final report for RTB (Knežević, 1991), apart from selling know-how, the idea was also to place RTB's products in Iran (which happened only to a limited extent) and to start importing goods into Yugoslavia (like dates, almonds, and pistachios). There was no progress in this regard, as the project ended in 1991.

All the skilled workers who worked in Iran had either finished university or some high school specialized for engineering. Era described his colleagues as very capable and knowledgeable – as experts. This was in essence a desirable job, as the salary per month was three to four times higher than that in their Institute. Era's work overall cost the Iranian company 17,000 DM (Deutsche Mark) on a monthly basis (approximately 8,691 EUR), while Era received 3,000–4,000 DM monthly (up to 2,000 EUR), and the rest of the money went to the Institute's funds. Besides the income obtained from the work in Iran, the workers received their regular salaries back home too. The workers also had a budget for their daily expenses and the state paid them in the local Iranian currency. Throughout the duration of this project, the sum they received decreased. With the surplus of money that had been collected for almost a decade, the Copper Institute built a new building with a new modern lab for analysis of samples as a strategic investment in the extractive industry and research and projects in that field. The extra funds that remained from the workers' salaries were sometimes allocated to healthcare and building apartments. Era took the job under one condition – since he lived in a very small one-bedroom flat, upon his return he requested a larger flat from the Institute. Eventually he got the promised apartment, but he still had to contribute and pay half of the value, according to him. This could be seen as an illustration of one of the possible navigations of the unequal distribution of socially owned flats, which certain categories of citizens used different strategies to obtain (Archer, 2013, 2016).

'Transferring' knowledge and experience was considered by Era and Marko⁵ (a planner, researcher, and metallurgy engineer) as being loyal to the company and the state. Because the state and the company enabled them to obtain training and experience in these skills, they felt indebted to the company and the state. Despite observing that some unfair payments were taking place, Era regarded his expertise as a gift to him from the company, and he felt indebted to the company because of that: 'I was not born with that knowledge; I acquired it from RTB. I transferred what I learned in the company there. I had a duty to be loyal to that company for what I know and for what I learnt in this country [*Dužan sam da toj firmi budem lojalan*]' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022). The competencies in technological processes, he argued, were important for preserving 'the integrity of the team in the field', which he found important, while also noticing the shortcomings and the 'weak links' in the project, by which he meant that some workers were not as professional as him (having love affairs on the fieldsite, for example). Being part of this team meant being professional, in terms of the knowledge and expertise they had and there was a duty to contribute to the professionalism of the team.

Improvisations at the semi-peripheries

When describing specific jobs they performed, our interlocutors pointed to the ability of workers from Bor to *improvise* in various specific situations of interruptions or calamities. They assessed the causes of these incident situations and emphasized the innovative solutions that the workers had to come up with when faced with the uncertain situations arising from the attempts to continue the engineering plans left by the American workers, which required moving the copper production forward in an unfinished and brand-new complex where the workers did not obtain the necessary

training to operate the abandoned system. In their ability to improvise they saw a difference between Yugoslav and other foreign (Western) teams who, according to them, only followed the schemes, rules, protocols, and their project documentation, not daring to react to unplanned and unforeseen circumstances in a creative way. Completely new conditions for all the actors and the new undeveloped technology enabled a 'more creative' approach to solving minor accidents and downtime in production, when the work experience of the Yugoslav experts came to the fore, in which they took pride. These delays reduced the productivity in the context of very expensive production, where the priority was to solve problems quickly. This was where more experienced workers were significant for managing (within the structured work organization) efficient delivery of services. Our interlocutors frequently mentioned the required improvisations that were done in spite of all the problems and impediments which occurred due to the very nature of work and the technical and economic conditions in which it was done. Such navigations, which consisted of finding innovative ways to solve problems and going beyond the project's documentation, constituted the everyday work in the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex.

Such quick reactions were necessary during production stoppages, from accidents in electrical installations to other specific problems in certain industrial facilities. All the workers pointed out some good sides of the American contractors. Marko, a retired engineer remembered: 'The Americans distributed electrical stainless steel pipes, so they broke the cables through them with steel guides so that the cable could not be damaged by shocks and was not exposed to moisture, so it could last 100 years' (Marko, March 21, 2022). Some of the Yugoslav workers' innovative solutions targeted the final refining processes that were assessed as hasty solutions. Era pointed out that the converters had to be rebuilt with slightly reduced capacities. According to one of our interlocutors, the moments and places in which they had to improvise were also connected to what they found on the site after the American workers left. Era called the American side of production 'the West' and saw it as a core of capitalism. 'the West', according to him, left the site in a hasty manner:

There was a failure on the converters. Those are big barrels. They found them completely surrounded by walls [and they were not supposed to be] . . . Then we tempered them with heaters, wood burners, to become red-hot so that they could receive copper and those thermal stresses . . . We pour copper and it starts to leak. At the very start . . . Nothing can come out of that. Then I have to walk the converter up and down first to freeze it inside and then plug it in . . . I don't know if it was a mistake or they did it on purpose . . . I don't know . . . Maybe they knew they would be kicked out . . . one can feel that . . . (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022)

Era added: 'There are no better people than us for improvisations. The Germans (*Švabe*) always have a functioning system, and when the system fails, they are incompetent' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022). It would never occur to the Germans to improvise, he said. He described how when a mechanical part from Germany did not arrive for months, the German workers would stop working and after some months of not receiving the proper part, would simply return to Germany without finishing the job. The Germans did everything 'by the book', according to him. While understanding the world as polarized ('the West' and 'us'), our interlocutors noted the importance of their improvisation which enabled the agreed business to be completed. All the workers understood that modern ('Western') business and entrepreneurship implied that everyone who worked outside the project using non-procedural problem-solving with handy materials and technical wit meant a certain improvisation. Faced with the half-finished, abandoned Iranian project that needed expertise for its finalization, the improvisation that they performed was seen as a practice that was a fault line separating the way in which 'developed' or 'Western' countries approached the work (hence, with less improvisation) and the way in which Yugoslav workers skillfully approached their job in conditions that were not always ideal.

Our interlocutors understood the domestic and foreign political situation of that era in a way that largely coincided with the ideological orientations and official positions of the SFRY. They were aware of the situation in which the country they came from was doing business with both Iran and Iraq, which were at war at the time. This implied that there was a constant fear of assessment of

'interstate relations of honesty and friendship' (Č. Knežević, interview, April 2, 2022), especially by Iranian authorities. In the ideological sense, the workers were obliged not to express their political views based on socialist self-government while on the territory of Iran but subordinated them to apolitical market strategies. Nevertheless, they were critical of their socio-political environment of 'socialism with a human face' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022), reformulated into an ideological hybrid. Era said: 'A man with a soul cannot be a capitalist' (E. Mičić, interview, 20 March, 2022) and mentioned the paradoxical situation in which it was considered that Yugoslav companies would be aligned with communism while at the same time Yugoslavia operated, all our interlocutors agreed, according to capitalist principles on foreign markets. This specific hybrid and fluid connection between the rigid ideology of the Communist Party and the concession to the principles of a liberal market economy was certainly a characteristic and well-known position in the public sphere and public discourse as understood by the workers. Such an impression was shared since they considered that their position was determined by the active participation of Yugoslavia in the NAM, which was an attempt to create a different distribution of power and survival outside the bloc classification.

Apart from the improvisations around performing the engineering work, the very notion of improvisation was also very prominent in the story of the former director of the Institute. He claimed that his managerial struggle was to overcome what he considered as rigid bureaucratic socialist apparatus and bodies within late socialism, when BOALs were showing their failures. The BOAL organization (or *OURization*) initially brought the breakup of companies into financially independent parts. With this, RTB Bor was broken up into a great number of separate companies (within one big complex), which had their own internal banks, especially after market-oriented business became possible from 1963. The first internal banks at RTB were founded in 1966 (Kolektiv, 1965, p. 4). According to Horvat, the BOAL system contributed to transforming the existing business systems into a kind of confederation of sovereign economic entities. This was in line with the general concept of confederalism in politics and 'contract economy in industry' (Horvat, 1989, pp. 31–34). However, the atomization, according to him, required arbitration and thus enabled a political monopoly. After the resistance to such transformations in the fields of economics and science was broken, it seemed that politics had secured absolute supremacy, and the consequences of the *OURization* appeared (Horvat, 1989, p. 32). According to Horvat, a decline in economic efficiency, occurred, as well as discrediting of self-management, and the dispersal of work collectives (Horvat, 1989, p. 32). In this period, the BOAL model inaugurated a formalistic model of self-governance with assemblies, votes, numerous normative legislations, and many agreements and arrangements (most often imposed), with numerous imposed structures (different groups for coordination) (Horvat, 1989). Horvat claims that this was fertile ground for manipulation of all kinds, which prevented initiatives, discredited self-management, and broke up and passivized the collective, while generating statist behavior. At best, according to him, BOALs brought deep juridical-economic-organizational-ideological confusion. At worst, they were 'simply a diversion that prevents self-management and the economy is forcibly returned to the statist track' (Horvat, 1989, pp. 36–37). The narration by Čedomir Knežević (85), the former director of the Institute, about his experiences of leading and managing the Institute resonates with Horvat's analysis of the consequences when the BOAL system showed its weakness.

Čedomir Knežević was a professor at the Technical Faculty in Bor and the director of the Copper Institute from 1978 to 1990. When he was appointed, the Institute employed over 600 people, of which 150 were experts. As a director and the head manager of the Iranian project (among other projects conducted at the Institute), he had full autonomy in decision-making. There was no influence from the state or the Communist party in his business, he emphasized. Iran was very satisfied with the results, he maintained. This project was, according to him, an independent action, an enterprise that required ingenuity and the freedom to make choices, which he certainly had. He used his own negotiating skills to get this job, and he emphasized that the main characteristics of a leader were necessary, as well as ingenuity and freedom of decision-making to carry out the project. This was especially important in the context of socialist 'levelling' (*uravnilovka*). *Uravnilovka*

was a form of wage and benefits egalitarianism, in the sense of equal redistribution of income among those who were involved in the production, unrelated to the amount and quality of work done, and directed towards the productivity of labor but also the stable balance of the company. Such social distribution and levelling, according to the former director, took away the possibility for workers to be rewarded. According to him, that particular inability destroyed the work and productivity. Such a system of redistribution, according to him, diminished the possibility of providing a financial reward to those 'who deserved and worked better' (Č. Knežević, interview, April 2, 2022). This meant that the rewards stimulated productivity, which was the principle he marked as 'the Western' one. These were small differences in salaries, but, in his opinion, they were significant in relation to the then legal categories of three existing salary pay grades. This created the need for bureaucratic improvisation, which he described:

Then [...] I was a little virtuoso. I was inventing titles [for the pay grades]. There were three grades for a higher position (for experts), and I made [the categories] to have six or seven, but the legal advisor [from the Institute] did not allow that. And then I sent him [the legal advisor] on a business trip exactly at the moment when the workers' council was about to have a meeting where they could approve the opening of more job positions (with different pay grades). This is how places were created [...]. One who has greater reach needs to be rewarded. There were small differences in salaries (Č. Knežević, interview, April 2, 2022).

By sending the best experts to Iran, he claimed, with such improvisations and navigations where they could perform, the director managed to reward the workers through this project (this is how he fought *uravnilovka*). The director himself also went abroad because of the money he could earn. He commented that in the West the salaries were better, while in Yugoslavia 'only those with lower salaries had to go abroad'. When the worker could both work at home and go abroad for a while to work there, it comprised a better job than the regular job 'in the West', he claimed (with the exception of representatives of some big entrepreneurial companies). The socialist system of *uravnilovka*, according to him, could not provide the space for more ambitious and better workers. Therefore, they could not develop more ('The one who is more trenchant, cannot easily germinate [to develop]' [*Onaj ko je prodorniji ne može lako da klija*]). The former director argued that going abroad to work on such projects was the way in which one could avoid *uravnilovka*: 'The one who is more literate, who wants to do more, to earn more, he could not get away from it [*uravnilovka*] except by working abroad. Inside the country, it was difficult. We put up with it' (Č. Knežević, interview, April 2, 2022).

These strategies also seemed to be tacitly accepted by the Party at that point, since Ivan Stambolić (the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in the 1980s), according to the director, visited the Copper Institute several times. During one of his visits, the former director argued, Stambolić asked the director how he rewarded the workers. Stambolić was known for supporting reforms and was against the status quo politics that were prevalent in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s (Archer & Musić, 2019, p. 17). The very improvisations and navigations were also mentioned by Branko Horvat, who observed 'the jungle of rewarding' (Horvat, 1984, p. 242), which he found as an 'unsurprising deviation' (Horvat, 1984, p. 242), where each non-planned action, such as providing rewards, could also have been judged as a violation of social ownership. However, no matter how chaotic these bureaucratic improvisations may seem to be, in fact they required certain skilled bureaucratic maneuvers (in this case by the former director) that were acts of harmonization within the particular larger context of liberalization of the socialist market.

The very improvisations on the plan of organization of work and also within the performance of highly skilled work, which stem both from experiences of the 'nature' of work and from class differences, in fact enabled a shift in the production towards and an accommodation of more capitalist ways of production. In this sense, more private initiatives and improvisations and tacit approval for them were made possible in the late socialism of the 1980s. These practices reveal the very process of the wider capitalist transformations. Moreover, the very contestations and improvisations bring to the fore the development of conceptualization and differentiation between the 'salary'

and 'earnings' mentioned by our interlocutors.⁶ Such a distinction denoted that the 'earnings' and bonuses could not be added to the salary in an easy way, since the 'salary' was tied to social contributions (health and pension, for example), which were proportional to the fixed gross amount.

The example from Bor indicates the ways in which certain individuals, especially highly skilled workers who worked in the field of metallurgy and mining, were involved in constant shifts and in embedding entrepreneurial reasoning. The presumed direct influence of the highest state bodies such as the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce or the relevant ministry did not exist, but they did create, according to the Director, a 'favorable climate' for signing profitable deals. One of the rationales for rewarding the workers was also due to very difficult conditions in which the work was performed in Iran. The position of the workers from Yugoslavia who left for Iran was burdened by the war with Iraq and it influenced the difficulty experienced by the management from Yugoslavia in their negotiations with Iran at the beginning. In addition, while Yugoslav workers were residing in Iran, one of the workers heard rumors among the Iranian workers that Yugoslavia was selling material for chemical weapons to Iraq (poison gas). While Yugoslav workers were working in such conditions, the Iranian workers who worked at Sarcheshmeh were also fighting in the war with Iraq and are today perceived by NICICO as Sarcheshmeh martyrs (NICICO, n.d.). The industrial endeavors and warfare were intertwined.

Conclusion

The creativity and innovations shown in problem-solving by the Yugoslav team at the Sarcheshmeh project, which deviated from particular norms, existed to maintain, continue, and enable production at RTB. However, at the same time these endeavors served to enable RTB to join and harmonize with the global market in late socialism. The improvisations our interlocutors described had an important ideological (socialist) component. These practices were, in fact, embedded within a wider and broader process of neoliberalization of the global market and within the transformation of Yugoslav industry and organization of labor and decision making, while at the same time the BOALs were starting to show weaknesses. Hence, as our interlocutors pointed out, such improvisations led to shifts in the production, which facilitated and helped consolidate capitalist methods of production. The workers who were highly educated and a privileged stratum of the working class, working in an advantaged but also highly profitable Yugoslav company, and their temporary labor migration to the Middle East played a role in facilitating the capitalist transformations. Such labor migratory flow, which enabled the export of know-how in the metallurgical industry, indicates not only the multi-layered character of Yugoslav migration and Yugoslav self-management but also the limits and contradictions of the Yugoslav emancipatory project at home.

Despite the efforts to continue the project and cooperation, the war in Bosnia was the main reason why this project stopped. The tensions were also felt at the very working site in Iran in 1990, as nationalist politics and anti-Muslim sentiments were increasingly present in Serbian politics. For RTB, the crisis was not only an economic one during the 1980s, but it came with the crisis related to the 'national question' in Yugoslav republics. In spite the official end of the collaboration, it did have some aftereffects. Long-term cooperation was achieved in the field of education of personnel from Iran at the Technical Faculty in Bor and some of them stayed to work and live in Bor. As the director of the Copper Institute mentioned, several mixed marriages resulted from these collaborations. As a social contribution to the distribution of funds enabled by self-management, part of the profit earned from this project served to build a new laboratory of the Copper Institute, which is still in use today. It allowed the purchase of more modern equipment and enabled participation of the Institute in the construction of facilities in the town that were built under the promise of the socialist 'social standard'.

In this paper we have looked at two kinds of work of Yugoslav industrial workers from two different angles. The improvisations we have illustrated show the very texture of the conditions of such work in the period of stabilization in Yugoslavia. We have shown how innovative and

sometimes spontaneous practices, without previous preparation (hence, not by acting within the routine), enabled these workers to 'jump through the hoops' to get the industrial (profitable) work done. Such practices among highly skilled workers and the (technical) managers were constitutive practices that also made the collaborations facilitated by the NAM possible. The improvisations that our interlocutors mentioned were interpreted more as creative ways to contribute to entrepreneurial endeavors (to obtain highly paid expertise and get the work done) that came to the fore in Iran, which were conducted for and enabled for the survival, preservation, and growth of capital. Such practices, as we have shown, were an important part of the dynamics of such temporary labor migration that was constitutive of the heterogeneity of the Yugoslav working class (Archer & Musić, 2017, 2019). Archer and Musić (2019) pointed out that within Belgrade metalwork factories during this same period of deep crisis and the period of stabilization in the 1980s, blue-collar workers at other factories expressed multifaceted grievances, pointing to, among other things, the usurpation of socially owned property, unemployment, corruption, and wide social inequalities among the working class. Unlike in such factories, the example from Bor brings narratives of successful navigation of work that seems to be more capitalist-like ventures in the late socialism. Such 'success stories', which caused the economic crisis to be felt less keenly in Bor, were possible exactly because of the very support provided by the federal state to RTB which many other factories did not have. In addition, this extractive, export-oriented Yugoslav 'giant' was crucial to realizing the Yugoslav idea of joining the global market, due to the very extractive potential and the goods it exported and sold on the global market. The latter made a big difference when it comes to the experiencing work at this company. The very grievances on the shop floor found in other factories across Yugoslavia that produced particular goods (such as machine producers) and the very economic problems encountered in the late 1980s were experienced differently in big metallurgical complexes, such as RTB, that extracted and processed precious metals. Hence, in order to theorize a social history of labor of the period of stabilization, it is necessary to avoid generalizations and to emphasize the heterogeneity of different industrial fields in Yugoslavia that made a difference within the very experiences of labor and its organization. The case of RTB shows that long before the 1980s, the complex was engaged in selling precious metals (gold, silver, and copper, among others) on the global stock exchange market, and during the period of stabilization it exported non-material goods, such as engineering expertise. We have shown that the economic migrations were not the only ways in which Yugoslavia participated in the global market. Rather, Yugoslavia also participated through specific transnational labor migration, and the export of engineering know-how was applied in extractive and precious metal industries constitutive of the global market. Through such a big industrial system during late socialism in Yugoslavia, temporary labor migration from Bor was important for silent acceptances of the reproduction of capitalist relations. At the same time, the export of know-how was important for the social status and reputation of Yugoslavia. By pointing to such highly qualified workforce flows to the Global South, we have shown how know-how as a non-material strategic resource and a service (and not a mere material good) was involved in consolidating the general process of liberalization of the socialist market in the late 1980s. With this, we have shed light on the ways in which the entire frame of the Yugoslav project worked according to the logics of transnational capitalism and, crucially, how workers managed to improvise in order to circumvent the bureaucratic restrictions of Yugoslav self-management socialism.

The labor mobility and collaborations facilitated by both Yugoslav desire to join the global market in late socialism and the NAM alliances cannot and should not be seen as resistances and/or alternatives to the Western/Northern hegemonies. Rather, they should be seen as practices embedded in particular economic, historical, political, and social conditions which made the accommodation of capitalist relations at the semi-peripheries possible. The global market and the NAM as a framework rather served to facilitate such labor migratory flows and flows of industrial know-how that enabled capitalist ventures to emerge from and through collaboration with the semi-peripheries.

Notes

1. Since we started this research during the COVID-19 pandemic, the contacts with our interlocutors were limited. As the work on the export of know-how occurred almost forty years ago, many of the workers who worked on that project are no longer alive and other actors are elderly and among the vulnerable category. Limited by the trying circumstances, we managed to conduct some interviews onsite in Bor, with the help of informal telephone conversations with our interlocutors, which served for acquiring details and through which we also managed to create rapport.
2. A company that has now ceased trading, the Anaconda Group from Montana and Parsons-Jurden, headquartered in Virginia (Financial Tribune, 2016).
3. According to Archer and Musić (2017, p. 61) the Basic Organisation of Associated Labour (BOAL) was 'the smallest unit of the enterprise which constituted a political and economic entity. Each of these smaller enterprise departments was equipped with its own set of self-management bodies and joined the larger collective voluntarily, based on a self-management contract and a delegation in the central workers' council. The Yugoslav self-managing enterprise in late socialism was a 'work organization' – an association of BOALs enjoying full legal and political sovereignty. BOAL is also abbreviated as OOUR from the Serbo-Croatian *Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada*'.
4. From the German word *Gastarbeiter*, which means 'guest worker'.
5. The interlocutor remains anonymous.
6. A concept that in a more general sense relates more to the private entrepreneurial context (Žikić, 2007).

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Disclosure statement

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