THE CHANGING FACE OF NEPAD AND THE CHALLENGES OF FACILITATING SUB- REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ON THE ECOWAS PLATFORM (2001-2011)

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MARCH, 2013.

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that **Udo Robertson Agomuonso** with **Reg. No: 201014011** carried out this research work under my supervision.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been presented in part or in full anywhere or in any academic forum; it was not adapted, cropped or redesigned in any form for academic purposes. The work is original and the authors whose works are cited and reviewed were duly referenced**.**

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Udo Robertson Agomuonso

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the one who liveth forever, whose hand spread out the heavens, who sits on the throne in heaven and uses the earth as his footstool. He ordained that I will visit this planet, and granted me the grace to reach this academic height. I love him so much.

GOD ALMIGHTY!!! TAKE ALL THE GLORY.

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ABSTRACT

This research is intended to evaluate and study the challenges confronting NEPAD's quest for sub regional economic integration in the ECOWAS domain. Political and economic integration has been part of African strategy to overcome fragmentation, marginalization and improve the continent's position in the global political economy. Indeed, Africa needs integration more than any other continent or region in the world and this is why, it has had a fair share of regional integration arrangements all through her history. Unfortunately, these efforts have not paid off in the dimension of desired expectations. When NEPAD was established, it was given regional integration responsibilities, even though it was not a regional organization. It was mandated to drive regional integration in Africa by supporting the regional integration efforts of the regional economic institutions in Africa. After 10 years of existence, African leaders dissolved NEPAD and in its place, instituted the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). This move was orchestrated by the seemingly slow progress made by NEPAD in this direction. NEPAD and ECOWAS has been working together to promote regional integration, but like in most parts of Africa, the challenges has been seemingly intractable. The study is anchored around the principles of integration as presented by the neo-functionalists theorists. Hence, the research attempted to provide an explanation of the performance and non-performance of NEPAD as a regional integration tool, within the confines of the theory. The findings show that while, there has been some level of success in this venture as evidenced by the projects that are on-going in the sub region, the fact remains that NEPAD did not deliver or actually delivered below expectations. However, this situation is reversible as the study submitted that, there is a future for regional integration in West Africa, Africa and the new NPCA, if the African Union pulls the right levers.

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ABBREVIATION

AGOA:	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
APRM:	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU:	African Union
CAADP:	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme
CET:	Common External Tariff
COREPER:	Committee of permanent Representatives
ECA:	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAP:	Economic Community of West African Agricultural Policy
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC:	European Coal and Steel Council
EEC:	European Economic Council
EMCP:	Ecowas Monetary Cooperation Programme
EU:	European Union
FMPMT:	Free Movement Pilot Monitoring Team
ICT:	Information Communication Technology
IGO:	Intergovernmental Organisations
ITU:	International Telecommunication Union
LDCs:	Least Developed Countries
NEPAD:	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPCA:	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
NPoA:	National programme of Action
O C A:	Optimum Currency Area
OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
SADC:	South African Development Community
STAP:	Short Term Action Plan
UEMAO:	West African Monetary Economic Union
WAGP:	West African Gas Pipeline
WAMZ:	West African Monetary Zone
WAPCO:	West African Gas Pipeline limited
WAPP:	West African Power Pool
WEF:	World Economic Forum

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction of Study

This research studied the circumstances surrounding the recent dissolution of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and its consequent replacement with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). When NEPAD was established in 2001, it received widespread support and the expectations were very high. This situation began to change a few years after, as most of the founding elites began to show their disappointment with the Agency. Two of such frustrations came from President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. In the words of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal:

> I am disappointed. I have great difficulties explaining what we have achieved when people at home and elsewhere ask me. We are spending a lot of money and, above all. Losing time with repetition and conferences, that end and you are not quite sure what they have achieved...Expenses adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on trips [and] on hotels. But not a single classroom has been built, not a single health center completed... a Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, who was the chief architect of NEPAD, stated Thus; I am afraid that we have not made the progress we had hoped for. Indeed, and regrettably, I believe that we have lost some of the momentum, which attended the launch …of the NEPAD; he then submitted that, "Ten years on, to deny that NEPAD has not failed will be foolhardy (Jonas, 2012, p. 98).

Other African leaders may have shared this feeling because at the end of the 14thAfrican Union Summit in Addis Ababa on the 1st of February 2010, they announced the dissolution of NEPAD, and replaced it with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). This new agency will be a body of the African Union and has been mandated to facilitate and coordinate the implementation of continental and regional priority programmes, while mobilising resources and partners in support of their implementation. The heads of states and government at the AU Summit also directed NPCA to coordinate research, monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes in line with the vision and core values of the African Union (Kabange, 2010, p. 1).

One of the major reasons for the establishment of NEPAD is to facilitate regional integration and thereby accelerate development in Africa. Africa has been overwhelmed by multifaceted problems ranging from poverty, to hunger and poor infrastructural development including poor governance. Some of these problems were vividly stated during the African Business leader Forum in October of 2003, hosted by Eskom in Johannesburg, South Africa.

During this summit, Africa's problems were summarized to include: "the economic dependence of African countries on the developed nations of the north, which coupled with borrowing from IMF and World Bank, leaves many African countries with seemingly insurmountable debts and, in consequence, imposed structural adjustments". Other problems identified were those that adversely affect growth and sustainability on different parts of the African continent, including those caused by globalisation, market access and peace and security" (Dani and Neuland, 2005, p. 447**)** . The level of retrogression and poverty in Africa leaves a huge gap when compared with the level of advancement recorded in the developed countries of the world. For instance, "In Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, lives in less than US $1 per day. The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1000, and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58% of the population has access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 percent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in Africa, compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high-income countries (NEPAD, 2001).

In addition, a report of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (1991) further reiterates these woes. According to the report" The African nations and their 650 million people have suffered a bitter and persistent social and economic crisis. Africa has the largest number of poorest countries in the world. Out of the 42 nations in the world that are known as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which are the poorest among the poor Africa have 29 countries." Some opinions hold that these situations were an aftermath of globalisation, which is seen as antithetical to Africa's development. Consequently, when African leaders created NEPAD in 2001, it was with the sole aim of using it as a tool to foster African integration and ensure that Africa will check the negativities of globalisation. This is evident in the long-term objective of NEPAD, which is to "eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process" (NEPAD, 2001).

Clearly, NEPAD is expected to pursue a twin role of being a regional integration tool and a globalisation stabiliser. The promoters of AU and NEPAD combine the traditional motivation for regional integration of harnessing pooled resources for a common interest, and serve to reconcile the tensions between globalization pressures and the demands for greater local autonomy, while offering states in Africa an opportunity to retain their own autonomy over political processes" (Ogwu, 2006, p. 3*)*.Infact, the founders of NEPAD gave it regional integration responsibilities. This is notable in Article 90 to 95 supports this fact. In it, NEPAD recognizes that most African countries are small in both population and income per capita. This it attributed to limited markets, which attracts limited investments and that "these economic conditions, point to the need for African countries to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration on the continent, in order to improve international competitiveness. The five sub regional economic groupings of the continent must, therefore be strengthened" (Article 91). Article 92 and 93 stated the focus and priority of NEPAD. It is expected to focus on the provision of 'essential regional public goods' like transport, energy, water, ICT, disease eradication, environmental preservation and provision of regional research capacity as well as the promotion of intra-African trade and investments. Accordingly, it will seek to rationalize the institutional framework for economic integration, by identifying common projects compatible with integrated country and regional development programmes and on the harmonization of economic and investment policies and practices. This will be done through a coordination of national sector policies and effective monitoring of regional decisions.

In summary, NEPAD is expected to give priority to capacity building in order to enhance the effectiveness of existing regional structures and the rationalization of existing regional organization while the African Development Bank is expected to support it because of its primary role of financing regional studies, programmes and projects. Concisely, the quest for an efficient regional integration was one of the major reasons behind the formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Now, it is pertinent to understand the concept of regionalism and regional integration.

Regionalism is defined by Lavergene (1997, p. 2) as "regional approach to problem solving including regional integration, regional co-operation or both" succinctly stated, regionalism is acting in concert as opposed to acting unilaterally. When a nation understands that certain problems cannot be tackled as a single force or entity, they tend to look for a corporate approach to that issue and, it is this combined efforts that is termed regionalism. The process and tool of regionalism is usually regional co-operation or integration. Regional integration itself, is defined by Bischoff (2004, p. 122), citing Harlow as a "process by which a group of states voluntarily and in various degrees ‘accesses’ each other’s markets and establish (es) mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social, and cultural benefits of their interactions” It should be stated here that, whereas economic integration may form a cardinal point for the integrating states, regional integration could include other levels like politics, culture, etc. Scholars especially of third world integration order have always struggled with this dichotomy, mainly because most regional integration arrangements in Africa and the third world tilts more towards economic than other forms of integration.

Historically speaking, the idea of African Unity is not new. When they started getting independence in the late 1950s, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who was one of the first leaders of African independence, implored African leaders to galvanize towards the unity of the continent. This was the emergence of Pan-Africanism, nationalism and regionalism, central planning versus free market play of market forces, self-reliance versus the continued extraversion of African economies. According to Lavergene and Daddieh (1997, p. 104) “these competing and economic visions were manifested in the interactions and tensions of three camps the radical Pan-Africanist ‘Casablanca’ group; its conservative antithesis, the nationalist “Monrovia group and the francophone African ‘Brazzaville’ group during the period before the formation of the organization of African Unity”. However, there was no formal unified institution to pursue the African dream at this point, as Lavergene and Daddieh (1997, p. 7) concluded, “What it did not do was to construct a continental political Kingdom capable of planning economic development and harnessing African energies and resources for that purpose. Instead and virtually on the contrary, African leaders established a club of heads of state that sought to protect the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independence existence. “By 1963 the Organization of African Unity was created and this opened the floodgates for the creation and formation of subsequent continental organizations to fill the gap of Nkrumah’s generation. It should be also stated here, that other than the continental, regional and sub-regional wide organizations like the OAU and ECOWAS, other Intergovernmental organizations began to emerge to strengthen and drive the agenda of these organization. It is within this platform that The New Partnership for African Development sprang up. The transmutation of NEPAD into Nepad Planning and Coordinating Agency according to African leaders was a result of the failure of NEPAD to live up to its mandate.

This research is an attempt to examine the challenges that ultimately led to the dissolution of NEPAD and its replacement with the NPCA. Put differently, the research should be able to show the extent to which NEPAD succeeded in accomplishing this task of fostering regional economic integration on the platform of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It will do this by undertaking a review of the role of NEPAD in facilitating certain elements of economic integration in West Africa. In this vein, NEPAD lead ECOWAS projects in energy, transport, ICT, Monetary Union, Trade, Industrialization etc will be examined. It should be noted here that the research does not treat NEPAD as a regional organization since it is not one, but as an instrument, crafted to facilitate and ensure effective integration. NEPAD is not a regional integration arrangement in itself but a tool for strengthening regional arrangements. Thus, in carrying out this assignment, NEPAD has been mandated to work in collaboration with the regional groups. Therefore, challenges of NEPAD programmes will therefore translate to challenges to regional integration arrangements.

This chapter includes the following; Historical background, a statement of problem, the research question or hypothesis, Objectives of study, review of related literature, research methodology, and limitation of study.

1.2 Historical Background of West Africa

Although the fulcrum of our study is the ECOWAS institution, it is necessary to understand the background of West Africa, upon which the ECOWAS operates. This is necessary to bring clarity to the domain of our study. ECOWAS covers the nations of West Africa, but our study focuses on ECOWAS as an actor in international, regional and continental relations.

West Africa is a region of sorts, when one considers its diverse climates, cultures, people, races and geography. Despite these differences, there are evidences that suggest a common ancestry and remote past. Historical sources has it that they may have moved into the region as part of the vast migration of Negroes who fled the Sahara as it grew progressively drier beginning about the sixth millennium B.C. Human habitation in the forest has been found dating back ten thousand years ago…infiltrating the forest probably in response to population pressures from the north, the migrants would have found, first of all, shelter from attack, and then a fertile, well watered territory capable of sustaining substantial numbers of people. (July, 1970, p. 102) The pre-colonial history of West Africa revolved around certain great and ancient kingdoms. For instance, Benin was already a strong and extensive Kingdom when the Portuguese discovered it in 1485, and subsequently the Yoruba of Oyo, The Ashanti, and Dahomey, which all established centralized stable states with extensive political authorities, diverse economic interests and deep-seated culture.

The people lived under varying socio-political environments. The Ibo, who dwelt east of the Niger and north of its delta, were mainly farmers, organized around village communities, made up by the homestead and lead by the clan head with the council of elders. The age grades were expected to carry out the decision of the elders and were the local police. Family descent was patrilineal and family solidarity was strong, centering on the homestead, with its heavy walls of red earth surrounding the barns and dwellings… Near the barn was sure to be a small shrine where rested the symbols of personal gods and ancestors, and these received regular offerings of food, palm wine, kola nuts and prayer (July, 1970, p. 105). The Akan People were another group that lived west of Yorubaland, but in compact villages and under matrilineal family structure. There were also the Wolof and Serer people of Senegambia, whose kings run a sort of aristocratic monarchy. Thus, the government was hierarchical and centralized, and with the king's mother who ruled certain villages doubled as a judicial organ of some sort, legislating over minor cases.

The Mendes of Sierra Leone were also an interesting group whose government relied much on secret societies. They were defacto guardians of the ethical and moral standards of the people. The Ife and Oyo People of the Yoruba extract where also another group with a rich historical culture in the pre-colonial West Africa. From their ancestral father, Oduduwa, who settled in Ife and whose descendants formed the great ancient Oyo Empire, they left indelible footmarks through their rich culture in West Africa. Yorubaland in the height of its authority during the eighteenth century extended to Niger in the north, south to the sea, east to Benin and west to the kingdom of Dahomey. The Alafin of Oyo was the head of the kingdom, who governed under natural and strict checks and balances. This obviously was an indication of the early practices of democratic principles in West Africa. The power resided with the Oyomesi who were the kingmakers. They were the aristocratic leaders of the seven wards of the capital city, who formed a council of state and were responsible for the selection of the Alafin. They are also expected to condemn a deficient king to death by suicide and thus became a check against tyranny. The Ogboni was also a secret society for religious and political leaders and was a kind of enforcement agency.

The people of Benin Kingdom, who lived east of Yorubaland had common heritage with the Yoruba, infact both heritage and traceable to a common ancestral descent of Oduduwa. The Capital was cited in Benin and the King ruled in a fashion of aristocratic monarchy. However, he was more supreme than the Alafin, since the checks were not as rigorous. Kingship was by succession and the Oba has a council of chiefs that ruled with him. It should be noted that because of its proximity to the seacoast, Benin was one of the earliest West African States to meet the European explorers during the 15th century. Infact it was in 1485 that the Portuguese appeared at Benin in search of trade, which was quickly instituted with pepper and slaves. There was also the kingdom of Dahomey, which first emerged as a vassal state to the Oyo Empire but later became an independent name. It became prominent like Benin, as one of the main sources of supply for West African Slave trade. It included the Aja and Ewe states in the west of Yoruba Kingdom. One of her notable kings was King Agaja, under whom she engaged in some expansionist policy. The royal house of Dahomey ruled from its capital at Abomey on principles unusual in traditional West African societies, for power was highly centralized in the hands of the king (July, 1970, p. 114). A highly military state with women soldiers called the Amazons; Dahomey became a great nation controlling the Slave trade with strong European Presence. Further West of Dahomey lived the Akan States of Ashanti and Fante. They were majorly Twi and Akan speakers, which also included villages like Wassa, Sefwi, Denkyira, Ashanti, Assin and Fante. The Ashanti kingdom rose under the auspices of three notable kings of the Oyoko Clan namely; Obiri Yeboa, Osei Tutu, and Opoku Ware to become the foremost military state in the Gold Coast region. Additionally, it became a major commercial power, with commitments, north to the Savanah and south to the Atlantic. Like the Ashanti, the Fante States formed a league with a parliament composed of national representatives headed by the braffo or ruler of Mankessim who became the head of State. It set out to counter the Ashanti Threat but lacked cohesion. Consequently, by the nineteenth century, the Fante felled to the superior power of the Ashanti. The crisis that followed brought British Intervention and further strengthened European control.

In the domain of Arts and sculpture, the Yorubas of Ife were notable with their bronze sculptors traceable from the earlier Nok terra cottas, there was also the delicate Bulom ivory carvings so priced by the early Portuguese visitors to Sierra Leone. Others are the wood sculptures of Ibo and Yoruba, Dan and Guro, Senufo, Baule, or Mende etc.According to Robert July (1970, p. 105) “ these societies claimed a wide ranging prerogative to dictate in such matters as public health, agricultural production, education, or political succession relying on their close liaison with the spirit world as a basis for their authority".

Commerce in the pre-colonial West Africa was a beehive of activities. It was more of a specialized division of labour, where certain communities focused on those industries that offer them a comparative advantage. The industries were majorly led by farming with further subdivisions into different type of crops, mining, weaving, smithing and trading. Robert July (1970, p. 104) has noted that " commerce became the specialty of certain tribal subdivisions like the Dyula who had their representatives located strategically along trade routes and who devoted their full time to merchandising, leaving cultivation of their lands in the hands of domestic slaves. The products that were popularly exchanged in the absence of a common currency included gold dust, fabrics, kola nuts, Shea-butter, and salt.

The scramble for and partition of Africa took a slightly dramatic direction in West Africa. Portugal was the first European power to show expansion interest in West Africa, but Britain and France overtook her in the quest for territories in West Africa. By 1900, the scramble was virtually over, and all West Africa, except the small Republic of Liberia, was now under the European rule. Even then Liberia was not unaffected by the scramble for she lost a considerable portion of the coast to which she had laid claim since the 1830s (Ayandele et al, 1971, p. 141). The European colonization of Africa and indeed West Africa was successful for several reasons. Firstly, the Europeans were better armed and had better trained soldiers than any West African people. The Maxim gun, which played a major part in these wars, was a weapon the like of which no West African people had ever seen or heard of before. They therefore had no answer to it. Secondly, West African opposition was not coordinated. Each Kingdom, and sometimes each village, fought its own battle and suffered defeat without any help from its neighbours… furthermore; many of the better-organized African States were in decline at the time (Ayandele et al, 1971, p. 145).

The major attempts made by the colonialists mainly Britain and France in entrenching their administration were the very foundation laying for the emergence of regional integration in West Africa and the incorporation of these economies into the international economic system. This is so because in an attempt to rule over their vast territories, they began to introduce policies that tended toward unification of these territories. First, each of these two powers was concerned with encouraging West Africans to produce raw materials for her home industries. Both knew very well that the export of these raw products would bring more money into the hands of West African and with, and that with this money the latter would become increasingly able to buy more manufactured goods. French and British economic policies in Africa were thus very selfish; they were designed to benefit mainly the colonial powers. (Ayandele et al, 1971, p. 159) Second, they abolished trade by barter as well as indigenous currencies because they said these did not make for quick businesses. Trade by barter was too slow, while indigenous currencies were too cumbersome to be carried around conveniently. In place of these the colonial powers introduced their own currencies which helped to increase the speed of economic transactions (Ayandele et al, 1971, p. 145). In addition, it is reported that the British were quite vigorous in building railways and road in their West African colonies. For instance apart from Gambia, a small country that needed no railway since it was satisfactorily served by the river from which it derives its name…railway construction began in Sierra Leone in march 1896, in the Gold coast in 1898 and in Nigeria in 1896. By 1932, there were about 311 miles of railway in Sierra Leone, 510 miles in the Gold Coast and 1,905 miles in Nigeria (Ayandele et al, 1971, p. 161). These also became an effective means of transportation for export products and equipment and thus fuel a kind of intra and international trade. Ayandele et al (1971, p. 161) had noted "the Y-shaped railway system of Sierra Leone tapped the palm oil producing regions of the country. In the gold coast the line from Takoradi to Kumasi passed through the gold mines and was useful for transporting the heavy equipment needed for mining gold at great depths. The eastern line from Accra to Kumasi passed through the cocoa producing regions of the country. In Nigeria, the lines from Lagos to Port Harcourt not only passed through the palm belts of the south but also traversed Northern Nigeria from which the British got groundnut as well as hides and skin.

West Africa, like other parts of Africa experienced a violent wave of nationalism in the struggle to wriggle itself out of the imperialist stronghold of colonialism. This was approached in different modules of confrontation and counter confrontations. According to July (1970, p. 347) "direct confrontation, diplomatic or military, was futile in the face of European Technological superiority and in West Africa, the end was invariably defeat and submission, whether it was decided by the sword in the mangrove creeks of the Niger Delta and on the rolling plains of the West African Savanna, or by negotiation in a chiefly compound". This situation met with much resistance both in the French and British dominated part of West Africa. It should be noted, that the level of nationalist resistance was exacerbated and directly linked to the kind and style of administration by the colonizing powers. France with their Policy of Assimilation and later association recorded a less violent nationalism when compared with the British indirect rule system, which elicited heightened and vigorous resistance.

Ayandele et al (1971, p.166) believed that this is a result of the type of treatments the elites got under these administration " the elite French in West Africa were better treated by their colonial masters than their counterparts in British West Africa. They got well-paid jobs in administration, and as civil servants could not criticize the government. Those of them who were not employed in West Africa even found employment in France itself… the elites in British West Africa had every reason to protest against British rule. British officers treated them with contempt and often referred to them insultingly as 'black Englishmen' or 'apes in trousers'. The British argued that because of their Western education the new African elite were not qualified to lead their people". this situation made July (1970, p.351) to conclude that " if African self-awareness in the French areas were emerging as an offshoot of French nationalism, a different set of circumstances in English-speaking West Africa was bringing forth a correspondingly different African response. These aggrieved elites became the leaders of various nationalist movements and activities that pressed for the independence of these territories from colonial powers. Consequently, towards the mid-1960s, European colonized West African Territories began to gain independence. It was these independent countries that later became the founding members of ECOWAS in 1976.

1.3 Statement of Problem

This research investigated the reasons for the inefficient and ineffectual regional integration in West Africa and proffered solutions towards a better integration arrangement. One notable consequence of the Berlin conference of 1884 was the partitioning of Africa into a number of separate states for the strategic and administrative convenience of the European powers. According to Moss (2007. pp 189-190), "this leaves the continent with both huge, unwieldy, and probably ungovernable states, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and tiny unviable states as Djibouti (which is really little more than a port) and the Gambia (which is just a silver of two river banks cut into the heart of Senegal) …Out of forty-eight sub-Saharan countries, twenty has less than 5 million people or about a population of metropolitan Detroit. Economically, the effects are especially evident as African economies are fragmented into relatively tiny and undiversified units.The GDP of at Least thirty sub-

Saharan economies is $5 billion or less or about equivalent to the capitalization of a midsize US company".

Consequently, Africa has embarked on several regional arrangements to overcome the challenges identified above, but despite the formation of regional blocs, most scholars believe that a proper and efficient regional integration is yet to evolve in Africa. For instance, Ndukwe (2004, p. 49), notes that "the establishment of a number of regional economic communities has not led to the creation of large and effective trading blocs with effective sizeable markets, sufficient to produce scale economies and competition". NEPAD is an intergovernmental organizations established by African leaders as an interventionist tool to foster development and support the Regional Economic Communities in Africa. After a decade of its existence, there have been divergent opinions as to the performance of NEPAD and weather it was still necessary to allow it to continue to function according to statuesque. At the end of the day NEPAD was transformed into The Nepad Planning and coordinating Agency (NPCA). Because of the peculiarity of her history and coupled with the failure of numerous intergovernmental organizations, ECOWAS provides a good platform for investigating and understanding the challenges of NEPAD in facilitating regional integration. In the words of Abass Bundu who was an Executive Secretary for ECOWAS for many years, "there are about 40 major Intergovernmental Organizations(IGOs) in the region… However, these IGOs have not had any significant development impact; because of the difficulties in securing the effective implementation of integration programs in the member countries" (Bundu, 1997; p. 29). This research is therefore confronted with the problem of providinganswer to the critical question of 'why despite the creation of many intergovernmental organizations, regional integration has remained largely elusive?

1.4 Objectives of Study

The broad objective of this study is to investigate and examine the difficulties encountered by NEPAD in facilitating regional economic integration on the ECOWAS platform.

The study has the following specific objectives

1. Examine the reasons for the dissolution of NEPAD.
2. Asses the role of NEPAD and ECOWAS as tools of economic integration.
3. Identify and evaluate some of the challenges encountered by NEPAD and ECOWAS in the quest for economic integration.
4. Evaluate the role of the European Union as a standard for ECOWAS and NEPAD.

5. Make recommendations towards the success of NPCA.

1.5 Research Questions

1. What are the reasons for the dissolution of NEPAD and its replacement with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency?
2. What are the challenges to NEPAD and ECOWAS in the quest for economic integration?
3. Is there a relationship between the challenges of NEPAD and its reformation?
4. In what ways did NEPAD support the integration efforts of ECOWAS?
5. Are there lessons for NEPAD and ECOWAS from the European Union?
6. What are the prospects of the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency?

1.6 Significance of Study

This research will provide the bedrock for understanding the problems of NEPAD. Critics of NEPAD like President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal have been quick to point out its weaknesses and what they are not doing right. According to him "nothing whenever I am asked what we have done, it is meeting, meeting, and meetings; we need action" (Venter and Neuland, 2005). However, very few critics seem to look beyond the over-emphasized issues of state weaknesses and lack of support by member states.

This research undertakes to unravel other causal factors than the traditional ones stated above. This study also brings to the fore, the need to look at focus other internal elements, which are destructive of our development plans in Africa as opposed to the traditional finger pointing of the developed economies as being sorely responsible for our plight. Consequently, this will help Scholars of the discipline in distilling the root challenges confronting NEPAD and hence engage in a constructive analysis of the subject matter. If Joseph Nye's proposition that success of a regional integration process will trigger off further integration in other areas, future proponents of regional initiatives will find this research a useful guide. In addition, Policy makers, public officials, and political scientists will find this work as a useful guide in trying to chart a new course for regionalism and nation building in Africa. Further still, this study provides a resource base for the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency in understanding the pitfalls of its predecessor, NEPAD.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This research is both historical and descriptive. It is reviewing phenomenon that has already occurred and so inclines towards an ex-post facto research. The existing data will be classified as the researcher undertakes to understand and explain why things happened the way they did. To this extent, the research is also explanatory. In building a theory and framework to understand the subject, it will be approached from two major standpoints. First, there is need to understand and explain what went wrong with NEPAD's quest to foster economic integration on the ECOWAS platform. Second, it is necessary to also understand, the ways and processes of the institutions, and how they work and determine whether the challenges emanated from their operations. To this end, two theories will be useful in achieving these objectives. They are structural functionalism and the neo-functionalist theory of integration.The proposition as presented by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1996) is majorly used to construct the ideas behind this research.

Structural functionalism is an offshoot of the political systems theory. Political systems theory originally developed from the Behaviouralist movement (Varma 1992, p. 127-139) the behaviourists argues that it is important for political scientists to study phenomena both in totality and in parts and processes and not just in isolation, but also in their dynamic interactions(Taylor 1978, pp. 210-217). Thus they recognize that a system can be seen at varying levels including, the international, national and sub-national levels. Additionally, the existence and functioning of different levels of systems will also mean that there must be equilibrium for the system to work effectively. Structural-functional analysis contains as concepts structural and functional requisites. A structural requisite is a pattern or observable uniformity of action necessary for the continued existence of the system whereas a functional requisite is a generalized condition, given the level of generalization of the definition and the units' general setting. Moreover, it makes effort to distinguish between functions and dysfunctions (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 112).

A good understanding of sub regional economic integration under the ECOWAS platform, will involve a study of the patterns of interactions among the various member states and the process of operation within the institution. It will overlay the functions of each unit with the performance of the institution to explain why things are working or otherwise. NEPAD has been given a responsibility to foster regional integration by supporting the regional economic communities. A careful study and observation of the patterns of interactions and processes will enable the research to determine whether the integration system is functioning or not. Additionally, in an attempt to compare the practice of integration on the platform of European Union, it will be necessary to examine its processes, and the operations of its organs. In this regard, the study will need to understand and evaluate the functions of its structures to determine the differences and similarities with the module orchestrated by the NEPAD on the platform of the ECOWAS. At the national level, structural functionalism seeks to explain the relationships between the parts (structures) and the whole (system). The relationship is explained by the functions performed by each structure in terms of input-output relations. At the international level, it consists of the development of models of international systems in which patterns of interactions are specified. Thus, it studies the processes by which decision makers in one national unit, interacting with each other and responding to inputs from the domestic and international environment, formulates their foreign policy. In addition, it studies the external linkage groups that is other political systems, actors, or structures in the international system with which the national system under examination has direct relations (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 112). This research attempts to gain understanding of the reaction and behaviour of the political elites who tend to support ECOWAS and NEPAD at one level and becomes antithetical to her course in other situation.

Gabriel Almonds (1965, pp. 1-20) shows the relevance of the Structural functional approach to this research. According to Him, “Structural-functionalism is an approach to the analysis of how political systems not only adapt but disintegrate or change in response to changes in their own and other environmental sub-systems in terms of the efficiency of their capacity and maintenance functions”. It is obvious from the standpoint that the challenges of regional integration partly stem from the problems of member states, who cannot keep to their promises or who have been economically emasculated to do so. Consequently, NEPAD’s efficiency oscillates in consonance with the instability in these states, especially with constant change of political leadership. First, the environment change because of political changes in the sub-systems and in this case, a nation state, the second change is orchestrated by the policy discontinuity of these states that had supported NEPAD in the beginning. Seen from Almonds perspective, the changes in NEPAD could be linked to the changes in its environment.

Neo functionalists as represented by Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye are intellectual offspring of functionalism. Hence the idea of neo-functionalism was basically defining a new and extended dimension of structural functionalism. Their major contribution is in the area of elaboration, modification and testing of hypothesis about integration. They, therefore, provide a good framework for understanding NEPAD and their role as regional integration facilitators on the ECOWAS platform. As reported by Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff(1996, p. 423) Ernst Haas studied the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and put forward a proposition that "the decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it depended on the expectation of gain or loss held by major groups within the unit to be integrated". Haas made two basic assumptions about integration. First, he assumed that "integration proceeds as a result of the work of relevant elites in governmental and private sectors, who support integration for essentially pragmatic reasons, such as the expectation that removal of trade barriers will increase markets and profits. These elites anticipating that "they will gain from activity within a supranational organizational framework are likely to seek out similar minded elites across national frontiers" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 423). NEPAD is a product of elitist deliberations who expected it to deliver tremendous gains to its members. The fact that some of these elites are presently not happy with its achievements, speaks volume to the fact that, their expectations are not being met. Consequently, some of them are primarily withdrawing their support for the organization and hence leading to its dysfunctional position.

Secondly, these theorists proposed that "as a result of the learning process from integration, power oriented governmental activities can evolve toward well-oriented action; as actors realize that their interests are best served by a commitment to a larger organisation, learning contributes to integration, conception of self-interest and welfare is redefined" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 423). In fact, to clarify this, Haas opined, "Integrative lessons learned in one functional context will be applied in others, thus eventually supplanting international politics. He further stated that critical to integration is the 'gradual politicization' of the actors purposes which were initially considered 'technical' or 'non-controversial'. However, the actors become politicized, because in response to initial technical purposes they agree to consider the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them. It therefore appears that whereas, these elites agree to form a union on the basis of their unanimous desire, there comes a time in the life of the union that begin to consider different approaches to achieving that goal. Some of these options and alternative does not exclude outright dissolution of the Union.

This research shows how actor or elite's politicization has negatively affected the efforts of NEPAD and consequently, a potent factor leading to the dissolution of NEPAD. Haas also borrowed Mitrany's doctrine of 'ramification, when he introduced a revised version called 'spillover'. Still using the ECSC, he found out that among the European elites, few were initially strong supporters of the union. Many began to give it support after several years of operation. Mitrany also suggested that, some of them because of the experience became leaders of other integrative processes in Europe e.g. the European Common Market. In the light of this, he concluded, "there was a marked tendency for persons who have experienced gains from supra-national institutions in one sector to favour integration in other sectors" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 424). This situation obviously emerged based on recorded remarkable success, which such organizations achieved. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of NEPAD because Instead of enlisting new membership, existing members tend to develop apathy for its activities and gradually become indifferent to its projects. It is also notable, that regarding Africa, leaders has tended to opt for new supra-national institutions even when there is no evidence of success of gains from the existing institutions. If the argument holds that Africa has not had a successful integration arrangement and ideally, lessons learned from a successful practice could orchestrate a new one, then, it appears that NEPAD, or NPCA as tools of integration has failed from the beginning. The idea is that unsuccessful integration experience cannot lead to a successful experience. Consequently, this research agrees that why this could be a reason for the emergence of new regional arrangements especially in Europe, the situation in Africa has been different. In seeking to establish factors that hindered NEPAD from achieving its economic integration objectives. It will seek to know why the same leaders who started NEPAD unlike their European counterparts signed onto this new dispensation whereas they did not seem to or agreed to have benefited from the old dispensation. It will therefore be necessary to find out, if the NPCA is borne out of the belief byAfrican leaders that their interest will be better served in the NPCA than in NEPAD.

Joseph Nye's neo functionalist theory is also significant to the research, because it explains the 'process mechanisms' and 'integrative potential'. He analyzed the condition for integration, which modifies the notions of politicization and spillover as put forward by Mitrany and Haas. Nye identified seven 'process mechanisms' which may as well be regarded as the metamorphosis for any regional integration arrangement. First, there is the functionalist linkage of tasks or the concept of spill over, which could be negative and thus result to ‘spillback. He gave the example of the European Union where elites and interest groups benefited in their earlier stages of integration, but with economic growth, they had better become reluctant to take additional integrative steps when growth rates dropped off.

Second is the phenomenon of rising transactions. The idea is that rising transaction is an indication that integration is on the increase, i.e. if transactions, including trade, capital movement, communications, and exchange of people and ideas is on the increase. Third is deliberate linkages and coalition formation or what Nye called ‘accentuated spill over’ where problems are deliberately linked together into package deals, not because of technological change, but because of political and ideological projections. Drawing from the EU experience, he noted the efforts of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups to create coalitions based on linkage issues. He stated that “although such efforts may promote integration, they may have negative effect, if for example, the political fortunes of a group supporting integration, or an issue identified with integration declines” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 427). Consequently, the widening of integration becomes a function of the extent to which a coalition in favour of integration enjoys widespread public support. This research will also show if transaction is growing or in decline among the members of ECOWAS.

Fourth is Elite socialization. There could be growth of support for integration arising from the elites who have actively participated in an integrative scheme. The extent to which national policy makers and bureaucrats become participants in regional integration, will determine the level of their socialization. This is important because such elites are sometimes reluctant to participate because of possible loss of sovereignty or national control. This could also work negatively, where in the process of socialization; elites may forget the demands and problems at home and concentrate on their new found affinity for selfish reasons” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 427). Fifth is regional group formation. Regional integration orchestrates the formation of nongovernmental groups or trans-national associations, which according to Nye ‘remain weak’. This is because only the more general interests and issues are aggregated at the regional level whereas issues of more specific interest are left at the national level.

The sixth process mechanism is Ideological identitive appeal, which is the establishment of a sense of identity among integrating units. Therefore, the stronger the sense of identity, the less willing opposition is willing to attack the integration scheme frontally. Ideological identity level will always affect the level of support and risk the integrating units are willing to take. Finally, Nye talked about the involvement of external actors in the process. Here, he recognized the importance of external governments and agencies, international organizations and nongovernmental actors as catalysts in the regional integration schemes. These organizations are actively involved in the process mechanisms of regional integration. NEPAD depends so much on the contribution of her partners notably, international donors and organizations. The other side is to say that without the support of such agencies, regional integration will remain largely unsuccessful. This research will show to what extent these external actors have supported the programmes of NEPAD.

Further, Nye also discussed the integrative conditions as stimulated by process mechanisms; this is also regarded as "integrative potential" and further set out four conditions that will affect the evolution of an integrative scheme. They are as follows:

1. **Symmetry or Economic Equality of Units:** This is the size of potential participants measured in total GNP is important in integrative schemes of less developed states than in industrialized nations. He believes that the "the lower the income per capita of the area, the greater the homogeneity in the size of economy must be" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 428).
2. **Elite Value Complementarity:** This is the extent to which the elites in the integrating zone think alike, hence, "the higher the complementarities, the more likely, the success of the Integration" (Dougherty &Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 428). The present set of African leaders seems to be thinking alike in disbanding NEPAD and replacing it with NPCA, how far this will go will be determined by history, but what is noteworthy is the fact that they were also unanimous in the decision to form NEPAD. To this end, this research will seek to understand certain departure points among the various leaders that subscribed to NEPAD.
3. **The Existence of Pluralism:** He believes that functionally specific diverse groups will enhance the likelihood of integration. Consequently, "the greater the pluralism in all member states the better the conditions for an integrative response to the feedback from the process mechanism" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429). To him this accounts for success of integration in Western Europe and failure in third world states.

4. **Capacity of member states to adapt and respond:** This depends on the level of mutual responsiveness within the political units to be integrated into a larger regional entity. The idea is that "the higher the level of domestic stability and the greater the capacity of the key decision makers to respond to demand within their respective political units, the more likely they are able to participate effectively in a larger integrative unit" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429). Unfortunately, there is a high level of domestic instability in Africa in the forms of internal and external wars and political uprisings. This research will unravel the impact of domestic instability in the policy inputs, support of NEPAD, and determine what level of it has affected the achievement of NEPAD mandate. It will also seek to examine the above conditional ties to determine whether its absence is mitigating NEPAD's push for integration in Africa.

Joseph Nye also provided 'three perceptual conditions that are affected by the integrative processes. They include: (1) The perceived equity of distribution of benefits – i.e. "the higher the perceived equitable distribution in all countries, the better the conditions for further integration" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429) (2) Perceived external cogency-perceptions of decision makers about their external problems including dependence on exports, threats from larger powers, and loss of status in changing international system. (3) Low (exportable) visible cost. This is "the extent to which integration can be made to be perceived as relatively cost free" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429).

Finally, Nye set out "four conditions that are likely to characterize the integration process over time. They include: (1) **Politicization:** A means of resolution of interests (2) **Redistribution:** Phasing of changes in status, power, and economic benefits to benefit the whole. (3) **Redistribution of alternatives:** The ability of the decision makers to convince all that alternatives to integration is less satisfactory. This part of the pressures as integration proceeds to increase the level of integration. (4) **Externalization:** This deals with the extent to which members can take a common position on issues in other to deal with non-members. (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 429) Nye concluded that with respect to neo-functionalism "Micro-regional economic organizations are unlikely to develop into units that encroach greatly on, or supersede the existing nation-states" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 429). ECOWAS is a micro-regional economic organization and its achievement will tend to negate of validate this conclusion but clearly and in its current states, ECOWAS is still dancing to the tunes of its powerful member states. Its achievement in conjunction with NEPAD is reviewed in chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

1.8 Methodology

The study adopted qualitative methods, which provides an understanding of a subject and its contextual setting and then offers explanations or reasons for theories and strategies and social phenomenon.

Hammersely (1989) had noted that qualitative research method is the range of research techniques using unstructured forms of data collection, interviewing and observation; it entails verbal description and explanation rather than quantitative measurement and statistical analysis. Usually, there are issues and phenomenon that are not amenable to empirical measurement and verification i.e. variables that can be assigned figures or values which can be empirically observed and verified, but there are also other phenomenon that cannot be so studied. Qualitative research on the other hand is one, which has variables that are not easily or objectively amenable to empirical measurement and verification. It may at times incorporate issues that are value-laden (ie subjective) in nature. It therefore applies mostly non-statistically-based data, which nevertheless can be empirically studied. Although it does not test hypothesis in the statistical sense of the term, it nevertheless proves its hypothesis, using the deductive or inductive logical method or the method of content analysis. (Obasi, 1999, p. 60)

In this respect, Nwanunobi(2002) noted that qualitative method is capable of being used in the study of social life at the local and small-scale levels. Moreover, it is useful in the examination of group interactions where there is need to understand the diverse strands of social participation. He further noted that scientific research might be broken up into three levels, viz preliminary level, principal level; and evaluation or validation level. According to him, qualitative research can be used at any of these levels. Therefore, it can be used at the preliminary stage in the formulation of key concepts and as the main research tool at the principal level. This is true of research dealing with the informal, complex or sensitive issues that are difficult to quantify (Walker 1985, p. 21). In the final stage of the research, the qualitative method helps to appreciate the result through setting clear guidelines in validation and implementation. Since it is built on a theory, it usually goes to validate or negate the proposition. Generally, the qualitative method includes the use of participant-observation, ethnography, photography, ethno-methodology, sociometry, dramaturgical interviewing, case study, unobtrusive measures, content analysis and secondary analysis of data. It is within the context of this methodology and approach that the research was conducted.

1.8.1 Data Collection

The study adopted the historical and descriptive mode of research which is explained in the next level and so is purely a qualitative research. Accordingly, the research depended on secondary data from Books, journals, newspapers, newsletters, periodicals and organizational documents. Organizational documents include the materials from the institutions under study and government white papers.

1.8.2 Data Analysis

This study adopted both Historical and Descriptive modes of research. Historical approach is relevant because, there is need to determine, evaluate and explain past events essentially, for gaining a better and clearer understanding of the present trends on NEPAD, ECOWAS and Regional Integration in West Africa. This will make it possible to make further reliable predictions about the future of NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). Since the research relies, much on generalizations made from the existing body of knowledge, it will be necessary to ensure a critical and objective analysis of events.

Descriptive approach will help us unravel the major elements and characteristics of NEPAD, ECOWAS, NPCA and The European Union. This will help us to explain the conditions and relationships that exist among them, their processes and modus operandi. It will also help us to be able to classify, analyze and interpret their activities and events. Additionally, this research attempted to make a comparative analysis of the practice of economic integration under the platform of the European Union and the practice of the same under the platform of the ECOWAS. The Descriptive approach will help us to discuss in details certain elements and organs of both institutions. While adopting the Historical and descriptive modes of research, this study will rely mainly on secondary material: books, journals, newspapers, periodicals, and Organizational documents. One major challenge for this two modes of research is in the validity of the materials and findings which deals with the question of ‘’to what degree the materials can elicit the right level of response needed for the research? The impact of this challenge will be mitigated by comparing internal and external evidence, documents and literatures. This will ensure that every organizational document is weighed against the field documents to reduce bias. This will help us to ensure the content, internal and external validity of the materials.

1.8.3 Scope and Delimitation of Study

Even though the ECOWAS, which is the platform of our study, covers 16 countries, this study majorly reviews identifiable activities of the ECOWAS about regional integration. No doubt, West Africa is the centerpiece of the study, but the research does not review the sixteen countries in details. The study is focused on the institution rather than on the members and hence integrating efforts within the ECOWAS region will be the fulcrum of our study. Additionally, selected regional integration initiatives in Europe and Africa may be used as points of reference. While it is Afrocentric, it will not study every African country in detail; rather it will select those ones that possess the elements and characteristics needed for our analysis. The period under review spans from the early 1960s when African countries began to get independence until present. Events that occurred within this time will be analyzed either in details or skeletally as the case may be.

1.8.4 Limitation of Study

The issue of currency of Literature affects this research especially as it concerns NEPAD. NEPAD has been transmuted to NPCA and the political instability of decision making in Africa could affect the research. Again, the performance review of NEPAD is also shrouded in confidentiality, as officials are reluctant to release certain information in event it may be used against them. Time is also a constraint because of the pressure on the researcher's programmes.

1. 9 Table of Contents

The thesis will be divided into 8 chapters. Each chapter will have subdivisions where necessary.

Chapter 1- Introduction to study

This chapter will introduce the subject matter, stating the background of study, Objectives of study, Hypothesis, Significance, Methodology, Theoretical Framework of analysis, Scope and Delimitation of Study, etc.The objective of this chapter is to give a snapshot of what the study is all about and get a user acquainted with what to expect.

Chapter 2- Review of Related Literature

This chapter will review literatures on regional and sub-regional integration, economic integration in Africa and West Africa and a few literatures on European integration. It will also review literatures relating to the role of NEPAD in regional integration in and various efforts it has made in facilitating regional integration in Africa. In this regards some of its activities regarding short term projects were reviewed.

Chapter 3 - NEPAD, ECOWAS and Sub-Regional Economic Integration

This chapter will show the relationship between NEPAD and ECOWAS; and how NEPAD has used the ECOWAS platform to facilitate economic integration in West Africa. Here NEPAD's contribution to ECOWAS and her regional projects will be studied. It will also review the historical perspectives of ECOWAS, NEPAD and West Africa, which are major platforms for understanding the research.

Chapter 4 - The Metamorphosis of NEPAD to NPCA- A Critical Analysis

This chapter will investigate the remote and latent causes of the transmutation of NEPAD. It will capture opinions of scholars and African leaders on why NEPAD was disbanded and why the NPCA was considered as the way forward. It will also evaluate the structure and modus operandi of NEPAD in comparison to the proposed NPCA. The aim is to distil variances which may have been antithetical to NEPAD but which might work well for NPCA into the future.

Chapter 5 - A Successful Economic Integration- Lessons From European Union

This chapter will study certain practices that has made the European union a success story of economic integration and see how this differ from what NEPAD is doing through the ECOWAS. The aim is to see best practices and see how adaptable it can be in the African context.

Chapter 6 - Analysis of Data, Findings and Discussion on Findings

This Chapter will study in-depth certain Identified challenges of sub regional economic integration in West Africa. Some of them will be identified from the vast and available literature studied in Chapter 2. The purpose is to undertake a granular study of the factors that adversely affected the performance of NEPAD as a facilitator of economic integration in West Africa. It will compare current literature with historical literature in order to determine the validity of the identified challenges. It will also explain the findings and discuss them in line with the neo functionalist perspective of integration and check to see the alignment and nonalignment of NEPAD to this school of thought.

Chapter 7- The Prospects of NPCA

This chapter will do introspection and attempt to predict the future of NPCA. Based on the lessons from successful integration arrangements, recommendations were made on the modus operandi for the NPCA. It is expected that this will help the proponents of NPCA in designing an enduring system in the new dispensation.

Chapter 8- Conclusions and Recommendations

The findings of the research will be discussed here and on this basis, general recommendations will be made for the success of Nepad Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter undertakes a review of related literature on the subject matter. In this regard, literatures relating to; definitions of regionalism, regional integration, integration, economic integration will come under scrutiny with the aim of understanding conceptual and practical meanings of the terms. The review will be divided into two segments. First is the review on the concept of regional integration, regionalism and economic integration. This segment will be focused on a global review of the concepts and practice of regional integration and regionalism. The second segment will review the concepts within the African context. This will involve the opinions and approaches to regional integration in Africa. This will be done to achieve the dual purpose of identifying the gaps and closing them with latent and current opinions from this research.

The Concepts of Integration, Regional Integration and Economic Integration

The subject matter of integration has attracted too many commentaries as scholars attempt to conceptualize it. This has given birth to multidimensional approaches to understanding integration. Paul Streeten (1964, p. 13) writing in the mid-1960s opined that “integration is a value term...integration has connotations similar to such concepts as ‘equilibrium, adjustment, free market, welfare, organization, progress, development, balance”. He posited that it is frequently used as if it was a descriptive term of positive economics, whereas it contained strong normative components and warned that anyone using such terms must beware.

In furtherance of his analysis, he adopted a historical and descriptive approach, in tracing the origin of European integration narrating vividly the post war attempts at integration. He borrowed Raymond Aaron’s explanation of the integration process that, two different economic units may be said to be highly integrated when transactions between two individuals, one in each of the two units, most closely resemble transactions between two individuals in the same unit. Aaron has given an indication of how to know when integration has taken place, saying that, if movements of goods, capital and people could take place as freely as between a number of economic units as they do inside any one of these units, and then these various economies would have been unified (Streeten, 1964, p. 15). This position seeks to identify integrating element by virtue of the level of uniformity among the integrating units in carrying out diverse tasks. It also connotes that geographical boundaries should not create barriers in trade and free flow of capital. In all, successful integration will be said to have occurred, if there is an unhindered flow and interaction of goods and services between one political entity and the other. Integration seen from this perspective means a replication of the free flowing transactions within the units in the system among units external of the system.

Streeten (1964) further discussed the liberalist and anti-liberalists approaches to integration noting the differentiating elements of integration in both approaches. This discussion went beyond mere using transaction as a determinant of integration to include the presence of free enterprise. Consequently, the liberalist posits that integration is when people are free to enter into transaction with whosever offers most acceptable terms. This implies that, buyers may buy in the cheapest market, Sellers may sell in the dearest market, workers may seek employment where rewards are most attractive, and capital may flow to where expected returns are highest. Thus, inconvertibility of currencies, import tariffs and quota restrictions prevent integration in this sense (Streeten, 1964, p. 14). Looking at the liberalist opinion, the key element of free trade is seen as being critical to the integration process and consequently, it should avoid imposition of tariffs and convertibility of currencies. These are factors, which ordinarily impedes the speed and freedom of transaction. This liberalist position, relegates the role of government for the integrated economy, because such functions like; enforcement of contracts and the provision of collective services can now be carried out by the national governments subject to their obeying the rules of international integration, i.e., the gold standard or an agreed system of credits or exchange rate adjustments, free trade, free factor movements, among others (Streeten,1964, p. 14).

Simple as it may seem, this liberalist position suited the situation before 1914, when the European currencies where convertible, free mobility of people abounded and there were no import quotas but as societies and economies began to get complicated with the advent of economic protectionism, this position can no more hold. In fact, Streeten (1964, p. 15) noted that the attraction of this definition is deceptive because it is based on confusion between ends and means. In his view "in so far as it benefits from the positive emotive content of liberty and equality, it does so fraudulently". His position is hinged on the fact that commercial transaction among the unified units is not an end in itself, if it cannot be shown to translate to better results, which will be visible in the form of greater real income and more equality or liberty. Therefore "although free choice to buy and equality of treatment are ends in themselves, it remains to be shown that free choice to buy and sell in a wider area does not restrict other choices, and that equal treatment in commercial transaction does not increase inequality… for it is quite possible that restrictions of economic liberty may be needed to guarantee liberty and unequal treatment of unequal's in order to safeguard equality" (Streeten, 1964, p. 15). Generally, the liberal position will manifest in; higher real income which is a faster growth rate, greater equality of opportunity, greater equality of incomes and greater freedom of choice. So, Integration should not be defined in terms of the means that is, free trade, unified market, convertibility and liberalization, rather it should be defined in terms of ends notably; equality, liberty and prosperity. However, the theory recognized the fact that, where these are not attainable, then intervention in such economy or market becomes not just necessary but justifiable.

The post-World War 1 scholars were anti-liberal in their postulations about integration. For instance, their view is that "integration only exists where different economic units are coordinated by a single plan. Integration is the combination of parts into a whole, but the whole can exist only where there is purpose, a plan, underlying the various activities of the whole" (Streeten, 1964, p. 15). He was however quick to note that this definition like the liberalist tilt more towards the means than the ends. Finally, Streeten (1964, pp. 16-17) harmonized the position of the liberalists and anti-liberalist scholars of the pre and post war era. According to him “we shall speak of an integrated society, if all members of that society are treated equally, enjoy equal opportunities, and an equal degree of liberty and if they can to the fullest extent achieve whatever goals they may pursue and in particular more goods and more leisure. Equality in the market, Equality in the eyes of the law, equality of income and wealth may or may not be expressions of the basic quality enshrined in the ideal. That will depend on circumstances and be subject to analysis”.

The advantage of this position over all others is that it does not exclude a priori government interference with trade, lending and borrowing or collective bargaining. It does not also exclude the possibility of a strong supra-national institutions and economic planning, but neither does it postulate a priori. Comparing the positions of the liberalists and Anti-liberalists, there tends to be much emphasis on concepts like equality, freedom to interact and unifying of processes. These are not entirely different from the position of modern day integration theorists, who expects that integration must go alongside the equality of the integrating units with absence of domination. This same group recognizes it as a unifying element especially against the negative effects of globalization as noted in Chapter 1. In this research, there is an attempt to evaluate the impact of these variables within the NEPAD efforts to support the ECOWAS platform of integration.

Apart from the liberalists and anti-liberalists, the integration theorists put forward certain propositions for understanding integration and regional integration in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They mostly belong to the functional and neo functional school of integration. While this group generally agree that integration is a “process leading to a condition called political community” (Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, 1996, p. 420), Ernst Haas a prominent member of this group defined integration “as a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, 1996, p. 421). Later Haas refurbished this definition in line with the contemporary international system, noting that integration refers exclusively to a process that links a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible future concrete system. His opinion was that if the present international scene is conceived of as a series of interacting and mingling national environments, and in terms of their participation in international organizations, then integration would describe the process of increasing the interaction and mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international organization and the environment provided by their national state members (Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, 1996, p. 421). The idea is that the issue of shifting of loyalties is important to the success of regional integration and this will invariably lead to support and loyalty to regional facilitating instruments like NEPAD. As will be seen in this research, while the member state of ECOWAS and by extension NEPAD may have agreed unanimously to the formation of these arrangements, they do not automatically or ever shift their loyalties to such supranational organizations. Practically, the extent to which the member states of the ECOWAS have responded to NEPAD's overtures towards integration will be evident in the course of this study.

Karl Deutsh was another integration theorist whose work contributed immensely to the understanding of integration at the time. Deutsh referred to political integration as "a process that may lead to a condition in which a group of people has attained within a territory a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure, for long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population" (Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, 1996, p. 421). Deutsh further argued that integration is a matter of fact, not of time and that political integration can be compared to power "if we recall that power can be thought of as a relationship in which at least one actor is made to act differently from the way that actor would act otherwise (i.e. if this power were absent) (Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty, 1996, p. 421). Consequently, Deutsh believes that like power, integration is an influence over an actor to act in a certain way.

Hettne (1989) was also another scholar whose conceptualization of regional integration was shaped by the experiences of the Second World War. Little wonder why he hinged his definition of the concept around security. While adopting historical approach in discussing the issues surrounding the European integration, he submitted that regionalism is the essence of a new security order and sustainability is a new security imperative. He noted that even though there are several definitions and misapplication with regionalism, regional organisation and regional co-operation, which refers to actors intentions and activities, that may not end up in regional integration, regionalism can be defined as a political ideology about how the world should be organised, namely as a loose structure of world regions . He was categorical to the fact that most initiatives in regionalism does not end up in regional integration, and insisted that, the element of intent is important since according to him what may appear as regional integration is often “a more general tendency towards international interdependence… interdependence implies essentially, internationalisation of the most dynamic sectors of national economies…” (Hettne, 1989, pp. 1-10) A cursory look at this position will portray the fact that economic integration is deeply political because the much-touted economic integration of Eastern Europe was actually orchestrated by the need for international security.

Jiru (1995) held opinions similar to Hettne in terms of approach to study and conceptualizations. Jiru who was a Director of the Department of International Economic Relations at the Institute of World Economics and Politics referred to economic globalisation and regional economic integration as two major trends in the world economy after World War 2. According to him, the concept of regional economic integration could be roughly defined as “a group of countries (including certain special regions) coming together on an equal footing and voluntarily restraining the exercise of or even giving up part of their respective economic sovereign rights and, through formulating strict treaty laws and regulations, to set up a corresponding enforcement body, jointly determine and standardize the conditions for the free flow of partial elements of production (commodities, for example) or the entire elements of production (includingcommodity, capital, personal and labour) among all the member states so as to optimize the allocation of resources within the member states from being restricted by boundary limits to achieve optimization of economies among member states, to realize the economic complementarity of all member states, and finally to achieve common prosperity” (Jiru, 1995, p. 43).

Jiru (1995) agreed to the fact that, cooperation in economic integration is realized through various integrated economic organizations and that these integrated economic organisations are usually classified by the international academic circles into the following six categories according to their different levels, (1) preferential tariff region, (2) free trade area, (3) Customs Union (4) Common market (5) Economic Union (6) Complete Economic Union. One of the things that stand out in Jiru’s position is the fact that regional economic integration needs an enforcement body to jointly determine and standardize its operations and activities. This element has been purportedly missing in most third world regional integration arrangements and when they are available, they are weak in carrying out this responsibility. This study will show the extent to which the absence or inefficiency of this enforcement arm of regional integration arrangements affects the implementation of its mandate. It will be necessary to understand, the extent to which the weakness of ECOWAS and NEPAD in achieving regional integration has been hampered by the absence of an enforcement agency.

Generally, these theorists have certain points of convergence in their conceptualization of regional integration. First, they agree that integration is concerned with the process by which loyalty or attention is shifted from one point of focus to another. Again, there are some consensus regarding the pattern of communications and transactions within the units to be integrated. They also believe that persons adopt integrative behaviours because of expectations of joint rewards for doing so or penalties for failing to do so. Usually, such expectations in the beginning are those of the political elites, both in the governmental and private sectors. They also hold that successful integration depends on people’s ability to internalize the integrative process and for integrating elites rather than external elites to assume the direction of an integrative process. They also hold that integration is multidimensional and spans through social, political and economic, cultural dimensions leading to a sense of common identity and integrated community. NEPAD from inception never hid their intention regarding the role of the founding elites in leading the process other rather than external elites and this was a remarkable difference between NEPAD and the other integrative arrangement in Africa. Thus, the issue of African ownership was one of the cardinal goals of the organisation. This research is interested in finding out if this principle has worked well in favour of the organization and its members.

One other scholar who provided an econo-centric definition of integration was Maruping (2005). In his view, regional integration entails the coming together of two or more states, normally through reciprocal preferential agreements, based on one or more of the following successively more integrating cooperation arrangements, Preferential Trade Area (PTA) or Agreement, where member states charge lower tariffs to imports produced by fellow member countries than they do for non-members; Free Trade Area (FTA), a PTA without any tariffs on fellow members’ goods; Customs Union, an FTA using the same or common tariffs on imports from non-members; Common Market, a customs union with free movement of the factors of production; Economic Community, a single-currency common market or monetary union in which fiscal and monetary policies are unified” (Maruping, 2005, p. 131).One other notable position taken by Maruping (2005) is the fact that, where the political elites refuse to give up political sovereignty, integration will fail but it will survive, where the reverse is the case. Therefore, if political sovereignty is given up, an economic community becomes a federation or political union with common legislation and political structures (Maruping, 2005, p. 131). Comparing this position to that of Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty (1996), which sees the shifting of loyalties as critical to integration; it will suggest that this position reinforces the need for integrating units to submit to the supranational institution, for integration to succeed. Maruping (2005) also put forward the benefits and disadvantages of regional integration saying that regional integration can foster competition, subsidiary, access to wider market (via trade), larger and diversified investment and production, socio-economic and political stability and bargaining power for the countries involved. It can be multi-dimensional to cover the movement of goods and services (i.e. trade), capital and labor, socio-economic policy coordination and harmonization, infrastructure development, environmental management, and reforms in other public goods such as governance, peace, defense and security". He however warned that, integration could be complicated by perceived or real gains or losses among the members that may lead to disputes and a sense of loss of national sovereignty. His position is that for integration to be successful, it requires strong commitment in implementing the agreed arrangements, mechanisms to arbitrate disputes and equitable distribution of the gains and costs of integration. The issue of an agency for arbitration of disputes among members is somewhat similar to the proposed enforcement agency as postulated by Jiru (1995).

Maruping (2005) concluded that the ultimate goal of regional integration is to merge some or all aspects of the economies concerned. This usually evolves from simple cooperation on and coordination of mutually agreed aspects amongst a given number of countries to full integration or merger of the economies in question. He noted that the history of regional integration in Africa shows that the reasons or objectives for integrating have been evolving over time. According to him, these have shifted from the initial focus on the political decolonization of Africa to the current emphasis on socio-economic integration in the post - independence era for stronger bargaining base in global forum and for mutual benefit in the form of accelerated growth and development. The issue of commitment and political will to implement the agreements of the organization has been a recurring issue in the literature of failure of African regional organizations. He agreed that, "for the integration process to be successful there is need for strongmechanisms to arbitrate disputes and equitable distribution of the gains and costs of integration" (Maruping, 2005, p. 130). Finally, He gave warnings regarding the perceived loss of sovereignty by member nations as a complication that could arise from regional integration, while at the same time suggesting that giving up political sovereignty will enhance economic community or federation. While it is evident that, there are no strong agreement enforcement agencies in most of the regional integration arrangements, Maruping (2005) failed to make provision for what should be done to manage this challenge. So far, NEPAD and its agencies seem incapacitated in the area of enforcement of agreed plans. This research is interested proposing ways to ensure implementation and get compliance from member states

The issue of perceived fear of loss of sovereignty also comes through in the conception of Bischoff (2004). In his work, regional integration is defined as a “process by which a group of state voluntarily and in various degrees “accesses” each other’s market and establish(es) mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their interactions… It is thought that the product of regional integration, regionalism, is the best possible response to the demands of trans-nationalism, fission, and fragmentation” (Bischoff, 2004, p. 121). He however noted that the desire and enthusiasm for regional integration as a way to deal with Africa’s many developmental problems is tempered by the fear national leaders have about the possible loss of sovereignty by their respective states (Bischoff, 2004, p. 121). His idea is that this is critical, since sovereignty is the one precious strategic and political asset, political elites have to hold on to and that this singular issue of fear of loss of sovereignty largely shapes the practice and implementation of regional integration. Based on this, he concluded that “while consensus on the desirability for unified African development is longstanding; there has been serious disagreement on the scope, level, and strategy for attaining it” (Bischoff, 2004, p. 122). This research is confronted with extending the frontiers of this discussion to understand what impact this fear of loss of sovereignty may have on the performance of NEPAD and ECOWAS in the implementation of its mandate.

In their work, *Regional Integration, the European Union and the African Union*: Olivier and Olivier (2004)highlighted the importance of geographical proximity as a necessary condition for integration. Therefore, they see regional integration as a quest by geographically contiguous states to achieve peace through cooperation, security from neighboring or distant enemies, the creation of greater economic opportunities, shared values, convenience and efficiency. They restated that most nations of the world towed the integration line because of the lessons from the Second World War. This stems from the fact that autarky was proven an impossible national goal for any nation and hence nations embraced the wind of constructive cooperation and interaction that was blowing across the globe after the war. Olivier and Olivier (2004) believed that because of this reason regionalism or regional integration became a common phenomenon in many parts of the world, but with varied success. They further noted that integration is both a process and a condition depending on the situation, geography or other similar variables (Olivier and Olivier, 2004 p. 352).

In their words, "these theoretical differences or uncertainties about the dynamics of regional integration stem mainly from the fact that it is seldom, if ever, a predictable or linear process. Rather, it is a mixture of many things as it adapts to the unique circumstances of the environment in which it takes place (Olivier and Olivier, 2004, p. 352). They argued that in both Europe and Africa, integration is all but straightforward, hybrid, and driven by mixed motives in several directions at variable speeds. They cited the example of the European Union when they noted that "throughout its development, European integration showed elements of various integration, paradigms, i.e. supranationalism, (federalism and functionalism) and state centrism, (confederalism, intergovernmentalism). African integration, on the other hand, followed the state centric or confederal mode very strictly, and for this reason it is far less advanced than the European experiment when measured against ideal-type notions on integration." This means that, the European Union comes closest to a regional ideal type in contemporary international politics, while regional integration in Africa (as is the case with similar experiments in North and South America and Asia) still have a long way to go (Olivier and Olivier, 2004, p. 352). They shared the same opinion with Ernst B. Haas, that political integration with its attendant political community is invaluable in any quest for regional integration. Ernst B. Haas had defined political community as "a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space." Olivier and Olivier (2004), also borrowed Karl Deutsch et al definition of political community thus 'we speak of a 'we-feeling, trust, and mutual consideration… a process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making' (Olivier and Olivier, 2004, p. 352). These were all employed to buttress the indispensability of the existence of political community as a prerequisite for regional integration. The idea is that the existence of a political community heralds political integration and political integration must predicate regional integration.

Olivier and Olivier (2004) also referred to the definition of integration as put forward by Cantori and Spiegel. They described integration as "the process of political unification" and used the term "level of cohesion." In other words, the degree of similarity or complementarities in the properties of the political entities was considered and the degree of interaction between these units to identify the quality or depth of the process.

It should be noted, that the many debates about the right definitions for regional integration does not foreclose the intellectual debate about the process and the path of integration, which is still an open-ended matter. Most scholars still maintain that, there is no generally accepted 'essentialist' definition of integration, and that it should be seen as a 'moveable feast,' rather than a universal or conclusive phenomenon, and this is why Groom and Heraclides suggest that 'integration is much more a process of becoming, than it is a clear outcome or a definitive political end state." (Olivier and Olivier, 2004, p. 354) They also put forward the definition of another scholar of integration. According to O'Neill, "the latest revisionist account of regional integration assumes that regional integration is a multifarious rather than a one-dimensional process. And that, as such, its dynamic or momentum is neither teleological induced nor fixed, but is infused instead with mixed motives and variable influences". These views buttress the fact that, integration cannot be tied down to one specific historic outcome or narrowly institutional expression. On the basis of this Olivier and Olivier (2004) concluded that "a more acceptable approach would seem to admit that integration is a variable condition which, in a dialectical way, progresses over any length of time to a fixed condition" (Olivier and Olivier, 2004, p. 354).

Olivier and Olivier will be commended for discussing the indispensability of political community, level of cohesion and complementarity among the integrating entities in the integration process. However, they left certain questions unanswered. First, if Regional Integration is a condition, what are the elements that define this condition? Second, if it is a process, at what point do we agree that integration has taken place? While this research will seek to ascertain the level of political cohesion and complementarity among ECOWAS/ NEPAD members states, it proposes that regional integration cannot be lost in the pipeline of the 'process' of becoming or 'conditions' of existence. It is needful to show the tangible and intangible elements that makes regional integration visible. This research will show the level of integration in Africa and West Africa particularly using the ECOWAS venture in this quest as an example.. It will put forward Solutions or conditions that will make regional integration more workable in Africa. One other element missing in other definitions, which was highlighted by Olivier and Olivier was the issue of geography as an influence on regional integration arrangements. This obviously describes the relevance of physical locations and territories in determining the success of integration.

Factually, speaking, the two terms ‘regional co-operation’ and regional integration has often been used interchangeably, even though they are not the same. Martin (1989) borrowed from Ernst Haas position that, “regional co-operation is a vague term covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly experienced need.” While, “the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty, while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves (Martin, 1989, p. 5). He submitted that “co-operation refers to joint action, by two or more states, in the form of common programmes or projects in functionally specific areas, while integration implies the creation of new supra-national institutions within which common policies are planned and implemented” (Martin, 1989, p. 5). Lavergene (1997) agrees with Martin “the terms regional integration and regional co-operation have in common the involvement of neighbouring countries in collaborative ventures”. He however made a distinction between the two thus “regional cooperation implies that this is organized on an ad hoc and temporary basis through contractual arrangement of some sort, around projects of mutual interest, while regional integration involves something more permanent” (Lavergene, 1997, p. 2).

This definition brings two factors to clarity; the first, is that cooperation can happen in piecemeal whereas integration is wholesome; the second is that, co-operation may lead to integration, but not in all cases. Consequently, states can co-operate without necessarily integrating. In Africa and West Africa in particular, there has been a mis-application of the terms regional cooperation and regional Integration. First, while countries starts out with ‘cooperation, most of such cooperation ends at the level of bilateral contractual relations without snowballing into full time integration, hence whereas there are several bilateral agreements among countries in West Africa, there are very few effectual integration arrangements, like ECOWAS and the CFA zones. Hopes of advancement into integration may be sacrificed at the altar of sheer withdrawal of support by participating countries. While Martin and Lavergene succeeded is providing a basis for understanding regional Integration and cooperation, they failed to explain why most regional cooperation is in Africa stops at the bilateral contractual level. For Instance, why do they not snowball into fully-fledged regional integration schemes? In this regard, this research is interested in advancing reasons why there are more adhoc and temporary organisations than the permanent ones in West Africa. It seeks to distil why African countries are in a haste to put pen to paper for cooperation but do not appendage their signatures with same swiftness to regional integration arrangements. More so, it will seek to show why even after they might have appendage their signature, they still do not fully support the regional integration efforts.

Regional Integration in Africa

Since the early days of independence, African leaders and scholars has been deeply divided on the issue of African unity or integration. The first group were radicals who were interested in a frontal assault on national sovereignty. This group were called the 'Pan Africanists' represented by the likes of Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. They were radicals who believed that "political integration is a prerequisite for economic integration." The other group were rather conservatives who believed that "economic integration should precede political integration" (Martin 1989, p. 5). In this group were leaders like Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Senghor.

Economic integration according to the conventional neoclassical theory "constitutes a means of expanding economic opportunities through specialization based on comparative advantage and economies of scale. It analyzes the effects of integration essentially in terms of "trade creation" and "trade diversion" that would result. Trade creation refers to a shift from the consumption of higher cost domestic products in favour of lower cost domestic products of other member states. Trade diversion refers to a shift in the source of imports from lower cost sources outside the regional bloc too higher cost source within it. A union that is on balance tradecreating, is regarded as beneficial, whereas a trade diverting union is regarded as detrimental" (Martin 1989, p. 5). The debate as to the order of occurrence of either economic or political integration has attracted the attention of other scholars. Lavergene (1992) supports the conservative group when he noted, "the concept of regional integration takes on a predominantly economic slant in literature, to the point of confusion with that of economic integration... Regional integration covers the full range of public sector activity, including not only the coordination of economic policies, but also regional security, human rights, education, health, research and technology, and natural resource management. The concept of regional integration is thus a broader one than that of economic integration." (Lavergene, 1992, p. 2)

He further buttressed his position noting that, regional integration was identified essentially with economic matters, regional trade in particular, and that most people still think predominantly in those terms. Yet, there is widespread consensus that preference schemes to stimulate regional trade has not worked as intended in the region and probably cannot be made to work without some major thinking about the costs and difficulties of implementing such schemes. He added that there are two aspects to the argument; one has to do with the wisdom of import substituting industrialisation as development strategy. The second argument concerns the fiscal implications of preference schemes and the unequal impact of those measures on different countries (Lavergene, 1992, p. 2). Lavergene and Daddieh (1997) summed this up as follows "in the absence of workable compensation schemes such as that of CEAO are meant to rectify this, but merely shift the fiscal burden onto the exporting country."The solution advocated by donor community is for liberalisation to proceed along fairly general lines, with only limited preference margins for member countries of any particular scheme". While not disagreeing with Lavergene and Daddieh (1997) that Integration in Africa especially takes a predominantly economic slant, it will be an error to discard the views of the radical schools that it must be predicated by political integration. However, this research proposes that a synergy of politics and economy will produce a stronger integration arrangement in West Africa. The argument is because economic Integration will need political will to survive. NEPAD itself has targets and objectives that transverses both political and economic domains. This Research will seek to fill the gap in the radical and the conservatives' argument of extreme 'politics' or economic undertones of integration and show to what extent this synergy is needed to fuel the development of present integration efforts in Africa.

Further, while undertaking a historical review of Regional Integration in West Africa, Lavergene (1997) defined regional integration as "regional approach to problem solving including regional integration, regional co-operation or both" This implies acting in concert as opposed to acting unilaterally or individually as a nation. The idea is that when a nation finds out that certain problems cannot be tackled as a single force or entity, they tend to look for a corporate approach to that issue and it is this combined efforts that is termed a regionalism. The process and tool of achieving regionalism is called regional co-operation or integration. He pointed out though it is increasingly becoming popular, Regionalism or Regional integration, which is seen, as a solution to Africa's woes is not entirely a new phenomenon. "In Africa, regional unity is seen as a possible solution to the continents deep prolonged economic and social crisis, at a time when private energies are being released thanks to the strengthening of civil society and the deregulation and privatization of national economies, while continuing decline of state-imposed barriers to inter-country flows is paving the way for increased regional trade. Integration has existed in Africa in the pre-colonial day's and. the quest for regionalunity is in many ways a search for ones roots. They thus include a search for solutions extending beyond what existing nation states appear capable of providing, including better regional infrastructure, better management of the regions resources and even a broader range of freedoms" (Lavergene, 1997, p. 2).

He holds the view that, "regional aspirations as shared by West African Statesmen, intellectuals, citizens alike is a desire to break the confines of nation's state, and a denial of all that, which divides the region like the multiple barriers to the free movement of goods and services; people and capital among countries; and differences in legal, governmental and educational structures." (Lavergene, 1997, p. 2) There is no doubt that Lavergene's position is highly aspirational concerning the objectives of regional integration. The danger with this position is that it assumes a lot of rationality on the side of the integrating elites. The reality is that whilst most of these ambitions remain a mirage in Africa and indeed West Africa until date, there are cases where these founders do not have a common objective in joining an integration arrangement. This research is interested in finding out why most of the aspirations of the founding fathers of regional integration in Africa have hardly been achieved many years after the existence of such organisations. Concisely, Lavergene's position assumes an unequivocal acceptance among the founding fathers of regionalism in Africa. Quite to the contrary, it does not appear to be so, while the leaders vocally and declaratively sounds unanimous, their action do not show same. This research justifies this position based on the frugal financial support, which NEPAD has received even from its subscribing members of the union.

While Lavergene (1997) believes that regional integration has always been practiced in Africa and so current practices may be regarded as a reversal to historical statuesque, others believe it emerged out of necessity and i.e. on the fact that it has become almost impossible for a nation to operate in isolation internationally. On the contrary, Khor (2004) believes that, regional integration is a child of necessity i.e. emerged out of necessity and not necessarily a matter of historical statuesque. In this vein, he argues that, it is a reaction to globalisation and its challenges. According to him ‘’Perhaps the most important and unique feature of the current globalisation process is the ‘globalization” of national policies and policy making mechanisms. National policies including; economic, social, cultural and technological areas that until recently were under the jurisdiction of states and people within a country, have increasingly come under the influence of international agencies and processes or of big private corporation and economic and financial players. This has led to the “erosion of national sovereignty and narrowed the ability of governments and people, to make choices from options in economic, social and cultural policies” (Khor, 2004, p. 4).

Ogwu (2006) while reviewing ECOWAS achievements supported Khor’s position, that regional integration is propelled by the consequences of globalization. She noted that “most economies in the developing countries do not, individually have the capacity to deal effectively with challenges of globalisation such as improved productivity and competitiveness. Regional cooperation or integration appears to be their only alternative in effectively meeting the challenges of competitiveness spawned by globalisation”. She further identified two basic justifications for regional integration in West Africa. According to her, “two basic rationales underpin the logic of integration in West Africa. The first is that integration would result in the expansion of markets, which can be of great advantage to various industries and businesses. The second is that removal of trade barriers between member states would facilitate coordinated industrial planning among member states regarding the production of specific goods. The overall effects of regional integration, therefore should be to facilitate the process of rapid regional growth and development” (Ogwu, 2001, p. 1). Balogun (1987) supported the market expansion factor as a major justification for pursuing regional integration. His Arguments to justifying regional economic integration hinge on the calculation of the probable external and internal effects of creation of a larger economic region in which full factor mobility is allowed to operate. In his view, an integrated economic region makes economies of scale possible and this in turn improves resource allocation (Balogun, 1987, p. 3). He also admitted that gains in trade could also be political and strategic. This study will need to investigate how much of market expansion has happened in West Africa under the tutuledge of NEPAD.

Ogwu (2006) further submitted that one of the key motives behind the formation of ECOWAS was the need to foster regional integration in the sub region. It was also in line with the expectations of regional integration that ECOWAS members at inception affirmed as its objective, the promotion of “cooperation and integration”. Some of the steps taken to achieve these goals include,

- The suppression of customs duties and equivalent taxes;
- The establishment of common external tariff;
- The harmonisation of economic and financial policies;
- The creation of a monetary zone and
- The adoption of a free protocol on movement of people, goods and services among others. (Ogwu, 2006; pp. 1-3)

She however noted that, the concept of regional integration is still largely elusive to define either in terms of geographical or economic boundaries. She cited the example of ECOWAS as one of the regional groupings in Africa that have strict geographical context and whose members have historical and cultural ties. However, she was quick to clarify that despite the multifaceted definitions, which scholars have put forward on regional integration “integration can be regarded as a process or as a state of affairs reached by that process” (Ogwu, 2006, pp. 1-3). She further cited Fritz Machlup position that “the question as to whether that state has to be a terminal point or intermediate point in the process can be taken care of by distinguishing between ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete integration’. According to him, the more difficult question is ‘what is to be integrated, people, areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies or what? (Ogwu , 2006 , pp. 1-3).

Ogwu (2006) noted that although integration scholars have used integration and cooperation interchangeably, there is a fundamental difference between the two. This difference has to do with the structure, size, coverage and commitment levels both in qualitative and quantitative contexts. According to her “while cooperation may be employed to identify loose forms of interstate activity designed to meet some commonly experienced needs, integration refers to a much more formal arrangement that involves some political and economic sacrifices as well as commitments, concessions, processes and political will to redefine participation in the international economy” (Ogwu, 2006, p.18). She concluded that in this regard, regional cooperation might be a phase in the process of regional integration. This position raises some critical question, for instance, if regional cooperation is a phase in the process of regional integration, how long will a cooperation arrangement exist before migrating to a full-fledged regional integration? That is, at what stage should this migration happen? Where this migration is overdue, what could be done to fast track it and eventually produce regional integration? This research is intended to produce answers to these questions.

Commenting on the challenges of economic integration in West Africa, Adetula (2009) stated that it is often defined in terms of trade liberalization or absence of economic discrimination among economic units. He however noted that such a definition is misleading in the case of Africa and gave an example that justifies his position. In his words "based on common tariff and free movement of capital and labour, the East African Common market in 1963 was more integrated than the European common market. But only 20% of the total trade of East African countries was with their partners within the region whereas the European Economic Community (EEC) had 40% of trade among its members" (Adetula, 2009, p. 15). He lamented that based on this misconception, many self -styled common markets, federations, unions and communities have emerged in Africa without promoting regional integration or even showing any potential to do so. In the light of this, he posited thatthe conception of regional integration as the progressive elimination of trade and tariff discrimination between national borders is too restrictive (Adetula 2009, p. 19). Indeed, it is evident today that the removal of trade barriers and allowance of free movement of people has not translated to a high level of integration or even trade among them. This may be the reason why integration in Africa and West Africa in particular has been elusive notwithstanding the presence and existence of many IGOs in Africa. Rather than just elimination of trade barriers and free movement of people, Adetula (2009) recommended the custom union theory of economic integration as postulated by Viner. This focuses on production effects as well as realization of more efficient utilization of productive resources. Citing Viner, the primary purpose of customs union is to shift sources of supply; a gift, which may be either to lower cost sources, or to higher, cost sources. This position brings into focus the basic theoretical concepts in Viner's analysis mentioned earlier which is those of 'trade creation' and 'trade diversion'. The Vinerian approach argues that the desired 'trade creation can be achieved if: (i) Member countries are initially competitive but potentially complementary in trade; (ii) Intra-regional trade, in proportion to total trade, is relatively high; (iii) the ratio of foreign to domestic commerce is low. It therefore follows that where a customs union consists of countries with widely differing comparative advantages, an economic union will assist to rationalize their production pattern with prospect for trade creation. On the contrary, where countries have similar comparative advantages and they consequently have to trade merely among themselves rather than with one another, economic union will lead to trade diversion.

Adetula (2009) also noted that in the south "scarcely do countries meet the conditions for trade creation; particularly in countries such as West Africa where economies are competitive rather than complimentary". However, it is noteworthy, that Adetula and Viner did not show where lack of competiveness and comparative advantage has hindered economic integration in West Africa. For instance, in ECOWAS, do member countries complement each other through comparative advantage or trade for the sake of being in one custom union? It will also be necessary to find out if most integrated economies in Africa, as the ECOWAS is actually trade creating or trade diverting. The answer to these will obviously give an indication as to what the challenges of NEPAD in fostering integration will be. Adetula (2009) further cited Arthur Hazelwood who observed quite early that "the removal of barriers between African countries would not have any redistributive effects on the pattern of production within the union, replacing high cost of domestic production by lower cost supplies from members of the union" (Adetula, 2009, p. 19). He also cited Adebayo Adedeji who, while looking at the prospect of custom union type of regional integration for West Africa advanced the ECLA position. ECLA had stated thus, 'The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) rejects the fact that conventional theory of customs union is irrelevant to Less Developing Countries (LDCs) like Africa. Their position is that the theory 'is too economistic', but he recommended customs union as a means of "collective import substitution in developing areas". ECLA further advocated, "For a strategy that would address the trade gap between the underdeveloped countries and the industrialized ones through programmes of industrialization and import substitution which in effect translated to the replacement of extra regional manufacturers by local ones" (Adetula, 2009, p. 20). The proposal is that in this way, custom union will offer protected markets of adequate size for Industrial development. ECLA proposed a regionalism, which would unite some groups of countries by separating them from others. Unfortunately, the import substitution strategy has degenerated and does not have a good record in ECOWAS countries. In this vein, Adetula (2009) concluded that "although most integration schemes among LDCs have continued to emphasize 'trade creation' and 'trade diversion' as a basis for evaluating the gains and losses of regional integration, their experiences in practical terms however have been that soon as it became expensive to purchase within the union, such schemes were abandoned." The undeniable fact is that the custom union theory of economic integration is highly euro-cloned because the effect of trade creation and trade diversion is different in the LDC environment and that of the industrialized countries since there is no full utilization of production in the south. This research will seek to validate this in line with why the economic integration schemes orchestrated by NEPAD have yielded little or no results.

Adetula (2009) also presented the position of the dependency school of integration. According to him, "economic integration should aim at creating economic stimulus among member states. The dependency school had advocated for a re-examination of such issues like politics of integration." He buttressed this by citing the works of other scholars submitting that those "scholars considered the impact of exogenous factors in the process of integration among third world countries mostly centred on hegemonic input and dominant influence of the north" which has conditioned and determined the outcome of integration." (Adetula, 2009, p. 19) The Implication of this is that all the African countries, individually and collectively remain integrated within the international market than they are among themselves.

Further, Adetula (2009) singled out Lynn Mytelka's framework for Integration among LDC's for discussion. Mytelka had reviewed the relationship of social forces within integrated economies and developed three model frameworks notably type 1, type 11 and type 111 to advance her proposition. Mytelka in her postulations was questioning the logic of 'laissez-faire', which informs many of the integrative efforts in the third world, especially the bias towards trade expansion. In her view "By neglecting the peculiar problems of the less developed countries, through unreserved support for free trade without regard for the ability or inability to take advantage of available opportunities (if any), the application of the 'laissez-faire' model could only promote competition and conflict from the promulgation of protectionist policies by participating countries" (Adetula, 2009, p. 20). ECOWAS fall under her type 11 model, which includes "mechanism for the distribution of losses and gains of integration. Her type 111 model is advanced compared to type 11. The focus is that this module is constructed to resolve the contradictions of regional dependence through the introduction of some measures' "it seeks solutions to the problem of unequal distribution of gains and polarization" (Adetula, 2009, p. 20). The model may include arrangements to attack the conditions of dependence through some complex institutional frameworks. On the basis of the above discussion, Adetula (2009, 24) submitted that "the ECOWAS model is no more than a 'hybridisation' of 'laissez-faire' customs union theory with only scanty attention given to the crisis of dependency and underdevelopment in the sub-region… regional integration represents a much more formal arrangement, which requires states to make certain political and economic sacrifices and commitments as well as concessions, and demonstrate political will towards a redefinition of their individual and collective participation in the international economy… it is worth noting that with regional integration conceived strictly in terms of economic relations among the states involved, the role of ECOWAS as an economic community for long was not more than creating some infrastructures where commodities can be exchanged at reasonable cost.” (Adetula, 2009, p. 24)

Finally, Adetula (2009) concluded that ‘regional integration in the south is an extremely complicated and varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and political dynamics that are different from what obtains in the North”. He suggested that the theory of regional integration in Africa must recognise the unity of the processes of economic integration, political integration and social integration, and provide for the political weapon as part of the strategies for implementing regional integration programmes. Adetula’s submission is rather apprehensive and diversionary. The question of why regional integration is complicated in Africa and the third world but obviously easier in the developed world has not been answered. This research will adopt a correlation approach to distil the difference between the regional integration in the North and the South as represented by the ECOWAS, and the European Union.

Lavergene (1997) introduced a twist to the practice of regional integration. He stated that economic integration could also proceed through unilateral policy reforms. However, this option has been much ignored by African governments and intergovernmental institutions. It must be noted that, although economic liberalisation as pursued under structural adjustment programs is not designed to promote regional trade in particular, its intent is certainly to promote trade, and the fact that it can be pursued unilaterally makes it potentially a powerful and immediately available instrument for stimulation of regional trade” (Lavergene, 2009, p. 20).

In a manner that seems very simplistic Landau (1999) defines regionalism as “the creation by governments of international economic links between adjacent countries”. This also makes possible an increase in the bargaining powers of the member countries vis-à-vis third countries. Further, she made a distinction between the current regionalism and the old regionalism. In her opinion, today’s regionalism differs from the previous wave in the 1960s because, it is embedded in a different international economic and political context characterized by the end of the Cold War and its bi-polarity, a strengthened multilateral trading system epitomised by the WTO, and globalisation of the world economy. In her words “Today’s regional agreements differ in their treatment of issues. Some concerns aspects other than the traditional goods sector, shifting from shallow integration, that focuses on trade restrictions like tariffs and quotas on manufacturers to deep integration covering governmental practices like services and intellectual property, which are far more complex to handle, or investments and capital mobility” (Landau, 1999, 15). This was not the case in the pre 1947 era. Just like Ogwu and Machlup, she agreed that Regionalism is also innovative in the diversity of its manifestations and hence its multi definitions. However, she also identified certain inextricable characteristics of regional integration. To this end, she submitted that regional integration subscribes to the logic of trade liberalisation, in contrast to the logic of import substitution, which prevailed at the time of the first regional arrangements. There is no doubt that the practice of regional integration has changed over time and Landau did well to recognize this fact. The division into the old and new practive makes room for the accommodation of the diverse practices and multidimensional activities that has shaped the concept of regional integration over the years.

While proposing alternative approaches to regional integration, Bourenane (1997) made a distinction between regional integration and economic integration based on geographic factors i.e. proximity or non-proximity. In his view, economic integration implies the integration of economic activities, sectors or subsectors in the pursuit of economic advantage. In this, the geographic dimension, notably spatial proximity is not always fundamental. In contrast, the notion of regional integration cannot be detached from the association with geographic and physical space, regional affiliation becomes the determining factor around which are defined feelings of cultural and political cohesion and a shared vision of the future for a defined group (Bourenane, 1997, p. 49). Put differently, economic integration may even prevent regional integration, if it takes place between regions that are geographically removed at the expense of neighbouring regions and so m he submitted that, the two notions are frequently confused in the literature, although they only partially intersect. This research agrees with the position that, being geographical contiguous is preferable, for an effective integration has to take place. Bourenane (1997) further analyzed the conventional approaches to regional integration notably; neoclassical economics, Marxism and development economics tracing the history of approaches to regional integration to the theory of comparative advantage in international trade. In this regards, he cited Viner (1950) who stated regional economic integration could lead to either trade creation or trade diversion, by reducing trade barriers between neighbouring countries, customs unions and free trade areas which could promote economic efficiency in the allocation of resources by contributing to the gradual strengthening of international trade. However, the emergence of such economic entities could also promote trade diversion and become a source of economic inefficiency. For instance, if the most competitive producers of a particular product suddenly found themselves excluded from the regional market because of the custom union.

Bourenane's clarification on the difference between economic integration and regional integration is of interest to this research. If economic integration can prevent regional integration and if most integration arrangements in Africa predominantly take an economic slant, then, it may be that we have stumbled on one of the impediments of regional integration in Africa. Simply stated, is it possible that the integration arrangements in Africa fail because member nations are already engaged in non-contiguous economic integration with non-member states of the union especially those nations of the north. (Europe). This research will seek to show how relationship with external members of a union affects regional integration in West Africa.

The other approach is that of the Marxist-Leninsts. The Marxist Leninist thinkers believe that integration emerges as a reflection of the internationalization of capital and is intrinsic to the evolution of the capitalist economy. For example, the creation of a single European market is seen to reflect the concentration of capital and the internationalization of European firms, rather than the desire of welfare maximizing governments to rationalize the allocation of resources among countries concerned. The integration of the European market is thus the consequence, not the precursor, of the transformation of production and trade in favour of larger firms. In this vein, regional Integration is seen as a source of exclusion and impoverishment of small-scale enterprise and a range of social groups through the usual mechanisms of market displacement. Hence, developing countries intent on actively promoting development through the initiative of the state are urged not to rely on free market forces. Integration among developing countries, in this view should be geared towards, the rational use of available resources according to a planned and centralized approach to production for the satisfaction of the regions own needs (Bourenane, 1997, p. 49). The weaknesses of this approach stems from the fact that, it is based on an assumed 'effectiveness of planning' in relation to markets i.e. based on centralized planning and government directives. However, the rapid collapse of the eastern Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) after the breakup of the Soviet Union has nullified the relevance of this approach (Bournene, 1997, p. 53).

He went further to analyse the approach proposed by Marshall (1965) and Perroux (1966) which will take into account the historical dimension of economic and social phenomena. Citing Marshall, Bournene (1997) stated that integration, as the result of development is distinct from integration as an instrument or precondition of development. To this end, economic integration can be perceived as the historical product of evolving technical, economic and social structures; or it can be the product of conscious efforts on the part of human societies; acting collectively to improve their economic conditions as a matter of choice". Marshall shows that integration taken as a product of history is primarily the result of social transformation and cannot occur just anywhere or under just any condition (Bournene, 1997, p. 53).

Bach (1999) citing Oman (1996) supported the above position stating that "the specific nature of regionalisation process in Africa results from this ambivalent relationship between regionalisation, as impelled by private agents and the institutionalised patterns of regionalisation, a distinction which is congruent with that between dejure and defacto nationalism". This is where regionalism gets confused for parallel trade. While undertaking a review of regionalism and globalisation in sub-Saharan Africa, Bach adopted a capitalist approach in explaining the workings of regionalism in Africa. In doing this, he stated that elsewhere as in Asia and Africa; regionalisation was associated with trade and investment strategies of private agents who operated in the absence of or as in Africa, in opposition to institutionalised regional structures. On the basis of this misapplication of regionalism, he concluded that Regionalisation reveals itself in sub-Saharan Africa through complex and often conflicting trends of interaction. it will be argued that far from contributing to an adjustment of the state of the pressure of globalisation, regionalisation in Africa is primarily the expression of micro-strategies which, unlike what is happening in most other areas of the world seek to take advantage of the resources of globalisation, with the effect of a further erosion of states territorial and governmental legitimacy" (Bach, 1999, p. 2). Bach (1999) finally concluded that regionalisation in Africa as in Europe or North America represented an opportunity to establish a more appropriate framework for absorbing the pressures of multilateralism and globalisation. However, in sub-Saharan Africa specifically, “regionalisation proceeds mostly from interactions initiated by non-state actors and inter-personal networks faced with decaying states unable or unwilling to assert their sovereignty…. Trans state integration is stimulated by market distortions as opposed to trade liberalisation, a situation which accounts for the overall failure of the IGOs programmes towards market integration… globalisation becomes a source of renewed opportunities for inter-personal networks which contribute to the deconstruction of state affiliations without seeking to promote the emergence of alternative territorial arrangements” (Bach. 1999, p. 12)

Looking at Bachs submissions on regional integration in Africa, one thing stands out clearly, which is the role of non-state actors’ especially powerful individuals in perverting the course of regional integration and by implication fostering regional disintegration? This happens when through their activities, parallel trade replaces regional trade and thus personal networks overrides the desire for integration. This overarching influence negates the real essence of regional integration. NEPAD is not excluded from this negative elitist influence, which eventually becomes antithetical to the NEPAD mandate. It must be pointed out that regional integration is expected to involve institutional and state apparatus and other machineries of government either in part or in full. This is necessary because it involves decisions and actions, which only the state or governmental bodies can make. This research expects to expose the role of the founding elites of NEPAD in its current retrogression. It will do this by showing how the prospect of NEPAD oscillates between the national and personal interest.

It should be restated here that, one distinctive factor of economic integration in contrast to other forms of integration is that the countries involved may or may not be contiguous. However, regional integration in this research will tilt towards the economic dimension to see what efforts NEPAD has made in this direction since its inception. Other forms of integration may be discussed briefly where they are linked with economic integration arrangements and activities. Regional integration herein represented refers to that which is characterized by the establishment of joint institutional mechanisms, and a degree of shared sovereignty as embodied in NEPAD. Regional integration is seen as problematic in Africa because “existing integration schemes in Africa function as an ‘intergovernmental’ rather than ‘supranational’ mode, and the actual sharing of sovereignty is minimal. (Lavergene, 1997, p. 17).

The fulcrum of our discussion is that NEPAD has been adjudged as having failed to salvage this position and because of this; it was transmuted to NPCA, all in the quest to achieve effective integration. Scholars have argued that integration efforts fail in Africa because, the founders always intends to make them a prototype of the European integration. For instance, Martin (1989) concurred with Rothchild and Curry that “the Euro-based intellectual concepts and integration schemes, when strictly applied have not proved to be adequate basis on which to construct integration in Africa”. In this regard, Martin (1989) concluded that, the classical theories of integration have not helped Africa much. This research will not just treat the problem of regional integration holistically; however, it will study the peculiarity of the failure attributed to NEPAD as an agency of regional integration to separate facts from rumours regarding reasons why it was transformed into NPCA. There are several examples which points to the fact that integration processes in the continent of Africa has not been too successful. Infarct most scholars agree as to the causal factors of poor regional integration in Africa.

There has also been a lot of contributions and literature in the areas relating to conditions that necessitates regional integration. Most of these conditions are borne out of the African and European experience, i.e. what is present in Europe, which is not available in Africa? One of such positions is that put forward by Adewoye while studying regional integration in West Africa.

Adewoye (1997) argued that constitutionalism, or the rule of law is basic to regional integration and the fact that this condition is satisfied in the European case is considered one of the important reasons for the success of the European Union. He further justified the linkage between Integration and constitutionalism arguing that the Constitutionalist state, accustomed to separation of powers, more easily accepts the transfer of sovereignty to regional institutions. Constitutionalism also ensures the political and social stability necessary to the pursuit of long-term projects, such as regional integration. The rule of law facilitates human interaction among individuals or groups of different nationalities, thanks for the basic freedoms provided and the effective enforcement of contracts (Adewoye 1997, p. 320). Comparing Europe with Africa and West Africa, Adewoye (1997) submitted that lack of constitutionalism is the major impediment to her integration, because West African states have barely begun instituting constitutionalism as a mode of governance, and it is therefore not surprising that their efforts at economic integration have met with little success. An evaluation of this position is that Africa's deficient constitutionalism has undermined the process of integration, whereas the habit of constitutionalism and shared power (sovereignty) has facilitated the transition to supranational forms of authority in Europe. Manifestations of Africa's deficient constitutionalism includes, the concentration of power in the hands of personal rules, which has made the sharing of power difficult, a political system devoid of defined mechanisms and structures of representation or participation and as such lacks consistency, commitment and long term legitimacy which regional integration demands, Supports and growth of private sector which is an engine for integration among others.

In support of the above position that, the lack of constitutionalism is an impediment to regional integration in West Africa, Martins (2000) believes that current integration arrangements like the AU, and ECOWAS are problematic when you consider the fact that decision making process, which requires agreement at the highest political level (Heads of states & Government) is bound to create difficulties because of overriding concern with the preservation ofsovereignty and the defense of national interests to the detriment of supranational and community interests.

Richard Gibb (2009) in his paper 'Regional integration and Africa's development trajectory, meta-theories, expectations and reality' explored the issue of regional integration in the context of 'development' theory and the neo-patrimonial state system in Africa. In it, he opinionated that, Western, Euro-centric conceptions of regionalism, particularly those centered on the market integration approach, have promoted a very biased understanding of regional integration in many parts of the developing world. Using Southern Africa as an exemplary case study, he argues, The various meta-theories focused on explaining the political economy of regionalism, often closely allied to a development theory paradigm, fail to account for the nature, character and evolution of regional integration. According to him, "Regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa, has been conceived and analyzed in the light of the market-led approach, modernity and development"(Gibb, 2009, p. 701). He went further to say why market-led regional integration has failed and why, for the near future, it will continue to do so. Quoting Jean Francois-Poncet, a former French foreign minister, who regarded regional agreements as forming 'centers for political and economic development' in the new world order. He however noted that despite the trend towards regionalism, and its associated geopolitical implications, the developing World, and Africa in particular, has been neglected in the general theoretical debate on regionalism. These lack of attention he believes explains why, “almost without exception, the wider discourse on regionalism has had a developed country, principally Eurocentric, focus. The result was that throughout the developing world, and in particular, in Sub-Saharan Africa, regional integration schemes have been established in terms of a completely misconceived analogy with the European Union (Gibb, 2009, p. 702).

Gibb (2009) reiterated that, Western conceptions of regionalism have been fused with a development discourse to promote a very biased understanding, and policy agenda, of regional integration in many parts of the developing world. He further challenged the traditional belief that Western, Eurocentric conceptions of regional integration are unquestionably successful, and are therefore the yardstick against which Africa’s attempts at integration should be judged. Further, Gibb (2009) opines that the global resurgence of regional integration based largely on trading blocs and cannot be understood in economic terms alone. Whether in Europe, Asia or Africa, regionalism is a political economy phenomenon that requires a more general theory of social and economic transformation. Thus he asserts that transferred meta-theories, conceived to explain the integrationist agendas that have prevailed elsewhere, are out of touch with the reality of the economy and polity of sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular with the nature of the African state (Gibb, 2009, p. 702).

Throughout the developing world, and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, regionalism is viewed widely as a mechanism to promote economic development and political independence through the reconfiguration of neocolonial influences and unfair trading practices. Thus, regional integration is often perceived as a way to destabilize the global spatialities of economic power and unstable core–periphery relations established in the colonial period. Since 1980, African leaders have promoted an extraordinary number of development plans, frameworks and programs. Although diverse in nature and scope, these initiatives are united in prioritizing and privileging regional integration as prerequisite for political independence and economic development. Today, each African state now belongs to four different regional integration agreements. This research believes that this is only one of the factors orchestrating regional integration in Africa. However, caution must be taken in order not to discard other potent factors of integration, especially in the aspects of infrastructure and Agricultural development. Therefore, the current regionalism is not just about political and economic independence from the neo colonial strongholds of the world powers alone.

Talking about the necessity of regional integration in Africa and Southern Africa in particular, Gibbs (2009) cited an African Development Bank study on economic integration thus “so serious are the challenges facing Southern Africa that governments cannot afford to ignore... the limitations which national boundaries impose on their prospects for economic recovery and growth... Regional integration is not an optional extra; it is a matter of survival”. In this respect, the African Development Bank has given African no option apart from regional integration, if they must have accelerated growth and development (Gibbs, 2009, p. 703).

Adetovi (1997, p. 65) while reviewing the subject of regional integration; brought a new dimension and perspective to understanding the subject matter in Africa. He adopted a socio cultural approach and methodology in explaining the failure of current regional economic adventures in Africa. His view is that” regional integration process for Africa should be grounded in their historical and cultural roots … the notion of precise geographic boundaries is profoundly alien to Africa’s historical and cultural traditions, because the rigid geographic boundaries of post -colonial state contrasts sharply with fluid areas of socio-political and cultural integration that existed in pre-colonial era” (Adetovi, 1997, p. 65). He frontally opposed the obsession among scholars of the discipline with linking regional integration to economic and political spheres alone because, in his view integration cannot be achieved without enlisting the feelings of community and cultural affinity that are so deeply rooted in African history. To this end, he put forward a proposal that the challenge of effective regional integration in Africa will be dealt with once proponents find ways of fostering these feelings of community, which transcend national borders without threatening the viability of the state. Adetovi (1997, p. 66) reasserted his position thus “There is a general consensus, loudly proclaimed by economists, political scientists, and journalists, but also by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, that the many and costly IGOs set up to promote regional integration in Africa have been a failure, both sub regionally and Africa-wide” He explained that Africa has repeatedly failed to transcend the confines of the nation state because the foundation was unsound to begin with.

Adetovi (1997) believes that regional integration without consideration of cultural affinities will amount to building castles in the air and such a process is disconnected with African history and current social realities. He belongs to the school who believes that the solution to issues in regional integration lies in rediscovering and capitalizing on our cultural roots. One of the major justifications given to his ideas is that an individual in Africa is defined by his or her culture, more than anywhere else in the world. He therefore concluded “to plant the seed the seeds of regional integration in Africa, we must plum the very depths of the African soul. There is a whole archaeology of integration in Africa to be written to understand how best to Marshall our meager resources to take our own destiny in our hands, in a quest that may prove the topic in the end, but constitutes the only way forward if Africa is to escape the somber prognosis that its recent history otherwise seems to predict” (Adetovi, 1997, p. 67).

This research will explore the possibility of Adetovi’s postulations as a way of strengthening the current regional arrangements in Africa and seek to find out if his position could be validated within the context of the challenges of NEPAD in fostering regional economic Integration in Africa and West Africa. However, the starting point in this investigation will be to ascertain if the proponents of NEPAD had actually considered Adetovi’s position during the foundation lying of NEPAD. Practically speaking, this research will seek to know if NEPAD is missing anything by underestimating the impact of history and culture in fostering integration. This might as well be the missing link in rewriting the history of regional integration, NEPAD and ECOWAS in Africa. It may also become a basis of new foundation in the bid to rejuvenate the NEPAD through the Nepad Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA).

Ijeoma (2007, p. 179-194) in his contribution to the subject matter established a link between Pan Africanism and contemporary integration efforts stating the inextricable link between the two and how both were shaped by the principal actors of national affairs. Adopting a Pan-Africanist approach in his work titled “Re-Thinking Pan-Africanism, Dilemmas and efforts towards African Integration”,he established a link between the notions of nationalism; ethnicity and other related issues that could affect Africa’s efforts towards achieving its much-needed economic integration.

Ijeoma (2007, p. 182) posited that the different colonial legacies has negatively affected the advancement of regional integration in Africa. His idea is that “Co-operation needs to be fostered between the different African countries. A major challenge to the realization of the pan-Africanist ideology has been how to bridge the gap between the Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone and Afro-Arabic countries, which are known to veer towards their traditional allies in the form of their mother countries (e.g. Britain, France, and Portugal). Africa can no longer afford to rely on public officials who still view themselves as black

European as these artificial ties compromise efforts towards pan-African unity. In particular, the traditional language and cultural barriers will need to be addressed in conjunction with those of communication and infrastructure, for example, by building efficient and elaborate information technology links to run through the continent (Ijeoma, 2007, pp. 179-194).

Ijeoma (2007) concluded that because Pan Africanism has failed, the political unification and economic integration of the continent has also failed. The idea flaunted here is that, there are still elements of compromise among African elites who sacrifice African unity and by extension African integration to satisfy the whims and caprices of the erstwhile colonial masters. Therefore, if this position does not change, regional integration in Africa will continue to fail. In his words,

> Pan-Africanism has not done well. The political unification and economic integration of the continent have thus far failed, (at least when judged against the dreams of the key figures of the Pan-African movement), as have the documents and plans prepared by Pan-African conferences. The declarations and rhetoric of the African leadership have similarly yielded little. Pan-Africanism has failed when judged against projects of regional co-operation on other continents. It has failed when judged against the well-articulated, widely shared understanding of the needs of the African people. It has failed when judged against the emotive force of Pan-Africanism in African discourse. …Yet despite its poor record, Pan-Africanism has tenaciously held its grip on the minds of Africa's intelligentsia (Ijeoma, 2007, p. 192).

On NEPAD's attempts at regional integration, He believes that NEPAD is far from achieving African Integration, portend hope because, it has at least provided a rallying point for African leaders, who can speak with one voice on matters of international concern. In his view "Up till now, the NEPAD initiative has not been able to achieve many of the strategies mapped out for achieving African integration. However, NEPAD has managed to bring African heads of states and government to speak with one voice on several common African challenges, including (though not exclusively) the matter of poverty and the economic backwardness of the continent." (Ijeoma, 2007, p. 192) The summary of this position is that NEPAD has not been able to implement strategies that could ensure positive results for African integration in the near future and on this basis, Ijeoma called for continuous appraisal of the results, failures and challenges that have an impact on the implementation of most Pan-African projects and programs stating that perhaps a new strategy could lead the Pan-African ideology to its envisaged promised land.

Generally, Ijeoma (2007) largely put forward a concrete argument linking the idea of Pan Africanism with regional integration. Both ideas were supported by African leaders, both programs became a rallying point for these leaders, unfortunately, the failures of Pan-Africanism cannot necessarily be said to be the same with the weaknesses of NEPAD. Pan Africanism was not essentially an economic centered program for African development as NEPAD and the modus operandi were entirely different. The quest for fostering Pan-Africanism seems to have moved into extinction as many countries gained independence. NEPAD as an instrument of economic integration is project oriented and orchestrated by a twin objective of economic development and a platform for providing a united front for Africa to confront the challenges of globalization. This Research will go beyond the Pan Africanism linkage provided by Ijeoma and go on to access the challenges that is unique to NEPAD.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development was set up majorly to foster regional integration in Africa. It was Africa's response to the forces of globalization, which was gradually becoming overwhelming to Africa and left them to swim against the tides of globalization. Okoh (2002) magnified this position. In his view "NEPAD is an innovative response to the hydra-headed forces of globalisation… Globalisation, which NEPAD has responded to, is anchored on neo-liberalisation, which pursues open markets, and free enterprise with minimum trade restrictions as applied to African countries and other third world countries. In this particular orientation, NEPAD seeks to respond to the many challenges of globalisation in its own neoliberal African version (Okoh, 2002, p. 220).

Ogwu (2006, p. 3) supported Okoh's view when she noted that "For the promoters, AU and NEPAD combine the traditional motivation for regional integration of harnessing pooled resources for a common interest, and serve to reconcile the tensions between globalisation pressures and the demands for greater local autonomy, while offering states in Africa an opportunity to retain their own autonomy over political processes". According to Nadubere (2002) NEPAD is a product of the continuing search by African people and their leaders to create a pan-African structures that can lead to social and economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly globalising world.

Ajulu (2008) approached the subject matter of integration in Africa by looking at it a basically one strategy opened to its nations in their quest for development. He started out defining regional co-operation simply as consisting of co-operation and collaboration among countries on matters of mutual interest. Further, he noted that regional integration in Africa has been pursued pre-dominantly through three main approaches; market integration, regional co-operation and developmental integration but was also quick to note that of the three, regional cooperation has been seen as a softer option, since it allows the respective players room for flexibility. He pointed out that, from a theoretical perspective, there are two competing visions of regionalism and regional integration models. The first is the ‘market- or liberal-led integration model’, or ‘open regionalism’, which privileges the ‘market’, that is, the Self-Regulating Market (SRM), over society. This is based on classical or neoclassical economic theory, which posits that the market should drive the integration processes. The other, ‘closed regionalism’, lays less emphasis on the market, and posits that the objective of integration is the achievement of social and economic development (Ajulu, 2008, p. 29).

It is noteworthy that market integration has followed the theory of customs union developed by Jacob Viner’s (1933) economic treatise, which presented a robust defense of the neoclassical free-trade theory, and insisted, on unhindered free trade without regional barriers throughout the world. Viner argued that the regional exchange of goods and services was beneficial to all the parties within a customs union, as long as it created trade. Such exchange, he argued, enabled the most efficient producers to take a major share of the market, and to replace the less efficient ones. Although the latter would be thrown out of the market, he argued that this would nevertheless be beneficial, in that the most efficient producers would reduce the unit costs of production, resulting, in turn, in lower prices for consumers throughout the customs union. This would lead to an increase in the trade within the union as a whole, and would therefore be trade-creating (Ajulu, 2008, p. 29).

The opposite of this will be trade diverting. In this regard, Viner has posited that trade based on the protection of less efficient producers within the customs union would have the opposite effect i.e. trade-diversion. Given their higher production costs, the less efficient producers would not be able to gain a larger share of the market unless they were protected by tariff or non-tariff barriers, as well as subsidies provided by the states in which they were located. This would eventually result in consumers paying more for those products or services. The result would be trade diversion from the more efficient producers, and eventually lead to a reduction in trade. However, market integration went beyond a customs union, the latter being only one of the stages in the integration process; that is, the abolition of discriminative practices and policies among various national economies, ultimately leading to a single, unified market (Ajulu, 2008, p. 29).

Thus, Ajulu (2008) concluded that market integration has been seen as a process that moves progressively through different stages and degrees of integration, and achieves the ultimate being a single market, and a political union. He noted that, the stages have been identified as follows:

- Free Trade Area (FTA). This would be characterized by an arrangement whereby tariffs and other restrictions to trade are removed among member states, while member states continue to impose their own tariffs with regard to non-member states.
- Customs union. This stage entails the introduction of a common external tariff against on-member countries. In other words, the stage is a combination of an FTA plus a common external tariff.
- Common market. This stage sees the introduction of the free flow of factors of production into a customs union.
- Economic union. The introduction and harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies.

The expected benefits from this type of market integration accrue from what Viner described as trade creation, and to the extent that there is more trade creation, market integration is deemed as successful. Other benefits accrue from the comparative advantage that the model imposes on member states. The gains have been identified as follows:

- Increased production arising from specialization according to comparative Advantages;
- Increased output resulting from better exploitation of scale of economies;
- Improvement in the terms of trade of the group with the rest of the world;
- Forced changes in efficiency arising from increased competition among the group;
- An integration-induced changes affecting the quantity or quality of factor inputs, such as increased capital inflows, and changes in the rate of technological advance.

However, a successful market integration project requires certain conditions to obtain. The following would be considered the minimum conditions for a successful implementation of market integration: (i). a similar level of industrial development among member countries (ii) harmonized national macroeconomic policies (iii) regional macroeconomic stability (iv) regional political stability; (v) significant intra-regional trade (vi) complementary industrial development among member countries (vii) significant differences among member countries' factor endowments (viii) (ix) significant distribution of the benefits of integration; and (x) A political willingness to share some level of sovereignty (Ajulu, 2008, p. 30).

Ajulu (2008) went on to discuss the idea of development integration. Development integration emerged as a process to address the problems and dysfunctions of the pure market integration approach that we have discussed above. This approach recognizes that when market forces are let loose on society, their tendency is to reproduce inequalities and widen economic differences between the less developed and the more developed areas. Development integration seeks to correct this situation by recasting the terms and the tenor of the integration process. It does this by focusing on three key objectives, as follows, (i) redefining the objective of the integration process (ii) addressing the controversial question of the distribution of the costs and benefits of regional integration; and (iii) addressing the issues of timing and level of interstate binding commitments (Ajulu, 2008, p. 30).

He further submitted that basically, the objective of the integration project is redefined based on the issues of economic and social development. The integration model is linked to the theory of development, and the relationship between the state and market, to produce the desired outcome. Secondly, deliberate efforts have to be made to ensure that compensatory measures are in place. As we have indicated above, without these in place, the integration project is unlikely to take off. Compensatory measures might assume different forms, for example, SACU, which has worked with some degree of success, even though the recipient countries have remained far from satisfied. Thirdly, a high level of political commitment is required for all these processes to take off. Whereas market-led integration relies less on the state, and Political intervention appears only to be required in the last stage of the integration process, developmental integration seems to emphasize the primacy of the state. However, like the market-led model, the developmental integration project requires similar conditions for success to be ensured. The point is that under the developmental approach, the role of the state is important in facilitating these conditions.

In summary, political intervention is the backbone of the development integration model, as the state is required to co-ordinate policy to create an enabling environment and to drive the process. Each state is also required to co-operate in organizing the common political power of the member states. Without such common political commitments from member states, development integration is unlikely to function properly. It is worth mentioning here that, this was also the experience of the old EAC. Kneld Phillips, the Danish economist who chaired the Phillips Commission to review the operations of the East African Common Services Organization (EASCO), candidly admitted to this is a critical role of the state.

He actually stated, "It is not possible to expect the Common Market to function so long as there is no common political power to make decisions. Not to have a political power in this field would only be possible provided all the countries were following the principles of 19th century liberalism, As all the countries are practicing economic planning and all these wish to interfere in the economic development. It is necessary and recommendable that there should be responsible political body to govern the Common Market. Again, because modifications would have to be introduced in the Common Market, and as machinery will have to be established, it is necessary to make a Treaty concerning the Common Market between the three countries, therefore, this machinery should have three levels, namely, political, official and a tribunal to solve disputes (Nabudere, 2005, p. 26).

2.2 Conclusion

The review has undoubtedly excavated diverse opinions on the subject matter of regional integration that can be classified into two major categories. The first is focused on the definitions and approaches to understanding integration, while the other one deals primarily with identifiable challenges of regional integration. Generally, some scholars took a position which suggests that, the primary purpose for regional integration lies on the need to consolidate the fragmented markets. One of these positions was put forward by Maruping (2005, p. 130) who concluded that the ultimate goal of regional integration is to merge some or all aspects of the economies concerned. He noted that it usually evolves from simple cooperation on and coordination of mutually agreed aspects amongst a given number of countries to full integration or merger of the economies in question. The implication of this position is that integration is a process with several stages, which begins with cooperation but ultimately progresses to full integration. Again this further clarifies the difference between regional integration and regional cooperation. Indeed, this multifarious levels of integration may have informed the position of most scholars that "there is no generally accepted "essentialist" definition of integration and that it should be seen as a "moveable feast" rather than a universal or conclusive phenomenon' and that 'integration is much more a process of becoming than it is a clear outcome or a definitive political end state' (Olivier and Olivier, 2004, p. 354). It is this from the standpoint of its necessity for fragmented economies that regional integration has been recommended for Africa.

The other positions are the ones that see regional integration as an engine of growth and as a framework for security among the integrating units. Hettne (1989, p. 186) is one of those who believes that the primary reason for integration is Security. His conclusion is borne out of the European experience. He had noted that the overall pattern of integration in Europe no matter the underlying rational of the integration processes has been shaped by the security imperative. Consequently, he therefore submitted, that if it security driven, then it must be politically motivated. This relationship between political integration and economic integration is further discussed in this research.

One other factor that is related to security, which has adversely affected regional integration, is the issue of fear of loss of national sovereignty. Bischoff (2004, p. 121) has noted that the benefits of regional integration for Africa is being eroded by the fear national leaders have about the possible loss of sovereignty by their respective states (Bischoff, 2004, p. 121). He had therefore concluded that "while consensus on the desirability for unified African development is long standing, there has been serious disagreement on the scope, level, and strategy for attaining it.In the next few Chapters, the research will dig deeper into this factor and show how tenable this position is.One unpopular opinion which was uncovered in this research is the linkage between culture and integration. Adetovi (1997, p. 66) has noted that regional integration without consideration of cultural affinities will amount to building castles in the air and such a process is disconnected with African history and current social realities. This is worthy of mention because of the linkage of history and culture to regional integration.

Regarding the challenges of regional integration in West Africa, they were identified to include; lack of constitutional practices, lack of political will and support for the existing arrangements, the fear of loss of sovereignty etc. Jiru (1995, p. 43) also highlighted the fact that regional economic integration needs an enforcement body to jointly determine and standardize the conditions and activities. This element has been purportedly missing in most third world regional integration arrangements and even when they are available, they are seen to be weak. These and other factors will be investigated in the course of our research, to determine the degree of threat, which they pose even to the NEPAD planning and coordinating Agency**.**

Generally, Regional integration assumes different dimensions at different time and its peculiar environment shapes its structure. This re-echoes O'Neill position as put forward by

Olivier and Olivier (2004, p.354) that “the latest revisionist account of regional integration assumes that regional integration is a multifarious rather than a one-dimensional process. And that, as such, its dynamic or momentum is neither teleological induced nor fixed, but is infused instead with mixed motives and variable influences”. These views buttress the fact that integration cannot be tied down to ‘one specific historic outcome or narrowly institutional expression. On the basis of this Olivier and Olivier (2004, p.354) concluded that “A more acceptable approach would seem to admit that integration is a variable condition which, in a dialectical way, progresses over any length of time to a fixed condition”. Finally, there is a high level of convergence among scholars on the fact that integration in Africa is essentially problematic. In the next chapter, this research will study certain identifiable elements of economic integrations, championed by NEPAD on the platform of the ECOWAS.

Generally, Regional Integration has been identified as the sum total of activities, processes and conditions that unifies a group of individual states or political entities into one single strong whole. Consequently, they begin to work as a single force in a bid to surmount a common enemy, challenge or situation with an objective that will be beneficial to all. Some of the identified conditions and characteristics include, single currency, single monetary institutions, absence of tariffs for imported items i.e. singular customs union, possibly a single army for enforcement and a free movement and mobility of people within that geo-political entity. The conditions include absolute commitment to the union and a shift in loyalty from the units to the whole. It is also necessary or at least most beneficial for countries in the union to the contiguous. This research intends to compare the operations of NEPAD and ECOWAS with these elements in a search for possible reasons and clues to the failure of NEPAD as a regional integration-facilitating instrument.

CHAPTER THREE

NEPAD AND ECOWAS EFFORTS AT SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter evaluated the NEPAD and ECOWAS led economic integration efforts. Some of the projects and programmes, which NEPAD and ECOWAS have embarked upon in a bid to foster sub-regional economic integration in West African area, are reviewed. It should be mentioned that these efforts are reviewed by programmes and not by countries since it will be too broad to do so. It will start by undertaking a historical review of West Africa upon which the ECOWAS operates and then proceed to explain the rationale for and practice of sub-regionalism in for West Africa. It will also discuss the NEPAD strategy and how it works. In this vein, it will discuss the NEPAD strategy using the Nigerian example to display its mode of operation. The last segment is the hub of this chapter i.e. reviewing the combined efforts of NEPAD and ECOWAS in the quest for sub-regional integration.

3.2 Rationale for Sub-regional Integration

Paul-Henri Bischoff explains the preference for sub-regional integration over continental regional integration. Bischoff (2004, p.122) had noted that "in the new post-cold war effort, African States has found it politically and economically useful to opt for sub regionalism as opposed to an all-encompassing continental regionalism" He synthesized the positions of various scholars on the subject matter and synergized that sub regional integration remains one way of promoting unity and re-launching development in what is a different world economic and political context, without having to enter into the vexed debate of whether or not to redraw boundaries. The idea is that sub-regionalism is a convenient way of deferring the question of continental political unity, which is being orchestrated on the platform of Pan-Africanism. This is validated by the fact that "aside from the Economic Commission for Africa, a UN body, sub-regional economic entities, encouraged by the ECA, have stood more chance of attracting outside donor support than continentally based development schemes" (Bischoff, 2004, p.122).

The justification for sub-regional integration in West Africa is supported by the above position when one considers the fact of her pathetic and deplorable economic situation. West

Africa constitutes over more than half the population of Africa courtesy of Nigeria's burgeoning population. Consequently her development is critical and the need for integrationmuch more expedient. Gibb (2006, p.701) painted a thorough picture of this situation and the need for West African integration. According to him, there is no doubt that sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed Africa as a whole, represents a small, relatively peripheral and shrinking component of the world economy. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2006 the whole of Africa accounted for around 2.5% of all merchandise trade. In 2005–06, the collective GDP of Southern Africa, comprising 14 countries with a combined population of 243 million, was just US$346 billion. This is less than the GDP of Belgium, which has a population of just 10.5 million and a surface area less than 1% of the size of southern Africa. It is not surprising, therefore, that since decolonization, many African leaders and multilateral institutions have prioritized and promoted the cause of regional integration based primarily on an economic rationale centered on the problems of 'smallness' and the benefits of scale economies."

This situation is to say the least of West Africa's predicament and suggests that there is a dire need for some level of intervention through governmental programmes and agencies to arrest this deteriorating situation. Abbas Bundu (1997, p.30) who was the Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States for many years recognized this fact when he noted that "The challenge thus facing the governments and people of West Africa is how to halt the disintegration of the economic base and arrest the deterioration of societal norms and values… The economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by the growth in per capita income, has been declining since political independence. The modest annual growth rate of 1.5% achieved during the 1960s fell to an average of only 0.7% in the 1970s, and turned negative in the 1980s (-1.2%), as a combination of external and endogenous factors conspired to derail the development process launched after political independence (ECA various issues)".

On this basis, Bundu (1997, p.30) noted, "The legitimate aspiration of African people for a higher standard of living have been frustrated and our national economies retain the characteristics of colonial economy". If anything economic problems appear to have accumulated over time as policy makers' battle with chronic food shortages, high population growth rates, deforestation and desertification, excessive dependence on commodity exports, deteriorating terms of trade, huge balance of payments deficits, government deficit financing and increasing indebtedness both domestic and external. He actually noted that nowhere in West Africa have development strategies been successful in reversing the structural imbalances of our economy (1997, p. 30).

This position is not to suggest that we actually do not need a developmental strategy for West Africa, neither does it nullify the necessity for regional integration. On the Contrary, it calls for a well thought through and highly effective strategy to confront these negatively galloping challenges. It is within the fact of this preference for sub regionalism over continentalism or regionalism that ECOWAS finds justification. It should however be pointed out here that the quest for regional integration in West Africa has been an age long dream starting from the early nationalists who ruled these West African states from independence. For example, Nnamdi Azikiwe, in an address delivered to a meeting of the committee of African Organisations held in London August 1961, proposed a scheme of a West African Common Market as a means of attaining Unity in the sub-region (Adetula, 2009, p.25). It is also on record that Kwameh Nkrumah one of Africa's frontline nationalists led the idea of Pan Africanism, which in itself set the pace for African Unification of some sort. Infact, by May 1, 1959, Ghana and Guinea announced that they had formed a union. According to Adetula (2009, p. 26) "the Union was intended as a pilot scheme for a wider Union of African States… On 30th May 1959, the Counseil du l'Entente was formed by four Franco phone countries Cote D'Ivoire (then Ivory Coast), Burkina Faso (Then Upper Volta), Niger and Benin (Then Dahomey). Compared to Ghana-Guinea Union, the former was looser. Nevertheless, Counseil du l'Entente was formed essentially in reaction to the Ghana-Guinea Union"

3.3 ECOWAS and Sub-Regional Integration

The available data on West Africa suggests that it is a region, which has certain level of experience in regional integration. For instance, there are some 40 IGOs in this region, some of which have their origins in the colonial past and there are about three economic communities each pursuing the economic integration of its members. The first attempt was with the establishment of the West African Economic Community (CEAO) in 1972 through the conversion of the much older customs and economic grouping, The Union douanie`re et economique de l'Afrique de l' oust (UDEAO). Disbanded on 14 March 1994, CEAO has been supplanted by West African Monetary Union. (UEMOA). The other economic union is the Mano River Union (MRU) established in 1973 and the Economic Commission of West African State established in 1975.

The Treaty establishing the ECOWAS was signed on 28th May 1975 in Lagos by 16 countries in West Africa. The Treaty came into force on June 10, 1975 when seven countries ratified it. The aim of the Community is " to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the field of industry, Transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and in all social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African Continent" (Nnanna, 2009, p. 175).

Under this treaty, the mandate given to ECOWAS was as follows,

> The elimination of customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of the importation and exportation of goods between member states; the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the member states; the establishment of a common external tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries; the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital; the harmonization of agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects notably in the fields of marketing, research and agro-industrial enterprises; development of joint transport, communication, energy and other infrastructural facilities as well as the evolution of a common policy in these fields; the establishment of a Fund for Cooperation and Development; and such other activities that could further the aims of the Community as may from time to time be undertaken in common by member states. (Nnanna, 2009, p. I75)

What is today known as ECOWAS originally started as West African Economic Community (WAEC) which was conceptualized in 1963 (Robson, 1983, p. 86). However, this was later to snowball into ECOWAS after the end of Nigerian civil war, being that Nigeria played a crucial part in its establishment. It should be noted here, that Nigeria's leading role in the formation of ECOWAS has been perceived as being orchestrated by certain national objectives; First, there are some opinions that, Nigeria wanted to reduce the dependence on Europe and USA especially considering their roles in supporting the Biafra secession bid between 1967 to January 1970. French support for Biafra was visible since Ivory Coast was one of its colonies and one of the first countries in the comity of nations to recognize Biafra.

Secondly France has ‘midwived’ the formation of a purely francophone CEAO. Hence, Nigeria felt her national influence would be threatened if this statuesque remained. The subject of Nigeria’s role and her national interest colourising the formation of ECOWAS remains an issue of contention among scholars. It is also widely believed that the perception of Nigeria’s domineering influence by other members of the region made most of them to pay lip-service to the formation of the community at first. This position was helped by language barrier among these West African nations. According to Robson (1983, p. 86) *“*Although the Anglophone countries together with Guinea, Benin and Togo, displayed a willingness to cooperate in the setting up of a broader community, four of CEAO’s six members; Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Mali continued to oppose the formation.” Robson (1983, p. 86) maintained that a number of factors reversed this statuesque including, the Yaoundé convention in which Nigeria’s negotiation role allayed the fears of her smaller neighbours that she could be trusted, General Gowon, Nigeria’s leader‘s personal diplomacy and the persuasive advocacy of Adebayo Adedeji, the Nigerian federal commissioner for Economic Development who was a principal architect of ECOWAS.

Presently, ECOWAS membership includes; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (Bissau), Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Lone and Togo. Mauritania was later to withdraw in the year 2000. The geography delineating ECOWAS covers about 5 Million Square meters and having a population of 260 million people as at 2005. It is necessary to point out here, that looking at the original treaty of the ECOWAS, it is obvious that the union tilts more towards the classical model of economic integration, with the intention of establishing an economic community through a gradual process of tariff elimination leading to the establishment of a free trade area, a customs union and a common market.

ECOWAS has had its multifaceted challenges and problems, which will be discussed elaborately at a later part of this research, but it needs to be mentioned here that these multifarious problems orchestrated a call for the revision of the almost two decades old treaty. Consequently, The ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State set up a Committee of Eminent Persons to examine the areas of concern and make appropriate recommendations in the form of revised Treaty provisions for the ECOWAS. Adetula (2009, p. 41) noted the comments of the Chairman of the committee of Eminent Persons on the revised treaty thus “We believe therefore that the time is ripe to review the existing arrangements for cooperation and integration in West Africa and to update them in the light of the changes in and reforms taking place both within and outside the region".

In carrying out its responsibilities, the committee was mandated to include political cooperation, institutional matters, regional economic integration, regional peace, security, and the financing of regional integration efforts which were not very expounded in the original treaty and which has made such sectors problematic. In July 1993, the revised Treaty was submitted to the Summit of Heads of State in Cotonou and adopted. Adetula (2009, p. 30) commented, "In 1996, The ECOWAS Treaty was revised to enable ECOWAS address new realities, notably the global craze for democratization, good governance, and human rights". Adetula (2009, pp. 42-43) summarized the highlights of the revised Treaty to include the following nine areas:

- It defines ECOWAS as ultimately the sole economic community in the region and clearly spells out the relationship between ECOWAS and other West African IGOs.
- A certain change of orientation is evident in the supranational status accorded the community and the undertaking to pool national sovereignties through measures that would strengthen the community decisions directly enforceable in members' states.
- The powers of the community institutions and the executive Secretary are enhanced to reflect the greater priority being placed on regional integration. Instead of community tribunal, the Revised Treaty provides for a court of justice to reflect the important role this body has to play. A West African parliament will be part of the political cooperation program to be developed. Similarly, the expected greater involvement of the professions and interest groups in general has led to the inclusion of an economic and social council in the revised treaty.
- Sector Ministers will be more involved in the decision making process and the technical commissions have been reclassified to ensure better representations at meetings as well as more efficient organisation of the corresponding technical departments of the executive secretariat, Rationalisation of IGOs is expected to lead to the creation of specialised agencies to handle specific sectorial programmes.
- The Institutions provided for in the two existing protocols on defence matters will be reviewed and made operational to handle defence corporation program and ensure regional peace and security.

- The Revised Treaty proposes that the perennial problems of arrears in contributions should be overcome by instituting a system for generating an independent resource base. A community Levy, representing a percentage of the value of total imports from third countries, would be imposed to generate sufficient funds for both operational budget of the community and the development assistance extended to member countries by the ECOWAS Fund.
- In the field of economic Integration, the objective is the achievement of a common market and monetary union. Equal attention will be given to all economic sectors and activities, including the service sector. The revised Treaty aims to ensure that not only market integration, but also production and physical integration are achieved.
- Emphasis is placed on private sector participation. The private sector is to be encouraged to participate actively in community decision making and is assigned a bigger role in the implementation of community programs. The ECOWAS protocol on community enterprises is expected to be revised to reflect greater reliance on the private sector and a community investment code is proposed, to favour private sector involvement in cross-border investments.
- Building on the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, which recognised the need for regional cooperation in the social and cultural sector, the revised treaty spells out measures to be adopted in various fields. Important areas of cooperation, such as science and technology, information and defence, which did not feature in the 1975 Treaty but were included in the community work programme, are now provided for in the revised treaty. In addition, democratic principles contained in the Abuja declaration of political principles form part of the general undertaking by member states in the preamble to the revised Treaty (Adetula 2009, pp. 42- 43).

The revised treaty as mentioned earlier was expected to strengthen the organization and take care of the challenges both internal and external that have confronted the organization for close to two decades of its existence. Looking at the new treaty, many steps were obviously taken to strengthen the organization.

First, the idea of recognizing ECOWAS as the sole economic community of the region was necessary to eliminate the confusion and dispersal loyalty to ECOWAS because of the existence of parallel economic communities notably the CEAO and MRU. Indeed most scholars believe that the existence of these triplicate economic communities is in itself antithetical to the economic development of the sub region. For instance,Ogwu (2009) had noted, “The rationalisation issue was needful for the three regional economic communities, ECOWAS, CEAO/UEMOA and MRU because they overlap and compete with each other. Each operated with different schemes of non-tariff and trade liberalization and this in itself created difficulties and bottlenecks in the region”. Some other analysts believe this rationalisation has political undertones. For instance, Bourenane (1997, p. 35) argues “such an analysis is fundamental to the definition of a realistic set of objectives and strategies for regional integration and cooperation in West Africa.”

Such analysts have asked questions as to why the relationship between ECOWAS and other two communities notably; CEAO and MRU were not defined before 1975 and incorporated into ECOWAS treaty from the start and why less than 3 years after the 1991 decision to make ECOWAS the sole economic community in West Africa, did the francophone countries decide to established a parallel and competing UEMOA, whatever the direction of these arguments, the fact remains that the existence of two parallel economic unions is antithetical to the integration in the sub region.

The next three articles of the treaty focuses on recreating the supranational status of ECOWAS by setting up modalities for submission or ceding of sovereignty by member states and ensuring the enforceability of agreement reached by the community. This was obviously an attempt to boost the image of the community, which has been decimated by blatant disrespect to the agreements hitherto by member states. There has been an issue around how much of sovereignty should be submitted and the inefficiency to enforce agreements, which has ultimately affected the performance of the community. The review, which led to the imposition and introduction of a community Levy, representing a percentage of the value of total imports, was to ensure that the issue of inadequate funding was dealt with finally. The new treaty set out to strengthen economic integration. In doing this it subscribed to the achievement of a common market and monetary union. They also gave focus to production, industrialization and private sector participation in the quest for integration. While not attempting to do a critique of the revised Treaty of ECOWAS, it should be stated that the revised treaty seems to have brought more life to a hitherto struggling organisation and it is pertinent to do an analogy of the roles of ECOWAS in regional Integration in West Africa.

In this research, it is evident that both ECOWAS and NEPAD have suffered from severe underfunding from the member states. It will be necessary to check if the new treaty solved the problems, which orchestrated the renewal or revision in the first place. For instance what is the level of enforceability of ECOWAS agreements and can we say that the fear of loss of sovereignty been very assuaged in the new dispensation. It is expected that with its supposedly granted mandate to strengthen sub-regional organizations, ECOWAS should have overcome these problems.

NEPAD, Modus Operandi and Domestication

African leaders adopted NEPAD in 2001 as the latent vision for Africa in her quest for development of the continent. As mentioned in the introductory parts of this research, its three long-term objectives include“to eradicate poverty, to place African countries, both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development and to ensure Africa’s full integration and active participation in the world economy. It aims at achieving the United Nations Millennium Development goals for 2015”. (Nsouli and Funke, et al, 2004, p. 1) There is also another long term objectives of promoting the role of women in all activities. Generally, NEPAD goals includes the following; to sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of over 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years; to ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International Development Goals (IDGs) which are, to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015; to enroll all children of children age in primary schools by 2015; to make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating gender disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2005; to reduce infant mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015; to provide access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015 and to implement national strategies for sustainable development by 2005, so as to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015” (NEPAD , 2001, p. 14). These goals and targets will be driven through several strategies and initiatives to attend to all sectoral projects as identified by NEPAD.

NEPAD is the latest plan, because there has been a myriad of plans for Africa’s development before the coming of NEPAD. Just like NEPAD, “Most resolutions adopted by African leaders through the OAU in the early years of independence had been aimed at the notion that the economic integration of Africa was a pre-requisite for real independence and development. This was the main theme of the declarations from Algiers (1968), Addis Ababa (1970 and 1973), Kinshasha (1976), and Libreville (1977). But from the late 1970’s onward, Africa became progressively inundated with various plans, frameworks, agendas, and declarations all aimed to varying degree at promoting development, and later democracy (Taylor 2005, 17). Some of the plans include the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final act of Lagos (1980), the African Charter on Human and People's right, the Omega plan, the new African initiate etc. Interestingly, NEPAD combines both development and democratic objectives and was a product of a synergy of the Omega plan and the new African Initiative.

The founding fathers of NEPAD believe that, it is assumed African ownership and non-dependence on foreign powers is a differentiating factor between NEPAD and the earlier development plans. Thus the third fundamental goal of NEPAD plan of action is "to move away from aid dependency towards a partnership with the developed world that will equitably develop and share the African resource base in order to contribute to sustainable global economic growth" (Venter and Newlands, 2005, p. 276). The extent to which this target has been achieved is an issue discussed in Chapter 4. Generally, NEPAD pursues programmes across the socio-economic and political landscape. In this chapter, the emphasis is on sub regional integration.

Before we begin an evaluation of NEPAD's role in sub regional economic integration in West Africa, it's necessary to understand its modus operandi regarding the task of executing projects which it undertakes under the umbrella of RECs and in this case ECOWAS. In the beginning, we have noted that regional integration is a priority of NEPAD because individual African economies are typically too small to generate the economies of scale that can be found in larger markets. An Account by the Executive Summary draft of NEPAD (2002) identified the solution to the issue of regional integration in Africa and West Africa in particular. According to the document,

> Bridging the infrastructure gap has been identified as an important element of promoting regional integration in Africa. Infrastructure is defined in this context as energy, water, transport, and Information and Communications Technology (ICT). The development of regional infrastructure is critical for sustaining regional economic development and trade. The potential for promoting regional integration in Africa through the sharing of the production, management and operations of infrastructure facilities and through hubs, development corridors or poles is considerable". (Executive Summary Draft, STAP, 2002).

NEPAD usually adopts a two prong approach in putting together their development plan,a short-term action plan is developed based primarily on a survey of the infrastructure projects and initiatives in the countries are included in the programs put forward by the Regional

Economic Communities (RECs). This is notable for two reasons, first, this is where NEPAD initiatives and regional economic development plans meet, and second this is the synergy that is expected to drive sub regional economic development. In West Africa, the NEPAD priority projects are basically on, (a) transport, air, roads, railways and sea; (b) energy, electricity-generation largely from hydro and thermal sources; (c) telecommunications, telephone lines and information management; and (d) integrated water management/sanitation, hydro and irrigation.

For the short-term plan, the main emphasis is on selecting projects and initiatives with a strong facilitation element. The project selection process is guided by the following criteria; projects that are at an advance stage of preparation and that can be fast-tracked; projects that support both a regional approach to infrastructure provision and regional integration; projects that have stalled for political reasons and where NEPAD's intervention could be expected to make a difference; and initiatives that offer solutions to regional policy, regulatory or institutional constraints to infrastructure development. The Short-term Action Plan will be linked to and complemented by a Medium- and Long-term Action Programme that will take up projects and initiatives that require more time for preparation and development. Consequently, In May 2002, the first NEPAD Short-term Action Plan for Infrastructure (STAP) was produced.

For each of the infrastructure sectors, the Plan contains a brief statement of overall objectives linking the sub-sector with the overarching goal of reducing poverty. Next the Plan reviews the problems and challenges facing the sector and outlines the response under NEPAD. The four Common areas covered in the Plan are, (i) facilitation – establishment of policy, regulatory and institutional framework to create a suitable environment for investment and efficient operations; (ii) capacity building initiatives to empower particularly the implementing institutions to meet their mandates; (iii) physical or capital investment projects; and (iv) studies to prepare new priority projects.

The role of NEPAD in ensuring the successful implementation of the Short Term Action is usually three dimensional, (a) Mobilising political will and actions to implement policy and institutional reforms in the sectors, including harmonising regulatory systems, and ratification of agreements; (b) Facilitating the mobilization of resources for regional projects by pooling of resources of the countries concerned and by enlarging the participation of the private sector in operations as well as in financing of infrastructure; and (c) Facilitating knowledge sharing, networking and dissemination of best practices among countries, RECs and technical agencies.

Underpinning all NEPAD infrastructure programs is the objective of strengthening or developing sector governancearrangements that are rule based, predictable, transparent and participatory. A Peer Review Mechanism is established to monitor implementation of the Plan and to identify any areas requiring specific intervention to speed up action. The principal aim will be to create the enabling environment for enhancing competitiveness and stepping up the flow of investments. Generally, it will be necessary to point out that The NEPAD short-term plan in infrastructure is not a new set of initiatives, neither is it entirely novel or virgin. NEPAD Executive Summary draft (2002) recognizes this fact when it noted, "What NEPAD brings is a new vigour to accelerate the response to familiar problems and to implement tested policies and good practices. The new sense of urgency is embodied in the Africa leadership's collective commitment and determination to urgently mobilize and harness all resources available to speed up economic growth and social development and, thus, eradicate poverty".

It is also worthy of mention here, that due to the nature of the Short-term Action Plan, it does not contain all the projects proposed by the RECs, nor does it set out to achieve balance between regions in Africa. It is to be interpreted rather as the first stage in a rolling action plan that will be updated periodically as and when better information becomes available**.** Scholars have misconceived this issue of non-balancing or even development but its pertinent to note that NEPAD recognizes the fact that many countries in Africa is at different levels of development. Unfortunately, this school belongs to the group who believes that, regional integration is will be more successful among society with a measure of even development. What NEPAD seeks to do is to leverage the scale and provide the needed platform to take Africa to the next level. The Medium- and Long-term Action Programme is usually much more comprehensive than the Short- term action plan

The Strategy of Domestication and the Nigerian Example

One of the main approaches to implementation of NEPAD programmes is the domestication of NEPAD programmes or rather nationalization i.e. to make the programmes implementable at the national level. This is intended to develop NEPAD's programmes to suit the local or national needs of member countries. Through domestication, it is also expected that such programme will be aligned with national developmental programmes and hence compliments the development initiatives of the national governments. NEPAD understands that the domestication of her programmes is necessary, if it has to be effectively implemented. Additionally, one other possible reason for the current emphasis on domestication of her programme may not be unconnected with the fact that NEPAD has been accused of not carrying the average African along (SeeLesifi, 2006, p. 70 in chapter 4). Consequently, each participating country is expected to develop a framework building on the general framework with which to deploy NEPAD within its polity. This research will attempt to review the progress towards the domestication of NEPAD in Nigeria as an insight into NEPAD activities in West Africa. The rationale for this is obvious since Nigeria is the most populous NEPAD country and hence constitute about half of the West African (ECOWAS) population. Again, as a leading member of NEPAD, the implementation in Nigeria will show the seriousness or non-seriousness of the NEPAD adventure.

The Mission of NEPAD Nigeria is “to identify and work with Partners in the Public and Private sectors, including the civil society and international organisations operating in Nigeria, to develop, implement, and promote NEPAD programs at the Country Level. Among the specific responsibilities of NEPAD Nigeria as approved by the president, are to disseminate to the public, information on NEPAD programme and activities; establish and maintain a functional databank on NEPAD activities in Nigeria; promote stakeholder participation in the preparation and implementation of NEPAD projects, with particular reference to the three-tiers of government, the Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Private Sector; and work closely with relevant organs of Government in mainstreaming NEPAD programmes into national policies and programmes” (NEPAD, 2003-2006, Pg xi).

NEPAD programmes are actually grouped into seven clusters for the sake of focus and this includes, harmonisation; Infrastructure Development; Agriculture, Trade and market Access; Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance; Environment, Urbanisation and Population; Science and Technology; Human Resources development and Health; and Communication Advocacy (NEPAD, 2003-2006, Pg xi). Even though, these provide the functional framework for implementing NEPAD’s programmes, each of them is operationalized through various initiatives and Action plans. Some of these initiatives and Action Plans are; The Africa Comprehensive Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) driving the Agricultural development plan of NEPAD in Nigeria and Africa; The Action Plan of Environment

Initiative of NEPAD; NEPAD Tourism Action Plan; NEPAD Health Action Plan and NEPAD Action Plan on Fisheries and Agriculture, which is a complement to CAADP.

The highlights of NEPAD's structural framework in Nigeria are as follows;

1. There should be a position of the Director-General who will be Chief Executive of NEPAD Nigeria as well as the Senior Special Assistant to President on NEPAD;
2. NEPAD Nigeria should further be structured into three (3) Departments, namely, Administration and Finance; Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; and Programme Development and Implementation;
3. Each of the Departments should be headed by a Director who should report to the Director-General;
4. NEPAD Nigeria should be given a self-accounting status to enable it perform its functions and fund its activities as and when due; and
5. NEPAD Nigeria should be assisted to relocate to a good and more accessible location and an office building that befits its status.

Structurally, there are three departments including; (i) Administration and Finance; (ii) Planning, monitoring and Evaluation and (iii) Programme Development and Implementation.

Operating Module

The effective implementation of NEPAD in Nigeria is driven by a sound and dynamic structure. NEPAD Nigeria as we mentioned is broadly divided into three departments namely; the Administration and Finance; Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; and Programme Development and Evaluation.

Administration and Finance Department

The administration and finance department of NEPAD Nigeria is the strategic hub that provides leadership and direction to the organization. It is sorely responsible for total staff management ranging from appointment to training, welfare and discipline. In doing this, it considers skills, best practices and at the same time Nigeria's diversity. The unit develops and implements appropriate staff welfare schemes and staff training programmes. The Department is also responsible for budgeting and a custodian of budgetary allocations, which accrues to NEPAD both from the Nigerian government and Private Corporate organizations.

Infact it is a fund mobilizer for the organization. This also includes maintaining banking relationships and other financial related relationships especially with international and local financial institutions. Other than this, the Unit is mandated to carry out other function as may be determined by the Senior Special Assistant to the President (NEPAD) who is also the Director General and chief Executive officer of NEPAD.

Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department

This department could best be described as the operations hub of NEPAD. Broadly speaking, it undertakes the planning and execution of NEPAD projects. In doing this, either it acts as a coordinator of all development plans and initiatives internally and system generated or externally as inputs from stakeholders. As will be mentioned elsewhere in this research, one strong factor that helps NEPAD operation is the relationships and offices it maintains at the various governmental department and ministries through which execution of certain NEPAD programmes takes place. The Planning, Monitoring and Execution Department are responsible for ensuring a seamless relationship with these extra- NEPAD bodies. In this regard, it facilitates linkages and interaction with stakeholders and network between NEPAD Nigeria and NEPAD state coordinators. Similarly, it promotes and facilitates the establishment of NEPAD Focal Points in all relevant federal Ministries and Agencies. When a project is being prospected, the department will undertake to conduct a research to ascertain the viability of such a venture even before they are undertaken. This way NEPAD will not ventilate her energies on non-result oriented projects. The department is also the information gatherer and database of the organization as it provides NEPAD with needed historical, demographic and other data and statistics needed to execute her projects. In doing this, it collects, collates and analyzes information and consequently store them up in a databank. The data bank is now updated and becomes the resource base of the organization. In addition, the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation are also responsible for preparing Quarterly and Annual Reports and disseminating same to all stakeholders. While this unit is accredited with thorough planning, analyst believes that regarding the operationalization of NEPAD in different countries, Monitoring and Evaluation is still an issue. Nigeria is not an exception to this position. NEPAD numerous supervised projects are littered across the country, but some has been abandoned, while others are moving at a ‘snail speed’.

Programme Development and Implementation Department

The program development and implementation department is responsible for the implementation of various NEPAD initiatives and Action plans such as the infrastructure Action Plan, the Comprehensive Agricultural Development Action Plan, the Health Action Plan, the Action Plan of the Environment Initiative, the Tourism Action plan, the Cassava Initiative, the NEPAD City Initiative and the Democratic, Economic& Corporate Governance Initiative, etc. In this regard, it facilitates the national implementation of African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is NEPADs instrument for ensuring democratic governance among member countries.

Furthermore the Program Monitoring and Implementation department responsible for promoting Private Public Partnership (PPPs) and collaborating with stakeholders in both public and private sectors to develop and implement programs in line with NEPAD objectives. Additionally, it follows up on relevant resolutions and recommendations of national and international meetings and conferences bearing on NEPAD.Other than these departments, it is necessary to mention two other relevant operating units in NEPAD namely; the NEPAD Focal Points in Federal Ministries and Agencies and the role of NEPAD State Coordinators.

NEPAD Focal points in Federal Ministries and Agencies

As mentioned elsewhere in this research, Government Ministries and Agencies that has a direct link with the implementation of NEPAD programs are requested to appoint Desk Officers or Focal points within their organization. This will serve as a medium to integrate national programs into NEPAD and to also avoid duplication of efforts and hence save cost. Thus, the focal points will assist in the domestication and collaboration of the governmental and NEPAD programs while also assisting in the planning, development and Evaluation of NEPAD programs within Ministries and Agencies. From time to time, workshops are organized for the Focal points to keep them abreast of NEPAD objectives and programs and gain insight into intra-ministerial workings and implementation of NEPAD programs.

NEPAD State and Local Government Coordinators

The need to take NEPAD programs to the grassroots basically the state and local governments in Nigeria, which are basically the 2nd and 3rd tier of government led to the appointment of NEPAD programme coordinators at that level. NEPAD requested all state governors including the Minister of the Federal Capital territory to appoint coordinators for their respective states. The state coordinators are mandated to act as focal points at the state and local government level, while liaising with NEPAD Nigeria in the presidency. The domestication of the NEPAD programs lies with them but most importantly, they will assist in the implementation of NEPAD outreach programs to ensure effective public awareness and participation.

Workshops are usually organized from time to time to train the coordinators and recharge them to the mandate. For instance, from the 30th to the 31st August 2004, one of these workshops was held in Abuja and it ended with a recommendation to the Presidency that there was need to for NEPAD to prepare an advisory guide for the establishment of NEPAD state offices. Perhaps one of the most interesting and thoughtful structural innovation is the use of inter-ministerial and government departmental secondment to NEPAD by the Federal and State governments in Nigeria. This is a system whereby the government at both levels transfer staffs into NEPAD to provide technocratic support and hands on experience." Additionally, NEPAD Desk Officers have been established in Key Federal ministries and agencies to facilitate the implementation of NEPAD programmes with those organisations. These officers become a watchdog in ensuring the compliance of NEPAD plan by various ministries and units of government.

As mentioned earlier the programmes of NEPAD are cascaded to the state and local government level, to offer grass root relevance to the plans. The State Governors has appointed state coordinators for the 36 states of the federation including the Federal Capital territory. Whereas this research has not conducted popularity test of NEPAD at the grassroots level, there are abounding evidences of programmes, which has been rolled out at the state and local level. Currently, some of the on-going projects/programmes at the grass root levels include; e-school Programme; e-School Administration Project, Rural Access and Mobility Project (RAMP); NEPAD Coastal Tourism Project; NEPAD Cities Programme; African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) National Medium - Term Investment Programme (NMTIP); NEPAD Pan-Africa Cassava Initiative; NEPAD Fertilizer Initiative; NEPAD Fish For All Initiative; and the Home-grown School Feeding and Health Programme (HGSFHP); Ten-Africa Initiative, NEPAD-ETF e-School Admin Project; National Integrated Food and Sanitation programme.

The foregoing is not to suggest absolute domestication or smooth implementation of NEPAD programmes at the grassroots level. The challenges are still visible and the need for improvement and increased visibility at the grassroots cannot be over-emphasized. One of such areas that need more attention is the process and mode of communication. This is necessary to create awareness for NEPAD's programme and elicit more goodwill from Private Strategic Partners and the locals too. In fact, the NEPAD document actually recognized this fact, when it stated, "there is need for intensifying the NEPAD outreach and advocacy programme to ensure that NEPADs activities are communicated to the grassroots" (NEPAD, 2001). It is also worth stating that whereas the plan that sets out NEPAD's desk in Federal Ministries and Agencies are laudable, such desks must be made to become functional. This may include a process that seeks to measure how efficient these desks are in carrying out their mandates. This is necessary since the Nigerian Civil Service within which theses desks sit has been overtimes criticized for their apathy to work. One other issue of importance is in the areas of gaining the confidence and support of public and private sectors, including identification of NEPAD Strategic Partners including Partnership with donor agencies and other international organizations operating in Nigeria; Right now, NEPAD has not done so well on this especially since there are still huge gap in funding of the projects. There is also need for closer working relationships with other continental and regional NEPAD offices to leverage the NEPAD scale. This is more so since NEPAD Nigeria acts as a clearing house for projects in West Africa and Africa as a whole. Through its National Programme of Action (NPoA), the strategy of domestication has impacted national development in several ways including, Agriculture, electricity, roads and infrastructures, health, electricity and Education etc to mention a few.

According to the Concept Notes of NEPAD Nigeria, published by the Department of Programmes Development And Implementation (DPDI), "the challenge faced by NEPAD Nigeria therefore is to clearly identify and make an insightful and operational definition of what we do, or should be doing, within a given programme as against what the relevant collaborators or programme Partners should do and succinctly communicate same to our duplication of functions, thereby endangering collaboration and cooperation" this challenge is worthy of note as we skeletally consider the numerous national projects having NEPAD's pigmentation. The bulk of the activities of NEPAD is driven through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and contained in the National Programme of Action (NPoA). It should be noted that to ensure that the country's National Programme of Action (NPOA) is speedily implemented, a 14-member inter-ministerial committee on the domestication of APRM standards and codes was established on 18th June 2009 (NPOA, 2010, xiv).

In the area of trade, Nigeria has been a strong supporter of issues bordering on regional integration especially within the West African sub-region. This is evident in the dismantling of all roadblocks along the border towns to enhance movement of goods and services and with one harmonized ECOWAS passport, citizens of member states can now move around without hindrances. Nigeria has also adopted the Common External Tariff (CET), which reduced the previously existing 19-band tariff structure, ranging from 0-150 percent to four-band tariff structure ranging from 0-50 per cent.

Further, there have been frantic efforts to resolve the challenge of electricity and power supply. The Ministry of Power operates in consonance with the recommendation of the National Programme of Action (NPoA). Working with NEPAD, the Ministry received the sum of N94.62 billion in 2009 to execute the following projects among others; construction of Electricity transmission Substations, completion of double circuit transmission lines and completion of ongoing projects for electrification of communities at different locations throughout the country. These projects where scheduled for completion in 2010. However, regarding most of these projects, the Progress Report on Implementation of The National Programme of Action (NPOA) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Vol 11, has noted that

> Like any other exercise, these projects were also being faced with certain challenges that slowed down the speed of work. Some of the challenges include compensation issues, problems related to carrying out stringing operations, hard rock foundation problems encountered during excavation and difficulties in the clearance of procured equipment from ports, excessive rainfall and the clayey nature of the soil.

NEPAD through its NpoA supports the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) framework, which seeks to stimulate their participation in all sectors including power supply. This is the vehicle through which the government intends to achieve the privatization of the power sector. building on this , the federal government of Nigeria established the National Integrated Power project (NIPP) to be used as a veritable means to fast track the execution of the earlier mentioned 7 power stations (the Progress Report on Implementation of The National Programme of Action (NPOA, 2010, p. 15).

In the area of transport, so many road construction projects targeting the reconstruction of the total 195,530 km is in progress. This is done in collaboration of the Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA) and office of the Surveyor-General of the Federation. Additionally, there is the current wave of revitalization of railway lines which is aimed at rehabilitation and modernization of the railway system through strategic overhaul of the entire railway system such as track spot renewal of Lagos to Kano and Maiduguri to Port-Harcourt, supply of 25 new locomotive engines from Brazil, south America, to boost the existing locomotive power base of the corporation. The aviation sector has also felt the impact of NEPAD’s Support projects. It was in this respect the federal government was incited to set aside N300bn intervention fund for aircraft operators and made accessible to them at 7% interest rate over a period of 10 to 15 years. It was in recognition of its success in this direction, that Nigeria was awarded with the American International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) category one certification on 23rd August 2010 (NPOA, p. 17).

The agricultural development projects in Nigeria, has leveraged the provisions, expertise and technocratic support of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) and Economic Community of West African States Policy on Agriculture (ECOWAP), which are NEPAD, led programmes. Under the CADP, the persistent sub-optimality in the supply and distribution of agricultural inputs was addressed. Agricultural financing received a major boost with the launching of the N200 billion Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme (CACS) by the CBN in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resource s (FMA & WR). The objective of the scheme are: to fast track the development of the sector by providing credit facilities to commercial agricultural enterprises at a single digit interest rate, enhance national food security by increasing food supply to effect lower produce prices, and thereby, promote low food inflation. It seeks to diversify the revenue base of the economy, increase foreign exchange earnings and provide inputs for the industrial sector on a sustainable basis (NPOA, p. 13).

The United nations Development programme and other international development partners have supported some of the activities and programmes of the national Focal point, including sponsoring radio jingles for raising public awareness of the Country APR process, and provided grants for APRM-NPoA workshops for stakeholders, and the preparation of the Nigerian country report on the APRM especially during the 6th Africa governance forum. The UNDP has recently, decided to use the NPoA programme as a basis for granting support to African countries. (Report on Implementation of The National Programme of Action (NPoA) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Vol 11, 29). Consequently, the Nigerian strategy will provide a standard point of reference and a model of implementation elsewhere in Africa.

Even though the report noted that as at the time of its submission, some of those projects have reached advanced stages, the challenges are very much present on an ongoing basis. For instance, the fact remains that the electricity project has not provided Nigeria with an uninterrupted of optimally high power supply as envisaged. Despite the seeming success of the strategy of domestication, it has been inundated with several teething challenges. First, there are evidence to the fact that the Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (FMDAs) lacked an in-depth understanding of the NEPAD process and the NPoA. Whereas it was expected that they clearly earmark funds for this initiatives in their budget, it was noticed during a stock taking exercise that this was not the case. Most of these ministries and agencies saw it as a substitute to other ongoing national developmental initiatives such as NEEDS 11, 7-Point Agenda, and Vision 2020. Consequently, there is need to evaluate the NPoA initiative alongside the National development programs to avoid duplication. These will ensure the mainstreaming of NPoA into national development programs.

Nigeria will also need to ensure that adequate legislations are enacted to lubricate the operations of the NEPAD and its associates agencies and initiatives. The absence of this " to a great extent, limits the extent of leverage available to NEPAD Nigeria in its efforts to get the Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies to implement the National Programme of Action. in addition to this is the fact that at states and local government levels, the challenge with NEPAD Nigeria is partly due to lack of political will and basically, how to decentralize and domesticate the entire NEPAD/APRM process inspite of existing lack of capacity to mainstream the NPoA" (NPOA, p. 27).

3.4 ECOWAS, NEPAD and Sub-Regional Economic Integration in West Africa

This section is intended to evaluate the combined role, which NEPAD and ECOWAS have played in ensuring sub-regional economic integration in West Africa. The question here is "to what extent and in what manner has NEPAD and ECOWAS promoted sub regional economic Integration in West Africa?

A better starting point of this discourse is to briefly expound on the relationship between NEPAD and ECOWAS. NEPAD has an objective to enhance integration by supporting and strengthening the regional economic groupings including ECOWAS, but this relationship has not been with seamless fluidity. According to one source "the less-than-strong relationships among the various components of NEPAD, member states and RECs make it difficult to implement NEPAD. This is the case when there is no mechanism to mediate conflicting interests among the parties. The problem is further exacerbated by the lack of incentive mechanisms to get the RECs and member states to implement NEPAD programs. Again, Coordination of the many activities and participants in NEPAD also poses a challenge for effective implementation" (RCM, 2007, viii).

This position is to say the least of the not too flourishing relationships between NEPAD and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The fact remains that NEPAD cannot be said to have equal powers in the power balances of this partnership. As identified by this opinion, there is no clear cut mediation procedure between NEPAD and the RECs should frictions arise, neither is there a defined means by which NEPAD could enforce compliance or extract obedience when faced with erring country members. This situation makes NEPAD to always go to subscribing nations with a 'beggars bowl', the same situation that NEPAD has attempted to avoid in its relationship with foreign partners through African ownership of the NEPAD process. Consequently, NEPAD remains at the mercy of these nations and will only operate within the confines of their goodwill. Despite these, NEPAD has managed to make some progress and this is reviewed in the course of this chapter.

The Economic Community of West African States was set up to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial and in socio- cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent" (Adetula, 2009, p.30).

It is necessary to mention that within the context expected of an ideal regional integration management, ECOWAS has operated majorly as an agent of economic integration with little attention paid to other aspects of integration. This is why the original goals predominantly tilt towards economic matters, reason for which it also became necessary to revise the treaty and accommodate the neglected aspects of integration. In this regard, Adetula (2009, p. 24) has noted that "The ECOWAS model is no more than a 'hybridisation' of 'laissez faire' and the customs union theory with only scanty attention given to the crisis of dependency and underdevelopment in the sub-region. This, in effect, resulted in the restriction of goals of integration largely to the economic domain with emphasis on purely economic performance as key indicators of integration". Adetula (2009, p.24) went further to compare the ECOWAS model with what the ideal situation should be "In contrast to the above, regional integration represents a much more formal arrangement which requires states to make certain political and economic sacrifices and commitments as well as concessions, and demonstrate political will towards a redefinition of their individual and collective participation in the international economy". However, this research places emphasis on certain elements of economic integration and will review the role of NEPAD and ECOWAS along certain identified economic integration pillars; namely, monetary integration, trade, free movement of persons, energy, agriculture, communication , ICT etc.

The NEPAD programme is built around regional integration, good governance, public private partnerships and conflict prevention; all these objectives are congruent with ECOWAS' programmes. On the other hand, ECOWAS programmes are intimately related to NEPAD's Africa-wide programme, because they aim to improve the socio-economic environment through regional integration, good governance and improved public-private partnerships in West Africa. It will therefore suffice to say that the programme of ECOWAS constitute the expression of the NEPAD objectives in West Africa. In May 2002, ECOWAS Heads of State organized a summit in Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire) with the aim to plan for implementation of NEPAD in West Africa. They came up with some approaches to implement NEPADs agenda in West Africa and decided to, designate ECOWAS to coordinate and monitor the implementation of NEPAD programmes and agreed to provide ECOWAS with the appropriate resources; create a NEPAD Focal Point within the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat; invite each State to create a national NEPAD Focal Point; and establish an ad hoc Inter-ministerial Committee to oversee the implementation of the NEPAD programme." (NEPAD, 2003, p. 9)

This declaration places the NEPAD agenda at the centre of the ECOWAS programs in West Africa. In order for ECOWAS to meet its new challenges and become a well-performing institution, it was expected to take a number of substantive actions to address critical issues like consolidating its internal structure and simplifying the numbers of layers of decision. This was necessary to make for quick decisions. It was also expected to strengthen the Office of the Executive Secretary in order to better define the institution's corporate strategy, business plan and corporate priorities and to align its programmes systematically with the NEPAD programme to have a systematic corporate view of the institution's activities and key performance indicators. Other areas of expected improvement included developing an efficient information system, enhancing ECOWAS's capacity to communicate the content and implementation progress of NEPAD programme to civil society in the region, developing more transparent and streamlined administrative and financial procedures, developing a new management culture that is action-and result-oriented and revising the incentives and staff evaluation systems" (NEPAD, 2003, pp. 9-10). Most importantly, ECOWAS needed to harmonise the policies and activities of ECOWAS and UEMOA and to better coordinate the two programmes, which will require greater interaction and collaboration between the two organisations. To actualize these plans, a donor funding agency meeting was convened in November 2002, where the essential components of the plan attracted funding pledges. Unfortunately, the ECOWAS management has been distracted intermittently over the years from this task due several crisis in the sub region including military coup d'états and wars. This actually is an evidence of how hard it is to keep a consistent focus on institutional development for regional programmes.

In all, ECOWAS has taken important steps towards defining the roadmap for the effective implementation of the NEPAD STAP. The extent to which they have been translated into actions will be determined in the next levels of this research.

3.5 ECOWAS, NEPAD and Monetary Integration in West Africa

The origin of economic and monetary cooperation in West Africa dates back to the colonial period, when regional cooperation schemes served the economic interest of the imperial powers rather than the development needs of the region. The colonial powers promoted the creation of federations, common service organization and common banking system in their protectorate areas, created transportation networks to link the hinterland to coastal centers… the Anglophone countries in West Africa, namely the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, had their local currencies fixed to the British pound sterling, while the French Franc served the rest (The Comet, 4 January 2006, p. 35), both arrangements where currency board systems established to provide for and to control the supply of currency in their protectorates and trust territories. Ideally, in a currency board arrangement, the exchange rates is strictly fixed, and the Currency board is obliged to exchange its domestic currency for the key currency… the board is obliged to hold sufficient liquid reserves in the key currency to redeem all of its domestic currency liabilities (The Comet 4 January 2006, p. 5). However, the Anglophone countries abandoned their own arrangement, while the Franco phone countries held strongly to theirs after independence. In Post-Independence Africa, there have been several attempts at economic and monetary integration, without really considering whether the conditions necessary for such integrations are present. According to Nnanna (2006, p. 2)

> Monetary and economic integration may evolve from trade links, as well as, historical and cultural ties. African sub-regions are pursuing economic and monetary co-operation at different speeds. However, African regional economic groupings do not, exante**,** satisfy the traditional OCA criteria. (Optimum Currency Area) Until the various sub-regional arrangements are firmly established, the African Economic and Monetary Union cannot take-off effectively. More important is the need to nurture strong institutional framework, vibrant trade and financial markets integration that will support a common monetary policy.

The quest for regional economic integration in Africa gained continental popularity in 1991 with its inclusion in the Abuja Treaty, which made provision for a single monetary zone for Africa was under the aegis of Organization of African Unity. This treaty established the African Economic Community and outlines stages for the attainment of a single monetary zone for Africa by 2028. As will be reviewed subsequently, this has remained largely elusive and the stages are yet to become very visible eleven years after the treaty. Nnanna (2006, p. 3) noted that even though African Union which replaced the OAU retained this provision with some adjustments. “The African Union’s 1999 Sirte Declaration retained the African Economic and Monetary Union agenda, but made a case for an accelerated implementation of the process for creating institutions of the union, especially, the African Central Bank. In the new arrangement, Sub-regional monetary unions were expected to form the fulcrum of the single African central bank and currency”. Nnanna, who was the Director General of West African Monetary Institute in Accra concluded from his analysis that “Until the various sub-regional arrangements are firmly established, the African Economic and Monetary Union cannot take off. More important is the need to nurture strong institutional framework, vibrant trade and financial markets integration that will support a common monetary policy”.This re-states the need to strengthen the various sub-regional integrations in Africa, including ECOWAS as a pre-requisite for the establishment of a strong monetary union. It is therefore deducible from this that NEPAD would be highly instrumental in this direction as it aspires to support sub-regional organizations.

Before delving into a discussion of various NEPAD and ECOWAS attempts at monetary integration, it is pertinent to discuss the concept of Optimum Currency Area (OCA). This is critical because OCA addresses the central question of whether a monetary union should be pursued or not. Nnanna (2009, p. 5) presented the definition of OCA by Mundel (1961) and Kaboub (2001). While Mundell defines it as "as a region in which factors of production are internally mobile but internationally immobile, so as to facilitate the intraregional redistribution of resources in response to demand shifts" Kaboub defines it as "the optimum geographical domain having as a general means of payment, either a single common currency, or several currencies whose exchange values are immutably pegged to one another with unlimited convertibility for both current and capital transactions, but whose exchange rates fluctuate in unison against the rest of the world". Nnanna (2009) went ahead to discuss the characteristics of an OCA thus:

> The first characteristic of an OCA is price and wage flexibility, which was the basis for Friedman's argument in favour of flexible exchange rates. A second characteristic of an OCA is that of financial market integration, suggesting that a successful currency area must be sufficiently integrated in financial trading. The third characteristic is that of factor market integration. This includes internal factor mobility, both inter-regional and inter-industry mobility. The fourth is the integration of the goods market, suggesting that a successful currency area must have a high degree of internal openness that could be measured by the marginal propensity to import, or the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods in production or consumption. An OCA requires a close coordination of national monetary authorities or even the creation of a supranational central bank, which implies the surrendering of the national sovereignty over the conduct of monetary policy". (Nnanna, 2009, pp. 5-6)

He further presented other opinions on the theory of OCA. This included McKinnon (1963) who incorporated the trade factors as a necessity for OCA, submitting, "Considerations of a country's trade behavior are essential in determining optimality". He however does not believe that flexible exchange rate and financial credibility are ends in themselves in arriving at OCA. Appleyard and Field Jr (1998) define an Optimum Currency Area (OCA) as an area that for optimal balance-of-payments adjustments and effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic policy, has fixed exchange rates within the area but maintain flexible exchange rates with trading partners outside the area. The other opinion presented was that of Kenen (1969) who noted that diversification should be a larger concern than labour mobility. He noted that homogeneity is not always optimal since a country with a fixed currency would better withstand asymmetric shocks provided her economy is diversified and depended on more than one commodity for revenue base.

Nnanna (2009, pp. 5-6) also noted the views of Frankel and Rose (1998) who introduced the notion of endogeneity. Their submission was that a group of countries that does not qualify as OCA ex-ante might evolve into one ex-post, by virtue of adopting a common currency. They contended that countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles and thus, would converge towards the ideal conditions for monetary integration. It should be stated that, this observation in itself undermines the conventional OCA theory, as it proves difficult to rule out potential common currency regions based on their current shortcomings. More reactions came from McKinnon (2004) who revisited the issue of homogeneity and argues for intra-regional diversification as a safeguard to economic shock, particularly for specialized economies. The idea is that, heterogeneity offers a risk-sharing arrangement within which a homogenous country with a specialized economy benefits from monetary union with countries that have a different revenue base. Thus, when one member suffers an economic shock, others are unhurt and can provide temporary assistance to the needy country. McKinnon (2004) concludes that there are only two compelling reasons for any country not to enter into monetary union with its trading partners, fragile public finances and unstable monetary model. Given that the dollar or the euro could both serve as stable monetary standards in the current international financial arrangement, the only lingering obstacles to optimal monetary integration has been reduced considerably (Nnanna, 2006, p. 6). The benefits of a membership of a monetary union was also addressed by some scholars like De Grauwe (2000) who noted that a strong trade relations are a precondition for a successful currency union. He also focused on the advantages of reducing instability and concluded that Mundell's criteria were restrictive as it ignores the important prospective benefits of monetary integration that put the costs into focus.

An indication of the direction for the OCA performance in the WAMZ countries notably; Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Guinea was given in the works of Balogun (2007) while testing the hypothesis that independent monetary and exchange rate policies have been relatively ineffective in influencing domestic activities (especially GDP and Inflation) and that when they do, they are counterproductive. His conclusion using economic methods shows that "erstwhile domestic monetary policy, as captured by money supply and credit to government hurt real domestic output of these countries. Indeed rather than promote growth it was a cause of stagnation. The study concluded that "these countries would be better-off to surrender its independence over these policy instruments to the planned regional body under appropriate monetary arrangement"(Balogun, 2007, p. 7).

There have also been studies about the benefits of monetary integration in Africa. Balogun (2007) has cited the works of Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo (2003), who were studying the rational for establishing regional currency unions in West Africa, using the European example. The result of their study supported the fact that, notwithstanding the differences in the political, economic and historical background of the two zones under ECOWAS, monetary unification will beneficial to a number of the members of the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). The reason, which they gave for this, is that "the costs stemming from the loss of monetary autonomy are often more than offset by the gains originating in the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers" (Balogun, 2007, p. 3). They however cautioned, "Large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditure objectives would not be attractive partners because they would be expected to pressure the common central bank creating excessive inflation in the entire union. Hence the desirability and sustainability of a currency union critically depends on fiscal discipline among its members... overall, the desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strong fiscal surveillance procedure both in the transition phase and after the establishment of the union" (Balogun, 2007, p. 3).

Nnanna (2006, p. 6) also presented the opinion of Devrajan and de Melo (1987) whom he noted demonstrated how participation in the CFA Zone shielded member states.From the negative impact of economic shocks that jolted the global economy during the 1970s. According to him, "the authors noted that individual and aggregate measures of the Zone's GDP growth are higher than those of other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their position is was also supported by Guillaumont and Plane (1988) who analyzed the effects of CFA participation on policy formation in member states by controlling for the effects of exogenous influences such as resource allocations and political influences and concluded that monetary integration in the CFA Zone benefited participating countries (Nnanna, 2006, p. 7).

The contribution of Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) regarding the advantages of monetary integration was also reviewed by Nnanna (2006, p. 7) they stated that the "advantages of monetary integration were not restricted to CFA countries". The authors compared the Zone with other African monetary unions and concluded that membership in other common currency areas offered comparable benefits. For example, members of the Rand Monetary Area was said to have experienced high levels of growth and investment as well as low inflation rates in the period between, 1974-1993. The foregoing discussions suggest that monetary integration remains a strong component of economic integration, which NEPAD through the institutional apparatus of the ECOWAS is mandated to pursue. Again, it presupposes that the adoption of a single currency is critical to an Optimum Currency Area and hence indispensable in the quest for integration. This could be why Nnanna (2009, p. 175) submitted that "the creation of a common economic space is at the heart of the integration effort, because a common economic space will foster trade amongst the member countries and trade will promote growth, reduce poverty and enhance prosperity".

Nnanna (2009, p. 178) citing self and other scholars summarized the major attractions for joining a monetary union. They include the following; achieving "a reduction in transaction cost, achieving a low inflation rate, enhancing capital flows and technological transfer, increasing intra-trade transactions, sustaining monetary and fiscal discipline, establishing a power bloc as a countervailing influence against the domination of neighbouring powers." Nnanna (2009, p. 177) also submitted what could be termed a precondition for a monetary union as follows; harmonize fiscal and monetary policy by prospective member countries, harmonize the tariff regime, enhance factor mobility (free movements of goods and people) open sky, sea-ports etc, establish common financial and legal architecture, especially, a common payments systems, regulatory framework for the money and capital markets. We will move further to examine the practicality of these theories in the quest for economic integration in West Africa.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)

ECOWAS by virtue of her colonial legacy is made up of two major lingual groups namely; the Anglophone and Francophone countries (colonial legacy), its monetary integration scheme is also polarized along these lines. First, eight out of the fifteen member countries belongs to the CFA zone, and by its operations and activities, they seem to have more economic space than the second group, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) that is made up by Anglophone countries including Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, which joined recently. Generally, the contribution of both groups to economic integration is examined in this section of the research.

Economic integration in ECOWAS region is notable for two major breakthroughs so far. First, the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMPCP), which was introduced in

1987 to promote financial and monetary cooperation among member, states with the ultimate objective of achieving a single currency area after a convergence process. Second is the ECOWAS Travellers Cheque, which was launched in a bid to increase transactions among member states and hence deepen the integration objectives. In furtherance of this ambition, the ECOWAS authority in later years established a second monetary zone, The West African Monetary Zone, to provide a platform for the current arrangement on moving towards a single currency, the countries constituting WAMZ are non UEMOA countries of Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. The WAMZ was meant to issue the Eco as a currency that will eventually merge with CFA of the UEMOA zone to form a single monetary zone in West Africa. It was hoped that a single West African currency would boost intra-regional trade and thus strengthening integration of the economies of the sub-region.

Unfortunately, the Single Monetary Programme Project under the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP), which was initiated in 1987, has experienced setbacks. Nnanna (2009, p. 176). This setback is attributable to the inability of the Anglophone member countries to achieve the quantitative convergence criteria. The inability to achieve this has made the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to extend the timeline several times. This was the reason behind the launching of the "fast track" approach to economic and monetary integration in ECOWAS in Lome in 1999 and the Accra declaration in 2000, which was a radical solution for the inertia and false starts, which the EMPCP had witnessed since 1987. Under the fast track approach, The EMPCP can take-off provided a minimum of two countries in the WAMZ have satisfied the primary convergence criteria (Nnanna, 2009, pp. 176-177). Nnanna (2009, p. 177) has noted that "the WAMZ project is a logical consequence of the fast track initiative, which was designed to galvanize the seven countries outside the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), to attain the same level of convergence like the WAEMU countries." His believe is that a synergy of the WAEMU and WAMZ strategy will ultimately deliver the EMCP. Based on this, he submitted that WAMZ member countries have much to gain by belonging to a monetary union. Whereas, he recognized that, the volume of trade amongst WAMZ countries was disappointing, he remained optimistic that, there was hope, since informal trade among them is put at 30 per cent while the level of labour mobility is also higher than assumed by analysts (Nnanna 2009. Pp. 178-179).

At this point, it is necessary to provide an explanation, definition and idea behind the WAMZ convergence criteria. The WAMZ countries account for about 60 per cent of the ECOWAS population and about 65 per cent of the ECOWAS 144 domestic product. The EMCP convergence criteria are categorized into primary and secondary criteria, with various target and dates set for their achievement. According to Nnanna (2009, p. 179) "quantitative macroeconomic and structural convergence criteria are stipulated and countries are required to meet them as a proof of commitment to sound macroeconomic policy. Ability to achieve and sustain the convergence criteria represents a measure of good economic housekeeping by member countries. The converse is also true, because it demonstrates the lack of commitment and political will to implement needed macroeconomic adjustment policies that would sustain the monetary union" The Primary criteria consists of four pillars, namely (i) Inflation (to be maintained at single digit) (ii) fiscal deficit/GDP ratio excluding grants- ≤ 4% (iii) central bank financing of fiscal deficit as per cent of previous year's tax revenue ≤ (iv) Gross External Reserves (months of Imports) ≤.

The secondary convergence criteria consist of the following pillars:

1. Zero domestic arrears, implying prohibition of domestic debts contraction,
2. Tax revenue to GDP ratio ≥ 20 Per cent
3. Wage bill to total tax revenue ratio ≤ 35 per cent
4. Exchange rate stability (defined as ≤ 15 percent and later reduced to ≤ 10 per cent of the quoted central rate prevailing as at April 1, 2002)
5. Maintenance of positive real interest rate
6. Public Investment on total tax revenue ≥ 20% (Adetula 2009, p. 180)

The major objective of the convergence criteria is to ensure that the member countries are committed to fiscal discipline, the absence of which has been a major cause of macroeconomic instability in the ECOWAS. The achievement of the primary criteria represents the necessary and sufficient condition precedent for take-off of the monetary union in the WAMZ (Adetula, 2009:p. 180).

A critical assessment of the performance of WAMZ Convergence criteria is necessary here to determine progress made on the issue. The first pillar or convergence criteria have to do with the level of inflation or rather non-inflation. Inflation is defined as "increase in the level" based on the changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) between successive end periods (viz. point-t-point). This definition is certainly preferred by policy makers over the alternative "moving average" definition of inflation as a 'sustained increase' in the price level over a period. An analysis done by Nnanna in which five WAMZ countries inflationary trend was analysed shows that this pillar of convergence is far from being achieved. The countries that were analysed are, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

The data, which spans from 1981 to 2004, reveal a lot of ups and down. However looking at it from the year 2000, when WAMZ was initiated, the records are better but yet not compliant. Records show that from 2000 to 2004, WAMZ member countries recorded some remarkable improvements. Apart from the Gambia, which remained stable, the rest recorded some decline from marginal to substantial. Nigeria moved from 15% to 10% between 2003 and 2004, Ghana from 41% to 12%, etc. The second pillar is fiscal deficit to GDP ratio $\leq$4.0 per cent is an important performance criterion, which the majority of the WAMZ member countries have not been able to achieve on a sustained basis since the convergence process started in 2000. It is important to remark that the convergence protocol excludes "grants" from the computation of revenue. This is a challenge to countries that rely heavily on donor assistance e.g. Sierra Leonean war times.

The objective of the second pillar is to measure the internal revenue generating effort of member countries in the zone as well as in their commitment to fiscal prudence and most importantly, the fiscal sustainability of the proposed monetary union. Nnanna offered some analysis depicting that the WAMZ countries have not done well in fiscal prudence. In the data presented by Nnanna between 1993 to 2004, Nigeria met the criterion thrice in five years, but not on a sustained basis. The Gambia and Guinea met it only once, Ghana never did and Sierra Leone missed it out by a wide margin. The third pillar has to do with Central bank financing of government budget $\leq$10 per cent of previous year's tax revenue while the fourth pillar deals with the target that gross external reserves must be $\geq$ 3 months of import. The data presented by Nnanna for 2000-2004 shows that Gambia and Guinea overshot the target and has to borrow from their Central Banks in four out of five years, while Ghana and Sierra Leone missed that target twice; and Nigeria only once.

The WAMZ countries have experienced relative positive terms of trade shock with exception of Guinea. Consequently meeting the gross reserve target has been generally easy, despite the disappointing fiscal performance. Nigeria's gross external reserve positively overshot the prescribed target by a wide margin throughout the five-year period. Gambia performed above average and Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone recorded mixed performance. Overall, no WAMZ country has met the criteria, leading to a postponement of the take-off of the monetary union from 2003 to 2005 and later to Dec 2009. It should be restated here that, the commencement of the Union initially set for 2003 was extended three times, owing to the inability of member countries to attain the convergence level required for the introduction of the common currency. The Heads of State and Government of the WAMZ had at its summit in Abuja on June 22, 2009 agreed to a new commencement date for the monetary union on or before January 1, 2015. There are still opinions that points to the fact that as economic indices indicate that, this date could still be an illusion.

It is also worthy of mention here that, WAMZ authorities have made substantial progress in designing the key structural architecture for the operations of the monetary union.; these includes the setting up of a framework for banking supervision, under the West African Financial and Supervisory Authority (WAFSA); the payments and currency management system guidelines and the drafting of the statue of the proposed West African Central Bank (WACB). The WAMZ member countries have agreed in principle to liberalize the current and capital accounts, a measure, which will enhance the benefits associated with the adoption of common external tariff by the WAMZ countries. It should be noted that, Nigeria has provided strong leadership at WAMZ; Nigerian economy has strong impact on the WAMZ. Nigeria, as at 2010 has met three of the four converging criteria and missed inflation criterion, which the WAMZ has fixed at single digit.

Despite these, the countries' overall missed the convergence criteria in 2010. While declaring open the 30th meeting of the Technical Committee of the West African Monetary Zone in Abuja on the 7th of February 2011, Nigeria's Minister of State for Finance, Hajia Yabawa Lawan Wabi, noted that a review of the West African Monetary Zone countries economic performance in 2010 indicated that overall compliance with the macro economic convergence criteria deteriorated from their primary criteria by end of December 2009 to two in 2010. Consequently, a single digit inflation rate and fiscal deficit, excluding grants, criteria was not attained. The summary for 2010 was summed up thus "while Ghana and Gambia met three of the primary criteria, Guinea experienced its worst performance since December 2005 by not meeting any criterion... Liberia met all the four primary criteria to maintain its December 2009 performance while Nigeria sustained its performance on the convergence scale by attaining there criteria as at the end of June 2010 Sierra-Leone maintained its end-December 2009 performance of compliance with one criterion" (Nigerian, Tribune, 8 February 2011).

Sanusi (2011) has recently declared that measures have been employed to drive down the figure to a single digit through empirical methodology, just as he said Nigeria was well on course to meet convergence criteria with the economy recovering from crisis, size and structure of government spending being addressed and the pace of structural reform in power and agricultural sectors encouraging" (Guardian, 11 February 2011.) Sanusi (2011) further gave an insight to the challenges of meeting the convergence criteria and the status of the WAMZ. According to him, the inability of the converging countries to meet the criteria is tied to the global financial crises. He said, "the global economic recovery, which began mostly on account of impressive growth in emerging Asian economies, notably China, was stalled in the wake of the Euro zone debt crisis and the waning impact of the huge monetary and fiscal stimulus packages implemented by many countries. The global economy grew by 5.0 per cent in 2010 although at uneven pace. Recovery in many advanced economies was sluggish, but fairly strong in emerging and developing economies. Commodity prices were relatively stable in the international market during the period, while global trade improved slightly, indicating resumed demand for exports from developing countries" (Guardian, 11 February 2011).

This situation produced a mixed-bag result for WAMZ, as it affected positively on the economic performance of WAMZ countries, which benefited from this resumed demand for exports through the reduction on inflation but with a challenge to the fiscal sector resulting from the depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Sanusi captures this scenario thus:

> Consequently, the economic performance in WAMZ is strong with real GDP growth expected to average 7.2 per cent for 2010. Inflationary pressures generally eased due to stability in commodity prices and improvement in domestic food production, although fiscal sector performance worsened mainly because of shortfall in member countries' revenues. Gross external reserves generally declined and local currencies depreciated against the U.S. dollar…the resultant effect are that overall compliance with the macroeconomic convergence criteria deteriorated. Member states missed the criteria on single-digit inflation rate and fiscal deficit, excluding grants. Only Liberia met all four primary criteria, while the Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria met three primary criteria each. Sierra Leone met one criterion during the period.

On this basis, Sanusi (2011) concluded, “The WAMZ project, therefore, recorded some progress through the on-going upgrading of the payments systems, the accession of Liberia to the zone and progress in the integration of financial markets. There are still some challenges to be resolved with public finances, trade and financial sector development to be ready to launch the single currency and tap from the fruits of the union. It is critical to improve and sustain performance on the convergence scale through further strengthening of fiscal performance.” (Guardian, 11 February 2011)

The frustration for the single monetary venture has been perennial. In December 1 2009, the Summit of Head of State dashed the hope of the region while meeting in Abuja. Expectations that the ECO was coming into force was dashed as President Yard aqua addressed the press. According to him “the global economic and financial crisis had put constraints on member states ability to meet the convergence criteria individually and collectively”...the summit resolved that adequate preparation and time were necessary for the launching of the monetary union” (Sunday Punch June 28 2009, p. 26). They also agreed to the extension of the period for the completion of the establishment of the common central bank (West African Central Bank) from January 1, 2010 to June 2014. According to one source “the postponement of the time frame for the introduction of the new currency, ECO, by the West African Heads of State in Abuja last week was the third time that the common currency suffered the same fate as it has been postponed twice in the past in about 10 years” (Sunday Punch June 28 2009, p. 26). Part of the reason for the postponement in 2009 was the fact that “the legal framework for its take-off has yet to be initiated... without a legal framework from member countries for ratification and domestication of all activities of the institute would be illegal and of no effect (The Guardian, March 17 2009, p. 23).

The prevailing circumstances has obviously made Sanusi (2010, p. 7) to conclude that “Ghana and other West African countries are not yet ripe for common currency like Europe... with just 10 per cent of trade transaction among the region, discussion on a common currency should be the end gain adding that Ghana and Nigeria are leading the single currency drive which is expected to take off by 2015”. Sanusi (2010, p.7) went further to buttress his position thus “A common currency only makes sense after integration of the region. What is the trade between Nigeria and Gambia, between Nigeria and Ghana and between Nigeria and Burkina Faso? What is the purpose of the currency when we have not yet built trade flow? We don’t have free movement of goods and capital”. Sanusi’s position is undoubtedly correct since the issue of volume of trade is important and in fact a major factor in determining the success of monetary integration. He justified this using the European example. “Before imitating the Euro, it should be noted that 60 per cent of the trade in Europe is within the European Union...almost 50 percent of the total trade of the Southeast Asia is among countries of Asian nations.”

Sanusi’s conclusion in this regard concurs with Joseph Nye position in his neo-functionalist theory of integration. While discussing the “process mechanisms” as studied in chapter 1, Nye noted that the second stage of integration or in an integration process is the phenomenon of rising transactions. This is a proof that integration is on the increase, i.e. that transactions, including trade, capital movement, communications, and exchange of people and ideas is on the increase. Consequently, the success of integration or even readiness to integrate is evident in the level of transaction among the integrating members. If the trade among members of the ECOWAS sub-region is at 10%, whereas those of the European Union and South East Asian Unions are about 50%, then it could be concluded that our economic integration is challenged.

The UEMOA

The West African Monetary Union (UMOA) now UEMOA is one of the major assets of the West African region in matters of integration. The West African Monetary Union (UMOA) has transmuted into the UEMOA in January 1994. It groups seven francophone countries under the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), which is the issuing authority of the Union’s common currency, the CFA Franc. Largely, this union has been rated as successful. This is usually attributed to the supranational nature of the institution and the external support from France, who as an erstwhile colonial authority of the member countries has provided the needed support and expertise to drive the organisation to its present heights. Presently, the Union has expanded its functions beyond that of monetary cooperation, into full-blown economic sphere for West Africa as a whole. These are certain landmark achievements, which makes the UEMOA’s rating high as a successful integration element.

First, the Central Bank of the region established the West African Clearing House (WACH) to facilitate intraregional transactions and economize on the use of foreign convertible currencies. The scope of WACH is now being enlarged, and transformed into West African Monetary Agency. The Agency will be a specialized ECOWAS institution responsible for the

ECOWAS Monetary program, whose objective is the creation of a single monetary zone with a single common currency replacing the ten existing ones (The CFA franc and nine inconvertible currencies). Second, to strengthen the harmonization and coordination of their macroeconomic policies, they adopted a set of convergence criteria, established a common external tariff regime, harmonized their tax systems, and strengthened their institutions to entrench their developmental projects. The convergence criteria adopted in 1994 included a ceiling on civil service wage bill of 40 percent of tax revenue, a ceiling on public investment financed by primary basic fiscal surplus of not less than 15 percent of tax revenue and a declining or unchanged level of domestic and external arrears. The countries demonstrated strong commitment to comply with the criteria, but the lack of sanctions for non-compliance and poorly designed indicators undermined effectiveness. The criteria were later enhanced in 1999, with the adoption of a more stringent indicator under the convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact. The pact required the member countries of UEMOA to aim at a balanced or surplus, in the basic fiscal balance, an inflation rate of three percent or less, domestic debt/GDP and external debt/GDP ratios of below 70 percent and non-accumulation of both domestic and external debt arrears. Furthermore, the pact prescribed sanctions for non-compliance.The success of UEMOA was summarized by Medhorain in the following words" The UEMOA countries have managed to maintain stable, non-inflammatory monetary policies, thanks to the insulation of the BCEAO from political interference." He added that the major deficiency of the union "was for many years, the inability to devalue the CFA, but now that this has been resolved, the benefits of monetary integration, such as reduction of risk and decline in transaction costs, could help stimulate regional trade and promote investment in the region".

The monetary integration process was also strengthened with the introduction of various cooperation instruments such as the Customs Automation Project (ASYCUDA) to improve the collection of customs revenue, the Common ECOWAS Passport in addition to the ECOWAS travelers Cheque, the introduction of the third party insurance scheme for cross border vehicles known as the brown card. (Nnanna,p. 15) Looking at West Africa in line with these requirements and characteristics will show that while there has been some success, a lot of job still needs to be done.At this point, it is necessary to discuss other ECOWAS Monetary Integration Programmes supported by NEPAD. Other initiative undertaken to support monetary integration in West Africa includes;

1. The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI). This was set up in Accra, Ghana in January 2001 to facilitate the creation of a common central bank and the introduction of a common currency. The Institute ismandated to undertake technical preparations for the establishment of a common West African Central Bank started operations in March 2001. Its functions include,
   a. monitoring of macroeconomic convergence of the member countries vis-à-vis the prescribed benchmarks;
   b. harmonization regulations and design of policy framework;
   c. promotion of the Regional Payment System;
   d. conduct studies on exchange rate mechanism and conversion rate;
   e. organization of sensitization programme for the citizens of the member countries; and
   f. The design and technical preparation of the new currency, etc.

   The institute is to become a think tank and brain box for the successful implementation and establishment of the West African Central bank. It will do this through awareness creation, research and evaluation of the total process

2. West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM). This is a sub-regional training institute whose principal objective is to build capacity for debt, macroeconomic and financial sector management in its constituent countries. WAIFEM was established by the Central Banks of The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone to strengthen capacity of public sector officials engaged in macroeconomic and financial policy formulation and implementation. As at the end of December 2004, WAIFEM had executed 142 capacity-building programmes, involving 4,021 participants of which 1,905 of them were from Nigeria.

3. The West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) is an autonomous specialized agency of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In 1996, the West African Clearing House (WACH), which was established in 1975 as a multilateral payment agency to improve sub-regional trade in West Africa, was transformed into a broad based autonomous agency called the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA). WAMA's Headquarters was officially inaugurated on the 28th November 1996. The Agency is concerned with monetary co-operations and payment issues within the context of economic and monetary integration process of the region in line with NEPAD's

continental objectives. Presently, Nigeria's 22% contribution is the single largest contributor to the WAMA budget.

4. The Association of African Central Banks (AACB) was established in February 1965. The objective of the Association is to promote co-operation in the monetary, banking and financial sphere in the African region and to support the establishment of guidelines along which future agreements between African countries can be framed in the areas already identified. The objectives of the AACB are in line with NEPAD's objectives of promoting integration in the African continent. The Association has an Assembly of Governors (thegoverning body of which are members all African Central Banks Governors), a Bureau (composed of the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson of the Association and Chairpersons of sub-regional Committees), sub-regional Committees (composed of Governors of Central Banks of the five (5) sub-regions as defined by the African Union). Membership of the Association and its Sub regional Committees is open to all Central Banks of member countries of the African Union.

This discussion will be incomplete without mentioning Nigeria's partnership with NEPAD in bringing about economic integration in West Africa. Being that Nigeria is the largest member of the group and makes the biggest contribution to ECOWAS, NEPAD and their projects. Nigeria's 29.66% contribution to the ECOWAS budget has been the largest single contribution. The Central Bank of Nigeria has been in the fore front of ensuring the success of the ECOWAS Monetary Integration Program me. It is expected that the successful take off of the program me will lead to the commencement of the Single Monetary Union in the African Union (AU) in line with NEPAD objectives.

Generally, ECOWAS efforts at monetary integration set many clear milestones. First, the revised ECOWAS treaty included, the harmonization of monetary, financial and payment policies; introduction of limited convertibility of currencies towards facilitating the liberalization of intra-regional payments transactions; promotion of the role of commercial banks in intra-community trade financing; introduction of a credit and guarantee fund mechanism to improve the multilateral system of clearing payment transactions between member states; promotion of activities of the West African Monetary Agency towards ensuring convertibility of currencies and creation of a single monetary zone and the establishment of a Community Central Bank and a common currency Zone. Others includes; the establishment of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) to coordinate the activities leading to the creation of a single monetary zones in West Africa. This was cascaded in three phases that saw the introduction of the West African Clearing House (WACH), exchange rate harmonization and an ECOWAS exchange rate system and market oriented approach to monetary policy (Ogunkola, 2005, p. 9). There was also the establishment of the West African Monetary Agency to promote the use of national currencies in intraregional trade and to promote savings in the use of member states foreign exchange reserves. Two things underlie the operations of WAMA. First, the fact that the volume of intra-regional transactions passing through them, has an indirect relationship to exchange control measures and fixed exchange rate regimes and the volumes of this transactions being an indication of the level of intra-regional trade in the sub-region. Additionally, the proposal to establish a West African Inter-bank payment system (WAIPS) by commercial and merchant banks in the region is noteworthy. It focus is on trade, payments and transfers across the sub region. It is to improve efficiency in fund transmission at the lowest cost. The efficiency and success of these institutions will be studied in Chapter 5.

3.6 NEPAD, ECOWAS and Trade in West Africa

Trade is obviously one of the most potent instruments in bringing about regional integration and hence, regional integration may be said not to be incomplete without trade. In fact, as discussed in the last paragraph, the volume of trade among member could be an indication of the level of integration among them. According to Nwokoma (2009, p. 227) the basic idea of economic integration is an arrangement where a group of countries, in the same region and preferably of relatively equal size and at equal stages of development, join together in an economic union to, among other things, enhance trade among themselves... where the countries raise a common tariff walls against the products of non-members as well as free internal trade among themselves, we have a customs union. Where external tariff against non-members differs but free trade exists among members of the union, then we have a Free Trade Area. The common market represents a case where a customs union arrangement exists alongside the free movement of labour and capital among the member countries of the union. The benefits accruable from these include trade creation (shift in production from high to low cost in member countries) and trade diversion (shift in production and consumption from lower-cost non-member countries to higher cost member countries).

The predicament of Africa and indeed West African countries regarding trade is pitiable. First, they are rated among the third world countries, who are exporters of mainly primary commodities and whose prices are more cyclical than those of manufactured products are. Consequently, the terms of trade of primary products from the Third World has over the years fared marginally worse than for developed countries. Primary product price instability creates uncertainty and difficulties for producers and individual exporting countries as well as contributing to the instability in the world economy. Therefore, it will suffice to say that the trend of global trade tilts against West African Countries and the idea of trade liberalization is only good for this group of nation for the singular reason of economics of scale.

Nnanna (2009, p. 9) agreed to this fact, that the potential benefits of trade liberalization and integration is hinged on the economies of scale. According to him, “the potential benefits of trade liberalization for African countries are ingrained in the theory of economies of scale. The small size of most SSA economies points to unification as a useful means of expanding markets and increasing participation in the global economy. Thus, a relaxation of trade restrictions within a given region could reduce internal transport costs, stimulate intraregional trade, and ultimately increase the growth and productivity of member states”. He went further to say that trade is the lynchpin to creating a common currency area, because trade integration creates the trans-national political and economic infrastructure required for an effective monetary union. Intra-regional trade agreements can be adopted without restricting monetary policy flexibility. As against monetary unions, trade unions preferably permit members to enjoy communal benefits of preferential treatment without sacrificing the benefits of monetary policy autonomy. There is therefore no doubt that trade liberalization will profit West Africa as long as they trade majorly among themselves, but unfortunately, the sub region has never taken advantage of this Nnanna (2009, p. 9).

He however lamented that, In spite of these prospects, trade unions in Africa have shown limited capacity of enhancing economic development. He cited the survey carried out by Hanink and Owusu (1998), in which they used a trade intensity index to analyze trade within ECOWAS and reported that it has not promoted trade among its members. Nnanna (2009, p. 9) also cited Oyejide (1998) who contended that policies to increase intra-regional trade are not particularly, instrumental in solving the ‘Africa growth problem’. Oyejide has stated clearly that early trade unions in Africa, including ECOWAS and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (forerunner of COMESA), did not result in appreciable increases in formal intra-regional trade. The background so far will help appreciate the impact of NEPAD and ECOWAS in expanding trade in the sub region of West

Africa. Their role is best understood, when one considers them as a platform for trade promotion and market expansion. In this segment, the research will examine the NEPAD and ECOWAS frameworks of trade in West Africa and the practicability or otherwise of these plans. In doing this, the positions of Dot Keet in his article The Character and role of trade within NEPAD, critical challenges and questions is reviewed.

The NEPAD framework for trade recognizes the fact that African economies do not currently enjoy patronage nor get international attention because they are small and fragmented and recognizes the need to use the sub-regional economic groupings in Africa to foster trade. NEPAD document (2001. Pp. 90-92) notes that,

> Most African countries are small, in terms of both population and per capita incomes. Owing to limited markets, they do not offer attractive returns to potential investors, while progress in diversifying production and exports is retarded. This limits investment in essential infrastructure that depends on economies of scale for viability. These economic conditions point to the need for African countries to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration on the continent, in order to improve international competitiveness. The five sub regional economic groupings of the continent must, therefore, be strengthened.

To this extent, NEPAD and ECOWAS are aligned to the objective of achieving better trade relation internally and externally in West Africa. NEPAD framework regarding trade is targeted at the promotion of African exports and hinged on the following objectives (i) To improve procedures for customs and drawback/rebate schemes; (ii) To tackle trade barriers in international trade through the improvement of standards; (iii) To increase intra-regional trade through promoting cross-border interaction among African firms; (iv) To counter Africa's negative image through conflict resolution and marketing; (v) To deal with shortages of short-term skills through appropriate incentives and training at firm level. (NEPAD, 2001, Pp. 90-92)

These objectives will be achieved through the following actions at the African level,

a. Promote intra-African trade with the aim of sourcing within Africa imports formerly sourced from other parts of the world;
b. Create marketing mechanisms and institutions to develop marketing strategies for African products;
c. Publicize African exporting and importing companies and their products through trade fairs;

d. reduce the cost of transactions and operations;
e. Promote and improve regional trade agreements, foster interregional trade liberalization and harmonize rules of origin, tariffs and product standards;
f. Reduce export taxes.

In addition, the strategy at the international level is hinged on improved negotiations for African products. Others include: (1) negotiation of measures and agreements to facilitate access to the world market by African products; (2) encourage foreign direct investment; (3) assist in capacity-building in the private sector, as well as strengthening country and sub-regional capacity in trade negotiations, implementing the rules and regulations of the WTO, and identifying and exploiting new trading opportunities that emerges from the evolving multilateral trading system; (4) the African heads of state must ensure active participation in the world trading system, which has been managed under the auspices of the WTO since 1995. If a new round of multilateral trade negotiations is started, it must recognize and provide for the African continent's special concerns, needs and interests in future WTO rules.

At the same time, NEPAD states that participation in the world trading system must enhance, (1) Open, predictable and geographically diversified market access for exports from Africa; (2) The provision of a forum in which developing countries can collectively call for Structural adjustment by developed countries in those industries in which the natural competitive advantage now lies with the developing world; (3) Transparency and predictability as preconditions for increased investment, in return for boosting supply capacity and enhancing the gains from existing market access; (4) Technical assistance and support to enhance the institutional capacity of African states to use the WTO and to engage in multilateral trade negotiations. (NEPAD 2001, Pp. 90-92)

Again, NEPAD (2001) noted that In addition to broad-based support for the WTO, African heads of state must identify strategic areas of intervention and, together with the international community, strengthen the contribution of trade to the continent's recovery. The strategic areas include, (1) Identifying key areas in export production in which supply-side impediments exist; (2) Diversifying production and exports, especially in existing and potential areas of competitive advantage and bearing in mind the need to move towards higher value-added production;(3) Assessing the scope for further liberalization in manufacturing, given the concentration of access in low value-added sectors and its restrictiveness in high value-added activities with the greatest economic and growth potential;

(4) Renewed political action by African countries to intensify and deepen the various integration initiatives on the continent. To this end, consideration needs to be given to, (5) A discretionary preferential trade system for intra-African trade; (6) The alignment of domestic and regional trade and industrial policy objectives, thereby increasing the potential for intra-regional trade critical to the sustainability of regional economic arrangements (Para.168).

A critical evaluation of the above provisions in the NEPAD document will show that NEPAD under the aegis of the sub-regional organisations has orchestrated quite a number of activities to stimulate trade. West Africa has benefited from these programmes in a number of ways. First NEPAD recognizes the need for diversification of production by African countries, since there is a high level of dependence on production of primary goods, which has narrow export bases. The proposal is that to stimulate trade in Africa, there is need to align and harmonise domestic and regional trade and industrial policy objectives, thereby increasing the potential for intra-regional trade, which is critical to the sustainability of regional economic arrangements (Keet, 2006, p. 156).

A critical assessment of intra-regional trade in West Africa will obviously show a mixed bag. Nwokoma (2009, p. 235) who studied this subjected noted that “findings from UNCTAD/WTO using IMF statistics indicate that about 91 percent of total reported exports from ECOWAS go to destinations outside the sub region while only about 9% was intra-regional-in 1998. The main exporters of ECOWAS are Nigeria (95 percent of exports are oil) and Cote d’voire. These two countries alone account over 70 percent of the regions export to the world. Hence with Nigeria being the dominant economy in the sub-region and with only 5percent of the exports coming from non-oil sources, the volume of non-oil export to the sub region is expected to be quite insignificant”. The additional facts also show that “by 1998, the indicative intra-regional trade potential for the sub region is estimated to be US$ 2.4 billion with the product group of frozen fish having the highest trade potential evaluated at $157 million (Nwokoma 2009, p. 235). Intra-regional trade within the ECOWAS ranged between 2.9 per cent in 1970 and 10.2 per cent in 2002. The average ratio for the period was 7.4 per cent. In dollar terms, the value of the intra-trade within the region rose progressively from $83 million in 1970 to US$2.7 billion in 2000, but fell to US$2.2 billion in 2001. Between 2002 and 2004, the value averaged US$3.3 billion.

We need to caution that the official statistics analyzed above could be misleading, as data on total trade within the regional groupings exclude the informal trade sector, which is very significant according to some analysts? Infact, it should be noted here that one of the biggest challenge for studying and understanding sub regional trade in West Africa is the lack of records or good book keeping regarding volume of trade. To this end, Nwokoma (2009, p. 235) submitted that "the study of Essien and Egbuna indicate that there is no supporting evidence of growth induced by regional trade. The plausible reason being that trade within the region is largely informal and unrecorded". Be this as it may, the foregoing discussion has remained in tandem with the position of Sanusi (2010) as concurred by Joseph Nye, that West Africa is not ready for integration, because of the abysmal level of trade amongst its members. Whilst, the research agrees that a lot of informal trade exists in the sub-region, there is no strong evidence to show that its volume, even if they were recorded, will reverse the trend. Again, these economies are export dependent because, they are not diversified. Nigeria produces crude oil, while Cote d'Ivoire produces cocoa. This will likely give advantage to exports to other parts of the world because of the weight of the dollar, euro and pounds. Consequently, with an undiversified economic base, it does not appear that the end is insight for this predicament.

ECOWAS has introduced many programs and projects to boost sub regional trade in West Africa. First, there has been the protocol on free movement of persons. This was accentuated with the abolition of visas and entry permits all in an effort to enhance accessibility among citizens of the sub region According to Charles Dokubo (2009, p. 149) "A key requirement for the achievement of this objective is the removal of obstacles to the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment of May 1979 guaranteeing free entry of community citizens without visa for ninety days was ratified by member states in 1980 and put into effect immediately. This ushered in the era of free movement of ECOWAS citizens within member countries". the 1979 Protocol has stipulated that "citizens of member states shall be regarded as community citizens, and accordingly, member states undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the community... the Treaty recommends in Article 27 (2) that member States shall by agreement with each other exempt community citizens from holding visitors visas and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories". Whereas, there has been a sad moment for this protocol, which is to say that implementation has not been altogether seamless, its importance in facilitating regional trade cannot be obliterated.

To further lubricate the implementation of the protocol and bring about complete implementation of all its phases, the Economic Community of West African States has put in place a functional Free Movement Pilot Monitoring Team (FMPMT) expected to check illegal activities and abuses along Seme border and other designated entry points into the country... that will check and choke the harassment, intimidation and collection of illegal tariffs along the same border and other designated entry point in the country with the intent of opening up the roads for the facilitation of free movement of goods, services and capital and with a view to accelerating the integration process in the sub-region (Guardian March 9 2009, p. 13). Commenting on the project, ECOWAS Director of Free Movement and Tourism, Mr.Sanoh Fally stated that “as at this moment about eight countries including Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and others are setting up a monitoring pilot team. As a matter of fact, Benin Republic has not only set up a monitoring pilot team, it has also constructed a befitting operating office at the border and as I am talking to you, the outgoing ECOWAS Chairman Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso has dismantled all check points between his country and other countries” (Guardian 9 March 2009, p. 13).

The second factor, which has promoted trade in West Africa, which is strongly championed by ECOWAS and NEPAD, is the Free Movement of Goods. The objective of this ECOWAS programme is to “establish a customs union among the member states of the community over a period of fifteen years, starting from 1st January, 1990” (Nwokoma 2009, p. 225). It constitutes of three elements notably; the total elimination of customs duties and taxes having equivalent effect, removal of non-tariff barriers, and establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET). It provides for “a liberalisation of trade in unprocessed goods and traditional handicraft products. Hence the unprocessed goods and traditional handicraft products will circulate freely between member states, exempt from duties and taxies having equivalent effect, and not subject to any quantitative or administrative restrictions” (Nwokoma 2009, p. 232).The qualification for exemption applies to the two categories of products, first is the unprocessed good and traditional handicraft products and the industrial or processed products. In both cases, the products must fulfill three conditions namely; originating from member country, be on approved list and possess a certificate of origin and an ECOWAS export declaration. This provision was meant to encourage intra-regional exports and reverse the earlier mentioned trade situation, where 90% of trade forms external of ECOWAS.

In order to facilitate the Trade Liberalisation Scheme, ECOWAS developed and provided certain harmonised, uniformed and statistical customs documents to take care of the above processes. This included the certificate of origin, the customs and statistical nomenclature, and the customs declaration. Additionally, a protocol on inter-state road transit and a transit guarantee mechanism was adopted (Nwokoma 2009, p. 233). Under the Trade Liberalisation Scheme, member countries were expected to remove trade barriers of both unprocessed and industrial products. The scheme also determined to eliminate tariff barriers within an ECOWAS free trade zone by 31st December 1999. This will make way for the introduction of ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) within the following two years. Nwokoma (2009, p. 234) gave an indication of benefits that has accrued to ECOWAS because of the free trade area. He provided some data to support this fact thus, “from 1998 to July 2004, about 2,536 industrial products from 807 companies in 12 Member states were approved under the preferential regime of the scheme. Nigeria ranked first with 42 percent of the total, followed by Ghana with 28 percent and Cote D’Ivoire”

The major emphasis for creating these Unions was the liberalisation of inter-community trade and related forms of cooperation, such as regional roads and telecommunication networks supported by ECOWAS. Other areas of ECOWAS activity have included measures to facilitate the free flow of people, through the introduction of visa- free travel for citizens of West African countries throughout the region. It is on record that the ECOWAS passport has been in circulation for close to a decade now. This has facilitated entry into other countries in the region by ECOWAS citizens. There are other programs to facilitate free movement of goods and persons includes, the introduction of the ECOWAS Travel Certificate, introduction of harmonized immigration and emigration forms, introduction of the Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme, Printing and introduction of the harmonized customs document. There has also been the launch of West Africa’s Travelers Cheque.

The other program, which has facilitated sub regional trade, is the Common External Tariff. Usually the CET is a significant step towards the realization of a customs union. The establishment of a trade liberalization scheme in 1990 is a significant achievement in the creation of a Free Trade Area in West Africa, to enhance the removal of all barriers to internal trade among member states. It was meant to enhance free movement of goods in the sub-region, which will involve a total elimination of customs duties and taxes having equivalent effect, removal of non-tariff barriers and establishment of a Common External

Tariff (CET).This scheme actually covered three group of products including; traditional handicrafts, unprocessed goods and industrial products. However, in order to qualify for exemption as described above, such unprocessed goods and traditional handicraft products must satisfy their criteria's (i) originate in member states (ii) appear on the list of products annexed to the decisions liberalizing trade in such products and (iii) be accompanied by a certificate of origin and an ECOWAS export declaration (Nwokoma 2009, p. 233). This was this scheme, under which ECOWAS and UEMOA trade liberalization schemes were achieved, which also gave a new impetus to the actual and gradual implementation of the free trade area. In this respects, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo have lifted tariff barriers in respect of unprocessed products under the TLS. However, only Benin is said to have removed tariff barriers to trade in industrial products (Nwokoma, 2009, p. 240).Further, ECOWAS has undertaken the development of infrastructure in the sub region such as the construction of regional (inter-member state) roads, proposed establishment of ECOAIR and ECOMARINE for air and sea transportation respectively and the development of telecommunication links between the countries are all development that has ultimately improved trade in the West African sub region.

It is also notable that sub regional trade has always received the executive support of the Heads of state of the ECOWAS. This support has been consistent at least to the level of outcomes from its various summits. At the end of a summit of Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 1 January 2007, they resolved to tackle the obstacles to free movements of goods in the sub region. To this end, it endorsed the decision of the Council of Ministers to establish pilot units on the Lagos- Cotonou, Lome-Accra, Abidjan-Quagaougou and Bamako-Conakry axis and to create a central coordination and monitoring bureau. It therefore reiterated the need for all member states to implement the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment. It also instructed the ECOWAS Commission to ensure the completion of the remaining portions of international highways and interconnection of railway networks with standard gauge. (Guardian 23 January 2007, p. 80)

ECOWAS has also undertaken to sign various bilateral and multilateral agreements to boost trade in the sub region. For instance, ECOWAS and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce signed a Memorandum of Understanding on trade and investment in Lagos on the

14th of January 2010. In the partnership, the two parties expect to generate a trade worth $1 billion. According to Nigeria's Vice President "we hope that our co-operation will also help ECOWAS to expand their influence to promote sustainable development… we have put in place tax relief to encourage your investment. (This Day 15 January 2010, p. 9)

In addition, NEPAD has organized trade fairs to foster regional trade cooperation and integration of the continent and West Africa especially. This is an initiative of the African Trade Center in collaboration with NEPAD Nigeria, which expects to sensitize and mobilize both public and private sectors to be more proactive, productive and responsive in its need to stimulate African trade. The third ECOWAS, NEPAD fair took place in Lome, Togo. (This Day, Vol 9, No 2906, 7 March 2003, p. 20) commenting on the 2010 edition of the fair, Ambassador Tunji Olagunji, who is the Special Adviser to the President of Nigeria on NEPAD "the objective of the fair in part is to encourage collaboration and competition in the production of goods and services whose potentials can create new opportunities for demands of African products in global markets". Indeed, he pointed out that "we hope by engaging in such activities, NEPAD can challenge the old paradigm of uni-directional and monolithic relationship between Africa and its developed Partners especially in the area of indigenous product services" (The Guardian 17 September 2010, p. 35). The fair, which lasted between 23rd to 31st October 2010, is just one of the many fairs organized by NEPAD as a platform to boost intra-regional trade among members of the ECOWAS community.

3.7 ECOWAS, NEPAD and Agriculture in West Africa

The Agricultural sector is one of the most important variable and denominator of West African economy. This is so because it contributes to the wealth, employment and food security as well as a major export to the international markets. Agriculture contributes as much as 35 percent of regional GDP as well as 15.3 percent of all goods and services exports of the region. As a source of employment, 60 percent of all West Africans live in the rural areas and draw most of their resources from agricultural activities, while 65 percent of active workers of which more than half are women, work in agricultural sector and related industries. Additionally, poverty and food insecurity characterize about 30 percent of the population. Imports of food products constitute about 19 percent of all ECOWAS imports (Excerpts from 28th session of the Authority of Heads of state and Government, 19th January 2005, Accra.) Therefore, it will not be in error to say that agriculture is the mainstay of the greater majority of people in the sub region. The NEPAD Agricultural Plan relates to those elements directly specified as being the framework for Agricultural developments and other elements in the plan, which indirectly supports agricultural development. The direct agricultural plan is composed of three key areas; land productivity and water management, food security and supply and rural infrastructure and market access.

Regarding land productivity and water management, the NEPAD Agricultural strategy seeks to address the problem of declining soil fertility in Africa's arable land and constraints associated with the continents climatic variability through investment in new irrigation schemes and rehabilitation of dormant schemes for increased agricultural production. About 725 million hectares, or 83 percent of Africa's arable lands, have serious soil fertility issues or other limitations and will require costly improvements to attain high and sustained productivity…due to the widespread problem, the plan proposes investments in the protection and improvement of the soil (Moyo, 2006, pp. 114-115). The strategy also identified the fact that only 7 percent of this arable land is irrigated in Africa, but 40 percent of this is North Africa whilst in the developing world, the lowest percentages are 10, 29 and 41 per cent for south America, South –East Asia and South Asia respectively, thus the agricultural strategy calls for strategic public and private investment in water management.

Second, since Africa has the World's poorest people, NEPAD Agricultural strategy in this respect strives at eradicating food insecurity and hunger on the continent, which will ultimately lead to poverty reduction and eradication. To this end, the plan therefore advocates for vigorous large-scale community based programs to improve the performance of small firms throughout the region. This encourages governments to provide a policy and incentive framework that is conducive to agricultural growth including well-functioning lucrative markets for agricultural products (Moyo, 2006, pp. 14-115). This plan also expects the countries to take advantage of existing regional programs for food security from organizations like the Food and Agricultural Organization.

The third thrust of the plan is the development of rural infrastructure and market access. The poor state of roads, storage, and processing and market facilities is blamed on years of consistently psaltery investments in the sector. For instance, between 1990 and 1996, external investments in economic infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa were US$26.7 billion, or just over one third of East Asia's US$71.9 billion dollars (Moyo, 2006, p. 115). Consequently, the plans call for resource mobilization to boost this sector to improve market access to the agrarian products of Africa. Regarding market access, the plan is to reverse Africa's declining share of world exports, the continents share of world exports having declined from about 8 per cent in 1971-80 to just 3.4 percent in 1991-2000. It also states the need to invest on both human and capital resources and facilities to meet technical standards for export products (Moyo, 2006, p. 115). Ultimately, it seeks to also give African's advantage at WTO. Unfortunately, West African Agriculture is characterized by low productivity, which in turn is attributed to institutional weaknesses, ecological, and land tenure constraints, weak innovative technologies, disengagement of the states etc all combine to weaken the sector.

In response to these challenges, Article 25.2(h), the revised ECOWAS Treaty makes provision for an implementation of a Common Agricultural Policy. In application of this agreement, the ECOWAS Ministerial Commission for Food and Agriculture adopted in 2001 in Bamako the principle elements and even instructed the Executive Secretariat to commission a study leading to the preparation of this policy. This was the birth of the Economic Community of West African Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP). The policy was expected to define the principles and objectives of the agricultural sector, the orientation of agricultural development, and the axes of intervention through which the sub-region will exploit its potential to assure; sustainable food security in member states, decent remuneration for agricultural workers, expansion of trade on sustainable basis as much within the region as with the rest of the world (28th session of the Authority of Heads of state and Government, 19th January 2005, Accra).

ECOWAP is expected to harmonize all agricultural strategies of ECOWAS nations through negotiation and coordination of all stakeholders including the civil society, intergovernmental organizations and national governments. Additionally, ECOWAP is fully aligned to the implementation of NEPAD. ECOWAP contributes to the achievement of NEPAD objectives, and thus benefit from the investments and other elements that NEPAD seeks to promote. The ECOWAP covers all production of the agriculture, livestock, and fishing, sectors along with forestry and natural resource management. The General Objective sought by the West African Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) is to "contribute in a sustainable way to meeting way to meeting food needs of the population, to economic and social development, to the reduction of poverty in the Member states and thus to reduce existing inequalities among territories, zones and nations" (28th session of the Authority of Heads of state and Government, 19th January 2005, Accra).

Generally, ECOWAP intervention will be on three major axis; increasing food productivity and competitiveness of West African agriculture, implementing a Trade regime within West Africa, and adapting trade regimes vis-à-vis countries outside the region. ECOWAP will also undertake the modernization of farming including water control, improved seeds, farm equipment, water and soil conservation, fertilizer production etc. It also undertakes agricultural research and ensures that the findings are disseminated among the member states. The plan is that agricultural research should be promoted at the regional level. It should be stated here that currently, there is an existing initiatives for regional coordination in research, for instance CORAF/WECARD and the Sahel institute. However, what is needed is the continuous improvement and dissemination of its findings and implementation of the same. There is also need for the coordination of all national and international agro-economic research including ICRISAT, IITA, ADRAO. This will ensure that there is simultaneous development in this sector across member nations of the community.

The agricultural policy also includes the development of agricultural and agro food chains for food security, foodstuff chains, export chains on the international markets; coffee, cocoa, cotton, tropical fruits, cattle beef chains, fish, dairy products etc. Additionally, it will see to the coordination of national organization structure, either in the form of inter-professional associations or vertical coordination among stakeholders, which need to be linked at the regional level. This will also include some product chain organization of producers, which are currently in existence, or those that will emerge in the near future. Already there exists ROPPA and RECAO. There are also others especially among critical products like rice, cotton and potatoes. The financing of ECOWAP was as well provided for. In order to facilitate financial resources flowing in support of ECOWAP, there was a proposal to establish an ECOWAS Agricultural Development Fund (ECOWADF), which will be funded by the community’s own resources and by donors who want to channel resources into Agricultural programs within the framework of ECOWAP. Regarding monitoring and evaluation of ECOWAP, it was left in the hands of the ECOWAS executive secretariat in collaboration with the consultative committee of stakeholders. The Ministerial Commission will oversee this for Food and Agriculture, which will meet periodically with the consultative committee to review progress in the implementation of ECOWAP and to approve modifications that may be needed.

Concisely, the NEPAD framework has provided a platform for RECs and NEPAD to adopt Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) with support from their development partners. Rwanda became the first country to sign the CAADP Compact 2007. As at May 2011, 26 countries had signed the compact and incorporated the CAADP Compact into their agricultural agenda. These countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, DRC, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2003 African heads of state met in Mozambique and pledged to allocate 10 per cent of their national budget to agriculture by 2008. To date, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Senegal have exceeded this target and most countries have made significant progress towards this goal. CAADP has an agricultural growth target of 6 per cent. To date nine countries have exceeded this target (Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania) and another four have achieved growth of between 5 and 6 per cent. The NEPAD Secretariat conducted a series of regional workshops in 2005 to help implement CAADP. In this regard, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), West Africa Health Organization (WAHO), CILSS and Development Partners hosted the West Africa Regional CAADP Nutrition Programme Development Workshop November 9-12, 2011 at Le Meridien Hotel in Dakar, Senegal. This workshop was organized in recognition of the critical need to integrate nutrition in National Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plans and development agendas of ECOWAS member states.

The workshop common objective was to address the challenges of malnutrition and exploring how best to coordinate efforts to effectively deliver nutrition services where they are most needed. Again, it was to play the role of ensuring that each ECOWAS member state will fully utilize this opportunity to do nutrition business differently in order to improve their food and nutrition security situation. It was organized within the context of the CAADP Framework for African Food Security (FAFS) which sets out a plan of action for achieving MDG1: to reduce hunger and poverty in Africa in half by 2015. FAFS aims to assist in achieving this goal through agricultural-led growth aimed at reaching the following objectives: (a) reducing risk at all levels; (b) increasing the supply of affordable and safe food; (c) increasing the incomes of the poor, and (d) increasing dietary diversity. It brought together approximately 180 representatives of government Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Finance and Economic Planning, and Civil Society from the 17 countries in West Africa. Donors including World Bank, USAID and the Gates Foundation, UN organizations (WHO, UNICEF, FAO), non-governmental organizations (HKI), and academia provided critical technical support for the workshop (Communiqué: West Africa CAADP Regional Nutrition Programme Development Workshop: 15 November, 2011, pp. 1-30).

This workshop also set out a framework for domesticating and integrating countries to develop action plans and programs within their respective National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plans (NAFSIP). Consequently, this, workshop sought to; (a) provide information and hands on practical tools for program design, and (b) promote sharing of knowledge and best practices about what works and makes nutrition programs successful. One Specific objective is to identify and integrate nutrition-related best practices and approaches into program design and promoting implementation that aligns with National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plans, increase knowledge of available tools, technical resources, and program experiences to strengthen nutrition program design, identify opportunities for partnership and capacity building to support nutrition program scale-up. (Communiqué: West Africa CAADP Regional Nutrition Programme Development Workshop: November 15, 2011,pp. 1-30).

During this workshop, participants were organized into country-specific teams to develop draft action plans, which incorporate relevant nutrition interventions to address their specific nutritional problems. Country teams examined the objectives and framework for strengthening the nutrition component of the NAFSIP; partners and coordination mechanisms; monitoring, evaluating, and learning about the nutritional impact of agricultural policies and programmes; public-private and public-public partnerships; capacity development; budgeting and financing. Participants also deliberated on constraints and strategic solutions to effective action plan implementation and on priority actions required to improve nutrition in ECOWAS member states. Country teams exhibited exemplary zeal and commitment in going through the process of developing their actions plans. As a major component of the workshop, many distinguished speakers from multi-sectoral institutions, both public and private, gave presentations to provide technical expertise on program design and facilitate knowledge sharing on the best practices for developing successful nutrition programs that are contextualized to identify and address priorities at the country level. The action plans aim to strengthen coordination among appropriate sectors and stakeholders (e.g., donors, government, technical partners) in aligning ongoing and new nutrition programs with current or planned agriculture programs. Country teams were encouraged, upon return to their countries, to meet with other nutrition and agriculture colleagues among others, to discuss the draft nutrition action plan prepared at the workshop. Following the workshop, technical assistance was given to assist country teams in finalizing their action plans at country and regional levels in partnership with AU/NEPAD, ECOWAS institutions and regional food security and nutrition stakeholders such as the Nutrition Working Groups in each country.

One other area, where NEPAD and ECOWAS have excelled is in the area of fertilizer support for member countries. As stated earlier on, one of the identified problems of agriculture in Africa is the declining soil fertility. NEPAD's Fertilizer Support Programme was created to improve the use of soil fertility across Africa and thereby address other related soil fertility issues. This was initiated at The Abuja Declaration on Fertilizers for an African Green Revolution, which called for a substantial increase in the use of fertilizer in Africa by 2015. The declaration outlines a set of concrete actions that, if implemented, will improve the accessibility, affordability and quality of fertilizers available to African farmers. The Fertilizer Support Programme works to support these objectives. The Fertilizer Support Programme aims to affect policy and markets at country and regional levels to encourage the development of a sustainable market for fertilizer in Africa. The programme also works to improve access to fertilizer and provide incentives to farmers to make wider use of fertilizer. Under this programme, the following projects has been implemented; Fertilizer Policy Studies Programme, Fertilizer Policy Peer Review, Learning and Sharing Programme, Policy Training Programme, Monitoring and reporting on progress in the implementation of the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizers. The fertilizer programme has made progress in a number of key areas including: The implementation of many of the resolutions within the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer, including those that deal with the size of the fertilizer market, capacity building activities in the private sector, fertilizer subsidies, public-private partnerships, private sector fertilizer production and financing mechanisms; An increase in the number of agro-dealers and the corresponding dealer networks; An increase in the number of small-scale farmers using chemical fertilizers; Some countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania, have introduced financing mechanisms to enable agro-dealers and farmers access to improved seeds, fertilizers and other inputs.

There is also the fertilizer policy studies programme, which aims to commission policy studies on the fertilizer industry in Africa by African researchers and institutions in order to establish a homegrown knowledge base of the fertilizer industry in Africa. The objective of the programme is to identify major issues that affect the fertilizer subsidy programmes. The intended outcome is a toolkit of best practices for managing and implementing fertilizer subsidy programmes. The study will be implemented in eight countries (Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Senegal). Technical guidance and funding is provided by IFDC, FAO and AGRA. The Implementation of the study will include a technical orientation workshop, a literature review, fieldwork in eight African countries, a synthesis workshop, and a stakeholders' validation workshop.

Closely related to this, is also the Fertilizer Policy Peer Review (Learning and sharing programme). The programme aims to improve the quality of fertilizer policy formulation and implementation through peer review and sharing of country and regional experiences and practices, successes and failures. The programme will sponsor two peer review meetings each year in which a host country or a Regional Economic Community (REC) lays a given fertilizer policy or initiative open to examination by 6-8 other countries, RECs and relevant African NGOs. Each meeting will be preceded by the compilation of an expert report the results of which will be published by the NEPAD Agency. The activities will entail a fertilizer subsidy-learning platform with participants from five countries (Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, and Nigeria). These experts will convene a regional learning platform to share experiences and lessons learned in implementing fertilizer subsidy programmes in their country. They will prepare a report on best practices in the implementation of fertilizer subsidy programmes in Africa.

NEPAD has also succeeded in getting certain African governments to agree to increase agriculture’s share in national budgets to at least 10 per cent by 2008. While this agreement is on paper, the implementation is entirely a matter of national sovereignty. It is also worthy of mention here, that the CAADP has also received significant support from such development partners as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Bank, USAID, World Food Programme (WFP) and the leadership of Africa’s RECs. In addition to CAADP, the World Bank has launched the Multi-country Agricultural Productivity Programme (MAPP) as well as established a fisheries seed programme. Again, NEPAD, in conjunction with the Global Alliance for

Improved Nutrition (GAIN) has established the National Food Fortification programme in several African countries.

One of the notable and laudable domesticated programmes in this sector has been the development of Cassava and the hype about its usefulness both in Africa and beyond. This programme was supported by former Nigerian leader, President Olusegun Obasanjo. In this respect, a onetime CEO of NEPAD and Special Assistant to the President noted that "sensitization has been very high and production has gone high and we expect it to continue to increase, as the many uses of cassava becomes known to people, both locally and abroad. There is a high demand for cassava now…Nigeria is also becoming a supplier of food, maintain food security especially in those African countries that are at risk… the fact that we have enough strategic food reserve to be able to send food to a stricken country like Niger is something that we have to celebrate as a country… the president thinks that in the near future we can earn more money from cassava than from crude oil" (This Day, Vol. 11, No 3755, 3 August 2005, p. 44).

In the realm of education, it is notable to stress that NEPAD principles emphasize education for all with its "Basic Education and Education for All" Project. This project will ensure access to primary and high school for all school-age children. An important aspect of this strategy is the primacy of science in primary and secondary schools. To achieve this NEPAD establish the "Building Capacity in Education Research and Development for Africa "which component emphasizes scientific research in high-school education has been developed and adopted by African countries under the NEPAD Principles. According to one source "this is a welcome change in the delivery of instruction in Africa as it emphasizes problem solving rather than memorization" (This Day, Vol. 11, No 3755, 3 August 2005, p. 13).

Regarding West Africa specifically, NEPAD has identified the ECOWAS sub-region as an area where governments should make special efforts to accelerate gender equity in education. NEPAD school-feeding programs have been implemented in pilot stages in many countries, including Ghana and Nigeria. To increase the supply of qualified teachers, the Distance Education and Teacher Training Development Project has been introduced in four Central and Southern African countries, with contracts signed with four African Universities to deliver instruction. As part of the implementation of NEPAD principles, projects in Mathematics and Science education impost-conflict environments in the five NEPAD sub regions of Africa have been established. These are pilot projects, which will be extended to all parts of Africa if they prove successful. Still on Education, NEPAD introduced a programme tagged the 600,000 schools initiative. In this programme, protagonists “envision that within a speculative period of between 10-15 years, every African school leaver will have the basic technological skill required to function in the information society to make learners IT literate and to bridge the digital divide by harnessing a more equitable Global Information Society… the implementation of the NEPAD e-schools Initiative was intended to lead to a steady and sustainable process in which young African graduate from primary and secondary schools will be equipped with skills to enable them function as equals in the emerging knowledge economy and information Society of the 21st century” (The Punch, 21 September 2004, p. 30).

Finally, NEPAD has undertaken a school feeding programme, which provides at least one nutritious meal a day for poor rural primary schoolchildren in Ghana. The Feeding Programme started in January 2006 after a pilot programme in one school in each of the 10 regions from September to December 2005. Currently, the programme covers at least one school in each of the 110 districts, carried out by a local implementation committee in collaboration with the Ghana Education Service and coordinated by a National Task Force. The menu is based on food crops grown in the local area, thus providing markets for local farmers. Initial reports suggest that the programme has been a resounding success. School enrolment has dramatically increased (it has doubled in some rural schools), absenteeism has dramatically decreased, and the number of hungry and malnourished school children has decreased (The NEPAD School Feeding Programme, http.//ghanadistricts.com/home/)

Energy Sector

According to NEPADs Executive Summary 2002 draft, “The challenge for NEPAD’s Energy Infrastructure Initiative is to develop fully the energy resources of the continent in order to deliver affordable energy services to economic and social sectors. This will enhance economic and social development and improve the standard of living of the continent’s population. Under the Initiative, the continent’s rich energy resources will be developed through regional cooperation. Guaranteeing a sustainable supply of affordable energy will contribute to a significant reduction in poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation”.

The projects identified in the Short Term Action Plan will support sustainable energy development, and serve as building blocks for the realization of medium- to long-term goals.

Some of projects proposed for the Short-Term Action Plan include; power system and gas/oil projects that are ready for implementation; Power Systems Projects, such as: Mepanda Uncua Hydropower, Ethiopia-Sudan Interconnection**,** West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) Program**,** Algeria-Morocco-Spain Interconnection (Strengthening), Algeria-Spain Interconnection, Algeria Gas-fired Power Station and Mozambique-Malawi Interconnection. There is also the Gas/Oil Transmission Projects such as the Kenya-Uganda Oil Pipeline**,** West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) Libya-Tunisia-Gas Pipeline.

In addition, studies will be undertaken for physical projects that will be implemented in the medium to long term. Some studies include those on Grand Inga Integrator DRC-Angola-Namibia Interconnection Nigeria-Algeria Gas Pipeline Sub-Regional Interconnections (East, West, and Central). For Capacity Building (Regional) **-** AFREC Operationalization & REC Capacity Building, Africa Energy Information System & Planning Tools, Training of Energy Experts. In terms of Facilitation; Facilitation (Regional) Policies and Strategies Energy Protocol**,** Cooperation in new and renewable energy**,** Cooperation in improving energy efficiency & reliability of supply, Cooperation in Oil and Gas trade, refining/processing Cooperation in rural energy.

The Capacity Building Project is intended to operationalize and strengthen the African Energy Commission (AFREC) and build capacity in the sub-regional organizations. As regards AFREC, it is intended to transform the institution into a legal entity through the ratification of the Convention and operationalize it through the appointment of the Board and the Technical Advisory Body by providing the appropriate technical support to discharge its responsibilities. The project would also provide technical support to the sub-regional organizations to strengthen their capacity in the formulation and implementation of regional policy, as well as strategy formulation, and preparation and implementation of regional programs. The Capacity Building and Facilitation Projects will be undertaken by the countries with support from AFREC in collaboration with RECs.

The Facilitation project will promote reforms and cooperation among African countries, donors and the private sector for energy infrastructure development. The preparation and implementation of an Energy Protocol will assist in attracting more, less costly investment, as it will include establishing legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, assisting in providing the necessary enabling environment to attract investors. This will help to reduce the risks and enhance the perceptions of investors with respect to private sector investments. A key role of NEPAD would be in particular to support the strengthening of AFREC. Other important roles of NEPAD relate to facilitating cooperation and conclusion of agreements, monitoring implementation of projects. NEPAD is expected to assist in putting into place the necessary energy institutions, frameworks, structures, policies and strategies to further public-private partnerships for development of the energy sector. A key project for NEPAD and ECOWAS in the West African Sub region is the West African Gas Pipeline. Oji (2005, p. 37) has noted that “the gas project represents a practical demonstration of the spirit of not only the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) but also those of theNew Partnership for African Development. The project according to oil and gas analysts also demonstrates what can be achieved through cooperation and partnership amongst neighbouring countries on one hand, and the private sector on the other”.

The West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP)

The West African Gas pipeline is a natural gas pipeline to supply gas from Nigeria's Escravos region of Niger Delta area to Benin, Togo and Ghana. It is the first regional natural gas transmission system in sub-Saharan Africa. As stated in the company profile, The West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCo) is a limited liability company that owns and operates the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). The company has its headquarters in Accra, Ghana, with an office in Badagry, Nigeria, and field offices in Cotonou - Benin, Lome - Togo, Tema and Takoradi, both in Ghana, and has the mandate to transport natural gas from Nigeria to customers in Benin, Togo and Ghana in a safe, responsible and reliable manner, at prices competitive with other fuel alternatives.

WAPCo is a joint venture between public and private sector companies from Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. this includes Chevron West African Gas Pipeline Ltd (36.7%); Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (25%); Shell Overseas Holdings Limited (18%); and Takoradi Power Company Limited (16.3%), Societe Togolaise de Gaz (2%) and Societe BenGaz S.A. (2%). The West African Gas Pipeline Company (WAPCo) is in charge of both construction and operation of the pipeline whereasWest African Gas Pipeline Authority based in Abuja is the regulatory body for WAPCo.

The history of the project could be traced to 1982, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) proposed the development of a natural gas pipeline throughout West Africa. However, it was not until 1991 that, a feasibility report conducted by the World

Bank on supplying Nigerian gas to West African markets deemed that, the project was commercially viable. Then followed a series of agreements and memorandum of understanding signed for the project at different levels, for instance In September 1995, the governments of four African countries signed a Heads of Agreement. On 11 August 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by participating countries in Cotonou. In February 2000, an Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed. The WAGP implementation agreement was signed in 2003. The development was divided into three phases and the United States International Development Agency (USAID) provided the funding for the first phase. Findings from ECOWAS show that, about $74 million was spent on the project development between September 1995 and December 16, 2004 with the USAID being the major provider of the funds, while the ECOWAS contributed minimally (Omoweh, 2009, pp. 217-218). Two years later specifically in 2005 the construction started the offshore pipeline was completed in December 2006. The second delivery deadline, which was scheduled for 13 February 2008, had to be postponed, when one of the contractors of Willbros was shot and killed in Nigeria by armed robbers. However, the pipeline was commissioned on 13 May 2008. The gas deliveries were expected again by the end of 2009 after commissioning of the Takoradi and Tema regulating and metering stations in Ghana, compressor station at Lagos Beach in Nigeria, and regulating and metering stations in Cotonou in Benin and Lome in Togo; however, deliveries were postponed again.

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), which has been the leading partner and its joint venture partners expect to supply half of the initially required gas, an estimated 65 – 70 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscf/d), through the WAGP. The web of partnership and the coverage of the project positioned it as a strong agent for sub regional economic integration in West Africa. Mutiu Sunmonu, Country Chair, Shell Companies in Nigeria and Managing Director, SPDC buttress this position at the time. According to him, “we are happy that it will also contribute towards realisation of the Federal Government’s objective to enhance regional economic cooperation and development whilst capturing the opportunity to reduce associated gas flaring.” SPDC pioneered the domestic gas industry in Nigeria and has been the leading domestic gas supplies since the early 1960s.

In addition to meeting growing domestic gas demand, the SPDC JV intends to supply WAGP customers via the Escravos- Lagos Pipeline System (ELPS) owned by the Nigerian Gas Company (NGC). The WAGP is connected to the ELPS by an onshore line from Itoikin, near

Lagos, to the (WAGP) Lagos Beach Compressor Station at Badagry from where the second section of the pipeline runs offshore along the West African coastal waters to the Takoradi Power Plant in Ghana. SPDC has non-associated gas (NAG) plants at Utorogu and Oben fields in the Western Niger Delta of Nigeria which delivers gas to the WAGP and ensure security of supply to customers connected to the ELPS. These plants previously supplied only the government-owned thermal power plants via the NGC, to produce electricity for residential and industrial consumers in Nigeria. These plants were initially upgrade has increased the installed capacity of the Utorogu gas plant from 270mmscf/d to over 300mmscf/d with the drilling of new wells. This will help meet Nigeria's growing domestic demand and support the government's programme to improve power generation fuelled by natural gas. The pipeline route consists three sections with a total length of 678 kilometers (421 mi).The 569 kilometers (354 mi) long offshore section starts at starts the Itoki terminal in southeastern Nigeria and runs through the waters of Benin, Togo and Ghana parallel to the coastline, approximately 15 kilometers (9.3 mi) to 20 kilometers (12 mi) offshore in water depths of between 30 meters (98ft) and 75 metres (246 ft). The Nigerian onshore section of the pipeline connects the offshore section compressor station at Lagos Beach with the Chevron-owned Escravos–Lagos pipeline system, operational since 1989. Structurally, the diameter of the onshore section is 30 inches (760 mm). The diameter of the offshore pipeline is 20 inches (510 mm) and the capacity is 5 billion cubic meter(bcm) of natural gas per year. The pipeline was constructed by Willbros, with Bredero Shaw Ltd applying a concrete coating to the pipeline at its facility in Tema, Ghana. BJ Process and Pipeline Services provided the pre-commissioning services. The total pipeline costs around US$974 million, for which they provided a guarantee of $50 million for Ghana, while they provided a $75 million political risk guarantee for WAGPCo as a whole.

So far, NEPAD flagship projects including the West African Gas Pipeline had reached the stage of implementation at the time of the study. The WAPP has already generated a project document, which is currently being studied by the World Bank. If the assessment of the document by the World Bank is favourable, the funding and marketing processes will begin. Although considerable progress has been recorded in these projects, mobilizing funds from UN organizations, the World Bank Group, the AFDB, the Arab Development Bank, the European Commission (EC), donors and other private foreign development banks remains the major constraint. Some details on these projects will give useful insights into the nature and scope of participation by the local and foreign private sectors.

As the facilitator of NEPAD projects in the sub region, ECOWAS has made a considerable effort to their implementation. In the energy sector, the REC adopted the Energy Protocol on 31 January 2003. One of the gains from the Protocol is the availability to local and foreign private firms interested in the sub region's energy sector of basic data, guidelines and the conditions for investment. The WAGP is a private sector initiative, while the WAPP is facilitation project. Although the two projects began first as ECOWAS projects, they are now under the umbrella of STAP projects of the NEPAD in the sub region.

The WAGP project began in 1995. The project developers are Chevron/Texaco and Shell, which represent the international private sector. The public institutions are: (a) the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria; (b) the Volta River Authority (VRA), Ghana; (c) SOBEGAZ, Benin; and (d) SOTOGAZ, Togo. The last two are public oil corporations of Benin and Togo, respectively. The 678 kilometre long pipeline project was valued at US$ 400 million, and the equity structure of the WAGP Corporation, the transporter of the gas, is as follows, Chevron/Texaco holds 36.7 per cent; NNPC, 25 per cent; Shell, 18 per cent; VRA, 16.3per cent; and Société Béninoise de Gaz (SOBEGAZ) and Société Togolaise de Gaz (SOTOGAZ) hold 2 per cent each. The WAGP Corporation is the regulatory body monitoring the project. The Project facilitator is the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), and the technical assistance in terms of funding of the first three phases of the project development was provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and its major consultant/adviser has been NEXANT based in San Francisco, California, USA. Findings from the ECOWAS and the USAID show that about US$ 74 million was spent on project development between September 1995 and December 2004, with the USAID having been the major provider of the funds, with minimal contributions from the community. (ECOWAS Energy Protocol A/P4/1/03, Abuja, January 2003).

Another major infrastructure project of the NEPAD in West Africa is the West African Power Pool (WAPP). Developed under the auspices of the ECOWAS, the WAPP was set up in 1999 for sub regional electricity exchanges and marketing. It is aimed at integrating national power grids of five coastal countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo) and three landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger). It also provides a framework for promoting the realization of regional investment, in terms of both energy production and interconnection and grid systems, and for setting a general regulatory framework for regional energy exchanges. In spite of all this, there are still fundamental problems like financing, weak institutional capacity, and reluctance of private sector firms to invest in infrastructure. The key role of the NEPAD in this project is in facilitating cooperation and the conclusion of agreements, monitoring the implementation of the WAPP project, and helping put into place the necessary energy institutions, frameworks, structures, policies and strategies to further the development of the energy sector.

Since July 2002, the following activities have been carried out; setting up of national teams in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo focusing on the preparation of the project; setting-up of a project preparation coordination committee; approval of key terms-of-reference for the environmental and technical studies; approval by the Council of Ministers of ECOWAS of the Energy protocol; strengthening of ECOWAS capabilities in the energy sector; and progress on the commissioning and appraisal of the Ikeja (Nigeria) /Sakete (Benin) transmission line, Takoradi/Tema transmission line in Ghana and the Bobo Diolasso/Ougadougou transmission line within Burkina Faso;- USAID, BOAD, and EBID have expressed interest in financing the project at an estimated cost of US$221 million, up from the previous estimate of US$ 151 million.

Historically, the government had provided public utilities, with the foreign private firms; the role of foreign capital in promoting private sector activities is sector/project-specific, with emphasis on funding and the returns on investments. It helps market the project and builds confidence of other would-be investors in it. The WAGP and WAPP projects of the NEPAD, among others, present concrete cases of the support and involvement of foreign capital in promoting private sector activities and PPPs.As noted earlier, the WAGP is the first of its kind in West Africa and an example of PPP in infrastructure, especially in the energy subsector. Though the AFDB and the ECOWAS contributed funds, the USAID provided most of the funds for the development of the project in terms of feasibility and market studies, sourcing of funds, economic and social impact assessment, and hiring of consultants to build capacity at ECOWAS. With the World Bank having signed the indemnity agreement, the confidence of foreign oil capital, (Chevron/Texaco and Shell) in the project was raised. All this eventually led to the conclusion of the FDI on 16 December 2004.

The West African Power Pool (WAPP) has hardly attracted the kind of private sector participation that characterized the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) at the time of the present study. Further, the perception of the role of donors in infrastructure development across the RECs was that once a project's development interested the World Bank, there were prospects of involving private sector capital. Perhaps this explains why the World Bank's study of the ECOWAS Electricity Generation and Transmission Master Plan containing 16 WAPP projects signalled the great potential of the project. In essence, the Bank is seen as playing the role of investment risk guarantor in the sub regional projects (Document Published by the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa United Nations, New York, 2006)

In all, investigation reveals that the West African Gas Pipeline has at best performed sub-optimally. The Chief Executive of the Volta River Authority (VRA) Kweku Andoh Awotwi during a media chat on February 12 , 2012 lamented that " though Ghana, Togo and Benin, with other stakeholders under the WAGP project, had a contractual agreement in 2011 to provide gas in volumes of 80MMscf/d between November 1, 2011-January 1,2012, HoMMscf/d from February 1, 2012- April 30, 2012, and 123MMscf/d from May 1, 2012 onwards, gas supply has been irregular'' he added that " gas supply has not been necessarily good, though sometimes it goes to 120MMscf/d, which is more, and at other times as low as 40MMscf/d and even 20MMscf/d. The problem with this is that the VRA has to switch back and forth in using gas and crude oil to power its thermal plants, which from an operational point of view, causes havoc to our machines, because today we have gas, tomorrow, we don't have gas" (Africa Oil and Gas Report, 2 May 2012, pp. 3-4).

The main issues are the self-induced crisis of gas supply by the Nigerian State and the blame should go, though not on equal measure, to the petroleum ministry, The NNPC, Federal Government as well as Shell and Chevron, the producers. In addition, there are ongoing construction repairs in some segment as well as debottlenecking of the Escravos Lagos Gas Pipeline. This is critical because, it feeds the WAGP in Badagry, which is the starting point of WAGP (Africa Oil and Gas Report, 2 May 2012, pp. 3-4).

In the light of all these, it is necessary to mention that the projects have been impeded overtime by challenges ranging from attacks and raids from the host communities. For Instance, the first major challenge to the project was the decision of the onshore pipeline contractor to leave Nigeria complaining of incessant raid on its facilities and projects, Wilbros, the American engineering company walked out of Nigeria in 2006 after the construction started. This was worsened by the consistent militant attacks and all this reduced production capacity. For instance, Shell Nigeria's onshore and shallow offshore production was reduced from about 900,000 Barrels of Oil per Day to 140,000 BOPD. The militants blasted some of the pipelines.

Transport

The goal of the NEPAD transport program is to close Africa's gap in transport infrastructure and services, by, (a) Reducing the costs and improving the quality of services; (b) Increasing both public and private financial investment in transport infrastructure; (c) Improving the maintenance of transport infrastructure assets; (d) Removing formal and informal barriers to the movements of goods and people; and (e) Supporting regional cooperation and the integration of markets for transport services. (NEPAD STAP, May 2003)

NEPAD's role in the transport sector is to provide strategic leadership by mobilizing political support and financial resources to pursue needed reforms and to launch programs and projects in support of regional integration and overall competitiveness. NEPAD seeks to promote innovative approaches in mobilizing resources to develop infrastructure along regional corridorsto facilitate trade and to open up previously isolated regions. NEPAD transport objectives will be pursued under programs targeting specific institutional constituencies. The NEPAD transport program has been developed along five broad themes, namely, (a) trade corridors without borders and barriers; (b) better and safer roads to bring Africa together; (c) competitive and seamless rail services; (d) efficient ports and safe seas and ports; and (e) safe, secure and efficient skies and airports.

The goal of trade corridors without borders and barriers is central to the NEPAD transport agenda as cumbersome and unpredictable clearance procedures in the ports, at border crossings, and at inland terminals, as well as unnecessary road checks, are a major source of delays and costs along trading routes particularly along the corridors serving landlocked countries. The role of NEPAD will be to accelerate the implementation, by member States, of existing agreements and protocols to eliminate non-physical barriers and help ECOWAS to set benchmarks and seek compliance through the NEPAD peer review mechanism. The goal of better and safer roads to bring Africa together is being pursued by accelerating the development of regional networks and by strengthening the capacity for sustainable road management. The first priority was to support Road Sector Development Programs (RSDPs) based on the network management approach and on institutional arrangements and to ensure reliable funding of maintenance and accountability to users. The medium term goal is to bring the number of countries that are implementing or preparing RSDP from 15 at present to at least 25. Increased investment in regional roads will be pursued under the framework of sub-regional programs prepared by the RECs. NEPAD will support the development of guiding principles for planning and financing the upgrading of roads along regional corridors.

Regarding rail lines, the immediate major challenge for railways is to reverse the historical poor management of most national public railways. There is the goal of competitive and seamless rail services which is being pursued through institutional reforms combined with investments. NEPAD also support joint or coordinated concessions and cross shareholdings across borders as well as well as the integration of railway services in multi-modal logistic chains. In order to fulfill their role as Africa’s gateway to rest of the world, regional ports need to improve their performance and modernize their operations. There is also the goal of efficient ports will be to align the performance of all African ports with the best among them specifically by reducing Container clearing time by half or to the five-day benchmark by year 2006. The component for safe seas and ports includes measures to protect Africa’s seaboard from the risks of maritime pollution and to ensure the safety of its ports. NEPAD will foster multi-country approaches to capacity building and environmental preparedness.

The next is the goal of safe, secure and efficient skies and airports. This is to lower the cost of air travel and freight, to reduce the isolation of Africa in the air transport market, and to improve safety on the ground and in the air. The first objective was targeted to consolidate the Yamoussoukro Decision through support directed at sector reform, airline privatisation, regulatory capacity, restructuring of civil aviation services and upgrading of aviation infrastructure. The safety and security agenda will be supported through the implementation of, (i) a regional UACC (Upper Air Space Control Center) project; (ii) two regional GNSS project (Global Navigation Satellite System); (iii) measures to comply with ICAO security standards; and, (iv) Joint Safety Oversight Inspection Capacity (COSCAP). At the political level, the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism will support the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision. NEPAD will also help to build consensus for joint action regarding in particular modern upper air space control centers. It is worthy to mention here, that political commitment at the high levels will be a powerful driver for NEPAD objectives, in transport. However in order to obtain rapid progress, the delays and the problems that have plagued regional initiatives must be sorted out. NEPAD is expected to pursue the establishment of a regional Transport Reform and Integration Support Facility for Africa

(TRISFA). The proposed facility would be set up as a trust fund modeled along the lines of the Private Participation in Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) and would be demand driven. It will offer punctual support to RECs and agencies engaged in NEPAD transport programs.

Some of the Short-term programs/projects on transport currently under implementation include the ones for the following corridors (a) Abidjan – Ouagadougou – Niamey; and (b) Abidjan – Accra – Loma – Lagos (c) Douala – N'djamena – Bangui Corridor, West Africa. Summary of Short-Term projects for Ports includes the Abidjan Port, container terminal, dredging of Vridi Canal, Cote d'Ivoire Dakar Port, rehabilitation and construction of container terminal Senegal. It is also notable that there is evidence of impressive progress in the transport and communications sector, thanks to external funding of the coastal highway. According to "Bundu (1997, p. 35) this is "82% complete, The trans-Sahelian highway (76%) complete and the West African portion of the Pan African Telecommunications Network that now links all the countries in the region".

NEPAD Short-Term Program for Safe Skies, which deals with air transport, is executed under the following initiatives. First, under the institutional and physical sector, there is the Support for implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision (liberalisation) and aviation restructuring, Regional coordination and exchange of information and best practices, second, under the Regulatory capacity building, there is the upgrading of airport security, upgrading airport infrastructure and related facilities to category 1 standard, in all regions and countries. There are also two non-categories and one major airport per sub-region (total 10), establishment of Upper Airspace Control Centre (UACC) SADC & EAC. GNSS project, implementation of test bed installation of ground infrastructure Africa & Indian Ocean region. Additionally, there is the establishment of joint safety oversight units (COSCAP) in the West, Southern & East sub-regions in the sphere of studies, which is one of the levers of implementation planning, there has been the establishment of the Upper Airspace Control Centres (UACC) and studies to cover other sub-regions (West, Central, North-East, and North) Aviation infrastructure needs assessment study Angola and D.R.Congo.

3.8 NEPAD, ECOWAS and Industrialization in West Africa

The issue of industrialization in West Africa is another economic segment that has experienced the impact of ECOWAS and NEPAD. Perhaps the best way to define ‘industrialization’ may be to define the opposite, which is ‘deindustrialization’. Weiss (2000, p. 1) defined deindustrialization as “dismal experience… Africa has been de-industrializing” talking about the declining industrial performance. Jalilian and Weiss (2000, p. 137) stated that the “term de-industrialization’ has crept into the debate in recognition of the decline in manufacturing sector… de –industrialization has gate-crashed the literature, thereby avoiding the entrance fee of definition”.

West Africa has a long tradition of industrial activity from the pre-independent to post-independent era. Stryker et al (1997, p. 199) had noted, “The growth of industry in West Africa is a combination of resource-based industrialization and import substitution. Resource based industrialization sought to build on a country’s comparative advantage in export of primary products, mining, agriculture, forestry and tourism by intensifying, expanding and diversifying those activities. Import substitution was fostered primarily through tariff protection which allowed domestic industries to compete against relatively more efficient external resources”. The ECOWAS strategy for industrialization and promoting industrial development is that member Countries are expected to cooperate with one another in the exchange of industrial plans, avoid unhealthy rivalry and waste of resources, and harmonize their industrial policies to avoid disruption resulting from dissimilar policies. In fact, Adetula (2009, p. 24) has categorically stated that “in West Africa, the need to harmonize policies is higher in the industrial sector than in any other sector. The level of importance attached to this evident in the fact that it was fully represented in Chapter V, Article 28 & 32 of the ECOWAS Treaty. Unfortunately, the provision made no room for timelines of implementation and as will be seen, this is one of the reasons for the slow pace of development in the industrial sector. The provision in the treaty phased the process of harmonisation into three stages. Other areas of the treaty on industrialization are contained in Articles 27, and 39, for instance that provided free movement of factors within the community. Article 50 makes provision for the funding through the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development.

The milestones of ECOWAS on industrialization are notable. In 1983, ECOWAS was able to put in place an industrial Cooperation Policy whose objective is to adopt a sub-regional approach to economic development, which will include market integration (liberalization and promotion of intra-community trade) and physical integration… The industrial Cooperation Policy is drawn around the idea that sub regional approach to industrial development should give priority to industries that will contribute to the modernization and promotion of other sectors. The policy is also aimed at establishing the industrial foundations of the community by promoting intermediate goods and input production industries. This is expected to facilitate the specialization of states or group of states within the sub region (Adetula, 2009, p. 33). There has also been the Community's Industrial Development Programme, which was adopted in 1986. The programmes in this domain includes; rehabilitation of industrial enterprises, coordination of production activities through the involvement of the private sectors in member states, regional cooperation in Industrial training, sponsorship of West African Industrial Forum, and coordination of the IDDA programmes in West Africa. (Adetula, 2009, p.33).

Further, sound competition laws are also necessary to support industrial development. In this direction, ECOWAS and NEPAD have also fostered the establishment of industrial laws. They do this by liaising with better completion rules practicing regions like Europe and America to foster a healthy competition practice. For instance, Countries in the West African sub region and the leadership of the European commission (EC) met in Abuja in September 2010. The objective is to drive home the need for implementation of regional competition Law, which regulates anti-competitive behavior in the market. The law has been adopted since 2008. The policy framework when fully implemented is expected to ensure healthy competition among market players within the ECOWAS sub-region to give opportunities for increased number of players in different segments and ensure innovation and cheaper services for the benefit of the consumer". Ruth Okedeji, a Participant at the forum noted, "The competition law would prevent a company or group of producers from behaving in a way that distorts the market from its normal operations". This is a step in the right direction, as it will provide ECOWAS not only with the composite knowledge to frame its competition policy but to also learn from the EC example and them customize it to suit the West African Market. (The Guardian, 3 September 2010, p. 20)

Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs)

A discussion on sub regional economic integration must actually and necessity undertakes an understanding of the level of 'digital, integration among the integrating elements of that union. It is in this vein, that we need to understand to what extent NEPAD and ECOWAS has aided the development of ICT in West Africa. This discussion is even more necessary as the world fully metamorphoses into the global village. ICT will have an overall impact on trade, transport and virtually every facet of economic development in the sub region. The Case of ICT in Africa and specifically West Africa is a mixed bag with a high level of advancement but also with its attendant challenges. For the purpose of clarity, ICT refers to information and communication technologies in reference to all digital services including, broadcasting services, computers, telephones and the internet. The problem of inadequate access to affordable telephones, broadcasting services, computers and the Internet in most African countries is due to the poor state of Africa's ICT infrastructure, the weak and disparate policy and regulatory frameworks and the limited human resource capacity in these countries.

Although African countries, in recent years have made some efforts to facilitate the ICT infrastructure deployment, roll-out and exploitation process in a number of areas, Africa still remains the continent with the least capability in ICT and least served by telecommunication and other communications facilities. The threat posed by the digital divide to the rapid development of African countries can on the whole be attributed to their inability to deploy, harness and exploit the developmental opportunities of ICTs to advance their socio-economic development. There is therefore an urgent need to put in place and implement ICT initiatives to bridge the digital divide at four levels namely, (i) bridging the divide between the rural and urban areas within a given country, (ii) bridging the gap between countries of a given sub-region, (iii) bridging the inter-regional gap and (iv) bridging the gap between Africa and the rest of the world. The need to bridge this gaps cannot be overemphasized if one considers the fact that a great number of scholars of believes that integration will be faster among integrating units at even or same levels of developments. West Africa is a sub region with countries at different levels of development. Consequently, NEPAD using the ECOWAS platform has initiated programmes and projects to bridge these gaps. The NEPAD Plan proposes three broad areas of programs for implementation under Short-term Action Plan; namely, ICT Infrastructure Development and Roll-out Projects; ICT Infrastructure Development and Roll-out Facilitation Projects; and ICT Infrastructure Exploitation and Utilization Initiatives. A number of projects and initiatives have been identified for implementation under each of these three broad program areas.

First, five ICT physical infrastructure development projects to speed up the process of sub-regional and regional connectivity and inter-connectivity are identified for implementation under the Plan. Second, five sub-regional and regional initiatives directed at facilitating the ICT infrastructure development, deployment and rollout process have been identified. These include, harmonizing the regulatory framework and environment across the sub-regions; studies to assess the development of equipment manufacturing capability in the continent; developing the necessary human resources; facilitating the effective participation of African countries in global ICT policy and decision making; and strengthening regional institutions mandated to support ICT infrastructure development, roll-out and deployment activities on the continent. The projects to drive these include; COMTEL PROJECT, which is sponsored by COMESA, the ECOWAS Regional Interconnection Project, sponsored by ECOWAS the SADC Regional Infrastructure Initiative (SRII) by SADC. There is also the RASCOM Project Whole Continent RASCOM SAT-3/WASC/SAFE Utilisation to Improve Interconnectivity South, Central, West, East SAT3/WASC/SAFE.

Finally, to facilitate the wide deployment, exploitation and utilization of ICTs within the societies and economies of Africa, six continental umbrella initiatives are identified for implementation namely, African SCAN-ICT and E-Readiness Initiative, The African Regional Telemedicine Initiative, The Electronic Governance and Government Initiative for Africa, The African Electronic Commerce and Trade Initiative, The African Regional Tele-education Initiative and the Africa Content Development Promotion Initiative. The Plan provides details of the broad institutional arrangements required for facilitating the implementation of the projects and initiatives identified under the three broad program areas. The roles that NEPAD will play in facilitating the implementation of the projects of the short-term plan are also detailed. Specifically, NEPAD will, (i) promote the projects and initiatives both within and outside Africa; (ii) in consultation with the various sub-regional and regional stakeholders of each of the initiatives identify the effective ways and means by which to support and speed up the implementation of each of the initiatives within the time-frame of the Plan and (iii) facilitate the mobilization of the required financial resources from both domestic and external sources to speed up the process of implementation of the projects. Issues relating to the risk factors associated with each of the project areas identified for implementation are also addressed in the Plan.

A Summary of Short-Term Plan, ICT Infrastructure Deployment Facilitation Projects and their sponsors includes the following; Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturing in Africa Study (Whole Continent ITU Africa Region), ICT Policy and Regulatory Framework Harmonization at Regional Level- (Whole Continent ATU), RECs Strengthening of African Telecommunications and ICT Institutions. Whole Continent Identified Institutions

Programme to enhance Africa's Participation in the Global ICT Policy and Decision Making Fora Whole Continent (ATU, RECs, NTOs) The ICT Human Resource Capacity Development Initiative for Africa (Whole Continent ATU/ITU). A Summary of Short-Term Plan ICT Infrastructure Exploitation and Utilisation Initiatives Project Region (s) Sponsors the African SCAN-ICT and E-Readiness Initiative (Whole Continent UNECA), The African Regional Telemedicine Initiative (Whole Continent RECs), The Electronic Governance & Government Initiative for Africa (Whole Continent RECs AFDB).The African Electronic Commerce and Trade Initiative (Whole Continent RECs AFDB),The African Regional Tele-education Initiative (Whole Continent RECs) The Africa Content Development Promotion Initiative (Whole Continent RECs). (NEPAD STAP). In order to domesticate ICT projects and development, each member country is expected to appoint partners, consultants and experts to help execute their programmes. For instance, in 2003, Nigeria appointed Resourcery Limited, a leading systems integrator as its strategic and Communication Technology (ICT) Partner to promote its ICT Vision and mission" (The Guardian, 14 October 2003, p. 53).

Further, NEPAD has overtime mobilised other Donor Agencies towards the support and deployment of ICT for the poverty eradication programme in the least developed countries including West Africa. One of such meeting happened in August 2004, between NEPAD's E-Africa Commission, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Commonwealth Business Council. The meeting concluded that "technological development, if left unmanaged, can widen the current digital gap and trap developing and least developing countries in a perpetual spiral poverty and exclusion" (The Punch 17 August 2004, p. 29). This forum provided an opportunity to display a number of success stories with projects jointly implemented by ITU in developing and least developed countries. By October 2004, the information society Partnership for Africa's development, which is the partnership component of NEPAD e-Africa Commission, became a partner to Hewlett Packard (HP) an international IT solutions company. ISPAD, which is funded generally by contributions from Public and Private Sector Partners, is in this union as a "gold partner-level commitment... in the NEPAD e-Schools project, an initiative which aims to connect, in the first phase, all secondary (or equivalent) schools across 20 countries in Africa within a five year period. The intention is to impact ICT skills to the young Africans and use that technology to improve the standards of education delivered (The Guardian 26 October, 2004, p. 63.). In fact, Nigeria, Boukina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda are all beneficiaries of the e-school initiative (Punch 21 September 2004, p. 30) In all ICT has been fully supported by NEPAD and ECOWAS through projects and policies to enhance its development and support other ICT dependent sectors for development.

The research will be inconclusive without mentioning the role of NEPAD and ECOWAS regarding the mobilization of funds for their projects. It was discovered that, with respect to this, they have initiated programmes and activities to attract foreign support. For instance, they have courted Canada to support their initiatives. The Canada example of support for NEPAD is worth mentioning. In 2004, Canada floated $500m investment fund for NEPAD. Mr. Greg Bates who was the Commercial Counselor, Canadian Deputy High Commission in Nigeria stated that "the first part of the fund would be disbursed under a $100 million African Investment Fund which African countries especially Nigeria would benefit from through direct investment by Canadian business in Nigeria… He said that members of the G-8 summit at a recent meeting had announced their responses to the New Partnership for Africa Development and the Canadian response centered on the need to contribute through funding which amounted to $500 million". (The Punch 28 April 2004, p. 10) Canada floats $500m investment fund for NEPAD. Canada's initiative for Africa covered areas of fostering economic growth, strengthening institutions and governance, investing in the people and future of Africa as well as increasing, untying and improving the effectiveness of its aid. Highlights of Canada's Commitment in the area of fostering economic growth include; opening Canada's markets to African imports by eliminating tariffs and quotas on most imports from 34 countries, $100m to encourage private sector in investment by creating an African investment including infrastructure such as roads, water supply and pipeline construction, $35m for three initiatives to help bridge the digital divide by supporting African initiatives that expand the use and benefits of new information and communication technologies, $20 million for three initiatives to increase Africa's trade capacity by working to promote exports within and outside Africa and to strengthen the role of African countries and institutions in multilateral trade negotiations (Daily Champion 31st July, 2003, p. 11).

3.9 Conclusion

The need for a sub-regional framework for the development of the West Africa cannot be over- emphasized as long as the fragmented nature of its markets and economies remains. Consequently, the need of facilitating regional integration, through the strengthening of

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is a step in the right direction. In pursuing this mandate, NEPAD developed the strategy of domestication through which it expects to localize her initiatives and bring their activities closer to the citizens. Additionally, NEPAD and ECOWAS has worked together to achieve economic integration in several ways. Their zeal is demonstrated in the combined effort to tackle very serious challenges that has negated integration in their domain. In this regard, a lot of efforts have been made in the areas of monetary integration, trade, transport, agriculture, energy, industrialization and ICT as studied in this chapter. Unfortunately and as will be seen in the next chapter, these efforts have not completely resolved these; rather the gaps are still burgeoning. The issue of monetary integration is still a mirage as long as the ECO is not in existence; the volume of intra-regional trade is still at less than 10%; more so the ECOWAS borders are not fluid to allow for the free movement of persons and goods. Again, the target of constructing and maintaining more than two thirds of the sub regional roads is far from being achieved. In the agricultural sector, food security is still an illusion and poverty with its attendant malnutrition is still prevalent in the sub region. There have also been positive strides in education, ICT and energy. However, what is obvious is that the mass of positive development needed to orchestrate an efficient regional integration in West Africa is still not attainable now. In the next chapter, we will study the challenges of NEPAD and ECOWAS in bringing about sub-regional integration in West Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF NEPAD TO NPCA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to investigate the remote and latent causes of the transmutation of NEPAD into the Nepad Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). It will capture opinions of scholars and African leaders on why NEPAD needed transformation and why the NPCA was considered as a better option. The aim is to distil variances which may have been antithetical to NEPAD but which also may provide a corrective direction for NPCA. It has to be declared upfront that the NPCA in terms of its look and feel does not entirely look new; the structures are virtually the same, the people, the offices and even the name, only that something has been added to it. This raises some concern as to whether the idea is about change in the real sense of it, or just a re-baptism of the agency. If this is so, one may conclude that the NPCA is challenged from the onset.

It must be stated here, that the transformation of NEPAD into NPCA is an admittance and acceptance of its failure, underperformance and the need to re-consolidate the instrument so that it can deliver the goals for which it was originally created. By extension, there is an obvious yawning gap between the goals, expectations and promises of NEPAD and its current reality. It is therefore important to isolate the factors that have necessitated this change and by so doing, begin to lay the foundation for the new NEPAD. Therefore, this chapter intends to investigate and analyse, what went wrong with NEPAD. It will undertake a critical analysis of the NEPAD's structures and modus operandi..

4.2 What Is Wrong With NEPAD?

Right from its inception in July 2001, there have been diversities of opinion as to how far NEPAD will go in bringing about development and regional integration. For the sake of history, some of the basic objectives and focus need to be reviewed. Ukeje (2008, p. 18) has provided a synopsis of NEPADs objectives and expectations. In his words,

> The blue print of NEPAD derived its strength from the AU. NEPAD acknowledges good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development: African ownership and leadership: and broad participation by all sections of the society. It anchored the development of Africa on its own resources and the resourcefulness of its people: on creating partnerships between and among African peoples; on

> accelerating regional and continental integration, building the competitiveness of African countries and the continent; on forging a new international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world; and finally on ensuring that all partnership with NEPAD are linked to the Millennium Development Goals and other agreed development goals and target.

African leaders that signed up to NEPAD resolved to ‘’eradicate poverty and to place their countries individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on equal footing’. They acknowledged that poverty can be effectively tackled through the promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and security; the development of human and physical resources, gender equity; openness to international trade and investment; allocation of appropriate funds to social sector; and new partnerships between government and private sector (Ukeje, 2008, p. 21). In summary, they wanted to achieve the twin objective of poverty eradication and economic development. In doing this, NEPAD identified four areas of core emphasis: Democracy and Good Political Governance, Economic and Corporate Governance, Socio-economic development and the African Peer Review Mechanism.

Looking at the current performance of NEPAD, when compared against these objectives, Ukeje (2008, p. 21) seemed to agree with the likes of (Chaba 2002: Diescho 2002; Kanbur 2002; Adesina, 2005) who all submitted, “These principles, objectives and action plans are bold and beautiful in print” giving the impression that in practice, NEPAD has left many people guessing. At the time of his studies,Ukeje (2008, p. 21) noted that there is “the temptation to give NEPAD a chance to mature further before subjecting it to critical evaluation on the basis of it avowed objectives and achievements”. He however noted that there are preliminary observations germane to its creation and existence so far could serve as a useful guidepost for short term and midterm reviews. While Ukeje could have been a bit skeptical about an early evaluation of NEPAD barely 7 years after its creation (2008), this research believes that, the needed maturity level has been attained after a decade of existence (2012) and consequently pitches tent with both opinion leaders and scholars who believes that it has to be now or never. More so, it would not be necessary to postpone such evaluation because NEPAD has been transformed into NPCA and hence, there is need for a post-mortem.

Ishmael Lesifi (2006, p. 70) is one of those who believes that, something was endemically wrong with NEPAD from the beginning. He believes that the formative processes of NEPAD were very wrong. His view was that the process was “undemocratic and non-consultative... only heads of state and their designated experts took part in the formulation and adoption of the development framework. In a workshop convened by the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), it emerged that many people probably first heard of these processes when South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki was making a presentation to the 2002 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos... the civil society formations adopted a resolution that was very critical of the development framework and called for its rejection. Corroborating this fact, the African Scholars Forum for Envisioning Africa, meeting in Nairobi in April 2002, noted that “although NEPAD was to be prepared through participatory process involving the people, the lack of serious and thorough consultation with African citizens, as well as particular stakeholders such as academia, civil society and women’s organizations during the process of developing the NEPAD is alarming” (Maloka 2006, p. 86)

Clearly NEPAD lost from the beginning in terms of its narrow acceptability, because it adopted a top-down instead of a bottom-up approach. The facts being presented here by the likes of Ukeje (2008) Lesifi (2006) gives credence to the fact that even though NEPAD is touted to be original to Africa, the African people were not fully conscripted at the point of its formulation. As seen in Chapter 3, this could have been responsible for the several attempts made by NEPAD to domesticate and nationalize their programmes as a means of filling the gap of poor awareness to the local populace. Consequently, while NEPAD is African to the elites who were its founding members, it remained alien to the African citizens for whom it was designed. This disconnect may as well be responsible for the apathy towards NEPAD’s projects especially as subsequent governments other than the ones headed by the elites who formed NEPAD emerges in Africa (See Chapter 5). However, it is noteworthy that, as stated in chapter 1, the neo-functionalists and integration school’s position that “integration proceeds as a result of the work of relevant elites in governmental and private sectors, who support integration for essentially pragmatic reasons seems to have been validated. Haas as cited by Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1996, p. 423) has maintained that these elites are usually the proponents of integration and hence, the role of NEPAD’s elites fully validate this fact. Unfortunately, the reasons for their proposition may not be said to be pragmatic except perhaps, where ‘pragmatism’ is synonymous with parochialism’.

Olukoshi (2003, pp. 21–23) is one of the scholars who feel strongly, that part of the limitations of NEPAD arose from “its over-reliance on myths to sell itself to the public; myths that essentially represent a misreading of African past and recent experiences, but are gaining the status of truth with deliberate repetition. Four of such myths revolve around (i) the idea that 40 years of independence in Africa has been characterized by a universal and uniformly dismal socio-economic record which NEPAD is now designed to correct; (ii) the claim that the initiative represents the first comprehensive programme to emerge from within Africa for resolving the developmental problems of the continent; (iii) the even more pretentious claim that it is the first truly African- owned framework for redressing the socio-economic and political difficulties of the continent and; (iv) the erroneous impression that NEPAD is the first truly market-friendly initiative to have emanated from African leaders.”.

It is believed that these myths have been developed to sell the neoliberal logic on which the existence and legitimacy of NEPAD is dependent. It is this apparent obsession with neo-liberalism and its willingness to integrate Africa into what is essentially an unjust global trade system that has attracted the intellectual wrath of many scholars. Infact, scholars like Lesufi (2006, p. 70) believes that there was a suspicion attached to the manner and speed with which the developed world accepted NEPAD, whereas they had out rightly rejected earlier developmental frameworks for the continent. Africa’s developmental frameworks of the 80’s and 90’s were seen as progressive. Critics has noted that “the adoption of these neo-liberal measures underpinning the NEPAD development path marks a departure from earlier progressive attempts at alternative development models and most, importantly, represents the adoption of SAP’s by African leaders. Others noted that such policies are primarily responsible for the state of development on the continent and, therefore cannot be relied upon to lift Africa out of poverty, let alone reverse the continent’s marginalisation in the global economy”. (Lesufi, 2006, p. 70) . The idea here is that as a people, Africa cannot be doing the same thing repeatedly, whereas such things have never helped the continent in time past. NEPAD as packaged by the protagonists is essentially seen as an old wine in a new wine skin that should not be trusted or accepted hook line and sinker.

Still lending a voice to the mythology of NEPAD, Ukeje (2008, p. 20) noted that, this pandering to the logic of a thoroughly discredited neo-liberalism that has failed Africa in the past is unfortunate. On the basis of its avowed commitments to neo-liberalism, there is little hope that NEPAD would be able to mobilise sufficient autonomy and action to challenge or seek a comprehensive reform of the existing global political economy largely responsible for Africa's many predicaments". Elsewhere, neo-liberalism and its attendant globalization has been said to be antithetical to Africa's development. In fact, Critics believe that neoliberals has grossly overstated the economic benefits of globalisation and understated its costs, especially where noneconomic costs are concerned. In this regard, Nnadozie cited Dunkley (2000) noted that, "if we consider noneconomic costs, the virtues or so-called benefits of globalisation may become degraded; hence the rise in international opposition and resistance to free trade and globalization".

Akokpari (2008, pp. 45-46) supports Ukeje's view that "the overwhelming neo-liberal orientation of NEPAD is a source of concern. This posture is informed not only by the global dominance of neo-liberalism as an ideology, but importantly by the assumption tracing Africa's crisis to mainly internal factors... Yet, the generally pauperising effects of SAPs, but also the preponderance of economic crisis, deflate optimism about NEPAD. In West Africa for instance, where economic decline and impoverishment has been massive, NEPAD is either unknown, considered an exclusively South African agenda, or a personal Mbeki project". He further cited Hwedie (2003) who noted, "Having just emerged from the war, Angola has become more preoccupied with internal reconstruction and development than with NEPAD. The astute collateral damage inflicted on the African economy informed Ukeje(2008, p. 21) lamentations that "at a time when consensus is building overwhelmingly within and outside, that the global political economy has been unfair and unjust to Africa. It is curious that NEPAD is still calling for further integration, through the instrumentality of trade liberalization and the formation of free markets".

A critical evaluation of the much touted free market access and trade liberalization will show that overall, this has not also worked best tor the African economy neither has it positioned the West Africa sub region on the part of future development. NEPAD program of action attaches great importance on trade promotion and ensuring market access. Indeed, there have been numerous studies to suggest that Open economies promote a more efficient use of resources and faster growth. For instance Norbert Funke and Saleh Nsouli (2004, p. 37) put forward a study by Berg and Krueger (2002) which reviewed the evidence in the relationship between openness and levels of income and between changes in openness and changes in GDP per capita. They found out that "an increase in trade volumes tends to lead to higher growth rates." They also presented the research by Mengistae and Pattillo for three Sub-

Saharan African economies. Using firm level panel data from these economies they concluded that "higher exports can lead to positive productivity effects through learning by exporting. There has also been other study which suggests that the benefits of trade liberalization accruing to the poor are on an average, roughly equal to the benefits accruing to an average person. In this regard, Funke and Nsouli (2004, 38) cited the works of Dollar and Kray (2001a and 2001b) and also those of Srinivasan and Bhagwati, (2002). On the basis of findings from this two works, they arrived at a conclusion that "the benefits for the poor may even be more important if trade liberalization is accompanied by an increase in the relative wages of low skilled labour and if liberalization of the agricultural sector results in higher rural incomes." These positions speak volume to the fact that the neo liberal trade liberation which underscoresthe pigments of NEPAD is by no means a foolproof.

While acknowledging the fact that there have been trade reforms since the early 1990's which removed most non-tariff barriers and lowered peak tariff rates to a range of 20-30 percent, these have not been sufficient to support faster growth in income per capita. The summary is that Africa's world export market share has continued to decline from 3.9 percent in 1970 to 1.9 percent in 2001. Funke and Nsouli agreed with Rodrik (1999b) that "more openness may be expected to lead to faster growth only if it is complemented by well-functioning institutions and sound domestic policies. As will be seen elsewhere, the issue of "well-functioning institutions and sound domestic policies remains an illusion to Africa and as long as this is so, free market access and its attendant benefits will not accrue to Africa. Conclusively, on the neo-liberalism factor, Ukeje (2008, p. 21) cited Mbaku (2004, p. 53) that no matter which rosy form it is presented in, neo-liberalism can only accelerate and accentuate the deep seated crisis of development facing societies in Africa as it draws more and more people into poverty, rather than relieve them from it, as it promises".

Apart from its neoliberal stance, which combines the clamor of market access and globalisation, it is necessary to emphasize as mentioned earlier, that globalization which brings about de-industrialization has been orchestrated on the platform of NEPAD, hence with the waning acceptance of globalization also comes the unpopularity of NEPAD. Globalisation is not new to Africa as African countries are already members of several global organisations e.g. UN WTO. Africa will also need to decide whether to remain at the sub-regional levels of integration and cooperation or go for a globalist approach to it. In other words, to what extent should we integrate? This is the right way since Isolationism is out of the question. However, this research do not necessarily believe that globalisation in itself is an impediment, rather its bye products seems to portend some negativities, for instance, under the Clinton administration, the United states diverted attention from Africa to China and since then, Africa has lost its position as a primary destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Nnadozie (2004, p. 21-47) cited the case of Sino-America's relation under the Clintons administration in which, it was expected that, flow of funds from America to China will bring change as opposed to Africa where change is expected to bring about flow of funds. One wonders why these flipi.e. in the case of Africa, change should predicate flow of investments but in the case of China, FDI will predicate changes. The implication is that the flow of investment into the continent is impeded by such external factors. This change in direction of FDI is blamed because, in adopting neo-liberal economic reforms, one of the expectations of African countries is increased and indeed unfettered capital flows from rich countries in the form of direct investment, which they perceive to be extremely beneficial to national development. This new trend unfortunately has altered the expectations as Dunning (2000, p. 20-21) confirms that developments in the global economy have deeply affected the pattern of foreign investment, leading to a "new geography of foreign direct investment" to the detriment of African countries. He speaks of "a spectacular increase in investments to Asia and central and Eastern Europe, modest increases to Japan and the EU, and relatively smaller gains" to the rest of the world. A closer look at foreign investment in Africa will also reveals that most of it is concentrated in the extractive industries, primarily in petroleum and petroleum related activities. It is only in South Africa that the majority of American investments exhibit some level of diversification (William 2000). The implication of the forgoing discussion is that the neoliberal proposition offers a double tragedy to Africa. First, is a pseudo investment expectationwhereas FDI has move on elsewhere and the emphasis on the extractive industry, which is intended to make Africa a perpetual producer of raw materials. Neither of these features supports Africa development and any strategy that propagates it should be jettisoned.

Critics also believe that neoliberalism has grossly overstated the economic benefits of globalisation and understated its costs, especially where noneconomic costs are concerned. In this regard, Nnadozie (2004, pp. 21-47) cited Dunkley (2000) states that if we consider noneconomic costs, the virtues or so-called benefits of globalisation may become degraded; hence the rise in international opposition and resistance to free trade and globalization.

Globalisation is also said to lead to significant de-industrialisation through import liberalization, as exemplified by the following "A process of de-industrialisation has taken place in countries such as Zambia. "once our flourishing import business has been wiped out by imports from Asia; several small industries such as tire manufacturers and medical supply companies has folded in the face of competition from large south African firms" (Henriot 2000, p. 3).The advantage of globalisations stems strongly from trade. It is also seen as an agent that fosters political stability through induced democratic reforms and mutual political reinforcements by regional and political organisations. Unfortunately, the promises of globalisation as contained in the NEPAD plan has not delivered these goods to Africa and West Africa especially. West Africa has neither become stronger in trade nor in instilling democratic ideas of government. The call for the transmutation of NEPAD in this respect is necessary based on a high perception of its deceit to the African populace.

Again, there have been negative reactions to NEPAD's conceptualization of' Partnership' and 'Ownership'. Partnership is intended to move Africans away from dependency. Dani et al (2005, p. 276) has stated that "the third fundamental goal of NEPAD Plan of action is to move away from aid dependency towards a partnership with the developed world that will equitably develop and share the African resource base in order to contribute to sustainable global economic growth. It is also based on a new partnership between African leaders and their people and between African's themselves. In short NEPAD seeks to foster the alleviation of poverty in African Countries by a sustainable development process, that is African inspired and supported by the developed world" Records abound which shows the level of support and partnership which NEPAD has received from these donors especially the IMF and World Bank which is not entirely new and hence suspicious. For instance, IMF's Managing Director, Horst Kholer, has emphasized that "the IMF is committed to support NEPAD wholeheartedly". Apart from its financial assistance to many countries notably, through the Concessional Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the IMF has responded to NEPAD's requirement, by intensifying its support of capacity building efforts in the region. The IMF Institute has expanded its training activities in Africa to help build up the capacity of government officials to design and implement macroeconomic policies, including through the JAI. Furthermore, it has inaugurated the first of five African Regional Technical Assistance Centers. The IMF is also pursuing its work on internationally agreed codes and standards of good practices, which West African leaders have endorsed, and is preparing the related country reports. In addition, together with the World Bank, the IMF is implementing the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, providing substantial debt relief to African countries and thereby realizing more resources for economic and social development purposes.

A commentator had noted that “it is the relationship between NEPAD and the G8 that the fact comes out in bold relief that NEPAD, after all, is not yet an indigenous African concept, it is not ‘home grown’ as has been pervasively propagated. The whole idea of NEPAD was laid out most notably by the British government... it caught on and fired the imagination of African leaders because of latter’s appreciation, especially by South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, that British Tony Blair’s second term as Prime Minister would provide an opportunity to launch the African development initiative with the guarantee of a sympathetic response (Dani and Ernst, 2005, p. 276). The commentator gave a further proof to buttress his position, which summarizes the fact that partnership with donor countries has been ongoing prior to the coming of NEPAD and that it was actually such partnership especially like the one which existed between Britain, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda that actually cloned the new relationship under the aegis of NEPAD. Based on this assumption, it concluded that “the idea of Africa’s ownership of NEPAD is only a matter of principle and appropriate practice in which the first finance would be derived from African sources; even though the initial funds to kick start the concept would come from both domestic and international sources” (Dani and Ernst, p. 276). The implication is that NEPAD was actually influenced by the donor countries of Britain, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. The point worth mentioning from the foregoing is that NEPAD cannot lay claim to “a new kind of partnership’ whereas what it has done was basically to refurbish and rejuvenate the alreadyexisting partnerships, neither can it also claim African ownership since the plan was obviously scripted under the tutelage of the developed world. This reinforces the belief that there was nothing entirely new about NEPAD and little wonder then, the level of apathy it generated.

The second group of problems associated with NEPAD is those relating to its operations. The most notorious is the issue of funding to meet its financial obligations either by members or by foreign donors. For instance, one source noted that of the required \$64 billion yearly budget for NEPAD, only \$4 billion was raised for NEPAD as at 2004 (4 years after formation of NEPAD). The bad news is that of this amount, the World Bank has made \$2.5 billion available. This means that the contribution of member states then was insignificant. This has not changed much today as NEPAD is still struggling with funding her projects. Consequently, Taylor (2005. p. 153) noted that “Heads of state will have tackle the tricky issue of raising money to support their projects... just as with investment within the continent, if NEPAD own promoters and leaders have so little confidence in the project that they refuse to contribute financially to its success, it seems strange that they expect the outside world to somehow bankroll the whole thing. It may be pertinent to let the Heads of state and Governments know that Africa’s development partners and prospective donor nations will not throw in their hard-earned money if they do not see corresponding evidence of seriousness by those who should be most enthusiastic about the programme (Taylor 2005, p. 157). The asymmetries between rhetoric and reality have left onlookers wondering and even the G8 has remained recalcitrant to the course of NEPAD and in committing to the massive resources NEPAD is demanding.

The point is what re-stating that there is an obvious psaltery funding of NEPAD’s projects across Africa. For instance, Moyo (2006, p. 130) noted that “the NEPAD agricultural strategy will require an annual investment of some US$12 billion, excluding maintenance costs, for the next fourteen years. Yet overseas aid to Africa has fallen from US $32 per person in 1990 to US $18 per person in 1998. Moyo (2006, p. 130) .The fact remains that, NEPAD does not have the right level of funding for its projects. NEPAD projects costs a fortune. For instance, the Guardian Newspaper of May 9th 2009 reported that Nigeria needs “N2.3 trillion to implement the various components of Nigeria’s National Programme of Action (NPoA) under the African Peer Review Mechanism”. The fact that, it even tends to get more support from the foreign partners makes it vulnerable to their whims and caprices and with this beggars bowel, it almost impossible for them not to bow to them. Ideally, NEPAD should carry out its projects with funds from member nations while, expecting a little part of this to come from the Partners. However, the reverse has been the case, because member countries reneged from providing adequate financial support, expecting the ‘manna’ to fall from the developed world, which automatically makes them vulnerable to their dictates. Consequently, the whole issue of ‘African Ownership’ with its attendant redefined ‘Partnership’ is a fluke.

Perhaps one of NEPAD’s most successful campaigns has been the quest for a fairer global trading system about attaining greater access to global markets for the continents exporters and this is where the developed world could actually help in providing markets for agricultural products from Africa. Unfortunately, NEPAD puts a lot of trust in the hand of the

G8 regarding this issue and seems not much worried about the fact that the G8 may not be willing to compromise its power and core interests which may be sequestered by such policies. For Instance, NEPAD places more emphasis on ‘tariffs’ and ‘quotas’ but misses the essential point which is the issue of ‘subsidies’. In this direction, Taylor (2005, p. 164) has argued that “a thorough overhaul of the international financial system is a prerequisite if Africa is to begin tackling its lack of development... as part of this overhaul, the subsidies for agricultural producers in the north would need to be addressed, as such structures effectively close off the developed world’s markets to African exports”. To buttress this position, Taylor (2005, p. 164) cited Christian Aid (2002) that “even the most democratic of African governments in Africa find trade rules stacked against them. Western markets are closed to many of their exports, and yet they are forced to open their own markets from the rich world. At the same time, they are forbidden from adequately supporting or protecting their own vulnerable producers in the way that almost all western countries do. The opinion is that any development plan that claims to support agriculture in Africa and help alleviate rural poverty has to directly target the subsidies in the west. This is critical since its estimated that sub-Sahara Africa’s annual loss from exports over the past 30 years has been calculated at $68 billion (Subramanian and Tamirisa 2001, p. 3) Sadly, the events of 9/11 and, the invasion of Iraq and the rebuilding projects in those areas and even the totality of war on terrorism seems to have diverted attention from Africa in this regard.

Further, it is believed that the issue of conditionality, which usually characterizes the relationship of the donor, agencies to Africa subtly, crept in through the conditions set out for, would be signatories and members of NEPAD. However, in the case of NEPAD, the conditions are not strictly monetarist. According to one source, “one striking thing about NEPAD conditionality is that they are termed “conditions for sustainable development”. If considered against the backdrop of the fact that sustainable development means a development that does not threaten the wellbeing and survival of humanity itself... the toughness of the conditional ties is self-evident... countries that have to join will have to sign up for democracy and political governance initiatives that demand specific obligations and requires actions towards good governance that conforms to international standards. (Daily Champion, January 1 2004, p. 19)

In the same vein, the G8 has attempted to help Africa out of the maligning debt crisis. It will be recalled that in the year 2003, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair had described Africa as “a sear on the world’s conscience” and had gone ahead to use Britain’s leadership of the European Union and G8 as a platform for orchestrating actions towards the complete forgiveness of Africa’s debt crisis. According to one source “the British Premier has in recent weeks, proposed the complete forgiveness for debts of some eighteen of the world’s poorest countries, with about fourteen of them coming from Africa.” The plan involves the provision of some $40 billion in debt relief, which was adopted at a meeting of the G8 finance ministers in London (Sunday Champion July 3, 2005). Britain has not been alone in the quest for debt relief and more aids to Africa. The United States of America through President George W Bush pledged to increase aid to Africa through the multi-billion Dollar Millennium Challenge Account following several hours of meeting with five of Africa’s democratically elected leaders in Washington DC including President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, John Kuffour of Ghana, Abdoulayi Wade of Senegal, Abdoulaziz Boutaflika of Algeria and Mamadou Tanja of Niger. (Sunday Champion July 3, 2005)

Unfortunately, these good reports have failed to convince a band of intellectuals who still believes that the proposition of partnership is shrouded in ambiguity in terms of the character and parameters of the proposed partnership between NEPAD and the donor nations. Presently, NEPAD is claiming a development rhetoric, which retains the political and economic governance processes elsewhere in the West as the model of what it means to be ‘developed’ (Ukeje, 2008, p. 21). By pushing in this direction, operators of NEPAD are not even thinking that there may well be other paths to development, different from the one the West is working hard to impose on Africa. Regardless of the claim to African ownership, NEPAD is still manipulated behind the scenes by its so-called development partners pushing for a strange type of partnership that further undermines the capacity of Africans to undermine their own destiny and future (Mathews, 2004, 497-500). Ukeje (2008,21) also cited Hope (2002, p. 400) that “it is this kind of relationship that is driving the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) implemented since 1999 by the World bank and the International Monetary Fund, after admitting that the celebrated Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s turned out a disaster. In this regard, Taylor (2005, p. 166) lamented that there are better strategies of development, but unfortunately, African elites are not looking in that direction. He commented that “certainly, Africa’s recovery plan would have been far more advised to construct a plan that sought to mobilize the continent’s own private and public resources as a means to pay towards any recovery project, while advancing an agenda to address major structural barriers to African trade, rather than naively relying on the

West as external motor of recovery. After all, it is estimated that 40 percent of wealth created in Africa is invested outside the continent. Taylor (2005, p. 166) also supported the position of the Port Harcourt based Centre for Advanced Social Science that “the goals of NEPAD are laudable. However, NEPAD is predicated on the notion that foreign assistance is indispensable to national development. That presupposes that the forces of development are largely exogenous. Such a notion negates the experiences of developed countries. There is no substitute for development forces that must come from within. Ukeje (2008, p. 21) further projected the scathing criticisms of NEPAD from Rita Abrahamsen (2004a, p. 1454) that “partnerships are little more than “conditionality by another name; a form of advanced liberal rule ‘that increasingly governs through the explicit commitment to self-government and agency of the recipient states. It is also a form of advanced liberal power working not primarily as direct domination and imposition, but through promises of incorporation and inclusion. Recognising that their over-prescriptive and interventionist development models have not worked satisfactorily, the West is retreating to the position that ‘they are no longer in business of telling poor countries what to do”.

Further still, there is actually no guarantee that the FDI will flow as expected to supported NEPAD. This is one of the erroneous assumptions upon which the foundations of NEPAD were laid, but which over the years has remained a mirage. This assumption is fully presented by Akokpari (2008, p. 39) while presenting the views of Afro-optimists and Afro-pessimists regarding the role of NEPAD. According to him, “optimists hold that as a partnership with developed countries, NEPAD has the ability to attract the much needed external aid to Africa. This expectation is nursed against a background of declining ODA and FDI to Africa since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe economies. For example, in 1992, the OECD pledged more than $45 billion to the 24 countries in the Eastern European-based Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In that year, the OECD’s total pledge to Africa with 53 countries was $34 billion... Although total ODA to Africa was $28 billion in 1990, this plummeted to $16.4 billion in 2000”. Therefore, the fear that Africa’s ODA was declining and hence, there was need to re-invigorate it through NEPAD partnership is a fluke. The declining ODA and FDI have not necessarily improved Post NEPAD when compared to the pre NEPAD era. Elizabeth Asiodu (2004, pp. 116-117) had analyzed the critical role of foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to substantiate this fact. According to her, “NEPAD’sframework indicates that Africa will need to fill an annual resource gap of $64 billion, equivalent to some 12 per cent of continents GDP, to achieve the millennium

Development Goals. – Whereas this will need increasing domestic saving, a substantial part of the needed resources will have to come from abroad. She identified the major determinants of FDI to show whether Africa predicament is different.

The result shows that an absolute investment in Africa has not been sufficient to attract a large share of global FDI in a highly competitive environment. Although sub-Saharan Africa has improved its infrastructures, liberalized trade, and reformed its institutions, the degree of reform has been mediocre compared with other developing countries. Consequently, relative to other regions, sub-Saharan Africa has become less attractive for FDI overtime. Her conclusion was that it is not enough to improve Africa's policy environment in absolute terms and that improvements need to be in relative terms as well. Infact the Afro-pessimists had noted the commitment of Africa's partners to meet aid obligation is an even bigger source of pessimism. Africa's unmitigated past disappointments with western aid deals substantiate this. In 1986, for example, the UN developed a four-year recovery programme, the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Developments (UN-PARRED) 1986-1990. This programme contained pledges by the international creditor community to assist to Africa. However, the slow response from the international community condemned UN-PARRED to early relegation. Again, in 1991, the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990's (UN-NADAF) was adopted under which the international creditor community was to commit 0.7 per cent of its GNP as ODA to Africa. On their part, African countries committed themselves to economic and democratic reforms. However, in return for Africa's wholesale adoption of SAPs and submission to multiparty elections by the close of the decade, only the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden provided 0.7% or higher of their GNP as ODA to Africa. Infact, aggregate ODA to Africa actually plummeted from $28.6 billion in 1990 to $16.4 billion in 2000. Akokpari (2008, p. 45) noted, "The HIPC programme initiated in 1986 brought little debt relief to the region. Africa's latest disappointed came from Gleneagles, Scotland, where the G8 met in July 2005. The AU had expected massive increments in aid, unconditional debt cancellation and bigger access to western markets given public declarations of the G8, in particular the US and UK, to help Africa out of its quagmires. However, at the conclusion of the meeting, the G8 only adjusted aid figures from the current $25 billion a year to $50 billion by 2010. Experts estimate that Africa requires $100 billion in development aid and a minimum annual growth rate of seven percent (more than double the current growth rate of between two and three per cent) if it is to meet the UN millennium goals". The resounding position here is that the west has not done enough in the "so called partnership" to sustain NEPAD and her projects. What has rather been evident has been a consistent decline in FDI and ODA. This coupled with lack of adequate funding from her members as seen in (Chapter 5) combines to impede the functioning of NEPAD. Regarding granting Africa access to Western markets little has also been achieved. It is obvious that Africa has a limited ability to compete in western markets where agriculture and other industries are heavily subsidized even if granted unfettered access. Based on these inconsistencies Akokpari (2008, p. 45) concluded, "There is little evidence to suggest that meeting donor conditionalities under NEPAD will necessarily attract ODA and FDI".

Further, the dependence on foreign development partners for NEPAD projects is in error. In the beginning, NEPAD set out to correct this dependence, which was the undoing of earlier development plans in Africa, but this does not seem to have worked as dependence on the west is still as gargantuan as ever. Taylor (2005, p. 166) has argued that Africa's recovery plan would have been far more advised to construct a plan that sought to mobilise the continent's own private and public resources as a means to pay towards any recovery project, while advancing the agenda to address major structural barriers to African trade, instead of relying on the developed countries as the external vehicle of recovery. He noted an opinion (This Day, 4 December 2003) which stated that an estimated 40% of wealth created in Africa is invested outside the continent.

There is also a clear indication that NEPAD is not really, as African as it claims, neither does the partnership seem insulated from dependency at the long run. Instead, dependency persists in its finest subtlety and the so-called leadership and ownership is constantly eroded in like manner. It is still difficult to prove how Africa will remain insulated from the subtle influences of the donor countries while at the same time expecting their FDI and other financial supports. In this regard, (Taylor 2005, p. 156) believes that African leaders do not keep to their financial obligation and hence should not expect the Western Powers to do their bit. "the disjuncture between rhetoric and reality is probably why the G8 has adopted a wait and see attitude and has not rushed to embrace NEPAD… all previous recovery plans have failed due in part to a distinct lack of political and financial commitment by those African Leaders who has signed up to them". Taylor (2005, p. 157) went ahead to conclude that "it may be pertinent to let the Heads of State and Government in the continent to know that Africa's development partners and prospective donor nations will not throw in their hard earned money, if they do not see corresponding evidence of seriousness by those who should be most enthusiastic about the programme".

There is also another position, which is fired by the initial efforts to separate NEPAD from the AU. Indeed while justification for this was given in the need for focus and empowerment of NEPAD, there is a belief that the underlying reason rests with the fact that while the AU was orchestred by anti-west inclined Libyan leader Mammar Qaddafi, pro-west leaders like Obasanjo, Mbeki and Wade of Senegal initiated the NEPAD. This is to further strengthen the fact that NEPAD was accepted because of it neo-liberalism and pro-western stance, while the AU did not receive same support because of its anti-west stance or perception. Consequently, this division in the ideological disposition of its founding elites is seen as endemically challenging to the success of the organization.

One other area that has attracted too much critics is NEPAD's bid to promote democratic and good governance through the instrumentality of 'Peer' monitoring represented by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a voluntary instrument acceded to by Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism with the primary purpose to foster good governance. It expects to achieve this through the adoption of policies, standards and practices leading to political stability, high economic growth, and sustainable development. This will in turn drive accelerated sub regional and continental integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice. APRM's Core Guiding Principle is that every review exercise carried out under the authority of the Mechanism must be technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation.The African Peer Review Mechanism is the pivot upon which NEPAD's good governance initiative revolves. Generally, the assessment of governance and development performance, in terms of the APRM, is based on the codes, standards and objectives referred to in the Declaration on Democracy and political, Economic and Corporate Governance. This document itself was adopted at the Sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 9 March 2003" (APRM Country Review Report No 8, June Federal Republic of Nigeria 2009; 1). The APRM is open to all member states of the AU and currently, about 28 African countries has voluntarily acceded of which six countries has been peer reviewed. It should be mentioned here that the APRM reviews are conducted under the leadership of the African Peer Review (APR) Panel, which in itself consist of five interrelated stages that are defined in the APRM Base Document.

Indeed the whole idea of the APRM is laudable and good thinking. The mechanics and efforts are most recommendable only if it was practicable. This research agrees with the founding fathers that the fulcrum of Africa’s development resides within the ability and capacity to stem the tide of corruption and entrench sustainable democratic principles and good corporate governance. On the contrary, what have not gone well with NEPAD are the modus operandi and the processes of monitoring and evaluation. First, Ukeje (2008, p. 44) had noted that that the fact that “submission to APRM is voluntary. Countries that initially signed up can opt out of the process, proves intrusive. Second, and more important, the AU lacks the muscle to compel countries to either sign up to the new process or to comply with standards of good governance. This major limitation has left the AU and APRM as a lame leviathan. “To buttress his position Ukeje (2008, p. 44) cited an instance from (Africa Research Bulletin, 2004, 15629- p. 30) which noted, “Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda were reviewed in 2004. However, the review process focused not on whether the stated standards of governance were adhered to, but whether the countries were moving towards these goals. The current reality is that NEPAD and the AU has not been able to achieve good governance amongst its members. This is evident in continuous allegations of corruption and nepotism involving top government officials in Africa, and human rights restrictions and abuses in Zimbabwe and Swaziland nearly four years after the adoption of NEPAD and the APRM. Worse still, NEPAD and the AU has not been able to stop conflicts and wars in Africa. While there has been remarkable success in conflict resolution, new crisis are erupting all over the continent including those in Dafur, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continue to present challenges to the AU.

This litany of woes is compounded by the continuous military intervention in Africa and even recent crisis in some states of Africa. Guinea and Niger had military intervention in late 2008. To this end, an extraordinary summit was fixed by the ECOWAS to discuss the issue. Indeed, the then ECOWAS Commission Chief, Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambers warned, “Guinea was in danger of slipping into a new dictatorship. The junta, which seized power last year, was repressing the people with ‘arbitrary and irresponsible” use of state power .The situation was so bad that soldiers opened fire on an opposition meeting... and dozen were killed” (The Guardian, 15 October 2009, p. 72). This was the September 28 massacre in Guinea. Whereas various diplomatic shuttles to resolve the crisis failed, The ECOWAS Council of Ministers at the 64th ordinary session suspended Guinea and the Republic of Niger until both countries return to civil governance through the conduct of credible elections (This day, 1 June 2010, p. 7). The post- election violence, which plunged Cote d'Ivoire into chaos as the incumbent President Laurel Gbagbo who lost his re-election bid, refused to quit power against all international and local opinion. Gbagbo's supporter was purported to have torn the election result sheet as it was being announced in front of national television cameras, claiming the election was marred by irregularities... (The Punch 7 January 2011, p. 14). Quattara, a respected economist and one time Prime Minister was adjudged the winner with 54.1 per cent. A combined and aligned force made up by the UN and ECOWAS member countries by mid-2011 forcefully ejected Gbagbo. Gbagbo's undemocratic disposition casts a lot of doubt on NEPAD's APRM since the same Gbagbo has at other times been sent on missions by NEPAD to resolve issue around democratic practices. This speaks to the fact that, one of the factors that, the African Leaders and Elites are agents that hampers the establishment of democracy in Africa.

Taylor (2005, p. 154) had painted a clear picture of the predicament of 'Sit tight' leaders in Africa this way "equally problematic is the fact that enforcing basic democratic rights in Africa would mean reviewing and replacing practically every government in Africa... with less than five exceptions, Africa's governments are dictatorships, whether this fact is proclaimed openly and proudly or quietly enforced through manipulating elections and jailing opponents... and the chance that such elite will commit effective class suicide in the furtherance of NEPAD is viewed with some doubt." Taylor (2005, p. 154) noted that "far more important in my mind is the fact that many of NEPAD'sstalwarts do not practice what they are now preaching, either neither to the rest of Africa nor to the international community. It is unreasonable that the likes of Omar Bongo or Denis Sassou-Nguesso sit at NEPADs HSIC and sign off on pledges towards democracy and clean government. And it is remarkable that the like of Doroth Njeuma sit on a so called independent Eminent Persons Panel, while being a member of Paul Biya's political party and openly canvassing for him in elections". This presupposes that the African elite' who are vanguards of the NEPAD and APRM initiatives, lacks the moral sanctity and courage to undertake these tasks. It is hypocritical to engage in a campaign for democratic practices, while at the home country, these same elites are agents of misgovernment.

Taylor (2005, p. 162) has actually stated “ that a good number of democratic transitions have not only been very limited in scope and invariably confined to electoralism, but also have often been hijacked by civilizing military dictators, returnee Bretton Woods employees or recycled elites who held positions in previous (now derided as undemocratic and corrupt) regimes”. Because of their background, they end up singing the familiar tunes as dictated by the donor countries. Taylor (2005, p. 163) gave the example of “gender that “there is very little practical detail on how gender inequality on the continent is going to be addressed... certainly in common with most high- level (male elite) African initiatives, the involvement of women has been at best marginal, and commitments to gender equity such as those adopted in Beijing have not been accorded mainstream status within NEPAD... as for HIV/AIDS, one of the greatest threats facing the African continent, this barely mentioned at all, a remarkable omission and one that may come back to haunt NEPAD when, in years to come, commentators to re-evaluate the projects progress”.

Finally, still reviewing the role of the elites as detrimental to NEPAD’s good governance stand, Taylor (2005, p. 163) concluded that “practically, implementing and operating by NEPAD’s rubric of “good governance’ would inevitably damage the incumbents elites own personalized grip on the system and reduce their ability to service their clients, probably leading to their replacement by others. As a result, the speedy implementation of NEPAD’s measures on governance and accountability, which are really preconditions for the continents future development, is viewed with some doubt”. This was the situation with many other development plans before NEPAD and sadly has continued. According to Ake (1987, p. 41) African leaders.... are saddled with a strategy that hardly any of them believes in and the most of them condemn (including NEPAD)... lacking faith in what they are doing and caught between their own interests, demands of their external patrons, and their constituents, African leaders tend to be ambivalent, confused and prone to marginalise development and even their role in its pursuit. The development of Africa will not start in earnest until the struggle over the development agenda is determined. According to Bischoff (2004, p. 122) “While at the level of rhetoric, most states identify with regional cooperation projects, at the level of implementation this support tends to be fed by the immediate or purely national benefits regional membership can bestow, principally, that of obtaining extra sources of official development aid (ODA) from the developed industrial economies”.

NEPAD is seen to be structurally deficient. Protagonists of this position believe that the type of governance structures that makes up NEPAD cannot be hurriedly implemented. Practically speaking, the empirical state in Africa does not conform to Western conceptions of the Weberian state, something that NEPAD fails to acknowledge. In this regard, NEPAD seems to assume that African states are rational-bureaucratic. According to Taylor (2005, p. 153) "This is hugely problematic as many of the accepted features of democratic state are simply not present in large swathes of the continent, even though African elites has been adept at appropriating external guarantees for their states". Taylor further concurs with Dunn and Shaw (2001) who noted that "while it may be true that it is our western conceptions of the state in Africa, rather than the state itself, which has failed, this overall does not really help the African, mired in poverty and all too often susceptible to autocratic impulses and predatory rule by her leaders, despite the promises made by NEPAD".

This is not however to veto the creation or toleration of informal structures for running the affairs of the state. Consequently and as mentioned in Chapter 5, the structure of the state system with its state-led development apparatus in Africa runs antithetical to the NEPAD framework. The view is therefore overwhelming that NEPAD stresses a functioning, administrative state with a competent, committed, and non-corrupt bureaucracy, which does not exist anywhere in the African continent. The ideal of structural functionalist state as proposed by Ernst Haas and others is almost non-existent. Taylor (2005, p. 161) had noted that

> the state has long ceased to perform as a mechanism to meet people's long term survival needs… the type of development policies articulated by NEPAD would require major infrastructural needs to be addressed such as education, communications, the maintenance of a conducive political and economic environment, a reliable legal framework, the assurance of public order and sort of milieu that can encourage and guarantee long termFDI. However, if these functions cannot be efficiently performed, as is unquestionably. The case of a large number of African states, then development policies which depend on them will fail.

The fore going discussion brings one more problem into focus; NEPAD as it is today inadvertently encourages neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa, seeking western endorsements and support. Taylor further submitted that NEPAD is "in dire danger of becoming a mechanism for aid-funded projects, a sort of mega-NGO, distinguished by the fact that its governing board consists of heads-of-State…NEPAD is not an implementing agency. If it were to become so, it would be a competitor to existing ministries and departments and would rightly be shunned. NEPAD has no business in projects; it has no business handling resources (De Waal and Raheem 2004, pp. 3-4). When we do a deep dive into De Waal and Raheem's position, it may well become that what they foresaw is currently happening. For one, NEPAD has been transmuted to NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). The idea of "coordination" is now Key to NEPAD operations. Is it also possible to relieve NEPAD of its project orientation and even resources mobilization...? NEPAD seems to be tilting more and more towards being an implementation, coordination and resource mobilization agency than what it originally set out to do. In this respect, this research joins forces with Taylor (2005, p. 170) that the neo-patrimonial nature of most African states is fundamentally deleterious to broad-based development and good governance and it is this that may well ultimately sabotage the high aspirations contained in NEPAD". Some other schools hold that NEPAD cannot escape the negative influence of neo-patrimonial society. There are indications that there has never been a clear separation between the private and public sphere of the economy. The patron-client politics configures the spectrum of Africa and especially West African politics. According to Taylor (2005, p. 160) "the implication for NEPAD may mean that it is a little more than an instrument calculated to gain western endorsement of certain elites and the continuation of resource flows... furthermore there is the very real danger that rather than implementing genuine reforms, NEPAD may evolve into yet another institutional structure but one with very little influence...there is the danger that NEPAD promoters are seeking to turn it into some sort of giant pan African coordinating agency for expected inflows of FDI and aid".

NEPAD's Agricultural policy framework also seems to have a weak foundation from the onset. This stems from the efficacy of its development philosophy i.e. the lack of explicit commitment to promoting equity in general and in the agricultural sector is not only surprising but also indicative that NEPAD is theoretically founded on a 'trickle-down' framework (Moyo 2006. p.119) rightly stated, the plan does not refer to equity and redistribution. According to him, "The NEPAD agricultural strategy is steeped in a market-led framework to development management, which requires a minimalist role for the African state, this approach to promoting agricultural development is, however; fundamentally counter to existing practices of global agrarian development". The idea is that this module conforms to the dominant paradigm espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions. The major limitation is that the agricultural trade and monetary policies of Northern states directly undermine the goals of weaker states. This is because the agricultural development policy management in the Northern hemisphere is based on extensive state intervention in product and factor markets in favour of an agrarian structure comprising mainly protected owner-operated family farms, reinforced and protected by dominant position held by these states in key multilateral financial, aid and trade institutions. This approach neglects the primacy of Northern trade-related constraints to African agriculture. The double standards and effects of issue such as protectionism, subsidies, agricultural production and dumping are not articulated in a strategy to defend the African agricultural sector and to nurture the market potential repressed by external dumping (Moyo 2006, p. 121). Further, it looks at poverty as a by-product of improved market-based growth in agricultural production than as a direct product of the inefficiencies of capitalist agrarian systems, the negative effects of direct exploitation of rural labour and wider effects of inequality. In General, Moyo (2006, p. 121) submits, “The strategy does not articulate issues of social justice or demands for reparation in general, which could form a basis for reviving African agriculture”. Ideally, there are other issues, which could be factors affecting, food insecurity and decline in agriculture and not necessarily internal factors. Climatic uncertainty, unstable world commodity prices, etc. this research is of the opinion that, even if Africa improves all production, infrastructure and the likes, without an attendant change in the international market structure that makes them perpetual producers of raw materials, the statusquo will remain unchanged.

Trade is one area where NEPAD and ECOWAS have been quite strong. The NEPAD framework for Trade was well discussed in chapter 3. The scholarly presentation of Dot Keet was also examined. However, Dot Keet provided a critical analysis and weakness of the NEPAD trade framework and this is being examined here. Writing on the topic ‘The Character and role of trade within NEPAD: critical challenges and questions, Keet (2006, p. 159) noted that NEPAD “recognises the potential for creating backwards and forward linkages within and between African economies through increased intra-regional trade via promoting cross border interactions among African firms. It even suggests at one point, although rather tentatively, that consideration needs to be given to discretionary preferential trade system for intra-African trade”. The idea is that, if acted upon, this could provide some tariff policy support to encourage inter African trade, and more internally oriented economic interactions.

This proposition has two major challenges. According to Keet (2006, p. 159) “while apparently aiming to create larger and more integrated markets within Africa to stimulate

African producers and provide larger guaranteed market for African traders. NEPAD also explicitly offers up Africa as “a vast and growing market for producers across the world.” This will automatically put Africa products and producers under pressure and stiffer competition for the goods from the developed economies. In all, this provision was taken by NEPAD not only to strengthen Africa but to maintain the relationship with international partners. Consequently, NEPAD seems to be confused between fostering intra-African development and satisfying the requirements of international partners. This situation will ultimately become counterproductive especially for the African economies that deal with primary products. Again, looking at the issue of intra-regional trade, The NEPAD proposal seems to assume that all African nations are at the same level of development. This is however not so. Clearly this preferential treatment will strengthen the more developed African countries like South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius over the very week ones like Niger, Togo, Republic of Benin etc. this is in. this research believes that rather promote African trade in general, it will cannibalize the markets and trade of the weaker economies of Africa.

In Paragraph 166 of the NEPAD document, NEPAD emphasizes the importance of increased investment in order to strengthen African external trade. In this regard, NEPAD identified market access to the developed countries for African exports as one of its top priorities and concludes that this is one of the programmes to be fast tracked with our development partners. Paragraph 170 of NEPAD (2001) also admits that it is necessary to remove non-tariff barriers to allow more access to the markets of industrialized countries for those products in which Africa has a comparative advantage. It states “African leaders believe that improved access to the markets of industrialized countries for products in which Africa has a comparative advantage is crucial. Although there have been significant improvements in terms of lowered tariffs in recent years, there remain significant exceptions on tariffs while non-tariff barriers also constitute major impediments. Progress on this issue would greatly enhance the economic growth and diversification of African production and exports. Dependence on ODA would decline and infrastructure projects would become more viable because of increased economic activity. The foregoing also means that NEPAD has made proposals to ensure that, Africa’s development is supported by the expansion of external trade. According to Keet (2006, p.162) “the adoption of improved market access has become the new glib answer to African development problems. After years of argument on this by

African governments in their separate and joint official positions, more recently, this has been picked up and promoted by Northern development NGOs and even the 'new' World Bank."

Keet (2006, p. 162) went further to do a critic of the market access provision. He was quick to point out that "market access is not what it seems to be in the Brussels propaganda. Even the generous tariff free and quotation free access to EU for all exports of all LDCs- the much publicized Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement, which NEPAD welcomes, is actually hedged around with exceptions and postponements until the year 2006, and in some cases until the end of the year 2009. And safeguards will continue to protect European producers against the threat of import surges from the weakest and the poorest countries in the world. Whose export trade is supposedly being encouraged by the EU" His position is that although trade barriers are discriminatory and are a serious impediment, the more basic problems for African countries reside in their supply capacities, their low levels of production, volumes, quality and price competitiveness, infrastructures, trade financing and commercial information and so on. However, it must be noted that there is an opinion that, the problems of African countries are much more about all round development than trade. The former drives the later and although trade in specific sectors can be useful under certain circumstances, it does not in and on itself, creates development.

Keet (2006, pp. 162-163) further noted that from UNCTAD (2002) and UNDP (2003) which supports the above fact that

> Trade does not necessarily create quantitative growth. NEPAD does seethat there are other impediments to effective African export trade, but its solutions focus on technical and marketing deficiencies, and at one point it even seems to blame Africans trade 'limitations' on their own ' low standards'. However, what NEPAD does not enlarge on are the high tariffs in the richest countries, and their deliberate tariff escalations that are increased in proportion to the degree of processing or manufacture of African exports. These high protectionistbarriers are constantly criticised by African trade analysts and representatives in international meetings such as WTO rounds, but NEPAD does not even endorse. Let alone build on such public African positions. The inadequate observation by NEPAD on the long standing role of such policies is deliberately impeding industrial development and diversification within Africa."

Though diversification may be beneficial, what NEPAD has done is basically to condition Africa to certain tradition European trading partners. Again, NEPAD at one point recommends negotiations to facilitate market access for African products to world markets, and even makes a token reference to encouraging South-South Partnership. Craftily, the main focus and orientation of its recommendations to African heads of state is that they do all they can to secure and stabilise what it calls ‘preferential treatment by key developed country partners’. He also noted that this ‘ tariff preferences’ together with financial and technical aid from Europe to African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) partners under the aegis of lame convention reinforced the dependence on Europe. Keet (2006, pp. 163-164) however lamented that, “it has not even begun to take on board, the more developed positionsof the ACP countries in their negotiations with the EU, let alone the more advanced positions of ACP civil society organisations, particularly in challenging the ‘ reciprocal trade liberalisation’ that the EU is demanding, nor does NEPADs position, remotely begin to question the outrageous invasion of Africa policy rights and political autonomy by Washington in return for the limited ‘special’ access for the US market that it offers under AGOA… The extremely weak engagement of NEPAD on such centrally significant economic agreements between Africa and its major investment, trade and aid partners raises profound doubts and holds out little hope for the continent”. Based on these opinions, he concluded that “this obviously mean that Africa may not be experienced enough to handle the so called “New Partnership’ under NEPAD”.

Regarding multilateral trading organisation and African participation in their unions, NEPAD encourages active engagement of African governments within the multilateral system of rules and regulations being created by and implemented under the WTO. However, it does so with some caution and prescription of a mode of operation. It notes the “absence of fair and just rules and the unfavourable terms of trade facing Africa…and the biases in economic policy and instability in the world commodity prices that affects Africa negatively (Keet 2006, p. 132). It call for active participation by African leaders to ensure ’open, predictable’ market access for Africa’s exports , the usual code words referring to the multilateral system of trade under WTO rules (Keet 2006, p. 164).

Concisely, NEPAD has not been able to reverse the trend of helplessness that has been the position of the states of Africa at the multilateral trading institutions like WTO. NEPAD only mentions the need for rules and regulations of the WTO to be implemented without focusing on the major issues confronting the developing countries. the government of developing countries, individually and collectively, have been trying over the last five to six years to make these issues the priority matterson the agenda of the WTO for review, revision and rectification, only to be intransigently blocked by the more powerful players in the WTO, particularly the notorious Quad consisting of the Majors; The EU, The USA, Canada and Japan." The most powerful industrialised country governments have most times evaded responsibility to the developing countries. For instance, there was the case of the USA skilful evasion of undertakings to remove tariff and quota restrictions on textile and clothing exports from the developing countries" (Keet 2006, p. 165) . Additionally, It is also on record, that these proposed African 'Partners'in African development has on some occasions postponed the fulfillment of their undertakings to provide financial and technical assistance to the LDCs and other countries that would be adversely affected by the new global regime which were promised by this powerful countries in the last moments before the signing of the Maraketch Treaty that concluded the Uruguay round.

Furthermore, paragraph 169 of NEPADs document suggests that the expansion of the WTO must recognise and provide for the African continents special concerns, needs and interests in future WTO rules, it calls on African Heads of State to ensure this and urges them to persuade the developed countries to 'negotiate more equitable terms of trade for African countries within the WTO multilateral Framework. This research believes that this call is pitiable knowing fully well that the task assigned to these governments by NEPAD is absolutely herculean. If this were to be, then it would have become before now. African countries and leaders did not need a NEPAD platform to advice them to negotiate "hard". This research believes that NEPAD platform is a bigger and significant platform to achieve this rather than commissioning the little and fragmented states to undertake this task. "it is an extremely tough negotiation arena, where ruthless hard bargains are driven by powerful corporate and national vested interests and it is characterized by unprincipled arm twisting and barely veiled threats, not the polite diplomatic position taking of heads of state. And, with the WTO secretariat clearly biased towards the interests and demands of the most powerful members states" (Keet 2006, p. 166). This research believes that the muscle and capacity needed for such negotiation will better be mustered, orchestrated and engendered by a more elaborate platform like NEPAD, than burdening the despairing governments with such a laborious task.

Again, reports has it, that many top political leaders in Africa are far more susceptible to the pressures and persuasions of their northern aid and trade partners, who are known to contact them directly and confidentially outside of the negotiation processes and behind the backs of the African negotiators on the frontline, in order to counter and undermine African negotiating positions and negotiators (Keet 2006, p. 166). Such disjuncture and divisions within and between African governments, between the negotiating teams in Geneva and their home ministries, and between detailed technical, legal and economic arguments on the one hand, and the broad political and diplomatic positions, on the other hand, are also evident in NEPADs approach to WTO.

> The issue here is that Africans are not united and does not have a strong united front at the WTO. For Instance, there is a difference between Africa's position and that of South Africa both for the third WTO ministerial in Seattle, in Dec 1999, and the Fourth Ministerial in Doha in November 2001. In this case, Africa officially opposed and collectively resisted the introduction of a range of new issues for negotiation in the WTO, whereas South Africa's more ambiguous official position was to accept most of this as a legitimate and necessary bargaining issues, or at least as matters to be bargained over as trade –offs for other needs. Again, there is the issue of industrial tariff liberalisation in the WTO, which the joint African position opposes, but which South Africa supports, is nonetheless subtly alluded to in NEPAD as the need for further liberalisation in manufacturing (Keet 2006, p. 166).

Another issue is that NEPAD is silent on the terms and constraints imposed on regional trade arrangements (RTAs) as they are defined by the WTOs. These constraints are designed to ensure the RTAs, or what are conceived, as Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in African plans, do not raise barriers that discriminate against third parties in the world economy (Keet, 2006, p. 172).

Despite the foregoing, there are certain optimistic opinions regarding NEPAD's achievement especially from very close associates like Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, who is currently the chief Executive of NEPAD. In a recent interview, he noted that NEPAD has achieved a lot, contrary to what most western media claim. According to him,"there are three major ways in which NEPAD may be assessed. First, NEPAD is the only development initiative available on an African scale. It has been with us for the past 10 years, yielding conclusive results in areas such as science, technology, agriculture and infrastructure. The initiative has just been re-launched with its recent integration as a development agency in the African Union structure. I am not aware of any other African initiative that has lasted this long and relied on a formal, institutionalized framework such as this one, with a mandate focusing on issues of implementation. Second, NEPAD is directly responsible, from the start, for some of the most important development strategies implemented in key areas such as agriculture, with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, or infrastructure, with the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, areas that are also deemed to be of the utmost priority. The fact that all African countries strive to implement the rules and norms of both strategies at the level of our continent is a great achievement.Third, little known though eyed with envy by Europe, has to do with the African Peer Review Mechanism. This original and unique approach is about evaluating political or economic governance in countries that are willing to be assessed" (Sunday Independent South Africa p. 1) Mayaki (2012) believes that critics of NEPAD are impatient to understand its achievement and rather prefer to toe the line of western media, which has been quite critical of NEPAD. He also blamed the critics for living with the colonial mentality that nothing good comes from Africa. According to him, "the problem is that many Africans spend too much time repeating what the Western media says. It will take some time to ward off this colonial way of thinking. Obviously, when you watch the way Africa is treated on a major news channel like CNN, the feeling is that Africa is plagued by misery and ruled by inept and corrupt leaders who hardly give any thought to the greater public interest. Many among us Africans tend to repeat what CNN and others have to say without taking a step back and reflecting about what we just heard. We seem to wallow in a kind of self-disparagement. Nowhere else is such an attitude so widespread than on our continent.Unfortunately, this self-disparaging attitude does have a negative impact. We cannot afford to keep on offering our children a negative image of Africa. We need to put things into perspective. A country like Rwanda has made significant progress while reducing its reliance on foreign aid. By mobilizing its own resources, Cape Verde has succeeded in becoming a middle-income country. Judging from the design and implementation of its new constitution, Kenya is making significant progress in terms of governance. Botswana refuses to appeal for foreign aid, with many other countries following its example". (Mayaki, 2012, Sunday Independent South Africa, p. 1) He actually believes that NEPAD remains an abstraction because people do not know what it has achieved since NEPAD's achievements are not communicated and then concluded that, NEPAD needs to develop strategies to increase the awareness of our achievements in the public. The opinion put forward by Mayaki (2012) is very much expected of the chief officer of the organization, Unfortunately, Mayaki is relying on information and awareness creation to make people believe in the achievements of NEPAD, instead of allowing the works to speak for itself. This research believes that NEPADs achievement does not need just to be in print or media to become real. Tangible achievements are visible, seen and commended by all.

4.3 Conclusion

The discussion in this Chapter has been centered on the subject of why NEPAD failed or at least why it has been adjudged a failure and why African leaders considered it necessary to re-engineer it, through the emergence of the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency. There have been internal and external opinions presented in this chapter to buttress this subject.

First, even though NEPAD lays claim to African ownership, it does not represent the interest of the totality of the people and it is not perceived to be so. On the contrary, the sum total of its perception is that, it is an elite driven top-bottom organisation that does not connect with the local people whose interest it seeks to protect. To this extent, NEPAD suffers a problem of legitimacy and acceptability by the people, who does not see it as representing their interest in the real sense of it. Consequently, it does not appear that the founding elites were fully in touch with African reality, neither have they acted in manners that suggest that they fully believe in the NEPAD, which they are professing. This hypocrisy has eroded her integrity as a developmental agency. It is rather seen as a 'talkshop' to orchestrate western influence with its neo-liberal policies. The result is that, the model is not well suited for the African state where it is to being implemented.

This chapter also identified the failure of African leadership to 'walk the talk' instead of being hypocritical to the causes of NEPAD. Accordingly, there are still evidence of un-democratic practices in Africa while the supposed peers do nothing serious to stop them.The case of Cote d'Ivoire where President Laurel Gbagbo refused to hand over power after losing election is a case in point. Consequently, it does not appear that the African Peer Review Mechanism has actually succeeded in checking the excesses of these peers by instilling good governance practices.Infact opinions are rife to the fact that most African nations pay lip service to the undemocratic acts of their Peers for other national interests. This has further eroded the political integrity of these leaders and makes them a laughable stock in the eyes of the international community. Infact, this study reveals that compliance with the elements of good governance will mean practically replacing every government in Africa. Further, NEPAD's agricultural policy is very weak especially, since it did not clearly resolve the issue of equity in the exchange or sale of those products with the north. This is also one area that has been grossly under-funded and hence poverty and food security issues persist in Africa. Closely related to this is the issue of trade. Scholars believe that the failure of NEPAD in this area largely stems from the fact that it is not focused on the real issues at the multilateral trading institutions and platforms like the WTO. For instance, NEPAD fails to recognize that there have been cases where the powerful nations have avoided responsibility about African trading concerns. Instead, it assumes so much rationality on the side of these multilateral institutions to take Africa to its destination. Consequently, exporters of raw material remain the 'boot lickers" of the inevitable global trading system. This research categorically noted that NEPAD has offered up Africa as a vast and growing market for producers across the world, which will automatically put African products and producers under pressure and stiffer competition for the goods from the developed economies. In fact, it is also obvious that, NEPAD seems to be confused between fostering intra-African development and satisfying the requirements of international partners. The NEPAD Planning agency has to quickly make a choice between these two foundational principles or at least clearly state the limits of both 'African Ownership' and 'Partnership' with the international donor nations. This will clearly delineate roles and show where the relationship starts and where it will end.

Generally, the call for a new NEPAD or at least a refurbished NEPAD is a step in the right direction, only if the NPCA will move to correct the pitfalls of NEPAD.

CHAPTER FIVE

A SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: LESSONS FROM EUROPEAN UNION

5.1 Introduction

The subject of this chapter should not be misunderstood to mean that the European Union has no problems; neither does it propose that the integration arrangements set up under its aegis is fool proof. The truth is that the EU has its own endemic and cancerous maladies which threaten the very existence of the union and some of which are internally orchestrated. For instance, “the Danes voted against the Treaty of the European Union in the summer of 1992. The French and Dutch citizens blatantly rejected the treaty establishing the constitution for Europe in their referendums on 29th May and June 1 2005, respectively, thus freezing the constitution for at least a year. Only two weeks later, the heads of the EU states could not agree upon the financial framework for the Union for the years 2007-13; National interests seem to prevail over the breath-taking rhetoric of European unity” (Sten Beguland et al, 2006, pp. 1).

This research recognizes the fact that while the study is going on, the European Union is still going through turbulent times with the declaration of bankruptcy on the Greek economy and the impacts of recession in other parts of Europe. The research also notes that there is some huge repository of data and studies that tend to relegate the EU model to the background while charting a course for regional integration for Africa. For instance, Steyn (2005, p. 35) in his work “The European Union is not a role model for Africa’ concluded that far from the argument that NEPAD should follow the path of the European union, there are substantial contextual and other differences that will not allow this or that makes it inconsistent for emulation. Steyn buttressed his position by showing the difference regarding how the EU and African Union emerged. According to him, “The European Union grew from a series of small economic unions into a larger body, while the African Union started as a politically driven union with the aim to attract foreign investments and to eradicate poverty through high economic growth and so still has to prove that it can be economically sustainable in a global economic market’’. He pointed out that Africa must have to develop its own model and make it work. He canvassed for a model that will see each of the five regions in Africa developing its own regional economic organisation i.e. one Regional Economic Organisation for each of the five sub-regions of Africa (Southern Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, North Africa) and get them to work in terms of the NEPAD vision. He further stressed that no overlapping memberships of member states should be allowed. In the Southern Africa Development Community, South Africa plays according to Geyer (2003, p. 409) an important role as a gateway to Africa and as a role model of implementing global economic-politics. The South African positive influence is undermined by the tactic of 'silent diplomacy' towards the abuses of power by the Zimbabwean government (Miller, 2005, p. 55). It will have to use its position as a regional power in the peer review process as a disciplining instrument and not only for rhetoric. Steyn (2005) noted that when the different economic regions of Africa succeed in getting their sub regions on the path of sustainable growth, development and good governance, they can now start investigating the viability of the bigger economic union. Consequently, he is against developing a vast model like the European Union in Africa or put differently, he does not believe that the time is ripe for the establishment of the African Union, until such a time when the five regional blocs in Africa has gotten very strong. Therefore, this proposition is basic to the fact that sub regional integration must precede regional or continental integration.

The choice of the European Union as a model for our study is predicated upon many factors, first, this research does not totally accept that the 'over-lapping' of membership to the RECs in Africa, is the only cause for their inefficiency, neither does it disagree that each region should have its own economic grouping, however, modern day international economic relations does not necessarily follow a geographic pattern. As will be shown in this chapter, countries without geographical affinity can successfully be part of the same regional economic arrangement. Again, considering the theoretical construct of our study, which is pivoted upon structural functionalism and integration theories as postulated by Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye, the European Union comes nearer the mark of a perfect and ideal regional integration and most importantly regional economic integration model. This chapter will study the origin, functions and modus operandi of the union while highlighting its strength, weaknesses and challenges. It will highlight those functional and other benefits accruing to it, which should be emulated by the RECs in Africa and especially by the NEPAD-ECOWAS led integration aspirations.

Maclesse and Brulhart (1998, p. 475) stated that "the EU is an association of states with a particular legal character, it is regarded as a community in international law, not as a nation, although it possesses some features of nationality" They do not have a formal constitution, but has been built up on the basis of a series of treaties, regarded as binding commitments by the 25 member states that signed them. These includes Internal agreements between member states of the European Union, as well as agreements between member and non-member states, are in existence, for example the Schengen treaty and the Benelux treaty. The Maastricht treaty, signed in 1992, established the European Union (EU) as a 'first pillar'. Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was designated as a 'second pillar', while Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) comprised the 'third pillar'. The last two pillars are operated through intergovernmental cooperation. Then, in 1994 the European Economic Area was founded in order to enable the European Free Trade Countries to participate in a single market, without having to join the European Market (Steyn, 2005, p. 2) These prevailing circumstances does not in any way obliterate the fact the European Union remains a model going through perfection especially when compared to her peers elsewhere. In many respects, the European Union (EU) represents the most advanced example of regional integration in the modern international nation state system (Olivier and Olivier 2004, pp. 341-362).

It is based on these factors that, the European Union is selected as a model, which will help to foster a better integration in Africa and West Africa specifically. This will also showcase some of the EUs integration arrangement projects and their successes which will provide a framework for NEPAD and other integration aiding agencies in other parts of the world especially Africa. In doing this, this chapter undertakes to study the "structures" and "functions" of the European Union, to see whether there are similarities and discrepancies when compared to ECOWAS and NEPAD. It will further study its successes and challenges and on that basis review the issues around the metamorphosis of NEPAD and challenges of Regional Integration in Africa.

5.2 Regional Economic Integration- The Model of the European Union

The founding treaty of the European Union was the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which was signed by the original six member countries of the then European Community. This treaty marked the beginning of European integration. This was further to metamorphose into the European Union with the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, with an enlargement to 27 member states. Today, the European Union has grown into a superstructure and has become "the world largest donor of development assistance, accounting for some 51% of the global total in 2002. (Ona, 2010, p. 17)

A dipstick into the origin of the European Union will reveal that the quest for world peace after the world wars were the basic motivation behind it. After the failure of the League of Nations to stop another world war, it became obvious that a stronger union was necessary if Europe will develop economically under a peaceable environment. In 1943, Jean Monnet, a member of the Free French government in exile in Algiers, declared,“There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty… The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation…” (Llewellyn & Westerway, 2011, p. 8).Consequently, the United Nations was formed after World War 11. Unfortunately Instead of establishing world peace, this organisation merely created a platform for discussion but it failed to bridge the development gap between the rich north and the poor south.

The first moves towards regional economic integration began to incubate after this time. For instance, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg founded the BENELUX in 1949. Its purpose was that of a custom union to facilitate a free flow of goods and capital between these states (Zonneveld & D’hondt 1994, p. 34). Subsequently, in 1950, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, put forward Monnet’s plan to place the production of the raw materials of war (coal and steel) under the control of a single common authority, in order to contribute to economic recovery. This led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC) in 1951 by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries), as well as West Germany, France and Italy (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002, p. 17). The aim of the ECSC was to pool the steel and coal resources of the member states, in order to prevent another European war. These were the states that, through the Treaty of Rome of 1957, tried to form a European Defence Community and a French Political Community but ultimately succeeded in forming the European Economic Community (EEC), based on freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people. In 1958 the Benelux Economic Union treaty, which virtually abolished border checks within the Benelux area, was signed (Zonneveld & D’hondt 1994, p. 104). A series of treaties led to the formation of the European Union. In 1967, they became known as the European Communities and after signing the treaty in Maastricht 1993, the European Union. Membership of the European Union is open to any European country with a stable democratic government, a good human rights record, a properly functioning market economy and sound micro-economic policies.

Several enlargements of the Union occurred over the course of time as the following countries obtained membership, 1973; United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, 1981 Greece, 1986 - Spain and Portugal, 1990 - East Germany (which was reunited with West Germany, thus increasing the area and population, although not the number of states), 1995 - Austria, Sweden and Finland, 2004 - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland as well as Slovakia and Slovenia jointly. One major step taken towards economic unification was the agreement that was entered into by eleven countries in 1999 to abandon their own currencies. This marked the introduction and circulation of Euro notes and coins in January 2002.

The old European Economic Community was primarily a developed, urbanised and industrialised economic block, whose member states were characterised by a relatively high standard of living and a good infrastructure but the enlargement of the Union brought into it a mixed population now comprising of those who can help and those who needed help. These new Euro-countries are in need of assistance in the upgrading of their infrastructure, as well as with regard to their average income. A large proportion of the budget will have to be spent for this purpose. The inclusion of the Eastern countries into the European Union expanded the land area by 25% and brought in an additional 75 million citizens. This gave birth to a new larger Europe, with a larger market population approaching 500 million and a combined economy approaching that of the United States of America. However, this comes with responsibility to carry on board the poor axis of Europe. It should be noted that the EU started off small, as a number of different economic communities and closely allied custom unions and was only able to unite in 1992 with the Maastricht treaty after working together for 35 years (Steyn 2005, p. 1) If we go by this calculation, one can still argue that it’s too early to write off NEPAD after just a decade of existence.

One of the things that made the European Community (EU) acceptable and unique was that from the beginning, it made provision and set guidelines for relating with the developing countries especially in Africa. For instance, the 1957 Treaty of Rome included a provision to extend relationship with twenty two countries all of which had colonial ties with the EC membership states. According to Ona, he states that “in keeping with this provision, the EC developed a first generation of economic cooperationagreements mainly with French speaking African countries.” In 1963 and 1969, the Yaounde conventions were respectively signed between the EC and eighteen independent French speaking African States; the

Yaounde 1 and Yaounde 11 conventions named after the capital city of Cameroun, where they were signed. Also when the United Kingdom joined the EC in 1973, it brought along its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries thus including the former British Commonwealth countries. It is therefore not in error to conclude that the relationship between Africa and the European Community has been long standing and in fact has been contracted from the onset of the European Union.

Ideally, this relationship ordinarily should have provided a good breeding ground for the multiplicity of regional and sub-regional arrangement that was to erupt in the African landscape. Unfortunately, this incubation was never to be as exemplified in future regional arrangements and instruments like NEPAD. For instance, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 and replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2002 so far represents a less successful effort towards Integration. According to some of its founding members, the AU is to be modeled after the European Union (EU). Gerrit and Michele (2004, p. 351) are however worried that the question is, however, whether this is a realistic or even serious expectation in the light of the well-known trials and tribulations of intra-African politics and economics. According to them, “Many questions remain to be answered and many uncertainties still prevail about the political and economic aspects of African integration. Specific questions could be asked about the perennial absence of peace, security and predictability in Africa’s many troubled regions, about the failure of various African governments to adhere to universal principles of the rule of law, good governance, democracy and human rights. Will the AU is able to assume the legal status and authority to override the national sovereignty of errant member states in order to make a success of African regional integration?”

This research will proceed to evaluate the European Union in line with our theoretical construct of an ideal regional integration and show why it has been deemed successful and what the ECOWAS and its instruments of integration like the NEPAD should learn from them. It will however be unscholarly to proceed in this direction without mentioning the influence of the political and economic environment upon which these integration arrangements occur, being that the European Union developed in an entirely different setting from the African experiment. For Instance Olivier and Olivier (2004, p. 353) observed, “Throughout its development, European integration showed elements of various integration paradigms, i.e. supra-nationalism (federalism and functionalism) and state centrism (confederalism, intergovernmentalism). African integration, on the other hand, followed the state centric or confederal mode very strictly, and for this reason, it is far less advanced than the European experiment when measured against ideal-type notions on integration. From a teleological perspective, therefore, the European Union comes closest to a regional ideal type in contemporary international politics, while regional integration in Africa (as is the case with similar experiments in North and South America and Asia) still has a long way to go". Consequent upon this, the European Union has a lot of overhead advantage over her African counterparts, if we relate the above condition to the views of Ernst B Haas and Karl Deutsh et al that the existence of a political community is a prerequisite for regional integration.

Gerrit and Michele (2004, p. 355) has cited O'Neill, who commented that "the latest revisionist account of regional integration assumes that regional integration is a multifarious rather than a one-dimensional process and as such, its dynamics or momentum is neither teleological induced nor fixed, but is infused instead with mixed motives and variable influences. A more acceptable approach would seem to admit that integration is a variable condition, which, in a dialectical way, progresses over any length of time to a fixed condition. It, therefore, involves a minimalist threshold to be crossed and a maximalist outcome, the former being the process which is deliberately set in motion by political actors and the latter, the coming into existence of a new political unity conforming to the Haas definition. This maximalist outcome has yet to be approximated by all existing regional organizations across the world, Including the EU, the most advanced among them (Olivier & Olivier 2004, p. 354).

The EC was originally set up as three separate entities but with some sharing of institutions. Although there are some differences of legal competences, it became convenient to consider the ECSC, Euratom, and EEC as branches of the same whole and in this the EEC became the dominant partner. Since 1965, when a merger treaty was passed, it seemed more logical to refer to the whole structure as the European Community (EC) whose main constitutional base with the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC. Although the EEC treaty relates simply to the formation of a common customs Union and provides the basis for a common market in terms of free factor mobility, many of the originators of the EEC saw it as a phase in the process culminating in complete economic and political union. Thus the treaty on European union (the Maastricht treaty), which transformed the EEC into the European Union in 1994 and which intends inter alia to provide the EU with a single central bank, a single currency, common foreign and defence policies , should be seen as positive steps towards attainment of the founding fathers desired goals. Article 2 of the EEC establishing the treaty states that “the community shall have as its task, by setting up a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states to promote throughout the community an harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the member states belonging to it.” (Article 2, p. 3)

Details of the Treaty and the conditions for the Union are stated in Article 3 thus;

1. The elimination, as between Member States, of Customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the imports and exports of goods, as well as all other measures having equivalent effect.
2. The establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third Party countries.
3. The abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the freedom of movement for persons, services and capital;
4. The establishment of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture;
5. The adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport,
6. The establishment of a system ensuring that the competition in the common market is not distorted’
7. The application of procedures by which the economic policies of member States can be co-ordinated and disequilibria in the balances of payments can be remedied;
8. The approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for proper functioning of the common market,
9. The creation of a European Social Fund in other to improve the possibilities of employment of worker and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living;
10. The establishment of European Investment bank to facilitate the economic expansion of the community by opening fresh resources and
11. The association of overseas countries and territories with a view to increasing trade and to promoting jointly economic and social development. (Alli & El-Agraa 1998, p. 13)

Article 9 (1) states that “the community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between members states of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relation with third countries”. Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 13) concluded that “the EU is at present more than a common market but falls short of being a complete economic union, but it is aspiring to achieve the latter as well as political union” .At this point, it is necessary to study in details the various agencies of the EU and their roles in fostering the EU mission include and the provisions of the treaty. This will help us appreciate the inner workings of the European Union. First, The EU Structures includes; the European council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the European Central bank and other supporting arms are still emerging.

The European Council made up of heads of state and governments remains one of the most powerful organs of the European Union. They are directed to provide the impetus for development and political guidance for the union. The heads of state or government meets at least twice a year to deliberate on issues with provides thought leadership to the union. They set the goals and rules of the community and discuss plans for the future. The presidency of the union is usually changed and rotated among countries every six months. This practice was initiated to check against the marginalization of the small EU countries and to ensure that no one nation gains undue advantage over others. Unfortunately, this has not been so because evidence abounds of the superiority of the original six members over others in matters of decision making especially. For instance, it is a known fact that no programme or decision can succeed without the support of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France.

The Council of Ministers is also another powerful agency of the union. It is the law-making organ of the European Union. The council was until 1987, the main decision- making institution of the European Community. However, since the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the Treaty of the European Union (1993) and the subsequent Treaties of Amsterdam (1999) and Nice (2003), it has had to share many decisions with the European Parliament. This ‘co-decision’ procedure is used in an increasing number of areas. Before 1987, decisions were taken by unanimity, which clearly complicated the whole process if a country decided to use their veto. Today most decisions are taken by qualified majority or consensus and only very few decisions lead to controversy. (Magone, 2011, p. 148).The council of ministers consists of representatives of member governments. Its decisions are taken by unanimous, simple or qualified majority voting and, when the last method is used, the votes are weighted, so that at least some of the smaller members must assent. Like the leadership of the European

Council, each member holds the presidency of the council for a six months period and even the leadership of the many committees in the council alters correspondingly. According to Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 32) “to achieve continuity, a troika of the immediate, past, present and immediate future presidents also meets. It has become a practice for each member state to try to establish a particular style of working and to single out certain matters to which, it wishes to give priority.” The beauty of this practice is that overtime because of certain priorities, which they have adopted; member nations became synonymous with certain projects that they had driven, when they were at the helm of affairs. This way also, it became possible to drive even development to a point, since project decisions are not only spearheaded by the urbanized nations but also their sister nations from the less urbanized especially Easter Europe. Again, this practice made for specialization as certain countries became owners of certain projects. This is something worth emulating especially by ECOWAS and NEPAD, thus making sure that certain countries become owners of certain projects, for Instance, Nigeria can be made the champion for West African Gas Pipeline. The President of the Council also makes representation at other EU institutions like the Parliament and uses this platform to orchestrate the positions of the council on certain subject matters.

It should be noted that membership of the council varies according to the subject matter under review and this growth has brought its own problems at home. Various ministers, briefed by their own civil servants, so it becomes harder for any government to see its European policy as a coherent whole, handle community issues. The inputs from their home civil servants ensure that they do not lose touch with the grassroots. In addition, the Council has a secretariat and is supported by a most important body called “The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The members of this committee who are usually of ambassadorial rank and drawn from national administration include members of home departments who travel to Brussels when required. They prepare council meetings, handle a lot of the work on behalf of the council, and ultimately serve as a link between the national bureaucracies and the Council. Consequently, this is an agency that facilitates the domestication of the Union as policies at the nationalities level, while at the same time becoming a feedback centre for the Council from there. However, this has not gone seamlessly without complications. According to Collins (1998, p. 33) “this has encouraged domestic media to present council meetings as 'national battles' in which there has to be victory or defeat and politicians too, have become extremely adept to using publicity to rally support to their point of view. As a result, the effect has become the opposite of the original intention when it was thought, that the experience of working together would make it progressively easier to find an answer expressive of the general good and for which majority voting would be a suitable tool. Instead conflict of national interests is often a better description" they further noted that some other problems are encountered by the council "the great press of business, the fact that ministers can only attend to Council businesses part time, the highly sensitive nature of their activities and the larger number of members all contribute to a grave time lag in reaching policy decisions and the move towards QMV to settle matters relating to the single market was one measure designed to overcome this difficulty" (Collins 1998, p. 33).

Generally, it will not be wrong to conclude that, The Council acts as a coordinator of general economic policies of the members and a platform within which grassroots programs and domestic wishes are orchestrated. The critical role assigned to the council makes it important to equip them with certain powers for sanctioning erring bodies. To this end, the EU treaty has also given them power to fine member states or to impose other sanctions with regard to government deficits. Consequently, it increases in power as the need arises for strengthening the monetary Union.

The European Commission is also another organ, which is the executive branch of the European Union. It is "the main administrative machinery of the European Union. It is a supranational institution with the aim of progressing the European integration process. Therefore, it is often referred to as the 'motor' of the European integration (Magone 2011, p. 143). It is responsible for planning new laws and suggesting them to the council of ministers and parliament, to this extent; it is an enforcement agency that ensures the Union's rules are followed. It is a body of twenty commissioners drawn from each member state and each of them is responsible for a certain area of development like environment, energy, Agriculture, transportation etc. They have a tenure spanning over 5 Years, which must be approved by the parliament. They are chosen on the grounds of competence and capacity to act independently in the interest of the EU itself. The president of the Commission is said to be the most important official of the European Union, who is appointed by the Council of Ministers and confirmed by the European Parliament. Because of the volume of their work, the commissioners are supported in two ways. Each commissioner has a private office under a 'chief de cabinet' and these officers take many decisions on their behalf there is obviously a large bureaucracy resulting from the over fifteen thousand civil servants. This number is a consequence of the use of over eleven official EU languages in transacting the Business of the Union. Consequently, this amorphous size of bureaucracy ultimately slows down the functioning of the Commission.

It should be stated here, that in the recent years the commission has become more involved with operation of the structural funds. In this vein, it has a lot of discretion in the allocation of monies, within broad guidelines. The commission is gaining power and relevance by day especially with the implementation of the single market, which includes harmonizing directives and other legislations. However, this has brought a lot of worry to the European Parliament and the politically motivated groups, who are concerned about the commission's lack of accountability and the difficulty of keeping abreast of their activities. They see the commission to be gradually eroding their powers. Another important function of the commission is to ensure that the members abide by their obligation. In this vein, they can investigate a suspected breach of obligation and issue a reasoned opinion. Consequently, if matters are not set right, the Commission may refer the matter to the court of Administrative Justice and this may ultimately lead to a fine (Art 171 (2)). The Commission has few direct sanctions. For instance, it has the power to fine firms which breach certain operational rules, member states has so far accepted their obligation to abide by EU rules. It should be stated clearly, that even though, there are still evidences of breach among states especially on issues relating to the single market , the EU through these practice has been able to control, sanction and extract obedience from its members. This obviously is not the case with other regional integration bodies and their agencies like NEPAD. According to Collins (1998, p. 32) "the commission also attends Council meetings and plays an active part in helping to reach a decision although it has no voting rights. It is here that it can however perform an important mediatory function between national viewpoints and its own which is intended to represent the general community interest."

In summary, the role of the commission stretches from commissioning initial studies and getting feedback on a proposed policy, initiation of policy, the protection of EU interests, mediation on issues of national interest, protection of treaty and extracting compliance from firms and members. According to Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 36) "these extensive and lengthy discussions taken both before and after a proposal is formalized are part of process designed to obtain the highest level of acceptability to member states and at the same time to enhance the process of European integration". Perhaps one of the biggest problems of the commission is that it is seen as being too large a body for its task, a problem which will further be aggravated by the clamor for more enlargements by its members.

The European Parliament is unique to the extent that even though it is tagged a 'Parliament', it is different from other parliaments because it cannot pass laws. On the contrary, its function is restricted to making suggestions to the commission and council of ministers. According to Collins (1998, p. 39) "the key question for the EP has always been its role in the legislative process. The original treaties laid down occasions upon which the EP must be consulted and in practice, its opinion has been sought on every important issue. It could nevertheless be disregarded". However, the hopeless situation of the EP on this matter has been partially revered with the introduction of the of a new procedure of 'Co-decision' contained in Article 189(b) which covers issues relating to internal market, free movement, education, culture and public health. Co-decision requires the Council of Ministers to adopt common position unanimity, which if appropriate, the EP can again approve, express no opinion on, reject or amend. Collins (1998, p. 39) has pointed out regarding this that "the council may, of course, accept the amendments but, if it rejects the EPs position, a joint conciliation committee comes is convened to try to get a text agreeable to both sides".

However, the EP has strongest powers in budget and monetary matters. This is so because it is empowered to validate, authenticate and decide if a budget should be adopted and in what dimension it has to be apportioned. This is what makes the EP to be revered by other agencies and member nations. The other unique thing about the parliament is that, it remains the only body of the EU that is elected directly by the citizens of the member countries. The people elect about Seven hundred and eighty-five MEPs(Members of the European Parliament). In 1997, the maximum membership was set at 700 members. Collins (1998, p. 37) noted that Countries that has large population like Germany, Italy, and France has more MEPs than smaller countries like Luxembourg. The headquarters straddles between Luxembourg and Brussels. Additionally, its representativeness makes it more acceptable and their decisions more binding than the others do. In fact, the parliament to an extent remains the voice of the European Union. In addition, this makes it a debating chamber and other major institutions submit annual reports to it for this purpose. Collins (1998, p. 37)

Further, the EU treaty made the appointments of Presidents and Commission subject to parliamentary approval. Consequently, it can influence the composition of any reappointed

Commission. Using this right, the EP provides the needed checks and balances for the system to ensure that the European Council and Commission remains in shape in the discharging their responsibilities. The parliamentary question time is an important tool that cannot be ignored as this is used as another control tool at their disposition to check actions and legislations especially on foreign policy. It can also set up a commission of inquiry and appoint an ombudsman and thus receives petitions from the EU citizens over an issue. The EP is also expected to draw up proposals for a Uniform procedure for the electoral process, which the council is to recommend to members for adoption. In this regard, Collins (1998, p. 38) had noted that 'the European parliament is remarkable for having achieved the first international election in June 1979 and members (MEPs) are elected for a period of 5 years. Once elected, the MEPs are organized in political, rather than national groups and the EU treaty gave formal recognition to parties and their importance to the integrative process (Art 138 (a)). For instance, following the 1994 elections, the socialists were returned with the largest number of seats (214) and the European Peoples Party (Mainly Christian Democrats) came second with 181 seat. The other groups are considerably smaller. The Group for Europe has 56 members, The Group for European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party 43, the Confederal Group of the European United left 33, the Green group 28, The Group of The European radical Alliance 20, the Group of Independents for a Europe of nations 18 and the Non-attached 33". Collins (1998, p. 38) it must be noted that the business of the Parliament is conducted through these groups and so it is important for parliamentarians to belong to a group.

Generally, the EP is relevant in matters of control, legislative information and assent and as a platform for aggregation of opinions in the union**.** Collins **(**1998, p. 41) has pointed out that "A considerable problem for the EC has always been that of keeping in touch with citizens and ensuring they are adequately consulted and informed. Parliament of course is one way of making public opinion more aware of EU activity and it is an important channel through which information and knowledge are feedback to the member states".

The European Court of Justiceoperates the courts of the European Union. It is made up of fifteen judges and nine advocates-general. The Advocates generals are responsible for preliminary investigation and for submitting a reasoned opinion to the court to help it come to a decision. It is notable that the court in its operations is heavily affected and influenced by the legal systems of its members and particularly the original six. It hears cases brought by a community institution, member state or firms. Judges decides the action of the commission and both member states and private citizens comply with the rules of the European Union. Their decision is final and even the governments are expected to comply with them. The court is also expected to ensure that the institutions of the community acts constitutionally, fulfilling their treaty obligation and also help to rationalize the ever growing volume of EU rules by member states, firms and individuals. This includes the need to guide the national courts in their interpretation of the EU laws. The courts are expected to ensure a uniform application of the law especially considering the fact that it has to be incorporated into fifteen legal systems. Collins (1998, p.36) noted, "The difficulty is compounded since EU rules often operate alongside national ones, where responsibilities are shared. It is not surprising that a great many court cases arise from policies for agriculture, competition and social security for migrants where states have their own pre-existing policies, national, and EU interests overlap. The court can impose penalties on infringement. Collins (1998, p. 37) has noted, "States agreed that they would abide by the decisions and the fact that, in practice, they mainly do so is an important factor in maintaining the validity of the system." David Easton and the Structural functionalist school had postulated the every system has a way of maintaining its equilibrium. The European Court of Justice remains a tool of maintaining the system equilibrium of the EU system.

The European Central Bank is the union's bank, which is expected to control the amount of money in the euro zone and maintain the euro as a strong currency for transactions across the globe. The ECB was founded in 1998 and has its headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. There is also, the European Investment Bank (EIB), which was given the task of contributing to the balanced and steady development of the common market in the interest of the EC. It has three main fields of operation which includes aiding regional development,, helping with projects made necessary by the establishment of the common market for which normal financial means are lacking and to assist projects of common interest. In addition to its lending operations, it is used as a channel for loans guaranteed by the EC budget especially for loans to the third world and Mediterranean countries.

Additionally, the EU treaty sets out the institutional arrangements for economic and monetary union; these include the European system of Central banks and The European Central bank. There is also the European monetary institute, which operates, only in the second stage towards economic and monetary union with the task of preparing the entry of the third and final stage.

The Court of Auditors is one of the latest institutions, which the EU treaty established because of the growing demands for better external auditing of the budget and its clarification. It is expected to investigate the operations carried out in member states pronouncing upon their effectiveness and publishing a report on its work in the official journal (Collins 1998, p. 37). It is expected to ensure good control and auditing to check issues surrounding the fraudulent use of community funds.

5.3 Elements of European Integration

At this point, it is important to look at the various areas of European integration championed by the EU to examine the level of integration achieved and further compare these with the NEPAD–led ECOWAS quest for integration. This will include areas covering, the Single Market, Monetary Union, Agriculture, Industry, Energy and others.

The issue of a single market was the first priority according to the bulletin of European Communities (No.6, 1985, p. 18). It noted, "From the words of the treaties themselves through successive declaration by the European council since 1982, the need to complete the internal market has been confirmed at the highest level. What have been missing have been the agreed target date and a detailed programme for meeting it. The commission has welcomed the challenge of providing the missing piece. It has interpreted the challenge in the most comprehensive way possible; the creation by 1992 of genuine common market without internal frontiers". Additionally, the white paper noted that the completion of the internal market will become a reality when the EU has eliminated any physical, technical and fiscal barriers among its member nations (Alli & El-Agraa, 1998, p. 154).

The plan is to eliminate physical frontiers in its totality because as far as the commission is concerned, as long as persons and goods have to stop to be checked, the main aim will not be achieved. To achieve this, they needed to identify the activities and functions which needed to happen at the borders. For instance, there are provisions regarding goods and services. The provision was that once goods satisfy the safety and health standard, they should be made available for sale in other parts of the European member nations. Regarding services, they submitted that goods and services should be treated the same way since it was growing fast, providing employment and being a backup support for the manufacturing sector. Their position was that “the creation of a true common market for the services sector which will enable the exchange of financial products, such as insurance policies, home ownership saving contracts and consumer credit, using a minimum coordination of rules as the basis of mutual recognition”. (Alli & El-Agraa, 1998, p. 155) The changes in the transport sector were to be phased. There was to be liberalisation of road passenger services by 1989, of sea transport services by the end of 1986 and competition in Air transport services by 1987. The commission also stated that the issue of capital movement residual currency control measures should be applied by means other than border controls starting from 1992. They also proposed that if frontiers and associated controls were to be eliminated, it would be necessary to set up a community clearing system for VAT and a linkage system of bonded warehouses for exercised products and introduce a considerable measure of approximation of indirect taxes. Though the single market remains an on-going initiative, the European Union has achieved at least 93% percent of planned objectives. Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 157) noted that “By the end of December 1992, the EC was forced to concede that only 95% of the 300 directives had been launched, but all internal EC border checks were abolished by then”. It should be noted that to achieve the single market, the commission had earlier enacted 300 initiatives to drive the unification.

Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 167) noted that “the EU has been successful not only in achieving negative integration, but also in adopting elements of positive integration. Because in the latter progress has been slow, the EU has set itself an extensive programme, with deadlines, for accomplishing a true internal market and an EMU, only history can tell whether or not the EU has been unduly optimistic, but in terms of the philosophy of the founding fathers it could be argued that the EU is at last on target.”. The issue of achieving a single market has been herculean for the ECOWAS. As seen in chapter 3, one of the greatest impediments to achieving the target is the various restrictions at borders and the hostility of the custom officials on the other side of the border. It was also noted that despite the free entry without visa, the complexities at this borders portend a great challenge for the citizens. The ECOWAS must insist on a borderless sub region and see to its enforcement. The different between the EU and ECOWAS lies in the enforcement of the agree principles and rules. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the EU has completed about ninety-five percent of the targets it set for itself concerning a single market is an indication that, it took the single market issue very seriously.

The European competition policy is one aspect that has been influenced greatly in the bid for regional integration in the European Union. For the sake of clarity, competition policy outlines the rules of competition. For instance in a perfect market, firms will compete with each other for the custom of buyers. According to McGowan (1998, p. 170) "such a competitive market will be characterized by pressures towards low prices, close to a level consistent with the costs of and profits for, manufacture and supply. Firms may go bankrupt and drop out of the market, but others will enter. Equally, if a firm will try to price a product too high, it is likely that competitors will undercut it. The market according to this view is a self-equilibrating system, good for buyers and sellers fostering innovation and choice and keeping the economy as a whole efficient". Unfortunately, the reality is that there exist certain market imperfection elements like price fixing and other forms of anti-competitive activity, which are orchestrated by firms who benefit from it. McGowan (1998, p. 170) noted "competition policy therefore is important as a mechanism for correcting market distortions". By doing this, it helps to maintain the efficiency and functionality of the economy and the absence will bring many inefficiencies. Efficiency here means that the market is highly self-regulating to this extent and surprises are avoided as much as possible.

Article 3 (f) of the EU treaty sets the objective of ensuring that competition in a common market is not distorted. Articles 85-94 spell out the rule as it applies to both firms and government. For instance, Article 86 speaks to situations where firms with bigger market share uses their market power to distort competition and affect trade. According to McGowan (1998, p. 175) "this can be done through such means as imposing unfair prices, limiting production, discriminating between customers and applying for specific conditions not related to the transition" this has largely been applied against single firms, although the joint actions of firms could be addressed by the provision. The administration of these rules which was granted to the commission by the Council in a series of regulations lies with the Directorate General Four (DG IV) and the commissioner who is responsible for competition policy. It is worthy of note that just like the EU laws, the competition rules prevails over national legislation especially where issues transcend the national boundaries, but where issues are of purely domestic front, such issues are left for the national government but in all of it, the Commission still has exclusive competence.

While assessing the functionality of the rules and how it has guided Europe McGowan (1998, p. 177) noted that "applying competition rules has been a feature of EU policy making for the past forty years, particularly since the provision of implementing powers in the early 1960s. It will however be naïve to think that the policies have been consistently and rigorously implemented. However, quite apart from the cumulative nature of policymaking and its interaction with court decisions, the conduct of policy has often operated within political limits, of both the priorities of the commissioner and the commission and the politics of member states attitudes. Thus some areas of policy have only emerged in recent years or have been subject to considerable delay in their development." Some of the cases where the rule have been strictly applied with results include the Akzo case of 1991 was notable for punishing predatory pricing behavior and the TetraPak case of 1991 became popular for the scale of fining applied by the commission (7million ECU) (McGowan, 1998, p. 177).

The issue of **Common Agricultural Policy** is one other area that has witnessed astute integration in Europe. The importance of agriculture cannot be over-emphasized especially concerning trade and feeding the populace. According to Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 200) "Agricultural trade constituted a substantial part of the total trade of the founding members especially so in the case of France, it is quite obvious that excluding agriculture from the EC arrangements would have been direct contradiction of this requirement". Additionally, there were many historic reasons for the focus given to agriculture ranging from the fact that among founding member's agriculture was among the highest employer of labour and getting to the fact, that agricultural sector had been on decline at the time of signing this treaty. It should also be noted that prior to signing the treaty, many of these member states already had various agricultural policies ranging from direct import levies to market control systems including non-price policies etc. Nevertheless, the development of common Agricultural policies marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Europe. These are clearly stated in Article 39 of the treaty to include the following;

1. To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring rational development and agricultural production and the optimum utilization of all factors of production.,
2. To ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earning of persons engaged in Agriculture,
3. To stabilize markets,
4. To provide certainty of supplies,
5. To ensure supplies to consumers at reasonable price (Alli & El-Agraa, 1998, p. 210)

According to Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 210) “the treaty further specifies that in order to attain the objectives set out above, a common organization of agricultural markets shall be formed. This organization shall take one of the following forms depending on the products concerned:

1. Common rules as regards competition
2. Compulsory coordination of the various national marketing organizations; or
3. A European organization of the market.

The point worth noting from the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is that CAP did not focus on basics of common pricing and the likes but went further to provide the enabling environment for the development of Agriculture in its totality. As noted in the case of CAADP, ECOWAS Agricultural plan, the biggest challenge is actually having an enabling environment. For one most of the soils are not good for agriculture, in some others there is need for hydro-powered or solar powered irrigation systems. These brilliant basics must be sorted out before West Africa can move forward in Agriculture. However, the CAP entrenched better price support mechanism. The CAP price support mechanism included the guarantee given to farmer’s income by regulating the market to reach a price high enough to achieve this objective. They also contained mechanisms that protect the prices from cheap imports from other parts of the world. To this end, Alli and El-Agraa (1918, p. 214) commented concisely on the target and threshold price. According to Alli and El-Agraa, a target price is set on an annual basis and is maintained at a level, which the product is expected to achieve on the market in the area where cereal is in shortest supply- Duisburg in the Ruhr Valley. The target price is not a producer price since it includes the cost of transport to dealers and store. The target price is variable in that it is allowed to increase on a monthly basis from August to July in order to allow for storage costs throughout the year.”

He further noted that ‘threshold price’ is calculated in a such a way that when transports costs incurred within the EC are added, cereals collected at Rotterdam (Europe’s major port) should sell at Duisburg at a price equal to or slightly higher than the target price. The consequences being that adding the levy and transport costs to Duisburg will make it unprofitable to sell cereals anywhere in the EU for less than the target price”. There is also in existence a ‘green rate’, which is the rate at which the support prices were translated into national prices. El Agraa (1998, p. 216) writes that “in March 1979, it has been given a value equal to the European currency unit (ECU) called a green ECU’. This implies that if a member country devalues its currency, its farm prices expressed in terms of the national currency rise (fall). It should be noted that the scope for changing green currency (allowed because of the desire of member countries to stabilize farm prizes in the face of exchange rate fluctuations at the time). Gives the member countries scope for altering internal farm prices independently of price changes determined at the annual review for the EC as a whole.

The EU over the years has witnessed tremendous unification of its transport policy. Transportation itself is critical for so many reasons ranging from the facilitation of trade and development to the provision of employment and stronger networking among states. McGowan (1998, p. 248) has noted that "the EU transport sector is important in its own right, accounting for about 4% of GDP employing over 4.5 million people and accounting for 28% of final energy consumption, its real importance stems from its infrastructural role". To this extent a common transport policy will help save costs for the community. Little wonder why there is a high degree of regulation and control by the government over the transport sector.

It must be pointed out that there were several transport policies, which existed among members of the Union before the integration commenced. They ranged from policies around liberalization, free market, to privatization etc. For instance, while the UK moved from government intervention to market access i.e. privatization and liberalization, Germany, Netherlands and Denmark had policies conditioned by environmental factors say like pollution etc., while France has theirs around central control and planning. Despite these differences McGowan (1998, p. 248) noted, "Certain broad characteristics of transport policy can be identified. In practice, national transport policies have been dominated by supplier interests, fostered by the close links between governments and industries in many sectors and countries". The first step towards a unified transport policy was contained in a memorandum published as far back as 1961 and an Action Programme published in 1962 to create competition in the transport sectors, reduce trade barriers, harmonizes, and integrates the community. The EU transport policies cover all areas including road transport, Air, shipping and rail.

In the area of road transport, the community policy focused primarily on the carriage of goods through some initiatives on both coach travel and car transport. This one area where there has been a high level of protectionism by nation states. The first step towards liberalization of the controlled sector by the community saw them introduce the "bracket system" which specified maximum and minimum rates within which carriers and consignors would be free to negotiate (McGowan 1998, p. 255). Community policy on individual passenger transport by car has been largely indirect and this has adversely affected support for national vehicle manufacturers, trade on vehicles, on relations between suppliers and distributors of cars, on energy taxes, on emissions and on new technologies for guided transport but not on car transport directly. Recently, the EU has initiated policies on road pricing and citizen's network. It should be stated here that the Community role in policy on cars has become critical because of the associate problems of pollution and congestion.

The EU policy on Rail transport was meant to tackle the age long problems of loss making in the sector and its attendant continual need for subsidy from the governments. Additionally, rail has over the years lost traffic to Air and road transport. Originally, the Community's policy focused on freight transport by rail and the overall railway issues including passenger services as well. According to McGowan (1998, p. 256) the commission in its policy has sought to "rationalize the operations of the national railways by encouraging a clearer allocation of costs between different aspects of industry operations, while it has been able to secure some agreements between member states, the practical effects of these reforms have up until recently been rather limited."

The introduction of high-speed rail transport was a revolution that changed the course of the Community involvement. More so with the growing awareness about environmental pollutions all combined to reshape the EU participation on rail matters. After the dramatic success of the Paris-Lyon route in 1981, the community of European railways launched a plan for high-speed network across the community, justifying it on environmental as well as economic grounds (McGowan 1998, p. 257). The Community leveraged on this and began to scale up the idea of high-speed network across the community. They supported the project by granting funds to for developing these routes in member states. McGowan (1998, p. 257) noted in this regard "in its Communication on Community Rail Policy, the commission spelt out its plans to increase transparency in the industry by separating out the different functions of rail transport (track and services). This will allow both subsidies to those elements which required it and competition on those elements where it was possible". By 1996, a White Paper on rail policy sought to extend liberalization beyond the international freight and passenger markets, whether through direct competition between direct competition between railway companies or through competitive franchises for less attractive routes (McGowan 1998, p. 257).

The EU intervention on the shipping sector covers both inland transportation and maritime transportation. The proposal centred on the need to move away from the rotation scheme of cargo allocation towards a more competitive regime and encourage the scrapping of excess – capacity. The issue of scrapping excess capacity was a process that will see owners get or be given financial incentives to scrap vessels and no new vessel can be constructed without an equivalent reduction in tonnage. Article 84, paragraph 2 has stated that “the council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport,. This was seen as been pushed across by the Dutch for their selfish reasons (McGowan 1998, p. 258). In 1985, the Commission presented a package of measures, which tackled these issues, which was agreed on by the end of 1986. “the package consisted of four regulations which covered the application of competition rules to maritime transport, the principle of freedom to provide services within the community and between the community and third countries, measures to tackle unfair pricing and measures to safeguard access to cargoes” (McGowan 1998, p. 258).

On Air transport, government owned carriers for most of its history has dominated the industry. Though there were private owned operators, the industry tilts more towards government owned companies. Before now the European nations operated their airlines individually and enter into bilateral relations with each other on aviation. The 1970’s witnessed attempts towards a unified aviation rules but it was not until the 1980’s that they began to make much progress. According to McGowan (1998, p. 261) “a more comprehensive and committed effort at reform was made in 1984 with the publication of the Second Memorandum on Air Transport…although it established a wide ranging agenda, it was aimed at gradual reform. The memorandum stated at the outset that a US-styled deregulation was not desirable and couched it proposals for change very much within the context of the existing regulatory framework.”

Again, the rules of the competition were applied to this sector. They developed Community policies on air traffic control but the main thrust of the policy was enforcing competition. McGowan (1998, p. 261) noted that its most important action was “the intervention in the BA-BCal merger in 1987-88. After the takeover was finally agreed at the UK level, the Commission’s Competition directorate indicated that it considered the merger a potential abuse of dominant position and sought further concessions by BA limiting its operations from Gatwick within Europe… In 1988, it fined the Belgian airline Sabena 100,000 ECU for denying another Carrier (London Express Airways) access to its system". It further developed a general regulation on systems establishing a code of conduct which specified the terms of access, ranking, data processing and charges. Despite these, full deregulation of the Community air transport industry was only achieved with a third package of reforms agreed to in 1992 and implemented in 1993. This package covered issues around carrier licensing, market access and fare setting. These measures came into force in the beginning of 1993.

A Common Energy Policy (CEP): The issue of Common Energy Policy for the European Union is touted to be as old of the Community itself, meaning that it was one of the earliest areas of corporation among member nations of the Community. The importance of the energy sector is evidenced in the fact that almost all the treaties signed contain something around energy. It can also be recalled that that the earliest integration arrangements in Europe started out around the energy sector. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which sought to abolish all trade barriers between member states while controlling subsidies and cartel-like behaviour among producers; So in the 1950's, the Commission sought to develop a policy, first for coal and then for other types of energy. It is also noteworthy, that the ECSC formed the platform for theorization of the integration school. When oil became the primary source of energy because of increased demand, and being that about 60% of the oil is imported, means that Community has to make rules on issues, which they are not totally in control of. The period between, 1973 to 1986 is regarded in history as a time of energy crisis, by this time the European oil market was highly dependent on imports. The EU attempted to play a crisis management role but failed to provide a united front vis-à-vis OAPEC over their oil embargo of the Netherlands. Member states pursued their own policies or worked through the International Energy Agency (IEA). The commission attempted to manage the crisis further by developing what was tagged 'a new strategy', which had targets expectation from member states by end of 1985. They were to reduce dependence on oil imports, develop domestic energy capabilities (nuclear energy) and the rational use of energy.

Generally, the objectives of the EU energy objectives in 1995 and 2010 included some of the following; improving efficiency of the final energy demand by 20%, to maintain oil consumption at around 40% of energy consumption and to maintain net oil imports at less than ½ of total energy consumption, maintaining the share of natural gas in the energy balance on the basis of a policy aimed at ensuring stable and diversified supplies, increase the share of solid fuel in energy consumption, to apply community price formation principles to all sectors, to integrate energy and environmental objectives and to incorporate the full cost of energy in the price, to strengthen security of supply through improved diversification and flexibility of domestic and imported supplies on the one hand and ensuring flexible responses to supply emergencies on the other, to improve energy efficiency by 2010 through better coordination of both national and community measures, to promote renewable energy resources with the aim of achieving a significant share of primary energy production by 2010, to develop a coordinated approach to external energy relations to ensure free and open trade and to secure investment frame work (McGowan 1998, p. 270). It is worthy of emphasis that the inclusion of environmental sustainability in the objectives of the Commission was meant to elicit European response to the threat of global warming. In the regards, the member states with exception of the United Kingdom, agreed to stabilize emissions of Co2 by the year 2000. This happened in 1991 and by 1992; it produced proposals for decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly Co2 (McGowan 1998, p. 274).

The Commissions continue to pursue a variety of other energy policy objectives. For instance, It has strong support for energy efficiency and renewable through research budgets and other measures designed to encourage their use. It has also developed policies for supporting energy infrastructures primarily in less developed areas of the community, although this goal has been broadened in the light of attempts to increase integration of gas and electricity supply, through the initiative on fostering Trans EU networks. It has also developed mechanics to monitor disruption in supplies and elements that comprises a variety of measures designed to establish a clearer role for the commission on energy crisis management and diplomacy.

Further, the EU gas industry has also gone through series of changes. The industry is rooted in town gases according to McGowan (1998, p. 281) “while the natural gas accounted for 3% of energy requirements for the EU in 1960, it has risen to just under 20% by 1994. Exploratory companies dominate it, production is widespread, distribution, transmission, imports are usually in the hand of monopoly, and the extent to which this is sustained is reinforced by the degree of vertical integration in the industry. The EU policy is focused on supply security. One of the commission main objectives is to see the creation of an EU-wide gas network. Generally, the Commission is striving to ensure availability of gas and every programme in gas is in line with this objective. The commission has hoped to integrate the whole of the community into the gas market and to improve links with neighbouring states.

Community funds have been used to bring gas to Greece and Portugal while the Trans-European Networks initiative has sought to strengthen the network across the continent. Attempts to introduce rules for the transit of gas between utilities were opposed by a number of member states and the Commission's proposals were eventually passed by majority vote. Opponents argue that such a system (by introducing competition) would not provide the certainty required for the long-run investments needed in the sector and would jeopardize existing contractual arrangements.

Electricity too has witnessed rapid growth because of increase in demand and production. The Commission has indicated that integration and liberalization of the Electricity supply industry (ESI) was desirable, the idea did not receive any serious consideration. In the 1970's, the policy has been largely informed by the need to diversify fuel types in power production by discouraging and encouraging various forms of power generation. It believed in the EC-wide electricity pool. The commission was opposed to the dominance of national systems in the ESI by identifying a number of distortions and barriers to trade within and between these systems. (McGowan 1998, p. 285)

The European Monetary Union (EMS) was launched by the EC in 1971. Generally, monetary integration has two essential components namely; an exchange-rate union and capital market integration. An exchange rate union is established when member countries has what is in effect one currency. The other way to achieve this is where all members has an irrevocable fixed exchange rate,. In this situation, convertibility, which is the permanent absence of all exchange controls for all transactions and dividend payments, is instituted. Practically speaking, monetary integration must include harmonization of monetary policies, a common pool of foreign exchange reserves and a single central bank. The committee was set up led by Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxemburg to consider the issues surrounding the setting up of the monetary Union. The Council endorsed the 'Werner' Report in February 1971. The council resolution included the following:

1. Constitute a zone where persons, goods, services and capital would move freely, but without distorting competition, or creating structural and regional imbalances and where economic undertakings could develop their activities on a community scale,
2. Form a single monetary entity within the international monetary system characterized by the total irreversible convertibility of currencies; the elimination of fluctuation margins of exchange rates between the members…. These steps would be essential for the creation of

a single currency and they would involve a community level organization of central banks.

3. Hold the powers and responsibilities in the economic and monetary field that would enable its institutions to ensure the administration of the economic union. (Alli and El-Agraa, 1998, p. 120)

To this end, the necessary economic policy decisions would be taken at community level and the necessary powers would be attributed to community institutions. The development and full transmutation to the EMU was planned in 3 phases beginning 1971 and terminating by 1980. Unfortunately, these did not happen as planned and the timelines were reset with the Delors Report. The report was an aftermath of the EC summit held in Hanover on 27 and 28 June 1988 where they agreed to an objective of ‘progressive realization of economic and monetary union’ (Alli & El-Agraa 1998, p. 123). The Committee was of the opinion that the creation of the EMU must be seen as a single process, but that this process should be in stages, which will progressively lead to the ultimate goal, the decision to enter upon the first stage should commit a member state to the entire process. This first phase will emphasize greater convergence of economic performance through the strengthening of economic and monetary policy coordination within existing institutional framework. The Committee noted that the second stage should be a transition stage leading to the final stage and should constitute a training process leading to a collective decision making but the ultimate responsibility for policy decisions will remain with national authorities during this stage. At this stage, there will be the establishment of the European System of Central Bank (ESCB).

The third and final stage would start with the irrevocable fixing of member states exchange rates and the attribution to the RC institutions of full monetary and economic consequences. it is also expected that at this stage the national currencies will give way to a single EC currency. The member states agreed that 1 July 1990 would be take-off stage for the first stage. The chain of events culminated into the agreement that 1 January 1999 should be the earliest day for introducing the Euro. Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 129) concluded that “the EMU envisaged in the Delors Report and detailed and endorsed in the Maastricht Treaty is consistent with and satisfies all the requirements of a full economic and monetary union”.

The discussion on European Integration will not be complete without a discussing of her Tax Harmonization practices. At the EU level, we may trace the discussion on tax harmonization from Article 99 of the Treaty of Rome, which particularly call for the harmonization of indirect taxes, mainly turnover taxes and excise duties. The pre harmonization era witnessed the prevalence of diverse tax regimes in the member nations, but harmonization became necessary because after the removal of tariffs among member states, taxes if not harmonized will remain the main source of intra-EU trade distortions. Regarding indirect taxation, most of the developments were in terms of VAT, which the EU adopted as its turnover tax. Having adopted the VAT system and having accepted a unified method of calculating it. It was agreed by all member states that the coverage of VAT should include the retail stage that crude raw materials bought-in elements, similar components were to be deductible from the tax computation and that investment stock, and inventories should be given similar treatment by all member nations.

However the Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 299) has noted, "This similarities of principles was, in practice, contradicted by a number of differences. The tax coverage differed from one country to another, since most of them had different kinds, as well as different levels, of exemptions. For example, the United Kingdom applied zero rating for foodstuffs and children is clothing…. There were wide differences in rate structure." Regarding corporation tax, he further noted that the method of tax harmonization, which was accepted, was not the ideal one of a single EU corporation tax and a single tax pattern, but rather a unified EU corporation tax accompanied by freedom of tax patterns. He therefore concluded, "Hence, all systems were entertained at some point or another and all that can be categorically stated is that by 1986 the EU limited its choice to the separate and imputation systems. He showed a table of corporation tax structure rates in 1986, which buttresses the fact that the rates were highly different. For Instance citing various publications by the commission and other national sources, he showed the differences in corporation tax rates ; Belgium 45%, Denmark 50%, France 45%, West Germany 56 & 36%, Greece 34 -47%, Ireland 50%, Italy 46%, United Kingdom 35% etc. (Alli & El-Agraa 1998, p. 301). Regarding excise duties harmonization was slow due to the differences in the rate of commodities. He however noted that the greatest progress was achieved in tobacco where a new harmonized system was adopted in January 1978. There was the abolition of duties in raw tobacco leaf and the adoption of new sales tax at the manufacturing level combined with a specific tax per cigarette and VAT.

The period that they saw the introduction of the SEA was marked a watershed in the history of tax harmonization in the EU. The SEA was geared towards the transformation of the EC to a single market by the end of 1992 and to achieve this, the SEA has to revolutionize taxation. Part of this revolution included; the replacement of the system of refunding tax on exportation and collecting it on importation by a system of tax collection by country of origin, the introduction of EC clearing mechanism to ensure that Revenue would continue to accrue to the EU member nation where consumption took place so that the destination principle would remain intact and the narrowing of differentials in national VAT rates so as to lessen the risk of fraud, tax evasion and distortion in competition. For Excise duties, there conditions were applied; an inter-linkage of the bonded warehouse system, upholding the destination principle and an approximation of the national excise duty rates and regimes" (Alli & El-Agraa, 1998, p. 305).

Generally, tax harmonization was slow and difficult before the SEA era because of the complications arising from national government, which ordinarily consider tax as a tool for controlling the economy. There has obviously been some good and incomparable success with integration in Europe vis-à-vis other integration arrangements in the world. The research will proceed to consider the salient elements of the European Union that makes it a model for other integration arrangement in the world.

5.4 The European Union as a Model

There are diversities of opinion as to whether the European Union and its agencies can be regarded as an ideal model for ECOWAS and NEPAD. This debate will transcend generation of scholars especially with the current challenges of economic recession confronting Europe. However, the fact speaks volumes to the point that the European Union has survived where many others failed and has a sustainable legacy of managing regional unity. This fact is buttressed with its high degree of decentralization, coupled with accountability checks among the various organs and agencies of the European Union. In the light of the Weberian model and structural functionalism as postulated by Marx Webber, David Easton and Joseph Nye, There is a clear role clarity to the extent that the agencies knows what lies in their domain of authority and where they should collaborate with each other.

Alli and El-Agraa (2008, p. 32) noted this level of inter-agency relationship between the European Council, The Committee and the Parliament. According to him, "the commission also attends council meetings and plays an active part in helping to reach a decision, although it has no voting rights. It is here however, that it can perform an important mediatory function between national viewpoints and its own which is intended to represent the general community interest". Being that the agencies themselves are large, there is the existence of sub-agencies within the agencies to ensure focus and grass root administration. For instance, the European council is supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) whose members are of ambassadorial rank drawn from national administration. Alli and El- Agraa (2008, p. 33) describes them as "pinnacle of a structure of specialist and subordinate committees, often including members of home departments... COREPER prepares council meetings and handles a great deal of work on behalf of the council of ministers....Many policy matters are in reality agreed by COREPER and reach the council of minister only in a formal sense". COREPER is further described as link to national bureaucracies who are in touch with the commission during the process of formulating an intended proposal. This is a means of tracking national matters and ensuring that the Union is not estranged and isolated from the nationalities in Europe. The support role of the COREPER to the Council is replicated in the Commission with the role of 'chef de cabinet' who supports its commissioner and makes much decision on behalf of their chief. There is also the commission staff which is further subdivided into directorates and all these assist to lubricate the functioning of the commission.

Magone (2011, p. 145) while commenting on this practice noted that "the supranational and national integration of levels is best exemplified by what we can call 'transnational level' in which officials from both national and supranational institutions work together, prepare policy –making initiatives and are engaged in decision making processes. All these processes take place between the supranational and national levels. For example, the 300 working groups within the council of ministers, the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which take pre-decisions on behalf of the member states before they come to the Council of Minister. The over 300 working groups within the Council of Ministers that deliberate legislation initiatives proposed by the European Commission before a final decision is taken by the higher bodies". The issue of interface between the national and supranational institutions and the application of laws and decisions both vertically and horizontally is a uniqueness of the European Union that need to be called out for deeper understanding.

Magone (2011, p. 158) referred to this as the Europeanization of national politics and domestication of European politics. "Since 1985, there has been a growing integration between national and supranational politics. The ‘Europeanization’ is increasingly complemented by a ‘domestication’ of European politics in which national actors try to shape the future and ongoing policies of the European Union. He also cited the views of Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse who “characterized this as the ‘ uploading of preferences by national actors to the supranational level otherwise called domestication of European politics and the downloading of supranational policies to the national level otherwise referred to as the Europeanization of domestic politics”.

Magone (2011, p. 159) further presented the position of Radaelli (2003, p. 31) on both practice. In their view Europeanization of national politics includes “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs, norms that are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”. Individual member states or alliances of member states may formulate new ideas and policy proposals that are successful at the national level at a supranational level. The European Convention leading to the Treaty in 2003 internalized the public debate on the future of the European Union, taking into account constituencies at different levels of the governance system”. Magone therefore concluded the Europeanization is “a never-ending process and part of the systemic nature of European integration”. It is actually the process of Europeanization that ultimately leads to the convergence of national policies of Member states. This process is actually the pivot upon which a deeper integration is achieved as it entrenches a gradual replacement of individually customized laws to a more generic and generally acceptable module of behaviors.

It should however be noted that the issue of ’acceptable behaviour’ is not easy to achieve among member states. In this regard Magone (2011, p. 158) has actually noted that “Europeanization processes are complex and can be characterized by parallel, but different, time frames because changes in attitude may take a long time” for instance, the Labour government found it difficult when it sought to change the attitudes of the British people regarding the economic and monetary Union (EMU) and the adoption of the Euro. The same example applied to Sweden, where almost 60 percent of the population rejected the Euro in a referendum in 2004. However, the reasons for rejection were quite different. In the case of the United Kingdom it was the fear of losing sovereignty which is strongly connected to economic and monetary issues but in the case of Sweden, it was for a reason unconnected to monetary issue.

Beyond role clarity, the EU has clearly enshrined the ‘controls’ to ensure compliance and accountability in their treaties. This is very important and in fact is responsible for the ever-growing influence of the union. Article 104 (c) 11) fully suggests that the EU treaty has given to the Council of Ministers power to fine member states or to impose other sanctions with regards to Government deficits. EL Agraa (1998, p. 33) noted, “These measures suggest that it is gaining in power vis-à-vis member states. In this regard, the Commission is empowered to investigate any suspected breach of obligation and issue a reasoned opinion. If the matter is not corrected, the commission will take the matter to the court of justice, which ultimately will impose fines on the offenders. The commission has the power to fine firms, which breach certain operational rules. The European Court of Justice is obviously the strongest watchdog of the European Union because, in the course of hearing cases brought by individual and firms or even government against any breach of treaty, it ensures that no entity operates beyond its power. In matters of, Accountability, the role of the Court of Auditors cannot be overemphasized. They were set up to address the issue of fraudulent use of the community’s fund. It puts together an audited report of the operations carried out in member states and declares whether they are effective or not.

Regarding the EU competition policy, it has been adjudged one of the most successful in the world. McGowan (1998, p. 184) has noted, “The EU competition policy constitutes the first example of an effective international competition policy”. He further noted that “its success contrasts with the failure of other multilateral attempts to develop such a regime, starting with the United States led efforts in the abortive international trade organization, and continuing through the ECOSOC, WTO and UNCTAD over the next two decades. Some modest agreements have been reached for example, the UNCTAD model rules and various declarations in the OECD but this fall short of a regime equivalent to the EU rules in their coverage and enforcement procedures”. He noted that despite these, “the EU greatest contribution may rest on its vanguard role in reviving the multilateral debate. In the wake of the last GATT Round, the question of the relationship between trade and competition policy has been reopened”.

The EU’s Common Agricultural and air transportation model has recorded a lot of success. For instance, it has facilitated intra-EU free trade on agricultural products through the removal of most intra-EU trade impediments. Additionally, Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 220) noted that "the EU as a whole has become more or less self-sufficient in farm products going to the final consumer (in 1993-1994 the EU of fifteen members had self-sufficiency rates of 12%, 13% and 105% in, respectively cereal, sugar and wine, while the EC of 12 had rates between 101% and 211% except for wine and sheep meat and goat meat, with respectively 97% and 87%... the CAP has resulted in stability in EU agricultural markets and in increasing self-supply… finally, it could be claimed that CAP has achieved much progress in increasing the size of farm holdings and in reducing the number of farm business". Regarding the benefits of the Europeanization of the Air transport, McGowan (1998, pp. 263-264) noted, "At the time of the gulf war, the commission approved a number of emergency measures to allow airlines to cooperate in limiting services. The Commission has also been active in developing codes of conduct for opening up access to slot allocation procedures, introducing proposals for regulating the cartel market and proposing that it take on the role of negotiating agreements on air transport with non-EU states.

One other area where the impact of the European Union cannot be denied is the area of international monetary regime. According to Mayes (1998, p. 345) "There is little dispute that the EMS has so far been something of a success". The EU has clearly influenced the global economic monetary policies by its introduction of a single currency, which has become a denominator of other currencies in the world. Madeleine Holsti (1998, p. 165) attested to this fact when she noted that "one of the potentially significant developments in the evolution of the EU's international role is Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the creation of a common currency and common monetary policy will clearly affect patterns of global currency investment and character of exchange rate management". The European Monetary System (EMS) with its two components notably the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and The European Currency Unit (ECU) has reshaped the global economy. This position will always be a matter of contest among scholars of diverse disciplines. Holsti however remains its great protagonist even on its impact on international trade. She did an analysis to buttress the fact that the ECU has increased international trade among members in the direction of trade creation other than trade diversion (1998, p. 179). In her analysis, she compared intra-EU and extra-EU trade in 1960, 1975 and 1990. Citing the Eurostat, she submitted that intra-EU trade grew from 38% through 49% and reached 59% in 1990 while extra-EU trade declined from 62% through 50% and became 41% in 1990.

The strength of the Euro globally is an indication of the success of the EMS. Today, the Euro remains the strongest currency in the world and has become a determinant of what happens to other local currencies in both Europe and other parts of the world. In relation to the strength of the Euro, Lelart (1999, p. 140) had noted that "when the EU member states decided to stabilize their currencies, the franc zone was indirectly affected since the creation of the EMS included the French Franc to which the CFA franc was pegged. Here is an indication that the European Monetary policy indirectly affects whatever monetary policy that exists in West Africa".

Before we close this discussion on what lessons ECOWAS, NEPAD and indeed Africa can learn from the EU, it will be important to stress that the European Union has always been at the forefront of granting developmental support to Africa. The EU is a long-standing advocate of regional integration in Africa and an important source of financing for regional schemes. The Commission of European Communities (CEC), which has been instrumental in stimulating new ways of thinking and debate and has sponsored numerous studies and policy statements, working in conjunction with other donors through the GCA, has provided intellectual leadership the CEC has recently drawn up an action plan to promote regional cooperation and integration in sub-Sahara Africa. As stated earlier in the chapter, the EU remains the highest donor across the globe. Africa has been a beneficiary of much of this. It is on record that regarding research and training, the EU is contributing to a collaborative research programme of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) based in Nairobi. This usually involves several researchers from different parts of Africa as well as a few European Research institutes (Kennes 1999, p. 37). This medium might well be a place for exchange of ideas to make ECOWAS better. In addition, some pilot training workshops have been organised involving the European Institute of public Administration, (EIPA), the European Centre for Development and policy management (ECDPM) and the University of Aix en Provence. This involves around twenty-five participants from national and regional administrations. The programme is focused on elements of the European experience, not at all with a view to proposing a similar approach in Africa, but to enhance practical understanding and to study how problems were overcomed (Kennes 1999, p. 37).

5.5 The Challenges of the European Union

In the beginning of this chapter, we have mentioned the fact that, the European Union is having difficult times, even as it is seen as a model of regional integration in the world. The

European Union seems to be more successful in economic aspects of integration than other aspects of integration. Berglund et al (2006, p. 113) has stated that “the member states of the EU has successfully managed to stick together when it comes to economic issues (i.e. trade), perhaps even showing solidarity on environmental issues and aid, but ‘high politics’ remains a difficult issue”. One of these areas is the issue of foreign policy and security, which obviously affects regional economic integration. Articles 4 and 5 of the Union’s draft constitution states thus, “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security and sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respects for the principles of the United Nations Charter (Berglund et al 2006, 114)

The outbreak of the war in former Yugoslavia which Europe could not stop until the intervention of the Americans, the Balkans war, the Iraq war are all evidences that Europe does not pose a common front in some matters of foreign policy. In a research conducted by Berguland et al (2006, 114) which centered around measuring and evaluating public opinion and support for common European Policy, it was revealed that the United Kingdom is the most skeptical country with about 39 per cent explicitly against the notion of a common foreign policy for EU members. The second factor that has affected the project of European integration like other integration arrangements elsewhere is the issue of nationalism or what Berguland etal (2006, 139) regarded as ‘Euroscepticism’. Usually integration is seen as contingent upon the gradual erosion of national power of member nation. Berguland etal has noted, “The successful unfolding of the European project of integration is in fact contingent upon the gradual erosion of national constraints on European political elites as the people they represent. Brussels and Strasbourg are faraway places for many Europeans, who are therefore reluctant to transfer more powers to the union. There are many examples to substantiate this fact; for instance in 1972 and 1994, Norwegian voters has advised against EU membership; Swiss voters have even rejected the notion of a loose affiliation with the EU within the framework of the European Economic Space (EES). At some points too, the EU, the UK, Denmark and Sweden have established themselves as outspoken EU-skeptics. This polarization is visible with the position taken by the original 15 EU members on the eve of the EU enlargement to introduce temporary restrictions on the free movement of labour from the new member countries in Central and Eastern European countries.

As enlargement day moved closer, more and more EU countries including those originally committed to an open-door policy vis-à-vis the enlargement countries, opted for transitional arrangements designed to restrict free movement of labour to the original 15 EU members in Western Europe from the eight East European Countries, Berguland etal (2006, p. 139). The point worth stating here is to further buttress the earlier faction discussed that the European Union itself is internally polarized and this affects integration. For instance, free movement of persons is essentially a strong element of integration as people are expected to move freely across the region. Many political leaders spoke out against on the ground of nationalism. For instance, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder branded suggestions by German industrial leaders to move industrial facilities eastwards as unpatriotic. This implies that even though political elites are generally favourable to the tenets of integration, they still do so with so much skepticism and nationalism. This is in line with Joseph Nye position that "integration proceeds as a result of the work of relevant elites in governmental and private sectors, who support integration for essentially pragmatic reasons, such as the expectation that removal of trade barriers will increase markets and profits. Elites anticipating that they will gain from activity within a supranational organizational framework are likely to seek out similar minded elites across national frontiers" Berguland etal (2006, p. 423).

This factor is obviously a recurring decimal in the literature of regional integration in the world. In Chapter 3, the issue of nationalism and sovereignty had been discussed as an impediment to regional integration in West Africa. Just like their European counterparts, West African Statesmen are careful not to cede too much power to the supranational institution. Unfortunately, much of this happens for the benefit of the 'Patron' and his 'clients' and not necessarily for national interest or nationalism, as is the case in Europe. The neo-functionalists have actually tied this behaviour to nationalism and the excessive patriotism of the elites. More recently, the EU has experienced one of the worst crises in over three decade of its existence. This is basically around the ratification of the EU draft constitution. Here again Nationalism and Euro-scepticism erupted with destructive wave. British Prime Minister had called for a referendum over the draft European constitution in May 29th and June 1st 2005. The referendum came up against the draft and the animosity was simply overwhelming. Berglund et al (2006, p. 195) has noted "a year ago, in the summer of 2004, few analysts would have expected the French and Dutch voters to reject the draft constitution in the referendums held on 29 May and 1 June 2005, respectively. The possibility of failure was there from the beginning, but vetoes' spoken by the UK, Denmark and Sweden somehow hurt less than rejection by core countries like France and the Netherlands, two of the original core signatories of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and active promoters of European integration. Berglund et al (2006, p. 195) further lamented that "there is even a standard operating procedure revolving around catchwords like consultations, negotiations, and exemption clauses, for how to cope with member countries reluctant to implement certain EU policies all the way through. Britain, Denmark and Sweden have thus gained acceptance for not joining the monetary union, the two former through formal negotiations and the latter informally, by tacit agreement".

While the competition policy especially those on articles 85 and 86 has been quite instrumental in shaping the business operating environment, there has been some difficulties around the question of market definition. According to McGowan (1998, p. 177) " the question of market definition has proved problematic because, while a firm may have a large market share inside the EU, this may not be a reflection of the scale of operation which is necessary to compete internationally". He further noted that there has been a long-running debate within the community and the commission on the size of European firms, particularly on the problem of ensuring that both competition within the EC and international competitiveness. There may also be problems in identifying the nature of the market, especially as regards the availability of substitutes. The related task of determining dominance can embrace not only market share but also other factors such as degree of vertical integration or the structure of the market," (McGowan 1998, p. 177)

Though the CAP has been successful in uniting agricultural policies of these several countries, it has mostly failed in the structural aspects of encouraging farmers to seek alternative occupation (even though the drift from land to industry is a natural process), that is the reason why the objective was finally abandoned. Moreover, the CAP has been the cause of embarrassing surpluses (Alli and El-Agraa, 1998, p. 220). He further added that the CAP has had the effect of making the prosperous farmers richer, but not helped the poorer farmers as it retained them in the industry through high intervention price levels. The CAP has failed to achieve reasonable and stable prices for the consumer". Generally, the CAP has failed to adopt the most efficient method of implementing its own objectives. Alli and El-Agraa (1998, p. 232) noted that "it clearly demonstrated that direct subsidies and deficiency payments are in that order, economically superior to the variable levy system".

Further, the transport policy of the EU has not gone unopposed especially internally. For instance, some member states and national railways opposed the Rail transport reorganization. Mc Gowan (1998 , p. 257) noted that “their arguments have been similar to the attitudes of other public utilities, in so far as they have seen European rail policy as working against the various social and regional policy objectives”. The reforms in Air transportation could be said to have a devastating effect on the private airline operators. In the words of McGowan (1998, p. 263) “a number of private and independent operators have disappeared, either bankrupted or taken over by flag carrier. The development casts doubts over the overall impact of liberalization, unless of course the rewards of competition and the strength of the commission are sufficient to encourage the major airlines to start competing more vigorously against each other.”

Finally, the structure of the European Union itself is a challenge. This is seen in reference to the European Commission, which is the main administrative organ of the European Union. The body of commissioners is too large for the job of the commission. According to Magone (2011, p. 143) “after successive enlargements, there are now too many commissioners for the amount of work in the European Commission, so following 2014, it will be reduced to fifteen members. The selection of the fifteen members is be based on a rotation system in order to allow a balanced representation of smaller and larger countries... Once confirmed commissioners should represent the interests of the European Union and cease to be national representatives”.

5.6 Conclusion

There is no doubt that the European Union has suffered severe setbacks in recent times, but there are abounding evidence to the fact that it is worthy of emulation. The suggestion is not for ECOWAS to copy the European Union model in its entirety, but to review most of her activities by adapting best practices as exemplified in the working of the European Union. The European Union has formalized structures with checks and balances amongst its various organs. It has been able to reach out to the grassroots and managed the multiplicity of nationalistic ambitions through power sharing and openness. Most importantly, the critical role of the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which takes pre-decisions on behalf of the member states before they come to the Council of Ministers, is worth emulating. This body not only ensures grassroots participation but also reduces pressure on Council time, thereby lubricating the processes which otherwise would have remained complex. This will be very useful to NEPAD, which has been severely accused of too much elitism and inability to engage the grassroots in its activities. The European Union has also displayed strong political will especially in dealing with issues of negative nationalism and ensuring that such ‘issue fields’ are handled in such a manner that orchestrates a popular majority.

ECOWAS and NEPAD have a great opportunity to leverage on the ongoing Strategic partnership between Africa and Europe. “The purpose of this Joint Strategy is to take the African EU relationship to a new, strategic level within a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels… the partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic development and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents… (Odock 2010, p. 364) So far, there have been very positive outcomes of this relationship as it pertains to ECOWAS. For instance, there are indications that “the ECOWAS-EU negotiations for a regional economic partnership agreement are becoming more fruitful. Though, at the end of June 2010 the two partners were yet to agree on the content of the EPA, funds have been made available for some regional projects such as customs harmonization, improvement of quality control and testing of export products and a few other preparatory activities prior to take off of the EPA”. This commitment to this relationship was further reiterated in the June 15, 2010 ECOWAS-EU political dialogue in Luxembourg. (Odock 2010, p. 387) It is expected that this relationship is should be cemented. Here lies a possible energizer and fuel for the economic growth of West African integration. Within the confines of this platform, notes could be exchanged, best practices shared, and such practices proudly copied for the advancement of African Integration.

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS OF DATA, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ON FINDINGS

The Challenges of Sub-Regional Economic Integration: The NEPAD-ECOWAS Experience

6.1 Introduction

This chapter reviewed the challenges of sub regional economic integration which have been isolated from the available literature studied in chapter 2 and chapter 3. The purpose is to undertake a granular study of the factors that adversely affected the development of an efficient integration and hence impeded the role of NEPAD as a facilitator of regional economic integration. It will compare current literature with historical literature in order to determine the validity of these challenges. It will also explain data in line with the neo functionalist perspective of Integration and check to see the alignment and nonalignment of NEPAD to this school of thought. The idea is that since NEPAD has been adjudged a failure, which is the rationale behind its current changes, then the challenges of NEPAD regarding regional integration is obviously the reason for its failure.

In the course of evaluating the challenges of sub regional economic integration, it is pertinent to discuss the relationship between politics and economy as a basis for understanding the spectrum of economic challenges which ultimately may exude political undertones. David Easton has described politics as "the process whereby societal values are authoritatively allocated"... to the extent that such a definition presupposes the organization of a society under effective authority able to take decisions on values and priorities by way of the budget process and able to enforce its laws by holding in the background, the threat of sanction. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 31) By implication, politics is authoritative allocation of economic resources for organizing a group of people in a certain area at a particular time. Paul Streeten (1964) further magnified the inextricability of this relationship. Paul Streeten (1964, p. 11) While studying the subject of European Integration noted that

> For a proper understanding of the origin of the movement towards European integration and the forces behind it, political and strategic motives are more important than strictly economic ones. The distinction between economic and non-economic considerations is superficial. It is obvious that economic strength is a condition for political and strategic power, that rates of economic growth have acquired international prestige and that more generally; little can be said of economic changes unless political vale premises are introduced. On the other hand, each non-economic objective clearly has its economic aspects,

> even if political unity were to involve a material sacrifice, it will be foolish not to attempt to minimize the sacrifice

NEPAD is a political and economic instrument, driven by both political and economic objectives. These aspects overlap, even as political heads of countries take government's major decisions i.e. it will suffice to say that political decisions in the sub region affect economic developments and projects. Consequently, this is consistent with interactions and interjections between political and economic needs as we progress to examine the challenges of sub regional economic integration under the ECOWAS platform.

6.2 ECOWAS, NEPAD and the Challenges of Sub-Regional Economic Integration

Integration ensures the free movement of people, goods and services from one country or unit to the other and until this is achieved, real integration cannot be said to have taken place. The issue of free movement of people, goods and services is the pivot upon which every other thing revolves in bringing about an effective regional integration. This is so, because a borderless region will help cooperation among the units, which will accelerate growth in trade and even movement of labour and other capacity-building agents, which is necessary to support integration.This need is paramount in West Africa for so many reasons. First, West Africa needs a lubricated border movement because "West African citizens are among the world's most mobile population. Population census indicates that the region's countries now harbour approximately 7.5 million migrants from other West African countries" which is almost three per cent of the regional population" (The Guardian, 19 March 2009, p. 13). Unfortunately, integration process in West Africa has experienced bottlenecks resulting from its non-lubricated boarders. The fact is that, too many existing legislations by ECOWAS, the problem of free movement of goods and services has remained largely intractable.

ECOWAS, even with NEPADs support has been struggling with maintaining the major highways that cuts across the region. ECOWAS targets to "interconnect existing road networks and build new ones to fast track the process of free movement of goods and services. Its 4,560 kilometre long trans-coastal highway is to link Lagos, Nigeria with Nouakchott in Mauritania. Also, the ECOWAS Trans-Sahelian Highway spanning 4,460 kilometres links Dakar in Senegal with N'Djamena in Chad Republic. ECOWAS has been struggling with these projects 35 years after its inception (The Punch, 26 February 2010, p. 21). Worse still, the existing traditional routes have not actually helped trade or free movement due to certain man-made blockades. For instance, the age long and old coastal road from Lagos to Abidjan and on to Nouakchott commonly called“the ECOWAS route” which is now referred to as ECOWAS trans-coastal Highway because of its intense usage has become object of complain because of “unfriendly border officials and contradicting national policies... issues of customs and border crossing formalities, extortion, robbery, chaotic traffic, is yet to be tackled. Travelers especially business men, complain of harassment, extortion, unnecessary delays at seemingly uncountable checkpoints and many anti integration tactics by border officials of different countries” (The Punch, 26 February 2010, p. 21.)

The factor of harassment and extortion at border posts is seemingly intractable and fueled by sheer greed of certain government officials especially among the customs and immigration officials. Asante, S.K.B in an article titled ECOWAS at 28: Between Standstill and Progress noted, “The abolition of visas has not spared citizens of the community administrative harassment and extortion at border posts. In many ways, regionalism and the quest for integration in West Africa has become a mirage (The Punch, 26 February 2010, p. 21). The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat Abuja supported the above view noting that “it is true that citizens can now enter any country of their choice without visas, but travelers especially across land-borders, pass through ‘hell’ before crossing the borders. They lose lots of time in transit because of cumbersome procedures, harassments at entry points, extortions, request to produce unnecessary documents and demands to pay series of unauthorized levies. Travelers are subjected to multiple checkpoints or toll gates as they are derisively called”.

However, it has to be mentioned here that in order to ameliorate the problems regarding the bottlenecks on the highways, ECOWAS with the partnership of the European Union has started making plans for a “joint border post project” which is expected to cost about #64m pounds. One of the posts will be at the Niger/Benin border and this will be replicated at the Benin/Togo border, Togo/Ghana border and Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire border. Nigerian envoy to the Republic of Benin, Mr. Lawrence Akindele said that when concluded, “It could have fulfilled the dream of West African leaders in the transformation of ECOWAS from ‘ECOWAS of States’ to ‘ECOWAS of people’ by the year 2020 (The Punch, 26 February 2010, p. 21). The plan is that by the first quarter of 2013, ECOWAS would have taken over the sites and then the benefits of free movement will follow. How far this will go or whether the project will even be concluded is a matter for future scholars of the discipline. At the time of concluding this research, the problem of free movement of people across the borders in

West Africa is still as gargantuan as ever.The fact remains; that what we still have now is the ECOWAS of states not the ECOWAS of people. This fact is quite insightful since there has been so much allusion by leaders in the sub-region that the abolition of visas is a great achievement. This research uncovers the fact that the removal of visas has not in any way reduced the complexity of accessibility into neighboring countries. The ECOWAS borders are not free at all, the research commends the creation of the Free Movement Pilot Monitoring Team (FMPMT) expected to check illegal activities and abuses along Seme border and other designated entry points into the country. This is a concept that will help lubricate the borders for growth in trade.

The reports of intra-regional trade in West Africa and Africa as a whole are not very encouraging. The challenges with trade are two pronged. First, the research shows that there are poor records of the volume of trade transaction in the region, to the extent that most of the unofficial trade is not on record. Unfortunately, the volume of trade in West Africa seems to tilt more towards unofficial than official trade. For instance, while the volume of official intra-African trade stands at only 6% of estimated total trade in the region (World bank 1989, p. 158), unofficial intra- African trade in the 1980's is estimated to have comprised as much as 30-50% of export crop production in a range of African countries, as well as millions of dollars annually in food crops, minerals and consumer goods… in addition to moving a substantial volume of goods, this unofficial trade is conducted with much greater efficiency, speed and responsiveness than official trade despite the obstacles attributable to its illegal status" (Meagher 1997, p. 165). This report has not changed in 2010. As cited in Chapter 3, Sanusi (2010, p. 7) has noted that "Ghana and other West African countries are not yet ripe for common currency like Europe, just because only 10 per cent of trade transaction happen among the region". Sanusi (2010, p.7) asked. "What is the trade between Nigeria and Gambia, between Nigeria and Ghana and between Nigeria and Burkina Faso? What is the purpose of the currency when we have not yet built trade flow? We don't have free movement of goods and capital...before imitating the Euro, it should be noted that 60 per cent of the trade in Europe is within the European Union...almost 50 per cent of the total trade of the Southeast Asia is among countries of Asian nations." The reasons for the growth of informal trade over formal trade are multifaceted, but majorly driven by distinctive government policies regarding such commodities. For instance, the informal trade between Nigeria/Niger and Nigeria/Benin Republic is high because of the subsidies that the Nigerian government placed on certain commodities like petroleum products, agricultural inputs like fertilizer that have more than 200% subsidy (Balami 2011, p. 92). It will be unscholarly, to say that informal trade is antithetical to development and integration in its entirety. Scholars like Balami (2011, p. 92) has argued that cross border trade acts as a vehicle and means for the dissemination of technological expertise, important managerial talent and the transmission of ideas and entrepreneurship. He further argued that the trade helps to promote free competition and acts as a vehicle for the international movement of capital from the franc zone to Nigeria and vice versa, regardless of whether the capital is produced in the sub-region or not. In this regard, agricultural inputs, generators and spare parts imported by Nigeria find their way through informal trade to the neighboring countries of Benin, Chad and Cameroun. Again, it provides the needed foreign exchange, which the central bank of Nigeria cannot provide (Balami, 2011, p. 93). Despite these flourishing arguments in favour of informal trade, the negative effects on ECOWAS and NEPAD is obvious. This is because informal trade ultimately affects the revenues of governments in the region and hence affects their commitment to NEPAD. Governments do not benefit from informal trade because trade volumes and shipments are not declared and therefore not taxed. For instance, Niger is the only WAMU country, which receives the least tax revenue from imports, and where the ratio has fallen most (4.6% in 1982 to 2.8% in 1990). Budget revenue from petroleum products was nearly 12 billion CFA in the mid-1980s and was less than 5 billion CFA in 1990 (Balami, 2011, p. 95). There are also other problems associated with poor planning due to varied income estimation and de-industrialization. In it all, the volume of official trade remains small.

Since the volume of trade is small, then NEPAD and ECOWAS need to do more in their quest to enhance regional integration in West Africa. Scholars like Sanusi believe that the volume of trade is directly linked to the level of integration. So far, trade has not progressed to the level of NEPAD's and ECOWAS expectations. The same could be said of the target of market access for the products from the sub region. This is concomitant with the proposition of Joseph Nye that one of the indices for knowing an effective integration arrangement is '*the phenomenon of Rising transactions'*. Rising transaction among the integrating units is a sign of closer relationship, which automatically encourages fraternity in other areas. For instance, 'Rising Transactions' will encourage the units to advance monetary integrations to facilitate the transaction, make combine agricultural policies to keep the steam going, ensure enhance road networks and telecommunication. All this will combine to accelerate the 'Rising

Transaction'. Unfortunately, the report shows that West Africa trade volumes have been on the decline and the phenomena of rising transactions remains a mirage.

The failure of trade or rather, its decline is further orchestrated by poor policy environment, obsolete infrastructure and lack of Manpower development which have been identified as being responsible for the failure of Free Trade Policies of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At a yearly 3 day summit with the theme "promoting Trade and Investment" ECOWAS Commissioner for Trade, Customs, Industry and Mines, Free Movement of persons, Goods and Tourism, Mohammed Daramy, said that "intra-regional trade barriers and poor policy dialogue between the government and the private sector still characterized trade among the ECOWAS Member states… business in the region is bedeviled with poor co-operation and co-ordination between tax and customs administrations as well as disadvantageous tax and tariff systems… transport and storage systems at the sea and airports are lacking, while unstable power and Water Supply persist". He calls for the strengthening of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme through effective fiscal compensation and the relaxation of rules to boost trade (The Guardian, 10 October 2008, p. 18).

The ECOWAS Common External Tariff has been impeded by so much frustrations and challenges. According to Ibn Chambas (2007, p. 3) a onetime Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) "the commission, which was locally set up on May 25, 1975 is set to have a common tariff by January 2008 but is facing the problem on how individual countries would benefit from the trade liberalization". He added that "the region is well advance on the path of market integration. It became a free trade area in January 2000…the challenge is how to enable each country and the ordinary community's citizen to derive maximum benefit from trade liberalization".

Regarding the achievement of monetary integration, which is seen as a pre-requisite for effective regional and sub-regional integration, the situation report and challenges are not any different with those facing trade. Though it is possible to claim that with the success of the CFA zone of francophone Africa, the sub region has been successful to an extent, but the fact remains that this success is partial, as it does not benefit the whole region. This research is of the opinion that the much-touted success of the CFA Franc Zone should not be over-emphasized because, it tends towards dis-integration, than integration. As it is today, the ECO, which is the proposed unified currency for the two West African zones, is still unborn. Therefore, the fact remains that, the success of the UMOA without the ECOWAS is in itself detrimental as it pitches each zone against the other, thereby rekindling the age long rivalry orchestrated by colonial heritage and language differences. This fact is validated by Ojo (1999, p. 123) that “monetary Union has equally been unable to progress significantly. Like the ex-CEAO with respect to trade liberalisation, the West African Monetary Union (UMOA), based on long standing pre-independence francophone monetary union, with a central bank, a common currency, and harmonised credit policies, is pitched against ECOWAS on the latter’s monetary co-operation programme”. The challenge of inconvertibility of the currencies of the sub-region was heightened by this divide, when Francophone West African states expanded their existing monetary integration arrangement into an Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), which superseded both CEAO and UMOA in January 1994.

This situation not only combined to nullify the quest for a single monetary union but also led to consistent and long-term postponement of the take-off of the Monetary Union. The postponement has moved from take-off dates in 2000, 2003, through 2005, then 2009 and currently to 2015. Worse still, available data in terms of fulfillment of convergence criteria has shown that 2015 may not actually be feasible. Ideally, all WAMZ member countries should attain the OCA through qualifying in the 5 pillars, but as shown in this research (Chapter 3), the result has been disappointing. The summary for 2010 as presented in the Nigerian Tribune of 8th February 2011 is that” while Ghana and Gambia met three of the primary criteria, Guinea experienced its worst performance since December 2005 by not meeting any criterion... Liberia met all the four primary criteria to maintain its December 2009 performance while Nigeria sustained its performance on the convergence scale by attaining three criteria by the end of June 2010. Serra-Leone maintained its end-December 2009 performance of compliance with one criterion.” (Guardian 11 February 2011, p. 4)

Nigeria’s serving Central Bank Governor Sanusi Lamido blamed the global economic crisis and gave a hint of hope for the sub region. As noted in Chapter three, Sanusi (2011) has stated that “Consequently, the economic performance in WAMZ is strong with real GDP growth expected to average 7.2 percent for 2010. Inflationary pressures generally eased due to stability in commodity prices and improvement in domestic food production, although fiscal sector performance worsened mainly as a result of shortfall in member countries’ revenues. Gross external reserves generally declined and local currencies depreciated against the U.S. dollar…the resultant effect are that overall compliance with the macroeconomic convergence criteria deteriorated. Member states missed the criteria on single-digit inflation rate and fiscal deficit, excluding grants. Only Liberia met all four primary criteria, while The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria met three primary criteria each. Sierra Leone met one criterion during the period”.

The Former President of Nigeria, Musa Yar'Adua supported Sanusi (2011) that global economic and financial crisis was the reason for the delay in the take-off of monetary union in West Africa. As mentioned in Chapter 3 “the global economic and financial crisis had put constraints on member states ability to meet the convergence criteria individually and collectively”...the summit resolved that adequate preparation and time were necessary for the launching of the monetary union” (Sunday punch, 28 June 2009, p. 2).

Adetula (2009, p. 180) however noted that the problem with this, is that there is no consensus as to how member countries should be assessed. For example, must convergence be sustained and be assessed on a continuum, or at the point of transition to the formation of the monetary union? In other word, is ‘point of convergence’ a sufficient condition for the take-off of the WAMZ monetary union? Protagonists of this position are vindicated by the fact that, the convergence records has fluctuated over time. While some countries start to show positive results, other does not and when they do, the countries that where positive before them, would have started dwindling. This is why there is need for clarity as to whether convergence is a continuum or whether; it should be measured at the point of convergence.

The achievement of the primary convergence criteria on a sustained basis during the transition period by the member countries is preferred over a point of convergence, and analysts believe that there is no compelling reason to delay the take-off of the monetary union, once all the member countries have severally and collectively met the requirement at the stipulated transition point. This research agrees with the position of these scholars since achievement of the criteria’s at the point of convergence could be deceptive, misleading and unsustainable. It does not take into account, the need for laying a solid foundation and the dangers are rife that at any point where the point of convergence pillars wobble, the integration and single currency scheme follows suit.

Lessons of experience from other successful monetary unions such as the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the CFA Franc Zone have shown that the monetary union per se, represents a major external force that can compel member countries to commit to a sound macroeconomic policy on a sustained basis, even when short term benefits in policy choice dictates otherwise. One of such scholars is Adetula, who noted that another area of challenge is the inflation target (single digit) and fiscal target (≤ 4% of GDP), which have proved most problematic for member countries to achieve since the WAMZ project started in 2000. Still on the inflation criterion, The WAMZ protocol is silent as to which component of inflation member countries should target and monitor, for example, is it desirable and practicable to target: (a) headline inflation (b) food inflation or (c) core inflation? And for the purpose of comparability, should member countries settle for urban or rural inflation? Or should they focus on the composite. He is opposed to targeting headline inflation considering the fact that food command a lot of weight in the consumer price index of the WAMZ countries. Food production and its availability in the domestic markets of the WAMZ countries are largely driven by the vagaries of weather, rather than by monetary policy actions. Hence the rate of inflation will continue to overshoot the single digit benchmark as long as food demand continues to exceed supply. On this basis, he submitted that, core inflation, which can be influenced by monetary policy, should be targeted. Again, the convergence has its own challenges. First, the multiple currencies in the ECOWAS are inconsistent with the common currency objective and the common economic space envisaged under the EMCP. Second fiscal pressures, external debts burden and lack of institutional capacity are factors, which contributed to the failure to achieve the primary quantitative convergence criteria, by the WAMZ member of the countries.

There is also the issue of nationalism, where regional ambitions clashes with national ambitions. For instance, it will be necessary to mention that there are some member states of WAMZ, who do not accede to pursuing WAMZ against all odds, for instance where the convergence criteria's ambitions clash with their national ambitions. The Case of Nigeria, which is the largest member of the union, is worth discussing. Whereas, Nigeria is at the forefront of the crusade for the actualisation of these criteria, it has overtime restated that such commitments will be pursued and predicated by certain internal economic indices. For instance: during the meeting of the West African Monetary Zone Committee in Abuja on the 11th of February, 2011. the Central Bank of Nigerian (CBN) Governor, Mr. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who incidentally assumed the chairmanship of the West African Monetary Zone Committee (WAMZ) same day noted that “Though Nigeria is determined to implement the policy on monetary union in the six West African countries through the adoption of a common currency, the Eco in 2015, she will not do this to the detriment of the country's growth by pushing inflation to a single digit without economic fundamentals" (Guardian, 11 February 2011) The committee was meeting in Abuja to consider the report of the technical panel of the WAMZ, to review the compliance status of the converging six West African countries. (Guardian 11 February 2011) Sanusi (2011) further stated, "Nigeria's inflation rate is 11 per cent but we are targeting single digit. It is not a source for alarm to us, but CBN is moderating it. CBN will not pursue single digit inflation at the risk of growth" (Guardian, 11 February 2011) It should be noted that, Nigeria has provided strong leadership at WAMZ, Nigerian economy has strong impact on the WAMZ. Nigeria, as at 2010 has met three of the four convergence criteria and missed inflation criterion, which the WAMZ has fixed at single digit. He further declared that measures have been employed to drive down the figure to a single digit through empirical methodology, just as he said Nigeria was well on course to meet convergence criteria with the economy recovering from crisis, size and structure of government spending being addressed and the pace of structural reform in power and agricultural sectors encouraging" (Guardian, 11 February 2011.p. 4).

It should be restated here that, the commencement of the union initially set for 2003 was extended three times, owing to the inability of member countries to attain the convergence level required for the introduction of the common currency. The Heads of State and Government of the WAMZ had at its summit in Abuja on June 22, 2009 agreed to a new commencement date for the monetary union on or before January 1, 2015.Sanusi (2011) further gave an insight to the challenges of meeting the convergence criteria and the status of the WAMZ. According to him, the inability of the converging countries to meet the criteria is tied to the global financial crises. He said that "the global economic recovery, which began mostly on account of impressive growth in emerging Asian economies, notably China, was stalled in the wake of the Euro zone debt crisis and the waning impact of the huge monetary and fiscal stimulus packages implemented by many countries. The global economy grew by 5.0 per cent in 2010 although at uneven pace. Recovery in many advanced economies was sluggish, but strong in emerging and developing economies. Commodity prices were relatively stable in the international market during the period, while global trade improved slightly, indicating resumed demand for exports from developing countries."

This situation produced a mixed-bag result for WAMZ, as it affected positively on the economic performance of WAMZ countries, which benefited from this resumed demand for exports through the reduction on inflation but with a challenge to the fiscal sector resulting from the depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Sanusi (2011) captures this scenario thus

> Consequently, the economic performance in WAMZ is strong with real GDP growth expected to average 7.2 per cent for 2010. Inflationary pressures generally eased due to stability in commodity prices and improvement in domestic food production, although fiscal sector performance worsened mainly as a result of shortfall in member countries' revenues. Gross external reserves generally declined and local currencies depreciated against the U.S. dollar…, the resultant effect is that overall compliance with the macroeconomic convergence criteria deteriorated. Member states missed the criteria on single-digit inflation rate and fiscal deficit, excluding grants. Only Liberia met all four primary criteria, while The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria met three primary criteria each. Sierra Leone met one criterion during the period.

On this basis Sanusi (2011) concluded that "The WAMZ project, therefore, recorded some progress through the on-going upgrading of the payments systems, the accession of Liberia to the zone and progress in the integration of financial markets. There are still some challenges to be resolved with public finances, trade and financial sector development to be ready to launch the single currency and tap from the fruits of the union. It is critical to improve and sustain performance on the convergence scale through further strengthening of fiscal performance."

Further, there have also been indications that African leaders have paid lip service to the issue of monetary integration. At the 20th Convergence Council Meeting of Ministers and Governors of WAMZ in 2007, Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria noted that "the dreams of integration has largely remained an illusion more than 30 years after it was established. Going down memory lane, I cannot hide my disappointment on the limited achievements made by ECOWAS on the economic front... the Europeans are celebrating the golden jubilee anniversary of the economic union as I speak to you today. In addition, a common currency, the Euro has become the legal tender in several member states stretching from Atlantic Ocean of the Adriatic Sea... indeed economic history has confirmed that Europe has never enjoyed a period of greater peace and economic prosperity than during the 50 years... perhaps, the case of ECOWAS is peculiar. This surely is compounded by insincerity (Sunday Punch, 28 June 2009, p. 26). Obasanjo's despair is an indication of hopelessness for the region for many reasons. First, as a onetime Chairman of ECOWAS, he lacked power to ensure monetary integration. Second, as the President of the most influential state actor of the region (Nigeria), He could not even influence a fast tracking and acceleration of the Monetary Union. As noted earlier, the fact that, these African elite do not believe in the benefits of monetary integration is considerable.

Additionally, it is necessary to point out here, that the establishment of a West African Monetary Agency (as noted in Chapter 3) with the sole aim of facilitating the use of national currencies in intra-regional trade and to promote savings in the use of member states foreign exchange reserves and promote trade liberalization has failed to achieve this aim. Ojo (2005, p. 10) has taken this position, stating, “Even where intra-regional trade transactions passes through the Agency, settlement of transactions in hard currencies rather than clearing of net balances dominates. The share of the amount that was cleared out of the total transactions passing through the Agency remained very low, between 2.83% and 38.95% during 1976-1998. Settlement generally required the use of foreign exchange; hence the Agency was not effective in promoting the use of national currencies as well as saving foreign exchange of member states”. The fact remains as evidenced by available data that the road is still far regarding the take-off of a monetary Union in West Africa. Attaining an Optimum Currency Area is still difficult and West African countries are trailing behind in achieving the convergence criteria pillars. The ECO will have to wait a while or remain stillborn. The inevitability of a single currency zone in the bid to regional integration cannot be overemphasized. The benefits and value it brings to the subscribing members is also not questionable. As seen in Chapter 5, monetary integration remains the life-wire of European integration and hence must be achieved as an indication of deeper integration. This is not so in West Africa, because, its achievement has remained elusive.

Apart from the economic aspect, there are spectrums of political challenges, which adversely affect regional economic integration in West Africa. First, there is absence of constitutionalism and democracy among member states, which further engenders a weak state system that all combine to dysfunctionalise sub regional integration in Africa. The constitutionality issue is not to say that there are no constitutions but rather, these constitutions are not duly followed and hence leaders are bound to become unconstitutional. This creates the leadership problem. Adewoye (1997, p. 321) argued that constitutionalism, or the rule of law, is basic to regional integration. According to him, “the fact that this condition is satisfied in the European case is considered to be one of the important reasons for the success of the European Union”. He further justified the linkage between Integration and constitutionalism arguing that the “Constitutionalist state, accustomed to separation of powers, more easily accepts the transfer of sovereignty to regional institutions (Adewoye 1997, p. 321).Constitutionalism also ensures the political and social stability necessary to the pursuit of long term projects, such as regional integration. The rule of law facilitates human interaction among individuals or groups of different nationalities, thanks for the basic freedoms provided and the effective enforcement of contracts. Comparing Europe with Africa and West Africa, Adewoye (1997, p. 321) submitted that lack of constitutionalism is the major impediment to her Integration. According to him "West African states have barely begun instituting constitutionalism as a mode of governance, and it is therefore not surprising that their efforts at economic integration have met with little success." An evaluation of this position is that Africa's deficient constitutionalism has undermined the process of Integration, whereas the habit of constitutionalism and shared power (sovereignty) has facilitated the transition to supranational forms of authority in Europe. Manifestations of Africa's deficient constitutionalism includes, the concentration of power in the hands of personal rules, which has made the sharing of power difficult: a political system devoid of defined mechanisms and structures of representation or participation and as such lacks consistency, commitment and long term legitimacy which regional integration demands: Supports and growth of private sector which is an engine for integration among others.

Closely related to this is the fact that NEPADs module of integration would function better under a democratic political setting, consequently implementing it effectively may become antithetical to majority of the states who are either partially democratic while professing democracy or not democratic at all. In this direction, Taylor (2005, p. 154) noted, "Enforcing basic democratic rights in Africa will mean reviewing and replacing practically every government in Africa. With less than five exceptions, Africa's governments are dictatorships, whether this fact is proclaimed openly and proudly or quietly enforced through the manipulating elections and jailing opponents" His position is that it would be difficult if not impossible for such political elites to commit class suicide just for the sake of furtherance of NEPAD's regional integration agenda. Taylor further cited President Thabo Mbeki, who was a strong supporter of NEPAD when he stated that "African political leaders cannot be trusted to promote and entrench democracy and human rights" defenders of this position are usually quick to say that democracy and accountability are western imports which does not reflect or accommodate the cultural specificity of Africa" Taylor (2005, p. 154).

This position is supported when one considers South Africa's support for Zimbabwe to the detriment of the NEPAD project. As Hamill, (2002, p. 18) pointed out "African states have to appreciate that they cannot unilaterally rewrite the NEPAD contract and attempt to detach its economic benefits from the accompanying political obligations 'cherry picking' as it were, those aspect of the projects that they find most appealing, while disregarding the others. African states, and South Africa in particular have objected to what they see as western fixation with Zimbabwe at the expense of the bigger African picture and they particularly resent the thereat to inflict collective punishment on Africa for Mugabe's failings. However this is to miss the point, for the two issues are inextricably tied. The lessons that Western governments and potential foreign investors are drawing from African states complicity with the Zimbabwean outcome is that Mugabe style behaviour is a very real possibility in those states too and that the peer pressure on fellow African leaders to adhere to democratic norms is virtually non-existent". The point here is that African leaders are being hypocritical with the issue of good governance and development which they preach and this will obviously affect the credibility of NEPAD and obviously increase the gap of skeptism by foreign investors and partners.They are quick to ask for economic benefits and yet, they are not ready for the political obligation of democracy.

Closely related to this, is the issue of patron-client relationship, which holds sway in the African states. The African elites are seen as untrustworthy as far as the cause of NEPAD and regional integration is concerned. These same patron clients hold the machinery of government in their various countries and we do know that there is a strong relationship between the politics and economy of a society considering that politics itself has been defined as the authoritative allocation of resources. There is evidence that speaks to the fact that, the corruption of these elites and the value system in Africa in itself constitutes an obstacle to regional integration. For instance, most African leaders is said to be richer than their countries, and use their ill-gotten wealth to hold on to power. Some opinions exist to say that unless this trend changes, regional and sub-regional integration will remain problematic. Scott (1998, p. 273) notes, "as long as public officials or businessmen can conspicuously display their enormous wealth that cannot be attributed to their innovation, business acumen, hard work, inheritance, winning the lottery etc. Without any fear of being asked by the appropriate authorities to account for their wealth, inefficiencies and corruption will continue to flourish. The average African must first realize that the luxury automobiles or the villas arrogantly displayed by a public servant may be connected with his or her poverty and deplorable living conditions"

Elsewhere, Moss (2007, p. 37) referred to the corrupt elites whose activities are hampering regional integration as the "Big Men". In his article titled ' Big men, personal rule, and patronage politics', he defined the Big men as a cliché, which also defines a particular political system dominated by individuals and personal relationships, with the peace kept through the distribution of money, jobs and favours. He noted that the Big man, be it a local chief, warlord or a president, who is thought of not only as a political leader but also often as the father of the nation" … the biggest of the men is the president.". The fact is that African political system and these big men dominate landscape. Here individuals rather than bureaucracies through informal relationships make decisions. This is patronage politics, which is an aspect of personal rule where the political system operates, based on the distribution of goods, money, and favours in exchange for support. Thus, it is called clientalism or patron-client system. This system is most visible in a one party state, having a dictatorship and life president. The African sit tight presidents are in this group, because the interactions are based on distribution of money, and political leaders must resort to corruption. The point worth stating here is that the personal ambition of the corrupt elites has most time led these countries into wars and violence. With unstable national politics, it becomes difficult to support regional integration projects or even to support actions against another unconstitutional state and government. There are also opinions that believe that this is the biggest challenge to the African Peer Review Mechanism, an agency of NEPAD.

As stated earlier, the non-commitment of the protagonists of NEPAD to her course, with the lack of financial support was a decoy to frustrate the advancement of the project itself. In the early stages of NEPAD, a source has actually warned that "it beggars belief that the gathering of men (i.e. NEPAD elites) who benefit from disorder will help unravel...disorder, that they will pave the way for good government in their countries; that they will give up their cash cows, surrender power and with it their means of livelihood" (Mail and Guardian, 12 July, 2002 p. 2). This suspicion has not been abated, and the opinion is right after all.

The official misconduct of the African elites, is further exacerbated by their decision making process. Martins (2000, p. 22) believes that current integration arrangements like the AU, and ECOWAS are problematic when you consider the fact that "decision making process, which requires agreement at the highest political level (Heads of States & Government) is bound to create difficulties because of overriding concern with the preservation of sovereignty and the defense of national interests to the detriment of supranational and community interests."

Apart from the Patron-Client state system, with its attendant neo-patrimonialism and corruption orchestrated by African elites, there are still other leadership problems especially that which relates to fear of loss of sovereignty by this African leaders which in turn informs their nonchalant behaviour to the regional integration arrangements. According to Bischoff (2004, p. 122) The desire and enthusiasm for regional integration as a way to deal with Africa's many development problems is tempered by the fear national leaders have about the possible loss of sovereignty by their respective states. There has always been a high degree of ambiguity in the regional processes found in the continent. Thus while consensus on the desirability for unified African development is long standing, there has been serious disagreement on the scope, level, and strategy for attaining it. This has had effect on the level of implementation. Bischoff (2004, p. 122) lamented that the first phase of integration after independence was "anything but damning" because "all major projects, except the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) were found disappointing"

There has also been a long history of the politicization of inter-state relation (Calvert, 1986, p. 95). Attempts at economic integration between 1965 and 1995 failed largely for reasons that which includes the background of ubiquitous foreign donor influence, the failure to translate regional agreements into substantive changes in national policy, the unwillingness to subordinate immediate political interest to long term economic goals, an absence of developed regimes to enforce treaties, endemic political instability and uncertainty for policy makers, the non-commercial objectives pursued by parastatals, little consideration paid to potential benefit consumers could derive from regional cooperation, antiparty towards market and free enterprise, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, structural adjustments policies that discounted regional scenarios, and absence of popular identification with regional schemes (Mistry, 2000 pp. 558-559). Thus, in West Africa, state driven ventures aimed at achieving integration do not necessarily overlap with transnational economic relations

Bankole (1993, p. 749) supported the fact that fear of loss of sovereignty impeded regional integration and as such leads to politicization of interstate relationships in West Africa. according to him "A formidable obstacle to economic integration derives from the problem of transfer of sovereignty and the tension between the concept of sovereignty and that of domestic jurisdiction, where sovereign states come together with the intention of coordinating and integrating their economies, through the framework of a supranational body and its constituent treaty, the norm is to leave intact the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. But such a body may be given legislative or quasi-legislative powers in respect of matters normally within the ambit and competence of the national legislatures. This may constitute a surrender of sovereignty. “Sovereignty and “domestic jurisdiction” are difficult concepts in international law. Both have given rise to problems of legal subtlety and practical importance… One troublesome question has always been what is or what is not within a state’s domestic jurisdiction”.

Bundu (1997, p. 38) fully agree with the fact that fear of loss of sovereignty is a big hindrance to attaining regional integration in West Africa and Africa as a whole. In his view, “it was the rise of nationalism that inspired the peoples of the colonies to seek political independence. Subsequently, the creation of a national identity and the exercise of national sovereignty have been prominent features of the post independent political agenda. Today, the legacy of national sovereignty and the jealousy with which it is guarded have become obstacles to progress on the road to regional integration, which requires a certain sharing of sovereignty among members of the community”.

Bankole (1993, p. 749) further submitted that “A key area of cooperation in economic integration schemes that as it were, goes to the root of notion of domestic jurisdiction is the adoption of common external customs and excise tariffs. In this case, it is usual for the contracting member states to reserve in their respective national laws on the subject some power for the Minister of Finance to take unilateral action to amend, suspend, vary, or terminate existing import and export duties in cases of national economic emergencies. Where such power is exercised, its effects will be to disharmonize rates that has been harmonized and agreed upon multilaterally. In West Africa, this right reservation is borne out of the fear of outright loss of sovereignty and so is detrimental to the development of regional integration. The overarching point here is that integration schemes in Africa has consistently been subjected to national laws because of the fear that should it become supreme, national sovereignty may be undermined. Iwilade (2012, p. 79) reinforced this position using Nigeria as an example. According to him, “integration schemes in Africa are generally subjected to national laws of member states who subscribe to them. Whether they are integration arrangements under the aegis of the African Union, South African Development Community or the Economic Community of West African States, the sovereignty of member states, as contained in their respective national constitutions are scarcely tampered with. He went further to say that "While African nations reasonably desire some form of integration to counteract the raging economic, socio-cultural and political effects of globalization and to cushion years of abysmal underdevelopment, the issue of absolute exercise of sovereignty is one that remains jealously guarded by member states of various integration schemes across the continent".

Examining the case of Nigeria, Iwilade (2012, p.79) noted that no administration has been able to expunge this subservient status of integration schemes to the Nigerian Constitution, rather, it has been replicated in the 1963, 1979 and 1999 constitutions. Practically speaking, section 74 of the 1963 constitution contains elements that super impose national laws over regional integration treaties. in reference to its provision, Iwilade (2012, p. 79) concluded that "by the effect of this provision, whatever decisions reached at any international or pan African forum, whether for the purpose of promoting African Integration or for any other purpose whatsoever, will remain unenforceable until parliament has enacted it into a law and even if its operation in a region was also made subject to consent of the governor of such region. Thus under the 1963 constitution, implementation of treaties was made subject to the exercise or otherwise of Nigeria's sovereignty".

While concluding the assessment of Nigeria's constitutions and its supremacy over regional integration treaties, Iwilade (2012, p. 79) submitted, "It is obvious that Nigeria's three constitutions, that the nations sovereignty is more important and ascribed greater primacy than any integration scheme whatsoever. However, the Constitutions still successively provided for safe havens for any government wishing to lead or join viable African integration schemes. Nigeria is merely a case study but the constitutions of virtually other African countries have revealed similar obsession and preference for non-dilution of their sovereignty against any forms of integration whatsoever".

It is also argued that the State in Africa as it is presently constituted is an impediment to the success of NEPAD and regional integration in Africa, and need to be reformed. This is because the state is central to the accumulative process and needs to be reoriented towards the various groups that it encompasses. This is not so now. According to Ottoh (2006, p. 320) "the last two decades of the twentieth century have witnessed increasing numbers of states in Africa failing to discharge their functions to the people. The phenomenon of the inability of the state to perform is seen as the general crisis of development." Ottoh (2006, p. 321) went further to say, "State failure in Africa can be understood within the context of certain functional requisites of a modern state that are absent. The basic functions that modern states supposed to perform are maintenance of law and order, maintaining the internal security and sovereignty of the state against internal subversion and external invasion, provision of social amenities and basic welfare services, etc. it is the inability of the African state to accomplish all these tasks that failure manifests".

There is also the position that stems from the research of (Haggard & Webb 1994, pp. 13-15) which submitted that bureaucracies and parliaments stall reforms the most. Unfortunately, NEPAD is premised to run on a functioning, administrative state with a competent, committed and non-corrupt bureaucracy who largely is unobtainable in Africa. The type of development articulated by NEPAD requires major infrastructural needs to be addressed such as; education, communications, the maintenance of good political, economic and legal environment all to encourage FDI. The tragedy is that as stated by a source, "the state in Africa has long ceased to perform as a mechanism to meet people's long term survival needs (Reno 2004, p. 108).

Professor Jerry Gana who was political adviser to the President of Nigeria summarized the above challenges and agrees that political instability and overlapping membership constitutes a problem to ECOWAS in its quest for regional integration. Gana (2006, p. 3) during an international conference on "ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration, held in Lagos has stated that African governments lack political will and have been unwilling to subordinate domestic political and economic interest to supranational institutions with long-term-goals. Lack of good governance and the rule of law coupled with endemic political instability, resulting in debilitating civil wars and armed conflict were some of the reasons why ECOWAS and other similar bodies in Africa has not performed as expected after 30 years of existence." additionally, he identified pervasive weakness in regional integration structures as exemplified by the existence of weak industrial structures and the absence of intra-industry linkages, poor transport and communication infrastructure as well as non-convertibility of various currencies as some of the reasons why ECOWAS has not fully integrated.

In another occasion Gana (2006, p. 40) extended the list of challenges. According to him," political instability and conflicts tend to have eroded the institutional capacity and worsen economic performance, thereby creating a vicious cycle…He named Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo as clear examples of conflicts and political instability...Such situations with the added complexity of several integration organizations and over-lapping memberships made the achievement of regional integration objectives extremely difficult". On the issue of lack of political will, Scholars like Kennes (1999, p. 37) has noted that lack of political will is only one side of the coin. In his words, "slow progress on integration cannot be attributed to a mere 'lack of political will, even if this will is present, there is often insufficient capacity of human resources at the national level to implement measures agreed at the regional level. Integrating regional agreements into national legislations is not at all straightforward. There is thus need for more training on the technology of regional integration. This also applies to the multilateral agreements reached under the WTO. A better understanding of the subject matter could help to put forward more realistic objectives and avoid disappointments with results".

Another challenge is from diverse colonial heritage of the member countries of ECOWAS. In this regard, loyalty to colonial heritage remains a challenge to trade and other aspects of economic integration in West Africa. The polarization of the sub-region along language and colonial lines of Anglophone and Francophone countries is to say the least very detrimental to the advancement of integration in the sub region. Given the presence of an on-going economic cooperation arrangement among the francophone countries under UEMOA (Union Economique et Mone'taire Quest Africaine) and strong ties that still exist between these countries and their former "colonial masters", trade flows appears still strong between these countries and Western Europe, particularly France, to an obvious disadvantage of other countries in the sub-region. This kind of relationship runs antithetical to sub regional integration. Clearly, this is also one of the reasons why it has been difficult to foster a merger to a unified currency in the region.

Also, the operations of The ECOWAS parliament has been impeded by this obnoxious polarization along linguistically and colonial lines and this have adversely affected regional integration. Mr Osei Kyei Mensah Bonsu, Head of Ghanaian delegation to the ECOWAS Parliament that "the parliament may collapse if the problems currently facing it are not resolved immediately, reinforced this situation In June 2004... Lack of commitment by member states, arrogance of the leadership of the parliament and the struggle for supremacy between English and French speaking countries in West Africa are major factors hindering the progress of ECOWAS parliament". The ECOWAS parliament is the most effective international parliamentary institutions in the whole world (Daily Champion, 2 June 2004, p. 10).

Part of the issue that fuels the differences noted above is the traditional fear of Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions. Although Nigeria is and continues to be the driving force behind the formation and existence of ECOWAS, most ECOWAS countries view this with a high degree of suspicion. Analysts believe that this happens because of the need to please their erstwhile colonial masters. For instance, a commentary noted that "during the ECOMOG adventure in Liberia spear-headed by Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Senegal declined to contribute troops in order to spite Nigeria. In the like manner when President Wade assumed office as President of Senegal, one of his first pronouncements was a threat to withdraw his country from ECOWAS unless Nigeria is excluded from membership of ECOWAS. The point here is that Nigeria's leading role in the sub region is viewed with utmost suspicion. There is a silent bellicosity against Nigeria. First, there has been consistent incursion into Nigeria's borders by her immediate neighbors. For Instance, The Nigerian North –West zone and the republic of Benin has been having issues as their troops invade the Nigerian villages of "Gulma, Tungchadi and Tungangoye, which is more than eight kilometers from the officially recognized boundary in Turvgo hills" (Akinterinwa, 2011, p. 104). Infact, there have been quite a lot of scholarly presentations which tends to suggest that Nigeria is not benefiting from her big brother role in Africa and West Africa as it should. For instance, Nigeria played a crucial role in installing the Chadian leader Goukouni Weddeye in office against active Libyan diplomatic and military opposition, but by 1980 Weddeye was in alliance with Libya, in 1995, Nigeria failed in a bid to succeed to the office of the President of ADB because it lacked the collaboration of non-regional and regional members" (Akinbobola, 2000, p. 38). Clearly, Nigeria's big brother role has not been quite acceptable by her peers. In this regard, the profiling of Nigeria and her leadership role is seen as eliciting intra-regional rivalry.

Another factor that is making integration difficult is the well-known asymmetry both in the size and in the distribution of resources among member countries. This creates the fear of domination by the smaller states and suspicion on integration projects. There is obvious fear that the regional powers notably; Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa will dominate the regional arrangement. This is because of their level of wealth and resources, which are, skewed more towards them, it will be recalled that the neo-functionalists posits that one of the ‘integrative conditions’ is a symmetry or economic equality of the units. This is the size of potential participants measured in total GNP, which is important in integrative schemes of less developed states than in industrialized nations. He believes that the “the lower the income per capita of the area, the greater the homogeneity in the size of economy must be’. The idea is that the disparity between the units making up the region will impede drastically, the level of integration. The reality is as mentioned earlier, that some countries outsized others and this engenders mistrust.

This research believes strongly in the role of ICT as a tool for socio-economic development depending on how they are applied i.e. they should be applied in such a way that their positive effects can spread to the larger population rather than to be concentrated in a few hands. It should be deployed in a way “that reduce their numerous negative effects such as creating a people more dependent on importation of products of technologies rather than doing the technology themselves (Akpan-Obong, 2006, p. 61). The problem with ICT is its obvious dependent on importation. Even though the national policies of West African governments do stress, that they should be locally produced, there are no practical policies matching this actions. The danger here as noted by Akpan-Obong (2006, p. 3) is that “many African countries may end up becoming markets for ICT products manufactured in industrialized countries. If this happens, then, the continent would have once again missed an opportunity to map out and implement endogenous and inner directed strategies of development”. This inability for local capacity or production will ultimately impede the advancement of the national ICT-for-development projects in Africa.

Another challenge that confronts NEPAD, ECOWAS and regional integration in Africa is the obvious lack of full cycle involvement of the private sector, which ironically is expected to carry through the implementation of NEPAD. Opinion leaders are of the view that the Private sector participation is low as far as NEPAD is concerned. One of such Opinion is that of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur. Tukur who was erstwhile Minister in Nigeria and one time Executive President of African Business Round table had noted that “the public sector is not taking the private sector into confidence to work closely, in what we call the formulation stages in planning process of whatever they want to do, there have always been problems with projects and programs. By the time the whole plan is finished, it becomes difficult to carry out because the expected implementers, most often the private sector, do not have the vehicle for implementation". David Asante, who used to be technical adviser to the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), also corroborated this position. "In Africa the public sector has been the focus of activity. In most of our countries, the state is everything. We have all kinds of state enterprises because of which we have not given the private sector what it is due. We have not even recognized the role of the private sector can play in the economy as a whole and thereby looked at the limitations of government involvement in economic activity". He further added, "That the private sector has not been vibrant at all. In fact, in some countries, the private sector was not even tolerated. Even in countries where they were tolerated, there were not even allowed to operate in certain areas given the necessary incentives to move forward". Consequently, the private sector has not been as active as expected.

In chapter three, the role of NEPAD and ECOWAS in the Agricultural sector was carried out majorly through the CADAAP. CADAAP made some remarkable breakthroughs especially in the area of improving soil fertility and undertaking many fertilizer availability initiatives. However, the CADAAP is challenged in many ways. For one, there is still an obvious food security problem in the West African sub region and Africa as a whole. The per-capita food production index decreased by about 0.5 per cent between 2000 and 2006 while the number of people classified as hungry in Africa increased from 176 million to 210 million between 2004 and 2006. Several possible reasons could account for this. The first is that, these efforts take time before they affect food production and consumption. There is also the possibility that NEPAD's agricultural efforts may have focused on the production of export crops at the expense of food crops. In that case, although agricultural production may have increased, it is possible that hunger also increased. It could also be that the increased effort was not enough to increase agricultural output significantly. As it is today, food security as a basic need remains elusive.

There has been so much investment in the area of education to supports NEPAD's pillar of Human capacity development, but these investments looks more like a drop in the ocean, a large proportion of school-age children are still not enrolled, there are serious shortages of qualified teachers and quality in science education remains elusive. However, there are indications that enrolment rates of girl students in primary and high schools are growing faster than the rates for boys. For example, the gender-parity ratio for primary and secondary school enrolment increased from 80 in 1991 to 83 in 2004 (WDR 2007). It must be noted that girl enrolments start from a very small base so a lot remains to be done on this score. There is anecdotal evidence (e.g. in Ghana) that the school-feeding programme is achieving the dual objectives of improving nutrition and increasing school enrolment. This is an example of programmes that emphasize small steps but yield big dividends. (The NEPAD School Feeding Programme) The cost of implementation of NEPAD projects and programmes is astronomically high. For instance, one source noted that "Federal Ministries, department and agencies (FMDAs) require 522.2 billion naira for the execution of federal government designated National Programme of Action (NPoA) of Africa Peer Mechanism (APRM) activities in 2009… the amount is the minimum amount the federal government will need to properly empower the MDAs for implementation of the programme of action''. (Daily Champion, 31st January 2009, p. 7) Further, it does not seem that Africa is getting enough support from the developed world. Therefore, this research calls for such acceptable level of support and intervention from donor countries.

6.3 Conclusion

Generally, the challenges of sub regional integration in West Africa are multidimensional. There is still the existence of artificial barriers and man-made blockades, even when African leaders are preaching otherwise. Little wonder then, why trade volume is low. The situation is made worse by the absence of a region-unifying currency. There have been earlier submissions on the potency and usefulness of a single currency as an instrument for economic growth in West Africa. For Instance scholars like Jayeoba (2006, p. 257) have enumerated the benefits of the ECO to Nigeria and West Africa

> The introduction of the ECO will, eliminate the need for traders to pass through the process of exchange of currencies for cross-border trade within the sub-region…foster strong relationships amongst nations and peoples of the sub region. The monetary union will give them a sense of belonging to one socio-political and economic entity and they will therefore act as a people with a common destiny… the sub-region will become better organized economically and thus will be able to better harness, direct and widen economic production which will invariably create growth within the sub region… nations within the sub region will have the opportunity to adopt common prices for raw materials like Cocoa, rubber, timber etc and with this they will be able to improve their earnings from international trade thereby leading to increased foreign reserves

Unfortunately, The ECO is yet to see the light of the day and all these expectations could best be described as a mirage. There has also been a combination of political factors that has directly affected the development of a strong regional integration in West Africa. These are;

corruption, neo-patrimonialism and its attendant patron-client relationship, negative nationalism, absence of constitutionalism and lack of political will. It is rather unfortunate, that NEPAD's APRM meant to institute probity, transparency and good governance in Africa, has been incapacitated and found wanting in carrying out this responsibility. The 'Big men' who are the political gladiators has refused to submit totally to the demands of APRM. The Peer Review could best be described as a 'toothless bulldog' and 'talk-shop' lacking the power to extract obedience and ensure compliance with the recommendations made to such countries. The Peers' do not accept the Review Mechanisms. This was why Laurent Gbagbo refused all entreaties even from fellow Peers to hand over power after he lost the election. These myriad of factors combines to frustrate the efforts of ECOWAS and NEPAD in bringing about sub regional economic integration in West Africa. Until these issues are frontally confronted and addressed, the quest for sub regional economic integration will remain a wish.

6.4 Discussion on Findings

First, it is important to mention that, sub regional integrations remain a viable tool and institutional framework to achieve the NEPAD mandate especially in the ECOWAS region. The research has exhaustively discussed the relevance of sub-regionalism over continentalism. As noted in Chapter 3, the opinion of Bischoff (2004, p. 122) Gibs (2006, p. 701) and Bundu (1997, p. 30) buttresses this fact. Sub-regionalism brings regionalism closer to the populace and hence more useful to them, politically and economically. This makes it easy to get more support from the people and the international community. "aside from the Economic Commission for Africa, a UN body, sub-regional economic entities, encouraged by the ECA, have stood more chance of attracting outside donor support than continentally based development schemes" (Bischoff 2004, p. 122). Bundu has identified that the challenge facing the governments and people of West Africa is how to halt the disintegration of the economic base and arrest the deterioration of societal norms and values and with over one third of Africa's population and sub regionalism remains the best model of integration for her.

The West African experience has been made possible by the activities of the elites. These elites had at different times in history supported the formation of the ECOWAS, NEPAD and Presently, the NPCA. Additionally their decisions are based on the assumed gains expected from the operation of these supranational structures. These are all in line with the neo functionalist position that “the decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it depended on the expectation of gain or loss held by major groups within the unit to be integrated. Haas made two basic assumptions about integration. First, he assumed that “integration proceeds as a result of the work of relevant elites in governmental and private sectors, who support integration for essentially pragmatic reasons, such as the expectation that removal of trade barriers will increase markets and profits. These elites anticipating that they will gain from activity within a supranational organizational framework are likely to seek out similar minded elites across national frontiers (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 423). Joseph Nye had also mentioned that Elite value complementarity is one of the enablers of integration. This is an integrative condition, which from the foregoing has been met by the African elites. The Elite value complementarity shows the extent to which the elites in the integrating zone think alike, hence “the higher the complementarities, the more likely the success of the Integration” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 428).

Second, this research, also uncovers the fact that the removal of visas have not removed the complexity of free movement of people into neighboring countries. There are still local national legislations that make other demands on visitors planning to get into other countries in the sub region. This inadvertently affects trade and movement of goods and services. This further implies that there is a challenge with implementing regional agreements among member nations. Consequently, such agreements never get to be executed and hence a reinforcement of the need for an enforcement agency in the sub region, if regional integration is to succeed..

Again, there is the confirmation, that there is still a lot of unofficial trade in the sub region. This is responsible for the poor official records and so it is difficult to ascertain the actual level of trade and transactions that goes on among countries in the region.In fact,anecdotal records have it that in the ECOWAS region, there could be unofficial than official trade and to this extent, integration cannot be effectively measured. The opinion of Meagher (1997, p. 165) and Sanusi (2010, p. 7) speaks volumes to the fact that trade transaction is low in the sub region. Infact as noted in Chapter 5, Sanusi (2010, p. 7) had commented that “What is the purpose of the currency when we have not yet built trade flow? We don’t have free movement of goods and capital”...“before imitating the Euro, it should be noted that 60 per cent of the trade in Europe is within the European Union...almost 50 per cent of the total trade of the Southeast Asia is among countries of Asian nations.” In this regard, the joint efforts of

NEPAD and ECOWAS do not meet the criteria for integration as recommended by the neo-functionalists led by Joseph Nye. In addition, the issue of loyalty to colonial heritage further endangers monetary integration. The polarization of the sub-region along language and colonial lines of Anglophone and Francophone countries is challenging because, trade remains strong between these countries and Western Europe, particularly France, to an obvious disadvantage of other countries in the sub-region. This invariably affects the quest for a single currency for the sub-region.

There is also a strong indication that, the foreign partners who are to provide some level of less domineering support to NEPAD do not really have absolute confidence in the project. This is informed by the way, in which African leaders have handled issues relating to democracy, constitutionalism and their corruptive practices. Though, there are scholars who posit that democracy and accountability are western imports, which does not reflect or accommodate the cultural specificity of Africa (Taylor, 2005, p. 154). The fact remains that its abuse by these leaders hinders efforts to build a stronger sub regional union. These leaders also take a common position in matters that may be antithetical to democracy and integration but which remains important to their personal ambitions or 'national interest'. While discussing the factors and behaviour that may characterize regional integration overtime, the neo-functionalists had noted that 'externalization' would make the members to take a common position on issues while dealing with non-members, (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429). Whereas this is a factor that normally occurs in relation to trade i.e. trade creation and diversion, African elites tend to use it negatively in a bid to defend peer undemocratic regimes. This research therefore agrees with Hamill (2002, p.18) that "African states have to appreciate that they cannot unilaterally rewrite the NEPAD contract and attempt to detach its economic benefits from the accompanying political obligations 'cherry picking' as it were, those aspect of the projects that they find most appealing, while disregarding the others''. This is also a form of politicization. Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1996, p. 423) citing Haas has said that "critical to integration is the "gradual politicization of the actors' purposes which were initially considered 'technical' or 'non-controversial'. However, he added that the actors become politicized because, in response to initial technical purposes they agree to consider the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them"

Again, whereas NEPAD has good intentions in their domestication strategy, it yet to achieve its goal of creating grassroots awareness, because there are still issues of unpopularity and apathy on the part of the citizenry. There is often insufficient capacity of human resources at the national level to implement measures agreed at the regional level and vice versa from national to local level. As its today, it does not appear that serious consultation has been made with the populace on what needed to be changed in the old NEPAD before the commencement of the new one. Consequently, NPCA may still face the apathy and rejection that NEPAD witnessed. It is therefore very likely that the citizens will remain alienated as in the case of NEPAD and the challenge of grass root awareness may remain unresolved. Whereas the neo functionalists' recognizes the congregation of like-minded elites as the breeding ground for the germination and growth of regional integration, the theory failed to give a direction as to the dissemination of these ideas across all stratas of the society. Put differently, it assumes the paramount rationality of the integrating elites. In this regard there have been earlier warnings from intellectuals and scholars of a possible failure of NEPAD, because of its alienation of the intellectual class. Dani Venter et al (2005, pp. 319-320) presented the position of Ramphele (1999) who argued that "successful modern democracies make a strong case for the role of ideas in entrenching values and practices that promote the environment required for flowering creativity and empowerment of citizens...anti-intellectualism is almost always associated with failure to entrench and enhance democracy and sustain socio-economic development. Stimulating and enabling intellectualism and building intellectual capital are therefore key requirements for achieving the NEPAD political, economic and social objectives''. This research makes bold to say that, in the migration from NEPAD to NPCA, the African leaders have not considered the opinions of intellectual as to what needs to be done. The position above speaks volume to the fact that a development strategy of this nature certainly needs a wide range of inputs, if it has to be successful. This informed Ramphele (1999) "the European Renaissance succeeded largely because, it mobilised the creative energies of intellectuals across disciplinary, political and geographic boundaries. The two attempts at Africa's renaissance, Nkurumah's and Nyerere's failed they remained political programmes of the establishment, with little enthusiasm from the wider intellectual community". Denver et al (2005, p. 320) therefore warned that Mbeki's renaissance (NEPAD) runs the same risk unless it widens its appeal. This warning is worth resounding in the current scenario for the NPCA. This research has highlighted the fact that gaps between the elites and the citizenry regarding the objectives of integration and accepting a strategy with a small base of inputs is obviously a recipe for failure.

The other strong factor, which is unanimously validated in the research, is the fact that, the fear of loss of sovereignty is in itself a challenge to integration efforts. Consequently, the elites set out to integrate because they find it expedient to do so, but at the same time slows down the level of integration for fear of losing their sovereignty in its entirety. As noted earlier, Bischoff (2004, p. 122) has stated that the desire and enthusiasm for regional integration as a way to deal with Africa's many development problems is tempered by the fear national leaders have about the possible loss of sovereignty by their respective states. He provided an insight that there has always been a high degree of ambiguity in the regional processes found in the continent. The reason is that while there may be consensus on the desirability for unified African development, there has been serious disagreement on the scope, level, and strategy for attaining it.

Joseph Nye and the neo-functionalists in their theory provided that 'elite socialization' is a stage as well as a process in the integrative process. They concurred that; there could be growth of support for integration arising from the elites who have actively participated in an integrative scheme, because the extent to which national policy makers and bureaucrats become participants in regional integration, will determine the level of their socialization. They also noted that this is important because such elites are sometimes reluctant to participate because of possible loss of sovereignty or national control. This could also work negatively, where in the process of socialization; elites may forget the demands and problems at home and concentrate on their new found affinity for selfish reasons" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 427). Unfortunately, the much-touted sovereignty in most African states tilts more towards negative sovereignty rather than positive sovereignty. Robert H Jackson (1990, pp. 1-12) in his book 'Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International relations and the third World' gave an insight into the concept of positive and negative sovereignty.While adopting a combination of the institutional approach and philosophical idealism as opined by Collingwood and Oakshott, He focussed on normative presuppositions underlying negative sovereignty game as opposed to the older form referred to as positive sovereignty. He was concerned with Sovereignty in the third world which emerged as a result of colonialism, Western Imperialism and colonization. This is negative sovereignty. Jackson (1990, p. 1) believes that '' negative sovereignty is crucial and overlooked institution which not only helps sustain many of these states, but also impinges on human rights and socio economic development within them.''. In his postulations, Jackson (1990, p. 21) classified some states as ‘juridical’ and ‘quasi’. Most of the identifiable attributes of judicial and quasi states points the arrow to Third World states, including Africa.

According to him, “the ex-colonial states have been internationally enfranchised and possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states: juridical Statehood. At the same time many have not yet been empowered domestically and consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by classical international law. They disclose limited empirical statehood: their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organised power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare. He further noted that juridical states are characterized by greed, avarice and corruption of its elites while the generality of the citizenry suffers. He believes that sovereignty should not be imposed but earned through legitimacy and the ability of such state to dispense effectively and efficiently, the duties of a state. According to him, ‘’international society can enfranchise states which usually require general recognition of a government’s independence. But international society cannot empower states to anything like the same extent since this for the most part involves internal relationships. (Jackson 1990, p. 21)

Jackson (1990, p. 22) qualified the juridical states as quasi-states. According to him ‘’quasi-states enjoy equal sovereignty even though, they lack established institutions’ capable of constraining and outlasting the individuals who occupy their offices: still less do they reflect respect for constitutions’ or acceptance of the rule of law. He concluded that this means that the real benefits of independence which is what freedom amounts to have not yet arrived for most of their citizens.’’. Jackson (1990, p. 33) further elaborated the understanding of the concept of sovereignty especially as it concerned Third World countries and Africa. He did this by making a distinction between sovereignty by international law (negative sovereignty) and Sovereignty by international fact (positive sovereignty). While the former is classical and imposed at independence, the latter is concerned with the actual earned capability of the state to do the things it is expected to do internationally and domestically.

In a nutshell, African elites are only concerned with protecting negative sovereignty of their states, rather than pursuing positive sovereignty, through the building of the capabilities of their states. This research is of the opinion that mere sacrificing regional integration at the altar of negative sovereignty is antithetical to development. Instead, African leaders should pursue positive sovereignty and that way their real sovereignty remains intact, despite the submission to an integration arrangement.

Again, as predicted by the neo-functionalists and related to the above, it does not yet seem to appear that ECOWAS has the capability to encroach greatly on, or supersede the member states. They have stated “that with respect to neo-functionalism “Micro-regional economic organizations are unlikely to develop into units that encroach greatly on, or supersede the existing nation-states” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429). As it is today, the member states still maintain a higher weight in the power balance, especially since they can withdraw their support without any fear of punishment from ECOWAS. More so, ECOWAS depends heavily on them for funding.

Furtherit’s evident from the research that the high level of asymmetry among the integrating counties in the ECOWAS is dysfunctional to the equilibrium of the system. The idea is that the disparity in the distribution of natural resources has engendered fear of domination and loss of sovereignty especially to regional powers like Nigeria. However, the research pointed out that Nigeria contributes about 30 percent of the funds to ECOWAS, this in itself breed fear among other members. The neo-functionalists have posited that one of the ‘integrative conditions’ is a Symmetry or economic equality of units. This is the size of potential participants measured in total GNP is important in integrative schemes of less developed states than in industrialized nations. He believes that the “the lower the income per capita of the area, the greater the homogeneity in the size of economy must be’. This fear is still rife in the ECOWAS region and remains dysfunctional in the words of the structural functionalists. Regarding this issue, the research also found out the European Union has been able to manage the issue of disparity and asymmetry among its members better than the ECOWAS. Consequently, it has systemic inbuilt checks and balances to curtail domination of the smaller members by the big countries. One of this is the rotation of country leadership and the location of the headquarters of its different organs in different countries.

In all, Joseph Nye’s ‘three perceptual conditions that are affected by the integrative processes is validated especially, the issue of perceived equity of distribution of benefits – i.e. “the higher the perceived equitable distribution in all countries, the better the conditions for further integration” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429). The same thing applies to the other two perceptual conditions. this is the perceived external cogency, which is the perceptions of decision makers about their external problems including dependence on exports, threats from larger powers, and the loss of status in changing international system and low (exportable) visible cost, which is "the extent to which integration can be made to be perceived as relatively cost free" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429).

The weak structure of the African state is also antithetical to the smooth running of NEPAD. Ottoh (2006, p. 321) had noted, "State failure in Africa can be understood within the context of certain functional requisites of a modern state that are absent. The basic functions that modern states supposed to perform are maintenance of law and order, maintaining the internal security and sovereignty of the state against internal subversion and external invasion, provision of social amenities and basic welfare services, etc. it is the inability of the African state to accomplish all these tasks that failure manifests". NEPAD is premised to run on a functioning, administrative state with a competent, committed and non-corrupt bureaucracy. In addition, the development articulated by NEPAD requires major infrastructural needs to be addressed such as; education, communications, the maintenance of good political, economic and legal environment all to encourage FDI. However, like Reno (2004, p. 108) "The state in Africa has long ceased to perform as a mechanism to meet people's long term survival needs. The implication will be appreciated when one considers this position within the context of the structural-functional analysis.

Closely related to this, the research has also validated the fact that political instability in the ECOWAS region has negatively affected the quest for integration. The likes of Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and SierraLeone have had their fits of political instability, which has affected their response to the integration overtures by ECOWAS and NEPAD. The neo functionalist position holds that, the Capacity of member states to adapt and respond remains a good condition for integration. The idea is that "the higher the level of domestic stability and the greater the capacity of the key decision makers to respond to demand within their respective political units, the more likely they are able to participate effectively in a larger integrative unit" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 429).

Structural-functional analysis contains as concepts structural and functional requisites. A structural requisite is a pattern or observable uniformity of action necessary for the continued existence of the system whereas a functional requisite is a generalized condition, given the level of generalization of the definition and the units' general setting. Moreover, it makes effort to distinguish between functions and dysfunctions (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 112). It will not be in error to say that the African state system has therefore tended towards dysfunctionality, because it has found it difficult to maintain equilibrium. This research believes many of the basics have to be fixed before NPCA can make good progress.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PROSPECTS OF NPCA

7.1 Introduction

The end of the 14th African Union (AU) Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25th January to 2nd February 2010 heralded a new dawn in the history of integration and development in Africa. The summit announced the dissolution of NEPAD and the setting up in its place, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). This new agency will be a body of the African Union, mandated to facilitate and coordinate the implementation of continental and regional priority programmes and mobilise resources and partners in support of their implementation. The summit allocated $3 million as start- up funding for the new office (Daily Nation, 3 February 2010, p. 7). By the 15th of February 2010, the Kenyan honourable Minister of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, Mr. Wycliffe Oparanya called a press conference to brief them on the transformation of NEPAD into The Nepad Planning and Coordinating Agency. A statement curled out of his speech reads thus

> Distinguished members of the Media, Ladies and Gentlemen I am delighted to have this opportunity to host you here today at this press conference which is intended to provide a formal brief to you, other stakeholders and the general publicon the transformation of the NEPAD into a NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency. The 14th African Union (AU) Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25th January to 2nd February 2010, decided to strengthen the New Partnership forAfrica Development (NEPAD) programme by transforming the NEPAD secretariatinto an implementation agency, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). (Daily Nation 3 February 2010, p. 7)

This resolution is based on the recommendations of the 22nd Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) held on 30 January 2010 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and presented to the African Union by H.E. Meles Zenawi, Chairperson of NEPAD HSGIC and Prime Minister of Ethiopia. The minister hinted that the decision was a product of many earlier debates, discussions and consultations by different committees at various levels on the best approach to integrate the NEPAD programme into the structures and processes of the African Union. Some of these decisions and committees included; The 2nd African Union Assembly in Maputo of July 2003, The 13 point conclusions of the Algiers NEPAD Brainstorming Meeting of March 2007 as endorsed by the

10th AU Assembly of Addis Ababa in February 2008, The Dakar NEPAD Review Summit of April 2008, and The recommendations of the Consultancy Study Report on AU/NEPAD Integration, commissioned in December 2008. (Daily Nation 3 February 2010, p. 7)

Accordingly, this transformation designates the NPCA as a technical body of the African Union, whose core mandate is to facilitate and coordinate the implementation of regional and continental priority programmes and projects. The other functions include: (1) Mobilize resources and partners in support of the implementation of Africa's priority programmes, (2) Conduct and coordinate research and knowledge management, (3) Monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes, and Advocate on the AU and NEPAD vision, mission and core principles/values. However, the organizational and governance architecture is not much different from the existing NEPAD structure. For instance, the African Union Summit approved the retention of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), as a sub-committee of the AU Assembly, but now under a new name; the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC). This high-level Committee will provide political leadership and strategic guidance for the continuation of the implementation of NEPAD. Second, there is an intermediary body known as the NEPAD Steering Committee comprising personal representatives of Heads of State and Government, which will provide the inter-face between the HSGOC and the NPCA.

Further still, the Chairperson of the AU Commission will exercise authority over the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, whilst giving the new agency adequate and necessary flexibility to carry out its mandate, and thereby maintaining the corporate brand identity of the NEPAD programme within the AU system. Regarding financing, this decision comes in with important benefits as the NPCA will draw from the statutory budgetary resources of the African Union Commission (AUC) in addition to continued voluntary contribution by AU member states and additional support from development partners and the private sector. However, the minister in his speech also noted that "the AU Summit made an important decision on the location of the NPCA which will continue to be based in Midrand, South Africa and to this end, the Summit urged the early conclusion of the Permanent Host Agreement for the NPCA between the South African Government and the AU Commission in consultation with NPCA…As was with NEPAD when it was first initiated by African leaders, the countries and regional offices have the flexibility for reforming NEPAD institutions based on country specificities in order to align themselves as appropriate with this transformation and to deliver on the NEPAD Vision effectively. (Daily Nation 3 February 2010, p. 7)

During the 26th Meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) and the 18th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 28 January and 29-30 January 2012, respectively. The NPCA Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Ibrahim Assane Mayakigave a synopsis of the NPCA achievement for the period between July to December 2011. Highlights of their achievements suggest some efforts to deliver some quick-wins. Accordingly, the NPCA has scaled up efforts, in conjunction with partner institutions, in delivering on its mandate as approved by African Leaders, namely, to:(i) Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of priority regional and continental programs and projects; (ii) Mobilize resources and partners in support of programs and projects implementation; (iii) Monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes and projects; (iv) Conduct and coordinate research and knowledge management; and (v) Advocate on the vision, mission and core values of the AU and its NEPAD Programme. From this perspective, the NPCA undertook major programmatic activities during the 6-month period reflected in this Report within the operating context of: Continued implementation of the NPCA Strategic Direction: 2010-2013 which is based on the AU Commission's Strategic Plan: 2009-2012; and AU rules, regulations and practices in Human Resources, Finance and Administration in support of our mandate;

The NPCA seems to have started well when one considers its activities in its short time of existence. In the field of Agriculture and Food Security, about 42 African countries are engaged on the CAADP agenda. Of this number, 30 countries have signed CAADP compacts, while 21 have developed National Agriculture Investment Plans (NAIPs). Of these, 18 countries have undertaken technical reviews of their NAIPS; Again, Under the TerrAfrica Programme, NPCA developed the Agriculture Climate Change Adaptation-Mitigation Framework while the Grant Agreement of the TerrAfrica Leverage Fund of US$ 1.5 million was signed and NPCA promoted African agriculture within G20. In addition, NPCA signed an MOU with China's Ministry of Agriculture to strengthen cooperation in agriculture and fisheries between Africa and China and in October 2011 DFID, NPCA and China engaged on Africa-Britain-China (ABC) Trilateral Cooperation project in Agriculture and Fisheries. Similarly, NPCA signed an MOU with Sierra Leone Ministry of Fisheries and

Marine Resources in November 2011 with US$1.4m support for fisheries reform strategy under the West African Pilot Project; Progress on CAADP Targets 10 countries registered annual growth rate in agriculture sector of at least 6% in the second half of 2011. 8 countries had reached or surpassed the 10% budgetary allocation target, while 9 were in the 5% - 10% range (Mayaki, I, 2012, pp. 1-5).

In the sphere of Regional Integration and Infrastructure, there has been a continuous implementation of AU-NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI) through identified technical focal points coordinated with the support of the Government of South Africa as chair of the High Level HSGOC Sub-Committee on PICI; NPCA technical support to newly-independent South Sudan on strategic planning, infrastructure, agriculture investments and public sector capacity under the South Sudan Development Initiative (SSDI), in conjunction with Kenya, UNECA and UNDP, resulting in a scooping mission led by the NPCA CEO in November 2011 (Mayaki 2012, pp. 1-5).

There has also been certain advancement in Climate Change and Natural Resources Management. For instance, NPCA has finalized the review of the Environment Action Plan given the critical emerging issues including the Green Economy and focus on implementing the Rural Futures Programme and the Natural Resource Governance Programme under the African Mining Vision. In addition, NPCA has offered technical support for Africa's negotiators and participation in Durban COP17/CMP7. This was in respect to the Continent's common position with key outcomes based on the nexus between climate change policy, research, practice and development as well as knowledge sharing on climate smart innovations in policies and practices. It also included the launch of the NEPAD Gender Climate-Smart Agriculture and CAADP Support Program; Again, it has supported NEPAD's role as the sustainable development framework in the "African Consensus for Rio+20" which is part of Africa's preparatory process for the upcoming Rio+20 Summit in 2012 (Mayaki, 2012, pp. 1-5).

More than this, in its short time of existence, NPCA has also affected Human Development. It has driven the African Medicines Regulatory Harmonization (AMRH) for improved public health through increased access to quality essential medicine. NPCA developed requisite planning, financing and management frameworks while the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-AMRH) was established in agreement with the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Also, following the official launch of Phase 2 of the ASTII Initiative, participating African countries in ASTII has grown from 19 to 28, with NPCA now working to develop the capacity of AU Member States to conduct both R&D and Innovation surveys.

Further, NPCA and key partners convened the International Conference for Young Scientists in August 2011 and brought together young scientists from all over Africa, which enabled sharing of experiences on the role of IKS and S&T in climate change adaptation and mitigation. This facilitated the creation of a youth champion cadre on STI and IKS. Their impact has also been felt in Capacity Development (CD).There has been the Successful facilitation of Africa's common positions by NPCA on outcomes of fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea under AU auspices with CD as core driver in Africa's development effectiveness agenda. NPCA received key support of partners - UNDP, UNECA, AfDB, UNAIDS, ACBF, UN Women, Oxfam and Trust Africa.

Again, based on the CDSF, NPCA activated the Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev) as the mobilizing mechanism for the African voice in reshaping the global partnership architecture at HLF-4 Busan. This resulted in the presentation of the first ever African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness (DE) as well as evidence based on African case studies on DE best practices. The NPCA has also scaled up in implementing AU/UN Ten Year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP) for NPCA through the CD Programme, which engaged UN Agencies at the 12th UN Regional Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa convened by UNECA in November 2011. Regarding gender issues, It has also seen to the finalization of the second phase of disbursement of €20 million NEPAD-Spanish Fund for African Women Empowerment to national and sub-regional organizations and the BIWAE to COMESA and ECOWAS (Mayaki, 2012, pp. 1-5).

It is also on record that the NPCA has orchestrated activities in the Strategy and Knowledge Management for instance; NPCA collaborated with AUC to develop a joint framework on harmonizing plans and programmes while a Knowledge Management Needs Audit for NPCA was conducted with support of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa. Similarly, a Rapid Assessment of all the Systems and Tools supporting KM within NPCA was concluded with the support of UNDP, while the Agency and UNDP, ECA and AfDB have commenced the review process of NEPAD implementation since inception (Mayaki, 2012, pp. 1-5).

There is also the existence of a planning, monitoring and evaluation task team established at NPCA to develop appropriate systems, mechanisms and tools for M&E. accordingly; the team developed a draft planning and monitoring policy. Finally, in terms of Partnerships, NPCA provided technical backstopping to African countries on the 17th Africa Partnership Forum (APF) in Addis Ababa and follow up to the Cannes G20 Summit outcomes. NPCA also developed a policy review brief on domestic resource mobilization for Africa's development programmes from NEPAD implementation perspective, in partnership with UNECA and engaged AU technical institutions on sharing experiences and lessons. Additionally, The draft of Rules of Procedure for NEPAD Governance Structures was finalized under the guidance of the Personal Representatives of NEPAD HSGOC Leaders on the NEPAD Steering Committee and support provided by the AUC and its Office of Legal Counsel, following the convening of a Special Retreat of the Steering Committee in October 2011 hosted by Government of South Africa in Rustenburg (Mayaki, 2012, pp. 1-5).

The NPCA, during the review period signed institutional instruments of cooperation with a number of partner institutions including the MoU with UNDP signed in October 2011 and Technical Cooperation Agreement with the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) of November 2011. Other grant agreements were also concluded to support the effective functioning of the Agency. Conclusively, the implementation of the NEPAD Programme is being re-energized through progress and performance in the above-mentioned specific areas. In particular, the NEPAD Agency continues to strengthen its working relationship with the AU Organs, including the Commission and RECs. To this effect, the Agency organized a consultative engagement with AU technical institutions in Midrand, South Africa in December 2011. This has advanced the core objectives of coordination, coherence, alignment and harmonization in programme delivery within the AU.

Looking at the NPCA structure, not much have changed, obviously, because at the time of gathering this data, not much has happened in terms of breaking down the plan into working details. However, an appraisal of the skeletal plan will suggest that the new plan is more about repositioning NEPAD. NEPAD used to operate independent of the African union but currently it has become a body of the African Union. While this decision brings a lot of credit on board, it portends danger too as it will automatically acquire the challenges confronting the African Union. For instance, in the words of Jiboku and Omitola (2009, p. 59) "The OAU failed significantly to accomplish its well-conceived programmes and projects. The principle of non-interference and respect for the sovereign integrity of member states constrained efforts and the intervention of the organization when the need arose, especially when some African leaders embarked on repressive measures against their compatriots and indulge in arbitrary violation of human rights of these people". This will obviously remain a challenge to NPCA and it thus appears, her wheels have been removed from the beginning. First, we need to ask the question, how a project oriented organization like NPCA will function effectively under a parent body that has been noted as a colossal failure in project implementation. Second, the principle of non-interference in the activities of these member states will perpetuate and perpetrate the obnoxious conditions where, the NEPAD lacks the instrumentality to extract obedience and compliance from member states. While the research acknowledges that, it was a smart thing to attach a portion of the funding on the statutory budget of the African Union; this will still not take NPCA to its real destination. For instance, the OAU herself has been suffering from non-compliance and disregard for to its rules from member state, the end of which is still non-fulfillment of responsibilities to the OAU, what is going to change? This research restates that while this is a noble idea, it will only end up putting more pressure on the meager resources of the African Union. Still on the financing of the AU, Jiboku and Omitola (2009, p. 66) noted that "eighty percent of the OAU's fund went into the payment of salaries and only twenty per cent to programmes… the AU needs much more than psaltery funding and cannot commit such a high proportion of its budget to wages alone if it is to succeed. They further added that at the inception of the African Union, 45 out of the 54 member nation were owing the organization $54.53 million (Jiboku and Omitola 2009, p. 59) with the additional NPCA staff, it is yet to be proven how the AU will cope and also how the twenty percent will take up the incremental budgets for implementing NEPAD projects.

Additionally, it is clear as argued in Chapter 4 that NEPAD's dependence on foreign assistance was part of its challenge to achieving maximum expectation. NPCA must therefore re-craft the objectives to reverse this trend. A recovery plan for Africa must seek to mobilize the continents own private and public resources as a means to pay for any of its project and must combine this with restructuring the barriers to African trade. Taylor (2005, p. 166) noted that "NEPAD is predicated on the notion that foreign assistance is indispensable to national development. This presupposes that the forces of development are largely exogenous. Such a notion negates the experiences of developed countries. There is no substitute for development forces that must come from within" Wapmuk (2006, p. 219) warned NEPAD “the days of depending on aid are over. Africa will have to build a strong dynamic and viable domestic economy in which resources can be mobilized continuously to finance a process of capital accumulation and institution building, necessary for economic growth and development to take place. African governments will need to put in place the right incentives to stimulate the investment climate for domestic business activity, pro-poor growth and infrastructure development”

While it could be argued that the NPCA still need some little help from the donor countries, it should look out for the ones whose relationship will be based on certain criteria. Such donors like the G8 should devise a partnership with the peoples of Africa, not its venal elites, and should encourage the development of this ‘reconfiguration’ of state power across the continent, while at the same time balancing this by providing technical resources to those states that are genuine in their reform efforts. In assisting serious state elites, they should focus more on technical support than the provision of funds. Taylor (2005, p. 166) has concluded, “neo-patrimonial nature of most African states is fundamentally deleterious to broad-based development and good governance and it is this that may well ultimately sabotage the high aspirations contained in NEPAD. The idea is that this portends danger for the NPCA as it may compromise the integrity of doing business with Africa, unfortunately, there is nothing yet in the NPCA that speaks to the re-invigoration of the APRM and the need to check the excesses of these leaders. Unfortunately, too, the AU principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states would have already impaired any serious action that the NPCA may have wanted to take in this direction. The fact remains that as studied in Chapter 4 and 5, this will always be a problem to integration. The NPCA will need to develop a strategy with which they could monitor bad governance or even intervene to correct elements of such bad government. As it is today, there is still some sit tight leader’s in-charge of some countries in Africa and hence patron-clientism is ever present with its attendant colossal corruption.

A cursory look into the tripartite function of the NPCA does not actually show a departure from those of the old NEPAD. The responsibility to mobilize the greater part of the resources still lies with NPCA. This research believes there is nothing new in this, what is necessary is to show how the NPCA should be able to mobilize more funds than NEPAD. There is nothing to also show that people are going to change the mode of their response to NEPAD or NPCA in terms of paying up their dues. The other is about implementation of programmes alongside an extra baggage of supporting the drive for the AU vision and mission.

Generally, the new outlook is useful for the sake of rationalization of integration arrangements and reducing the overlapping challenges as seen in Chapter 5. The other is about harmonizing policies of different organizations. Perhaps, it is expected that this will bring focus to the member countries on fewer projects and reduce a lot of their financial responsibilities in attending to the responsibilities of the multiple membership of international organization. Only then can the new NPCA can have more funds to work with.

In terms of the structure, it is yet to be proved, if the renaming of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) into the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) is enough to make them perform better. Second, the decision to set up the intermediary body known as the NEPAD Steering Committee comprising personal representatives of Heads of State and Government which will provide the inter-face between the HSGOC and the NPCA looks like a step in the right direction to ensure that nothing is lost in the gullies between the HSGOC and NPCA. They may perform roles similar to the COREPER in the European Union.

The NPCA has the literature of NEPAD to borrow from, if indeed, it has to survive. However, this research believes that whereas, this is possible, there is nothing yet on ground to prove that NPCA will live beyond NEPAD. Though it may be too early to make the assertion, it is still valid to undertake the task. In this direction, Taylor (2005, p. 164) argued that the only way for a new Africa under the NPCA will be to insist that "a thorough overhaul of the international financial system is a prerequisite if Africa is to even begin tackling its lack of development, setting aside the very real internal problems of neo-patrimonial rule that has been identified as holding the continent back. As part of this overhaul, the subsidies for agricultural producers in the North would need to be addressed; as such structures effectively close off the developed world's market to African exports". The idea here is that, the problem is not about the much talked about democratic practices, since democratic practices does not in any way revert the odds against Africa with regards to trade rules as Taylor (2005, p. 165) noted that "even the most democratic of African governments in Africa find trade rules are stacked against them. Western markets are closed to many of their exports, and yet they are forced to open their own markets to subsidized imports from the rich world. At the same time they are forbidden from adequately supporting or protecting their own vulnerable producers in the way that almost all Western countries do.”

The NPCA will need to focus on subsidies rather than tariffs and quotas as NEPAD did. This is because; tariff and quotas are considered more important for already active traders and investors. Any development plan that claims to support agriculture in Africa and help alleviate rural poverty has to directly target subsidies in the west. After all, it is estimated that sub-Saharan Africa’s annual loss from exports over the past 30 years has been calculated at $68 billion (Taylor 2005, p. 165).

This research is of the opinion that no hope is lost regarding the future of regional integration in West Africa. However, this position is susceptible to the options the new NPCA will take as a facilitator of regional integration in Africa. In terms of attaining convergence or achieving the criteria, the NPCA will need to advice the RECs to review the current criteria’s in line with reality especially considering the fluctuations in food supply and the fact that these countries are basically primary commodity producers. It may also mean that the seemingly European prototype criteria should be dropped for an African based criterion. This is necessary since the attainment of these criteria is not in itself an end but a means to an end. This will be the starting point for advancement in the WAMZ integration and that of ECOWAS as a whole.

The NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency will stand a better chance of getting good results in the area of good governance, if it could reposition the African Peer Review mechanism to focus on highlighting the laws, institutions and practices that needs to be reformed to develop better climate for both Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) instead of the current practice where the focus has been on sovereignty, African Solidarity vs. peer pressure to promote good governance, punitive vs. non punitive actions in dealing with noncompliance and big states vs. weak states (Tawfik 2008, p. 67). Again, since the essence of “peer review” is “sharing best practices”, the NPCA needs to move to the level of exchanging best practice information and convincing the governments to explore them as opportunities for good governance capability building.

It will also be most expedient for the NPCA to insist that member countries subscribe to establishing appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks to build capacity at various levels to plan, draft, implement and monitor successful partnerships. According to Tawfik (2008, p.

67), in this regard, “no single judgment can be made on public-private partnerships, under the right conditions, and in the right sectors, the PPP can offer value for money to governments and good opportunities for investors, but governments need to undertake thorough feasibility studies, develop appropriate and rigorous regulatory framework, tackle corruption and demonstrate strong political commitment”.

The implications of the transformation of the NEPAD into NPCA, puts a lot of responsibility in the new organizations if it will not become the proverbial “old wine in a new bottle” the starting point for the NPCA will be to create awareness at the grassroots level of all member countries, such that the local populace will identify with it. NEPAD was vehemently criticized for being too elitist as in Chapter 4. It was seen as starting from top to bottom instead of bottom up as the case may be. The NPCA must rewrite this history if it has to remain relevant to the people. It will need to strengthen its domestication apparatus and use feedbacks for new inputs into the system.

The fact that NPCA will now operate under the African Union is going to change the perception of the people about them. It will also change the way the international community see them. This research believes that this new relationship may have more liabilities for the NPCA than otherwise. This may be so with respect to the foreign partners who may not be disposed to relating with AU. The AU was seen as an anti-west organization because of the same stance of leaders like Maumar Ghadafi who was one of the founding fathers. Even though Ghadafi is dead, it does not seem that the international community will change this perception overnight. If this is so, then NEPAD NPCA will be challenged since most of their funds come from the foreign partners. The perception of the international community is important to the survival of NPCA. Taylor (2005, p. 169) has stated the reason why this is necessary. In his words “the international community can play an accommodating role, particularly in helping build capacity and supporting African efforts to exercise responsible power through legal channels and through rehabilitating the state into something capable of pursuing develop goals, a tall task admittedly, but not unattainable… but picking who to work with needs to be far more selective than at present, certainly, there should be a complete refusal to lend and donate to state elites, where there is an absence of the rule of law, good governance and sensible economic policies”.

In summary, the NPCA has emerged out of the ashes of NEPAD but have an advantage having known the challenges of NEPAD. It will need to rebuild itself and surprise the protagonists with a sterling performance.

7.2 Conclusion

The NPCA looks set to succeed especially by virtue of emerging from the ashes of NEPAD. The lessons has been learnt and in a very hard way. Africa will need to build on o new foundation. The proposal is to ensure that the NPCA will muster mass support not just from the elites, but also from the generality of the citizens. It should approach relationship with the donor countries cautiously and ensure that it does not compromise, the same principles and practices that are supposed to help Africa, out of its doldrums.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction

There are compelling reasons for regionalism in Africa. Among other reasons, Africa is threatened with further marginalization in the global economy. It has fragmented population with only five of the fifty-three countries on the continent having a population of more than thirty million and over a quarter with a population of less than three million. Integration creates bigger markets and stimulates large-scale production. This in turn mitigates Africa's dependence on the world economy, its status as a supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods. In addition, regionalism insulates Africa's nascent industries against international competition. Robson (1983, p. 1) noted that "in Africa itself, a particularly fertile ground for cooperation and integration is provided by the existence of large number of new states whose smallness and poverty represent severe constraints on their autonomous development. After analyzing the pathetic state of Africa, Peter further stated that "Regional integration is thus important, it is still more so to the development of those African states, that are not only poor and small, but that suffer additional handicap of being landlocked and are consequently particularly dependent on cooperation with coastal neighbours. For these and related reasons, regional integration is an imperative.

The fragility of African economies and its increasing marginality in the international political economy necessitate a regionalist approach that elevates Africa and augments its capacity as an active (as opposed to marginal) participant in the global economy without aggravating its external dependence. Therefore, this research agrees with Adetula (2009, p. 25) that "regional integration in the South is an extremely complicated and varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and political dynamics that are different from what obtains in the North. Therefore, the theory of regional integration in Africa must recognize the unity of the process of economic integration, political integration and social integration, and provide for the political weapon as part of the strategies for implementing regional integration programmes. Consequently, what Africa needs is a special kind of integration called the "new" regionalism, which is different from the 'old' regionalism, which operated in the 1950s through the cold war era. Akopkpari (2008, pp. 47-48) has summarized four different types of regionalism, which can be identified in this research notably; (i) open regionalism

(ii) the WIDER Approach (iii) regionalism from below (iv) and the external guarantor's model.

Open regionalism is consistent with neo-liberal globalisation and makes countries more extroverted, i.e. conforming to neoliberal inclinations. Currently, NEPAD is administering this dosage to its member states. Akopkpari (2008, p. 47) Citing (Soderbaum, 1996, pp. 1-2) noted that, the WIDER approach sees the new regionalism as a multidimensional process that leads to the homogenisation of political, social, cultural and economic policies of states. It proceeds on the premise that globalisation and regionalisation are part of processes of structural change occurring at the global level. WIDER see globalisation as a force escalating 'market driven' disorder and turbulence not only on the level of the world, but also in local systems. As a prescription for this disorder, the WIDER approach promotes regionalism from below rather than the state-led approach often initiated from the top. Thus regionalism is seen as a process by state to increase regional trade and interdependence to serve as a counter-hegemonic force of globalisation. In this sense, regionalism offers a path for marginalised regions in Africa, Latin America and in the Arab world to establish large integrated regions that create a new and different global world from globalisation-generated 'global disorder' of the post-cold war era (Amin, 1999, p. 54) 'Regionalism from below' sees regional integration as a counter-force to globalisation. It presents regionalism as a process driven not only by states but also by non-state actors including informal sectors such as cross boarder trading activities. Globalisation produces winners and loser with the latter in the majority. Losers retreated into the informal sector. Regionalism from below recognizes the phenomenal expansion of the informal sector because of the failure of the state to meet popular expectations. It calls on developing countries to shun the state dominated European Union model of integration in favour of non-state approaches to regionalism" (Akopkpari, 2008, p. 48).

The 'External Guarantors Model' (EGM) model advocates a partnership between developed and developing countries in establishing regional integration schemes in the latter. It argues that international agencies such as the World Bank, IMF and creditor countries should have greater influence on Africa's regionalism by acting as guarantors to prevent the reversal of politically unpopular microeconomic programmes. The EGM is replicated in the role of France's in the French West African Monetary Union, l union economique et monetaire quest-africaine (UEMOA). In this union, the common currency of UEMOA, the CFA is linked to the French franc with Paris serving as the guarantor and supervisor. NEPAD seeks to establish a similar supervisor role for Africa’s creditors who in addition to ensuring compliance with conditionalities also ensure the judicious use of disbursed credit. Thus the EGM hold mixed blessings to Africa; whereas it could instigate good governance practices, it could also- as with the experiences with SAPs potentially entail intrusive and pauperizing conditionalities that could worsen Africa’s development challenges.

Africa requires regionalism that combines the best possible opportunities for accelerated development. In this direction, Keet (2002, p. 18) rightly argues that Africa requires rounded internally integrated and more soundly-based production economics. To this end Africa should de-emphasize the open regionalism intrinsic in NEPAD.... a more development-friendlier approach is that which combines elements of WIDER approach and regionalism from below: these are predominantly introverted approaches that mobilize domestic resources, and recognise the importance of the huge and expanding informal sector” (Akopkpari, 2008, p. 4).

The combination of WIDER approach and regionalism from below is complimentary to what Robson (1983, p. 2) calls ‘positive integration’. He was concerned that in the past two decades, much has been learned about the problems and techniques of regional integration among developing countries. In particular limitations of orthodox customs unions and of measures for trade liberalisation are not widely recognised. It is widely appreciated that effective regional Integration demands not only such measures of ‘negative integration’ but also what Tinbergen (1965) terms measures of ‘Positive Integration’. In his view, positive integration are measures designed to make an integrated market function effectively and to promote broader policy objectives. Although gaps in technical knowledge remain, if the knowledge gained from the integration experience of the past two decades is put to good use- of which there signs- both established schemes and those in the process of formation, will stand a much improved chance of making their potential contribution of development policy.

First, the structure of regional integration on the continent and especially, West African Sub region need to be rationalized. There are too many initiatives, with overlapping memberships, duplication of mandates, and very few successes. Many countries belong to more than one regional grouping, with resultant problems of diversion of loyalty, resources, skills, and commitment. The process of rationalization has to be initiated and addressed at the level of the African Union. This was on the agenda of AU already in 2006 in Banjul, but a speedy solution to the patchwork of regional groupings needs to be found. In this direction, the integration of the Nepad Planning and Coordination Agency into the African Union is commendable. The idea is that African leaders should strive to make existing institutions work effectively instead of coming up with new ones from time to time. The danger is that these new ones become counterproductive with time and instead of replicating the success of the old integration as postulated by the neo-functionalists, they end up importing their negatives and frustration from the old system to the new one. Ultimately, the new organisation will die and then another cyclic process begins. This research believes that the coming of new integration facilitating organisations is a colossal waste of time. Real integration will be to further integrate and re-integrate the so-called integrated arrangements in the continent i.e. a consolidation of the already existing integration arrangements.

It must be stated that the neo-functionalist and integration schools represented by Haas had opined that “integrative lessons learned in one functional context will be applied in others, thus eventually supplanting international politics”. This research believes that the proposal will be “positive” lessons not negative lessons. Unfortunately, the birth of new integration arrangements and intergovernmental organizations has not bequeathed a better organization than the existing ones. It thus appeared that what the elites do is to abandon their agreements to an organization and switch loyalty once they see that it is not serving their patrimonial interest before even the national interest. This has led to the apathy and lip service paid to NEPAD and its transmutation. Therefore the “gradual politicization of the actors’ purposes which were initially considered ‘technical’ or ‘non-controversial” is to satisfy their patron-client systems before a consideration to national interest. Secondly, as the case of IGAD has demonstrated, interstate and intrastate issues can easily cripple noble initiatives, including regional integration schemes. Therefore, reconciling national and regional interests helps states to cooperate on the common goals of regional integration and development, which can benefit all. It is true that states are principally concerned about security, and even in this case national interests are best served through regionalization, as very often threats to national security have regional character.

NPCA, as an arm of the African Union can serve as a think tank and be involved for example in leading the study and implementation of the rationalization process. This rationalization should be accompanied with policy harmonisation between French and English speaking West African’s. In this regard, Lavergene and Daddieh (1997,p. 103) advised “ That there is an urgent need for greater efforts at policy co-ordination in matters of trade policy reform such as is being carried out under Structural Adjustment Programs. Substantial Trade Liberalization has already taken place in the region, but there seems to be virtually no effort to tap this systematically for the reinforcement of regional trade by focusing on products with particular regional trade potential, such as those identified by Stryker et al, for example, textiles, footwear, cooking utensils, or processed foods and beverages.

In Africa, regional integration is closely associated with development, which requires African states to look at the potential of developmental integration in contrast to the classic model of market integration. As some projects are either beyond the capacity of single states or affect and/or benefit multiple states, joint regional projects can be more beneficial than going it alone. Several areas cited in this regard, including transport and communications, regional commons and the environment, regional energy pools, food security, research and higher education, governance, political and social stability, security cooperation and crime prevention are some of the promising areas of cooperation.

Again, there is a danger in committing the whole spectrum of projects in Africa and making it open for "Partners" sponsorship. The consequence is that if a project is considered not useful to them or even as opposing their interest, they will not likely offer their sponsorship. This is the situation with the huge dam on the Omo River, under construction in southern Ethiopia since 2009, considered the second biggest on the continent, has run into serious opposition from environmental and human rights groups in the West, and the World Bank has refused to finance the project. However, the Ethiopian government has continued with the project. The dam has on the one hand implications on the flow of water into Lake Turkana in Kenya, while the government claims that the dam is intended to benefit the other states in the region with the supply of energy. This is the whole reason behind giving conditionalities to Africa and determining how the money will be spent. Therefore, in sourcing for funding or making requests from the foreign partners, NPCA should isolate those project accordingly to identify the projects which are of interest to them in different countries and for which funds should be sought unequivocally from inside Africa. This may have been the reason that made Akopkpari (2008, p. 47) to submit that "in the face of repeated unfulfilled western promises and the inability of the previous strategies to induce development, Africa's hopes lie in a development model that minimizes dependence on external agencies".

Still on funding, it is very important for the NPCA to extend the meaning of the concept of "ownership" not just to the 'founders' but also to the 'funders'. The ownership of NEPAD has to be founded largely in funding. Hence, the trend must be revered in the funding equation and the bulk of the funding must come from within Africa rather than the multilateral agencies.

On the other hand, NEPAD and ECOWAS should collaborate with these multi-lateral agencies much more in areas of technical knowledge acquisition and importing 'best practice'. For instance, this kind of collaboration over instituting a sound competition law in the sub region as examined in Chapter 3 is commendable. Countries in the West African sub region and the leadership of the European commission (EC) had met in Abuja in September 2010, to craft and plan modalities for the implementation of regional competition Law, which regulates anti-competitive behaviour in the market.

One issue that must be sorted out, in the quest to move the new NEPAD forward is the lack of political will on the side of the African leaders. Sykers etal (1983, p. 3) has noted that, "it not just technical knowledge that has been lacking but the political will. During the past two decades, the emphasis of policy in most African states has been on internal political consolidation. Most of these leaders are deep into nationalism than regionalism. In this regard, Omoweh (2009, p. 221) noted that "the majority of the African political leaders are not really convinced about the capacity of the NEPAD initiative to deliver the public goods of development and bail the continent out of the woods. Political will itself is a result of legitimacy and good governance and as long as this is not the practice, political will to support NPCA will remain elusive. In this regard, the NPCA must as a matter of urgency, re-model and reinvigorate the African Peer Review Mechanism. African leaders must not be allowed to be a judge in their own case or be an examiner in a process where they are also candidates. This research believes that an independent body should be entrusted with harnessing the results from APRM. This is where they need to partner with Europe to provide unbiased and independent opinion on issues around democracy and good governance.

Further, NPCA should insist on bigger sanctions or introduce other means of extracting compliance from the leaders of the member nations. A situation where they back out of commitment is to say the least unacceptable. They have to mobilize political will and actions to implement policy and institutional reforms, including harmonizing regulatory systems and ratifying agreements.

It appears one of the biggest challenges to intra-regional trade remains the availability of surpluses of goods over and above the need of individual member states. There is need for the integration of production process of cooperating countries. In addition, there is need to ensure a conflict free decision-making processes and the resolution of conflicting national and supranational loyalties. NPCA should orchestrate a broad industrial policy for the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) while at the same time facilitating the lubrication of tight borders of the member nations. This will achieve the twin objective of ensuring surplus goods and strengthening intra-regional trade. Again, as noted in Chapter 5, volume of official trade is low and consequently pauperizes the member states of ECOWAS. NEPAD should initiate projects that will boost formal trade. This could be informing of tax relief driven incentives for products that pass through the formal channel. The member states must ensure that the price gaps between products sold through both channels are either eliminated or insignificant.

Regarding the ICT sector, African governments should ignore any development plans on ICT that encourages dependence on the importation of technologies as well as rejecting in its entirety, using their markets as dumping ground for refurbished ICT materials. Technology becomes more useful and cost efficient if they are manufactured locally, Consequently, West African leaders and government should move from being just a consumer of technology to an engineer of technology producing and deploying it for rapid socio-economic development**.**

Also, as it is today, it does not appear that NEPAD has attracted the needed level of private partnership investment which is needed to drive growth and development. As identified in the research, state-led integration initiatives are not as efficient as private sector led integration and development (see Chapter 3). Apart from a strong presence in the energy sector, this same presence is not replicated in other sectors. Consequently, Private sector and the building of PPP for the implementation of the NPCA projects must be courted. The opportunity is huge as Omoweh (2009, p. 221) pointed out ‘it is important to build confidence of foreign capital and donors of the African private sector firms and groups. The donors are reluctant to deal with the local business class not so much because it is weak, as its lack of political access to power-that-be, which is required to have a deal sealed”

Further, this research agrees with Adewoye (1997, p. 321) on the relationship between constitutionalism, democracy, good governance and regional integration as mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. NEPAD, itself also lays credence to this matter. What is remaining is to re-energize the peer monitoring under the auspices of the African peer Review

Mechanism. There is obviously, a high level of asymmetries' between the practice democratic ideals itself and the way it is practiced in Africa. Until these principles are strictly adhered to, the enabling environment of consistent foreign direct investment and trust will not be nurtured. This 'new society' will eradicate or reduce parochialism, patron-clienteles' and patrimonial system of government to the barest minimum. There is therefore need for a new orientation, which must emphasize people before wealth, and human and environmental security before profit. It is emphasized that development must meet the needs of the present era without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

While examining the Council of Ministers of the European Union, This research found out that, because the presidency of the council is rotated among member nations, such nation in lead uses the opportunity to orchestrate and cascade their "pet projects". This automatically gives the project a face that even after they leave office, they are emotionally bound to drive it to conclusion, this way ECOWAS and NEPAD can successfully put an end to the issue of abandoned properties. Again, this will make the member countries to be tied to the project financially, knowing that if the project does not get to a conclusion, it will come to their discredit. This research suggested that just like in the theory of comparative advantage, countries in the ECOWAS regions should own project to which they have comparative advantage. For instance, Nigeria should own and be made the champion of the West African Gas Pipeline since Gas and Oil is the mainstay of their economy. A country like Senegal or Ghana or such as has a high hydra- system should be made to own, the West African Power pool.

There are some practices that should be borrowed from the European Union. First, is the existence of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is necessary to bring focus to the grass root administration? Through it, the European council is able to function effectively without being immersed in less mundane matters. Interestingly, these Representatives are of ambassadorial rank drawn from national administration. They are actually strategically positioned to make the activities of the EU get closer to the people or translated to the grass root. They ensure that there is an interface between the national and supranational institutions and the application of laws and decisions both vertically and horizontally across the members of the union. In fact as noted in Chapter 6, Jose M. Magone (2011, p. 158) discussed this alongside many other scholars. Magone referred to this as the Europeanization of national politics and domestication of European politics."

Though, NEPAD has made attempts at the domestication of their policies, it does not appear that such process is still efficient and practicable. The focus officials are not as powerful as their European Counterparts (COREPER), neither are they empowered to drive the process of this magnitude. It is to be restated here that one of the biggest problems of NEPAD for which a barrage of criticisms has been raised is that fact that it does not have a grass root connection with the people. One other thing worth stating here is that the COREPER are both agents of feedback who has the power to turn or suggest such policies to become a law. This is definitely a learning curve for the new NPCA in its bid to be acceptable and incur popularity. This research very much support the intellectual partnership on Africa development being chaperoned by the EU using the platform of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) based in Nairobi. This medium might well be a place for exchange of ideas and sharing best practice. It could become an engine room for developing best practice, processes and ideas incubated by the European Union to assist Africa out of the doldrums of underdevelopment. However, such intellectual exchanges should not be ‘copy and paste’, since the African environment is entirely different and may not be suitable for an exact replication of such practices.

8.2 Conclusion

The broad objective of this study is to investigate and examine the difficulties encountered by NEPAD in facilitating regional economic integration on the ECOWAS platform. This has been fully identified and discussed. They include; difficulties associated with free movement of people, transportation , absence of a unifying currency, undemocratic practices and regime, fear of loss of sovereignty to mention a few. Accordingly, the role of NEPAD and ECOWAS to assuage these militating factors was reviewed. This included: the ECOWAS Passport, traveler’s cheques, the West African gas pipeline, the construction of transnational routes etc. The European Union was also studied with the intention of seeing what lessons ECOWAS and NEPAD can take in their bid to foster regional integration. On the basis of these, suggestions were made for the take-off of the NPCA.

Generally, this research is clear on the fact that regional integration is very indispensable in Africa’s journey to development. It also acknowledges the contribution of NEPAD using the platform of the ECOWAS in bringing about integration; however, it also examined the difficulties of NEPAD and ECOWAS and has attempted to build a link between the challenges and the transformation of NEPAD. As the new NPCA comes on board, the research has placed valuable information at their disposal on some of the things that could help them achieve better result. Our conclusion is that there is a future for regional integration in Africa and West Africa specifically. There is also hope for the new NPCA, but there is a price to pay for it. The African Union must do more than just changing the nomenclature of NEPAD. They have to equip the NPCA with more arsenals and demand accountability along given metrics from her. This way the NPCA will not be haunted by the ghost of NEPAD.

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APPENDIX

THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NEPAD NIGERIA



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