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DOI:

[10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104914](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104914)

Document Version

Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication record in King's Research Portal](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

John, P., & Sjoberg, F. (2020). Partisan responses to democracy promotion – Estimating the causaleffect of a civic information portal. *WORLD DEVELOPMENT*, 130, [104914].
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104914>

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Partisan Responses to Democracy Promotion – Estimating the Causal Effect of a Civic Information Portal

[anon.]

Monday, April 20, 2020

Abstract

Citizens respond to information about democracy according to whether they are electoral winners or losers. This difference occurs both at the national and constituency level. Democratic interventions that seek to promote accountability and transparency might therefore impact citizens differentially depending on the political party that people support. In a placebo-controlled experimental design, carried out in Kenya, we find that democracy promotion boosts the external efficacy and political participation of ruling party partisans, but leaves those from the opposition unaffected. These responses—based on national incumbency—are further conditioned by the partisanship of the MP of the constituency where the voter resides. These findings throw new light on the impact of civic interventions, such as Get Out the Vote (GOTV) and civic education, common in Africa as well as elsewhere, as we show their benefits accrue to the electoral winners rather than the losers.

Keywords: winning and losing; democracy promotion; political participation; external efficacy; Kenya; civic technology

7,493 words

Introduction

Which side voters are on in an electoral contest matters because there are clear winners and losers. Not only does the outcome affect reactions to the poll, winning or losing shapes how citizens view the political system itself (Anderson, 2005), such as satisfaction with democracy (Singh, Karakoç, & Blais, 2012; Singh, 2014; Hansen, Klemmensen, & Serritzlew, 2019), political trust (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002), and external political efficacy (Davis & Hitt, 2016). Information that partisans receive about the political system is likely to be interpreted in a binary fashion: democracy appears to work for the winners; for losers it may not. Such views are also likely to condition how citizens respond to interventions that promote democracy in general terms. Today, international and national public organizations fund many projects that aim to boost democratic attitudes and promote an active citizenry (Moehler, 2010; Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2017), which are justified as benefits to the whole population. What has hitherto not been fully recognized is that the impact of these civic measures might differ depending on which side people are on in the partisan battle.

In this paper, we test the claim that pro-democracy interventions suffer from partisan bias. Our case is a real-world non-partisan parliamentary monitoring site – mzalendo.com based in Kenya. This kind of online resource for citizens has emerged in many places around the world in recent years.¹ Civic technology has generated high expectations in the field of governance and development (Patel, Sotsky, Gourley, & Houghton, 2013). Engaging the citizenry using digital information and communication technologies (ICT) can reach a large number of individuals. The appeal of ICT stems from the reduced transaction costs associated with this way of accessing information, and the convenience and immediacy of ICT-enabled forms of engagement. Around the world there are many cases of interventions like Mzalendo (McNutt et

¹ Already in 2011 a survey revealed 191 parliamentary monitoring sites (Mandelbaum, 2011).

al., 2016; Peixoto & Fox, 2016). However, little is known about the causal impact of such projects.

In Kenya, parliamentary monitoring operates in a context of intense partisan conflict (Mueller, 2011), making it an appropriate case for which to test our hypotheses. Kenya is an East African emerging democracy with a population of around 40 million (Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, & others, 2015). Kenya is also a low-income country and low-information environment. Extreme political polarization means that elections are intensively fought, with at times lethal outcomes (Mueller, 2011). Partisan affiliation overlaps with ethnicity (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). In spite of abuses of power, there are regular contested elections where the parties in power do switch: the basics of democracy are in place (Chege, 2008). This makes it a good site in which to test the theory. Winning and losing matter very much in the country, both for individual and constituency-level outcomes, where which party is in power is very important, but where democratic procedures mean there is a chance for reversing power making contests competitive. The majoritarian electoral system offers stark electoral outcomes at the local level, which may or may not contrast with the national outcomes, helping the test of our multi-level framework.

At the core of the Mzalendo platform, there is norm-affirming democracy messages, including quotations from the Kenyan constitution adopted in 2010. The website also provides commentary on current legislative issues as well as information about the performance of MPs, such as attendance and plenary speech excerpts. We conducted an experiment whereby we recruited and randomly assigned subjects to a Mzalendo-type website containing pro-democracy civic education messages and where participation was signaled as desirable. External efficacy and participation were captured with a survey instrument administered before and after treatment. We analyze the impact of the treatment conditional on self-reported pro-government

orientation. We find that losers in electoral contests do not react to democratic messaging while winners do.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explain why partisans differentially process information depending on their role as electoral winners or losers. Second, we report the details of the experimental design. Third, we present the results. Finally, we discuss the findings, make conclusions, and draw implications for policy.

The Multi-Level Winner-Loser Framework

Democracy matters because it provides a legitimate avenue for political representation and a means for ensuring accountability. Elections are valued as key elements to that process as they provide the means for electoral punishment and reward. For partisans, they are crucial for an additional reason: the party to which they are attached may either win or lose. There can be a positive or a negative result from the campaigning and the emotional investment in the party that partisans have given freely in the period before the poll. In democratic theory, attitudes to democracy should not depend on an electoral outcome, which needs to be regarded as fair whatever happens to the fates of the individual contestants; but in practice partisanship is such a powerful driver of political attitudes and shaper of interests that general attitudes to the system and political behavior are affected by these outcomes. Losing is important because access to power has been denied and winning secures benefits—either material, ideological, or psychological—for the group for whom the partisan is a member. This loss continues until there is another occasion to challenge the incumbent in the subsequent electoral contest.

The framework of winning and losing has been advocated by a number of scholars since Anderson's seminal contributions (Anderson, 2005; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001). The argument runs along the following lines. Losers feel an element of discomfort when their favored candidate loses, and they feel angry and discontented as a result. They had put their faith in

their team as a badge of their partisanship, but it had lost. There is an element of cognitive dissonance from the result because the expectation and messaging of the campaign is for winning rather than losing. It is plausible to believe that this discontent with the outcome could spill over to attitudes to the political system in general. Losers may believe that the political system is going to be less responsive to their interests because their opponents are in government and are rewarding their supporters. In contrast, winners feel the responsiveness from those partisans who are expecting rewards. Winning means satisfaction and taking pleasure in the result, and where there is a reward for the effort put into the campaign and long years of support, as the expectation is that the leaders are going to reward their supporters when in office. Such a feeling from winning among party supporters is stronger in majoritarian systems because the stakes are higher (Plescia, 2019).

The conclusion to draw is that losing or winning is likely to condition general political attitudes toward the political system. This finding emerges in studies of attitudes toward democracy, such as satisfaction (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Blais & Gélinau, 2007; Blais, Morin-Chassé, & Singh, 2017; Conroy-Krutz & Kerr, 2015; Hansen et al., 2019; Henderson, 2008; Singh, 2014; Singh et al., 2012), political trust (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002) and external political efficacy (Davis & Hitt, 2016). It is also reasonable to conclude that the higher the degree of polarization in a country, the more there is at stake, making the impacts of winning and losing starker in their consequences for partisans as the winner is most likely to use the benefits of winning to secure long-term advantages (Lelkes, 2016).

Such attitudes to success and defeat are reinforced by the partisan conditioning of political information in general (Anduiza, Gallego, & Muñoz, 2013; Bartels, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011), whereby partisanship structures attitudes to national politics. As a result, partisanship acts as a filter whereby information is processed to be in accordance with

pre-set beliefs about the party, and affects how citizens attribute credit and blame for government actions (Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). It also affects how partisans evaluate democratic processes, such as electoral fraud (Beaulieu, 2014). Such filters are likely to apply to positive information about the political system.

In the case of democratic interventions, like the one in our experiment, the treatment constitutes an affirmation of democratic norms, so we hypothesize that only those who already support the government, where winning is congruent with democratic messaging, are nudged by this kind of messaging. In other words, government partisans process affirmative democracy information because it bolsters their view of the political system. When exposed to conflicting, losers ignore incongruent information making them insensitive to such a treatment.² Opposition partisans remain unaffected because they have a lower rating of democracy to begin with and the information does thus not confirm their views. This is a gap in knowledge because research studies on GOTV and other civic interventions have not evaluated partisanship as a conditioning variables, focusing instead on measures of propensity to vote (Enos, Fowler, & Vavreck, 2013), party affiliation in general (Gerber and Green 2000), with only Panagopoulos (2009, p. 74) finding some support for partisan conditioning of GOTV.

So how can democratic values and behaviors be affected by democracy promotion? One issue is that external efficacy is a core political attitude that captures how responsive citizens think the government is (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). It is often thought to be a disposition that arises from the political culture and socialized preferences of a society (Almond & Verba, 1963; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) and is thought to be relatively stable over time (McPherson, Welch, & Clark, 1977). Despite this, citizens are not immune to information or affirmative messaging, even if the attitude is socially embedded. For instance, experimental work has shown that citizens interacting with political information online can increase their

² Or 'partisan resistance' to mainstream messages (Zaller, 1992).

external efficacy (Tedesco, 2007), though other studies have found no effect (Pennington, Winfrey, Warner, & Kearney, 2015). Important for this study, winning elections has been found to have an impact (Anderson and Tverdova 2001).

In addition to external efficacy, we are also interested in political participation as an outcome. Political participation refers to citizen acts directed toward the political process, which can range from voting, to contacting, and forms of collective action (Conge, 1988). Participation, in particular intention to participate, may be seen as more malleable than efficacy as it is affected by citizen costs and benefits that vary. It is also possible to influence participation by communicating core values in a political system, such as civic duty, as in GOTV campaigns (Green & Gerber, 2015). Participation is linked to efficacy: getting people to consider participating may be affected to the extent to which they have efficacy because when they have low efficacy they are not inclined to participate and vice versa, a core finding of survey research on the factors affecting political participation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Barnes, 1979; Karp & Banducci, 2008; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

More specifically, we consider turnout intention to be intimately linked to the satisfaction of supporting a winning side in a contest (Andreoni, 1990). A voter who did not win on either of the two levels – national and constituency – will be less sensitive to a treatment that encourages participation in the future. A ruling party supporter, who is represented by a co-partisan, associates elections with winning and when encouraged to vote their interest in taking part is increased. An opposition supporter, on the other hand, associates voting with losing and when encouraged to vote they remain unaffected.

Conditional responses based on winning and losing in a national context can affect partisan individuals wherever they live. However, we also know that they do not face the same conditions across a territory, especially in plurality systems. They may be represented by someone who they voted for or not, and this may also affect how they respond to democratic

interventions. When citizens are exposed to information about parliament and are invited to monitor the performance of their representative, it matters what the relationship the voter has to this person. Studies show the feelings of empowerment and efficacy increase when a group perceives it is directly represented in the legislature (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Gay, 2002; Tate, 2003). In between the two extremes of win-winners and lose-losers are those whose party won on one of the two levels and they can also be expected to react positively to encouragements.

To set the impact of different electoral contexts, we consider a generalizable two-level hierarchy with a national level and a constituency level. At the national level, a partisan’s party can be either in government or opposition. At the constituency level, a partisan may be either represented by a co-partisan or not. The combinations and the associated hypotheses are represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Sensitivity to Treatment by Partisanship Category & Hypotheses.

<p>Winner</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National: Ruling party • Constituency: Represented by ruling party • Hypothesis: Positive impact
<p>Loser</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National: Opposition party • Constituency: Not represented by opposition • Hypothesis: No impact
<p>Partial Winner</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National: Ruling or Opposition party • Constituency: Represented or not • Hypothesis: Partial positive impact

We are interested in how attitudes and intentions are conditional upon placement in this scheme. For a ruling party supporter with a high level of external efficacy, the treatment will further increase their efficacy, i.e. the treatment will confirm information that the individual

has already internalized. An opposition party supporter should have lower efficacy to begin with since the ruling party cannot be expected to be as responsive to the losing side in an election. As a consequence, opposition supporters would be expected to ignore the pro-efficacy message.


On the other hand, if an opposition supporter is represented by a co-partisan then it seems reasonable to expect a positive impact, as long as the efficacy question explicitly taps into the responsiveness of the subjects' own representative. Conversely, if a ruling party supporter is not represented by a co-partisan and if the efficacy question focused on the regime and not the specific MP, we would expect a positive albeit a less powerful impact of the treatment. We test these implications in our research design.

Research Design

The research was conducted between 11th November and 2nd December 2016. Subjects were recruited via Facebook using paid adverts, many targeted directly to women.³ Our adverts had almost 850,000 views. Once recruited, participants were randomly allocated to one of two trial arms, the Mzalendo website and the placebo “Oceans” (see Figure 2, which reports the numbers for both men and women). A total of 3,463 subjects completed the last phase of the study, the end-line survey, 1,759 from the treatment group and 1,704 from the control.

³ See Appendix 3: Recruitment Pages.

Figure 2. Flow Diagram of Subjects Over the Course of the Experiment.



* Note: 'Start' defined as non-missing value on Q1 on the respective survey wave and 'end' defined as non-missing value on the last question on the respective survey wave. Attrition % refers to the percentage of subjects that completed wave 1, but who did not complete wave 2.

Random assignment was validated through a sample balance test. In a F-test simulation, as suggested by Gerber and Green (2012), the imbalance in the sample is not greater than what would be expected by chance.⁴ In other words, there is covariate balance in the experiment: subjects that completed the study have similar background characteristics in both treatment and control groups. In terms of attrition between the two rounds of surveys, Figure 2 shows that there was attrition between the two waves. However, this was not concentrated in either of the experimental groups. The attrition rate in the control group was 58.3 percent and in the treatment group 56.7 percent, a difference that is not statistically significant.⁵

⁴ See Appendix 2: Covariate Balance and Table 1 from Appendix 8: Additional Statistical Material.

⁵ The difference is not statistically significant (p -value 0.15), see Appendix 8: Additional Statistical Material.

Subject Pool

The subject pool consists of predominantly young Kenyans. On average the age is 26 years (see Table 1). This is in line with what we expected since we recruited subjects via Facebook as well as reflecting the population in Kenya that is on average relatively young, with 42 per cent being under the age of 15.⁶ Just over a third of the sample is female, even after having spent considerably more on advertising directly to women. It is not a wealthy sample, but skews towards the highly educated. There is a degree of self-selection into the sample, but nonetheless with good representation of subgroups to allow for the use of covariates.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Subject Pool.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	3,458	25.51	6.17	15	73
Female	3,463	0.36	0.48	0	1
Socio-Economic (wealth index)	3,463	2.00	1.29	0	6
University (attended some)	3,462	0.75	0.43	0	1
External Efficacy Score (1-5)	3,458	2.42	0.84	1.00	5.00
Likelihood of Voting (1-4)	3,462	3.39	0.94	1	4

Due to limitations in terms of how IP addresses are captured in Kenya and the prevalence of mobile phones as the main mode of accessing the internet, we are not able to infer the geographical location of the subjects; though we expect the sample to be made up of mostly urban dwellers. The main analysis is conducted on the theoretically relevant subset of partisanship categories: losers, partial winners, and winners. These categories cover 1,630 study subjects, constituting 47.1 percent of all 3,463 who completed the study. It should be noted that half of the respondents, 49.7 per cent of the total pool of subjects, self-identified as non-partisans (1,030 as non-partisans in ruling party constituencies, the largest group, and 690 as non-

⁶ 2015 estimates by United Nations Population Division.

partisans in opposition constituencies). Although included in the sample for the analysis, we have no theoretical expectations for this group, as specified by the pre-analysis plan.⁷

The Treatment

The intervention is the exposure of recruited citizens of Kenya to a website mimicking the real-world mzalendo.com site.⁸ Mzalendo is a non-partisan project started in 2005 whose mission is to ‘keep an eye on the Kenyan parliament’.⁹ The Mzalendo site seeks to promote greater public voice and enhance public participation in politics by providing relevant information about the National Assembly and Senate's activities. Respondents can find socio-biographical information about their Member of Parliament (MP) as well as the complete record of speeches during plenary sessions. Our treatment introduces respondents to their role in democracy and the role of MPs. The treatment also informs users about voter registration and encourages respondents to vote (for the full treatment content see Appendix 4 and Appendix 5). The treatment text conveys the aim of the democratic system: “Their job is to represent the people of their constituencies as well as special interests (youth, women, persons with disabilities and ordinary workers).” It also told the reader about the responsibilities of the citizens to find out information. Segments of text are interspersed by short quizzes, designed to make the experience interactive. Finally, respondents are encouraged to participate in politics, and then provided with a link to rest of the Mzalendo.com site and encouraged to visit it. The website conveys basic facts about Kenyan democracy and then gets respondents to interact with the


⁷ Registered on 9 November 2016 (registry details withheld for blinding).

⁸ IRB approval received 2 May 2016 (details withheld for blinding).

⁹ Developed in partnership between the researchers and staff at Mzalendo, we created a replica of the key elements of the site for the purposes of this study. The reason was twofold. First, we wanted to track the subjects’ interactions on the site and keep the subjects in the assigned treatment funnel. Given how the regular site is set up this would not have been possible. Second, we wanted to distill the key elements of the mzalendo.com experience, including some of the interaction components, into a site that would keep the subjects engaged.

material using a quiz (see Figure 3). Given that Mzalendo is a MP-monitoring website, we furthermore consider the treatment as a reminder of the identity of the MP, and thus of partisanship.

Figure 3. First Part of the Treatment Group Webpage.



The screenshot shows the Mzalendo website header with the logo and tagline "Eye on Kenyan Parliament". Below the header is a green banner with the text "Your Vote Your Representative!". The main content area contains a paragraph about the National Assembly of Kenya, followed by a list of duties and non-duties of members of parliament. A note mentions a short quiz. Below this is another green banner with the text "Your Role In Democracy". The final section is a yellow box containing a short quiz with two questions: "How many members of Parliament are there?" and "Do members of Parliament exercise oversight over the Governor?".

MZALENDO Eye on Kenyan Parliament

Your Vote Your Representative!

Did you know that the National Assembly of Kenya is made up of 350 members? Their job is to represent the people of their constituencies as well as special interests (youth, women, persons with disabilities and ordinary workers).

The duty of members of parliament is to:

- Debate and make laws
- Determine where public money is spent
- Review the actions of the President

The duty of members of parliament does not include:

- Oversight over the Governor
- Attending funerals
- Maintaining county roads

Note we will be having a short quiz later so do pay attention!

Your Role In Democracy

Kenyan citizens are expected to find out how politicians are performing to ensure high standards of leadership and integrity are respected and maintained.

As a Kenyan citizen, you have the opportunity to hold your representatives to account in the national elections scheduled to take place in August 2017.

You can use websites like Mzalendo to find out how well your elected representative is doing, to check if they have attended the national assembly and to get news and information too, such as what is said in Parliament. You can follow Mzalendo on Facebook and Twitter. You can hear about the elections next year and who is standing for office.

Now take this short Quiz

How many members of Parliament are there?

Do members of Parliament exercise oversight over the Governor?

To offer a similar online experience without political content, we designed a placebo, which has the same kind of activities as the treatment. It has the same design and spread of text

and activities, but the content is about the oceans of the world. The placebo informs the reader about oceans and then offers a short quiz. The remaining text after the quiz contains more information about oceans.

Winner-Loser Typology


Our winner-loser typology incorporates both national level as well as constituency-level dynamics. First, we asked the respondents to say whether they feel close to a particular party or not (Q14).¹⁰ This is a standard way of finding out partisan leanings. Second, as a follow-up to those that responded affirmatively (n=1,748, 50.5 percent of all subjects), we asked which of the following categories best describe their party: government, opposition, or neither (Q14b). In the analysis, we label those that picked neither as undeclared partisans. Third, and finally, we asked whether the MP from their own constituency was a member of the ruling party coalition or not (Q15). Three questions generate the following theoretically relevant winner-loser categories:

- Losers: opposition – unrepresented (*Opp-Opp*, n=238);
- Winners: government – represented (*Gov-Gov*, n=788);
- Partial winners: a) government – unrepresented (*Gov-Opp*, n=211) and b) opposition – represented (*Opp-Gov*, n=393).

The full list of partisanship categories, which includes the different winner-loser categories, are shown in Figure 4.

¹⁰ For the full questionnaire, see Appendix 6: Questionnaires.

Figure 4. Partisanship Categories – All Observations.



For presentational purposes, we refer to only two national-level categories: government, if you are a ruling party supporter (*Gov-*) or opposition, (*Opp-*). In terms of constituency dynamics, we refer to the subjects either being represented by a ruling party supporter (*-Gov*) or not (*-Opp*).¹¹

Outcomes of Interest

Both waves of the survey asked three standard items on external efficacy:

1. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement(s): Representatives in the National Assembly care what people like me think.

¹¹ Q15 is worded to capture whether or not the representative is from the ruling party. A negative response to this question does not technically mean that the MP is an opposition MP since there is a small number of unaffiliated MPs in Kenya. However, given the polarized environment we make this simplification in the initial analysis. Another option would be to use the terminology *Gov-in-non-Govt* for a ruling party supporter in a non-ruling party represented constituency and *Opp-in-non-Govt* for an opposition supporter in a constituency not represented by the ruling party. The simplification into *Gov-Opp* and *Opp-Opp* is for presentational purposes.


2. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement(s): Representatives in the National Assembly are only interested in people's votes but not in their opinions

The response-options to these two first efficacy questions were on a five-point Likert scale: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, or strongly agree. These two items were asked as part of a battery of five questions (see Appendix 6 for the questionnaire). The third item was asked as a separate stand-alone question:

3. How responsive is your National Assembly Representative to your needs?

The respondent was asked to pick an answer from a five-point scale: very unresponsive; somewhat unresponsive; neither responsive nor unresponsive; and somewhat responsive; or very responsive. All three items closely follow standard external efficacy questions (Craig et al., 1990). However, the questions were adopted to reflect our interest in Members of Parliament (and not just the government or the regime at large). The first is positively worded, where the respondent is asked to acquiesce with the external efficacy statement. The second is worded negatively, in terms of efficacy. Finally, the third question is neutrally worded. In Figure 5 the baseline values on these three external efficacy items are shown, scaled so that strongly agree (dark green) indicates efficacy. From this we can see that the responses skew negative and that the more neutrally worded question (3) results in much higher efficacy.

Figure 5. Response Option Distribution on the External Efficacy Items in the Pre-Treatment Baseline Survey.




As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we construct an external efficacy index by adding up all three relevant items and dividing by three, thus arriving at the mean of all items.¹² The resulting external efficacy index has values ranging from 1 to 5 and a mean value of 2.39 in the baseline data, suggesting that overall external efficacy is negative, i.e. below the middle point, 3, on the scale. Prior to the administration of the treatment the subjects' composite external efficacy score varies significantly across the partisanship categories. Ruling party supporters score considerably higher in terms of external efficacy compared to opposition partisans. This finding is in line with the established literature on efficacy (Davis & Hitt, 2016).

We capture political participation by two separate items: likelihood of voting in upcoming elections (Q7) and likelihood of contacting ones' MP (Q6). We focus primarily on turnout intention because it is the kind of activity that most citizens would be willing to do irrespective of the partisan stripe of the MP concerned.

¹² For the purpose of constructing the index, we inverted the negatively worded item.

Figure 6. Response Option Distribution of the Participation Items in the Pre-Treatment Baseline Survey.



Turnout intention in the upcoming elections is equally high among the main partisanship categories, ranging from 88.7 per cent for *Opp-Gov* to 91.6 per cent for *Opp-Opp*.

Results of the Experiment

We start by analyzing the treatment effect on external efficacy and then turn our attention to political participation. As well as the interaction term, we include all constitutive terms so as to estimate the conditional impact of the treatment (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). The model we test is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{External Efficacy (post-treatment)} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Treatment} + \beta_2 \text{WinnerCategory} \\
 &+ \beta_3 \text{Treatment} * \text{WinnerCategory} \\
 &+ \text{External Efficacy (pre-treatment)} \\
 &+ \beta_1 \text{Controls} + \varepsilon,
 \end{aligned}$$

where *Treatment* is a dummy for treatment assignment and *WinnerCategory* is a categorical variable containing all combinations of electoral winners and losers. *Controls* refers to a series of pre-treatment covariates (age, gender, socio-economic, and education) as is standard in the literature on efficacy (Finkel, 1985; Karp & Banducci, 2008). Note that this model follows directly from the pre-analysis plan that was registered before treatment was administered. For simplicity we present just the causal effects, the treatment-related coefficients, in Table 2 and Figure 7.

The coefficient *Treatment* in Table 2 constitutes the effect on subjects in the treatment group (*Treatment* = 1) that are in the omitted winner category (*Opp-Gov*, i.e. when the winner category dummies = 0). The treatment effect on these electoral double-losers in terms of external efficacy is a non-significant -0.05. In other words, our treatment does not have any effect on these individuals.

The theoretically most relevant winner category is ruling party partisans who are represented at the constituency level (*Gov-Gov*). The β coefficient for *Treat*Gov-Gov* should be interpreted as the treatment effect compared to the treatment effect for reference category, i.e. electoral double-losers (*Opp-Gov*). An effect of 0.22 on the 1 to 5 scale (p -value=0.032, FDR-adjusted 0.043) indicates the treatment effect on *Gov-Gov* individuals, which can be interpreted as a 7.1 percent increase in external efficacy.


Table 2. Conditional Average Treatment Effects, Linear Interaction Models (OLS).

	External Efficacy Index		Political Participation Index	
	B	p-value	B	p-value
(Intercept)	1.4	<.001	1.33	<.001
Treatment	-0.05	0.606	-0.19	0.017
Interactions:				
[omitted: <i>Opp-in-Gov</i>]				
Theoretically relevant:				
Treat* <i>Gov-in-Gov</i>	0.22	0.032	0.29	0.002
Treat* <i>Gov-in-Opp</i>	0.1	0.432	0.17	0.14
Treat* <i>Opp-in-Opp</i>	0.07	0.551	0.36	<.001
Other:				
Treat* <i>Non-P-in-Gov</i>	0.1	0.322	0.17	0.051
Treat* <i>Non-P-in-Opp</i>	0.12	0.257	0.27	0.004
Treat* <i>Und-in-Gov</i>	0.11	0.593	0.33	0.061
Treat* <i>Und-in-Opp</i>	0.06	0.776	0.3	0.123
[omitted: <i>Controls and constitutive terms</i>]				
Observations	3,450		3,456	
R2 / adj. R2	.317 / .313		.309 / .305	

* Notes: The *p*-values reported are unadjusted. The Partisan categories (Non-P=non-partisan, Und=Undeclared). The outcome at baseline and the covariates (age, gender, socio-economic, and education) are omitted from the presentation, but included in the actual model.

The results from the model is displayed visually in Figure 7 below.

Figure 7. Graph of Conditional Average Treatment Effects on Outcome Indices, Linear Interaction Models (OLS), 95% Confidence Intervals.



* *Notes:* The outcome at baseline and the covariates (age, gender, socio-economic, and education) are omitted from the presentation.

These two findings confirm the predictions of the multi-level winner-loser framework presented in the earlier section. Among electoral winners, i.e. government party supporters that are represented at the constituency level, there is a strong positive effect, while there is no effect on electoral losers, i.e. unrepresented opposition supporters. Electoral winners display the highest level of external efficacy to begin with, which is as expected.¹³ These are individuals who are represented both at the constituency and the governmental level. In a context characterized by clientelism, like Kenya, it makes perfect sense for represented ruling party supporters to consider the government as responsive to their needs. That is how electoral politics works in much of Africa and elsewhere (Wantchekon, 2003). When exposed to normative messaging about how responsive MPs should be individuals that have experience with MPs being

¹³ For baseline descriptive results, see Appendix, Figure 7.

responsive are moved. The information in the treatment thus re-affirms prior beliefs. For electoral losers the reverse is true. They display lower levels of external efficacy prior to treatment, and for good reason since they are not represented by their ‘patron’. When presented with incongruent messaging, i.e. pro-efficacy messaging, these individuals fail to be moved. When it comes to the category of partial electoral winners the coefficients are in the expected direction, i.e. positive (see Table 2), but the effects are not statistically significant.

Now moving to participation intentions, Table 2’s second model provides evidence for the mobilizing hypothesis for ruling party represented (*Gov-Gov*) subjects.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Participation Index (post-treatment)} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Treatment} + \beta_2 \text{WinnerCategory} \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{Treatment} * \text{WinnerCategory} \\ &+ \text{Participation Index (pre-treatment)} \\ &+ \beta_1 \text{Controls} + \varepsilon, \end{aligned}$$


where the only difference to the external efficacy model is the outcome and the baseline control of that outcome. We see that for electoral winners the estimate of the effect is 0.29 on the 1-4 Likert scale (very unlikely to very likely), which constitutes a 4.9 per cent increase on the four-point scale when compared to the mean in the reference group (*Opp-Gov*). The effect is highly significant with an unadjusted *p*-value of <0.01 (FDR-adjusted 0.0062). Interestingly, it seems as if the effect on electoral double-losers (*Opp-Gov*) is negative, in other words the treatment has a demobilizing effect (*p*-value=0.017, FDR-adjusted, 0.033). However, if the opposition person is represented by a MP (*Opp-Opp*), then the mobilizing effect is the highest of any of the effects and it is strongly significant. The results from the model are displayed visually in Figure 7.

The reason for the finding for among partial losers is probably because the decision to vote in a general election is driven by local constituency-specific factors. Ruling party partial

winners are thus not represented and thus do not constitute winners at the local level. When encouraged to vote, they are not moved since they associate voting with being on the losing side locally. This is consistent with the treatment, which explicitly focuses on the parliament and not the presidency. It is therefore reasonable to expect the treatment to be more impactful on those who are represented in the parliament by one of their co-partisans.

Beyond voting we also examine the impact on intention to contact one's representative in the future (see Figure 8). This is another standard participation item, which allows us to examine a political action that is explicitly constituency-based. Here the treatment effect is negative for electoral losers (β 0.263, p -value 0.031), the reference category, which comes as no surprise. Interestingly, prior to treatment these unrepresented opposition partisans were equally likely to contact their MP in the coming six months (1.78 on the four-point Likert scale compared to 1.77 for represented ruling party supporters). The treatment probably reminds these voters that they are not represented by one of their co-partisans and therefore they report a decrease in the likelihood of contacting the MP from the ruling party. But there is a positive effect on *Opp-Opp* (β 0.183, p -value 0.039). If citizens are out of government nationally, being represented by a co-partisan matters.

Figure 8. Intent to Contact MP in own Constituency, OLS regressions for Separate Partisan Categories.



* *Notes:* The p-values reported are unadjusted. The outcome at baseline and the covariates (age, gender, socio-economic, and education) are omitted from the presentation, but included in the figure.

Conclusions

Policy-makers commonly believe that democratic interventions improve the performance of democracy as they promote what are considered to be core democratic attitudes and behaviors. External efficacy is one such outcome, which indicates that citizens have a stake in the government through the sense that they—or that people like them—can influence political outcomes (Abramson, 1983). In terms of democratic behavior, there is both the act of voting, but also non-electoral modes of participation, like approaching political representatives with complaints or requests. With these measures in mind, with the aim of creating more responsiveness and an active citizenry, a myriad of interventions have been funded and undertaken based on governance-enhancing insights (Besley, 2006; Olken & Pande, 2011).

Of course, societies get the efficacy and participation they have cultivated in past generations, consistent with their cultures and histories, and reflecting past levels of efficacy and the performance of governments. With such powerful transmitted progenitors, the task of increasing efficacy is daunting as recipients of a message that says positive things about political system in terms of its responsiveness, will view it in the light of past considerations and collective memories. Nonetheless, even though some observational and experimental research suggests citizens can be reminded of the democratic process and with the aim of boosting democratic attitudes, we argue that rather than receptiveness to messages, it is conditioned by something far more powerful than national memories and cultures: the status of citizens as an electoral winners or losers.

Our experimental study shows that electoral winners get a boost in external efficacy as a result of being exposed to information about the parliament and MPs, while opposition partisans remain unaffected. Opposition partisans exposed to a pro-democracy message fail to be moved since they do not agree with the proposition to be begin with. Opposition partisans are already more critical as it is and therefore fail to be moved by the positive messages since the message is inconsistent with their existing beliefs. As politics is local, our framework incorporates sub-national level dynamics as well. We show that it matters whether citizens are represented by MPs who have the same partisan stripe. In terms of the general theoretical framework, this finding means that electoral winners get a boost, while electoral losers do not, which comports with other findings on the impact of winning on satisfaction (Singh 2014).

These results show that information intended to promote citizen engagement is not perceived as neutral, but is responded to according to ideology, partisanship, and the experience of electoral success or failure. The Kenyan context of polarization and ethnic divisions create sharp divisions, where many aspects of politics are structured in these terms. Our findings are a logical extension of the impact of these divisions. While marked in Kenya, we do not believe

these findings are limited to this country: the winner-loser framework implies that differential responses to democracy promotion and education are likely under any regime that organizes regular competitive elections. It is therefore probable that a wide range of acts of civil mobilization, such as GOTV, that are common in jurisdictions across the world, are conditioned by the experience of winning or losing. Policy-makers, donors, and practitioners who are engaged in civic programming should take note of these findings, as what may be thought of as having a neutral benefit actually targets those who are already powerful actors in any political system.

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Appendices for:

Partisan Responses to Democracy Promotion – Estimating the Causal Effect of a Civic In- formation Portal

Monday, April 20, 20

[Not intended for publication]

Appendix 1: Research Design – Pre-Analysis Plan

Subjects were recruited via paid adverts on Facebook and offered 500 shillings on completion of the second wave survey. This appendix describes the design prior to the administration of the study.

Randomization


The viewing of the sites is randomised by the partner organisation mySociety into treatment and placebo. The randomisation is using the php rand function. It randomly chooses a number between 1 and 100 and then assigns that number to two branches based on a 50:50 allocation. Users are assigned a group completely at random the moment they confirm acceptance of the survey terms and consent into the treatment.

Power Analysis

We carried out power calculations to show that the experiment is capable of detecting an effect size of .12 (Cohen's d , see Figure 1) between treatment and control, a two-sided test at 80 per

cent power. We use information from the pilots we know that the mean internal efficacy score is 3.454 and the standard deviation is 0.777. As a point of reference for the effect size (d) that we would be able to detect, a 0.1 point increase (which would mean a 3% increase to 3.554) in the internal efficacy score is a d of 0.113. Here we do not account for the fact that using co-variables (with an explanatory power, R^2 , of 0.064) will further increase the power.

Figure 9. Power Analysis Visualization.



Attrition

Attrition was expected between baseline and follow up. If attrition was two-sided we proposed to report and then ignore it on the basis that the sample is a convenience sample there is no advantage in re-weighting the estimates to the population at wave one. If the attrition were one-sided in which case we proposed using Lee bounds analysis to examine the impact of attrition on the results.


Covariates

We carried out a pre and post treatment survey (see appendices), which harvested the following covariates: age (in years), gender, attend university or not, ownership (one point each for Refrigerator, TV, Car, Smart phone, Bicycle, Motorcycle, and employed (Employed by the government, Self-employed, Employed by some other person or organisation) or unemployed (Unemployed, A student, Housewife, Retired, Prefer not to answer). Covariates were used for checking of the balance of the sample and for regression analysis as known predictors of the outcome variables.

Appendix 2: Covariate Balance

To test the null hypothesis, that the covariates predict random assignment no better than would be expected by chance, we regressed treatment on the full set of covariates. We then simulated 10,000 randomizations to get the sampling distribution under the null hypothesis of random assignment. The histogram in Figure 2 shows the sampling distribution of the F-statistics (in black) from the simulation and the F-statistic from the actual data (in red). As can be seen, we fail to reject the null, which suggests that the sample is balanced.


Figure 10. Covariate Balance - F-Test Simulations To Assess The Null Hypothesis That The Covariates Predict Random Assignment (Z) No Better Than Would Be Expected By Chance.



Appendix 3: Recruitment Pages

A total of \$1,377 was spent on Facebook adverts. Of that \$908 was spent on reaching 483,707 women (23,180 of whom clicked the advert) and \$469 was spent on 366,114 men (with 21,203 clicks). Note that the average cost per click to get women recruited was 77.2% higher than for men. Below an example of the advert content.

Figure 11. Recruitment Advert for Facebook.



The image shows a Facebook advertisement for mySociety. At the top left is the mySociety logo, a circle of colored dots, and the text "mySociety Sponsored ·". To the right is a "Like Page" button. Below the logo is the text "Take just a few minutes to complete a short survey, and earn 500KSh." A central image shows a person's hands typing on a blue Braille keyboard. Below the image is the text "#WOCInTech chat". Underneath is the main headline "Help Kenya develop and earn money" and the subtext "Anyone can take part. We want to know your opinions." At the bottom left of the ad is the URL "SURVEYGIZMO.COM" and at the bottom right is a "Learn More" button. Below the advertisement, it shows "93 reactions 23 Comments 13 Shares" and three interaction buttons: "Like", "Comment", and "Share".

Appendix 4: Treatment Pages Text Content – Side-by-Side Presentation

Treatment Pages Content

Page 1

Eye on Kenyan Parliament [banner]

Your Vote Your Representative!

Did you know that the National Assembly of Kenya is made up of 350 members? Their job is to represent the people of their constituencies as well as special interests (youth, women, persons with disabilities and ordinary workers).

The duty of members of parliament is to:

Debate and make laws

Determine where public money is spent

Review the actions of the President

The duty of members of parliament does not include:

Oversight over the Governor

Attending funerals

Maintaining county roads

Note we will be having a short quiz later so do pay attention!

Your Role In Democracy

Kenyan citizens are expected to find out how politicians are performing to ensure high standards of leadership and integrity are respected and maintained.

As a Kenyan citizen, you have the opportunity to hold your representatives to account in the national elections scheduled to take place in August 2017.

You can use websites like Mzalendo to find out how well your elected representative is doing, to check if they have attended the national assembly and to get news and information too, such as what is said in Parliament. You can follow Mzalendo on Facebook and Twitter. You can hear about the elections next year and who is standing for office.

Placebo Pages Content

Page 1

[no banner]

The Oceans of the World

An ocean is a body of saline water that makes up much of the planet, covering almost 71% of its surface. These are the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, Southern (Antarctic), and Arctic Oceans. The word sea is often used interchangeably with "ocean".

Here some facts about oceans in general:

Less than 5% of the ocean has been explored

Total volume is 1.35 billion cubic kilometers

The average depth is nearly 3,700 meters

Here are some facts about particular oceans:

The Pacific Ocean is the largest ocean

The Atlantic Ocean separates the continents of North America and South American from the European and African continents

Note we will be having a short quiz later so do pay attention!

Exploration

Ocean travel by boat dates back to prehistoric times, but only in modern times has extensive underwater travel become possible.

The deepest point in the ocean is the Mariana Trench, located in the Pacific Ocean near the Northern Mariana Islands. Its maximum depth is 10,971 meters.

You can use science websites to find out more about water and oceans, and learn more facts. On such sites you can get updates about new findings and research, such as on fish and squid. You can find out more by following Twitter sites on oceans and postings on Facebook.

(Treatment continued)

Now take this short Quiz

How many members of Parliament are there? [drop-down list]

Do members of Parliament exercise oversight over the Governor? [drop-down list]

Registering to Vote

In order to vote, you must be registered. To be eligible to register to vote you must be:

A Kenyan citizen

Aged 18 years and above

Have a national ID or a Passport

To register, you must go to your nearest registration centre.

Have you already registered to vote? It is not too late to do your civic duty!

If not, find your nearest registration centre!

Type part of your constituency name and select it from the list:

Constituency [drop-down list]

Next page [button]

Page 2

Eye on Kenyan Parliament [banner]

Thanks for responding.

We will send an email to the address you provided in the survey in 2 weeks time, which will include more information on how you will receive payment.

Your active participation makes democracy work in Kenya. Keep an eye on the Parliament - visit mzalendo.com.

Find your Representatives and see what they say while in Parliament!

Click here to go there [button]

(Placebo continued)

Now take this short Quiz

How much of the world's surface is covered by oceans?

[drop-down list]

Which ocean has the Mariana Trench? [drop-down list]

Oceans around Africa

Africa, the world's second-largest continent, is bounded

by:

The Atlantic Ocean - Africa's longest coastline

In the East, Africa faces the Indian Ocean

The Southern oceans

Tectonic forces are pulling much of East Africa away from the main continent.

Guess the deepest point

The Ocean that makes up the waters of the Kenyan coast is the Indian Ocean.

Can you please guess what the deepest point of the Indian Ocean is? [drop-down list]

Next page [button]

Page 2

[no banner]

Thanks for responding.

We will send an email to the address you provided in the survey in 2 weeks time, which will include more information on how you will receive payment.


Learning more about the Oceans of the world can be very interesting. Please visit the United Nations site for Ocean monitoring.

Find an ocean of the world you are interested in.

Click here to go there [button]

Appendix 5: Treatment Pages as Viewed by Subjects

Figure 12. First (out of two) Page of the Treatment Group.

 **MZALENDO** Eye on Kenyan Parliament

Your Vote Your Representative!

Did you know that the National Assembly of Kenya is made up of 350 members? Their job is to represent the people of their constituencies as well as special interests (youth, women, persons with disabilities and ordinary workers).

The duty of members of parliament is to:

- Debate and make laws
- Determine where public money is spent
- Review the actions of the President

The duty of members of parliament does not include:

- Oversight over the Governor
- Attending funerals
- Maintaining county roads

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Now take this short Quiz

How many members of Parliament are there?

Do members of Parliament exercise oversight over the Governor?

Have you already registered to vote?

Figure 13. First (out of two) Page of the Placebo Group.



The Oceans of the World

An ocean is a body of saline water that makes up much of the planet, covering almost 71% of its surface. These are the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, Southern (Antarctic), and Arctic Oceans. The word sea is often used interchangeably with "ocean".

Here some facts about oceans in general:

- Less than 5% of the ocean has been explored
- Total volume is 1.35 billion cubic kilometers
- The average depth is nearly 3,700 meters

Here are some facts about particular oceans:

- The Pacific Ocean is the largest ocean
- The Atlantic Ocean separates the continents of North America and South American from the European and African continents

Note we will be having a short quiz later so do pay attention!

Exploration

Ocean travel by boat dates back to prehistoric times, but only in modern times has extensive underwater travel become possible.

The deepest point in the ocean is the Mariana Trench, located in the Pacific Ocean near the Northern Mariana Islands. Its maximum depth is 10,971 meters.

You can use science websites to find out more about water and oceans, and learn more facts. On such sites you can get updates about new findings and research, such as on fish and squid. You can find out more by following Twitter sites on oceans and postings on Facebook.

Now take this short Quiz

How much of the world's surface is covered by oceans?

Which ocean has the Mariana Trench?

Oceans around Africa

Africa, the world's second-largest continent, is bounded by:

- The Atlantic Ocean - Africa's longest coastline
- In the East, Africa faces the Indian Ocean
- The Southern oceans

Tectonic forces are pulling much of East Africa away from the main continent.

Guess the deepest point

The Ocean that makes up the waters of the Kenyan coast is the Indian Ocean.

Appendix 6: Survey Questionnaires

Facebook ad copy: Help Kenya develop and earn money.

Baseline intro text (incl. consent form)

Kenya's Next Generation

Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research! It will only take a few minutes and by taking part you contribute to the development of Kenya. There are two stages to this study:

Part 1 (Today): Complete a short survey and interact with a web page.

Part 2: Complete another short survey in a weeks time.

When you are done with the second survey, you will be paid 500KSh via MPESA. This payment will be made within 15 days of you completing the second survey. All information will be treated as confidential and used only for the purposes of this research study. If, at any time, you wish to withdraw your consent to participate, email us at the below address and your data will be deleted.

If you would like to learn more about any of these points please contact mzalendo-research@mysociety.org. This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 3949/006.

Follow-up intro text

Kenya's Next Generation

It has now been two weeks since you took part in the first part of our study. Before we process the payment of 500KSh via MPESA you need to complete a short survey. Again, it will only take a few minutes and by taking part you contribute to the development of Kenya. Thank you for your time!

Questions

The endline questionnaire only contained questions with an asterisk.

1. What is your age?

[open number field 0-100]

2. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Prefer not to answer

3. Have you attended university?

Yes

No

4. Have you registered to vote?*

Yes

No

5. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements*

[Strongly disagree:1 Disagree:2 Neutral:3 Agree:4 Strongly agree:5]

[Random order]

Representatives in the National Assembly care what people like me think.

I believe I can affect legislation in the Kenyan parliament

I feel that I have a good understanding of the political system in Kenya

I consider myself to be well-informed about the Parliament in Kenya

Representatives in the National Assembly are only interested in people's votes but not in their opinions

6. How likely is it that you will contact your Representative in the National Assembly in the next six months?*

Very unlikely:1 Somewhat unlikely:2 Somewhat likely:3 Very likely:4

7. How likely is it that you will vote in the upcoming general election?*

Very unlikely:1 Somewhat unlikely:2 Somewhat likely:3 Very likely:4

8. How responsive is your National Assembly Representative to your needs?*

Very unresponsive:1? Somewhat unresponsive:2? Neither responsive nor unresponsive:3? Somewhat responsive:4? Very responsive:5?

9. Do you know the name of your constituency?*

Yes

No

10. Do you know the name of your Representative in the National Assembly?*

Yes
No

11. Which of the following are [formal] duties of National Assembly Representatives?*

- [Random order]
Attend funerals in the constituency
Enact legislation
Determine the allocation of national revenue (budget)
Exercise oversight over the Governor
Responsible for maintaining county roads
Exercise oversight over the President (and his Cabinet)

12. When is the next general election?*

- [Random order]
August 2017
December 2017
May 2018
November 2018

13. What is the monthly salary of a Representative in the National Assembly in Kenya (including allowances)?*

KSh

14. Do you feel close to any particular political party?*

Yes
No

14b. [if yes follow-up] Which of the following best describes the party you are close to?

- Opposition*
Government
Neither

15. Is the Representative in the National Assembly from your constituency in the ruling party coalition?*

Yes
No

16. Do you own any of the following items? This question is required.*

Tick all that apply.

- Motorcycle
Car
TV
Refrigerator
Smart phone
Bicycle
None of these

17. Are you currently... This question is required.*

[Random order]

Employed by the government

Self-employed

Employed by some other person or organization

Unemployed

A student

Housewife

Retired

Prefer not to answer

18. What is your email address?


We need this to send you the second survey and to pay you once you have completed the second survey.

Appendix 7: Outcomes at Baseline

External Efficacy


The scale for the negatively worded item (2) has here been inverted in order to capture external efficacy on a five-point scale (from strong negative to strong positive in terms of efficacy).

Figure 14. Response Option Distribution on the External Efficacy Items in the Baseline Survey.



* Notes: Items presented in order of external efficacy. Baseline data for the full set of subjects that completed the study


Figure 15. Average External Efficacy Index Scores by Partisanship Category at Baseline.



* Notes: standard errors of the mean displayed with error bars (95-percent level).

To analyse further how the full range of covariates is associated with external efficacy in the baseline survey we fit a linear regression with the external efficacy score as the dependent variable. As can be seen in Figure 8, pro-government partisans have a much higher external efficacy, when controlling for a range of theoretically relevant factors. Interestingly, being a non-partisan is negatively associated with external efficacy. Furthermore, the richer, older, and more educated an individual is, the lower the sense of external efficacy is. Also, gender does not seem to be driving efficacy. These latter four findings conflict with the findings in the external efficacy literature on the West (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Kahne and Westheimer 2006).

Figure 16. Predictors of External Efficacy at Baseline (OLS estimates).




* Notes: Opposition is the omitted partisan category.

Intent to Participate Index

Note that Pro-Govt orientation is generally speaking not driving intent to participate at baseline (for the experimental subjects).

Figure 17. Predictors of Intent to Participate Index at Baseline (OLS estimates).



Appendix 8: Additional Statistical Material

Table 3. Covariate Balance per Main Partisanship Category – Predictors of Treatment Assignment, Linear Models (OLS).

	Gov-Gov	Gov-Opp	Opp-Gov	Opp-Opp
(Intercept)	0.618*** (-0.097)	0.753*** (-0.182)	0.255 (-0.194)	0.582*** (-0.136)
Age	-0.001 (-0.003)	-0.002 (-0.007)	0.01 (-0.006)	-0.007 (-0.004)
Female	-0.087* (-0.039)	-0.081 (-0.078)	-0.01 (-0.076)	-0.015 (-0.061)
University	-0.087 (-0.045)	-0.135 (-0.083)	-0.004 (-0.079)	0.054 (-0.061)
Socio-Economic	0.003 (-0.014)	-0.011 (-0.028)	-0.005 (-0.029)	0.03 (-0.021)
N	786	211	238	392

Table 4. Prediction of Completion of the Endline Survey, Linear Models (OLS).

	Endline Survey Ini- tiated	Endline Survey Completed
(Intercept)	0.420*** (-0.008)	0.417*** (-0.008)
Treatment	0.016 (-0.011)	0.016 (-0.011)
N	8,156	8,156

For robustness of the main findings we here present some additional specifications. The results are fully in line with the results presented in the paper. Models presented in

Table 3 use external efficacy as the outcome variable. All three models are interaction models, where we omit the *Loser* category in terms of election results. Interaction models allow us to see whether the conditional average treatment effects (CATE) are significantly different for the other partisanship categories, when compared to the omitted reference category. The interaction is Treatment * Partisanship. The gist of the hypothesis from the article is that the effect on ruling party supporters will be positive and significantly different from the null effect on oppositional supporters. Models I and II present the results without considering constituency-level dynamics, while model III presents the full range of partisanship, considering both national and constituency-level dynamics. Model I is the model we presented in the pre-analysis plan. Model III is a direct extension of the main model presented in the paper, but here presented as an interaction model and including the full sample (not subsetting to theoretically relevant categories).

Table 5. Treatment Effect on External Efficacy Index, Linear Interaction Models (OLS) – All Partisanship Specifications.

	I (PAP)		II		III	
	National-level Partisanship Only		Partisanship dummy considering constituency dynamics		Partisanship categories (all) considering constituency dynamics	
	β	p -value	β	p -value	β	p -value
(Intercept)	1.34	<.001	1.28	<.001	1.4	<.001
Treatment	0	0.949	0.04	0.099	-0.05	0.606
<i>[omitted: Oppositional]</i>						
Treat*Non-Partisan	0.06	0.324				
Treat*Government	0.15	0.032				
Treat*Undeclared	0.04	0.804				
<i>[omitted: All Others]</i>						
Treat*Gov-in-Gov			0.13	0.022		
<i>[omitted: Opp-in-Gov]</i>						
Treat*Gov-in-Gov					0.22	0.032
Treat*Gov-in-Opp					0.1	0.432
Treat*Non-P-in-Gov					0.1	0.322
Treat*Non-P-in-Opp					0.12	0.257
Treat*Opp-in-Opp					0.07	0.551
Treat*Und-in-Gov					0.11	0.593
Treat*Und-in-Gov					0.06	0.776
Observations	3,450		3,450		3,450	
R2 / adj. R2	.316 / .314		.315 / .313		.317 / .313	

* Notes: The p -values reported are unadjusted. The Partisan categories (Non-P=non-partisan, Und=Undeclared), the outcome at baseline, and the covariates (age, gender, socio-economic, and education) are omitted from the visual representation, but included in the actual models. Model I is the specification provided in the pre-analysis plan.

Table 5 clearly support the two main findings on external efficacy presented in the article. First, there is a positive effect of treatment on ruling party supporters, when compared to the reference category (oppositional, all others, or *Opp-Gov*). Second, there is no effect on opposition supporters.

Table 4 presents the same specification for the intent to participate outcome. There are no significant results on ruling party supporters in model I, while model II suggests a positive, albeit non-significant effect, and the third model shows a strong positive and highly significant effect. In terms of impact on the omitted oppositional category, model three actually suggests a negative de-mobilizing effect.

Table 6. Treatment Effect on Intent to Participate Index, Linear Interaction Models (OLS) – All Partisanship Specifications.

	I (PAP)		II		III	
	National-level Partisanship Only		Partisanship dummy considering constituency dynamics		Partisanship categories (all) considering constituency dynamics	
	β	<i>p</i> -value	β	<i>p</i> -value	β	<i>p</i> -value
(Intercept)	1.24	<.001	1.12	<.001	1.33	<.001
Treatment	0.03	0.506	0.02	0.353	-0.19	0.017
<i>[omitted: Oppositional]</i>						
Treat*Non-Partisan	-0.01	0.807				
Treat*Government	0.04	0.519				
Treat*Undeclared	0.08	0.523				
<i>[omitted: All Others]</i>						
Treat*Gov-in-Gov			0.07	0.14		
<i>[omitted: Opp-in-Gov]</i>						
Treat*Gov-in-Gov					0.29	0.002
Treat*Gov-in-Opp					0.17	0.14
Treat*Non-P-in-Gov					0.17	0.051
Treat*Non-P-in-Opp					0.27	0.004
Treat*Opp-in-Opp					0.36	<.001
Treat*Und-in-Gov					0.33	0.061
Treat*Und-in-Gov					0.3	0.123
Observations	3,456		3,456		3,456	
R2 / adj. R2	.305 / .303		.301 / .299		.309 / .305	

* Notes: The *p*-values reported are unadjusted. The Partisan categories (Non-P=non-partisan, Und=Undeclared), the outcome at baseline, and the covariates (age, gender, socio-economic, and education) are omitted from the visual representation, but included in the actual models. Model I is the specification provided in the pre-analysis plan.

Table 7. Treatment Effect on Diffuse and Constituency-Specific External Efficacy, Linear Model (OLS).

	Diffuse	Constituency-Specific
(Intercept)	1.580***	1.717***
	-0.143	-0.184
Treatment	-0.048	-0.087
[omitted: <i>Opp-in-Govt</i>]	-0.106	-0.142
Interactions		
Treat*Govt-in-Govt	0.253*	0.200
	-0.121	-0.162
Treat*Govt-in-nGovt	0.153	0.086
	-0.155	-0.208
Treat*Opp-in-nGovt	0.06	0.103
	-0.134	-0.18
Pre-treatment Covariates		
Outcome at Baseline	0.421***	0.481***
	-0.023	-0.021
Age	-0.002	-0.007
	-0.004	-0.005
Female	0.011	0.008
	-0.046	-0.062
Socio-Economic	-0.022	-0.01
	-0.017	-0.022
University	-0.032	-0.005
	-0.05	-0.067
Constitutive terms		
Govt-in-Govt	-0.077	-0.029
	-0.085	-0.115
Govt-in-nGovt	-0.067	-0.061
	-0.112	-0.151
Opp-in-nGovt	-0.1	-0.084
	-0.094	-0.127
N	1622	1627

Table 8. Turnout Intention for Partial Loser, Linear Model (OLS).

	Turnout govopp	Turnout oppopp
(Intercept)	1.315***	1.661***
	(-0.335)	(-0.245)
Treatment	-0.043	0.146*
	(-0.097)	(-0.068)
Turnout Intent (baseline)	0.494***	0.429***
	(-0.056)	(-0.044)
Age	0.029**	0.009
	(-0.009)	(-0.006)
Female	-0.196	-0.056
	(-0.108)	(-0.083)
Socio-Economic	-0.058	0.022
	(-0.039)	(-0.028)
University	-0.037	0.102
	(-0.115)	(-0.082)
N	211	392

Table 9. Treatment Effect on External Efficacy Index per Other Partisan Categories, Separate Linear Models (OLS).

	Non-Partisan in Government Constituency	Non-Partisan in Opposition Constituency	Undeclared Partisan in Government Constituency	Undeclared Partisan in Op- position Con- stituency
(Intercept)	1.200*** (-0.14)	1.482*** (-0.164)	1.452*** (-0.387)	1.58 (-0.787)
Treatment	0.055 (-0.043)	0.073 (-0.052)	-0.112 (-0.151)	-0.063 (-0.224)
Outcome at base- line	0.572*** (-0.027)	0.526*** (-0.033)	0.552*** (-0.086)	0.527*** (-0.116)
Age	-0.007 (-0.004)	-0.009* (-0.005)	-0.018 (-0.01)	0.009 (-0.02)
Female	0.047 (-0.043)	-0.049 (-0.053)	-0.055 (-0.158)	-0.193 (-0.248)
Socio-Economic	-0.009 (-0.017)	-0.009 (-0.021)	-0.031 (-0.061)	-0.106 (-0.101)
University	-0.017 (-0.052)	-0.106 (-0.063)	0.571** (-0.188)	-0.324 (-0.328)
N	1,029	686	62	51

Table 10. Treatment Effect on Turnout Intention per Other Partisan Categories, Separate Linear Models (OLS).

	Non-Partisan in Govern- ment Constit- uency	Non-Partisan in Opposition Constituency	Undeclared Partisan in Government Constituency	Undeclared Partisan in Opposition Constituency
(Intercept)	1.457*** (-0.162)	1.261*** (-0.188)	2.092*** (-0.57)	-0.05 (-0.929)
Treatment	0.000 (-0.053)	0.11 (-0.065)	0.122 (-0.22)	0.035 (-0.22)
Outcome at baseline	0.496*** (-0.025)	0.521*** (-0.029)	0.320** (-0.11)	0.735*** (-0.145)
Age	0.009* (-0.005)	0.012* (-0.006)	-0.006 (-0.015)	0.043* (-0.02)
Female	-0.109* (-0.054)	-0.103 (-0.065)	0.252 (-0.225)	0.057 (-0.244)
Socio-Economic	0.01 (-0.022)	-0.001 (-0.025)	0.025 (-0.087)	-0.259* (-0.1)
University	-0.047 (-0.064)	-0.022 (-0.079)	0.322 (-0.269)	0.18 (-0.31)
N	1,028	688	62	51