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Removing Peoples

Forced Removal in the Modern World

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Editors' Foreword

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The contributions of a number of people were crucial in the production of this volume. Without the commitment and help of Professor Hagen Schulze, then Director of the German Historical Institute in London, Dr Benedikt Stuchtey (Deputy Director), Dr Indra Sengupta, and Wolfgang Haack, we could not have got this project off the ground; and without the editorial work of Angela Davies this book would not have appeared. Professors Christof Mauch and Dirk Schumann, respectively Director and Deputy Director at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, at the time of the conference, were extremely supportive of the idea and helped us make it a reality. We also would have been unable to organize the conference without the help of a number of people at the University of York, in particular Professor Mark Ormrod (then Head of the History Department) and Johan de Jong, who served as conference administrator, ensured that everything ran smoothly, and even took participants to the gym.

We also want to thank all of those who attended the conference and enriched our discussions, including those participants who gave papers but who, for a variety of reasons (including giving birth), were unable to commit to the very tight publication schedule. And last but not least, we thank the two readers who consented to review the manuscript at short notice and who encouraged us with their praise and improved the volume through their critical suggestions.

Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake

York and Washington, DC
February 2008

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Explaining Forced Migration

Alf Lüdtke

Practices: 'How did (s)he do it?'

The desire to find explanations for the 'doings' of historical actors apparently resonates with the 'extremes' that millions of people encountered during the twentieth century.[1] Such desire obviously sparks the continuous interest if not obsession both of the historical profession and the wider public in finding, for instance, 'the one and only' document that contains the order for exterminating European Jewry, signed by Hitler or one of his paladins. From here, so the internal logic seems to go, one could pursue the events down the 'line of command', not least the forced migration of the related deportations, and their fit to this man-made catastrophe. Yet most people would agree: any written declaration of intent to that effect may be a necessary but nevertheless not a sufficient element for understanding—or explaining—the Holocaust in general and the related forced migrations in particular.

Raul Hilberg pioneered the analysis of the political and, in particular, the administrative process of marking 'Jews' and others who were similarly labelled as 'racially unfit' (such as the people often referred to as 'Gypsies'), of excluding them and, in due course, of deporting and, finally, exterminating them.[2] The machinery of administration and its functionality for any purpose occupies the centre of Hilberg's explorations. Thus it is the bureaucratic persona that emerges from his scrupulous analyses. This self-'administered individual' (H. G. Adler) in many ways

[1] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, igip-iggi* (London, 1994)-

[2] Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (rev. edn., New York, 1985); id., *The Politics of Memory* (New York, 1994). For the distant if not hostile stance of members of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich) in the late 1950s and 1960s towards the work of Joseph Wulf, effectively excluding him from professional exchange, see Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen, 2004).

resonated with the portrait Hannah Arendt drew of one of the vice-captains of annihilation, Adolf Eichmann. Her phrase, the 'banality of evil', applied to Eichmann and his co-perpetrators, stirred much protest. At the same time, however, this concept brilliantly captured one of the two dimensions of 'doing' mass killing: organizational routine and skilled paperwork. Others added their manual labour at the killing sites themselves.[3]

In his studies Raul Hilberg focused on perpetrators, but the main emphasis of his work has been on the institutional settings and administrative procedures that allowed for and routinized the practices of exclusion, demarcation, and deportation, and, finally, extermination of European Jewry. In Hilberg's research the actual practices of killing remained out of sight. Here, pioneering studies were authored in the ig6os by another outsider to established historiography, Joseph Wulf. In his research on the Lodz ghetto and Warsaw ghetto respectively he focused on the victims.[4]

Both Hilberg and Wulf neglected the themes that dominated academic research at that time: policy and ideology. What is more, their investigations did not gear towards the general picture, the annihilation of millions of people. Rather, in their studies they tried to scrutinize the actual processes of excluding those who were marked by the state authorities and ruling party as 'foes' or 'subhuman': how did perpetrators, and bystanders as well, do or support it, tracing and segregating ordinary citizens, even neighbours? And who segregated and denigrated, deported and killed these people (and how)?[5]

Only since the late 1980s have others elaborated on this topic, widening its scope and enriching its perspective.[6] These studies have not only made increasing use of court records but have also

[3] Cf. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London, 1963); see also H. G. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland* (Tübingen, 1974).

[4] Joseph Wulf, *Vom Leben, Kampf und Tod im Ghetto Warschau* (Bonn, i960); id., *Das letzte Ghetto auf polnischem Boden* (Bonn, 1962).

[5] Götz Aly, *'Endlösung': Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).

[6] In particular the work by Christopher Browning has alluded to concrete ways of 'doing' the killing. His zooming in on specific cases does not show any kind of 'standard' practice. Instead, his approach reveals ranges of (non-)participation, of doing or not doing things. See Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, 1992).

used accounts of survivors and recollections from bystanders. They reveal both myriad forms of suffering and of distancing or resisting—and they also show the manifold practices of cooperation within support for official policies. Not least, these narratives made clear that bystanders only rarely 'stood by'.[7] Many applauded, for instance, the degrading of people who were accused of *Rassenschande?* Others nodded approvingly while the person standing next to them may have turned away or shaken his or her head; and the same people or others may have formed a human corridor as deportees were herded to the railway station for deportation. At any rate, many did more than simply 'stand by', even if they were not directly among those who regularly, or occasionally, actually perpetrated acts of forced removal and, hence, extermination.[9] These examples indicate the ranges and degrees of active participation or active support, even if many who acted in that way never wanted to or did remember.

From this angle it becomes even more obvious that the causal model has clear limits for explanation. It does not grasp the complexity and multiplicity of societal or, for that matter, historical practices and situations. Attempts to link X as 'causal' to Y—if X, then Y—do not work. (That, however, was implied by the Hempel/Nagel model that has been popular among social scientists since the 1950s: accordingly, under given circumstances the occurrence of X would result in Y.[10]) But it is neither just the big criminals nor the anonymous forces that drive people, even behind their backs. Instead, research ought to focus on everyone, on every setting or situation, whether 'on top' or 'on the ground', and on what individual people did. It must ask: *how did he or she do it?*

More concretely, how did German administrators and academics design plans for reshuffling 'peoples in the east', especially after the occupation of Poland in 1939? These were plans

[7] Raul Hilberg, *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945* (New York, 1993).

[8] Alexandra Przyrembel, *'Rassenschande': Reinheitsmythos und Vernichtungslegitimation im Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen, 2003).

[9] Michael Wildt, 'Gewalt gegen Juden', *WerkstattGeschichte, 6/* 18 (1997), 59-80.

[10] Carl Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (New York, 1949), 459—71; Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (London, 1961), 454-6, and esp. 558; see also Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschcften,* Philosophische Rundschau 5 (Tübingen, 1967), 30-2.

that entailed the expulsion of Jews and non-Jewish Poles on a mass scale, in order to enable the 'resettling' of so-called 'native Germans' from the sites they had made their own for generations in south-eastern and eastern Europe. At the level of individual activity: *how* did the young Melita Maschmann perform in 1942—3 when she was in charge of a labour camp in occupied Poland, in the Warthegau, and became involved in the resettlement of 'native Germans'?[11] Or, *how* did 'resettled' people deal with their removal; how did Jewish and non-Jewish expellees go about it? Materials such as those preserved in the Ringelblum archive,[12] and the recollections of survivors, allow some answers about the perceptions and the ways of coping among people who were targeted by Nazi policies of removal and expulsion. Not least, what impact did experience or imaginations of colonization, in particular, of colonial violence, have? In what sense and to what degree did the resulting 'colonial fantasies' fuel the violent fervour for labelling, excluding, and expelling 'enemies' of the German Reich, the German *Volk,* or the 'Aryan race' after 1933?

How can one approach the grey zones of cooperation between the dominant and the dominated, the occupiers and the occupied? This mix did not simply 'occur', but was produced in people's everyday lives, whether in commercial or industrial firms, in administrations, or in the military—and among inmates of concentration camps. Thus such a mix was instrumentalized time and again by the camp guards and, consequendy, served to promote ruthlessness among those targeted for exclusion if not extermination.[13]

Terms: Blind for Violence?

The term 'forced migration' was accepted by the fifteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in the 1970s.[14] This is certainly

[11] Melita Maschmann, *Fazit: Kein Rechtfertigungsversuch* (Stuttgart, 1963).

[12] Ruta Sakowska, *Die zweite Etappe ist der Tod: NS~Ausrottungspolitik gegen die polnischen Juden, gesehen mit den Augen der Opfer* (Wroclaw, 1986; Berlin, 1999).

[13] Cf. Christopher Browning, 'Jewish Workers and Survivor Memories: The Case of the Starachowice Labor Camp', in id., *Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers* (Cambridge, 2000), 89-115; Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (London, 1989).

[14] *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia,* xii (Chicago, 1976), 186 7.

indicative for the English-speaking world. In the German-speaking context, more precisely, in West Germany, the term which covered that area was 'expulsion' *(Vertreibung).* In East Germany the authorities banned this term. And it was precisely this effort which kept it present in public consciousness.[15]

Specific emphases and, thus, horizons of these terms refer to the particular contexts of their usages. During my childhood in 1950s West Germany, 'expulsion' or *Vertreibung* were treated as seemingly natural and given catastrophes that had hit people without any man-made impact. The rhetoric of politicians and of the mass media reverberated with such parlance, as it was dominant not only among people whom my parents knew and met with. At coffee tables and in pubs throughout the socio-political spectrum the term for 'it' was—expulsion. The issue was, of course, the forced removal or expulsion of 'ethnic Germans' from territories of what was then Poland and Czechoslovakia which many, at least at that time, still claimed as 'German'. Using this word meant simultaneously to mourn the expellees and to denounce those who had expelled them. Furthermore, this usage granted the expellees a position of innocent victimhood. The term reflects and reverberates with immediate action conveying some of the shocks or violence both at the centre of the practice of the perpetrators and of the experience of those targeted.

By contrast, the term 'forced migration' resonates with a view of society and history that emphasizes processes of a somewhat longer duration. After all, the main reference is migration. At least the term presents it as a process without any deflnite limit, going on for weeks and months if not years, and having a bearing for one's lifetime if not beyond. At the same time, and in contrast to 'expulsion', the emotional flavour of the term smacks of a certain optimism which even the adjective 'forced' does not totally erase. The term still rings with some of the brighter sides of history. Thus, even as 'forced migration', the modernizing appeal of processes of change that seem truly fundamental for the modern era seeps through. And, again in contrast to 'expulsion', the observers are looking from afar and from above. Yet it is not just the commanding heights that invite such a view (and

[15] See policies and terminology in, among others, Volker Ackermann, *Der 'echte' Flüchtling: Deutsche Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge aus der DDR ig y—igßi* (Osnabrück, 1995).

terminology). Such relative distance also seems implied when ethnographers try to look 'closely', aiming for 'thick description'.

The notion normalizes what people have encountered as removal. Even the adjective 'forced' covers up the sheer brute violence which is at the centre of all such removals. What is specifically missing is the emotional charge on both sides: the rage and revenge (if not pleasure) among those who did the expelling; the mixture of anger, desperation, and hatred among those who were expelled, hatred of those who inflicted (or seem to have inflicted) misery and grief on oneself. To be sure, the latter are the emotions of victims: expulsion emphasizes victimhood. Still, it also reflects the will or desire of the instigator, perhaps for vengeance, as in the 'wild expulsions' of Germans in 1945 in Poland and Czech areas, but also in the context of more orderly removals such as those in the same regions in 1946 7. At the same time, the term reverberates with the violence that is at the very centre of expulsion.

This violence was produced and encountered in interactions. Thus the study of face-to-face settings and configurations is central. This holds for the academics who, in German academic institutions and the centres of the SS establishment, since 1937 and 1938 had drawn up plans for the expulsion and resettlement of Jewish and non-Jewish Poles, and also of native Germans.[16] This similarly holds for various levels of the SS and ministerial bureaucracies: in particular, for subordinate administrative units, those who actually operated 'on the ground'. These low-level officials or police (or soldiers) had only rarely 'volunteered'. However, many did not just plod along grudgingly, but began to invest ambition and zeal if not pride in their task. The same holds, for instance, for the drivers of locomotives or the clerks who drafted lists in an office or on a railway platform. In sum, there was ample daily and, not least, nightly activity among the many who made 'it' work. Plans from 'Berlin' and orders from superiors turned into that very 'corporeality' which we historians face when considering the wide margin of self-guidance among those who actually handled things and people.

It is this field of forces that deserves much more scrutiny. Of

[16] On this see Michael Wildt (ed.), *Die Judenpolitik des SD 1333 bis 1338: Eine Dokumentation* (Munich, 1995); id., *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg, 2002).

course, local and regional studies and survivors' reports have touched on this issue of active, sometimes spontaneous participation in removing or expelling people: that is, in threatening or inflicting \iolence.

Forced Migration— 'Ethnic Cleansing'— Genocide

The very term 'forced migration' implies that ordinary migration does not involve force. According to a widely established understanding both inside and outside academia, two 'factors' drive migration: push and pull. For instance, it may be the push of hunger or starvation that drives people to migrate. In a more abstract view, social deprivation and economic misery can make survival extremely hard if not unlikely unless one migrates. Letters or accounts by priests and administrators 'on the ground' testify abundantly to such drives among those who departed for the 'new world', for instance in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, in nineteenth-century Hesse or Swabia, in southern Italy, or in the 1870s or 1880s in the easternmost provinces of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires and in the western provinces of the Russian Empire. But it was precisely these migrants who vividly claimed the attraction (or 'pull') of this 'new world', promising relief, and perhaps joy and happiness, for themselves or their children.

Forced migration means something else.[17] It is not the 'push' of dire living conditions or waning job opportunities; nor is it the stern single-mindedness of semi-feudal lords or factory owners who gave no thought to 'just prices' or 'just wages'. 'Forced migration' refers to the very physical violence of police batons or the military's guns, to the violence executed in the name, if not by the consent, of state authorities.

In modern times such violence has become the 'productive force' of 'ethnic cleansing'. Notions of and aspirations for national identity were wide open to almost any attempts to draw distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. Others have shown that the 'bio-political dispositive' (Michel Foucault) of 'pure blood' capitalized

[17] On the complex interrelationships of free and 'unfree labour' and, in turn, 'forced migration' see Paul E. Lovejoy and Nicholas Rogers (eds.), *Unfree Labour in the Development of the Atlantic World* (Ilford, 1994).

on the promise of scientific precision and truth and fuelled a vigorous dynamic of its own. In post-colonial histories this drive has not ceased to operate; the case of Rwanda from 1994 is mentioned often in this respect. But what is frequently overlooked, at least in Europe, is Partition in India and the expulsions undertaken for such 'cleansing'; Gyanendra Pandey gives a powerful account of this in his essay in this volume.

Across different historical cases the respective debates and activities revolved around images and notions of national identity, if not purity. They often triggered processes of erecting or solidifying national states. Efforts to mark border lines and purify those on the inside focused on, for instance, a national language, thus eradicating dialects or minority languages. A case in point in the early and mid nineteenth century is the rigorous measures of the French central state to ban the Norman-Celtic language in the north-west or Provencal in the south; similarly, dialects were stigmatized as outcast and administratively outlawed in public schools in the mid twentieth century in Germany.

Purification was demanded even more forcefully by the policies and practices of religious homogenization implemented in the German territories and states from the Reformation. Here, the 'father state' of early modern times forced his subjects into the strict discipline of either Protestant or Catholic rites and conduct. However, people 'on the ground' had multiple and inter-confessional ways of getting by, a practice that was by no means rare. Nevertheless, what justified such encroachments was the religious spell that the dominant felt or, at least, claimed. Thus they bore responsibility for the well-being of every 'subject', at least during his or her worldly pilgrimage. Still, why and how people took confessional rigidity as an agenda of their own is a matter for empirical study. Such investigations definitely show that acceptance did not exclude ways and means of deviating, disagreeing, or manoeuvring out from under the demands from above, of practising a different form or language, or of deciding when and how one might emigrate or choose exile.

'Ethnic cleansing' has been the common denominator of massacres and the resulting expulsions and refugees' movements in former Yugoslavia since 1991-2, a term used interchangeably both by those who did the expelling and those who observed. However, as the anthropologist Alexander Hinton noted, this is a 'vague

term . . . which . . . exoticize [s]' that violence which is pivotal for the 'sweeping off of people; importantly, 'cleansing . . . d[oes] not carry the legal imperative of intervention'.[18] For Hinton the term 'genocide' is preferable because it directly addresses the killing of 'a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part'.[19] Thus the term focuses explicidy on what is crucial but concealed in the term 'ethnic cleansing': the violence of killing or of mutilating.

It was the slaughter of almost one million people within a few months in the spring of 1994 in Rwanda and the killings of tens of thousands of people in former Yugoslavia from 1992—that is, it was the scale and simultaneity of these atrocities—that gave 'genocide' a special momentum, the stark differences between the two cases notwithstanding.

The renewed focus on 'genocide', that is, on actions that were or seemed to be characterized 'by the intention to annihilate "the other"',[20] triggered reassessments of massacres and past genocides, making one of them an issue of national politics in several central and western European countries (especially in France): the forced expulsions and massacres, the genocide of probably more than one million Armenians by Turkish authorities and soldiers during and after 1915. Whereas in this case forced expulsions seem to have led to massacres, in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia refugee movements and expulsions often seem to have resulted from massacres. By contrast, the mass scale and particular cruelty of mass killings as reported of the Khmer Rouge in Democratic Kampuchea in the mid-1970s did not trigger any comparable international reaction at that time.[21]

[18] Alexander L. Hinton, 'Introduction: The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of Genocide', in id. (ed.), *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide* (Berkeley, 2002), 23. On the issue cf. also Eric Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton, 2003) and Robert Gellately (ed.), *The Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 2003). Their differences notwithstanding both focus less on people's practices but explore macro-dimensions and emphasize stages of development towards genocidal killing.

[19] Hinton, 'The Dark Side of Modernity', 3, quoting from the 1948 Genocide Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Genocide. However, the Convention is lacking on several scores, as Hinton emphasizes. For instance, it remains silent about 'political groups' that might be targeted, persecuted, or killed by the mighty; and about pressures which the Soviet Union in particular exerted on these groups, as these clauses were dropped prior to the final version, according to Hinton.

[20] Hinton, 'The Dark Side of Modernity', 1—40, 6 quoting the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, who had coined the term 'genocide' in 1942.

[21] See, on further cases, Hinton (ed.), *Annihilating Difference,* 8—10, 23—5.

Shock, outrage, and, not least, efforts to get a closer view and to investigate causes, reasons, and, what is more, practices and trajectories of events in order to intervene—this emphasis is a very recent phenomenon.

Focus on Local Settings and Concrete Practices

The task, then, is not to fall prey to the attraction of seemingly clear-cut distinctions or bold definitions. Any effort to be ever more precise merely adds to the power of binaries pitting 'us' versus 'them'. What is needed is a more sensitive approach to the concrete actions and scenes of 'doing' the killing. Or, as Hinton has asked: how was it made and how did it start? Who did it and what practices served to 'prime' things? How, for instance, did the instigators in Rwanda employ pivotal symbols for the mass killings, such as those of the necessary 'flow' in human life and between humans?

How can we capture the dynamics of 'doing' violence? It is this micro-analytical approach that relates such deeds to claims that promised justification to perpetrators and to those consolations that granted relief if not glory to the victims or targets. The main issue, then, is to trace the concrete forms and activities that 'primed' things towards the actual violence of killing. It is in this vein that one should place the actual practices of pushing people and acting upon their bodies at the centre of attention, research, and description. Forced migration refers to force and violence as it does to expulsion. Both reverberate with the drive, among those doing the expelling, to act violently and with the shock that makes those who are expelled suffer at the time and possibly for years or even decades afterwards.

Accordingly, authors of studies on violence have shifted their emphasis from macro- to micro-perspectives when researching 'who did it'. The sociologist Jacques Semelin has observed the repercussions of the extreme violence of massacres:[22] massacres triggered forced removals even if they were not designed to 'force people out'. First, Semelin recommends that we consider the extent to which the perpetrators target not soldiers or guerrilla

[22] Jacques Semelin, 'Toward a Vocabulary of Massacre and Genocide', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 5 (2003).

fighters but civilians of all ages, women as well as men. What is it that turns civilians into particularly fitting targets? Secondly, and even more disturbingly, those who actually expel people have often been their good neighbours for many years. Thus the proximity between those forcing people out and those being forced out seems only to stimulate that brutality to which many of those doing the expelling seem to have driven themselves.[23] Thirdly, perpetrators increasingly tend to be teenage boys and girls. Whether this is also a feature of removals and expulsions of previous conjunctures remains to be seen.[24]

Slavey

The disciplining of subjects is obviously one element in 'producing' citizens who could, and also did, function in and for modern societies and states. This process involves a specifically European *longue duree.* Therefore it is important to address another *longue duree* which is particularly significant in the field of migration or, as it were, forced migration: slavery.

This is not to address the ancient and ubiquitous institution that existed in most parts of the populated world. What I have in mind is the kind of slavery that became a pivot in and of the Atlantic triangle described and analysed so incisively by Sidney Mintz in his masterly analysis of both the direct interrelationships and the twisted resonances between 'power' and 'sweetness'.[25] Amongst its other accomplishments this study masterfully demonstrates a productive combination of perspectives. The author combines macro- and micro-analyses in his reconstructions of economic calculations and political incentives on the 'commanding heights' as well as among the practitioners 'on the ground' when they set out to hunt and hurt Africans, shipping them across the Atlantic in order to sell them to plantation owners in Brazil, the Caribbean, or North American colonies or states.

[23] Slavenka Drakulic, *They Would Never Hurt a Fly: War Criminals on Trial in The Hague* (London, 2004).
[24] Cf. for the 1990s especially Liberia.
[25] Sidney W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modem History* (New York, 1985)-

Mintz never loses sight of the suffering and deaths of those being enslaved, and their efforts and strategies for surviving (including resistance and escape). What is more, in tracing the products and uses of slavery in England and on the European continent this study shows the dynamics of enslavement and forced migration and how they fed into the accumulation of capital and rigorous labour discipline. It is the specificity of the practices of historical actors in specific settings that reveals resonances and interrelationships, while never ignoring the material dimensions and the violence attributed and encountered time and again at almost all moments of these processes.

Numbers— and their Magic?

Narratives of removal, expulsion, and various forms of forced migration always contain or revolve around numbers. More precisely, debates and references employ enormous figures. Thus, it comes as no surprise that millions are mentioned time and again when the removals and expulsions between the late 1930s and late 1940s in eastern and central Europe are mentioned or analysed. A case in point is Philipp Ther's account of Europe.[26] He distinguishes three 'large waves of ethnic cleansing' for the twentieth century (1913-23 in south-eastern Europe; 1938-48 in eastern and central Europe; and the 1990s in the Balkans), which forced 30 million people to leave their homelands permanently. More specifically, for the Polish German and Czech—German discussions the figure of about 12 million expellees covers both the 'wild' expulsions in 1945 and the more regulated and 'controlled' ones of 1946 and 1947.

The importance of large figures is also obvious when it comes to those forced migrations and expulsions that European debates and textbooks regularly overlook or forget: among them the refugee movements leading up to and in the wake of Indian Partition in 1946 and 1947. Here, half a million are counted as having perished and up to 12 million people as having been made homeless or forced to leave home and resettle. One may wonder

[26] Philipp Ther, 'A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing', in id. and Ana Siljak (eds.), *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948* (Lanham, Md., 2001), 43-73, 49-58.

about the figures and their similarity (12 million here and 12 million there). In addition, in the European context another figure is at least as present: the 6 million murdered Jews who are usually attributed to 'Auschwitz' and the Holocaust/Shoah.[27] Such figures point at least indirectly to what one might call the monotony and, at the same time, the magic of large and 'simple' numbers.

For the Indian case Gyanendra Pandey has traced the issue in his own work. In minute detail he shows how figures such as the 'about 500,000 presumably killed between August 1946 and December 1947' have become 'standard in all accounts about the occurrences'. He himself acknowledges having accepted this figure as 'most likely in a previous contribution to debate'.[28]

Strong State— Weak State?

Accounts by historians emphasize the state as the driving or at least legitimizing force in removals, resettlements, and forced migration. Norman Naimark's comparative analysis of 'ethnic cleansing' in twentieth-century Europe is a case in point.[29] In this view, state and state agencies set the frame. They and their agents give licence as they provide plans and necessary material resources, from the means of transportation to weapons and manpower for actually pushing people 'out' or herding them towards their new destination.

Thus the state appears as a direct and particularly suitable product of man's devotion to perfecting him- or herself and, even more, others. In this view the state has been considered as 'gardener'. Zygmunt Bauman, who conspicuously employed this

[27] This figure is still prominent, although for more than two decades research has shown that it was somewhat smaller. Efforts to clarify the issue by the specialist Wolfgang Benz settle on the figure of about 5 million killed by the Nazi actions of deportation and expulsion (and for Auschwitz in particular a figure of about 1.1 million is now considered plausible). Cf. Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Dimension des Völkermords: Die fahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus* (Munich, 1991).

[28] Gyanendra Pandey, 'Woman's Place in the No Man's Land of Violence: The Indian Subcontinent, 1947-48', in Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), *The No Man's Land of Violence: Extreme Wars in the Twentieth Century* (Göttingen, 2006), 153—82; and his contribution to this volume.

[29] Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).

image, has found many followers, for instance James C. Scott in his *Seeing Like a State.*[30] The metaphor of 'gardening' reflects plans and practices of intervention in society. This drive was intensified and, in fact, emotionally charged consonant with the emergence of nation-states. Increasingly, 'we' seemed to need guarding against 'them'. Actual or possible enemies were to be found 'out there', beyond what controlling zeal had turned more and more into clear-cut boundaries and frontiers.[31] However, the gaze of suspicion not only looked outward but inadvertently turned back inward when detecting those who would undermine the established order of things 'from within'.

Notions and visions of gardening lent themselves to demands for engineering social relationships and, simultaneously, the shape and direction of institutions. Biopolitics and the furthering of demographic reproduction became imperative, at least in the late nineteenth century among socio-cultural and socio-political elites in central and western Europe and in North America.

Thus, gardening impinged upon people's hygiene and their diet; it concerned child- rearing and people's reproductive inclinations and abilities as well. The gardener begins with a natural site and aims to create an entirely designed space of botanical order. The organic dimension of the flora limits his or her possibilities; yet she or he has wide-ranging discretion in pruning and planting and weeding out plants that look like destroying or disturbing the intended order. Or to quote James Scott: 'What grows in the garden is always a small, consciously selected sample of what *might* be grown there. Similarly, social engineers consciously set out to design and maintain a more perfect social order.'[32]

More concretely, at issue are the people who envisaged and longed for the 'state'. These are the individuals and networks that designed, established, and ran 'well-ordered police states' from the eighteenth century on, at least in central and western Europe.[33] Its

[30] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Ascertained Schemes to Approve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998), 92-3.

[31] See, for this process of abandoning zones of mixture and simultaneity for the linear frontier, Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain at the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989)-

[32] Scott, *Seeing Like a State,* 92.

[33] See on this also Marc Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach', *American Historical Review,* 80/5 (Dec. 1975), 1221—43.

commissars set out to homogenize the multitude of localities and the specific methods of domination and administration. These officials pursued not only the interest of the respective prince comprehensively to exploit the resources of the territory and the population ruled. This is because, in the societal field of forces, those who had claimed domination since ancient times also acted, as did the 'many', that is, that majority of people who stubbornly pursed their own goals, interests, and needs, thus often outflanking controls and demands 'from above'. For their own justification, officials who acted in this field emphasized the demands of the state, which they linked to the 'common weal'. By this token, however, one would also protect and support the respective sovereign. In this regard, most of the agents of the state showed devotion, if not love, not only for the prince but also for the state, not least when they aimed to weed out and remove those among its population who seemed 'unfit'.

Pre-modern or Modern?

In the wake of the Shoah, as of Stalinist deportations and killings, it was the imminent terror 'from above' as witnessed by survivors that inspired analyses of a new kind of devastating power being produced by particularly 'modern' or 'total' rule (Hannah Arendt).[34] This view invoked history's *longue duree-.* interrelationships between societal modernization or its breakdown on the one hand and conjunctures of mass killing on the other became an issue of academic and, more generally, of public debate.

However, as the sociologists Tzvetan Todorov and Zygmunt Bauman have both argued,[3'] manually killing and executing acts of cruelty on bodies of the 'other' in concentration camps was not a sudden re-emergence of pre-modern or 'primitive' attitudes. On

[34] Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), which is the largely rewritten German edition other *Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, Od[1])- There she addresses especially imperialism and antisemitism as providing a lasting imprint. Others have argued that mass participation in politics as proclaimed by the French revolutionaries of 1789 had instilled in the 'masses' a sense of empowerment by implementing programmes of 'national' or other kinds of 'purity'. See Michael Hanagan, 'Gewalt und die Entstehung von Staaten', in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (eds.), *Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung* (Wiesbaden, 2002), 153 76-

[30] Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York, 1992), 14; Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, 1989).

the contrary, these mass killings rely on the combination of intensified fury with sober, rational calculation. This very blend has fuelled the murder of people and groups who were marked as foes (as Jews or Romani were under Nazism); this blend has informed and still does inform killing actions against whole peoples, and makes them cases in point of a particularly modern combination of intensified action, in emotional and cognitive terms alike.

Removal and Expulsion: 'Weapons of the Subaltern'?

The shocking ubiquity of relocations and removals leaves no doubt that such practices were popular, and not only in well-established states (states modelled on the European and, thus, colonial and colonizing paradigm). Expulsions and removals in republican Turkey and, consequently, in republican Greece from 1918 to 1921/3, and the violence of 'ethnic cleansing' from 1992 in former Yugoslavia (or in various African settings today), reflect not strong but non-existent or, at least, weak or faltering states. In fact, removals have almost become an ingredient of post-colonial states. Aspirations of subalterns to challenge those very states that have set the tone not only in Europe but worldwide since the late nineteenth century also turned to 'ethnic cleansing ... as a weapon of the subaltern' (Michael Geyer), including not least the expulsions of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia during and after 1945.

If the oppressed or the 'subaltern' confronts the dominant, she or he employs or threatens violence. This very violence focuses on the actual or recalled pain inflicted previously by the 'prick' of the master's baton, whip, gun, or bayonet, and by the silent gestures of denigrating the subaltern. It is in their effort to (re)claim or (re)capture space or time (or both) that dominated people may embark on practices of violence. But what they may present as their last resort, the dominant can easily turn into an excuse for applying even more violence. The latter, in turn, can easily enhance confrontation and, in the end, instigate the removal and expulsion of those being attacked in the first place.

In this view, expulsions and removals do indeed change or, at least, suspend the top-down relationship that seems so characteristic of power and domination. However, Hannah Arendt has emphasized that totalitarian rule flattens out if not erases the distinction between the dominant and the dominated. Accordingly, self-mobilization imbues a sense of domination to those who actively participate in subjugating others. And it is physical violence that seems particularly 'fit' for this very job. If removal and expulsion are practices in and by which the dominated empower themselves, such a perspective is chilling, or at least unsettling.[36]

Afterthought: Emotions and their Multivalences

The emergence of standards of 'civilized' if not humane conduct appears as a long-term process in history. Several decades ago (in the wake of fascism) the historical sociologist Norbert Elias explored what he called the 'process of civilization' in people's everyday life. He emphasized not only the reduction of physical violence but also the simultaneous refinement of eating habits and table manners. More recently such wide-ranging tableaux have met with some scepticism. Nevertheless, only a few years ago Jürgen Osterhammel proposed to reflect on a similar long-term process: the formation of a 'western' or, as he put it, 'transatlantic and Euro-American consciousness of norms'. For him the outstanding example is the abolition of slavery.[37]

I am not so sure about the assumed 'normativity' of such norms, that is, the extent to which people's conduct and its changes are dictated by norms. This may be even more the case when the humane treatment of others is at stake. Certainly, Osterhammel is well aware of the multivalence of such norms. They were easily available for campaigns to abolish slavery as waged by the great powers for their own benefit, in fact, justifying the global intervention of these powers during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, parallel to the cognitive statements, both their utterance and their performance dwelled on or openly displayed emotional charges that the arguments of both critics

[36] See Michael Geyer's review of Norman Naimark, *The Fires of Hatred,* in *Journal of Modem History,75* (2003), 935—8; Walter Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969).

[37] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Sklaverei und die Zivilisation des Westens* (Munich, 2000), 57—9, esp. 62-3.

and defendants of slavery were imbued with.[38] And these emotions that are invested in or were related to, or triggered by, normative speech and practice have been shed, or have gone rather unnoticed so far.

More concretely, when people sing 'Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves' (which at least in Britain considerable numbers of people sing emphatically at least once a year, on the last night of the Proms at the Royal Albert Hall in London), they also sing the line 'Britons never, never shall be slaves'. These lines date back to the early eighteenth century but they still reflect in most audible vigour at least two sets of feelings: on the one hand the terror of enslavement and deportation; on the other the joy of having beaten the actual danger of it becoming reality. Here terror and anxiety fiercely resonate with joy and longing—the longing for freedom. Or, as with the 'Britons' who are singing and whom the song also addresses: many take it as their ferocious claim to ever again seize that freedom. Thus one could take the longing for and the joy at the abolition as 'mirror emotions' of the very terror that shook people who were actually enslaved, but also the fear of those who later envisioned themselves facing 'barbarians' and their forces of evil.

Terror and joy do not easily match. They go together, although in rather asymmetrical ways. It is this interrelationship that is ignored in the debates and contestations about the universal usage and legitimacy of Euro-American concepts of forced migration, similar to Jürgen Osterhammel's argument about slavery (see above). Critiques of such 'western' modes, ideas, and forms of (intellectual or academic) conduct focus on what they consider the denial of respect or at least awareness of the specifics of those who never got beyond the threshold of being treated as 'the same but not quite' (Gayatri Spivak). However, such criticism tends to omit that notions and practices commonly labelled 'western' had and have multiple facets. Thus they could cover, for instance, both enslavement and abolition or freedom as well. Still, in its historical presence the universalizing claim of western notions in many parts of the world and for many generations meant experiences of being subdued, exploited, and dominated, often ruthlessly. Even more, processes of westernization lumped

[38] The latter is, of course, not to deny that enslavement as a process continues and has even spread in the most recent times.

together multiple ways of encroaching upon people and making them receptive to 'western' ways of perceiving the world and of making do. One of its more recent slogans in people's everyday usage is consumerism. In other words, westernization denotes processes of hegemony and domination, with wide-ranging consequences as far as spatial mobility and migration are concerned, from 'induced' migration to violent enslavement and deportation.

To approach it from yet another angle: if subjugation, deportation, and slavery sparked emotions of pleasure but also dismay and horror among observers and witnesses, they also strengthened longings for pleasure among the profiteers and co-dominators and those related or tied to them; and horror and disgust among many others, most of them excluded from the heights of societal command.

What, then, does this mean for the interrelationship between the terrifying encounter of deportation (or slavery) on the one hand, and the longing to be 'free at last' on the other? In contrast to the brute violence of such forced removals, the forms of westernization may work differently. Obviously, in people's appropriation of 'western' ways of thinking and perceiving the world in which they find themselves, of doing things and of enjoying themselves, they do not encounter that 'prick' which persists from slavery. It was that 'prick' of violence that hurt the subjugated especially hard. However, this very same 'prick' occasionally galvanized individuals and helped to spark a broad movement to counter that very mode of subjugation and domination. Still, this would also mean that softer means of domination do not carry this very 'prick'. And precisely for this reason, these softer means appear more effective for establishing or sustaining domination than does solely physical violence and brute force. It is the lack of an emotional 'other' to which the dominated could or would aspire that makes it so effective for the dominant.

In that vein, to refrain from employing terms such as 'forced migration' for what was, on closer inspection, forced removal, deportation, or expulsion may be a first step towards more carefully tracing the emotional dynamics on both sides: among the people who were expelled and removed as well as among those who designed and actually did the expelling and deporting. This

will not change violent practices, but it is an 'indispensable' analytical step (Dipesh Chakrabarty)[39] towards developing more adequate perceptions of what happened and how it did.

[39] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, 2000), 19: 'Categories and strategies we have learned from European thought (including the strategy of historicizing) are both indispensable and inadequate.' He is referring to the attempt to represent a 'particular case of a non-European modernity' by upper-caste Hindu Bengalis in the 1990s.

PART II

Forced Removal and Indigenous Peoples