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Making Peace in an Age of War: Emperor Ferdinand III (1608–1657)

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MAKING PEACE IN AN AGE OF WAR

EMPEROR FERDINAND III (1608–1657)

MARK HENGERER



MAKING PEACE
IN AN AGE OF WAR

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EMPEROR FERDINAND III (1608–1657)

MARK HENGERER

TRANSLATED BY ELKE SOLIDAY

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Courtesy of Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.

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INTRODUCTION

Emperor Ferdinand III ended the Thirty Years' War, saved the Habsburg Monarchy from peril, and consolidated a confessionally pacified as well as constitutionally stabilized Holy Roman Empire. However, unlike the “heroes and villains giving life to the opening phases” of this terrible war, he belonged quite a while to the “figures ignored by posterity” (Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, 2009, xxiii), those who did not spectacularly start but who laboriously solved the seemingly indissoluble commixture of inherited civil and international wars. On the occasion of the fourth century of the later emperor's year of birth, Lothar Höbelt published a biography of Ferdinand III in 2008 (*Ferdinand III. (1608-1657) Friedenskaiser wider Willen*). The original version of this book (*Kaiser Ferdinand III. (1608-1657) Eine Biographie*), completed in the same year, appeared only in 2012 because the recording of music for Ferdinand III attached to the book had to go through a legal odyssey. Meanwhile, important German experts have, on the occasion of the fourth century of the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, published studies on this conflict, such as Johannes Burkhardt's *Der Krieg der Kriege. Eine neue Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (2018), Georg Schmidt's *Die Reiter der Apokalypse. Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (2018), Heinz Duchhardt's *Der Weg in die Katastrophe des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Die Krisendekade 1608-1618* (2017), and Herfried Münkler's *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg. Europäische Katastrophe, Deutsches Trauma 1618-1648* (2017). However, Peter Wilson (*ibid.*) is still right when he points out that the last thirteen years of the war—a period that largely coincides with the reign of Ferdinand III—is generally “compressed into a quarter of less of the text, much of which is devoted to discussing the peace and aftermath.” If Wilson's *The Thirty Years War* and Joachim Whaley's *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire* (2012) still stand out as fundamental works, and if Robert Bireley's *Ferdinand II, Counter-Reformation Emperor, 1578-1637* (2014) does indeed “fill the gap for this influential Austrian Habsburg Ruler” (viii), there is place for an English biography of this emperor's pathbreaking yet overshadowed successor.

Older publications on Ferdinand III are rare. The first historical account, the *Historia Di Ferdinando Terzo Imperatore*, a comprehensive volume in folio, was published in 1672 by Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato in Vienna and deals primarily with the reasons for the Thirty Years' War and with Ferdinand II, with whose death in 1637 it ends. Matthias Koch released a history of the Empire under the reign of Ferdinand III in two volumes (*Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III, 1865–1866*) that draws a rather positive image of the emperor; as it was still common, the focus lay on military and political events and deeds. Only in the last third of the twentieth century, several series of editions of sources—especially the *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Triennale Illustrantia*, the *Acta Pacis Westfalicae*, and the *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*—as well as a seminal series of (mainly) monographs on the Peace of Westphalia (*Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte*) enabled researchers to reconsider the setting of Ferdinand III's life.

Konrad Repgen's call for the exploitation of private material, made in a balanced biographical article on Ferdinand III in an influential compendium (*Die Kaiser der Neuzeit 1510-1918*, 1990), led me to the *Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv* in Vienna, where I started reading the emperor's calendars in 1994, and to Rome, where I consulted young Ferdinand's pieces of homework on Aristotle, the *Mirror for Princes* dedicated to him, and other sources, mainly on the Court. Inspired by Robert J. W. Evans' pioneering *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700*, by approaches of cultural history as well as systems theory, I focused on the social and organizational transformation of the Imperial court in the sixteenth and mainly seventeenth centuries (*Kaiserhof und Adel. Eine Kommunikationsgeschichte der Macht in der Vormoderne*, 2004) before coming back to the person of Ferdinand III. As is Robert Bireley's book on Ferdinand II, this book on Ferdinand III is based mainly on archival sources from Rome, Vienna, Munich, and Stockholm. Höbelt's biography dwells on a wide range of primary sources, too, and provides a detailed history of events, but it makes use of metaphors and hyperboles to such a degree that a serious discussion seems unexpedient, even if he is comprehensive in the field of military history (see also his book *Von Nördlingen bis Jankau. Kaiserliche Strategie und Kriegführung 1634-1645*, 2016).

My focus lies on education, mindset, knowledge, and cultural and social patterns while I try to describe what life and being a ruler meant to an emperor in the now very distant seventeenth century; it is primarily from this perspective that I deal with Ferdinand's colossal challenge, the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia. Thus, the private correspondence reveals a maudlin man: an emperor who was aloof toward his presumably best allies

and lamented that the death of a Spanish Habsburg prince, who had helped him win the important battle of Nördlingen in 1634, would prevent him from hunting because of the obligatory mourning ceremonies; a man who disgustingly detailed the horrors of war as well as the abject crimes committed by his own troops, and who tried in vain to prohibit them by establishing military discipline; and a fervent Catholic who, nonetheless, chose an exceedingly moderate confessor, fell out with subsequent popes, and dropped the intransigent Catholic Imperial Estates in order to make peace in the Empire—a peace that freed his own hands to impose Catholicism to his Austrian and Bohemian subjects. But again, shades of gray nuance the picture, with Ferdinand III honoring a multiconfessional state in Hungary and additional exceptions for Silesia, the Lower Austrian nobility, the army, and his court.

In fact, Ferdinand III wanted peace from the beginning, but he did not “want” to accept the essential French condition that he forsake not only his stirrups but also his Spanish ally to boot. The turn became possible not just because of political pressure from his equally desperate allies and because of military destitution, and not just because of the death of his Spanish wife in 1646 and the resulting decline of Spanish influence, but also as an application of a procedural element in policymaking deeply rooted in a dynasty whose members had learned for a long time to compromise on the very principles that seemed to assure their rule. Ferdinand III’s first lesson in compromise with what was called a clear conscience was his swearing in 1625 to maintain the multiconfessional order in Hungary rather than risk losing it for his dynasty and leaving all its people in the clutches of various Protestant denominations; his Catholic clerics formally consented. This procedure had allowed for Ferdinand’s father to compromise on his own principles a decade later at the Peace of Prague in order to pacify almost all of the Imperial Estates. Alas, the bloodshed lasted until 1648 mainly because of the intransigence of both Ferdinand II and the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel in their dispute over Hersfeld Abbey, a dispute that undermined the—almost successful—pacification within the Empire in 1635; this kind of conflict between the emperor and a few Protestant German princes gave leverage to Habsburg’s determined foreign enemies so that, when Ferdinand III had become emperor in 1637, he inherited a war that combined interests of Imperial Estates as well as of European countries. Caught in the midst of a terrible military crisis in 1645, Ferdinand III himself recognized the need to accommodate their demands. A strategy of seeking compromise by raising the stakes to such heights may seem criminal to modern observers. Yet, it seemed fair to contemporaries, whose human identity revolved around the soul, and whose salvation was not just important but essential. Furthermore, even if the Swedes abhorred Catholicism, they shared the emperor’s insistence on the right to determine his subjects’ faith,

as they, too, considered multiconfessionalism a deadly threat to any state's stability. What is more, besides the cession of Habsburg territories in the east of France, Ferdinand's highest stake was the Spanish alliance, which was a very political matter, not only a religious one. The end of the Austro-Spanish Habsburg alliance was, however, the last unmet requirement of the victorious French. This break would not only give France a free hand in its war against Spain but raised the chance that Louis XIV could, after victory in the Franco-Spanish War, marry the Spanish King's firstborn daughter and thereby acquire a hereditary title to the Spanish Empire. It was characteristic of Ferdinand's decision-making that it was an ultimatum of his Bavarian ally that seemingly forced him but in fact helped him to make this final concession, though it was his negotiators who used the emperor's 1645 declaration of a state of emergency the condition to capitulate to France's demand. His younger brother had earlier diagnosed this necessity, urging him that no cleric or councillor could, while upholding the principles of Catholicism or dynastic unity, advocate for the total military and political ruin of the Austrian Habsburgs.

The biographic approach also helps to apprehend an important reason why the Thirty Year's War took so long and was finally won by France, Sweden, and their German allies. In his very first military campaign in 1634, Ferdinand III and his Bavarian and Spanish allies won the battle of Nördlingen that pushed the Swedish army back into northern Germany for years and led to the nearly successful Peace of Prague in 1635. Thereafter, Ferdinand III tried to compel Sweden to conclude peace directly with him, thus separating it from its French ally, much as the French tried to get him to conclude peace without his Spanish allies. In the end, the emperor's own army was too weak to lead a war on the multiple fronts in France and northern Germany while simultaneously guarding its southeastern flank against looming threats to Hungary from Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire. In this situation, Ferdinand III (though he feared decisive losses) bet on decisive victories in battles. In his wishful thinking, such a battle would secure peace with Sweden, set the army free to fight France, and achieve an acceptable second peace with the Bourbons. Focusing on campaigns and battles, the emperor understood too late that the Swedish army was highly resilient and, more importantly, that wintering grounds secured by fortified places in conquered enemy territory were the key to victory, a key that the Swedish got into their hands very early. Ferdinand's first political success, the pacification of the vast majority of Imperial Estates since 1635, backfired on a military level: his army could not prey on wintering grounds of pacified or allied estates. Ferdinand III's misperception of the relevance of battles and provision was aggravated by his fear of a single strong Imperial Army with a powerful military leader. That had been the legacy of his father's struggle with the seemingly omnipotent commander Wallenstein,

whom Ferdinand II did not dare to discharge and, thus, had killed in 1634. Instead, Ferdinand III relied on the armies of his allied Imperial Estates, whose greater proximity to the French and Swedish invaders exposed them one after another to defeat and capitulation. His own field army was rather small and divided despite occasional and desperate rather than heroic efforts to strengthen them on the eve of battle. It was led by officers who were willing to accept that they could not deliver victory with the tight political strings put on them and without sufficient funding and provision.

Despite his forlorn political and military strategy and the inability to win a European war on the terms of the imperial Peace of Prague that his father had struck, Ferdinand III still shaped the constitution of the Empire. In 1640, he called an Imperial Diet (which had not met since 1613), struck the Peace of Westphalia, thereby changing the Empire's constitution, and worked with the postwar Imperial Diet to resolve residual issues left open by this peace. From negotiating experience gained from multiple Hungarian Diets, he stoically acquired a taste for confessional and even political diversity, so long as it could be contained within the distinct confines of his diverse dominions; he even accepted the definitive secularization of several imperial ecclesiastical principalities that his father Ferdinand II had tried to restore to the Catholic church. The new constitution settled the confessional and territorial disputes and guaranteed religious freedom in the private sphere—except for the Austrian hereditary lands, where Ferdinand insisted on the invariable right to determine his subjects' confession. It is fair to say that this new order finally resolved issues that had festered for a century following the Peace of Augsburg of 1555. Although Ferdinand III could still not establish a truly Imperial Army, he maintained his judicial rights as emperor. He could not implement majority voting in the Diet, which would have been beneficial as Catholic polities were in the majority, but was able to preserve juridical and political privileges. What is more, and decisive in the ending of interconfessional war in the Empire, was a procedural invention, the *itio in partes*, which pacified the Diet and the Empire by requiring that the Protestant and Catholic Estates meet separately to discuss and vote on all disputes involving religion, thereby assuring a majority consensus of *both* parties. Of capital importance for Ferdinand was that the peace and stability that issued from such a balanced constitution would enable him to have his son designated as the next emperor.

This was quite a success for a distressed and often defeated ruler. Happily for his territories, Ferdinand III bore the terrible lessons in mind after the Thirty Years' War. Even when he tried to reestablish the alliance with the Spanish branch of his Habsburg dynasty, he did so within the legal terms of the Westphalian peace. Given the constant specter of war, Ferdinand initiated the strengthening of fortifications, especially in the regions exposed to Swedish

and Ottoman invasion, and retained a peacetime army, thereby creating the monarchy's first standing army. Yet, under no circumstances was he willing to tolerate another war. This was a difficult task when his support was sought in the ensuing Russo-Polish War, the Nordic War, and Franco-Spanish War. But by then, the gouty, corpulent, and often melancholic forty-year-old emperor was no longer a young, high-flying prince instilled with late-medieval and alleged Roman ideals but rather a tenacious moderate (Figure 1).

The faith of a man who had lost his mother as a young boy focused early on Mary and did not vacillate in a difficult life that was shaped by war and the loss of two truly beloved spouses and many of his children, both young and adult. Though he was fond of music and painting, and in no way contemptuous of joy, he upheld his princely *gravitas*

to his last breath, much as he embraced to the end a view of this world that he shared with so many in the dark decades of the Thirty Years' War: *vanitas*.

This English version of Ferdinand's biography has been considerably shortened. This pertains in part to the narrative where several passages have been cut out, mainly descriptions of ritual and ceremonial that structured a princely life at court as well as some subtleties of military history and political negotiation. It pertains massively to the scientific apparatus, which has almost 200 pages in the original version.

As the original version is available online (publisher's link: http://www.boehrlau-verlag.com/download/160420/978-3-205-77765-6_OpenAccess.pdf university's link: https://epub.uni-muenchen.de/17491/1/Hengerer_Ferdinand_17491.pdf), it is possible to get the complete information by referring to the detailed notes. Thus, in the notes of this abridged version, the abbreviation PH, meaning *paragraph Hengerer*, points to the page of the apparatus and the number of the note or notes that provide sources, discussion, and further literature for the relevant paragraph in the original version. In order to



FIGURE 1 Medallion cameo with a portrait of Emperor Ferdinand III, ca. 1640/50. Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, Collection of Antiquities XII 67.

credit other authors, the notes in this version identify more important scientific publications; they also identify the sources for literal quotations but not the signatures or pages of further archival or edited sources. Quotations in Italian and some in Latin have been conserved as well as some particularly interesting quotations in German, mostly from unpublished material and herein mainly from Ledel's useful but unpublished thesis on the letters from Ferdinand III to his brother. This is why the list of archives, edited sources, and cited literature is shorter than in the original version. The English translation was completed early in 2016, so I made use of later publications only exceptionally.

It is a pleasure to include in this list all those who made this version possible.¹ I am grateful to many for their support. Elke Soliday astutely translated the text. University of Konstanz's Cluster of Excellence "Cultural Bases of Integration," led by the eminent historian Rudolf Schlögl, generously financed the translation. Stefan Mayr vigorously abbreviated the text, and Volker Schniepp provided an English version of his genealogical tree and map. Alexandra Sophie Popst procured the copyright permissions. Daniel Mahla increased the comprehensibility of the Introduction. Ryan Crimmins and Alexandra Röckel shared very interesting material from their research. Daniela Friedrich assisted with the proofreading of the volume.

The contribution of the distinguished Charles Ingrao was fundamental. It was under his direction that the series took up this project. He constantly supported the process, most amicably revised the translation, and persevered when my own revision took, due to a new appointment, more time than expected. The new Series Editor Howard Louthan kindly helped in the final stage as did Katherine Purple and her colleagues with whom it was a pleasure to cooperate.

PART I

THE WAY TO THE THRONE, 1608–1637

1.1

PATH TO THE IMPERIAL THRONE, 1608–1636

Heir and Spare

In mid-May of 1608, people in Graz expected Anna Maria, wife of Archduke Ferdinand, to give birth within a few days, and they fervently hoped for a son. Since her marriage in 1600, she had already borne three children; only one son had survived. At the beginning of June, the birth was still thought to be imminent, and when it had not happened by the beginning of July, it became apparent that there had been an error in the calculation of the due date. It was not until two weeks later, around twelve o'clock at night from July 12 to 13, that the archduchess delivered a son. The birth, so eagerly awaited, went smoothly; both mother and child survived. As infant mortality at the time was extremely high, the papal nuncio at the court of Graz was rushed to the castle the same day. On Sunday, July 13, he baptized the boy with the name Ferdinand Ernst.¹

Archduke Ferdinand Ernst was born into a widely extended dynasty that had also produced the reigning Emperor Rudolf II, who, like the newborn's father, was a grandson of Emperor Ferdinand I. Behind him stood an illustrious ancestral line: Queen Joanna of Castile and Aragon and her husband Philip the Handsome, whose mother Maria was heir apparent of Charles the Bold of Burgundy and whose father was Emperor Maximilian I. He, in turn, was a son of Emperor Friedrich III, who had commissioned the imperial palace at Graz. The first king of the Romans from this dynasty had been Rudolf I, born in 1218.

There were European dynasties who could boast longer rule, but none controlled so many lands worldwide. Joanna's and Philip's children had divided this immense inheritance between a Spanish and an Austrian line; the latter, in turn, was split into an Imperial and a Styrian line. As head of this last lineage, the newborn's father reigned over the duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, the county of Gorizia (Görz), and some coastal regions around Trieste and Fiume (Rijeka). The Spanish line ruled large regions of South, Central, and North America, the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily, Naples, the duchy

of Milan, and several enclaves in North Africa. The Burgundian lands, which included the Franche-Comté and those ten provinces of the Netherlands loyal to the Habsburgs, had come to them as inheritance via Mary of Burgundy and was often governed by Austrian Archdukes; the French were aware that her ancestors belonged to a cadet line of the French royal family and considered the Habsburg succession in Burgundy as damage to be repaired. Besides the kingdom of Hungary and neighboring Croatia and Slavonia, the Imperial line ruled the kingdom of Bohemia (including Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia) as well as the two Austrian territories above and below the river Enns—a “monarchical union of monarchical unions of states formed by estates” (Winkelbauer).² The county of Tyrol along with a number of Swabian, Alsatian, and Upper Rhenish regions, collectively known as Further Austria, were administered by an archduke serving as viceroy; there, the Imperial and Styrian lines ruled by turns.

As diverse as this giant dominion was, it appeared oppressive to some, such as the king of France, say, or the many imperial princes, and especially the many knights, barons, and counts in the Austrian Habsburg territories who stood in opposition to the dynasty. In the Holy Roman Empire, there was little authority in the narrower sense, and there were problems with the Estates as well, especially concerning the confessional and ecclesiastical aspects of rulership. But precisely here was the the newborn assigned a role: after the baptism, his father asked the nuncio for the pope’s blessing for himself, the mother, and the little boy, who was born a “new servant of His Holiness and the Holy See.”³ Thus, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, later Emperor Ferdinand III, was, from the day of his birth, a party in the confessional conflict that would soon embroil the Empire in war.

Let us look briefly at this Empire. It was composed of a multitude of estates—privileged holders of feudal rights constituted in corporations that guaranteed political participation—with very different rights of dominion or lordship. Seven electors—the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, the margrave of Brandenburg, the duke of Saxony, the count Palatine, and the king of Bohemia—selected the king of the Romans, who was heir apparent to the emperor. Immediately under the emperor were several hundred other territorial rulers, including clerical and secular princes; Imperial abbots, counts, barons, and knights; a number of Imperial villages; and, finally, the Imperial cities, which frequently had considerable extramural rights and even territories that they governed almost independently. The electors (though not the king of Bohemia), imperial princes, and Imperial cities had voting privileges in the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*), which met every few years, generally in Regensburg. Deputations of the Imperial Estates addressed problems between Diets, though the electors often regulated matters at special electoral conferences (*Kurfürstentag*) without input from the other Imperial

Estates. The two highest judicial instances were the Imperial Chamber Court (*Reichskammergericht*), dominated by the Imperial Estates, and the emperor's Aulic Council (*Reichshofrat*). In addition, the Empire was divided into ten Imperial Circles, especially important for military affairs. The Imperial Circles were also organized by the Estates; even counts and knights were represented in their corporate units.

The year of Ferdinand III's birth marked a profound turning point in this Empire's history. Its institutions collapsed and were replaced by armed confessional alliances of the Imperial Estates. In 1608, for the first time, the Imperial Diet was unable to arrive at a final agreement because of religious differences. The Peace of Augsburg (1555), which had calmed a religiously divided Empire by promoting coexistence for Catholics and Lutherans, had run its course; now the principal dispute was over the legal status of properties taken after 1552 from the Catholic Church by Lutheran and, especially, Calvinist rulers. Although the secularizations carried out before 1552 had been ratified in 1555, many questions remained open. Could the city councils of Imperial cities determine their citizens' religion? Could secular princes confiscate church property surrounded by their own territories? Could clerics who became Lutherans or Calvinists retain, as their personal secular property, territories entrusted to them by the Church? Catholics regarded the interdiction of this practice in 1555 and termed the ecclesiastical reservation (*Geistlicher Vorbehalt*) as protection from further loss of ecclesiastical territories. Protestants, on the other hand, saw it as an unacceptable restriction of the princes' right to religious authority, and they continued their confiscation of church property. Nor did the Imperial Chamber Court function any longer as it was meant to.

This massive functional disruption of two central Imperial institutions was exacerbated in 1608. Mere days after the breakup of the Imperial Diet, several Protestant Imperial Estates formed a military alliance, the so-called Evangelical Union, headed by the Calvinist count Palatine who resided in Heidelberg. The ecclesiastical electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, several Catholic bishops, and the duke of Bavaria did not believe the *Union* to be a defensive agreement, and in 1609, they founded their own military alliance, the Catholic League, under Bavarian leadership. The crisis engulfing Imperial institutions and the military buildup were decisive factors for the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.⁴

The year of Ferdinand III's birth also marked a profound turning point for the Habsburg lands. In 1608, two territories saw the deposition of their ruler in the interest of the Protestant Estates. Because of military resistance to his re-Catholicization policy, Emperor Rudolf II had to abdicate as king of Hungary. The Hungarian Estates replaced him with his younger brother,



FIGURE 2 Mary Anne of Bavaria, mother of Ferdinand III, oil painting by Joseph Heintz the Elder. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.

Archduke Matthias, who was more open to compromise where religious rights were concerned. In Moravia, Rudolph II attempted to enforce the prince's disputed right of reformation, and there, too, the Estates deposed him, choosing Archduke Matthias as their new ruler. Rudolph II was able to save his Bohemian crown (though only for a few years) by granting the Estates, in a so-called Letter of Majesty (*Majestätsbrief*), religious freedom as well as far-reaching governmental participation.

The two depositions make clear why Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III fought so tenaciously for their territorial dominion and for the right, granted in principle to all secular imperial princes in 1555, to determine the religious confession of their subjects, including the nobility. In the sixteenth century, the Habsburgs had not been able to realize this Right of Reformation because of their geographical situation. Defense against the Ottoman Empire's war of conquest demanded constructing and maintaining a line of fortresses from the Adriatic Sea far into northeastern Hungary. Though the Holy Roman Empire provided financial assistance, the Habsburgs needed additional tax revenues from their own territories. These were approved and raised by the Estates, which in return demanded and received religious autonomy that included confessional freedom and their own churches, clerics, schools, and printing presses. Thus, there developed at the manorial level a Protestant ecclesiastical organization that the nobility shaped into a territorial church led by the Estates but also including urban populations and peasants. The territorial churches headed by Protestant princes in the Empire served as their model. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Protestant nobles were fully aware of the political implications of this process and formed protective alliances beyond their borders. From the Habsburgs' point of view, this amounted to a kind of state within a state or—as in the Netherlands, Hungary, and Moravia in 1608—the end of the rule for those Habsburgs who found themselves in serious conflict with the Protestant Estates.⁵

Early Years

Ferdinand III's mother Maria Anna was a daughter of the Bavarian Duke Wilhelm V and Princess Renata of Lorraine (Figure 2). Born in 1578, she was married off in 1600 to Inner Austria in order to strengthen the alliance of two princes of the Counter Reformation. Historical research deems her marriage "exceedingly happy" (Albrecht).⁶ After Ferdinand's birth, she remained, as custom decreed, in the same room for over a month. There, the Graz nuncio presented her with letters of congratulations from the pope and the Cardinal Secretary of State Borghese. She returned her thanks and commended "her husband, children, and her entire Most Serene House"⁷ to the Holy Father.



FIGURE 3 Archduke Charles of Austria, elder brother of Ferdinand III (died in 1619), oil painting, artist unknown. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.

Though the children of the Habsburgs were usually suckled by wet-nurses, during their early years, they remained with their mothers, who had their own households dominated by women within the framework of the general court. No picture of Ferdinand III as a small child survives, but like his elder brother (Figure 3) and later his own children, he probably took his first steps

in a dress and was draped with lucky charms and religious trinkets. An early, somewhat more elaborate notice concerning the future emperor reports that in 1615, during a visit by the archducal family to the nuncio's Graz residence, he assiduously devoted himself to the Italian pastries. It is likely that he saw his maternal grandfather, Wilhelm V of Bavaria, when the duke visited Styria in 1612 on a pilgrimage to Mariazell with all the princes and his daughter.⁸

Throughout these years, Ferdinand III's mother served as a link between Inner Austria and Bavaria. She kept informed about political, dynastic, and court matters and, in turn, informed her Bavarian relatives. Thus, in 1611, she commented on the financial needs of the Counter Reformation as well as on two Graz personalities who were later to assume importance in Ferdinand III's life. She described Eggenberg, her husband's main counselor, as an "upstanding man" and justified his financial conduct. Of her husband's younger brother, the twenty-five-year-old Bishop Leopold of Passau and Strasbourg, she noted that he had "little taste for the ecclesiastical state."⁹ This was apparent to everyone as he, evidently in quest of a crown, had interfered militarily in the dispute between Rudolf II and King Matthias.

After Rudolf II's death in 1612, the obligations for Ferdinand III's father increased. As Rudolf II's successor, the electors chose Matthias, who charged his Graz cousin with various representational functions. So, for two months during the winter of 1612/13, the four-year-old Archduke Ferdinand Ernst traveled to Vienna with his parents and elder brother. In order not to cause the little princes any discomfort, the journey proceeded at a leisurely pace and took eight days, from December 11 to 18, for the distance between Graz and Vienna. After their return to Graz, Maria Anna reported that the imperial couple had been inordinately fond of her children and had taken "great pleasure in them; praise God the Almighty that everything went so well."¹⁰ She was probably also referring to the esteem the Inner Austrian ruling family had enjoyed in Vienna. The emperor had presented them with rich gifts, and some people already hailed the archduke from Graz as the future king of the Romans.

In 1613, Archduke Ferdinand again represented Emperor Matthias at the Imperial Diet in Regensburg. Because the imperial couple could no longer be expected to produce children, the emperor discussed the issue of succession with his cousin from Graz. Already at this time they included the Spanish ambassador, as King Philip III also had a claim to the Imperial inheritance. In August of 1613, the archducal family went from Graz to Lower Austria. Because plague raged in Vienna, they stayed in Wiener Neustadt. Here was Maximilian I's grave as well as a Gothic Hofburg where Ferdinand III would later reside from time to time. And it was here, on January 5, 1614, in the hour before midnight, that his younger brother Archduke Leopold Wilhelm

was born. Thus, Ferdinand III spent the fifth year of his life first in Wiener Neustadt and then in Vienna. Only in July of 1614 did he travel back to Graz with his mother and siblings; his father went on to the Moravian Diet in Olomouc (Olmütz).¹¹

At this time, Maria Anna, in her letters, referred to her growing sons as her “little fellows” and her sons and daughters as “my little troop.” She was happy that the children had withstood the journey from Vienna to Graz in good form: “Travel has not harmed my little troop.”¹² Only Archduke Leopold Wilhelm had been a bit off-color, and the eldest, Johann Karl, had developed a growth on his right cheek that had soon improved. In Graz, the family was given a splendid reception. Noble students had dressed as nymphs, “surrounded the carriage and accompanied it through twenty-four gates decorated with fresh foliage and wreaths. On arrival they were met by more students disguised as goddesses, singing and playing music, and showering the carriage with good wishes and fragrant flowers.”¹³ This surely must have impressed the six-year-old Archduke Ferdinand Ernst.

But Maria Anna had to leave her children for good in 1616, and Archduke Ferdinand Ernst lost his mother at the age of seven. In December of 1615 she became so ill that her brother in Munich ascribed her recovery to divine omnipotence after the doctors had already despaired of her life. But joy at her improvement was short-lived. During the night of March 7, 1616, she had severe seizures and became so weak that the doctors gave her mere hours to live. She died at dawn on March 8. After being laid out for three days in a castle chamber, where the archduke’s portable altar had been erected for the reading of masses, she was buried provisionally in a nunnery at night. The final interment would take place when a new mausoleum was completed.¹⁴

Her husband’s reaction throws light, albeit surely somewhat idealized, on his children’s experience; after the mass read immediately after his wife’s death, he spoke “with the strongest emotion of the great mutual love” that had remained without the least shadow of antagonism through sixteen years of marriage. This corresponded to the ideal of a Christian marriage but was not taken for granted in princely houses. The nuncio further recorded the archduke’s expressing “sorrow that the three little princes and two little princesses would now be left without the guidance of this excellent mother” but also described a successful socialization. The children “truly had the looks and behavior of angels, so well had they been brought up by their outstanding mother.”¹⁵ This nuncio was not overly sentimental but rather sober, as befitted his diplomatic calling, so his description may be taken at face value.

The reigning Archduke Ferdinand became ill and was so distraught that the doctors were called. Ferdinand III’s father wrote to Duke Maximilian that he was of the firm conviction that “my dearest wife’s sainted and pious soul has

gone from her mouth straight to heaven, there to gaze upon her maker's countenance for eternity, although I would have sorely needed her for my own comfort and the upbringing of my small children. But as God's decree is unfathomable, we are resigned to submit to the divine will, even though it is very hard."¹⁶

Years without Parents

After his mother's death, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst did not grow up in his father's presence for two reasons. First, Archduke Ferdinand stayed in Graz only briefly between long journeys. In 1617, he was elected and crowned king of Bohemia; in Wrocław (Breslau), he accepted homage from the Silesian and in Prague (Praha) from the Moravian Estates, and he traveled to Dresden to discuss his election as king of the Romans with the elector of Saxony. In 1618, he spent much time in Hungary in order to have himself elected and crowned king there as well, and 1619 saw him in Frankfurt for his election as king of the Romans.

The second reason was the formation of small households, ancillaries of the general court, for the archducal children. Since 1615, Archduke Johann Karl, the elder brother, had already lived with his own court, including a grand steward, a tutor and teachers, noble courtiers, valets, masters of wardrobe, and other servants. It is possible that Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, nearly eight years old, shared this court with his brother after 1616. But it is also possible that he still remained for a time in the shelter of the household his father had established for the younger siblings: two-year-old Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, five-year-old Archduchess Cäcilia Renate, and six-year-old Archduchess Maria Anna. Over this court presided an aristocratic widow who raised the children with the aid of a large number of women, ranging from ladies-in-waiting to a nurse's aide in the infirmary. The establishment also included men such as the master of the household, a chaplain, valets, stokers, and someone to lay the table for the children's nurse. But by 1618 at the latest, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst had joined his elder brother's household and was now assiduously prepared for his future role as prince.¹⁷

An illustration from a mourning and memorial book, compiled on the occasion of his mother's death, shows what his role might have been (Figure 4). It demonstrates with what self-assurance and steadfastness Archduke Ferdinand Ernst and his siblings, like all other children of this time, were prepared for strictly codified functions, roles, and identities. In the early modern period, education was deemed successful if children accepted and lived out the destinies and roles ascribed to them.

The elder brother was the designated future ruler. The scepter, embellished with the Eye of God and scales, emphasize his role as judge; helmet, scimitar, Turkish shield, and trumpet symbolize warfare; plummet and



FIGURE 4 Allegory of Spring (“Ver”) with the children of Mary Anne of Bavaria and Archduke Ferdinand, unmarked copper plate etching out of the remembrance book of the Jesuits of Graz for Mary Anne. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München, Res 4 L. eleg. misc. 132.

compass, the advancement of trade; globe, sundial, and celestial sphere, that of the sciences; books and the Eye of God, that of religion; and hunting horn and musical instruments, princely leisure. The younger brother, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, was to become a prince of the Church. This is shown by

attributes like the miter and crosier; monstrance and Eucharist; the cross and, on the right, next to his archducal hat, the crown of thorns. The sisters were to devote themselves entirely to religion, as demonstrated by the attributes of Christ's passion: the thirty pieces of silver and the purse; the scourge and fasces; hammer, nails, and tongs; the Roman soldiers' dice; and the Bible. Yet, this depiction ignores their dynastic function, marriage. Future husbands, though quite virtuous, are difficult to portray.

It may come as a surprise that Archduke Ferdinand Ernst is shown as a secular prince. He too is shown with armor but no helmet, merely protection for his arm, which, according to a popular conceit, was a body part serving the head. Pen and inkwell represent political correspondence and thus suggest a role as governor of a Habsburg territory, possibly the Netherlands or Tyrol with Further Austria. As a regent thus serving the dynasty, Ferdinand Ernst was to advance trade, traffic, and science; this is indicated by the delphinium-encircled anchor, compass, numerical tablet, and mechanical clock. The latter, symbol of the vanity of all things, may underscore the religiosity also represented by the book. The small picture is a depiction of the Virgin Mary with the body of Christ, a Pietà. His father's special piety toward the Virgin has been transferred to the son as a guide for his mode of life. May we go this far in interpreting the engraving? We may, as the Graz Jesuits had produced the work. They knew the court and the reigning archduke very well, having supplied his confessor.¹⁸

His education was to transform Archduke Ferdinand Ernst into the human form of the ideal chivalrous, pious, and cultivated secular prince. A baron from the ancient Austrian nobility, Christoph Simon Freiherr von Thun, administered his and his brother's household. He was responsible for the retinue as well as the princes' education; he was the central reference person in their everyday lives and, as Knight of the Order of St. John, the embodiment of the mythically exalted Christian knight (*miles christianus*). The period around 1600 was not only an era of confessional conflict but also a time in which Venice defended the remaining Christian territories in the eastern Mediterranean region, while the Habsburgs (with financial and military aid from the Imperial territories) defended the Hungarian territories east of the Adriatic Sea against the sultan. In this conflict, the Habsburgs were satisfied just to be able to beat back Ottoman incursions and to maintain the military borders in Croatia, Slavonia, and Hungary with fortifications at Karlovac (Karlstadt), Petrinja, Varaždin, Veszprém, Győr (Raab), Léva, Fülek, Tokaj, Szatmár, and elsewhere.

This situation had practical ramifications for Archduke Ferdinand Ernst's daily routine, beginning with the riding lessons that were of fundamental importance for his future lifestyle. Soon he would be training for tournaments as well. A first step was an exercise of skill in which a small ring, suspended above or near the course, had to be speared in full gallop with a type of dagger.

The next step consisted of lengthening the dagger to the size of a small lance. The sometimes-deadly tournaments in which two knights charged each other with long lances had been abandoned in the sixteenth century, but charging wooden or cardboard figures had been retained. Another exercise consisted in beheading such figures with sword or saber from horseback. The figures often resembled Turks, who had come to symbolize the essential enemy, conquering most of Hungary and frequently invading the rest, abducting Christians there and especially from the Ukraine, pressing them into slavery, and forcing children into military service for the sultan.¹⁹

The forms of courtly dance of the period derived their basic steps and foot positions from fencing. Thus, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst learned dancing and fencing at the same time. The dancing master at the Graz court, Ambrosio Bontempo, drew a remarkably high salary and was ennobled in 1623. Dancing was not primarily regarded as a pleasure but as expressing, in a representational manner, how human social intercourse was perceived. Court dances brought all participants into a well-ordered relationship with one another. They showed the individual, the couple, and the group as components of a general social network organized according to aesthetic, numerological, mythological, and societal principles. Dances based on free movement were not customary. The introduction of the waltz in the nineteenth century was a scandal to many because it disengaged the couple from the strictly proscribed movement of the group and demonstrated how much the social order had changed.²⁰

In the courtly world as Archduke Ferdinand Ernst knew it, relaxation was found mainly in certain forms of the hunt. For it, too, the princes practiced how to handle weapons from an early age. As soon as they were old enough and had learned to ride well, they were allowed outside the castle with a small retinue and could—throughout their lives, but only in pursuit of game and in war—follow paths that had not been laid down in advance by societal regulations. When they were hawking, falcons and other birds of prey determined the course, and in single combat, it might remain uncertain whether a falcon or a heron was the victor. This made the chase unpredictable. When they were stalking, their quarry, mostly stags but sometimes hares pursued by a pack of hounds, led the way. Boar hunting was dangerous, especially when conducted with a lance from horseback. In the winter of 1620/21, Ferdinand Ernst's father was thrown by a horse that shied away from a wild boar; only by great good luck did he sustain no injuries.

There were other more representational forms of hunting, in which game, rounded up from a large area in great numbers, was shot from a platform or, when surrounded, speared from horseback. During the representational hunt or ceremonial court events, princes of the era experience an ideal of rule as they conceived it: actual personal domination as an organic element in the natural order of the cosmos.²¹

Immeasurably more regimented was life in the Hofburg. At court, going to bed and rising, dressing and undressing, washing, brushing teeth, bathing, drinking, and relieving oneself were all codified events subject to strict rules under the supervision and with the help of aristocratic courtiers, valets, masters of the wardrobe, barbers, stokers, and, where riding was involved, equerries, bootblacks, pages, and others. Besides private meals, there were public banquets; they, too, were proscribed and regulated in every detail. The princes had to learn all this gradually from their attendants. They could not dress themselves or close and undo their many buttons; they needed someone to comb their shoulder-length hair. In 1619, Archdukes Johann Karl and Ferdinand Ernst had, among others, a personal master of wardrobes, door keeper, janitor, gardener, two servants for the silverware, and one servant to lay their table and oversee that of the courtiers. By 1619, the princes already had six chamberlains. They, together with the valets, not only formed the main body of attendants for this extremely sheltered intimate existence but, hailing from noble families of various Habsburg territories, also acquainted the princes from infancy with the heterogeneous and multilingual world of the aristocracy.

Language acquisition, knowledge of the aristocratic world, and further training in social behavior were also fostered by the princes' noble pages, who were approximately of their own age. Because they were unpaid, we generally do not know their names as we do those of their chamberlains, teachers, valets, fencing instructor, tailor, and laundry woman. From other sources, we learn that the pages came from different countries and so familiarized the princes with their own languages and cultural characteristics and that they were their study companions and, within the very narrowly defined boundaries of strict courtly conduct, playfellows.²²

In addition, the princes had a language master with a doctorate, which was rare for this time. From him and the noble courtiers, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst learned quite a number of languages: besides a probably heavily Styrian-Bavarian-inflected German, certainly Italian, Latin, and Castilian Spanish as well as some Czech and Hungarian. These were the principal languages spoken in the Habsburg-dominated lands, if one disregards native languages, especially those in the Americas. Around 1600, every aristocrat whose parents were not thoroughly unaware of the trend toward an academic education spoke Latin, the language of the Church, law, the sciences, and the classical Roman writers. Latin was also the official spoken language in multilingual Hungary, where it was used as the common vernacular by the nobility, clergy, and municipal elites. The bourgeoisie in Upper Hungary and the western Hungarian free cities spoke German. Already in 1620 Archduke Ferdinand Ernst had two Hungarian chamberlains and probably picked up some Hungarian from

them. From 1622 on he had Bohemian chamberlains, and one, Maximilian von Waldstein, with whom he maintained a lifelong close relationship based on mutual trust, must have taught him enough Czech to make a good impression on the Prague aristocracy. Spanish may have been added somewhat later, possibly at the beginning of the 1620s, when his marriage to a Spanish *infanta* was in the cards. As an adult, Ferdinand III regularly spoke four languages: “perfect Italian, fluent Latin, sufficient Spanish, and of course German.”²³

Like his elder and later his younger brother, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst learned the advanced skills of pen and ink from Dr. Elias Schiller, who like their father had studied with the Jesuits in Ingolstadt, whence he imported new didactic methods. He taught the boys to write poetry in foreign languages, something they liked and continued to do. Archduke Ferdinand Ernst was educated with the tenets of reformed Catholicism. The ruling family attended mass every morning, observed feast days and Lent, and celebrated the high holy days of the ecclesiastical year as well as the name days of numerous saints, especially the new saints of the Counter Reformation and the patron saints of the dynasty and its various realms. The princes’ religious education was in the hands of the Jesuits, who also furnished their confessors.²⁴

Already at the age of eleven, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst assumed duties of princely and ecclesiastical representation. On December 1, 1619, at the Jesuit University in Graz, he and two bishops attended festivities for St. Francis Xavier, especially revered in the time of the Counter Reformation and chosen by the philosophical faculty as its patron saint. In 1621, the archduke attended a theatrical play there, dedicated to him and his siblings, about the persecution of Christians in Japan. Using the example of two Catholics martyred for their faith, it also extolled the virtues of bravery and steadfastness. In 1619, Archdukes Johann Karl and Ferdinand Ernst, together with their father, took part in the forty-hour prayer during Lent and attended public communions, hourly prayers, and processions. With the sons carrying candles, the three Habsburgs accompanied the Host, something that greatly impressed the aristocratic students. The piety legitimizing their authority was meant to reassure their subjects and was thus part of princely representation itself.²⁵

1.2

HEIR APPARENT OVERNIGHT

On the morning of December 23, 1619, the nuncio in Graz was summoned to the Hofburg to give extreme unction to the heir apparent, Archduke Johann Karl. The fourteen-year-old had suffered several strong apoplectic convulsions during the night. The doctors feared a genetic predisposition because both his mother and his uncle, Archduke Maximilian Ernst, had died of apoplexy in 1616. On the day after Christmas, the heir apparent had another seizure that ended with his death. An autopsy removed the dread of a hereditary disposition because numerous stones were found in his organs. As the court went into mourning, the nuncio listed the four surviving siblings' names and dates of birth in his report. Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, now ten years and five months old, was first on this list.¹

His elder brother's death changed his designated role fundamentally but at first barely affected his daily life. The small household he had shared with Johann Karl continued to exist for him alone. His educational program, designed for a life as a secular prince, henceforth had to include the word "ruling." What is more, Ferdinand was to be prepared to be ruler not only of some Austrian provinces but also of the entire Habsburg dominions, including Bohemia, Hungary, and the Empire.

Basic Standards: Legitimacy and Peace

The ten-year-old, who up to now had known the world and its order mainly through the ritualized religious routine of the Graz court and sumptuous allegorical mythical-religious tableaux, would one day take his place in a line of Roman emperors as well as Hungarian and Bohemian kings. Toward this end, it was important to acquire reference points. In the early modern period, this was achieved by looking back at how things had been done and by seeing who the ancestors were who had gone before. To do so, someone at the Habsburg courts, an artfully compacted world of signs and symbols, simply had to look around or to open one of the many books that glorified the family's history and its virtues.

There were genealogies, mostly compiled in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, that traced the family to the great personages of world history. Voluminous family trees, series of paintings and etchings, decorated playing tiles and desks, and small and large bronze sculptures all portrayed the rulers and brought real and fictitious ancestors to life. During festivals, they were even portrayed by actors, last done in Graz in 1617 and 1619. The legendary or mythical character of various additions to the ancestral line was acknowledged around 1600. The point was not a precise genealogy, however, but rather the expression of an ancient tradition of power.²

Beyond the certifiable ancestors, a key figure in the Habsburg family trees was Charlemagne, founder of the Empire, whose crown the Habsburgs wore. In the late middle ages, they had even traced their origins back to Julius Caesar and Augustus, founders of the Roman Empire. Caesar himself had followed his lineage to Troy, the setting for Homer's *Iliad*. At the Habsburg court, the notion of descent from Troy culminated in the cultivation of Aeneas's history. Son of the goddess Venus and the Trojan Anchises, he flees the destruction of Troy; at the conclusion of a long odyssey, he arrives in Rome via Carthage, marries a Latin king's daughter, and is victorious in the war over Latium. From his father in the nether world, Aeneas receives this charge:

You, Roman, remember: Govern! Rule the world!
 These are your arts! Make peace man's way of life;
 spare the humble but strike the defiant down.

Archduke Ferdinand Ernst learned these lines early and absorbed what was held to be the timeless task of rulers: the creation of an unassailable order of peace through governance. According to legend, the lineage of the Julians hailed from Ascanius/Julius, Aeneas's son, and from that line descended the Romans Julius Caesar and Augustus, idealized during the early modern period both as commanders-in-chief and peacemakers.³

Following the Imperial line, we come to the second key figure in this ideology, the emperor Constantine, ever present in illustrations and discourses. The first Christian emperor, he was regarded as the essential link between Christianity and the Roman Empire. According to legend, the emperor permitted his Christian soldiers to carry the sign of the cross into battle, bearing the divine prophesy *in hoc signo vinces* (under this sign you shall be victorious). This derivation of descent and rule, however, posed the dilemma of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. The young archduke's teachers solved this problem by expounding the theory of "*translatio imperii*" or "transfer of rule," which held that the "Empire" had passed from

the Romans to the lineage of Charlemagne. So the title king of the Romans carried a meaning much greater than the city where the pope had crowned Charlemagne emperor.

A text by a Dominican friar, written for the young heir apparent and entitled *Lucerna Principis Christiani* (Instruction for a Christian Prince), gives insight into the early phase of ideal socialization.⁴ It addresses the tenets of rulership and virtue set down by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century and combines pre-Christian Greek and Roman philosophy (especially that of Aristotle and Cicero) with Christian teachings formulated by theologians of late antiquity, mainly St. Augustine. This worldview was diametrically opposed to religious heterodoxy (the Reformation now recognized by Imperial law), reason of state (Botero, Bodin), and the divorce of princely politics from religious and moral norms (Machiavelli).

The gathering clouds of war in the seventeenth century make it seem surprising that this educational text presented the young archduke with peace as the norm. War might only be waged if it were a just war. The preconditions were a legitimate military leader (no private war), a justifiable cause (legitimacy, defense), and a correct attitude (avoidance of collateral damage and an earnest desire for peace): "After all, peace is not sought in order to wage war, but war is sought in order to bring about peace." Possibly because war seemed imminent, the *Lucerna* emphasized these demands with a quotation from the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God." The *Lucerna's* warnings were manifold and dire. The outcome of war was uncertain: "Soon one, then another would fall victim to the sword." In either case, the consequences would be dreadful: "hatred, murder, arson, robbery, theft, bloodshed, depopulation, devastation of towns, deprivation of the poor, imprisonment of the innocent, moral depravity, weakening/extermination of humans, laxity of the clergy, peasants' sons turned thieves, their daughters whores, alms and other good works thwarted." All this, and worse, would come to pass.⁵

This glance at Ferdinand III's education supports Konrad Repgen's assertions that the future emperor "did not come out with spectacular political reform programs" even after war's end, and that he only waged a full-fledged war, one that mobilized all his resources, for a few months in 1645.⁶ The values inculcated in him did not bind him to the future but rather to the past, not to princely absolutism for pursuing sociopolitical utopias but to the reconstruction and maintenance of an old judicial order, not to the sovereignty of separate states but to a universal order of peace, and to war not as a calculated means for imposing an amoral reason of state but as an instrument for the restoration of peace.

Mortgages: Bohemia, the Costs of War, and the Palatinate

While the archduke studied the ideal of a universal standard for peace, the conflict between the Bohemian Estates and his father escalated. Thus began the war Ferdinand III would later inherit, a war of such existential importance that we will examine its causes.

It was triggered by one of the many controversial issues about the interpretation of Bohemian constitutional law: how binding were the Bohemian king's confessional concessions made to Protestants living on lands belonging to the Catholic Church? The question became relevant when two Protestant churches were erected on lands and with wood belonging to the Catholic Church, which had agreed neither to the construction nor the cutting of trees. During Matthias's reign, the royal Bohemian governor declared the construction illegal and gave orders for the churches to be torn down.

Protestant aristocrats reacted by storming the governor's seat on May 23, 1618. Protesting the destruction of the churches, they threw two high-ranking Catholic officials—whose support for the Counter Reformation made them ideal targets—from a window of the castle in Prague and, for good measure, tossed a secretary after them. Because the three landed on the slope of a manure pile and, contrary to all expectations, survived the fall, the nobles fired at them but missed. However, the attack had been aimed more at the office than the three men, and they were later allowed to flee Prague.

The rebels now formed an Estates government that raised an army and hoped to create a Protestant federation of Estates. The majority of Protestants in Moravia balked at joining an anti-royalist federation, but under threat of a Bohemian Estates army marching into Moravia, they organized a Diet and a Moravian Estates government after the Bohemian pattern. In 1619, at a general Diet of all Bohemian lands (the kingdom of Bohemia, the margravian counties of Moravia, Upper and Lower Lusatia, and the Silesian principalities), a federation under the leadership of the Bohemian Estates was formed. In 1620, the Estates of Upper and Lower Austria, Hungary, and Transylvania joined as well.⁷

Between 1619 and 1621, the Transylvanian prince and Estates, with the sultan's support, attacked Ferdinand II in three campaigns in Hungary, Moravia, and Lower Austria. The Estates army marched against Vienna in 1619 but could not conquer the city. In August of 1619, the Estates deposed Ferdinand II as king of Bohemia and elected the Calvinist Elector Palatine Friedrich V as their new king. But on November 8, 1620, he lost the decisive battle at White Mountain near Prague against Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, who was fighting for Ferdinand II. The confederated Estate was too weak, partly because it had become apparent to the many knights, cities, and peasants who had supported the uprising that the Protestant ruling elite was unwilling to share the fruits of the rebellion either generously or voluntarily. Early on, the

peasants rose against all those in power, the cities did not finance the armies as had been expected, and even the funds raised by the Protestant aristocracy were insufficient for its own army.⁸ The Elector Palatine and his family went into exile. The fact that he had survived as king for only one season earned him the sobriquet of “Winter King.”

In 1621, Ferdinand II’s victory was followed by a day of judgment. Twenty-seven executions were carried out in Prague. This spectacle concluded with the heads of the condemned men, along with the severed hands of those convicted for perjury, impaled on the Old Town (*Altstädter*) Tower of the Charles Bridge. They served as a warning to everyone, including the several hundred nobles who had been let off with a mere fine. At this time, Ferdinand II, with Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, was on a pilgrimage to Mariazell. He let it be known that he, as sovereign, was obliged to punish the rebellion, but that he would pray for the souls of the executed.⁹

The emperor did not neglect to punish 680 people and 50 towns in Bohemia by confiscating the entire property of 166 persons and a portion of that belonging to the rest; in Moravia, about 150 domains were affected. The confiscation of Protestant properties and their distribution among loyal Catholic nobles raised the specter of a rural Counter Reformation by the new landowners and, with it, the shattering of a Protestant territorial church (*Landeskirche*) down to the level of the peasantry. In 1627/28, Ferdinand II also expelled all nobles unwilling to convert to Catholicism from Upper Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia. Many Protestant peasants fled. Between 1620 and 1628, 100,000 to 200,000 people, approximately ten percent of the population, left Bohemia and Moravia. The lower nobility lost 300 to 350 out of 1,300 to 1,400 families. Tens of thousands emigrated from Upper and Lower Austria. Ferdinand’s uncompromising reaction to an uncompromising rebellion brought, along with a loss of population, the export of noble and confessional opposition into the Empire and Europe.¹⁰

Of greater impact on the war was Ferdinand II’s treatment of the Winter King. Friedrich V had acknowledged Ferdinand II as the legitimate king of Bohemia during his election as emperor yet had also accepted his own election to the post, which gave Ferdinand II cause to impose an Imperial ban. But the emperor also decided to settle his debt to Duke Maximilian of Bavaria for the Bohemian campaign. Between 1619 and 1628, he gradually transferred the banned king’s electoral dignity to Maximilian and, as compensation for the war costs, gave the duke a portion of the king’s territories, namely the Upper Palatinate.¹¹

This treatment of the Palatinate escalated into an Imperial conflict and a European war. First, because Ferdinand II had neglected to wait for Electoral Saxony’s input; in the opinion of many, the Imperial ban placed on the Winter King was marred by a procedural flaw and thus unlawful.¹² Consequently,

Bavaria's entitlement to the Upper and Lower Palatinate was questioned, and many urged restitution to the count Palatine or his heirs, especially his Calvinist relatives who occupied European thrones, as they did in England.

Second, the transfer of an electoral office from a Calvinist to a Catholic increased the majority of Catholics in the Electoral Curia to a ratio of 5:2. This was unacceptable to many Protestants, not only because of the king's election but also because of the electors' special importance in Imperial government due to their privileged position in Diets and Imperial Deputations.¹³

Third, after occupying the Upper and Lower Palatinate, Maximilian I carried out a Counter Reformation. This sent yet more people into exile and led to the fear, increasingly well founded, that Ferdinand II might attempt to impose the Catholic interpretation of the Peace of Augsburg on the Empire. The effects of his Palatine policies alienated one of Ferdinand II's most important allies, the Elector of Saxony, even though he, as a Lutheran, had no sympathy for Calvinist gains in the Empire and had captured Lower Lusatia for Ferdinand II in 1620 (and kept it as his reward).¹⁴

Fourth, in 1620, another one of Ferdinand II's allies, the king of Spain, occupied the Wetterau and the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine.¹⁵ This strengthened the Spanish hand vis-à-vis France, worsened the strategic position of the United Netherlands embroiled in an open war with Spain (the Twelve-Years' Truce ended in 1621), and contributed considerably to the Europeanization of a war originally confined to only a few regions.

Through the refusal of an amnesty and the perceived favorable financial settlement of the Palatine issue, the Empire's religious balance was weighted disproportionately in favor of the Catholics, as was the European balance in favor of Spain. Thus, until both these imbalances were reversed, a war begun as a noble rebellion and seemingly concluded by its defeat continued as a war among the Imperial territories and among European powers. This was the situation Ferdinand III would inherit.

Farewell to Graz and the Early Viennese Years

Although the emperor had laid the foundation for this development, by the end of 1620, he seemed to think that the conflict was under control. In August, Ferdinand II rewarded three of his privy councillors—Grand Steward Eggenberg, the president of the Aulic Council Hohenzollern, and the chief Bohemian Court Chancellor Lobkowitz—with their induction into the Order of the Golden Fleece. He also remarried.

His choice fell on Eleonora Gonzaga, a daughter of the duke of Mantua. Maximilian von Dietrichstein, a Bohemian noble whom we will encounter with some frequency, became her grand steward (*Obersthofmeister*). The courtiers who had remained in Graz prepared the transfer to Vienna.¹⁶



FIGURE 5 Ferdinand II, father of Ferdinand III, etching, Pieter Soutman / Pieter van Sompel. Vienna, private collection Hannes Scheucher.



FIGURE 6 Eleonora Gonzaga, second wife of Ferdinand II, etching, Pieter Soutman / Pieter van Sompel. Vienna, private collection Hannes Scheucher.

For the emperor's children, this meant taking leave of Graz. On January 14, 1622, the university arranged a farewell ceremony for Archduke Ferdinand Ernst with a theatrical performance in the auditorium and a banquet given by the Jesuit faculty. The thirteen-year-old archduke acknowledged the speeches, recitations, and a book present “in the Latin tongue and assured them he would remember them with the old archducal loyalty.”¹⁷ He kept his word; the Jesuit student Matthias Pricklmayr, for example, became Austrian court chancellor under Ferdinand III. In February, Ferdinand II took the children to Vienna.

In Vienna, too, with its ostentatiously religious court life, the Jesuits dominated the archduke's continuing education. Here, we again encounter Thomas Aquinas's systematized Aristotelian-Christian-medieval tradition that regarded nature and physics as derived from a divinely inspired metaphysical system. So, it is remarkable that Archduke Ferdinand Ernst could absorb certain contemporary arguments, for example, in the field of astronomy. In his own written exercises on astrophysical theory, the heir apparent discussed the current theory of the spheres. He understood that the sun illuminated the moon but suspected that the moon had light of its own: “The moon appears to have some inherent light but receives much from the sun, especially in

summer.” He answered questions concerning the manner and reason for the movement of celestial bodies by pointing to various explanations, citing the “multitude of authors” who shared certain opinions for his assumption that theirs was “the most likely tenet,” but allowed for doubt: “Yet nevertheless there is no certainty.”¹⁸

In a series of *Theories*, the heir apparent also reflected on aspects of Aristotelian physics. A section about coincidence and luck in a chapter on the causation principle contains his thoughts on whether anything was possible without God’s or the angels’ causality. He had doubts as to the angels. That not only religion but also metaphysical or physical theories about life derived from the idea that the soul, according to the archduke, “is the first principle in living bodies” helps us understand the strength of religious ties in the early seventeenth century. The soul as a substantive form constituted a natural part of the living body; death was “the separation of the soul from the body.”¹⁹ Archduke Ferdinand Ernst was not yet aware of a circulatory system when he wrote that arteries distributed blood to all animated body parts. For him, the heart was not yet a pump but the place where life forces originated. But he recognized the difference between arterial blood and blood understood as part of the lungs.

His comments on the world’s age again demonstrate how strongly science was connected to religion. In the classical-didactic question-and-answer style he wrote: “When was the earth created? First question: How many years before Christ . . . did God create this world? Answer: The Romans and Jews count 1656 years from the beginning of the world to the Deluge. From that to Abraham’s birth, the more probable calculation is 382 years. From there to Abraham’s Promise 15 (Genesis 12), from there to the Covenant with Moses 430 . . . and thus you will count 3452 years from Creation to the Destruction of the Temple.”²⁰ Thereupon he named an impressive selection of authors from antiquity to support his claims. He had also memorized the chronology of Persian history.

Such a view of the world could hardly be more foreign to today’s readers, but for Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, it remained largely intact. He liked chronologies, especially those of the Old Testament, and debated them with his confessor Heinrich Philippi, who had published several treatises on the subject. The calendars used by Emperor Ferdinand III have been preserved, and they affirm the frame of reference for his calculations on a yearly basis. The year 1644, for example, was thus calculated as the year 5606 from the world’s creation. He also counted back to the Deluge, which was understood as a historical event. From it to the archduke’s birth, 3914 years had passed. His own family, too, figured in his calendar. His almanac of 1644 counted 371 years from the first Habsburg emperor’s reign and 206 years for the uninterrupted Imperial rule of the Habsburgs.²¹

Of greater importance for the Empire's future supreme judicial authority was the study of jurisprudence. In 1625, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst had to present the fruits of his studies in an examination attended by the emperor, the privy councillors, his own confessor, and the leadership of the Jesuit faculty. During the disputation, he defended geographical, historical, and jurisprudential theses. As expected, his performance satisfied the examiners and, thus, the emperor as well: "Here the prince garnered such praise that His Majesty showed a most gracious special appreciation."²² This provides us with a glimpse of the archduke's educational horizon.

1.3

COLLECTING CROWNS: FAILURE IN THE EMPIRE

No Marriage without a Crown: Hungary 1625

The heir's first coronation as king was intended to facilitate his marriage. Ferdinand II planned to wed his son to a princess from the Spanish Habsburg line. For Spain, the importance lay not primarily in the dynasty's unity but rather in finding an ally because the Truce of 1609 between the rebellious Dutch and their discharged but tenacious sovereign, who happened to be king of Spain, had expired in 1621. To win this war, Spain had to reinforce its position on the Atlantic and along the English Channel, and it initially endeavored to bring about a marriage between a Spanish princess and the English heir apparent Charles, who even traveled to Madrid to inspect the prospective bride. It was not confessional differences but rather the Palatinate that prevented this marriage. The king of England, father-in-law of Friedrich V of the Palatinate, demanded the restitution of the Palatinate and its electoral status, which had been transferred to Bavaria. So, Spain had to choose between England's maritime power and a continental base in the Lower Palatinate. It decided in favor of the Palatinate and, after the failure of the English marriage prospects, carved out an alliance between the Habsburg lines and Bavaria. Thus, Archduke Ferdinand Ernst was the second choice as a husband for the Spanish *Infanta*. Preliminary negotiations had proceeded to a point where Ferdinand Ernst received, on the occasion of his birthday on July 13, 1625, a small portrait of *Infanta* Maria Anna, whom he had not yet seen.¹

The Spanish king, however, insisted that the future spouse of a Spanish princess should already have a crown. In 1625, the Imperial court had no simple solution for this problem. The reorganization of Bohemia had not yet been concluded, the Empire was at war, and Hungary was an elective monarchy dominated by Calvinist nobles. But, by chance, Ferdinand II was obliged to travel to Hungary in 1625 because the Hungarian Palatine had died, and the election of his successor demanded the presence of the king at the Diet (*Magyar Országgyűlés*).²

After consultations with the Hungarian chancellor and several magnates, Ferdinand and his advisers did not dare place the election of a new Hungarian king on the agenda of this Diet. The Hungarians wanted a new Palatine, not a new king, and furthermore, they wished to discuss other important subjects: confessional conflicts, the defense of the country's border, and the reinstatement of a regular currency. At court, it was even suggested that the archduke first be elected king of Bohemia in order to facilitate his subsequent election as king of Hungary. It was not unusual to elect the next king while the current one was still living, and it was not necessarily a problem that the candidate was still young. Hence, there was indecision, and, just in case, the archduke was taken along to Hungary.³

A delegation from the Hungarian Estates received the court at the border. A long train of nobles, military leaders, and courtiers accompanied the dynasts up to the gates of the free royal city of Sopron (Ödenburg). There, the Archbishop of Gran, in his role as Hungarian chancellor, gave a remarkable welcoming address. Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, along with others, had to hear, in Latin, that almost precisely one hundred years ago, in the battle of Mohács against the Turks, thirteen bishops (including the Archbishop of Esztergom [Gran] of that time) and many nobles had met their deaths alongside the Hungarian King Lajos. The previous century of Habsburg rule had seen “much unpleasantness and revolution”⁴ that would now, with God's help, be overcome.

Ferdinand II replied and extended his hand to be kissed by the Hungarian representatives; Archduke Ferdinand Ernst followed suit. The festive entry into the city ensued according to local custom, with the thousand-strong Hungarian cavalry leading the way. Archduke Ferdinand Ernst wore Hungarian dress made especially for the occasion. At the gate, the mayor gave a speech and handed over the keys to the city. After the ceremony, everyone went to church, where a *Te Deum* celebrated the happy arrival, and the court then moved into its quarters.⁵

The Diet was a difficult one for the Habsburgs. At its opening, there was as yet no official talk of the hoped-for election. Instead, the usual topics were discussed, especially the increase of unremunerated service (*Robot*) by the subjects, particularly for border security. Meanwhile, the courtiers sought to steer conversations toward persuading the Estates themselves to propose the choice of an heir apparent; supporters of the Habsburg succession were supposed to prod the Protestant Hungarian Estates in that direction and to guarantee a majority.⁶

But first, the Estates elected as Palatine Miklós Esterházy, a Catholic magnate thought to be above confessional strife. During the ensuing negotiations about substantive issues, wrangling over the election and coronation of the archduke went on behind the scenes for weeks. Opponents, especially the prince of Transylvania's followers, warned about infringements of their

liberties and pointed out that no mention of a royal election appeared in the Diet's agenda. Supporters collected and bought votes and found a way to mend the procedural flaw: the Palatine himself could officially propose the election.⁷

Several of the emperor's advisors recommended leaving things at an election or designation and proceeding with the coronation at some later date; as far as the Spanish marriage was concerned, the title of king-elect should suffice. Postponement of the coronation could also serve another purpose: a delay in a new king's reaffirmation of the Hungarian Estates' liberties. Perhaps better conditions might be obtained later, particularly after the reigning Transylvanian prince's death. But the archbishop of Gran, the Palatine, and several privy councillors disagreed. In Hungary, there was the danger of crowning a Protestant king. The archduke's conscience would remain clear, as his father had already confirmed the privileges; besides, the Hungarian crown would facilitate the archduke's election as king of the Romans. The Spanish ambassador threatened the emperor with postponement of the Spanish marriage. Were the coronation not to take place, the assumption would be that the archduke's succession in the kingdom of Hungary was in jeopardy. Ferdinand II repeated his confessor's judgment that it was unnecessary for the archduke to concede the same rights he had conceded during the crisis of 1618, as there were presently no dangerous circumstances, and that he could dispense with the coronation after the election. But the Estates blocked this loophole and demanded a reaffirmation of their privileges before the election.⁸

The court now identified several emergency situations that would allow the emperor to permit his son's confirmation of confessional privileges: the danger that the still-loyal Protestants might turn their strongholds over to Transylvania as part of an anti-Habsburg alliance; the danger that not the emperor's son but his brother might be elected king, which would give rise to a new fraternal dispute; and the danger that some aristocrats might set Eleonora against her stepson's coronation, with the argument that she might one day rule Hungary as a widow. Although she is said to have rejected this alleged offer, asserting that she honored Archduke Ferdinand Ernst as her own son, the mere possibility overcame the scruples of Ferdinand II, who agreed to facilitate his son's election by having him confirm the Estates' privileges.⁹

Thereupon the Estates produced St. Stephen's crown, revered as a relic and symbol for the kingdom and thus indispensable for a legitimate coronation. Before the coronation, the archduke paid his tribute and respects to Ferdinand II and Eleonora by kneeling and bowing to them. Only then the coronation mass began and, with it, the ritual demonstration of the Estates' power. Thrice before the scriptural reading, the Palatine called loudly into the nave, asking whether those present were willing to accept the archduke as their king. Only after the third time did he pass the crown to the archbishop

of Gran, who placed it on Archduke Ferdinand Ernst's head. After mass, the new king (whom we will now call Ferdinand III or the king of Hungary), wearing the crown, rode to a suburban square and confirmed the Hungarian privileges and freedoms. The customary coins tossed to the populace proclaimed Ferdinand III's motto as sovereign: *pietate et iustitia* (with piety and justice). Afterward, in a ritual peculiarly Hungarian, he rode to the top of a hill and brandished his sword in all four directions, signifying his readiness to defend the kingdom against all enemies. Only then the coronation gala commenced, assembling around a common banquet table with not only the dynasts and the ambassadors but also, another peculiarity, the kingdom's two highest representatives, the archbishop of Esztergom and the Palatine. The Estates celebrated at other tables.¹⁰

The final act was the paternal blessing. After the banquet, Ferdinand III went to the emperor's chamber, knelt once again, kissed his father's hands, and thanked him "with an impressive Latin oration" for his assistance in obtaining the crown as well as "for other paternal favors." Privy Councillor Khevenhüller reports in his annals that Ferdinand II was greatly touched. He accepted his son's gratitude tearfully, addressed him "movingly," and dismissed him with his paternal blessing.¹¹

The Hungarian coronation converted an archducal household into a royal court, with important consequences. Already prior to the coronation, Ferdinand III's grand steward Thun had been regarded as the future power behind the throne, who "might one day rule all these lands because of the great esteem"¹² the archduke bore him. New courtiers were added from renowned Hungarian families such as the Pálffy, Forgách, and Esterházy. One of them, Janos Drašković, later represented Ferdinand II as ban of Croatia and Palatine of Hungary. Others departed, among them the valet Thomas Ernst Tauber, who in Graz had served the infant Ferdinand Ernst as footman, "sitting up with him, carrying, watching, and walking him day and night."¹³

Back in Vienna, there were good tidings. The objective of the coronation had been achieved. Now concrete plans were made for the marriage contract in Madrid and *Infanta* Maria Anna's journey to Vienna. A fleet of galleys would accompany her to Genoa, and from there, she would proceed via Mantua, Trent, and Innsbruck; she was to reach Vienna as early as fall of 1626. But five years would pass before her actual arrival.¹⁴

Electoral Congress and the Bohemian Coronation 1627

Ferdinand III also had to wait a long time for his coronation as king of the Romans. The wider his father extended his military power throughout the Empire, the weaker his political position became. The Imperial ban on Friedrich V of the Palatinate, the bestowal of his electoral dignity on Maximilian I, and

the occupation of Palatine territories by Bavaria and Spain were unacceptable to many, and so several princes launched military campaigns against the emperor and his allies. Though they were all defeated, the war continued and took the emperor's as well as the Bavarian elector's troops far into northern Germany.¹⁵

In 1625, the Danish king Christian IV, as head of the Imperial Circle of Lower Saxony, went to war against the emperor. He, too, did not overlook the practical advantages, hoping to annex the archdioceses of Verden, Bremen, and Osnabrück as secular territories for his son. With monetary support from France, England, and the Netherlands, two other military leaders recruited troops and, like Christian IV, moved into Westphalia. Thence, Maximilian I dispatched Catholic League troops and urged Ferdinand II to reinforce the Imperial Army. Because Ferdinand II found himself unable to finance a larger military force, he accepted an offer from the Bohemian aristocrat Albrecht von Waldstein, who achieved fame as Wallenstein and who raised an army at his own expense. In the summer of 1625, the two met at Nikolsburg (Mikulov), and it is worth noting that Archduke Ferdinand Ernst was there as well. The journey was in the guise of a hunting expedition through Lower Austria and southern Moravia that included a visit to Cardinal Dietrichstein and was also undertaken to avoid an outbreak of the plague in Vienna. Already in 1625, Wallenstein succeeded in raising his army, whose running costs had to be borne by the inhabitants of the territories where it was deployed. In order to enforce this policy on a local level, the army had to be (and was) unbeatably large. So, a victorious march began in 1626 and continued north to Jutland through 1627. But the nuncio Caraffa drew the political conclusions from this military victory already in the summer of 1627. Precisely because the emperor appeared strong enough to push through his son's election as king of the Romans, the electors would prevent it.¹⁶

Indeed, the electoral congress meeting that fall demonstrated solid biconfessional opposition. The electors were unwilling to accept a transformation of the present Imperial military might into a permanent political force. Given the current military situation, they would not even consider electing the emperor's son as king of the Romans. The emperor, who had hoped all year that he might be able to pacify the Empire through a special Imperial Deputation and afterward might dare to call a Diet and elect his son king of the Romans, was even more perplexed than before. Some people at his court predicted a swift peace for the Empire, others a continuation of war; the Spanish allegedly counseled that a peace agreement should only be concluded after all enemies had been defeated. The idea of solving the Empire's many complications during a Diet was jettisoned because there was fear that the Imperial Estates would have to be granted too many concessions. Ferdinand III's election as king of the Romans had to wait.¹⁷

Thus, it happened that in 1627, Ferdinand III received only the Bohemian crown, strictly a routine matter. In October, he journeyed with the imperial couple and a reduced retinue to Prague. After an inauspicious entry into the city, the court prepared the architectural arrangements for the coronation and left Prague already at the beginning of November. The emperor with the empress, Ferdinand III, and his sisters preferred to stay in Brandýs nad Labem (Brandeis on the Elbe). There, Rudolf II had constructed a residence with a park and had established an observatory for the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe; Kepler had visited frequently and had calculated the orbits of the planets based on Brahe's observations. There, the emperor now pondered the Empire's future and relaxed while hunting. Later, in December, the court traveled once again to Brandýs, where Wallenstein arrived as well.¹⁸

Ferdinand III was able to observe the new Bohemian order in mid-November, when he and the emperor attended the Bohemian Diet in the great hall of the Prague castle. They came to the point at once, demanding two coronations as well as funds for the Imperial Army and other expenditures. Why these stipulations would certainly be granted was made clear a few days later by a procession from St. Vitus's cathedral to the convent Strahov, with which the imperial couple, Ferdinand III, the archduchesses, and the court celebrated the anniversary of the victory over the confederate Estates army in the battle of White Mountain. This was so important that the procession was not canceled even though rain had turned the road to mud.¹⁹

A few days before his own coronation, Ferdinand III saw his stepmother Eleonora crowned Queen of Bohemia. In several letters largely written in Latin, he reported the events to his younger brother who had remained in Austria. They demonstrate that the nineteen-year-old was more interested in the program accompanying the festivities—the theater and tournaments—than in the coronation ritual of a realm that had been degraded to a hereditary monarchy.²⁰

Ferdinand III dealt only cursorily with his own coronation: "Yesterday I was crowned, which happened as follows . . ." He reworded the sober transition and made the report somewhat more dramatic: "Yesterday my coronation was solemnized as well," employing the verb *peragere*, denoting a production or performance, which suggests that Ferdinand III thought the ritual less than impressive: "In the morning all Bohemian gentlemen came to my house and accompanied me to St. Wenceslaus's chapel; there I donned the royal garments and proceeded with only the Bohemian officeholders to the main altar, where the ceremonies were conducted in their usual order. After dinner, court actors presented an Italian comedy. Afterwards we had fireworks." In a postscript, he added that he was including several coronation coins, which his brother could use as he saw fit.²¹ In the next letter, Ferdinand III once again elaborated



FIGURE 7 Ferdinand II and Dominicus a Jesu Maria praying to Virgin Mary for the victory at the Battle of White Mountain, detail. To the left Ferdinand III as young King of Bohemia, oil painting by Anton Stevens von Steinfels (1641), Church of St. Maria de Victoria, Prague. Klášter Pražkého Jezulátka, image: Zdeněk Matyáško © Ústav dějin umění, Akademie věd České republiky.

on the festivities, which included a “sung comedy,” equestrian games, a ballet, and a shooting match in which he had won nothing but a pig. But he was able to demonstrate his language proficiency in Latin, Italian, Spanish, and Czech with *suem sive porcum, oder die Saw, o vero il porco, o el puerco, anebo Swinie*.²²

War in Europe Instead of Election as King of the Romans 1630

Only someone the electors chose as king of the Romans could become emperor. In 1628, Ferdinand II informed the electors of Mainz and Bavaria that he wished his son’s election as king of the Romans. He then traveled in person to the 1630 electoral congress and made his son attend as well. The effort was in vain, however. The old reasons for the electors’ grievances still existed, and new ones had arisen that must be described briefly.²³

The relationship between the emperor and the imperial princes, especially the elector of Bavaria, continued to deteriorate. The Imperial Army under Wallenstein, though its formation had been promoted by Bavaria, caused an intensification of structural differences. Bavarian interests in the Empire were focused on the guaranty of its rights to the Palatinate on one hand and on the electors’ powers in Imperial politics on the other. Thus, Bavaria pursued a rather defensive military strategy and sought reaffirmation of its rights to the Palatinate. But during the struggle for Bohemia, the emperor had strayed into the north of the Empire, with which he had little to do up to this point. The drama over the Palatinate repeated itself in 1628. As he had earlier rewarded the Duke of Bavaria with the Palatinate, the emperor now bestowed General Wallenstein with the principality of Mecklenburg, whose dukes were under Imperial ban for their support of the Danish king. Maximilian I was infuriated by Wallenstein’s rapid rise. The nuncio Pallotto therefore considered Ferdinand III’s election as king of the Romans unlikely. After all, even the Catholic Estates would reject a powerful Imperial Army given their fears of subjugation on the Bohemian model and of a power grab by Wallenstein.²⁴

Another cause for opposition was Ferdinand II’s attempt to use his military victories in the Empire for political gain. In 1627, the bishop of Augsburg had turned to the emperor for help with litigation concerning confiscated church property. The emperor asked the Catholic electors for an expert opinion on the continuing dispossessions of Catholic church properties by Protestants, a problem the Peace of Augsburg had not solved in 1555. The emperor thought in terms of a political solution, but the Electoral Congress of 1627 decided that he should act through Imperial jurisdiction. To weaken Calvinism, which he blamed for the war in the Empire, Maximilian I led Ferdinand II to the (in his mind) best possible solution: an edict from the emperor (without the Imperial Diet’s input) that would bring about restitution

of church property and the exclusion of Calvinists from the Peace of Augsburg, something that had been decided in 1566 at an Imperial Diet but not carried out. The Edict of Restitution, at last handed down by Ferdinand II on March 6, 1629, and presented as an interpretation of the Peace of Augsburg, meant the return of Bremen and Magdeburg, Halberstadt and Minden, Verden and Kammin, Lübeck, Ratzeburg, and Schwerin to Catholicism. Throughout the Empire, more than 500 expropriated convents had to be given back, especially those now governed by Calvinist counts and princes, with the terms enforced by the army.²⁵

Even though their own property rights were scarcely affected, the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, especially, objected because the emperor's edict and its execution disregarded the electors' special position and the culture of consensus that had at one time been cultivated in the Imperial Diet. The edict shook the foundation of the electoral and princely conception of the Empire, its confessional structure, and the territorial integrity and autonomy of the Imperial Estates. Given this situation, the electors would hardly agree to Ferdinand III's election as king of the Romans. Yet in order to bring about the election, the emperor attempted to entice Saxony with offers of compromise. Again, he did not dare to call a Diet to settle these conflicts but rather summoned the electors to Regensburg in 1630.²⁶

At the time of this meeting, Ferdinand III was twenty-two. For the past five years, he had participated in some sessions of the Privy Council, a body that had not discouraged the emperor's disastrous conferral of the Palatinate to Bavaria and Spain and since then had found no path to peace in the Empire but rather had contributed to the continuing deterioration of the political and, finally, the military situation. Among the emperor's closest privy councillors, whom Ferdinand III had known well since 1625, there was not one who could give him a different perspective on the last years. No one knew France or Northern Europe well. The imperial vice chancellor and the president of the Aulic Council—men who commanded a profound knowledge of the Empire—were no shapers of opinion. The formative experiences of the other privy councillors had been the successful Inner Austrian Counter Reformation, the suppression of the Calvinist-dominated Estates' revolts of 1618, the active Spanish, Bavarian, and Saxon support during the Bohemian war, and the lesson that one could wage war at someone else's expense (from the Palatinate and Mecklenburg) and that such a policy could be quite profitable. Several of Ferdinand II's privy councillors received Spanish incomes as well as lordships in Bohemia and, after the Edict of Restitution, also in Württemberg.²⁷

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Ferdinand III followed his father's victory-lined path into political and military defeat without any signs of deviating from it. He identified with the emperor's policies and described

enthusiastically and in detail one of Wallenstein's victories over Danish troops. In March of 1629, the archbishop of Esztergom issued warnings (presumably also to the prince) against the Imperial campaign in Mantua and about a coalition between France and Transylvania, the Ottoman Empire, and the dissatisfied Imperial Estates. How Ferdinand III handled such cautions is unclear. While the emperor was quite pleased that his son abstained from political involvement, Ferdinand III had, according to the nuncio, developed into a prince of ability and firmness. The nuncio's reports suggest that the Imperial court tried, through his future spouse, to prevent the Franco-Spanish War in Northern Italy in 1628. Nothing indicates that Ferdinand III, warned of collapsing prospects for his election as king of the Romans, opposed plans for the Mantua campaign on which Spain predicated his marriage, nor did he foresee the consequences of a restitution of church properties in the Empire. When, at the end of 1627—predating the Edict of Restitution—the cathedral chapter of Halberstadt, under pressure from the emperor, chose his brother Archduke Leopold Wilhelm as its bishop, he sent congratulations on the “happy” election and hoped that God would soon gift his brother “with Magdeburg and other bishoprics for his honor, the increase of the Catholic religion, the benefit of our House, and the comfort of all Catholics.”²⁸

As his letters to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm show, the heir to the throne did not realize the gravity of the situation even by 1630. That spring, he had attended the Hungarian Diet at Bratislava (Pressburg, Pozsony) and afterward traveled to Regensburg via Styria and Upper Austria. He wrote enthusiastically to his brother about his stay at the Benedictine abbey of Kremsmünster and described its restoration by the abbot, who was a privy councillor and occasionally president of the Imperial Chamber Court. The large apartment put at Ferdinand III's disposal was “regal.” He spent his time as usual, hunting stags and participating in church festivals, which in this case was the Corpus Christi procession. He also prepared for a meeting with the electors by practicing gambling for money. If the opportunity presented itself and “he played with the electors, it would be necessary that he was learned and experienced in this.”²⁹

The electors did indeed gamble with him at Regensburg, where he arrived on June 19, 1630, though in a different way than he had envisioned. The young king dedicated himself to knightly exercises, the composition of poems, and the hunt, and he wrote to his brother of wardrobe adjustments made necessary by the cold. He found visiting the electors taxing. Four electors present meant four visits and four return visits, all “with great ceremony.”³⁰ His initial naiveté was staggering. On June 25, 1630, he visited the archbishop-elect of Trier, Philipp Christoph von Sötern, and told him of *Infanta* Maria Anna's arrival in Genoa: “I shared my joy with him.”³¹ Ferdinand III took much pleasure in

Sötern treating him with the greatest politeness; he does not seem to have been aware that Sötern had brought a lawsuit concerning an abbey against Spain before the Aulic Council and considered guiding his electorate through the shallows of the war between Spain and the Netherlands by a rapprochement with France. The elector of Bavaria, too, drew closer to France at this time and was, like Pope Urban VIII, determined to prevent Ferdinand III's election as king of the Romans. Maximilian I did not allow his nephew to feel this. At the end of his letter about hunting quarry and the weather, Ferdinand III wrote: "Aside from that, we all are faring well with the electors, thank God. The elector of Bavaria—(my Lord and father), [. . .] is a prince without equal and not as grumpy as I had been told [. . .]."³²

While the emperor hoped to prod the electors into electing his son, they pulled his teeth one by one. In order to demonstrate their displeasure, Electoral Saxony and Brandenburg sent only representatives; the elector of Bavaria and the three ecclesiastical electors were present in person but unified in their conviction that the emperor's power had to be curtailed. Bavaria, with its grab for the Palatinate, its promotion of Imperial rearmament, and its influence on the Edict of Restitution, was largely responsible for the present precarious situation and now executed an about-face. Together with the other electors, it demanded the removal of the emperor's top general Albrecht von Wallenstein, the disarmament of the Imperial forces, and the absorption of the rest into the Catholic League under the command of the Bavarian Count Tilly. Already on August 13, 1630, Ferdinand II yielded and dismissed Wallenstein. He thought that he had no choice because the majority of his own army stood in northern Italy in order to help Spain, while only weeks earlier, the Swedes had begun their invasion of northern Germany. Although Ferdinand III was in Regensburg and had attended several meetings of the emperor's Privy Council, the collection of individual opinions and the recommendation for Wallenstein's removal occurred without his participation.³³

The hoped-for reward—Ferdinand III's election as king of the Romans—did not materialize. Having dismissed Wallenstein, the emperor no longer had the clout to exert power. He could not restore the Palatinate without Bavaria and did not want to rescind the Edict of Restitution. Perplexed and in vain, his privy councillors looked, as late as September, for ways to bring about the son's election as king of the Romans. In addition, the electors exploited the situation by forcing peace negotiations with France. Soon thereafter, the emperor, now without an army deserving of the name, agreed to a sad peace. Prior to that, in October, the emperor had asked the electors to remain in Regensburg and to consider the election of a king of the Romans. The elector of Saxony had made his opinion known that peace within the Empire—read, retraction of the Edict of Restitution—should come first; only then could there

be consideration of electing a new king. The electors of Cologne and Trier communicated their opinions even more frankly to the nuncio, demanding restoration of the Electoral Curia's authority, which the emperor's counselors had damaged by making "dispositions about everything without consulting the electors." Indeed, electing "a youngster like the King of Hungary" at this point would cost them even more respect.³⁴ The electors could not allow themselves to be degraded to an election consortium. In this dispute, Ferdinand III was no player but rather a pawn.

1.4

WAITING

Oaths of Allegiance and Power Plays

Though Ferdinand III was king of Hungary and Bohemia, he lived, as the nuncio wrote in mid-1631, “in obedience to his father” and did “not interfere in important matters.”¹ He even had to guarantee in writing his renunciation of active rulership in Bohemia. But his Hungarian and Bohemian courtiers must have afforded him certain insights, and it was probably no accident that two Bohemian chamberlains, Johann Ulrich Slavata and Georg Adam von Martinitz, members of his retinue since 1625, were sons of the prominent victims of the Prague defenestration, Vilém Slavata and Jaroslav Bořita von Martinitz. The emperor thus took care that the experience of 1618 was transmitted to his son. In addition, Georg Adam von Martinitz had already become president of the Bohemian treasury in 1628; in 1632, Ferdinand III, as King of Bohemia, named him royal Bohemian chancellor and in 1637 his privy councillor. So, little by little, the future government was constituted.²

During these years, Ferdinand III gained formal governmental experience on a small scale. In 1627, he began to mint his own coinage in the county of Kłodzko (Glatz), thus distributing his likeness, still beardless, among his subjects as well as gaining some added knowledge about economics and representation. He also learned more about the relationship between representation, rulership, and force. In 1628, from Prague, he reported to his brother on an uprising of Bohemian peasants. Around 7,000 peasants had gathered and laid siege to several county seats. Wallenstein had quelled the insurrection with 1,000 cavalry and “3,000 infantrymen,” “slaughtered” 450 peasants, dispersed the rest, taken about 30 of their leaders prisoner, and “ordered some to be quartered, others to be broken to the wheel, and yet others to be drowned in swamps, as a gruesome deterrent.”³

Among the rituals of early modern justice was the pardoning of criminals. Ferdinand III practiced this as well, pleading before his father for the life of a soldier condemned to death for theft. The emperor answered that “I will

spare his life because of Your Grace's intercession."⁴ At the Old Town Bridge tower in Prague, Ferdinand III would have seen the impaled heads and hands of those executed in 1620. On his return from Regensburg to Vienna in 1630, he would not have been able to ignore that 12,000 peasants had perished in a 1625/26 peasant uprising against Bavarian debt collectors in Upper Austria. Now, as another deterrent, a tribunal in Linz had displaced severed heads and the corpses of the hanged rebels. Fear of—and preparation for—new uprisings remained part of the political climate.⁵

During the homage ceremonies of the Upper Austrian Diet in Linz at the end of 1630, festive pomp was clearly not matched by general elation. On their way from the parish church to the residence, Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III followed Prince Eggenberg, the new marshal of the hereditary lands; behind them came only Catholic nobles, as Protestants were no longer admitted after the rebellion. The Estates pledged their allegiance to their two sovereigns in the knights' chamber of the Linz residence. The new constitution, issued by the emperor as a simple act of grace, granted the territorial Diet the privileges of tax appropriation and of appointing administrators from its ranks, but it made any effective opposition impossible.⁶

Arrangements for the territorial Estates of Lower Austria were more satisfactory at their homage to Ferdinand III in May of 1629 in Vienna. There, nobles who had not or had only briefly participated in the rebellion of 1620 were permitted to keep their privileges and to remain Lutheran, whereas the non-Catholic aristocracy of Inner Austria had been exiled in 1628. Ferdinand III excused himself in writing to the Carinthian Diet for not receiving its oath of allegiance in person and, in 1631, sent Prince Eggenberg, who affirmed the old Estates' privileges in his stead.⁷

It is remarkable that Ferdinand III's father, when revising the constitutions of those territories that had participated in the rebellion, did not reorganize them into one political entity and let this one-time opportunity for uniformity pass. An explanation lies, perhaps, in the fact that his only experience with supraterritorial unity had been the armed resistance by the confederation of Estates from 1618 to 1620. He regarded the Estates' privileges that had made such resistance possible as invalidated by their rebellion, demanded and received unconditional surrender from the Bohemian, Moravian, Silesian, and Upper Austrian Estates, and consequently enhanced the heterogeneity of their privileges in the various hereditary territories. On the other hand, the emperor centralized governance of his hereditary territories through the Bohemian and a new Austrian Court Chancery (*Hofkanzlei*), both of which were located in Vienna.

Ferdinand II also altered the Imperial court, which had failed as a forum for conflict resolution even before 1618. Already under Rudolf II, court patronage as an instrument of power in confessional conflicts had discriminated

against Protestants. Emperor Matthias had then reduced the number of aristocratic officeholders and, notwithstanding the Bohemian nobility's pleas to keep it at Prague, had finally relocated his court to Vienna. Thus, the court had shouldered aside precisely those aristocrats with whom it disagreed, had become too small as a basis for the integration of nobles, and—considering the potential for conflict—had moved to the wrong location. In contrast, Ferdinand II bestowed a large number of court offices and did promote new ties between the aristocracy and his court.⁸

After all, the aristocracy continued to retain its Diets and its official positions in the territorial administration, government, and judiciary. Aside from that, it supplied an important part of the higher clergy, was intricately linked through family networks, and, even without resorting to rebellion, could make the territorial prince's life difficult or easy, especially when it came to collecting taxes. As local authorities, aristocrats overwhelmingly determined their subjects' living conditions through their own jurisdiction, legislation, economic enterprises, and church patronage.⁹

However, the nobility needed the sovereign's support in order to maintain its status in a dynamic economic and competitive social development. The Habsburgs could elevate the nobles; confer court, administrative, military, and ecclesiastical positions; supply incomes; arrange marriages and, with them, dowries; help with the coveted legal privileges concerning the impartibility of family property; lend prestige; and more.¹⁰

At court, the cooperation between ruler and nobility was most conspicuous at aristocratic weddings. If an imperial lady-in-waiting married, the ceremony could take place in the court chapel and the wedding banquet at the imperial table; it was difficult to acquire more prestige. In 1628, Ferdinand III reported such a celebration in a letter to his brother, but the occasion was already so familiar to the emperor's children that he only described the deviations from the usual routine, namely that the dinner took place in a room closed to the general court because of a mourning period.¹¹

As long as there were Protestant nobles in Lower Austria and Hungary, Ferdinand II continued to use the court as an instrument for aristocratic re-Catholicization by favoring those who had converted. Thus, Ferdinand III learned to regard the cultivation of a loyal court aristocracy and noble converts as the most elegant way to enforce the Counter Reformation and as a form of territorial rule based on the cooperation of ruler and territorial Estates as practiced at court. The influx was ceaseless, as a few examples may demonstrate. In 1627, a Thuringian Lutheran, the high-ranking military officer Wolfgang Count Mansfeld, converted to Catholicism in Vienna and thereupon became privy councillor for Imperial affairs. The same year, Ferdinand III participated in the confirmation of the Hungarian Palatine Esterházy's converted wife.

Later that day, he and the imperial couple attended the splendid wedding feast of his chamberlain Joachim Slavata at the hall of the Lower Austrian Diet. The bride's father was Grand Steward Meggau, and the groom's father was the same Vilém Slavata who, raised as a Protestant, had been thrown from a window in the Prague castle in 1618 as a Catholic. As another example, at the beginning of 1630, two converted young Hungarian counts, Adam Batthyány and Adam Thurzó, became imperial chamberlains. Because Thurzó's younger brother was still regarded as refractory, the emperor sent him to the Jesuit school in Vienna.¹²

Ferdinand III's contact with the nobility was further intensified by the ceremonious nature of the Imperial household. The emperor, with members of his family, regularly held open court dinners. Selected courtiers saw to it that princely and aristocratic prestige mutually enhanced each other and that the imperial dinner became a representational event. Numerous courses were served, and exquisite tableware proved the lofty station of the princes with china, glasses, jugs, basins, and table decorations in every imaginable shape made from precious cloth, silver, gold, crystal, and semiprecious stones. Lesser courtiers were expected to attend these displays as spectators. During carnival festivities, on the other hand, the imperial couple waited on their aristocratic guests during the so-called *Wirtschaft* (literally: tavern); costumes made the game of social reversal less formal.¹³

Ferdinand III's diplomatic contacts also increased during these years. The pope, Spain, and Venice maintained regular ambassadors at court; these had privileged entry to the imperial antechambers and to the masses celebrated at court festivities. Even their secretaries and aristocratic servants sometimes had access to the dynasts. In addition, there were many permanent and occasional representatives from the electors, princes, counts, and Imperial cities. Already as archduke, Ferdinand III had been visited by other ambassadors and electors passing through.¹⁴

During the late 1620s, Ferdinand III gradually became visible as a relevant persona in the web of favor and influence at court. In 1628, the duke of Savoy presented him with a valuable sword and a diamond-encrusted dagger. Wallenstein now made him the gift of expensive horses. The king's stable expenses allow conclusions concerning his position in the general Imperial household. In 1631, the court office responsible for horse feed paid 22,097 Gulden for the emperor's mounts and 3,496 Gulden for Ferdinand III's. The horses were needed for public appearances, tournaments, court travel, and hunting.¹⁵

Hunting was the main reason for the dynasts' residing not only in Vienna but also in the countryside. In the 1620s, a hunting pattern emerged that Ferdinand III would follow his entire life. Throughout the year, there were

many brief hunts and several fishing expeditions, most lasting half a day or a day, that started out from the Hofburg and generally led to the Danube meadows. Then, there were times when the imperial family remained for days or weeks in its hunting lodges. May generally saw a sojourn of several weeks at the moated Laxenburg castle. Here, ducks, egrets, and other birds of prey were hunted. In the summertime, many brief stag hunts took place; in late summer, a stay of several weeks at Ebersdorf; and in the fall, shorter boar hunts.¹⁶

Ferdinand fit himself seamlessly into his father's mode of life, and the emperor was well satisfied; the nuncio noted that he took "extraordinary pleasure"¹⁷ in his son. He was present when the imperial couple celebrated the high holy days with the Jesuits, received Jewish felicitations and presents on New Year's Day, appeared at the Jesuits' forty-hour prayer during Carnival and dined with them, returned from Laxenburg for the Whitsuntide holiday, visited abbeys, honored the entry of aristocratic ladies into convents with his presence, attended special sermons, and participated in processions. That the heir apparent assisted his father at the foot washing, an act of humility, on Maundy Thursday 1627 was so much a matter of course that the nuncio passed over it and went on to other topics. The knights' hall in the Hofburg was filled with spectators, and one of the men was 108 years old, four others over 90, the rest more than 70.¹⁸ He also remarked that on Holy Saturday, the emperor visited the city's sacred sepulchers on foot, but on Easter Sunday, he and Ferdinand III came to St. Stephan's cathedral on horseback.

Spanish Marriage, Spanish War

"Falerlalaralallera, thank God the courier finally arrives who has been awaited as long as the Messiah by the Jews; sent by Princess Doria, he brings the happy news that the queen is already at the Genoa shore . . . she herself has seen the 27 galleons . . . I hope to God that we will shortly have her here with us."¹⁹ With this joyous onomatopoeia, Ferdinand III informed his brother in 1630 that the Spanish *Infanta* had completed her sea voyage across the Mediterranean and would arrive at court in the foreseeable future. The waiting period, marked by never-ending rumors about the *Infanta's* departure date and by repeated delays, had indeed been long. In 1625, Ferdinand had received a portrait of the *Infanta* along with a crown for her. In 1627/28, the marriage contract had been negotiated and the pope's dispensation for the marriage, required because of the close degree of affinity, had been obtained. A marriage by proxy took place in 1629, simultaneously with the deployment of Imperial troops to northern Italy. But the *Infanta* did not leave Spain until 1630 and arrived in Genoa on June 18 with a retinue of about 200. There, Cardinal Dietrichstein received her in the emperor's name.

Yet landing in Genoa did not end the waiting period. The plague was rampant in Lombardy, and travel along this route was too dangerous. In summer, an alternate route led through Naples; in winter, it led across the Apennine Mountains. For political and ceremonial reasons, the *Infanta* did not meet the pope but visited Loreto, a place of pilgrimage dedicated to the Virgin Mary. At the end of January 1631, she crossed the Adriatic Sea with a fleet of Venetian galleons and arrived in Trieste. There, Ferdinand III's uncle, Archduke Leopold V of Tyrol, received her. Her marriage had conferred on her the status of queen of Hungary. Grand steward Khevenhüller, who had been assigned to her, assumed the ultimate administration of her suite, which included about 60 Spaniards. The journey proceeded across the eastern Alps toward Vienna by way of Carinthia.²⁰

Ferdinand III dispatched numerous courtiers to meet the slowly approaching train. He himself first met his wife at the end of February 1631 on the Semmering Pass. Here, an event had been contrived that allowed the king and queen to recognize each other with apparent surprise and to fall quickly and spontaneously in love. The Royal Grand Steward Thun had applied for an audience with the queen and appeared with approximately thirty nobles. Among them was Ferdinand III, "thinking that the queen would not know him. But when he made her an especially gallant obeisance, the queen bowed deeply and so the king realized that the queen recognized him, received her with great reverence and respect, and began speaking Spanish with her."²¹ Queen Maria Anna is said to have been relieved because she had heard rumors to the effect that her husband not only lacked "good sense" but was also "ugly and unsightly."²² After a little while, Ferdinand III intimated that "he would come to her after dinner," whereupon she thanked him, answering that "she awaited him eagerly." The couple, already married pro forma, then spent some time conversing in the presence of the Tyrolean archducal couple, thus assuring that due decorum was observed.

On the following day, the queen and her ladies-in-waiting were magnificently received and taken by coach and sedan chair to Wiener Neustadt. Empress Eleonora, Queen Maria Anna, and Ferdinand III's two sisters settled among themselves the new situation of rank politely and firmly. The emperor met his sister's daughter for the first time in Ebersdorf. He left her no time to kiss his hand but rather embraced his niece and kissed her forehead. Then, Ferdinand III and his wife entered a room in which all princes, counts, and lords "waiting on the emperor kissed the queen's hand."²³ The reception by the dynasts and the court had been accomplished.

These festivities, the most elaborate of Ferdinand III's life, lasted a whole month and deserve a closer look. On the morning of February 26, 1631, Queen Maria Anna traveled to Vienna. Ferdinand III, accompanied by Archduke

Leopold Wilhelm, awaited her at St. Margaretha. The servants wore new liveries; Ferdinand III's dress and bridle were embroidered with pearls. After a parade by many Hungarian and Austrian cavalry companies, the train for the entry into Vienna—with over 5,000 riders—was formed, with the queen's gilded coach as its center. The Viennese municipal authorities waited at the Stubentor city gate with a baldachin for the king. Armed Viennese lined the streets.

The imperial couple, Ferdinand III's two sisters, the privy councillors, and other courtiers attended in the court church of St. Augustine. After the reception, all proceeded to the Habsburg dynasty's sacred center, the Loreto chapel. Then, the dynasts entered the choir, where Cardinal Dietrichstein waited under a baldachin. The imperial couple's baldachin was embroidered in gold and the royal couple's in silver. The cardinal affirmed the marriage and blessed the newlyweds in the pope's name. The wedding banquet took place in the Hofburg. Two dukes of Saxony-Lauenburg served the imperial couple, and Grand Stewards Thun and Khevenhüller served the royal couple. Khevenhüller later noted that "the dinner lasted a long time, the food and drink were sublime and the music enchanting."²⁴



FIGURE 8 Ferdinand III and his first wife Maria Anna, unmarked copper plate etching. Vienna, Austrian National Library / Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, picture library, Pg 149137/3.

During the next few days, a series of festivities followed, beginning with a public mass in the court chapel, a gala banquet, and a ball for the numerous nobles, including about 180 aristocratic ladies. The royal couple performed the “dance of honor,” led by Archduke Leopold V of Tyrol, the two dukes of Saxony, and the prince of Guastalla, all carrying torches. A “ballet” followed, an immersion into the allegoric-mythical world of antique deities: Diana, Juno, and Minerva appeared; Archduchess Maria Anna in a sumptuous robe, accompanied by eleven ladies-in-waiting, pantomimed the bride’s name; and Archduchess Căcilia pantomimed the name of the bridegroom. Ferdinand III presented his wife with a diamond and ruby necklace, and the empress gave her a gilt goblet with diamond insets.²⁵

The following two days were given over to the acceptance of gifts. Presenting them carried great prestige and increased the glory of those who already were of rank and name. The old prince von Eggenberg’s son, for example, presented a diamond ornament from the archbishop-elect of Mainz, Adam Waldstein, and 40,000 Reichstaler in gold coins from the Bohemian Estates. Lower Austrian, Styrian, and Carniolan representatives followed.

March 3 saw a celebration of the king—and of love—on the Burgplatz; a chronicler counted over 700 revelers in lavish dress. Triumphal chariots represented the ruler’s virtues, territories, and the king himself “as if a Roman Emperor.” In a symbolic battle between more than a dozen chariots, the king’s—symbolizing “the most perfect love”²⁶—emerged victorious. Equestrian games as well as Quintana races followed.

The highlight of these celebrations was a very special gift from Innsbruck. Because the marriage solemnities had for a time been scheduled to take place there, Archduke Leopold of the Tyrol and his Florentine wife Claudia de Medici had already begun to prepare a series of festivities in 1628. They had erected a dedicated theater hall in the Innsbruck Hofburg, repaired the court buildings, polished the armaments, restored the gardens, put the city to order, decreed a new court ceremonial, constructed a ship for a pleasant trip on the Inn and Danube rivers to Vienna, prepared tournament games, planned a horse ballet, and chose and rehearsed a theater program. So that this effort should not be in vain, all the requisites had been transported to Vienna.²⁷

Thus, on March 4, Archduke Leopold and his gilded chariot arrived in the Burgplatz. The chariot, symbolizing the sun, was large enough to hold 36 musicians. There ensued the first performance of a horse ballet in Vienna. Twelve nobles on horseback, symbolizing the twelve Zodiac signs, rode in a formation that spelled out the names Ferdinand and Maria. Now others, the young prince von Eggenberg among them, could display their chariots. On the evening after the equestrian games, in which the king participated, Claudia de Medici presented a pendant to her spouse’s chariot. He had

personified the sun, and she was dressed as the moon. Sun and moon were at that time understood to symbolize man and wife. A singer costumed as Orpheus sang an aria of homage; ladies-in-waiting and courtiers performed a ballet, which was followed by general dancing and the awarding of prizes to the participants.²⁸

The following weeks were given over to tournaments and hunting as well as continuing presentations of gifts. One day, an immense number of stags were pointed out but not hunted because of the closed season, though “bears, wolves, foxes, and the like” were shot instead. On March 27, 1631, the celebration ended as the emperor and the king escorted their departing relatives out of Vienna.²⁹

Plaything of Spanish Politics

People noted with pleasure that the young couple got along well, but personal happiness was not the goal of this marriage. Rather, it was meant to solve a strategic problem for the Spanish military and to help the emperor overcome his inability to pacify an Empire that his policies (toward the Palatinate, Mecklenburg, the army, the Edict of Restitution) had torn even further apart. Let us briefly recall that Ferdinand III, from Spain’s point of view, had only been its second choice, after the king of England, in the search for an ally in its struggle for the United Netherlands. By settling on him, Spain had committed itself to a land war whose basis was the free passage from Milan across the Alps and along the Rhine to the Spanish Netherlands. Ferdinand III’s father had sent his army to northern Italy to support Spain against France and had thus provided the Swedes with the opportunity to conquer northern Germany. Now France was becoming attractive as a protective power to some of the Catholic princes who, until 1630, had been troubled by the mighty Imperial Army, burdened by Spanish troop movements, and threatened by the approaching Swedes.³⁰

Shortly before the *Infanta*’s arrival in Vienna, in January 1631, France and Sweden drew the logical consequences from their common interests; they signed a treaty that provided French funds for a Swedish war against the Empire. France had seen to it that Bavaria remained neutral and that the League’s troops did not have to face the Swedes for some time. The imperial princes were not keen on a European war. In April 1631, shortly after the marriage in Vienna, they forged an armed but neutral alliance that would confront the emperor and the Swedes as a “third party.”³¹ They demanded that the emperor distance himself from the Edict of Restitution but in vain. In August 1631, an attempt to negotiate an agreement in Frankfurt between the princes and the emperor foundered as well; the imperial envoys then fled Frankfurt before the approaching Swedish army.³²

Sweden's advance also frustrated the Protestants' peace policy. The Swedes pressured the Imperial territories to declare for or against them, and one after the other went over to their side.³³ The Lutheran princes did not like this coerced armed alliance, but the Imperial-Bavarian alternative seemed more terrible than ever, especially since Magdeburg had been conquered by the Imperial-Bavarian troops; during its sacking, a fire erupted that destroyed the city. More than 20,000 inhabitants were killed. The conquerors then moved against Saxony because Maximilian I interpreted its armed neutrality as support for Sweden.

Only now did Saxony go over to Sweden. In September 1631, the Swedes and Saxons jointly obliterated the emperor's and the League's troops at Breitenfeld near Leipzig. This ended imperial dominance of the Empire, as the entire artillery, half of the cavalry, and two-thirds of the foot soldiers were wiped out and the war chest lost. The dam had been breached; the Swedes increased the number of treaties with Protestant princes, occupied Thuringia, and conquered the Catholic bishopric of Würzburg as well as Electoral Mainz; taking winter quarters in enemy territories was politically more comfortable than occupying the land of allies. Saxony invaded Bohemia and conquered Prague. Countless refugees returned with the Saxon army. At last, a decade after the Prague tribunal, the impaled heads were taken down from the tower and given burial in the Theyn church. Almost 15,000 Prague citizens professed to be Protestants. Many emigrants expelled those who had bought their estates, stormed castles, ruined Catholic churches, mistreated priests, and drove out the Jesuits. The Bohemian aristocratic republic was about to be reborn.³⁴

Things looked no better for the emperor in Imperial Italy. In April 1631, under threat from the Swedish advance, Ferdinand II signed a peace agreement with France as an addendum to the not yet ratified Treaty of Regensburg, having charged Major General Gallas with the negotiations. The emperor was still satisfied in March, but by April, word got about that he now believed Gallas to have been duped by the French. The conditions were disadvantageous for the emperor, and matters got worse. France did not abide by the peace treaty, hiding soldiers in fortifications that were to have been cleared and, in the end, keeping the vital fortresses of Casale and Pinerolo.³⁵

The emperor's military collapse created a need for action by Spain and changed the role that had been envisaged for Ferdinand III. As late as February 1631, the Spanish ambassador had discussed how to achieve Ferdinand III's coronation as king of the Romans; barely six weeks later, this was no longer a subject for debate. While Ferdinand II sank into severe melancholy—today we would probably speak of depression—the Spanish ambassador attempted to gain control over him through Ferdinand III.³⁶

The marriage had paved the way. Presiding over the new queen of Hungary's court was the Imperial privy councillor, Grand Steward Khevenhüller, who was responsible for monitoring contacts of the queen and her ladies-in-waiting with the outside world. Khevenhüller himself was very much oriented toward Spain. During the negotiations over her court, the queen had also been granted numerous Spanish attendants: six gentlemen, six ladies-in-waiting, a mistress of the court, and eight chambermaids. The emperor had even relented as to her confessor; instead of the Jesuit he had requested, he accepted the Capuchin Diego Quiroga, a top diplomat of the Spanish crown. An inventory of the court of Ferdinand III's wife, compiled before 1637, lists approximately sixty Spanish servants, among them a chief mistress of the household and ladies-in-waiting, ladies' and chamber maids, nurses, chaplains, fiscal officers, a gatekeeper, a blood-letter, a dancing master, kitchen personnel, a personal laundry woman, a gatekeeper's assistant, and an assistant for the servant laying the table. Taken together, they probably sufficed as an instrument of influence over the queen, all the more because the Spanish embassy had no lack of personnel either. Spaniards were so numerous at court that they used St. Michael's church near the Hofburg as their own. In addition, the Spaniards developed a network of loyalties in Ferdinand III's retinue. In 1630, the royal chamberlain Joachim Slavata had been ceremoniously inducted into a Spanish knightly order. In April of 1631, the nuncio reported that the Spanish ambassador used the queen's confessor as a go-between to initiate talks between Ferdinand III and his father. Thus, Quiroga became an influential link—via the queen and Ferdinand III—to the emperor. Even Rome tried to approach Ferdinand II in this indirect manner.³⁷

Since the summer of 1631, the Spanish embassy manifestly worked on separating Ferdinand III from the Imperial court. This resulted in “some vexations”³⁸ between the emperor and the royal couple. Once again, Prague was under discussion as the royal residence. The pressure increased in August, when the nuncio registered tensions between Empress Eleonora and Queen Maria Anna and surmised that the queen wished to dominate. The Spanish courtiers were attempting to divide the court in order to “assume command,” thought the nuncio, because Ferdinand III accepted his father's dominance and tried to stay out of important political matters.³⁹ Even the rumor bruited about in Rome that one of Eleonora's servants was plotting to poison the royal couple did not change Ferdinand III's relationship with his father and the empress. According to the nuncio, an open conversation did away with even “the shadow of a doubt.”⁴⁰ In any case, Saxony's conquest of Prague scotched any plans for a separate residence. To gain decisive influence over and through Ferdinand III, the Spaniards at court had to come up with another scheme—the supreme command over the Imperial Army.

But this position was occupied, and for cogent reasons. When the Imperial military power collapsed throughout the Empire in 1631, Ferdinand II, with the approbation of his theologians, prepared to distance himself from the Edict of Restitution. The emperor also saw the Swedish army coming closer to its military goal of restoring the situation in 1618. People connected to Sweden and its allies demanded an annulment of the Edict of Restitution; restoration of the earlier confessional status in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; return of the emigrants; restitution of the Palatinate, together with its electoral position; the expulsion of Jesuits from the Empire; alternating elections between a Protestant and a Catholic emperor; and much more. On November 1, 1631, the nuncio wrote to Rome that the emperor feared the annihilation of his dynasty. Spain insisted that peace at this time would be in no one's interest; it supported Wallenstein's recall and, to placate Saxony, withdrawal from the Edict of Restitution. In December of 1631, Eggenberg met with Wallenstein in the south Moravian city of Znaim (Znojmo) and negotiated his return.⁴¹

Here, Ferdinand III, for whom serving as his father's assistant at foot washings and hunting must have been less than a challenge, came into play. After the Spanish attempts had not resulted in detaching him from obedience to his father and the mesh of the Imperial court, he was now lured with the supreme command over the Imperial troops. This project could have solved two Spanish problems. Spain would have gained immediate influence over military strategy and would have found in Wallenstein an able military consultant. It could have countered the electors, who had forced Wallenstein's dismissal in 1630 from the highest command post, with the argument that he was no longer supreme commander but a mere lieutenant general.⁴²

In the summer of 1631, Ferdinand III did indeed ask his father for the supreme command of the Imperial Army. Thus began a time of imperial hemming, hawing, and wrangling. The privy councillors supported the young king's petition, and, at first, the emperor agreed as well. But his son was not appointed. This change of mind did not appear to be the last word, however, and the vacillation continued. At the end of November 1631, for example, the nuncio firmly believed that Ferdinand III would go to war with Wallenstein as his lieutenant. In December 1631, however, Wallenstein, though agreeing to assume the general command for three months and to reorganize the army, refused to serve under the king of Hungary. This satisfied the Spanish and the emperor, but Ferdinand III felt duped.⁴³

Moreover, as Wallenstein's command was limited to an initial three months, Ferdinand III's future role remained unclear. In January, it was said that he would not go to war because Wallenstein was used "not to paying court, but rather to being flattered and served."⁴⁴ Because all hopes rested

with him, he could not be snubbed. The Spanish needed victories, and for that, they needed Wallenstein. With Eggenberg's help, they held the emperor's confessor Lamormaini, Wallenstein's enemy, in check. Quiroga also got along well with Wallenstein.

The expiration of the three-month term brought the question of the supreme command back. Again, the Spanish side talked of Ferdinand III's going to war; again, it was rumored that Wallenstein would not tolerate a superior. In March, Quiroga conferred with Wallenstein, but they found no solution for Ferdinand III. Quiroga told the nuncio that it was difficult to find a compromise: "The king wished to go to war since the Spanish wished it," but "Wallenstein wanted to be sole and absolute master."⁴⁵ It is not clear whether Ferdinand III really did wish this or whether Quiroga or the nuncio attributed such a wish to him. In any case, the arrangement of April 13, 1632, between the emperor (represented by Eggenberg) and Wallenstein resulted in Wallenstein, not the king, receiving the supreme command.

At the end of April, as a sop to Ferdinand III, his father conferred on him the administration of Bohemia. But this face-saving act was still as unsatisfactory. Ferdinand III was to govern only Bohemia, not the other Bohemian crownlands: not Silesia, the mortgaged Lusatia, or even Moravia. A transfer of government, moreover, would have meant Ferdinand III's presence in Bohemia, but the Saxons still held Prague. There were other restrictions: Ferdinand II reserved for himself the scheduling of Diets and levying of taxes as well as the granting of Bohemian fiefs. The revenues transferred to the king entailed expenditures. He had no access to confiscated estates. Finally, the emperor had his son take an oath to the kingdom's Renewed Territorial Constitution (*Verneuerte Landesordnung*) of 1627, a "most gracious intention" Ferdinand III had to accept with "suitable thanks and filial respect."⁴⁶

Therefore, an independent government was out of the question. Furthermore, the assumption of the pseudogovernment was delayed. By October of 1632, six months after Wallenstein had retaken the city, Ferdinand III still was not allowed to go to Prague, allegedly because the peace had not been officially concluded. Ferdinand III nevertheless named his chamberlain Adam von Martinitz as his royal Bohemian chancellor. He was probably content not to have been relegated to Graz, something that had been under discussion.⁴⁷

One reason for keeping Ferdinand III in suspense for so long may have been the suspicions that he was very much under Spanish influence and that his rule in Bohemia would include a military component. Both held the threat of conflict with Wallenstein. Very early on, the nuncio spread the rumor that the king and his wife would reside in Prague and predicted that "he would be governed by a council entirely dependent on Spain's will."⁴⁸ Because Spain

wished “that the king, now that he is married, could rule without deferring to his father,” Quiroga had seen to it that the king would be responsible for Bohemia’s defense. Wallenstein could then only interfere by sending reinforcements.

Wallenstein’s Death

By many influential persons, Ferdinand III was seen as an alternative to Wallenstein. Thereby, he became part of the constellation leading to Wallenstein’s brutal—and to this day controversial—death in February 1634. Behind this drama lay a structural problem that endured beyond Wallenstein’s murder. The Franco-Swedish alliance brought together three rulers—Ferdinand II, Maximilian I, and Philip IV—whose only point of agreement was resisting aggression. On any further goals, they were deeply divided. Spain alone pursued a definitive program, the assurance of Imperial support for the war in the Spanish Netherlands. Bavaria, on the other hand, sought recognition of its possessions in the Palatinate wherever it could be found. Finally, though the emperor slowly realized that he would have to modify the Edict of Restitution, he never reached a comprehensive plan. As far as military strategy was concerned, this meant three things. First, Spain insisted on support for its war in the Netherlands and its supply route through the Empire’s western regions. Second, in order to exploit all options, Bavaria husbanded its resources and, whenever possible, maintained its combat-ready and largely independent army in enemy territory. Third, the emperor had an ill-defined military strategy because of his ill-defined political perspective. However, because Ferdinand II tried to distribute the war’s burdens, there was one decisive factor in all this vagueness: political and military dependence on Spain and Bavaria. It comes as no surprise that the military actions of the Imperial Army soon caused a rift among the three unequal partners.

It is not our task to trace in detail the development leading to Wallenstein’s death. At bottom, it lay in the divergence of Spanish, Bavarian, and imperial interests. Observing the war’s development up to this point, Wallenstein had concluded that peace could only be reached by a compromise with the Protestant imperial princes. In his view, the role of the Imperial Army lay in warding off Sweden and asserting the emperor’s political power even over Bavaria. Wallenstein could not be made to feel enthusiasm for politically useless battles and the war for Spain. After he had maneuvered the Saxons out of Bohemia and the Swedes out of Bavaria, he could, according to his understanding of imperial interests, do nothing that would not have exposed him to criticism by Bavaria and Spain, something highly detrimental to his position at court.⁴⁹

But Wallenstein no more than the emperor was able to determine where imperial interests lay; no one could. The privy councillors tried. Werdenberg, for example, criticized the Spanish; the Hungarian cardinal Pázmány criticized the Edict of Restitution, the imperial confessor along with the nuncio argued for it, and the Spanish Capuchin Quiroga was probably against it. The Viennese bishop Anton Wolfradt wanted a peace conference, and Wallenstein, who held certain powers of attorney, negotiated with several of the Imperial Estates. Liechtenstein sketched a peace program based on Wallenstein's thinking and urged a confessional compromise. Victory, the argument went, was impossible because the European powers would prevent Habsburg predominance in the Empire. The situation had gone awry to such an extent that in 1632, England no longer saw a reason to keep its ambassador at the Imperial court.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, estrangement of Imperial Estates from the emperor intensified. In 1632, the elector of Trier placed his archbishopric and the bishopric of Speyer, together with the fortresses Ehrenbreitstein and Philippsburg, under French protection.⁵¹ The Swedes established an Imperial government in Mainz and distributed Catholic possessions. In addition, they founded an Imperial League in Heilbronn and thereby committed Brandenburg as well as the Protestant territories in the Franconian, Swabian, Upper, and Electoral Rhenish Circles to a joint military action. Saxony continued to control its own army.

Throughout this period, Ferdinand III figured in the rumors concerning Spain, Wallenstein, and the situation in the Empire. In December 1632, the nuncio related that Quiroga had told him that Ferdinand III had resisted pawning his wife's jewels, something allegedly planned to increase Spanish subsidies. The king had seen to it, however, that this emergency reserve would remain intact. In March of 1633, it was reported that Ferdinand III's election as king of the Romans could now move forward. This was at once illusory and topical, as the emperor's only surviving siblings had died in 1631 and 1632. When Ferdinand II fell ill in July 1633, Ferdinand III presided at the council. Not illusory was the possibility of replacing Wallenstein with Ferdinand III in 1633. According to the nuncio, this possibility was backed by one of the most influential imperial privy councillors, Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff. In May of 1633, he seemed to the nuncio to be "the person on whom people think the king would rely for advice, were he to get the command."⁵² The nuncio wrote that Trauttmansdorff had attempted to sway him, "at least in his role as a friend and a private person," to convince Eggenberg that he should persuade the emperor to transfer the command to the king. In order to strip Wallenstein of power, it would be sufficient to instruct the most influential colonels to this effect. When the nuncio refused, Trauttmansdorff replied that not even the

Spanish were willing to discuss this possibility with Eggenberg. If there is a shred of truth in this report—and there is much that speaks for it—Ferdinand III was, as early as May 1633, a factor in Trauttmansdorff's reflections on how Wallenstein could be replaced. For the past year, Wallenstein had made enemies in the officer corps, among them the influential Ottavio Piccolomini.

When it became clear that Wallenstein would not undertake a large offensive during the 1633 campaign and would not accede to Spain's, Bavaria's, and the emperor's demands because he (rightly) thought them ill advised, censure was almost universal. Bavarian criticism drew ever greater assent. Though Quiroga pointed out that Maximilian I owed his position as elector to Wallenstein, he was powerless. In the spring of 1633, many identified Wallenstein, of all people, as an obstacle to the peace the emperor was willing to conclude "if it could be done without damaging his conscience or authority."⁵³ The nunciature joined the critics: Wallenstein was indifferent as to confession, whereas Maximilian I had done much for the Church.

So, the topic of Ferdinand III as supreme commander arose once again. This fit in with rumors that Wallenstein hated the king and harbored suspicions against the Spanish. For a short time, there was gossip of Wallenstein's demise and of his having murdered a servant. Such tales were floated to test how the court would react to Wallenstein's death. At the same time, they stoked fears of his "extraordinary extravagances."⁵⁴ For years it had been rumored that he himself wanted to become king of Bohemia.

The approaching birth of Ferdinand III's first child also helped to put the king's status back on the agenda. In his diary, the imperial privy councillor Adam von Waldstein recorded two sessions that dealt with this matter. On September 5, 1633, the Privy Council debated in the emperor's presence a "royal move to Bohemia"; two days later, the question was discussed "morning and night." Then, on September 8, 1633, "at one hour and sixteen minutes past midnight," according to Waldstein, Queen Maria Anna gave birth to the heir apparent. That day saw the child's "resplendent christening"⁵⁵ as Ferdinand Franz, and already on September 9 the "Bohemian Council" discussed his royal father's journey to Bohemia. The Spanish ambassador saw to it that the birth was publicly celebrated for several days, which kept the topics of succession and the heir's role on the agenda. Again, rumor had it that Ferdinand III would soon go to Prague, and this time actual preparations were indeed made. But in October, the journey was canceled. It was thought that the royal government would limit Wallenstein's authority in his military base of Bohemia, something no one wanted to impose on him given his concessions to Bavaria. In this context, the nuncio reported that it was Spain's intention—and Ferdinand III's wish—that Wallenstein could "somehow"⁵⁶ be deprived of his authority but that it was difficult to convince the emperor.

It is not clear what Ferdinand III himself wanted at this time. As king of Hungary and Bohemia, married and with his own heir apparent, he could not have been satisfied to remain anyone's plaything. But as he had congratulated Wallenstein after the battle of Lützen in 1632, so he congratulated him now, in October 1633, on a controversial victory in Silesia. The same month in which Wallenstein faced criticism because of this military operation, Ferdinand III assured him of his "constant royal affection."⁵⁷ This looked good on paper. At the beginning of November 1633, the nunciature wrote that Wallenstein had a new enemy in the person of Ferdinand's grand steward, Thun, who, with Spanish backing, aspired to a Silesian duchy. The realization of this ambition was said to depend on Wallenstein's approval; Wallenstein and Thun, however, were not on good terms. Such reports and hearsay do not allow conclusions as to Ferdinand III's involvement in the court rumor mill, especially as no other topic operated so intensely with facts taken out of context, half-truths, and calumnies as did the Wallenstein matter.

The Spanish diplomat Oñate, who was sent in December 1633 to the Imperial court in order to assess and mediate the situation, found a climate in which attempts were made to turn the hostile mood into action. Tellingly, the nunciature reported that Oñate was supposed to arrange a campaign for Ferdinand III so the Spanish could deploy the Imperial Army in the Netherlands. Meanwhile, the court in Vienna did indeed contemplate how Wallenstein might be "restrained,"⁵⁸ and a campaign led by Ferdinand III and financed by Spain was under discussion. One scenario was the division of the supreme command between Wallenstein in the east and Ferdinand III in the south and west.

But the emperor resisted, according to the nunciature. "Never," a commentary from the presumably best-informed circles stated, "would he decide to send the King of Hungary to war,"⁵⁹ not on account of Wallenstein but because of the heir's safety: "This is no time to expose a royal personage to danger." But, the report continues, the privy councillors were of divided opinion. The nuncio wrote that Ferdinand III "himself shows little enthusiasm for this endeavor besides that instigated by the queen, who is weary of remaining with the family and who sees that the road to rulership will not soon be opened by any other means." These were differing points of view: the emperor's concern for safety, patience on the king's part, and, among the rest, a struggle for influence.

Ferdinand III still defended Wallenstein at the end of December, when the general was blamed for the Swedish capture of Regensburg, and he applauded the controversial peace negotiations between Wallenstein and Franz Albrecht of Saxony-Lauenburg. A compromise concerning the question of the supreme command also seemed within reach. Wallenstein now appeared flexible and

negotiated with Quiroga. But the Spanish demanded help in the Netherlands, urged the king's assumption of the command, and offered subsidies if this were to take place. The emperor emphatically recommended this last course to Wallenstein but did not dare to issue an actual order.⁶⁰

Alas, Wallenstein did not follow the recommendations, and the situation continued to deteriorate. His adherents threatened to resign their offices should he withdraw, as he had personally guaranteed their outstanding pay. The privy councillors who were on his side feared Spanish dominance over the army and saw their positions endangered if Ferdinand III should join the command. On January 13, 1634, Wallenstein, who by now feared for his life, had his colonels swear a personal oath of allegiance. His enemies, foremost among them Piccolomini, slandered him, claiming that he wanted to gain the Bohemian crown, get rid of the Habsburgs, and more. Nobody in Vienna any longer believed the information Wallenstein himself had disseminated that he would resign and "personally help the young king of Hungary into the saddle."⁶¹

The script for the final act of this drama was written by Gundaker von Liechtenstein at the end of 1633. He counseled Wallenstein's dismissal for his "disobedience to the emperor as well as the great damage done to the House of Austria, the hereditary lands, and the Catholic religion."⁶² As this could no longer be done amicably, the emperor should make sure of his officers' loyalty, find a new commander (preferably Ferdinand III), and then remove Wallenstein. If it was felt that this was not possible without killing him, two or three trusted counselors should secretly consider the matter and render an opinion on whether, if there were no other means of getting rid of him, the emperor might have him killed without violating the law. If not, so be it; but if *iustitia* would allow, it should be done in order to save the emperor, his dynasty, his lands, "religion, and so many tyrannized innocents."

So the emperor agreed, falling back on a procedure already known to us from the Hungarian coronation and later used by Ferdinand III. It appears hypocritical but was grounded in the theory that the emperor derived legitimacy not from an effective pursuit of power politics but instead from ties to religiously based principles of justice. According to this theory, the infraction of fundamental principles of justice was justified only in cases of genuine emergencies. The predominant opinion at the imperial and Bavarian courts now assumed such an emergency because of Wallenstein's alleged subversion. The emperor himself wrote that he perceived the "greatest danger in delay."⁶³ Because fear and assumptions alone were not sufficient, a procedure to confirm the emergency had to be found. To provide an expert opinion, Ferdinand III's father named three privy councillors; two of them were former adherents of Wallenstein—Eggenberg and the bishop of Vienna—and Trauttmansdorff was

the third. On January 24, the three conferred and concluded that Wallenstein should be relieved of his command and, if there were no other way, might be killed during his arrest.⁶⁴

Ferdinand II avoided any appearance of having consulted Ferdinand III in this matter. Research suggests that the king was informed only after January 24, 1634, and only under the condition of secrecy. We do not know whether Ferdinand II also sought Ferdinand III's advice, but it is doubtful. The emperor probably did not want to involve his son in such a questionable decision. It also explains why he did not appoint him the new commander but, for the present, chose Field Marshall Matthias Gallas.⁶⁵ Ferdinand III should not have to wash Wallenstein's blood off his hands, at least not in public.

It is more than likely that Ferdinand III did not object to the order. He probably knew of Wallenstein's willingness to step down by February 1634. On February 18, Wallenstein had sent Maximilian von Waldstein to Eggenberg with a message to this effect. However, the latter did not open the letter and indicated to the messenger that it was too late. Waldstein had been Ferdinand III's chamberlain for many years, and we may assume that he informed the king. Ferdinand III's involvement with securing the army and dividing Wallenstein's confiscated property occurred primarily in the form of plans and rumors. He was supposed to be joining the army with the emperor at České Budějovice (Budweis) shortly before Wallenstein was "deprived of his life" (according to Liechtenstein's contingency plan) in Cheb (Eger) on February 25, 1634. But the journey was postponed several times. By the end of February, there was talk of Ferdinand III dividing Wallenstein's possessions, but this was denied by his grand steward in a plausible letter to his own relatives. Indeed, the emperor reserved the division of spoils for himself, though Ferdinand III did profit, receiving the Smrkowicz stud farm.⁶⁶

In vain did Wallenstein's widow petition Ferdinand III "as protector and father of all sorrowful widows and orphans."⁶⁷ Her pleas for the inheritance, possessions, and support were fruitless; she was left with only a small portion. Maximilian von Waldstein, who had been close to Wallenstein, retained the king's favor and later became grand equerry and grand chamberlain. Under Ferdinand III, many of Wallenstein's enemies received high positions, especially among the officers Piccolomini, Gallas, Colloredo, and Leslie. The decisive slander campaign against Wallenstein goes back to Piccolomini and Gallas. Leslie was among the officers who had ordered the murder over which the emperor had agonized; he was made royal chamberlain in March of 1634. Walter Deveroux, who had done the actual killing, received from Ferdinand III a small annual stipend of a few hundred Gulden during the 1650s. Shortly after Wallenstein's death, Trauttmansdorff was assigned to the king as counselor and later as his grand steward.

The case was immediately and heatedly discussed at the court and throughout the Empire and Europe. Some people believed that justice had been done, but most others regarded Wallenstein's death as the assassination of someone who had fought for peace and confessional compromise.⁶⁸ It must have been irksome to Ferdinand III that both opinions construed the death along a chain of events featuring the Spanish and himself as their instrument. At least he asserted later that Leslie had told Wallenstein, who was already in flight, that Ferdinand III was leader of the Spanish party.⁶⁹

Aside from what the heir apparent had or had not actually done, he appeared to be a tool used by Spain to push through its military strategy at the Imperial court. In this situation, only proof of Wallenstein's high treason could help. The emperor too hoped for such proof and had Wallenstein's papers scrutinized. Many compromising items were found but nothing that could support the charge of high treason. The fact that Ferdinand III vainly insisted on documentation and demanded a formal posthumous sentence against Wallenstein from his father is a strong argument for his recognizing how precarious his position in the world would be.⁷⁰ His role, no matter how we regard it, was a far cry from what he had been taught about a ruler's virtues. Because Wallenstein had never been legally judged, Ferdinand III could not clear himself and remained in the gray area of unproven suspicion and shady involvement.

Ferdinand III's Spanish Campaign

After Wallenstein's death, the emperor distributed his disenfranchised heirs' immense wealth to military leaders and courtiers in order to decrease the imperial debts. More than 15,000 subject families, especially in northern Bohemia, found themselves under new masters like Gallas, Piccolomini, Colloredo, and Leslie.⁷¹

Eggenberg, ill and disgusted, retired to Inner Austria a few weeks after the murder. Subsequently, he returned to court, but was often away. When he died two years later in Ljubljana, he left as a "symbolic representation of the universe" (Kaiser)⁷² the Eggenberg palace near Graz, which preserves at least his rank and name for posterity. Business at court was now conducted primarily by the bishop of Vienna. Trauttmansdorff remained somewhat in the background; on the other hand, Lamormaini, an open adversary of Wallenstein, made it known that he had always been in the right. Another of Wallenstein's antagonists, Cardinal Dietrichstein, was summoned to court. But March and April 1634 were a time of reorientation. The nuncio commented on "discord"⁷³ among the courtiers and wrangling between the two groups around the emperor and Ferdinand III. There was renewed hope for victories in the Empire, and Spain was willing to provide money if Ferdinand III were sent to the war.

At the end of April 1634, the emperor named Ferdinand III supreme commander. Here we must clarify the preconditions and consequences of a step the emperor had resisted for so long. Ferdinand III now had a son and his wife was once again pregnant, though given high child mortality, this did not guarantee the succession. Yet the emperor remained unwilling to finance the Empire's war by himself. He pleaded before the nuncio for papal subsidies, with the express argument that "the king my son"⁷⁴ would go to war. But he continued to depend mainly on Spain and Bavaria. Spain demanded a commander who was willing to support its causes in the face of strong anti-Spanish sentiment in the Empire; Ferdinand III was its man. For him, Spain represented not "servitude" but legitimacy, tradition, and the present and future of his dynasty. In addition, the court feared another independent supreme commander like Wallenstein; relatives or weak military officers were preferable. Ferdinand III's assumption of the office would thus also guarantee the emperor's authority over the army. However, the supreme command could not solve the problems within the Empire and at its borders. To the contrary, it highlighted the Spanish orientation of imperial policies. Thus, the state of affairs between the emperor and Bavaria, "though initially less critical after Wallenstein's death, was in no way resolved" (Albrecht).⁷⁵

The supreme command offered the twenty-six-year-old untried warrior no substantive military and political opportunities for personal development. The campaign's goals were predetermined by an Imperial-Bavarian-Spanish military conference. Taking part were two diplomats representing Bavaria; Trauttmansdorff, War Council President Schlick as well as the officers Gallas, Aldringen, and Colloredo representing the emperor; and Oñate representing Spain. For political and military guidance during the campaign, the emperor assigned a number of counselors to his son. From this modified position, Ferdinand III informed the elector of Bavaria, as commander of the Catholic League forces, of the emperor's decision that "I, in His Majesty's name, will conduct the Imperial Armada's administration and go to war myself."⁷⁶

But the guidelines for the next few years became visible in the days before Ferdinand III's departure for the army. There remained the constellation—the alliance between Bavaria and the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs—that had justified the war for France and its enemies within the Empire. Pay for the army had not yet been raised before there were disagreements with Bavaria concerning the division of command, the costs, and the expected gains. Ferdinand III hoped to achieve peace in the Empire by gradually concluding separate peace treaties with individual Imperial territories and by using the resources freed in this way for war with his other enemies. With this calculation and his father's mandate, he sent Trauttmansdorff to negotiate with Saxony: "May God grant that we can find a good solution with them so that we

may deal better with our other enemies.”⁷⁷ He was conscious that his role as the negotiator’s dispatcher was merely symbolic, and he asked Trauttmansdorff to work out the assessment the emperor sought: “I could not give it until I had first heard your opinion in this matter.”⁷⁸ He also made clear to Trauttmansdorff that he himself had “no say in Imperial matters”⁷⁹ but that any decision rested with the emperor.

The beginning was auspicious. In May 1634, the emperor asked Maximilian I’s permission for the Spanish army’s march through Bavaria. Together, the imperial and Spanish troops were supposed to clear a marching route to the United Netherlands. Ferdinand III traveled from Vienna to Prague that month, took over the government there, arranged the Bohemian lands’ defense against Saxony, and tried to find funds for financing the war. His war chest was already empty.⁸⁰

In Plzeň (Pilsen) he joined the army and accompanied it to the Danube. The battle plan provided for the expulsion of the Swedes from southern Germany. The campaign began with the siege of Regensburg, which lasted several weeks and forced its Swedish garrison to negotiate their surrender to Ferdinand III. The Swedes were allowed to retreat; Ferdinand III guaranteed the Regensburg Protestants their confessional privileges and, beyond that, amnesty for sacking and destroying several convents and Bavarian possessions as well as for acts of violence against Catholics. He wrote that he “preferred mercy to might.”⁸¹ This worked well for him but angered the elector of Bavaria, who would have liked to annex the Imperial city. At the same time, Maximilian felt duped because he had not received the final version of the Imperial-Swedish agreement, was against an extensive amnesty, and wanted a Bavarian rather than an imperial commandant for the city. He had his protest notarized and so provoked Ferdinand III and the emperor. Ferdinand II saw this protest as endangering the conclusion of peace negotiations with the other Protestant territories and, furthermore, did not want to subvert his son’s authority from the outset “by negating the young king’s first public act” (Albrecht).⁸² The emperor prevailed against the elector, and thus the relationship between Ferdinand III and Maximilian I, which had already had a very bad start in 1630, continued to be troubled.

Another event adds to this picture. The Saxons conquered the Silesian city of Głogów. Though Ferdinand III criticized this fortress’s insufficient logistics, he did nothing constructive to enhance the defensive capacities of other cities. The structural problems underlying this event became apparent in retrospect after the Swedes had taken one Bohemian stronghold after another. They knew that their military advances paid off only with the conquest of such fortifications.⁸³ In August, Ferdinand III carried out the campaign plans by moving with the army up the Danube. The Swedish occupiers of Donauwörth

were not prepared to surrender, so the Imperial Army conquered and sacked the city. Meanwhile, the Spanish army had crossed the Alps and marched from Kufstein toward the Danube via Bavaria, which had been laid waste by the Swedes. The Spanish commander Don Fernando, brother of Philip IV, met the elector of Bavaria at Braunau and coordinated the further course of action with him. Spanish, imperial, and Bavarian troops were to initiate a battle designed to push the Swedes out of southern Germany and end their dominance in the Empire.⁸⁴

Ferdinand III spent the summer with the troops that besieged Nördlingen from the end of August. This small Imperial city, situated slightly north of the Danube and allied with Sweden, was heavily fortified and controlled access to Württemberg. The Spanish army was on its way there. Don Fernando and Ferdinand III, royal cousins and brothers-in-law, met on September 2.⁸⁵ If Sweden wanted to hold Württemberg for the Heilbronn League and its allies, it had to hold Nördlingen. So, the Swedish troops and their German allies did not hesitate to act. The imperial-Spanish-Bavarian troops continued their attacks on Nördlingen and, on September 5, goaded the Swedish commander Bernhard von Weimar with his 22,000–24,000 soldiers into charging the 28,000–30,000 imperial-Spanish-Bavarian troops.

The battle's first day ended in a draw only with the onset of darkness. That evening, Ferdinand III transferred the command to his Lieutenant General Gallas, who in the night had the imperial position fortified precisely where the Swedish main thrust occurred the following day. Here, the Swedes and their allies foundered; their retreat was disorderly and gave the imperial-Spanish-Bavarian army a chance to pursue them. At day's end on September 6, 1634, between 9,000 and 12,000 soldiers of the Swedish-Protestant alliance lay dead, and about 4,000 had been taken prisoner; their artillery was in the hands of the imperial-Spanish-Bavarian troops, who had lost fewer than 2,000 men.⁸⁶

Throughout the fighting, Ferdinand III remained on an elevated command post and, from there, observed one of the bloodiest battles of the entire war. In a message to Trauttmansdorff, he took credit for the victory, referring to Don Fernando as his aide: "On my behalf give the elector of Saxony the good news that I, with assistance from the Cardinal Infante, have this morning knocked Weimar, Horn, and Graz (the enemy commanders) on their heads, thank God."⁸⁷ The Spanish, however, regarded Don Fernando as the victor, aided by Ferdinand III, and the Bavarians also strove for public recognition as the true victors of Nördlingen.

The battle of Nördlingen broke the back of Swedish dominance in the Empire; the Heilbronn League dissolved. With his own hand, Ferdinand III wrote a postscript to the letter from his chancellery that informed the Bavarian

elector of the victory: “God be thanked for his grace to me that I defeated this enemy so that I do not think he will be able to rally . . .”⁸⁸ His prognosis that the Swedes would be unable to pull themselves together after this defeat proved to be correct. However, it was invalidated by the intervention of French King Louis XIII and his minister Cardinal Richelieu. France openly joined the war against the Habsburgs in 1635 and, from 1636 on, propped up the Swedish army with subsidies.

Only days after the victory of Nördlingen, Ferdinand III found how narrowly focused the interests in his own camp were. He wanted to continue to Franconia, Thuringia, and, in time, Bohemia in order to drive the Swedes and Saxons from his hereditary territories. A new corps was supposed to fight the count Palatine at Lake Constance. But Don Fernando wanted to take his army to the Netherlands, whereas Maximilian I hoped to use the Spanish passage through Württemberg to conquer fortifications there as a buffer zone for Bavaria. On the other hand, he forbade his troops from escorting the Spanish. This decision took France into account because the commander of the Bavarian troops, Maximilian I’s nephew Duke Charles IV of Lorraine, had only recently been driven from Lorraine by France. Instead, Maximilian I complained about the imperial tactics and personally assailed one of Ferdinand III’s war counselors, who “to me is as great a clandestine enemy as Wallenstein was an overt one.”⁸⁹

Had all three allied commanders been able to carry out their design, the southwest, with the exception of Bavaria, would have remained in Swedish hands after the Spanish withdrawal. So, Ferdinand III altered his plans. He divided his army, sent Piccolomini with several thousand soldiers toward Franconia, and went to Württemberg himself. He did not bother about French sensibilities and had his cavalry safeguard the Spanish march to the Further Austrian fortress at Breisach. The nuncio at the Imperial court calculated Ferdinand III’s troop strength against Bernhard von Weimar’s mercenary army and concluded that it was insufficient. Securing both the Rhine basin and the Bohemian territories was so difficult a balancing act that Ferdinand III did not even try to continue the offensive against Sweden in the center of the Empire with his forces. Instead, he asked the elector of Cologne to use his troops to keep the army of the Swedish ally, the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, busy in the north. The nuncio wrote laconically that the victory at Nördlingen had been “important” and “wonderful”⁹⁰ but that there remained a great deal to do before peace could be achieved. Ferdinand III himself added to this problem by treating Nördlingen less generously than Regensburg. Mercy before might was not an unshakable principle of pacification but rather depended on the military situation—one more reason for Protestant cities to fortify themselves well.

But there were other frictions. After Ferdinand III had decided to occupy Württemberg and use it for provisioning his army, Bavaria left its troops with the emperor's after all, at least for a time, in a race for winter quarters. On September 20, 1634, Ferdinand moved into the Stuttgart residence of Duke Eberhard of Württemberg, who had fled. There, the imperial, royal, and electoral counselors took almost three weeks to reach an agreement concerning future military cooperation. No one was happy with the result; the goals were too diverse. The royal counselor Stadion would have liked to incorporate the League's troops into a unified Imperial Army; on the other hand, Bavaria insisted that, in Ferdinand III's absence, the League's supreme commander should lead the Imperial troops as well as his own. Soon, Ferdinand III had to mediate a dispute between his Lieutenant General Gallas and Catholic League Commander Charles IV of Lorraine.⁹¹

On November 24, Ferdinand III left Stuttgart against the advice of Stadion, who did not like to see the Imperial Army under the command of Maximilian I's nephew. However, there were rumors that an assassination attempt against the king was being prepared near Stuttgart. In Württemberg, the armies also went their separate ways. The League troops, fortified by imperial divisions, moved to Baden-Durlach and into the Palatinate east of the Rhine; the Imperial troops occupied Württemberg and also marched to the Rhine; and the Spanish moved to the Netherlands.⁹²

Even though the alliance's fractiousness became apparent to the participants immediately after the battle of Nördlingen, the victory nevertheless established Ferdinand III's military reputation. Sweden's nimbus had been destroyed and its victory march from the Baltic Sea to the Alps terminated; Ferdinand III was credited with vanquishing the mightiest army of his time. A long line of artists, some significant to this day, began an accolade to the king, with or without special emphasis on the slaughter. At Don Fernando's entry into Antwerp, a painting designed by Rubens commemorated his meeting with Ferdinand III near Nördlingen, interpreting the victory as the result of collaboration by the two Habsburg lines (Figure 9).

But it also depicts an allegory of the Danube brimming with bloody water and one of the Empire mourning the bloodshed. The Spanish dramatist Calderón de la Barca even brought Ferdinand III, Queen Maria Anna, Don Fernando, Gallas, and others to the stage in one of the plays about Nördlingen. The drama has the Church complaining to the Archangel Michael about the situation in the Empire and the forceful suppression of Catholics by Lutherans. It salutes Ferdinand III as their savior.⁹³

At the beginning of December, after a six-month campaign, Ferdinand III returned to the Imperial court, which was at Wiener Neustadt because of an outbreak of the plague in Vienna. There, his family received him "with great



FIGURE 9 Encounter between King Ferdinand of Hungary and the Infante Ferdinand before the Battle of Nördlingen, Peter Paul Rubens 1634/35. Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, picture gallery 525.

jubilant.⁹⁴ Two days earlier, the Imperial delegation led by Trauttmansdorff had returned from its negotiations with Saxony. It brought a truce and a preliminary peace agreement, thus adding political success to the military victory. The Swedish-Saxon alliance was finished. To this end, everyone retreated from some old demands. Saxony was to retain its claims to the two Lusatian regions and Magdeburg, and Bavaria, to the Palatine electorate. The emperor distanced himself somewhat from the Edict of Restitution and relinquished large portions of former Church possessions in the Empire's north. The Imperial, Bavarian, and Saxon troops would, in the future, fight together against foreign armies.⁹⁵

The campaign and the prospect for peace attributed to the victory at Nördlingen gave Ferdinand III new gravitas at court and increased his involvement in day-to-day affairs (Figure 10).⁹⁶ After his return from Stuttgart, he remained at the court for approximately six months. Shortly before Christmas 1634, the emperor's family traveled to Hungary to attend the Diet at Sopron; Ferdinand III's wife, far advanced in pregnancy, remained at Wiener Neustadt. In order to be on hand for her confinement, Ferdinand III returned there on



FIGURE 10 Ferdinand III as victor of the Battle of Nördlingen of 1634, oil painting by Frans von Luycx (ca. 1639). Stockholm, Swedish National Museum, inventory number NM Ghr 298.

December 21, not coincidentally together with the Spanish ambassador Oñate. On the following morning, Queen Maria Anna gave birth to a daughter. The emperor returned from Hungary to see the child, and Cardinal Dietrichstein christened her at Wiener Neustadt with her mother's names. In February 1635, almost simultaneously with the theological conference that approved Imperial concessions to Protestants for the Peace of Prague, the nuncio conveyed the pope's congratulations on the occasion of the birth. Ferdinand III assured Pope Urban VIII of his—politically insignificant—devotion. That he had in the meantime gained much experience in the duplicitous game for time is demonstrated by his reaction to the nuncio's plea on behalf of the papal interests in an important dispute over ceremony in the curia. He agreed to speak with the emperor, adding that the electors' positions as well as Spain's view had to be considered; this would take time, but not much.⁹⁷

Behind the scenes, the circle was now completed that would determine Ferdinand III's policies over the next fifteen years. His old grand steward Thun, pleading illness, asked to be released from his office in March 1635 and died that same month. Ferdinand III was moved by the loss of a courtier who had educated and accompanied him for a decade and a half. Soon thereafter, Trauttmansdorff took over as grand steward, the highest post at the royal court; Johann Rudolf Count of Puchheim accepted the second highest position as Grand Chamberlain. Puchheim had studied in Siena and Padua and served as an administrative councillor in Lower Austria. In 1634/35, he gained diplomatic experience as ambassador to the sultan and to the governor of the Spanish Netherlands. Trauttmansdorff, and presumably Puchheim as well, determined Ferdinand III's court and policies to a large degree. Trauttmansdorff's influence is manifest, but because Puchheim was sworn to secrecy, his is barely demonstrable.⁹⁸

In 1635, there was another significant alteration within the personal sphere. After the death of his first wife, the elector of Bavaria married Ferdinand III's sister, Archduchess Maria Anna. The wedding took place in the Loreto chapel of the Augustinian church in July 1636. Ferdinand III had left Vienna already during the marriage negotiations and did not return for the ceremony. Even though this did not improve the relationship with Maximilian I, Bavaria distanced itself somewhat from its option to form an alliance with France. The new electress, albeit with limited success, supported Bavaria's fragile orientation toward the Habsburgs.⁹⁹

1.5

ILLUSORY ACHIEVEMENTS: THE PEACE OF PRAGUE, KING OF THE ROMANS

The Peace of Prague

After the victory of Nördlingen, people at the Imperial court were unsure whether to make peace or to continue the war. The pope encouraged the emperor to organize a European peace congress in Rome. Spain, on the other hand, offered financial support for an army in the Empire, confident of support from most of Ferdinand III's counselors.¹ The Imperial court attempted to combine both options: first concluding peace with those Imperial territories fighting on the Swedish side, and then forming a combined army to fight France and Sweden. The preliminary peace treaty with Saxony, signed in December 1634, was a first step in that direction.

Signed by the emperor in May 1635, the so-called Peace of Prague with Saxony, together with numerous ancillary agreements and a long series of declarations of accession from other territories, was a decisive turning point for the Empire and remained the basis for Ferdinand III's policies for an extended period. It solved or postponed a number of problems. The emperor relinquished his claim to sole interpretation of Imperial law and moved away from the Edict of Restitution, which now would be suspended for forty—or, in the case of Saxony, for fifty—years. For the Protestants, this was close enough to the Greek calends. The Imperial territories were guaranteed the secular possessions they had held on July 6, 1630, the day of the Swedish invasion, and ecclesiastical holdings going back to 1627. The Catholic Church would keep the possessions within the Empire that had been restored by 1627 (Bremen, Verden, Minden, and Halberstadt). This was not overly generous, and the Protestants could accept these losses more easily because they lay in the Swedish-Protestant area of influence. As the Peace of Prague also brought an amnesty for most Protestant territories aligned with Sweden, the Swedes lost nearly all their allies within the Empire.

That the Peace of Prague nevertheless could not pacify the Empire internally lay in the fact that some territories were excluded for the present. This exclusion affected a number of largely Calvinist counts as well as members of the Heilbronn League but chiefly some important princes: Margrave Friedrich of Baden-Durlach, Duke Eberhard of Württemberg, and Landgrave Wilhelm of Hesse-Kassel. For these outcasts, the way to peace lay in special negotiations with the emperor, who demanded that the princes agree to expropriations in their territories as a precondition for their inclusion. Duke Eberhard of Württemberg was hit hardest. In 1638, he had to surrender approximately half of his territory, mostly former church property but secular holdings as well, as a condition for joining the peace. Ferdinand II gave some of these holdings to the Church, their former owner, and used others to pay debts of money and gratitude to Bavaria but also to Trauttmansdorff and Schlick. In spite of such onerous conditions, almost all the excluded territories chose similar options to retrieve their dominions. They were accordingly denominated *restituti gravati* (literally: reinstated, but burdened).²

Decisive for continuation of the war was the fact that the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel did not follow this path. He would have had to relinquish the ecclesiastical territory of Hersfeld and recognize a decree by the Aulic Council that awarded a large portion of his lands to the Hesse-Darmstadt line. Duke Bernhard of Weimar, the mercenary leader serving the Swedes, and the descendants of Count Palatine Friedrich V, who had died in 1632, caused additional disturbances because they could not be satisfied with the vague prospect of princely subsidies and the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine.³

Another decisive factor in the war's continuation was the future organization of the army. The Peace of Prague prohibited all military alliances within the Empire, including the League dominated by Bavaria. In their stead, an Imperial Army would be raised. This was anathema to the Calvinist electors Palatine and to Hesse-Kassel as long as the Palatinate itself and Hessian Hersfeld and Marburg were in dispute. Therefore, according to the emperor's peace plan, the confessionally integrated Imperial Army had to enforce the Peace of Prague precisely against these territories.

The plan's legitimacy was derived from the majority principle. The Peace of Prague, so the reasoning, should be regarded as universally binding as soon as the majority of Imperial territories had ratified it. Yet the Imperial Diet's confessional minority had, for a long time, rejected the binding force of majority decisions. Though almost all Protestants were agreeable in this particular case, recognition of the binding force of majority decisions depended principally on the minority's consent, not the majority. The minority, however, now refused, as it had already done at the Imperial Diet in 1613, and, together with a well-armed Hesse-Kassel, it commanded a military force to be reckoned with.⁴

No powerful prince except the emperor found the proposed Imperial Army appealing. Thus, the Peace of Prague allowed large territories such as Bavaria, Saxony, and, later on, Brandenburg to command their own troops. Other principalities like Hesse-Darmstadt actually kept their armies under their own command and engaged them—for all practical purposes as neutral forces—for the defense of their own territories.

As future supreme commander of the Imperial Army, Ferdinand III was occupied with the organization of the army's regulations. This led to a bitter dispute with the elector of Bavaria, who insisted on commanding his own troops. Neither the king's protest nor the 1635 marriage of his sister Archduchess Maria Anna to Maximilian I was of any help. Because the emperor needed Bavaria's vote for Ferdinand III's election as king of the Romans, he gave Maximilian I the command over the former League troops. The elector even declined a compromise, according to which Ferdinand III would have had "disposition" over these troops when Maximilian was not in the field himself. Nor did a conference of Bavarian counselors with Ferdinand III, Trauttmansdorff, and the future Imperial Vice Chancellor Kurz in November 1635 improve matters. Maximilian I remained obdurate once again in 1636, compelling the emperor to grant him the command of the erstwhile League troops over Ferdinand III's head. The situation was so tense that agreements could only be reached by constantly renewed individual negotiations. This was of "fundamental significance"⁵ for warfare during Ferdinand III's reign. He could depend on Bavaria only to an extent that suited the elector.

Though military organization under the Peace of Prague looked good at first glance, it provided Ferdinand III not, as his father wrote, with "supreme command"⁶ but merely its appearance. Nevertheless, the emperor gave him a large-scale military commission to lead the Imperial Army "against all who would oppose" the Peace of Prague.

Ferdinand III's Debut in the Great European War of 1635

While the Peace of Prague was being prepared, the Franco-Spanish conflict in the Empire's west escalated. Faced with Swedish invasion, the elector of Trier had placed his archbishopric and the bishopric of Speyer under French protection and had surrendered important fortifications. In 1632/33, Louis XIII invaded the duchy of Lorraine, which was part of the Empire, and in 1635, he established French garrisons in the region, such as in Colmar. In retaliation, Spain attacked Trier, where another French garrison was situated, and took the elector prisoner. Thereupon France declared war and won the support of the United Netherlands, with the prospect of a complete division of the Spanish Netherlands between them. France also enlisted the dukes of Savoy, Mantua, and Parma to aid in conquering the Spanish duchy of Milan.⁷

Those Imperial territories unwilling to accept peace with the emperor based on the Prague conditions continued to keep their troops under arms. Especially important among them were Landgrave Wilhelm of Hesse-Kassel in the north, the sons of Friedrich V of the Palatinate at Lake Constance, and the mercenary leader Bernhard von Weimar in the southwest. France used this fighting force to its advantage, first taking into its service the duke of Weimar with his army and, in 1636, forming an alliance with Hesse-Kassel. A Franco-Swedish alliance had existed since 1631, was renewed in April 1635, and now readied itself to support its allies among the Imperial territories.⁸

The Franco-Swedish alliance was not without alternatives. Most notably, the princes of Mecklenburg and Electoral Brandenburg urged the emperor to make peace with Sweden. But the emperor regarded Swedish financial claims in exchange for peace with the Empire as too burdensome. That it could be more advantageous to simply pay, despite his view that others had generated the reasons of war, should have been apparent from the disastrous consequences of two prior money-saving measures—awarding the Palatinate to Maximilian I and Mecklenburg to Wallenstein. Nor were the imperial princes willing to bear the financial burden of Swedish compensation demands. The Swedes, after all, contributed to the failure of a peace treaty in 1635/36. Mainly for propaganda reasons, they called for a return to the old political and confessional status in the hereditary lands, thus blocking the emperor's path to peace.⁹

When the emperor and Bavaria negotiated the new campaign in the spring of 1635, the elector demanded an offensive against France. Shifting the war to French territory would relieve his own lands from provisioning the troops, would forestall a French border along the Rhine, and would return their duchy to the dukes of Lorraine—all of which would amount to a “compromise peace” (Albrecht)¹⁰ in the end. But the emperor and the elector of Bavaria underestimated the Swedes and left hostilities in the north to the elector of Saxony. The allies also underestimated the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel and sent only one corps under Piccolomini against him. The landgrave quite successfully took his army into northern Germany, where the United Netherlands and Sweden covered his back. Nevertheless, the sheer number of 55,000 soldiers (Habsburg and Bavarian combined) was supposed to force France to the bargaining table. Ferdinand III adopted the strategy demanded by Bavaria, accepted by the emperor, and very advantageous to Spain. He did not “wish to conquer anything,” he wrote during the campaign, but “with this invasion of his realm [by France, he] wanted to force the king into accepting fairer and safer peace conditions.”¹¹ This seemed to promise success. The pope proposed Spanish-French-Imperial Peace negotiations, and the emperor agreed.¹²

Ferdinand III left Vienna more than a week before the Peace of Prague was signed. The journey took him via Horn, Třeboň (Wittingau), and České Budějovice first to Prague, a visit he had planned since February 1635 in response to wishes of the Bohemian nobility. When he arrived, the Peace of Prague had just been concluded. Because the victory at Nördlingen—and indirectly the Peace of Prague—were attributed to him, the king was duly celebrated. Ferdinand III reinforced the Bohemian nobility's good will by adding several Bohemian courtiers to his retinue. While he was present, governmental power rested with him. Aside from that, Ferdinand III concerned himself chiefly with military matters. The ceremonial highlight of his visit was not the Corpus Christi procession, however, but was the exchange of ratifications. Trauttmansdorff arranged a festive banquet, and henceforth Ferdinand III could present himself not merely as a victorious commander-in-chief but as a patron of peace as well.¹³

Ferdinand III's campaign of 1635 had no military relevance. He essentially passed any complaints about the Imperial Army on to others, attended to provisions and personnel problems, kept informed about military affairs, and coordinated but left decisions concerning technical questions to the commanding officers, especially to Gallas. His presence in the Empire's southwest was, above all, a political signal, an emphatic Imperial plug for Spanish subsidies on one hand and its membership in the Peace of Prague on the other. It was recognized as such by the Nuremberg City Council, which sent a delegation to Ferdinand III while he was moving from Bohemia through the Upper Palatinate to Swabia. Trauttmansdorff worked out the details, and Nuremberg joined the Peace of Prague. The king, through an emissary, made futile attempts to persuade Hesse-Kassel to follow suit, if only because of the landgrave's army. The duke of Württemberg, who had been subjected to extraordinarily hard conditions for joining, sent emissaries to Ferdinand III pleading in vain for further negotiations. Yet, overall, the list of treaty partners grew considerably over the course of the summer.¹⁴

In early July, the new Grand Chamberlain Puchheim joined Ferdinand III at Dinkelsbühl, and a French ambassador explained to him the reasons for the French declaration of war against Spain. From July 7, 1635, the king resided in Heilbronn for over a month. There, a meeting took place with the widow of Friedrich V of the Palatinate. Ferdinand saw to it that she was escorted by a courtier with the rank of prince, met her halfway in the knights' hall, and asked her to be seated during the audience. But the claim for a restitution of the Palatinate and the electorate, though in the air, would be honored by Ferdinand III only thirteen years later in the Peace of Westphalia, and then, only partially.¹⁵

When several of Ferdinand III's courtiers died during an outbreak of the plague in mid-August, his otherwise quite orderly campaign became a hasty retreat before the epidemic. Trauttmansdorff had assured the emperor already from Dinkelsbühl that he would do everything in his power to avoid exposure, but aside from isolation, very little could be done. On such travels, it was impossible, as Privy Councilor Liechtenstein suggested in a pest ordinance issued somewhat later, to remove "manure, dead dogs, cats, and such like" from the streets, to ban "pigs, pigeons, rabbits, and other animals from the houses,"¹⁶ or to render less dangerous contact with the afflicted. Because the epidemic also raged in Worms, after August 23, the king resided for several weeks in the strategically important Philippsburg, which the Imperial Army had just taken from the French in January. Here, Ferdinand III fell slightly ill, though not with the plague. Yet the danger was so great that in September, he retreated to Horneck on Neckar, a fortress belonging to the Teutonic Order. There, he had to make do without his confessor, who was stricken with plague, and as a precaution, he furloughed most of his court. Soon, Horneck too was no longer safe, and Ferdinand III, with Trauttmansdorff, Puchheim, and only a few others, escaped to the Teutonic Order's nearest castle, the small residence of Heuchlingen. His courtiers were lodged in surrounding villages. On October 19, the flight before the epidemic continued from Heuchlingen to Ellwangen, where the prior, an imperial prince, received the king who awaited military reports from Gallas.

In mid-November, Ferdinand III was able to return to Vienna. On November 14, he left Wallerstein, situated near Ellwangen and Nördlingen, and two days later visited the Bavarian electoral couple in Ingolstadt on the Danube. He remained for only one day. Though he had a good relationship with his sister, relations with the elector were all the worse for it. Thus, a meeting between the supreme commander of the Imperial Army and his ally, the head of the disbanded League, was no cause for celebrations after this campaign.¹⁷

Although the Imperial Army had taken back large regions of the Rhine Valley and had moved on to Lorraine, it had also deployed both 10,000 men to Flanders and another 10,000 to northern Italy to assist Spanish forces against the French. The elector of Bavaria's nephew, Charles IV of Lorraine, also got 6,000 soldiers to help retake his duchy. Thus, not enough troops remained for carrying out a plan to force France to the bargaining table. The campaign's foundering had another reason: the Imperial Army was ill-provisioned and, even when not engaged in battle, suffered massive losses through "illness, hunger, or desertion" (Rebitsch).¹⁸

The gravity of the situation went unrecognized at the Imperial court, which took pleasure in the fact that many Estates were joining the Peace of Prague and did not stint itself when it came to expenses for ceremonial

occasions. On his return, Ferdinand III and his family first went to Orth on the Danube for a few days of boar hunting. Then, he signed a contract with the Spanish ambassador that would assure him subsidies for a new campaign should there be an offensive against France. For the soldiers who had perished during the campaign, he commissioned requiems.¹⁹

Planning the new campaign already proved difficult. At the beginning of 1636, an Imperial-Bavarian-Spanish military conference had “to restore unity” (Albrecht)²⁰ before doing anything else; the resulting plan specified that Ferdinand III would join the war in May. Spain exerted pressure toward this end and displayed its resources. A clergyman in the queen’s service, for example, received a living in Spain. More valuable was Philip IV’s gift of a Neapolitan duchy to Lieutenant General Gallas. The emperor tried to find money and asked the Moravian governor Cardinal Dietrichstein for revenues and, as a courtesy, his advice for the Electoral conclave planned for the fall.

Accompanied by Trauttmansdorff, the king began his journey to join the army with a visit to Maximilian I in Munich, where he tried to persuade the elector to attend the conclave. This proved difficult because renewed differences over the command structure had arisen. It is likely that the visit had other purposes as well. In 1636, the emperor had the opportunity to gain or secure two strategically important allies if Bavaria were to relinquish parts of the Palatinate, and this caused two serious conflicts with Maximilian I. The first concerned Wolfgang Wilhelm of Pfalz-Neuburg, a Wittelsbach cousin of both Maximilian I and Friedrich V whose scattered dominions bordered both the Netherlands battlefields and the Upper Palatinate. Pfalz-Neuburg had registered his own claims to the Palatinate after Friedrich V had been banned. To Maximilian I’s fury, the emperor acknowledged the duke’s right to proceed in court. The second dispute grew out of the emperor’s negotiations with England, during which he had promised restitution of a part of the Palatinate to Friedrich’s heirs. If the Habsburgs could arrive at a solution acceptable to the king of England and his Palatine nephews, they could hope for England’s support in its war with France. But Maximilian I remained unyielding.²¹

Ferdinand III very quickly left Munich and spent several weeks of June and July in Donauwörth. From there, he corresponded with his officers and passed his time hunting. A military conference at Speyer had vaguely considered an offensive against France, and then, during the summer, French troops crossed into imperial territory with sorties into the Franche-Comté and threatened Alsace. In June, emissaries from the Franche-Comté sought Ferdinand III’s help. Hesse-Kassel then intervened in the military action on the Swedish side and could register initial successes during the first month. “An improvised solution to the predicament” (Rebitsch)²² was provided by the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Don Fernando, who invaded France from

the north with support from the Imperial Army, thereby relieving the Imperial campaign that was supposed to help Burgundy. Ferdinand III also kept a few divisions in readiness for battle with Hesse-Kassel.

Although the emperor had considerable qualms about declaring war with France on his own, he saw a campaign there as a means of establishing winter quarters outside the Empire. Ferdinand III, on the other hand, did not want to invade France without legitimate reasons. The result of an Imperial-royal agreement was a royal manifesto that did not declare war but still justified military operations on French territory.²³

In July of 1636, Ferdinand III traveled via Wallerstein, Gmünd, and Stuttgart to the Rhine Valley. When he arrived, Piccolomini wrote Don Fernando, predicting in detail why the campaign was doomed to fail; his letter to Ferdinand was somewhat less blunt. During the summer, the king remained in the Rhine Valley, mainly in Freiburg and at the margrave of Baden's residence at Stollhofen. He hunted, visited the fortress of Breisach, and did not ignore the army, which was cheered by his presence—a king in camp guaranteed supplies. Ferdinand III knew how to make himself agreeable by giving repeated proof of his esteem and recognition to the officers. He dined with them in the open country near Breisach and took the opportunity to drink to the soldiers' health. In agreement with Ferdinand III and his counselors, Gallas conducted the day-to-day affairs. The king asked the officers for expert opinions and offered suggestions, but his main task was the procurement of support as well as an understanding with Spain and the Tyrolian Habsburgs, who ruled this part of Further Austria.²⁴

So, it was without Ferdinand III that Gallas led the main body of the army to the French border in September. The wait for reinforcement and provisions near Champlitte lasted for weeks and cost him about 3,000 men. At the beginning of October, Piccolomini informed Ferdinand III that the northern Imperial Army faced ruin during the winter. Because they had occupied no important city in northern France, the soldiers were scattered about the countryside, where they could not pass the winter. The main Imperial Army crossed the French border at the end of October, but it was unclear what exactly it hoped to accomplish. When Gallas posed this question in a letter to Ferdinand III on October 26, the king informed Don Fernando that he had transferred the military leadership of the action against France along the Rhine to Piccolomini.²⁵

Gallas aborted the invasion at the beginning of November, after sinking into a morass, unsuccessfully marching against Dijon, and failing even to take the small town of Saint-Jean-de-Losne on the Saone with his weakened forces. Though the Spanish Netherlands had been secured and the French army forced back onto its own territory, the Imperial-Bavarian objectives had not been achieved. There were neither peace negotiations nor winter quarters on French

territory. Ferdinand III could not prevail in the dispute about the allocation of winter quarters in the Empire, and his troops ignored his order to avoid transgressions, looting even the important Cistercian convent at Citeaux.²⁶

Election and Coronation as King of the Romans

Shortly after the conclusion of the Peace of Prague, the royal counselor Count Stadion suggested the election of the new king of the Romans to the archbishop-elect of Mainz, whose position as imperial archchancellor (*Reichserzkanzler*) gave him the right to call and preside over electoral congresses. Six months later, the emperor repeated the request, and, in March 1636, Mainz invited the electors to meet. For the candidate, this meant not giving offense to anyone, and there was talk of Ferdinand III's not participating in the military campaign. As we have seen, things happened differently, and yet the king was with the army merely on recall. In September, while Gallas and the troops were bogged down near Champlitte, rooms were already prepared for Ferdinand III at the Regensburg bishop's residence. At the end of September, the emperor had his son conveyed from Breisach to Regensburg, with the queen joining him from Vienna. Negotiations were difficult and Ferdinand III could take his time; he did not arrive until mid-October. Immediately after greeting the imperial couple and his sister Archduchess Cäcilia Renata, he went off hawking with the emperor.²⁷

Negotiations concerning the election as king of the Romans dragged out until mid-December. Saxony demanded of Ferdinand II the Empire's pacification and, above all, compensation for his kinsman Duke Eberhard of Württemberg, who had been forced to relinquish a great deal of his duchy in order to join the Peace of Prague. The emperor demanded in vain that Duke Eberhard acknowledge the territorial losses, while the duke offered to pay for restoration of the confiscated Württemberg territories, also in vain. Opinions among the Aulic Councilors were divided. Some were prepared to relinquish several convents if that would guarantee Ferdinand III's election and peace. Others insisted on the legality of the emperor's actions in Württemberg and recalled the fruitless electoral conference of 1630. Once again, concessions might not guarantee the election.²⁸

The emperor shifted the decision to the other electors. Mainz, Cologne, and Bavaria followed the imperial interpretation, stating that the amnesty question had been sufficiently regulated in the Peace of Prague and that Württemberg's punishment was legal; the duke and the Württemberg clergy should be free to present their grievances to the emperor once more. The Protestant elector of Brandenburg agreed to this vague formulation of the compromise, and the emperor and his advisors concluded that the elector of Saxony alone could no longer prevent the king of Hungary's election.²⁹

On December 12—the thirty-sixth day of negotiations—the electors finally agreed to hold the king’s election ten days later despite failing to reach an agreement on Württemberg. The so-called pre-election capitulation of conditions and legal guarantees to which the king had to swear had already been written. Under pressure from Bavaria, it stipulated increased participation in Imperial government by the electors and emphasized the Imperial Diet’s privileges and rights vis-à-vis the emperor. It also declared legal, however, the controversial procedure with which Emperor Ferdinand II had imposed an Imperial ban on Count Palatine Friedrich V, the very procedure that had handed the electorate to Bavaria.³⁰ The Peace of Prague, still fresh in everyone’s mind, probably disguised the fact that the election could proceed only because the emperor’s military position was weaker than in 1630.

And the king of Hungary? The foundering of the French campaign was apparent to all. Although everyone understood that victory had been impossible without provisions, money, and soldiers, criticism of Gallas was openly voiced at court, though Ferdinand III stood by his general. The English king’s ambassador, Lord Arundel, had a long interview with the king of Hungary about the Palatinate, but even now the king was not the right person to be asked political questions. However, he (unsuccessfully) opposed the formal exclusion of Hesse-Kassel, a disappointment that proved to be tragic. The emperor still believed that the Palatine question had been settled by the Peace of Prague.³¹

On the morning of December 22, 1636, the electors of Mainz, Cologne, Bavaria, and Bohemia entered the Regensburg cathedral dressed in their splendid electoral robes; the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony had sent representatives. The Archbishop of Trier had been excluded for having favored the French. After mass, hymns, and the oath, the men moved into the festively decorated sacristy and took their time. One did not elect a king in haste, even if the sole candidate was in the room. After a while, the elector of Mainz fulfilled his role as imperial archchancellor by announcing the result. Choice had fallen on the king of Hungary and Bohemia. The emperor was notified and immediately came to the church with his court. There, he donned the Imperial vestments, including his own crown, and was now officially informed of the election result. Following the emperor’s address, Ferdinand III responded with a declaration of acceptance. Cannons and muskets fired salutes outside; the Ambrosian hymn of praise, the *Te Deum*, resounded within.³²

There followed banquets, visits, and preparations for the coronation. The elector of Mainz still had to be ordained, for, as archbishop, he would then celebrate the coronation mass. The cathedral had to be put in order, tapestries were hung, and tribunes were built for the many spectators and guests. This time, the imperial family was complete. The emperor, Empress Eleonora, the queen of Hungary, and the remaining siblings, Archduchess Cäcilia Renata

and Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, had arrived; only weeks after giving birth to the Bavarian electoral prince, so had Archduchess Maria Anna. On December 30, 1636, six years after the first attempt, the goal had at last been achieved. Archduke Ferdinand Ernst, King of Hungary and Bohemia, twenty-eight years old, was crowned king of the Romans. The coronation ritual in the Regensburg cathedral lasted several hours and utilized the Imperial insignia, some of which were revered as relics. The ceremony was based on medieval coronation regulations that, in turn, were derived from the bishops' ordination rites. Some features had been adapted to the circumstances, taking into account the Protestant electors, for example, or choosing music for the taste of the times.³³

We do not know how Ferdinand III regarded his third coronation, but he took being emperor seriously. After his father's demise, he would become the ninth Habsburg emperor in an unbroken chain, successor to Charlemagne, and successor to the Roman emperors, including Constantine and Augustus, according to the notion of *translatio imperii* (transfer of rule) from the Romans to the Franks.

The celebration continued for some time because of his wife's coronation in January. Ferdinand III, accompanied by many aristocrats, undertook sleigh rides, one of them with his Electoral-Bavarian sister. Though his father remained indoors with a fever, he met with his Privy Council and continued to argue with Saxony over Württemberg, while Maximilian I bickered with the English resident about the Palatinate. The emperor departed at the end of January and left Ferdinand III as well as his privy councilors Trauttmandorff and Wolfradt with authority to conclude the negotiations. There was little left to do besides taking leave. Planning for the new campaign was beginning. On his departure, Maximilian I presented his nephew with a book on how to govern both politically and economically. At the end of January, Ferdinand III also fell ill and fought a fever for almost two weeks. When he recovered, the ice on the Danube was melting, and thus, on February 11, 1637, the newly crowned couple could leave Regensburg for Vienna on board ship.³⁴

PART II

SEARCHING FOR PEACE IN WAR, 1637–1648

2.1

THE CONSTELLATION OF IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

On the journey from Regensburg to Vienna, Ferdinand III learned by courier that his father had died on February 15, 1637. Although Ferdinand II had been ailing for a long time, the time of his death came as a surprise and fundamentally changed Ferdinand III's status. From now on, he was emperor and, according to his father's last will and testament, the universal heir of "all our . . . hereditary kingdoms, archduchies and principalities, margravian territories, counties, dominions, etc., lands, people, and subjects . . . without exception."¹ Such an inheritance carried its own weight, but assuming it in wartime seems to have been a burden for Ferdinand III that threatened to overwhelm him. Though he demonstrated outward composure and resignation "to God's will,"² after his unceremonious entry into Vienna, he withdrew, became ill, and had to remain in bed for the better part of several weeks.

Because of Ferdinand III's poor health, his father's obsequies were not held until mid-March, but even then, the new imperial couple did not attend; the doctors had warned the new emperor against leaving his room. He also did not travel with the casket to Wiener Neustadt as planned but instead left the task to his younger brother, whose original assignment had been to accompany it to Graz, where Ferdinand II was to be entombed. A captain of the guard, Maradas, now took over, while Archduke Leopold Wilhelm returned from Wiener Neustadt directly to Vienna. The archduke had to comply with this directive, which corresponded to the new constellation that bears a closer look, beginning with Ferdinand III's relatives.³

The Dynastic Constellation

For Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, Ferdinand III's assumption meant a massive setback. Emperor Ferdinand II had altered the traditional dynastic practice, abolishing the usual division of inheritance.

This decision was the result of unpleasant past experiences. First, the acrimonious quarrel of the brothers Rudolf II and Matthias over the division of authority had threatened the dynasty as a whole. Second, based on earlier rules

of partible inheritance, Ferdinand II had been compelled to grant the Spanish Habsburgs candidacy to Alsace as the price for their renouncing Emperor Matthias's legacy. This had affected Ferdinand III's marriage contract, which curtailed his rights over Alsace. Archduke Leopold had wrested a final inheritance division from his brother Ferdinand II, by which he received the Tyrol, the margravian territory of Burgau, and other dominions in Alsace, the Upper Rhine, and the Black Forest. He took off his bishop's robes and, as Leopold V, ruled the county of Tyrol and Further Austrian lands, some of which were held in common with their Austrian relatives. With his wife Claudia de Medici, he had several children, thereby establishing his own line.⁴

Their uncle's success cast a shadow over Ferdinand III's relationship with his brother Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, who, like Leopold V, wanted to rule as a secular prince but, as bishop, had been granted ecclesiastical principalities, thereby precluding his rights to an inheritance. In 1626, when he was twelve, he had received his first bishopric, Passau, to which Strasbourg, Halberstadt, and Olomouc were subsequently added. Ferdinand II's testament left his second son only a yearly stipend of 45,000 gulden and lifetime interest in a territorial lordship. The archduke was highly dissatisfied and did not conceal his desire to give up his ecclesiastical position. Because Ferdinand III already had children, the archduke could not expect to succeed him; yet he harbored hopes for a secular dominion.⁵

In this difficult situation, Ferdinand III did what he could to appease his brother without having to relinquish his own rights. Immediately after receiving news of their father's death, he assured the archduke in a letter written in his own hand: "Your Grace may be certain that he will always have in me the truest brother until death."⁶ The new emperor raised his brother's allowance and took care to demonstrate his high regard and his hope for their continuing on friendly terms. In 1637, Ferdinand III had the Privy Council consider the feasibility of at least granting the archduke's wish for the supreme command of the Imperial Army; he was advised against it. Nevertheless, in 1639, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm did receive the supreme command and, with some irony, explained his position as somewhat unusual for a bishop, as he had to obey the emperor but would continue as the pope's servant. The military position also defused the brothers' dispute over Archduke Leopold Wilhelm's aversion to ecclesiastical vestments. He now received papal dispensation to wear military dress and, as an indication of his ecclesiastical offices, merely adorned it with the cross of the Teutonic Order (Figure 11).

After the crushing defeat at the battle of Breitenfeld in 1642, for which the archduke bore responsibility, the emperor accepted his brother's resignation from the military command but continued to include him in political decisions. In their correspondence of 1643, Ferdinand III deflected the archduke's frustrations over



FIGURE 11 Archduke Leopold Wilhelm of Austria, brother of Ferdinand III, copper plate etching (1658), Anselmus van Hulle / Pieter II de Jode. Vienna, private collection Hannes Scheucher.

having to relinquish the command, as well as his renewed hopes for a territorial dominion of his own, by writing remarkably long passages about the weather, ascribing any tensions between them to hypothetical outside influences: “The weather here has not been beautiful but so cold that for several days we have had a thick cover of frost; after that it became pleasant again; but today the snow is so heavy that it might be February [. . .]. I have lately been thinking that, God willing, there must be no discord sown between us.”⁷ Aside from this, he talked of hunting and, as a sop to his brother, granted his wish to expedite the elevation of an archducal protégé to the rank of count. Shared interests in literature, music, visual art, and alchemy helped to maintain amicable relations.

The brothers’ cordial and disciplined conduct bore fruit. Archduke Leopold Wilhelm remained a bishop, fulfilling duties onerous to him, but was also assigned additional tasks more to his liking. In consultation with his brother, he worked for the dynasty with some success in an extraordinary diversity of functions as bishop, military leader, Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, viceroy in the Spanish Netherlands, and patron of the arts.⁸

The drastic change of 1637 also proved difficult for the Dowager Empress Eleonora. Only ten years older than Ferdinand III, she had to adjust to life as a widow of diminished importance. After her husband’s death, she gave precedence to the new imperial couple, thus acknowledging the revised ranking order, and though they politely demurred at first, the new emperor and empress acceded. Eleonora formed her own household, which was quite large but less attractive, as people who had sought her intercession with the emperor now withdrew. She herself had to relocate within the Hofburg.⁹

Her doubts about her future maintenance were so grave that she offered to present the emperor with some of her holdings when he conveyed the message that good hunting was to be found there. According to the nuncio’s report, she burst into tears during the audience in which he delivered the pope’s

condolence letter. She was not on friendly terms with the new empress, and Maria Anna was noticeably reluctant to demonstrate any good will. In 1637, she accompanied the dowager empress only a short way on her journey to Wiener Neustadt. That same month, Eleonora retired to Graz on the pretext of wanting to be near her deceased spouse.¹⁰

But later that year, she returned from Graz to the court and there found her niche. She and her stepson Archduke Leopold Wilhelm were close; she was on affable but distant terms with the imperial couple. There were the usual visits, and Eleonora regularly took part in the dynasty's public demonstrations of piety. Aside from that, she went her own way. When she wished to be gone from the Hofburg, she spent time at Laxenburg and frequented Schönbrunn near Vienna. Beginning in 1640, she had a wing added to the old Katterburg, which thus extended toward the Schönbrunn residence. When in Vienna, she often retreated to the convent of the Carmelites, which she had founded and where she had an apartment nearby.¹¹

During 1645/46, when Ferdinand III resided in Linz, she lived in neighboring Steyr, where she organized hunts, comedies, and ballets for the emperor and from whence she visited him in Linz from time to time. She was very engaged with the advancement of her courtiers and ladies-in-waiting, watched over their devoutness, and took care to preserve and enlarge her own and her household's religious privileges, such as her personal chapel.¹²

The dowager empress developed especially close ties to Ferdinand III's children. Thus, she was entrusted with an ailing Archduke Leopold's care when the court was away at Laxenburg. Later, when he was king of Hungary, Ferdinand's oldest son often visited her, even at Schönbrunn. Sometimes the siblings visited her together, invited their step-grandmother to festive family occasions in Vienna, or celebrated them at her residence. More frequently, it was she who visited the princes. After 1647, she was repeatedly ill and, in 1648, had to undergo a successful operation to preserve her vision. But she remained sickly and was often seen at the spas near Vienna.¹³

Her intervention was especially important for the house of Lorraine, which had been forced into exile by France. Duke Niklas Franz and his wife Claude of Lorraine, who was the dowager empress's niece, lived at the Imperial court, or more precisely Eleonora's court, for many years. In 1645, the Lorrainers even followed her to Steyr. In 1648, when Duchess Claude died in Vienna, the nunciature named Eleonora her chief mourner after her husband. The emperor paid a pension to his second cousin Duke Niklas Franz and defrayed the costs of his small court, but there appears to have been no close contact between them. They sometimes hunted together, but the duke seems to have been at the emperor's table only rarely; on one such occasion, he served as a substitute for Eleonora while she was being bled. One of the

Lorraine princes was named Ferdinand, however, and like many Habsburgs was a member in the Rosicrucian Brotherhood of the Viennese Dominicans. His motto, *Pietate et Justitia*, was the same as Ferdinand III's. The other son, Duke Charles V, would later wed Ferdinand III's daughter from his marriage to Eleonora Magdalena Gonzaga.¹⁴

Though separated by considerable distances, Ferdinand III and his two sisters maintained a cordial relationship. His correspondence with Archduchess Anna Maria, married to the elector of Bavaria since 1636, though a duty, shows a personal tone. Yet the emperor could exert little influence over Maximilian I through his sister; Ferdinand III's relationship with his uncle and brother-in-law was, and remained, marked by a "colder, more realistic strain" (Albrecht).¹⁵

The 1637, the marriage of his sister Archduchess Cäcilia Renata to their cousin, the Polish King Wladislaw IV, also served to firm up unstable conditions. The Habsburgs and Poland had a common enemy in Sweden, though in 1635, France had been able to mediate a truce in the Swedish-Polish war. Because of the mourning period for Ferdinand II, there had been no elaborate festivities but merely a solemn ceremony to mark his daughter's wedding in Vienna. In a public audience, the Polish ambassador asked the new emperor for Archduchess Cäcilia Renata's hand on behalf of the Polish king; then followed addresses by Empress Maria Anna, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, and the Spanish ambassador, whereupon Ferdinand III, in Latin, gave his consent from the throne. The marriage did not put an end to apprehension about alliances hostile to the Habsburgs. Queen Cäcilia Renata died in 1644, followed by her son Sigismund Kasimir in 1647. In 1644/45, Wladislaw IV married a princess from the Francophile Gonzaga-Nevers dynasty, and Ferdinand III carefully distanced himself, fearing French influence on Poland. This also held true for his relationship with his Polish cousin Jan Kasimir, whom he regarded as an adherent of France. Yet in 1646, during the election of a new Polish king, he supported Jan Kasimir's successful candidacy, though he remained distrustful.¹⁶

Ferdinand III never personally met his most important cousin, King Philip IV of Spain, who was also his brother-in-law and later his son-in-law. He had known Philip IV's brother, Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando, for only a few weeks during the Nördlingen campaign and, in 1641, commented on Don Fernando's death in a letter to his brother that is remarkable for his offhand observation that Archduke Leopold Wilhelm should take better care of himself, considering his advancement in the Spanish succession; for his own part, the archduke only regretted that he had to give up hunting in order to attend his cousin's obsequies, lamenting that "the Cardinal-Infante's death has cost me a good 150 to 200 wild boars."¹⁷

Close ties to the Spanish Habsburgs depended not only on treaties and the mutual exchange of military and financial support but also, above all, on Ferdinand III's wife, Empress Maria Anna. She had been prepared from infancy for a representational role and, consequently, presented herself well at court. This was made evident mainly by her contact to the countless ambassadors to whom she granted audiences.¹⁸

The empress—abetted by her confessor Quiroga, her Spanish courtiers, and the Spanish embassy—concerned herself chiefly with guarding the interests of the Spanish Habsburgs. The Venetian ambassador wrote in 1641 that although she gave the impression of not being involved in political affairs, the empress actually maneuvered matters in the Spanish king's interests and did so unobtrusively and circumspectly so as not to irritate Trauttmansdorff, who tolerated her interference in many matters even if he did not like some of the resulting decisions. In 1644, the nunciature voiced the firm conviction that an important letter should be brought to her attention via her grand stewardess to ensure that it would reach Ferdinand III. The empress herself exercised certain governmental functions; during Ferdinand III's sojourn in Bohemia in 1645, for example, she served as Austrian regent and had a number of counselors for this purpose. In the crisis of 1645, she requested—according to the nuntiature, “close to tears”¹⁹—papal subsidies from the nuncio, yet she was confident enough to demand action, declaring the pope's purported good will insufficient. Sources show that Ferdinand III discussed with her important questions concerning his relationship to Spain.

The marriage of Ferdinand III and Empress Maria Anna appears to have been happy. The Venetian ambassador reported in 1638 that she had “the emperor's favor and love in the highest degree.”²⁰ There are no hints of extramarital affairs; the sources' silence on this topic, in light of their eloquence when it came to other rulers, can be taken as an indication that they had nothing to conceal. Because marital fidelity in princely houses could by no means be taken for granted in the seventeenth century, another Venetian ambassador formulated his description of the emperor nicely by referring to his “angelic habits.”²¹ Ferdinand III regularly mentioned the empress in letters to his brother and reported particularly on her depressed moods or her health. During the military crisis of 1645, when Empress Maria Anna had to be evacuated to Graz for her safety, he described his mixed feelings: “My spouse is gone; I am partly glad and partly quite miserable. Both of us had their eyes filled with tears.”²²

The imperial couple had six children. Two sons, Philip August and Maximilian Thomas, born in 1637 and 1638, respectively, died in 1639; a




FIGURE 12 Sarcophagi of children of Ferdinand III (Archdukes Maximilian Thomas and Philipp Augustine). Private collection (to be found in Marquardt Herrgott und Martinus Gebert: *Taphographia principum Austriae*, St. Blasien 1772, Mon. Austr. T. IV. P I., Tab. LXXIII).

daughter, Maria, died in 1646 shortly after her birth (Figure 12). The high child mortality did not spare the palaces. Three children survived their early years: Franz Ferdinand, born in 1633 (Figure 13); Maria Anna, born in 1634; and Leopold Ignaz, born in 1640. Ferdinand III's worry about his children's health is palpable. He wrote of his daughter's and older son's smallpox, and during epidemics and in times of war, he often had his children carried to safety, for example, to the small town of Bruck on the Leitha. As he had done formerly, his children wore charms meant to protect them. Especially frail was Archduke Leopold Ignaz, whose recurring illnesses were mentioned even by the nunciature. Teething was so difficult for him that in 1643, the doctors had little hope for his survival and the imperial couple pledged an altar in St. Apollonia's honor. The son recovered, the pledge was fulfilled, and the court church of St. Augustine received its altar.²³

The infants' day-to-day upbringing was in the hands of an aristocratic widow, Susanna Veronica von Trautson, the heir apparent's and Archduchess Maria Anna's longtime governess, who enjoyed special esteem. She received numerous gracious presents from the imperial couple, and after her death in 1648, the court honored her during her obsequies in St. Michael's church. The children saw their father mainly at mass and at dinner. When they were older, he often took them hunting, which he regarded as an experience that allowed for spontaneity; at least we can read this into a note to his brother, in which he described a hunt with his then ten-year-old son: "... took Ferdinand along and stayed out overnight;" his brother might imagine "how happy [the boy] was; he was mightily pleased."²⁴



FIGURE 13 Empress Maria Anna with the couple's first son, later King Ferdinand IV, 1634, oil painting by Frans Luycx. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, inventory number 3113.



FIGURE 14 Copper plate etching by Matthäus Merian 1638, cartige, "Et documenta damus qua simus origine nati" (And we give evidence whence the origin was taken). Historisches Museum Frankfurt, signature C 2104.

Religion, Art, Music

And the new emperor himself? Ferdinand III was twenty-nine when he succeeded, no longer young by the standards of the early modern period and yet not old. Although the year 1637 had begun with a series of fever bouts and he had reacted to his sudden accession with illness, he was in good physical health from mid-1637 until the late 1640s. Let us look at some descriptions of the emperor from the 1630s and early 1640s.

In 1638, Venetian legates reported his average height, good physical condition, agility, and strength. They also wrote that Ferdinand III's portraits were not very lifelike but made him older and more dignified than he appeared in person, when he was "very sociable" if "very majestic."²⁵ In 1641, another Venetian ambassador also dwelled on his self-presentation, noting that his countenance was "very serious but exalted," his physical condition good, and that he had "natural affability, incomparably good judgment, and gravitas, especially when leaving a room."²⁶ In their view, Ferdinand III adapted his behavior to the situation at hand to the point of mimicry, yet his portraits show him as someone playing a role; for good reason, his portraitists were not realists but "representatives of the ideal courtly style" (Heinz).²⁷

An added aspect was the pope's political disapproval of pro-Spanish policies, which influenced the papal ambassadors' perception of Ferdinand III. One of them asserted in 1637 that Ferdinand III "lived in every way after the Spanish manner"²⁸; in 1639, another even ascribed to the emperor a "Spanish" physiognomy and character, as he was "of dark complexion and hair, a stern demeanor, and weighed his words . . . all in all a real Spaniard."²⁹

The 1638 descriptions of Ferdinand III by the Venetian ambassadors show that they deemed his socialization for the position as ruler successful. They spoke of his education by the Jesuits, pointed to his daily attendance at mass as well as at vespers on holy days, mentioned his role as a model for "the people," emphasized his linguistic abilities, praised his knowledge of philosophy and the sciences, recalled his public disputations, and affirmed his independent way of governing. The emperor participated in council sessions and signed documents with his own hand.³⁰ In a few sentences, the report of 1641 summarized the mode of life regarded as the norm: ". . . with outstanding gifts of intellect, adorned by much scientific knowledge and many languages, and of the most exemplary piety . . . accustomed from childhood—if one disregards the hours spent at serious studies or the practice of hunting and other princely pursuits—to spending all day at the frequent council sessions as well as daily public and private masses . . ."³¹

Though this picture is rhetorically exaggerated, it is basically accurate. In the sphere of public and courtly piety, Ferdinand III continued to practice what he had been taught. After a period of illness in February and March of 1637, one of his first public appearances was the traditional foot-washing ritual of thirteen poor old men on Maundy Thursday. On principle, he heard mass on a daily basis and continued his regular visits to Viennese convents and his participation in pilgrimages and processions. If a church was consecrated in the vicinity or another one's cornerstone was being laid, he was in the party.³²

Ferdinand III was characterized by an intense adoration of the Virgin Mary. His 1646 hunting log contains one of his own prayers to the Virgin, in which he asked for help against his enemies, an end to the war, and the fruits of peace (Figure 15).

He was a member of at least one fraternity devoted to the Virgin. His librarian Mauchter dedicated a collection of 1,500 aphorisms on the sufferings of Christ and Mary to him; he reciprocated with a generous gift of 1,500 Gulden.³³

In spite of his piety, Ferdinand III maintained greater distance from the clergy than his father had. In 1638, for example, he dissolved the Convent Council (*Klosterrat*) responsible for the Counter Reformation and transferred its functions to the Lower Austrian administration. The Venetian ambassadors




FIGURE 15 Prayer to Virgin Mary in the hunting calendar of Ferdinand III. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv HHStA, HA FA, K. 89, Jg. 1646, fol.1v.

stated that although the new emperor had been educated by the Jesuits, he did not particularly favor them. The nuncio used the strong word “hammer”³⁴ to describe how the Jesuits fared when Ferdinand III made clear at the beginning of his reign that he would grant them less influence than his father had. He would not attend their masses as often as before and would break with some traditions. In 1637, he did not dine with them on the day after Easter. Pointing to the “poor soldiers,” he withdrew some of the Jesuits’ revenues and refused to change his mind in the face of many pleas to do so. In May 1637, his attitude toward them was evident. According to the nunciature, the emperor regarded the Jesuits with benevolence but would not brook their interference in the court’s affairs.

Consequently, he chose a confessor who supported a policy of moderation in religious conflicts. After serving him for twelve years, Ferdinand III's old confessor, the Jesuit Heinrich Philippi, had died at the end of November 1636 in Regensburg. The Jesuit Johannes Gans, born in 1591 in Würzburg, became the new confessor. He had been on his way to China and had already arrived in Lisbon when he was transferred to Austria, where he served as preacher first in Graz and then at St. Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna before becoming court chaplain to the young king of Hungary, whom he accompanied during his campaigns. Gans enjoyed life and the pleasures of the table at court more than his superiors deemed suitable; more than once they counseled moderation, decorous behavior, and seriousness. Members of his Viennese order complained that he accompanied the emperor on hunting expeditions in secular garb. He had a loose tongue and was even said to have mocked the Bishop of Ljubljana (Laibach) by calling him *Crassus Carinthus* ("the fat Carinthian").³⁵

Nor did he always guard his tongue with Ferdinand III, criticizing his preoccupation with alchemy. But he accepted that the emperor was not interested in a politically influential confessor and would not allow him to attend sessions of the Privy Council. Thus, Ferdinand III kept the one person whose clerical influence might otherwise have been quite effective far removed from matters of policy. According to Gundaker von Liechtenstein, this did not preclude that Gans "brokered many different person's affairs and often fostered their speedy resolution"³⁶ or that Gans informed the nuncio concerning issues of territorial ecclesiastical policy and promoted the award of papal marriage dispensations.

In spite of the confessor's reduced scope, Rome directed the nuncio to exert influence over the emperor through Gans. Here, the nunciature was unsuccessful. During the Imperial-Hessian negotiations concerning Hersfeld in 1639, the nuncio wrote that he maintained contact with Gans but that the latter acted "more like a politician than a cleric,"³⁷ adding the sour summarization: "Well, to be frank, he is a Jesuit, but one must reckon with them (the Jesuits) because they know a lot, can do much, and also benefit the Catholic religion. Yet where princely interests and their own are concerned, one must keep one's eyes open and not simply trust them, lest one be duped." Before the Regensburg Diet, when the nuncio pleaded with the confessor to keep the emperor from permitting religious freedom in the hereditary lands and Calvinism throughout the Empire, Gans ambiguously promised he would do "what he could."³⁸ At the Diet itself, however, he openly declared that the main reason for war lay with the 1629 Edict of Restitution. When he also advocated an amnesty for the emperor's Protestant adversaries in the Empire, the Holy See tried to replace him as confessor, though it failed when Ferdinand III resisted.

Like his father, the emperor guarded against overreaching demands from the Holy See with the help of theological commissions. In 1638, for example, he had the religious issues before the Hungarian Diet discussed by a commission of theologians behind which the imperial confessor could hide as well. That same year, Ferdinand asked such a commission to address the question whether he could “in good conscience”³⁹ give the Hersfeld Abbey to Calvinist Hesse-Kassel; the nunciature called its opinion “more political than religious.”⁴⁰

The emperor also fulfilled another aspect of his role as prince in a somewhat different manner than might have been expected from his socialization. The lute, the symbol of music with which he had been depicted in 1618, was never far from his hand. At great expense he maintained a large Court Chapel, which, in addition to its chaplains, included many musicians, among them instrumentalists and composers (some like Ebner and Froberger famous to this day) as well as singers. The soprano voice was sung by both men and women. The orchestra was responsible for arranging masses, but the highly esteemed musicians also played in the dining hall and in the emperor’s chambers.⁴¹

Until far into the 1650s, Ferdinand III occasionally wrote his own compositions. His most important instructor was Kapellmeister Giovanni Valentini, who was so highly regarded that the court made him an impressive wedding present and, in 1630, granted him the considerable gratuity of 6,000 Gulden. Ferdinand III asked Valentini to look over his compositions and appeared highly satisfied when he could tell his brother that his teacher found “only one word to be corrected”⁴² in a new madrigal. But he was not a vain man and readily admitted, for example, if the themes on which he based his works were not his own.

The emperor chiefly wrote religious vocal compositions; some of his works have actually been recorded. Probably best known are a Lauretarian litany, a Passion from 1640, a *Miserere*, and a *Drama musicum* whose subjects are celestial and worldly forms of love. When the Graz court musicians replaced Emperor Matthias’s chapel, a change in musical style took hold. Instead of polyphonic compositions, whose attraction lay in their complex thematic texture, intelligibility of text and clarity of melodic line were now prized. Eleonora had grown up in Mantua, and her sway over the Imperial court’s musical and festival culture enhanced the Italian influence, especially on the early forms of opera and, with it, the ballets danced by the aristocrats at court.

Music and ballet were not merely meant to please and serve as relaxation; nor was sacred music meant to be merely religious exercise. The production of operas, including ballets, required such great financial expenditures for costumes, scenery, stage technology, and lighting that they were only justifiable

for special occasions. These were chiefly carnival festivities for lighter fare; more elaborate productions were for dynastic celebrations, especially the imperial birthdays. The content of these pieces could not ignore external conditions, and thus the great festival productions in particular took on the character of mythological-allegorical interpretations of rulership, strongly shaped as allegorical propaganda programs.⁴³

Beyond that, music was understood as a manifestation of supreme harmony. Rudolf II's Protestant court mathematician Johannes Kepler subjected even Bodin's state philosophy to an analysis based on mathematical principles of harmony. The emperor's sympathy for such reflections is demonstrated by the fact that he sent financial support to the author of *Musurgia universalis*, the Roman Jesuit Athanasius Kircher. In turn, the *Musurgia* reprinted a composition by Ferdinand III. It is likely that the lower sketch on a page from the emperor's hunting log, reproduced here, reflects his reading of the book. One of the book's topics was the diffusion of sound, and Kircher offered a graphic illustration of a practical application in listening devices that might make overhearing conversations at court possible (Figure 16).⁴⁴

Several entries in his 1645 hunting log also point to Ferdinand III's preoccupation with Kircher's transformation of various systems of encodings. Transformation probably interested the emperor because the act of composing thus became meditation on the cosmic order. Kircher had developed a type of composition machine and derived rules for the creation of music from cosmic connections. The emperor used these rules for his own compositions, which may be the cause of their sometimes mechanical character. After all, Kircher attempted to translate celestial mechanics into music.⁴⁵

A series of analogies with astronomical, mathematical, and musical proportions gave the emperor insight into his own self. The painter Sandrart portrayed him as Jupiter, ruler of the Olympic pantheon. On another level, according to Johannes Kepler, both the god and the planet Jupiter corresponded to a special stone—the magnet. An analogy led from planet to magnet by mathematically connecting a planet's density to its distance from the sun. Ferdinand was apparently interested, ordered magnets, and examined them. Not coincidentally, Kircher dedicated his book on magnetism (*Magnes sive de arte magnetica*) to the emperor in 1641. The dedication likened his patron to the “stone”: magnets could repulse and attract iron, depending on the pole. Then Kircher addressed the emperor directly: “Whenever you draw iron, you fight for the heavens and for the Catholic community; thus for the Empire you purchase peace with war, security with danger, and gold with iron.”⁴⁶

So it was in this sense, within the framework of a universal world order constructed by analogy and linked to a universal order of knowledge, that




FIGURE 16 Sketch of probably a listening device as designed by Athanasius Kircher in the hunting calendar of Ferdinand III. HHStA, HA FA, K. 90, Jg. 1650, fol. 1. Athanasius Kircher; *Musurgia universalis*, Rom 1650, vol. 2, S. 296, ULB Münster, Photo MH.

Ferdinand III conducted alchemical studies. By experimenting even with lesser materials, the thinking went, one could detect the order and forces of the universe. We know that the emperor had a laboratory in Vienna through a question in a letter from his brother, who wished to know whether he had one set up in Prague as well. In 1640, Ferdinand III himself mentioned his new “Cymicus.”²⁴⁷ His reports about experiments with handwriting made legible by heat, and others with vitriol, antimony, and different substances that Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and Piccolomini procured for him, show that he was interested in practical problems as well as effects interesting for their own sake. He probably did not experiment with making gold himself, but it is likely that during the financial crisis of the late war years, he supported an Inner Austrian alchemist’s attempt to produce gold.

Not only did Ferdinand III himself stand within the tradition of a universal worldview, but he also had inherited, and enlarged, some of the imperial collections that had been established in this spirit. In particular, he bought exquisite objects, such as an unusually large emerald, but also paintings. Here, he displayed almost precisely the same taste that to this day dominates the assessment of works from the renaissance and early baroque. In 1641, he wrote from Regensburg to tell his brother proudly about the acquisition of thirty-four paintings, naming some of the artists: “Corregio, Titian, Tintoret, Paris Bardon, Guido Reni, Lamberto.” He was most impressed by a Corregio painting that had remained unidentified up to that point: “I don’t believe I have such another among all my paintings; everyone values it at 1,000 ducats, just this one alone.”²⁴⁸ The purchase did not remain his only one; in 1642, he bought “a small one by Rubens.”²⁴⁹

But another letter to his brother documents that the emperor was not merely interested in famous names and market value but in the pictures themselves. The English ambassador had brought a crate full of paintings to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, and because the archduke was absent, the emperor asked him whether he “might open the crates and look at the pictures.”⁵⁰ So, in a prematurely executed last will and testament, the archduke left his paintings to Ferdinand III, “because he is a special connoisseur of painting.”⁵¹ Word of this got around Rome, and, consequently, Cardinal Barberini also presented paintings to the emperor. Archduke Leopold Wilhelm’s vast collection, established chiefly in the Netherlands, outshone Ferdinand III’s, which has not been preserved as a whole. Court painters specialized mainly in portraiture; other more innovative painters generally remained at court only a short while before moving on. Several artists were ennobled by Ferdinand III.

The emperor was particularly fond of painters who specialized in *trompe l’oeil* and whose works led spectators, at first glance, to mistake painted objects for the real thing (Figure 17).



FIGURE 17 Board of Letters (so-called Trompe-l’œil still life) with a medal of Ferdinand III, oil painting by Samuel Hoogstraten. Karlsruhe, Staatliche Kunsthalle, inventory number 2620.

In 1651, Samuel Hoogstraten showed the emperor three paintings and later reported that Ferdinand III had regarded the first two with pleasure but had been mesmerized by the third. He had gazed at it for a long time and finally, after recognizing the first illusion in the painting, had said: “This is the first painter who has ever duped me.”⁵² He had then bought the painting.

The picture probably showed a holder for letters (*Briefbord*) depicting not only deceptively real objects but also a painted frame that appeared genuine. The emperor honored Hoogstraten with a medal, his portrait, and a golden chain; he also bought additional pictures from him. There is a similar anecdote from that same year 1651: A visual deception in a painting by Sebastian Stosskopf was reportedly so good that Ferdinand III is supposed to have tried to take an object from the picture, laughed at his own mistake, and bought the painting (Figure 18).




FIGURE 18 Trompe l'Œil Letter Rack with Rosary and Playing Cards, Sebastian Stosskopf, 1653, oil on canvas. Department of Art Collections of the Prague Castle, Inv. No. HS 117, photo number 04/300229.




FIGURE 19 Sketches of optical illusions. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv. HHStA, HA FA, K. 90, Jg. 1653, fol. 10v-11r, 15r.

The emperor himself made illusionary drawings though only after several preliminary sketches and clearly without artistic pretensions (Figure 19).⁵³

That Ferdinand III was at the same time interested in the universal scientist Kircher and the epistemologist and painter Hoogstraten, that he experimented with magnets and sketched optical illusions, indicates that he was aware that theology and astronomy debated not merely different worldviews and thus different notions of God, but also that the means of resolving the questions these views generated were uncertain. His preferences lead one to conclude that he adhered to the concept of the world as part of a divinely ordered cosmos, but that he was not unaware of more skeptical interpretations. This seems contradictory and yet has a common denominator: awareness of the transitory nature of humanity and its endeavors, *Vanitas*. This idea dominates the two surviving Italian poems set to music by Ferdinand: the world is “a river of calamity, is a vapor, is nothing.”⁵⁴ Or, as he noted in his calendar of 1656: “Oh human, thou art mortal in a base and contemptible world” (cf. Figure 20).⁵⁵




FIGURE 20 Vanitas aphorism and chronogram of the year 1656 (LVCMDI=MDCLVI), realized like a prayer (“Thou shalt give light”). Österreichisches Staatsarchiv. HHStA, HA FA, K. 90, Jg. 1656, fol 1r.

2.2

ASPECTS OF LORDSHIP: COURT, GOVERNANCE, TRAVELS, ROME

The New Old Burgundian Court

We also encounter oscillation between new and old in the manner in which the new emperor organized his court. In mid-April of 1637, the nuncio commented on a remarkable event: During an evening stroll on the Hofburg's ramparts, Ferdinand III found the guards asleep in their shelters, called them out, and asked why they were not doing their duty. The alleged reply was that the captain was keeping back almost their entire pay, and thus they were unable to dress warmly and remain outside in the cold. As this also was the case at another location, the emperor summoned the captain, relieved him of his command, and, under severe threats, ordered him to pay off the men. We do not know how far this story corresponds to the truth, but it reflects the mood of reform at court.¹

This mood did not please everyone, the nuncio continued, as many people dreaded a closer look at their acquisition of confiscated lands. Not everyone expected advantages from the regular payment of courtiers, from measures against widespread corruption, or from reform of the wretched management of debts. It was precisely from this mismanagement that administrative personnel profited. Indeed, because the courtiers' terms of office ended with the old emperor's death, Ferdinand III's accession seemed to offer an opportunity for court and governmental reform. At the end of March 1637, immediately after Ferdinand II's obsequies, the old grand steward Meggau terminated the courtiers who had appeared especially for this ceremony in the great hall of the Hofburg. According to the report by the nunciature, approximately 800 persons were present (Figure 21).²

But there was no *tabula rasa* for Ferdinand III. Most people in active service, those in administrative, judiciary, or lower-level court positions, were confirmed in office as usual. Because Ferdinand III's royal household had



FIGURE 21 Nocturnal Banquet in the Vienna imperial palace, painting, oil on copper, 1640, by Wolfgang Heimbach. Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, picture gallery 599.

already been largely established, some of his father's top officials and chamber personnel lost their positions, but many managed the transition into the new imperial service. At the beginning of April, for example, when Ferdinand III collected the keys conferred on his father's chamberlains, he retained the nephew of General Piccolomini, who had already served to Ferdinand II.³

On principle, it was in the new emperor's interest to adapt his royal household to the grandeur of the imperial office. The Burgundian court of the fifteenth century served as the model with a well-regulated household, not too large and characterized by nobility, which achieved dignity and gravitas through reserved and heavily ritualized forms of behavior. The Habsburgs had assumed the Burgundian heritage in the late fifteenth century and had evolved the ceremonious formal language of the Burgundian court. If it was said that Ferdinand III desired to live in the Spanish manner, the implication was the Burgundian manner in the brilliant style of the Spanish Habsburgs.⁴

That a model for this household was even needed lay in the fact that it was not merely a frequently changing location but a community that shared the sovereign's life, one that dined, prayed, slept, traveled, celebrated, played, fought, and mourned together. The vocabulary of the Romance languages makes clear that the courtiers—*familiares* or *commensales*—formed a community grouped around common tables (*mensa*) like a family. It was no coincidence that the emperor employed so many cooks and table layers. Many of the hundreds of courtiers gathered around numerous different tables and consumed, among other fare, game that had been killed during the court's hunting expeditions.⁵

The court included men and women, children and the elderly, people of dwarfish stature, and even some who today would be regarded as physically and mentally handicapped. There were court physicians and apothecaries.

If courtiers fell ill, they could delegate their work, often for years; after retiring from court, many received a type of severance pay or pension. A court chaplain distributed alms in the emperor's name. In residence towns, homeowners had to furnish court officials with quarters, which spared the emperor's purse but tended to impede a city's development. Though the two night watchmen posted atop St. Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna were not in fact courtiers, they too received a small honorarium every New Year's Day. The emperor paid small subsidies to impoverished aristocrats and stipends to a number of students; in 1644, a tight-rope walker received the considerable sum of 150 Gulden for his performances.⁶

Sometimes prisoners came to the court. Probably best known among them was Prince Rupert of the Rhine, second son of Friedrich V of the Palatinate, who was taken prisoner in 1638, detained from 1639 to 1641 in the Linz residence, and then allowed to occupy the ball house outside the city gates. Shortly before his release, he came to Vienna, where Ferdinand III even took him hunting. The emperor set him free after making him promise "not to serve against me and the Empire, his fatherland."⁷ After all, the two were related through the Danish royal house and were both interested in a solution to the Palatine conflict. The court was a safe harbor for other aristocrats. The Walachian princess Anna and her son Michael, for example, lived there a long time and received an imperial pension; the emperor even financed the son's journeys to Walachia. Several princes who stayed at court also received pensions.⁸

The Imperial household included several hundred horses, hundreds of hunting dogs as well as other canine breeds (from lapdogs to Great Danes), and countless birds used for hunting. There were also several eagles, after all the imperial heraldic bird. There were parrots and, in the 1620s, at least one tiger and an elephant in Vienna and Prague. In 1656, camels could be gaped at, and in 1648, a man received 18 Gulden for showing Ferdinand III an ostrich, which the emperor may have recalled in 1649 while sketching several birds in his hunting log (Figure 22).⁹

In this compact sphere, there was no private life in the modern sense of the word. Language itself determined Ferdinand III's role as an exalted plural being (Your Imperial Majesty). In his personal correspondence, he used the first-person singular with his siblings or selected courtiers like Trauttmandorff, Slavata, and Siegmund Ludwig von Dietrichstein only as an exception—albeit a regulated one—from the customary *We*. In their personal letters, his siblings addressed their imperial brother largely in impersonal terms; Archduchess Cäcilia Renata wrote: "Most Serene Imperial Highness, Most Gracious Sovereign, and dearest brother." Archduke Leopold Wilhelm called him "Most Serene and Most Powerful Imperial Roman Emperor" and signed his letters "Obedient and Faithful Brother and Servant unto death." The

Bavarian Elector Maximilian began a handwritten epistle assuring his “Most Serene and Most Powerful Emperor, Your Imperial Majesty, my most humble service in every obedience at all times. Most Gracious and Much Loved Sovereign and Cousin and Brother-in-law.” Empress Maria Anna and her brother Philip IV used the shorter but no less formal Spanish address “Señor.”¹⁰

Rules of behavior were exacting and adapted to finely differentiated situations in a more or less flexible ceremonial framework, beginning with the morning routine. The chamber personnel awakened the emperor at an hour he had indicated. The grand chamberlain, the only person allowed to wear sword and mantle in his presence, dressed him in his shirt; then, the emperor emerged from his bed chamber. There, the chamberlains on duty awaited him, helped with his ablutions, and dressed him in his day clothes, something he could not do for himself. The ranking of chamberlains went so far as to determine who worked on his right and his left. The grand chamberlain tested the water for rinsing his mouth, a precaution against potential poisoning. Also present were a physician and a barber for shaving him and dressing his long hair, as were court dwarves and court jesters.¹¹

Older chamber regulations from the Graz court detailed the activities of other personnel, such as valets and wardrobe servants. They proscribed who undid and closed which buttons, removed the emperor’s breeches, and dressed him in his slippers and nightcap in the evening. These regulations make clear that Ferdinand III was alone neither during his morning prayers nor his bowel evacuations, but instead his grand chamberlain was nearly always with him. Not once in his life did the sovereign sleep in a room by himself; the grand chamberlain had a pallet at the foot of the prince’s bed. Along with the chamberlains on duty, a valet with clock and light kept watch outside the




FIGURE 22 Sketch of an animal and a calculation in the hunting calendar of Ferdinand III. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv HHStA, HA FA, K. 90, Jg. 1649, fol. 62v.

bedchamber's door, which was locked from the inside; the stoker was permitted to retire only very late. When prince and princess slept in the same room, a valet remained outside their door; in that case, the grand chamberlain entered in the morning.¹²

Franz Albrecht Count of Harrach, appointed chamberlain in 1640, made infrequent notes in his calendar, such as "slept in front of His Majesty's door" or "played with His Majesty in the ball house early this morning."¹³ The emperor not only bowled occasionally but also played an early version of tennis popular at the time. In 1656, the ball player who "handed him the balls when he played in the ball house"¹⁴ received a gratuity. Indications that Ferdinand III played cards are extremely rare. But we know those individuals who the emperor usually allowed "to bathe with him"¹⁵ in 1656: Grand Chamberlain Gonzaga, Grand Equerry Harrach, and two long-serving chamberlains. Three of them had already been in their posts in 1640 and since that time had served the emperor for hundreds of weeks as tasters, slept at his door at night, guarded his rooms during the day, and accompanied him to mass and on the hunt, sleigh rides, festivities, and journeys.

With his court jesters and dwarves, Ferdinand III carried on a tradition that placed him, the prince, between chancellor and fool. Thus, each morning, he was confronted with the symbolic representation of good and bad counsel at the very moment when he was nearly unclothed. According to the Old Testament, the Pharaohs had already had fools among their counselors. From the Middle Ages on, the fool reminded rulers of death, humility, wisdom, and *vanitas*. In the sixteenth century, it was positively modern for the high nobility to have court jesters. At the courts of Emperor Maximilian I and Ferdinand III, these were persons who could play the fool, but others also had "mental and physical defects" and were regarded as "natural fools." Far into the seventeenth century, the function of jesters at the Imperial courts was to create, whether deliberately or unconsciously, unusual situations: to expose distorted perceptions and so to test continually the concept of normality, especially important because courts were places of stringent insistence on conformity and extreme control of oral and body language. This was made visible by a fool's embodiment of the Other.¹⁶

Also among the household personnel were personal physicians, one of whom served originally as court librarian. One valet, Sebastian Dellamasso, worked as master of the wardrobe, and another, Maximilian Bosso, worked as treasurer. In addition, there were the personal barbers and apothecary as well as the artistic craftsmen: a gem carver, a goldsmith, the painter Franz Luycx, and the personal carpenter Hans Jakob Herz. Several door keepers and the personal stoker Leonhard Sutter were among the many other servants. Regina Victorin laundered the new emperor's intimate apparel.¹⁷

To reorganize the entire household would have been overwhelming, and it is understandable that Ferdinand III began with his own chamber and the antechambers, thus regulating the general access to his person. Apportioning the opportunities for direct communication meant apportioning opportunities for exerting influence to groups and individuals. Every important imperial residence had a suite of antechambers that were open to different circles, with access based on different criteria such as noble rank, office, and diplomatic status. Doorkeepers and guards saw to it that rights of access were hierarchical and that the doors remained closed to most people. Like his father before him, the new emperor regularly passed through the antechambers going to the *Capella* (Figure 23).

Thus, he could see who appeared frequently to prove his or her loyalty and who had urgent requests to make of him. He regularly accepted petitions and held brief conversations with one or another among those present. The antechambers served as a sensor for topical issues and their importance and were thus an unobtrusive barometer of the monarch's state of mind. But in this highly hierarchical situation, the initiative for any personal contact lay principally with the emperor. For someone to address him extemporaneously was shocking. The nunciature characterized a bishop who blocked Ferdinand III's path to the chapel and began to speak as a bizarre screwball. Of course, the regular audiences that Ferdinand III held from March 1637 on were different.¹⁸

These inner rooms also served as meeting places for the attendees, especially the high-ranking courtiers who had access to the outer chambers as well. Here, officeholders, foreigners, aristocrats, and ambassadors from the Empire, foreign countries, and the Habsburg territories met, conversed, and negotiated. Documents were circulated, read aloud, and discussed. One might see privy councillors emerge from the privy chamber—situated between the antechambers and the living quarters—and could address them. Here, persons newly arrived at court, even Cardinal Harrach, spoke with courtiers like Trauttmandorff on the day before an audience with the emperor. Occasionally, diplomats like the English resident and the Spanish ambassador would get into an argument or dispute “so that the whole antechamber was astonished.”¹⁹

Ferdinand III rigorously curtailed access to these rooms. The only persons admitted to the most exclusive antechamber were official ambassadors to the court, the nuncio and the ambassadors from Spain and Venice, the primas and Palatine of Hungary, imperial princes, field marshals, holders of the four highest court offices, privy councillors, and chamberlains on duty. The middle room was open mainly to resident royal ambassadors and aristocratic counselors. Active and former military officers (colonels), non-noble counselors, active secretaries, and a number of resident ambassadors were permitted to enter the third antechamber.²⁰ The new order was so strict that it downgraded or even excluded many nobles and military officers. Above all, the deceased



FIGURE 23 Awarding of the Order of the Golden Fleece in the Augustine Church of Vienna in 1644, Gouache by Wilhelm Frommer. Albertina Collections Vienna, Graphic Arts. Albertina Inv 14530.

emperor's courtiers complained, and the former Grand Steward Meggau is reported to have asked the new Grand Chamberlain Puchheim in bitter jest whether it would suit him if he, Meggau, entered. Puchheim's answer was that the emperor wished to be exacting.²¹

The numerous complaints were nevertheless effective. Though Ferdinand III maintained this strict norm, he gave about 180 personal dispensations over the next few years. Several groups profited, among them candidates for court positions and Protestant aristocrats from Lower Austria, whose religious affiliation stood in the way of their integration at court. In this way, the emperor also granted admittance to mediators whose ranks or positions were not high enough for regular access, particularly the representatives or secretaries of generals and diplomats.²²

Thus, the admittance decree placed not only persons and, with them, their ranks, positions, and titles into a hierarchical order but also communities. The Venetian resident, for example, demanded, and received, access to the middle antechamber because the emperor acknowledged the royal status of the Venetian Republic. The resident of Genoa could merely ask for this, and in order to achieve it, he entered into an argument over precedence with his Venetian colleague. The duke of Modena's resident did not appreciate being treated worse than the other residents. After the reform, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany's consular secretary entered the third antechamber as he had always done and was sent back to the preceding hall by the grand chamberlain. While his complaint to high-ranking courtiers was in vain, another ducal agent claimed the title of resident and, with it, admittance to the third antechamber; other agents gave him away. In the end, he was told that the emperor was astonished at his having assumed a rank to which he was not entitled and that he was to remain outside in the future. The infighting about the residents' status continued with quibbles about the modes of address; by being called "Your Excellency," those at the margin hoped to gain entry to the antechambers of power.²³

Last but not least, restoring exclusive access to the antechambers was about safeguarding the emperor's high aristocratic milieu. Because of the previous inflation of honors on one hand and the nobility's increasing hierarchical consciousness on the other, high-ranking aristocrats had shunned lower or intermediate court positions and demanded more exclusive posts; the emperors had acceded. Thus, since the late sixteenth century, the old balance between diverse court positions and aristocratic rank in the hereditary lands had been greatly upset. Ferdinand III once again attended closely to the high status of nobles holding honorary positions. In 1637, in spite of a personal plea by the Polish ambassador and a written one by the Polish king, the emperor denied the king's resident the chamberlain's key that would have secured him access to a more exalted antechamber, explaining to the ambassador that many nobles would resign their positions if the lower-ranking resident were to get such a privilege.²⁴ Regulation of the antechambers carried the double charge of the widest possible integration and yet a fully operative differentiation among diverse European territories and social and functional elites.

Ferdinand III also revised several official instructions for his leading courtiers, such as the marshal of the household, the grand chamberlain, and the new imperial grand steward Trauttmansdorff.²⁵ But shortly thereafter, the reform attempts came to a halt.

Ferdinand III's Governmental System

A key figure in Ferdinand III's system of government was Maximilian Count Trauttmansdorff. His contemporaries rightly saw him as the most influential of the emperor's courtiers; many regarded him as a favorite. But the position of such a personage, whose influence went far beyond the sphere of his official duties, was first the result of a structural problem: a prince was inundated by such a multitude of affairs that he could not master them with the help of his administration alone. He needed a "filtering agent who might, at the same time, serve the sovereign as an adequate alter ego" (Asch).²⁶ Ferdinand III—emperor, king, duke, and count among his other positions—had much to occupy him beyond his administrative and jurisdictional routines, and many people sounded out Trauttmansdorff first when they wanted something of the emperor.

That such a position even existed was regarded by contemporaries as an indicator of a more deep-seated problem, namely that "the court as a community had failed to communicate" (Asch).²⁷ Thus it was with Ferdinand III's court. The emperor was not easily accessible, and courtiers were so numerous that they tended to form cliques. They were divided according to particularistic loyalty systems such as families and clans, territories of origin, languages, aristocratic "nations," and cohorts. Favoritism created minions but also people who were excluded. Therefore, it was important for the emperor's overall acceptance by the nobility to be able to leave some doubt about who was responsible for certain decisions. It was also important to have someone who knew the aristocracy so intimately that he could balance princely patronage over time.

Whoever wanted to function in this way had to be firmly in the saddle, as leadership positions were not secure. At Rudolf II's court, positions of power eroded rapidly; under Emperor Matthias, even a cardinal, Khlesl, foundered. In 1625, Prince Gundaker von Liechtenstein, Ferdinand II's grand steward, toppled with breathtaking speed. Wallenstein could not prevail in 1630 and 1634 any more than Eggenberg could in the end. If one tumbled from such heights, one's family's future chances were in jeopardy. Trauttmansdorff had much to lose, and he had witnessed the dramas from 1608 to 1637 for himself. Born in Graz on May 22, 1584, as the scion of the ancient Styrian nobility, he studied jurisprudence in Italy and briefly participated in the Turkish war before beginning his career as imperial aulic councillor and steward to Rudolf II in 1606, the year of Ferdinand III's birth. After Rudolf II's death, he became grand steward of the new empress Ana (who died in 1618), married one of her ladies-in-waiting, Sophia Countess Pálffy, and so cemented his

own close relationship with this influential family of Hungarian magnates. He remained Aulic Court Councillor and became Emperor Matthias's chamberlain as well as his privy councillor on September 1, 1618, shortly after the fall of the emperor's leading advisor, Cardinal Khlesl.²⁸

After Rudolf II's deposition, Trauttmansdorff also survived that of Emperor Matthias by Ferdinand II, and he soon became the latter's privy councillor. He was among Eggenberg's entourage and, in the early 1620s, was already counted among the most influential privy councillors. Ferdinand II entrusted him with numerous diplomatic missions. Trauttmansdorff secured Ferdinand II's 1619 election as king of the Romans in Frankfurt, negotiated Spanish-Bavarian military aid in Munich, obtained papal subsidies in Rome, and, in 1622, concluded a peace treaty with the prince of Transylvania, who had attacked Vienna three times during the Bohemian war. In recognition of his deserts, the emperor conferred on him the rank of imperial count in 1623. After 1628, Trauttmansdorff, like many other courtiers, bought "low-priced confiscated estates" in Bohemia.²⁹

In 1628, the nuncio described him as Eggenberg's likely successor. The emperor valued him highly for his integrity, ability, and intelligence; he was serious, truth-loving, incorruptible, and disinterested. So it is no surprise that in 1630, at the Regensburg Electoral conference, he was regarded as Ferdinand III's grand steward, though in all probability, he merely represented the actual officeholder Thun, who was ill. We already know that Trauttmansdorff acted in Ferdinand III's supposed interest during Wallenstein's fall and that he became the young king's regular grand steward after Thun's death in 1635. That same year, he received from Ferdinand III's hand the Order of the Golden Fleece and, with it, a Spanish pension that he transferred to one of his sons. He did not keep the valuable horses the Spanish ambassador Oñate presented to him after Ferdinand III's coronation as king of the Romans but instead passed them on to the new king, who in turn gave them to the elector of Mainz. A reputation for being disinterested and incorruptible was so rare and so precious at court that Trauttmansdorff was mindful of maintaining it throughout his life.³⁰

Yet he did not have only friends. He had helped to write Ferdinand II's testament, which denied Archduke Leopold Wilhelm a secular dominion of his own, and it was no secret that the archduke harbored no love for him. In addition, Trauttmansdorff's participation in Wallenstein's downfall had led indirectly to Eggenberg's retreat, which did not please Wallenstein's and Eggenberg's numerous adherents. Third, with the Peace of Prague, he had shown that he regarded Counter Reformation in the Empire as a policy matter to be dealt with pragmatically; inflexible factions in the Catholic camp regarded this with disfavor. Fourth, after the death of Ferdinand II, he gradually withdrew from the Spanish sphere of influence; he allowed

conflicts with the Spanish ambassador Castañeda to escalate and complained that the latter sowed discord between him and the empress and her ladies-in-waiting.³¹

Thus, Trauttmansdorff not only had to administer his office as grand steward but also had to establish authority, channel influence, and control personnel decisions to suit his own purposes. He did this in a way that gave the nunciature pause, especially because it did not value Trauttmansdorff's pragmatic stance toward confessional policies. When Ferdinand II departed Regensburg at the beginning of 1637, leaving the conclusion of negotiations to Ferdinand III, the nunciature noted that Trauttmansdorff "takes the business upon himself and daily more so, to a degree that everything already passes through his hands."³² Soon after Ferdinand III's accession, the nuncio expected Trauttmansdorff to "take over everything," while the privy councillor and bishop of Vienna, Anton Wolfradt, would fall.³³ The nunciature's secretary added that Trauttmansdorff "already commands greater respect than the bishop of Vienna, and the entire court along with His Majesty allows him to handle the majority of affairs, so that low-ranking officials deal with him rather than with others."³⁴ Soon it was said that Trauttmansdorff's credit was growing so rapidly "that everyone runs to him and he gladly takes everything on."³⁵ Wolfradt and the other privy councillors had personal favors to ask: "Since they perceive that His Majesty esteems Trauttmansdorff so greatly, they think of nothing but agreeing to everything he proposes."³⁶ At the end of March, the nuncio wrote that Trauttmansdorff "is reshaping the whole court to suit himself, handing positions to those that depend on him without consideration; everyone is astonished that already during the first days he has established an absolute right of disposal for himself."³⁷

Matters became clearer after the organization of the new Imperial household during the last week of March and the first week of April 1637. Ferdinand III confirmed many of his father's privy councillors in their posts, but only those who had been expressly invited were permitted to attend the council's sessions. The nunciature realized that confirmation of someone's position merely meant that Ferdinand III was unwilling to deprive the old counsellors of "their titles and honors." At the beginning of April, the nuncio wrote that "from now on the handling of affairs is left to Trauttmansdorff alone, who on his own initiative makes decisions with the emperor; and for everyday advice no others are consulted except the bishop of Vienna and Count Khevenhüller."³⁸ Two weeks later, the picture firmed up. Court reform proceeded "entirely according to Count Trauttmansdorff's dispositions."³⁹ The nuncio claimed that the Privy Council, for all practical purposes, consisted of three people: Trauttmansdorff, Wolfradt, and Khevenhüller. If military issues were on the agenda, Schlick—who had been promised nomination to the

Privy Council when he threatened to resign as president of the War Council—was included. A number of other privy councillors were admitted only when invited; any complaints were futile. Wolfradt endorsed Trauttmansdorff's opinions. Trauttmansdorff, the nuncio continued, bullied people over every issue, "frequently responding categorically when confronted with petitions, and if one wants to hear from His Majesty, one receives no other decision than the first one given by him."⁴⁰ The nuncio expressed himself even more concisely at the beginning of May: "As I have already stated, Trauttmansdorff's absolute authority and favor are so entrenched that he not merely decides most matters on his own, but imposes, absolutely and quite openly, whatever he likes."⁴¹

The Venetian ambassador Grimani wrote in 1641 that although the emperor "had hoped to realize total independence from his ministers, he has put the entire leadership and government of the Empire solely and circuitously into [Trauttmansdorff's] hands."⁴² About Ferdinand III, the nuncio said in 1644: "He is capable in the highest degree to deal with every issue himself, but he decides nothing without the council, and here Trauttmansdorff is the most significant person."⁴³

Thus, during the first years of Ferdinand III's reign, Trauttmansdorff was perceived as overly dominant. It must be emphasized, however, that the ambassadors' reports did not offer a sufficiently finely differentiated analysis of the political system; instead, they attempted to attribute power and influence as concisely as possible, and to this end, they employed narrative techniques and concepts that produced an exaggerated picture. Because their contemporaries oriented themselves through such descriptions, which in a way indirectly affected the court's structure, it becomes necessary to report them.

To arrive at a more balanced picture, we must also highlight the gray areas, and here there are discoveries to be made. During the 1630s, people at the Imperial court had quite diverse conceptions about the form that the relationship between the emperor and his most influential courtier might take. That the emperor had a "serious, experienced, and trustworthy"⁴⁴—as approved by a contemporary guidebook for princes, the *Princeps in Compendio*—courtier with whom he could discuss even secret matters openly was acceptable in theory; but the notion took on a more concrete character when the question arose of whether the emperor still made his own decisions.

Ferdinand III delegated a vast number of governmental affairs to Trauttmansdorff. The grand steward himself gave countless audiences and also conducted, with help from his own chancellery, an intensive political correspondence based on the emperor's very high esteem. Yet Trauttmansdorff did not lead "the government." To begin with, he had no personal political agenda that visibly and substantively deviated from supposed or actual

imperial interests. From his first diplomatic missions, he had respected the boundaries set for him by Ferdinand II and later by Ferdinand III. Only once can we document an attempt to get Ferdinand III to alter a political decision: during negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia, he tried to win a concession concerning confessional policies from the emperor, but he desisted when Ferdinand III refused to yield.⁴⁵

On the other hand, Ferdinand III and Trauttmansdorff tightly synchronized their agendas. As grand steward, Trauttmansdorff had nearly unlimited access to the emperor. From the antechambers, where he regularly held discussions, he could enter Ferdinand III's living quarters and speak with him as a matter of course. At the same time, the two saw each other almost daily at meetings of the Privy Council. If Trauttmansdorff was about the city on business, notes went back and forth. The emperor would summon his grand steward for a consultation, or the latter would report on conversations and letters. In this way, Trauttmansdorff solicited imperial instructions concerning, for example, the framework for talks with ambassadors—whether they would be conducted face to face or in conference with other courtiers. Ferdinand III might reply: “Listen to ambassadors alone then brief me and [Imperial Vice Chancellor] Kurz.”⁴⁶ There is evidence that the emperor talked over some important questions with Trauttmansdorff alone, but frequently, he ordered the grand steward to discuss matters with one or more privy councillors and then report back to him.

Ferdinand III's comments in a letter to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm make clear that he recognized the enormous public pressure this workload put on Trauttmansdorff, that he did not grudge his becoming wealthy, and that he did not demand dissimulation from his grand steward. He reported that Trauttmansdorff's sister had “gone to the devil,” which pleased the emperor as she had greatly damaged her brother's good name. He also sensed that Trauttmansdorff was happy about inheriting her large fortune, observing that “It seems to me that the brother is not too cast down—the 100,000 fl. she left him help a great deal.”⁴⁷

The coordination between Ferdinand III and his grand steward was so tight that disagreements generally did not get out; it was the exception when third persons could clearly attribute a position to either of them. Ambassadors who held conversations first with one and then the other often had to listen to the same answer twice. This is not to say that there were no differences of opinion, as their correspondence at the time of the Westphalian Peace Congress demonstrates. But that their opinions generally appeared indistinguishable to their contemporaries rather ensured that imperial policy could not be regarded as personal policy. The emperor, Trauttmansdorff, and other leading courtiers could carry out inconvenient decisions more easily if their

opponents could not attribute them unequivocally to a single person. That Ferdinand III's share in "his" decisions can so rarely be clearly identified was the result of a governing and administrative style that strove to screen individual political positions from the public.⁴⁸

A second element to the contemporary picture of the emperor's accepted confidant was the view that he should not monopolize his influence over the ruler. This trait became tangible when the question arose of whether the emperor still heard the counsel of others. Here, too, the facts are multilayered. On one side, Ferdinand III regularly held sessions of the Privy Council that allowed many to have their say. He gave innumerable audiences, personally accepted petitions, and conducted an intensive correspondence, some of it in his own hand. Henry Frederick Schwarz rightly has found him to have been an able, "persevering, and conscientious worker."⁴⁹ On the other side, Trauttmansdorff had a hand in forming institutions that could exert influence in cooperation with him. Let us sketch the constellation that led to decision-making at court.

Courtiers who had earlier held sway, among them Chancellor Werdenberg and the erstwhile grand steward Meggau, quickly withdrew. The formerly powerful privy councillors Eggenberg and Cardinal Dietrichstein had been dead for some time. Besides Trauttmansdorff, the active Privy Council at the beginning of Ferdinand III's reign consisted of the bishop of Vienna, held in check by Trauttmansdorff; his old confidant Count Khevenhüller, who also served as grand steward to Empress Maria Anna; Gundaker Prince of Liechtenstein; and Vilém Slavata, powerful as a victim of the Prague Defenestration and as chief Bohemian chancellor, of whom the nuntiatore said that he "never contradicted the leader."⁵⁰ Liechtenstein no longer had great career aspirations. But the Privy Council's composition changed over a very few years with the admission of most incumbents of leading posts of administrative and judicial organs.

Ferdinand III bestowed his court's top positions on people who had long been part of his inner circle. His royal grand chamberlain Johann Rudolf Puchheim, an Imperial count from an ancient Lower Austrian family, was now imperial grand chamberlain. Puchheim and Trauttmansdorff were related by marriage, having wed sisters of Pál Pálffy. As grand chamberlain, Puchheim, after consultation with the emperor and possibly Trauttmansdorff as well, scheduled the emperor's audiences and oversaw his chamber personnel.⁵¹ The Bohemian Maximilian Count Waldstein, whom we have already encountered as Wallenstein's kinsman, became Ferdinand III's grand equerry. He saw to the emperor's mobility, the horses, and the imperial conveyances; he accompanied the sovereign in his coaches and had regular contact with him. He was also responsible for the education of imperial pages. Like Puchheim, he was

later made privy councillor.⁵² As captain of the imperial guards, Ferdinand III installed the Scotsman Walter Count Leslie. The nunciature noted that the emperor liked him greatly, and sources show that the two played cards for money. Ferdinand III entrusted Leslie with an ambassadorship to England and made him privy councillor in the 1650s. Because Leslie had been instrumental in Wallenstein's death, he was not on good terms with Wallenstein's nephew, Grand Equerry Waldstein; in 1636, both had to promise Ferdinand III that they would refrain from insulting each other. The office of Imperial court marshal went to Heinrich Wilhelm Count Starhemberg from Upper Austria, another aristocratic acquaintance from the emperor's early years, who had been his royal court marshal since 1634.⁵³

Ferdinand III retained some officeholders in top administrative positions. He confirmed Wilhelm Count Slavata as chief Bohemian chancellor and, in 1637, appointed his own royal Bohemian chancellor, Georg Adam von Martinitz, privy councillor, with the promise to make him Slavata's successor. Together, the two conducted Bohemian affairs until the 1650s. Ferdinand III also confirmed Schlick in his position as president of the War Council and, in 1637, appointed him to the Privy Council. Officers who had engineered Wallenstein's downfall remained influential, especially Gallas and Piccolomini, who were named privy councillors in 1639 and 1640, respectively. Both carefully nurtured their relationship with Trauttmansdorff, who was fully occupied with the war's political issues, had little interest in military details, and was content to leave them to the experts.⁵⁴

Likewise, the president of the Imperial Court Council Fugger and the Imperial Vice Chancellor Stralendorf initially remained in their positions. But in 1637, Ferdinand III wished to reform the Imperial Aulic Council and replaced Fugger with Johann von der Reck; Stralendorf died that same year, and the emperor replaced him with the court councillor Ferdinand Sigmund Count Kurz, an able jurist and diplomat who was entrusted with numerous missions in the Empire. Kurz was closely linked to Trauttmansdorff, and it is likely that he owed this promotion to the grand steward. In 1640, both Reck and Kurz were made privy councillors and worked in many deputations. Trauttmansdorff, Kurz, and Reck were the essential Imperial councillors in all matters concerning the Empire.⁵⁵

The central office for the imperial fiscal administration was the court treasury (*Hofkammer*). It was in charge of the court and military bursars' offices as well as those of most territories, exclusive of the Inner Austrian court treasury. This institution's condition was lamentable and was continually being criticized, both orally and in writing, even within earshot of the emperor. The position was lucrative for its personnel but a catastrophe for the war chest. The military, more than anything, demanded order and efficiency.

The officers' complaints about the court treasury support the thesis that the Thirty Years' War was one into which princes fell and from which bureaucratic states emerged.⁵⁶

But in 1637, things had not yet come to this. The current president of the court treasury, Ignaz Krafft Abbot of Lilienfeld, refused Ferdinand III's request for a financial account of his term in office as not being customary. In April 1637, Krafft and the vice president of the court treasury, Berchthold, got into a shouting match in the imperial antechambers, and so the nuncio, "accused each other of fraudulent acts, so that people got to see a nice comic scene."⁵⁷ Berchthold kept his position, and Krafft lost his. Ferdinand III appointed the president of the Bohemian Chamber, Ulrich Franz von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, as the new court treasury president and made him a privy councillor in 1644. The emperor did not relent immediately and demanded information about confiscated properties, something from which almost the entire influential court aristocracy had profited substantially. But a close scrutiny of the office's financial dealings during the 1620s and 1630s, especially the disposition of Wallenstein's assets, was dragged out and finally prevented.

Werdenberg's retirement made a new appointment to the Austrian chancery possible, and the position went to a peasant's son, Matthias Pricklmayr, who had been advanced by the Graz Jesuits and had worked his way up as a lawyer in the service of a territorial prince. In 1648, Ferdinand III made him Baron von Goldegg. The old aristocracy found it difficult to accept this rapid rise and saw to it that Pricklmayr became notorious as a corrupt bureaucratic automaton in the service of Trauttmansdorff. He dealt, *inter alia*, with cases in which the claims of the Habsburgs, in their role as territorial rulers, collided with those of the Church, especially the Venetian patriarchate of Aquileia and the two imperial prince-bishoprics of Brixen and Trent. It was no coincidence that the emperor quartered Lukas Holstenius—secretary to the pope's nephew Cardinal Francesco Barberini and later director of the Vatican library, an eminent humanist and theologian—with Pricklmayr during a Vienna sojourn. At the Diet of Regensburg in 1640/41, the emperor had Pricklmayr, of all people, defend the elector of Trier's imprisonment. Last but not least, Pricklmayr negotiated joint concerns, such as the salt trade and military recruitment, with the Venetian ambassadors. In 1640, he was appointed privy councillor.⁵⁸

By the end of 1637, most top positions at court had been filled under Trauttmansdorff's patronage. After this influence had solidified, Ferdinand III gradually added the new officeholders to the Privy Council, which remained a consultative agency and had no decision-making powers. It met only in the emperor's presence, and he set its agenda in consultation with the grand steward and the privy councillors. Ferdinand III regarded it as a prince's duty always to solicit extensive advice, something he did before military campaigns

both in his early years and later as an experienced ruler. The emperor asked the presidents of central administrative bodies, most of whom were or quickly became privy councillors, to present more weighty issues to the council. The number of attendees fluctuated with individual invitations, with roughly seven to ten privy councillors attending the sessions during the first years of Ferdinand III's reign, later growing to as many as twelve.⁵⁹

Especially important problems were discussed by Ferdinand III and a few councillors in advance. For these so-called deputations, he assembled the councillors he needed and allowed them to negotiate with third parties. Those present included, as a rule, a generalist (most likely Trauttmansdorff), a specialist, another privy councillor, and, depending on the nature of the problem, Imperial Vice Chancellor Kurz or the heads of the Imperial Aulic Council, the War Council, or the court treasury. The deputized councillors usually presented a carefully prepared report in a council session, where others then had the opportunity to voice their opinions—though they made “surprisingly few” changes in the deputations’ suggestions.⁶⁰ After all, who could have contradicted the authority, expertise, and circumspection of such a body? The emperor used the deputation of privy councillors as the essential instrument for structuring political processes. Thus, the sessions of the Privy Council tended toward consensus-building rather than controversy.

Before making a decision, the emperor consulted his council even on matters that were brought to him directly, whether at audiences, in petitions, or through mediators. He frequently asked that a report be submitted in written form and then channeled the documents to the appropriate authorities. Issues pertaining to Imperial justice went to the Aulic Council, financial matters to the court treasury, military questions to the War Council, territorial matters to their respective administrations, and court issues to the responsible court officials. These agencies examined the cases, checked judicial and financial implications, gathered information, and rendered expert opinions; after going through the internal procedural motions, the head of the respective agency, generally accompanied by a counselor and a secretary, presented the results to the emperor. At such business audiences, the emperor was usually surrounded by only a few privy councillors from his inner circle. The workload of these sessions tended to be high, mainly because the emperor himself, at least pro forma, made decisions concerning even insignificant expenditures and subordinates, including the choice of a night watchman. The outcome was generally his approval of the resolutions presented to him.⁶¹

So the paths of direct and indirect access to the emperor—via innumerable third parties—and the formal and informal influence on his decisions could be understood generally, but they were opaque in detail and could not be monopolized. The reason for this situation lay in the already emphasized

interdependency between the central government and the territorial nobility. The territorial ruler's field of direct action was quite limited. Ferdinand III attended chiefly to a prince's most important task, the maintenance of justice in "a simultaneity of legal systems" (Winkelbauer).⁶² In 1644, he issued a new directive for the Bohemian Court of Appeals. As territorial prince, he had the credit system, which had been wrecked by war, reorganized earlier than that of the Empire, and in 1656, he promulgated for Lower Austria new penal and criminal procedures, which still included prosecution of sorcery and presumptive witches. Territorial administrations worked with relative independence, however, and the emperor knew their work from draft resolutions submitted to him through court channels by territorial administrative or cameral officials. Territorial police ordinances (*Polizeiordnungen*) of this time appeared to have little impact. At territorial Diets, Ferdinand III was usually represented by courtiers, regional officials, and sometimes relatives like his brother, as he was at Linz in 1641. In Lower Austria, he frequently attended such Diets in person.

Thus, princely authority was put into practice through the court's integration of the nobility; it functioned through the linkage of influence in both spheres of court and territory. The enforcement of princely authority in the territories was predicated on and modified by the participation of courtiers firmly anchored in their regions. This integration intensified under Ferdinand III because he strongly preferred to advance aristocrats who held offices in territorial Diets and administrations as well as at court. At the same time, he bestowed court offices with an eye to family and clan influences both at the regional level and at court.⁶³

During Ferdinand III's reign, the gentry or lower nobility lost its connection to this system. It had profited in relatively minor ways from the many elevations into the higher ranks of the aristocracy and the dispersal of confiscated lands to so many courtiers and military officers during the 1620s and early 1630s. The gentry held little sway in the territorial Diets. It also had difficulties financing its children's preparation for higher court positions. Courtiers required servants, suitable living quarters, horses, and expensive clothing. They had to accept large and small ambassadorial charges that took them to Spain, Poland, and Constantinople as well as to popes, kings, republics, electors, princes, imperial cities, and confederations. This demanded confident and courtly behavior and a command of foreign languages, and thus required an expensive education. In addition, such travels had to be financed in advance, with expenses frequently reimbursed only after the journey, if at all.⁶⁴

The court was also important when it came to conferring positions on clerics. Frequently, the emperor, through his courtiers, exerted influence on the canons who elected bishops. He could nominate some bishops, as he did in 1646, for example, by naming Antonio Marenzi as the new bishop for

Trieste. At court, rumors were rife that he might nominate his oldest court chaplain Gorizzutti, though this did not happen. Perhaps as a compromise, the chaplain's nephew was made imperial court chaplain the following year and later became his uncle's successor as the distributor of imperial alms. The influence courtiers could bring to bear on appointments to ecclesiastical posts is demonstrated by the superintendency in the cathedral chapter of Brno (Brünn), where the Privy Councillor and Bohemian Vice Chancellor Martinitz engineered the installation of Rota-Auditor Peutingner over one of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm's privy councillors.⁶⁵

In a way, the empress's ladies-in-waiting were the equivalent of the emperor's chamberlains. For both these groups, the court served as a central marriage market. If courtiers from different territories married, the court's hand in the creation of a supraterritorial Habsburg aristocracy was particularly obvious. Recognizing their significance, the nunciature systematically reported on court marriages. Aside from gleaning many other details, we can see which connections were deemed important, such as the niece of a cardinal or a nephew of Pál Pálffy.⁶⁶ We also learn that some nobles, like Miklós Pálffy, were quickly promoted to the rank of chamberlain so that they might have the honor of a court wedding. However strategically positions were apportioned—with the overall dispersion resembling a quota system in macro- and political sociology—the process often constituted a delicate way of handling complex situations, recommendations and demands, and deals and deceptions in surprisingly diverse constellations.

During Ferdinand III's reign, the court was large, flexible, and mobile enough to integrate the upper aristocracy from the hereditary lands and the Hungarian nobility, respectively. At the highest level of leadership, both at court and in the territories, the key role lay with the Privy Council, and at mid-level, it was with the chamberlain's office. For these two agencies, the connection between service and presence at court was relaxed. Many privy councillors and chamberlains came to court only occasionally because they tended to hold positions in the military, governmental or judicial sectors, or in provincial administration. The high regard in which such offices were held is demonstrated by the numerous tombstone inscriptions referring to a deceased's positions and the many portraits showing a chamberlain with a key symbolizing his office.⁶⁷

Presence in Bohemia and Hungary

Ferdinand III spent approximately half of his twenty-year reign as emperor away from Vienna and Lower Austria; his other regular places of residence were Regensburg, Bratislava, Linz, and Prague. This mobility was no longer that of a medieval itinerant kingship but instead resulted in part from the

Estates' power in two of his monarchies. As a precondition to his election, in 1625, he had sworn to attend the Hungarian Diets, and reason dictated that he also attend those of the Holy Roman Empire. In addition, plague, war, and peace negotiations occasioned extensive travels. Finally, the Bohemian coronations of his relatives took him to Prague.⁶⁸

Ferdinand III's first two journeys to Prague as emperor, however, had different motives. In late spring of 1638, he remained there for about a month, probably to be in closer proximity to his newly regained Saxon ally or to more easily assess the possibilities of a peace agreement with Sweden. In summer, the emperor traveled again to Bohemia for an extended visit, nearer to the theaters of war and negotiations. It is also quite likely that in the 1630s, he planned an annual stay in Prague. He refurbished his wife's apartments in the Prague palace in 1638 and undertook additional construction work there in the early 1640s, corresponding with his brother during the mid-1640s about the renovation of the chapel. In 1647/48, he remained so long that people thought he would make the city his main residence. Then, in 1652, he met the electors in Prague and replaced the art collection that had been looted during the war.⁶⁹

The Bohemian nobility welcomed the emperor's residence in Prague in his role as king of Bohemia, though the Austrians regarded it with disfavor. Although the emperor had numerous Bohemian aristocrats in his retinue, holding court in Prague helped to facilitate informal contacts. Last but not least, it mitigated any resentment at Bohemia's new status as a hereditary monarchy whose important affairs were regulated by the royal Bohemian Court Chancery, which had moved to Vienna in 1624. Though the territorial government remained in the hands of aristocrats, it too was dominated by a relatively small faction of families loyal to the emperor. Their enormous landholdings, combined with an accumulation of positions at court and in the territorial administration, gave the leading families—especially the Lobkowitzes, Slavatas, Martinitzes, Waldsteins, Sternbergs, Kolowrats, Dietrichsteins, and Liechtensteins—considerable authority. Given the situation of a divided royal and Estate authority, the Bohemian and Moravian nobles could intensify their manorial rights over their subjects, particularly the peasants' compulsory labor, the *Robot*.⁷⁰

Ferdinand III first traveled to Hungary as emperor to attend the Hungarian Diet from November 1637 to the end of March 1638. The country's governance was almost entirely in the hands of Hungarians, though a royal Hungarian Chancery existed at the imperial court. But the Hungarian estates protested on principle against their affairs' being conducted by non-Hungarian counselors and placed great importance on their king having a Hungarian court, at least when he was in the country. While many leading Bohemian officials resided at the imperial court for extended periods, nearly all high Hungarian

officials remained in Hungary. On the one hand, their presence was necessary because of the ongoing border skirmishes with the Turks; they were personally involved with the country's defense and maintained their own fortifications and sometimes even private armies that could number up to several thousand soldiers. On the other hand, Calvinist nobles could not practice their religious beliefs freely outside of their country. In addition, most Hungarians preferred speaking Hungarian and Latin over the principal languages at court, namely German, Italian, Czech, and Spanish.⁷¹

When a Diet was not in session and significant matters had to be settled, representatives of the territorial administration and the Estates usually came to court for a few days. Shortly after Ferdinand II's death, such a delegation arrived in Vienna with the Palatine and the Hungarian bishops to prepare for the Diet. At this time, one of the most important territorial posts was vacant because Cardinal Pázmány, Archbishop of Esztergom and royal chancellor, had died in March of 1637, and a replacement had to be named. After deliberations at court, the Hungarians proposed three candidates, and Ferdinand III appointed one of them. The Hungarians hastily departed for Pázmány's funeral, which the nuncio described as an example of cultural idiosyncrasy: it reminded one of "carnival"; people cheerfully drank "to the decedent's good health."⁷²

At the end of 1637, Ferdinand III took up residence in Bratislava. The self-confident Hungarian estates would not be satisfied without pomp, so Ferdinand III took care to be adequately represented, with numerous courtiers, pages, personal lackeys, the chapel choirboys, and even the imperial bootblack receiving travel livery.⁷³ The deliberations at Hungarian Diets tended to focus on three issues: the confessional situation, relations with the Ottoman Empire, and judicial and administrative questions. First, there was the religious dispute. In 1625, Ferdinand III had sworn to uphold the extensive confessional privileges granted by King Matthias in 1608, and as regent, he was bound by his oath. Nevertheless, a Counter Reformation was carried out in Hungary by the archbishops, bishops, the reformed religious orders, and, more importantly, those aristocrats who had converted from Lutheranism and Calvinism to Catholicism. As a rule, such conversions went against family tradition and were frequently punished by the family. Palatine Miklós Esterházy, for example, was disinherited by his Calvinist father when he converted to Catholicism. This was no isolated case, and, consequently, converts sought the Diet's support in legal disputes with their families. But not a few Catholic nobles were wealthy and powerful enough to assert their confessional notions in their domains—just as Lutheran and Calvinist nobles had done during the Reformation and continued to do. During Ferdinand III's reign, this generally meant the expulsion of pastors and the prohibition of Protestant churches.

In the late 1630s, the formerly Calvinist Esterházy and Forgáchs, the erstwhile Lutheran Adam Batthyány, and the Catholic branch of the Pálffy were particularly zealous champions of the Counter Reformation. But compulsion and force remained nondenominational. The Calvinist György Rákóczi, for example, expelled Catholic priests from his extensive Hungarian domains.⁷⁴

Taking into account Ferdinand III's pre-election agreement, the interdenominational solidarity necessary for the Hungarian struggle against the Turks, the strong support for Calvinists in Transylvania, and the need to maintain a balance between magnates and other delegates at his first Hungarian Diet, he acceded neither to offensive Reformation nor Counter Reformation demands. Instead, he respected Protestant privileges without significantly expanding them to the Catholics' disadvantage. He was mainly occupied with brokering compromises, which could be difficult if, for example, they concerned the right to interment of Protestant nobles in new or restored Catholic churches. That problem arose when a converted aristocrat had turned a Protestant church on his estate into a Catholic one even though other Protestants had previously obtained the right to be buried there. Typical confessional compromise included permissions for a Protestant cemetery at Skalica in Nitra County and a Protestant church in Trnava (Tyrnau, Nagyszombat). On the other hand, in 1638, Ferdinand III declined to forbid testators' favoring of Catholic institutions—especially the Jesuits—in their wills.⁷⁵

The second major topic of the Hungarian Diets was the relationship to the Ottoman Empire. The Diet of 1637/38, for example, had to prepare an embassy to Constantinople, regulate financing of border security, impose the construction of border entrenchments on the peasants, and reconstruct the fortress of Győr. Finally, it attempted to prevent Hungarian violations of border agreements, something that could never be done to everyone's satisfaction given that the Hungarians had never lost sight of their country's liberation from the Turks nor the Ottomans of its full conquest. Both sides were not squeamish when it came to a border they regarded as temporary. When in Hungary, Ferdinand III was repeatedly and more or less openly confronted with the assumption that driving back the Ottomans was more important than wars with Catholic princes like Louis XIII. Here, the Hungarians and Pope Urban VIII were in agreement, but they were unable to move the emperor even an inch toward war with the Turks. Ferdinand III preferred expressing to the nuncio his regret that "he was unable to turn his weapons against the Turks."⁷⁶ This sentiment combined a rare military realism with wishful thinking that he could inspire the pope to urge France to make peace with the emperor.

Finally, the Hungarian Diet was obliged to consider numerous problems that would today be settled by decree or arbitration. In a dualistic elective monarchy with a strong feudal nobility, political affairs not only included

various controversies over the expansion of aristocratic authority along the Hungarian-Transylvanian border but also issues such as litigation rights, cattle trade, or domestic inheritance disputes. The daily routine of the Diet was relieved by carnival festivities and Empress Maria Anna's coronation as queen of Hungary.⁷⁷

Emperor, Pope, and the Elector of Trier

At the outset of Ferdinand III's reign, there ruled in the person of Maffeo Barberini as Urban VIII (1623–1644) a pope who did not give the Austrian Habsburgs the support they felt was their due. The explanation was the problematic position of the papacy between “the goals of the Counter Reformation and political interests; between the demands of Roman reason of state and obligations based on ecclesiastical responsibility” (Lutz). We will merely sketch two sides of this situation. The war between the two great Catholic European dynasties adversely affected papal efforts to maintain and spread Catholicism. At the same time, the conflict in Central Europe left the defense against the Ottoman Empire's wars of conquest largely to the Republic of Venice, overtaxing it for long periods of time. In addition, the Habsburgs and Bourbons conducted their hostilities repeatedly in northern Italy. This threatened the Holy See, which once before had sustained serious damage by soldiers of Emperor Charles V during the sack of Rome (1527). In northern Italy, France served as a counterweight to the Spanish Habsburgs, who ruled the duchy of Milan in the north and the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily in the south. Thus, Urban VIII faced “nearly insurmountable difficulties” (Lutz).⁷⁸

Against this background, Urban VIII supported a short-lived French-Bavarian alliance in 1631, denying the emperor effective assistance against a victorious campaign by the Swedes, who were backed by the French. Protests raised by the Spanish ambassador and Cardinal Borgia at a meeting of cardinals ended in turmoil. The emperor was so angry at Urban VIII that even a semblance of respect for the papacy from the imperial courtiers was a relief for the papal delegates. Thus, Ferdinand III inherited a deeply troubled relationship with the pope.⁷⁹

The very assumption of his reign proved to be a problem because Urban VIII delayed his acknowledgement of Ferdinand III's imperial office. Having conveyed the pope's felicitations for the election as king of the Romans at the beginning of 1637, the nuncio reported that Ferdinand III had accepted the papal letter of congratulations with high esteem and “expressed the wish to live as a reverent and obedient son of His Holiness and the Holy See.”⁸⁰ But the nuncio also reported on a celebration in Rome for this occasion. In the early modern era, such festivities were not mere entertainment but served as public political manifestations, and Trauttmansdorff took exception to

certain omissions from the description of the celebration, such as, among others, the phrase “King of the Tiber River”⁸¹ from a depiction of Hercules. This was directed against Ferdinand III’s claims as king of the Romans and emperor; Trauttmansdorff rightly assessed it as a sign that the pope would delay Ferdinand III’s recognition as emperor.

At the end of April 1637, Trauttmansdorff complained to the nuncio that the pope was delaying his recognition, adding to other vexations like the dispute over rank between the Imperial and French ambassadors in Rome and the delayed appointment of the bishop of Vienna as a cardinal. According to the nuncio, Trauttmansdorff said that Ferdinand III was very perplexed that Rome could doubt his readiness to send the customary delegation of obeisance (*Observanzgesandtschaft*) to the Holy See and the pope, “as whose reverent son he lived.” He was furthermore astonished that Rome paid him so little respect. Trauttmansdorff, with a cutting remark about the dispute over the Hungarian royal title, emphasized the king’s “wartime efforts and affliction in the service of the Catholic religion.”⁸²

It was not difficult for the nuncio to recognize this as a threat, one which demanded of the Counter-Reformation Church politician Urban VIII that he rein in the Francophile power politician Urban VIII. The imperial court made clear that although pope and emperor had common confessional goals, each of them separately tallied the merits of losses and gains of his investments. During these demonstrations of a potential imperial threat, Ferdinand III took on the role of the knight in shining armor fighting for the Church and Trauttmansdorff that of the inflexible representative of the dynasty’s interests. Yet these scripted roles should not induce us to mistake them for merely personal expressions. Rome understood the threat and, getting ready to acknowledge Ferdinand III as emperor, began to examine precedents, namely the accessions of Rudolf II, Matthias, and Ferdinand II to power.⁸³

The delegation to Rome was the precondition for a papal acknowledgement of Ferdinand III as emperor. This was necessary because, after the Empire’s confessional division, the emperor’s coronation was no longer performed by the pope. But the choice as king of the Romans by the electors and his coronation by a German archbishop alone could not legitimize the emperor’s “supreme position in Europe” (Burkhardt).⁸⁴ In 1530, after the last coronation of an emperor by a pope, a process had evolved that transformed the elected and crowned king of the Romans into an emperor. A royal representative assured the pope during an audience that the king would fulfill his Imperial duties to the pope, after which the pope acknowledged the king as emperor. The interpretation of the Imperial declaration was as controversial as the designation of the delegation as one of obeisance (*Observanz-* or *Obödienzgesandtschaft*).

Now someone had to be found who would convey this message, preferably at his own expense, as the journey would be extremely costly because of the massive expenditures for ceremonial display. So the ambassador had to be very wealthy and easy to blackmail. Ferdinand's choice (it is unclear at whose instigation) was the young prince Johann Anton von Eggenberg, son of Prince Eggenberg who had died in 1634. He had been in Rome once before in 1631, and Ferdinand III knew him well—they were approximately the same age. As owner of the southern Bohemian duchy of Krumlov (Krumau), the prince was one of the very richest men in the Habsburg territories. In 1637, he was summoned to the court at Laxenburg and enlightened by Trauttmansdorff as to his situation. He was faced with an investigation of his legal rights to Krumlov because his father's acquisition of the duchy in the 1620s had not been quite aboveboard. When Ferdinand III then asked Eggenberg to take on the ambassadorship, the young prince agreed and thus saved his dukedom. He could and would not conceal his dismay at the immense expenditures he was forced to incur but did not dare take the risk of asking for a guarantee of Krumlov. Speculation at court related by the nuntiatore had it that Ferdinand III had not given such a guarantee but would should Eggenberg's journey to Rome earn him "a merit."⁸⁵

Shortly after Easter 1638, following months-long negotiations between the imperial and papal courts and after much prodding from the imperial side and extensive preparations, Eggenberg at last set out for Rome with his own retinue of more than 200 persons. Trauttmansdorff knew how important it was to keep an eye on events and ordered one of his own sons, who happened to be in Rome at the time, to remain until Eggenberg's arrival.⁸⁶ Eggenberg was eminently presentable. A coach, built as a gilded showcase especially for this purpose, transported the valuable gifts for the pope during the entry into the city. Eggenberg had the façade of his house near the Trevi fountain ornamented with an extravagance that, according to one report, had never before been seen in Rome. Paintings and inscriptions glorified the Habsburgs, depicting them as ever victorious patrons of Catholicism and champions against heresy and rebellion. A picture of a triumphant Ferdinand III showed his carriage preceded by an allegory of glory and the goddess of victory with crown and palm fronds, with the vanquished enemies of Austria beneath it and the inscription *Numquam Digniori* ("never has a worthier man worn the imperial crown") above. Busts of several Habsburg emperors, among them Rudolf II and Charles V, were on display, as were finely painted statues on gilded columns representing allegories of Piety, Power, Justice, and Religion. Furthermore, two paintings depicted Ferdinand III's victories in the conquest of Regensburg and the battle of Nördlingen. Allegorical representations showed the river Tiber with Romulus and Remus as well as the Danube

with children wreathed in palm fronds and laurels; inscriptions explained that the pictures illustrated the notion that Imperial authority had derived from ancient Rome. From the Tiber's mouth emanated the words "Ancient Honors are restored to Me" and from the Danube's "My Empire is Without Borders."⁸⁷

All this could not please France at all and the pope only conditionally. After the young prince, with enormous ostentation, had accomplished his entry into Rome, a chain of mishaps during the papal audience caused its abrupt cancellation. After further months-long negotiations, Eggenberg repeated the costly entry parade and was granted another audience within the new framework of an assembly of cardinals. Thus, the journey fulfilled its purpose after all and brought Ferdinand III papal recognition. But even at the end of 1639, the Imperial court still worried about the details of the legal instrument with which Urban VIII documented his acknowledgement.⁸⁸

Ferdinand III had recurring conflicts with the Holy See. The Hungarian bishops, for example, complained to the emperor that Rome delayed bishops' appointments and encumbered them with fees. In spite of imperial pressure, Urban VIII did not make the bishop of Vienna a cardinal. The emperor soon tired of the nuncio's excuses and, according to the nuncio's report, said that he did not like "to be led about by the nose."⁸⁹ Taddeo Barberini, the prefect of Rome and Urban VIII's nephew, insisted on ceremonial precedence even over the imperial ambassador, which caused trouble for years. There were also tensions over the question of whether St. Augustine should be depicted with or without shoes. In 1638, Ferdinand III took the side of the Unshod Augustinians in this once purely ecclesiastical dispute by rejecting the Holy See's demands for enforcement of its pictorial tradition. Thus, the Unshod Augustinians were able to display St. Augustine's picture, without shoes, in the Viennese Augustinian court church.

From time to time, there were also difficulties over marriage dispensations for the emperor's protégés. In many such cases, Ferdinand III was successful, such as in 1642, when he recommended the marriage of his cousin Anna Catharina Constantia of Poland to Philip Wilhelm of Palatinate-Neuburg. On this occasion, the emperor and the courtiers voiced "extreme satisfaction"⁹⁰ with the pope, according to the nunatiature. Yet, three years before, it had proven more difficult to obtain a dispensation for Katharina von Brandenburg, sister of the reigning elector and widow of Prince Bethlen Gábor of Transylvania, who had converted to Catholicism and wished to marry a Lutheran Prince.

All these conflicts were surpassed by the politically volatile controversy concerning the elector of Trier and archbishop of Speyer, Philip Christoph von Sötern. We already know that in 1636, the Spanish had imprisoned him for making treaties with France and granting French troops the right to occupy

fortifications in his territory. At the beginning of 1637, the elector lived, still as a prisoner, with the smallest possible retinue in an apartment of the Linz residence.⁹¹ As archbishop, Sötern enjoyed the Church's protection and soon came under the formal custody of both the papal nuncio and the bishop of Vienna. During their audiences, several successive nuncios presented his case to the emperor almost weekly. The emperor with his courtiers, on the other hand, employed classic delaying tactics for eight years. He promised deliberations and actually undertook them—gaining a great deal of time—on aspects meant to show his alleged good will, though with minimal and exceedingly slow compliance. So in 1637, for example, he gave permission for a move from Linz to Vienna that was followed by endless deliberations about Sötern's new living quarters, the details of his surveillance, and the incremental relaxation of his arrest.⁹²

But on the central issue of the elector's release, both sides remained obdurate. Ferdinand III and Trauttmansdorff proved to be a good team, with Trauttmansdorff placating the nuncio with "sugared but very general words,"⁹³ while Ferdinand III emphasized the affair's long duration and claimed to have given instructions for a decision to be made. Once Sötern finally understood the delaying techniques, the court put him off with word that the Privy Council had decided to hasten a decision. A decision was made but not the one the elector hoped for: Ferdinand III increased the spending for his maintenance. By now, even Trauttmansdorff had enough of Sötern's complaints and let the nuncio know that he regarded the elector as "terrible."⁹⁴ In 1639, Ferdinand III sent the Imperial Vice Chancellor Kurz to Sötern and had the Aulic Council debate the case. A few months later, the Nuremberg Electoral conference discussed but deferred it as a matter of war for the general peace congress. This satisfied the emperor but not Sötern. The nunciature wrote: "He screams and yells to high heaven."⁹⁵ Because the other electors had not clearly supported him, Sötern remained in Vienna under watchful eyes for several more years while the Church continued to press the case.

2.3

NEGOTIATIONS

Contrary to expectations reported by the Venetian ambassador, Ferdinand III was set on peace negotiations to end the various wars from the outset of his reign. He followed a “three-step strategy.”¹ First, the Peace of Prague would be completed and thus the Empire pacified internally. Simultaneously, peace with Sweden would be concluded. Deprived of its allies, France would then be compelled to return to the peace treaty of 1630/31 and to acknowledge the Peace of Prague. It was central to this plan that negotiations with the different partners would be conducted separately. The emperor’s position tended to be stronger in individual negotiations than at congresses, where he was confronted by all antagonists at the same time. He also hoped to keep the Empire’s internal problems out of the peace negotiations with France and Sweden.

This plan did not work. The peace negotiations, begun separately in 1637, became entangled in the attractive idea of a general peace congress in Cologne that never actually met but was appealing during its lengthy preparatory phase. Only France, Spain, and the emperor were supposed to make peace in Cologne, but France made participation by its allies a precondition for the start of the main negotiations. A congress supported by France and its allies within the Empire seemed more promising for the emperor’s antagonists than separate negotiations. Thus, they demanded settling their affairs at the congress of Cologne. The emperor’s strategy of separate negotiations with Sweden and the Imperial territories proved chimerical.

Negotiations with Sweden

Shortly after his accession, Ferdinand III entered into negotiations with Sweden. He lacked sufficient funds to wage an effective war and hence urged a speedy peace. Sweden demanded money to pay its troops and territorial compensation along the Baltic Sea. The Spanish were willing to help the emperor with Sweden’s financial requests (with the remainder being raised by the Protestant Estates) and also supported Swedish demands for territory,

calculating that peace with Sweden would bolster the emperor in the war against France and that Swedish territories in the north would check the large Protestant territories of electoral Brandenburg and electoral Saxony.

In the spring of 1637, Ferdinand III briefly traveled to Prague, raising hopes for a rapid peace. He did not conduct the negotiations himself but authorized the elector of Brandenburg and the dukes of Mecklenburg to lead the preliminary deliberations. Based on their progress, he believed the Swedes were ready for a peace agreement and, in the fall, sent his new Vice Chancellor Kurz to Hamburg for further discussions. At the beginning of 1638, peace with Sweden seemed imminent. But although the territories demanded by Sweden were a part of the Empire, Ferdinand could not simply cede them; they belonged to other imperial princes whose consent, as well as commensurate compensation, was required. If this could not be attained, the approval of the other territories, or at least that of the electors, was needed. Ferdinand III sought backing from the electors and asked the Aulic Council to discuss the juridical implications. All this took time.²

Meanwhile, the Swedes realized the Imperial Army's weakness, which the nuncio frankly described at the beginning of 1638 as being "... reduced to a small contingent, entirely without weapons, quite dilapidated, and as good as naked."³ This encouraged the Swedes to continue the war with financial support from France. In March 1638, France and Sweden concluded an agreement for subsidies. Sweden renewed the French alliance, abandoning for three years a separate peace treaty with the emperor. Thus, the emperor's strategy for negotiations already foundered in 1638. But, almost to the end, he did not abandon hope for a separate peace with Sweden. The Swedes, however, were no longer interested. In 1639, when Ferdinand III, under pressure from a growing Turkish threat, decided to explore actual conditions for peace with Sweden, to renew negotiations, and, in December, to offer them Rügen and Stralsund, the Swedes would have nothing to do with it.⁴

Negotiations with Hesse-Kassel

The situation concerning the emperor's second important adversary, Hesse-Kassel, was similar. Landgrave Wilhelm V had been driven from Hesse by the military but had saved his army by taking it north. At the beginning of 1638, Ferdinand III again sought a compromise and seriously considered restoring the convent of Hersfeld to the Calvinist landgraves. The nuncio mobilized Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and the bishop of Vienna to oppose this scheme. Though in March the emperor delayed the restitution, at the end of April, he still hoped to pacify Hesse-Kassel. The attempt came to nothing: one of the archduke's chamberlains opined that the emperor had been made to look foolish and was very annoyed.⁵

For Hesse-Kassel, a rapprochement with France offered better prospects than an early compromise with the emperor. Hersfeld was not the only item on Hesse-Kassel's wish list; the landgraves also demanded a reversal of the Imperial Aulic Court's ruling on the division of inheritance with Hesse-Darmstadt. Unlike Ferdinand III who was bound by this verdict, Louis XIII had a free hand and, in October 1637, sent an ambassador to promise that France would not make peace with the emperor without considering Hesse-Kassel's interests. In addition, France threw its support behind Hesse-Kassel precisely during the Imperial debate over Hesse-Kassel's participation in the congress of Cologne.⁶

As he had with Sweden, Ferdinand III insisted on an attempt at a separate peace with Hesse-Kassel. In the summer of 1639, the Landgravine Amalie of Hesse-Kassel authorized peace negotiations during a ceasefire, and the emperor was willing to relinquish Hersfeld as compensation. When the nuncio protested vehemently, the emperor cited the support of his Privy Council, his theologians, the elector of Bavaria, and the elector of Mainz, who was, after all, an archbishop, "a clergyman and theologian."⁷ Trauttmansdorff was incensed by the nuncio's complaints; Ferdinand III's confessor argued for keeping a sense of proportion, calling disputed restitutions "bagatelle"⁸ and recommended considering the whole picture.

Hesse-Kassel nevertheless remained in France's camp. Although it observed the ceasefire in the summer of 1639, it dispatched troops to the United Netherlands, which were allied with France. Ferdinand III, on the other hand, did not concede as much as his agents and curbed their alterations to confessional stipulations important for Hesse-Kassel. By the end of 1639, the emperor had lost an army in a battle with the Swedes, but Hesse-Kassel had gained a formal alliance with France. After that, a separate peace agreement with Hesse-Kassel was out of the question.⁹

Negotiations with England

In the same manner, the emperor let negotiations on the conflict over the Palatinate slip away from him. Here, too, he had sought a way to an early compromise. During his stay in Prague in July 1637, he had learned that the Spanish had misrepresented to England the Imperial stance on restitution of the Palatinate, and he reportedly told the English representative, "Rest assured that I have ever conducted this affair with an honest heart and wish to do all that is possible to satisfy your king. But since issues important to Spain as well as to Bavaria are at stake here, I wish to take the time to consider everything carefully."¹⁰ Ferdinand stated that he had asked Bavaria to send an envoy to Brussels for negotiations on the restitution; he, too, would send someone and would ask the English king to do the same. Yet, he would have preferred a conference of only those who were immediately affected.

But preliminary negotiations with the English representative at the Imperial court dragged on so long that the latter told Trauttmansdorff and Schlick in August 1637 that the English king—according to the nuntiatore—no longer wanted to be “led by the nose,” that “the emperor allowed himself to be ruled by the Spanish,” and that Spain “threw its weight around the Empire because of its money” and “bought the Germans by the dozen like animal skins.” Although Ferdinand III and Trauttmansdorff continued to negotiate, they remained under Spanish influence and thus too inflexible. The English ambassador, according to the nuncio, called Trauttmansdorff “hard as a rock.”¹¹ Ferdinand III still had the basic problem of not knowing how to compensate Maximilian I if the elector had to return the Upper Palatinate to the count Palatine.

The option of an Anglo-Spanish alliance against the United Netherlands, which would have decisively relieved the emperor in the war with France, was not off the table. At the beginning of January 1638, the Imperial courtier and expatriate Scotsman Leslie dared to quarrel with Trauttmansdorff in the emperor’s presence. He asserted that, in case of the Palatinate’s restitution, England would assist Spain against the United Netherlands in the conflict over the Spanish Netherlands and its territories in South America. Nevertheless, Spain wanted to keep the Lower Palatinate, from which it could exert pressure on three electorates simultaneously as well as put pressure on the emperor concerning his old war debts. In March 1638, the situation was so tense that the English resident and the Spanish ambassador Castañeda had a vehement altercation in the imperial antechamber.¹² Because of his empty coffers, Ferdinand III could rush neither Bavaria nor Spain into ceding the Palatinate, and this gave France an opportunity for rapprochement with England, something the Imperial court had not thought possible. After Spain and England had long made common cause against their common Dutch enemy, England now entered into an alliance with France. There was also a dynastic connection, with Louis XIII’s sister Henrietta Maria marrying the English King Charles I. Consequently, France could claim that it, too, represented English interests in the Palatine question at the congress of Cologne.¹³

Negotiations over the Palatinate, which Ferdinand III had initiated and Spain endorsed in 1637, did take place in Brussels, but at the beginning of 1639, the Danish king informed the emperor that France was undermining limitations on the number of participants. Ferdinand III nevertheless sent a representative to Brussels. France countered by insisting on the count Palatine’s participation in the congress of Cologne, though Ferdinand III had no assurance that the English king would even allow negotiations to take place. Though an English representative belatedly arrived in Brussels, he came with unchanged demands for restitution of the Palatinate. Thus, no resolution was to be found in Brussels, nor could an Imperial representative find one later in London.¹⁴

The Congress of Cologne

The hopes for a general peace congress thwarted the emperor's quest for separate peace agreements. For years the pope had pleaded for a peace congress with Spain, France, and the emperor, and at the end of his reign, Ferdinand II had agreed to send representatives to Cologne.¹⁵

At this time, Richelieu was pursuing several foreign policy goals: first, the recognition of French annexations in the Empire (Pinerolo, Lorraine, and the bishoprics Metz, Toul, and Verdun); second, the separation of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs; and finally, the formation of two military alliances, one of Protestant and Catholic territories in the Empire that was designed to prevent the Habsburgs from becoming "absolute rulers in Germany" (Tischer)¹⁶ and another of Italian territories to check the power of the emperor and the Spanish king there. Because of its internal weakness, France could not manage war on several fronts against the Habsburgs without allies. Under pressure from aristocratic rebellions instigated by his younger brother Gaston, Louis XIII needed partners and time. The congress of Cologne—or, more precisely, its delay—offered both.

Thus, France agreed to send representatives to Cologne only on the condition that the emperor and Spain admit additional parties to the congress. In so doing, Richelieu used to his advantage conflicts within the Empire that the Peace of Prague had been unable to resolve.¹⁷ At the end of 1636, France demanded passports not only for Sweden, the Netherlands, England, Denmark, and Venice but also for the princes and cities of the erstwhile Heilbronn League (such as Württemberg and Nuremberg), the Swiss Graubünden, the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, the mercenary leader Duke Bernhard of Weimar and the Italian dukes of Savoy, Mantua, and Parma.

According to imperial instructions, France was to return to the terms of the Regensburg peace treaty of 1630 and, beyond that, to ratify the Peace of Prague. Concerning the participation of additional parties, in 1636/37, the emperor had acceded to demands that the electors' representatives would attend; this was to his benefit because he needed their agreement for ceding Imperial territories. However, he did not wish to see other polities represented in Cologne, as their participation would render the Peace of Prague hollow and would alter the balance of power among emperor, electors, and the other Imperial territories.¹⁸

Under these circumstances, it is remarkable that Spain and even Ferdinand III sent ambassadors at all, let alone in March of 1637. However, the congress of Cologne represented a peace initiative by the pope, whose authority in the Christian world the emperor respected despite his difficulties with Urban VIII. Even before Ferdinand III's accession, the nuncio had expressly pleaded for such a congress. In spite of his doubts about France's intentions, the

emperor most likely expected early peace at the outset so long as the die had not been cast against him in Hesse and Sweden. When his negotiators, the Aulic Concillors Krane and Questenberg, had arrived in Cologne, Privy Councillor and Vice Chancellor Stralendorf informed the nuncio that an immediate start of negotiations was desirable, affirming that “His Majesty wants peace.”¹⁹

Alas, negotiations in Cologne were not about peace but rather about whether and how to admit additional representatives, questions that offered ample opportunities for conflict. For example, in October 1637, Ferdinand III was prepared to admit the United Netherlands as subjects of Spain. But they insisted on a title that would underscore their independence from Spain. When Ferdinand III, after protracted negotiations, thought he had found a compromise at the end of 1638, France insisted that Spain, in its passport for the representatives of the United Netherlands, designate them as “free states” (*Estatz libres*),²⁰ a designation that would have acknowledged their independence even before the issue of independence could be negotiated.

In May 1637, after Ferdinand III had conceded Savoy’s, Mantua’s, and Parma’s participation, he learned that passports for Protestant Imperial Estates were being prepared at the French court. Yet he continued the negotiations and conceded, in principle, passports for Sweden and the United Netherlands at the end of 1637. In early 1638, he explained his persistent willingness to negotiate to the nuncio by stating that he “wished for peace and quiet in the highest degree”²¹ and would not let an opportunity pass to achieve it. Contrary to a previous agreement, however, the French envoys still did not appear after receiving these passports. Trauttmansdorff had told the nuncio in July 1637 that France would not send its representatives independently of Imperial assent because it did not want peace, something the emperor reiterated at the beginning of 1638. Imperial Court Councillor Walderode and the bishop of Vienna voiced the same opinion.

Thus, an expert opinion from the circle around the papal envoy in Cologne described the congress in 1638 as “obsequies for deceased aspirations.”²² Without unforeseen important events, peace would remain remote and the Swedes would tip the balance. That Ferdinand III continued to negotiate was a consequence of his having lost hope for a speedy separate peace with Sweden because of the Franco-Swedish military alliance of March 1638. The congress, after all, still presented a chance and served as proof of the emperor’s willingness to make peace. Thus, Ferdinand III demonstrated “his goodwill and his wish for peace”²³ by providing the required security assurances for the Dutch delegates. The bishop of Vienna asserted that the opening of the congress was truly desirable. France now demanded an expansion of safety guarantees to include crimes against the crown. Trauttmansdorff retorted that the emperor would refuse categorically, terming it unacceptable and calculated to slow the peace process.

But the military situation of 1638 forced the emperor to make further concessions. In November, Ferdinand III retreated from the Peace of Prague sufficiently to accept Hesse-Kassel, Duke Bernhard von Weimar, and the other intransigent Estates as congress participants. At the beginning of 1638, he still conducted personal negotiations with Bernhard von Weimar, although an agreement broke down because Weimar had demanded a military command position and—once again—money. Thus, the duke continued to fight on the French side, taking the fortress Breisach in December. France now controlled the Franche-Comté and part of the Upper Rhine; from Breisach, it could make sorties into southern Germany with impunity.²⁴

Meanwhile, Ferdinand III was under pressure to the southeast. In the summer of 1639, the Venetian ambassador reported Persian-Ottoman peace negotiations, and the emperor complained to the nuncio that the Dutch were supplying weapons to the Turks, while France was encouraging them to wage war against him. According to the nuncio, the emperor laughed at the news that France had also promised 10,000 soldiers in case of a common war against the Turks by the emperor, Spain, and France. The actual Franco-Turkish threat was less amusing and persuaded the emperor to admit Count Palatine Karl Ludwig to the congress of Cologne.²⁵

Besides the conflict over Hesse, the conflict over the Palatinate was now on the agenda as well. Though the congress still existed only in theory, it was becoming universal—even more so because Ferdinand III demanded admittance of the expelled duke of Lorraine's family as compensation. For the Imperial Estates, the Cologne congress grew ever more interesting, with demands from within the Empire that the emperor clear any obstacles to its opening becoming ever more pressing. In the spring of 1639, the Imperial Vice Chancellor Kurz urged the discontinuation of negotiations, but the other privy councillors recommended continuation of parallel preliminary and separate negotiations. Even though the preliminary negotiations undermined separate peace conclusions, Ferdinand III decided against their discontinuation in July 1639.²⁶

Only when no French delegation had appeared in Cologne by the fall did the emperor threaten to withdraw his own. But he did not carry out his threat and did not cancel the congress even though preliminary negotiations had collapsed. Because the Franco-Swedish campaign of 1640 was successful and penetrated deep into southern Germany, France allowed the emperor's attempts to open the congress to break down.²⁷ But many Imperial Estates were under the impression that it was the emperor who prevented peace by a petty refusal to grant passports. Thus, Ferdinand III was forced to make preparations for the congress of Cologne the subject of deliberations at the Regensburg Diet of 1640. Against the advice of his counselors, after these

debates, he granted France and Sweden passports for all their allies among the Imperial Estates, namely the counts Palatine, Hesse-Kassel, and Brunswick-Lüneburg. He had conferred with the still-imprisoned elector of Trier but had not been taken in by the elector's assurances that he would no longer make agreements with France, for which reason Ferdinand admitted only one representative for Electoral Trier.²⁸

These concessions were also in vain. Finally, the pope recalled his legate from Cologne, and the congress, despite years in preparation, never took place. The preliminary negotiations brought the emperor something he had not bargained for, namely a general peace congress with the participation of all interested Imperial territories. Later, Ferdinand III was unable to withdraw the concessions he had made to bring about the Cologne peace negotiations.²⁹

He did not fall into another trap that had been set for him. In the summer of 1637, Urban VIII proposed a ceasefire. This suggestion originated in Richelieu's reaction to an earlier papal proposal for a truce. The Spanish categorically refused, fearing that after a ceasefire, Louis XIII would refuse to relinquish territories his troops had taken. At the court, there was apprehension that a Franco-Imperial truce might separate the two Habsburg lines. Ferdinand III was distrustful, having learned of French rearmament. Trauttmansdorff was convinced that France did not want peace and opposed a truce, sharing Spanish skepticism on why France was unwilling to return its conquests before a ceasefire. According to the nunciature, he regarded truce negotiations as an attempt "to lull the House of Austria to sleep."³⁰ Consequently, the court also declined later efforts by the pope and France to reach a ceasefire agreement.

In June of 1639, after the crushing French defeat in the battle at Diedenhofen on the Mosel, Urban VIII, through the nuncio, urged a ceasefire. Trauttmansdorff brusquely declined, openly charging France with the intent of exploiting a ceasefire to make the annexation of the conquered territories permanent. True to form, Ferdinand III showed himself ready for peace but laconically added that "it was necessary to ask God for peace from heaven because otherwise there could be little hope."³¹ The nuncio replied that it was doubtlessly correct to turn to God for every blessing but that it was necessary to accept the recommendations of God's representative. Ferdinand III, however, had doubts about Urban VIII representing God; he notified the nuncio that he wished to examine the documents and would then render his decision. The refusal stood.

The attack on the Austro-Spanish Habsburg alliance, implicit in the ceasefire offer, probably had the effect of strengthening it. At the same time, relations between the two were not without tensions. The vehemence with which Spain's backers at court attempted to push through their agenda sometimes irritated the emperor. He was excessively annoyed when Spain did

not support Imperial troops in the battle of Breisach. The Spanish were also extremely unpopular with many of the Imperial Estates. The anti-Habsburg press reduced the complicated relationship to the handy alternative of “German freedom” versus “Spanish servitude.” Opinion often disregarded that Philip IV’s contested territories—especially the free counties of Burgundy, Brabant, Hainaut, Luxemburg, Limburg, and Cambrai as well as sections of Flanders and the Franche-Comté—were a part of the Empire. But Spain was more to Ferdinand III than just an ally given that his children were nieces and nephews of the Spanish king and were designated, as heirs or as marriage partners, to rule the Spanish Empire one day.³²

Thus, Ferdinand III also declined the French peace offer in 1638, which would have demanded his neutrality in the Franco-Spanish War and would have meant the loss of Alsace for the Habsburgs ruling in Innsbruck. Instead, in the Ebersdorf treaty of 1639, he concurred with attempts by Spain and the Innsbruck relatives to recover Alsace and the rest of the Further Austria. In 1640, he was quoted by the Venetian ambassador to the effect that he “would rather remain in the hands of the Spanish than that of the French.”³³

His reservations toward France also had to do with his failure to understand how Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu—only a few years after dismantling the military clout of the French Calvinists and against the background of the French Wars of Religion—could now support Calvinists and Lutherans in their fight against him as a Catholic sovereign. Nor was he able to grasp why the pope operated according to political rather than confessional points of view in the Habsburg-Bourbon conflict. As an explanation for the absence of papal subsidies, the nuncio offered nearly the same reason Richelieu himself had given to Kurz in 1631: the emperor’s interference in the Franco-Spanish War in northern Italy. Speaking to Trauttmansdorff in 1639, Nuncio Mattei was quite explicit that “The war with Sweden is not a religious but a political war,” adding that Spain, after all, had aided the French Calvinists against Louis XIII. To Trauttmansdorff’s question of why the emperor, who had never supported a heretic, should be made to suffer, the nuncio laconically replied, “Divine providence.”³⁴

During the waiting period for the Cologne congress, the court developed a growing distrust of Urban VIII. When the pope negotiated an Italian military alliance according to Richelieu’s proposal in 1640 and the nuncio praised this plan as a measure that would guarantee peace, Trauttmansdorff retorted that such a league would become “a mine that could explode the world.”³⁵ The Franco-Spanish War in northern Italy went on and continued to involve the emperor. When the Spanish had repulsed the French invasion of Milan in 1640 and were preparing a siege of French-occupied Casale, Ferdinand III considered an exchange of occupied territories between France and the Empire.

As Casale was a key stronghold in northern Italy, a struggle for this fortress would have led to an “inextinguishable war in Italy.”³⁶ Trauttmansdorff suggested taking the fortress from both warring parties, either turning it over to an Imperial occupation force or razing it. Later, in Cologne, the details could be worked out with France.

Ferdinand III’s wish for “quiet in Italy”³⁷ would not become reality. Instead, a dispute between Urban VIII and the duke of Parma over the papal fief of Castro generated a league of Italian states under French influence, with Venice, Modena, and Tuscany forming an alliance and fighting a brief war against the pope in 1643. In the space of one day, Ferdinand III heard the news consecutively from representatives of the republic of Venice, the grand duke of Tuscany, and the duke of Modena. He remained neutral to his utmost ability but supplied the grand duke with an officer. The nuncio complained that the emperor permitted Venice to recruit soldiers in Poland, something Trauttmansdorff denied.

It was with relief and pleasure that the court learned in 1644 of Urban VIII’s death and his succession by Innocent X, who was regarded as being partial to Spain. The emperor, keeping up appearances, assured the nuncio that he had always shown “a son’s obedience” to the old pope but added that he expected from the successor effective support in his quest for “a good peace.”³⁸

The Ottoman Empire and Transylvania

As to the relationship with the Ottoman Empire, Imperial policy strove to maintain an approximation of the status of the Zsitvatorok treaty, which had ended the so-called Long Turkish War from 1593 to 1606. True peace agreements with non-Muslims were unacceptable to the Turks, and thus the emperor periodically had to renew temporary agreements. This proved difficult because of recurring border violations, including Turkish incursions into parts of Hungary, Croatia, and Styria that entailed abductions and enslavements of inhabitants but also attacks by Hungarian and Croatian border troops on towns belonging to the Hungarian and Croatian sectors of the Ottoman Empire. These skirmishes included acts of revenge that led, in turn, to even more intense counterattacks. As long as these actions involved less than 4,000 soldiers and no artillery, the sultan and the emperor did not see them as treaty violations—an arrangement that demonstrates that the term *peace treaty* merely whitewashed the border situation.³⁹

As neither the sultan from Constantinople nor the emperor from Vienna could control local military commanders effectively, there was always the danger that such skirmishes could turn into full-blown war. Thus, during his entire reign, Ferdinand III was occupied not merely with defending the borders but also with complaining about ongoing Turkish encroachments

and justifying those of his own border troops. He maintained a resident in Constantinople and on special occasions, sent ambassadors there; he was repeatedly visited by ambassadors from the pasha (beğlerbeği) in Buda/Ofen and less frequently by those from the sultan. The conflict on the northern border of the Ottoman Empire also involved Transylvania, Wallachia, and the Tartars and the tsar of Russia, with all of whom the emperor maintained loose diplomatic relations.⁴⁰

Because it was important to show strength in diplomatic discourse, and at the beginning of his reign, Ferdinand III tried to impress a Turkish legation soon after his succession by transforming Vienna into a Potemkin village. To demonstrate his military prowess, he had the citizens of Vienna join soldiers to form a cordon between the city gate and the castle, and he constructed an especially high platform for his throne. This wisdom was born out in 1639, when Sultan Murad conquered Baghdad and made peace with the Persians and Venice. Amid apprehension that he would now turn against his Imperial neighbor, the new sultan Ibrahim I instead deemed it necessary to resume war with Venice, enabling the emperor to extend the truce with him in 1642.⁴¹

The relationship of the Habsburgs with the princes of Transylvania was no less precarious. Until 1541, the region had been a part of Hungary, though with extensive autonomy. In Ferdinand III's time, it was a predominantly Calvinist, dualistic, and elective principality, a feudal dependency of the sultan with considerable influence in Hungary. At the beginning of the century, the principality had lost approximately half a million inhabitants when struggles over internal control were linked with the war between the emperor and the sultan for suzerainty over Transylvania. Later, Prince Bethlen Gábor had assisted the confederate territories against Ferdinand II, just as his predecessor István Bocskai (1605/06) had fought against Rudolf II on behalf of the Hungarian Protestants. Similarly, Prince György I Rákóczi (1630–1648) had been embroiled in hostilities from the outset of his reign, beginning with a succession dispute in which the governor from Buda/Ofen interfered with military force. During the 1630s, the Hungarian-Transylvanian-Ottoman powder keg was made even more explosive by Tartar incursions. To counteract them, the Turks concentrated some 10,000 soldiers south of Transylvania and marched them in the direction of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1637. In his distress, Rákóczi repeatedly asked Ferdinand III for help, but the emperor was so eager to avoid at all costs adding a war with the Ottoman Empire to his multi-front struggle in the south, west, and north that he distanced himself from Rákóczi. But Rákóczi found support elsewhere. In 1631, the first of several Swedish ambassadors had called on him and begun to prepare Transylvania's future alliance with Sweden and France.⁴²

The Nuremberg Electoral Conference

The Imperial Estates stirred up the already muddled internal situation within the Empire. In 1639, during the preliminary negotiations for the congress of Cologne, the Archchancellor and Elector Archbishop Anselm Kasimir of Mainz invited the electors to a conference. On the agenda were the possibility of accelerating the peace process among the great powers as well as the electors' own continuing warfare. Although Ferdinand III defended the meeting as such vis-à-vis the Spanish, he demanded that the issue of peace be negotiated in Cologne under Imperial leadership.⁴³

Early in 1640, before the electoral conference could begin in Nuremberg, it became clear that the Bavarian elector and others would attempt to turn the meeting into a comprehensive assembly including the leading princes of the Imperial Circles. This gathering would have been largely independent of the emperor because for such a newfangled construction, there existed no old order of business grounded in Imperial law that would have allowed Ferdinand III to control the proceedings. In addition, Bavaria had sounded out the possibility of a separate Imperial Peace with France, which would have isolated the emperor, who was clinging to Spain. Thus, there loomed a twofold detachment of the Imperial territories from the emperor. Given this situation, Ferdinand's advisers advocated convoking a regular Imperial Diet, toward which end the elector of Mainz procured the necessary agreements for a summons in April 1640. In order to promote the project, the emperor left Vienna for Regensburg on May 21. En route from Wels, he invited the Imperial territories to the first Imperial Diet in twenty-seven years. This was a big step forward to peace.

The Regensburg Diet

From the beginning of June, the emperor resided in the bishop's palace at Regensburg and waited. Though scheduling an Imperial Diet met with general approval, no elector appeared; of the secular princes, only Margrave Wilhelm of Baden-Baden came in person. The prince-bishops who did travel to Regensburg only stayed for brief periods of time, the exception being the Regensburg prince-bishop who lived there anyway. Most princes were reluctant to leave their territories, which were threatened or exhausted by war, and balked at the high costs and dangers of traveling through a war-torn country. Several territorial princes had not been invited, particularly those who were still regarded as the main reasons for war: the Palatine heirs of Friedrich V, the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and the landgravine of Hesse-Kassel. However, most of the invited and even the uninvited territories sent ambassadors. Because the emperor hoped (albeit in vain) that the elector of Mainz would appear personally, he set the very late date of September 13, 1640, for

opening the Diet. Because only delegates had shown up by then, the nuncio characterized the pleasure the emperor displayed during the opening ceremonies as dissimulation.⁴⁴

True or not, the ceremonies marked the beginning of a complicated and tactically difficult marathon of negotiations. In principle, a Diet debated substantive issues separately and in sequence from the electors to the princes to the cities. The emperor responded to decisions with replies that were then again considered by the Estates. This process was repeated until an agreement had been reached or rejected. Before publication of the Diet's final decree on October 10, 1641, no less than 158 deliberations by the electors' council, 153 by the princes' council, and 26 by the joint Imperial curiae had taken place. Ferdinand III had brought his Aulic Council along, which, together with his privy and deputy councillors, advised him before he accepted or rejected suggestions or additional counsel. The Diet's procedural rules strengthened the emperor's hand, especially because decisions by the approximately 200 directly or indirectly represented territories could become law only with his consent and in the form he approved.

France feared that the Diet might persuade the territories to accept the Imperial plan for a concerted action against external enemies. Hence, in January 1641, it attempted to dissolve the Diet by sending Swedish and Franco-Weimarian troops to Regensburg to drive out the Estates' deputies. In spite of the danger, Ferdinand III, after consulting Trauttmansdorff, decided to stay to reinforce the Imperial troops and to convince the delegates to remain as well. In January 1641, the city was indeed attacked, with the danger passing only when the ice melting started to prevent the attacking troops from crossing the Danube.⁴⁵

The first and central topic of the Diet was an amnesty for the emperor's old adversaries. The goal was to reach an agreement with the count Palatine, the elector of Trier, and those Estates from the four upper Imperial Circles that had been excluded from the amnesty and restitutions of the Peace of Prague and had not yet made peace with the emperor, especially Brunswick-Lüneburg and Hesse-Kassel. The emperor and the Imperial Estates agreed in principle on an amnesty but differed when it came to conditions. Of the emperor, the Estates demanded amnesty for territories not yet reconciled, their admittance to the Peace of Prague, and restitution of ecclesiastical property dating back to 1627 and secular properties to 1630. They furthermore demanded that all who had been forced to relinquish properties when joining the Peace of Prague would have at least part of their property restored to them (which especially affected Württemberg). The Estates accepted the emperor's condition for an amnesty, including the obligation of Hesse-Kassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg to incorporate their troops into the Imperial Army.⁴⁶

The negotiations concerning Württemberg were especially difficult. Ferdinand II had restored the immense former ecclesiastical property in Württemberg to the Church, had replenished his war chest by selling some estates, and had granted other holdings to some of his courtiers, thus depriving the duke of Württemberg of more than half his duchy.⁴⁷

Negotiations over the implementation of amnesty and restitution were made even more complicated because the elector of Bavaria—supported by other electors and Protestant and numerous Catholic princes ready to compromise—demanded a general amnesty. All Estates and subjects, with the exception of those in Austria, were to benefit from the amnesty and restitution, in return for which they were to integrate their troops into the Imperial Army. These Bavarian demands encouraged several Protestant territories to seek a return to the property situation in 1618 as well as confessional freedom for the Habsburg subjects in Silesia. They also demanded to know what would become of the Edict of Restitution when its suspension, agreed on in the Peace of Prague, would lapse a few decades hence. This was tricky for the emperor, and he considered deferring such problems for a later meeting of the Imperial Deputation. Delay was his major political tool, as nuncio reported that Ferdinand III had told him: “Time means life.”⁴⁸

But while the Imperial Diet was already underway, the emperor was prepared for a compromise concerning an amnesty, something he had to defend against objections from people within his own Habsburg and Catholic camp. He was supported by his privy councillors, his theologians, and Spain. In the end, the emperor and the Imperial Estates agreed on a compromise against the wishes of more radical Catholic and Protestant Estates. Although there was an amnesty, Imperial interests, especially those in Württemberg, were protected until the actual pacification of the Estates had been accomplished. Because amnesty was now tied to a deferment of actual conditions and a series of contentious clauses, only Brunswick-Lüneburg and tiny Isenburg-Büdingen accepted, while Hesse-Kassel, Baden-Durlach, and Nassau-Saarbrücken rejected it as insufficient. As a result, the conditional general amnesty failed to reach its goal of the internal pacification of the Empire based on the Peace of Prague as modified by the Regensburg Diet.

The second central topic of the Diet was external pacification. By 1640, Sweden’s price for a peace agreement had increased to include the acquisition of Pomerania as an Imperial fief. To satisfy this demand, Ferdinand III still needed approval from the Imperial Estates. In addition, Sweden demanded the consent of the elector of Brandenburg, and for that, Brandenburg required territorial compensation. Whereas this territory would have to be taken from others, Ferdinand III and Brandenburg could not agree from whom. Although he had initially sought to avoid a debate about an external peace, the emperor allowed consideration of

the issue. When it became clear that the Diet, contrary to his expectations, would not support his position on Electoral Brandenburg, Ferdinand III considered ceding Pomerania without the Diet's approval—though the electors of Mainz and Bavaria agreed with him that this would be of no help. Using the Imperial offer to its advantage, Sweden raised the price for continuation of its alliance with France, which it then extended in 1641. Again, there was no separate Imperial-Swedish peace, though Ferdinand III tried his luck once more in 1643.⁴⁹

The emperor encountered heavy weather when several Imperial Estates attempted to initiate direct peace negotiations with France. Prompted especially by Bavaria and Brunswick-Lüneburg, the Diet compelled Ferdinand III to write to the king of France about this question. In order to obstruct any undesirable contact between the Estates and France, the court used a Franco-Imperial dispute over titles, with the emperor refusing to address Louis XIII (who had still not recognized him as emperor) with the title *Majestas*. Although the Diet demanded a compromise formulation *Regia Dignitas et Majestas*, the emperor drew up his letters with only the title *Regia Dignitas*—whereupon Louis XIII omitted all titles of emperor, electors, and territorial rulers. In Regensburg, this was judged an affront and helped the emperor justify his refusal to answer the “insulting epistle,”⁵⁰ making it easier for him to prevent a debate about the required concessions.

Louis XIII's letter did, however, contain hints of French stipulations for peace with the Empire, demands that basically burdened only the Austrian Habsburgs with territorial concessions and the emperor's separation from Spain. Because Bavaria's strong supplications for peace with France had isolated Ferdinand III from the Imperial Estates, he traveled to Munich at Whitsuntide of 1641. There, the emperor elicited from his brother-in-law Maximilian I a statement of absolute certainty that France was ready for peace if the emperor would proclaim his neutrality in the Franco-Spanish War. A break with Spain was unacceptable for Ferdinand III, and he forestalled Bavarian pressure at the Diet by threatening to exclude Bavaria from peace negotiations. He also touched the elector's sorest spot by hinting that he could oblige Maximilian I to relinquish both the electoral dignity and territory of the banned Count Palatine Friedrich V. If he, Ferdinand, were to fully restore the territory, power, and status to the counts Palatine, they would then be able to raise the money that would then be owed to Maximilian I.⁵¹

To remove the issue of the Palatinate from French influence, Ferdinand III continued to support direct negotiations between Bavaria and representatives of the counts Palatine, with mediation from electoral ambassadors. These negotiations began in Vienna at the end of September 1641 and continued until the summer of 1642, but they foundered when the parties decided to defer settlement until the general peace congress.⁵²

The Regensburg Diet foreshadowed the structure of the coming peace congress. The Imperial Estates demanded Ferdinand III's agreement that they all could send representatives to the congress. The electors rejected this at their conclave of 1636/37, insisting that only they—but not the Imperial Estates—could participate in the negotiations. The emperor declined to admit a committee of the Imperial Diet, while the electors declined a proposal they deemed too accommodating to the princes. Finally, the emperor agreed to yet another compromise, agreeing that every prince would be able to send delegates, all of whom had to be heard by Imperial negotiators. Thus, in practice but not formally, Ferdinand III renounced the right of sole representation of the Empire and opened the future congress to all Imperial Estates. Presumably, he preferred to appear at the congress with all the Imperial Estates over only seeing those hostile to him in the French and Swedish camp there. After all, in the preliminary negotiations for the Cologne congress, France and Sweden had already attained representation for the Estates allied with them.⁵³

Hamburg

The renewal of the Franco-Swedish treaty in 1641 made a general peace congress seem inevitable. Thus, Ferdinand III gave the Imperial Aulic Councillor Lützwow permission to enter into concrete preliminary negotiations with the Swedish resident Salvius in Hamburg. Here, too, the title dispute between the emperor and France delayed any progress; because France did not recognize his Imperial title, Ferdinand III attempted to exclude the French ambassador d'Avaux from preliminary negotiations. The Regensburg Diet, however, demanded his inclusion. Ferdinand III relented somewhat by allowing d'Avaux to attend Lützwow's negotiation with Salvius. Prompted by the Danish king, Ferdinand III at last permitted d'Avaux to negotiate directly with Lützwow and Salvius, thereby permitting preliminary negotiations to commence in the summer of 1641.⁵⁴

After this breakthrough, Ferdinand III made haste to clear away any further hurdles. Lützwow received permission to grant the passports demanded by Sweden and France for the representatives of Electoral Trier, the duchess of Savoy, the prince of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the United Netherlands, the count Palatine, the landgravine of Hesse, and all "allies" and "adherents" of France and Sweden. It was especially because of the Swedes that everything went smoothly, as they pushed France toward a speedy opening of peace negotiations because the death of the Swedish military leader Baner in 1641 had plunged the Swedish army into a profound crisis. When, more than four years after Ferdinand III's accession, France acknowledged him as emperor, the three negotiators in Hamburg could conclude the preliminary agreement

on December 25, 1641, for a general peace congress. It was to begin on March 25, 1642, and take place in the Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück, not, as Ferdinand III had desired, in Cologne, Hamburg, or Lübeck.⁵⁵

Münster and Osnabrück

Because of military developments in 1642, the most important participants were in no hurry to begin peace negotiations. France and Sweden had the advantage; the emperor hoped for better times. Still, he also feared that he would fare worse at a congress than at separate negotiations. On the other hand, he could not afford to be regarded as a warrior for Spain by the Imperial Estates. Only after his troops had expelled the Swedish main army from Bohemia in August 1642 did the court see it as imperative that the congress move forward; even the issuance of passports now went comparatively fast.⁵⁶

But on November 2, 1642, the main body of Ferdinand III's army was nearly annihilated in a battle at Breitenfeld near Leipzig. The emperor reconsidered his peace policy and discussed it especially with Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and Trauttmansdorff. When word came that Cardinal Richelieu had died in December 1642, there was renewed hope at court for the peace congress. Relieved, Ferdinand III wrote his brother that the cardinal "finally went to the devil."⁵⁷ Trauttmansdorff, unlike the emperor, thought that a separate peace with France was possible and considered minimal Imperial concessions: two fortresses, restitution of the elector of Trier, and an amicable settlement of the Palatinate question. Following Trauttmansdorff's advice, at the end of 1642, the emperor sent an ambassador to France with instructions to clarify the peace conditions and prepare separate negotiations in secret. The Imperial offer proved to be unrealistic; the mission miscarried. In 1643, Louis XIII himself died, and the new chief minister Mazarin, together with the Dowager Queen Anna—a sister of Philip IV and Empress Maria Anna—carried on the affairs of state in the spirit of Richelieu, something the Imperial court had not anticipated.

Therefore, a general congress remained the only viable road to peace, and by April, Ferdinand III had announced July 1643 as the starting date. He asked several of his privy councillors for written opinions concerning instructions to his ambassadors. Most of them were certain that France would demand territory. The councillors recognized that Sweden would have to be indemnified with Pomerania and counseled step-by-step compliance; the elector of Brandenburg could be compensated for the loss of Pomerania with former Church territory. The emperor agreed, and both the official and secret instructions for the imperial ambassadors were completed by the end of September 1643.⁵⁸

Still, Ferdinand III did not relinquish his notions about separate peace treaties. A Swedish offer might be debated, while France might be approachable, though out of consideration for the Imperial Estates, not in secret. The emperor further hoped to maintain the Peace of Prague, along with the 1640–1642 modifications, as the basis for the Empire's internal organization. To ensure his territorial sovereignty, his hereditary lands were to be exempt from amnesty and restitution.⁵⁹

Yet Ferdinand III began the congress by delaying the main negotiations. In 1644, he hoped for an alliance with the Danish king against the Swedes. But while these reluctant talks were underway, Sweden attacked and defeated Denmark. The emperor, insufficiently informed, did not wish to lose his last possible ally and sent his main army to the Baltic Sea in support of the Danes. It arrived too late and perished during its retreat. It was then clear that Sweden could not be forced into a separate peace. The Danes had been invited to the congress as mediators but did not appear; Ferdinand III cut through the dilatory deliberations and, at the end of October, instructed his ambassadors in Osnabrück to proceed to the main negotiations.⁶⁰

The emperor's delaying these negotiations was in France's interest as well. In any case, the French ambassadors did not turn up until they had concluded an alliance with the Dutch, and only then, in April 1644, did the two legates from Sweden and France, Oxenstierna and Servien, appear in Münster and Osnabrück. To delay negotiations even further, France instructed its delegates to blame the war squarely on Ferdinand III. Even the mediators, the Venetian Contarini and the papal legate Chigi, felt this was going too far but no more so than the emperor, who rejected assertions that he, his father, and the loyal electors and princes "had caused the entire war"⁶¹ and accusations that they were "unjustified invaders, aggressors, and oppressors of foreign subjects." According to Ferdinand III, the French king "had in no way been forced to enter this ongoing German war against his will."

The emperor demanded a new French mandate. Because of several obscure points, the French followed up by demanding new Imperial mandates. Ferdinand III stoked the fire by asking for clarification of the scope and legality of French negotiation powers—the court, after all, did not plan to invest much energy in a nonbinding exchange of ideas, especially after the failed experience of Cologne. Last but not least, Louis XIV, King of France, born in 1638, was a minor, and there was squabbling over whether his signature had to be notarized.

This dispute also affected the conflict over of the Imperial territories' participation in the negotiations with France and Sweden. In 1644, Ferdinand III retreated from concessions he had made at the Regensburg Diet and attempted to define the territories' inclusion more narrowly. After a tug-of-war lasting

several months, the French deleted the war guilt clause from their mandate and affirmed its binding force. Ferdinand III, for his part, declared himself satisfied with Louis XIV's signature, yielded to the electors who finally wanted to begin the main negotiations, and met, if insufficiently, the various Imperial Estates' demands for participation just as they were preparing to send representatives to the congress without his authorization. Only on December 1, 1644, did the Imperials and Swedes exchange their original mandates, as did the Imperials and France on February 16, 1645.⁶²

2.4

WAGING WAR

Here we return to the beginning of Ferdinand III's reign. After all, the peace negotiations were not concerned with diplomatic disagreements alone but rather concentrated on the constant vacillations of the military situation. Yet making peace quickly is difficult when conditions for it and the course of war are variable and interdependent and when the variables include hope for military success next year.

In 1637, the situation initially seemed to favor the emperor. After the battle of Nördlingen and the Peace of Prague, the Swedes had retreated to the Baltic, while the Imperial and Spanish armies had fought on French territory. It looked as if moderate peace agreements could be forced on France and Spain with only a few campaigns. This impression was based on an avoidable error. The military leaders Gallas and Colloredo had attempted not to dissuade Ferdinand III from an offensive but to set two conditions: there had to be total peace with the imperial princes, and the army "had to be furnished with all requisites needed for a foreign war."¹ Neither condition could be met. Not all of the princes had joined the Peace of Prague, and the main Imperial Army, lacking sufficient provisions, had less than 10,000 readily available and nearly 4,000 sick soldiers.

Ferdinand III countered these restrictions with hope that the problems of an offensive would be solved by its success and that the enemies within the Empire, deprived of French support, would join the Peace of Prague. Spanish subsidies for the war against France would compensate for the lack of resources. Piccolomini also believed that only a victory over France, gained on French territory, could bring peace. So, in 1637, the emperor ordered an offensive against France and Sweden.²

Although Ferdinand III doggedly tried to redress the situation, war accompanied the Imperial Army on its march. For help, the emperor looked not only to the hereditary lands but also to Spain and the imperial princes, especially to Bavaria. Thus, Ferdinand III's military strategy was doomed from the start. To use a metaphor, he sailed with a leaking ship and assumed that the crew could be victorious while he was having the leaks repaired.³

To the frustrations of peace negotiations, war, and excessive strain, the emperor reacted with an attitude that was normal for the times but should be explained because the total wars of the twentieth century have altered the premises of war itself. Models for his fundamental stance were found in the ranks of Greek and Roman mythic heroes—men like Aeneas and Odysseus, who came to grief along the way, or Socrates and the stoic Seneca, who valued their principles more than their lives. In the seventeenth century, Stoicism was highly prized, with a prince's virtues including not only valor but also perseverance, hence Ferdinand III's admission after the defeat at Breitenfeld that "one must not allow oneself to sink, but must do what one can and more than that."⁴ Before the defeat at Jankau, he hoped that "making a virtue of necessity" might compensate for the lack of equipment and troops.⁵

The idea of overtaxing oneself as a permanent solution was possible not least because he and his officers did not grasp the interaction of the many elements necessary for warfare of the time. Several structural reasons for Imperial military failure became apparent only when it was too late. Only after the war did Ferdinand III's and Louis XIV's officers Montecuccoli and Vauban codify a basic theory of warfare that kept pace with the rapid technical and tactical developments of the times.⁶

An Army Divided

The Peace of Prague stipulated the formation of an Imperial Army consisting of troops supplied by the German princes and divided into various commands led by powerful figures like the electors of Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, and Cologne, who were officially under the command but only nominally answerable to the emperor. The legal situations were "murky and the individual stipulations unclear" (Salm).⁷ The princes' cooperation with the emperor was determined by their own interests, with them insisting on virtually independent commands within the Imperial Army. After 1644, the members of the Westphalian Imperial Circle raised a small army for their own defense; yet only a year and a half later were these troops put under the emperor's supreme command and deployed outside the circle. Duke Charles IV of Lorraine operated in the Empire's west independently of the emperor, though often in concert with him as his forces strove to reclaim his duchy from France.

An army composed in this way made an effective command impossible and instead demanded constantly renewed contractual agreements down to the level of the Imperial Circles on even the minutest details of military policy. Therefore, there was no consistent and concerted long-term planning. After 1639, the emperor was on the defensive, with any plans now being merely short-term reactions to the previous year's campaigns.⁸

The Imperial Army also suffered from the diminishing support of those princes who had been on the emperor's side. Beginning in 1636, the Saxon and Brandenburg electors reduced their forces. Under the threat of Sweden's superior force, Mainz joined both of them in leaving the Imperial alliance in 1641, 1645, and 1647, respectively. Bavaria and Cologne also deserted the emperor in 1647 and signed a truce with France, though they reversed their course a few months later.⁹

The longer the war continued, the more important cooperation with Bavaria became for Ferdinand III. Maximilian I also insisted on commanding his own contingent of the Imperial Army. Bavaria's and the emperor's common points of interest were few and the squabbles over political and military questions nearly permanent. Again and again the allies put their military strategies to the vote at military conferences and, as trust was in short supply, made a long series of agreements concerning the many potential conflicts, such as the sharing of command, deployment of troops, winter quarters, indemnifications, support, etc.¹⁰

Working with Maximilian I was so frustrating for Ferdinand III that in 1640, when the elector was gravely ill, he painted for his brother a scenario of consequences, were Maximilian to die, with the emperor taking over the Bavarian contingent of the Imperial Army, giving the Bavarian generals printed instructions to subordinate their army "in its entirety without any interference from others."¹¹ But Maximilian I recovered and had one more reason to prevent his officers from fighting for the interests of his indiscreet Imperial nephew and brother-in-law. Thus, in 1640, Ferdinand III tried, without much success, to compel the Bavarian Commander Mercy to comply with orders from Imperial supreme commanders, arguing that the Bavarian troops, like his own, were a part of the Imperial Army "because it is my as well as the Empire's army, just as those of my other immediate troops are."¹² Though he contributed significantly to the Bavarian army's financial support, the fact that it was also a part of the Imperial Army in no way put it in a line of command with the emperor's own territorial forces.

In principle, Maximilian I wanted neither allied nor enemy troops on his lands because foreign soldiers oppressed the population and economy to the extreme. From 1643 on, France was again on the offensive in the German south, prompting continuous appeals for Imperial help in expelling them or their Swedish allies. Yet as soon as the danger and the campaign ended, Bavaria raised new complaints about encroachment by Imperial soldiers and demands for their removal. Concerning this issue, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm wrote to the emperor at the end of 1646 that he would have to "see how you can conduct your own affairs and not depend on others."¹³

Meanwhile, the emperor had absolute command only over that part of the army he himself had raised as a territorial prince. Aside from garrison troops at fortifications, it consisted of three sections. During Ferdinand III's reign, the main army predominantly fought the main Swedish army between the Baltic Sea and the Danube. General Hatzfeld led 4,000–5,000 troops mainly in Westphalia, Hesse, and Franconia against the sons of the count Palatine, Hesse-Kassel, and a second Swedish army under General Königsmarck. The third Imperial Army stood chiefly in Hungary, southern Moravia, and Lower Austria, principally to defend the southeastern border against Transylvania and the more egregious Ottoman border violations. In 1643, the three sections together numbered about 32,000 soldiers.¹⁴ The war against France in the north was thus effectively left to the Spanish, who also occupied Electoral Trier and the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine. After the 1636 invasion had failed, Ferdinand III no longer sent a major army against the French but melded his initial strategy with that of Spain, which urgently needed military support, especially during France's alliance with the United Netherlands. Thus, for years the emperor repeatedly detached parts of his main army to help in the battle against France.¹⁵

Ferdinand III continued these deployments throughout the 1640s, although they rendered him unable to extricate his troops in time to stem the Swedish advance into Bohemia in 1639. He also permitted his most capable officer, Piccolomini, to enter Spanish military service twice. The Spanish could recruit soldiers in the Empire at a time when the emperor himself could hardly obtain them. Because of his dependency on Spanish money, he could not control the Spanish army or the Imperial troop contingents attached to it, being reduced to negotiating, pleading, and recommending. Cooperation with Spain was, in any case, no unalloyed pleasure, as his rich brother-in-law's representatives created enormous pressure at court, not only debating even military details with the same tenacity as the Bavarian representatives but also interfering in the selection of Imperial supreme commanders.¹⁶ Nonetheless, in 1637, the emperor believed that he had an Imperial Army that he could use it for offensives, and that he could rely on his Spanish allies. He was wrong on all three counts.

Campaigns, Fortifications, Procurement

The second, deeper reason for the emperor's military weakness lay in his very conception of war. The central element of his military strategy was the annual campaign. Campaigns generally started in spring and ended in fall, with soldiers quartered with the entire region's civilian population during winter. They reassembled in spring, their equipment renewed as much as possible, to begin the next campaign. The troops literally moved into the fields and attempted to compel the enemy, whom they mostly encountered in limited fights and skirmishes to give way or to retreat.

At strategically important points like river crossings, major thoroughfares, or mountain passes there were more intensive engagements or relatively rare large battles. This presupposed an army's seeking battle and the enemy army's not avoiding it (Jankau 1645) or not being able to avoid it (Tuttlingen 1643); often it involved breakthroughs at geostrategic locations (Nördlingen 1634, Breitenfeld 1642). But such battles were risky; frequently, entire divisions were wiped out. Imperial military leaders tended to avoid them if possible. Only in three exceptional cases did they allow matters to go this far: when a victory was likely (Nördlingen 1634), under extreme duress and orders by the commanding archduke (Breitenfeld 1642), and, finally, if the emperor ordered it (Jankau 1645). In principle, Ferdinand III was, in his own words, disinclined to "hazard all Imperial weapons on the danger and uncertainty of one battle."¹⁷

The significance of such battles lay especially in the fact that the survivors of the defeated side generally had to retreat a great distance, leaving open to the victors a region that, depending on the outcome, was their own or enemy territory. In enemy territory especially, farmers could be robbed of their harvest and towns could be forced to provide money, weapons, and provisions. Under certain conditions, it was possible to establish winter quarters for the soldiers in conquered lands. Winter quarters in enemy territory were doubly valuable because they spared the home regions and resources while sapping the enemy's strength and confronting it with the problem of finding provisions for its own troops elsewhere. The side holding winter quarters on foreign soil had more money for the next campaign in its war chest and could operate more efficiently.

Campaigns and battles brought lasting military successes only if they contributed to the establishment of winter quarters for the home troops or at least denied the enemies' foreign territory for their quarters. Expecting a quick peace, and later for want of resources, Ferdinand III ordered several campaigns hoping to pressure his adversaries into negotiations, motivate his allies to continue the fight, or relieve his own military situation elsewhere. Campaigns on enemy territory without a clear objective of victory were often called "diversions." They did not open up foreign winter quarters for the Imperial Army, as this would have required the seizure of a larger number of fortified locations from whence regions could be governed and protected against incursions. For the conquest of fortified sites, a strong and mobile artillery was generally imperative because quick successes during sieges demanded rapid offensive fire against defensive installations. Unlike the Swedes, the emperor did not command a strong artillery; moreover, Imperial losses of weaponry were frequent and significant, and replacements were difficult, slow, or not forthcoming. While the Swedes conquered one fortified location after another—forestalling Imperial troops who were supposed to obstruct sieges—the main Imperial

Army could occupy only a few fortified sites despite marching great distances during many campaigns. In this manner, winter quarters could not be secured and substance for the next campaign was lost.¹⁸

Only after Sweden had invaded Silesia, Moravia, and Bohemia did Ferdinand III concentrate on strengthening the fortifications he still held. But afterward, the Swedes were able to capture a series of fortified sites during their invasions and could hold them even after their field army had retreated. In 1636, Piccolomini had recommended taking several such vital sites in France to obviate the need for extensive campaigns. Nonetheless, until 1640 or even 1643, the Imperial leadership did not take the decisive military importance of its own or the enemy's strongholds sufficiently into account. Nor did Ferdinand III assign top priority to a reconquest of lost sites. In 1642, he ordered his supreme commander to abort a siege to recapture Głogów and to pursue the enemy troops instead "because this was the chief task."¹⁹ The demonstrative pursuit of the Swedish army served one of the emperor's political goals of preventing the Protestant princes from forming a new alliance with the Swedes.

To be more specific, the western campaigns of 1637 and 1638 against France were Spanish diversions with Imperial support which, despite several victories, ate away at the army's substance while yielding no fixed territory worth mentioning. In 1639, there was no strong invasion of France by Imperial and Spanish armies. The same situation prevailed in the north. After the Peace of Prague, the Swedes kept to northern Germany. Although the Imperial Army pushed them back as far as the Baltic Sea, it was unable to take important strongholds like Szczecin (Stettin). Hence, the political success hoped for in the 1637 campaign, a quick peace with Sweden, did not come to pass. In 1638, the main Imperial Army, weakened by a lack of good winter quarters, was still in the north but once again had to detach some divisions to help the Spanish. In addition, the emperor's allies began to suffer from attrition, with Brandenburg's army so feeble that a joint advance against Sweden was not worthwhile, while a hoped-for union of Saxon, Brunswick-Lüneburg, Danish, and Imperial troops failed to materialize. At the end of 1638, the Imperial troops drew back slightly; as the Lower Saxon Circle did not make winter quarters available, the main army, shrunk to approximately 6,000 soldiers, retreated, according to Gallas, because of "inexpressible want"²⁰ to Saxony and Bohemia, where the supply situation was somewhat better.

The Imperial Estates and Circles that had joined the Peace of Prague could deny winter quarters to the army. To occupy these by force would have violated the Prague agreement that had also resulted from their successful resistance in 1630 to Wallenstein, who had forced them to supply the army wherever it happened to be. Because in 1639 winter quarters had been prepared in the Rhineland, the emperor was probably too late calling the troops

stationed in the west to Bohemia, where a Swedish invasion ravaged those of his hereditary lands that were suitable for winter quarters. Franconia was frequently inaccessible to Ferdinand III because Maximilian I used it for the Imperial Army's Bavarian contingent. In 1640, the emperor declined a French truce offer because, among other reasons, he did not know where in the Empire he could quarter his army without marching against Hesse. In 1638, Trauttmansdorff had rejected a similar offer when the question arose about what was to be done with the armies if a truce were signed.²¹ The battles with Hesse-Kassel in the 1640s were partly fought to ensure access to winter quarters. But war in Hesse drew the Imperial troops into a region that was easily accessible to Sweden and France and thus militarily and politically counterproductive. In the war's last phase, only shrinking areas in Bohemia and Moravia and some Austrian lands south of the Danube remained as winter quarters for the main army.

Beyond this, the Peace of Prague limited the Imperial Army's size. There was no longer any thought of Wallenstein's 100,000 soldiers, especially as Ferdinand II had refrained from significant rearmament after 1635 in expectation of a speedy internal and external peace. Hence, Ferdinand III was left with an army too large to supply but too small to succeed. Plans and reality were widely divergent. At the Regensburg Diet in 1641, for example, Ferdinand III pleaded for an increase of the Imperial Army to a total of 80,000 men, a rhetorical inflation for negotiating purposes. In the spring of 1642, he aimed at less than 10,000 soldiers for his own army. That number could be maintained during the winter, even though it would have to be temporarily increased for summer campaigning. Ferdinand III's main army typically ranged from 10,000 to 15,000, never counted more than 20,000, and fell to only a few thousand immediately after the defeats of 1642, 1643, and 1644. Such an army was simply too small for something as ambitious as a victory over the still hostile Imperial territories, not to mention Sweden and France.²²

Continuous yo-yo-like advances and retreats further sapped the army's strength. In several large campaigns (1637–1638, 1640, 1641, 1644, and 1646), Ferdinand III sent his main army to northern Germany. But these campaigns did not yield enough strongholds and thus no lasting territorial occupation or winter quarters. As a consequence, the army was so weakened that the Swedes were able to advance into Habsburg territory (1639, 1642–1643, and 1645–1648) and could, with their artillery, conquer and hold fortifications there.

The War from 1637 to 1644: An Overview

In 1637, the Swedes could assert themselves only in a few strongholds in Northern Germany. But in 1638, fortified by French subsidies and new Swedish and Finnish recruits, they built up their army and went on the offensive. Their

goal was no longer a Protestant Empire under Swedish influence but the permanent acquisition of territories within it. This required a continuation of the war against the emperor, who would have to give these territories up as imperial fiefs. The Swedish supply situation also made war against the Austrian Habsburgs imperative. Because of the widespread destruction, the Swedish commander Baner wrote that they could no longer support their army “except in the emperor’s hereditary lands,”²³ a diagnosis that now determined the goal. At the same time, the Swedes helped the sons of Friedrich V of the Palatinate to assemble an army of about 4,000. Ferdinand III fought this force with the Hatzfeld corps, which, though victorious near Vlotho in October 1638, had to leave troops behind in Westphalia.

The invasion of the hereditary lands by the Swedes, foreseen by Gallas, occurred in 1639. Their success in the Battle of Chemnitz enabled them to clear a passage to Bohemia in April. Instead of a structural lack of supplies, Ferdinand III saw human machinations at work, asked whose tactics had caused the defeat, and sought reinforcements. His plans for an offensive by Saxon-Imperial-Bavarian troops against the Swedes had not panned out, and thus he ordered the defensive of fortifications in Bohemia. In May of 1639, the Swedes stood before Prague; unable to take the city, they devastated northern Bohemia instead. In 1640, the Imperial troops once again expelled the Swedes from Bohemia, but in Silesia, a Swedish corps was able to establish a permanent base. That same year, which witnessed the first Imperial Diet since 1613, posed a dilemma for Ferdinand III, who had to choose between waging war in the Empire and defending his hereditary lands; opting for an Imperial policy, he followed a Saxon suggestion and pursued the Swedes as far as Hildesheim and Paderborn, but was unable to cut the Swedish supply lines to the Baltic.²⁴

In 1641, there was no Swedish invasion of Bohemia only because the Swedish commander Baner died, his troops mutinied, and Baner’s successor Torstensson needed a year to gain the army’s trust. The Imperial main army used this opportunity to force the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg to make peace. The Swedes profited doubly from their retreat during this year, as their evident weakness in the south persuaded France to extend its agreement to provide Sweden with additional subsidies; meanwhile, in the Baltic, they were so strong that the new elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg distanced himself from the emperor, allowing the Swedes the right of passage and the occupation of fortifications. As a consequence, the Swedes could operate more freely and safely between the Baltic and Silesia and thus had a base from which to conduct subsequent campaigns in the Habsburg hereditary territories.²⁵

In 1642, the Swedes took the strategically important Moravian capital Olomouc on the river March, thereby placing Moravia’s middle and northern

regions under Swedish control. Still hoping to drive the Swedes from the hereditary lands, Ferdinand III had the Imperial Army repel them but was unable to retake fortified locations, towns, and cities they had occupied. Instead, Torstensson used his retreat to secure and expand the Swedish base, forestall the Imperial reconquest of Silesian Głogów, and then march against Leipzig. Following Ferdinand III's order to prevent the Swedish seizure of the city, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm risked battle. On November 2, 1642, the main Imperial Army was practically obliterated in the battle of Breitenfeld; Leipzig surrendered and remained in Swedish hands until 1650. Thus, the Swedes could advance their base of operations into the north of Electoral Saxony (Leipzig), Silesia (Głogów), and Moravia (Olomouc) while occupying a number of fortifications along the Bohemian frontier.²⁶

In a financial tour de force, Ferdinand III somehow reconstituted a new army in less than two months. At the beginning of 1643, Piccolomini led the army in preventing the rest of Electoral Saxony from falling into Swedish hands before retreating. Despite innumerable small changes, the situation in the Empire's northwest stabilized during this time. The Swedes entrenched themselves in the area around Osnabrück and Minden. In territories along the Lower Rhine, in eastern Friesland, and northern Electoral Cologne, Hesse-Kassel's troops kept to the safety of their fortifications in Jülich. The elector of Cologne, on the other hand, maintained fortifications in the south of Electoral Cologne and his prince-bishopric of Münster. In Bohemia and Moravia, the Imperial Army cautiously hindered Swedish operations in 1643, though the Swedes still took numerous cities (Littau, Sternberg, Kremsier, Tobitschau) and continued to supply Olomouc, with the strategically important Brno remaining in Imperial hands. Torstensson now pulled his troops back to Silesia and proposed a ceasefire.²⁷

In late 1643, while the Imperial Army and Ferdinand III were still puzzling over this situation, the main Swedish army moved north and attacked Denmark. The Danish king had considered an alliance with Ferdinand III because he was troubled by Swedish expansion and the extremely tense relations between the two Baltic rivals. Ferdinand III regarded Denmark as his last option for an effective alliance against Sweden. Though he had no Danish guarantees for an alliance, he sent his army to Jutland in 1644. A great plan was drawn up: Hatzfeld's corps would march up the Weser and contain Königsmarck's Swedish force; another corps under Johann von Götz would retake the most important Moravian and Silesian strongholds and then move north along the Oder to support Gallas, who, in turn, would march down the Elbe with the main army. Because the territories through which the troops were to move were exhausted, the army was to be supplied via these three rivers.²⁸

This plan failed completely. The western corps could not be counted on because it had to safeguard its winter quarters in Hesse and Franconia, nor could the eastern corps, which had to protect Hungary and Moravia against the prince of Transylvania. The strategy for the Danish campaign was obsolete before it ever began, though the small and poorly equipped main army still moved toward Jutland. By the time it reached Mecklenburg, the Danish troops were already retreating to the islands ahead of the Swedes. The campaign's futility became abundantly clear in Kiel when Gallas had his men fire after the departing Swedish fleet.²⁹

Things were even worse for the emperor's soldiers. While Gallas sat in Kiel, the Swedes, having vanquished Denmark, moved across the river Eider in the West and past the Imperial troops south into the Empire. The Imperial Army had no choice but to retreat. The withdrawal was marked by starvation and mass desertion, with continuous Swedish attacks turning it into a desperate flight. In the fall, the Imperial troops could not penetrate the Swedish blockade at the Saale River and were stuck from September until the end of November in Bernburg until finally breaking out and fleeing to Magdeburg, where they were again encircled by the Swedes. Breaking out once again, a remnant made for Bohemia, as the Swedes began moving into winter quarters in Thuringia and Meissen. They had nothing to gain from annihilating the remaining Imperial troops. Of the approximately 18,000 soldiers Gallas had taken north to Holstein, only about 1,000 made it through, and Ferdinand III had lost a second major army in the war against Sweden.³⁰

Silver, Mercury, Subsidies

The spectacle of the miserably equipped Imperial troops played an important role in Sweden's 1637 decision to prepare another offensive. In contrast to the enemy, Ferdinand III had a notoriously underfunded army of mercenaries. Throughout the hereditary lands, emergency conscription was the exception. Mercenaries, however, understandably did not like to fight on credit but wanted to see cash. As he had practically no war materiel production of his own, the emperor also needed money for weapons, ammunition, horses, clothing, and victuals.³¹ The economy of the hereditary territories was not strong enough to finance an Imperial war. The so-called Little Ice Age lowered agricultural productivity, while massive forced emigration from Bohemia, Moravia, and Upper Austria as well as the extreme inflation of the 1620s exacerbated the negative military impact on the economy. In the territories occupied or devastated by Sweden (mainly Silesia, northern Moravia, and Bohemia), little remained that could replenish the war chest after 1639. Upper and Lower Austria had been war theaters during the Bohemian-Palatine war; in addition, Upper Austria had suffered greatly

during the peasant uprising in 1626. After 1618, only Inner Austria had been spared any military campaigns.

Added to the economic weakness was the fact that Ferdinand III could marshal a large portion of the remaining resources only in the form of securities for loans that could temporarily overcome his liquidity problems. He was forced to obtain credits to bridge the gap between the cash he needed and his expected income from duties, tolls, taxes on salt, beer, and wine as well as appropriations from territorial Diets. The personnel of the court treasury, however, not only came up with expensive cash loans but also had to organize debt service as a socioeconomic power struggle for loan securities. Meanwhile, they did not neglect to enrich themselves.³²

Imperial appropriations and Ferdinand III's own—encumbered—income still were insufficient, and thus his ability to make war depended on Spanish subsidies. These were especially important because the emperor personally assigned them a prominent and salubrious significance in his total financial planning.³³ But Spain's military and economic might collapsed dramatically in 1640 when both Portugal and Catalonia launched wars of secession against Philip IV, the latter with French help. For their part, the United Netherlands attacked Spain in South America and, like England, reduced the flow of American silver to Spain. This flow had ebbed in any case because the most productive Spanish mine in Potosí (today's Bolivia) required mercury for extracting silver. But the production of mercury was dwindling in South America and fell sharply in 1637/38. Ferdinand III sold mercury to Spain from his Inner Austrian mine at Idira in Carinthia, but such exports could not meet Potosí's demands. After the fall of Breisach in 1638 and the sinking of a Spanish fleet in the English Channel, supplies both by land and sea were much reduced. In 1640, the United Netherlands took Breda and France took Arras. Between 1635 and 1640, Spain annually provided approximately four million escudos for the army in Flanders; between 1643 and 1648, there were only about two million. Thus, not much could be spared for Ferdinand III; even his mercury bills remained unpaid.³⁴

The mutual dependency was complete when Ferdinand III detached soldiers to support Spain and French aristocratic revolts in 1641, while Madrid assured him in return that no truce with France would be concluded without his consent. The emperor even considered sending reinforcements to Catalonia and Portugal. The weakened Imperial-Spanish alliance also remained intact because Spain was able to pay for the loan of soldiers despite its financial crisis. In 1641, for example, Ferdinand III was prepared to send troops on the condition that the Spanish would pay cash immediately.³⁵ Yet only a year later he was so incensed about the imbalance between Spanish requests and payments that he gave orders to distribute his own money through his own people because “not a penny was Spanish money but all of it Hungarian, Austrian, and Styrian.”³⁶

But for his alliance with Spain, the emperor had to pay a high political price. The imperial princes accused him of prolonging the war in the Empire by supporting Spain against France and the United Netherlands. Along with this criticism, the Spanish plea for help grew more insistent with time. In 1643, the French annihilated the Spanish army at Rocroi. In 1644, they took the fortress of Gravelingen. Only shortly before, Piccolomini had asked the emperor for help with its defense, with Philip IV pointing out to Ferdinand III that Flanders, once occupied, could not be regained; if that were the case, the Empire, Hungary, and Bohemia would also be in danger.³⁷

Given this financial situation, Ferdinand III was continually occupied trying to bridge gaps in his supply chain. This was actually the responsibility of the court treasury and the War Council, but these institutions not only fought among themselves but were also unable to meet their own responsibilities. The War Council was a small bureaucratic agency led by President Schlick and his associate Lobkowitz. It was to provide recruits and war materiel to the Imperial Army and render expert opinions for military campaigns. But because of political implications, the assignment of winter quarters, even down to its details, quickly became a matter for the commander-in-chief. In 1642, the emperor himself, “without consulting Schlick and the War Council,”³⁸ decided on winter quarters for the infantry.

Ferdinand III was not very successful in his struggle to provision the troops. The fall of Breisach in 1638 was the result of insurmountable deficiencies. At the beginning of the 1640s, the situation had deteriorated to a point that the emperor himself had to deal with details like bills of exchange for the acquisition of horses and artillery mounts, deliveries of oxen, flour transport, reductions in the soldiers’ pay, and even the provisioning of their socks. His quest for funds intensified. He considered selling the county of Ortenburg, upgraded Genoa’s title for 100,000 Gulden, and, in 1641, imposed special taxes on Lower Austria’s Jewish population. At the Regensburg Diet, the emperor was able to obtain war revenues from the Imperial Estates, though only after securing Brandenburg’s support by exempting it from the levy. In 1642, he renewed a tax on beverages. It embarrassed him that he was constantly forced to appeal to the Inner-Austrian Court Treasury President Dietrichstein, conceding that “I write you so often about money that I almost do not dare any longer, but the need goes on.”³⁹

After the 1642 defeat at Breitenfeld, Ferdinand III asked Parma, Rome, and Venice for funds and loans, and he considered selling the county of Pazin (Pisino, Mitterburg) to Venice. Advances on revenues from his territories were now only to be had on account. The emperor impressed upon his brother how much this bothered him: “All this often robs me of my sleep, gives me headaches, and makes me vomit. I am frequently so listless that I don’t know what to do” (Figure 24).⁴⁰



FIGURE 24 Emperor Ferdinand III, bust ca. 1643 by Justinus Psolmayr. Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, Cabinet of Curiosities 10161.

In 1644, the court treasury could no longer raise sufficient funds for the military, and Ferdinand III placed his hopes in a mission of the Augustinian monk Chrysostomos, who was to borrow money from an Italian prince. In his desperation, he very likely also supported an alchemist's efforts to make gold. When the Lower Austrian Estates declared that they could no longer supply the revenues and horses he demanded, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm asked clerics, churches, and convents for help.⁴¹

After the battle of Jankau in 1645, the Swedes in northern Lower Austria helped themselves to the horses and

money that had been earlier denied the emperor. Ferdinand III dispatched his chamberlain Leslie to Italy to ask the pope for help once again. A small sum given immediately could do more than a large sum later. Thus, the emperor defined the central problem of financing a war as one of liquidity. In 1645, the already reduced salaries of many courtiers were stopped altogether. Now, even the Court Treasury Councillor Peverelli had to go to Italy in order to pawn jewels in Genoa; at court, items made from precious metals were melted down. When the Imperial troops refused to leave Vienna in the spring of 1645 because they had not been paid, Dowager Empress Eleonora also pawned her jewelry. In 1646, Ferdinand III learned from his brother's letters that desperate soldiers were selling their rifles. Again, he negotiated the sale of the county of Goricia and offered Venice domains in northern Italy. He resisted the sale of rights to Genoa, however, though he sold the Imperial fief Gradisca (Gradišče ob Soči) to Prince Eggenberg. Again, in urgent missives, the emperor pleaded with his nobles for loans, and again he received very little. In 1648, when the Swedes looted rich treasure from aristocratic palaces in the sections of Prague they had conquered, Piccolomini commented bitterly how his soldiers had previously not even been able to get bread there.⁴²

Weakness of the Supreme Command

Even the supreme commanders themselves could not unravel these knots. Because the Habsburgs had lived in fear of a military coup since Wallenstein's day, they tied the hands of his successors. Commanders had to coordinate their actions with the War Council, other commanders of the Imperial Army, the elector of Bavaria, and the emperor, who himself, depending on the situation, sought the advice of his Privy and War Councils, his allies Bavaria and Spain, and the Hungarian Estates. What made military sense often counted for little. Ferdinand III's many supreme commanders were generally feeble because their mandates were severely restricted. The emperor himself recognized at the end of the war that no general had sufficient authority "if a Habsburg is not above him."⁴³

This weakness of the highest command, never intended to go so far, had the consequence that supreme commanders had to rely on military and court networks, with the result that each of them had supporters, doubters, and antagonists. Instead of giving them greater executive power, Ferdinand III frequently shielded his generals against attacks from within the military and the court. Gallas, for example, was still praised by the emperor shortly before his dismissal in 1639; Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and Schlick also defended him against criticisms—unjustified from a military standpoint—by the powerful privy councillors Trauttmansdorff, Khevenhüller, Slavata, and Martinitz. After the loss of his army in 1644, Ferdinand III still took Gallas's side, blaming the lack of equipment. That he rarely held his commanders' failures against them stemmed from his understanding of the faulty supply situation and the unpredictability of war. Thus, he wrote his brother after the failure of a siege that "in war not everything goes as planned."⁴⁴

In the beginning, the emperor gave his supreme commanders a relatively free hand, especially with operational decisions. He issued mainly general instructions and goal definitions; expert opinions passed back and forth, discussions, propositions, and information for the commanders were more common than orders. The relationship between general instructions and specific orders, and which orders might or might not be changed, was frequently unclear. Where the defense of the hereditary lands was at stake, Ferdinand III often interfered in various areas with detailed orders about which the commanders were simply informed. This was due partly to an information gap and partly to Ferdinand's reconsiderations, with which the supreme commanders had to deal as best they could.⁴⁵

During Gallas's first supreme command (1637–1639) following the Swedish invasion of Bohemia, Ferdinand III concerned himself with everyday military affairs. After Gallas was relieved (though he formally remained in office as lieutenant general), Archduke Leopold Wilhelm received the supreme

command in October 1639 as the guarantor of military discipline and a symbol of the ruling house's engagement for its army. Yet the emperor's brother, too, had only limited powers. Because he had to give the impression of having special authority, he was appointed governor of Bohemia but only in the manner Ferdinand III himself had been appointed in 1634—as window dressing without any important rights. In the spring of 1640, the archduke demanded greater executive powers but received them only partially. He had volunteered to become commander, but as a prince-bishop without military experience, he needed someone to tell him what to do. At the end of 1639, Piccolomini fulfilled that role.⁴⁶

In the beginning, Ferdinand III supplied the archduke above all with information and asked for reports on the war. By the end, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm felt “duped again and again” (Schreiber).⁴⁷ To examine this change in more detail, the emperor started out by giving the new supreme commander instructions about his objectives (for example, securing the Bohemian borders), but at the same time, he set safekeeping of the army as the foremost goal (“because it is the only one I have”)⁴⁸ by precluding risky operations. Yet he emphasized that he would approve his brother's measures because “I do not know how the army is constituted; I do not know the enemy's actual state; I also do not know whether there are means for sparing the people . . . all this Your Grace knows better than I.”⁴⁹ Yet the emperor criticized even details like supply accounts, interfered in personnel decisions, and sent his brother an advisor in 1640.

In 1641, his trust in Archduke Leopold Wilhelm's supreme command crumbled. Ferdinand III transferred the command in Bohemia to Colloredo, effectively bypassing the archduke in the chain of command. He recommended two war counsellors to his brother, issued orders concerning the treatment of captured soldiers, sent instructions, and proscribed in detail the deployment of troops. He demanded secrecy from the archduke as to the acquisition of horses only to leave the final decision to him; then again, he himself decided under which circumstances officers who had crossed over from the enemy might be absorbed. He warned his brother of deception during recruitment and at the same time stressed his confidence in the archduke's ability to make decisions “that best serve my interests.”⁵⁰ At the end of 1641, he informed his brother of his decisions about regimental allocations while leaving him the task of seeing that no Protestant preachers accompanied the regiments. A year later, he gave the archduke direct instructions concerning military operations and brought him to the Elbe in Saxony with his order to pursue the Swedes. There, on November 2, 1642, at Breitenfeld, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm risked a large battle against Piccolomini's advice and lost the army. After this defeat, Field Marshals Hatzfeld and Piccolomini quarreled, thus exposing the archduke's

lack of authority. Ferdinand III demanded to know the rules of command and gave his brother instructions on how to alleviate the dispute. Shortly thereafter, the archduke asked to be relieved. The emperor initially declined, fearing a loss of troop morale and an increase of desertions that might follow a change of command, before finally accepting his brother's request for a discharge.⁵¹

No one really wanted to assume such a supreme command. The interim commander Piccolomini preferred serving the Spanish; Hatzfeld preferred a pilgrimage in honor of the Virgin Mary; and even the interim—and eventual—commander Colloredo skirted the assignment. For the time being, the emperor had no other choice than to demonstrate his most personal concern for the army; hence, he visited the territorial militia in Korneuburg in January 1643, thinking that he himself might take over the supreme command. Gallas, rumored to be a heavy drinker, displayed total sobriety and advised Trauttmansdorff to cease military operations. But word was received that the Swedes demanded religious freedom in the hereditary lands as a condition for peace, along with the return and restoration of the Bohemian emigrants and cession of Silesia to Brandenburg and of Pomerania to Sweden. Rather than accede to this, Ferdinand III gave the supreme command to Gallas, beginning a new cycle of corrosion.⁵²

Gallas undertook his second supreme command in March 1643. Before taking over, he had demanded improved Bavarian-Imperial cooperation and a better supply situation for the troops but had agreed to serve even if these conditions were not met—in which case he would “submissively obey and do his utmost and best but would not bear responsibility.”⁵³ Thus, the “anti-Wallenstein” began his second general command by exonerating himself in advance for its likely failure. After rekindled harmony at the outset came renewed Imperial displeasure about Gallas's tactical decisions. Ferdinand III issued orders concerning the enemies' possible moves, ancillary orders to Colloredo, and instructions on the deployment of regiments and the defense of cities. In July, rumors were rife that the emperor himself would join the army because Gallas was losing the court's confidence. In late summer, Ferdinand III instructed Gallas to break off his operations and to pursue the Swedish army through the Bohemian lands. During the march to Jutland in 1644, the emperor sent his general a long list of suggestions and orders that were not practicable without heavy losses. Only when the army had already been nearly wiped out during its retreat did the emperor grasp the situation. From then on, his orders assumed the character of “well intentioned suggestions” (Rebitsch).⁵⁴

At the beginning of October 1644, the supreme command could at times no longer be clearly defined. Ferdinand III joined the army at Prague and himself nominally assumed the command. This pleased the officers opposed

to the ailing Gallas, who came to Prague in mid-February 1645 to participate in Privy Council sessions. Ferdinand III transferred battle command against the Swedes to Field Marshal Hatzfeld and the Bavarian Field Marshal Götz. Against Hatzfeld's advice, he ordered a decisive battle against the Swedes and thus lost his third major army at Jankau. Because Hatzfeld was taken prisoner and Götz was killed, Ferdinand III had to transfer command to Colloredo and Schlick in Bohemia and Archduke Leopold Wilhelm in Austria. The hierarchy was unclear; for example, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm ordered Gallas (who was still lieutenant general) not to obey an order by Ferdinand III to withdraw from Bohemia. The emperor repeated his order, Gallas delayed its execution, and at last Ferdinand III changed his mind. Soon afterward, the emperor once again asked his brother to take over the supreme command. Mindful of his previous experiences, the archduke demanded, and received, greater executive powers that largely overrode those of the Imperial War Council. On May 1, 1645, it was agreed that Gallas would remain a lieutenant general and serve as counselor.⁵⁵

In spite of greater executive powers, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm's second supreme command soon showed weaknesses. Ferdinand III issued direct commands to Colloredo, who for all practical purposes was commander in Bohemia. By the end of 1645, there were increasing indications that influential military leaders and courtiers preferred Gallas in charge and began undermining the archduke's authority, which Leopold Wilhelm countered by forcing Gallas to withdraw from both the military and the War Council. At the court, demands were voiced for Piccolomini becoming supreme commander, but the Spanish beseeched the emperor to leave him in Flanders. Ferdinand III exerted himself and made his orders to Colloredo subject to his brother's approval. The archduke complained to the emperor about the army's state and counseled peace ever more urgently, arguing that "in the end one had to bite into a sour apple, however sour it might be, rather than die of hunger."⁵⁶

In view of the 1646 summer campaign, which resulted in the Swedish invasion of Bavaria, Maximilian I criticized the archduke in extremely sharp terms, undermined what remained of his authority, hindered him wherever he could, and demanded the transfer of the supreme command to Gallas. Trauttmansdorff agreed, complaining that his negotiations at the congress were impeded because the archduke so strongly advocated peace. The court discussed a successor. Archduke Leopold Wilhelm counseled Ferdinand III to take over the command himself and then lost his nerve and resigned. He left the troops before his successor—once again Gallas—could join them.⁵⁷

In December 1646, the ailing Gallas began his third supreme command. In January 1647, when he arrived at the headquarters of the Imperial Army

near Regensburg, only Lobkowitz was still trying to maintain some order among the essentially rudderless troops. Although Ferdinand III prevented Gallas from sending the soldiers into winter quarters for fear of Swedish attacks, he was able to persuade the emperor to undertake no large military actions and to focus on simply maintaining the army. As he had done in 1643, he advised Ferdinand III to stop any battle activity “unless he were able to turn stones to bread, and ice and snow into hay and straw.”⁵⁸ Gallas was too ill to conduct another campaign; Ferdinand III recalled him to Vienna, where he died in April 1647.

A few days before Gallas’s death, the emperor transferred the supreme command to the Calvinist Field Marshal Peter Melander and prepared to join the army himself. The command was again divided. Puchheim, whom Ferdinand III had appointed a general for the defense of the Danube line in 1645 (“because we have no one else”),⁵⁹ oversaw the war in Moravia, Silesia, and Lower Austria; he also exercised this function in Bohemia whenever Colloredo was absent. Ferdinand III joined the army at České Budějovice; for several weeks during the late summer, he unsuccessfully led a relief force at Cheb, a town under Swedish siege, and then withdrew to Prague. Melander was in his post for only a short time, being badly wounded in January 1648 near Marburg and killed in the battle of Zusmarshausen in May. General Field Master of Ordinance Fernemont temporarily assumed the vacant post.

After Melander had been wounded, leading officers had sought the return of Piccolomini, who duly left the Spanish service in April 1648 to join the Imperial Army and assume supreme command after others had declined it. Yet his formal status was unclear. According to Imperial-Bavarian agreements about the division of leadership, Bavaria had the command over Imperial troops operating within its territory. Therefore, Piccolomini was under Maximilian I’s command in the summer of 1648, when the main body of the Imperial Army fought in Bavaria against the Swedes. In order to protect Bavarian territories not yet occupied by France or Sweden, the elector did not permit the Imperial troops to retreat to Bohemia. As the Swedish army had already taken a section of Prague, the emperor had to choose between losing the rest of the city and his ally Maximilian I. Piccolomini lamented Ferdinand III’s indecisiveness, blocked access to the Danube for the Swedes in Lower Bavaria, and, first in secret and then openly, sent soldiers to Prague, where Colloredo and Puchheim led the defense. He put up with Maximilian’s protest.⁶⁰ Instead of a feared and overly powerful supreme commander like Wallenstein, at war’s end, Ferdinand III had two less powerful regional commanders in Colloredo and Puchheim and a supreme commander under Bavarian authority in Piccolomini. None of them could provide more than emergency support.

Lack of Discipline and the Horrors of War: Looking to Heaven for Help
Ferdinand III attributed the numerous deficiencies in the military leadership and supply situation mainly to a lack of discipline. High-ranking officers were allowed to get away with certain transgressions. Piccolomini, for instance, followed a marching order too late and carelessly, allowing the Swedes to escape from Regensburg to Saxony in 1641. He was not reprimanded by the emperor, though the electors of Bavaria, Mainz, and Saxony criticized him sharply. That same year, after the battle of Wolfenbüttel, Ferdinand III directed his brother to see that future orders would be promptly obeyed. At times, the emperor initiated the investigation of officers suspected of failure, treason, or cowardice before the enemy. Colloredo, for example, had to justify himself in 1649 for losing Prague's smaller west bank but was subsequently rehabilitated. Convictions were rare, though one officer was executed after being accused of having deliberately contributed to the defeat at Chemnitz in 1639. Yet such trials often ended in acquittals.⁶¹

The commandants of fortified places were faced with a dilemma. If a city was stormed, one's own occupation force could be lost along with it when it might have been saved by timely surrender. The emperor appreciated this dilemma, dealing with officers accused of having surrendered fortifications as the situation demanded. Nonetheless, the commandant who surrendered Olomouc in 1642 was executed, while his counterpart in Cheb, Franz Paradeiser, was also condemned for handing the place over to the enemy in 1647. But all sentences were not necessarily equal. Although it was used as a deterrent in early modern justice, it was frequently not carried out to demonstrate princely clemency, hence Ferdinand III's decision to pardon Paradeiser following the intercession of many officers.⁶²

He was less considerate when it came to the common soldiers, insisting on trials for deserters without ever being able to reduce their numbers significantly. The mercenaries regarded serving in war as a job at best, as they typically became soldiers because of poverty or the recruiters' questionable methods. It was difficult to recruit sufficient numbers of men, and Ferdinand III sometimes tried to lure enemy soldiers into his own service by offering them generous pay. During the war's last decade, soldiers were nearly or entirely indifferent to the actual or professed goals of their commanders. For them, as for their officers, the actual confession was of little importance. The rules of war, which tended to spare the lives of expensive mercenaries, contributed to their disengagement. Indeed, if an occupation force surrendered early enough, the mercenary troops were quite often turned over to the conquerors. Many soldiers changed sides repeatedly.⁶³

Hence, mercenaries saw no reason to risk their lives for a particular side, whether in battle or by starvation beyond what was absolutely unavoidable. As long as there was sufficient discipline to prevent desertions (but not

starvation), looting of the local population was customary and pervasive. Especially during the last decade of the war, mercenaries plundered their own as well as enemy lands, affecting mainly the peasantry but also small towns. Ferdinand III was regularly informed by protesting Imperial territories, subjects, and sometimes military officers about the ravaging and killing his own and enemy troops were inflicting; he was also often in the field and knew a pillaged countryside when he saw it. He countered the long series of complaints and demands for greater discipline among his soldiers with an equally long list of generally ineffective orders meant to enhance safety. But he never questioned the sacking and devastation of enemy territory.⁶⁴

Because his orders were largely ineffective, he often lamented gruesome misdeeds by his own troops, such as the treatment of those of his subjects who did not immediately surrender their belongings, noting that they “cut holes in their nose, pulled a rope through it and dragged them about with it, even putting gunpowder in their nose, mouth, and ears and setting it alight, or pouring molten lead into them and hacking off their hands and feet; [they] would sack entire villages and drive off many horses and cows.”⁶⁵ Ferdinand III recognized that a lack of provisions was the main reason for such atrocities. At times, he ordered the requisite supplies with the explicit aim of preventing the looting, but they were rarely available because of the financial situation. More frequently, he demanded stricter measures for protecting the territories.

Often such excesses included not only the looting of provisions and animals or the torture and slaughter of peasants but also the rape and murder of women and girls. In June 1643, Ferdinand III complained to Gallas that his own soldiers were “violating little innocent girls of eight, nine, and ten in large numbers (more than a hundred . . .) in such a manner that they were entirely and permanently ruined.”⁶⁶ This horror could only be halted by a peace that was still in the distant future; Ferdinand III had every reason to pray and hope for divine assistance. He did this in the belief that his was a just war in which peace was prevented by France and Sweden and their unjustified desire for conquest and reluctance to make peace. In his 1639 report to Rome, the Nuncio Matthei stressed the sincerity of the emperor’s pronouncement that one had to ask God’s help and seek a “good peace.”⁶⁷

At the beginning of 1642, Ferdinand III and his wife arranged prayer sessions and processions “in order to beg God’s help in the present plight.”⁶⁸ After grim comments about his plans for the future (and the weather), he wrote his brother that “God can do everything, and prayer can do much.”⁶⁹ In May 1642, he and his wife made a pilgrimage to Mariazell, telling the archduke that “we will pray assiduously.”⁷⁰ At the end of 1642, after the defeat of Breitenfeld, he hoped that “one day God will punish this enemy’s pride,”⁷¹ and he put his trust in the Virgin Mary: “Thus I hope to God that by His mercy and the Blessed

Holy Mother's intercession all will end well."⁷² Partly, Ferdinand III attributed the military disasters of 1642 to the decline of the fear of God in the army and accordingly reformed the field-vicariate.⁷³ He did not credit his army but God's intervention with the Swede's partial retreat in 1642/43, claiming that "it is right to thank God and Our Lady, because it is not human but divine doing, and I hope the Almighty will continue to bestow his mercy upon us so that everything may come to a happy end. Amen."⁷⁴ After important military victories and peace treaties, he had the *Te Deum* sung. During the most difficult military predicament, at the end of March 1645, he promised erection of a column dedicated to the Virgin Mary, which was consecrated in May 1647 on Vienna's largest town square, opposite the church of the Jesuits. The figures on its pedestal symbolize the fight against heresy, pestilence, hunger, and war. During the ceremony, Ferdinand III affirmed the Virgin's designation as Austria's patron saint. As did many European princes of the time, he dedicated himself, his children, his subjects, his army, and his dominions to Her. In the view of the times, the *Mariensäule* was "the adequate answer"⁷⁵ (Reppen) to extreme danger.

2.5

THE TURNING POINT, 1644–1645

By the end of 1644, Ferdinand III's situation was grim from both a diplomatic and a military point of view. The peace congress made no progress; the Danish treaty option had been destroyed along with the Imperial Army. In 1643, Transylvania's Prince György Rákóczi had concluded a military alliance with Sweden, begun a war against the emperor with the sultan's approval, and reached the Moravian border by March 1644. The Imperial Army in the south-east pushed him back to the Nitra River, whereupon Rákóczi began ceasefire negotiations before resuming hostilities in August with the help of French subsidies. This time, he was pushed back to the Tisza River. Although he resumed negotiations at Trnava in November, they offered no military security.¹

As France no longer had to fear a Spanish invasion in its north, the French troops in southern Germany began an offensive they had coordinated with Sweden. In 1643, Imperial troops, together with contingents from Electoral Cologne, Bavaria, and Lorraine, were able to win a decisive battle at Tuttlingen, but in 1644, the Bavarians were unable to conquer the area just north of Lake Constance and the fortress Hohentwiel, a starting point of repeated raids into Swabia. They did not even attempt to attack Breisach. The French, on the other hand, conquered Philipsburg, Speyer, Worms, Landau, and Mainz. By year's end, all Rhine crossings in the region were in French hands except for Spanish-held Frankenthal.²

Hence, Maximilian I expected a Franco-Swedish invasion of Bavaria in the coming year and renewed his plea for a truce with France. Again, the emperor declined. A ceasefire would endanger the Imperial alliance with Electoral Saxony and Mainz, raising the specter that French-occupied Habsburg territories might be lost in the negotiations without compensation. Because Vienna was experiencing an outbreak of the plague, a meeting with the elector seemed convenient. According to a report by the nunciature, Maximilian I aborted the reunion by pretending that it was unfitting for the emperor to come to the elector, while he himself was unable to leave Munich

because of his age, illness, and the cold. Ever fearful of a Bavarian-French armistice, Ferdinand III still sent the imperial vice chancellor to Munich in order to negotiate for winter quarters and find another road to peace.³

The emperor was at wits' end. He remained in Linz, where the swollen Danube at least offered some security by preventing the Swedes from crossing over from Bohemia. But even politically he saw no way out, and on January 1, 1645, he asked several privy councillors for separate expert opinions about options for a peace agreement and military survival until peace was at hand as well as what to do if his Imperial allies deserted him in the interim.⁴ Only very rarely did the emperor ask for separate written opinions. That he did so now might be explained not merely by the complex political situation but also by a breakdown of his political counsel. At the end of November 1644, the nunciature wrote that Trauttmansdorff was sheltering behind the consensus of the other privy councillors because he realized that "things were not going well."⁵ The Hungarian Palatine Esterházy openly disparaged the emperor's most important advisor and called him "untalented and unfit to lead in these times of war."⁶ It is difficult to know whether such observations and assessments corresponded to the facts, though they are plausible. It is more likely—and might explain Trauttmansdorff's apparent renunciation of any authoritative influence—that the emperor and his courtiers regarded a separation from Spain as taboo.

From the perspectives of observers both at the time and later, this separation was the only possible road to peace. At the end of 1644, the nuncio reported that "the poor emperor, overwhelmed by so many disasters, out of money, soldiers, and luck, is, even if full of good intentions, almost overpowered by the multitude of these problems. . . . He wants peace, but to achieve peace together with the Spanish is a long-term business. He does not wish to separate himself from them."⁷ The solution was perfectly clear to the nuncio, but the privy councillors seemingly did not dare voicing such an opinion to Ferdinand III.

The eloquent silence reflected a dilemma; it was probably not the aborted Cologne Congress that sowed skepticism with regard to the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück but rather the fact that the Westphalian Congress was to be futile so long as Ferdinand III rigidly rejected the separation from Spain that France and so many of the Imperial territories were openly demanding. Yet not a single opinion from the councillors mentioned even the possibility of such a separation.

Along with what remained unsaid, the commentaries in the written opinions, though individually divergent, do give a general picture. Ferdinand III had to avoid the desertion of the imperial princes at all costs and, thus, had to demonstrate his peaceful intentions concurrently with a military buildup

sufficient to provide them with “a relative sense of security in the face of the enemy.”⁸ Without the territories’ support, he faced total military destruction. In addition, the cost of concluding a peace could be shifted onto the Empire. Finally, cohesion within the Empire would protect the emperor from France’s and Sweden’s anti-Habsburg and anti-Imperial policies. For the councillors, the Empire was an indispensable instrument for serving the interests of the Austrian Habsburgs.

The privy councillors’ hope for a separate peace with Sweden had been extinguished, as had that for sufficient support from Spain, Electoral Cologne, and Denmark. They urgently recommended a rapprochement with Transylvania. Though no one supposed that Ferdinand III could still prevail militarily, the privy councillors advocated strengthening the army. The hereditary lands would have to expend all their economic strength, while the army could enhance the prospect of the peace effort. Here, Trauttmansdorff concurred, urging that “armaments, once found, should also be used.”⁹ Slavata advised the emperor to join the army in person because there could be no doubt that he would continue to have “the Lord’s triumphant blessing”¹⁰ as he had in the victories at Regensburg and Nördlingen.

The Battle of Jankau and Its Aftermath

On the basis of these opinions, Ferdinand III left Linz accompanied by Archduke Leopold Wilhelm on January 18, 1645, headed to Prague to join the army (whose remnants had been reassembled and reinforced with the southeastern corps), and formally assumed command. Maximilian I urged the emperor to fight a decisive battle against the Swedes and sent support troops, which Ferdinand III had to relinquish as soon as the French campaign against Bavaria started. Thus, the emperor was under pressure, especially as there was not yet a peace treaty with Rákóczi, whose army might intervene on the Swedish side at any time.¹¹ The Swedish army invaded Bohemia as expected but avoided a field battle. In mid-February, Ferdinand III himself encountered several Swedish soldiers during a hunt near Prague. He mustered his army at White Mountain, where the federation of rebel Estates had perished in 1620, yet despite Slavata’s suggestion, he did not move out along with it, handing the command over to Hatzfeld, whose advice he promptly ignored by ordering a decisive battle. At the beginning of March, the skeptical nuncio detailed that “the piety of these good princes is their greatest capital.”¹²

The Swedes avoided the Imperial Army until their chronically ill commandant Torstensson felt up to leading his troops into battle and until the ground had frozen solidly enough for the deployment of artillery. On March 6, 1645, near Jankau in central Bohemia, Torstensson was ready and began

the battle, which progressed somewhat like that of Nördlingen, though with wholly opposite results. Once again, taking a hill decided the battle's outcome, much as the retreat after a futile attack turned into a bloodbath. After steady artillery fire from the Swedes and pursuit of the soldiers, the Imperial Army was obliterated, with only a few managing to escape. With Prague now exposed, the privy councillors advised the emperor—and each other—to flee. On March 7, only hours after receiving the report, Ferdinand III left Prague's castle, reportedly covering his eyes to hide the tears. He reached Plzeň on the eighth and the Upper Palatinate two days later before boarding a boat in Regensburg on the fourteenth to proceed down the Danube to Vienna.¹³

Northern and central Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia were now open to the Swedes, with the road to the Danube unobstructed. Torstensson looted his way through Moravia and Lower Austria to Krems on the Danube. Many people with their movable possessions fled the area north of the Danube to seek shelter in Vienna. Empress Maria Anna and her sons also journeyed there from Linz, which was no longer safe. The population was put under arms. Fortunately, Brno in Moravia, Tabor, Plzeň, and České Budějovice in Bohemia, Bratislava in Hungary, and Krems and Vienna in Lower Austria were all fortified. Empress Eleonora told the nuncio that if Krems were to be threatened, the emperor's sons would also be taken away from Vienna. But Ferdinand III was confident that Torstensson would not be able to proceed because "all his care should be how to get across the Danube."¹⁴

After arrival in Vienna on March 19, the emperor sought relief via a quick peace with Transylvania, sending Count Csáky to Trnava with flexible instructions. He also looked for financial support. Spain immediately sent some money, as did Poland after receiving Opole and Racibórz as surety. Ferdinand III could still recruit soldiers in northern Italy, but Charles IV of Lorraine's army remained in the Netherlands, and Bavaria as well as Saxony asked for support of their own.¹⁵

The pope did nothing to help, though the emperor sent Leslie to Rome and bombarded the nuncio with every argument he could muster. If Sweden were to remain victorious, Catholicism in the hereditary lands and the Empire would be finished, as would Italy's security (and with it that of the Papal State). Trauttmansdorff stoked the fire, warning that if the French were set on the total annihilation of the Habsburgs, the emperor would have to turn to the Ottoman Empire for help. The nuncio was unmoved, opining that the one thing worse than the court's situation was its moral stance: "The distress is dire indeed and the fear even greater, and what is most needed, is missing here, love and obedience on the part of the subjects, wisdom and a sense of direction on the part of the ministers and, finally, resolve on the prince's part—all of which is vital in this extreme crisis."¹⁶

At the end of March, the Swedes had taken the northern bank of the Danube at Krems and had attacked the fortifications that controlled access to Vienna's bridges across the river. Taking Vienna first required securing the hinterland, which the Swedes began by besieging the southern Moravian fortress of Brno. If Bratislava were to succumb to the prince of Transylvania, the city's supply lines across the Danube would be blocked. Ferdinand III could send no support to Brno because there was not enough money for pay and equipment, although the massive melting down of Imperial treasures and the pawning of jewels had begun. The Dowager Empress Eleonora and Empress Maria Anna and her children were taken to the safety of Graz. Many nobles, among them Duke Niklas Franz of Lorraine, followed or at least evacuated their families from Vienna.¹⁷

At the beginning of April, the nuncio voiced his belief that Trauttmansdorff was aware of "the general hatred directed towards him because of the adverse events"¹⁸ and, contrary to his convictions, would consequently support the nomination of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm as the new supreme commander with extensive powers. The aristocracy, the military, and the people would obey him if for no other reason than their "disgust"¹⁹ with Trauttmansdorff, who had always endeavored to keep the archduke down. The nuncio's report clearly omits mention of the emperor, whose stance must be read between the lines. A few weeks later, the emperor's brother received the command with far-reaching authorization. April 1645 was a month for concessions.

Under the impact of danger, his own helplessness, and the lack of foreign aid, the emperor looked again to the peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück. In April 1645, he made three important concessions. The first was the release—after nine years of imprisonment—of the elector of Trier, which France had demanded. In a formal audience, Ferdinand III restored the elector's fiefs, and in May, Sötern departed via the Danube to the sound of trumpets, escorted by the Swedes along the north bank and the Imperials on the south bank. The second concession was an agreement to relocate the Frankfurt Deputation to Münster. The Regensburg Diet had installed this Imperial Deputation, and the transfer had been requested because the Deputation represented the Imperial territories to a certain degree and permitted their broadly conceived participation in the peace negotiations. The third concession was the emperor's indication that he was largely prepared to restore the duke of Württemberg, something many people had demanded.²⁰

These concessions were in line with the Privy Council's recommendations from January. Ferdinand III had to prevent the Imperial territories from making peace with France and Sweden without him and so was forced to meet them halfway. He put at their disposal what was left of the Prague peace order after the Regensburg Diet and simultaneously signaled his readiness for peace with France from a position of weakness.²¹

But a signal was not yet a peace agreement. A rapprochement of emperor and his Imperial Estates was disadvantageous for the French and gave them one more reason to increase the military pressure. In May 1645, they concluded a subsidy agreement with Prince György I Rákóczi, whose main army appeared before Brno in August. The combined Swedish and Transylvanian troops numbered about 25,000–30,000 men, which turned the desperate situation into a crisis. Its resolution amounted to a rescue, which came from two quarters. From the beginning of the siege on May 3, the city's defense had been led by Louis Raduit de Souches, an openly Calvinist (and formerly Swedish) Imperial officer from France. The 400 soldiers and roughly 1,000 citizens he commanded repulsed several Swedish attacks. Meanwhile, Sultan Ibrahim I prohibited his Transylvanian vassal from rendering military aid to France and Sweden because he had just landed an army in Crete in June and wanted peace in the north and in the Ottoman satellite state Transylvania in order to properly conduct operations. As he deemed the imperial ambassador Cernin's offer of seven Hungarian counties to Rákóczi sufficient, he forced the prince to withdraw his army from Brno in August before it could participate in the siege. Thus, the emperor had survived an existential crisis, with the Swedes lifting the siege on August 20 and Rákóczi once again returning to the peace negotiations in Trnava.²²

This relief helped Ferdinand III to weather a second crisis. After a battle at Alerheim against French and Hessian troops, the Bavarian army had been forced to retreat to Donauwörth. Maximilian I demanded support. If it were not forthcoming, he would not be able to drive the French army back across the Rhine, could not supply winter quarters outside of Bavaria, and would be unable to finance a campaign in the coming year. Because this concerned the preservation of the allied Bavarian army, Kurz negotiated directly with Maximilian I and advocated giving him the support he demanded. Expelling the French from Bavaria was of greater importance than driving the Swedes from the hereditary territories. Bavaria became even more important for the emperor at the end of August, when the Saxons had to agree to a ceasefire with Sweden, thereby depriving Ferdinand of his most important ally in the north. All of Electoral Saxony now became a Swedish deployment zone. Following the advice of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and Gallas, Ferdinand III sent part of his army to Bavaria, hoping that the Swedish troops standing north of the Danube would not immediately notice their departure so that the remaining army could still hold the Danube line. Indeed, the beleaguered French army retreated across the Rhine in October, and the Imperial troops moved into winter quarters in southern Bohemia.²³

The emperor left Vienna around October 12, this time not to flee the Swedes but to avoid the plague that had raged in the city since the end of June, causing numerous deaths. Ferdinand III retreated to St. Pölten for a time and from

there, traveled to Linz via Melk.²⁴ The nuncio did not accompany him, and the emperor would have scarcely missed him. The Holy See's conduct in times of extreme need and crisis had disillusioned him; his tone grew increasingly sarcastic. According to the nuncio, addressing his explanations for the pope's refusal of subsidies, the emperor said that "he liked the sympathy and all the best intentions well enough but not unless they were accompanied by actions."²⁵ Neither is it likely that Ferdinand III was pleased that the Holy See even now made difficulties about marriage dispensations or that the nuncio objected to the melting down of church silver and the religious concessions that were to help the emperor out of his predicament in Münster, Osnabrück, and Trnava. In May, during their audiences, Ferdinand III had no longer discussed any details with the nuncio, brushing off complaints about a possible second secularization of convents in Württemberg, saying only that all would be negotiated in Münster.

Because of the Imperial concessions of April 1645, there was at last some real progress in the peace negotiations, though not quite as the emperor had envisioned. First, his remaining barriers against significant participation by the Imperial territories in the peace negotiations were removed. We must look at the complicated situation. The electors were present as a result of the Regensburg ratification of 1637, the territories allied with France and Sweden as a result of the 1641 Hamburg preliminary agreement, the Imperial Deputation as a result of Ferdinand III's resolution from April 1645, and the deputies from the Franconian and Swabian Circles because of a Swedish-French invitation.

The emperor had no procedural plan for the imperial princes' participation in these negotiations, nor did they allow themselves to be lured into the trap of an Imperial Diet. At the congress, they enjoyed a freedom unknown to them up to this point. During the debates over the form their participation would take, as events in Westphalia happened thick and fast, even the heretofore privileged electors of Saxony and Bavaria no longer resisted full participation and voting rights for all Imperial Estates. Left without the electors' backing, Ferdinand III also ceased to resist and, at the end of August, formally invited all of them to the congress. He left resolution of the dispute over procedures to them and, on August 29, 1645, granted them the privilege of making their own decisions concerning war and peace (*ius belli ac pacis*). At the conclusion of these internal debates, there occurred in both congress cities conferences of electors, imperial princes, and Imperial cities that functioned as official meetings without the emperor's guiding hand. Ferdinand III insisted on the emperor's symbolic role as highest Imperial judge by excluding from the congress those princes who had not yet accepted the Peace of Prague (Hesse-Kassel, Baden-Durlach, and Nassau-Saarbrücken). This was without practical consequences, as he had already guaranteed their admittance in the preliminary Hamburg treaties.²⁶

The Secret Instruction of October 1645

Because an end to the years-long delay in negotiating concrete conditions for peace now seemed imminent, Trauttmansdorff's delegation to the peace congress was in the spotlight. Although it had been planned for this eventuality since 1643, it still needed instructions, something that gave Ferdinand occasion to rethink the situation and prospects. He consulted his wife, sister of the Spanish king, and his brother Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. At the end of September, he asked for additional thoughts from Privy Councillors Trauttmansdorff, Schlick, Martinitz, Kurz, Kolowrat, and Pricklmayr.²⁷

Three privy councillors now discussed the separation from Spain that had long been taboo. At year's beginning, they had left this option off the table and acted as if war were the only option. But in the secret reports, presented privately to the emperor, it was clear how much the defeat at Jankau had altered the situation.

The dreaded worst-case scenario was that the emperor would be able to conclude a peace treaty with France but without Spain because it was unwilling to reach a simultaneous agreement on the conditions of a Franco-Spanish treaty. In this case, Ferdinand III would have to choose between Spain and the Empire. Either he (and the Imperial Estates) would make peace with France and abandon his alliance with Spain, or he would continue the war together with Spain but without the imperial princes—even Bavaria—which would then sign a peace treaty with France.

Georg Adam von Martinitz outlined these possibilities and repeated the state of opinion at court. In his view, both options appeared "impossible" to the emperor and "extremely dangerous" to the Spanish. The emperor himself had frequently commented that, in this extreme case, he would conclude peace on behalf of the Spanish, who then would have to either accept it or "not hold it against him."²⁸ Martinitz could see no other way. Thus, there was a solution, other than the military option that would leave it up to the Spanish, to whether, if the worst were to happen, they would break with the emperor by not joining a Franco-Imperial settlement that included conditions for Spain.

Kolowrat emphasized that the Imperial Estates were eager for peace, that they would not be stopped, and that the Imperial-Bavarian alliance stood on shaky ground. To avoid a break between the emperor and the princes as well as one between the emperor and Spain, Spain would have to bestir itself and cede territories to France. The Imperial Vice Chancellor Kurz wrote curtly that the Spanish would have to prepare their ambassadors at the peace congress for the worst scenario because the emperor was determined and being exhorted to make peace. The Spanish had to adapt their decisions to the Imperial ones so that together they might get out of this affair. No one expressly mentioned the consequences of a possible Spanish refusal. Trauttmansdorff, Schlick,

and Pricklmayr did not address the Spanish question in writing: an eloquent silence, but the advisory opinions inverted the burden of proof. It was up to the Spanish to meet France halfway, and in case they refused, there was now a practicable procedure for making peace alone and obliging Spain to accept responsibility for the consequences.

On October 9, 1645, Ferdinand III drafted the instruction for Trauttmansdorff based on these recommendations and concluded his work on October 16 by writing a protocol of the whole text, noting down what he would be willing to sacrifice for peace. It was so much that it would win the peace but also so much that it had to remain secret at all costs. In the end, it was more than what was ultimately needed.²⁹ Ferdinand III understood that, at worst, his concessions could bring about the former confessional situation of 1618 in the Empire and 1627–1630 in the hereditary lands; that France would receive Alsace and the Breisgau with the fortress of Breisach; that Sweden, indirectly at the cost of church property, would receive Pomerania and other lands; and, finally, that he would have to break with Philip IV. This was bitter. Ferdinand headed his draft with three crosses and began by appealing to the highest possible source of authority: “*In nomine Domini et filij et Spiritus Sancti Amen.*”

In the final draft of October 16, Ferdinand III omitted the reference to God but reiterated the defensive introduction that succinctly summarized the developments of the previous years in one long sentence: “after I have considered the length of the present war; the resulting ruin of the Holy Roman Empire and especially my hereditary kingdoms and territories; the ever increasing enemy forces and conversely the decrease of my own and my allies’ weapons and forces; the almost total want of resources; the general yearning for peace, and from that its inevitability.”³⁰ Just as succinctly, the emperor structured the text around eight points, sorting the concessions from his best to worst options. He wanted the text understood in this way, emphasizing that concessions would be made only if necessary and one step at the time and that Trauttmansdorff should go to the last one only in case of extreme necessity.

The first of these eight points concerned the Empire’s internal pacification. At the congress, Trauttmansdorff should see to it that the imperial princes would realign themselves with the emperor (“like members of a body with me as their head and father”) and that the *harmonia* within the Empire would be restored so that Sweden and France could be compelled to make peace. But this old concept of pacification was immediately thrown out because Trauttmansdorff was instructed to work simultaneously and “most speedily” on a peace agreement with France and Sweden. According to Ferdinand III, internal peace would be achieved through a solution of the amnesty problem and the religious conflicts. When negotiating the amnesty, Trauttmansdorff

could retreat incrementally, first to the conditions of 1627 and, if need be, to those of 1618. Ferdinand III wanted to ensure that his own kingdoms, the hereditary lands, and the issue of the Palatinate were exempted from this far-reaching amnesty. But if necessary, Trauttmansdorff could even back away from this and agree to restitutions in the hereditary lands to the 1627–1630 status. He could tolerate the religious practices of aristocratic Protestants or waive short-term emigration periods, respectively, and he could overlook or not “so severely” punish such practices as attendance at Protestant church services in other dominions.

Concerning religious conflicts, Ferdinand III insisted that Catholic properties still existing in the Empire would in the future not be secularized. He was prepared to relinquish church properties the Protestants had appropriated before 1618, however, and thus separated himself definitively from his father’s Edict of Restitution. For the Imperial judicial courts, he was prepared to accept religious parity, though he demanded an agreement on procedures that would not lapse into religious disputes. As to the hereditary conflict between Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, which had been inflamed by the confessional strife and settled by military means, Trauttmansdorff was instructed to favor the Lutheran prince of Hesse-Darmstadt over Calvinist Hesse-Kassel. Ferdinand III, fearing that the situation created by the Imperial decision of 1623 could not be sustained, charged Trauttmansdorff with ensuring that the involved parties would arrive at a compromise.³¹

Ferdinand III regarded the conflict over the Palatinate as the cause of the war and a settlement “nearly” concluded. Trauttmansdorff was to try to achieve alternation of the electoral office between the dukes of Bavaria and the Rhenish counts Palatine, but if this were not possible, each of them could receive his own electoral dignity. Furthermore, Trauttmansdorff should try to push through the installation of a Habsburg as a ninth elector but did not have to insist on it. As for the Palatine territories, if pressed to the extreme, Ferdinand III would agree to the restoration of the Upper Palatinate, but it would have to remain Catholic, with England and the other “friends and supporters” of the counts Palatine paying part of the Imperial war debt he owed Bavaria.

In the second and third sections of his draft, Ferdinand III addressed the peace with France and Sweden. He added to the text what he had hoped for so long and given up for lost: that if a separate peace with Sweden could be realized, Trauttmansdorff should conclude it as speedily as possible. Because the Swedes had previously been offered half of Pomerania, they should have it; if they wanted more or all of it and “if there was no other way,” they should have portions of the archbishopric of Bremen, Stralsund, Wismar, and Rostock as well, for several years or permanently, all as imperial fiefs. Those

in the Empire who lost territories and privileges because of the Swedish compensation would be indemnified with rural districts around Halberstadt and Magdeburg; those who should lose those districts were to be compensated with money that the Imperial territories would have to come up with.

France could have Alsace. Trauttmansdorff should ask to have Breisach returned but, under extreme duress, could relinquish it along with the Breisgau. Both belonged to the Innsbruck line of Habsburgs, however, and Ferdinand III wrote that negotiations with them would be necessary; yet, if need be, they could be ignored. In that case, they could be indemnified with money, privileges in Carinthia, or even all of Carinthia—something preferable to continuation of the war. Yet Trauttmansdorff should see to it that the Tyrol line would not ask for indemnification but would “bite into the sour apple” for love of peace (*amore pacis*). Trauttmansdorff was not empowered to grant France a seat and a vote at the Imperial Diet based on the ceded territories.

Ferdinand III was remarkably openhanded when it came to fulfilling the demands of France and Sweden at the cost of other territories, the Catholic Church, and his relatives in Innsbruck. Such generosity was more difficult when it came to his relationship with Spain. Ferdinand III worked from the—correct—assumption that his enemies were interested in separating the Spanish from the Austrian Habsburgs, for which reason he instructed Trauttmansdorff to try everything possible to prevent a break between the lines. Trauttmansdorff was to urge the Spanish ambassadors to work for a Franco-Spanish peace treaty but also to warn them that, if compelled, the emperor would make peace without Spain. In that case, Spain could agree or dissent, but if the latter were the case, the Spanish should “not hold it against me . . . if I cannot assist them.” Martinitz’s Latin formulation had been nearly identical, and Ferdinand III had written to Philip IV in similar terms shortly after the defeat at Jankau. Thus, Ferdinand permitted the break with Spain, suspension of military aid, and the cession of those territories for which his father (in the Oñate treaty signed in 1617 and renewed in 1634 as a reward for Spanish support in quelling the rebellion of 1618) had established a Spanish reversion claim.³² In addition, Ferdinand allowed for a ceasefire, hoped for a money-saving discharge of the soldiers, and dreamed of compensations in cash “because I and my house have done and suffered so much on behalf of the Empire.”

The emperor did not hail his decisive contribution to the war’s end as a discovery of political reality. Nor did he regard his willingness to distance himself from the old Empire, the old justice, and the old Church as a heroic deed. He was not pleased with the prospect of being the head of a badly plucked Imperial eagle with little more than reduced judicial powers. The

eventual break with Spain, his own closest relatives, and his few dependable—if exhausted—allies, which moreover constituted a breach of the 1617 and 1634 treaties, was infinitely difficult for him. In hindsight, no alternative to the break with Spain seems to have been viable, but in fact, it could have been avoided. True, Spain was in a profound crisis, but France was also at the end of its strength. Spain was still a world power, and it was unclear who would inherit it. The decision rested with the Spanish king, who had to choose between the Austrian Habsburgs and France. It was evident that when making this choice, he would take the emperor's stance during the peace congress into consideration. In 1645, Ferdinand III not only accepted the end of an alliance but arrived at a decision that—should the extreme case come to pass—would secure either the Imperial dignity and Habsburg hereditary territories on one hand or a world empire for his dynasty on the other.

One possible explanation for this difficult choice deserves mention: his personal experience. At the end of 1644, Piccolomini had recommended that the emperor should look to the example of Bavaria and attend to his hereditary lands instead of the Empire. Ferdinand III could see the scope of his hereditary territories better from his vantage point in Linz than from the Vienna Hofburg. The castle in Linz is situated on a hill above the banks of the Danube, and from Linz, the road leads to Bohemia. The river had impeded the Swedish advance at Jankau. After leaving Graz, Ferdinand III had spent the greater part of his life in cities on the Danube (Vienna, Regensburg, Bratislava, Donauwörth, and Straubing) and its tributaries (Munich on the Isar, Skalica on the March, and Bruck on the Leitha). Even Nördlingen lies on a tributary of the Danube. The territories along the Danube, Vltava (Moldau), and Mur were his hereditary lands. He had briefly seen the Rhine and Neckar but never the north of his Empire. In Linz, he now surrendered what he did not know; in Linz, one could outline what would remain of Habsburg universalism—a Danubian monarchy.

The Continuation of Peace Negotiations

Trauttmansdorff left Linz at the end of October 1645 and traveled to Westphalia with a retinue of approximately one hundred persons, among them jurists, secretaries, chancery officials, and one of his sons. Negotiations for concrete peace conditions now truly began in Münster and Osnabrück during the largest peace congress ever, which, as a working prerequisite, developed certain principles of modern diplomacy. A total of 194 diplomatic delegations from 16 European countries appeared, sent by 140 Imperial Estates and 38 other polities. They created a network of agreements that in the end ran to more than 300 paragraphs and whose every sentence was the result of long and intricate negotiations.³³

Trauttmansdorff remained at the congress for approximately eighteen months and was able to advance though not conclude negotiations based on the emperor's October instructions. Along with the subject matter, the tactics of negotiating were difficult because many of those present advanced their agendas by tying them to their stance on other issues. Trauttmansdorff's workload was enormous. For months, he slept poorly, became ill, and recovered only slowly. From August 1646 until May 1647, he negotiated from his sickbed. Ferdinand III allowed him much latitude but no free hand. The two corresponded constantly; the emperor regularly added instructions to the already approved reports of jurists and politicians of the Aulic and Privy Councils.³⁴

Because French military successes in southwestern Germany gave rise to the fear that he would lose Bavaria, his last important ally in the Empire, Ferdinand III wanted to arrive at a compromise with France before the 1646 campaign. Toward that end, in March, he relinquished Alsace. Trauttmansdorff was of the opinion that the religious disputes in the Empire had to be solved first; then one could, in agreement with the Imperial Estates, take a stronger stand vis-à-vis Sweden and France. The Spanish, the empress, and Quiroga opposed giving up Alsace, but Bavaria needed relief and put the emperor under pressure. Ferdinand III instructed Trauttmansdorff at the same time to cede the fortress Breisach, as France had demanded. The tactic of yielding only by increments delayed the desired effect, especially as Alsace was no unified territory but rather a conglomeration of bishoprics, Imperial cities, and other territorial fiefs. Trauttmansdorff was told to relinquish the Habsburg administration of the territory only after giving up the bishoprics. The French ambassadors were able to increase the pressure by biding their time and waiting for military successes.³⁵

They came. In 1646, French and Swedish troops made another incursion into southern Germany. Although the emperor had not yet arrived at an agreement with Spain concerning Alsace, and although France did not admit the duke of Lorraine to the congress as Ferdinand III had demanded, in September 1646, he accepted the preliminary contract with France and with it the cession of Alsace. The Imperials were not pleased, but they had passed the first stage of the road to peace. As it was only a preliminary contract, Spain still had time.³⁶

Negotiations between the emperor and Sweden were the second stage. Because no serious Swedish territorial demands immediately affected Habsburg territories or the reliably loyal Imperial Estates, Ferdinand III fared better here. The Swedes were entrenched in the area between the river Weser and the mouth of the Elbe as well as in Pomerania, and, thus, a state of emergency existed that justified a cession of ecclesiastical lands. Against the opposition of the influential Catholic bishop of Verden, the apostolic vicar for

Bremen, and numerous Catholic imperial princes, Ferdinand III was prepared to give up these properties, excepting only the city of Bremen. Under pressure from Bavaria, which cited military reasons, he also agreed to convert the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden into secular principalities.

Ceding Pomerania to Sweden was more difficult because at the Diet of 1640/41, the emperor had committed himself not to do so without Brandenburg's consent, something the electorate obstinately refused to grant. The elector relented only when Sweden, France, and the emperor united in pressuring him. By way of compensation, Ferdinand consented to cede him Church land in the bishoprics Halberstadt and Magdeburg as well as the strategically important abbey of Minden. Thus, in February 1647, Trauttmansdorff was able to conclude the Imperial-Swedish preliminary treaty and an agreement on the indemnification of Brandenburg.³⁷

Even more difficult were negotiations concerning the internal peace of the Empire. With France and Sweden participating in the deliberations, Ferdinand III now acknowledged the constellation of power within the Empire. The 1629 Edict of Restitution was lost long ago, and in addition to Bremen, Verden, Halberstadt, Magdeburg, and Minden, Ferdinand III was prepared to relinquish to their new rulers all other ecclesiastical territories Protestants had acquired between 1552 and the Thirty Years' War. This was going too far for Bavaria and many other Catholic Imperial Estates, but some Protestants felt that the concessions were insufficient, and Ferdinand III was thus caught between the confessional fronts.

Like the prince-archbishop of Mainz, he justified this surrender of ecclesiastical lands with a promise to more uncompromising Catholics that such concessions would not be valid "forever" but only until the confessions could be reunited.³⁸ He could also point to the military emergency and claim that he had been the only serious combatant because the Catholic princes had not supported him to their utmost ability, while papal support for France also bore a share of the responsibility for their loss. For the future, the emperor insisted on the Ecclesiastical Reservation that henceforth any acquisitions of Catholic church property by Protestant Imperial Estates would be out of the question.

With these concessions within the Empire, Trauttmansdorff (according to an imperial instruction dated July 12, 1646) was supposed to compel the Protestants to accept Ferdinand III's inflexibility concerning religion in his hereditary lands. The emperor also justified such distinctions to the Holy See. As territorial ruler, he insisted on the preservation of the status quo from the 1620s that had been maintained there. Yet amnesty for Bohemian, Moravian, and Upper Austrian Protestant emigrants who had participated in the rebellion, the restitution of their former property, and the return of religious emigrants were important matters for Sweden's prestige. After all,

their fate had served as a justification for the Swedish invasion and had shed a more favorable light on Swedish territorial gains in the Empire while also sustaining the ongoing project of weakening the Habsburgs. Religious conflict had undermined their authority and, in 1619, had led to the temporary end of their rule in the Bohemian territories. Indeed, the Swedish ambassador Salvius likened multiconfessionalism to a mouse gnawing at the roots of a tree “until the tree tumbles down.”³⁹ By contrast, Ferdinand III was focused on “catching up with and securing what had long been achieved elsewhere in a territorial religion as a means of shaping identity and integration” (Schmidt).⁴⁰

Granting amnesty to the rebels of 1618–1620 and restoring their property as well as allowing well over 100,000 emigrants of the 1620s to return as Protestants to the hereditary lands would have revived the old threat to Habsburg territorial lordship. But if at war’s end Ferdinand III as ruler were to return to the initial situation of the 1618 rebellion, he might just as well continue the fight—with Spain’s help, not without it. Thus, it came as no surprise that Ferdinand III remained almost totally immovable on this point.

The renunciation of confessional politics in the Empire in favor of securing territorial rulership was also supported by bishop and supreme commander Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, the emperor’s brother. At the beginning of 1646, the archduke wrote to Ferdinand III in no uncertain terms that the emperor’s weak position in the Imperial constitution was not worth putting the hereditary lands at risk and was imprudent from a theological point of view:

“If you retain what you have, and make these (territories) entirely Catholic, I believe Your Imperial Majesty is doing work pleasing to God; that Your Imperial Majesty is ruler and yet not ruler of the Empire, cannot make a single free decision, must depend on so many opinions and may not do what he wishes, and because of this could lose what is his own . . . not the cleverest theologian can give such advice.”⁴¹

During the peace conference, Trauttmansdorff could not fail to see that, in matters of principle and prestige, small concessions had great value as bargaining chips. But on October 8, 1646, Ferdinand III explicitly directed him not to exceed the concessions listed in the secret instructions.⁴²

Moderate Protestants, on the other hand, recognized that, together with the emperor, they could sidestep the intransigent Catholic estates. Hence, they gradually distanced themselves from their demand for an amnesty that would restore the status quo of 1618 in the hereditary lands. Ferdinand III, for his part, conceded the right to determine their own confession to four Silesian duchies and the city of Wrocław. He was not prepared to retreat further where his own territories were concerned but would have preferred the status of

1618 in the Empire instead. Trauttmansdorff, however, did not have to make that concession, agreeing with the Protestants to restore the status of 1624, though with a series of controversial exceptions. For example, some regulations concerning the religiously mixed city of Augsburg were difficult for the emperor to swallow, and he had to abandon hope for securing at least some of the convents in Württemberg.⁴³

Influenced by a developing Franco-Bavarian truce, Ferdinand III now urged utmost acceleration of negotiations and dropped his last demands on behalf of the Catholic Church in the Empire. In view of a favorable military prognosis, the Protestants returned to their most far-reaching demands. In March 1647, Trauttmansdorff countered by offering the ultimate confessional concessions for the hereditary territories stipulated in the secret instructions. When the Protestants, as a purportedly final concession, demanded acceptance of Lutheranism in all of Silesia, Trauttmansdorff saw the chance for a conclusive agreement. He proposed a compromise that would exceed the emperor's secret instructions and urged Ferdinand III repeatedly to relent—something “that had never happened before” (Ruppert).⁴⁴ The emperor declined, and for the time being, the religious questions remained unsolved.

Instead, Trauttmansdorff was able to bring about an agreement concerning the Palatinate. In the end, the Upper Palatinate remained Catholic and Bavarian, while the heirs of the Winterking, the Calvinist Counts Palatine, regained the greater portion of the Rhenish Palatinate and their subjects, Calvinism. For its part, Bavaria waived repayment by the emperor of the embarrassing 13 million Gulden in war costs. As instructed, and with Ferdinand III's renewed agreement, Trauttmansdorff directed Hesse-Darmstadt toward negotiations with Hesse-Kassel. Ferdinand III at last ceded the long-contested abbey of Hersfeld to the Calvinist line, and in April 1647, the two branches agreed to a settlement that favored Hesse-Kassel.⁴⁵

For some time, and more insistently since the collapse of negotiations on religious matters, Trauttmansdorff had pursued his return to court. He now received Ferdinand III's permission and left Münster in July 1647. He was able to point to considerable successes: preliminary treaties with France and Sweden had been concluded, solutions for Hesse and the Palatinate had been negotiated, and agreements over religious disputes in the Empire and the hereditary lands had been largely prepared. With this last—still open—question, Trauttmansdorff had run up against the line in the sand Ferdinand III had drawn in his secret instructions.⁴⁶

Yet he had additional reasons for returning. He worried about the Grand Steward's Office (where Khevenhüller served as his deputy) and with it his own position at court. In January 1647, Ferdinand III had to reassure him in writing, recalling pertinent decree from Khevenhüller and then canceling it

along with its draft. Finally, with the Imperial-French preliminary agreement, Trauttmansdorff had negotiated conditions that, in the end, the Spanish would have to accept or decline. It was imprudent to take negotiations beyond this point, especially as the Spanish made no progress in their deliberations with France. Yet Trauttmansdorff could take satisfaction that “as long as I was in Münster and attended the proceedings, Spain was always included and no division took place.”⁴⁷

2.6

THE BREAKING POINT

Guaranteeing the Internal Habsburg Alliance

Ferdinand III countered the dreaded possibility of a division between Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs with marriage policy. This was indicated because, while the peace negotiations were ongoing, their relationship steadily deteriorated. After the surrender of Breisach, the Spanish ambassador in Münster observed that “I have never seen such fatalism and torpor as with these Germans.”¹ Though fighting on many fronts, Spain was unwilling to make far-reaching concessions to France, as it held a valuable pawn. Instead of ceding territories, Philip IV was prepared to achieve peace and soften its terms through a marriage between *Infanta* Maria Theresia and Louis XIV.

The highly alarming specter of a French succession in Spain had been a distinct possibility ever since the Franco-Spanish double wedding of Louis XIII to *Infanta* Anna Maria and his sister Isabella to Philip IV. The Imperial court, especially people around Empress Maria Anna, planned to preclude a French succession in Spain through a Habsburg double wedding of both the *Infanta* Maria Theresia, who was born in 1638, to Ferdinand III’s oldest son and the emperor’s daughter Maria Anna to the Spanish heir apparent, Don Balthasar. On July 4, 1646, the court neared its goal when a marriage contract between Don Balthasar and Archduchess Maria Anna was signed in Madrid.² But several deaths altered this situation. Quite unexpectedly, Empress Maria Anna fell ill in Linz on the evening of May 12 and died at six o’clock the following morning. After her death, the doctors delivered, via Caesarean section, an infant daughter who was baptized as Maria but died shortly afterward. After lying in state in an antechamber of the Linz residence, she was transferred to a church and on May 24, onto a ship on the Danube. A funeral procession met the casket at the Vienna docks, took it to St. Stephan’s for the obsequies and, afterward, took it to a vault in the church of the Capuchins, where two of the dead empress’s sons were already entombed. Her ladies-in-waiting and the Spanish ambassador accompanied her to her final resting place.³

Ferdinand III remained in Linz. He was deeply affected by the death of his wife of fifteen years, with whom he had had three living and three dead children, the nuncio lamenting that he “suffered greatly because of this loss.”⁷⁴ As happened frequently during severe emotional distress, he became so ill that his doctors had to intervene. His face was marked by grief, his chamberlain Leslie writing that he “spoke to no one.”⁷⁵ Leslie was substituting for the grand chamberlain and thus could report that “last night His Majesty slept as restlessly and displayed as much grief as in the night after the empress’s death.” In order to mourn and pray, the emperor retreated to the small town of Ebelsberg near Linz, where Eleonora and Duke Niklas Franz of Lorraine arrived from Steyr to be near him.

The death of the empress, a sister of Philip IV, made securing the dynasty’s Spanish future through a marriage of the emperor’s son to *Infanta* Maria Theresia more difficult, but Ferdinand III did not desist. He mollified Spain about the peace negotiations, called a joint peace with France vital (*conditio sine qua non*), and insisted on Spanish efforts for peace. He also conferred a crown on his son, which was required if he wished to marry an *Infanta*. In June 1646, he had his son conveyed from Graz to Linz, introduced him to the business of government, and named his son’s grand steward Auersperg privy councillor. Since the beginning of 1645, the heir apparent had had his personal apartment and retinue. Fittingly, among his multinational aristocratic chamberlains was a son of the imperial ambassador to Spain.⁶

At the end of July 1646, Ferdinand III took his son to Prague to have him crowned king, something he had not done earlier because the Swedes continued to operate in Bohemia. The Diet’s loyalty oath, the coronation, distribution of royal coins, and the coronation banquet went smoothly but, because of the empress’s death, without any pomp. The estates raised no difficulties with this second coronation because Bohemia had become a hereditary monarchy in 1627. Instead, they asked the emperor to take up residence in Prague after the next Hungarian Diet. Ferdinand III praised the manner in which his nearly fourteen-year-old son played his role at the coronation as “*benissimo*.”⁷⁷

Together with Ferdinand IV, the emperor moved quickly on to Vienna via Linz. He arrived at the end of August and went hunting the next day in order to recuperate. The bishop of Vienna and the burial brotherhood of St. Augustine had already conducted obsequies for the deceased empress, but the funeral solemnities arranged by the Imperial court were more splendid. Preparations had been made since June, including a “Castle of Sorrows” (*castrum doloris*) later publicized in a copper engraving depicting the empress “enthroned in the clouds with her children” (Brix)⁸ and emphasizing her Habsburg ancestors—possibly a hint for Spain. Over four days, Ferdinand III once more took leave of his wife by celebrating vespers and death matins on Sunday evening

and obsequies over the next three days. At the beginning of September, the Spanish brotherhood of the Sacrament organized additional obsequies in St. Michael's Church, with the Spanish ambassador appearing for three consecutive days. Though the Spanish had lost "their" empress, they retained their importance. Quiroga remained at court, leaving only in 1649 when he traveled to Spain with Archduchess Maria Anna. Many of the empress's ladies-in-waiting moved into her daughter's retinue.

Shortly after the last obsequies, at the beginning of September 1646, Ferdinand III publicly announced his daughter's marriage to the Spanish heir apparent, Don Balthasar. The court took a one-day break from mourning while Ferdinand III received congratulations from the nobility, the envoys, and especially the Spanish ambassador, who appeared with his servants dressed in costly livery and later hosted a congratulatory banquet for the court notables. Since the Spanish prince's bride was only eleven years old and still in Graz, the civil marriage was slated to take place by proxy after the Hungarian Diet had ended. At Easter, she had sent her father a laurel wreath symbolizing all he wished to achieve: "Victory, palm branches, and cherished peace."⁹ Ferdinand III approximated these goals by accepting, still in September, the cession of Alsace and Breisach, even as the Spanish, now tied somewhat closer to him by this marriage, urged him to continue the war.

The constellation changed dramatically in 1646 when the Spanish heir apparent Don Balthasar suddenly died of smallpox. The heir to the Spanish Empire was now *Infanta* Maria Theresia, who was not only entirely out of reach for Ferdinand III's son but also much more valuable as a pawn in the Franco-Spanish War than before Don Balthasar's death. Against the advice of Peñeranda and Trauttmansdorff, who in Münster had regarded each other as the main obstacles to Habsburg policies, Ferdinand III and Philip IV agreed on another spouse for Archduchess Maria Anna. The Spanish ambassador, who had consoled her after her betrothed's death, congratulated her six months later on a newly planned marriage to Philip IV, who had been a widower since the end of 1644. That Philip IV was nearly thirty years her senior and also her uncle presented no impediment because if the marriage were to produce a successor, Habsburg dominion in Spain was secured for the next generation.¹⁰

The internal dynastic connection was strengthened even more in 1647 when Archduke Leopold Wilhelm assumed the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands with the emperor's permission. Since Don Fernando's death in 1641, the post had been repeatedly offered to him. With an Austrian Habsburg as governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Ferdinand III could expect increased consideration of his own situation, but then so could Philip IV, something that put the archduke in a difficult position. In winter of 1646/47, the brothers concluded negotiations about conditions under which Leopold Wilhelm would be

given—and would accept—the job, meeting several times in Bratislava, where Ferdinand was now attending the Hungarian Diet. In mid-February, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm prepared for his journey by forming a new retinue. On February 15, 1647, on the occasion of a memorial service commemorating their father's death, the brothers demonstrated the dynasty's concord in Bratislava. Only then did the archduke travel to Brussels.¹¹

Securing Peace in the East

In September 1646, Ferdinand III had traveled to Bratislava. From a Hungarian standpoint, he arrived several years late. In 1642, he had conferred in Vienna and Laxenburg with representatives of the Hungarian Estates and had been able to postpone the Diet that was due. When Palatine Miklós Esterházy died in September 1645 and the emperor had to go to Hungary for the election of a successor, there was another reason to delay the trip as long as possible. The Danube line still was not safe, with people having to break the river ice in January 1646 in order to prevent the Swedes from crossing. In spring of 1646, Imperial troops were able to drive the Swedes from Krems and the southern Moravian town of Mikulov. Lower Austria was only in relatively safe hands at the end of August, following the capture of Rabensburg on the Lower Austrian-Moravian-Hungarian frontier.¹²

The postponement and cancellation of travel by land was blamed on other circumstances: an outbreak of pestilence in Bratislava, which brought up Sopron as an alternative, and the empress's death and mourning period. On that occasion, several Hungarian bishops had come to Vienna and discussed the Diet there. On September 9, 1646, Ferdinand III finally departed from Vienna. On September 11, he endured a festive reception in Bratislava, something he had tried to avoid because of his wife's death. The military situation allowed for a boat bridge across the Danube but demanded strong military security for city and castle.¹³

But the eleven days between his arrival and the meeting brought the deep-seated reason for dragging out the Diet to the fore. During the Trnava peace negotiations leading to the Treaty of Linz in November 16, 1645, not only had Ferdinand handed over seven Hungarian counties (*Komitate*) to Prince György Rákóczi for his lifetime but, more importantly, both parties had agreed on exceptionally far-reaching religious privileges for the Hungarian peasants. Thus, they had concluded a treaty in favor of a third party, an important point for Rákóczi because he held political rights in Hungary and had justified his war against Ferdinand III with a radical Calvinist national program. The Swedish army's appearance on the Danube had made these concessions necessary because the emperor hoped that a lasting peace with Transylvania would keep Rákóczi away from the Westphalian negotiations.¹⁴ Whereas

Ferdinand III had kept the text of the agreement secret, the treaty itself stipulated its inclusion in the Hungarian Diet's final decisions and thus made its consideration imperative. Meanwhile, word of the religious concessions had gotten around Hungary, with György Rákóczi's adherents at the Diet in the position to provide the details. Therefore, Protestants expected the incorporation of the Linz treaty into Hungarian law, something Ferdinand III and the Catholic majority rather liked to circumvent.

This hope turned out to be illusory. The Protestants refused to elect a new Palatine (not to mention Ferdinand IV as king) without first discussing the treaty. After several days of preliminary negotiations, Ferdinand III gave in because the Protestants, after all, were in the right and had in Rákóczi an advocate with executive power. Thus, the deliberations were scheduled ahead of the Palatine's election, and Ferdinand III formally opened the Diet on September 22, 1646. After a mass "Of the Holy Spirit," the magnates and delegates congregated in the Bratislava castle's great hall, the Hungarian chancellor listed the subjects to be discussed, Ferdinand III added a brief address from the throne in Latin, and the archbishop of Gran, representing the Estates, thanked the emperor, also in Latin, for his presence.¹⁵ Now, even the new Palatine's election was promptly held. Preliminary negotiations had shown that there would be no majority for the emperor's favorite candidate, the Catholic Pál Pálffy, who had close ties to the court. Instead, on September 17, Ferdinand III made him privy councillor, abandoned his nomination, and submitted a list of other candidates. Before the end of the month, the Estates overwhelmingly elected the Catholic ban of Croatia Janos Draskovics, a friend of the Jesuits. The emperor liked him and was content.¹⁶

By then, his hopes that the scheduled negotiations concerning the Peace of Linz could somehow be conducted without revealing the text came to naught when the magnates unexpectedly withdrew their support, arguing that they had been excluded from the deliberations. At this point, the Upper House's rights of participation were more important to the Catholic magnates than maintaining their stance on the Counter Reformation. At last, the emperor gave in and, on October 1, 1646, handed over the pertinent documents, together with a request that they ratify the treaty. When the Catholic magnates realized how extensive the privileges of their subjects would be, they split. The minority opposed ratification, but the majority of Catholic and Protestant magnates finally voted to ratify at the end of October after intensive pressure from Ferdinand III, Pálffy, and Draskovics.

The camps were split even further during subsequent negotiations over restitution of Protestant churches on properties belonging to Catholic landlords who had confiscated them. Some delegates from the Catholic clergy opposed the bishops of the Upper House and supported Protestant claims, as

did the secular Catholic delegates from the *Komitate*. But Catholic magnates who had voted to ratify the treaty now got cold feet when deliberations opened with demands for the restitution of 400 churches. The Protestants eventually waived restitution of 250 churches erected either before the Reformation or afterward by Catholic landlords. In the next round of negotiations, they also waived restitution of churches that stood on Catholic land. In the end, only 90 churches were to be returned.¹⁷

When publication of the treaty's wording was at issue, the Catholics had put the status of the Diet above their religious interests. Both in these negotiations and in the Empire generally, however, Ferdinand III stood between the confessional parties and even between the two wings of the Catholic camp. It is remarkable that he stayed there. The relationship between the crown and the upper Catholic clergy was and remained antagonistic. In order to arrive at a viable conclusion, the emperor urged all participants to find a compromise and entered into an albeit "short-lived alliance" (Péter)¹⁸ with the Protestants. He honored the prohibition stipulated in the Linz treaty against solving confessional issues by outvoting the Protestant minority and, according to the nunciature, attempted to bring about unity in individual cases "with the utmost patience."¹⁹

One revolutionary outcome was that peasants could no longer (legally) be interfered with when it came to their religious practices, not even by the landlords on whose property they lived. The practice of nearly all nobles in both camps to impose their own religion on their subjects was thus nullified, at least normatively. This especially affected the Habsburg strategy of Counter Reformation as carried out by the Catholic aristocracy, although the following Diet showed what became of this norm. In addition, Ferdinand III again guaranteed privileges (granted by Matthias in 1608) and freedom of religious practices to estates, cities, and soldiers in the border territories, along with the rights to churches, bell towers, and grave sites.

Though vehemently attacked by the Counter-Reformation wing of the Catholic Church, the emperor sought his court theologians' approval for these religious concessions. His Jesuit confessor Gans, his deceased wife's Capuchin confessor Quiroga, and the Dominican Georg Herberstein, who undertook diplomatic missions for the court, were realists who oriented themselves along the lines of political and confessional compromise. Probably in order to somewhat disguise this imbalance, Ferdinand III also asked his deceased father's confessor Lamormaini to participate in the consultations.²⁰

Ferdinand III simultaneously cultivated the loyal Hungarian nobility. He stood godfather to a converted Count Nádasdy, appointed the son of a deceased Palatine to be his chamberlain, and conferred that same position of trust on many other Hungarian and Bohemian aristocrats. In addition, the

Austrian and Bohemian nobles, who dominated at the Imperial court, pursued rapprochement with the Hungarian nobles, and not only at court festivities. Finally, the Hungarian Diet admitted several aristocrats from Ferdinand III's entourage into the Hungarian nobility.²¹

The negotiations over religious questions (whose discussion here remains necessarily sketchy) dragged out over seven months. The emperor repeatedly urged their speedy completion, particularly in November 1646. He wished to return to Vienna lest news and envoys from the negotiations in Westphalia had to take the longer route to Bratislava. But his hopes for concluding the negotiations during November or at least before Christmas were not fulfilled. At the end of December, Ferdinand III offered a number of churches barely acceptable to the Catholics but deemed entirely insufficient by the Protestants. The rejection put a severe damper on the political proceedings. For a long time after this, there was nothing spectacular to report from the Diet if one disregards a long series of illnesses and deaths of Hungarian and Croatian nobles and bishops as well as the grudging continuation of the dispute within the Diet.²²

Ferdinand III had established himself with his household, knights of the Golden Fleece, ambassadors, and residents in Bratislava and held *Capella* as usual. Bratislava's climate was infamous, and when rain and fog commenced in the fall of 1646, the Spanish ambassador and Quiroga departed for Vienna. In November, illness was rampant, with Khevenhüller, Tieffenbach, and Schlick taking to their beds. Other courtiers simply took leaves of absence. The emperor, too, fled on occasion. His eldest son had remained in Ebersdorf since September, and Ferdinand III had Archduke Leopold and Archduchess Maria Anna conveyed there from Graz. He visited his children and Eleonora both in Ebersdorf and in Bruck an der Leitha. When Ebersdorf also became too damp and cold, the children were moved to the Vienna Hofburg, where the emperor repeatedly visited them, especially for the last days of carnival. Many Hungarian nobles—Batthyány, Nádasdy, and Zrinyi among them—had also left Bratislava until being recalled in March. The ice on the Danube began to melt, and Ferdinand III resumed hunting, but he remained in the vicinity of Bratislava in order to be present for various ceremonies and negotiations that were finally making headway.²³ In April, he again traveled to Vienna for Holy Week and Easter but suffered an attack of gout there. By month's end, he was able to move about his room but, instead of returning to Bratislava, went with his family to Laxenburg for rest and cure. He had left commissioners at the Diet to work with a delegation of the Estates toward settling the conflict over restitutions. Though needed as mediator, he was not expected to stay after such a long Diet, even though an end was finally in sight.²⁴

Of course, neither furloughs nor sickbeds could bring Hungarian politics to a halt. Though sharply attacked by the Calvinists, the Jesuits gained the emperor's ear via Lamormaini and the head of their Viennese convent (*Professhaus*), while the Hungarian Estates repeatedly pleaded for his presence in Bratislava, where he returned at the end of May. The Estates thanked him with a special present by agreeing to elect and to crown Ferdinand IV. Before crossing the border, Ferdinand IV spent a night at Rohrau with the counts Harrach, where he was received ceremoniously by the Hungarian nobility and military, escorted to Bratislava, and greeted there by Ferdinand III. Negotiations were concluded in June, and that same month, the Hungarian Estates elected and crowned Ferdinand IV as their king.²⁵

On the following Monday, the Diet met for its final session. Ferdinand III and the Palatine signed the 155 articles and thus brought to an end the emperor's most difficult and longest Hungarian Diet. The main document, Article 6, named the ninety churches to be restored, together with their cemeteries, chapels, school buildings, and more. Other important religious problems like the difficult relationship between Calvinists and Lutherans were regulated as well. With the rules of the Peace of Linz and their concrete implementation, Hungary obtained one of the freest confessional orders in Europe, and Ferdinand had peace in the east.²⁶

Without Bavaria: The Crisis of 1647

But what had long been dreaded now happened in the west. In March 1647, Bavaria signed a truce with France and declared its neutrality in the Franco-Imperial war. This was terrible news for the court because for all practical purposes, the emperor would now have to fight France, Sweden, and their allies by himself.²⁷

The final impetus for the Bavarian truce had been the success of the Franco-Swedish-Hessian campaign of 1646. In that year, the Imperial Army was supposed to demonstrate the strength it had regained after Jankau, as it did with some successes in Westphalia. But the French, Swedes, and Hessians had combined their armies and outmaneuvered the Imperial troops at the river Main, whereupon the Swedes had once again invaded Bavaria. Parts of the Imperial Army had remained in Westphalia, while others had pursued the Swedes. That they had defended Augsburg at the end of the campaign was of little importance because a French-brokered Swedish-Polish ceasefire provided several thousand Swedish soldiers with an opportunity to march against Bohemia. The main body of the Imperial Army retreated there in March 1647, something that created disastrous prospects for Bavaria in the coming summer. Maximilian I's solution, a truce with France, was adopted also by his brother, the elector of Cologne. France and Sweden

could now focus on annihilating the last remaining Imperial allies. They devastated Hesse-Darmstadt and forced Electoral Mainz to sign a treaty of neutrality.²⁸

Yet the consequences of Bavarian neutrality were even more multifaceted, as Ferdinand III did not know what would become of the Bavarian troops that were still nominally part of the Imperial Army or of the cities they still occupied. He dispatched Khevenhüller to Maximilian I to clarify the situation and learned that Bavaria was attempting to take the Regensburg bridges. In order to defend the Imperial city against Bavaria, the emperor sent his chamberlain and officer Conti to Regensburg with his soldiers. We must remember that in 1634, the emperor and the elector had had a vehement conflict over the city. Ferdinand III was able to hold Regensburg, but his attempt to acquire control over the Bavarian contingent of his army failed. The Bavarian cavalry commander Werth went over to the emperor, but his troops did not follow him.²⁹

Paradoxically, peace in Westphalia seemed within reach at this time. Preliminary treaties with France and Sweden were completed, and negotiations about the confessional order in the Empire were far advanced, though not concluded because of the dispute over the Habsburg hereditary lands. Ferdinand III did what little he could to hang on militarily without losing further territorial authority until the peace treaty was signed. He pushed through a regimental reform and transferred the supreme command from the gravely ill Gallas to General Melander. He made preparations for a visit to his army, participated in the Corpus Christi procession, honored an aristocratic wedding at court with his presence, and departed to the army the next day. Empress Eleonora, Ferdinand IV, and Archduchess Maria Anna prayed for divine assistance at the *Mariensäule* he had commissioned. The emperor made his son regent and appointed Privy Councillor Vilém Slavata his special assistant. Thus, Ferdinand IV, like his father before him, experienced the Prague Defenestration through one person who had survived it.³⁰

Ferdinand III traveled via Linz, southern Bohemia, and the Upper Palatinate to western Bohemia. In Strakonice, he was able to win over the officers as he had done on previous occasions. He reached Plzeň in mid-July, established his headquarters in the city hall, and from there, accompanied the troops to the vicinity of the fortified town of Cheb, which was besieged by the Swedes. The soldiers who had been summoned from the Empire and Styria to break up the siege arrived too late as the garrison surrendered on July 17, 1647, after the Swedes had breached and undermined the fortifications. To lure the Swedes away from Cheb, Imperial troops took the castle of Falknov nad Ohří, but the two armies merely watched each other, without the Imperials being able to besiege the Swedes in Cheb. In mid-August, Ferdinand III returned to Plzeň, where Trauttmansdorff, recently returned from Westphalia, awaited

him. The Swedes pursued the emperor to Plzeň, and skirmishes took place near the city. Though the armies approached each other at Tepl—situated between Cheb and Plzeň—neither side precipitated a battle.³¹

This dismal state of affairs was regarded as a success by Imperial adherents. But news from the Empire may have prompted the emperor to quit the army suddenly and to head for Prague, where he arrived on September 21, 1647. He prepared to remain there for the time being, probably because of its greater proximity to Westphalia, Saxony, and the theaters of war, while making good his old promise to the Bohemian Estates of an extended stay in Prague. He sent for the court musicians and, a few months later, for the Aulic Council members and their families. Some people even suspected that Prague would become his permanent residence.³²

But what had been this news from the Empire? In August 1647, the elector of Cologne once again went over to the emperor's side, with the Bavarian elector following in September. There were many reasons for the Bavarian and French moves, but their importance is unclear. Sweden did not accept France's retreat in the south, prompting the French to cancel the ceasefire. Even earlier, the Spanish had succeeded, by dint of persuasion and bribery of his chief advisor, in detaching the elector of Cologne from the ceasefire with France. On the other hand, the military situation did not develop quite as Bavaria and the emperor had feared, as most fortifications in the hereditary lands withstood the Swedes. As governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm brought some relief for the south by beginning a quite successful offensive against the northern French army.³³

Moreover, during the Franco-Bavarian truce, Ferdinand III had ceaselessly signaled his willingness to continue the Imperial-Bavarian alliance. In July, he enlisted the help of his sister, Maximilian I's wife, to intercede on behalf of a new alliance for achieving peace. He wrote that the security of both dynasties lay in their closeness, something their enemies had unfortunately recognized and broken with the detested defection of Bavaria. To bring his uncle and brother-in-law back into his camp, that summer, he sent prominent courtiers, once again Khevenhüller and Kurz, to the elector. The two negotiated the conditions for a new alliance following the Franco-Bavarian break. This was difficult, taking several weeks just to arrive at a solution for the general of the cavalry, Werth, a hero to the emperor but a mutineer to the elector. As before, the nominal supreme command remained with the emperor, though the elector commanded the Bavarian forces as well as any Imperial units stationed in Bavaria—an arrangement that would have far-reaching consequences.

After the Bavarian about-face, the Swedes withdrew their army far into the north. In northern Bohemia, the Imperial troops expelled Swedish occupation forces from the towns and secured the northern Bohemian mountain

passes. In Moravia, the Swedes were forced to relinquish Iglau (Jihlava) after a long siege but stood their ground elsewhere in Moravia and Silesia. In Bavaria, too, the Imperial Army was no longer on the defensive. In Hesse, a part of the Imperial Army fought against that of Hesse-Kassel and in December 1647, took the town—though not the fortress—of Marburg.³⁴

For the semi-successful renewed alliance with Bavaria, the emperor paid a political price. Maximilian I demanded progress at the peace congress at a time when a new Franco-Swedish offensive in Bavaria and the hereditary lands could be expected for 1648. Giving in to well-reasoned Bavarian pressure, Ferdinand III instructed his negotiators to abandon the attempt to reach an agreement with the Catholic territories on a common policy.³⁵

The emperor still hoped for an agreement between Spain and France, and he wanted to stay the course until it had been achieved. In winter of 1647/48, he tried to induce Saxony to rejoin the Imperial-Bavarian military agreement. Once more, he explored the feasibility of an alliance between the Empire, Bavaria, and Electoral Cologne with Denmark, Brandenburg, and Electoral Saxony, albeit in vain. Thus, in February 1648, he accepted the conditions for the Empire's religious order on which Trauttmansdorff had settled at the end of 1645 within the scope of the secret instructions. As justification for the war's continuation, there now remained only the hope for a Franco-Spanish agreement—the hope for a general European peace.³⁶

Peace, Finally

But Ferdinand III made another momentous detour. He had only two surviving sons, too few to ensure the dynasty's continuation. Thus, after his wife's death, the question was not whether he would remarry but when. Again, there was a marriage within the dynasty, this time his cousin Archduchess Maria Leopoldina, born in 1632, to the Leopoldine line that ruled Tyrol. In March and May 1648, Maximilian Prince von Dietrichstein was in Innsbruck to arrange the wedding and retinue. For months, it was unclear whether the ceremony would take place in Passau, Linz, or Vienna. At the end of April, the choice fell on Linz, whence the couple would travel back to Prague for the new empress's Bohemian coronation.³⁷

The essential reason for the court's hesitation was the military situation. Except for a few fortresses, Ferdinand III had few resources to help stem the Swedish spring 1648 offensive at a time when part of his army was stuck in Hesse. At Augsburg, Imperial and Bavarian troops attempted to halt a Franco-Swedish incursion into Bavaria. They blocked the invasion near Zusmarshausen but lost the last large battle of the war on May 17, 1648. Other Swedish troops operated in Moravia and Bohemia, where they devastated the region around Cheb before fighting their way through Franconia

to the Danube. To prevent a Swedish incursion into Austria, Imperial troops secured the Danube in Lower Bavaria, while much-needed auxiliary forces were detached from Bohemia.³⁸

Thus, planning for the imperial wedding depended on military strategy. The emperor's counselors were of two minds, with some urging him to remain in Prague to reinforce the Bohemian capital's defense, while others urged him to travel to Linz for his own safety. Ferdinand III took the sceptics' advice and chose Linz over Prague, as he had done in 1645. As the more comfortable route via western Bohemia, the Upper Palatinate, and the Danube was no longer open, he had to travel through southern Bohemia. The journey was not exactly a flight but not far from it. There were not enough vehicles to convey the courtiers, and many were forced to follow later. The nuncio noted that the emperor appeared exceedingly "melancholy" before departing but displayed the "usual affability."³⁹ Ferdinand III asked the nuncio to perform the marriage ceremony, denying this honor to the bishop of Vienna and Cardinal Harrach, who had to remain in Bohemia.

In mid-June, the emperor arrived in Linz, where he awaited the bride and the requisite ceremonial items being brought from Graz. At the end of June, everything was ready. Ferdinand III met Archduchess Maria Leopoldina at the church, where they heard a *Te Deum*. During the marriage banquet, the bridal couple sat with the Innsbruck relatives, including the mother and siblings of the bride, Claudia de' Medici, Archduchess Isabella, and Archduke Ferdinand Karl with his wife Anna de' Medici, along with the ambassadors of the pope, Spain, and Venice. The celebration was less ostentatious than in 1631, but there was festive music. The couple received courtiers and presents sent by Eleonora and Ferdinand IV as well as a Hungarian delegation that included two counts Pálffy who offered the kingdom's congratulations. In July, there were hunting excursions lasting several days, for example, to Ebelsberg and Enns.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, on July 26, 1648, the Swedes took Prague's Hradshin castle and the city's smaller west bank. After the victory at Zusmarshausen, the Swedish general Königsmarck had taken advantage of the Imperial troops' weakness to march into Bohemia and, thence, rapidly on to Prague. The sources differ whether this was due to treason or carelessness, but a few Swedes seized the gate near the city's Strahov convent, killed the guards, and held the gate open for Königsmarck and several thousand soldiers. When he became aware of the attack, Colloredo allegedly ran through the gardens to the Charles Bridge in his shirt in order to take the steps necessary for securing the old and new city of Prague east of the Vltava. There, General Puchheim was encamped with somewhat over a thousand men. The citizenry was called to arms, and the city's eastern areas escaped conquest. Because there was no resistance on the now Swedish side, there were few dead and wounded but

much looting of Imperial and royal art treasures, together with the property of high-ranking aristocrats who lived in this part of the city. The aristocrats—among them Cardinal Harrach, Trauttmansdorff's oldest son, the President of the Court Treasury Kolowrat, and Count Bernhard von Martinitz's family—had to pay large sums for their ransom. The Swedes fortified their side, increased the strength of their troops, fired at the side defended by Puchheim's soldiers, and tried to take it. For once they were unsuccessful.⁴¹

But matters worsened for the emperor. In August, the Swedes also took the southern Bohemian town of Tabor, while Ferdinand III was only able to assemble troops in České Budějovice and Krumlov for the liberation of Prague. Meanwhile, his army stopped the Swedish advance from Bavaria to Austria between Landau on the Isar and Dingolfing. Amid these efforts, the nuncio reported that the prince-archbishop of Salzburg was unwilling to take the risk of complying with Ferdinand III's request for a few hundred men or ammunition.⁴²

The emperor could not return to Prague, and things literally went downhill when he defied the dire financial situation by presenting the new empress with a new and, in the opinion of the nunatiure, "exceedingly beautiful barque"⁴³ in which they traveled downriver to Vienna, arriving there on September 12. In spite of all the troubles, there was a festive reception with Ferdinand IV, the ambassadors, and the nobles accompanying the emperor to the St. Augustine church, where he was awaited by his second son, Archduke Leopold, and Archduchess Maria Anna. Together, they heard litanies in the Loreto chapel and dined that evening with Eleonora.

Archduchess Maria Anna now was the promised bride of the Spanish king, but the relationship with Spain was extremely precarious. Ferdinand III had long waited—in vain—for a Franco-Spanish peace treaty and had for some time urged a solution for French-occupied Lorraine. In January 1648—more than eighty years after the rebellion and decades of war—Spain had recognized the independence of the United Netherlands and made peace. Because this move meant a noticeable improvement of Spanish prospects in the war with France, France increased its pressure on the Imperial Estates and, in concert with them, on the emperor. At the beginning of 1648, Ferdinand III was still assuring the king of Spain that there would be no break between them, but as a precondition for an Imperial-Bavarian summer campaign, Maximilian I demanded that the emperor break this promise. In early May, hoping for a general peace, Ferdinand III acceded and strongly urged Spain to hand over large Spanish territories to France. From the truly enormous French demands, however, the Spanish concluded that France did not want peace but only a break between the emperor and Spain. Philip IV declined to give in to French conditions or to renounce his claims to Alsace, which rested on the treaties of 1617 and 1634.⁴⁴

Because all hope for a Franco-Spanish peace in 1648 had ended, the Imperial representatives at the peace congress moved only in response to the strongest pressure. Whether consciously or subconsciously, but in any case most unhappily, Ferdinand III found himself in the kind of extreme situation that provided him with a justification for the violation of legal principles.⁴⁵ His Imperial vassals, both Catholic and Protestant, finally took the initiative at the peace congress. In March 1648, they accepted a compromise concerning Imperial jurisdiction that amounted to near confessional parity of judges, though the emperor would have preferred otherwise. In view of this agreement between the two confessions, Ferdinand's delegates still made some minor concessions in the religious structure of the hereditary lands. As Trauttmansdorff had exhausted his negotiating authority in 1647, the Imperial representatives who had remained at the congress had to go beyond it. In the hereditary lands, they agreed on a new basis for the religious liberties of Silesia's Lutherans—rights no longer regarded as a ruler's act of grace. In territories outside the hereditary lands, subjects were permitted to keep their confession if it had already existed there before 1624.⁴⁶ Private religious practices of other faiths would be tolerated everywhere. Expulsion would only be permitted if a creed had not been practiced in a territory by 1624. Last but not least, Ferdinand III accepted balanced financing of the Swedish military's discharge, although he was appalled at the way his delegates conducted the negotiations. Accepting a report of his deputized councillors, in April 1648, he imposed negotiation tactics that completely isolated them at the congress. The Imperial Estates often simply ignored his instructions. In August 1648, Sweden, as protector of the Protestants, came to an agreement with the Protestant and Catholic territories over as yet unresolved conditions for peace. Sweden dropped further confessional demands on behalf of Protestants in the hereditary lands in return for the financing of its army's discharge.⁴⁷

Thus, by the summer of 1648, the treaties with France and Sweden—along with the religious reorganization in the Empire and the Habsburg lands—were complete. In essence, the only thing lacking was the emperor's consent to the clause that prohibited him from supporting Spain. On one hand, this clause was "a constitutional, dynastic, and political . . . monstrosity" (Reppen).⁴⁸ On the other hand, a military emergency was undeniable. Half of Prague was occupied by the Swedes, and Silesia, Bohemia, and Moravia were more or less in their hands; Bavaria was almost entirely occupied; and Maximilian I had fled to Salzburg. It was he and his brother, the elector of Cologne, who now most urgently insisted that Ferdinand III conclude peace without Spain's participation. This peace harmed Ferdinand as emperor but not as territorial ruler.

Predictably, he asked several privy councillors to discuss additional options. On September 14, 1648, they diagnosed the emergency that would justify the emperor's actions: the war's continuation would benefit neither the

emperor nor Spain. Ferdinand III's pro-Spanish stance had totally isolated him in the Empire. Were he not to sign, he would stand alone and would lose the hereditary lands, the Empire, and all prospects for his son's succession. Spain would gain nothing, while he and his descendants would suffer "irreparable damage" (Repgen). His dynastic ties to the Spanish Habsburgs did not oblige the emperor to do anything that would harm the two lines more than it would benefit them. The future would offer him the means and opportunities to help Spain, at which point the treaty might be subverted. When prohibiting the emperor's military aid for Spain, the imperial princes had formulated the treaty loosely. Had they done otherwise, they would simultaneously have curtailed their own right to form alliances. All else aside, the report concluded that the peace treaty was not a "bad" but rather a "conciliatory" one (Repgen). The Imperial gains from the Bohemian-Palatine war (the confiscations, the re-Catholicization, the Bohemian constitution of 1627) would be recognized by all parties.⁴⁹

Thus, on September 16, 1648, Ferdinand III issued two directives to his delegates, one overt and one they were allowed to open only if the congress's total failure could not be avoided any other way. In the open directive, he demanded that one more attempt be made to bring about peace between Spain and France. His closed directive allowed the conclusion of peace with France, with the central clause concerning Spain.

On the same day, a letter from Maximilian I reached the emperor. The elector demanded that Ferdinand III join the peace under the "ultimate threat" (Ruppert)⁵⁰ of a Bavarian-French ceasefire and separate peace. The emperor gave in, and on September 20 and 22, instructed his ambassadors to sign the treaties. But before these new directives could arrive at the congress, the delegates, in tumultuous circumstances, had already fallen back on the closed instructions and had declared on October 6 that they would sign the treaty. Thereupon many wanted to increase their demands. The imperial ambassadors agreed to one clause that gave France, which had already been granted the Habsburg dominion in Alsace, Metz, Toul, and Verdun along with the fortress Pinerolo, a temporary surety of four towns along the upper Rhine (Waldshut, Säckingen, Rheinfelden, and Laufenburg) in case the Spanish, who were not bound by the peace treaty, were to insist on their claims to Alsace as stipulated in the 1617 and 1634 treaties.

Finally, on October 24, 1648, the Imperial, French, and Swedish ambassadors signed the peace agreements alongside fifteen deputies from the Imperial Estates whose inclusion demonstrated their enhanced constitutional status. On the following day, they publicized and celebrated the new peace and listened in various churches to the *Te Deum*. Couriers brought the news to the troops and the courts. On November 3, the son of the Imperial diplomat Nassau informed

the emperor in Vienna. The next day, a courier from the Imperial negotiator Lamberg confirmed the tidings. From infancy, Ferdinand III had known only war; now, for the first time, he was an emperor in peace—a peace, albeit, that had not become a general European one.⁵¹



FIGURE 25 Ten ducats, 1648, Chemnitz, in honor of the end of the Thirty Years' War, 34.78 g. Armor-clad bust portrait with laurel wreath, cloak, and the necklace of the Order of the Golden Fleece, surrounded by a laurel wreath, head of an angel above, signature below. // Sun with a face, below cartridge with the year. Fritz Rudolf Künker GmbH & Co. KG, Osnabrück. Lübke + Wiedemann KG, Leonberg.

PART III

THE DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING PEACE

3.1

FIRST STEPS IN A NEW ERA

Clinging to Spain, Ending the War

The conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia treaty confronted Ferdinand III with a serious challenge. How could he maintain a peaceful order—necessary for his hereditary lands, beneficial for his own rule there, and guaranteed by the European state system—and yet pursue his own interests in the wars still being fought in surrounding territories?

Because of the ongoing Franco-Spanish War, this dilemma was felt most immediately in the emperor's relationship with the Spanish Habsburgs. His basic interest lay in Spain remaining with the dynasty, but he could no longer supply military aid overtly. The problem could not be solved by pleas for speedy peace negotiations with France, recognition of Alsace's cession, or Ferdinand IV's marriage to the Spanish hereditary *Infanta* Maria Theresia because Philip IV also found himself in a quandary. The long withheld recognition of Alsace's cession as well as the hereditary option embodied by the *Infanta* had to be kept as bargaining chips until he deemed the time right for serious negotiations with France. For the moment, he still needed Ferdinand III's support. The dual connection corresponded to a dual strategy on both sides. Ferdinand III clung to the letter of the Westphalian peace agreement and declined to render open military aid. At the same time, he stretched the legal position as far as possible and supplied covert support. He assiduously cultivated his ties to Spain, at least symbolically. Philip IV, on the other hand, accepted the support but took his time making a decision about his heiress's marriage.¹

It was part of this complicated relationship that made both Ferdinand III and Philip IV cling to their second agreement, the marriage of the emperor's daughter to the Spanish king. As this project had been made public in June of 1647, Archduchess Maria Anna's departure for Spain had been repeatedly postponed, but she was already treated as the Spanish queen and fulfilled representational tasks. Thus, she honored Philip IV's birthday by arranging

a tournament, appeared at *Ambrosian Hymns* celebrating Spanish victories, and received the Spanish ambassador.²

Significantly, the marriage ceremony in Vienna was held on the Sunday after news of the Westphalian peace had arrived. The Spanish ambassador read the authorization for Philip IV's proxy, the emperor gave his consent, and Archduchess Maria Anna and Ferdinand IV (standing in for Philip IV) recited the marriage vows. In Vienna, volleys and fireworks celebrated the dynasty's union, which had just been so badly damaged in Münster and Osnabrück. Soon thereafter, Ferdinand III's eldest daughter left Vienna. Her family accompanied her part of the way given that family members rarely saw each other again after such farewells. But the emperor was soon reminded that territories were far more important than dynasties and dynasties more important than individuals when he attended the feast day of the sainted Austrian Margrave Leopold from the earlier Babenberg dynasty, on whose skull rested the Austrian Archduke's hat, as it does to this day.³

Ferdinand III initially sent his heir apparent and second marriage candidate along to Spain, lest Philip IV change his mind, especially given rumors that Ferdinand IV (Philip's godson) did not agree with Alsace's cession to France. The journey proceeded slowly and came to a halt in Trent, where the siblings waited for months along with Cardinal Harrach, Auersperg, and Quiroga. Not until May 1649 did the emperor decide to put his son's Spanish marriage on hold, for which reason Ferdinand IV did not accompany his sister to the Spanish court but instead only as far as the Spanish duchy of Milan. The reception there was unenthusiastic because of unresolved issues of precedence. On the return trip, Ferdinand IV visited the Innsbruck Habsburgs and arrived back in Vienna at the end of July 1649.⁴

Ferdinand III's daughter did, however, continue on to Spain. Hopes for a Habsburg successor were so high that in November 1649, the Spanish ambassador celebrated the news of the marriage's consummation with banquets and bonfires. Finally, in 1651, the Spanish court sent a portrait of Queen Maria Anna, great with child, to Vienna and only a few weeks later followed it up with a courier. At the age of seventeen, she had given birth on July 12 to the *Infanta* Margerita Theresa.⁵ The Spanish ambassador celebrated the tidings with three days of bonfires, the court with a *Te Deum*, salvos, and a grandiose feast. For weeks, Ferdinand IV rehearsed a foot tournament with courtiers and high-ranking officers, among them Piccolomini. In addition, the emperor commemorated the dynasty's unity with great pomp and a festive opera in the newly constructed Hofburg theater. The four continents vied over each other's precedence at festivities celebrating the *Infanta's* birth. So that the pomp might be demonstrated elsewhere, the court immortalized the opera in copper engravings. The wait for a Spanish successor resumed (Figure 26).⁶



FIGURE 26 Mary Anne, oldest daughter of Ferdinand III, painted as Queen of Spain, painting by Diego Velázquez. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, inventory number 6308.

Thus, the emperor continued his support of Spain. In 1649, he dismissed soldiers in Carinthia in a way that enabled them to cross the border and enter Spanish service. In subsequent years, he permitted Spain to recruit mercenaries from his hereditary lands. This was contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Münster but not its letter, as Ferdinand III could point to his now expanded privileges as a territorial ruler. But with the Peace of Westphalia in mind, he rejected the notion advanced by several of his counselors that the four upper Rhenish towns Waldshut, Säckingen, Rheinfelden, and Laufenburg could be recovered from France by military means. Such a campaign would have spelled the end of peace with France as well as the Imperial Estates that had relinquished these towns as additional surety during the peace negotiations.⁷ Ferdinand III supported Spain in this legal gray area as a territorial prince, but as emperor, he also did so with the instruments of Imperial law. His far-reaching power as supreme judicial authority and feudal lord could influence political developments in Spain's favor. Thus, he inhibited the anti-Spanish duke of Modena's efforts toward territorial expansion and delayed the pro-French duke of Savoy's enfeoffment with parts of Montferrat important for Spain.⁸

While Ferdinand III thus clung to Spain, he was also occupied with military implementation of the Westphalian peace agreements in the Empire. Though many imperial officers and courtiers had no confidence in the peace, this particularly concerned the difficult troop withdrawals. After the cessation of the hostilities, the Swedes alone still held over one hundred fortified positions throughout the Empire and the hereditary lands. The commandant of the Swedish army even resided in Prague. On the Charles Bridge, the Swedish commander—the future King Charles X Gustav—negotiated the conditions for a Swedish withdrawal beginning in January of 1649.⁹

Further negotiations about implementing the Peace of Westphalia led to a congress in Nuremberg with participation by the Imperial Estates. In summer 1649, the plans for an incremental retreat were largely complete, with the first large wave of withdrawals from Bohemia beginning that fall. In the summer of 1650, the Swedes evacuated Moravia and Silesia (with the exception of Głogów, which served as their surety for Spain's release of Frankenthal two years later). Moreover, the process of the military implementation of the peace treaty over several years induced the organization of a small standing army in the hereditary lands.

The three Bohemian territories still in Habsburg hands were in a frightful state. After the wave of emigrations, their population had once again suffered heavy losses in the war. The old Moravian capital Olomouc, for example, had declined from 30,000 in 1618 to less than 2,000. Of its 700 houses, less than 200 remained habitable.¹⁰

Only on July 24, 1650, Ferdinand III celebrated the fact that peace was now a reality with a gun salute and a *Te Deum* in St. Stephen's. A procession had to be canceled because of rain.¹¹ This seems appropriate because, even if the hereditary lands happened to be at peace for the moment, the Westphalian peace had not completely ended war in Europe.

The Hungarian Diet of 1649; Maintaining Peace in the East

The death of the Hungarian Palatine Draskovics in August 1648 necessitated another Diet. In September, when the emperor was still trying to make up his mind about assenting to the Westphalian peace, a large number of Hungarian nobles assembled at court asked him to come to Bratislava. At month's end, the archbishop of Esztergom also arrived for the preliminaries. The need for a Diet became acute when the Prince of Transylvania, György Rákóczi I, died a few weeks later. The *Komitate* that Ferdinand III had transferred to him in the Peace of Trnava now asked the emperor, as the king of Hungary, to resume possession. Thus, he would travel to Bratislava after Christmas.¹²

Preparations for the Diet intensified in January 1649, when additional Hungarian notables arrived in Vienna. After the concessions he had made during the last Diet, Ferdinand III kept his composure about this one. To the nuncio, who asked him to see that a Catholic would become the next Palatine and that Protestants would be granted no new privileges, he replied—reportedly laughing—that at the last Diet the Protestants had received “enough privileges to last for some time.”¹³ Besides, things would not get overly serious because the prince of Transylvania had died.

Because the Danube was still frozen over in February, the Hungarian aristocrats could not receive their king until March, when they finally accompanied him to the castle. Hungarian noblewomen waited on the empress, and the court at Bratislava thus reconstituted itself as a royal Hungarian-Imperial retinue. During his stay, the emperor appointed five new Hungarian chamberlains: Adam Batthyány, György Frangepán of Tersat, Imre Balassi, Dániel Reváy of Reváy, and Ferenc Csáky.¹⁴

The Diet's central task was soon accomplished. As Palatine, Ferdinand III nominated two Protestants as well as the Catholics Adam Forgách and Pál Pálffy, of all people. Pálffy was elected with a large majority. He came from a family that had remained Catholic during the Reformation and was strongly oriented toward the Imperial court. From his youth, Pálffy had been Trauttmansdorff's brother-in-law, lived often (his wife and children almost permanently) in Vienna, and since 1646, had been the emperor's only native Hungarian privy councillor.¹⁵

Like many Hungarians, Pálffy was dissatisfied that, despite the newly won peace in the Empire, Ferdinand III had made no preparations for a military campaign against the Ottoman Empire in order to liberate Hungary. But in

principle, there was agreement that the fortress belt along the Ottoman frontier needed reinforcing, especially because the burdens imposed by the long war had reduced by a third the 22,000 soldiers deemed necessary in 1641 to garrison it. At the end of April 1649, Ferdinand III urged the conclusion of the Hungarian Diet and, as usual, was asked to remain a bit longer. As usual, he assented, undergoing his spring cure and blood-letting in Bratislava while relaxing in the archbishop's garden. The negotiations were finished at the end of May, and the emperor was able to conclude the quietest Hungarian Diet of his life. On the way home, the imperial couple visited the Dowager Empress Eleonora and arrived back in Vienna at the beginning of June.¹⁶

Ceasefire and Skirmishes in the Southeast

Ferdinand III gained time for consolidating his ties with the Empire, the hereditary lands, and Hungary, which had been appeased by both the Peace of Westphalia and a stabilized relationship with the Ottoman Empire. A few months before the Hungarian Diet, he had sent his War Councillor Schmidt as ambassador to Constantinople. Schmidt returned at the end of September 1649 and could report the conclusion of a treaty that guaranteed a ceasefire for another twenty years.¹⁷ In July 1649, after a Venetian victory over the Ottoman army, an ambassador from the governor of Buda had arrived in Vienna and announced his intention to maintain peaceful relations. That fall, however, Ferdinand III assembled the Hungarian leaders to discuss Ottoman complaints about border violations, with them pointing out to him that the Turks had only recently taken a fortress belonging to the archbishop of Gran.¹⁸

Negotiations with the Ottoman Empire also dealt with pirates in the Mediterranean Sea, which continued largely because the sultan refused to recognize Ferdinand III's title. In the summer of 1650, the emperor rejected the formulation "King of a Part of Hungary," winning the title "King of Hungary" after a few months. Although the treaty's ratification that summer brought Tartar and Transylvanian legations to court so they, too, could demonstrate their willingness to maintain peaceful relations, there were disquieting reports about a Cossack rebellion against the Polish king in which the princes of Moldavia and Transylvania as well as the sultan had intervened.¹⁹ From the Hungarian-Ottoman border came renewed warnings in the summer of 1651. General Puchheim had much to do as citizen militias mobilized and drilled. Following a Turkish attack on the mining town of Krupina (Korpona, Karpfen) in which 400–500 Hungarians had been abducted and enslaved, Hungarian leaders went to Vienna for consultations. Shortly thereafter, the Turks violated the treaty by firing cannon at the border fortress of Kiskomárom (Kleinkomorn). They justified the attack as a response to one by Miklós Zrínyi in Croatia that had taken 400–500 Turkish lives and

captives. Zrinyi, on the other hand, justified himself by claiming that these soldiers had been part of an army of 2,000–3,000 men who had invaded and pillaged Christian territory. Ferdinand III dispatched the generals to their posts at the border, with Pálffy shuttling between the court and Bratislava. The situation escalated in September 1651, when both sides massed several thousand soldiers near Nagykanizsa (Kanizsa), although the nuncio reported that neither side displayed a zest for war.²⁰ The governor of Buda, the Palatine, and Ferdinand III all advocated de-escalation. The governor apologized for the attack on Kiskomárom, and the hostilities shifted to Croatia, where they became smaller raids.

Yet the military situation remained so unsettled that in 1652, the Hungarian leaders asked the emperor for another Diet. Because of preparations for an Imperial Diet in Regensburg, it was only possible to hold consultations with about two dozen leading Hungarians in Vienna. In view of the unstable conditions in southeast Poland as well as concurrent Swedish-Polish tensions, these resulted in the decision to reinforce fortifications in Hungary, Moravia, Bohemia, and Silesia. The situation was so grave that the Spanish ambassador Castel Rodrigo joined Pálffy in inspecting several Hungarian fortresses. That summer, the Turks again invaded Hungary, fighting a battle near Vezekény (Velké Vozokany) in which more than 1,000 men were killed. A funeral procession in Trnava for the fallen members of the Esterházy family numbered about 5,000 people, including soldiers. Puchheim assembled additional troops for the pacification of the border regions.²¹

3.2

DEATH AND A NEW BEGINNING FOR THE DYNASTY AND THE COURT

Empress Maria Leopoldina's Death

After the Hungarian conference of 1649, Ferdinand III remained in Lower Austria. The new empress was pregnant and on August 7, 1649, gave birth to Archduke Karl Josef (Figure 27).

Because she was gravely ill, the baptism was held in the Hofburg's small court chapel. Ferdinand III's older sons represented the godparents: the king of Spain (who was still being courted and whose ambassador was present) and Archduke Ferdinand Karl, ruler of Tyrol. That evening, the young empress took a turn for the worse; she received extreme unction, no longer spoke, lost consciousness, and died around midnight.¹

There followed the public laying-out, the funeral cortege to the church of the Capuchins, and entombment there. Ferdinand III had forbidden an examination of Maria Leopoldina's skull during the autopsy; he did not join the funeral procession. The nuncio wrote that the emotional shock affected his body, and indeed, as so often happened in such situations, the emperor became ill.² He left the newborn in the care of the dowager empress and retreated with Ferdinand IV to Ebersdorf. At first, he granted no audiences. It was only on August 18 that he wrote his sister and asked her pardon for not informing her of the death in person, adding that she might imagine how he had felt "about losing such an angel."³ Surely everything had been tried, every spiritual and worldly remedy, "all for naught."

The quiet of Ebersdorf and possibly the cure and bloodletting there helped. Everyday activities were gradually resumed, and the usual audiences were increased by the numerous ambassadors arriving to express condolences. Still in August, Eleonora and the emperor's younger son, Archduke Leopold, came to Ebersdorf, soon after which Ferdinand III went hunting almost daily. Because of continuous rain, Ebersdorf became too damp, and the court



FIGURE 27 Leopoldine, second wife of Ferdinand III, oil painting by Lorenzo Lippi. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, inventory number 8119.

returned to Vienna at the end of September, when three days of obsequies for the deceased empress were held. The emperor and the court attended “in tears,”⁴ as the nunciature wrote, describing real sorrow.

Ferdinand III had a special reason for attending the funeral ceremonies arranged by empress Eleonora in the church of the Carmelites. After the empress’s death, there were widespread and persistent rumors that not enough care had been taken during and after the confinement. The empress felt her honor besmirched. In August, after her and Ferdinand III’s rejections of these insinuations proved insufficient to suppress them, and a critical report written by Khevenhüller had appeared, Eleonora publicized her own version of the birth and the empress’s death. The emperor’s presence at the obsequies served to clear the dowager empress of any suspicions.⁵

Meanwhile, the emperor’s physical condition had worsened noticeably since his first severe attacks of gout in 1647. After a day of hunting in the fall of 1649, he could not rise from his bed. His usual Christmas church attendance declined, and he had to cancel a pilgrimage to Mariazell in 1650 and another to Klosterneuburg in 1651. To spare his sensitive eyes, his hunting rifles were fitted with an exhaust for powder vapors. He also gained a great deal of weight. Ironically, the fact that he possessed asbestos gloves prized for their flame-detering properties may have contributed to his indisposition, even if he kept them exclusively for show.⁶

Third Marriage: Empress Eleonora Magdalena Gonzaga

Given that only two of the emperor’s sons had survived beyond infancy, a third marriage seemed necessary to ensure the succession. Under the Dowager Empress Eleonora Gonzaga’s influence, Ferdinand III selected Eleonora Magdalena Gonzaga, this child born in 1630 to the Gonzaga-Mantua-Nevers line. In March 1651, the marriage took place by proxy in Mantua, with the emperor celebrating the news a week later with day-long festivities in Vienna. The elder Eleonora traveled to Carinthia to meet her successor and received her together with the archdukes of the Tyrol. While travel plans were continually changing, the court prepared a rather simple celebration in Wiener Neustadt, a festive entry with fireworks into Vienna proper, and a subsequent sojourn at Laxenburg. At the end of April, Ferdinand III traveled with his sons via Laxenburg to Vienna and awaited the new empress, who was accompanied by ever more high-ranking courtiers, including the master of the hunt, the grand equerry, the grand chamberlain, and, last but not least, the grand steward of the Imperial household.⁷

The emperor saw his third wife for the first time briefly at Neunkirchen between the Semmering and Wiener Neustadt, which Eleonora Magdalena entered on the following day. Because the marriage ceremony had already

been concluded, there was merely sacred music in the residence chapel, followed by a wedding banquet with the imperial couple, the dowager empress, and the emperor's sons. The court remained at Wiener Neustadt, Laxenburg, and environs for a few days before entering Vienna in about 80 coaches.⁸

On March 27, 1652, shortly after midnight, Eleonora Magdalena gave birth to a daughter. That afternoon, the nuncio baptized the child in the knights' chamber with the name Theresia Maria Josepha. There was such relief that mother and child had survived this time that a *Te Deum* was sung. Again, Philip IV was godfather, and again, he was represented by Ferdinand IV. The Dowager Empress Eleonora was godmother, as in a way she had been godmother to the emperor's third marriage. At the beginning of May—almost exactly one year after her arrival in Vienna—the new empress appeared in public for the first time after her confinement. In the Loreto Chapel that the Dowager Empress Eleonora had endowed, Eleonora Magdalena heard a celebration mass with the emperor and his sons and then visited her mother-in-law Eleonora Gonzaga.⁹

In the dowager empress, Eleonora Magdalena had a model for successfully positioning herself in the court's structure. She fulfilled her role admirably as a princess of exemplary piety, an engaged patron of the arts and her courtiers, and a huntress who frequently accompanied Ferdinand III. It was no accident that one of her few early portraits show her as Diana, goddess of the hunt (Figure 28).

As far as the sources allow such statements, Ferdinand III was quite attached to her personally and showed it in ways suited to the times. After she had been bled in 1656, he gave her a piece of jewelry studded with diamonds in the form of a bouquet. In his hunting journal of 1652, Ferdinand III acknowledged his admiration in Latin sentence that “She, Ferdinand's chosen wife Eleonora, brings peace to the Empire and great cheer to the good.”¹⁰

The Death of Old Companions

The years around 1650 were a time of profound change that also affected the court. Courtiers who had already attained high-ranking offices under Ferdinand II departed. Trauttmansdorff, one of the three most important incumbents, died in Vienna on June 8, 1650, probably of an infected leg, though some believed the cause to have been too many strawberries washed down with beer. A few days later, Privy Councillor Khevenhüller, formerly grand steward of Empress Maria Anna's court, died in Baden near Vienna, his position going to Grand Chamberlain Puchheim. But in January 1651, shortly after his appointment, Puchheim died as well. We do not know how Ferdinand III reacted to Trauttmansdorff's and Khevenhüller's demise, but he was reported by the Bavarian envoy to have “felt deeply and mourned”¹¹ Puchheim's passing.



FIGURE 28 Eleonor Gonzaga, third wife of Ferdinand III, painted as Diana, oil painting by Frans Luycx. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, inventory number 4508.

Longtime holders of the highest Bohemian territorial offices also died, among them the two prominent survivors of the Prague defenestration, Jaroslav Bořita von Martinitz in 1649 and Vilém Slavata in 1652. As miraculous embodiments of the Habsburg's legitimacy during the Estates' rebellion, they had become living legends, especially Slavata, who lived to see the birth of his great-grandson and died as one of Bohemia's most powerful aristocrats. Having outlasted all wartime commanders, Heinrich Schlick, president of the

War Council since 1632, also left the circle of Bohemian leaders in 1650. There followed in 1651 Georg Adam von Martinitz, who had been Ferdinand III's close confidant for more than twenty-five years; like the others, he had been a privy councilor, but he had also been perpetual successor-designate to Slavata for the office of Bohemia's chief chancellor.¹²

The list does not end here, although we will mention only a few more names. During the Hungarian Diet, Ferdinand III lost Michael Johann Count Althann, his master of the hunt (and for twenty-five years, his chamberlain); in 1651, he lost his ambassador to Spain, Francesco Caretto di Grana, and Grana's oldest son, an Aulic Councillor. In 1653, the emperor lost Siegmund Ludwig Count Dietrichstein, who had been with him at Nördlingen and had headed the Inner-Austrian court treasury for twenty years. At the end of 1655, the Imperial Confessor Gans resigned, having become too weak to accompany the emperor on drives in Lower Austria. His successor was the Jesuit Hermann Horst, formerly the Dowager Empress Eleonora's confessor.¹³

Outside of the hereditary lands, other main protagonists of the Thirty Years' War departed. In 1650, Ferdinand III lost one of his most important allies with the elector of Cologne, followed one year later by his brother, Elector Maximilian I of Bavaria. The emperor's uncle and brother-in-law had never been a staunch ally but always a great trouble to him. Peace had not improved their relationship. Bavaria had dismissed its troops faster than Ferdinand III liked, and there was never a lack of controversial issues. One of the most aggravating had been the triangular conflict among the emperor, Maximilian I, and the archbishop of Salzburg over the procurement of revenues by the Bavarian Imperial Circle to pay off the Swedes. Most troublesome was the question of who owed what to whom after the emperor had agreed, in 1639, to use a Bavarian surcharge for Salzburg's salt exports to pay military expenditures. The fact that Maximilian I had married his son and heir apparent to Princess Henriette Adelaide of Savoy, a cousin of Louis XIV, strengthened Franco-Bavarian relations during his last years. Ferdinand III owed it to himself and the dynasty to attend the obsequies for Maximilian I, but there is no indication that he mourned for him. The court chapel's protocol book mentions a rather meaningless, though "beautiful," mourning scaffold.¹⁴

Ferdinand III was probably also not consumed by sadness at the death in 1652 of the elector of Trier, who, like Maximilian I, had already played an important role in the militarization of religious conflict long before 1618. The elector had continued to cause serious difficulties even after Ferdinand III had freed him in 1643. The emperor had plenty of time to contemplate all these dead, not least because of the court's long mourning ceremonies for many other persons, including more distant relatives.¹⁵

A Change of Generations

The emperor had to fill the positions of the deceased courtiers. His choice of the fifty-five-year-old prince Maximilian von Dietrichstein as grand steward to replace the politically significant Trauttmansdorff looked like a break from the old system of government. Dietrichstein had little experience with governmental affairs and was no real lawyer like Trauttmansdorff. But like the latter, he had already been a grand steward, serving Eleonora Gonzaga for as long as she ruled as empress (1637). He only returned to court in 1648 when Ferdinand III appointed him to the same position for his second wife. Dietrichstein was appointed privy councillor in 1648 or 1651 and only accepted the leading court position when Puchheim resigned shortly before his death. Although his correspondence shows that this position gave him the function of a patronage administrator, this did not bring him measurable political clout. Indeed, in the Venetian ambassador's words, he served Ferdinand III "in the palace rather than in the council."¹⁶

Dietrichstein was well suited to lead the household and coordinate personnel patronage. He was experienced and held the emperor's confidence, was rich, and belonged to a powerful family. He hailed from Moravia, which made him equally acceptable to the Bohemian and Austrian nobles influential at court. Though a prince, he was Ferdinand III's territorial subject, and thus his rank fit in with the hierarchy of the Imperial household, attuned as it was to the hereditary lands' aristocratic hierarchy.¹⁷

After more than thirteen years as ruler, Ferdinand III had considerable experience with Imperial and European politics. He also retained a longstanding principle of governance, the informal apportioning of areas of responsibility. In the summer of 1650, one of his courtiers opined, with good reason, that Trauttmansdorff's death would bring little change. Public affairs would still be shared by various courtiers based on Imperial, Austrian, and Bohemian concerns, though Trauttmansdorff's opinion no longer had to be considered. The two functions Trauttmansdorff had combined as grand steward—significant political counselling and patronage administration—Ferdinand III once again assigned to two different persons.¹⁸

When filling other vacant posts, the emperor considered informal claims resulting from the careers of his longtime courtiers. He replaced the deceased Grand Chamberlain Puchheim with his Grand Equerry Waldstein. Count Losenstein, who filled Waldstein's former post, died shortly thereafter and was replaced by Hannibal Gonzaga. When Waldstein died in 1655, Gonzaga followed him as grand chamberlain. The chamberlain and master of the hunt Franz Albrecht Count Harrach became grand equerry.¹⁹

A very consequential series of replacements took place from 1650 to 1652 for Archduke Leopold, second in line of succession, who turned ten in June of 1650 and needed a capable grand steward. Ferdinand III's first choice fell

on Johann Maximilian Count Lamberg, who had been Imperial negotiator at the Westphalian Peace Congress. But in 1651, after his latest marriage, the emperor appointed Lamberg Eleonora Magdalena's grand steward. His second choice for Archduke Leopold was a Count Fugger. Finally, when Lamberg took over the position of imperial ambassador to Spain after the incumbent's death, Fugger replaced him at the empress's household, and Archduke Leopold was again without a suitable grand steward. The emperor's third choice was the former ambassador to Venice, Johann Ferdinand Count Portia. Taking over in July 1652, Portia began to serve the archduke both as grand steward and as his Italian teacher but would later guide Leopold's politics from 1657 to 1665.²⁰

By 1652, almost every high office was newly occupied, and the Privy Council changed as well. To some contemporary observers, it seemed that the Privy Council expanded aimlessly. Indeed, the council's reputation and efficiency suffered under the "mediocrity of its members" (Schwarz),²¹ with the Venetian ambassador writing in 1654 that the emperor was his own best counselor. But during Ferdinand III's reign, the Privy Council had changed its function, becoming more honorific as a forum for integrating top representatives from court, administration, judiciary, and territorial governments. Ferdinand III continued to concentrate the consultative function in smaller deputations that could be employed more flexibly. Many people regarded the patently polycentric web of influence at court as an opportunity to attack the powerful Privy Councillor Auersperg as an imperial favorite; Ferdinand III regarded him as his son's Trauttmansdorff. But because Auersperg was merely the heir's grand steward, he had little influence over personnel patronage and was thus easily assailable.

Minor Household Reform and Continuities at Court

Last but not least, the realization of peace in 1650 enabled Ferdinand III to restore a modicum of splendor to an Imperial household that had badly faded over the course of this long conflict. In 1651, he replaced the table silver that had been sold to help finance the war. He refurbished his rooms in the Prague Castle and replaced the paintings in his gallery, which had been looted by the Swedes, by acquiring parts of the collection belonging to the duke of Buckingham. The imperial library in Vienna was put in order, expanded by the acquisition of the famed Augsburg collection of Albert Fugger, and given a new catalogue. Its dedication praised the emperor as "reviver of scholarship."²² Other passages, too, may have pleased him: "Since peace has been given us, you, oh Emperor, have ceased winning victories with weapons / You can now achieve greater victories through written law." Soon after Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, at war's end, had expressed his regret that "Your Imperial Majesty's music is now so neglected,"²³ the court chapel again reached its former high standard.

The court organization also had suffered, especially because of its own decade-long absence from Vienna but also because of the death of Trauttmansdorff, Khevenhüller, and Puchheim, who had held the highest court positions for many years. Especially in view of his third marriage, Ferdinand III was disturbed that his court no longer appeared majestic. Thus, in 1651, he began to reform his household with the intention of reviving the Burgundian court ritual (as he perceived it) or at least the “old standard of decorum”²⁴ from the days of Emperors Rudolph II and Matthias. As standardization seemed impossible, the court introduced a systematically conducted ceremonial protocol. As this protocol served as a guideline for subsequent ceremonies, the court practices of the 1650s structured the Habsburg ceremonial for the next centuries. Beyond that, elder instructions for numerous officeholders were collected in a single extensive volume. Ferdinand III himself revised many of these instructions, rewriting in his own hand several that concerned his immediate surroundings, such as those for his valets and a supplement for the grand chamberlain.

The Emperor described his court in his own words as a sphere of order “for the maintenance of Our reputation”²⁵ corresponded to actual practice. Valets, for example, were not to delegate tedious tasks like serving the morning soup to lower-ranking servants. They were to remove their hats at the door of the first antechamber and were to hand serving dishes not directly to the emperor but to chamberlains and other nobles appointed to wait at table. The grand chamberlain should see to it that courtiers in the antechambers conduct themselves “modestly and silently.” No one was to appear in the knights’ hall or the antechambers without a coat, and no one except the grand equerry would be permitted to wear boots with spurs. Ferdinand III was particularly incensed that “servants, officials, and officers, but also other persons of higher rank, appeared in the antechambers and walked about, talked loudly, and committed other infractions” while the table music was playing. Another problem, addressed in instructions to the chamber guards, remained people “sneaking” into the imperial antechambers; this appeared unsolvable, and the privy councillors advised against making the admission order public because their inability to enforce it would make them look ridiculous.

One important administrative reform remained undone. Whereas Ferdinand III issued a new order for the War Council, he did not do so for the court treasury, even though its blatant mismanagement was quite openly criticized because some employees were enriching themselves through means beyond merely accepting “gifts.” They dragged out the payment of debts and bought discounted claims against the court treasury from helpless debtors in order to realize them under conditions more favorable for themselves. They charged inflated prices when making purchases for the court, hindered court

accountants and bookkeepers, and, in concert with others, organized high-priced credits for bridging liquidity problems they themselves had caused through bad management.²⁶

Unlike Emperor Matthias, Ferdinand III did not take this opportunity for a general reduction of noble courtiers. The court continued to function as a place where power and influence between nobility and emperor were negotiated. A princely government needed courtiers as long as they dominated its territories as landowners and representatives of the provincial estates. The emperor compensated for restoring Vienna as his main residence by appointing numerous courtiers from his more remote territories. Nor did he stop at the borders of his hereditary lands, with the famous—or infamous—Prince Rupert of the Rhine sojourning at court in 1654 without, however, attaining the position he allegedly coveted. The emperor continued to extend imperial protection and prestige to his court nobility, bestowing the Order of the Golden Fleece on some, celebrating carnival with the aristocrats, allowing them to participate in ballet performances and sleigh rides, helping to arrange marriages between ladies-in-waiting and courtiers, and celebrating their weddings at court. In addition, he made them showy presents and, on occasion, stood godfather to their children. Protestant nobles who converted to Catholicism enjoyed special advancement, as did Christoph Count Ranzau, scion of a powerful aristocratic family from Holstein.²⁷

3.3

COUNTER-REFORMATION AND TERRITORIAL RULERSHIP

The Confessional Situation in the Hereditary Lands around 1650

In Ferdinand III's hereditary lands, the confessional situation was now quite heterogeneous.¹ He had recently reaffirmed freedom of religion in Hungary, while in Croatia, the estates had concluded far-reaching re-Catholicization on their own by 1600. In Croatia, larger groups of Protestants had concentrated only in the fortified border towns of Varaždin and Karlovac. In Inner Austria, the Counter-Reformation had already been completed under Ferdinand II. There, only a few thousand Protestants still practiced their faith in secret. Almost all Protestants unwilling to convert had emigrated from Lower Austria in the 1620s. In the Salzkammergut, larger groups of Lutherans survived into the eighteenth century, escaping expulsion by participating in masses, pilgrimages, and Corpus Christi processions. In spite of stringent re-Catholicization, some 10,000 Protestants lived in Bohemia and Moravia at war's end, though Ferdinand III had refused the elector of Saxony's plea for tolerance and had complained about emigrants returning from Saxony. In Silesia, the religious situation corresponded to the area's complicated regionalization. In Lower Silesia and several Silesian towns, the deliberate billeting of soldiers in Protestant households had led to mass emigrations or conversions during the late 1620s, but the Peace of Westphalia guaranteed religious freedom based on the Augsburg Confession to subjects of the Silesian principalities of Legnica (Liegnitz), Brzeg (Brieg), Wołów (Wohlau), Ziębice (Münsterberg), and Oleśnica (Oels) as well as the city of Wrocław. For other Silesian principalities, Ferdinand III waived the right to expel Protestant subjects and tolerated Protestant churches outside the city gates of Świdnica, Jawor, and Głogów.²

In Lower Austria, Ferdinand II had confirmed religious practices according to the Augsburg Confession for loyal Protestant aristocrats in 1620. By 1650, approximately thirty Protestant families from the lower nobility and more

than forty from the upper aristocracy resided in Lower Austria. Some 10,000 Protestant subjects lived mainly on lands belonging to Protestant nobles and in the border regions near Hungary. The ruler's Counter-Reformation decrees were largely ignored with the connivance of landowners and their local agents. Responsibility for enforcing the ruler's directives lay with municipal, market, and rural courts, which were expected to bring infringements to the attention of the Lower Austrian administration. But local jurisdiction and administration lay with the landowners who, without religious distinctions, resisted on principle any governmental encroachment on their local control. Many landed nobles concerned with preserving manorial authority sat in administrative agencies that acted with restraint, examined denunciations critically, rarely punished infractions, and preferred spurring the clergy on to more intensive missionary work. If these aristocrats supported the Counter-Reformation, they did so as manorial lords with authority over "their" pastors and administrators. In 1654, for example, Privy Councillor Gundaker von Liechtenstein ordered one of his administrators to check "whether and how often which pastors"³ actually provided religious instructions as decreed by the Church.

The Counter-Reformation in Lower Austria and Silesia

After the Peace of Westphalia guaranteed the right of religious determination, a new phase of the Counter-Reformation began. Until then, Ferdinand III, as territorial ruler, had mainly reiterated older directives, namely forbidding Lower Austrian subjects from attending Protestant services, possessing Lutheran books, hearing lay sermons, sheltering Protestant pastors, and disregarding orders about fasting and Sunday rest. These directives had produced no noticeable results. In the new phase, the Lower Austrian government conducted "the business of religious reformation largely on its own" (Piringer)⁴ and, bypassing noble landowners, organized direct access to the subjects' religious practice.

A first step after 1650 was a census tabulating the confession of subjects in the hereditary lands. But in Lower Austria, data about a person's age, employment, and local authority were to be recorded along with the name and religion, something that was perceived as encroaching on a manorial lord's sphere. Pastors entrusted with conducting the census came under pressure from such lords, many of whom were church patrons or exercised direct governance, with the result that the pastors' accounts were incomplete or non-existent. The nunciature grasped the reasons for the government's overreach, calling it an inventory of all "heretics . . . and their characteristics."⁵

The second step began in early 1652 with clarification of the new legal situation. Two patents announced that the Westphalian peace guaranteed religious freedom only to the nobility, not subjects, and reiterated the prohibitions

of 1627, 1634, 1638, 1645, and 1651. In addition, Protestant subjects were now enjoined to take instructions from Catholic clergymen and to decide in favor of conversion within six weeks. To avoid a mass exodus, the documents made no mention of the right to emigrate. Instead, emigration was restricted, and border crossings were controlled. The patents once again encroached on manorial lordship because subjects could have their houses searched for banned books; aristocrats were told to dismiss their Protestant servants and not prevent their Catholic subjects from attending mass.⁶

The third step established inspection commissions to travel through the provinces. In this way, the government could bypass landowners and pastors, assigning to them mere auxiliary services. Each commission consisted of a prelate and a counselor from the Lower Austrian administration, accompanied largely by Jesuits as well as members of mendicant and reform orders, all of whom served as missionaries. In 1652, four such commissions moved through areas of Lower Austria, assembling the inhabitants, explaining the legal situation, making the subjects choose between—highly recommended—conversion, time for reflection, or emigration (something described in abhorrent terms), and obliging Protestants to consult priests. The commission was charged with dismissing parish priests suspected of declaring Protestants to be Catholics in order to protect them. Persons in positions of authority were singled out for conversion in what was seen as admissible manner.⁷ The commissioners were to be generous when extending deadlines but were not authorized to expel people by themselves.

In the course of the year, the nunciature reported matter-of-factly that the commissions typically threatened peasants with expulsion and thus forced them into conversion, with the result that there were only a few emigrations. In reality, the effect of a commission's work still largely depended on landowners and pastors in spite of efforts to bypass them. Protestantism remained strong wherever settlement areas were compact (as they were in the hill country of the Waldviertel region) or Protestant landlords held church patronage. In the end, there were places where more than 80% of inhabitants were ready to convert and others where more than 80% announced their emigration, but in many areas, the commissioners never reached the residents.⁸

The Estates also fought the reform commissions in the Lower Austrian Diet of 1652. The Catholic prelates did not want to comply with Ferdinand III's revenue demands, arguing that their economic base had been reduced by widespread emigration. The Lutherans used the same economic reasoning to demand an end to the reform commissions. The Catholic nobles joined the prelates' attempt to make a portion of the tax revenues dependent on the degree of emigration. Hoping for negligible emigration, Ferdinand III remained inflexible and, indeed, no Protestants were expelled in 1652. Clandestine

emigrations were fewer than expected but still significant enough to be made more difficult. Having been greatly depopulated by the war, neighboring Franconia beckoned with available land. Hence, there was an amnesty at the end of 1654 allowing people who had secretly emigrated to return and have their property restored—if they converted. Meanwhile, the landholders, even those who were Catholic, opposed the Lower Austrian administration, resisting house searches, the census, the inventory of emigrants' property, and "the dissolution of manorial autonomy" (Piringer).⁹

This tenacious process was enlivened by one of the commissioners, the Lower Austrian government's Councillor Joachim Enzmilner von Windhag, who had to visit the intensely Protestant quarter above the Manhart mountain. He did not accept the local landowners' refusal to support his commission's work and the administration's failure to intervene effectively against this obstruction. After vainly lodging complaints against the landlords and the Lower Austrian administration, he arbitrarily put together armed forces consisting of a cavalry captain and armed soldiers. This impressed the subjects and led to some conversions, but pressure from nobles in the Diet obliged the administration to quickly compel Windhag to dismiss the soldiers and then punished the captain. Windhag remained ambitious and in 1654, compiled a lavishly produced volume with the names of about 22,000 alleged converts from *his* district. The title page showed Ferdinand III and the heir apparent with the caption "Conquerors of Heresy."¹⁰ But many of the people listed had emigrated or in practice remained Protestant. Nonetheless, Windhag made a name for himself, with Ferdinand III naming him general reformation commissioner for Lower Austria in 1656.

By the end of the reform commissions' activities, many parts of Lower Austria had been re-Catholicized. Exceptions were the domains of courageous aristocrats, especially those of Lutheran noblewomen, and the areas along the Hungarian border, where frequenting Protestant church services in Hungary was easy and was covered up by the landholders. Because subjects followed their lords, as the land marshal (*Landmarschall*) put it, in 1655, Ferdinand III created an endowment for the Catholic education of noble orphans; even children who had lost only one parent came under the prince's guardianship and, notwithstanding parental rights, were educated as the ruler saw fit.¹¹

In Silesia, on the other hand, there was a wave of emigrations. Wherever the Westphalian peace permitted, Ferdinand III carried out the Counter-Reformation. Consequently, his commissioners took approximately 650 churches from Protestants and expelled more than 500 Protestant clergymen between 1653 and 1655. The three Protestant churches (half-timbered and without towers, bells, tiles, or stones) permitted outside the city gates of Świdnica, Jawor, and Głogów became a strong Protestant symbol.¹²

The Counter-Reformation in Vienna

Vienna was treated differently during the Counter-Reformation. Though the prince-bishop, since 1639 Baron Philipp Friedrich von Breuner, saw to the reorganization of Viennese parishes, the spiritual welfare of plague victims, and the baroque refurbishing of St. Stephen's Cathedral, he was mainly occupied with the difficulty of securing the bishopric's legal status. He regarded the new Catholic orders that settled in Vienna as competition. In addition, since 1649, he had been handicapped by a severe eye disorder.¹³

Thus, Jesuits and monks from the old and new convents especially shaped reform Catholicism in Vienna. The enforcement of Counter-Reformation measures was taken over by the Lower Austrian administration, which forced pastors to reveal the confessional situation in their parishes and, so, turned them into "de facto public officials" (Stögmann).¹⁴ On the surface, the Counter-Reformation showed sweeping successes, but during the 1640s, the observance of fasting and Sunday rest was not widespread. In Vienna, however, only the Danish and Swedish legations had the right to support Protestant chapels, and Protestant Aulic Councillors could practice their religion only in private, something also tolerated for foreign ambassadors and representatives of wholesale merchants.

Beginning in 1650, the government once again strengthened measures to re-Catholicize Vienna. The university, for example, had to report its Protestant employees. In 1651, the Lower Austrian administration appointed reform commissions. The Protestants were once again counted and then obliged, under penalty of being fined, either to convert or meet with a Catholic clergyman at least forty times to receive instruction and additional sermons. Only then were they permitted to emigrate. As in the countryside, Lutheran widows led the resistance.

When the commission tabulated the results at the end of 1654, only 193 of the 537 registered Protestants had converted to Catholicism, 155 had secretly left the city, 22 were allowed to remain Protestant, the conversion of another 22 was still likely, but not for 112 others, and the remaining 33 had died. Following Ferdinand's decision, the administration ordered expulsion of those for whom there was no hope of conversion. The commissions continued and intensified their activities in 1656. One group was not affected by re-Catholicization policies. Unlike his father and later his son, Ferdinand III did not expel Jews from Vienna. The ghetto, formed in the 1620s, remained unmolested, except for tax demands.

Vienna's re-Catholicization deprived the emperor of some Protestants he valued. The court silver merchant Seuter had to depart. Although emigration to Hungary was now interdicted, Ferdinand III permitted him to settle in Bratislava, while his Vienna establishment was run by a Catholic

representative, with him coming to Vienna from time to time. The emperor did not regard the confession of foreign painters like the Calvinist Sandrart or the Mennonite Hoogstraaten as an impediment because they were not his subjects. The mathematician von Werwe, who provided Ferdinand III with calendar editions, lived in Vienna as a Lutheran. Yet, two weeks before his death in January of 1656, the nunciature wrote that he summoned Catholic priests, discussed religious questions, and converted to Catholicism “to the joy of the entire court, which had always esteemed his qualities to an unusually high degree . . .”¹⁵ At year’s end, the nunciature again reported “great rejoicing at court”¹⁶ over the conversion of a count from a respected territorial Lutheran family. Though tolerated, the Protestant aristocracy could only escape almost total exclusion from imperial and provincial offices by conversion, a route that many families took over the decades of Habsburg Counter-Reformation established by Rudolf II. During Ferdinand III’s reign, direct control over the subjects’ religion (bypassing manorial and church organization) became a political instrument later expanded into more intensive state power. In Lower Austria, the basis for an Estates-dominated Protestant church, and with it the preconditions for the nobility’s rebellion in 1618, disappeared in the mid-1650s for a kind of established Catholic regional Habsburg church (*Landeskirche*). This development consolidated Habsburg rule in their hereditary lands.

3.4

EMPEROR AND EMPIRE AFTER 1648

The Peace of Westphalia stipulated scheduling an Imperial Diet within six months of ratification in order to address unresolved constitutional problems. Essential decisions were to be made, especially concerning the king's election, Imperial revenues, and the Imperial Army. Ferdinand III had much at stake. At the same time, the procedurally grounded dominance of emperor, electors, and the Catholic majority in the Diet's College of Princes had been curtailed by the Peace of Westphalia, which granted imperial princes enhanced rights of codetermination and precluded outvoting the Protestant minority by requiring parallel majority votes by both confessions in settling confessional disputes. Though the emperor was faced with a Diet that would decide central constitutional questions, it was also one he could no longer control with outdated techniques. This uninviting prospect presumably explains why he did not follow his councillors' advice in 1649 for a timely meeting of the Diet, blaming the delay on the continuing Nuremberg Executive Congress, which lasted until mid-1650.¹

Restoring the Prewar Situation

The peace that had finally arrived in summer of 1650 was fragile. A series of conflicts (some of them military) and real and perceived threats left Ferdinand III with little confidence. There were also indications of a Calvinist-dominated military alliance directed against him.² A primary element in this scenario was the dispute between the Palatine and Bavaria electors over their investiture with Parkstein and Weiden, a dual fief in the Upper Palatinate. The joint holding, established in 1421, had come into the possession of the Palatinate and Bavaria (and in 1623, briefly, into that of the Wittelsbach prince of Pfalz-Neuburg). The confessional and legal status of these territories was so complicated that the Bavarian court published a special book explaining its view of the situation to the Imperial councillors. The dispute was explosive because the Palatinate combined it with demands for Spanish evacuation of

Frankenthal, whose presence the Protestants regarded as a threat. For a time, Ferdinand III was on Bavaria's (and Spain's) side, creating ill feeling by denying the elector Palatine a final recognition of his rights.³

The 1651 marriage of the prince of Transylvania's brother to a sister of the elector Palatine posed another threat. At court, there were suspicions that the underlying reason for this marriage was the formation of a military alliance among the Calvinist princes of Transylvania, the Palatinate, and Brandenburg for the Upper Palatinate's reconquest from Bavaria and the seizure of Cleves and Jülich by Brandenburg. Meanwhile, Transylvania harbored even more extensive plans for the liberation of Bohemia from Habsburg rule, to be followed by an attack on the Anti-Christ (the pope).

Forty years earlier, the struggle between Brandenburg's elector and the Catholic duke of Pfalz-Neuburg over Cleves, Jülich, and Berg had nearly caused a great European war.⁴ By 1651, an actual war between the two in the Rhineland constituted a third threat to the Peace of Westphalia. The elector's army took several towns, moving up to Ratingen near Düsseldorf by summer, with the duke fleeing to Cologne. The Imperial court feared interference from the Calvinist United Netherlands and Hesse-Kassel. Ferdinand III dispatched General Hatzfeld to Cologne and Westphalia, where he was supposed to forge a defensive alliance that included the electors of Cologne and Mainz as well as Westphalia's Catholic bishops. Hatzfeld was pessimistic, being certain that there would be renewed hostilities within the Empire within the next couple of years. Though there was a ceasefire in the summer of 1651 and Brandenburg's forces withdrew, the elector kept an occupation force at the residence of Angermund near Ratingen, among other places. Negotiations lasted into fall, but no one was satisfied with the results. Pfalz-Neuburg put its hopes in a legal solution and the Diet. This problem occupied Ferdinand III, if for no other reason than that Rome supported Pfalz-Neuburg and the nuncio repeatedly accosted the emperor over this matter.⁵

A fourth area of conflict whose military escalation frightened the court was a dispute of Catholic and Protestant cantons within the Swiss confederacy. There was fear of an alliance of Calvinist Bern and Zwinglian Zürich with the Palatinate and Württemberg. The confederated Catholics petitioned the emperor for support, but Ferdinand III decided against intervention. He justified his wait-and-see policy with the permission granted the princes in the Westphalian peace to conclude foreign alliances as long as they were not directed against the Empire.⁶

A fifth source of intense anxiety was a military alliance of Calvinist princes backed by Transylvania, the cantons Bern and Zürich, and the United Netherlands. At the beginning of 1652, the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, among others, formed a military alliance with Hesse-Kassel and Sweden. The

expressed goal of the so-called Hildesheim Alliance was defensive protection.⁷ In order to distance themselves from the unfortunate mono-confessional Evangelical Union and Catholic League of the prewar and war eras, and to make clear that they were afraid of military incursions, the allies insisted that Catholic princes join them. When the bishopric of Paderborn heeded the call, Ferdinand III intervened to dissuade the bishopric of Münster from following suit. Nonetheless, that same year, the Hildesheim Alliance pushed through its agenda by laying plans for arming the Lower Saxon Imperial Circle and inducing Sweden to join by making it the Circle's alternating director.

The Prague Electors' Meeting of 1652

Against this background, such an important Diet had to be carefully prepared. Beginning in 1649, Ferdinand III had probed the electors' conception of the postwar order and his own succession. In 1652, Spain finally vacated Frankenthal, with Mainz supporting Ferdinand IV's election as king of the Romans in return. Concrete preparations for the Diet could now begin, with a meeting in Prague attended by the emperor and several electors.⁸ Ferdinand III sought divine protection for his journey to the electoral conference and Imperial Diet by a pilgrimage to Mariazell. At the end of July, the Upper Austrian Estates paid homage to his son in Linz. Travel became difficult as several people and many horses succumbed to the heat. At last, on July 3, the emperor, empress, and heir apparent were received in Prague by the nobility and an armed citizenry.⁹

Here, Ferdinand III's first important public function was the consecration of a column dedicated to the Virgin Mary a few days after his forty-fifth birthday, having promised its erection during the 1648 Swedish invasion of the Prague west bank should the towns on the Vltava's right bank be spared. The column now stood in the city's main square, the Altstädter Ring, near but not at the location where the rebels of 1618 had been executed. The emperor came with a large retinue across the Charles Bridge to participate in the ceremony, followed later by an inspection of the city walls. Thus, he kept his promise and demonstrated that he was true to his destiny as he conceived it: as a sovereign who could defend his realms not alone but only with divine help and as a prince ready to carry out the sovereignty bestowed on him by God—and affirmed by the Westphalian peace.¹⁰

The meetings with the electors were encouraging. The electors of the Palatinate, Trier, and Mainz traveled to Prague in October, with the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg arriving in November. Ferdinand III's sister, mother of the Bavarian electoral prince who was still a minor, had arrived in September. The emperor and his son, the heir apparent, received most of the electors at the city gate but met the Bavarian electress at White Mountain,

thereby conjuring up their two dynasties' alliance on the battlefield where the Bavarian-Imperial Army had vanquished the troops of the confederate Estates in 1620. His sister resided in the Hradschin and the other electors in houses belonging to the wealthiest Bohemian aristocrats, with Mainz in Cardinal Harrach's palace and Trier in Chief Burgrave Martinitz's residence. The electors did not arrive unaccompanied. About 150 servants came from Trier and about 600 from Saxony with as many horses. For his part, Ferdinand III's son, as candidate for the emperor's throne, brought along the prestigious Order of the Golden Fleece. He had now been king of Bohemia and Hungary for some years and had also accepted homage from several duchies in 1650/51.¹¹

Prague honored the guests with banquets, splendid fireworks, and visits. Ferdinand IV called on the electors in their palaces, with the emperor then showing them the same courtesy. But in November, he was so ill that he had to be carried by sedan chair to the reception for the elector and crown prince of Saxony. After the unavoidable joint carriage ride back to the city, he still attended the obligatory audience, and for the next few days, he remained in bed whenever possible to gather strength for Brandenburg's reception.

The strategy of the emperor and Electoral Mainz paid off. One by one, the electors were persuaded that the dreaded attack on their privileges could be warded off by their making common cause with the emperor against the imperial princes. They also agreed that they should avoid encroachment on the electors' rights, especially on that most precious component—negotiation of the pre-election agreement (*Wahlkapitulation*). Earlier, such agreements had led to the Empire's being ruled jointly by the electors and the emperor. To avoid violating the letter of the peace treaty, they made plans to hold the royal election immediately after convening the Diet so that the Imperial Estates would not have time to intervene. The electors, as usual, demanded compensations for their political compliance, especially where the election of the emperor's son was concerned, and Ferdinand III promised above all tax reductions and further concessions in the pre-election agreements. By the time the electors began departing Prague, he had secured six of the eight votes for Ferdinand IV. Only Saxony and Brandenburg still reserved this means of exerting political pressure, at least for a time.

The late arrival of the electors from Saxony and Brandenburg delayed the journey to Regensburg. In addition, the emperor suffered from gout during late November and early December, leaving Prague not by coach but in a sedan chair. He distributed rich gifts to the guests, sent his most beautiful coach to Regensburg, and had another one—*superbamente*—built for the celebration of his son's coronation. Although the emperor had asked them to attend, only four of the now eight electors—the elector Palatine and the three archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier—appeared in person. Very few Protestant princes from south-western

Germany showed up, along with small numbers of bishops, prince-abbots, and prelates. With the exception of the Mainz elector, most remained only a short time, leaving the congress to be dominated by ambassadors.¹²

Although Ferdinand III had no need to come to Regensburg in person, the court thought that his presence would convey the message that he harbored peaceable and consensus-oriented intentions for the Empire. He would present himself as mediator for the Imperial Estates and leave enforcement of his interests as emperor and territorial prince to others, especially to the electors under the leadership of Mainz and his representative in the directory of the Austrian Circle, Isaak Volmar. As usual, the Imperial court, privy, and deputy councillors prepared the emperor's decisions. The courtiers, especially the Spanish ambassador, canvassed for his policies, sometimes with money. Ferdinand III was not present during formal negotiations, attending a few ceremonial acts such as the opening of the Diet, where he gave an address lasting about half an hour. But he held court in his Regensburg residence (the bishop's palace), issued decrees, gave audiences, and spoke with princes, counts, bishops, prelates, and ambassadors.¹³

His entry into Regensburg was probably the most representational of the emperor's life—witness the images on the triumphal arch erected for the occasion. In the style of the Roman emperor Constantine's triumphal arch, they glorified Ferdinand III as a peacemaker, endowing him with the Roman honorific "Father of the Fatherland" (*pater patriae*) (Figure 29).

Another demonstration of Imperial prestige was the colossal 1653 production of a celebratory opera, *L'Inganno d'amore* (*Love's Deceit*), performed in an especially constructed theater that boasted two tiers and every technical and musical advance that could be mustered at this time.¹⁴

In June 1653, Empress Eleonora Magdalena gave birth to another daughter. After her confinement, she appeared in public and undertook a small pilgrimage with Ferdinand III. But soon afterward, news came from Vienna that the couple's first daughter, Archduchess Theresia Maria Josepha, had died. At the end of January 1654, the empress fell so ill that smallpox was suspected, and only two months later, she suffered a miscarriage that also depressed the emperor. At about the same time, Dowager Empress Eleonora Gonzaga lay near death in Vienna, but once again, she recovered.¹⁵

In late summer of 1653, the imperial couple spent what was probably the most pleasant time of the Diet with Ferdinand IV on a three-week journey to Munich. There, the electress, the emperor's sister, took care that they were received with great pomp and provided entertainment and relaxation. Ferdinand III liked the visit so much that he prolonged it. On their way back, the dynasts visited the Bavarian pilgrimage site Altötting, where Elector Maximilian I's heart had been entombed in a silver urn. Soon after, this became a model for the Habsburgs.¹⁶




FIGURE 29 Portal of Honor in Ratisbon (1652). Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München, Hbks E 24-7.

Preliminary Policy Negotiations and the Royal Election of 1652/53

Beginning in late 1652, representatives from the Imperial territories gathered in Regensburg and discussed how and when the Diet might begin. Before the formal opening, they had to solve two problems. Though Sweden as an Imperial Estate had the right to appear, border agreements obligated it to cede Eastern Pomerania to Brandenburg. Instead, negotiations in Szczecin over the border's location had dragged on. Ferdinand III had already promised Brandenburg his support in Prague and now made evacuation of Eastern Pomerania a condition for Swedish participation at the Diet. So as not to aggravate the Swedes, the Estates allowed them time by postponing the opening of the Diet, first from January to March and then beyond that date. By the end of May, Eastern Pomerania was acknowledged to have been cleared, and now, nearly six months after the princes' arrival, the Diet could officially begin.¹⁷

The delay benefitted Ferdinand III and his plan to instruct the Estates as briefly and cursorily as possible about the royal election. This was one of the most important questions with which the Diet had to deal, as the negotiations stipulated in the Peace of Westphalia gave the princes a one-time opportunity to curtail the electors' privileges. Previously concluded pre-election

agreements, accepted by the emperors to guarantee their sons' succession, had greatly strengthened the electors' constitutional position in the Empire to the detriment of the emperor and other estates. It quickly became apparent that the princes insisted on deliberating this topic but also that the front formed by emperor and electors was solid. By pointing to the dangers inherent in proposals by the Protestant princes, the emperor and the electors were able to win over the Catholic bishops previously at odds with Ferdinand III and could thus split the College of Princes. Hence, the princes were also willing to compromise, working with the Imperial cities to formulate a list of demands that the electors had to consider in their negotiations for a pre-election agreement. The electors conceded this tiny step and accepted the list along with several formulations they concluded for themselves "and all princes and Estates."¹⁸

On this basis, Ferdinand IV's election as king of the Romans could proceed, and the emperor and his son traveled to Augsburg. During the Thirty Years' War, Ferdinand III had saved the city (where the religious peace had been signed in 1555) from Bavarian annexation. The Peace of Westphalia made Augsburg a model for legal relationships in multi-confessional cities. That Ferdinand IV's election took place here also made the city a symbol for the

Empire's unity. In May 1653, when the electors chose Ferdinand III's son as the new king, the two main goals of every emperor had been achieved: the preservation of Imperial unity and the succession of his own dynasty. In June 1653, Ferdinand IV's coronation took place in Regensburg (Figure 30).

Ferdinand III was greatly relieved, as the nuncio made clear in his report that the emperor "recognized that everything good came from God's hand . . . since there had been no lack of those who had taken pains to prevent just that."¹⁹



FIGURE 30 Ferdinand IV, King of the Romans, oldest son of Ferdinand III, copper plate etching, Anselmus van Hulle/Pieter II de Jode. Vienna, private collection Hannes Scheucher.

Deliberations by the Imperial Diet 1653/54

After Sweden's admission and the royal election, the emperor formally opened the Diet on July 1, 1653. That the enormous tensions

did not break it up and that Ferdinand III fared reasonably well as emperor—exceptionally well as territorial prince—was due to internal dissension among the Imperial Estates and his own troubled alliance with the electors. Cologne protested the ceremonial precedence Mainz had received at the coronation. Both their representatives left Regensburg prematurely, as did Trier, which was dissatisfied for reasons of its own. The electors of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne were also unhappy with the emperor's policy toward the duke of Lorraine, while Bavaria objected to his treatment of Savoy. The emperor's relationship with the prince-bishops of Bamberg, Konstanz, and Trent was particularly freighted by the dispute over the Imperial Chamber Court's competency to adjudicate their complaints about the emperor as Austrian territorial prince. Even the Tyrolean Habsburgs argued with Ferdinand III about his policy toward France.

The Protestants were united only in their rejection of a strong emperor but hardly on anything else. Brandenburg and Bremen were militarily threatened by Sweden and its allies in the Hildesheim Alliance. To the Protestants' astonishment, Sweden supported the election of the emperor's son. That the Peace of Westphalia lumped together Calvinists and Lutherans as a confessional unit in Imperial institutions intensified their differences. Emperor, electors, and princes of all faiths denied the Imperial cities certain procedural rights. Questions concerning taxation further altered the constellations. Although almost everyone agreed that Bremen should not be allowed to fall to Sweden and that France should not be allowed to grow more powerful after its recent territorial gains, there was disagreement about how to achieve these policies. At any rate, the era of armed religious conflict had passed.²⁰

The dynamics of ever-changing constellations gave central importance to the scheduling of subjects for deliberation. It worked in the emperor's favor that the elector of Mainz, as archchancellor, could make such dispositions. But after Ferdinand III and the elector of Brandenburg had reached agreement on the royal election in exchange for help in the dispute with Sweden over Eastern Pomerania, Brandenburg tended to support Protestant positions, at least as long as the preservation of electoral privileges did not require point-by-point cooperation with the emperor.

Given this background, Ferdinand III could not attain one very important goal: the binding force of majority decisions for levying Imperial taxes. This explosive issue had contributed to the foundering of Diets in 1608 and 1613 and was again opposed by Protestants and cities that were in the minority and felt threatened by procedural regulations. In particular, the emperor's attempt to lure a number of Catholic princes over to his side by promising to lower their tax burden ended up strengthening the resistance of all imperial princes. Indeed, not even those in the majority were in favor of enabling the emperor to levy or lower taxes disproportionately and arbitrarily.

This conflict also showed that the peace treaty's prohibition of a majority's outvoting a minority in religious disputes actually worked. Several princes invoked this guaranteed right to interdict majority decisions through separate deliberations by confession (*itio in partes*) and insistence on an amicable consensus among religious groups. Because the emperor stubbornly clung to his point of view, a number of Protestants threatened to quit the Diet under protest, citing the last one before the war in 1613. The threat was effective. Ferdinand III was unwilling to risk breaching the peace and relented. The issue was tabled and remained undecided. The Protestants, on the other hand, accepted the fact that they could not make *itio in partes* a general principle for religious parity at the Diet. Though protected from being outvoted, they remained a minority.²¹

Ferdinand III also had to relinquish hope for an Imperial military constitution that would have given him significant leverage in the Empire. After the war, the estates' distrust was simply too strong.²² He had at least superficial success with his endeavor to introduce to the Diet persons recently elevated to princely rank, especially Imperial courtiers like Ferdinand IV's grand steward. The most senior imperial princes feared a loss of prestige and insisted that new princes could join the Diet only if the electors and the pertinent Imperial college agreed. Even when present in person, they were allowed to give their opinions only after the senior princes' representatives had done so. Thus, the emperor could still bestow the title of imperial prince, but in practice, the estates bestowed placement and vote at the Diet.²³

Aside from that, the emperor could only be too pleased if deliberation of certain topics went nowhere. For example, a discussion concerning what exactly France had gained in Alsace was tabled. Alsatian cities that had been ceded to France insisted on their Imperial status, a hot iron the emperor and the Estates did not wish to touch. In the dispute over Philippsburg, the imperial princes dared merely to recommend that Louis XIV evacuate the fortress, being that it brought him "no advantages"²⁴ because the parties concerned were "in the midst of peace and good understanding." Louis XIV left his troops where they were, as did Ferdinand III by declining suggestions that he retake Philippsburg and Alsace by force.

He and the Estates were, however, interested in restoring Imperial jurisdiction. The Diet largely affirmed the Imperial Chamber Court's ordinance as a Deputation had drawn it up and quickly agreed on the organization of confessional parity, without fully resolving the judiciary's financial problem. Ferdinand III issued a new ordinance for the Aulic Council. As he regarded it as an institution belonging to the Imperial court, he did not submit the new ordinance to the Estates for approval but did meet them halfway by appointing several Protestant court counselors. Though the Protestant Estates complained,

many were content to leave the judiciary in the emperor's hands because legal proceedings at the Imperial Chamber Court sometimes outlasted both plaintiff and defendant; at the Aulic Council, the parties had at least a chance for legal redress within their lifetime.²⁵

The Imperial Deputation that functioned as the Diet's executive committee between meetings also had to be adapted to the modified constitution. The difficulty lay in establishing the required religious parity in the Deputation's electoral curia. Even though Bohemia was not represented in the Imperial Deputation, Electoral Mainz, Cologne, Trier, and—since 1623—Bavaria constituted a Catholic majority in the Electoral College vis-à-vis Electoral Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Palatinate. Only when the Protestant princes once again threatened to break up the Diet and Ferdinand III weighed in as well was a compromise reached, by which the three Protestant electors could together wield a fourth vote in the Deputation.²⁶

On this basis, several unaccomplished tasks stipulated in the Peace of Westphalia could be shifted to the Deputation, especially details of the many restitution cases. The question of who would decide restitutions if the responsible commission could not arrive at a unanimous verdict had been left open in the peace treaty. This task could not be completed by the Nuremberg Execution Congress, by a second Deputation from the Estates made up of equal numbers of Protestants and Catholics (who had been meeting since 1650), or even by yet another Deputation that the Diet had appointed only after a long dispute about its composition and procedure. The expulsion of the Capuchins from Hildesheim incensed people so much that work in Regensburg came to a standstill. As it was now possible to transfer unfinished business to the Imperial Deputation, Protestants avoided giving the emperor decisive influence over this aspect of implementing the peace. Volmar, on the other hand, safeguarded the emperor's jurisdiction over the restitution processes already pending at the Aulic Council. Ferdinand III therefore sent Volmar as his representative to the Frankfurt meeting of the Deputation in 1655.²⁷

There were three areas in which the emperor protected Spanish interests at the Diet. France in particular regarded imperial permission to recruit soldiers for Spanish service as a breach of the Peace of Westphalia. But the emperor referred to every German's right to serve foreign rulers and the right of every territory to recruit soldiers. The Spanish king, as a ruler of Imperial territories, also had this right. However, Ferdinand III did not want disputes with the Imperial Estates, especially not in this matter, and made clear to the Spanish ambassador that he could support Spanish recruitments only covertly. This did not work. When Philip IV demanded permission to recruit, Ferdinand III relented, having his eye on the Spanish succession and thus being susceptible to blackmail. The situation escalated immediately. Prince

Christian of Mecklenburg, who had entered Spanish service, recruited former Swedish soldiers for Spain, but the Lower Saxon Circle forcibly disbanded these troops. Prince Christian arrived at Regensburg to complain and received Spanish money, which greatly aggravated the Estates, with the electors joining the princes in demanding interdiction of Spanish recruitments. Though Ferdinand III could prevent this decision from becoming legally effective, he could not mollify the French ambassador other than by pointing out that France, too, had the right to recruit troops in the Empire.²⁸

Meanwhile, in Vienna, the emperor favored Spanish interests in rejecting Montferrat's enfeoffment to Savoy in 1651/52. Because Bavaria's crown prince was married to a Savoyard princess, Bavaria's representatives joined the Estates in bringing strong pressure to bear. Volmar found a solution by pointing out that debating this issue in the College of Princes would also necessitate complying with the imperial princes' plea for an additional discussion of the electors' privileges. As Bavaria naturally did not want this, the electors demanded from the French king proof that he had fulfilled his share of preconditions for Savoy's enfeoffment, which the French could not provide when its ambassador in Regensburg died before the necessary French guarantee of payment arrived. During another session, Volmar acted contrary to Diet rules by ejecting Savoy's representative, thereby creating more controversy and delay. The case would later come before the Imperial Deputation.²⁹

More difficult for Ferdinand III was the problem of Lorraine.³⁰ Though the Peace of Westphalia had stipulated a future settlement between France, Sweden, and Duke Charles IV, the latter continued to fight against France. This especially affected the territories of the Rhenish electors where Lorraine's army had its base and winter quarters and where it occupied several towns, among them Hammerstein, Homburg, and Landstuhl. Because the duke had been a—albeit difficult—brother-in-arms of both the emperor and Spain, the Nuremberg Execution Congress had charged the emperor with removing Lorraine's troops from these towns. Ferdinand III was not prepared, however, to send an Imperial Army against the duke.

Complaints at the Diet continued. The emperor maneuvered between his own interest in having contented electors and Spanish interest in the duke. He pressed Spain to end its incursions into Lorraine (which was occupied by France). When that failed, he sent a courtier to the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, his brother Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. Like the written reminders demanded by the Estates, this looked good but achieved nothing. Equally ineffective was the emperor's appeal for troops to the competent Imperial Circle, with Mainz alone raising a mere 150 men. A few months later, Ferdinand III and the Estates agreed on negotiations with Charles IV, a triangular arrangement that further delayed the negotiations. Very reluctantly,

the duke's and emperor's representatives agreed to evacuate the three cities in exchange for monetary indemnification for Charles IV. Then, there followed general disagreements over the amount.

After many weeks, the frustrated electors united against Ferdinand III, who then turned the matter over to Volmar, who avoided an Imperial war against Lorraine by continuing negotiations. An accord was reached in December 1653 that called for the Empire to pay the duke 300,000 Gulden in compensation. Yet this was such a large sum that the Diet refused to ratify the agreement, at which point Charles IV invaded the elector of Cologne's territory. It took Ferdinand III nearly six weeks to answer the Diet's request for military aid to Cologne. Then, his response was another reminder, another courtier sent to Brussels, and another complaint to the Spanish ambassador but also approval of a military contingent from several Imperial Circles. Brandenburg sent 800 men and Mainz sent 260 (on paper; only 106 actually turned up). But the cost was still too high for the princes, who were satisfied with having vented their spleen by coming up with this minimal force, but who were more eager to continue negotiations amid disagreements over how to apportion their share of the 300,000 Gulden.

But the Habsburgs thought the situation too precarious. At the end of February 1654, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, as governor of the Spanish Netherlands, had his second cousin Charles IV arrested because of compromising contacts with France. The archduke had disliked the duke since their first personal meeting in 1647 and soon thereafter had sent his brother the ironic prayer, "Lord, preserve us from the duke of Lorraine."³¹ Concerning a conflict over winter quarters, he had written that he would try to make the duke see reason. Only a week later, he called his second cousin "mad and maniac."³² He had concluded by saying that, were the duke ever in hell, he "would be unable to get out again." Now, in 1654, came to pass what the archduke had predicted would be the result of the duke's stubbornness and recalcitrance: "I only fear he will go too far and I will lose patience."³³ The Habsburgs did lose patience and sent the duke to Toledo as a prisoner of the Spanish. There, he remained until the end of the Franco-Spanish War in 1659. He fared better than his wife Nicole, whom the French had taken prisoner at Lunéville during their invasion of Lorraine in 1634 and who remained as a hostage in France until her death.

Archduke Leopold Wilhelm placed the troops under the command of Duke Nicolas Francis of Lorraine. Ferdinand III had conferred with the duke shortly before his departure from Vienna and now called him to Regensburg. The coup was successful. The Estates now debated whether they should pay anything at all, advising negotiation on the elector of Cologne, in whose archbishopric of Liège French troops had replaced those from Lorraine. In March

1654, he reached agreement with Spain, and in May, France joined the treaty. After the so-called Peace of Tirlmont (Tienen) was concluded, the Imperial Estates again argued about the costs, though Cologne captured Hammerstein, thus relieving some of the pressure.³⁴

With the help of Volmar and his skilled handling of permissible and forbidden procedural techniques, Ferdinand III was able to secure and enlarge Habsburg territorial dominion, which had been especially endangered by the Imperial Chamber Court's months-long attacks on the privileged Habsburgs' jurisdiction in territories that belonged to the Empire. A large majority of Imperial Estates and several electors regarded this privilege, with good reason, as an illegitimate anomaly in Imperial law, an unacceptable favoritism toward the Habsburgs in their conflicts with Imperial Estates that themselves had dominions within the Habsburg sphere of influence. In the end, Bavaria was unwilling to forfeit the emperor's favor for the territorial rights of the affected bishops of Bamberg, Konstanz, Brixen, and Trent. Although it continued to insist on following the law, it simultaneously counseled an amicable settlement. Thus, the other estates also desisted from attacks and drew down their complaints about the frequently abusive court decisions in Habsburg-ruled Swabia.³⁵

Finally, Ferdinand III strengthened the territorial rulers' right of reformation as guaranteed by the Peace of Westphalia, which also obliged him to hear pleas for his Protestant subjects at the Diet. This he did, giving audiences and accepting petitions, though a subject from his territorial lands who canvassed in Regensburg for the Protestants of Upper Austria was arrested. Although Brandenburg, Braunschweig, Magdeburg, and Sweden pointedly asked to be heard, the emperor did not give in to these requests. The Privy Councillors offered their expert opinion that traditional rights had been forfeited by the rebellion, and readmission of Protestants would only cause new disturbances—something that Ferdinand III “as a Christian and wise ruler”³⁶ was duty bound to prevent. The accent had shifted, with a single religion becoming an express condition of reason of state.

When Ferdinand III returned to Vienna in May of 1654, the Habsburg succession in the Empire was secure. He had accomplished his most important task as head of his family. He now wielded considerable influence in the Empire through the Aulic Council. Even if only mere representatives rather than princes appeared for the allocation of imperial fiefs, Imperial prestige continued and was later expanded even further by propaganda. The Imperial territories were more independent than ever before, reshaping their common legal system to an extent to which they were once again comfortable. This also held for the Imperial Prince Ferdinand III. The peace established in Münster, Osnabrück, Nuremberg, and Regensburg definitively recognized Habsburg

territorial rulership in all matters religious. Because the emperor incorporated the 1648 treaties into the Imperial Recess (the Diet's official closing document) and therefore acknowledged Lutherans and Calvinists protections under Imperial law, the nuncio protested in the pope's name. Ferdinand III saw to it that the protest was included in the chancellery files and left it at that.³⁷

Though religious propaganda continued on all sides, the entwined military and constitutional struggle among the confessions as such was a thing of the past to the very end of the old regime in 1806.³⁸ The knot that had led to the Thirty Years' War had been untangled.

3.5

THE DEATH OF FERDINAND IV

The emperor and his son returned via the Danube and were welcomed in Vienna by great crowds and triumphal arches. But Ferdinand III felt the need for relaxation and soon went to Laxenburg, where he received medications, and then visited the baths in Baden, though without finding relief. On June 20, 1654, he was back in Vienna, but already the first Sunday chapel service in July had to be canceled. The court blamed the strawberries the emperor had eaten the previous day. Ferdinand IV was also ill, though far more seriously: he had contracted smallpox. This was life-threatening, not only for him but for everyone around him who had not previously survived the disease, among them all the emperor's children, the empress, and probably the emperor himself. At any rate, the family fled to Ebersdorf, while the heir apparent remained behind in care of Auersperg and the doctors. Soon, the worst seemed to be over, but on July 7, respiratory symptoms appeared "that gradually took away his breath and finally his life."¹ On July 9, 1654, Ferdinand IV died in the Vienna Hofburg at the age of twenty.

The Imperial Confessor Gans, Grand Steward Dietrichstein, and Grand Chamberlain Waldstein together informed the emperor. According to a report by the nuncio, Ferdinand III maintained his composure, showed "great steadfastness of the soul when suffering this severe blow,"² and quoted the central theme from the Book of Job that "The Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away, blessed be the name of the Lord."³ The papal ambassador related another dictum: "It pains me that he had so little time to enjoy life, but he was too good—God wanted him for himself."⁴ His upbringing had taught Ferdinand III to control his feelings. How deeply he was really affected can be gleaned from several reports, such as the comment that in spite of all equanimity "in his feelings he was unable to refuse nature its due."⁵ For several weeks, he withdrew to Ebersdorf. Ferdinand III informed his sister by a letter in his own hand, displaying his vacillation between grief and consolation, describing the illness's final phase, the confession and extreme unction, adding that "Your Highness can easily guess at the grief I and we all suffer; our loss is great."⁶

When Ferdinand III again granted audiences at the end of July, the nuncio expressed his condolences, adding afterward that “He is quite strong spiritually and submits to God’s will, but is very weak in body.”⁷ The report shows that, henceforth, illness and grief went hand in hand. In spite of the cures he had undergone since his return from Regensburg, the emperor could barely stand on his own two legs, though he did take rides in his coach every day. He returned briefly to Vienna for the obsequies but continued to reside in Ebersdorf, whence he traveled to the Hungarian Diet. He also worried about the little Archduke Karl Joseph, who had a fever but not smallpox (Figure 31).

At the end of July, Ferdinand III spent several days at the Carmelite convent in the Mannersdorf wilderness near Vienna, which had been founded by Eleonora Magdalena and whose church was being consecrated. When he returned to Ebersdorf, the feast day of St. Ignatius of Loyola was being celebrated. The nuncio reported that the emperor was in fine spiritual form and that his facial color was good, but that he showed little improvement in his legs and “had himself carried in a sedan chair wherever he went.”⁸

In Vienna, rumors were rife. The doctors were blamed for the king’s death. They had applied too much heat and had not bled him soon enough. There had been omens. On the day before the death, several people had felt a small earthquake, and one of the doctors wrote later that things had gotten worse from that moment on. It was reported that one of the eagles kept at the Hofburg escaped that day and flew across the square between the castle and St. Michael’s Church. Loss of the heraldic bird was linked to the loss of the Roman king. It is possible that the increasing apprehension also stemmed from preparations in July 1654 for imminent and astrologically calculated eclipses of sun and moon. Privy Councillor Gundaker Prince Liechtenstein advised his subjects on July 6 to keep their doors closed and not to eat and drink during the events so “that the infected air had little or no chance to enter their bodies.”⁹

The court went into mourning. Ferdinand IV’s courtiers entombed his remains in the Capuchin crypt next to his mother. He had asked that his heart be buried separately in the Loreto Chapel of St. Augustine’s Church, where it was brought in a silver vessel. The emperor had his trusty theater architect Burnacini erect a gigantic mourning scaffold in St. Augustine’s. Shaped like a triumphal arch, it displayed in its center a life-sized effigy of the king, looking as if he were asleep. The scaffold was surrounded by allegories of death, grief, time, and faith and was crowned by a rising phoenix, glorifying victory over death, apotheosis, and resurrection.¹⁰

At the end of July, Ferdinand III once more began to look to the future. What he had done for Ferdinand IV he now repeated for Archduke Leopold, preparing him for the succession. That their personal relationship was somewhat less close, in part because of the emperor’s long absences, did not affect



FIGURE 31 Archduke Charles Joseph of Austria, youngest son of Ferdinand III, oil painting by Frans Luycx. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, inventory number 3185.

the preparations. We know that he kept close watch on the education of his second son, who had been trained up to this point to be a prince-bishop. Thus, the father was irritated when the boy called the confessors Gans and Geier “two great birds,”¹¹ though his anger turned to praise when the son asked whether it were not true that goose and vulture are large birds.

In 1654, Ferdinand III assigned several of the deceased king’s trusted chamberlains to his new heir and changed the order of precedence in Archduke Leopold’s household in their favor. It was more difficult to find a position that suited his abilities of Ferdinand IV’s grand steward, Prince Auersperg. He was now merely a privy councillor. It did not help him at court that Ferdinand III thanked him for accompanying his son by conferring him with the Silesian duchy of Księstwo ziebickie (Münsterberg). Count Portia, Archduke Leopold’s grand steward, was now in the ascendance, even though he had only been the third choice for this position. The rivalry that now embroiled Auersperg and Portia was more than personal because Portia, as the former ambassador to Venice, was primarily focused on the relationship with the Ottoman Empire, while Auersperg’s main concern was the Spanish succession. When, after Dietrichstein’s death at the end of 1655, Ferdinand appointed him as his own grand steward, Auersperg was unable to build a position comparable to that of Trauttmansdorff.¹²

Finally, Ferdinand IV’s death rekindled the question of succession in the Empire. Archduke Leopold was only fifteen and described by the nuncio as “of weak constitution.”¹³ His minority opened an opportunity to confer the imperial crown on another Catholic or Protestant imperial prince or even on the king of France, who was very interested. Early rumors from the Lower Saxon Circle reached the court, according to which several Protestants were prepared to try electing a new king of the Romans during Archduke Leopold’s minority—which would have excluded the Habsburgs, even the emperor’s brother, whose candidacy had been considered but rejected at court. Ferdinand III had to bide his time until Archduke Leopold’s coming of age and, meanwhile, curb political developments in the Empire. The Imperial Deputation to be installed after the Regensburg Diet offered a first opportunity, and Ferdinand III did what he could to delay its opening until September 1655. When the Imperial Deputation finally convened, he delayed its conclusion until September 1656. He wished not merely to solve the problems that remained to be negotiated but rather to gain time before another Imperial Diet and election.

3.6

NEW SUCCESSION: OLD AND NEW DANGERS OF WAR

1655: The Hungarian Diet and Succession

Archduke Leopold's Hungarian coronation soon followed. A Hungarian Diet had been in the cards ever since Palatine Pálffy's death in February 1654, and preparations were underway when Ferdinand IV died. At the end of July, Ferdinand III sent his grand chamberlain to Bratislava to get the castle ready. One month later, he summoned the archbishop of Esztergom to court for preliminary consultations, with the Diet scheduled for fall.¹ This deadline had to be postponed. After the obsequies for Ferdinand IV, the emperor continued to suffer from gout and went to the country for another extended period. The empress was again pregnant, and it is likely that after her miscarriage at the beginning of 1654, the journey was thought too much for her. At the end of December, she gave birth to a daughter. Her christening once again affirmed the jeopardized dynastic unity. She was baptized Maria Anna Josepha in the presence of the Spanish ambassador, with the Spanish royal couple nominally serving as her godparents. The knights' chamber was furnished with the "most beautiful tapestries" and a richly decorated altar. Ferdinand III showed himself highly pleased, though many at court had hoped for a son to guarantee the succession.²

It was in the same chamber that Ferdinand III opened the Lower Austrian Diet in January of 1655, asking the Estates to pay tribute to Archduke Leopold. The ceremony was delayed until the end of the month because his gout once again confined Ferdinand III to bed. Then, the archducal hat was taken off St. Leopold's skull in Klosterneuburg, brought to Vienna, and placed on Archduke Leopold's head in the presence of his father.³ Yet, the Hungarians still required patience. In February, the Danube was iced over and a journey by boat impossible. The emperor was again bedridden for several days. Because of storms from the southwest, the cold was followed by a rapid thaw that damaged the bridges. But Ferdinand III's gout abated along with the cold, and he was able to leave his bed and grant audiences. The improvement was of

short duration, however, and the Diet had to be postponed again. Before his departure, two old confidants died, causing the emperor great distress. First was his Grand Chamberlain Waldstein, who had been with him since 1622 and who had remained a loyal and close companion through Wallenstein's death in 1634. To prove his esteem once again before he died, Ferdinand III appointed his son Chamberlain and Aulic Councillor and had the court chapel accompany Waldstein's obsequies in the church of St. Augustine. That same month, Balthasar Maradas, the longest-serving active chamberlain, also died after serving Ferdinand III for nearly twenty years.⁴

At last, in March of 1655, the Hungarian Estates received their king at the border. Several thousand men on horseback filed past Ferdinand III and accompanied him to Bratislava. He proposed four candidates for the office of Palatine, with the Catholic Wesselényi elected by an overwhelming majority, both because he had the required age and was experienced in war. Compilation of the Estates' grievances to be addressed was completed by the end of March. It was clear that there would be no difficulties over Archduke Leopold's election as king, but the Estates' affairs had to be negotiated first.⁵

The focus of this Diet was once again the controversy over confessional issues concerning the Jesuits and marriage rights, but the most difficult concerned enforcing religious freedom (guaranteed in the Linz peace agreement of 1645 and the Hungarian Diet resolution of 1647) for the subjects vis-à-vis their local authorities. As the Hungarian peasants were mostly serfs, they had confessional freedom only to the point that one magnate protected them from another. This would have encroached on the domain of local aristocrats, however, and thus the Estates agreed, after week-long deliberations, on what was for them an elegant solution: from a strictly legal point of view, the subjects would have recourse to court proceedings. Thus, on paper, their religious freedom was assured, but they remained subject to the will and powers of enforcement of their respective manorial and feudal lords. Ferdinand III showed himself content that no new concessions would be necessary beyond those of 1645–1647. The nuncio's remonstrations left him unmoved.⁶

After this agreement, the king's election could be celebrated. In mid-May, the archbishop of Esztergom and the new Palatine appeared before Ferdinand III and proclaimed the Estates' desire to elect Archduke Leopold. After the next round of negotiations had been concluded, the Palatine proposed the election. The Estates concurred, announced the new king, and initiated a horse race; the first to arrive at the castle bearing the tidings, a Count Draskovics, received a gold chain and much honor. Ferdinand III sent a chamberlain with the news to Vienna, where Empress Eleonora sojourned. Archduke Leopold was her favorite. The Estates used commissions to deal with the remaining minor issues. The imperial couple now undertook the

spring cures along with the obligatory bleeding and amused themselves with fishing, though on Maundy Thursday, the emperor still had been unable to conduct the traditional foot washing.⁷

Meanwhile, matters in Bratislava were settling down. Immediately after the Diet began, there had been several murders, resulting in a nightly curfew, followed by the suspected poisoning of a Hungarian count and an attack on the residence of the Venetian ambassador. Other fights continued over several weeks, sparked by the theft of a Spanish uniform and the mistreatment of its wearer in a tavern. An act of revenge by Spanish embassy personnel left two Hungarians dead and many wounded. Several Hungarians then ambushed the ambassador's retinue while he was out driving in the town. Again, there were dead and wounded. The Palatine had the culprits arrested and punished, but acts of revenge continued. Only when Ferdinand III sent several thousand soldiers into the city and forbade the Spanish ambassador from leaving his house did the fighting subside.⁸

Before and during the Diet, there were incursions by Ottoman troops, along with the usual abduction of local residents. These extended to the fortresses of Karlovac in Croatia and Radkersburg in Styria. The emperor summoned Piccolomini to the court and ordered Leslie to leave his Bohemian lands for his command post at Warazdin. At the end of the Diet, the Estates accepted, ahead of all others, Piccolomini, Auersperg, and three War Council members into the

ranks of the Hungarian nobility.

They could not have been unaware that the two princes were the most important councillors for external and military affairs.⁹ Like his father in 1625, Archduke Leopold was now inducted into the Order of the Golden Fleece. On June 27, 1655, the day of his coronation, he, too, affirmed the kingdom's privileges, rode to Coronation Hill, brandished his sword in all four directions, and promised to defend the land (Figure 32).

In Vienna, Dowager Empress Eleonora died on her favorite's coronation day. She had requested that her body, dressed in the habit of the Carmelites, be entombed there in the convent church she had



FIGURE 32 Leopold I (uncertain) as King of Hungary, oil painting (artist unknown). Private collection.

endowed but her heart in Graz with Ferdinand II. At the beginning of July, Ferdinand III was back in Vienna for Ferdinand IV's first annual memorial rites. The emperor now appointed his son's grand steward to the Privy Council. Further homages to Leopold I and the hereditary Bohemian crown could, and had to, wait.¹⁰

On the Threshold of a Great New European War

Many military leaders were in Bratislava because the emperor had problems more pressing than just the Ottoman incursions. From 1654 on, Sweden had a new king, Charles X Gustav, who took after his belligerent uncle, Gustav II Adolf, and in the summer of 1655, invaded Poland. The moment was favorable because in the previous year, Tsar Alexis had attacked Lithuania, a part of Poland. After suppressing uprisings by the nobility and parliament, Louis XIV also went on the offensive. He wanted to regain Gravelingen, Ypers, and other territory in the Netherlands that Archduke Leopold Wilhelm had only recently reconquered. The archduke had very little with which to counter the French king. To save his duchy, Nicolas Francis of Lorraine now had only one option, to change sides and deploy his army in 1656 against Spain.¹¹

The results of the Bratislava negotiations stipulated that the emperor's army be built up sufficiently to secure the border with Poland and still maintain reserve troops. It should number at least 25,000 men, but money was scarce. Poland was not the emperor's only concern. As a former Swedish commander, Charles Gustav had resided in Prague in 1648 and knew from firsthand experience how exhausted the hereditary territories were. Under pressure and with little success, Ferdinand III attempted to raise money from the Estates. News about the Swedish invasion forces was disquieting. They numbered more than 30,000 soldiers, many of them experienced in warfare, and could boast a strong artillery. Ferdinand III bought weapons on a large scale, sent troops to the border, and continually reinforced them. Wrocław's capitulars did what they could to advance the Habsburgs' engagement in Silesia and elected Archduke Leopold Wilhelm as their new bishop. The emperor also chose diplomacy and dispatched two envoys to Moscow.

Sweden's conquest of Warsaw in September 1655 meant further escalation. The new Swedish King Charles X Gustav had been born a prince of Palatinate-Kleeberg and was, through his mother, a scion of the Lutheran Vasa dynasty, which was related to the weaker Catholic royal family of Poland. Charles Gustav found support among the Polish aristocracy in his quest for the Polish crown. This crown also attracted the prince of Transylvania, who made it known that he would help fight the Swedes. The scenario of a war between Sweden and Transylvania for Johann Kasimir's throne, support for all three parties by factions of the Polish nobility, the Polish-Russian war, and, on top

of that, Brandenburg's involvement in the Swedish-Polish conflict required not only protection for the hereditary lands but also support for King Johann Kasimir of Poland.¹²

But Ferdinand III could supply no military aid. He was too weak. Above all, the peace between Sweden and the emperor was no ordinary one but instead carried the weight of an unprecedented multinational, multi-confessional, and constitutional 1648 peace treaty. Were it to end, the entire peaceful order would be threatened, as would the compromise of 1654 between emperor and Empire. Thus, Ferdinand did what he did best: he negotiated and waited. He sent a new resident to the Swedish king and did not allow himself to be provoked when, during the Swedish attack on Cracow, a Swedish aristocrat came to the Imperial court to receive the imperial fiefs for his king.¹³ Ferdinand III replied with a rather strong hint. He gave two splendid horses to Piccolomini, renowned throughout Europe for having repeatedly repulsed the Swedes in the last war, who then passed them on to the Swedish king, together with his compliments. Furthermore, the emperor decided to recruit additional regiments, perhaps while hoping that the Swedes were taking Piccolomini's combat experience into consideration. Though Piccolomini was gravely ill, the emperor needed him so desperately that he kept him at court.

It was the king of Poland who had to flee, going to Silesia and residing first in Głogów and then in Opole. In the fall of 1655, the kings of Poland and Sweden both held Polish Diets, the former in Opole and the latter in Warsaw. Ferdinand III openly offered to mediate between the warring parties, thus affirming his commitment to the neutrality he had to maintain for preserving the Peace of Westphalia. In December, some relief for Johann Kasimir was perceptible. After negotiating with the emperor, the Cossacks and Tartars declared themselves ready to fight for the Polish king, who consequently dared to reenter his realm. Ferdinand III wanted to expand his forces to 35,000 men and, at the Lower Austrian Diet in 1656, demanded a great deal of money for that purpose. In Bohemia, he had recruiters for Sweden arrested.¹⁴ But the emperor did not permit the many envoys from the Polish king to pressure him into military intervention on Poland's behalf. He also forestalled the nuncio who, on New Year's Day of 1656, pleaded for military aid but gained nothing beyond the imperial dictum of wait and see, reporting to Rome that "His Majesty showed that he had thought it over, but as usual he said nothing but that everything would be carefully considered."¹⁵

For Ferdinand III's relationship with Spain, the Imperial military buildup became a test of endurance. The contrived attempt, repeated in 1654, to marry the *Infanta* Maria Theresia, the presumptive heiress to the throne, to a relative of the emperor (both Archduke Leopold and Archduke Leopold Wilhelm had been mentioned) foundered in early summer of 1655. Ferdinand III reacted

by halting the ongoing Spanish recruitment in the hereditary lands. With French attacks rendering the Spanish position in Milan as well as in the Netherlands extremely precarious, the Spanish ambassador Castel Rodrigo pressured the emperor and his counselors with increasing urgency to allow recruiting. In agreement with Piccolomini, who had firsthand memories of Ferdinand II's fatal error in fighting the two-front war of 1629/30 in Italy and northern Germany, the emperor decided to support Milan only if absolutely necessary. In the meantime, he limited himself to diplomatic signals by sending envoys to northern Italy and Madrid. He remained composed even when the Spanish ambassador in London informed him of Sweden's attempt at pressuring England to prevent Archduke Leopold's election as king of the Romans.¹⁶

The tensions between Spain and the emperor at last erupted in a confrontation. After struggling for months in the Imperial antechamber with the court's flexible defensive front, the Spanish ambassador accused Prince Auersperg in December 1655 of being personally responsible for the delay. Auersperg, who had only recently become grand steward, brushed Castel Rodrigo off. Both considered themselves insulted, and the dispute turned into what the nuntiature called an "open break,"¹⁷ a scandal. The quarrel fit perfectly into Ferdinand III's tactics of procrastination. He did not deny access to either party and waited until the end of January before ordering the opponents to reconcile. He now appointed Auersperg first Privy Councillor and tried to secure him decisive influence in Leopold I's future government. To Castel Rodrigo, the emperor justified his refusal to supply weapons by blaming the Swedish threat and his own need for soldiers. In April 1656, the Spanish ambassador finally reported that Philip IV had accepted his resignation, and a Spanish interim ambassador arrived from Venice. With Castel Rodrigo's departure, talk of an army under the command of a Tyrolean archduke for the defense of Poland was no longer relevant.

Waiting rather than acting was again the imperial *modus operandi* at the beginning of 1656, when an ambassador from the Swiss confederation's Catholic cantons, with support from the *curia*, asked Ferdinand III for military aid in the brief war against the Protestant confederates. The emperor sent cautionary words instead of soldiers, put off the ambassador with empty promises, barricaded himself behind his councillors, and, under less stress than before, used the pretext of his imperial duty to preserve religious neutrality in confessional questions that did not concern his hereditary lands. This procedure was important because the Catholic cantons were also counting on Spanish support. Linking this conflict within the confederation, which was not vitally important to the emperor, to the Franco-Spanish War was too dangerous because of the dictates of neutrality.¹⁸

During this crisis, which extended from Moscow to Madrid, Ferdinand III put Leopold I's further assumption of power on hold. Only days after his return from Bratislava, he, together with his family and a small retinue, left Vienna because of the plague and remained for some time in Ebersdorf. Even during the three-day obsequies for the Dowager Empress Eleonora, he did not spend the night in the city but appeared only briefly at the ceremonies. The apparent end of the plague in October allowed him and his court to return to Vienna as usual for All Saints' Day. But a few days later, fear of a recurrence closed the Hofburg to many servants and visitors; not even the ambassadors' coaches were allowed to enter the courtyard. Only the winter cold eradicated the plague around New Year's Day.¹⁹

The emperor's gout worsened as well. In both July and September of 1655, he stayed in bed for several days. He got up to attend an aristocratic court wedding, but a subsequent attack rendered him unable to move on his own. Between such bouts, he sought relaxation in the hunt, even driving to Wiener Neustadt for a meet. In the fall, he again suffered attacks after hunting, was bedridden for an entire week in December, and was forced to postpone all political activities. In February 1656, he even missed the traditional visit to the St. Augustine convent in the Viennese suburb of Rochus and could not accompany his sister on her return to Munich.²⁰

The dowager electress Maria Anna had meanwhile turned over the governance of Bavaria to her son. She had a poor relationship with his Savoyard wife and contemplated returning to Vienna. Ferdinand III allowed her to stay for only several months, and so his sister, with her younger son, had come to Vienna for the winter of 1655/56. She was received cordially, resided in the Hofburg, and participated in life at court. Because her son's precedence vis-à-vis the ambassadors was unclear, the court employed the ceremonial subterfuge of incognito, which occasionally made him socially invisible.²¹

During Mardi Gras of 1656, news came from Spain that Ferdinand III's daughter had given birth to a girl who shortly died. As the court went into mourning, the wait for a Spanish heir continued. With the coming of spring, hunting commenced at Laxenburg, and after Easter, the court remained there through May. On Maundy Thursday, Leopold I took over the traditional foot washing for the emperor, who was unable to leave his sedan chair.²²

Navigating through International Crises

In the summer of 1656, Ferdinand III could no longer procrastinate with Spain once the pro-French duke of Modena joined the war against the Spanish in northern Italy with military force. Because both Modena and Milan were imperial fiefs, the emperor viewed the French ally's war against Spain as governed by Imperial law in order to protect Milan against encroachments by the duke of Modena. At the beginning of July 1656, Ferdinand III decided

to send about 12,000 troops to Milan. But the approximately 6,000 soldiers gathered at Klagenfurt mutinied from mid-August to mid-September, successfully resisting the move to Italy under Spanish command. During this mutiny, well over 1,000 women who did not want to be separated from their husbands played an important role. Only the troops marching through the Tyrol, much reduced by desertion and illness, actually arrived in northern Italy. They were a “painful disappointment” (Valentinitisch)²³ to the Spanish. In any case, they were too late to help defend Valenza, a strategically important town taken by the French troops and their allies on September 15. Spain, and thus also the emperor, were somewhat relieved by France having suffered a setback in the Netherlands and being forced to abort the siege of Valenciennes.

During the first days of the aforementioned mutiny, the retinue accompanying the Habsburgs via Linz and České Budějovice to Prague got underway. There, on September 11, Empress Eleonora Magdalena was crowned queen and, three days later, Leopold I king of Bohemia. The emperor then went for a few days to Brandýs, where he celebrated the feast day of the sainted King Wenceslaus of Bohemia. His son was ill and could not accompany him. From Prague, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm paid a lengthy visit to his bishoprics of Olomouc and Wrocław. He had relinquished his ill-fated governorship of the Spanish Netherlands in May of 1656 and, since the end of July, had been at the Imperial court, where no special tasks had awaited him. The imperial couple’s return journey to Vienna also lasted longer than usual because the empress was pregnant and had to be carried in a sedan chair, as conveyance by coach was considered unsafe because of poor road conditions.²⁴

Another journey for the purpose of a hoped-for third coronation was not in the cards, as Leopold I was still too young to be elected king of the Romans, and chances for a Habsburg to win such an election were slim in any case. The old elector of Saxony, who had been loyal to the emperor, died in October 1656, and his successor, much to the emperor’s dismay, supplied weapons to Transylvania. The young elector of Bavaria, whose marriage allied him more closely with France, was himself mentioned as a possible candidate for the imperial crown. The elector of Brandenburg had been fighting against Poland since 1655 and from 1656 on, did so on the side of Sweden. The elector of the Palatinate was once again quarreling about Weiden with the Catholic prince of Sulzbach, who had Ferdinand III’s support.²⁵ The electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier continued to suffer from the war between Spain, France, and Lorraine, which was fought without consideration for the territorial integrity of the region. The arrest of Charles IV of Lorraine now took on the appearance of a Spanish coup abetted by the emperor, and the ongoing dispute over Lorraine put a strain on the relationship between the Rhenish electors and Ferdinand III during the Imperial Deputation at Frankfurt.²⁶

The emperor had no solution for the security problem of the imperial princes in the west and north. Military intervention would have set the Empire back to the status of the years 1636–1648, something neither the emperor nor his subjects wanted. He had already witnessed the foundering of the Peace of Prague and now clung to the letter of the Peace of Westphalia. Many of the Imperial territories did the same, making use of their right to form alliances granted therein. For years, the elector of Mainz worked on an interconfessional alliance—concluded in 1658—that would secure the Empire in the west. In the “Rhenish Alliance,” he brought together under French protection the electors of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, the prince-bishop of Münster (who had been frustrated by a verdict from the Aulic Council), the count of Pfalz-Neuburg, the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, the Guelph dukes, and the king of Sweden in his role as duke of Bremen and Verden.²⁷

But in 1656, matters had not yet come to this, though the Italian campaign shed light on the coming constellation. France exhorted the Imperial Estates to resist Imperial military intervention on behalf of Spain in the duchy of Milan, something it chose to regard as a violation of the Peace of Westphalia. As treaty partners, the Imperial Estates were responsible for this peace and, as it happened, had already gathered at the Deputation meeting in Frankfurt. There, and with the electors of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, Volmar had been busy since August 1656 attempting to reject French demands on the Deputation. Ferdinand III’s compliance with the terms of the treaty toward France was of utmost importance to the German princes, and thus the Deputation was for some time engaged with French claims that were controversial and highly irksome to the emperor. The princes could only ensure their security interests by maintaining the differentiation between the emperor and the Empire as a multitude of Imperial Estates. This stance corresponded to the duke of Modena’s reaction to the emperor’s reproaches about his attacks on Milan with a manifesto to the electors, whose votes the emperor would need, in turn, for Leopold I’s election as king of the Romans.²⁸

These many interconnections left Ferdinand III almost no room to maneuver, and what remained shrank even more because of rapid developments, among which a revival of the mutiny in Carinthia was not the least threatening. Only a series of arrests and probably even death sentences ended the renewed unrest among the soldiers. The nuncio, on the other hand, remonstrated with the emperor over the unjust manner in which his deputies handled their search for the Marchese Gregorio Spada, whom Graz authorities accused of being partially responsible for the mutiny and whose wife and children they had arrested in Ljubljana after his disappearance. It is likely that the nuncio interfered on behalf of Spada’s uncle, Cardinal Bernadino Spada, and thus Gregorio Spada came to Vienna after all, though not as a prisoner but as a thorn in the emperor’s side during his audiences with the nuncio.²⁹

But above all, it was a new pope, Alexander VII (1655–1667), who urged Ferdinand III to withdraw from Italy. Auersperg explained the emperor's actions to the nuncio as a legitimate defense of an Imperial fief that did not infringe on the treaty, and he held out the prospect of negotiations during the coming winter. Ferdinand III himself justified his actions in an audience at the end of October 1656, but considering the legal situation, he restrained the troops. During the conquest and sacking of towns, the churches, at least, were to be exempted because as places of refuge, they were protected by ecclesiastical law. Should the Imperial soldiers enter the duchy of Modena, they were to spare the possessions of the bishop and the cathedral chapter of Parma there. But in January 1657, the emperor rejected the request to withdraw his soldiers from their winter quarters on the Riviera di San Giulio on the pretext that the area was part of the fief of Milan, though in 1219, it had actually come into the possession of the bishop of Novara. Once this circumstance had been unearthed, Ferdinand III ordered the territory cleared.³⁰

In 1656, Ferdinand III continued his efforts to relieve the Polish king. After he had dispatched envoys to Moscow the previous year, an ambassador from the tsar now appeared at the Imperial court. In utmost secrecy, a select few privy councillors conducted negotiations about imperial mediation of a Russian-Polish peace. After a few Polish victories, this was welcomed not only by the Polish king but also the tsar. Beginning in August of 1656, imperial envoys in Vilnius duly led negotiations for ending the war.³¹

Nevertheless, that summer, the king of Poland lost Warsaw for the second time. The elector of Brandenburg's army fought on Sweden's side, in return for which the Swedes released his Prussian holdings from Polish overlordship. Because these were not part of the Empire, the elector of Brandenburg could now dispose over a sovereign territory. Thus, Ferdinand III witnessed the birth of the European superpower Brandenburg-Prussia, though he may not have given it much thought, as another reversal demanded his attention. In November 1656, Russia and Poland agreed to a ceasefire in Vilnius, whereby Russia now attacked Swedish possessions in Latvia and laid siege—albeit unsuccessfully—to Riga.³²

These reports finally persuaded Ferdinand III to render unofficial military aid to the Polish king. Since October, two Polish envoys had been at the court, at last taking the ceremonial hurdles on which their predecessors' mission had foundered a year earlier. After their introductory audience, Ferdinand III had them discuss the feasibility of supporting Poland. The presence not only of Auersperg but, according to the nuncio, of the president and a secretary from the Aulic Council indicated that the emperor wished to take the Peace of Westphalia into account during these talks. They also had to consider the imperial princes' criticism of the Italian campaign as well, and the nuncio

talked into the wind when he tried to win Auersperg's approval for an alliance with Poland. Instead, the court sent a secretary from the Polish embassy to the Frankfurt Deputation in November. This served to delay the negotiations and was meant to convince the territories that the emperor would do nothing to endanger the Peace of Westphalia. The envoy's task was to convey the emperor's wish "to march in step with the imperial princes in such matters, just as a head would together with its limbs."³³

The imperial head did not march with the Brandenburg limb into a Swedish alliance, however, but turned in the opposite direction. At the beginning of December, reacting to reports from Latvia, Ferdinand III declared himself willing to support Poland with 4,000 soldiers who, in consideration of the Peace of Westphalia, would fight under the Polish banner. The Polish envoys returned to their king, agreement in hand, but it still needed to be ratified for it to become effective.³⁴ Still, in December of 1656, there were reports that Russia was negotiating a truce with Sweden. Thus, in early 1657, the emperor prepared a new embassy to Moscow, in an attempt to "dissuade the tsar from any hostile action against Poland . . . and to avoid anything that might give the warring parties cause for justified doubts about the emperor's commitment to peace."³⁵

Only a month later, news arrived that the prince of Transylvania was now making preparations for war against Poland. For months, rumors had been rife at court that Rákóczi would join the war on the Swedish side. In January 1657, when it became clear that an invasion by Rákóczi was imminent, the emperor could do nothing but swallow his anger and prepare the archbishop of Esztergom for a mission to Transylvania. Rákóczi was faster, setting out in January, arriving in Poland by February, and completing the invasion by March. His force, approximately 14,000 strong, together with about 6,000 Moldavians and 20,000 Cossacks, was larger than the emperor's entire army. In addition, Rákóczi was formally allied with Sweden. The goal of this alliance was, above all, a Calvinist Poland divided between Sweden and Transylvania. Pointing to the threat of a Swedish attack on the hereditary lands, the emperor again declined the Spanish demands for sending soldiers to Milan and dispatched those he could muster to secure the border with Silesia.³⁶

But that was not all. In February 1657, the borders with the Ottoman Empire suddenly seemed threatened. Encouraged by the successes the pasha of Bosnia had achieved in land battles with Venice—evidenced by approximately 200 enemy heads sent to Constantinople in 1654—the sultan, with French support, had intensified the sea war against the city, only to lose a great battle in 1656. By February of 1657, there were rumors at court that a direct land attack on Venice was imminent. Such an attack had to be conducted

by way of Habsburg territory, and Auersperg did indeed inform the nuncio, on Ferdinand III's orders, that the Ottomans had asked permission for their troops' passage through his lands.³⁷

Thus, in addition to the lasting Franco-Spanish War over Milan and the Spanish Netherlands, there raged around Ferdinand III's territories armed conflicts that involved Russia, Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia, Poland, Transylvania, Moldavia, the Cossacks, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire. Given this situation, the emperor would not possibly spare 4,000 soldiers and, at the same time, risk breaching the Peace of Westphalia vis-à-vis Sweden despite clinging to its letter. He delayed ratification of the treaty with Poland. For him, waiting had frequently paid off. Consequently, in early 1657, he had his various councils conduct detailed debates about aid to Poland from legal, political, and military standpoints. The result was disagreement among the councillors but also a clear warning that Sweden would regard support for Poland as a breach of the peace agreement. Auersperg informed the nuncio that a way had to be found to help the Polish just enough that they would not be forced into a peace that would simultaneously damage the emperor. The nuncio tried to learn more from Ferdinand III himself but could not get an audience—and, indeed, would never have another one.³⁸

Illness and Death

Until the final week of his life, nothing pointed to the emperor's approaching death, though sources retrospectively narrating his final months describe his illnesses as a downward curve. After returning from his son's Bohemian coronation in the summer of 1656, he canceled his usual sojourn at Ebersdorf because of the damp. He became ill nevertheless, experiencing severe stomach pains and, for two days, suffering such intense cramping and vomiting that there was fear for his life. The emperor had Auersperg take over the most pressing matters but signed no documents. After a particularly severe attack, his personal doctor ordered the application of leeches, which seemed to alleviate the pain. In October, he still had himself carried to a boar hunt and resumed granting audiences, though the nuncio found him "very feeble"³⁹ at this time. Over the following weeks, his health improved. He participated in celebrations honoring St. Leopold and his wife's birthday and spent additional days hunting—once there was even a bear among the quarry.

At the end of November, gout and stomach problems forced him back onto the sickbed for nearly two weeks and caused him to postpone his audiences. Again, he recuperated, and the gout attack he suffered in February or the "small Catarro"⁴⁰ of March, which confined him to bed for two days, were nothing unusual. In fact, it was common in the early modern period for people to continue working as well as they could, defying sickness and

pain. Gallas had commanded the Imperial Army while suffering from the most severe gout. Despite unsatisfactory recuperation from a lung infection, Trauttmansdorff had negotiated for months on end from his bed in Münster. Piccolomini had built up the Imperial Army's fighting strength from Vienna and the spas of Baden while suffering from a urinary tract infection. One did not resign because of illness.

So, government affairs and court life continued. At the beginning of 1657, Ferdinand III participated in several meetings of the courtly and learned Italian academy his brother had arranged and celebrated the latter's birthday. That year, carnival was not marred by mourning at court and was thus celebrated as splendidly as ever. Among other events, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm staged a *Pastorale in Musica* that lasted several hours. The academy continued in February, and the emperor took pleasure in attending.⁴¹

There was special joy at court when the empress gave birth to Archduke Ferdinand Joseph Luigi on February 11, 1657, and both mother and child survived. During the following week, Ferdinand III began his heir's political training. He transferred the Silesian duchy of Cieszyn (Teschen) to Leopold and inducted him into the Privy Council. This should not be taken as a sign that the emperor feared an untimely death. Rather, he postponed further carnival celebrations until after Easter so that the empress could recover from childbirth and take part.⁴²

Yet, one week later, on March 25 (Palm Sunday), he fell so ill that he had to vomit and remain in bed. Nevertheless, on the next day, he attended the empress's first public appearance after her confinement. He was also present for the blessing in the chapel of the Hofburg and afterward dined in public. According to a (retrospective) report, he looked "as if he had risen from the grave"⁴³ despite his festive dress and needed both hands to hold his drinking vessel. He then returned to bed, with the cramps and vomiting resuming.

According to the very detailed and reliable account Archduke Leopold Wilhelm sent to the dowager electress Maria Anna, Ferdinand III brought up "black bile along with greenish slime"⁴⁴ and grew weaker from day to day. On the Saturday before Easter, he appeared to be rallying briefly, but in the early evening, the empress dissolved into tears as she, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, and the doctors decided that he should be made to understand that, "as long as he was still in his right mind," the time had come for confession—a veiled suggestion for him to make his final arrangements. Eleonora Magdalena herself, "at first quite composed but then with crying and sobbing," spoke with Ferdinand III, while Archduke Leopold Wilhelm stood a little to one side. The emperor told his wife not to weep, that he "hoped to live with her for a number of years" but would be "glad to make his confession." The family retired, and Ferdinand III confessed.

He then called Archduke Leopold Wilhelm to his bedside and charged him with supporting the king and the empress in future. He also attempted to defuse the foreseeably difficult political situation at court. His brother was to protect Auersperg and to let him “suffer no injustice.” Leopold Wilhelm had this and other instructions put in writing as the Last Will. “After His Imperial Majesty had cried a little,” the privy councillors were admitted, among them Auersperg and Portia—diametrically opposed in the disputes at court. The Last Will and Testament was read in the presence of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, Leopold I, and the courtiers who had been summoned and was affirmed by the emperor. After these courtiers had left, Ferdinand III, with great effort, spoke to his brother, called Leopold I to bestow his paternal blessing, and received communion. Thus, according to time-honored rules, all important worldly matters were in order for a good Christian death.

On the following and final day of his life, Easter Sunday of 1657, Ferdinand III suffered another severe attack of nausea. In the afternoon, he felt somewhat improved and took part in the prayers that were recited in his chamber. The former Imperial Confessor Gans withdrew because of his own infirmity, and his successor Horst prepared Ferdinand III for extreme unction, which a court chaplain administered that afternoon. The emperor then asked the nuncio’s blessing. As had been the case with Ferdinand IV, a number of portents for the imminent death were registered. One was accepted by the skeptical chronicler from the nunciature as a certain indicator because numerous witnesses attested to it: the death of a captive eagle in the Hofburg.

Ferdinand III now began to hallucinate a bit from time to time; his speech failed him, which caused the empress and his brother to “wail dreadfully,” whereupon Archduke Leopold Wilhelm took the empress from the room for a while. But the emperor called for his brother with “half a voice” and looked at him “intently” without being able to speak. To his brother’s question whether he knew him, he responded, “yes, of course” but could say no more. The confessor Horst, who “continuously comforted” the emperor, asked Archduke Leopold Wilhelm to take the empress a little aside because she “much agitated” the emperor. The two remained behind a curtain in the room, where Ferdinand III could not see them. Only in the evening could the archduke persuade Eleonora Magdalena to go to bed; he himself rested in an armchair outside the emperor’s chamber with instructions that both were to be awakened if need be. The emperor was left in the care of the clerics and the chamber personnel. Toward midnight, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm was summoned.

At about the same time, a fire broke out in one of the Hofburg’s kitchens, endangering the rooms of the empress and the imperial children above it. “Without shoes, coat, sword, and hat,” Archduke Leopold Wilhelm rushed to the empress and took care that she and the children were out of danger and

that the gates to the castle were opened so that soldiers could extinguish the flames. During this time, the clerics prayed with the emperor, who initially could still say a few words: “*ora pro nobis or amen.*” When he could do this no longer, he repeated “Jesus Maria” from time to time. When that, too, became impossible two hours before his death, he gave “signs with his eyes because he could no longer move his hands.” When the archduke reentered the emperor’s chamber after the commotion caused by the fire had died down, Leopold I’s confessor was reading the mass for the dying. As the emperor was handed the blessed candle, Leopold Wilhelm summoned the successor. Ferdinand III died at the end of the mass during the final blessings. It was four o’clock in the morning of April 2, 1657.

Archduke Leopold Wilhelm now commenced the care for the deceased and had the first mass for his soul read. Their father had done exactly the same for their mother in 1616. The emperor’s brother concluded his report with a view to the future government, reiterating what Ferdinand III had accomplished over the past eight and a half years: “God be with us and grant that there will not be another war in Germany.”⁴⁵

Everything else went according to custom at the Imperial court, which now informed itself by means of the ceremonial protocol instituted under Ferdinand III. On the next day, an autopsy took place that established the cause of death, an inflamed gall bladder. Then the body, in court dress, was laid out in an antechamber draped in black cloth and illuminated by candles. A canopy above the deceased and copies of the insignias of power reflected his rank. Prayers were said day and night. The Hofburg had been opened and whoever wished could enter—“practically all of Vienna”⁴⁶ came. On the night of April 5, Ferdinand III was carried by his courtiers in a long procession to the Church of the Capuchins, with approximately 1,500 torches accompanying him on his final journey. Behind the catafalque walked his brother Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and his son King Leopold I. His body was laid to rest next to his deceased wives Empress Maria Anna and Empress Maria Leopoldina, his son Ferdinand IV, and his other children who had predeceased him. As he had wished, his heart was interred in Graz.

NOTES

Introduction

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PART I

1.1 Path to the Imperial Throne, 1608–1636

1. PH, 381, notes 1 and 2.
2. Winkelbauer, 2003, vol. 1, 25 (“monarchische Union monarchischer Unionen von Ständestaaten”).
3. Q: FB II, 190, fol. 13, 13v, Graz, 14 VII 1608. *il quale era nato nuovo Servitore della Santità Sua et della Santa sede*. PH, 381, note 4. On young Ferdinand’s strong grandmother Maria who died in 1608 having massively contributed to shape the counter-reformation in Styria, Keller 2012 (with an interesting chapter on the court in Graz).
4. Burkhardt 1992, Schmidt 2006, Stollberg-Rilinger 2007. Cf. Bireley 2014, 61-89. Lately, Heinz Duchhardt published monograph on the decade before the war: Duchardt 2017.

5. Schulze 1973, Frisch 1993, Dipper 1997, Liepold 1998, Buchmann 1999, Pörtner 2000, Winkelbauer 2003.
6. Albrecht 1998, 154.
7. FB II, 190, fol. 61, 61v, Graz, 11 VIII 1608; *il Marito, i figli, et tutta la Serenissima Casa*. PH, 382, note 17.
8. PH, 382, notes 5 and 6.
9. KS 705, fol. 65-67v, Maria Anna to Wilhelm V, Graz, 16 X 1611. *aufrechten . . . man; wönig lust zum geistlichen stant*. PH, 382, note 24.
10. KS 705, fol. 94-95, Maria Anna to Maximilian, Graz, 14 II 1613. *vber die massen lieb gehabt, und nit inen sonderlich erfreidt, Gott dem Almechtigen sey lob daß alles so glicklich abgangen*. PH, 382, note 26. PH, 382, notes 25-27.
11. Gliss 1930 on the succession; Schreiber 2004; PH, 282, notes 28-30.
12. KS 705, fol. 154, 154v, Maria Anna to her brother Maximilian, Graz, 19 VIII 1614. *ich samt meiner klainen Purschen*; fol. 148v, Graz, 15 VII 1614: *unnd hatt diese meine Rais meinen klainem Hauffen nichts zu schaffen geben*. PH, 382, note 31.
13. Peinlich 1870, 7.
14. PH, 383, notes 35 and 36.
15. All three quotations: FB II, 207, fol. 87, Graz, 8 III 1616; *Poi S.A. mi aspettava havendo discorso di questa perdita con grandissimo sentimento, particolarmente per la gran corrispondenza d'amore, che passava tra loro; il quale non è stato mai interrotto da minima ombra di disgusto per spatio di sedici anni. Al che s'aggiunge il dispiacere restando tre Precipini, e due Precipine senza l'educatione di questa gran madre*. PH, 383, note 37.
16. KS 706, fol. 23, Ferdinand to Maximilian, Graz, 14 IV 1616; *die Gottsellige und Gottliebende Seel meiner herzallerliebsten gemahelin, von mundt auf werde gehn himel gefaren sein vnd aldorten in Ewigkhait, dz angesicht Ieres erschöpfers ansehen, so hatte ich Sie doch woll zu meinem trost und auferziehung meiner kleinen kindern bederft, die weilen aber Iudicia Dei occulta, so ist billich dz wier unns in seinen Göttlichen willen ergeben ob es ja gleichwoll hart genueg ankombt*. PH, 383, notes 37 and 38.
17. Household: ÖNB, Cod. 8102, fol. 23r-30v; PH, 393, notes 40 and 41.
18. StBM, 40 L. eleg. misc. 132. Cf. Graff 1979/80, 51.
19. Schulze 1973, Barker 1982, Liepold 1998, Pálffy 2003. Riding: Müller 1860, 268f. PH, 383, note 44.
20. Bontempo: Rottensteiner 2006, 195f. Dancing: Zakharine 2005, Waldstein on Ferdinand as a dancer: Koldinská 1997, 328. PH, 383, notes 45 and 46.
21. Hunting: PH, 383, note 46. Hammerstein 1986, Teuscher 1998, Plodeck 1972,
22. Ceremonial at the Inner Austrian Court: Hengerer 2015; Ferdinand's court in Graz: ÖNB, Cod. 8102. PH, 384, note 48.
23. Q: Giustiniani 1654, ed. Fiedler 1866, 387: *italiana perfettamente, la latina francamente, la spagnuola bastantemente, e naturalmente l'allemana*. Bůžek 2002, 292; Müller 1860, 269; PH, 384, 49.
24. Schiller: Schreiber 2004, Schreiber 2013. More general: Vocelka 1997, Coreth 1982, Evans 1986, Winkelbauer 2003, Bireley 2014.
25. Peinlich 1870, Höflechner 2006. PH, 384, notes 51-54.

1.2 *Heir Apparent Overnight*

1. PH, 384, notes 1 and 2.
2. Benz 2003; Vocelka 1997.
3. Vergil's quotation in the "textbook" for Ferdinand III: Augustin 2008, 272. Translation: Frank O Copley; cf. Vocelka 1997, 117-140.
4. Ed. Augustin 2008.
5. On war and peace: Lucerna, chapter 14, ed. Augustin 2008, 278-281. Peace as norm: Burkhardt 1992, 11-15.
6. Reppen 1990, 158 and 163.
7. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 94f. On the rebellion with a focus on Ferdinand II: Bireley 2014, 90-122. In much detail on the politics of Ferdinand II from 1617 to 1630, see Brockmann 2011.
8. Ibid. 96-98; Broucek 1992.
9. On the struggle for the public opinion: PH, 385, notes 16-22.
10. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 101-103; for Moravia in much detail: Knoz 2006. Protestant emigration: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 27f., 69-67.
11. Albrecht 1998, 603-610.
12. Ibid. 541.
13. Cf. Duchardt 1977.
14. Schmidt 2006, 34; Lusatia: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 96.
15. Albrecht 1998, 542f., 557f.
16. PH, 386, notes 30-32.
17. Peinlich 1870, 20; Krones 1886, 18. PH, 386, 34.
18. Ferdinand's philosophical "homework": BAV, Cod. Ottob. 1789, fol. 1-160v (Philosophia Ferdinandi Tertij Imperatoris manu eiusdem propria scripta), cf. Reppen 1990, 480. Moon: "Philosophia", fol. 129v (*Luna videtur aliquid ex se lucis habere; multam vero accipit a sole primum in aetatibus*), following quotations: ibid. fol. 130. *propter multitudinem Authorum . . . hoc asserentium, non est tamen omninozerta* (sic); PH, 387, notes 53 and 55.
19. BAV, Cod. Ottob. 1789, fol. 134v (first principle: *principium primum in corporibus viventibus*), ibid. fol. 142 (death: *Mors est separatio animae a corpore*). PH, 387, notes 57 and 58.
20. BAV, Cod. Ottob. 1789, fol. 123. *Quando mundus fuerit creatus . . . numerabis annos 3452*; PH 2012, 387, note 59.
21. Confessor's works on chronology: Dühr 1913, 232. PH, 2012, 387, notes 60-62.
22. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 10, column 693f. PH, 387, note 63.

1.3 *Collecting Crowns: Failure in the Empire*

1. Widorn 1959; Albrecht 1998, 646-651; Mecenseffy 1955. PH, 2012, 388, notes 1-3.
2. Obligation to be present: Turba 1911, 2-6. Nuncio's description of the Diet: ed. Müller 1860, 270-286. PH, 2012, 388, notes 4 and 5.
3. PH, 388, note 6.
4. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 10, column 695; PH, 388, note 11.

5. PH, 388, note 14 (entry); on Hungary: Evans 1986, 177-201; Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 78-80.
6. PH, 389, notes 18 and 19.
7. PH, 389, notes 20 and 21.
8. PH, 389, notes 22-24.
9. PH, 389, note 25.
10. PH, 389, notes 26-30.
11. Khevenhüller, *Annales*, vol. 10, column 704.
12. BL 6938, no. 7, Vienna, 5 IV 1625. *un giorno potria comandare tutti questi paesi per l'amor grande, et volontà, che li porta detto Serenissimo.*
13. Q: accountant's opinion, see Valentinitisch 1975 (Stadtpfarrkirche), 43 *tag und nacht mit wekhen, tragen, wachen und führen*; on Draskovics: Fallenbüchl 1988, 70, 75; PH, 389f., notes 31-33.
14. PH, 390, note 34.
15. Schmidt 2006, 34.
16. Albrecht 1998; Schmidt 2006; PH, 390, notes 36-40.
17. Schmidt 2006, 41; Albrecht 1998, 679; PH, 390, notes 41 and 42.
18. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 101-104, 207-213; Bergerhausen 2001; Bahlcke 1998, 63; Mann 1971, 424f.; Albrecht 1998, 670; PH, 390, notes 43-48.
19. PH, 390, notes 49 and 50.
20. PH, 390, note 51; Gindely 1894, 514-516.
21. HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Prague, 26 XI 1627, fol. 3-4; *Heri etiam mea coronatio peracta fuit, quae sic successit. [first version: Heri fuit mea coronatio, quae . . .] Mane omnes Bohemici Domini ad meam domum venerunt, meque usque in sacellum Sancti Wenceslai comitati sunt. ubi me habitu Regio Indui, et Ex inde comitantibus me officialibus Bohemicis tantum, ad altare magnum contuli ubi caeremoniae solito ordine peractae fuerunt. post prandium habita fuit quoque comedia italica recitata a comicis. et post illam ignes artificiatii . . .* PH, 390f., note 54.
22. HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Prague, 3 XII 1627, fol. 7, 7v; *habuimus commoediam cantatam* PH, 391, note 55.
23. Albrecht 1998, 752-756.
24. Schmidt 2006, 34; PH, 391, notes 58 and 59.
25. On the decree of restitution: Schmidt 2006, 43-48; Albrecht 1998, 694-711; in detail: Frisch 1993.
26. Schmidt 2006, 46f. PH, 391, notes 61-63.
27. Privy Council: Schwarz 1943; pensions: Ernst 1991, 278; PH, 391, 70-71.
28. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Prague, 15 I 1628, fol. 7. *eidem de Episcopatu Halberstadiensis, in cuius antistite nuperis diebus, feliciter electa fuit . . . congratularer, Deum omnipotentem precatus, ut Dilecto Vestro brevi, et Magdeburgensi, et alijs episcopatibus, ad honorem suum, Relligionis Chatholicae incrementum, utilitatem Domus nostrae, et omnium chatholocorum consolationem dotet . . .* PH, 391f., notes 72-75.
29. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 18v, 19, Wels, 6 VI 1630. *videat an non Regie accommodatus fuerim . . . nos ludimus singulis Diebus*

primeram, pro porro pretio tamen, puto Causam esse, ut nos exerceamus, ut si contingat cum electoribus ludere simus bene docti et experti. PH, 392, notes 76f.

30. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 26, 26v, Regensburg, 20 VII 1630. *cum magnis Caeremoniis.*
31. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 22, Regensburg, 25 VI 1630. *cum eo laetitiam meam communicavi.*
32. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 24, Regensburg, 30 VI 1630. *Caeterum nos omnes una cum electoribus laus Deo bene valeamus. Et Elector Bavariae [added later: meus Dominus, Pater] (qui est insignissimus princeps, et non tam morosus sicuti descriptus et depictus nobis fuit) valde desiderat D. Vestram videre . . .* Cf. Mann 1971, 580; on Sötern: Abmeier 1986, and Seibrich, 1990; PH, 392, notes 78-83.
33. Schmidt 2006, 47f.; Mann 1971, 598; Albrecht 1994, 100. PH, 392, notes 84-86.
34. Q: SSG 120, fol. 265, 266, Regensburg, 4 XI 1630: *dispongono il tutto senza alcuna partecipazione de gli elettori; un giovane, come e il Re d'Ungheria; on France and Italy: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 379f.; Tischer 1999, 183; Bertière 2007, 93-96; PH, 392f., notes 87-92.*

1.4 Waiting

1. SSG 121, fol. 171v, 174v, Vienna, 30 VIII. *il Re vive sin hora sotto l'obbedienza del Padre, e poco o niente s'ingerisce in cose di rilievo.*
2. Privy Council: Schwarz 1943; PH, 393, notes 1-4.
3. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 12, Prague, 3 III 1628. . . . *dux Fridlandiae . . . obviam ivit, 450 mactavit [. . .], capita illorum et Duces ad 30 usque caepit, quos partim in quatuor partes dividi, partim in Rotam agi, partim in palus (sic) conijci iussit; alijs ad exemplum.* Mint: Herinek 1984, 465f.
4. Q: HHStA, HA FK, K. 10, Ferdinand II to Ferdinand III, fol. 40, Prague, 9 I 1628. *Als will Ich auf Euer Liebden beschehene Intercession, denselben das Leben geschenckht haben.*
5. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 68-73, 98-100.
6. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 75f.; Planck-Planckburg 1929, 29f.; Wurm 1955, 216.
7. Disputed homage in 1620: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 63f. PH, 393, note 10.
8. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 394-396. Confessionalition of court patronage: MacHardy 2003; PH, 394, 11-13.
9. Winkelbauer 1999 and Winkelbauer 2008.
10. Cf. for Inner Austria Puschnig 1984, and for the 17th century Imperial court: Hengerer 2004.
11. PH, 394, note 17; Keller 2005.
12. PH, 394, notes 18 and 19.
13. Dining at court: Ottomeyer 2002; Löwenstein 1995; Haslinger 2002; Wirtschaft: Schnitzer 1995.
14. PH, 394, notes 23 and 24.

15. PH, 394, notes 25-27.
16. Residences and hunting: Polleross 1998; Hassmann 2004; PH, 394f., notes 28-30.
17. Q: SSG 118, fol. 13, 14, Vienna, 17 XII 1628. *mostrò godimento non ordinario*.
18. PH, 395, notes 31-33.
19. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 22, Regensburg, 25 VI 1630; *Faleralalarallera, laus Deo, advenit semel cursor tamdiu expectatus, ut a Judeis Messia, a Principissa doria missus, qui attulit laetam nuncium Reginam Jam in littoribus Genuensibus esse . . . ipse vidit 27 Galeras . . . spero in Deum quod brevi illam apud nos habebimus . . .* PH, 396, notes 1 and 2.
20. On Maria Anna: Mecenseffy 1938, 43f., Widorn, 1959, 60-64, 91-93; weddings: Vocolka 1976; PH, 397, note 3.
21. Quotation and report on the first meeting: Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1504.
22. Mecenseffy 1938, 42.
23. Q and report: Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1505.
24. Q and report: Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, columns 1506-1510.
25. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1511f.; Sommer-Mathis 2001.
26. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1511f.
27. Weiss 2005, 324f. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1242f.
28. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1511-1515; Weiss 2005, 334-336. Husband and wife as equivalent of sun and moon: Wunder 1992.
29. Khevenhüller, Annales, vol. 11, column 1511-1515.
30. On the relations between Spain and the Emperor: Bosbach 1988, 97; on Richelieu's imperial politics: Hartmann 1998, 63.
31. Schmidt 2006, 51.
32. Schmidt 2006, 50.
33. Schmidt, 2005, 50-53.
34. Schmidt, 2006, 52; Mann 1971, 630f., 652, 683.
35. On Gallas: Rebitsch 2006, 56f.; on France: Bertière 2007, 95; no ratification of the peace treaty by France: Ernst 1991, 43.
36. PH, 398, note 25.
37. On Spanish influence via Maria Anna: Albrecht 1998, 961. PH, 398, notes 28-33. On Quiroga, Maria Anna, and the Spanish influence, Bireley 2014, esp. 222-229, 238-240.
38. SSG 121, fol. 146, 147, Vienna, 19 VII 1631. *qualche mala sodisfattione*.
39. SSG 121, fol. 171v, 174, 174v, Vienna, 30 VIII 1631. *che si facessero due corti per commandare, a loro modo*.
40. SSG 121, fol. 171v, 174v, Vienna, 30 VIII 1631. PH, 399, note 40. *non vi era fondamento alcuno, opero, che l'ombre svanissero*.
41. Schmidt 2006, 61; Ernst 1991, 42; Mann 1971, 654-660. PH, 399, notes 36-38.
42. PH, 399, notes 36-38; Mann 1971, 657, on Spain fancying Ferdinand being commander.
43. Albrecht 1998, 303f., 794; Mann 1971, 657; Ernst, 1991, 51-53; Hallwich 1912, vol. 1, 396f., 404f. PH, 399, notes 41-44.

44. SSG 123, fol. 20v, 24, Vienna, 10 I 1632. *non esser solito di corteggiare, ma esser corteggiato e servito*. PH, 399, note 45.
45. SSG 123, fol. 116v, 120, 120v, Vienna, 3 IV 1632. *il Re d'Ungheria vorrebbe uscir in Campagna desiderandolo i Spagnoli, et il Duca vuol esser solo et assoluto padrone*. PH, 399f., notes 46-49. Cf. Mann 1971, 693-698.
46. Ed. Fellner 1907 (I/2), 474-479, here: 478. PH, 400, notes 50-52.
47. PH, 400, notes 53-55; Martinitz: Fellner 1907 (I/2), 477, note 4, and 493f. as well as Schwarz 1943, 299; Graz: Duhr 1913, 231.
48. This and the following quotation: SSG 123, fol. 131, 131v, Vienna, 17 IV 1632. *governato da un Consiglio al tutto dipendente dal volere de Spagnoli; il Re hora che e ammogliato, habbia dominio senza dover stare sotto il Padre*. PH, 400, note 56.
49. Schmidt 2006, 53; Albrecht 1998, 836-840; Mann 1971, 706-718. PH, 400, notes 57 and 58. On the fall of Wallenstein with a focus on Wallenstein and Ferdinand II, Bireley, 2014, 255-265.
50. Winkelbauer 1999, 219f. (Liechtenstein's plan); Mann 1971, 807-810 (Wallenstein's negotiations); Veltlin: Wendland 1995; Schmidt 2006, 56 (controversy around the decree of restitution); PH, 400, note 59.
51. Schmidt 2006, 54f.
52. This and the following quotation: SSG 127, fol. 142v, 146, Vienna, 14 V 1633. *Tramstorf (del cui consiglio principalmente si crede, che il Re si servirebbe, quando a lui toccasse di comandare); almeno come amico, e persona privata*. PH, 401, note 61-63.
53. Q: SSG 127, fol. 104v, 107v, Vienna, 9 IV 1633. *senza lesione della sua coscienza, et autorità*. PH, 401, note 64.
54. Q: SSG 127, fol. 224v, 227, Vienna, 13 VIII 1633. *stravaganze non ordinarie* PH, 401, note 65.
55. Quotations referring to the Bohemian Council: diary of Adam Waldstein, ed. Koldinská 1997, 340f.; PH, 401, notes 66 and 67.
56. Q: SSG 127, fol. 252v, 255, 255v, Vienna, 8 X 1633; *in qualche modo*. PH 401f., note 68.
57. Q: ed. Hallwich 1912, vol. 4, no. 2098. On calumnies: Albrecht 1998, 870-873; Mann 1971, 887-890. PH, 402, notes 69-72.
58. Q: SSG 127, fol. 292v, 295, Vienna, 17 XII 1633. *moderatione* On Oñate: Mann 1971, 851, 854f.; Ernst 1991, 77-79. PH, 402, notes 73-74.
59. All three quotations in this paragraph: SSG 127, fol. 296, 300v, 301, Vienna, 24 XII 1633. *mai l'Imperatore sia per risolversi di mandar fuori il Re d'Ungheria, adducendosi da suoi piu intimi non esser tempo di arrischiare una persona Reale; con il Re, il quale tuttavia per se stesso si mostra poco fervente in questo desiderio, se non quanto viene stimolato dalla Regina", impaziente di stare piu lungamente in famiglia, vedendo non potere cosi presto per altro mezzo aprirsi la strada al commando*. PH, 402, note 75.
60. On Quiroga and Wallenstein: Mann 1971, 853-855. PH, 402, note 76.
61. Q: Mann 1971, 875. PH, 402, notes 77-81; Mann 1971, 856-891.
62. Both quotations: Liechtenstein's advice, see Winkelbauer 1999, 224-225. On the procedure: *ibid.* 225f; Mann 1971, 892-894.

63. Ferdinand II to his confessor Lamormaini, see Mann 1971, 895.
64. Schmidt 2006, 57; in detail: Mann 1971, 894f.
65. Mann 1971, 895; Winkelbauer 1999, 225.
66. “Too late”: Mann 1971, 917, Srbik 1952; 151. On the young Waldstein: Mann 1971, 875; Suvanto 1963, 353. Habsburgs move to the army: Mann 1971, 909; Kampmann 1992, 177f. “deprived of his life”: Lichtenstein, see Winkelbauer 1999, 225. Distribution of Wallenstein’s possessions: Fellner 1907, 87; Mann 1971, 970; Knoz 2006, 696. PH, 403, 88-90.
67. Q: Hallwich 1912, vol. 4, no. 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415; On denial, distribution and rewards: Mann 1971, 947, 970f.; Kampmann 1991. PH, 404, notes 91-94.
68. Mann 1971, 957-962.
69. Suvanto 1963, 357.
70. Hallwich 1912, vol. 4, no. 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415; unsufficiently compromising items: Mann 1971, 964f.; Ferdinand’s III renewed request for a formal verdict in 1636: Kampmann 1992, 194f.
71. Mann 1971, 969-973; Kampmann 1992, 178-184; Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 108.
72. Q: Kaiser 2006, 5; Heydendorff 1961, 135f. PH, 404, note 102. Bireley 2014, 267f., stresses that Eggenberg, a supporter of Wallenstein, was not disgraced by Ferdinand II and was still „on the best of terms“ with the emperor, „though not with the king of Hungary“.
73. SSG 128, fol. 60v, 62v, Vienna, 21 III 1634. *disunione*. PH, 405, note 103.
74. Q: SSG 128, fol. 141, 142, Vienna, 1 VII 1634: *poiche uscendo in campagna il Remio figliuolo*; subsidies: Albrecht 1956; Ernst 1991, 79-93; PH, 405, notes 103 and 104; Bireley 2014, 267.
75. Albrecht 1998, 873.
76. Q: BA II/8, no. 372, Ferdinand III to Maximilian I, Vienna, 26 IV 1634. Conference: Albrecht 1998, 876-879.
77. Q: BA II/8, no. 375, Ferdinand III to Maximilian I, Vienna, 30 IV 1634.
78. Q: AVA, FA Trauttmansdorff, K. 125, Konv. Bb. 4b, fol. 9, Ferdinand III to Trauttmansdorff, field camp near Regensburg, 4 VII 1634.
79. Q: BA II/10/2, no. 54, Ferdinand III to Trauttmansdorff, field camp near Nördlingen, 23 VIII 1634. PH, 405f., notes 108-111. Cf. Lernet 2004, 55f.; Wandruszka 1955, 99-104;
80. PH, 406, notes 113-116.
81. Q: Albrecht 1998, 880, note 111.
82. Q: Albrecht 1998, 882. PH, 406, notes 117-119.
83. PH, 406, note 120.
84. PH, 406, notes 121-123. Cf. for this and the following to Nördlingen: Mann 1971, 974.
85. Rebitsch 2006, 113.
86. Descriptions of the battle: Martín Gomez 2006, 172-189; Rebitsch 2006, 112-123; Leo 1900; Schmidt 2006, 58.
87. BA II/10/2, no. 61, Ferdinand III to Trauttmansdorff, sine loco, 6 IX 1634. Spain and Bavaria as victors: Rull 1981; Albrecht 1998, 888f. Ferdinand praying: Koch 1865, 2; Ferdinand’s ambivalent attitude towards war: Rebitsch 2006, 217-225.

88. Q: BA II/9, no. 102, Ferdinand III to Maximilian I, field camp near Nördlingen, 6 IX 1634.
89. Q: Maximilian about Johann Caspar Stadion as clandestine enemy: see Albrecht 1998, 887. Lorraine dimension: Rebitsch 2006, 113; Albrecht 1998, 885-888; Fulaine 1997, 114-117. PH, 407, note 130. Charles IV was a second degree nephew to Maximilian.
90. Q: SSG 131 L, fol. 3, 3v, Vienna, 23 IX 1634. *La vittoria . . . e stata grande, e miracolosa*; PH, 407, note 132. Bireley 2014, 271, quotes the same central nuntio's assessment stressing that the religious interpretation helped Ferdinand II compromising with Saxony on the way to the Peace of Prague (1635).
91. Albrecht 1998, 888-892; Rebitsch 2006, 122; Schmidt 2006, 58. PH, 407, notes 133-136.
92. Albrecht 1998, 888. PH, 407, notes 137 and 138.
93. Rebitsch 2006, 113f., 122; Rull 1981, especially 54-56.
94. Q: SSG 131 L, fol. 41, 42, Vienna, 9 XII 1634; *con gran giubilo*. PH, 408, note 141.
95. On the role of Nördlingen for the Peace of Prague: skeptical: Schmidt 2006, 58f., emphasizing: Bierther, BA II/10/1, *25. Cf. PH, 408, notes 142 and 143.
96. PH, 408, notes 144-147. He dealt with the status of Christians in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and good political and confessional terms for the confessionally mixed Imperial town Augsburg that was under pressure from Bavaria.
97. Birth and baptism of Princess Maria Anna: Widorn 1959, 105f. PH, 408f., notes 148-150.
98. PH, 409, note 154. Puchheim's private archive seems to have been lost.
99. On the marriage: Albrecht 1998, 934-936. PH, 409f., notes 155-156.

1.5 Illusory Achievements: The Peace of Prague, King of the Romans

1. PH, 410, notes 1 and 2.
2. On Hessen: Haan 1967, 54f.; Bierther 1971, 146f. (exclusion of Imperial Estates); Ruppert 1979, 21 (Prague as failed peace, exclusions); Philippe 1976, 20-24 (impositions on Württemberg); Haan 1967, 177-179; on the exclusions in detail: BA II/10/4, no. 568 and Kretzschmar 1922, vol. 1, 334-338, cf. Haan 1967, 21f. Lateley on the Peace of Prague, its preparations since Nördlingen, its effects in the empire, and the reasons of its eventual failure, see Bireley 2014, 273-296.
3. On the Frederik V.: Pursell, 2001; on his wife and children: Lemberg 1996.
4. Schmidt 2006, 59.
5. Albrecht 1998, 928-933, quotation: *ibid.*, 933. Kapser 1997, 166.
6. Both quotations: BA II/10/3, no. 560, Ferdinand III to Ferdinand II, Prague, 15 VI 1635.
7. Rebitsch 2006, 120; Schmidt 2006, 54f., 60f. PH, 411, notes 14-16.
8. Franco-swedish alliance: Hartmann 1998, 65; Tischer 1999, 185.
9. Schmidt 2006, 62f.
10. Q: Albrecht 1998, 950; *ibid.*, 948-950.
11. Q: see Rebitsch 2006, 153, note 146. On the campaign 1635 in detail: Ernst 1991, 109-199.

12. PH, 411, note 20.
13. PH, 411f., notes 22 and 23.
14. PH, 412, notes 24-27.
15. PH, 412, note 28. On the Winterking's widow: Lemberg 1996.
16. Q: ed. Winkelbauer 2008, no. 50. PH, 412f., notes 29-31.
17. Rebitsch 2006, 126-131; Schmidt 2006, 62f. PH, 413, note 32 and 33.
18. Rebitsch 2006, 134-143; Q: *ibid.*, 141.
19. Representation: Sommer-Mathis 2001, 689; Widorn 1959, 108; on the treaty: Rebitsch 2006, 146; PH, 413, notes 34-37.
20. Q: Albrecht 1998, 952; campaign 1636: Ernst 1991, 201-231; duchy for Gallas: Rebitsch 2006, 148. PH, 413, note 38.
21. Ferdinand III in Munich: Hoppe 2006, 241f.; Janowitz 2006, 329f.; Haan 1967, 94. Dispute about command: Albrecht 1998, 926-933. Negotiations: Haan 1967, 89-02; Albrecht 1998, 606, 568, 954. Back to war: Haan 1967, 34, 54, 72-76. PH, 413f., notes 39-42.
22. Q: Rebitsch 2006, 147. Rebitsch 2006, 145-152; PH, 414, notes 43-47.
23. Rebitsch 2006, 154-163; Hartmann 1998, 249-262; PH, 414, notes 48 and 49.
24. Rebitsch 2006, 156. PH, 414f., notes 50-53.
25. Rebitsch 2006, 156. PH, 415, notes 54-56.
26. Rebitsch 2006, 158-164. PH, 415, note 57.
27. Haan 1967, 26; Ardundel's report: ed. Springell 1963, 82. PH, 416, notes 58-60. On the preparation of the succession in the Empire Bireley 2014, 296-302.
28. Haan 1967, 125. PH, 416, note 64.
29. Haan 1967, 177-187.
30. Haan 1967, 196f., 176-178, 275-277; Albrecht 1998, 957f. Capitulations: ed. Burgdorf 2015. PH, 416, notes 66-68.
31. Haan, 1967, 224f., 233f., 241f.; Albrecht 1998, 958f. PH, 417, note 69. On the king of Hungary's opposition to the Imperial ban Bireley 2014, 301.
32. Election day: Knorr 1986; Begert 2003, 376; Albrecht 1998, 957. PH, 417, note 72.
33. Lindner 1986 (Ferdinand III); Reuter-Pettenberg 1963; Sommer-Mathis 2006, 259-261. PH, 417, notes 73 and 74.
34. Coronation of Maria Anna: Lindner 1986 (Maria Anna); Widorn 1959, 112f. PH 417, note 75.

PART II

2.1 The Constellation of Imperial Government

1. Q: ed. Turba 1912, 340. On the death of Ferdinand II on his way from Regensburg to Vienna, Bireley 2014, 303f.
2. Q: BL 6984, no. 51, Passau, 24 II 1637. *si rassegno anche presto nel volere di Signore Dio*. PH, 418, notes 1-4.
3. Funeral: Brix 1973, 219, 222. Last will: ed. Turba 1912, 335-361; PH, 418, note 5.

4. Alsace: Gliss 1930, 40-41, 47, 52f.; Tyrolia: Turba 1913, 173-216; Wendland 1995, 200f. PH, 418, notes 6 and 7.
5. Mertens 2003; Schreiber 2004. PH, 418, notes 8.
6. Q: HHStA, HA FKA, K. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., fol. 1, s.d.; apanage: Schreiber 2004, 163. PH, 419, notes 10 and 11.
7. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 106, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 22 IV 1643. *hir ist zwar khin solliches schön wetter, aber solliche khelten gewesen, dass es etlich tag an einander herumben dickh eis gefhroren, nacher ist wider zimlich hibsich wetter worden; heut aber schneibt es so jämmerlich, alls wann es in februaryo wäre . . . Ich habe aber seithero ein mehr daran gedacht, also dass, ob Gott will, wol nicht ein zitoria (Zwist) soll zwischen uns gesähet werden.* PH, 419, 12-14.
8. PH, 419, notes 15-21.
9. On her musicians: Seifert 1982. PH, 419, 22
10. PH, 419f., notes 23-25.
11. On her residences: Hassmann 2004, 487-492. PH, 420, 26-28.
12. PH, 420f., notes 29 and 30.
13. PH, 421, note 31.
14. On the Lorraine exile: Fulaine 1997, 97f. PH, 421f., note 32.
15. Q: Albrecht 1998, 961. PH, 422, note 33.
16. PH, 422f., notes 34 and 35.
17. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 41, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 2 XII 1641. *des Cardinals Infante dot hatt mich wol umb 150 oder 200 sau gebracht.*
18. PH, 423, note 37.
19. Q: SSG 142, fol. 69, Vienna, 18 III 1645. *quasi con le lagrime agli occhi* PH, 423, notes 38-43.
20. Q: Report Zeno/Contarini 1638, ed. Fiedler 1866, 190f.
21. Q: Report Grimani 1641, ed. Fiedler 1866, 277.
22. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 118, Vienna, 11 IV 1645. *Mein gemahel ist wekh, eins thails bin Ich froh, anders thails erschreckhlich mikherisch.* PH, 423, notes 44-47. Alexandra Röckel kindly provided me with her decryption of the key of the end (*nasse augen*) of this quotation (*es hatt beiderseits [code] abgeben*) that Ferdinand III had resourcefully encrypted in such an effective manner that the code withstood until lately.
23. PH, 423f., note 48.
24. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 114, Ebersdorf, 13 X 1643. *den Ferdinandl auch mit gehabt und sein übernacht ausblieben; [. . .] was das vor ein freidt bei ihm gewesen, es hatt ihm gewaltig gefallen.* Staff: Keller 2005, 255-259. PH, 424, 49-51.
25. Q: Report Zeno/Contarini 1638, ed. Fiedler 1866, 188-190.
26. Q: Report Grimani 1641, ed. Fiedler 1866, 277f.
27. Q: Heinz 1963, 169. Portraits: Ebenstein 1907. PH, 424, 52-54.
28. Q: SSG 132, fol. 82, Vienna, 11 IV 1637. *si viva in tutto alla Spagnola.*
29. Q: SSG 135, fol. 49v, 50, 50v, Vienna, 28 IX 1639. *questo e di carnagione bruna, di pelo negro, di guardo severo, di parole misurate, di natura serrata, per non*

- dire sumlata, stretto nello spendere, e nelle gratie. In summa tutto Spagnuolo d'inclinatione, et d'interessi.* PH, 424, 55-57.
30. Q: Report Zeno/Contarini 1638, ed. Fiedler 1866, 188-190. On Ferdinand's assiduous work: Schwarz 1943, 134.
 31. Q: Report Grimani 1641, ed. Fiedler 1866, 277f. PH, 424f., 58-59.
 32. On foundations: Kalina 2003, 103f. On Mariazell: Kinsey 2000, 210. PH, 425, notes 60-65.
 33. On Mauchter: Unterkircher 1968, 161. PH, 425, notes 66-69.
 34. Both quotations: SSG 132, fol. 93, 94, 18 IV 1637. *Li Giesuiti stanno con martello: poveri soldati* PH, 425f., notes 70-71. On the abolition of the "Klosterrat" in favour of the government of Lower Austria: Stögmann 2001, 545.
 35. Q: see Bireley 2003, 210, and the same and Duhr 1913, 232-235, on confessors. PH, 426, note 72.
 36. Q: Winkelbauer 1999, 281. PH, 426, note 73.
 37. Q: SSG 135, fol. 54v, 55, 55v, Vienna, 8 X 1639. *piu da Politico, che da Religioso. -- In somma e Giesuita a dirla liberamente, ma bisogna in queste parti farne conto, perche sanno assai, possono molto, e fanno anche del bene per la Religion Cattolica. Ma dove si tratta d'interessi de Principi, e proprij, bisogna aprire gli occhi, ne bisogna esser facile a credergli, perche si resta ingannato.*
 38. Q: SSG 136, fol. 71v, Regensburg, 10 VII 1640. *disse di far tutto quello, che potra* PH, 426, note 74.
 39. SSG 134, fol. 249, 249v, Bratislava, 26 III 1638. *se Sua Maestà poteva veramente lasciare con buona coscienza l'Abbatia di Hersfelt ad Hassia.* PH, 426, 75.
 40. *Ibid. consiglio piu politico, che Religioso.* PH, 426f., 76.
 41. On music at Ferdinand's court: Saunders 1995; Antonicek 1989, Hilscher 2000, 98-121, Hilscher 2001, Kalina 2003, 325-337. PH, 427, notes 77-80.
 42. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 60, Vienna, 24 VIII 1642. *nuhr ein wort corrigirt.* Antonicek 1990, Schreiber 2004, 131-141. An edition of Ferdinand's compositions: Adler 1892. PH, 427, note 81.
 43. Changes in musical style: Krummacher 1999; on performances 1631-1646: Sommer-Mathis 2001, 686-694. PH, 427, note 82. Weaver 2012 offers the latest detailed and astuted presentation of the Ferdinand's relation to music.
 44. Scharlau 1988, 56f., Findlen 2004, Kepler ed. Caspar 1940, 186-205 (Digressio politica), Simon 1979, 413-418 on Kepler's equation of planets and musical intervals; Kircher 1650; Fletcher 1988, 183.
 45. Antonicek 1989, 19f.; Antonicek 1990, 230-234; Hilscher 2001, column 967. PH, 428, notes 85 and 86.
 46. Q: Kircher, Magnes, a4: *Magnes ferrum ita scit repellere, ut sicut & trahere, prout polus dictat. Tu quoties ferrum stringis, pro coelo pugnas, & Reipublicae Catholicae bono, ut bello pacem, securitatem periculis, ferro aurum emas Imperio.* PH, 428, notes 89 and 90. On Kircher and passim on his many contacts to Ferdinand III, his reader and sponsor, see Englmann, 2006, here 104f.
 47. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 17, Regensburg, 7 IX 1640. Hengerer 2004, 587 on gold making. PH, 428, notes 93-95.

48. Quotations: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 28, Regensburg, 14 VII 1641.). *Ich meine Ich habe khin solliches unter allen meinen gemählten, es schätzen alle auf 1.000 Dukaten, dises allein.*
49. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 97, Vienna, 27 XII 1642. *khleins von Rubens*. PH, 429, notes 96 and 97.
50. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 29, Regensburg, 19 VI 1641. *ob Ich die khisten auf thun und die gemähl sehen darf.*
51. Q: see Kalina 2003, 376. Ferdinand as collector: Kalina 2003, 376-382; appointing of painters: Heinz 1963, 161; nobilitation of artists: Warnke 1996, 221. PH, 429, notes 98-101.
52. Q: see Brusati 1995, 54, 282, note 9.
53. On Strosskopf: Brusati 1995, 284. Ferdinand's portrait-medallions: Schemper-Sparholz 1996, 169f. PH, 429, notes 104-111.
54. Q: see Antonicek 1990, 227. Author of this text was Leopold Wilhelm. On Ferdinand and madrigals: Antonicek 1989, 17f.
55. Q: HHStA, HA FA, K. 90, 1656, fol. 1. *D'abietta terra e vile / Huomo sei tu mortale*. PH, 429f., notes 112 and 113.

2.2 Aspects of Lordship: Court, Governance, Travels, Rome

1. PH, 430, note 1.
2. PH, 430, notes 2 and 3.
3. PH, 430, note 4.
4. On early Habsburg ceremonial: Marti 2008; Hofmann 1985; Hofmann 1990.
5. PH, 430, note 7.
6. PH, 430, notes 8-10.
7. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 37, Vienna, 10 XI 1641. *wider mich und des reich, sein vatterland, nicht zu dinen*. On Rupert: Rebitsch 2006, 190f.; Lemberg 1996, 48-50; Welsersheimb 1970, 221-234. PH, 430, note 11.
8. PH, 430f., notes 12 and 13. This Michael was most probably Michael Majthényi: <http://kaiserhof.geschichte.lmu.de/12059>.
9. PH, 431, notes 14-16.
10. Q: HHStA, HA FK 10, Cäcilia Renata to Ferdinand III, fol. 7, 7v, Warsaw 18 II 1640; RAS, Extr. 195, no. 52, Leopold W. to Ferdinand III, Waidhausen, 18 II 1648; HA FK 10, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III, sine folio, Munich, 25 II 1637; HA FK 10, Maria Anna to her husband Ferdinand III, fol. 123, Vienna, 27 IX 1636 (Señor); HA FK 10, Philipp IV to Ferdinand III, fol. 122, Madrid, 22 VI 1647. PH, 431, note 17.
11. Veltzé 1900, 17; Schreiber 2000, 63f., Hengerer 2005, 258.
12. BayHStA, Abt. III. Gch. HA, Hofhaushaltsakten 181, ed. Hengerer 2015.
13. Q: see Hengerer 2004, 262f.
14. Q: HKA, HZAB 102 (1656), fol. 301.
15. Q: AVA, FA Harrach, Hs. 319, Mai 1656. Hengerer 2004, 264f. PH, 431, notes 20-23.
16. Mezger 1981; on a dwarf's portrait: Heinz 1963, 170; on the situation at the Spanish court: Sellés-Ferrando 2004, 282-284. PH, 431f., notes 24 and 25.

17. PH, 432, note 26.
18. PH, 432, notes 27 and 28.
19. Q: SSG 134, fol. 252, Bratislava, 26 III 1638. *si riscaldrono tanto nelle proprie opinioni, che cosi il Marchese come Residente con gesti molto apparenti si mostravano turbati, et in gran dissensione, che tutta l'Anticamera stava con ammiratione.* PH, 432, note 29.
20. Access to the antichambers: Hengerer 2004, 220-231; Pangerl 2007, 256-259; resident's ranks: Müller 1976, 122f. PH, 432, note 30.
21. PH, 432, note 31.
22. Individual appointments to the antechambers: Hengerer 2004, 225-231. PH, 432, note 32.
23. PH, 432f., notes 34 and 35.
24. PH, 433, note 36.
25. PH, 433, note 37.
26. Q: Asch 2004, 521. Trauttmansdorff as "favorite": Lernet 2004, 86f.
27. Q: Asch 2004, 521. Formation of groups at court: Hengerer 2004, 327-339.
28. PH, 433, note 42. On Rudolf's court: Noflatscher 2004.
29. Lernet 2004, 42f.
30. PH, 433f., note 44.
31. On Trauttmansdorff's uneasy relation Leopold Wilhelm: Rebitsch 2006, 229. PH, 434, notes 45-47.
32. Q: BL 6984, no. 14, 15, Regensburg, 27 I 1637. *si va ogni giorno piu avanzando in modo che tutto passa gia per le sue mani.* On Trauttmansdorff's pragmatism in religious affairs: Repgen 1962, 481f.
33. Q: SSG 132, fol. 42 Passau, 24 II 1637. *assumerà à se tutto*
34. Q: SSG 132, fol. 43, 43v, Vienna, 28 II 1637. *è già in maggiore stima dell'istesso Vescovo di Vienna, e di tutta la Corte, e S. Mtà rimette à lui la maggior parte de negotij, onde li ministri inferiori più trattano seco, che con altri.*
35. Q: SSG 132, fol. 60v, 61, Vienna, 14 III 1637. *Cresce tuttavia più il credito, e rispetto à [Trauttmansdorff] in modo, che tutti corrono à lui, et egli tutto abbraccia molto volentieri.*
36. Q: SSG 132, fol. 60v, 61, Vienna, 14 III 1637. *vedendo Sua Maestà tanto inclinata à Tramstorf non pensano che à concorrere nel suo volere.*
37. Q: SSG 132, fol. 76, Vienna, 28 III 1637. *riforma tutta la Corte à suo modo, e pone gli officij tutti in suoi dependenti senza riguardo alcuno, et ogn'uno stupisce, che ne primi giorni habbia ridotto à se la dispositione tanto assoluta di tutto.* PH, 434, notes 48-52.
38. Q: SSG 132, fol. 79, 80, Vienna, 4 IV 1637 (singular in the original: *l'honore, e'l titolo; onde hora il negotio è ridotto al solo [Trauttmansdorff], che da se risolve con l'Imperatore e per il consiglio ordinario non sono chiamati di piu altri, che [the bishop and Khevenhüller].*
39. Q: BL 6984, no. 97, 87, Vienna, 18 IV 1637. *riforma tutta la Corte à suo modo*
40. Q: SSG 132, fol. 93, 93v, Vienna, 18 IV 1637. *et risponde molte volte cathegoricamente all'istanze, che se li fanno, e sesi vuole anche poi sentire Sua Maestà non si riceve altra risoluzione, che la prima data da lui.*

41. Q: SSG 132, fol. 120, Baden, 9 V 1637. *L'auttorita assoluta, et il favore e cosi stabilito in [Trauttmansdorff], che, come scrissi, molte cose non solo risolve da se, ma assolutamente dispose con molta franchezza quello, che li piace.* PH, 434f., notes 53-57.
42. Q: Report Grimani 1641, ed. Fiedler 1866, 281.
43. Q: SSG 142, fol. 14, 17, 17v, Vienna, 26 XI 1644. *Egli per se stesso e capacissimo d'ogni affare, ma non si risolve senza il Consiglio; in questo il [Trauttmansdorff] e il soggetto principale.* PH, 435, notes 58 and 59.
44. Q: ed. Bosbach 1991, 100, *Princeps in Compendio*, § 10. The "Princeps in Compendio" is a guidebook for a princely ruler.
45. On Ferdinand's and Trauttmansdorff's work relation: Lernet 2004, 90-96; the one only incident: Ruppert 1979, 281. PH, 435f., note 61.
46. Q: see Lernet 2004, 93. PH, 436, note 62.
47. Both quotations see Ledel 1992, no. 81, Vienna, 22 XI 1642. *Mich dünkt, der brueder seie nicht gar zu traurig – die 100.000 fl., so er geerbt, thun vil.* PH, 436, note 63.
48. PH, 436, notes 64 and 65.
49. Q: Schwarz 1943, 133. PH, 436, notes 66 and 67.
50. Q: SSG 132, fol. 68v, 21 III 1637. *mai contradice al Capo.* PH, 436, notes 68-71.
51. On Puchheim: Schwarz 1943, 326f.; Hengerer 2004, 479-482. PH, 437, note 72.
52. On Waldstein: Schwarz 1943, 381; Mencík 1899, 478.
53. PH, 437, notes 75-77.
54. On Gallas' relation to Trauttmansdorff: Rebitsch 2006, 310-313. PH, 437f., notes 78-81.
55. On Fugger, Recke, Kurz, and Stralendorf: Schwarz 1043, 223f., 237f., 260-263, 261. PH, 438, note 82.
56. Gindely 1894, 525-532; Hengerer 2004, 173f., 600f.; Körbl 2009.
57. Q: SSG 132, fol. 93, 93v, 18 IV 1637. *vennero a giorni passati in Anticamera a parole, et ogn'uno disse al compagno quelle fraudi, che sapeva havebbe fatte, in modo che si senti un bel atto di commedia.* On the delay: Winkelbauer 1999, 62; Mann 1971, 195-210. PH, 438f., notes 84-86.
58. On Pricklmayr: Schwarz 1943, 323-325; PH, 439, notes 87-89.
59. On the Privy Council: Schwarz 1943; Siennell 2001; Hengerer 2004. PH, 439f., note 90.
60. Q: Ruppert 1979, 36. On those deputations: Siennell 2001, 31-33. PH, 440, note 91-92.
61. Hengerer 2007 (Finanzstaat).
62. Q: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 202. On the legal system: *ibid.* 202-226. On the prosecution of pretended witchcraft: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 267-305. On Diets: Mata 2006. PH, 440, notes 94 and 95.
63. Hengerer 2004, 541-546.
64. PH, 441, note 97.
65. PH, 441, notes 98 and 99.
66. Quotations: SSG 146, fol. 405, 405v, Vienna, 5 XII 1648. On the ladies-in-waiting: Hengerer 2004, 180-183, 560; Keller 2005. PH, 441, notes 100 and 101.
67. Portraits with the chamberlain's key: Hengerer 2004, 169-171; Brusati 1995, 58; Pferschy 1986, 534. PH, 441f., note 102.

68. Presence at Hungarian Diets: Turba 1911, 3, 6. PH, 433, notes 110 and 111.
69. Itinerary, Prague: PH, 443, note 110-112.
70. On Bohemia: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 109-117; Evans 1986, 157-164; Mata 2003. PH, 444, note 113.
71. On Hungary: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 127, 138-140; Hungarian administrative autonomy by Hungarian councillors: Turba 1903, 355. PH, 444, notes 114-116.
72. Q: BL 6984, no. 92, 93, Vienna, 11 IV 1637. *rende la funtione piu tosto carnevalesca, che funebra; alla sanita dell morto*. Murdock 2000, 34. PH, 444, notes 117-118.
73. PH, 444f., note 119.
74. PH, 445, notes 120 and 121.
75. PH, 445, note 122.
76. Q: SSG 134, fol. 45, 45v, 46, Bratislava, 8 I 1638. *li doleva di no poter voltare le sue armi contro il Turco*.
77. PH, 445, note 126.
78. Both quotations: Lutz 1976, 84, 76. Cf. Reppen 1962.
79. On the Borgia-crisis: Büchel 2003; PH, 446, note 128.
80. Q: BL 6984, no. 71, Vienna, 28 III 1637. *mi rispose di non desiderar egli alto, che vivere riverente, et divoto figlio della Santità Sua, et della Santa Sede Apostolica*.
81. Q: SSG 132, fol. 63, 63v, Vienna, 14 III 1637. *Rex Tiberis*. On the festivities: Vocolka 1997, 182; Sommer-Mathis 2006, 262-268; Rietbergen 2006, 182-185. PH, 446, note 130.
82. Quotations: SSG 132, fol. 97, 98, 98v, Vienna, 25 IV 1637. *Sua Maestà haveva per una parte passione di vedere, che si onga in dubbio la sua volonta di prestare li soliti ossequij alla Sede Apostolica, et a Sua Santità di cui vive figlio reverente, e che per l'altra stava con molto sentimento in vedersi cosi poco stimare, quando anche non ui fossero altri meriti, che li suoi proprij per le fatiche, e patimenti havuti in guerra per servitio della Religion Catolica*. PH, 447, note 131.
83. PH, 447, note 132.
84. Q: Burkhardt 1992, 36. PH, 447, note 133.
85. Q: SSG 132, fol. 121v, 122, 122v, Laxenburg 9 V 1637. *assolutamente Sua Maestà non li dara questo contento di assicurarli in detto negotio di Cremau, ma che potrebbe essere, che col merito di questa Ambasceria movesse poi Sua Maestà ad usargli quella benignita*. PH, 448, note 135.
86. On Eggenberg in Rome: Rietbergen 2006, 181-217. PH, 448f., notes 136-138.
87. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 7852, fol. 478-483v; description on the same source base: Rietbergen 2006, 196-198. PH, 449, note 138.
88. PH, 449, note 140.
89. Q: SSG 134, fol. 105, 105v, Bratislava, 12 II 1638. PH, 449, notes 141-144. Cf. Rietbergen 2006, 251f. and Karsten 2007.
90. Q: SSG 137, fol. 164, 3 V 1642. On Anna Katharina: Fessler 1824, 611. PH, 449f., notes 145 and 146.
91. On Sötern: Abmeier 1986, Seibrich 1990, Wiedemann 1883, 4-35 (Philippsburg); Welsersheimb 1970, 216-221 (Sötern in Linz).

92. PH, 450, notes 149-153.
93. Q: SSG 133, fol. 174v, 175, Vienna, 14 XI 1637.
94. Q: SSG 134, fol. 301v, 302, 302v, 303, Vienna, 17 IV 1638.
95. Q: SSG 136, fol. 32v, Vienna, 12 V 1640. PH, 450f., notes 154-168.

2.3 Negotiations

1. Q: Repgen 1990, 157. Albrecht 1998, 961f.
2. Wermter 1962, 194-198; Tischer 185 (Compiègne); Hartmann 1998, 247 (Wismar). PH, 452, note 2.
3. Q: SSG 134, fol. 115v, 116, 19 II 1638. PH, 452, note 3.
4. On the separate negotiations in 1638, 1639, 1640: Wermter 1962, 197; Hartmann 1998, 349-351, 418f.; Albrecht 1998, 975f. PH, 452f., note 4.
5. PH, 453, note 7.
6. Hartmann 1998, 332, 354-358.
7. Q: SSG 135, fol. 45v, 46, 46v, Vienna, 17 IX [1639].
8. Q: SSG 135, fol. 45v, 46, 46v, Vienna, 17 IX [1639]. *istae sunt nugae*: one could even translate: *peanuts*. On this important statement: Bireley, 2003, 213. PH, 453, note 10.
9. PH, 453, note 11.
10. Q: SSG 133, fol. 34, 34v, Vienna, 25 VII 1637. *Assicuratevi, che io so sempre trattato questo negotio con cuor sincero, e che desidero fare tutto che sia possibile per dar gusto al Vostro Re, ma essendo in cio gl'interesse di Spagna tanto grandi, e cosi di Baviera, desidero, che si dia tempo, che possi ben il tutto considerarsi.* On Arundel's proposition: Haan 1967, 241. PH, 453, note 12.
11. All quotations: SSG 133, fol. 87v, 88, 29 VIII 1637. *non voleva piu esser menato per il naso, che ben lui conosceva, che l'Imperatore si lasciava governare da Spagnuoli, che all'Imperatore restava obligato della buona volonta dimostrata Che egli non haveva ordine di trattare piu altro, perche si vedeva, che li Spagnoli erano quelli, che comandavano l'Imperio col mezzo de denari, co quali compravano li Tedeschi come si comprano le pelli d'animali a dozzana Se bene à [Trauttmansdorff], anco esso Residente [of Sweden] si duole, che mai risponde, e stia duro come un sasso.* PH, 453f., notes 13 and 14.
12. PH, 434, notes 15-16.
13. PH, 434, note 17. On Henrietta Maria: Dupuy 1994.
14. PH, 454, notes 18-20. On the delegate in Brussels: Hartmann 1998, 407.
15. Albrecht 1998, 963-965; Haan 1967, 259-262; Repgen 1962, vol. 1, 393-400.
16. Q: Tischer 1999, 196f.
17. Hartmann 1998, 287f., 321. PH, 454, notes 23 and 24.
18. Albrecht 1998, 962-965. PH, 454, notes 25 and 26.
19. Q: SSG 132, fol. 77v, Vienna, 4 IV 1637. *Questi Ministri dicono d'haver gran desiderio di vedere cominciare il trattato, perche Sua Maestà vuole la pace.* PH, 454f., notes 27-29.
20. Q: Hartmann 1998, 401. PH, 455, note 30.

21. Q: SSG 134, fol. 39v, 40, Bratislava, 8 I 1638. *sommamente desidera la quiete, e la pace*. Hartmann 1998, 306f., chapter XV; PH, 455, notes 31-34.
22. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 7852, fol. 420. *l'essequie alle morte speranze di questo congresso*. PH, 455, note 35.
23. Q: SSG 134, fol. 247v, 248v, Bratislava, 26 III 1638. *la sua buona dispositione, e desiderio verso la pace*. PH, 455, notes 35-37.
24. Hartmann 1998, 381, 398; Breisach: Albrecht 1998, 961. PH, 455, notes 38-40.
25. Hartmann, 1998, 349-352; Setton 1991, 106 on the French tactics. PH, 455, note 41.
26. Hartmann 1998, 407f., 502-504. PH, 456, note 42 and 43.
27. Hartmann 1998, 424. PH, 456, notes 44-46.
28. Bierther 1971, 214; 227-230; Hartmann 1998, 425-456; on Brunswick-Lüneburg Aschoff 2002, Aschoff 2005. PH, 456, notes 47-49.
29. On Cardinal Marzio Ginetti: Squicciarini 1999, 133. PH, 456, note 50.
30. Q: SSG 134, fol. 11, 11v, 18 XII 1637. *per addormentar la casa d'Austria*. On the truce Hartmann 1998, 382-398. PH, 456, notes 51-53.
31. Q: SSG 135, fol. 12, Vienna, 16 VII 1639. *ma disse, che bisognava pregare Dio, che la mandasse dal Cielo, perche altrimenti dubita sia difficile il sperarla*. PH, 456f., notes 54 and 55.
32. On anti-Spanish propaganda Schmidt 2001, Bosbach 1998, 105f. Lack of Spanish support: Wendland 1995, 263. PH, 457, notes 56-58.
33. Q: SSG 136, fol. 18, Vienna, 21 IV 1640. *che meglio staria in mano de Spagnuoli, che de Francesi*. Ebersdorf treaty: Bierther 1971, 24.
34. Both quotations: SSG 135, fol. 57v, 59v, 60, 60v, Vienna, 15 X 1639. *guerra con Suedesi non era veramente di religione, ma politica; - - ma l'Imperatore, che non ha aiutato nessuno heretico, perche ha da patire? l'Effetto della providenza Divina*. On Richelieu and Kurz: Hartmann 1998, 63.
35. Q: SSG 136, fol. 95, 96v, Regensburg, late VII / early VIII 1640. *la mina del mondo*. PH, 457, notes 61 and 62.
36. Q: SSG 136, fol. 34v, 35, Vienna, 19 V 1640. *una guerra inestinguibile in Italia*. PH, 457, note 63.
37. Q: SSG 138, fol. 9v, Vienna, 11 X 1642. *desidera la quiete dell'Italia*. PH, 457, notes 64-68.
38. Q: SSG 140, fol. 20, 20v, Vienna, 15 X 1644. *far una buona pace*. PH, 458, note 68.
39. Cf. Winkelbauer 2003, 142-147.
40. Vocolka 1981, 220-222; Pribram 1894. PH, 458, notes 70-72.
41. On Persia: Ruppert 1979, 16f.; Bierther 1971, 24; on Crete: Setton 1991, 106f. PH, 459f., notes 73-75.
42. Winkelbauer 2003, 148-151; Murdock 2000, 274f., Barker 1982, 34f.; Ruppert 1979, 16. PH, 459, notes 76 and 77.
43. Bierther 1971, 25-38; Albrecht 1998, 968f.; Bireley 2003, 214; Ferdinand III was not invited even though he was, as king of Bohemia, an elector: Begert 2003, 377. PH, 459, note 78.
44. Bierther 1971, 38-45; Weiland 2008, chapter 4.2; PH, 459, notes 80-81.
45. Bierther 1971, 47-62. PH, 459, note 82.

46. Bierther 1971, 63f. Hartmann 1998, 450-456.
47. Bierther 1971, 65f. On the papal diplomacy at the Diet: Repgen 1962, 407-526.
48. Q: SSG 137, fol. 16, 16v, Regensburg, 15 X 1641. *chi ha tempo ha vita*. PH, 459f., note 85. On the relation of the Diet to the congress of Cologne: Hartmann 1998, 450-456. The unreconciled estates were margrave Friedrich V of Baden-Durlach, the counts of Nassau-Saarbrücken, Isenburg-Büdingen, Löwenstein, Hanau-Münzenberg, and Count Johann Albrecht Solms. Restituti Gravati (reinstated but burdened by confiscations) were the lords of Freiberg, the counts of Eberstein, and, most important, Duke Eberhard of Württemberg: Bierther 1971, 147.
49. Bierther 1971, 322. PH, 460, note 86.
50. Q: "schimpfliche Scharteke": see Hartmann 1998, 475.
51. Bierther 1971, 268-273; Albrecht 1998, 974.
52. Bierther 1971, 219-223 on the negotiations about the Palatinate. PH, 460, note 89.
53. Bierther 1971, 231-243.
54. Bierther 1971, 232-250.
55. Bierther 1971, 250. On the delay: Ruppert 1979, 36.
56. PH, 460, note 94.
57. Q: Ledel 1992, no. 97, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 27 XII 1642. *der teufel [Richelieu] auch ein mahl geholet hett*. On separate Imperial-French negotiations: Ruppert 1979, 24-26-38; Bertière 2007, 198-202; Mecenseffy 1938, 317f. PH, 460, 95-98.
58. Ruppert 1979, 36; Bierther 1971, 259. PH, 460f., notes 99 and 100.
59. Repgen 1990, 157; Ruppert 1979, 26, 36-42.
60. Ruppert 1979, 52, 57-63. PH, 461, note 102.
61. All three quotations: APW II A 1, no. 251, Ferdinand III to Nassau and Krane, Vienna, 10 V 1644, 400.
62. Ruppert 1979, 51-63.

2.4 Waging War

1. Q: DBBTI VI, no. 399, Gallas and Colloredo to Ferdinand III, sine loco, 5 II 1637 (concept). PH, 461, notes 1 and 2.
2. PH, 461, note 3.
3. Rebitsch 2006, 320. PH, 461, notes 4-6.
4. Q: Ledel 1992, no. 99, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 31 XII 1642. *man muss doch den muet nicht sinkhen [lassen], sunder thun, was man khan und mehr alls man khan. - - aus der noth ein tugend*.
5. Q: Ferdinand III to Hatzfeld, Linz, 15 I 1645, see Rebitsch 2006, 320.
6. On Montecuccoli: Schreiber 2000.
7. Q: Salm 1990, 11. PH, 461, notes 10 and 11.
8. Salm 1990, 15-18. PH, 461, note 12.
9. Ruppert 1979, 15 (Electorate of Saxony), 273 (Electorate of Mainz); Immler 1992 (Bavaria, Electorate of Cologne). Wandruszka 1955, 106f.
10. Albrecht 1998, 1057. Ruppert 1979, 43. PH, 462, note 14.

11. Q: see Albrecht 1998, 989. Ledel 1992, no. 9, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 29 IV 1640.
12. Q: Ledel 1992, no. 11, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vilshofen 3 VI 1640. *denn dises ist so wol meine und des reichs armada alls meine ibrige immediat velkher*. On imperial subsidies for Bavaria: Kapser 1997, 157f.
13. Q: RAS, Extr. 195, no. 103, Leopold W., 28 XI 1646. *schauen, wie sie Ihr sach allein richten, und sich auff ander nit verlassen*. Rebitsch 2006, 329-341. PH, 462, notes 19-21.
14. PH, 462, notes 22-23. Numbers vary hugely. Here, I follow Ruppert 1979, 13.
15. Rebitsch 2006, 170f, 183, 186f.
16. PH, 462, note 25.
17. Q: see Ledel 1992, no. 104, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 16 I 1643. *alle khaiserlihen Waffen auf einen gefehrlichen und ungewisen hazard einer schlacht*.
18. On Swedish field artillery: Broucek 1971, 5. PH, 463, note 27. Strongholds and provision as decider of the war: Reppen 1990, 151-153.
19. Q: Ledel 1992, no. 61, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 26 VIII 1642. *denn dises ist das haubtwerkh*. PH, 463, notes 29-32.
20. Q: see Rebitsch 2006, 194. Rebitsch 2006, 183-196. PH, 463, notes 33-36.
21. Rebitsch 2006, 184-186. On the options for a truce: Bierther 1971, 36, 305. PH, 463, notes 37 and 38.
22. Bierther 1971, 279-297 on winter-cantonment, recruitment, and finances. PH, 463, note 40.
23. Q: Banér to Oxenstierna, 26 X 1637, see Rebitsch 2006, 183. Rebitsch, 2006, 170-189. PH, 463, notes 41-43.
24. Rebitsch, 2006, 195-203, 226; Ruppert 1979, 15 (on Silesia); Bierther 1971, 288f. PH, 463f., notes 44-47.
25. Rebitsch 2006, 227f.; Ruppert 1979, 15; on Brandenburg: Bierther 1971, 98f. PH, 464, notes 48 and 49.
26. Ruppert 1979, 15f. (Silesia, Moravia, Bohemia). PH, 464, notes 50-52.
27. Ruppert 1979, 16f., 48f.; Rebitsch 2006, 233, 237f. PH, 464, note 53.
28. Ruppert 1979, 49-51.
29. Ruppert, 1979, 59-61, 74f.
30. Ruppert, 1979, 72f. PH, 464, note 57.
31. PH, 464, note 58.
32. On war and finance: Asch 1997. Pohl 1994; Habsburg finance: Bérenger 1975, Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 470-500. On climate and crisis: Parker 2008. PH, 464, note 59.
33. Ernst 1991, Ernst 1988, Mecenseffy 1955. PH, 464f., note 60.
34. Ruppert 1979, 20; Schmidt 2006, 67f. Mercury: Valentinitisch 1981, 11-16, 340-351. On the Netherlands: Vermeir 2006, 351-355. PH, 465, notes 62 and 63.
35. Q: see Ledel 1992, no. 39, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 15 XI 1641. *strax zug um zug*; Bierther 1971, 301-307; Pribram 1894, 20f.
36. Q: see Ledel 1992, no. 58, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 10 VIII 1642. *khin khrizer spanisch, sunder lauter ungrisch, osterreichisch und steirisch gelt*.

37. Ruppert 1979, 20; Bierther 1971, 298-304. PH, 465, notes 69 and 70.
38. Q: see Ledel 1992, no. 99, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 31 XII 1642. *ohne wissen des khrigrats und Schlickhen*. On the Council of War: Regele 1949. PH, 465, notes 71-75.
39. Q: StLA, FA Dietrichstein, Schuber 8, Heft 25, fol. 40, Ferdinand III to Sigmund Ludwig Gf. v. Dietrichstein, Vienna, 25 X 1642. PH, 466, notes 76-81, 90.
40. Q: see Ledel 1992, no. 99, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 31 XII 1642. *dergleichen mehrers nimbt mir gewis oftmals ein stück von main schlaff, macht mir khopfwe und speiben und offt so unlustig, dass Ich offt nicht weiß, was Ich thun soll*.
41. Hengerer 2004, 589; Valentinitich 1981, 347. PH, 467, notes 87 and 88. Leopold Wilhelm: PH, 467, note 91.
42. Q: DBBTI VII, no. 1162, Piccolomini to Leslie, sine loco, 21 VIII 1648. Reduction of pay: Winkelbauer 1997; Genova: Schnettger 2006, 499-502; Kaiser 2006, 57; Gradisca; Opole and Racibórz: Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 150; letters to nobility: Hengerer 2004, 590f. PH, 467f., notes 92-96.
43. Q: ed. Schreiber 2004, 60. PH, Broucek 1969, 9-16 (commanders' authority); Salm 1990, 28f. (commanders).
44. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 64, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Ebersdorf, 16. Sept. 1642. *in khrig khan es nicht allzeit gradt hergehen*. Rebitsch 2006, 199-201, 299-318. PH, 469, notes 113-117.
45. Cf. Ruppert 1979, 11. PH, 469, notes 118f.
46. Rebitsch 2006, passim (Gallas); Schreiber 2004, 56 (Leopold Wilhelm). PH, 469, notes 120-123.
47. Q: Schreiber 2004, 57.
48. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 5, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 2 IV 1640. *denn Ich kheinen ander habe alls diese*.
49. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 6, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 9 IV 1640. *Ich waiß nicht, wie die armada beschaffen, Ich wais nicht, wie der feindt jezt aigentlich beschaffen, Ich waiß auch nicht, ob mittel zu erhaltung der velkher vorhanden . . . dises alls wissen Euer Liebden besser alls Ich*. PH, 469, notes 124-129.
50. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 34, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Regensburg, 10 X 1641. *wie es mein dienst zum besten sein wirdt*.
51. PH, 470, notes 130-138.
52. Rebitsch 2006, 231f., 353. PH, 470f., notes 139-144.
53. Q: DBBTI VI, no. 1390, undated, sine loco, I-III 1643, 456. Rebitsch 2006, 230-236, „anti-Wallenstein“: 304. PH, 471, notes 145-147.
54. Rebitsch 2006, 232-294, Q: *ibid.*, 291. Schreiber 2004, 60. PH, 471, notes 148-151.
55. Salm 1990, 28 (end of Gallas' command); Rebitsch 2006, 319 (chain of command), Rebitsch 2006, 321-323, Broucek 1969, 26-35 (Leopold Wilhelm commander). PH, 471f., notes 152-155.
56. Q: see Schreiber 2004, 62. Rebitsch 2006, 332f., 343. PH, 472, notes 156-160.
57. Schreiber 2004, 62-64; Rebitsch 2006, 337-341, 349; Immler 1992, 309-323.
58. Q: Gallas to Ferdinand III, Kösching, 13 I 1647, see Rebitsch 2006, 351. PH, 472, note 162.

59. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 116, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 3 IV 1645. *weilen wir khin andern haben*. Salm 1990, 28f., Ruppert 1979, 315 (Melander), Salm 1990, 29 (Fernemont). PH, 472f., notes 164-168.
60. Albrecht 1998, 1080-1082, Ruppert 1979, 329 (Bavaria). PH, 473, notes 170f.
61. Bierther 1971, 77 (Piccolomini); Rebitsch 2006, 197. PH, 473, notes 172-177.
62. Rebitsch 2006, 229. PH, 473, notes 178f and 179.
63. Peters 1993, 143; Just 2006, 545 (rules of war). PH, 473f., notes 180-184.
64. Just 2006, 552. PH, 474, notes 185f and 186.
65. Q: see Rebitsch 2006, 218f., Ferdinand III to Gallas, Vienna, 9 V 1643. PH, 474, 187-189.
66. Q: see Rebitsch 2006, 219, Ferdinand III to Gallas, Vienna, 24 VI 1643.
67. Q: SSG 135, fol. 14v, 15v, Vienna, 30 VII 1639. *cercare una buona pace. Mostro di dirlo di cuore* PH, 474, notes 191f.
68. Q: BL 7023, no. 50, 52, Vienna, 15 II 1642. *per implorare l'aiuto divino*. PH, 474, 196.
69. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 54, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 19 II 1642. *aber Gott khan alles thun und das gebett vil darzue helfen*.
70. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 60, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Vienna, 24 VIII 1642. *wollen fleissig betten*.
71. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 63, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., Ebersdorf, 16 IX 1642. *Gott werde dises feindts hochmuet einmal straffen*.
72. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 88, Vienna, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., undated, sine loco; 10 XII 1642. *so hoffe Ich zu Gott, es solle durch sein genadt und der gebenedeiten Mueter Gottes furbitt alles wol abgehen*.
73. Ryan Crimmins was so kind as to share results from his work on his ongoing doctoral thesis on the role of religion in Thirty Years armies.
74. Q: ed. Ledel 1992, no. 100, Ferdinand III to Leopold W., probably XII 1642 or I 1643. *ist wol billich, Gott und Unser Fraun darumb zu danken, denn es khin menschlih, sundern gettliches werkh ist, hoffe auch, sein allmacht solle noch ferners sein gnad geben, dass alles zu einem glikhligen endt gedein solle, amen*. PH, 474, notes 193-199. Cf. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 199.
75. Q: Repgen 1990, 147. Ruppert 1979, 82 (absence at battle of Jankau); Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 199f. (votum in March 1645 in Vienna's cathedral, column); Broucek 1981, 35; Kurz 1904, 7-18 (column); Weaver 2006 (votum: music and ritual); Laurentin 1988, 105-112 (European dimension); Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 199f.; Kalina 2003, 12-76 (Ferdinand's piety). PH, 475f., notes 200-204. Weaver 2012, 223-249, offers a detailed and delightful analysis and description of the vow and Consecration of the statue.

2.5 The Turning Point, 1644–1645

1. Ruppert 1979, 75; Setton 1991, 80-82.
2. Ruppert 1979, 42-44, 65f.
3. Ruppert 1979, 66f. PH, 476, notes 4-7.
4. Ruppert 1979, 75f. PH, 476, notes 8 and 9.

5. Q: SSG 142, fol. 14, 17, Vienna, 26 XI 1644. *vedendo che le cose non procedono felicemente.*
6. Q: Esterházy about Trauttmandorff: ed. Lernet 2004, 111f. Ruppert 1979, 33 (crisis of political counselling). PH, 476, notes 10 and 11.
7. Q: SSG 142, fol. 14, 16v, Vienna, 26 XI 1644. *Il povero Imperatore . . . vorrebbe la pace, ma haverla unitamente con gli Spagnuoli è negotio longo. Separarsi di quelli non vorrebbe . . .*
8. Q: Ruppert 1979, 76. SSG 142, fol. 14, 16v, Vienna, 26 XI 1644.
9. Q: Trauttmandorff's opinion, Linz, 6 I 1645, ed. Ruppert 1979, 369.
10. Q: Slavata's opinion, Linz, 7 I 1645, ed. Ruppert 1979, 375.
11. PH, 476f. note 17. Höbelt 2016, 425, interpretes Jankau not as a decisive battle but as a battle that "only" [. . .] ratified" the collapse that had happened in the two preceding months."
12. Q: SSG 142, fol. 62, 62v, Vienna, 4 III 1645. *la pieta di questi buoni principi è il maggiore capitale che habbiano.* Cf. Ruppert 1979, 82 (religious dimension of the battle).
13. Ruppert 1979, 80-82. Rebitsch 2006, 320f. PH, 477, note 20.
14. Q: Ledel, no. 116, Vienna, 3 IV 1645. *soll all sein sorg nuhr sein, wie er uber die Donau khume.* Broucek 1970 (Swedish army in Austria). PH, 477, note 21.
15. Broucek 1989, 12f., Ruppert 1979, 82-85. PH, 477, notes 22 and 23.
16. Q: SSG 142, fol. 72, 75, Vienna, 25 III 1645. *amore e quell'obediencia ne sudditi, quella prudenza, e quella direttione ne Ministri, e finalmente quella risoluzione nel Principe, che sarebbe necessaria in questi mali estremi.* Koch 1866, 37-39 (Leslie in Rome). PH, 478, note 24.
17. Broucek 1970, 123f. and Ruppert 1979, 82-85 (military situation). Widorn 1959, 121f. (journey to Graz). PH, 478, notes 25 and 26.
18. Q: SSG 142, fol. 85, 86v, 87, Vienna, 8 IV 1645. *aversione al Conte di [Trauttmandorff], che tutti credono, che sempre habbia tenuto a Dietro il sopradetto.*
19. Q: SSG 142, fol. fol. 90, Vienna, 8 IV 1645. *Credo, che conosca l'odio universale, che è contro di se per li successi avversi.* PH, 478, note 27.
20. PH, 478, note 28.
21. Ruppert 1979, 69f., 84-89 (Bavaria, estates). PH, 479, note 29.
22. Schwarz 1943, 348-351 (Souches); Setton 1991, 81, 106f., 123-127, 172-189; Ruppert 1979, 119-121; Broucek 1981, 14-16 (military situation); Bittner 1903, 55 (preliminary peace). PH, 479, notes 30 and 31.
23. Ruppert 1979, 123-126; Schreiber 2004, 63; Immler 1992, 116-130. PH, 479, note 32.
24. PH, 479, note 33.
25. Q: SSG 142, fol. 120, Vienna, 20 V 1645. *l'ottima dispositione des Papstes li piaceva bene, ma che non li giovava, se non era accompagnata da gli effetti . . .* PH, 480, notes 34-36.
26. Ruppert 1979, 86-97.
27. Edition of this important source: APW I 1, no. 29, Ferdinand's secret instruction for Trauttmandorff, Linz, 16 X 1645, 440f. PH, 480, note 38.

28. Q: *ibid.*, 450.
29. On the original and draft: Ruppert 1979, 133, note 301; Lernet 2004, 172, note 721. Immler 1992, 185-188 (Bavaria's influence).
30. Q: APW I 1, no. 29, Ferdinand's secret instruction for Trauttmansdorff, Linz, 16 X 1645, 440. Further quotations are taken from this edition.
31. On Hessen: Ruppert 1979, 285f.
32. Cf. Mecenseffy 1955, 75 (emperor's letter to Philip IV after the lost battle of Jankau); Gliss 1930, 57f. (on the secret treaty with Spain from 1634); cf. Ruppert 1979, 135. PH, 480, note 45.
33. Lernet 2004, 163-194 (Trauttmansdorff); Repgen 1990, 155f. (congress). PH, 480f., note 47.
34. Ruppert 1979, 27-29 (imperial diplomats), 30-36 (workflow); Wagner 1977 (diplomats); Lernet 2004, 184f. (Trauttmansdorff, his health).
35. Ruppert 1979, 144-200; Mecenseffy 1955, 85 (Spain's and emperor's unease with Trauttmansdorff). PH, 481, 50.
36. Ruppert 1979, 199; Bosbach 1988, 105f. (fear of French universal monarchy). PH, 481, note 51.
37. Ruppert 1979, 220-228.
38. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) had been struck on the assumption of future confessional reunification. Cf. For negotiations in the later seventeenth century: Aschoff 2005, 182f.
39. Q: see Ruppert 1979, 276. PH, 481, note 54.
40. Q: Schmidt 1999, 337.
41. RAS, Extr. 195, no. 54, Leopold W. to Ferdinand III, Thürnstein, 22 II 1646. PH, 481, note 56.
42. Ruppert 1979, 262.
43. Ruppert 1979, 228-265; Roeck 1989, 949-974, esp. 969 (Augsburg); Philippe 1976, 110-113 (Württemberg).
44. Q: Ruppert 1979, 281. Ruppert 1979, 266-282.
45. Ruppert 1979, 283f.; Weiland 2008, chapter 4.3.6.
46. PH, 482, note 62.
47. Q: APW I 1, no. 30, 455, Trauttmansdorff to Ferdinand III, Vienna, 2 II 1649. PH, 482, notes 63 and 64.

2.6 The Breaking Point

1. Q: Peñeranda to Castel Rodrigo, 21 V 1646, ed. Mecenseffy 1955, 84. Cf. Rohrschneider 2007 (negotiations between Spain and France).
2. Mecenseffy 1955, 79f. (marriage-contract). PH, 482, notes 1 and 2.
3. PH, 482, note 4.
4. Q: SSG 143, fol. 147, Vienna, 19 V 1646. *ha patito assai per la sopradetta perdita*.
5. Both quotations from Leslie: Leslie to Johann Friedrich v. Trauttmansdorff, see Lernet 2004, 133f. PH, 482, notes 5-7.
6. Q: *conditio sine qua non*: Ferdinand III to Grana, 10 VII 1646, see Mecenseffy 1955, 85. PH, 483, notes 9-11.

7. Q: SSG 142, fol. 279, 279v, Vienna, 25 VIII 1646. *veramente si era portato benissimo*. PH, 483, notes 12-14.
8. Q: Brix 1973, 222 (illustration: 210). PH, 483f., notes 15-17.
9. RAS, Extr. 195, no. 176, Maria Anna to Ferdinand III, Graz, 22 III 1646. PH, 484, notes 18-20.
10. Mecenseffy 1955, 80, 85; Ruppert 1979, 346f.; Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano 1998, 29. PH, 484, notes 21-23.
11. Schreiber 2004, 67-69. PH, 484, note 24.
12. Fallenbüchl 1988, 70 (Palatine's death); Broucek 1981, 22f. (Danube, Krems). PH, 485, notes 25-28.
13. PH, 485, notes 29-31.
14. Péter 1991 (Diet); Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 150 (session of counties); Setton 1991, 95 (Rákóczi non-member of Westphalian peace treaty); Bernrath 1972, 23 (Transsylvania); Ruppert, 1979, 119-121. PH
15. Turba 1903, 355 (preparation of the coronation). PH, 486, notes 33-35.
16. PH, 486, note 36.
17. Q: Péter 1991, 265. Evans 1986, 101 ; Murdock 2000, 34f. (churches). Agreement: Diet's conclusion 1647, Art. 5, ed. Kolosvári 1900, 420-426.
18. Q: Péter 1991, 266.
19. Q: SSG 143, fol. 327, Bratislava, 14 XII 1646. *Sua Maestà con grandissima pazienza procura per molti mezzi di concordar le Parti*. PH, 486, note 38.
20. PH, 486, note 39.
21. PH, 486, notes 40 and 41.
22. PH, 486, notes 486f., notes 42 and 43.
23. PH, 487, notes 44-48.
24. PH, 487f., notes 49 and 50.
25. PH, 488, note 51.
26. PH, 488, note 52.
27. Immler 1992, 444-459; Albrecht 1998, 1016f., 1057-1067. PH 488, note 53. More precisely: Truce between Bavaria and Cologne on the one side with France, Sweden, and Hessen-Kassel on the other side.
28. Immler 1992, 322f.; Roeck 1989, 956-958; Ruppert 1979, 266-282; in much detail: Immler 1992, chapters VI and VII.
29. Albrecht 1998, 1067-1076; Ruppert 1979, 311, 316. PH, 489, note 56.
30. Keller 2005, 270, 227 (marriages). PH, 489, notes 57-60.
31. Ruppert 1979, 312. PH, 490, 63.
32. PH, 490, notes 64 and 65.
33. Mecenseffy 1955, 87; Albrecht 1998, 1073, 1078f.; Schreiber 2004, 80f.
34. PH, 490, notes 69 and 70.
35. Ruppert 1979, 316-325; Albrecht 1998, 1074f. (planning for the campaign of 1648).
36. Ruppert 1979, 331f.; Frisch 1993, 180 (de facto abolition of the edict of restitution). PH, 490f., notes 72 and 73.
37. PH, 491, notes 74 and 75.
38. Schmidt 2006, 76; Albrecht 1998, 1079f. PH, 491, notes 76 and 77.

39. Both quotations: SSG 146, fol. 202, Linz, 26 VI 1648. PH, 491, notes 78 and 79.
40. PH, 491, notes 80 and 81.
41. PH, 491f., note 82. Lately, Rebisch/Öhmann/Kilián 2018, 214, have dedicated a monograph focusing on those events, with a detailed outline of the military situation from 1645 until the coup. The book offers an exploration of the legendary spoliation of the royal castle in Prague and the loot's whereabouts in Sweden.
42. PH, 492, notes 83 and 84.
43. Q: SSG 146, fol. 299, Vienna, 12 IX 1648. *Buccentoro nuovo bellissimo*. PH, 492, note 85.
44. Ruppert 1979, 303, 343-352; Schreiber 2004, 81f.; Tischer 2007, 93 (international relations, military situation); Gliss 1930, 54-59 (the Onate-treaty still kept in secret; not even the imperial diplomat Volmar knew). PH, 492, notes 86 and 87.
45. Ruppert 1979, 330, 348, 352.
46. Ruppert 1979, 336f. HP 492, note 89.
47. Ruppert 1979, 330-343.
48. Q: Reppen 1990, 159. Albrecht 1998, 1081f., 1052-54 (Maximilian I); Reppen 1990, 159 (Bavaria and Cologne advocating separation from Spain). PH, 492, notes 91 and 92.
49. Q: Reppen 1990, 159-161. Cf. Ruppert 1979, 348, 71f.
50. Q: Ruppert 1979, 354.
51. Ruppert 1979, 354-358. PH, 493, notes 95 and 96.

PART III

3.1 *First Steps in a New Era*

1. The assessment of the Spanish reaction is diverse: Ruppert 1979, 355, notes 364f. and Gliss 1930, 57f. (protest), Mecenseffy 1955, 89 (understanding).
2. Pribram 1891, 323. PH, 493, note 2.
3. Mecenseffy 1938, 353. PH, 493, note 3.
4. PH, 493f., notes 4-8.
5. PH, 494, note 9.
6. PH, 494, notes 10-12.
7. Valentinitich 1975 (Meuterei), 12-14; Hoyos 1976, 184-190 (soldiers for Spain); Ruppert 1979, 353; Hoyos 1976, 185-189 (recruitment in the Empire); Müller 1992, 339 (Philipsburg, Alsace); Oschmann 1991, 446-472 (Spanish retreat). PH, 494f., notes 13-15.
8. Schnettger 2006, 450-458 (Spain and Genova); Müller 1992, 325-337 (Savoy). PH, 495, note 16.
9. Oschmann 1991, 112-124 (conference in Prague). PH, 495f., notes 19-23.
10. Oschmann 1991 (passim), esp. 267-289; Bahlcke 1998, 427. PH, 496f., notes 24-28.
11. PH, 497, note 27.
12. PH, 498, notes 36-38.
13. Q: SSG 147, fol. 82, Vienna, 30 I 1649. *disse ridendo, che nella Dieta passata, che ne avevano fatti tanti, che potevano bastar, per un pezzo*. PH, 498, notes 43 and 44.

14. PH, 498, notes 45-48.
15. Keller 2005, 305f. (Pálffy). PH, 498, note 49.
16. Murdock, 2000, 278 (discontent); Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 443 (troops). PH, 499, notes 54 and 55.
17. Bittner 1903, 317 (treaty). PH, 499, notes 57-58.
18. PH, 499, notes 59 and 60.
19. PH, 499f., notes 61-63.
20. PH, 500, notes 64-66.
21. Berényi 2001 and Újváry 2006 (battle of Vezekény, 26 VIII 1652). PH, 500, notes 67-69.

3.2 Death and a New Beginning for the Dynasty and the Court

1. PH, 500f., notes 1-5.
2. SSG 147, fol. 414, 414v, Vienna, 14 VIII 1649.
3. Both quotations: KS 184, Ferdinand III to his sister Maria Anna, fol. 12, Eberstorf, 18 VIII 1649. *das Ich ein sollchen engel verlohren hab; Aber alles umbsunst*. PH, 501, notes 6 and 7.
4. Q: SSG 147, fol. 517, 517v, Vienna, 2 X 1649. *ma certo con lagrime*. PH, 501, notes 8 and 9.
5. Lernet 2004, 136f. PH, 501, note 10.
6. Ferdinand's rifle: Kunsthistorisches Museum Vienna, Jagd-, Rüst- und Waffenkammer, D 103. Kalina 2003, 361-363 (asbestos); cf. on Ferdinand's appearance Kalina 2003, 311-313 and Schemper-Sparholz 1996, 169f. PH, 501f., notes 11-18.
7. Immler 1992, 492f. (Bavaria's plan for a double marriage Bourbon-Austrian Habsburg). PH, 502, notes 19-21.
8. PH, 502, note 22.
9. PH, 503, note 30.
10. Q: HHStA, HA FA, K. 90, 1650, fol. 1. *En Ferdinando Data Consorts eLeonora / fert regno PaCem dat bona Laeta boNIs*. PH, 503f., notes 31-34.
11. Q: KS 195, fol. 11, 13, Vienna, 18 I 1651. *hoch empfunden und betraurt haben*. PH, 504, notes 35 and 36.
12. Schwarz 1943, 343-348 (Slavata), 313f. (Slavata's succession), 297f. (Martinitz). PH, 504, note 37.
13. PH, 504f., note 38.
14. Q: AugKA, Konventsprotokoll, Bd. 2, Jg. 1651, p. 157. Albrecht 1988, 1088f. (disputes with Ferdinand); Oschmann 1991, 112-124 (money for the Swedish retreat). PH, 505, notes 39-41.
15. PH, 505, note 42.
16. Q: Giustiniani 1654, ed. Fiedler 1866, 400. *più per il Palazzo, che per il Consiglio*. Schwarz 1943, 225f.; Hengerer 2004, 427-436. PH, 505, 43.
17. Schwarz 1943, 222-224 (Cardinal Dietrichstein); Winkelbauer 1999 (Liechtenstein), Heydendorff 1954 and Kaiser 2005 (Eggenberg).
18. Hengerer 2004, 433f. (consequences of Trauttmansdorff's death).
19. Hengerer 2004, 510-521. PH, 505f., note 46.

20. PH, 506, note 47.
21. Q: Schwarz 1943, 142. Sienell 2001, 32-34 (committees of the Privy Council), Mecenseffy 1938, 398-412 (Auersperg). PH, 506, notes 48-51.
22. This and the following quotation: Unterkircher 1968, 158-160.
23. RAS, Extr. 195, no. 48, Leopold W. to Ferdinand III, Brussels, XII 1644. Kalina 2003, 302 (silver plate), 376-382 (paintings); Schreiber 2004, 98f. and Brotton 2008, 6 (paintings); Krummacher 1999 (crisis in musical composition). PH, 506f., notes 52-55.
24. Q: SSG 149, fol. 66, 66v, Vienna, 4 III 1651. *si disegna di ridurre la detta Corte al posto antico di decoro, in che si trovava al tempo dell'Imperatore Ridolfo, e dell'Imperatore Matthias, e pero si vanno disponendo molte cose per il sudetto effetto*. Duindam 2001, Hengerer 2004 (reform), Scheutz 2011 (edition of HHSa, ZA SR 10). PH, 507, notes 56-58.
25. All quotations in this paragraph: see Hengerer 2004, 259f. Sellés-Ferrando 2004, 145-149. PH, 507, notes 59 and 60.
26. Hengerer 2004, 307-317; Bérenger 1975, Hengerer 2007 (Finanzstaat). PH, 507, 61-63.
27. Keller 2005 (marriages). PH, 507-509, notes 65-78 with more examples.

3.3 Counter-Reformation and Territorial Rulership

1. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2 in much detail.
2. Pörtner 2003 (Inner Austria). PH, 509, notes 2 and 3.
3. Q: ed. Winkelbauer 2008, no. 87, 441. Lower Austria: Piringer 1950, esp. 26f.; Pörtner 2003, 227 (frontier); Brakensiek 2005 (local domination).
4. Q: Piringer 1950, 24f., note 67. Piringer 1950, 25f., 113f.; Murdock 2000, 255 (Transsylvania).
5. Q: SSG 149, fol. 66, Vienna, 4 III 1651. *nota di tutti gli Heretici, che si trovano nelli suoi stati hereditarij, e di tutte le loro qualità*. Piringer 1950, 111f.
6. Piringer 1950, 112-116.
7. Q: see Piringer 1950, 121. Piringer 1950, 113, 117-126.
8. Piringer 1950, 148, 176f. PH, 510, notes 12 and 13.
9. Q: Piringer 1950, 138. Piringer 1950, 129-138, 169-173.
10. Q: see Piringer 1950, 174f. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 115f.; Piringer 1950, 191 (Windhaag); Reingrabner 1992.
11. Piringer 1950, 185f., 188, 43-45 (orphans, children).
12. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 67f.
13. Weißensteiner 1990, 48. PH, 510, note 21.
14. Q: Stögmann 2001, 545. This and the following two paragraphs: Piringer 1950, 112, 190f.; Stögmann 2001. Rauscher 2005 (Jews). PH, 510, note 22.
15. Q: SSG 157, fol. 39, 40, 40v, Vienna, 15 I 1656. *con giubilo di tutta questa Corte, che non ordinariamente haveva sempre stimato le sue qualità*. Kalina 2003, 302, 375 (silver smith, Calvinist Sandrart, Mennonite Hoogstraten). PH, 510f., notes 23-25.
16. Q: SSG 157, fol. 615, 616, Vienna, 9 XII 1656. *gran giubilo a tutta questa Corte*. MacHardy 2003, Piringer 1950, 141-144 (confessionalization of patronage). PH, 511, notes 26 and 27.

3.4 Emperor and Empire after 1648

1. Müller 1992, 21-24, 35-42.
2. Kluetting 1999, 46f.
3. Albrecht 1998, 606; Bittner 1903, 62. PH, 512, note 3.
4. Lemberg 1996, 64; Murdock 2000, 276f. (plans in Transsylvania). PH, 512f., note 4.
5. PH, 513, notes 6 and 7.
6. Wendland 1995, 200f. PH, 513, note 7.
7. Kluetting 1999, 46. Müller 1992, 72-74.
8. Müller 1992, 48-54; Schindling 1991, 15-17; Kluetting 1996.
9. PH, 514, notes 13, 15 (Mariazell, journey to Prague); note 15 (homage).
10. Kalina 2003, 71-73 (column); Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 2, 200 (veneration for Mary in Bohemia); Louthan 2008, 54-64. PH, 514, note 16.
11. Hengerer 2004, 574 (Order of the Golden Fleece). PH, 514, note 17.
12. This and the preceding paragraphs: Müller 1992, 55-68. PH, 514f., note 19.
13. Ruville 1896, 8f. (procedures); Willich 1998, 192-206 (directorship in the princes' council); Sommer-Mathis 2006, 268-278 (festivities); Stollberg-Rilinger 2008, 137-225. PH, 515, notes 21 and 22.
14. Schilling 1989, 104f.; Sommer-Mathis 2006, 268-278; Stollberg-Rilinger 2008, 137-225; Baumann 1986, 214-218; Müller 1992, 71.
15. PH, 517, 33-36.
16. Albrecht 1998, 1106f. (Maximilian's heart). PH, 517, note 37.
17. Müller 1992, 284-291.
18. Q: see Müller 1992, 139. Müller 1992, 81-144; Germershausen 1901, 31-48 (election); Duchardt 1977, 166-171, 204f. (France against Habsburg's accession to Imperial throne).
19. Q: SSG 151, fol. 384, 384v, Regensburg, 9 VI 1653. *non poteva farmi maggiore espressione del suo filiale ossequio verso la Santità Sua, di cui mi disse di voler esser sempre obbedientissimo figliolo per corrispondere a tante gratie, che li faceva Dio benedetto, dalla cui divina mano riconosceva tutti questi prosperita, et esaltazione nella sua persona; mentre non sono mancati tanti di quelli, che si sono affaticati per impedirle.* Roeck 1989, 960-974 (Augsburg). PH, 517, notes 40-42.
20. This and the preceding paragraph: Müller 1992, 57, 251, 289, 295-302, 306, 354. Wolff 1966, 182-189.
21. Müller 1992, 145-208, 258-262; Wolff 1966, 187.
22. Müller 1992, 389-406.
23. Müller 1992, 225-231.
24. This and the following quotation: decision of the prince's council, 22 I 54, see Müller 1992, 317. Müller 1992, 309-319, 338-346; Oschmann 1991, 458, note 227 (rejected plans for a war against France to regain the four "Waldstädte"). PH, 518, note 50.
25. Müller 1992, 232-235; Sellert 1990, 12-45; Ruville 1896, 115f.; Germershausen 1901, 26-28; Imperial Court Council in detail: Ortlieb 2001, Sellert 1990.
26. Müller 1992, 145-175; in detail Schnettger 1996.

27. Müller 1992, 267-279; Oschmann 1991, 435-440.
28. Müller 1992, 319-324. PH, 518, note 56.
29. Müller 1992, 325-337; Albrecht 1998, 1100-1104 (alliance Savoy-Bavaria). PH, 518, note 57.
30. This and the following paragraphs: Müller 1992, 351-385.
31. Q: RAS, Extr. 195, no. 41, Leopold W. to Ferdinand III, Roeselare, 24 X 1647. *a Duce Lotringiae, libera nos Domine.*
32. This and the following quotation: RAS, Extr. 195, no. 46, Leopold W. to Ferdinand III, Brussels, 23 XI 1647. *toll und unsinnig; khumbt er einmal darein [hell], so khumbt Er woll nit mehr darauß.*
33. RAS, Extr. 195, no. 43, Leopold W. to Ferdinand III, Gent, 8 XI 1647. Fulaine 1997, 99. *Ich fircht nur er macht eß einmal zue grob, daß Ich werde die gedult verliern, und mechten mir grob ein einander khumen.* PH, 518, notes 58-62.
34. Ruville 1896, 25f.; Fulaine 1997, 97-99; Schnettger 1996, 177-195; Bittner 1903, 62.
35. Müller 1992, 236-248; Willich 1998, 191f. (Bamberg)
36. Q: ed. Müller 1992, 265. Müller 1992, 262-266.
37. PH, 519, note 66.
38. Ruville 1896, 120f. (departure); Laufs 1975 (text of the Diet's conclusion); Duchardt 1977, 172; Müller 1992, 255 (imperial indifference towards papal protest against the conclusion). PH, 519, note 67.

3.5 The Death of Ferdinand IV

1. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 10423, fol. 232. *li levò a poco a poco il respiro, et la vita.* PH, 519, notes 1-4.
2. Q: SSG 153 B, fol. 26, 26v, Vienna, 11 VII 1656. *che mostrasse poco apresso una gran costanza d'animo nel soffrire questo gravissimo colpo.*
3. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 10423, fol. 232v. *Dominus dedit, dominus abstulit, sit nomen Domini benedictum.*
4. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 10423, fol. 232v. *Mi duole d'haver goduto cosi poco, ma era troppo buono, pero Iddio l'hà voluto per se.* PH, 519, note 5.
5. Q: SSG 153 B, fol. 26, 26v, Vienna, 11 VII 1656. *non pote nel sentimento negare il debito alla natura.*
6. Q: KS 184, Ferdinand III to his sister Maria Anna, fol. 34, Ebersdorff, undated.
7. Q: SSG 153 B, fol. 47, 47v, Vienna, 25 VII 1654. *assai vigoroso di spirito, e molto rassegnato nel volere del Signore Iddio, ma altrettanto languido di forze, per non stare troppo bene delle sue gambe, nelle quale non si regge quasi niente.* PH, 519f., note 7.
8. Q: SSG 153 B, fol. 55, Vienna, 25 VII 1654. *con il solito vigore d'animo, et anche con assai buona cera, ma pero con poco miglioramento delle sue gambe, facendosi portare sempre in Sedia.* PH, 520, note 8.
9. Q: ed. Winkelbauer 2008, no. 88, 441, 6 VII 1654. PH, 520, notes 9-11.
10. Brix 1973, 218-220, 223, 229, 230; Popelka 1994, 42, 80f. (both with illustrations). PH, 520, note 12.

11. Q: see Hengerer 2004, 260.
12. PH, 520, notes 16-18.
13. Q: SSG 153 B, fol. 26, 27, Vienna, 11 VII 1656. *gracile, e di debole compassione*. Schnettger 1996, 234f. (delaying tactic). PH, 520, notes 19-21.

3.6 New Succession: Old and New Dangers of War

1. PH, 521, note 1.
2. Q: SSG 154, fol. 5, Vienna, 2 I 1655. *tutta ornata di bellissimi panni d'Arazzi*. PH, 521, notes 2 and 3.
3. Püchl 1954 (homages in Lower Austria). PH, 521, note 4.
4. PH, 521, note 5.
5. SSG 154, fol. 86, Vienna, 6 III 1655. PH, 521, note 6.
6. PH, 521, note 7.
7. PH, 521, note 9.
8. PH, 521f., note 10.
9. PH, 522, notes 11 and 12.
10. PH, 522, notes 13 and 14.
11. Schreiber 2004, 76-80 (Christina's abdication), 81-83 (French offensive); Schnettger 1996, 111-141 (nordic war); Pribram 1889, 422-424 (Tsar's diplomacy, mediation); Fulaine 1997, 161-173 (Lorraine). Ferdinand III would not live to see the duke's son, Charles V of Lorraine, who had grown up in Vienna, change sides once again and fight with the Austrians.
12. Duchardt 1997, 206 (Brandenburg's plans to procure the imperial crown to Sweden as price for an alliance against Poland); Pribram 1889, 423-428 (mission to Moscow). PH, 522, notes 18 and 19.
13. PH, 522, note 20.
14. PH, 522f., notes 21-24. Bittner 1903, 54 (treaty with Tartars).
15. Q: SSG 157, fol. 12, Vienna, 1 I 1656. *Mostro . . . , ma secondo il solito, altro non mi replico in fine, se non, che al tutto si sarebbe fatta la dovuta consideratione*. PH, 523, notes 25 and 26.
16. Schreiber 2004, 39-41 (no marriage with Maria Theresia). PH, 523f., notes 27-28.
17. Q: BAV, Vat. Lat. 10423, fol. 138v. *aperta rottura*. Mecenseffy 1938, 400-403. PH, 524, notes 29 and 30.
18. Gallati 1932, 353-355; Schnettger 1996, 108-111. PH, 524, notes 31-32.
19. PH, 524, note 33.
20. PH, 525, note 34.
21. PH, 525, note 35.
22. PH, 525, notes 36 and 37.
23. Q: Valentinitich 1975, 25; on the mutiny: 6-12, 25, Rombaldi 1992, 79-88. PH, 525, note 38-41.
24. PH, 525f., notes 42-44.
25. Albrecht 1998, 1000-1002 (Bavaria-Savoy). PH, 526, notes 45 and 46.
26. Schnettger 1996, 359.

27. Winkelbauer 2003, vol. 1, 420f (archchancellor). PH, 526, note 48.
28. Schnettger 1996, 141-170 (deputation); Rombaldi 1992, 83 (Modena).
29. Valentinič 1975 (Meuterei), 21f. (mutiny); Karsten 2001, 191 (Spada). PH, 526, notes 51 and 52.
30. PH, 527, notes 53 and 54.
31. Pribram 1889, 428-445. PH, 527, notes 55-58.
32. Pribram 1889, 445f. PH, 527, note 59.
33. Q: SSG 157, fol. 552, 552v, Vienna, 18 XI 1656. *caminar ben unita in simili materie, non altrimenti che fa il Capo con le sue membra*. PH, 527, 60-62.
34. Pribram 1894, 98f. Bittner 1903, 63 (treaty). PH, 527f., note 63.
35. Q: Pribram 1889, 449. PH, 528, notes 64 and 65.
36. Murdock 2000, 280-284 (Rákóczi); Bernrath 1972, 24f. (Ottoman Empire against Rákóczi 1658-1660). PH, 528, notes 66 and 67.
37. Setton 1991, 170-189 (pasha). PH, 528, notes 68 and 69.
38. Pribram 1889, 449 (avoidance of conflicts with Sweden with regard to Leopold's succession in the Empire). PH, 528, note 70.
39. Q: SSG 157, fol. 501, Vienna, 28 X 1656. *tuttavia molto languida*. PH, 528f., notes 71-73.
40. Q: SSG 159, fol. 162, 162v, Vienna, 10 III 1657. *un poco di Catarro*. PH, 529, notes 74-76.
41. Schreiber 2004, 139-141; Hengerer 2007 (Lebensjahre), 28f., 36 (Academy). PH, 529, note 77.
42. PH, 529, note 78.
43. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 10423, fol. 287, 287v. *pareva a punto fosse uscito d'un sepolcro*. PH, 529, notes 79 and 80.
44. This and the following quotations: KS 729, fol. 1-5v, Leopold W. to his sister Maria Anna, Vienna, 6 IV 1657. Renate Schreiber was so kind to let me use her transcription, cf. Schreiber 2004, 45f., edition: Schreiber 2007, 40-42. PH, 529f., note 81.
45. Schreiber 2004, 46, and 52, note 138 quotes this sentence, too. The Venetian ambassador shared this opinion: The consequences of the Emperor's dead would be abyssal and impossible to perceive without horror. PH, 530, note 82.
46. Q: BAV, Vat. lat. 10423, fol. 289, 289v (exposition as well as fire, autopsy, eagle). *vi fosse concorsa quasi tutta Vienna . . . essendo quelle stanze un continuo flusso, e riflesso tanto d'huomini come donne ne altro si sentiva che pianto, e sospiri*. Brix 1973, 222f, 257, and Kalina 2003, 369 (catafalque). PH, 530, notes 83 and 84.

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
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Elizabeth of Castile ♂ Ferdinand of Aragon

Mary, Duchess of Burgundy ♂ Maximilian I

Joan

Philip I

Charles V ♂ Elizabeth of Portugal ♂ **Ferdinand I** ♂ Anne of Bohemia ♂ Christian II of Denmark ♂ Isabella

Antoine II Duke of Lorraine

Mary ♂ **Maximilian II**

Anne ♂ Albert Duke of Bavaria

Christina of Denmark ♂ Francis I

Philip II ♂ Anne

Rudolph II ♂ Matthias

Charles ♂ Mary Anne

William V of Bavaria ♂ Renata

Charles III Duke of Lorraine

Philip III ♂ Margaret

Constance ♂ Sigismund III of Poland

Ferdinand II ♂ Mary Anne

Leopold ♂ Claudia de' Medici

John II Casimir

Vladislas IV ♂ Cecilia

Leopold William

Mary Anne ♂ Maximilian I of Bavaria

Henry IV

Mary Anne ♂ **Ferdinand III**

Mary Leopoldina ♂ Ferdinand Charles

Mary Anne ♂ Francis II

Elizabeth

Philip IV ♂ Mary Anne

Eleanor Mary Josepha

Charles IV

Nicholas Francis

Mary Anne

Louis XIII ♂ Louis XIV

Mary Theresa

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Charles II of Spain

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Charles VII ♂ Mary Amalia

Maximilian III of Bavaria

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