

# Theognidean Misconduct: Representing the (Un)traditional in Pherecrates' *Chiron*

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**T**HIS ARTICLE centres on the hexametric Pherecrates fr. 162 K.-A., from the comedy *Chiron*, preserved in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* (364A–C):<sup>1</sup>

μηδὲ σὺ γ' ἄνδρα φίλον καλέσας ἐπὶ δαίτα θάλειαν  
ἄχθου ὀρώων παρεόντα· κακὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ τόδε ῥέζει·  
ἀλλὰ μάλ' εὐκηλος τέρπου φρένα τέρπε τ' ἐκεῖνον.

- ἡμῶν δ' ἦν τινὰ τις καλέσει θύων ἐπὶ δεῖπνον,  
5 ἄχθόμεθ' ἦν ἔλθῃ καὶ ὑποβλέπομεν παρεόντα  
χῶττι τάχιστα θύραζ' ἐξελθεῖν βουλόμεθ' αὐτόν.  
εἶτα γνούς πως τοῦθ' ὑποδεῖται, κῶτά τις εἶπε  
τῶν ξυμπινόντων “ἦδη σὺ; τί οὐχ ὑποπίνεις;  
οὐχ ὑπολύσεις αὐτόν;” ὁ δ' ἄχθεται αὐτὸς ὁ θύων  
10 τῷ κατακαλύοντι καὶ εὐθὺς ἔλεξ' ἐλεγεία·  
“μηδένα μῆτ'<sup>2</sup> ἀέκοντα μένειν κατέρυκε παρ' ἡμῖν  
μῆθ' εὐδοντ' ἐπέγειρε, Σιμωνίδη.” οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οἴνοις  
τοιαυτὶ λέγομεν δειπνίζοντες φίλον ἄνδρα;

And do not invite a friend to the rich banquet and  
be angry if you see him there: bad indeed is the man who does so;  
but, being totally at your ease, enjoy yourself, and make him enjoy  
himself.

<sup>1</sup> Eight fragments of the *Chiron* are extant (fr.155–162 K.-A.). The attribution of the play was questioned in antiquity (cf. Ath. 364A, 368A, 388F, 653E, schol.<sup>VEΘBarb</sup> Ar. *Ran.* 1308b). I follow here modern scholars, who instead are positive about Pherecrates' authorship and date the play to the 410s; full references in E. Franchini, *Ferecrate: Krapataloi-Pseudherakles (fr. 85–163): introduzione, traduzione, commento: con la collaborazione di Michele Napolitano (fr. 155)* (Göttingen 2020) 240–241.

<sup>2</sup> The reading of the MSS. of the Theognidean *Sylloge* is μηδένα τῶνδ'.

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But if one of us, when he organises a sacrifice, invites somebody to  
 dinner,  
 we are angry if he comes and we glare at him while he is there  
 and we want him to get out as quickly as possible.  
 So, he realises this somehow and puts his shoes on, and then one  
 of the drinking comrades says, “you go already? Why don’t you drink  
 a little?”

Take his shoes off!”<sup>3</sup> But the host himself is angry  
 at this who is detaining [the unwanted guest], and right away recites  
 the elegiacs:  
 “and do not hold with us anyone who is unwilling to stay,  
 and do not, Simonides, wake up the one who sleeps.” Do we not,  
 indeed,  
 say things like these over wine, when we invite a friend to the  
 banquet?<sup>4</sup>

The “elegiacs” cited at 11–12 coincide with Theognis 467 and  
 part of 469.<sup>5</sup> In the Theognidean *Sylloge*, these lines are found in  
 a sequence of sympotic prescriptions, which, like Pherecr. fr.  
 162.1–3, advise to be accommodating towards one’s guests  
 (Thgn. 467–474):

μηδένα τῶνδ’ ἀέκοντα μένειν κατέρυκε παρ’ ἡμῖν,  
 μηδὲ θύραζε κέλευ’ οὐκ ἐθέλοντ’ ἰέναι·  
 μηδ’ εὐδοντ’ ἐπέγειρε Σιμωνίδη, ὄντιν’ ἄν ἡμῶν  
 θωρηχθέντ’ οἴνῳ μαλθακὸς ὕπνος ἔλη,  
 μηδὲ τὸν ἀγρυπνέοντα κέλευ’ ἀέκοντα καθεύδειν·  
 πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ’ ἀνηρὸν ἔφω.  
 τῷ πίνειν δ’ ἐθέλοντι παρασταδὸν οἰνοχοεῖτω·  
 οὐ πάσας νύκτας γίνεται ἄβρᾶ παθεῖν...

Do not hold back with us anyone of these people who is unwilling to  
 stay,

<sup>3</sup> This is said to a slave.

<sup>4</sup> Except where differently specified, I quote Pherecrates from R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae comici Graeci* VII (Berlin 1989), Athenaeus from S. D. Olson, *Athenaeus Naucratis: Deipnosophistae* III.A (Berlin 2020), Theognis from M. L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati*<sup>2</sup> I (Oxford 1989). All translations are my own.

<sup>5</sup> Pherecr. fr. 162 is the earliest preserved source quoting lines found in the Theognidean *Sylloge*: T1 in H. Selle, *Theognis und die Theognidea* (Berlin 2008) 398.

and do not order out one who does not want to go;  
 and do not wake up the one who sleeps, Simonides, whomever among  
 us,  
 made drunk by wine, soft sleep has taken hold of.  
 And do not order the one who lies awake to sleep if he is unwilling to  
 do so:  
 for every act of forcing is troublesome.  
 Let [the cupbearer] pour wine to the one who wants to drink, standing  
 at his side:  
 it does not happen every night to enjoy oneself sumptuously...

In this article I aim to clarify the logic and humour of Pherecrates' reuse of Thgn. 467 and 469. I argue that he avails himself of Theognis' lines to thematise current developments in socio-cultural and moral standards.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, I aim to highlight that the fragment reveals important aspects of the reception of the *Theognidea*: I contend that the Theognidean text features in Pherecrates as an exponent of the cross-generic tradition of paraenesis.

I shall start with a close analysis of Pherecr. fr. 162, focusing on the comic abridgment of the Theognidean passage (§1). I then move to Pherecrates' engagement with archaic sympotic paraenesis and cross-class sympotic ethics (§2), and I eventually set the text against other comic representations of cultural novelties (§3).

A preliminary note about the authorship of Thgn. 467 and 469 is necessary. Some scholars have long attributed the whole section 467–496 to Evenus of Paros,<sup>7</sup> but there is no consensus

<sup>6</sup> The classical *locus* for a contrast of “old” and “new” education practices and value systems is the agon of the Logoi in Ar. *Nub.* 889–1112, for which see below §3; for Athens' “innovationist turn,” see A. D'Angour, *The Greeks and the New: Novelty in Ancient Greek Imagination and Experience* (Cambridge 2011) 216–224.

<sup>7</sup> Arist. *Metaph.* 1015a29–30 and *Eth.Eud.* 1223a31–32 ascribe Thgn. 472 to Evenus; cf. also Plut. *Non posse* 1102C. See most recently A. Capra, “Rise and Fall of a Parian Shooting Star: New Perspectives on Evenus,” *MD* 76 (2016) 87–103, and “Homer, Evenus and the ‘Discovery’ of Litotes,” *Paideia*

on the matter.<sup>8</sup> In this article, I stick to the conventional designation of Thgn. 467 and 469 as “Theognidean” based on the manuscript tradition, while acknowledging that it cannot be proven whether Pherecrates knew Theognis or Evenus (or neither) as the author of these lines. This does not pose an obstacle to my interpretation of the fragment. As I shall argue, two levels of engagement with the quoted lines are possible. The audience may recognise them as an instance of old-style paraenesis and as an expression of traditional sympotic ethics; in this case, they will understand the scene as thematising the current neglect of traditional morals and the misuse of the texts that typically voice them. If instead the audience also recognises Thgn. 467 and 469 as lines of a specific poem (whoever its author) and can spot that it has been doctored, a further level of humour, ensuing from the abridgement of the quotation, will be activated.

1. *The fragment: metasymphotic misquoting*

The opening of Pherecr. fr.162 consists of a three-line precept exhorting hosts to be genuinely welcoming and to enjoy the leisured atmosphere of the symposium. This is expressed by means of several distinctively epic and archaic phrases.<sup>9</sup> In the

75 (2020) 87–95 (esp. 91 n.20); C. Catenacci, “Teognide, Eveno e Simonide: una revisione e una nuova ipotesi,” *QUCC* 115 (2017) 21–37. In fact, the unity of the entire sequence 467–496 has also been questioned: see F. Condello, “Due presunte elegie lunghe nei *Theognidea*,” *Prometheus* 35 (2009) 193–218, at 208–218. Scholars who recognise Evenus in Pherecrates are e.g. C. Kugelmeier, *Reflexe früher und zeitgenössischer Lyrik in der Alten attischen Komödie* (Stuttgart 1996) 121–123, and K. Bartol, “Structuring the Genre: The Fifth- and Fourth-Century Authors on Elegy and Elegiac Poets,” in B. Currie et al. (eds.), *The Reception of Greek Lyric Poetry in the Ancient World: Transmission, Canonization and Paratext* (Leiden 2020) 129–147, at 137–138.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. Condello, *Prometheus* 35 (2009) 208 n.54; G. Colesanti, *Questioni teognidee: la genesi simposiale di un corpus di elegie*<sup>2</sup> (Rome 2011) 102–107.

<sup>9</sup> Both the *unctura* δαίς θάλασσα, “rich banquet,” and the adjective εὐκηλος, “at one’s ease/free from care” (lines 1 and 3) appear in *Hymn.Hom.Merc.* 480

source (Ath. 364B), the speaker (Myrtilus) interrupts the quotation after line 3 with a comment that introduces lines 4–13.<sup>10</sup> At 4, the phrase ἡμῶν δ' ἦν τινά τις frames the rest of the fragment as “our” reality. A sympotic behaviour that contravenes the precept at 1–3 is then illustrated in 4–13. We do not know whether the two portions of the fragment as preserved in Athenaeus were spoken by the same speaker.

In 4–6, using first-person plurals, the speaker says that they and their contemporaries are hostile towards their guests: after inviting them, they give them dirty looks and make them leave. In 4–5, the description of the contravention is punctuated by lexical parallels with 1–3.<sup>11</sup> A subtle message underlies this verbal reversal: the prescriptions at 1–3 are ineffective, they can be contravened, and their diction can be used to describe the opposite situation. This interplay of literal repetition and ethical subversion is taken to the next level in the rest of the fragment, where traditional sympotic ethics (instantiated, at 11–12, in

εὐκηλος μὲν ἔπειτα φέρειν εἰς δαῖτα θάλειαν (“then confidently take [the lyre] to the rich banquet”). For δαῖτα θάλειαν cf. also Hom. *Il.* 7.475, *Od.* 3.420, 8.76 and 99, Hes. *Op.* 742. For the expression καλέω ἐπὶ/εἰς δαῖτα/δεῖπνον, “invite to the meal/banquet,” cf. Hes. *Op.* 342, Thgn. 563. The phrase ἀλλὰ μάλ' εὐκηλος recurs in the same metrical position at Hom. *Il.* 1.554, while the idiom φρένα τέρπομαι, “enjoy oneself/take pleasure in” (line 3) is common in epic and archaic poetry (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.474, 9.186, *Od.* 4.102, 8.131, Mimm. fr.7.1 W. [=Thgn. 795] and Thgn. 921).

<sup>10</sup> In the *Deipnosophists*, Myrtilus, before quoting the comic passage, talks of the devotion and the restrained banqueting habits of the ancients (363D–F), and then describes the degenerate sympotic customs of his own time (363F–364E); he says that his contemporaries forget entirely Pherecr. fr.162.1–3, but memorise the lines that come immediately after them (νῦν δὲ τούτων μὲν οὐδ' ὄλωσ μέμνηνται, τὰ δὲ ἐξῆς αὐτῶν ἐκμανθάνουσιν, 364B). Further on Myrtilus' comment below, §2.

<sup>11</sup> As already pointed out by Z. Stamatopoulou, *Hesiod and Classical Greek Poetry: Reception and Transformation in the Fifth Century BCE* (Cambridge 2017) 192 n.45: cf. 1 καλέσας ἐπὶ δαῖτα and 4 ἦν τινά τις καλέση ... ἐπὶ δεῖπνον; 1–2 μηδὲ ... ἄχθου ὀρῶν παρεόντα and 5 ἀχθόμεθ' ἦν ἔλθῃ καὶ ὑποβλέπομεν παρεόντα.

Theognis' lines) are invoked to endorse behaviours that are in fact opposite to those very ethics.

From line 7, the general description turns into a vignette illustrating one particular case. The unwelcome guest, looked down upon by the host, decides to leave the party;<sup>12</sup> yet another banqueter invites him to stay, acting in conformity with the traditional ideal of conviviality. Ironically, his thoughtful invitation is dismissed as anti-sympotic by the host of the party, who intervenes to finally drive away the unwanted friend: by quoting Thgn. 467 and part of 469, he exhorts the polite banqueter not to hold "anyone who is unwilling to stay." With an ironic move, the host ably and paradoxically passes off his rudeness as exemplary hospitality.

This is, however, just the most superficial level at which irony operates in this fragment, since a subtler wit results from the abridgement of Theognis' lines.<sup>13</sup> In Pherecrates, the pentameter Thgn. 468 (μηδὲ θύραζε κέλευ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντ' ἰέναι, "and do not order out one who does not want to go") is absent, which is functional to the wit of the passage: reporting this statement would expose the host's ethical fault in driving away his friend. There are elements suggesting that Pherecrates creates the conditions for the audience to sense the omission.

A proleptic echo of Thgn. 468 is possible already at line 6 χῶττι τάχιστα θύραζ' ἐξελθεῖν βουλόμεθ' αὐτόν ("and we want him to get out as quickly as possible"), which expresses the contraven-

<sup>12</sup> Because just one man is unwelcome, Olson concludes that he must be socially inferior: S. D. Olson, *Broken Laughter: Select Fragments of Greek Comedy* (Oxford 2007) 319. Yet the described situation is exemplary: the unwanted guest (invited, but only in the hope that he does not show up) is an indefinite "someone" (τινα, 4), not unlike the ἄνδρα φίλον of the opening precept (1) or the μηδένα of the quoted Thgn. 467 (11). However, it is true that we do not know how this vignette of sympotic neglect was connected to the comic plot, and whether this imaginary unwelcome "someone" or the unwelcoming host implied allusions to the comedy's characters.

<sup>13</sup> Similarly, Franchini, *Ferecrate* 313.

tion of the precept at Thgn. 468.<sup>14</sup> Secondly, the host introduces the quotation with the term ἐλεγεία, thus giving away that, by quoting only hexameters, he is abridging elegiac couplets.<sup>15</sup> Thirdly, only Thgn. 467 (μηδένα τῶνδ' ἀέκοντα μένειν κατέρυκε παρ' ἡμῖν, “and do not hold with us anyone who is unwilling to stay”) is strictly relevant to the host’s justification, as he pretends to act liberally and to let go the friend who wants to leave. Nevertheless, he also quotes part of 469 (μήθ' εὔδοντ' ἐπέγειρε, Σιμωνίδη, “and do not, Simonides, wake up the one who sleeps”), which is not pertinent to the situation. As I shall argue in §2, the inclusion of this second exhortation serves the evocation of paraenetic discourse. Yet what interests us most here is that it adds some coordinates for the memory of the audience, recalling the original context of the extrapolated lines, and with it the missing pentameter. Finally, after the quotation, the speaker asks, “do we not say things like these over wine?” (οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οἴνοις / τιοιαντὶ λέγομεν, 12–13). If we take this question at face value and infer that these lines were currently performed at symposia, the speaker would be indirectly reminding the external audience of their real-life (and unabridged) performances.

All these elements were likely to trigger the memory of the Theognidean passage in those who knew it, as if in a process of mental re-insertion of the excerpt in its original context. As a result, the missing pentameter and the bad intentions of the host in skipping it are exposed.

<sup>14</sup> The adverb θύραζ(ε) is in fact a conjecture (by Cobet, cf. Kassel and Austin, *PCG* VII 186), while Athenaeus’ codex A reads θύρας. The parallel with Thgn. 468 is noted by Kassel and Austin, and Kugelmeier, *Reflexe* 121–122. Possibly, during the performance someone in the audience would pick up on this parallel in retrospect (but see Franchini, *Ferecrate* 315, who objects to this point); on the stratified decoding competence of theatre audiences see M. Revermann, “The Competence of Theatre Audiences in Fifth- and Fourth-Century Athens,” *JHS* 126 (2006) 99–124.

<sup>15</sup> On the word ἐλεγεία see M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (Berlin 1974) 3–4; E. Bowie, “Early Greek Elegy, Symposium, and Public Festival,” *JHS* 106 (1986) 13–35, at 26.

Since the recited Theognidean lines are metasymphotic, the symposium is 1) the general matter they deal with, 2) the social context they aim to regulate, 3) their internal setting, 4) their performance context. Their reuse in Pherecr. fr.162 is indeed in the context of an imaginary symposium and serves the conventional function of metasymphotic recitation. By reciting the lines, the “bad” host aims to regulate the party, controlling another guest’s conduct and justifying his own actions. To put it in the words that Hobden uses speaking of Anacreon, the host “generates a sympotic persona for himself that is validated in his performance, as his companions witness him in action.”<sup>16</sup> Yet, he tramples over the metasymphotic tradition while mimicking it. He amends the archaic poetical medium and uses it to endorse his subversion of sympotic morals, all the while trying to give the impression that he conforms to them.

The choice of Theognis’ text as the object of subversion is not accidental. As I argue in §2, Theognis’ lines, together with the archaising opening precept at 1–3, are instances of archaic paraenetic discourse and, per se, voice traditional morals. The host repurposes and re-semanticises such a medium of traditional ethics, bending traditional *paideia* to circumstantial rhetorical aims—thus in fact embodying a more general tendency. This fragment is indeed in keeping with other passages of old comedy that reveal the moral preoccupations arising from contemporary changes in cultural and educational practices, as we shall see in §3.

## 2. *Archaic sympotic paraenesis and fifth-century sympotic culture*

Given the archaising precept that opens Pherecr. fr.162, and the title of the play it belongs to (as witnessed by Ath. 364A), some scholars have recognised in the fragment allusions to the

<sup>16</sup> F. Hobden, *The Symposium in Ancient Greek Society and Thought* (Cambridge 2013) 38.



instructional Hesiodic poem known as *Precepts of Chiron*.<sup>17</sup> Chiron, the mythical tutor of Achilles and other heroes, is represented as a dispenser of moral instructions by Pindar and Cratinus.<sup>18</sup> He is considered to have been a symbol “of Athenian elitist pedagogy.”<sup>19</sup> As for *Precepts of Chiron*, it was a hexametric poem giving moral advice, probably consisting of juxtaposed instructional statements.<sup>20</sup> It was fictionally addressed to Achilles and the sources associate it with educational practices and

<sup>17</sup> Hesiod fr.283–285 M.-W. = 218–220 Most. For this hypothesis see G. Marckscheffel, *Hesiodi, Eumeli, Cinaethonis, Asii et Carminis Naupactii fragmenta* (Leipzig 1840) 188–189; P. Friedländer, “ΥΠΟΘΗΚΑΙ,” *Hermes* 48 (1913) 558–616, at 571–572; L. Kurke, “Pindar’s Sixth *Pythian* and the Tradition of Advice Poetry,” *TAPA* 120 (1990) 85–107, at 93 and 101–102; A. Ercolani, “Fragments of Wisdom, Wisdom in Fragments,” in C. Tsagalis (ed.), *Poetry in Fragments* (Berlin 2017) 29–46, at 41 n.43; P. A. LeVen, *The Many-Headed Muse: Tradition and Innovation in Late Classical Greek Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge 2014) 77. Olson suggests that the speaker of 2–3 might have been the “title character” Chiron (*Broken Laughter* 319).

<sup>18</sup> Pind. *Pyth.* 6.21–27, Cratin. fr.253 K.-A. For the *Precepts* in drama, see also Ar. fr.239 K.-A. (cf. n.21 below) and the hexametric Chaerem. *TrGF* I<sup>2</sup> 71 F 14b Sn.-K., probably from Chaeremon’s polymetric *Centaur*. According to Kurke, *TAPA* 120 (1990) 93, the references to the *Precepts of Chiron* in fifth-century comedy suggest that the “old *paideia*” was “falling out of favor in Athens”; however, if traditional poetical heritage is branded as old in comedy, new cultural and literary fashions were not staged in flattering terms either (see §3 below).

<sup>19</sup> The quotation is from G. W. Dobrov and E. Urios-Aparisi, “The Maculate Music: Gender, Genre, and the *Chiron* of Pherecrates,” in G. W. Dobrov (ed.), *Beyond Aristophanes: Transition and Diversity in Greek Comedy* (Atlanta 1995) 139–174, at 143; see also Kurke, *TAPA* 120 (1990) 93–94, and A. L. Ford, “Plato’s Two Hesiods,” in G. R. Boys-Stones et al. (eds.), *Plato and Hesiod* (Oxford 2010) 133–154, at 147.

<sup>20</sup> The amplest fragment recommends honouring the gods (Hes. fr.283 M.-W. = 218 Most) and is preserved in the scholia to Pind. *Pyth.* 6.22 (Drachmann II 197.8–13); for a hypothesis on *Pythian* 6 as drawing on the genre of “sympotic instruction” see Kurke, *TAPA* 120 (1990) 85–107.

contexts.<sup>21</sup>

However, while Pherecrates' audience might assume a focused reference to the *Precepts*, the paraenetic elements in Pherecr. fr.162 might suggest a broader engagement with paraenetic poetic discourse. In fact, already Athenaeus (or his source) established a link between Pherecr. fr.162 and Hesiod. In Ath. 364D, Hes. *Op.* 722–723 are quoted immediately after Pherecr. fr.162 as additional evidence for archaic sympotic ethics: μηδὲ πολυξείνου δαιτὸς δυσπέμφελος εἶναι· / ἐκ κοινοῦ πλείστη τε χάρις δαπάνη τ' ὀλιγίστη (“and do not be rude if a meal at joint expense is attended by many guests: the delight is the greatest and the expenditure the lowest”).<sup>22</sup> Besides the thematic affinity, these lines are an important stylistic parallel for Pherecr. fr.162.1–3, like several others in the sequence Hes. *Op.* 695–764: mostly negative commands (introduced by μή or μηδέ), occasionally complemented by explications and symmetrical positive exhortations.

Moreover, Athenaeus makes an explicit statement about the relation of Pherecr. fr.162 to Hesiod. In Ath. 364B the character Myrtilus introduces Pherecr. fr.162.4–13 by saying that they parody the *Great Ehoiai* and the *Great Works* ascribed to Hesiod.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> For Achilles as the addressee see *Suda* χ 267 and Paus. 9.31.5 (= Hes. T71 and T42 Most); for educational associations, Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.15 (= Hes. fr.285 M.-W. = 220 Most) and Ar. fr.239 K.-A. (= Hes. fr.284 M.-W. = 219 Most), from the *Banqueters* (see §3 below). See also the representation on the Vulci *kyathos* (BA 203389; Berlin, Antikensammlung F 2322), with Kurke, *TAPA* 120 (1990) 92, Ford, in *Plato and Hesiod* 147, and F. Lissarrague, “La place des mots dans l’imagerie attique,” *Pallas* 93 (2013) 69–79, at 71.

<sup>22</sup> See Ercolani, in *Poetry in Fragments* 39–42.

<sup>23</sup> Ath. 364B τὰ δὲ ἐξῆς αὐτῶν ἐκμανθάνουσιν, ἅπερ πάντα ἐκ τῶν εἰς Ἡσίοδον ἀναφερομένων Μεγάλων Ἠοίων καὶ Μεγάλων Ἔργων πεπαρόδηται (corr. Meineke : παρόδηται A : παρωδεῖται Olson). The phrase καὶ Μεγάλων Ἔργων is expunged by Olson, *Athenaeus* III.A 60, and by previous editors of Athenaeus; Merkelbach and West instead suggest erasing Μεγάλων Ἠοίων καὶ (*Fragmenta Hesiodica* [Oxford 1967] 146); see Ercolani, in *Poetry in Fragments* 40–41. In any case, both the *Great Ehoiai* and the *Great Works*, irrespective of their

As Stamatopoulou suggests, it is likely that the archaising lines 1–3 are a close rewording of “a Hesiodic precept about hosting,” while 4–13, as we have seen, in fact report a subversion of such a Hesiodic-sounding precept, rather than being a “parody.”<sup>24</sup> In any case, Myrtilus’ comment reveals that Athenaeus conceived of the Hesiodic writings as a “general direction” in which one could find parallels for Pherecr. fr.162.<sup>25</sup>

The prescriptive style applied to Pherecr. fr.162.1–3, which is distinctive of the *Precepts*, but also of *Works and Days* and other fragmentary Hesiodic writings, consists of stylistic, pragmatic, and structural features: series of second-person commands, an internal addressee, and accumulation of prescriptions or gnomic statements that can be detached from the context while maintaining their logical and syntactical autonomy. These elements define the paraenetic discourse that is typically instantiated in *Precepts* and *Works and Days*, but also in the *Theognidea*, and which we find embedded in different kinds of ancient writings over time.<sup>26</sup>

predominantly genealogical or didactic character, might have contained sympotic precepts and might thus have been mentioned by Athenaeus. For “traditional wisdom content” in Hesiodic fragments, see Ercolani 29–46.

<sup>24</sup> Stamatopoulou, *Hesiod* 192. For a similar point see Ercolani, in *Poetry in Fragments* 41–42, who states that Pherecr. fr.162.1–3 should be considered a Hesiodic fragment *incertae sedis* (see also Kurke, *TAPA* 120 [1990] 102 n.70). According to Olson, *Broken Laughter* 319, the “parody” might actually take place in 1–3; see also S. D. Olson, *Athenaeus: The Learned Banqueters* IV (Cambridge [Mass.] 2008) 169 n.255.

<sup>25</sup> See Friedländer, *Hermes* 48 (1913) 571–572. On the reception of Hesiodic poetry as hortatory and protreptic see R. Hunter, *Hesiodic Voices: Studies in the Ancient Reception of Hesiod’s Works and Days* (Cambridge 2014) 75–86.

<sup>26</sup> *In primis* in the elegies of Phocylides, Tyrtaeus, and Callinus, but see also Isoc. 1–2 (which for Friedländer, *Hermes* 48 [1913] 603 and 609, were the prose continuation of the genre of “*hypothēkai*”). For the embedment of paraenetic poetry within other genres (esp. epic), cf. R. P. Martin, “Hesiod, Odysseus, and the Instruction of Princes,” *TAPA* 114 (1984) 29–48, at 31. My notion of paraenetic “style” or “discourse” is close to Volk’s concept of the

As we know, the sympotic exhortations contained in the Theognidean *Sylloge* are another important intertext for Pherecr. fr.162: Thgn. 467 and 469, quoted at lines 11–12, come from the sequence of sympotic prescriptions Thgn. 467–474. The choice to quote part of Thgn. 469, which is thematically irrelevant to the vignette, contributes to Pherecrates' evocation of archaic paraenesis. Thgn. 469, as quoted by Pherecrates, begins with μήθ': the ensuing repetition of μή- at the beginning of subsequent lines recalls the anaphors of connectors (μή/μηδέ/μηδεῖς or καί) that are typical in sequences of prescriptions (as indeed in Hes. *Op.* 695–764 and Thgn. 467–474), and which contribute phonetically to the accumulation effect created by the juxtaposition of commands. Moreover, the part of Thgn. 469 that is quoted includes the vocative Σιμωνίδη. Direct apostrophes to the addressee of the prescriptions are another typical paraenetic feature.

In Pherecrates' fragment, therefore, the style of archaic paraenesis is instantiated in 1–3 as well as in the Theognidean quotation. The theme of these lines—banquet ethics—further circumstantiates the intertextuality: Pherecrates is here engaging particularly with archaic sympotic paraenesis. In archaic times, sympotic poetry, and metasymphotic paraenesis specifically, expressed the ethical values that marked archaic aristocratic identity, while prescribing the “right” sympotic conduct and affording the *hetairoi* an opportunity to define their role and social authority within the *hetaireia*.<sup>27</sup> We know that, in the fifth century, archaic and late archaic sympotic poetry remained part of the aristocratic repertoires.<sup>28</sup> Theognis, in particular, prob-

didactic “mode”: K. Volk, *The Poetics of Latin Didactic: Lucretius, Vergil, Ovid, Manilius* (Oxford 2002) 43, drawing on A. Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Oxford 1982) 106–111.

<sup>27</sup> For a comprehensive handling of metasymphotic performative practices see Hobden, *The Symposium* 25–65.

<sup>28</sup> For the familiarity of fifth-century aristocrats with Solon and Anacreon see e.g. Pl. *Criti.* 113A–B and *Chrm.* 157E.

ably featured in them as a medium and epitome of traditional ethical values; he was considered an authority on the theme of virtue, and was a staple reference in Socratic circles.<sup>29</sup> Yet, it is challenging to determine whether the paraenetic echoes in Pherecr. fr.162 resonated especially with a restricted portion of the theatre audience, the conservative elites.<sup>30</sup>

First, whilst we know that, towards the end of the century, Theognis' elegies were performed in conservative circles, we do not know whether they were performed *exclusively* in such environments. We know that sympotic performative practices varied along the social spectrum, and possibly according to political orientations too. Still, there is no reason to exclude that at least some verses from the *Theognidea* were circulating more broadly as sympotic material—especially given that fifth-century aristocratic sympotic practices and musical customs were being taken up by other social groups.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Cf. the renowned Theognidean echo in Critias fr.5.3 W., on which see F. Condello, "Sul 'sigillo' di Crizia (fr.5 W.<sup>2</sup> = 3 G.-P.2)," *QS* 76 (2012) 165–185, and P. Bertocchini, "Criti. fr.5 W.<sup>2</sup> e la silloge teognidea," *Eikasmos* 30 (2019) 85–93. For the possible role of the Athenian aristocracy in the compilation of an Attic Theognidean *Sylloge* see e.g. M. Vetta, "Teognide e anonimi nella *Silloge teognidea*," in G. Cerri (ed.), *La letteratura pseudepigrafa nella cultura greca e romana* (Naples 2000) 123–141, at 140–141; Colesanti, *Questioni teognidee* 320 and 336. On the fourth-century reuses and canonicity of Theognis see S. De Martin, "Theognis the Author, Traditional Wisdom, and Some Side Effects of Authority," in R. Berardi et al. (eds.), *Defining Authorship, Debating Authenticity: Problems of Authority from Classical Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Berlin 2020) 111–138, at 112–123.

<sup>30</sup> For the elites of Classical Athens see M. Canevaro, "The Popular Culture of the Athenian Institutions," in L. Grig (ed.), *Popular Culture in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 2017) 39–65, at 41; for modern definitions of elites in general see J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton 1989) 11–13. I shall call "elite/elitist" the worldview based on the presumption that certain social and political roles are (or should be) exclusive to the upper social group(s).

<sup>31</sup> For the variation of performative practices along the social and political

Speaking more broadly of sympotic experience and sympotic ethics, citizens of all social classes engaged in sympotic activity and had at least a partial experience of elite sympotic procedures and codes.<sup>32</sup> Surely, the values of friendship and reciprocity voiced in Pherecr. fr.162.1–3, though central to the ethics typically expressed in elitist archaic *sympotica*, were part of a universal model of symposiality, shared across social strata in the fifth century.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the conduct of the host as represented in 4–13 probably looked like a negative *exemplum* to most of the audience. Moreover, as shown by Bowie for Aristophanes, “the symposium is not associated exclusively with any particular social class.”<sup>34</sup> On the contrary, the comic symposium can be the venue to laugh at the *hybris* of all social groups and political parties, as Aristophanes’ *Wasps*, for instance, shows well. In this

spectrum, compare, in *Wasps*, Philocleon’s fables and anecdotes, deemed too vulgar for the symposium he will attend (Ar. *Vesp.* 1174–1207), and the sympotic *skolia* (rehearsed at Ar. *Vesp.* 1219–1248), which are either rooted in the democratic tradition, or, despite having aristocratic origins, were possibly re-ideologised by the democratic wing (PMG 749 [= 897], 911, 912b); see M. Vetta, “Appendice. Un capitolo di storia di poesia simposiale (per l’esegesi di Aristofane, ‘Vespe’ 1222–1248),” in M. Vetta (ed.), *Poesia e simposio nella Grecia antica. Guida storica e critica* (Rome 1983) 117–131; E. Fabbro, *Carmina convivialis Attica* (Rome 1995) XXVIII–XXIX and 157–158. On the “popularisation” of musical culture and elite sympotic customs see A. L. Ford, *The Origins of Criticism* (Princeton 2002) 207; T. Power, “Ton of Chios and the Politics of *Polychordia*,” in V. Jennings et al. (eds.), *The World of Ion of Chios* (Leiden 2007) 179–205, at 191–192. For the possible reaction of the more extreme, philo-oligarchic circles see N. Fisher, “Symposiasts, Fish-eaters and Flatterers: Social Mobility and Moral Concerns in Old Comedy,” in D. Harvey et al. (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Athenian Old Comedy* (Swansea 2000) 355–396, at 371; Power 192–194; for anti-democratic activity at symposia in the fifth century see Canevaro, in *Popular Culture* 62.

<sup>32</sup> See Fisher, in *Rivals of Aristophanes* 355–396.

<sup>33</sup> On the “middling” ethics of the symposium and their cross-class universality see S. Corner, “Symposium,” in A. Wilkins et al. (eds.), *A Companion to Food in the Ancient World* (Oxford 2015) 234–242, at 239–241.

<sup>34</sup> A. M. Bowie, “Thinking with Drinking: Wine and the Symposium in Aristophanes,” *JHS* 117 (1997) 1–21, at 3.

play, the hubristic subversion of sympotic codes is perpetrated by the unsophisticated Philocleon, who is a supporter of a democratic political side; yet he is ὑβριστότατος μακρῶ (*Vesp.* 1303), thus presumably only “the most arrogant” among the arrogant refined partygoers;<sup>35</sup> moreover, the drinking mania is cited as a “disease” of the *chrestoi* (*Vesp.* 78–80), and gastronomic dainties are parodically referred to as symbols of anti-democratic tyrannical excess (493–499).<sup>36</sup>

All in all, we cannot conclude that only members of the elites had the necessary competence to appreciate the comic effect of the Theognidean abridgement at Pherecr. fr.162.11–12, nor do we have elements to determine whether the *hybris* of Pherecrates’ imagined bad host has a socio-political colour. Whilst thus avoiding a socio-political over-interpretation of fr.162, and particularly of the Theognidean reuse, we have established that the fragment builds on common sympotic ethics, expressing them with old-style paraenetic discourse, and resorting to some well-known lines (Thgn. 467 and 469) as its instantiations. Yet, in Pherecrates’ handling, this traditional discourse is manipulated and distorted—and to such a treatment we now turn.

### 3. *Cultural novelties and the manipulation of tradition*

We have seen in §1 how Pherecr. fr.162 thematises the symposium as a codified practice rooted in the archaic past (cf. the Hesiodic-sounding opening) and normatively described in traditional metasymphotics. The drinking party is also evoked as the performative context of such a repertory. However, in the situation imagined by the speaker, the essence of the symposium

<sup>35</sup> The partygoers mentioned at *Vesp.* 1299–1302 are socially prominent individuals. Yet, although the mention of one Phrynichus (1302) might point to a conservative characterisation of the group, their identities are dubious (see Z. P. Biles and S. D. Olson, *Aristophanes: Wasps* [Oxford 2015] 461), as well as their possible implied political leanings.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. J. Davidson, “Fish, Sex and Revolution in Athens,” *CQ* 43 (1993) 53–66. For the symposium in Aristophanes as a mirror of the order or disorder of society see Bowie, *JHS* 117 (1997) 1–21.

as “a structuring device for Greek *paideia*”<sup>37</sup> is completely subverted. The drinking party appears instead as the context of the literal corruption of traditional poetry and of the adulteration of its message. The symposiarch might be well-versed in archaic poetry, yet he bends the text—as the New Musicians are said to “bend” Mousikē in Pherecr. fr.155.15, also from the *Chiron*<sup>38</sup>—to achieve a goal that is contrary to the ethics it originally mediates.

In Pherecr. fr.162 some tension arises from the juxtaposition of recognised sympotic ethics, expressed in the traditional medium of paraenesis in 1–3, and the ill-intentioned adaptation of similarly traditional metasymptotics. It is not sure whether we should read in 4–13 some yearning for the morals of the past. The first-person plurals make the described situation appear a present-day standard, but does the speaker condemn present-day moral slackening, including himself in the category of “non-traditional” hosts only to turn around and chastise their behaviour?<sup>39</sup> Or does he dismiss the opening precept and the ethics it expresses, undercutting “the value of didactic literature”?<sup>40</sup> His stance remains unclear. In any case, the mistreatment of literary and ethical tradition illustrated in the passage evokes some well-known fifth-century cultural phenomena that generated tensions and moral concerns, which in turn found expression in old comedy.

<sup>37</sup> V. Cazzato and E. E. Prodi, “Introduction,” in V. Cazzato et al. (eds.), *The Cup of Song: Studies on Poetry and the Symposion* (Oxford 2016) 1–16, at 12.

<sup>38</sup> For the vast bibliography on Pherecr. fr.155 see Napolitano in Franchini, *Ferecrate* 246. On the critique of the New Music and the “myths” about it, see LeVen, *Many-Headed Muse* 71–86.

<sup>39</sup> See Olson, *Broken Laughter* 319. For similar uses of first-person plurals, cf. e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 309–310, *Lys.* 404–419.

<sup>40</sup> Thus Stamatopoulou, *Hesiod* 192, speaking of Pherecr. fr.156 and 162 (both from the *Chiron*), although it is unsure whether in fr.156 there is a reference to educational matters at all.



Numerous comic texts engage critically with current musical trends as new-fangled.<sup>41</sup> Despite their ironies, such passages (as well as other critical sources on the New Music) give voice to some moral preoccupations originating from the perceived innovations. For instance, LeVen has pointed to the socio-political and anti-democratic resonances of the vocabulary used in Pherecr. fr.155 to refer to musical innovations as “not quite in keeping with the ‘straight’ moral and ethical standards associated with the good citizen.”<sup>42</sup>

There are then comic passages that flag other cultural-moral concerns: they refer nostalgically to traditional education (as, for example, the tirade of Kreittōn Logos in Ar. *Nub.* 889–1023), to the clash of old education and new practices (e.g. Ar. *Nub.* 936–937b, and fr.205, 225, and 233 from the *Banqueters*), or they hint at the traditional aura of archaic and late-archaic poetry, characterising it nostalgically as a thing of the past that has now scarce success (cf. e.g. Ar. *Nub.* 1354–1372, fr.235; Eup. fr.148 and 398 K.-A.).<sup>43</sup>

In Pherecr. fr.162 there is no explicit flagging of the treatment of Theognis as a new-fangled procedure or a clever sophism. Yet, the text should be counted among the comic fragments that refer to cultural novelties and to their (perceived) moral implications. We can think in particular of Pherecr. fr.155. While the latter allegorises current developments in song-composition and alludes to their implications for public morals, fr.162

<sup>41</sup> Notoriously Pherecr. fr.155; for a survey of Aristophanes’ critical passages see A. Barker, *Greek Musical Writings I* (Cambridge 1984) 99–116.

<sup>42</sup> LeVen, *Many-Headed Muse* 78 (and cf. 79–81); on the New Musicians’ lack of “straightness” and immoral ethos (according to the critics) see also T. Hadjimicheal, “On Kinesias’ Musicopoetic *Paranoia*,” *Greek and Roman Musical Studies* 7 (2019) 284–307.

<sup>43</sup> See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Textgeschichte der griechischen Lyriker* (Berlin 1900) 11–14; Ford, *The Origins of Criticism* 207. On novelty in fifth-century comedy see D’Angour, *Greeks and the New* 211–216; M. Wright, *The Comedian as Critic: Greek Old Comedy and Poetics* (London 2012) 70–99.

exemplifies a subtler risk of the new cultural-intellectual trends: traditional form itself, when cleverly manipulated, can mediate corrupted ethics. Thgn. 467 and 469, well-known for the traditional morals they express, are ably reemployed by a symposiarch to pass off rude behaviour as commendable. The very performance of the text hampers its ethical efficacy, and ultimately archaic paraenetic discourse appears no longer a safe medium of traditional values.<sup>44</sup>

Dactylic hexameters in comedy are generally a clue to the playwright's archaising and parodic intent,<sup>45</sup> and their use in Pherecr. fr.162 may also contribute to problematising the efficacy of the traditional medium. By using hexameters and claiming to be quoting renowned sympotic lines, the speaker and, through him, the host show formal adherence to tradition, while paradoxically illustrating how old-school paraenesis and traditional ethics are contravened.<sup>46</sup> Besides, the bad host carries out this subversion by citing hexameters that are, in spite of their archaic veneer, the product of the manipulation of truly traditional elegiacs.

Finally, the separation of medium and content recalls also the alleged moral effects of the new rhetoric, which (as seen in the examples cited above) is perceived as endangering traditional

<sup>44</sup> More generally, for the themes of poetry and performance in Pherecrates' production, cf. fr.6, in which the speaker asks who the worst lyre singer is, and fr.100, in which Aeschylus maintains that he is the creator of "a great art."

<sup>45</sup> See e.g. M. L. West, *Greek Metre* (Oxford 1982) 98; L. P. E. Parker, *The Songs of Aristophanes* (Oxford 1997) 53; R. Quaglia, "Presenze di Omero nei frammenti della commedia antica," *Maia* 59 (2007) 239–262. Compare particularly the hexametric quotations at Ar. *Nub.* 967, in the context of Kreittôn Logos' nostalgic remembrance of old *paideia*.

<sup>46</sup> Compare how in [Plu.] *De mus.* 1132D–E it is stated that the dithyrambist Timotheus wrote the beginning of his *nomoi* in hexameters, so that, by means of this metrical traditional camouflage, it was not immediately apparent that he was transgressing the rules of archaic music. See LeVen, *Many-Headed Muse* 90–93.

*paideia* and ethics. We could say it with the words used by Kreittōn Logos in Aristophanes' *Clouds*: Pherecr. fr.162 showcases an instance of unscrupulous clever talking that makes *aischros* what is traditionally *kalos*, while passing off as *kalos* what is truly *aischros* (*Nub.* 1020–1021). And indeed, with such words Kreittōn Logos refers to the corrupting effects of the sophistic education, embodied by Hēttōn Logos.<sup>47</sup>

A final note needs to be made on the comic critiques of contemporary cultural tendencies mentioned above—namely, in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and *Banqueters*, and by Eupolis. These passages might be considered tilted towards a target audience that is substantially conservative, especially in light of the ethical concerns sparked in the elites by the musical and cultural innovations.<sup>48</sup> However, such nostalgia and the skepticism towards the new cultural practices are also expressed by comic characters whose conservatism issues from their age rather than from their social status or political leaning. It is, for example, the case of Strepsiades, who is a self-professed *agroikos* and yet wants to listen to Simonides while banqueting (*Ar. Nub.* 1355–1356). Ultimately, Pherecr. fr.162 does hint at the current cultural and educational landscape of Athens. Yet, from the extant text we cannot determine whether the speaker is endorsing or condemning the contemporary intellectual developments. And

<sup>47</sup> For the sophists' abuses of poetry, cf. Pl. *Prt.* 339A–347E, where Protagoras quotes from Simon. fr.260 Poltera (= *PMG* 542) and Socrates objects to his out-of-context reuse showing that all interpretations of poetry are not serious means of teaching ethics; see e.g. G. W. Most, "Simonides' Ode to Scopas in Contexts," in I. J. F. de Jong et al. (eds.), *Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature* (Leiden 1994) 127–152. A similarly flawed interpretation of poetry (of Thgn. 33–36 and 435–438 jointly) might be feigned by Socrates in Pl. *Meno* 95C–96A to mock the sophists; see R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge 1961) 28–29 and 391.

<sup>48</sup> On elite criticism of the New Music see E. Csapo, "The Politics of the New Music," in P. Murray et al. (eds.), *Music and the Muses: The Culture of "Mousikē" in the Classical Athenian City* (Oxford 2004) 207–248, at 229–245; Hadjimicheal, *Greek and Roman Musical Studies* 7 (2019) 287 with n.8; see also Wright, *The Comedian as Critic* 71 and 83, on the conservatism of comedians.

much less can we decide whether the playwright, with his handling, meant to elicit a reaction from a socially or politically defined subset of the audience members.

#### 4. *Conclusions*

This article was aimed at deepening our understanding of the use of Theognis' lines in Pherecr. fr.162. First, I have clarified the logic of Pherecrates' reuse, showing that the Theognidean quotation allows the dynamic engagement of the audience, involving them in the realisation of the humour of the speech. The audience may recognise the lines as instances of old-school paraenetic discourse, mediating conventional ethics, and may thus feel the dissonance between their contents and the amoral end of the host who uses them. Alternatively, if they are familiar with these specific sympotic lines, they will probably spot the convenient abridgement, thus accessing a second layer of irony. I have argued that the comic text provides them with some aids to recall the original context of the quotation.

I have also explored how fr.162 engages intertextually with paraenetic discourse, exhibiting awareness of its stylistic, thematic, and pragmatic features. While 1–3 reproduce the style and themes of archaic sympotic paraenetic discourse, at 11–12 Thgn. 467 and 469 are quoted as a sample of it. The fragment thus prompts us to look beyond the sympotic character of the *Theognidea*, and showcases how in the fifth century lines that will later be included in the *Theognidea* are perceived as being in a network of generic relationships with other archaic paraenetic texts. This reception episode thus feeds into the broader cross-genre tradition of paraenesis, in which the *Theognidea* place themselves.

Finally, I have shown how, like several other well-known old comedy passages, Pherecr. fr.162 deals with the changes away from traditional *paideia*, typical of the current education and rhetorical trends. In the fifth century, paraenetic “go-to” such as those featured in the fragment (Thgn. 467 and 469) could be used both as assertions of old values to oppose modern depra-

vation, but could also be held as examples of old outgrown morals. The host cites Thgn. 467 and 469 feigning an endorsement of traditional ethics, but, in fact, with his very quotation indirectly comments on such values as negligible. As for the anonymous speaker, in the preserved text he does not offer a moral interpretation and leaves us with a tantalising question: does he condemn the degeneracy of the host, and the mistreatment of the text, or does he approve of such a parodic mistreatment, finding this challenge to old values long overdue and amusing?<sup>49</sup>

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