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Degrees of peace: Universities and embodied experiences of conflict in post-war Sri Lanka

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Abstract

This paper examines the impacts of conflicts on universities and considers the corresponding implications for their ability to contribute to post-war recovery. Pushing against the methodological individualism associated with notions of human capital loss, I concentrate on the interaction between conflict and the social constitution of universities. I argue that the ways in which universities as social groups embody experiences of conflict can powerfully influence how they operate and how they interact with post-war peacebuilding and development. To operationalise the framing of universities as social groups, I Introduce the concept of a university substrate as a means of thinking through the evolving constitution of universities. Drawing on thirty-one semi-structured interviews with university actors in Jaffna and elsewhere in Sri Lanka, I explore the case of the University of Jaffna and how it has been shaped by conflict. I outline the moulding of its social constitution by waves of departure during the conflict and by the environment created by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the main non-state actor in the war. This case study illustrates how the substrate lens can capture dynamics that are missed by human capital approaches and can help better explain the legacies of conflict for universities.

Keywords: higher education, conflict, human capital, development, Sri Lanka, peacebuilding

Introduction

The pivotal role of education in transforming societies has become an almost unquestionable feature of development discourse in recent years. The 2016 Global Education Monitoring Report, for instance, announced that "education is the most vital input for every dimension of sustainable development" (UNESCO, 2016, ii). This belief in education's transformative potential extends into conflict-affected contexts, where education institutions have been given a role in crafting new futures after war. Recent works on universities, in particular, have highlighted mechanisms by which they might contribute to peacebuilding and post-war development, with some even suggesting that higher education can be

the "catalyst" for post-war recovery (Milton and Barakat, 2016). These proposed mechanisms include training cadres of civil servants, engineers, and doctors to rebuild key infrastructure; stimulating economic growth through innovation and knowledge dissemination; utilising academic expertise to craft development and peacebuilding agendas; bringing students and staff together from across dividing lines; and acting as a critical voice in society that can contest problematic narratives of past, present, and future (Millican, 2017; Milton and Barakat, 2016; Pacheco, 2013).

More work needs to be done, however, to understand whether conflict-affected universities are likely to be in a position to play such a catalytic role. As part of answering that question, it is necessary to carefully think through the nature of the effects of conflict on universities. Too often, however, the framing of the impact of conflict on universities takes a narrow focus on considerations of human capital and institutional capacity, thereby obscuring the complex social transformations that take place due to experiences of conflict and that affect how post-war universities function. In this paper, I push for a view of the legacies of conflict that incorporates these social dimensions of universities, while leaving room for recognising shifts in qualification levels and technical knowledge. I frame universities as complex social groups, introducing the concept of the *substrate* to capture their evolving social constitutions. Using the example of the University of Jaffna in Sri Lanka, I explore different ways in which wars can shape university substrates. From this, I suggest that the ways in which universities embody experiences of conflict and crisis can result in constraints on how they operate and, correspondingly, their ability to contribute to post-war projects of peacebuilding and development.

The paper begins by summarising key points from existing literature about the effects of conflict on educational institutions, focussing in on prominent understandings associated with human capital theory. After highlighting key absences in human capital approaches, I introduce a different framing, centred on universities as social groups and the concept of an evolving university *substrate*. The second part of the piece then moves to explore the analytical utility of this framing using the example of the University of Jaffna. Following a brief introduction to the case context, I proceed by looking at how conflict shaped the university into a mono-ethnic space and how the wartime environment formed particular power structures and practices within the university community. I then point to how shedding light on these effects of conflict can help explain features of the post-war university environment, with particular reference to faculty recruitment. In doing so, I offer insights into how wartime social structures and practices persist and are reproduced after war. I conclude by reflecting on what these findings imply about human capital approaches to the legacies of conflict as well as about the ability of universities to realise contributions to post-war recovery.

Human Capital and the Consequences of Conflict

Armed conflict affects education institutions in myriad ways. Key infrastructure can be destroyed, with schools and universities in some cases becoming battlegrounds, and the direct and indirect consequences of war can limit the availability of education funding (Burde, 2014; Lai and Thyne, 2007; UNESCO, 2011). While buildings can be rebuilt and new equipment sourced, however – at least where funding allows – the effects of war on students and staff are often more complex and harder to address. Alongside the psychological impacts of wartime experiences (Davies, 2004; Johnson, 2013), one of the most significant ways in which conflict can affect universities is by hollowing out university communities through the departure and death of staff and the disruption of the normal pathways by which faculties are replenished. Milton and Barakat note, for instance, that "after decades of conflict,

Afghanistan had lost an estimated 20,000 experts and academics" (2016, p.404). This hollowing out is frequently described as 'brain drain', when speaking of the migration of qualified academics and graduates, or, more broadly, as a loss of human capital.

In recent years, the language of human capital has been central to prominent notions of development, such as those around the knowledge economy (Couch, 2019; Molla and Gale, 2014). As Tessema articulates, "In development circles, there is a growing realization that sustainable development cannot take place without sound human capital" (2009, p.131). According to the logic of human capital, education and training are investments, ones which lead to increased worker productivity, and the means by which individuals, companies, and countries compete and succeed within the global economy (Bonal, 2016; Marginson, 2019; Tan, 2014). In such a view, the problem of rebuilding universities after war and, thus, preparing them to contribute to processes of recovery is an issue of replacing the human capital that has been lost and enhancing it to face new challenges (Pacheco, 2013; Milton and Barakat, 2016). As Couch (2019) documents, the attempted reconstruction of the higher education system in Afghanistan after the US-led invasion was predicated on human capital theories, where the goal of reconstruction was the creation of the human capital that would then drive economic development.

In addition to issues with the conceptualisation of people as human capital for the nation and firm and the indeterminate nature of what actually constitutes human capital (Bebbington et al., 2004; Brown, 2016), I suggest that the language of human capital and connected discourses around brain drain and institutional capacity fail to capture the complexity of the transformations that universities experience in relation to conflicts and crises. Underlying human capital theory is a methodological individualism that strongly emphasises the individual over wider social structures, with explanatory power for social phenomena correspondingly residing with individuals (Tan, 2014). This acts to disconnect individuals from their social contexts and renders the distinct properties and dynamics of social groups (Elder-Vass, 2010) largely invisible, with human capital theory modelling collectivities as aggregations of atomised, rational individuals instead. Despite the additions and qualifications made to human capital theory since its inception, such as those associated with social capital (Fine, 2010), there appears to remain a substantial and consequential gap between the world imagined in the theory and the complex social world in which it is applied (Marginson, 2019).

In the context of attempts to better understand conflict-affected universities, two specific issues arise from the use of a human capital lens. First, human capital approaches have a limited ability to reckon with the variable form of departures due to conflict. Use of the homogenising labels of brain drain or human capital loss (Barclay, 2002; Milton and Barakat, 2016; Novelli, 2011) serves to bundle academics into a simple elite category, which does not account for the variation in who stays, who goes, and how the demographics of higher education communities are consequently affected. As literature from displacement studies demonstrates, forced migration does not necessarily occur in a homogenous fashion, with intersecting effects associated with, for example, class, race, occupation, gender, and religion (Van Hear, 2006). This is evident, for example, in the departure of Jewish academics from institutions in Nazi Germany (Niederland, 1988) and in the university purges in Spain under Franco (Pacheco, 2013).

A second issue is that human capital framings of the effects of conflict, due to their methodological individualism, cannot fully account for the relations that occur between individuals in the form of the practices and social structures that they collectively constitute. Narrow human capital approaches do not incorporate the fact that one 'unit' of human capital cannot be replaced by another without altering, on some level, the social constitution of a university. Consider the situation of a set of lecturers from a particular social or political group being replaced by those from another group, such

as was attempted with de-Baathification in Iraq (Milton, 2013). Viewed from a perspective of human capital, measured through, perhaps, the level of qualifications, the situation may not have significantly changed. In reality, however, the social and political environment of the university would likely be transformed, with potential consequences for how staff interact with students from different social groups or the sorts of political campaigns that are prevalent on campus. Crucially, I contend that these types of changes are not peripheral to the functioning of universities but are, instead, fundamentally intertwined with how they operate, with such a transformation in functioning being arguably the goal of, for example, de-Baathification in the first place.

Social Groups and University Substrates

To capture the dimensions of universities obscured by human capital framings, I propose viewing universities as social groups as opposed to aggregations of atomised individuals. As social groups, universities are constituted by their particular collection of members, the practices and beliefs embodied by that membership, and the sets of relations between those members (Elder-Vass, 2010). These social groups may themselves be composed of sub-groups, which are social groups in their own right, down to the level of the individual. Examples of sub-groups in the context of a university are the group of staff and the group of students, which can both be further subdivided into, for instance, those staff and students belonging to different faculties. Framing universities as social groups does not mean ignoring the skills and knowledge that are the focus of human capital approaches. Instead, it means recognising that skill and knowledge levels are one significant property among many of the collectivities that constitute universities.

In the social group view, universities are also connected to other social groups through their common intersections and interactions. A portion of a university faculty may, for example, be members of a political party such that the university and the political party are intersecting groups, with changes in one of the groups potentially leading to changes in the other due to their common members. On the other hand, a group that is distinct from a given university in terms of membership, such as a Ministry of Higher Education, may alter the membership of a university, for instance by changing hiring procedures, or affect the structures and practices within a university, for example by introducing new policies about management hierarchies or dress codes. I consider the set of interactions and intersections between groups, and indeed the existence of particular groups, to be primarily an empirical question, although I am guided in my thinking by the work of scholars such as Bourdieu (1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990) and Fraser (Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018).

In order to operationalise the social group view of the university, I consider the processes of migration, death, and community shaping that can occur during, and leading up to, conflict as the creation of particular *substrates* for post-war universities. I define the substrate of a university at a given point in time to be its social constitution in terms of its membership, considered in relation to contextually pertinent social divisions and intersecting social groups, and the dominant structures, practices, beliefs, ideologies, and social institutions that are embodied by that particular configuration of members. The former aspect of the substrate captures the variability in departures during war, and the latter aspect enables analysis of the shifts in systems of social interaction that can occur due to conflict.

Drawing on analogies from both geology and biology, my use of the concept of a substrate emphasises that a particular configuration of the university is both the result of processes of historical

development, like the creation of a stratum of rock through historical processes of accumulating material, and also the foundation upon which the university will exist and evolve, akin to the idea of the underlying landscape upon which an organism lives and grows. Similar to Bierschenk's notion of sedimentation (2014), and in contrast to path-dependence approaches that focus on sequential chains of events (Mahoney, 2000), historical events and the choices of different actors are seen as leaving traces in substrates, which then influence, without determining, the features of the next 'layer' that accumulates over time. My conception of the legacies of conflict for university communities, therefore, refers less to disembodied forces that nudge institutional trajectories and more to embodied features of university substrates which are reproduced or transformed. By being embodied in the social constitution of universities, experiences of conflict and crisis can continue to constitute part of the shifting social terrain that actors navigate (Vigh, 2009), thereby affecting how those universities function in the post-war period.

Research Background

The research that underpins the arguments in the paper was undertaken as part of a study of factors that have constrained public university contributions to post-war processes in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka¹. I spent three months in Sri Lanka in early 2019, meeting with staff, students, and other individuals connected to the higher education system. I conducted thirty-one semi-structured interviews with academics and others connected to the universities in Sri Lanka, including sixteen interviews with current and former staff and one student leader at Jaffna². A morning spent discussing changes at Jaffna University with a former administrator who had been involved with the institution since the 1970s, for example, yielded a rich picture of how the social life of the university community had altered over time, a picture which also reflected the broader transformations in Jaffna that are captured in the reports of University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna). While I make use of relevant documents and other sources throughout, the availability of sources which speak directly to key dynamics at the University of Jaffna is relatively limited, due to the sensitive and often deliberately opaque nature of the topics under discussion. Rather than being seen as somehow representative of all post-war universities, the focus on Jaffna University is justified by the fact that the particularly striking features of Jaffna, including its proximity to central developments in the conflict, facilitate the observation and conceptualisation of processes that are likely to be present, to different degrees and in different forms, in other post-war institutions (Russell, 2021).

To understand the evolution of the social constitution of the University of Jaffna, it is necessary first to place the university within its context. Sri Lanka is a small island state whose northern coast is separated from India by a short stretch of sea, with this proximity to India's southern states playing a significant role in the country's historical development and contemporary politics. As with many British colonies, a combination of racializing colonial governance strategies; in-migration to meet labour demands; and reactive and proactive identity building projects, in response to both colonial oppression and the opening up of political opportunities associated with independence; served to reify existing social divisions along ethnic and religious lines while also constructing new dimensions of difference (Nissan and Stirrat, 2004). While these categories have changed over time, the current population is mostly constituted by a majority Sinhalese group, with majority Buddhist and minority Christian elements; and a substantial Muslim population, a distinct ethno-religious group who generally have Tamil as their first language. While spread across the island, the Tamil population is particularly prominent in the north and east of the island and the Muslim population has a strong concentration

in the east (Wickramasinghe, 2014). Although various reforms have been introduced to bring in some autonomy at the provincial level, much of the executive power remains concentrated in the central state apparatus, which is largely controlled by members of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, or rather an elite fraction of that group.

Since shortly before Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, achieved independence from the British in 1948, education, up to and including tertiary-level, has been free. The first university was founded in 1942, but it was a restricted, Anglicised institution, which served to produce the elite professional class (Jayasuriya, 2010). The association built during the colonial era between education and secure public sector jobs made higher education a highly desirable good and put pressure on successive governments to expand university access. Nevertheless, there has remained a contrast between the widespread availability of free primary and secondary education and the restricted nature of university education, engendering competition for places between individuals and social groups. Where secondary enrolment increased from 20% in 1950 to 80% in 1980, the corresponding change in tertiary rates was from 1% to just 3% (Little and Hettige, 2013). Nonetheless, over time the higher education sector has seen some expansion in absolute terms. It grew from under 5000 new university admissions in 1980 to just under 32000 new admissions in 2019 (UGC, 2011; 2020), with fifteen main public universities and a rising number of private institutions.

Occurring amid the increasing incidence of violence along ethnic lines in the 1970s and 1980s, the events of 'Black July' in 1983 are often cited as a sparking point for the war. An attack on government soldiers by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was followed in quick succession by military retaliation and anti-Tamil riots during which the police mostly took a bystander role (Parasram, 2012). This all took place in the context of growing separatist sentiment related to, among other things, perceptions of Tamils and Tamil language and culture being placed in a subordinate position in the country. The anti-Tamil violence of Black July added to the grievances and fears held by many in the Tamil population and turned some Tamil youth, in particular, against seeking change through the political establishment and towards more radical and militant approaches to achieving Tamil autonomy. Significantly, many commentators link the emergence of Tamil militancy and the outbreak of the war to, among other factors, the narratives and material realities of a highly segregated and contested education system (Brown, 2011; Parasram, 2012). The University of Jaffna was a key site of militancy, and the LTTE itself emerged from a group that was originally called the Tamil Students' Federation (Wickramasinghe, 2014), although the mainstay of the LTTE, including its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, came from the fishing villages around the Jaffna peninsula.

By the time of Black July, the LTTE were already on their way to becoming the dominant Tamil separatist group amid violent struggles between competing factions, largely achieving this goal by the end of the 1980s (Keerawella, 2013). LTTE rule over the territories it controlled in the north and east was severe and, while the war is often portrayed as simply between Tamils and Sinhalese, there were also clashes between Tamil groups and Muslim groups (Duncan and Cardozo, 2017; Parasram, 2012). The majority of the fighting, nonetheless, took place between the LTTE and government soldiers with the focus on the north and the east. In these areas, there was heavy loss of civilian life and infrastructure damage, including to universities (Duncan and Cardozo, 2017). The war was punctuated by a number of peace talks with the last being internationally orchestrated discussions in the early 2000s (Stokke, 2012). Following the failure of these talks, peace was pursued militarily, and the Sri Lankan government eventually achieved victory in the east in 2007 and in the north in 2009, when the remaining LTTE leadership was gunned down after a brutal period of fighting with substantial civilian casualties (Parasram, 2012). The period after the official end of the war continued to be characterised by militarisation (Ruwanpura, 2018) and the centralisation of state power, leaving some

commentators to note that while the country may have been post-war, it was not yet post-conflict (Bastian, 2013).

Making a Mono-Ethnic University

The University of Jaffna was founded in 1974 as part of a push to establish universities in the provinces away from the capital and as a result of pressure from Tamils for an institution in the north. When the university began in the mid-1970s, it comprised of students and staff from across ethnic groups. A retired administrator who was at the university at the time described how there were well-respected Sinhalese scholars at the university (interview, Jaffna, 2019), with Thiruvarangan similarly commenting that a "notable aspect of the University of Jaffna in the 1970s was that it had arguably the most progressive Sinhala Department in the country at the time" (Thiruvarangan, 2016). The departure of Sinhalese scholars and students following violence in 1977 and the early 1980s and the Eviction of the Muslims in 1990 (Thiranagama, 2011), however, dramatically shifted the constitution of the university towards being a mono-ethnic Tamil institution. With regards to the former, disturbances in Jaffna in 1977, following police provocation of the Tamil community, and the subsequent anti-Tamil pogroms that took place in the south led to the government no longer sending Sinhalese students to Jaffna (Hoole, 2001; Thiruvarangan, 2016). The broader escalation of tensions in the lead up to the war, notably around the burning of Jaffna Public Library in 1981, ultimately meant the departure of Sinhalese members of the university. As well as affecting the availability of staff and the diversity of voices at the university, the absence of Sinhalese staff and students can also be considered in terms of the language mix at the university, with Muslims generally using Tamil as their first language.

The Eviction of the Muslims in 1990 by the LTTE then left the university as an ethnic Tamil space. Pointing to the size and speed of the displacement, Thiranagama notes that "70,000–80,000 Muslims had been forcibly cleared from the five districts of the north that the LTTE (at the time) controlled in October 1990 within 24–48 hours" (2011, p.106). A lecturer who was a student at the university at the time commented on the overall scale of the departure from Jaffna, with his batch of 97 students having only 14 remaining after the exodus of the Muslims, although much of this drop is likely tied to the contemporaneous departure of many Tamil students for the south and east. Departures of this magnitude can lead to the reconfiguration of ethnic categories themselves. Thiranagama's (2011) exploration of the experiences and identities of Muslims who had been forced to move from the north of Sri Lanka, for example, articulates how the displacement led to the constitution of a new identity category of 'Northern Muslims', which was connected to, but distinct from, the pre-existing ethnoreligious Muslim label. In contrast to homogenising narratives of human capital loss, these episodes of departure emphasise that the wartime creation of absence in universities can occur differently for different social groups.

In addition to inter-ethnic considerations, it is important to recognise the intra-ethnic violence that took place in Jaffna and the effects this had on the university. The documentary *Demons in Paradise* (2017) contains conversations with former members of different Tamil nationalist militant groups who highlight inter-group killings and how some members were forced to flee Jaffna. As one of the key sites of militancy, the university was affected by these contestations. Student members of different groups were targeted during power struggles, while staff members who took sides were also affected. The LTTE's quest for dominance over the civilian population in Jaffna and its efforts to eliminate rivals served to remove or silence those who would criticise or contest its actions (Lilja and Hultman, 2011). Rajan and Kirupa Hoole, a couple working at the university who were involved in documenting human

rights abuses during the conflict, described to me how they were informed that the LTTE was looking for them and how they were forced to stay away from Jaffna (interview, Jaffna, 2019). This occurred in the wake of the LTTE's assassination of Rajini Thiranagama, another founding member of the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) group. Such assassinations and forced departures constitute further examples of how absences due to conflict are often not random but rather frequently correspond to important characteristics of those targeted, including political affiliations or a willingness to speak out about the injustices of conflict. In this sense, universities can also be selectively hollowed out in relation to significant fine-grained characteristics that go beyond ethnic or other identities.

Another aspect to emerge in interviews was the disruption of the generational continuity in the academy. The periods of violence that preceded the beginning of the war led to the emigration of many Tamils. As well as constituting significant departures in their own right, these migrations meant that there were already established networks in countries such as the US, UK, and Canada, which facilitated further departures once the war started (Jayawardena, 2020). The cumulative effect of such large-scale migration is to thin out entire generations of communities, including academic communities. As Dr Guruparan, Head of Law at Jaffna, explained about the contemporary environment, "You see a senior crop of people... operating, then you see a major gap. One generation that has either left or been washed out and then you see completely young people. So, the sort of institutional continuity, the generational continuity is massively affected" (interview, Jaffna, 2019). This gap appears to be evident in the distribution of staff at different levels at Jaffna University in comparison with other established universities in Sri Lanka. Just under 9% of Jaffna's permanent academic staff were at the level of Professor or Associate Professor in 2010, while the same figures for the universities of Colombo and Kelaniya were 16% and 23% respectively (UGC, 2011). By 2019 the gap is even wider, with figures of 6%, 21%, and 21% for Jaffna, Colombo, and Kelaniya respectively (UGC, 2020). The much lower proportions of senior staff seen at Jaffna appears to support Dr Guruparan's comments about the 'washing out' of generational layers in the university community.

Part of this dynamic is, again, that the nature of departure is non-random. In his work on the intersection of socio-economic status and migration potential, Van Hear, for example, notes "that the form of migration and ultimately its outcomes are shaped by the resources that would-be migrants can muster" and that, in turn, "the capacity to mobilize such resources is largely determined by socio-economic background or class" (2014, p.100). This and other research on academic migration during conflict (Barclay, 2002; IIEP, 2010) suggests that those higher up the academic ladder and those with the strongest academic records are likely to be those most able to migrate. This resonates with conversations in Jaffna that pointed to the loss of the cream of the academic crop during the war, including those who would have likely gone on to occupy senior posts, which can be understood as disrupting the inter-generational reproduction of the faculty.

Wartime Structures and Practices

The examples of departure and change above highlight how the dynamics of conflict can drive scholars to leave universities, affecting the university substrate. Staying at an institution, however, does not mean stasis. Kalyvas's study (2006) of the nature of violence within civil wars, for instance, illustrates how pre-existing personal and community grudges can become imbricated with logics of violence, tying these smaller-scale relationships to the broader dynamics of conflict and potentially upending social hierarchies. The same dynamics that drive departure fundamentally shape the lived realities of

those who continue to work at universities during conflict, altering which practices form part of university community life as well as how institutions are socially structured. Here, I focus on wartime practices around open discussion, dissent, and loyalty at Jaffna as these dimensions of the wartime environment are particularly significant for understanding its post-war substrate.

In the early days of the university, the Jaffna campus was as a place of vibrant discussion, with the expression and contestation of different views about the situation of Tamils and the way forward (Sritharan, 2010). This is evident even in the proliferation of different political and militant groups on the campus. This situation changed, however, once the LTTE rose to dominance and began to exert its authority over social life. Under the LTTE, demonstrations of loyalty to the group and their cause formed an important part of survival strategies for individuals and households. Satkunanathan describes, for example, how "a young woman who was forcibly recruited stated it was not possible to hide from the LTTE to escape recruitment, as neighbours would inform the LTTE. This was likely done to prove their loyalty to the LTTE and thereby prevent the forced recruitment of their own family members" (2016, p.420). The other side of this dynamic was the denunciation of those who were deemed to be traitors (Thiranagama, 2010), for whom the punishment would often be torture and then death. As Terpstra and Frerks note, "The boundaries of the categories that defined treasonous acts in areas under LTTE control grew wider creating an ever-looming possibility of destructive punishment" (2017, p.291). The results of living in such an environment were that "keeping quiet, conforming to expectations, and being invisible thus [became] ways of surviving in everyday situations" (Brun, 2008, p.410).

These changes were deeply felt at the university. The retired administrator mentioned earlier spoke to me about how the "democracy or intellectual freedom" of the university was lost, with dissenters unable to speak openly amid fear of violent retaliations (interview, Jaffna, 2019). The LTTE's use of spies on campus to inform on dissenters deepened the environment of suspicion and further stifled free speech. The environment of suspicion and the dangers of being branded a traitor by the LTTE (Thiranagama, 2010) served to shape those who had stayed, by emphasising a certain loyalty to the LTTE and its cause as a prime virtue and bringing an atmosphere on the campus that pushed for conformation to the LTTE's ideology and practices. As Ahilan Kadirgamar, a lecturer at Jaffna after the war, described, "The LTTE's control of the university for two decades was a kind of militarisation" and that kind of militarisation "set the context for an exclusive Tamil nationalist politics in the university". He further explained that a "generation of lecturers were living under these wartime conditions of militarisation. A very brutal environment... assassinations and so on. So maybe they just got used to keeping their head down and not getting involved in anything and maybe... that culture has continued after the war as well" (interview, Jaffna, 2019). As Kopalasingham Sritharan, a founding member of the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), put it, the university "became subservient to the LTTE's politics purely as a means of survival" (2010). The war meant a shift from an environment that enabled contestation and debate to one in which the narrative espoused in Jaffna around the Tamil struggle and the role of the LTTE became substantially homogenised and where deviation from that narrative was harshly punished.

The dislocations created by war mean that ad hoc and temporary measures may be used to fill gaps and forms of personal or military power, as opposed to legal-bureaucratic power, may become the determining force in appointments, providing avenues for stacking the faculty along particular lines. In this way, the departure of academics from Jaffna appears to have created space for the culture and practices described above to be more firmly embedded through the hiring of new staff. Recruitment came to be aligned, in part, with the priorities of the new social environment, which altered the social hierarchies in the university. One aspect of this is that the performance of LTTE loyalty became a central part of power dynamics on campus over the course of the war, interacting with who might be considered a 'good candidate' for the university. Professor Jeevan Hoole, who tried to return to Jaffna as Vice-Chancellor but was forced away by the LTTE, explained, "In Jaffna during the Tiger period, you either were with the Tigers or were a traitor. People who didn't support the Tigers went quiet. Those that supported the Tigers became VCs and that and this. Ironically, although it's the president who appoints [the VC], the Tigers made sure all three [candidates] were amenable to them" (interview, Colombo, 2019). These comments were echoed by other interviewees who spoke about how staff had been brought into the university by the LTTE during their period of control and how these staff continued to occupy powerful positions within the institution. As one professor summarised, the LTTE "had their own loyal [people], both staff and students" (interview, Jaffna, 2019). These findings resonate with Klem's work on LTTE involvement in the management of civil servants in the east of the country (2012), pointing to the power that the LTTE were able to wield over the selection of state employees.

The shifting of the construction of the good candidate, even if not absolutely, likely allowed for those who were otherwise academically underqualified to access positions at the university by appealing to the alternative standard associated with loyalty to the LTTE cause. Speaking about the situation at Eastern University, which shows similarities with Jaffna in this respect, Jeevan Hoole notes that "several senior academics left for Colombo en masse. Soon Eastern University was left with no one at the rank of professor and even very few PhD-holders. In the absence of qualified and experienced personnel, the pool of unqualified contenders and aspirants to new appointments grew. Some competitors became informants – going to the LTTE with tales of other candidates not supporting the LTTE's goals of a separate state and so on" (2007, p.515). A part of this dynamic at Jaffna appears to have been the way in which academics, once established in the faculty hierarchy, could use their position to bring in young candidates who would support them, resulting in entrenched power structures which would last beyond the end of the war.

Recruitment and Recovery after the War

Providing a powerful example of how a university's substrate after a war can affect how its faculty functions, post-war recruitment at the University of Jaffna has been an ongoing struggle. Jaffna University Science Teachers' Association (JUSTA) has documented multiple cases of irregular recruitment practices, including political interference in the choice of candidates and the use of practices to frustrate the applications of some candidates. As a 2014 report put it, JUSTA "found blatant, endemic abuse across several university departments and units in the selection of academic and non-academic staff" (JUSTA, 2014). Tamils who had left during the war and tried to return often found their way blocked by administrative hurdles and shifting goalposts while favoured candidates saw their path to a position cleared. Younger Tamil staff members who had been working or educated elsewhere in the country have also had to fight for their place in the university (Colombo Telegraph, 2017). Dr Thiruvarangan, for example, had only just joined the university before my visit in 2019 despite having applied for permanent posts there since 2010. He spoke about the subtlety of discrimination in recruitment with, for example, interviews being postponed for some candidates that were unable to attend the suggested date but not for other candidates (interview, Jaffna, 2019). While the fact that Dr Thiruvarangan was able to join the university shows that these barriers in recruitment are not absolute, the prevalence of incidents indicates that they, nevertheless, likely constitute a means of directing the post-war reconstitution of the faculty.

The above discussions of the evolution of the university substrate during the war allow for delineating two important factors that underpin recruitment struggles at Jaffna. First, practices of selective recruitment and malpractice can be seen as ways in which the social order entrenched by the war has worked to maintain the power structures in the university by avoiding the recruitment of those who might challenge the legitimacy of established academics and by drawing in those who will act as supporters. On the former, cases of recruitment malpractice were repeatedly described as discrimination against merit. The JUSTA report highlights, for example, that there have been blatant instances of discrimination where candidates with higher levels of qualifications or larger numbers of publications were rejected in favour of those who were clearly weaker candidates (JUSTA, 2014). As a former union activist at the university explained, those who were part of the entrenched networks were careful to avoid bringing in talented academics so as to avoid challenges to their positions (interview, Jaffna, 2019).

There appears to have also been a connected tendency to bring in young local graduates who are more likely to support the existing structures in the university (Colombo Telegraph, 2017). In the words of the JUSTA report (2014), "Too frequently... our young graduates who excel in their fields are treated with contempt and made to doubt their ability and worth. This is because sycophancy towards those in authority, rather than merit, is the route to academic employment". Underscoring this point, the JUSTA report emphasises that "the root of [the] abuse is both political and personal patronage which operates at all levels" of the university system (JUSTA, 2014). While patronage practices in public institutions is a broader issue in Sri Lanka (De Silva, 1978; Little and Hettige, 2013), the practices at Jaffna seem to both echo and build upon wartime practices around performing loyalty and avoiding visible dissent, with prospects for employment, as well as professional progression, in the post-war period being partly tied to showing allegiance, to both people and ideologies, and not 'rocking the boat'. This likely impedes the functioning of the university due to, for instance, qualified academics being turned away who could have otherwise helped to raise the quality of teaching and research. It also, as I explore elsewhere (Russell, 2021), feeds into dynamics that limit the potential for critical discussions on the conflict and issues of peacebuilding and development.

A second aspect of recruitment struggles at Jaffna is how selective recruitment appears to advance, and be intertwined with, the ideological agendas associated with the social order entrenched by the war. Returning to the idea of the conflict affecting how the idea of the 'good candidate' is constructed, whether candidates aligned themselves with the particular conception of the Tamil university ascribed to by some powerful academics seems to have become a marker of suitability for joining the university. One head of department described, for example, how some staff at the university would resist recruiting anyone who was opposed to the Tamil national struggle (interview, Jaffna, 2019). Paraphrasing the associated ideology, the former administrator explained that the viewpoint connected with this resistance was that "throughout the history Tamils have been treated as second class citizens so all the Tamils feel that this a university for Tamils. It's our property. Our university. We are the people" (interview, Jaffna, 2019). Pointing to the way in which such considerations might be implicitly included in decision making, the 2014 JUSTA report documents how recruitment schedules have been used which weight a collection of non-academic criteria such as 'attitudes' much higher than relevant qualifications and knowledge. One such schema suggested that academic qualifications and subject knowledge should be worth 16 out of 100 points while the group of nonacademic traits should be worth 60 points (JUSTA, 2014).

The practices and structures of this particular instantiation of the Tamil university appear to be closely linked with the legacies of the war. The creation of a mono-ethnic institution during the war, as well as the continuing power of ideologies around Tamil ownership of public institutions connected with the broader project of secession, served to legitimise certain Tamil claims to the university space and to delegitimise those of people who did not fit the mould. Referencing the notion of ideological biases in recruitment, one Northern Professor articulated that only those who could 'toe the line' with regards to a certain sort of 'Tamil mind set' were accepted into the university without resistance (interview, Jaffna, 2019). Similarly, the return of Sinhalese students to the university after the war has also seen some clashes in the student community over the cultural ownership of the university space (Thiruvarangan, 2016). What this highlights is that performing loyalty to the Tamil-nationalist cause, which has itself been somewhat reshaped by the end of the war, remains a key practice of belonging in the post-war university. One academic at the university suggested that such dynamics can be viewed, in part, as the war being continued by other means, with resistance to change in areas such as staff recruitment being a way to perform the Tamil nationalist struggle in the post-war space. Providing another example of this continuation of wartime practices, she also highlighted that some staff continue to utilise the word 'traitor', which formed a powerful part of the LTTE's practices of subjugation (Thiranagama, 2010), to describe those engaged in academic collaboration with people in the south (interview, Jaffna, 2019). This environment likely aids some of those who came to positions of power during the war to remain there due to the way in which their strong credentials in the field of fighting the 'Tamil struggle' provides an ongoing source of legitimacy. Through the continuation of such practices, key features of the substrate that developed over the course of the war come to be reproduced, albeit imperfectly, in the post-war period.

Conclusion

Taken together, what do these findings imply about the ability of the University of Jaffna to realise strong constructive contributions to post-war recovery? As has been suggested throughout, the structures and practices embodied in its post-war substrate were consequential for how the University of Jaffna has functioned. By throwing up obstacles for highly qualified candidates, dominant forces at the university resisted the entry of those who could have helped realise the mechanisms for contribution noted at the beginning of this paper, with the war's disruption of the generational continuity of the faculty also impeding the training and development of academics. Ongoing attempts to maintain a form of Tamil-nationalist ideological control over the university have served to limit the space for recognising the grievances of other communities, such as the Muslims forced out from Jaffna during the war, and thus also the possibilities for peacebuilding on campus. More broadly, the embodiment of the wartime environment in the substrate has impacted upon the ability of the university to effectively act as a critical voice in society and to turn the lens to analyse its own role in the conflict. Similarly, the painting of staff who work with counterparts in the south as 'traitors' appears to have diminished the ability of academics to meaningfully collaborate on issues of common concern, both academically and in terms of development and peacebuilding goals.

This picture is far more complicated than a human capital approach, focussing on the skills and knowledge of individuals, would suggest. The way in which the university as a social group was shaped by experiences of war – from a structuring of power relations to changed practices around critical discourse – fades from view under such an approach. In short, the critique of human capital theory on the grounds of the yawning gap between the world imagined by the theory and the reality which it seeks to explain (Marginson, 2019; Tan, 2014) is borne out here for the case of conflict-affected universities. To go beyond a simple refutation of human capital theory, however, I have also sought to put forward, through the concept of the substrate, an alternative means of thinking about the university and how it is affected by conflict. Where human capital takes the individual, isolated from

their context, as the core object of analysis, using a substrate lens means analysing the social group as an object in its own right. Where human capital is, in a sense, ahistorical – it does not greatly matter how a particular level or configuration of human capital came to be – the substrate is deeply historical, with the social constitution of the university being accumulated over time and through the embodiment of historical events and the choices of actors. Experiences of conflict and crisis, and reactions to those experiences, leave traces in the social constitution of universities, which are layered over time to create the social terrain that actors navigate (Vigh, 2009).

To close, it is useful to comment on how the substrate idea might apply to other conflict-affected contexts and how the substrate's influence over post-war university contributions might be understood within the wider social world. On the former, although many of the points above are specific to the context of University of Jaffna, there are substrate features that are likely common to numerous post-war contexts. For example, generational disruptions in universities due to extended periods of displacement and death is a feature that has wider resonance, as suggested by Barclay's work on Liberia (2002) and Rappleye and Un's comments on Cambodia (2018). While examining such commonalities may be illuminating, the real power of the approach resides in the ability of the substrate to capture the specific features of different social landscapes. In contrast to the situation of Jaffna, the university at the centre of Johnson and Hoba's study in Cote d'Ivoire (2015), for example, had a much more fragmented substrate, with wartime fighting along social fracture lines exacerbating the same inter-group divisions within the university – leading to corresponding contestations around the processes of reconstructing the university. Despite the differences between the cases, each can be usefully analysed through the lens of the substrate, speaking to the particular social constitutions of each university, how they have been shaped, and their possible implications for future developments.

On the second question, the potential for a university to contribute to post-war processes depends not only its substrate but also on the context in the universities is embedded, with universities evolving in response to the actions of both external and internal actors. In the period following the end of the war, the Sri Lankan state, for example, has unilaterally removed Vice Chancellors from a number of universities, including Jaffna; instituted rules that give the government more power of the hiring of non-academic staff; and enrolled new students in leadership courses run by the military. Individuals and groups within universities can also change substrates through acts of struggle as well as simply through the ways in which they navigate their social environment. The work of JUSTA to document recruitment issues, for instance, has served to push for change in the university, while individual academics have fought hard to join the university and change its structures. Such acts alter substrates by shifting university membership and the practices and structures which are dominant. In turn, the university substrate constitutes an important piece of the broader social terrain over which these struggles are fought, with its features facilitating certain actions – and thus, ultimately, contributions to recovery – and constraining others.

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Notes

¹ Ethical approval for the research was sought and received from the University of Edinburgh.

² Explicit permission was sought from participants with regards to attributing interview quotes or specific insights. Interview quotes and insights have, therefore, been anonymised where permission was not received or in cases where ethical considerations require anonymisation.

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