

Copyright
by
Daniel Max Ferguson
2023

The Dissertation Committee for Daniel Max Ferguson Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation:

Peace With Strength: Developing the Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy

Committee:

William Inboden, Supervisor

Jeremi Suri

Sheena Greitens

Mark Lawrence

Tami Biddle

**Peace With Strength:
Developing the Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy**

by

Daniel Max Ferguson

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2023

Dedication

To my father, who gave me the inspiration for this endeavor. To our children, who I hope lead a life of purpose and fulfillment.

And to the practitioners in search of peace with strength.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US government. All errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

Acknowledgements

My father died when I was 14 and I have limited memories of him. The only recollection I have about his PhD was him pointing at the library on Fordham University as a Freshman in High School at Fordham Prep, telling me, “If anyone ever wanted to read my dissertation, it’s up there somewhere in the Fordham library stashed in a drawer.” In the spring of my first year of coursework, about three weeks before our comprehensive exams, a random thought came to me to do an internet search of my father. I knew he went to Brown, had a PhD in English Literature from Fordham, and did some graduate studies, but knew little else. I was too young for those sorts of conversations when he died. But now in my first tenuous year as a PhD student, I had so many questions that my dad could have helped me with: thoughts about research topics, forming a committee, and developing research questions. So on a whim, I googled him in the hopes that I could find some inspiration out there. The first search result that came up exceeded all my expectations.

Sitting in my home office in Round Rock, Texas, I found my father’s dissertation – all 545 pages that he wrote on a typewriter in 1967 – digitized and waiting for me: “HENRY JAMES AND HONORE DE BALZAC: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LITERARY TECHNIQUES.” Nothing about the dissertation was familiar to me. The abstract did not help much. But it was a beautiful little connection to my father, that I had to share with my four older siblings. As I drafted an email to them, I thought it might be nice to save until Father’s Day, which had to be only a few weeks away. Glancing at the calendar, my heart skipped a beat: 14 May. The anniversary of my father’s death in 1998. There was no better sign that I was on the

right path. That little divine gesture managed to give me some precious encouragement that helped carry me through this very uncertain journey.

Pursuing this PhD was one of the more difficult undertakings I have taken in my life. I was certainly not particularly studious in high school or college. Despite having great professors who shaped how I thought, I was more focused on developing as a leader than becoming a scholar. I enjoyed studying sociology but never foresaw myself becoming a sociologist. I focused on the tactical aspects of becoming an Infantry officer. Something clicked when I was at the Naval War College on a one-year academic interlude from tactics to study strategy. Professors like Dr. Andrea Dew and Dr. Richard Lobban helped me discover an intellectual curiosity that I had not let out before. Studying at the Naval War College seemed to unite simmering thoughts and reflections about my experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and West Africa. But I soon discovered that education I received at the Naval War College would not be enough to carry me through the later parts of my career. The security problems I encountered working with some phenomenal colleagues in the Chief's Coordination Group in the Pentagon and with the Iran Action Group at State made me appreciate that I needed to expand my education, acquire new intellectual tools, and broader perspectives for the years and problems ahead.

I am indebted to my fellow White House Fellows (WHF) who also expanded how I think and how I understand problems. My doctoral education experience really started the year before arriving at Texas with my WHF Class 2019-2020. The lifelong friendships, counsel, and insights from fellow fellows like Frank Leija are what makes the program so impactful. It is a coincidence but a point of pride that White House Fellows were involved in every case study in this dissertation, including Tom Johnson (*Pueblo* Incident), Bud McFarlane (Euromissiles), and Colin Powell (Haiti Intervention). I must acknowledge that I have a personal soft spot for fellow

WHF Bud McFarlane (1937-2022), having the privilege of knowing him as a friend later in his life, not a historical figure. My profile of him in the Euromissile chapter does selfishly reflect my own experience with him, his warmth, his loyalty, and his commitment to our nation.

This experience would not be possible if it were not for the Army's Advanced Strategic Policy and Planning Program (ASP3). I am grateful the Army remains willing to invest the time, opportunity cost, and budget for officers to pursue doctorates. I am committed to the expectation that Goodpaster Scholars will continue to solve the Army's toughest problems, help senior leaders unpack complex issues, and guide the U.S. military through difficult challenges in the years ahead. I am grateful to all the staff at the Command and General Staff College who make our education possible, especially the support from Dr. Robert Davis and Keith Pruitt.

The education I have received at the LBJ School here at UT-Austin, along with the Graduate Fellows Program through the Clements Center, has been world-class. Dr. Will Inboden has been the perfect balance of scholar and practitioner to guide my research from the outset of my time here at LBJ and I have the deepest admiration for what he has built in the Clements Center. Dr. Jeremi Suri has a superpower to expand how we think and guide a class discussion. I hope I can lead a classroom like he can one day. I am grateful that Dr. Sheena Greitens was able to guide my research design, keep me on task, and provide critical feedback as a political scientist and Korea scholar. Dr. Mark Lawrence has been tremendous as a committee member, director of the Graduate Fellows Program, and director of the LBJ library. And as a testament to the influence of the Clements Center, I credit Dr. Tami Biddle to introducing me to coercive diplomacy, shaping how I see coercion theory, and helping me think about the role the military plays in coercion. I am also grateful for the help from so many of my colleagues and fellow

students here at UT, especially Sam Rosenberg and Rohit Goswami, for the dutiful work of proofing my initial drafts and giving me sound feedback on my writing and ideas.

Most of all, I am grateful to my family for giving me the inspiration and sense of purpose to follow a career of service to the nation. The secret gift of this PhD was being able to share these years with Ben, Teddy, and Penny. I love watching them grow and follow their own passions. Jackie deserves so much credit for their development and making this Army life work. She is a testament that military spouses are as selfless in their service as their partners in uniform. None of this work or this enriching life would be possible without her. Jackie fills our lives with love and direction.

I do not know how I will apply this doctorate in the decades ahead, or who will benefit from this research, but I have come to believe there is providence in the motto of UT-Austin:

What starts here changes the world.

I will consider the endeavor worthwhile if it simply introduces national security professionals to the conditions of coercive diplomacy. Practitioners are the true target audience of this study. I will be content if this study helps leaders recognize the distinctions between deterrence and compellence when trying to change behavior before of resorting to war. But this research will be truly effective if this study provides practitioners with a systematic and deliberate way to think about coercive diplomacy. Not just viewing the conditions as a checklist but seeing how the different elements interact, where to apply organizational energy, and avoid some hurdles that may prevent leaders from being more successful.

*D. Max Ferguson
Austin, Texas
14 April 2023*

Abstract

Peace With Strength: Developing the Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy

Daniel Max Ferguson, PhD

The University of Texas at Austin, 2023

Supervisor: William Inboden

United States policymakers need viable crisis response options – other than war – when deterrence is not able to prevent aggression. This study examines one policy option in the space between deterrence and war: coercive diplomacy. Applied successfully, coercive diplomacy defuses emerging conflicts by persuading an aggressor to change or reverse their behavior. However, attempts at coercive diplomacy fail more often than they succeed, even when applied by global powers like the United States. I build on the work of scholars who have examined policy traits found within effective coercive diplomacy attempts. Alexander George first developed a set of conditions for coercive diplomacy – also described as ingredients or prerequisites – that, when present, increase the policy’s likelihood of success. A critical gap in

the literature is a study that helps understand what leads to creating the conditions for coercive diplomacy – or what stands in the way of establishing those conditions.

The central research question for this study is *what facilitates or inhibits U.S. policymakers from developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy?* I examine historical cases from the Johnson, Reagan, and Clinton administrations where the United States attempted coercive diplomacy to reveal the messy realities of policymaking. I uncover the complicated relationships, impediments to action, and what subtle factors helped U.S. decision-makers develop policies to compel opponents to change behavior. This research helps establish how policymakers achieve the conditions of coercive diplomacy or what factors prevent them from attaining these benchmarks. The conclusion of this dissertation provides original insights about the eight conditions, both individually and how they interact with one another. Learning how the conditions interact is one of the novel and important contributions of my dissertation to the field of coercion. Understanding how the conditions interact also helps policymakers anticipate the dynamics or tensions between the different conditions. I share seven policy implications that this study reveals about future applications of coercive diplomacy. Lastly, I offer a series of initial questions that policymakers should ask before exercising coercive diplomacy.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	16
Research Design	21
Way Ahead	27
Chapter 2: Theories on Coercion, Policy Development, and Coercive Diplomacy ..	31
The Policy Development Process	35
Coercive Diplomacy Studies Review	38
The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	46
Chapter 3: The <i>Pueblo</i> Incident of 1968	63
Case Study Overview.....	64
Context in Time	67
The Personnel Behind the Policy.....	70
Tracing the Policy Process: <i>Pueblo</i> Incident Response.....	79
Conclusion	123
Chapter 4: The Euromissiles.....	132
Case Study Overview.....	136
Context in Time	141
The Personnel Behind the Policy.....	149
Tracing the Policy Process: The Euromissiles.....	161
Conclusion	213
Chapter 5: Haiti Intervention	225
Case Study Overview.....	227

Context in Time	231
The Personnel Behind the Policy	245
Tracing the Policy Process: The U.S. Intervention in Haiti.....	250
Conclusion	303
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	315
Insights into Individual Conditions.....	316
The Interaction of Conditions	328
Policy Implications	333
The Questions of Coercive Diplomacy.....	342
Appendix: Acronyms	349
Bibliography	351

List of Figures

Figure 1. The Coercion Continuum	34
Figure 2. Anderson’s Linear Model of the Policymaking Process	35
Figure 3. Easton's Dynamic Response Model of a Political System	36
Figure 4. NATO Weapons Ranges in Europe (April 1981).	145
Figure 5: The Interaction of Objectives and Risk.	328
Figure 6. Examples of Scenarios in the Continuum of Coersion.	333

List of Tables

Table 1. Summary of the Prerequisites for Successful Coercive Diplomacy	44
Table 2. Separating the Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	47
Table 3. The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	66
Table 4. The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	123
Table 5. The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	137
Table 6. The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	199
Table 7. The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	230
Table 8. The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	269
Table 9. The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy.	315

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

*“I’m not convinced that we have **fully thought** our way through all of **the challenges** we may face on the future high-end battlefield **if deterrence fails**. We need to **look harder at key cases**... We need to recognize that **bureaucratic infighting**, attachment to **the way we’ve always done** it, and reflexive skepticism of new ideas can be powerful **roadblocks** to progress. So we need to be focused. We need to be strategic...The future is a lot closer than some of us think. The stakes are high, but we are up to the challenge if we move decisively.”*

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth
October 11, 2021

A PROBLEM OF POWER AND PERSUASION

United States policymakers need viable crisis response options – other than war – when deterrence is not able to prevent aggression. This study examines one policy option in the space between deterrence and war: coercive diplomacy. Secretary Wormuth’s comments invoke a modern reality for the United States in the 21st century. Emboldened competitors and rogue states increasingly challenge the U.S. power to deter. Despite diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and threats of force, rogue states like Iran and North Korea defy U.S. pressure to halt their nuclear programs. Russia remained undeterred from attacking Ukraine in 2014 or 2022. China remains undeterred from militarizing barrier reefs and shoals across the South and the East China Sea. Will deterrence continue to prevent China from forcefully uniting Taiwan with mainland China?

Answering Secretary Wormuth’s call for action, I look at critical cases after deterrence *was unable to prevent behavior*, requiring the United States to defend its interests by *changing behavior* through coercive diplomacy instead of pursuing war. I used historical instances where the United States attempted coercive diplomacy to reveal the messy realities of policymaking: uncover the complicated relationships, impediments to action, and what subtle factors helped advance policy initiatives. I looked at how national security professionals, including elected and appointed officials, diplomats, and military leaders, develop policies that persuade opponents to

change behavior through diplomacy and force.* I also focused on international relationships as well because when the U.S. applies coercive diplomacy, is not just American officials collaborating among themselves. It takes a big tent to cover all the internal and domestic stakeholders involved in applications of coercion. Coercive diplomacy involves collaboration with allies, partners, and rivals, as well as considering the interests of domestic audiences.

Conceived as the ‘peacetime’ form of compellence, coercive diplomacy serves as an attractive conflict mitigation tool for the United States. While defensive in nature, this form of compellence is not for the timid. The selective employment of violence (sharp power) remains a core component of coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is recognized as the hardest form of coercion that pushes brinksmanship nearest to war.¹ Applied successfully, coercive diplomacy defuses emerging conflicts by persuading an aggressor to change or reverse their behavior. It helps defending nations achieve what Sun Tzu designates as the *acme of skill*, “to subdue an enemy without fighting.”² Like any acme of skill, coercive diplomacy is challenging. Political-military leaders must make hard calls under uncertain conditions, working with a slurry of ingredients. Attempts at coercive diplomacy fail more often than they succeed, even when applied by global powers like the United States.[†] Though haphazard or halfhearted attempts at compellence are easy to assemble, they are least likely to succeed. Worse yet, poorly developed coercive measures risk encouraging greater aggression.

* The reference of “policymaker” in this study is meant to incorporate the breadth of U.S. officials who contribute to national security policy decisions. This includes the President, the White House staff, political appointees across the administration, senior career civil servants, military officers, and diplomats. The focus of this study is on military, political, and diplomatic power, but economic power is also a major instrument of coercion.

† In the comparison of results between the cases performed by George and those by Art and Cronin demonstrate consistency that coercive diplomacy succeeded 32 percent of the time and outright failed approximately 45 percent of the time across their studies Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*.

The United States possesses an abundance of power across diplomatic, military, and economic instruments. However, the realization of power depends on the collaboration across these different instruments. In *Exercise of Power*, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates examines how to combine the elements of national power to support national interests. He describes the application of national power as a symphony, focusing on numerous additional instruments beyond the traditional taxonomy of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) tools.³ Building on his idea of a symphony, the military becomes one instrument – the percussion section – in this orchestra, and the application of force is not a spontaneous drum solo. Instead, civilian politicians become the composers of policy, combining the resources and instruments within their orchestra to create harmony and melodies based on their vision, objectives, and aims. Compellence requires a sophisticated integration of force and diplomacy to maximize its persuasive melody.

Policymakers must simultaneously weigh internal and external policy considerations to set favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy. Internally, policymakers consider the power at their disposal and how far they are willing to go to achieve their goals. Externally, they perceive what combination of levers might convince the opponent to change their behavior. Coercion requires leaders to consider how the world seems in the eyes of the opponent. How will rational interests collide with emotions of pride, humiliation, and honor? How will domestic considerations compete with international interests? Some issues require leaders to compare their internal position against what they see in the opponent. Which side is more motivated to pursue their aims? Coercion is more than a competition of power: it becomes a competition of will. Which side is more determined to assume risk and accept costs? Policymakers wrestle with these issues and more while developing coercive diplomacy policies.

I build on the work of scholars who have examined policy traits found within effective coercive diplomacy attempts. Alexander George first developed a set of conditions for coercive diplomacy – also described as ingredients or prerequisites – that, when present, increase the policy’s likelihood of success.⁴ A critical gap in the literature is a study that helps understand what leads to creating the conditions for coercive diplomacy – or what stands in the way of establishing those conditions. I help establish how policymakers achieve these conditions or what factors prevent them from attaining these benchmarks.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING INGREDIENTS

One way to look at the problem is that coercive diplomacy is like baking bread. Both tasks have a very simple list of ingredients but are deceptively hard to create without additional information. The ingredients for bread are simple: just combine flour, yeast, water, and salt. Likewise, George identified a rather straight forward list of eight ingredients for coercive diplomacy, like clear objectives, international support, terms of settlement, and establishing fear of escalation. Having a fully stocked pantry is not enough to confidently produce a fresh baguette from scratch. A baker would also want to reference a recipe. What temperature should the oven be? Does the water temperature matter? How much flour? A professional baker will understand the physical transformation that occurs when yeast combines with flour. Professional bakers recognize the nuances of what happens to the dough when they add water at different temperatures. They know when and at what temperature to let the dough rise in a proofing box. They know much more than how long to leave the bread in the oven. They appreciate what happens to a crust in a wood-fired or convection oven.*

* And even if the baker creates the perfect product, they recognize that it is the customer who ultimately has a choice about whether or not to buy their product. A professional baker cannot actually control or predict if a customer will choose to buy their rye bread or a baguette.

Like a stocked pantry of baking supplies, the United States has an abundance of military, economic, and diplomatic power, so achieving the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy should be a reasonable endeavor. They seem like simple tasks for a superpower like the United States to achieve. Yet applying coercive diplomacy with just a list of ingredients is like baking bread without a recipe. Unlike the volumes of cookbooks and recipes available online, policymakers have needed to rely on their intuition and personal experience to guide attempts at coercive diplomacy. At best, they might have come across the list of ingredients that scholars like George and Art developed years ago, but there is a significant gap in knowledge about how these ingredients interact or what inhibits a major power from achieving those conditions. This dissertation attempts to resolve that gap. The policy questions and considerations at the end of this dissertation are the closest I could make to a recipe for policymakers to reference when attempting to apply the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy.

RESEARCH QUESTION

In this dissertation, I answer *what facilitates or inhibits U.S. policymakers from developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy?* Concentrating the study on the policy development process enabled me to examine the only aspect of a coercive diplomacy effort that the United States controls: the contents of a policy. Studying the policy's development also allowed me to observe *bureaucratic infighting* and identify self-imposed *roadblocks* to the U.S. compelling cooperation in place of waging war.

I answered the research question using qualitative analysis of three historical cases where the United States applied coercive diplomacy in response to another state's aggression. These cases include the USS *Pueblo* incident of 1968 with North Korea, the SS-20 Euromissile affair with the Soviet Union during the Reagan administration, and the U.S. intervention in Haiti to

restore democracy between 1993 and 1994. The next section on research design further explains how I applied process tracing across the study's three cases. I then explain the criteria used to select the cases in this study and discuss alternate cases that I considered. I conclude this chapter discussing the limitations of this study, my positionality as a researcher, and outline the remainder of the dissertation.

Research Design

I used process tracing and case comparisons across the three cases to examine what facilitates or inhibits U.S. applications of coercive diplomacy.* In this study, I derived evidence from analyzing numerous forms of information found in documents, interviews, and archival sources. I began at predetermined moments within the case and traced along the causal process to infer the context of each step. For the *Pueblo* case, I began the study in the days leading up to the seizure of the USS *Pueblo*. For the other two cases, I narrowed my focus by picking up the story several years into the broader dispute at moments that I believe offered the most value for my study.

CASE SELECTION

The three primary cases in my research are 1) the USS *Pueblo* incident in 1968; 2) the SS-20 Euromissile affair between 1981-1987; and 3) the U.S. effort to restore democracy in Haiti between July 1993 and September 1994.

* Process tracing assimilates multiple forms of evidence within each case, tracing decisions as they evolved through the policy process, to verify how they developed. Process tracing helped me investigate how policymakers arrived at specific policy decisions. Process tracing helped me understand how different leaders influenced decisions and what elements inside the political system shaped that decision. Process tracing allowed me to observe bureaucratic infighting and tension between individual leaders within administrations. Comparing my observations across the different cases in this study offered insights into not just individual conditions but also how different conditions interact with each other. See Gerring (2007) and George (2005) for more about the technique of process tracing.

I selected these possible cases based on a series of common factors. First, the cases needed to occur within the scope of the study where the United States was the coercer towards target states. Second, I selected cases that occurred between 1946 and 2001. This time window encompasses when the United States emerged as a superpower after World War II and before the American focus shifted to counterterrorism after September 11, 2001. This period offered unique insights to the United States' role as a coercive power in times of competition. Third, I sought cases where the U.S. acted as the coercer applying compellence before resorting to brute force to change another state's behavior. With the focus on the U.S. policy development process, isolating the role of the U.S. as a superpower when it applies coercive diplomacy best reveals findings that will be relevant to U.S. policymakers in future crises.

The selected cases represent a broad sample of state actors from different geographic regions and opponent sizes. Selecting cases across a spectrum of small, medium, and large (near-peer) opponent sizes lets me observe how policymakers evaluated U.S. objectives and what to ask of an opponent against different levels of costs and risk. Coercing small states necessitates a different approach to power than coercing near-peer adversaries. The constant across these cases is American power. I want to assess how leaders decided to exercise this power, regardless of the opponent.

Selecting cases across multiple regions, including Asia, Latin America, and Europe, improves the generalizability of the findings from this study. This study investigated how the U.S. exercises power in compellence, not how to influence specific adversaries like the Soviets or North Koreans. Diversifying the regions allowed me to reduce the influence of cultural biases toward one region or another in policy making. I wanted to observe how American policymakers approached applying coercive pressure under different internal and external considerations. For example, compelling a junta government in Haiti revealed different tensions than coercing a rival

nuclear power. I did not want this to be a study of coercion for regional hedgehogs or have the findings inadvertently influenced by U.S. inclinations towards one region or culture. Instead, I examined a wide gamut of policy dilemmas while keeping the tools of U.S. national power constant.

While there may be advantages of consistency in selecting cases from within one administration or similar opponents, I deliberately chose cases from across multiple administrations to minimize the influence of individual policymakers and decision-making groups. The distinct influence of certain officials within administrations, such as Henry Kissinger in the Nixon administration or General Maxwell Taylor in the Kennedy administration, possessed more significant influence than other counterparts in the overall period. Therefore, limiting the cases to within one administration could have distorted the outcomes of the decision-making process regarding security issues. Distinguishing the characteristics of the three instances across era, region, administration, categorical type of compellence, and outcome enabled the study to focus on the relationship between U.S. policymakers as they develop coercive diplomacy policy.

An attractive feature that influenced the selection of the three primary cases was that key participants are still living and accessible to provide interviews for each of these cases. Interviews were key to seeing inside the black box of the political system. In addition, living participants could tell the stories behind the documents preserved in the archives.

ALTERNATIVE CASES

Reviewing alternate cases increased my confidence that I have selected the right set of cases for this study. Some of the other options I considered include the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969, the Jordan Revolt of 1970, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon

1981-1983, and Iraq 1990-1998. The Suez Crisis offered several unique characteristics of coercing allies. Still, the primary instrument of national power used in that case was economic leverage which did not satisfactorily meet the scope of the study's research question. The Sino-Soviet conflict of 1969 offered an opportunity to study a unique conflict between the two leading competitors of the United States today. From a coercion study perspective, the decision by President Nixon to leverage U.S. coercive pressure against the Soviets would be a fascinating case to study. However, the incident dealt more with deterrence than coercive diplomacy. Nixon's policy decisions focused most on preventing the Soviets from employing nuclear weapons against the Chinese. The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 rests just outside the scope of coercive diplomacy for my purposes but would offer tremendous present value for a study on policy decisions in deterrence.

The Jordan Revolt of 1970 and the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s were alternate options for the small-opponent category of this study. They were attractive because they have not received much scholarly attention as cases of coercive diplomacy. However, the United States served a supporting role in these crises. These cases were primarily international efforts where the United States shared decision-making considerations with coalition partners. Therefore, the cases fit best in a study that looks at coalition efforts to set the conditions for coercive diplomacy.

I choose not to include Iraq between 1990 and 1998 as the mid-sized opponent in this study, even though the case offers several valuable qualities. I felt the USS *Pueblo* case with North Korea provides a broader array of issues than Iraq. In particular, I appreciated the interconnected nature of North Korea in 1968 with the Soviet Union and Communist China. There are less significant ties to great power competition in the Iraq example. Also, I had not come across studies of the *Pueblo* incident as a case of coercive diplomacy. Meanwhile, Iraq in

the 1990s has received a fair amount of scholarly attention. Therefore, the *Pueblo* incident was the better mid-sized case for this study.

STUDY LIMITATIONS

The study examined how U.S. senior officials make decisions during a crisis, including how they interpret information about internal and external policy issues. The purpose of this study was not to score the outcome of the policies in each case. Other studies can further examine whether the information available to leaders effectively supported the decision-making process and the accuracy of intelligence assessments.

This study was not designed to determine how target states make decisions as recipients of coercive diplomacy. The overriding value of this study is its focus on the U.S. policy development process. Though I incorporated foreign evidence to gain insight into the opponent's perspective, further studies may examine how opponents decide how to respond to coercive diplomacy in greater detail.

A target state's cooperation is ultimately a function of humans making decisions. This boils down to influencing a choice, not forcing an outcome. Therefore, this study did not take a deterministic approach to causality but should still yield helpful conclusions on how policymakers can improve the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy efforts.

RESEARCHER POSITIONALITY

It is important to recognize my positionality as a researcher studying policymakers and where I may have carried unintended bias in my research. I am a career Army officer who has directly served senior military, political, and diplomatic officials. As a career Army officer, I have an emic relationship with military officers and identify with the professional and personal

roles of career Foreign Service Officers. In addition, my experience as a White House Fellow gave me a unique appreciation for the perspective of political appointees serving as officials in national security.

My experience working with the U.S. Special Representative for Iran on the Secretary's Iran Action Group (S/IAG) at the Department of State drove my interest in policy development and coercive diplomacy. The entire year was an exercise of U.S. coercive diplomacy attempting to change Iranian behavior through the maximum pressure campaign. The assignment also exposed me directly to tensions that developed between State, the Executive Office of the President, and the Department of Defense. I observed tension over policy issues between the civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the geographic combatant command, CENTCOM, in Tampa, Florida. My year at State Department gave me a better window into the friction within the Department of Defense than I had previously seen in the decade prior or my preceding year inside the Pentagon. I recognize that the contention I observed between these groups was anecdotal and does not encapsulate how these entities habitually interact.

My experience working on Iran policy at State also gave me a unique appreciation for the role of international partners and allies in coercive diplomacy. I witnessed how Germany, France, and the United Kingdom regularly shaped U.S. policy considerations.* In addition, the role of Russia and China, both aligned with the target state, played an equally significant role in U.S. policy decisions. These observations on the role of international stakeholders contribute to my interest in studying whether coercive isolation is a condition for coercive diplomacy. Still, I

* These three countries were known as the E3 regarding the U.S. policy towards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

was careful to avoid imposing a biased perception of how international stakeholders influenced policy decisions as I looked at each case.

The case selection attempted to mitigate my potential bias as a researcher to conflicts and crises I dealt with in my professional capacity. I selected cases that occurred before 2001 both to avoid direct personal bias and to acknowledge my role as an emic researcher. I began my military career in July 2001 and subsequently deployed numerous times to Iraq and Afghanistan. I did not want to study cases that evaluate the decisions of active-duty senior military leaders. It was easier to assess historical instances in which all key participants are long retired and no longer directly influence my professional career. I also found it most helpful to examine older cases that current and rising leaders have overlooked or forgotten.

Way Ahead

There are five remaining chapters in this dissertation. In Chapter Two, I review theories on coercion, compellence, and policy development. I also discuss the concept of coercive diplomacy and the eight conditions first developed by Alexander George that serve as the focal point of my research. These ingredients were the lens through which I looked at my cases for how policymakers applied coercive diplomacy in my three cases.

Chapters Three through Five are dedicated to the three case studies in this dissertation. The case studies are in chronological order: Chapter Three is the Pueblo study; Chapter Four is the Euromissile study; Chapter Five is the Haiti study. Each case study chapter is written using the same basic structure. The chapters open with a scene setter story meant to grip the reader's imagination about the crisis that policymakers were trying to resolve. Then the case study chapters follow an approach for framing historical events to help solve emerging problems that was inspired by Neustadt and May in "Thinking in Time" (1986). According to Neustadt and

May, looking back to look ahead requires leaders to not just familiarize with the history of an event, but understand the context of past decision and the personal histories of the people who made those decisions.* Therefore, the case study chapters include a section called “Context in Time” and “The Personnel Behind the Policy” before tracing the policy decisions involved in the case. The context and personnel sections help place the decisions that pertain to the case within greater context and appreciate the unique attributes of those making the decisions. The case study chapters include analysis of how the conditions of coercive diplomacy were enabled or hindered by the circumstances within the case.

The conclusion chapter offers observations for both scholars and practitioners. First, I provide insights from across the three cases about what facilitates or inhibits individual conditions and how the conditions interact with one another. These sections add new knowledge to the scholarship on coercive diplomacy. I then offer policy implications drawn from observations in this study. Lastly, I provide questions and considerations for policymakers attempting to apply coercive diplomacy.

Ultimately, this study explores ways the U.S. applied force and diplomacy to avoid war. President Reagan often spoke of ‘peace *through* strength,’ and his administration applied this principle while coercing the Soviets during the Euromissile affair. The motto endures today as a guiding principle for defense in great power competition. However, this study shows that Reagan’s watchword deserves a subtle amendment. Peace is not achieved *through* strength. Just like Clausewitz is often quoted as having said, “war is but politics *through* other means,” but the

* Neustadt and May called this **placement** – where those looking at a historical event come to appreciate both the public history (big events) and the personal history (details) of those who made decisions in the past. These public and personal histories required looking at “the other’s outlook on the world, the job, the issue, their premises, prejudices, blind spots, commitments.” Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 167

better translation is that “war is but politics *with* other means.”⁵ Neither war nor peace are isolated endeavors. War is just the last of many instruments involved in a political struggle. This study shows that convincing an opponent to accept peace through coercive diplomacy requires multiple instruments in concert with one another. Strength becomes one of many instruments that, when combined carefully, can persuade an opponent to change behavior. This study shows how the more appropriate watchword becomes *peace with strength*.

ENDNOTES

¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

³ Robert Gates, *Exercise of Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020).

⁴ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1971); George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69.

Chapter 2: Theories on Coercion, Policy Development, and Coercive Diplomacy

This chapter introduces theories that inform the concept and practice of coercion. I also discuss models of policy development that depict the policy decisions this study examines. I then introduce the foundational concepts of coercive diplomacy and briefly summarize existing literature in the field. I conclude the chapter with an overview of the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy that serve as the framework for this dissertation.

BRUTE FORCE VS. COERCION: A DIFFERENCE OF CHOICE AND PERSUASION

Thomas Schelling categorized political violence into two types, coercion and brute force. For the latter he also used the term “forcible action.”¹ Brute force simply pits the strength of one actor against the strength of another. To determine if an act is appropriately in the category of coercion or brute force, one need only ask the question, “Is the cooperation of the adversary required?” With brute force, it is not. “There is no need for a decision by the target state because power is imposed directly in such a way as to obviate choice.”²

Coercion takes an inverse approach to the use of power. Through either deterrence or compellence, a coercer seeks to persuade the target state to either not take action, or to change its behavior (or cease a behavior it has begun).^{*} The target state is presented with the choice to cooperate with the coercer’s demands or face the manifestation of the coercer’s explicit or implicit threats. Ultimately, “the success or failure of coercion rests in the decision of the target

^{*} Key term definitions: target state and coercer. The target state is the state that is the recipient of coercive pressure by the coercer. In this study on compellence, the target state will be the state that originally took aggressive action against another state, leading to the United State to apply coercive diplomacy as the coercer (the state applying coercive pressure on the target state).

state.”³ Policy goals that rely on gaining (or maintaining) cooperation through coercion cover a breadth of scenarios: convincing an opponent not to employ nuclear weapons; to refrain from invading a neighboring state; to cease the support of separatist groups; to abandon weapons programs; to cede power to democratically elected leadership, and so forth. The challenge for policymakers applying coercive diplomacy is devising a compelling policy that convinces the target state to change its behavior by presenting well-conceived, credible threats that are clearly understood by the opponent, and politically acceptable to the domestic polity of the coercer.

In coercive diplomacy, brute force looms as an escalatory threat. If a coercer does not get a desired outcome through coercive acts, it has the option to shift its emphasis to the application of brute force/forcible action and invade enemy territory to replace that enemy’s existing government. Indeed, forcibly removing the regime rests at the top of the conventional (non-nuclear) escalatory ladder. The target state should be influenced by the knowledge that the coercer can up the ante at any time. Escalatory threats are important in coercion (and thus important in coercive diplomacy), so the possession of escalation dominance is a meaningful component of crisis interaction.⁴ States owning expeditionary armies are formidable foes in crises, not least because they possess the ability to launch a land invasion should they choose to do so. If the target state in a coercive contest does not believe that the coercer has the (political) will to actually launch a major military operation, then the coercer’s military power is not so influential. Coercive diplomacy is centrally about will and credibility: possessing power becomes a matter of credibility: possessing power is different than having the willingness to use it. In the ensuing game of brinkmanship, both contestants will analyze the other’s resolve and commitment, evaluating the other’s willingness to take risk and to stay the course. And both actors will try to gauge and assess the value of the stake in the eyes of the other.

THE TWO FORMS OF COERCION: DISTINGUISHING COMPELLENCE FROM DETERRENCE

Alexander George deserves tremendous credit for all of his contributions to the fields of crisis management and coercion. One might argue, though, that his selection of the term “coercive diplomacy” has been problematical, since it is not always understood instinctively outside the academic community. The term “coercive” evokes, in the minds of some in the military and policy-making communities, pejorative meanings associated with the practices of gangs, mafias, and underworld operators. And the term “diplomacy” is categorized by some as existing in the realm of “soft power.” Indeed, those (in the military in particular) who do not understand diplomacy do not realize its full range and potential; instead, they may perceive it simply as “talking” (without doing). Some scholars have attempted to modify the name to ‘compellent diplomacy’ or ‘forceful persuasion,’ but George’s name ‘coercive diplomacy’ established itself as the standard term.*

Compared to deterrence, references to coercion and compellence rarely appear in U.S. strategic documents or policy discussions. When they appear, it is most likely as a reference to an adversary’s behavior. The terms evoke negative stigmas of blackmail or bullying vulnerable states to give up something valuable. Seemingly contradictory to American values of freedom and democracy, these attributes are neither politically favorable nor terms government officials want to be associated with.⁵ On the other hand, U.S. policymakers draw on deterrence in strategic documents and policies. This is because deterrence carries a socially acceptable connotation, evoking defensive postures and maintaining peace. Coercive diplomacy is a

* Art and Greenhill prefer the name *compellence diplomacy* but recognize George’s original name *coercive diplomacy* has become convention in practice. See Art, Robert and Greenhill, Kelly in *Coercion : the Power to Hurt in International Politics / Edited by Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause*. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp 13. George himself calls it “coercive diplomacy (or compellence, as some prefer to call it)” in his forward to Art and Cronin’s 2003 book on coercive diplomacy.

defensive measure that seeks to restore peace instead of war. Its principles are as American as apple pie, epitomizing the idea of “peace through strength” even though it bears an unfortunate name.

In an era that is seeing the renewal of great power competition, coercion – and compellence in particular – deserve a renewed focus. I hope this study helps expand policy conversations beyond deterrence, so that they embrace the many situations that both involve and rely on compellence. This study is meant to create a better appreciation for, and understanding of the value of coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy tool.




Figure 1. The Coercion Continuum originally developed by Alexander George. (George et al. 1971; George and Simons 1994).

Schelling first delineated the concepts of deterrence and compellence as subcomponents of coercion in the 1960s, during the height of the Cold War.⁶ **The point of departure between deterrence and compellence is whether the opponent has yet to act.** Deterrence only applies when an opponent has yet to commence the action in question. As soon as an opponent begins a hostile act, they cross an invisible line of departure that extends applications of coercion beyond deterrence, pushing policymakers into the arena of compellence. The use of contemporary terms such as “contested deterrence” and “re-establishing deterrence” are actually references to compellence, whether practitioners realize it or not. Figure 1 demonstrates the coercion continuum from deterrence to compellence. The chart reflects the three types of coercive

diplomacy along the continuum that become increasingly difficult to achieve, depending on the policy goals of the coercer.⁷ To the right of Type C is war. Once a war has begun, the landscape changes: the actors involved switch from the means and mechanisms of coercive diplomacy in a crisis to the ways and means of warfighting. The latter share characteristics with coercive diplomacy, but coercion and brute force in war have their own literature. The scope of this study is limited to coercive diplomacy.*

The Policy Development Process

From a public policy studies perspective, this study examines the convergence of demands within policy process. The first policy development models laid out the basic steps of the policymaking in a linear process with sequential stages.⁸ Public policy scholar Deborah Stone observes that such models oversimplify the process. “The model of policy making in the rationality project is a production model, where policy is created in a fairly orderly sequence of stages, almost as if on an assembly line.”⁹ In practice, few national security policy decisions follow a linear process, especially in coercive diplomacy. The paths to many policy decisions become much messier endeavors with various internal and external influences shaping outcomes. As Stone puts it, “the production model fails to capture...the essence of policy making in political communities: *the struggle over ideas*.”¹⁰




Figure 2. Anderson’s Linear Model of the Policymaking Process

* See Art and Greenhill (2018) for further discussion on the distinctions between wartime compellence and coercive diplomacy.

In 1965, David Easton developed a macro interpretation of the policy process that better reflects the cyclical nature of policy development.¹¹ He explained how a series of demands and inputs converge into policy outputs that flow into a natural feedback loop. Easton referred to this process as a dynamic response model of a political system. Refined depictions of the policy process, such as Easton’s model, help visualize the various inputs and influences that affect decisions. Easton recognized the internal and external aspects of policymaking in what he called ‘extrasocietal’ and ‘intrasocietal’ factors of the total environment.

The ‘conversion of demands’ inside Easton’s political system is the heart of this study. The function of translating demands into policy outputs within this political system is sometimes described as a ‘black box.’ Lin-Manuel Miranda touches on this phenomenon in the Hamilton song, The Room Where It Happens. “No one really knows how the game is played. The art of the trade. How the sausage gets made. We just assume that it happens. But no one else in the room where it happens.”¹²




Figure 3: A depiction of the conversion of demands in Easton's Dynamic Response Model of a Political System (1965). Internal and external factors of the environment converge into policy outputs in the ‘black box’ of the political system.

The only way to see inside the black box is to have access to sensitive information and personal observations. Gaining public access to this data often requires time. The declassification process takes years, sometimes decades. Public officials are not likely to have permission (or a

desire) to openly discuss what occurred in private meetings until years after the fact. Therefore, the best way to peek inside the black box and shed light on how these decisions are made is to look at historical cases. Ideally, those cases occurred long enough ago to allow for declassification, but recently enough that participants in those meetings are still alive to interview. In this study, the sweet spot for case selection was finding cases that offer both access to documents and the availability of living participants to interview. A historical analysis of policy decisions allowed me to uncover what inhibited or facilitated efforts to build a coercive policy – to go back to the room where decisions happened.

MODELING THE CONVERGENCE OF DEMANDS

Policy scholars created several models to depict the *struggle over ideas* inside the black box of the political system. Cohen, March, and Olsen developed the Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice as one possible explanation.¹³ To Cohen and his colleagues, the policy process is anything but linear. Instead, policy making is “organized anarchy” (1972). In their model, participants drift in and out of decision-making, debating issues out of self-interest instead of sincerely attempting to solve a policy dilemma.¹⁴ Inside this model, problems mix with solutions, participants, and resources in a metaphoric garbage can.

John Kingdon adapted the garbage can model to develop the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) to describe federal government decision-making.¹⁵ Kingdon observed three distinct families of processes (streams) that form in policy making: problems, politics, and policies. When these three streams converge, policy windows open to create policy outputs. The problem stream draws attention to how issues come to capture the attention of those in government. Do government leaders need first to address whether the United States should intervene? The politics stream factors national mood, public opinion, election results, and

interest group pressure campaigns on whether or how to address the emerging problem. The policy stream, which includes the influence of the community of specialists, including bureaucrats, legislators, researchers, and budget officials that draft policy proposals, formulate options based on technical feasibility and acceptability.¹⁶ My study emphasizes the role of diplomats, civil servants, civilian defense officials, and uniformed military leaders within the policy stream.

Policy entrepreneurs attempt to merge the three streams by advocating for or coalescing behind specific policy options. In this study, there are repeated examples of policy entrepreneurs, from international stakeholders to domestic political activists, that influenced U.S. policy decisions regarding coercive diplomacy. One example is when South Korea pressured the United States to retaliate against North Korea for the Blue House Raid that occurred just days before the seizure of the USS *Pueblo*. Other examples include the heavy lobbying pressure on the Clinton administration by pro-Aristide interest groups to forcefully reinstate the Haitian president back to power. Scholars have growing recognition of “the outside game” of coercion that includes important factors to recognize in coercive diplomacy. I discuss these ideas, including the theory of coercive isolation, later in the chapter.

Coercive Diplomacy Studies Review

Alexander George established the concept of coercive diplomacy in the 1971 study of Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.¹⁷ He examined these three cases of coercion by the United States to develop the fundamental principles of coercive diplomacy today. This included the continuum of coercion from deterrence to escalating forms of compellence and the four forms of coercive diplomacy: ultimatums, tactic ultimatums, “try-and-see,” and “gradual turning of the screw.”¹⁸ Alexander George expanded his portfolio of coercive

diplomacy confrontations in his second co-authored addition of *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* and his book *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*.¹⁹ These books add cases of compellence between the United States and Japan, Nicaragua, Libya, and Kuwait. Across these cases, George explores how demonstrations and threats of force can complement diplomatic efforts to achieve peace without resorting to war. He bounded coercive diplomacy as a concept only to defensive instances that respond to an aggressor, not as an offensive tool to bully victim states for blackmail.*

In 1978, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan studied the role of the U.S. armed forces as a political instrument in *Force Without War*.[†] Blechman and Kaplan examined instances of coercion by the United States between 1946 and 1975. They identified 215 confrontations where the United States employed armed forces in coercive efforts. These events ranged across many scenarios, from major military mobilizations to minor applications of force in many political contexts. The study determined some valuable findings regarding the utility of force in coercion, such as what types of armed forces are more effective tools for coercion (ex: land-based, aircraft, naval, nuclear), but it did not examine the decision-making process that determined the level of force needed to achieve the desired political objective.

* A fundamental component to how Alexander George established coercive diplomacy as a concept was by delineating that coercive diplomacy only served as a defensive application of coercion. Conceivably, coercion can also be used as a threatening form of blackmail to “persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up resistance” (George 1994: 7).

[†] Blechman contributes to a follow up his 1978 study in *Military Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy* Melanie Sisson, James Siebens, and Barry Blechman, *Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War* (New York: Routledge Global Security Studies, 2020).. In the second study, Sisson, Siebens, and Blechman examine confrontations of U.S. coercion from 1991 to 2018. This subsequent study similarly looks at the conditions under which types, sizes, and uses of military force affect applications of deterrence and compellence. The study also explores messaging, credibility, and resolve in select cases of coercion. In the case study on the Middle East, the contributor Kenneth Pollack concentrates on the lack of understanding of the adversary’s motivational drivers due to confirmation bias by national security leaders despite the available intelligence.

In 2011, Todd Sechser published a study focused on the military's influence on compellence. He found a significant gap in the literature on studies focusing on compellence.²⁰ In response, he developed a dataset called the *Militarized Compellent Threats* (MCT) that coded 210 confrontations of compellence between 1918 and 2001 (the United States is the coercer in 21 of these 210 events). The MCT produced a similar analysis as the Blechman studies on coercion, where the variables help assess the likelihood of success of different applications of compellence. The study helps policymakers identify correlates of successful compellent threats using macro variables but his study did not examine the intergovernmental decision-making process about how to apply compellence.

In 1996, Robert Pape published one of the most influential studies on air power in coercion using air campaigns performed by many states from 1917 to 1991. One of Pape's contributions to the field of coercion studies was how he characterized the four strategies of coercion that air power performs: denial, risk, punishment, or decapitation.* Pape concluded that strategies that rely on bombing to punish adversaries are rarely successful, while bombing strategies of denial are most likely to coerce the compliance of an adversary. While Pape's findings help policymakers distinguish which coercion strategies and methods are most likely to succeed, his study is limited to air power and focuses mainly on wartime coercion to support his findings. Coercion in peacetime, especially in situations of compellence, possesses distinct motivation factors by adversaries that change in wartime scenarios. Furthermore, adversaries usually perceive the demands and the threat of force from a coercer differently in peacetime than they perceive large-scale employments of force in wartime. Therefore, Pape's findings on air

* Pape builds on the work by Thomas Schelling, who introduced denial and punishment as the two primary methods of coercion Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).. Tami Biddle notes that coercion scholars sometimes interpret Pape's method of "risk" as an extension of Schelling's concept of punishment (2020).

power introduce concepts for coercion but are most applicable to wartime applications of compellence – in particular coercive air power.

In 2002, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman analyzed the applications of coercion in American foreign policy in *The Dynamics of Coercion*. Their study included the political dynamics within the coercer – focusing on the domestic political constraints in applying coercion and building consensus among coalition members in coercion. I build on their work by examining how military and diplomatic leaders account for domestic political constraints.

The dominance of U.S. military power during the 1990s exhibited during the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo conflict influenced the coercion scholarship from that era. The context of these studies is important to consider. Pape's study came about during a period when the United States seemed to wield unrivaled coercive potential. The novelty of precision-guided munitions and the dominance of U.S. stealth technology showed that the U.S. retained distinct advantages in coercion. Yet I show in the Haiti case just how hard it is for a superpower to convince even the weakest of opponents to change behavior, even within the same hemisphere. Moreover, the proliferation of cheap and accessible drones only further reduces the asymmetric power advantage the U.S. enjoyed throughout the 1990s.

The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis is another demonstration that coercive power – and relying on 'what worked before' – can be fleeting and elusive. The Clinton administration deployed an unprecedented U.S. armada of naval power, including two entire carrier fleets, through the Taiwan strait in 1996 to resolve the crisis through coercive diplomacy. Frustrated and embarrassed by their military inferiority, China dedicated the subsequent twenty-five years seeking ways to reduce and marginalize the coercive advantage possessed by the United States.

Policymakers today recognize that classic symbols of U.S. military strength, like nuclear powered aircraft carriers, might be losing some of their coercive power.* U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South and the East China Sea disrupt and delay Chinese ambitions to dominate the region. Still, the U.S. has yet to deter (prevent) China from provocative actions like militarizing shoals and reefs in contested waters. The shrinking military and diplomatic power gaps between the U.S. and its competitors that materialized over the last twenty years challenge American efforts to set favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy.

Even though Byman and Waxman's book was published shortly after 9/11, it was written from a 1990s perspective that now feels dated. They offer "a critical point: most U.S. crises have recently been and will continue to be in the near future, relatively low stakes," using the Persian Gulf War as a counterpoint for what exemplifies a high stakes crisis.²¹ Within a year of that publishing, the U.S. invaded Iraq. The stakes against North Korea, peaking in 2017, remain high. The stakes against Iran could not have come closer to war in January 2020 when Iran retaliated for the Qassim Soleimani strike with a medium-range missile barrage against U.S. military installations in Iraq. That crisis averted war by chance when no Americans died in the Iranian missile attack. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine created a situation that the international community had not experienced in decades when, in 2022, Russia flirted with nuclear warfare during its invasion of Ukraine.²² These heightened stakes of global crises over the last two decades have made it increasingly imperative for U.S. policymakers to reconsider the dynamics of coercion.

* The advancements in anti-ship ballistic missile technology question the strategic value of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers, even if the U.S. carrier fleet remains unrivaled in quantity and quality.

Reviewing the last fifty years of studies on compellence, scholars find that coercive diplomacy fails more often than it succeeds²³. In their book *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin explore why coercive diplomacy is so challenging and review the track record of the United States in its attempts to employ coercive measures.²⁴ Art and Cronin expand on the studies by Alexander George by adding cases between the United States and Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, North Korea, Taiwan, Iraq, and violent extremist organizations. If one assesses results between the cases included by George and those included by Art and Cronin one finds that coercive diplomacy succeeded 32 percent of the time and outright failed approximately 45 percent of the time.* Art further examines the success rates of compellence.²⁵ Together, they compare additional findings by John Mearsheimer, Michael Horowitz, and Daniel Reiter that reaffirm the low probability of success in compellence. Recognizing that attempts at coercive diplomacy yield a low success rate demonstrates the value of this study.

IDENTIFYING PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

Through his studies, Alexander George identified eight recurring conditions that contribute to favorable outcomes in applying compellence against target states.²⁶ George identified these conditions through inductive research on historical case studies. Across the literature on coercive diplomacy, these conditions come closest to offering a set of guidelines for practitioners to follow in formulating a coercive diplomacy policy.

* Art and Cronin (2003) recognize that they could expand the datasets by isolating distinct attempts of compellence within the broader conflict. For example, the one Iraq case breaks down into six separate efforts by the United States to apply coercive diplomacy: 1990-91, 1991, 1992-93, 1994, 1996, and 1998. In the expanded dataset of the original eight cases, they identify sixteen distinct observations of coercive diplomacy.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target's fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 1. Summary of the prerequisites for successful coercive diplomacy, as originated by Alexander George and detailed by Robert Art (George, Hall, and Simons 1971; George and Simons 1994, 288; Art and Cronin 2003, 371).

As depicted in Table 1 and henceforth referenced throughout this study, I present the eight conditions as an enumerated list. They have not always appeared that way from one study to the next in earlier scholarship. The conditions are ideas that evolved inductively. In *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, George notes the apparent variance in the conditions from his earlier works (1994). After two decades, he found one of his original conditions, “usable military options,” was not appropriate to include as a prerequisite. “This omission does not downgrade the importance of selecting military options that are politically and strategically appropriate...it merely reflects our later recognition...that coercive pressure can sometimes be applied through nonmilitary means.”²⁷ The list of conditions continued to adapt when Robert Art examined them in 2003. My dissertation picks up the list where Art left off. I use the same wording as Art and I follow his numbering sequence.*

* I include the table of the eight conditions in each case study chapter to help readers reference the conditions as a numerical group.

The eight conditions help guide policy making but do not amount to a failproof checklist. George recognized that these conditions, when present, favor the success of coercive diplomacy strategies “or, if absent, reduce the likelihood of its being effective.”²⁸ Not all these conditions are needed in each attempt of compellence. George and Art identified situations where it is appropriate (and recommended) that policymakers omit certain conditions.* Policymakers applying coercion could not presuppose any generic list of actions could guarantee a successful outcome. George also implies that the conditions alone do not automatically create a favorable outcome. The result also depends on the talent and skill of the leaders applying coercion. “Strategic skill can contribute to the successful application of coercive diplomacy only if the eight conditions...are present.”²⁹ There is an art to combining force and diplomacy for political aims that lists and policy guides will never replace. Refining this list of conditions helps empower leaders to navigate the subtleties of statecraft.

Furthermore, George warned that, while some of the conditions seem to be more critical than others, “it would be a dangerous oversimplification to believe that coercive diplomacy can always be successful if only one or another condition is satisfied.”³⁰ I examine all eight conditions in this study, looking for insights to individual conditions and observing how different conditions interact with one another.

Though not sufficient by themselves, George and Art found that the two final conditions, as listed in bold in Table 1, stand out in terms of importance. “The [first] six ingredients facilitate the successful execution of coercive diplomacy, but they are not in themselves sufficient to produce target compliance. The last two ingredients are critical, and unless they are favorable to the coercer, the attempt will fail.”³¹ It is important to note that the necessary conditions look

* I discuss some of these circumstances further in my discussions on each condition later in this chapter.

outwards, concerned with external considerations about influencing the opponent's perception. George hammers home the necessity for policymakers to exercise empathy. "The prospects for success in the choice and implementation of coercive diplomacy are greatly enhanced if a policymaker can view the crisis events and his own crisis behavior from the perspective of the opponent."³² This study will scrutinize how policymakers appreciate the situation from the opponent's perspective in developing coercive policies.

The Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy

George and Art's conditions for coercive diplomacy served as the framework for my research. I used the list they developed as a lens to evaluate what facilitates or inhibits the development of successful coercive diplomacy policies. Many of the conditions are sensible and intuitive. They establish fundamental tasks for policymakers to consider. But politicians, bureaucrats, military leaders, and senior diplomats often face dilemmas that offer no obvious or ready options for solution. They need to weigh compromises between different organizational and political interests under conditions of imperfect information, and that involve high stakes. Leaders instinctively weigh risks, set objectives, and assess public support before deciding on the use of force. The topics are simple to describe but deceptively hard to settle. Learning how decision-makers mix these policy ingredients becomes the necessary next step to building on the work by scholars like George and Art.

I created focal points to guide my research by separating the eight conditions into two thematic categories of internal and external policy issues.* This simplified my research focus and

* Interpreting the list across two buckets of internal and/or external policy issues follows a core principle of Sun Tzu. "Know the enemy and know yourself... When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to peril." Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

analysis toward two overarching policy perspectives. Table 2 shows my interpretation of how the last condition shares internal and external considerations.

Developing the Conditions for Coercive Diplomacy			
#	Condition	Internal Policy Issue	External Policy Issue
1.	<i>Clarity of objectives</i>	✓	
2.	<i>Willingness to accept costs and risks</i>	✓	
3.	<i>Domestic and international support</i>	✓	
4.	<i>Strong and unified leadership</i>	✓	
5.	<i>Clarity and precision in terms of settlement*</i>	✓	
6.	<i>Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state</i>		✓
7.	The target's fear of unacceptable escalation		✓
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer**	✓	✓

Table 2. Separating the conditions of coercive diplomacy into internal and external policy considerations.

The internal conditions focus on policy decisions that require policymakers to affirm the policy position of the United States on the issue. Examples include: What are the United States' political objectives in this crisis? How much risk should the United States assume in pursuing these goals? What do the American people and international community think about U.S. involvement in this crisis? It is essential to clarify that I include international partners and allies as an internal policy issue (as reflected in Condition 3).^{*} External issues focus outwardly on the *opponent's perception* of the coercive pressure directed by the United States. Examples include: What does the opponent fear most in this situation? Does the opponent think the U.S. is

^{*} There is an argument that policymakers would consider building and maintaining international support an external policy consideration. I liberally expand the notion of 'internal' to include like-minded partner states that share U.S. security interests. External policy issues deal exclusively with how policymakers shape the opponent's perception. Likewise, policy considerations directed at shaping positions of the opponent's partners and allies would be an external issue. For more, see discussion on coercive isolation.

serious in following through with threats of force? What is driving the opponent's provocative behavior?

A PRIMER FOR THE EIGHT CONDITIONS

Summarizing the eight conditions reveals the breadth of internal and external considerations baked into coercive diplomacy policies. Unfortunately, many of these prerequisites are much easier for academics to identify than for practitioners to develop. In the section below, I review each condition and interpret some of the conclusions made previously by George and Art. This section also introduces some theories of decision-making, political-military relations, and organizational behavior that I consider throughout this study. The conclusion chapter provides additional observations about individual conditions and how the conditions interact with one another.

It is easy to appreciate the strategic value of **Condition 1**, *clarity of objectives*. Clear objectives lend to clean soundbites and signal resolve. Blunt policy goals help “persuade the opponent of the coercing power’s strength of purpose.”³³ Having clear objectives helps persuade the enemy as much as it helps encourage domestic support. Establishing Condition 1 leaves less room for misinterpretations by the opponent and helps domestic and international audiences understand the U.S. government plan. It is a simple condition that is, nonetheless, hard to get right.

Defense policies originate from political leaders who then entrust professional military leaders to exercise force – violence – on behalf of the state. The application of force is meant to achieve political aims because, as Carl Von Clausewitz explained, war is fundamentally an extension of policy: “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”³⁴ Linear depictions of the

polycymaking process suggest civilians formulate and adopt policies and then present policy objectives ready for military implementation. However, political aims are not necessarily delivered at the outset of the conflict in clear terms for the military to execute. Instead, politicians may suggest or infer objectives, mention aims during the convergence process, or deliberately leave their goals ambiguous to allow room for diplomacy. Attempts to provide political guidance may be too vague, and guiding documents, such as National Security Reviews, often lack specificity. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, recalled how these official reports meant to provide political intent “came up short, a bland work, full of generalities and truisms, doomed for the dustbin.”³⁵

Sometimes, the only way to glean intent from civilian leaders is through close interaction and personal relationships. Personal interaction can reveal subtle cues about what is really important to a leader. In deliberations on whether to invade Iraq in 1991, General Colin Powell, remembered, “I studied the President’s face...From his questions and demeanor, I concluded that George Bush no longer wanted an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.”³⁶ General Powell also expressed frustration with policy guidance created on behalf of the White House by bureaucrats and appointees. Issuing vague guidance also creates opportunities for broad interpretations. When subordinates must decipher intent, they may misinterpret the vision of the decision-maker and move out in an undesired direction.*

In developing this condition, George and Art do not require policymakers to solidify their aims at the outset of a crisis and adhere to these original goals throughout. “The coercer’s initial

* Tami Biddle notes that National policy documents, like the National Security Strategy, serve many purposes and are meant to send general signals about US priorities. They are not only for a domestic audience (to send signals about the budget), but also an international one. Diplomats read it carefully to see what issues the U.S. is focused on at any given time. It has meaning in this role. But the NSS cannot and should not be expected to provide specific policy guidance for a specific crisis. (Biddle interview, 13 April 2023).

objectives may undergo some change because of the bargaining that takes place between it and the target.”³⁷ Policymakers should consider what to share with the public or signal to the opponent as U.S. political objectives adjust throughout the crisis.

Military plans often struggle to operationalize political objectives into military action. War termination scholar, Fred Iklé, observed that military planners suffer from underrating political, domestic, and foreign policy aspects in war plans or ignoring those factors entirely (1971). As a result, planners often develop military objectives that fall short of political aims, “similar to designing an elaborate and expensive bridge that reached only halfway across a river.”³⁸ Military professionals diminish their credibility with civilian decision-makers when they lack political sensitivity while planning and conducting military operations. Similarly, civilian leaders expect military officers to know how to judge the political consequences of military action.³⁹ Understanding the political leader’s aims and objectives is vital if the military leader will best understand how to translate the civilian leader’s intent into outcome through military means.

Condition 2, the *willingness to accept cost and risk*, is an intertwined effort across different elements of government. Since coercion is a dangerous game of brinkmanship using all instruments of power, its gambits generate uncomfortable levels of political, military, and diplomatic risk. The Constitution ensures civilian political leaders control the U.S. military, so motivation to assume risk and cost ultimately rests with political leaders. Still, the U.S. military possesses significant influence to steer and shape national security policies through their advice and the policy options they develop for the President to consider. Differences between political and military leaders over a coercive strategy's assessed risks and costs can debilitate policymaking.

Under ideal circumstances, policymakers establish a shared understanding of their resolve, capabilities, limitations, and constraints towards the policy issue. Military leaders understand the limits of political resolve and how high up the escalation ladder they can climb. This leads to appreciating the differing perspectives on political versus military risk and learning what opportunities each group, such as the diplomats, brings to influence the crisis. Policymakers would also appreciate what capabilities each instrument of power offers and the limitations of what those elements of power can achieve.

Two other scenarios occur among government officials. On one end, tension and infighting between leaders overwhelm the policy making process. Individual and bureaucratic rivalries lead to disjointed policies that fall short of harnessing all the potential power available to the United States. On the other side, too much cohesion between senior officials risks developing groupthink and stifles creativity. There is a subtle difference between dissent and constructively challenging assumptions. Prominent personalities and overbearing departments can equally suppress the full potential power of the United States to develop policies of coercion. Establishing the conditions for coercive diplomacy is too intricate of a task to muddle through with haphazard and disjointed policies.

One way to appreciate the internal tensions over risk is through the “principal-agent” theory. Here, the political decision-maker is the principal, and the agents are the military leaders and senior diplomats. Asymmetries of information ⁴⁰ and variances in risk tolerance ⁴¹ between political leaders and their military or diplomatic agents create friction in the relationship. The agents possess greater information regarding capabilities, including how to exercise force or leverage diplomatic tools. This requires the political principals to depend on their subordinate leaders' “best military advice” and diplomatic counsel. Conversely, political leaders possess greater information about resolve, their political commitment to the object, and how much risk

they are willing to take to acquire it. As a result, political leaders may not be willing to reveal all the considerations (domestic, political, etc.) shaping their decisions to foreign policy advisors and military leaders.

Differing attitudes toward risk, a common issue in principal-agent relationships, also affect the resolve between political and military (pol-mil) leaders. * Schelling viewed compellence as “a competition in risk-taking. It involves setting afoot an activity that may get out of hand, initiating a process that carries some risk of unintended disaster.”† Resolve becomes a reflection of willingness to incur risk amidst an unknowable future. Considerations for political risk versus military assessments of risks to mission or force may create tension or affect cohesion towards a policy position. This study examines how senior leaders from across the government interpret risk and their differing willingness to accept the cost of pursuing coercion.

Condition 3, *domestic and international support*, serves as a force multiplier for coercive diplomacy efforts. Because domestic or international support sometimes involve unique considerations, this study sometimes make distinctions about one or the other independently. Domestic support is referenced as ‘Condition 3a,’ and international support is referenced as ‘Condition 3b.’

Alexander George recognized the necessity for domestic political support in “any serious use of coercive diplomacy by U.S. leaders.”⁴² Assessing and interpreting domestic support (Condition 3a) is inherently a politician’s responsibility in national security policymaking.

* This study borrows the term *pol-mil* from the U.S. Department of State as an inclusive reference to political, military, and diplomatic officials. This spans political appointees, career civil servants, and uniformed officers who support national security affairs for the U.S. government.

† Schelling continued: “The risk is intended, but not the disaster. One cannot initiate certain disaster as a profitable way of putting compellent pressure on someone, but one can initiate a moderate risk of mutual disaster if the other party’s compliance is feasible.” See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 91.

Gaining and interpreting international support (Condition 3b) is overtly a responsibility of diplomats serving in the U.S. Department of State. Often, political leaders will draw their assessments of how other heads of state will respond to requests for international support. Military diplomacy also helps gain international support for applying coercion. In addition, military to military relations helps build trust and support with international partners and allies. I assess what enables political and military leaders to merge these competing requirements in this study.

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman explored the role of domestic political pressure in coercion in *The Dynamics of Coercion* (2002). They focused on three domestic political factors that constrain U.S. policy decisions on coercion: the need to justify force, casualty sensitivity, and sensitivity to adversary civilian suffering. Byman and Waxman's findings offer a starting point on the political considerations that I assess and build on in my study.

Building and maintaining international support (Condition 3b) helps legitimize U.S. applications of coercion. Byman and Waxman (2002) expand the notion of international support to include non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations like the United Nations, as efforts to increase the legitimacy of coercive measures. This is especially useful in situations of humanitarian intervention. While coalitions add legitimacy, they risk undermining credibility for the coercer. Alexander George cautioned that coalitions diminish the credibility of coercive pressure when they struggle to maintain unity and a sense of purpose⁴³. Coalitions look weak and lack resolve when they reveal diverging interests between the partner states. Cumbersome decision-making processes within coalitions signal weak commitment.⁴⁴

The qualities of **Condition 4**, *strong and unified leadership*, will naturally vary from administration to administration. There is no prerequisite for experience or leadership style for a

President or their cabinet secretaries and advisors. Eisenhower and Reagan came from different professional backgrounds and led with individual styles, yet both were effective presidents. This study aims not to judge one style over the other but to observe which traits help unify political and military leaders towards a common objective.

Furthermore, it is crucial to understand what enables the United States to convey strong and unified leadership to its opponent. Robert Art found that unity of messaging is an essential function of Condition 4. He explains, “if the coercer’s top-level decision-makers do not provide consistently strong leadership, then the coercer’s message can become disjointed, clarity in objectives can be lost, and sufficient domestic and international support will not be forthcoming.”⁴⁵ Policymakers message through various mediums, from overt public statements to private dialogue and signals of resolve. In coercive diplomacy, projecting a unified message requires careful pol-mil alignment in both deeds and words.

Political and military alignment enables unity of their messaging across each group’s communication channels. At the outbreak of a crisis or during rapidly developing security situations, synchronizing public statements and direct engagements with counterparts across the political, diplomatic, and military spectrum with a unified voice becomes burdensome unless leaders are already in alignment on the policy issue. Additionally, deeds need to match words to maintain credibility as a coercer. Signals such as the deployment or redeployment of forces and diplomatic gestures must reinforce messages transmitted through other pol-mil channels.⁴⁶ This includes the possibility of accidental or inadvertent signals through the routine movement of troops or pre-planned exercises that bear new meaning in the emerging security environment.⁴⁷ Unified messaging amplifies the perception of a coercer’s capabilities and resolve in the eyes of the opponent. Conversely, disjointed messaging and obscure signals can undermine policy efforts.

Condition 5, *clarity and precision in terms of the settlement*, shares internal and external policy considerations. Studies suggest achieving clarity and precision of terms is not always the desired condition, it is sometimes suitable to leave vague and imprecise on purpose. Looking back to the coercion continuum (Figure 1), as the demands on the target state increase, so too does the level of difficulty for the coercer. When the United States asks for minimal demands of the target state (ex: Type A), clarity and precision in the demands may enhance the likelihood of cooperation. On the other hand, if the demands “are more threatening to the opponent’s interests than the punishment being inflicted,” avoiding clear and precise terms may be more suitable.⁴⁸ Determining whether to specify clear and precise terms requires policymakers to consider how the target state will react to the U.S. demands.

A notable aspect of the policy decision towards the precision and clarity of settlement terms are possible internal political and diplomatic considerations. As a superpower and dominant military power, the United States faces expectations that it will demonstrate strength and solidarity against destabilizing behavior.* These expectations come from both domestic and international audiences. In considering Condition 5, political-military leaders contend with possible internal and external tensions on how boldly or firmly to present their demands to a target state.

The last three conditions rely on policymakers to visualize the crisis through the eyes of the target state. An overriding theme found throughout the literature on coercive diplomacy, bargaining, and persuasion is the need to appreciate the dispute from the opponent’s perspective. “Whether [a] strategy will work,” George and Simons argue, “rests heavily on the correctness of

* Secretary Pompeo’s 12 demands on Iran (May 21, 2018) presented a long list of expectations on the rogue state. There is an argument that those maximal demands carried more weight for satisfying domestic political audiences than enabling a realistic negotiation position. Transcript available at: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/after-the-deal-a-new-iran-strategy/index.html>

the policymaker's assessment of the opponent's perception and strategic reasoning."⁴⁹ Moreover, anticipating the opponent's needs reveals their boundaries, zones of possible agreement, and opportunities for compliance. In a word, this amounts to policymakers exercising *empathy*. Empathy helps policymakers understand the root causes of the opponent's behavior because to change behavior, statesmen must first recognize what is causing the behavior and the associated policymaker perspective.*

Condition 6, *creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state*, may not always be apparent to the opponent or applicable to the situation. In the four forms of coercive diplomacy developed by Alexander George, setting ultimatums or tacit ultimatums generate a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state. Taking the tactic 'try-and-see' or 'turning of the screw' avoid creating a sense of urgency. Building a sense of urgency can inspire reluctant states to cooperate. Still, just like any act of brinksmanship, excessive pressure also risks pushing an opponent to react desperately or defiantly and leads to greater aggression.⁵⁰

One way to interpret the influence of emotions is to distinguish between logical, illogical, and nonlogical behaviors.⁵¹ Rational choice equates to logical behavior where ends and means drive reason. Illogical behavior represents behavior not rooted in ends and means, which social scientists view as a rare occurrence. Nonlogical behavior represents this instinctive counterweight to rationality, where emotions and sentiment influence behavior.⁵² Clausewitz saw this as *collisions between living forces* where emotions intertwine with interests.⁵³ Nonlogical

* Zachary Shore coins the concept of strategic empathy for policymakers to think like their opponents "to pinpoint what truly drives and constrains the other side" (Shore 2014, 2). Exercising empathy assists policymakers in identifying what combination of levers best detaches an opponent away from aggression. Developing an awareness of what drives the opponent in the crisis, what caused them to initiate aggression in the first place, and what it may take to get them to cease or reverse that aggressor requires empathy. The recent work by Robin Markwica builds on the specific role of empathy in compellence by exploring how the logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, applies to coercive diplomacy (2018). Markwica studies the emotional perspective of target states, asking "why and under what conditions do political leaders reject coercive threats from stronger opponents and when do they yield." The five key emotions Markwica examines are fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation (2018).

(emotional) behavior, often manifested in pride, stubbornness, and defiance competes with logical thinking. Nonlogical behavior helps explain why states may accept dismal living conditions under strict economic sanctions to build advanced weapons programs. In such circumstances, the state may value pride and honor over rational economic or security interests. Policymakers applying coercive diplomacy can anticipate opponents to attach emotional value to otherwise rational considerations.

One of the essential ingredients to successful coercive diplomacy, **Condition 7**, *fear of unacceptable escalation*, also requires policymakers to appreciate the opponent's perspective. Robert Art describes this condition as the ability to threaten higher costs against the target's population, cities, or military through punishment or denial. "If the target does not fear the costs that will result from such escalation, then it will have no incentive to comply."⁵⁴ However, 'fear' is a deceptively broad concept. Assessing how policymakers interpret and perceive what the opponent fears becomes a valuable consideration for this study. Is it as simple as affecting the target state's basic hierarchy of needs?

The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to divorce notions of what Americans value, based on western culture, and appreciate what the target state values. Those things that a target state may fear include, in order of intensity: humiliation, loss of power or status (domestically, regionally, globally), physical harm, and death. Target states facing coercion consider domestic or international audience costs when assessing whether or not to back down under pressure.⁵⁵ Resilience in the face of deprivation, poverty, and suffering may be an inherent source of national pride, rather than fear, for many cultures. In my three cases, it is interesting to observe how policymakers approach this condition. As a superpower, the United States possesses absolute means to escalate a conflict to existential levels with its opponents. Yet wielding a

sword of absolute power diplomatically in the name of peacetime compellence is a challenging policy act for even the most skilled swordsman.

If fear is the first element of Condition 7, the second element is escalation management. Are there mechanisms to threaten cost imposition beyond traditional tools of military force and economic sanctions? Are there ways to exercise horizontal escalation, increasing pressure in other regions or sectors, to create unacceptable risks for the opponent?

Condition 8, *asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer*, rounds out the list as one of the necessary prerequisites for success in coercive diplomacy. The last two conditions intertwine as co-related policy issues on motivation and fear. “The target’s willingness to bear future punishment...and hence its degree of fear about escalation, depend on the strength of its motivation to prevail.”⁵⁶ Establishing or creating asymmetry of motivation is also one of the most intricate policy endeavors covered in this study.

Achieving asymmetry of motivation is a powerful and uncomfortable concept for policymakers to evaluate, especially from the perspective of a superpower. Asymmetry in motivation has little to do with national power or military strength. Robert Art found that in coercive diplomacy, “will counts more heavily than capability...because estimates about the efficacy of military power are different from the actual use of military power.”⁵⁷ Sun Tzu taught, “In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power.”⁵⁸ Clausewitz viewed power as more than simply comparative figures of strength, “that would be a kind of war by algebra.”⁵⁹ Similarly, relative military power plays a lesser role in compellence than rational logic would suggest.⁶⁰ In a hierarchy of interests, if an object is ‘vital’ to the opponent and yet only deemed ‘important’ to the United States, the size and strength of the U.S. may not matter.

Asymmetry of motivation becomes a comparison of political aims between the U.S. and the target state. It requires policymakers to determine how badly each side wants what they seek. The critical word in this final condition is *asymmetry*. Simply sharing an equal desire as the opponent to achieve your goals falls short. A tie or minor edge falls short, tilting favor to the target state. To achieve Condition Eight, the coercer must demonstrate a disproportionate level of motivation towards its objectives relative to the opponent. Developing these final conditions necessitates U.S. policymakers to establish internal pol-mil alignment and an accurate perception of the opponent's position. Internally, establishing asymmetry of motivation requires clarity of the U.S. aims (Condition 1) and a resolve to accept the cost and risk in achieving those aims (Condition 2).

Externally, establishing this condition requires policymakers to understand what is driving the opponent to act aggressively in the given crisis. Understanding the enemy at this level is no simple task. Opponents often go to great lengths to hide their decision-making calculus. Negotiators must protect their bottom line in bargaining situations. Knowing what someone thinks when you live or work with them every day is hard enough. Knowing what a leader is thinking in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, or Pyongyang is far harder. "In the absence of adequate information, one side often arrives at such images through attributing to the opponent a value system and reasoning process similar to its own. This mirror-imaging tendency can distort policymakers' estimates of likely opponent motivation."⁶¹

In certain situations, the relative motivation in crisis may tilt in favor of the target state.* There are two possible ways policymakers can improve their relative position in terms of

* There are several contemporary examples where an opponent maintains equal or greater motivation to achieve its goals over the policy aims of the United States. This includes China's adamant desires to unify the mainland with the islands of Taiwan and North Korea's desire to develop a nuclear weapon.

motivation. First, policymakers can attempt to achieve condition eight by isolating the central issues at stake. As a result, states can “create a more favorable asymmetry by demanding only what is essential for its vital interests and minimizing demands on the vital interests of the adversary.”⁶² Policymakers increase the legitimacy of their demands and create an asymmetry of motivation by focusing objectives on what is truly vital to the United States. Second, policymakers can attempt to reduce the target’s motivation to achieve their goals by presenting inducements.

EMBRACING THE OUTSIDE GAME

This dissertation further explores the role of external stakeholders and how the U.S. approaches international considerations in coercive diplomacy. Even when coercive diplomacy boils down to a dispute between two states, there are always allies, sponsor states, or of international stakeholders that play a notable role in situations of coercion. Timothy Crawford (2018) calls this ‘the outside game’ of coercion in his theory of coercive isolation. Crawford points out that George and Art’s original focus on the conditions of coercive diplomacy concentrates too heavily on “the dyadic axis of a confrontation.”⁶³ It is not to say George and Art ignored the role of external stakeholders in coercion. Instead, they acknowledge isolation as a contextual variable that sometimes makes coercive diplomacy more complex. The cases in this study reveal the breadth and significance of the outside game, where complex or unexpected international interests can emerge, even from stakeholders in other hemispheres.*

* See Haiti chapter.

ENDNOTES

¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, xiv, 2, 3, 80.

² Biddle, 2020.

³ Pape 1996, 13.

⁴ Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 38-39, 100-101.

⁵ Tami Davis Biddle, "Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners," *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109.

⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

⁷ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

⁸ Kevin B Smith and Christopher W. Larimer, *The Public Policy Theory Primer*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017).

⁹ Deborah Stone, *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, Revised Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2002), 10.

¹⁰ Deborah Stone, *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, Revised Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2002), 11.

¹¹ David Easton, "The Political System Under Stress," in *Public Policy Theories, Models, and Concepts* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 118.

¹² Lin-Manuel Miranda, Alex Lacamoire, and Ron Chernow, *Hamilton: An American Musical*, 2016, 2016, Los Angeles, CA.

¹³ Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Jonah P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (March 1972): 1–25.

¹⁴ Cohen, March, and Olsen; John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd ed. (The University of Michigan, 2003).

¹⁵ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*.

¹⁶ Nikolaos Zahariadis, "The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects," in *Theories of the Policy Process*, ed. Paul Sabatier, 2nd ed., Zahariadis vols. (USA: Westview Press, 2007).

¹⁷ George, Hall, and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam*.

¹⁸ George, Hall, and Simons.

¹⁹ George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*; George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

²⁰ Todd S. Sechser, "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 377–401.

²¹ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 131.

²² Helene Cooper, Julian Barnes, and Eric Schmitt, "Russian Military Leaders Discussed Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say," *The New York Times*, November 2, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html>.

²³ Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, "The Power and Limits of Compellence: A Research Note," *Political Science Quarterly* 133, no. 1 (2018): 77–97.

²⁴ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

²⁵ Art and Greenhill, "The Power and Limits of Compellence: A Research Note."

²⁶ Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1971); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*.

²⁷ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 280.

²⁸ George and Simons, 279.

²⁹ George and Simons, 287.

³⁰ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 76.

³¹ Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, 372.

³² George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 288.

-
- ³³ Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 288.
- ³⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.
- ³⁵ Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, *My American Journey*, Large Print Edition (New York: Random House, 1995), 437.
- ³⁶ Powell and Persico, 499.
- ³⁷ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 371.
- ³⁸ Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 17–18.
- ³⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 2nd Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 13.
- ⁴⁰ George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84 (1970): 488–500.
- ⁴¹ Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” *Academy of Management Review* 14 (1989): 57–74.
- ⁴² Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 284.
- ⁴³ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
- ⁴⁴ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- ⁴⁵ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 371.
- ⁴⁶ Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109.
- ⁴⁷ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
- ⁴⁸ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 286.
- ⁴⁹ George and Simons, 288.
- ⁵⁰ Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 283.
- ⁵¹ Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and Society*, ed. Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935); Bryan Jones, “Bounded Rationality and Political Science,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 13 (2003): 395–412.
- ⁵² Jones, “Bounded Rationality and Political Science.”
- ⁵³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
- ⁵⁴ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 372.
- ⁵⁵ James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Relations,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92; Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- ⁵⁶ Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, 372.
- ⁵⁷ Art and Cronin, 407.
- ⁵⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1963), 122.
- ⁵⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 76.
- ⁶⁰ Todd S. Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 377–401.
- ⁶¹ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 289.
- ⁶² Jack S. Levy, “Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George,” *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 540, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.x>.
- ⁶³ Timothy Crawford, “The Strategy of Coercive Isolation,” in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 229.

CHAPTER 3: THE *PUEBLO* INCIDENT OF 1968

A CRISIS UNFOLDS

The USS *Pueblo* limped along at a vulnerable pace, trying to buy time. Smoke billowed from the crew compartment as sailors torched classified documents in makeshift incinerators. There were too many documents to burn. Other sailors took sledgehammers to the ship's electronic intelligence equipment. One of the 83 crewmembers lay dead; others were wounded. The *Pueblo*'s inaugural voyage was not going as expected.

The letters AGER painted on the bow of the old cargo presented a thin masquerade. This was no Auxiliary General Environmental Research vessel collecting water samples along the international waters off North Korean shores. The *Pueblo* was a spy ship. She contained some of the most sophisticated signal and electronic intelligence equipment available in 1968. The *Pueblo* sought to loiter in the international waters along North Korea's eastern coastline to eavesdrop on its military activities and communications.

The crew had little option but to resist when the North Koreans attacked. The stowed .50 caliber machine guns on the *Pueblo*'s bow were no match for the North Korean MiG-21 fighters or the torpedo boats strafing the hapless U.S. naval vessel. The distress calls transmitted by the *Pueblo*'s captain, Commander Lloyd "Pete" Bucher, made little difference as well. There were no ships nearby to respond. U.S. forces in Korea were not postured to respond either. This was the height of the Cold War after all, and the *Pueblo*'s mission was designated as a low-risk endeavor. All the Air Force F-105s jets stationed on alert in Okinawa, Japan, and F-4s in South Korea were armed with nuclear weapons. It would take hours to download the nuclear ordinances, plot mission profiles, arm the jets with anti-ship and anti-air missiles, and fly out to

interdict the *Pueblo*'s attackers.* With no word of reinforcements or hope of rescue, the crew of the *Pueblo* sent its last messages: "Have been directed to come to all stop and being boarded at this time. Destruction incomplete. Several pubs will be compromised. Four men injured and one critically. Going off air now. Destroying this gear."¹ The transmission reached the White House a 2:04 am on 23 January.

Case Study Overview

When the North Koreans seized the *Pueblo* on 23 January 1968, it was the first U.S. Navy vessel captured at sea since the War of 1812.[†] It was a disastrous situation by all accounts. The fate of the crew was unknown. It was difficult to interpret what motivated Kim Il Sung to seize the ship. Leaders in Washington worried about the crew and whether they would be released, or if they were going to be humiliated, tortured, or executed. Pentagon officials and the intelligence community also worried about how much of the equipment and materials onboard the ship had been compromised. It was unclear whether the *Pueblo* crew was able to destroy the trove of classified documents and collection equipment onboard.

This was no isolated incident. Dangerous battles loomed in Vietnam at an outpost called Khe Sanh. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula were already boiling. Just two days before the *Pueblo* incident, North Korean commandos had infiltrated across the Demilitarized Zone to assassinate the South Korean president and his family at his presidential residence, the Blue House. North Korea's increasingly provocative behavior threatened regional and global security.

* Official reports acknowledged the F-105s in Japan were too far to reach the *Pueblo* before nightfall. The F-4s in South Korea would not have the air-to-air capability to defend against the North Korean MIGs harassing the *Pueblo*. See LBJ Archive: *Pueblo* Policy Leader Chrono pp 6

[†] The only other ship captured since the War of 1812 was the river gunboat USS *Wake* seized by deceptive Japanese escorts on December 8, 1941 while anchored at port and minimally manned in Shanghai, China.

In December of 1968, after 11 months of captivity and torture, the United States finally succeeded in securing the release of the *Pueblo* crew. Over a half century later, the ship remains moored in Pyongyang as North Korea's prized war trophy and museum attraction.

This case study does not add to the numerous studies that expose the numerous faults in military planning, risk calculations, or prudence in creating the *Pueblo*'s mission. The ship was barely seaworthy, and flaws in planning assumptions by the Navy, intelligence community, and the Joint Staff are well documented and offer valuable insights for military planners and intelligence professionals.²

This study explores the incredibly complex security environment the LBJ administration faced in approaching the *Pueblo* incident. I focus on how policymakers at the national level responded to the circumstances the United States found itself in on the morning of 23 January 1968. Specifically, I examine how national security leaders in the Johnson administration relied on coercive diplomacy to secure the release of the crew of the USS *Pueblo* from the North Koreans without provoking a broader conflict on the Korean peninsula. This case study offers several key observations for what inhibits or facilitates setting the conditions of coercive diplomacy. These include a better appreciation for how risk and cost (Condition 2) influence objective setting (Condition 1), how national self-interests influence international support (Condition 3) and how policy considerations towards creating leverage to establish urgency, fears of escalation, and motivation (Conditions 6, 7, and 8) in a crisis.

The *Pueblo* incident demonstrates the complex environment and competing priorities policymakers must balance when applying coercive diplomacy. A glance at the incident presents a basic example of how the United States exercised force and diplomacy to compel North Korea to return the sailors alive. However, the incident encompassed much more than a bilateral

conflict between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The conflict with North Korea complicated U.S. policy efforts in Vietnam, strained the U.S. security relationship with South Korea, and drew the United States dangerously close to direct hostilities with the Soviet Union and China.

Unpacking the wider context of policy considerations in compelling North Korea during the *Pueblo* incident demonstrates why coercive diplomacy is so hard to apply successfully. Any steps to compel North Korea needed to consider security arrangements with South Korea and resource requirements to protect the troops at Khe Sanh. Meanwhile, the fallout of the Tet offensive plagued the situation in Vietnam for the Johnson administration. The Johnson administration swam against the currents of war to resolve the affair without further escalation and safe return of the crew.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target’s fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 3. The eight conditions of coercive diplomacy separated between the internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions.

This chapter examines what enabled U.S. policymakers to attain the conditions of coercive diplomacy, or what got in the way, during the *Pueblo* incident. As a review, those conditions are depicted in the table above. The role of the international partners (Condition 3) stands out in this study as the Johnson administration became heavily involved in managing the

relationship with South Korea during the *Pueblo* affair. This study also reveals the challenges of attaining the external conditions of coercive diplomacy (6, 7, 8) against target states, even if the U.S. has a clear military superiority over the opponent.

CASE STUDY STRUCTURE

There are four components to this case study on how the Johnson administration applied coercive diplomacy in the *Pueblo* incident. First, I contextualize this period in history by introducing some of the key national security policy issues competing for attention and resources during the affair. Second, I provide insight into the personnel involved in decisionmaking. Exploring their personal backgrounds and shared experiences helps illuminate the unique influences shaping policies examined in the case study. Third, I chronologically explore the case itself, tracing policy proposals and decisions from the morning of the takeover of the ship to the eventual release of the crew eleven months later. I separate the story into four phases based on distinct events that mark new chapters in the policy process. I conclude by reviewing how U.S. officials balanced the internal and external policy considerations of the *Pueblo* incident to set the conditions of coercive diplomacy against North Korea.

Context in Time

Analyzing the policy decisions of the Johnson administration towards *Pueblo* incident must be understood in the context of the competing security dilemmas facing true complexity of these policy decisions. Additionally, Johnson officials needed to assess who in the international community might help defuse this crisis, as well as consider who might benefit from trying to provoke it.

On 21 January 1968, just two days before the *Pueblo* incident, thunder clouds began to form for what would be a stormy year. In Vietnam, North Vietnamese forces initiated a major attack on the isolated outpost at Khe Sanh. On the same day, North Korea launched its brazen attack to assassinate the South Korean president and the U.S. ambassador to South Korea in what became known as the Blue House Raid. By the end of the month, the outlook in Vietnam would fundamentally change with the initiation of the Tet Offensive. Domestically, rising domestic political and racial tensions continued to unsettle Johnson's presidency. Two assassinations would shock the nation: civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King was killed on 4 April, and the admired brother of President Kennedy and presidential hopeful, Robert F. Kennedy, was killed on 6 June. Riots erupted following the death of Dr. King, and the death of Democratic favorite RFK opened the door for Republican candidate Richard Nixon to succeed Johnson as president. These events weighed on the decisions of military, diplomatic, and political leaders throughout the year as they attempted to compel North Korea to release the *Pueblo* and its crew.

The following two sections expand on the two issues that directly intertwined and interacted with the *Pueblo* incident at the outset of the crisis.

KHE SANH

Reports of a threat to the U.S. military outpost at Khe Sanh emerged on 8 January and increasingly drew the attention of President Johnson and his military leaders.³ A fragile optimism grew within the administration at the beginning of the year that the investments in Vietnam were starting to bear fruit, but the massing of troops around Khe Sanh was a troubling development. It appeared that the largest battle of the war was about to unfold. For Johnson and his advisors, the encircling of the remote American outpost presented unsettling similarities to the 1954 French military defeat at Diem Bien Phu.⁴ A defeat at Khe Sanh would be a military and political

disaster for the United States. Johnson became so fixated on the anticipated battle of Khe Sanh that he had a detailed sand table depicting the outpost and the surrounding hills installed in the White House basement.⁵ By early 1968, 6,000 U.S. Marines and a South Vietnamese Ranger battalion defended the outpost. In the hills surrounding the Marines were 40,000 North Vietnamese attackers.⁶ On 21 January, just two days before the *Pueblo* incident, the North Vietnamese initiated a coordinated siege against the defenders of Khe Sanh.⁷

SOUTH KOREA AND THE BLUE HOUSE RAID

January 21 marked more than the commencement of the Battle of Khe Sanh in Vietnam. That same day, North Korea sent a team of commandos south of the demilitarized zone to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee in a dramatic event known as the Blue House Raid. Tensions on the Korean peninsula came to a fever pitch after the raid as South Korean and U.S. leaders contemplated response options. Though the United States sought to avoid another war in Asia, South Koreans remained on edge about seeking retaliation.⁸ The assassination attempt came after 566 attacks emanating from the north throughout 1967.⁹ The conflicting policy interests between South Korea and the United States over how to deal with DPRK aggression required a two-level game of coercion. Defusing the crisis on the peninsula required simultaneous applications of both forms of coercion: compellence (on an adversary) and deterrence (on an ally). The United States needed to compel North Korea to release the *Pueblo* crew while deterring South Korea from abandoning security agreements with the United States to unilaterally attack North Korea.

For Johnson and his team of national security officials, the emerging crisis on the Korean peninsula compounded the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. South Korea had become a key security partner for the United States in South Vietnam by late 1967, committing two of its best

ROK Army divisions to the fight in Vietnam. While the president fixated on ensuring adequate forces were available to reinforce the Marine outpost, the South Koreans threatened to pull out of Vietnam altogether. Yearning to retaliate against repeated North Korean aggression, President Park either expected the United States to retaliate for North Korean aggression or the South Koreans would resort to unilateral action. If the United States did not honor its security treaty with South Korea, the South Koreans would need to recall their forces from Vietnam to fight North Korea alone.¹⁰

The *Pueblo* incident created a unique dilemma for the Johnson administration as policymakers sought to defuse a dangerous situation in Korea while preserving their coalition in Vietnam. North and South Korea were headed towards a Second Korean War just fifteen years after their armistice agreement, with both sides possessing security alliances with competing Cold War superpowers. Any war on the Korean peninsula risked dragging the United States into a conflict with the Soviet Union and Communist China, igniting the Cold War into World War III.

The Personnel Behind the Policy

Recognizing the adage in Washington D.C. that “personnel is policy,”* it helps to understand the cast of characters involved in a policy effort. Understanding the reactions and decisions requires context and background.[†]

* The term became popular by Ronald Reagan’s Director of Personnel, Scott Faulkner in 1981. See Jeff Hauser and David Segal, “Personnel Is Policy,” *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, 6 February 2020, <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/personnel-is-policy/>.

† See May and Neustadt: public and personal historical placement of leaders involved.

This section introduces the U.S. political, military, and diplomatic leaders at the center of this case study on the *Pueblo* incident. Key policymaking officials in the *Pueblo* incident included President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ), the incoming and outgoing Secretaries of Defense, the Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretary of state, and his under secretary. Also important are the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, and Cy Vance as a Special Presidential Envoy to South Korea. The personal histories and the interpersonal connections between the leaders in the Johnson administration are important to understand the conflicting priorities, personal biases, and individual outlooks that shaped their policy recommendations and decisions.

There are recurring themes in many of these vignettes. A prototypical official in this case would have an Ivy League degree (McNamara, Clifford, Rostow, Katzenbach, Vance), perhaps a Rhode Scholar (Rusk, Bonesteel, Rostow, Katzenbach), perhaps a lawyer (Clifford, Katzenbach, Vance, Rusk*), and almost certainly would have served in World War II. * By the time the *Pueblo* incident unfolded, almost all had served with Johnson for years in one form or another. The uncertainty of the Vietnam war they enabled weighed heavily on all of their shoulders.

Many of the officials in key roles during the *Pueblo* incident had served together since the beginning of President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson's administration. McNamara, Rusk, and Wheeler helped John F. Kennedy resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and

* The most notable person that does not fit this mold is the president himself, who grew up poor, went to Southwest Texas State Teachers College, dedicated his career to politics and made a small personal fortune in the Austin, Texas media industry. The only common characteristic would be his shared service in World War II where he requested a leave of absence as a sitting Congressman to serve in the Pacific theater. He experienced combat once during his brief service, as an observer on a B-26 bomber. General MacArthur awarded Johnson the Silver Star for his conduct during the dangerous bombing mission, though the merits of Johnson's award were thin. See <https://www.history.com/news/lbj-world-war-ii-bathroom-break>; <https://www.lbjlibrary.org/life-and-legacy/the-man-himself/lbjs-military-service>. * Dean Rusk did not practice law but earned a law degree from UC-Berkley in 1940 with aspirations to become a professor of international law. See *As I Saw It* pp 88-89.

respond to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964. Rostow, Katzenbach, and Vance were all carry overs from the Kennedy administration as well. The newest member to join Johnson's administration at the outset of the *Pueblo* incident, Clark Clifford, was no stranger around the White House and Democratic administrations. Clifford had participated in many of the deliberations on Vietnam with Johnson's cabinet as a key advisor, having also advised Kennedy for years and built a strong reputation from his service in the Truman White House.

Sometimes, the leaders had serendipitous and unexpected ties. This is certainly the case between General "Tick" Bonesteel, the U.S. military commander in Korea, and Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State. One managed the crisis from within the White House in Washington D.C and the other managed the fragile security alliance between the U.S. and Republic of Korean (ROK) forces in Seoul. They came from vastly different backgrounds: Bonesteel was a polished graduate of West Point and Rusk was a rural Georgia boy who rose from poverty to earn a college degree. Despite their distinct origins, Rusk and Bonesteel had first connected in England in the 1930s as Rhodes Scholars studying at Oxford University. Their career paths had taken them to different corners of the world by 1968. Fate seems to have played a hand in their ultimate roles in defusing a crisis over North and South Korea. After all, it happened to be Rusk and Bonesteel who together proposed that the Korean peninsula be bisected at the 38th parallel back in 1945.

On the night of 10 August 1945, leaders working in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee had called two trusted staff colonels to propose a line to divide North and South Korea between U.S. and Soviet occupation forces. The colonels had thirty minutes to come up with a suggestion. Standing over a 1942 National Geographic map of "Asia and Adjacent Areas" (a map that measures 26"x40") on the wall of their office, Colonel H.C. Bonesteel and Colonel

Dean Rusk considered their options. They liked the look of a line ‘at the narrow neck’ of the peninsula near the 39th parallel between Wonsan and Pyongyang, but their map lacked enough detail to suggest something accurate. Instead, they eyeballed the 38th parallel as a distinct boundary that they sent forward as the proposed solution. Within days, Rusk and Bonesteel’s proposed separation line was sent to the Soviets, who readily accepted the boundary.¹¹ Twenty-three years later, these two former officemates would find themselves in different corners of the world facing the consequences of a new crisis.

Among the political leaders in the West Wing and the National Security Council staff who contributed to the *Pueblo* affair, I draw particular attention to President Johnson and Cyrus Vance. Many more deserve further analysis, including the notoriously hawkish National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, but this section highlights two particularly influential political leaders in this affair.

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Foreign policy was not President Johnson’s strength or his passion. Persistent issues like Vietnam consumed him and ultimately forged his legacy, but his gift was advancing legislation through his old colleagues on the Hill. His political priorities centered around his domestic agenda and advancing his vision for the Great Society, including civil rights, education, protecting the environment, rural development, and healthcare. Johnson was sensitive to his political standings. He became a voracious consumer of the media, closely tracking public opinions and legislative support for his policy goals.¹²

There is a distinct arc to President Johnson’s political state of mind during this case as 1968 unfolded. The new year began with somewhat encouraging prospects for the progress in

Vietnam, though that quickly faded as the siege of Khe Sanh materialized by mid-January. Only a week after the *Pueblo* incident came the Tet Offensive which shattered Johnson's efforts to portray modest success in Vietnam. As he became embroiled in foreign policy dilemmas, domestic politics drew his attention as well. On 31 March, nine weeks into the *Pueblo*'s captivity, Johnson surprised the nation (and many members of his administration) when he announced: "I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President."¹³ For the rest of his term as commander in chief, he would be a lame duck president. Johnson claimed the decision had been long under consideration and was meant to allow him to focus less on campaigning and more on the Vietnam War and his domestic agenda.¹⁴

The *Pueblo* incident occurred at a pivotal point in Johnson's presidency. Much of his political capital was invested in Vietnam. Since President Kennedy's death in 1963, Johnson had incrementally increased the U.S. troop presence in Vietnam. The pivotal moment to expand the conflict in Vietnam from an advisory mission to war was in retaliation for the Gulf of Tonkin incident, where the USS *Maddox* came under attack by North Vietnamese forces. By the beginning of 1968, there were 496,000 Americans and 641,000 South Vietnamese troops fighting in Vietnam.¹⁵ The reality of the Gulf of Tonkin incident later came into question by both the public and legislators on Capitol Hill. As a leader, President Johnson understood persuasion and applied political pressure on foes and friends alike. These traits served him well in the *Pueblo* incident as the U.S. needed to apply forms of coercion on allies and enemies.

PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY CYRUS VANCE

Cyrus Vance was a military lawyer who rose from DoD General Counsel in 1961 to Secretary of the Army for Kennedy and then Deputy Secretary of Defense for Johnson from

1964-1967. Vance had earned a particular reputation as a crisis mediator, unrelated to his official titles or positions, and he became Johnson's personal firefighter for both domestic and international disputes. Johnson dispatched Vance to defuse numerous crises, including student riots in Panama in 1964, a standoff between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in 1967, and, later that same year, riots in Detroit, Michigan. By the time of the *Pueblo* seizure, Vance had returned to civilian life practicing law in New York. Vance did not possess any particular specialty in Korean relations as the *Pueblo* incident unfolded, but he understood the art of mediation, the unique role of a presidential envoy, and the personal trust of the president of the United States.

A handful of military leaders stand out as playing key roles in shaping decisions at the policy level for the *Pueblo* incident. It is important to understand the vantage points of both the outgoing and incoming Secretaries of Defense since their transition occurred in the first month of the crisis. In addition to General Bonesteel, who served as the commander of U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea, the uniformed leader who contributed most to the policy process was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Earle Wheeler. Unlike his predecessors as CSA or CJCS like Generals Bradley, Ridgway and Taylor, Wheeler had few bona fides as a wartime hero. Instead, his predominant experience and skills emerged as a staff officer and strategic planner. He maintained a subdued persona both in public and in closed meetings, but found his voice as an uncontentious senior advisor to policymakers.

THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: ROBERT MCNAMARA (OUTGOING) AND CLARK CLIFFORD (INCOMING)

January 23 is a prominent date for both the *Pueblo* incident and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The morning of the 23rd marked the first formal meeting that Clark Clifford attended in his transition to becoming the 9th Secretary of Defense. The outgoing

secretary, Robert McNamara, had led the Department of Defense since the beginning of the Kennedy administration. A veteran of several notable military events, including the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the expansion of the Vietnam War, McNamara wielded strong influence over the military and White House. He had transformed the Department of Defense into a bureaucracy fueled by data analytics. President Johnson held McNamara in the highest regard, but McNamara's resolve on the Vietnam war strained his relationship with the president and his colleagues on the Cabinet, including Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow.* The weight of the Vietnam War became too much for Robert McNamara to carry, and he became disillusioned with the prospects for achieving a military victory. His nomination to the World Bank was a clean exit for McNamara who had served two presidents over a grueling eight years, the longest serving Secretary of Defense in the department's history.¹⁶

February would be McNamara's last month on the job. His replacement, Clark Clifford, was a long-time advisor to President Johnson and a trusted counsel to both Presidents Truman and Kennedy. Starting his service in the White House as a junior office Naval aide in 1945, he soon earned rapport with the administration and became Truman's White House Counsel. As his in-house legal advisor, Clifford contributed to historic foreign policy initiatives. He contributed to the formulation of the Marshall Plan, the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state (over the objections of Secretary of State George C. Marshall), the formation of NATO, and the Truman Doctrine.¹⁷ He also served as an architect of the National Security Act of 1947 that established

* Beginning in 1966, McNamara began to question the effectiveness of the bombing campaigns and troop increases. In a private admission over the telephone to LBJ that he was doubting validity of the war effort, the president gave only a grunt in response. See Dean Rusk and Richard Rusk, *As I Saw It*, ed. Daniel S. Papp (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1990), 522; "240. Editorial Note on Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara," n.d., Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.25, Side A, PNO 1, JPL, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d240>.

the position of Secretary of Defense. A lawyer by trade, Clifford became a trusted advisor within the Democratic party. President Kennedy tapped Clark to lead his transition team and appointed him to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.¹⁸

There's an irony to Clifford finally accepting the role of Secretary of Defense to replace the frayed McNamara. Early in the Johnson administration, McNamara had served as one of the original proponents of increasing the U.S. role in Vietnam, while Clifford had been one of the few dissenters against expanding the conflict.* Despite his early reservations about Vietnam, Clifford decisively supported Johnson's decision once the U.S. committed to fighting the war. By late 1967, Clifford and McNamara seemed to have reversed their earlier positions on Vietnam. Clifford had become a hawk as McNamara's belief in the war effort was quickly fading. Clifford would later reflect that the Tet Offensive solidified his belief that there was no military solution to the Vietnam War.¹⁹ His tempering beliefs on the effectiveness of military power is apparent in his debates over how to compel North Korea to return the *Pueblo* and its crew.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE KATZENBACH

Nick Katzenbach served as Rusk's Under Secretary of State throughout the *Pueblo* incident.† As the No. 2 at State during a year when Secretary Rusk admits he was mentally and physically fatigued, Katzenbach attended many national security meetings with the President and

* In 1965, Clark Clifford reinforced George Ball's lonely effort to dissuade President Johnson from expanding the U.S. contribution to the Vietnam War.

† The role of the Under Secretary of State has evolved since 1968. At the time, there was only one Under Secretary who served as what would now be considered the Deputy Secretary of State. The position of Deputy Secretary of State was established in 1972. The State Department now has six Under Secretaries of State and the Counselor of the Department who holds the equivalent rank of the Under Secretaries. For more, see Office of the Historian at the State Department "Under Secretaries of State" at <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/under-secretary>.

developed many of the State Department's policy proposals with the White House Staff and the Department of Defense.

Katzenbach dedicated his life to public service and was an ideal person to support the *Pueblo* policy efforts. He could relate to the plight of Commander Bucher and his crew held captive by the North Koreans: As a navigator in World War II, Katzenbach had been shot down over North Africa in 1943 and spent the last two years of the war as a POW in Poland.*

Katzenbach joined the Kennedy administration in 1962 as the Deputy Attorney General.† He was a veteran of the Cuban Missile Crisis, writing the legal brief in support of President Kennedy's naval quarantine of Cuba.²⁰ In 1966, Katzenbach moved from Attorney General to Under Secretary of State, where he remained a trusted member of Johnson's inner circle of advisors.‡ After an argument about bombing, Katzenbach remarked, "I finally understand the difference between Walt and me. I was the navigator who was shot down and spent two years in a German prison camp, and Walt was the guy picking my targets."²¹ He remained a regular participant in major foreign policy issues, not afraid to assert himself among the senior members of the administration.

* During his captivity, he managed to read over 400 books. Returning home after the war, he convinced the administrators at Yale to credit his coursework, earning a bachelor's degree in 1945 after passing a series of final exams. Katzenbach went on to earn a law degree in 1947 and study at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar from 1947-1949. <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/nicholas-katzenbach-1960s-political-shaper-dies-at-90.html>

† He earned national praise in June of 1963 when, as Kennedy's representative as Deputy AG, he led a federal delegation to ensure two black students could enroll in the University of Alabama. With news cameras filming, Katzenbach demonstrated both his character and his proficiency in coercion when he convinced Governor Wallace to abandon his barricade at the schoolhouse doors in a sensational moment of desegregation. Video of the incident can be viewed at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/from-the-archives-george-wallace-stands-in-the-schoolhouse-door-33114691525>

‡ Katzenbach rose to become the Attorney General after Robert F. Kennedy in 1964 but stepped down in 1966 in opposition to J. Edgar Hoover's unethical surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King.‡ Still willing to serve, Katzenbach accepted the opportunity to succeed George Ball as the Under Secretary of State in 1966.

Tracing the Policy Process: *Pueblo* Incident Response

The *Pueblo* incident can be broken into four policy phases. The first phase of the affair took place over the first tumultuous week when officials explored an array of policy options and leaders scrambled to try to understand what was driving North Korea's behavior. The Tet Offensive initiated the second phase of the affair. For the next two weeks, administration officials reacted to the overwhelming size and scope of North Vietnam's surprise attack during the Tet holiday cease fire. During this second phase of the affair, tensions also peaked to alarming levels over South Korean fervor to forcefully retaliate over the Blue House Raid. President Johnson attempted to reduce the developing war footing of his South Korean allies by sending Cyrus Vance as his Special Presidential Envoy to meet with President Park and his defense minister. The third phase of the affair took place as tensions on the Korean peninsula settled and the situation in Vietnam regained some control. Here, policymakers search for options to break through the underwhelming progress made through direct negotiations with the North Koreans over the *Pueblo* and its crew. The last phase began in mid-May, almost four months after the ship's capture, as policymakers identify a possible objectives and terms that seem to overlap with North Korean demands. Though the negotiation positions seem to finally overlap into some sort of zone of possible agreement, it takes another seven months of haggling and counter offers to finalize the terms of settlement to return the crew.

PART I: THE INITIAL CRISIS (23 - 30 JANUARY)

This phase begins with policymakers trying to piece together the facts to understand suitable military or diplomatic response options. In this initial week, the *Pueblo* incident dominated foreign policy discussions, while leaders in Vietnam finalized their defensive posture at Khe Sanh. In these first few days, U.S. senior officials assessed many of the initial conditions

of coercive diplomacy: the administration's objectives, risk tolerances, the enemy's motivation, and the role of the international community – especially the role of the Soviet Union. The Johnson administration felt a sense of urgency to resolve the crisis immediately but struggled to impress the same sense of urgency on their North Korean counterparts.

Gathering the Facts

The early morning hours of Tuesday, 23 January, were filled with phone calls between senior officials trying to piece together the initial facts. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs received their initial reports from the National Mission Command Center (NMCC) in the basement of the Pentagon. The first call out of the NMCC was 12:36am. Walt Rostow received the first call from the Situation Room in the basement of the White House at 12:45am. For the next six hours, Rostow, McNamara, and Rusk exchanged calls with each other. Rostow briefed the president at 2:25 am. McNamara updated LBJ at 7:31 am. DoD issued a press release an hour later. Leaders in Washington needed more information on the circumstances, including the precise location of the ship at the time of capture, to determine response options.²²

The president regularly met with his national security leaders for lunch on Tuesdays so the meeting at 12:30 on 23 January was already on the books. This was the first meeting Clark Clifford joined as the incoming Secretary of Defense with his counterpart, Robert McNamara. Also in attendance were other regulars to the Tuesday lunches, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Rostow, and CIA Director Richard Helms.

The president expressed an interest in military and diplomatic options and a suspicion of wider communist collusion. Johnson sought alternatives for “hitting the North Koreans with U.S. forces” and seizing a North Korean vessel in return but there were few desirable military

solutions.²³ National Security Advisor Walt Rostow advocated for protecting the prestige of the United States through a reciprocal use of force. “As I see it, international law states that the seizure of a ship of the high seas justifies counteraction and equivalent reprisal.” President Johnson was not looking for retribution. “Walt,” he quickly replied, “I do not want to win the argument and lose the sale.”²⁴ Scoring points on redeeming national pride through blunt military strikes were shortsighted if those actions did not yield the return of the *Pueblo* or its crew. The president established the priority of all response efforts needed to focus on the return of the ship and crew.

Another important influence on Johnson’s resolve to employ military force was establishing whether the *Pueblo* had entered North Korean territorial waters during its mission. The president admitted, “we must always bear in mind the possibility that we are in the wrong.”²⁵ These doubts extend beyond the legal or military realm. From an international norm perspective, the customary response to a non-hostile ship entering another nation’s sovereign waters was to escort the trespassing ship back to internal waters, twelve nautical miles from the defending nation’s coast. The U.S. and Soviet navies practiced these customs regularly. Military and intelligence reports confidently measured the *Pueblo* as being in international waters at the time of capture on 23 January. Still, they could not completely account for the ship’s course over the previous thirteen days as it collected along North Korean shores. Even though Secretary McNamara had confidence that the ship’s captain followed his directives to remain outside of territorial waters, he could not be certain. “It is important to remember that we did not know where this ship was prior to the time of this incident.”²⁶

The Gulf of Tonkin incident was casting a shadow over the *Pueblo* incident that eroded Johnson's confidence about taking bold action against North Korea.* Johnson had predicated his escalation in the Vietnam War on a confusing attack on another signals intelligence collection ship in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964. The reality of the alleged attack on the USS *Maddox* remained a politically vulnerable topic for Johnson. Whistleblowers had drawn renewed scrutiny to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution beginning in 1967. As the president concluded a meeting on the evening of 24 January, the similarities between the two incidents were notably on his conscience. Tellingly, his last words to McNamara were confirming whether he had appointed a board to investigate the Gulf of Tonkin incident.²⁷ Though there were military distinctions between the *Maddox* and *Pueblo* incidents, politically, the two events bore troubling similarities. Domestic audiences (Condition 3) would be skeptical of another conflict in Asia instigated by questionable skirmishes at sea. This limited the amount of pressure the U.S. could apply on North Korea over the *Pueblo*. The expectation that the administration could only garner limited domestic support for the *Pueblo* after the Gulf of Tonkin experience limited Johnson's objectives (Condition 1) to the ship and crew.

Implicit Bias for Communist Collusion: Presuming Soviet Influence

Leaders in Washington were quick to embrace circumstantial evidence that suggested the *Pueblo* incident was connected to a wider communist ploy. At initial meetings on the *Pueblo* incident, Secretary McNamara and CIA Director Richard Helms supported the president's suspicions of a communist ploy between North Korea and the Soviets. The Johnson administration based many of its response options based on the assumption that the Soviet Union

* This is an example of what Neustadt and May describe as 'recency bias' for decision-makers. See Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

was involved in the Pueblo incident. Failing to appreciate that North Korea was acting independently hindered the Johnson administration from seeing where and how to apply pressure against the North Korean government.*

McNamara led off the National Security Council meeting the day after the incident with bold assertions of Soviet complicity. “Three things are clear,” he begins the meeting, “*One* - It was a conscious effort to provoke a response or a lack of response; *Two* - The Soviets knew of it in advance; *Three* - The North Koreans have no intention of returning the men or the ship.”²⁸ The evidentiary basis of McNamara’s conclusion on Soviet foreknowledge was conjecture based on loose interpretations of Soviet actions. McNamara defended his assertion, stating “the impression that the Soviets were informed in advance is supported by their actions in Moscow. When Ambassador Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson went to the Soviets at his post in Moscow, he received a Soviet position on this quite promptly. It is unlikely that the Soviets could have reached [received] the information about the incident, conferred about it, and then taken a position so quickly without advance knowledge that the incident was to take place.”²⁹ This assessment amounted to pure speculation, based on the unusual speed with which the Soviets had replied to a diplomatic request.

In the following days, emerging events fed these misperceptions. On 25 January, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow interjected in the midst of a discussion “we just received information that a North Korean aircraft is flying to Moscow with two men and 792 pounds of cargo aboard.” Without any further information about the crew or cargo, Rostow claimed, “this could be equipment taken from the *Pueblo*. It is suggestive that the Soviets were in on this.”³⁰

* Understanding the motives behind an act of aggression are important to establishing the external elements of coercive diplomacy (Conditions 6, 7, and 8).

Without knowing what the crew or cargo really was on that flight, the conclusion by Rostow demonstrated the implicit bias of several members of Johnson's team.*

Reports presented by other leaders reinforced the notion that the *Pueblo* seizure was tied to wider communist goals. The CIA Director, Richard Helms, shared assessments that the *Pueblo* seizure appeared "to be an effort by North Korea to support the North Vietnamese in their efforts. They want to distract attention from Vietnam."³¹ He concluded that the *Pueblo* incident would hinder movements of South Korean forces to South Vietnam and disrupt U.S. efforts in Vietnam.³²

Leaders across the Johnson administration were falling into a Cold War trap, where it was "easier to ascribe all adversity to one omnipresent factor than to recognize and evaluate the complexities of disparate international events."³³ Richard Helms briefed on the day of the incident that seizing the ship was a coordinated effort to "create the appearance of a second front which would reduce U.S. freedom of action."³⁴ Leaders were consumed by a tenuous situation in Vietnam and living in the shadow of great power competition with the Soviet Union and China. The Johnson administration presumed all communists sought the same goals and cooperated as one entity. Instead of evaluating North Korea independently, senior officials saw North Korea as "only as one cog in a greater communist conspiracy that consisted of virtually interchangeable parts."³⁵

While the president, secretary of defense, and CIA director carried the presumption that the *Pueblo* incident served a wider communist agenda, the State Department harbored doubt

* Walt Rostow made similar assertions on Soviet involvement based on speculation "The confession by the Captain appears to have been written by the Soviets. This is not the language of an American ship captain. The Soviets may have had a hand in drafting it." <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d218>

about the role of the Soviet Union in the *Pueblo* seizure. State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued an intelligence note on 24 January that "the Soviet Union "appears to have been caught unawares by the *Pueblo* incident." The report concluded insufficient evidence supported claims that "Moscow instigated the North Korean seizure of the *Pueblo* or that Moscow even knew in advance that the incident would take place."³⁶ The only manifestation of this finding at the policy level became Secretary Rusk stating "The Soviets *may* have had advance notice of what was planned" in response to McNamara's excessively confident assertion of clear Soviet foreknowledge of the attack.³⁷

Capturing the *Pueblo* was not an effort to help communist brothers in, despite the timing near the Tet offensive. The North Vietnamese ambassador had secretly bemoaned the *Pueblo* connection, asserting that the comparison made no sense and was "completely unrealistic. It is imbued with wishful thinking, it denies the nature of the mass revolution of the Vietnamese people, and it does not recognize the efforts and successes achieved by the Vietnamese people"³⁸ As much as leaders like Rostow, McNamara, and Johnson wanted to believe North Korea was acting as part of a wider communist conspiracy, Kim Il-Sung had acted alone. North Korea was acting in its own self-interest.

Leading with Diplomacy

Purely military operations were blunt and fraught with risk that President Johnson was not willing to accept (Condition 2). Therefore, diplomacy became the leading instrument of power with the military in a strong supporting role. The *Pueblo* incident presented a lack of viable military options for U.S. national security officials, though it was not for lack of creativity on the part of military planners. The options presented ranged from the U.S. seizing a North Korean vessel and punitive bombing operations to naval quarantines.³⁹ The boldest option that

the U.S. Navy actively rehearsed for several days was to send a U.S. Navy destroyer into the heavily defended North Korean harbor under cover of U.S. fighters to retrieve the USS *Pueblo* by force. As the U.S. Pacific Fleet's plan prescribed, the USS *Higby* was to storm into Wonsan harbor where U.S. Marines would jump off the back of the destroyer onto the deck of the *Pueblo*, chains in hand. The Marines were to shackle the chains to anchor points on *Pueblo* for the USS *Higby* to rip the *Pueblo* from its moorings and drag the impounded ship back to international waters in the largest game of capture the flag in naval history.⁴⁰ Though the mission would have made a blockbuster Hollywood film, the likelihood of success was bleak, and there was a higher chance of turning one naval disaster into a second with a US Navy destroyer and countless other lives lost. Ultimately, the mission was cancelled after senior leaders assessed the crew were not likely on board and most of the intelligence value of the ship was already compromised, meaning that the risk of the raid did not justify the (improbable) reward.⁴¹

As leaders continued to review the breadth of military options, few courses of action seemed to meet the president's intent. General Earl Wheeler admitted he resented seeing a U.S. ship in the hands of an enemy but conceded, "an effort to sink the *Pueblo* by submarine would be very difficult because of the shallow water. An air attack on the ship would encounter stiff North Korean resistance."⁴² After recognizing the risk of direct military retaliation presented to the president's policy aims, Johnson's national security leaders rallied behind options that placed diplomacy first.

Complementary Pressure: Combining Military and Diplomatic Tools

By the evening of the 24th, initial diplomatic and military recommendations were ready for the president's review. Diplomatically, Secretary Rusk recommended a series of actions: engage the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), leverage both partners and rivals to

influence North Korea (Condition 3), and create a sense of urgency (Condition 6) with the 16 countries that had UN forces in Korea to “inform them of the situation and get them nervous about it.”⁴³ President Johnson possessed limited confidence in resolving the matter through the UNSC, but recognized the intermediary benefits. “I see little hope that the United Nations will yield anything productive. We do need to show that this is a very serious matter. We must show to the North Koreans and their brothers that they must avoid the confrontation. We need to show our plan in the United Nations and display some muscle to back up that plan.”⁴⁴ His cabinet shared the pessimism on resolving the matter directly through the UNSC but shared the appreciation for the utility of the United Nations in this crisis.

Secretary Rusk and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, recognized the unique de-escalating potential of the United Nations. Rusk noted that addressing the matter at the United Nations Security Council “is one way of putting prestige factors in the refrigerator for a few days. Security Council debate affords a framework in which contact can be made with the other side without engaging major prestige... Council consideration could also afford an important breathing spell in public feeling.”⁴⁵ Incoming Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford agreed with his diplomatic peers. “We need a period to quiet down the feelings which have been engendered. Going to the UNSC would be the best avenue to do this.”⁴⁶ None of the Johnson officials had much confidence the Security Council possessed the influence to resolve the crisis but recognized the power of the UNSC to defuse tensions and empower other diplomatic initiatives.

The administration opted to deploy a robust military package to the region. These troops served both a prudent and a coercive purpose. Posturing additional forces around Korea increased the military’s readiness to respond in the event hostilities broke out on the peninsula.

The forces also contributed to the external conditions of creating a sense of urgency (Condition 6) and meant to help establish a fear of unacceptable escalation (Condition 7). The Secretary of Defense proposed moving 250 Air Force aircraft to South Korea, ordering the carrier USS *Enterprise* to South Korean waters, and activating 14,000 Air Force and Navy reserves.⁴⁷ The president supported all of these proposals, ultimately encouraging the Department of Defense to send 300 planes instead of the proposed 250, “Get more than you think you really need.”⁴⁸ The forces would begin to flow into theater in the coming days, careful not to interfere with General Westmoreland’s efforts to defend the Marines at Khe Sanh.

The decision to deploy forces to South Korea demonstrated how diplomatic and military leaders were aligned on how to exert pressure on North Korea. Secretary Rusk appreciated the diplomatic value of Secretary McNamara’s military proposals. “We must be braced for anything. The call-up of forces makes our diplomacy more creditable. For instance, the call-up of reserves had an immediate effect on the Russians in the Berlin crisis [of 1961].”⁴⁹ Ambassador Goldberg recognized the compelling effect of military activity as a catalyst for action in the Security Council. “These military actions will create a sense of urgency for the U.N. to act. The only time those guys (the representatives to the United Nations) will do anything is when they have to.”⁵⁰ From a diplomatic perspective, the military buildup served useful short-term coercive purposes.

The buildup of forces on the Korean peninsula fed a key component to coercion: brinkmanship, which many of the leaders in the LBJ administration knew from the Cuban Missile Crisis. The question became what to do with the forces once they arrived in South Korea. Deploying troops to a region for coercive purposes created additional risk (Condition 2). Under Secretary of State Katzenbach noted, “it is important to distinguish between symbolic movement of forces and actual use. The former does not commit you, the latter does.”⁵¹ Secretary

McNamara concurred with this distinction, adding, “there will be time between the call-up of forces and the movement of these forces for diplomatic activity.”⁵² Though Johnson sensed a risk of placing a powerful military force without a clear mission, his leaders convinced him that the deployment of forces was ultimately necessary both as a coercive measure and as a matter of preparedness in the event of further North Korean provocation.

The commitment of forces, especially in relative air power on the Korean peninsula, significantly shifted the relative combat power advantage on the Korean peninsula in South Korea’s favor. The ROK Army maintained a larger ground force than the DPRK, but North Korea had a larger air force of advanced Soviet MiGs. * President Johnson reflected, “the South Korean army could look after itself, but the North Koreans had a larger air force and we did not wish them to be tempted by the advantage.”⁵³

These steps achieved three important results. First, the rapid deployment of combat power facilitated compellent effects towards North Korea. As a compellent measure, the additional air and naval forces would have helped create a sense of urgency in the eyes of the target state (Condition 6). Second, the additional forces supported a deterrent measure for South Korea, augmenting the limited South Korean air power and created a reassuring effect to calm South Korean fears of vulnerability to further North Korean aggression (Condition 3). “It was an act that would give confidence and strength to the harassed South Koreans.”⁵⁴ Third, the

* In a meeting with the president on the evening of 24 January, Secretary McNamara informed Johnson that the North Korea air force had 400 jets compared to 200 jets in South Korea. McNamara proposed sending “63 Air Force F-4’s; 33 Marine F-4’s; 50 F-100’s; 50 A-4’s; 30 F-8’s; 22 F-105’s; and possibly some other aircraft.” President Johnson replied, “I would send 300 planes. Get more than you think you really need.” See “221. Notes of the President’s Meeting,” January 24, 1968, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXIX, PART 1, KOREA, 221, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d221>.

precautionary deployment of forces to Korea in response to the *Pueblo* seizure created a compelling effect on the Soviet Union, as discussed in the next section.

Compelling Soviet Influence

The Johnson administration tried to get the support of the Soviets (Condition 3) to assist with resolving the *Pueblo* incident, though Moscow did not want to get involved. It would take coercive measures to convince the Soviets to change its position. The Johnson administration used two conditions of coercive diplomacy to inspire the Soviets to intervene with the North Koreans: the U.S. demonstrated a heightened motivation towards its objectives (Condition 8) and created a sense of unacceptable escalation with its deployment of military forces to the region (Condition 7).

Moscow seemed uniquely positioned to deescalate the *Pueblo* incident. The Soviet Union was bound by a defensive treaty with Kim Il-Sung, so it had to maintain a delicate position in the *Pueblo* incident: any attack on North Korea would draw the Soviet Union into the conflict. The United States shared similar security ties with South Korea: if South Korea attacked North Korea, the U.S. would be expected to join the fight. With the Cuban Missile Crisis only six years prior, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States sought another nuclear-charged crisis.

One of the earliest diplomatic efforts by the LBJ administration was to solicit the assistance of the Soviet Union to convince North Korea to release the American hostages. The State Department telegram sent out early on the morning of the 23rd urged the Soviets to “act at once to convey our position and strongest protest to North Koreans and should bring their influence to bear in the interest of avoiding any further consequences.”⁵⁵ In Moscow, the Soviets told the US Ambassador that the *Pueblo* incident “was not their problem,” blaming the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea as the reason for continued tension with North Korea. The Soviets

concluded saying “they would not take action on the matter.”⁵⁶ The opening message on the 23rd was clear: the Soviets wanted no role in shuttling diplomatic efforts between Kim Il-Sung and President Johnson and desired to stay out of the conflict.

The USSR’s effort to remain neutral emboldened North Korea, who shared with Eastern European communist diplomats on 26 January, “we are content with the fact that the Soviet Union refused to mediate the matter of the captured vessel. We will regard those who will accept the United States proposal to mediate this matter as friends of the Americans.”⁵⁷ However, by 28 January, these diplomats stationed in Pyongyang began to sense the problem was escalating. The ambassador to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic reported home, “If we take into account the concentration of the South Korean forces not only as a consequence of the Seoul incident on 21 January [the Blue House Raid]... the *Pueblo* problem is beginning to outgrow the context of the Korean Peninsula and is becoming one of the new serious problems that can have very serious consequences sooner or later.”⁵⁸ Despite North Korean efforts to maintain the support of their communist partners, the increased threat of military escalation over the *Pueblo* wore down cohesion among communist states and nudged the Soviets to become involved. The combination of military and diplomatic signals sent by the Johnson administration in the first week of the crisis demonstrated resolve and a determination to secure the release of the crew and ship. By signaling a willingness to accept risks and costs (Condition 2), Washington was establishing a greater motivation towards its objectives (Condition 8) than the Soviet’s desires to remain neutral.

The United States used diplomatic pressure to compel the Soviets to join in mediation efforts. As President Johnson recalled, “we contacted almost every government in the world and asked them to use their good offices to secure the release of the crew.”⁵⁹ Declassified communist

diplomatic reports suggest that the Soviets picked up on the repeated diplomatic signals. Hungarian diplomats in Moscow reported on 30 January, “it seems obvious that the Johnson administration really strove, and still strives, for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. This is indicated by the contacts established between American official personages and socialist diplomats in Moscow, New York, and elsewhere.”⁶⁰

The Johnson administration helped to create a sense of urgency (Condition 6) for the Soviets to become involved by resisting the temptation to initiate a retaliatory attack at the outset of the crisis. Soviet leaders recognized that the demonstrated patience and restraint by the Johnson administration should not be taken for granted. Domestic pressure from the public and political opponents continued to mount on President Johnson. Johnson faced significant domestic pressure to take military action from constituents, media commentaries, and hawkish legislators.⁶¹ Johnson also needed to carefully manage his relationship with his counterpart in South Korea, who faced tremendous domestic pressure to take unilateral action against North Korea in retaliation for the Blue House raid. The strong relationship between Presidents Johnson and Park kept the alliance together, but South Korean domestic pressures mounted significantly as well. Immediately after the *Pueblo* seizure, the South Korean Minister of Defense warned U.S. partners his country “would refrain from retaliatory raids against North Korea for time being, but if North Koreans made other significant raids, he would promise nothing further.”⁶²

A week after the *Pueblo* attack, communist leaders in Moscow questioned how long “Johnson will be able – and willing – to resist the extremely provocative attitude of the Congress that demands immediate military actions against the DPRK.”⁶³ The Hungarian ambassador to the Soviet Union questioned “whether a possible prolongation of the crisis will bring forth circumstances which may induce the Johnson administration to head towards a military solution

against its wishes.”⁶⁴ Uncertainty about North Korean intentions stoked concerns about escalating confrontations on the peninsula. In addition to enacting war preparations at home, DPRK leaders wrote to their Soviet counterparts on 31 January that North Korea had been “forced to conduct preparations to give the aggression an appropriate rebuff,” and conveying the expectation that “the Soviet government and the fraternal Soviet people will fight together with us against the aggressors.”⁶⁵

Efforts by U.S. diplomats and officials to delegitimize North Korea’s acts of aggression helped reduce the Moscow’s support for Pyongyang’s actions.* Soviet leaders privately questioned the international legitimacy of North Korea’s seizure of a foreign vessel for crossing into sovereign waters. Established norms of the time called for nations to simply escort ships out of their territorial waters, not seize vessels and hold crew captive.† Soviet leaders remarked internally, “one should say that the measures taken in this case by the government of the DPRK appear unusually harsh: as a rule in the practice of international relations, in case of an incursion by a foreign military vessel into the territorial waters of any state, it is simply advised to leave these waters or forced to do so.”⁶⁶ The *Pueblo* incident was becoming a nuisance and a liability for the Soviet Union, further straining the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow, and creating an opportunity for Washington: Moscow could become its partner in resolving the *Pueblo* incident (Condition 3).

* This is an example of coercive isolation between a primary state and a secondary state. See discussion in Chapter 2 regarding ‘The Outside Game.’

† See earlier discussion in Part I: Gathering the Facts. For additional reference, see legal review by Johnson administration in “Legal Issues in the *Pueblo* Seizure,” 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, *Pueblo* Crisis, 1968, Box 32, Vol 12, Draft White House Paper, Summary Press Reaction, Representative Press Stories, JPL.

The U.S. efforts to compel Soviet mediation in the crisis succeeded. However, the Soviets were unable to convince Pyongyang to resolve the crisis failed to bring about meaningful results. The Soviet Union had little influence over the issue. Moscow had not sanctioned the *Pueblo* attack. Rather, the Soviets had kept secret from the U.S. that the North Koreans had acted without Soviet knowledge (or approval). North Korea was not interested in being shepherded by the Soviets. Soviet leaders recounted how they “expressed an opinion to the Korean leadership... [to] finish this affair by disgraceful deportation of the crew of the USA spy vessel from the territory of North Korea.”⁶⁷ However, Soviet diplomats reported back to Moscow, “the Korean comrades maintained an extreme position and were not inclined toward settling the incident.”⁶⁸ Instead, the North Korean government was preparing its population for a fight. “DPRK propaganda took on a militant character, and the population was told that a war could begin any day, that the military forces of the DPRK are ‘ready to smash American imperialism.’”⁶⁹

The Johnson administration had indeed succeeded in compelling the Soviet Union to mediate a resolution in favor of the U.S. objectives, but officials in Washington could not see the internal division between North Korea and its communist sponsor, the Soviet Union. Despite a successful campaign to compel Soviet change in behavior, the effort failed to produce the desired results. It turned out that Moscow did not have enough influence over Pyongyang to change North Korean behavior.

On 29 January, senior U.S. officials met again to discuss possible response options and way ahead for the *Pueblo* crisis. Though the group reviewed several different courses of action, from air strikes to economic pressure, the group's consensus was to see what might result from direct talks with North Korea. Walt Rostow noted, “it was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken... until we could

form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.”* Direct talks were arranged to begin four days later, on 2 February.

Part II: Instability (31 January - 15 February)

This phase began with the initiation of the Tet Offensive and ended after the Vance mission to South Korea. Within this two-week span, the Vietnam war and tensions over the Blue House Raid significantly altered the military and political considerations in the minds of officials trying to deal with the *Pueblo*. The Tet Offensive weakened U.S. leaders’ resolve and focus, forcing officials to reevaluate their political objectives (Condition 1), willingness to accept the risks and costs of another possible foreign intervention (Condition 2). The international community paid close attention as well. South Korean leaders began to question how much they could rely on U.S. support against North Korea after the devastating setbacks in Vietnam. Rhetoric within political circles in Seoul stirred real concern for South Korean officials. The U.S. was losing its ability to impress a sense of urgency (Condition 6) and unacceptable escalation (Condition 7) against North Korea. Seeing the need for immediate political reassurances, American officials serving in Seoul encouraged President Johnson to send a respected emissary try to de-escalate a dangerous situation with the most important partner to the U.S. in the crisis (Condition 3). What began as an effort to compel North Korea became an urgent matter of deterring an ally: preventing South Korea from withdrawing its troops in Vietnam and unilaterally attacking North Korea. Had this occurred, the U.S. and Soviet Union were bound to enter the war on the peninsula, risking all of the Cold War consequences.

* Advisors present included: George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell D. Taylor, Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Joseph Sisco, Samuel Berger, Director Richard Helms, W.W. Rostow, and Bromley Smith. See “242. Report on Meeting of the Advisory Group,” January 29, 1968, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, FRUS.

The Influence of the Tet Offensive on Pueblo

The coordinated attacks by the North Vietnamese on more than 100 cities and towns across South Vietnam on 31 January set off a political earthquake for the Johnson administration. Though several officials, including General Westmoreland and Walt Rostow, anticipated some sort of winter or spring offensive, the scale and scope of the Tet Offensive exceeded all plausible intelligence estimates.* However, the United States performed well in defending against the attacks and North Vietnam not suffered tremendous casualties in the counterattacks against their massive assault but failed to retain any of the territory gained in the offensive.

Tet did more than erode public support for the president's policies toward Vietnam; it also calcified the necessity to resolve the *Pueblo* crisis through diplomacy (affecting Conditions 1 and 3). The offensive was a political victory for North Vietnam despite their battlefield losses.† McNamara and Johnson struggled to formulate a credible public response after the attacks. McNamara conceded to the president the day after the offensive began, "I've talked to the Chiefs about some kind of reciprocal action in retaliation for their attack on our Embassy or for their attack across the country. There just isn't anything they've come up with that is worth a damn."⁷⁰ Johnson struggled to control the domestic public narrative about the outcome of the battle. Hanoi's real accomplishment with Tet was changing the American public's perception of progress in the war. In the aftermath of Tet, there was no feasible way for Johnson to rally support for another military operation in Asia.⁷¹ The battle in Vietnam solidified Johnson's

* Because of the time difference in Asia, the first reports of the Tet Offensive arrived on the afternoon of 30 January in Washington D.C.

† The United States and South Vietnamese forces inflicted between 30,000-50,000 casualties on the North Vietnamese attackers.

determination to come to some sort of diplomatic resolution to the *Pueblo* dilemma that remained short of war.

Initiating the MAC Dialogue: 2 February

American diplomats struggled to find a way to open a direct line of communication with Pyongyang to defuse the crisis and secure the release of the ship and crew. Officials first sought to use the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) channel, consisting of Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, to assist with negotiations. North Korea insisted on direct talks with the United States through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) at Panmunjom channel.⁷² The Armistice Agreement in 1953 established the MAC at Panmunjom to facilitate dialogue with North Korea and to “settle through negotiations any violations of [the] Armistice Agreement.”⁷³ The armistice agreement established firm guidelines on the makeup of the commission, including the number and military rank requirements for all representatives.

Demanding bilateral talks at the MAC favored North Korea in several ways. At the time, only communist countries gave North Korea international recognition. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was not a member of the United Nations.* North Korea therefore increased its international status by holding direct negotiations with the United States over the *Pueblo*. It also created friction in the relationship between South Korea and the United States just as tensions were flaring in Seoul over the Blue House raid.† Ambassador Porter sent a telegram to Washington from Seoul on 28 January about his discussions with his counterparts in the

* North and South Korea both joined the United Nations in 1991.

† President Park expressed concern that excluding South Korea from the negotiations would signal to Pyongyang that only the “*Pueblo* and crew were all that mattered.” Ambassador Porter had to reassure President Park that “the US would remain deeply concerned about NK [sic] violations in the DMZ and infiltration.” See “From Seoul, Tel 3727,” January 29, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, *Pueblo* Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 1, JPL.

Republic of Korean Government (ROKG). “We have not informed ROKG of exchange between ourselves and North Korea through NNSC members. Despite security precautions we cannot keep this from them for very long....Should ROKs learn that we have requested meeting of senior members MAC solely to discuss *Pueblo* incident...without parallel effort on intrusion problem, results could be explosive.”⁷⁴

Still, the offer to talk at the MAC was one of the first diplomatic breakthroughs with North Korea in the weeks since the *Pueblo* was seized. Excluding South Korea from the talks strained the alliance, but also increased the likelihood of isolating the issue to the *Pueblo* and its crew.^{*} Furthermore, the Tet offensive solidified the necessity to pursue a diplomatic solution, so any open channel to talk with North Korea was worth exploring.[†]

Bilateral negotiations at the MAC began on 2 February and continued until the ultimate resolution of the crisis eleven months later. Overall, there were 29 private meetings between U.S. and North Korean representatives. Progress came slowly. It took four meetings before North Korea cooperated to reveal the crew's names and types of injuries.[‡] The frequency of meetings mirrors the level of emphasis on the issue. In the first month (February), there were nine meetings. By the summer, as progress stalled, there was just one meeting a month.⁷⁵

^{*} Vance recalled, “we felt that to bring the South Koreans into the discussion at this point might jeopardize the success of the discussions. President Park agreed to this, and we kept him fully informed--the Embassy kept him fully informed at all times—on what had taken place as each meeting at Panmunjom was terminated.” See “Transcript, Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview II,” December 29, 1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, JPL, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/vance_c/vance2.pdf.

[†] For discussion about the impact of the Vietnam War in domestic attitudes towards the *Pueblo* affair, see Mitchell Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 159.

[‡] The names of dead and wounded were delivered on 7 February at the 4th MAC meeting. See “7 February 1968 Diplomatic Activities,” February 7, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 2, Chron Part 2 [Feb. 2-19], JPL. 7

The lead negotiator for the U.S. in the MAC meetings at the outset of the crisis was poorly qualified and ill-suited for the role, which inhibited the U.S. from making progress on any of the external conditions of coercive diplomacy (Conditions 6,7, or 8). Rear Admiral John V. Smith was the “Senior Member” of United Nations for the MAC. Official summaries on the MAC negotiations present Smith as a dutiful representative; his memoirs, however, reveal a different story. Privately, Smith referred to the North Koreans as “Mongolian savages.”⁷⁶ His personal memoirs reveal that Smith possessed no aptitude or patience for diplomacy. The relationship between Smith and his North Korean counterpart, Major General Pak Chung Kuk, was toxic, devolving into caustic insults and juvenile games to taunt and intimidate each other. Smith relished blowing cigar smoke into Pak’s face, and Pak slung inflammatory rhetoric about the United States, reading only from approved cue cards on official talking points.⁷⁷ The output of negotiations were far from optimal. The meetings achieved the bare minimum progress to keep them going.

Suggestions of Smith’s lack of suitability did circulate between Rusk and Porter. After reading the verbatim transcripts of the first two negotiations, Rusk cabled Porter to question whether Smith was the right person for the job. Rusk recognized that the North Korean representative was likely a professionally trained negotiator with years of experience.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, the United States placed little emphasis on the UNMAC representative assignment and rotated leaders on regular two-year intervals. Smith had neither formal negotiation training nor any unique diplomatic intuition. Ambassador Porter shared the Secretary of State’s instincts, replying that he recommended Smith be relieved and replaced with a successor who carried the additional title of “Special Representative of the United States.”⁷⁹ There was risk to this proposal. Appointing an official Special Representative would elevate the status of the

negotiations for North Korea and further isolate the role of South Korea in the crisis. Ultimately, officials decided that it would send unfavorable signals to replace Smith at an early date.

Smith rotated out in May, as originally scheduled, and was replaced by Army Major General Gilbert Woodward.* Though not an experienced negotiator, Woodward possessed a better temperament to deal with North Korean negotiation tactics. He exercised more patience in the face of Major General Pak's repeated insults and vulgarity and earned a reputation as a "firm and determined bargainer."⁸⁰ Woodward also learned how to negotiate on the job through his assignment at the MAC.⁸¹ The United States missed an opportunity to hand select a uniquely capable representative for these negotiations, but the sense of urgency (Condition 6) that existed in first weeks of the crisis had passed. By the time Woodward took over as the UN's Senior Member at the MAC, North Korea had lost interest in making major concessions in the negotiations. The *Pueblo* affair was shifting from a 'crisis' into a drawn-out stalemate. Woodward would remain in position through the end of the successful repatriation of the crew.[†]

A Fracturing Alliance with South Korea

The relationship between the U.S. and South Korea during the *Pueblo* incident provides valuable insight to the prominence of focusing attention on international support (Condition 3) in exercising coercive diplomacy against an opponent. The incident exposed the need for the United States to apply multidirectional coercion: a balancing act of compellence of the opponent and deterrence of its ally. The growing tensions on the Korean peninsula stemmed from a mismatch in interests between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea during the crisis. The United States

* In May, Major General Gilbert Woodward replaced Smith as the UN MAC lead representative.

† MG Woodward was the U.S. official who presented and signed the final resolution agreement on behalf of the United States that satisfied the North Korean terms to release the 82 American captives.

identified clear objectives (Condition 1) that concentrated on the release of the ship and crew. But these goals conflicted with the interests of South Korea to stop North Korean aggression south of the DMZ. The Blue House Raid was a final straw after months of repeated incidents of aggression by North Korea. South Koreans needed reassurance that they could count on the United States if war returned to the peninsula.

On 28 January, Ambassador Porter saw the first signs that the Republic of Korea was second-guessing the reliability of its American allies. He reported, “we have had broad hints that ROKs are talking among themselves of possible withdrawal ROK Armed Forces from operational control CINUNC and, because of concern over reopening of hostilities here, return of ROK troops from Vietnam.” Porter downplayed the significance of these suggestions as more bark than bite, but still wanted to convey the mood in Seoul. “We do not believe they are serious, but the fact that senior ranks imply such considerations is indicative of psychological climate we must deal with here.”⁸² This simmering tension inside South Korea may have remained manageable had it not been for two near simultaneous turns of events: the unexpected crisis in Vietnam over Tet and the revelation that the United States had excluded South Korea from the negotiations with North Korea.

By 6 February, South Korean news outlets suggested the bilateral MAC talks undermined South Korea’s sovereignty and elevated the status of North Korean regime. The press called for ROK inclusion in the negotiations and to ensure North Korean intrusions into the South received equal or greater weight to the *Pueblo* incident. Riots and demonstrations gathered outside the U.S. embassy in Seoul. Groups called for the withdrawal of ROK troops in Vietnam. Others called for independent operational control of the ROK military by the South Korean government.⁸³

Leaders in the ROKG came under tremendous public pressure about questions whether the United States was a reliable a security partner as concerns about the Blue House Raid seemed to be left unaddressed. General Bonesteel reported, “I have been deeply disturbed over last several days at growing irrationality in certain areas ROKG, most especially in President Park himself...Park is almost irrationally obsessed with need to strike now at North Koreans.”⁸⁴ The Chief of Staff of the ROK Air Force warned General Bonesteel that he “may receive orders from Blue House for unilateral air strikes, which he know would be suicidal.”⁸⁵ For President Park, this was more than playing politics or pandering to the passions of his constituents. The assassination attempt was directed at him and his family. Park shared the growing despair with his public: was the United States going to honor its security alliance with South Korea or were the South Koreas being left to fend for themselves? Being cut out of the talks at the MAC was an unsettling sign for South Korean leaders that the United States was distancing itself from South Korean interests.

Bonesteel provided valuable insight into the core needs of his ROK counterparts that reveals an important element to facilitating international support (Condition 3) in coercive diplomacy. The angst in Seoul was a symptom brought on by uncertainty. He relayed back to Washington, “however unreasonable President Park’s obsessive drive may appear to Washington, I wish to state frankly that we have given him no real idea of what we intend to do or alternative courses, and so I believe we have brought large part of it on ourselves.” Bonesteel recognized that deliberate communication would help provide reassurance to South Korean counterparts. “It is absolutely essential,” Bonesteel relayed, “that we give certain ROK’s, including Chiefs of Services, some concept or strategy as to what we intend to do. They know we are making contingency plans, but they do not know what, where, when, or why and it

meantime our actions are highly confusing to them.”⁸⁶ To maintain the support of South Korea while the U.S. was applying coercive diplomacy towards North Korea, U.S. leaders needed to update South Korean leaders on the way ahead. South Korean leaders needed to know they were partners in the relationship, not afterthoughts. The fourth condition of coercive diplomacy – strong and unified leadership – is not just as an internal consideration within the U.S. government. Condition 4 also applies within an alliance. Fostering solidarity and addressing the individual interests of allies and partners (applying Condition 4) facilitates Condition 3: gaining international support.

Deterring South Korea: The Cy Vance Mission

Senior U.S. officials proposed sending a special presidential envoy to Seoul after recognizing that the Porter-Bonesteel team in South Korea might not have sufficient clout to effectively reassure ROK government officials.⁸⁷ State Department officials anticipated President Park would favorably respond to receiving a special envoy sent on behalf of the president of the United States. “When the President sent somebody to come and speak on his behalf, Park listened in a fashion that he could not or would not do for the people who were on the ground and there all the time.”⁸⁸ The president selected Cy Vance as his emissary to meet with Park. Vance was one of Johnson’s most trusted mediators, having already performed three successful negotiations in both domestic and foreign crises for the president.⁸⁹

Vance needed to demonstrate that the U.S. was in solidarity with ROKG and that it remained committed to addressing South Korea’s security interests as well (Condition 4). Rusk and the White House gave Vance blunt instructions to arrange for a secret conversation with President Park with only his interpreter and/or personal assistant.⁹⁰ There were two core issues to

discuss: the first was security. The second was politics. Vance's purpose was to deter the U.S. ally from rash or undesirable action.

First, Vance needed to convey that the immediate release of the USS *Pueblo* and its crew was essential "to reduce quickly the tension in the area and the danger of war." He asserted, "this is of transcendent importance." Persuading Park of the need to prioritize the crew's release over addressing South Korea's land border security was critical. For this reason, the U.S. did not want the talks at the MAC to address the Blue House Raid and the systematic acts of aggression by North Korea along the Demilitarized Zone; Vance needed to explain how that major issue would be resolved through other mechanisms later.

Second, the instructions characterized the domestic political stakes of the *Pueblo* as "extremely important to President Johnson." It went on to explain "if the crew and the vessel are not returned quickly...it can become a very serious matter on the American political scene." Vance was to tie the U.S. domestic political implications to South Korea's interests. "This is an election year in the U.S., and the issue could become a major one in the campaign in such a way as to affect U.S.- ROK relations and our position in Southeast Asia." Vance was to convey that including ROK officials in the negotiations at the MAC was likely to extend the negotiations, which risked spoiling the U.S. domestic support for South Korea.⁹¹

This presented President Park with his own political dilemma. He was under pressure from his domestic supporters to respond forcefully to North Korea's provocations. Still, Park relied on the United States for military assistance and could not afford to jeopardize that security alliance. Vance ensured that President Park knew the potential risks of taking unilateral action. He carried the message from LBJ "that President Park should be under no illusions as to the seriousness of any such action; and that if such a step were taken without full consultation with

the United States that the whole relationships between our countries would have to be reevaluated.”⁹²

North and South Korea were receiving similar warnings from their sponsor states meant to incentivize restraint. In private talks with Pyongyang, the Soviets tried to set boundaries on its security relationship with North Korea. Moscow tried to clarify that the security treaty between the DPRK and USSR was defensive in nature only.* If North Korea were attacked by an act of war, the Soviet Union would readily come to its assistance. If the North Koreans were the ones to initiate a war on the Peninsula, the Soviet Union was not guaranteed to participate in the conflict.

Johnson and Vance sought to prevent South Korea from launching retaliatory attacks against North Korea, and to prevent South Korea from recalling its troop commitments in Vietnam. The close personal relationship between Park and Johnson played a key role in Vance’s ability to ask Park to accept the U.S. request. Vance was instructed to relay Johnson’s deepest appreciation for the bond he shared with Park, evoking the unique relationship established between Roosevelt and Churchill during World War II. Johnson wanted Vance to show how the security issue was directly tied the personal bonds between him and Park. Vance needed to convey that any acts of retaliation against North Korea “would create a wholly new set of problems and dangers and strains on our alliance, as well as interrupt the great progress that the

* Brezhnev later reported that he told Kim Ch'ang Bong, North Korean Minister of People’s Armed Forces, “literally the following: ‘We indeed have a treaty. Its essence is known to both you and us. We would like to stress that it has a defensive character and is an instrument of defending the peace-loving position of North Korea. Since comrade Kim Il Sung did not put the circumstances and the details of the current situation in a concrete form, we consider it very important to conduct serious consultations with him on this question.’” See Leonid Brezhnev, “Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev’s Speech at the April (1968) CC CPSU Plenum, ‘On the Current Problems of the International Situation and on the Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the International Communist Movement,’” April 9, 1968, Document 110507, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110507>.

Republic of Korea has been making under President Park.”⁹³ Vance therefore applied a comprehensive approach towards deterrence, using multiple forms of pressure (military, political, diplomatic) to prevent South Korea from taking any action.

Keeping a pulse on the health of international relationship during tense situations created in coercive diplomacy is difficult to maintain from Washington (Condition 3). National security leaders sometimes refer to this as the ‘*tyranny of distance*’ for building and implementing sensitive operations. Communications and expectations degrade the further apart two entities become and/or when cultural distinctions inhibit mutual understanding.

In Seoul, U.S. officials believed Vance’s visit was urgently needed. Bonesteel conveyed to Washington on 9 February, “I have tried for some days now to express in more formal language the mad hatter’s tea party atmosphere among high-level ROKs here. Forgive my reverting to the vernacular, but most seriously it will be very important that Cy Vance come here prepared to answer in some way the questions of what the US is prepared to do, particularly re stopping NK infiltration threat by threat of force if necessary.”⁹⁴ From Seoul, Bonesteel could see flashing-red warning signs that a major incident between South and North Korea was about to unfold.

Rusk, however, remembered the situation differently. In an interview less than two years later, he recalled, “the South Koreans were interested in what might be called close-in retaliation, but I never got the impression that the South Koreans wanted to go into full-scale war. So to the extent that it was necessary to restrain them, it wasn’t a very difficult job because they were not itching for war, either.”⁹⁵ There is some rational logic to Rusk’s assessment that South Korea was not wanting to go to war with North Korea.

There are several explanations for these contrasting views from senior government entities. Porter and Bonesteel were immersed in the emotions swirling throughout South Korea at the time. The country had just endured a high-profile multi-day manhunt to kill or capture the North Korean commandos from the Blue House Raid. Several additional border skirmishes had ensued since the capture of the *Pueblo*. Bonesteel and Porter were finely tuned to the sense of urgency in Seoul to address the North Korean threat.

The glaring warning signs that Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel sensed were visceral and unsettling but there was a unity of leadership issue emerging (Condition 4). Leaders in Washington became consumed with their own pressing issues during the first few days of February. The weight of the Tet Offensive supplanted much of the noise on the Korean Peninsula. General Westmoreland still thought Tet was an elaborate diversion for the main North Vietnamese attack at Khe Sanh.⁹⁶ The totality of Tet would feel different for diplomats and military leaders serving in South Korea. Senior American officials in Seoul would certainly appreciate the strategic implications of the Tet Offensive, but the tyranny of distance would preclude them from fully appreciating the political pressures Washington was experiencing from domestic audiences over Vietnam.

The Johnson administration dispatched Vance and his hand-selected team of advisors on a special C-135 flight to South Korea within thirty-six hours of receiving the list of possible envoys. Vance's team arrived in Seoul on the morning of 11 February and spent the next four and a half days in marathon meeting sessions with various ROK government officials. Vance made a deliberate effort to include Porter and Bonesteel in as many meetings as possible to reinforce their credibility as senior U.S. government officials in the eyes of their ROK counterparts. Vance maintained close coordination with Washington throughout the mission,

exchanging lengthy telegrams each night discussing the progress and way ahead. Progress came slowly and incrementally. A diplomatic breakthrough came on the night of 14 February, where the session began at 8:45 pm and lasted until 6:45 the next morning. This ten-hour session between Vance and the ROK Foreign Minister finally resulted in draft Joint Communiqué that both governments were willing to release. Draft in hand, Vance then met with President Park that same morning. “After a hard session covering US-ROK differences President Park reversed his stand and agree to release the Joint Communiqué.”⁹⁷

The communiqué was a somewhat benign joint statement but it reflected that Vance had succeeded in fostering U.S.-ROK solidarity (Condition 4).^{*} Most significantly, the communiqué subtly showed that Park conceded to punt on the issue of retaliation for the Blue House Raid.[†] “If such aggression continued,” the statement declared, “the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Defense Treaty between Republic of Korea and the United States.”⁹⁸ The statement also made a deliberate effort to reinforce the defense treaty's consultative framework. The communiqué helped address the U.S. concerns that South Korea might drag the United States into a conflict with North Korea (and by likely extension, the USSR).

Two inducements helped Vance garner President Park's support to back down from seeking immediate retribution for the Blue House Raid and to accept being excluded from the

^{*} Vance needed to demonstrate that the U.S. was in solidarity with ROKG and that it remained committed to addressing South Korea's security interests as well (Condition 4).

[†] Political scientist Alexander George might interpret the document as a non-confrontational effort to apply Type A Coercive Diplomacy towards North Korea: stop behavior.

talks with North Korea at the MAC. First, Vance offered a pledge by the United States to deliver \$100 million in security aid to South Korea, specifically aimed at counterinfiltration programs.*

Second, Vance made a private pledge to keep Park fully informed of all discussions and developments between the U.S. and DPRK in the MAC as soon as each meeting was terminated.⁹⁹ This pledge provided a layer of transparency to the talks and allowed ROK officials to detect any unacceptable developments behind closed doors. Providing full access to the transcripts satisfied the festering environment of uncertainty that plagued ROK officials early in the crisis. In business negotiation terms, Vance identified a zone of possible agreement and found a best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The \$100 million in counterinfiltration aid and full disclosure of talks met the core needs of the ROK officials while permitting the United States to preserve their key interests over the issue.

Vance's mission also succeeded not just because of the substance of the offers but because of who delivered it. Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel maintained healthy relationships with their ROK counterparts, but in this moment of crisis, Park needed to feel a direct connection with the president of the United States. After the mission, Vance explained that "the Presidential Envoy should be, if possible, a man of recognized trouble-shooting capacity, and if possible, of known association with the President."¹⁰⁰ Vance's mission benefitted from carrying the prestige, credibility, and authority of President Johnson, giving an extra layer of reassurance that the two allies were valued partners in the security relationship.

* Adjusting that figure for inflation, the pledge amounts to approximately \$851 million in 2022 based on calculations made on 21 July 2022 from inflations estimates updated on 13 July 2022 using <https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1968>

PART III: ENTRENCHED POSITIONS (16 FEBRUARY - 16 MAY)

The third phase of the affair occurred as tensions on the Korean peninsula settled and U.S. commanders began regaining control of embattled regions in Vietnam. During these months, policymakers searched for options to break through the underwhelming progress made in direct negotiations with the North Koreans.

The Johnson administration had achieved some commendable secondary achievements in the first month of applying coercive diplomacy over the *Pueblo* affair. These included successfully deterring South Korea from taking retaliatory action and compelling the Soviet Union to apply pressure on the DPRK as a mediator in the conflict. These achievements reduced the risk of the affair spiraling into something greater and not making the incident worse over those first three combustible weeks was no small feat. But the primary objectives of securing the release of the ship and crew remained unattained.

While officials in Seoul eased tensions in the ROKG, the U.S. seemed to find itself in a stalemate with North Korea. North Korea proved insulated from foreign pressure after the Soviet mediation attempt failed to yield substantial influence. Private meetings with General Pak at the MAC continued to yield nothing of substance. Early efforts to generate bargaining chips or leverage over North Korea proved fruitless. There was no longer a sense of urgency (Condition 6) surrounding the *Pueblo* affair and the U.S. had made little progress in establishing the other external conditions of coercive diplomacy. The ‘scoreboard’ between the United States and DPRK was decidedly lopsided in North Korea’s favor. Pyongyang had gained a treasure trove of classified documents and equipment from the ship, and presumably confessions by the crew.*

* Note from FRUS: “Intelligence reports indicated that Communist China had sent an interrogation team to question 17 crew members who had previously gathered intelligence off the Chinese coast and that the Soviet Union sent a

Possession of the ship and signed confessions by the crew provided DPRK steady propaganda value for both domestic and international audiences. The *Pueblo* incident raised the prestige of North Korea while exposing the limits of American power and military prowess.* Policymakers in Washington needed to reevaluate how to compel North Korea. The United States was a long way from achieving one of the necessary conditions of coercive diplomacy: establishing an asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer (Condition 8).

Reevaluating Strategies and Objectives

Policy recommendations circulated among senior officials considering what leverage the United States could generate that might shift North Korea's position. Under Secretary Katzenbach sent Ambassador Porter a telegram requesting his assessment and advice on the *Pueblo* situation from his vantage point in Seoul.¹⁰¹ Porter recommended measures to gradually increase pressure on North Korea with incremental steps, including ordering the departure of American dependents and non-essential personnel serving in South Korea, high visibility but low-threat air demonstrations by the USAF well south of the DMZ; and blacklisting North Korean shipping. These measures would allow the United States to systematically dial up pressure.

An interagency planning team known as the Korean Working Group (KWG) produced five alternative strategies in "North Korean Aggression and the *Pueblo* Incident, Possible Future

team of electronics and decoding experts to assist with the interrogation of *Pueblo* crew members. (Telegram from the Commander of Naval Intelligence in Japan, February 16, 1968; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, *Pueblo*, 23 January 1968 to December 1968)" FRUS: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d279>

* Though the United States still does not formally grant North Korea international recognition, this episode strengthened the international reputation of North Korean government as a regional power.

Strategies.”* The desired outcome going forward maintained Johnson’s original policy objectives in the crisis: maximize the possibility of freeing the crew while avoiding major hostilities (Condition 1). Alternative strategies ranged from maintaining ongoing diplomatic efforts while building up ROK military capabilities to executing decisive military action to significantly reducing military and diplomatic pressure on the DPRK.

One of the many proposals was to identify a suitable North Korean vessel for the U.S. or South Korea to capture with the idea of exchanging one ship and crew for another. This idea, however, had numerous moral, ethical, diplomatic, and practical problems.¹⁰² Ultimately, North Korea did not appear to maintain comparable merchant, fishing, or naval vessels either within or outside North Korean territorial waters. The few international ships affiliated with North Korea were joint ventures with other nations. Rostow wrote to President Johnson after aggressively exploring the idea, “it is true we can pick up some North Korea-Polish ships; but they turn out to be almost wholly Polish.” Recognizing that this might turn into a foreign relations debacle, he conceded that the idea was no longer worth pursuing. He closed by relaying to the president, “you should know that [U.S. Ambassador to Poland] Gronouski, when sounded out, said in effect: Please don’t.”¹⁰³ The lack of viable targets made it easy to walk away from the ship-seizure suggestion, as potential damage to U.S. integrity and credibility eclipsed any bargaining value.

* On 26 January, the Department of State established two provisional teams to assist with the crisis. The Korean Working Group was an interagency committee that included representatives from DoD, DoS, CIA, USAID, the White House, and the U.S. Information Agency. The KWG developed policy recommendations and proposals for senior leaders to review. The Korean Task Force (KTF) was an expanded desk operation set up within the State Department’s Operations Center, manned mostly from members of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs personnel. The KTF handled routine reports, staffed action papers, and compiled information for daily readouts. See “Korean Working Group: ‘North Korean Aggression and The Pueblo Incident, Possible Future Strategies,’” February 9, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part 12, JPL.

Leaders became concerned about the perception that the U.S. was coming across too eager to negotiate a peaceful resolution, potentially weakening the sense urgency (Condition 6) or undermining the credibility of escalation (Condition 7). Porter's 20 February telegram advised demonstrating less interest in scheduling frequent meetings with Major General Pak. He cautioned, "we have been a little too eager in this case, and they have made us dance to their tune."¹⁰⁴ Porter was not the only official to sense the United States was showing an imbalance of interest. Beginning on 3 February, a director on the NSC Staff, Alfred Jenkins, warned Rostow about the risks of how keen the U.S. came across in the early negotiations. He feared North Korea would believe "they have us over a barrel because of Vietnam and because of our anxiousness about the peace image. They are trying to maneuver us into the psychological set of being a supplicant."¹⁰⁵ A month later, Jenkins warned again, "While we should be ready to talk at all times, we should not play along in seeming weakness with the North Korean propaganda game by seeming to want frequent meetings. Each side has given its position and I don't see how we can alter our last position appreciably. Over-eagerness is weakness."¹⁰⁶ Porter recommended applying deliberate delays to responses to requests for meetings with Pak. The goal was to not appear too desperate or eager.*

Policymakers began revisiting the original U.S. objectives (Condition 1) and what terms Washington would ask of Pyongyang to resolve the affair (Condition 5). The priority of the crew's safe return remained constant, but recovery of the ship was becoming an expendable. "The most urgent objective, but not the most important over the long term, is to regain the crew,"

* See Mastro for discussion about how states approach open and closed negotiations. Oriana Skylar Mastro, *The Cost of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

stated the Korean Working Group, with the suggestive conclusion, “and, hopefully, the ship.”*

After three weeks of communist exploitation left the ship with little intelligence or physical value to the United States. The ship itself was always a piece of junk and was surely most valuable to North Korea as a propaganda symbol. More important to the United States was freeing the crew without sparking further hostilities or detracting from American commitments in Vietnam.

Other U.S. objectives were at stake: protect US/ROK relations; reduce future North Korean aggression against South Korea; maintain U.S. freedom of navigation in international waters; and repair damage to U.S. prestige and credibility, “especially with respect to the USSR and East Asia.”† The Vance Mission directly supported the objectives relating to South Korea by reinforcing the alliance, pledging counter-infiltration aid, and signaling resolve to respond to further acts of aggression. President Johnson would try to further reinforce the progress made by Vance when he hosted President Park for a leadership summit in Honolulu two months later.

Leaders began to soften their position toward North Korean demands for an apology and admission of wrongdoing by the United States due to the frustration about slow progress and reputational cost that the prolonged crisis was imposing on the United States (Condition 5). On 14 March, Secretary Rusk sent President Johnson a memorandum recommending the United States acknowledge the *Pueblo*’s mission as an intelligence gathering ship and express regret for

* KWG 13 FEB. On 21 March, Secretary Rusk further elaborated on how he viewed the ship. “FYI. Return of ship not mentioned in these instructions because doing so might reduce prospects of obtaining early release of men. (At seventh meeting, Pak said “return of the ship cannot be the subject of the discussion ... It will be good if you do not mention this question again.”) As soon as men have been returned, however, Smith should immediately state that he is now prepared to discuss the return of the ship and call or ask Pak to call a further closed meeting for that purpose.” See “300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea. 135403. Subject: Instructions for Thirteenth Closed Meeting.” March 23, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Foreign Relations of the United States, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d300>.

† Regarding the sensitivity to Freedom of Navigation: The USS *Liberty* incident with Israel occurred just the year before so the need to protect U.S. vessels at sea was a raw issue, especially for the U.S. Navy. Investigations into the attack on the USS *Pueblo* and USS *Liberty* would identify numerous faults by the U.S. Navy on how to sufficiently guard its vessels. Those findings were critical for future operations but fall outside the scope of this study.

the possibility that the *Pueblo* may have violated orders to remain in international waters. He notes to Johnson, “This is slightly further than we have yet gone on regrets—and as far as I think we should go.”¹⁰⁷ Rusk understood his recommendation was less than ideal, but he closed by suggesting this concession in language was better than the alternative: escalating the conflict by applying military force. This was not a cost the administration was willing to accept (Condition 2).*

Johnson might have been willing to go further than Rusk’s tepid language of acceptance and regret and offer an outright apology if the United States had proof that the *Pueblo* had indeed violated its orders by sailing into North Korean waters. † An apology from the U.S. to North Korea would have been a persuasive inducement to resolve the affair because Pyongyang would gain a valuable propaganda victory. But all evidence suggested that the *Pueblo* never violated its orders and remained in international waters throughout the operation. For policymakers, this meant that an apology in return for the crew’s expeditious release rubbed against national integrity and a strategic objective to preserve the right of safe passage in international waters.

Presidential Summit

In mid-April, President Johnson followed through with Vance’s proposal to meet President Park for a summit. The two presidents met in Hawaii to discuss a range of security and

* He concluded his proposal with an assessment of the futility of force in the present circumstances. “We are all convinced that minor military actions or shows of force would have no constructive effect. Some really massive effort—such as an attempt to eliminate the North Korean Air Force—involves obvious costs and risks. We do not recommend it.” See “297. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson: USS Pueblo,” March 14, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Foreign Relations of the United States, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d297>.

† The internal debate about how to phrase honest statements about the knowledge of the ship’s voyage led to tension among officials. See Walt Rostow, “Ambassador Goldberg’s Statements on January 26 Concerning the Pueblo’s Position,” February 5, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part 10, JPL.

political issues. Park sought to gain greater security guarantees from President Johnson as a follow-up to the Vance dialogues. Johnson sought to convince Park to commit additional troops to Vietnam.

Even before the summit began, tensions emerged between the two leaders. President Johnson had just announced his decision not to seek reelection for a second full term. Many of the earlier agreements between Park and Vance had been predicated on assisting U.S. domestic political stability and ensuring the long-term relationship between the two nations. Johnson's lame duck status created unforeseen uncertainty for U.S./ROK security agreements.

Even the itinerary of the trip became a sensitive issue for the relationship between Johnson and Park. The trip originally included meetings with both President Park and President Thieu of Vietnam to maximize the president's time.* From President Park's perspective, however, that plan felt like a snub and undermined any sense of a special bond between the United States and South Korea. The notion of splitting the summit with another head of state would cause President Park "to lose face and would create the impression that he was merely a follower, rather than a leader of high stature."¹⁰⁸ In the end, the summit was rescheduled as a bilateral meeting on 16-18 April in Honolulu.

The summit revealed that the White House and the Blue House were focused on very different priorities. The unity and solidarity that Vance had patched together with Park in February was frayed (Condition 4). Official reports and the joint communique summarizing the meeting fail to capture the tension and frustration exhibited by both presidents. President Park

* President Johnson originally planned to meet President Park in Hawaii on 7 April, but the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on 4 April led to significant civil unrest across the country, so the trip was delayed by a week.

carried deep concerns for South Korea's security against the North, the U.S. bombing restrictions in Vietnam, and the political uncertainty stemming from Johnson's decision not to seek reelection. Johnson remained singularly focused on convincing Park to increase South Korea's troop commitments to Vietnam. In December of 1967 when the two leaders spoke in Canberra, Australia, Park had agreed to send a light division of 11,000 troops and 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. January 1968 changed Park's planning estimates as the Blue House Raid showed how far North Korea was willing to push. To him, the Tet Offensive demonstrated what an organized guerilla force could accomplish in rear areas, and made him consider the difficulty of Korea's vast rear areas against tens of thousands of trained North Korean guerrilla forces.¹⁰⁹

President Park also expressed his frustration with Johnson's limited approach to fighting the North Vietnamese. He was disappointed in the bombing restrictions on Vietnamese ports and American decisions to pass on striking large military convoys due to civilian collateral damage concerns. "We are not allowed to hit Soviet or Communist Chinese ships in the waters of North Vietnam. This is the first time I have heard of this type of war. During the Korean War, we hit every enemy target in North Korea."¹¹⁰ Though Johnson replied by expressing his concern over avoid sparking a larger war with the USSR or China, Park bluntly concluded that there should be no bombing restrictions in Vietnam. It was a mismatch in Condition 2: their willingness to accept risks and cost in the conflict. In many ways, the conversation reflects the differing perspectives towards the Blue House Raid and *Pueblo* seizure. In both situations, Park sought to show strength through force. Johnson wanted to prevent both conflicts from sparking a great-power war and hoped modest gestures of restraint will persuade the opponent to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

The two leaders continued to talk past each other, and neither seemed to yield to the other. Park bared his domestic security situation for Johnson in a vulnerable moment during their second session. He stated (through his translator) to Johnson, “I hope that President Johnson will study and pay attention to the problem of South Korean national defense.” The transcript then shows that Park whispered in Korean to a translator, “why can’t he understand the true Korean situation?” Park then described how pillboxes and bunkers were being built around his capital and tunnels were being constructed in preparation for a Second Korean War. He challenged LBJ’s assertions that the ROK military had sufficient power to defeat the North. The situation was clearly urgent for Park. Johnson responded without acknowledging any of the issues Park just described. Instead, he asked if Korea was willing to make short-term investments of \$50 and \$100 million in U.S. bonds and securities. Their subsequent exchange perfectly captured the difference in priorities between the two Presidents:

Park: “I keep a carbine loaded with live bullets in my bedroom.”

Johnson (to his translator): “Did you translate my remarks on investments in bonds?”

The meeting pressed on with little satisfaction on either side. Johnson failed to secure the commitments he desired. In that last personal plea, Park failed to sway Johnson that the defense of Korea deserved attention equal to Vietnam.

To outward audiences, the summit achieved important goals for both parties. Politically, President Park secured an exclusive meeting with the President of the United States to discuss a wide range of security issues. Porter concludes, “the ROKs have had their day with our President, and they appreciate it.” The joint communique suggested the meeting reinforced all of the key security issues and demonstrated mutual trust and empathy. Very few of the topics mentioned in the communique were discussed in the presidents’ meetings. Regardless, the

perception of unity between the two heads of state was sufficient for President Park to obtain a domestic political achievement. Porter's assessment of the conference two weeks after the summit was optimistic. "It can be said that at the top echelon, especially President Park, derived a considerable sense of achievement from it." Porter's evidence comes largely from interpreting the general media coverage from the South Korean press and public impressions. The flattering joint communique that was released after Johnson's summit with Park directly boosted President Park's public image (regardless of the true substance of the actual meetings).

Johnson did secure short-term cooperation from Park over the *Pueblo* issue (Condition 3), but the long-term security relationship between the U.S. and South Korea was weakened. According to a CIA Intelligence Information Cable five days after the summit, President Park "was deeply disappointed by, and critical of his meetings with President Johnson." After the summit, Park's Presidential Secretary concluded, "the ROK can no longer rely on the U.S. for long-range military assistance."¹¹¹ The U.S. paid a strategic cost for securing South Korea's support in the *Pueblo* affair.

PART IV: THE LONG NEGOTIATIONS (17 MAY - 23 DECEMBER)

The last phase began in mid-May, almost four months after the ship's capture, as policymakers identified possible objectives and terms that seem to overlap with North Korean demands. American policymakers searched for a way to pull off a non-apologetic apology: a way to offer remorse without admitting wrongdoing. From the initial proposal to implementation, the process took seven months, marking the longest phase of the affair. During this time, very few actions occur on either side other than painstaking back and forth debates about the format of the final apology. It became a game to manage the sensitive terms of settlement on both sides to save face (Condition 5).

Eventually, a deal was brokered at the MAC for the United States to provide a disingenuous apology where the U.S. representative would first refute validity of the apology he was about to give, then apologize. The approach allowing both sides to save face to their own domestic audiences. Americans would be told that extending the ‘apology’ was always just a superficial concession to secure the release of the crew. The prearranged format gave the DPRK a final propaganda victory for its domestic audiences because the North Korean government would not need to reveal to its domestic audiences that the U.S. apology was invalidated.

The concept of issuing an insincere apology came with recent precedence that officials referenced as the “Helicopter Incident” throughout the affair. In May 1963, two U.S. Army Captains had inadvertently flown their helicopter into North Korean airspace while checking markers along the DMZ.¹¹² North Korea managed to shoot down their helicopter and hold the two pilots as captives for a year. Captains Ben Stutts and Charleton Voltz were ultimately released on 16 May 1964 after Major General Cecil Combs, the U.S. Senior Member at the MAC, offered an apology for “the crime of espionage and intrusion” by the United States and “military espionage acts after illegally intruding into the air over the northern part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.”¹¹³ It was always meant to be a temporary apology. Major General Combs publicly refuted the apology the next day and disavowed its legitimacy.

North Korea had no qualms with this approach and actively sought this outcome as an acceptable resolution for the affair. General Pak first hinted that there was already a precedent (set by the Helicopter Incident) for how to resolve the incident at the tenth meeting on 4 March.¹¹⁴ Ambassador Porter referenced the Helicopter Incident the day after the *Pueblo* was seized as a likely end to the affair. The difference for U.S. policymakers was the basis of the Helicopter Incident involved actual wrongdoing by U.S. service members who had inadvertently

flown beyond the DMZ boundary. The *Pueblo* circumstances made issuing an apology harder to embrace.

As the Johnson administration refined its objectives to just the crew, dropping the need to retrieve the ship, the U.S. was able to gain an important advantage of motivation for Condition 8. Dean Rusk later reflected, “the North Koreans came to the conclusion that they had milked the *Pueblo* affair for all that was in it, and that there was no particular point in holding on to these men any further.”¹¹⁵ However, the ship retained unique value to North Korea as a propaganda tool that the U.S. could not compete with. The ship had no military or intelligence value to the United States, so it was an easy to offer the USS *Pueblo* as a bargaining chip.* In the final negotiations, the ship was dropped from the terms of settlement (Condition 5).

The ultimate proposal to present a cover letter over the apology solved the ethical dilemma for U.S. officials. Instead of refuting the apology the next day and waiting 48 hours to receive the crew, the U.S. would flagrantly disavow the apology right before offering it. North Korea had finally agreed to provide a simultaneous release of the crew with the receipt of the apology (that came with a cover letter disavowing the validity of the document). The unusual agreement satisfied both sides. The 82 surviving members of the *Pueblo*, along with the body of Duane Hodges, crossed the Bridge of No Return between North and South Korea the day Major General Woodward signed the apology.[†]

Ambassador Porter all but anticipated how the crisis would play out in his original assessment the day after North Korea seized the ship. On 24 January, he wrote:

* The ship remains on display in Pyongyang as a war trophy for visitors to tour.

† North Korean officials would discard the cover letter and present the apology to their domestic audiences as final proof of American belligerence and backing down.

“Forecasting NK actions is risky game. Certainly their past conduct in refusing to release our helicopter in [1964] and returning pilots only after lengthy negotiation, plus their pattern of treatment of ROK fishermen, gives no ground for optimism that they will react favorably by releasing vessel and crew immediately. We are more inclined to believe that they will attempt to exploit their possession of ship and crew to maximum extent from both technical and propaganda points of view. After these purposes have been ably served, they will probably return crew, but under conditions of considerable humiliation to U.S.”¹¹⁶

Just as Porter anticipated, North Korea resisted coercive pressure to release the crew immediately. The U.S. did ultimately secure the crew's release, but only after North Korea exhausted their propaganda value.

The real accomplishment in the *Pueblo* incident is not what coercive diplomacy helped the U.S. achieve, but what coercive diplomacy helped prevent. The combined provocations of the *Pueblo* attack and the Blue House Raid created an incendiary environment on the Korean peninsula. Johnson's deliberate application of coercive diplomacy helped avoid a second Korean War or possible confrontation between nuclear superpowers.

From the outset of the conflict, American diplomats utilized a breadth of avenues and channels to signal that the preferred solution was to resolve the crisis diplomatically. This became a double-edged sword: the U.S. decreased its coercive posture against North Korea but increased its ability to compel the Soviet Union to abandon its neutrality and mediate a possible end to the affair. Had the Soviets possessed more influence over North Korea, as Moscow wanted to project, the incident may have been resolved earlier.

Conclusion

The *Pueblo* incident offers several policy considerations for developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy, including insights to how objectives (Condition 1) and risk (Condition 2) interplay. This case also reveals the importance of focusing on relationships with allies and partners to maintain international support (Condition 3). The case also reveals the difficulties in achieving the external conditions of coercive diplomacy (6, 7, 8) against target states, even if the U.S. has a clear military superiority over the opponent.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target's fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 4. The internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions of coercive diplomacy.

Johnson established what he wanted as his objectives because he understood most of all what he did not want: another war in Asia. Johnson's limits of what he was willing to risk and expend over the *Pueblo* (Condition 2) drove his objectives (Condition 1). There was no room to let the *Pueblo* incident intensify any further. Not only was Vietnam the priority military effort, but the possibility that the *Pueblo* incident and the Blue House Raid could spiral into a devastating conflict was real. The magnitude of risk in this crisis, coupled with the administration's existing military and political stakes in Vietnam, overtly constrained their potential objectives in this unexpected incident.

Establishing clear objectives based on a shared understanding of the risk enabled other conditions of coercive diplomacy to form. Johnson's repeated focus on the ship and crew unified the collective efforts of political, military, and diplomatic leaders across the administration

(Condition 4). Knowing the president's boundaries for risk to achieve his objectives also helped guide efforts to clarify the terms and conditions of settlement (Condition 5).

This case also highlights important considerations regarding international support (Condition 3). The *Pueblo* incident is so much more than a bilateral conflict between the United States and North Korea: The Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union were key actors on each side. U.S. policymakers consistently included the Soviet Union in their military and diplomatic calculus and needed to manage escalation risk with South Korea as well.

A superficial estimate based on alliances and political ideology would pit the U.S. and ROK on one side against the DPRK and USSR on the other. Although an alliance may have tied the United States and South Korea, their national interests diverged: South Korea sought decisive confrontation where the United States sought de-escalation. Shared interest in de-escalation meant the United States experienced easier relations with the Soviet Union than with its South Korean ally. The national interests of the two Cold War superpowers converged on a shared mutual interest to avoid getting entangled in treaty obligations with their sponsor states, to steer North and South Korea away from their war footing.

The fragmented and sometimes counterintuitive series of relationships where friends bickered and opponents collaborated offers some insights to establishing international support in coercive diplomacy. The case demonstrates the preeminence of national interests over historical relationships and defensive agreements under the strain of coercion.¹¹⁷ Under these conditions, individual relationships and empowered envoys can matter greatly.

The Vance mission to soothe tensions with South Korea demonstrate how the fourth condition of coercive diplomacy – strong and unified leadership – is not just as an internal consideration within the U.S. government. Condition 4 was also a critical component the U.S.

relationship with its ally, South Korea. Fostering solidarity and addressing the individual interests of allies and partners (applying Condition 4) facilitates Condition 3: gaining international support.

The national self-interest of South Korea pulled the ROKG away from its ties to the United States, and the shared self-interest between the U.S. and USSR to prevent a messy war on the Korean Peninsula drew the two hegemonic rivals closer together.¹¹⁸ Tensions between the U.S. and South Korea stemmed from a growing doubt about the reliability of the United States as an ally and a fundamental moment of perceived need for self-preservation. Several times during this incident, domestic political pressure and acute security concerns pushed South Korea to the brink of taking high-risk, high-cost actions by unilaterally attacking North Korea.

Personal relationships, including the preexisting rapport President Johnson had built with President Park, became one of Washington's strongest assets in maintaining international support (Condition 3). Visible demonstrations of the importance of the relationship between South Korea and the United States also helped to calm the Korean public's angst over North Korea's aggression. Dispatching an experienced and well-regarded Special Envoy infused confidence and assurance into a fraying relationship, as Vance carried more than his reputation as a skilled mediator, he carried the prestige of the White House.

The United States struggled to achieve the external conditions of coercive diplomacy: 6) creating a sense of urgency, 7) establishing a fear of escalation, or 8) asymmetry of motivation. This case reveals the tension in games of coercion between states that hold power and those that hold the cards. Despite possessing infinitely greater military, economic, and diplomatic power, the United States found itself at a significant disadvantage to North Korea. A key reason the U.S.

failed to maintain an advantage was the imbalance of leverage North Korea retained throughout the affair.

The U.S. struggled to maintain a fear of escalation (Condition 7) throughout the affair. The initial deployment additional forces to the region were useful in establishing a fear of escalation against further North Korean aggression (especially in the mind of the sponsor state – the Soviet Union). However, it was not hard for the North Koreans to realize that the United States possessed few viable offensive military options in retaliation for the *Pueblo* attack or the Blue House Raid. Though the United States possessed the nuclear arsenal to annihilate North Korea, Pyongyang's defensive treaty with the USSR elevated the potential risk of a Mutually Assured Destruction scenario for the United States. The visible domestic pressure created by the Vietnam War weakened the credibility of any demonstrations of military power.

North Korea also felt little urgency to cooperate with U.S. demands (Condition 6). Extending the affair allowed North Korea to maximize the domestic propaganda value of showcasing the American captives and reinforced the international legitimacy of the North Korean government by commanding direct talks with the largest power in the west. The Johnson administration was only able to project asymmetry of motivation for a very limited and specific objective: the safe release of the crew (Condition 8).

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Report “Pueblo Crisis: Presidential Decisions and Supplemental Chronology” 12 December 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Box 27, Johnson Presidential Library (hereinafter JPL).
- ² See “Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, HASC No 91-92” (Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, July 28, 1969), Congressional Reports, National Security Agency digital archives.
- ³ See Intelligence Memorandum “The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh” 10 January 1968, CIA.gov Reading Room, Document 00028244, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/00028244>. Memorandum for Record: “The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh, A Speculative Appraisal” 8 January 1968, CIA.gov Reading Room, Document 05010230, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/05010230>.
- ⁴ Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, First Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 533. Jacob Van Staaveren, “The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968” (Office of Air Force History, September 1970), 7, Document 6, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/index.htm>.
- ⁵ Kyle Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 55.
- ⁶ “35. Notes Of The President’s Meeting With The Democratic Leadership,” January 30, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968, 35, Foreign Relations of The United States (hereinafter FRUS), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d35>.
- ⁷ See “Intelligence Memorandum: The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh” (CIA, January 10, 1968), CIA.gov Digital Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/00028244>.
- ⁸ Porter, “145. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State,” January 24, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d145>.
- ⁹ Jack Cheevers, *Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 154.
- ¹⁰ See Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval*.
- ¹¹ Mark Barry, “The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging the ‘Big Decisions,’” *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 4 (December 2012): 44. Dean Rusk and Richard Rusk, *As I Saw It*, ed. Daniel S. Papp (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1990), 119.
- ¹² Kyle Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); “Opinion: L.B.J.’s Musings About the Media,” *Time*, February 14, 1969, <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,900647,00.html>.
- ¹³ Lyndon Baines Johnson, “Remarks on Decision Not to Seek Re-Election,” <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-31-1968-remarks-decision-not-seek-re-election>.
- ¹⁴ Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, First Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 426–27. Kyle Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- ¹⁵ Jacob Van Staaveren, “The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968” (Office of Air Force History, September 1970), 12, Document 6, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/index.htm>.
- ¹⁶ Tim Weiner, “Robert S. McNamara, Architect of a Futile War, Dies at 93,” *The New York Times*, July 6, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/us/07mcnamara.html>.
- ¹⁷ Marilyn Berger, “Clark Clifford, a Major Adviser to Four Presidents, Is Dead at 91,” *The New York Times*, October 11, 1998, sec. Section 1, Page 1, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/11/us/clark-clifford-a-major-adviser-to-four-presidents-is-dead-at-91.html>.
- ¹⁸ Berger.
- ¹⁹ See Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991).
- ²⁰ Douglas Martin, “Nicholas Katzenbach, 90, Dies; Policy Maker at ‘60s Turning Points,” *The New York Times*, May 9, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/nicholas-katzenbach-1960s-political-shaper-dies-at-90.html>.
- ²¹ Todd Purdum, “Walt Rostow, Adviser to Kennedy and Johnson, Dies at 86,” *The New York Times*, February 15, 2003, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/15/us/walt-rostow-adviser-to-kennedy-and-johnson-dies-at-86.html>.
- ²² Report “Pueblo Crisis: Presidential Decisions and Supplemental Chronology” 12 December 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Box 27, JPL.

Jack Cheevers, *Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 108; Mitchell Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 125.

²³ “Notes of the President’s Tuesday National Security Lunch,” January 23, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 213, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d213>.

²⁴ “223. Notes of the President’s Breakfast Meeting,” January 25, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 223, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d223>.

²⁵ “248. Notes of the President’s Foreign Affairs Luncheon,” January 30, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 248, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d248>.

²⁶ “218. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the National Security Council,” January 24, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 218, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d218>.

²⁷ “221. Notes of the President’s Meeting,” January 24, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 221, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d221>.

²⁸ “218. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the National Security Council.”

²⁹ “218. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the National Security Council.”

³⁰ “225. Notes of the President’s Luncheon Meeting,” January 25, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 225, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d225>.

³¹ “218. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the National Security Council.”

³² “217. Summary Minutes of Pueblo Group,” January 24, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 217, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d217>.

³³ Mitchell Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 103.

³⁴ “217. Summary Minutes of Pueblo Group.”

³⁵ Mitchell Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), vii.

³⁶ “218. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the National Security Council.”

³⁷ “218. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the National Security Council.”

³⁸ “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.047, Regular,” February 19, 1968, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113959>.

³⁹ See Nicholas Katzenbach, “Memo to the President: Possible Courses of Action in the Korean Crisis,” January 29, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 28, Vol. 4 Day-by-Day Documents Part 5, JPL.

⁴⁰ Jack Cheevers, *Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 108; Richard A. Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

⁴¹ Cheevers, *Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo*.

⁴² “217. Summary Minutes of Pueblo Group.”

⁴³ “221. Notes of the President’s Meeting.”

⁴⁴ “226. Notes on the President’s Thursday Night Meeting on the Pueblo Incident,” January 25, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 226, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d226>.

⁴⁵ “220. Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President,” January 24, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 220, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d220>.

⁴⁶ “220. Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President.”

⁴⁷ Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, First Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 385.

⁴⁸ “221. Notes of the President’s Meeting.”

⁴⁹ “220. Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President.”

⁵⁰ “225. Notes of the President’s Luncheon Meeting.”

⁵¹ “220. Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President.”

⁵² “220. Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President.”

⁵³ Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, First Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 535.

⁵⁴ Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, First Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 536.

⁵⁵ “212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union. 102940. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador. From the Secretary.,” January 23, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 212, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d212>.

⁵⁶ “213. Notes of the President’s Tuesday National Security Lunch 23 January 1968,” January 23, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 213, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d213>.

-
- ⁵⁷“Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.020, Flash,” January 26, 1968, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113946>.
- ⁵⁸ “Information about the Incident with the Ship Pueblo” (The Embassy of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, January 28, 1968), Document 116721, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116721>.
- ⁵⁹ Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, First Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 536.
- ⁶⁰ “Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” January 30, 1968, Document 114571, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114571>.
- ⁶¹ See Kyle Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- ⁶² “214. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander of United States, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp),” January 23, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 214, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d214>.
- ⁶³ “Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.”
- ⁶⁴ “Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.”
- ⁶⁵ Leonid Brezhnev, “Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev’s Speech at the April (1968) CC CPSU Plenum, ‘On the Current Problems of the International Situation and on the Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the International Communist Movement,’” April 9, 1968, Document 110507, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110507>.
- ⁶⁶ Leonid Brezhnev, “Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev’s Speech at the April (1968) CC CPSU Plenum, ‘On the Current Problems of the International Situation and on the Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the International Communist Movement,’” April 9, 1968, Document 110507, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110507>.
- ⁶⁷ Brezhnev.
- ⁶⁸ Brezhnev.
- ⁶⁹ Brezhnev.
- ⁷⁰ “37. FRUS Editorial Note About Phone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara,” January 31, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 37, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d37>.
- ⁷¹ See Mitchell Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002); Kyle Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- ⁷² See “From Seoul, Tel 3859, Feb. 2, 0230 GMT, Secret/Nodis/Cactus,” February 1, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 1, Chron Part 1, JPL.
- ⁷³ Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State, signed 27 July 1953, available at <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/armistice-agreement-restoration-south-korean-state>.
- ⁷⁴ Porter, “From Seoul, Tel 3706, NODIS/CACTUS, with Cover Memo from Rostow,” January 28, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 28, Vol. 4 Day-by-Day Documents Part 4, JPL.
- ⁷⁵ These meetings occurred in 1968: February 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 19, 26; March 4, 9, 21, 28; April 11, 21; May 8, 28; June 27, July 10; August 29; September 17, 30; October 10, 23, 31; December 17, 19, 22, 23. See “Enclosure B. Military Armistice Commission Closed Meetings of Senior Members, Panmunjom, Korea - 1968,” n.d., Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 32, Vol 11, Background Documents, JPL; “The USS Pueblo Incident, Research Project No. 939-C, with 31 December Addendum” (Historical Studies Division, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept of State, October 1968), Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 1, Basic Study and Presidential Decisions, JPL.
- ⁷⁶ Quoted from Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*, 124.
- ⁷⁷ Smith, John Victor, Vice Adm., USN (Ret.) Oral History Interview, 1976, 422–26, U.S. Naval Institute, <https://www.usni.org/press/oral-histories/smith-john>.
- ⁷⁸ “To Seoul, Tel 109845, Feb. 4, 1651 GMT, Secret/Nodis/Cactus,” February 4, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 2, Chron Part 2 [Feb. 2-19], JPL.

-
- ⁷⁹ Porter, "From Seoul, Tel 3945, Feb. 5, 0249 GMT, Secret/Nodis/Eyes Oly for Secretary from Ambassador, Cactus," February 5, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 2, Chron Part 2 [Feb. 2-19], JPL.
- ⁸⁰ "Gen. Gilbert Woodward Dies; Army's Inspector-General, 56," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1973, <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/18/archives/gen-gilbert-woodward-dies-armys-inspectorgeneral-signed-and.html>.
- ⁸¹ "Gen. Gilbert Woodward Dies; Army's Inspector-General, 56."
- ⁸² Porter, "From Seoul, Tel 3706, NODIS/CACTUS, with Cover Memo from Rostow," January 28, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 28, Vol. 4 Day-by-Day Documents Part 4, JPL.
- ⁸³ "From Seoul, Tel 4015, Feb. 6, 1045 GMT, Limited Official Use," February 6, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 27, Vol 2, Chron Part 2 [Feb. 2-19], JPL.
- ⁸⁴ Bonesteel, "GEN Bonesteel Telegram to ADM Sharp, Included in Mission of Cyrus R. Vance Special Instructions," February 9, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part II, JPL.
- ⁸⁵ Bonesteel.
- ⁸⁶ Bonesteel.
- ⁸⁷ Trevor Armbrister, *A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair* (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2004), 276.
- ⁸⁸ "Transcript, Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview II."
- ⁸⁹ "Biography, Cyrus R. Vance, Lyndon Johnson Administration," n.d., DoD Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, <https://history.defense.gov/DOD-History/Deputy-Secretaries-of-Defense/Article-View/Article/585240/cyrus-r-vance/>.
- ⁹⁰ See "Mission of Cyrus R. Vance Special Instructions from President Johnson," February 9, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part II, JPL.
- ⁹¹ "Mission of Cyrus R. Vance Special Instructions from President Johnson."
- ⁹² "Transcript, Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview II."
- ⁹³ "Mission of Cyrus R. Vance Special Instructions from President Johnson," February 9, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part II, JPL.
- ⁹⁴ Bonesteel, "GEN Bonesteel Telegram to ADM Sharp, Included in Mission of Cyrus R. Vance Special Instructions," February 9, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part II, JPL.
- ⁹⁵ "Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview III," January 2, 1970, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, JPL, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/rusk/rusk03.pdf.
- ⁹⁶ See "51. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson: Khe Sanh," February 3, 1968, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, FRUS.
- ⁹⁷ "Cyrus Vance Report to President Johnson on Mission to South Korea," February 20, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Box 259, Korea - Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (A), 2/9-15/68, JPL.
- ⁹⁸ "Cyrus Vance Report to President Johnson on Mission to South Korea."
- ⁹⁹ "Transcript, Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview II," December 29, 1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, JPL, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/vance_c/vance2.pdf.
- ¹⁰⁰ "Cyrus Vance Report to President Johnson on Mission to South Korea."
- ¹⁰¹ Telegram 117379 to Seoul, February 17, in which Katzenbach requested Porter's assessment and advice on the Pueblo situation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US).
- ¹⁰² See Nicholas Katzenbach, "Memo to the President: Possible Courses of Action in the Korean Crisis," January 29, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 28, Vol. 4 Day-by-Day Documents Part 5, JPL.
- ¹⁰³ Walter Rostow, "Letter to President Johnson About Korea Problem," February 8, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 6 Day-by-Day Documents Part II, JPL.

-
- ¹⁰⁴ Porter, “Cable from Ambassador Porter (Seoul 4321) For the President: Putting Pressure on North Korea,” February 18, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 30, Vol 7 Day-by-Day Documents Part 13, JPL.
- ¹⁰⁵ Jenkins, “Note for Mr. Rostow,” February 3, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 56 Day-by-Day Documents Part 9, JPL.
- ¹⁰⁶ “289. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” March 4, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 289, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d289>.
- ¹⁰⁷ “Sec. Rusk’s Proposals on the Pueblo to President Johnson,” March 14, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 30, Vol 7 Day-by-Day Documents Part 14, JPL.
- ¹⁰⁸ “189. Editorial Note on Johnson’s Trip to Honolulu 4 April 1968,” n.d., 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 189, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d189>.
- ¹⁰⁹ “Memorandum of Conversation: Johnson and Park Summit,” April 17, 1968, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 30, Vol 8 Day-by-Day Documents Part 15, JPL.
- ¹¹⁰ “Memorandum of Conversation: Johnson and Park Summit.”
- ¹¹¹ “195. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence Agency,” April 23, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 195, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d195>.
- ¹¹² “Reds in Korea Free 2 U.S. Copter Pilots,” May 16, 1964, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/16/archives/reds-in-korea-free-2-us-copter-pilots.html>.
- ¹¹³ “Reds in Korea Free 2 U.S. Copter Pilots.”
- ¹¹⁴ “290. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach): Next Steps on Pueblo,” March 4, 1968, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 290, FRUS, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d290>.
- ¹¹⁵ “Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview III,” January 2, 1970, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, JPL, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/rusk/rusk03.pdf.
- ¹¹⁶ In original document, Porter improperly lists 1965 as the date of the incident. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d219>
- ¹¹⁷ For more on national self-interest, see Jack Donnely, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Hans Morgenthau, *In Defense of National Interest* (New York: Alfred and Knopf, 1951); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3rd Edition (Indiana: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).
- ¹¹⁸ For more on alliance abandonment, see Thomas Christensen, *Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

CHAPTER 4: THE EUROMISSILES

A CRISIS INTENSIFIES

Secretary of State George Shultz recalled D-Day in the “*Year of the Missiles*” as 23 November 1983.^{*} This was the long-promised day when 108 American Pershing II (PII) missiles began arriving in Europe. The presence of the missiles in West Germany sparked massive protests across Europe out of fear of nuclear disaster. The Pershing IIs posed a major threat to the Soviets – what Soviet scholar Simon Miles described as a “cocked pistol to Moscow’s temple.”¹ Once assembled, the PIIs could fly at Mach 8 into the Soviet Union, hitting precision targets in six to twelve minutes, faster than the Soviets could react. The Soviets saw the PIIs as the perfect first-strike weapon: disturbingly fast, unpredictably mobile, dangerously accurate, and designed to penetrate fortified control centers.²

The arrival of the PIIs was the cornerstone of the U.S. strategy to compel the Soviet Union to dismantle the SS-20 program that threatened NATO members in Europe.[†] The whole U.S. strategy of compellence hinged on emplacing Pershing IIs in West Germany.[‡] The West German government did not want to be alone in hosting the advanced American nuclear weapons. That would make it the weak gazelle in the herd. Therefore, West Germany insisted other European allies join in hosting new missiles. West Germany would tie its participation to

^{*} Shultz wrote in his memoir, “if the Reagan administration had a ‘D-Day,’ it was 23 November 1983: the day the first American Pershing II missiles would be deployed to West Germany, where protests and opposition to deployments were at a fever pitch.” *Turmoil and Triumph*, 373.

[†] The mobile Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles were also a threat to Russia’s neighbors to the east, including Japan.

[‡] West Germany was the eastern most NATO ally where the range of the PIIs could strike strategic targets inside the Soviet Union. Placing them elsewhere in Western Europe would not pose a meaningful threat to the Soviets.

the collective participation of other NATO allies in Western Europe. The other participating nations would receive 464 radar-evading nuclear-tipped Ground Launch Cruise Missiles (GLCM). West Germany would host the most formidable ballistic missiles, 108 Pershing II missiles. The combined 572 American nuclear missiles were an assertive response designed to confront the Soviet Union's massive arsenal of forward-deployed SS-20 missile systems that were upending the balance of power in Europe.

Weeks earlier, U.S. officials had felt optimistic as diplomatic progress poked through the bluster and rhetoric of the Cold War. Arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union offered promise. Quiet diplomatic exchanges between Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, General Secretary Andropov, suggested a head-of-state summit was possible. Signs of a "mini thaw" seemed likely by the summer of 1983.*

Then much changed in U.S.-Soviet relations. In the ten weeks between 1 September and 23 November 1983, several unexpected crises emerged that brought the two superpowers dangerously close to war. Not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 had the world come so close to nuclear cataclysm.

On 1 September, the Soviet Far East District Air Defense Forces interdicted a Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 over Soviet airspace. An air-to-air missile sent all 269 passengers, including 60 Americans, one of them was a sitting member of Congress, to their death. Three weeks later, a Soviet warning system detected the launch of five American nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet watch officer on duty on the night of 26 September

* George Shultz recalled in his memoir, "we had witnessed the beginnings of a Cold War mini thaw prior to the shooting down of KAL 007. The superpower relationship had been warming up. The KAL attack brought back the cold." *Turmoil and Triumph*, 367.

guessed the alarm was an error and, despite his protocols and procedures, took it upon himself to sit on the warning. Soviet satellites had falsely interpreted sunlight reflecting off clouds above North Dakota as missile launches. His personal courage and gut intuition broke the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) chain, potentially saving the world from all-out nuclear war.³

The following month brought more violence. On 23 October, terrorists attacked U.S. Marines and French paratroopers in Beirut, Lebanon, leaving 241 American and 55 French service members dead. Two days later, the United States invaded the small island nation of Grenada, signaling to the Soviets an American willingness to use force. During the fighting, U.S. troops captured almost 800 Cuban Soldiers, 49 Soviet military advisors, 15 North Koreans, 10 East Germans, and 17 Libyans.⁴

But the culminating moment came in November. The arrival of the American Pershing II missiles on 23 November 1983 fulfilled a long-standing promise to rebalance the nuclear status in Europe. However, the decision to fulfill this promise came with immense political uncertainty. Hundreds of thousands of protestors across Europe flooded the streets in opposition to hosting American nuclear missiles. In October 1983, nearly 3 million Western Europeans took to the streets across the continent in protest of the nuclear missile deployments and to end the nuclear arms race with the Soviets. * The political leaders in the U.K., West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and

* Cortright expanded further, “[The] demonstrations were the largest mobilization of peace sentiment in human history up to that time... In London more than 300,000 people assembled in Hyde Park for what the New York Times called the “the largest protest against nuclear weapons in British history.” Similar mobilizations of hundreds of thousands of people took place in Rome, Vienna, Brussels, Stockholm, Paris, Dublin, Copenhagen, and other cities. The largest crowd assembled in the Hague, as nearly one million people filled the streets of the Dutch capital. The biggest turnout of protesters occurred in West Germany, when on a single day, 400,000 marched in Bonn, 400,000 in Hamburg, 250,000 in Stuttgart, and 100,000 in West Berlin. In addition, more than 200,000 people participated in an extraordinary human chain that stretched continuously for sixty-four miles from the US army headquarters in Stuttgart to the missile base at Neu Ulm. The October 1983 demonstrations were the largest mobilization of peace sentiment in human history up to that time (the worldwide mobilization against war in Iraq in

the Netherlands stood firm despite the enormous pressure to rescind their commitment to hosting the American nuclear missiles.

Deploying the American missiles across Europe was no secret: a NATO public communique endorsed by the Carter administration had publicly announced the plan four years earlier.⁵ NATO became aware in 1977 that the Soviet Union was deploying modernized intermediate ballistic missile systems, including the SS-20, which carried three warheads apiece, in Eastern Europe. Every NATO capital in Europe sat within range of these missiles, giving the Soviet Union a commanding nuclear advantage against European rivals. In response, Reagan's team leaned into Carter and NATO's joint concept of dual-track diplomacy. NATO's commitment to deploy these more advanced missiles was meant to persuade the Soviets to withdraw theirs.

On 23 November 1983, the world watched as Reagan's 'peace through strength' strategy kicked into high gear. Deploying the PIRs and GLCMs despite the public unrest in Europe and the risk of escalation with Moscow was a clear example of the United States establishing effective conditions for coercive diplomacy: brinkmanship, a demonstration of resolve, and a direct effort to develop a *fear of escalation* in the mind of Soviet leaders. The day the PIRs offloaded planes in Germany on 23 November, the Soviets responded by walking out of arms control negotiations in Geneva. The mini-thaw was over, and the outlook for a peaceful settlement seemed bleak.

February 2003 was even larger)." David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 194.

Case Study Overview

This case study examines how U.S. officials in the Reagan administration applied coercive diplomacy to compel the Soviet Union to remove a missile threat directed at Europe. The Euromissile affair was a classic contest of coercion that relied heavily on brinksmanship. Deploying the Pershing IIs and GLCMs in November of 1983 was one of several incidents where the United States challenged the Soviets and demonstrated resolve. Elements of deterrence weave throughout this episode – *preventing* the Soviets from employing these missile systems – but this case is a specific issue of compellence where the United States exercised force and diplomacy to *change the behavior* of an opponent.

This case study wrestles with several themes that help understand what inhibits or facilitates setting effective conditions of coercive diplomacy. Key areas include exploring the tensions and dynamics with allies and partners in applying coercion. The interdependence of key allies became a central theme in the *Pueblo* incident between the United States and South Korea. In the Euromissile case, the United States simultaneously managed the interests and requirements of numerous allies, including allies in NATO and security partners across the globe.

The United States certainly benefitted from *chance* in applying effective coercion on the Soviets in the outcome of this case.* The assassination attempt on President Reagan in March of 1981 played a profound role in his conviction to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Chance

* Clausewitz's concept of chance: "No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance [than warfare]. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war... From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards." Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 85.

played roles in subsequent events that (directly or indirectly) contributed toward the affair’s favorable resolution. From European election results and the deaths of Soviet General Secretaries to bombings and downing of civilian airliners or catastrophic reactor meltdowns, the resolution of this standoff has to do with a combination of unexpected events and shrewd foreign policy decisions.

Chance remains a bedeviling reality in national security crises. Unexpected developments, frustrating distractions, and destabilizing turns of events can erase months of planning and careful posturing. Yet the perennial role of chance only reinforces the importance of condition setting in complex games of coercive diplomacy. As a review, those conditions are depicted in the adjacent table.⁶ This case explores how the Reagan administration attempted to achieve these conditions against the Soviet Union beginning in 1981. The role of the U.S. attaining international support (Condition 3) to set external conditions of coercive diplomacy (Conditions 6, 7, and 8) against the opponent stand out as a key observation in this case.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target’s fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 5. The internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions of coercive diplomacy.

Time plays a distinct role in the analysis of this case. While the *Pueblo* case began and ended within the same calendar year, the Euromissile issue extended for over a decade. The

Pueblo incident evolved rapidly, even on a day-by-day basis at its outset. In the Euromissile case, the crisis developed incrementally over months and years. In both cases, the crisis transitioned from a rolling boil to a low simmer, settling into a period where tactics of coercion shifted to traditional diplomatic negotiations. The Euromissile affair reflects a similar pattern, where after the rolling boil (that peaked in the fall of 1983), the crisis defused into a manageable state. Through a combination of luck and skill, all sides managed to prevent the incident from devolving into a hot war. With their respective coercive signals on the table and their field positions established, the dispute dissipated through a long series of diplomatic negotiations. After 1983, both sides resorted to playing the hands they established at the outset of the crisis and took a diplomatic course to settle the dispute. This included highly visible negotiations and tete-a-tete summits in Geneva (1985) and Reykjavik (1986). While this case study spans 1981-1987, ending in the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the decisive chess moves of coercion occurred in the first two years. From 1984 to the case's resolution in 1987, the United States built upon the foundational positions set in the early years of the Regan administration to compel the Soviet Union to eliminate the missile threat against Europe.

The Euromissile affair resembles the Cuban Missile Crisis from 1962, which remains the archetypal case of coercive diplomacy that generated much of the original scholarship and many of its theories.⁷ Yet scholars have yet to examine the Euromissile affair as a case of coercive diplomacy.* Both events began with the Soviet Union forward deploying land-based nuclear missiles in discrete efforts to shift a delicate balance of power. Both events relied on deft

* Susan Colburn (2022) is one of the first scholars to publish a book on the Euromissiles. Her work begins to fill important gaps in the literature on this issue. Her work examines the affair from the European perspective. This study compliments her work by looking at the Euromissile issue from the U.S. policymaker perspective.

statesmanship to compel the Soviets to withdraw their arsenal.* In both cases, the crises came uncomfortably close to global nuclear exchanges only to end peacefully in celebrated diplomatic achievements.

There are several distinctions between the cases. The Euromissile affair unfolded over a decade while the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred over 13 days. Instead of missiles based in Cuba threatening the southeastern United State and Washington D.C. (the homeland), this crisis involved Soviet missiles capable of striking every NATO capital in Europe (extended deterrence).† Where Kennedy and Khrushchev served as key protagonists in the Cuba scenario, two very different American presidents sparred with four succeeding Soviet General Secretaries and simultaneously collaborated with a host of NATO heads of state.‡ The circumstances of the crisis in 1962 allowed the Kennedy administration to act with a predominantly unilateral framework against the Soviet Union.§ In the Euromissile dilemma, the United States relied on the cooperation and support of different European countries through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance.

When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, he inherited a plan set by President Carter and NATO in 1979. The agreement called for the United States to eventually deploy a

* Type B Coercive Diplomacy: persuade an opponent to undo an action. See Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).

† The term “extended deterrence” describes the idea of protecting the interests beyond a state’s border, including allies. See Jack S. Levy, “Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George,” *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 537-52, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.x>.

‡ The crisis came to attention in 1977 during the Carter administration and became a dominant foreign policy issue for the Reagan administration. Leonid Brezhnev initiated the crisis. Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev each inherited the crisis from their predecessors as General Secretaries of the Soviet Union. See Section II for more discussion on key leaders in this case.

§ The threat of Soviet retaliation in West Germany was an important consideration to any decision to use force by the Kennedy administration, but the primary arena for action and staging of response forces remained within the western hemisphere and the continental United States.

counter-armament of land-based nuclear missiles to select European allies in 1983. The protracted response plan was designed to create a negotiation window to persuade the Soviets to withdraw the missiles, known as the dual-track decision. The Carter administration pursued the dual-track plan as a measure to buy time with NATO allies who were concerned about the emerging SS-20 threat. Carter's priority was on intercontinental missiles, but his allies needed reassurance. The objective was "to preserve the consensus within the Alliance that the US nuclear guarantee is credible (given that the US guarantee is the binding force in the Alliance)."⁸ The dual-track decision helped him buy time on intermediate-range missile issues while he focused on the second iteration of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II).

The final year of the Carter administration suggested the sun was setting on the era of détente as SALT II negotiations with the Soviets faltered and the emboldened Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The dual-track commitment to deploy American nuclear missiles to Europe by 1983 fell on the new Reagan presidency to implement – or abandon. By 1981, the prospects of making an agreement with the Soviets seemed bleak. The SS-20 threat became a key foreign policy debate for the new administration. How would Reagan approach the growing Soviet threat against Western Europe? The credibility of the NATO alliance and the American security guarantee was in question, and the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence was at stake. The Cold War was beginning to feel warm to the touch. The best way for the United States to cool it back down was through a careful application of coercive diplomacy.

CASE STUDY STRUCTURE

There are four sections to this case study on the Reagan administration's application of coercive diplomacy in the Euromissile affair. First, I contextualize this period in history by

introducing some of the key national security policy issues competing for attention during the crisis. Second, I provide insight into the personnel involved in the decision. Exploring their personal backgrounds and shared experiences helps illuminate the unique influences shaping policies examined in the case study. Third, I chronologically explore the case itself, tracing policy proposals and decisions from the beginning of the Reagan administration to the resolution of the affair six years later. Lastly, I review the conditions of coercive diplomacy based on how they interacted with the case itself, according to the internal, international, and external policy considerations of the affair.

This study does not attempt to provide a comprehensive historical account of the events of the Euromissile affair. Telling the complete story from beginning to end is beyond the scope of this chapter. I use this case study to concentrate on pivotal moments in the crisis where policymakers deliberated on key decisions towards applying coercive diplomacy. I then trace these decisions in detail to understand where senior U.S. officials became torn between competing policy efforts. This often requires understanding the interpersonal (or interstate) tensions lurking behind a decision. The goal is to reveal what inhibited or facilitated the U.S. government from setting favorable conditions of coercive diplomacy.*

Context in Time

Analyzing the actions taken by the Reagan administration towards the Euromissile affair requires an appreciation for factors that emerged before the Reagan administration took office. This includes the SS-20 missile dilemma introduced by the Soviets in 1977 during the era of

* The original purpose of this study is to answer the research question: “what facilitates or inhibits U.S. policymakers from developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy?” with Alexander George’s eight conditions of coercive diplomacy as the study’s theoretical framework.

détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I provide a synopsis of the ‘dual-track’ diplomacy policy that Reagan’s team inherited from the Carter administration. I also offer context for grain and gas sanctions between the United States and Europe that emerged early in the Reagan administration. These sanctions later became a source of political tension between the Reagan administration and European allies that impeded the U.S. ability to apply coercive diplomacy against the Soviet Union over the SS-20 threat.

SS-20s IN AN ERA OF DÉTENTE

The Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, first sounded the alarm in 1977 over the Soviet SS-20 build-up along NATO’s border with the Warsaw Pact.* The SS-20s were significantly upgraded medium-range ballistic missiles to replace the aging arsenal of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5. The SS-20s came with a 3,000-mile range, three independent warheads per missile, reloadable launchers, and mobile firing platforms. With its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) nuclear warheads, each SS-20 missile possessed “11 times the destructive power of the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.”⁹ When positioned east of the Ural Mountains, the solid-fueled SS-20s could hit hardened point targets anywhere in Europe within minutes of an order to launch. “The SS-20 was capable of destroying any nuclear system in Eurasia within less than half an hour, i.e., before it was ready to take action. This would eliminate NATO’s option of first nuclear use on which its deterrence was based.”¹⁰ The SS-20s

* Wettig wrote, “SS-20 development had started in 1968; testing began in 1974. Three years later, the deployment of the first systems was discovered by US reconnaissance satellites. There were ten launchers at the end of 1977, 70 in December 1978, and 120 one year later.” Gerhard Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983,” *Cold War History* 9, no. 1 (n.d.): 79-110, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740802638640>.

created a decisive nuclear superiority on the continent of Europe that the United States could not effectively counter while development continued on the pending Pershing II missiles.*

The main progress made by Carter's team in resolving the SS-20 issue was establishing the notion of dual-track diplomacy with NATO on 12 December 1979, which agreed to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs in 1983. Carter embraced Nixon and Kissinger's policy of détente, which somewhat normalized relations with the Soviet Union. Carter also attempted to complete Ford's efforts to negotiate a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union.† These negotiations dealt with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and strategic long-range bombers – where superpowers reach out and strike superpowers. The SS-20s poised against Europe were effectively regional missiles, not ones that cross oceans and arc their way through space to find their targets. Disagreements over intermediate-range cruise missiles in SALT II negotiations with the Soviets were one of the reasons why Ford left office without a signed agreement.¹¹ Carter wanted to keep any negotiations over the SS-20s and other intermediate missiles out of SALT II, preferring to table those for separate talks in the future.

NATO'S DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION: 12 DEC 1979

The central concept that the Reagan administration applied to resolve the Euromissile affair relied on a carrot-and-stick strategy of 'dual-track' diplomacy. The PIIs and GLCMs were

* The first Pershing II prototype missile was test fired on 18 November 1977, three weeks after Helmut Schmidt's speech on the SS-20s at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. The Pershing II system formally entered engineering development on 20 February 1979. Ten months later, NATO ministers announced their decision to center the NATO SS-20 response plan around the deployment of the Pershing II system in 1983. Production for the Pershing II began in December 1980. For entire Pershing system timeline, see: <https://history.redstone.army.mil/miss-pershing.html>

† Though Carter and Brezhnev signed a SALT II agreement in the summer of 1979, Carter scuttled the ratification of the treaty by the U.S. Senate in January 1980 after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union continued to honor the terms of SALT II through 1986.

the stick, while arms control negotiations were the diplomatic carrot. It was a compromise that attempted to balance the European desire for peace and an American interest to show strength against the Soviets. It is important to understand the genesis of this policy to appreciate a lingering tension between the United States and its security partners throughout this case study.

The idea of a two-track solution to the SS-20 dilemma developed as a compromise between President Carter and his counterparts in NATO. Carter saw advancements in cruise missiles and the updated Pershing missile systems as means to counter the Soviet threat. There was a strong sentiment in Europe to end the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals.¹² Still, European leaders recognized the value of matching the Soviet threat to build credibility and empower a better bargaining position. The dual-track decision was a parallel and complementary approach meant to avert an arms race in Europe while preserving NATO's strategy of deterrence and the strength of the alliance.¹³ The plan sought to escalate to deescalate.

The dual-track communique announced an overall reduction in nuclear weapons just as it announced the intent to deploy 572 new PIIs and GLCMs. "The programme will not increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of [Theater Nuclear Forces] modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible."¹⁴ Though the dual-track decision effectively reduced stockpiles of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe by 428 warheads, the decision to deploy upgraded nuclear weapons would be viewed by constituents across Europe as a dangerous escalatory measure that brought the world closer to nuclear war. This public sentiment would only increase as the countdown to 1983, what would become known as the *Year of the Missiles*, drew nearer during the Reagan administration.




Figure 4 A declassified National Security Council chart depicting NATO weapons ranges in April 1981. Note how the U.S. kept Moscow just beyond the reach of the Pershing II missiles but inside the range of the slower Ground Launch Cruise Missiles best suited for a second-strike capability (RPL, Executive Secretariat Meeting Files, NSC 1-10, Box 1, NSC 00008, 30 APR 81 (3/3)).

It is ironic that the Euromissile issue became a crisis at all, given that both the Soviet Union and the United States went out of their way to design their respective intermediate-range missile policies to avoid sparking a crisis. Gerhard Wettig concludes the SS-20s were designed to achieve escalation dominance in Europe without posing a direct threat to the continental United States. This gambit sought to create a way to wedge apart the Atlantic alliance and keep the United States focused on its territorial security. It was a bold plan to achieve overmatch in the theater most likely to trigger an American nuclear response. “Once Soviet escalation dominance on the Eurasian continent made the United States feel that its commitment was no longer feasible, conflict would cease.”¹⁵ The Soviet strategy sought to “make the Americans understand that nuclear commitment to allied countries was useless given the fact that, in the event of war, these would already be destroyed before the United States could use its deterrent.”¹⁶

The United States attempted to present a similar nuclear diplomacy with the Pershing IIs and GLCMs sent to Europe. First, the Pershing II missiles were deliberately created as an inferior counter to the SS-20 specifications. The Soviet counterpart had a 3,000-mile range and three independent warheads. The American PII had a 1,800 km range and one warhead. Placed in West Germany, the PII could NOT reach Moscow – by design – to signal it was NOT intended as a first-strike weapon.

Second, the disproportionate number of GLCMs (464) to PII (108) in the NATO response plan overtly reinforced the concept of establishing a credible *second*-strike capability. While the mobile ground launch cruise missiles had the range to reach Moscow, their long flight times made them ineffective as a first strike weapon since they allowed defenders adequate response time to launch a counter strike.

Yet neither side managed to sell these security guarantees. As this case study demonstrates, the U.S. viewed the Soviet threat against NATO allies as a direct threat to the United States. Limiting the range of the SS-20s to the continent of Europe did not present the missiles as any less of a threat to U.S. vital national interests.* In turn, the U.S. gesture to restrict the range of Pershing II missiles from reaching strategic targets in Moscow offered little assurance to the Soviets. The Soviets simply did not believe the (genuine) American range declarations of 1,800 kilometers. Soviet intelligence concluded the new PIIs could reach 2,500 kilometers, which would make the Soviet capital a mere twelve-minute flight from annihilation.¹⁷

* Keeping the missiles east of the Ural mountains, as the Soviets often proposed, would still pose a threat to Japan and China. Moreover, the missiles were on mobile launchers so there was no long term guarantee that the missiles would not return west of the Urals to positions that could range European targets. Therefore, the solution that gave the highest degree of confidence to resolve the issue was to eliminate the missile program completely.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO AND REAGAN'S DILEMMA IN POLAND

President Reagan struggled for the first two years in office with two lingering issues from the Carter Administration: how to manage a grain embargo against the Soviet Union and what to do about growing unrest in Poland, a Soviet satellite state. These two issues would become points of contention between President Reagan and his European counterparts, complicating efforts to set favorable conditions of coercive diplomacy during the Euromissile affair.

President Jimmy Carter established the grain embargo against the Soviet Union on 4 January 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A poor harvest from extremely dry weather in 1979 left the Soviet Union desperately short of grain production, and the United States saw an opportunity to exert “food power” over the Soviets.¹⁸ The United States had agreed to provide 25 million metric tons (MMT) of grain to the Soviets, which created a \$3 billion economic stimulus to American farmers.¹⁹ However, Carter had to cancel this highly lucrative agreement because it became politically difficult for him to continue assisting the Soviet Union in light of their flagrant invasion of Afghanistan. In using the grain agreement as leverage against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter took “a multibillion-dollar gamble – using the nation’s farmers to cover his bet.”²⁰ It was not a popular decision domestically and seemed to have little persuasive power against the Soviet invasion.

Ronald Reagan capitalized on the unpopular embargo and campaigned to abolish it as part of his 1980 presidential election bid. Rural farmers across America would appreciate the campaign promise. “17 MMT of production that had already been grown and harvested and scheduled for movement by truck, barge, rail car, and ocean vessels through the U.S. grain export system; 17 MMT of system revenue, margins, and farmers’ annual income – all

canceled.”²¹ President Reagan wanted to lift the grain embargo on 20 January 1981, “but decided that doing so would be 'misinterpreted' by the Soviet Union.”²² But he did not wait long.

Two months into his presidency, Reagan found an excuse to lift the embargo and provide a coercive incentive to the Soviets: a festering crisis in Poland that emerged in August of 1980. The Soviet Union sought to exert control over the uprising of the Warsaw Pact member state and impose martial law. The Reagan administration feared the Soviets were preparing for a military incursion into Poland after identifying a military buildup along the border. In a National Security Council meeting on 26 March 1981, President Reagan suggested “some quiet indication that the United States might be willing to lift the embargo if the Soviet Union exercise restraint with respect to Poland might help the situation.”²³ The president’s cabinet disagreed with the suggestion. The Secretary of State felt lifting the embargo would embolden, not constrain, Soviet aggression. The CIA director doubted the grain embargo was a relevant concern to the Soviets at the time and felt tying the embargo to the situation in Poland would have little impact on Soviet behavior. But the president’s proposal had more to do with politics than foreign policy and coercion. Reagan explained, “the Administration was now caught between a campaign promise and the need to resolve a domestic issue.”²⁴ Reagan announced the removal of Carter’s grain embargo on 25 April 1981, three months into his presidency. The Soviet threat to Poland would only increase, which forced Reagan to explore other measures to curb Soviet behavior that became a major friction point within the NATO alliance.

The Personnel Behind the Policy

Recognizing the adage in Washington D.C. that “personnel is policy,” it helps to understand the cast of characters involved in a policy effort. * Understanding the reactions and decisions in each case requires context and background.²⁵ This section introduces the U.S. political, military, and diplomatic leaders at the center of this case study. The cast of characters in the Euromissile case is significantly larger than in the *Pueblo* incident. Time certainly plays a role since this case covers seven years of the Reagan administration that this case examines, so there is a greater opportunity for a changeover. This section is designed to help readers appreciate the evolving group of personalities and perspectives of the leaders in Washington, Western Europe, and Moscow that directly influenced the decisions made by the Reagan administration in this study.

Among the numerous political leaders who shaped policy decisions in this study, President Reagan and two of his National Security Advisors stand out as the most influential. Vice President George H.W. Bush also played a role as an advisor to the President and as his representative. There were several times when Bush – a former CIA director, war veteran, and Congressman – provided important input and recommendations during difficult national security decisions in this case. Bush also became the senior representative for Reagan on repeated trips to Moscow for the funerals of Soviet General Secretaries. But Reagan’s influence, both in making decisions and leading policy directions as a political leader, stands alone.

* The term became popular by Ronald Reagan’s Director of Personnel, Scott Faulkner in 1981. See Jeff Hauser and David Segal, “Personnel Is Policy,” *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, February 6, 2020, <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/personnel-is-policy/>.

Ronald Reagan was widely seen as an actor who found his way from Hollywood to the White House, but there were several other roles that served him well in dealing with the Euromissile affair. He spent eight years as governor of California from 1967 to 1975. His campaign in 1980 was his third attempt at becoming President of the United States. * Reagan debuted his conservative economic values and determination to fight communism through “peace through strength” with a nationally televised speech in 1964 called “A Time for Choosing.”† He then mounted an unsuccessful campaign to challenge Gerald Ford for the Republican party’s presidential nomination in 1976.²⁶ Undeterred by the loss in 1976, he spent the next four years refining his political positions. It was a visit to NORAD in 1979 where Reagan solidified his dislike of the nuclear policy of Mutually Assured Destruction.²⁷

Reagan began his professional career as a member of the Democratic party and a supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt. During World War II, Reagan served in the Army but never saw or trained for combat. Instead, he appeared in training films after receiving limited stateside duty due to poor eyesight.²⁸

Reagan might have missed the experience of combat during WWII, but his service as the president of the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1955 taught him how to negotiate, which fulfilled a vital role in preparing him to act as the commander in chief during the Euromissile affair. “As president of the Screen Actors Guild, I’d matched wits with some of the shrewdest negotiators on the planet—people like Jack Warner, Y. Frank Freeman, the president of

* Ronald Reagan lost to Richard Nixon in 1968 and Gerald Ford in 1976 for the Republican party nominations, before winning the 1980 presidential election.

† Reagan delivered the nationally televised speech on 27 October 1964 where he introduces conservative economic policy values and shows a defiance against appeasing communist pressures. See <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/ronald-reagan/time-choosing-speech-october-27-1964>

Paramount, MGM's Louis B. Mayer, and the heads of the other studios.”²⁹ Negotiating labor disputes with Hollywood executives gave Reagan unique experience that guided his instinct in negotiating with the Soviets as president of the United States.

The power dynamics in labor disputes between unions and employers offer interesting similarities to the challenges of wielding power in coercion. An employer possesses the raw power to hire, fire, and compensate workers. Yet unions can create leverage against the employer to achieve their objectives using similar principles found in the conditions of coercive diplomacy: unified leadership, clear objectives, clear terms of the settlement, creating a fear of escalation and uncertainty in the minds of the employer, and demonstrating an asymmetry of motivation towards the objective over the corporate leadership. Representing the SAG in labor negotiations exposed Reagan to an important skill for the future statesman. Combat experience was more than well-represented among his cabinet officials. Instead, Reagan contributed his skills to the art of negotiations.*

Reagan was supported by an unprecedented number of National Security Advisors. Of the six who held the title of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Reagan administration, some were more influential than others. Though all of them presided over one element or another of the Euromissile, the second and third NSAs proved to be the most influential to this study: Judge William Clark and Bud McFarlane.†

* The practice of negotiating remains underemphasized in policy programs or professional military education despite the notion that politics, policymaking, and war are all inherently forms of negotiation with other means.

† The six National Security Advisors were: Richard Allen (21 Jan 81 - 4 Jan 82), William Clark (4 Jan 82 - 17 Oct 83), Bud McFarlane (17 Oct 83 - 4 Dec 85), John Poindexter (4 Dec 83 - 25 Nov 86), Frank Carlucci (2 Dec 86 - 23 Nov 87), and Colin Powell (23 Nov 87 - 20 Jan 89). The last NSA, Colin Powell, assumed the role two weeks before the INF treaty was signed.

William Clark served as National Security Advisor for nearly two years when much of the condition setting in the Euromissile affair occurred. He inherited the role from Richard Allen, who struggled to maintain influence in national security affairs due to his subordinated role in the administration. Clark returned to the prominence of the national security advisor role by regaining direct access to the president.

As a longtime friend and trusted colleague of Ronald Reagan, Judge Clark assumed a powerful voice in the president's inner circle. "Tuesday, January 5, 1982, the least-qualified national security advisor in history walked into the West Wing for the first day of his new job...he would become the most influential of Reagan's national security advisors and one of the most important— albeit least remembered— national security advisors in history."³⁰ Clark was one of the few members of the administration who maintained a warm relationship with the embattled Al Haig, having served as Haig's deputy secretary of state before replacing Allen in the White House. Clark's source of power came from his longstanding relationship with Reagan and his ability to channel the intent and policy direction of the president. Clark was seen as "the President's closest associate and value friend...the alter ego of the President of the United States – on matters of national security and much more, the same organism."³¹ Clark left the White House in October of 1983 to become the secretary of interior for another two years under the Reagan administration.

Clark's successor as National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane, was a loyal public servant who earned Reagan's trust through his demonstrated performance at State and as Clark's deputy National Security Advisor in the first two years of the administration.* McFarlane was a

* McFarlane was the counselor to the secretary of state from 28 February 1981 to 4 April 1982 under Secretary Al Haig. He was the Deputy National Security Advisor from 4 April 1982 to 17 October 1983.

protégé of Henry Kissinger, having served in the Nixon administration as a White House Fellow and as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. McFarlane would add important contributions to the Euromissile affair, including being one of the leading advocates for the Strategic Defense Initiative and an important figure in orchestrating the Geneva Summit. But McFarlane would also be publicly remembered for his infamous role in the Iran-Contra Scandal that nearly ruined the Reagan presidency.

Those who knew McFarlane understood that he was a compassionate and dedicated leader who cared for those around him. A letter McFarlane wrote on 3 December 1983 to one of his departing staffers captures his true demeanor. “Dear Roger,” McFarlane writes, “In this job you often find yourself very torn when faced with competing demands on your time. Right now I am in a meeting with the President. By definition, that is important. Still the wish to be with you and others honoring you is one I feel very deeply.”³² Bud goes on to celebrate his teammate’s quiet service and devotion to the nation as he would hope the same would be said for him one day.

Caspar Weinberger (often called “Cap” by his colleagues) served as secretary of defense for nearly the entire Euromissile affair, joining the administration at the outset of Reagan’s presidency and resigning weeks before the INF treaty was signed. * Weinberger earned the nickname “Cap the Knife” as the director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Nixon administration for notoriously slashing budget requests.³³ As secretary of defense, he oversaw a historic increase in defense spending. Weinberger graduated from Harvard and Harvard Law

* Weinberger remains the second longest serving secretary of defense after Robert McNamara. He led the Department of Defense from 21 January 1981 to 23 November 1987.

School before enlisting as an Infantryman in World War II.* After the war, he practiced law and became a policy professional in California, where he first met Ronald Reagan in 1965, helping Reagan's gubernatorial campaign in 1966, and serving as Governor Reagan's Director of Finance for two years.

Weinberger's experience as a private in the U.S. Army infantry in the early 1940s shaped his inclination to expand defense spending despite his conservative fiscal values. He recalled in his memoir the demoralizing impact of training with dummy rifles, pre-1914 machine guns, and wooden blocks for grenades before being sent to the Pacific theater in World War II.³⁴

Weinberger objected to how the U.S. fought with constraints in Korea and for limited objectives despite an "unlimited willingness to commit troops" in Vietnam. He felt it was a "terrible mistake for a government to commit soldiers to battle without any intention of supporting them sufficiently to enable them to win, and indeed without any intention to win."³⁵ Weinberger sought to rectify how the United States applied force by building the strongest military possible and only using that force to win overwhelmingly.

Weinberger opposed using the military for strategic diplomatic posturing. The tragedy in Beirut in October 1983 cemented his belief that the military should be reserved to fight and win wars. The secretary of defense codified his beliefs on the use of force in 1984 with the "Weinberger Doctrine."³⁶ The tenets he posed as tests before exercising force reveal how Weinberger felt about integrating military power with diplomatic power to achieve political

* Weinberger recalls in his memoir that he promised his father that he would complete Harvard Law before joining the Army. He enlisted in the Infantry in September 1941. He then earned a commission through Officer Candidate School and ended his service as a captain in military intelligence. See Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 6. and David Stout, "Caspar W. Weinberger Dies at 88," *The New York Times*, March 28, 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/obituaries/caspar-w-weinberger-dies-at-88.html>.

objectives.* The Weinberger Doctrine presented a clear set of criteria to guide policymakers as they considered the use of force. George Shultz noted that the doctrine could be a useful framework for major conventional wars but noted that it could undermine efforts at coercion and great power competition. “In the face of terrorism, or any other of the wide variety of complex, unclear, gray-area dangers facing us in the contemporary world, [the Weinberger Doctrine] was a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis.”³⁷ The Weinberger Doctrine inadvertently weakened American coercive power.

“Weinberger essentially rejected force as an arm of diplomacy; he saw it rather as a substitute for diplomacy—to be used only when diplomacy failed. In so doing, he implicitly rejected the Clausewitzian dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means and denied the continuum of agreement, negotiation, threat, coercive diplomacy, and war.”³⁸

Weinberger sought to compartmentalize and isolate the military from political and diplomatic efforts. It is, therefore, little surprise that Weinberger developed infamously abrasive relationships with both of Reagan’s secretaries of state.

Several American diplomatic leaders had especially prominent roles with the Euromissile affair. Two secretaries of state, Alexander Haig and George Shultz, played critical roles as foreign ministers representing the United States abroad as well as cabinet members shaping

* The six criteria of the Weinberger Doctrine were:

- 1) Only commit forces to combat to protect the vital national interests of the United States or its allies.
- 2) If troops are sent to combat, the U.S. must have a clear intention of winning, or do not commit them at all.
- 3) The U.S. must establish clearly defined political and military objectives before sending troops to combat and only send forces equipped and designed to complete the intended mission.
- 4) Continually reassess and adjust the size, composition, and disposition of the force sent to combat and adjust the force as the conditions or objectives change.
- 5) The U.S. must possess the support of the American people and the elected representatives in Congress before sending troops to war.
- 6) The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

See Caspar Weinberger, “Use of Military Force: Remarks by Caspar Weinberger at the National Press Club,” November 28, 1984, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?124872-1/military-force>.

policy decisions for the Reagan administration. Paul Nitze, the lead negotiator for Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Geneva, also plays a major role.

Alexander Haig was a controversial cabinet member who struggled to earn the confidence of the president as secretary of state. Haig learned the hard way that the most influential members of the Reagan administration drew their power from a close personal relationship with the president. He repeatedly clashed with colleagues in Reagan's inner circle, including Richard Allen, Cap Weinberger, William Clark, and the White House Troika of Ed Meese, James Baker III, and Michael Deaver.

Haig was no stranger to the White House, having served with distinction in the Nixon administration from 1969 to 1974. In his five-year stint with Nixon, he rose "from colonel to four-star general without holding a major battlefield command, an extraordinary rise with few if any precedents in American military history."³⁹ Haig became the White House Chief of Staff, where he provided essential leadership during the fallout from the Watergate scandal. "He was widely perceived as the acting president during the final months of the Nixon administration. He kept the White House running as the distraught and despondent commander in chief was driven from power by the threat of impeachment in 1974."⁴⁰ Haig left Washington to become the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for all NATO forces for both the Ford and Carter administrations. Haig commanded NATO throughout the onset of the Euromissile affair and was immersed in the Western European sensitivities to the establishment of SS-20s beginning in 1977. He retired in July of 1979 while NATO was finalizing the dual-track decision.

Haig suffered from a transparent ambition for power. He flirted with a presidential run in 1980 and later mounted a very unsuccessful bid in 1988.⁴¹ His 1988 bid would have been no surprise to his colleagues in 1981. Few senior members of the Reagan administration trusted

Haig because of his overt quest for control of the foreign policy agenda. Ed Meese, the influential counselor (and gate keeper) to the president, “feared that the new Secretary of State would allow personal ambition to enter into his policy calculations over the next four years, that he would use his position to go beyond making or analyzing policy to deciding it and taking credit for it publicly.”⁴² Despite Haig’s constant tension with his colleagues and difficulty in maintaining the confidence of the president, he played a key role in shaping the early efforts of the Reagan administration to set the conditions for coercive diplomacy. He was an early advocate for the European perspective and sensitivities. Often it was not the soundness of his advice or the value of his experience but his political blunders and portentous ambition that prevented him from being more influential.

George Shultz succeeded Al Haig in July of 1982 and remained Reagan’s chief diplomat through the end of the administration. Shultz was no stranger to the role of cabinet secretary, having served as the secretary of labor, the first director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and secretary of treasury under President Nixon. Shultz traveled extensively overseas as the head of the treasury department working to improve the international monetary system. He recalled becoming “well acquainted with important government leaders all around the world, forming friendships that were deepened by working together on difficult problems in an atmosphere of great tension.”⁴³ Notable counterparts he befriended as secretary of treasury included Helmut Schmidt, the future chancellor of West Germany, as well as the future president Mitterrand of France and future prime minister Nakasone of Japan.

Shultz and Weinberger first worked together at OMB. The future secretary of defense (and bureaucratic rival), Caspar Weinberger, served as Shultz’s deputy OMB director for two years before taking over as the Director when Nixon appointed Shultz to lead the Treasury

Department.⁴⁴ It was at OMB that the tension between Shultz and Weinberger first began as Weinberger repeatedly felt snubbed and slighted by Shultz.⁴⁵ They continued their rivalry during the Ford and Carter years when they both served as executives at the same construction firm, Bechtel, in San Francisco. Once again, Shultz was senior to Weinberger.⁴⁶

Shultz shared Reagan's appreciation for the art of negotiations. The economist, former university administrator, and former secretary of labor understood that "a sense of strategy is critical in any negotiation: when to make concessions, when to hold firm, when to let things cool off, when to be intransigent."⁴⁷ George Shultz championed the principle of combining military with diplomatic power to resolve crises and national security threats without resorting to all-out war. "Diplomacy could work these problems most effectively when force – or the threat of force – was a credible part of the equation."⁴⁸ Complementing diplomacy with military power was the fundamental difference between Shultz's approach to force and the Weinberger Doctrine.⁴⁹ For the six years that he served as secretary of state, Shultz applied a sense of power and diplomacy to help persuade both adversaries and allies to follow the U.S. strategy in the Euromissile affair.

INTERNATIONAL LEADERS

The breadth of key characters also includes several important international leaders, both friends and foes. Understanding the decisions and events that unfold in this case necessitates an appreciation for the European and Soviet leadership perspectives. The interests of leaders in London, Bonn, and of course Moscow, play a prominent role in this case. Adding profiles of all international leaders in the Euromissile Crisis is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Nonetheless, the section below provides a brief familiarization of select leaders in this study.⁵⁰

The key European leaders include the British Prime Minister and the two Helmut who led the

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) during this study: Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Chancellor from 16 May '74 - 1 October '82 of the Social Democratic Party of Germany) followed by Helmut Kohl (Chancellor from 1 October '82 - 27 October '98 of the Christian Democratic Union).

Helmut Schmidt went through a political roller coaster over the Euromissile debate. He was the first to sound the alarm to the NATO community about the SS-20 threat in 1977 but then found opposition within his party once NATO responded. "At the time Schmidt made his speech...in 1977, he still had full Social Democratic Party (SPD) support behind him; but by the time of the Guadeloupe meeting fourteen months later, the implication of what he had proposed caused dissension within his party...to maintain his leadership of the party he felt compelled, in effect, to repudiate some of what he had advocated in his IISS speech."⁵¹ On 12 June 1980, Carter wrote to Schmidt warning that his recent public remarks were causing "confusion about the position of your government," threatening the solidarity of the relationship between allies.⁵² Schmidt would later bark at Carter and Brzezinski at their next meeting that "Germany is not the 51st state but has interest of its own and its own special responsibilities."⁵³ The difficult position that Schmidt faced was "that the Americans were Germany's long-standing friends and that the Soviets were at best neighbors."⁵⁴ Schmidt would lose power in 1982 after a parliamentary motion of no-confidence for Schmidt's cabinet. In electing Helmut Kohl of an opposing party, West Germans signaled their ultimate support for the dual-track decision and strengthening ties with the United States.

The new Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Kohl, bore a stronger affinity to the role of the United States in rebuilding West Germany after World War II. He would share privately with Margaret Thatcher that "the European debt to the United States was enormous." In their meeting,

he would share how “at the end of the War his own home was 80 per cent destroyed and people were starving. It was the Americans who had moved in with food parcels and other aid. He had met his wife at dancing classes – when she had worn an American dress and he an American suit...It was wrong to expect the Americans to be policemen of the world and at the same time publicly abuse them.”⁵⁵ The ascendancy of Helmut Kohl in West Germany in 1982 strengthened the bond between the U.S. and the most critical ally in the Euromissile affair.

The other critical relationship for the United States in the Euromissile affair was the United Kingdom. Margaret Thatcher served as Reagan’s counterpart in the U.K. from 4 May 1979 to 28 November 1990. Her leadership played a distinct role in maintaining US-European relations. She became a close friend to President Reagan, though their relationship strained over numerous events during the 1980’s. Her position as prime minister nearly crumbled at the same time that Reagan came to office. * Thatcher recovered from her near domestic political demise in 1981 and became a pivotal partner for Reagan throughout the Euromissile affair.

There were four General Secretaries of the Soviet Union during this case: Leonid Brezhnev (from 8 April ‘66 - 10 November ‘82); Yuri Andropov (from 12 November ‘82 - 9 February ‘84); Konstantin Chernenko (from 13 February ‘84 - 10 March ‘85); and Mikhail Gorbachev (from 11 March ‘85 - 24 August ‘91). Andropov and Chernenko led with similar traditional positions to the longstanding Cold Warrior leader Brezhnev. Gorbachev was a younger and more progressive leader. He introduced the principles of Glasnost (transparency) and Perestroika (restructuring)

* Thankfully, Thatcher took heed to scathing advice offered by trusted advisors in what became known as “the Blockbuster Memo.” Rarely do heads of state receive such candid and blunt feedback, but Thatcher’s domestic support was fading, and her cabinet was near revolt by August of 1981. Her advisors prefaced their political intervention letter with “there will not be time for another such paper – the worst disloyalty would be to dress up the message so that you thought we were saying everything is alright.” They then describe in detail topics such as “the Cabinet is not a team; you lack management competence; your own leadership style is wrong.” See Hoskyns, Wolfson, and Millar, “The Blockbuster Memo,” August 20, 1981, Archive, Hoskyns MSS, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margarethatatcher.org/document/210187>.

into the Soviet Union. He also consolidated power by replacing the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Brezhnev's era, Andrei Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1957-1985), with a more loyal and likeminded colleague Eduard Shevardnadze.

Tracing the Policy Process: The Euromissiles

I separate the Euromissile affair into three phases for this case study. The first phase of this study covers from Reagan's inauguration on 20 January 1981, through the end of 1982 as the administration stormed and formed over domestic and foreign policy issues. The second phase of this study covers all of 1983, when the administration took a bold stance toward building coercive pressure against the Soviet Union's SS-20 missile posture. The last phase begins with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and the groundbreaking leader summits in Geneva in November 1985 at Reykjavik in October 1986. The phase concludes with the celebrated agreement to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement in 1987.

PART I: INHERITING AN ARRANGEMENT

There were several pivotal moments in the first two years of the Reagan presidency for the Euromissile affair. First was deciding how the Reagan administration would approach Carter's 1979 agreement towards dual-track diplomacy. The key to any bargaining position against the Soviets was the planned missile deployments to Europe. But this move relied on maintaining host nation approval. If Reagan lost the support of his European partners on the PII and GLCM deployments, he lost his coercive power. The second major development in this phase was the introduction of the zero-zero option. As negotiations commenced in 1982, a third major development occurred when U.S. and Soviet negotiators Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky charted out a compromise agreement known as the "walk in the woods." Though their proposal

failed to persuade leaders in Moscow or Washington D.C., the draft agreement gave several positive indications that a zone of possible agreement could exist between the two rival powers.

When Reagan first took office, domestic policy and economic issues consumed most of the administration's attention, but Reagan aspired to tackle the nuclear weapons issue with the Soviets. Then on 30 March, just ten weeks after his inauguration, Ronald Reagan came within an inch of his life after being shot by an assassin. National security leaders scrambled to establish continuity of command, with some fearing the attack on the president was part of a Soviet nuclear strike plot. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig infamously stated to the White House press corps that he was in charge, the public relations fallout only weakened his struggling status within the administration.

Yet the assassination turned out to have nothing to do with great power rivalries: the assassin, John Hinkley Jr., just sought to gain the attention of an 18-year-old Jodie Foster and, in his delusion, thought killing the president would solidify her love. Still, the near-death experience affected Reagan's conditions of coercive diplomacy. In his recovery, Reagan reflected that divine providence allowed him to survive so he could resolve the nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. "Perhaps having come so close to death made me feel I should do whatever I could in the years God had given me to reduce the threat of nuclear war."⁵⁶ In effect, the assassination helped Reagan clarify his objectives (Condition 1), expanded his willingness to accept risk and costs (Condition 2), and strengthened his resolve as a leader (Condition 4). However, he needed a way to initiate arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

Big Two-Hearted Tracks: A Test of Confidence

The commitment to deploy the PIIs and GLCMs needed to stay on track to counter the Soviet's plan to deploy 1,400 SS-20 warheads by 1985.* But deploying the missiles was track one of the two-track agreement. The other track required a commitment to resolving the crisis through diplomatic negotiations. Haig and Weinberger gave directly opposing statements about the status of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) negotiations that troubled the NSC Staff. In a New York Times article from 17 April 1981, Haig was quoted saying he “expected the United States to hold preliminary talks with the Soviet Union soon on resuming negotiations.” Yet in the same article, Weinberger is quoted as stating he “was against opening talks with the Russians as long as the Soviet Union ‘threatened’ Poland.” The conflicting policy positions coming from these leading Reagan officials damaged the credibility of the administration. An internal note between NSC staff members flagging the NYT article bemoaned, “who is in charge here?” noting how Haig’s statements “all violate current interagency agreement and guidance and specifically repudiate Secretary Weinberger’s statements in Bonn.”⁵⁷ The president met with his cabinet on 31 April 1981, a month after the assassination attempt, to solidify when the administration planned to renew TNF negotiations with the Soviets.† Both Cap Weinberger and Al Haig were set to meet with their counterparts at an upcoming NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Rome and needed to present a unified policy position for the administration.

Richard Allen advised the president that the administration’s early Euromissile actions would serve as the impetus for “U.S. - Allied relations over the life of your administration and beyond.”⁵⁸ Secretary Haig prefaced the 30 April 1981 NSC meeting that, in discussing with both

* Important to note that each SS-20 missile contained three independent warheads while the PIIs and GLCMs carried one warhead each.

† Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) was the early term that later Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF).

Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Schmidt, “it became apparent that European leaders cannot maintain domestic consensus behind TNF modernization without a specific date for the start of TNF negotiations.”⁵⁹ Reagan’s team needed to transmit a unified commitment to signals to Europe about his commitment to using the position of strength created by the PIIIs and GLCMs to sue for peace.

Maintaining the support from NATO members to host the missiles was key to Reagan’s coercive diplomacy strategy. Europeans needed to see consistency from the new American administration and have confidence that the U.S. sought peace, not war, by emplacing advanced nuclear weapons across their continent. Carter’s divisive interest in neutron bombs and hesitancy to address the SS-20 threat when it emerged in 1977 left European leaders uncertain about the United States as a security partner. Now Reagan’s team owned the execution of the 1979 agreement drafted by Carter.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci described a realist interpretation for the European interest in the American missiles. He told the National Security Council that “the Allies are not really interested in theater nuclear deployments for survivability. They regard TNF simply as a tripwire which would lead to the use of U.S. strategic weapons.”⁶⁰ The future National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense missed the deeper symbolism behind the PII and GLCM debate. The weapons had become much more than a stopgap defensive measure; the missiles represented a good-faith pledge between the United States and the rest of NATO: a test of trust. How the United States approached the missile deployment and the parallel commitment to pursue negotiations was a litmus test to see if Europe could continue to trust the United States as a guarantor of security.

The American missiles were intertwined with statecraft. Their true purpose exemplifies what Inboden describes as “Reagan’s concept of “peace through strength.” Oft- cited but sometimes misconstrued, for Reagan, it meant integrating force with diplomacy. Military power would not just deter aggression. It would also fortify negotiations and thus render the need to fight much less likely. Reagan’s defense modernization had a diplomatic purpose as much as a military purpose.”⁶¹ Haig and the State Department recognized the deeper meaning of the two-track plan. The TNF issue was becoming the administration’s greatest test case for the integrity of the NATO alliance. “If we fail to sustain support for the deployment of modern theater nuclear weapons we will lose far more than a much needed strengthening nuclear arsenal in Europe.” The first step to retaining European support was a clear signal that Reagan intended to meet the Soviets for negotiations. Without a strong commitment by Reagan’s administration for the negotiations track, Haig warned, “we will suffer a fundamental political reversal from which the Atlantic Alliance would not recover for many years.”⁶² Reagan would follow through with the two-track agreement. He dispatched his secretaries of defense and state to their meetings in Rome with the directive that the United States intended to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF by the end of the year.*

European leaders celebrated Reagan’s commitment to the 1979 agreement. At a North Atlantic Assembly meeting in October, NATO leaders adopted a resolution affirming both the strategic value of and symbolism behind the commitment to the dual-track decision. “The

* In Reagan’s diary from 5 May 1981, he writes, “Al Haig back from a most successful NATO meeting in Rome. They have agreed to accept Theater Nuclear Weapons on their soil & are convinced we are willing to negotiate with the Russians. Clincher Al said was when he showed them a copy of my handwritten letter to Brezhnev.” See Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 17. 1 May 1981 Presidential Directive found in Richard Allen, “Presidential Guidance Memo: Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF),” May 1, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 21-30, Box 3, NSC00022, RPL.

cardinal importance to implementing the 1979 decision – not only to maintain deterrence and bargaining leverage in negotiations with the Soviets, but also as a demonstration of the ability of the Alliance to take a difficult decision and stick with it in the face of determined Soviet opposition and growing public uncertainty.”⁶³ Leaders called the endorsement of the dual-track decision a “make or break issue” with “no turning back.” The date to begin TNF negotiations with the Soviets was 30 November 1981.

Forming the Zero-Zero Option

The zero-zero position became the heart of the Reagan administration’s terms of settlement (Condition 5) for INF negotiations. When Ronald Reagan introduced the zero-zero option at the National Press Club on 18 November 1981, he presented a bold proposal. “Today was the big day,” he reflected in his diary that night, “I asked Russia to join us in total elimination of all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.”* Reagan chose to share with the world what he had already sent General Secretary Brezhnev in a private letter ahead of the INF negotiations scheduled for the end of the month.⁶⁴ He revealed, “my representatives will present the following proposal: The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.” Reagan exuded pride in his terms, stating: “this would be a historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the Moon, would be a giant step for mankind.”⁶⁵

* Despite the magnitude of the moment, Reagan reflected on a secret irony to his speech. “Funny – I was talking peace but wearing a bullet proof vest. It seems Kaddafi put a contract on me & some person named Jack was going to try for me at the speech. Security was very tight.” Diary entry from 18 November 1981 found in Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007).

The zero-zero option certainly was a moonshot. As a condition for coercive diplomacy, it was a first step toward developing *clear and precise terms of settlement*. But as a credible bargaining position, the option was questionable. The United States retained little leverage in the fall of 1981. In accordance with the original 1979 NATO plan, the U.S. had already removed 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. Reagan was effectively proposing to do nothing in return for a profound shift in Soviet behavior. The Pershing II missiles, the backbone of the proposal, were not even built yet.* Even though Reagan was calling for both the U.S. and Soviet Union to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the proposal notably omitted participation from the U.K. and France, who maintained small independent arsenals of intermediate nuclear weapons for their national defense.† Brezhnev predictably replied to Reagan’s private letter on 1 December, frustrated with the unilateral Soviet disarmament of the zero-zero option. “Why then, may we ask, are we offered to scrap all our medium-range missiles while the entire NATO’s nuclear arsenal remains intact? Is there any logic here, Mr. President?”⁶⁶ There was. The key to appreciating the logic in the American negotiation strategy was to see the two hidden elements at play: the willingness to play a long game and angling for European support.

How the zero-zero option emerged offers important insight into condition setting for coercive diplomacy. The zero option came from a confluence of different sources. Early variations of zero options first emerged in debates among European leaders, including Dutch and West German officials, during 1979 debates over the dual-track proposal.⁶⁷ Talks of zero options gained renewed interest across Europe in the summer of 1981 as the arrival of American

* Pershing II production phase began in December 1981. See Pershing II Project System Chronology at <https://history.redstone.army.mil/miss-pershing.html>

† Whether to include or exclude the U.K. and French missiles in INF negotiations became a deep issue between U.S. and Soviet negotiators for several years.

intermediate nuclear weapons drew near. Europeans became increasingly anxious their continent may become the arena for a limited nuclear war between Cold War superpowers.⁶⁸

Officials within Reagan's Department of Defense began embracing zero-option concepts that called for the complete elimination of intermediate nuclear weapons for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the spring of 1981. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Richard Perle became DoD's leading advocate.* Defense studies had concluded, "if the Soviets retained more than 50 SS-20s, that would be sufficient to attack and destroy virtually every important military target in western Europe." If such a low number was strategically necessary, the most prudent position was to demand full elimination both for verification and political reasons. "It was a much more appealing proposal to say, 'Let's get rid of these weapons on both sides,' than to say, 'Let's have some number on both sides that would have guaranteed that a controversial deployment would go forward.'"⁶⁹ While the Department of Defense lobbied for a complete zero option, the State Department opposed setting a maximalist position, advocating for more negotiation space and flexibility for the arms control talks in Geneva. The debate primed an interagency battle inside Washington.

The spark that forced the Reagan administration to confront the dueling tensions over zero options came when reporters in Bonn asked Al Haig about it at a press conference on 14 September. Tap dancing around an answer, Haig led by noting, "it is premature to get too

* Richard Perle may also have helped instigate the renewed European interest in a zero option during a meeting with a Dutch defense minister in early 1981. In trying to solidify European commitments to receive American nuclear missiles with his Dutch colleague, Perle proposed a commitment to first negotiate for the total elimination of missiles on both sides before resorting to deploying the missiles under the dual-track agreement. The Dutch defense official "thought it was a terrific idea...and raced off to the Hague...to present it to the others in the government." Either by Perle's subtle interest or European initiative, the idea of a 'zero option' gained increasing interest between European capitals through the summer of 1981. See Interview with Richard Perle, February 25, 1988, Zero Hour, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age collection, WGBH Educational Foundation, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_03AE731BD9B24B31B01CA59A33ACDD2D.

definitive on this subject. The Secretary of State gave a very diplomatic answer: the Reagan administration had “not rejected” the proposal and “under ideal conditions such a proposal might be very worthy of exploration and consideration.”⁷⁰ Privately, Haig had reservations about pushing for zero. The next morning’s *Washington Post* gave the story a presumptuous headline, “Haig Statement Indicates Softening of Stance on Missiles in Germany.”⁷¹ That was certainly news to the administration.

As soon as Haig’s statements broke in the media, the interagency scrambled to develop a cable with guidance for American embassies across Europe about ‘zero option’ queries. Draft language was noncommittal and tried to steer the conversation “to start referring to ‘complete dismantling’ vice ‘zero option.’”⁷² In an internal debate within the National Security Council staff, NSC Director Richard Pipes lamented to his colleagues, “Nothing reveals better our ineptness at propaganda than our hesitancy to adopt the ‘zero option.’” He went on to argue, “the fact that the Russians cannot be ‘realistically expected’ to adopt it is their problem: why do we always act as their attorneys? We should press for the zero option and let them explain why they won’t adopt it.”⁷³ By early October, a finalized draft cable made its way through the interagency with compromised language that left the door open for US-Soviet TNF negotiations could lead to a ‘zero outcome’ under which there would be no LRTNF missiles deployed on either side.”⁷⁴

President Reagan convened the National Security Council on 12 November to settle the competing variations of zero options for the upcoming Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva.* Secretary Weinberger, Assistant Secretary Perle, and the Joint Chiefs of

* This meeting is where the administration transitioned from using the term Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) to Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF). See “NSC Briefing Paper on Theater Nuclear Forces,” November 12, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 21-30, Box 3, NSC 00025, RPL.

Staff recommended the rigid “Zero Only” option that genuinely meant ‘null,’ including the dismantling of systems, not just moving them west of the Ural mountains. Secretary Haig and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) proposed a more acquiescent bargaining option described as “Zero Plus” that specified “zero as the preferred outcome” while conceding to the “lowest possible equal level” as acceptable outcomes.⁷⁵

Officials weighed several important considerations about how to weigh these two approaches. The key objectives highlighted that any substantive agreement that significantly reduced Soviet missile forces and increased security would take *time* and require *political support from Allied governments* to host the PII and GLCMs. “Thus,” an Interagency Group assessment concluded, “our opening position must be such as to secure European and American public understanding and support and to provide a solid basis from which to pursue negotiations over a sustained period.”⁷⁶ The U.S. needed to “secure the high ground” in Geneva and burden the Soviets with any need to deploy missiles to Europe in 1983.

The career military planner in General (Retired) Haig emerged at the NSC meeting as he became entangled in the details, the pitfalls, and the what-ifs of the zero-only proposal. Haig voiced numerous concerns. He anticipated the angst of his European counterparts and the flaws in such a brazen bargaining position. He cautioned, “if we appear too rigid, our Allies will depart from our side.” He, too, hoped the negotiations could get to zero but cautioned, “zero, carried to the extremes, is a brittle position. It will be seen as a propaganda ploy for quick victory.” He feared demanding full elimination in INF negotiations opened a slippery slope on parallel arms control talks for strategic and conventional forces that the U.S. could not afford to give up. Weinberger argued trying to open the negotiations by seeking “the lowest-possible formula,” as Haig suggested, would never get to zero.⁷⁷ To Weinberger, presenting a malleable bargaining

position in Geneva increased the risk of a quick but superficial settlement over the missiles. With his defense minister counterparts in Europe all requesting the U.S. take the zero-only option, Weinberger felt confident the zero-only option would rally, not jeopardize, Alliance support. *

Where Haig saw only the gaps in the plan, President Reagan saw it with the vision of a politician and as a tested negotiator. The zero-only proposal did not need to be cast as a brittle or excessively rigid position. “One should ask for the moon, and when the other fellow offers green cheese, one can settle for something in between,” the president remarked. He wanted to start with eliminating the SS-20s and, in “a hope in good faith negotiations,” future arms control negotiations could address other systems.⁷⁸ Vice President Bush mentioned the general perception of Reagan as a nuclear hawk, despite the President’s true anti-nuclear beliefs. A strong stance in support of the INF negotiations served a political benefit. Seizing the high ground through the zero-only option “would do a lot for public opinion in Europe and the United States,” the vice president noted. The president decided to side with Weinberger and establish a high ceiling for the terms of settlement. “The modus operandi of the arms control establishment,” Weinberger later reflected, “was to start with the idea that we must, above all, secure an agreement, no matter what it says.”⁷⁹ The zero-zero proposal that Reagan announced on 18 November 1981 as his terms of settlement bore a greater risk for failure and a greater reliance on

* In October, Secretary Weinberger found himself in an unsavory predicament: NATO defense ministers asked him to sign a joint communique calling on the U.S. to adopt the zero-option policy position he championed. But to win the interagency fight with Haig and the State Department and gain the full commitment of the Reagan administration, Weinberger felt the zero-zero option needed to emanate as a U.S. driven initiative and not a proposal forced upon the U.S. by European allies. He struck down the NATO communique proposal despite trying to sell same idea at home. As mentioned in the 12NOV NSC meeting by Weinberger and recounted by Richard Perle about the 13th NATO Ministerial Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting at Gleneagles in Scotland on 20th and 21st October 1981. See Interview with Richard Perle, February 25, 1988, Zero Hour, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age collection, WGBH Educational Foundation, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_03AE731BD9B24B31B01CA59A33ACDD2D.

time to wear down the Soviet position. Reagan sought substance over a quick resolution in the issue and relied on his persuasiveness to maintain European support in pressuring the Soviets. After the speech, Reagan received strong political support for the initiative. Both houses of Congress endorsed the proposal, including a unanimous vote from the U.S. Senate. European leaders celebrated the message, with both Helmut Schmidt and Margaret Thatcher offering high public praise.⁸⁰

A Walk In the Woods

The INF negotiations that took place from late 1981 to 1982 demonstrated the importance of interpersonal relationships in coercive diplomacy. These talks may not have settled the affair, but they did set a precedence for how to create breakthroughs with the Soviets that President Reagan followed during his summits in 1985 and 1986.

The United States and the Soviet Union met at the first round of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces negotiations on 30 November 1981 in Geneva, Switzerland. Paul Nitze led the U.S. delegation responsible for presenting the zero-zero option to the Soviets.* The chief negotiator for the Soviet Union was Yuli Kvitsinskiy, a forty-four-year-old English-speaking diplomat with a sense of humor. These two diplomats understood they were entering prolonged negotiations from the start. In contrast to the hostile negotiating environment between the U.S. and North Korea at the Military Armistice Commission during the 1968 *Pueblo* incident, Nitze

* In parallel to INF negotiations, other U.S./Soviet teams began Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva and continued longstanding negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) for conventional arms in Vienna, Austria. These programs represented the main arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. START replaced the Nixon/Ford/Carter initiative of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) from détente. President Reagan chose to rename the program because he wanted to emphasize reductions instead of limitations of intercontinental nuclear weapons.

and Kvitsinskiy developed a cordial relationship in their months together in Geneva.* Often joined by their wives, the Nitze's and Kvitsinskiy's socialized on weekends, at formal events, and hosted each other for dinners at their residences or meeting for picnics at local parks.⁸¹ In formal sessions, Kvitsinskiy faithfully offered a "continuous stream of one-sided propaganda arguments." However, "in private discussion, away from the ears of his associates, and presumably of the KGB as well, he was generally quite a different man. He could be charming, a conversationalist, interested in an amazing array of subjects."⁸² Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinskiy made an effort to get to know and understand one another on a personal level. Their civil engagements resembled the fictitious American and Russian counterparts, Jim and Ivan, that Ronald Reagan would later evoke in speeches on public diplomacy.

"Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and an Anya could find themselves, oh, say...sharing a shelter from the rain or a storm with a Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted...[W]ould they find themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company, they would probably have touched on ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, maybe Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice? She also teaches music."...They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon. Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars."⁸³

Beyond the bluster and rhetoric of the two great powers attempting to coerce one another were common people with some fundamental common interests. But there were many competing forces that kept Americans and Russians from sharing real dialogue. Imposing conference tables and public spectators certainly do not facilitate open and collaborative discussions.

* Nitze understood that Kvitsinskiy was ultimately a political operative. "When he wishes, he can be charming. His focus is entirely political. The truth or falsity of any statement is only of secondary interest to him. After a period of time, I came to think I could generally, though not always, sort the true from the false in what he said." See Paul Nitze, "The U.S. Negotiator's View Of Geneva Talks," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1984, sec. A23, <https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/19/opinion/the-us-negotiators-vie-of-geneva-talks.html>.

For six months, Nitze and Kvitsinskiy's delegations met biweekly to advance their nation's positions. The United States proposed eliminating all INF missiles globally. The Soviets countered with offers to limit the agreement to removing missiles in Europe and tried to rope French and British nuclear programs into the scope of the INF negotiations.* The formal plenary sessions mostly allowed negotiators to identify areas of disagreement but yielded little progress toward a negotiated agreement. Neither side seemed willing to initiate a compromise, and Kvitsinskiy revealed to Nitze that Moscow was preparing to review and finalize its INF policy in the summer of 1982.† This created a *sense of urgency* for Nitze to generate a breakthrough.

Nitze realized the “best hope for solving our problems was to explore informally with Kvitsinskiy a joint package entailing concessions by both sides leading to a mutually acceptable final outcome.”⁸⁴ He drew on his experiences in SALT I negotiations with the Soviets that informal (and off the record) discussions with Soviet counterparts fostered constructive outcomes. Nitze understood that a mutually acceptable agreement needed to include a compromise on both sides. He was leading a negotiation, not forcings terms of surrender. “I saw no way of exploring the possibility of significant Soviet movement without at least indicating the U.S. movement I personally thought commensurate with the movement I was soliciting from them.” Nitze reviewed the long list of divisive issues that accrued after six months of talks and formulated a bold hypothetical proposal. He sought to show the real compromise on his part while expecting reciprocal flexibility in return. The draft agreement was his own initiative. Nitze

* Moving the SS-20s out of range of Europe, often suggested as keeping them east of the Ural Mountains, provided little value to NATO members. The SS-20s were designed to be mobile and easily concealed. Shifting them eastward was a superficial gesture that could easily be undone and difficult to verify. See Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 373.

† Nitze recalled Kvitsinskiy “stressed the importance of progress in the negotiations prior to that review. A review of that kind would result in freezing the Soviet position; thereafter it was likely to be much more inflexible. I took this warning seriously.” See Nitze, 374.

would make it clear to his counterpart that the offer was by no means the official offer by the United States government. But it was sensible and pragmatic. He was *willing to accept the risk* of condemnation from Washington to potentially achieve a real agreement.

Nitze arranged to discuss the proposal with Kvitsinskiy on 16 July 1982.* Wanting to speak with complete candor, they traded boardrooms for the outdoors and went for a hike along an old logging trail in what became publicly known as Nitze's "Walk in the Woods."[†] At the top of the hill, they sat down on a log together. Nitze presented four carefully prepared papers that described the integrated compromise package. "Nothing is agreed, or even proposed, until everything has been agreed," he wrote.⁸⁵ The two reviewed each paragraph and spoke plainly about which points were non-starters and which paragraphs would be helpful in selling the proposal to their decision-makers. As it began to rain, they took shelter in Kvitsinskiy's car. With no language barrier between them, they compared notes and shared what they believed the proposal needed to say to make ends meet. They made amendments and additional concessions based on each other's feedback. They settled on what they felt was a fair compromise for all parties, "an integrated package of the necessary and sufficient elements for a definitive and comprehensive deal...[that] exceeded the value in the costs of the concessions." In this compromise, both sides would be making major departures from their key positions. The U.S. would be accepting a finite number of SS-20s above zero. The Soviets would need to concede that the British and French missile systems would remain excluded from the agreement. Both

* This was not a surprise conversation. The two diplomats had arranged the informal talks weeks in advance.

[†] The event became popularized by the 1988 Broadway play and television film "A Walk in the Woods" by Lee Blessing.

men then went their separate ways, returning to their respective capitals with an ad referendum for their leaders to consider.

Neither government embraced the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy compromise.* Cap Weinberger led the effort to kill the idea on the American side, ending in a presidential decision in early September.⁸⁶ The Soviets kept silent for weeks, and Nitze finally confirmed what the U.S. government understood to be true, that Moscow wholeheartedly rejected the Walk in the Woods package.⁸⁷ In one sense, the Walk in the Woods is just a compelling story that has an inconsequential ending. The endeavor was always a long shot that came about before either government was ready to make deep concessions. President Reagan was not yet ready to abandon the zero-zero position. Time was still on his side. Moscow could not agree to any settlement that seemed like unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union.

In another sense, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinskiy created an important breakthrough in the Euromissile affair despite the rejection of their proposal. They demonstrated compromises between the United States and the Soviet Union were conceivable: that under the right conditions and with the right approach, representatives could find a zone of possible agreement. Additionally, Nitze and Kvitsinskiy demonstrated that Americans and Russians were capable of substantive talks that led to creative outcomes. Reagan would patiently wait until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 for the opportunity to talk directly with his Soviet counterpart. The walk in the woods in the summer of 1982 yielded nothing but demonstrated that in coercive diplomacy, interpersonal relationships matter: they help find bargaining space and facilitate

* When Reagan shot down Nitze's proposal, his instructions to his envoy were blunt. "Well Paul, you just tell the Soviets that you're working for one tough son of a bitch." See William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 173.

candid dialogue. Nitze and Kvitsinskiy established that compromises could exist and that bold dialogue between two leaders could produce genuine progress over INF negotiations.

Grain vs. Gas: International Tension

In 1982, the Reagan administration encountered a problem with maintaining Condition 3b (international support) by trying to apply pressure in too many directions over multiple issues at the same time. Trying to apply coercive diplomacy for the Euromissile Crisis and against a Soviet gas pipeline over Poland in 1981 created excessive tension with European allies. Reagan's experience revealed how applying pressure through coercive diplomacy costs political capital in international relationships. The Reagan administration had to pick one effort to exercise American coercive power.

The predicament began when a political uprising in Poland became an opportunity for the Reagan administration to weaken the Soviet Union's grip on Warsaw Pact nations. The Reagan administration initiated a distinct application of coercive diplomacy that relied on applying economic and political power on the Soviets. Reagan placed economic sanctions on a new Soviet gas pipeline that delivered energy from Siberia to Western Europe. "The billions of dollars that the pipeline would generate by supplying gas to Western Europe was the way in which the Soviet Union planned to rescue its ailing economy." Aldous argued the crisis in Poland created the necessary pretext to justify sanctions against the Urengoy pipeline.⁸⁸ But Reagan's attempt to exert pressure over Poland with the Urengoy pipeline produced unintended tension within the Atlantic alliance towards the Euromissile affair. The pipeline gambit spawned what George Shultz described as a "poisonous problem" between the U.S. and its European partners.⁸⁹ The spillover pressure exerted on Reagan's allies from both the pipeline sanctions and the

Euromissile agreement was too great. The Reagan administration was forced to choose one of its two applications of coercive diplomacy and the nuclear missile issue took precedence.

The Poland crisis began on 13 December 1981, two weeks after INF negotiations began in Geneva when the prime minister of Poland imposed martial law to subdue a political uprising. The Reagan administration believed Moscow was behind the Polish government crackdown and saw an opportunity to attack communist oppression. Many European allies did not share the U.S. determination that the Soviets were directly responsible for the Polish government's activation of martial law.* "It seems a bit absurd if the Russians aren't actually in the front line of it to take it out on them when they're not," Margaret Thatcher told her foreign minister. "Well, it might be a bit unwise too," Lord Carrington replied.⁹⁰

In Washington, the president sought "to respond in ways that would punish both [the leader of Poland] and the Soviets while still leaving room for a negotiated solution, and not derailing the arms control talks getting under way in Geneva."⁹¹ These specific objectives meant the U.S. would exercise coercive diplomacy once again. "Let's remember," a member of the National Security Council meeting reminded his colleagues, "we are trying to achieve a rollback for the Polish people. We don't want Soviet tanks coming in and blood to flow."⁹² Reagan's objective was to compel Poland and the Soviet Union to lift the martial law order without instigating a wider conflict.[†]

Reagan reviewed his options with the National Security Council on 23 December 1981. He felt the need to send a strong signal to the Soviets that it was unacceptable to suppress

* See Inboden (2022, 114) for further discussion showing French and West German reluctance as well.

† This is an example of Type B Coercive Diplomacy. See Continuum of Coercion in Chapter 2.

political dissent in a satellite communist state. Weinberger proposed a near-total embargo that cut exports of oil and gas equipment as well as revoked international licenses for industrial equipment. “The total embargo is the price of intervention. They have already intervened. Let them guess what we are doing next,” the president proclaimed, wishing to exert strong compellent pressure. Reagan made one exception: the American grain program he reinstated back in April 1981. * “We will deliver food provided it reaches the people,” he allowed when listing the numerous sanction efforts for officials to act upon.⁹³ This exception would spark resentment among his European counterparts. Just like the Euromissile affair, for any embargo to have coercive teeth relied on European support. Implementing Weinberger’s recommendation for a near-total embargo hurt the European economy as much as the Soviets. The United States Trade Representative noted, “we will not hurt the Soviets much unless our Allies join us.”

Frustrated with the notion that Europe might try to hedge against another possible confrontation with the Soviet Union, Reagan lashed out at the “chicken littles,” as Reagan bluntly called European leaders, who might break with the United States if the administration applied strong pressure against the Soviets over Poland. “This is the last chance of a lifetime, that this is a revolution started against this damned force.”⁹⁴ The British Foreign Commonwealth Office picked up on Reagan’s determination to use the Poland crisis to hurt the Soviets. “It seems likely that the United States government intends to advance down the path of ‘punishment’ of both the military regime in Poland and the Soviet Union, using economic as well as political levers, whether or not its allies are in the mood to follow suit.”⁹⁵

* Reagan had characterized his decision to lift the grain embargo as a benevolent measure to incentivize the Soviets from interfering with Poland. That gesture had little influence on Soviet decisionmaking towards Poland.

Despite Reagan's bluster and conviction that he could swing American might to solve the crisis in Poland, the coercive power of the United States was tied to the support of its allies. Reagan warned his cabinet, "we should let our Allies know they, too, will pay the price if they don't go along; that we have long memories."⁹⁶ European allies had memories of their own, recalling Reagan lifting the grain embargos earlier in the year. "The perception in Europe was that Reagan's policy did severe damage to Western European companies, whereas the sanctions did not impair US grain trade with the Soviet Union. America's annual exports of manufactured industrial goods to the Soviet Union amounted to some \$300 million, whereas Reagan's measures threatened \$4 billion worth of European contracts related to the construction of the Urengoy pipeline."⁹⁷ Thatcher was reported to decry "attempts to penalize the Soviet Union for the imposition of martial law in Poland are unbalanced," while Britain's deputy trade minister bemoaned that "the burden is not being equally shared" between the United States and Western Europe because the U.S. was still selling grain to the Soviet Union.⁹⁸ Europeans believed the United States was revealing its willingness to sacrifice the interests of Europeans in pursuit of Cold War aims. This was an ominous signal for Europeans already uncomfortable with the U.S. planning on deploying advanced arsenals of intermediate nuclear weapons to the continent.

When Reagan announced his plan to apply sanctions against Poland and "those who aid and abet them" on 24 December 1981, he made clear that he possessed additional measures if the initial set of sanctions did not achieve satisfactory results.⁹⁹ By June of 1982, martial law in Poland persisted despite U.S. coercive measures. "Met to finally decide whether to lift sanctions on pipeline material to the Soviet Union. Cabinet divided," Reagan wrote in his diary after meeting with the National Security Council on 18 June. "I ruled we would not remove sanctions. There hadn't been the slightest move on the Soviets' part to change their evil ways."¹⁰⁰ Reagan

escalated the economic pressure through additional sanctions by restricting the licenses and subsidiaries of American businesses in Europe with ties to the Urengoy pipeline.¹⁰¹ Kengor and Doerner write that Reagan concluded the tense meeting by proclaiming, “Well, they can have their damned pipeline, but not with American equipment and not with American technology!”¹⁰²

The decision proved contentious both within the administration and in Europe. Haig felt slighted when the decision briefing to impose the controversial sanctions occurred while he was traveling for work.* Outcries in Europe against the pipeline sanctions were loud and bitter. “Margaret Thatcher, the president’s strongest overseas supporter, said in the House of Commons, ‘The question is whether one powerful nation can prevent existing contracts being fulfilled; I think it is wrong to do that.’”¹⁰³ Thatcher had warned Reagan against taking bold, independent action over the pipeline sanction. “My fear,” she wrote to Reagan in a letter, “is that further measures taken unilaterally would not carry the Allies with them but would greatly deepen and expose the divisions within the Alliance. That could advance Soviet interest more than your new measures would set them back.”¹⁰⁴ The United States was testing the limits of its relationship with its allies.

George Shultz recalled the tremendous challenge he inherited as the new secretary of state. “The year when negotiations on (INF) would come to a head...in the actual deployment of these sensitive U.S. nuclear weapons on the soil of the five European basing countries (West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands), all of them involved in the pipeline controversy.”¹⁰⁵ Shultz believed the pipeline sanctions were not worth the risk to the missile program. His prior experience as the secretary of treasury shaped his pessimistic view of

* His colleagues contended the NSC meeting followed the regular schedule Paul Kengor and Patricia Doerner, *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007), 182.

economic sanctions and “light switch diplomacy.” Countries trying to turn on and off sanctions “wind up damaging its own trade more than that of the target country” by becoming an unreliable global trade partner.^{*} Shultz evoked the plight of the American farmer to help persuade Reagan that a compromise should be made on the pipeline sanctions. He reminded the president how U.S. soybean farmers never recovered global market shares after the Nixon administration imposed export controls on soybeans.[†] The pipeline sanctions were becoming more than a headache with the European. The sanctions were a long-term liability for U.S. economic competition against the Soviet Union and a risk to the American heartland.

George Shultz made resolving the pipeline controversy his top priority. He facilitated a deal through careful negotiations with his European counterparts to lift the sanctions in return for trade agreements that reduced Soviet access to technology. Reagan’s diary on 9 November 1982 noted, “Shultz has worked out the agreement with our allies re the Soviets – trade, credits etc. This is more effective than our pipeline sanctions so I’m going to lift those sanctions.” Reagan presented a favorable impression of his sanctions program, “The agreement is what we tried before the sanctions – the sanctions have done their job.” His validating reflections overlooked the damage caused to U.S.-European relations by exercising coercive diplomacy over the Poland issue.

^{*} Shultz goes on to deride the misperception that “individual trades can be turned on and off like a light switch to induce changes in the domestic and foreign policies of a host government. As a result, the position of U.S. goods in the world markets is eroding as our trading partners, increasingly, see evidence that we cannot be counted on as a reliable supplier. Increasingly, when the diplomat flicks the switch, the light will not go on.” George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 137.

[†] The export controls were imposed in June 1973. After four months, the Nixon administration lifted the sanctions, though the damage to the U.S. soybean industry lasted for decades as other nations, including Brazil, became significant competitors in the soybean market. See Jonathan Coppess, “A Brief Review of the Consequential Seventies,” *Farmdoc Daily*, University of Illinois, May 30, 2019, <https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2019/05/a-brief-review-of-the-consequential-seventies.html>.

By the end of 1982, the Reagan administration had initiated several conditions of coercive diplomacy. This included confirming *objectives* with the dual-track diplomacy, *establishing terms of settlement* with the zero-zero option, and demonstrating a *willingness to accept risk and costs* after Reagan's assassination attempt. The Reagan administration understood the importance of maintaining *international support* to implement the dual-track strategy, but destabilized the transatlantic relationship during the Poland crisis. Internal tensions within Reagan's cabinet exposed a *lack of unity of leadership* within the administration throughout the first two years of the administration. Reagan was already on his second National Security Advisor and had replaced Al Haig as Secretary of State just two years into his presidency. Though George Shultz and Judge Clark proved more effective than their predecessors at aligning themselves with the president, Cap Weinberger and the Department of Defense remained in opposition to many of the diplomatic initiatives endorsed by the State Department. The INF negotiations in Geneva failed to produce any substantive agreement, but the collaborative gesture by Nitze and Kvitsinskiy demonstrated that the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of outlining some sort of agreement over the Euromissiles. But the United States had yet to make sufficient progress on the external conditions of coercive diplomacy against the Soviets. This included *establishing a fear of escalation*, *building a sense of urgency*, or *asymmetry of motivation towards the objective*. Those seeds were planted in the first two years of the Euromissile affair and would bear fruit the following year with the arrival of the PII's and GLCMs in Europe.

PART II: THE YEAR OF THE MISSILE (1983)

Nineteen eighty-three was a critical year for condition setting in the Euromissile affair as the United States sought to increase coercive pressure against the Soviet Union and energize

arms control negotiations. The decisive point of the U.S. strategy in the crisis was deploying the Pershing II missiles in West Germany. Bonn was not willing to be the only state in Europe to host the new set of American missiles, thus necessitating the Reagan administration to preserve the support of the U.K., Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium to receive missile systems as well.* The Soviets used every lever possible to disrupt the U.S. missile deployment, from direct political pressure to military power and efforts to foment public unrest within Western Europe. Those efforts almost succeeded as mass demonstrations opposing the American missile deployments created serious doubt as to whether host countries would honor their pledge to base PIIs and GLCMs on their soil. Without the cooperation of these host countries, the dual-track strategy would fizzle, and the United States fails to set the necessary conditions, especially a *sense of urgency* (Condition 6) and *fear of escalation* (Condition 7), to compel the Soviets to dismantle the SS-20s threat.

I focus on three key events that occurred in 1983 that had the most influence on condition setting. First, I examine the introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative by the Reagan administration in March 1983. Second, I analyze the impact of U.S. coercive power on international partners during the European elections of March and June 1983. Next, I explore how the U.S. invasion of Grenada damaged U.S. efforts to apply coercion in Eurasia. These three events – a strategic missile shield in space, foreign democratic elections, and a brief military intervention in the Caribbean – have a common thread: they all nearly undercut U.S. coercive

* Based on the range limitations of the Pershing IIs, only West Germany would receive the more threatening intermediate range ballistic missiles. The other countries would receive the longer range, but slower flying, Gryphon ground launch cruise missiles.

power for the Euromissile affair. This is because the U.S. power to coerce was interwoven with European support and 1983 turned out to be a trying year for transatlantic relations.

Thankfully, the year ended with the successful implementation of the dual-track decision.* When PIIs and GLCMs arrived in Europe in November 1983, the conditions of coercive diplomacy were successfully improved in favor of the United States. All the Soviets were able to do was order their negotiators to walk out of INF and START talks in protest as the coercive power in the Euromissile affair shifted in favor of the United States.

SDI and the Euromissiles

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) played a prominent role in the Euromissile affair even though the program was not designed or intended to protect Europe against intermediate-range nuclear weapons.† SDI impacted the calculus of both allies and the adversary in the Euromissile affair. First, the advent of SDI induced European allies' support to the PII and GLCM deployments out of fear that the U.S. resolve to defend Europe would weaken once its ICBM shield became active. Second, SDI generated a *sense of uncertainty* and *fear of escalation* in Moscow to the future nuclear balance of power in the Cold War. Therefore, the defense initiative intended to protect the U.S. against strategic missiles also complemented coercive diplomacy efforts against intermediate-range nuclear threats in Europe as well.

Reagan announced the controversial and alarming decision to pursue the SDI just two weeks after the president decried the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” in another provocative

* Chance had as much to do with the year ending without catastrophe as actions by the Reagan administration. This includes the Oko satellite early warning incident on 26 September 1983 when Soviet Colonel Stanislav Petrov decided to ignore missile launch detection system. See Sewell Chan, “Stanislav Petrov, Soviet Officer Who Helped Avert Nuclear War, Is Dead at 77,” *The New York Times*, September 18, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world/europe/stanislav-petrov-nuclear-war-dead.html>.

† SDI was also colloquially called the ‘Star Wars’ program.

speech.¹⁰⁶ These two speeches set an early tone for 1983, where many American and Europeans continued to view President Reagan as a hawkish cowboy capable of provoking a fight with the Soviets. Many of the administration's critics and members of the scientific community opposed the pursuit of SDI.¹⁰⁷ Even leading cabinet members of Reagan's administration opposed the initiative. In a rare instance of foreign policy cohesion, Cap Weinberger and George Shultz united in their common opposition to SDI. "Both [Weinberger and Shultz] agreed that the SDI announcement would overturn decades of strategic doctrine, rattle the allies with fears that America was retracting its nuclear umbrella, and violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."¹⁰⁸ The *leadership* was certainly not *united* (Condition 4) within the Reagan administration on the merits of pursuing SDI.

The initiative was propelled by a small group of policy advisors within the Reagan administration as President Reagan wrestled with his personal opposition to the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction.* Reagan was genuinely passionate about trying to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. Shultz would later recall, "I could see the depth of his feelings about this issue, his abhorrence of reliance on the ability to 'wipe each other out' as the means of deterring war, and, of course, I could agree that if we could learn how to defend ourselves, that would be wonderful."¹⁰⁹ But Shultz was kept out of the loop during the early discussions on SDI. It is noteworthy that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a prominent role in the decision to pursue SDI, the Secretaries of Defense and State were kept out of initial decisions to pursue the

* The Joint Chiefs of Staff met with President Reagan and Bud McFarlane to discuss missile defense technology on 11 February 1983 in the cabinet room at the White House. After the meeting, Reagan wrote in his diary that out of the meeting "came a super idea...What if we tell the world we want to protect our people, not avenge them; that we're going to embark on a program of research to come up with a defensive weapon that could make nuclear weapons obsolete?" Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 130. Also see Robert McFarlane, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 229.

program. The SDI decision was of the few instances where senior military officers played a direct role in formulating policy during the Euromissile affair. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins, played a prominent role in advocating SDI along with the National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane. There was an opportunity to gather input from experts across the U.S. government. But the Reagan administration already struggled with leaks. Reagan administration officials weighed whether interagency leaks were a greater risk than proceeding without pivotal input from agencies. Weinberger and Shultz were only notified of the decision to embark on developing the missile defense program 24 hours before the president's speech to the world.

Policymakers considered a wide array of questions in debating the *risks and costs* (Condition 2) of pursuing SDI. If the program faltered, the credibility of U.S. technology might drop in the eyes of the world. SDI also appeared to be a violation of Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with the Soviets. SDI could be seen as a modern Maginot Line that might ultimately fail to defend the nation despite any national pride or major financial investment in the program. Announcing SDI could set a "window of opportunity clock" for the Soviets to strike before SDI became fully operational, which was expected to take over a decade. Administration officials needed to decide when the U.S. share sensitive information since this announcement introduced significant policy shift implications. Officials needed to consider whether the U.S. government should preview SDI to the Soviets to moderate a fear of escalation. Condition 7 of coercive diplomacy, *the target's fear of unacceptable escalation*, is not an effect that should be applied unceasingly. Generating too much fear of escalation can trigger an excessive and rash response. Presenting SDI in a callous manner to the Soviets could have a boomerang effect: instead of a safer world, it could prompt the Soviets to strike preemptively. The debates over SDI would

continue throughout the affair, and the program would remain controversial for years. Reagan followed two conditions of coercive diplomacy: a *willingness to accept the risks and costs* (Condition 2) and *strong leadership* (Condition 4) that eventually improved the *unity* within his administration).

One of the most pressing questions was whether the Allies supported the program. Europe already had concerns about the will and reliability of the United States to defend NATO in Europe. Many presidential advisors, including Weinberger, Shultz, and McFarlane, advocated notifying European allies ahead of the speech, but the president refused on numerous occasions. Even Richard Perle, an outspoken pessimist to accommodating allied needs, made “an impassioned plea on behalf of the allies and their rights to know about this sea change in U.S. nuclear policy and the importance of coordination.” Reagan dismissed all suggestions to forewarn European allies. “Nope, no way. I’m going to be the one who breaks the news on this,” Reagan asserted.¹¹⁰ Reagan sent a letter to Thatcher on the same day he made the announcement public. He preempted several questions that his NATO colleagues were expected to ask: “Are we going to a fortress America? Do we intend to violate the ABM Treaty in any way or depart from our commitments to allies? Are we going for a first-strike capability? All of these notions are of course utter nonsense.”¹¹¹

Reagan’s private assurances were not enough to comfort the British government’s concerns. One official advised Thatcher, “despite the President’s assertions to the contrary, there is therefore likely to be considerable speculation that the United States is retreating into a ‘Fortress America’ mentality,” concluding, “despite the careful drafting of the President’s speech, it appears that the US Administration has taken insufficient account of our legitimate interests.” An antimissile system that only protected against intercontinental missiles left those

on the European continent without any active defensive protection. A classified assessment by British Ministry of Defence concluded:

“If a completely effective defence against strategic ballistic missile defences could be achieved, it would no longer be possible to deter exchanges within the European theatre by the threat of escalation to the strategic level. There is therefore a prospect of a nuclear exchange limited to Europe, with the territory of both the Soviet Union and the United States remaining immune from attack.”¹¹²

The new program ended up creating a double-edged effect for setting the conditions of coercive diplomacy. On the one hand, SDI reinforced NATO interest in hosting U.S. missiles later in the fall, which contributed to the need to create a *sense of urgency* and *fear of escalation* with the Soviet Union.* On the other hand, the advent of SDI damaged European trust and confidence in the transatlantic relationship despite U.S. assurances and guarantees. European allies saw the PIIs and GLCMs as the only way to fill the deterrence gap created by SDI. The American missile deployments to Europe became a necessity to ensure self-preservation. Having advanced tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe would mitigate the prospect of Europe becoming the nuclear battleground for the two superpowers.

European Votes of Confidence

European public support for the dual-track decision was tested between March and June of 1983 when three of the NATO countries scheduled to host missiles headed to the polls for national elections. These tests had real consequences for U.S. coercive power. The Reagan

* Not only did it contribute to the European willingness to host missiles on the continent, SDI became a coercive tool to instill fear of escalation on its own. “SDI continued to terrify the Kremlin because Moscow, bedazzled by American technology, believed it could work. A secret GRU (Soviet military intelligence) assessment concluded that SDI could destroy 90 percent of Soviet strategic missiles, whether launched from land or submarines, and that it posed ‘a serious threat to the Soviet Union.’” The Soviets saw SDI as step towards gaining a first strike advantage over the Soviet Union and erode the foundation of Mutually Assured Destruction as a stabilizing concept. See William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 263.

administration and the rest of NATO paid close attention to these elections because several of the challengers to the incumbent leaders in West Germany, the U.K., and Italy were running on platforms opposing the dual-track decision. The ability of the Reagan administration to carry out its Euromissile affair strategy lay in the hand of the citizens of these three key democratic allies. If these populations desired, they could elect leaders who campaigned on scuttling the NATO agreement to deploy American missiles to Europe. The Soviets watched these elections closely as well and mounted aggressive disinformation campaigns to foment public antagonism towards pro-dual-track candidates.¹¹³

Germany was the first to undergo national elections on 6 March 1983. Two parties challenged Helmut Kohl's party for parliamentary control by running campaigns opposing the Dual-Track Decision. Kohl's Christian Democratic Union party ran in support of the dual-track decision and attractive economic policies. Kohl's party won with one of their strongest margins in decades, but many observers assessed that voters cared more about Kohl's economic stance than missile support.¹¹⁴ West Germany's defense minister acknowledged to the British secretary of state soon after the elections, "the German election had been dominated by the competence of each of the parties in handling the economy rather than by the INF issue." He also stated, despite Kohl's party performing well in the elections, the majority of West Germanys were "clearly against the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles." But when Kohl remained in power because of the outcome of the election, the U.S. coercion strategy remained active. Like Thatcher, Kohl's administration recognized the strategic importance of fulfilling the dual-track decision despite public sentiment. Both governments foresaw that "it seemed unlikely that there would be an arms control agreement before the deployment date for the cruise missiles."¹¹⁵ If the

opposition parties won in their respective elections, these key NATO allies would withdraw their support for the missile deployments.

The United Kingdom was next to face national elections in early June of 1983. The Labor Party ran on a platform opposing Thatcher's missile policies. Political opponents advocated for alternative approaches, including rejecting the American missiles, softening the British bargaining positions with the Soviets over arms control negotiations, or mandating that the U.K. retain joint control of any American missiles based within Britain.¹¹⁶ When the votes were counted, Thatcher's Tory party gained 397 seats in parliament, the largest party victory in the U.K. since 1945, while the Labour Party experienced the worst election outcome in over sixty years.¹¹⁷ It was a decisive signal in support of the missile deployments.

The last election that held sway over the U.S. coercive power was Italy at the end of June 1983. This election would determine whether a non-nuclear NATO member would join West Germany in hosting American missiles. Belgium and the Netherlands (the other two non-nuclear participants in the dual-track plan) were non-committal on when they would permit American cruise missiles in their countries. Therefore the dual-track plan, and the U.S. strategy to apply coercive diplomacy, became beholden to who the Italian people elected into power on 26 June 1983.¹¹⁸ The elections proved favorable to the United States as the Italian people decided not to empower the party that ran in opposition to the dual-track decision. Instead, Italy elected a new prime minister who supported the dual-track decision. Reagan described the new Italian Prime Minister as "a different kind of Italian official. He's a socialist but totally anti-communist," who was very supportive of the United States and the Pershing II missile deployments.¹¹⁹

With this final election complete in June of 1983, the dual-track strategy that the United States was reliant on passed all three tests for European public support. "The Soviet

disinformation campaign had failed to fracture the alliance.”¹²⁰ Now the Reagan administration just needed to keep the transatlantic relationship together until November, when the missiles were set to be deployed.

Urgent Fury on the Eve of the Missile Deployment

The conditions of coercive diplomacy were coming together nicely for the Reagan administration in the summer of 1983, but the fall proved to be a wild card season for the Cold War, as crises unfolded from all corners of the world. Disasters involved 269 civilian passengers on a Korean Airlines flight over the Sea of Japan, Marines in Lebanon, even from clouds over North Dakota.* Protests raged across Europe. Many of these events were outside the control of the Reagan administration.

One of the crises was a deliberate operation carried out by the Reagan administration in the Caribbean. On 25 October, Reagan authorized Operation URGENT FURY, a military invasion to rescue American medical students in Grenada. More than an exercise in hostage recovery, the mission was a deliberate choice by President Reagan to demonstrate American military power and to block communism in the Western Hemisphere. However, the invasion of Grenada drew fury from NATO allies in Europe weary of any use of military force. The surprise U.S. operation almost collapsed European support for the dual-track decision just weeks before the missiles were set to arrive in the U.K., West Germany, and Italy.

Reagan used the invasion of Grenada to show Moscow that the U.S. was willing to use lethal force to protect its citizens and prevent communist expansionism. George Will wrote in

* KAL 007 flight was shot down on 1 September 1983. The barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon occurred on 23 October 1983. Clouds over North Dakota were the catalyst for the Soviet nuclear launch early warning system failure on 26 September 1983.

Newsweek after the invasion, “U.S. soldiers’ boot prints on Grenada’s soil have done more than the MX [experimental ICBM] will do to make U.S. power credible and peace secure...The boot prints prove that the United States will not only procure sophisticated weapon systems but also has recovered the will to use the weapon on which its security rests: the man with a rifle.”* The invasion also served domestic political purposes by showing strength days after the Beirut tragedy. Though the invasion revealed many deficiencies in the U.S. military joint force, the operation achieved both the military and political objectives set forth by the Reagan administration.† The real accomplishments of Grenada were mostly symbolic. Strategically, removing the communist threat on Grenada weighed far less in strategic value than the effort to remove the Soviet SS-20s that threatened Western Europe.

The Reagan administration’s handling of the Grenada operation was an unforced error in the U.S. relationship with its European allies, especially the United Kingdom. The root of the issue was the idea of consultation as co-equal partners with equal interests. Distrust and unease became an unshakable concern for Western European leaders over the reliability of Reagan as a close security partner. The notion of trust over control of nuclear weapons and strategic decisions had been festering since the ‘Fortress America’ debate that came with the Strategic Defense Initiative. By September, American scientists indicated increased confidence in the technological viability of SDI, leading to the possibility of initial testing. Any testing of antiballistic missile

* Quote of George Will in Newsweek taken from Simon Miles, *Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), 77–78. The MX was the experimental intercontinental missile system later known as the LGM-118 “Peacemaker.”

† The invasion of Grenada was an eye-opening experience for the branches of the U.S. military that exposed the challenges of operating as a joint force. The issues between Army, Navy, and Air Force elements in the Grenada invasion led to the requirement of joint service for senior U.S. military officers in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. For more on the operational challenges of the invasion, see Ronald Cole, “Operation URGENT FURY: The Planning and Execution of the Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October - 2 November 1983” (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).

systems was likely to be seen as a violation of the existing U.S. - Soviet ABM Treaty. Trying to renegotiate the ABM treaty risked roping in the two nuclear powers in Western Europe: U.K. and France. As the U.K. embassy in Washington warned London, “U.S. exploration of this area of technology is of direct concern to us: and the need for due consultation with us about the announcement of any further steps.”¹²¹

As the political situation in Grenada deteriorated in late October, the U.K. embassy in Washington had been reassured “there would be consultation if the Americans decided any further steps.”¹²² But this was not the reality. Thatcher even called Reagan to consult on the invasion while U.S. troops were en route to their objectives. Still, Reagan would not share with Thatcher that he had already launched the invasion. “She’s upset & doesn’t think we should do it. I couldn’t tell her it had started. This was one secret we really managed to keep.” Reagan was in a difficult position that policymakers regularly face – he had to select what he felt was the ‘less-worst’ choice when faced with no universally satisfactory options. He accepted some risk in his European relationships by not telling allies like Thatcher ahead of time. He may have underestimated how damaging it was to keep Thatcher completely in the dark about the imminent assault.

Taking a unilateral approach towards Grenada almost cost Reagan the Euromissile campaign. There were many reasons for Thatcher’s opposition to the U.S. invasion. First, Reagan had been reluctant to support Thatcher over the Falkland Islands war months earlier, which left the Prime Minister with a feeling of betrayal.* Second, Grenada was any Caribbean

* The official U.S. position on the Falklands War was another example of misalignment between the Pentagon and the Department of State. The Secretary of Defense was very supportive, but Alexander Haig was publicly opposed the war. Reagan demurred before finally showing support, but it was a poor moment in the ‘special relationship’ between the U.S. and the U.K. See Inboden, *The Peacemaker*, 148.

nation: it was part of the British Commonwealth, where over 200 British citizens resided. Any invasion put British citizens at risk, and there was an expectation that London would be granted the opportunity to evacuate its citizens before any possible military operation by the United States. That never occurred.

Lastly, while Reagan was thinking about American medical students, the possibility of communist expansion in the western hemisphere, and the opportunity to rally domestic support in the invasion of Grenada, Thatcher was thinking about the Euromissiles. She wrote to Reagan on the morning of the 25th, before she learned of the order to invade,

“I ask you to consider this in the context of our wider East/West relations and of the fact that we will be having in the next few days to present to our Parliament and people the siting of Cruise missiles in this country. I must ask you to think most carefully about these points. I cannot conceal that I am deeply disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for my advice. I have set it out and hope that even at this late stage, you will take it into account before events are irrevocable.”¹²³

But it was too late. “Thatcher found it especially painful because it came just weeks before the American nuclear missiles would be deployed in the U.K., which she had spent much political capital to support. To Thatcher, this felt more like a personal betrayal than a policy difference.”¹²⁴ Fortunately (as another instance of *chance*), none of the British citizens were injured during the invasion, and the operation ended swiftly. Thatcher eventually came around to modestly support the invasion similarly to how Reagan eventually supported the Falkland War, but that was not a guaranteed outcome.

Pershing II and GLCM Deployments in November 1983

The Grenada invasion exacerbated an already tense political situation in Europe due to the upcoming missile deployments. Record-breaking protests in Europe had been building for ten days just as the Reagan administration prepared for the invasion. One of many demonstrations

was a human chain of 200,000 people that spanned 65 miles from U.S. Forces European headquarters to American Army barracks at Neu Ulm, which was to be one of three Pershing II missile sites in Germany.¹²⁵

The participating NATO members of the dual-track decision hesitated to continue with the missile deployments because of the Grenada invasion. The operation's timing had been highly counterproductive. The British Cabinet Secretary noted the "lack of consultation and of American failure to take account of the British views in the Grenada context...[raised] the question of the 'adequacy' of the arrangements for joint consultation on the use of United States nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom was being revived as an active political issue... just at the moment when cruise missiles were about to arrive here."¹²⁶

Chancellor Kohl also struggled to maintain political support for the missile deployments in West Germany after Grenada. He would tell Thatcher, "the Americans seemed to combine the military power of 1983 with the categories of thought of Theodore Roosevelt. But time had moved on. The United States no longer understood the psychology of the rest of the world."¹²⁷

These were the same two leaders who, just months earlier, had become determined to improve the transatlantic relationship. Thatcher had told Kohl privately in April she wanted to "regenerate the American/European alliance for the whole world to see." Kohl had agreed, stating, "The alliance must be seen to be alive and strong... it must display this with regard to relations with the Soviet Union."¹²⁸ After Grenada, however, Thatcher and Kohl had to weigh their situation carefully. They concluded, "in light of events in Grenada, we ... arranged a Parliamentary debate on INF deployment. The programme of missile deliveries had been adjusted."¹²⁹ Italy, the United Kingdom, and West Germany all felt the need to hold last-minute parliamentary referendums to validate the commitments to host U.S. missiles.

The first ally to vote on whether to follow through with the missile deployments was the British parliament on 1 November. Despite the clamor of public protests against the cruise missiles, members of Parliament rallied behind Thatcher's government in a strong vote of support for the missile deployments. "The 650-member House of Commons voted 362-218 Monday in favor of placing the first 16 missiles at Greenham Common air base as part of the West's response to the Soviet Union's medium-range SS-20s in eastern Europe."¹³⁰ The first cruise missile launchers arrived two weeks later. The New York Times reported on 14 November that Britain's Defense Secretary had to shout "to make himself heard over howls of protest from opposition legislators, he said, "I have to inform the House that earlier today the first cruise missiles were delivered by air."¹³¹ On 16 November, the Italian parliament voted. The Italian prime minister's socialist government held together, voting to support the missile deployments with a 351-219 victory with one abstention.¹³² The favorable elections in Italy and the U.K. were important achievements for the dual-track plan, but the last country to hold votes also happened to be the most significant.

Moscow cared most for how the West German elections would turn because the system that provided a true first strike threat to the Soviet Union was the Pershing IIs slated to be stationed in West Germany. * The Soviet Union concentrated its anti-nuclear propaganda campaign on the German public. The public pressure against the missile deployment became a dramatic political issue for Kohl's government. The parliamentary vote was pushed to the very last minute. "President Reagan said that the Germans had just told him privately that they

* The cruise missiles slated for Italy and the U.K. were the complementary nuclear component to the dual-track plan. Flying low and slow, they were an idea second strike weapon but the PIIs had the characteristics to change the balance of power in Eurasia.

would be delaying their Bundestag debate until 21 November. This delay caused great concern.”¹³³ German legislators debated for 26 hours before finally approving with just a 60-vote margin, 286 to 226, with one absentia, mostly along party lines. *The Washington Post* reported, “the dramatic vote...reflected the trenchant conflict between loyalty to NATO and fear of the nuclear arms race that has bitterly divided the country's two major parties, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union and the opposition Social Democrats.”¹³⁴

The first installment of Pershing II missiles landed within 24 hours of the German vote. The same day, Soviet negotiators dramatically walked out of arms control negotiations in Geneva. It was a feeble attempt to demonstrate resolve, though the performative act was little surprise to members of NATO. The anti-nuclear protest movements across Europe that the Soviet Union had been instigating dissolved after the U.S. missiles arrived too. Richard Perle recalled, “for years we'd had demonstrations against the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing 2's and hardly a word about the Soviet SS-20. The day the Russians walked out of the talks, the demonstrators threw down their “stop the US deployment” signs And like that the peace movement was transformed from an engine of Soviet policy into an opponent to Soviet policy. It was a disastrous Soviet miscalculation. We never had it easier than in the aftermath of the Soviet walkout.”¹³⁵

The Reagan administration succeeded in retaining the support of NATO allies for the dual-track decision despite the extensive strain on the transatlantic relationship over trust issues stemming from the SDI program and Grenada. The outcome was a powerful moment for the Reagan administration and the NATO alliance. A Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled “INF: The Prospects for West European Deployment and the USSR's Reactions” noted the importance of ensuring the missile deployment continued as scheduled. “It will help thwart

longstanding Soviet effort to decouple US and West European defense...[and] that Soviet blandishments, threats, and support of Western anti-INF groups have failed to block the beginning of the NATO program.”¹³⁶ The outcome happened to be a success story, but too much of the result depended on chance. The Year of the Missiles reveals just how interconnected U.S. coercive power is tied to the support and decisions of its allies and partners.

By the end of 1983, the Reagan administration had addressed almost all of the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy. Internally, the Reagan administration had established its objectives (Condition 1), demonstrated a willingness to accept costs and risks (Condition 2), and despite numerous missteps and impediments, held together varying levels of domestic and international support (Condition 3). Where the leadership lacked unity, Reagan provided strength through his determination to abolish nuclear weapons (Condition 4). The zero-zero policy announced in November 1981 established the foundation for U.S. terms of settlement (Condition 5) in arms control negotiations.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target's fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 6. The internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions of coercive diplomacy.

Those conditions, however, had thus far proven insufficient to compel the Soviets to change their behavior through negotiations in Geneva. The arrival of the Ground Launch Cruise

Missiles and Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles at the end of 1983 added the missing external conditions of creating a sense of urgency (Condition 6) and fear of escalation (Condition 7). The only condition that remained uncertain was also one of the most important: establishing asymmetry of motivation over the objective in favor of the coercer (Condition 8). Convincing the Soviets that the United States possessed the intractable determination to eliminate the SS-20 threat would rely on a little chance, patience, a lot of diplomacy, and direct talks between Reagan and his Soviet counterpart. The Geneva and Reykjavik summits were the two most important events in finalizing the conditions of coercive diplomacy for the Reagan administration for the Euromissiles.

PART III: FROM GENEVA TO REYKJAVIK

After the fall of 1983, the Euromissile saga settled down, becoming less like a crisis and more like long-term negotiations and bargaining. There were certainly more crises to come for Reagan's second term in office, but those incidents mostly revolved around a wide array of foreign policy issues, including efforts to support anti-communist forces in Central America, conduct anti-terrorism campaigns in Libya, arm the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan, and protect U.S. interests in the Iran-Iraq War.

Little transpired in 1984 with the SS-20 issue. General Secretary Yuri Andropov, who was largely absent from public engagements during the turmoil at the end of 1983, proved to be terminally ill. Andropov died in February 1984. His successor, Konstantin Chernenko, became the third General Secretary to lead the Soviet Union during Reagan's presidency. Chernenko died 13 months after taking office without making a substantive impact on the Euromissile problem.

All that would change after March of 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Reagan met the newly installed Soviet leader when he joined Gorbachev for a summit in Geneva in November of 1985. The Euromissiles and nuclear disarmament took center stage in their conversations. Though the two leaders would develop a unique bond in Geneva, they did not settle the Euromissile issue. More time was needed to come to an agreement.

They met again in December 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland, for a 48-hour high-stakes game of coercion and diplomatic poker. Reagan nearly achieved his greatest policy aim when Gorbachev offered to eliminate nuclear weapons on all sides if Reagan abandoned his pursuit of SDI. The talks collapsed after Reagan insisted on keeping SDI and the two leaders left Iceland emptyhanded. Reagan almost attained a historic disarmament agreement. Gorbachev strained to persuade Reagan to abandon SDI, which had become a fixation for the Soviets. Though Reykjavik was characterized as a failure by the media and government officials, Reagan had incidentally achieved a major achievement for the Euromissile campaign. In holding firm on SDI despite the sweetest of inducements offered by the Soviets, Reagan helped solidify the final condition of coercive diplomacy for the United States: asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer.*

Horizontal Escalation Ahead of Geneva

The Geneva and Reykjavik summits came about in large part due to the effective applications of coercive diplomacy by the Reagan administration during his first term as president. The Soviet Union was facing severe economic pressure. Moscow's grip on the

* Though none of the conditions were found sufficient by Alexander George and Robert Art, the two necessary conditions were 7) the target's fear of unacceptable escalation and 8) asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer. Prior to Reykjavik, the United States had yet to establish condition 8 as the coercer in the Euromissile Crisis.

Warsaw Pact was beginning to weaken. Meanwhile, the recession that plagued the United States early in the Reagan administration was improving. A British foreign policy assessment in January 1984 noted the strategic value of encouraging U.S. economic growth.

“One of the West’s greatest assets, particularly as seen from the Communist countries, has been its apparently effortless capacity to generate wealth and technological advance. One of the sad effects of the recession has been the temporary loss of the political confidence flowing from this capacity. A sustained, repeat sustained, US economic recovery is therefore critical, politically as well as economically. Our advice to our western partners and our own people should be Guizot’s, ‘Enrichissez-vous.’”¹³⁷

While the United States and its NATO allies rebounded economically, the Soviet economy continued to stumble. The campaign led by the United States to build a sense of urgency in Moscow to negotiate was bearing fruit. Gorbachev discovered after assuming power that the Soviet Union was spending an unsustainable 20 to 30 percent of its gross domestic product on defense spending. Soviet sponsorship of fledgling communist regimes across the globe was costing up to \$6 billion a year. That cost was exacerbated by deliberate efforts of the United States to apply horizontal escalation against the Soviet Union. Though not directly tied to the Euromissiles, this effort supported Condition 7: the target state’s fear of unacceptable escalation.

In February 1985, the United States expanded its efforts to support proxy forces to fight communism in what became known as the Reagan Doctrine.¹³⁸ Notable applications of the Reagan Doctrine include support to rebels in Nicaragua and El Salvador, the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan, which were examples of horizontal escalation that imposed costs and burdens on the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Inboden notes, “targeting the peripheries of the Soviet empire, instead of a direct showdown between American and Red Army troops in the Fulda Gap, created more space for Reagan to reach out to Moscow while ensuring his diplomacy had teeth.”¹³⁹ But

the Reagan Doctrine also gave way to grave ethical and political controversies for the administration with the Iran-Contra affair, which severely damaged Reagan's presidency. Efforts to apply horizontal escalation to support Condition 7 (target's fear of unacceptable escalation) need to be carefully weighed against U.S. objectives (Condition 1) and the administration's willingness to accept risks and costs (Condition 2).

Reagan Meets his Counterpart

When Gorbachev agreed to meet Reagan in Geneva at the end of 1985, there was tremendous public attention on the historic tête-à-tête. Summits between heads of the state offer dramatic public appeal. After years of arms control negotiations between representatives and diplomats, the meeting of the U.S. president with the Soviet general secretary offered hope of a groundbreaking achievement. The lead National Security Council staff director for arms control negotiations, Jack Matlock, helped organize the summit. He recalled, "Nixon and Brezhnev had unwittingly made summitry in times of tension more difficult than it should have been. The public had been conditioned to think that the principal objective of summit meetings was to sign agreements."^{*}

Both Reagan and Gorbachev were under pressure to return home with some sort of accomplishment. "Neither the American president nor the Soviet general secretary wanted to go into a meeting that would be considered a failure."¹⁴⁰ The White House tried to tamp down expectations that the Geneva summit should produce a firm agreement. Previous staff analysis by the White House concluded that summits were risky endeavors. A memo from May 1983 to

^{*} Jack Matlock was a career Foreign Service Officer who served as U.S. ambassador to the Czechoslovakia from 1981 to 1983 and would become the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991. See Jack Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 35.

Judge Clark noted, “the record of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being merely unnecessary to being nearly disastrous.” The 1961 Vienna summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev led the Soviets to believe that the U.S. president “could be pushed around, and the result was the Berlin Wall and later the Cuban Missile Crisis.”¹⁴¹ Geneva would certainly be a risk politically and diplomatically, but President Reagan was willing to accept those risks (Condition 2). He had been waiting years for this moment.*

There were reasons to engage with the Soviet leader directly. Despite all the methods of engagement with the Soviet Union, there was a missing element of personal connection between the two governments. Paul Nitze’s Walk in the Woods in 1982 was the closest the two sides had come to some sort of true compromise, and that was only achieved after the two lead negotiators met in a personal and candid manner. Thus far in his presidency, Reagan had engaged with all his Soviet counterparts through personal correspondence, public diplomacy, and via envoys or representatives. Simon Miles observed, “Soviet policymakers only read excerpts of Reagan’s speeches – usually truncated to feature the most aggressive passages.”¹⁴² Reagan often came across as a nuclear cowboy and war hawk. Reagan’s personal exchanges with first Brezhnev, then Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev were certainly helpful in nudging the relationship closer (or keeping it from growing too far apart). But it is always difficult to understand a person by trying to interpret correspondence. Reagan needed to break the rhetoric and connect with Gorbachev personally. Handwritten letters are helpful, but face-to-face communication is powerful. Reagan clearly understood this when he described the fictional moment between Jim

* Reagan’s advisors also spent months preparing the former actor for each of his sessions with Gorbachev. The president rehearsed extensively and gained a strong grasp on each topic.

and Ivan, along with their wives Sally and Anya, taking shelter together from the rain, sharing notes about their children, and not arguing over differences.¹⁴³ Reagan gave that speech in January of 1984, weeks after Soviet negotiators walked out of arms control talks. This was one of his many efforts to signal his receptiveness to personal dialogue.

When the fateful opportunity came in November 1985, the press came out in full force. Reporters sought to scrutinize every move. Critics pointed to the 20-year age difference between the elder American president and his younger Soviet counterpart. President Reagan scored opening points in the media for coming out to greet Gorbachev without his coat on the cold Swiss morning, helping Gorbachev up the stairs, while the younger Gorbachev looked feeble, bundled in a long overcoat.* The summit became a public spectacle for the world to watch.

President Reagan and Gorbachev “hit it off well” in their first meeting alone, which ran for nearly an hour longer than the twenty minutes allotted.[†] When the two delegations met as a group for more substantive meetings, topics ranged from the Soviet war in Afghanistan to Central America and arms control. When the two sides attempted to convey their points on SDI, the mood shifted from a constructive atmosphere to combative and terse. One U.S. official in attendance recalled Gorbachev becoming “very violent now, loud, many gestures, reddened face, pointing” while trying to convey his opposition to SDI and the arms race it was destined to provoke.¹⁴⁴ Reagan tried to counter with appeals to find ways to rid all sides of the need for Mutually Assured Destruction. He argued, “if a defensive system is found, we would prefer to sit

* Shultz recalled in his memoir, “In the photos, Gorbachev – in topcoat and brown fedora – looked older than the president.” See *Turmoil and Triumph*, 600.

[†] As quoted in Shultz 600. The official transcript reflects that President Reagan just states “I would like to propose that we (Reagan & Gorbachev) walk together now. [At 3:44 pm, the President and the General Secretary left for a short walk. Others moved to a smaller room and continued the conversation.]” See “Geneva (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 2nd Session Memo of Conversation,” November 19, 1985, Archive, Reagan Library, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/109208>.

down and get rid of nuclear weapons and with them, the threat of war.”¹⁴⁵ The meeting was hitting an impasse. Neither side was willing to back off their fundamental positions. Reagan’s team had anticipated the possibility of this moment and decided to reset the conversation by borrowing a play from Nitze. “We get along pretty well talking alone,” Shultz recalled Reagan stating, and proposed the two go for a walk – alone.¹⁴⁶ There was a fireplace at a nearby pool house where the two could speak together privately.

The gesture to break away from their foreign ministers and policy advisors achieved the intended effect. The atmosphere of their conversation transformed from argumentative and charged to collaborative and sincere. “During their brief walk from the villa at Fleur d’Eau to the pool house, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev did not discuss substance,” notes the official memorandum of their conversation. Instead, Ron and Mikhail talked like the proverbial Jim and Ivan, reflecting on Reagan’s old movies instead of their differences. They spoke as peers, each trying to do best by their people. Reagan conveyed his passion for disarmament and his desire to protect future generations from nuclear disaster. When Gorbachev tried to dismiss the need for SDI because both sides had policies against the use of nuclear weapons as a first-strike platform, “the President interjected that he and Gorbachev might not always be here. He later “asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these were weapons that destroy nuclear missiles.”¹⁴⁷ Reagan’s pursuit of SDI was personal. The president shared a vignette that Gorbachev would understand:

“[R]ecall that in 1925 in this city of Geneva all of the countries that had participated in World War I had met and had reached agreement not to use poison gas in warfare. Nevertheless, all had kept their gas masks...we should go forward to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons, but at the same time retain something like that gas mask, i.e., a shield that would protect our countries should there be an unforeseeable return to nuclear missiles.”¹⁴⁸

Gorbachev replied that “to a certain extent he could understand the President on a human level; he could understand that the idea of strategic defense had captivated the President’s imagination.” But Gorbachev was bound by the interests of his own country. He then admitted, “However, as a political leader he could not possibly agree with the President with regard to [SDI].”¹⁴⁹ After an hour of talking privately, the two leaders elected to return to their delegations. As they walked back from the pool house to the villa, Gorbachev noted this was not to be their last meeting. He was right. They would meet again a year later, though not in the United States as Reagan offered. Their summit in Geneva ended the next day without a resolution towards arms control. The two sides resisted the impulse to settle on a mediocre agreement for the sake of avoiding coming home empty-handed. The real achievement made in Geneva was creating a new level of understanding between the two leaders and the realization that a compromise could exist on a wide range of issues, including the Euromissiles.*

The Reykjavik Rollercoaster: Reagan Establishes Asymmetry of Motivation

Reykjavik was a rushed gathering that ended in disappointment without any formal agreement. But the summit revealed a zone of possible agreement over the Euromissiles that led to the INF Treaty a year later. Iceland was never meant to be the location of the second summit. The White House returned from Geneva with grand visions of organizing an elaborate ‘tour of America.’ Reagan wanted to join Gorbachev on a week-long nationwide trip “to see first-hand America’s vision of a peaceful future where change, technology, and individual contributions

* The meetings in Geneva revealed numerous areas where the Reagan administration found progress was possible between the two adversaries. The scope of issues included: negotiations on nuclear and space arms, regional conflicts, people-to-people contacts and information exchanges, chemical weapons, risk reduction centers, thermonuclear fusion, cancer research, environmental research, and humanitarian issues. See Jack Matlock, “NSDD on Implementation of Geneva Summit Agreements,” January 21, 1986, Matlock, Jack Files, Box 55, Summit Agreements January 1986, RPL.

will lead to a safer and better world.” Draft itineraries included stops in New England, industrial centers in Tennessee, farmlands in the Midwest, and out to California to see Hollywood and academic institutions.¹⁵⁰ That version of the summit never came to be. The collaborative spirit that Reagan and Gorbachev fostered in Geneva dissipated within a few months. Soviet officials began stalling when asked to set a date for the subsequent summit. Diplomatic dialogue between the two sides fell back to old habits of stubborn and unproductive bargaining between officials. In a memo to the National Security Advisor on 2 April 1986, Matlock was convinced that Gorbachev must be trying to “maintain the image of standing up to U.S. pressure to change long-standing Soviet policies....[H]e may be subject to criticism for returning from Geneva empty-handed, and simply cannot risk another summit without some concrete results.”¹⁵¹ The two sides were reaching a stalemate again.

Then chance intervened once on 26 April 1986 when the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl experienced a meltdown. Gorbachev biographer William Taubman shares that the Soviet leader crossed a mental barrier after Chernobyl that freed him to become more decisive. According to Taubman, Gorbachev recalled that Chernobyl opened his eyes, and he would later divide his life into two eras: “before Chernobyl and after it.”¹⁵² The Chernobyl disaster gave Gorbachev a new appreciation for the sheer destructive power of nuclear weapons.¹⁵³ After months of rebuking and stifling American efforts to schedule a follow-up meeting, Gorbachev decided to organize a second summit.¹⁵⁴ Taubman partially attributes this change of heart to two meetings Gorbachev held in Moscow with French President Francois Mitterrand and former President Richard Nixon in July 1986. Mitterrand and Nixon both vouched for the sincerity of Reagan’s invitations to make a historic agreement. Reinvigorated, Gorbachev offered to meet Reagan in one of two locations: London or Reykjavik. When his assistant asked why the capital of Iceland, Gorbachev

replied, “It’s a good idea. Halfway between us and them, and none of the big powers will be offended.”¹⁵⁵ The follow-up summit to Geneva would not include a grand tour of America, but both sides seemed primed to strike a deal.

In Washington, Reagan administration officials picked up the signals that a shift was occurring in Moscow. Secretary Shultz sent the president a memo entitled “Arms Reduction: Getting to the Pay-Off Stage” in June, where he proclaimed, “Mr. President, the strong U.S. stance has brought us to the historic juncture of your Presidency. The Soviets have blinked.”¹⁵⁶ Shultz’s assessment was motivated by an earlier offer from Gorbachev to accept deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons in return for a U.S. commitment to abandon SDI and remain in the ABM treaty. Washington understood that the incident in Chernobyl was a critical opportunity to present Gorbachev with a counteroffer that kept SDI but still made drastic cuts to nuclear arsenals on both sides. The bargaining positions had formed, and now it required Reagan and Gorbachev to settle their positions face to face.

Reykjavik was a trap set by Gorbachev meant to offer Reagan unimaginable concessions as bait to woo the American president into curtailing his SDI program.* When Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik on 11 October 1986, they had less than two weeks to prepare for the summit.† The accelerated timeframe was all part of Gorbachev’s plan. Reagan officials expected Reykjavik to be a quick gathering where the two leaders could establish the foundation for a more substantive summit at a later date. Gorbachev meant to “sweep Reagan off his feet”

* Key concessions included the Soviet SS-18 strategic missiles, accepting the zero option for INF, conceding on leaving out the French and British nuclear arsenals, and allow SDI to continue development in laboratories only. See William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2017), 295.

† Reagan accepted Gorbachev’s formal invitation on 30 September to meet in Iceland on 11 October. See Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times*, 294.

and present an offer he couldn't refuse.¹⁵⁷ There was only one condition: Reagan first had to agree to curtail SDI.

After the first round of negotiations, the American delegation was ecstatic at the initial Soviet offers. Paul Nitze remarked, "this is the best Soviet proposal we have received in twenty-five years."¹⁵⁸ Following all-night negotiations between technical experts, there seemed to be optimism from both camps. Richard Perle reflected years later that Reykjavik was the first true moment when the Soviets eased their resistance to the zero option. "They resisted it through their walkout in 1983, they resisted it during their absence through 1984 and into 1985, they resisted it in 1985. It was only at the Reykjavik summit that we first began to get an indication that they might, at the end of the day, accept the zero option."¹⁵⁹

Then in the last scheduled meeting on the morning of the 12th, Gorbachev sprung his trap, holding the agreement on INF and strategic missiles hostage in return for Reagan restricting SDI to laboratories only. Gorbachev declared, "the Soviets had proposed a package, and that individual elements of their proposals must be regarded as a package." When Reagan tried to argue to delink the issues, Gorbachev shut the conversations down. He interrupted the president and announced, "[T]here had been a meaningful exchange of views but not common points. With that, the meeting could end."¹⁶⁰ But Gorbachev was bluffing. This was to be the last scheduled meeting of the summit, but he proposed to hold one more round of talks in the afternoon. Reykjavik went into overtime.

The bonus meeting that afternoon was as high stakes as it gets for international relations. As the two superpowers rehashed their positions, President Reagan sought to clarify exactly what type of disarmament Gorbachev was really offering. Reagan asked Gorbachev if he was saying

“we would be reducing all nuclear weapons – cruise missiles, battlefield weapons, sub-launched, and the like?” He added:

The President: “It would be fine with [me] if we eliminated all nuclear weapons.”

Gorbachev: “We can do that. We can eliminate them.”

Secretary Shultz: “Let’s do it.”

Never before had the Soviets offered to include all forms of nuclear weapons. This offer really was capable of sweeping Reagan off his feet. With that fantastic offer on the table, Gorbachev pivoted to SDI and the thorny issue of Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

Gorbachev: “If they were going to agree to deep reductions in nuclear weapons, and the U.S. side...put weapons in space and build a large-scale defense system, then this was unacceptable. But if the U.S. agreed to confine this work to laboratories, the Soviet side would sign....

The President said he could not give in.

Gorbachev asked if that was the last word.

The President said yes.”¹⁶¹

Gorbachev discovered that Reagan really did not see SDI as a bargaining chip. Reagan was revealing his unwavering commitment to his core objectives. He believed SDI was necessary for long-term peace. And he was showing his confidence that the United States had developed a stronger negotiating position than the Soviets through years of work. The summit ended without an agreement.* But Reagan had clearly signaled that he was willing to settle the INF issue in Europe as a separate issue. The eight conditions of coercive diplomacy were now complete. It would take a few more months for the efforts to bear fruit.

* This study is not meant to assess whether Reagan should have taken the offer or not. Other scholars and critics have debated that question at length and there are persuasive arguments for and against the decision. Had Reagan accepted the offer, it would have created major consequences for the NATO alliance. Reagan defended his position to Gorbachev that he had made a promise to the American people to protect SDI, and he would keep that promise. See “Reykjavik (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 4th Session [Declassified 2000; Second Version] Memo of Conversation,” October 12, 1986, Archive, Reagan Library, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110621>.

Arriving at a Favorable Settlement

Soon after Reykjavik, both Reagan and Gorbachev came under tremendous internal political pressure. In Washington, the Iran-Contra scandal plagued the Reagan administration. In Moscow, political opponents within the Communist party were attacking Gorbachev from all sides over his domestic reform agenda. Afghanistan was a thorn in Gorbachev's side. "In mid-November, the Soviets were practically begging us to help them out of Afghanistan."¹⁶² Soviet leaders seemed to grow restless over the lingering Euromissile issue. Susan Colbourn found "by early 1987, Soviet thinking began to evolve. A growing segment of the leadership questioned the wisdom of deploying the SS-20s, convinced that their predecessors had miscalculated the political costs."¹⁶³ Gorbachev felt the pressure to make some sort of progress somewhere in his policy agenda.*

The summit in Iceland had uncovered the opportunity to settle the Euromissile issue, and with Chernobyl in mind, he made the first moves to break the impasse after Reykjavik. First, Gorbachev came to terms with his need to link SDI with INF and strategic missiles. The package deal he insisted on in Reykjavik was not truly necessary. Then he informed his advisors that he was willing to drop the issue of French and British nuclear stockpiles. "There is not going to be a war with Britain and France; it's impossible," Gorbachev bemoaned to his defense minister.¹⁶⁴ Negotiators ironed out the final details of the INF treaty, and a summit was scheduled for 7 December 1987 in Washington. Reagan would finally get his Soviet counterpart to visit the

*Taubman notes in his biography of Gorbachev that the Secretary General found himself in a quandary by early 1987 over SDI. The military proposed a massive buildup of nuclear weapons to overwhelm (swarm) the SDI system. Taubman noted that Gorbachev rejected this proposal because the projected costs of such a buildup would "gut reforms at home." So Taubman found that Gorbachev decided to break up the nuclear arms package that was the source of tension at Reykjavik and settle on the INF issue separate to ICBMs and SDI. See Taubman, *Gorbachev*, 394.

United States. The Reagans would reciprocate and visit Moscow in May of 1988 after the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty.

The INF treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev was a historic moment. The settlement more than achieved the goal of removing the threat of SS-20s to Europe. The treaty agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons between the world's two great powers. It was a decidedly favorable settlement for the United States. The Soviet Union destroyed about fifteen hundred weapons, while the United States eliminated just 20 percent of that.¹⁶⁵ The settlement was a remarkable achievement of coercive diplomacy.

Who gets credit for the successful outcome of the Euromissile affair? Reagan? Gorbachev? Some scholars like Colbourn argue "it was Gorbachev who made the INF Treaty possible" by decoupling INF with SDI and making significant concessions.¹⁶⁶ It is certainly true that Gorbachev showed the greatest political courage to accept concessions in the end. But what drove him to change his behavior? Taking a holistic view of the sequence of events from 1981 to 1987 shows how the effective application of the conditions of coercive diplomacy, chance, and patience by the Reagan administration led to the peaceful conclusion of the Euromissile affair. The Reagan administration certainly made some missteps along the way that nearly undermined U.S. coercive power against the Soviets, but the team managed to keep the process together.

Conclusion

The Euromissile affair offers several policy considerations for what facilitates or inhibits U.S. policymakers from developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy. While U.S. officials wrestled with each of the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy in this case, several unique factors stand out.

First, this case emphasizes the role of *international support* (Condition 3b) in generating or undermining U.S. coercive power.* The most important step for the United States in this case was establishing PIIs and GLCMs in Western Europe. The amount of diplomatic energy that the Reagan administration exerted to achieve this milestone cannot be underestimated.

Second, this case demonstrates how candid face-to-face dialogue, like Nitze's Walk in the Woods or Reagan and Gorbachev at the pool house in Geneva, has a unique ability to help *clarify and refine terms of settlement* (Condition 5) when stalemates develop.

Third, this case expands our appreciation for how the United States can influence the *target's fear of unacceptable escalation* (Condition 7) by applying pressure on peripheral issues and horizontal escalation. This includes the application of the Reagan Doctrine to weaken the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and leveraging SDI to extract deep concessions on the INF talks.

Lastly, this case reveals how *strong leadership* (Condition 4), *clear objectives* (Condition 1), and a *willingness to accept risks and costs* (Condition 2) strengthen the ability to demonstrate an *asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer* (Condition 8).† Reagan reinforced his bargaining position in Reykjavik because of his vantage of risk and his determination to achieve his long-term objectives.

There are two additional elements present throughout the Euromissile affair that contributed to the successful outcome: chance and patience. Clausewitz admitted, "from the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war

* Condition 3 combines a) domestic and b) international support.

† Condition 4 is the combination of a) strong and b) unified leadership.

most closely resembles a game of cards.”¹⁶⁷ There are numerous occasions where chance played a considerable role in this case. Examples include but are not limited to: Reagan surviving his assassination attempt by millimeters; European elections went in favor of the dual-track candidates; the skepticism of a Soviet watch officer over missile launch warnings; the fact that no British citizens died in the surprise invasion of Grenada; three Soviet General Secretaries dying to allow for Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to power; and Chernobyl. Had any of these events turned another way, the outcome of this case could have been drastically different. If luck is a combination of preparation and opportunity, however, then the Reagan administration took advantage of its opportunities and was able to seize on these developments.

The second hidden element in this case is patience. The Reagan administration recognized early on that the SS-20 issue was not a sprint or a marathon but an ultra-marathon. The time horizon would be in years, not weeks or months. Original estimates expected the INF issue to endure through the 1990s. Having the strategic patience to set the conditions incrementally over time and the confidence to set high standards for a negotiated settlement was a virtue of the administration. The Reagan administration resisted the temptation to settle on nominal agreements, beginning with the compromise Nitze developed in his Walk in the Woods proposal in 1982. It took considerable time for the conditions of coercive diplomacy to bear fruit. The PII and GLCM missile deployment in 1983 was a hard-fought political endeavor that just set one stone in the plan’s foundation. It took months for Gorbachev to come around to accepting Reagan’s position after the brinkmanship of Reykjavik. Domestic and international relationships needed constant attention throughout the duration of the incident. The time and political capital required to successfully apply coercive diplomacy are less visible than the costs

of war. Thus, coercion can be a difficult endeavor, albeit in subtler ways than traditional armed conflict.

Endnotes

¹ Simon Miles, *Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), 79.

² Jack Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 39; William Broad, “Pershings Stir Accidental War Fears,” *The New York Times*, December 12, 1983, sec. A16, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/12/world/pershings-stir-accidental-war-fears.html>.

³ Sewell Chan, “Stanislav Petrov, Soviet Officer Who Helped Avert Nuclear War, Is Dead at 77,” *The New York Times*, September 18, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world/europe/stanislav-petrov-nuclear-war-dead.html>.

⁴ William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 242.

⁵ “Communique of a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers Brussels,” December 12, 1979, NATO Press Communique M2(79)22, NATO Archives Online, <https://archives.nato.int/communique-of-special-meeting-of-foreign-and-defence-ministers-brussels-12th-december-1979>.

⁶ The eight conditions of coercive diplomacy. See Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

⁷ The original studies include Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

⁸ See Richard Ericson and George Vest, “SCC Meeting on PRM-38,” (US Department of State, August 16, 1978), The National Security Archive, The George Washington University, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb301/index.htm#doc2>.

⁹ Ralf Bosen, “NATO Foiled Soviets with Cold War Double-Track” (Deutsche Welle (DW), December 12, 2019), <https://www.dw.com/en/nato-thwarted-the-soviets-with-its-cold-war-double-track/a-51615211>.

¹⁰ Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983,” 5.

¹¹ “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Overview,” n.d., The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Digital Library, <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/salt/salt.asp#:~:text=The%20Strategic%20Arms%20Limitation%20Talks,side%20could%20possess%20and%20manufacture>.

¹² Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983,” 8.

¹³ See “Communique of a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers Brussels,” December 12, 1979, NATO Press Communique M2(79)22, NATO Archives Online, <https://archives.nato.int/communique-of-special-meeting-of-foreign-and-defence-ministers-brussels-12th-december-1979>.

¹⁴ “Communique of a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers Brussels.”

¹⁵ Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983,” 6.

¹⁶ Wettig, 6.

¹⁷ See Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).

¹⁸ Robert Paarlberg, “Lessons of the Grain Embargo,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1980.

¹⁹ “An Expensive Gambit on Grain: Carter’s Embargo Will Cost the U.S. \$3 Billion in Lost Trade with Russia.” *Bloomberg BusinessWeek* (21 January 1980): 28–29. Print.

²⁰ “An Expensive Gambit on Grain: Carter’s Embargo Will Cost the U.S. \$3 Billion in Lost Trade with Russia.” *Bloomberg BusinessWeek* (21 January 1980): 28–29. Print.

²¹ Vince Peterson, “Effects Of 1980 Grain Embargo Echo Through The Years” (U.S. Wheat Associates, April 14, 2020), <https://www.uswheat.org/wheatletter/effects-of-1980-grain-embargo-echo-through-the-years/>.

²² Steven Weisman, “Reagan Ends Burbs on Export of Grain to the Soviet Union,” *The New York Times*, April 25, 1981, sec. 1:1, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/25/world/reagan-ends-curbs-on-export-of-grain-to-the-soviet-union-office.html>.

-
- ²³ “National Security Council Meeting Summary of Conclusions: Poland; Nicaragua/Central America; Southern Africa,” March 26, 1981, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, <https://www.thereaganfiles.com/document-collections/national-security-council.html>.
- ²⁴ “National Security Council Meeting Summary of Conclusions: Poland; Nicaragua/Central America; Southern Africa.”
- ²⁵ See Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).
- ²⁶ For more about the 1976 and 1980 Reagan campaigns, see Lou Cannon, “Ronald Reagan: Campaigns and Election” (UVA Miller Center, n.d.), U.S. Presidents, <https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/campaigns-and-elections>.
- ²⁷ See Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, *Reagan’s Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009); Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2006).
- ²⁸ “Military Service of Ronald Reagan,” n.d., Ronald Reagan, National Archives, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/ronald-reagan/military-service-ronald-reagan>.
- ²⁹ From Ronald Reagan’s autobiography, “An American Life” (Simon & Schuster, 1990), about taking office as the governor of California in 1967. Quote found at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-reagan-on-compromise-1445379280>.
- ³⁰ William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 118–19.
- ³¹ Quote of Roger Robinson interview found in Paul Kengor and Patricia Doerner, *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan’s Top Hand* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007), 183.
- ³² Robert McFarlane, “Letter to Roger Fontaine,” December 2, 1983, McFarlane, Robert Files, Chronological Files, RAC Box 6, RPL.
- ³³ David Stout, “Caspar W. Weinberger Dies at 88,” *The New York Times*, March 28, 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/obituaries/caspar-w-weinberger-dies-at-88.html>.
- ³⁴ Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*, 7.
- ³⁵ Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 9.
- ³⁶ Weinberger Doctrine publicly introduced at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on 28 November 1984. Speech video uploaded at <https://www.c-span.org/video/?124872-1/military-force>
- ³⁷ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 650.
- ³⁸ Jeffrey Record, “Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 79–95.
- ³⁹ Tim Weiner, “Alexander M. Haig Jr. Dies at 85; Was Forceful Aide to 2 Presidents,” *The New York Times*, February 20, 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/us/politics/21haig.html?>
- ⁴⁰ Tim Weiner, “Alexander M. Haig Jr. Dies at 85; Was Forceful Aide to 2 Presidents,” *The New York Times*, February 20, 2010.
- ⁴¹ Tim Weiner, “Alexander M. Haig Jr. Dies at 85; Was Forceful Aide to 2 Presidents,” *The New York Times*, February 20, 2010.
- ⁴² Robert McFarlane, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 173.
- ⁴³ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, 29.
- ⁴⁴ David Stout, “Caspar W. Weinberger Dies at 88,” *The New York Times*, March 28, 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/obituaries/caspar-w-weinberger-dies-at-88.html>.
- ⁴⁵ Philip Taubman, “The Shultz-Weinberger Feud,” April 14, 1985, sec. 6:51, <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/14/magazine/the-shultz-weinberger-feud.html>.
- ⁴⁶ Philip Taubman, “The Shultz-Weinberger Feud,” April 14, 1985, sec. 6:51; William Greider, “The Boys from Bechtel: Will Ronald Reagan Reverse U.S. Policy on Nuclear Proliferation?,” *Rolling Stone*, September 2, 1982, <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-boys-from-bechtel-88449/>.
- ⁴⁷ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, 31.
- ⁴⁸ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 650.

-
- ⁴⁹ See Gail Yoshitani, *Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine 1980-1984* (Texas A&M University Press, 2011).
- ⁵⁰ To read more about the distinct perspectives of NATO allies in Europe, see Susan Colbourn's "Euromissile: The Nuclear Weapons that Nearly Destroyed NATO" (2022).
- ⁵¹ Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 368.
- ⁵² Stephen Kieninger, *The Diplomacy of Detente: Cooperative Security Policies from Helmut Schmidt to George Shultz* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 92.
- ⁵³ Kieninger, 92.
- ⁵⁴ Found in Stephen Kieninger, *The Diplomacy of Detente: Cooperative Security Policies from Helmut Schmidt to George Shultz* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 101, where Kieninger references Helmut Schmidt's memoir, *Was ich noch sagen wollte*, Munich: Beck Verlag, 2015, pp. 167–169.
- ⁵⁵ "Germany: No.10 Record of Conversation (MT-Chancellor Kohl)," April 22, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/143254>.
- ⁵⁶ Quote found in Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2006), 50.
- ⁵⁷ Sven Kraemer, "State Department on TNF Talks," April 17, 1981, Sven Kraemer Files, 1981-1987, Defense Policy Directorate, NSC [1981-1983]; See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Expects Talk with Russians Soon on Europe's Missiles," *The New York Times*, April 17, 1981, sec. A:1, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/17/world/haig-expects-talks-with-russians-soon-on-europe-s-missiles.html>.
- ⁵⁸ Alexander Haig, "Memo to the President: The Atlantic Alliance," April 30, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 1-10, Box 1, NSC 00008, RPL.
- ⁵⁹ Richard Allen, "Memo to the President: NSC Meeting Recommendations," October 13, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 21-30, Box 3, NSC 00022, RPL.
- ⁶⁰ Allen.
- ⁶¹ William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 9–10.
- ⁶² Haig, "Memo to the President: The Atlantic Alliance."
- ⁶³ "West European Attitudes on LRTNF: Telegram "Endorsement of the Dual Track: No Turning Back'," October 27, 1981, Sven Kraemer Files, 1981-1987, NATO - Shaping Eur. Public Opinion, RAC Box 48, RPL.
- ⁶⁴ Ronald Reagan, "Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons," November 18, 1981, The American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-members-the-national-press-club-arms-reduction-and-nuclear-weapons>.
- ⁶⁵ Reagan.
- ⁶⁶ Leonid Brezhnev, "108. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan," December 1, 1981, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Foreign Relations of the United States, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d108>.
- ⁶⁷ For notes on the original European discussions of zero options, see Andreas Lutsch, "The Zero Option and NATO's Dual-Track Decision: Rethinking the Paradox," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 6–7 (2020): 957–89, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1814259>.
- ⁶⁸ "Reagan Remark Stirs European Furor," *The Washington Post*, October 21, 1981, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/10/21/reagan-remark-stirs-european-furor/2a057366-f45b-40e3-8daf-77d8739c5cf3/>.
- ⁶⁹ Richard Perle, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Zero Hour; Interview with Richard Perle, 1988, February 25, 1988, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, GBH Archives, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_03AE731BD9B24B31B01CA59A33ACDD2D.
- ⁷⁰ Sven Kraemer, "TNF: Guidance on Zero Options," October 2, 1981, Sven Kraemer Files, 1981-1987, NATO - TNF Arms Control Zero Option, RAC Box 48, RPL.
- ⁷¹ Bradley Graham, "Haig Statement Indicates Softening Of Stance on Missiles for Germany," *The Washington Post*, September 15, 1981, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/09/15/haig-statement-indicates-softening-of-stance-on-missiles-for-germany/8f38a40a-6a17-42b4-b8f2-e63a0c7b03e9/>.
- ⁷² Draft cable 63193 in Kraemer, "TNF: Guidance on Zero Options."
- ⁷³ Richard Pipes NSC Memo from 23 September 1981 in "TNF: Guidance on Zero Options," Sven Kraemer Files, 1981-1987, NATO - TNF Arms Control Zero Option, RAC Box 48, RPL.
- ⁷⁴ Draft cable 63208 in Kraemer.

-
- ⁷⁵ See Richard Allen, “Memo to the President: Prep Notes for 12 November NSC Meeting,” November 11, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 21-30, Box 3, NSC 00025, RPL.
- ⁷⁶ See Allen.
- ⁷⁷ “Minutes for NSC Meeting,” November 12, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 21-30, Box 3, NSC 00025, RPL.
- ⁷⁸ “Minutes for NSC Meeting,” November 12, 1981, Executive Secretariat Meeting File, NSC 21-30, Box 3, NSC 00025, RPL.
- ⁷⁹ Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 342.
- ⁸⁰ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 348.
- ⁸¹ Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 370.
- ⁸² Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 372.
- ⁸³ Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations,” January 16, 1984, National Archives, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-and-other-countries-united-states-soviet-relations>.
- ⁸⁴ Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 375.
- ⁸⁵ Nitze 380
- ⁸⁶ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 120; Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 388.
- ⁸⁷ Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 388.
- ⁸⁸ See Richard Aldous, *Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2012), 67–68.
- ⁸⁹ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, 135.
- ⁹⁰ “Poland: No.10 Record of Telephone Conversation (MT-Carrington),” December 20, 1981, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122536>.
- ⁹¹ Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World*, 114.
- ⁹² “NSC 35: Poland (Meeting Notes),” December 23, 1981, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, <https://www.thereaganfiles.com/document-collections/national-security-council.html>.
- ⁹³ “NSC 35: Poland (Meeting Notes).”
- ⁹⁴ “NSC 35: Poland (Meeting Notes).”
- ⁹⁵ “Poland: FCO Letter to No.10 (‘Poland’),” December 24, 1981, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122546>.
- ⁹⁶ “NSC 35: Poland (Meeting Notes).”
- ⁹⁷ See Stephen Kieninger, *The Diplomacy of Detente: Cooperative Security Policies from Helmut Schmidt to George Shultz* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 111; “Poland: No.10 Record of Conversation (MT-Alexander Haig),” January 29, 1982, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation; Margaret Thatcher, “Poland: MT Message to Reagan,” January 29, 1982, Personal and party papers, Cambridge, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123178>.
- ⁹⁸ R.W. Apple Jr., “Europeans Plan Talks on Pipeline Conflict,” *The New York Times*, September 3, 1982, sec. D:1.
- ⁹⁹ Lee Lescaze, “Reagan Takes Economic Action Against Poland,” *The Washington Post*, December 24, 1981, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/12/24/reagan-takes-economic-action-against-poland/77d14879-cc44-4682-bc3f-5717c70bc845/>.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 89.
- ¹⁰¹ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, 136.
- ¹⁰² Paul Kengor and Patricia Doerner, *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan’s Top Hand* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007), 182.
- ¹⁰³ Quoted from George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 136.
- ¹⁰⁴ Margaret Thatcher, “Poland: MT Message to Reagan,” January 29, 1982, Personal and party papers, Cambridge, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123178>.
- ¹⁰⁵ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, 136.
- ¹⁰⁶ For “evil empire” speech, see President Reagan “Remarks at the annual convention of the national association of evangelicals” in Orlando, Florida on 8 March 1983. Transcript available at

<https://www.reaganfoundation.org/library-museum/permanent-exhibitions/berlin-wall/from-the-archives/remarks-at-the-annual-convention-of-the-national-association-of-evangelicals-in-orlando-florida/>. For SDI announcement, see Reagan's "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security" on 23 March 1983. Transcript available at <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security>.

¹⁰⁷ See Rebecca Slayton, "Discursive Choices: Boycotting Star Wars between Science and Politics," *Social Studies of Science* 37, no. 1 (February 2007): 27–66.

¹⁰⁸ William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 102.

¹⁰⁹ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 253.

¹¹⁰ Robert McFarlane, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 232.

¹¹¹ Ronald Reagan, "Cold War: Reagan Letter to MT (Reagan Announces Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars))," March 23, 1983, Personal and party papers, Cambridge, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/131533>.

¹¹² "Cold War: MOD Letter to No.10 ('President Reagan's Speech on Defensive Technology')," March 29, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/134056>.

¹¹³ See Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).

¹¹⁴ Colbourn, 178.

¹¹⁵ "Defence: Ministry of Defence Record of Conversation (Nuclear Issues, US Protectionism, NATO Air Defence, Equipment Collaboration, Defence Sales)," March 23, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/147918>.

¹¹⁶ For British cabinet discussion about dual-key proposal, see "Cabinet: Minutes of Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Defence Policy - MISC 7(83) 3rd Meeting (Basing of United States Cruise Missiles, Policing of Demonstrations at Military Bases)," March 28, 1983, Cabinet Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/128290>.

¹¹⁷ Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO*, 183.

¹¹⁸ See Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO*.

¹¹⁹ Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007) date of entry 20 October 1983, 188.

¹²⁰ Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World*, 270.

¹²¹ "Cold War: UKE Washington Telegram 2792 to FCO (2355Z) ('US Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems')," September 27, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/134057>.

¹²² "Grenada: UKE Washington Telegram 3084 to FCO (2150Z) ('Grenada')," October 22, 1983, Personal and party papers, Cambridge, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/131471>.

¹²³ Margaret Thatcher, "Grenada: MT Message to Reagan (US Intervention in Grenada)," October 25, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/128147>.

¹²⁴ William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 241.

¹²⁵ William Drozdiak, "More Than a Million Protest Missiles in Western Europe," *The Washington Post*, October 23, 1983, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/23/more-than-a-million-protest-missiles-in-western-europe/9d703245-36fa-40ce-8714-e281f796a472/>.

¹²⁶ "US: Coles Minute to Armstrong," November 11, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/140752>.

¹²⁷ "Germany: No.10 Record of Conversation (MT-Chancellor Kohl) [East-West Relations, US Foreign Policy, Middle East, Grenada, Allied Cooperation, Arms Supplies for Argentina]," November 8, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/143881>.

¹²⁸ "Germany: No.10 Record of Conversation (MT-Chancellor Kohl)[Defence Sales, Argentina, French-German Defence Cooperation, Cooperation with the US, East-West Economic Relations]," April 22, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/143254>.

¹²⁹ "Germany: No.10 Record of Conversation (MT-Chancellor Kohl) [East-West Relations, US Foreign Policy, Middle East, Grenada, Allied Cooperation, Arms Supplies for Argentina]."

-
- ¹³⁰ “Britain Votes to Station Missiles,” November 1, 1983, UPI Archives, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/11/01/Britain-votes-to-station-missiles/2402436510800/>.
- ¹³¹ Jon Nordheimer, “First U.S. Missiles Arrive by Plane at British Base,” *The New York Times*, November 15, 1983, sec. A:1, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/15/world/first-us-missiles-arrive-by-plane-at-a-british-base.html>.
- ¹³² Charles Ridley, “Government Wins Vote to Deploy Cruise Missiles,” *UPI*, November 16, 1983, UPI Archives, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/11/16/Government-wins-vote-to-deploy-cruise-missiles/9545437806800/>.
- ¹³³ “Cold War: No.10 Record of Conversation (MT-Reagan) [First Meeting: Lebanon, East/West, Arms Control, KAL007, INF, Belize, US Supply of Arms to Argentina],” September 29, 1983, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/128206>.
- ¹³⁴ William Drozdiak, “Parliament Approves Missile Deployment In West Germany,” *The Washington Post*, November 23, 1983, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/11/23/parliament-approves-missile-deployment-in-west-germany/b9cc4416-b6b3-4422-927b-74747a6e923a/>.
- ¹³⁵ Richard Perle, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Zero Hour*; Interview with Richard Perle, 1988, February 25, 1988, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age*, GBH Archives, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_03AE731BD9B24B31B01CA59A33ACDD2D.
- ¹³⁶ “Special National Intelligence Estimate - INF: The Prospects for West European Deployment and the USSR’s Reactions,” November 16, 1983, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00302r000701060016-4>.
- ¹³⁷ “Foreign Policy: Sir Percy Cradock Minute (‘First Thoughts’),” January 27, 1984, Prime Ministerial Private Office files, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/228336>.
- ¹³⁸ See Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World*, 317. Reagan’s State of the Union speech on 6 February 1985 available at <https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/reagan-quotes-speeches/state-of-the-union-3/>.
- ¹³⁹ Inboden, 318–19.
- ¹⁴⁰ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended*, 35.
- ¹⁴¹ “52. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark),” May 18, 1983, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210422020443/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v04/d52>.
- ¹⁴² Simon Miles, *Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), 69.
- ¹⁴³ Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations,” January 16, 1984, National Archives, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-and-other-countries-united-states-soviet-relations>.
- ¹⁴⁴ Don Regan quoted in William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 375.
- ¹⁴⁵ “Geneva (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 2nd Session Memo of Conversation.”
- ¹⁴⁶ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 601.
- ¹⁴⁷ “Cold War: Geneva (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 3rd Session,” November 19, 1985, Archive (Reagan Library - Matlock MSS Box 92137), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109210>.
- ¹⁴⁸ “Cold War: Geneva (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 3rd Session.”
- ¹⁴⁹ “Cold War: Geneva (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 3rd Session.”
- ¹⁵⁰ See “Summit II Prep Agenda,” March 27, 1986, Matlock, Jack Files, Box 54, Working File Summit II, Box 54, RPL.
- ¹⁵¹ “209. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter),” April 2, 1986, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v05/d209>.
- ¹⁵² William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2017), 241.
- ¹⁵³ William Inboden, *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World* (New York: Dutton, 2022), 402.
- ¹⁵⁴ See Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times*, 293.
- ¹⁵⁵ Quoted from William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2017), 294.
- ¹⁵⁶ George Shultz, “Memo to the President: ‘Arms Reduction: Getting to the Pay-Off Stage,’” June 17, 1986, George P. Shultz Papers, Arms Control, Box 22A, RPL.

-
- ¹⁵⁷ As quoted in William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2017), 295.
- ¹⁵⁸ Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022), 226. See also Ken Adelman, *Reagan at Reykjavik* (New York: Broadside Books, 2014).
- ¹⁵⁹ Interview with Richard Perle, February 25, 1988, Zero Hour, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age collection, WGBH Educational Foundation, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_03AE731BD9B24B31B01CA59A33ACDD2D.
- ¹⁶⁰ “Cold War: Reykjavik (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 3rd Session,” October 12, 1986, Archive (Reagan Library - Matlock MSS Box 92140), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109179>.
- ¹⁶¹ Select excerpts of meeting taken from the White House’s official memorandum of conversation. Full transcript available at “Reykjavik (Reagan-Gorbachev) Summit 4th Session [Declassified 2000; Second Version] Memo of Conversation,” October 12, 1986, Archive, Reagan Library, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110621>.
- ¹⁶² George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 1003.
- ¹⁶³ Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022), 229.
- ¹⁶⁴ Quoted from Jack Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 252.
- ¹⁶⁵ Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022), 237.
- ¹⁶⁶ Susan Colbourn, *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022), 239.
- ¹⁶⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86.

CHAPTER 5: HAITI INTERVENTION

A DISASTER AT THE DOCKS

“We’re going to make a run for it!” called two embassy staffers over the radio as they were held at gunpoint inside the docks. The Americans jumped in an abandoned car and smashed through the locked gate of the harbor. They kept driving until they reached the U.S. embassy at Port-au-Prince.¹

It was the afternoon of 11 October 1993 and the Tank Landing Ship (LST) USS *Harlan County* (LST-1196) had just arrived in Haiti to deliver the first contingent of 1,267 troops under the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).² The LST was a symbol of the United States: the global leader of democracy with its unrivaled military. The ship’s arrival was meant to begin the peaceful transfer of power under the Governors Island Agreement that LTG Raoul Cédras and President Jean-Bertrand Aristide had signed a few months earlier.* The agreement was meant to bring democracy back to Haiti after Cédras’ military coup two years earlier.

But nothing had seemed right when Commander Marvin Butcher sailed the USS *Harlan County* into Port-au-Prince harbor at 2:00 am that morning. The entrance to the harbor was clogged with anchored ships, forcing Butcher to weave the LST through anchored boats and shallow reefs. By 5:00 am, the pier was in sight, but an old Cuban freighter occupied the slip where the *Harlan County* was supposed to moor. The U.S. embassy personnel at the pier radioed to the *Harlan County* that a mob was forming at the docks. Crew members of the *Harlan County*

* The Governors Island Agreement was signed 3 July 1993 on Governors Island in New York as a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Haiti. Cédras agreed to retire on 15 October 1993 and then Aristide would return to Haiti on 30 October 1993.

could see it from the ship's bridge: dozens of thugs and protestors, armed with machetes and axes. Some waving pistols.

The acting U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Vicki Huddleston, arrived outside the docks as the mob picked up energy. She tried to get past the rioters, but they blocked her car, smashing the windows of her armored sedan with clubs. "Remember Somalia!" chanted some of the demonstrators as they fired pistols aimlessly into the air.³ The reminder was unnecessary. The Battle of Mogadishu had occurred just the week before where 18 Americans died in a scenario just like the one unfolding on the pier at Port-au-Prince.

Aboard the *Harlan County*, Butcher was out of his element. The landing was supposed to be a welcome occasion into a "permissive" environment. The Joint Task Force he was delivering had been invited by Haitian leaders at Governors Island. But the scene unfolding at the pier was not what he was expecting. Reports of possible armored personnel carriers with 90mm guns hiding in the pier area were floating around the bridge.⁴ Haitian military patrol boats circling in the harbor seemed to taunt Butcher's arrival, though the boats never demonstrated any specific hostile intent or gesture towards his ship.⁵

The flood of reports of weapons, American hostages, and angry mobs made Butcher "hysterical," according to the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Haiti, Vicky Huddleston.⁶ He began sending frantic reports to back to his command in Norfolk and to leaders in Washington.* The intelligence and tactical reporting making its way back to Washington had the effect of greatly inflating the risk to forces. Leaders in Washington were hearing that "500-600 demonstrators at the port's main gate awaiting UN forces."⁷ The reports played into the fears of senior military

* Ralph Pezzullo uses the word "frantic" to describe CDR Butcher. See Pezzullo 2006, 196.

leaders and administration officials that a dangerous trap awaited the lightly armed and outnumbered U.S. military task force. “If the troops ran into trouble when they arrived, there was no backup plan, no real military force that could incrementally be applied.”⁸ Media crews at the docks sensationalized the scenes at the dock as Butcher kept the ship safely anchored in the harbor, refusing to move any closer to the pier.

Despite what some Americans perceived, the demonstrators on the dock were not meant to present a real threat. They were “grandstanding hoodlums, make-believe warlords,” and “goons,” as described by journalist and Haiti author Bob Shacochis.⁹ It was an unruly party of about 50 to 100 locals, a symbolic demonstration meant to save face for the Haitian forces about to step aside to facilitate Aristide’s return.^{*} The organizer of the protests, Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, was surprised by the outcome. Shacochis remarked that Toto “finessed a cock strut into a showdown, live on CNN, signaling to the world that it was still possible, even if you weren’t Fidel Castro, to make a mockery of American supremacy in its own backyard.”¹⁰ Constant later confided to journalists that he could barely believe the outcome, “my people kept wanting to run away, but I took the gamble and urged them to stay. The Americans pulled out! We were astonished.”¹¹

On 12 October 1993, the *Harlan County* unceremoniously departed Port-au-Prince harbor without ever disembarking the Joint Task Force personnel. Everyone, including Cédras, was astonished. America had retreated without a fight. “What have you done to me?” Cédras

* Moreno admitted that while he and one of his U.S. Embassy colleagues had been held at gunpoint, he did not actually believe his life was in danger based on the demeanor of the mob. He recalled that his captors were mostly drunk so he was concerned about a possible accident. However, the rioters did not display much intent to harm their American captives, just disrupt the landing of the USS *Harlan County*. Interview with Moreno, Huddleston, Garrison.

blistered at his UN counterparts. “I negotiated with [the protest organizers] to make sure there were only a few guys at the docks so that they wouldn’t give you any trouble. And you guys run away from that?”¹² The United States suffered a loss of credibility when the *Harlan County* unceremoniously withdrew from the port. This incident drove the United States to a clumsy, albeit successful application of coercive diplomacy, ultimately resulting in an overwhelming military intervention to forcefully restore Aristide to power with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Case Study Overview

In this case study, I examine how the United States applied coercive diplomacy from the fall of July 1993 to September 1994 to compel a revolutionary government in Haiti to step down from power so the democratically elected president could return to Haiti. The Haiti case represents the most difficult form of coercive diplomacy in the continuum of coercion: *persuading an opponent to change their government*.^{*} This study ends with a successful application of U.S. power. Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras voluntarily yielded control of Haiti due to the overwhelming threat of military force and then facilitated the peaceful return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. However, the U.S. intervention in Haiti was much more than a straightforward example of overwhelming power against a small regional opponent. The fourteen months between the Governors Island Agreement and when LTG Cédras conceded under pressure provides valuable insight into how the United States wields coercive power. An important question I try to answer is why it took so much force to persuade Cédras to step down. Why would such a small and militarily inferior opponent resist American power until the last

^{*} This is based on the three types of coercive diplomacy developed by Alexander George. See Coercion Continuum (Figure 1) in Chapter 2.

minutes of the 11th hour? I also examine why it took so long for the Clinton administration to convince Cédras to step down. I demonstrate that the Clinton administration struggled to manage domestic and international factors, including its relationship with President Aristide and well as sustained political pressure from American lawmakers.

Jean Bertrand Aristide became the democratically elected president of Haiti in December of 1990 after winning the elections with 67% of the vote. He took office in February of 1991 but was deposed seven months later in a revolt led by his military commander, Lieutenant General Cédras. The George H.W. Bush administration condemned the coup and granted President Aristide exile in Washington D.C. but did little else to assist Aristide in returning to power for the rest of Bush's administration. When Bill Clinton entered office in January of 1993, Aristide was still living in exile in a two-bedroom apartment in the Georgetown neighborhood within Washington. Haiti was a festering issue for Clinton as thousands of Haitian refugees attempted to enter the United States by boat, creating a humanitarian crisis and unwanted political spectacle for the new administration.

The Clinton administration attempted to resolve the issue through diplomatic means without the threat of force during the first six months of Clinton's presidency. Clinton's team collaborated with the United Nations to convince President Aristide and LTG Cédras to meet on Governors Island in New York harbor in July 1993. Diplomats seemed to deliver Clinton a resolution to the political crisis in Haiti that had endured since the George H.W. Bush administration. The agreement signed by both Aristide and Cédras "had been hailed as a unique triumph: for the first time, a successful restoration to power, by peaceful means, of a democratically elected president ousted by a military coup d'état."¹³ Cédras was to retire on 15 October 1993, and Aristide was to return fifteen days later.¹⁴ But disagreements emerged over

the terms of settlement (Condition 5) during the three months between when the agreement was signed and when it was to be carried out, jeopardizing the agreement.

The agreement between President Aristide and LTG Raoul Cédras at Governors Island in the summer of 1993 had been a great diplomatic achievement. The agreement should have worked, could have worked, but the disaster at the docks on 12 October 1993 ended the chance to see the agreement upheld. Had the Governors Island Agreement succeeded as LTG Cédras and Aristide had arranged, President Aristide would have returned to power in October of 1993 without the threat of a foreign military invasion. Had the agreement been implemented, the return of Aristide would have been an underwhelming and generic example of international stewardship of democracy where military advisors would have contributed to guaranteeing a peaceful transition of power. Instead, the incident embarrassed the United States and tarnished America's prestige on the world stage. More ominously, the *Harlan County* debacle spoiled the Clinton administration's hopes to resolve the political crisis in Haiti diplomatically. Meanwhile, rebel leaders in Haiti became emboldened. The refugee crisis emanating from Haiti multiplied while domestic political pressure intensified. By August 1994, it was the Clinton administration that felt compelled to act, and an invasion was planned. Aristide would be returned by force.

This chapter examines how even the smallest actor can wield tremendous power against the United States if the U.S. government does not adequately satisfy the conditions of coercive diplomacy. As a review, those conditions are depicted in the Table 7. The role of the domestic and international partners (Condition 3) stands out in this study. This study also reveals how international partners can steer U.S. policies if the administration does not have a clear concept of objectives (Condition 1) or the costs associated with a policy direction (Condition 2).

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target's fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 7. The internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions of coercive diplomacy.

CASE STUDY STRUCTURE

This chapter on the U.S. intervention in Haiti to return Aristide to power follows the same overall structure as the two previous cases in this dissertation. First, I introduce surrounding events that shaped the decisions in the Haiti intervention. This includes providing a brief overview of the U.S. policy shift occurring in the early 1990s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the U.S. as the sole superpower. This section also includes a discussion of events in Somalia and an explanation of Haiti's historical relationship with the United States. Next, I provide insight into the personnel involved in the decision, including political, military, and diplomatic leaders within the U.S. government, as well as the Haitian leaders central to this study. I then chronologically explore the case itself, tracing policy proposals and decisions from the beginning with the attempt to implement the Governors Island Agreement of 1993 to the capitulation by LTG Cédras in September 1994. Lastly, I review what the Haiti intervention reveals about setting the conditions for coercive diplomacy.

Context in Time

Understanding the Clinton administration's policy decisions in Haiti requires an understanding of several factors, including the Clinton administration's approach to enlargement and democracy promotion in a post-Cold War era, the U.S. humanitarian operations in Somalia initiated in the final weeks of the H.W. Bush administration, and the messy history of U.S.-Haiti relations.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ENLARGEMENT

The intervention in Haiti was a signature effort by the Clinton administration to assert America's role as a global leader in promoting democracy abroad. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States expanded efforts to encourage the development of democratic governments around the world. The Clinton administration entered office in January 1993 during the American transition from containment to enlargement. If facilitating democratic transitions for the former Soviet bloc nations was the strategic goal, it was imperative that the U.S. be able to protect a small democratic movement just a few hundred miles from Florida.

There were several foreign policy issues that carried over from George H.W. Bush to Clinton. Deputy National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, recalled, "we had a lot of things we wanted to do—NATO enlargement, opening to China, global economic integration. But we were overwhelmed in the first two years with the inherited agenda."¹⁵ The three main issues Clinton 'inherited' from H.W. Bush were Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Clinton's National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, recalled that Bosnia seemed like the most pressing security issue in his first months as National Security Advisor. "I would enter the Oval Office the first thing in the morning for our daily meetings with the President...I had often felt I had a "B" branded on my

forehead, for Bosnia.”* He noted that “the President would almost visibly wince when the [Bosnia] came up, as it did almost every day.”¹⁶ While senior leader attention initially focused on the conflict in Bosnia, the more difficult foreign policy issues for the new administration became Somalia and Haiti by the end of 1993.

Nancy Soderberg, the third-ranking official on Clinton’s National Security Council Staff, reflected on the challenge of implementing U.S. foreign policy early in the administration:

“There was no rule book after the Cold War. Clinton had the right instincts, but you get to the White House, and all these people say, ‘you can’t do it because it’s always been done this way....’ It took us two and a half years, essentially, to figure out the new rules of the post-Cold War era. Nobody gave us a book when we came in. The old way clearly wasn’t working. The world had fundamentally changed. The way you do business has to change, but how you do it took a while.”†

Tony Lake laid out the administration's view on this transition towards democracy promotion in a new era of enlargement in a speech on 21 September 1993. Berger explained that the “enlargement speech was an effort to create a new construct, containment vs. enlargement... it is an effort to articulate a more coherent, forward-looking view of America’s role.”¹⁷ Returning President Aristide to Haiti was a key component of this strategy. “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.” Lake presented this new vision of enlargement just three weeks before the tragic operation in Mogadishu and the humiliation of the *Harlan County* incident when the administration had appeared to be making some progress with several foreign policy issues

* Though NATO initiated its first ever combat action in February 1994 against Serbian aircraft on the Bosnian War, the conflict drew the most attention for Clinton the year after the Haiti intervention See Banja Luka Incident on 28 February 1994. The conflict in Bosnia would continue to escalate until the Dayton Accords were signed in November 1995.

† She then concluded: “So it did take us a long time to get [Jean-Bertrand] Aristide back, but we did it.” See Nancy Soderberg Interview, May 10, 2007, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

through diplomacy and American soft power. Haiti was on track since the Governors Island Agreement had just been signed, and the mission in Somalia appeared to be winding down.* Lake sought to differentiate the new U.S. approach to enlargement and democracy promotion from old Soviet ambitions of communist expansion. “The difference,” he explained, “is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion, or repression.”¹⁸ The problem in Haiti would soon make this assertion difficult when the Clinton administration struggled to restore democratic rule in Haiti through diplomatic and economic power alone. Almost exactly a year later, the United States would launch a military invasion of Haiti to restore democracy.

RECONCILING RUSSIA’S ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A MONROE DOCTRINE

One of the hidden considerations behind the U.S. military intervention in Haiti was the precedent such a move would set for the new Russian Federation. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a power vacuum throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkan states. Leaders of the new Russian Federation saw an opportunity to assert power as the preeminent regional power among former Soviet bloc countries.¹⁹ Lake proclaimed in his enlargement speech that “the end of the Cold War and the collapse of various repressive regimes has removed the lid from numerous caldrons of ethnic, religious or factional hatreds.”²⁰ Within a month of Clinton taking office, Boris Yeltsin declared, “the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR.”²¹

* Lake mentioned the optimistic progress in Somalia in his 21 September 1993 speech: “As we have approached our goals, we have reduced our military presence by 80 percent and transferred lead responsibility for peacekeeping and reconstruction to the UN. The withdrawal of our remaining combat troops is only a matter of time.”

Russia sought to assert its own jurisdictional claims over the former Soviet bloc just as President James Monroe had claimed U.S. primacy over the Western Hemisphere in 1823.²² The ‘Kozyrev doctrine’ declared “the post-Soviet region to be an area of exclusive interests, and in the implication that if Russia ever felt that this region was threatened, would have the right to take all steps.”^{*} Yet Russia’s credibility as a protectorate and peacekeeper of its near abroad was questionable by early 1994. Analysis of the regional conflicts from 1992 to 1994, where Russia served as the peacekeeper, revealed that Russia “intervened in such a way as to promote their escalation and/or continuation instead of their cessation.”²³ The new Russian power play meant the Clinton administration needed to be careful about how it went about applying military power in its own backyard to resolve regional security issues like Haiti.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

The experience with Somalia played a prominent role in how Clinton administration officials viewed policy options in Haiti. The two events literally came to a head in October of 1993 when 18 American Soldiers died in Somalia the same week the USS *Harlan County* was sailing to Port-au-Prince to enforce the Governors Island Agreement. The timing of the tragedy in Somalia and the outward similarities of the crises in Somalia and Haiti were unfortunate coincidences that reduced Clinton’s willingness to risk military force in Haiti. The policy decisions that the Clinton administration made towards Somalia also help in understanding some of the challenges that the administration later faced in dealing with Haiti. The Clinton administration had a tendency to muddle through policy issues without the President’s

* Named after Andrei Kozyrev, the newly established Russian Federation’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs under Boris Yeltzin. For further discussion about the Kozyrev Doctrine, see Bohuslav Litera “The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine,” *Perspectives*, winter 94/95, No. 4 (winter 94/95), pp. 45-52

involvement until the situation becomes a crisis. These issues of unclear objectives (Condition 1) and lacking strong leadership (Condition 4) emerge again during Haiti policy developments.

The operations in Somalia and Haiti shared several hidden similarities even if the circumstances that led the United States to intervene in two crises were different. The initial intervention in Somalia was about providing immediate relief to 1.5 million people starving from famine in a war-torn part of Africa. Haiti was supposed to restore democracy to a small island nation in the Caribbean. There are superficial similarities that make the two situations appear similar on 24-hour news segments: they both occurred in Third world countries with poor black populations and tumultuous systems of governance. Typecasting the two matters on their outward appearance alone, however, would be inappropriate and myopic.

There are some substantive similarities between the two situations. First, Bush and Clinton presented both interventions as humanitarian operations where the United States had a moral duty to provide assistance to a developing nation. Additionally, both commitments began as idealistic endeavors that then expanded into much wider military operations than originally intended. In both situations, the President and his closest advisors provided minimal oversight during the execution of the operations until public disasters struck. Finally, the U.S. policies towards both interventions were heavily influenced by a partner that had a specific agenda. Regarding U.S. policy in Somalia, the external sway came from the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In the Haiti situation, the external influence came from the exiled President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.*

* The United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali played a direct role in convincing the United States to take a greater role in providing humanitarian aid to the starving people in Somalia. The Secretary-General approached President Bush to ask for assistance in May of 1992. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia began in 1991 from droughts and crop failures that led to the collapse of the Somali government led by President Siad

The newly assembled Clinton team began trying to figure out what to do with the Somalia mission it had inherited from the Bush administration.* The former White House officials from the Bush administration meant the operation to last just a few weeks and spent 1992 deflecting suggestions from Boutros-Ghali to expand the mission beyond providing humanitarian aid.²⁴ However, the Clinton administration embraced suggestions from the United Nations Secretary-General to expand the mission in Somalia from humanitarian support to nation-building.[†] Some called it mission creep. Tony Lake defended the new objectives in what was called United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.[‡] “It wasn’t mission creep; it was mission creation. To try to figure out with the UN what to do with these soldiers so that we could try to leave behind us a sustainable position.”²⁵

Boutros Boutros-Ghali had a personal agenda and bias regarding Somalia and steered the Clinton administration to enable his objectives. Scowcroft recalled how Boutros-Ghali “had a deep involvement in Somalia historically. He wanted a certain outcome to the tribal struggle there. This was his opportunity to get it.” Prior to becoming the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-

Barre. Initial efforts by the Red Cross and United Nations struggled to support the 1.5 million Somalis at risk of starvation as warring factions fought for control of Somalia.

* The decision to send troops to Somalia in the last few weeks of the Bush administration was made without close consultation with the Clinton transition team. The Bush administration intended for the operation to last just a few months. Bush’s National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, recalled “it was a pretty small, contained operation of limited duration, couple of months, we thought.” General Colin Powell told reporters after the announcement that he estimated the U.S mission would last two to three months before turning the relief operation over to a multinational U.N. peace-keeping force. The outgoing administration tried to tell the Clinton transition team the same forecast. Soderberg recalled, “Scowcroft said, ‘Don’t worry, they’ll be out before you get here.’” See Brent Scowcroft Interview, August 11, 2000, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia; Nancy Soderberg Interview, May 10, 2007, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia; Don Oberdorfer, “Bush Sends Forces to Help Somalia,” *The Washington Post*, December 5, 1992.

† The UNOSOM II mandate was to “to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country’s institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country’s economy and infrastructure.” See “UNOSOM II Background” (United Nations, n.d.), UN Peacekeeping, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2backgr2.html>.

‡ UNSCR 814, signed 26 March 1993, gave UN a nation-building mission and established a new UN command (UNOSOM II) under U.S. Commander, ADM Howe, former Deputy NSC Advisor under Brent Scowcroft

Ghali had served as the foreign minister of Egypt under Presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, whom Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia had helped drive from power." Under UNOSOM II, the U.S. had now committed to leading a manhunting operation to remove General Aideed from power. The new operation in Somalia clearly identified who needed to be captured, though there was no clear plan on how the war-torn country would be led once Aideed was removed from power.

As the military mission expanded in support of nation building under Clinton, the risk to UN forces increased. "UNOSOM activities were almost entirely directed at the military struggle with the SNA, and humanitarian operations were significantly reduced."²⁶ A watershed moment occurred on 5 June 1993 when 25 Pakistani Soldiers under UNISOM II were killed in Mogadishu. Four American soldiers died on 8 August and six more were wounded on 22 August. In response to the increased attacks on US and UN forces, the Pentagon deployed Special Operations Forces to conduct combat raids to capture warlords in Mogadishu, including General Aideed.²⁷

Despite the change in objectives, and the increased risk to U.S. forces, senior leaders in the Clinton administration were not deeply invested in the ongoing operations in Somalia (a deficiency of strong or unified leadership – Condition 4). Cabinet officials often delegated strategic decisions about the operation to lower-level leaders. Historians in the Pentagon concluded in a report on Somalia that "discussions in the Deputies Committee, where guidance was formulated, came to revolve around short-term tactics without reference to long-term objectives."²⁸ The hunt for Aideed culminated in tragedy when two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during a raid on 3 October, leading to the deaths of 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu. The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey,

recalled that the first time there was a full National Security Council meeting with the President was right after the Battle of Mogadishu. “We had had, of course, principals’ meetings, which Tony Lake chaired, but no meeting with the President and the full National Security Council (NSC).”²⁹ The policy drifted without the President’s full attention, creating a lack of clear objectives (Condition 1).

Concerns about domestic perceptions (Condition 3) about the crisis in Somalia became an overriding factor for the President’s political advisors. Once the President did attend an NSC meeting, the discussion was not about policy decisions but about media strategies and public relations. There were more political advisors and White House aides than national security officials present. Nancy Soderberg would later admit, “It escalated in a way we should have been paying more attention to.” But she also reflected that part of the issue was neglect of civilian leadership over the military. “At the time, Powell was also running this show, saying, ‘we have this under control, we’re doing it. You just assume they know what they’re doing.’” She admitted that principals were not engaged enough to ask tough questions and reassess policies coasting along without oversight. “You don’t realize that in fact you always have to have a sanity check on these kinds of operations and say, ‘let’s review it, and ask the tough questions. We just didn’t.’”³⁰

Unfortunately, the Clinton administration allowed the same problems to develop with its foreign policy decisions regarding Haiti. The *Harlan County* incident suffered from a lack of senior leader oversight (Condition 4) until a public relations disaster struck and a lack of clear objectives (Condition 1) enabled external influences to commandeer U.S. policy direction.

UNDERSTANDING HAITI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND DEMOCRACY

There are several aspects of Haiti's history that are important to understand when examining the U.S. intervention in Haiti during the Clinton administration. Significant events include Haiti's fight for independence from France from 1791 to 1804, the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, and the transition from autocratic rule under the Duvalier dynasty (1957-1986) to the election of President Aristide in 1990.*

Haiti and the United States share a deep connection as the first two nations in the western hemisphere to earn their independence from a colonial power. While the United States declared its independence in 1776 from Britain, Haitians revolted against their colonial ruler, France, in 1791 and finally won its independence in 1804. Over these thirteen years, Haiti achieved military victories against three major global powers, including France, Spain, and Great Britain. First, the slave revolt in Haiti forced the French to abandon the island in 1793.† Then Britain and Spain attempted to capture the island in 1794, only to be beaten by the Haitians as well. Napoleon sent French troops back in 1801 with a force of 25,000 men and seventy warships to recapture the island under General Charles LeClerc.³¹ Starvation, yellow fever, and determined Haitian resistance slowly eroded French forces. Haitian leaders finally claimed independence on 1 January 1804 after inflicting an estimated sixty thousand French casualties.³² Defeating French, British, and Spanish forces during the Haitian Revolution would become not just a source of

* Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier was first elected President in 1957 and remained "President for Life" until his death in 1971. His son, Jean-Baptiste "Baby Doc" Duvalier, succeeded his father as President for Life at age 19. He ruled Haiti until he fled to France exile in 1986.

† The white French settlers (often bringing along their black slaves) who fled Haiti during the revolution sought refuge in the United States. The influx of the refugees from Haiti in 1793 to the U.S. was a driving factor to the creation of the Alien and Seditions Act of 1798. See "The United States and the Haitian Revolution, 1791-1804" (U.S. Department of State, n.d.), Office of the Historian, Milestones, 1784-1800, The United States and the Haitian Revolution, 1791-1804, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/haitian-rev>; "Alien and Sedition Acts (1798)" (National Archives, n.d.), Milestones, <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/alien-and-sedition-acts>.

pride for future generations but would also give inspiration to the Cédras junta when faced with the threat of invasion by a global power in 1994.

The relationship between the United States and Haiti in 1994 was (and remains) complex. On the one hand, there was a longstanding tradition of military cooperation between the two countries. Free black Haitians helped the Colonial Army in the American Revolution fight the British, including at the Battle of Savannah in 1779.³³ President John Adams returned the favor in 1800 by providing ammunition and over 2,000 muskets to support the Haitian revolution.* The first commanders of the modern Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armées d'Haïti—FAd'H) were active-duty officers of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and Navy. Not only were the pictures of these white American officers on the wall outside Lieutenant General Cédras' office when Carter, Powell, and Nunn were warning of an imminent U.S. military invasion in September of 1994, but the photos of U.S. military commanders remained hung on the wall in the FAd'H headquarters until at least 2010.†

The relationship between the FAd'H and USMC originated with the U.S. occupation of Haiti that began in 1915 during the Woodrow Wilson presidency and continued for the next nineteen years. The stated purpose of the occupation resembled the justification to intervene in 1994: to restore order after political instability. Seven Haitian presidents had either been killed or overthrown between 1911 and 1915. Haiti was at risk of complete collapse and was believed to

* Though there was strong common ground between the newly established United States of America and the independent Haitian government, the U.S. was reluctant to formally recognize Haiti's independence. Slave holders in the U.S. remained concerned about the secondary effect of supporting slave revolts. Indeed, the first leader of independent Haiti, a self-proclaimed emperor, began his reign by leading a slaughter of the remaining white and mulatto former colonists on the island. The United States refused to recognize Haiti's independence until Abraham Lincoln's presidency in 1862. See Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 54.

† Confirmed in discussion with Lynn Garrison on 17 January 2023, who verified the photos remained on the wall in the FAd'H headquarters when the building was destroyed in the 2010 earthquake.

be susceptible to German influence.* The ensuing occupation exploited Haitian resources and oppressed the population. Forced segregation, press restrictions, and forced labor policies led to peasant rebellions.³⁴ President Franklin Roosevelt finally ended the occupation and withdrew U.S. forces in 1934 under his ‘Good Neighbor Policy.’ When U.S. forces threatened to invade Haiti again in 1994, Haitians were inherently distrustful of American interests. Many Haitians still possessed vivid images from the stories of the previous American occupation that had ended only sixty years before.

The democratic elections that resulted in Jean-Bertrand Aristide becoming president in 1990 was a remarkable achievement of democratic progress, given the long precedent of political instability in Haiti. The political violence from 1911 to 1915 that triggered the first U.S. occupation was not an isolated occurrence. The first hundred years of Haiti’s self-rule had seen a turbulent succession of self-designated emperors, kings, and presidents who recurrently fell to violent mobs, revolts, and assassins. Haiti’s first emperor was stoned and dismembered two years after taking power. The Haitian Army emerged as the “kingmaker of Haitian politics” for the two decades after the U.S. occupation, where corruption and volatility persisted.†

Haiti experienced political stability from 1957 to 1986 during the ‘Duvalier Dynasty,’ but such continuity was built on a foundation of oppression and corruption . The dynasty began with Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who became president in 1957. Papa Doc quickly asserted himself as an autocratic dictator and designed himself as President-for-Life and reinforced the

* As World War I ravaged Europe, there was a large expatriate community of Germans living in Haiti, including businessmen who married Haitian women to circumvent laws prohibiting foreigners from owning land in Haiti.

† Haiti cycled through five different military dictatorships in 10 months before the 1957 presidential elections. See “International Delegation Report on Haiti Elections” (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, December 16, 1990), 30, The Carter Center.

mystical power of voodoo during his reign. The beliefs in voodoo became a real element of society in Haiti.

Papa Doc exploited Washington's fears of communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere to secure much-needed financial aid from the U.S. State Department. The ascent of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959 further solidified Washington's uneasy support to the Duvalier governments. When Papa Doc died in 1971, his nineteen-year-old son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, succeeded his father in becoming Haiti's next President-for-Life. Both Duvaliers led through fear and violence, amassing tremendous personal wealth through corrupt practices, while most Haitians suffered from poverty and lived in squalor. The father and son became dictators with demi-God cults of personality, much like the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Un lineage in North Korea. Papa Doc played up voodoo superstition to shore up his power. Baby Doc, born into opulence, flaunted a lavish lifestyle.* The impoverished public grew tired of the first family's ostentatious habits and eventually revolted against Baby Doc's rule.† The Reagan administration assisted in applying international pressure to persuade Baby Doc to flee with his family to live in exile in France on 7 February 1986.‡

Haiti's transition to democracy over the next five years was tumultuous. A planned election in 1987 was aborted after 34 people were massacred on election day. A subsequent

* His wedding in 1980 to Michele Bennet was one of the most expensive weddings in history at the time. See "Duvalier Weds in Style," *The Washington Post*, May 28, 1980.

† A visit by the Pope in March 1983 to Haiti first triggered public resentment of Baby Doc's disproportionate lifestyle. Pope John Paul II spoke to crowds of Haitians gathered. In broken creole, the Pope "condemned what he described as the excessive inequality and misery, hunger and fear suffered by many people in Haiti" and called on the Duvalier's to change. See Marlise Simons, "Pope in Haiti, Assails Inequality, Hunger and Fear," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1983, sec. A8; Joshua Jakobitz, "Michele Bennett Duvalier: Never Complain, Never Explain," *Polo Lifestyles*, June 2021.

‡ Jean-Baptiste "Baby Doc" Duvalier and his family fled to France in exile under the assistance of the U.S. Air Force. He returned to Haiti in 2011 and died in 2014. See Randal Archibold, "Jean-Claude Duvalier Dies at 63; Ruled Haiti in Father's Brutal Fashion," *The New York Times*, October 4, 2014.

election in 1988 was widely believed to have been rigged by the military.³⁵ But Haitians persisted in distancing themselves from the torture of the Duvalier regimes and managed to organize successful elections in December 1990. Former President Jimmy Carter led a delegation of non-partisan international observers to certify the elections.³⁶ A dutiful young Colonel in the Haitian Armed Forces named Raoul Cédras was appointed by the interim government to protect the population against violence and intimidation during the elections. It was during these elections that “Carter took a shine to Cédras at that time because Cédras made such a contribution to election security.”*

Father Aristide’s presidential bid was highly popular among the youth and impoverished Haitian population. His populist movement earned the support of the streets by activating the frustrations of the lower class. He championed the concept of *Lavalas*, meaning “cleansing flood,” and a new Haitian society based on “justice for the disenfranchised.”³⁷ His Lavalas platform ran against the elites on a vocal anti-Duvalier platform. Aristide became sure that he would carry the majority vote in the elections. On election day, Aristide resented questions by Carter’s election observers about whether he would respect the results of the free elections if he was not the winner. The report noted Aristide “insisted that he would win” to one of the delegation members, “and, if he didn’t, it followed that the elections were rigged.”³⁸ He turned out to be the only candidate on the ballot to suggest that he would renounce unfavorable election results. There would be no election disputes that day as Aristide came out with 67.5 percent of the popular vote out of eleven candidates on the ballot. The runner-up earned 14 percent.³⁹

* That relationship would become the genesis for Carter’s role in leading the delegation to negotiate with Cédras on the eve of the U.S. invasion in September 1994. Quote from Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, 94, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

While none of the losing candidates disputed the election, Aristide's ascent to power was almost derailed by a coup a month before inauguration day. On 6 January 1991, a former Duvalier official temporarily overthrew the interim government. The Haitian Armed Forces intervened, and the coup was foiled. Aristide attempted to accelerate his inauguration, but the reimposed interim president upheld the constitutional process. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was formally sworn in as the democratically elected president of Haiti on 7 February 1991. This was exactly five years after Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier was run out of Haiti. To both the Haitian people and leaders in Washington, the future of Haiti seemed bright. One young Aristide supporter told reporters celebrating the new President's democratic victory, "Today, Haitian democracy is born after 186 years of misrule. We have finally found the man we need after so many years."⁴⁰

Once in office, however, President Aristide became a controversial leader. He began accruing similar accusations of violence and repression that plagued the Duvalier era. In Washington, officials began noticing that Aristide "was not a stable nor an honest individual. He started agitating crowds against his political enemies."⁴¹ President Aristide seemed to incite vigilante justice against his political opponents and Duvalier loyalists by encouraging mobs by necklacing individuals. * Necklacing, also known as *Pere Lebrun*, was an extrajudicial form of execution first introduced in South Africa during apartheid. Rubber tires would be placed around the neck of a bound individual, the rim would be filled with gasoline, and the tire would be lit on

* Speaking about the Duvalier loyalists and henchmen known as *Tonton Macoutes*, President Aristide told his audience in a speech on 27 September 1991: "when you catch one, don't hesitate to give him what he deserves. What a beautiful tool! What a beautiful instrument! What a beautiful piece of equipment! It's beautiful, yes, it's beautiful, it's cute, it's pretty, it has a good smell, wherever you go you want to inhale it. Since the law of the country says Macoute isn't in the game, whatever happens to him he deserves, he came looking for trouble." See translation at Jean-Bertrand Aristide, "President Aristide's 'Pere Lebrun' Speech, Translated by Haiti Observateur" (Haiti, September 27, 1991), <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/009.html>.

fire. The unsettling behavior of the charismatic new president drew alarm from members of the Haitian Parliament, aristocrats, and members of the military, who began to see Aristide as another populist dictator in the making.⁴² By September 1991, just seven months after his inauguration, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was run out of Haiti in a military coup led by the very officer entrusted to oversee the security of the 1990 elections.

The Personnel Behind the Policy

The actors in the Haiti intervention separate themselves into several layers of influence. On the surface, main decision-makers like President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Secretaries of Defense Les Aspin and William Perry are prominent in the sense that they retained formal authority to adjudicate major decisions. But the Haiti case study exemplifies how many foreign policy issues are driven at levels below the President's Cabinet.

Clinton was the first democrat in the White House in twelve years when he took office in 1993. The team dealing with Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia were a mix-match of carry overs from the Carter administration, staffers who came with Clinton from Arkansas, and a new wave of young staffers beginning their careers in politics. There were inherent tensions between these different camps, and they were just going through the storming and forming phase of organizational groups.* Clinton's team contrasted with the seasoned and familiar team Johnson worked with during the USS *Pueblo* incident in 1968.†

* Tuckman's stages of group development are storming, forming, norming, performing. See Tuckman, Bruce W (1965). "Developmental sequence in small groups". *Psychological Bulletin*. **63** (6): 384–399. [doi:10.1037/h0022100](https://doi.org/10.1037/h0022100). [PMID 14314073](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14314073/)

† By 1968, Johnson's leaders had not just served with him for five years during his administration, but most of the senior officials in Johnson's administration had also been together since the beginning of Kennedy's presidency in 1961. They may not have all gotten along, but they knew each other well. See Chapter 3: The *Pueblo* Incident.

For both the Departments of Defense and State, the Deputy Secretaries became the senior officials to shepherd the policy as the U.S. headed towards the intervention in 1994.* This included Strobe Talbott as Deputy Secretary of State, who was responsible for Haiti policy issues on behalf of Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Talbott had a unique role at State because he was also a friend of Bill Clinton, dating back to their time together as roommates and Rhodes Scholars at Oxford.⁴³ Talbott was also a respected expert on Russia who “sat in every Clinton-Yeltsin meeting and otherwise managed the Bill-Boris relationship.”⁴⁴

National Security Advisor Tony Lake and his deputy, Sandy Berger, took the lead for the White House on overseeing the Haiti policy developments. Lake and Berger were often assisted by a career Foreign Service Officer assigned to the National Security Council Staff named Lawrence “Larry” Rossin, who had previously served in U.S. embassy in Haiti.⁴⁵ These three would become the leading advocates for military intervention in Haiti.

Two former U.S. officials also played prominent roles in the Haiti intervention. President Jimmy Carter repeatedly comes to the fore during Clinton’s dealings with Haiti. So does General Colin Powell, who begins the Clinton administration as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and reappears at the momentous finale of the intervention as a pivotal member of Clinton’s delegation sent to negotiate Cédras’ surrender.

There are numerous actors in both the Aristide and Cédras camps who shaped Clinton’s efforts in Haiti. This chapter often references Cédras, but he was actually the figurehead of a

* John Deutch became the Deputy Secretary of Defense after William Perry moved up from Deputy to Secretary of Defense in the winter of 1993. Perry delegated several policy issues to Deutch when Perry became Secretary of Defense, including the Haiti portfolio after becoming frustrated that Aspin had failed to delegate important policy issues despite being consumed by other pressing matters. See William Perry Interview, February 21, 2006, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

team of coup co-conspirators in Haiti that helped him run the junta.* This includes several infamous Haitian military leaders, including Colonel Guy Francois who ran the Haitian police, Cédras' deputy Brigadier General Phillippe Biamby, and Emanuel "Toto" Constant who led the extrajudicial militia group known as *FRAPH*.⁴⁶ In May 1994, Cédras also appointed his own President in Haiti, Emile Jonassaint, to lead the Provisional Government of Haiti. Jonassaint was largely a puppet figure that the United States declined to recognize since he was propped up by the junta. When Bill Swing became the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti in October 1993, his instructions from the Secretary of State was to only deal with Aristide's Prime Minister "and those members of his cabinet in hiding, and not to have a relationship with the military."⁴⁷ Jonassaint had no authority in Washington's eyes. Aristide was the legitimate President of Haiti.

A key figure behind Aristide was his personal lawyer, Michael Barnes, who was sometimes referred to as Aristide's "de facto foreign minister" during his exile in Washington.⁴⁸ Barnes' most important credential was that he was a former Democratic U.S. Congressman from Maryland, which was very helpful in Aristide's efforts to leverage Capitol Hill to influence Clinton's policies towards Haiti.⁴⁹

One of the most interesting relationships in this study is the connection between Bill Clinton, Jimmy Carter, and refugees from the Caribbean.

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON

President Bill Clinton was not known for his foreign policy expertise when he came into office. He was a young and ambitious Democratic Governor from Arkansas who had a gift for

* I refer to the government in Haiti as the junta to distinguish from President Aristide's legal authority as the recognized president of Haiti. When referencing the junta, I am using it in the context of how the oxford dictionary defines it: "a military or political group that rules a country after taking power by force."

connecting with domestic audiences. The tagline from Clinton's 1992 presidential election became 'The economy, stupid!' followed up by 'Don't forget health care!'⁵⁰ His popularity with the military was low, especially in his first year in office. Clinton was characterized by his critics as a Vietnam-era draft dodger who surrounded himself with young, naive staffers who did not respect the military. As Defense Secretary William Perry remarked years later, "It was more of a legend than it was a fact. But nevertheless, legends can hurt you too...the legend that the Clinton White House was hostile."⁵¹ Clinton made reforming DoD's policy towards gays in the military a major defense initiative for his first year in office. Perry recalled the push "consumed everything. [It] sucked up all the air. Everything we did was somehow revolving around that problem," which ultimately yielded the widely unsatisfactory compromise policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."^{*} William Perry, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, recalled the policy "solidified the view that the Clinton administration was hostile to, and didn't understand, the U.S. military."⁵² Clinton's true character, though, was much different from the public myth suggested. The military officers who worked closest with him, including General Hugh Shelton and General Shalikashvili, described a compassionate and dedicated leader who demonstrated the highest level of respect for the military. Indeed, Clinton's superpower seemed to be his ability to connect with people individually.

One relationship in the Haiti episode that Clinton struggled to maintain was with former President Jimmy Carter. The friction between Clinton and Carter originated in 1980 after a

^{*} Perry recalled the general dissatisfaction about the policy result. "The military was not happy with it, but was willing to accept it. The Congress was not happy with it, but was willing to accept it. The President was not happy with it, but was willing to accept it. The gay community was certainly not happy with it. But it ended, I said six months, almost close to a year—at least nine months—of this acrimonious debate that, even more than the first issue I talked about, solidified the view that the Clinton administration was hostile to, and didn't understand, the U.S. military." See William Perry Interview, February 21, 2006, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

messy incident involving 19,000 Cuban refugees from the Mariel Boatlift and armed Klu Klux Klansmen in what became known as the Fort Chaffee Riots.⁵³ Clinton was in his first term as governor of Arkansas and Carter was serving what would be his last year as President. President Jimmy Carter was struggling with how to manage over 120,000 Cuban refugees who were flooding the beaches of Florida in 1980.

To alleviate the burden Florida was facing, Carter distributed refugees to federal facilities across the country, including Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Since installations like Fort Chaffee were federal facilities, Carter did not need Clinton's permission to relocate the refugees. The 33-year-old Democratic governor begrudgingly supported the initiative (in large part out of party loyalty). Shortly after the refugees arrived at Fort Chafee, riots broke out among some of the Cubans. Refugees fled the installation after the active-duty U.S. Army garrison commander claimed he lacked the authority to intervene with law enforcement matters.* Clinton was widely praised for his handling of the ensuing riots that Carter had thrust upon him. Following the unrest, a White House official flew to Arkansas to publicly promise not to send any more refugees to Arkansas. But later in the summer, the White House sent all refugees from other federal facilities to Fort Chaffee, overwhelming Arkansan authorities. Clinton was furious. He told a Carter aide: "You're fucking kidding me! How could you do this to me? I busted my ass for Carter. You guys are going to get me beat. I've done everything I could for you guys. This is ridiculous! Carter's too chickenshit about it to tell me directly!"⁵⁴

* This is a dilemma between Title 10 (Active Duty) and Title 32 (National Guard) authority for members of the military. Guard members have the ability to act in a law enforcement capacity that Title 10 does not allow for active duty service members.

The political fodder that Carter created led to Clinton losing his reelection campaign that fall, one of only two elections that Clinton ever lost in his political career. Clinton had also warned that the decision to consolidate refugees in Arkansas would result in Carter losing Arkansas in the 1992 Presidential elections. Clinton, though, would come back to retake the Governor's Mansion in Arkansas the following election. Thus Clinton became both the 40th and 42nd Governor of Arkansas because of a refugee crisis and a betrayal by Jimmy Carter. The experience from the 1980 Fort Chafee riots gave Clinton political scar tissue for Caribbean refugees and a healthy distrust of Jimmy Carter. Both of these issues would reemerge in the summer of 1994 as Clinton assessed his chances to become the first Democrat since Roosevelt to become a two-term president.

Tracing the Policy Process: The U.S. Intervention in Haiti

I break the U.S. intervention in Haiti into three main phases. In the first phase, I analyze how the Clinton administration attempted to implement the Governors Island Agreement without fully understanding the environment in Haiti or the risks and costs of what it might take to return Aristide to power. In the second phase of this study, I examine how the Clinton administration assessed its remaining options after the disastrous outcome of the *Harlan County* incident. From November 1993 to August 1994, U.S. officials conducted a comprehensive review of not just the ways and means to return Aristide to Haiti but the wider policy options on whether Aristide was worth supporting. The last phase of this study concentrates on the final month leading up to the invasion. This phase includes the dramatic final negotiations by President Carter, General (RET) Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn between 17-18 September 1994 with LTG Cédras on the eve of the U.S. planned invasion.

All three phases have their own interesting components that add important insights to the condition setting in coercive diplomacy. The *Harlan County* incident reveals how self-inflicted mistakes can ruin U.S. efforts to apply coercive diplomacy. The middle phase, occurring from November 1993 to July 1994, underscores the political realities and uncomfortable dilemmas involved in national security decision-making. The last phase seeks to understand how overwhelming American power struggled to persuade a weaker opponent to comply with demands.

PART I: GOVERNORS ISLAND AND THE *HARLAN COUNTY* INCIDENT

Several conditions of coercive diplomacy contributed to the *Harlan County* incident, including disunity between political and military leaders (a lack of Condition 4), a lack of clear objectives (Condition 1), and a low willingness to accept risk and costs (Condition 2). The lack of cohesion among senior officials created problems with synchronization between political, military, and diplomatic leaders in planning the operation. For military planners, the political aims were difficult to track or operationalize. Poor military preparations, including hasty military planning efforts ahead of the mission and a divided command structure during the mission, caused the military operation to be significantly less capable than senior officials would expect. The political resolve for the operation eroded just as the *Harlan County* sailed down to the Caribbean due to the tragic events that unfolded in Mogadishu, leaving 18 American soldiers dead. The calamity in Somalia changed the political will for U.S. military assistance to developing nations.

The *Harlan County* incident exposes how tensions arise in coercive diplomacy between political officials in the White House, leaders of the Pentagon, military commanders leading

operations, and diplomats attempting to manage peace agreements. Individual equities and expectations can collide between these different groups. Cohesive leadership, clear objectives, and a shared understanding of the acceptable risks and costs of the operations are essential to success. When the U.S. fails to achieve these conditions, unforced errors like the *Harlan County* incident are more likely to occur, undermining coercive diplomacy efforts.

Limited Military Capabilities

The USS *Harlan County* carried the first detachment of troops set to arrive in Haiti under the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) established to reinforce the Governors Island Agreement.⁵⁵ These forces included a company of US Army Special Forces, a US Marine Corps Military Police platoon, US Navy Seabees, and a detachment of Royal Canadian Air Force engineers.* On paper, the units assembled to participate in the mission combined into an impressive force. Yet, this team was slapped together in an ad hoc fashion. These men and women had neither worked together before nor clearly understood the mission they were about to perform. Within the Haiti Assistance Group planning cell, “everything was in chaos. Planners from all services were thrown together trying to figure out what they were doing without much organization.”⁵⁶ The members of the Task Force eventually stumbled out the door of their planning cells into the

* The *Harlan County* mission down to Haiti was in support of UNSCR 867, unanimously approved on 23 September 1993, authorizing the establishment of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The mission was to dispatch up to 567 police and 700 military observers to Haiti for up to six months. Resolution 867 was part of “a proposal from the Government of Haiti requesting the United Nations to provide assistance in creating a new police force and in modernizing the Haitian armed forces.” The majority of these forces would be provided by the United States so the Department of Defense assembled a team of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines to support the UNMIH. Army Colonel James G. “Gregg” Pulley, the commander of the U.S. Army 7th Special Forces Group, was meant to lead the multinational and multiservice group. Recognizing no one in the Task Force had served above the brigade level, COL Pulley recruited an officer with what he felt was “the requisite rank or perhaps experience” to train the Haitian Army’s senior leadership about “what we think a good army ought to be.” Walter Kretchik, *Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 33. See also Horace Bartilow, “Diplomatic Victory Misunderstood: A Two-Level Game Analysis of US Policy toward Haiti,” *Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 115–52; Peter Riehm, “The USS *Harlan County* Affair,” *Military Review* 77, no. 4 (August 1997).

Harlan County without even a clear picture of the personnel in the JTF or what equipment they were bringing along.⁵⁷

The military's role in supporting the UN Mission in Haiti was unclear to military planners (Condition 1). The Governor's Island Agreement vaguely called for "technical assistance for development" and assistance with modernizing the Armed Forces of Haiti, which was loosely allowed for military engineers to conduct construction projects. But the true purpose of including the U.S. military in the agreement was never really about road repair or other infrastructure projects.* It was about presenting a show of force to ensure the peaceful transition of power. The unwritten political aim of sending troops down to Haiti on ships like the *Harlan County* was to signal U.S. commitment to promoting democracy. Lieutenant General John Sheehan testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 October 1993 that "the best teachers of democracy we have in this Nation are the young lance corporals and corporals who can teach some of these Haitians what they need to know."[†] The various units within what was named Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG) did their best to meet the chain of command's expectations, but they were not really the right tool for the job. They were trained as

* Military units assigned to the Joint Task Force (JTF) struggled to operationalize the political intent of the mission. During the six weeks of planning before sailing down to Haiti, representatives of the various units in the JTF attempted to decipher how their capabilities support the UN mission. The Governor's Island Agreement just stated international cooperation would provide 1) technical and financial assistance for development; 2) assistance for the administrative and judicial reform; and 3) assistance for modernizing the Armed Forces of Haiti and establishing a new Police Force with the presence of United Nations personnel in these fields. For many of these members, they were doing their individual best to fabricate some semblance of constructive service they could provide. Task Force planners eventually devised an array of justifiable missions, including clinic renovations, road repairs, police training and army professional development efforts. See Walter Kretchik, *Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 33. and "Governor's Island Agreement" (United Nations, July 3, 1993).

[†] LTG Sheehan's altruistic desire to preserve democracy typifies US democracy promotion efforts in the 1990s. Carothers (1999) characterizes such missions as "a tragicomic picture of democracy promoters as arrogant fools forcing simplistic schemes onto societies they do not understand, all the while preaching hollow homilies about the wonders of democracy. It is either misleading to the public or misleading to decision-makers to overemphasize the ability of tactical military units to lead democracy promotion efforts. See "Current Military Operations, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services" (Washington D.C., October 12, 1993).

combat engineers, military police, special operators, and medics. These professional Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines may have intrinsically represented the strength of democracy and symbols of government stability, but they lacked genuine qualifications to teach democracy or provide the requests for support outlined in the Governors Island Agreement.

Distracted Leaders and Rash Decisions

The *Harlan County* incident also suffered from a deficiency in strong and unified leadership (Condition 4). Small-scale operations in Somalia and Haiti were not the focus of senior leaders in the Pentagon in the fall of 1993. The Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, was consumed by a domestic political issue instead. William Perry, who was the Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the first year of the Clinton administration, recalled, “[Aspin] would be in meetings, literally four or five hours at a time on this gays-in-the-military thing, and operational issues were just coming and going.” As far as operations like the *Harlan County* arriving at Port-au-Prince to initiate the UN Mission in Haiti or the Ranger raids to capture warlords in Somalia, Perry recalled, “nobody would be aware of it...It was a turbulent period, to put it mildly.”⁵⁸ Perry noted that Aspin had the right to delegate oversight of these operations to Perry as his deputy but chose not to. “So along with these meetings on the gays in the military, they then strung a whole series of meetings about what to do about Somalia... [and the riots] going on in Haiti.”

While JTF HAG sailed down the Atlantic coast toward Haiti, U.S. Army Rangers in Somalia found themselves in the fight of their lives on 3-4 October 1993 in Operation GOTHIC SERPENT. Though on the other side of the world, the mission in Haiti bore some uncomfortably similar characteristics to the U.S. mission in Mogadishu. Some leaders, including diplomats working inside Haiti, felt there were distinctions that differentiated Haiti from Somalia, but

others couldn't look past the superficial similarities.⁵⁹ As Mogadishu turned into a national tragedy and exposed U.S. military vulnerabilities, new attention turned to the operation beginning in Haiti. The administration became divided between hawks who wanted to use military force and the doves, mostly from within the Pentagon, who wanted to try other forms of pressure before committing combat troops to what risked become 'Somalia II.'⁶⁰

Many senior leaders in the White House and Pentagon were not willing to accept the risks and costs of implementing the UN Mission in Haiti once apparent opposition had emerged on the docks (Condition 2). After reviewing the initial assessments out of Somalia, Secretary Aspin declared there were seven showstoppers that needed to be resolved before JTF HAG could land in Haiti.* Some of these were not really showstoppers at all but DoD-internal issues, like the Rules of Engagement for the troops in JTF HAG. The U.S. Special Envoy, Lawrence Pezzullo, told the Deputy National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, "We're getting sandbagged here, man... Those guys at OSD are going to try to abort this. If they do, this administration is going to look terrible. We have real problems here with discipline within the administration, and if we don't clear it up, we'll never be able to act."⁶¹ But Secretary Aspin's hesitation towards the upcoming Haiti mission also reflected the growing realization that the plan was poorly developed and contained dangerous ambiguities towards purpose. The press began reporting how Secretary Aspin and his DoD planners were growing concerned that "the small, lightly armed international force that was scheduled to go into the country would be incapable of preventing violence."⁶²

The DoD mission accounted for only a completely permissive environment, wherein the Haitians

* Aspin was hesitant about walking into another potential catastrophe after the recent experience in Somalia. For more about the influence of recency bias in decision-making, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

would welcome the UN force with open arms and no threat of resistance. The sudden deterioration of events in Somalia exposed the fault in that optimistic planning assumption. Now the Task Force was unprepared to meet the overall political objectives because of limitations built into their plan.

While the debate went on among policymakers about the suitability of JTF HAG's mission and the potential risk in sending the troops ashore, a key leader was missing from the dialogue: the Commander in Chief. The president was not involved in any of the critical discussions about the troops sailing towards Haiti.⁶³ It was not until the *Harlan County* situation turned into a crisis at Port-au-Prince that President Clinton was roped into the issue, at which point the US had less room for political maneuver.⁶⁴ When subordinate commanders called the Secretary of Defense for guidance on whether to land the troops in Haiti, Aspin "was busy doing something else at the time again." Faced with reports of unruly mobs, Aspin made a snap judgment. "His decision, a telephonic decision, based on limited information, was, 'well, we've got to pull the forces back.'"⁶⁵

Aspin's immediate impulses matched the White House's political inclinations to withdraw the *Harlan County* immediately. There was little interest within the Clinton administration to spark a confrontation in Haiti in October 1993. The Deputy National Security Advisor, Nancy Soderberg, later reflected in her memoir that "in the fall of 1993, the administration had no intention of using U.S. ground troops to [forcefully] restore President Aristide to power."⁶⁶ The administration was willing to deploy troops as a diplomatic gesture, but not in a combat role.

The Clinton administration was overly concerned with the domestic optics of the *Harlan County* incident (Condition 3). Sandy Berger recalled "we were driven by the political public

relations, public affairs view that it was disastrous” to let the *Harlan County* linger in Port-au-Prince harbor. Berger admitted that the administration “listened too much to the press people who said, ‘you can’t let the *Harlan County* just sit there—it would become a symbol of American impotence.”⁶⁷ Berger later reflected on his regret for allowing the administration to make such a hasty decision to abort the UN Mission in Haiti. The whole debacle could have been avoided if they had just exercised a little tactical patience. Three days after the embarrassing withdrawal of the *Harlan County*, the administration imposed new economic sanctions on Haiti and sent six frigates “to patrol, essentially seal Haiti.” Had the administration kept the *Harlan County* anchored safely offshore while they assessed what the best response to the unruly gatherings at the port was, there would never have been a ‘*Harlan County* Incident.’ Berger noted that if the U.S. had “sent the six frigates and imposed the embargo first, the *Harlan County* could have disappeared, and no one would have ever noticed it.”⁶⁸ But none of the decision-makers had the presence of mind to think about the second and third-order effects of withdrawing the *Harlan County* under pressure. Clausewitz might say that none of the decision-makers possessed a *coup d’oeil*, or inward eye, to see the breadth of consequences when making rapid decisions.⁶⁹ In retrospect, Berger noted, “we should have just let it sit there, figured out what the next step was, and then done the *Harlan County* in concert.”*

* Berger expanded on his reflections about the need to exercise patience: “One of the things I learned from Tony [Lake] was that sometimes you have to just suck it up and take the press hits for a couple of days until you know you’ve got it right. The instinct of the press guys is the news cycle. Now we have a 24-hour news cycle. So, they’re getting bombarded. Every 20 minutes, the picture of the *Harlan County* is running on CNN, and these guys who are living in this bubble of world—thinking that people around the country are watching nothing but CNN all day, when of course that’s not true—tremendous pressure builds up. You’ve got to do something. You’ve got to get the *Harlan County* out of there. Had we taken our hits for two days and then decided we were going to put an embargo on Haiti, send six frigates around, the *Harlan County* story would not now be legendary, it would have gone away.” See Samuel R. Berger Interview, March 24, 2005, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

PART II: POLICY REASSESSMENT (OCTOBER 93 -JULY 94)

This phase reveals how the U.S. policy towards Haiti shifted from diplomacy to military invasion during the period between the October 1993 *Harlan County* incident and the Haitian refugee crisis that peaked in July 1994. Immediately after the *Harlan County* incident shattered the Governors Island Agreement, the Clinton administration encountered several competing dilemmas regarding its policy towards Haiti. First, the U.S. needed to find a way to pressure LTG Cédras to step down from power. Some officials advocated for the use of force, while others still believed diplomatic and economic power could resolve the crisis without hostilities. Second, Clinton administration officials struggled with convincing President Aristide to cooperate with U.S. initiatives. President Aristide was becoming increasingly stubborn and resistant to mediation efforts by the U.S. and United Nations. He became a polarizing figure within the U.S. government, where some groups held him in high regard, and others, including the Central Intelligence Agency, viewed him as a duplicitous and corrupt leader not worth supporting. Lastly, after the *Harlan County* incident, the Clinton administration faced significant political and public pressure over U.S. policies towards Haiti. This included a growing refugee crisis in the Caribbean and lobbying efforts for the U.S. to take a stronger stance in support of President Aristide.

Reassessing the Problem after *Harlan County*

The pressure to find a new policy to restore democracy in Haiti began immediately after the political and diplomatic disaster created by the *Harlan County's* withdrawal on 12 October 1993. The Clinton administration's immediate actions were to reimpose new oil sanctions on Haiti. These sanctions had little coercive effect. They were seen more as a perfunctory measure to save face after the embarrassing retreat by the U.S. military. Cédras told a journalist profiling

him for *Vanity Fair* that the first round of sanctions from President Bush "had no adverse effects—the population was very indifferent." When asked about the embargo imposed after the *Harlan County* incident, Cédras told the reporter with a shrug: "It's just another day of the week."⁷⁰ Cédras countered with his own coercive diplomacy twenty-four hours later by assassinating President Aristide's Minister of Justice, Guy Malary, outside his office in Haiti.* The murder was an ominous signal that the crisis in Haiti was deteriorating. Cédras had successfully created a sense of urgency in the mind of some U.S. officials (Condition 6).

Congressman Charlie Rangel, a Democratic representative from New York, held a press conference denouncing the situation in Haiti. "The thugs in Haiti have clearly shown by the assassination of the young Minister of Justice exactly what they think about diplomatic initiatives," Rangel told reporters, even though he had historically been opposed to the use of force to resolve international disputes.⁷¹ Rangel felt the situation in Haiti now called for stronger action: "I think the time is now that if the UN is to have any credibility in the future... they should consider immediately taking over the military government in Haiti by the use of the international military intervention."⁷² Rangel tried to argue that an invasion could be conducted by an international force instead of unilateral U.S. military action. However, this appears to have been more of a politically motivated suggestion than a realistic policy recommendation. There was no appetite by the international community to conduct a military intervention in Haiti without the United States taking a major role.[†] Rangel's rhetoric was still a powerful shift in his stated policy

* Malary was killed by police forces under Colonel Michel Francois, an infamously violent Haitian Army officer who led the Haitian National Police for Cédras after the coup. See William Spindler, "Justice Minister Assassinated in Port-Au-Prince," *UPI*, October 14, 1993.

† Lake mentions the lack of interest from the international community to take the lead on the situation in Haiti in December 1991. "The international perception remains that Haiti is a U.S. problem with little beyond ambiguous moral implications for the rest of the world." "Anthony Lake to POTUS Re: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond

position. The New York Congressman was signaling to his constituents and his colleagues on the Hill that force was now the only way to restore Aristide, and democratic rule, in Haiti. It would take months for the American public to join him in this conclusion.

In November 1993, Larry Rossin and Tony Lake on the National Security Council Staff began working on a policy options memo for the President called “Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions.”⁷³ They were trying to provide new approaches if the sanctions-based strategy failed. National Security Council staffers like Lake and Rossin were coming to the same realization as Congressman Rangel that military intervention was the only path forward to restore democracy in Haiti. However, diverging camps were beginning to form within the administration after the failure of the *Harlan County* incident. While some officials supported the use of force, other members of the administration, including the U.S. Special Envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, still believed that the issue could be resolved diplomatically.

Lake’s memo to the President recognized that after the *Harlan County* incident and the abandonment of the Governors Island Agreement, opposition forces in Haiti had become emboldened by scaring off the U.S. military in October and the ability to withstand the burden from sanctions. Lake suggested that the military was “signaling that Aristide will never be allowed back.”⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Lake acknowledged that Aristide was “pushing for total sanctions and implicitly is suggesting foreign invasion.”*

Sanctions (10 Pages),” November 1993, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43314, CPL.

* Aristide often would allude to the need for a military intervention but would state that his constitution forbid him from ever asking a foreign power to invade his country. Here is an example of the veiled language Aristide would make to U.S. officials: “President Clinton wants to restore democracy and I understand that. He does not want to use force, and I cannot ask him to do so given my constitutional constraint....I must know what you will do about

President Aristide had been a difficult partner throughout the attempt to implement the Governors Island Agreement. He repeatedly demanded additional concessions beyond what the agreement specified. Specifically, Aristide pushed for the departure of Cédras, the Army high command, the general staff, as well as the policy chief and his allies before he returned to Haiti. Many of these officials would be motivated to try to assassinate him, so this surely was an understandable position for Aristide to take. However, Aristide never secured those conditions as part of the official Governors Island Agreement. General Cédras would speak publicly against Aristide's additional demands. "I decided to sign the Governors Island Agreement [because] it was about only one person, the Army commander in chief only, and no one else."⁷⁵ By demanding these additional requirements, Cédras argued that President Aristide was "rejecting the Governors Island Agreement because he is demanding things that are not provided for by the agreement."⁷⁶ Based on the specified terms of the agreement, LTG Cédras' assertions were valid. However, this was Aristide's modus operandi. Aristide habitually conceded to U.S. demands under pressure of the moment, only to later leverage his public supporters to attain his true objectives. Though Aristide and the U.S. were partners and shared common interests, Aristide was a challenging personality for the administration to work with and would achieve outsized influence over U.S. policy decisions towards Haiti.

Lake also laid out the different contingency options available if sanctions failed. The "retreat" option considered what would happen if the United States walked away from its public

Cédras and other. Pressure is not enough; when under pressure they kill as they killed Malarly. They won't leave and they will kill people. If my responsibility is to protect Haitian lives, then I must know how they will be stopped." See "Memorandum of Conversation with Haitian President Aristide with Berger, Pezzullo and Rossin, February 4, 1994," Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Aristide]) OA/ID 176, Box 15 of 16, CPL. Lake quote from "Anthony Lake to POTUS Re: Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanctions (10 Pages)," November 1993, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43314, CPL.

commitment to restore democracy. The “retreat” option was not presented as a viable choice. Lake noted retreating would hurt the Administration’s international credibility, signal a defeat for the UN, and fuel criticism for the Administration’s Haitian refugees policy.⁷⁷ Instead, Lake advocated for the “bolder measures” option.

The “bolder measures” option was a textbook description of coercive diplomacy, where a military force would be used to reinforce diplomatic initiatives. Lake advocated that a “fundamental decision to use force if necessary” would be used as leverage within “a credible diplomatic strategy which will maximize our chance of not having to intervene.”⁷⁸ Lake recognized that any new diplomatic approach would require some sort of concessions for the junta “that inevitably would mean giving the [Cédras’ junta] more and Aristide less than the two sides agreed to at Governor’s Island.” The proposal recognized that there was a likelihood that either side would reject a new compromise. Lake noted, “if [the junta] demurs, we must be prepared to intervene. If the military accepts but Aristide balks, we must be prepared to step back from him.”⁷⁹

There are two key elements to this proposal that Lake was relying on to make this coercive diplomacy option valid. First was that the administration would gain the political will to intervene militarily if the junta failed to cooperate. Second is that the administration had the political will (or a viable political alternative) to dump Aristide for a different leader if the junta cooperated with a new proposal, but Aristide “balked.” The reality was neither of these two elements was present in December of 1993. The experience in Somalia was still fresh in the minds of senior officials and the general public, so there was an insufficient willingness to accept the risks and costs of using force in Haiti (Condition 2). The United States was not yet ready to support a new military intervention for Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Additionally, it would be difficult to follow through on the threat to dump Aristide if he refused to join a new agreement favored by the junta. The Clinton administration had placed too much public emphasis on Aristide as the decisive winner of the 1990 elections. President Carter's validation of those elections as "free and fair" made it particularly difficult for the Clinton administration to reject Aristide in the future. The administration was stuck with Aristide. "There was the phenomenon in Haiti of, if it's not Aristide, it's nobody. And, in fact, that was the discussion."⁸⁰ To champion democracy as an ideal necessitated that the U.S. government support Aristide as the people's choice to serve as President. "You could never get around the fact that if you were going to restore democracy to Haiti, it meant restoring Aristide to power."⁸¹ The inescapable dependency on Aristide would create a distressing dilemma for the Clinton administration when the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) uncovered highly sensitive allegations connecting Aristide to drug trafficking.*

Lake's proposal in December of 1993 did contain two ideas that would become part of the final decision to invade Haiti nine months later. First was the realization that the administration needed to be willing to conduct a military operation without any meaningful international support. Lake was alluding to the bumper sticker slogan that the administration often invoked: that the U.S. will act "multilateral when possible, unilateral when necessary."[†] The National Security Advisor was recommending to the President the U.S. "should commit ourselves to use force unilaterally if others declined to participate" in a military intervention in Haiti.⁸² Though the President was not ready to commit to the U.S. using force unilaterally in

* Discussed further in this chapter in Part III: "A Late-Breaking Ethical Dilemma."

† Deputy Secretary of Defense acknowledged that the catch phrase was okay in trying to convey "we're sovereign and a superpower, and we'll act on our own when our interests require us to do so; at the same time, we'll exercise leadership in trying to get others to come our along with us when their interests are engaged." Letter from Strobe 21AUG94.

December of 1993, he would become more willing to act alone in a few months. Second, the Clinton administration sought to reframe any use of military force in Haiti as a humanitarian operation, not solely to restore Aristide to power. Lake's memo noted that the public confidence in Aristide was too low for regime reinstatement to be the driving factor behind the intervention. Lake felt many doubted Aristide's commitment to democratic ideals and practices.⁸³ There was insufficient domestic support behind Aristide to risk American lives to see his return to Haiti.

Rifts emerged between those in government who supported Aristide and those who opposed him, largely due to a classified assessment of Aristide by the CIA on 20 October 1993. The CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin America, Brian Latell, briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Aristide was bipolar, corrupt, and prone to political violence.* Details of the controversial briefing and the ensuing tension within the government over the findings spilled into the public on 28 October 1993.⁸⁴ The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, stood behind his agency's conclusions that Aristide was mentally unstable. "Aristide is really bipolar and was very much on medication. You could see it if you ever talked to him."⁸⁵ Many who worked closely with Aristide would agree that he was a difficult and temperamental person. Woolsey noted, "if he was on the good side of things, he is as friendly and articulate and smart as people get." But when Aristide was "on the dark side," Woolsey attested that Aristide was prone to inciting mobs, sanctioning the murder of his opponents, and backtracking on prior agreements.

* Larry Rossin, serving on the NSC Staff at the time, said "of course [Brian Latell] was no friend of the president and no friend of the president's policy. Latell himself was a holdover from the Bush administration and not a supporter of Clinton's policy on Haiti." Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

Inside the White House, staff members believed the Agency was deliberately intensifying a disinformation campaign against Aristide to prevent the administration from supporting him with U.S. military force. Nancy Soderberg felt the CIA “had long been mistrustful of Aristide.” She proclaimed, “the CIA’s personal profiling of Aristide as a psychotic nut was a textbook case of the politicization of intelligence.”⁸⁶ The truth about whether the CIA was politicizing the intelligence or was just speaking uncomfortable truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. But in the winter of 1993, the National Security Council Staff was beginning to recognize that, to move the policy forward, the administration needed to distance the U.S. policy for Haiti away from Aristide and towards a more inspiring cause.

Lake recommended to the President that the best way to gain both legislative and public support for a military force in Haiti was to frame the issue as a humanitarian crisis. “We might be able to win Hill support for intervention (especially if multilateral) to end the humanitarian crisis.”⁸⁷ Restoring Aristide to power was frequently referenced as the only way to end the refugee crisis. Crossing the Caribbean Sea in makeshift boats was a treacherous journey. The military junta was also accused of conducting repeated atrocities against the Haitian public. Aristide himself repeatedly argued that returning him to Haiti was the only way to end the refugee issue. Facilitating Aristide’s return was portrayed as an opportunity to promote Haiti’s transition toward democracy and to save thousands of lives. Positioning the crisis as a humanitarian intervention was, in a way, an attempt to create a sense of urgency in the minds of the American public (Condition 6) to support the policy. Condition 6 of the Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy is meant to create a sense of urgency in the minds of the target state. However, the effort to reframe the policy issue as a humanitarian crisis demonstrates that creating a sense of urgency also adds value to building domestic support for the policy.

Coercing Partners

The dynamics between Aristide and his counterparts in the U.S. government offer important insight to what inhibits the United States from exercising coercive diplomacy. Sometimes international partners become major impediments to applying coercive power. In the spring of 1994, tensions between the Clinton administration and President-in-Exile Aristide came to a head. Both parties were trying to compel the other to change their behavior. The White House hoped to resolve the crisis diplomatically, and Aristide wanted his enemies forcefully removed from Haiti before he would return. Both sides attempted to coerce the other. Aristide won.

The White House had one remaining alternative to resolve the political dilemma in Haiti without resorting to force – if only the U.S. government could convince Aristide to be cooperative. Aristide just needed to establish and *empower* a prime minister in Haiti. This would seem like a straightforward task. Appointing a prime minister was one of the specified requirements in the Governors Island Agreement that President Aristide had agreed to implement. Furthermore, the position was required under the Haitian Constitution, so this issue was all within the spirit of supporting Haiti's democratic process. Both the U.S. and Aristide recognized the implications of establishing a strong prime minister within Aristide's government. A strong prime minister was a mechanism to subtly decrease Aristide's influence as President. An effective prime minister would not only assist in running the government, but it could also hedge against the populist and unpredictable instincts that Aristide had displayed in his initial seven months in office.*

* The Governors Island Agreement was the first attempt to get Aristide to share power with a Prime Minister. Aristide appointed Robert Malval, a well-suited candidate who had come in second in the 1990 election with 14

Aristide dragged his feet and deflected appeals by U.S. officials every time the subject came up. “Irritation rose to a new high with Aristide and his machinations.”⁸⁸ Instead of cooperating on the prime minister issue, Aristide increased his rhetoric against the Clinton administration. On 25 March 1994, Vice President Al Gore was called upon to pressure Aristide. Gore proposed a new solution to the crisis in Haiti: Aristide would appoint a new prime minister, and the military leadership would resign in return for amnesty. Both sides were to act simultaneously. Aristide rejected the offer outright, insisting the military regime step down first. Aristide told Gore, “It is a waste of breath until we remove the coup leaders.”⁸⁹ Aristide reportedly claimed that if the military stepped down in the morning, he would appoint a prime minister that very afternoon.⁹⁰ Administration officials later conceded Gore “was completely ineffective with Aristide in this meeting. It didn’t work at all.”⁹¹

The meeting between Gore and Aristide on 25 March was also designed to change Aristide’s behavior. Gore was meant “to read [Aristide] the riot act because he had been getting very active within U.S. politics and had caused a lot of problems for the administration.”⁹² The White House’s frustration arose after the Haitian president-in-exile spoke at a conference hosted by the Congressional Black Caucus on 21 March 1994. The conference was organized to “plan a legislative and public-relations offensive to toughen United States” policies towards Haiti.⁹³

percent of the total vote. Malval took office on 31 August 1993 with great optimism from the international community that democracy was returning to Haiti. Since the Prime Minister appointment was part of the Governors Island Agreement and a legitimate position within the Haitian Constitution, Lieutenant General Cédras gave no opposition to the new position. However, Aristide gave his Prime Minister no power or access to government funds. In his resignation letter, he pleaded with Aristide to share any of \$1.8 million a month of state funds that Aristide was receiving from frozen assets in Washington. Instead, Aristide reportedly spent \$1.1 million on public relations firms to promote his agenda in the media. Malval tendered his resignation just two months after taking office, frustrated by being constantly undermined by Aristide. Malval reluctantly agreed to remain in his position for several more weeks at the request of the U.S. government. He ultimately resigned in December 1993. See Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 229; Robert Novak, “Adieu to Aristide,” *The Washington Post*, January 6, 1994.

Speaking at the event, Aristide suggested the United States government was supporting the military coup that removed him from power. He also described U.S. policies on Haitian refugees as racist.* Aristide's ire was solely directed at the White House. He commended the members of the Black Caucus for intending to make President Clinton's policies more aggressive towards the Haitian military.⁹⁴

The showdown with Vice President Gore had a reverse effect on Aristide from the one the White House had sought. Instead of compelling Aristide to moderate his inflammatory rhetoric and finally agree to appoint a prime minister, the Haitian President only became more provocative. Rossin recalled after the meeting, "Aristide only increased his criticisms of the administration and jockeying with the Hollywood types and Black Caucus and his other supporters, and it was really quite unpleasant."⁹⁵

President Aristide was generating incredible influence over the White House from his two-bedroom apartment in Georgetown. The Clinton administration was not effective at managing the relationship. A member of the NSC Staff later reflected,

"The United States is not used to hosting exiles and, as a consequence, we don't know how to handle them.... Aristide was in Washington as the tail wagging the president's dog... he was making life politically miserable for everybody and nobody had an idea how to control an exile."[†]

* The accusations that the U.S. policy towards Haitian refugees was racist was based on a comparison with the U.S. policy towards Cuban refugees. The Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1966 under LBJ gave special treatment to Cuban refugees, which was broadened in 1976. The four predominant reasons to establish the CAA including destabilizing the Castro regime. 1) to promote Cold War ideals by weakening a Communist dictatorship that threatened the American national security; 2) to maintain a safe haven in the United States with few procedural limitations as possible for Cuban refugees abandoning the island for politically related issues; 3) to allow Cuban refugees in the United States to remain in the country by applying for permanent residency; and 4) to create a faster approach for Cuban refugees to unite into the American workforce. Ironically, there is an argument that the CAA actually helped strengthen the Castro regime by incentivizing his critics and opponents from leaving Cuba. For further see Perez, Leslie *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law*. Summer 2016, Vol. 22 Issue 3, p563-583. 21p.

† Comment by Ambassador Larry Rossin during his Oral History interview. Rossin noted that other countries, like the French, have much more experience in hosting exiled leaders. These countries "just send people around to

In President Aristide’s memoir about his exile, he shared insight into how he achieved this position. He illustrated his position by reference to an old Haitian saying, “*Kouto pa grate manch li* – ‘a knife cannot scratch its own handle’; one cannot act alone. You need others.”⁹⁶ His most influential partners became congressmen from Clinton’s own party. Aristide also revealed his philosophy that “negotiations consists in exhausting your reserves of patience.”⁹⁷ By 1994, Aristide was in a position of strength to exhaust the White House’s patience. It was a mid-term election year and at a point in Clinton’s first term where the administration had suffered more foreign policy missteps than it had won accomplishments. Promoting democracy had become a key component of the U.S. foreign policy strategy of enlargement, and Haiti was a neighbor in chaos, and need of assistance.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target’s fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 8. The internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions of coercive diplomacy.

remind the exiles that they could always be sent back home if they did not restrict their commentary to the weather. We don’t know how to do that.” See Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, 96, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

The U.S. had some experience hosting exiled leaders prior to Aristide, including President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, who lived in exile in Hawaii from 1986-1989. Marcos was also a difficult leader to manage. Marcos found himself on “island arrest” after the Reagan administration discovered he was plotting a coup to retake power while living in exile in Hawaii. See Ronald Ostrow and Norman Kempster, “U.S. Restricts Marcos Over Alleged Anti-Aquino Plot,” *The Los Angeles Times*, July 9, 1987.

Aristide was exercising his own coercive diplomacy to compel the Clinton administration to have the United States eliminate his political rivals before he would return to Haiti. Aristide seized on the opportunity to create a sense of urgency in the mind of the White House (Condition 6) about the need to intervene in Haiti. Aristide built a powerful network of supporters from across society and unified the messaging permeating into the White House (Condition 3). Aristide would use the issue of refugees as the mechanism to create a fear of unacceptable escalation (Condition 7) for Clinton. Aristide would benefit from the fortunate coincidence that Clinton already had a political aversion to refugee crises emanating from the Caribbean. Aristide's negotiation tactic of exhaustion - to wear down the patience of the Clinton team – allowed him to achieve asymmetry of motivation toward his goals. The only way Aristide would return to Haiti was if all his military and political enemies were eliminated.* The Clinton administration was reluctant to use force, but that option had always remained on the table. Aristide just needed to push the White House to use a decisive military intervention against the Cédras junta. Aristide would try to make that the only way Clinton could fulfill his commitment to restoring democracy to Haiti.

Political Pressure on the Administration

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, including Representative Charlie Rangel of New York and political activists like Randall Robinson, exercised significant political pressure on the Clinton Administration to support the return of President Aristide. The Black Caucus

* Aristide claims he already survived nine assassination attempts by 1994 and there was long precedent of military coups in Haiti. Aristide 43

became a leading critic of the Clinton Administration's policies towards Haiti throughout the policy review period from mid-October 1993 to the intervention in September 1994.

The Black Caucus experienced a dramatic increase in power after the 1992 elections, where its members increased from 26 to 40 representatives, which was the largest increase Reconstruction. The added membership gave the Black Caucus leverage "to become a real broker on a wider range of legislation."⁹⁸ Their support was particularly important for Clinton's domestic agenda, including welfare reform, health care, and the 1994 federal crime bill.⁹⁹

Charlie Rangel became one of the most outspoken members of the Black Caucus to support President Aristide. Rangel himself had no direct ties to Haiti, he was born in Harlem, to parents of Puerto Rican and African descent, but he embraced the plight of the Haitian people throughout his career. There were two driving factors for this support. The first was a matter of constituency, where many of the Black Caucus members, including Rangel, represented communities with significant Haitian populations within their districts. But Haiti also became a source of inspiration for members of the Black Caucus. To Rangel and many of the Black Caucus members, supporting Haiti was an effort to encourage the one former slave colony that fought for and earned its independence.¹⁰⁰

There were two main policy issues that the Black Caucus sought to influence. The first was pressuring the Clinton Administration to enable the return of President Aristide to Haiti. The Black Caucus sought to support Haiti's evolution as a self-governed free nation of former slaves. Aristide represented the democratic shift in Haiti and its plight to move away from ruthless dictators. The second issue that the Black Caucus lobbied extensively for was to persuade the Clinton Administration to change its policy towards Haitian refugees. Legislators vilified Clinton's continuation of President Bush's policy to return refugees to Haiti while, at the same

time, Cuban refugees were granted immediate asylum in the United States. Opponents accused the administration of perpetuating racism against black Haitians over the policy disparity between the two Caribbean refugee groups. A democratic member of the Black, Representative Major R. Owens of New York, told reporters in March of 1994, “We are upset, we are indignant, and we are declaring war on a racist policy.”¹⁰¹

Other public figures joined the chorus urging the Clinton Administration to revise its policy, including celebrities and activists like Randall Robinson.* Robinson was the founder of an advocacy group known as TransAfrica and commanded significant national media attention.† His support for Aristide and Haiti was also inspired by Haiti’s struggle for independence and self-governance. He became a close friend and advocate of President Aristide and used his public platform to apply pressure on the Clinton Administration.¹⁰² On 12 April 1994, Robinson began a hunger strike in protest of the Clinton Administration’s Haiti policies.¹⁰³ Reporters covered his hunger strike in detail. He remained in his basement for twenty-seven days, gaining national attention while subsisting on water and juice.¹⁰⁴

The combined pressure of the Black Caucus and Randall Robinson drew considerable negative attention to the Clinton administration. Secretary of State Warren Christopher admitted the media criticism about refugees and Robinson’s hunger strike had a powerful influence on the administration: “Inside the Administration, we were all growing increasingly frustrated with our

* Some of the celebrities who sent or endorsed letters to the Clinton administration included: Bill Cosby, Jesse Jackson, Jeff Goldblum, Denzel Washington, and Dionne Warwick. See CPL LTG Group Letter, Jesse Jackson letter, Bill Cosby letter.

† TransAfrica was a foreign policy lobbying group founded by Randal Robinson that supported African and Caribbean issues. Robinson and TransAfrica gained national attention for their advocacy to free Nelson Mandela in the 1980s. TransAfrica worked closely with the Black Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives. See African Activist Archive at <https://africanactivist.msu.edu/organization/210-813-216/?pp=96&page=1> and <https://lasentinel.net/transafrica-movement-had-many-parts-that-mobilized-to-free-nelson-mandela.html>

lack of success and the effect this was having on public opinion, both within the United States and around the world.”¹⁰⁵ Bowing to the tremendous public pressure, the Clinton administration decided to reverse its policy to direct the return of refugees back to Haiti. Senator Sam Nunn would later privately “give an earful” to Christopher’s Deputy Secretary of State that they had “let Randall Robinson and the Black Caucus hijack [U.S.] foreign policy, especially on the no-more direct-return decision.”¹⁰⁶

Muddling Through the Haitian Refugee Issue

In the spring and summer of 1994, the thorny issue of Haitian refugees became the impetus that pushed the Clinton administration to embrace the use of force in Haiti. Aristide instigated the refugee dilemma in April 1994 by weaponizing the refugee issue to step up his campaign of influence on the White House. As the recognized President of Haiti, he possessed a critical legal authority to make – and break – legal agreements with the United States. This included revoking Haiti’s agreement with the U.S. to return refugees to Haiti. By playing this “immigration card,” Aristide retained the power to “unleash hordes of Haitian boat people who would clog the shores of Florida.”¹⁰⁷ The tactic proved effective at creating a sense of urgency within the Clinton administration, pushing them to take stronger measures against the Cédras junta. The refugee crisis that ensued over the spring and summer of 1994 became the final straw that convinced President Clinton to authorize the use of force in Haiti.

The U.S. policy to direct return refugees to Haiti was based on an agreement between the U.S. and Haiti from 1981. The authority came from an agreement between President Ronald Reagan and Haiti’s dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier permitting the U.S. to return refugees unless

they met U.S. requirements as asylum seekers.* As part of the original agreement between Reagan and Baby Doc Duvalier, Haiti could rescind its support to return refugees to Haiti by submitting a six-month notice of termination.¹⁰⁸ On 5 April 1994, Aristide formally submitted such notice.

Aristide's decision forced the White House to revisit all its options. White House staff admitted, "our current Haiti strategy has hit a dead end."¹⁰⁹ Clinton's team recognized serious flaws in the current situation in Haiti. "Human rights and humanitarian conditions are deteriorating. Our direct return policy is increasingly under attack. The tenability of in-country processing is in serious question."¹¹⁰ For the first time, the military option was seriously discussed inside the Oval Office.

In a National Security Council meeting on 15 April, Lake boiled down the choices for Haiti to "two fundamental options: to move forward and resolve this problem, or to find a sustainable muddling through approach."¹¹¹ Lake's idea of resolving the problem relied on decisive military intervention. 'Muddling through' involved a continuation of economic sanctions and diplomatic appeals to Aristide and Cédras. Tony Lake and Madeleine Albright supported military intervention. The Secretary of State argued that there was still time for sanctions and diplomacy to work. This was a controversial recommendation because of the strong evidence that sanctions had been ineffective against Cédras and his junta. Christopher's Deputy, Strobe Talbott, wrote to him in a private letter: "Our own experts are deeply concerned that the sanctions alone won't work, not least because the military leaders in Port-au-Prince

* From 1981 through 1990, 22,940 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Of this number, INS considered 11 Haitians qualified to apply for asylum in the United States. See https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS21349.html#_Toc293671241.

profit from the smuggling and blackmarketeering [sic] that sanctions make such a boom business.”¹¹²

Though there was little confidence in economic sanctions, there was equally little confidence that the administration could muster sufficient political support for military intervention in Washington. The Secretary of Defense told the Cabinet, “having reviewed the use of force option, I am skeptical we can do it, not so much the [invasion] but getting political support for it in the first place.” He cited both feedback he received from the Hill and his pessimism that Aristide supporters would “prove faint-hearted” about a U.S.-led invasion.¹¹³ The Secretary of Defense also noted that neither uniformed nor civilian leaders in the military supported an invasion of Haiti. The operation lacked military purpose. The problem was recognized as a political issue, not a vital national security problem. Perry concluded his remarks with a ~~very~~ blunt summation that would resonate with Clinton: “The arguments boil down to “Mogadishu *redux*.”¹¹⁴ The President sided with Secretary Christopher and decided against authorizing military intervention. * The United States would continue to try the ‘muddling through’ approach.

Several conditions for successful coercive diplomacy were not yet ripe. The President still was not willing to accept the risks and costs of a military invasion of Haiti (Condition 2). The combined pressure from Aristide and the Black Caucus meant Clinton was still struggling with significant resistance from both domestic and international supporters (Condition 3).

* Larry Rossin recalled that after the President decided to support Secretary Christopher’s proposal to continue with diplomacy, “A group of us immediately repaired to Tony Lake’s office, Tony and Sandy and myself, and a couple of other people who were totally put out by this outcome because it was obviously the wrong decision. It was more of the same. That was when we really started working on a parallel track on coming up with a policy that would involve the use of military force. I started working on that with Tony’s direction. We prepared a whole lot of papers on that through April and May into June.” See Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

However, the deliberate policy reviews with the President throughout April did help clarify Clinton's objectives for senior administration officials (Condition 1). Talbott shared with Christopher, "if anything is clear in this whole murky business it is, after all, that the President has decided Aristide must return."¹¹⁵

On 8 May, President Clinton announced his decision to reverse the direct return policy. The declaration was meant to appease political critics and improve his domestic and international support (Condition 3). However, the policy shift instead triggered a major refugee debacle. The day after Clinton's announcement, Aristide belittled the decision: "This policy is not aimed at protecting the millions of Haitians who continue to face political violence." Instead, Aristide praised "the sectors of the United States that prompted President Clinton to change the policy toward Haitian refugees" and doubled down on his rhetoric that only his return to Haiti could put an end to the problem of the refugees.¹¹⁶

The decision attempted to fulfill a longstanding pledge that Clinton first made during the 1992 presidential campaign. He had to walk back the promise to reverse the policy after reports that 200,000 refugees were preparing to make the perilous voyage to America once he came into office. Clearly, thousands would die in such an attempt. Fearing the humanitarian consequences, Clinton withdrew his promise but stated, "I will end the practice of direct return when I am fully confident I can do so in a way that doesn't contribute to a humanitarian tragedy."¹¹⁷ Ahead of the 8 May policy announcement, the administration worked to establish several offsite Migrant Processing Centers (MPC) across the Caribbean.

When word reached Haiti that America had finally opened its doors, impoverished and oppressed Haitians took to the seas in whatever craft they could find (or fabricate). The number of Haitians that took to boats far exceeded the capacity of the regional processing centers

established by the U.S. government. A White House policy review memo dated 3 May warned, “a change in the practice of direct return could result in massive tragedy. In the absence of direct return, it is estimated that as many as 100,000 Haitians could seek to leave Haiti by boat over a period of several months.”¹¹⁸ The estimates would prove fairly accurate. For the whole year of 1993, about 2,000 Haitians took to boats in search of asylum in the United States.¹¹⁹ In April of 1994, while still under the direct return policy, the U.S. interdicted 600 Haitian refugees. In May, as word of the announcement got out, the number jumped to 1400. “In June 1994 alone, the number increased to 5,603; and then the floodgates really opened as close to 6,000 decamped in the first four days of July.”¹²⁰ In the month of July, 16,046 Haitian refugees were processed by U.S. personnel.¹²¹

The political and humanitarian consequences of the refugee policy reversal were significant. Strobe Talbott reflected in a private letter to Secretary Christopher that the 8 May decision made “a bad situation worse.” The flood of refugees “was perfectly predictable.” From a political aspect, Talbott admitted, “we looked to be (and indeed were) not just reactive but nearly panicked in the face of the tidal wave.” After an outcry from state officials in Florida and congressional members on the Hill, the administration scrambled to process and contain the refugees elsewhere in the Caribbean without returning them to Haiti.¹²² “We scrambled around the hemisphere jury-rigging an archipelago of safe havens and processing centers.” Many of the Caribbean countries rejected requests for the U.S. to establish MPCs. The U.S. government even contracted a cruise ship to serve as a floating processing center. That plan was abandoned within two days.¹²³ Talbott later confided the diplomatic push to get support from regional partners “wasn't coalition-building – it was desperation, and it did us real harm because it cast us in the role of supplicant to a bunch of tiny countries, some of which told us to take a hike.”¹²⁴

As the influx of refugees quickly exceeded the capacity of initial processing sites, the U.S. government established a consolidated MPC in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¹²⁵ Thousands of refugees were sent to the camps at Guantanamo for holding, but there was no intention of allowing the vast majority of the refugees into the United States.* There was no larger plan for these refugees beyond Guantanamo; the processing centers were holding pens. Talbott told the Secretary of State that he felt one of the most troublesome and valid criticisms of the Clinton Administration was their failure “to consider with sufficient care the often all-too-predictable consequences of our initiatives and stances.” Course corrections, which he admitted really amounted to “course reversals” (like the Haitian refugee policy), were spectacular examples of “self-inflicted wounds.”¹²⁶

After mid-July, the U.S. government managed to slow down the flow of refugees by clarifying its messaging about its Haitian refugee policy. Taking to boats would not get the refugees to America, but rather to the same immigration processing screening already available at U.S. consular services inside Haiti. “When the word got out, the outflow stopped fast because getting to the United States is what drives the migrant phenomenon.”[†] Eventually, the concerted messaging campaign dissuaded others from attempting the journey. But the camps in

* The summer of 1994 also experienced a significant influx of Cuban refugees that added to the stress on the Haitian refugee situation. “Beginning in August, the number of people seeking to leave Cuba by boat or raft rose precipitously. For the whole of 1993, only 3,656 Cubans were intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard en route to Florida; between the beginning of August and early September the number surged to 30,000.” See <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/stable/2657562> The additional influx of Cuban refugees prompted President Clinton to also change the U.S. policy towards Cuban refugees where they would not be granted immediate asylum under the Cuban Refugee Act of 1966. See <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=409>. Quote from Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

[†] Regarding the refugees sitting at the processing centers in Cuba, Rossin noted, “it took a long time to get them back from Guantánamo. In fact, the intervention was what got them back to Haiti, but that was only three months later.” See Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, 105, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

Guantanamo were still overflowing with economic migrants, and there was no place to take them.

The Clinton administration had painted itself into a corner, and military force seemed to be the only way out. Economic sanctions, paradoxically, had benefited some members of the junta. Diplomatic engagements with Aristide and Cédras were getting nowhere. In defiance of the U.S. and UN, Cédras' junta expelled all the international human rights observers on 13 July.¹²⁷ The refugee debacle that peaked in July was of little surprise to anyone. The administration had not succeeded at finding “a sustainable muddling-through approach.”¹²⁸ Senior officials in the Clinton administration who initially opposed the use of force began to accept that the military option was becoming a necessity. Secretary Perry had told the President at the NSC meeting back in April, “On balance, I would rather face the problems associated with larger migration flows than those associated with force.”¹²⁹ But the migration issue was much more difficult to manage than the administration imagined. More and more members of the administration accepted the necessity to restore democracy in Haiti.* Perry would later admit that “the boat people were the impetus which allowed us to take the hard actions which we had to take.”¹³⁰ Within the Administration, there was an increasing willingness to accept the risks and costs (Condition 2) of intervening in Haiti to restore its democracy. With the refugee crisis pushing the U.S. towards military action, the Clinton administration needed to organize its

* Tony Lake recalled Strobe Talbott at State and Sandy Berger on the NSC Staff became helpful advocates for his recommendation to use force over the summer. “As the thugs kept cutting more and more people, and as it got worse and worse in Haiti, it became more and more evident that we would have to. As I recall, the political people were opposed. The Vice President would go back and forth a little on it. But by the end of the summer, the President decided, we’ve got to do it. This was just months before the election and I think it was the turning point for him.” See Anthony Lake Interview, May 21, 2002, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

domestic and international support (Condition 3) to use force. The first step would be securing the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council.

PART III: RETURNING ARISTIDE BY FORCE

In the final weeks before the intervention, the Clinton administration pulled together the international and domestic support needed to use force in Haiti. This section examines the efforts made by the U.S. government to secure a UN Security Council Resolution that authorized the use of military force. I also discuss some of the unexpected complications that arose in the final stages of the invasion planning. This section also analyzes the final negotiations with Cédras, where the U.S. ultimately achieved the external conditions of coercive diplomacy.

International Support for UNSCR 940

Gaining international support for a U.S.-led invasion supported several conditions of coercive diplomacy. Having the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council and other international organizations like the Organization of American States strengthened both U.S. credibility in the eyes of the junta in Haiti as well as American domestic audiences. The Clinton administration knew there were three magic words needed in a UN Security Council Resolution to legitimize an invasion into Haiti: ‘all means necessary.’ These words were what allowed the Bush administration to use military force against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War under UNSCR 678 from November 1990.¹³¹ By 22 July 1994, Talbott updated Secretary Christopher that “there really is a chance, I gather, for getting an ‘all necessary means’ resolution next week.”

Talbott recognized the significance of a UNSC resolution endorsing the use of force. First, it gained domestic support (Condition 3). “There were a number of polls showing that while less than 20% of the American people support a unilateral U.S. invasion, just over 50%

would support one that the U.S. lead under a UN banner.” Talbott also noted the value of gaining a Security Council resolution as a coercive measure against Cédras, especially in creating a fear of unacceptable escalation for the Haitian military leaders (Condition 7). Talbott noted in his update to Christopher that “dictators are more likely to fold their hand in the face of such a resolution.”¹³² Convincing the Security Council to support such a resolution became a major diplomatic lift for the administration.

The first step was convincing the Organization of American States to support a UN intervention in Haiti to restore its legitimate democratic government. In May 1994, Talbott and the new Special Envoy for Haiti, Bill Gray, convinced the OAS members to endorse a resolution at a meeting in Brazil. Warren Christopher later noted, “this unprecedented OAS resolution proved vital during the debate in the UN Security Council two months later.”¹³³

The next step was proving to the Security Council that all other efforts to resolve the issue had been exhausted. The U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Bill Swing, could see firsthand from his office in Port-au-Prince that sanctions had no influence on the military junta controlling Haiti, but they were necessary all the same. “No one thought the sanctions on Haiti would ever work because it was clear the military would just let the people suffer, not themselves. We knew from the beginning that it wouldn't work.” Swing shared that the value in patiently applying economic sanctions on Haiti throughout the spring and summer was to influence members of the Security Council in New York, not the military leaders in Haiti. “UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright had to be able to go back to the Security Council and say, ‘Look, we've tried all other options, including tough sanctions. They haven't worked, so now we have to use the military option.’”¹³⁴ Exhausting all non-violent options helped convince the international community that

there was an ethical justification, and within the framework of *jus ad bellum*, to use military force.* But the members of the United Nations Security Council would still need to be convinced that it made sense to accept some risk in order to help Haiti. In general, the international community generally still felt Haiti was a problem for the United States to fix. Thus they were reluctant to consider joining in a military intervention.

The United States faced a dilemma about whether to push for a multinational coalition in Haiti or take on the task unilaterally. A multilateral invasion would ~~further~~ add legitimacy and credibility to the operation, as well as assist with burden sharing. But some officials recognized the public-facing risk of trying to make the invasion a multinational endeavor. “What if [UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali] and/or other potential multilateral partners says no thank you?” Talbott suggested to his boss.† “We’re back in the box of proposing and being rejected. What do we do then? Throw up our hands? Act unilaterally?” Acting unilaterally might have been simpler in the short term but had its own pitfalls in the long run. Without a UN Mission in Haiti to assist with reconstruction after the invasion, the U.S. would “have to do the tidying up ourselves.” Talbott suggested that “what will be seen as a US-only invasion will become a US-only occupation.”¹³⁵ Talbott was raising the specter of another quagmire in the making if the U.S. failed to secure a transition plan with a multinational force.‡

* *Jus ad bellum* refers to the legality of beginning a war and the use of force by a state in a just war. See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 1977.

† Talbott posed these questions to Warren Christopher on 29 April 1994 in response to Tony Lake’s initial proposals to use force and then hand the mission over to the UN once the junta has departed and Aristide is back in power. Talbott summarized Lake’s proposal: “think of this as the 101st Airborne carrying the UNMIH ashore on its backs. Think of it as *Harlan County Redux*, only this time it lands its passengers and carries Cédras & Co. off to retirement.” Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (29 April 1994),” April 29, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.

‡ “Mogadishu redux,” as Perry warned in the 15 April 1994 NSC Meeting. See “Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Haiti,” April 15, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy), Box 1392, CPL.

The Clinton administration sought a compromise with UNSCR 940: the U.S. could take care of the invasion itself, but the Security Council Resolution needed to include specific language that committed members of the international community to the stability and reconstruction phase. Talbott recognized that sometimes gaining international support required the U.S. to take on some burdens on its own: “There is often going to be an element of unilateralism in our invocation of the international response.” This was a situation where the United States needed to demonstrate its resolve and lead from the front. “Were we not clearly willing to act on our own, we probably would not have gotten the UN to fall in behind us in Security Council, Resolution 940.”¹³⁶ The proposed arrangement of a U.S.-invasion and a UN-occupation would have to suffice.

On Russia Supporting UNSCR 940

Gaining international support for the U.S. to use force in Haiti was not just about bolstering domestic support and escalating the pressure on Cédras. Acquiring a Security Council Resolution was also a way to undercut Russian ambitions to control its own ‘near abroad’ under the Kozyrev doctrine.* Yet Russia voted in support of UNSCR 940 in July 1994 that sanctioned the U.S. military intervention in Haiti, only to resent that endorsement a few months later.

The Russian Federation would not get the satisfaction of attaining international legitimacy for its military operations in neighboring states. In the fall of 1993, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev asked both the United Nations and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to endorse ongoing operations in conflict

* The Russian term for “near abroad” was "blizhneye zarubeyzhe." See previous discussion about Kozyrev doctrine in the Context in Time section.

regions like Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russia wanted its military forces already involved in regional disputes to become anointed as peacekeeping forces by international organizations. In September 1993, the United Nations rejected Kozyrev's request. Two months later, the CSCE also denied the peacekeeping status. "Since both organizations refused to legitimize Russia's peacekeeping operations in the post-Soviet region, Moscow changed its position." In mid-June 1994, the Russian Foreign Minister denounced the need to gain consent from international organizations to conduct interventions within its near-abroad.¹³⁷ Operating under a Security Council Resolution gave the United States an opportunity to differentiate its intervention efforts in Haiti against Russia's interventions in Eurasia.*

The United States needed to find a way to secure UN support for the mission in Haiti while deflecting Russian attempts to gain similar support for its interests in neighboring regions like the Caucasus. In May, US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright cabled back to Washington that getting a resolution passed by the Security Council required very careful diplomacy. Albright summarized the three issues at play in a memo entitled "Theory and Practice in the Security Council: Haiti, Georgia, Rwanda." "The calculus is that we have a special interest in seeing a rapidly reconstituted UNMIH in Haiti; the Russians believe that UN blessing of a peacekeeping operation in Georgia/Abkhazia is of great importance to the security of their borders."¹³⁸ Albright also noted that the humanitarian tragedy in Rwanda was an urgent

* In April 1994, Strobe Talbott made a casual reference to the Kozyrev justification when he was weighing the merits of conducting a multilateral or unilateral operation in Haiti. He wondered to Christopher if it would "liberate us to go it alone?" He then posed the justification for unilateral action as "(We tried multilateralism, they said no, so now we're taking responsibility for the neighborhood on ourselves" – the Kozyrev in Georgia argument.)" See Strobe Talbott, "Letter from Strobe to Chris (29 April 1994)," April 29, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.

issue for African nations.* In a letter to Clinton of 28 June 1994, ahead of the G-7 summit in Naples, Boris Yeltsin addressed the friction between Russia and the United States over their respective regional security issues:† “To us, settlement of conflicts on the former USSR territory is of particular importance,” he wrote. “Russia is counting on the understanding and support for its actions. You must trust us in these matters, just as we trust you.”¹³⁹

On 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council approved UNSCR 940, giving the Clinton administration international legitimacy for its goals to return Aristide by force.¹⁴⁰ The resolution was approved 12-0, including approval from Russia. China and Brazil abstained from voting, and Rwanda was not present.‡ Russia wanted to encourage the precedent of regional military intervention set by Resolution 940.

Supporting the resolution was a calculated gesture by Russia, generated from two different diplomatic considerations. First, by supporting the United States in its efforts to lead a military intervention within its region, Russia was trying to validate a great power’s role as a regional peace enforcer. The goal was to set a precedent that would later validate Russia’s own interests in influencing its near-abroad. Russia’s support for UNSCR 940 was, in part, an endorsement made in good faith, playing to a long-term strategy. However, in the short term, the

* The Clinton administration had not yet fully appreciated the magnitude and scope of disaster occurring in Rwanda in the summer of 1994. See Anthony Lake Interview, May 21, 2002, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

† The LA Times reported that the summit “provided the most visible evidence so far of Russia’s gradual integration into the community of free, industrialized nations as President Boris N. Yeltsin was warmly welcomed to the political discussions that took up much of the summit’s final day. While Yeltsin did not join Saturday’s session on economic issues, his presence Sunday effectively turned the G-7 into a G-8 for the first time in 20 years.” See <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-07-11-mn-14298-story.html>

‡ China’s Ambassador to the UN said his country abstained from supporting UNSCR 940 because it would set a “dangerous precedent” and would “not contribute to a fundamental solution” to the problem.” See Wuthnow, Joel “Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council” 2011 at <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8K07BBK/download>

passing of UNSCR 940 weakened the credibility of Russia's ongoing unilateral interventions in areas like Georgia and Azerbaijan.

NATO expansion was another important reason why Russia supported UNSCR 940, even though the resolution granted a rival important legitimacy. In July of 1994, Russia held a sense of appreciation for how the U.S. had slowed down the NATO fast-track admission process for four former Soviet states.* A few weeks after the UNSCR was approved, Talbott was told by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov that:

“If our NATO decision last year had gone the other way – that is, if we'd adopted for fast-track admission for the V-4 countries – we might have had a very different Russia to contend with this year...[especially] Russian acquiescence on Haiti in the Security Council.”¹⁴¹

Getting Russia to support UNSCR 940 was a surprising and important achievement for Clinton's goals in Haiti. But the gambit came at a price. Russia would come to resent its benevolence towards Haiti when the U.S. would not reciprocate later. On 11 September, Talbott advised the Secretary of State that it was “very important that President Clinton telephone Yeltsin the same day that we issue the ultimatum to the Big Bad Three in Port-au-Prince.” Talbott had just spoken to his counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov. The discussion emphasized that both sides should be transparent with each other about foreign affairs. The Russians felt “‘No surprises’ and ‘partners consult’ are still the mottos of the day,” Talbott reported back to Christopher.¹⁴² But Talbott sensed a bigger issue emerging over Haiti. “I'm quite concerned that we may have re-started the NATO expansion juggernaut without really intending to and without sufficient consideration of the consequences.”¹⁴³ Talbott's perceptions were well founded. Just

* There is debate whether Russia really understood the U.S. support for the Partners For Peace program as a way to slow down NATO expansion. There were suggestions that Yeltsin may have just heard what he wanted to hear from Clinton and U.S. diplomats or misunderstood the U.S. plan, possibly because Yeltsin was drunk at the time. See <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>

weeks after the Haiti intervention, Clinton and Yeltsin met at a summit in Budapest. The summit turned out to be an embarrassment and a disaster.¹⁴⁴

The juggernaut of NATO expansion had indeed awoken. Talbott characterized the Russians as later suffering from “The Rodney Dangerfield Syndrome.”¹⁴⁵ Russian diplomats, including Kozyrev, were complaining “how they don't get no respect, how [the U.S. are] expecting [the Russians] to salute and take orders from us, how we're using double-standards against them (“support us in Haiti but don't expect us to support you in the Transcaucasus” [sic]).”¹⁴⁶ Clinton would garner the international legitimacy that he needed to bolster his domestic support to risk military force in Haiti and reinforce his pressure on Cédras. Clinton also succeeded at distinguishing his regional actions towards Haiti from Russia’s near-abroad campaigns. But these accomplishments came with a strategic cost: injuring relations between the United States and the new Russian Federation at a pivotal time when both sides were trying to establish their future roles as global powers. The Clinton administration’s military intervention in Haiti was a bet that that democracy promotion in a new era of enlargement was the new role for the U.S. as the sole superpower.¹⁴⁷

A Late-Breaking Ethical Dilemma

Just as the Haiti problem seemed to be coming to a head in the summer of 1994, an unsettling dilemma emerged about Aristide. In late July, a DEA allegation against Aristide surfaced that was so egregious Clinton’s inner circle feared it could destroy Clinton’s presidency. The investigation and allegations are still classified, but the discussion around the issue is now

available.* Vice President Gore stated, “even the most negative caricature of Aristide – whacked out liberation theologian, radical populist who wants to necklace the MRE and redistribute wealth to the poor,” did not compare to the “horrible” allegations of corruption.†

The select group of senior officials discussing the matter with the President in the Oval Office all went into different states of denial. Vice President Gore told the President that if the story breaks, it would be so shocking that “many – indeed, most – will find it implausible” and therefore be written off as not true.¹⁴⁸ Tony Lake “got the President's attention big-time in talking about how horrible this problem is.” The most pressing issue was if these new allegations were true, how could the U.S. risk American lives to see him return to power? Lake asked the President to “imagine how he'd answer the question from the grieving parents, "Why did you kill my son in order to reinstate a drug-runner?"”¹⁴⁹

The late-breaking ethical dilemma created by these allegations is an important issue to examine for the study of coercive diplomacy. The episode disrupts numerous conditions of coercive diplomacy that the administration spent months forming. The Clinton team had to reevaluate the objectives (Condition 1), the willingness to accept risks and costs (Condition 2),

* The letters from Strobe Talbott to Warren Christopher discussing the DEA investigation were posted to the public in February 2022. It does not appear that the DEA allegations ever leaked, though there were some news reports that surfaced right after the intervention that may be related to this issue: “The informant alleged that Aristide had accepted the money from a representative of the late Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar with the understanding that Aristide would provide protection for the drug barons in moving narcotics through Haiti.” A member of the administration who participated in these discussions claimed these news reports were “way off” when I asked whether these later news reports were the essence of the DEA allegations. I therefore can only piece together what Talbott’s notes suggest – that the DEA investigated “the truly horrible” allegations about corruption and drug smuggling. See Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (22 July 1994),” July 22, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act; Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994),” August 21, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.

† The 22 July letter from Strobe to Chris Talbott repeatedly referenced the situation as “horrible.”

and potential impacts on domestic support (Condition 3). The ethical dilemma became a test of leadership (Condition 4).

The Clinton administration renewed the debate about whether to dump Aristide in its commitment to restoring democracy in Haiti.* Possible candidates to supplant Aristide included members of the Haitian Parliament or retired military officers who had supported the 1990 election. There were some benefits to proceeding without Aristide: “If we end up in some sense dumping him, we’ll be better positioned with regard to the Haitian military and elite,” wrote Talbott on 5 August.¹⁵⁰ Some of the alternative presidential candidates were likely to be easier for the U.S. government to manage and less divisive with the military junta leadership controlling Haiti. But the issue remained that none of these candidates were the democratically elected leaders of Haiti. Any effort to ‘restore democracy’ without returning Aristide would be an affront to the Haitian people. Talbott noted, “that’s both a practical problem and a philosophical one since democracy is what this is all about.”¹⁵¹ In the spirit of supporting democracy, the administration felt the United States had to respect Aristide’s position as Haiti’s president.

As U.S. officials mulled what to do about this ethical and moral dilemma regarding Aristide and democracy, there were no good options. The Clinton administration needed to “balance principle and strategy on the one hand with short- and even middle-term political risk-assessment on the other.”¹⁵² The solution became how to frame the policy for the American public. Talbott advised Christopher, “it’s democracy, the process and the institution, we’re

* Earlier debates about dumping Aristide occurred throughout the Haiti policy review in March and April 1994 as Aristide was proving difficult to manage and threatening to expand the refugee crisis.

determined to restore in Haiti – not Aristide the man.”* Leaders were no longer “talking about *dumping* Aristide; we’re not talking about restoring democracy in Haiti *without* Aristide.” The administration sought to convince the American public that Aristide was still part of the plan, “but he’s not the only part; ours is not an Aristide-only policy.”¹⁵³ The reality was the administration was stuck with Aristide and stuck with the policy direction. Clinton had made returning Aristide the center of his Haiti policy since he back peddled on eliminating the Bush direct-return policy as President-Elect. Returning Aristide had become the one policy objective on Haiti that he consistently and clearly signaled since taking office. The administration had been bruised by repeated accusations of policy reversals and being too malleable in the face of domestic political and public pressure. By late August, it had become too late to reverse course again. The Clinton administration was bound to Aristide, regardless of his merits. “The consequences of reversing course...are worse than those of going ahead, even with the DEA factor now in the mix to make the dilemma truly horrible.”¹⁵⁴ On 26 August 1994, Clinton formally approved the U.S. military to invade Haiti on 19 September 1994.

Setting the Pieces for Invasion

The final weeks leading up to the invasion were used to shore up support for the operation. There were multiple audiences to target: the American public, Congress, and international partners who might contribute to the post-invasion UN Mission in Haiti. The White House also used the days before the intervention to exert maximum coercive pressure against

* Secretary Christopher wrote in the margins about this comment: “I have tried this but the NSC has adopted him [Aristide].” Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994),” August 21, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.

LTG Raoul Cédras and his military leadership in Haiti. Some of these efforts were behind the scenes, including a flurry of phone calls and letters to international leaders and U.S. lawmakers.

Signing up countries to join the new UN Mission in Haiti strengthened the domestic credibility of the US invasion. “We need to give the very highest priority to preserving the coalitions we’ve assembled and the institutions on which we rely.”¹⁵⁵ A way to avoid the risk of embarking on a quagmire in Haiti was to secure the support of international partners to assume the responsibility for stability operations. The international community would help demonstrate the U.S. had an exit strategy. President Clinton joined the effort to convince regional and global security partners to participate in post-invasion stability operations. After persistent engagement by members across the administration, 22 countries signed up to join the UN Mission in Haiti.¹⁵⁶

President Clinton gave a televised national address from the Oval Office on 15 September to connect with domestic audiences (Condition 3).^{*} In his speech, he laid the groundwork for the invasion and the necessity to use force in Haiti. Days before this address, he consulted with a longtime friend and campaign strategist, Dick Morris, for advice about his public address. Morris told the President: “I don’t know anything about Haiti. But this isn’t about Haiti; it’s about American politics a month before the 1994 elections.”¹⁵⁷ Clinton tried to explain the human rights abuses and refugee crisis. Morris recalled the 1980 Fort Chaffee riots that cost Clinton the gubernatorial election in Arkansas. “You’ve got to get off the refugee issue and onto the human rights and value issues. You look weak when you are trying to stop refugees from flooding us, but you look strong when you are protecting children abroad.”¹⁵⁸ The President embraced Morris’ advice. The night before the national address, Clinton deflected Lake’s

^{*} The next section discusses how the 15 September address was also used to establish a fear of unacceptable escalation with Cédras (Condition 7).

recommendations to make a case for the invasion to be about protecting American interests. Instead, Clinton told his team that “the case was strongest on humanitarian grounds. The American public would sympathize with the plight” of the suffering Haitian people.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, the national address laid the condemnation thick against the atrocities carried out by Cédras’ “reign of terror.” Clinton evoked the rape and murder of innocent people, along with the despair of Haitian orphans.¹⁶⁰

Clinton’s national address played up the international support for military intervention that “all agreed to join [the U.S.] because they think this problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests and their security.”¹⁶¹ It was an eclectic mix of participants. “More than twenty countries from around the globe, including almost all the Caribbean community and nations from as far away as Poland...Israel and Jordan... Bangladesh, have joined nations like Belgium and Great Britain.”¹⁶² The number of participants was not as extensive as the administration may have liked, but enough to add international legitimacy to the operation.

Despite all the public pressure to take greater action in Haiti since the beginning of the administration, domestic public support was divided on a military invasion once the Clinton administration decided to take forceful action. Even members of the Black Caucus were split on whether to support the invasion. On the eve of the invasion, news reports revealed that constituents and numerous representatives feared that restoring democracy to Haiti would drag the United States into a long and costly conflict.¹⁶³ One member who requested to remain anonymous told reporters the day after the President’s national address that Clinton had “embraced our cause somewhat too enthusiastically.”¹⁶⁴

The White House made a symbolic effort to keep the Hill informed of the invasion even though White House lawyers determined the President possessed the authority to order the invasion of Haiti without the consent of Congress.* Press talking points from 12 September highlighted that the administration had held “over 75 briefings, hearings and consultations on Haiti with the Congress over the last year.”¹⁶⁵ The White House drafted a report to Congress for the President to send to both the House and the Senate. White House staffers determined the notice was not legally required but the letters addressed “a sense of Congress” that the President should provide notice in advance of his intent to initiate any military operation in Haiti. Lake assured the President, “submitting the report responds to this congressional request without compromising your constitutional authority to act unilaterally.”¹⁶⁶ Two signed copies were sent on 18 September 1994, about a day and a half before the invasion was to begin. One letter was sent to the Speaker of the House and another to the President of the Senate, Vice President Al Gore. The letters were designed as a courtesy that suggested just enough deference to preserve a public impression of unity between the co-equal branches of government (Condition 4).

The letters and the President’s national address reinforced other internal conditions of coercive diplomacy as well. The President addressed his clear objectives for the mission (Condition 1) and the deliberate exit strategy (important for domestic support – Condition 3). The President also outlined the national interests the operation would address and his willingness to accept the risks and costs to attain the objectives (Condition 2). With these pieces coming together, the Clinton administration was finally in a position to present a credible threat of force

* The administration classified the invasion as a police action, not “war,” drawing on the precedents of the Korean War, Grenada, and Panama to deploy troops without a declaration of war from Congress. See <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/12/world/clinton-has-authority-he-needs-to-invade-haiti-top-aides-say.html>

to Cédras. But the White House would need to exert a surprising amount of pressure on Cédras to convince him to cooperate. Solidifying the final three conditions of coercive diplomacy was not as easy as the power differential between Haiti and the United States might otherwise suggest.*

Reinforcing Diplomacy with Force

September 1994 was the first time the Clinton administration applied credible military pressure on Cédras to step down from power. Earlier efforts of coercive diplomacy since the *Harlan County* incident in October of 1993 had relied almost exclusively on economic sanctions and public calls for Cédras to step down, but most of the pressure on Cédras was indirect and vague. Clinton and his officials had always held that all options remained on the table for using force in Haiti, but threats of force were halfhearted and lacked credibility. The shadow of Somalia still loomed over the White House. Aristide told the Vice President outright in their heated exchange back in March, “The United States does not follow through with pressure.”¹⁶⁷ The *Harlan County* withdrawal epitomized such accusations. It was apparent to all parties involved, from Aristide in Georgetown to Cédras in Port-au-Prince, that President Clinton had been unwilling to resort to military action in Haiti after the Governors Island Agreement fell apart. George Shultz argued during the Cold War that “power must always be guided by purpose, but the reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual.”¹⁶⁸

Clinton’s resolve and willingness to use force (Condition 2) evolved drastically after the refugee crisis in the summer of 1994. By September, Clinton’s threats carried new weight.

* The final three conditions of coercive diplomacy are directed externally towards the opponent. They are Condition 6 - creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state; Condition 7 – the target’s fear of unacceptable escalation; and Condition 8 – establishing an asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer.

Resolution 940 of the UN Security Council gave the United States an international mandate to use all necessary means to restore democracy to Haiti. Clinton's address to the nation on 15 September left little doubt about his readiness to use force. "Earlier today, I ordered Secretary of Defense Perry to call up the military reserve personnel necessary to support United States troops in any action we might undertake in Haiti." He revealed two aircraft carriers had set sail for Haiti, fully recognizing "what is at stake."¹⁶⁹ Clinton spoke directly to Cédras down in Haiti through the cameras: "Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you from power."¹⁷⁰ America was reinforcing diplomatic power with unmistakable military force.*

Two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and direct threats from the leader of the free world were meant to be more than enough show of force to make Cédras flee. But Cédras was not ready to leave. He was ready to fight. There was a lot of history that the Clinton administration underestimated. This was not the first time Haiti squared off against the great powers of the world. Despite the odds and the tremendous costs, Haitians knew they had won against Napoleon, Britain, and Spain during their revolution from 1791-1804. Scaring off the U.S. Navy in October 1993 had renewed hope that Haitians could again defeat the world's leading military. Many Haitians genuinely believed in the power of voodoo magic as a supernatural force. The brutality that Haitians endured during the American occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 further hardened any resolve to resist a new American invasion.[†] The nineteen-year occupation of Haiti fueled an inherent distrust of Americans in Haitian society. Both Aristide and Cédras shared this distrust in forming any arrangements with the United States. Aristide routinely believed the U.S.

* This was the balancing act that George Shultz espoused as Secretary of State. "Diplomacy could work these problems most effectively when force – or the threat of force – was a credible part of the equation." Shultz 650

[†] In 1994, that occupation had only ended 60 years before, which means that there would still be Haitians alive at the time who had lived under the occupation and most of the senior military leaders would have heard stories of the occupation from their parents while growing up as children.

would negotiate a deal that would result in him being replaced as president.* United States Ambassador to Haiti, Bill Gray, once reminded Lake about the mural in the Episcopal cathedral in Port-au-Prince to help explain why Haitians distrusted Americans. The mural depicts the last supper, where Jesus and all of the disciples are black, except one: a white Judas.¹⁷¹ Cédras was predisposed to resist any negotiations with the United States for his resignation. Carter, Powell, and Nunn would learn firsthand that convincing him to step aside would take more than a brute display of force.

Carter, Powell, Nunn Delegation

Bill Clinton had not planned to send Jimmy Carter down to Haiti on a delegation to negotiate. The initial plan was to send the National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili. Lake and the Chairman were to negotiate with Cédras about how to “resolve the situation peacefully and with dignity.”¹⁷² Carter was only meant to call Cédras to propose their meeting since the Former President had a prior relationship with Cédras from the 1990 Haitian elections.[†]

On 14 September, Carter spoke to Cédras twice on the phone, where the Haitian general resisted appeals to step aside. The conversation ended with a suggestion that Carter would come down to Haiti and facilitate face-to-face talks. President Clinton held reservations about allowing Carter to insert himself once again into international negotiations. Carter had volunteered himself to go to Pyongyang just a few months earlier to negotiate as a private citizen with Kim Il Sung

* This included the numerous debates over appointing a Prime Minister and earlier negotiations for the Governors Island Agreement. Aristide became very uneasy about the final negotiations between Carter and Cédras. See L. Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000), 138.

† Defense Secretary Perry made the suggestion to include Carter in the initial dialogue. See Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000), 136.

about North Korea's nuclear program. Carter managed to strike a deal with Kim Il Sung, but he had not been very cooperative with the White House and kept Clinton's team mostly in the dark about his negotiations. Madeline Albright recalled that Carter "was very much a loose cannon" after the North Korea negotiations.¹⁷³ "It was very evident...that Carter wanted to do things somewhat differently and did not really take instruction very well."

When Carter inserted himself once again in the Haiti negotiations, Larry Rossin revealed: "the White House did not want just Carter going." Clinton wanted "others to be present and witnesses and actors since they rightly did not entirely trust Carter's intentions." * Senator Sam Nunn from Georgia was a great counterbalance to his fellow Georgian, Former President Jimmy Carter. Nunn was also the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which meant he represented the legislative oversight for the use of U.S. military force. General Colin Powell was also asked to join Carter's delegation. He was an ideal addition to the group. As the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and at the height of his public admiration following the Gulf War, Powell embodied the prestige of the U.S. military. He was also of Caribbean descent. This would become a powerful element for his ability to connect with Haitian leaders like Raoul Cédras, where pride was a clear barrier in the negotiations with Cédras.

Most accounts by administration officials recall that Carter, Powell, and Nunn were not aware that President Clinton had already authorized the invasion when the delegation flew down to Haiti on the 17 September. It is true that the White House refrained from telling the delegation

* Also on the delegation were Carter's associate Robert Pastor, Larry Rossin and a NSC press officer from the NSC Staff, Mike Kozak from the State Department and Major General Jerry Bates from the Joint Staff. Rossin was designated as the interface between President Clinton and Carter and Bates assisted General (Retired) Powell, in addition to coordinating military efforts between the Pentagon and LTG Shelton, the invasion commander aboard one of the aircraft carriers supporting the operation. See Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Also, from interview with LTG (Ret) Jerry Bates (23 December 2022).

about the pre-decision to launch the invasion, just that they had to leave Haiti by noon on the 18th.¹⁷⁴ But the Department of Defense had told their representative on the delegation, MG Jerry Bates, about the invasion order. Bates also received permission to share the full plan with only one member of the delegation, retired General Powell. Bates and Powell flew together from Washington down to Georgia to pick up Nunn and Carter before flying together down to Port-au-Prince. During their flight to Georgia, Bates briefed Powell on the invasion plan.¹⁷⁵ The mission had already been approved to begin the minute after midnight on 19 September, about 36 hours after the delegation landed in Haiti. * Clinton had made up his mind that, one way or another, U.S. troops would land in Haiti. Powell recalled that their delegation was only allowed to negotiate “how, not if, our troops would go ashore.”¹⁷⁶

The first day of meetings made little progress towards a negotiated surrender by the junta. Establishing an asymmetry of motivation (Condition 8) and fear of unacceptable escalation (Condition 7) was proving especially difficult for the delegates. By building up the invasion forces, it was clear that the U.S. was fully motivated to pursue its objectives. But through the end of the first day of negotiations, Cédras established his equal motivation towards his own beliefs. If both sides are equally motivated toward their causes, then the tie favors the target state. The only way to successfully establish Condition 8 was to decrease Cédras’ motivation towards his goals. Fortunately, the delegation discovered a secret insight about LTG Cédras during one of their early meetings. A local business leader suggested “very strongly” to the delegation that “a key to getting General Cédras to be willing to step down from office was his wife.”¹⁷⁷

* Powell kept it secret that he knew the full plan. Even in his own memoir, Powell wrote, “we arrived at Port-au-Prince on Saturday at 12:30pm. At that point, though neither we nor the Haitians knew it, H-Hour for the invasion was set for one minute after midnight, Monday, September 19, less than thirty-six hours away.” See Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, *My American Journey*, Large Print Edition (New York: Random House, 1995), 909.

The next morning, Carter, Powell, and Nunn arranged a meeting with Cédras and his family. Cédras was more than willing to include his wife in the delegation. Nunn got the sense that LTG Cédras was, in fact, very anxious for the Americans to speak to his wife. Yannick Cédras' father and brothers were all military officers. Nunn observed, "she had a concept of duty and honor...and was a strong force behind convincing her husband that it was his duty to die for his country."*

The presence of Powell, not President Carter, was the key reason why LTG Cédras wanted his wife to meet the delegation. Cédras "was relying on Colin Powell to convince his wife that it was not the duty of the General and his family to die."† Perceiving this key dynamic between husband and wife, Nunn whispered his observations to Powell and advised the general to center his comments on "what is the duty of a military official when his country is about to be invaded and when his army is about to be overwhelmed." Powell was an ideal envoy to deliver this message.

The dialogue between General Powell and Mrs. Cédras was a altered two conditions for coercive diplomacy: the fear of unacceptable escalation (Condition 7) and the establishment of an asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer (Condition 8). The threat of escalation was

* Nunn also shared how "the first thing she said to us when her husband got home the previous night and he had been with us until 2:30 in our second meeting, she had gone and gotten her three children – a 17-year-old son, a 14-year-old daughter and a 10-year-old son – to come get in bed with them and spend the night with them because that was going to be their last night of life. That was the atmosphere we ran into. General Cédras had already told us that he knew the Delta Force has targeted his house and that he and his wife had made the decision that they would be there together and die together." Sam Nunn, "Senator Nunn Remarks at Leadership Atlanta Breakfast," September 19, 1994, Nunn's Personal Collection.

† Nunn first sensed the importance of Powell after LTG Cédras became visibly nervous after Powell left the room to spend twenty minutes on the phone with the White House. "When General Powell left, [Cédras] immediately looked like he had been stricken...He was increasingly nervous as he waited for General Powell. Finally, he got up and went to the door twice...It was very apparent." Perceiving this key dynamic between husband and wife, Nunn whispered his observations to Powell when he returned to the meeting, advising Powell to center his comments to be "directly related to what is the duty of a military official when his country is about to be invaded and when his army is about to be overwhelmed." See Nunn.

well known by this point, but Cédras had viewed sacrificing himself and his forces to imminent danger as an acceptable consequence. Powell helped persuade LTG and Mrs. Cédras that it was not their duty, or their Soldiers' duty, to die in the impending assault. Instead, the honorable approach was to spare Haitian troops and the country from a bloodbath. They did not need to accept the near-certain defeat. Slowly, Cédras began to soften his stance. Still, he did not agree to the delegation's demands.¹⁷⁸

The two sides began discussing possible arrangements as the time expired for the delegation to depart Haiti. The White House had set the noon deadline on the 18th because the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division was about to load planes in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Carter, Powell, and Nunn needed to depart Haiti before this force began their assault. At 11:30, Carter called the Oval Office to buy time from a phone in a small room adjacent to Cédras' office.* Their negotiations were making progress. President Clinton told Carter they had thirty minutes. Lake recalled the experience from the Oval Office. "Twelve o'clock, the phone doesn't ring. Twelve-thirty, the phone doesn't ring. One o'clock, the phone rings. It's Carter. I've got good news, Mr. President. They've agreed to leave."¹⁷⁹ Carter tried to convince President Clinton to accept the deal. Clinton fired back, asking if they had agreed to a date. Carter admitted they had not set a date. The terms of settlement (Condition 5) were unclear. Clinton called back ten minutes later to reject the offer. "Unless they are prepared to give us a relatively proximate date certain, we're going forward militarily. You've got to get the hell out of there, Mr. President."¹⁸⁰

* Major General Bates had brought a communications team with him but the mountains in the area prevented the crew from establishing a satellite connection. Instead, the delegates used a scrambler on a land line in the Haitian military's headquarters to have secure conversations about their discussions.

Carter, Powell, and Nunn were struggling to establish a sense of urgency in their negotiations (Condition 7). Cédras, along with the Police Chief, Colonel Francois, and the Army Chief, General Biamby, did not seem to be unnerved by the two aircraft carriers sailing off the coast of Haiti and the warnings of an imminent invasion. During the USS *Harlan County* episode, Clinton had dispatched an armada down to Haiti and left without landing a single troop. Aristide had not been the only Haitian to believe that “the United States does not follow through with pressure.”* For Cedars there was enough evidence to suggest the junta could drag out the negotiations with Carter into a favorable arrangement. The delegation had already blown by the supposed deadline for departure, and a former President, a retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and a sitting Senator were an ideal shield against an invasion.

At 4:00 pm, General Biamby stormed into the room. “The invasion is coming! You lied to us! You have betrayed us!”¹⁸¹ The announcement caught the entire room off guard. Neither side was expecting the invasion to occur in the midst of negotiations. Biamby claimed he learned of the invasion from spies who were watching airplanes take off from Fort Bragg with paratroopers.[†] This was a lie. There was no spy in North Carolina. Instead, there was a man lying on his belly six feet above the American delegation, constantly talking to the White House. The eavesdropper was able to hear every word spoken through a hole in the ceiling and crawled back to notify Biamby once he overheard the White House say that they were launching the invasion.[‡]

* These were the words of Aristide to Vice President Gore on 25MAR

† Powell: “He had just been on the phone with a source at Fort Bragg, he told us, and American paratroopers were getting ready to board their aircraft at 5:00pm. Not bad intelligence, I thought, for a poor country.” Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, *My American Journey*, Large Print Edition (New York: Random House, 1995), 913.

‡ The eavesdropper was a Canadian expatriate named Lynn Garrison who became Cédras’ strategic advisor throughout the junta reign. The U.S. delegation had taken over Garrison’s office during the negotiations with Cédras. Garrison wanted to tell Cédras himself of the invasion, but Biamby did not want to pull Garrison into the ordeal, so chose to deliver the message himself instead. Lynn Garrison interview (2Jan23). Also see “Voodoo Politics” by Garrison (2000)

The operational security leak worked in the delegation's favor. The news of the invasion order sparked a sudden sense of urgency in the stalled negotiations (Condition 7). As junta leaders made for the door to assume their battle positions, Carter barked, "You cannot leave! If you leave these negotiations now, your children will die. Haitians will die. You can't assume that responsibility."¹⁸²

Cédras was too proud to surrender under pressure but had a way of saving face. Cédras claimed that the decision was not his to make, but "he would follow the orders of his President."¹⁸³ Cédras was not referring to Aristide but the provisional President of Haiti that the junta had nominated in May 1994, Emile Jonassaint. Though Cédras was the effective leader of the military revolt, he claimed to serve under the leadership of Jonassaint.* The United States did not recognize Jonassaint as a legitimate leader, but the provisional president was about to become a valuable partner in persuading the military junta to resign.

Jonassaint turned out to be the conclusive factor in halting the crisis. The delegation scurried over to the Presidential palace to meet with Jonassaint. The final proposal was presented to the puppet president and his cabinet. Several ministers, including the Minister of Defense, voiced their opposition to the terms, stating they would resign in protest. "Then resign," Jonassaint told them, stating instead that he chose peace.¹⁸⁴ Powell later reflected that "Emile Jonassaint was wise enough to provide his overmatched generals with the cover they needed to quit."¹⁸⁵

* Jonassaint was appointed president in May 1994 but was not recognized by the U.S. government as the leader of the junta.

Nunn reflected the next morning on how the United States had made an error by focusing too much on Cédras in this ordeal. “It doesn’t make any sense at all if you are talking to the guy you say is responsible for all the violence but not talk to the leadership that might be able to do something about it.”¹⁸⁶ There is some truth to Nunn’s observation. Even though the United States chose not to recognize Jonassaint as the legitimate President of Haiti, there was merit in recognizing that he still had influence over the decision-making process. Still, Jonassaint’s role in the outcome should not be overstated. Cédras was the gatekeeper to Jonassaint and the crisis would not have ended without the decision by Cédras to acquiesce. Jonassaint was voice of reason, expressing what Cédras was too proud to admit publicly: fighting the United States over Aristide was a lost cause.

Carter and Jonassaint formalized their agreement just before U.S. Paratroopers and U.S. Special Operations Forces began their assault against the Haitian armed forces. Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton and the 10th Mountain Division helicoptered into Haiti the next morning without firing a shot.* Cédras honored his role in the agreement and departed Haiti before Aristide’s momentous return on 15 October 1994.

Conclusion

Technically, the Clinton administration successfully applied coercive diplomacy in Haiti. The United States combined force and diplomacy to compel the Cédras regime to step down from power so President Aristide could return as the democratically elected president of Haiti. But power disparity between the coercer and the target state did not make it easy to persuade

* Coincidentally, many of the 10th Mountain soldiers who landed in Haiti were the same troops who served in Somalia the year before.

Cédras to cooperate. Demonstrations of overwhelming military power had less influence than Clinton officials expected. In coercive diplomacy, “the center of gravity is elsewhere, in the realm of will and perception.”¹⁸⁷

In many ways, the U.S. intervention in Haiti contains more failures than successes. The experience of meandering through policy positions (and policy reversals) also revealed the interdependence of U.S. coercive power to and domestic and international stakeholders. The U.S. intervention in Haiti also revealed the importance of solidifying political objectives, along with rectifying the costs and risks associated with achieving those objectives, to successfully establish the other six conditions of coercive diplomacy.

There are two main takeaways from the U.S. intervention in Haiti. First, Conditions 1 and 2 are exceptionally important among the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy. Second, domestic and international support are essential elements for maximizing U.S. coercive power. They are, individually, too important and too multifaceted to lump together as a single condition.

When an administration gains a clear understanding of the political objectives (Condition 1) and is willing to accept the risks and costs to achieve those objectives (Condition 2), then the other three internal conditions are much easier to achieve. Leaders unite behind the clear objectives (Condition 4). Policymakers have a better sense of what terms and demands are needed in a settlement (Condition 5). And U.S. officials are better able to guide domestic and international support once they have a clear understanding of where the policy needs to go and what risks must be run to achieve that goal (Condition 3).

The experience with compelling Cédras to step down from power also reveals that Condition 1 and 2 also support establishing the external conditions of coercive diplomacy as

well. It took the Clinton administration fourteen months to settle the internal conditions (Conditions 1-5) but only four days – 15 to 19 September – to solidify the external conditions of coercive diplomacy (Condition 6-8). Clear objectives and a willingness to accept the risks and costs to achieve a goal are the foundations of credibility for a coercive gambit.

Prominent leaders from both the Euromissile and Haiti cases emphasized the importance of understanding objectives and risks in their doctrines about when to use force. Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger stipulated in 1984 that the United States must clearly establish the political and military objectives before sending troops to combat. Weinberger also cautioned that if troops are sent to combat, the U.S. must have a clear intention of winning.¹⁸⁸ Powell encouraged policymakers to consider whether the gains and risks were analyzed against the cost of the intervention, and what were the consequences.* Powell's questions about costs, risks, and anticipating the consequences of different political objectives draw out an important consideration for coercive diplomacy.

In coercion, considerations of risk and costs are wider than risk to U.S. troops and costs in terms of financial obligations or resources. Risk in coercive diplomacy comes in many forms. Risks to forces is certainly one of them. Eighteen service members had died in Somalia. The

* The Powell Doctrine that emerged after the Persian Gulf War asked a series of questions including whether the political objective was important, clearly defined, understood. There are seven elements to the "Powell Doctrine:"

- 1) Is the political objective important, clearly defined, understood?
- 2) Have all other non-violent means failed? (last resort)
- 3) Will military force achieve the objective? (appropriate)
- 4) At what cost?
- 5) Have the gains and risk been analyzed?
- 6) What are the consequences?
- 7) Win decisively.

These seven components were first introduced in 1992 by Powell in *US Forces: Challenges Ahead in Foreign Affairs*. The Powell Doctrine is often cited as including "have an exit strategy" but it was not included in Powell's original philosophy and Powell never formally recognized the doctrine attributed to his name.

Clinton administration had to determine whether it was willing to risk a similar, or worse, outcome by using force in Haiti. But the intervention posed other important risks. There were risks to relationship and risks to policy priorities. The diplomatic push to secure UNSC 940 risked putting a strain on the U.S. relationship with Russia, and it risked policy efforts in Europe over NATO expansion. The policy effort to promote democracy in Haiti created political risk and risk to the United States' status as a global leader. Costs must be calculated by assessing whether the United States has sufficient financial and material resources; whether it has sufficient political capital; and whether there is an opportunity cost for not pursuing an objective.

The second key takeaway from the U.S. intervention in Haiti is a better awareness of what Condition 3 (Gaining Domestic and International Support) really involves for policymakers. The Haiti case reveals the many sides of Condition 3. Relevant domestic audiences ran the gamut from the general public to lawmakers on the Hill, to political activists. International actors that influenced the U.S. policy on Haiti ranged from the UN Security Council to regional partners in the Caribbean, to the new Russian federation. But the Clinton administration also faced a surprising amount of resistance and opposition from its primary international partner, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, living in exile within the nation's capital. This case demonstrates that exercising coercive diplomacy strains relationships, regardless of party loyalties or personal affiliations. The Haiti case also reinforces the conclusion that Condition 3 is a highly complex and consuming element of coercive diplomacy.

Endnotes

- ¹ Max Ferguson, AMB Luis Moreno Interview, January 24, 2023.
- ² Donald Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, “Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for US Policy Toward Haiti” (US Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Strategic Studies Institute, March 10, 1994), <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11613>; Peter Riehm, “The USS Harlan County Affair,” *Military Review* 77, no. 4 (August 1997); Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006).
- ³ Walter Kretchik, *Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 38.
- ⁴ Kretchik, 38.
- ⁵ See Riehm, “The USS Harlan County Affair.”
- ⁶ As quoted in Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy*, 196.
- ⁷ Sheehan testimony 1993
- ⁸ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 271.
- ⁹ Bob Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion* (New York: Grove Press, 1999), 32–33.
- ¹⁰ Shacochis, 33.
- ¹¹ Ian Martin, “Mangled Multilateralism,” *Foreign Policy* 95, no. Summer 1994 (Summer 1994): 72–89.
- ¹² Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy*, 202.
- ¹³ Ian Martin, “Mangled Multilateralism,” *Foreign Policy* 95, no. Summer 1994 (Summer 1994): 72–89.
- ¹⁴ See terms of 1993 Governors Island Agreement “Governor’s Island Agreement” (United Nations, July 3, 1993), <https://peacemaker.un.org/haiti-governors-island93>.
- ¹⁵ Samuel R. Berger Interview, March 24, 2005, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ¹⁶ Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000), 144.
- ¹⁷ Samuel R. Berger Interview, March 24, 2005, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ¹⁸ National Security Council, Speechwriting Office, and Antony Blinken, “Tony Lake - “From Containment to Enlargement” 9/21/93,” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed March 15, 2023, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/9013>.
- ¹⁹ See Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and Implications for the United States Policy Toward Russia” (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 1994), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/back-in-the-ussr-1994.pdf>.
- ²⁰ Frank L. Jones, “Engaging the World: Anthony Lake And American Grand Strategy, 1993–1997,” *The Historical Journal* 59, no. 3 (September 2016): 869–901, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X15000436>.
Lake Enlargement Speech 22SEP93
- ²¹ Quote retrieved from Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and Implications for the United States Policy Toward Russia.”
- ²² For more about the Monroe Doctrine, see Sexton, Jay. *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-century America*. New York, Hill and Wang, 2011.
- ²³ Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and Implications for the United States Policy Toward Russia” (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 1994), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/back-in-the-ussr-1994.pdf>.
- ²⁴ Brent Scowcroft Interview.
- ²⁵ Anthony Lake Interview, May 21, 2002, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ²⁶ John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 122.
- ²⁷ Hirsch and Oakley, 122.

-
- ²⁸ Walter S. Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992 - March 1994." Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 2005, 70.
- ²⁹ R. James Woolsey Interview, January 13, 2010, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ³⁰ Nancy Soderberg Interview, May 10, 2007, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ³¹ Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 35.
- ³² Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 36.
- ³³ See Russ Bynum, "Ga. Monument Dedicated to Haitian Soldiers in American Revolution," *Gwinnett Daily Post*, October 8, 2007.
- ³⁴ "U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34" (U.S. Department of State History Office, n.d.), Milestones 1914-1920, U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti>.
- ³⁵ See "International Delegation Report on Haiti Elections."
- ³⁶ For list of international delegation members, see "International Delegation Report on Haiti Elections" (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, December 16, 1990), The Carter Center.
- ³⁷ "International Delegation Report on Haiti Elections" (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, December 16, 1990), The Carter Center, 43.
- ³⁸ Lawrence Rossin Interview, 94.
- ³⁹ "International Delegation Report on Haiti Elections" (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, December 16, 1990), The Carter Center, 122.
- ⁴⁰ Howard French, "Haitians Overwhelmingly Elect Populist Priest to the Presidency," *The New York Times*, December 18, 1990, sec. A, Page 1, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/18/world/haitians-overwhelmingly-elect-populist-priest-to-the-presidency.html>.
- ⁴¹ Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, 94, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 94.
- ⁴² See Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 144.
- ⁴³ Strobe Talbott Interview, July 26, 2016, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
- ⁴⁴ See Stephan Kieninger, "The Strobe Talbott Papers at the State Department's Virtual Reading Room" (The Wilson Center, February 2, 2022), Sources and Methods, History and Public Policy Program, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/strobe-talbott-papers-state-departments-virtual-reading-room>.
- ⁴⁵ See Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
- ⁴⁶ See Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006).
- ⁴⁷ See Ambassador William Lacy Swing Interview, April 7, 2021, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
- ⁴⁸ Michael Ruane and Manuel Perez-Rivas, "Democrats Applaud Comptroller Choice," *The Washington Post*, July 7, 1998, sec. A05, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/mdelect/statewide/barnes0707.htm>.
- ⁴⁹ John Goshko, "Aristide Finances Government-In-Exile With Frozen Haitian Assets," *The Washington Post*, January 15, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/01/15/aristide-finances-government-in-exile-with-frozen-haitian-assets/8c137750-9373-477e-8e96-de5a685e92c2/>.
- ⁵⁰ Michael Kelly, "THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: The Democrats -- Clinton and Bush Compete to Be Champion of Change; Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gain," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/us/1992-campaign-democrats-clinton-bush-compete-be-champion-change-democrat-fights.html>.
- ⁵¹ William Perry Interview.
- ⁵² William Perry Interview.

-
- ⁵³ For more information about the Marial Boatlift, see University of Miami Cuban Heritage Collection archives at: <https://sp.library.miami.edu/subjects/Mariel>.
- ⁵⁴ David Maraniss, *First in His Class: The Biography of Bill Clinton* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1995), 379.
- ⁵⁵ See “United Nations Security Council, Resolution 867,” September 23, 1993, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/867>.
- ⁵⁶ Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann, and John Fishel, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervention’: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 35.
- ⁵⁷ Kretchik, *Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994..*
- ⁵⁸ William Perry Interview, February 21, 2006, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ⁵⁹ Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 183.
- ⁶⁰ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 271–72..
- ⁶¹ Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 186.
- ⁶² Donald Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, “Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for US Policy Toward Haiti” (US Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Strategic Studies Institute, March 10, 1994), <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11613>.
- ⁶³ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 271.
- ⁶⁴ Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Debate over Risks Split Administration,” *Washington Post*, September 25, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/09/25/debate-over-risks-split-administration/1967370c-2fd4-4d54-abc9-0aed1971f05e/>.
- ⁶⁵ William Perry Interview, February 21, 2006, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ⁶⁶ Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 44.
- ⁶⁷ Samuel R. Berger Interview, March 24, 2005, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ⁶⁸ Samuel R. Berger Interview.
- ⁶⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
- ⁷⁰ Bella Stumbo, “A Place Called Fear,” *Vanity Fair*, February 1994, <https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1994/2/a-place-called-fear>.
- ⁷¹ Max Ferguson, Rep Charles Rangel Interview, February 1, 2023.
- ⁷² *Situation in Haiti: Press Conference by Rep Charles Rangel and Rep Joseph Kennedy* (Washington D.C., 1993), <https://www.c-span.org/video/?51443-1/situation-haiti%20Rangel>.
- ⁷³ Anthony Lake, “Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanction,” December 11, 1993, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43314, CPL.
- ⁷⁴ Lake.
- ⁷⁵ See Raoul Cedras, “Cedras Reaction to Aristide Address to UN General Assembly,” October 28, 1993, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Aristide]), CPL.
- ⁷⁶ Cedras.
- ⁷⁷ Anthony Lake, “Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanction,” December 11, 1993, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43314, CPL.
- ⁷⁸ Lake.
- ⁷⁹ Lake.
- ⁸⁰ Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, 102, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
- ⁸¹ Lawrence Rossin Interview, 102.
- ⁸² Lake, “Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanction.”
- ⁸³ Lake.

-
- ⁸⁴ Robert Novak, "Allegations about Aristide," *The Washington Post*, October 28, 1993, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/10/28/allegations-about-aristide/a4b838eb-a55c-4353-bb48-88032bab7e21/>.
- ⁸⁵ R. James Woolsey Interview, January 13, 2010, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ⁸⁶ Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 45.
- ⁸⁷ Anthony Lake, "Haiti: Contingency Thinking Beyond Sanction," December 11, 1993, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43314, CPL.
- ⁸⁸ Lawrence Rossin Interview, January 7, 2005, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
- ⁸⁹ See "MEMCON With Haitian President Aristide," March 25, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Haiti and Memcon]) OA/Box 191, CPL.
- ⁹⁰ "Peace Plan: Aristide Insists on Prior Military Step-Down," March 30, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Aristide]), CPL.
- ⁹¹ Lawrence Rossin Interview.
- ⁹² Lawrence Rossin Interview.
- ⁹³ Catherine Foster, "Black Caucus Aims to Stiffen Trade Embargo of Haiti," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 22, 1994, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/0322/22032.html>.
- ⁹⁴ "Aristide Questions U.S. Support of Democracy in Haiti," March 21, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Aristide]), CPL.
- ⁹⁵ Lawrence Rossin Interview.
- ⁹⁶ Jean-Bertrand Aristide, *Dignity*, trans. Carrol Coates (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), 101.
- ⁹⁷ Jean-Bertrand Aristide, *Dignity*, trans. Carrol Coates (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), 101.
- ⁹⁸ Michael Fletcher, "Visibility on Haiti Issue Helps Black Caucus Chart Its Political Ascendancy," *Baltimore Sun*, September 16, 1994, <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-09-17-1994260025-story.html>.
- ⁹⁹ Steven Holmes, "With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy," *The New York Times*, July 14, 1994, sec. A:10, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/14/world/with-persuasion-and-muscle-black-caucus-reshapes-haiti-policy.html>.
- ¹⁰⁰ Charles Rangel Oral History, July 21, 2007, C-Span, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?289426-1/charles-rangel-oral-history-interview>.
- ¹⁰¹ Kevin Merida, "Hill's Black Caucus Faults U.S. Policy on Haiti, Presses for Aristide Return," *The Washington Post*, March 24, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/24/hills-black-caucus-faults-us-policy-on-haiti-presses-for-aristide-return/de2b9c33-957e-4d13-b35b-1637a63c2c56/>.
- ¹⁰² To hear Robinson reflect on the importance of supporting Haiti and his personal relationship with President Aristide, see interview at <https://www.c-span.org/video/?199550-1/qa-randall-robinson>
- ¹⁰³ Kevin Merida, "TransAfrica Leader to Fast in Protest," *The Washington Post*, April 12, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/04/12/transafrica-leader-to-fast-in-protest/8b20ac7a-ac7f-42e9-96f8-9123b0712f97/>.
- ¹⁰⁴ Karen de Witt, "Hunger Strike on Haiti: Partial Victory at Least," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1994, sec. A:7, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/09/world/hunger-strike-on-haiti-partial-victory-at-least.html>.
- ¹⁰⁵ Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 178.
- ¹⁰⁶ Strobe Talbott, "Letter from Strobe to Chris (22 July 1994)," July 22, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹⁰⁷ Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 47.
- ¹⁰⁸ For more on the 1981 U.S.-Haiti agreement on refugees, see Katherine H. Tennis, Offshoring the Border: The 1981 United States-Haiti Agreement and the Origins of Extraterritorial Maritime Interdiction, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2021, Pages 173–203, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez005>.
- ¹⁰⁹ "Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force," April 12, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43318, CPL.
- ¹¹⁰ Haiti: Option Involving Possible Use of Force," April 12, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Limited Access and Haiti]) OA/Box Number: 43318, CPL.
- ¹¹¹ "Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Haiti," April 15, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy), Box 1392, CPL.

-
- ¹¹² Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (29 April 1994),” April 29, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹¹³ “Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Haiti.”
- ¹¹⁴ “Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Haiti.”
- ¹¹⁵ Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (29 April 1994),” April 29, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹¹⁶ “Cable: Aristide Reacts to Change in U.S. Policy on Refugees,” May 10, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Aristide]) OA/Box 505000, CPL.
- ¹¹⁷ President Clinton’s remarks from 14 January 1993 as quoted in Anthony Lake, “Background Information for Announcement on Haiti,” May 7, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Haiti and Memcon]) OA/Box 196, CPL.
- ¹¹⁸ Larry Rossin, “Expanded Haiti Points for VP/Roundtable,” May 3, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails, A1-Non-Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Aristide]) Box 12, CPL.
- ¹¹⁹ Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti,” *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 363–84.
- ¹²⁰ Morley and McGillion.
- ¹²¹ Interview with Lynn Garrison and Voodoo Politics table
- ¹²² Lawrence Rossin Interview.
- ¹²³ Max Ferguson, LTG Jerry Bates Interview, December 23, 2022. See also Pat Leisner, “Rented Cruise Ship Carried No Haitian Refugees,” *Tampa Bay Times*, October 7, 2005, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1994/06/18/rented-cruise-ship-carried-no-haitian-refugees/>.
- ¹²⁴ Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994),” August 21, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹²⁵ See Anthony Lake, “Crisis in Haiti Mitigation,” June 28, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Haiti and Memcon]) OA/Box 477, CPL.
- ¹²⁶ Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994),” August 21, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹²⁷ Douglas Farah, “Rights Observers to Quit Haiti Today,” *The Washington Post*, July 13, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/13/rights-observers-to-quit-haiti-today/a900d807-c93a-4a67-aab5-5c9e805d6fee/>.
- ¹²⁸ 15APR NSC MTG MEMCON pg 57/1265 in Declassified Options_Large
- ¹²⁹ 15APR NSC MTG MEMCON pg 57/1265 in Declassified Options_Large
- ¹³⁰ William Perry Interview, February 21, 2006, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ¹³¹ “Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of United Nations Resolutions,” n.d., News and Policies, Policies in Focus, Renewal in Iraq, The George Bush White House Digital Archives, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect2.html>.
- ¹³² Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (22 July 1994),” July 22, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹³³ Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 178.
- ¹³⁴ Ambassador William Lacy Swing Interview, April 7, 2021, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
- ¹³⁵ Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (29 April 1994).”
- ¹³⁶ Strobe Talbott, “Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994),” August 21, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹³⁷ Bohuslav Litera “The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine,” *Perspectives*, Winter 94/95, No. 4, pp. 45-52
- ¹³⁸ Madeline Albright, “Theory and Practice in the Security Council: Haiti, Georgia, Rwanda,” May 28, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2008-02190, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹³⁹ Boris Yeltsin, “Yeltsin Letter to Clinton,” June 28, 1994, Request F-2017-13804 Doc No C06838134, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27155-doc-01-yeltsin-letter-clinton>.
- ¹⁴⁰ For text of UNSCR 940, see <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/940> <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/01/world/un-resolution-for-invasion-of-haiti.html>.

-
- ¹⁴¹ Strobe Talbott, "Letter to Chris (11 September 1994)," September 11, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹⁴² Talbott.
- ¹⁴³ Talbott.
- ¹⁴⁴ "NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994" (Washington D.C.: The George Washington University, November 24, 2021), National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2021-11-24/nato-expansion-budapest-blow-1994>.
- ¹⁴⁵ Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with Russia," December 11, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹⁴⁶ Talbott.
- ¹⁴⁷ See Tony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," September 21, 1993, National Security Council, Speechwriting Office, and Antony Blinken, Clinton Digital Library, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/9013>.
- ¹⁴⁸ Talbott, "Letter from Strobe to Chris (22 July 1994)."
- ¹⁴⁹ Talbott.
- ¹⁵⁰ Strobe Talbott, "Letter from Strobe to Chris (5 August 1994)," August 5, 1994, Virtual Reading Room Documents, F-2017-13804, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
- ¹⁵¹ Talbott.
- ¹⁵² Talbott, "Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994)."
- ¹⁵³ Talbott, "Letter from Strobe to Chris (21 Aug 1994)."
- ¹⁵⁴ Talbott.
- ¹⁵⁵ Talbott.
- ¹⁵⁶ Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000), 136.
- ¹⁵⁷ Quote found in Philippe Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 71, referenced from Dick Morris "Behind the Oval Office" (1999).
- ¹⁵⁸ Quote found in Philippe Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 71, referenced from Dick Morris "Behind the Oval Office" (1999).
- ¹⁵⁹ Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000), 137.
- ¹⁶⁰ William Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti," September 15, 1994, The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-haiti> (text). Video of speech available at: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?60210-1/military-options-haiti>.
- ¹⁶¹ Clinton.
- ¹⁶² William Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti," September 15, 1994, The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-haiti>.
- ¹⁶³ "Black Caucus Split on Invasion; Many Express Reservations," *Los Angeles Times*, September 16, 1994, L.A. Times Archives, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-09-16-mn-39187-story.html>.
- ¹⁶⁴ "Black Caucus Split on Invasion; Many Express Reservations."
- ¹⁶⁵ "Draft Talking Points for Haiti," September 12, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails, A1-Non-Record (APR 94-SEP94) ([Aristide]) Box 13, CPL.
- ¹⁶⁶ William Clinton, "Use of Force Notice to Congress," September 18, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Haiti]) Box 6, CPL.
- ¹⁶⁷ "MEMCON With Haitian President Aristide," March 25, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Haiti and Memcon]) OA/Box 191, CPL.
- ¹⁶⁸ George Shultz, "Power and Diplomacy" (Veterans of Foreign Wars, Chicago, August 20, 1984).
- ¹⁶⁹ William Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti," September 15, 1994, The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-haiti>.
- ¹⁷⁰ William Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti," September 15, 1994, The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-haiti>.
- ¹⁷¹ Lake, *Six Nightmares*, 139; Anthony Lake Interview, May 21, 2002, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ¹⁷² Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000), 136.
- ¹⁷³ Madeline K. Albright Oral History, August 30, 2006, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/madeleine-k-albright-oral-history>.

-
- ¹⁷⁴ Anthony Lake Interview, May 21, 2002, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ¹⁷⁵ Max Ferguson, LTG Jerry Bates Interview, December 23, 2022.
- ¹⁷⁶ Powell and Persico, *My American Journey*, 909.
- ¹⁷⁷ Sam Nunn, “Senator Nunn Remarks at Leadership Atlanta Breakfast,” September 19, 1994, Nunn’s Personal Collection.
- ¹⁷⁸ Nunn, “Senator Nunn Remarks at Leadership Atlanta Breakfast.”
- ¹⁷⁹ Anthony Lake Interview, May 21, 2002, William J. Clinton Presidential History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- ¹⁸⁰ Anthony Lake Interview.
- ¹⁸¹ Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, *My American Journey*, Large Print Edition (New York: Random House, 1995), 913; Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 248.
- ¹⁸² Quote of Carter retrieved from Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 248.
- ¹⁸³ Sam Nunn, “Senator Nunn Remarks at Leadership Atlanta Breakfast,” September 19, 1994, Nunn’s Personal Collection.
- ¹⁸⁴ Powell and Persico, *My American Journey*, 915.
- ¹⁸⁵ Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, *My American Journey*, Large Print Edition (New York: Random House, 1995), 916.
- ¹⁸⁶ Nunn, “Senator Nunn Remarks at Leadership Atlanta Breakfast.”
- ¹⁸⁷ Tami Biddle Interview, February 26, 2023.
- ¹⁸⁸ Weinberger Doctrine publicly introduced at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on 28 November 1984. Video recording of speech available at <https://www.c-span.org/video/?124872-1/military-force>.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Policymakers regularly apply the principles of effective coercive diplomacy by instinct, but the United States cannot afford to attempt compellence without a systematic approach. The stakes are too high to rely on intuition and individual experience when national security crises arise. There are too many people attempting to orchestrate too many levers of power to take an unstructured approach to coercive diplomacy. The eight conditions of coercive diplomacy provide structure and guidance for future applications of compellence. Though I reference the conditions numerically and depict them sequentially in a table, the conditions do not constitute or create a checklist for coercion. The eight conditions are not linear; they interact. Sometimes, the conditions become complementary and reinforcing. Other times, pursuing one objective can create tension with establishing another. The conditions are never completely established: their status remains fluid, adapting to the prevailing and evolving security and political environments. Maintaining the different conditions requires active involvement and deliberate effort by leaders up and down the hierarchy of the U.S. government. The conditions should serve as a mental framework to guide collective efforts and help leaders anticipate requirements for compellence.

This study builds on the work of Alexander George and Robert Art, who identified the ingredients that increase the likelihood of success in coercive diplomacy. I adopted the conditions they identified, and numbered them, in an effort to build a framework for better understanding *what facilitates or inhibits U.S. policymakers from developing favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy*. I examined three distinct case studies to better understand what helps establish the conditions for coercive diplomacy – and what stands in the way of

establishing those conditions. I wanted to know how policymakers achieve these conditions, and which factors prevent them from attaining these benchmarks. The goal was to enable leaders to take a systematic approach to compellence and guide policy decisions by applying the conditions of coercive diplomacy. Each case in this study revealed important insights into the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy.

The Eight Conditions of Coercive Diplomacy	
1.	Clarity of objectives
2.	Willingness to accept costs and risks
3.	Domestic and international support
4.	Strong and unified leadership
5.	Clarity and precision in terms of settlement
6.	Creating a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state
7.	The target's fear of unacceptable escalation
8.	Asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercer

Table 9. The internal (1-5) and external (6-8) conditions of coercive diplomacy.

I summarize the overarching themes that emerge across the three cases in four sections of my conclusion. First, I review some of the new observations about individual conditions that emerge from the three case studies in this dissertation. This includes insights into many of the internal conditions, and some broad observations of the external conditions. Second, I discuss how some of the conditions interact with one another. This includes observations about how objectives (Condition 1) and risk (Condition 2) intertwine in decision-making, and how Condition 4 (unified leadership) improves international support (Condition 3b). Identifying and delineating how the conditions interact is one of the novel and important contributions of my dissertation to the field of coercion. Understanding how the conditions interact will help policymakers anticipate the dynamics or tensions between the different conditions. Third, I share seven policy implications that this study reveals about future applications of coercive diplomacy.

Lastly, I offer a series of initial questions that policymakers consider ask before exercising coercive diplomacy.

Insights into Individual Conditions

Across the three cases in this study, several themes emerged about what enables or inhibits policymakers from establishing individual conditions of coercive diplomacy. Below are some of the observations the cases revealed about risk, domestic and international support, terms of settlement, and the external conditions of coercive diplomacy.

ON CONDITION 2: THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF RISK IN COERCION

In coercion, considerations of risk and costs are wider than the risk to U.S. troops and the costs to the nation in terms of financial obligations or resources. In applications of coercive diplomacy, considerations of risk and costs (Condition 2) include risk to **forces**, risk to **priorities**, **political** risk, and risk to **relationships**. (is the latter re: both allies and domestic stakeholders?)

Risk to forces is certainly a prominent consideration. With respect to Case 1, eighteen service members died in Somalia. The Clinton administration had to determine whether it was willing to risk a similar or worse outcome by using force in Haiti. But the intervention posed other important risks to relationships and risks to policy priorities. Clinton's diplomatic push to secure UNSC 940 risked putting a strain on the U.S. relationship with Russia, and it risked policy efforts in Europe over NATO expansion. The policy effort to promote democracy in Haiti created domestic political risk and risk to the United States' status as a global leader.

Political risk became an important consideration in several cases. In Case 2, Reagan assumed political risk and risk to relationships throughout the Euromissile affair. Policymakers

had to consider a multitude of questions of risks in pursuing SDI. If the program faltered, the credibility of U.S. technology might drop in the eyes of the world. Reagan accepted political risk by deciding to negotiate personally with his Soviet counterpart in Geneva under major media scrutiny. In Case 1, Johnson was clear-eyed about the political risk of taking a hard position against North Korea during the *Pueblo* crisis. The American public already was weary of the U.S. commitments to Vietnam and had been made weary by the uncertainty surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

These cases also highlighted the costs of coercion in terms of relationships and competing policy priorities. Reagan placed an excessive strain on European partners with dual applications of coercion towards the Poland crisis and the Euromissiles. Ultimately, Reagan had to determine which of the two issues was of greater importance. Johnson incurred a cost in his relationship with President Park while applying pressure on South Korea to cooperate with U.S. objectives regarding the *Pueblo* affair. Clinton incurred costs in his relationship with Yeltsin over Haiti. Russia's support within the UN Security Council for the U.S. to invade Haiti came with a strategic cost for the U.S. relationship with Russia at a pivotal time when both sides were trying to establish their future roles as global powers. Costs must be calculated by assessing whether the United States has sufficient financial and material resources, whether it has sufficient political capital, and whether there is an opportunity cost for not pursuing an objective.

ON CONDITION 3: SEPARATING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

This study demonstrates how much effort and organizational energy is required to achieve Condition 3: gain domestic and international support. Exercising coercive diplomacy strains relationships, regardless of party loyalties or personal affiliations. The breadth of

relationships and stakeholders involved in “gaining domestic and international support” necessitates a significant amount of attention and political capital. Though they are classified as a single condition by George and Art, domestic and international support should be treated as separate issues. The task is not as simple as gaining the support of domestic audiences or international actors. These groups are comprised of diverse stakeholders who have their own interests and their own agendas.

In the Haiti case, relevant domestic audiences ran the gamut from the general public to lawmakers on the Hill to political activists. International actors that influenced U.S. policy on Haiti ranged from the UN Security Council to regional partners in the Caribbean to the new Russian Federation. But the Clinton administration also faced a surprising amount of resistance and opposition from its primary international partner, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, living in exile within the nation’s capital.

The experiences of applying coercion across the three cases in this study reinforce the conclusion that Condition 3 is a deeply complex and important aspect of coercive diplomacy. The international stakeholders that the United States must work with in coercive diplomacy will range from friends to partners to competitors. Sometimes Americans will be faced with “frenemies” (like Aristide) who may well require some degree of coercion themselves. Friends are useful for issues like supporting a UN Security Council Resolution. International partners may be needed to contribute to a coalition with personnel, financing, or operational requirements like access, basing, and overflight (ABO). Competitors may have diverging interests and thus may need to be persuaded to enable or support a coercive gambit. But the example of Russia in the Haiti case demonstrates that a competitor can become a friend or a partner on a specific issue, but remain a source of opposition on other fronts. Friends can become partners but may resist

efforts to participate in or support an issue for a multitude of reasons. Partners may be willing to approve the U.S. taking on responsibility but avoid committing to burden sharing. And the example of Aristide demonstrates that a key partner can become a competitor or a major obstacle in the pursuit of a policy direction.

ON CONDITION 3B: INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS IN GENERATING U.S. COERCIVE POWER

This study reveals an uncomfortable attribute of American power: the coercive power of the United States is circumscribed by the willingness of domestic and international actors to support U.S. efforts. This applies to both unilateral and multilateral applications of coercive diplomacy. Without the support of domestic and international stakeholders, U.S. coercive efforts will be significantly hampered and hamstrung.

Superpower status does not guarantee the power to compel any target the United States pleases. The target state always holds a significant degree of initiative and control in making the *choice* to comply with U.S. demands. The decisive moment of the Euromissile affair was determined by the will of U.S. allies when Italy, the U.K., and West Germany affirmed their commitment to host American missiles in November 1983. This study demonstrates that international support can be a necessary element in compellence. It was required, for instance, to convince the Soviet Union to abandon its SS-20 program. In the *Pueblo* case, this study illuminated the distinct role South Korea played in exercising American coercive power.

The Euromissile affair revealed how much U.S. coercive power is contingent on support of allies and partners. The Reagan administration needed to retain the support of NATO allies for the Dual-Track Decision despite the extensive strain on the transatlantic relationship over trust issues stemming from the SDI program and Grenada. The Reagan administration faced a

Goldilocks dilemma: how to apply enough pressure against the target state to compel a change in behavior without applying so much pressure that security partners fear being dragged into an unwanted conflict.

Maintaining the support of NATO allies to receive PII missiles in November 1983 was a powerful moment for the Reagan administration and the NATO alliance. Colbourn (2022) highlights how difficult it was to address and satisfy the interests of each member within the alliance during the Euromissile affair, especially those who had signed up to host American missiles. “All of those [nations] have an ever-moving set of calculations: they have domestic politics, they have party political views, they have personal feelings about other leaders. There is any number of things that are changing...They end up in this loop...Reassurance is this ever-moving target.”¹ As Colbourn argues, the sweet spot became a moving target where the administration had to meter pressure continually.

The Clinton administration repeatedly struggled to maintain the support of President Aristide, despite hosting Aristide in the U.S. throughout his exile from Haiti. Aristide’s most overt effort to manipulate Clinton’s inclination to intervene in Haiti was when he submitted the six-month notice that he was formally rescinding permission for the U.S. to return Haitian refugees directly to Haiti.

ON CONDITION 4: APPLYING COERCION AT THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF AN ADMINISTRATION

This study unintentionally revealed a useful insight into how timing within an administration influences the conditions of coercive diplomacy, especially Condition 4.* The

* The cases were not selected based on the phase within the administration that the incidents occurred. The fact that the three cases span contrasting phases within their respective administrations was happenstance, though it turned out to be a useful distinction for cross-case comparison.

three cases examined incidents that happened to occur at different stages in each administration: the *Pueblo* incident occurred at the end of the Johnson administration; the Haiti intervention occurred at the beginning of the Clinton administration; and the Euromissile affair spanned the beginning, middle, and end of the Reagan administration. An important distinction between the three cases in this study emerged about the timing of the incidents within the lifecycle of the administration.

Setting the conditions of coercive diplomacy usually will be harder at the beginning of an administration than at the end. When new presidents enter office, administration officials need to sort out a series of new demands that may compete with campaign pledges or aspirational goals envisioned by ambitious leaders. Presidential transitions are hard to manage under the best conditions. Inheriting new crises and simmering global dilemmas can place incredible burdens on new administrations. If the transition occurs in a transformative era for the U.S. role in global affairs, then old playbooks from previous eras (on how to respond to foreign provocations) may be less useful. This would have been true for President Harry Truman at the beginning of his presidency, and it was certainly the experience of the Clinton administration when facing the Haiti crisis.

Johnson demonstrated strong leadership and fostered unity among his senior leaders during the *Pueblo* affair in large part because his team of policymakers and advisors had been working together for nearly a decade. Additionally, Johnson had already committed to major policy efforts by 1968, particularly his promotion of the Vietnam War, so it was easier for him to eliminate certain courses of action early in the crisis. Had the *Pueblo* incident occurred earlier in Johnson's administration, before the Gulf of Tonkin incident and before the U.S. had committed major troop levels in Vietnam, Johnson may have entertained bolder responses against North

Korea. The Reagan administration, comprised of a new team of lead players, struggled with its application of coercive diplomacy throughout the first two years of the administration.

Using coercive diplomacy to resolve the Euromissile affair was ultimately a success, despite some significant missteps, including tension with NATO partners over the Poland crisis, friction with the United Kingdom over the invasion of Grenada, and very dangerous tensions with the Soviets that peaked with the KAL 007 incident. Had the Reagan presidency ended after one term, the affair would have ended with the Soviets withdrawing from INF and SALT negotiations and a very strained relationship with the Kremlin. But Reagan won a second term and was fortunate enough to find a collaborative counterpart in Gorbachev; this led to the INF treaty in 1987.

Among the three cases, Clinton's team had the greatest challenge. The Bush administration left Clinton to deal with both Somalia and Haiti at a moment when both the United States and the new Russian Federation were trying to sort out new roles in the world. Haiti became more than just a regional security issue: it became an opportunity for the Clinton administration to assert major foreign policy positions, particularly the ideas of democracy promotion abroad and the concept of enlargement. Aristide was hardly the optimal partner to advance these main policy initiatives, but the Clinton administration had to salvage imperfect circumstances. All these issues converged early in the administration's first term when leaders were still trying to learn how to exercise different levers of power while learning to coordinate and balance evolving policy priorities and getting to know the personalities of the new members of the team.

The point is not to make excuses or judgments on how the different administrations performed in each of the cases. The intent here is simply to acknowledge that while coercive

diplomacy is always hard, it is even harder early in an administration. Establishing unity among different leaders will be inhibited when officials are getting to know one another, understand the president's policy priorities, and learn how to combine instruments of power to generate pressure against other states.

ON CONDITION 5: THE POWER OF FACE-TO-FACE DIALOGUE

There are numerous occasions in this case where face-to-face dialogue either inhibited or facilitated the conditions of coercive diplomacy, especially in developing Condition 5 (clear terms of settlement). In several instances, personal engagements between leaders helped senior leaders better understand the needs and motivations of their respective states. Cyrus Vance gained essential support from President Park during his visit to South Korea during the *Pueblo* crisis. Paul Nitze made a critical breakthrough during his 'Walk in the Woods' with his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kvitsinskiy. The two envoys demonstrated that both sides were capable of ironing out some sort of compromise solution. Reagan salvaged the summit in Geneva when he and Gorbachev left the formal conference room to have a fireside chat at a nearby pool house. Carter, Powell, and Nunn discovered two keys to resolving the Haiti crisis when they met with Cédras' wife and then Emile Jonassaint.

But the *Pueblo* incident also reveals the importance of having the right people in place to facilitate face-to-face dialogue. While Cyrus Vance was an excellent envoy, Rear Admiral John V. Smith was poorly suited to be the lead U.S. representative to the North Koreans during negotiations at the Military Armistice Commission.

Relaxed dialogue appears to be most helpful when formal negotiations stall or reach a stalemate. In such instances, leaders may need to ditch boardrooms and conference tables and

seek out informal settings for open dialogue. During the ‘Walk in the Woods’, the two leading negotiators managed to establish the first semblance of a true compromise after they abandoned the conference for a private, forthright discussion. Reagan and Gorbachev similarly ditched their entourages and the formalities of the summit venue to have a plainspoken dialogue at the pool house in Geneva.

Similarly, in the days after Reagan’s near assassination, Reagan repeatedly expressed his desire to write a personal letter to Brezhnev.² Normally, official correspondence gets highly scrutinized by the bureaucracy before being sent, sterilizing the tone and key points of the letter. Reagan wanted to convey his true feelings and allow his Soviet counterpart to gain a deeper appreciation for the hope Reagan held for the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These sorts of genuine exchanges help adversaries understand and appreciate the opponent’s key interests. Open conversations also help *clarify* core objectives that may yield a mutually acceptable *settlement* (Condition 5).

In other instances, candid and personal dialogue helps foster unified leadership among officials within the same government or between allies. George Shultz recalled in his memoir a spontaneous evening early in his tenure as Secretary of State when the Reagans invited George and his wife over to dinner at their residence. “We were all relaxed, off duty, so to speak,” Shultz noted.³ A snowstorm prevented the Reagans from spending the weekend at Camp David, so they called on the Shultzs to join them for an informal dinner instead. The two couples spent the snowbound evening in the family dining room on the 2nd floor of the White House. After sharing stories and lighthearted conversations, Reagan confided in Shultz about his difficulty in dealing with China and the Soviet Union. The president struggled with facing his own past rhetoric and bureaucratic resistance from his own White House, the Department of Defense, and the CIA. The

informal nature of this unexpected dinner allowed Shultz to get a clear glimpse into Reagan's mind. He wrote, "Now that we were talking in this family setting, I could see that Ronald Reagan was much more willing to move forward in relations with these two Communist nations—even travel to them—than I had earlier believed."⁴ Personal moments like this *unify leadership* (Condition 4) by allowing policymakers and advisors to better appreciate where the president is trying to guide the ship of state.

ON CONDITION 6: CONTROLLING A SENSE OF URGENCY

This study demonstrated that a sense of urgency can either help or hinder the coercer's efforts. Establishing a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state can inspire the opponent to come to the bargaining table and change behavior. However, this study also showed how a coercer can be placed at a disadvantage if it does not control the sense of urgency in a crisis. In the *Pueblo* incident, the hostage situation created a unique sense of urgency for the United States to hold negotiations with North Korea. The Johnson administration appeared overeager to negotiate a settlement in its efforts to safely retrieve the crew. In the Haiti case, the refugee crisis in the summer of 1994 created a unique sense of urgency on President Clinton to take forceful action while economic sanctions failed to create a sense of urgency on Cédra to step down from power. The *Pueblo* incident also demonstrated how the U.S can gain control of urgency when Cyrus Vance effectively calmed tensions in Seoul over the Blue House Raid.

Urgency is a feeling that needs to be controlled by the coercer. Ideally, the coercer develops the ability to dial it up or down at a time of the coercer's choosing (to have a complementary effect with other coercive initiatives). If the urgency of a crisis dissipates, then the coercive gambit risks devolving into protracted negotiations or stalemates. The Reagan

administration was able to reestablish a sense of urgency after the Chernobyl incident: this complemented other coercive efforts during the Euromissile affair.

ON ESTABLISHING THE EXTERNAL CONDITIONS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Even a superpower that can present an existential threat to its opponent may struggle to achieve the external conditions of coercive diplomacy: 6) creating a sense of urgency, 7) establishing a fear of escalation, or 8) asymmetry of motivation. This study exposes the tension in contests of coercion between states that hold power and states that hold the cards. Despite possessing infinitely greater military, economic, and diplomatic power, the United States found itself at a significant disadvantage relative to determined opponents like North Korea in the *Pueblo* incident, and Cédras in the Haiti study.

Establishing a sense of urgency (Condition 6) or creating a fear of escalation (Condition 7) relies on the perceived credibility that American will carry out those threats. Clinton primarily used sanctions to exert pressure on Cédras for the first eighteen months of his administration. Perfunctory threats of military action against Cédras lacked credibility through the spring of 1994. The *Harlan County* incident only reinforced the impression that “the United States does not follow through with pressure.”⁵ But by the summer of 1994, the Clinton administration had acquired the political will needed to follow through with pressure and mount an invasion force to remove Cédras from power.

Cédras was unable to appreciate how the political will had shifted in the White House even as American aircraft carriers loomed off the coast of Haiti. He rebuffed warnings of an imminent invasion, even when the messengers were a former President, a sitting Senator, and the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Cédras’ judgment was clouded by pride, optimism,

stubbornness, and a sense of duty. Though he might have been willing to fight and die if needed, he could also cling to hope generated from knowing Haiti had defeated superpowers before. The *Harlan County* incident suggested he it might be able to do it again.

In the *Pueblo* incident, the Johnson administration held little leverage to create a sense of urgency with North Korea. North Korea was motivated to extend the crisis to maximize the domestic propaganda value of the hostage *Pueblo* crew and ship. Prolonging negotiations also lent international legitimacy to the North Korean government by enabling them to maintain direct talks with a major power. North Korea had little interest in accepting a sense of urgency to cooperate with U.S. demands (Condition 6). Meanwhile, the United States undermined efforts to create a sense of urgency by displaying eagerness to protect the crew and salvage the ship. Not only did the United States fail to create a sense of urgency in the mind of the target state, but it also signaled its own sense of urgency to North Korea, which worked to the U.S. disadvantage.

The Johnson administration also struggled to establish a credible fear of escalation over the *Pueblo* incident. North Korea was able to offset the threat of direct military attack from the United States because of its own defensive treaty with the USSR. The risk of entangling the U.S. and USSR into a conflict on the Korean Peninsula that could trigger Mutually Assured Destruction safeguarded North Korea from a major attack by the United States. The visible domestic pressure created by the Vietnam War weakened the credibility of any assertive demonstrations of military power.

The Euromissile affair revealed the difficult balance a superpower must maintain in exerting coercive pressure against an opponent. If the U.S. applies too little pressure, it sends a weak signal and lacks persuasive power. If the U.S. applies too much pressure, it can signal unwanted escalation to either the target state or to supportive audiences. Security partners or

domestic audiences can become concerned that the U.S. might drag them into an unwanted conflict. Too much pressure also has a boomerang effect on stubborn or headstrong opponents who might be too proud to capitulate. Compellence, after all, demands a kind of obvious capitulation by the target state that will be resisted, and that must be managed carefully. Imposing too much fear of escalation can make the opponent believe they are on death ground – where there is no option but to fight.⁶ This fear of escalation tipping point creates a Goldilocks dilemma: how to apply enough pressure against the target state to compel a change in behavior without applying so much pressure as to create a blowback effect.

The Interaction of Conditions

SETTING CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND THE INFLUENCE OF RISK

Formulating objectives and weighing risk in coercive diplomacy can be like debating whether a chicken or an egg came first. In one sense, concerns about potential risks or costs (Condition 2) can establish the boundaries for what leaders are willing to set as objectives (Condition 1). In another sense, objectives determine the level of risk and costs that leaders must be willing to accept to achieve those goals.




Figure 5: Setting objectives (Conditions 1) in coercive diplomacy is intertwined with an administration’s willingness to accept risk and cost (Condition 2).

The findings of this study suggest that if leaders establish objectives without the will to accept the risks or costs inherent in those goals, then the coercive gambit can lack credibility, and the U.S. coercive power will be lessened in the mind of the target state.

The *Pueblo* case exemplifies the interrelated nature of Conditions 1 and 2. Johnson knew what he wanted because he understood what he did not want to risk: he could not afford another war in Asia. The constraints drove his objectives. There was no room to let the *Pueblo* crisis intensify any further. Johnson's political-military leaders shared this realization with the president. Not only was Vietnam the priority military effort, but the possibility that the *Pueblo* incident and the Blue House Raid could spiral into a devastating conflict was real. This crisis possessed all the ingredients to trigger a second war on the Korean Peninsula or ignite the Cold War into World War III. The magnitude of risk in this crisis, coupled with the administration's existing military and political stakes in Vietnam, overtly constrained their potential objectives in this unexpected crisis.

TRUST AND SOLIDARITY FACILITATES INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Gaining and maintaining international support (Condition 3b) is a critical task in coercive diplomacy. The cases in this study revealed that fostering solidarity and addressing the individual interests of allies and partners (applying Condition 4) facilitates international support for a coercive endeavor. Administrations increased international support when they emphasized confidence-building measures and reassured allies that the United States valued the national interests of its security partners.

Fostering trust between partners is a powerful tool in maximizing U.S. coercive power in coercive diplomacy. In the *Pueblo* incident, the main source of tension between the U.S. and

South Korea was whether the Republic of Korea could rely on the U.S. to help it defend against North Korean provocations. President Johnson dispatched a trusted envoy, Cyrus Vance, to soothe tensions with South Korea by providing both military aid and security guarantees. In the Haiti episode, nagging doubts about trust and dependability between Clinton and Aristide plagued their relationship and inhibited U.S. efforts to apply pressure on Cédras.

In the Euromissile affair, the consequences of the U.S. invasion of Grenada exemplified the importance of unity and solidarity to maintain international support in coercive diplomacy. Reagan launched the invasion of Grenada just weeks before the GLCMs and PIIs were meant to arrive in Europe. The U.S. coercive strategy towards the Euromissiles relied on European support for the deployment of the GLCMs and PIIs. In the days before the invasion of Grenada, Reagan decided against informing Thatcher about his intent to attack the British Commonwealth. Keeping Thatcher in the dark about the invasion was personally unnerving and publicly embarrassing for the prime minister. And the fact that the U.S. was willing to conduct a potentially dangerous unilateral action that compromised the interests of a 'trusted' ally was very unsettling for NATO members in Europe. European support for the deployment of the GLCMs and PIIs was nearly derailed by festering doubts about trust and solidarity between the U.S. and NATO members in Europe.

THE THREE PERCEPTIONS OF ESCALATION: HOW CONDITION 3 AFFECTS CONDITION 7

Establishing Condition 7, the target's fear of uncontrolled escalation, requires the U.S. to consider three distinct potential perspectives: the target state, affected allies, and domestic audiences. Establishing the fear of escalation in the mind of the target state must be balanced against international allies' and domestic audiences' assessment of the risk of uncontrolled

escalation. If domestic constituents or international partners believe escalation may be uncontrolled, they will likely withdraw support and, thus, imperil the overall coercive diplomacy effort, regardless of the impact such actions have on the target state. Stated simply, the threat of escalation must be wielded carefully – and with intentionality.

ESTABLISHING ASYMMETRY OF MOTIVATION: THE LINK TO OBJECTIVES, RISK, AND LEADERSHIP

Establishing the necessary condition of asymmetry of motivation (Condition 8) can be a challenging endeavor. This study adds to the understanding of how coercers can achieve asymmetry in motivation (Condition 8) through refined objectives (Condition 1), a clear understanding of risk (Condition 2), and strong leadership (Condition 4).

Scholars have discussed possible ways policymakers can improve their relative position in terms of motivation. One method is to lower the target state's motivation toward its objectives through inducements or other incentives. General Powell applied this method with LTG and Mrs. Cédras when Powell helped persuade the Cédras' it was not their duty to die for Haiti over the return of Aristide. Instead, Powell argued that the honorable decision was to spare Haiti from a bloodbath.

The other established tactic to establish asymmetry of motivation is to narrow objectives down to the central interest of the coercer. Pinpointing a specific objective creates “a more favorable asymmetry by demanding only what is essential for [the coercer's] vital interests and minimizing demands on the vital interests of the adversary.”⁷ Coercers may not be able to achieve all their goals but may find some issues are less important to the target state than others. The coercer can demonstrate asymmetric motivation on finite issues that might draw an acceptable settlement. The Johnson administration applied this approach in the *Pueblo* affair

when it refined the objective of securing the release of the crew without retrieving the USS *Pueblo* vessel. The Johnson administration would not be able to demonstrate any credible justification for wanting the return of the ship, but there was consistent messaging and signaling throughout the affair that demonstrated how the crew was of exceptional value to the United States. Bringing the crew home safely was an unalterable goal for Johnson.

The Euromissile affair demonstrates how Conditions 1, 2, and 4 can facilitate Condition 8 to break a tie in motivation between the coercer and the target state. The Reagan administration struggled to establish that it had greater motivation over the Euromissile issue than the Soviets in the first five years of attempting coercive diplomacy. The combined effect of strong leadership presenting clear objectives, with a firm understanding of the risks, provided Reagan with the compelling bargaining position needed to convince the Soviets to ultimately accept the terms of settlement in the Euromissile dispute.

The Reykjavik Summit in 1986 was where Reagan finally conveyed to Gorbachev that the U.S. possessed an asymmetry of motivation over the Intermediate Nuclear Forces issue. Reagan had established clear objectives (Condition 1) in the first years of his administration with the pursuit of the zero-zero option. It was Reagan's leadership (Condition 4) that united his divided administration to support the Dual-Track Decision, the zero-zero option, and SDI. If there needs to be a choice between unity among officials or strong leadership from the executive power, this case suggests a strong executive can sidestep the choice by creating unity among senior officials. Reagan carefully weighed the risks and costs (Condition 2) of denuclearizing without a defense system, as the Soviets demanded. The president was convinced that the long-term benefit of developing a nuclear defensive system in space outweighed the risks of accepting Gorbachev's package deal in Iceland. Reagan also became adamant that an agreement between

the superpowers to denuclearize was needed to allow the further development of a nuclear defense system. Only then would the United States (and the world) be safeguarded from a future nuclear attack.

Policy Implications

In addition to the observations discussed above, this dissertation also revealed several policy implications for future applications of coercive diplomacy. American policymakers will face contests of power between rivals and competitors for decades to come. Ongoing or likely issues that are suitable for the types of coercive diplomacy include compelling Iran to end its state sponsorship of terrorist groups across the Middle East (Type A, in chart below), compelling Iran and North Korea to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs (Type B), and persuading Nicolas Maduro to step down from power in Venezuela (Type C).



Figure 6. A reflection of the types of coercion necessary for various global threats. Note that responses towards an invasion by a hostile state vary on the spectrum depending on the goals established by the U.S. Compelling an opponent to abandon gains in an invasion (ex: withdraw troops) or abandon military fortifications on shoals in the South China Sea would change the level of difficulty than trying to compel the opponent to halt current gains and cease further action.

The cases in this study represent a sample of possible issues that await American policymakers in the 21st century. The array of issues and decisions contained within these three cases, from different decades, against different adversaries, by different administrations, all rely on similar elements of U.S. power to persuade an opponent to change its behavior. Looking inside the decision-making process on how previous leaders approached those crises revealed some of the practical challenges leaders faced in setting favorable conditions for coercive diplomacy. The purpose of this study was to look for ways for government leaders to maximize the coercive power of the United States. I attempted to uncover the hurdles that prevent leaders from forming the conditions of coercive diplomacy and what enabled the U.S. to apply coercion more successfully. None of these observations will guarantee success in future cases. Coercion, like war, is a game of chance.* But the conclusions illuminated here should let policymakers build more persuasive policies of coercive diplomacy.

The seven policy implications are as follows:

IMPLICATION #1: OBJECTIVES AND RISK ARE THE FOUNDATIONAL CONDITIONS IN COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

This study suggests that the first two conditions of coercive diplomacy, determining objectives and acceptable risk, are the foundation for enabling the other conditions to materialize. This conclusion builds on Art's determination that while none of the conditions are sufficient, the last two are necessary for success.† Without knowing what the U.S. seeks to

* Clausewitz warned "guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war... From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry." CVC 85-86

† Though not sufficient by themselves, George and Art found the two final conditions stand out in terms of importance. "The [first] six ingredients facilitate the successful execution of coercive diplomacy, but they are not in themselves sufficient to produce target compliance. The last two ingredients are critical, and unless they are favorable to the coercer, the attempt will fail" (Art and Cronin 2003, 372).

achieve and accepting the risks and costs to achieve the goals, the rest of the conditions stall. Clear objectives unify leaders across the administration. Clear objectives concentrate efforts to gain the support of domestic and international partners. Understanding the costs and risks of an objective narrows the terms of a settlement. Most importantly, genuine willingness to accept the costs and risks of an objective reinforces credibility in the mind of the target state. When Objectives 1 and 2 are settled, the U.S. can credibly transmit a sense of urgency (Condition 6), and threats of escalation (Condition 7) are seen as a warning of what will occur if terms are not met. When policymakers have a clear understanding of what the true objectives are (the bottom line – not the aspirational goals), then it allows U.S. officials to determine if or where the U.S. can establish the necessary (and sometimes elusive) condition of asymmetry of motivation.

IMPLICATION #2: MIND OF THE TARGET STATE

Coercive diplomacy is a contest of will, not a contest of power. Being a superpower does not guarantee that an opponent will ‘bend the knee’ under threats of devastating force. Convincing an opponent to stop, undo, or reverse action takes more than overwhelming strength. Pride, humiliation, stubbornness, shame, and other nonlogical (but not irrational) factors shape a target state’s response.

Applications of coercive diplomacy cannot rely simply on tough talk about military power and debilitating sanctions to resolve a crisis. When the U.S. tries to leverage hard power without a genuine integration of diplomacy, the target state will likely resist the coercer out of sheer defiance, pride, or stubbornness. Nor can the United States expect adversaries to cease destabilizing behavior through diplomacy alone. George Shultz forewarned, “power must always be guided by purpose, but the reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual.”⁸

Coercive diplomacy is more than using power to force the opponent to change its behavior. It is about the nuanced art of persuasion, and it often requires a very personal touch to reach acceptable conclusions.

IMPLICATION #3: U.S. COERCIVE POWER RELIES ON INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

The U.S. power to persuade is tied to the support of international partners. Gaining international support enables coercive diplomacy in numerous ways. Establishing strong coalitions adds credibility to coercive threats. Support from international organizations like the UN can add legitimacy (ex: UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing the use of force). Regional partners can enable the operational aspect of a coercive gambit like basing or staging military equipment or personnel. Conversely, the lack of international support can become a major impediment to applying coercion (either unilaterally or multilaterally). Regional partners can deny U.S. military access, basing, or overflight for U.S. forces. Defensive treaties or international agreements may prevent the United States from exercising certain responses. Depending on the confluence of interests or developments throughout a crisis, some partners can become hindrances, and some rivals can become advocates. The implication is clear no matter the scenario: international stakeholders cannot be afterthoughts in coercive diplomacy.

IMPLICATION #4: REFINE OBJECTIVES AND TERMS

In compellence, the more a coercer asks, the harder the task.* If the opponent is entrenched in their objectives, the U.S. can refine its own objectives to find the core issue that the U.S. can easily demonstrate is of the greatest importance to its interests. If the objectives

* As depicted in the coercion continuum.

must remain broad, the risk and costs must increase to achieve those goals. Johnson strengthened his position by establishing very specific objectives (return of the ship and crew) and was willing to narrow his objectives further once it was clear that the ship had more value to the North Koreans than the United States.

Lofty goals, like Reagan's desire to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, are also likely to require patience and opportunity. Meanwhile, Clinton ran out of time as he struggled to implement his broad goal of returning Aristide to power after the refugee situation became politically untenable for him in the summer of 1994. Clinton then needed to accept the higher costs and risks of removing Cédras by force.

Refined objectives help clarify messaging efforts as well. Coercive diplomacy involves a multitude of outlets, channels, and venues to communicate an objective or policy position. Unity of messaging is enhanced when the objectives are simple to remember and explain. Having easy-to-digest goals like the 'zero-zero position' helps the U.S. maintain clear messaging with allies, opponents, and domestic audiences.

IMPLICATION #5: RECOGNIZING SUCCESS IN COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Coercive diplomacy may "fail more often than it succeeds," but this study also suggests that success in coercive diplomacy is a nuanced designation.⁹ Some attempts at coercive diplomacy may deserve credit not just for what was achieved but also for what was prevented. Conversely, some 'successful' outcomes of coercive diplomacy incur secondary costs that need to be recognized in conjunction any achievements. Successful outcomes may also mask unforced errors that were made along the way. This study uncovers some such errors in the hope of allowing others to avoid encountering similar problems in the future.

It is not hard to argue that the *Pueblo* affair was, at best, a partial success with generally unimpressive results. The North Koreans did release the crew as demanded by the U.S., but only after Pyongyang had exploited the affair to its fullest advantage. But the real accomplishment of the *Pueblo* incident was in what coercive diplomacy helped prevent and avoid. The situation on the Korean peninsula in January 1968 was nothing short of combustible. North Korea had embraced aggressive provocations that might have triggered a Second Korean War – and perhaps worse. But the Johnson administration deliberately applied coercive diplomacy to avert war on the peninsula. Viewed through that lens, coercive diplomacy was invaluable.

The Haiti case was technically a success: the United States did succeed at persuading LTG Cédras and the junta to relinquish power in Haiti to enable Aristide's return to power. But the Clinton administration's haphazard approach to coercive diplomacy began with an embarrassing episode involving the USS *Harlan County*. The struggling attempt at coercive diplomacy then led to a refugee crisis in the Caribbean and a public opposition campaign against the White House involving political activists, members of the House of Representatives, an exiled Haitian President, and Hollywood celebrities. When the United States finally did commit to using overwhelming force against the island of Haiti, the opposition leaders continued to resist, like David facing Goliath. It required the actual initiation of the U.S. invasion to persuade the Haitian Armed Forces to back down. That is not a resounding example of superpower success.

IMPLICATION #6: SPENDING POLITICAL CAPITAL IN COERCION

Applying pressure through coercive diplomacy requires spending political capital, especially in international relationships. The Reagan administration encountered the problem of

running out of political capital with allies during the Euromissile affair by trying to apply pressure in too many directions over multiple issues at the same time. Trying to apply coercive diplomacy for the Euromissile Crisis and against the Soviet gas pipeline over Poland in 1981 created excessive tension with European allies. The Reagan administration had to pick which effort – the Euromissiles or the pipeline – to prioritize. Reagan also expended significant political capital on the invasion of Grenada.

Hidden costs emerge in coercive diplomacy as the U.S. often has to coerce more than just the target state. Coercive diplomacy often involves compelling and deterring allies, partners, and competitors at the same time. In the *Pueblo* case, the United States was simultaneously applying compellence and deterrence. The primary objective was compelling North Korea to return the ship and crew. In doing so, the U.S. also applied deterrence to prevent South Korea from unilaterally attacking North Korea in retaliation for the Blue House Raid. In addition, the U.S. applied compellence towards the Soviet Union to persuade Moscow to mediate a resolution with the DPRK. Johnson expended significant political capital in convincing the Republic of Korea to support the U.S. over the *Pueblo* affair. Johnson's relationship with President Park suffered greatly as a result of that expense.

The Clinton administration mustered the political capital necessary to convince the UN Security Council, notably including Russia, to endorse a resolution that authorized the use of force in Haiti. Moscow became resentful that the U.S. could intervene in Western Hemisphere security issues while Russia was denied reciprocal support for intervening with military force in former Soviet states. Clinton paid an unexpected price for intervening in Haiti by inflaming Russia's angst over NATO expansion and creating resentment that the U.S. would not support Russia's 'near-abroad' goals.

IMPLICATION #7: BE PREPARED FOR WAR

Coercive diplomacy is a way for the U.S. to respond to an act of aggression (that deterrence was unable to prevent) without automatically resorting to war. But it would be a mistake to think of coercive diplomacy as a form of soft power. The coercive aspect of coercive diplomacy requires brinksmanship and a willingness not just to demonstrate force but to apply it lethally. The goal is to avert war and defuse a crisis, but people may still die within the realm of this ‘diplomatic’ venture. Robert Art cautioned, “next to outright war, coercive diplomacy represents the most dangerous way to use a state’s military power because, if diplomacy fails, the state that tries it then faces two stark choices: back down or wage war.”*

In practice, policymakers do not automatically need to make a binary choice of either backing down or waging war if coercive diplomacy is not producing the desired effects. Policymakers might still find a range of options available. If time permits, like it did in December 1983 for Reagan with the Euromissiles, the coercer can simply continue the campaign and find new avenues or opportunities to apply pressure. If the coercer fails to achieve its initial objectives, as Johnson did in the summer of 1968 with the *Pueblo* affair, the coercer can revisit its priorities and refine the objectives or terms based on what is viewed as vital or attainable. Accepting concessions should not be seen as backing down. Compromises are part of the bargaining process.†

* Art continued, “The first risks loss of face and future bargaining power; the second, loss of life and military defeat. Because both outcomes are possible, a state should never undertake coercive diplomacy lightly.” If an opponent is small such that a military defeat is not a likely outcome, costly, prolonged conflicts are still possible risk to waging war against weaker adversaries. See Art and Cronin (2003). Also see George, *Avoiding War*, (1991), 385.

† Reference the Questions of Coercive Diplomacy in the final section, below, for suggestions on how to approach objectives, terms of settlement, and establishing best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.

The external conditions of coercive diplomacy rely on the credibility of the coercer to follow through on threats of force. Target states can sense when threats are eroded by domestic political pressure and lack of international support. Perceptions of urgency, threats of escalation, or asymmetric interest in a goal – the external conditions of coercive diplomacy – are enhanced by foreboding demonstrations of force, select applications of force, or recognized precedence of employing force. If credibility and resolve are inherent elements for establishing the necessary external conditions of coercive diplomacy, then a **paradox of coercive diplomacy** emerges: the more the U.S. is ready and willing to use force, the less likely the U.S. will have to use it. If the U.S. is not ready to fight over its objectives, then force may not be necessary either, but the U.S. is likely to fail at achieving its goals.

Applying coercive diplomacy takes the United States right up to the doorstep of war – and knocks. Sometimes, the U.S. must step inside to demonstrate resolve. But brinkmanship is a dangerous and unpredictable game with unexpected results. The U.S. should not knock on the door with coercive diplomacy unless it is prepared and willing to stay and fight.* No outcome is guaranteed in coercion, but taking a deliberate approach to set the conditions of coercive diplomacy increases the likelihood of resolving a crisis and safeguarding U.S. interests between deterrence and war.

* Art advised, “never resort to coercive diplomacy unless you are prepared to go to war should it fail, or unless you have devised a suitable political escape hatch if war is not acceptable.” Art and Cronin, 2003, 402.

The Questions of Coercive Diplomacy

The series of questions below are meant to help policymakers at the outset of a crisis or policy review session where coercive diplomacy is under consideration. These questions are designed to help facilitate internal decisionmaking and encourage effective dialogue with allies and partners. The questions are meant to frame initial thinking about the eight conditions of coercive diplomacy. Policymakers also would be well served by revisiting and reconsidering these questions throughout the policymaking process, including implementation of coercive activities. This is especially true for determining U.S. objectives and the willingness to accept risk. Policymakers should refrain from finalizing objectives and levels of acceptable risk until leaders have assessed the entirety of the considerations below.

BASELINE QUESTION: *IS THIS A MATTER OF PREVENTING BEHAVIOR OR CHANGING BEHAVIOR (OR BOTH)?*

The preliminary question in coercion is to determine if the matter is an issue for deterrence (preventing an actor from doing something), compellence (persuading an actor to do something it does not want to do, or to stop something it has begun), or both.* This is an important distinction for policymakers to recognize. Compellence is inherently more difficult and demanding than deterrence.† In the former, factors including emotional considerations of honor, humiliation, shame, and pride, enter the equation.

* Coercive diplomacy may include elements of deterrence while needing to exercise compellence: the opponent may have initiated one behavior, but the U.S. may still be concerned about preventing another action from occurring. An example is a nuclear weapons program. The U.S. could be interested in simultaneously dismantling a nuclear weapons program (compellence) while also needing to prevent the opponent from employing the nuclear weapons it already possesses (deterrence).

† See continuum of coercion in Chapter 2.

The following questions are meant to facilitate U.S. policymakers establish the conditions of coercive diplomacy to increase the likelihood a target state will change its behavior:

1ST: WHAT DOES THE U.S. WANT TO THE TARGET STATE TO DO?

RELATES TO CONDITION 1

In developing objectives, it is appropriate to consider both aspirational goals and the minimum critical needs. Other factors considered in the subsequent questions will help determine the final objectives. Establishing the initial boundaries of the U.S. position by first considering this question is helpful in guiding the policy development process.

2ND: WHAT IS THE TARGET STATE TRYING TO ACHIEVE AND WHY?

RELATES TO CONDITION 8

Understanding the motives driving the aggressor's behavior is instrumental in coercive diplomacy. It helps the determine if or where the U.S. might be able to achieve asymmetry of motivation for its goals. Empathizing with the target state also helps refine the eventual terms of settlement. The reason why the baseline question is so important is recognizing how nonlogical influences like pride, honor, shame, status, and humiliation inhibit or induce the target's cooperation to demands .

3RD: HOW MUCH RISK IS THE U.S. WILLING TO ASSUME?

RELATES TO CONDITION 2

This question will be revisited when the final policy objectives are established but getting a sense for the severity of the crisis helps develop initial policy recommendations. Risk and cost assessments should include physical risk to U.S. military and civilian personnel, physical risk to

allies or partners, competing policy efforts, expected political constraints, and risk to U.S. relationships.

4TH: WHAT ARE THE KEY INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS IN THE CRISIS?

RELATES TO CONDITION 3B

Policymakers should consider the interests of both regional and global allies and partners that are notably involved in either the dilemma, or the possible resolution of the issue.

Stakeholders to consider also include regional or global rivals or competitors who might have an interest in either defusing or inflaming the crisis.

5TH: WHAT ARE THE MAIN DOMESTIC POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE?

RELATES TO CONDITION 3A

Who are the domestic opponents and supporters? How much political pressure or public influence do these groups wield compared to the noise they are capable of generating?

6TH: WHAT IS THE THRESHOLD OF ESCALATION?

RELATES TO CONDITION 7

What is the expected resilience of affected allies if the situation escalates? What types of escalatory measures will U.S. allies endorse and what forms of escalation will be difficult for allies to support? How much domestic support might exist for the United States to escalate this conflict based on national interests or national values?

7TH: WHAT ARE THE POSITIONS AMONG THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL?*

RELATES TO CONDITION 4

Getting a litmus test for how the designated representatives on the National Security Council feel about the proposed options and relative position of the United States in the dilemma is important to gauging the unity of leadership within the U.S. government. Major divisions or universal consensus among Principles can be equally troubling during the initial policy formulation. Major divisions can undermine unity of effort and messaging. An abundance of agreement might indicate group think or an underestimation of underlying issues. A little skepticism or dissenting opinions should be encouraged, while major differences should be judiciously resolved before the U.S. attempts to apply coercive diplomacy against a target state.

8TH: IS THE U.S. IN CONTROL OF THE SENSE OF URGENCY?

RELATES TO CONDITION 6

If not, how can the U.S. gain control of the sense of urgency in the crisis? As the plan develops, policymakers will want to determine how and when to dial up the sense of urgency as a complimentary effort to other coercive measures in the affair.

9TH: WHAT TO ASK OF THE TARGET STATE AND HOW TO PRESENT THOSE DEMANDS TO THE OPPONENT?

RELATES TO CONDITION 5

The last question considers both the *what* and the *how* to approach Condition 5 (terms of settlement). First, policymakers need to consider whether the terms should be broad or specific,

* This is also a leading question that serves as a reminder that coercive diplomacy is a risky policy endeavor that requires active involvement of the President and cabinet secretaries throughout the policy development process. See Haiti chapter.

ambitious, or tempered based on the cumulative analysis of the preceding questions. Initial demands and terms of settlement need reflect more than basic bargaining tactics (open high and negotiate down). Best Alternatives to Negotiated Agreements (BATNA). Relative combat power assessments should not be the driving factor in the demands or terms of settlement in a dispute. As the coercer, U.S. policymakers need to weigh the relative motivation towards each side's objectives. Policymakers need to recognize the perceived willingness to accept costs and risk *by both sides* when formulating demands. The developed terms need to account for the nonlogical influences like shame, humiliation, and pride that Question 2 first considered towards the external conditions of coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, the terms will also reflect the internal conditions of coercive diplomacy, including the U.S. objectives, risk tolerance levels, the interests of international stakeholders, and domestic political considerations.

Once policymakers determine *what* should be demanded, they need to consider *how* and when to present those demands. Leaders need to consider whether to employ public messaging or quiet diplomacy, and which channel(s) or messenger(s), will be the most persuasive way to communicate demands to the target state. It could be a forceful address from the oval office, a secret delegation of trusted envoys, communication through international intermediaries, or a combination of such approaches. The manner in which terms are presented becomes an important part of navigating around the emotional factors that are uniquely present in matters of compellence.

The timing of when to present the demands is all part of the condition setting process. *When* to present *what* demands and *how* should be tied to the establishment of other conditions. They are interactive conditions, not milestones in a checklist. They require synchronization, deconfliction, and deliberate evaluation by a broad network of leaders. When combined properly,

the conditions of coercive diplomacy can maximize the persuasive power of the U.S. to compel target states to change behavior.

ENDNOTES

¹ *The EUROMISSILE Program's Impact on NATO in the 1980s* - Prof. Susan Colbourn, 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzzlibQo0EU&t=3016s>.

² Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, *Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), 52.

³ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 246.

⁴ Shultz, 164.

⁵ "MEMCON With Haitian President Aristide," March 25, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Records Management ([Haiti and Memcon]) OA/Box 191, CPL.

⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1963).

⁷ Jack S. Levy, "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 540, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.x>.

⁸ George Shultz, "Power and Diplomacy" (Veterans of Foreign Wars, Chicago, August 20, 1984).

⁹ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

APPENDIX: ACRONYMS

ACDA:	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
DMZ:	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK:	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea)
FAd'H:	Forces Armées d'Haïti
GLCM:	Ground Launch Cruise Missile
ICBM:	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JTF HAG:	Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group
KWG:	Korean Working Group
LBJ:	Lyndon Baines Johnson
LST:	Landing Ship, Tank
MAC:	Military Armistice Commission
MAD:	Mutually Assured Destruction
MIRV:	Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle
MMT:	Million Metric Tons
NMCC:	National Military Command Center
NSC:	National Security Council
OMB:	Office of Management and Budget
PII:	Pershing II Missile
RET:	Retired
ROK:	Republic of Korea (aka South Korea)
ROKG:	Republic of Korea Government
SALT:	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI:	Strategic Defense Initiative
SNA:	Somali National Alliance
SPD:	Social Democratic Party
TNF:	Theater Nuclear Force
UNMIH:	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOSOM:	United Nations Operations in Somalia

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USMC: United States Marine Corps

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: Individual documents from archival collections, news articles, and interviews have been cited in footnotes and are not included in this bibliography.

- Adelman, Ken. *Reagan at Reykjavik*. New York: Broadside Books, 2014.
- Akerlof, George. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84 (1970): 488–500.
- Aldous, Richard. *Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2012.
- Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999.
- Anderson, Martin, and Annelise Anderson. *Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster*. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009.
- Aristide, Jean-Bertrand. *Dignity*. Translated by Carrol Coates. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994.
- Armbrister, Trevor. *A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair*. Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2004.
- Art, Robert J., and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
- Art, Robert J., and Kelly M. Greenhill. "Coercion: An Analytical Overview." In *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, edited by Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, 3–32. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- . "The Power and Limits of Compellence: A Research Note." *Political Science Quarterly* 133, no. 1 (2018): 77–97.
- Art, Robert J., and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*. 7th Edition. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009.
- Barry, Mark. "The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging the 'Big Decisions.'" *International Journal on World Peace* 29, no. 4 (December 2012): 37–59.
- Bartilow, Horace. "Diplomatic Victory Misunderstood: A Two-Level Game Analysis of US Policy toward Haiti." *Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 115–52.
- Betts, Richard. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Beyerchen, Alan. "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War." *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992): 59. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539130>.
- Biddle, Tami Davis. "Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners." *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109.
- Blanchard, Jean-Marc, Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman, eds. *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security*. New York: Frank Cass & Co, 2000.
- Bolger, Daniel. "Ridgway's Advice Proves Prescient in Vietnam." *Army* 69, no. 4 (April 2019): 52–54.
- Bowie, Robert, and Richard Immerman. *Waging Peace*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Brands, Hal. *The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022.

- Brooks, Risa. "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States." *International Security* 57, no. 3 (June 2013): 351–68.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.010>.
- . *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessments*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*. New York: Basic Books, 2007.
- Byman, Daniel, and Matthew Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Carothers, Thomas. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999.
- Carter, Ash. *Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon*. New York: Dutton, 2019.
- Carter, Donald Alan. "Eisenhower Versus the Generals." *The Journal of Military History* 71, no. 4 (October 2007): 1169–99.
- Cartwright, James. "Best Military Advice." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 13–17.
- Cary, Noel D. "Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement." *Central European History* 52 (2019): 148–71.
- Cheevers, Jack. *Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo*. New York: Penguin Books, 2013.
- Christensen, Thomas. *Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Christopher, Warren. *In the Stream of History*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Cialdini, Robert. *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. 4th ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2021.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Clifford, Clark, and Richard Holbrooke. *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*. New York: Random House, 1991.
- Cohen, Eliot. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Anchor Books, 2002.
- Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Jonah P. Olsen. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (March 1972): 1–25.
- Colbourn, Susan. *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022.
- Colby, Elbridge. *The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.
- Connelly, Owen. *On War and Leadership*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Cortright, David. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Craig, Gordon A., and Francis L. Loewenheim, eds. *The Diplomats: 1939-1979*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Crawford, Tim. "The Strategy of Coercive Isolation." In *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

- Crawford, Timothy. "The Strategy of Coercive Isolation." In *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, edited by Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Cray, Ed. *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman*. Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press, 1990.
- "Current Military Operations, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services." Washington D.C., October 12, 1993.
- Davis, Paul K. *Lessons from RAND's Work on Planning under Uncertainty for National Security*. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2012.
- Desch, Michael. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- DeYoung, Karen. *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.
- Dolman, Everett C. *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age*. London, England: Routledge, 2005.
- Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Easton, David. "The Political System Under Stress." In *Public Policy Theories, Models, and Concepts*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
- Egerton, George. "The Lloyd George War Memoirs: A Study in the Politics of Memory." *The Journal of Modern History* 60, no. 1 (March 1988): 55–94.
- Eisenhardt, Kathleen. "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review." *Academy of Management Review* 14 (1989): 57–74.
- Ellsworth, Robert, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser. "America's National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America's National Interests." The Commission on America's National Interests, 1996.
- Fearon, James D. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Relations." *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92.
- Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
- Finney, Nathan K., ed. *On Strategy: A Primer*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Army University Press, 2020.
- Fisher, Roger, and Daniel Shapiro. *Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate*. London, England: Penguin Books, 2006.
- Friedberg, Aaron. *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Gaddis, John. *Strategies of Containment*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Gans, John. *White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War*. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2019.
- Gardner, John W. *On Leadership*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Garrison, Lynn. *Voodoo Politics: The Clinton/Gore Destruction of Haiti*. Los Angeles, CA: Leprechaun Publishing Group, 2000.
- Garthoff, Raymond L., and Richard Pipes. "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy." *Strategic Review* 10, no. 4 (Fall 1982): 36–63.
- Gat, Azar. *The Causes of War & The Spread of Peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Gates, Robert. *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. New York: Vintage Books, 2014.

- . *Exercise of Power*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020.
- George, Alexander L., ed. *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
- . *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.
- George, Alexander L., David K. Hall, and William E. Simons. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1971.
- George, Alexander L., and William E. Simons. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
- Girard, Philippe. *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.
- Golby, James, and Mara Karlin. “Why ‘Best Military Advice’ Is Bad for the Military - and Worse for Civilians.” *Orbis* 62, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 137–53.
- Graebner, Norman. *America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan*. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1984.
- Greenhill, Kelly M., and Peter Krause, eds. *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Griffin, Ben. *Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022.
- Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.
- Handel, Michael. *The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, Sadat*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1981.
- Hauser, Jeff, and David Segal. “Personnel Is Policy.” *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, February 6, 2020. <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/personnel-is-policy/>.
- Hill, Fiona, and Pamela Jewett. “Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and Implications for the United States Policy Toward Russia.” Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 1994. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/back-in-the-ussr-1994.pdf>.
- Hirsch, John, and Robert Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.
- Hoffman, David. *The Dead Hand*. New York: Anchor Books, 2009.
- Hopwood, Lloyd P. “A Formula for Strategic Planning.” *Air University Quarterly Review* 8, no. 3 (Summer 1956): 21–33.
- Horowitz, Donald. *Coup Theories and Officers’ Moves*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Hutchings, Robert, and Jeremi Suri, eds. *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- , eds. *Modern Diplomacy in Practice*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020.
- Iklé, Fred. *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Inboden, William. *The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan in the White House and the World*. New York: Dutton, 2022.

- Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson, eds. *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Ingo Trauschweizer. *Maxwell Taylor's Cold War*. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2019.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier*. 2nd Edition. New York: The Free Press, 1960.
- Janowitz, Morris, and Stephen Wesbrook. *The Political Education of a Soldier*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Jenkins. "Note For Mr. Rostow," February 3, 1968. Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963-69, National Security Council Histories, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Box 29, Vol 56 Day-by-Day Documents Part 9. JPL.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. *The Peace Makers: Leadership Lessons from Twentieth-Century Statesmanship*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2018.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- . *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore, MD, 1985.
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines. *The Vantage Point*. First Edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971.
- Jones, Bryan. "Behavioral Rationality as a Foundation for Public Policy Studies." *Cognitive Systems Research* 43 (2017): 63–75.
- . "Bounded Rationality and Political Science." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 13 (2003): 395–412.
- Jones, Frank L. "Engaging The World: Anthony Lake And American Grand Strategy, 1993–1997." *The Historical Journal* 59, no. 3 (September 2016): 869–901.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X15000436>.
- Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47 (1979): 263–91.
- Kengor, Paul, and Patricia Doerner. *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand*. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007.
- Kieninger, Stephan. "The Strobe Talbott Papers at the State Department's Virtual Reading Room." The Wilson Center, February 2, 2022. Sources and Methods. History and Public Policy Program. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/strobe-talbott-papers-state-departments-virtual-reading-room>.
- Kieninger, Stephen. *The Diplomacy of Detente: Cooperative Security Policies from Helmut Schmidt to George Shultz*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Kingdon, John W. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2nd ed. The University of Michigan, 2003.
- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- . *World Order*. New York: Penguin Books, 2014.
- Kitfield, James. *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 1995.
- Kohn, Richard. "Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?" *World Affairs* 171, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 73–83.
- Kolko, Gabriel. *The Roots of American Foreign Policy; An Analysis of Power and Purpose*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

- Kretchik, Walter. *Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2016.
- Kretchik, Walter, Robert Baumann, and John Fishel. "Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion': A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy." Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998.
- Lake, Anthony. *Six Nightmares*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 2000.
- Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: FDR, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
- Lasswell, Harold. "The Garrison State." *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 455–68.
- Lebow, Richard N. "Thucydides and Deterrence." *Security Studies* 16, no. 2 (June 2007): 163–88.
- Lerner, Mitchell. *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
- Lettow, Paul. *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Random House, 2006.
- Levy, Jack. "Counterfactuals, Causal Inference, and Historical Analysis." *Security Studies*, n.d. ———. "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George." *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (2008): 537–52.
- Levy, Jack S. "Coercive Threats, Audience Costs, and Case Studies." *Security Studies* 21, no. 3 (August 2012): 383–90.
- Lewicki, Roy, Bruce Barry, and David Saunders. *Negotiation*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2010.
- Long, Tom. *A Small State's Guide to Influence in World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.
- Longley, Kyle. *LBJ's 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America's Year of Upheaval*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Lupton, Danielle. *Reputation for Resolve*. Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Lutsch, Andreas. "The Zero Option and NATO's Dual-Track Decision: Rethinking the Paradox." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 6–7 (2020): 957–89. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1814259>.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. Translated by Harvey Mansfield. 2nd Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Maraniss, David. *First in His Class: The Biography of Bill Clinton*. New York: Touchstone Books, 1995.
- Markwica, Robin. *Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Martel, William. *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Martin, Harold H. *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956.
- Martin, Ian. "Mangled Multilateralism." *Foreign Policy* 95, no. Summer 1994 (Summer 1994): 72–89.
- Mastro, Oriana Skylar. *The Cost of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime*. Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019.
- Matlock Jr., Jack F. *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended*. New York: Random House, 2004.

- McFarlane, Robert. *Special Trust*. New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994.
- McMaster, H.R. *Dereliction of Duty*. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.
- McNerney, Michael, Ben Connable, Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, and Marek Posard. *National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't*. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2018.
- Mearsheimer, John. *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- . *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2014.
- Merriam, Sharan, and Elizabeth Tisdell. *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*. 4th ed. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2016.
- Michishita, Narushige. *North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Miles, Simon. *Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Milne, David. *America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2008.
- Mobley, Richard A. *Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
- Morgenthau, Hans. *In Defense of National Interest*. New York: Alfred and Knopf, 1951.
- . *Politics Among Nations*. 3rd Edition. Indiana: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
- Morley, Morris, and Chris McGillion. "'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti." *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 363–84.
- Moyer, Mark. *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Murray, Williamson. "Thucydides: Theorist of War." *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 30–46.
- Nancy Soderberg Interview, May 10, 2007. William J. Clinton Presidential History Project. Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- Narang, Vipin. *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Nelson, C. Richard. *The Life and Word of General Andrew J. Goodpaster*. Lanham, Maryland: Roman and Littlefield, 2016.
- Neustadt, Richard. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*. 3rd ed. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Neustadt, Richard, and Ernest May. *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers*. New York: The Free Press, 1986.
- Nielsen, Suzanne, and Hugh Liebert. "The Continuing Relevance of Morris Janowitz's 'The Professional Soldier' for the Education of Officers." *Armed Forces & Society Original Manuscript* (2020): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20960480>.
- Nitze, Paul. *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.
- Owens, Mackubin. "What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 2, Article 6 (2012): 67–85.
- Paarlberg, Robert. "Lessons of the Grain Embargo." *Foreign Affairs*, 1980.
- Pape, Robert. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

- Pareto, Vilfredo. *Mind and Society*. Edited by Arthur Livingston. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935.
- Perry, Mark. *The Pentagon Wars: The Military's Undeclared War Against America's Presidents*. New York: Basic Books, 2017.
- . *The Pentagon's Wars: The Military's Undeclared War Against America's Presidents*. New York: Basic Books, 2017.
- Pezullo, Ralph. *Plunging Into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Democracy*. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006.
- Poole, Walter S. "The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992 - March 1994." Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 2005.
- American Journey*. Large Print Edition. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Prados, John. "Ike, Ridgway, and Dien Bien Phu." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* 17, no. 4 (Summer 2005): 16–23.
- . *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991.
- Press, Daryl G. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Rapp-Hooper, Mira. *Shields of the Republic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020.
- Reagan, Ronald. *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*. New York: Pocket Books, 1990.
- Reagan, Ronald. *The Reagan Diaries*. Edited by Douglas Brinkley. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007.
- Record, Jeffrey. "Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 79–95.
- Ridgway, Matthew B., and Harold Martin. *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, as Told to Harold H. Martin*. 1st ed. New York: Harper, 1956.
- Riehm, Peter. "The USS Harlan County Affair." *Military Review* 77, no. 4 (August 1997).
- Rodman, Peter. *Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Nixon to George W. Bush*. New York: Vintage Books, 2009.
- Rose, Gideon. *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.
- Rothkopf, David. *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.
- Rusk, Dean, and Richard Rusk. *As I Saw It*. Edited by Daniel S. Papp. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1990.
- Satow, Ernest Mason. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. 2nd ed. London, England: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1922.
- Saunders, Elizabeth. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.
- Schadlow, Nadia. *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017.
- Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Schinella, Anthony. *Bombs Without Boots: The Limits of Airpower*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019.
- Schultz, Kenneth. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Schulz, Donald, and Gabriel Marcella. "Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for US Policy Toward Haiti." US Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Strategic Studies Institute, March 10, 1994. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11613>.
- Schwartz, Thomas A. *Henry Kissinger and American Power*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2020.
- Sechser, Todd S. "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 377–401.
- Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Shacochis, Bob. *The Immaculate Invasion*. New York: Grove Press, 1999.
- Shapiro, Daniel. *Negotiating the Nonnegotiable: How to Resolve Your Most Emotionally Charged Conflicts*. New York: Viking, 2016.
- Sheehan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. New York: Random House, 1988.
- Shell, G. Richard. *Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
- Shelton, Hugh, Ronald Levinson, and Malcolm McConnell. *Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010.
- Shore, Zachary. *A Sense of the Enemy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Shultz, George P. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.
- Simon, Herbert. "Theories of Bounded Rationality." In *Decisions and Organization*, edited by C.B. McGuire and Roy Radner, 161–76. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972.
- Sisson, Melanie, James Siebens, and Barry Blechman. *Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War*. New York: Routledge Global Security Studies, 2020.
- Slayton, Rebecca. "Discursive Choices: Boycotting Star Wars between Science and Politics." *Social Studies of Science* 37, no. 1 (February 2007): 27–66.
- Slessor, John C. "TOTAL OR LIMITED WAR," (1957), 13.
- Smith, Kevin B, and Christopher W. Larimer. *The Public Policy Theory Primer*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Snider, Don. "Dissent and Strategic Leadership." *Orbis* 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 256–77.
- Soderberg, Nancy. *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
- Soloman, Richard, and Nigel Quinney. *American Negotiating Behavior*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010.
- Sparrow, Bartholomew. *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2015.
- Stoler, Mark A. *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and the U.S. Strategy in World War II*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
- Stone, Deborah. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. Revised Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2002.
- Strachan, Hew. *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: Free Press, 1996.
- Taubman, William. *Gorbachev: His Life and Times*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2017.
- Taylor, Maxwell. *Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1972.

- . *The Uncertain Trumpet*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960.
- Thatcher, Margaret. *Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years 1979-1990*. New York: HarperCollins, 1993.
- Tomz, Michael. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.” *International Organization* 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 821–40.
- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel Griffith. London, England: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Ury, William. *The Third Side*. New York: Penguin Books, 2000.
- Ury, William, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen Goldberg. *Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1993.
- Van Evera, Stephen. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
- Van Staaveren, Jacob. “The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968.” Office of Air Force History, September 1970. Document 6.
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/index.htm>.
- Von Lipsey, Roderick. *Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Intervention*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
- Walling, Kurt. “Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination.” *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 47–85.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Ware, Stephen. *Principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution*. 2nd ed. St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2007.
- Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Weinberger, Caspar. *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*. New York: Warner Books, 1990.
- Wettig, Gerhard. “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983.” *Cold War History* 9, no. 1 (n.d.): 79–110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740802638640>.
- William Perry Interview, February 21, 2006. William J. Clinton Presidential History Project. Miller Center, University of Virginia.
- Wilson III, Isaiah. *Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why American Fails to Win the Peace*. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
- Wright, Thomas J. *All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
- Yoshitani, Gail. *Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine 1980-1984*. Texas A&M University Press, 2011.
- Zahariadis, Nikolaos. “The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects.” In *Theories of the Policy Process*, edited by Paul Sabatier, 2nd ed. USA: Westview Press, 2007.
- Zubok, Vladislav M. *Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.