

RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS DIVISIONS IN INDONESIA

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Do rich and poor people experience religion differently? What about rural and urban people? It would be surprising if the answers to both questions were no, but questions linking religious differences with other social contrasts have rarely been asked. They are of practical importance for the future of democracy in Indonesia.

Indonesia's population of 240 million is 87% Muslim. How to understand the diversity within the world's largest Muslim population has preoccupied analysts for over a century. The dichotomies they invented often reflected the project on which they were engaged. Imperial advisers spoke of priests vs. aristocrats (the latter being considered more manageable); modernization planners of traditionalists vs. modernists; religious anthropologists of orthodox vs. syncretists (*santri* vs. *abangan*); critics of New Order authoritarianism spoke of regimists vs. pluralists; and lately counter-terrorism experts of radicals vs. moderates. In the long run democracy may prove to be the most enduring project. In the Arab Spring, the emerging distinction is between Islamists and liberals; in Indonesia the more common terms for the same dichotomy is conservatives and progressives.

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It is not easy to tell how significant either group is in today's politics. On the one hand, the expectation that democratization in 1998 would lead to a rapid increase in the Islamic vote – the Turkish scenario – failed to eventuate. It rose to nearly 40% in 1999 but then declined to less than 30% in 2009, and of that only half or less went to Islamist parties. Polls indicate that the collapse of religious parties continues today.² On the other hand, transgressive politics are often more religious than formal ones. Indonesia saw a spate of Islamist terror attacks in the early years of democratization; intolerant preaching is normal in most mosques, and aggressive acts against religious minorities and non-Islamic cultural icons continues to grow. Conservative regulations against alcohol and sexual freedoms are formally in place in many districts and provinces around the country (though not always enforced).

This chapter is not concerned with the mobilizational processes that drive politics. It is always possible for small groups to seize on opportunities and move the entire political spectrum to the left or right. Think of demonstrations, moral panics, terrorist attacks, martyrdom, or even coups. Instead, the chapter seeks to map broad constituencies for those processes within different layers of the population. Class and the urban-rural gap are two of the most potent divides in almost any society. Religious moralism has long been one of the two languages of opposition to governments in Jakarta that promote market reforms. The other is leftwing populism. They spring from the same anti-colonial movement – the first political party Sarekat Islam had a communist wing for ten years until 1923. We want to know about the prevalence of Islamism in various layers of society today. It would be surprising if class and spatiality did not help shape religiosity. The idea that cities generate a distinctive sociality is basic to urban studies (Savage, Warde and Ward 2003), while the notion that cultural classification systems are

² “Islamic parties ‘must’ form coalition to survive in 2014”, *The Jakarta Post*, 2 August 2012.

rooted in the class system is basic to many studies of class (Jenkins 1992). Yet there are at present almost no studies even posing the question whether less privileged, or rural, Indonesians believe/ talk/ think/ vote differently to the urban privileged. The discovery of such patterns should free us from the vague notion of religion as an array of free-floating convictions, and tie it to intelligible, long-term social forces.

A rich place to go for answers is the World Values Survey, which periodically interviews random samples in many countries including Indonesia. One thousand respondents were interviewed in both 2001 and 2006 (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>). The results are freely available and can be conveniently analyzed online. The survey covers a large array of issues. It includes questions relating to religion (e.g. frequency of religious practice, trust towards people of other religions, ideas about religion in politics); to class (e.g. occupation, income, education); and to urbanism (notably the size of the urban concentration where they live). It does not stop there: we will also explore other independent variables such as age and gender.

Global survey data are not an ideal source for understanding particular social relations. We do not know exactly what Indonesian respondents are thinking when they answer questions imposed from the outside rather than formulated by them – the questions are *etic*. However, researchers knowledgeable about Indonesia will recognize certain questions that *are* currently under discussion. And often several questions will cover similar territory; if the answers agree we feel more confident the respondents themselves are speaking.

Consensus

Our first impression is that neither class nor town size have much influence on people's opinions. Whether rich or poor, urban or rural, Indonesians enjoy an impressive degree of consensus on many important

issues including religion. Nearly everyone says they are deeply religious, everyone believes in hell, everyone goes to communal prayers often, everyone thinks political leaders should be religious, everyone agrees the government ought to protect religion. At the same time, people are strongly against theocracy, i.e. religious leaders telling government or voters what they should do. Everyone thinks democracy is OK. People are not out for revolution: everyone thinks society should be reformed gradually; nearly everyone thinks a strong leader is bad (all these results are from 2001, but are largely reproduced in 2006). Everyone is proud of their country; everyone thinks women should be educated. Most people, from every income category, think the economy is the most important political goal and problem for the government. Most then choose order and security as the second most important problem (both in 2006). Nearly everyone agrees that “immigrants” (presumably understood to be people from elsewhere in Indonesia) should not get jobs over the heads of locals. There are virtually no class differences either on the question of technocracy (rule by experts) – even though people are about evenly divided on that one. They all think science is mainly good but also has bad consequences.

Even on issues where you might expect a class difference to emerge it does not. Nearly everyone in 2001 seemed to agree that income inequalities did not need to be reduced as a matter of priority! The ideological terms “left” and “right” seem to have no meaning in Indonesia – everyone placed themselves neatly in the middle of the spectrum. (The latter is therefore a good example of an *etic* question, formulated in the West). On the question of government ownership of businesses, most similarly chose the safe middle. On the other hand, most people thought competition was a good thing. Indonesians, in short, appear to be enviably sensible, at peace with themselves and with the world.

Difference

But on some things they do not agree. Once we zoom in on religious questions that Indonesians find controversial, a pattern of sorts does emerge. Before we do, let us first investigate how salient class and urban-rural differences in Indonesia are. Class is always an economic concept, and relational. Marx thought people only acquired greater economic means by exploiting those with less, while to Weber the rich simply had better chances in life than the poor, for a variety of reasons including cultural ones. Both traditions proxy class positions by income level as well as occupation. The latter is the more fundamental, since it brings in the cash and puts people into relations with others. The WVS offers both these proxies, and adds a subjective social class category, which respondents apply to themselves.

Considering that class discourse has been absent from their society since the anticommunist pogrom of the mid-1960s, Indonesians think with remarkable clarity about their own class position. A quarter said they belonged to the upper and upper middle classes. Another 18.4% said they were working and lower class. And fully 56.7% said they belonged to the lower middle class (2006). The size of this latter category is surprising, considering that scholars in the mid-1980s still thought the middle class made up less than ten percent of the total population (Dick 1985). It could be illusory, a naïve choice for the modest middle on a puzzling question. More likely it is real, reflecting a surging economy. Using the (very low) per capita household expenditure of US\$2 a day, an Asian Development Bank study concluded the middle class had more than doubled between 1999 and 2009 from 25% to 43% (ADB 2010: 11-2). (That the WVS middle class is even larger than that is probably due to oversampling, see below).

People's own sense of social class correlates convincingly with the more objective income- and occupation-based ways of measuring class in the WVS data (Figure 1, Figure 2, Top axis shows income (as

above). Employers and white-collar workers such as non manual office workers (e.g. clerks, traders, teachers) earn more income than blue-collar (e.g. factory workers, tailors) and agricultural workers. Unskilled workers and agricultural workers are by far the poorest. (See graph above for more explanation).

Figure 3). The WVS uses a 13-part occupational classification (Table 1). With the exception of the last two categories (armed forces, never had a job), the progression is broadly from high status, high income occupations to low status and low income.

The occupation classification is a bit crude (we cannot separate teachers from traders, for example), but its contents are a bigger problem. WVS appears to have oversampled the higher occupations. Urban white-collar workers and in particular civil servants are over-represented at the expense of agricultural workers. Whereas WVS in 2006 had agricultural workers at 11%, the ILO in 2008 more reliably put “skilled agricultural and fishery workers” at 35% of the Indonesian labor force (<http://laborsta.ilo.org>). Whereas WVS talked with more white collar than and blue collar/ agricultural workers (56% and 43% resp., not counting the armed forces), the ILO put the ratio between the two groups at a more reasonable 29% to 70%. WVS puts civil servants at nearly one third of the total respondents who answered the occupation question, far higher than the national average of fewer than 15%.

As expected, the highest values in the first three figures lie along the diagonal: higher occupations earn more and feel they belong to a higher class, and vice versa. By far the lowest earners are unskilled manual and agricultural workers, and they appropriately see themselves as lower class. The data shows that class is meaningful in Indonesia and that we can measure it using any of the three categories as convenient.

Also expected is that the more highly educated one is, the higher one’s class whichever way it is measured. Educational achievement levels of people who regard themselves as lower middle class peak

somewhere in senior high school (SMA). People in higher occupations are also more satisfied with the financial situation of their household. In Most people say they belong to the lower middle class. Many employers say they belong to the upper middle class. Most unskilled and agricultural workers say they belong to the working or lower classes. (See graph above for more explanation).

Figure 4, answers have been weighted on a scale from -1 (dissatisfied) to +1 (satisfied), and also weighted for the size of the occupational group.³ Agricultural workers and unskilled manual workers were the least satisfied. When employers and white-collar workers are aggregated on the one hand, and blue collar and agricultural workers on the other, as in

Figure 5, it is evident that the former group is much more satisfied with their household economic situation than the latter.⁴ Agricultural workers and unskilled manual workers also gave the lowest scores on a more general question about “satisfaction with your life”, though most other people were fairly happy even if their household finances were less than satisfactory.

³ The whole survey population is N ; the number of respondents in the i 'th occupation is n_i . The total number of possible answers is O , which usually ranges from 2 to 10; the j 'th answer will have a value between -1 and +1 for bipolar questions (eg. dissatisfied to satisfied, disagree to agree). The number of respondents in the i 'th occupational group who chose answer o_j is p_{ij} , so the proportion of that occupational group who chose this answer is p_{ij}/n_i . We then weight p_{ij}/n_i for the value of the answer by multiplying it by o_j , so that the value of the response of the i 'th occupational group to the j 'th question, weighted for the answer and weighted for the size of that occupational group, is $(p_{ij}/n_i)*o_j$. Finally we sum all the responses for that occupational group from $j=1$ to $j=O$. This sum will fall between $o_j = -1$ and $o_j = +1$, and will indicate where, on average, the i 'th occupational group sits on that spectrum. If any of the subpopulations p_{ij} are too small (less than the square root of the total population N) the results quickly become meaningless because the sample is no longer statistically significant. This can be avoided by aggregating them.

⁴ It ignores the small and inconsistent group of foremen, the small armed forces and those never employed.

Since we are interested in politics, it is important to know how people's work relates to the state, which is the object of politics. The rich, being well educated, more often work within the state. Most professionals and about half the non-manual (white collar) office workers in the 2006 WVS sample work in state institutions, whereas blue collar and agricultural workers overwhelmingly work in the private sector. Figure 6 shows that only 16% of the sample's lowest income decile worked within a state institution, but the percentage climbs to 50% by the ninth decile. If agricultural workers had not been so badly under-sampled, the divide would have been even more impressive. Since state employees (including teachers) are influential in all aspects of Indonesia's social life, the divide has major consequences. A few cross-tabulations linking state vs. private employment with class, political opinions and political participation ring true with what we know about Indonesian politics.

- State workers earn a higher income; they generally belong to a higher social class than private sector workers (with the exception of an upper class in private business); they are more educated; they read the newspapers more.
- State workers feel more satisfied with their lives than non-state people; they also feel healthier.
- State sector and private sector people both agree that democracy is important; but state sector people (interestingly) are less convinced that the army should be in charge.
- Private sector people are more likely to be active in political parties, particularly PDIP (while state people in 2001 and 2006 favored Golkar and PAN). Although confidence in political parties generally is low, the poorer people in the private sector have more faith in them than average. At the same time, the latter group is more likely to hold authoritarian views on strong leadership, and on the need for religious authorities to interpret

the laws in a democracy. They are also likely to be less frequent attendees of religious services. And they tend to rely more on word of mouth for their information.

What about urbanism? The WVS oversamples urban dwellers. Of its 2006 respondents, 43% lived in cities of half a million or larger, 21% in provincial towns between 50,000 and 500,000, 30% in small towns of 2,000-50,000, and only 14% in villages less than 2,000. In actual fact 58% of Indonesia's population is rural (Firman, Kombaitan and Pradono 2007). Nevertheless, this does not make the data useless.

Although "lower middle class" people are in the majority everywhere, the class profile gradually rises as we move from the village through the town to the city. People who regard themselves as lower middle class dominate the social landscape of provincial towns. By contrast, in the villages and smallest of small towns, the number of people who describe themselves as lower or working class is twice the national average. This corresponds to a large proportion of farmers and agricultural workers, who make up at least a third of all occupations there (WVS under-samples them, so there are more than that). These occupations overwhelmingly told the WVS surveyors in 2006 that an interest in politics was "not very" or "not at all" important in their lives. Traders and semi-skilled manual workers increase in importance as the town becomes a service centre for its surroundings. These occupations showed the full range of opinions on the importance of politics. Upper middle class people, mainly professionals and employers, constitute one and a half times the national average in the largest provincial towns and the cities. For most of them, an interest in politics was "very" or "rather" important in their lives.

In short, the overall picture is of a three-tier society. At the top, a comfortable upper middle class, highly educated, likely employed within the state, interested in politics. They are not as big as WVS would have them, but they are strongly represented in big cities, where they

control most institutions of any ambition. At the bottom of the social ladder are working and lower classes, much larger than represented in the WVS survey. They are unskilled; many of them are in agriculture, all of them probably in the informal sector. They live everywhere but are particularly dominant in the village. Most of them do not find “politics” very interesting (elections, and all the newspaper talk about what the government should be doing). In between, we find a very large lower middle class, ranging from skilled workers, through traders, shop assistants and clerks, to teachers. They too live everywhere, but they are truly in their element in the provincial town. These towns exceed all other urban concentrations in their interest in politics (

Figure 7) – no doubt a consequence of the local elections introduced as part of the decentralization moves in 1999.

Table 1 – Occupation categories	2001	2006
1 Employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employed	3.40%	2.40%
2 Employer/manager of establishment with less than 10 employed	5.10%	4.70%
3 Professional worker	19.10%	23.30%
4 Supervisory Non manual -office worker	3.30%	3.00%
5 Non manual -office worker	20.40%	21.70%
6 Foreman and supervisor	2.10%	1.50%
7 Skilled manual	6.60%	13.80%
8 Semi-skilled manual worker	5.10%	12.80%
9 Unskilled manual	3.70%	4.40%
10 Farmer: has own farm	7.20%	6.40%
11 Agricultural worker	3.50%	4.90%
12 Member of armed forces	1.60%	0.90%
13 Never had a job	18.90%	0.10%
Total	990 (100%)	1184 (100%)

Religion

Let us now see if there are religious differences between classes and between urban centers. Indonesians adhere to many different religions, but 87% say they are Muslim. As a first approximation, we can assume the WVS questions about religion measure Islamic attitudes. Not many WVS indicators are controversial enough to differentiate between religious convictions. In 2001, one question in the political section was about the desirability of having “only laws of sharia”. This was clearly intended as a test of receptivity to what many western analysts would call a conservative (or Islamist, scripturalist, or fundamentalist) idea of religion. Its opposite has been labeled progressive (or humanist, or liberal). More people favored than disfavored this idea (49% agreed, 25% disagreed, the rest had no opinion). However, the division is not too unbalanced to be a useful differentiator. Whereas 48% of upper middle class and 47% of lower middle class people agreed this was desirable, 58% and 57% thought so among the working and lower classes respectively. The difference arose mainly because more higher-class people “disagreed strongly”. (Curiously, the tiny upper class sample rather favored sharia law – perhaps they were thinking of Islamic banking, whereas the lower class were thinking of lashings – but the sample was too small to be statistically significant) (Figure 8). When repeated for occupation, the same divide is evident (Figure 9, Figure 10). While employers are a curious borderline case, perhaps for the reason mentioned above, white-collar workers (and soldiers!) overwhelmingly rejected the desirability of having only sharia law. Blue collar and (to a lesser extent) agricultural workers predominantly endorse it.

Other cross-tabulations around this question lead to related insights. The exclusive application of sharia law appealed to poorly educated people, to people on low incomes, and especially to the unemployed. Answers to a similar question in 2006 confirmed the trend.

It asked whether in a democracy, “religious authorities interpret the laws”. Answers could range along a 10-step spectrum between “not an essential characteristic of democracy” to “essential”. A narrow majority of 54% thought this was to some degree essential. Once again, employers and white-collar workers were the least convinced of this idea, whereas blue collar and agricultural workers were the most convinced (only unskilled manual workers were indecisive). Intolerance towards other religions might also be related to Islamism, although the relationship is clearly not simple. The 2001 survey asked about having people of another religion as neighbors. No group was happy with the idea, but a slightly bigger proportion of the lower class group mentioned they were uncomfortable with it than of the upper middle class group (43% and 37% respectively). All this suggests commitment to a strongly moralizing and exclusive form of religion is more prevalent among lower than higher social orders. (It does contradict the still popular perception that rural poor people are overwhelmingly *abangan* or syncretistic rather than orthodox Muslims. The reason could be that the WVS has under-sampled them, but I suspect rural religious life really has become more orthodox).

So why do we not see it back in institutionalized national politics? One reason could be that the organizational aspects of religion at the national level remain in the hands of the established orders. The proportion of all respondents who said they were “active” members of a religious organization was 38% (2006). Among the upper middle class, this rose to 41% but among the working class it dropped to 27%. Working class people (but not lower class ones) also attended religious services less frequently than others did. The more objective occupational spectrum tells us more. Big and small employers and professionals were the most active (51%, 47% and 46% resp.), while unskilled manual were the least active (21%). (Farmers with their own farms were also highly active at 45%). Asked how frequently they attend religious services, two

thirds said they attend at least once a week, but among employers and professionals that figure was 77% while among unskilled workers struggling to survive it was only 51%.

Where do the people live who practice these different kinds of religion? The most consistently striking fact the data presents to us is that Islamism is strongest in the provincial towns. In 2006, conservatives clustered in small and intermediate provincial towns with populations in the range 20,000-100,000, not in rural villages, and not in large cities (Figure 11). In 2001, a turbulent year particularly outside the large cities, the feeling that only laws of sharia were desirable was even stronger in provincial towns and it had even penetrated to the villages (Figure 12). As we saw, these decentralized provincial towns were also places where more people than anywhere else said that politics were “important in life” (Figure 7). And they were places where people more often felt personally insecure. The number of people who felt strongly that the statement “It is important to this person: living in secure surroundings” applied to them reached 84% in towns of 50,000-100,000, whereas in cities over half a million it was 61% and in small towns only 49% (2006). The transition to local democracy was a bit wild. Competition, which was poorly institutionalized and even more poorly policed, led in some places to a breakdown in law and order. Looters ransacked government-owned plantations, ethnic or religious bosses whipped up straight-out communal warfare lasting months or years. Like provincials in war-torn Afghanistan today, some ordinary people began to think replacing national with sharia law might be a good alternative.

The provincial middle

Crude as they are, these observations about the spatial and class distributions of exclusive and moralizing forms of Islam build up to a picture that we can also recognize from field studies. In class terms,

Islamism is most interesting to the lower occupations. The simplest way to put the specifically religious conclusion is that less privileged people tend to be more conservative, privileged people more progressive, while the latter group runs all the mainstream organizations. Blue collar and agricultural workers, especially those in the sphere of influence of provincial towns, are interested in religion as an exclusive moral guide for the community, but they do not have the luxury of time to attend all religious services, nor the resources to run major organizations. In spatial terms, the interest in Islamism peaks in these provincial towns. The broader context is of two styles of politics. At the national and metropolitan level, we see a relatively progressive politics promoted by a largely professional upper and upper middle class. Provincial politics, by contrast, are frequently more conservative, more rough and tumble, and are closer to the grassroots interests of a lower middle, working and lower class constituency. The WVS data also show that comparatively illiberal attitudes among lower classes go beyond religion. The less privileged tend to be more suspicious of people, by contrast with the professionals of the upper middle class, who are the most trusting people in Indonesia. Support for authoritarian politics - rule by the army, a strong leader – is greater there too.⁵ At the same time, they less often read newspapers and magazines or watch the news on TV.

The WVS data allows us to check the broad link between conservative views and lower occupations in other countries, and in a quick peek I found that it holds also for Egypt and Morocco. Something similar can be found also in developed countries. The extreme rightwing

⁵ WVS 2006 results on authoritarian attitudes are difficult to interpret. On the one hand, 95% of respondents thought “having the army rule” was a good political system (ranging from 91-92% among upper and upper middle classes to 97% among lower and working classes). On the other hand, only half thought it was a good idea for the army to take over if democratic government failed (slightly higher among lower occupations), and only 22% of respondents thought “having a strong leader” was a good political system, with little occupational differentiation.

anti-Islam party of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands gets its votes from the same economically dissatisfied lower classes as those who in Indonesia support Islamism. The similarity obviously does not lie in content, but in style.

The class dichotomy is too simple to explain everything. Gender is another important dimension. Many more women were positive about sharia law in 2001 than men - 56% of women agreed, to 43% of men. However, the difference had disappeared in the more settled times of 2006, when the question on religious authority drew similar answers from men and women. Age is also important. Those in favor of the statement, that “religious people interpret the laws” is an essential characteristic of democracy (2006), were overwhelmingly aged 15-24. The next age cohort (25-34) was evenly divided on it, whereas those older than that tended to disapprove whatever their class. The feeling of distrust towards potential neighbors of other religions (2006) was also strong among young people under 24 (and among those over 55...). Youth also attend religious services more frequently – particularly when compared with the 45-54 year old group. So what looks like the militancy of the disaffected lower class might simply be the naivety of youth; while what looks like the moderation of the comfortable middle class might simply be the maturity of a professional who is educated and above all, *adult*. Indeed, on the question of veiling (2001), age seems to be the main determinant. Young people of all classes up to the age of 24 were overwhelmingly in favor of the idea that the ideal woman should wear the veil, while the over-50s were not (2001). However, the more political questions of sharia law and the role of religious authorities in a democracy *did* clearly have a class dimension as well. We can combine both insights by thinking of Islamism as the idealism of people with minimal organizational power. All youth fall in that category, but they have a greater likelihood of staying there if they belong to the lower classes.

This data helps explain why conservative religious politics are more prevalent in the provinces while elite politics are relatively progressive. In the 1950s the religiously orthodox political party Masyumi was strong among the petit bourgeois traders of the provincial towns that pepper the thinly populated islands beyond Java (Ricklefs 1979). The Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s took place in rural and small town West Java, South Sulawesi, and parts of Kalimantan and Sumatra. Orchestrated attacks on religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyah and Shi'ites recently have taken place mainly in provincial towns. Ethnographic studies on lower middle class Islam that confirm the general picture above include the innovative study by Abdul Syukur on the Talangsari agricultural community in Lampung that was massacred in 1989 for resisting the state (Syukur 2003), and Noorhaidi Hasan's book on Laskar Jihad (Hasan 2006). Both studies revolve around events in provincial areas. Noorhaidi Hasan's more recent work on the Islamic fashions of the upper middle class illustrate the same point on the other side of the divide (Hasan forthcoming). District and provincial elections in recent years have often included promises to implement sharia regulation (Bush 2008).

If Islamism does have stronger social roots among the poor majority in provincial areas than in the metropolitan centers, democratizing struggles could produce the kind of Islamizing scenario that has played out in Iran, Algeria, and recently in the Arab Spring. This certainly does not have to involve violence.⁶ The WVS data has nothing to say about terrorism. They do have something to say about the possibilities of populist and authoritarian politics, possibly of a religious cast, that can emerge in the provinces and come to stand in tension with

⁶ Indeed, those who have used violence to stimulate an Islamist agenda have faced a backlash. The Luxor bombing attack in 1997 caused Egyptians to turn away from radical agendas. The 2002 terrorist bombing in Bali and other attacks around this time could well have caused the declining lower class interest in islamism between the 2001 and 2006 surveys.

national and metropolitan politics. A few years ago Bill Liddle (2003: 5) warned on the basis of 1999 voter behavior that the social divide in democratic Indonesia threatened to come dangerously close to a religious divide:

The “Muslims” now out of power are staking a claim to represent the working class, the informal sector, and other economically marginalized Indonesians. To the degree that they succeed, the “Nationalists” now in power will come increasingly to be identified with the established upper and middle classes. These could be dangerous developments.

In the event, this insightful warning was not proven by the 2009 general election, in which neither religion nor class became significant campaign themes. However, religion has played more strongly in the provinces, as we expect them to do given the conclusions above.


More research must deepen these preliminary results. Surveys with locally interesting questions and ethnographic work should seek to establish more accurately how religious attitudes (and other life views) are linked to class and urbanism. The objective is to understand how processes of religious and economic change are related, and thus how certain religious outlooks express class tensions. My suggestion that Islamism is the exclusive moralism of people with minimal organizational power was a nudge in that direction. Manuel Castells once called it the “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” (quoted in (Bayat 2005: 894))

Such research – which I am sure is already happening – should stimulate fresh political action. Upper middle class professionals concerned about religious radicalization might realize that their fashionable foreign-sponsored seminars do not cross the divide that separates them from the less privileged. They might look for new ways to learn across the divide from those who are less progressive than they are. This uncomfortable learning process might in turn lead to cross-

class alliances that seek to achieve the true aim of religion – compassionate justice for all.


Illustrations

Figure 1– Social class and income (WVS 2006)




Left to right shows income, in steps of one tenth from lowest to highest. Higher classes earn more income than lower classes. (The values in each cell were first normalized for group size. Cells with the highest values in each row are shaded black, cells with about half the maximum value are shaded grey).

Figure 2 – Occupation and income (WVS 2006)




Top axis shows income (as above). Employers and white-collar workers such as non manual office workers (e.g. clerks, traders, teachers) earn more income than blue-collar (e.g. factory workers, tailors) and agricultural workers. Unskilled workers and agricultural workers are by far the poorest. (See graph above for more explanation).

Figure 3 – Occupation and social class (WVS 2006)



Most people say they belong to the lower middle class. Many employers say they belong to the upper middle class. Most unskilled and agricultural workers say they belong to the working or lower classes. (See graph above for more explanation).


Figure 4 – Occupation and “Satisfaction with financial situation of household” (WVS 2006)



Higher occupations (such as employers and professionals, on the left) are much more satisfied with the financial situation of their household than lower occupations (such as unskilled manual workers, on the right).

(Vertical axis, +1 = “satisfied”; -1 = “dissatisfied”. Occupations as listed in Table 1– left to right = higher to lower occupations.)


Figure 5 – Occupational divide and “Satisfaction with financial situation of household”



When the satisfaction levels for higher occupations are grouped together on one side, and lower occupations on the other side, the difference become even more obvious.

(Group 1: Employers and white collar; 2: blue collar and agricultural).


Figure 6 – Income and state (WVS 2006)



Among people with low incomes, most work in the private sector. But among people with high incomes, the number of state workers has increased, so that private sector and state workers are roughly equal.

Horizontal axis is the income scale (as above) – lowest income on the left, highest income on the right. Rising black line shows the proportion of all workers who work within the state, at various income levels. Falling grey line shows the proportion of all workers who work within the private sector.


Figure 7 – Town size and interest in politics (WVS 2006)



People in provincial towns of population 50,000-100,000 are more interested in politics than people anywhere else.

(Vertical axis, “important in life: politics”, +1 = very important, 0 = not at all important. Town size increases from left to right: 1 = 2,000 and less; 2 = 2,000-5,000; 3=5,000-10,000; 4=10,000-20,000; 5=20,000-50,000; 6=50,000-100,000; 7=100,000-500,000; 8=500,000 and more.)


Figure 8 – Class and sharia (WVS 2001)



In 2001, working and lower class people were more in favour of sharia law than upper middle and lower middle classes.

(1 = Upper class (sample size of 15 too small to be significant), 2 = upper middle class, 3 = lower middle class, 4 = working class, 5 = lower class)


Figure 9 – Occupation and sharia (WVS 2001)



In 2001, lower occupations such as semi-skilled manual workers (e.g. driver) were more in favour of sharia law than higher occupations such as professionals (e.g. managers) (Vertical axis, +1 = agree; -1 = disagree).

Occupations as listed in Table 1 – left to right = higher occupations to lower occupations. Largest occupations are 3, 5 = professionals and clerks, and 7, 8 = skilled and semiskilled workers)


Figure 10 – Occupational divide and sharia



(Group 1: Employers and white collar; 2: blue collar and agricultural).

When grouped together, the difference becomes even clearer.


Figure 11 – Town size and religious authority in a democracy (WVS 2006)



In 2006, people in provincial towns with population 50,000-100,000 were more in favour of the idea that in a democracy, religious authorities must interpret the laws than anywhere else.

(Vertical axis, “essential to democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws”, +1 = essential, -1 = not essential. Town size: 1 = 2,000 and less; 2 = 2,000-5,000; 3=5,000-10,000; 4=10,000-20,000; 5=20,000-50,000; 6=50,000-100,000; 7=100,000-500,000; 8=500,000 and more.)

Figure 12 – Town size and sharia laws (WVS 2001)



In 2001, people in provincial towns of population 50,00-100,000 were more enthusiastic about sharia laws than people anywhere else.

(Vertical axis, +1 = agree; -1 = disagree. Town size: 1 = 2,000 and less; 2 = 2,000-5,000; 3=5,000-10,000; 4=10,000-20,000; 5=20,000-50,000; 6=50,000-100,000; 7=100,000-500,000; 8=500,000 and more.)

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