

The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education

Philosophical History Bringing Epistemic
and Critical Values to Values

Ignace Haaz

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and Education**

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“Education is another sun to those who are educated”

Heracleitus of Ephesus, Fragment 134.

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INTRODUCTION

“Why should I be ethical?” is the central philosophical question we are trying to address. In order to answer, we could first clarify that we need to grasp what a cause is, and how many kinds of causes there are, since it is essential for describing the world around us where our actions and rules are happening, and for the explanation of the conditions of ethical actions. As Aristotle shows by distinguishing four different causes in his *Metaphysics* V 2, the words “*how*” and “*why*” are highly polysemic words: you can mean 1) the tool used to realize an intention, what could be formulated as “the primary source of the change or rest”, or *efficient cause*, 2) the finality of your intention, “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done” or *final cause*, 3) and 4) the matter or the form of your intention, that is on the one hand “that out of which”, e.g., the matter of a statue, on the other “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape and structure of a statue. Most of the time in real life, you might have in fact an intention that you associate with a simple intention, when it is in fact a mixed intention, a mixed sentiment, a mixed reaction: an intention related to a description based on various interrelated causes.

Philosophy and philosophical ethics in particular can be seen as an immense, partly hidden continent of intellectual reflections and findings by eloquent philosophers on the meaning of ethics in the Western European tradition. The whole range of ethical philosophers could be then further divided by regions, countries and languages such as the Classical Greek philosophers (Heracleitus, Plato, Socrates, etc.), the philosophy teachers of Rome (Cicero, Epictetus, Sextus), the philosophers and moralists of the Renaissance (Machiavelli, Montaigne), the French and

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Dutch Enlightenments (Descartes, Spinoza), German idealism and romanticism (Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer).

The study of philosophy can on the other hand be mainly concerned by systematic or historical presentations of the most important concepts discovered, or invented by these great personalities: ethics could mean a doctrine of the duty, of the good life, associated with a moral psychological presentation of our drives or instincts underlying our conscious motives for action. A considerable effort has been carried out to draft eclectic selections of some key virtues such as generosity, excellence or reciprocity. Some could, by the simple fact of being the highest ethical motivation we can achieve, constitute a *lighthouse type of value* which could guide us to the entrance of the port we call family life, education, or work.

In the following book, commissioned by Globethics.net, I was asked to reflect on the essential value of philosophical ethics for life and for education and to present my key concepts in such a way that I would draw a snapshot of various great chapters of the philosophical history of ethical concepts. Based on my experience in teaching ethics in the department of philosophy, and on my work as an international Editor of ethical texts, I focused on some important conceptual tools developed by philosophers to address the meaning of ethics and in particular ethics in higher education. I found six key concepts. I shall develop each in a chapter, hoping to constitute at the end a concise, interesting and easily readable whole:

1. Ethics and realism: elucidation of the distinction between understanding and explanation – the *lighthouse type of normativity*.
2. Leadership, antirealism and moral psychology – the *lightning rod type of normativity*.
3. Bright light on self-identity and positive reciprocity – the *reciprocity type of normativity*.

4. The virtue of generosity and its importance for inclusive education – the *divine will type of normativity*.

5. Ethical education as normative philosophical perspective. The normativity of self-transformation in education: learning and image of *the balloon, the juggler*, and the infinite process of self-overcoming.

6. Aesthetics as expression of human freedom and concern for the whole world in which we live, and which lives in us. We share an artistic presence in communities of practice, and across wider human circles, and finally seek to unite in the celebration of friendship and humanity across boundaries in a *philosophical garden*. Our last section, presents as conclusion the situation of *being in our inner garden*. Why should we be compassionate and listening to others, if not because we discover ourselves as incorporating already a collective being in ourselves, inner contradictions and tensions, as wild flowers growing wild in fields. As we are caring about the world in which we live, we are in search for our inner knowledge and unity by shared spiritual exercises; we share an artistic presence in communities of practice, and across wider human circles, and finally seek to unite in the celebration of friendship and humanity across boundaries.

In the two first chapters we address first the important question of the reality of the external objects – we call it the *normative function of a lighthouse*, since it sheds light on our object, on the reality of ethical values. After all, if values are not real why bother following ethical guidelines? If ethics is only a word, an empty convention attached to the external attitudes of generosity, then when we sit in public transportation we could just focus on explaining why public transportation are usually crowded, why it is almost inevitable to be in such a situation in large agglomerations at rush hours, instead of being pulled into ethical di-

lemmas. And as we all know, ethical dilemmas are, as all dilemmas, at best voluntary decisions about the best of two bads.

On the contrary we shall take very seriously the idea of the reality of the ethical life and show concrete examples of how abstract philosophical concepts meet literature, poetry, anthropology and psychopathology, and that there are many good reasons to believe that *values are real*. In order to present this reality we would need to position the framework of a traditional philosophical analysis of the distance between our self and the thing out there, asking whether we should introduce a middle path of an interior life, not only concerned by the subjectivist individual sensations, nor by a scientific reduction and categorization of the things in the world, but by an autonomous world of transcendently given experiences found in real essential values. As we discover with Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), values are not always visible external objects, they are nevertheless most of the time related to our feeling and rational capacity of setting up rules of behaviour and agending our life individually and collectively. Values in order to be real need coordination between the finality of our action, our intention, and some formal and material components, that we shall describe in the framework of our emotional life.

The second chapter is not anymore focusing on the subject-object relation (the intention), but it tries to show the benefit of a critical understanding of a possible consequence of the former question of the reality of the values: if there is a world of existing real values, aren't we by this simple fact living in different worlds, eventually populated by different and relative ethical values? Moral psychology can show a non-dualistic perspective on values, by taking seriously the economic and affective ground of a psychodynamic of the affects - we shall call it the *lightning rod normative model*. The material value of ethics is there on the foreground.

When we say that life very much resembles a river, which can either be calm, or with important changes in its flow, we can be enthusiastic and creative, but also feel tired, embarrassed, weak, or ashamed : we address some *material value* related characteristics of our environment. We not only live moved by specific moral or ethical intentions, we are surrounded by first degree ethical motives of doing or not doing, by contexts where things are working well and fast, but sometimes we experiment the finitude and difficulties of organizing life. By emphasising our status of being dependant of our environment, philosophers usually are preparing the ground for some ethical solutions to this state of puzzlement (or *aporia*).

By addressing with Nietzsche the value of our moral psychological drives, we introduce an anti-realist perspective, that of the river flow of our instincts and contextual conditions of realization of life. Anti-realism pays special attention to 1) a kind of moral sentimentalism which always tries to relate ethics to sentiments (eventually as preconditions for conventions, rules, principles or contracts) but without seeing it principally preoccupied by some notions important to realists as responsibility, freedom, conscious intentions, or even dominant economic results of interactions (to do more, to be productive, to compete with others in an effective way). We need here to bear in mind that formal, *final* and even *efficient causes* are not prominent components of the structure of values. 2) We show that the importance of anti-realism is in showing us that attitudes related to power and capacities are preconditions for any other passions, and showing the social role of the leader as better served by the idea of the innocence of the becoming, a way to escape a narrow expertise in ethics, management and politics, reassessing the central importance of irony for forming self-knowledge and in increasing our epistemic authority (our critical understanding and capacity of driving clear enquiry on methods of formation of values, knowledge and rules). 3) This anti-realist view introduces a pluralistic

understanding of ethics as a universal and global apology of the value of humanity, in a transformative process of an ethical self-overcoming of the figure of a philosophical leader with Nietzsche.

In order to fully understand some key conceptual terms as “realism”, “antirealism”, “power” based leadership, power based “capacity” and sustainable development as human being, “generosity”, “exemplarity”, education “service that we deserve”, basic “cultural rights”, “geophilosophy” as ethical meditation on our inner garden, we need to go well beyond the framework of one singular philosopher.

In the following chapters we shall try to unfold all these concepts and show in the unfolding the very importance of a *critical understanding of ethics*, not simply as critical knowledge but as a reading and writing praxis, inviting the reader to go beyond simplistic explanations in order to unfold the historical complexity of our mind and understanding. This invitation should not necessarily need to carry all the weight or prejudice, of a complete scientific transposition of the complexity of our historical reconstructions. We limit ourselves to train others to the philosophical discussion, as from the ideal perspective of the innocent play of the child, focusing on ethical notions across time and cultures, and hoping to contribute with humility by bringing a short presentation of the richness and complexity of some human values, which we have chosen to be of some epistemic and moral significance for educators.

1

ETHICS AND REALISM: ELUCIDATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLANATION

*On the Reality of Mental Objects
and of the Domain of Ethics*

1.1 Introduction

Looking at some objects as those below¹, the spectator may be embarrassed before getting a clear idea of what he sees. These examples, as many others where motives are hidden in the image, show the importance of the process of comprehension, which most of the time goes unnoticed in everyday life. The form of the object is questioned.



In another case we recognize the thing, behind the appearance, but continue to call it as it was another thing:

¹ On the left: Gentleman's Reading Chair, Turton Tower by David Dixon, on the right Beach Chair, Sand, Beach, North Sea, Max Pixel. Below my picture of the Broken Chair in Geneva.



In the first example the statement “this is a chair” or the immediate appearance of a chair is not available before we reflect and make some suppositions, as the room in the background brings important information, as the sand beach on the object on the foreground. For the third case, our *prima facie* statement “this is a chair” is done on the basis of the object himself; if we deny that it is a chair, it could be on some basic properties of a chair in all possible worlds. Should a chair be in all possible worlds a tool that can serve to sit, and therefore a *finality related reality*?

From this comparison we can conclude two things: first that in order to identify objects we need clear boundaries and edges: if a chair usually has four feet, we are expecting to see at least three, which explains our problem interpreting the image on the left. Secondly, chairs didn’t exist in the first place, only bits of matter that are referred to as chair, as new colours and shapes have been added, the arrangement of matter changed, whether we continue to refer to these objects as chair is either only a subjective choice to name them that way, or the concept or phenomenon, that we refer to as chair is the real chair, not the thing out there that is subject of change.

This small exercise shows what has been since early philosophy, the perspective of the philosophy of knowledge or epistemology (incl. the philosophy of perception for our example) on our relation to the reality of objects. Let us now present how the Neo-Kantian tradition deals with

the claim that reality is not out there but given through our relation to mental objects.

The Neo-Kantian philosophy is faced with two alternatives, either it opposes the modal logical epistemic authority to the evidence of the process of immediate perception (thus denying that answering the question “is this a chair?” is given by just looking at it), or it attempts to describe as subjective process the level of comprehensive and descriptive psychology of our perception, and gives the property of being a real object to a mental comprehension of the transcendental correlate[♦].

A theory of knowledge based on necessity leads to deriving from a postulate a theoretical construction which has a validity which does not depend on the evidence of its postulate; but it does not make it possible to account for any actual existing reality. Deriving on external experience, knowledge leads on the other hand to oppose a sensitive experience and an intellectual setting. W. Dilthey proposes to base on an internal life experience, a theory of knowledge deriving from what appears obvious: a necessary knowledge. In doing so Dilthey brings out a knowledge, which is neither in the subject of a Kantian sensory experience, nor the objective knowledge of naive realism, but between the two. Highlighting the opposition between “explanation” and “understanding” implies that Dilthey's epistemological principles of understanding are clear. Designating knowledge as a problem, however, is a direction of research that originated with I. Kant. A brief reminder of Kantian results allows us at first to clarify the shortcomings of intellectual formalism. Examining Dilthey's proposals to fill this gap leads to

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the distinction between explanatory and analytic-descriptive psychology. As a theory of knowledge, this distinction allows us to identify two scientific research methods, and to open a realistic foundation for ethical values.

1.2 The Ethical Norm as a Lighthouse

In doing so we shall also introduce the applied ethical dimension of the anthropological perspective in ethics as comprehensive philosophy of mind, it is an application to the field of psychopathology of these epistemological foundations. We call this model the lighthouse model of ethics in anthropology, clarifying the origin and main aim of ethics as dealing with the problem of the limit of the sea and the harbour, where-by a lighthouse answers by a fix luminous point in the world.

The question of our destination in life is similar to that of entering a harbour, after a journey on the sea, and when we cannot just rely on our direct vision to find our way. The problem of the limits of human knowledge, as posited by Kant, is similar: our knowledge and experience of ethics depends on the existence of some fix points, which in the case of our mental life aims at clearing the concepts of *static* and *genetic* understanding of the self, in line with Jasper's development of Dilthey's views.



The lighthouse is a metaphor which leads us to broaden the field of the concept of understanding. To throw light on the nature of these new applications presupposes a historical perspective, that of the inner narra-

tive of life, of which Georg Simmel has shown the premises and on which we propose to return. I propose to show on this occasion the limits of Jasper's concept of understanding which are in the explanation, that is to say in the demonstration of the physical conditions of a disease, but which are also in the Jaspersian conception of comprehension.

The relevance for us of the anthropological foundation of the mind, (which is a foundation of a personalist view on the existence) is this lighthouse which guides us and can also be applied to marginalized persons such as in mental illness. It is not simply to show that applying ethics and understanding makes sense in psychopathology but as well to return to the meta-ethical question of finding a realistic perspective on ethical values.

1.3 Kant as Precursor of Dilthey's Comprehensive Psychological Philosophy of the Mind

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thinks in his three *Critiques*, that there are ideas that make sense for us as human beings, for example: God or freedom /liberty but which are strictly speaking not object of knowledge². To formulate the limits of human knowledge amounts to showing the extent of the divide between matter and form. There are three kinds of knowledge for Kant: a divine knowledge that is creative and makes it possible to immediately grasp ideas like freedom, but which is foreign to us; an intuitive knowledge that allows to receive objects of sensibility as long as they are determined in time for a subject, and an intellectual knowledge that shapes what is only passively received by sensitivity. *To be subject of knowing something for Kant im-*

² A good translation of Kant: the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787), the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), are available by Guyer, P. and Wood, A. (eds.) for the first two, 1998, 2000, and in the 1997 translation of Mary J. Gregor for the third; all vol. being publ. in Cambridge at Cambridge University Press.

plies a mediate act: to derive from the categories of understanding the material conveyed by sensibility³. A matter is only for a form that orders it, just as a form is only for a matter of which it uses the elements. Kant successively proposes several solutions to bridge the divide that appears between sensible experience and intellectual knowledge, without result. Dilthey offers an intellectual experience that allows immediate ordering of elements of the experience. This thesis assumes the conception of man as a whole. It is based on a critique of the psychological explanation that also applies to Kant. To account for reality, what exists always leads to a problematic approach. The explanation tends to evade this fact by asking to accept a hypothesis, itself problematic, thanks to the force of deduction. Explanatory psychology accounts for large sets such as space, time, causality through elementary processes, all parts of the psychological enquiry as psychological explanation such as: association and fusion⁴. In doing so, psychological science constructs relationships

³ See on normativity as reasoning, governed by the laws of reason and in particular on the mediative feature of this reasoning or “participation” as descriptive normative ethical point of departure of the capacity of an ethical judgement, not simply a psychological process: Konstantin Pollok (2017): Introduction in: *Kant's Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason*, p. 6, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴ An important aspect of deductive method of reasoning is in how we use algorithms or a set of rules defining a sequence of operations, in order to build models of behaviour, as for example in a hiring process, forming an optimal stopping decision implies to form the evidence of the decision to hire someone (and stop the hiring process). The issue of evidence, whether we have the right person in the hiring process, can be seen as forming a baseline of possible candidates, and deduce from there the 30% best profiles to make such a decision. A rule could be: don't decide before at least having heard 1/3 of all candidates in order to build a sound comparison on who has applied to the hiring process. Another quantitative process, different from the optimal stop decision, is the random eviction in our memory, whereby the perception of randomness of data suggest things stop being so exact. On the other side, randomness doesn't mean there is no value, on the contrary, art and normativity stems out of some form of ran-

while ignoring the full richness of the lived experience. The limit imposed on knowledge also proportionally increases its strength and justifies abstraction. What does the modal force of a stronger necessity, however, mean, if only based on the deduction of universal principles, confronted to an object that exists in reality? The Diltheyan approach opposed to Kantian antinomies leads to an inner life experience, on the basis of an act of obvious knowledge. Before revealing the difficulties peculiar to the descriptive-analytical psychological method, let us lay down its principles. Dilthey shows a double requirement: on the one hand the mind must be described and analysed in all its reality as much as possible, on the other hand this description and analysis must be as certain as possible. While the explanatory method constructs relationships based on external perception and intelligence, it also refuses to account for the elements of its lived experience, which are nevertheless present in a psychologically definable way. We have internal experience of these elements in the form of immediately synthesized aggregates. It is therefore not necessary to reconstruct a mental relation built between some experiences, whose evidence is immediate, because the basis of the frequency of some relations or logical modality of necessity, proposed by empiricist psychology would not add anything informative to the simple lived experience. Why should we derive a psychologically obvious relationship from a reasoning that would not be a simple mediation or participation to the phenomenon? We will see with K. Jaspers' description of mental illness, the possibility of psychologically incomprehensible relations, such as the statistical relation between suicide and spring showing a precise relevance to what can be only statistically

domness. We would suggest that Dilthey focuses precisely on the simple space of our subjective natural evidence prior to quantitative deductive analysis, e. g. in experiencing values, which in some cases are not related to the strength of the logical modality of a given statistical hierarchy. Brian Christian, Tom Griffiths (2017): *Algorithms to Live By: The Computer Science of Human Decisions*, Ch. 1 "Optimal Stopping", Ch. 9 "Randomness", Harper Collins Publ., 9ff. 182ff.

known. Nevertheless, the diversity of the lived experience remains irreducible to a simple quantification because it is qualitative in nature. Dilthey gives several disciplines that should be related to our capacity of understanding and which are organized by analytical and descriptive psychological research. I propose to give two examples showing the richness but also the limits of our power of understanding.

1.4 Self-Understanding: Anthropological Foundation of Psychology and Psychopathology

Poetry and language in general are an area in which Dilthey's method of knowledge is particularly visible. How not to admit that some metaphorical images as that of *ethics as a lighthouse* surrounded by the sea is not particularly evocative? The relationship between the terms of this statement ideally reveals a central claim of ethical values - that of being seen as such, as real values. For this reason we can say that ethical values have a reality, without any intermediary form of Kantian categorization, based solely on *the evidence* of this experience in understanding.

The reconstruction of different states of awareness in our conscious life supposes as well, as one relies on lived experiences, a key property which so to say escapes any explanation, a property which is self-sufficient. To understand a genetic relationship between Christianity and a state of physical weakness can be done without further reasons or reasoning (this analogy is presented by Jaspers). To be able to identify the genetic correlation between components is however different from the nature of the components, which does not fall within the principles of understanding highlighted by Dilthey.

We have seen that this connection cannot be only formal, because a historical event such as a poetic allegory is not based on a logical relation comparable to an ordinary discursive statement. Nor can empirical psychological law subsume these unique cases. Dilthey saw the connection between the synthesis and the taking into account of the wholeness

of the experience of comprehension and perception. Simmel will follow Jaspers and establish that the semantic form of the genetic relationship presented by the former is at the same time grounded in important intentional attitudes of the individual, for whom an understandable whole makes sense. The possible lacks that arise from the Diltheyan epistemological foundations of personal identity and self-knowledge should not hide the richness of its applications in history, languages and psychopathology in particular.

One of the problems is related to the limits of personal identity. Is the whole psychic life revealed little by little in the experience that we experience of it, in a process, or could it be seen as an original fact, given without any need to isolate a process of phenomenal reduction?

Against the optic defining our identity as not needing a complicated process of interpretation, we could remind us that the experience may reveal obvious but problematic genetic relationship. Analytical and descriptive psychology must show, according to Dilthey, that it is even impossible to transform any experience into a concept. In other words, there are immanent antinomies in the field of knowledge of the empirical reality itself. Morbid unity as conceived by psychopathology on the basis of nosography constitutes an entity that makes sense but poses problems for knowledge. The explanation of the symptom is traditionally an important component of this entity. Jaspers reveals, however, that only a quarter of the patients in the insane asylum have revealed a purely organic origin for their disorder. Jaspers offers a broader perspective than that which reduces the patient to an organism that has operating problems. We have seen that comprehension makes it possible to psychologically approach domains that are difficult to quantify. Jaspers shows that the chemical and physical model leading to the reconstruction of a causation equation is impracticable in psychopathology:

“We find rules (for example, the rule of hereditary conformism): when a group of diseases of the manic-depressive group occur in

a family, those of the group of early dementia are rarely found in the same family and vice versa, but we find laws (e.g. no general paralysis without syphilis) and never causation equations like in physics and chemistry.” (PPG, p.276)

Before showing the consequences concerning specifically organic problems of this observation in the development of what is the explanation of a physiological disorder in Jaspers, I propose to situate from the outset in relation to the individual as a whole the problem of mental illness.

Jaspers proposes to distinguish static and genetic understanding. One can approach a state of mind directly, for example when one understands the gaiety of laughter, one grasps a feeling immediately comprehensible by intuition. One can also understand genetically the kinship between two feelings. Understanding mistrust by the relationship between anger and humiliation are of this order. Emotional penetration is a way of explaining understanding. It presupposes a similar lived event and the recognition by the one who exercises it that it is not his feeling but that of another. Understanding is not, however, a seizure of feelings, of boundless states of consciousness. Jaspers recognizes in extra-conscious dispositions or constructions the physiological limits of comprehension. To understand a lived event, felt but forgotten, is possible without any explanatory aid and thus admits that the understanding is limited by the extra-conscious, but without explaining what is meant by the latter. For example, a humiliation may have gone unnoticed; it can be recalled without leaving the patient's experience. To account for drunkenness, conversely, does not suppose any event of the lived experience, even if it can condition the lived experience: it is an *explainable* physiological experience. To account for hysteria by postulating an irreconcilable representation in conflict with self is more delicate. In this case, there is a traumatic event and reasoning in the form of a postulate: that repression is an extra-conscious mechanism responsible for defend-

ing the organism against the conflict in question. It is to the extent that we accept this postulate that the abnormal becomes understandably taken in a set. The “as if” understanding aims with or without a postulate based on the reasoning of putting in brackets the anomaly that sometimes does not alter the comprehension of the set of comprehensible relationships. Lastly, incomprehensible genetic relationships have been sketched, such as that between suicide and spring, which have been statistically established. It appears that the correlation is still incomprehensible, but that it is the frequency of this association that aims at a non-psychological but rational method. Of the four models of genetic relationship that Jaspers proposes, only one is in the strict sense dependant on the understanding, in other words a direct intuition of a state of consciousness. Two are unequivocal based on the explanation, either by a set of exogenous and endogenous conditions or by the rational seizure of a frequency by the probability calculation. Finally, the Freudian-type model, straddling a lived experience and an intellectual construction, does not rest on comprehension, insofar as it is not an immediate understanding of the experience but of an interpretation. The therapeutic interest of the psychological understanding inherited from Dilthey is reflected in the examples proposed by Jaspers. The principle on which Jaspers is based is inherited from the Diltheyan opposition between explanation and understanding:

“[...] despite the undeniable intimate union between soul and body, we must not forget that the two types of study never meet in such a way that we can speak of a correlation between determined psychic phenomena and determined physiological phenomena, or a parallelism of physiological and psychical phenomena”. (PPG, p.12)

As soon as understanding is no longer possible, Jaspers proposes to explain the organic conditions of the disease. Two directions of research are possible: either we take phenomena and isolated mechanisms as a

starting point, and we look for the causes that produced them, or we examine a typical cycle of phenomena. In both cases the psychopathologist is led to study the exogenous and endogenous conditions starting from the causes. It is therefore essential to know if it is a physiological disorder, or also a psychological disorder. In the case of ethyl poisoning, which corresponds to the first case, the cause is then the alcohol ingested. But this cause is not responsible for the form that the disease takes, which depends on the addiction of the subject. Jaspers shows that the endogenous cause: the specific toxin produced by the body, is a direct cause as opposed to alcohol. This toxin, however, is an exogenous cause when one considers the psychic illness constituted by Korsakoff's psychosis. It appears that the Jaspersian explanation never seeks to determine the cause of a malaise, but always a more or less extensive set of conditions. Nevertheless, the model of Jaspers' explanation focuses on the physiological characteristics of the organism to the extent that its model is the law.

1.5 Conclusion

The application to the psychopathological corpus of the Diltheyan notion of understanding has made it possible to show the specific relevance to the field of mental illness of this notion, conceived as promising in various fields of what is now called the human sciences. Jaspers has shown that concerning the intelligence of madness, one can not only consider it a disease, but that it is above all a question of taking into account the "real" psychic object, that is to say the patient. The comprehension of the states of consciousness of an individual certainly supposes the taking into account of lived experience as a holistic view, which rests in the inner unifying experience based on lived experience. Jaspers has limited the understanding as empathy *vis-à-vis* extra-conscious mechanisms in a consistent way. The path that Jaspers seems to favour

in the event of misunderstanding, however, is a return to a clean form of understanding based on empathy, separated from data from causal psychology. However, it is common in hospitals to encounter cases where all understanding is no longer possible, but where it remains desirable. The enlargement towards the reconstruction of the patient's own world, which should never be reduced to a clinical case, remains to be formed. Comprehension and compassion are related as they both are empathy related and both conditions of other related virtues and values.

Many people in the world suffer from this terrible illness that modifies our perception of the contact with others and consequently of the very meaning of *the golden rule* understood either as a rule of reciprocity with Confucius, who sees it as “cultivating benevolence and applying modesty”, the “measure between two extremes” with Aristotle, as reciprocity principle in the New Testament⁵, etc.

As a student of philosophy, I first followed with great enthusiasm the school of ethical philosophy of phenomenology (M. Scheler, E. Husserl, etc.), which bases ethics on an analysis of lived experience, empathy and compassion, that is, a basic understanding of the golden rule. In the midst of my studies, however, I was caught up in the concrete constraints of life, meeting a sick person who no longer had the ability to feel correctly the relationship to the other, as it is the case in schizophrenia. How can we continue to live with others when we share the same space, but that person isolates itself from a common world of experience (which philosophers call *koinos kosmos*)? My bachelor dissertation in philosophy focuses on an anthropological approach to mental illness, describing how it distorts our experience of empathy and presence to the

⁵ For other possible ways of defining the Golden Rule see my reading list for Globethics.net: „Global Ethics Day 2017 Reading List: The Golden Rule: 12 Key Concepts from Eastern Spirituality to Take the Cannoli“, Globethics.net News, 2018; and my short résumé in French: Ignace Haaz, „La règle d’Or“, *Foi et Communauté*, No. 150, Paroisse de Chêne, Genève, pp. 4-5.

world, and therefore the very possibility of applying in its relationship to the other the precept practice of the golden rule (or rule of compassion⁶). It was an eye opener experience of a philosophical understanding, and not simply a revelation and faith-based.

Realism in ethics is a serious matter; it is about finding a clear light-house type of reference to *ethical truth* by contrast to blurring the difference between values and installing another lower order of reality in order to dominate. The aim of he/she who don't fear to mystify the continent of ethical values:

“is not so much to please voters as to promote a system in which truth no longer has room because it is no longer valuable. But he who does not respect the truth is also the one who admits that only power and strength are the sources of authority⁷”.

Realism in ethics is built in this chapter on Dilthey's adaptation of the so-called *Copernician revolution* operated by Kant on the subject of knowledge and ethics, and we tried to show how Jaspers' adaptation to applied ethics in psychopathology brought a kind of case study proof on the value of carefully delimitating our praxis of comprehension, different from knowledge based on explanation.

As a further horizon of research, we could mention that global studies of epistemic vices, as an important subfield of virtue epistemology,

⁶ My Bachelor dissertation in 1998 had a focus on Eugene Minkowski's phenomenology of empathy and the facts of mental illness, a research on the essential subjective structure funding our practice of the golden rule. This early 20th Century French follower of H. Bergson is still not well known and would deserve better global exposition.

⁷ For a careful mapping the key arguments in favour of ethical realism see: Pascal Engel (2019): *Les Vices du savoir. Essai d'éthique intellectuelle*, Paris: Agone, 612pp. A common name for those serving mystifying systems of references, not clear arguments on ethics, truth and reality is to be called a “bullshit-ter”.

could bring even much more clarity on how transmission of knowledge can be diverted from focusing on a lighthouse type of normativity, i.e. on realism and truth based knowledge. If we shift our attention not so much on the definition of empathy, and its epistemic value but on how knowledge is transmitted and contexts where transmission of knowledge is a central finality, as in the education sector, a specific methodological problematic comes to the foreground. Without building knowledge on a clear method, but leaving it to epistemic vices, we contribute either actively or passively to what makes knowledge transmission ineffective and irresponsible.

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LEADERSHIP, ANTI-REALISM AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

The Selfish Anti-Realist View Point

2.1 Realistic Ethical Leadership, Anti-Realism and the Apology of Innocence: Introduction of Ethical Normativity as a Lightning Rod

The poets sometimes present love as a strange fatal attraction: for love to exist, we need to be consumed by it. This is the ethical model of the *Lightning Rod*, which is doomed to a blind process of consumption where at least the lightning is being diverted harmlessly into the ground. For the aim of protecting the house from the lightning, a metal structure is mounted which will be stricken instead of the roof of the house. In this second chapter we present a philosophical context where the importance of ethics is not to show us the right path to follow, that of a radical trust in our set of anthropologically founded values, as was the case with the *Lighthouse*, we are now concerned by fatal attractions as romantic literature could describe it. It is not because we don't decide fatality that some sort of determinism doesn't exist and should not enter in our definition of what ethics can bring to make our life more mean-

ingful and richer. To give an example, change in time often occurs without any voluntary process, many aspects of our daily activity are related to conflicting antagonisms and tensions. We are surrounded by habits that we try to distribute in ways that they contribute to reinforce our values and economically facilitate our decisions, by leaving to our unconscious life large sets of behaviours. When we arrive to our office we usually don't reflect on the key we need to grab in our pocket to open our door, we simply do it. This unconscious but extremely powerful aspect of daily life will now be in the centre of our focus.

The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) proposes to consider innocence and leadership, not as two antithetical terms but as related in a constructive way, as the lightning conductor plays a purely passive but important role in being stricken, at some point, and connecting the force of the natural phenomenon to the ground. In the similar way metaphorically, the ethical value of innocence is to help discharging some destructive power, not against the house or persons and values, but to drive all energies, being even destructive, to play an active and constructive role in life⁸.

Most of the current literature on Nietzsche's views on the innocence of the becoming don't draw any relationship to his views on leadership, or on ethics of self-mastering and empowerment, which is also a critical study on some limitations of a strong deontological view on leadership, as rule and responsibility driven principle. The main argument of an ethics of innocence is that in order to be an active participant an ethical

⁸ F. Nietzsche mentions the image of a locomotive and presents the importance of the steam compared to the conscious, responsible decisions of the driver for moving the locomotive forward. He shows our vital energy as first repressed, incarcerated within our organism and finally able to discharge and vent. The term „discharge“ is used explicitly „es bedarf für diesen verborgenen Grund von Zeit zu Zeit der *Entladung*, das Tier muß wieder heraus, muß wieder in die Wildnis zurück“, *GM*, I, 11.

leader not only needs rules and responsible behaviour; he also needs capacity for action which is impetus for creativity and self-transformation in order to escape routine types of behaviour. We shall argue that it is by the means of a reassessment of realism, as power oriented ethos through genealogical unveiling of our affective life, that philosophical ethics promotes responsible leadership, which should not be seen as preaching in favour of an ethics of the service for others, nor an ethics of the master, but an original mix of both, on the path of an ethics of self-overcoming and self-development, which takes the complexity and cruelty of life seriously.

In the following section it is not about realism or anti-realism in the sense of describing the relation of the subject to the object, which depending on the type of thing at stake, needs an anthropological or comprehensive stance, as we have tried to show. From this point of view, anti-realism corresponds to the idea - conform with Nietzsche's views-, that there are no objective facts about what is morally right and wrong, good or bad, at least in a mind independent way.

Our objective is to introduce a second universe of significations for the term "realism", which are adding important semantic layers, gathered from the particular chapter of the history of philosophy where we reflect on the German philosopher F. Nietzsche and draw the main lines of his anti-realistic moral psychology, which derives in some sense from this first definition, which defines antirealism as sentimentalism toward moral judgment. Leiter summarises this form of approach as following a simple rule: "best explanation of our moral judgments is in terms of our emotional or affective responses to states of affairs in the world⁹."

⁹ Leiter, Brian, Nietzsche, J. Doris & M. Vargas (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology* (2019, Forthcoming). See also: Shaw, Tamsin (2007): "Nietzsche as Moral Antirealist", Ch. 4, in: *Nietzsche's Political Skepticism*, Princeton: UP, 78 ff., Shaw would then in his Ch. 5 argue against this antirealist understanding.

This tendency explains a certain number of choices, e. g. why Nietzsche has never been considered as a realistic political thinker¹⁰, nor should he be considered as defending a realist moral psychological point of view as his notes related to Protagoras and Thucydides show. We should confirm this antirealistic stance, but also explain why is it valuable to refer to the world in such a sentimentalist way, instead of having a system of moral judgment depending essentially on rules, or principles, in short why is psychology important in understanding the notion of good leadership, and why should a good leader eventually follow the proposition made by Nietzsche of detailing our affective life to such important degree and with extensive precision?

Nietzsche's analysis of the relations between morality and power gives a line of justification for why moral psychology is relevant and important: in a realistic system of punishment and reward, the restoration of "the innocence of being" becomes a key agenda. Since the innocence of the being is based on a given naturalistic understanding of the limits of personal responsibility, we call this project a counter-Enlightenment proposition. As we shall show in other chapters of this book the liberal value of Modernity is not per se invalidated, only an over conformist reduction of a principle of free will and responsibility¹¹. Reason for that is that Nietzsche considers innocence as one of the most "bashful things", we should not seek it as an aim, but rather receive it as a situation given after responsible behaviour and virtue¹².

Prima facie, a psychology of power related motives leads often to question whether the central claim of psychology of the will to power is not simply an odious justification of blind domination over others. This

¹⁰ Brobjer, Thomas, 1998. "The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsche's Writings: The Case of the Laws of Manu and the Associated Caste-Society," *Nietzsche-Studien*, 27: 300–318.

¹¹ As example see our chapter 4 on Descartes' virtue of generosity below.

¹² „For enjoyment and innocence are the most bashful things. Neither like to be sought for. One should have them“ [...]. "Old and New Tables", 56, §5, Za, III.

is of course a serious matter, and as we shall see a complete examination of the notion of power, including as competency and see how it is necessary to deconstruct a purely physical reduction of a system of will to power to the lowest kind of exercise of power¹³. The aim of our reading of Nietzsche is to bring a positive framework to his extensive research around realism, from different perspectives (cognitive, moral, political etc.), concluding to an antirealist position, and to show how reaffirming the innocence of being should be taken seriously when it comes to understanding what it means to be an “ethical” leader.

As we shall see, Nietzsche gives clear indications on the importance of re-evaluating our compliance to morality, when under cover of “morality” the hidden agenda is conformism to a kind of system of the fear, where under cover of free will and responsibility, members of a system of dependence are under threat of punishment and vengeance. In particular three lines of critiques are original contributions by Nietzsche. If critical analysis is the core virtue of epistemic authority in moral psychology, then Nietzsche’s approach to moral psychology proves he is a good candidate for a new model of critical antirealist leadership as we propose to show¹⁴. It has been well established that the kind of genealogical understanding Nietzsche is inviting us to follow, is not meant to add perplexity and subversion to our philosophical analysis of values,

¹³ Nietzsche follows Baruch Spinoza on this point. For our presentation of Spinoza’s critique of the physicalist system found by Hobbes, see our chapt. 3 below.

¹⁴ Part of this text was presented and discussed at the Kolloquium: Politische Philosophie at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), when I was working as Assistant Doctor in the Department of Philosophy between 2004 and 2011, part of a lecture at Rhodes University in South Africa on the theme of Nietzsche and democracy in South Africa organized by Dr R. Bamford. Although leadership is not a main theme of philosophy curricula, wide focus on leadership in management and theology inspired me to rework and present this comparative historical and philosophical approach on the subject, linking it to the classical philosophy discussions around the term “power”.

but quite on the contrary, it means to be an original attempt to make room for more profound and uncompromising views on our affective life¹⁵.

“Genealogical debunking” runs the risk of nihilistic mystification of virtues and values such as integrity or responsibility, on the path to ethical leadership¹⁶. Recent research papers on Nietzsche's antirealism are showing the value of the innocence of the becoming, which reminds us of University of Basel lectures on Nietzsche's discussion of Heraclitus of Ephesus (active around 500 BCE), and the central point of view of the logos/lawfulness as becoming (i. e. the motto: “All Things Flow”) but also focusing on debunking the all-encompassing value of responsibility. The original perspective of Heraclitus is often presented as a shadow background on Parmenides' statement that “whatever is, is, and what is not cannot be”. At best is the former seen in a dialectical relationship with the later, but only a small minority would eventually take seriously the allegory of time seen from the point of view of becoming and compared to a child playing a game of draughts (H., 52). How could it be otherwise, is it only possible to imagine – not to dare a real program, of a supreme political or economic leadership, represented as “in the hands of a child”? When we do the thought experiment of allowing at early stages some young and talented leaders to write collective history, we invariably end up with negative consequences, many don't even succeed to be sustainable tyrants, either they die young, get replaced by other young fellows of the dynastic family before any overall political collapse or dynasty crumble¹⁷. As we shall see the image of the innocent

¹⁵ Queloz, Matthieu & Cueni, Damian, „Nietzsche as a Critic of Genealogical Debunking: Making Room for Naturalism without Subversion“, *The Monist* 102 (3) (2019).

¹⁶ Nietzsche is contrary to common understanding of his method denouncing the risks of the genealogical method. See: Queloz, Matthieu & Cueni, Damian, *ibid.*

¹⁷ History shows on a different tone that the reason of the state doesn't refrain from patriarchal legitimation of power, even in the presence of an incompetent

play of a child is a metaphorical figure of self-knowledge and time as creative transformation.

The early Greek philosopher Heracleitus can be related to the idea of “an exchange and play of the dialectical forces of nature itself that are in a state of perpetual war or strife with each other, but without the necessity of interpreting this phenomenon by means of the moral connotations of good and evil”¹⁸. It is said that for Nietzsche:

“there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts and reasoning play almost no significant role in our actions and how our lives unfold”¹⁹.”

child; on the contrary leadership in the hands of young kings and emperors is common on most continents. China’s last emperor, Puyi, became emperor at two years old; Sobhuza II became King of Swaziland before he could take his first steps; Emperor Shang of Han (China) could rule the entire country before he had any teeth, but died before reaching his second anniversary; Tsar Ivan VI of Russia was two months old when he was crowned; John I became King of France the day he was born. Unfortunately, John’s reign was one of the shortest in history: he died five days later. The in utero ruler: Shah Shapur II (Sassanid Empire), in year 309, was the youngest and the longest-reigning monarch in Iranian history, he reigned for his entire 70-year life.

¹⁸ “In the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not. “Heracleitus, Fragment 49a. Balto, M. “Logos as Will and Cosmodicy”, *Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 10, 2006.

¹⁹ Nietzsche writes: „Ich habe mich immer darum bemüht die Unschuld des Werdens mir zu beweisen: [...] um Ziele zu verfolgen, die sich auf die Zukunft der Menschheit bezieht. Die erste Lösung war mir die aesthetische Rechtfertigung des Daseins. [...] Die zweite Lösung war mir die objektive Wertlosigkeit aller Schuld-Begriffe und die Einsicht in den subjektiven, notwendig ungerechten und unlogischen Charakter alles Lebens. Die dritte Lösung war mir die Leugnung aller Zwecke und die Einsicht in die Unerkennbarkeit der Causalitäten.“ N, KSA 10, 237. Leiter, Brian (2019): *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*, Oxford: University Press. See Prinzhorn, Hans, *Nietzsche und das XX. Jahrhundert*, Niels Kampmann Verl. 20, 32, 63.

The positive idea of an “unconscious life in development” is a central idea which Nietzsche shares with Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) (“bewusstlos bildenden Leben”) who shows that we are part with the animals, the plants, the earthly nature, the earthly bodies of an unconscious basis of our psyche. Carus is the authority whom Eduard von Hartmann, contemporary of Nietzsche, also followed besides Arthur Schopenhauer’s critical reading of Kantian philosophy²⁰. There we find also negative or critical views on the unconscious life, considered “a fancy beyond man”²¹ a “backward men’s” creation.


This perspective receives a clear normative finality, which is to be able ultimately of justifying a new type of ethical naturalism which is somehow different from the previous methodological and epistemic distinction between comprehensive or historical views of the world, and scientific, or naturalistic views. Nietzsche claims we should be critical over a wide-ranging notion of responsibility, for the reasons made clear in his debunking of these values: promoting innocence is a way to foster an environment of reduced anxiety, and where a critical creativity on values is promoted. We can discover with Leiter the attractive nature of the claim, made very clear, of a new and important programmatic ethical agenda:

[Focusing on] “[...] Nietzsche's striking idea of ‘the innocence of becoming’ (die Unschuld des Werdens), and a partial defence of its import, namely, that no one is ever morally responsible or guilty for what they do and that many of the so-called reactive attitudes are misplaced. I focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the arguments as set out in *Twilight of the Idols*. First, there is Nietzsche's hypothesis, partly psychological and partly historical

²⁰ Ottmann, H. (2004): *Nietzsche Handbuch*, Das Unbewusste; Unschuld des Werdens, Stuttgart: Metzler Verl. 347-348.

²¹ „Wahn jenseits des Menschen“ *Za, I, Backworldsmen*.

or anthropological, that the *ideas of ‘free’ action or free will, and of responsibility for actions freely chosen or willed, were introduced primarily in order to justify punishment* (‘[m]en were considered “free” so that they might be judged and punished’). Call this the Genetic Thesis about Free Will. Second, there is Nietzsche's claim that the moral psychology, or ‘psychology of the will’ as he calls it, that underlies this picture is, in fact, false – that, in fact, *it is not true that every action is willed or that it reflects a purpose or that it originates in consciousness*. Call these, in aggregate, the Descriptive Thesis about the Will. (Here I draw on earlier work.) Finally, there is articulation of a programmatic agenda, namely, *to restore the ‘innocence of becoming’ by getting rid of guilt and punishment based on guilt* – not primarily because ascriptions of guilt and responsibility are false (though they are), but *because a world understood as ‘innocent’, one understood in terms of ‘natural’ cause and effect, is a better world in which to live*. I focus in particular on a reactive attitude often ignored by philosophers, but of crucial importance for Nietzsche, namely, revenge²².”



Source: The creative innocence of the becoming; author's picture.

We shall begin by clarifying our understanding of Nietzsche's readings of the Greeks' ethic of classical self-esteem, which is not an

²² „The innocence of becoming: Nietzsche against guilt“, *Inquiry*, Vol. 62(1), 2019 - Proceedings of the International Society of Nietzsche Studies (edited by Jessica N. Berry and Brian Leiter), 70-92.

irrational love of the military glory as described in many chapters of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*²³, and see how somehow Nietzsche escapes the tendency to be recognized as essentially representing a positive description of the experience of power, be it as a prolonged exercise in time of our own self-esteem and the empowering of our shared capacities, through a genealogy of our affective life as *will to power*.

It is immediately clear that although the German philosopher mentions tragic chapters of the *History*, he is not motivated by an amoral fascination by brute force (nor was Thucydides, which would have been fundamentally contrary to the so-called conformist conception of a common good, outlined as the Classical Greek morality based on shame). Nietzsche's point of focus is an enlightened ethical egoism, understood as (*un*)conscious lasting self-esteem, a psychological moral point of view on values that we aim to present from different chapters of history of philosophy, in a journey starting at the epistemic value of values (answering to the question why it makes sense to be a realist), but overcoming this epistemic hierarchy by pointing at simply the innocence of the being²⁴.

As early as the 1880s, and thus before the introduction and development of the notion of "will to power" between 1884-89, Nietzsche considered it advantageous to want power as a skill and even as something

²³ Thucydides was born c. 460 and died c. 400 BC. *The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Thucydides*. Thomas Hobbes translator. London. Bohn. 1843. <http://data.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0003.tlg001.perseus-eng1>

²⁴ Chapt. 3, 4, bring together Spinoza and Descartes on the subject of an ethics of esteem. Chapt. 5 focuses on adapting moral psychology and epistemic values to broad but central ethical aims within an ethics of education. Chapt. 2 brings the innocence of the being to the centre of the picture, as key ethical virtue of driving ethical agendas as an ethical leader.

cardinal. Man cannot ignore empowering potentials: power as intentional content to increase personal abilities:

“*The demon of power*. Not necessity, not desire no, the love of power is the demon of men. Let them have everything health, food, a place to live, entertainment they are and remain unhappy and low-spirited: for the demon waits and waits and will be satisfied. Take everything from them and satisfy this, and they are almost happy as happy as men and demons can be. But why do I repeat this? Luther has said it already, and better than I, in the verses: 'Let them take from us our body, goods, honour, children, wife: let it all go the kingdom must yet remain to us!' Yes! Yes! The 'kingdom'!”²⁵,

The self-esteem argument is useful for understanding the central premises of Nietzsche's affirmative morality. It has been seen by some commentators as justification for recognizing a realistic ethical leadership perspective, understood as the exercise of moral powers, a ydides/Greeks inspired leadership: this argument is founded on the so-called Thucydides' “courage in the face of reality” as well as “self-control” and “control over things”, by opposition to Plato's ideal²⁶.

We find in Protagoras the introduction of the fundamental constituents of life in ancient society that are shame (*aidôs*) and respect (*dikê*)²⁷. Shame is a quality that Thucydides inherits from Protagoras, and which remains at the centre of the Greek strategist's martial ethos and attracts Nietzsche's attention. The German philosopher seems to see in it the

²⁵ *M*, KSA 3, 262, p. 209. http://nietzsche.holtof.com/reader/friedrich-nietzsche/daybreak/aphorism-262-quote_1a85b4d68.html

See also: “Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to Life, but—so teach I thee—Will to Power!”, *Z*, 34.

²⁶ Cf. John Zumbrunnen, “Courage in the Face of Reality”: Nietzsche's Admiration for Thucydides, *Polity*, Vol. 35(2), (Winter, 2002), pp. 237-263.

²⁷ Plato, *Protagoras*, 322c-e.

idea that the Greek “could not conceive of virtue without witness²⁸”, as the point of departure for a deeper reflection on the origin of morality as a public sharing of esteem.

Nietzsche uses the ancient public culture of shame, which he eventually will oppose to a culture deprived of guilt, whose genealogical development he shows critically. In contrast to the internal feeling of guilt, shame is a social phenomenon conveyed by language, it consists in suffering from the loss of social esteem, considered as a link uniting the members of a community. It is a central driver of ethical and political decisions because trust and the ability to act predictably are the two conditions of peaceful civil life and its realistic political ethical aspects. The question of the mode of transmission of civil esteem is not clear, and we can strongly doubt that Nietzsche had a love for military glory, inherited from the heroic civilization of the ancient Greeks, which was a gift of self to the common good, in a time of strong reactions against nationalistic Germany. If the project of the moral improvement of the “great man” of Nietzsche, creator of his own values would simply consist in a Neo-Classical heritage of Greek sophistic ethics, his position would not do justice to an anthropological position on the man in the Kantian sense, nor show his profound respect for a Spinozist and Cartesian view on ethics, to turn towards a selfish realism.

2.2 Realism and Antirealist Leadership Based on the Unconscious Internal Drive

Let us present a comparison between both realism and antirealism. We can distinguish at least three features that are common to many

²⁸ *GM*, 2. Abh. KSA 5, p. 305. Thucydides does not describe a totally amoral world in which selfishness alone determines the choice of individuals, but the problem of individual choices is a major theme of *History*. His *Archeology* (I, 2 - 19), can also be interpreted as an argument against the position of Protagoras.

realist schools which form a first conceptual definition of realism as a first set of epistemic/critical components:

- a) the procedural realism that our human relationships are based on facts that should always be clarified before entering as constituent elements of events extrapolating these facts into a process;
- b) scientific realism, which supposes that there really exist external objective ideas that can be accessed by thought;
- c) ideological realism, which uses the supposition that there is knowledge that can be used as a means of constraint against adversaries.

These characteristics are distinct from a second conceptual set of definitions of realism, which can be compared to Nietzsche's deconstruction of political views aiming at explaining his dynamic antirealistic leadership as a critical view on controversial perspectives built on the notion of self-mastering, and which Nietzsche presents as a language of internal psychological moral drives:

- 1.1) Political realism attributes less a measure of order and morality to civilian life than it brings out the non-moral nature of relations between states²⁹. It was in the early days of hostilities described by Thucydides' thesis (I, 76), defended by the Athenian ambassadors at Lacedaemon, in response to the grievances of the Megarians and Corinthians against Athens; these two passages constitute the best examples of political realism understood as the absence of morality in relations between states.
- 1.2) Nietzsche can agree with the argument that the non-moral relations between states are more important than the order and morality of civil life, because this position stems from the biological principle of natural selection, which Nietzsche transposes to entities as socie-

²⁹ Wendt, A. (1995), pp. 129-77.

ties which he conceives organically as the will to power (GM, II, 11). Although Nietzsche praises the principles of the “Machiavellian power”, which theoretically presupposes the use of force if recourse to laws is not sufficient (*The Prince*, Ch. XVIII), it is an *axiology of proto-ethical drives* and not the domination by force in international relations that he aims at primarily³⁰. There is no contradiction in saying that this violent domination flows logically as a possible political consequence from the naturalized vision on moral psychology delivered by Nietzsche, in the same way that Nietzsche concedes that “exploitation” derives from the status of life as a will to power³¹:

“To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation, and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible, even as the *fundamental principle of society*, it would immediately disclose what it really is - namely, a Will to the *denial* of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, ex-

³⁰ Genealogy understood as a phenomenological study of the structure of proto-ethical and ethical drives and in some cases the formulation of grounding ethical principles related to these drives is at the center of another Schopenhauerian ethicist: Eduard von Hartmann as we shall present it in our Ch. 5.

³¹ *Nachgelassene Fragmente, Herbst 1887*, KSA 12, 9[145], p. 419. Cf. Ansell-Pearson, K. (1991), pp. 38-40. Warren, M. (1988), p. 227.

plotation - but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped? Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal - it takes place in every healthy aristocracy - must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy - not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it *lives*, and because life is precisely Will to Power³².”

- 1.3) The “rise of power” is the second distinctive category of political realism, where the “desire of gain” is intimately linked to power. The accumulation of wealth is the main driver of the accumulation of power and prosperity. This argument, which Thucydides first attaches to the economic development of Athens (I, 8), meets the analysis of Pericles, who sees in the financial reserves of Athens, and in the dreams of his empire, the true strength of Athens (I, 141). The Mytilenian debate is an example of the importance of using the material means of the allies of Athens to provide for its war costs (III, 46). The argument is that a city which does not extend is condemned to servitude; Pericles clearly calls for the motive of interest. Athens accumulates a superior naval power, because each time Athens is victorious, the empire recovers the ships of its enemies, constituting little by little an important “means for dominion” (II, 62). Interest is an important motive alongside fear, which moderates trust and predictability that is always limited. But when interest takes over fear and shared esteem, as will be especially the case after the death of Pericles, in the ruinous expedition

³² *JGB*, 259, Chapter 9, What is Noble? KSA 5.

to Sicily, then these three motivations do not behave harmoniously. Thucydides seems to lack an ironical distance from the use of force to increase political power. There is a brutal honesty to recognize that political accumulation increases security, contacts between individuals and wealth in general:

“(...) wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented anything great proceeding from them; though they would each have their affairs with their immediate neighbours.” (I, 17)

There is therefore a public conception of force as a homogeneous reality, to which a moral configuration is not applied, but only the idea that this political accumulation serves the interests of society as a whole. The formation and stability of Greek tyrants stems from the idea that accumulation is even a central political value.

When Thucydides says:

“Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired (*dynamis*); we have the usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours.” (I, 15), the logic of this analysis of power could be a) the power (*dynamis*) seen as coming from the conquest of others (*allon katastrophe*), or b) on the contrary real power coming from a form of moderation in not entering in warfare against foreign people just for the sake of increasing territories (colonisation).

1.4) The search for the power interpreted as a drive for power, the orientation of a quantum of power, whether it increases or decreases, is central for Nietzsche in that it grounds a type of proto-ethical leadership, based on the legislation - or we could say the management and planning - of the future. The accumulation of power indirectly concerns relations between states, but above all political legislation and self-legislation of time. Schopenhauer is the first figure, for Nietzsche, of a philosopher as educator whose work is to “legislate for measurement, financial value and the weight or standards of things³³.” To legislate in the sense of reflecting on laws in a descriptive way, or to fix codes, standards and obligations and thus to prescribe norms, implies a subjective and historical dimension that Nietzsche characterizes in his *Untimely Meditations*. It involves: accurately estimating one's time in comparison to others, triumphing for oneself of the present and producing a satisfactory image of life (ethos) through philosophy. One difficulty is to rise above the antinomy between description and prescription. The judgment of the ancient Greek philosophers on the value of existence is perceived favourably by Nietzsche, vis-à-vis the modern, because Nietzsche finds an emphasis of tensions between cultural and political particularities, involving a reflection on moral perfectionism: “They [the ancient Greek philosophers] had before their eyes and around them life itself in a luxuriant perfection and [...] in them the feeling of the thinker does not get distracted by conflicting desires for freedom (...)³⁴”. The category of increasing power is relevant, it shows that the search for resistance in the appropriation of rights is inevitable, that it is sometimes useful to provoke rather than to inhibit the vital forces: “Call to the fight for power those who like to hide and who would like to live for them-

³³ *SE*, 3, KSA 1, p. 350.

³⁴ *SE*, 3, KSA 1, p. 350. *ibid.*

selves - the wise, the pious, the calm of the country too! Contempt of their enjoyment solitude! All creative natures struggle for influence, even if they live alone – “posthumous glory” is just a misnomer to say what they want. The monstrous task of the powerful self-educating himself - the kind of man and people over whom he wants to rule must be preconceived in him: that is where he will first have to reign!³⁵ The figure of Zarathustra, as legislators of the agonal character of life, will be introduced in a second phase, this figure coincides with the introduction of a temporality of the future leader, for the realization of the Nietzschean legislator of time³⁶. By emphasizing the plural, dynamic character of life and its properties of intensification and surpassing, the increase of power is related to the self-knowledge of man. The increase of immoral power is also a problem for Nietzsche, when he enters into a contradiction with moral perfectionism. Tyrannical absolutism, associated with the feeling of power, shouldn't constitute the most enviable proto-ethical form of life, as it does not exclude either villainy or arrogance, as Plato also shows in *Gorgias*. In rarer cases, even more striking contradictions are found between the increase of power and justice: in the joy of harming or the imposition of the sacrifice of all to the arbitrary will of the tyrant. A first ethical consideration out of these risks would be to say that it is advisable to prevent the appearance of tyrants at any price³⁷. Many moral references to power must warn us to position Nietzsche too quickly as a political neorealist in favour of any thoughtless and harmful increase of power.

³⁵ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1883*, KSA 10, 16[86], pp. 529-30.

³⁶ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1883*, KSA 10, 16[86]-[89], pp. 529-32. Cf. Siemens, H. (2005). The Greek *agon*, or contest and emulation is complementary to the notion of harmony.

³⁷ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1880*, KSA 9, 4[301], p. 174.

- 1.5) The realist sees international affairs as an anarchic system in which only domination and hegemony manage to establish a certain order. A liberal vision or one based on individual responsibility may rebel against the construction of supranational structures, denying consideration for contextual and decentralized regional powers. The two discourses of Pericles (II, 35-46 and 60-64) that articulate a heroic vision of human freedom imply an anarchic conception of social life. To apologize for empire is to find in the empire a superstructure that is otherwise lacking in human affairs. Pericles's *Funereral Oration* shows that among the reasons for going to war with the Athenians, there is mainly the fear of losing a political freedom understood as independence of the empire: granting sovereignty to the subjugated cities would be a risk for the whole empire. The empire must be preserved because it is the expression of the will to undertake men. To abdicate power is dangerous because "people who are attached to their tranquillity can only survive if they have energetic men beside them"³⁸. Next to fear, which is undoubtedly the most real motivation for a domination that does not rest on a moral foundation, honour is a second important motivation, pushing Athens to seek to keep the empire. As honour implies the search for glory, it can be defined as an ethical action, aiming to leave the relative security within the private domain to distinguish itself in the public domain and to accept risks in defiance of its ordinary living environment³⁹.
- 1.6) The construction of a supranational structure or a global ethical order, understood as an entity that transcends national differences with Nietzsche, joins the political supposition that there is an anarchic mass of influences and no real constructive relations between

³⁸ Thuc. II, 63, p. 829. Cf. Finley, J. (1967).

³⁹ Hobbes, on the contrary, holds honour (*timè*) for only vanity, opposing it to fear deemed more rational as motivation.

states. Instead, however, of seeing in domination by force the most appropriate means of ordering an anarchic conception of small states towards a trans-statist human society, there is the introduction of a utopian figure by Nietzsche that he calls “good Europeans”, based on its synthetic vision of the radical cultural heterogeneity between Greek, Lydic-thracian and Phoenician-Semitic communities in Europe⁴⁰. This view is problematic in the sense that it brings a strongly paternal culturalist view, on the role of European elites toward the rest of the world, when it comes to weighting the role of European culture in a global context.

- 1.6.1) Realists see groups as standard units of analysis. Tributes, empires, virtually any organized group like the city-state in antiquity or the nation-state in the modern configuration do the trick. “The Athenians”, “the Corinthians” and “the Spartans” are represented by Thucydides, especially in the first books, as constituting homogeneous and undifferentiated entities. These categories are also used by Nietzsche.
- 1.6.2) Realists treat human behaviour as rational when it directs relations between states, or global relations between peoples.
- 1.6.3) Nietzsche sees continuity in accordance with his psychophysical monism between the instinctual bases that guide the behaviour and the rational element that defines public affairs.
- 1.6.4) Realists share the utopia of thinking that their scientific explanations will benefit future leaders⁴¹.

⁴⁰ Thrace includes southeastern Europe, northeastern Greece, European Turkey and southern Bulgaria. Lydia was the kingdom of Asia Minor, it comes under Persian power from 547. It is located on the west coast of the Turkish coast in Western Anatolia. Phenicia is made up of the Syrian-Palestinian coastline. See Watson, J. R. (1992), pp. 133-4. Kuhn, E. (1997) pp. 215-28.

⁴¹ Cf. Crane, G. (1998), pp. 64-9.

1.6.5) Nietzsche conceives the wish that his contemporaries come closer to his pan-European and cosmopolitan utopianism (PBM, 243).

This table of the constituent elements of political realism should not obscure the question of whether there is a moral realism in Thucydides or a perspective analogous to the realism of values or an anthropological view of the mind, to which we commonly refer as the a legacy of modernity, alongside the categories we have just introduced, specific to political realism, and its Nietzschean reception.

The question of the relationship of philosophical political and ethical thought to events must enable us to respond. Thucydides shows that he does not think that the events of the past that he describes have a hidden meaning, that there is a law of history that must be discovered with him, on which one can then project his life. It is therefore important to emphasize that Thucydides is not interested in the past but wants to understand human behaviour, which is why he is looking into the past. Thucydides' approach consists in dissociating oneself from a vulgar sophist position, which consists in only enhancing pleasure, to introduce moral realism. One thing is to describe an event of the war, taking into account the beliefs of men, rather than positively reducing these beliefs, another is to endorse the cruel outcome of certain events. To propose a spectrum of human motivations more important than those included in Plato's system, such is the merit of Thucydides, insofar as this approach makes it possible to unmask optimism.

Spinoza and Nietzsche were inspired by this model which consists in denying that the more a human being becomes rational, the more sociable he is and the happier he is. A particularly convincing way of reaching this goal is to show that the desires of men do not always coincide with their hopes. The example of Nicias is eloquent (VII, 77). Thucydides is widening the gap between the hope of the Athenian general who urges his men to continue to hope, and the realization of his desire to see

the second expedition in Sicily out of the impasse, an effort that will ultimately not be rewarded. Later, when the expedition to Sicily has effectively failed, Nicias will accept to be a prisoner in order to put an end to the massacre of his own soldiers, who fail to break the resistance to the Lacedaemonian leader Gylippos, Thucydides specifies that Nicias and Demosthenes, the two Athenian strategists, end up being put to death. He adds, however, that Nicias was, of all the Greeks of his time: “he who by his constant aspiration towards good deserved the least such misfortune” (VII, 86). Thucydides, therefore, explicitly denounces the injustice of Nicias' cruel end, emphasizing the originality of his position, which consists in remaining neutral in the face of disputes between parties in conflict with the events of the war, without being free from all value⁴². The position of Thucydides involves asking the question of the foundation that can be given to his moral typology and the role of the latter vis-à-vis Nietzsche.

Although the war-induced movement shifts the moral foundation to a second plane, in the face of fear and interest on many occasions, Thucydides presupposes however as Protagoras, a traditional definition of duty that is oriented towards self as self-esteem. We do not feel this self-esteem in intimacy, only in front of other people. Recall the central role played by self-esteem, when this feeling is freely conveyed by speech in Protagoras. This perspective is important for having a true image of realistic leadership. To unify the society Protagoras shows that Zeus brings to men: on the one hand the feeling of honour (it is the spirit of the heroic time of the ancients), of the modesty, that is to say the fear of shame and on the other hand that of law, in other words respect (322c)⁴³. As Protagoras is agnostic, Hermes, the messenger of the gods in the name of Zeus, does not dictate the righteous, he gives the power to men to say the righteous. The just is what every man must participate to be

⁴² Cf. Geuss, R. (2005), Williams, B. (1993).

⁴³ Plato, *Protagoras*, 322c-e. Cf. Crane, G. (1998), op. cite.

worthy of political and human existence. It is expressed by the statement of the law (*nomos*), which is the fact of every city, each city fixing through the law the just and the unjust. As the law refers to the faculty of speech, but the ability to articulate sounds to give a name to things is distinct, Protagoras traces back to the myth of Prometheus, the use of voice (322a). The fundamental education to the law (including *soft laws*) is necessary to the socialization and politicization of all, it allows that the essential function of the logos that is for Protagoras the declaration (I say that...) becomes the *doxa* of all. The traditional education referred to by Protagoras is understood in terms opposed to the aristocratic model. Although Protagoras recognizes that some individuals are more gifted than others, these natural gifts are randomly distributed and do not depend on belonging to a lineage⁴⁴.

Thucydides inherits from Protagoras the idea that participation in *dike* and *aidos* is something that cannot be denied. *Aidos* is the internalization of the gaze of others, I can be ashamed of what I give to see of myself and vice versa the political virtue is to take part in the discourse on virtue. We can speak of hypocrisy, since it is at the level of the discourse that everyone is expected to play its role, but this hypocrisy does not target the individual but collective interest. It is a question of the survival of the city that everyone agrees at least on what to say right or wrong and that all agree on the fact that justice is public. The righteous is thus subject to a state authority, he is subordinated to the laws of the country, that is to say to the territorial limits and the political conditions of each Greek city. The limits of justice that we have just seen in Protagoras, where each individual is a social actor where everyone avoids pushing the limits of his own interests too far, contrasts, however, with the dissolution of the emotional and moral structure that will imply some brutal actions of war between rival cities. The pure and simple negation of conventional values in the civil war in Corcyra shows that justice is a

⁴⁴ Cf. Vergnières, S. (1995).

fragile good, which in certain circumstances can be evaded by man: “candor, the first quality of every generous soul, becomes an object of laughed and eventually disappeared” (III, 83). The term “*aidos*” appears in Thucydides once in his Archeology (I, 5), while that of power (*dynamis*) appears ten times and thirty-five for close terms, having a link with physical force. “*Aidôs*” appears nineteen times in the whole work, while “*dynamis*” appears up to 931 times⁴⁵. When candour and innocence are seen disappearing from the common boundaries of life in the community, not only is anxiety at paroxysm. Constraint has replaced competency and society has moved from a free space of expression of good wills to a closed space which has much in common with a prison.

2.2.1 Irony in Innocence: Liberation from Narrow Expertise

When Socrates introduced the technic of irony, which is not related to innocence but to ignorance, which should not be seen as synonyms, his point was to attack sophists as Protagoras, who claimed to be experts in education in various fields. By pretending to be a naive ignorant, Socrates was opposing the sophists by ridiculing them. His technique was to put his interlocutor face to face with his contradictions by asking seemingly innocent questions, but finally showing that he - the sophist - did not master his subject. It is a very effective method to dismantle prejudices or false opinions, which has reached us through a long and venerable history⁴⁶. The problem with irony is that it doesn't work in all contexts.

⁴⁵ Cf. Crane, G. (1998).

⁴⁶ See Lombardo's apologetic note: « Oserait-on dire que, depuis bien longtemps, sans une forme ou une autre d'ironie, une œuvre risque de perdre son véritable caractère littéraire et nous tombe dessus comme un manifeste ou une tirade moralisante ? Le bon écrivain saura éviter l'uniformité d'un sérieux tout lisse et plein de bons sentiments ; il saura appeler le sourire ou même le rire » ;

Children, adolescents or persons coming from cultures very different from ours could be less accessible to irony or second-degree statements. Many people take most expressions at face value; irony could hurt them, sincerity seems a virtue indispensable for them. Although the kind of philosophical mockery entailed by irony should never be synonymous to contempt, it is an easy path to derive later from it, which in turn exposes to hate, of those firmly opposed to feel contempt, because there is a mental process of “looking down” upon, or treating someone for a fool, even with explicit marks of respect. Irony makes many persons retract and lose confidence (in them and in the one who inflicts them irony). Irony might be seen ultimately as counterproductive, as dialectic mediated mere “vengeance”, or ultimately as Nietzsche proposes, a form of “revolt”:

“The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to prove that he is not an idiot: he enrages and neutralizes his opponent at the same time. The dialectician renders the intellect of his opponent powerless. Indeed, in Socrates, is dialectic only a form of revenge?⁴⁷”

What is the point of all these observations on the limit of irony? Irony was originally meant to liberate from narrow expertise in a true dialogue and acceptance of the alterity of others, is irony still able to achieve its role?

We suggest that the central idea of Nietzsche’s *innocence of the becoming* is meant to give us a useful hint on how to keep the beauty of an itinerary between master and service-oriented ethics, without falling in the shortcoming of both ways. Borrowing to Heraclitus’ view of the true nature of reality that all sensible things are always in a state of flux, without focalizing on the solution given by Plato and Aristotle that if

Lombardo, P. « Tendresse et pudeur chez Stendhal ». *Philosophiques* 35, no 1 (2008) : 57–70. <https://doi.org/10.7202/018235ar>

⁴⁷ *The Problem of Socrates*, §7, *GD*, KSA 6.

there is to be any knowledge or thought about anything, there must be certain other entities besides sensible ones, which persist, Nietzsche sees the becoming as the interplay of opposing forms and values in a philosophy of gamification and human conjectures (“children’s toys”).

It should not be seen as counter critique to Socrates maieutical method, much more Nietzsche shows that the ingenuity of Socrates’s confrontation against the voice of such experts was to gain attention in front of Plato, the technique of asking seemingly innocent questions is represented as “rope-dancing” in *Zarathustra*, which in a sense brings the aspect of possible counterproductivity of irony on the foreground of the analysis of this concept, without targeting the most stable form or value, as a dancer, jumping over contradictions rather than following a comfortable path from antithesis to synthesis. “That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony” (Heracleitus, 8). Reason for it may be for the Greek philosopher that “The hidden harmony is stronger (*or*, ‘better’) than the visible” (H., 54).

Christian ethics of congratulation and blessing could be understood as well as this profound inspiration by the innocence and joy of becoming (“Happy are you”), although slightly on the side of the receptor of the message⁴⁸.

We should not be confused though by the Nietzsche way of applauding innocence, irony should not critically be evacuated, on the contrary the genealogical reevaluation of its epistemic and ethical value remains positive. We see the allegoric demonstration of this choice, as the main figure of *Zarathustra* is lowering himself in front of the dead corpse of

⁴⁸ “[...] my guiding interest in doing ethics [...] is a demand-driven ethics, not my academic career or the number of footnotes nor is it the citation ranking or the applause of my academic peers in ethics that influence my selection criteria for the themes and topics I deal with”. Stückelberger, Christoph (2016): “Introduction” in: *Global Ethics Applied, Vol. 3*, p. 10. See also: “Happy Are You”, in: *Global Ethics Applied, Vol. 1*, p. 9, Geneva: Globethics.net Readers Series No. 1. Read online for free: www.globethics.net

the rope-dancer. This allegory on the limits of the idealistic position of a Socrates in ethics, is as well a vibrant apology of irony and laughter and should not be opposed to the advantages of Nietzsche's antirealistic stance⁴⁹.

Zarathustra as Socrates counsels love, a sensualist ethics whereby love is symbolised by the act of dancing⁵⁰. Dancing or risking the maieutical method of discovering truth is always better than refereeing to conventional status of expertise and arguments of authority.

The principle of reality makes us socially responsible and attaches to our life institutional roles and mandates, which if we follow the path of an innocent becoming should be only different canals for expressing the need for self-knowledge (ethics), expertise doesn't replace the form and content and what it aims at delivering. Nietzsche places the aim of ethics beyond the status of what he will call the master or the servant, in an ideal type of being: the overman who as ideal figure personifies the love of wisdom, "Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed" (H, 35). Such an ethics of love is similar to the act of dancing, in reaching towards a goal between contrasting opposite things and values: "They would not know the name of Right, if these things (i.e. the opposite) did not exist" (H, 23)⁵¹. Although: "That which is wise is one; to understand the purpose which steers all things through all things" (H, 41).

⁴⁹ Rosen, Stanley (1995): *The Mask of Enlightenment Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, Cambridge: UP, 67.

⁵⁰ Kimerer L. LaMothe (2006): *Nietzsche's Dancers*, New York: MacMillan, 61.

⁵¹ We can find many fragments of Heraclitus which relates the knowledge of the dynamical character of the soul to the changing character of the world: "This ordered universe (cosmos), which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living Fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure." (H, 30).

2.3 Genealogical Perspective: The Drive for Power as Condition for any other Passion

It is implausible that the reference to Pericles' Athenian belief, which according to Nietzsche tends to be European today, that "the individual is convinced of being capable of anything, of being at the height of any role" (FW, 356) refers to the dangers of a new "physical necessity" for political action of tyrannical expansion. This allusion to Pericles rather prepares the European soul to measure, like Thucydides, the distance that can exist between a vision of modern society to its decline and the urgency of conceiving a strong ethical proposition, against:

"a mode of viewing things [which] comes to the front, the Athenian conviction which is first observed in the epoch of Pericles, the American conviction of the present day, which wants also more and more to become a European conviction: whereby the individual is convinced that *he can do almost anything*, that he can play almost any role, whereby everyone makes experiments with himself, improvises, tries anew, tries with delight, whereby all nature ceases and becomes art⁵²."

It is in reaction to this artistic and purely social definition of shared esteem that the direction of a human ethos, as related to an interior life is brought in reference to Thucydides and becomes central to Nietzsche. Thucydides makes understandable the shame and respect that prevail in times of peace but especially the painful consequences, in the event of disdain vis-à-vis these values. It is not according to the place and the moment, that one conceives the importance of the exemplary event of the Peloponnesian war but because they can be transposed to other places, other times. It is by following this intuition that Nietzsche extends

⁵² FW, 356, KSA 3, p. 595. Engl. transl. can be found online for free: http://www.lexido.com/EBOOK_TEXTS/THE_GAY_SCIENCE_FIFTH_BOOK_asp?S=356

the content given by Protagoras to shame in the public sense, to develop this concept as an open possibility of sustaining or perfecting our enduring moral capacity. Nietzsche draws inspiration from Thucydides to unmask the consequences of a superficial aspiration to happiness, or happiness as consumption we would say, as the imprescriptible right of an essentially all mighty human nature. The critical claim is directed against the idea that man is made to be happy at any price and must prevent against any attempt to sink into a life made to stifle the voice of conscience, including the underestimation of the unconscious languages of affects.

Conversely, suffering raises the question of the limits between which the individual can view an action as tolerable. The best attitude to approach Thucydides' reading by Nietzsche is to examine his attitude towards domination, violence and death. For Nietzsche, domination is involved in any self-control, that is, in any power turned against oneself. This must dispel the illusion that the pleasant sensation must always be involved in the determination of a content of rational moral motivation; it may be denied that it is necessary to seek one's good luck to act morally in a high manner. To take power as its objective does not consist in an inclination to dominate, as Locke, Kant and Rousseau thought, that is to say in a passion but on the contrary to form a condition for all other passions and wishes:

“How has it happened that the fundamental articles of faith in philosophy are so diverted and skewed? - Man aspires to happiness - What is true about it? (...) The man, become the master of the natural forces, the master of his own savagery and his own disturbances (the desires have learned to obey, to be useful) - The man, compared to him of a meadow -man, represents a huge

amount of power, not more ‘happiness’! How can one affirm that he had aspired to happiness?⁵³ “.

2.3.1 Redefining Power as a Decent Standard

The elements of the genealogical perspective on the drive of power will enter between 1884-89 in the definition of the notion of “will-to-power” for Nietzsche. To define the notion of power as not necessarily determined by force and violence, the following five premises are indispensable:

1) Power in the sense of a weak possibility (*Möglichkeit*) is necessary but not sufficient to have power in the sense of mastering an art; for example it is necessary but not sufficient to have hands to master the sculpture;

(2) Power in the sense of a competence or disposition (*Fähigkeit*) is also a necessary condition; for example, it is only if I trained by the exercise my sculptor know-how that I have a real or strong possibility of producing a finished sculpture.

3) The power (*Macht*) is ultimately in the interaction even with other powers: who make it (or not) obstacle, (negative freedom). For example, to properly ensure my art of sculpture, I must place myself in context with other achievements of my art, presupposing (1) the same ability and (2) the same dispositions.

4) The constraint (*Zwang*): as a limitation of the negative freedom, in the internal and external sense.

⁵³ *Nachgelassene Fragmente, November 1887-März 1888*, KSA 13, 11[111], p. 52. *Frühling 1888*, KSA 13, 14[115], p. 291. Cf. Lefranc, J. (2003).

5) The constraint of oneself: or self-control, which means that I have the power to act on my desires and inclinations. When we exert this constraint on ourselves, we form our own self-mastery.

Transposed into the political framework, these premises are insufficient to account for the political applications of the actions of a state, as opposed to an individual. In particular, this framework does not answer the relationship between politics and law, in the problematic hypothesis that power is a reality in itself, at the public level that bases our individual obligations. We must distinguish definitions that touch being (what power is as it is), definitions that show the relationship between power and duty. It follows from the possible relations implied by power in the strong sense, defined as the interaction of powers between them, that limitations arise in the face of our own possibilities of action and lead, on this pragmatic slope, to the question of the correctness of these limitations, as well as the place of the subject's decisions towards them. Without trying to define in detail different concepts of obligation, because a subject acts in a fair way, not simply out of desire for a good, in the sense that an action can be an instrument to achieve a good, - but also by regulating its conduct by means of rules - the following definitions must already be taken into account, which bring together the main possible relations between power and duty in the sense this time public. These definitions will always be presupposed in the context of any social practice:

6) The domination (*Herrschaft*): is the power on the motivations of others, that is to say a control on the possibilities of action of others. We can lead others to do something according to clear prescriptions, even against their will (by exerting superiority over others, by threatening others to use institutional constraints), domination can also be exercised by force.

7) Authority: is domination by recognized rules; for example in accordance with the law.

8) Force or physical violence (*Gewalt*): is the exercise of domination for the purpose (or with side effect) of harming others.

9) Terrorism: the use of force by an authority, whose authority is controversial, or by means that is morally and/ or legally controversial.

10) State punishment: is the use of domination in response to a crime that is being committed or after the judgment of a court, and the recognition of guilt at the end of a judicial proceeding having as goal a fair measure in response to the act.

We can illustrate in Thucydides what it would be appropriate to understand by just according to our modernized definitions of power above. Considering that the Athenians were not directly threatened by Melos but that it is a desire for tyrannical expansion that explains their motive for entering the war against this city, it should be provisionally concluded that the war means implemented to guarantee the submission of Melos are unfair. But it would be wrong to refuse any legitimacy to domination by force, strictly speaking, of international relations, that is to say in the interstate community of states. I first show why we cannot directly deny this legitimacy, then specify what is the disadvantage for the ethical and political theory to ignore interdependencies and transnational relations in favour of a categorization too reductive. In philosophy according to Mr. Wight's English school, political theory is progressive in that it is concerned with happiness and has developed a vocabulary particularly adapted to the control of social life⁵⁴. On the other hand, the philosophical theory describes the international framework as non-progressive because the subject concerned is the survival of the state in

⁵⁴ Wight, M. (1966), p. 18.

an anarchic international context, where order is conceived as a balance and a mechanical balance of politics between states. The problem is that, according to this realistic presupposition, there is a lack of a philosophical political theory of international relations whose richness would be comparable to classical political theories. By following a non-progressive political presupposition, adapted as we have just introduced it to international relations, can we philosophically legitimize the attack on Melos, or, on the contrary, should we deny all legitimacy to this event? It is not a question of asking whether Melos has failed in any obligation to any rule submitting it to a higher authority, since Melos has been independent for seven hundred years from Lacedaemon, and observes in the conflict between Athenians and Lacedaemonians strict neutrality, despite blood ties with the Lacedaemonians. The question of the legitimacy of the threat to which Melos is exposed depends on our theory of international relations. According to Wight's distinction, the threat of Athens to Melos is contrary to an abuse of power, that is to say to a pure and simple negation, not only of all justice but also of all rights, in the sense of the least realistic restraint. Whoever wants a state entity to engage in force only in response to force, would not always be assured of the success of its business. In order to ensure the security of Athens, it may be useful to prepare the war, concretely to annex a more modest state entity like Melos. Although at the state level, there appears to be an exclusionary relationship between a right, that is, a convention, a law, the relevance of which can always be discussed in time, and other the political power to subjugate an individual by force, to favour his interests. In the name of reason of state, on the international level such a thing is conceivable. Must we conclude that Thucydides and Nietzsche have equated relations between states with brutal relations between animals?

Among the ancients the use of force to constrain the weak is commonly perceived as a vulgar animal violence since Hesiod⁵⁵. When Thucydides shows that the Melians try in vain to argue that the right can be invoked for all, even for the weakest, because the strongest can find himself one day in the same situation as the weak, having in this case an interest to enjoy protection, he showed a disproportionate interest in the small island of Melos, if the question of justice was indeed for him external to international relations. In a manner similar to Book V of the *Laws*, which concerns the foreigner or the reception to be reserved for refugees, banished or exiled (*Laws* 729d-730a⁵⁶), Thucydides transposes the State policy question of the law of foreigners to an international problem. According to Plato, the strongest can find himself in the situation of the stateless and it may seem wild to refuse hospitality to a supplicating stranger, for which reason he enjoys the protection of a vengeful deity (*Zeus Xenios*: Zeus of Foreigners). The stranger being isolated from his comrades and relatives is an object of great compassion for men and gods; the being who has the power to avenge him is therefore more eager to help him. This comparison reveals Thucydides' ethical pessimism and "classical realism" in the face of Plato's optimism, as we have already shown. On the contrary, it is advisable to distinguish between hope and the individual desire for Thucydides. On the political level, the answer of the Athenians is that they fear more the uprising of their subjects than to lose the call to the right. They argue that there is no dishonour to yield to stronger than oneself, a cynical argument if state and interstate plans are confused rather than distinguished. In terms of international relations, it is philosophically possible to legitimize human

⁵⁵ West, L.M. (Ed.) Hesiod, "Hawk and Nightingale", *Works and Days*, 202-212, Oxford 1978. Ottmann, H. (2001).

⁵⁶ The banished or the refugee, who, regardless of the reasons for which he presents himself as such, receives hospitality the time necessary to listen to his story, before advising on his status. Plato, *Laws*, 729d-730a, vol. 2. Cf. Constantineau, P. (1998), p. 87.

relations as a balance of power, describing the place of law as presupposing an exceptional situation, where forces are equal, following the famous passage of Thucydides:

“(...) in the world of men, the legal arguments of law only have weight to the extent that the present adversaries dispose of equivalent means. If this is not the case, the strongest take as much as their strength makes possible, while the weakest can only bow down⁵⁷. “

The question is rather what, in this context, can be held as honourable by the Athenians, since the Athenians' proposed salvation, that of a survival reduced to slavery, implies on the part of the Melians, to concede to be themselves the instruments of their own enslavement? By choosing to place their hopes in the divine protection, and the possible intervention of the Lacedaemonians, but soon realizing that it is a disappointing hope, Thucydides presents a pessimistic and realist perspective, which stands for a controversial perspective on the underlying value of this morals of morality, as shown by Nietzsche⁵⁸. The behaviour of the Athenians after the taking of Melos confirms that the Melians did not risk anything to resist, since they would have lost everything anyway.

When Nietzsche analyses this event (*MA* I, 92 and 93) and transcribes this passage first, we see less clearly the two distinct planes of the discourse: the question of the legitimacy of the use of force in international relations and the question of justice. Nietzsche uses the instrument of genealogy to show that justice is reduced to the original level of impulses and their coordination, to a barter that is to say to a zero sum game; it is also worth to note that this process is complemented on the

⁵⁷ Thuc. V, 89, p. 1097. The Melian dialogue (416 B.C.) Thucydides, V.84-116, Warwick University, Classics, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/classics/students/modules/introhist/usefuldocuments/thucydides_v.84-116.pdf

⁵⁸ In the episode of the war against Melos, the gods are favourable to the Athenians. Cf. Thuc. V, 105, p. 1101.

positive side by a system of record focusing on positive reciprocal attitudes:

“Origin of Justice. Justice (fairness) originates among approximately equal powers, as Thucydides (in the horrifying conversation between the Athenian and Melian envoys) [...] rightly understood. When there is no clearly recognizable supreme power and a battle would lead to fruitless and mutual injury, one begins to think of reaching an understanding and negotiating the claims on both sides: the initial character of justice is barter. Each satisfies the other in that each gets what he values more than the other. Each man gives the other what he wants, to keep henceforth, and receives in turn that which he wishes. Thus, justice is requital and exchange on the assumption of approximately equal positions of strength. For this reason, revenge belongs initially to the realm of justice: it is an exchange. *Likewise gratitude*⁵⁹.”

Nietzsche's analysis refers, in the background, to his criticism to the origin of justice presented by Eugen Dühring, which is understood as a need for self-defence and compensation:

“Self-defense is the original form of all justice; this original foundation cannot yet disappear completely. The official justice is only self-defence organized for the vengeance of injustice⁶⁰.”

Nietzsche will continue to critically deconstruct this argument of justice as revenge later in his *Genealogy of Morals*, against Paul Rée's position. This argument has two premises: first, that justice must be done by a free act; we “cannot take revenge for necessary actions” because “one does not take revenge on a falling stone”. Second, the sense of justice helps to understand “what is right, it does not come from pun-

⁵⁹ *MA I*, KSA 2, 92, p. 89. Our emphasis.

⁶⁰ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1875*, KSA 8, 9[1], p. 151. Cf. Schiller, W. (2000). Let's remind us the dedication of the *GM* to Paul Rée.

ishment (as Rée means), but conversely, the punishment stems from the sense of justice". From the perspective of the original unconscious moral psychological language of our drives, it seems from a realistic point of view necessary: "to punish the one who has harmed us, because it has reduced the consciousness which we have of our power: it is a crime against the esteem which we carry⁶¹". Human beings can choose not to apply this naturalistic model of justice which reminds us of the conditions imposed on a besieged city as Melos, as second order "right of the weaker", consisting in keeping the inhabitants in slavery, rather than taking away their lives.

"[...] When any one submits under certain conditions to a greater power, as a besieged town for instance, the counter condition is that one can destroy one's self, burn the town, and so cause the mighty one a great loss. Therefore, there is a kind of equalisation here on the basis of which rights may be determined. The enemy has his advantage in maintaining it. In so far there are also rights between slaves and masters, that is, precisely so far as the possession of the slave is useful and important to his master. The right originally extends so far as one appears to be valuable to the other, essentially unlosable, unconquerable, and so forth. Insofar the weaker one also has rights, but lesser ones."⁶²

We are tempted to react against such expeditious justice, which can be chosen by man and can also be refused on the ground of integrity and equal consideration and respect, or an abstract idealistic conception of rights for all.

It must therefore be emphasized that Nietzsche's claim is not to justify what he brings under critical analysis: the psychological description

⁶¹ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Juli 1882 bis Winter 1883-1884*, KSA 10, p. 503, 16[15].

⁶² *MA I*, KSA 2, 93, p. 90.

of the drive at the origin of our sense of justice, which is distinct from the normative perspective which would entail some point of view of the ideal, and it is not political justification of power, as a non-rational planned cynical politic of might is right. Nietzsche does not seek to understand how the accumulation of power can directly benefit states in their respective relationships, but rather to critically delimit ethical self-regulation of the subject on the ground of a language of affects. The ethical problem of conceiving man as the measure of all things is well known under characters as the Callicles and Thrasymachus incorporate for Plato the evils engendered by the love of honour (or ambition: *philotimia*) and greed (or the estimation of its own value as superior to that which it is: *pleonexia*), which are based on abusive variants of self-esteem⁶³.

Thucydides gives examples of subversion of moral values, where the words that are the ultimate conventions also succumb to semantic erosion in times of civil war:

“The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise in every-

⁶³ “Callicles and Thrasymachus are the two great exemplars in philosophy of contemptuous challenge to conventional morality”, as Barney summarizes well. “Both are characters in Platonic dialogues, in the *Gorgias* and Book I of the *Republic* respectively; both denounce the virtue of justice, *dikaiousunê*, as an artificial brake on self-interest, a fraud to be seen through by intelligent people. Together, Thrasymachus and Callicles have fallen into the folk mythology of moral philosophy as ‘the immoralist’ (or ‘amoralist’). In particular we remind Republic 338c, where Plato attributes to Thrasymachus of Chalcedôn that “justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger“. Barney, Rachel, “Callicles and Thrasymachus”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/callicles-thrasymachus/>>.

thing, to be lazy in everything. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re-advise for the better security was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He that was fierce was always trusty, and he that contraried such a one was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than he.” (III, 82-83).

A particular sign of the anarchy of moral conventions is thus to intensify the accumulation of power by replacing, without critical examination, precaution, planning and prudence, which are seen as pretexts for inaction and cowardice, by the simple joy of taking revenge on its opponents, without reflection and deliberation on its own principles⁶⁴. A terrible simplification consists in saying that, at a certain point, it is useless to speak, it suffices to act and to fight. When Nietzsche refers to Athenian audacity, as one of the distinctive features of the European soul, he does not fail to emphasize the dangers of 'European nihilism', of which we find the classic counterpart in Thucydides. There is an emotional nihilism concomitant with (but distinct from) the non-emotional planning of a politics of power, for example in Melian dialogue or in different moments of Pericles' discourse. Nihilism consists in denying any moral order, which supposes: a) not only to accept this decomposition, which is the case of Thucydides, who takes into account the reality of the political life of his time, with a spiritual clarity distinct from all emotional bias, b) the abandonment of any traditional limit, considered as a subject of pride. One thing is to propose a drive model to explain the accumulation of power and extrapolate, politically, the reasons that lead states to prefer war to peace; another thing is to support the war as a

⁶⁴ The concept of *hetairos* (*ἑταῖρος*) is based on an unqualified oath of allegiance of its members, does not correspond to what we call political party. His modern counterpart would be a fanatic cell of a totalitarian group that struggles to obtain or keep power. Contemporary fundamentalism could be seen as following a similar type of blind solidarity.

lower level reaction. It is not a question of pushing to the cult of violence, conceived ideologically as courage, nor to an irrational reading of deception as intelligence. States can be conceived as higher-level organizations and distinguish the peace (equilibrium) of war (movement) as two states of one or more entities, resulting from tensions within and / or between entities. Let's look at an example, in terms of relations between states, where Thucydides justifies the accumulation of power and introduces a model based instead on adherence to tradition, understood as a set of well-established norms.

The accumulation of power makes it possible to understand how justice, understood at the heart of conventions and state laws, can come into conflict with conventions between states themselves. A phenomenon of saturation between state laws and international treaties is detrimental to the latter. Thucydides shows on several occasions that when there are international treaties of defensive alliance between several states, measures related to the security of a state may prevail over the respect of these treaties (V, 35).

One way of not subordinating the righteous to the accumulation of what is of interest, is to show a moral quality, a purely negative quality, of moderation (*sophrosyne*, *Besonnenheit*). Nietzsche follows Thucydides here, for whom moderation is distinct from an authentic individual philosophical quest of the just Platonist. For Thucydides positive virtue is the statement, interpreted by Nietzsche “whereby the individual is convinced that he can do almost anything”⁶⁵. This dynamogenic virtue of Athenian democracy is distinct from the moderation and legitimation of sovereignty by the duration of the conservative oligarchy of Sparta. Moreover Nietzsche literally opposes it to sustainable virtues, virtues which have capacity of duration. Thucydides mentions the idea that political power can simply consist in the conservation of power, giving

⁶⁵ FW, 356, KSA 3, p. 595. In the previous lines of this paragraph, we find: „capacity for duration (and duration is a thing of the first rank on earth!)“

the example of Sparta, whose constitution lasted four hundred years at the end of the Peloponnesian wars, and argue that the duration of conservation power is an indicator of the rising power of a state⁶⁶. Thucydides is inspired on this point by the idea that politics is a struggle between powers, where the stability of the city is the distinctive mark of its strength. To conceive of power as limited from the dynamic point of view of accumulation or the search for power is to support a conception distinct from that of Heraclitus, for whom: “War (*polemos*) is father and king of everything”⁶⁷. Of course the Greeks neglect a deep reflection on the causes of the wars, because these are part of the life, the armed conflict is a phenomenon against which one cannot do much. That war is part of life does not make it anything good, this is why although Thucydides does not subordinate political motives to moral ones, he seeks the causes of the Peloponnesian war and its pernicious effects on social cohesion and means to prevent war (or sustain peace).

The episode of Melos, which is a small island, receives a lot of attention and a disproportionate space, which suggests the extent of the moral dissolution of Athens. Strategic errors can be seen as correlated with a lack of moderation, leading to the devastation of a city or unnecessary killing of prisoners, implying an increase in shame⁶⁸. This may lead to saying that if public life is regulated by the notion of esteem, it is Thucydides' responsibility to show more the importance of its opposite. Although esteem is based on a feeling of a community of nature among all the Hellenic populations, the resort to *dike* (arbitration) remains particularly precarious as long as the adversaries feel in a position to win the war. There is a difference between the policy of Pericles, which

⁶⁶ Thuc. I, 18.

⁶⁷ Heraclitus of Ephesus, Fragment 53, the rest goes: “and it has revealed some as gods, others as men; some it has made slaves, others free.” *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Diels, K. Freeman (transl.), Cambridge: Harvard UP, 28.

⁶⁸ Among the main cities which were devastated we find Plateaus, Mytilene, Thyea.

relies on intelligence without, of course, totally excluding chance, and that of the Spartans, who also think according to an antithesis between intelligence and luck but where intelligence rests on well-established traditions where luck is given greater importance. The Spartans are more moderate but also more ignorant of the outside world. Thucydides shows how the triumph of this or that tactic disappears from the battlefield to become the victory of the intelligence: military victory is a verified reasoning; the art of forecasting finds a justification, since the intelligence can be the agent of victory. But what to think when the arbitration is not taken into account and an adversary does not submit his differences to the other before resorting to arms?

Should we first consider the moral qualities and say that the errors are on the side of the one who attacks without declaration of war? Thucydides does not doubt that moral qualities are necessary, but they are subordinated to intellectual ones. We must specify the justification that can be used to circumvent the arbitration. It is not for religious reasons but for descriptive analytical reasons that arbitration can be circumvented. The fact that a major battle can be won by devious means implies that an implicit rule has been circumvented, but that does not always mean that instead of relying on intelligence, foresight, elaboration and technical skills trust in luck and chance. By overthrowing the point of view of Homer and Herodotus, who take the divine as a principle and source of fortune, which amounts to explaining human affairs in terms of luck or fortune (*tyche*), the gods being able to vary the courage of men, Thucydides sees on the contrary the fortune in terms of human affairs. When men are dominated by their affects, fortune is what is unexpected or contrary to calculation. Thucydides conceives the state as “a divine institution”, as Nietzsche has also shown, when the intelligent mutual protection of selfishness disappears, as is the case in the civil war of Corcyra, where the murderous outburst of affects was observed:

“This is where Thucydides gave his theory of the state [III, 84]: he also showed what must happen when the state disappears (...). There, human nature buries itself in all its purity, in the state it is held in flange. Besides, the *polis* appears here not to be a product of men, nor an ingenious way of instituting a reciprocal protection of selfishness. Thucydides thinks that men are just not wise enough for that, but that they are for the moment [in the Corcyre episode] dominated by their affects. The state is for him a divine institution⁶⁹.”

On the international level, fortune is contrary to the city which denies the rules and customs of war, because the chance (*tyche*) is antithetical to the complex of notions implied by (*techne*) and (*gnome*) - perception, foresight, elaboration, technical skills. For example: the Athenians have an advantage because of the too abrupt attack of the Theban allies of Lacedaemon at Plataea, until Athens is in turn engaged in a double war, against the Lacedaemonians and the Sicilians; Athens loses its advantage little by little, through actions that are not based on a rational judgment (VII, 18)⁷⁰.

Nietzsche knows the meaning of the antithesis between chance and intelligence, whose importance for the understanding of Spartan and Athenian political models we have just mentioned, depending on whether the motive for action is in the knowledge, or on the contrary that trust in luck and tradition is more important than pragmatic calculation:

“Perhaps the Greek would see in our way of digging deep to discover the man an impious gesture towards nature, a lack of modesty. Conversely, we find it strange - *gnomè*, to hear that “when knowledge is there, action must follow”, (...); it seems so foreign

⁶⁹ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer bis Ende September 1875*, KSA 8, p. 256. 12[21].

⁷⁰ Thuc. VII, 18. Cf. Lowell, E. (1975), p. 91. Romilly, J. de. (1956/2005), p.173.

to us and so unlikely that we take a closer look to see if it's not a joke. It is as if they [the Greeks] had given the intellect an extra skin.”⁷¹

Nietzsche reaffirms even more enthusiastically this Greek form of knowledge in his *Genealogy of Morals*, when he says that:

“Such beings cannot be reckoned with, they come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration or pretext, they appear just like lightning appears, too terrible, sudden, convincing and ‘other’ even to be hated. What they do is to create and imprint forms instinctively, they are the most involuntary, unconscious artists there are: – where they appear, soon something new arises, a structure of domination [Herrschafts-Gebilde] that lives, in which parts and functions are differentiated and related to one another, in which there is absolutely no room for anything that does not first acquire ‘meaning’ with regard to the whole. They do not know what guilt, responsibility, consideration are, these born organizers; they are ruled by that terrible inner artist’s egoism which has a brazen countenance and sees itself justified to all eternity by the ‘work’, like the mother in her child.” (GM, II, 17)⁷².

In a broader historical context, the use of force to be constrained without valid ethical justification can be explained by the insecurity provoked by piracy practiced in the Mediterranean from the very earliest times⁷³. In fact, in the fifth century it was still a common way of earning a living unless it was exercised against fellow citizens. The populations

⁷¹ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Winter 1883-1884*, KSA 10, p. 643, 24[1].

⁷² As in most cases we use the English translation by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Ed.) and Carol Diethelme (transl.) of the GM, 2006, p. 58, Cambridge: UP.

⁷³ See Capelle, J. note 5. In : Thuc., *Histoire*, p. 330. GF Flammarion, Paris, 1966.

were thus accustomed to circulating with weapons only. It is necessary to await the extraordinary development of arts and sciences in Athens to find citizens who live without arms. A more virile way of life, however, should not overshadow the problem of the use of force, through the harm suffered by the victims, whose suffering men remember. In terms of international relations, any violation of a treaty or agreement affects the duration of the peace, until the adversary makes himself guilty of comparable action and restores the balance of powers. The memory of shame introduces the relation to temporality, to a past whose memory represents at the same time the horizon of its transcendence.

When Nietzsche says that the active, “aggressive, violent” man is “over-reaching” and has “clearer eyes” he claims that:

“Certainly, on average, even a small dose of aggression, malice or insinuation is enough to make the most upright man see red and drive moderation out of his sight. The active, aggressive, over-reaching man is still a hundred paces nearer to justice than the man who reacts; he simply does not need to place a false and prejudiced interpretation on the object of his attention, like the man who reacts does, has to do. In fact, this explains why the aggressive person, as the stronger, more courageous, nobler man, has always had a clearer eye, a better conscience on his side: on the other hand it is easy to guess who has the invention of ‘bad conscience’ on his conscience, – the man of resentment!” (GM, 2, 11).

Pointing out the reactive type of man Nietzsche introduces the internalization of shame by resentment and opposes to the active man, freed from the hatred implied in resentment a countermodel which should not be simply seen as negative, from the perspective of the innocence of the being⁷⁴. Injustice is characterized as a weakness of fundamental impuls-

⁷⁴ GM, 2. Abh. KSA 5, p. 310-11.

es of power, on which a psychological diversion of public esteem can be achieved, that is to say a psychological translation of public shame in lack of internal esteem, leading to the conscience of the fault and to bad conscience.

The link between justice and power, which Nietzsche uses in referring to Thucydides in *GM*⁷⁵, should not be reduced to a fascination for violence that would be unjustifiable. On the contrary, it is a reflection on the instinctual basis of justice as revenge, which is at the origin of pain, and also as we will show, reward.

This genealogical view point is understandable only if we distinguish the given origin of our affective drives, in relation to a temporality, where right and wrong, good and bad can be normatively developed as higher/lower axiological levels. There is also an understanding of values by the psychological reality, which is based on the individual reflection of the anxieties, by the concrete evocation of the war, with its visual and auditory elements, which are causes of the instinctual disorder, as opposed intelligence as the conquest of a real, on which it exercises its power. To tend towards an exhaustion of the real to get as close as possible to the total intelligibility is the strength of Thucydides, and a reason for Nietzsche to admire it. The conception of a typical and intelligent human motivation is broader and less dependent on a particular ethical perspective, or at least implies an extended conception of a moral psychological theory⁷⁶.

We have seen that Thucydides does not subordinate the psychology of human motivations, which he displays with a dexterity that attracts Nietzsche's praise to his ethical beliefs. This does not mean that his impartiality aims to describe human affairs as free from values. To think that human motivations are reducible to phenomena of a level analogous to physical transactions amounts to caricaturing their respective

⁷⁵ GM, 2. Abh. 7, KSA 5, p. 305. GM, 1. Abh. 11, KSA 5, p. 275.

⁷⁶ Williams, B. (1993), pp. 161-3.

positions. Conversely, each of the two thinkers willingly extrapolates the force in terms of motivations, understood as the better coordination of the motivations of a strong personality and the weakness as a lack of coordination, a symptom of a will of subordinate power.

It is interesting to show that there is an already controversial conception among the sophists of denying a clear distinction of principle between the rights (*thesis*) and the force (*physis*); I propose a possible reading of this antinomy in Nietzsche, by referring to his understanding of a plurality of motivations, of which we have just established the relation to Thucydides.

Plato and Socrates convey to us the image of a *right of the strongest*, a concept which is not unanimous among the Sophists themselves. We find it advocated by Thrasymachus, to denounce a link between sophistry and tyranny, but is it true that an intrinsic kinship should be established between sophists, democracy and tyranny?

Vernières argues in an interesting way a position different from Plato's analogy between these three terms⁷⁷. We cannot deny the power of sophism and the problem should be less to discard the effects of irrational fears on politics than to distinguish between a reasonable political argument and the mere tyrannical control over others. If justice is the interest of the strongest, then political power is inherently tyrannical, because the power concentrated in one man is the most accomplished form of tyranny and therefore the interest of the strongest leads to the power of a single pole of authority. Conversely, with Protagoras, the sophist notion of the just as esteem does not imply the belief that political power should be in the hands of the one or the few. The thought that democracy is the seed of tyranny is especially that of Plato, who keeps in mind the image of former tyrants who were leaders of popular parties. It is by purely political affinity with Critias who like Plato is favourable to the oligarchy and opposed to the democratic party, that Plato attacks

⁷⁷ Plato, *Republic*, I, 338c. Vernières, S. (1995) p. 35.

Thrasymachus, who simply states that in facts, the *just is nothing but the interest of the strongest*. It is in this political context that Callicles' role is that of giving a legitimation of tyranny on the ground of the law of nature, which will be denied in the rest of the argumentation. Callicles' argument is that, according to the law, it is worse to commit injustice than to suffer it, but that by nature it is worse to suffer, because this condition is that of a slave, it could be argued that the equality aimed at by the weakest, and the more numerous, is distinct from the natural right of the strongest to dominate, described as unjust and consequently severely censured and publicly stigmatized⁷⁸.

Instead of the expression "law of nature," which Thucydides used in the Melian dialogue, referring to "the natural necessity" or the lack of freedom of simply refraining to step into any action, as we have seen, Callicles uses the notion of law to advance the idea that a standard also exists, in order to qualify the democratic law as unjust, that is to say, against-nature. Recall that: "natural law" in Thucydides is introduced to justify the possibility of increasing the power of Athens, to the detriment of any weaker state. We understand that this expression can be used ideologically by Plato, under the mask of Callicles' character. Its content is simple: *democracy is unjust*; whereby Callicles introduces the qualitative distinction between the effective domination of the greatest number opposed to the few, who seek struggle and domination. The realistic political category in international relations, which consists of the increase of power, and which is used by the Athenian democracy, con-

⁷⁸ "I suppose the makers of the laws are the weaker sort of men, and the more numerous. So it is with a view to themselves and their own interest that they make their laws and distribute their praises and censures and to terrorize the stronger sort of folk who are able to get an advantage, and to prevent them from getting one over them, they tell them, that such aggrandizement is foul and unjust, and that wrongdoing is just this endeavor to get the advantage of one's neighbors: for I expect they are well content to see themselves on an equality, when they are so inferior." Plat. *Gorg.* 483b-c.


trasts at the state level with equality before the democratic law, which must allow even the weakest to subsist. His expression is that democracy remains the regime where the citizen is assured of not living as beasts do, or as the Greek cities in war between each other, relying often on physical force, martial spirit and the ability of a leader to drive a city beyond any kind of obstacle (capitalizing on the virtue of excellence: *arete, virtus, virtù*). Democracy should allow everyone to live without fearing the strength of the other. We measure what a simplification of human motivations the sophist schema represents, under the pen of Plato, why this description departs from the perception of values that Thucydides could have inspired Nietzsche.

A look at the Platonic reading of the sophist's axiology of values related to Nietzsche's critical but also partly positive reception of the right of the strongest, highlights a static dimension of this framework of values in the Classical context, although as we have shown, Thucydides is keen to always emphasise a structure in evolution. Nietzsche highlights the simplifying character of Sophism and introduces a solution to put some of these values in perspective and motion following a genealogical relationship of interdependence, which underlines the axis of temporality and of contextual adaptation and evolution⁷⁹.

We shall show how it is possible to integrate these various elements into a general scheme, which enables us to summarize the components of Plato's argumentation. We will see that it leads not to two types of fixed morals in Nietzsche's genealogical anti-realist ethical perspective, as it would be tempting to think. *Because there is no such thing as real "weak" type of personalities and "strong" type of personalities, but only a genealogical evaluation of certain types of values, it is on the contrary important to develop the relations of interdependence and tension between the so-called antithetical elements of the schema.*

⁷⁹ See Wolf, J.-C. (2004), p. 90.

By analysing the psychological extrapolation of weakness as a weak type of personality by Nietzsche, we find all the traits of a conformist morality, attached to conservation, security and collaboration, but which, however, risks immobility, aiming at its axiological opposite sustainable values (i.e. e. positive, generous, life, capacity and power friendly attitudes). The morality of the so-called strong type of personality brings out in contrast the non-conformism, founded on the strength of some outstanding exemplary views on ethics and morals. Examples are easily attached to the idea of the wise controlling of the political reforms and the moral innovations but this type has the disadvantage of not being able to be generalized, it lacks solidarity:



Weak type

(W: Service oriented) convince themselves that it is worse to commit injustice. So many are turning to self-preservation, equality before the law, survival of the weak.



They create an ethics that domi-

Strong type

(S: Leader oriented) convince themselves that it is worse to suffer injustice. So, the exceptional natures seek struggle and domination.



They create an ethic that dominates

nates under the existential criterion of what could be reasonably required for the greatest number. Origin of the great traditional and conservative oligarchies.



They want to persuade the strong that all ethics is an ethic of the common good.



“The original gregarious state is unconscious and tied to good conscience.” Violence does not offend him so much that he

under the essential criterion that it is not reasonably required for a free-born human being to live as a slave. Origin of the political category of the increase of the Athenian power and network influence.



The ethics of shame is useful to strong personalities. They know that an irreducible division exists between the strong, favourable to the reform of morality and politics, and the greater number who remains attached to the morality of morals. As long as historical conditions for economic development permit, they live as actors without inner quality, limiting themselves to considering virtue as shared esteem in public. “Thucydides, ideal of the sophist-free spirit⁸⁰”.



“The noble soul takes this fact of its egoism without any question mark and without the feeling that there is anything harsh, compelled,

⁸⁰ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Oktober-Dezember 1876*, KSA 8, 19[72], p. 347 and 19[86], p. 351.

considers it “from the point of view of his gregarious instinct”⁸¹.



Fear is experienced in the unpredictability of tragic events. Shame originates in one's own perception of man's nakedness. Lower expressions of the personality do not react externally to stay safe, so they perceive more shame.

or arbitrary in it [...] (JGB, 265)⁸².



The strong do not keep a simple life for a long time, where virtue remains in the exteriority of human relationships. In modernity, the habitable limits of the city in which man could accept to be hypocritical (that of the city) disappear. They give way to wider delimitations, which enlarge in concentric circles. The form of capitalist society reduces the order of the city, understood as an externally oriented patriarchal system, to an utopia to which man can aspire in a nostalgic way. Popular festivals are a modern alternative to classical theatre, where all are both actors and spectators. It may well be thought that the Dionysian magic can turn a “slave” into “a free man,” that “the noble and the villain unite in Bacchic choruses, that the social barriers “that need or whim have estab-

⁸¹ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühling-Herbst 1881*, KSA 9, p. 513, 11[185],

⁸² See also: 11[185], *ibid.*

lished between men disappear”, the problem is, according to Nietzsche, “the lack of organising geniuses”. The utopian project is threatened by the man of the big cities, who, in the manner of the actor of the Republic, threatens the equilibrium of the Platonic city. This superficial man is not what he seems to be externally; there is a lack of the individual who is “a stone in a great building; for which purpose he has first of all to be solid, he has to be a “stone.”” (FW, 356).



Part of the psychological tension is externalized as actions. The psychological archetype of the observer is internalized as the actions do not succeed and the sense of shame increases. The shame that was initially related to the perception of nudity is also related to the fear of anger, as the perception of nudity is associated with the feeling of humiliation. The fear of anger, however, may turn into fear of reproach; the archetype of the internalized observer then gives



Strong types/personalities must remain committed to interactions with other strong types/personalities. The individual reaffirms his capacity to set an individual moral law for himself, he “fights against the idea that selfishness is harmful and reprehensible”. “Back to nature” in the “Napoleonic” or Athenian sense, that is to say, in-depth questioning of any useless norm, affirmation of life and creation of values, “great politics”. Consequence: “the man without manners”. Nonconformity.

way to that of the victim⁸³.

The drive for power is explicit among the Leaders.

Delimitation of the pathological level of the self-transformation



Guilt and the notion of moral fault appear in proportion as the tyrannical control of one man over the other outweighs the teaching or the rational communication.



Weakening of the affirmative instincts, up to the bad conscience, the limit before the actual poisoning of the impulses of life.



Appearance of the sick state. The impulses of life turn against all that is affirmative and strong: the birth of resentment. Interpretation of hypocrisy as having the

⁸³ See Williams, B. (1993), p. 219.

purpose of particular interest and excluding a conception of the common good. Devaluation of the values of the strong, conceived as wicked.



Internalization of resentment. In a morality centred on guilt, one tends to a point where there is no difference between the subject and the internalized archetype. Guilt is perceived as an emotion that is experienced under the guise of an abstraction, the moral law, which has become part of the subject. This idealized perception is used for a false conception of the total moral autonomy of the subject⁸⁴.

*

*Origin of the great monotheistic religions*⁸⁵.

⁸⁴ See e. g. Morality defined as a proper “hypostasy“ of the ruling leadership. *Nachgelassene Fragmente Juli 1882 bis Winter 1883-1884*, KSA 10, p. 503, 16[15].

⁸⁵ It seems that Nietzsche’s genealogical critique doesn’t target Christianity but could apply to any great Monotheism: including Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism and Bahá’í Faith.

As we see Nietzsche's antirealistic view allows such thought experiments opposing leadership characteristics to service oriented or solidarity related dispositions, in an inner history of the human being, as if he would be only driven by descriptive normative tendencies and impulses. Let's see on the other side a possible realistic reading of the human being, referring again to Thucydides' *timeless universality* at the beginning of the first chapter of his *History* (I, 22), to bring out a pluralism of values, which should not be seen as mere relativism as Shaw has argued⁸⁶. This important observation comparing Nietzsche's point of view on humanity, or his concern for the type "man" (Mensch) as a concern for the development of humanity, would then allow us to deny his sophisticated deterministic relativism.

The way Nietzsche advances his argument of a (realistic) point of view on humanity is difficult to notice, for the reason that it is turned into a kind of counter-argument, precisely against some kind of (absolute) realism. The polemic target is twofold; there is moral universalism opposed to Thucydides' ethical thought. This first target reflects in the background the idea that the unilateralism of the tradition of the universal moral order is absurd if it doesn't contextually take in account variations in what is right. This variation could be seen as the Heraclitean fire, Heraclitus as a dogmatic thinker of the (human) reason as dynamic but universal principle⁸⁷.

Similarly, Nietzsche introduces an understanding of the good with regard to the consequences of an action and with regard to the context, not as ultimate standards equally valid in all contexts. This context de-

⁸⁶ Shaw, *ibid.*, "Nietzsche as Moral Realist", Ch. 5, p. 110, note 2.

⁸⁷We borrow this view from Sextus Empiricus who considers that Heraclitus was a Dogmatic, and therefore neither a relativist nor an early representant of Skepticism. See: *Adversus Mathematicos* VII, 126-34 and *the Pyrrhonian Hypotheses* I, 211. For a comprehensive study: Pérez-Jean, Brigitte (2005) : *Dogmatisme et scepticism: l'héraclitisme d'Énésidème*, Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presse Universitaire du Septentrion, 13.

pendency places his views favourably in relation to utilitarian doctrines, in so far consequential views are context dependant but can be grounded on some limited rules. Scanlon's *parametric universalism* of values could be compared to Nietzsche's critique of one single ultimate standard for moral appraisal of actions, but the point of view of relativism, concluding that "a standard uniquely appropriate for all agents and all moral judges" not being available we would be justified to conclude that "rather there are many such standards" is false, as pointed out by Shaw. *Parametric universalism* would entail to apply ethics or standards, as a fixed set of principles to varying circumstances⁸⁸. But how does the context shape our values, is it by adding some historical determination?

Historical determinism seems to be another target of Nietzsche's criticism. Historicism, which argues that a historical process shapes the real content of human capacities is nothing else than a great simplification for Nietzsche who is well aware that his understanding of power as either an organic process or as a social interaction may mean that organic and social relations are constitutive of our subject as a person, and accordingly that his views would be supporting those very similar to Hegel, who sees us as "children of our time". In contrast, a notion of timelessness is introduced by Thucydides (I, 22), to whom Nietzsche refers in a eulogistic quotation, where his universalism is again regarded as a model:

"What is it I love in Thucydides, why do I honor him more highly than Plato? He takes the most comprehensive and impartial delight in all that is typical in men and events and believes that to each type there pertains a quantum of good sense: this he seeks to discover. [...] Thus is him, the portrayer of man, that culture of the most impartial knowledge of the world". (*Daybreak*, 168)

⁸⁸ Scanlon Thomas (1998): *What We Owe to Each Other*, Harvard University, Harvard University Press, 340.

When he says that “there are few thinkers who say so much between the lines,” Nietzsche may be drawing attention to a feature of his own writing as well⁸⁹.

The element of greatness and timelessness of the Greek soul is to be related to the dialogue between Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt, about the “critical” mode of conceiving History in the *Second Untimely Meditations*, where Nietzsche is largely inspired by Burckhardt, who argues that one can “extract temporarily motives in the direction of knowledge, because it is knowledge⁹⁰.” Our duty, according to Burckhardt, is to reconstruct entire spiritual horizons of the past: his studies of the Greek city before democracy, and his understanding of the Athenian democracy before the Peloponnesian war are important examples. Nietzsche interprets in a pessimistic way the justification of the historian's activity for life: he who from “an infinite horizon [...] withdraws into himself, back into the small egoistic circle, where he must become dry and withered: he may possibly attain to cleverness, but never to wisdom.”⁹¹

⁸⁹ *Twilight of the Idols*, “Anvients”, 2. See also: Jenkins, Scott, “What does Nietzsche Owe Thucydides”, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 2011(42), 32-33.

⁹⁰ See Burckhardt, J. (1868/1982), p. 250, Bauer, S. (2001), pp. 220-1.

⁹¹ *UBHL*, 9, KSA 1, p. 311. The critique against a very consistent historical understanding not only of standards of values but as well of the whole set of hierarchy of values (axiology), in a dynamical but predictable evolutionary process is turned against E. v. Hartmann, who is Nietzsche's direct competitor, amongst gifted Schopenhauerians: “An excess of history can do all that, as we have seen, by no longer allowing a man to feel and act unhistorically: for history is continually shifting his horizon and removing the atmosphere surrounding him. From an infinite horizon he withdraws into himself, back into the small egoistic circle, where he must become dry and withered: he may possibly attain to cleverness, but never to wisdom. He lets himself be talked over, is always calculating and parleying with facts. He is never enthusiastic, but blinks his eyes, and understands how to look for his own profit or his party's in the profit or loss of somebody else. He unlearns all his useless modesty, and turns little by little into the “man” or the “greybeard” of Hartmann. And that is what they want

The pluralism of values does not imply that the antiquity of the investigations carried out dulls their importance, on the contrary they sharpen our consciousness of the contextual relations of values, of a typology of the values, which will endure throughout the world history of the human species. Thucydides offers us a key not only to decode its history but ours too. When he begins by declaring in his study:

“The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.” (Thuc, I, 22)

A critical positioning towards history should not hide that history brings the point of view of the human communities, expressing opinions on relationships such as the family or the civil society, but the moral depth formed by individuals and groups in action, in different contexts and social relations, does not exclude the formation of a moral universalism, which is challenged by customs and our interests, but becomes crucial for the evaluation of transnational relations and solidarities.

I propose to return to the concept of esteem and see its conditions of possibility more closely. We will see that it constitutes a positive notion distinct from shame and that it can be reconciled with a moderate form of universalism, without excluding consequentialism, that is, the definition of good not as a whole but in relation to its consequences. This perspective also implies the historical conditions of formation of what is

him to be: that is the meaning of the present cynical demand for the “full surrender of the personality to the world-process”—for the sake of his end, the redemption of the world, as the rogue E. von Hartmann tells us.”

considered good. We will see in particular the difficulties posed by utopianism, which makes the universal character of the subject available to the concrete means available.

Nietzsche seems to introduce a political aestheticism based on a pure subjectivism of values when he says:

“My recreation, my predilection, my *cure* from all Platonism has always been *Thucydides*. Thucydides and, perhaps Machiavelli's Principe are most closely related to me by their unconditional will to fabricate nothing and to see reason in reality - not in 'reason', and still less in 'morality'⁹²”.

Self-control conceived as moral realism is not sufficient but the necessary condition to develop the idea of an Art (an Apollonian art) making understandable a variety of motivations, accessible by the type of moderation that only the experience of art can provide. Conversely, our own self-esteem is all the more prominent as we sustain our fundamental activity of self-affirmation, at the risk of touching immoderation as the experience of an original unity, in the sense that Nietzsche gives to “Dionysian”, but also as injustice (*hybris*)⁹³.



Sylenus holding Dionysus, Vatican

⁹² *GD*, 2, KSA 6, p. 155.

⁹³ *GT*, KSA 1, 9, p. 65

This inspiration of an original-masculinity, as central unconscious archetype of the *psychè*, should be opposed to a maternal original feminine figure, in the work of a University of Basel colleague: Johann Jakob Bachofen⁹⁴.

Nietzsche can conceive “Greek serenity”, built into a masculine figure or Dionysus as not necessarily implying the feeling of well-being. Since it is important to constitute oneself the model of one's own morality and to stick to it in time, the morality of strong personalities tends to surpass all natural and social selection, by individual selection, which leads to the strengthening of some people. This affirmative selection leads leaders to break out of the group's consensual morality and to establish new creative values⁹⁵, as an impetus of life, or with another contemporary Henry Bergson's “*élan vital*”.

To be able to conceive “the basic idea ‘good’” *by oneself*, “in advance and spontaneously, and only then creates a notion of ‘bad’” (schlecht, mauvais) is presented in *Genealogy of Morals* (I, 11) and through the *Funeral Oration* of Pericles, a grandiose vision of a creative and affirmative morality, which as Nietzsche shows should be also seen as one of the central premises of the fall of Athens⁹⁶. The famous passage of the *History* transposed in the *GM*, where Pericles reminds the Athenians that their “daring has forced a path to every land and sea, erecting timeless memorials to itself everywhere for good and ill”⁹⁷ does

⁹⁴ Johann Jakob Bachofen (1861/1948): *Mother Right: an investigation of the religious and juridical character of matriarchy in the Ancient World. [Das Mutterrecht. Eine über die Gynaiokratie der alten Welt nach ihrer religiösen und rechtlichen Natur.* Basel, Benno Schwabe.]

⁹⁵ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr bis Herbst 1884*, KSA 11, p. 129, 25[441].

⁹⁶ Thuc. II, 35-46.

⁹⁷ *GM*, I, 11, KSA 5, p. 275. On the Funeral see also: *N. Fragmente Fragmente Frühjahr bis Herbst 1884*, KSA 11, 26[350], p. 242. OPC X, p. 269. Thuc. II, 35-46, pp. 811-18. Cf. Finley, J. (1967); Ottmann, H. (2001).

not refer to an individual and private search for honour, to an unlimited ambition, because it would be anticipating a modern individual freedom. Pericles contrasts with an individualist and liberal reading of politics and morality, the bold action involves a political community. A human acting without any coordination with others would see his plans foiled. Alcibiades, not Pericles, is the figure of excessive daring which is a dangerous passion. Alcibiades believed that focusing on his magnificence could also serve the interests of Athens, where the relationship between public interest and private is reversed. Alcibiades, Nicias and Demosthenes will be held responsible by Thucydides for the failure of the expedition to Sicily, and finally for the tragic epilogue of the war.

Daring evil could be understood as colonialism, genocide, terrorism or simply as a crime. On the anthropological level in Nietzsche, the reference to crime through the conception of a naive and promethean humanity, which he finds in Aeschylus' *Prometheus*, is considered by him as a release and liberation of artistic, intellectual, and moral capacities. Crime is a mythical origin but not a condition imposed on the individual who wants to rise; it is an anti-Apollonian conception, because Apollo on the contrary wants to appease the individuality. Daring to face the harshness and *cruelty of existence* is identified with the Dionysian wisdom, which is active and passive in its principle, and can be conceived in a gradual variety⁹⁸. This wisdom acts, as we have seen, by the

⁹⁸ Since Montaigne's *Essais*, *cruelty* has been recognized as a central motive in the psychodynamic of our drives. From a moral psychological skeptical view point, this motive usually associated for good reasons with a vice, the ugly pleasure of harming others (*Schadenfreude*), should be reexamined and reevaluated, not only in relation to some clear blameworthy conscious intention and acts, constituting affirmative violence, but in particular regarding negative violence. See Petr Lom's *The Limits of Doubt* (2002), which corroborates this view by showing the relevance of Nietzsche's genealogical antirealism in relation to cruelty, and his place as part of the ancient tradition of skepticism in the political

psychological archetype of the control of fire, the gift of Prometheus in favour of an active principle, which remains for the contemplative mind of man a sacrilege, a spoliation of the divine nature.

The founding myth of the gift of fire to the naked man shows it deprived of its natural powers, because forgotten by Epimetheus who endows with power only the animal species to ensure their conservation. This myth is related to the birth of the city by Protagoras; it does not have a pejorative value but means the capacity given to man to support artificially his own needs by mastering language and techniques (*technê*). This artifice ensures the abundance of resources but preserves neither animal violence nor that of men when they assemble; we see that such human creative capacity can even endanger the Earth, our only natural environment. Self-mastering and technique are therefore insufficient to ensure the survival of the species or the fate of the englobing world⁹⁹. The fate of Oedipus is the other Dionysian example presented by Nietzsche, a diametrically opposed example to the active principle described above. This second face of the Dionysus is defined in the *Birth of Tragedy* as “glory of passivity”, appearing “the antinatural abomination”¹⁰⁰. This representation of Dionysus, which seems contrary to the spirit of Promethean active crime and its selfish morality, shows the horror that can result from excessive passivity.

Historically, the Platonic solution aims after Thucydides, to reconcile the ideal of the Greek *excellence* with the rationalist attitude of the end of the fifth century, in providing a single antinomic explanation of active and passive natural tendencies, resulting eventually in metaphysical dualism. By constructing artificially the fundamental split between *ethos* (spiritual life) and *physis* (physical force), bodily determinations

and moral thought. See also Judith Shklar (1984) *Ordinary Vices* and *The Liberalism of Fear* (1989).

⁹⁹ Vergnières, S. (1995).

¹⁰⁰ *GT*, KSA 1, 9, p. 67.

will receive passive attributes while the spiritual attributes will be deemed superior.

In genealogical distance to this metaphysical solution, Nietzsche remains inspired by Thucydides and brings out a pluralistic psychological moral axiology in dynamic tension, successively pointing out the value and the strength of the personality and its weakness, according to a model of communication across the four propositions below:

1) On the general psychological level of the *individual* there is interaction between the faculties of the soul and the reality given by a naturalistic conception, instead of an abstract psychology of the human being. There is compatibility between the texts that highlight Nietzsche's Darwinism, where the will to power results from a long process influenced by natural selection and the idea of a continuous development of the man with Thucydides. Human behaviour is the theatre of the conflict between the rational and the irrational; great men are those who keep faith in the dignity of thought, and who dare to defend their ethical values.

2) There is a gradual hierarchy of values and communication between moral and intellectual perversion. The values for Thucydides are conceived in a psychological way and not in a moral way, which reinforces the hypothesis that they have a non-metaphysical origin and aim to improve and broaden a naturalistic conception. It follows from the natural order of the forces that the antagonism, the tension, the conflict or the competition between the individuals or the groups, are the externalization in action of the similar values found in a psychology of action. This psychology consists of a better redefinition of life in action through struggle, the search for danger and risk, as opposed to the love of rest. This first layer depends on the complementary value of harmony. Secondly, this psychology indicates that there are more complex values: such as ambition, ardour, resolution, dar-

ing, as opposed to Platonic virtue, goodness, wisdom, justice, reputation¹⁰¹. These active virtues are again depending on a level of sustainable interactions between living beings and ethical and religious values.

3) Psychologically, self-esteem facilitates a similar esteem for all others; secondly, it comes into play in my perception of myself, through the esteem of others which is essential for any action having a collective dimension. Nietzsche refers to a Promethean or Epicurean self-esteem and egoism when he says:

“Must one always have only the egoism of the robber or the thief? Why not that of the gardener? Joy in the tending of others, as in the care of a garden!”¹⁰²

4) Experiencing in a clear and conscious way the value of values implies a rational position which is not, however, understood as that of the impartial or neutral observer because the evaluation of the complex relativity of the interactions of power drives doesn't require a neutral position, at most the eventual neutral position is a negative consequence, that is, it does not need to be searched for itself. The capacity to experience the value of values as transparent comparative process, and to differentiate for example when some are based on active or reactive configurations of emotions, is not distorted by what Nietzsche calls elsewhere “metaphysical errors”, because our knowledge of the surrounding world, formed by impulses of powers, is independent of the thesis of the unreality of some object of knowledge or experience¹⁰³.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Huart, P. (1968).

¹⁰² *Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühling-Herbst* 1881, KSA 9, p. 441, 11[2]. Cf. Tongeren, van P. (2004).

¹⁰³ Cf. Wolf, J.-C. (2002).

For Nietzsche, the subject is less mistaken about the nature of his own power drives than about the estimation of the reactive variants he perceives most often through interaction with others, which explains that self-esteem should be related to feeling some sort of egoistic superiority over the other, which is a normative level coming in addition to the level of the interest of the subject. This is not to say that there should not be any ethics of resentment, resentment as we will see with Spinoza plays a very central role in our affective and ethical harmony.

The feeling of having a lot of value in oneself is by definition the feeling of one's own power as we shall also see in the next chapter with Spinoza's careful description of such ego related ontology of the world. This feeling could lead in a trivial way to simply esteem or love less all the others. Montesquieu goes further, when in a note raised by Nietzsche in his aphorisms, he says: "For a man to be above humanity, it costs all the others too much¹⁰⁴." It shows explicitly that there is an evident negative consequence of over evaluating self-esteem on the overall esteem of all others.

Apart from the tyrant who shows the case of a lack of excessive individual moderation in line with a possible high self-esteem, the lack of excessive moderation appears especially at the level of the community as a problem of morals, which enters as a condition of possibility of training or transformation - standards and laws.

From the utopian framework of Nietzsche's early writings, one can consider, on the purely individual level, that the Apollonian character guarantees an indispensable moderation. On the other hand, *History* suggests that public conditions imply causes of imbalances of morals that go beyond individual wishes. The involuntary movement imprinted on a human community as a whole during a war, or a natural disaster, attests of the inertia of each way of life and highlights the usefulness of providing appropriate norms to prevent and limit any possible disaster.

¹⁰⁴ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1887*, KSA 12, 5[87], p. 222.

The experience of suffering could be considered as *a radical truth*, that of the awareness of the inhuman or morbid character of a part of the human realm, which functions as a revelation of the importance of evolution towards the internalization of morality and the norms of public life, that is to say, to think the dependency between the affirmative force, which is the obligation turned towards oneself in self-esteem, and the external obligation of the law.

To conceive the law as an external norm which must be internalized by a slow evolution of habits corresponds to the general idea in Nietzsche that every artificial construction having a character of convention must be reconstructed internally by our emotional drives (or will-to-power), conceived as internal moral and psychological drives of each individual/group, in order not only to appropriate but also to serve the outside world. When Nietzsche conceives most of the rigid conventions as *a morality of the herd*, he comes near the British/Scottish moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, who were also paying a special attention at following the rules of justice, which understood as inflexible constraints, represent a symptom of a lack of moral interest of the person who is convinced by such type of argument.

The antinomy between the affirmative elevation of one's own morality and the obligation of norms is solved in *Human all too Human*, MA I (94), where the asymmetry between the subjective obligation of self-interest and the rule is significantly reduced. The calculus of utility plays an important role for Nietzsche, who sees in utility not only the first sign that the animal has become man, but also a generalization of high morality, by an enlightened legislator of opinions: "Knowledge enables him to prefer what is most useful, that is, general usefulness to personal usefulness, and the respectful recognition of what has common, enduring value to things of momentary value. He lives and acts as a collective-

individual.”¹⁰⁵ It follows from the historical phases of morality, as described in *MA I* (94) that moral elevation passes through the internalization of the fundamental instincts operating in self-esteem. One consequence of the time taken by this interiorization is the momentary appearance of antagonisms between the psychological exercise of this desire for power and the obligation to be just, as an equal esteem for other people.

To think of morality as a continuation of selfishness, however, does not mean that the incorporation of high values, understood as sublimation, excludes the equal esteem of others. This frankly optimistic and positivist note of *HHI* shows that Nietzsche takes seriously the idea that the plural social organism that his lawgiver constitutes, “at the highest degree of morality”, grants an equivalent esteem for the general and sustainable interest. The notes of the late 1870s show that Nietzsche did not seek to justify the supposed right of the strongest. On the contrary, Nietzsche follows the recommendation of Thucydides, who is warning us in two ways against egoistic narrow self-confidence, on the one hand he warns us against the underestimation of a higher power, which is the tragic situation of the Melian dialogue, and on the other hand, against the loss of concern for *ethos*, the proper ethical dimension embedded in any evaluation of capacities: that is to say the perspective of a lack of moderation, vis-à-vis the will to grow in power, which is the case of the Athenians. The graduation in the use of power enhancing dispositions should pay careful attention to its fragile equilibrium¹⁰⁶.

The best way to position a state of equilibrium of capacities is to already consider it as a debt to be paid back to society/the collective ar-

¹⁰⁵ *MA I*, KSA 2, 94, p. 91. We think about David Hume who conceives both the rule and the exception to the rule in his definition of norms and obligations. Cf. *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, 282-3. See on this topic: Darwall, S. (2003).

¹⁰⁶ *WS*, 22, KSA 2, p. 555.

rangement of the living. Being accepted as a newcomer to a community is a marginal situation, not the ordinary situation, reminding us of the fact that the “innocence in selfishness is peculiar to the child”¹⁰⁷. Reducing some freedom of the individual (e.g., by excluding him from the common life or the city) is presented, in the Greek history, as a measure that is only applicable when the individual is unable to recognize his debt to the community, which is externalized by his obligation to follow the rules. A methodical search for the balance of powers would pass through a communicative and intelligent distribution of public power. *History* shows, however, and on a considerable collective dimension for the time, that the corruption of institutions and individuals, aiming at an overall corruption of morals induced by the shame of each person who violates the rules of mutual social relations, becomes so unbearable to their perception of the common good, that large groups and collectives choose to discharge this shame in accepting the tragic ultimate confrontation and the war. One thing is that a man who breaks a rule should be punished; another is that there is an odd solidarity growing between citizens sharing a same emotion of shame or guilt.

Some particular conditions are fostering the creation of a feeling of shame, quite independently of the precise condition of the breaking of a rule by groups or individuals, which also embodies a collective shame, for other reasons, and conditions in which groups and individuals participate according to their capacities/powers and information/knowledge.

Nietzsche proposed a ranking of the reasons for punishment distinguishing between *the origin* and *purpose* of punishment (*GM*, 2. Abh 12 & 13).

“So people think punishment has evolved for the purpose of punishing. But every purpose and use is just a *sign* that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and

¹⁰⁷ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer-Herbst 1882*, KSA 10, 3[1], 326, p. 93. Not to confound with the so-called “child-like innocence“ previously presented.

has impressed upon it its own idea [*Sinn*] of a use function; and the whole history of a ‘thing’, an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random. The ‘development’ of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its *progressus* towards a goal, still less is it a logical *progressus*, taking the shortest route with least expenditure of energy and cost, – instead it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defence and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the ‘meaning’ [*Sinn*] even more so...”

The catalogue of categories presented in this section can be translated not only to the international equilibrium of State centred collective bodies, but to any collective living organism, at least to a certain point for Nietzsche as we shall show, if we don’t want to address Nietzsche simply as a realist thinker, reducing ethical norms to organic physical schemes of adaptation and transformation.

Nietzsche is certainly showing along a line borrowed from Thucydides the tragical way armed conflicts could suddenly appear, out of moral despair. The external signs that “the will to power” “takes hold of something less powerful” and “the sign of a function” impressed upon by this power, in other words the goal, often “added” afterwards, recalls in *History* the antinomy between *causes* of conflicts and their *justifications*. The origin or “cause of birth” of a sentence or a conflict in history must not be confused with the “final utility” that is then recognized to

justify them¹⁰⁸. The anthropological reality of punishment or war has taken on very different meanings depending on places and times. If one resorts today as yesterday to punishment, the meaning has varied a lot: retribution, preventive enforcement, punishment as repression. There is a distinction between incapacitating, or the prevention of further damage and the dissuasion or inspiring the fear of power. There are in punishment different means: to isolate what disturbs the social balance, to maintain/sustain a social type, to create a memory, to eliminate an unhealthy element, to define public health risks or isolate attributes different from that of the dominant group (as in the problematic cases of social hygienism, and some ad hoc migration policies)¹⁰⁹.

From the anthropological point of view, domination by physical force including more sophisticated preventive setbacks is a sign of weakness, - eventually of moral corruption, not strength, it is a sign of the inability either to tolerate or to be able to use in intelligent ways the power of one's adversaries; to inhibit and ultimately to annihilate an adversary implies the refusal to translate "intellectually enmity"¹¹⁰. Moral strength is that of preferring sustainability; harming others should be seen as missing this very ethical aim, as based on self-esteem. The genealogical anti-realist description of the moral psychological drives as the instinctual origin of justice, could invite us to consider revenge as belonging to the sphere of justice. Revenge constitutes a form of exchange and balance, and indicates, on this very unrealistic way of describing it, a ground for being equal, in an unequal world, where "recognition" of the other proceeds from the similar instincts, as Nietzsche presents it:

"The character of exchange is the primary character of justice.
Each party satisfies the other, as each obtains what he values

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Constantineau, P. (1998).

¹⁰⁹ Kremer-Marietti, A. (2001).

¹¹⁰ *GD*, 3, KSA 6, p. 84

more than the other. Each one receives that which he desires, as his own henceforth, and whatever is desired is received in return. Justice, therefore, is recompense and exchange based on the hypothesis of a fairly equal degree of power, thus, originally, revenge belongs to the province of justice, it is an exchange. *Also gratitude*. Justice naturally is based on the point of view of a judicious self-preservation, on the egoism, therefore, of that reflection, “Why should I injure myself uselessly and perhaps not attain my aim after all?”¹¹¹

To avoid having to punish in the sense of a private revenge, or as public sign of the same, punishment/revenge implies recognizing, and rewarding the other – gratitude is part of a process of reward and revenge, because it is still our own interest to do all what we can to prevent low types of discharge of our moral reactive drives.

We can now clearly establish that power shapes law or ethical codes, but it does not ground it. In any case, it is philosophically wrong to say that law is identical to power, that is, the world is conceived as a reality of forces, and that by “right” we mean only a different way to express these same forces¹¹². But we can agree with Nietzsche’s anti-realist understanding that the law cannot subsist without power. Deriving the right from power is: either 1) an error of category, or 2) the confusion between *is* and *ought*, between what we *should* be doing, eventually what we *must* do or not do (as a legal order) and a description of a context of justice which is given¹¹³. Plato has shown that a general good as a right is established only by taking in consideration *a general*, the distribution of bodily or spiritual founded superiority is thus eliminated from the list of the possible candidates of foundation of the value of values. It follows that a foundation of law built on power relations can

¹¹¹ *The Origin of Justice*, MA I, KSA 2, 92, p. 89.

¹¹² Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 490.

¹¹³ Cf. Gerhardt, V. (1983).

only be worthwhile, provided that power is given a general character, as for example when it is assumed that it is identical with a description from the perspective of a principle of reality. Apart from its descriptive content, that is to say, abstraction of facts, to which the factual course of history corresponds, the thesis of the origin of the right in power relations is left without value. It is irrelevant because it is a reductionism and lacks the specific nature of the law or the ethical code.

In *MA I*, 474, we find the assumption of a relation assumed by Pericles between the citizenship (here the Greek polis) and culture. Nietzsche claims that it is the path of perfection in intellectual culture, which provides indirect help to citizenship and the polis in that cultural development supposes that the ambition of the individual is stimulated to the highest degree, that is to say, justifies a morality of power but which can be seen as the empowering role of education ethics.

Law is presupposed in the same way as culture: when we ask that persons should act in a community according to rules, the cultural understanding of public authority brings Nietzsche close to a symbolic and interpretative understanding of the situations of power, which he will eventually aim at over-dynamizing at the risk of emptying the substantial unity underlying the “in-itself” of the ethical and normative reality. The German philosopher is elevating the individual to either an absolute (challenging Hegel) or conceiving of it as a concrete biological and speaking totality.

When Nietzsche says that the law assumes a principle of equal weight, he stresses the importance of understanding the organic and drive conditions of this equality:

“On the Natural History of Rights and Duties. Our duties are the rights of others over us. How have they acquired such rights? By taking us to be capable of contracting and of requiting, by positing us as similar and equal to them, and as a consequence entrusting us with something, educating, reproving, supporting us. We

fulfil our duty that is to say: we justify the idea of our power on the basis of which all these things were bestowed upon us, we give back in the measure in which we have been given to. It is thus our pride which bids us do our duty when we do something for others in return for something they have done for us, what we are doing is restoring our self-regard for in doing something for us, these others have impinged upon our sphere of power, and would have continued to have a hand in it if we did not with the performance of our “duty” practise a requital, that is to say impinge upon their power.”¹¹⁴

The law and all contracts between equals, lasts as long as the power of the contractors is equal or comparable. Prudence has created the right to put an end to the struggle and “useless waste between comparable forces (...).” (Ibid) Making the law functional as a tactical means would include the law in the struggle for power. Law derives from intelligence, and is a means, not an end. But the very durability of this pact at the origin of the law stems from the desire not to squander the subject forces, according to an ethical and not only psychological depth. From this point of view it may seem contrary to the esteem heard as purely individual and creative values because it is subordinated to self-preservation.

The economic evaluation of power as an absence of waste means to question what is the conservation of powers. By his reference to “caution” Nietzsche is close to the Hobbesian good conceived as “security” and thus a modern configuration of the stability of sovereignty. But Nietzsche also returns to an ancient conception close to a moral and rhetorical dimension in Aristotle when he says:

“As humans have set themselves alike for their safety, the foundation of the community, but this conception goes deep against

¹¹⁴ *M*, KSA 3, 112, pp. 100 and ff. *WS*, KSA 2, 26, p. 560.

the nature of the individual, to which it is forced by force, new shoots of old instinct of domination begins to revive as the general security is better assured: thus in the delimitation of the social classes, in the prerogatives and the honorary distinctions claimed by the trades, generally in the vanity (...).¹¹⁵”

Vanity is defined by Nietzsche as attributing to oneself only as much esteem as others attribute to us. However, this is not the current definition of an involuntary liking that “every man has just as much vanity as he lacks intelligence¹¹⁶”. In this vulgar sense the vain person loses sight of his advantage, he attaches himself to the good opinion of the people in a faulty manner by finding a substitute for the authority to which he is accustomed¹¹⁷. A form of voluntary vanity keeps in view the usefulness of the good opinion of the people; and a precise psychology and communication of vanity can serve to prevent corruption, moral wrong and social risks¹¹⁸:

“It is about assimilating oneself: in the form of praise, blame, the dependence of others on oneself; in addition to simulation, learning, accustoming, ordering, incorporating judgments and experiences. So there is no question here of a state of nature similar to men, understood as a relation to physical forces, and of inferring, like Hobbes, equality as a logic of self-preservation¹¹⁹.”

¹¹⁵ “(...) the human being continues to esteem himself as much as the others estimate him/her (vanity)”. *Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr 1881-Sommer 1882*, KSA 9, 11[185], p. 513.

¹¹⁶ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1872 bis Ende 1874*, KSA 7, 29[96], p. 673.. The reference is from Swift, vanity as involuntary inclination: *Fragmente Anfang 1875 bis Frühling 1876*, 3[24], KSA 8, p. 22.

¹¹⁷ *MA I*, 89, KSA 2, p. 88.

¹¹⁸ See also related to punishment: *MA I*, 105, KSA 2, p. 103.

¹¹⁹ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühling-Herbst 1881*, 11[181], KSA 9. *Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1872 bis Ende 1874*, KSA 7, 37[1],

While for Hobbes self-preservation is derived from the fact that even the strongest of men is not strong enough to survive in the state of nature, for Nietzsche on the contrary, it is first to evaluate the will to power as a habit taken to esteem ourselves as much as we allow others, then to make this power last in order to exceed it! This way of doing things is more appropriate for self-preservation when the individual's existence is assured. In this new framework, good as *security* gives way to good as *success*. Once the stability of the political community is consolidated, vanity energizes the relationship between sincerity and the use of rhetorical artifices, called to judiciously regulate a new practical moral conception¹²⁰:

“Wherever the “natural” is imitated while naked the artistic sense of the listener is hurt, but where, on the other hand, one only aims at producing an artistic impression, one easily breaks the moral trust of the listener. It is a game at the border of aesthetics and morale: any accentuation of one or the other cancels the success. The aesthetic charm must be added to the moral trust (...)”¹²¹.

Nietzsche shows that rhetoric tends towards an agonal normative representation of the just, which is weakly egalitarian but does not exclude any measure, understood in the sense of degree, that is to say of what is relative and gradual. The measure in the sense of *moderation* is a fourth definition of good, this time in the sense of *friendship philia* or

p. 825. Vanity as “balance” is drawn by Nietzsche from the German Language Dictionary of Grimm Brothers. Vanity as “standard of everyday life”, where it concerns extreme actions: *MA I*, 74, *KSA 2*, p. 83. “One will seldom go wrong if one attributes extreme actions to vanity, average ones to habit, and petty ones to fear.”

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, F. *Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen* (WS 1871/72-WS 1874/75), edited by F. Bornmann, F. et Carpitella, M. KGW, pp. 542-49, Abteilung II, Bd. 4, Berlin/New York, 1995.

¹²¹ Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Nancy, J. (1971).

companionship, which may also be involved in the normative representation of the just, distinct from mere *respect* in the sense that considers *security*, *success* as well as *moral justice* as a chance given to the most disadvantaged. According to Aristotle, *philia* implies *moderation* in the sense of the work of the virtuous man to find the just mass between two extremes. Without this form of moderation, good life remains out of reach, on the contrary with it one weaves an excellent link between the members of a large community (as was the Greek city)¹²². For Nietzsche, it is not an innocent sense of friendship but a moral power: to be able to return the good we have shown to us. This conception is similar to that of Pericles (II, 40):

“A benefactor is a friend all the more certain that he is anxious to preserve by right methods the rights he has to the recognition of his obligation. The latter, on the other hand, is lukewarm because he is aware that any generous act on his part will be inspired not by the desire to deserve gratitude, but by the desire to pay off a debt¹²³.”

In accordance with Thucydides' analysis, Nietzsche shows that when an external threat resurfaces, a broad consensus of the political community is obtained, either in the hypothesis of a defensive war, that is to say just, or when the tyrant ideologically imposes the wrong opinion that a real danger exists: “As soon as the danger threatening the collective life becomes sensitive again, since the most numerous have not been able to impose their preponderance in the situation of general calm, the state of

¹²² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 4.

¹²³ *Nachgelassene Fragmente Juli 1882 bis Winter 1883-1884*, KSA 10, p. 301, 7[185]. See Thuc. II, 40: “For we purchase our friends not by receiving but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn is ever the most constant friend because he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he bestowed it on. Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour but for a debt.”

equality reappears: absurd privileges and vanities disappear for some time¹²⁴”. According to the logic of a world traversed by force fields, one cannot deceive long on the reality of the power relations, because they depend on the duration of movement and rest of the bodies heard as powers in presence. We have pointed out the difficulty of this thesis, where war and peace enter into a cyclical relation in a dehumanized world. When Melos is forcibly reduced to impotence by its Athenian neighbour, no one doubts that Athens is in turn unfavourably positioned in a fragile equilibrium that will oppose it to Sparta. Although immobile, the latter will soon be pushed by an irresistible generalization of the conflict¹²⁵. It is therefore against the state of chaos, that the collapse of civil society in war is likely to engender, that we understand why a fair civil society must emerge in a sustainable way and that peace is ultimately better at war. In the contrary case, Nietzsche exhibits the horrible episode where “(...) the community collapses completely, (...) falls into anarchy, the state of nature, the casual and brutal inequality burst forth immediately, as it happened in Corcyra¹²⁶”. Remember that for the old, the city must remain homogeneous. The individual citizen, even if momentarily successful, will be defeated if the city as a whole is defeated (and vice versa): “one that is utterly ignorant in [...] [public affairs or state leadership and responsibility] to be a man not that meddles with nothing but that is good for nothing” (II, 40). Nietzsche, in contrast,

¹²⁴ Ibid. Thucydides describes the Peloponnesian war as a movement (*kinesis*) of an unprecedented magnitude and as related to a natural cause (*aitia, arche*). Since a natural cause is at the origin of any movement, therefor any human affair, including those political ones which are described as proceeding from a great freedom bear the mark of the constrains exerted by nature on the human being. Cf. Constantineau, P. (1998), p. 46.

¹²⁵ Strauss, L. (1964).

¹²⁶ WS, KSA 2, 31, p. 563. Fort the exemple of Corcyra : Thuc. III, 70-86.

experiences “sadness, contempt and a deep desire to withdraw¹²⁷” from Pericles' modern attempts at transposition to awaken national sentiment.

Here, it emerges from our analysis to make it understandable how Nietzsche dynamizes power in an unusual way, since instead of only treating a political or historical event as a singular phenomenon about which the philosopher is supposed to take sides, political or historical events are also expressions of an adequate or inadequate consciousness, vis-à-vis a conception of a given political configuration (e.g. conservatism, liberalism, socialism); dynamic of forces, where Nietzsche engages in an abyss of the political perspective on power, that is to say, the public power, in the direction of our own control of our capabilities, that is to say, private moral power. On the other hand, power must make it possible to explain phenomena of human reality of a different order understood as sociocultural and also physical processes.

To conclude, let us summarize the reasons for the birth of the belief that the sophists are promoters of tyranny and the understanding of this problem from Nietzsche's will to power:

- 1) The reference to physic/physics/force is hardly understood as the advent of a peaceful order. Every culture develops as an art of mastering the natural immoderation that everyone carries within him.
- 2) The threat of tyranny was real at the time of Callicles, after the tyrants took power between 411 and 404 in Athens, destabilizing the city. This explains historically why the sophists' intelligence appears as a force of social dissolution and is associated with tyranny. The role of the sophists indicates a reflection on the language implied by causal power relations.
- 3) Nietzsche has also seen power relations as involving the use of words and the understanding of ideologies. The potential for

¹²⁷ N. *Fragmente Anfang 1875 bis Frühling 1876*. KSA 8, p. 26, 3[41].

domination, that is to say the domination heard as an object of belief mediated by language was crucial at his time as for the Greeks in Athens. Today the cyber space gives to power relations an additional importance, as the amplitude of impacting human shared life and values by facilitated and increased network power is present at a greater degree¹²⁸.

4) Nietzsche as antirealist is proposing a moral psychology which is based on a causal and materialist foundation of the knowledge of reality, including the mind, but also based on some chapters of the philosophical history of ethics related to the Classical Greek tradition. As antirealist thinker of leadership and power Nietzsche shows the potential usefulness of taking an ideal point of view of *the innocence of the becoming*, which as a wise dialectical balance between service oriented leadership and peer based leadership, should assure competency and sustainable good practice.

5) In order to use antirealist and realist notions of power, they need to be understood as imbedded in a harmony or in peaceful interactions, which implies that one can never say of a power, a force or a right that it is absolute or non-transparent, because hidden to control by others¹²⁹. Conversely, it should not be possible to admit helplessness, weakness or lack of entitlement as total state of affair in any context of human interactions. The imbalance of the living conditions involved would be too dangerous. Generosity is highly recommended in order to preventively coun-

¹²⁸ See as example the good study of applied ethics in the cyber space: Stückelberger, C. et alii (Eds.) (2019): *Cyber Ethics 4.0*, Globethics.net Global 17, Geneva. www.globethics.net/global-series

¹²⁹ Our next chapter will analysis how far a strong view from the absolute remains very helpful, but we would then step out from the narrow political realist framework of powers, and reflect further on the affective ground of life and our essential development as a human being.

terbalance the negative use of power as we shall see in the coming chapters of this book.

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EH *Ecce homo*

FL *Fragments on language*

FW *Fröhlichewissenschaft*

GD *Götterdämmerung*

GM *Genealogie der Moral*

GT *Geburt der Tragödie*

JGB *Jenseits Gut und Böse*

M *Morgenröte*

MA *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*

NSt Nietzsche-Studien

UBHL *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*

Za *Also sprach Zarathustra*

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THE BRIGHT LIGHTS ON SELF IDENTITY AND POSITIVE RECIPROCITY

Spinoza's Ethics of the Other Focusing on Competency, Sustainability and Divine Love

The claim of this chapter is to present Spinoza's view on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. Spinoza makes the interesting claim that some essential *ethical means* are to be considered in priority: share and create competency, to foster community values are reciprocity, not for sake of some revealed truth on human values, but by deep ethical understanding of our essential structure of values.

Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-physiological conditions of life. From a panpsychist point of view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood psycholo-

gy, where the original distance between the mind and the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms. We shall present the high standard of Spinoza's personal values and positive reciprocity, related to his crucial understanding of the concept of wholeness of life grounded in nature as the strong roots of a tree of life, but also the very metaphysical conditions for ethical values. The essential capacity of shared social affects is completed by a self-overcoming of the animal-man based passions, restraining and sometimes harming social or spiritual life. We are first going to present these proto-ethical conditions for the sustainability of life as affective and dynamic grounding into the immanent world, second we shall present realistic principles of an ethics of competency and see how far mutual recognition, as the concrete activity of mutually serving each other, has been presented in a convincing way by Spinoza¹³⁰.

¹³⁰ We thank the Editor Fr Jose Nandhikkara for letting us republish this chapter originally published in *Journal of Dharma* 43, 3 (July-September 2018), 261-284. This journal is part of Dharmaram Vidya Kshetram (DVK), Pontifical Athenaeum of Theology, Philosophy and Canon Law.

3.1 Introduction

To introduce a constructive combination between the notions of the identity of the self and mutual recognition, we would like to present Spinoza's careful use of the terms "gratitude", "recognition", "gratefulness", "thankfulness" in his *Ethics*.

There are certainly two good reasons to dig into Spinoza's work on ethics: first we find a presentation of the relation between two cardinal ethical values: competency and sustainability, in a non-anthropomorphic framework of our presence on earth, as englobing whole and godly emanation. Second, Spinoza presents the concept of positive reciprocity and the sentiment of gratefulness as related to the holistic understanding of ethical stewardship, or human being as social beings, keen to being in the service of others. A true service is intimately grounded in a correct perception of the self and its dependency to the englobing whole. We find in Spinoza's ethics psychophysiological tendencies of the self, and the alienation of passions through a realist constitution of values, based on our capacity to understand our dependency as living being to the wholeness of life. It is not efficient to benefit from someone, as when we receive a gift, if the relation between equals is undermined for some hidden reasons, which are not transparently expressed. If someone may expect a benefit in return from a gift, which would semantically not be a gift anymore, the result would be the creation of a debt, which changes the relationship between equals. Positive reciprocity implies something different from the diminishing of the mutual equilibrium resulting from the possibility of hidden benefices or debts. In order to feel grateful we need to feel that the other has served us with the self, and not by imposing strength or any unexpected unilateral advantage, that we would owe in return. In recognising a service, we connect the experience with the totality of our experiences. Limitations serve, errors and wounds serve, even ignorance can serve, as the wholeness in us serves the wholeness in

others and the wholeness in life, what Spinoza calls our intimate foundational relation to the Substance or God.

We find inviting presentations of the value of Spinoza's ethics by important philosophers. We have certainly with Spinoza "the purest philosopher" "and the most effective moral code in the world" if we follow Nietzsche's commentary, who recommends him, on the ground of the apolitical character of what after Spinoza we could call rational moral agents as "free spirits."¹³¹ Nietzsche opposes his ethics of a tragicomic self-derision and laughter "ten times should you laugh in a day" and the Biblical image of the "laughing lion" to Spinoza's rigorous "vivisection of the affects," a very cautious control of the expression of affects, in an ethics of the "laughing-no-more" and "weeping-no-more."¹³² With Nietzsche we may add: where vivisection of the affects would make full sense, there shouldn't be any "harming of the affects."¹³³

E. von Hartmann, another Schopenhauerian philosopher as Nietzsche, complements his views on the meaning of affects for Spinoza, praising the precision and coherence of Spinoza's views on ethics, but regretting his extreme parsimony with regard to the phenomenological description of social affects. For Hartmann many of them are reason based principles such as political rights and today we would focus on

¹³¹Friedrich W. Nietzsche, *Human All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits (Ein Buch für freie Geister)*, VIII, No 475, trans. Marion Faber with Stephen Lehmann, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. See also Henning Ottmann, *Nietzsche Handbuch*, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler Verlag, 2000, 102.

¹³²"*Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari sed intelligere.*" Translation by Coleridge: "I sedulously disciplined my mind neither to laugh at, or bewail, or detest, the actions of men; but to understand them." *Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, vol. 4, (Part I), 166, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1969. Spinoza, *Works*, Vol. II, *Spinoza's Political Treatise*, "Introduction," IV, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, Princeton: University Press, 505.

¹³³Friedrich W. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Random House, No 198, 1966, 108.

cultural rights; others legal rights and ethical principles.¹³⁴ But a first larger set of ethical principles, corresponding to the affective ground proposed by Spinoza, should be rather seen as subjective ethical principles, as the crucial role of an ethics of compassion, including other social moral sentiments. Social affects or subjective ethical principles are extremely important for applied ethics, because they help grounding the very notion of equality. One needs to add that neither Hartmann, nor Nietzsche refutes Spinoza's formalism of the affects, they only observe the possibility, on the line developed by Leibniz, Kant and later Schopenhauer, to mark the limits of the world of subjective experience. In the 20th Century, Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl will later develop it as the phenomenological reduction of the first person experience. As example, the sentiment of repentance, which is an important moral sentiment related to the experience of an inappropriate choice that could lead to wrongful consequences, is understood differently depending on whether we place the experience of the subject in the centre of the picture or not.

Should repentance be considered as useful after a wrongdoing, considering that an amelioration and reconciliation is plausible based on the suffering related to the impossibility of undoing a wrong? Spinoza doubts the fundamental religious power of repentance, on the ground of his deterministic conception of our natural comprehension, contrary to Hartmann's Christian emphasis on the importance of the process of free decision making, and of the careful distinction between natural inclination for repentance on one hand and ethical principle of repentance on the other. Spinoza delivers a powerful argument for prevailing against received authority, and yet, the starting proposition of his ethics regarding the relation of the human being to God is fundamental:

¹³⁴Eduard von Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral*, ed., J.C. Wolf, "Moralprinzip des Geselligkeitstribe," Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1879/2006: 53, 59, 83.

E1P15: Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God. Dem.: Except for God, there neither is, nor can be conceived, any substance (by P14), i.e. (by D3), thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by D5) can neither be nor be conceived [30] without substance. So they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone.

E2P10: *The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.* [30] Dem.: For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by E1P7). Therefore, if the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, then substance being given, man would necessarily be given (by [II/93] D2), and consequently man would exist necessarily, which (by A1) is absurd, q.e.d. Schol.: This proposition is also demonstrated from E1P5, viz. that [5] there are not two substances of the same nature. Since a number of men can exist, what constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. Further, this proposition is evident from the other properties of substance, viz. that substance is, by its nature, infinite, immutable, [10] indivisible, etc., as anyone can easily see. Cor.: From this it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of God's attributes.¹³⁵

¹³⁵Curley's translation from Works vol. 1 *Ethics* is used but abbreviations are adapted as follow: parts of Spinoza's *Ethics* are referred to as: P(roposition), Sc.(holium), D(efinition) and the five parts of the *Ethics* are cited by Arabic numerals: thus E3P1 stands for the first proposition of the third part of the *Ethics*. The Collected Works of Spinoza, Ed. and translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton: UP. 1985/2016, 2nd printing. Spinoza uses the expression of "the Man" in conformity with 17th Century language, but at least in his *Ethics*, the Man stands for the generic term of the human being. Each man and woman

For (by E2P10) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of human being. That essence therefore (by E1P15) is something which is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be conceived. Spinoza gives some examples concerning the method of exposition he uses.

In order to start thinking ethics as a system, one needs to bear in mind some basic principles, such as thinking particular essences. The essence of spatiality is the exteriority of its parts, the essence of human being is to be a reasonable animal (or social, etc.) and then philosophers get confused because they then ask whether these essences are related to a first principle or independent to any first principle. Spinoza explains why these [mainly Cartesian] philosophers get puzzled when it comes to initial thinking about ethics:

[30] The cause of this, I believe, was that they did not observe the [proper] order of Philosophizing. For they believed that the divine nature, which they should have contemplated before all else (because it is prior both in knowledge and in nature) is last in the order of knowledge, and that the things that are called objects of the senses are prior [35] to all. That is why, when they contemplated natural things, they thought of nothing less than they did of the divine nature; and when afterwards [II/94] they directed their minds to contemplating the divine nature, they could think of nothing less than of their first fictions, on which they had built the knowledge of natural things, because these could not assist knowledge of the divine nature. So it is no wonder that they have generally contradicted themselves (E2P10 Cor. Note).

Ethics starts for Spinoza by a metaphysical reflection on the importance and role of God or the divine, as a realistic foundation point of

should be able to reach the intellectual love of God and nature, or supreme goal, from a path of deepening of their being.

values. Ethics is also a purification of the understanding, meditation on the experience of joy as an experience of the perfect character of love as related to competency, by opposition to weakness, which leads to corruption and evil.¹³⁶

(E3P11Sc.: We see, then, that the Mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, [II/149] indeed, explain to us the effects of Joy and Sadness. By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the Mind passes to a greater perfection.

Practically, we do not need to worry about the metaphysical beginnings of ethics in God, to find in the third and fourth books of the *Ethics* most of the passions related to reciprocal recognition. Recognition is partly shared esteem but not necessarily dependent on others, it is “to imagine [oneself] to be praised by others” (E4P53), and passing from lesser to greater perfection, by “imagining” and “encouraging” its “power of acting”. In order to stay in this solitary and solipsist circle of generating joy for the self, one consequently needs to prevent the opposite: i.e., any sudden lack of positive identification. Saddening the imagination or limiting the self in such a way as to encourage oneself to imagine being blamed by others is the opposite of self-esteem:

(E3D26) Exp.: Self-esteem is opposed to humility, insofar as we understand by it a Joy born of the fact that we consider our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it a Joy, accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decision of the [5] Mind, it is opposed to Repentance.

Negative self-esteem is related to humility, which “exists when someone knows his own imperfections, without regard to [others’] dis-

¹³⁶Gordon Clement Wickersham, *Spinoza's Concept of God's Infinity*, MA Thesis, Boston University, 1951, 97, see also: 77-81, <<https://www.globethics.net/gel/6506745>> (3 May 2018).

dain of him.” Humility is similar to “despondency” (E4P57), as far as both are the opposite of “pride: when someone attributes to himself a perfection that is not to be found in him.”¹³⁷ And they both “are born of humility”(E3D29), but despondency is “Sadness born of a man’s false opinion that he is below others.” Since the nature of man rooted in his capacity to produce himself completely, “humility and despondency are very rare,” “human nature, considered in itself, strains against them, as far as it can” (E3D29):

So Humility, or the Sadness which arises from the fact that a man reflects on his own lack of power, does not arise from a true reflection, or reason, and is a passion, not a virtue q.e.d. [II/250] E3P54: Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason, instead, he who repents what he has done is twice wretched or lacking power”(E3P55, S.P.B, n 58).

Humility, like repentance, remorse, etc. are depressing passions, which only tend to annihilate us. Overall, human being’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects is called “bondage” by Spinoza, who describes in the fourth part of the *Ethics*, “how man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of [10] himself, but of fortune” (E4 Preface).

It is slightly better to be content than sad: “A desire that arises from Joy is stronger, other things equal, than one that arises from Sadness” (E4P18); but “overestimation is thinking more highly of someone than is just, out of Love.” It differs from “scorn [which] is thinking less highly of someone than is just, out of Hate” (E3D21-22). But, “it happens that everyone is anxious to tell his own deeds, and show off his powers, both of body [5] and of mind—and that men, for this reason, are troublesome to one another”(E3P55, Sc.). We see that envy is intoxicating mutual

¹³⁷Spinoza, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*, Ch. VIII, "On Esteem and Disdain."

recognition. Human beings are by nature envious or “glad of their equals’ weakness and saddened by their equals’ virtue” (E3P55, Sc.). Envy shows an important aspect of all passions: they are diversity by excellence of the nature of sentiments and the fluctuation of desires, in narrow and wide forms. The ignorance and fading of the desire as a set of psychodynamic mental, emotional, or motivational forces, leads to melancholy, on the contrary its accentuation vivifies us.¹³⁸ Vices such as envy show the affected nature of the man as “mode” for Spinoza, in conformity with the idea that all modes, including the human being, are finite and limited expressions of the substance in the nature, except *the substance* or *causa sui*. A failure or incapacity to realize a competency is a failure of the expression of the human being, conceived as a capacity to develop expansive power. In nature, limited modes are stable and express always the same thing; human being, in comparison has a power of development that has much more elasticity, regeneration, elevation and amplification.

For Spinoza our identity is grounded on a universal egoistical anthropological assumption common in XVII century (as with Hobbes), also called a “possessive individualism.” By contrast to hedonism, it has not pleasure as an aim but the affirmation and expansion of the individual self: *l’amour propre*, which arises with the planning and calculation of the future will to power. Spinoza focuses on the desire, not to realize a transcendent value, but as sustainability of the individual in the existence and the accumulation of power on the world or conatus. But for Spinoza self-sustainability is not the assimilation with an instinct of conservation (as Hobbes derives it from vital and animal movement), it has to do with living *in suo esse*, in one’s being or essence, hence through the objectivation of values in a genealogical process related to

¹³⁸Louis Millet, *Pour Connaître la pensée de Spinoza*, Paris: Bordas, 1970, 83.

passions.¹³⁹ Opposed to the Hobbesian biological anthropology, which does not lead to an objective representation of values, the genealogical definition of passions of Spinoza leads to a theory of the alienation of passions in an identification process which does. Passions have to do with a simple identification: we are glad to witness the conservation of an object, which we love, and grieve its loss.

Against the Cartesian dogma that the self should be identified with the mind Spinoza (and later Schopenhauerian philosophy) will ground the presupposition that the self is embodied and that its integration into reality at large is thus made possible. By contrast to Spinoza, later propositions as the phenomenological analysis proposed by Hartmann show that it may not be possible to ask only to the rational faculty to make good choices; Hartmann thinks that moral sentiments and the ethical principle of taste, which are only conceived negatively by Spinoza, have a proactive role to play in helping the man to constitute higher and higher ethical values.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹“Objectivation of values” is a proposition used by Matheron to describe a situation where we cannot control objects that we seek to value but only evaluations for Spinoza. On the one side, the self is losing his ipseity, his wholeness of sensible being by being rational but on the other side the objective representation of values for Spinoza offers a firm grip on the sway that external objects and the passions exercise over our existence. Finally the wholeness of the self is experienced in seeking the deepest treasures of the human mind. Spinoza invites us to an *itinerarium mentis in Deo*, a perfectionist knowledge path, which is at the same time an intellectual love of God.

¹⁴⁰E. v. Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral*, ed., J.C. Wolf, op. cit. 53, 59, 83. Read also further on similarities between Schopenhauer and Spinoza: Jenny Bunker, *Schopenhauer's Spinozism*, Thesis, University of Southampton, 2015, Sections on “Ethics,” 99, and “Salvation,” 143.

3.2 “Hate is to be Conquered by Love”: Shared Competencies vs Integrity

In his important study, Matheron gives some additional indications on the logic of mutual recognition in Spinoza’s *Ethics* that could be called egoistic. The key argument of Spinoza is that instead of autonomous choice based morals, we should concentrate on the knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and observe rules, practice them, and direct most actions according to the command of reason.¹⁴¹ What is Spinoza’s understanding of mutual recognition or gratitude?

If there is a maxim for Spinoza as a rule of praxis it would be: “Hate is to be conquered by Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it with Hate in return” (E5P6), as presented in the fifth part of the *Ethics* “On the power of the intellect, or the human freedom.” Inter-human relations can be assured by a system of obligation to give (E3P36), to take (E4P70), and to give back (E3P42). Gratitude tends to minimize in this process the joy that we first get from the surprise of receiving since the experience of the past service allows us to imagine better the future comportment of our partners and related benefits. From the point of view of Spinoza’s definition of love, I necessarily love the merchant that gives me the object of my desire. This purely trade related sentiment of love is an interesting positive ethical optic and shows the valorisation of trade.¹⁴² In the economic sector of trade each individual feels the interdependence and convergence of interests, each being in solidarity with all. Individual prosperity is depending on the prosperity of all with whom the trader is in professional relation: retailers, distributors, clients, fund-

¹⁴¹Alexandre Matheron, *Individu et communauté chez Spinoza*, Paris : Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969/1988, 86, 204-5 ; C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

¹⁴²Spinoza shows also that the more the predictability of this mutual recognition is given as in trade the more likely it is to find ignorance and the absence of free spirits (See E4P71).

ing partners, etc. But it is at this stage a pure commercial interaction: “The thankfulness which men are led by blind Desire to [II/264] display toward one another is for the most part a business transaction or an entrapment, rather than thankfulness” (E4P71Sc.).

As we see in the economic understanding of gratitude as interplay of desires to possess and desires to give and sell objects of desires, human trade based interactions tend to develop a strong solidarity of interdependencies and converging interests, but with some limitations regarding gratitude. How does the immanent-realist constitution of value arise from this dense tissue of human transactions and expectations? Many gifts should not be accepted. On the contrary, “firmness of mind” is demonstrated by “who does not allow any gifts to corrupt him, to his or to the general ruin” (shared disgrace, lat.: *communem perniciem*). There is often a moment when the desire for glory intercedes on that of love, when Y doesn’t feel obliged to X to pay his dues, to refer to a register of duties, to adhere to prevailing collective policies.

Commerce is of wildfowl (Mercatura, seu aucupium), not that corruption belongs to the essence of trading, but all trading without clear policies and sanctions turns quickly to conflicts of interest and abuses. When X acknowledges the ingratitude of Y: “He who has benefited someone—whether moved to do so by Love or by the hope of Esteem—will be saddened if he sees his benefit accepted in an ungrateful spirit” (E3P42). We fall back to negative reciprocity as finely analysed by Matheron,¹⁴³ but X and Y do not forget all of a sudden the advantages resulting from their previous interactions, they stay for a while in a mixed feeling between love and hatred. “So from imagining himself to be hated by someone, he will be affected with Sadness, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him [as a cause of the sadness] or (by the same Scholium) he will hate the [15] other, q.e.d.”(E3P40). “Given a just cause for this hatred, he will be affected by Shame (by P30).” “But

¹⁴³Matheron, *Individu et communauté chez Spinoza*, 206.

(by hypothesis), he nevertheless loves him. So he will be tormented by Love and Hate together” (E3P40Sc.).

It is the principal aim of political ethics to stabilize the process in minimizing the fluctuations of affects, to create rules in order to sustain positive reciprocity. Contrary to Kantian future propositions, Spinoza does not use the virtue of integrity, which depends on practical imperatives based on a subjective free choice, in contradiction with his affirmation of absolute determinism. As indicative ethics, stabilization of affects has nothing to do with morals, since good and bad are all necessary manifestations of God’s providence, and wrongdoing should not be considered blameworthy but subject of disdain (*contemptus*, *versmading*). Contrary to Hobbes: “those things which we neither desire nor hate we said to contemn,” Spinoza follows Descartes’ usage, as Edwin Curley shows well, “*contemptus* represents *mépris*” as opposed to *esteem*, and is defined as an inclination to consider the baseness or smallness of what is *mépris*. So something closer to disesteem seems preferable.”¹⁴⁴ Spinoza prefers such virtues as honesty, trust, reliability and faithfulness to describe the positive interplay of shared competencies (lat. *fides*, *fidelis*, *fidus*).

Gratitude is a tricky social virtue: how to deal with unexpected and sudden invitations, or with servile attitude such as loyalty in student-teacher interactions, or decisions on voluntary basis between church members and a church minister based on off-record expectations (where the intentions are not explicitly stated), or marks of employee-director deference. In some cases, familial language can treat individuals as social equals, although individuals may have several defined social

¹⁴⁴Disdain, Glossary-Index, English-Latin-Dutch, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Ed. and translated by Edwin Curley, Vol. 1, Princeton: UP. 1985/2016, 2nd printing. Hobbes’ quotation is from Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*, Part I, Ch. 6, London: Penguin Classics, 1651, fourth ed. with Introduction by C. B. MacPherson, 1985, 120.

responsibilities and limited freedom to accept new cooperation. In various situations where conflicts of interest are often a possible issue, socially constructed self-images of the individuals interact in conflicting and potentially contradictory ways. Part of the ambiguity is specifically on the language or the form of communication. We can also feel gratitude for God, as when we pray and thank God for living a good life.

On the one hand, on the subjective side of the moral sentiments, gratitude and mutual recognition have to do with the expression of love, solidarity and brotherhood. But the difficulty with love is that it is not only a subjective attitude, but a moral sentiment based ethical principle. As principle of religious unity of the highest metaphysical harmony and perfection of the creation, love is an objective *telos* of all living beings, directed to an eternal temporality, distinguished from what is sustaining in time, as we find it for example in both Spinoza's subjective and metaphysical *Ethics*.

As Kuno Fisher shows well, Spinoza's rationalism does not suppose a process of development; it does not focus on the method of knowledge of the world and on the phenomenal conditions of experience of the values. Although Spinoza doesn't contradict such views found after Kant's Copernican redefinition of the early modern *cogito* in particular with Schopenhauer's Neo-Kantian adaptation of the Spinozian immanent world, Spinoza's early modern formalism should be understood as the affirmation that all being is given by God or Nature. The later description of the subjective space and time as an essential structure of the experience, attached to an intersubjective component, will complement the rather minimalistic framework of the constitution of the human world within Spinoza's work.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵Fisher Kuno, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre, Spinozas Monismus*, Bd. IV, 1. Theil, Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1898, 25.

3.2.1 Spinoza's High Standard of Personal Values

We know from the biographers that Spinoza was living in La Haye from 1670 to 1677.¹⁴⁶ In a letter of 16th February 1673 from Louis Fabritius, Professor at the Academy of Heidelberg, Spinoza was invited to the post of Ordinary Professor at the Academy of La Haye on the behalf of the Elector of Palatine, where he could carry on his research in philosophy, without any particular constraint other than teaching a few hours to young students in philosophy.¹⁴⁷ Spinoza would receive the salary of any Professor in similar situation. Surprisingly, Spinoza politely refused the offer, arguing that he would have to renounce partly his research in order to teach, also mentioning that he never had any desire to accept the responsibility of a university professor.

As Kuno Fischer shows, Spinoza was subject of much criticism particularly after his political work on the freedom of thinking and expression, and before the posthumous edition of *Ethics* in 1677. Spinoza's adaptation of the Cartesian methodic sceptical reduction to religious matters, in particular revelation and prophetic insights, has been much commented upon since Popkin's work.¹⁴⁸ The philosophy of personal

¹⁴⁶*Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, His Well-Being*, Transl. and ed. A. Wolf, London: A. C. Black, 1910, lxxxii.

¹⁴⁷Correspondence, XLVII, Fabritius to Spinoza, 16th February 1673, XLVIII, The answer of Spinoza to Fabritius, the 30th March 1673. Spinoza, *Oeuvres Complètes*, transl. R. Caillois, M. Francès, R. Misrahi, NRF Pléiade, 1954, 1283-84.

¹⁴⁸Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Hobbes and to some extent Spinoza are accused of not recognizing the distinction between "moral motives" and "physical efficientes", the latter being derived from self-motion, while the former from a motive related to the activity of the understanding. See Samuel Clarke (1738/2005): *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, Prop. X, "Of the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding" Elibron Classics Replica, London: John and Paul Knapton, 99.

identity has been building personal identity on the top of the psychodynamic and affect oriented natural understanding of the psyche. A key aspect of the question how a philosopher understands social ethics is related to the kind of philosophy of history he/she places in the background of this interrogation. Seventeenth century philosophers are used to grounding human capacities on God or Nature, therefore the question of the nature of God is an important foundational block of how the historical development of ethical values are constructed. With Cartesian philosophy in general there are Stoic, Epicurean and Christian philosophical elements presupposed concerning ethics, philosophy of history and religion. With Spinoza in particular, anthropological aspects of God (theism) are mixed with non-anthropological aspects (deism).

Instead of “standing as judge over us,” which can have only “deleterious effects on human freedom and activity, insofar as it fosters a life enslaved to hope and fear and the superstitions to which such emotions give rise,” Spinoza is placing all social ethics on the healthy ground of a philosophical faith. Of course this deep tendency of his work, which gave him the reputation of being an early modern sceptic and materialist philosopher, was not without consequences for his life. As early as July 27 1656, Spinoza was issued a harsh ban or excommunication pronounced by the Sephardic community of Amsterdam, for unclear reasons.¹⁴⁹ Leaving a comfortable professional situation in the family busi-

Short Treatise, “On the Immortality of the Soul,” Ch. XXIII; “On God and the Creation as Nature” Ch. VIII and IX.

¹⁴⁹Coherent with Spinoza’s definition of the nature or God (but not its attributes or modes), divine providence means only the second essential attribute of God, after being *causa sui* (and as perfect being cause of all things): God is the self-sustaining character of all being, as “universal providence” the self-sustaining of all things, as part of the whole nature. The third attribute being the predestination of God, who cannot avoid doing what he is doing, having created all things so perfect that he cannot amend them and do them better. Cf. also: Nadler, Steven (2001): *Spinoza: a Life*, Cambridge: University Press, xi.

ness and the security of his religious community, Spinoza's main intention is to come back to the radical principles of philosophy.

3.2.2 Ethics of Sustainability: An Immanent Onto-Metaphysical Foundation

Spinoza shows his deep understanding of sustaining values that are not only related to ethics, but part of a coherent system explaining the metaphysical hierarchy between what exists necessarily, by its proper nature “whereby the essence envelops the existence,” and the being for which “essence envelops only a possible existence.” This is later divided into “substance” and “mode,” as for example, movement is the mode of the body, having a real being without which we cannot conceive a body, but not of the triangle to which movement is only an accident, as Spinoza famously demonstrates. It is from this metaphysical abstract structure that Spinoza derives further relations between what has eternal temporality, distinguished from what is sustaining in time: The existence and the sustaining character of objects are only “a distinction of reason,” meaning not metaphysically distinct, but distinct as a mode of thinking that serves to recollect, to explain or imagine things that have been understood.¹⁵⁰

From a religious and metaphysical point of view, the mind being related not only to the body, which is the “foundation of our love” but also “to God who is inalterable, and thus remains inalterable,” it would be more precise to call Spinoza's view panpsychist or pantheist rather than materialist (a kind of early non-reductive materialism), with two attributes of the material world, and the spiritual and metaphysical world. God being the infinite, necessarily existing (that is, uncaused), unique substance of the universe, there is only one substance in the universe; it

¹⁵⁰“Appendice Containing the Metaphysical Thoughts,” Part I, Ch. I. “On the Real Being, the Being of Fiction and the Being of Reason.” In French: Spinoza, *Oeuvres Complètes*, op. cit. 301.

is God; and everything else that is, is in God. On the one hand *the natura naturata* understood by Spinoza as “movement in the matter” or “the sciences of nature” and on the other hand there is an understanding as thinking reality, but not as two different “substances.” There is only one substance, a being that does not need anything other than its sole existence, God, or Spinoza’s *natura naturans*. This is the key argument to ground sustainability on a divine love. With the project of his *Ethics*, what Spinoza intends to demonstrate (in the strongest sense of that word) is the truth about God, nature and especially ourselves.

3.3 Spinoza’s Realistic Principle of an Ethics of Competency and Sustainability: Reflecting on the Real Formal Causes

The most central notion of Spinoza’s ethics regarding sustainability is the *conatus* understood not simply as a survival instinct with Hobbes but as the fundamental drive of any being, on a perfectionist path of empowerment. Other regarding attitudes such as love and care are derived from it, but since we focus on the pole of the ego, we need to explain socio-cognitive decentration, social virtues and generally speaking, altruistic attitudes. First Spinoza presents dispositions related to love such as gratitude, defined as mutual love, presupposing a rational attitude grounded on the wholeness of life. Gratitude is appropriately expressed for Spinoza when a person is benefiting a service of someone being in the service of life, by opposition of helping in such a way that the one who helps feels the greatest satisfaction. A person who receives a service should not consider that something has been fixed, as a person should not be perceived as broken, but a person should keep the sense of worth and gratitude related to the process of healing described by Remen as “integrative medicine”. Integrative philosophical medicine is a path first explored by Spinoza’s exigent view of gratitude and positive reciprocity. When Spinoza asks for “a just cause for the love” the phi-

osopher has in mind similar situations when a person would falsely believe he/she is loved by another, because no cause for the love has been given. We could imagine that by helping, a person “may inadvertently take away” from others more than he/she could ever give them, diminishing their self-esteem, their sense of worth.¹⁵¹ The objectification of the desire to fix an issue passes by the awareness of being used in the service of something greater than a simple desire of overcoming an obstacle. The objectification of the desire to help into a caring for others implies serving the dimension of the wholeness of life.

Of course, one could imagine loving someone in return without a reflective attitude on the causes of love, as consequence of the fact that the human body can move and dispose a great number of external bodies in a multitude of ways (as outlined in E2Post.6, E2P16). But to ground mutual recognition or gratefulness, human beings are looking for good reasons, or a subjective-objective constitutional ground, not only for psychologically agreeable sentiments. One could answer love by loving on the basis of a reflex as the child, but in order to answer gratitude we need an additional causal condition that needs clarification:

[15] P41: If someone imagines that someone loves him, and does not believe he has given any cause for this, he will love [that person] in return. [20] Dem.: This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one. See also its scholium. Schol.: But if he believes that he has given just cause for this Love, he will exult at being esteemed (by P30 and P30S). This, indeed, [25] happens rather frequently (by P25) and is the opposite of what we said happens when someone imagines that someone hates him (see P40S). Next, this reciprocal Love, and consequent (by P39) striving to benefit one who loves us, and strives (by the same

¹⁵¹Rachel Naomi Remen, *Kitchen Table Wisdom*, New York: Riverhead Books, 1996. <<http://www.rachelremen.com/>

P39) to benefit us, is called Thankfulness, [30] or Gratitude (E3P41).

Ethical resistance against unjustified gratitude is one thing: we already gave some examples of conflicting affects occurring in this situation. But could we really think ourselves as free from desires if the goal of removing desire is itself a desire among many appetites which need to be concretely satisfied? We have desires of fulfilment and blessedness, understood as essential components of living a good life, just to name some important desires. We can easily think about a point in our existence that lacks complete development and that generates a degree of suffering and frustration, regarding these important goals, and therefore need a religious or *philosophical consolation/ purification* of the spirit with Spinoza.

Competency is therefore part of what grounds sustainability: that is a reflection on what is subject of change in the world and the proposed idea of a temporality that could be seen as not transient, not subject of becoming other than what he/she is. In Spinoza's vocabulary mode (*Modus, wijz*) is the unsustainable property of things, as opposed to *attributum*, which designates essential, enduring properties of things. *Modus* is usually not used in the trivial sense of way or manner.

Spinoza introduces a principle of identity in a Godly being and says we should love others for the sake of God only, in his earliest work, *Short Treatise*:

For whenever we do not love that object which alone is worthy of being loved, i.e. (as we have already said), God, but love those things which through their own kind and nature are corruptible, there follow necessarily from that hate, sadness, etc., according to the changes in the object loved [30] (because the object is subject to many accidents, indeed to destruction itself). Hate: when someone takes the thing he loves away from him. Sadness: when he loses it. Love of Esteem: when he depends on love of himself.

Favor and Gratitude: when he does not love his fellow man for the sake of God.¹⁵²

Spinoza shows in the first part of his *Descartes' Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated in the Geometric Manner* how the notion of "necessary existence" is contained "in the concept of God" (Axiom VI), which is a sovereignly perfect being, existence being only "possible, in the concept of a limited thing"¹⁵³. We discover a discrete sign of the heritage of Cartesian dualism in Spinoza's early reflections on ethics in the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (1677), where Spinoza is juggling with two different perspectives at the same time: the notion of a naturally perfect being on his own, and the elimination of ideas that are coming from an external source, considered as contrary to this inner perfection. Spinoza understood by the philosophical aim of "a purification of the intellect" this dualistic early point of view. But logically, in order to be purified, intellect cannot at the same time be both inherently pure and needing purification¹⁵⁴. This methodological contradiction will be reassessed and resolved in a complete set in Spinoza's monumental but posthumous *Ethics*.

¹⁵²Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, Part. II, Ch. XIV.

¹⁵³A6, Axioms Taken from Descartes, Descartes' Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated in the Geometric Manner, in: *Spinoza, Collected Works*, vol. 1.

¹⁵⁴The translation of *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* is disputed for being too literal and close to the Latin: *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, when Purification of the Intellect is closer to the intention of the author, adopting a proposition closer to the Dutch *Handeling van de Verbetering van't Verstant*. This text is the first of the section Earliest Works of *Spinoza, Collected Works*, vol. 1.

3.3.1 The Monistic Notion of Identity Related Mutual Recognition vs the Transformative Model

The Commentary on the *Short Treatise* shows that Spinoza here opposes the view of Descartes, who (De Pass. An. III. 194) considered gratitude “always virtuous as one of the chief bonds of human society.”¹⁵⁵ It is only if we start to think more widely and develop the subjective level of embeddedness of the self, after Descartes with Kant and Schopenhauer, in a transcendental and empirical framework (also called later the phenomenal world), that we find transformative models of ethical values. Instead of the rationalistic realism of Spinoza, we can further think in Hegelian and Schopenhauerian terms the transformative process underlining the cultural, communicational and social ethical level of subjectively constructed interactions, adding metaphysical flesh to the formal bones of Spinoza’s ethical system.

E. von Hartmann’s key work on the phenomenology of the ethical consciousness (*Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, 1879) shows an elegant understanding of how ethics could be further adapted as transformative, i.e., based on a historical process in development, without needing to go beyond the very notion of metaphysical identity as Spinoza grounded it.¹⁵⁶ As shown by the Berliner philosopher it would not be necessary to change the monistic description of a hierarchy of values (called axiology), but only to think more in detail the characteristics of the self-sustaining nature of the being, through a dialectical, evolutionary, transformative framework. If Spinoza introduces self-fulfilment within determinism, as Bunker shows well, transcendental

¹⁵⁵Commentary, 218-19. René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, transl. S. Voss, section 193 "Gratitude," Indianapolis: Hackett, 1649/1989.

¹⁵⁶E. v. Hartmann, *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins. Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Ethik*, Berlin: Carl Duncker’s Verlag, 1879, 871pp. Cf. first part of our *Solidarité chez Hegel, von Hartmann, Tocqueville et Mill*, 2012, Paris: L’Harmattan, 11-190, where we apply this sort of monistic ethics to the philosophy of criminal law.

metaphysic is necessary to introduce an ethics of compassion, which is also a pluralistic model of motivation opening to alterity, multiplicity and transformative change.¹⁵⁷ Arbib shows finally that Spinoza could be reconciled with the philosophy of alterity of Levinas, both having proposed an ethic: "Spinoza as the fulfillment of the essence by the love of the substance, Levinas as the assignment to our neighbor as the first philosophy."¹⁵⁸

3.3.2 Enlargement of Spinoza's Realistic Reciprocal Interactions: the Politeness Theory

In order to develop positive reciprocal interactions, as not only affectively grounded on desire but also on a refined psychological typology of what has been called politeness attitudes, we could take into consideration two symmetrical groups of attitudes, the first based on love as positive politeness, and the second on the mixed emotions, where love and hate are both part of the overall *Stimmung* of a mixed reciprocal interaction, in negative politeness. *Positive Politeness* would entail such attitudes as noticing, attending to the other, exaggerate interest (approval) use in-group markers, avoid disagreement, assert common good, presuppose knowledge of the other, offer, optimism, reciprocal inclusion, assume reciprocity, and cooperation emphasis through gifts. On the contrary, *Negative Politeness* would entail being conventionally indirect, to question, be pessimistic, minimize the face threatening impositions, give deference, apologize, impersonalize the self and the other, nominalize, and refer to on-record as incurring debt of the other.¹⁵⁹ Spinoza's

¹⁵⁷Bunker, *Schopenhauer's Spinozism*, 17, 114.

¹⁵⁸Dan Arbib, "Les deux voies de Spinoza: l'interprétation levinassienne de l'Éthique et du Traité théologico-politique," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 2 (2012), 275 [our translation].

¹⁵⁹We borrow the typology to Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson, *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage* (1987): Cambridge: University

reference to the debt as part of the negative reciprocal degradation of trust and love echoes such set of attitudes very well.

3.4 Conclusion

Spinoza could be seen as outdated as some contemporary critical minds might think, because: “a systematic, comprehensive, even consoling view of the world, and of our place in it, has come to seem either too ambitious or just impossible.”¹⁶⁰ It is true that the ultimate attempts for systematic great groundings in philosophy are to be found in 17th Century works (as in v. Hartmann’s, Husserl’s work). We would nevertheless disagree on the idea that because great systems are implausible, calm and systematic thinking is not increasing our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live, and therefore are not at the very centre of the aim of education and research.

Knowledge is based on normative optimism that things around us in the world should be transformed to some extent, and human progress is desirable. Spinoza invites us to operate a qualified pessimistic view according to which life is worth living, even though it involves overcoming many of our passions. Because we recognise egoism and distrust in the world, even among the wisest philosophers, we have therefore strong motives to build trust, and require assistance from the community. What does overcoming of passions mean? There should be first a “vivisection of the affects”, a realistic recognition that we are often “driven about in many ways by external causes”, in ways contrary to our

Press, 61, 101, 129, 210. This list of negative and positive politeness linguistic markers can be found in a very clear transposition of the politeness theory in Edward J. Bridge, "The 'Slave' Is the 'Master': Jacob's Servile Language to Esau in Genesis 33.1-17," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*, 38.3(2014), 268-9.

¹⁶⁰Mason, R, “Why Spinoza?” *Philosophy Now*, Feb/Mar 2017, Issue 118 <https://philosophynow.org/issues/35/Why_Spinoza> (1 March 2018).

ethical values. Reason for that is that we cannot acquire absolute mastery over all our passions. Consequently for Spinoza, the most central principle of education and research should start by identifying the immanent, bodily incorporated, socially constructed and environmentally contextualized conditions of what Spinoza calls “bondage” or the dependency on passions which is to enter in social contract in order to enjoy the benefits of civil society. The claim of this paper was not to present Spinoza’s social contract solution, but simply to underline the coherence and internal value of an ethics built on self-esteem, where positive reciprocity or gratitude plays a key role. This role is comparable to ethics education which always impacts larger concepts of sharing of benefits and costs of social collaboration, if an educator has succeeded to pass over a model of good life, it is likely that future generations will remember the good example. Spinoza’s ethics is a philosophical ethical system which places the trustworthiness of ethics education in the centre of civil life, by focusing not only on what *a philosophy* can give to education but to what *philosophy* is aiming for, and the hope to transform human being through philosophical models. Mutual recognition, gratitude, positive reciprocity are as competence and generosity not only the ethical virtues which allow to share esteem in an inclusive way at school, in a way that nobody is left behind, competence and gratitude are the very condition of any other ethical social values based on reciprocity. Cooperative services and responsibilities in education, as in many other sectors of human activities, are grounded on human beings’ capacity to share esteem which is only understandable on a holistic global level with Spinoza, in a world where global standards are criticised on the ground of localism and petty politics. Spinoza uses the metaphor of God and nature to express a global dimension of ethics. The importance of a *globally active nature* of the highest ethical values for the human being is defined as “*natura naturans*”, as the presence of a divine model in life. The beauty of Spinoza’s divine presence is related

to the self-sustaining and immanentist view of the relation of the mind and body, where there is always a door open for a fruitful dialogue between life as a whole and the Englobing Whole. The symbolic entry door for community is not a swinging door model, or an invitation for isolated contemplation of God, but common values lived in positive reciprocity, in search for reciprocal understanding, a precondition for any meaningful notion of social contract.

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R. DESCARTES' VIRTUE OF GENEROSITY AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR INCLUSIVE EDUCATION

4.1 Exemplarity Based Education: Trusting Some Passions as Admiration or Wonder

Early Modern philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) has been developing an explanation of inclusive ethics defined on the ground of the relation of the body and the soul (virtue ethics), but surprisingly most of the commentators have not widely acknowledged since the XVIIth Century the profound value (and originality) of Descartes' morals and power of mediation for the sector of education (Taylor, 1989; Sarri & Pulkki, 2012)¹⁶¹, although some significant work has been made (I. Wienand;

¹⁶¹ Commentators focus on knowledge not so much on morals, they see teaching meditation practices as egoistic activities, without at all taking in account the generosity of the Cartesian *Passion of the Soul*. "Cartesian subject as disengaged and knowing mind has hegemonic status. These ideal minds are able to reason and master knowledge, but have no clue as to what purposes knowledge and understanding should be used for. Moreover, this abstract mind without a body cannot relate to social surroundings, emotions, or corporeal existence". Antti

2006) to assess Descartes as an outstanding moral thinker. Descartes who wrote some of his books in French, others in Latin at a time most of the works were delivered in the lingua franca Latin, was aware of the importance of translation, not so much for choosing a language or another, but for adjusting and “correcting one’s thinking”¹⁶².


Descartes is certainly not the advocate of the model of laissez-faire in ethics or education, what has been described as a “swinging door” model (Sarri & alii., *ibid.*), and should not be represented as an enthusiast of a purely egoistical view of the individual subject. Quite on the contrary, Descartes presents at the very beginning of his essay a moral exemplary position, very similar to the contemporary debate about the value of setting examples for education. Prefiguring a position similar to Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory—where “foundation does not lie in a concept but in particular individuals we admire because of their moral exemplarity”, the notion of exemplarity is grounded on the so called indexical approach in semantic linguistic¹⁶³, whereby expressions such as “*this* teacher”, is a direct reference, as we find by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke, but applying it to the moral domain. Moral exemplars are made “by direct reference to persons like that, namely individuals whom we admire upon reflection and we identify

Wiljami Saari, Jani Pulkki: “Just a Swinging Door” – Examining the Egocentric Misconception of Meditation, *Philosophical Inquiry in Education* Vol 20, No 2 (2012), p.17. See also the famous chapter of Charles Taylor for the polemic against a supposed “liberal” individual subject: Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 141 ff.

¹⁶² Prevot, Amédée (édité par), *Oeuvres morales et philosophiques de Descartes*, “Descartes à son lecteur”, Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Imprimeurs de l’Institut de France, p. 4., undated.

¹⁶³ Indexically referring to a state of affair relates to the character of pointing to (as with our index finger), indexically indicating something dependent on the context, we usually use demonstrative adverbs as (here, that one, there) or pronouns (her, them), or special time context (next Monday).

indexically by pointing to them¹⁶⁴.” What about living in a world where many things, that we could define as objects of exemplarity and admiration, are either tiny things that we barely notice as micro-chips (see the small circle below “as small as a sharpened pencil tip”¹⁶⁵), or a fluctuant string of things that depend on canals, as information data?



Although Descartes builds on a genetic development of ethics from admiration or wonder, his ethical language is less focusing on admiration or wonder than on the methodical perspective of the language of esteem (see *The admiration*, II, 53), following on that the father of empiricism and scientific method Francis Bacon. Esteem is related to epistemic authority on one hand, and on the other finely structured within a complex of mutually depending virtues.

Admiration doesn't have any contrary, says Descartes, it is the first of all the passions, if the object is present without bringing any admira-

¹⁶⁴ Croce, Michel: “Exemplarism in Moral Education: Problems with applicability and indoctrination”: *Journal of Moral Education* vol. 48 (2019), see also the counterargument of examples which doesn't receive admiration, as brain data, for example: Koji Tachibana: “Nonadmirable moral exemplars and virtue development”, *Journal of Moral Education*, vol. 48 (2019). Linda Zagzebski (2017): *Exemplarist Moral Theory*, Oxford: UP.

¹⁶⁵ The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies>, accessed April 2019.

tion, we are not surprised but it doesn't mean we would barely notice it, only that we remove all emotion or passion. The role of admiration as for most of the passions is motivational, not informative although passions fix somehow our attention on particular thoughts and prepare our body for certain course of actions. In any case, we should not simply rely on passions in order to receive direction about representing things as good or evil, beneficial or harmful, and when passions do fix our attention on some objects, they represent things as good or evil albeit in an exaggerated manner¹⁶⁶.

4.2 Esteem Based Education: a not so Admirable Direction Model of Education: Generosity as a Focus

A new rediscovery makes the perspective very clear: Descartes is a deep moral thinker, not only the champion of the early modern metaphysics of the subject, and should be considered as independent from Aristotle's eudemonistic ethics as retaining "certain aspects of Stoicism, epicureanism, and Christian morality and integrates them into his own moral reflection¹⁶⁷".

As Descartes already clearly explained as his third main maxim in the *Discourse on the Method*, III, Ch. 3, the Stoical component of his

¹⁶⁶ It is clear for the author that "happiness requires us to guide our passions instead of letting our passions guide us": Brassfield, Shoshana, "Never Let the Passions Be Your Guide: Descartes and the Role of the Passions", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 21(3), May 2012, 459ff., 459-477.

¹⁶⁷ Wienand, Isabelle, "Les morales de Descartes", *Review of philosophy and theology of Fribourg*, Bd. 53(3) (2006), 590, <http://doi.org/10.5169/seals-760632>. Cf. also: Morgan, V. (1994): *Foundations of Cartesian Ethics*. New Jersey : Humanities Press, 99 sq. These latest rediscovery of Descartes' views on the passion of the soul are not very different from Spinoza's understanding of Descartes' work on ethics (and partly Spinoza's criticism of Descartes), and the long history of the reception of Spinoza's reading of Descartes.

ethics which distinguishes between what is in our power and capacity from what is not, is the starting point of his ethics of virtue:

“we shall no more regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth, when deprived of them without any fault of ours, than our not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico, and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of necessity, we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in imprisonment, than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of birds to fly with.”

But precisely because we should not promise the impossible, we are left free with a wide spectrum of remaining capacities.

Descartes initiated his work on inclusive ethics as generosity as part of his last book, and a correspondence with princess Elisabeth of Bohemia to whom the work is dedicated. The determining role of resolution and generosity can be seen in the work of the *Passions of the Soul* where this last virtue is presented and underlined in the ethical understanding of being a truly responsible person. The virtue of generosity will not only be the reason for knowing how to live a virtuous life, but also a reason for developing ethical education institutions which would in turn reciprocally disseminate and implement this virtue, which should not be considered as only determined by innate capacities and inherited wealth, but as the key aim of good education.

Generosity being the highest form of the grounding principle of a parity of esteem, by presenting this Cartesian virtue, as related to a liberal understanding of responsibility and education, we wish to show which connected virtues play a key role in inclusive education, from Descartes' point of view¹⁶⁸. Our aim is to put Descartes' moral philoso-

¹⁶⁸ Elisabeth's correspondence with Descartes begins in 1643 and continues until Descartes' death in 1650, her philosophical writings consist mostly of her correspondence with Descartes, although having as well contact with Henry More, Nicolas Malebranche. Cf. Margot, Jean-Paul, *El yo moral de Descartes: resolu-*

phy in an imaginary dialogue with the conditions of inclusive education worldwide, because we believe in the strength of his propositions, which as Kant or Mill could be universalised and adapted in many different cultural contexts.

“Descartes's very liberal account of virtue, which requires only the intention to do good, does not require that one's good intentions are realized in actions that are actually good.” Descartes' account of virtue allows for the virtuous agent to make mistakes, identifying the moral good with the media that are in our power to reach good life (*felicity*). If we take the image of the archer (Margot, 2010), the aim of virtuous action is to aim to reach the target, although reaching the target is something that does not entirely depend of him. There are circumstances that do not depend on the archer's ability to adjust its arrow towards the centre of the target. But nevertheless, his purpose (*telos*) is to do everything that depends on him, and his ability as an archer to reach the target. In this respect, no obstacle can be interposed between him and his end, since precisely, by definition, it mainly depends on him and on his capacity to doing everything that virtue is defined. Descartes is building on the Stoic distinction between “what depends on us” and “what does not depend on us,” and unifies the virtue from the point of the will or the practical reason. The ethical life as the search for good life is, and can only be, subject of what depends entirely on us, namely, “the free disposition of our will”, and this is the reason why the virtue of generosity is the one that makes a man praiseworthy at the highest degree that human being can legitimately estimate each other¹⁶⁹. *Megalopsyche*, to be gifted with a great Mind and ethical power is the key quality of education leaders.

ción y generosidad. El Hombre y la Máquina, 2010 (Enero-Junio), <https://www.globethics.net/gel/11576456>

¹⁶⁹ Margot, Jean-Paul, *El yo moral de Descartes: resolución y generosidad*, *ibid.*, p. 22.

“152. *What can cause us to esteem ourselves*
One of the principal parts of wisdom is to know how and why anyone ought to esteem or condemn himself, so I shall try to give here my view about this. I see only one thing in us that could entitle us to esteem ourselves, namely the exercise of our free will and our command of our volitions. For we can be rightly praised or blamed only for actions that depend on this free will; it makes us like God in a way, by making us masters of ourselves, provided we don't lose the rights it gives us through shrinking reluctance¹⁷⁰”.

4.3 Generosity Related Cartesian Corpus

All articles related to generosity are in “Part III: Specific Passions”, mainly: “54. Esteem (with generosity or pride), and contempt (with humility or abjectness)”, “153. What generosity consists in”, “154. Generosity keeps us from condemning others”, “156. The properties of generosity; and how generosity serves as a remedy for all the disorders of the passions”, “158. Vanity's effects are opposite to those of generosity”, “160. How the spirits move in these passions”, “161. How generosity can be acquired”, “164. The function of these two passions [veneration/scorn]” “187. How the most generous people are affected by this passion”, “203. Generosity serves as a remedy for anger's excesses”

“54. Esteem (with generosity or pride), and contempt (with humility or abjectness). Wonder is joined to either esteem or contempt, depending on whether we wonder at how (·metaphorically speaking·) big the object is or at how small. So we can esteem ourselves, giving rise to the passion of magnanimity or pride, and

¹⁷⁰ Descartes, René. *Passions of the Soul*. Translated by Jonathan Bennett, III, article 152, p. 43, 2010/2017, <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1649part3.pdf>

the corresponding behaviour; or contemn [see Glossary] ourselves, giving rise to the passion of humility or abjectness, and the corresponding behaviour.”

“153. What generosity consists in:

So I think that true generosity, which brings it about that a person’s self-esteem is as great as it legitimately can be, consists only in (i) his knowing •that nothing truly belongs to him except this free control of his volitions, and •that his good or bad use of this freedom is the only valid reason for him to be praised or blamed; and (ii) his feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use his freedom well—i.e. never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best. To do that is to follow virtue perfectly.”

“154. Generosity keeps us from contemning others

Those who have (i) this knowledge and (ii) this feeling about themselves find it easy to believe that any other person can have the same knowledge and feeling about himself, because there’s nothing in this that depends on anyone else. That’s why such people never contemn anyone. Although they often see others acting wrongly in ways that show up their weakness, they are more inclined to excuse than to blame them—more inclined to regard these actions as due to lack of knowledge than as due to lack of a virtuous will. Just as they—i.e. generous people—don’t rate themselves much below those who have greater wealth or honour, or even those who have more intelligence, knowledge or beauty, or surpass them in some other perfections, they correspondingly don’t have much more esteem for themselves than for those whom they surpass, because all these things strike them as very unimportant in comparison with a virtuous will. That is the

only thing they esteem themselves for, and they suppose that everyone else does—or at least could—have it too.”

“156. The properties of generosity; and how generosity serves as a remedy for all the disorders of the passions

Those who are generous in this way are naturally led to do great things while not undertaking anything that they don't feel capable of doing. And because they don't rate anything higher than •doing good to others and contemning [see Glossary] their own self-interest, they are always perfectly courteous, gracious and obliging to everyone. And along with this they have complete command over their passions, especially •over desires, jealousy and envy; because the only things they think to be worth pursuing depend solely on themselves; •over hatred of other people, because they have esteem for everyone; •over fear, because their confidence in their own virtue reassures them; and finally •over anger, because (i) they don't put much value on anything that depends on others, and so (ii) they never give their enemies the advantage of knowing that they are injured by them.”

“158. Vanity's effects are opposite to those of generosity¹⁷¹ The volition we feel within ourselves always to make good use of our free will results, as I have said, in generosity. Self-esteem based on anything else—anything else—is a highly blameworthy vanity, which is so different from true generosity that it has quite the opposite effects. For all other goods—such as intelligence, beauty, riches, and honours— are usually esteemed so highly because so few people have them, and most of them are intrinsically incapable of being had by many people; and that brings it about that vain people try to pull everyone else down, and being

¹⁷¹ See also article 157 focusing on vanity.

slaves to their desires they have souls that are constantly agitated by hatred, envy, jealousy, or anger¹⁷².”

“160. How the spirits move in these passions

It’s easy to grasp that vanity and abjectness are not only vices but also passions, because their commotion is quite apparent in the demeanour of those who are suddenly elated or depressed by some new happening. But it may be questioned whether generosity and humility, which are virtues, can also be passions: their movements are less apparent, and virtue seems to be less in key with passion than vice is¹⁷³. Still, if a movement of the spirits

¹⁷² See article 184 focusing on envy, where generosity is seen as a medicine against the hatred generated by envy of some goods that we are blocked access to: “When we want that same good for ourselves and are blocked from having it because it belongs to others who are less worthy of it, this makes the passion more violent: but it is still excusable, provided its element of hatred relates solely to the bad distribution of the desired good and not to the people who possess it or distribute it. But few people can rise to that standard. Few people are so just and so *generous* that they don’t hate anyone who gets in ahead of them in the acquisition of a good that can’t be shared by many and that they had wanted for themselves, even if the person who acquired the good is as worthy of it as they are, or even more so. [...]“ My italic.

¹⁷³ Article 159 distinguishes between virtuous and unvirtuous humility as opposed to generosity. “*159 Unvirtuous humility* For someone to be abject, or unvirtuously humble, is chiefly for these things to be true of him: •he has a feeling of weakness or indecision; •he can’t help doing things that he knows he’ll be sorry about later on (as though he lacked the full use of his free will); •he believes that he can’t survive unaided or do without many things whose acquisition depends on others. *So this humility is directly opposed to generosity*, and it often happens that the most abject people are the most arrogant and haughty, just as the most generous are the most modest and humble. But whereas those who have a strong and generous spirit don’t change their mood to suit the prosperity or adversity that comes their way [...]” The italic is ours: it shows the antithetical relation between generosity and some excessive passion of humility.

strengthens a thought that has bad foundations, I don't see what's to stop it from also strengthening one that is well-founded. And because vanity and generosity both consist simply in our good opinion of ourselves—differing only in that this opinion is unjustified in one case and justified in the other—I think we can relate them to a single passion that is

aroused by a movement composed of the movements of •wonder, •joy, and •love (self-love and the love we have for what is making us think well of ourselves).

And humility, whether virtuous or unvirtuous, is

aroused by a movement composed of the movements of •wonder, •sadness, and •self-love mingled with hatred for the faults that give rise to self-contempt.

The only difference I observe between these two ·composite· movements comes from their component of wonder. The movement of wonder has two varieties: (i) an initial vigorous surge of movement that comes from surprise, ·followed by variations in the force of the movement from then on·; and (ii) a continuing uniform movement of the spirits in the brain. Of these varieties, (i) is found mostly in vanity and abjectness. That's because vice usually comes from ignorance, and those who know themselves least are the most liable to become vain or excessively humble: they are surprised by anything new that happens to them and, attributing this novelty to themselves, they wonder at themselves, and either esteem or condemn themselves depending on whether they think that what is happening to them is to their advantage or not. But often one thing that makes them vain is followed by another that makes them humble, which is why their passion in-

volves a variable movement of the spirits. On the other hand, variety (ii) is more prominent in generosity and virtuous humility than in the unvirtuous pair. That's because there is no incompatibility between generosity and humility of the virtuous kind, nor anything else that might alter them; which brings it about that their movements are firm, constant and always very similar to each other. These movements don't come from surprise, because those who esteem themselves in this way are already thoroughly in touch with the causes of their self-esteem. Still, it can be said that those causes (our power to use our free will, which leads us to value ourselves, and our infirmities, which lead us not to overrate ourselves) are so marvellous that each time we consider them they are a source of wonder."

"161. How generosity can be acquired

What are commonly called 'virtues' are habits of the soul that dispose it to have certain thoughts: though they aren't thoughts, these habits can produce thoughts and be produced by them. These thoughts can be produced by the soul alone; but they are often strengthened by some movement of the spirits, in which case they are •actions of virtue and •passions of the soul. [In what follows, Descartes connects the 'gen' in *générosité* with origins (as in the English 'generation', 'genesis', 'genetic' and so on). And the source of the word 'magnanimity' (and the similar corresponding French word) is a Greek word meaning 'greatness of soul'.] Despite the fact that there seems to be no other virtue to which good birth contributes as much as it does to the virtue that leads a person to value himself at his true worth, and it's easy to believe that the souls that God puts into our bodies are not all equally noble and strong (which is why I have called this virtue 'generosity', following common usage, rather than 'magnanimity'. . . .) nevertheless a good upbringing ["la bonne institution", a good educa-

tion institution] is a great help in correcting [egoistic innate dispositions¹⁷⁴]; and someone who often gives thought to •the nature of free will, and to •the many advantages that come from a firm resolution to use it well, and to •how vain and useless are the cares that trouble ambitious people, can arouse in himself the passion of generosity and then move on to acquire the virtue. Since this virtue is a kind of key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of the passions, it seems to me that this consideration ·about how to acquire it· deserves serious attention”.

“164. The function of these two passions [veneration/scorn]

Whether someone’s veneration or scorn is used well or badly depends on whether he has generosity or weak-spirited abjectness. The nobler and more generous his soul is, the more inclined he is to render to each person his due; thus, he not only has a very deep humility before God, but he is also not reluctant to render to each person all the honour and respect due to him according to his position and authority in the world; and the only things he contemns are vices. In contrast with that, abject and weak people are liable to sin by excess, sometimes in revering and fearing things that deserve nothing but contempt, and sometimes in haughtily scorning things that are most deserving of reverence. They often switch quickly from extreme impiety to superstition, and then from superstition back again to impiety, so that there’s no vice or disorder of the mind that they aren’t capable of.”

“187. How the most generous people are affected by this passion [by pity]

¹⁷⁴ Our translation for “défauts de naissance” translated literally as “birth defects” by Bennett.

Nevertheless, those who are the most generous and who are most strong-minded in •not being anxious about evil coming to them and •regarding themselves as beyond the power of fortune, are not without compassion when they see the infirmities of other men and hear their complaints. For generosity involves having good will towards everyone¹⁷⁵. But the sadness of this pity is not bitter anymore¹⁷⁶; like the sadness caused by tragic actions represented on the stage, it is more external and sense-related than in the interior of the soul; while the soul has the satisfaction of thinking that it is doing its duty in feeling compassion for the afflicted. And it has another special feature: whereas the man in the street has compassion for those who complain because he thinks their misfortunes are very distressing, the pity of •the greatest men is directed mainly at the weakness of those whom they see complaining. For •they think that nothing that happens could be as great an evil as the shrinking reluctance of those who can't steadily take it. And although •they hate vices, they don't on that account hate those who have them; for those people all they have is pity¹⁷⁷.”

¹⁷⁵ See article 154, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Descartes thinks consistently with his understanding of ethical responsibility and competency as essentially free will dependent, that a passion of ours will be especially bitter if we are the whole cause of it (cf. articles 63, 197, 191). We replaced the colon by a semicolon following the punctuation of the French version and added the idea that pity is no longer bitter compared to the common non-generous perspective presented in “186. Those who are most given to pity”.

¹⁷⁷ The next article explains how unfair it is to lack all together any sort of pity or compassion in life. “188. *Those who aren't affected by pity* What sorts of people don't have pity for anyone? Only •malicious and envious minds that naturally hate everyone, and •ones who are so brutish—and made so blind by good fortune or desperate by bad—that they don't think any more misfortune could befall them.”

“193. Gratitude

Gratitude is also a kind of love aroused in us by some action of the person to whom we are grateful—an action by which we think he has done us some good or at least intended to do so. So it has the same content as approval, with the extra feature that it is based on an action that affects us and that we desire to reciprocate. That's why it has much more strength than mere approval, especially in the souls of those who are to any degree noble and generous.” [Our italic]

“203. Generosity serves as a remedy for anger's excesses although anger is useful in energizing us to push back against wrongs, there is no passion whose excesses we should take more care to avoid¹⁷⁸. Such excesses confuse our judgment and often make us act wrongly in ways we'll later have to repent. Sometimes they even prevent us from pushing back against the wrongs as well as we could if we were calmer. But just as vanity more than anything else makes anger excessive, so I think that generosity is the best remedy for its excesses. Here is why. Generosity makes us put a low value on all the good things that might be taken away, and to put a high value on the liberty and absolute control over ourselves that we cease to have when we take of-

¹⁷⁸ See also 202: *It's weak and servile souls that let themselves be carried away most by the second sort of anger* on two types of anger. The first when “one flares up suddenly” and which “is obvious from the outside, but it has little effect and can easily be calmed” and a “less obvious” which “gnaws more at the heart”, and is far more dangerous type of anger: “And just as it's the most generous souls who have the most gratitude, so it is those with the most vanity, the most abject and weak, who are most readily swept up into this kind of anger. The wrongs that arouse someone's anger appear greater in proportion as vanity increases his self-esteem and also in proportion to his valuation of the good things that those wrongs take away.”

fence at something that someone else does. Thus it brings it about that if we are generous we limit ourselves to contempt¹⁷⁹, or at the most to indignation, for the wrongs that others would ordinarily be offended by.”

4.4 Conclusion

The free will of Descartes is, unlike that of St Augustine and Luther, independent of grace. Descartes has emphasized several times the paradoxical condition of human freedom that resembles God in reason for the absolute dimension of the will¹⁸⁰. Descartes’ will is conceived either as a non-limited or non-dependent will, which will allow Hegelian philosophers from the 19th Century to link him to the Cartesian tradition but also to complete his *cogito ergo sum* by ‘I think therefore there is a Will.’

First possible objection is that “Descartes makes virtue impervious to fortune or moral luck”. But since even our ability to reason is subject to luck, this objection should not be counted as unavoidable (pace Aristotle).

In line with the classically Stoic position, a second objection proposed as well by Princess Elisabeth, states that “Descartes’ account of

¹⁷⁹ To contempt, in French *mépriser*, should be understood in a weak sense as having the attribute of being inoffensive and of negligible proportions. See articles 54, 149 and 207. See also our analysis of an ethics of change where we doubt that blaming others in order to get the best out of them fits the purpose. Haaz, Ignace, “Inclusive Education and Epistemic Value in the Praxis of Ethical Change” in: Ike, O. Mbae, J. Chidiebere, O. *Mainstreaming Ethics in Higher Education*, Ch. 12, Globethics.net Education Ethics Series No. 4, 2019, 251-268.

¹⁸⁰ Selected Correspondence of Descartes, transl. by J. Bennett, To Mersenne, 2017, 25.xii.1639: (5–7) “Everyone’s desire to have every perfection he can conceive of, and consequently all the perfections we believe God to have, is due to God’s having given us a will that has no limits. It is principally because of this infinite [here =‘unlimited’] will within us that we can be said to be created in his image.”

virtue separates virtue from contentment". She objects "that Descartes' account of virtue allows for the virtuous agent to make mistakes, and she does not see how an agent can avoid regret in the face of those mistakes. Insofar we regret when even our best intentions go awry, we can be virtuous and fail to be content. While it is unclear whether her objection is a psychological one or a normative one, she does maintain that achieving contentment requires an 'infinite science' (4:289) so that we might know all of the impact of our actions, and so properly evaluate them." Without a faculty of reason that is already perfected, on her view, we cannot only not achieve virtue we also cannot rest content. (See Shapiro 2013 for an interpretation of these remarks.)

Third: if we understand good to be a matter of balancing competing self-interests", then without a proper measure of value, "[...] Descartes' account of virtue cannot even get off the ground, for it is not clear what should constitute our best judgement of what is the best course of action"¹⁸¹. As we showed in the previous chapter, Spinoza tried to resolve some of these objections by founding the whole framework of moral passions into a new affective science framework, but at the heavy price of totally abandoning individual freedom of choice, moral responsibility as dependant to free will and the strong focus on contentment: joy becomes a by-product of competency and sustainable self-development.

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¹⁸¹ Shapiro, Lisa, "Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/elisabeth-bohemia/>>.

mility or abjectness)", "153. What generosity consists in", "154. Generosity keeps us from contemning others", "156. The properties of generosity; and how generosity serves as a remedy for all the disorders of the passions", "158. Vanity's effects are opposite to those of generosity", "160. How the spirits move in these passions", "161. How generosity can be acquired", "164. The function of these two passions [veneration/scorn]", "187. How the most generous people are affected by this passion", "203. Generosity serves as a remedy for anger's excesses".

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ETHICAL EDUCATION AS NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

5.1 Introduction

For a teacher/educator, as for an artist, education has in common with a work of art that it takes shape from the moment it comes “to eliminate the elements that divert the attention of the form of and interaction with the painting¹⁸²” (Bélanger, 2017). The element of interaction is what makes education similar to a game, for a game must have interaction in order to return power to the player. It is the same in education processes; it is only when power is circulating between all the stakeholders in any social construction that there is a fair balance, or an ethical dimension present at the core of the construction, and the idea of what human being *justly deserves*. That’s what makes it a dynamic and transformative model. As the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights reminds us: fair conditions for higher education are met not when most basic conditions and rights to education are solely met, but when an additional condition has been fulfilled –when “higher education [...] [is] *equally accessible to all on the basis of merit*”:

¹⁸² Bélanger, Guy et al (2017) : Qualité des pratiques de développement des compétences informationnelles au sein du réseau de l'Université du Québec, Université du Québec, <http://rapport-qualite-pdci.uquebec.ca/Documents/Rapport-FODAR-CI-2017.pdf>



“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally *accessible to all on the basis of merit*.”¹⁸³

“(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, *on the basis of capacity*, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education”¹⁸⁴.

Merit as capacity is either related to epistemic and cognitive processes, apprenticeship of any given discipline including pedagogy and ethics in education, and can be grounded on innate structures and capacities, as when we say we would empower people to develop their own potentials (or knowledge innateness) in a given domain, or ground apprenticeship on the empirical experience, built by social interactions.

¹⁸³ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26(1), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>. See also very recent references to this milestone, e. g. in: Gita Steiner-Khamsi et alii, “Foreword”, *The Right to Education Movements and Policies: Promises and Realities*, NORRAG Special Issue 01, January 2018, p.4.

¹⁸⁴ Our italic; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 entry into force 3 January 1976. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx> ; Education 2030: Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action for the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 4, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002456/245656e.pdf>

5.2 Philosophical Models of Knowledge Acquisition Based on Capacities/Merit and the Perspective of Innate Ideas

We should remind ourselves that “the philosophical debate over innate ideas and their role in the acquisition of knowledge has a venerable history” (Fiona Cowie, 2008). This debate is as old as the classical Plato/Aristotle dispute on knowledge innateness, which first considers the idea of a “forgotten knowledge” that could be recovered through recollection. Raising the broader issue of the limits of human knowledge, of the nature of the soul, Plato thought we could have certain properties before birth, through the postulate of an access to divine Ideas. Smuggled into this wide question of the limits of human knowledge, was the specific idea of a duality of the body and the soul where for Plato, innate ideas have been forgotten because of the embodiment of the human being at birth. But if the world is related to us, as Aristotle opposes Plato, then knowledge is not formed by a hypothetic process of isolating what the disembodied soul is capable of, but by reflecting on the external conditions of knowledge formation, such as language, social interactions, etc.¹⁸⁵ Equal access to all, based on our knowledge capacity, is a true principle, but one should not abuse truth principles, which could

¹⁸⁵ The modern version of this debate is between John Locke and Leibniz, and the contemporary version is between Piaget and Chomsky. Goad, Candice Shelby (1991): *Locke and Leibniz: The innateness debate*, Doctoral dissertation, Rice University, Houston Texas. <https://scholarship.rice.edu/handle/1911/16442>; Piatelli-Palmarini, Massimo (1984): *Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky*, Harvard: University Press. Remnant, Peter and Bennett, Jonathan (Eds.): *Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge: University Press, 2003.

become less informative after strong use, and in this case, even become a joke¹⁸⁶.


If merit is defined by some appropriate consequences of *rules* or *actions* by individuals or groups, in such a way that we don't focus on the intrinsic value of merit, but on the contrary, as dependent on some other [ethical] values, then we could found our system of education on a distributive principle, either as a right-based distribution, *sensitive to merit*, or on a eudemonist system, based on the idea of a life-world and the notion of desert adjustment.

The model of the balloon corresponds to this Platonist innate view of how we could help to get the best out of our human knowledge potential. The more the balloon would raise, full of hot air and liberated from bodily weight, the higher the pilot of knowledge would reach, enhancing the ability to contemplate the full range of his capacities. In this divine/ideal model of progress, technical advancements are symmetric with wide educational political view, although not in the Modern sense, since the many, the people, and the self, are not in point of focus. A majority based rule cannot work for Plato, since most of the people are not trained lifelong to be good leaders, and the ideal republic is a mixed system, where a kingdom is ruled by the one or few wise preferably¹⁸⁷:

¹⁸⁶ To constitute a propriety based on essential features could be seen as trivial as if we would ask a student: “causam et rationem quare/Opium facit dormire”? The student would reply: “A quoi respondeo,/Quia est in eo/Virtus dormitiva,/Cujus est natura/Sensus assoupire”. This is a joke made by B. Pascal in the 17th century, in his *Thoughts*, where we also find the “the aperitive virtue of a key, the attractive virtue of a hook”. Blaise Pascal (1623–1662). *Thoughts*. The Harvard Classics, No. 55.

¹⁸⁷ Chrysanthus Nnaemeka Ogbozo (2018): “Good Governance Requires a Metaphysic of the Good: Platonic-Aristotelian Insights”, in: *Ethics in Higher Education: Foundation for Sustainable Development*, Ike, O. and Chidiebere. O. (Eds.), Globethics.net Education Ethics Series, No. 2.

Classical model from external sources of values



Natural and divine powers driving knowledge formation and ethical values

Ethical education and knowledge communication as accessing the highest peaks of technical and ethical virtue progress

(Plato, St. Augustine, Noam Chomsky)

The practical problem with balloon is that it floats in the air and it is not possible to direct it entirely, but only to move it up and manoeuvre currents not of the pilot's choosing.



The classical model of education based on innate ideas is not meant to totally bring self-direction, but with Leibniz the question whether

there are “ideas and truths born with us”, or “the question of the origin of our ideas” takes a new perspective. Modernity is planning to escape from a simplistic duality between ideas which are learned vs. innate. Leibniz explicitly says: “I cannot accept... that whatever is learned is not innate. The truths about numbers are in us; but still we learn them” (Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*)¹⁸⁸. In fact when we compare the framework of the innate ideas with the one of determined genetic factors of development, we see more precisely what innateness can bring and what it can’t add to the process of learning and self-development. As Stewart-Williams rightly points out, the existence of an influence of innate ideas is not problematic *per se*, the central question is: “If evolutionary psychology reveals that certain aspects of our representation of the world have an innate origin, this raises an important question: Does the innateness of these aspects of mind give any reason to think they are accurate?”¹⁸⁹,

From the point of view of natural selection theory, “if innate contributions to our representation of the world were not accurate, they would not have been useful and would not have been selected. The fact that they were selected gives us some assurance that they are accurate depictions of the world¹⁹⁰”. Therefore we could wrap this argument up with Goldman as: “Natural selection is a process that produces true beliefs, if it produces beliefs at all”¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸ Remnant, Peter and Bennett, Jonathan (Eds.): *Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding*, *ibid*, see book I, for our quotation p. 85.

¹⁸⁹ Stewart-Williams, Steve (2013): *Darwin Meets Socrates : Evolutionary Psychology and the Innate Ideas debate*, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand, pp. 2-3, <<https://www.globethics.net/gel/6393082>>


¹⁹⁰ Stewart-Williams, *Darwin Meets Socrates*, p. 225, *ibid*.

¹⁹¹ Goldman, Alwin I. (1975), “Innate knowledge” in S. P. Stich (Ed.), *Innate Ideas*, New York: University of California Press, p. 117.

Innate contribution to a particular faculty can be considered as very plausible: the concept of cause or causal cognition, or the implication that one event necessitates another and the capacity to distinguish between event sequences that are causally connected and those that are not (see Stewart-Williams, Ch. 6). Concerning wider grounding structures of our mind, pertaining to topics in metaphysics, it is also likely that the existence of other minds, causation, space and time, constitute a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge¹⁹².

On this line of argument, Kronfeldner explains further that we partly tend to underestimate innate potentials because they seem abstract structures as some fundamental subject-predicate grammatical structure of the discourse, but “traits we usually consider as acquired (as, for instance, the capacity to write a scientific article) are also not caused by acquired factors alone. On the contrary, lots of genes are necessary to make it possible. Furthermore, the situation that something is called a cause even though it is not sufficient for the effect is not specific to genes”. Circumstances that are important triggering factors to develop a capacity complicate the whole picture far more than we suspect, because we tend to believe that the environment is predictable as conventional human rules and interactions, but the environment is not so simple to define. In order to answer to the difficulty of mapping from what exactly our environment is composed, a way to deal with this question is to turn it negatively and say that we can express about 75% of innate potentials that we are born with, through environmental stimuli as shown below by Morra and Zenker, who explain the difference between genes that will be expressed and those which will never be:

¹⁹² Cf. Stewart-Williams, *Darwin Meets Socrates*, p. 226, *ibid.*



In a nut shell, innate capacities complemented by environmental factors play an important role, related to complex sets of accurate beliefs produced by natural selection, but as we suspected with our metaphor of the balloon, concrete limits to innate faculties have to be defined too. What are the aspects of our cognition that we cannot control, given the plausibility and the accuracy of innate causal relations in our mind? As we see in biology and medicine, the acquired-innate distinction is important, first because determinism should not be considered as fatalism. It is not as simple as Plato’s dualistic reduction of mind and body would suggest, about getting rid of the heavy obstacles of our bodily nature as in *Timaeus*, and affirm that the notion of perception is an innate form of space, not depending on our sense but on “a spurious reason”. It is about us (not necessarily in terms of a discourse on free will), but by *ethically*, to realize how *ethical dispositions such as hope* play a key role.

Even if we would take some moral categories as being related to innate dispositions, is all ethical life reducible to causal evolutionary functions? What about the notion of ethical leadership itself? As Morra and Zenker show, these notions can be explained through the optic of inborn qualities that are phylogenetically activated, and can even apply to complex ethical and management notions as being an appropriate leader:

“Leadership is a contextual morphological position, action and/or symbol that is adaptive, by definition, to the contextual style and/or needs required by people in that context including but not adaptively limited to the establishment or removal of limitations on a person achieving goals; experiencing creativity and influence, innovation and change; realising trust, learning, team work and intellectual stimulation;

understanding vulnerability, authenticity, empathy, commitment and performance; visualising goals, solidarity and motivational factors; training self-awareness, self-regulation and emotional intelligence; discovering and applying innate potential and talents through the actions of inspiring a shared vision enabling others to act; modelling, encouraging and empowering others towards that shared vision; behaving with any or all attitudes as optimistically, calmly, flexibly, authoritatively, credibly, dynamically, persuasively, energetically, considerately, affectionately or any variations of and serving the needs of those in context¹⁹³”.

Ethical leadership in particular or ethical life in general can certainly not be reduced to stimuli or morphological natural quality. When it comes to reflect about good and bad, right and wrong, ethical categories can be seen as part of an innate endowment, based on “the poverty-of-stimulus argument” derived by G.E. Moore (*Principia Ethica*, 1903), argument that the good cannot be defined in terms of any other property, also presented as one of the main aspects of a “naturalistic fallacy¹⁹⁴”.

To give some concrete examples, to the question do we possess moral predilections? It could be answered that innate moral predilections related to issues as incest and the value placed on human versus non-

¹⁹³ Morra and Zenker call this definition a “Grand Unifying Leadership Definition”, which includes their research of innateness. Morra, Erica; Zenker, Lisa (2014): *In Search of Innate Leadership : Discovering, Evaluating and Understanding Innateness*, Linnaeus University, Institutionen för organisation och entreprenörskap (OE), Master Thesis Chapter 1, p. 36, <https://www.globethics.net/gel/15112537>

¹⁹⁴ “The naturalistic fallacy always implies that when we think This is good, what we are thinking is that the thing in question bears a definite relation to some one other thing. But this one thing, by reference to which good is defined may be either what I may call a natural object—something of which the existence is admittedly an object of experience—or else it may be an object which is only inferred to exist in a supersensible real world.” Moore, G.E. (1903): *Principia Ethica*, Chapter II: Naturalistic Ethics, §25.

human life may be seen as related to fundamental innate functions (Cf. Stewart-Williams Ch. VII¹⁹⁵).

On the other side, to discover our innate potential or on the contrary genetic factors that tend to make our life more complicated is not so much about scanning our genes, i. e. the necessary conditions for such and such potential (not to be confounded with causal relations), but about reflecting on sufficient conditions that are far more complex than scanning our genes and which are spread around us, in our environment. Although we tend to get innate factors as the most decisive factors, only for epistemic reasons: because “we believe in genes since we can now do things with them that we cannot do as easily with environments.” We will never be able to screen our personal environment the way we screen DNA. Environmental factors are multiple by definition and reasons based on these factors can be of a large variety.

We need an interactionist consensus based on this distinction (Kronfeldner, 2009)¹⁹⁶. As an illness or physical disability is never only based on innate conditions, and genes would not directly cause an illness, genes may certainly interfere in specific ways, among other factors in an interaction process, as we say a disability is caused by genetic predispositions *and* environmental factors.

The model of the *good gardener* or *steward* tries to answer some of the problems related to the strong heteronomy (lack of self-development), and weak anthropocentric nature of the balloon system in the Ancient Greek model of Plato and that is highlighted by the genetic approach of modern science on our capacities and on how environment is crucial as our ethical disposition to interact with both.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Stewart-Williams, Ch. VII, *Selfish Genes and Moral Animals: Morality as an Adaptation*, 175-176.

¹⁹⁶ Maria E. Kronfeldner (2009): *Genetic Determinism and the Innate-Acquired Distinction in Medicine*, *Medicine Studies* (2009) 1:167–181, 168.

Long before modern sciences, the innate capacities centred model of education have been criticised, and it has been proposed to complement it by a moral sentiment based ethics (as the Christian compassion based ethical principle of *agapism*), a more equalitarian essence, and a redirected model of education toward the building of contemplative communities, instead of highlighting particular definitions of *the good*.

The essential ethical structure of our human condition, as an innate structure of human capacities, remains in the centre of this model, which should be seen as a logical development, rather than a radical shift from the balloon type of education as an axiological, hierarchy of values based, ascension of the happy few. The return to nature in philosophical garden related education adds the importance of sharing, among all human beings, some essential pleasures of life, of which the Epicurus model of philosophy remains an example¹⁹⁷.



First crisis with external powers driving education, back to observable data, and building human original communities

Ethical education and knowledge communication as the good gardener/steward (Epicurus)

The key question remains unresolved. What does adjustment to what people deserve mean?

If we distribute education access as directly related to the result of a practice, without focusing so much on the innate qualities – and suppose we don't rely primarily on external sources of authority, but on the learned qualities of those who teach, or on students who enter an educa-

¹⁹⁷ On this topic see our last chapter 6 and Conclusion on the Aesthetics of a Philosophical Garden.

tion system. What are these qualities of the self that make education ethical, in a normative sense?

Let's present a third education model, that of *the juggler*, which will try to avoid the main objections directed against the previous ones.



Modern perspective: self-development, positivism, natural science discoveries, and economic and social science as main guides for technical progress¹⁹⁸; self-oriented education as means for social progress. The problem of technical innovation, without correlative ethical progress

Ethical education and knowledge communication as the juggler and master of a multiplicity of competing cognitive and ethical influences and forces (Darwin, Marx, Foucault)

When persons are asked whether they believe they intimately have some ethical capacities, they for the most part may well answer that they certainly think they do have them, at least to some degree, because we easily imagine some ethical or moral qualities present at early stages of human development. On the contrary, when persons are asked whether they would like to try juggling, most answer by raising some doubts about being able to juggle if they are not experienced jugglers, but most of us don't begin to juggle knowing how to juggle. "Everyone who has started to juggle has found it awkward, annoying, and exhausting –

¹⁹⁸ "The scientists, not the philosophers, now address most effectively the great questions of existence, the mind, and the meaning of human condition". Edward O. Wilson, *The Philosophers' Magazine*, Autumn 1999.

beginners drop the balls more often than they catch them¹⁹⁹” (Wallace, 2017). Access to education opportunities based on merit could therefore be represented in this third model of the juggler, since teaching ethics and education would not be natural and innate, following the point made early in Greek Antiquity by Aristotle:

“Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (*ethike*) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word *ethos* (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; [...] Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit”. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1.

Furthermore, if we enter Modernity and remove an earth centric understanding of the universe, and put in brackets the classical cosmological vision of the world, we find with the Newtonian model of physics that man and the world are part of the universe, as Kant understood it in his research on the place of the solar system in the milky way²⁰⁰. Kanti-

¹⁹⁹ Wallace, Meg, “Juggling and Aristotle, Philosophy and Circus”, 2017, blog entry: <http://www.megwallace.org/juggling-and-aristotle/>

²⁰⁰ „Dem Herrn Wright von Durham, einen Engländer, war es vorbehalten, einen glücklichen Schritt zu einer Bemerkung zu thun, welche von ihm selber zu keiner gar zu tüchtigen Absicht gebraucht zu seyn scheint, und deren nützliche Anwendung er nicht genugsam beobachtet hat. Er betrachtete die Fixsterne nicht als ein ungeordnetes und ohne Absicht zerstreutes Gewimmel, sondern er

an categories of space and time, the belief in freewill, the capacity for logical reasoning, the understanding of persisting identity of objects, people and minds can lead to reject the innateness hypothesis (see Stewart-Williams, Ch. 8, *ibid.*). Although categories are presuppositions that could be seen as innate structures, the transcendental idealist perspective provided by Kant comes back to a common sense position on knowledge and Copernican turn positioning human subject in the center of the experience of knowledge, not innate functions²⁰¹.

The education and teaching model of the juggler becomes more and more dominant, since the perspective of a struggle for power, survival, and recognition, follows the emancipation of man from the classical paradigms of education as presented earlier, which was not mainly focused on self-development, but on the leadership aspect. With Modernity and the new classical liberal principles of individual benefits related education, various models of education emerge such as the democratic liberal and the evolutionist liberal perspectives. The latter perspective is inspired by the theory of evolution and reaction to liberal models, such as the Christian democrat; the radical; and the Marxian or socialist socio-historical point of view, where man is the product of a social and historical conditioning, and an industrial (and fast-approaching) post-industrialized mode of economic production²⁰². If technical and economic production moves to the foreground of the model of society and

fand eine systematische Verfassung im Ganzen, und eine allgemeine Beziehung dieser Gestirne gegen einen Hauptplan der Raume, die sie einnehmen. „ Kant, E. *Allgemeine Naturegeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäude nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt*, Leipzig: Petersen, 1755, Fischer 1988, Bd. 2.

²⁰¹ Op. cit. Stewart-Williams, p. 93.

²⁰² This variety of liberal political view takes different forms, it is not always an extreme position that would sanctify natural selection transposed to social phenomenon as the socio-Darwinism.

model of education, this might induce an asymmetry toward human anthropological progress.

Merit based justifications can be viewed as the intent of the teaching process either a making or doing, as opposed to access to disinterested understanding (knowledge is ethical only if it is definable on the basis of a (manual) mastering, or craftsmanship (*techne*), by contrast to any theoretical principle (*episteme*)). Merit based choices in teaching can rapidly be attributed to our contemporary post-industrial and liberal society, with the classical liberal belief that an activity should be considered good when it brings some benefits but should not necessarily promote a market-centric paradigm opposed to an anthropocentric view of higher education. Post-industrialized liberal education could include idealized cultural wealth and the understanding of a deep system crisis hidden by the simplification of a university education transformed into an “entry and exit system”²⁰³.

Liberal education is not necessarily utilitarian and techno centric, because merit based education can be understood as related to general principle, not only on practical and concrete ends, but entailing the aim of education as the purpose of knowledge for its own sake, through (at least) three varieties of possible normative ethical self-understanding of ethical values in education. As Metz (2009) summarizes it:

“So, one readily finds debate, often in the context of the liberal arts or humanities, about whether public higher education ought to pursue knowledge with little or no expected payoff in terms of health, wealth, liberty or other tangible goods, in order to realize a certain kind of well-being (utilitarianism), develop human excellence qua rational (eudemon-

²⁰³ On this line read: Herrera Llamas, Jorge Antonio (2013): “Ética, equidad y meritocracia en la mercantilización de la educación en Colombia”, *Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética*, 13/1, pp. 9-10.

ism), or accord with norms that persons would freely and reasonably agree to live by (Kantian contractualism)²⁰⁴.”

Taking the eudemonist model as example, good life and personal development should be considered as important, in a *desert-adjusted intrinsic attitudinal eudemonism* that could give a foundation and aim to our highest value in education (cf. Feldman, F. (2004): *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 149; 192-198). As *right based adjustment to merit*, it would remain in line with education for its own sake, and follow the classical aim of knowledge as *mindfulness*, or practical capacity to focus on present issues (*phronesis*), and seek to realize a true form of authentic human knowledge, a collective cultural heritage across generations *paideia* (παιδεία ; cf. Meyer-Bisch).

Knowledge production and circulation as *sensible to merit* can help us start to address the central issue found, in the UNESCO “World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First Century” (1998), where the international organization alarmed us, already 20 years ago, on the need for an urgent recognition of an impending values crisis in the Higher Education sector, due to a lack of clarity in the definition of the value of values, for teachers, students, and university administration. But merit related education can only partially help us clarify some wider societal crisis and contextual specificities related to particular educational cultures and social phenomena. Many great systems of education and morals have been proposed as *great foundational systems*, since the 19th century in particular²⁰⁵, but do we really want to find a new solid foundation for any system of belief today?

²⁰⁴ Thaddeus Metz (2009): “Higher Education, Knowledge For Its Own Sake, and an African Moral Theory”, *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 28 (6), p. 518; see also pp. 517-536.


²⁰⁵ The ethical system of von Hartmann is a significant example of a possible attempt of great foundation, that is now considered as outdated. Cf. Von Hartmann, E. v. *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* (1871), Berlin: Dunker

A solution to this new situation is to focus on a transformative model of education that can integrate the idea of unexpected paradigm shifts and a multipolar world in a positive way, without fear of omitting any educational value, whether cognitive or ethical, as in the juggler paradigm above:

5.3 The Great Global Paradigm Shifts Challenging Higher Education: Cognitive and Ethical Values Acquisition and Sharing

The context of secularization: The historical conditions that explain

<p><i>1.4 Looking for great synthesis and new utopias, not based on innovation but on [global] knowledge circulation, cultural rights and social economy of cultural goods²⁰⁶</i></p>	<p><i>Ethical education and knowledge communication as transformative process; toward a circular Kairos (Leibniz, v. Hartmann, Bolton, SDGs)</i></p>
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Verl. 871pp. In the infinity graph above we show our attempt to formalize Hartman's axiology and complete it, see also note 16.

²⁰⁶ For the complete graph, including text related to the letters, see: the annex, at the end of the chapter.

The crisis is first related to a mental shift from traditional education based on faith, supported by the external authority of the Church, the interpretation of the Bible, and the State power of the Sovereign (T. Hobbes, J. Locke, J. Bentham). From the perspective of the method of knowledge formation, Locke's point of view on innate ideas was to catch the psychological apprehension of truth, while Leibniz's focus is on the enduring properties of the soul and to display the ontological structure of truth as realm of innate knowledge as Goad's good study shows in detail (Goad, 1991)²⁰⁷.

The very late Modern understanding of humanity is close to a – sometimes agonistic – but surely critical understanding of the human being and his place in the society regarding the great problems of traditional metaphysics (as freedom of choice, the relation to God and life after death).

Discussion of knowledge and values become ideally linked to the active inclusion of others, and as part of a rationalized public scheme process of building validity, they are related to a notion of solidarity, or inclusive interactivity, and not to the sole force of brute discharge of unequal powers, or institutionally legitimized inequalities. The role of education changes from an *antiquarian conservation of culture*, where knowledge is deeply rooted to some traditions, possible only for a minority who would safeguard them but would not be ready to face any new contextual historical challenge, as met in a post-industrial and globalized world.

As Bolton (2016, p.14) wraps this change of paradigm by saying that when “cultural stock of knowledge is strong the lifeworld is dominated

²⁰⁷ Goad, Candice Shelby (1991): *Locke and Leibniz: The innateness debate*, op. cit.

by political autocracy, tradition, dogma, and ritual, all relatively unchallenged. Over time it is rationalized in the sense that claims of validity increasingly are exposed to criticism and discussion rather than accepted merely on faith²⁰⁸.”

Knowledge circulation and the role of the University: Between hierarchic, heroic innovators and a crucial contextual –but also mundane– daily work of filtering, evaluating, modifying, and channeling knowledge, the role of higher education institutions and knowledge, particularly knowledge on how teaching should be adapted to new standards, follow ethical, political or pedagogical criteria, which is an important aspect of the freedom of the research and the responsibility of the teacher. Ahlbäck (2018) uses the antinomy between: “microcirculation” “countercirculation” to contrast two very different ways of moving knowledge around the university environment:

“I use the term *microcirculation* for the local, informal, and or un-written circulations by which practical knowledge about teaching methods [are] shared, and *countercirculation* for how academic staff circulated critical knowledge amongst themselves that questioned the legitimacy and applicability of formalized knowledge about university pedagogy²⁰⁹,” [our italic].

In education, communication is a typical interaction, although it is not the sole inclusive path of interaction, as empathy and unconscious pro-attitudes are other possible ways of interacting. Communication may be considered analogous to knowledge sharing, but communication without a desire to change the society and share with others could be

²⁰⁸ Bolton, R. (2016): “A comparison of Habermas-inspired approach and economists' approaches to social capital”, North American Regional Science Conference, Conference paper, p. 14.

²⁰⁹ Anders Ahlbäck (2018): “Unwelcome knowledge: Resistance to pedagogical knowledge in a university setting, c.1965–2005” in: *Circulation of Knowledge: Explorations in the History of Knowledge*, Lund: Nordic Academic Press, pp. 126-7; see also pp. 125-143.

seen as a mere semiotic fact, as lacking an ethical value: for the one who has knowledge dominates the one who lacks it.

For this reason, the principle of communication should be regarded as a basic principle out of which constructive and culturally engaging discourse can flourish. In the following lines, I would like to sketch several normative dimensions that are possible through the interaction of communication, considered not as simple fact or empirical phenomenon, but as a normatively loaded exercise of a mutual power sharing process, between two ideal protagonists of a teaching praxis.

So, if we would want to simply introduce how applied ethics in education largely relies on assumptions we make from the normative ethical side, this means education is built on our ethical values as part of our ethical life. Therefore, we need to present some of the key dimensions of these normative assumptions, related to the ethics of discourse and communication, so that good education is not presented in a descriptive normative way, but in a way relevant to any teacher's experience in action, or concern for the student experience of learning, where communication eliminates the elements that divert attention from what the teacher has to transmit.

Individual, social and meta-ethical presumptions are also important to note, while focusing on normative ethics as the ethics of discourse. We all want to know what sort of reality a value is attached to, in order to live the values we have, without fear of being indoctrinated or worse: that our values are fake values and we have been cheated.

I would like to exemplify all these assumptions and meta-ethical suppositions with current possible issues in education in the African context.

Finally, I would like to discuss the relevance for non-philosophers of this axiology (an axiology is a hierarchy of values) and why understanding the difference between normative, meta-ethical and applied ethical dimensions in teaching are vital, in order to present the form of the

“works of art” of education in an interactive and honest way– to revisit the metaphor of the artist and the painting. But the painting is not only our work of art. As teachers and students, it is also a cultural heritage that we want to transmit to future generations, including the freedom to adjust cultural rights along some basic norms of education.

If we are concerned about the reality of a power relation between the teacher and the student, then we need to realize how serious ethical values are for us compared to the important didactic aim of teaching technical competencies. This is the reason why eudemonistic understanding of the aim of education should be complemented by a right based approach that is aware of the challenging agenda of being founded on democratic processes, cultural heritages, freedom of research, and the conflict between rights, their negation, and the importance of recognizing the dignity of the human person. At this point, we would have achieved the aim of clarifying the extent of good and ethical education, as originating in the lifeworld of our individual and social ethical life, which would entail transforming, or changing, a dialectic category into a right based realization of life and a civil society phenomenon.

5.4 Self-directed Individual Education as Motivating Ground for Common Good and Social Education

- *Teachers and students as learners*: Borrowed from the classical Greek normative ethics: the concept of *aletheia* is central, it means unconcealed-ness, and can be defined as being in the truth and should be understood as disclosure, exposing what is hidden, all of which is subconsciously in conflict and repressed in our nature. It is viewed as coherence occurring between our thoughts and words, and coherence between words and deeds (Probuscka, 2016). In the framework of education there are many ways to understand this concept and apply it. One

way is to say that a student is essentially a learner. Once truth has become part of the student's life, the student has de facto become a learner, and we know that teachers are the main learners in a higher education institution.

We can introduce the understanding of unconcealed-ness from the point of view of communication ethics in the empirical field of documentation and library resources, with the student being an agent.

- *Teachers and students as agents*: Communication ethics, as unconcealed-ness, is creating conditions for active learning processes, by opposition of passive learning conditions, particularly in the construction of knowledge, through library resources. The teacher should draw attention to the importance of the student adopting an intellectual approach of his own, and this should in the first instance, include proper library resources monitoring, involving teacher, student and the [university] librarian. Indeed "... for a concept to be well assimilated by the student, there must have been an intellectual approach. To assert a fact to him or even to make him notice [as in a lecture] will not have the same impact in the long term, than if a student has participated at the construction of his knowledge" (Papin, 2010), by interactive communication processes and the introduction to library resources²¹⁰. How frustrating it can be when access to information is not available, when a library door is being closed, after effort is made to get to the entrance. Teachers have the re-

²¹⁰Papin, D. (2010) : Favoriser la construction des connaissances dans les formations documentaires, <https://tribuneci.wordpress.com/2010/09/20/favoriser-la-construction-des-connaissances-dans-les-formations-documentaires/>

sponsibility to monitor library resources' information as prerequisite to any discipline teaching.

- *Teachers and students as virtuous agents*: One trivial objection against communication ethics as an attempt at being unconcealed is to say that many aspects of the learning process are de facto either hidden, or beyond voluntary intentional capacities turned in the direction of an explicit language flow between the learning parties. Consider the instance of a university library entrance being hidden or closed. Strong ethical commitment to appropriate axiology of values certainly favours good communication and active learning processes, but it supposes some particular learning virtues.

When it comes to shaping the right personality and character, a cardinal learning virtue is the virtue of patience: 'makrothymia', a combination of two words makro + thymia, which means long + anger. "It implies that there is a sufficient long pause, a sign of 'wait' before deciding to express one's anger. It could be described as "long-tempered" (...) as against a more familiar and accepted use of the term: "short tempered". This means that primarily, there is legitimacy for the emotion of anger that rises in one's body, mind and soul, to be expressed in public. Patience does not mean swallowing one's pain, pathos and humiliation forever" (Anderson-Rajkumar, 2016). A philosophy of the truth as unconcealed-ness is, therefore, a philosophy of the mask of patience as well. If education is defined as a kind of political philosophy, then having the right friends and building the right communities is as important as having the right means (resources, books, discovery tools). Schools and universities need to be organised as communities (Sas, 2010). The aim of education is to shape character and moral civic virtues, before forming competencies of any type. To develop what we mean by civic virtue we first need to better understand social education.

5.5 Social Education and the Point of View of the Rights: Cultural Rights and Africa

Contemporary fears of technological and environmental threats have put the concept of responsibility into a dominant place. The parent-child relation can be viewed as the central paradigm of responsibility, as it relates to who we are as human beings, with essential characteristics and who we ought to be as an ethical responsible person. (ref. Hans Jonas; Neequaye, 2013). Responsibility can be understood as religion-related and/or philosophical ethical. In the African context, a religious based understanding of responsibility has some advantages over secular ones related to the place of Africa in the global Church history and the resilience of African faith to 20th century Western secularism²¹¹.

In the following paragraph we shall present how a philosophical faith –not religious institutions only– and philosophical dialogue based motive of social ethics can help build some epistemic and ethical normative paths toward African community ethics, and human development; and how this initiates some key elements of the concept of collective cultural rights in an unexpected way.

From a collective self-oriented point of view, human rights education needs to move in the direction of cultural rights understanding in order to develop a convincing framework for global citizenship education. It is possible only if ethical philosophy helps address this gap between different understandings of human rights, that ethical philosophy in the education sector would not only be aimed at professional philosophers, but at the grasping of the diversity of cultural facts, and outlining (as has always been its task) an anthropology of global knowledge and global ethical values in context.

²¹¹ See e. g.: “Earth integrity” as community and Church commitment, toward future generations; a WCC global ecumenical programme.

Social ethics could be defined, not as religious *aliquid* and a strict Church community matter, but as a philosophical praxis (with Wittgenstein) and, as we introduced above, a transformative model in the critical theory perspective with J. Habermas and H. Arendt. The ethics of communication is grounded in a philosophical faith through questioning, as means to uncover the most urgent educational and anthropological progress agendas, - or what we name simply: “social dimension” in education. Authority may prefer that intimate truth be considered latest truth, as opposed to truth related to dialogue, debates and confrontation. The ethical intention, with regards to prospective or retrospective dimensions of human choice is important in new domains of information and communication (Agostinelli, 2005)²¹².

In a possibly surprising way for non-Africans, we might discover the African conception of the personhood as presenting the advantage of being already rooted in a dialogical way, because of the African conception of the person. Personhood “is something that is attained in direct proportion to one's moral worth and one's relations with her surrounding community” as a key asset (Matolino, 2008). Mbiti (1970, 140) argues that within the African system, this network of relationships binds everyone together, such that African people conceive their relations as familial. Human beings derive his/her identity from his/her “shared fate with her other fellow human beings”. The family in the African scheme is not limited to the immediate relations of what he describes as a household, but distant relatives are part, as is anybody who “belongs to the same kinship system”. If society is understood by analogy to family, then citizenship might be related to natural virtues instead of pure artificial conventions as when I might feel just to favour my family, my ethnic identity, my tribe, etc. Although early modern philosophers such as Hume, and later Hegel, warn us against the analogy of natural based

²¹² Agostinelli, Serge (2005) : « Introduction » in : *L'éthique des situations de communication numérique*, Paris : L'Harmattan, pp. 7-9.

communities and social conventions, there might be a dialectical relation between the levels of commitment, the proto-conventional level of the family, and the conventional level of social norms and active citizenship.

Furthermore, metaphysical and religious ethical dimensions of life should help us to understand ourselves as part of the big family of the human species (*homo sapiens*) and prevent us from being reduced to a strictly individual understanding of our role on earth, in social life, and in regard to our human rights and duties. If African Ubuntu “is both a state of being and of becoming, both of which are anchored in reciprocity of care, thus as a process of self-realization through others”, then Ubuntu should be considered as a great development in understanding human rights as it not only covers self-directed individual rights, but also collective or interdependent rights. Particularly, for comprehension of the importance of cultural rights, the African community based system of values should be considered as showing the path to understand cultural rights, and recognize their logic of interdependency, (cf. the *Fribourg Declaration of Cultural Rights*, Chuva, 2014; Meyer-Bisch, 2016²¹³).

²¹³ Chuva, L.T. (2014): "Ubuntu Ethics", in: *African Indigenous Ethics in Global Bioethics Interpreting Ubuntu*, New York: Springer Verl., p. 33, Ch. 2. *Fribourg Declaration of Cultural Rights*, <http://www.unifr.ch/iiedh/assets/files/Declarations/declaration-eng4.pdf>. Patrice Meyer-Bisch, Stefania Gandolfi, Greta Balliu (éds.): *Souveraineté et coopérations: Guide pour fonder toute gouvernance démocratique sur l'interdépendance des droits de l'homme* (2016), Geneva : Globethics.net. http://www.globethics.net/documents/4289936/19073413/GE_souverainete_cooperations_web_final.pdf

5.5.1 Extract of the Main Definitions of Cultural Rights Regarding Education:

In the Art. 2, under “definitions”, the *Declaration of Cultural Rights* proposes a constituting understanding of cultural rights, where culture is not seen as an exterior product of language behavior without value oriented consequences on the development of the whole human being. It says that:

- a. “The term "culture" covers those values, beliefs, convictions, languages, knowledge and the arts, traditions, institutions and ways of life through which a person or a group expresses their humanity and the meaning they give to their existence and to their development;
- b. The expression “cultural identity” is understood as the sum of all cultural references through which a person, alone or in community with others, defines or constitutes oneself, communicates and wishes to be recognized in one's dignity;
- c. “Cultural community” denotes a group of persons who share references that constitute a common cultural identity that they intend to preserve and develop.”

In relation to higher education, cultural rights concern, in reference to cultural communities, the right of:

“Everyone [to be] free to choose to identify or not to identify with one or several cultural communities, regardless of frontiers, and to modify such a choice” (Art. 4a);

From the point of view of African understanding of the person, this later possibility to choose freely one’s reference to a particular community might need further reflections that we leave for any possible additional enquiry or survey.

Cultural rights are delimitating the right to access knowledge in relation to:

“The freedom to develop and share knowledge and cultural expressions, to conduct research and to participate in different forms of creation as well as to benefit from these” (Art. 5b) (see on ethics in research: Toulouse, 1998)²¹⁴.

The following two articles explain why the right to education as right throughout one’s lifespan includes not only fundamental educational development capacities, but as in Greek *paidea*, special care is taken for the cultural heritage of individuals and groups, across multiple generations, in respect of others’ similar rights and in acceptance of cultural diversity. Therefore, this right is not based on the idea of a conflict of cultures, but as in the 19th century, it is related to the notion of education reform, and reform of the sciences given the need for a large number of students to enter education institutions. But is it possible to have only a non-competitive understanding of cultures, without any agonistic layers? Comparison and care/compassion are both necessary, and rights allow reducing subjective differences into common aims:

Art. 6 (education and training)

“Within the general framework of the right to education, everyone has the right throughout one’s lifespan, alone or in community with others, to education and training that, in response to fundamental educational needs, contribute to the free and full development of one’s cultural identity while respecting the rights of others and cultural diversity. This right includes in particular:

²¹⁴ See also examples since twenty years to formulate the deontology of the researcher as a call to federate education and research around ethical values: Gérard Toulouse (1998): *Regards sur l’éthique des sciences*, Hachette Littératures, p.24.

- a. Human rights education and knowledge;
- b. The freedom to teach and to receive teaching of and in one's language and in other languages, as well as knowledge related to one's own culture and other cultures;
- c. The freedom of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions while respecting the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of the child on the basis of her/his capacities;
- d. The freedom to establish, to direct and to have access to educational institutions other than those run by the public authorities, on the condition that the internationally-recognized norms and principles in the area of education are respected and that these institutions comply with the minimum rules prescribed by the State.

Art. 7 (communication and information)


Within the general framework of the rights to freedom of expression, including artistic freedom, as well as *freedom of opinion and information*, and with respect for cultural diversity, everyone, alone or in community with others, has *the right to free and pluralistic information that contributes to the full development of one's cultural identity*. This right, which may be exercised *regardless of frontiers*, comprises in particular:

- a. *The freedom to seek, receive and impart information;*
- b. *The right to participate in pluralist information, in the language(s) of one's choice, to contribute to its production or its dissemination by way of all information and communication technologies;*

c. The right to respond to erroneous information concerning cultures, with full respect of the rights expressed in this Declaration.” (ibid. our italic)

If cultural rights are ethical, values-based entities, then the question of the meta-ethical grounding of these values should be clarified in order to address new forms of cultural goods and developments.

5.5.2 Annex



5.6 Bibliography (extract)

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CONCLUSION: THE AESTHETICS OF A PHILOSOPHICAL GARDEN

Shared Spiritual Exercises between Greek Autarky and Community and the Ethical Value of Christian Humility and Capacity of Self-Organisation and Cooperation

In the previous five chapters I intended to show five contrasting yet similar philosophical ethical readings on what makes us consider a value to be ethical. Is it our fundamental quest to recognize the human being as built on an anthropological ethical constituting layer of the experience, called comprehension, compassion or love? Is it on the contrary a biological thermodynamic structure of our affects which is punctually discharging in an ethical language some deeper and hidden instinctive capacities, ultimately related to our self-mastering of the world? Aren't we mainly concerned by some relation between ethical subjects, to recognize a fundamental ethical community which would be needed to collaborate around a social contract? Therefore, neither the deep foundation in transcendental essential structure which grants the reality of our ethical experience, nor the biological instinctual level of expression of life would be the main entry point to ethics; it would be our capacity to identify a system of higher values, built on individual interrelations of reciprocity and solidarity. Furthermore, we considered the ethics of virtue and generosity, and our capacity of forming clear intentions, as those virtues which can help us the most for the very sake of good edu-

cation and strong social impact. Finally, we have moved ethics on the background and put education as main figure of our enquiry, asking how much should be expected from the ethical subject when it comes to learning, how much has necessarily to be left to innate structures? We can recognize a human right for education, but this right depends on a very basic level on our ethical development and our capacity to position ourselves as right holder, in a space of interrelated human rights in conflict (but should not mean in negation). Cultural rights are among the most important abstract and formal tool that we have in order to systematically describe the normative human right based interrelated hyperstructure of good education.

As conclusion we would want now to enlarge our journey in applied ethics to a last allegory of philosophical education and ethics, that of seeing the normativity of ethics as being placed in an imaginary space of a philosophical garden. Based on our experience, and the inspiring paradigm an *Epicurean garden*, we would like to describe this space as a shared space of spiritual exercises between Greek autarky and community, and in touch with the ethical value of Christian humility and capacity of self-organisation and cooperation.

Epicure's view on socio-political issues differs from the one expressed by the main Stoic schools regarding how the wise man should behave, pertaining political matters, either by political activism or favouring a private life, avoiding public notice, "which has not to be a life of solitude" but of an enlightened community based on high order [Greek] friendship²¹⁵. The aesthetics of a philosophical garden, as a

²¹⁵ This attitude is not a *categorical imperative*, only a context driven philosophical ethical attitude, similar to phenomenological bracketing of the experience, that is held as valid "unless some emergencies force" the person to engage in political activism. *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, C. J Rowe, Malcolm Schofield, Melissa Lane, Simon Harrison (Eds.), Cambridge: UP, p. 436.

place for shared spiritual exercises, is a metaphorical inner space of the self, or thought experiment, based on the imaginary structure of a real garden.

One of the most profound relation between poetical imagination in dreams and the world or the garden as a place of a “poetic intentionality”, has been made by Bachelard’s essay of enlarging the philosophical cogito, with the intentionality of the imagination, inspired by the Epicurean wisdom of a disengagement of preoccupations of the daily life:

“once the dreamer has dismissed all the preoccupations that encumbered daily life, when he has detached himself from the anxiety that comes from the care of others, when he is really the author of his solitude, when finally he can contemplate, without counting the hours, a beautiful aspect of the universe, he feels, this dreamer, a being who opens in him. Suddenly such a dreamer is dreamer of the world. He opens to the world and the world opens to him. We never saw the world well if we did not dream what we saw²¹⁶”.

There has been some recent substantial research done on the philosophy and ethics of gardens, going from ontological and aesthetical philosophical definitions (Cooper, 2006) to applied ethical normative reflections on landscape and environment planning (Müller, 2017). Although no consensus about the strict semantic of what the philosophy of gardens should be, as Cooper shows, one reason for it is being that from an aesthetical point of view, “a world without garden would not be one in which a kind of appreciation is lost, but merely one that is devoid of certain objects or occasions for the joint exercise of familiar kinds” following Cooper (2008)²¹⁷. It is obvious, and geographical splendours

²¹⁶ Bachelard, G. (1960/1971): *The Poetics of Reverie*, Transl. D. Russell, Ch. 5, *Reverie and Cosmos*, p. 175, Boston: Beacon Press.

²¹⁷ “[...] there simply doesn’t exist, within the philosophical community, a shared perception of a ‘discipline’ – *the* philosophy of gardens – replete with

and catastrophes suffice to demonstrate it, that there is no need of a human centric notion of the world to be impressed by its blessing beauty and terrifying unpredictability. Of course literally speaking, garden appreciation seems to be a mix of art and natural appreciations, although Japanese garden could consist on the contrary in the indiscernible unity of artificial and natural types of appreciations. On this line of argument, it seems questionable whether it is at all possible to distinguish, even in Renaissance type of gardens, a degree of evaluation of artistic style and a technic, as in any sportive discipline such as diving or ice skating. Of course there are different garden styles (English, Italian, French gardens, etc.), and therefore a style could be defined by opposition to another style, but from a systematic analytical point of view a garden style is an atmosphere, not some sufficient and necessary sets of components, such as music and dance for the work of art constituted by a ballet. An atmosphere is related to the experience of a totality, not to the figurative language adapted to describe precisely the contours of particular things composing the whole: it is about a presence, a mood, a feeling, a tone:

“Beauty, grandeur, impressiveness [of] scenery, is not often to be found in a few prominent, distinguishable features, but in the manner and the unobserved materials with which these are connected and combined. Clouds, lights, states of the atmosphere, and circumstances that we cannot always detect, affect all landscapes²¹⁸”.

But this is not to say that there might not be ways to reconstruct, based on existing appreciations, a whole typology “garden virtues” and “vices” for example (ibid. Cooper, Ch.5, 2008).

well-defined ‘problems’, ‘methods’, and ‘research programmes’.” David E. Cooper, David E. (2008): *A Philosophy of Gardens*, pp. 1 and 44, Oxford: UP. Cf. also pp. 90, 99 on virtues and vices.

²¹⁸ Olmsted, Frederick Law (1852) : *Walks and Talks of an American Farmer in England*, New York : Putnam, p.154. See also Cooper, p. 52, ibid.

Does a landscape, that we could imagine as purely a natural object, without a human presence, have an [aesthetical] value? Not sure, but even from a theist and anthropocentric perspective, different hierarchies of values could be differentiated, as we might try to show below, distinguishing “garden virtues” and “vices”.

6.1 Garden Virtues and Garden Vices

The Preacher of the Ecclesiastes describes the construction and possession of a garden as a symbol of individual success and greatness of earthly achievements, but although this is all the fruits of my work: “all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun.” (Ecc II, 11). If we shift our attention from the empirical objects and observable actions of planting vineyards, the fruit trees, of making pools of water to water the wood (Ecc II, 4-5), etc. and focus on the virtue and practice related to these activities, that imply to care about life, to be in communion with the nature, the vanity of possessing natural objects to make my neighbour envious seems to be missing the point, because one needs to turn away from self-interest in order to experience a disinterested relationship to the plants, the flowers and the trees, and fully appreciate the atmosphere of a garden as a whole (Cooper, *ibid*, p.94). Descartes and Aquinas also talked about loving for our own good (*amor concupiscentiae*²¹⁹), that’s when we may say we love the river near our house, which is not for the good of our river; and there is a quite different love of a good, of a person, for his/her own good (*amor benevolentiae*), as we should love our children: normally not only for our own good (although some egoistic motive may coexist with essentially altruistic ones, as in egoism of groups). How to build a culture that can live in

²¹⁹ Descartes, René (1649): *Passion of the Soul*, Part II, Art. 82. Gallimard. Aquinas, T. *The Summa Theologica*, Of the Passions of the Soul in Particular: and First, of Love.

harmony with the garden? An ecumenical religious interpretation, focusing on the “creation’s integrity”, understood as the aim of preserving the gift of the earth’s richness and “sustain the world’s life”, shows the actuality of this important environmental agenda. It is the great challenge to which church organisations are responding by worldwide processes, such as the World Council of Church’s “Justice, peace and the integrity of creation” programme²²⁰.

Let’s take the negative image of the richness and plenitude of this garden that may make our neighbour envious by its abundance, and turn to the French contemporary philosopher Simone Weil (1909-1943) who could help to grasp a metaphysical explanation of the world –or for us the garden– as the mark of the withdrawal of God, which she illustrates by the landscape of the beach at low tide (cf. Comte-Sponville, 2012).

The beauty of the garden, that some may envy, could be explained by the proposition that the world looks like God (hence its beauty) but not as plenitude of forms, and overabundance but on the contrary as hollow, like the shore when the sea has retreated, which looks like the ocean that has forged and abandoned it. The world is the trace of the absent God, the emptiness of his disappeared presence – “as done at low tide, on the wet sand, the absence, but actual, but visible, of the flood that is no longer there” (ibid p. 419). The garden as the world at large is creation from God, but not as “an act of self-expansion, but of withdrawal, of renunciation. God and all creatures are less than God alone, God has accepted this diminution²²¹.”

The paradoxical image of a compassionate gardener - but inconsistent “moderator” of the whole creation, was already present in Cal-

²²⁰ Raiser, Konrad (2018): *The Challenge of Transformation: An Ecumenical Journey*, WCC Publications, p.102.

²²¹ Weil, Simone (1942): “Formes de l’amour implicite de Dieu”, *Œuvres*, Gallimard, coll. « Quarto », 1999, p. 723-24. Also Comte-Sponville, André (2012): *Le sexe ni la mort. Trois essais sur l’amour et la sexualité*, Éditions Albin Michel, p.419.

vin's *Catechism*, if we compare the interpretation of God's will of preservation of Earth and Heaven as an altruistic "stewardship", and not only a one time creation, with episodes of tyrannical domination: as God "framed the world in the beginning, so he still preserves it; and that the earth and all other things abide, only as they are preserved by his power and management/ stewardship"²²² but episodic crisis happen, when "by withdrawing his hand", wet places would shift dramatically on earth and become barren, since all things are subject to his dominion, he is as well not only author of tempests and hails, but as well of hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes and climate change.

Christian religious communities, such as that of St. Benedict, praise spiritual development as religious ethical and philosophical understanding of life; Andrew Williams reminds us: "There is nothing more important in our own list of important things to do in life than to stop at regular times, in regular ways to remember what life is really about, where it came from, why we have it, what we are to do with it, and for whom we are to live it. [...] A spiritual life without a regular prayer life and an integrated community consciousness is pure illusion"²²³. Prayers and a well-structured community life are important to shape the conditions of a good life, but if one of the motivations is to be capable of leaving the comfort zone of the home and work, for very meaningful purposes as spiritual exercises, this bracketing of everyday experience could be done by philosophical method. A garden, or any landscape

²²² The text which follows makes the notion of arbitrary domination more explicit: "[God] is alike the author of the rain and the drouth, of the hail and other tempests, and of fair weather: who makes the earth fruitful by his bounty, and by withdrawing his hand, again renders it barren: from whom alike come health and disease: to whose dominion, all things are subject, and to whose will, all things are obedient." Calvin, John (1570): *The Catechism of the Church of Geneva*, transl. E. Waterman, 1815, Hartford: Sheldon & Goodwin: p. 14.

²²³ Williams, Andrew, "When is it time to stop and pray", Unpublished, Communication to the Ecumenical Center, Geneva, 19.10.2017.

outside the space of the agora, could well become a special place for meditation and intersubjective sharing, although a sacred space would need to be clearly defined by some symbolic means if we remain in the framework of the great global religions²²⁴. A long tradition of theologians from Clement of Alexandria to John Calvin oppose a “true fear of God” and orthodox Christian dogmatic doctrine to the interpretation of philosophers who, full of “pride and vanity”, are considered limiting their knowledge to their personal or own knowledge, instead of that of Ecclesial orthodoxy, including for instance Epicurus, among these “wise barbarians”²²⁵. Calvin uses a nice garden metaphor referring to Paul, to underline the notion of *solī deo Gloria* crucial for Protestant Reform:

"[...] we are *wild olive-trees*, (Rom.11:24,) and unproductive, until we are ingrafted into Christ, who by his living root makes us fruit bearing trees, in accordance with that saying, (John, 15:1) *I am the vine, ye are the branches*. He at the same time shews the end - that we may promote the glory of God. For no life is so excellent in appearance as not to be corrupted and become offensive in the view of God, if it is not directed towards this ject²²⁶."

Also: “You have all things from God, [...] therefor be solicitous and humble²²⁷.”

²²⁴ Gerald Dwi Rizndi Kongkoli, “A Home with(out) Walls”, in: *God is Everywhere*, Geneva: Globethics.net, 2017.

²²⁵ “Heretic and philosopher are named by οησισοφοι or δοκησισοφοι and οιεσισοφοι, βαρβαροι σοφισται” A. Le Boulluec, A. (1985): *La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque. IIe - IIIe siècles*, Vol. II : Clément d'Alexandrie et Origène, Paris, Études Augustiniennes, p. 270. *Calvin's Complete Commentary*, Volume 8: Philippians to Jude, Philippians 11.1, Delmarva Publications, 2013.

²²⁶ *Ibid.* Philippians 11.1.

²²⁷ *Ibid.* Philippians 2.13.

But a philosophical spirituality that would keep an idealized image of God as “blessedness and immortality²²⁸” with Epicurus may still be considered, not only as iconoclast – vis-à-vis a traditional Greek [pagan] polytheism, as well as to Christian faith since he believed the corporeal nature of soul, and recognized to some humans the quality of *deus mortalis*, that perishes after death -, but Epicurus should be seen as well as the image of a true secular believer [gnostic], since he professes to act out of fear, inspired by the perfection of a supreme being. Basing his conviction of an ethic of tranquil contemplation on a first fundamental “principle of conservations”, the philosopher nicely introduces the image of the seed as precept of sufficient reason for the generation of all things [that cannot be created by the arbitrary will of gods], and proposes an ecological notion of perpetual recycling and transformation of unanimated bodies. Is there behind the ability of nature to transform matter without any loss, a partly unknown and perhaps unexplainable process? Therefore, the temptation to see that the regenerative property of the world is oriented toward small scale economic relations and actions, that may have less unintended consequences, could be seen as an “invisible hand” type of general equilibrium, including industrial human activities. There would be in domestic human economic activities, and gradually on larger scales, a hand with a green thumb: minimizing our

²²⁸ Cicero (45-43 BC.): *De Natura Deorum*, I.44, c. XVII: “Since the belief in question [belief of a god/of gods] was determined by no ordinance or custom or law, and since a fast unanimity continues to prevail among all men without exception, it must be understood that the gods exist. For we have notions of them implanted, or rather innate, within us, and, as that upon which the nature of all men is agreed must needs be true, their existence must be acknowledged. If their existence is all but universally admitted, not only among philosophers, but also among those who are not philosophers, there is a further admission that must in consistency be made, namely, that we possess a preconception which makes us think of them as blessed and immortal. For nature, that gave us the notion of gods as such, has also engraved in our minds the conviction that they are blessed and eternal.”

waste, since market and nature would have in common a computational nature, a high order collective intelligence, - but the whole starting at the modest level of the family and domestic communities²²⁹. For the Greek culture, a divine presence, a predication of God by worship and hope is stronger than just the fatalist view of a natural causal determination; God cannot be simply related to the domain of the hazard, for most educated persons since Plato, it is for Classical Epicurean philosophers a God of worship and a god-man²³⁰.

If we turn back to the regeneration doctrine of Epicurus, following Parmenides footsteps, it only states that: “concerning the non-evident” processes in Nature, that are beyond our capacity of observation

“nothing comes into being out of what is not. For in that case everything would come into being out of everything, with no need for seeds. (...) Also, if that which disappears were destroyed into what is not, all things would have perished, for lack of that into which they dissolved.” (*Letter to Herodotus* 38-9)²³¹

Without seeds for specific species in the garden, anything whatsoever could be generated out of just any types of material elements. And nothing can be destroyed *stricto sensu*, since in that case “everything would cease to exist (and would have ceased to exist either as instantaneous process, either before now, given infinite past time — recall that

²²⁹ Fressoz, J.-B. (2016) : « La main invisible a-t-elle le pouce vert ? Les fauxsemblants de “l’écologie industrielle” au xixe siècle », *Techniques&Culture* 65-66 « Réparer le monde. Excès, reste et innovation », pp. 324-339.

²³⁰ Bollack, Jean (1975) : *La pensée du Plaisir. Épicure: textes moraux, commentaires*, Paris : Les Éditions de Minuit, p. 137.

²³¹ Long, A.A. & Sedley D.N (1987): *The Hellenistic philosophers*, Vol. I, Epicureanism, “The principle of conservation”, Cambridge University Press, p. 25. See also: Lucretius I, 159-173; 225-237, *ibid.* Freymuth, G., (1953): *Zur Lehre von den Götterbildern in der epikureischen Philosophie*, Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften.

nothing is created out of nothing”. But it is a profound philosophical astonishment that things do exist, and the natural cycle shows that death takes time, it is not annihilation, it contributes to the growth of other things. Hence the premise is false, and a place for assurance and even a religious ethics of hope is possible, as an eschatology inspired by a theology focusing on the very notion of *hope*, with Moltmann, could resonate appropriate in this context.

As example we find in the reading of Revelation 21 instead of Genesis, and its revolutionary effect on life (Moltmann, 1967/2009²³²): “a new earth” “prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband” (Rev. 21.2). A true Christian humility based ethics, in conjunction to a dose of philosophical faith and hope, gathered at the materialistic source and wisdom of Epicurean philosophy, could cooperate with the sacred space of the Churches and spread as eco-theology or eco-philosophy a combination of environmental ethics, theology philosophy, and Church ecological education and sustainable administration²³³. Contrary to

²³² Moltmann, Jürgen (orig. German 1965, transl. 1967/1991): *Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology*, San Francisco: Harper, p.291 and p.28: “a god of the present and eternal present god”.

²³³ As a good example of an integrated research between philosophy, ecology, education and theology, see Globethics.net Collection on Ecotheology: <http://www.globethics.net/web/ecotheology>. In his book, Prof. Werner shows the important work that needs to be done and discrepancy between studies done on the environment, commitment from Churches, and real theological education involvement in ecological education: “[...] in a few institutions of theological education and Christian leadership development issues of eco-theology, climate justice and food security form part of the regular curriculum of instruction and training or inform theological formation processes in an integrated perspective, especially [...] in exchange with the global South”. Dietrich Werner, Elisabeth Jeglitzka, *Eco-Theology, Climate Justice and Food Security, Theological Education and Christian Leadership Development*, Globethics.net Global Series No. 14, pp. 13-14.

Onfray, we would not emphasize that the great monotheisms reduced the world, because they “wanted to celebrate a book that pretended to say the totality of the world. To do so they have dismissed books, which were saying the world differently²³⁴”. Instead of confronting both secular and religious ethics, we try to show the complementarity of them as equal wisdoms, or as related to particular capacities of adaptation.

6.2 A Garden Based Space out of the Agora

Beside the agora where human beings mutually recognise each other as citizen, and that is the symbolic place of our thoughts, there is a garden. Man works out the world so that it becomes a place to live but ends up transforming the earth into propriety and losing the meaning of the garden for the Greeks and in the Gospel. The philosophical garden, in our understanding, should not be the symptom of good life in the sense of prosperity theology teaching that “faithful Christians can expect God to bless them with financial prosperity” (Higginson, 2012²³⁵).

There might be other good reasons to quit the agora and the walls of our towns that initiate a poetical and philosophical journey in the garden, other than enjoying a business lifestyle, exalted by a health and wealth Gospel that might drive to serious disillusion. Grygielewicz

²³⁴ Onfray’s criticism against a Christian world view that he sees in opposition to [Epicurean] philosophy, may be related to some early conflict between the Church, represented by St Jerome who branded Lucretius enemy of all religions, and whom he described a psychopath who committed suicide. Onfray’s “transcendental Epicureanism” is explicitly relates to the teachings of Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura*, much more in line with what Virgil’s eulogistic memory of the Epicurean Roman. Virgil (29 BCE) *Georgics*, Thomas, Richard F. (ed.), 2 vol., Cambridge, 1988, 2.490–2. See: Onfray, Michel (2015): *Cosmos Une ontologie matérialiste*, Paris: Flammarion, p. 523.

²³⁵ Higginson, Richard (2012): *Faith, Hope & the Global Economy: A Power for Good*, Ch. 2. Theology in Business, Series Editor: Mark Greene, Gosport, Hampshire: Inter-Varsity Press, p.24.

(2017) nicely describes some original metaphors in the Bible but also in Greek philosophy of the garden, as *the walking trees* of the Gospel, where “Jesus Cures a Blind Man at Bethsaida” and seems to invite to stay true to a wandering nature of man, that doesn’t conceive any absolute sense of *here or elsewhere*²³⁶, i.e. a global ethical dimension. The philosophical garden is a common world, described as a path between nature and places constructed by humans:

“22 They came to Bethsaida. Some people brought a blind man to him and begged him to touch him. 23 He took the blind man by the hand and led him out of the village; and when he had put saliva on his eyes and laid his hands on him, he asked him, ‘Can you see anything?’ 24 And the man looked up and said, ‘I can see people, but they look like trees, walking.’ 25 Then Jesus laid his hands on his eyes again; and he looked intently and his sight was restored, and he saw everything clearly. 26 Then he sent him away to his home, saying, ‘Do not even go into the village.’”²³⁷

“At the present day, under the general name of gardens, we have pleasure-grounds situated in the very heart of the City, as well as extensive fields and villas. Epicurus, that connoisseur in the enjoyments of a life of ease, was the first to lay out a garden at Athens; up to his time it had never been thought of, to dwell in the country in the middle of the town²³⁸.”

²³⁶ Cf. Grygielewicz, Malgorzata (2017), *Le jardin grec*, Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 21, 30.

²³⁷ Mark 8:22-26, New Revised Standard Version (NRSV).

²³⁸ Pliny the Elder, *The Natural History*, The Pleasures of the Garden, Ch. 19.4. UTL=<<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:abo:phi,0978,001:19C>>

The garden for Epicurus is not a place for gardening; it is a place for the accomplishment of one's symbolic perfection, a renaissance to the self. Epicurean spirituality is not to be confounded with Aristippean hedonism, as Feldman rightly explains, which could be tagged as "default hedonism" and summarized as a system of values, where: "bodily pleasures are more valuable than mental, intellectual pleasures, since physical pleasure tend to be more intense than mental ones²³⁹". Spiritual exercises in Ancient philosophy are key, they are means to free human being from biological and cultural determinations. It doesn't follow from the hypothesis that a return to nature and pleasure is valuable, that short term and physical pleasures should be considered as highest goods. Physical pleasures are in general more intense than mental ones, as Aristippus was keen to notice, but it doesn't follow because quality of life could be defined by the addition of episodes of pleasure, and because pleasure could be considered as intrinsically good, no other thing (as knowledge, virtue, freedom, good intention) has a primordial role, since it doesn't directly determine intrinsic values of complex things composed by pleasure or good life. The problem of pleasure, by contrast to good life, is that libertinage or lust put us in the impossibility to achieve our aim of a good life, as maxim no.10 presents clearly, therefore the problem of lust and sensual pleasure is not having lost the main aim of good life but of having chosen the wrong means.

"If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind,--the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain ; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflow-

²³⁹ Feldman, Fred (2006): *Pleasure and the Good Life. Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism*, Oxford: OUP, pp.30-33. In particular p. 30: The Hedonism of Aristippus of Cyrene (c.435-350BC).

ing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil²⁴⁰.”

By contrast to Aristippus' views on the value of sensual pleasure, Epicurean values converge around a “Life of tranquil reflection”, that should not be seen as identical with static pleasures [*katastematic*, or negative pleasures] which occur when bodily pain or mental disturbance are removed (Feldman, p.95). If pain stops, one could just not feel anything, neither pleasure nor pain (as it has been argued famously by Plato, *Philebus* and Cicero, *De Finibus*, II)²⁴¹. Furthermore, we cannot feel pleasure without taking pleasure at something. The difficult health conditions of the philosopher Epicurus at the end of his life, who was suffering from renal calculus, may partly explain the sober shapes of his hedonism, essentially based on the recognition of the [natural] limitations of pleasure, compared to Titus Lucretius Carus (?94-51 BC) far more sophisticated, from the point of view of the ethics of taste, if we look at some villas found in Herculaneum, decorated of works of art that are saying long on the taste of Roman Epicureanism²⁴²:

²⁴⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, R.D. Hicks, Ed. Book X, Epicurus, 139-154. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=D.+L.+10&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258>. A good philological analysis by Bollock, 1975, op. cit. p. 273.

²⁴¹ For a good résumé of Epicurean ethics and possible objections: Feldman *ibid*: pp. 91-107.

²⁴² “We find a good résumé of the sober eudemonistic ethics of Epicurus by Long and Sedley, pp. 6-7: “Epicureanism's means of teaching us to maximize the pleasantness of life include eliminating fears of the unknown; recognizing the utility of mutual benefits and non-aggression; and mapping out the natural limits of pleasure and attempt to exceed which is merely counterproductive. The tranquility of Epicurean enlightenment, complemented by a few simple enjoyments, and underpinned by friendship with others of the same persuasion, can emulate even the paradigmatic bliss of the divinities we worship.”

“The sardines caught in the Mediterranean, the olive oil produced with the fruits of the garden. The fishes are pickled with lemon tree fruit. Butter, milk, cream and eggs come from the farm animals. The lamb meat is grilled with the vine shoots of which one drinks the fresh wine²⁴³.”

Taking care about oneself in order to live a better life, as Foucault explains, has succeeded for the Greeks and Romans because good life is not essentially measured by human factors, principally work (or man essentially conceived a socio-economic actor) with Hegel and Marx in the Modernity²⁴⁴. Spiritual exercises are similar to the art of the sculptor, which accordingly to Plotinus has little to do with composing a character or taking an attitude, it is an art that removes, by opposition to painting that is an art that adds (Hadot, 2002, p.62)²⁴⁵.

“Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiseling your statue²⁴⁶,”

Animals are traditionally viewed as representing the shadow of human virtues and vices. Since Plato, philosophers used to present animal metaphorical shadows [not animal reality] of our moral qualities of individ-

²⁴³ Our translation of Onfrey’s description of Lucretius’ villa, *ibid.* p.525.

²⁴⁴ Cf. Foucault, Michel (1984, 1990): *The Care of the Self, History of Sexuality*, Vol. 3, London: Penguin Books.

²⁴⁵ Hadot, Pierre (2002) : *Exercices spirituels et la philosophie antique*, Albin Michel, Paris, p.62.

²⁴⁶ Plotinus, On Beauty, *Enneads* 1.6.

uals of the human species, as symbolic place of the *Fall of the soul* or the description of the human finitude, as we read here the French poet Victor Hugo:

« tous les animaux sont dans l'homme et chacun d'eux est dans un homme. Quelquefois même plusieurs d'entre eux à la fois. Les animaux ne sont autre chose que les figures de nos vertus et de nos vices, errantes devant nos yeux, les fantômes visibles de nos âmes²⁴⁷. »

A Garden full of children playing with flowers surrounded by colorful butterflies has inspired Guyau to grasp a poetic philosophy of the hope where truth is found in movement and hope:

“A child saw a butterfly poised on a blade of grass; the butterfly had been made numb by the north wind. The child plucked the blade of grass, and the living flower that was at its tip, still numb, remained attached. He returned home, holding his find in his hand. A ray of sunlight broke through, striking the butterfly's wing, and suddenly, revived and light, the living flower flew away into the glare. All of us, scholars and workers, we are like the butterfly: our strength is made of a ray of light. Not even: of the hope of a ray. One must thus know how to hope; hope is what carries us higher and farther²⁴⁸.”

Epicurus founded around his garden a peaceful place devoted to philosophical contemplative life, a place for reconciliation beyond any

²⁴⁷ Guyau, Jean-Marie. *L'introduction des idées philosophiques et sociales dans la poésie contemporaine (suite)* : Victor Hugo In : *L'art au point de vue sociologique* [en ligne]. Lyon : ENS Éditions, 2016 (généré le 22 octobre 2017). Disponible sur Internet : <<http://books.openedition.org/enseditions/5999>>.

²⁴⁸ Guyau, J. -M. (1895) « La philosophie de l'espoir », *Pages Choisies des Grands Écrivains*. Paris, A. Colin, transl. Mitchell Abidor for marxists.org. Guyau has also written an impressive study on Epicurus's moral philosophy.

conception of the good, and even beyond the aim of happiness, that is recognized as the supreme good of individual good life. Communities are united on an essential founding principle:

“Epicure is the one who conjugated *the idea of communities united for the sake of worship alone*, seeking to give them institutions to preserve it. While Plato subordinated friendship to the ends [the Good] that it allowed to discover, while Aristotle indissolubly associated the most worthy activity of the man and his most perfect happiness, Epicure seems to make it an end even superior to the contemplative life itself, which we know from other aspects of its doctrine, that it does not reach a principle of all things analogous to Plato's Good, nor a happiness that would be specific to his activity²⁴⁹.”

The ethical aim of a communal worship could be seen in various ways, either as a social ground for a benefit related good cooperation but benefit should be understood as closely related to higher interests, in Epicurus' view. As concretely rooted in the education institution of the Garden by Epicurus, a material and economical community has been created by the Greek philosopher, who explicitly founded it on economic solidarity and mutual intellectual aid²⁵⁰. As the aim of community building, Epicurean friendship and cooperation remain closely related to the Christian adaptation of Epicurean ethics, and contemporary Christian work ethics has proven on the global scale to be very successful, not because of a particular conceptual truth behind the bible or the example of Jesus, but because it has shown a unique ability to set a solid ground for doing things together. The most contemporary version of Christian

²⁴⁹ Fraisse, Jean-Claude (1984) *Philia. La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique. Essai sur un problème perdu et retrouvé*, Paris: Vrin, p.287. Our italic.

²⁵⁰ Canto-Sperber, M. (2004) : *Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale*, t. 1, Épicure, Paris : PUP, p. 649.

Epicurean ethics, that is a global religion of the humanity, is useful in an increasingly technological and global communication society. The problem with faith is the counterpart of its positive aspects as hope and optimism: faith could be seen as blindly related to its history. It is a matter of fact that human efforts often are focusing on the quantitative pursuit of fictive entities as nations, meaningless commercial brands, and potentially harmful fetishes of social success as stigmatisation of minorities, xenophobia, and other types of intra-cultural self-intoxications. Social fetishes can include openly harmful fetishes as well as weapons, instead of simply caring for the sensible living beings in the reality.



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Since 2012, Ignace Haaz has contributed to release over 190 books on ethics, theology and philosophy as Globethics.net Publications Manager across 14 Series in 7 languages. As ethics online library executive, he is also developing online library collections on applied ethics for Globethics.net, currently focusing in particular on education. Previously Ignace received a Doctorat ès Lettres from the University of Geneva and taught ethical theories as Doctor Assistant at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland).

