

**BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY** COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

## Introduction

- Machine learning-driven malware detection systems have demonstrated potential in identifying zero-day malware.
- Existing approaches lack robustness and needs more testing on different types of malware.
- AML attacks can help to determine effectiveness and robustness of a detection system.

#### **Challenges:**


- Obfuscated malware can be difficult to catch. Memory forensics is the solution. (VolMemLyzer)
- CIC-MalMem-2022 dataset only covers Spyware, Ransomware, and Trojan Horses.
- ML based malware detection systems have been tested on Windows, but further research is needed on Linux and MacOs to create unification between the systems.

## Approach

#### Phase 1:

Develop and train machine learning based Malware **Detection Model:** 

- Take memory snapshot and extract features.
- Data balancing using SMOTE.
- Split data and input into detection system.
- Binary output (malicious or benign).



#### Figure 1: Basic ML based Detection System Workflow

References


1. Akhtar et al, Malware Analysis and Detection Using Machine Learning Algorithms. Symmetry 2022, 14, 2304. 2. Dener et al, Malware detection using memory analysis data in big data environment. Appl Sci, 12 (17) (2022), p. 8604

# Enhancing Malware Analysis and Detection Using Adversarial Machine Learning Techniques

#### Troy Tolman, Md. Mashrur Arifin, Dr. Jyh-haw Yeh **Boise State University** Phase 2: Attack the detection model using JSMA Collect malware binaries to execute on a VM and take memory snapshot. VolMemLyzer to extract features to CSV file (new dataset). Feed CSV files into the detection model. Record performance for analysis in phase 3. Take Snapshot of Volatile Memory using FTK Imager Select and Extract Features Run Malware using VolMemLyzer on VirtualBox Ŕ -----..................... -----------0 -----**Record Performance for** Feed into Detection Analysis in Phase 3 Model Figure 2: AML Model Workflow **Phase 3:** (Future Work) Analyze model performance and Adversarial Example Transferability Robustifying Techniques - Defensive Distillation - Adversarial Training Feature Extraction • AE Transferability - Provides insight into ML models Tools **VirtualBox** Check Balance $\sqrt{2}L_{V}$ ..... Balanced Data python exterro synthetic minority

learn

oversampling





## Results

- Algorithms Tested in Detection Model
- Top Performers

- XGBoost, Rand	ure 3: XGBoost Confusion Matrix			
Metrics used: - 10-fold cross validation - accuracy - F1 Score	ttack Benign		0.0% 7/11769	0.0% 2
<ul> <li>FPR</li> <li>sensitivity</li> <li>PPV</li> <li>Cohen kappa</li> <li>specificity</li> <li>MCC</li> </ul>	Actual Attack		0% 2 nign	100.0% 11668/11670 Malicious
Authors	Algorithm		Accuracy (in %)	
[1]	RF, DT		92.01, 99.00	
[2]	LR		99.97	
[3]	KNN w/ Stacked Ensemble		97.00	
This study	XGBoost, RF		99.98, 99.98	

Table 1: Performance comparison of related works.

## Conclusions

- malware.

#### Future work:

- AE Transferability Problem
- Test model on MacOS and Linux



## - Decision Trees, Random Forest, LGBM, XGBoost

• ML based Detection systems are a viable solution to combat zero-day malware, but needs more research. • The new dataset from Phase 2 will help researchers to robustify their models against many forms of

Defensive Distillation, Adversarial Training

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