Practicing Ecological Security and Making Multispecies Relations in Anti-Base Resistance: Insights from Environmental-Oriented Anti-Base Activists in Henoko and Takae struggles in Okinawa

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Abstract

Henoko and Takae are two Okinawan villages entangled in the struggles against militarization of Henoko-Oura Bay and Yanbaru forest, respectively. These struggles highlight the problems associated with the US military bases and operations in relation to environmental justice (EJ), conservation, and ecological security concerns. Focusing on environmental-focused anti-base resistance, my research asks what activities activists engage in and how those activities relate to activists' understanding of the problems associated with the US military bases in Okinawa. Drawing on in-depth interviews with environmental-oriented anti-base activists and participant observation in protest sites and activist communities, my research explores how activists ascribe meanings to their current resistance activities in Henoko and Takae, particularly direct action interferences, monitoring, and translocal collaborations. My analysis of activists' perceptions, experiences, and behaviours in these activities contributes to (Critical) EJ and social movement studies (SMS) literatures by highlighting non-western forms of resistance and activists' interpretation and articulation of their particular approaches. Additionally, informed by assemblage theory, my research investigates how activists interact with human and nonhuman entities in their activism and how those interactions shape activists' perceptions of their relations with others and their ideas of security. My analysis reveals activists' exceptional humility to and practice of ecological security from the ways in which they interact with the local community, those on 'the other side,' and nonhuman surroundings. My analysis also demonstrates how protest sites become spaces of knowledge production and relationship-building, which challenge the Japanese and US governments' colonialist, militaristic, and anthropocentric governance and security narratives. Such findings contribute to the theoretical understanding and practical application of assemblage theory, particularly in relation to the SMS and environmental sociology literatures. The activists' practices of ecological security and multispecies relations in Henoko and Takae can be an exemplar for EJ and other social justice activism.

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List of Acronyms

CGs: the Coast Guards
IPP: the Informed Public Project
JSDF: Japan Self-Defence Forces
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
MOE: Ministry of Environment
NTA: the Northern Training Area
ODB: Okinawa Defence Bureau
OEJP: Okinawa Environmental Justice Project
SACO: the Special Action Committees on Okinawa
SOFA: the Status of Forces Agreement
UNESCO: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
USCAR: US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
USFJ: the United States Forces of Japan
WNH: World Natural Heritage

Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

The southmost prefecture of Japan, Okinawa, has a long and complex history of anti-US military base resistance. Often referred to as the 'Okinawa struggle' or *Okinawa tōsō*, the people of Okinawa have fought against American and Japanese colonialism and militarization since the end of WWII (Arasaki, 2001; McCormack & Norimatsu, 2018; Tanji, 2006). Such resistance continues to date, with its focus, dynamic, and tactics constantly shifting. This study focuses on anti-base resistance in Henoko and Takae, the two small villages that became the sites of anti-US military base struggles after the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement was sealed between the Japanese and American governments in 1996.[1] Henoko and Takae villages are embedded in Henoko-Oura Bay and Yanbaru forest, respectively, and local and nonlocal anti-base groups have incorporated environmental concerns into their anti-base grievances (Nakashima, 2010; Taylor, 2008; Yoshikawa, 2020a). The deployment of environmental concerns (along with issues of gender, peace, democracy, and Indigenous sovereignty) in the anti-base movement has enabled various translocal collaborations, which have raised the issues related to US military bases in Okinawa to an international audience (Davis, 2017; Taylor, 2008; Yoshikawa, 2009). Despite persistent effort and translocal collaboration, activists have not fully achieved their goals to demilitarize Okinawa; they continue to resist the ongoing construction of a new base in Henoko, as well as military occupation in Takae.

My research highlights the strengths and elements of the resistance activities that are often ignored. With the rise of ultranationalists, *neto-uyo* (ultranationalist netizens) and

[1] The SACO was established in 1995 in response to the political uproar that ensued after the 1995 rape incident involving US military personnel. The premise of the SACO agreement was to downsize the US military presence on Okinawa in order to reduce the military burdens on Okinawans. I discuss this incident and the SACO agreement in more depth in Chapter Two.

‘*reisho-kei’* (the cynical type)[2] across Japan, both Henoko and Takae protesters have been a target of racist and xenophobic—and blatantly ignorant—insults (Fusek, 2022[3]; Mainichi Japan, 2017). The derogatory comments generally lack an awareness of the historical contexts of Japanese and US colonization of Okinawa and Okinawans’ resistance to it. My research contextualizes the current activities in Henoko and Takae by demonstrating the persistent resistance that locals and activists from ‘outside’ the Henoko and Takae communities have maintained, the humility and principles of nonviolence displayed by the activists towards ‘the other side’, and multispecies relations that encompass the significance of the struggles. These elements are not random creations: Activists’ shared memories and emotions of the Okinawa resistance to US and Japanese colonialization and militarization shape their activism.

Research Overview: Guiding Questions and Objectives

This study explores the perspectives and experiences of anti-base activists in Henoko and Takae, who centre environmental concerns in their activism, using semi-structured individual interviews and participant observations in the sites of protest and protest communities. I am particularly interested in how the activists construct meanings in relation to their involvement in resistance activities and to activists’ understandings of environmental problems in the region. Additionally, this study attempts to understand the knowledge produced through the anti-base activism in Henoko and Takae, especially in relation to the idea of (ecological) security. As the idea of security varies between anti-base activists and the state, I am

[2] ‘*Reisho-kei*’ directly translates to ‘the cynical type’ (Abe, 2022). People who may fall under this category deride others’ political and social justice actions and statements, usually on online platforms (Abe, 2022).
[3] Hiroyuki, an online entrepreneur who insulted Okinawans and the Henoko sit-ins in October, 2022, is also a current administrator of 4Chan, an English-language online platform that allows users to post anonymously. Talley & Levy (2021) write, the chat rooms on 4Cchan “is known among analysts as a hub for spreading far-right ideology, especially white supremacy” (Talley & Levy, 2021). According to the same article by the Wall Street Journal, the 4Chan chat rooms also helped organize the January 6 Capitol attack.

interested in how activists conceptualize security from their own perspectives, and how they may link this idea to environmental concerns. Consequently, this project is guided by the following questions:

1. What resistance activities do activists engage in?
2. How do these activities relate to activists' understanding of the problems associated with the US military bases in Okinawa?
3. How do activists interact with other human and nonhuman entities in their activism?
4. How do these interactions shape activists' perceptions of their relations with other human and nonhuman entities and their idea of security?

The objective of this study is threefold. First, it aims to highlight the various viewpoints and experiences of each participant. Following the radical pluralist approach that acknowledges the heterogeneity within a social movement (Schlosberg, 2002), I hope this study contributes to an understanding of social and environmental (justice) movements and their actors. Second, building upon Sasha Davis's (2020) notion of antimilitary movements as not simply a *resistance* force but also a *productive* one, I analyze the knowledges they produce through their activism and how activists thus serve as a counternarrative to the colonial and militaristic ideas of security and governance, and relations established based on those ideas. This objective also responds to the call from social movement studies (SMS) scholars such as della Porta and Paven (2017) and Chesters (2012) for the ethical conduct of research *with*, rather than *on*, a social movement. As I acknowledge that movements and actors within them produce knowledge along with the researchers, I treat the anti-base movement not as mere research material, but a co-producer of knowledge. Third, my research aims to construct a historical narrative of the particular form of anti-base activism that centers environmental concerns at this particular stage of the Okinawa anti-base movement.

In analyzing activists' perspectives of anti-base resistance activities, this research contributes to the (Critical) Environmental Justice (EJ) and SMS literature by building on the existing understanding of how activists interpret the issues, as well as movement strategies and meanings from their particular vantage points. Particularly, with respect to the Okinawa anti-base movement literature, this research adds important analyses of issues concerning EJ and (ecological) security from the lens of the activists and variety of tactics used to address those issues. Additionally, my analysis of activists' interactions with human and nonhuman entities in their resistance activities, this research builds on the theoretical understanding and practical application of assemblage theory in SMS and environmental sociology literatures.

Research Interest and Social Location

My entry into this topic was influenced by courses I took in my undergraduate studies in sociology. Within the field of sociology, there has been a shift to include the more-than-human (e.g., nonhuman animals, the environment, etc.) as subjects of sociological analyses (Legun & Virens, 2020). For example, the concentration in Critical Animals Studies at Brock University provided me with opportunities to learn about the interconnections between the human and more-than-human worlds, as well as the impacts of colonialism and capitalism on human relationships with the more-than-human world. I became particularly interested in the topics of environmental and multispecies justice and their concepts and praxis. As my interest in these fields grew, I started researching cases of environmental injustice in Japan, where I was born and raised.

Then, I came across the intersecting problems of military colonialism and environmental destruction in Okinawa. I was familiar with the term '*beigun kichimondai*' (meaning the issues related to US military bases, hereafter *'kichimondai'* for short), but I knew very little about what those problems entailed. I was shocked not only to find out about

various environmental and other problems associated with the US military presence in Okinawa, but also to learn about the brutal history and ongoing situation of Okinawa's relationship with mainland Japan and the US. I felt uneasy. This feeling of uneasiness perhaps came from my embarrassment about my ignorance and sense of guilt as a mainland Japanese citizen. I was also involved in the environmental justice (EJ) movement in mainland Japan at the time, but I heard no one talk about issues of Japanese and US colonialism in Okinawa and how they may relate to EJ. I felt the need to understand the *kichimondai* from EJ perspectives.

As I researched more about historical and contemporary Okinawan experiences of living with military bases, I constructed Okinawans as 'victims' and the US military as 'oppressors'. But I soon realized that the US military was not the only 'oppressor': Imperial Japan has subjugated Okinawans, by annexing the Ryukyu and 'sacrificing' Okinawans during WWII. Today, the Japanese government continues to ignore oppositional voices and keep Okinawa militarized. As I gained more understanding of these problems, I also learned about the strong and resilient Okinawan people and the anti-base movement. They are not merely a victim of militarization and colonization, but also a strong force influencing national and global geopolitics (Davis, 2020). I became interested in how people resist powerful institutions like the state.

Despite my interest in learning more about the movement, I was not sure whether, as a mainland Japanese citizen, it was my position to research it. I did not want this project to be simply an academic pursuit. As I made progress in my research, however, activists I connected with helped me understand the role I could play as an outsider and researcher. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter Five, anti-base activists face many challenges in their efforts vis-à-vis the Japanese government. For instance, despite their persistent oppositions to new base construction in Henoko, the government has ignored the local people's voices and

proceeded with the project. Because the *kichimondai* is not just an Okinawan issue, but also one involving the Japanese and American governments, many activists I spoke with expressed the importance of external pressure and support from outside Okinawa. These views helped me see myself as an external supporter who can raise awareness of these issues within Japan and internationally. As I also later learned during my research, the Japan Self-Defense Forces' (JSFD) Kagamigahara Air Base in Gifu, located approximately 30 minutes away from where I grew up, was occupied by the US Marines for about 13 years until the Marines were transferred to Okinawa. In other words, instead of people in my prefecture bearing the burdens of the US military base and its associated crimes (Chan, 2016) and accidents (Mitchell, 2020), the burdens were transferred to Okinawa. Such a history tied to the city close to my hometown also increased my sense of responsibility to write about *kichimondai* and the anti-base movement from my particular positionality to Okinawa.

Organization of the Paper and Notes on Terminology and Formatting

My thesis is organized as follows. "Chapter One: Introduction" describes the research overview and my entry to the research topic. "Chapter Two: Context of Study" provides a brief history of Japanese and US colonialism and the Okinawa anti-base resistance. As my research focuses particularly on anti-base resistance in Henoko and Takae, my discussions of history of the Okinawa resistance and current struggles in the wider regions may fall short. To learn more about the history of the Okinawa anti-base struggle, I direct readers to Miyume Tanji's (2006) *Myth, protest and struggle in Okinawa* and McCormack and Norimatsu's (2018) *Resistant Island: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States.* After delineating this history of struggles and resistance, "Chapter Three: Literature Review" considers three sets of literature. First, the chapter situates my project within the EJ literature, delineating studies on environmental problems and environmental movements related to the US military

bases in Okinawa. Second, it discusses the concept of a *frame*, as used in SMS. Third, it reviews assemblage theory and its application in SMS and environmental sociology. "Chapter Four: Methodology" details the methodology employed to conduct this research, as well as some obstacles and ethical concerns I encountered. "Chapter Five: Strategies, Goals, and Meanings of Resistance Activities" describes my participants' perspectives of particular forms of resistance activities they are involved in, and those activities' relation to the *kichimondai.* The main goal of the chapter is to analyze the ideological and practical meanings participants make of their resistance activities. "Chapter Six: Resisting Militarization from Ecological Perspectives" discusses how participants interact with other human and nonhuman entities in their activism and how those interactions shape their understanding of their relations with others and the idea of security. This chapter attempts to demonstrate how their understanding of relationality and security can counter the Japanese and American governments' colonial and militaristic ideas of security and governance. This thesis ends with "Chapter Seven: Implications and Conclusions," which contains a summary and implications of my study, as well as discussions of limitations and future studies.

Before beginning the next chapter, it is crucial to explain some of the terminologies and formatting I chose to use throughout this thesis. As I discuss more in the context chapter, Okinawa is a colonial name imposed by Japan to refer to the archipelago under the jurisdiction of Okinawa prefecture. Prior to being called 'Okinawa,' the archipelago used to belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the people, culture, and language of Ryukyu were called Ryukyuan (or Luchuan). In this study, I use 'Okinawa' to refer to the islands under the judicial control of Okinawa prefecture, and 'mainland Japan' to refer to the rest of Japan, which is located north of Okinawa.[4] I made this choice because the word Ryukyu was rarely

[4] Situating Japan outside of Okinawa as the 'mainland' signals Okinawa as a periphery, and thus reinforces the colonial core-peripheral relationships. This is a larger discussion beyond the scope of my thesis. Thus, for simplicity, I refer to Japan outside Okinawa as 'mainland Japan' for this thesis.

used in my conversations with local Okinawans. While I have encountered the word (such as in *Ryukyu Shimpo*, which is one of the two major news agencies in Okinawa), ‘Okinawa’ seems more commonly used than ‘Ryukyu’.[5]

To further clarify, referring to someone as ‘Okinawan’ signals their ethnicity, not nationality. However, it is difficult to distinguish Indigenous Okinawans from others because of the large number of immigrants who moved to Okinawa from other Asian countries especially the Philippines since the 50s (Suzuki & Tamaki, 1996) and the mainland Japan, as well as interracial marriages and reproduction between Okinawans and US military that have created ethnic and racial diversity within the islands (Shimabuku, 2019). For this reason and to avoid confusion, I use ‘Okinawans’ to refer to people living in Okinawa and specify their indigeneity when necessary. When I refer to people from the mainland Japan, I call them mainland Japanese.

For the formatting of Japanese and Okinawan names, I follow the standard Romanization. I write Japanese names with surname first followed by given name, except when the names are written in reverse in the quoted texts. Japanese and Okinawan words are also Romanized, as phonologically close as possible. Thus, I use macrons (e.g., *tōsō*) where necessary. I now move on to lay out the context of my study.

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[5] The less common use of the word Ryukyu may be due to assimilation policies. As the Association of the Indigenous Peoples in the Ryukyus (2018) notes, the descendants of Ryukyu “are often forced into the situations where they have to hide their ethnic origin or identity…there are also more and more persons in the Ryukyus, despite themselves being indigenous in the Ryukyus, forcing others and their children to also assimilate” (p.4).

Chapter Two: Context of Study

Introduction

This chapter provides a brief history of US and Japanese colonization and militarization of Okinawa, as well as the anti-base struggles and resistance often referred to as the Okinawa struggle. I then discuss the development and current situations of Henoko and Takae struggles. The aim of this chapter is to delineate the trajectory of Okinawa struggle since the end of World War II till the 1996 SACO agreement, which created the conditions for Henoko and Takae struggles to emerge. As this study primarily focuses on Henoko and Takae struggles, this thesis touches only the surface of the long and complex history of Okinawa struggle since the post-war. Nevertheless, delineating the trajectory of the resistance is crucial to understand the complexities of the anti-base movement in Okinawa.

Militarizing Okinawa

Situated in the East China Sea, spreading between the southern part of mainland Japan (*kyūshū*) and Taiwan (see Figure 1), the Okinawa archipelago offers important cultural and ecological values. From a cultural perspective, it has traditions and language influenced by, yet distinct from, Chinese and Japanese cultures. It has created unique music, cuisine, martial arts, and other traditions. From an ecological perspective, the Okinawa archipelago, including Okinawa, Amami-Oshima, Iriomote, and Tokunoshima Islands,[6] is home to 95 globally endangered species, the majority of which are endemic to the region (Government of Japan, 2021).

Besides its cultural and ecological significance, Okinawa has been made into 'a Keystone of the Pacific,' geopolitically important location for the US-Japan military strategy

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[6] These four islands used to belong to the Ryukyu kingdom, and thus they are referred to as Ryukyu archipelago.

(Chibana, 2013; Davis, 2015). Particularly during the Cold War and intensified hostility between the US and the Soviet Union, the US saw Okinawa as "vital for the implementation of United States policies toward China, the Korean Peninsula and the newly independent states of Southeast Asia" (Saeki, 2012, p. 23). In addition to security concerns, the heavy presence of bases in the East China Sea ensures US control over vital systems, such as fuel distribution, energy generation and transmission, and the distribution of goods (Davis, 2015). Thus, for the US, locating military bases across the Pacific also helps maintain the control over these vital systems, which are essential for the survival of US neoliberal global capitalism (Davis, 2015). As such, Okinawa has been made into both important military strategic and logistical space by the US, and its foreign alliances in the regions.

Figure 1

Maps of Ryukyu Archipelago



Note. The maps showing a chain of islands known as Ryukyu Archipelago spanning across the East China Sea. From *Systematic Review of Late Pleistocene Turtles (Reptilia: Chelonii) from the Ryukyu Archipelago, Japan, with Special Reference to Paleogeographical Implications,* by Takahashi, A., Otsuka, H., & Ota, H. (2008). Pacific Science. 395-402. Copyright 2008 by University of Hawaiʻi Press.

The construction of Okinawa as a strategically and logistically significant place led to the heavy militarization of the islands under the US control since the end of WWII. As of 2021, about 70% of the total US military facilities is concentrated on Okinawa, which only comprises 0.6% of the total land surface of Japan (Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2021). Thirty-one US military bases and joint-use facilities with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) occupy approximately 15% of Okinawa Island, many of them located in the residential area in central Okinawa (see Figure 2). Below I present a brief overview of the three major events that marked the shift in Okinawa's history vis-à-vis Japan and the US: Annexation of the Ryukyu kingdom to Japan in 1879, the US military occupation of Okinawa in 1945, and the 'reversion' of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972. As this historical overview makes clear, the large concentration of military bases in Okinawa we see today is a product of a history of US and Japanese colonization of Okinawa.

Figure 2

Areas covered by the US military bases on Okinawa Island as of 2018

Note. A map of Okinawa Island showing the areas occupied by the US military installations as of 2018 highlighted in Orange, by Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2018. Copyright 2018 by Okinawa Prefectural Government.

The Okinawa archipelago belonged to the Ryukyu kingdom until 1879, when it was annexed by the Japanese Meiji government. The people of Ryukyu governed the kingdom for about 400 years, trading merchandise with China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. During the early-modern period, "[the Ryukyu] constituted a vital and in some respects unique realm, an open, nonmilitarized, economic, cultural and political system, flourishing on the frontiers of the early modern Asia-Pacific" (McCormack, 2009, p.6). While having tributary relationship with China, the kingdom maintained its autonomy in the Asia-Pacific (Matsumura, 2015).

With the Meiji Restoration[7] and modernization of Japan in the late 19th century, the Japanese Meiji government sought to consolidate the Ryukyu kingdom into its nation-state's territory as Okinawa prefecture (Matsumura, 2015). This annexation of the Ryukyu, also known as Ryukyu disposition or *Ryukyu shobun*, was accompanied by the Meiji government's repression of local resistance, which included the detention and torture of Ryukyu political leaders (AIPR, 2018). The Meiji government took the local government and implemented assimilation policies to 'civilize' Okinawans to be more like mainland Japanese. For instance, the Meiji government prohibited the use of their language and the practice of their cultural traditions and forced Okinawans to replace ethnically distinctive names with more 'Japanese' ones (AIPR, 2018; McCormack & Norimatsu, 2018). Simultaneously, the Meiji government slowly incorporated Okinawa into the Japanese political and economic system in the next few decades, while maintaining some of the social and economic structures under the Ryukyu kingdom (Matsumura, 2015).

Through the process of annexation, Okinawans' ethnic differences made them essentially second-class citizens in Japan. To give an example, the 1903 Osaka Exposition

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[7] Meiji Restoration refers to the political revolution in 1868 that ended Tokugawa shogunate (military government) and returned the sovereign control to the emperor. The subsequent Meiji period (1868-1912) saw the westernization, industrialization, and modernization of Japan.

put live humans from Okinawa on display, along with people from Ainu, Taiwan, Java, Africa, and other parts of the world deemed to be primitive and exotic (Ziomek, 2014). This 'othering' of Okinawans not only made them ethnically different from the mainland Japanese, but also reinforced the image of Japan as civilized and prestigious (Ziomek, 2014). Japan's discriminatory attitudes and policies since the annexation can explain Imperial Japan's sacrificial operations in the final few months of the WWII. Known as the Battle of Okinawa, Imperial Japan carried out an intense battle against the US military on Okinawa in April 1945, in order to prevent US troops from landing on mainland Japan. Okinawan civilians, including women and children, were forced to participate in this battle, which killed one-fourth of the population living in Okinawa at that time. During WWII, people in Okinawa, as well as in the rest of Japan, were indoctrinated to believe in the mystic and divine authority and sovereignty of the emperor (Arasaki, 2001).[8] Historical records show that Okinawans killed themselves in groups (*shūdan jiketsu*) because they thought being captured by the US soldiers would be a 'betrayal' of the Japanese Emperor (Akibayashi & Takazato, 2009), though some also argue that Okinawans were coerced to choose death by the imperial army (e.g., Masaaki, 2008). Nevertheless, such historical records show how Japanese colonialism had psychological effects on the people in Okinawa.

With Japan's defeat in WWII, the US Navy occupied Okinawa until 1951 and established US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) taking administrative control over Okinawa. While mainland Japan was liberated from the post-war Allied Forces occupation in 1952 as the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, the same Treaty made Okinawa into a formal territory of the US, which lasted for the next 20 years. Alongside with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty signed in 1952 assured the

[8] This belief system is referred to as the National Polity, which ensured the people of Japan (including Okinawans) to devote themselves to the emperor (Arasaki, 2001).

rights of the US forces to stay in Okinawa "to contribute to the security of Japan against armed attack from without" (US-Japan Security Treaty, 1952). Note that this was also during the Cold War. As this agreement demonstrates, the reason for the US military presence in Okinawa was never to protect Okinawans, but to "contribute to the security of Japan" from growing communist powers in Asia. As a result, militarization of Okinawa was justified by the narrative of 'national security' that only considered the US and Japan as subjects of security and protection.

During the occupation, multiple incidents of crimes and accidents related to US military such as sexual violence against Okinawan women and girls (Akibayashi & Takazato, 2009; Chan, 2016) and aircraft crashes (Tanji, 2006), fueled the local citizens' anger, pressuring the US and Japanese governments to reconsider the occupation. As the opposition to the US military presence escalated the US and Japanese governments decided to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. In 1972, the reversion of Okinawa took place under the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Most Okinawans had longed for Japan's return at the time, in part because they thought the Japanese Constitution would safeguard their rights and democracy and prevent greater militarism.[9] In reality, however, the SOFA ensured the continued presence of the US forces in Okinawa even after the reversion was achieved. Thus, the reversion was just the beginning of a more covert form of military colonialism, this time more structurally sanctioned by the Japanese government (Arasaki, 2001; McCormack & Norimatsu, 2018; Tanji, 2006).

As such, Okinawa was made into a subject of colonization and militarization by both US and Japan especially in the last 70 years. Even to date, fifty years after the reversion, people in Okinawa not only face immediate problems of militarization, such as the military

[9] Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, also known as the peace or 'no war' clause, forbids Japan's use of force as a means to settle international disputes. In order to achieve the abovementioned aim, the clause also states that Japan will not sustain any land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potentials.

personnel's acts of violence, military-related accidents, gender-based violence, and environmental pollution, but they also experience issues structurally embedded into Okinawan society. Some of these structural issues include an economic dependence on government-funded public work and military base economy, as well as 'extraterritoriality' that protects the US military operations and soldiers' violations of Japanese laws (Dudden, 2019, McCormack & Norimatsu, 2018; Mitchell, 2020; Nishiyama, 2022). Notwithstanding the long list of problems associated with the US military presence that affect the everyday lives and future of Okinawans, the Japanese government has consistently been prioritizing its own political agenda over the security and safety of Okinawans. Despite this history and ongoing reality of militarization, Okinawans, along with some Japanese activists, have resisted occupation of their islands. I now layout the history of resistance.

'Okinawa Struggle': The Anti-Base Movements in Post-War Okinawa until SACO

The 'Okinawa struggle' or *Okinawa tōsō* refers to a series of Okinawan citizens' resistance to the US military occupation and militarization. The Okinawa struggle is not a single, monolithic movement. As I discuss n this section, it encompasses different types of the resistance movements such as the island-wide movement, reversion movement, and anti-base movement. Moreover, although 'Okinawa' in the Okinawa struggle has romanticized the movement as unified (Tanji, 2006), such myth about the movement can erase various conflicts and heterogeneity within the movement. Thus, it is vital to lay out the context of the movement in its various stages and articulations.

An Okinawan historian Arasaki Moriteru (2001) categorizes the Okinawa struggle into three waves. The first wave occurred in the 1950s when Okinawans organized a series of protests against aggressive US land policy. The second wave transpired at the end of the 1960s when Okinawans demanded the reversion to the Japanese administration, also known

as the reversion movement (*hukki undō*), which led to the 'reversion' of Okinawa to the sovereign control of Japan in 1972. The Okinawa struggle weakened after the reversion, yet smaller, more localized struggles continued to resist the US and Japanese government-sanctioned projects (Tanji, 2006). Finally, more than two decades after the reversion, the third wave began in 1995 with a mass protest in response to the abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl in the same year. Mass protests following this incident led the US and Japanese governments to agree on the reduction of military burdens on Okinawans under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement in 1996.

The protests and other resistance activities observed in each of these waves have some distinctive characteristics, which are shaped by the socio-political environment at that time. Thus, it is crucial to understand the context in which the movement developed from 1952 to 1996. After the 1996 SACO agreement, two localized struggles in Henoko and Takae, the focus of my study, emerged. I discuss these struggles in the next section.

First Wave

As mentioned, the first wave of the Okinawa struggle emerged as a response to the US land policy in post-war Okinawa. With the San Francisco Peace Treaty ensuring the US administrative, judicial, and legislative control over Okinawa, the USCAR decided to establish a private lease contract to Okinawan landowners. Despite many landowners refusing to sign the contract, the US government authorized the USCAR to acquire land by force. Armed US soldiers invaded Okinawan land with tanks, bulldozers, and teargas, evicting villagers and destroying their farmland in order to build permanent military bases (Tanji, 2006). Many farmers whose land was expropriated protested with sit-ins, blockades, and marches. Iejima, a small island located north of Okinawa Island, was one of the islands most affected by the land acquisition. The Iejima farmers began a 'beggars' march' (*kojiki*

kōshin) in 1955, publicizing the mistreatment they endured to people across Okinawa, while literally begging for food and money to survive (Tanji, 2006). The march was the manifestation of farmers' struggles for survival, and this struggle “exemplifies collective actions at its most desperate and symbolically powerful” (Tanji, 2006, p.69).

Around that time, Okinawans started to recognize the structurally discriminatory policies and systems imposed upon them. For example, in 1955, a US military sergeant abducted, harassed, and killed a 6-year-old Okinawan girl. The sergeant was convicted and given a death sentence by the Ryukyu court, but once he was returned to the US without Okinawans’ public knowledge, the sentence was lowered to 45 years of hard labour (AIPR, 2018; Tanji, 2006).[10] This rape incident, along with rampant and brutal sexual violence against Okinawan women and girls by the US military personnel, provoked Okinawans to organize a mass protest against the US military occupation and crimes (Tanji, 2006).

These protests eventually led to the first wave of the Okinawa struggle. In 1956, the US House Armed Service Committee, which reviewed the land problems in Okinawa, released a ‘Price Report, ’defended the continued conversion of land into military bases and unfair lease agreements. Frustration accumulated among Okinawans, and just a few weeks after the report release, 160,000 to 200,000 local residents, as well as students from mainland Japan, joined residents’ rallies in rejection of the report (Tanji, 2006). The organizations from various sectors and from different political spectrum joined the 1956 protest, including Okinawa Teachers’ Association, the Youth Group Association, the Women’s Association, the Parents’ Association, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, the Okinawa People’s Party, the Okinawa Democratic Party, the Chamber of Commerce, the Mayors’ Union, and Landworners’ Unions (*Tochiren*). Because different groups social sectors beyond political

[10] Once the sergeant was sent back to the US, he spent 17 years in jail, until he was released due to his health conditions.

ideologies and social classes across Okinawa collaborated, the first wave of the Okinawa struggle is often referred to as the island-wide struggle (*shimagurumi tōsō*) (Tanji, 2006).

Second Wave

The second wave of the Okinawa struggle is marked by a series of mass demonstrations and political opposition against the US presence in Okinawa towards the end of 1960s, which eventually led to the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. During the 1960s, Okinawans continued to experience discrimination and violence, segregation, labour exploitation, low-wage contracts, and gendered violence, among other hardships (Tanji, 2006). On top of these daily occurrences, the accidents and crimes were never properly resolved, often favouring the US military personnel involved in those cases. As Tanji (2006) explains, "[the] extraterritoriality 'rights' associated with the crimes of the US military members were the most humiliating aspects of the foreign military's domination" (p.81). Because of the humiliation, discrimination, and violence imposed on Okinawans by the US, many Okinawans began to desire that Okinawa revert to Japan. To many Okinawans, albeit not to all, having protections under the same Constitutions as mainland Japanese appeared to be a much better option than living under the apparent colonial rule of the US (Tanji, 2006).

To achieve reversion, the Okinawa struggle utilized 'reversion nationalism' that focused on raising the living conditions to Japanese standards, which improved through the rapid industrialization and political reforms (Tanji, 2006). Labour organizations and progressive political parties especially sought to fill the socio-economic gaps between Okinawa and Japan (Tanji, 2006). The connection between pro-reversion Okinawan groups and mainland Japanese unions and anti-US political parties mostly involved in *Anpo-tōsō*

(anti-US-Japan Security Treaty struggle)[11], strengthened under the same principle of reversion nationalism. However, the discourse of reversion became so dominant in the movement that it silenced other voices such as those calling for Okinawa's independence and self-determination (Tanji, 2006).

While anti-base protests based on reversion nationalism attracted support from mainland Japan, primarily through shared progressive beliefs, they failed to represent the concerns or goals of business owners and workers in the 'special business districts.' These districts comprised brothels, bars, and other businesses that served US military personnel, and also functioned as a 'sexual breakwater' to protect the ordinary citizens from sexual violence (Tanji, 2006). These businesses, also known as 'A' sign businesses, heavily relied on the presence of US military economically, and as a result, these businesses were politically and economically isolated from the reversion movement.

This 'A' sign businesses' isolation from the movement, however, changed in 1970. During the Vietnam war, US military personnel's crimes and violence escalated particularly in the special business districts. On December 20, 1970, a US soldier hit a local man with his car in the street of Koza, one of the districts. This car accident sparked anger among the local Okinawans, who then started setting American military cars on fire. This incident later became known as the Koza riot. The riot involved approximately two thousand local people who had previously disassociated themselves from the reversion movement because it did not reflect their concerns. As Tanji (2006) argues, the Koza riot "gave voice to the 'bar town' workers, at least to young male workers who were capable of violence but who had been irrelevant to the organization or mobilization of the progressive coalition" (p.104) that dominated the movement at that time.

[11] *Anpo-tōsō* (anti-US-Japan Security Treaty struggle) refers to a series of protests against the US-Japan Security Treaty. These protests occurred in the 1960s and 70s in mainland Japan.

Another important characteristic of the second wave was a shift in Okinawans' framing of themselves as 'mere victims' of the US military occupation and violence to 'aggressors' contributing to the war happening elsewhere (Arasaki, 2001). In the wake of the Korean War and later Vietnam War, Okinawans became more conscious of how the increased militarization of their islands—such as the deployment of a nuclear missile—would impact not just them but also people living elsewhere. Because of their memories and direct experiences with the Battle of Okinawa, Okinawans developed a yearning for 'absolute pacifism' – absolute rejection of militarization everywhere, not just in Okinawa (Tanji, 2006). As a result, the Okinawa struggle became more explicitly anti-war and anti-military in the 1960s and 70s. After a series of protests and responses from Okinawans that marked the second wave of the Okinawa struggle, the reversion took place in 1972. Under the renewed US-Japan Status Forces Agreement (SOFA), Okinawa was 'returned' to Japan; however, as stated previously, this renewed SOFA promised the continued presence of US bases in Okinawa, and many Okinawans soon realized the reversion was another form of control over the islands.

The Rise of Community-Based Movements in Post-Reversion Okinawa

In post-reversion Okinawa, a group of anti-war landowners, who are mostly middle-class, politically experienced activists, became a 'glue' of the Okinawa struggle (Tanji, 2006). They continued the anti-war movement along with Okinawan progressives and Japanese leftists based on the constitutional principles of democracy and pacifism (Tanji, 2006). However, the anti-war landowners' struggle against the US bases did not result in mass mobilization like the island-wide struggle. In this 'low' activity period of the Okinawa struggle, small-scale localized struggles in Kin Bay and Shiraho that "laid foundations for a new collective identity for the 'Okinawan' movement" emerged (Tanji, 2006, p.149).

Both Kin Bay and Shiraho struggles began in the post-reversion Okinawa with residents' opposition to a development project, the Central Terminal Station (CTS), an oil and aluminum refining infrastructure, and New Ishigaki Airport, respectively. Although these development projects were not directly related to the US military, residents saw the projects as a new form of Japanese colonialism (Tanji, 2006). The construction of the CTS and New Ishigaki Airport was part of the Japanese government's implementation of the Okinawa Regeneration and Development Plan, which sought to restructure the post-reversion Okinawan economy with the government subsidies (Tanji, 2006). In both cases, the local residents, especially those of the fishing community, saw the ocean reclamation required for the projects as a threat to the environment and thus to the local livelihood (Tanji, 2006). Fearing further economic dependence on state-sanctioned environmentally hazardous industries, as well as stripped local autonomy, the residents organized themselves to oppose these development projects.

These struggles developed through what Tanji (2006) calls a 'localist' framing of the issue, emphasizing the impacts of the projects on unique local livelihood, culture, and the environment, and encouraged political participation of 'ordinary' people. In that sense, these local struggles were slightly different from the 'Okinawa' struggle that purposively represented various political ideologies and social sectors across Okinawa. While the 'Okinawa' struggle during the first and second waves was led by progressive politicians and various unions experienced in political organizing, these new local struggles were mostly initiated, organized, and led by the local residents, who had little experience in political activism (Tanji, 2006). For instance, in Kin Bay, "Elderly women and housewives constituted the major participants in the protest" and played important roles in incorporating their concerns regarding education, health, and the environment as domestic and care workers (Tanji, 2006, p.139). These local struggles then later received support from other groups

outside the community. Shiraho struggle's focus on environmental concerns was particularly successful in mobilizing extra-community groups, by expanding the network of support from scientists and researchers from mainland Japan and overseas.

While Kin Bay and Shiraho struggles were seen as still part of the wider 'Okinawa' struggle, these localized struggles challenged the notion of the Okinawa struggle as a 'singular' movement, promoting the public to acknowledge the differences in experiences and knowledge (Taiji, 2006). For instance, the founder of the Kin Bay Life Protection, Asano Seishin, advocated for the reimagination of the "meaning of life" as cherishing local economic and cultural activities, while challenging the narrative of 'affluence' that dominated post-reversion Okinawa (Yamashiro, 2005). At the same time, Okinawans shared a common memory of the war and US colonial brutality and experienced marginalization by mainland Japan, which then still connected these more localized struggles to the collective struggle as 'Okinawans.' As such, despite the decline in activity of 'Okinawa' struggle, more localized struggles emerged in the post-reversion Okinawa and continued to pass down the sentiment for pacifism and local autonomy.

Third Wave

Okinawa's reversion to Japan and 'independence' from the US in 1972 did not eradicate the military-related problems. Sexual violence and crimes by US military personnel continued and military-related accidents put Okinawans in constant danger. Even though US military-related incidents and accidents frequently occurred, no anti-base protests as large as the ones in the previous decades were seen. In 1995, however, the abduction and rape of an Okinawan girl re-ignited the frustrated minds of Okinawans, especially women, and mobilized the public. This marks the third wave of the Okinawa struggle. After the incident, the Okinawa Women Act against Military and Violence (OAAWMV) held a press conference to help

"raise a voice" among silent Okinawa (Taiji, 2006). Founded by an Okinawan feminist Takazato Suzuyo and her colleagues, OAAWMV helped legitimatize gender issues as part of the anti-base struggle.[12] The increased involvement of women in the anti-base movement changed some structures of the Okinawa struggle, which was previously dominated by men (Chan, 2016). Okinawa women became key contributors to the anti-base movement by both challenging *kichimondai* from feminist perspectives and influencing the male-dominated movement space.

The OWAAMV's initiation of the press conference and call for change encouraged a collective action to take place. On October 21, a month after the rape incident, 85,000 locals and mainland Japanese attended the Okinawa Prefecture Citizens' Rally, with two demands to the Japanese government: to revise the SOFA, which has not been revised since 1960, and to reduce the bases on Okinawa. Ota Masahide, then Governor of Okinawa, also refused to sign the land lease contract on behalf of the 35 landowners, taking the side of citizens' opposition. However, the national government politically suppressed Ota and offered a 'special adjustment budget' to Okinawa, ultimately making him agree to authorize the leases (Tanji, 2006).

Despite some setbacks with Ota authorizing the land leases, a series of escalated actions nevertheless added pressure on the US and Japanese governments to reconsider the US military presence in Okinawa. In November 1995, both governments established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), announcing plans to reduce the presence of US bases in Okinawa. The final SACO agreement report in 1996 outlines changes such as the requirements of returning land, adjusting training and operational procedures, implementing noise reduction procedures, and changing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

[12] Takazato has investigated gender-based violence tied to militarism and economic dependency and supported many women who worked in the sex industry since the 60s. The OWAAMV also expanded a global network of organizations with similar experiences with militarism and gender-based violence, especially in the Philippines and South Korea (Chan, 2016),

procedures. Japanese governments proposed the consolidation or reduction of 11 bases and areas, two of which—the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and the Northern Training Area (NTA)—later became and continue to date as a matter of contention. While the SACO agreement seemed to concede to the people's demands by downsizing the military installations, in reality, it reinforced the US-Japan military alliance (Arasaki, 2001). After the SACO agreement, the major actors in Okinawa struggle split into smaller groups, and other more localized struggles in Henoko and Takae became the foci of the Okinawa struggle (Tanji, 2006).

As I briefly illustrated here, the history of the Okinawa Struggle is long and complex. Many organizations, grassroots groups, and loose networks were born throughout, some of them worked only temporarily and others still operate today. After the SACO agreement, two localized struggles emerged in Henoko and Takae, which are the focus of my study. I now turn to provide context of each struggle in order.

Henoko Struggle

In 1996, the Japanese and US governments decided to relocate the US MCAS Futenma as part of the SACO agreement, established in an effort of reducing the risks and dangers associated with the base, such as crimes, aircraft crashes, and noise pollution caused by routine operations. This quick 'fix' of the problems, however, produced another struggle as the two governments proposed a plan to construct a new heliport as a replacement of the MCAS Futenma. The governments selected offshore of Henoko, the eastern coastal village of Okinawa Island, as a site for the new heliport. Henoko is a small, quiet village right by the pristine Oura Bay, and fishing has been a crucial part of the local livelihood. Construction of the new base offshore of Henoko meant the destruction of coral reefs and water, disruption of the residents' traditional way of life, and threats to their safety (Dudden, 2019). Simply put,

the US and Japanese governments did not address the source of the problems or reduce the burdens of Okinawans as they gestured under the SACO agreement.

After the proposed plan, called 'heliport plan' became public, about 30 residents of Henoko who opposed this plan formed a citizens' movement group, *Inochi o Mamoru Kai* (Save Life Society). Residents in two other nearby districts joined the opposition and formed the Group of 10 Districts North of Futami against the Heliport (*Jukku no Kai*, for short) in 1997. These groups later became part of the wider network of the *Herikichi Hantai Kyogikai* (Council Opposed to the Offshore Heliport Base), along with other labour unions and anti-war groups in Okinawa. The citizens of Nago, a city holding jurisdiction over Henoko, voted against the construction plan in a referendum in 1997, which transformed the local movement into a larger one (Yoshikawa, 2020a). Later in the same year, Kishimono, who opposed the heliport plan, won the mayoral race in Nago. However, the Japanese government pressured him to accept the base "in ways that have long defined the anti-democratic maneuverings of all things related to American base issues throughout Japan" (Dudden, 2019, p.179).

At the beginning of the struggle, the majority of the Henoko residents opposed the plan. However, a handful of them sought to take this as an opportunity for economic stimulation (Kumamoto, 2008). By the time the governments selected Henoko as a relocation site, Henoko had already experienced economic instability and depended on the base economy from renting land to Camp Schwab, which sits right next to the village (Tanji, 2006). Operating since 1956, the Camp helped improved the local infrastructure such as the electricity and sewerage system and provided job opportunities in construction, restaurants and bars, and other businesses in Henoko (Tanji, 2006). In addition, Henoko received more than 100 million yen for renting the land to the Camp (Tanji, 2006). Because of the economic dependence on the bases, "it has been extremely difficult for the [Henoko] residents to express opposition to the heliport construction" (Tanji, 2006, p.164). The heliport plan then

created a division within the Henoko village and eventually repressed some oppositional voices within the community.

Once the plan was accepted by the Nago mayor, the anti-construction residents and people outside the village started protests on the beach. In April 2004, in response to the government's decision to conduct surveys and assessments without democratic process, *Inochi o Mamoru Kai* began sit-ins and later in September, sea protests with kayaks (Dudden, 2019; McCormak & Norimatsu, 2018). These protests both on the land and sea were largely in response to the Japanese government's proceeding with the Environmental Impact Assessment (ETA) of the offshore construction site. The anti-base protesters saw this as a threat, as once the EIA approves the construction, it would become extremely difficult to halt the project (Yoshikawa, 2009). In the fall of 2004, the protesters then interfered with the assessment surveys by approaching the site in their kayaks and occupying the scaffolds erected for the surveys (Urashima, 2005). Meanwhile, another aircraft crashed into Okinawa International University, further strengthening the opposition. Yet, the Japanese government announced it would proceed with the construction, which then met with as many as 400 protesters coming from across Okinawa and mainland Japan (Dudden, 2019).

In 2006, the Japanese and US governments agreed to withdraw the heliport plan in the offshore and move the construction site to the coastline of Henoko. The new plan involved constructing a V-shape heliport attached to the exiting Camp Schwab (see Figure 3), which requires the reclamation of approximately 150 hectares of the sea floor. In 2007, the Japanese government began preliminary surveys in the Henoko and Oura area before the official EIA process. Anti-base activists criticized this move and began sit-ins both on land and at sea. This is the beginning of the ongoing protests in Henoko.

Figure 3

New Base Construction Plans in Henoko



Note. The map on the left shows the location of the new base in Henoko and its geographical location relative to the Futenma Air Base. The map on the right shows the ocean areas planned for land reclamation for the new base. From *Tokyo preparing for protracted battle over Henoko project,* by Asahi Shinbun, November 26, 2021, (https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/photo/41232469). Copyright 2021 by Asahi Shimbun.

Henoko struggle has taken an environmental approach and incorporated concerns about environmental and ecological destruction in the struggle. Since the announcement of the initial relocation plan, the citizens' groups opposing the construction were concerned with the environmental impacts of the project (Tanji, 2006; McCormack & Norimatsu, 2018). In 1997, the concern became more urgent as protesters found out the endangered Okinawan dugong was spotted by the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Yoshikawa, 2009). Civil environmental groups such as Dugong Protection Fund and Dugong Network Okinawa were formed, and as the movement became more explicit about the environmental concerns, it enabled the formation of translocal collaboration by attracting environmental and conservation groups from and beyond mainland Japan (Nakashima, 2010; Yoshikawa, 2009).

Since then, local and national environmental groups, sometimes with support from international and US organizations, have brought the issues to international attention using various methods, such as speaking at international conferences and writing letters to the US Congress (Yoshikawa, 2020a).

Perhaps the most notable case exemplifying the success of translocal collaboration is the ‘dugong lawsuit’. In 2003, the Japanese Environmental Lawyers Federation (JELF) in collaboration with Okinawan, Japanese, and American lawyers, individuals, and environmental NGOs, filed a lawsuit against the US Department of Defense (DoD) for violating the US National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). As the Okinawan dugong is registered as a ‘national monument’ of Japan, the group used this dugong’s special status to claim the construction’s disturbance to their habitat, thus violating Section 402 of the NHPA (Yoshikawa, 2009). Though the court initially ruled the US DoD to comply with NHPA, the court dismissed the case and only recommended the US DoD’s continued oversight of the potential impacts on the local environment. Nevertheless, this case set a precedent for the use of NHPA in interfering with state-sanctioned projects (Tanji, 2008). Thus, the ‘environmental turn’ in the anti-base movement made the collaboration among the local, national, and international groups possible.

As of late 2021 when I visited Henoko, one of the contentious issues was the transplant of coral reefs from the landfill site to the offshore. The Okinawa Defence Bureau has taken on this project in an ostensible effort to mitigate the impacts of landfill on the corals. Henoko-Oura Bay’s coral reefs create an ideal environment to more than 5,000 marine species, including 262 identified endangered species (Yoshikawa, 2020b). Coral reefs play a key role in maintaining the ecosystem, and damage to the reefs can devastate other species living there. An international initiative Mission Blue has also recognized Henoko-Oura Bay

as a Hope Spot in 2019, a critical environment that can protect the planet's health (see Figure 4).

In the last few years, local organizations such as Environmental Justice Project (OEJP), Okinawa Environmental Network (OEN), and the Informed Public Project (IPP), together with other organizations and individuals, have been maintaining the focus on environmental concerns with the construction. They have collaborated with international groups such as Veterans for Peace, World Beyond War, and World Heritage Watch. While these organizations mostly work with international bodies and governments, other protest groups such as Henoko Blue and Diving Team Rainbow, loose groups of individuals who protest at sea, also play a significant role. Henoko struggle thus represents the translocal network tying local environmental concerns with broader problems regarding security, peace, and democracy. This development of Henoko struggle parallels with the development of Takae struggle, to which I now turn.

Figure 4

Coral Reefs in Henoko-Oura Bay

Note. An image of coral reefs in Henoko-Oura Bay. From *[Photo gallery] The cradle of life,* by Henoko Blue. (https://henokoblue.wordpress.com/2017/02/04/photo-gallery-01/). Copyright by Henoko Blue.

Takae Struggle

The northern part of Okinawa Island is covered by the rich Yanbaru forest. The locals also call it Broccoli Forest, as *itaji* trees in the forest resemble broccoli stems (see Figure 5). Like Henoko-Oura Bay, the Yanbnaru forest is also home to many endemic and endangered species, such as Okinawan rails (*yanbarukuina*) and Okinawa woodpeckers (*noguchigera*). Spanning Higashi, Kunigami, and Ōgimi villages, the Yanbaru forest makes these villages socially and geographically distinct from the rest of Okinawa Island, due to the absence of major industries and reliance on agriculture. Despite the Japanese and Okinawan governments' efforts to stimulate the region's economy by promoting tourism, the villages are still considered economically peripheral compared to the rest of Okinawa Island (Takahashi, 2015).

Figure 5

Yanbaru Forest

Note. An image of Yanbaru Forest. From *U.S. military must not jeopardize Okinawan forest's bid for World Heritage status*, by the Japan Times, February 1, 2017. (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2017/02/01/voices/u-s-military-must-not-jeopardize-okinawan-forests-bid-world-heritage-status/). Copyright 2017 by the Japan Times.

At the east end of the Yanbaru forest is the US military's jungle combat training centre, also known as the Northern Training Area (NTA) or Camp Gonsalves. The US Marine Corps first began using the NTA in 1957. During the Cold War, the Marines used the jungle-like environment of the Yambaru forest as a 'simulation' to prepare for their battle in Vietnam. During such training, the villagers were also mobilized to imitate the 'Third World Village' for US military training (Mitchell, 2020; Takahashi, 2015). Under the US military occupation of the forest, the local residents of Kunigami have expressed opposition to the US military training in the Yanbaru forest on two occasions, one in 1970 in response to the live bullet training, and the other in 1987 against the construction of an aircraft landing zone.

Figure 6

Maps of Northern Training Area and the Proposed Locations of the New Helipads



Note. A map of Northern Okinawa showing the areas covered by the NTA, the areas to be returned under 1996 SACO agreement, 22 aircraft landing zones in use pre-return, and 6 new locations of new landing zones. From *NO HELIPADs in TAKAE: Okinawa's Yanbaru forest,* by No Helipad Takae Resident Society and Citizen's Network for Biodiversity in Okinawa. (http://nohelipadtakae.org/Takae-handout-english-final.pdf).

In 1996, under the SACO agreement, the US government agreed to return 4,166 hectares of the NTA out of a total of 7,824 hectares to the respective landowners. This agreement, however, came with a condition that seven new helipads would be built in the area remaining as the NTA. After discussions among the US and Japanese leadership, the decision was made for the seven helipads (later reduced to six) to be constructed around the Takae District in Higashi Village (see Figure 6). Residents of Higashi and Kunigami villages were not consulted on this relocation plan, so in 2006 when the government announced the plan, the residents were surprised as they discovered the military installations to be constructed near their living space (two of the six planned just 400 meters from the residential area of Takae) (Takahashi, 2015).

Concerned with the risks and danger associated with military training—and the military presence in general—on their livelihood and safety, the residents and politicians from Higashi Assembly started an opposition campaign. The residents and politicians formed a group called *Brocoli no Mori wo Mamoru Kai* (the Association of Protection of the Broccoli Forest) to start an anti-construction campaign, however, with the Mayor changing his stance and withdrawing his opposition to the plan, the oppositional campaign ceased. From then, the local families stood up against the construction directly confronting the Japanese government with no political representation (Takahashi, 2015). Despite the local opposition, the Okinawa Defence Bureau (ODB) carried out the helipad construction on July 2nd, 2007, which also began a decade-long sit-in protest in Takae. This local oppositional movement then transformed into No Helipad Takae Residents Society (*helipaddo iranai takae jumin no kai*), and soon after, Okinawa Peace Network consisting of a number of labour unions and socialist parties, communist parties and their affiliated groups, and the *9-jo no kai* (Constitution 9 Group) in the neighbouring village supported the sit-ins.

In 2008, after a series of protests and interference with the construction in the form of sit-ins and blockades, the Okinawa Defence Bureau (ODB), which was in charge of the construction, filed a civil litigation against 15 protesters representing the Takae Residents Society for obstructing the construction.[13] Two of the 15 protesters were found guilty in 2014 in the Naha Regional court. As this litigation targeted ordinary citizens and repressed opposition, Okinawans and Japanese recognized this as a case of 'SLAPP' (Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation) and criticized the state for upholding the court's decision.

In 2014, the construction of two of the six helipads was completed, and after a brief pause, the ODB began transporting the materials for the construction of the remaining four in July 2016. On July 11, 2016, as many as 60 protesters blockaded the gate of the NTA to interfere with the construction. Unfortunately, the protesters were removed by the Okinawan riot police (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2016). Despite the opposition, on July 22, the ODB proceeded with the construction of the remaining four helipads, which met with approximately 100 protesters coming from Okinawa and mainland Japan. This strong opposition met even stronger state repression; more than 500 riot police from Okinawa and mainland Japan were mobilized to counter the protesters gathered in front of the NTA gates. After a decade of local resistance and direct interference, all six helipads were completed in 2016. Once the helipads were complete, the problems of the NTA became less of a priority for other actors involved in the Okinawa anti-base movement, as the construction in Henoko was underway.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Ministry of Environment (MOE) attempted to nominate Yanbaru forest as a UNESCO World Natural Heritage (WNH) in 2017. The UNESCO did not approve the nomination because the area covered in the nomination was too small. The MOE then resubmitted the nomination again, this time including Amami-Oshima and Tokunoshima islands. The UNESCO approved the nomination, and the areas were inscribed

[13] The 15 protesters included one child, who at the time was only 8 years old (Takahashi, 2015).

as a WNH in 2021. While the inscription was celebrated both in mainland Japan and Okinawa, it soon became a contentious issue as the local activists publicly exposed the wastes and ammunition discarded by the US military in the Yanbaru forest.

In 2017, a local activist and entomologist Miyagi Akino discovered an abundance of waste and ammunition discarded by the US military in the formal NTA area. The presence of military waste contradicted the Japanese Ministry of Defence's report that the area returned was cleaned and free of waste. Akino then started collecting the waste as evidence and exposed the issues in 2018 and demanded the Japanese government conduct a proper survey and cleanup. Other civil NGOs such as OEJP, IPP, and OEN joined the call. For instance, they pointed out the fact that the MOE's 2017 nomination letter failed to mention environmental concerns and problems regarding the NTA, which is adjacent to the Yanbaru forest (Yoshikawa, 2019). Given the *de facto* colonial occupation of area, the local activists thought it was inconceivable that there was not even a single word about NTA in the letter. The MOE responded to the criticism by including a few lines about the NTA in the second round of nomination. Though this mention signals their recognition of the issue, the Japanese government did not take any meaningful measures to conduct a proper survey or cleanup of the area. This US military waste issue in Yanbaru forest became a contentious issue regarding the presence of US military in Yanbaru forest, as well as issues of environmental accountability and transparency of the US military and the Japanese government (Mitchell, 2020).

Henoko and Takae struggles both demonstrate the particularities of the problems in each local environment. Both places are socioeconomically and geographically peripheralized even within Okinawa and thus made vulnerable to the government-sanctioned projects, such as base and helipad construction (Takahashi, 2015). Although the concerns in both struggles are local, it also passes on the history of 'Okinawa' struggle. In addition, both

struggles successfully expanded the network of support and collaboration beyond the borders of Japan.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the history of Okinawa, connecting the colonial oppression and militarization in the post-war to the current, ongoing struggles in Henoko and Takae. While these two specific cases are the focus of my research, this chapter illustrated how these struggles cannot be isolated from the countless protests, demonstrations, and struggles in Okinawa that preceded them. As the history of the Okinawa struggle showed, Okinawa's colonial experience with both Japan and the US has complicated the way Okinawans framed issues related to the US military and attempted to demilitarize their islands. Such complications were particularly evident during the reversion movement, when some Okinawans longed for a 'return' to Japanese sovereignty, while others desired independence from both the US and Japan. By understanding these complexities and the messiness of the movement's history, we can better understand the activists' struggles and experience as well as the 'meanings' of each struggle.

Chapter Three: Literature Review

Introduction

My interest in this topic is largely influenced by EJ scholarship and activism. Its theoretical and analytical frameworks are useful tools in understanding various aspects of environmental problems as well as the movement addressing those problems. While tackling the environmental problems, the anti-base movement in Okinawa is most well known as an anti-base or peace movement (Tanji, 2006), rather than an environmental (justice) movement. Just a few studies have explored *kichimondai* through the lens of EJ, with the environmental problems becoming more prominently pronounced in the Okinawa anti-base movement in the late 1990s, particularly addressing the Henoko controversy (e.g., Kumamoto, 2008; Taylor, 2007). Along with the EJ perspectives, conservationist and (ecological) security perspectives are also used by scholars and activists to explore *kichimondai*. By grounding my analysis in the literature of EJ scholarship and activism, my research contributes to deepening the understanding of activists' environmental and ecological approach to demilitarization. This chapter provides a review of various perspectives on the US military-related environmental problems as well as anti-base resistance approaches in Okinawa.

As my research also aims to explore individual anti-base activists' subjective understandings and articulations of the meanings of particular forms of anti-base resistance, I also review the concept of a frame (Goffman, 1974) and its applications in social and environmental movements. As individual actors in a movement interpret and construct meanings of a particular event differently (Snow et al., 2018), activists' understanding of the problems, as well as the purposes, strategies, and meanings of the anti-base activism helps us make sense of both pragmatic and ideological aspects of their activities. The concept and application of a frame is thus useful in examining anti-base activists' construction of meanings through their involvement in the movement.

In addition, I am also interested in how the activists form relations and produce knowledge through their interactions with various human and nonhuman entities. Here, I am following Davis' (2020) conceptualization of social movements as not merely a resisting force, but also as an assemblage of different entities producing different ways of governance and territorialization based on their ethical principles. Building on Davis' notion of social movements as relational and productive assemblages, this chapter reviews assemblage theory and its application in environmental sociology and SMS. While Davis (2020) focuses more on translocal assemblages among militarized islands, I pay attention to assemblages forming on smaller scales in my analysis. By taking this approach, my research also aims to highlight various local relations and the roles of nonhuman entities in formation of relations and production of knowledge. This review explains the concepts of assemblages and territorialization and stresses the importance of a relational approach in examining social movements.

In what follows, I first review some of the key discussions and analytical frameworks of EJ scholarship and movements, as well as the four pillars of Critical Environmental Justice (CEJ). I then review how militarization differs from other types of industry in how it produces environmental harms. Next, I review various environmental perspectives used by scholars and the anti-base movement in analyzing and articulating the environmental problems associated with the US military presence in Okinawa. I divided the perspectives into three broad categories: environmental justice, conservationist, and ecological security. I then review the concept of frames and its application in the social movement research. Finally, I review the frameworks and application of assemblage theory, specifically in SMS and environmental sociology.

Environmental Justice: Conceptual and Analytical Frameworks

The term environmental justice was developed through civil collective actions in the 1970s and 80s with the aim of addressing environmental issues that intersected with other forms of oppression, particularly racism, in the US (Bullard, 2001; Taylor, 2014). Since the late 1970s, some racialized and low-income communities have become increasingly concerned about the impact of industrial facilities on their health, particularly through cases like the dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) water contamination in Triana, Alabama, the polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) contaminated waste dump in Warren County, North Carolina, and the alley of over 200 petrochemical plants and refineries called Cancer Alley in Louisiana (Taylor, 2014). Concerns raised in these cases eventually prompted a broader question of how toxic facilities are placed in proximity to socially marginalized communities (Taylor, 2014). EJ movements thus underscore the need to examine other oppressive systems that maintain the structural inequalities through which environmental harms are created and distributed across various communities (Chesters & Welsh, 2011; Taylor, 2000).

As the Principles of Environmental Justice developed by the 1991 First National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit (FNPCLS) suggest, EJ recognizes, for instance, the interdependence of all species on Earth, the importance of cultures, languages, and beliefs about the natural world, and the role of colonialism in poisoning the Earth. In other words, EJ not only protects the nonhuman world, but also ensures the safety of human communities (Bryant, 1995). Particularly, Black, Indigenous, and low-income communities have been historically vulnerable to environmentally hazardous industries and practices, and these communities have been at the forefront of the EJ movements in North America (Murdock, 2021). EJ analytical frameworks developed by scholars such as Bullard (2001), Cole and Foster (2001), Taylor (2014) and Schlosberg (2007) have been particularly useful in

unpacking the complex underlying structures of environmental justice, such as colonialism and racism, and other forms of structural oppression and discrimination.

While EJ issues are often discussed alongside the impacts of racism in the US, the concepts of 'race' and 'racism' are not always prominent in environmental (justice) movements in other countries (Terada, 2017). In the US, race and racism have been important factors to analyze within the EJ scholarship and movement, as an extension of the civil rights movements in the 1960s and 70s (Bullard, 1990; Taylor, 2014). 'Environmental racism,' which refers to racial inequalities in the distribution of and protection from environmental harms, is an ongoing issue (e.g., the water crisis in Jackson, Mississippi in 2022; NAACP, n.d.). This focus on race in the EJ literature seems to reflect the salience of racism as a social issue in the US; whereas in Japan, scholars and activists have been less attuned to racism, and instead associate environmental issues with other social and political issues (Terada, 2017). As compared to the US, EJ movements have been more concerned with the impacts of environmental hazards on daily living conditions via the destruction of the surrounding environment in countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (Terada, 2017). Particularly in Japan, environmental issues are often linked to impacts on human health and subsistence livelihoods (Terada, 2017). These associations were especially true in the post-WWII period when many communities in Japan suffered from *kōgai*, which refers to environmental harms as a result of rapid industrialization (Terada, 2018). Although the term 'justice' was not commonly used to discuss the impacts of *kōgai*, Terada (2018) suggests it was clearly an environmental justice issue because the people who suffered from the toxic contamination and developed diseases experienced discrimination in the diagnosis and treatment processes.

Other Japanese scholars such as Takahashi (2012) and Otsuki (2016) have also investigated how EJ issues arise from the 'peripheralization' of rural communities through

government-sanctioned development infrastructure projects. The process of 'peripheralization' refers to a socio-economic marginalization of a 'peripheral' community, characterized by its remoteness, economic marginality, political powerlessness, cultural defensiveness, and/or environmental degradation (Blowers, 2010). This process is an example of what Bullard (2004) calls geographic inequity, which refers to the placing of noxious facilities in close proximity to socio-economically vulnerable communities, such as poor communities and communities of colour in the case of the US. In Japan, many rural towns are often considered 'acceptable' as a site for a nuclear power plant (Otsuki, 2016). Many rural towns were structurally coerced to accept these facilities in the late 20th century as they suffered from economic marginalization and impoverishment during that time (Otsuki, 2016). As Otsuki (2016) notes, "the benefits of hosting the nuclear power plants have been carefully crafted by a closed relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, scientists, industry and the media," also known as Atomic Circle, to force rural towns into "energy sacrifice zones" (p.301). The Atomic Circle took advantage of rural towns' political and economic vulnerabilities, which is an example of 'peripheralization.' As nuclear power plants and radioactive waste facilities pose threats to human and ecological health, the case of rural nuclear towns illustrates the process of peripheralization can produce environmental injustice in peripheral communities in Japan.

While Okinawa has been integrated into Japanese politics and economy, its experiences with environmental problems are slightly different from mainland Japan due to its history of colonization and militarization. Taylor (2007) claims that arguably the first known 'Japanese' environmental justice movement began in Okinawa when the residents of Kin organized themselves to oppose the construction of a new oil reserve base, or the Central Terminal Station (CTS), in Kin Bay for the US forces. This project generated concerns about oil spill and ecological destruction among the residents, which eventually led to the rise of

the anti-CTS movement (Mori, 2013; Yamashiro, 2005). While anti-CTS movement's concerns were initially centered around the ecological impacts of the station, the residents also became increasingly aware of structural issues, such as Okinawa's economic dependency on Japan and the US, precipitated by Japanese and US colonization of Okinawa (Taylor, 2007). Unlike in mainland Japan, where environmental problems were strongly tied to industrialization, the post-WWII environmental problems in Okinawa were inseparable from the US military presence on their islands. Therefore, as Yamashiro (2005) argues, the post-war Okinawan environmental movement was intricately connected to anti-US military base struggles.

Analytical frameworks of EJ: distributive, procedural, and recognition

Despite these differences in the conceptualization of 'environmental injustice' across countries and communities, EJ analytical frameworks developed in the West are still useful in examining environmental (in)justices in Japan, particularly the three aspects of EJ: distributive, procedural, and recognition (Terada, 2017). Perhaps the most recognized aspect of EJ is distributive injustice, which refers to the unfair distribution of environmental burdens and benefits across different communities. In the US, scholars have found racial and social class discrimination to be an important factor in explaining the disproportionate siting of environmentally hazardous facilities in or near Black and low-income neighbourhoods (Bullard, 2004; Taylor, 2014). Conversely, many local environmental policies such as zoning and restrictive housing covenants have created unequal access to employment opportunities and home ownerships, which often worked in favour of white and high-income communities (Bullard, 2004; Kaswan, 2021; Taylor, 2014). As such, environmental costs and benefits are not randomly distributed; they often reflect the socio-economic dynamics between different races and classes.

While distributive justice can be attained by providing fair protection from environmental harms and access to environmental benefits, to do so requires the other two aspects of EJ: procedural justice and recognition. Procedural justice refers to fair and open access to political participation (Schlosberg, 2004). Exclusion of certain individuals or communities from decision-making processes related to environmental policies can allow the unfair application of environmental laws and regulations or placement of environmental hazards, which can then lead to the unfair distribution of environmental hazards (Bullard, 2001). In an attempt to pursue procedural justice, however, including relevant groups in the decision-making process is not sufficient: one must examine the power asymmetries between the actors involved and their relative influence in decision-making processes (Marion Suiseeya, 2021). On a global scale, for example, even if equal participation may be secured, there has been a case in which organizations such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Parks Congress[14] failed to prioritize providing translation services to non-English-speaking participants (Marion Suiseeya, 2021). This barrier limits non-English-speaking actors' meaningful participation in the congress.

In the case of community members being affected by a new development project, requiring free and prior informed consent from community members is a crucial step to ensuring procedural justice (Marion Suiseeya, 2021). However, some socio-economically and politically marginalized communities may consent to environmental harmful development projects because of the accompanying economic benefits. For instance, Indigenous scholar Gilio-Whitaker (2019) illustrates how some Indigenous Nations often get entangled in an ethical dilemma, trying to balance their need to escape from poverty and their worldview of honouring the Earth. Gilio-Whitaker argues the latter is consistent across American Native

[14] The IUCN World Parks Congress discusses conservation goals of protected areas globally and develops strategies to combat various threats to human and ecological wellbeing (IUCN, 2014).

Nations. Also known as 'energy colonization,' American energy companies have "targeted Indigenous communities knowing that their poverty made them vulnerable to tempting promises of a better way of life" (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019, p.71). Thus, even if Indigenous Nations consent to environmentally destructive projects, we need to recognize the underlying socio-economic conditions that led to such decisions.

A similar case is found in Japan, particularly through the process of 'peripheralization.' In investigating the process through which the two rural towns—Futama and Okuma in Fukushima—accepted the construction of the radioactive waste facilities after witnessing the devastating impacts of nuclear meltdown in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, Otsuki (2016) demonstrates how these towns' decisions were influenced by their economic dependence on the nuclear energy industry and the central government's subsidies generated from hosting these facilities. Otsuki (2016) concludes that, despite the opposition to hosting these facilities, it is difficult for these towns to break from "their structurally induced coercion and peripheralization, which keep on inhibiting the towns' residents and officials to imagine a new life without the nuclear power plant" (p. 308). Given that their acceptance of these projects contributes to further degradation of the environment and residents' health and safety, these cases highlight the need to look beyond consensual politics, which effectively create an illusion of procedural equity (Otsuki, 2016).

The remaining aspect of EJ is recognition. As Iris Marion Young (1990) and Nancy Fraser (2000) argue, while the framework of distributive justice is useful in examining how various goods and benefits are distributed, its focus on *the process* of distribution alone is inadequate to understand why unjust distribution occurs across social groups in the first place. By paying attention to how different social groups experience social, cultural, symbolic, and institutional subordination, the politics of recognition stresses the needs to take cultural differences as a legitimate factor in order to achieve just distribution (Fraser, 2000).

As Fraser (2000) illustrates, the distributive and recognition dimensions of justice are intertwined under capitalist society; each dimension produces its own inequalities, which can impede achieving the other dimension of justice. Therefore, both dimensions of justice need to be examined simultaneously. Echoing Young's (1990) and Fraser's (2000) critique of the liberal justice framework of distribution, Schlosberg (2004) contends that recognizing and respecting different communities' varying experiences with environmental and social injustice is also crucial in achieving EJ.

For instance, as Gilio-Whitaker (2019) notes, while EJ movements led by African Americans focus more on toxic facilities and the health impacts of those infrastructures, the Indigenous environmental justice focuses more on relationships with the land, not only as a physical space but also as a space tied to Indigenous identity and culture. For many Indigenous communities in the US, environmental degradation is intricately connected to cultural genocide, which may be neglected in the mainstream EJ movement and scholarship, and thus EJ needs to account for culturally and historically specific process of environmental injustice (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019). In sum, the three aspects of environmental justice – distributive, procedural, and recognition – need to be examined simultaneously to gain a better understanding of how environmental injustice is produced and maintained (Schlosberg, 2004).

Moving towards a more critical approach to EJ: Critical Environmental Justice Studies

Sociologist David Pellow (2015) identifies four limitations of EJ and proposes a new framework, which he calls the Critical Environmental Justice (CEJ) Studies. The first limitation of EJ scholarship, Pellow argues, is the limited scope in analyzing intersecting oppressions. The North American EJ scholarship has a tendency to focus only on the issues of race and class, but only a small portion of the scholarship have explored other axes of

oppression such as sexism, ableism, and speciesism in relation to EJ (Pellow, 2015). CEJ expand the current limited scope of analysis and include multiple forms of oppression.

The second limitation of EJ is its limited analysis of 'scale,' both in terms of space and time. Given the trajectory of EJ movements in North America, EJ research has focused on the environmental impacts on specific communities, neglecting how those impacts may influence the biosphere on a global scale. In addition to the spatial scale, Pellow suggests the need to analyze the environmental issues spanning across generations. This multi-scalar approach both in terms of space and time enables us to widen the scope of analyses to better capture the impacts of environmental problems.

The third problem with EJ, according to Pellow, is its limited critique of the state. As the state proactively produces and maintains inequalities and contributes to environmental injustices, Pellow argues for a more critical approach to examining the role of the state. As EJ movements often rely on an ecolegal approach, which relies on legal procedures to resolve environmental issues, Pellow argues that this approach legitimatizes state power, hence upholding the legitimacy of the state itself. CEJ thus considers the state as a source of the problem, rather than a means to solve it.

The fourth limitation Pellow identifies is the limited emphasis on the contributions of socially and politically marginalized human and nonhuman actors, often deemed as 'expendable.' Emphasizing the interconnectedness and interdependency of all human and nonhuman communities, he calls for the recognition of all human and nonhuman members as 'indispensable' agents, who are necessary in the work of building the collective future. While Pellow agrees that procedural justice and recognition are important elements of EJ efforts, the 'indispensability' approach of CEJ more explicitly rejects inclusion based on assimilation politics and existing power relations, such as white supremacy and human dominionism within EJ advocacy.

These pillars of CEJ offer critical analytical tools to better understand the intersection of environmental and other social issues. In particular, if we look at military bases and operations as a global network (or 'assemblage' as I will explore later in this chapter), the multi-scalar analysis is useful in understanding the expanded environmental and ecological impacts of the militaries. Moreover, as my research focuses on militarization, which is sanctioned by the state, the CEJ's critical framing of the state is also relevant to my research. Additionally, CEJ's emphasis on the role of more-than-humans—as included in the first and fourth pillars—also helps my analysis of multispecies relations in Henoko and Takae struggles, in which nonhuman animals are also entangled.

My analysis draws on both EJ and CEJ frameworks to explore various forms of anti-base resistance activities in relation to the respective environmental problems they address, and activists' experiences in them. However, I also try to be cautious not to force activists' understandings of the environmental problems and experiences into EJ or CEJ frameworks. This is because I employ an interpretive methodology (e.g., Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012) in my research, which centers the anti-base activists' subjective understandings of environmental problems. Before reviewing the literature on various environmental perspectives in the anti-base movement more closely, it is important to detail the processes through which environmental and ecological harm is produced through militarization. The next section reviews such processes.

Militarization, Colonialism, and Environmental (Justice) Issues

The military-industrial complex, including armies and weapon industries, greatly contributes to environmental destruction. While sharing similarities to other environmentally destructive industries, the military-industrial complex is unique in that it is supported primarily by public funds, militaristic ideas of national security, and the state's desire for control over natural

resources and territories (Hooks & Smith, 2004). Within the field of Environmental Sociology, Hooks and Smith (2004), Jorgenson et al. (2012), and Givens (2014) have demonstrated such characteristics of the military-industrial complex using the treadmill of destruction theory. While a treadmill of production refers to how the 'productive' economic processes under capitalism leads to environmental degradation, a treadmill of destruction refers to how militarization, which is connected to inherently destructive projects, produce environmental destruction (Hooks & Smith, 2004). The treadmill of destruction theory thus helps explain how the expansion of the military, which is motivated by arms races and geopolitical conflicts, causes greater environmental harm not only during armed conflicts but also – *and especially* – during times of peace (Hooks & Smith, 2004). For instance, Jorgensen et al. (2012) identify various ways in which militaries contribute to ecological destruction, such as through their large consumption of energy and natural resources for base operations and production of weapons, machinery, and vehicles. Military preparations, such as flying, combat training, and bomb testing also contribute to air and water pollution and toxic contamination (Jorgenson et al., 2012).

The environmental impacts of militarization are particularly severe in Indigenous or colonized places. For instance, studies have shown how many military-related facilities and operations are deliberately placed on Indigenous or formally colonized lands (e.g., Hooks & Smith, 2004; Davis, 2015, 2020). During WWII and the Cold War, for instance, the US government deliberately placed toxic, environmentally hazardous military facilities on or near Native American reserves and conducted testing there (Hooks & Smith, 2004). Hooks and Smith (2004) further demonstrate how social coercion (e.g., racial discrimination, economic disparities, etc.) often dictates the location of such environmental hazards. Although their research does not explicitly rely on the EJ framework nor use the term EJ, it addresses the intersection of racism, colonialism, and environmental harms that EJ literature

encapsulates. Additionally, because military-related facilities are often considered 'necessary evils,' the lives of economically and racially marginalized communities are 'scarified' in the name of national security (Hooks & Smith, 2004).

Similarly, the US government heavily militarized Indigenous islands in the Asia-Pacific region throughout and after WWII. For instance, the US transformed Indigenous land into bases and conducted military trainings and testing in Marshall Atoll (Davis, 2015), Kaho'olawe (Blackford, 2004), and Okinawa (Mitchell, 2020; Taylor, 2007; Yamashiro, 2005). These operations have created various environmental and social issues in these islands. It is also well known that the US military operated intensive atomic bomb testing on small islands in the Pacific during and after WWII. However, despite the tremendous impacts on the local population and the environment, the ecological impacts on these sites are insufficiently investigated (Davis, 2015). Constructing Indigenous land as "wasteland," empires, such as the US, justify the complete transformation of the land to fit their needs while erasing history, culture, and bodies on the islands (Davis, 2015). As Davis (2015) suggests, the colonial "out of sight, out of mind" mentality played into the unfair distribution of environmental burdens on the people and environment of the Pacific. Such research well demonstrates the connections between militarization and colonialism, which then together create ecological and social damages that last for generations. Next, I review various perspectives on the US military-related environmental problems in Okinawa.

Environmental Perspectives on *Kichimondai*

To my knowledge, only a few studies have specifically used the EJ frameworks to examine environmental problems related to the US military presence in Okinawa (e.g., Kumamoto, 2008; Mitchell, 2020; Yamashiro, 2005; Yoshikawa, 2019, 2020a). While there seems to be no 'consensus' on whether the environmental problems associated with the US military

presence in Okinawa are deemed as environmental justice issues, citizens' groups such as Okinawa Environmental Justice Project, as its name suggests, began explicitly framing the problems as environmental justice issues (OEJP, n.d.). This section reviews various perspectives on these topics, including how the anti-base movement has addressed the problems and how academics have examined them. I divided those perspectives into three broad categories: environmental justice, conservationist or universalist, and ecological security perspectives. I now describe each perspective in detail.

Kichimondai as Environmental Justice Issues

One of the studies that examines the US military-related environmental problems from EJ perspectives was conducted by Yamashiro (2005). This study examines how the local residents of Kin Bay responded to the environmental disruption caused by the 1970s building of the Central Terminal Station (CTS), an oil transportation facility, initiated by the Japanese and US governments. Although the CTS was not directly related to the US military, the problems reflected the power dynamics between the states and the local Okinawans, which was maintained through the US occupation of Okinawa (Yamashiro, 2005). When the construction started, the residents in Kin Bay raised concerns about its potential impacts on their livelihood and economic activities, which are closely tied to the Bay (Yamashiro, 2005). The residents used what Tanji (2006) calls a 'localist framing of the issues', which focused on the impacts of the projects in their particular local environment. Seishin Asato, a local activist also highlighted the important connections between the people and place, which was then being disrupted by the CTN (Yamashiro, 2005). While the residents themselves called their movement a 'residents' movement' and not an 'environmental justice movement,' it nonetheless stressed that impacts on the environment and the local residents are interconnected. Referring to this movement, Yamashiro (2005) argues that the

"Environmental justice movement is not simply about race, class, and the environment; but rather it is essentially about struggle for one's connection with the place, acknowledging fair and equal distribution of benefits and burdens" (p.55). Thus, recognizing and protecting the residents' cultural, social, and economic connections to their local place is also an important component of EJ.

In another, more recent example in Henoko, Kumamoto (2008) examines the issues of procedural justice between the 'old' landowner residents who benefitted from renting their land to the US military and 'newer residents' of the village who opposed the new base construction. In the matter of accepting the new base construction, the old residents dominated the decision-making process, which resulted in the favouring of their economic interests. The new residents, in turn, faced procedural inequity in this matter (Kumamoto, 2008). While it may be easy to criticize the landowner residents for accepting further militarization and its accompanying social and environmental issues, it is also important to understand the historical economic disenfranchisement that Okinawa, including Henoko, has gone through in the post-war period. The historical, socio-political, and economic context is thus crucial to understand why certain communities or residents accept projects and industries that contribute to the increase in environmental threats.

Jon Mitchell, a Welsh journalist who has been investigating the US military's poisoning of Okinawa (and beyond in the Pacific), also suggests other aspects of environmental problems as justice issues. In his recent work *Poisoning the Pacific* (2020), he exposes the US military's historical and ongoing contamination of Okinawa islands, from the US military's storing of Agent Orange in Okinawa during and after the Cold War to recent accidents involving the so-called forever chemical, per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), leaking into the public waterway from the Kaneda Air Base. Tracing these cases, Mitchell (2020) argues the contamination of Okinawa is structurally maintained through the

US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which "enshrined the right of the US military to pollute Japan with impunity" (p.202). This unfair arrangement allows the US military to disregard environmental accountability or transparency, as well as human rights to a clean environment. Mitchell's work effectively frames the US and Japanese colonialism as an underlying structure that enables the unfair treatment of the people in Okinawa, and thus it constructs these problems as environmental *justice* issues. As Yamashiro (2005) argues, the environmental problems in Okinawa are intricately linked with the US military presence on the islands; they are part of the outcomes of militarization and colonization.

As I discussed in this section, studies investigating Okinawa through EJ perspectives emphasize the structural dynamics between Okinawans and the US and Japanese governments. Even though it is evident from these studies that the US military colonial occupation backed by the Japanese government produces various environmental problems, race and racism are not salient in these studies, which supports Terada's (2010) analysis of Japanese EJ frames. However, it is also noteworthy that a report[15] by the Eradication of Racial Discrimination NGO Network (2018) that lists the US military occupation as one of the racial discrimination cases in Japan, notes environmental problems such as perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) leakage from the US military base. Even though this report does not explicitly call this situation as an 'environmental racism', it implies that such environmental problems are interconnected with racism and colonialism.

Kichiomondai as Conservation Issues

Especially after 1996, when the plans to relocate the Futenma Air Base to Henoko-Oura Bay were proposed by the Japanese and US governments, the Okinawa anti-base movement started paying more attention to how the construction would harm wild animals, particularly

[15] The report is titled '日本における人種差別', which translates to 'Racial Discriminations in Japan.'

the endangered Okinawan dugong. Okinawans, along with Japanese activists, founded multiple groups and organizations such as Okinawa Environmental Network and Save the Dugong Foundation, aiming to raise awareness of the environmental and ecological concerns related to the construction (Taylor, 2008). These efforts made an international coalition possible among American and/or international environmental NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Foundation, Centre for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, and Friends of Earth. The emphasis on the environmental concerns regarding the construction became salient and helped win support from mainland Japan and overseas (Taylor, 2008).

While a conservationist approach can gain support from the 'outsiders' or *yosomono*, such as the Japanese and international organizations who share concerns with Okinawans about the protection of endangered animals and environment, the involvement of outsiders in such an approach raises the question about the roles of the outsiders and distinctions between 'insiderness' and 'outsiderness.' Drawing on the two localized environmental movements in Isahaya and Amami-Ōshima, Japanese environmental philosopher Kitoh Shuichi (1998) demonstrates how outsiders, who may have weaker connections to the place than the locals, can contribute to the movements by bringing in the 'universal perspective' to recognize nature's intrinsic values. According to Kitoh, such perspectives contrast with localist perspectives that stress the connections between the people and the place in a specific local environment. The local people may be more concerned with how environmental destruction affects their livelihood, whereas the 'outsiders' can advocate for the protection based on the universal principle of environmental conservation (Kitoh, 1998).

Kitoh (1998) further explores the construction of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in the context of local environmental movement. First in the case of a grassroots opposition to the Isahaya wetland development project, the activist who spearheaded the movement and took the case (also known as the 'Rights of Nature' lawsuit) to the court in 1996, Yamashita

Hirofumi, was born and raised in the community but only became aware of the wetland's biological importance after traveling across the country. In other words, this activist was able to adopt new perspectives on the same place because of the 'outsiderness' he attained from spending time away from the community. In short, this case shows how 'outsiderness' is not always clearly defined or predetermined.

In the case of Amami- Ōshima's Rights of Nature lawsuit, in which one of the main actors of the movement—who happened to be a new immigrant to the community—used a combination of the universalist perspective and local relationships. The activist utilized the western framework of 'rights', environmental conservation, and deep ecology while listening to stories from the local elderly about their relationships with wild animals. These stories shaped her understanding of the locals' relationships with nature and encouraged her to highlight the stories in the lawsuit. The activist was able to gain the 'insider' perspectives to the issue through her interactions with the locals. As such, this example illustrates how the 'outsider's' concerns about environmental conservation from their 'universal perspectives' can work with the concerns specific to the local community. These two examples challenge the insider/outsider binary that is often considered to be static and predetermined. Instead, they demonstrate how 'insiderness' and 'outsiderness' are constantly negotiated as one interacts with the locals and other places.

While 'outsiders' can bring new perspectives to the grassroots environmental struggles, there is also a risk of clashes between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' with distinct cultural or ideological differences. For instance, Gilio-Whitaker (2019) presents the case at the #NoDAPL demonstrations at the Standing Rock, where white 'hippie' participants treated their visits more like a music festival than a political struggle. There were other clashes between the Native people and white protesters arising from their different understanding of social ethics such as a dress code (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019). While the collaboration between

the Native peoples and white settlers successfully mobilized protesters across the nation, the existing system of white domination reflected in how white settlers acted in the Native space. Thus, in the movement where outsiders and insiders share a space, a conflict between them may arise if outsiders come in without respecting the locals' or insiders' experiences and views, not only within that immediate space of activism but also within a broader socio-economic and political structure.

Nevertheless, regardless of one's insider or outsider status, a conservationist approach can add a new perspective to a local struggle and mobilize a wider audience who might not have strong connections with the local environment. Like the activist in Amami-Ōshima, a universalist framing can also incorporate local framing of the issues. As Gilio-Whitaker (2019) demonstrates, however, it is also important to recognize group differences in how they approach the issues.

Kichimondai as Ecological Security Issues

Other scholars link environmental problems associated with US military bases and operations with 'security' issues (e.g., Kim, 2021; Yoshikawa, 2020a, 2020b). Before reviewing their perspectives, it is crucial to understand what 'security' means to different actors. 'Security' is a contested term in the International Relations (IR) studies and critical security studies, as the ideas of what 'security' means and whose 'security' matters differ depending on a group (McDonald, 2018). For instance, Yeo (2018) found that the policymakers in South Korea often utilize a realist discourse of 'national security,' which rationalizes the presence of military bases as instruments of national defence. In contrast, anti-military activists link the issues of militarization with peace and regional (in)security, as well as the economic and environmental impacts local communities have to endure as a result of continued militarization (Yeo, 2018). As such, different actors adopt a particular frame of 'security' to rationalize their position and actions.

McDonald (2018) identifies four categories of ‘security’ in his study of climate change discourse: national security, human security, international security, and ecological security. Each category has a referent to which the security matters, and the events or factors that threaten it. For example, the populations directly affected by various outcomes of climate change see security in terms of securing the stability of their livelihood, whereas the state is more concerned with protecting its economic interests and sovereignty over the impacts of climate change on its population (McDonald, 2018). In this example, the former discourse relates to human security, the latter relates to national security. ‘Ecological security,’ as McDonald (2018) describes, is a frame “oriented towards ecosystem resilience and with it the rights and needs of the most vulnerable across time, space, and species: impoverished populations in developing states; future generations; and other living beings” (p.155). In the context of climate change, it means to protect and maintain the ecosystem in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change on human *and* nonhuman populations who are the most vulnerable to those impacts. These different conceptions of security produce different responses to the same crisis.

In the case of Okinawa, the concentration of US military bases there is also often justified in the name of national security (Akibayashi & Takazato, 2009; Nishiyama, 2022). The US government, along with the Japanese government, use the rhetoric of potential threats to the security of the Asia-Pacific Region, constructing the US military presence in Okinawa as ‘deterrence’ to the Chinese and North Korean military powers. While some of their perceived threats may be real and rational, they are also more concerned with maintaining control over the vital system in the region that secures energy trades and other systems on which the US and Japan economically depend (Davis, 2020). Similarly, an Okinawan professor and director of OEJP, Hideki Yoshikawa (2020b), suggests that state actors rationalize militarization by positing military defences as the only means to protect ‘national

security,' particularly in the case of the new Henoko base construction. These security perspectives also center the state's economic and political interests, more so than the security and safety of the people (Yoshikawa, 2020b).

In contrast to the national security discourse, anti-base activists pay attention to direct impacts on their lives and bodies, as well as their surrounding environment. Davis (2020) calls this approach a body-centric ethic of inclusion, which prioritizes the safety and security of individual bodies and environments. Yoshikawa (2020b) also proposes environmental realism to be incorporated into demilitarization efforts, highlighting not only the security concerns regarding the people, but also the legitimacy of environmental problems in construction projects. In a similar vein, Kim (2021) builds on McDonald's (2018) categorization of security to demonstrate how anti-military activists in Jeju, South Korea and Henoko, Okinawa have practiced ecological security in their activism. In these two high-profile anti-military movements, the actors have made a conscious effort to highlight the ecological significance of nonhuman entities, specifically naming a volcanic rock in Jeju and dugong in Henoko as "subjects deserving protection" (p.259). Not only has this incorporation of 'nonhuman ecological symbols' popularized the movements, but it also shifted the perception of what constitutes security and who deserves protection (Kim, 2021). As such, the anti-military movements in South Korea and Okinawa have challenged the traditional views of security that only represented human concerns. These alternative ethics and discourses can counter the hegemonic political framework, or the political realism of international relations (IR) and its perception of security.

While the ecological security perspective shares some similarities with the conservationist perspective in their ecological concerns, the former makes a more explicit link between the protection of the environment and the safety and security of the people (e.g., McDonald, 2018). The conservationists, for example, could support militarization if it is

presented as part of the mechanism to protect 'the natural environment.' Such potential 'benefits' of militarization can greenwash or mask the real, devastating impacts of militarism on both the environment and human populations (Harris, 2015). In sum, while the conservationist perspective may be primarily concerned with protecting the environment, which can benefit humans, the ecological security perspective more clearly recognizes the interconnection between human security and environmental protection.

This section reviewed various ways in which anti-base movements and scholars analyze and interpret the environmental issues related to *kichimondai*. In addition to EJ frameworks that help analyze various structural issues that produce environmental problems, scholars and activists have used conservationist and security perspectives to highlight other aspects of the kichimondai and link them to environmental concerns. These different perspectives can reveal how the movement utilizes a particular frame to better articulate the issues and garner support. I now review the concept of a frame and its application in social and environmental movements.

Frames

A frame is a useful tool in SMS for understanding how individuals attribute meanings to events through their observation and lived experience within a social movement setting (Chesters & Welsh, 2011). The concept of a frame, developed through the work of sociologist Ervin Goffman (1974), enables researchers to understand the social processes through which the meaning of an event is negotiated and discussed among a particular social group (Chesters & Welsh, 2001). Thus, understanding the concept and application of frames in SMS helps me examine how individual anti-base activists in Okinawa understand the purpose, strategies, and meanings of their activism. Thus, it is worth exploring how

individual activists develop particular understandings of their resistance activities from their particular standpoint in the anti-base struggle.

Rooted in the symbolic interactionist ideas that meanings are constructed through interactions (Goffman, 1974), framing (i.e., development of a 'frame') refers to the process through which a particular individual or group puts a focus of attention to and make meanings of a certain event (Snow et al., 2019). In the context of social movements (including environmental movements), framing is "the process by which individuals and groups identify, interpret, and express social and political grievances" (Taylor, 2000, p.511). Activists can utilize frames to bring a targeted group's (e.g., potential supporters, media, etc.) to a particular focal point of an event to be looked at from a desired angle. Looking at social movement actors as strategic agents, Snow and Benford (1988) categorize the frames actors use into three types: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. The diagnostic frames refer to a description that identifies a problem and attributes blame or responsibility, whereas prognostic frames describe how the actors propose a solution to an identified problem. Motivational frames are a description of the indication of a rationale for actions, encouraging people to take a specific action. Snow and Benford (1988) elaborate that, in SMS, a frame shared by actors in a movement often becomes a 'symbol,' which then helps mobilization. This allows a particular social group to establish a collective or shared frame to understand a phenomenon, which helps mobilization. For instance, Taylor (2000) illustrates how the EJ movements' adoption of 'justice' framings of environmental problems successfully mobilized and increased the visibility of the EJ issues in the US. As 'justice' was already accepted and shared value in the country, actors in the movement were able to utilize the concept to gain more support from the public (Taylor, 2000).

Regarding the relationship between a frame and actions, Chesters and Welsh's (2011) work also suggests that the ecology of mind, an ontological position that recognizes the

interdependence of humans and the environment, "also provides a primary sense-making device—a frame—to guide actions consistent with that recognition" (p. 68). In this sense, frames can also reveal one's ontological position, what they understand as a 'reality,' which then influences their actions. The movement actors engage in the reflexive process of negotiating their frames and refining their actions (Chesters and Welsh, 2011). As Snow et al. (2019) add, since the idea of framing posits that each individual has a different interpretation and meaning-making process, it "problematizes the meanings associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors, suggesting that those meanings are typically contestable and negotiable and thus open to debate and different interpretation" (p.393). Simply put, framing is an iterative process through which individuals and groups attribute meanings to a particular event, which can then influence actors' choices in a particular form of action.

As the concept of frames illustrates, social movements are inherently heterogenous and plural as each actor develops their unique frames even within the same movement. Drawing on Donna Haraway's notion of 'situated knowledges', Schlosberg (2001) also argues that each actor's knowledge is situated in and shaped by their particular social locations and experiences. Such differences in perspectives and experiences can also influence an actor's choices of a particular tactic. Recognizing and validating such differences among actors are thus an important aspect of forging solidarity among individual actors as well as creating alliances among groups with varying tactics (Schlosberg, 2001).

Particularly in investigating the Okinawa anti-base movement, this pluralist approach can counter what Tanji (2006) calls a movement's 'myth of unity'. Although some Okinawan activists and politicians have romanticized Okinawa as a 'united' community, different viewpoints and values of actors have complicated and sometimes divided the Okinawa anti-base movement (Inoue, 2004; Jin, 2016; Tanji, 2006). Even within a smaller group, such as kayak protesters in Henoko, Davis (2020) found different views and opinions among them.

These protesters are no doubt 'united' in the sense that they collectively attempt to impede the landfill construction in the Henoko-Oura Bay; yet, they are also a group of diverse voices in regard to the question, such as their relationship with the state (Davis, 2020). Moreover, seeing the movement as singular and monolithic puts us in danger of excluding marginalized voices. For instance, Shimabuku (2019) illustrates how the Japanese nationalist rhetoric that successfully mobilized the people of Okinawa and eventually achieved 'reversion' in 1972 excluded marginalized groups of people, such as immigrant women, sex workers, and mix-race children. To avoid simplifying the movement, it is also important to pay attention to the heterogeneity and plurality that exist within it. The next section reviews assemblage theory and its application in SMS and environmental sociology.

Assemblage Theory: Application in SMS and Environmental Sociology

In attempting to understand the Okinawa anti-base movement, its practices and visions, assemblage theory is useful. Rooted in a relational ontology, assemblage theory helps researchers consider how heterogenous—tangible and intangible, human and nonhuman—entities take form together or 'assemble' to configure particular relations (Legun & Virens, 2020). For instance, a 'person' can be understood as an assemblage formed through interactions between different genetic codes and molecules, as well as cognitive and emotional experiences and relationships with others (Davis, 2020). A 'bigger' entity, such as a military base, a protest, or a state, can also be conceptualized as an assemblage comprised of different elements constantly interacting with one another, or one of the elements to form another form of relation (Davis, 2020). Related to the concept of assemblage is the notion of territorialization and deterritorialization. Territorialization refers to the process through which heterogenous entities hold up together to for a particular period of time to form a territory (Müller, 2015). Such a formation is always subject to deterritorialization, the process of

alternation and mutation (Müller, 2015). This assemblage thinking of entities, forms, and territories rejects the idea that some things are static and complete. What often seems static and complete, such as sovereignty and territory, is always contested. Instead, assemblage theory helps us see them as relational and heterogeneous entities formed through the circulations and flow of things, which are subject to disconfiguration (Müller, 2015).

Political geographer Sasha Davis (2020) applies this assemblage thinking in analyzing both the state and social movements as an assemblage each concerned with exercising a particular form of governance and territorialization. Two steps are needed to digest this idea. First, the state can be understood as an assemblage composed of various entities to govern and create particular spatial boundaries to control (Müller, 2015). Following Foucault's notion of power, we can see that the state's exercises of power depends on various institutions and discourses (Davis, 2020). In other words, if the state's purpose is to govern and control, the state cannot function without various socio-material entities that make up 'the state.' The idea of the state as an assemblage also draws on Gilles Deleuze's contention that 'the state' does not exist, but only 'state control', which can be understood as "the attempts at control and governance arise from the distribution of power relations that saturate the spaces of everyday life and that occur *outside* the state and exist *prior to* their capture by the states" (Davis, 2020, p.41). Such conceptualizations of the state help us reject the idea that the state power is complete and absolute, and instead help us see the state as constantly shifting relations of various entities.

Second, social movements are also an assemblage concerned with power and governance. Like the state, social movements are also a configuration of relations between heterogenous entities. While we may consider social movements as 'anti-governance,' as Davis (2020) suggests, they are also interested in forming an alternative way of governance through producing different kinds of relations. This notion of social movements as a

governance-seeking entity challenges the assumption that only nation-states can legitimately claim a territory or sovereignty (Davis, 2020). As Davis (2020) contends, drawing on Foucault, "Power, if thought about relationally, is not something one can be free of, and it can never be simply resisted or destroyed – it can only be countered by the production of other actual actions and practices" (p. 136). Social movements are, therefore, a productive entity competing for power over a territory or sovereignty, rather than as an entity simply resisting existing forms of governance (i.e., state governance) (Davis, 2020). Assemblage theory can help us better understand the process through which various entities form relations, assemble as a movement and produce an alternative vision for the future with its particular ethics, practices, and knowledge that constitute a counternarrative to hegemonic, militaristic, and colonial governance.

Assemblage theory has also been useful in the analysis of the translocality of social movements (e.g., Amo, 2023; Davis, 2017, 2020). Looking at translocal activism as an assemblage, researchers can pay attention to the process of dispersion and transformation of ideas, people, and materials between movements in separate locations occur (Müller, 2015). In his comparative study of anti-military movements in the Asia-Pacific, Davis (2020) illuminates how anti-military activists on one island constantly learn from and share struggles with activists on another island. By sharing cognitive and emotional experience, as well as the knowledge from their activism with others, anti-base activists can create translocal solidarity (Davis, 2020). When investigating translocal movement from assemblage perspectives, researchers often pay more attention to the translocality in a broad scale (e.g., between islands, countries, etc.). While this broad scale of analysis is important in anti-military movements, I also pay attention to how different actors in much smaller scales (e.g., within the country) relate to one another to form an assemblage when analyzing activists' accounts of their relations with others.

Another important intervention of assemblage theory, like its sibling Actor-Network Theory (ANT), is its explicit incorporation of more-than-human entities as 'actors' within an assemblage. Within environmental sociology, Legun and Virens (2020) argues that recognizing nonhuman entities such as environment or landscape elements as part of assemblages "helps explore how particular ecologies are mobilized and supported by governance and relationships" (p. 169). As we are interdependent with ecologies, our actions are inevitably both limited and made possible by the given environment, both materially and discursively. For instance, social understandings of certain landscape features play a significant role in shaping the social and cultural understanding of what can be assembled with that feature, as much as its physiological or material features enable or limit the process of assembling. In short, more-than-human entities "play a significant role in assemblages and assembling as a factor that shapes how those processes occur and develop" (Legun & Virens, 2020, p.168). Assemblage theory thus helps us conceptualize how human-nonhuman interactions shape our understandings of the world. Such conceptualization is useful for my research in analyzing how activists' relations with nonhuman surroundings shape their subjectivities. As Haraway (2016) writes, "Critters—human and not—become-with each other, compose and decompose each other, in every scale and register of time and stuff in sympoietic tangling, in ecological evolutionary earthly worlding and unworlding" (p.97). It is crucial that we pay attention to how nonhumans become part of our lives and ideas, to develop something new.

In thinking of nonhuman entities as part of an assemblage, I also want to recognize the agency and subjectivities of nonhuman animals, a notion that Critical Animal Studies scholars have argued for (e.g., Colling, 2018; Corman, 2017). Investigating an environmental movement in Chile that was incited by a pulp mill company's pollution of the Río Cruces (the Cruces River), Sepúlveda-Luque (2018) found that the political agency of nonhuman

animals—the suffering of swans, in this case—was an affective force of the Valdivian local mobilization. As this study shows, the association between human actors and swans was constructed through the 'doing' of swans, not just the scientific data they helped present regarding the wetland environment, but also their affective capacity to mobilize the masses. By including swans as political agents, this association between the Valdivians and swans disrupts the dominant, Euro-modern understanding of the human/animal dichotomy, where animals are deemed as 'objects.' This study offers a new insight into the role of nonhuman animals and their affective capacities in social movements. While suffering is a crucial part of recognizing nonhuman subjectivity, reducing them to their suffering or victimization can reinforce the stereotypes about nonhuman animals as 'passive victims' (Corman, 2017). In my research, I also pay attention to how the often-overlooked role of nonhuman subjectivity beyond suffering plays into the forming of a particular assemblage with their affective capacities.

Conclusions

This section first reviewed the theoretical and analytical frameworks of EJ and CEJ, which helped me better contextualize the literature on Okinawa's environmental problems and anti-base movements' and scholars' responses to them. As these perspectives on the US military-related environmental problems reviewed in this chapter are mainly used by scholars and the movement as a whole, there is still room for exploring how individual actors' perspectives involved in the movement on the ground develop a particular way of understanding and addressing the issues. Following Schlosberg's critical pluralist approach, my research investigates how the activists frame environmental issues generated from the US military presence and how those framings become reflected in their resistance activities.

In addition to the literature on environmental (justice) issues and movements, this chapter reviewed assemblage theory and its application in SMS and environmental sociology. Assemblage theory offers an innovative way of investigating the relations between heterogenous human and nonhuman entities entangled in the configuration of the anti-base movement. Employing this assemblage thinking and building onto Davis' (2020) study, I look at Okinawa anti-base movement as well as actors involved in the movement as a relational, productive, and heterogeneous assemblage in my analysis.

Chapter Four: Methodology

Introduction

Situating my research in environmental sociology, environmental justice, and SMS literatures, I aim to deepen the understanding of the Okinawa anti-base resistance activities as well as the environmental-oriented activists' experience in them. Furthermore, I am interested in exploring the activists' various relations with other human and nonhuman entities, as well as how those relations influence their ideas about those relations and a broader question of security. More specifically, the following questions guide my research:

1. What resistance activities do activists engage?
2. How do these activities relate to the activists' understanding of the problems associated with the US military bases?
3. How do activists interact with other human and nonhuman entities in their activism?
4. How do these interactions shape activists' perceptions of their relations with other human and nonhuman entities and their idea of security?

To answer these questions, I chose to employ semi-structured, individual, in-depth interviews as my primary method of data collection. As the research progressed, I also decided to use participant observation to supplement my interview data. This chapter explains my rationales in choosing these data collection methods, as well as my other methodological decisions, concerns, and obstacles.

In what follows, I first provide an overview of the research design and rationale for choosing qualitative research methodology. After outlining the research design, I discuss how I navigated my social location and ethical concerns in conducting this research, drawing on teachings from Indigenous, feminist, and critical qualitative researchers. Next, I explain how I recruited participants using a purposive snowball sampling method. I then illustrate how I collected data, using primarily semi-structured individual in-depth interviews, in combination

with participant observation. Following the data collection method, I explain how I handled and analyzed the collected data. Lastly, I end this chapter by discussing three major obstacles I faced while conducting this research related to travels, recruitment, and translation, and how I have (tried to) overcome those obstacles.

Research Design and Rationale

As I intended to examine activists' experiences in anti-base resistance and their subjective understanding of security and their relations with others, I chose to use qualitative methodology for my research. Unlike quantitative methodology, which relies on numerical and statistical data to understand the social reality, qualitative methodology allows researchers to pay attention to the complex and plural nature of the social reality (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). Qualitative research also aligns with my interpretivist epistemological understanding that meanings are co-constructed through social interactions among beings situated in a particular social location (Esterberg, 2002). This interpretivist assumption also differs from the 'traditional' positivist research paradigm that assumes 'truth' is 'out there' to be objectively known through controlled observation and measurement (Esterberg, 2002; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). From this vantage, both participants and researchers are co-producer of knowledge (Esterberg, 2002; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). Therefore, my research methodology needs to account for how I engage in such co-production of meanings and knowledge. Interpretivist, qualitative research methodology allows me to conduct this research in a way that recognizes social realities as complex and multifaceted, with various subjective, situated beings involved, myself included as a researcher. Interpretivist, qualitative research methodology also aligns with the objective of my research to highlight the heterogeneity of the movement by exploring differences in their perspectives and experiences in the anti-base resistance activities.

Additionally, feminist research methodologies have guided me to pay attention to relational and emotional aspects of the movement and the actors in it. Feminist researchers recognize the role of emotions in knowledge production, including its influences in researchers' development of new inquiries based on their emotional experiences with the participants and research settings (Dupuis et al., 2022). This approach also aligns with my theoretical grounding in assemblage thinking, which recognizes emotional and affective aspects of relations (Müller, 2015). Decolonial methodologies have also informed how I designed my research, particularly with respect to the question of what counts as valid knowledge, and who has the authority to know (Kovach, 2009; Smith, 2012). As my research participants are situated in the military colonial environment where the US and Japanese governments have the power to produce their security narratives (Nishiyama, 2022), I wanted to highlight the activists' active role in producing ideas of security alternative to the states' dominant security narratives. This practice also echoes SMS researchers' call for recognizing social movements as a space for knowledge production rather than simply a research object (Chesters, 2012; della Porta & Pavan, 2017).

With the intent to explore activists' experiences in the resistance activities and their perceptions of their relations with others and their ideas of security, my research involves understanding activists' subjective accounts, opinions, and beliefs regarding their resistance activities and their experiences in them. This objective makes qualitative in-depth interviews appropriate for this research. In-depth interviews are a useful tool to generate the participants' reflections of their experiences and perceptions, which helps the researcher to "analyze the meanings individual attribute to the external world and to their own participation in it, the construction of identity, and the development of emotions" (della Poarta, 2014, p. 230). Particularly in social movement research, researchers may explore activists' motives to participate in a particular form of actions, their cognitive and emotional experiences in their

activities, and their views on the movement's organizations and strategies (Blee & Taylor, 2002; della Porta, 2014). In-depth interviews therefore are fitting to my research as they allow participants to explain their own experiences and ideas in their own words without being constrained by existing definitions or conceptualizations (Graham et al., 2017), while I also participate in the meaning-making through the conversations.

I also chose to make my interviews semi-structured, rather than structured. With this methodological approach, I can use an interview guide to help me stay on topics relevant to my research, while leaving room for participants to share stories and ideas that might not be directly related to the prepared questions. I developed each question in my interview guide in association with one or more research questions I initially developed to ensure the relevance of the questions (see Appendix A). The semi-structure nature of the interviews also allowed me to change the questions as the research progressed and ask follow-up questions, which was an important insight I plan to elaborate on later in this chapter. I also chose individual interviews rather than focus groups as I anticipated my participants to be involved in different tactics and individual interviews can allow participants to share contentious views (Graham et al., 2017).

Although I initially planned to rely only on interviews as my data collection method, I later decided to use participant observation to supplement the interview data. As I elaborate more on the details later, my plans to visit Okinawa developed in an unexpected way. One of my interview participants asked me to attend protests in Henoko, which I decided to do so after consulting my committee members. During my time in Okinawa, I inevitably gained more insights to the movement than were raised during the interviews, so I decided to use the data I recorded through my participant observation into this research. In fact, many social movement researchers use participant observation along with in-depth interviews (Blee & Taylor, 2002; della Porta, 2014). Participant observation is especially compatible with in-

depth interviews in social movement research because the researchers can gain a deeper and more contextual understanding of the milieu of the movement through observing movement actors' behaviours in the research settings such as protests and social dynamics within such settings (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014). By participating in the research setting, researchers can observe what people 'really' do, while experiencing what it is like to be in the particular setting (Esterberg, 2002). It was an important decision for me to participate in protests because I wanted movement actors to trust me as a supporter who fight for demilitarization alongside *with* them, and not simply as a researcher coming from outside to study *on* them. Participant observations can also give the researcher a greater chance to encounter non-public aspects of the movement, such as behind-the-scenes planning of actions and discussions (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014). Indeed, my participation in protests allowed me to build closer relationships with activists, which then gave me greater access to non-public aspects of their behaviours, conversations, and dynamics in places like post-protest meals and casual gathering. I discuss more on how I navigated this change in plans and data management later in this chapter.

For this research, I initially planned to recruit *Okinawan* environmental-oriented anti-base activists. I chose this specific population because I believed Okinawan activists, who were born and have lived in Okinawa, would be able to share how their lived experienced has been affected by the presence of the US military bases on their island, in addition to their experience as activists. Unfortunately, however, I struggled to recruit Okinawan activists due to my limited connections, so I decided to broaden my sample to include mainland Japanese activists. As I was primarily interested in understanding activists' framing of environmental issues related to the US military presence, I sought activists who explicitly center and address environmental concerns in their anti-base activism. I also aimed to recruit at least three participants over 65 years old. As Yamamoto's (2019) study illustrates, Japanese society

often ‘others’ elderly participants of the Okinawa anti-base movement by constructing the ‘aging’ of the movement as an issue for the movement’s stagnation. However, this process of othering the elderly participants deters our attention from their experience and perspectives, which can provide valuable insight to their movement involvement and production of their subjectivity. For instance, through her interviews with six elderly participants, Yamamoto (2019) illuminates how older people’s involvement in the movement shows new ways of governing bodies, which are often constructed as subjects of restriction by the nation-state politics, as they are minimized as a ‘vulnerable population.’ Yamamoto’s study helps me acknowledge the importance of highlighting their voices that could challenge negative stereotypes or assumptions about older participants in social movements.

Some social movement researchers choose to interview key informants as their interviewees, such as a leader of an organization (Blee & Taylor, 2002), who are traditionally considered to hold “key” information about the movement. However, I did not specifically seek those who have top-down view of the movement. Instead, I planned to recruit any activists who could provide their own experience, as well as their perspective on the issues and the movement, because I was more interested in how each individual activist understands the issues and their activities from their specific vantage point.

As I had some ideas for what I was looking for in participants, I employed a purposive strategy in recruiting them, which allows the researcher to deliberately recruit participants for their specific perspectives and experiences (Esterberg, 2002). Unlike positivist quantitative researchers’ preference for random sampling that seeks statistical representativeness when recruiting, qualitative researchers often recruit participants more deliberately (Esterberg, 2002), which I did in my research. To establish contact with the activists, I chose to use a snowball sampling method, which asks a participant to refer the researcher to an appropriate individual (Esterberg, 2002). As I initially had a limited

connection with the activist community and imagined activists I could reach out to would help me connect to other activists, I chose this method to recruit my participants.

To analyze the data, I planned to start engaging with the data as the research progressed because analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing, iterative process (Blee & Taylor, 2002; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). I expected to take notes on the information that was interesting and striking during the process of data collection. Once I completed all the interviews, I anticipated beginning with open coding, which allows the researcher to pay attention to every possible code generated from each interview (Esterberg, 2002). I chose to start with a broad perspective to allow for as many codes to emerge as possible, and then categorize those codes by theme. I only determined these steps for my analysis at the stage of research design, and I discuss the actual process I took later in this chapter.

When designing each stage of the research, I kept in mind my learnings from interpretive qualitative, feminist, and decolonial research methodologies, which made my choices of methods in each stage of the research intentional and purposeful. Choosing appropriate methods is crucial not only to achieve the objective of the research, but also to ensure the research can be conducted as ethically as possible. I designed this research to better understand the activists' perspectives and experiences in regard to the US military issues in Okinawa and the anti-base movement. It is also important to note that my social location inevitably influenced how I planned and conducted the research. In the next section, I discuss how my social location impacted my choices in and process of this research and how I navigated ethical concerns in the context of this research.

Social Location and Research Ethics

As discussed earlier, researchers also co-engage in meaning-making and knowledge production with their participants in qualitative research (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012).

The researchers' social locations, past experiences, and presumptions all influence the process and outcomes of the research because researchers are involved in the interpretation of meanings and thus knowledge production (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). As contrasted to quantitative research that often pursues 'objectivity' as a sign of its validity, qualitative researchers typically practice reflexibility to enhance the trustworthiness of the research (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). Informed by Indigenous, feminist, and interpretivist qualitative methodologies (Dupuis et al., 2022; Kovach, 2009; Mauthner & Doucet, 2003; Reid et al., 2017; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012; Smith, 2012), I practiced critical reflexibility throughout the process of my research by reflecting on my social positionality in relation to their participants. I posit myself as a relational subject in the research, as opposed to "a neutral instrument" (Kovach, 2009, p.32), because making social location and its influence on the research transparent is key to increase research validity. Below, I make clear my social positionality in relation to anti-base activists in Okinawa and Okinawa more generally.

A researcher's social positionality is contextual. In the context of this research, I am positioned as a racialized immigrant within the western settler-colonial academia. I am writing this thesis as a settler in a traditional territory of Haudenosaunee and Anishinaabe peoples. Even though I am marginalized within the western academia, that does not mean I am exempted from being scrutinized for reproducing dominant frameworks. In fact, I have been educated in the western, settler-colonial post-secondary institutions for more than six years, and I have undeniably internalized settler colonial perspectives about research. Reading scholarly articles and following standard academic practices, there is no doubt that Western academia has shaped how I think about and conduct research. Thus, I paid attention to how such learnings within Western academia influenced the process of designing and operationalizing the methods throughout the course of my research. Yet, I also had the

privilege to learn qualitative, feminist, critical, and Indigenous research and research methodologies in my graduate courses. This experience also helped reassure the possibility of conducting research that centers ethics and practices of anti-oppression and social justice.

Because I was visiting Okinawa temporarily, I also had to carefully reflect my positionality in relation to participants and Okinawan communities. When I was in Okinawa, I was not only an 'academic' trained in Canada but also a mainland Japanese, who, in relation to Okinawans, had more privilege in not having to jeopardize my relationships with my own or Okinawan communities by speaking up about *kichimondai*. I was a temporary visitor, and inevitably, my outsider status became salient when I was in Okinawa. As an outsider, I had to ensure the academic purpose and personal motives of my project were clearly communicated to the participants in order to build trust (Kovach, 2009). I shared my educational and activist background, as well as my will to support the movement to my participants and other activists I met. Because of how I communicated my background and motives with activists, they invited me to protests and casual gatherings; my insider and outsider status kept shifting and co-exited as the research progressed.

Following the ethic of feminist and Indigenous research, I intended to practice the ethic of 'giving back' in my research. For example, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) criticizes Western academic research located in a positivist tradition for a history of exploiting knowledge for unaffected populations to enjoy. Instead, Smith (2012) argues for a kind of research that respects the research participants as crucial knowledge holders and contributors to the research and 'gives back' the fruits of the research to the community under study. To learn how I can practice this ethic of giving back to the community, I asked my participants what support would be useful in increasing their activism's impact during the interviews. Subsequently, I have collaborated with one of the participants, along with OEJP and the IPP

in producing a call for support statement targeted to the international audiences[16]. I have also connected another participant and key actor in the movement with Japanese environmentalist communities to highlight the issues in Okinawa. As such, I tried to maintain this reciprocal relationship with my participants throughout the course of my research, including during and after my stay in Okinawa.

In addition to these ethical concerns, I also carefully dealt with anonymity of the participants. Especially in social movement research, if participants engage in civil disobedience or direct action, exposing their identity in the research can increase their vulnerability to criminal charges (Esterberg, 2002). To avoid this potential risk, I made sure to ask the participants how much information about themselves they want to be included in the final manuscript and if they wanted me to use pseudonyms for them.

Informed by interpretivist qualitative, feminist, and Indigenous methodologies, navigating my social location and ethical concerns has been a crucial part of conducting this research. Throughout the course of this research, I constantly reflected on how I, as a particular individual, influence the knowledge production process. This self-reflexivity encouraged humility, and inspired openness to different interpretations of the data. In the following sections, I describe in detail how I navigated each stage of the research. I first describe my participants and how I recruited them.

Participants

My initial plan was to use a purposive, snowball sampling method. I first identified a few individual activists and groups I wanted to contact. The groups I identified were Henoko

[16] This project is currently on pause. The initial plan was to release this statement concurrently with the 45th UNESCO World Heritage Committee which was planned to take place in summer of 2022. However, with the host country, Russia, being in the midst of war, the Committee was postponed. Meanwhile, there have been new developments in regard to the US military waste issue, and the call for a support statement needs updates. With my limited capacity, I have not had a chance to follow up with the activists about this project, but I plan to do so after completing my thesis.

Blue, Okinawa Environmental Network, Peace Boat, and Okinawa Environmental Justice Network. As soon as I got a clearance from Brock University Research Ethics Board to conduct this research in September 2021, I reached out to one Okinawan activist with whom I already was connected on Facebook. She declined to participate in the research due to her complicated circumstances. I then contacted Henoko Blue and Peace Boat and asked if they could refer me to someone who might be suited for this research. Multiple people referred me to the same Japanese activist living in mainland Japan, who later became my first participant.

At this point, I was not sure if I could recruit Okinawan activists because of my limited network and time, so I decided to include mainland Japanese activists as my research sample. A few weeks after I sent out the initial email to Henoko Blue, one activist from the group, who is also mainland Japanese, agreed to participate in the research in November. This activist also invited me to go to a mass demonstration on the third-year anniversary since the beginning of the land reclamation project in Henoko on December 14th, 2021 (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2021). I could not miss this chance, and I immediately planned my visit to Okinawa.

When I asked the first two activists I interviewed to refer me to other activists who might be interested in participating in this project, they referred me to the Okinawan activist who had initially declined my invitation. At this point, I had planned a visit to Okinawa and knew my schedule would be more flexible; I asked her again if she could participate in my research. Luckily, this time she agreed to participate in the research on the condition that I help spread the word about the situation of the ammunition and waste discarded by the US soldiers in the Yambaru forest to an international audience. As my research aims to 'give back' to the community, I appreciated this opportunity. I agreed with the condition and booked an interview with her. During my stay in Okinawa from December 13th to 22nd, 2021, the activist who invited me to Okinawa introduced me to two other activists, who agreed to

participate in my research. One of the new participants then connected me to another activist, who also agreed to be my research participant. I also met and spoke with other activists, as well as community members, professors, and lawyers who worked on the US military base issues when I attended the protests and public seminars. I was extremely honoured to talk one-on-one with Professor Yoshikawa Hideki, the director of OEJP and one of the key figures advocating for the cancellation of the construction from environmental perspectives. The conversations with these individuals further helped me to contextualize the movement and gain a more nuanced understanding of the issues.

In the end, I was able to recruit six activists in total for this research (see Appendix B). Four of the six participants are from outside of Okinawa, but two of them have been residing in Okinawa for more than 5 years. The other two participants have been living in Okinawa since their birth. Half of the participants identified as women, and the other half men. The participants' ages at the time of the interviews range from 42 to 72. All participants have been involved in the anti-base movement in Okinawa for more than five years, with most of them working on the issues related to US military base for more than 20 years. I categorized four out of the six participants as 'high-profile' given their appearance in the mainstream news media. Two of the 'high-profile' activists were in major lawsuits against the US military bases and at least two of them have been arrested for their acts of protest. These four 'high-profile' participants allowed me to use their real names for this research. The other two are kayakers who are currently engaged in direct actions, so I used a pseudonym they picked for themselves. Despite the sample population changing from the initial plan, interviewing activists from various background helped me understand different viewpoints in which they engage in their own resistance activities. The next section discusses my data collection process in detail.

Interviews and Participant Observations

Interviews took place in various places between the end of October and end of December 2021. I conducted one interview on Zoom, one over the phone, one at a café, one in a car, and two at the participants' homes. I let each participant decide the location where they felt comfortable and/or convenient to have an interview. The length of the interviews ranged from 1.5 hours to 4 hours. I conducted all interviews in Standard Japanese, despite some dialectical differences and challenges. In addition to the initial six interviews, I requested follow up interviews with two of the participants for clarification or elaboration on information they shared in their first interview. Both follow-up interviews took place on Zoom, in January 2022. All interviews were audio recorded on my password-protected cellphone, and later transferred to an encrypted file in my password-protected computer. Once the data was transferred to my computers, I deleted the files on my phone.

As mentioned earlier, it became more than just interviews after spending time with activists in Okinawa. Because I was involved in resistance activities such as sit-ins and sea protests, and activists' daily lives, I collected valuable data that I could not obtain from my interviews. Spending several days at the guest house, called Okinawa Peace Support[17], which also functions as a 'hub' for anti-base activists, I also observed dynamics of the activist community, which I would have missed if I did not spend my time there. For instance, it was interesting to learn that many of the activists staying at the Okinawa Peace Support knew one another, even though they are coming from different places in mainland Japan. Most of them have been involved in the protest for many years, and they keep contact with one another on social media. In a way, Okinawa Peace Support functioned as a meeting space for new and seasoned participants and supporters of the anti-base movement. The manager of the

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[17] Okinawa Peace Support (沖縄平和サポート) is a not-for-profit organization located in Henoko, which provide information about *kichimondai*, particularly the issues in Henoko. It also functions as a meeting hub and a guest house, providing food and accommodations to protesters.

Okinawa Peace Support also provides care and support for the guests/visitors, by cooking them breakfast and dinner every day, while also participating in sit-ins and other political activities. This meeting hub also helped me to connect with other activists, share meals and build relationships. The activists there also invited me to the protests in Awa, which also gave me critical insight to the direct interference activities, which I discuss more in Chapter Five. During my stay in Okinawa, I also visited Takae Village to meet two of my participants. I stayed a night at 'Broccoli House,' which is a container house local activists in Takae built for visitors to stay. Before the COVID-19 global pandemic, Broccoli House was filled with activists and visitors from many places from mainland Japan to overseas, according to the locals. Although I was the only one who was staying there on that night, I was able to experience the support the local community provides for the visitors through interactions and conversations with the local organizers who set up the space for me to stay.

These experiences also informed the questions I asked the activists during the interviews; it felt appropriate to incorporate participant observation. As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012) note, knowledge is situated in specific historical, cultural, geographical, and social contexts. My participation in protests allowed me to access how actors behave in the spaces of protests and what it is like to be in such settings. Through participating in various protests, I encountered multiple aspects that are part of activists' and local residents' lives, which were not talked about in the interviews: lively nature—coral reefs, forests, and nonhuman animals; massive construction ships and hundreds of dump trucks transporting soil unearthed from a mountain; angry, frustrated, and confused dump truck drivers; private Japanese security guards standing still in front of the Camp Schwab gate; riot police removing sit-in participants one by one; Japan Coast Guards jumping into the ocean to stop the kayaker activists, and more. By participating in protests, I was able to see not only how activists behave, but also how other human and nonhuman surroundings move.

Additionally, as one of my participants explained in our interview, being in the field helps develop emotional and personal connections to the place. Perhaps the most intense emotional experience I had was when I sat beside an older Okinawan woman in a wheelchair during the protest in front of the Camp Schwab gate, who was determined to stay in a blockade as long as she could, in the face of riot police trying to remove her. She expressed her frustration and disappointment towards riot police for betraying Okinawans, as she remained in the blockade. I also sat there in protest as long as I could, until someone in the crowd told me to get up voluntarily before getting forcibly removed by the police. I experienced many intense emotions during the protest, and I believe I would not have experienced these emotions and feelings if I had not been there. These experiences and encounters with the people and the place also increased my sense of responsibility to the activists and residents who have been opposing to the base construction and military presence in Okinawa. Seeing these different aspects of the community and the environment and connecting with them on a more personal level further motivated me to give back the fruit of my research labours to the community.

It would be hard to imagine what kinds of data I would have gained if I only conducted interviews online; however, being in the field with other activists, I was able to build relationships that are meaningful and sustaining. As I ground my research in interpretive, qualitative research methodology, which is inevitably relational (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012), it was important for me to get to know them more personally, as well. Being in the field and having conversations with other activists also gave extra context for this research that I might have not gained only through the interviews. For instance, I was invited to one of the local activist's houses, located the other side of Henoko, across Oura Bay. In our conversations, he said, "I always call the issue, Henoko-Oura issue, because it is not just about Henoko. This is also about all the other communities that have connection with

the Henoko-Oura Bay" (personal communication). Before this conversation, I always called the issue the 'Henoko issue' because that is usually how the issue is discussed. This conversation added more nuance to my understanding and transformed how I think and talk about the issue.

I also visited historical locations and museums. Himeyuri Peace Museum, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, and Sakima Art Museum gave me visual, audio, and textual resources to learn more about the history of Okinawa, particularly during the Battle of Okinawa and the subsequent military colonial violence and oppression by both the US and Japanese governments. I also visited *gama*, which is a cave Okinawans used to hide themselves from US soldiers during the Battle of Okinawa, and the Southern shore, where many, including young students, threw themselves into the ocean during the same Battle. While I knew some of these historical 'facts' before visiting these places, being there and connecting the information to the place amplified my empathy toward Okinawans' experience with military and colonial violence.

I used a notebook to record what I saw, heard, thought, and felt from participating in protests, activist communities, and other sites I visited in Okinawa, and I later highlighted the points that were relevant to my research questions. I also used my cellphone and camera to take photos of activists, the police, people, the scenery, the US military bases, and other things that sparked my interest. Together, these forms of documentation constitute my field notes. As I did not follow a formal protocol for participant observation as the decision to use the method was made as the research developed, I only use the data from participant observations to supplement my interview data for my analysis. Nevertheless, data I collected through my participant observation—activists' behaviours in actual protests and other settings and my personal experiences in those settings—helped contextualize and added complexities to the interview data. My experiences and learnings in the field also helped me

adjust my research questions to be more relevant and relatable to the participants. Had I not visited Okinawa and gotten involved in the sit-ins and ocean protests as well as their daily activities, the data would have been much different.

The data I collected through interviews and participant observations helped me better understand the complexity of the issues, the multidimensionality of activists' experience, and their resistance activities. I learned, for instance, that one of my interviewees had to navigate uncomfortable situations at her workplace, where she works with individuals with different political orientations. Another interviewee also shared her experience with sexual harassment while working on the issue related to the *kichimondai*. Although these are not the centre of my analysis for this project, these pieces of information added nuances to my understanding of their experiences in their activism. My research supports existing knowledge about the compatibility of in-depth interviews and participant observations (della Porta, 2014). If I had only conducted interviews online or just done the interviews without the additional interactions mapped above, my understanding of the context would have been poor. In the next section, I discuss how I managed and analyzed the collected data.

Analytical Methods

Once the interviews were complete, I began transcribing the recordings in Word documents in Japanese. I then sent each participant a copy of their interview transcript and asked if the transcribed interview accurately represented their views. I also added brief follow-up questions to clarify some of their responses and asked each participant if there is any information they wanted to add to or omit from the transcripts. These were important steps to ensure their values and perspectives are reflected in the transcripts. During the interviews, some of the participants have also shared information about internal conflicts within the movement or what sounded to be confidential. As sharing such sensitive information through

my thesis can cause conflicts with other activists, I made sure with the participants if they would want the information to be included in the transcripts.

After receiving each participant's confirmation on their transcript, I began translating the transcripts into English, one by one. Due to the large amount of data, I chose to use DeepL, an online translation program, to generate an AI translation of each transcript. I then reviewed this transcription line by line to ensure the accuracy of the translation and made corrections where necessary. There are some obstacles during translation, which I will discuss more in the next section. After considering each line, I asked a friend of mine, who is a Japanese-English bilingual writer, to review the accuracy of the translation. I sent her the copies of both Japanese and English transcripts of the interviews after receiving her agreement to keep the data secured and confidential. She reviewed each transcript in detail and made comments and editorial suggestions where she thought was inaccurately translated or could be better translated. We also met on Zoom a few times to discuss her comments and suggestions, and I edited the translation where necessary.

As the analysis is an ongoing, iterative process (Blee & Taylor, 2002; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012), I started engaging with the data after each interview, taking notes of aspects that were interesting and surprising from the interviews, and adding them to my field notes. Once I transcribed and translated the interviews, I started highlighting excerpts that I found intriguing. I did not analyze those in depth at first, but my intuitive responses to those specific texts helped me in the later stages of the analysis. With the driving research questions in mind, I noted codes that repeatedly emerged within and across transcripts as potential central themes for my research and highlighted them in this stage of analysis. I also kept in mind the theoretical frameworks that my research relies on—(C)EJ and assemblage theory—which also influenced the kinds of information I paid attention to in the text. In particular, this included EJ literature on different framings of environmental issues, (C)EJ

studies' multi-scalar approach, and assemblage theory helped me conceptualize the activists' subjective accounts of their ideas about security and safety, relationships with the local community, more-than-human worlds, the state, and other entities with whom they interact.

In my first round of coding, I used an open coding method to code everything that I thought was interesting, while paying attention to my research questions and my theoretical frameworks. I also took notes when I found recurring codes and codes that were similar and contrasting across different interview transcripts. Based on my notes, I then created three broad categories based on the codes most relevant to my research questions: 1) activists' discussions of problems related to *kichimondai*, 2) their descriptions and discussions of movement strategies, goals, and dynamics, and 3) their individual emotional and cognitive experiences in their resistance activities. I created these categories to make it easier for me to handle the copious amount of data. I then organized excerpts based on their assigned category or categories in a document, and further grouped excerpts of similar codes together, and examined each group's underlying theme.

While examining the data, I looked for important insights, recurring themes, and patterns across the codes. From this process, I generated nine themes: participants' framing/diagnosis of environmental issues; the purposes, strategies, and goals of their resistance activities, their attribution of meaning to the anti-base movement and their involvement in it; challenges they have faced in their resistance activities; their past, current, and potential future networks of support and collaboration, their understanding of their positions in relation to the local community, nonhuman animals, and the environment; their views of alternative economies and governance, their views of and relationships with different levels of governments and their apparatuses; and their emotional and cognitive experiences of the resistance activities. After considering each theme's relevance to my research questions, I organized them into two broad discussions: one on the participants'

framings of the environmental issues related to the US military bases and operations and how these framings manifest in the movement goals and strategies, and the other on the participants' views and reflections on their ideas about (ecological) security and relationships with the local community, nonhuman animals, and the environment. I then turned these into two separate analysis chapters, which follow this chapter.

Obstacles

There are three major obstacles that I faced during my research, primarily related to travel, recruitment, and translation. First is navigating international and domestic travelling amid a global pandemic. As I thought meeting participants in person would allow me to build rapport, I planned my trip to Japan to conduct the interviews. When I planned my trip to Japan, there were still travel restrictions such as mask and vaccination mandates, as well as 10-day quarantine upon arrival. With travel restrictions frequently changing, I experienced additional stress in planning the trip. I followed these restrictions to ensure my research was done as ethically and responsibly as possible. When I was in Okinawa, I took extra precautions such as wearing a mask inside and sanitizing my hands as frequently as possible.

The second obstacle I experienced was finding participants. As I mentioned, my initial plan was to recruit Okinawans activists, who were born and have lived in Okinawa. With my limited connections with the local activists, it was difficult to reach out to the specific population. However, as I spent some time in Okinawa, I found out that the movement consists of people from various backgrounds. As discussed in Yamamoto's (2019) study, many people from mainland Japan immigrate to Okinawa so they can commit themselves to the movement. In fact, when I was introduced to my third interviewee, other activists told me that she was Okinawan. It turned out, however, she was from mainland Japan, though she has lived in Okinawa for more than 20 years. She initially moved to

Okinawa for her post-secondary education, and, as she expressed in her interview, her 'affection' to the ocean grew as she got more involved in the Henoko struggle. While there seem to be other reasons why she decided to stay in Okinawa, such as her work and personal relationships, her 'affection' to the ocean also seems to play significant part of the reason.

If I had more time and connections with local activists, it could have been possible to only recruit Okinawan activists. It was stressful that the research did not go as planned, but with my committee members' support, I was able to accept the challenge and made changes to the plans. These changes are common in qualitative research. Similar to other processes of qualitative research, sampling is also an iterative process "as a researcher's increasing insight into the group or activist network under study raises new questions and requires additional or different types of respondents" (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 100). For instance, in her research on social movements, Mattoni (2014) first identified activists as her research sample, then she realized that left-wing journalists would also add key insights to the research. As her research progresses, she broadened the sample population to include such new populations that she was not aware of or did not think would be beneficial to the research. Therefore, as Mattoni (2014) argues, "[s]ampling…becomes a reflexive process whose outcome cannot be fully predetermined when the data gathering starts" (p. 29). While my sampling did not go as planned, I am very happy that I met and interviewed those I did because of the valuable insights they share as 'outsiders', which was personally relatable to some extent.

Lastly, I faced the third obstacle during the process of translation. Because Japanese colloquial language does not have to follow the correct grammatical structure, DeepL did not capture the meaning that the text was conveying. For instance, Japanese speakers usually omit subjects and objects in speech, and the hearers have to 'guess' from the context in which the speech was produced. Although I was able to 'guess' most of what they meant, as the time goes by, I had to remember what we were talking about in what context. Additionally,

because I am not a native speaker of English, I often struggled with coming up with the 'native way' of phrasing certain texts. Nevertheless, with help from my friend who assisted me with translation, I was able to ensure the meanings of translated interviews are as close to the original Japanese transcribed interviews as possible. I was also cognizant of the fact that some concepts in Japanese cannot be directly translated into English. As English has been used as a Western imperial tool that erases cultural and historical meanings of non-western concepts (Smith, 2012, p. 82), I tried my best not to erase the original meanings on the texts.

These obstacles made conducting the research challenging. With limited time and resources that I had, I made changes to my original plans when necessary and tried my best to conduct the research as close to my intention as possible. Despite the challenges and additional stressors that I experienced, these obstacles helped me learn the importance of being flexible and reflexive in an unpredictable and uncertain situation.

Conclusions

Using qualitative in-depth interviews and participant observations, I was able to gain a better understanding of the participants' subjective experiences and perspectives as well as the context of their activities, the US military base issues, and the anti-base movement in Okinawa. While I experienced some challenges and struggles in conducting this research, through sustaining relationships with my participants and the Okinawan activist community, and guidance from my committee members, I was able to navigate difficult yet crucial process of the research. In the next chapter, I discuss the themes I found in this research, including the participants' framings of the environmental issues related to the US military bases and operations and how these framings manifest in the movement goals and strategies, and the other on the participants' views and reflections on their ideas of (ecological) security and their relationships with the local community, nonhuman animals, and the environment.

Chapter Five: Strategies, Goals, and Meanings of Resistance Activities

Introduction

Both Henoko and Takae struggles began as protests against the construction of new US military installations: the new base in Henoko-Oura Bay and six new helipads for the Northern Training Area (NTA) in Yanbaru forest, respectively. Local residents and activists from outside the village have been actively attempting to halt construction since the early 2000s. Their actions range from physically obstructing the operations to employing legal strategies to halt the operations. When I visited these communities at the end of 2021, the two projects were at different stages of completion. The construction of the new base in Henoko was only about 8% complete. Dump trucks and construction ships were constantly on the move, transporting soil and sand to the construction site to reclaim the land, and activists were primarily concerned with obstructing these operations. In comparison, the helipad construction in Takae was completed in 2016. Nonetheless, local residents continue to protest in front of the NTA gate, while monitoring the US military activities in and around the NTA. Despite these different situations in Henoko and Takae, activists in both struggles advocate for total demilitarization and environmental protection within and outside Okinawa.

This chapter presents the findings of my investigation into perspectives and experiences of environmental-oriented anti-base activists regarding their resistance activities in Henoko and Takae. In particular, I pay close attention to how these activists conceptualize the strategies and goals of their actions as well as how they assign meanings to these actions. These lines of analysis primarily address two research questions: What resistance activities do activists engage? and How do these activities relate to their understanding of the problems associated with the US military bases?

My interview participants—Shinichi, Kazu, Pag, Masatsugu, Akino, and Kikuko—come from various backgrounds, and each has unique relations to the movement (see

Appendix B for more details about each participant). Their individual perspectives on the problems and their experiences in the movement demonstrate its plurality. Through participant observations and my interviews with the activists in the protest sites and communities in Henoko and Takae, I found three main types of resistance activities: direct action interference, monitoring, and translocal collaboration. Below I detail each activity and explain how each activist assigns meaning to it.

Direct Action Interference

In both Henoko and Takae, direct action interference has been one of the main forms of resistance. In Henoko, local activists, as well as activists from mainland Japan, have participated in sit-ins and actions on the sea (*kaijō-kōdō*, hereafter referred to as the 'sea actions') to obstruct new base building work in Henoko-Oura Bay. Protesters engage in interference at four different points to effectively block the operations: in front of the Camp Schwab Gate ('the Gate') in Henoko, on the sea of Henoko-Oura Bay by the construction site, in front of the Ryukyu Cement Company's pier in Awa ('the Awa pier'), and on the water by the Awa pier (see Figure 7).

Ryukyu Cement, located on Nago's west coast, mines Awa Mountain for soil and sand to be used in the foundation of the new base in Henoko-Oura Bay. Local construction companies then hire dump trucks to transport the soil and sand either directly to the construction site or to the Awa Pier, where the soil and sand is transferred to the construction ship. After that, the ship transports a massive amount of soil and sand to the construction site. At the two protest locations on land, in front of the Gate in Henoko and the Awa pier, protesters interfere with incoming construction trucks loading soil and sand. Protesters in kayaks and boats on the sea interfere with construction ships loading soil and sand.

Interferences at sea occur almost every day, except on days when the sea and weather conditions make paddling unsafe.

Figure 7

Maps of Nago and Four Protests Sites

Note. The red dots are the four locations where protests primarily take place. The original map created on Map-It (https://map-it.azurewebsites.net/) and edited by Kaho Nishibu.

In front of the Gate, protesters sit in lines to block the movement of the construction trucks. Sit-ins, or *suwarikomi,* have been the foundational form of Okinawan resistance, not only since the beginning of the Henoko struggle but also since the post-war period under US military occupation (Tanji, 2006). Okinawans staged sit-ins to protest Japan's and the US military's oppressive policies and practices, including the forced seizure of their land and sexual violence against Okinawans (Tanji, 2006). Anti-base activists in Okinawa inherited Okinawans' legacy of protests and continue to organize sit-ins as a primary method of resistance. The sit-ins in front of the Gate occur almost every day, and a sign across the street from the Gate displays the number of days since the start of the sit-ins in 2004. The sign said it was the 6455th day of sit-ins when I visited. Along with the sign, the network of anti-base

citizen groups has created a line of tents in which protesters can gather, eat, and recharge. A group of protesters, many of them appearing to be in their 60s, 70s, and 80s, assemble at the Gate holding their signs and banners against the construction. Some people bring collapsible chairs, which are kept in the tents when not in use. As the trucks begin to arrive, the crowd then forms one or more lines in front of the Gate. Security guards hired by the Japanese government stand in line between the protesters and the Gate, and police officers control traffic allowing protesters to cross the street safely.

When I participated in the protest on the 6455th day of the sit-ins, the protest began with a speech, followed by a crowd singing a protest song. After a little while, riot police arrived from their bus parked nearby, requesting each protester individually to leave the Gate "for their safety." While some cooperated, others resisted and shouted back at the police. With this sit-in I participated in, protesters stopped the trucks for at least 30 minutes.

Instead of holding sit-ins, protesters at the Awa pier slowly cross[18] in front of the trucks as they enter and exit the dock. When I visited the pier, there were 10 to 15 protesters there, who also appeared to be in their 60s, 70s, and 80s, holding signs expressing their opposition to the new base construction. Strikingly, these protesters politely bowed at each truck driver as they stopped in front of them (see Figure 8). The protesters act in such a manner because they understand that, even though the drivers are part of the construction, the drivers are not to blame for it. Even though some drivers seemed irritated by the obstruction and sometimes even insulted protesters as they stopped, the protesters avoided confrontation by saying, "Thank you for your cooperation." Occasionally, the police intervened to clear the pathway for the drivers, but the protesters remained calm and cooperated with the police. As I

[18] This tactic is called '*gyūho* tactic', which is often used by minority parties in the Japanese Diet to obstruct the majority party members from casting their votes before the deadline by walking slowly to the ballot box. '*Gyūho* (牛歩)' literally translates to 'cows walking,' which is the speed the obstructors attempt to imitate.

discuss more in detail later in this section, cooperating with authorities is a strategic act rather than merely a gesture to follow the order.

Figure 8
Protesters at Awa Pier

Note. Protesters at Awa pier stopping the dump trucks. Photo taken by Kaho Nishibu.

While protesters block the trucks on land, a group of kayakers, called Henoko Blue, interferes with the construction ships at the two locations on water. Kayakers obstruct the operations of the ship by approaching them and creating unsafe conditions for the ship's operations (see Figure 9). At both sites of interference, the Japan Coast Guards (hereby 'the CGs') regulate the kayakers' activities. As the kayakers approach the target ship, the CGs will first appear from a distance on their high-speed boat. It only takes a few minutes for them to arrive at the protest site, and as they approach the kayakers, one of the CGs jumps into the water and physically captures the kayakers, which has caused the kayakers to flip over (personal communication). Even though the CGs assert that they are "ensuring the safety of the protesters," it has created and continues to create a perilous situation for the kayakers. In order to stop the construction ship for as long as possible, kayakers also tie their

kayaks to the net attached to the pier with their ropes in intricate knots, so it takes time for the CGs to untie the knots and remove the kayakers from the pier (see Figure 10).

Figure 9

Henoko Blue Kayakers and a Construction Ship

Note. Henoko Blue kayakers paddle out to interfere with the ship's operations. A few boats creating white waves are the CGs. Photo taken by Kaho Nishibu.

Figure 10

Henoko Blue Kayaker and the Japan Coast Guard



Note. A Henoko Blue kayaker tying their kayak to the net under the pier where the construction ship was anchored. The CGs approached the kayaker on a highspeed boat, asking them to remove themselves from the net. Photo taken by Kaho Nishibu.

Whether on land or at sea, the main purpose of these actions is to delay construction operations. Activists I spoke with concede that interference alone will not stop the construction. Even though they engage in interference almost every day, at multiple locations on land and the water, they could only stall the process for a few hours each day. Nonetheless, activists believe that by delaying the construction with these small yet consistent collective efforts, other opportunities to delay or cancel the construction will arise. In fact, these activities combined with other factors *have* slowed the progress by nearly a decade. A group of kayakers, for example, occupied a scaffold that had been set up by the Japanese Defence Bureau to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the initial heliport plan in 2004 (Urashima, 2005). This temporarily halted the project, prompting the US and Japanese governments to switch from the offshore heliport plan to the current plan to build the base on the coastline of Henoko. When the current construction plan was announced, it was estimated that it would be completed by 2014. However, the interferences, along with other contributions from legal and academic actors, slowed the construction process drastically.

After more than two decades of resistance, however, the Japanese government is still determined to proceed with its plans. This is the harsh reality activists have been dealing with. Kazu, one of the experienced Henoko Blue kayakers from mainland Japan, explains why he participates in the interference at this stage of construction: "...by slowing down [the construction], we can raise our chances of halting it…That's why it's important that we go out to the sea every day… even if just for a few minutes, that's all we can do." Although activists are aware that their involvement alone does not have a significant impact on the construction process, they remain optimistic that additional possibilities may present themselves while they are delaying the construction.

Kazu explains that changes in national politics are one of these chances. With the exception of a few years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been in power since its foundation in 1955. This conservative party has increased the 'compassion budget' (*omoiyari-yosan*) to subsidize Okinawa for hosting the bases and national defense spending, particularly in the previous few decades (Davis, 2021; Nishiyama, 2022). Despite objections from the majority of Okinawans (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2019), the LDP has ignored local opposition and insisted that the construction of the new base in Henoko should move forward as planned. During the two most recent national elections in 2021 and 2022, other major Japanese political parties, including the Social Democratic Party, Japan Communist Party, and Constitutional Democratic Party, stated that they would at least halt the construction in Henoko. Because bottom-up strategies have so far been ineffective in influencing the LDP's decisions, activists hope that by electing one of these other parties as the ruling party, the project's course might be altered for the better.

Pag, a fellow Henoko Blue kayaker, also shares why she participates in the sea actions: "...for me, being out in the ocean makes me relax, and though I don't like to see the construction in front of me, I think I can continue because I love the ocean." Pag also claims that the action requires "mental strengths," but despite this, she is able to continue because of her bond with the ocean. Forming a connection with a particular place is one of the crucial shared components of their willingness to participate in the movement. I discuss this relational aspect of the actions more in detail in the next chapter.

At all four interference points, the police and the CGs that regulate the protests are the largest obstacle to delaying the construction. There have been some conflicts in the past between protesters and these state apparatuses, and the activists currently involved in interference exercise caution and act cooperatively in order to continue their activities. The CGs and police technically allow protesters to exercise their rights to protest, but they limit

their activities without a valid reason. “We are attempting to find the middle ground because if we really disrupted the authorities there, everything would end up being restricted,” Pag explains. Even though activists are frustrated that they are only able to interfere with the operations up to a certain limit arbitrarily set by these authorities, those who participate in these actions, like Kazu and Pag, believe that doing something is better than doing nothing. The “middle ground” allows them to interfere while being partially restricted by the authorities. Reflecting on her experiences in previous Takae protests, Pag adds:

> I would want more people to join, but if there were more people, the other side will come back with more. That’s the reality...That’s why we were able to temporarily halt the construction in Takae when there were fewer people…we were able to put a stop to it more effectively when we chased, persuaded, and befriended the workers. That’s not to say we don’t want more participants, but when we protest more, the authorities spend more money and deploy more riot police, which is what happened to us in Takae. If we become more serious, they also get more serious to protect themselves...

As Pag explains, activists have learned that the larger and more combative protests would be curtailed by even more powerful forces. Therefore, keeping the existing relationship between the protesters and the authorities, according to Pag and some other activists, is vital to continuing the actions.

In Takae, there have not been many interference actions since the completion of the NTA’s helipads in 2016. Prior to it, Takae residents and protesters from other parts of Okinawa and mainland Japan made blockades to obstruct and halt the construction. Although organized mass sit-ins are no longer held in Takae, some activists who live in Higashi village nevertheless engage in direct interference actions in other ways. Akino, an Okinawan entomologist who collects the waste and ammunition discarded by the US military in the Yanbaru forest, stops US military vehicles and demands the US soldiers clean up the military waste. She has attempted to confront American soldiers during their duties and demanded them directly to take back the military waste, but her efforts have been mostly unsuccessful. As Akino describes, “[the American soldiers] don’t say the military waste is not theirs, but

they also don’t say that’s theirs, either, which is just ignoring.” The US military is shielded from environmental responsibility by the US-Japan SOFA agreement, and the US military has already stated that this is Japan’s problem and that Japan should handle it, something activists are aware of. However, the Japanese government has not taken actions to properly address those problems, either. As this situation demonstrates, the dynamics of US-Japan relations and activists’ own relationships with both the US military and Japanese government complicate how activists address the problems.

As an illustration, in December 2021, Akino dispersed 277 unused empty shells when then-Prime Minister Suga was visiting, in an effort to draw government and national attention to the problem. She was arrested for breaking the Explosive Control Act for this action. She explains the rationale behind the action: “I thought if normal approaches didn’t work, I’d let the public hear me by becoming a criminal.” By making herself a topic of national news, Akino aimed to publicize the issues of military waste across Japan. This strategy was successful, as major media agencies both in Okinawa and mainland Japan picked up the incident, along with her work on military waste issues.

As Akino’s action demonstrates, civil disobedience and direct actions can be a strategic and effective method to attract public attention to the problems that the Japanese government wants to conceal. Masatsugu also shares his experience in the SLAPP lawsuit after being charged with traffic violation during a blockade, which demonstrates that by engaging in civil disobedience, we can show that “we are a country where a powerful state sues its citizens if they disobey the government.” According to Masatsugu, civil disobedience and direct actions can be used to expose some of the undemocratic practices of the central government, which prioritizes its interests over citizens’ right to protest. As such, activists employ direct actions and civil disobedience to draw public attention to the problems and wrongs enacted by the government.

These direct interference actions in Henoko and Takae have been nonviolent for the most part, and activists also strive to ensure their actions are nonviolent. Henoko Blue for instance describes itself as a nonviolent direct action group on its website and refrains from employing any potentially harmful methods. Activists take great care to protect one another and maintain their nonviolent attitude towards the construction workers and CGs because, particularly at sea, any escalating situations could result in the development of a life-threatening situation. Moreover, Henoko Blue owns at least one boat to assist the kayakers in maneuvering around the CGs and successfully obstructing the construction while also ensuring the kayakers' safety. For new participants, Henoko Blue members also provide mandatory safety training. Although activists try to maintain safety during their activities without using any force, CGs do not. The CGs have in the past used force against the protesters, hurt one of the kayakers and once capsized the boat. As Pag explains:

> We don't go out when the weather or sea conditions are not good, but what is dangerous is that … the Coast Guard has been attacking our canoes which are as vulnerable as bicycles, with their high-speed boats with engines, even if it's not on purpose. The Coast Guard would tell us 'This is a dangerous area, blah, blah, blah…' but we never go out in the ocean when it's dangerous, and it is them that are doing the dangerous construction…

From this excerpt, we can see how activists are making their decisions to interfere with the construction at their own risks. They prepare themselves well to protect their safety, but the CGs create the dangerous situations for them. As such, even though activists maintain nonviolent and safe methods, the situations nonetheless may escalate.

The principle of nonviolence is also important to the protesters in Takae. When I visited the Broccoli House, the first thing I noticed was the sign listing the three guidelines for participants of sit-ins (see Figure 11). Masatsugu, one of the Takae residents who founded the Takae Residents Society, believes that responding to situations with violence can lead to greater violence:

> Violence can create a cycle of violence…Everyone has a different definition of nonviolence. Some argue that using violent words is not the same as violence. However, we believe that violent words are also violent. I tell people that using violent language with the other side will only breed hatred.

This excerpt demonstrates how important the principle of nonviolence is to Masatsugu. In the past, there have been violent altercations in Takae between protesters and police. Having experienced this, Masatsugu thinks nonviolence ought to be at the core of protests. "We are all humans," Masatsugu adds, emphasizing the importance of humility even in intense and hostile situations. Including nonviolence as a fundamental principle in Takae's protests can thus serve both practical and ideological purposes. Practically, remaining nonviolent during direct actions and civil disobedience can be an effective tactic to contrast how activists act and the opposition power (i.e., the state) responds. At the same time, being and striving to be nonviolent is consistent with their pacifist beliefs and objectives on an ideological level.

Figure 11

Guidelines for Sit-ins

Note. A sign put up outside the Broccoli House. It reads "Guidelines for sit-ins: 1) **We are nonviolent**. We don't want to harm anyone, not even verbally, 2) **We take part in sit-ins of our own volition.** Nobody is forcing us to do anything. Take care of your physical and emotional well-being. Please notify those around you before leaving for the restroom and meals, and 3) Always have love and a sense of humour. By No Helipads Take Residents Society"

Although participants generally oppose violent actions and recognize the strategic importance of nonviolent direct actions, Kikuko contends that direct actions are not simply a strategy or always a premeditated choice that can increase the likelihood of success:

> It's not a question of possibility. Those things (direct actions) are something that you do out of compulsion. It's not something you think about in your head and do because it has potential or something strategic like that. It's something you feel compelled to do, something that comes from your core. It's not a question of whether we should or shouldn't do…but that we can't help ourselves...Common sense would tell you that this is absurd, but everyone gets together and does it. The source of this energy is your rage and the absurdity that is being thrust upon you. People who stand up when they are on the verge of despair, but feel compelled to defy the despair, are very strong.

Kikuko also draws on the Koza riot in 1970, one of the rare violent acts of resistance throughout the history of the Okinawa struggle, to explain how the riot was a manifestation of citizens' resentment and fury towards US soldiers. As I discussed in Chapter Two, even though the Okinawa struggle has long promoted nonviolence, the Koza riot exemplifies how people's reactions cannot be controlled in the face of humiliation, discrimination, and injustice. Although the riot turned violent, it brought together many in Okinawa who had previously been at odds with one another. As Shimabuku (2019) writes, "The Koza riot belonged to no one, it belonged to everyone" (p.120). This unavoidably violent act put the state's power in jeopardy, which eventually pressured the US government to return Okinawa to Japan (Shimabuku, 2019). Hence, even while using violence is discouraged in today's resistance activities, some activists nonetheless recognize that using violence is sometimes unavoidable.

To summarize, I found three main purposes of direct interference actions that we can observe in Henoko and Takae today. For one, delaying the construction is the primary function of the actions. By doing this, activists anticipate that additional chances of halting or even canceling the construction may present themselves. Second, direct actions can garner public attention. Activists think that by carrying out their actions consistently, and even

occasionally employing ‘extreme’ methods like Akino does, they can assist in increasing awareness of the issue they are fighting against, especially because they shine light on the ignorance of the Japanese government, and indifference from the public. Lastly, with their nonviolent actions and principles, they can demonstrate their pacifist stance in opposition to the state’s use of violence.

Monitoring

Monitoring is yet another significant action carried out by activists in Henoko and Takae, which was also apparent in my interviews. In Henoko, activists closely monitor the base construction from the sea and the beach. In addition to Henoko Blue, activists formed a dive team called Diving Team Rainbow, whose primary role is to monitor the construction operations as well as any effects they may have on the marine life and environment. When I visited Henoko in December 2021, the Okinawa Defence Bureau had just begun transplanting corals away from the construction site in an effort to mitigate damage to them. Diving Team Rainbow monitors the procedure and reports their observations to experts, who can then identify any errors in the operations. The construction process can then be delayed using this knowledge. In this way, interference and monitoring activities complement each other.

In Takae, residents have been monitoring the US military training exercises in and around the NTA since the helipad construction was completed in 2016. For instance, Masatsugu records activities that could endanger the locals, such as suspension drills above the hamlet, aircraft flying low with a door open or hanging heavy goods, and aircraft flying low over the prefectural road (see Figure 12). He then posts the photos and videos on his social media, brings up the issues in the village council, and occasionally shares them with the news agencies in Okinawa. Masatsugu asserts that “no one would notice if there was an accident in the forest” considering the forest’s seclusion and its geographical distance from

the city. Monitoring in Takae is thus crucial for preventing the concealment of such accidents.

Figure 12

A US Military Aircraft and a Resident

Note. A photo of a US military aircraft landing in front of the residents. Photo exhibited at Broccoli House.

Another important monitoring activity in Takae is conducted by the entomologist Akino, who surveys the Yanbaru forest for discarded waste and ammunition and collects it. Although Akino first brought attention to the military waste issue in 2018, the Japanese government and major media agencies in mainland Japan had mostly ignored the issues until 2021, when Akino was arrested. Akino's investigation made the issues more widely known and garnered critical attention to the Japanese government's and the US military's disregard for environmental protection of the Yanbaru forest. This monitoring reflects how activists view the issues as well. Because the US military has a history of keeping its operations secret (Mitchell, 2020; Nishiyama, 2022), activists believe the US military withholds information on its accidents unless they are too hard to conceal. In a similar vein, neither the Japanese

government nor the vast majority of the Japanese news media adequately discuss these accidents. Thus, activists believe monitoring to be one of the most important components of democracy and critical responsibilities of citizens in order to hold those institutions accountable.

Another vital role of monitoring activities, especially from the perspective of multispecies justice, is that these activities help keep records about nonhuman entities who are often overlooked or ignored. In Henoko, for example, activists encounter marine animals and birds—such as sea turtles, fishes, and terns—when they are out in the sea. When I joined the sea action on the boat one day, a stingray came right past us. Monitoring the construction is undoubtedly important, but activists stress the need to pay careful attention to various creatures in the ocean, as well as some landscapes. As I also felt during my participation in the ocean protests, it could be challenging to see what impacts the construction has on marine life and environment by only viewing the construction from the beach.

Pag also shares her observations of the migratory terns that, up until recently, had been frequenting the Henoko shore: "In the start of each summer, hundreds of them would fly to Nagashima and cover up the entire Island with their droppings. Last year, as the construction resumed, there were only a few dozen of them. We didn't see as many this year - not even 10." Pag believes that the construction disrupted these migratory birds, who used the area during the summer for breeding and nesting. The large rock where these terns used to nest had reportedly been blasted with dynamite to make room for building, according to Kikuko, who also relates the same story Pag shares. These changes and their effects on these birds may not seem important to those who view the ocean as an empty expanse devoid of lives worthy of considerations, but from the perspective of these activists, the ocean is full of lives. If these activists were not monitoring the area, the construction's impacts on these creatures' lives might have been overlooked and their existence forgotten. Monitoring

activities thus help activists notice the impacts on nonhuman animals, which is also advocated for by the first pillar of CEJ.

In addition to the impacts on living creatures in Henoko-Oura Bay, the construction has also had an impact on a landscape of cultural significance, such as a small island called Hirajima on the Bay, whose beach was an important place for both the kayakers and local residents. Pag laments that the beach has now gone: “The seawall has been built and the current has changed. That’s one of the things I’ve noticed by spending time in the ocean all the time, so that’s a key reason I go out there.” Although the impacts of new base construction are often discussed in the future tense in the anti-base movement, my participants discuss these effects that demonstrate that the construction has already been making an adverse impact. These activists dedicate their time to being in the construction site, which allow them to notice those impacts in real time. By spending their time in the field, they also gradually establish connections with the nonhuman entities around them as a result. Such relationships are an essential component of activism, as I explain in more detail in the following chapter, and they can also challenge the colonial and military structures that the state has forced upon us.

Similarly in Takae, Akino has been observing the behaviours of insects and birds around the helipads. Akino shares the story of her encounter with Okinawa woodpecker chicks, who were showing signs of being almost ready to fly, as they poked their heads out of their nest close to the NTA. However, when a US military Osprey swooped into the forest, the chicks retracted their heads into the nest. They then stopped chirping and spent more than two hours hiding. Akino explains, “I’ve observed several nesting sites, but I’ve never seen anything like that: a chick just before leaving the nest doesn’t show their face for two hours.” The chicks’ odd behaviour demonstrates how the Osprey has already an impact on daily life

in the area[19]. Such impacts are easy to overlook, which makes the activists' attention to and documentation of such effects even more valuable.

Activists also expressed their dissatisfaction with the general public's indifference to environmental issues. Pag, for instance, states that she believes problems like water contamination are "invisible" to the general public. As a result, some activists, like Akino, who initially used her biodistribution survey to highlight the significance of the Yanbaru forest's ecosystem, now think that using physical evidence is more effective to draw attention to the negative effects of the US military presence in Okinawa. By collecting the military waste and discarded ammunition, she is able to provide tangible proof of the US military's polluting of the forest. Akino reflects on this approach:

> …people are uninterested in living creatures, they will not be moved if I tell them that living beings are being harmed. However, military waste contains hazardous materials, and this area can't be used for tourism or any other purposes as long as it's polluted. To be honest, my intention is not to talk about the benefits for humans or uninteresting things like discovering natural resources. However, in order to impress people or attract their attention, I must discuss things that are beneficial to them. it would be nice if we could just talk about protecting animals, but that won't get us anywhere.

As an entomologist, Akino wants people to care about the impacts on the nonhuman creatures living in the forest. She has had challenges, though, convincing people to pay attention to these issues with her initial approach. Akino seems conflicted about the fact that she has to do what she finds "uninteresting things", but she also knows this strategy, despite being human-centric, attracts greater attention. Even though the protest has died down and the NTA issues are receiving less attention now that the helipads have been built, Akino claims that, "As long as helipads exist there, they affect the lives of these living creatures" (240:242). Akino also hopes that by demonstrating the long-lasting effects militarization has on the ecosystem in Yanbaru, people would see the need to resist the building of a military base in Henoko.

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[19] Low-frequency noise from MV-22 Ospreys, which are stationed and used in Okinawa, exceeds the level of 90 dB, which is much higher than the standard (50-60 dB) set by Japan's environmental standards regulations (UPR, 2017).

Participants in monitoring activities, as described here, operate on both strategic and ideological levels. On a strategic level, monitoring allows participants to collect information that they can use against the militarization projects and the US military's activities in Okinawa. On an ideological level, monitoring allows them to note things that are important to them, whether that be marine creatures or landscape. As I discuss in the next chapter, being in the field and noting other species' existence is an important aspect of the resistance activities such as monitoring.

Another important finding is the ways in which anti-base activists see 'the state,' which relates to the third pillar of CEJ. As I discuss above, activists generally have distrust in the government. Participants *are* critical of the government, but because they have mostly had the LDP as the ruling government in the last several decades, they might not be so critical of the government *as an institution*. Many activists I spoke to seem to be in support of other parties and politicians who have promised to reduce the military burdens of Okinawans, such as Tamaki Danny, the current Governor of Okinawa. Yet, based on their own experiences with the state apparatuses like the police and CGs which I described in the previous section, participants also understand the government can deploy its apparatuses to repress the anti-base activists. Such experiences illustrate the multiplicities of 'the state,' as well as each activist's varying relations with and perception of the state apparatuses. The fact that the US is also involved in these controversies complicates those relations even more, as many activists see the US-Japan SOFA as the fundamental problems of the *kichimondai*, including the environmental problems. As long as the SOFA remains, activists have limited power to influence the US military, whose operations are largely exempted from the Japanese laws. Therefore, participants hope to shape the public opinions about the issues by using tactics such as direct actions and monitoring, which can then help elect a government that can change the US-Japan relations with Okinawans in mind.

Translocal Collaboration

Translocal collaboration is another crucial component of the Okinawa anti-base movement. The anti-base activists in Okinawa have ties to other anti-base movements worldwide, particularly those with similar circumstances. Hawaiʻi, Guåhan (also known as Guam), the Philippines, and South Korea are some of those who have resisted the US occupation on their islands (and some still do). Activists from these islands, including Okinawa, have supported each other by visiting other protest sites and engaging with locals. As Davis (2020) found in his research, these activists also learn from one another by participating in others' resistance.

Although I have been discussing the activities in Henoko and Takae separately throughout this chapter, it is crucial to remember that my participants who primarily work in one place are also involved in the other. All of them have participated in anti-base activities in both Henoko and Takae, as well as elsewhere. Many of my participants have also traveled to Miyako Island, where the Japan Self-Defense Forces have deployed the long-range missiles (Okinawa Times, 2021). Shinichi, who lives in the Kanto region of mainland Japan, used to participate in protests and various other activities in Okinawa, but now mostly engages in anti-base protests in the Kanto region. As a 'caretaker' of the Okinawa Environmental Network and leading actors in various other kichimondai-related groups, he plays an important role in bridging communications between Okinawa and mainland Japan. He consistently updates groups in mainland Japan on the progress of the construction and environmental and other problems related to the US military bases and operations and helps organize actions in front of the Diet.

The activists have been in contact with others outside of Japan as well, including those in Guåhan, Hawaiʻi, South Korea, and the Philippines. Masatsugu emphasizes the value of translocal interaction by saying, "I believe the most important thing is for the people to be connected. I think that's what the powerful are the most afraid of. That's why it's important

for us to join hands." This assertion is in line with Davis's (2020) findings of the power of translocal solidarity. These anti-base activities may seem insignificant in the context of the US-centred military hegemony over the world, but taken as a whole and united, they have the power to have a greater influence on the military network (Davis, 2020).

Translocal solidarity is vital for achieving total demilitarization. In 2006, the Japanese and US governments decided to relocate 8,000 Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guåhan to reduce the military burdens of Okinawans, while maintaining the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Similarly to Okinawa, the US military has occupied Guåhan since 1898[20] and structurally subordinated the Indigenous people there. Even to date, the people's rights are only partially recognized, limiting their political participation. Okinawa's military burdens were thus transferred to more disadvantaged and marginalized communities. As Pag explains, "Right now, those horizontal ties have weakened, which has led to the relocation of bases to other places, so I think building that connection is so needed." As evidenced by this comment, activists are not just thinking about themselves or the locations to which they are most connected; they are also thinking about other places that are going through comparable challenges. In this sense, their struggle is not limited to local issues, but is translocal; they resist militarization everywhere. Not only does this kind of alliance make tactical sense, but Masatsugu states that "it feels lonely if you are fighting alone." As I discuss more in the next chapter, the emotional component of the resistance cannot be discounted.

During my stay in Okinawa, I also had a chance to meet Yoshikawa Hideki, the director of the Okinawa Environmental Justice Project (OEJP). Since 2018, the OEJP has worked closely with local activists and international organization in hopes to "connect the green dots" (OEJP, n.d.).[21] Since the Yanbaru forest was inscribed on the list of UNESCO

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[20] Except for the time when Imperial Japan took over the island of Guåhan and occupied it for about 31 months during the WWII.

[21] It is also important to note that connecting the local and global is not a recent strategy. Shinichi, who has also been involved in the Henoko struggle since the late 1990s, explains his position as "a bridge" between Okinawa

World Natural Heritage sites, the OEJP has collaborated with Akino and other local activists, scholars, and organizations, as well as international organizations such as the World Heritage Watch to raise awareness of US military waste issues in the Yanbaru forest on a global scale (personal communication). As such, local individuals and organizations have made coordinated efforts to increase translocal collaboration, in addition to individual connections with activists in other parts of the world.

Participants all agreed that it is critical at this point in the issues' development to garner international attention and external pressure. They believe that there is a limitation in just addressing the problems within Okinawa or Japan. After all, these military installations are US property, and changing the American public opinion within the US is thought by the activists to be essential in shifting the situation. Within Japan, Kazu has encountered people saying that they feel powerless to intervene because the US military is involved. He continues, "if the US citizens spoke up against it, I think it might make a difference." Moreover, Pag believes that the majority of Americans are unaware of negative consequences of their military's operations abroad. "I hope Americans understand that their country is the root problem and that's what it's doing." Akino elaborates on this notion and claims that it is a global problem: "Ultimately, the problem of the US forces in Okinawa is not only a Japanese problem, but also an international problem. I'd like to bring the issue to the attention of the entire world..."

As I illustrate, activists believe in the importance of translocal solidarity for two reasons. First, in order to achieve global demilitarization, activists and people from different parts of the world with similar experiences with colonization and militarization must collaborate to build greater pressure on the US military. Second, and related to the previous

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and mainland Japan and the international community. Despite his limited English proficiency, he has attended the Ramsar Conference, and brought back information back to Japan and Okinawa.

point, translocal collaboration enables sharing information on multiple scales, building a bridge between local, national, and global groups and organizations, which then helps strengthen their global demilitarization effort. Additionally, as my participants share, there is also an important emotional role that translocal solidarity can play. As Masatsugu says, being isolated on the island can feel lonely. However, knowing that other people are fighting against the same institution can empower these activists. I personally felt such connections when I saw the mural on Broccoli House, which was painted by a Filipino artist who visited there to support the protest (see Figure 13). Such solidarity among anti-base and anti-military activists across the oceans is symbolically powerful.

Figure 13

A Mural on the Broccoli House

Note. A mural painted on the Broccoli House by a Filipino artist visiting Takae. A word 'solidarity' is written in Japanese and Spanish. Photo taken by Kaho Nishibu.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I described how environmental-oriented anti-base activists participate in resistance activities in Henoko and Takae, focusing on direct action interference and monitoring. I attempted to further demonstrate how activists interpret these actions and how these actions relate to how they perceive the nature of the issues and who is responsible for them. Although they make up a small portion of the anti-base movement in Okinawa, my analysis shows how these activities are foundational to other kinds of activism. Furthermore, I also discussed how translocal collaboration and solidarity help legitimize the anti-base resentments. In the following chapter, I go through how these activists connect with diverse entities through their activities to create specific knowledge and relationships as well as how they might challenge the dominant colonial militaristic idea of security.

Chapter Six: Relation- and Knowledge-Production in the Anti-Base Movement

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore my third and fourth research questions: How do activists interact with other human and nonhuman entities in their activism, and how do these interactions shape activists' perceptions of their relations with other human and nonhuman entities and their ideas of security? I take a relational approach to look at the protest communities in Henoko and Takae as an assemblage, which constantly (re)forms itself as it interacts with other—human and nonhuman, tangible and intangible—entities, and produces different kinds of knowledge and relations (Davis, 2020; Müller, 2015). With this approach, I aim to highlight how those relations shape the activists' cognitive and emotional experiences in their activism and produce particular knowledge. By doing this, I hope to demonstrate how such knowledge and relations may provide an alternative view of security to the current colonial and militaristic idea of security.

I first examine how protest sites and communities serve as a source of production of knowledge and relations. In particular, I analyze four different relational aspects of the anti-base movement: activists' relations with the local communities and environment, their interactions with memories and emotions, their relations with 'the other side' (state apparatuses and construction workers), and their relations with the more-than-human surroundings. I then discuss how activists envision alternative communities and relationships, connecting such visions to their perceptions of their responsibilities. Finally, I conclude this chapter with discussions of my analyses.

Protest Communities as a site of relation and knowledge production

In the social movement studies literature, researchers used assemblage theory and its related Actor-Network Theory to investigate how various entities form a network or assemblage to

mobilize resources. Assemblage theory especially has been useful to examine the broader scale of configurations of various entities, as we see in the research of translocal (Davis, 2020) and global social movements (Amo, 2023; Stalker & Wood, 2021). In this study, I want to look at a more micro-scale assemblage, with particular attention to activists' relations with individuals who are often situated outside the movement, such as community members, those who are in opposition to the activists, and nonhuman surroundings. I also pay attention to intangible entities such as shared memories and emotions as an important part of an assemblage.

Place-based connections and contextual understanding of local struggles

While connected to the larger problems of Japanese and US colonialism and militarism, Henoko and Takae struggles are both localized issues. These localized struggles have been led by both local and non-local anti-base activists. Consequently, there is a mix of people who have different relationships with these local communities and such relationships can complicate the insider/outsider distinctions. It is worth examining how each activist develops relationships with the local communities and participates in the movement.

There are multiple ways to consider activists' insiderness and outsiderness in the context of Henoko and Takae struggles. For instance, we can categorize them into Okinawans and mainland Japanese. Among the six participants of my study, only two of them, Masatsugu and Akino, identify themselves as Okinawans; they were both born and raised there. The other four participants all come from mainland Japan (see Appendix A). Among the four, Pag and Kikuko have migrated to Okinawa so they can commit to the movement. As Yamamoto's study (2019) demonstrates, there have been many mainland Japanese protesters, most of them retired, who decide to move to Okinawa in order to become more involved in the movement. Although Pag and Kikuko were in different circumstances from the

participants in Yamamoto's study, they have been dedicating themselves to the movement for over 20 years. The other two mainland Japanese participants, Kazu and Shinichi, regularly visit Okinawa to participate in protests and other activities, while raising awareness to the issues and participating in anti-base activities in the mainland where they live. Even within my small sample of activists, there is a mix of Okinawans and mainland Japanese on my observations in Okinawa.

As I learned more about the participants through interviews and participant observations, such 'insider/outsider' relations turned out to be a lot more nuanced than I initially anticipated. Masatsugu, a resident and a co-representative of the Takae Residents Society, for example, considers himself as both an 'insider' and an 'outsider' to the Takae village. Although Masatsugu and his family have been living in Takae since prior to the controversy started, he used to live in Okinawa city, located in the central-south of Okinawa Island. Like Masatsugu's family, there are a handful of families who moved to Takae to live a quiet life away from busy cities, and these 'immigrant' Takae residents were the ones who spearheaded the movement. Thus, they have a more nuanced relation with Takae, including its people, community, and environment like the Yanbaru forest.

Like Masatsugu, Akino was born and raised elsewhere in Okinawa and began visiting Takae in October 2017 as part of her research on the endangered *Ryukyu uraboshi shijimi* butterfly species. In November 2017, while she was studying the biology of the butterflies, the helipad construction in the NTA, which had been put on hold for a while, was resumed. She then began participating in the protest because she was concerned about potential impacts of the construction on the local environment and the creatures living there. Since then, she has moved to Higashi village and now focuses on raising awareness to the issues of US military waste in the Yanbaru forest. Although coming from outside the community, Masatsugu and Akino have both been playing a key role in the Takae struggle.

When the protests were at their peak and many people were coming to Takae village to protest, these activists who live in the area were put in a difficult position. As Masatsugu put it, they were "caught in the middle" between the local residents who chose not to participate in the protest and the protesters coming from across Okinawa and mainland Japan. Masatsugu further explained: "...We were told by the local residents to stop the protesters. The protesters were also hitting out at the residents, but no matter how many times I tell them to stop, they would say, 'why are you stopping *me*? You're supposed to be stopping the police!'" During these intense protests, Masatsugu and other local activists had to navigate difficult situations such as this shown in the excerpt. On one hand, there were some locals who would rather like the helipad construction to end as soon as possible and get back to living a quiet life. To these residents, the influx of protesters, sometimes a few hundreds of them, only temporarily visiting Takae for the purpose of protesting disrupted the quiet and peaceful way of life. On the other hand, there were emotionally charged protesters who were outraged by the decisions made between the Japanese government and the US, as well as by the police forces used to repress the protesters.

Kikuko, Pag, and Kazu all participate in the protests in Henoko, but none of them are Okinawan. Interestingly, however, when I was introduced to Kikuko and Pag, other activists thought the two activists were Okinawan. Because they have been in the movement for a long time and have lived in Okinawa for some time, it may not be always immediately clear who is and is not Okinawan even to those in the movement. Kikuko and Pag have lived in Okinawa for some time, and even though their experience with the US military bases may be different from Okinawans, they are still inevitably impacted by the US military bases and operations. As such, insider/outsider distinctions are not so clear-cut.

Like in Takae, hundreds of protesters from all over Okinawa and mainland Japan used to come to the Henoko village to protest, which disrupted the quiet way of life in the

community. Pag, who has been in the movement for more than 20 years, explains how many protesters only come to the village "just for the sake of protesting" without considering the village also as a living space for the locals. Pag continues:

> I think it's easy for the people from other places to assert themselves and act accordingly because they are not attached to the local community. It's not just about the base issue, especially when it comes to the municipal election. It's not about the issues of peace or economy, but about the entire city and region, which should be valued.

Protesters from mainland Japan visit Henoko in support of the movement, but they might not necessarily care about other issues that are relevant in the city. Especially during the times of municipal elections, mainland Japanese support the candidates who oppose the base construction, but other issues can get neglected. While Pag believes mobilization of people is important for the movement's survival, she is also concerned about the impacts of mobilization on the local community. At the same time, activists like Pag, who have been more actively involved in the movement for a long time, set themselves apart from other protesters who come to Henoko "just for the sake of protesting" by emphasizing their concerns for the local people's lives. Even though Pag is still an outsider to the community, her years of involvement in the movement made her more connected to the village, which gave her the chance to see other aspects of the community other than the base-related issues.

Such place-based connections seem to play a crucial role in activists' relations with the local environment, as well. Pag, who had never been "an outdoor person" prior to being involved in the movement, expresses how she developed affection for the Henoko's ocean after spending time there as part of the protest. She described such feelings for the ocean: "...people who have children take good care of them, right? If you asked them why they [do], they would say, 'I'm not sure, but why not?' To me, that's Henoko's ocean." There is also a small island called Hirajima just outside the construction site in Henoko-Oura Bay, where protesters and locals used to rest. However, because the land reclamation disrupted the

ocean's water flow, the Hirajima beach has been gradually disappearing. Both protesters like Pag and local residents are dismayed to see these changes in the ocean and landscape that they know and love. While non-local activists' emotional response may be slightly different from the locals', there is no doubt that Pag has emotional connections with the local environment.

Activists develop a nuanced understanding of what it means for them to be part of the movement through their interactions with the local people. Kazu, for instance, battled with his outsiderness in participating in the movement after finding a video interview with a local fisherman who supported the construction of the new base. He was perplexed and conflicted by the fisherman's stance because he had thought locals were against the construction. He felt the need to visit the town and observe how locals were responding to the situation first-hand rather than making a judgment based on what he had seen in the interview video. As he spent time in Henoko, he had a few encounters with locals who appreciated him for coming to support the protest. He recalled one encounter with an old couple from Henoko village who attended the sit-in but chose to remain on the periphery of the crowd. Kazu continued:

> I remember them leaving quietly, and I thought it must be so painful for them to feel like they couldn't speak up because they are villagers, but I guess they couldn't stop from coming to the protest...they could sit right in front of us and raise their voices [but they didn't]. They were the people who suffered the most…

It is also worth noting again here that, since the villagers found out that the new base would be built in Henoko, the village community has been divided between those who financially benefit from leasing the land to the government and those who are concerned with the new base's impacts on their lives (Kumamoto, 2008). According to participants and other activists I spoke to, local residents have been hesitant to voice their opinions about the construction because of the risk of ostracization. Having witnessed both proponents and opponents of the construction within the community, Kazu learned the complexity of the issues, including the

fact that a new base is due to be built, and because of it, locals have been compelled into the community divide.

In Takae, too, there are some locals who shy away from participating in the protests. Yet, Masatusgu shared an instance where such locals brought food to the protesters' tents and thanked them for their efforts. Although it is difficult to assume why they were not participating in the protest, such gestures demonstrate that they at least understand the importance of resistance. In small, already peripheralized communities like Henoko and Takae, the local residents may feel the risk of ostracization if standing out. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge some protesters' roles as 'outsiders' to the community, which may be difficult for the locals to fulfill.

As I illustrated here, activists' relationships with the local community and environment shift as they spend more time in the protest space. Such relationships allow the activists to develop more genuine connections with the local community and environment. I now look at how memories and emotions play into activists' experiences in the movement.

The role of memories and emotions in forming relations

There are a few factors that can contribute to the activists' development of connections with the local community and the issues. One such factor is the interactions with the locals in the protest site and sharing emotions with them. For instance, Kikuko observed some people come to the protests in front of the Gate with little knowledge of what is happening in Henoko, but the sit-in site at the Gate creates an opportunity for them to learn about the struggle and forge new connections with the locals. As Kikuko claims, "When the students see *ojī* and *obā*[22] being removed by the riot police, students from the mainland all burst into tears. I think this is exactly what makes these horizontal connections possible."

[22] *Ojī* and *obā* refer to grandpa and grandma in Okinawan language, respectively.

Indeed, witnessing these older protesters' jubilant, expressive, and furious sit-in in front of the gate was quite an emotionally intense experience for me. Not only have I become emotionally connected with the protesters, but I have also felt an increased sense of responsibility to the struggle. As Kikuko claims, being on the site of protest and sharing the emotions with other protesters is vital for the outsiders to form genuine connections with the movement.

In addition to feelings, memories also play an important role in outsider activists' involvement in the struggle. Pag shared her friendship with an "eccentric" *uminchu* (fisherman), who used to attend the demonstration despite the risk of ostracization from the fishermen community. Pag recalls her interactions with him as follows:

> He was always drinking, singing, and dancing, but he was the only *uminchu* among the community who came to the sit-in. He was a very interesting and strange person, and he passed away a little too early. When I went to see him near the end of his life, he asked, "How's my boat doing?" And he told me that after the war, he was saved by the sea. He'd never said anything like that before.

Pag's interaction with this *uninchu*, who struggled economically after the war and later became involved in the Henoko struggle, plays an important role in her involvement in the movement. Even though Pag was not the one who went through the difficulties that this *uminchu* did, his memories have been passed on to her through their interactions. As Avery Gorden (2008) writes, memories "linger well beyond our individual time, creating that shadowy basis for the production of material life" (p.166), and we can see such effects of memories in Pag's involvement in the anti-base resistance. Pag's relationship with the locals thus has influenced her activism and grounds her in a particular positionality as an 'outsider' activist.

As I illustrate here, activists form a particular relation with the local community and protest site through their interactions with the locals and other protesters. While many of my participants are 'outsiders' of the community, they forge connections with the issues and

local struggles through sharing emotions and memories with the people who are more directly affected by the US military presence. On the one hand, protesters' experiences are shaped by their immediate emotional responses to what is happening at a particular moment at the protest site. On the other, as participants of my study note, their temporal relations, particularly the memories from the past generations, influence their emotional and cognitive experiences of their activism. These activists' accounts also highlight the importance of 'being in the field' as a step to understand their own positions in the movement.

Practicing humility in anti-base activism

Another question of relationality within the movement is activists' relations with and perceptions of individuals on 'the other side' – those in the police forces, Coast Guard, and construction of the military installation. When speaking about these groups of people, activists often refer to them as 'the other side' (*aite-gawa*) as these groups are enabling the construction, quite literally the opposite side of the activists. While the interests of the activists and the people on 'the other side' are in conflict, many activists (try to) approach them with humility.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the (riot) police and CGs regulate or restrict the protests, sometimes using force. They claim their duties are to safeguard the protesters, but they have instead repeatedly put the protesters in a dangerous situation. As many of the activists I spoke to recalled, riot police were at their most brutal in 2016 when several protesters went up to block the entrance to the NTA for the construction trucks. There were a few hundred protesters assembled near the NTA at that time, but roughly 500 riot police were deployed to disperse the protesters. The CGs have also injured protesters in the past, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The CGs and the riot police therefore have failed their

supposed duties to safeguard the protesters; instead, they have been serving as the security guards of the government-sanctioned militarization projects.

Despite these mistreatments, most activists seem to approach the police and the CGs in a less hostile manner. For instance, when Henoko Blue kayakers get caught by the CGs during the protest, they often cooperate and chat with the CGs about anything from gossip to politics. Pag explains that this approach is a more fun way to do sea actions than being antagonistic towards the CGs. This explanation sounds surprising given the progress of the construction and overall state of the struggle. Such an approach, however, may be another part of the strategy to delay the construction progress. Pag feels that if the protesters engage in the resistance activities in a more hostile manner, they would face a larger, more militant form of state repression. For this reason, Pag believes retaining such relationships and having the "middle ground" with the CGs is an important part of continuing the resistance efforts.

Furthermore, Kazu hopes to influence individual CGs' perceptions about the construction by interacting with the CGs on a more personal level. Even though he understands CGs as a state apparatus, he also believes that they are individually good people. Interestingly, Pag views CGs officers are also victimized by the state, as she sees they are utilized "like a robot" to read out copy-and-paste sentences and comply with the project that they might not necessarily agree with. Both Kazu and Pag consider the CGs as individual humans, not as 'the CGs.' Such a view may contrast how high-level government officials may use these individuals to advance the militarization projects.

Other activists develop humility to those on 'the other side' after witnessing *their* humility. For instance, Kikuko describes her encounter with a riot police officer while attempting to block the construction trucks in Takae as follows:

> The riot police formed a wall around us, and I saw some of [the police] crying as we sang and expressed our emotions…when me and others were surrounded by riot police in a small circle, I asked them, 'Did I do anything wrong? I'm just trying to protect the forest.' I said to the police in front of me, 'please let me out of here!' The

> others refused to let me go, but the person in front of me raised their arms and let me go. As a result, I was able to position myself directly in front of the police car before the lead dump truck.

From her experience with the police who let her go so she can stop the truck, Kikuko understands that the police are not heartless robots, but real people with emotions and agency. After this incident, Kikuko realized that they were also brought into this conflict:

> I really feel bad for them. The people are divided. But in reality, the real evil is not onsite – those are the ones who are trying to divide the people, looking down from the top, letting each side fight, and they are the worst of the worst who are gloating over it from on high.

What Kikuko means by "the real evil" here are the Japanese government officials who used the state apparatuses to repress the opposition. Viewing the police officers onsite being entangled in the conflict by the vested interests of high-level officials, Kikuko feels empathetic towards the police on the protest sites.

In Kikuko's account of her experiences with the riot police, we can also see the territorialization/deterritorialization in action. The human circle made by the riot police—a territory—was disrupted by Kikuko and one riot police who was emotionally affected by Kikuko. This instance stresses the significant role of emotions and affective aspect of an assemblage in reshaping a particular relation.

Akino also participated in the same protest in Takae and shared her perspectives. At the time, the riot police from mainland Japan were also deployed, in addition to the riot police in Okinawa. Even though the riot police all looked the same, Akino, a self-proclaimed "police nerd," was able to identify which prefecture each officer came from by the slight differences in their uniforms. During this protest, Akino observed that the riot police from the mainland acted more violently towards the protesters than Okinawan police. Akino recalls the event:

> Police officers from the mainland who had no ties to Okinawa would behave violently and abusively on the island. Some officers insulted citizens, while others used (physical) violence…there were police officers who came to Okinawa from the

> mainland with the intent of acting out in Okinawa, and those officers made a mess and left....however, the protesters' rage was directed at the Okinawan riot police who were right in front of them. The Okinawan police always had the shortest lines to draw, while the mainland police left the division they brought with them in Okinawa.

As this excerpt illustrates, Akino observed the differences in how the police behaved depending on how they are connected to Okinawa. Even though Okinawan police were less violent compared to the others in Akino's eyes, many protesters there were unaware of those differences; as a result, these protesters' resentment was directed towards the police who remained on the island after the event. To Akino, the fact that the mainland Japanese police did not experience the same resentment from the protesters as the Okinawan police did not seem fair. Thus, Akino feels somewhat more empathetic to the Okinawan police than the mainland police. Akiko also shared she has much more 'friendly' relations with the local police in Higashi village than she does with the prefectural police. As Kikuko and Akino's examples demonstrate, activists also develop a certain perception of and relation with the different levels and types of police through their involvement in the movement.

Construction workers are another group of 'the other side' who protesters have complicated relationships with. As described in the previous chapter, the construction sites are where activists engage in interference actions, so activists and construction workers have daily encounters with each other at these sites. Because the main purpose of the interference is to delay the construction process, the workers, especially the truck drivers get irritated by the traffic created by the interference. When I visited Awa pier, I witnessed some drivers mocking the protesters, shouting "go find better things to do!" at the protesters. Others had sour faces as they stopped in front of the protesters.

Despite some hostility, the protesters continued vowing at the drivers. Such behaviors and attitude towards the drivers may reflect their understanding that construction workers are also in a difficult position. As Okinawa's economy heavily relies on base-related construction work, the workers in the construction industry are also entangled in the anti-base struggles.

Some activists believe that the 'conflict' between the workers and activists is part of the government's plan to further divide Okinawan society. Because of such awareness within the movement, many activists avoid confronting the workers.

Even though most activists share such views about the workers, some activists believe that the workers, too, have *some* choice to escape the situation. To support this claim, Pag shared a story about a truck driver who quit his job as a construction truck driver. This truck driver came to the protest one day and told one of the protesters that they quit the job because they could no longer contribute to the construction as an Okinawan. According to the protester who shared this story with Pag, the driver was someone who responded to the protest well. This instance suggests how this particular form of protest is producing different kinds of relations with the drivers – one that is not hostile and determined by someone else, but one that is based on mutual understanding and humility. This insight gives us a new perspective to look at other environmental justice and other social justice struggles that involve state apparatuses and others who are entangled in the struggle. I now turn to activists' relations with nonhuman beings.

Multispecies relations in the anti-base movement

The question of relationality extends beyond human-to-human relations. We are inextricably interconnected to the more-than-human world and the protest sites are no exception for multispecies relations to form. Activists in Henoko and Takae daily encounter nonhuman creatures at protest sites and the surrounding environment, and such encounters also shape activists' cognitive and emotional experiences in the anti-base resistance.

Both in Henoko and Takae, the role of nonhuman creatures in anti-base resistance has been recognized by some scholars and activists. In Henoko, Okinawan dugongs have been part of the security discourse within the anti-base movement, and they have become a symbol

of ecological significance of Henoko-Oura Bay in the whole anti-base movement (Kim, 2021). In Takae, the Okinawan woodpeckers and rails appear on protest materials created by the Takae Residents Society, as a symbol of struggle.

In addition to these symbolic species, activists also extend their care to other, less recognized animals, including fishes, sea turtles, and terns, as well as the overall ecosystem as mentioned in the previous section. Akino for instance described an incident in which an US military's Osprey fighter jet crashed into the water in 2016. When Akino visited the scene of the event, she noticed something odd about people's reactions: "When Osprey crashed in the sea in Nago, I heard people saying they were relieved it had crashed in the ocean, not on the land, even among the anti-base crowd...I thought that was strange. That's a human-centric perspective." Akino noticed numerous crabs around the aircraft and the aircraft debris floating in the ocean along with oil. It puzzled her why others—even those in the anti-base movement—were not more concerned about the accident's effects on the environment and small creatures living there. Akino's story not only demonstrates her care for these small creatures and the environment, but also her critiques for the anthropocentric perspectives she saw in the general public, even within the anti-base movement. Paying attention only to particular species, such as endangered species, could draw criticism because it might appear to some that activists are using those nonhuman animals to push their agenda in the movement. The dugong lawsuit, for instance, skillfully utilized the Okinawan dugong's 'national monument' status to obstruct the Henoko construction (Tanji, 2008). While actors involved in this lawsuit genuinely cared for the animals (Yoshikawa, 2009), this strategic move could look as though dugongs were 'used' for the anti-military agenda. Put another way, activists' care for such species can be seen as a strategic move, rather than a reflection of ideology. Akino's view challenges such an assumption.

Like Akino's critiques of the overall movement suggest, activists involved in the movement are not necessarily always in agreement with the dominant ideology or narrative of the movement. For instance, the movement often uses phrases such as "let's protect the beautiful Henoko-Oura Bay" as its master frame, but some activists question their roles to "protect" nature. Particularly Kazu, who has visited Alaska and spent time around other animals like caribous and bears, and Kikuko, who was a key actor in the Rights of Nature lawsuit in Amami, rejects the views that humans are "protectors" of nature. Instead, they perceive themselves as having a responsibility to "stop other humans from damaging the ecosystem that protects us." They hold the view that nature is powerful and it can heal itself, but with the expansion of human domination, it has taken away nature's ability to heal itself in a timely manner. Akino also recalled her childhood and explained how she was "saved" by bugs. While her peers grew out of playing bugs when they turned ten or so, her interests in them continued, and she taught herself without a formal training to become a published researcher. She explained her motivation for working as wanting to "repay them" for saving her during her difficult childhood. Akino's passion and dedication to protecting the natural habitat for bugs, or rather stopping the destruction of the forest, has its roots in her childhood relationships with bugs. Such a viewpoint rejects the colonial and capitalist conceptualization of nature as beings that are independent of humans and that we may control and use as we please.

Other activists also recognize subjectivities of nonhuman animals. Kikuko explains how nonhuman creatures are impacted by the construction work in Henoko-Oura Bay as follows:

> There are masses of lives that were taken away because they could not raise their voices. There are *living* creatures, who have no say in this matter, and they are being buried under the soil. Although I don't like anthropomorphizing them, living creatures have life and we have to respect them, and we shouldn't even compare them to humans. However, they rarely get a chance to voice their objections, and yet humans are harming them.

According to Kikuko, nonhuman animals “rarely get a chance to voice their objections” even if they want to. As this excerpt shows, Kikuko views nonhuman animals as subjects with their own interests (which, in this case, in not being harmed). In fact, the ongoing construction of military bases has a direct impact on these nonhuman creatures. These creatures’ safety is at stake if their habitat is destroyed by these developments. Kikuko’s account emphasizes the need to consider nonhuman creatures as a subject to which security matters.

Reflecting on her experiences in the Henoko-Oura Bay, Kikuko shares that: “There are so many times when I feel helpless and frustrated, but the beauty of nature never fails in moving my heart, and at the same time, I can’t help but sense that nature is being destroyed.” Kikuko also describes the Henoko-Oura Bay as “vivid, lively nature” as she makes eye contact with sea turtles, watches fish jump out of the water, and watches birds fly when out in the sea. Such firsthand experience increases her sense of urgency and responsibility to stop the construction. Her interactions with the more-than-human surroundings inevitably shapes her view of nature, as well as her relations with it. This also amplifies the importance of resistance activities like monitoring, which allows the activists to be more attentive to the impacts on the local environment and nonhuman creatures. Furthermore, activists’ view of nature as full of works is in contrast to the Japanese and US governments’ perception of nature as nothing more than a location used as part of their military strategy.

Visions for the Future

I discuss activists’ visions for the future for two reasons. For one, anti-base activists’ future visions offer alternative ways of protecting and growing the local community and environment to the current ones systematically imposed on by the Japanese and US governments. While pro-base governments and individuals construct US bases as necessary

infrastructure to sustain Okinawa's economy, anti-base activists challenge such ideas and envision different ways of using land and building their relationship with it. Second, the activists' capacity to envision a better, demilitarized, and decolonized future despite more than 50 years of struggle is itself a form of resistance. In short, there is hope in their future visions, and I believe it is imperative to highlight such visions.

Despite the various challenges activists face in their effort to demilitarize Okinawa, activists have ideas for what they would like to see in the future, once the land is returned to Okinawa. Masatsugu, for instance, has a very specific idea of what should be done with the NTA once the area is returned. In the NTA, there are barracks for the US soldiers to stay in, and Masatsugu believes that these barracks will be used as a guest house where people can visit. Masatsugu explained his vision as follows: "If we can get those [barracks] back from [the US military], we could use them for people to see beautiful stars, or to wake up in the morning to the sound of birds chirping. That's what I want people to feel." His vision emphasizes how the people can experience and appreciate the Yambaru as it is. He then added:

> The water is clean, too. That's what I want people to feel. I don't have much else to say. We don't need large corporations to come in....I think we need to make every effort to keep large corporations out of the area as much as possible. If the area is returned, the large corporations will simply destroy it...I think we need the power of the people. It would be nice if the people who live here could show visitors around.

As this excerpt shows, Masatsugu wants to share the beauty of Yanbaru with people, while supporting local autonomy over how those projects are decided and operated. Having already witnessed how Okinawa was made economically dependent on the Japanese government through its 'compassion budget,' he believes that an economically and ecologically sustainable future of Takae lies with strong local autonomy. Even though he does not completely agree with the idea of 'Okinawa Independence,' on a much smaller scale, such as in Takae, he envisions the future where locals can make decisions for themselves with

consideration for the environment and other living creatures who they share the forest with. Another thing that stands out in Masatsugu's future vision is the way he talked about what to feel. As himself moving from other parts of Okinawa and having slowly built connections with the local environment, he believes it's important that people immerse themselves in nature to really understand the nonhuman co-habitants in the area and other things nature can offer.

Like Masatsugu, others who oppose the military bases present other economic opportunities as an argument against Okinawa hosting those bases. Among those alternatives, development projects such as theme parks are often used as an example to illustrate the comparison between the revenues from hosting the bases and profits from the tourism industry. Although such projects have economic perspectives as a better option than military bases, some activists are wary about these alternatives as they can also harm the environment even if they can constitute a strong case for demilitarization. Kikuko for instance believes the developmental projects will not address the fundamental problem of humans' domination of nature, even though she understands why resorting to such ideas is much more accepted by the general public.

Aside from the alternative economy, the activists also envision fundamental changes in our relationships with the land and nature through education. Kikuko shares an example of *Jinbun Gakko*, a school located in Nago city that offers workshops for children and adults about how they can live with nature. *Jinbun*, meaning "life wisdom passed on from the ancestors," this school teaches the importance of playing in nature, as well as learning how to make fire and food by themselves. As the US and Japanese colonialization and militarization of Okinawa disrupted Okinawans' relationships with nature (Yamashiro, 2005), reconnecting with nature is a form of decolonial knowledge and practice. This kind of eco-critical education, Kikuko believes, creates more opportunities for children and adults "to see,

observe, and experience nature" and "feel nature firsthand, not just theoretically." Even though such education may seem disconnected from anti-base and environmental activism, it can plant seeds of care for others and environment in us. As such, activists' visions for future give us an idea about their perceptions about the local economy, governance, and education. Such visions allow us to see alternative futures that are not imposed by the militaristic and colonial governments.

Discussions and Conclusions

In Henoko and Takae struggles, different individual actors—both inside and outside the movement—as well as groups and organizations continue to form and reform a different kind of assemblage. These assemblages were not only made of individuals or groups, but also intangible entities such as ideas and memories as well as nonhuman entities such as animals, birds, insects, ocean, beaches, and forests. Each activist forms a unique relation to these entities, which shape how they engage in the resistance activities and imagine alternative futures of Okinawa. Below, I summarize the findings from Chapter Five and Six, in correspondence to the research questions.

Resistance activities and strategies in Henoko and Takae

Through my interviews with anti-base activists and participant observations, I found direct action interference, monitoring, and translocal collaboration to be the crucial components of the current anti-base resistance in delaying the new base construction in Henoko and in exposing the US military waste issues in Yanbaru. Previous studies have indicated direct action interference, particularly the sit-ins, as vital to the Okinawa resistance since the beginning of the US military occupation (e.g., Davis, 2021; Takahashi, 2015; Tanji, 2006). I provided an in-depth discussion of various interference actions, particularly the importance of

sea actions by Henoko Blue and how they relate to other direct actions on land. I also explored how activists ascribed meanings to such activities. While the consensus seems to be that nonviolence is the core value and principle of their resistance, some activists also believe there are times violence is inevitable. Most activists also see direct actions as a mere strategy, whereas others view such actions as emotional response. Although activists also see the importance of political and legal actions, interreferences are the foundations for other types of actions to take place. Despite the Japanese government persistent ignorance to the locals' and activists' concerns (Nishiyama, 2022), interferences allow the protesters to continue showing their presence and demonstrating grievances.

Monitoring was another important activity in Henoko and Takae. To my knowledge, there is no empirical studies done to examine the monitoring activities in Henoko and Takae. My research highlights the crucial role it plays in revealing the US and Japanese governments' lack of environmental accountability and transparency, which is part of the structural violence maintained through SOFA (e.g., Mitchell, 2020). The information gained through monitoring can be strategically used against the construction works in Henoko and the government's inactions to properly survey and clean up the forest. Monitoring not only serves as a tactic to stop the current building in Henoko or demilitarize Okinawa more broadly, but also reflects activists' perception of their responsibilities to often neglected entities. Monitoring allows activists to connect with nonhuman surroundings and gain contextual understanding of them. By doing so, activists can take control of constructing the narrative of security: who deserves security and protection. Monitoring activities, then, can enable such exercise of power, by noting the nonhuman surroundings with which and with whom they share space.

Additionally, activists stressed the significance of translocal collaboration. Translocal solidarity has been the subject of numerous investigations in the previous studies (e.g., Davis,

2015, 2017, 2020; Takahashi, 2015). The findings of my study contribute to the understanding of shifting relationships between anti-base groups and new collaboration forming in response to new issues. Moreover, my analysis of the scale of translocality presents the collaboration efforts happening on smaller scales (e.g., within Okinawa, and Okinawa and Japan) than Davis' (2020) work (e.g., translocal solidarity across ocean). My research also elaborated on the ways in which activists justify the necessity of international support. Anti-base and anti-military activists uniting across oceans is not just potent symbolically, but as Davis (2020) contends, it also creates an assemblage that opposes the global network of military bases. Such assemblages form through activists' interactions with other human and nonhuman surroundings, which I discuss next.

Making relations by being in the field

In Chapter Six, I examined the development of various relationships activists develop through their resistance activities. I focused on their relations with the local residents, 'the other side,' and nonhuman entities in this study, as they relate to my theoretical frameworks of (C)EJ and assemblage theory. Despite the fact that the majority of activists are 'outsiders' to the local community, my research suggests activists' careful navigation of their 'outsiderness' by going to the field and being fully immersed in the protest sites. By doing this, activists gain a more nuanced awareness of the challenging circumstances that locals face. The connections activists have with the local environment may be different from those of the local residents because they are 'outsiders.' But, as my interviews with the activists showed, 'outsider' activists can nonetheless forge close personal bonds with the local environment, whether they do so directly by engaging with the environment or indirectly by hearing the locals' stories. As a result, in addition to human others, memories and feelings of those people also significantly contribute to the configuration of an assemblage of activists

who build their own particular relations with the local community and environment. This finding also relates to Kitoh's (1998) discussions of 'insider/ousider' boundaries. The protesters also link their current resistance activities with earlier memories, as I addressed previously. This finding shows that anti-base activists are strongly influenced by recollections of the tragedy of the war and the purposeful Okinawan sacrifices made by the Japanese government.

The relationship between activists and those on 'the other side' who helped build the new base, such as the police, Coast Guards, and construction workers, was another significant relationship covered in the chapter. While their relationship has been hostile to neutral in some cases, activists (try to) approach them with humility, rather than with hostility. Activists believe that these individuals are victimized by the state, as they see those on 'the other side' are being forced to comply with the government-sanctioned project that endangers Okinawans, including themselves, while higher-level government officials who have power over the decision about the military bases can avoid such consequences. To use Kikuko's phrase, "the real evil is not onsite." Viewing the police and CGs—the state apparatuses—also as 'victims' of state violence, activists use non-confrontational approaches when interacting with these individuals. The activists' understanding of 'the state', therefore, may be a more nuanced than what the CEJ suggests: the state apparatuses can be both part of the source of the problems (i.e., the state) and the victim of the state. When investigating the militarization of Okinawa and environmental problems associated with it, then, it is also important to pay attention to how it also impacts the lives of those deployed by the state to repress the activists and contribute to the militarization.

Additionally, some activists develop humility towards 'the other side' after witnessing their humanity or individual agency. As such, and connected to the previous point, being on the field and having the direct interactions with these individuals create a type of relations

that may be beyond what the state can control. This is an important insight to add to the discussions of CEJ's third pillar, which critiques the state as the source of environmental problems. Participants of my study offer a critical insight that suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of 'the state', particularly the relationship between 'the state' and its apparatuses that do the 'dirty' jobs. They see these people being forced to comply with the government-sanctioned project that endangers Okinawans, including themselves, while higher-level government officials who have power over the decision about the military bases can avoid such consequences. To use Kikuko's phrase, "the real evil is not onsite." My research highlights thus the value of "being in the field" and witnessing firsthand how militarization affects many people, nonhuman animals, and the environment. Despite being perceived as 'outsiders' to the local community, activists are able to establish relationships that foster a sense of attachment to the community of Henoko and Takae and its environment. Direct action interference and monitoring activities both enable activists to be attentive to the human and nonhuman surroundings.

Activists not only form relations with human others but also with nonhuman surroundings. The findings of my study showed that environmental-oriented anti-base activists develop relations with particular nonhuman creatures, landscape, and the ecosystem through their participation in the anti-base resistance activities. In some cases, as previous studies have noted, nonhuman entities, particularly culturally and ecologically significant animals have served as a symbol of the movement (Kim, 2021); however, less has been said about how activists may see other animals, birds, and insects. As my participants shared, other species whose lives are frequently disregarded by the general public, the media, and even among anti-base activists, also have ecological and moral relevance. Environmentally-oriented anti-base activists see these creatures as subjects, who deserve protection like other more socially recognized and valued animals such as dugongs, and doing so, they disrupt the

species hierarchy of protection within the scope of their activism. In addition, participants' account of their relations with nonhuman surroundings—Akino's connections with bugs, Pag's affection to the sea, and Kikuko's emotional response to the beauty and suffering of nonhuman lives—all demonstrate the *affective* aspect of the nonhumans. This finding responds to Sepúlveda-Luque's (2018) observation of swans as a mobilizing force for the Valdivian environmental movement. Thus, nonhuman surroundings, their material and discourse elements, influence the activists' experiences and interpretations of their relationships with and responsibilities to the more-than-human world.

Ecological security as knowledge and practice

As I discussed in the literature review chapter, 'security' is a contested idea; depending on whose perspectives it is, its meanings vary. When the US and Japanese governments talk about 'security,' it often means protecting the economic and political interests of the state, more so than protecting their people (Davis, 2020; Kim, 2021). In contrast, anti-base activists see security as protection of their bodies and lives, which are directly affected by militarization and armed conflicts (Davis, 2020). Participants in my study also view humans but also the environment and nonhuman creatures inhabiting there to be deserving of safety and protection, while criticizing the Japanese government's ongoing denial of the disproportionate risks that Okinawans have endured and will continue to endure if the military bases are attacked. Activists view the protection of nonhuman beings and nature as an important element of security, not only because they see themselves as part of nature and they are interdependent on it, but also because they also see the environment and nonhuman creatures as subjects of moral consideration and protection in their own light. They acknowledge the environment and nonhuman animals in their ecological and individual values, which makes this finding intriguing. These activists' viewpoints confirm Kim's study

that suggest the use of ecological security in the Okinawa anti-base movement. Furthermore, they practice ecological security through actions like monitoring, by paying attention to the creatures whose lives are otherwise dismissed. While Okinawan dugongs were the only animals discussed as a "symbol" of the anti-base opposition in Kim's (2021) study, activists in my study also extended their care for other, culturally less significant nonhuman creatures. This finding suggests that these activists are not 'using' these animals for a strategic means to gain support, although animals such as the dugong can and have helped garner support and attention; they view these creatures as subjects to which security matters.

As such, activists produce and promote both discourses of human security which focuses on human security and ecological security that pays attention to the holistic protection of the ecosystem, as opposed to the national security discourse that the Japanese and US governments employ to defend militarization. This insight adds to Davis' (2020) contention that anti-military movements produce, practice, and promote body-centric ethics of inclusion, which views all bodies as worthy of protection, a subject of security. In addition to producing such discourses, activists also practice ecological security within the context of their own activism, particularly through their monitoring efforts. As mentioned earlier, activists' monitoring activities serves as a way to recognize various impacts of militarization on the environment and nonhuman beings in the sea and forests. By sharing stories about them and continuing to observe the nonhuman surroundings, they practice a form of care that is rooted in the ecological security discourse.

In sum, my research contributes to the discussions of security by highlighting how anti-base activists also include nonhuman animal bodies to be worthy of protection. To protect the bodies of nonhuman animals, activists also believe that protecting the environment, or as some of my participants put it, preventing other humans from destroying the environment, is the necessary step integrated into their demilitarization effort. The

activists in Henoko and Takae thus develop these alternative discourses through forming relations and connections with various human, nonhuman, tangible, and intangible entities entangled in the movement. I contend that activists' relationships with various entities support the growth of these concepts; in other words, assembling ideas and relationships with diverse entities allowed these ideas to develop.

Chapter Seven: Implications and Conclusions

Research Summary and Implications

My research demonstrates the meanings of anti-base resistance activities in Okinawa through the lens of activists and various relations and knowledge produced through the assembling among activists and their human and nonhuman surroundings. Through my analysis of the perspectives, experiences, and behaviours of environmental-oriented anti-base activists in Okinawa, my research helps gain a deeper understanding of how activists interpret and articulate the meanings of resistance activities, particularly direct-action interferences, monitoring, and translocation collaborations. My research also illuminates how activists interact with community members, 'the other side,' and nonhuman surroundings, and how such relations influence activists' understanding of *kichimondai*, their relations to the environment, and their idea of security.

With my analyses of the activists' perceptions, experiences, and behaviours, I highlight five contributions this research makes. First, my research contributes to the EJ and SMS literatures by adding the knowledge about non-Western forms of resistance activities against militarism, imperialism, and environmental destruction. In particular, non-violent interference actions centering radical humility and patience, as seen in Awa protesters bowing to the truck drivers, Masatsugu's commitment to nonviolence (including verbally), and kayakers' cooperation with the CGs, were noteworthy findings.

While the CEJ encourages the EJ movements to be more critical of the state, my research raises a question of who counts as 'the state'. As I discussed in Chapter Six, activists believe those on 'the other side', including the state apparatuses like the riot police and CGs, are victimized by the state. With this understanding that those participating in the base construction projects are also 'victims' of the state violence, activists avoid blaming them for their work. Additionally, because environmental justice struggles often entangle other

workers (e.g., truck drivers in Henoko, workers in fossil fuel industry, etc.), it is critical that we also pay attention to how they become part of an 'assemblage' that produces environmental destruction.

Second, my research demonstrates how the anti-base activists understand the problems of *kichimondai*, particularly its environmental aspects, and explains to why their particular approaches and tactics are important. In doing so, my research makes contributions to the EJ and SMS literatures by. My findings in Chapter Five also reveal not only activists' strategic thinking, but also ideological and ethical groundings in explaining their activity involvement. The thesis demonstrates both similarities and differences among activists in how they perceive and assign meanings to a particular resistance activity. Although how they understand the purpose of the activities was quite similar across participants, their experiences and their perceptions of the activities were much different despite the small sample. Particularly, each activist's relations with the local community, construction workers, police, other activists, and nonhuman surroundings illustrated their varying understanding of their own role as an activist (i.e., their 'insider/outsiderness', their role in relation to the nature, etc.). My research contributes to the literature on Okinawa anti-base movement by presenting the strategies, tactics, relations, and knowledge that the currently active actors use and produce. With the rise of ultra-nationalists and their counternarratives to the Okinawa anti-base movement emerge in Japan (Nishiyama, 2021), a proper presentation of the current state of the movement is imperative. As noted at the beginning of the thesis, there had been an attack on sit-ins in Henoko by a popular online influencer, who visited Henoko to insult the sit-ins, without referring to (or demonstrating his knowledge of) the history of struggles. I hope I continue to share my findings with Japanese public to challenge such insults and counternarratives to the movement.

Third, my findings on monitoring activities contribute to the literature on Okinawa anti-base movement, as this form of activity has been overlooked. To my knowledge, no studies have been done on monitoring activities in Henoko and Takae to empirically analyze their roles in the movement and the meanings activists give to the activities, although there are a number of studies on the interferences, blockades, and sit-ins (e.g., Davis, 2021; Mori, 2013; Takahashi, 2015). The strategic and ideological importance of monitoring activities cannot be overstated. From a strategic standpoint, monitoring enables activists to gather data that they or other collaborators can use to refute the construction. In that regard, monitoring activities complement direct action interference well because both can result in construction process delays. From an ideological standpoint, monitoring is essential for activists to *become aware* of the nonhuman surroundings as well as the impacts of the US military bases and operations on them. Such attentiveness to nonhuman surroundings also can indicate that activists view them as morally significant subjects. Monitoring also emphasizes the transparency and accountability, this also adds to the understanding of tactics in EJ movements.

Fourth, this research contributes to the theoretical understanding and practical applications of assemblage theory. With my theoretical grounding in (C)EJ and environmental sociology, I paid attention to how nonhuman entities also become part of the struggle. While Davis (2020) also discussed the roles of nonhuman entities in assemblages, my research emphasized the affective aspects of nonhuman surroundings, as evidenced by Pag's affections for the ocean, Akino's relations with bugs, and Kikuko's emotional responses to nonhuman surroundings. Focusing more on the relational aspects of the activities, I examined how activists interact and form relations with other human and nonhuman entities through their resistance activities in Chapter Six.

Fifth, my research contributes to the knowledge of ecological security and EJ literature by illuminating how activists include nonhumans into the discourses of security. As Kim (2021) argues, Okinawan dugongs represent an important symbol of activists' practice of ecological security. My research builds on this claim by demonstrating how activists care not only symbolic or culturally or ecologically significant animals like dugong, but also animals with whom they encounter and share the space, like terns, crabs, fishes, bugs, and so on. My research also shows how activists' idea of ecological security is shaped by their relationships with the nonhuman surroundings; thus, my research shows that protests sites become a space for knowledge production (i.e., the idea of ecological security, ecologically sound alternatives to bases, eco-educations, etc.) and relationship-buildings (i.e., with community members, 'the other side', and nonhuman surroundings). By doing so, I also highlighted the movement as an assembling force that produces, not just resists.

Limitations and Future Research

There are four limitations that are evident to me. The first limitation relates to the sample of my study. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, my original sample population was *Okinawan* anti-base activists, who were born and raised in Okinawa. I did this because I wanted to learn not only how they engage in the anti-base movement, but also how they experience the US military-related environmental problems. However, as noted in Chapter Three, finding *Okinawan* activists was a challenge due to my limited connection with such activists. While I was fortunate enough to speak to two Okinawan activists, this limited sample size of the specific population made it difficult to adequately understand how the environmental problems impact the lives of Okinawans. Nonetheless, the findings of my study gave me insight into how 'outsiders' see such environmental issues from their unique points of view and in relation to the surrounding environment and community, a question promoted by

Kitoh (1998). While many studies on Okinawa anti-base movement tend to generalize the participants as ‘Okinawans’, my study contributed to a more nuanced understanding of participants’ experiences by paying attention to participants’ backgrounds as well as their relations with Okinawa. I hope that future studies will consider this point and take these nuances into account. Additionally, as I was only able to show the diversity and heterogeneity among the six activists, future studies can represent a larger sample to demonstrate other perspectives and experiences that were not represented in my study.

The second limitation relates the translation of the interviews. Given time and resource constraints, I was not able to employ the back translation method, which increases the accuracy of the translation by translating scripts in the target language back to the source language (Sutrisno et al., 2014). In the case of my research, the procedure would have involved translating the English versions of the interview transcripts to Japanese. Even with the back translation, however, the translated texts are not the same as the original texts: some meanings are lost through the process of translation. Thus, with or without the back translation, the original meanings of the text cannot be fully captured in the translated texts.

Finally, because my research is primarily built on English literature, it is limited in that it does not include the full range of literature written in Japanese. Although I made an effort to include authors from Japan and Okinawa whose works are only available in Japanese, I faced some difficulties when trying to obtain the electronic copies of several articles. For instance, I requested my friends in Japan to help me get access to those articles, but some of the articles were not available online. I acknowledge this as a limitation of my study because I failed to incorporate a wider range of scholarly perspectives. I encourage future studies, particularly by the authors outside of Okinawa, to attend closely to the discussions of Okinawa issues by Okinawan scholars.

Concluding Thoughts

It is both inspiring and disheartening to learn how long the anti-base resistance has lasted. Although I recognize the significance of my research and I hope it to be additional force for activists' demilitarizing efforts, I am also aware of inaccessibility of academic literature to non-academic audience. I would like to translate my findings into Japanese and present them in a way that can be useful to the on-the-ground activism.

It would be a lie if I said I never experienced the sense of powerlessness throughout the course of my writing this thesis. In doing a relational work with a social movement, I could not help but to question how my research could be useful. I share what Golfín, Rusansky, and Zantvoort (2022) went through in their MA research, to "[question] the relevance of the many hours spent behind the screen while the activists we worked with were busy organising" (p. 230). Especially watching the development of the construction in Henoko and situations in Takae on my phone screen in Canada, there were so many times I wished I could have been more useful. While such thoughts were discouraging to complete my writing at times, the trust that activists have given me to share their stories and let me write about them helped me continue. As I learned more about assemblage thinking, I was also able to see myself as a small yet important element of an assemblage working together to demilitarize Okinawa. As mentioned in Chapter Three, visiting the construction site, experiencing the nature of Henoko-Oura Bay and Yanbaru forest firsthand, and attending the protests all made me feel more accountable to Okinawans and activist communities. Like my participants forming relations with other people and nonhuman surroundings, I did so too during my visit to Okinawa. My support for the movement does not end with this research project; I hope to maintain relationships with the activists and continue supporting their demilitarizing efforts.

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Figures

Figure 1: Takahashi, A., Otsuka, H., & Ota, H. (2008). Systematic Review of Late Pleistocene Turtles (Reptilia: Chelonii) from the Ryukyu Archipelago, Japan, with Special Reference to Paleogeographical Implications, *Pacific Science*. 395-402.

Figure 2: Areas covered by the US military bases in Okinawa main island as of 2018 Retrieved from Okinawa Prefectural Government

Figure 3: Asahi Shimbun. New Base Construction Plans in Henoko Retrieved from https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/photo/41232469

Figure 4: Coral reefs in Henoko-Oura Bay. Henoko Blue. Retrieved from https://henokoblue.wordpress.com/2017/02/04/photo-gallery-01/

Figure 5: Japan Times. Yanbaru forest. Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2017/02/01/voices/u-s-military-must-not-jeopardize-okinawan-forests-bid-world-heritage-status/

Figure 6: Maps of Northern Training Area and the Proposed Locations of the New Helipads. No Helipad Takae Residents Society. https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=http%3A%2F%2Fnohelipadtakae.org%2FTakae-handout-english-final.pdf&psig=AOvVaw1YnIlxqdMGZZFoWjtF2wta&ust=1676496298949000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CBIQ3YkBahcKEwjY-q3F-ZX9AhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQMQ

Appendix A: Interview Guide

Interviewer: Kaho Nishibu

This interview guide is meant to aid the interviewer in collecting good quality, extensive and relevant information from research participants. The following list of questions is preliminary; the interviewer may ask questions not listed here to clarify understandings or pursue further information. The order in which questions are asked may also change as participants guide the open-ended conversation. Please also note that this interview guide will be translated into Japanese once approved by REB.

I have developed the list of preliminary interview questions in this interview guide to solicit responses that help me answer my thesis research questions. To demonstrate the clear relationship between my research questions and my interview questions, I have labelled each research question with a letter and then paired it to corresponding interview questions. I labelled my research questions as following:

(A) How do Okinawan environmental activists represent the (environmental, social, political) challenges posed by the US military on their land?
(B) What changes do they envision related to these US military bases and why?
(C) What resistance strategies have they employed to urge governments to implement these changes? Why? What alliances have been or would be useful in resistance activities and why?
(D) How have activists experienced resistance activities? What suggestions do they have for future endeavours?
(E) How have activists come to environmentally-oriented, anti-base resistance? How have their relationships with more-than-human world shaped their activism?

As indicated below, I have added the letter(s) of these research questions beside each interview question to note the connection between the research question(s) and the interview question. For instance, interview question 1-a is paired with the research questions (C), (D), and (E), which demonstrates that the interview question 1-a is meant to solicit responses that help answer the research questions (C), (D), and (E).

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1. Activist Involvement

First, I would like to ask you about your activism and what drew you to activism.

a. Please tell me about your current activism. (C) (D) (E)
b. What motivated your involvement with activism (anti-base, environmental, or others)? (A) (B) (D) (E)
   i. What sustains your activism? (E)
   ii. How have others helped sustain, hinder, or complicate your activism (e.g., family, friends, community members, other activists, etc.)? (D) (E)
c. How would you describe your experiences being involved in environmental-oriented, anti-base movement? (D)
   i. What are the key challenges of being involved in activism? (D)

d. How have your relationships with nature and nonhuman beings affected your involvement your environmentally-related activism, if at all? (E)
   i. Have [a specific animal/plant/landscape, etc. that the participant is directly involved with] informed your activism, and if so, how? (E)

2. Issues of Concern

I would like to hear your opinions about *kichimondai* (US military bases issues).

a. What do you think are the most important issues that need to be addressed about US military bases in Okinawa? (A)
   i. How do you think those issues are addressed (or not) by the government and media? (A)
b. What changes do you think are needed to address those issues? (B)
c. How do you think the environmental aspects of *kichimondai* are perceived by the people, media, and government? (A) (B) (D)

3. Resistance Strategies

I'd like to hear *how* you do your activism. I want to focus on strategies you use and how you work with others (e.g., other social movements, activist groups, the state, etc.); this section is different than the first section of our interview when we concentrated on your experiences with activism.

a. Please tell me more about the activities or projects you are involved with, if you haven't already shared about these. (B) (C) (D)
   i. What was the goal of activity or activities? (B) (C)
   ii. How do you evaluate the success or efficacy of your actions? (C)
   iii. What do you think would be or would have been more effective to bring about change? (C) (D)
b. How do you evaluate the overall organization of the activism you are involved, if you are part of an organization or group? (C)
c. How have people responded to your activism? (e.g., such as the Japanese government, US government, even Okinawan government, the military, media and people from Okinawa and mainland Japan) (D)
   i. How did you feel about the responses? (D)
d. What relationships or connections do you have with other activist groups (e.g., other anti-base or groups whose primary focus is not anti-base)? (C) (D)
   i. If you have worked with other groups, how did you find the experience in working with them? (C) (D)
e. How does your activism engage with the state (e.g., Okinawan government, Japanese government, the US government, the US military)? (C)
   i. If you have worked closely with the government, why have you taken that route? (C)
f. What else do you want me to know about your activism?

4. Future Directions

I'd like to hear about your hopes for the future.

a. What are your hopes for the future, particularly in regard to your activism and issues of concern? (D)
b. What kinds of actions and support do you think are necessary to achieve your goals? (C) (D)
    i. What kinds of collaboration would be useful to achieve your goals?
    ii. Why should people outside Okinawa care about and support the movement?

5. Topics Not Discussed

Is there anything else that you want me/others to know about you and your activism? Please share.

6. Demography

Lastly, I would like you to share your demographic information.

a. What year were you born?
b. How do you identify your gender?
c. What ethnicity do you identify yourself with?
d. Do you have any religious affiliation?
e. What is your educational history?
f. Where were you born?
g. Where do you live?
h. What is your occupation?
i. How do you describe your economic status?
j. What pseudonyms do you prefer me to use?
    a. Discuss the issues of anonymity. Ask how much confidential they want their information to be.

Appendix B: Participants Demographics

Name (First name, Last name)	Year of Birth	Affiliations	Roles	Other Relevant Experiences	Place of Birth	Current Place of Residence	Occupations / Professions
Hanawa Shinichi	1949	Okinawa Environmental Network	Caretaker, protest organizer	Worked for WWF Japan (1991-2011)	Sendai, Miyagi, Japan	Kanagawa, Japan	Retired
Kazu	1965	Henoko Blue	Kayaker; protester	Organized Okinawa History Tours	Gunma, Japan	Yamanashi, Japan	Outdoor guide, watercolour artist
Pag	1978	Henoko Blue	Kayaker; protester	Participated in Takae struggle	Kagoshima, Japan	Okinawa	N/A
Isa Masatsuggu	1962	No Helipad Resident Society	Co-founder	Been prosecuted for obstructing the road with a human blockade in Takae	Okinawa city, Okinawa	Takae, Higashi Village, Okinawa	Craftsman of *totome*, Okinawan traditional alter; Higashi village councilor
Miyagi Akino	1978	N/A	Investigation, civil disobedience	Been arrested for Obstruction of Business in 2021	Himaka Island, Okinawa	Higashi Village, Okinawa	Entomologist; author; photographer;
Nakahara Kikuko	1960	Henoko Blue	Captain	Participated in Takae stggle; led the Amami Rights of Nature lawsuit	Nagasaki, Japan	Nago city, Okinawa	N/A

Appendix C: Trajectory of Henoko Struggle

Year	Major events	Opposition
1996	The Japanese and US governments decide to relocate the US MCAS Futenma under the SACO agreement.	
1997	Nago mayor accepts the construction plan and resigns.	Nago citizens vote against the offshore construction plan.
1998		Okinawa Governor Ota rejects the offshore construction plan.
1999	Okinawa Governor Inamine announce the plan of relocating the base to the reef area of Henoko-Oura Bay.	
2002	The Japanese government conducts environmental assessment, concluding there is no impacts.	
2003		Nago citizens demand a proper environmental assessment. Okinawan and American individuals and NGOs file a case in San Francisco Federal Court against the US Department of Defense for violating the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) through construction a new US base in Henoko (also known as the dugong lawsuit).
2004	CH-53 crash into Okinawa International University in August.	Sit-ins start in April. Interference actions on sea start in September, taking over the scaffolding.
2006	The construction plan changes. The Japanese and US governments agree on the V-shaped airfield plan.	
2008		The San Francisco Federal Court rules in favour of the plaintiff (dugong), recognizing the US DoD’s failure to consider the impacts of the construction works on dugong under the NHPA.

		Okinawa Prefectural Assembly opposes the new heliport construction.
2009	Hatoyama gets elected as a Prime Minister, promising to substitute the Futenma relocation to outside Okinawa. The dugong lawsuit pauses as the direction of the construction works becomes unclear.	
2010	Hatoyama reverses his promise and agrees to the construction in Henoko. He resigns in May.	Okinwan Citizens' Rally demands the base to be relocated outside Okinawa in April.
2012	The US DoD begins its own surveys to investigate the impacts of the construction on dugongs without consulting the locals.	
2013	Okinawa Governor Nakaima approves the landfill construction.	
2014	US DoD submits a report that concludes the construction has no harm to dugongs to the federal court. Sea floor research of the construction site begins.	Anti-base Onaga wins the Governor race in December.
2015	The dugong lawsuit resumes with a new judge. The course dismisses the case on the ground of the political questions doctrine in February. The central government filed suit in Naha court against Okinawa under Administrative Appeals Act in November, claiming Okinawa sought proxy execution.	The defendant in the dugong lawsuit submits appeals in the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In October, Governor Onaga cancels the approval of reclamation issued by Nakaima. Okinawa prefecture launches suit against the central government in Naha court in December.
2016	Naha court advises the out-of-court settlement, ending the prosecution. Rape and murder of an Okinawa women by a US military base serviceman.	

	The central government launches new suit against Okinawa in Naha court, and the court upholds the central government. Okinawa prefecture appeals to Supreme Court. Marine Corps Osprey crashes off the coast of East Nago. Supreme court dismisses Okinawa prefecture's appeal. Governor Onaga gives permission to start the reclamation.	
2017	The district court requests the US DoD to submit the administrative records. Seawall construction works begin in Henoko.	
2018	Governor Onaga, who maintained his anti-base stance, passes away. Anti-base Tamaki wins the Governor race. The court concludes the claims submitted by the US DoD are valid. The land reclamation of the Henoko-Oura Bay begins.	Okinawa prefecture launches a new suit seeking to stop the land reclamation works for their damage on marine lives. The defendant in the dugong lawsuit appeals to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
2019		Civil groups and individual organize a referendum. More than 70% of Okinawans vote against the landfill. Mission Blue recognizes Henoko-Oura Bay as a 'Hope Spot'.

Appendix D: Trajectory of Takae Struggle

Year	Major events	Opposition
1957	The U.S. Military start using the Northern Training Area.	
1996	The Japanese and U.S. governments agree to reduce the burden on Okinawans (SACO).	
1999	Okinawa mayor announces the base in Futenma will be moved to Henoko.	Takae villagers vote against the plans to construct new helipads.
2004	The U.S. military helicopter crashes into a university.	
2006		Takae villagers again vote against the plans to construct new six helipads.
2007		Village mayor withdraws the promise to oppose the helipad construction. The construction works begin and Takae residents start sit-in protests.
2008	Okinawa Defense Bureau files an allegation of 15 protestors for an ‘obstruction of traffic’.	
2009	2 of the 15 protesters are put on for a trial.	
2010	90,000 people gather outside Futenma Base to demand moving bases outside Okinawa	
2012	The court rules in favour of the ODB, ordering Isa Masatsugu to stop the obstruction	
2013	The construction works for one of the six helipads is completed.	
2014	Boring exploration of the construction area begins.	Supreme Court rejects an appeal from the defendant.

2015	The U.S. Marines starts using two of the helipads in the NTA.	
2016	An Osprey crashes into the ocean in Abu, Nago city.	Takae villagers sues the Japanese government.
2017	The construction resumes. CH53E crashes and burned on the pasture in Takae village.	Protesters blockade the construction.
2018	The construction works are completed.	Okinawan and Guam activists collectively submit a letter opposing to the expansion of the U.S. military. Akino begins surveys in the Yanbaru forest, discovering an abundance of wastes and ordinance discarded by the US soldiers.
2021	UNESCO inscribes the Yanbaru forest in the list of World Natural Heritage sites	