

*The Subject Reimagined: Language, Event, and the Event of Language*

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Abstract: In event phenomenology, the problem of subjectivity and its relation – or non-relation – to event remains a legitimate problem. A legitimate problem because, on the one hand, events are the definitional neuter, or nihil, that erupt into the something of being and subsequently reconfigure this being; while on the other, our experience of ourselves, what constitutes the bedrock of subjectivity, appears as cogent, unified. The purpose of this thesis is to propose a new sort of phenomenological language, carried through in a thoroughly ontological anthropology, that provides a way to connect discontinuity with continuity, the unfamiliar and alien with the familiar, inside subjectivity. Doing so requires abandoning the transcendental residue in Heidegger's work, relying instead, and primarily, on Françoise Dastur's ontogenetic analysis of language (and its event) to forge a path forward to an eventful subjectivity.

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## Introduction

### I. Event: Birth, Death, and Surprise

How do we make sense of the insensible? The prism is instructive for this. When light shines through a prism, we say that the prism separates the seemingly unified light into seven visible wavelengths according to their index of refraction. Yet the prism is not, in any true sense, dividing the light. The light arrives at the prism already divided, already constituted, in difference, by the divisions between its wavelengths. On this basis, we do not speak of there being *lights* – as if each wavelength were a self-subsisting singular; a light onto its own – but rather of light itself, with its seven wavelengths, thus recognizing the inherency of duplication, of difference, in a phenomenon that our perception consolidates. Critically, there is no prior point at which the wavelengths collect or congeal, no prior singular total out of which the different wavelengths emanate: at each point, the light is different, and it is merely our perception that convokes difference into the unity of perceptible light. Nor do we say that the wavelengths originate in the prism, for the prism is not an origin: the light is already there, already operating as a multiplicity, obscured by impecunious human perception, the latter enriched by the prism that disaggregates what human eyes natively cannot. The insensible, light's intrinsic but invisible difference, is shown to us through the prism, its sensible conglomerator. In the model of the prism, we see the essential and essentially anxious impulse in the history of philosophy to countervail being's intrinsic and prismatic refraction in eventfulness. For thousands of years, ontology was collective. Not in the colloquial sense, not that ontology was a shared and collaborative social exercise (though surely it was sometimes that). But rather that collection was ontology's mode: the One Being is first divided into the Many beings, then redoubled, and the impetus for philosophizing was thus recollecting the Many back into the One.

Over the last century, however, a problem on the thinking of being emerged, motivated by the ancients who deviated from this collectivity. We realized that being, as through light in the prism, if nothing else, resists our entitative and categorial attempts at subjugation. Rather than continuing the violence of recollection, ontologists began the radical project of taking being's posture of difference, as in the division of light into itself, as constitutive. The project of contemporary thinking on being is in its way even more radical, being an obsecration toward differencing, as identity, without its reduction to a mere alterity. In other words, contemporary ontology, at least in its continental form, seeks to not only modify but abandon its reconciliatory path. The task for contemporary ontology is to meditate on, to sit with the disquietude and unease of separation; and to, in some way, mobilize thought toward thinking difference as autochthonous to being itself. We call such thinking event philosophy.

As thought converged on event, naturally questions emerged as to its pluralities and presentations in human experience. The task for event thinking was how to maintain the tension in diffraction, in thinking being as its own difference, while at the same time making sense of our seeming access to this difference as continuity. Event in the common sense, not only in English, but also in German (*Ereignis*) and French (*l'événement*), speaks to this tension. An event is defined as “a thing that happens, especially one of great importance.” There exists, then, an implied divergence between things or facts as purely innerworldly things or facts, and things or facts that are also, and at the same time, events. To maintain this tension, event thought set for itself the task of developing what seems contradictory to the notion of difference: a taxonomical analysis

of the things called events that make them the phenomenon of event, the event of the differencing of being. The tension in such a project inheres in the taxon itself, as category: the proposal of a taxonomy linking events to *the event* obscures, as we will see, that *the event* is pure difference, is in fact the differencing of difference, and is the basis of both separation and joining – the latter of which manifests as the giving forth of phenomena as distinguished in both objective space and time. There is no point at which events link back to the originary event and thus the idea of a taxonomy is irreconcilable with an event phenomenology. There is no temporal core accessible by means of an event phenomenology; no transcendental unity at the origin for which Husserl was searching. There exists only difference, operating as the making different of beings, indeed that what is ordinarily called being is this difference, and it is a structural defect of subjectivity to obscure this difference in predicative language. Thus, one of the purposes of this thesis is not a taxonomical analysis of eventfulness, but the exploration of a new form of phenomenological language that shows the animating core of taxonomy, the apophantic category, to be an anachronism.

And yet, we are in each instance of a human life presented with the obstinate volubility of the world, the bi-directional and conditional interpretive fluency around us – the intractable proposition that things, simply, straightforwardly make sense. Which arises a question: in what sort of thing are discontinuity and continuity uneasily maintained as difference? That is, *to whom* does the event happen? The question of the relation – or better, perhaps, non-relation – of subjectivity to event, indeed to its own event, remains paradigmatic, especially in phenomenological discourses of event. As Rajiv Kaushik says, summarizing the relation of event and phenomenology viz., Badiou, “[the event] means nothing in itself, but counters in dramatic fashion the existent thing that otherwise presents itself as coherent and unified,”<sup>1</sup> a problem indeed when the existent, coherent, and unified thing is the location for event. Event phenomenology has struggled to proffer an answer to this problem. And so, absent from the entire history of phenomenological event thinking is a reliable, meaningful definition of a happening that seems not only eventful, but one that self-evidently brings together, and belongs to, all the happenings typically identified as events: the eventful subjectivity. Though event philosophy, and event phenomenology specifically, have ruminated to produce stunning and revolutionary analyses that oscillate on the ontological nature of birth and death, events that *belong to and imply a subject*, such ruminations have not in a meaningful way brought the subject and event back into joint. The purpose of this work, then, is bringing the subject of the event – an eventful subject – into the breaking day of philosophical thought by way of this hermeneutic return in event thought.

Following Heidegger, the primary strategy for dealing with aporetic discontinuity internal to subjectivity is suggesting that the anthropomorphous is a false problem, as its self-integrity, through both time and language, closes the ‘I’ off to the event problem. What I want to suggest in these pages, however provisionally, is that the subject of phenomenology must be fundamentally rethought as already harbingering to some disjunction or dis-articulation inside itself, as itself, to the nothing – the true aporetic neuter – consecrated by Derrida with the question “*Comment s’habituer, rien?*,”<sup>2</sup> without in the same gesture succumbing to the rancorous and fractalizing ontological problems to which deconstruction often leads. We must acknowledge, with Derrida, that if nothing is a fundamental aspect of being, then it must also be present within the realm of the subject as that which bears witness to being as its function. We must, then, too, embrace an anti-Cartesian subjectivity disarrayed against itself, differing originally from itself, to use Dastur’s

summarization of Heraclitus, in which subjectivity is dis-placed, and un-constellated *before* the representational gesture of signification. It is of course part of the event's enigma that it unfolds symbolically, in such a way as a lighthouse: where the structure of the thing is obscured by the luminosity of the bulb affixed on top. We never, as such, experience *the event*, and this is precisely what Heidegger means when he speaks of the belonging of the not with Being. There is interstitial to being, concomitant to it, within it, not merely the sense of alterity but its constitution – right there at the center of things. It is only in acknowledging the difference as itself the most constitutive fact of all, obscured by the symbology of being, that we come to know something about the event; through the glass darkly, grasping at significations that gesture, but never hold, the thing they intend. This *is the subject as event*.

The problem that Derrida and his contemporaries never broach, however, is the problem of this thesis; a hermeneutic return, a redolence back to sense, from non-sense, which in each and every signification presents – or re-presents – itself to us involuntarily, as the natural way in which things make sense. The Derridean *diaphéro* stands as alone in this juncture as Heidegger's Dasein, and the task for event phenomenology is to transit between these poles without paying the tax of disclaiming one or the other as victor; to choose a path without nomination, without genuflection. Whether it is regardless, or because of, this internal dis-articulation inside subjectivity, it is, as Gadamer suggests, the most "ontological fact of all" that things make sense to us; that we are the kind of thing for whom our own thinginess is a simultaneously compulsory but frictionless problem. In the following pages, steps are taken, unsure and unsteady as a newborn's, toward a solution. I suggest that the path is through finding the discontinuous inside the continuous, in time, therefore in history, and to locate a polymorphic subjectivity interior to this discontinuity; but then providing a transitory mechanism by which subjectivity elides reification inside either deconstruction or phenomenology's limits. To right ourselves along this path, we must first ask two preliminary queries: what is event and what is hermeneutic phenomenology?

## II. What is Event?

What of the event remains unthought? Owing to its conceptual promiscuity, event has many disciplinary shades, from semiotics, to semantical and morphological linguistics, to the cognitive and social sciences, and of course philosophy in its analytical and continental varieties. In each of these disciplines, the event is assigned definite attributes or values and positioned within an ecosystem of abstractions, stable and self-perpetuating, where the event's function there seems obvious, permanent. Assured of their propriety, each intellectual enterprise has, over the past number of decades, plumbed the event's depths: entire genealogies of event knowledge produced on the certainty of an obviously multivocal concept turned hermetic. Neither Byron Kaldis, in his monograph entry on event in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences*, nor Casati and Varzi, in their articles or compendium on events, standards in the analytical community, discuss event thought in the phenomenological or broader continental traditions. The silence is repaid in kind. None of the major works on event within phenomenology acknowledge the existence of the analytic tradition's event philosophy and the brief encounters within the wider continental body (in Badiou's *Event and Being*) are tangential. It seems everything sayable about the event has been said except, in any given case, why this rather than that connotation of the event is the subject of inquiry. Before answering the question of what is left to say about the event, let me first note the importance of how one says it.

From the outset, this definite phrasing, “the event,” invokes philosophy of a certain disposition – and so the question, too, presumes its response. The definite article is not a grammatical accident. In lexical and semantical philosophy, events show up as a sort of morphosyntactic technology. Events, there, are merely verbal equipment used to substantiate the motility of the semantic field and are thus presented as the unit in lexical typology that shows change, alteration between the states of double arguments (subject and object). In the analytic gaze, regardless of the internecine debates on its features, events are reduced to the instrumental function of an algorithm: an event is, at base, a set of instructions which determine the role and continuity between syntactical entities. An event, even a cataclysmic one, therein justifies and maintains the normal flow of chronology. The continental tradition, however, nominates *the* event, consciously and conspicuously, to elevate the problem beyond its anonymous, mechanical presentation in especially the language sciences as one continuous, discrete process among many. Despite their intersections and conflicts, all the writers in the phenomenological and continental tradition converge on an event concept that is violent, disruptive, precedential – where the event breaks in and breaks down the normal flow of things and shatters the orientation of time, the world, and us as beings subject to, and of, this shattering. As the definite article, the event is not subordinate to the category metaphysics of a scientific linguistics, because it antecedes and disrupts the category itself. The event, in its chaotic, interruptive, eruptive eventfulness is not of a category, because it is itself categorial: it is the verbal noun, happening, specifically the categorial intuition of what capacitates things to happen. When we involuntarily intuit that *things happen*, when we come to grips that a loved one has died, for example, the event is already there, making the dying itself within the “has died” phenomenally understandable because of its eventful character. We understand that this death changes things, perhaps everything; we measure time as before and after the death’s always untimely arrival; and we are gripped by grief and the utter destruction of our world regardless of our anticipations and are bereft in its wake. It is not the physiology of death that leaves us naked to bereavement, but the sheer fact that it happens, even in light of our expectations – that is, its eventfulness. As Francois Raffoul states, thinking *the* event therefore means resisting the entitative call to reduce the event to what happens, the *eventum*, and instead considering the fullness of its *evenire*, the violent disruption of its coming. To think, in other words, “not *what* happens, not *why* it happens, but *that* it happens.”<sup>3</sup> This happening, for Françoise Dastur, so revolutionizes our existence that it thwarts its situation in the world; on the contrary, it is as if “a new world opens up through its happening.”<sup>4</sup> The event is not merely the extremity of time, but the ruin of its synchronicity and the establishment of a new world which is admitted to us from this ruin. Thus, *the* event is not one, certainly not one among many, but *the* one, the original one; as singular, the event happens. Only in the continental tradition of philosophy do events become *the event* and so only there does its problem become the event problem.

And so, the scope of the original question narrows. What of the event, conceived as neither substance, nor as a property of merely linguistic thinking, remains unthought in the continental tradition? The answer is no less imposing. Though Heidegger inaugurates the event as a phenomenological concept nearly a century ago, eventfulness remains mostly alien to phenomenological discourse for decades. The event instead gestates in the shadow ecology counterposed, or at least in contention with, phenomenology in France. Deleuze provides the first systematic (or, anti-systematic) treatment of event philosophy in 1967’s *The Logic of Sense*; Derrida



follows shortly thereafter with 1971's *Signature, Event, Context*; Badiou's arrival to the evental scene is delayed, but spectacular, publishing *Being and Event* in 1988. Around this time, Jean-Luc Marion and Claude Romano initiate a Cambrian explosion in phenomenological event thinking in the visage of a discrete, identifiable phenomenology of the event. In *Being Given* and *Event and World*, respectively, Marion and Romano find in the event a phenomenology that, in the words of Marlène Zarader, "discovers or rediscovers its own central theme."<sup>5</sup> A phenomenology of the event is, in this sense, *the event* of phenomenology: the event of making manifest the conditions of appearing in what appears (Marion); making manifest the conditions of existing in what exists (Romano); and thus, the central theme that Marion and Romano recover is phenomenality and being themselves in the structure of eventfulness. Marion and Romano thereby influence the course of contemporary phenomenology, proliferating a new iteration that abandons uncovering the essences of individual conscious phenomena in lieu of articulating the ontological structure of how the phenomenon itself comes, originarily, into the light of phenomenality – that is, locating and articulating the original event that undergirds all other events, the event of being.

The new problem of being's structural eventfulness is subsequently taken up with fervor in the French academe. In phenomenological quarters, Romano stretches his "eventicity" into a three part "evental hermeneutics" in the space of five years (*Event and World*, *Event and Time*, and *There is: The Event and the Finitude of Appearing*); Marion continues publishing on the event, though less rigorously and systematically, where the event increasingly becomes a feature of his redefined saturated phenomenon; and Françoise Dastur, Francois Raffoul, and Jocelyn Benoist all devote significant works to thinking in and around the event. Outside of phenomenology, but interior to its dependencies, Jean-Luc Nancy devotes a non-trivial portion of his attention to the epoch of the event. In less than a decade after Marion and Romano catalyze interest in the event, the event is consumed by the uniquely French intellectual economy – which is to say, it becomes the object of fervent abstractive production and competition, it is stripped bare and built back up from first principles, haggled and negotiated and exchanged amongst an elite few, and then abandoned to the masses (in other words, anglophonic social sciences) as a *fait accompli*. For philosophy on the continent, which owing to certain historical vestiges still meant at the time German and French philosophy, the question was not who had written about the event but who had not. Indeed, France is so replete with thoughts of eventfulness by the 2000s that, in *On Touching*, Jacques Derrida considers the way that "they" speak of the affair "a little bit tiring."<sup>6</sup> Perhaps Derrida's enervation is warranted. Perhaps the event problem, despite its innumerable recitations, has been solved essentially. That is, perhaps the solutions offered in the phenomenologies of the event above are the essential solutions, ones that foreclose the event's focal aspect of surprise. Perhaps one is now left with the unhewn stone of the event's local presentations, tarrying in the infinite adumbrations of the event in everyday life. Given the volumes on the event produced by the names mentioned here alone – to say nothing of the sizeable secondary literature – the question is not idle. One can consider Raffoul's recent entry into event thinking, the capacious *Thinking the Event*, as an emphatic punctuation in this regard; a compendium on the event, the phenomenon, and the phenomenon of the event that in its completeness challenges the urgency of further work on the event in its generalities.

Despite these manifest challenges, I want to say that important work on eventfulness is possible. In fact, it is in event phenomenology's cleavage of the universal from the concrete, and so its tendency to ignore the infinite adumbrations of everyday life, where I suspect an opportunity

exists to recover the event in the direction of everyday phenomenality. The answer to the question motivating this thesis, therefore, is the transit back from the structural ontology of eventfulness to a hermeneutics of the event as a concrete phenomenon in everyday subjective life. As I note above, Marion and Romano successfully uncover eventfulness as the structure of phenomenality and being. This discovery is made possible by moving from an event of a given phenomenon, to *the* event as it shows itself both as the structure of that phenomenon's presentation and as the origin and structure of all phenomena – as Martin Heidegger's event of being, *Ereignis*. Both then ascribe to this expanded eventfulness certain general features or characteristics, embodied by paradigmatic examples that serve to make clearer these general features. The phenomenologies of the event that follow adopt this trajectory and coalesce on a set of phenomena emblematic for the event: birth, death, and the surprise. These are experiences with certain phenomenological features – the disruption in the flow of time, their impossibility of occurrence, the creation of a world, and so on – that based on these features properly designate these phenomena as the special genus of phenomenon called *events*. In *Being Singular Plural*, Nancy describes their confluence this way:

In a birth or in a death – examples which are not examples, but more than examples; they are the thing itself – there is the event, some [thing] awaited, something that might have been able to be. It can also be formulated like this: what is awaited is never the event; it is the advent, the result; it is what happens. At the end of nine months, one expects the birth, *but that it takes place is what is structurally unexpected in this waiting.* <sup>7</sup>

In this selection, Nancy makes clear the event's structural features which all the phenomenon called events, birth, death, and the surprise, share. The first structural feature of the event is that it is, according to Dastur, that which was “not expected, what arrives unexpectedly and comes to us by surprise...something which takes possession of us in an unforeseen manner, without warning, and which brings us towards an unanticipated future.” <sup>8</sup> The event is paroxysmal: it convulses our world in its unexpectedness and thus seizes us “in our incapacity to experience the traumatizing event.” <sup>9</sup> Dastur then links the two paradigmatic examples for the event's surprise: birth and the death of a loved one. <sup>10</sup> These examples are notable for demonstrating the event's chiasmic structure of possibility: the event moves out from its *evenire* (the blunt happening of its happening) and in one case continues to establish on this horizon the possibility for possibilities (birth) and in another represents their terminal closure (death). We are perpetually unfolding in the event of our birth, “the permanent surprise of being born which is constitutive to our being,” that in every new event of moving forward along our register of possibilities recurs and replicates “the proto-event of birth.” <sup>11</sup> Death permanently closes this register, and even in the case of expecting someone with a terminal illness to die, this closure, in its factual arrival, is constituted in its very unexpectedness and surprise. In each case, birth and death, surprise is not incidental to the event but determinant: if the event were foreseeable, it would not, as such, happen, for its utter predictability would stifle the articulation of change essential to our *a posteriori* relationship to the event. A phenomenology of the event makes room for this structure of expectation and surprise, letting the impossible that nevertheless happens arrive in contingency. The second structural feature of the event is that singularity of the event itself – “that *it* takes place,” as Nancy says. The event is the impossible possible, and thus singular: it is what cannot arrive, but does. Though it takes place to us, in a set of contextuality, the event is so tyrannical that it exceeds the anticipations and expectations concordant to this context; and in so doing, arrives in such a way

to transform time and our very relation to it. Event disintegrates in its catastrophe the very notion of causal order, and with it the tinge of transitive time; as we will see in later chapters, the event is thus an *a*-synchronous time, indeed only each times. As Raffoul notes, “just as there is no “general” existence, there are no “general” events.”<sup>12</sup> The event is at the same time inevitable and unpredictable, and even when we know it is coming, it defies our wishes and arrives in its own way and time regardless of the posture we assume against it.

And so we have the first mode of an event phenomenology: a typology of eventfulness, characterizing events as happenings that intervene on us, produce the world anew, that interrupt and disject everything. The second mode, proceeding from the first now on the basis of event as an ontological proposition, unconceals in phenomenology a dual structure of event that is typically invisible and interstitial within phenomenon: the structural event of presentation, or phenomenality itself, that is always lurking within but covered by the appearing of this phenomenon; and the event structure within all beings as such, the event of being itself as that which allows showing, coming, or appearing, but hides in that which shows, comes, or appears. In each case, however, the justifiable effort to expand the parameters of eventfulness such that it canvases phenomenality *per se* tends toward writing that I hesitate to call essentialism, but that verges nearby. Of course, phenomenology’s original motive force is the quest for the essentially invariant facets of any given experience, so as phenomenology moves from a transcendental phenomenology of consciousness to an ontology of the event, one expects a certain degree of universalization. A concept of eventfulness is, in that sense, necessary to identify *the* original event of being in any given phenomenal experience nominally known as *an* event. And so, naturally, the phenomenologists of the event say through select examples that “This is what the event essentially is despite its varying appearances.” My concern, here, is that these phenomenologists speak as if these varying appearances are allowed to make no difference *except* an essential difference. Such a univocal, unidirectional, and essential figuration of eventfulness runs the risk of an oppressive conceptual entropy, where the event expands unchecked to the point where all phenomenon, by definition, are merely the specific showing of the event’s general thesis – and so, it runs the risk of a phenomenological regression. The heart of phenomenology is developing a mechanism to curb that generalization or halt its forward momentum. Phenomenology must ultimately be a methodology that arrests the inertia of the essential impulse and one that returns, each time, home to the concrete phenomenon, the initial *happening of an event*, to bestow to that phenomenon the additional textures gleaned from rendering the invisible *structure of eventfulness* visible. This requires not only acknowledging the ontological gravity of the event’s disruption of the normal flow of time in, say, birth, but acknowledging also how the birthing moment includes the relationship between the young and the old, between the new and the established, thus organizing temporality in a very specific way that summons the event to give up its universalities and become susceptible to the finite, specific, practical limitations of that summons. It is indeed only in this hermeneutic return that the phenomenology of the event can avoid creating a self-bounding topography, in which the event means something only within its own boundaries or limits.

To avoid this fate, a phenomenology of the event must instead, and in each instance, adjudicate its inheritance: the fleshy, ambiguous disaster of the particular, and importantly, how particulars are pre-interpretively arranged in an index of multiplicities colloquially known as the world. Losing a loved one is not just an example of a general thing called an event, nor just a site

for the structure of being called eventfulness, although it is certainly both; it is also burdened with the specificity of being *this* death, *this* loss, and therefore the collapse of *this* world in all its messiness. This encumbrance requires us, as phenomenologists, to treat the death as not only a way to validate the general or structural features of a concept called eventfulness, but to use the paradigm of the event to validate the specific, concrete features of how it is for a specifically human death to mean something. This is a different phenomenological task, not only in intensity and order, but also of orientation. What could and ought to be the second step of event phenomenology, returning to the phenomenon of the event, captures one of Edmund Husserl's primary motifs, and primary failures, in the *Crisis*: the thematic of the return, the recrudescence, which is in each case also a renaissance or revival, where the generative power of that famous apparatus, the epoche, derives from the fullness of the world's hermeneutic contextuality. The second move would explicate not how some universal subject experiences the event and its general appearances; it would explicate how it is like to experience those generalities as they colonize the horizon of my experience and in that act become its particularities. What is it about eventfulness, specifically, that allows it to congregate the universal and the particular and, in that determination, strengthen both? The method that answers these questions is the method of hermeneutic phenomenology and developing that method must be the second task for a phenomenology of the event.

As Zarader notes in her event historiography, <sup>13</sup> however, this second task for event phenomenology, the recrudescence or revival of the concrete, is "not realized by any of the different phenomenologies of the event." The failure to explicate this fuller sense of the event is not, I think, a consequence of individual phenomenologists or their talents, but is rather a consequence of phenomenology as a disciplinary or scholastic regime. Phenomenology is unique, even among philosophical disciplines, in its pathological obsession with litigating its philosophical origins. The benefit is that phenomenology obeys its own dictate for perpetual renewal and reinvention, but there is a cost to everything. Compelled to follow the phenomenological schema, so to speak, writing in phenomenological books and journals often pretends as if phenomenology exists in some pristine, sterile environment untouched by its own performance. When phenomenology redoubles philosophy's bizarre phobia of examining its own history – as if history as a practice is an embarrassment, some lesser pursuit – phenomenology as a discipline suffers. Phenomenology is of course a historiographic phenomenon – indeed, its own event – that creates a hermeneutical endowment. A responsible phenomenology must situate this endowment, bringing it to bear in any given phenomenological pursuit. I want to say that, for reasons I will develop fully later, event phenomenologies do not approach themselves as their own historical objects; in turn, the event becomes in this historical failure a coda in service of unpacking a certain view on the event problem. To return to the concrete phenomenon of events, event phenomenologies must first articulate themselves as historically bounded phenomenon. Only in first accepting its own history can phenomenology of the event return properly to the history of a given event.

In turning eventfulness into its own thematic, and failing to return to, or sometimes even acknowledge, the phenomenon of the event as an enworlded, historical attachment, phenomenologies of the event thus discover not only their own central theme but also their own central limit. This purlieu is ironic. The departure point for all event phenomenologies is Heidegger's ontological egress from Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness, based on the

latter's inability to fully resolve and make transpicuous the fact of life, its facticity, within the constitutive operation of that consciousness. And so, Heidegger ontologizes the intentional gesture precisely to found ontology, which for Heidegger is the target of the phenomenological method, on that which shows as merely a residue in Husserl's immanent field: our factual, finite insertion into a quotidian world of things. Heidegger's point of departure for phenomenology, and therefore the point of departure for event phenomenology, is precisely this world, but now not as a final, stubborn roadblock to eidetic purity, but as itself being constitutive, prior to consciousness, as the most real factor of all. Ironic, then, because in phenomenologies of the event, the event concept becomes an *a priori* ontological presupposition, the starting point, and a mechanism of access to an eventful field. In so doing, event phenomenologists approach Husserl's same broken circumference, an inability to reintegrate the product of thematizing back into what Gadamer calls the "hermeneutical situation."<sup>14</sup> Whereas Husserl begins within the *ego cogito* and becomes, in attempting to constitute this beginning point, trapped in an enclosed space of immanence where appearing can never be resolved into what appears, phenomenologies of the event begin with an ontology of facticity and trap themselves in an enclosed space where eventfulness can never be resolved into what an event means. The problem for both is the brute fact of our being's insertion into the world: it cannot be fully thematized by any reflective operation because it is always there, right in the middle of things, for Gadamer, "on its side support[ing] every insight into essences,"<sup>15</sup> its factual potency resisting reduction within any field or register. Hence the requirement for the hermeneutic return. Our finite, ineluctable, and prejudicial insertion into the world co-determinates ontology and this insertion cannot be tamed, or held in abeyance, by any methodological contrivance. Our enworldedness must be embraced as both the genesis and termination of the phenomenological circumference as the meaning of the question of being.

Ergo, Heidegger's turn away from systematics more broadly: in *Building, Thinking, Dwelling*, we see for example the schematic modeling of being (persistent throughout Heidegger's work in the 1920s) abandoned in order that the venue of being's coming, its event (*Ereignis*), might be revealed in the poetry of, say, Rilke. Poetry conceived as an event *is not*; specifically, it is not an *is*, rather, poetry as an event *comes*. In poetry, we are bidden to a meaning always and already fully fledged, already there. We do not attack poetry scientifically, dissecting it into its constituent elements (the medium, the format, the author, the words) and derive from this operation hypotheses about how poetry is constituted. We come to the poem, or perhaps more properly, it comes to us; we find it there, already at work, already gathering up what is meaningful in the wound of being's infinite arrival. The poem's rawness stands in contrast to the plasticity of prose – often and especially philosophical prose – and exposes being's eventfulness as the production of trauma: that in its coming, the event of being marks (wounds us) with its essential inaccessibility. The poem thus comes, and in its coming, attempts to express the tragedy of occlusion, of the hidden. A phenomenology of the event must somehow duplicate in prose the function of poetry: simultaneously accessing the event through language in the very act of demonstrating its inaccessibility. A phenomenology of the event is, therefore, a phenomenology of language and thus also a phenomenology of phenomenology. It must begin by recognizing that phenomenology is or approaches the interior limit of language and language is or approaches the interior limit of phenomenology. A phenomenology of the event is thus difficult because it exposes this delimitation, indeed depends precisely and strategically on it, in such a way that it must also propose and accept an entirely different conception of phenomenology, language, and the very

subject who accesses them. This mode of access is the contingency of the event to which I earlier alluded: that, somehow, we as the contingent and particular being who shows in being might gesture, through a glass however darkly, to the very point at which the distinctions on which our language depends both disintegrate and reconnect. A true phenomenology of the event tarries in the middle of where the event strikes at comprehensibility, shows itself therefore as the pure incomprehensible, or impossible, but nevertheless accepts that we are always already engaging with and depending on this incomprehensibility.

It is Dastur alone who truly provides an exodus to this problem, even if she herself does not pursue this exodus in toto. She begins her primary event work, “Phenomenology of the Event: Expectation and Surprise,”<sup>16</sup> by questioning the very possibility of creating a “phenomenology of the event,” suggesting that the event consists in annihilating possibility itself (in, for example, madness, or death). The event is paroxysmal, in this way, and in all the senses of that word: it is a sudden, violent, convulsive attack or intrusion, one that seizes us in its being unforeseen and uncontrolled, and one also that occurs of its own accord, against our wishes, and thus obscures or destroys our current register of possibilities. Hence, Dastur’s doubt that the event can be known, in that what we experience “in moments of crisis is *our incapacity to experience the traumatizing event in the present.*”<sup>17</sup> Dastur’s counter, however, is that even the *attempt* to assign meaning to the event requires a pre-engagement, that we are already in its midst, engaging with the event, and this attempt at sense-making is itself the true target of phenomenology. Thus “[w]e must therefore not oppose phenomenology to the thought of the event, but rather conjoin them, so that the opening to the phenomenon can be merged with the opening to the unforeseeable.”<sup>18</sup> Dastur, in her characteristic way, thus subtly but fundamentally reorients phenomenology to rupture its own limits, abandoning a descriptive orthodoxy whose function it is to explicate the *a priori* and transcendental features of either consciousness or existence. For Dastur, phenomenology and hermeneutics are synonymous, representing the “reversibility dear to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for whom ‘leaving oneself is returning to oneself and visa versa,’”<sup>19</sup> a reversibility which precisely and paradoxically “makes us capable of welcoming the surprise of the event whose unforeseeable nature takes off from the ground of our anticipations, as if through excess.”<sup>20</sup> Hence an event phenomenology is, too, always the “thinking of the *a posteriori* and of the “after the event,” a re-engagement with the trauma, after its arrival, and an admission that language must be reconfigured and reconceived considering its ontological pre-relation to the excess of event.

Despite the frankly intimidating depth and profundity of her thought, proved in her most recent English translation, *Questions on Phenomenology*, much of this thesis consists in obligating Dastur to her own radicality. As she says in Dominique Janicaud’s Heideggerian historiography,<sup>21</sup> Dastur does not locate herself within, and is thus not infatuated with, the differential oppositions that characterize Heidegger’s reception in post-war France. While many event phenomenologists right themselves parallel to Derrida and Deleuze in recognizing the displacement and decentering of all that Heidegger holds dear in phenomenology, Dastur’s project is altogether different: her thinking pulls the ends fraying in the threads of Heidegger’s thought back to their center, knotting Heidegger where appropriate back into himself. Dastur’s non-litigatory approach produces a more sympathetic Heidegger, but these sympathies lead her occasionally to using her considerable exegetical prowess in service of defending abstractions in Heidegger, such as the ontological difference, that consume the resources of what would otherwise be her novel ontology

of an eventful hermeneutics. It is not that Dastur ‘misses’ Heidegger’s cannibalism, as if a thinker of such insight could or would gloss, in her otherwise exhaustive cartography, valleys of such imminence and potential danger to her project. It seems more appropriate to say that Dastur is too humble; often not recognizing that, though by different lights and pathways, she has herself become a recusant from the Heideggerian altar. Dastur seems to view her event phenomenology, during which she furthest ejects from Heidegger’s schemas, as adjuvant to her whole oeuvre. I rather think that her event phenomenology forms the subsantia of her corpus, both as it reaches its apex in the two revisions (2000 and 2004) of “Phenomenology,” and in its more inchoate form, in her PhD thesis under Ricoeur, *Telling Time*. In the latter, Dastur commands us to a seemingly absurd thought: a differential, but nevertheless hermeneutic, ontology of language. *Telling Time* is a sort of waypoint, incorporating and resisting the influences and exigencies of Derrida, who sat with Ricoeur on her habilitation committee, inveighing as he did against hermeneutics – such that while Dastur attempts only to recover a phenomenological chronology, she ends up recovering language in the direction of its own event.

This thesis then sets for itself a reconstructive and speculative task: to lead Dastur back to this event and to a version of herself that she would, perhaps, not abet. The path is not linear, scarred with bisections and crosswalks, by which I often use other philosophers and their ideas to supplement Dastur in the transit – maybe a regression, in the psychoanalytic sense – of Dastur back to herself. Each diversion, however, serves this purpose: showing the ultimate rectitude of Dastur’s event thought, that we in each instance *return to the event to give meaning to it*. It is perhaps an affliction that I overestimate and enlarge to a statutory status a single phrase in a single work of Dastur, but I am drawn to the voracious faith and promise in this sentence; a stand, almost, that Dastur makes against other event thinkers that hopelessly consign the entire hermeneutic project to decrepitude. Dastur is possessed of a certain energy for, and dexterity for the application of, the human resource of interpretation and meaning – and thereby also an optimism that, *contra* Derrida in his debate with Gadamer, the hermeneuticist is not besotted by his own ambit. It means something that we mean something to ourselves, and this meaning cannot by way of any procedure or method, or any anti-procedure or anti-method, pledge fealty to its own destruction (even in event). Above all, this attempt that only the event can show, a callback to sense from its ramification into non-sense, defines the being that we ourselves are; if anything is ontological, it is that we keep trying to give meaning to ourselves. Event alludes to the call and response in our dialogue with a world in which we find ourselves involuntarily sensible and Dastur cannot ignore the potency of this response. Fashion is to dismiss this call as the transcendental paeon of the *subjectum*, but this dismissal is a blunt instrument substituting for a philosophical scalpel; as one imagines, the prognosis with such dullness is bleak. No doubt a harder task, Dastur invites us to hold hermeneutics to its measure as the investigatory method of an eventful phenomenology. Harder because this task, as we will see in her rebuke of Ludwig Binswanger’s psychoanalysis – one of the errors for which I think a correction is necessary – requires us to mediate between the categorials which in their sharp, unyielding bijection prevent the unperturbed transit between their strata. Event phenomenology must properly exist in the undefined space between the ontological and ontic, the event and advent, identity and difference, which even in their negative presentation in differential ontologies, somehow cease being peripatetic and roost in a place that begets its own justification.

Dastur's syncretic impulse resists this accretion and redounds to the benefit of both sides of the Derrida-Gadamer misunderstanding. To the former, she elevates difference to the level of determinative, showing a primordial language *as* being in its differencing; to the latter, while she involves together the alien and the familiar in understanding through this fundamental differencing, she does not place the subject posterior to, but concurrent with, this event. Such is the "intermediary" ground on which Dastur gains hermeneutics its purchase, in which she demands that a true – that is, historically-mediated – hermeneutics:

must equally include the strangeness arising from the non-negatable temporal distance, without which the thing's alterity and separation that lets it be meaningful for us could not appear to us. Only in the tension between familiarity and strangeness can transmission be achieved as an act of language." <sup>22</sup>

By casting off any purported restriction on a hermeneutic ontogenesis of language, indeed as we will see by questioning the very basis for these restrictions inside the torturous bonds between logic and grammar, Dastur finds a legitimate ontogenesis of language as ontology. She then finds us humans there, at the site of the differencing and primordial split, tarrying in this split as the fulminant infection of being into us. Dastur welcomes with open arms the tremors and disconnections that differential ontology offers, but does not find cause in these disconnections, as Derrida does, <sup>23</sup> to subalternate understanding to them. Understanding is not a *post hoc* contribution by an intentional consciousness to the otherwise empty world of the subject to whom that consciousness is relative; following Ricoeur, she rather invokes the "valid alternative" of the "Gadamerian finitude of a consciousness exposed to the effectiveness of history." <sup>24</sup> As historicity already contains the alter, the Derridean trace or the Foucauldian archaeology, for example, "can privilege discontinuity and ruptures only by literally silencing" the inextricable link between subject and history through tradition. <sup>25</sup> Being and history do not stand on two sides of an impassable discontinuity and nor does proposing their co-gestation inside one another necessitate privileging continuity and totality over discontinuity and incompleteness. Through the *a*-synchronic temporality that Dastur provides, temporality *is* such discontinuity and therefore its dissolution within a subjectival history that depends on alterity is not its repudiation but its triumph.

Dastur's diachronic temporality functions in the final analysis to bring finitude and mortality to sense as the ontological understructure of Heidegger's *Dasein*. To her credit, she unlike Heidegger takes natality and birth seriously, within event thought and without, to truly distribute ontology throughout a human life as breadth. She does not, despite her syncretises, find eventful subjectivity as the phenomenon that implicates and better defines birth and death for ontology. That is our purpose here: to follow Dastur to each critical juncture, at which point we reroute her thought to accord our destination in subjectivity. This work therefore often has a strange quality of reviewing the new; in the sense that a carpenter's apprentice, having completed the master's schematic, shows the master what she herself designed. There is also therefore a structural mirror of showing and concealment, in that the genuine contribution of this thesis, if there is one, is to show a phenomenon that is both concealed from Dastur and revealed as the demand from her own work – the phenomenon of subject as event, that in its unconcealment, reveals the depth of what has been concealed in event thought. It is yet another single phrase that motivated me to pursue this line of thinking. While I had for some time been fascinated with death and subjectivity, writing in my graduate school application that I wanted to "complete"



Heidegger's fundamental ontology with an analysis of ontological subjectivity, I had not, as such, encountered event. The intended direction of this thesis was to question how the pregnant mother, in spontaneously losing her child, questions the totality of death, but a single notion from Dastur deviated the project: the surprise of the "proto-event" of our birth. Dastur is of course correct – birth is always a surprise. But surprises belong to the register of the expectations that they annihilate, so what expectation does birth annihilate? It cannot be nothing, *das Nichts*, for the event of the thing that we are, in its advent, cannot be contraindicated to a mere attributional negativity as Dastur herself informs us. The surprise of birth pertains to coming of its ostensibly final event of death: we exist only such that arrive as death.

### III. What is Hermeneutic Phenomenology?

Despite Claude Romano's professed allegiance to hermeneutics in *Event and World*, the book that catalyzes his "evential hermeneutics," there is a disquieting aridity of the subject in Romano's descriptions of how the event might be interpreted – an aridity that is, perhaps, emblematic for much event thought. For example, in a section of Part 2 of *Event and World* differentiating events as innerworldly facts from events proper, Romano says the following:

Strictly speaking, it is *meaningless* to attempt an explanation of the *very origin of meaning* for the human adventure. An illness, for instance, as an innerworldly fact, has epidemiological and genetic causes, whose interlocked sequence could be traced back, at least ideally. But the *event* of an illness, as it happens unsubstitutably to an *advenenant* by reconfiguring his essential possibilities, his world, and by bringing him to *understand himself* differently, is rigorously *without a why*, and *happens "because it happens."* It is itself its own *origin*.<sup>26</sup>

There is in Romano's impersonal attestation to event a subjectivity who, rather than being investigated, put to question, is instead forsaken. This subjectivity itself is not, by its posture to the event, utterly passive, tremulous, but persistently meaning making: it is the very attempt that Romano says is meaningless that is not only the most real ontological facet of humanity, but the basis for hermeneutics besides. In an ostensibly hermeneutic analysis of the event is it not curious that the one who "accomplishes" this relation to being, to borrow Heidegger's term from the "Letter on Humanism,"<sup>27</sup> is discarded by Romano as itself the origin for this meaning of the event? What else other than the event of interpretation would be the significance that Romano notes in illness, that Nancy notes in surprise? To whom else other than us, in our deictic innerworldly ways, would the event *event*?

As Dastur rightly guides us, the event does not derive, does not come from us, but happens to us, and in fact cannot happen without us, which it to say, event depends on an endogenous collusion with our own history *as the very origin of its meaning*. Of what significance would any given event be without history, and indeed, would we even call this 'thing' event without our copulation with our own history which Heidegger and Gadamer both capture with the fulness of the term historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*)? Romano can only ask the question by cryptically maintaining as a possibility for event that which his evential hermeneutics ought to disunite: the metaphysical conceptuality of origin. The attempt is meaningless not because no assignable origin exists, but rather because meaning is circumambulatory, always up for grabs, in the mix, as it were, with this ambulation constantly establishing and re-establishing the totality of meaning in the event of every word as the very origin of language in Gadamer:

But there is another dialectic to the word, which accords to every word an inner dimension of multiplication: every word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus, every word, as *the event of a moment*, carries with it the unsaid, to which it is related by responding and summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, rather, the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to express it totally. All human speaking is finite in such a way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to be explicated and laid out. That is why the hermeneutical phenomenon also can be illuminated only in light of the fundamental finitude of being.<sup>28</sup>

Meaning is exactly not ek-static, as Heidegger believes, because, for Gadamer, there is nowhere to stand outside of interpretation, history, or the history of interpretation, because in their radically finite intercrossing with literally *each other* they expose the functional infinity of meaning bred by this scission. What Gadamer finds thus even in the purported auto-constitution (*Urkonstitution*), what Dastur in *Telling Time* calls the “very mode in which the originary exists as affectivity,”<sup>29</sup> is that the *hupokeimenon* at which Husserl and Heidegger are differently though similarly grasping is already rooted inside existence, inextricably, because existence itself is already rooted inside the history and tradition that produces for existence’s ontological register – human meaning.

One might note therefore a structural identity between the reduction in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and much event phenomenology – the phenomenological regression mentioned in the prior section. In the (in)famous 1927 *Encyclopedia Britannica* article collaboration that doomed Husserl’s and Heidegger’s professional relationship, there is a point in which Husserl notes of the “transcendental bracketing”: “When I do it for myself, I am therefore not a human-I, although I lose nothing of the essential content of my pure soul (that is, of the pure psychological).”<sup>30</sup> Heidegger makes two instructive ripostes, first noting that this “human-I,” rather than being a handicap to eidetic purity, is instead the human “exactly in its truest ‘wondrous’ possibility of existing”; and second, he asks of Husserl “Why not? Is this activity [i.e., the phenomenological reduction] not a possibility of the human being ...?”<sup>31</sup> To reappropriate Alon Segev’s comment about the reduction, event ontology, “as radical as it may be, should not leave aside the one...through whom one is supposed to attain the meaning of being.”<sup>32</sup> Hence why Heidegger thought that the reduction trammels being and thus why Heidegger in the “Letter on Humanism” is fastidious in separating “accomplishment” away from its use in describing merely practical and causal relations – as a term that describes the effect or set of effects derived from some *praxia* or *poiésis*, as a mere determination of action – and instead uses accomplishment to describe unfurling something into the “fulness of its essence.”<sup>33</sup> In other words, accomplishing for Heidegger is not an instrument, or method, not therefore a reduction, but is rather a revealing or self-showing, an expanding that brings something fully into what it really is, its *ipseity*. For Gadamer, this is the function of truth, ἀλήθεια, not as the formal correspondence between a judgement and a judicative situation, but of the interplay in the tension between revealment and concealment. Put otherwise, hermeneutic thinking in Heidegger’s hermeneutic of facticity is not a psycho-cognitive act that could, in any instance of a particular event, be so distantiated from the event that it would not show as the origin of the event’s meaning; thinking “is” the concerning and unfurling that brings men into their relation with being – and thus “thinking purely,” as it belongs to being, is that which, “defines every *condition et situation humane*.”<sup>34</sup> But this is not to say, however, that “pure thinking” is, in itself, the specific “bringing of” being to the essence of

man – for this proffering of being through thinking exists only insofar as thinking brings being to be expressed *in* language. Thus, it is not thinking itself which allows men to accomplish their nature, but rather, it is that thinking, in its belongingness to being, brings being to a type of dwelling in which men exist and by which they are constituted: “Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes to language: Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells.”<sup>35</sup>

The problem for event phenomenology, then, is language. Not language conceived as a logical set of procedures or rules that dictate the position and purpose of lexical and syntactical entities, but rather language as the game of understanding in which we are all unavoidably and ineluctably involved as part of what we are. Language, as Gadamer says, that has the “real function of mutual understanding...[language that] is absorbed into making what is said visible, and has itself disappeared, as it were.”<sup>36</sup> Language in this sense is a problem, for Husserl’s reduction, as perhaps it is for Romano’s eventual hermeneutics, because neither systematically elucidates the concatenation between subjectivity, language, and for the former the reduction, and for the latter event; leaving language denuded of its generative and evocative power in the constitutive operation, for Husserl, and the determination of the essence of event, for Romano. And in these gaps arise aporias. On the one hand, essences and events are meant, for Husserl and Romano, respectively, to be purely eidetic and therefore unreal content, denuded of theoretical conceptualities and empirical determinations, and thus in their ideality proof for the evidentiary nature of the reductive operation or the meaninglessness of attempting to interpret the event’s origin – and in each, therefore, evincing the apodicticity of a transcendental ontological entity, with essences and event being the evidence-thing corresponding to this evidential procedure. On the other hand, both essences and events are presented in and through language, even when such essences and events are not, or not primarily, phenomena of language, and presented this way on the basis of language, must be posterior to it. In other words, the operations that ostensibly constitute the fundamentally irreducible condition of possibility, the transcendental reduction or the event’s very arrival, depend on something internal to it, language, with its association to social and historical exigency, which itself never shows in the breach of these constitutive operations though it precedes them. I take Gadamer to precisely make this point in noting the circumscriptive nature of transcendental phenomenology:

Even a perfected phenomenological knowledge of all essences might not be able to reach the actuality of what is actual, the actuality of thinking consciousness, as well as the experience of actuality...The dilemma was that factual Dasein could be illuminated by phenomenological research only as an *eidōs*, an essence. In its uniqueness, finitude, and historicity, however, human Dasein would preferably not be recognized as an *eidōs* but rather itself as the most real factor of all. In this aporia, Husserl and phenomenological investigation in general was to encounter its own limit, finitude, and historicity.<sup>37</sup>

We are mistaken to regard application as a practice in which a determinate particular is subsumed under an equally determinate universal. Universals only come into being as such in the process of being instantiated in, or applied to, particular contexts. This is the meaning of Gadamer’s thesis that understanding and application, as well as interpretation, must be regarded as “comprising one unified process,” which he identifies with event: “Understanding too cannot be grasped as a simple activity of the consciousness that understands, but is itself a mode of the event of being.”<sup>38</sup> Gadamer spoke of the interpreter “belonging” to the interpreted object in the sense that one stands to a text, a moral case, or what have you, not as a subject to an object, but in a far more

intimate relation. For Gadamer, then, language is ultimately the expression of a specific social and historical context of understanding, and this understanding comes pre-loaded with existence beliefs as the very grammar by which it executes. Thus, the supposedly denuded pure essences and events are, too, polluted with these existence beliefs (among many other annoyances to the intended epistemically hygienic *eidos*). Hence Gadamer's consistent point that history, finitude, and sociality are bound up to language: unless we suggest that, in employing essences or talk of an event, we are reducing language to non-referential private language that means something only within the context of these philosophies, we must instead admit that the purported radicality of the transcendental reduction or the event presupposes historically and socially mediated language and thus miscarries at the last instance.

The only plausible course of action is admitting that the object-thing whose essence we determine through free variation, or whose event we cannot interpret is, in fact, always already socio-historically mediated – given over by a tradition of language, “not only the language of speakers, but the language of the dialogue that things carry on with us,” in Gadamer's words.<sup>39</sup> To render either concept plausible, we are forced to surreptitiously import material from the outside, from the ‘it’ of the world designated as the residue leftover from the reductive operation, or obliterated and reconfigured by the event, but never acknowledge this importation because it cannot, by definition, show in the attitude of either phenomenological vintage. In the case of human science research, this transcendental Trojan horse produces deep contradictions because I think, for example, nothing like “essence” is meant when a nurse wants to research the anticipation of death in palliative care; and nothing like “event” is meant even when the average person is moved by the gravity of its significance. The “essence” of anticipation does not need to be put in abeyance, nor do the particularity and instancy of facts need be stratified as merely ontic, because the language games that we use to describe each cannot be divorced from a social context that already makes use of, and presupposes, technical language, scientific concepts, and existence beliefs. Now, here I must admit that, to combat this tendency, Husserl in his later works posits the *Lebenswelt*, or life-world, posing this life world's indubitability, claiming in the *Crisis* that:

Phenomenological idealism does not deny the factual [*wirklich*] existence of the real [real]world (and in the first instance nature) as if it deemed it an illusion... Its only task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense [Sinn] of this world, just that sense in which we all regard it as really existing and as really valid. That the world exists... is quite indubitable. Another matter is to understand this indubitability which is the basis for life and science and clarify the basis for its claim'.<sup>40</sup>

Even this ignores the centrality of language to the problem, however. Notice the end of Husserl's statement: the point is to determine the *Sinn*, or sense of this world as meaning. How is that meaning determined? Through the reduction and epoche. Where do the reduction and epoche lead us? Inevitably back to a transcendently pure consciousness. The matter is not whether the world exists, contingently, out there, but whether this contingency itself becomes part of the reflective operation through language. For Husserl, it cannot and must not – this contingency is intrinsically inferior to the *a priori* conditions of this world's existence, its unifying force of meaning, which is the institution of a transcendental consciousness. The point is that the world is not a final obstacle to overcome in the pursuit of eidetic finality or an “eventual hermeneutics”; there is no terminal, absolute transcendental truth to be rung from freely varying its empirical presentations. Nor is this world's interpretation a secondary relation in the interstice between the primary relationship of a transcendental subject and the multiplicity of things that appear,

immanently, in this subject's perceptive field. The world in all its empirical messiness and our interpretations thereof are irreducibly real factors, they themselves are ontological because the world does not happen "behind the back" of language," as Gadamer says, the world happens within language. In other words, we meet language at the brink of finitude, so to speak, where both we and language are given over within a finite horizon of time, that is, history, and the fusion of these horizons is co-determinative. We cannot arbitrarily deploy words as merely alembic, syntactical instruments, because words appear to us already beholden to a hermeneutical situation that includes history and tradition.

For this reason, hermeneutics and a hermeneutically-oriented phenomenology is first and foremost an abandonment of method – or if that claim is too strong, method understood as a totalizing science of some subject or the ground of all subjects. Hermeneutics is not a prescriptive set of steps or instructions that are presumed to lead the researcher to a place of verticality whose veracity is in turn judged by that very method's internal criteria. Hermeneutics also does not consist in an abstention from interpretation and does not relegate itself or even aim to produce research that is merely or mostly descriptive. That a phenomenological researcher could engage in mere description requires the researcher to assume a distanced stance from the world and language's co-habitation that is in principle, and in practice, impossible. Merleau-Ponty tells us that the given thing appears to us:

'in person,' or 'flesh and blood,'" and hence "the thing accomplishes this miracle of expression: an interior that is revealed on the outside, a signification that descends into the world and begins to exist there and that can only be fully understood by attempting to see it there, in its place."<sup>41</sup>

Expression – and therefore speech; and therefore, writing – always occurs within the acquisitional and sedimentary dimension of institution, such that Merleau-Ponty, aligning with Gadamer, claims that "it is the sentence that gives each word its sense."<sup>42</sup> When we begin to write, our formulation of the question or ingress to the phenomenon of interest is shot through with interpretation as the very thing that enables us cautiously to make our approach to sense – such that taking a stance 'outside interpretation,' or even making that one's goal, is to presume that we can step outside the context that makes speaking or writing about the shared instance possible. To say that any language is merely descriptive is to say that we can, somehow, step outside language, because interpretation is not a cognitive device grafted on to the pure descriptive content of experience: interpretation is experience. Once we even attempt to remove interpretation from experience, we are attempting to remove experience from itself – leaving ourselves with nothing else than the very brute 'facts' of empirical science that phenomenology is crafted to overcome. Instead, we must recognize that 'things' and 'us' are not extant within or to themselves – and indeed, that they are perhaps not 'extant' at all, they are instead eventful, as the *events of interpretation*. Part of the craftsmanship associated with hermeneutics is reconfiguring one's ontological gaze to accept, or posit, that things percolating on the horizons of one's analysis strictly speaking *are not*; for positing that they are, in turn, expresses the metaphysics of presence, the admittance of static and unalterable being. Hermeneutics neither posits an *is* nor an *is not*, but instead responds to that or those which is or are happening, as event, at which point event becomes the motif, motive, and mode of hermeneutics simultaneously. Admitting for the sanctity and appropriateness of this interpretation is, in other words, hermeneutic phenomenology.

This latter, more hermeneutic tradition of phenomenology is the vintage that I first encountered, embodied in the Dutch or Utrecht School of Phenomenology. Like much in phenomenology's historiography, the word 'school' in Utrecht School operates like a cosmological object with an observational frame of reference inversely proportional to one's proximity: discrete if amorphous from a distance, but from a sufficiently close frame of reference the details resolve into such granularity that they can hardly be said to exist. Thus, the Utrecht School of Phenomenology is not a school, in the sense of body of knowledge adherent to a set of organizational schema or pedagogical and epistemic principles, but rather a school in the sense of a set of practices – a kind of *praxis*. Practice here is used with Gadamer's resonance, which we will later see consists in deliquescing the boundaries between *πρᾶξις* (*praxis*) and *θεωρία* (*theoria*) to allow the former to propagate within the latter:

Is theory in the end a *πρᾶξις* as is already suggested by Aristotle, or is precisely *πρᾶξις*, when one means genuine human *πρᾶξις*, always at the same time theory? Is it not, when it is human, a looking away from itself and an attending and listening to the other? In this sense, life is the unity of theory and practice, which is the possibility and task of each human being, seeing beyond oneself (*Abeshen von sich*) to what is (*Hinsehen auf das, was ist*).<sup>43</sup>

*πρᾶξις* is already carved into *θεωρία*, its ineffaceable etching, during which the “modern opposition between theory and practice” that Gadamer finds “rather odd”<sup>44</sup> is dissolved in confrontation with this opposition's absence in concrete existence. The Utrecht School scholars, particularly Frederik Buytendijk, Johannes van de Berg, and Martinus Langeveld sought to establish an approach to phenomenology which does not attempt to overcome, but in fact incorporates, its anthropological limitations; finding it itself always back in time, or back in *a* time, to which that insight or instance belongs. Hardly heretical, the Utrecht School, in conducting concrete examinations of lived-in phenomena, in all their mundanity and quotidian style, conduct what Heidegger was attempting in the *Zolikonar Seminare*: a phenomenology *as πρᾶξις*, what Dastur relays as “training doctors in “phenomenological seeing,” which for Heidegger means *beim Selben verweilen*, lingering with the same, the self, and *den Sinn für das Einfache wecken*, awakening the sense for what is simple.”<sup>45</sup> Dastur says of Heidegger that “[h]is whole art is in his practice,”<sup>46</sup> because phenomenology is a relation that is performed for Dastur; a kind of *technē*, what Gadamer calls “knowing one's way around,” in which, say, the pediatrician Nicholas Beets may abstain from a expatiating on Husserl's establishment of mereology in the Third Investigation in the *Logical Investigations*, but uses phenomenology to ascertain the *meaning* of an illness for his patients.

In the late-1980s to mid-1990s, under the charge of Dutch export Max van Manen, the education department at the University of Alberta became the site for a phenomenological renewal in this direction of the Utrecht School. Under the supervision of Vangie Bergum, a nurse and researcher who was one of van Manen's first graduate students, my mother completed her nursing dissertation, *The Lived Experience of Older First Time Birth Mothers*. I learned phenomenology in the context and capacity of a resistance to quantitative research, to stifling coda and transcription protocols, to formulating prescriptive steps that might snuff out the multivocal challenge of the research participant. So, until perhaps the fourth year of my undergraduate studies, I was, if not unaware, then at least uninterested in, the strict philosophical existence of phenomenology beyond its distribution within qualitative research programs. As I conducted my own phenomenological research, I continued to gain purchase on a

phenomenology that abjures the absolute, does not have a place for a transcendental ego, does not provide a treatment of philosophical method (*Methodenlehre*) except indirectly, and does not work toward a final foundation (*Letztbegrundung*). I found in the Utrecht School a steadfast ambivalence towards adhering to what would be considered specifically phenomenological rigor in the strictest philosophical sense. These scholars object to the reductivist view of phenomenology as a sharp and narrow typological orthodoxy, choosing instead to frame phenomenology as a practical and reflective method – one endowed with the generative power of evocation derived from its capacity to produce compelling, insightful, textual portrayals of concrete human phenomena. The concern, here, is tilted towards the seemingly mundane and banal trivialities of everyday life, over and above philosophical questions concerning indubitable knowledge or the conditions of possibility of phenomenological understanding.

As I later discovered what one might consider properly philosophical phenomenology, I was perplexed by its inherent paradox: it is an insurgent form of skepticism, militantly denying the scientific pre-conceptualization of, say, time, and yet it accedes in almost every variation to a certain historical ideology of rigor. Indeed, perhaps this auto-ethnography does not conform to the contours of philosophical rigor, involving as it does subject-historical associations contaminated by an historical mind. And yet, the method through which I came into intellectual fitness, that of critical sociology, would ask: why is rigor valuable? Who does it serve? In the context of phenomenology and ontology, by now metonyms, from what does rigor exclude us in our phenomenological investigations? Phenomenology, even in its hermeneutic and existential species, often cannot think through the place of history and society in its investigations. More importantly, that this defect is recessed in phenomenology as phenomenology is already contaminated by its historical origins; it arrives from somewhere unclean, handled, subject to the pesky influences of history both personal and world-historical, and thus infected by them.

Phenomenology's allergy to an historical analysis is, I think, at the center of its failure to bring eventful subjectivity into the light of phenomenological inquiry. For decades, qualitative researchers using phenomenology as their method have produced thousands of studies – of course, of varying quality – on subjectivity's unannounced rupture of what event phenomenology takes to be a teleological carriage, birth. Rigor is examining these studies, situating them, if critique is required, critiquing them, but rigor is not pretending that the 'regional ontology' of sociology is so sufficiently beneath a true ontology that its pertinent results can be ignored. Phenomenological sectarianism has in no sense cooled, however. Scholars familiar with the sectorial battle between van Manen, Jonathan Smith, and Dan Zehavi know this.<sup>47</sup> Over at eight, increasingly caustic articles in *Qualitative Health Research*, *Nursing Philosophy*, and the *International Journal of Nursing Studies*, this triad engage in disciplinary brinkmanship that leads in the final breath to a set of discourses passing one another in the wind: a set of lines asymptotic to one another but each convinced that its parabola emanates and returns to the genesis in the reliquary of an original phenomenology. Lost in their partisan bickering between what in the last word phenomenology comes to be, is that phenomenology itself denies developing a finally adequate, oracular, and disciplinary language of procedure that irons out the inconsistencies inhering to human experience. Any set of languages, behaviors, or sociobiological markers that we may conceive of as expressing a fundamentally terminal, fundamentally common human nature are already mediated, and phenomenology is not exempt from such mediation. Phenomenology, especially event phenomenology, cannot design policies and practices that attempt to silence this mediation;

rather, event phenomenology must give expression to the everyday experience that is fully present, fully immediate, and inescapable; and it must demand an understanding of how the experience is brought, with all its messiness and perplexity, to and through the inquirer. It must complete a hermeneutic return.

#### IV. Organization of Chapters

The thesis indicated in this project will complete the path started by Dastur, to effectuate the hermeneutic return in phenomenology of the event. Its central target will be an eventful subjectivity, what I will argue is a singular phenomenon because of its interruption and integration of all the modalities acknowledged as foundations for event – birth, death, and surprise. Subjectivity is the factual experience, the advent, which is isomorphic with its event, and thus problematizes the history of event phenomenology and demands a reconfiguration in ontology; what Dastur will later say of hermeneutic phenomenology, what strikes at the gap between epistemology and ontology. But, for this target to be reached properly, we must not view differing contributions to phenomenology as opposites, or even apposite, but as already internal to one other. To begin, I focus the first two chapters on the construction of temporality and time. I will demonstrate in chapter one how Dastur's efforts to find a phenomenological chronology in the late Heidegger eventually create a version of Heidegger immersed in difference. Positioning a version of Heidegger as a philosopher of difference potentially solves for the problem of circularity in phenomenological writing – circularity of the immanent objects of consciousness, for Husserl, and circularity of the concept of eventfulness, for phenomenologies of the event. The first chapter in addition elaborates how Heidegger's inauguration of the event problem in *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* determines the structure of event thinking in Marion, Romano, Raffoul, and Nancy. I will argue, there, that phenomenologies of the event want to adopt the product of Heidegger's existential analysis, an ontology of eventfulness, without following its process, a rigorous hermeneutic phenomenology. The second chapter attempts to reconcile the impossibility that a transcendental schema poses to novelty, as necessary and prior to any erupting of novelty. In what is, perhaps, the most forceful of our attempts to reorient Dastur to her own path, I suggest in the second chapter that Heidegger's ontological difference and his ecstatic temporality, despite his disavowals and complications of both starting in the 1930s, consistently determine his philosophy. Heidegger's vaunted *Kehre* obscures a transcendental throughput that connects his epochal breakthroughs, *Dasein* and *Ereignis*, in a way that closes him off to event – and through a mereology that, in the last chapter, will be shown as the infrastructure for phenomenological thought. In that chapter, I will argue that it cannot be the case that the ontological difference and event can co-exist if the event is thought as the event of difference in being. The former would reduce the latter to a gathering, rather than a differencing, which would in return renounce differencing as the impulse of ontology and once again gesticulate to an identity that precedes difference. To resist Heidegger's transcendental motions, I counter in the second chapter by proposing to renew historicity (*Geschichte*) through interrelating Dastur and Gadamer. The upshot of this strategy is denying the difference that Heidegger finds between the ontic and ontological and showing this difference as being mediated by eventful hermeneutics. Proposing such a mediation allows us a philosophical justification and procedure by which we can fully bring the event and advent of subjectivity into a determinate relation.



Midway, the focus of this work shifts from time or, at least, from time explicitly, to the kind of thing for whom time and therefore event happen. In the third chapter, I situate the event problem in phenomenology as one where ontology is privileged over phenomenology, resulting in event phenomenologies in which one of phenomenology's primary modes, uncovering what something is like for us, is obscured at the cost of theorizing.<sup>48</sup> The third chapter proposes to discover the subject of what Merleau-Ponty has called ontological psychoanalysis – which is in essence a psychoanalysis of limits. In this chapter, I attempt to think through the relation between *psychē* and *logos* in event, specifically emphasizing how subjectivity is itself structured to create the interior delimitation between language and phenomenology noted above. That is, any given thing exceeds only in relation to the limit it transgresses; to the extent that event *is* excess, the event must, then, exceed some limit in relation to the subject and its concatenation to the linguistic and phenomenological registers. From this view, event would appear subjectively limited and thus impossible; hence, the turn to an ontological psychoanalysis. From the psychoanalytic posture, the *psychē* is always more than that which ostensibly contains it (the subject) – and is thus already eventful, but must be exposed to that which is otherwise by some ontologically salient mechanic. Because many phenomenologists have followed Heidegger's adversarial turn to psychoanalysis, the third chapter is a mediatory work in which I propose *logos*, through Heidegger's concept of *Austrag*, as this mechanism. In it, I attempt to show that Heidegger – and following, Dastur – misunderstand the value in Ludwig Binswanger's *Daseinanalyse*, which in its anthropological rejection of the ontological difference, though it is a mistake on Binswanger's part, provides the mediation between ontological and ontic that event commands. To provide a sensible architecture for an *psychē* that phenomenology cannot, but must access, I link the young Foucault with the late Merleau-Ponty to show what underlines the subject is an ontological anthropology, which has for its most appropriate implement psychoanalysis. To conclude the chapter, I turn to Jean-Luc Nancy's conception of arch-spatiality in event to show the space of the *psychē*.

The final chapter returns to Dastur in attempt to link her thanatology, especially as shown in *Death: An Essay on Finitude* and her event thought, showing how each one is constitutive for the other. This chapter therefore culminates our reconciliatory project of tying Dastur back to the conclusions that her premises demand. I find in this chapter that the lucidity of Dastur's writings on natality and death compel us to posit event as their mediation, and in turn, the most appropriate accomplishment for a phenomenology of the event. Counter to Dastur, but interior to her own demands, death is presented there as the *event exemplar*, an event whose advent and event converge, which in this convergence questions the distinction that event phenomenologists maintain between the two terms. The chapter begins by situating the problem of death, analyzed within the context of Heidegger's offhand reveal of his Husserlian mereology. Differencing by nature – if it makes sense to speak of differencing as having a nature, but such is the limits of language – cannot submit to mereology, being a science of whole part relations, because it subverts the entire program. Composition in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* serves the master of totality, which in its infinity and absoluteness forecloses the variance and alterity of event. The event is, as such, otherwise, and cannot reduce to another attribute of an ontologically prior whole; it is rather the differencing on which the cognitive appearance of wholes rest. Death as an absolute singularity therefore cannot be thought through mereology or through the Third Investigation, which Dastur takes as sheltering, rather than condemning phenomenology of death.

Death then appears in this analysis as betraying the entire philosophical behaviour that maintains separations between parts and wholes, ontic and ontological, and event and advent. Death is the phenomenon that allows us to meet Zarader's challenge and bring the ontology of event back to phenomenology. In its ontological singularity – the ontic space in which the most significant ontological events, the beginning and the end, combine – the event of death forces a reorientation of phenomenology to a sort of cosmology of finitude.

## V. Questions

Throughout these chapters, I hope to answer four paramount questions:

### 1. *Can phenomenology countenance the event?*

As I indicate earlier in this proposal, event phenomenology proceeds first by developing an essential taxonomy of eventfulness, which reveals a set of happenings which are of the genus *events*; and underneath, or within these events, the structure of eventfulness itself as both the mode of appearance for phenomenon (phenomenality) and being itself. What event phenomenologies do not develop, however, is a phylogenetic history between these taxa, and in this failure also cannot complete the return trip, so to speak, back to the phenomenon. While Dastur provides us a path for this return in the mode of a phenomenological temporality and the event of difference, she does not elucidate on why events do not collapse into a single act of eventfulness. It is a task for this thesis to elaborate on the individuation and particularization of events, and consider the potential for reciprocal travel between them, to determine whether phenomenology can countenance the event.

### 2. *What is the relationship between time and being in event?*

On a procedural basis, this question constitutes much of the bandwidth in event thought. As noted above, Raffoul and Dastur both consider event the structural discontinuity of time; Nancy considers event to be time itself, in a very real way. The issue that presents event phenomenology, however, is that such pronouncements largely ignore the important implication that time has for hermeneutics – which is to say, what time *means* for us. Something crucial occurs to subjectivity in its dispersion within the moment, and event phenomenology must systematize our retention to this subjectivity's access even in the fundamental discontinuity of time.

### 3. *Who experiences an event?*

While Dastur comes closest to a diegesis of eventful subjectivity in her analysis of psychosis, it is nevertheless unclear who, exactly, experiences events. What remains especially underdeveloped in all event phenomenologies is the self-recognitive aspect of surprise: prior to even being surprised I must first recognize myself as *the one to whom surprise accrues*. Indeed, it is only on this basis that the *a posteriori* of eventfulness that Dastur demands can occur. The event thus implicates the very nature of subjectivity, in the sense of a structural openness to eventfulness. Heidegger concatenates being and human in *Ereignis*, but flattens them both in this act. Without reverting to tautology, a robust phenomenology of the event must explicate how event and human co-determine one another while remaining separate.

#### 4. *Why and how is death the event exemplar?*

Heidegger famously speaks of a “forgetfulness of being.” Indeed, the purpose of the *Seinsfrage* is to unconceal being from its forgetting. Yet, in the works of Heidegger – and Romano, Marion, Nancy – we find *Dasein*, the human, *already there*, already fully formed. There is little acknowledgement in the traditional phenomenological canon for ontogenicity, for the process by which whatever is named by the term *Dasein* grows. This forgetfulness then contaminates Dastur’s thanatology, pushing her to see death as not *the* event, but a non-event because it eradicates the subject to whom event redounds. If being is a legitimate topic of phenomenological discourse, and if we must honour that the human being is at minimum a vector for this being and *emergent*, then we must, too, acknowledge that this emergence is complicated by its non-emergence – that, in death, being and non-being are impossibly though constitutively bound.

## Chapter I – Dastur's Heidegger

### I. Introduction

Can phenomenology countenance the event? In her primary event work, “Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise,” Francois Dastur begins by questioning philosophy’s essentialist impetuses, stating: “Can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event if it is still traditionally defined, as it has been since Plato, as a thinking of the invariability and generality of essences?”<sup>1</sup> The transcendental residue imbruing even radical attempts at reconstructing phenomenology must defeat the (warranted) assumption that its sense-making reduces abnormality to normality and non-sense to sense – thus ameliorating the event of its foundational novelty.<sup>2</sup> And so, the question is whether phenomenology can buttress itself against the event’s unpredictability while not in the same gesture reducing this incoherence to the sterility of an essence. That is, can phenomenology cope with the violent incursion of the new world that opens up through the event’s happening? For Dastur, meeting the event’s surge does not consist in casting the thought of being or essence, *ala* Levinas and Derrida, to a strict separateness or alterity in opposition to Heidegger. Dastur attempts to show instead that, through Heidegger’s *Ereignis*, phenomenology integrates difference into its structure, creating an eventful schismogenesis that is its “most appropriate accomplishment.”<sup>3</sup>

Dastur’s rehab of Heidegger’s *Ereignis* and thus its various modes of presentation wildly varies from the traditional interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, however. While most event phenomenologists acknowledge that Heidegger inaugurates this thinking of eventfulness, the chronology and mechanisms within and by which Heidegger is open to eventfulness differ. Some thinkers, such as Romano, close Heidegger off to the event until his explicit writings on *Ereignis* in the 1930s, while others, such as Raffoul, recognize (at least the elements of) eventfulness in Heidegger as early as the 1920s. What typically differentiates these scholars in their approach to Heidegger is, ironically, differentiation – or what Heidegger will in *Identity and Difference* call differencing itself. There arises immediately in any analysis of Heideggerian difference, however, a trouble: the charge that Heidegger pushes surreptitiously toward a unity of substance at the ontological origin, thus foreclosing his discovery of the event to its own condition. On this account, the transcendental and ekstastic temporality of *Dasein* ultimately forecloses the invariability of the event to itself – that the ontological difference ultimately papers over a unity of time and language at the origin of being. Though I will in later chapters propose a modified version of this critique, in this chapter I suggest that Dastur, primarily in *Telling Time*, rescues phenomenological chronology from, and through, Heidegger. To do so, I will trace Dastur’s event phenomenology from the Heidegger of *Being and Time* onward, noting how at each point in Heidegger’s development Dastur establishes a foundation of difference preceding identity in his work. The purpose of this procedure is explicating a phenomenology capable of capturing the event.

The form of a phenomenology equal to this accomplishment must gain access to the production of time on which Dastur focuses *Telling Time*. The first paragraph of Dastur’s “Phenomenology” validates the centrality of time to this phenomenological recomposition, specifically in time’s contingency – or what Dastur labels the “dehiscence of time,” the event’s most fundamental discontinuity, in which the event invades the isochrony of time to literally “pro-

duce” its “different parts as dis-located.”<sup>4</sup> The event, for Dastur, interrupts into the “usual representation of time as flow,”<sup>5</sup> striking time at the jointure between past and future and, in its suddenness, scattering the present into a new and unprecedented configuration. A phenomenology capable of phenomenizing the event will therefore not only make way for this devastation, but be at home in it, autochthonous to it, such that the divergence of the event’s diachrony is never brought to heel. Hence, Dastur states that “Such a philosophy [the “true philosophy”] should be able to explain the discontinuity of time, or what we could name the structural eventuality of time.”<sup>6</sup> I note, here, the importance of the French *éventualité* in Dastur’s phrase, the “structural eventuality of time.” The English translation is insipid, losing its vitality as both ‘a possible outcome’ and the literal out-coming of that outcome: as the happening of an event as eventuality or the ipseity of being as event – its eventfulness. A phenomenology of the event *is*, therefore, a phenomenology that phenomenizes the disruption of time in eventfulness as the simultaneous establishment of a new temporal field. I will want to show that Dastur establishes a new logic of temporality, manifest in the event of language as difference as such – and this difference is precisely what articulates the dehiscence of time. Phenomenology can thus absorb the pro-duction of temporality in the syncopated beat of being because Dastur provides its fundamental features: two key concepts discussed below, *Austrag* and *Unter-schied*, which in their eventuation as the difference of time, are the “flash of lightning which at once unites and disjoins world and thought...that gathering [that] is at the same time separation.”<sup>7</sup>

## II. Tallying Heidegger on the way to Telling Time

Dastur does not describe her works this way, but I read *Telling Time* as a propaedeutic to her later works on event phenomenology, in particular “Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise,” precisely because the former provides the infrastructure for a phenomenology of difference. A phenomenology conducive to the event is fully formed in Dastur’s “Phenomenology,” but it did not arrive in that condition. Dastur prepares phenomenology, her phenomenology, in the staging place of *Telling Time* – where she works around and through Heidegger’s experimental formulations from the mid-1920s onward on the primacy of *Ereignis*. Dastur’s stated intention in *Telling Time* is finishing the “phenomenological chrono-logy” implicit in Heidegger’s work in the 1920s, which serves in addition as the formal logic of temporal phenomenality.<sup>8</sup> An unintended consequence of this preparation is that *Telling Time* is, too, the animating core for a phenomenology of the event, one open to differencing, and thus its philosophical catalyst. To understand Dastur’s achievement, it is therefore first necessary to examine her relationship to Heidegger and Heidegger’s relationship to grammar, logic, and metaphysics.

Dastur prepares the way for the event in the “Logic and Metaphysics” chapter of *Telling Time*, mapping how the Heidegger of the 1920s disintegrates the logistic tautology of “predicative-determinant articulation”<sup>9</sup> According to Dastur’s reading of Heidegger, the logico-grammatical obsession of Western metaphysics relentlessly compresses the being of language into the “merely pre-sent subject” of logic. The obsessive preoccupation with a vulgar form of presence thus veils being’s duplicative presentation in the ontological difference – that the One is split into the Many – and posits the predicate as being’s disclosive function.<sup>10</sup> Western metaphysics, through the incestuous relationship between logic and grammar, thus denies the being of being, allowing it only to emerge within being’s verbal predication. Thus, the apophantic statement, the validator

infrastructure for truth in what Dastur calls the “logician interpretation of the being of language,”<sup>11</sup> gains an illusory independence as the nomothetic semantic structure that expresses the logical correspondence between predicate and subject – this is to say, the correspondence between identity (the One) anterior to difference (the Many). Regional ontologies, and the theories of language of which they are the progenitor, thus follow the disjunctive impulse of Aristotle’s *logos aporphantiko* and separate the operative terms of assertion, the subject and its predicate, thereby transforming λόγος into a formalistic *Aussagenlogik* (the “logic of assertion,” propositional logic).<sup>12</sup> In a dual maneuver, both theories of language and Western ontology first insert this complex underneath ontology as such, then use the philosophical hegemony conferred by this insertion to assert the uncovering – or perhaps better, dis-discovery – of the logical architecture that the regional ontologies themselves situate there. Hence Heidegger’s claim that logic is exiguous in Western metaphysics: he asserts that it is “founded on an ontology of the pre-sent being,”<sup>13</sup> one that not only demands a second-order disruption between the hermeneutic event and the declarative, propositional form which it births but additionally views this parturition as evidentiary.<sup>14</sup> Against this, and what Heidegger later deems the “technological-scientific [*technisch-szientistische*] conception”<sup>15</sup> of language in contemporaneous language theory, Heidegger by the 1930s is now and instead interested in an anamnesis that recovers language itself in the direction of ontological primordially<sup>16</sup> – in the direction of the verbal root of λόγος, λέγω, specifically as its infinitive, λέγειν, in its dual sense as ‘I say,’ and as ‘I collect, arrange, order.’<sup>17</sup> Though fully developed in *Introduction to Metaphysics*,<sup>18</sup> *Contributions to a Philosophy (of the Event)*,<sup>19</sup> and their preparatory antecedents, as early as *Being and Time* Heidegger gestures to this hidden sense of λόγος, noting in descriptions of logos and phenomenology that “λόγος as discourse really means δηλοῦν: to make manifest “what is being talked about” in discourse”<sup>20</sup> and that “[the] “being-true” of the λόγος as ἀλήθεύειν (*alithévein*) means that in λέγειν (*légein*) the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (*alithés, ἀληθές*).”<sup>21</sup>

Notice that while Heidegger will in the final sections of Division One of *Being and Time* reveal how ἀλήθεια constitutes the existential core of *Dasein*’s being in the care structure as disclosedness,<sup>22</sup> λόγος is already in these passages the juncture between “α” and “λήθη” – that is, it already speaks to an originary differencing in grammar preceding the merely nominal difference of subject-predicate relationships that logic, grammar, and metaphysics later systematize. In his readings of Heraclitus, λόγος, for Heidegger, matures into the ontological activity that motivates the alpha privative to reach into λήθη, what Dastur labels the “inapparent,”<sup>23</sup> or hiddenness, to bring forth, arrange, or gather up manifestness as the site of language itself.<sup>24</sup> It is worth noting, here, that for Dastur reading the Heidegger of the *Zähringen Seminar*,<sup>25</sup> λήθη as *unscheinbar* (‘inconspicuous,’ ‘inapparent’) is not an undifferentiated concealment *in opposition to* ἀλήθεια, and thus “in no way refers to an absolute invisibility.”<sup>26</sup> Dastur cleverly reads Merleau-Ponty into Heidegger, rather than against him, and in so doing counters the notion that Heidegger collapses the Heraclitean divergence. On her reading, the inapparent is the “‘invisible which is there,’ always happening *with* the visible whose secret counterpart it is.”<sup>27</sup> For Dastur, the inconspicuous or inapparent in Heidegger is therefore not opposed to, but interstitial within, the apparent, the invisible right there with the visible – or in Heidegger’s words, where the “presencing presence” gathers itself “right ‘at’ and in unconcealment.”<sup>28</sup> The “presencing presence,” or “presence of the presencing” (*Anwesen des Anwesenden*) that gathers at the site of unconcealment,

<sup>29</sup> is the end point in Heidegger's etymological trajectory for λόγος. Heidegger begins this trajectory in the *Introduction*, first tracing λόγος to λέγειν, then to the Latin root *legere*, finally underwriting the German word *legen* ('to place,' 'to put,' and for Heidegger, 'to lay').<sup>30</sup> By the time of his 1951 essay on Heraclitus, "Logos," Heidegger concludes that "λέγειν properly means *between* the laying-down and laying before which gathers itself and others" (author's emphasis).<sup>31</sup>

As Dastur notes, this etymological shift is paradigmatic. Already, Heidegger is here showing that the *between*, that is, the difference between things, is precisely that which constellates being in language – it is the very factor that allows things to show up, that is, presence, in the inapparent. On this account, the upsurge of self-showing in the *Lichtung* – the "ever-rising" in Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus' fragment B16<sup>32</sup> – is the tensive play of the *between* in hiddenness/manifestness that allows things, in ἀλήθεια, to tarry in the show of what they are and what they are not. Heidegger stresses the verbality of gathering to conserve the happening or processuality at the heart of λόγος, in which λέγειν has the sense of a disclosive encounter where clearing is neither definite nor indefinite because it is not only the nominal, but also the verbal noun. *Lichtung* is clearing, a space that has been cleared away, therefore opened to the light<sup>33</sup>, unfolded, and thus available but also the happening of this clearing – a literal clear-ing as the jointure of lighting and lightening of the load, as to make carrying what is cleared away easier.<sup>34</sup> Thus, in Heidegger's lighting-clearing, Dastur asserts that Heraclitus' opposites are dynamically preserved by "the λόγος in the sense of the gathering of beings and letting them be"<sup>35</sup> in which "gathering is not a relation between two terms already present, *vorhanden*, but the event of their distinction and simultaneously of their relation."<sup>36</sup> "Letting them be" perhaps whispers to a certain grammatical passivity, carrying the meaning of a mere allowing something to show. But one must remember that, for Heidegger, being is intranquil, restless, and agitating – it is always on the move. And thus, the 'letting be' in Dastur's sentence reverberates as Levinas suggests it reverberates, as a "new sonority of the verb 'to be': precisely its verbal sonority... not what is, but the 'act' of being."<sup>37</sup> As the site for "the play of being,"<sup>38</sup> the clearing is not for Heidegger a passive conduit of receptivity in which things dwell in presence. Clearing is rather the site at which language is struck by and in being, "like a lightning flash," or "storm of being,"<sup>39</sup> in Dastur's words, where language is opened and things must be ripped out of their hiddenness. Dastur's phrasing on the revelatory drama of ἀλήθεια speaks to this activity, saying that: "ἀλήθεια (truth) must in no way be thought of as a pre-existing *state* of openness, an immobile opening, but, on the contrary, as a robbery (*Raub*) through which a being is torn out of hiddenness, or as the occurrence (*Geschehnis*) of a clearing."<sup>40</sup>

The clearing is an event, the event is the site for the presence of the presencing, what presences in presence is the gathering of being in language through difference, and language takes place in the event of the clearing. Skeptical readers will no doubt notice that Heidegger's formula is tautological and thus, according to the schema of propositional logic, non-informational. As Jason W. Alvis<sup>41</sup> reminds us, however, tautology becomes for the later Heidegger the "primordial sense of phenomenology"<sup>42</sup> – it is the "necessary phenomenological door"<sup>43</sup> which one opens to move past the artificial matrix between appearance and non-appearance, or identity and difference, as opposites. Recall that Dastur's purpose in the "Logic and Metaphysics" chapter is presenting Heidegger's *Destruktion* of the tradition of metaphysics; a tradition that dominates language by alligating logic and grammar, a maneuver that according to Heidegger only nomologically supervenes a matrix of opposition between manifestness and hiddenness or

appearance and non-appearance. For Heidegger, a legitimate metaphysics obliterates this grammatical nomology and moves instead to the ontological primordality of language that I earlier referenced, where difference is constitutive and not merely nominal. Whereas grammar assigns itself to the dominion of the logic of metaphysics, which circularly takes as its central premise of identity – the apophantic statement – the identity of grammar, the primordial at which Heidegger aims is anterior to this subject/predicate bifurcation. Hardened through tradition to a subject-predicate logic, the primordial and authentic sense of *λόγος* is instead the event of difference itself. This is precisely the hidden history of metaphysics at which Dastur is aimed, carried through in the presentation of presence as substance, that Heidegger wants to “loosen up”<sup>44</sup> in *Destruktion*.

### III. Language, Difference, and the Event

Developing a philosophy of abiding difference, via Heidegger, is Dastur’s genuine achievement on the way to her phenomenology of the event. Dastur’s sympathy to Heidegger is in some senses controversial, given that asserting Heidegger’s non-relation to the contemporaneous event concept is the wedge ground on which many event phenomenologists purchase leverage. In his triumvirate of event work, for example, Romano accepts Levinas’ contention above<sup>45</sup> that Heidegger’s discovery of the ontological difference between being and beings is what allows, in Francois Raffoul’s words, for a sense of being in which “being itself is not a substance, but an event of presence, an event in which we human beings participate, to which we correspond and belong,” that is, a sense of being in which being “is not, but being be-ings.”<sup>46</sup> Under Romano’s pen, however, Heidegger reverses his epochal breakthrough by collapsing the profound ontological novelty of the event concept into the merely apparent multiplicity of innerworldly things. Romano’s Heidegger speaks of event only in the ordinal sense, which for Romano is named *Geschehnis*, casting *Ereignis* instead as the “en-owning” of such ordinary occurrences.<sup>47</sup> That is, Romano charges that what should be Heidegger’s second epochal breakthrough, the event, is subordinate to his first epochal breakthrough, *Dasein*. On this account, *Dasein* is therefore the very reductive tendency of phenomenology that I mentioned above made manifest: according to Romano, the oppressive existential apodicticity of *Dasein* prefigures and prevents the abnormality of the event.

Nowhere in *Telling Time* or “Phenomenology” does Dastur explicitly disagree with, or even mention Romano, save for a generous footnote in the latter that credits Romano with inspiring her own work on the event. While Heidegger is pervious to this criticism in ways that become clear in the following chapter, and in ways for which Dastur must account, for now this much is clear: Dastur presents at least a *version* of Heidegger that not only maintains a difference or divergence *in* eventfulness but posits this difference *as* eventfulness. Such an account begins by recalling that *Geschehnis* is a rare coinage for Heidegger and, at least in *Being and Time*, is to Romano’s point a technical, scientific designation for natural occurrences.<sup>48</sup> That said, Heidegger clearly abandons this technical definition at some point prior to 1932, when he is developing the preparatory work to his *Contributions*, entitled *To Event Thinking (Zum Ereignis-Denken)*. In this oft-ignored segment of the *Gesamtausgabe*, Heidegger uses *Geschehnis* in the full complement of presence: *Das Sichentfaltende Aufgehen aber ist das Hereinstehen von darin Anwesenden – Geschehnis der Anwesenheit – Anwesung* (This self-unfolding emerging stands in that which presences – it is the occurrence of presence – its event) (author’s translation).<sup>49</sup> Everywhere in her work, Dastur follows the later Heidegger in resuscitating *Geschehnis/Geschelnisse*<sup>50</sup> to the potency of *Geschehen*,



as a vital happening, that is, an event, and thus also makes lucid what is at issue for Heidegger in the clearing and what is at issue for Dastur in Heidegger: none other than the *event* of being itself as “the entry into presence of what enters into presence” via difference.<sup>51</sup> Dastur appends a footnote to the sentence on *Geschehnis*, containing a passage from “Origin of the Work of Art” that justifies her translation and shows Heidegger himself positioning the clearing as the event of being. The footnote reads:

This means that the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing, is never a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its course...The unconcealment of beings (*Unverborgenheit des Seienden*) [is] an event.<sup>52</sup>

Hence Heidegger, at least for Dastur, positions *λόγος* as constellating the “between” of manifestness and hiddenness in such a way that visibility operates within it. Dastur defines the interrelation as *unscheinbar*: the “non-signifier” in which being in the midst of beings, “also and at the same time comes into presence in an inapparent manner”<sup>53</sup> and thus gives phenomenality as the event of differencing. For Dastur, though, difference, like the clearing, is not a rigid, immobile state, or an attribute, or even a substance; Dastur specifically does not properly noun difference as *das Differenz*. Rather, difference is difference itself, “on the basis of which being as well as beings appear.”<sup>54</sup>

The textual corroboration for Dastur’s interpretation is clear in Heidegger. In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger deems difference itself as the verbal noun, “differencing,”<sup>55</sup> where Heidegger thinks of being itself emerging from difference as event. Both here, in *Identity*, as well as in the *Contributions*, Heidegger explicitly describes the ‘from which’ being emerges as difference, nothingness, and fissure. In *Identity*, Heidegger deems this emergence *Unterschied*, in *Contributions* Heidegger calls it the “abyssal fissure in which beings are divided,”<sup>56</sup> and in “Overcoming Metaphysics” details the concatenation between *Ereignis*, *Austrag* and *Unterschied*:

However, as the *Ereignis* (the dif-ference [*der Unter-schied*]), Being firstly lets beings diverge...It can be said that Being and beings are infinitely different – namely, abyssally different [*ab-gründig verschieden*] – that is that they are divided one from the other by an Abyss [*Abgrund*], which is Being itself. Things are different in the other beginning: the Divergence [*Austrag*] is itself, as the deployment [*Wesung*] of Being, the Abyss of the In-between [*Inzwischen*].<sup>57</sup>

By *Inzwischen*, Heidegger means not only spatially in between, but temporally in-between – as in, in the meantime, or meanwhile. *Inzwischen* thus also carries the sense of abeyance, that in the division from being to beings, being is held in trust. Thus, Heidegger is here identifying being itself as the space of nothing in which “Nothingness is neither negative nor a “goal,” because the genuine negative “cannot be grasped through the representational denial of something.”<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, it should be noted, consistently reinforces that the negative, fissure, or difference cannot be entered into or be transduced by an ontologico-transcendental sublation because they do not pertain to the hidden secret of dialectic, its elemental supposition, that of the category. Difference is not a rote categorial representation, and thus not the contrapositive,<sup>59</sup> because each of these terms reduce negativity and difference to the shadow of the identity which the event of difference blossoms – and so, as Heidegger tells us, “in a certain sense, the *Λόγος* does not show itself at all and is akin to nothing: namely, the *nothing of beings* which, of course, remains fundamentally different from the *nothing of being*.”<sup>60</sup> Important to Dastur’s Heidegger, then, is a

literal co-occurrence as non-coincident parts – co-eventfulness – of beings and beings in and through differencing itself as *Austrag* and *Unterschied*.

Far from Romano's collapse of a self-identical continuity anterior to difference, being and beings are for Dastur's later Heidegger co-implicative spatially and temporally and this co-implication is, itself, the event of being in language (λόγος). In *Contributions*, Heidegger's "leap," in Dastur's phrase, is into seeing difference itself as *Anwesenung*, "the event of coming to presence."<sup>61</sup> Dastur elaborates:

Being and beings are not in separate places. It is being itself which transforms itself into beings through a movement of *transcendence* which is at the same time that of the arrival of beings in *presence*. This implies that they are the same, in the intimate intensity of the event of a split through which they are at once separated one from the other and related one to the other.<sup>62</sup>

Notice that Dastur's language suggests being and beings to be coterminous, not the One before the Many, but rather one appearing in the thick of the many in the very event of their separation – as their simultaneity in difference, as Dastur says. Identity is not hierarchical to difference in eventfulness, not its ontological superior or genesis, but is rather the co-expressed *in* the event of separation. Being is for Dastur's Heidegger a non-dialectical intercedence, being intervening in beings, or perhaps better, within beings, carrying those beings to term in its very divergence from them. Thus follows the emphasis for Romano<sup>63</sup> and Dastur<sup>64</sup> on birth as a paradigm event: birth is partitive, in the sense of the transitive Latin verb *partīre*, which means to divide, cut, separate, and thus to draw or spread away from, but also to share. The birth event, as the event of difference, and too as the essence of eventfulness, means to turn the one into the many as divergence but in a connective act – that which has been separated in birth (mother/child) is also that which is shared between, a connecting divergence. Of course, Dastur, following Heidegger, herself notes this connection in her description of the indominable *Austrag*, a word for which English lacks a fully expressive analog and that Heidegger "connects with the Old German *bern, bāren*, 'to bear', found today in *gebāren* (to give birth) and *Gebārde* (gesture)."<sup>65</sup> Resisting the entitative call to render *Austrag/austragen* as a mere attributional *Differenz*, Dastur takes *Austrag* to be the "distributive and gestational dimension" in which "being and beings...thought on the basis of difference show themselves to us."<sup>66</sup> In a 2014 paper, "Time, event and presence in the late Heidegger,"<sup>67</sup> Dastur contends that Heidegger selects *Unter-schied* and *Austrag* over *Differenz* because "he wants to show that what has to be thought is the process of difference itself, the event of separation," in its eventuality, "rather than the terms themselves that are in such a way differentiated."<sup>68</sup> On this basis, Dastur asserts, Heidegger shows that "the space between" Being and beings, that is, difference, is "older than them."<sup>69</sup> *Unter-schied* is older than being and beings because it consists in the event of their difference as they burst forth through each other and *Austrag* is the distributive dimension in which this connecting-separation occurs.

Again, what I highlight here is the divergence that itself shows up, and shows in, the fascial presence of λόγος as the being in beings: fascial in the way that the genitive Latin verb *fascis* means to bundle – as in bundling a load of separate things together as separate things, or in the way that bodily fascia connects the organs only because they are first, and remain, different organs. Dastur expatiates further on this fascial, interstitial, or between element in being's eventfulness in another incisive footnote to *Telling Time*, turning to Heidegger's use of Hölderlin's *Innigkeit* (intimacy):

Heidegger uses the Holderlinian term *Innigkeit* (intimacy) to speak of the same *Unter-schied* (difference) and of the same split that yields the separation on the basis of which world and thing, being and beings, arise. This separation which is at the same time a joining, is the separation of the same differing 'originarily' from itself and not the difference between two terms that could be subsequently unified. Heidegger's thought is a thought of the same and not of the one.<sup>70</sup>

Originarily is the key word in this fecund passage, as it speaks to a splitting that has always split and that remains split – the split that holds open this “separation of the same,” the *Unter-schied*, a dis-continuity that forever prevents a vulgar unification and thus allows the world to arise. There is a motility to the event at work here, where being ambulates in eventfulness, an ambulant dis-juncture; one in which “suddenly (*jäh*) it seems, the world as world worlds.”<sup>71</sup> As Dastur explains, *jäh* is a German adjective/adverb that means “precipitous, abrupt, obscure,”<sup>72</sup> – that is, the characteristics of the event in its very eventfulness. Being as *Ereignis*, by now offered by Heidegger exclusively as *beyng*, in its single word cultivates the essence of the spatio-temporal differencing of beings and being in time through language.<sup>73</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

Dastur's purpose in rehabilitating Heidegger in a phenomenology of the inapparent and difference is equipping phenomenology with access to its constitutive inapparent, the inapparency of its own ontogenesis through time. If time is not a unified flow, contiguous to its own boundary, but is rather a syncopated beat, then there is no requirement, as there is for Husserl, for *hyle* to compile in an object unified immanently by the internal time consciousness of a transcendental subject.<sup>74</sup> A diachronic arrangement of time through the event arrives each time, each instance, indeed it resists the connotation of time as flow itself and substitutes in its wake only each times (*Jeweiligkeit*); and thus delivers over an avenue for discontinuity, divergence, and diffraction that does not conflict with an *a priori* subject as we find it does in Husserl. As Dastur notes, Husserl's attempt to permit “consciousness to observe its own birth and give birth to itself,” in *Urkonstitution* (auto-constitution), leads Husserl to posit the temporal unification of *hyle* within the unified time horizon of a subject transcendental and *a priori* to the multiplication and differential presentation of these *hyle*. But internal time consciousness, for Husserl, involves not only the succession of now-moments in which *hyle* constellate into the positive presentation of an object to consciousness, but also a protentive (futural) and retentive (past) pole. By tying the constitutive operation to time's triadic continuity, and each to a subject transcendental to both, Husserl effectively forecloses the possibility of change because each impression “precedes itself in its very own retention.”<sup>75</sup> Husserl's phenomenological temporality is therefore self-circumscribing, a topology that determinates its own limits by defining an uroboric temporal field. In internal time consciousness, Husserl, once and for all, subjugates the variability of incoherence and difference to coherence and unification, reducing all objects and their variance to the immanent genesis of the subject's perceptive and temporal field. Hence Dastur's quote above, regarding the ‘sterility’ of essences: the very accessibility of this internal time consciousness as the pre-figurative, pre-valiative architecture of a continuous flow of givenness oppresses the variance at the heart of eventfulness. To Dastur, Heidegger's epiphany is to foist open a split in the emergence of being and to recognize this split as itself integral, through which *Austrag*, the distributive dimension of being, constitutes the difference between being and beings and thus also the differencing of time

through language. Prior to any state of givenness, there is difference; and both what gives (*es gibt*), and the given, emerge exclusively on the basis of this split in time and language.

Thus, the true product of Dastur's rehabilitative project. If there is no in-existent or ideally existing antecedent prior to time consciousness and its reflexion, then objects arrive in time's syncopation and thus, to the extent that our existentiality is tied to our insertion to the world through time, the world, which emerges on the basis of language, also arrives in a syncopated fashion. If phenomenology attunes itself to the ontological dispensation conferred by the event – that is, access to difference, or divergence, itself – then phenomenology can overcome its tendency to limit its own circumference, as no recourse is required to ground showing, or manifestness, in the isochrony of a transcendental subjectivity. This chrono-logy is precisely what Heidegger means by *Ereignis*: to think phenomenon, and thus being, in the very event of difference. Remaining open to the diffraction of being into beings, the separation of difference, is a difficult task, however, as one must challenge this upsurge without at the same time enfeebling it into a universal substance from which it could not have come. Phenomenology's nomological compulsion seems uniquely unsuited to such a task, as positivistic formalism purchases its clarity at the high cost of prohibiting the very spontaneity of the event. Speaking of this problem, Dastur explains that “[t]he happening of the world from which the thing is lowly (*gering*) born” cannot be the consequence of a “mere change of attitude” or “methodological decision,” by which she denigrates Husserl's “transcendental description.” Phenomenology as “mimetic reconstruction” has “here only the negative virtue of preparing for what cannot be prepared for, for what, though it cannot take place without us, does not spring from us.”<sup>76</sup>

By thinking the event's vibration through the world and the subject's sense of time, Dastur links language to temporality in an originary phenomenology that becomes the “thinking of the *a posteriori* and of the “after event”<sup>77</sup> “Coming after the event,” says Dastur, is “the modality of thinking that wants to be, not the foundation and seizure of the things of the past (*das Vergangene*), but the reception and de-finition of a 'presence' (*Anwesen*) of what has been and comes to us from the future.”<sup>78</sup> In connecting a hermeneutic openness to what happens with the phenomenology of the inapparent, Dastur has identified the phenomenology of temporality that lies at the heart of thinking the event.<sup>79</sup> Dastur's model of time is a self-interruptive chrono-logy, the literal *à*-synchronicity of an originary temporality that “interrupts itself at the very moment it makes manifest the lightning flash of the simultaneity that makes it possible.”<sup>80</sup> In this way, the logic of temporality, manifest in the event of “*differance* as such,”<sup>81</sup> expresses the dehiscence of time. Phenomenology can absorb the pro-duction of temporality in the syncopated beat of being because Dastur has already provided its modality: *Austrag* and *Unter-schied* in their eventuation as the difference of time, which is the “simultaneity in which two movements of opposite direction are one...the flash of lightning which at once unites and disjoins world and thought...that gathering [that] is at the same time separation.”<sup>82</sup> Phenomenology heeds the call of an event because its sense of time, returned to its privative origin, is the syncopic gap of eventual temporality – what divaricates to produce the divarication in which time *is*. In opening phenomenology to the event's disorientation of time, Dastur then allows for an openness in which being and beings are coterminous, not the One before the Many, but rather one appearing in the thick of the many in the very event of their separation – as their simultaneity, “the intimate intensity of the event of a split through which they are at once separated one from the other and related one to the other.”<sup>83</sup>

Hence Dastur's emphasis on *Austrag*, the split "on the basis of which world and thing, being and beings, arise." <sup>84</sup> Through her rediscovery of the gestational element of *Austrag*, Dastur provides a framework for an original event accessible by singular subjects who do not require recourse to a transcendental subjectivity who supposedly antedates their access to difference. And, too, in highlighting Heidegger's turn to the impersonality of *Ereignis*, Dastur sees that, in dislocating *Dasein* from its privileged place, Heidegger has elevated the possibility of the event over the actuality of a factually-tethered *Dasein* – thus giving us access to the excess of possibility that characterizes events. <sup>85</sup> In that same 2014 paper, which centers on Heidegger of the mid 1930s and on, Dastur believes that Heidegger has cast aside the "transcendence of *Dasein*," no longer locating the ground of difference there. <sup>86</sup> Da-sein is now literally dis-placed, no longer there as the there of a transcendental being and in its place is difference as a "dimension of Being itself, as duplicity (*Zwiefalt*), i.e. as the double fold of Being and the beings which makes them inseparable." <sup>87</sup> By taking Heidegger up on this later call, Dastur, unlike Romano, say, does not view *Dasein* as the thing facing a magnetic call to transcend itself in an ek-stasis, which therefore neuters the manifold of possibilities that ostensibly characterize its factual life. As Dastur finds in the late Heidegger that, *Ereignis*, and not *Dasein*, is the site of being in eventuality, she creates a reciprocal path between factuality and eventfulness that allows for the constellation of language and time in event. Moreover, Dastur stresses that the event is neither a mirror of, nor merely opposite to, the human as mortal – but stands alone in its eventuation. *Ereignis* is neither "something opposite us nor as something all-encompassing," neither an object nor an all-embracing absolute, because "*Ereignis* neither is, nor is *Ereignis* there." <sup>88</sup> The event is not synonymous with the *eventum*, the what happened, neither is it an object, nor concept of how it happens, nor the where or why. The event events, it happens. And it happens regardless of our context, expectations, or site, in the most impersonal mode of an occurrence. It is the impossible possible.

## Chapter II – Time, Finitude, and Difference

### I. Introduction

What is the relationship between time and being in event? As Heidegger makes clear from the first page of *Being and Time*, his project is, if nothing else, a reaction against the historical concealment (*Verborgenheit*) of being under the shroud of both metaphysical philosophizing and the “vague and average understanding of being” as a fact.<sup>1</sup> For Heidegger, the history of metaphysics and understanding of being, culminating in Kant, has a central and multi-faceted problem: both metaphysics and the “everyday comprehensibility” of being historically aggregate in what Heidegger later calls the “forgetting/forgetfulness of being” (*Seinsvergessenheit*).<sup>2</sup> Heidegger is specifically concerned with a kind of self-concealment when we forget that we, above all beings, are the kind of being whose being is a matter of concern for ourselves – not as a mere what, “but rather [as] being [*Sein*]” itself.<sup>3</sup> Hence the uniqueness of the *Seinsfrage*: Heidegger locates the ontological difference between mere extants (like a rock) and the being of these extants in human intelligibility understood not as a psychological factum, but as our very existential constitution. Our self-directedness discloses what being *means* and the apparatus for this disclosure is, in turn, what Heidegger terms the architecture of care (*Sorge*). Heidegger thinks our fundamental capacity is to locate ourselves automatically, absent any asservation, in a nexus of meaningfulness constituted on the horizon of our own finitude: being *means*, and meaning is handed over only insofar as the human life is composed of a finite possibility of actions. The instant in which we temporalize this care – that is, step outside of a historical time to render ourselves available for disclosure on a finite horizon – is the ecstatic transcendence of clock-time in the *Augenblick* (the ‘moment’).<sup>4</sup>

Heidegger later describes the embeddedness of care in time in a way that, I think, intractably begets our interpretation of ourselves as embedded within its horizon: our self-interpretation on the horizon of time is “not a matter of chance but has its existential and ontological necessity in the fundamental constitution of Dasein as care.”<sup>5</sup> In other words, the hermeneutic self-understanding in which we are unavoidably involved does not merely take place *in* time, but time is existentially necessary to the structure of care itself. *Augenblick*, as will we see, is the instance of perspicacity – in the sense of its archaic Latin root, *perspicere*: to see clearly – in which Heidegger claims we see the temporal understructure of our “fundamental constitution of Dasein as care” projected on the horizontal limitation of our own finitude. Of course, we ourselves must first reckon with the annularity in Heidegger’s writing on time before getting to the *Augenblick*. What is time, for Heidegger, and how is it related – or not related – to temporality? Like being, Heidegger specifically militates against time in its theoretical or classically metaphysical conceptions; in this case, the portrait of time as a processional ‘thing’: “[time is not the]...vulgar succession of constantly “present” [*Vorhanden*] nows that pass away and arrive at the same time.”<sup>6</sup> But what are we to make of a conception of time that is neither linear, nor transitive, nor successional? If time is neither a flux, nor succession, then time for Heidegger is necessarily happening all at once, all the time; a definition we can provisionally sync with a description of the “originary time” that is Dasein’s essential temporal structure:

Temporalizing does not mean a “succession” of the ecstasies. The future is *not later* than the having-been (past), and the having-been is *not earlier* than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in the process of having-been.<sup>7</sup>

By resisting the entitative characterization of vulgar time as a physico-mathematical property, delineable into discrete and successive units, we instead consider time as a sense that conglomerates these units into a unified field of experience, that is, into temporality. Temporality is here explicitly thematic: temporality (*Temporalität*) makes timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*), an ontic determination of Dasein, appropriately ontological as “the condition of possibility for the understanding of being and of ontology as such.”<sup>8</sup> Hence, time for Heidegger is not existent, but occurrent: it “temporalizes.”<sup>9</sup> The “vulgar” or “ordinary” conception of time that temporality temporalizes is meaningless, according to Heidegger, because it forecloses the effectively interpretative relationship between time and the human Dasein in its infinity. Our very finite confrontation with time is precisely what designates us as human, as finitude constellates the manifold of possibilities that fashion a human life as distinctly human. All our temporal engagements distinguish themselves *as temporal* because they are backgrounded by the possibility of our non-existence. Thus, an eternal conception of time, for Heidegger, “is meaningless” because temporality functions first and most of all for Dasein: “time only temporalizes itself in so far as humans are. There is no time in which humans were not...[because]...time only temporalizes itself in each case in every time as human-historical.”<sup>10</sup> Insofar as I see the human-historical – and so, decidedly hermeneutic – function of time, I also see myself as the for-the-sake-of-which that time operates in finitude. In this sketch of time, it exists only for Dasein.

Here emerges in Heidegger’s temporal analysis at least two problems in its relationship to temporality and event — the vulnerabilities from which Dastur, even in the grace of her anastomosis, cannot save him. First, regardless that Heidegger breaks through into *Ereignis* at the *Kehre*, and as we saw in the previous chapter positions *Unter-schied* as “older than” both being and beings, he never abandons the ontological difference as axiomatic. These positions are irreconcilable. If the ontological difference remains the essential ontological power by which our interpretability obtains, then difference is not constitutive of, but subordinate to, this power; the gathering of difference would precede difference itself, which is antithetical to event. In routing difference through the ontological difference, even the purportedly constitutional difference for which Dastur persuades, differences services ecstatic temporality. As a result, the thoroughly hermeneutic account of Dasein that Heidegger provides in the first division of *Being and Time* deteriorates in its imposition on the ecstatic analysis of time that Heidegger provides in the second. One must note, as Dastur does, that while Heidegger abandons the ecstatic analysis of temporality by the 1930s, he never similarly abandons the ontological difference which is coherent through this analysis and countervails the eventful temporality to which Dastur beckons us. Second, a meaning of time in which Dasein transcends its everydayness to reinforce the distinction between ontic and ontological would buttress, rather than defeat, the transcendental subjectivism of which Heidegger frequently charges Husserl. In the ek-static moment, the *Augenblick*, the everyday world in which I encounter the other ceases to be, plundered in an ascent to the ontological foundation of time, temporality, which means something only for me. In this stroke, the very basis of hermeneutics, a literal con-text, or textuality with each other, is removed from the possibility of Dasein. Levinas writes in the same context in a small 1947 piece, “Time and the Other,” “in the original time, or in Being towards death, (Heidegger's ontology) discovers

the nothingness upon which it is based, which means that it rests upon nothing else than itself.”<sup>11</sup> The decisive moment in Dastur’s event phenomenology, that we return to the site of incoherence to try and impart meaning to it, which is what Gadamer calls the event of meaning, would therefore be closed off in the ecstasies. While Gadamer and Dastur both offer a charitable view that the problem is merely one of linguistic limits, I am unsure. I suspect a deeper problem at work. In this chapter, I attempt to rectify this problem. I begin by describing Heidegger’s conception of both care (*Sorge*) and the moment and detailing their relationship to one another for the disclosure of intelligibility and meaning; and how, more importantly, Heidegger’s ecstatic analysis by nature forecloses the very possibility for this meaning. I then attempt a broader recovery of hermeneutic temporality, specifically instantiated in Gadamer’s temporality of the festival. I then show how Heidegger’s temporality relies on its Husserlian lineages in fundamental ways, for the purpose of charting a line outside this reliance.

## II. The Fundamental Error of Ecstatic Temporality

In many ways, Dastur’s project is negotiating an armistice between Ricoeur and Heidegger through establishing a new logic of temporality, manifest in the event of language as difference, that accounts for the historical mediation of Dasein. She does this through establishing the *a*-synchronicity of an eventful temporality, which in its syncopation allows for the differencing and singularization of time and language; therefore, establishing the syncopal gaps through which the difference between different subjects, and events, emerge without reduction to the identity of superordinate being. Under the thrust of her eventful hermeneutics, Dastur brings the pivotal Heideggerian concept of the belongingness of time to Dasein, *Jeweiligkeit*, into its appropriate orientation as the structure for understanding and interpretation. While this synthetic impulse is implicit in *Telling Time*, a 2011 article, “Ricoeur’s Critique of the Conception of Temporality in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*,”<sup>12</sup> renders the purpose explicit. There, Dastur, a preternatural mediator between thinkers, wants to say that Ricoeur errs in showing that Heidegger’s notion of originary temporality is diametric to an historical time in which interpretation necessarily obtains. Ricoeur misunderstands that historical time is not under Heidegger a *derivation* from originary time, as if the “hierarchy of the levels of temporalization”<sup>13</sup> is a mere set of sequential deductions from a supervening temporal *Grund*. As we know, Dastur posits that the “origin of time” is “in ourselves, in this temporality that we are,”<sup>14</sup> which is to say that there exists no self-subsisting identity of time separate from our deictic enmeshment in the world’s contextuality. Time *is* that which configures and permits the appearance of phenomena, in and through the event of difference in language – which is itself emergent based on a temporally-conditioned world. The triangulation between language, time, and event, manifest in the “bursting of time into the plurality of ekstases” is properly ontological because it does not “occur...in the interiority of a soul or subject,” as this “primordial temporality can be considered the principle of all the modes derived from temporality.”<sup>15</sup>

In adopting what I think is a correct portrait of language, Dastur, however, does not recognize Ricoeur’s largely accurate critique of Heidegger and does not there conciliate what appears as an impossible – but necessary – thesis latent in Heidegger’s work on language in the 1920s: he collapses the hermeneutic sketch of Dasein that he provides in the first section of *Being in Time* with his turn to ecstatic temporality as the horizon for this meaning in the second. Such a conciliation is necessary. Until the last, Heidegger makes clear that his philosophical procedure –



one in the same with his philosophical substance – is the hermeneutic of facticity (*Hermeneutik der Faktizität*): that is, using temporality to disclose that our essential mode of being is a factual insertion in the world, from which we subsist and from which we take over meaning (*Auslegung*, interpretation).<sup>16</sup> The welding of hermeneutics to ontology in event continues operating for Dastur, who in a different, later analysis of the confrontation between Ricoeur and Heidegger (along with Levinas) on ethics, defines the late Heidegger's purpose as "being open to the "event" of the copropriation of Being and of the human (that is, being open to a thought of the of the encounter as the simultaneity of call and response)," and that, indeed, this is the meaning of Heidegger's *Kehre*.<sup>17</sup> Dastur will in the same collection of essays that contains her trigonal reading, suggest that the condition of an eventful phenomenology – if I can invoke the very resonance of that which I intend to resist – is the envelopment of event in its hermeneutic context. For phenomenology to capture event, which Dastur believes is its interior possibility, phenomenology must open itself to the hermeneutic of facticity:

an *interpretation* of what existence conceals and what is not reducible to the ideal...Such must...be the thought of the *may-be* and contingency – or in other words, it can no longer be only the thought of the *a priori* and the conditions for the possibility of phenomenon, but must also be the thought of the *a posteriori* and its after effect [*apres-coup*]."<sup>18</sup>

The precise problem with Heidegger's *Dasein* in all its metabolisms of time, however, is that Heidegger continues, even after his discovery of *Ereignis*, to not only maintain a duality between the ontic and the ontological but maintains this duality as the essential precondition of understanding. Even at the twilight, in the late hour of the *Zollikoner Seminare*, Heidegger believes that the Swiss existential psychotherapist, Ludwig Binswanger, confuses "ontological insights with ontic matters," in applying the philosophy of *Being and Time* to his therapy, thereby committing in Heidegger's mind a grave error in designation. In elaborating her stance on the potential interlays between *Daseinanalytik* and *Daseinanalyse* in psychotherapy,<sup>19</sup> Dastur repeats the late Heidegger almost verbatim, noting that "Binswanger does not see the ontological difference, and thus confuses ontological views with ontic things."<sup>20</sup>

But does the event not show us in its eruption that the organizational schema of the ontological difference is infecund? Heidegger consistently tell us that *Dasein*'s existentials are not "accidental structures, but essential ones," and that care, which as we will see is temporality's structure, is a "primordial structural totality...existentially *a priori*" to every "factual "attitude" and "situation" of *Dasein*."<sup>21</sup> Yet, as Dastur tells us, at least in the original 2000 version of "Phenomenology of Event," the event is that which "descends upon us, the accident in the literal meaning of the Latin verb *accido*."<sup>22</sup> The question then becomes: how can the ontological difference and its privative reference to a transcendental field of time make way for what is, in essence, the explosion of the novel? And perhaps more importantly, does not maintaining this difference suggest that being is an ontological fundament taxonomically separate from and prior to the intentional disclosure of being in beings? If it is, the literally verb-al *Dasein* distills an understanding of itself out of an ante-predicative transcendental *a priori* – with no recourse to resecure itself the factual conditions of its existence. There is a conflict here between the accidental and contingent, on the one hand, and the necessary and transcendental, on the other, that Heidegger, I think, cannot resolve. What is required, in a structural symmetry to the call for a hermeneutic return in event, is a structural mediation between the ontological and the ontic, where this mediation (*vermittelt*) is, as Dastur says, "something altogether different from "applying"

the ontological to the ontic.”<sup>23</sup> In other words, Dasein, in its seizure by the ontological difference, poses an impossibility to its own alleged condition and an eventful hermeneutics must reverse this impossibility.

Heidegger develops this impossibility in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, positing that “the intrinsic possibility of the essential unity of the ontological synthesis” is the tendency of Dasein to manifest the “ontological structure” of something other than itself, beings, in its knowledge of the thing’s alterity.<sup>24</sup> Dasein’s “transcendental schematism,” continues Heidegger, is the “condition of the possibility of experience.”<sup>25</sup> The problem, as it stands, is that Heidegger elsewhere explains that Dasein is existentially discursive, such that it utters being through self-saying.<sup>26</sup> The ontological gravity of the care structure is that care is the mode by which the indexical inter-embeddedness of Dasein and world in understanding (*Verstehen*) and significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) becomes clear to itself. In any given hermeneutic circumstance, the essential structure of the world, its “wordliness,”<sup>27</sup> is the sum of meaningful contexts that function as deixis in the “there” of Dasein’s being-there: the “*phenomenon of the world*” is where “*self-referential understanding*” takes place<sup>28</sup> because each self-utterance of Dasein is a personal deictic reference to the world as something from which it is never interpretably separate. The utterance ‘I was there,’ for example, is intelligible only because in each self-interpretive act the world is always and already disclosed as the indexical background (of people, places, things, etc.) that constitutes our understanding of ourselves – “to say ‘I,’” in Dastur’s words, is the way in which “Dasein is returned to its own being.”<sup>29</sup> Therefore, because “interpretation is grounded in understanding” for Heidegger, and because understanding itself is the “existential structure” of the care project (*Entwurf*) every interpretive – that is, hermeneutical – act reveals Dasein as a constellation of projective possibilities interminably indexed to a world that contains those possibilities.<sup>30</sup> The generative architecture of this pre-givenness is our understanding of the world in the characteristic modes of care. But here lies the confusions: if utterances are the intentional phenomena in which being discloses its meaning to Dasein; and if Dasein in the ontological difference gains access to and manifests something other than itself, as a function of itself; and if the ontological difference is an essential tendency of Dasein, then in uttering being, Dasein in its very essentiality also utters non-being.

This appears to be the very problem that Heidegger attempts to reconcile in positing *Ereignis* in response to the failure of the planned third division of *Being and Time*. In the 2014 paper on presence in the late Heidegger already mentioned, Dastur believes that the failure of the purported third division of *Being and Time* was “not entirely negative” for Heidegger, because in the failure of ecstatic temporality, he was “led to think this relation otherwise than grounded on the transcendental projection of Dasein.”<sup>31</sup> As we saw in the prior chapter, Heidegger shifts the problem from the temporalization of time in an ecstatic temporality and its hermeneutic implications to the event of presence, what Dastur defines as his leap, and thus the apparent *aporia* is a non-issue for Dastur; as the event of difference, being expresses both itself and the alter *through* the ontological difference. The potential obstacle for Dastur, and thus the problem for a polymorphic subjectivity capable of receiving the event, is that Heidegger, even into the 1960s and despite his attempts at nudging his ontology otherwise, thinks difference relationally and not constitutively as it is for the event. Through and by the ontological difference, he subjugates his thoroughly hermeneutic account to an ecstatic analysis of temporality that, in its transcendental overtones, never truly disappears from his work. There arises therefore a noxious problem that is

never resolved in Heidegger's turn to *Ereignis*: preserving the emergence of being through beings, through an ek-static temporality, enslaves the event to a transcendental schematism (the ontological difference) from which it could never have emerged, because the event destroys the schema as such. Dastur's valiant effort to recapacitate Heidegger by positioning *Ereignis* as the event of the differencing of being is, I want to say, therefore corrupted by her retention of the ontological difference. Dastur's phenomenology cannot be whole without abandoning the transcendental schematism at the heart of Heidegger's temporal analysis.

To understand this corruption, we must first understand Heidegger's impulse to pursue temporality in its fundamental presentation as ecstatic. For Heidegger, the purpose of temporal analysis is to show that time bereft of Dasein is destitute; and thus, an analysis of temporality exclusively services a proper (authentic) conception of existentiality. The site where Heidegger describes care and temporality's confluence is principally §65 *Being and Time*, "Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care," the very section that Dastur believes proves the separation of Heidegger's temporality from the science of time. Heidegger sets the stage for meaning's embeddedness in temporality midway through §65, saying: The wholeness of the meaning of the being of Dasein as care means: "ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being-together-with (beings encountered in the world)." <sup>32</sup> Heidegger here establishes that each of these modes of the care-structure concords with a node in the triadic structure of the ecstasies of time: (already-being-in) with past(ness); fallenness (being-together-with/being-alongside) with present/presencing; and projection (ahead-of-itself) with the future. Note that Heidegger casts the triadic concordance of care and temporality as an expressly hermeneutic enterprise: in §63, *Being and Time's* entire first division is characterized as preparing the path for the "*disclosure of the meaning of being in care*" <sup>33</sup> a path that ultimately leads, in §65, to a description of meaning itself as the "upon which" <sup>34</sup> Dasein confronts its futural possibilities agglomerated in the unified, experiential sense of time as temporality. If the human existence *is* the deictic interpolation of world into our self-utterances (the care structure), and temporality as a unified field of time experience is the horizontal delimitation of care, then Heidegger means that our self-utterances are undergirded by our interpretation of ourselves as belonging to time – that is, *Jeweiligkeit*, that facet of existentiality that Dastur properly identifies as the basis for our interpretation. <sup>35</sup> If being *means*, then finitude is the disclosive gesture for that meaning. In their simplest descriptions, care is, then, our volitional directedness towards life's tasks, whose urgency we entail on a finite horizon; and the ontological difference distinguishes that only we are the sort of being who has this direction as a matter of concern for itself. Thus Heidegger, in arguably his most comprehensible statement on time, claims that "*Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.*" <sup>36</sup>

The problem with Heidegger's ecstatic analysis of temporality, beginning in §65, is that it cuts against the understanding of time as a hermeneutic distillation of finitude. The untenability of Heidegger's ecstatic thesis emerges in the privilege Heidegger affords to the not-yet (being-ahead-of-itself, *Sein zum Tode*) in temporality. The future is where one travels to grasp one's death as "that possibility which is one's ownmost." <sup>37</sup> In Heidegger's conception, the future outvies the present and past because our projective possibilities perforate the ontic facade of lived time to present the "authentic primordial temporality" <sup>38</sup> of the future. In this turn, *der Augenblick*, the moment, is the literal *ek-stasis* in which we step outside of ourselves as hermeneutically constituted by the lived-in world of everyday things and render ourselves visible on time's (now) infinitely

transcendental horizon. Heidegger says that the present is “brought back from its dispersion of what is taken care of closest at hand” when we resolutely grasp ourselves on the horizon of our finitude: in resoluteness, “[w]e call the *present* that is held in authentic temporality, and is thus *authentic*, the *Moment* [*Augenblick*].”<sup>39</sup> Notice that the operative term in this sentence is “brought back,” as Heidegger conceives the present as being bound to the finite sense of meaning as taking care of everyday things; time is ensnared inauthentically in the trap of our everyday compartments. According to Heidegger, the cost of an authentic resolute grasp of the ownmost ontological possibility of our future, death, is retroactively obliterating the hermeneutic constitution of time as the finite horizon of involvement in everyday things. To Ricoeur’s point, the verisimilitude of an everyday time, acknowledged by compulsion in the force of Heidegger’s hermeneutic analysis, is here relinquished for a more originary time: a temporal river, flowing beneath our quotidian time engagements, that in the rupture of the ecstasies enacts a recursion of everyday time back into *a priority*. Rather than submit temporality to the indignity of existing within the history of metaphysics, Heidegger pushes Dasein to the synthetic precipice: we are a conduit of receptivity that somehow manifests itself out of a non-existent, unaccounted for pure time. Heidegger’s temporality is thus effective substitution, disassembling time’s appearance in Dasein’s everyday life to expose the non-presence of a more ancient transcendental chronology; in so doing, relentlessly denying the present-ness of the present. Heidegger implies and legitimizes instead a non-presence, time’s alterity, and thus in a single stroke ties the horizon of time to the impossibility of both no-thingness and non-time.

Heidegger’s temporal misadventure, his ecstatic analysis of time, thus fails in two steps. The first step is that Heidegger adopts the crucial turn in Kant’s critique: collapsing the transcendental into the empirical and positing this collapse as the regulative necessity of epistemic conditions. Hence Heidegger’s focus in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* on the “essential possibility of the ontological synthesis.”<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, facing his own stricture on not reducing the ontological to the ontic, must nevertheless posit the ontological nature of time, which we never as such encounter, as being the rule-governed structure of the ontic or ordinary time that we do encounter. He then modifies this apparent inaccessibility by positing this disconnection as related not to the epistemic, but ontological, constitution of what we ourselves are – a disconnection that we must paper over in our grasp of the ‘authentic’ temporality underlining and powering it, a grasp that occurs ontically, but then itself is enabled only because we simultaneously, and somehow, grasp the ontological difference that is supposedly prior and necessary to it. The second step is precisely this: that Heidegger ontologizes Kant’s synthetic artifice. The transcendental *a priority* of apperception in Kant becomes the hermeneutic apperception of Dasein and the regulative necessity of epistemic conditions becomes the regulative necessity of time. The hermeneutic Dasein established in the first division of *Being and Time* is vanquished by the transcendentially *a priori* Dasein in the second. To preserve the interior coherence of a lived time which appears to manifest itself in dis-junctured and prismatic moments, Heidegger must adopt Kant’s schema, *qua* Husserl, and posit another time, more originary, that conditions this coherence. Intentionality, conceived by Husserl as subtending the subject-object relation, nevertheless stands *in transcendental relation* to them as between, say, the noesis and the noema, the verb and its predication.

In its supposed unification, intentionality thus entails a concealed severance, a separation; and a conditioned analysis of either a pure ego or “originary time,” therefore, must retroactively

condition the empirical contents of the gesture's target to reconcile the bifurcated halves of this relation. Heidegger subserves lived time to the non-procession of originary temporality because he believes that ecstatic temporality fulfills intentionality's bridge function: it is the intentional, and thus reconciliatory, gesture that brings opposite qualities (the now and not-now, the not-yet and having-been, beings and being) into their determinate unification. Being's *intentio* stitches together the disjunction between being and beings in the ontological difference, hence the *Augenblick's* constituency in *Being and Time*; the moment is always passing over from the past to the future and, in its becoming, discloses for Heidegger the consolidation of being into beings in time, through language, that enables the turnover. The "intrinsically *transcendent*" Dasein reveals that "being is an intentional comportment" in the perceptual "foundation" formed in the "*ecstasis of the present*." <sup>41</sup> Dastur, under the sway of the ontological difference, then identifies ecstatic temporality with how the event "introduces a scission between past and future" and is what produces the differencing and non-coincidence in temporality and exposes "this difference in the suddenness of its irruption." <sup>42</sup> But the ecstasies are precisely not the ontological non-coincidence of event. Certainly, their purpose is to produce the gap or scansion between past and future, but the purpose of this gap is to show what necessarily exists underneath: an originary, that is, grounding temporality that shows itself only once we heed the ambiguous moral call of authenticity.

Heidegger's ostensible egress from the confines of Husserlian phenomenology thus ironically finishes with a formal ontology (temporalization) of the *epoche*. Heidegger's reliance on Husserl's ideality, a reliance about which Heidegger remains silent, therefore subverts, rather than establishes, the primordial language that animates Dastur's analysis. Heidegger makes such a maneuver to rescue time from its dissipation in instrumentality. But in his ecstatic execution, Heidegger makes temporality itself incomprehensible: a literally *ek-statik* time – and thus a transcendental time; and thus, an infinity – cannot recursively determine a unitary horizon of time perceptually constituted by and through the possible project of human finitude. The late Heidegger of the *Four Seminars* sees this problem, noting that he would "formulate this relation differently," because he would "no longer speak simply of ek-stasis of *instancy* in the clearing (*Inständigkeit in der Lichtung*)." <sup>43</sup> Dastur, too, notes that Heidegger after the *Kehre* sees the problem of the ontological difference, who in the 1962 lecture course *Time and Being* <sup>44</sup> is attempting to "rid the ontological difference of the metaphysical treatment it receives" when being is subjected to beings. <sup>45</sup> The *instancy/instaneity* to which Heidegger turns nevertheless obtains in and through the separation of being into beings, through the ontological difference, that he never abandons despite its schematism.

In the *Le Thor Seminar*, Heidegger not only reaffirms the license of the ontological difference, calling it the "fundamental distinction" from which "all considerations take off," he expressly frames it as a Kantian transcendental schematism: "Spoken in a Kantian manner, the ontological difference is the condition of possibility for ontology." <sup>46</sup> Later in this seminar he will recall, despite his advances, the fundamental character of the ontological difference as it has been stated since *Being and Time*: "being is not a being." <sup>47</sup> While the "ontological difference holds being and the being together at a distance," as *διαφορά* (*diaphéro*, difference), Heidegger will in the 1944 winter semester course on Heraclitus remind us that he subtends difference as a *relation* between things:

even in the separating of one thing from another there remains a relation between the two: namely, that one is bound to the other – for how could things that have absolutely no relation even be cut off from one another? The ‘away from one another’ of things is still, and necessarily, a relation of being ‘toward one another.’ διαίρεσις, as the Greeks already knew, is still, and always, σύνθεσις.<sup>48</sup>

Heidegger had already worked out the systematic intercedence of *diarsis* and *synthesis* in the 1929/30 lecture course transcribed as *Die Grundbegriffeder Metaphysik*. There Heidegger tantalizes us by denying the staid language of ipseity and describing the ontological difference in an eventful way, saying that this “distinction is never at hand, but refers to something that occurs.”<sup>49</sup> He continues on to say that, while we had in *Being in Time* seen “that which is different in its difference,” we had not yet apprehended this “difference itself,” which is in turn the “fundamental occurrence in which Dasein moves as such.”<sup>50</sup> Despite the eventful intimation, the transcendental collapse nevertheless happens: the “distinguishing [that] is earlier than the two terms that are distinguished,” what Dastur describes in the Prologue to *Telling Time* as “the *event* of thought...this *simultaneity* in which two movements of opposite direction are one,”<sup>51</sup> is collapsed by Heidegger into a “unifying connection” and the “unitary character of the fundamental occurrence,” also called in the *Beiträge* the “essential occurrence” – that is, event.<sup>52</sup> Dastur, following Heidegger, resolves λόγος back to its originary dimension prior to its declarative duplication in λόγος ἀποφαντικός, which provided us in the first chapter “the *very event of language*” as<sup>53</sup> difference. Unfortunately, with Heidegger, who will in the *Die Grundbegriffeder Metaphysik* say that “λόγος is grounded as such in σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις,”<sup>54</sup> Dastur agrees: “that synthesis is always also dieresis, that gathering is at the same time separation.”<sup>55</sup> A connecting-separating, finally, then becomes the theme to actuate *Ereignis* in the *Beiträge*: “[t]he “between” of Da-sein overcomes the χωρισμός [‘separation’] not by slinging a bridge between beyng (beingness) and beings...but by transforming together, into their simultaneity, both beyng and beings.”<sup>56</sup>

Regardless that *Ereignis* and its distribution through *Austrag* intimates the epochal breakthrough for the event of difference as such, a breakthrough well-traveled in the last chapter, as the event of difference *between* being and beings, the event in Heidegger buttresses the notion of category. Difference cannot remain difference so long as it retroacts itself to establish a category, beings, that is subordinate to another, being. The point for event phenomenology is that any such distinction between being and beings is diametric to the event, as there is no way to maintain this distinction without positing difference as a mere gathering anterior to what Heidegger (quite rightly) identifies as the *Unter-schied* (διαφορά,) that is older than them both. Perhaps more, one cannot in any case posit a term as the “essential occurrence of difference” and then say it gathers this difference; being *as* difference resists gathering. This is the recurring problem of the ontological difference in Dastur’s work: its retention presses downward on her own launch away from Heidegger’s unitary reading of being. The self-identity of being supervenes on the differentiation of beings themselves, and Heidegger’s project is recoupling the disjunction of being into beings – that is, conquering difference – by unconcealing the originary identity from which they emerge in ecstatic temporality by way of the ontological difference. The illusion of a total unity of being at some ill-defined genesis, and perhaps one that remains interstitially expressive in beings, is what Rajiv Kaushik means when he says that Heidegger’s “characterization of being as a jointure that becomes disjointed implies that it has some initial moment where it is self-identical so that it can then show itself as self-differentiated.”<sup>57</sup> In the same way that

Heidegger establishes the artifice of ekstatic temporality to restore coherence to temporality's fracturation in quotidian time, Heidegger establishes the becomingness of being to reconcile its differentiation in beings. In each, Dasein must *transcend itself*, its inauthentic, everyday self, to grasp the ultimate mineness of time or being against the scrim of its second order differentiation. Heidegger cannot think the absolute singularity of event because he cannot think the genuine multiplicity through and into which singularity convolves; he cannot read the scansion in an arrhythmic being that shows up singularly, and neither can he see that this singularity is multiplicitous. In the article on Heidegger's logic,<sup>58</sup> Dastur quotes a letter Heidegger wrote to Richardson that is a lucid example of Heidegger's conception of being in its unitary origination, stating: "What is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?...To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined?"

If it makes sense to speak of an essence of the event – and, indeed, this phrase is troubling – this essence is to neutralize and be incompatible with any common derivation of being or its simple differentiation into beings. In event, being is the *divaricating* of divarication, an original splitting in which the suggestion of being as a junction prior to its disjunction into beings is nonsense. To put temporality back into contact with event, through Dastur, we must recognize that an eventful ontology of the event is not, it cannot be, modal in the sense of the transcendental because a transcendental schematism requires a stable site for the presupposition of an *a priori* that is presupposed in, and necessary to, the experience that shows because of this presupposition. But nothing about the event, by definition, can be presupposed; it is the pure and unexpected arrival. Event is in this sense not a modal condition but is the bursting forth of modality *qua* modality; not the *condition* of possibility, but this possibility itself. Even if we follow Dastur and charitably acknowledge that the late Heidegger formally abandons ecstatic temporality and the ontological difference, problems remain because Heidegger thinks time through being that transcends itself, via the event of difference, into beings – meaning that time remains transcendental despite Dasein's demotion in his later philosophy. In *Die Grundbegriffeder Metaphysik*, for example, Heidegger is perhaps even more perplexing about the transcendental circularity of time than he is in *Being and Time*, saying:

Only in the resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, in the moment of vision, does it make use of that which properly makes it possible, namely time as the moment of vision itself...*Dasein's being impelled into the extremity of that which properly makes possible* is a being *impelled through entrancing time into that time itself*, into its proper essence, i.e., *toward the moment of vision* as the fundamental possibility of Dasein's existence proper.<sup>59</sup>

Resoluteness is a posture that Dasein must adopt to disclose itself to itself in the moment of vision, *Augenblick*, which is the "fundamental possibility of Dasein's existence proper," but Heidegger is vague as to not only how, specifically, one adopts this posture, but more importantly, how such adoption is even possible within this schema. Heidegger here seems to disregard the conservatism and humility with which Kant approaches his own transcendental arguments. The transcendental unity of apperception that Kant posits and explicates in §16 and §17 within the Transcendental Deduction in the second *Critique*, while necessary and prior to "all possible representations" as the "thoroughgoing identity of the self," nevertheless "remains distinct from its representations"<sup>60</sup> and not deducible from them. The purpose of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories is to provide the methodological schematic for the deducibility and applicability of the categories to

sensuous experience. As such, this schematic depends on the distinction between the categories and experience, and thus the experiential inaccessibility of the categories, as Kant reasons them as the rule-governed schemata – and thus necessary and prior to – their enabling of sensuous experience. Likewise, Heidegger maintains that an originary – that is, prior and necessary – temporality is the condition of authentic time, accessed by *Augenblick*; but he provides no similarly rigorous methodological justification for the deduction of this temporality from everydayness, nor a satisfactory explanation for this distinction. Heidegger is using the structure of Kant's transcendental arguments to demonstrate the necessity of an authentic temporality for the disclosure of Dasein to itself, but in this disclosure ignoring the restrictions that transcendental argumentation as such places on this access. The result is a time self-circumscribed within an uroboric field, similarly, and ironically, to the Husserlian transcendental ego from which Heidegger believes he escapes. In this way, the great irony of Heidegger's project is that he attempts to so thoroughly depart the bounds of philosophy's history that he often ends up traveling all the way through its circumference, ending up at the beginning. To this end, though perhaps not appreciating how deep the circumferential reference runs, Heidegger in a 1927 letter to his Marburg colleague Rudolf Bultmann writes: "The fundament of [my work] is developed by starting from the "subject", properly understood as the human Dasein, so that with the radicalization of this approach the true motives of German idealism may likewise come into their own." <sup>61</sup>

Relegating this problem to only *Being and Time*, as Heidegger himself and many interpreters do, means accepting Heidegger's later position that the *posing* of the *Seinsfrage*, with its structural representation of the ontological difference, interferes with (now) Da-sein's standing in the "truth of beyng." <sup>62</sup> In the *Beiträge*, the "mere representation of being and beings in their differentiation is now vacuous and misleading" in its "logical-categorical-transcendental" sense because, while this difference may have created the "very first horizon for the question of beyng," it does not as a transcendental and therefore "merely "mathematical" retrogression" grasp the "truth of beyng" in event. <sup>63</sup> In turn, Heidegger's emphasis in *Being and Time* on Dasein's historical situation and its *Seinsgeschichtliches Denken*, its being-historical-thinking, are also now considered prolegomenous but fatally flawed efforts to think the "essence of history, understood of the essential occurrence of beyng itself." <sup>64</sup> Amidst the rage and bitterness that propounds in the *Schwarze Hefte*, there are, too, moments of pellucidity regarding the default of ecstatic temporality and rare attempts by Heidegger to subject his philosophy to explanatory historiography. In the first *Notebook*, which overlaps in its final years with the construction of the *Beiträge*, Heidegger impugns a retained demarcation between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*:

*Being and Time* is not a "philosophy about time," and even less so a teaching on the "temporality" (*Zeitlichkeit*) of the human being, but rather clearly and surely a path to the grounding of the truth of Being; of *Being itself*, and not of beings, and also not of beings *as* beings. Leading the way is the leap into "Temporality" (*Temporalität*), into that wherein primordial time with primordial space essence together *as* unfoldings of the essencing of truth, of its [truth's] transporting-transfixing clearing (*Lichtung*) and concealing. Of course, [therefore], the first, insufficient version of the third section of the first part of *Being and Time* had to be destroyed. <sup>65</sup>

Heidegger is here stating the essential problematic that Dastur references above, a response to the terminal paths in *Being and Time* that lead Heidegger "to think this relation [the ontological difference] otherwise than grounded on the transcendental projection of Dasein." <sup>66</sup> We see in this



selection from the first *Notebook* what Dastur calls the “performative dimension of Heidegger’s thought,” where thinking is not of a “reflexive objectification, but only of an expression, an *Ausdrücklichmachen*”<sup>67</sup> – a description that aligns with Heidegger’s stated intention in the *Beiträge*, the bringing forth of being in the disclosure of the *Lichtung*, where his philosophy “does not describe or explain, does not proclaim or teach... does not stand over against what is said... rather the saying itself is the ‘to be said.’”<sup>68</sup> This is, in a sense, Heidegger’s last aphonic exorcism of the Husserlian parentage of the questioning into being, a resignation that ecstatic temporality, beginning as it does with *Zeitlichkeit*, will never by means of a transcendental-phenomenological reduction of Dasein’s historicity reach the *Temporalität* of being/beyng. The work is now literally dis-placing Dasein, hence the hyphenation, Da-sein, and viewing Dasein not as *opening* the truth of being by way of authentic action but being the *opening*, in the sense of the clearing, on which this truth happens in a non-human, impersonal way.

But does Heidegger’s restatement of the problem of history as the “essence of the essential occurrence” and his archaeology into the original “abyssal fissure” between beings and beyng not simply reconfigure the old molecules into a new structure? Though Heidegger discontinues the *Augenblick* and remits language of the transcendental, he still in the *Beiträge* speaks of the “essential moment” in a way redolent of *Augenblick*; and he still thereby vaticinates a time when beyng is effectively outside history. Heidegger in the 1930s is indeed explicitly stating that Da-sein is no longer historical, where Da-sein is thought “on the essentially occurring ground...for the temporalizing spatialization for the temporal-spatial playing field of beyng.”<sup>69</sup> Heidegger in this very sentence is chastising those who misinterpret *Being and Time* on the basis of “moral resolution,” but then in a vacillating and inconsistent pivot tells us that the truth of beyng in space-time happens only through “openness and resoluteness.”<sup>70</sup> In a later section on “beyng-toward-death” Heidegger uses similarly moralizing language:

But the issue is surely not to dissolve being human [*Menschsein*] in death and to declare being human an utter nullity. On the contrary, the task is to draw death into Da-sein so that Da-sein might be mastered in its abyssal breadth and thus the ground of the possibility of the truth of beyng might be fully measured. Not everyone, however, needs to carry out this beyng-toward-death and to take over the self of Da-sein in this authenticity. Rather, to carry that out is necessary only in the sphere of the task of laying the ground for the question of beyng, a task which is of course not restricted to philosophy. The carrying out of being-toward-death is a duty incumbent only on thinkers of the other beginning, though every essential human being, among the future creative ones, can know of it.<sup>71</sup>

Is this not the *Augenblick* mystified? The call to authentically take over oneself in the magnitude of one’s own mortality replicates the transcendental condition of Dasein *as* time and is thus effectively incomprehensible. How does the dismissed, finite, inauthentic ‘now’ in which we live our lives, spit out the authentic, infinite temporality whose unity in the “essential occurrence of history” retroactively transforms the inauthentic moment to present us with that supposedly *a priori* authenticity? In other words: how can a fundamentally finite experience of time – as any historical, human experience of time must necessarily be – itself be *a priori* infinite? Heidegger confronts his ecstatic misadventure headlong in the *Beiträge*, only to restate its deficiencies in new forms. In maintaining the ontological difference, and based on this difference, the distinction between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*, Heidegger leaves us bereft of a phenomenology that could mediate appropriately between the ontological and ontic; or perhaps better, one that could

question the relevance of this distinction. Heidegger gives no quarter for the hermeneutic moment in his ecstatic analysis because Heidegger gives no quarter for a grounded, quotidian experience of time in his analysis. Summing up this same issue in his own exegesis of the *Augenblick*, David Farrell Krell calls for a recovery of the *Augenblick* in the direction of everydayness.<sup>72</sup> This recovery must, I think, find provenance not only in refiguring the differences that Heidegger finds in modes of time, but their rejection.

### III. Hermeneutic Temporality and Contemporaneity

In the chapter of *Questions on Phenomenology* dedicated to Ricoeur and Gadamer, “History and Hermeneutics,” Dastur says of Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach that he “wants to give back to experience its original content (which is ontological and not ontic) by recognizing its properly historical dimension.”<sup>73</sup> There is between Gadamer and Dastur another giving back: in this case giving back to Heidegger the original content of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) which, while it escapes Heidegger’s attention after *Being and Time*, is the mediatory step by which Dastur claims that “phenomenology...in becoming hermeneutics, breaks with the reflexivity of the Husserlian *Auslegung* and with the status of the “disinterested onlooker” that Husserlian phenomenology reserves for the philosopher.”<sup>74</sup> Historicity is for Heidegger of the 1920s the happening of Dasein through the repetition (*Wiederholung*) of its heritage and thus, for Dastur, “inseparable from the hermeneutic of facticity” and the “thematization of the question of being” as the “relation of accomplishment and time.”<sup>75</sup> Dastur assigns to hermeneutics a vacillatory character – the “turning” and “shifting,” in Ricoeur’s language – that allows phenomenology, through hermeneutics, to occupy an “intermediary dimension” between epistemology and ontology.<sup>76</sup> The chapter approaches Heidegger at a tangent, but in Ricoeur and Gadamer’s “relations with the ontic plane of historical reality,” which for both represents the “interpreter’s fundamental mode of being,”<sup>77</sup> we find what Dastur earlier called “something altogether different from “applying” the ontological to the ontic.” Free from the ontological difference and its torturous influence on history – this is my polemic phrasing, not Dastur’s – Gadamer finds in historicity, as he states in “The Continuity of History and the Existential Moment,” “something about the mode of being of man who is in history and whose existence can be understood fundamentally only through the concept of historicity.”<sup>78</sup> As the title of the essay indicates, Gadamer there deals with *Augenblick*, removing it from the ecstasies of temporality and returning it to historicity, as “not so much a decisive point in time, but rather the moment in which the basic historical condition of human existence is experienced.”<sup>79</sup> We can begin to see here, even at this preliminary junction, a restoration of the *Augenblick* away from an ecstatic temporality and into grasping one’s historical situation as the event of understanding – a link that Gadamer himself explicitly makes between the “Kierkegaardian concept of the existential moment [*der Augenblick*]”<sup>80</sup> and event.

Gadamer’s engagement with Kierkegaard is neither frequent nor sustained, but it is instructive and consistently draws out the theme of *interpreting* time as being an event of belonging to the kind of being that we are. Gadamer sees in Kierkegaard’s *Augenblick* the temporal singularity with which Dastur characterizes event: the former is “no longer a point in the uniform flow of change...and which is unique because it is now and will never be again” and poses to the “experience of discontinuity” the “question of how and in what sense it contains continuity,”<sup>81</sup> a description comports to the latter, which is for Dastur is that which “dislocates time and gives a new form to it, something that puts the flow of time out of joint and changes its direction.”<sup>82</sup>

Gadamer responds to the question posed to discontinuity by *Augenblick*, in what Dastur calls “being addressed (*angesprochen*) by the tradition,” by claiming that this understood encounter between us and tradition *is an event*. What belongs to history as process, what Gadamer calls “that realized continuum of ebbing present happenings,”<sup>83</sup> is the objectification of temporality as the *Geschichtswissenschaft*, the science of history; whereas tradition, according to Dastur, is not a “pure order of events” because it is a language and “constitutes for us who belong to it a true interlocutor rather than an object.”<sup>84</sup> For Gadamer and Dastur both, *Geschichtlichkeit* is the historical dimension of the human being in which it is called upon by history, opened to and affected by it, and thus “understood as a being-affected by history or a being-exposed to the efficiency of history.”<sup>85</sup> Historicity is in this sense not an affectation or production intrinsic to an intentional consciousness that is inside history and so it contains what Dastur calls an “original alterity,”<sup>86</sup> Ricoeur’s “paradox” that “we are temporally affected as much as we act temporally.”<sup>87</sup> In stitching historical presence to alterity, Gadamer and Dastur intermingle, rather than oppose, the intimate and alien in time, which is the linkage between language and time in the event as the purely novel and new. As Dastur says of Gadamer’s sense of time, “only in the tension between familiarity and strangeness can transmission be achieved as an act of language...which implies the appearance of a discontinuity in the historical continuity.”<sup>88</sup>

Dastur does not explore her link with Gadamer in this direction, but there corresponds to each, and I think as much is at least latent in these few words, a sense of eventuation in which being’s ceaseless happening does not occur *in* the now, rather its eventuation *establishes* the now. This is to say, the event of meaning, in its very eventuation, establishes the implacable horizon of what Gadamer, invoking Kierkegaard again, calls the contemporaneous (*Gleichzeitig*). On this occasion in *Wahrheit und Methode*, what Gadamer borrows from Kierkegaard is a temporality that is instantiated not as a succession, flow, or flux, but rather as the intransitive property of total presence:

Contemporaneity, on the other hand, means that in its presentation this particular thing that presents itself to us achieves full presence, however remote its origin may be. It consists in holding on to the thing in such a way that it becomes “contemporaneous,” which is to say, however, that all mediation is superseded in total presence.<sup>89</sup>

Our attempted reengagement with the event of meaning in contemporaneity, this “holding on to the thing” after its arrival, regardless of the remoteness of its origin, is what I take Dastur to identify as the ontological structure that *we keep trying to give meaning* to the event. We attempt, that is, to make the event present to us and, in this recurring-presence, the temporality of an event casts off what Gadamer calls the “usual experience of temporal succession” as between “present, memory, and expectation” in a radical presence.<sup>90</sup> Our attempted re-engagement with the event thus unfolds, in each instance of its repetition, the uninhibited re-creation of a “present time *sui generis*,”<sup>91</sup> the singular and each timedness of Heidegger’s *Jeweiligkeit*. Hence the event of meaning is the achievement of temporal amalgamation and the perpetual recursion of the present back into itself, an event which Gadamer above says is “unique because it is now and never will be again.” The fleeting singularity of contemporaneity, which one might deem the practical instance in which we are, to Ricoeur’s point, “temporally affected,” in this way binds the multiplicity of time to one’s present, dually understood, “not as mere negation” in the dialectical antithesis between being and not yet, or in the triadic ecstasies, but as the “positive possibility of being wholly with something else.”<sup>92</sup> The finite transcendence of Dasein that Heidegger insists is

thus unnecessary because being, and along with it, temporal subjectivity, is fundamentally multiplicitous, divergent, and is called to account by alterity; it is only within our pre-existing consonance to a world in which we are prejudicially intelligible that our being-history, in our self-utterances and dialogue with tradition, *appears to us* as coherent. Whereas for Heidegger the unity of the ecstasies in *Augenblick* exposes the primordial unification of temporality concealed by the messiness of the present and the vulgarity of historical time, here the direction is reversed: the pure multiplicity of being's event for Dastur and Gadamer is concealed in any historical moment by the pre-given intelligibility arising from Dasein "uttering *itself*" and these utterances understanding "in one sense or another the being intended" in time.<sup>93</sup> In its verbality, in other words, Dasein's interpretive facility conditions the pure potentiality of time – all possible moments – into the thematic availability of temporality, insofar as the latter distillates time into present and presently accessible moments. A divergent conception of time, dehiscent, in Dastur's language, is thus a temporality that is impermanent and, in that way, attached deeper to time than any transcendental schematism.

Approximately halfway through the section of *Wahrheit und Methode* where Gadamer invokes *Gleichzeitig*, "The temporality of the aesthetic," Gadamer relates the totality of presence in contemporaneity to the experience of the **θεωρός**, the sacred designated observer, who is sent either as a functionary of the city-state to the festival of the Panhellenic games, or alternatively to the oracle, at Delphi, to engage in "sacred spectating" and thus to glean "broader perspective" and transmit this knowledge back to the city. This sacralised spectation is described by Gadamer in a way that echoes Dastur's claim that we are incapacitated by the event: "Theoria is...not something active but passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in and carried away by what one sees."<sup>94</sup> The reference to pathos is crucial, for it re-collects the primitive dimension of **θεωρίᾱ** in the light of **θέᾱ** (*théā*, "sight"), as in, before the contemplative transformation, how the **θεωρός** *sees* the oracle in the way we *see* someone about a matter of concern for us and are "carried away" in that concern. In the original form of **θεωρίᾱ**, sacral spectating, the *theoros* thus heeds the call of pathos not, in the context of the pure *contemplatiō* which **θεωρίᾱ** later becomes, but rather in the sense of pathos' root verb *páskhō* (**πάσχω**), 'to undergo an authentic experience.' Here Gadamer recalls something like Kierkegaard's existential pathos, with its pre-emption of event:

pathos is not a matter of words, but of permitting this conception to transform the entire existence of the individual. Aesthetic pathos expresses itself in words, and may in truth indicate that the individual leaves his real self in order to lose himself in the Idea; while existential pathos is present whenever the Idea is brought in relation with the existence of the individual so as to transform it.<sup>95</sup>

The *theoros* answers the call of existential transformation (pathos) passively, and in so doing, achieves presence only through the absence that is the otherwise; he really "transform[s]" his entire existence in being "wholly with something else."<sup>96</sup> The spectator transforms into one who has "no other distinction or function than to *be there*"<sup>97</sup> and one who fades seamlessly into experience and not, as in the sterility of speculative contemplation, as merely the ego's "subjective self-determination," but as "attending" to something and "giving oneself in self-forgetfulness."<sup>98</sup> The pathetic *theoria* is here an absorption, *in totum*, where the immediacy of the event supersedes the seeming remoteness of time in the fusion of self-forgetting.

And in events, what Dastur calls “events in the strong sense,” do we not find ourselves given over to this kind of self-forgetting and therefore also given over to this kind of representative temporality? We do not stand guard over our involvements – including, most principally, the involvement with the events of our own lives, such as births and deaths – guiding them from start to completion like a teleological parabola; we “know our way around” (*Sichverstehen*)<sup>99</sup> time in virtue of observing its reference to our common-sense world, even when an event disrupts the possibilities of which this world is the culmination. In this way, the hermeneutic of facticity in which we are all involuntarily determined and habituated, in its binding to the event, eliminates the need to ecstatically transcend our own interpretation to grasp the reality of this facticity. The event, even in ravaging time of its succession and the world of its sense, shows to us in our recovery from this eradication that the possibility for this recovery belongs to us, existentially; that indeed, as Dastur says, the “very experience of such a “commandment” confirms that the event requires my collaboration.”<sup>100</sup> It is only a world to which we are interpretably configured that can by dint of the event temporarily seem insensible; if the world was not the place of our pre-understandings, then it is not the place to which we could return, ala Dastur, to deputize ourselves to make sense of the event’s trauma. Though our attempt to regain our mooring after the event is often futile, the magnetism of the attempt itself can be said to determine what we ourselves are as “merged with our being-in-the-world.”<sup>101</sup>

Language and its reference to the field of our finitude is thus what inaugurates the event *as such*; and time-as-meaningfulness, manifested from the pure potentiality of possible meanings and possible times, is perpetually established on the horizon of contemporaneity. In our attempts to giving meaning to the event, that is, we do away with the very mediation of the ontological difference that purportedly characterizes its appropriate grasp. The event is the site at which our being-present-there instantiates the contemporaneity of time; the contemporaneity of time, in turn, constitutes the essence of being present where, in the event, all mediation between disparate nodules of time are superseded in the “total presence” of the pathetic immersion of the experiencer. The observance of pathos thus allows Dasein to reveal itself in a dual sense of total presence; both actualizing what Heidegger might deem an existential totality (*Anwesenheit*) and disclosing a field of interpretation pegged to its historical present-ness (*Gegenwartig*). Though the whisper of both past and future conspire to imbue the event with its irrevocable discontinuity, the present-now is the meeting place for lived time in the contemporaneous. Despite allusions throughout to the Heideggerian *ek-stasis*, Gadamer critically defines the “continuity” of the perpetual present, the contemporaneous, as *not* epiphanic (*epipháneia, ἐπιφάνεια, ας, ἥ*); it does not burst forth ecstatically into mere historical projection to show (*epi-phaneia*, “to make show”) “some other future or reality behind it” because the spectator is already “*purely present* to what is *truly real*.”<sup>102</sup> Unlike Heidegger, Gadamer does not see duplication as needing transcendence, for the duplicative moment, *Augenblick*, recurs what was already taken as real in the original interpretation. Not only is the repetition taken as real, but in its pure difference, the representation, in “being only becoming and return,” lodges a “radical sense” of temporality: “Thus, its own original essence is to always be something different... An entity that exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history.”<sup>103</sup> The event itself, though not an entity, displays exactly this incessant difference in its becoming the future; and thereby the present-ness of the event is taken as exhibiting an “autonomous circle of meaning.” The spectator is not derivative in his present presence, he is

really there, in the absolute tense of the present and *nous*, and so in the midst, knowing “all about how it really was,” interfacing with tradition.<sup>104</sup> Gadamer both modulates and subtly rebukes his teacher’s infamous neologism to express this total hermeneutic envelopment of *theoria* in presence: the spectator is a “being there present (*Dabeisein*),” an engrossed passivity who is not, as in Heidegger’s formulation of Dasein, merely “being alongside” in presence, but whose very being is determined by it.<sup>105</sup>

I should note, here, that Dastur, at least in “Phenomenology of the Event,” distances herself from any description of the event as contemporaneous. But for Kierkegaard and Gadamer both, contemporaneity does not consist in sameness; as we have seen, it demands of history that it submit to the discontinuous, always containing the alterity and noncoincidence of moments otherwise than each other. Contemporaneity describes the salvific act by which the true believer brings two noncoincident moments – namely the present moment and the redemption of Christ, for Kierkegaard; and the present moment and the moment of the aesthetic awe, for Gadamer – into determinate relation in a pathetic immersion in the present. In fact, and even using language of the event, I think that Kierkegaard describes contemporaneity (*samtidighed*) in *Philosophical Fragments* as depending on a distinction that Dastur (and Raffoul) recognize as advent and event:

But what does it mean to say that one can be contemporary without, however, being contemporary, consequently that one can be contemporary and yet, although using this advantage (in the sense of immediacy) be a noncontemporary – what else does this mean except that one simply cannot be immediately contemporary with a teacher and event of that sort, so that the real contemporary is not that by virtue of immediate contemporaneity but by virtue of something else.<sup>106</sup>

There is an interplay between proximity and distance, between advent and event, on which Kierkegaard, Gadamer, and Dastur converge. In ἀπολύτρωσις, the Christological redemption, one’s historical (adventful) proximity to Jesus is irrelevant because one is incapable of being contemporary to, and is thus distal from, his presence in arrival, Christ’s *evenire*. An unrecoverable distance is maintained in the Greek, *apolytrōsis* (to redeem by paying a price, as in ransom), even in salvation, because the salvific act, like event, occurs to us but does not belong to us. Mirroring what Dastur will say about mortality in the final chapter, salvation for Kierkegaard is aleatory, containing an indissoluble trace until it is finalized in death: the one who is redeemed from (ἀπο, -apo, ‘from,’ and λύτρωσις, -lytrōsis, ‘to redeem’) existential enslavement is still the one who was enslaved and is thus marked out, temporally, by the expanse between enslavement and liberation. By this right, Mark C. Taylor takes contemporaneity not as “occurring at the same time,” but as making “all persons equidistant from the event.”<sup>107</sup>

Establishing the contemporaneous therefore does not refer to a givenness subsiding in subjectivity but is its attempt to wrest comprehensibility from the borderlands of the incomprehensible and speaks too of the “call and response” in an eventful encounter – precisely what I take Dastur to mean when she says that time “makes us capable of welcoming the surprise of the event whose unforeseeable nature takes off from the ground of our anticipations, as if through excess.”<sup>108</sup> *From the ground of our anticipations*, that is, the subject’s pre-interpretive, pre-relational, and therefore ontological predisposition to the event, in its relation to temporality. In attempting to give meaning after the event, we do not thereby become contemporaries to the event in the historical sense; we rather in contemporaneity preserve the syncopation of time, its

dis-junction and singularity, by submitting to the delay in interpretation, thinking the very alterity that Dastur defines as essential to understanding:

We grasp here what constitutes the very root of understanding insofar as it in principle requires the temporal distance and alterity of what is understood. Understanding does not consist in a mere reproduction of a meaning already effected in the past (since the meaning of a text is not something that the author could have mastered), but is rather what escapes from the author, not occasionally but in essence, and is what can be given only in the figure of alterity and in temporal distance.<sup>109</sup>

The recovery from alterity and temporal distance in contemporaneity is always to come, perhaps never complete, and thus for Dastur our existence is never the “master of such surprise and occurrence.”<sup>110</sup> We attempt only to right ourselves in the shipwreck of understanding that pertains to event – an attempt to transmute from a past, one that is eradicated by the event’s establishing a new world, a sense of meaning by bringing it into this moment. In the *Umgangssprache* of Marburg, where Gadamer was born, the *gleich* of *Gleichzeitig* speaks to this debt: it has the sense of same, equal, and immediate, but also of the minor delay — of a break in immediacy, in the way one’s spouse asks for a favor and one responds, ‘*Ja, gleich*’ (yes, soon). *Gleich* here refers to a time otherwise, but complementary to, the now, a recuperation of the now in a deferred present; it is promissory.

If we follow Dastur’s impulse, through Gadamer, back to a hermeneutic orientation of temporality, what event phenomenology receives in this picture is a temporality immune to what appears as its own limits, alterity, or at least one that redefines what is meant by limit. But perhaps we substitute one aporia for another? Is not a total supersedure of presence, in its own way, abjective to event; degrading it to a contiguousness and a totality that it opposes metaphysically? And is contemporaneity, in its own way, not merely the congregation of ecstasies by another name? In a Heideggerian fashion, these questions presume their response with the thought of presence being opposed to absence, rather than identifying inside this presence an absence – what Dastur, following Husserl, calls the “experience of the foreign (*die Fremderfahrung*),” what can never be “understood as full synchrony, but must instead always be understood as the experience of an absence in presence.”<sup>111</sup> If we bring the event into its *a posteriori* relation to us in contemporaneity, and if the site on which total presence in the contemporaneous obtains is the world, then to maintain the event as differencing, the world itself must *already contain* this difference and the other populated within it. Indeed, as Dastur tell us in her Ricoeur and Gadamer essay, this is precisely how Gadamer conceives the world: “In every worldview (*Weltansicht*) the existence of the world-in-itself (*das Ansichsein der Welt*) is intended. It is the whole to which linguistically schematized experience refers. The multiplicity of these worldviews does not involve any relativization of the “world”. ”<sup>112</sup> As meaning, the world never comes into self-identical contact such that it would abolish the event, because the worlding of the world for both Dastur and Gadamer *is* this event of presence in *Anwesenheit*. The divergences between multiplicities do not resist understanding, but are the ontological basis for understanding, compelling Gadamer to agree with Derrida in saying “I too affirm that understanding is always understanding-differently (*Anderverstehen*).”<sup>113</sup> Presence is thus not unattributed existence as such, because Dastur thinks that such a conception is denuded of its own possibility. The presence indicted by a critique of the metaphysics of presence is neutered, for Dastur, because presence: “means for it the presence of what is present, i.e., beingness, and not the event of presence, an event that is simultaneously

presence and absence, the self-withdrawing of Being happening on behalf of the appearing of beings.”<sup>114</sup> If presence is an event, then presence no longer has a substance or ipseity separate from the event of being as difference; and thus, achieving “total presence” in contemporaneity is tantamount to our captivation by the event. This presence would always express its own interior limit, the other, exposing this as an inoperable void in the presenc-ing of presence.

Event directs us ultimately to a difference that differences – which is to say, difference is the “verbal noun” of which Levinas speaks, rather than being, which means that it is evenly distributed throughout what we would otherwise deem being as a productive, non-absent negativity. Event is presence, yes, but the presence of absence, not as lack, but as a productivity that does not submit to the ordering function of logic, grammar, and metaphysics in their fraternal collusion. Remembering that identity and difference, nounced proper, instantiate an artificial matrix that is supervened over differencing, we can point to a total presence, an immersive pathos, that internally constellates itself as differencing and thus maintains the tensions in-between a time that always arrives partially, in strikes and glances, and is always discontinuous to itself; that, in a real sense, pathos depends on this discontinuous in bringing together two moments, like the wavelengths of light, that were always and remain different. Appropriately, in our recognition of ourselves in the moment, we achieve “full presence” insofar as the event’s self-re-present-ation, like the temporality of the festival, already and in each case contains the alterity of time in the way it brings “together two moments that are not concurrent, namely one’s present”<sup>115</sup> and the other objective time instances that are re-presented in our experience. In perpetually establishing the contemporaneous in our experience, in other words, the event “constitutes the essence of ‘being present.’”<sup>116</sup> A hermeneutical conception of the event thus allows the phenomenon of meaning to disclose itself. The event is thus the instant in which one might undertake a phenomenology of time as it turns up in its most quotidian form.

#### IV. Conclusion

There is a contradiction between what Heidegger considers Dasein’s inherent sociality and his relegation of that sociality to a lesser status that is troubling beyond being leaky transcendental philosophy. I see in the ontological difference and its maintenance of a separation between merely historical affairs and properly ontological ones a kind of moral confusion – that in the abyss and abyssal fissure and *ab-Grund* to which Heidegger in the 1930s turns, there is an attempt to hide from the detritus of real history by withdrawing into *Seinsgeschichte*. I say this not to participate in further scandalizing Heidegger, but to highlight a methodological failure: the making of history nothing but a starting point for a method whose destination is a philosophy which separates itself from history. Only in such a grotesque break between actual history and a history of being could Heidegger in the *Schwarze Hefte* say, without irony:

For the spirited, active man [*den geistigen, handelnden Mann*], there are today only two possibilities: either to stand out there on the command-bridge of a minesweeper or to steer the ship of uttermost questioning out into the storm of being.<sup>117</sup>

I am reminded here of Marcuse, in two ways. The first reminiscence is a 1948 article, “Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre’s *L’Être et le Néant*,” containing a section worth quoting at length:



The development of Sartre's Existentialism spans the period of the war, the Liberation, and reconstruction. Neither the triumph nor the collapse of fascism produce any fundamental change in the existentialist conception. In the change of the political systems, in war and peace, before and after the totalitarian terror – the structure of the “*realite humaine*” remains the same. “*Plus ça change, plus c'est la meme chose.*” The historical absurdity which consists in the fact that, after the defeat of fascism, the world did not collapse, but relapsed into its previous forms, that it did not leap into the realm of freedom but restored with honor the old management – this absurdity lives in the existentialist conception. But it lives in the existentialist conception as a metaphysical, not as a historical fact.<sup>118</sup>

In the case of *Being and Nothingness*, and equally in the case of Heidegger, when faced with the aporias born from the immutable presentation of being in some concretized system, these historical ontologies have no other recourse than to elevate real, human history to the level of metaphysics to resolve these aporias. Heidegger develops his core impulse and insight, that of the essence of the history of being, the grasping of which he considers the apogee of human authenticity, quite literally during a period of unmitigated human brutality where the National Socialists were, as Marcuse writes to Heidegger in 1947, “in every respect imaginable the deadly caricature of the Western tradition that you yourself so forcefully explicated and justified.”<sup>119</sup> Heidegger can resolve this contradiction only by pivoting to the truth of being as a metaphysical, rather than historical, postulate. The real conditions of the “spirited, active man” of *this* human being in their very specific actuality are not the point, *per se*; rather, it is the ontological architecture of any given human – the unshakeable transcendental subjectivity, as Marcuse aptly notes – that in its generality allows Heidegger to morally equivocate between the terror of war and steering “the ship of uttermost questioning out into the storm of beyng.” In Heidegger’s sacrifice of real history to the “essence of history,” we see the pathogenesis of what Marlène Zarader notes is event phenomenology’s historical affliction: relitigating the origin of the event of being without consolidating or reconciling this origin with how the genus of phenomenon called events show up in the lives of real persons.

The second reminder of Marcuse comes from the interview Marcuse gives to the Heidegger scholar Frederick Olafson in 1977, wherein a clearly agitated Marcuse says of Heidegger, among other incendiary things, that Heidegger “seems to use his existential analysis to get away from social reality rather than into it.”<sup>120</sup> While Marcuse grants that Heidegger founds his analytic of Dasein in Dasein’s historicity – that indeed this historicity is the horizon for being itself – Heidegger ends up with an “ontology which, in spite of its stress on historicity, neglects history, throws out history and returns to static transcendental concepts.”<sup>121</sup> Marcuse continues:

Dasein is for Heidegger a sociologically and even biologically "neutral" category (sex differences don't exist!); the *Frage nach dem Sein* remains the ever unanswered but ever repeated question; the distinction between fear and anxiety tends to transform very real fear into pervasive and vague anxiety. Even his at first glance most concrete existential category, death, is recognized as the most inexorable brute fact only to be made into an unsurpassable *possibility*. Heidegger's existentialism is indeed a transcendental idealism compared with which Husserl's last writings (and even his *Logical Investigations*) seem saturated with historical concreteness.

Speaking in 1977, Marcuse may not have access to the published portions of the *Gesamtausgabe* where Heidegger makes his turn, but recall, as Marcuse does, that Marcuse is with Heidegger in Freiburg until 1932 – which would then include the ‘29/30 lecture courses and Heidegger’s

inaugural lecture on metaphysics, both of which deal in a substantially similar way with the thematic analysis of being in the *Beiträge*. I mention this history only to say that Marcuse speaks from a privileged place of testimony. His disillusion with Heidegger stems not from political or moral rebuke – which Marcuse notes in the interview did not emerge until after the war, besides – but from a philosophical disappointment that each specific, actualized, historical investigation that Heidegger partakes is subsided to Heidegger’s transcendental idealism. In response to Olafson’s question regarding the necessity of historical analysis that intermediates between the levels of “impersonal forces and tendencies” (by which he seems to mean Marxism) and “how the individual ties into such forces and tendencies,” Marcuse answers in the affirmative but claims that this “entire dimension” is missing from Heidegger.<sup>122</sup> “To be sure,” Marcuse continues, “Dasein is constituted in historicity, but [of] individuals purged of the hidden and not so hidden injuries of their class...purged of the injuries they suffer from their society.”

I say all of that to say this: Marcuse is acutely identifying that Heidegger’s mistakes are internal, that Heidegger fails to see that there is something deeply non-phenomenological about his dismissal of “this entire world, "existential" throughout,” such that it becomes in the majority of its forms and presentations merely *existentiell*. Where Heidegger might here rejoin that Dasein’s ontological modes (care, its being-in-the-world and so on) are prior to this historical presentation, Marcuse pre-empts: whatever the nature and characteristics of these more originary suppositions, they can only be described beginning from an historical modality that has already pre-conditioned the possible depth of explication. Heidegger’s ontology surreptitiously depends on, while obfuscating, an intransigent historical and factual residue that cannot be subdued or transduced by entry into an ontological difference – existence is already embossed with the texture of the ontological and so constitutes its legitimate genesis and terminus in an historical analysis of being. I thereby do not think that Marcuse’s critiques reduce to methodological differences. That Heidegger takes off from history only to find in this history the supposedly ontological conditions of its retrogradation speaks to an anti-hermeneutic bent to his work. What Heidegger takes as ‘merely ontic matters’ are, in each case, and precisely as a function of their onticity, eventful, and thus the animating stroke of ontology. Such is the heart of what I have proposed as a hermeneutic return to event: to think variously and thoroughly through event in all its levels, mediating between the allegedly split strata of ontic and ontological so that this problematic disjoining is no longer required. To affect a hermeneutic return in event is to elucidate that event indeed consists in a splitting, but that this split is being itself, and thus it occurs well before and is the foundation for the secondary and illusory split between history and ontology; that, indeed, acknowledging the conception of event as difference not only allows, but perhaps demands, for not the opposing of history to ontology but the consideration of history *as* ontology. In the next chapter, I propose precisely to recuperate phenomenology in the direction of ontological anthropology, which has as its appropriate method psychoanalysis.

## Chapter III – The Eventful *Psychē*

### I. Introduction

Who experiences an event? Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are monophyletic. The phyletic relation between these two intellectual movements is clearest in their derivation of the subject, in both instances owing much to their progenitor. Franz Brentano's psychology operates within the epistemic and historic tandem of the enlightenment and industrial revolution, related events that bring with them an overwhelming turn toward technical rationalism and a fetish for designative and classificatory schema that still typify the modern sciences. Thus, Brentano's most enduring achievement, reinvigorating the Scholastic notion of *intentio*, not only expresses for the positivist impulse to reduce, to regiment, and to subdue, but also engenders in the pillars of continental thought a monomorphic portrait of the subject. The consequence, if not the purpose of which, is a universalized and transcendental unity at the origin of subjectivity in phenomenologic and psychoanalytic thought, one whose self-repressive tendencies are regurgitated as the *a priori* and apodictic rudiments of an entire epistemological and ontological enterprise. And hence, what psychoanalysis and phenomenology offer as methodological maneuvers to 'discover subjectivity,' libidinal inscription/cathexis for psychoanalysis, and the reduction for phenomenology, are not discoveries autogenous to a pre-formed subjectivity, but are instead tools that subjugate the aberrancy intrinsic to an enworlded, enveloped, and fully historical, that is, eventful, subject. Indeed, even the etymology of intentionality, the Latin root *intendo*, demands a bifurcation and thus also a construction: even where Brentano is attempting to subtend a subject-object duality, the severance between the two is merely displaced and concealed. Intention presumes a deliberate direction, specifically being directed toward a conceptuality that I, as subject, intuit – and thus also imposing on the incoherent or transgressive a façade of intelligibility that supposedly structures that incoherence *a priori*.

In a 2011 talk on Freud and the unconscious, "Daseinsanalyse and psychoanalysis: the issue of the unconscious," Dastur, quoting Medard Boss, suggests that Freud develops his stratigraphic analysis of intra-psychical subjectivity to "satisfy the methodological requirements of the sciences of nature."<sup>1</sup> As with Husserl's self-alienating transcendental subjectivity, Freud's unconscious is a contrivance meant to reconnect the structure of subjectivity that he himself disconnects; it is an "an artificial construction to which the modern subjectivism resorts to, to try and explain the being of man."<sup>2</sup> In other words, the impositional nature of intentionality and its establishment of a phenomenological field, along with the translocation of the symbolic to an ostensibly inaccessible unconscious in psychoanalysis, obviates the possibility for excess: the claims of phenomenal or psychoanalytic methodology pre-figure the subject, obliterating in their oppressive apodicticity the event's excess. There is nothing beyond coherence. As Dastur herself notes in this same talk, this transcendental stain shows perhaps most of all in the impossible structuration that Freud applies to an unconscious that is out of reach. Dastur accepts, at least in basic outline, that Heidegger relegates Freudian psychoanalysis to a second-order mechanistic theorizing; a neo-Kantianism that infers, but definitionally cannot, bring to light an "unconscious which appears as an abstraction" because it "remains obscure, opaque and precedes the advent of existence."<sup>3</sup> Encircled and enciphered by an *a priori* presupposition about its existence that is never delivered in the operations of its existence, the Freudian unconscious not only submits to,

but in fact serves as the psychical sustentaculum for, the specious diremption between identity and difference that Dastur rejects. The unconscious, proposed by Bauer as a metaphorical gesture, becomes in Freud's fealty to the mechanistic impulse an avatar for an unrefined otherness, or difference, embedded in, but contrary to, sameness or identity; and, contradictorily, as referring to a general class of objects which the very concept of difference defies. Freud's move, to position the unconscious opposite and anterior to consciousness, and to thereby assume its inaccessibility by the deployment of consciousness, already assumes what it needs to demonstrate: the ontological status of a permanent subject *whose nature it is* to signify and thematize by way of the signifying and thematizing appurtenances through which it is itself structured. Dastur quotes Freud himself to buttress her point, with Freud stating that "we must suppose the existence" of the unconscious "because, for example, we deduce it, we infer from its effects but we don't know anything about it. We have the same relationship with it than with a psychological process in another individual." <sup>4</sup> As we are "inhabited by somebody else that is not ourselves," Freud must theorize an intra-psychical division and an "original alienation of the psyche." <sup>5</sup>

For the event, such a reductive instrument of subjectivity is problematic, because the event, in its happening, is discontinuous, irruptive, ejective; it breaks the order of things. A structure of subjectivity inclined to calm this dissonance, then, presents a serious problem for philosophies of the event: how can a subjectivity defined by language represent that which is undefinable by language? The answer is that subjectivity must itself be defined, or transfigured by, the event of difference; this subjectivity must be a space that consummates in signification but is not itself significative, in the correlational or representative sense; and it must be a subjectivity grounded and constituted by something alter to, and that exceeds, itself and its set of signifying practices. An event phenomenology therefore requires a subjectivity that is transgressive, always in the process of defying the reciprocal self-circumscription in which language and subjectivity typically show in phenomenological time. In the epilogue to *Telling Time*, Dastur similarly asks whether Western languages, imbued by the mark of the logic of grammar and therefore also the subject and its predication, afford "the possibility of letting the thing itself come to language without recourse to the permanence of a subject proving necessary?" <sup>6</sup> She indicates that such a project is possible through "metamorphosis, not of language, but our relation to language," <sup>7</sup> to *directly* sign the event. To execute this project requires first an act of phenomenological heresy, abandoning a prescriptive methodology, what Dastur calls a "methodological treatise," because this logic first and most of all leads us astray – specifically, back to the point of separation between the hermeneutic and existential event and the linguistic system to which the former gives birth. For Dastur, that is, the invariants that phenomenological archaeology supposedly discovers are instead always and already mediated by the particular; their terminal presentation always diffracted, or suspended, by the incorrigible interpretive fluidity of the particular and its attachment to event.

In the chapter that remains, I unpack how an eventful portrait of the *psychē* can provide precisely the non-significative ontology at which Dastur aims and thus a subject for the event. I begin by grappling with Dastur's and Heidegger's similar criticisms of the hypothesis of the unconscious, and existential psychoanalysis, at least as they appear respectively in Freud and Binswanger; a criticism that appears at least temporarily to deny my suggestion that Dastur's phenomenology is whole only based on an eventful *psychē*. Two unlikely collaborators – given

the reception of their mature works, the young Foucault and Merleau-Ponty – are brought into contact to mount a defense of Binswanger, or at least the project that Binswanger represents, leading us to the departure point of Heidegger’s critiques of regional ontology in §6 of *Being and Time*. The purpose of this contact, *contra* Heidegger, is to demonstrate an ontological anthropology as a legitimate ontological mode, which has for its method psychoanalysis. Such a method posits the *psychē* as event to overcome the problem of interiority and limit that attends psychoanalysis and forms the essential basis of phenomenology’s resistance to psychoanalysis. Due to Dastur’s radicality, there is a subject recoverable in her work that, perhaps, she herself would repudiate. Recovering a Dasturean subject requires an analysis of the *psychē* that allows subjectivity access to the eventful field, that is in fact event, and in so doing does not reduce the incoherence of eventfulness to coherence. In this way, I attempt to recover what Dastur calls, in the talk on the conflict between Daseinanalyse and psychoanalysis, <sup>8</sup> a “certain fertility of the unconscious” and a “phenomenological core” in Freud. <sup>9</sup> By showing *psychē* as Dastur’s event, I attempt to show a *psychē* that Dastur requires, one “not understood as a topic...but a place of concealment, pre-psychological place of concealment which is pre-personal as well, a concealment that remains inaccessible and from which everything emerges.” <sup>10</sup>

## II. The Eventful Subject

We began by asking a question: who experiences an event? The answer to this question requires posing another: in which sort of philosophical trajectory do we understand our journey once the distinction between ontological and ontic has been dispensed? The answer is perhaps no version of philosophy at all. In Foucault’s twice-long 1954 Introduction to Binswanger’s *Traum und Existenz*, “Dream, Imagination, and Existence,” Foucault preemptively answers of the deficits that Heidegger will in the *Zolikonar Seminare* see in Binswanger’s *Daseinanalyse*. <sup>11</sup> As we saw, Dastur and Heidegger both consider Binswanger’s fundamental error to be a misreading of the ontological difference, with Heidegger saying that Binswanger’s *Daseinanalyse* remains a merely ontic and existentiell understanding of Dasein in its factual model. Heidegger is insistent to Boss, the therapist on whose *largesse* the seminars are organized, that Binswanger’s existential psychopathology perverts his method in *Being and Time* because it perverts the *Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein* (the question of the meaning of being). <sup>12</sup> By not showing fealty to the ontological difference, which is the preparatory ground that the *Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein* opens up to the *Seinsfrage* in *Being in Time*, Binswanger adds to Dasein additional modes which he believes Heidegger to have missed, who in turns takes these to be spurious adumbrations of what cannot, as such, be adumbrated – the being of beings. Binswanger treats “‘man’ as an object in a broad sense, as a being-at-hand,” committing the unforgiveable sin of appreciating the totality of man not as the site for the interplay of *λήθη* and *ἀλήθεια* but as a matrix of empirically ascertainable characteristics. In contrast, Dastur explains that Heidegger was “considerably impressed” by Boss’ interpretation of his work, because he accurately assessed its denudation of subjectivism: “[r]ather than any particular anthropological determination of Dasein, Boss had thus initially situated the therapeutic relation with respect to what in Heidegger is “the name for the whole unfolding essence of Dasein”— that is, *die Sorge*, care.” <sup>13</sup> Even to the last, Heidegger is asserting the primacy of the *Seinsfrage* viz., the path opened to it by the *Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*; that the question of being itself can only be posed by first, and always, distinguishing between being and those to and into which it is diffracted, beings. Without acknowledging this distinction, all analyses remain regional.

It is unclear from the historical record to what extent Foucault, if at all, was aware of Heidegger's criticisms of Binswanger. Binswanger is treated with charity and vigor by Merleau-Ponty in the latter's *Phenomenology of Perception*, a book well-read in the French academe and certainly by Foucault. Merleau-Ponty's positive treatment of Binswanger in the terms reconsidered here could have percolated in his supplementary courses at the École Normale Supérieure, for which we have evidence of Foucault's attendance. But Merleau-Ponty did not position Binswanger *against* Heidegger or offer much in the way of a critique of Heidegger's program either in *Phenomenology of Perception* or the lecture courses during this time. I invoke the historical record for this reason alone: Foucault's introduction to *Traum und Existenz* converges with Merleau-Ponty in the call for a reinvigorated anthropology and does so in a peremptory way against Heidegger's criticisms, mirroring their language, that is eerie. Recall that Heidegger charges Binswanger with a reductive, anthropomorphic reading of *Being and Time*, one that misapprehends the *Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein* by polluting it with anthropology. But Foucault rejoins that Binswanger "outflanks" the "problem of ontology and anthropology" in general, the very problem whose construction in Heidegger becomes the formal problem of the ontological difference, by:

moving continually back and forth between the anthropological forms and the ontological conditions of existence...continually cross[ing] a dividing line that seems so difficult to draw, or rather, he sees it ceaselessly crossed by a concrete existence in which the real limit of *Menschein* and *Dasein* are manifested. <sup>14</sup>

To Dastur's point regarding Heidegger's insistence that "mediating" between the strata of his foundational difference requires something "altogether different from "applying" the ontological to the ontic," Foucault answers in identical language: "nothing could be more mistaken than to see in Binswanger's analyses an "application" of the concepts and methods of philosophy to the "data" of clinical experience." <sup>15</sup> Foucault goes on to say that "it is a matter for [Binswanger], of bringing to light, by returning to the concrete individual, the place where the forms and conditions of existence articulate," <sup>16</sup> thus seeing in Binswanger a resistance to rigid disciplinary bounds and a rigorous existential archaeology of the traces and structures of subjectivity that thereupon redefine the entire problematic of 'man'. The inscription of history all across the surface of existence, to Foucault's point, interferes with and determines the questions that would thereby open to the transcendental field of *Dasein*. And, so, when Foucault says that Binswanger's existential analysis avoids any "*a priori* distinction between ontology and anthropology," which does not eliminate the distinction but "relocates it to the terminus of an inquiry whose point of departure is characterized not by a line of division, but by an encounter with concrete existence," <sup>17</sup> the answer to our opening question becomes clear: the only place at which "the forms and conditions of existence articulate" is a concrete subject who is always already ontological. The field in which one studies this subject might thereby be called ontological anthropology, resisting Heidegger's caricature, and its most appropriate method would be psychoanalysis.

If one reads in the spaces between Foucault's description of Binswanger's anthropology an uncharacteristic grace toward the possibility for a certain phenomenology, one should not be surprised to see his teacher's handwriting in the margins of these spaces. One for example hears Merleau-Ponty in Foucault's demand that phenomenology "must ground itself by elucidating that movement in which the directions of the trajectory of existence are constituted," <sup>18</sup> a demand which Foucault believes is fulfilled in existential analysis and that he explicitly deems a certain

phenomenological psychoanalysis. Dissatisfied with the lingering subjectivism in phenomenology at the end of the period coinciding with *Phenomenology and Perception's* publication, Merleau-Ponty in the 1950s, according to Dastur, undertakes “a destruction of the classical subject...precisely because consciousness is thought in it as operant intentionality and because the emphasis is placed on the irreducible divergence between Being and meaning.”<sup>19</sup> By the time of the 1958/59 Collège de France lecture course entitled *La philosophie aujourd'hui*, Merleau-Ponty is now interested in not merely dis-placing transcendental subjectivity and its intentional preoccupation from phenomenology's locale, but now thinking psychoanalysis as a non-philosophical philosophy:

There is only one complete psychology: it is philosophy, that is to say Psyche confined to the auto-revelation of Being (hence, reference to the Psyche of Heraclitus). If philosophy is true psychology, psychology is an incipient philosophy: But this is not only true of Psyche; the body as bearer of Psyche returns to being where all things are together.<sup>20</sup>

For his “ontological psychoanalysis,” to borrow Merleau-Ponty's term if not his edifice, Merleau-Ponty believes that philosophy would or could posit the *psychē* as such, in Heraclitus' original conception – a *psychē*<sup>21</sup> that in fragment B115 Heraclitus describes as αὔξων, which depending on the translation renders the fragment something like “the logos (λόγος) of the soul (ψυχή) increases itself (ἑαυτὸν αὔξων) (ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων).”<sup>22</sup> A *logos* inside the *psychē* that increases itself would do so by way of an originary splitting that remains open to the world, and therefore alterity, therein differencing itself to take in the world as other and prevent its own reduction to self-identity. If we follow Dastur's anamnesis halfway, that is, to λόγος which is not, and is not grounded in, the interweave between σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις, but rather that maintains λόγος as διαίρεσις, we find what Dastur defines in *Telling Time* as the “very event of language.” If we then, by way of a cautious twofold transit, first situate this λόγος in the eventful sense, as the event that shows hiddenness and manifestness as distinct, and then locate this evental λόγος interior to a self-enlarging *psychē*, we would recover what Dastur calls, in the talk on the conflict between *Daseinanalyse* and *Daseinanalytik*,<sup>23</sup> a “certain fertility of the unconscious” and a “phenomenological core” in Freud.<sup>24</sup> This surgery would evince *psychē* as event, as the opening up of the divergence typically named by the relational difference between conscious and unconscious, which we might now synonymize with concealment and unconcealment, and by such measure show an unconscious that Dastur requires, one “not understood as a topic...but a place of concealment, pre-psychological place of concealment which is pre-personal as well, a concealment that remains inaccessible and from which everything emerges.”<sup>25</sup>

But whereas Dastur suggests that such a “cosmic unconscious...precedes that event of the world which is the existence for each and every one,”<sup>26</sup> we would suggest, rather, that *psychē* as such is the event of the world that is already anterior to the terms conscious and unconscious. *Psychē* would thereby only name the event by which the world opens to itself, by itself, as the null point in which multiplicity is multiplied. If the *psychē* as such is eventful, then differencing would reticulate throughout its multiples, and return through the nominal differences thereby produced, maintaining a reticular tension throughout the network, and preventing the collapse into self-similarity. As reticulated into one another by constitutive differencing, conscious and unconscious, sign and signified, constitution and what is constituted, would no longer be thought on the basis of relative difference and must instead be thought as equivalent magnitudes in a null set. But this null is precisely *not* nothing – the null is non-zero, composed of opposite and equivalent

components that define the whole of the null point. Every configuration thought on the nominal basis of opposition would in a null configuration be a dimension in which opposites are preserved, exactly as opposites, without deleting one another. The sum of the dimension is zero, but the quantity contained in it is definitionally infinite (and thus non-zero) — which is to say, infinitely populatable, open, because whatever a point in the field might be, it commands an opposite. The reticular differencing of a null point *psychē* would in these openings and gaps constitute its self-enlargement through the infilling of these openings with new relations, concepts, and most importantly, intercalating its own history while always tensing its ultimatum, finitude. We would here not think conscious on one side and the unconscious on the other, entombing and ossifying each as the other's limit; we would think of each as belonging to a psychical space in which each is sympatric for the other, intercrossing and interbreeding without losing their identity because differencing arborizes through both. Each evades and flows against the other, flows back into one another, as transcendence without transcendental schematizing, because one forms the opposite of a finite intersect with the other that generates and terminates in event. To interpret such a *psychē* in its eventful character would then return to the anthropological and hermeneutical project promised but uncompleted by Foucault, not as a mechanistic and causal Freudian order, but as the eventful subject itself.

To trace historical existence back through these reticulations, in a sense to pursue a differential anthropology that to Foucault's point resists a difference between anthropology, philosophy, and ontology, we would in this methodology find the human, given *as such*, in its concrete existence, and thereby find who it is that experiences an event: the very human who Dasein transcends, but now embossed already with the texture of what Heidegger calls "ontological" and by the aegis of which he repeatedly calls forth Dasein. And perhaps Merleau-Ponty has already taken us in such a direction. In the essay "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis," which is the preface to Angelo Hesnard's 1960 *L'oeuvre de Freud et son importance pour le monde modern*, Merleau-Ponty eluviates the couple between intentionality and intended act, saying that while consciousness remains consciousness of something, "Consciousness is now the 'soul of Heraclitus' and being, which is around it rather than in front of it, is a being of dreams, by definition hidden." <sup>27</sup> I find this phrasing crucial for three reasons. First, we can find in this phrasing a connection between the ontological and psychoanalysis in the *psychē* as event. As Keith Whitmoyer notes, Merleau-Ponty's references to the Heraclitean *psychē*/soul (ψυχή) refer in his late ontology to fragment B45, which rendered by Husserl reads: "You will never find the boundaries of the ψυχή, even if you follow every road; so deep is its ground." <sup>28</sup> Here, Merleau-Ponty is resisting the call of the phenomenological reduction, *ala* Husserl, to put being, a self-subsistent and uninvestigable whole, in front of consciousness, in the sense of both an identifiable geometric location and in the investigative hierarchy, only to be dissolved to access the instituting subject behind it. To rather put being *around* consciousness is to distribute it, diffract it, to scatter it all around such that is not recuperable as a self-similarity and to acknowledge the inherent incompleteness of the reduction; it is to show being as event. In this sense, Whitmoyer claims, with a footnote reference to Dastur's event, that "at the event of the transcendental, at the event of ψυχή, there is no limit, and therefore the relation between inside and outside, immanence and transcendence, must be fundamentally rethought." <sup>29</sup> "You will never find the boundaries," that is, never encounter the end of what is a null point.



Second, including in this sentence both a reconfiguration of consciousness as the soul or *psychē* of Heraclitus and to call being a “being of dreams,” seems a reference to not only fragment B45 but also B89, to Heraclitus’ *idios kosmos*, which therefore implicates a methodological justification in the easement between phenomenology and psychoanalysis – the intermediary ontological anthropology, which Foucault finds in Binswanger’s analysis of dreams. Fragment B89 reads in the Diels and Kranz translation: “Heraclitus said that the waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.”<sup>30</sup> I want to draw the young Foucault once again to Merleau-Ponty, with what a dream world, or a being of dreams, implies regarding the project of an ontological anthropology in Binswanger:

One cannot apply to the dream the classical dichotomies of immanence and transcendence, of subjectivity and objectivity. The transcendence of the dream world of which we spoke earlier cannot be defined in terms of objectivity, and it would be futile to reduce it, in the name of its "subjectivity," to a mystified form of immanence. In and by its transcendence the dream discloses the original movement by which existence, in its irreducible solitude, projects itself toward a world which constitutes itself as the setting of its history. The dream unveils, in its very principle, that ambiguity of the world which at one and the same time designates the existence projected into it and outlines itself objectively in experience. By breaking with the objectivity which fascinates waking consciousness and by reinstating the human subject in its radical freedom, the dream discloses paradoxically the movement of freedom toward the world the point of origin from which freedom makes itself world. The cosmogony of the dream is the origination itself of existence. This movement of solitude and of originative responsibility is no doubt what Heraclitus meant by his famous phrase, “*idios kosmos*.”<sup>31</sup>

Note the similarities here between Foucault’s description of the *idios kosmos* and Whitmoyer’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of *ψυχή* with its promise of event. Powerfully, Foucault stipulates a sense in which the dream world, as the unconscious, far from being the rightful object of Heidegger’s derision as mere non-sense, is by Binswanger elevated to the “origination itself of existence.” The private world into which I turn in dreaming is not deluded by the common encounter with *λόγος* in which, to Heraclitus’ point in fragments B1, B2, and B17, the many do not understand the order (*κόσμος*, *kósmos*) it proposes, despite its universality and immortality. The waking world, through *λόγος*, is that which all “meet with” (*ὁκοίσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν*) (B17), but only the wise grasp that “this Word is true evermore,” (B1) while the “many live as if though they had their own understanding.”<sup>32</sup> In other words, Heraclitus is in these fragments both underlining the unreality of dreams but also the illusory character of common understanding in which being is the “being of dreams, by definition hidden,” to Heidegger’s credit, in the *Seinsvergessenheit*.

The method of dream analysis that Foucault recovers in Binswanger would not, here, then service the mechanistic and naturalistic reduction of the unconscious to a drive-laden counter-consciousness and thus this method would not be explanatory, in the derivative sense in which Heidegger describes Freud’s theory of instincts (*Trieb*). The point of this method is to show the perforation of the internal limitation between hiddenness and manifestness, immanence and transcendence, interiority and exteriority, self and other that Whitmoyer above says is the event of the *ψυχή*, one site for which is the dreamworld, the fully formed Heraclitean *idios kosmos* on which Merleau-Ponty and the early Foucault converge. Through an anthropology now considered already eventful, we would use its most appropriate implement, psychoanalysis, to show that what

the mature Foucault, in *Order of Things*, thinks is against phenomenology *is already inside phenomenology*: “a mode of thought in which the in principle limits of knowledge [*connaissance*] are at the same time the concrete forms of existence, precisely as they are given in that same empirical knowledge [*savoir*].”<sup>33</sup> For the later Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, ψυχή as event is already in this regard integrative, such that philosophy’s entire orientation in *Visible and the Invisible* is “a question put to what does not speak . . . it addresses itself to that mixture [*mélange*] of the world and of ourselves that precedes reflection.”<sup>34</sup> In Binswanger’s oneiric analysis, both the early Foucault and the late Merleau-Ponty see that raising psychoanalysis to this ontological level – which is to say, this anthropological level – not only re-inserts the unconscious back into the world of things, away from a crude and naturalistic understanding of the unconscious as anti-conscious, but indeed propose a legitimate Heraclitean cosmogony; a procedure which, though they diverge on whether it has been accomplished, both recognize as a genuine target of phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty does not, however, subserve psychoanalysis to phenomenology in this accomplishment, as if phenomenology’s purpose is “saying clearly what psychoanalysis has said obscurely,” rather it is by what phenomenology “implies or unveils at its limits – by its *latent content* or its *unconscious* – that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis.”<sup>35</sup> “Thus, the cross-validation,” Merleau-Ponty continues: “between two doctrines is not exactly on the subject man; their agreement is, rather, precisely in describing man as a timber yard, in order to . . . discover man’s relations to his origins and his relations to his models.”<sup>36</sup> This co-implication or unveiling could indeed be identified as Binswanger’s project in *Traum und Existenz*, which is for Foucault an anthropology of the instantiation – that is, event – of the transcendental interior to the empirical, a phenomenological anthropology that “continually deploys itself from the cipher of the appearance to the modalities of existence.”<sup>37</sup> And while Foucault mentions above the “movement of solitude,” he is quick and steady throughout “Dreams” to note that the imagined wall between anthropology and ontology is breached by “existence itself indicating, in the fundamental direction of the imagination, its own ontological foundation” as presence-to-the-world as *Menschein* (being-with-an-other).<sup>38</sup> Indeed, as Walt Whitman imbues in his poem the mark of Heraclitus, even in dreams we are connected: “I dream in my dream all the dreams of the other dreamers//And I become the other dreamers.”<sup>39</sup>

Third, I think Merleau-Ponty’s point provides us something crucial and at which this entire work has been aimed: this transit back from the event of being to the genus of phenomenon called events, the hermeneutic return. The first half of the quote above speaks to this clearly: “All consciousness is consciousness of something or of the world, but this *something*, this world, is no longer . . . an object that is what it is, exactly adjusted to acts of consciousness.”<sup>40</sup> Merleau-Ponty is not only referring here to the inherent incompleteness of the phenomenological reduction, but to the fictive, oneiric, and in this sense, hyper-real constitution of subjectivity that elides the positivistic concatenation between signs and signification. “It is not the useful, functional, prosaic body which explains man,” Merleau-Ponty claims in this same paper, but “on the contrary, it is the human body which rediscovers its symbolic or poetic weight.”<sup>41</sup> The instantiation of the transcendental into the empirical means that the discordance between empirical facts and their *a priori* conditions is broken, such that the proposed limit between real and unreal in Husserl is transposed through ontological anthropology. We could, then, use this ontological anthropology to realize and explicate a subjectivity that exists at this limit, what Merleau-Ponty describes as the

latent conscious, and develop a methodology that describes what inheres in this limit: the event of the birth of the world. Merleau-Ponty seems to believe that such an endeavour is the:

new sense of philosophy: not philosophy which projects itself over [*surplombe*] the *Strom* [stream], the lux, the plurality, and proceeds by [the] subtraction of an ideal unity—but philosophy which enters the *Tiefenleben* [depth-life] where the lux is premeditated [*sa prémédité*].<sup>42</sup>

By elevating meaning to the jurisdiction of ontology, the method attending to the *psychē* as event could bring us as close as possible to the impossible – to what Dastur asks for in *Telling Time*, a direct signing of the event, and what Ricoeur notes is the proper scope of the connection between phenomenology and psychoanalysis in the hermeneutic arts. A direct signage of the event, a contact with its searing luminosity, requires a new kind of thought without superintendence, a thought in Whitmoyer's words “already within the stream of sense as it splits open, [which at] the same time, attempts to give voice to that which is coming into articulation through it.”<sup>43</sup> For both Whitmoyer and ontological anthropology – and indeed, for Dastur – the essential question is whether thought can bear witness to the event.

If such testimony is possible, it is through rethinking the event in overcoming the bias in event thought for arrival and against departure; or, perhaps, against the thoughts of completeness. If we describe  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  as the event of difference which births the nominal differences between interiority and exteriority, transcendence and immanence, and in this include constituting and what is constituted, we could then ask a simple question: is this event always complete? Or does, in its *evenire*, its arrival, which always implies a departure, in this departure leave gaps, cracks, or chasms in the self-supporting divergence that it reticulates through identities? And if it does, how would this show in the *psychē*,  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ? Dastur rightly notes in “Phenomenology of the Event” that the “event is not produced in a world but is instead what allows the world itself to be opened.”<sup>44</sup> The  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  opens the world as difference, based on which nominal differences show, implying that difference as identity is self-integral and supporting. The *écart* that Merleau-Ponty defines in his ontology is the spacing of the split in event, but is, in that sense, a non-synthetic unity, which he in 1952's “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence” analogizes by way of comparing the comprehensibility of language to an arch: “[Saussure's diacritical linguistics] is a unity of coexistence, like that of the sections of an arch that shoulder one another. In a whole of this kind...[each part]...has the immediate value as a whole.”<sup>45</sup> The diacritical nature of signification, to enable the lapidary wholeness of significations viz-a-viz their difference, is to create in Merleau-Ponty's elaboration “total parts,” a mutated mereology dissonant with the rendition of wholeness. Difference, then, is self-integral; and the event of being *as* difference reticulates this self-integral differencing through and into and between identities. Our perception of event is thus the perception of self-integrity, or as Merleau-Ponty later says, difference *is* identity. But in the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  described in cosmogonical terms, precisely as event, and in Dastur's topological reference, is there not the potential for caesura internal to the event's caesura, for an incomplete opening or incomplete reclosure of that which opens?

If we think event and *psychē* topologically, a form according to which both Dastur and Merleau-Ponty arrange themselves, we must also think through the boundaries, closures, and openings that this topology implies. The event *comes*, but in this coming also departs, and the duplicity of arrival and departure implies transition, however instantaneous, between arrival and

departure and thus also implies a topology that describes this opening of the world. Merleau-Ponty describes this diegesis as effective trauma, comparing the temporal indeterminacy of the unconscious in *Phenomenology of Perception* to an open wound: “Time never closes in on itself and it remains like a wound [*blesure*] through which our strength flows out [*s’écoule*].”<sup>46</sup> To read Merleau-Ponty back into himself, perhaps time is not an eternal denudation, but rather a palpitation of such rapidity that it gestures to an illusory contiguity. If time is the syncopal *a*-synchronicity which Dastur defines – a de-finition, to recall Dastur’s play on words, with which Merleau-Ponty would agree – then as the event that establishes time and world, *psychē* would not be *an* open wound, but the perpetual recursion of *wounding events* back on to themselves, retraumatizing the same site called itself. Event would be not *the* event, but the *events*; the event *keeps happening* in psychical traumatogenesis, τραῦμα, which in the Greek means both to wound and the indictment of this attack, whereby our *psychē* is a self-incriminating encounter with the laceration it itself causes. In eventing the continuous duplication of the present, its arrivals and departures would also be distended into and against one another, representing a functionally infinite series of stressed openings and closings. But what if, in the stress of this closing-opening, a mistake or error is transcribed into the very event of *psychē*, such that its opening remains open, or its closure does not fully close? There would be an ontological exudence interior and between the limits of nominal opposites that the space of the *psychē* establishes in its null-set; a leak in being, a hemorrhage by which a zero or null point origin irradiates and exposes its points. The symmetrical quantities between oppositive magnitudes in any given dimension that maintain the tension between these opposites, and thus allow for their dynamic interplay in sleep-wake, conscious-unconscious, sign-signified pairs, would give way to an imbalance that overwhelms and transgresses the tensive limit. The dream intrudes on the waking mind, the unconscious invades consciousness, disintegrating the spatiality of the psychic space and leaving the *psychē* to reassign the position of opposites according to a faulty function.

What I want to say is that madness represents this faulty topological function, it is the incomplete reclosure of the *psychē*’s constant event, exposing itself to its own conditions. I am thinking here of an instance that Dastur references in “Phenomenology of the Event,” which she says ruins one’s openness to the event, psychosis:

Psychosis provides a particularly gripping paradigm for those moments of “existential crisis”: the schizophrenic, for example, experiences the loss of the world (or the rupture of the “ordinary” linkages of experience), and this dooms him to the impossibility of an encounter and to sojourn in the terrifying. The capacity to be open to the event and to experience the reconfiguration of possible that it demands of us is consequently lost. For it is the event itself that demands, after the fact, to be integrated into a new configuration of possibles, rather than we who decide freely to change from one world to another or to convert ourselves.<sup>47</sup>

In Phillip K. Dick’s semi-autobiographical essay on schizophrenia, 1965’s “Schizophrenia and The Book of Changes,” in which he also references Binswanger, a similar theme emerges: “the schizophrenic is having it all now, whether he wants it or not; the whole can of film has descended on him, whereas we watch it progress frame by frame.”<sup>48</sup> In Dastur and Dick, we see that the schizophrenic *psychē* possesses a certain incessancy, a right of first refusal on conscious lucubrations. The interminable gap in eventfulness creates a time dilatory pressure that consists in perpetually incomplete, interrupted temporal reintegration; where the schizophrenic is, in some real sense, forced to be contemporaneous with the event of their *idios kosmos*, an involuntary and

incapacitating testimonial to eventfulness. Madness is *psychē*'s attempt to make sense of this event in the moment of its historical contemporaneity, an unsuccessful attempt to integrate the products of incommensurable worlds: the slow hum of the sensible world's algorithm, the whirl of its processional time, and the ceaseless howl of the dream world, its phantasms, its breaks, the death rattle of its impossible geometries. The recursive and boundless inward fall into fantasy, into a deviated time and its tendrillar whisps that create illusions of causality is, as Dastur notes above, often thought in terms of the absolute negativity – a fault line opening to a substitute formation.

But perhaps madness is not the sleep of being but can be seen as the blindness caused by witnessing the origin of its dis-memberment in *psychē*. One finds a tremble of this in *Phenomenology of Perception*, in a footnote reference to T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. In the passage, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the singular locality and wordliness of language, that even in such instances where we *speak* multiple languages there is one language we *inhabit* and that inhabits us, because "one never does belong to two worlds at once."<sup>49</sup> In the footnote, Lawrence, recounting his experience in Arabia, directly links madness with the repulsion of incompatible worlds:

Sometimes these selves would converse in the void; and then madness was very near, as I believe it would be near the man who could see things through the veils at once of two customs, two educations, two environments.<sup>50</sup>

What is at stake for Lawrence is the schismogenesis in which *psychē* is the 'that which' is divided, in which madness would not be the schism between sense and sensible but the attestant to the event of this split in which it itself obtains – a witness to the event of being, where *psychē* is the space of the split between sense and non-sense, and madness is the dilapidated reconcile of two disparate languages of being, a sort of counter-*logos* involuntarily dialoging in a single *psychē*. Understanding *psychē* in this way returns to Heraclitus' original mode, as Heraclitus believes that *psychē* encounters itself in the limit or border between it and *kosmos*, in which this limit is understood as an event. It is, too, not to degrade madness – with its corollary, dreaming – to a tangent at being, it is rather, along with Merleau-Ponty and Binswanger, to recognize that the consummation of time and space in the dream, in their purest forms, are grounded in the generality of being common to what we have here called existence.

The distensible topology of an eventful *psychē* could, in this way, also be understood as a spectral phenomenon: consisting in one end, the end of madness, or the *idios kosmos*, as the obliteration of limit, or turning this encounter with limit into its own event, which in either case exudates opposites into one another and in this dissolution also frustrates all signposts to the solid existentials that Heidegger claims necessitate an analysis of Dasein; on the other end, the total concretion of opposite magnitudes, their settlement in the *psychē*'s stable and stabilizing geometry, consisting in the genetic constitution of intentional acts in Husserl; and between them, in the fugacious boundaries between sense and non-sense, the *Augenblick* and contemporaneity of Gadamer and Kierkegaard, in which the sensible mind attempts to comprehend what it cannot. To return to Foucault's defense of Binswanger, ontological anthropology, by already in-building to its apparatus an existential subject that crosses these dividing lines, could seamlessly traverse between these two poles without committing a methodological error. Referencing Binswanger elsewhere in *Phenomenology of Perception*, perhaps Merleau-Ponty has in a meaningful way already arrived at this destination: "The study of a pathological case has thus allowed us to catch

sight of a new mode of analysis – existential analysis – that goes beyond the classical alternatives between empiricism and intellectualism, or between explanation and reflection.”<sup>51</sup> The benefit now of not retreating to a phenomenological posture – even with the lacunae and gaps with which Merleau-Ponty has etched it – is that event provides the principle of crystallization to which Merleau-Ponty alludes elsewhere but does not make of this principle a principle of *hypokeimenon* (ὑποκείμενον), or some substantial transcendental podium from which anthropology speaks to being.

If man is pre-given in his concreteness within the anthropological modality, then his event in *psychē* is traceable throughout both his internal and external history without exhausting a supposed restriction on the limit between transcendental and empirical intervolving. The initiating event of the *psychē* that events, its birth in the world, which would then reverberate as the “proto-event” in Dastur’s words and colour all its other involvements, could be located on a series of such events: an ontological history, a record of events, a *Geschichtlichkeit* of the *kosmos* (κόσμος), in which each birth of a subject is understood in terms of *ψυχή* emerging into the world that it itself creates; where the tissue of the world is a cosmic nursery for the appearance of a solar system of *psychēs*, an endless series of *idios kosmos*, and thus a cosmology of finitudes ordered by their insertion in the world in which birth is the ordering principle of event, the *kosmos* in fragment B30:

This kosmos [the same for all] no god nor man has made, but it always was and is and will be: an everliving fire, kindling in measures and in measures going out.

κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωνον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεन्नύμενον μέτρα.<sup>52</sup>

Birth would be here the *arkhé*-event, *ἀρχή*, in equal measures going in and establishing the finitude by which we go out, the ordering principle on which all other events depend, and to Claude Romano’s point, the establishment of history:

But what are these pre-personal possibilities, which precede me in a history that is older than my histories and to which I am connected by the event of birth itself? They are first of all the possibilities of others not only my parents but *others in general*. In the event of birth, an other is already announced.<sup>53</sup>

From its cry into the world in birth, to its bellow out in death, and in the tensive expanse in between waking and in sleep, the subject of ontological anthropology could thus be understood as the self-showing of event in its subjectival way, and so also as the site on which we bear testimony to this showing. We are each, in this sense, John as he implicates himself in John 1:8, “He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light,”<sup>54</sup> and so we are brought to this light of event by birth to later take hold of an existence which is this birth’s testimony – aligning with the use of *μάρτυρας* for ‘bear witness,’ which Aristotle connects with asserting things that we know, but cannot prove, to be true. In *Origins of the Work of Art*, Heidegger makes a similar point in reference to the comportment of the artwork when he claims that “Man can represent, no matter how, only what has previously come to light of its own accord and has shown itself to him in the light it brought with it.”<sup>55</sup> While Heidegger is here speaking of the artwork, the point is even more salient for the event: eventfulness brings forth the very light by which the event itself is seen. Birth is the intimate gift of existence, establishing both the historicity of being and the *ψυχή* that is itself the event of the world, and incised into each is the mark of a *kosmos* into which

we are organized. Retracing the dotted line between these events with an anthropological pen would not be cause for concern because the ontological difference that would otherwise render such an analysis ‘ontic’ is now irrelevant, as is the intra-psychical and mechanistic positing of the Freudian unconscious.

While we will return to birth in greater depth in chapter IV, I broach birth here to finalize a response to the essential question of whether thought can bear witness to the event. I point out last chapter, in a glance, that Dastur answers this essential question negatively – that the non-contemporaneity of event is its distinguishing mark. The quote from which I reference there is worth reproducing in full:

We are never contemporaneous with the great events in our life, above all with the very first, our birth, which we did not will and which attests to the fact that we are not at the origin of our own existence... There is thus within us a surprise regarding our own birth that is in a way constitutive of our own being, a permanent surprise of having-been-born that testifies to the absolutely unmasterable character of this proto-event. It is possible to think that in each event (in the strong sense of the term) this proto-event of birth is, as it were, repeated, giving it its character of a “first time,” a radical newness... I therefore also have this experience with respect to the overwhelming event, whose present, because of the suddenness of its irruption, does not coincide with itself...<sup>56</sup>

Thinking testimony at the point of origin is non-sense, for Dastur, because the event, while it colludes in us, is the pure coming of non-coincidence, the “radical loss of all possibilities of the world.”<sup>57</sup> I wonder, however, of what Dastur would make a psychological configuration in which it is the geometrics for event, separating, as she does, event from its reflection in the latter’s impossible collision with the former. Holistically positioning *psychē* as the event of antipodals, and thus non-coincident with a reflecting consciousness, ejecting them into and ligating them within a null point, allows not only a sense of madness to impress itself as testamentary, but perhaps also represents the loss of possibility that Dastur otherwise posits as the origin of philosophy:

Nevertheless, we do sometimes experience not understanding, what the Greeks called ἀπορία (absence of πόρος, which means a “passage” or a “way”). This is the experience one has when one comes to a standstill and cannot proceed any further, when what has made sense before is no longer evident, and the totality to which one had felt one belonged has been shattered. In other words, it is an experience of disorientation, what the Greeks called ἄτοπον (the “no place”), an experience of that which no longer meets our expectations, which manifests itself to us in its opacity and strangeness, leaving us “at a loss.” Such an experience is, in reality, far from negative because when we are separated from all the natural evidence that is the framework of our everyday life, we are gripped by astonishment (θαυμάζειν), which is where the first Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, both saw the origin of philosophy.<sup>58</sup>

It is difficult indeed not to draw together Dastur’s θαυμάζειν, astonishment, the destruction of the “totality to which one had felt one belonged,” and her description of the event. Is madness not being “separated from all the natural evidence” of our lives, replaced instead with its phantasmic distortions and representations? Madness would, at that point, consecrate its own ground as not the event’s dis-placement, but im-placement; its starting place, its *Stiftung*, in a way, and thus also the place from which an event philosophy properly germinates.

Perhaps Dastur would nevertheless reject this attempted reconciliation, relying in her rejection on the psychotic’s abject break with all sense-making, even in the delayed or deferred

*Augenblick* of Gadamer and Kierkegaard. Is there another experience that harnesses the vibration of birth's eventfulness, its naked coming, but belongs to the world of comprehension? Does not waking from sleep, the event of this transition, satisfy this requirement? James Morley shows in a short but brilliant analysis that sleep and dreams are focal for Merleau-Ponty, topics on which he variously ruminates in *Phenomenology of Perception* and the Passivity Lectures. In the former, Morley quotes Merleau-Ponty describing the common dream experiences of rising and falling, tied significantly to respiration and sexuality, as expressing a primary spatiality:

We must understand how respiratory or sexual events, which have a place in objective space, are drawn away from it in the dream state, and settled in a different theatre. But we shall not succeed in doing so unless we endow the body, even in the waking state, with an emblematic value...The movement upwards as a direction in physical space, and that of desire towards its objective, are mutually symbolical because they both express the essential structure of our being. The phantasms of dreaming, of mythology, the favorite images of each man or indeed of poetic imagery are not linked to their meaning by a relation of sign to significance, like the one existing between a telephone number and the name of the subscriber: they really contain their meaning, which is not a notional meaning, but a direction of our existence.<sup>59</sup>

Far from being non-being, as constellatory, dreaming is not a second-order or derivative mode of existence for Merleau-Ponty – and is far from its deletion. In his later work, as Kaushik notes, sleep becomes for Merleau-Ponty not the opposite of dreaming or waking, but “being in the divergence” between dreaming-waking and is thus “not merely ontological but the concrete limit of ontology—an ontology before ontology.”<sup>60</sup> If sleep is thus the divergence, itself event, would the sudden closure of this event because of the “suddenness of its irruption” of ourselves back into the waking world, not too be an event? The warrant underlining Dastur's point is that birth *would* be the event *par excellence*, but it is too originary; it defies the very structure of testament for, like death, there is no executor to whom testament belongs. If we however accept Merleau-Ponty's consistent point about sleeping and dreaming, that our being persists in them, indeed finds its lucidity in them, then whatever it is that we are remains contiguous in sleep and is *therefore present at the origin* of sleep's closure – which is simultaneously the re-birth of our *psychē*, thrown into the world anew each parturition of dawn. Each night that we fall into sleep, the *psychē* becomes the site for a bilateral and reciprocal directionality of event, containing and comprising its arrival and departure; or perhaps more, the arrivals inside its departures and vice versa. The event of the dream, in its arrival, is the departure of the waking consciousness, opening up the cosmic magnificence of the *idios kosmos*; the event of *waking up* from this dream is the arrival of the world back into itself, and thus the departure of the dream world, and in this arrival-departure contains all the motifs of event in the writhing presence of that which cannot, by definition, be anticipated. Regardless that we remain what we are in sleep and in dreams, we cannot expect our awakening and this awakening is abrupt, surprising; it is event.

All this said, we might still ask of what thinking's direct testimony to the event avails us. The question remains as to whether positing *psychē* as event, anterior to these differences, merely defers the most essential question, refuses to answer it in a sense. Perhaps it does and of this one must admit a humility. Yet, from a different vantage point, this deferral is ontological anthropology's victory – solving the problem, as Foucault says, by moving it to the terminus of a question, at which point the specific modalities of phenomenology proper, psychoanalysis proper,



and so on, might then begin and address with their specificity and instruments the phenomenon of their fields as it originally comes. The purpose of ontological anthropology is to set the stage for the subject of event, which is to say *psychē* as event, which has as its possibility its own testamentary motion, the salutary gesture between experiencing and writing that eludes the split between the Freudian conscious and unconscious. I do not think that a lack of explanatory weight attached to what this *psychē* is denigrates this analysis, it perhaps strengthens it by relieving from it the encumbrance that beleaguers Freud: the impulse to reduce the human sciences to their naturalistic counterpart and hope that the product of this maneuver is a respectable objective methodology. This is the deep anxiety of the scientific method in its encounter with the unconscious, a recalcitrance in the face of a foundational perturbation; this unease belongs to a rejection that not only something that is alien can be intimate, but is intimate only because it is alien: as Nancy says, only the foreigner can be welcomed.<sup>61</sup> In the environment of eruption, irruption, of undimmed luminosity and the inscriptions of these, maintaining one's grip on a naturalistic conceit of measurement and verification is its own sort of madness. An ontological anthropology, rather, allows for the disturbance in what Heidegger takes to be fundamental, indeed *a priori* existential states, which in this alteration shows these existential states, as Foucault believes, to be bound up by the contingent:

The dimensions of anthropology can thereby be circumscribed. It is an undertaking which opposes anthropology to any type of psychological positivism claiming to exhaust the significant content of man by the reductive concept of homo natura. It relocates anthropology within the context of an ontological reflection whose major theme is presence-to-being, existence (Existenz), Dasein.<sup>62</sup>

Though he never explicates the method for such a procedure, this is precisely what Foucault means above when he claims, “nothing could be more mistaken than to see in Binswanger's analyses an “application” of the concept and methods of the philosophy of existence to the “data” of clinical experience.”<sup>63</sup> This uncompleted analytic – as Foucault terms it – is, perhaps, concordant with what Merleau-Ponty calls at various times “ontological psychoanalysis.” The purpose of exposing the *psychē*'s event in and through subjectivity is to then provide the subject for Merleau-Ponty's analysis — to at the same time take Dastur's step back, a gesture to being, a stopping point in the procession of being at the point of contact with our existence. It is doubtless difficult not to read in this gesture a similarity to what Merleau-Ponty thinks is “Freud's genius:” “his contact with things, his polymorphous perception of work, of acts, of dreams, of their flux and reflux...his listening to the confused noises of a life.”<sup>64</sup> The task of ontological anthropology is to tune an attentive ear to these sounds, to then direct a further analysis toward their scope and breadth.

### III. The ψυχή and λόγος

Recall now that Heraclitus' fragment B115 has two essential components: logos (λόγος) and *psychē* (ψυχή), “the logos of the soul increases itself (ἐαυτὸν αὔξων) (ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἐαυτὸν αὔξων). The question remains how *logos* increases itself, inside *psychē*, and of what this entails for the nature of both. In *Telling Time*, Dastur says that, for her part, she sees in the “λόγος, on condition that it is seen in its naissant moment and not in its result, the ek-centric element that opens the human ψυχή [the psyche], to all that it is not.”<sup>65</sup> Dastur's playful distortion of the French and its transfiguration between its contemporary and archaic morphologies is at work in this

sentence: naissant here functions as a double entendre, both in its derivation from the Middle French *naitre*, and Latin *nascere*, verbs for birth, which as the present participle one would render here ‘being born,’ but also in its more general sense as synonymous with issuant, ‘coming forth, emerging.’<sup>66</sup> This in mind, we might conclude that Dastur sees in *λόγος*, only in its partitive moment as the bursting forth of language – the aurora of its event – inside and because of each word, but not in the result of this parturition, the word itself, that *λόγος* is the force bustling within, while remaining interior to, *ψυχή*. By naming the oppositions which populate its geometry, *λόγος* is that which births difference inside *ψυχή*, that in this emergence articulates its differencing, opening the *psychē* to all which is otherwise – thereby increasing itself. A *λόγος* which is, in each instance, both the act and testament of its own parturition, would thereby create in *ψυχή* the multiplicity attested in fragment B45; it would be the genesis of the everlasting roads by which neither *λόγος* nor *ψυχή* have consignable boundaries, regardless the duration of one’s travel.

As we established in the first chapter, Dastur executes an anamnesis of language, achieving a perpetual duplication that facilitates the expansion of *logos*’ non-consignable boundaries. Dastur finds an originary, primordial sense of *λόγος* to be that which constellates, or gathers, the “between” of manifestness and hiddenness in such a way that visibility and invisibility operate interstitially within each other – that is, that *λόγος* names being and language together, in which things show up not only *through* difference, but *as* difference. Dastur calls this gestational element *Austrag/austragen*, the “distributive dimension” in which being in the midst of beings, “also and at the same time comes into presence in an inapparent manner”<sup>67</sup> and thus gives phenomenality as the event of differential being. I am reminded here of Phil Lynes’ remarkable arbitration between Derrida and Heidegger on the Heraclitean *έν διαφέρειν έαυτώ* (*hen diapheron heauto*, ‘the one differentiated in itself’) where Lynes wants to:

[r]eimagin[e] Heidegger’s *relational* conciliation [*Austrag*] or hidden harmony [*άρμονία άφανής*] between thinking and things, the nothing of beings and the nothingness of being as a *non-relational diaphora*, difference [*unter-Schied*], *différance*, indeed in terms of *disinterest* and *indifference*.<sup>68</sup>

Of course, thinking *Austrag* differentially – indeed, thinking Heidegger differentially – is the beating heart of Dastur’s gambit on the later Heidegger and unfurling this gambit is the purpose of chapter I. There is in that chapter the intimations of Dastur’s reading that align with Lynes’ deconstructive mediation, an attempt to reconstitute Heidegger to difference:

Heidegger defines difference as *entbergend-bergen-der Austrag*, unconcealing-concealing *Austrag*, and as *Unter-schied*, because he wants to make clear that the in-between, the “space” between Being and the beings is older than them. By using the German word *Unterschied* here instead of the word *Differenz*, he wants to show that what has to be thought is the process of difference itself, the event of separation, of the *Scheidung* between Being and the beings rather than the terms themselves that are in such a way differentiated. The word *Austrag*, which means something like “issue” or “decision” in the sense of the settlement of a quarrel, but also the carrying (*tragen*) apart (*aus*) of Being and the beings, is the name chosen by Heidegger for the event of difference as such, in order to indicate that difference has what could be called a “dynamic” character, which means that it is not a relation between two terms already present, *vorhanden*, but the advent of their distinction and simultaneously of their relation... The thinking of difference as a process brings Heidegger to a reversal of the relation between Being and difference. Whereas the ontological difference was still thought as a difference in Being, now it is Being itself which is thought on the basis of difference.<sup>69</sup>

As we have seen, and despite Dastur's best efforts at restitution, Heidegger refuses to surrender the distinction *between* being and beings, regardless that he no longer coronates this distinction, formally, as the ontological difference. The chronological situation between *Unterschied* and being and beings is a second order consideration because *Unterschied* is set *between* being and beings; it remains a relational, and therefore positive, determination of a *some thing* prior to difference that constitutes the *Inzwischen*. Hence "this gesture," as Lynes will later say, "reiterate[s] the Hegelian and Schellingian formulas of the absolute as the *unity of unity* and *opposition*, the *identity of identity* and *non-identity*, a *dialectics of dialectics* and *anti-dialectics*," that demands a "correlational, representational subjectivity." <sup>70</sup>

To salvage a subjectivity melodious to a non-relational difference, Lynes turns to an uneasy partnership between Blanchot and a cadre of speculative realists (Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux) to think the thing as pure *différance*, and thus the processual receptivity of the thing, the subject, as the site for a "*non-relational* nothingness withdrawn from any amphibological reversal between being and beings, being and nothingness." <sup>71</sup> Lynes' démarche is meant to overcome the intrinsic co-relation operating in Heidegger's *Unterschied*, using Derrida's deconstruction as a methodology to effectuate the realist metaphysic in speculative realism; overcoming, therefore, the transcendental schematism between the ontic and ontological that chapter II similarly dismantled. But as Heidegger responds to Sartre in the "Letter," "the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement." <sup>72</sup> Lynes' incision to Heidegger's ontology is essentially accurate, as the latter's reliance on ek-stasis, despite his insistence on the "in-stancy" of Da-sein after the rejection of *Being and Time's* schema, ignores the radical contingency of a subject that is impossible to explain merely in reference to a supposed openness to being. In this incision, however, we must not reactively privilege Heraclites' *hen diapheron heautōi* over what Dastur in "History and Hermeneutics" recognizes as Aristotle's definition of *Geschichtlichkeit* as "*epidōsis eis autō* (growth in and from out of itself)," but rather conjoin them, thus "understanding this growth on the basis of *Sprachlichkeit*, the profoundly language-like [*langagière*] essence of historicity." <sup>73</sup> Derrida's emphasis of the continuity and co-relation in Heidegger on which Lynes relies, though justified, blinds Derrida to see in Heidegger the potential processuality that Dastur sees – a *logos* as the discontinuous force of history as historicity, where *logos* is the "human capacity to enter into a relation with beings as such," <sup>74</sup> and thus also, as she quotes Gadamer, "the way in which understanding comes about lies in the *coming-into-language of the thing itself*." <sup>75</sup> In *Telling Time*, Dastur marries the event as such, *Ereignis*, to historicity-as-understanding by identifying *Austrag* as the ontologically propulsive force inside an ontology of language, claiming that "we let what has been come to language in the saying of the *Austrag*." <sup>76</sup> By underlining that *Austrag* means not only bearing, conciliation, but also carrying apart, distribution, Dastur then accommodates the *dis-* in *dis-*tribution and returns distribution to the Latin vocative *distribūtiō*, which in grammar and rhetoric both is the transliteration for *διαίρεσις* itself: it is to literally take apart. The *aus* of *Austrag* in *λόγος*, what is at the same time the *διά* in *διαίρεσις*, is what therein allows *logos* to necessarily exceed the modern, Western metaphysics of language as nominal and logical representation while being internal to it, gestating it, and thus dyadically constituting language as the site for the thing, and what is otherwise, to come originally to itself. *λόγος* as the primordial carries within the discursive as propositional, antedating it, without ever being exterior to, dispelled from it, or being

its gross negative, as *Austrag* is, as Dastur informs us, the bearing of difference, its exceedance in language.

By not positioning being as *like* a language, but being *as* language, and by positioning being as the event or process of the difference of history through *Austrag*, what Dastur attempts is altogether more radical than either Ricoeur or Heidegger on language: she foists a morphology of difference in the negative space between each signification and then cleverly notes that each sign is always already pregnant with the primordial as the site of historicity. This primordial language, λόγος, is then a perpetually productive negativity animating the opposites of which ψυχή is the null point, while remaining interior to ψυχή and tying each to the subject's embeddedness within its own history and the interpretation of this history as the conjunction of alterity and familiarity – the naissance by which “λόγος opens the human ψυχή [the psyche], to all that it is not.” But primordial language, λόγος, does not have for its supreme and teleological destination the symbolic, where the *subjectum* is constituted, in the final analysis, by the reciprocity between subjectivity and the architectonic of grammar. What Dastur instead finds in the primordial, at least potentially, is a phenomenal field that defies the subject's grammatical logicism, that indeed defines itself both alter to, and interior within, the λόγος ἀποφαντικός. Through Dastur, we tune our analysis of subjectivity to the obdurate connection between subjectivity and its constitution within an ontology of language that simultaneously resists, and in this resistance, renovates the law of the logic of language systems. The primordial accesses a non-propositional logic of subjectivity, what Dastur in an early paper on Heidegger's logic, “Logic and Ontology: Heidegger's Destruction of Logic,” calls a “pre-logical openness to being,”<sup>77</sup> and thus also an ante-discursive ontology of the unspoken that exists secretly, ambiently, yet nevertheless constitutively in between and exceeding the spaces of signification – that is, it accesses the relation of *logos* to *psychē* as the relation of excess to limit.

Accessing this excess through psychoanalysis is consonant to the way in which Dastur refers to the possibility for a *Daseinanalyse* as a hermeneutic analysis of the unconscious element of language in her talk on Freud. There, she references the following section of *Phenomenology of Perception*:

Even with Freud, it would be wrong to say that psychoanalysis excludes description of psychological motives and confronts with the phenomenology method: on the contrary it has contributed to development of phenomenology in asserting, as Freud said, that each human act “has a meaning” and in always trying to understand the event rather than connecting it with mechanical contingencies.<sup>78</sup>

I incorporate Dastur's reference to Merleau-Ponty because it functions as an entry to a middle point between the two, whereby we might systematically elucidate *how*, precisely, *logos* and *psychē* contaminate one another in an ontological subjectivity. As a first step on this path, we might note that, while Merleau-Ponty attempts especially in his later ontology to succeed the thinking of subjectivity as such, at least here there is a gesture to a certain complexion of subjectivity redolent to the anthropological subject we find in Foucault. In the direction of Lynes' indifferent, non-relational subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty wants to debilitate the subject in Freud's mechanistic exigencies and anachronize its obvious, but unsated, supposition of an isochronal time. In psychoanalytic practice and thought as the hermeneutics of facticity – Merleau-Ponty's ontological psychoanalysis, which is also Binswanger's anthropological *Daseinsanalyse* – we find,

with Boss and Dastur, “that Freudian practice becomes what it is truly.”<sup>79</sup> In such an historical, hermeneutic psychoanalysis, we discover Dastur’s mandate for phenomenology, that it must “be aware of the depth of the invisible and the unconscious,” where it is precisely *Austrag* that in its difference functions as, in Boss’ existential reimagining, the possibility “against which the human existence must conquer a domain of opening to the clarified world”<sup>80</sup> – that is, conquering *logos* as the *meaning* of that which opens *psychē*, the event of the subject’s world, to its own alterities. Our psychological complexion is therefore one of impose, of trespass, of infringement: we cannot unilaterally direct our sense out there to the world but must accept the creep of the world into us and anoint that creep as constitutive, we must think that this creep *is* language. In *psychē*, being and non-being, or being and beings, are not contrary relations to the same motif of identity that can be traced to some prior unity, as it is for Heidegger. If we accept that Dastur posits *Austrag* as the *that in which the past comes to language as alterity*, then language and its reference to the field of multiplicities forms a circuit between different things, through their very divergences, to exist in the liminal space between interlocutors. We might therefore find at this location the partitive and self-enlarging element of *psychē*.

In his qualified endorsements of what Dastur deems the “certain fertility” in Freud,<sup>81</sup> what Merleau-Ponty wants to think is the nexus at which the sensible world and language attract and repulse, converge and diverge, which he locates at the site of the *psychē*. The *psychē* produces for its own limit in the unavoidable conflict between world and language, purportedly impassable as the innermost feature of representation. Hence, the central facet and defect of phenomenology being discussed here, and what Lynes attempts to overcome in turning toward speculative realism: that every phenomenological investigation eventually concedes its impotency when it encounters the unconscious, for what constitutes is always itself occluded in an eidetic description of constitution. Traditionally, this internal delimitation between phenomenology and language is thought to also form the effective boundary for the investigation of phenomena, including the phenomena of consciousness’ own appearance in what appears. As the linguistic system is sequestered behind, or at least lateral to, the signified of which it is the apparition, every signification incurs its own anonymous self-limit. Signification and its attendant practices are thus defined by their own impossibility: the non-significative that is incursive and determinative for the significative, but whose incult nature is never domesticated in the significations that it internally determines. While this limit in addition serves as terminus for classic phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty it serves rather as the genesis for incriminating, if not outright rejecting, the appliance of intentionality and its circularity. For Merleau-Ponty, this limit is always self-interrupted by the *écart* that animates it, in fact with which it is identical, such that this limitation, as divergent and “promiscuous,” is not a limit that facilitates a regression into identity but maintains difference *as* identity. Merleau-Ponty calls this limit the “symbol,” or “symbolic formation,” and through it he petitions the Freudian unconscious to assume a place in ontological analysis:

unconsciousness of the unconscious [is the] unknown; but not known by someone in the depth of ourselves. The unconscious [is the] abandonment of the norms of wakeful expression, i.e., of the symbolic as symbolic of self, direct language, which presupposes distance and participation in the category. But this unconscious is not distant; it is quite near, as ambivalence. The “affective content” is not even unconscious or repressed, i.e., the unconscious as pulsation of desire is not

behind our back...[The] unconscious [is the] implex, [the] animal, not only of words, but of events, of symbolic emblems.<sup>82</sup>

The limit of language, the symbol, is an “implex,” a concept that “elaborates the push and pull between language and the sensible world and refers to an inability of language to directly refer to the space of this.”<sup>83</sup> The limit of language is almost kinetic in this way, nomadic: it does not lie still at the site of signification, but rather self-breaches, interrupts its own arrival through an interlineation, creating a virtual, non-significative localization that simultaneously runs between, into, and through the signification. By identifying the unconscious as symbol, I take Merleau-Ponty to be saying that the *psychē* cannot be reduced to absolute consciousness or unconsciousness because both concepts distill to a heterogeneity that paradoxically names the authority of identity by separating the two terms *on the basis of* identity. The *logos*, as symbolic, interdicts onto consciousness and the unconscious, becoming their generative limit, and thus also a duplicate, but one that cannot be vulgarized as the *relation* of duplicity; it is, rather, the *differencing* of duplicity. If the symbolic component of the *psychē* reticulates itself non-reductively to consciousness, it thereby provides to phenomenology in this reticulation an “ontological symbolism” – the “analysis of analysis in the act of sedimentation,”<sup>84</sup> or ontological psychoanalysis.

Merleau-Ponty turns to sedimentation, and a related term, institution, to make sense of the event concept.<sup>85</sup> Event, though it is feral and oblitative, nevertheless shows as Dastur and Gadamer demonstrate: inside *Geschichtlichkeit*, the quality of call and response between subjectivity and history, the latter of which is defined and expressed in such a way to not only makes sense *to us* but makes sense *of us*. The event events as interval or interspace, disrupting a transitive and sequential analysis of time, but nominal events appear to us in such time, and indeed the involuntary sensibility of this appearing is what Dastur, with Gadamer, sees as the “historiographical consciousness [that does not] represent something absolutely new in history (*Geschichte*), but is only a new form of the relation to the past that constitutes the historicity of the human being.”<sup>86</sup> Recognizing that intentional analysis cannot phenomenize the event directly, as the event is the differencing of space-time *from which* phenomenality itself comes, but does not show in this coming, Merleau-Ponty proposes to psychoanalyze the significance of the event as it embeds itself within a historico-phenomenological matrix – to found phenomenology on the very attempt that Romano claims is meaningless, which is in the same breath the connection between hermeneutics and psychoanalysis that Ricoeur thinks legitimate. An ontological psychoanalysis raises to the level of analysis the fact of the event’s inapparency, which we infer through its sedimentation in times and happenings otherwise than itself – that is, we may analyze the event, through institution, as a “symbolic matrix.”<sup>87</sup> By “the fact of the event’s inapparency,” I mean that Merleau-Ponty uses institution as Kaushik suggests he does, to show that “each intention between sense and meaning will have more and other meanings; these remain unsignified and yet configured within the intention so much as to make it available to reflection.”<sup>88</sup> Following this, Kaushik notes that event and reflexion are not orthogonal, or “simple negatives.”<sup>89</sup> The event is both synchronal and diachronal, the gap fundamental to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the chiasm, where terms normally thought oppositely in metaphysics are a chiasmatic lattice: reflecting and what is reflected upon, institution and what is instituted, or signification and what is signified traverse and reverse each other, never closing the gap of divergence in this transversal. Merleau-Ponty locates this chiasmatic structure in the symbol, which modulated by the chiasm,

resists the substructure of identity in the unconscious and its symbolization in Freud. Here, symbolic formation brings the perpetual deference of being demanded by the event, its openness to itself through difference, into a phenomenological understanding through λόγος.

At least facially, Dastur substantively converges on Merleau-Ponty's own position on language, at least in the contour it takes in the College de France lecture course, "The Sensible World and the World of Expression." There, Merleau-Ponty argues for the "[d]iacritical notion of the perceptual sign," our innate ability to "perceive differences without terms" because perception is, itself, structured like a language.<sup>90</sup> By the time of *Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty has pushed the matter even further, stating in the working notes that "What I call the tacit cogito is impossible... It is by the combination of words that I form the transcendental attitude," and later, on the same page, "there are only differences between significations" and language.<sup>91</sup> Merleau-Ponty will later say that "it no longer makes any sense to ask if my world and that of the other are numerically or specifically the same, since, as an intelligible structure, the world lies always beyond my thoughts as events."<sup>92</sup> As the indeterminate element of event interior to consciousness, then, *Austrag* as the distributive dimension of difference is what Alphonso Lingis in the translator's preface to *Visible and the Invisible* calls the "elemental event by which the flesh captures the lines of force of the world, brings itself up to the levels about which visibility is modulated, rises upright before vertical being."<sup>93</sup> Indeed, what else but λόγος as it events in ψυχή could satisfy Dastur's description of the event as that which does not spring from us but cannot happen without us? *Logos* is the excess interior to the subject's *psychē* that exceeds it, in its happening, without being ejected from it, as it captures through naming all that is otherwise than the *psychē*. This conception then aligns with Merleau-Ponty's notion of medial language, of an ontogenesis of language without, as such, a genesis. Merleau-Ponty and Dastur both, in that context, recuperate a language both interior and anterior to this repetition, such that recognizing the *psychē* as event, and thus the site of language, does nothing but circuit difference through identity in the way in which Merleau-Ponty and Dastur both demand. Every conscious investigation occurs through language, in an unconscious that shoots through consciousness, showing its event, such that the differences, gaps, and terminals that Merleau-Ponty wants to see in the world and that are "pre-reflective" exists identifiably *within* subjectivity.

In identifying the triadic relationship between *logos*, *psychē*, and *Austrag* in this formation, we also provide the throughput between language, event, and subjectivity that I suggest connects Merleau-Ponty's institution with Dastur's demand for a subjectivity of the event. The *psychē* as event delivers a subjectivity that does not obliterate the very possibility of the event in its oppressive regulatory activity – but receives for it in the syncopation of its being. The subject in a truly eventful phenomenology is in Romano's words a "response to the event," a response that "exceeds it through and through by opening it to more than itself...to the gift of the world."<sup>94</sup> Structurally anticipating time as difference, as gap, and the world through such disjointure, means that an eventful subjectivity is through, and relative to its *psychē*, the double fold, *Zwiefalt*. As *Zwiefalt*, subjectivity folds in on itself as the site for conjunction and disjunction, and so the gapping and joining of interior and exterior, such that the eventful structure of itself shows its permanent opening toward the difference of being. The species of thinking, as Dastur says, appropriate for this phenomenology is the radical contingency and the *a posteriori* alone, of abandoning the transcendental as a limiting affectation. Dastur establishes this possibility for the *psychē* in the opening lines of "Phenomenology" that introduce the second chapter, questioning whether

philosophy can “account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event if it is still traditionally defined, as it has been since Plato, as a thinking of the invariability and generality of essences?”<sup>95</sup> The “factuality” of eventfulness removes it from the pall of a transcendental field and the absolutism of schema that explain the presence of one side of a relation by reasoning from the other. An event does not happen via a reason or a rational procedure but is simply a fact of our meaningful relationship to ourselves, as ourselves. The *logos* as primordial language is, in this sense, a fact; we observe its happening in the structure of surprise, of the breach of excess into the horizon of our conscious anticipations that alters, or perhaps destroys us, that we can never fully appropriate, but that still appears to us inside a horizon interpretable by us. We are pre-related to event, structurally, by containing both the anticipations and expectations that are exterminated by the event and our receptivity to it; indicating that there exists a somewhere or some non-object thing inside subjectivity that exceeds it. This some thing is the relation between  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  and  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , as an ontological fact, *Austrag*, without which the meaning of surprise and event are nonsensical.

#### IV. Conclusion

A final question before ending this chapter, which has spoken so much in the pithy way philosophers do of math and geometry: *where is this psyche?* That is, in what sort of space or spaces does a *psychē* as event obtain? As event, the *psychē* would need to configure its own geometry as to not be circumscribed inside the very limit that Foucault tells us that Binswanger transgresses. In defining the “essential meanings” of existence that dreams bring to light, Foucault first notes that “forms of spatiality disclose in the dream the very “meaning and direction” of existence.”<sup>96</sup> In what Foucault contrasts to the geometric and objective space of the natural sciences, the dream reveals for existence a “scene or landscape” in which “displacement preserves an original spatial character; it does not cross, it travels along; until the very moment it stops, it remains a proffered trajectory of which only its point of departure is known for certain.”<sup>97</sup> If I can, allow me to bring another interlocutor, if only momentarily, into the perhaps awkward discourse in which I position Dastur, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault – Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy, who himself thinks the linkages between phenomenology, unconscious, and event, provides such a space in which we can construct the *psychē*. Because the *psychē* is here a non-Euclidean geometry, Nancy’s sense of space as spacing, as the gapping of the gap, is in its inherently eventful nature non-local and dysmorphic with respect to how it innervates the respective morphologies of the opposites that it covers in the whole null point. Nancy in this way spatializes space in a way consonant with event.

In *Being Singular Plural* proper, Nancy begins by assuming but radicalizing Heidegger’s critique of individualism in the latter’s hermeneutic of existence. Nancy believes that Heidegger’s critique fails because Heidegger proffers Dasein as the one, the single one, whose singular insertion into the world creates this world and therefore others are only implicated in one of Dasein’s characteristic modes, *Mitsein* (being-with). The ultimate mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*) of Dasein as it appears in Heidegger is “insufficient as the initial understanding of *existentiell* everydayness,”<sup>98</sup> Nancy claims, because the world always appears to me as a “reticulated multiplicity” of an each time, each day, each event, in which Dasein’s singularity is differentiated only because it emerges from difference itself, as difference inheres in this multiplicity. Dasein, as the singular, is here a *mit-Dasein*, it is already pre-indexed involuntarily to the plural and thus *Mitsein*, for Nancy, is not



additional to Dasein, not its duplicate, but its origin and scaffold in difference itself. Whatever we are, we are always a singular emerging from the world's multiplicity or plurality of singulars and are thus also always a being-with. Nancy's multiplicitous rendering of Dasein provides the basis for him to conclude that Heidegger's true failure is a hermeneutic one: while they both agree that the world is meaning, Nancy's multiplex allows him to assert that meaning is circulatory, always somewhere between "us," always up for grabs or in circulation within the plurality, "because *meaning is itself the sharing of Being.*"<sup>99</sup> In Nancy's view, the surprise of the event, its upsurge into the world, is what allows the multiplicity to show up and to show in the world, to bear its ontological network.

For Nancy, space and its configuration are thus essentially identifiable with the *nihil* (nothing) – as in his formulation in *Creation of the World, creatio ex nihilo*. Despite the secondary literature reading an explicit – and explicitly Catholic – metaphysics into Nancy's diegetic philosophy, it is important to note that Nancy denudes 'nothing' of any affirmative or propositional content. The *nihil* is, here, if not inert, then at least inoperable, in the dual sense of neuter itself, as both neutral and unproductive, what Lynes identifies in Derrida's own riposte to Heidegger, wherein "différance would itself constitute a 'nothing' that relates (without relating) the 'nothing' of the ontico-ontological difference to the nihilitive 'not' of nothingness."<sup>100</sup> Nothing understood as nihilation is unproductive because the nothing is not *between* things in the fascial or interstitial sense, it does not connect and, in that sense, produce or breed connection between singularities allayed in its tissue – there is no tissue, no bridge between subjectivities, *contra* Heidegger's late topology of being, because nothing is the "stretching out [distension] and distance opened by the singular as such."<sup>101</sup> "This between," Nancy will say later in "Being Singular Plural," "has neither a consistency nor a continuity of its own," because it performs no disclosive, or connecting functions.<sup>102</sup> Against such a conception of the negative, Nancy wants to say that the negative is a field, or register, without allegiance to the metaphysical conceptualities of empiricism. Negativity is the space of difference, conceived as not a substrate, neither topologically nor reactive, but as a reality to its own. In Nancy's diegesis, then, the world is divergence itself, as itself: the *habitating* that allows for habitation in the expanse understood as the verb form of the Latin root for expand, *ex-pando*, literally an 'out spread.' Nancy thus does not understand space in the traditional sense, as a geometric or mathematical property in which things have spatial relationships – that is, as relationships pertaining to the fundamental attributes of this purportedly objectival field. Instead, Nancy has what one might call an archi-spatiality, in the French connotation of *archi-*, in which the prefix connotes the ultra. Nancy's ultra-spatiality is, in this most fundamental sense, the out-spreading of the world as not *an* interstice, neither as the transitive nor the infinitive sense, but in the pure verbal of interstice-ing itself. To spatialize space for Nancy is to gesture to the gapping of the gap, the disjoining of the disjuncture, "the interlacing [*Yemrecroisement*] of strands whose extremities remain separate even at the very center of the knot."<sup>103</sup> The world is thus not ecstatic, it does not burst forward from nothingness to create a somethingness by which the nothing itself is distinguished. The world happens, but it happens nowhere; the nothing is, as Nancy will say early in *Being Singular Plural*, not "beneath or in addition to" the phenomenon of the world but is indeed extending "beyond it" to saturate all its possibilities.<sup>104</sup>

And so, being, for Nancy, no longer appears in contradistinction from beings in the ontological difference because this difference merely obfuscates the more primordial gapping of space – in which the "singularities" of prior philosophy "co-appear" because being always and

already exists in the “plural, the singular plural.”<sup>105</sup> Under Heidegger’s clear influence, Nancy will in “Being Singular Plural” and *Being Singular Plural’s* other essays return frequently to this motif of the withdrawal or abandonment of being. Unlike in Heidegger, however, this withdrawal is not negative and thus also not something which requires an active uncovering. Nancy’s singular plural does not face *Dasein’s* magnetic and transcendental call to overcome its communal insertion and to thus reclaim its oneness in the face of the withdrawal of nothingness. Rather, for Nancy the world itself emerges *ex nihilo* as creation perpetually obtains in the shared configural of nothing – in the shared space between beings. Indeed, this communality is what Nancy in “Being Singular Plural” calls the very creation of the world:

[W]hat is called "the creation of the world" is not the production of a pure something from nothing – which would not, at the same time, implode into the nothing out of which it could never have come – but is the explosion of presence in the original multiplicity of its division.<sup>106</sup>

I want to say, here, that this “explosion” from nothing constitutes, in an elaboration of Nancy’s hermeneutic first proposed in *The Sense of the World*, the constituting act of the world of meaning, “the spacing of meaning, spacing as meaning,” that characterizes  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  and  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  in Fragment B45 – and thus also what Dastur identifies as the “*very event of language*.” As meaning and space are co-expressed from the nothing, and we relate to our world fundamentally through meaning, we thus pre-relate to another *through* this spacing and thus through difference: “Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of this singularly plural coexistence.”<sup>107</sup> What Nancy is doing here is drawing a distinction between nothing (*rien*) and nothingness (*le néant*), which is a distinction between “nothing” as an open space that is shared, and “nothingness” as the reification of nothing as a self-positing and unilateral existent. By highlighting a neutral and inoperable configural in which being first appears, Nancy is subtly but cleverly also rejecting the very notion of nominal difference. If the non-foundation of things is a betweenness, then even Heidegger’s ontological difference between Being and beings, existence itself and existents, is on this account superfluous. The *appearance of the world itself* is brought by, and through, this distancing: “The nothing, then, is nothing other than the dis-position of the appearing. The origin is a distancing.”<sup>108</sup> The world of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  emerges from the gap that is opened up among beings, which does not pre-exist the cold hard weight of space-time but opens as its magnitude. Hence, the origin of the world is found only in sharing. Or, as Nancy himself puts it: “There is no existing without existents and there is no “existing” by itself, no concept—it does not give itself—but there is always being, precise and hard, the theft of the generality.”<sup>109</sup> Literally dis-placed and dis-located by the gapping of the world, a portrait of an eventful subjectivity thus requires being at home with the ambulant dis-juncture of the event – being at home, indigenous, with the unrest and agitation of a world that worlds itself, suddenly, from nothing.

The space of signification within, through, and by nothing becomes for Nancy, in *Sense of the World*, “the affair of psychoanalysis. It is the unconscious.”<sup>110</sup> Wherein the unconscious means, for Nancy, “the world as totality of signifiability, organised around nothing other than its opening,” that is, its event.<sup>111</sup> Again, we would here not recognize unconscious in this way, recognizing it as the oppositive quality to conscious in the *psyche’s* null point origin, but I think such a configuration is preserved even in Nancy himself. Later in *Sense of the World*, Nancy will claim that the unconscious designates:

the inexhaustible, interminable swarming of significations that are not organized around a sense but, rather, proceed from a significance or signifyingness [*signifiance*] that whirls with a quasi-Brownian motion around a void point of dispersion, circulating in a condition of simultaneous, concurrent, and contradictory affirmation, and having no point of perspective other than the void of truth at their core, a void itself quite superficially and provisionally masked by the thin skin of an “ego.”<sup>112</sup>

That the “inexhaustible, interminable swarming of significations” are organized not around sense or sensibility, but instead a “void point of dispersion,” is precisely to say that what Nancy identifies as the unconscious is the event of the *psychē*. The *psychē* is here the *is which* of event, where the world opens, so to say that being is a language and language is in the world is to say that language is in itself. This refers to language self-enlarging, which is, one might add, a commonsensical interpretation of the being of language: language is that which, to Heraclitus’ point, enlarges itself – it is *logos*. The fundamental flaw of the original phenomenological impulse toward a transcendental subject, according to Dastur, thus lies in the ideal, and atemporal, posture that it adopts to language. When the phenomenal or symbolic field for subjectivity itself is constituted by an ideal and transcendental discursivity, then its outer boundaries are the outer boundaries of the transcendental ego’s internal time consciousness. And since the rule-governed schema of a transcendental *ego* are themselves the conditions of possibility for language, this ego forms a self-enclosed and absolute limit in which interpretation is possible only within its own immanent horizon – it impoverishes the space of event. Of course, destroying or circumventing the transcendental subject is for this reason, among others, Heidegger’s purpose in *Destruktion*; that is, deracinating the metaphysical roots that characterize copulative subjectivity. Dastur not only takes up, but particularizes, Heidegger’s critique. Dastur transposes Heidegger’s metaphysical destruction of language into a specific attack on the way in which contemporaneous language theories follow the disjunctive impulse of Aristotle’s *logos apophantiko*. The partuitive apophantic statement, taken as the infrastructure for propositional logic and its utterances, and therefore also the logico-mathematical tools of modern language theory, is therefore not a dis-covery. According to Dastur, it covers the metaphysical presupposition of a speaking subject rendered transpicuous based on a conceptual model that is precisely reversed:

It does not suffice to say that 'speech is born from meaning' to avoid considering words as things provided with meanings after the event since the anteriority of a silent articulation of meanings has also been assumed, and language, which constitutes the worldly expression of discourse, then simply has the function of expressing it.<sup>113</sup>

The speaking subject and all its pernicious metaphysical dependencies is an active construction, a subterfuge which retroactively inserts itself as the logic of subjectivity and ignores our involuntary insertion into a pre-interpretive world. For Dastur, utterances are not evidence of the pre-existing meanings gestating within a transcendental subjectivity who predeterminates the structure of meaning *a priori*; rather, the primordial language that she recovers, via Heidegger, as itself ontological, comes prior to and is expressed within meaning – it is the functional infinity of which we spoke in the introduction

## Chapter IV – Death, The Event

### I. Introduction

Can phenomenology articulate death? The great paradox of a human life is that we, in the sense of a spatiotemporally persistent, self-aware subject are not, as that self-awareness, present for the two most important events of our own lives: our births and our deaths. Our most distinct feature as mortal creatures is that mortality itself, and our capacity for meaning making, with their often-violent confrontation, are the basis for what Heidegger often calls totality. Those two aspects that render us most human are ineluctably distant from one another, bringing into relief the challenge facing phenomenology: how can this humanist enterprise articulate, through language, the most human elements that resist its methodology? In *Death: An Essay on Finitude*, Francoise Dastur embraces this impossibility. She notes the paradox of capturing death through philosophy, because “death, as such, never happens.”<sup>1</sup> Death is in this sense both event and non-event, for it is an instance that occurs to no one, in non-time, and yet determines all mortals and is the ground of temporality. As humans, we are, so to speak, arranged mortally – allayed out ahead of time, finitely, and thus directed always to the process of the becoming, the not-yet, toward an excess of ourselves that is unrealizable. This claim at first sounds strange to the ear, but it is an eeriness resolved by a simple question: what is a mortal’s life when all her possibilities are realized? It is over. Death is the only condition in which the “structural anticipation”<sup>2</sup> of possibility deflates into a conclusive actuality. If a mortal lives, her death is yet to happen, and therefore she persists in the mode of the not-yet, or becoming, where death furnishes her with unrealizable, excess possibility; if a mortal dies, her possibilities topple into actuality, but nobody exists to experience this toppling. Death is the only event that can catch up to the possibilities running in front of us and is at the time unreachable by us, that is, the possible that is definitionally impossible to realize. Finitude’s permanent excess of possibility induces a philosophical realignment, for Dastur, in that the possible must be elevated over the actual in recognition that it is untouchable. In providing this elevation, a phenomenology of the event self-identifies as the “locus of excess with regards to reality.”<sup>3</sup>

In several of his works, Derrida counters the notion of death as non-event; ironically, given his historically adversarial relationship and entanglements with Heidegger, Derrida in this way completes the Heideggerian project of dis-placing Dasein. Derrida displaces death with mourning on the ontological hierarchy, in a reverse of Heidegger’s point, in that we are a self who is expressed by our relation to the death of the other, thus intimating difference as the determinative element. For Heidegger, we can imagine what death is like for us, phenomenally, because we imagine death as belonging to the being that we are; but this death remains phenomenologically distal, almost totally inaccessible because death belongs not to the trajectory of selfhood but to its termination. Under such a rubric, an eventful analysis of death is unreached because it remains a dimension of finite human existence which is neglected and obscured by Heidegger’s overriding focus upon the singularity of being-towards-death in *Being and Time*. In the same way that Derrida finds an aporia in Heidegger and the history of ontology, I want to propose an equal aporia in Dastur, the disconnection of death and event. Death is the event exemplar because it is composed by the features that themselves compose the event: it interlaces and simultaneously contains as its nature not only birth, death, and surprise, but also is the invisibility interposed to their visibility

in the way characteristic of eventfulness. But death is not only the event *per se*, it is an experience in the lives of people and this experience cannot be elutriated in an ontological analysis of eventfulness; it is the factuality to which this eventfulness must return. Yet in a forgetfulness of its being, death as belonging to subjectivity is, in essence, set against phenomenologies of the event – despite all these phenomenologies positing death as in some fashion determining being. There is thus an intrinsic duplicity of the invisible and eventfulness to death, where its advent and event are uniquely isomorphic, preventing the regression, as I have critiqued in other phenomenologies of the event, to treat death as only ontology. Hence the demand for a hermeneutic return: death's intractable corporeality and attachment to its own history forces an earthen phenomenology; a phenomenology that abjures its pharisaical tendencies and juridical impulsions and stations itself against any method that views the instance as a burden.

Phenomenology does not, it cannot, escape the warrant that history places on its procedure; it is already detained inside of history, determined by it, where its fastidious and clinical universals are humiliated by their secret infiltration by the instance. So long as it clings to its universals, its invariants, its *eidōs*, and however diagonally event phenomenology replicates these, phenomenology cannot be taken seriously as a method to explicate the worldliness of the world. By treating the *factual experience of death* as collateral damage ignorable on the way to constructing an ontology alleged to be the condition of this experience, phenomenologies of the event become circumscriptive to their own requirements. The purpose of this chapter is to forge a way, Dastur's "step back," to connect the hermeneutic contextuality of death with its ontological situation, elucidating the belongingness of one to the other. The purpose of chapters two and three have been to develop this mechanism, allowing for what I earlier called an anastomosis – a surgical procedure that connects two organs that are normally disconnected. The purpose of this chapter is to deploy these mechanisms, and in so doing, establish not only the ontology of death but also its hermeneutics. With vigilance for what is unknowable to me, the remainder of this chapter attempts to adjure phenomenology to measure up to itself.

## II. Mereology of Death

I want to commit Dastur once again to her own transit from Heideggerian constraints, by way of a brief excursion through mereology – showing, along the way, how all post-Husserlian phenomenology careens toward this mereological destination in any articulation of finitude. In a section of *Death: An Essay on Finitude* called "Finitude and Totality," Dastur critiques Sartre's misinterpretation of Heidegger by ascribing to Sartre a sequential mereology. In Dastur's reading, Sartre's bungling of Heidegger consists in a "radical failure to appreciate" that death is not a contingent fact, nor the "'final term' of a series,"<sup>4</sup> but rather constitutes the vector of unification between finitude and totality. Because Dasein is a living whole, resolved on the horizon of the possibility that only it can own, its death, this ownership places Dasein in constant "relationship with its beginning and its end, so that it constitutes a 'whole' in which no parts are to be distinguished."<sup>5</sup> Whereas for Sartre death is only a factuality, that "comes to us from outside and it transforms us into the outside,"<sup>6</sup> Dastur views death as the inapparent that winds its way through each apparency, including the most important apparency – the phenomenality of our own lives, viewable only on the background of our finitude. That death irrevocably coils itself around life means that the human life is not a compositional problem analyzable by reduction to any relation that connects these parts; Dasein is projectively whole, moving toward its most

existential fact that is, also, always already interior to it. Death for Sartre and Dastur both is absolute, but for the former it is an absolute contingency, and more importantly, one amongst many contingencies and the final in such a sequence; for the latter, death resists sequence and lends itself to a non-sequential diffusion throughout the breadth of living, characterizing every phenomenon that superficially belongs to the order of time on its own horizon. Because being means for itself through the intentional gesture of time, finitude is not an objective consequence that Dasein encounters at the end, like a stranger; death embraces Dasein in the intimate way of a re-collection amongst friends. Finitude is the *relation to its end* to which Dasein is always already directed and is thus what mortality means. And so, death cannot be comprehended by any schema that has for its foundation a “totality obtained by composition and addition.”<sup>7</sup>

To support her riposte, Dastur references an obscure foot note in §48 of *Being and Time*, “What is Outstanding, End, and Wholeness,” that itself refers to the third of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, “On the Doctrines of Wholes and Parts.”<sup>8</sup> In the portion of the Third Investigation that Heidegger references, Husserl is formulating one of the first formal mereologies, the systematic theory of parthood relations – specifically, that part/whole relations are ideal necessities pertaining to all objects both actual and possible. Critically, Husserl stratifies the unreal above the real in his mereology, such that the ground of objects Husserl is deducing pertains to the very transcendental ground of objects as such; not, or at least not especially, to the subjective experience of objects as they are given in experience, nor is he therefore providing an ontological *genus* into which the species *being* fits. Husserl is rather deducing the interconnectedness of parts to wholes *as being*, stating to this end that “These sorts of relations (parthood relations) have an *a priori* foundation in the *Idea* of an object.”<sup>9</sup> The point, in other words, is the deduction of the essential laws allowing for the bifurcation of objects into parts and wholes *per se*: it pertains to the very possibility of being an object that there are actual or possible part/whole relations involved. For Husserl, as we see, the idea of parthood both necessitates and incorporates the assumption of transitivity: if *part a* belongs to *part b*, and *part b* belongs to *part c*, then *a* belongs also to *c*. The existential calculus that Husserl is performing, then, in all of its nomology contains the principle of what in mereology is called summation and fusion: that wholes are the sum total of fused parts that, as parts, imply their summation and fusion.<sup>10</sup> The binary function of summation, as a transitive expression, means that for any combination of entities ( $a+b$ ) that result in a sum,  $s$ , all such parts, and the sums of these parts, set theoretically belong also to  $s$  – with fusion being the algebraic generalization of these specific interrelations.

Transcendental subjectivity, as being, is then the sum  $s$  into which all combinations of parts and entities belong, specifically differing expressions of space (here and there), time (past, present, and future), along with their interlining (here and now). In Husserl’s mereology, the highest transitive ontological entity designated is what he calls a “pregnant” whole, defining it as:

a range of contents which are all covered by a single and unitary foundation without the help of further contents. The contents of such a range are called its parts. By talking of the unitarity of the foundation we imply that every content is foundationally dependent, directly or indirectly, with every content. This can happen in such a way that all those contents are founded on each other, directly or indirectly, without any external recourse.<sup>11</sup>

The whole is “pregnant” with the relation of ontological dependence, where parts are what they are solely in their reversion back to being fragmentary moments, or adumbrations, of the whole.

Most of all, it is the *a priori* logical structure of being itself that engenders the “categorical transformation” from wholes to parts and vice versa – and Husserl’s construction on top of this notion is, in a meaningful sense, the spirit of his subsequent transcendental phenomenology. There is no intentionality, or epoche, the aspects in Husserl’s thought we have claimed that Heidegger ontologizes, without the Third Investigation dictating the irreality of parthood relations: the very purpose and structure of the epochal moment, even in the most generative phenomenology, is excising the extraneous parts from an ontologically undivided totality. Hence, in the footnote Heidegger raises the scholastic logical schematic of predicative versus integral wholes, saying:

The difference between whole and sum, ὅλος and πᾶν, *totum* and *compositum* is familiar to us ever since Plato and Aristotle. Of course, the systematics of the categorical transformation already contained in this division is not yet *recognized* and conceptualized. For the beginning of a detailed analysis, cf. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2, Third Investigation: “On the Doctrine of Wholes and Parts.”<sup>12</sup>

The appended passage is routine, a section where Heidegger, to Dastur’s point, is saying that the *a priori* condition of Dasein’s being, its ipseity, is the clandestine *not-yet*, or becoming, that animates but lies hidden within its project. As Dasein, I am in other words always already becoming, and this process of becoming is not a psychological comprehension but rather the essential and essentially ontological condition on which my being rests – I am, in each case, only be-ing as long I am perpetually and recurrently turning over into my own possibilities. The passage reads as follows:

The not-yet that belongs to Dasein, however, not only remains preliminarily and at time inaccessible to one’s own or to others’ experience, it “is” not yet “real” [“wirklich”] at all. The problem is not our grasp of the not-yet character of Dasein, but rather the possible being or non-being of this not-yet. Dasein, as itself, has to become, that is, be, what it is as the not yet...[and further]...Dasein...is always already its not-yet as long as it is.<sup>13</sup>

Where Heidegger appends the footnote, however, immediately after the phrase “Dasein is always already its not yet,” is revealing. Reexamining the selection above in the light of Husserlian mereology, as Heidegger seems to do, suggests that Dasein’s characteristic modes of Sorge – falling alongside/discourse, futural projection – are component moments in the wholeness of its being. Further, that it is part of Dasein’s very existential constitution as the exemplar of being for it to subsume this distinction through the ontological difference, as the modality of Husserl’s ontological dependence; that it is always already defining the split between being and beings as a function of their parthood relation to the pregnant whole of being.

The point I am making, here, is that it is not *how* Sartre reaches his particular ideal of totality either *totum* or *compositum*, that is an error, but rather that the differential subjectivity crying out from the liminality of event, this processuality to which Dastur herself leads us, precludes any version of totality *writ large* – indeed, that the non-correlational subjectivity established in chapter III fundamentally cannot be provoked by a mereological fusion or summation of individual parts. And, so, if death is the end to which subjectivity is directed, this end cannot, paradoxically, be recursively inscribed within this notion of totality, but must, in some sense, transverse the concept of totality in its existence. The issue for phenomenology, however, is that the *very impulse* of Husserl’s mereology is baffled by its own subscription to the Parmenidean conundrum of the undifferentiated eternity and totality of the One<sup>14</sup> and being,

stated most lucidly in fragment B8, to which it is subservient and from which it takes its central metaphysical instinct: that of *ex nihilo nihil fit*:

For it is not possible that the unspeakable and unthinkable exist. And what compulsion roused it to grow, either sooner or later, even though it began from nothing? Therefore, it is necessary that it exists entirely or not at all. Not once from non-being will credibility allow anything to come-to-be alongside being.<sup>15</sup>

Husserl imbibes himself on the metaphysical anxiety that there must be something underneath, or antecedent to, nothing, which already in this formulation demands adjuvant conceptualities that retard the aggregative momentum of the One. Expressing for his Parmenidean bias, Husserl will in various places in the Third Investigation state that the “parts have relative dependence as regards one another: we find them so closely united [*vereint*] as to be called “interpenetrating,” that moments are only “moments of unity (*Einheitsmomente*),” that parts are coincident and dependent shades of a “a more comprehensive (*umfassenderen*) whole,” and that, most importantly, “without any association, as non-parts (*Nicht-Teile*), they are unthinkable.”<sup>16</sup> Though Husserl’s project stems from Brentano’s attempt to subvert – or at least subtend – the subject/object duality, his assumption of the ontological unity at the origin, an eternal *sui generis* viz., a *res extensa*, runs headlong into any ontogenetic discourse that does not assail, but rather embraces, seeming antinomies. Thus, Husserl begins from a unity, and returns back to a unity, as does any phenomenology that does not exterminate this mereology, strangling the genealogical disunity and differentiation requisite to event. Here we see again the echoes of Husserl in Heidegger, and perhaps from where emerges Heidegger’s failure to think *διαίρεσις* without reverting to a *σύνθεσις* that infrastructures this difference. Even in such instances where Heidegger self-criticizes, such as in *The Event*, which serves as a commentary on *Contributions* and is contained also in the third section of the *Gesamtausgabe*, make of partition and differentiation an *argumentum a fortiori* for the transcendental orientation to composition and identity in which the truth of being ostensibly obtains. Hence, my criticism that Heidegger’s *Jeweiligkeit* and *Jemeinigkeit* must be adapted or modified by Dastur’s differential ontology because their original morphology bespeaks a temporal smoothness and un-interruption that forecloses time to event. Explicitly in Husserl, and implicitly in Heidegger, there is a metaphysics that approves, because it emerges from, an interior unity that draws in, without resolving, the great mass of dyads that event is purported to solve: the One and the Many, difference and identity, transcendence and immanence, exteriority and interiority. The purpose of the eventful subject posited in the previous chapter is, at least provisionally, to navigate a course through which the space of such a resolution is made clear. While this is a speculative – and somewhat scandalous – suggestion, I want to say that the monomorphic subjectivity rejected in the previous chapter forces us to reject not only its constitution considering event, but also its termination; shifting the focal aspect of death and perishing away from end and to a sense of continuum in death, the sort of reticulated cosmology of finitude uneasily broached also in chapter III. Indeed, it seems at least plausible that Heidegger clings to the ontological difference, despite his own work demanding its transgression *through* difference, because he thinks being as a totality *ala* Husserl’s Third Investigation.

To all this, Dastur would counter, I think, by noting that Husserl’s definition of the unitary pregnancy of ontological wholes is one of completeness, not lack, thereby providing for the liminality of living beings that contain in themselves their own sense of becoming. A living being is a totality that becomes what it is not yet because “in a certain fashion it was that *always-already*.”



<sup>17</sup> As it is “not possible for a living being to become radically other than what it is,” <sup>18</sup> its directedness toward its own end is not a *part* of its being, but its being itself. But in “Logic and Ontology,” <sup>19</sup> Dastur flags Heidegger’s self-admitted reliance on the Sixth Logical Investigation, <sup>20</sup> without flagging how the Sixth Investigation relies on the Third, how the Third is the substructure for Husserl’s transcendental project, and how Heidegger’s hushed reliance on the transcendence of being destroys his hermeneutic of facticity. While the *not-yet* Heidegger references appears to resist a compositional ontology, as does his conjuring of the *non-being* recursive in being, they are both dependent on the mereological concept of extensionality, which requires as its substructure the acceptance of, and dependence on, a concordant ontological unity. Each moment of *not-yet* of Dasein, its ostensibly constitutional becoming, would thus be merely unrealized moments of the pregnant whole of being from which beings in this analysis emerge – which, in turn, always refers to the formal correspondence between logic and a transcendental identity from which it could never have come:

It is possible to speak of the relation of ‘parts’ to a whole only in the case of a totality obtained by composition and addition, and it is impossible to regard the development of a living whole in that way, since its becoming is that of a self-containing in itself all ‘moments’ of its extension in time. In pointing out that there is therefore a *formal* identity between the being of *Dasein* and the living being, Heidegger...refers us to the development of the concepts to be found in the third of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. <sup>21</sup>

Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is, ultimately, an elusive and allusive return to the nomology of Husserl’s mereology, in which Heidegger relies on, and subsequently ontologizes, Husserl’s mereological methodology and this return makes up Heidegger’s project. The subjunction of beings to being inside the ontological difference is a mereological advance, regardless that Dasein’s constitutional liminality prevents a straightforward compositional analysis. Being in its living, breathing, connective character, and in its being a unitary and thus categorical presentation, is the being Husserl indicates with this fecund term, ‘pregnant whole’ – the being that shows in this Sixth Investigation as “nothing in the object, no part of it, no moment inhering in it; no quality or intensity, no figure or internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature however conceived.” <sup>22</sup> By bringing along, rather than rejecting, Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality and his ontological difference, Dastur maintains the ontological integrity of part-whole relations – a serious problem because this relational or attributive analysis of ontological integrity is what closes Heidegger off to event. If the instance, however manipulated it be through linguistic and ontological acrobatics, is not interpolated within its supposedly ontological condition, then the instance – such as the instance of finitude that shows temporality in cogency – cannot in so many ways be eventful. Heterogeneity demands that the relationality or connectivity of the parts be accounted for in terms of the very subtraction of oneness or of the immediacy of the multiple.

Regardless of whether one accepts the argument above, the footnote remains instructive and perplexing because, while I think it betrays a hidden mereological schema at the heart of *Being and Time* that influences, if not conditions, Heidegger’s missives on the relationship between subjectivity, death, and totality, it is nowhere discussed in the voluminous secondary literature – save for Dastur. Despite the foundational place that Husserl’s “Theory of Wholes and Parts” occupies within his work, it vanishes from both the primary and secondary literature in continental thought (despite, and ironically, forming nearly the whole of analytical thought’s engagement with Husserl). <sup>23</sup> Neither Heidegger, nor Sartre, nor Merleau-Ponty, nor phenomenology’s French

antagonists such as Derrida, nor even the event phenomenologists discussed in this work, Raffoul, Romano, and Nancy, save for Dastur, devote any space in their analyses to Heidegger's dependence on the Third Investigation. Even Taminiaux, whose genealogical trace from the Sixth Investigation on the categorial intuition of being to the *Seinsfrage* remains definitive in this regard, does not reveal in this trace that the Third Investigation imbricates the Sixth.<sup>24</sup> I find this a curious absence because, in both direct and indirect ways, and despite Heidegger only much later acknowledging the impact of the Sixth Logical Investigation in *Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie*,<sup>25</sup> and as we see, it is possible to recast Heidegger's entire project as an extensive Husserlian mereology. By extension, one can reverse engineer the failure of event phenomenology to return to the hermeneutic, not even in death, but perhaps especially in death, to this incestuous and private relation between Heidegger and unity.

Against such a tendency, Dastur's event phenomenology instructs us to uncover a co-extensivity between instances and events, and the instance of event, where one does not displace but intervenes the other in an inter-interpolation; or perhaps better an intrapolation, if we can coin the term, where it consists not in introducing extraneous or separate elements to create a unity, but where an interior dis-unity of a given thing is the basis for that thing's apparently unified presentation. For example, the way in which invisibility is intrapolated with visibility, internally constellating it by maintaining their difference. The differential ontology at the heart of this thesis wants to upend Heidegger's confidential mereology by problematizing the very notion of unified wholes. In its place would be an anti-mereology, or at least an *a*-mereology, a desynchronization of unified wholes, suggesting that unified and contiguous wholes, as ontological entities, are the desultory and illusory impact of the mind's perceptive limitations. Without assigning to these operations the name of *a*-mereology, I think we have walked with Dastur down this path in the first two chapters to conceive time and language, in their intrapolation, as constellating the difference in signification as being and the arrival of this being arrhythmically, blow by blow in a diachronic temporality. What we have thereby and potentially unlocked through the denial of a Heideggerian mereology is a subjectivity opened to difference as its structure – constitutionally unable to resolve itself back into a whole. Elucidating the structure of this subjectivity is the purpose of chapter III. It is a constant anxiety in phenomenological thought since Husserl to hope that, after a sufficient degree of division, one will reach the indivisible. But the nature of event is to show that there is not something to being, but nor is there nothing, there is an *a*-nothing, which while it seems to violate the law of the excluded middle is why Dastur devotes so much time to Heidegger's resistance to formulaic logic. A proper philosophy, which is to say phenomenology, in its appropriate application, which is to say to the event, would be a philosophy that expresses this excluded middle. In the next section, I want to resist the mereological impulse that I find in Heidegger and present the death of the eventful subject as such an excluded middle.

### III. Death as Event

I stage this intervention on Dastur at this point to reallocate death to event determined to the interior dependencies of her work, based on which we have uncovered an eventful subjectivity. An eventful subjectivity, arriving as it does always partially, in reserve, and in an arrhythmogenic temporality, would not in this context view its relation to its own finitude as totalizing or singularizing because it would not involve itself in any mereological construction of totality. In assenting to the totality of Dasein through its relation to its own death, Dastur also assents to the

loneliness in which Heidegger thinks Dasein. The interiorization of death in its inward direction, as a transcendental condition, leaves Dasein desolate, even with *Mitsein* as one of its characteristic modes. Death is mine, as Dastur wants it to be, but it is not only mine – it is also the others', for their death is also mine, in that we affect a mutual possession through inheriting from one another the notion of mortality that for Heidegger conditions my existence *a priori*. Heidegger would consider such inheritance at best regional, as Dastur notes, because the “understanding *Dasein* has of itself as mortal” is the “hidden presupposition” upon which all access to other others' death rests.<sup>26</sup> Here, the ownness and individuality of the root of *Ereignis*, *eigen*, is emphasized over the apposite and equivalent senses in the common German of strangeness, peculiarity, and particularity – the sense that what is inherited, another use of *eigen*, contains its own reversible limit, in being given over only because it first belonged to another.

Dastur considers and rejects this literal co-ordination between self and other in death as she thinks it begs the question that it seeks to establish. The anguish of the others' death exists for me only because “one is *already* a self, only if that structure of receptivity consisting in ipseity, one's selfhood, is already there, and it can be already there only as a relation to one's own going-to-die.”<sup>27</sup> A susurrant of Derrida then appears in the next sentence, who is often obliquely referenced, but rarely named, in Dastur's mature philosophy. The tangent disserves the nuance and complexity of Derrida's writing on death, suggesting that, in *Aporias*, Derrida in “originary mourning” posits a pristine, egoistic subject who “*derive[s]* the relation to oneself from the event of the death of the other,” thereby determining oneself in the “pure result of the operation of the other.”<sup>28</sup> The self cannot be derived from any relation for Dastur because the self is a structure of “being open to itself and to the other,” wherein death, as the horizon of finitude, is what “makes these possible.”<sup>29</sup> The structure of subjectivity that Derrida requires, and to which Dastur herself has led us, *is*, however, this being open to itself, in and through being eventful; and this subjectivity consists not in mereological totalization through an authentic grasp of its end, but in deferral and displacement, in which alterity is not an absolute other but is tensed through a differencing that defies a unidirectional singularization. Accepting that the “I exists only as affected by the trace of the other in the I,” as Marc Crepon states,<sup>30</sup> means that Derrida resettles the meaning of finitude close to the late Heidegger's *Ereignis*: mortality is dis-located and dis-placed, an ontological harlequin lacking permanent residence because it pertains to the untrappable magnitude between the ‘you’ and the ‘I’ that perpetually re-constitutes both. By placing event inside this subjectivity, through language, we also place in each signification in which this subject speaks I, a signal to the other as an equal apportionment of the event of being as difference. If in death we access the disbursal of event that differences one subjectivity to other, we would in this access redetermine ourselves.

Leading Dastur back to death as event *vis-à-vis* Derrida requires showing their perpendicularity and divergence on death, where each, through Heidegger, views a phenomenology of death as eschatology. But Dastur thinks that the loss of the world cannot be eventful because the subject to whom the world is lost no longer exists, and Derrida thinks, rather, that it is the world itself that is lost in each death, in an ineffaceable and irreproducible event, because subjectivity is never evacuated of the other in the way that Heidegger demands. And so, the loss of the world is always the loss of the other and is, as such, what individualizes me, because death is more radically singularizing than Heidegger imagines:

Death puts an end neither to someone in the world nor to one world among others. Death marks each time, each time in defiance of arithmetic, the absolute end of the one and only world, of that which each opens as a one and only world.”<sup>31</sup>

While this total vacating of meaning in death will soon become Derrida’s decisive, though oft-ignored, link to event, we can provisionally say that Dastur therefore errs in ascribing to Derrida a psychological conceptualization of death; one that denies the truth of death as a structure of subjectivity and subjectivity being a testament to this death. For Derrida, I inherit the difference of my individuality from death as a function of bearing testament to being and this witnessing, which for the other shows as mourning, is a self-relation in which the self “welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as different from itself”: it is part of the event of being that death differences one from the other, while joining one to the other through mourning.<sup>32</sup> Like Dastur, Derrida agrees that death is not a contingent ‘event in the world,’ but unlike Dastur, views death as the very condition of the production of the trace – the testamentary that one leaves behind, constituting one’s individuality – and thus the structure it subsequently comes to bear:

In my anticipation of death, in my relation to a death to come, a death that I know will completely annihilate me and leave nothing of me behind, there is just below the surface a testamentary desire, a desire that something survive, get left behind or passed on—an inheritance or something that I myself can lay no claim to, that will not return to me, but that will, perhaps, remain.<sup>33</sup>

Heidegger’s lonely Dasein, despite his continual efforts to differentiate death and biological perishing, encounters in its demise its destruction, which ignores that there belongs to subjectivity a continual structure, established through what is recorded, written, and especially born from oneself, a legacy. This extension is what Derrida calls the trace and this trace is a structure of subjectivity that is opened through the event of my death, establishing the trace to the end of my world. Hence, Derrida claims that “the trace I leave signifies to me at once my death, either to come or already come upon me, and the hope that this trace survives me.”<sup>34</sup> Against Heidegger, who would in Dastur’s eyes view the trace as an attempt to turn death into an event, moving around it, and thus confer itself a “provision immortality,”<sup>35</sup> Derrida responds: “[trace] is not a striving for immortality; it’s something structural.”<sup>36</sup> Death is not a banal fact, a *Geschehnis*, that ends the trace in which my subjectivity consists, but is instead the *event* that opens up my trace, is in fact its precondition in mourning, and hence through the trace Derrida opens up a path to reconnect death and event.

Trace is the structure of subjectivity that survives me, if only transiently, and the threat of this impermanence, of the always already threatened future, is what characterizes my structural relationship to death through a structural relationship to the other – not an end that retroactively characterizes me in totality, reliant in this way on the Third Investigation’s mereology, but an end that is, at the same time, an indeterminate beginning. Even in death, in fact especially in death, the subject continues to structurally arrive: “. . .it is impossible to escape this structure, it is the unchanging form of my life. . . .It’s the ultimate test: one expropriates oneself without knowing exactly who is being entrusted with what is left behind.”<sup>37</sup> Unless we assign subjectivity to a biological functionalism which Dastur vehemently rejects, then this subjectivity’s outlay in life is establishing the trace, regardless of its impermanence, that is intrapolated with the other because the work of mourning is acknowledging this trace. As Derrida says, “it is impossible to escape this structure,” defining subjectivity relative to this permanent porosity to the other; we are always

mourning. The echo of Heidegger here is obvious, but it is an echo that in its reverberation cancels or strikes out the original voice. Heidegger tells us that “Death is a way to be, that *Dasein* takes over as soon as it is. ‘As soon as man comes to life, he is already old enough to die.’”<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, ever the archaeologist, misses that the existentiality of death – that it singularizes – is itself based on its own hidden presupposition: that the way to death is through mourning, that therefore we take over this mourning to be as soon as we are, and that we are what we are in virtue of being serialized within an endless stream of mourning. Each death belongs with and implies each other death, in series, because mourning is the structure of subjectivity that testifies, and opens us up to, the differencing in being of the other:

The “me” or the “us” of which we speak then arise and are delimited in the way that they are only through this experience of the other, and of the other as other who can die, leaving in me or in us this memory of the other. This terrible solitude which is mine or ours at the death of the other is what constitutes that relationship to self which we call “me,” “us,” “between us,” “subjectivity,” “intersubjectivity,” “memory.” The possibility of death “happens,” so to speak, “before” these different instances, and makes them possible...We know, we knew, we remember – before the death of the loved one – that being-in-me or being-in-us is constituted out of the possibility of mourning. We are only ourselves from the perspective of this knowledge that is older than ourselves; and this is why I say that we begin by recalling this to ourselves: we come to ourselves through this memory of possible mourning.<sup>39</sup>

By unearthing a mourning that precedes the rigid subjection of death, Derrida in turn deprecates the division between my relation to my own death and my relation to the death of the other. The convolution between self and other, which while interior to one another defy appropriation, results in an alterity that constitutes me while remaining intimated. I cannot “incorporate, interiorize, introject, subjectivize the other in me,”<sup>40</sup> a resistance that, I want to say, testifies to the eventful nature of subjectivity as the *logos* opens the *psychē* to all that which is otherwise. There is something of Derrida’s dear friend Blanchot at work here, too, in the latter’s concept of the *autrui*: the *autrui* is infinite, infinitely other, which perhaps renders the totalizing function of death impotent – what is infinite retards the conquest of mereology in its assignation of whole and parts, similar to its destruction of *telos*. The other is in-finite, which is to say remains in-finite, because their otherness not only persists in death, but is most other in death; they become otherwise than me, as alive, in being dead. As one subject dies, the world collapses irrevocably in the *psychē* of the other, besieging the walls that line the other’s self-restriction and, in this foundering, brings down any claims to particularity that are not at the same time universality. It is because the other cannot be incorporated or reduced to a shade of my subjective representations that their death is not one among many, one loss appropriable within the hermeneutic context of a pre-established worldly horizon, but is instead, as Derrida says, “the absolute end of the one and only world.” But this closure remains eventful because it is not exclusively a closure: in ending what opens to being, death exposes the erasure of the world, the singularization of subjectivity, and thus also consists in exposing us to the event of our differentiation. Because subjectivity is event, and because subjectivity is structured by sharing death through mourning, death is, too, the event of being injected and divided to and by the other. The meaning of finitude is thus the meaning of being shared in perpetuity, being an absolute singular amongst a series of such singularities, such that, as Nancy says, “in principle, being-with escapes completion and always evades occupying the passage.”<sup>41</sup>

The event of death is in this analysis an ontological trauma, the τραῦμα of chapter III, in which the eventful subject defines itself in the split of its space. The relationship of the event of death to the tissue of the world is like the relationship of the wound to one's skin: the trauma itself, that which institutes the wound, is tangential to the skin, it passes over after violent conflict and, in this sense, the trauma is *not*, it does not exist in any substantive sense. There is confrontation between the weapon and the skin and here, in that confrontation, one says the "Trauma happens," but one does not say the "Trauma exists." The trauma is referential, indicative – it is not substantive. The trauma is neither located in the raw wound nor the scar that betrays its arrival and departure. The wound is evidence of an occurrence, not an entity, a coming and a passing. So, too, the event functions like this in space and time. The event is not existent, but occurrent, inflicting a trauma in space and time that is not locatable in reference to some determinately and causally extant body, not in some literally object-ive entity. Death, in its incessant turn over into itself, in becoming and dissipating, leaves only an evidentiary trail to its self-referral. The event inflicts a wound in the world and from that wound springs being in its purest instantiation: arrival. Like trauma, the event in lacking a substance is never fully there, and so is always in the mode of arriving, what Derrida says is the *arriver*, the deferral in arrival of what is still to come in the happening.<sup>42</sup> The event of death is thus the seat of its own impossibility, an arrival that is always *arriving* but never fully *arrives*. The event arranges for itself a kind of ontological escrow, an excess or reserve of possibility that is never paid in full on arrival. This reserve of possibility is why Dastur defines death above as the "locus of excess with regards to reality."<sup>43</sup>

Death is the ultimate trauma, and ultimate event, because its "non-actuality...is more present than things in actual life will ever be."<sup>44</sup> But there is a dual paradox to death – one in the inapparency of its appearance and one in the non-eventfulness of its event. To the first, death, as the closure of possibility and so too of presence, is an absolute absence – a non-appearing that nevertheless "confers upon phenomena as a whole their singular 'tenor' of finitude by having them stand out against the background of its black light."<sup>45</sup> In what is now a recurring theme for Dastur – in fact, what is perhaps her central theme – death, as the invisible, is the "secret counterpart" to the visibility of life, indeed the invisibility "that without which there would be no visibility at all."<sup>46</sup> To the second, death is pure event because of its excess, in that human beings are mortal and, "in existing, [have] a constant relation to [their] own death, [we] constantly remains in the mode of possibility. [We] remains in the mode of a structural anticipation toward [our] own being, which remains unrealized as long as [we] exists."<sup>47</sup> Here, possibility, specifically one's futural orientation to their own impossibility, not existing, is the "eventfulness of existence as excess" that Raffoul defines as the "essence of event"<sup>48</sup> Death in Dastur's phenomenology figures prominently because it is that event which raises the possible over the actual. Though death is "liable to occur at any moment,"<sup>49</sup> though death always "happens against all expectations, always too early...like a thief in the middle of the night,"<sup>50</sup> and though it is "coming to us without coming from us,"<sup>51</sup> and therefore illumines all the motifs of event, death is the Epicurean paradox: when we are here, death is not, and when death is here, we are not. As we noted above, Dastur thinks that "death as such never happens,"<sup>52</sup> because when it occurs, the person to whom it would occur no longer exists. Therefore death, as the perfect event, is no event at all – it never happens to anyone, in any time.

I want to again, here, draw Dastur transverse to herself, in that her characteristic recalcitrance to phenomenology's limits enables contact between two seemingly disparate nodes

of her own work. As a first stroke, we should note that the dual impossibility of death, its non-event and non-appearance, far from being the abolition of phenomenology, is for Dastur its absolution: only in phenomenology's "relatedness-to-death," she claims, "that there can be phenomenology."<sup>53</sup> Death is for this reason not counter posed to life but posed in life; death is precisely what confers a human life its meaningfulness by establishing this life on the horizon of mortality and finitude. Death is the interior impossible that infrastructures the possible in horizontality, constituting essentially "that relation of Dasein to its own being which Heidegger calls *existence*."<sup>54</sup> In Dasein's existentiality, however, Dastur demarcates a phenomenology of death from a phenomenology of the event. As an impossibility attached existentially to life, rather than its caesura, "death must not be equated with dying,"<sup>55</sup> and this difference is why "death can never become an 'event in the world'."<sup>56</sup> Events are external facticities that erupt to create a world for a subject, whereas death is the internal limit for the world of this subject, and therefore Dasein can never be "put into relation" to its own death by "any event in the world" – including the factual, objective event of its own death, dying. Though Dastur does not fully equip her phenomenology of death with a typology differentiating innerworldly facts as events, from event as the happening of such facts, her analysis of death and dying implies such a typology: death is an existential type belonging to Dasein, as the condition of its existence, whereas dying is a factual type belonging to the innerworldly context of things. Whatever death might *be*, for Dastur, I want to instead emphasize, in recuperating her event phenomenology, *what death means* and how this meaning occurs in the interspace between subjectivities and is an unwanted and unanticipatable co-ownership that comes as event. Death at the interstitial command of Derrida and Dastur's event is from this view always shared, always co-owned, a rupturing of exposure to the other and it is from and only within this irradiation to being that our sense of mortality is revealed to ourselves. Only if we think subjectivity as a constituent in a totality do we also think that death would belong only to the subjectivity that does not, as such, experience it. A subjectivity whose only permanence is its permanent impermanence, arriving only in each times, as Dastur demands of us, is never totalized by any operation or realization, including the realization of a death that is 'authentically' mine. Thinking authentically in Dastur's mode means thinking death as not merely an end to which we are related through structural anticipation, but as the making different that is being. Dastur's thanatology is indebted to Heidegger's thinking of ipseity as being prefigured by the inward diffusion of death, but it is converse to itself; it requires a subjectivity that she implies, that we found in previous chapters, and this subjectivity is one structured by the shared event of death.

As Dastur notes in "Phenomenology: Waiting and Surprise," we are not contemporaneous with the great events of our lives, birth, and death. But the work of hermeneutics, as shown in chapter II, is to show that contemporaneity with the *event as such* – to the extent we can allow such verbal infelicity – is an impossibility, countered with the possibility that makes us human, the attempt to bring the non-cotemporaneous into contemporaneity. The purpose of chapter II is to show that we are not only capable of, but in a real sense are compelled to, attempt a reconfiguration of the discontinuity internal to and constitutive for continuity, that such attempt is named historicity. In turn, we are then and now forced to acknowledge that subjectivity is pre-configured with an irrevocable discontinuity, and it therefore seems a strange sort of temporal determinism to assign supremacy to a singular moment in time that christens itself as "death." This is where the secret subscription to Husserlian mereology shows as most dangerous, as the

moment of perishing, as dis-articulated as any other belonging to an eventful subjectivity, is deemed that moment which totalizes a self-integral subjective whole. But if event phenomenology directs us toward any philosophical light, it is the luminosity emerging from the discontinuous; in which case, death is the ongoing process, serialized infinitely through the other, in which subjectivity becomes most other, and therefore most internal, to itself – the permanent disjuncture of being that opens subjectivity to that which is the ultimate otherwise than itself, death. By restructuring copulative subjectivity to be discontinuous with itself in the event of signification, Dastur arrives at the location of death through the trumpet of voice, stating that, through speech, “the human soul opens itself to the strangeness of beings and the for-itself welcomes alterity. The voice will therefore always be the name of this element in the human that decenters the human and opens it to what it is not.”<sup>57</sup> We do not only resound the proto-event of birth, the permanent surprise inscribed by our ejection in the world; we also echo death, each utterance, every signification containing a illicit paen to the absolute eradication of ourselves, and the world, that is enervated through us already in our consummation to the other. Every speech act contains in itself the articulation of birth and disarticulation of death intrinsic to subjectivity, and that these events distend into and throughout the arrhythmia of subjective time to constitute ourselves. The legitimate maneuver, I think, is not to place ‘death’ behind the wall of experienceability, on the basis of an unannounced allegiance between phenomenology and mereology in a construction of totality; it is to rather restructure what one means by experience, because it is to restructure what one means by subjectivity. The flux and change of an eventful subjectivity pulls language back through its copulation and to the point of its own antecedences, and then ties this antecedence to the *psychē*, allowing for what would be the next pivot, but what cannot be discovered in the space of this work: to the melancholy of pre-death in every word.

#### IV. Conclusion

In the first chapter of his book, *Merleau-Ponty: Between Philosophy and Symbolism*, Rajiv Kaushik begins in what perhaps seems an odd place for a book on phenomenology to begin: with the unrelenting stochasticity of events. Specifically, Kaushik is concerned with the way in which phenomenology is often set against events and their unpredictable eruption into the “very scene in which its previous appearance would seem impossible.”<sup>58</sup> Phenomenology seems diametric to events because phenomenology is arguably philosophy’s most potent normalizing apparatus: it is the epistemic mechanism by which incoherence is ineluctably reduced to coherence through the transcendental subject’s relentless sense-making. Phenomenology is hence uroboric, developing a transcendental field or horizon, one that forecloses difference in virtue of identity, to function as evidence for a transcendental consciousness that supposedly and fundamentally structures this identity *a priori*. Events, however, not only resist but, as we have seen, are in a real sense beyond the concretion of a transcendental field and its oracularity. Events “rupture,” as Kaushik notes, and in so doing, remove “the very conditions of existence, cohesion and unity.”<sup>59</sup> Prudence therefore demands, as we have, as Dastur does, wondering whether phenomenology can account for the subject of this event, and now even its death, happenings that, perhaps above all, violently discharges abnormality and difference into the stable environ of normality and identity. At times, it seems that phenomenology has nothing at all to say about difference, because difference resists configuration. If difference was reduced to the mere opposition to identity in its thematization, it would lose the verbal prosperity – its differenc-ing – that makes it in the first place a valuable topic of inquiry. Alternatively, if it remains open and wild, then phenomenology seems impotent



to capture its essences. Phenomenology cannot, on the one hand, view intentional action or being, both phenomenally observable but not strictly empirical objects, as its bread and wine, while at the same time adopting conflict to the novel.

Hence for me what is the ascendancy and necessity of hermeneutics for event thought. Whether death *is* pertains to the ontological dimension of thinking, susceptible as it is to methodological problems regarding the applicability of a concept to experience/existence that is not deducible within it. But this problem emerges only because phenomenology as ontology wants to say something about what is in principle inaccessible to it. Hermeneutics does not suffer this pathology because it does not need to suffer this pathology. It is fully comprehensible to talk about what death *means for me* without presupposing in this access any ontological conceptualities other than the obvious and factual interpretability of the world. This is the fundamental promise of Heidegger's hermeneutic of facticity before it washes upon the shores of his transcendental anxieties – that there must be literally some-thing behind the inappearance of the inapparent and that ontology's responsibility and promise is explicating this some-thing. I think it is cognizable to structure a hermeneutics that not only abjures this responsibility but questions its applicability in the first place to human affairs, a position that Gadamer frequently intimates but does not ever embrace in full. But this is the very injunction through which Dastur pulls herself. In the substantially revised version of "Phenomenology: Waiting and Surprise" that in 2017 appears in the edited essay collection *Questions on Phenomenology*, Dastur links the phenomenology of mortality with the phenomenology of the event that is absence in prior editions. She notes that:

This surfeit or excess of event is what a phenomenology would have to think, and in this respect the phenomenology of eventuality is in a very similar position to the phenomenology of mortality. Isn't death always what happens prematurely and against expectation, an impossible that nevertheless happens, coming *to* us without coming *from* us, in the impersonal mode of an event that happens to others, and that is even the most universally repeatable event? <sup>60</sup>

Perhaps moving away from the obdurate line that she draws in earlier editions, Dastur again claims that "We may say that death is the event par excellence, that which is never present, never happens in the present, is not open to a world, but instead forever closes the world," <sup>61</sup> and goes on to say that Heidegger defines death as the possibility, but not event, par excellence, without terminally closing this distinction off. Whereas in the 2000 version of the paper Dastur calls death "far from an event," in the 2017 edition she merely moves from event to possibility without, as such, closing the possibility of their interconnection. There is an equal amount of doubt on the nature of eventful temporality introduced in the nearly 20 years: in the first edition, the event has an irrevocable continuity as being the difference that introduces the difference between past and future, whereas in the 2017 version far more attention is paid to the fact that event disrupts and scatters any such notion of continuity, it "as such constitutes a moment of caesura and undermines the temporality that paradoxically makes continuity possible." <sup>62</sup>

At least in death, however, Dastur departs from this event structure, following Heidegger who in turn believes that being is a totally convergent ideal; and that death is not an event of a singular entity, but rather an adumbration of this ideal. Dasein's life progression as the between of birth and death is thus reconciliatory, suturing back together the divided Dasein from the unmitigated oneness of being from which birth begins it and death separates it. Death in this

framing is not, and indeed cannot be, an event – an opening up of new worlds. Death is here relegated to an advent: it is how this specific permutation, or part, of the transcendently unified whole arrives to us in fragmentary form; it is a moment in the wholeness of an ironically, or fittingly, pregnant being. As such, for Heidegger and Dastur both, the anticipation of death is what gives Dasein its ipseity of selfhood, and in turn its individuation. As is usually the case, however, there exists already the kernel of appropriation in Dastur's work, in this case her acknowledgement of the relation between individuality and communality *in time*. In "Time and the Other," she notes that "The incomparable difference between myself and the other is what makes me equal to the other and what separates me from other is precisely what I share with the other." <sup>63</sup> Dastur notes here that Dasein's each-timedness, its ownmost nature – *Jeweiligkeit* and *Jemeinigkeit* – has, through *Austrag*, the distributive structure that commands and demands the existence of the plurality of singularities (as Nancy might say) in advance. The only work remaining, here, is to acknowledge that, in her own conception of event, death is the sub-alternate, not *another* but an *other*, otherwise than a being, ejected and incomplete: it is to acknowledge that death and difference are the asymptotic limits to themselves, inconfigurable, such that it is its own transcendence within immanence – the ultimate, both in terms of supremacy and finality, act by which the *logos* opens *psychē* to that which is otherwise. The eventful subject both violates and completes the definition of event for Dastur, containing the other as an *other*, the other, one's most appropriate other as its place of production of itself where difference and identity are conjoined in annihilation.

Death is the literal site at which the subject's torn from itself, where we see convergence and divergence re-doubled, duplicated, and expressed within each other at the site of their emergence. Death is not a dialectical relationship where divergence and convergence lead up to, and postulate the other, in order that both are sublimated into a higher category allegedly immanent to both. Here, there is no higher category; there is no sublimation that transmutes convergence and divergence into that which somehow supervenes them both. The direction is in, not above: convergence and divergence in death reach out from the void of potential and self-actualize, and in finding each other, redouble into their own co-expressive interiors. Fully dependent on one another, while fully separate. The profundity of the event of death is thus that death is, despite Dastur, the happening par excellence. In the happening of the death, one confronts an the ineluctable phenomenality of presence itself, wrapped around the event: death *is* not, it is rather a happening, or occurrence. The death only arrives, inflicting a deep wound in its arrival, and subsequently disappears without remainder. Importantly, the excess of the event of death does not, cannot, emerge only from its arrival, as if the arrival into the world is a sort of concretion of metaphysical possibilities. Rather, life is *always already* excessive, underwritten by the more essential impossibility of the eventful subject. We arrive in excess and are futurally oriented towards it in each instance; preconfigured as harbingers of the more originary excess, that is, non-possibility. The fetus creates its own excess – that is, pure possibility – and arrives with excess appended to it in birth. Indeed, it is always and only the pure possibility of death, its origination of excess, in which the baby may be born and pointed toward the excess of its own existence.

In Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophy both, the radical contingency of death is something to be displaced, subtended, overcome or, at least, extricated from essentiality and exemplarity as the objects of a thematic phenomenological analysis dependent on a hidden

mereology. Even after Heidegger renounces Husserl's eidetic typology and focuses on the dietic embeddedness of Dasein and world in one another, he nevertheless subjects this Dasein to a temporal analysis that in its realest sense is an *a priori* transcendental diachrony. Phenomenology provides no quarter for the contingent ostensibly because it is not foundational and, in each case, the student and the master, the purpose of the philosophy is fomenting a new way of thinking being. The target is being and thus the methodology must countenance being's infinite – and therefore essential – nature. What each leave alone is the possibility that the vehicle for being's manifestation in human affairs, the human itself, is radically contingent on not merely the ontic but ontological level. Phenomenology has to this point posited an abstractive and uni-directional finitude, one toward which the human being is directed in the manner and mode of a futural orientation to possibility. Contingency's operations are both more fundamental and more radical than this: it is not merely that we arrive as some essentially invariant conduit of generativity and our orientation to passivity and to finitude alters us; rather, we emerge from finitude, from a radical contingency and only on the horizon of our most essential possibility of non-being. Our lives are contingent in a real sense that the phenomenological canon has failed to grasp, precisely because of the obsessive preoccupation with essentiality and the furtive belonging to a mereological constitution. We always find the phenomenological subject there, already at work, or in the sense of finitude, already being worked on, already thrown. Yet we only arrive at this point of thrownness because we stochastically overcame and are then oriented to the fundamental *realitas* of non-being, that is, difference. Nothing is more contingent, less abstract, more brute in its facticity than the stochasticity of when we die; there is no exemplar, no eidetic invariant to lift from the burden of the death's specificity. The death is a sort of ontological singularity and thus death is the limit event in precisely this sense: it has always and in each case already happened, already actualized the non-actuality of non-being, precisely in the very genesis point for being itself. The tenor of death – its tyranny of occurrence, its establishment of the perpetual contemporaneity by which it emerges – is, in the case of the eventful subject, and to the extent that Dasein is characterized precisely in its openness to the event, through the difference of time and language, the closure preceding the opening of event. Death is both the determinate negation and completion of event.

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## Endnotes

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### Introduction

1. Kaushik, Rajiv. *Merleau-Ponty between Philosophy and Symbolism: the Matrixed Ontology* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2019), p. 1.
  2. I am referencing here a luminous work by Phillip Lynes, *The Nature of the Thing (Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida) - Introduction to 'Dearth: Deconstruction after Speculative Realism)*, p. 8. In the work, Lynes performs a remarkable arbitrage between Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, and the foremost authors of speculative realism. Ultimately, however, I think the Derridean subject is dissatisfactory for the purposes of this work, as Derrida's frequent aporias do not resolve in a subjectivity harmonious to the hermeneutic interpretability of the world.
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  24. *Ibid.*
  25. *Ibid.*
  26. Romano, Claude. *Event and World* trans Shane Mackinlay (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), p. 85.
  27. Heidegger, Martin. "The Letter on Humanism" (German ed: *Über den Humanismus*) (Klostermann Frankfurt am Main, 1949).
  28. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. 2nd ed, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1992).
  29. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p.29.
  30. Husserl, Edmund as qtd. in Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer, "Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, 1297-1931 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 87.
  31. *Ibid.*



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- <sup>32</sup>. Segev, Alon. "Logic of Question and Answer and the Limit of Phenomenological Reduction – Collingwood, Heidegger, Gadamer," *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2007,
- <sup>33</sup>. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 174
- <sup>34</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup>. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," p. 163.
- <sup>37</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup>. Ibid.,
- <sup>40</sup>. Husserl as qtd. in Moran, Dermot *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 36.  
Crisis.
- <sup>41</sup>. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *Phenomenology of Perception* (Routledge: London, 2002), p. 375.
- <sup>42</sup>. Ibid., p. 438.
- <sup>43</sup>. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 145.
- <sup>44</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup>. Dastur, "Phenomenology and Therapy: The Question of the Other in the Zollikon Seminars," in *Questions on Phenomenology*, p. 85.
- <sup>46</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup>. Jonathan Smith is the originator of Investigative Phenomenological Analysis, or IPA. Max van Manen across several books, including *Researching Lived Experience*, has attempted to bring a hermeneutical bent to qualitative research in phenomenology. Of late, the three have conducted several internecine battles on the nature of phenomenology.
- <sup>48</sup>. I am substantially borrowing here from Marlene Zarader's concise but brilliant event historiography.

### Chapter I - Dastur's Heidegger

- <sup>1</sup>. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 182.
- <sup>2</sup>. Kaushik, "Merleau-Ponty," p. 1.
- <sup>3</sup>. Ibid. p. 183.
- <sup>4</sup>. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 182.
- <sup>5</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>6</sup>. Ibid. p.179.
- <sup>7</sup>. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. XII
- <sup>8</sup>. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 85.
- <sup>9</sup>. Ibid. p.39.
- <sup>10</sup>. Ibid. p. 41
- <sup>11</sup>. Ibid. p. 44.
- <sup>12</sup>. Heidegger, Martin. *A Contribution to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), p. 48.
- <sup>13</sup>. Ibid. p. 41.
- <sup>14</sup>. Ibid., p. 44.
- <sup>15</sup>. Heidegger, Martin. "Phenomenology and Theology" in *The Piety of Thinking*, trans. J.G. Hart and J.C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 23.
- <sup>16</sup>. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 39.
- <sup>17</sup>. Heidegger, Martin. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. R. Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 124.
- <sup>18</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup>. Heidegger, Contributions, p. 35.
- <sup>20</sup>. Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time* trans. Joan Stanbaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), p.30.
- <sup>21</sup>. Ibid. p. 31.
- <sup>22</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup>. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 33.

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24. Heidegger, Introduction, p. 131. Also "Aletheia" and "Logos" in *Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1975).
25. Heidegger, Martin. "The Zähringen Seminar" in *Four Seminars* trans. Andrew J. Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
26. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 33.
27. Ibid.
28. Heidegger, "The Zähringen Seminar," p. 96.
29. Heidegger, Martin. *On the Way to Language*, trans. P.D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 122.
30. Heidegger, *Introduction*, p. 124.
31. "Logos," p. 60. My reading was also influenced by Brian Bard, "Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus," which appears self-published and for which there is no further bibliographic information. pp. 30-42.
32. Heidegger, "Aletheia," p. 110-1. The English translation of Diels-Kranz's German provided by Krell and Capuzzi.
33. Licht in German is the verbs 'to light,' and as lichten, 'to clear out,' and a noun as 'the light.'
34. Hofstadter, Albert in the *Introduction to Poetry Language, Thought* by Martin Heidegger, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: HarperCollins, 1971). p. xxi.
35. Heidegger, Martin. *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 50. As qtd. In Francoise Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 47.
36. Dastur, Francois. "Time, event and Presence in the Late Heidegger," *Continental Philosophy Review*, 47, 2014: 399-421, p. 414.
37. Levinas, Emmanuel *God, Death, and Time*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 122 as qtd. In, François Raffoul, *Thinking the Event*, p. 338.
38. Heidegger, Martin. "Origin of the Work of Art," in *Basic Writings* trans and ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HaperCollins, 2008), p. 179.
39. Heidegger, Martin. *The Principle of Reason* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 124.
40. Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
41. Alivs, Jason W. "Making sense of Heidegger's 'Phenomenology of the Inconspicuous' or Inapparent (*Phänomenologie des Unscheinbaren*)," *Continental Philosophy Review*, 51, 2018: 211-238.
42. Heidegger, "The Zähringen Seminar," p. 80 as qtd in. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 220.
44. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 308.
45. Hakhamanesh Zangeneh, "Right Outta' Nowhere: Jean-Luc Nancy, Phenomenon and Event Ex Nihilo," *Continental Philosophy Review*, 45: 363-379, 2012, p. 365.
46. Raffoul, *Thinking the Event*, p. 187.
47. Hakhamanesh Zangeneh, "Right Outta' Nowhere," p. 365.
48. Hemming, Laurence. "Speaking out of Turn: Martin Heidegger and die Kehre," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 6(3), 1998: 393-423. Footnote 47.
49. Heidegger, Martin. *Zum Ereignis-Denken, Gesamtausgabe Band 73.1 (To Thinking the Event, Heidegger's Collected Works, Vol 73.1)* ed. Peter Tawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013), p. 20.
50. Thomas Sheehan neuters Geschehnis in his translation of this passage by inactivating Heidegger's agminated forms of Anwesen. He renders, Anwesenden, for example, as the "thing that is present," ignoring the impact and verbal activity of Anwesenden as the presencing requisite to presence that Heidegger dictates elsewhere. He thus also elides Heidegger's deliberate choice to interpose Geschehnis der Anwesenheit between the dash of the two activities of presence, suggesting them as equal forms of a happening.
51. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 33.
52. Heidegger, "Origin of the Work of Art," p. 179.
53. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 33.
54. Ibid.
55. Niederhauser, J.A. *Heidegger on Death and Being*, (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2021), p. 128.
56. Ibid. p.262.
57. Heidegger, Martin "Overcoming Metaphysics," *Metaphysics and Nihilism, Gaustamsgabe, Vol. 67*.
58. Ibid.

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59. Heidegger, *Contributions*, p. 210.
60. Ibid.
61. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 38.
62. Ibid.
63. Claude Romano, *Event and World*, p.81. “But what are these prepersonal possibilities, which precede me in a history that is older than my histories and to which I am connected by the event of birth itself? They are first of all the possibilities of others” not only my parents but others in general. In the event of birth, an other is already announced. To this extent, birth puts me originally in the presence of an otherness that is assuredly still “anonymous,” since it can be under as such only in its “relation” to my selfhood. I am not born alone; any isolation or solitude are instead derivative phenomena with respect to the presence of otherness, which is anonymous but nevertheless already inscribed in the event of birth... Therefore, it is not others who open a world for me, but it is rather starting from the impersonal event of birth that other scan in their turn enter my horizon... Having been endowed with a world, they can merely “pass it on” to me that so that I share in this endowment. Even though it is in fact another who brings me into the world, she does not open the world as such to me. Birth alone, in its impersonality as an event, is “capable” of such prodigies.”
64. Dastur, “Phenomenology,” p. 182.
65. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 142.
66. Ibid. p. 48.
67. Dastur, Françoise. “Time, Event and Presence in the Late Heidegger,” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 47, (3-4), 2014 :399-421.
68. Ibid. p. 414.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid. p. 401.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. p. 421.
73. Raffoul, *Thinking the Event*, p. 117.
74. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 29
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Dastur, “Phenomenology,” p. 183.
78. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 139.
79. Dastur, “Phenomenology,” p. 179.
80. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 69.
81. Ibid. p. 49.
82. Ibid., p. XII
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid. p. 141.
85. Ibid. p. 12.
86. Dastur, “Time,” p. 414.
87. Ibid.
88. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 32.

## Chapter II – Time, Finitude, and Difference

1. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 4.
2. Martin, Heidegger. *Pathmarks*, ed and trans by William McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 30
3. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 43
4. Ibid,
5. Ibid., p. 411
6. Ibid., p. 422

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7. Ibid., p. 350.
  8. Heidegger and Albert Hofstadter. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 2nd ed. (Indiana University Press, 1982), p.30.
  9. Heidegger, "Logic," p. 410.
  10. Heidegger, *Introduction* p. 64.
  11. Levinas, Emmanuel "Time and the Other", trans. Richard A. Cohen, (Duquesne University Press, 1987) (in English).
  12. Dastur, Françoise, "The Ricœurian Critique of the Conception of Temporality in Heidegger's Being and Time," *Archives de Philosophie*, 74, no. 4, 2011, p. 565-580.
  13. Ibid.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p, 438.
  17. Dastur, François "Conscience: The Most Intimate Alterity," in *Question on Phenomenology: Language, Alterity, Temporality, Finitude*.
  18. Dastur. "Phenomenology."
  19. Dastur. "Phenomenology and Therapy: the Question of the Other in the Zollikon Seminars," in *Questions on Phenomenology: Language, Alterity, Temporality, Finitude*, p. 83.
  20. Ibid.
  21. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 238.
  22. Dastur. "Phenomenology."
  23. Ibid.
  24. Heidegger, Martin. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. by Richard Taft, fifth edition enlarged (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. xix.
  25. Ibid. 153
  26. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 322. "In saying-I, Dasein expresses itself as being-in-the-world. . . Surely in saying-I Dasein means the being [Seinende] that it itself always is."
  27. Ibid., p. 35.
  28. Ibid.,
  29. Dastur, François. "Time and the Other: Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas," in *Questions on Phenomenology: Language, Alterity, Temporality, Finitude*, p. 75.
  30. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 140.
  31. Dastur, Françoise. "Time, Event," p. 414,
  32. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 327.
  33. Ibid., p. 320
  34. Ibid., p. 310.
  35. Ibid., p. 17
  36. Ibid., p. 326
  37. Ibid., p. 294.
  38. Ibid., p. 315
  39. Ibid.
  40. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 38
  41. Heidegger, *Basic Problems*, p. 358
  42. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 20.
  43. Heidegger, Martin. GA 15, 384/FS, 71 as qtd in. Raffoul, François, *Thinking the Event*. p. 215.
  44. Heidegger, Martin. *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
  45. Dastur, "Time and Event," p. 429.
  46. Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, p. 48.
  47. Ibid.
  48. Heidegger, Martin. (GA 55 336-7/251).

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49. Heidegger, Martin. *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics (World - finiteness – loneliness) (winter semester 1929/30)* ed Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann 3<sup>rd</sup> edition 2004. XX, 544 pages. 361, §76 [523-24].
50. Ibid.
51. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. xi-xii
52. Heidegger, *Basic Concepts*, p. 356.
53. Dastur, *Telling Time*, xii
54. Heidegger, *Basic Concepts*, p. 317.
55. Ibid.
56. Heidegger, *Contributions*, p. 381.
57. Kaushik, Rajiv. *Merleau-Ponty between Philosophy and Symbolism: The Matrixed Ontology* (Buffalo: SUNY Press, 2019), p. 22.
58. Dastur, “Logic,” p.56.
59. Heidegger, *The Basic Concepts*, p. 149
60. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason, Second (B) Edition*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), p. 313.
61. Heidegger, Martin as qtd. in George Kovacs, Philosophy, Faith, and Theology in Heidegger's Correspondence with Rudolf Bultmann,” *Heidegger Studies Flight. 26, Foundations of Science, Tradition, and the Other Onset of Thinking*, 2010, pp. 219-222
62. *Contributions*, the phrase appears everywhere and has no specific notation here.
63. Heidegger, *Contributions*, p. 197
64. Ibid., 28.
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66. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 94.
67. Dastur, *Questions on Phenomenology*, Note 209.
68. Heidegger, *Contributions*, p. 4
69. Ibid., 70.
70. Ibid., 69.
71. Ibid., 224
72. Frell, David Karrell. *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being* (Pennsylvania: Penn State University, 1990).
73. Dastur, “History and Hermeneutics,” in *Questions on Phenomenology*, p. 143
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., p. 140.
77. Ibid.
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80. Ibid., 237.
81. Ibid.
82. Dastur, “Phenomenology,” p. 182
83. Gadamer, “The Continuity of History and the Existential Moment” p. 237
84. Dastur, “History and Hermeneutics,” in *Questions on Phenomenology*, p. 141
85. Ibid., 144.
86. Ibid.
87. Ricoeur, as qtd in Ibid.
88. Dastur, “History and Hermeneutics,” in *Questions on Phenomenology*, p. 145.
89. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 129.
90. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 126.
91. Ibid., 127.

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92. Ibid., 121.
93. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.328
94. Ibid., 127.
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96. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 127
97. Ibid
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99. Ibid., p. 265
100. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 124
101. Ibid.
102. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 129
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid
105. Ibid.
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108. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 94.
109. Dastur, "History and Hermeneutics," in *Questions on Phenomenology*, p. 144.
110. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 123
111. Dastur, "Time and the Other," p. 75.
112. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 451.
113. Gadamer, Hans-George. "Hermeneutics and Logocentrism", in *Dialogue and Deconstruction. The Gadamerian–Derrida Encounter*, eds. D. P. Michelfelder and R. E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 114–125).
114. Dastur, "Time, Event and Presence," p. 414
115. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 129
116. Ibid.
117. Heidegger, Martin. *Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*, ed. Peter Trawny, 2014, VI, 286p.
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121. Ibid., 119.
122. Ibid 120.

### Chapter III – The Eventful Psychē

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2. Ibid.
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4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 71
7. Ibid.
8. Dastur, "Daseinsanalyse and psychoanalysis," p. 9.

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9. Ibid.
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  11. Foucault, Michel. "Dream, Imagination and Existence," p. 38.
  12. Heidegger, Martin. *Zollikon Seminars*, p. 161.
  13. Dastur, "Phenomenology and Therapy," in *Questions on Phenomenology*, p. 83.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Foucault, "Dreams," p. 35.
  16. Ibid., p. 42.
  17. Ibid., p. 40.
  18. Ibid., p. 35.
  19. Dastur, Francois. "Temporality and Existence: Merleau-Ponty between Husserl and Heidegger," in *Questions on Phenomenology*.
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  22. Heraclitus, Fragment B115 in *Fragments*, trans Brooks Haxton (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).
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  28. Whitmoyer, Keith. "The Sense of the Transcendental: ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty." *Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty's Thought*, 18, 2016: pp. 199–214.
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  35. Merleau-Ponty "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis," pp. 84-8.
  36. Ibid.,
  37. Foucault, "Dreams, Imagination and Existence," p. 33.
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  39. Whitman, Walt. "Sleepers," in *Song of Myself*, 1892 "Deathbed" Edition (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015).
  40. Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis," p. 81
  41. Ibid., 83.
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  43. Whitmoyer, "The Sense of the Transcendental," p. 205.
  44. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 123
  45. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice and Smith, Michael B. "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), p. 51.
  46. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 85.
  47. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 123.
  48. Dick, Philip K. "Schizophrenia and the Book of Changes," *Niekas #11*, p. 176.

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49. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 218.
  50. Ibid.
  51. Ibid., 151
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  53. Romano, *Event and World*, p. 31.
  54. Zondervan *NIV Study Bible*. Kenneth L. Barker, general editor, full rev. ed., Zondervan, 2002.
  55. Heidegger, Martin "The Origin of the Work of Art," in eds. Francois Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson, *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic), p. 199.
  56. Dastur "Phenomenology," p. 124
  57. Ibid., p. 121
  58. Dastur, "What is Understanding?," trans. Kaisa Sivenius, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 40, 1, 2019: pp. 133-44.
  59. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 284-285
  60. Kaushik, "Merleau-Ponty," p. 72.
  61. Nancy, Jean-Luc. par lui-même. *Cités* 58 (2).
  62. Foucault, "Dreams and Existence," p. 28.
  63. Ibid.
  64. Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis," p. 86.
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  66. Meriam-Webster
  67. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 33.
  68. Lynes, Phillip. *The Nature of the Thing (Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida) - Introduction to 'Dearth: Deconstruction after Speculative Realism)*, p. 8.
  69. Dastur. "Time, Event and Presence," p. 415,
  70. Lynes, *Nature of the Thing*, p. 10.
  71. Ibid. p. 7
  72. Dastur, "Time, Event and Presence," p. 418.
  73. Dastur, "History and Hermeneutics," in *Questions on Phenomenology* p. 146.
  74. Dastur, Françoise. "Logic and Ontology: Heidegger's "Destruction" of Logic," *Research in Phenomenology* 17 (1), 1987: pp. 55-74.
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  77. Dastur, "Logic and Ontology," p. 61.
  78. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, as qtd in Dastur, "Daseinanalyse and psychoanalysis."
  79. Ibid. 12.
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  84. Ibid., p. 99.
  85. Ibid.
  86. Dastur, "History and Hermeneutics," in *Questions on Phenomenology* p. 146.
  87. Kaushik. *Merleau-Ponty*, p. 95.
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  90. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, and Bryan Smyth. *The Sensible World and the World of Expression: Course Notes from the Collège de France, 1953*. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2020)
  91. Ibid.
  92. Merleau-Ponty, *Visible and the Invisible*, p. 91.



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<sup>93</sup>. Alfonso Lingis, in the Translator's Preface to *Visible and the Invisible*.

<sup>94</sup>. Romano, *Event and World*, p. 98.

<sup>95</sup>. Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 185.

<sup>96</sup>. Foucault, "Dreams and Existence," p. 60.

<sup>97</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Being Singular Plural." p. 9.

<sup>99</sup>. Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>100</sup>. Lynes, *Nature of the Thing*, p. 16.

<sup>101</sup>. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Being Singular Plural." p. 5.

<sup>102</sup>. Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>103</sup>. Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>104</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>105</sup>. Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>106</sup>. Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>107</sup>. Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>108</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>. Nancy, "Sense of the World," p. 28.

<sup>111</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>. Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>113</sup>. Ibid.

#### Chapter IV – Death, The Event

<sup>1</sup>. Dastur, Françoise. *Death: An Essay on Finitude* trans John Llewelyn (NJ: Althone Press, 1994), p. 24.

<sup>2</sup>. Dastur, Phenomenology and Surprise.

<sup>3</sup>. Dastur, *Death*, p. 62.

<sup>4</sup>. Ibid., 64.

<sup>5</sup>. Ibid., 64.

<sup>6</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 326

<sup>9</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>. Mereology reference.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid., §21, p. 34.

<sup>12</sup>. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 327.

<sup>13</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>. Rajiv Kaushik expands significantly on this point: "Plato's failure to disassociate being from the One in Parmenides means that time is reduced abstractly to the present, and the concept of being means a truncated presence that excludes past and future. But, in Sophist, when the problem of being is posed in terms of quantification, it is immediately recognized that being cannot truncate the present and exclude past and future, while the One is also freed from its equation with the now-moment and being. The solution that Plato offers in Sophist to the problem in Parmenides is thus to tear the One away from being. The Sophist is radical to the extent that it gives up the ontological dogmatism of the One, and the impracticable problems that come with it, and it opens the question of being even at the expense of its degradation. This means that the temporal forms of "is, was, and will be" are no longer explained in terms of the singular, unchanging, and eternal moment like they are in Parmenides." Kaushik, *Merleau-Ponty between Philosophy and Symbolism*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>15</sup>. Parmenides, as qtd in., McKirahan, R., 2008. "Signs and arguments in Parmenides B8," in P. Curd and D. W. Graham (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press) pp. 189–229.

<sup>16</sup>. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 437, p. 442, p. 453, and p. 457, respectively.

<sup>17</sup>. Ibid., p. 66.

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- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Dastur, "Logic and Ontology," p. 55.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Dastur, *Death*, p. 65.
- <sup>22</sup> Husserl, Edmund. *Logical Investigations*, trans J.N. Findlay (United Kingdom: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 426.
- <sup>23</sup> In relation to the centrality of Husserl's writings for the discussion of parts and wholes, I offer the following evidence: (1) according to Kit Fine, 'Husserl's third Logical Investigation is perhaps the most significant treatise on the concept of part to be found in the philosophical literature';<sup>189</sup> (2) Varzi, another prominent contemporary mereologist, comments that Husserl's analysis 'may rightly be considered the first attempt at a rigorous formulation of the theory' of parthood relations;<sup>190</sup> (3) Smith and Mulligan claim that Husserl's analysis of mereological dependence is 'the single most important contribution to realist (Aristotelian) ontology in the modern period';<sup>191</sup> (4) finally, Simons, in his comprehensive study of mereology, characterises Husserl as 'the earliest systematic mereologist of this century'.
- <sup>24</sup> Taminiaux, Jacques. "Heidegger and Husserl's "Logical Investigations"," *Research in Phenomenology*, 7, (1), 1977: p. 58.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Dastur, *Death*, p. 52.
- <sup>27</sup> Dastur, *Death*, p. 50.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Crépon, M. and Loriaux, M. *The Thought of Death and the Memory of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).. I borrow much of the following analysis of Derrida's thoughts on death from Crepon on Michael Naas.
- <sup>31</sup> Derrida, Jacques. *Sovereignities in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan* eds Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), p. 45.
- <sup>32</sup> Derrida, Jacques. *Aporias: Dying--Awaiting (One Another at) the "Limits of Truth" (Mourir--S'attendre aux "Limites De La Vérité")* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 64.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> Dastur, *Death*, p. 50.
- <sup>36</sup> Derrida, Jacques. *Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview*, trans Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. (Hoboken, N.J.: Melville House Publishing, 2007).
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 245.
- <sup>39</sup> Derrida, Jacques. *Memoires for Paul de Man*, ed and trans Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Duller, Eduardo Cadava, and Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 1989), pp. 33–34.
- <sup>40</sup> Derrida, *Aporias*, p. 25.
- <sup>41</sup> Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, p. 27.
- <sup>42</sup> Raffoul, *Thinking the Event*, p. 20.
- <sup>43</sup> Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 140.
- <sup>44</sup> Dastur, *Death*, p. 70.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 42.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 41.
- <sup>47</sup> Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 183.
- <sup>48</sup> Raffoul, *Thinking the Event*, p. 93.
- <sup>49</sup> Dastur, *Death* p. 42.
- <sup>50</sup> Dastur, "Phenomenology," p. 183.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

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- <sup>54</sup>. Ibid, p. 49.
- <sup>55</sup>. Dastur, *Death*, p. 50.
- <sup>56</sup>. Ibid., p. 51.
- <sup>57</sup>. Dastur, *Telling Time*, p. 70.
- <sup>58</sup>. Kaushik, Merleau-Ponty, p, 5.
- <sup>59</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>60</sup>. Dastur, “Phenomenology,” in Questions on Phenomenology, p. 151.
- <sup>61</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>62</sup>. Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup>. Dastur, “Time and the Other,” in Questions on Phenomenology.