Trust in peacebuilding organizations: A survey experiment in Haiti

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ABSTRACT

Peacebuilding organizations are important to support development in countries disrupted by conflict or disasters. However, to function effectively, these organizations need to generate trust among locals. Haiti has been flooded with foreign intervention following political upheaval in the 1990 s and even more so after the earthquake in 2010. The massive external involvement largely by-passed government institutions leading Haiti to be described as a 'republic of NGOs'. The role of foreigners has become increasingly contested, but little is known about whether Haitians consider all interventions and interveners similarly. Our study examines variation in trust in political organizations, such as the UN, INGOs, and local community organizations, reporting on a country-wide survey experiment included about 3,000 respondents held in Haiti in the autumn of 2019. Our study finds that identifying the type of organization impacts significantly on people's expectations and trust. Contrary to common perceptions, we find no clear evidence that local organizations are trusted more than external organizations. Local organizations are, however, seen as more capable than external organizations. INGOs are generally seen as more inclusive and least affected by corruption. In line with our expectations, Haitians view the UN as least inclusive.

1. Introduction

In 2019, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA, 2019) estimated 2.6 million people in Haiti – out of a total of 11.3 million – in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community has repeatedly and extensively responded to recurrent crises in Haiti such as earthquakes, hurricanes, displacements, and epidemics (Joseph, 2022; Kianersi et al., 2021). It has been extensively documented how the devastating earthquake of January 2010 led to an influx of foreign aid and aid workers (Katz, 2013). Structural factors, such as economic deprivation and fragility of the political system, further aggravate the vulnerabilities of many Haitians. The United Nations (UN) deployed several peacekeeping missions in response to violent political crises between 1994 and 97 and 2004–19. The goal of these large and sustained peacekeeping and -building efforts was to promote political processes and restore a secure and stable environment, but their impact has arguably been limited with political instability and high levels of crime remaining endemic. Persistent insecurity undermines trust in central authorities (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016), but also reduces trust in UN police and peacekeepers (Wong, 2016; Gordon and Young, 2017).

The role of the international community in peacebuilding has become more contested in general. External actors are considered at best as well-intentioned but at the same time as often insulated from and uninterested in local understanding of pressing problems and feasible solutions. Local 'ownership' and 'authorship' are seen as crucial for the success of programs: "It is not only local authorship that matters for peacebuilding. Other scholars, studying all kinds of international efforts around the world, have widely demonstrated that local ownership similarly increases the effectiveness of international initiatives, while its absence has the opposite effect" (Autesserre, 2014, 103; see also Ruggeri, Han Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2017). Haiti is commonly seen as a case in point and a clear illustration of the failure of external interventions in particular because of their failure to engage with local communities. Commenting on the international response to the devastating earthquake, Katz (2013) describes how by-passing national authorities has turned Haiti in a 'republic of NGOs', while Bell (2013) details how local social movements have played an essential role in reshaping Haitian society afterwards. In these arguments trust, or rather lack of trust, in international organizations plays a key role, and is contrasted to trust in local organizations to deliver projects that reflect better the needs and interests of the local population.

Yet, understanding of and empirical evidence for the micro-level mechanisms behind (lack of) trust in external and local organizations

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remains scant. Accordingly, our key research question is: does trust of local populations vary across different types of peacebuilding organizations? We are especially interested in whether trust in international organizations, or their trustworthiness, is distinct from trust in local organizations. Since our analysis concerns the relationship between the population and relevant peacebuilding organizations, we focus on trust in political organizations rather than general or interpersonal trust.

Following Mayer, David and Schoorman (1995) and Hardin (2002), we consider trust to be multi-dimensional and to typify the relation between trustor and trustee: 'A trust B to do X' (see also, Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017; Van der Meer & Ebe Ouattara., 2019). Specifically, Mayer, David and Schoorman (1995) distinguish between ability, integrity, and benevolence as dimensions of organizational trust. We follow the first two dimensions but propose an alternative conceptualisation of benevolence based on inclusiveness and representation in line with our interest in trust in political organizations. Inclusiveness is closely related to accountability (or being extrinsically committed) as contrast to caring (being intrinsically committed or benevolence) (Van der Meer & Ebe Ouattara., 2019; Zmerli & van der Meer, 2017). To this end, we adapt and apply this unified framework identifying different dimensions of trust of Haitian towards three distinct types of peacebuilding organizations – specifically, International Organization (IOs) (i. e., the UN), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Local Community Organizations (LCOs). These organizations share a stated interest in providing public services, but also decide on the nature and distribution of these services as well as access to them. In short, since they determine who will get where and when, they are *political* organizations. We argue that, in evaluating trust in these different organizations, it is relevant to distinguish between trust based on the perceived ability of an organization to deliver, its integrity, and its willingness to act in line with the interests and needs of the local population. Do these various dimensions of trust align with commonly made arguments about the relative strengths and weaknesses of international and local organizations? In other words, are international organizations indeed trusted because they are perceived as rich in resources but poor in (local) knowledge, while local community organizations are seen as more responsive to local needs?

We implemented a large nationwide survey held in Haiti in the autumn of 2019. Haiti is well-suited to explore (dis)trust in external and local peacebuilding organizations because of repeated and extensive foreign interventions as well as highly active local community organizations. Notably all these organizations have been dogged by controversies and scandals. By means of an experimental survey, Haitians were asked about their expectations about the delivery of a (hypothetical) local project, namely the building of a local clinic which is a common example of a so-called quick impact project. The treatment in our experimental setup is thus the type of organization responsible for the project to examine its impact on people's trust. Respondents were primed on either international organizations (IO or INGOs) or local community organizations. The experiment evaluates how identifying a specific type of organizations (IOs, INGOs, or LCOs) impacts on distinct dimensions of trust (ability, integrity and inclusiveness). Specifically, does the type of organization affect expectations about the delivery of the project in a timely manner (i.e., ability), their concerns about corruption (i.e., lack of integrity) and their expectations whether an organization will deliver a project that serves the needs of the community (i. e., inclusiveness). We explore the different dimensions of trust separately and find notable variation between organizations.

The next section outlines our expectations about how trust in peacebuilding organizations varies along different dimensions according to the relative strengths and shortcomings of such organizations. In short, organizations' every-day role and actions shape trust creating a perception of who is more (or less) trustworthy to bring peace, stability, and development. Foreign (or external) peacebuilding organizations tend to bring resources and specialized skills that are lacking locally. At the same time, they often do not have any lasting relations with local

communities which local organizations can take for granted. The high visibility of and familiarity with local organizations can also make the local population more aware of instances of corruption and nepotism. External organizations commonly use delegation and cooperation to deal with their relative (dis)advantages, but they are constrained by the need to demonstrate the value of their presence (to the local population but also potential donors) and they are aware of the risks of becoming embroiled in scandals. Subsequent sections elaborate on our theoretical argument, discuss the survey sample and experimental setup. The main findings are that Haitians indeed have different perceptions regarding specific organization and that the trustworthiness of these political organizations varies accordingly. At the same time, we do not find clear evidence that local organizations are trusted more than external organizations. In particular, INGOs are generally seen as more inclusive and least affected by corruption. The main findings are discussed further below, and we conclude with the key implications of our study for Haiti and beyond.

2. Peacebuilding and trust

Trust, or lack thereof, has been given increased attention as a salient feature of post-conflict societies. Trauma associated with violence and conflict experiences has been shown to erode trust between ethnic communities (Habyarimana et al., 2007). Interestingly, however, violence does not always reduce the predisposition of victims to trust; for example, whereas Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013) and De Luca and Verpoorten (2015) find that violence reduces levels of social trust in Uganda, Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii (2014) report higher levels of trust in communities that had been more exposed to violence in Sierra Leone and Nepal respectively. In Afghanistan, Weidmann and Zuercher (2013) do not find a significant relationship between violence and trust. These seemingly contradictory findings can be reconciled as differential effects of violence on intra- and inter-group levels of trust (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2020), because of efforts to heal historical wounds (Botero, 2020), or simply because of the amount of time gone by since violent events (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015; Ingleaire and Verpoorten, 2020). As noted by Schoorman, Mayer, and David (2007, 344), treating trust as an aspect of relationships means "that it varied within person and across relationships". For instance, Marien (2017), Schneider, (2017), Van der Meer & Hakhverdian (2017) and Van der Meer and Ouattara (2019), examine the equivalence of indicators of political trust in different institutions (as trust-objects) and contexts (countries, regimes, (sub)cultures). Here, we show that political trust in Haiti varies across objects (IOs, INGOs and LCOs) and that object-specific benchmarks for trust (worthiness) are appropriate. Haitians perceive international and local organizations are distinct objects of trust.

In their integrative model of organizational trust, Mayer, David and Schoorman (1995, 715) argue that trust is considered as an aspect of the relationship between trustor and trustee that is built and sustained over time. Here, trust refers to the relationship between the population and political authorities, it reflects the beliefs of the former as to whether the state, its institutions and representatives are "motivated to deliver on their promises and to act in the interest of the people" (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016, 69). Accordingly, good governance is associated with higher levels of trust, while failures to address local concerns are found to undermine trust. It matters, moreover, what specific organizations are held accountable; De Juan and Pierskalla (2016) find lower levels of trust in national governments in reaction to their inability to address

security threats. Using local attacks as a quasi-experiment, Gates and Justesen (2020) find that people responded to rebel attacks by attributing blame to the president rather than parliament or local government, while trust in institutions was largely unaffected. In the case of Haiti, peacebuilding organizations have to a large extent substituted for the national government. Accordingly, here we focus on trust in peacebuilding organizations rather than governmental authorities.[1]

When government institutions are weak – or weakened because of conflict or crises – external and local organizations become germane political actors. Given the sheer amount and duration of foreign interventions in Haiti and the common practice whereby peacebuilding and humanitarian initiatives by-pass official government channels, it becomes pertinent to question how much political trust Haitians have in external actors, such as the UN and international NGOs, and on what basis such political trust rests. Further, it is relevant to contrast external with local community organizations rather than the official government, since LCOs often play an important role in post-conflict societies. Trust in local community organizations is also important because international actors increasingly support and delegate to LCOs as part of bottom-up peacebuilding. Adveenko and Gilligan (2015) and Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein (2015) examine the experience with Community-Driven Development and Community-Driven Reconstruction to enhance social capital in Nepal and Liberia respectively. In both cases, however, they find that any positive impact is conditional on supporting more open and inclusive local organizations. These findings suggest that the integrative model of organizational trust is indeed relevant for trust in peacebuilding organizations.[2]

3. Contrasting ability, inclusiveness, and integrity of local and external peacebuilding organizations

Our adapted integrative model of trust posits ability, inclusiveness, and integrity as three relevant dimensions of perceived trustworthiness. Arguably, the perception of external and local peacebuilding organizations varies across these dimensions based on their observable characteristics, e.g., the resources they have at their disposal, as well as the discourse, e.g., being part of the society or having endured similar experiences. We hypothesize that the relevance of these different dimensions of trust for external and local organizations varies accordingly.

ABILITY Performance is commonly seen as crucial for trust in an incumbent government (Hetherington, 1998). People bestow trust upon organizations that they consider to be capable or competent. Delivering public goods, or good governance, requires access to sufficient resources as well as an effective organizational structure. Organizational ability has been shown to enhance trust in lesser-developed or politically more fragile countries; for example, Gent et al. (2015) argue that NGOs need to establish a reputation for competence to maintain donor support, even when this may come at the expense of securing long-term goals. Aksvik, Jamil and Dhakal (2010) show that institutional capacity strengthens political trust in Nepal, while Hutchison and Johnson (2011) observe this to hold across Africa. Sacks and Larizza (2012) show the positive association between governance indicators and trust in regional and sub-national authorities in Sierra Leone. Comparing the

Dominican Republic and Haiti, Stoyan et al. (2016) find that performance is a key factor underlying trust in political institutions such as the national legislature, Supreme Court, national elections committee and courts.

In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, any lack of resources or ability towards peacebuilding becomes urgent and apparent: it is widely recognized that the Haitian government simply was short of resources to respond effectively to the 2010 earthquake that had also destroyed many main government buildings. Local communities, especially outside the capital Port-au-Prince, were largely left to their own devices to respond to the emergency often with very limited resources, but still played an important role in providing shelter and basic health care (Bell, 2013). The resources available to international organizations provided a sharp contrast. Even though UN peacekeepers were also directly affected by the earthquake, extensive international support and equipment was rapidly airlifted into Haiti making them a reliable provider of aid which enhanced trust in them. Gordon and Young (2017, 72) report accordingly that experience with UN peacekeeping activities such as patrol and arrests increased the perception of their effectiveness among the local population. Successful fundraising further supported numerous and large-scale initiatives by INGOs. The equipment and materials brought into Haiti and support given to international staff clearly showed the relative abundance of resources available to IOs and INGOs (Katz, 2013). Therefore, we expect that LCOs are perceived as having lower *ability* to perform effectively compared with INGOs and IOs since the latter hold more resources to assist in a post-conflict environment.

INCLUSIVENESS The local population is more inclined to trust peacebuilding organizations that represent local concerns better; in other words when peacebuilding organizations align their activities with the interests and concerns of the local population. By being more inclusive, organizations also build trust as an affective attitude. As Wong (2016, 775) argues organizations can generate 'positive experiences' by "engaging citizens through communications and showing their concerns". Studying Kosovo, Kelmendi and Radin indeed find that respondents were more satisfied with UN peacekeepers when their activities aligned with the ambitions of local groups. Ideally, "within the broad political constraints of the mandate, missions can identify policies that best align with the goals of the competing groups in the society" (Kelmendi and Radin, 2018, 1004). Ardanaz, Otálvaro-Ramírez, and Scartascini (2023) find some evidence that information about citizen participation increases trust beyond those who participated directly.

Although closely related to benevolence – a term introduced by Mayer, David and Schoorman (1995) – we prefer to use the terms inclusiveness. Firstly, inclusiveness is more closely related to our interest in trust in *political* organizations. As emphasized in research on local peacekeeping and -building, the ambitions of the local population are commonly ignored while most attention is given to accommodating elites (Autesserre, 2010; 2014). However, at the local level, peacebuilding activities are often highly political in providing selective access and benefits. People will be more trusting in organizations that are more considerate and that want to find out what their interests and needs are. Secondly, activities that include or represent the local population are much easier to observe than a benevolent predisposition. The local population knows whether organizations are interacting with and listening to them. It is equally obvious when they only engage with a small group of people, specifically the elite. Finally, external organizations are commonly accused of being arrogant and failing to listen to the people they're supposed to help, which neatly opposes inclusiveness.

The close and dense ties between community organizations and local communities should make it easier for them to represent and include the local voice. Awareness of every-day problems but also showing interest in solving them directly affects public opinion by creating a positive image towards the organization and becomes an important source of trust. In other words, we expect people to trust local organizations more because it is easier for them to listen to communities and to address their specific concerns. Markedly, Stoyan et al. (2016) observe that: "[i]n

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[1] It can also be relevant to distinguish between the short-term and long-term impact of crises; for example, Deglow and Sundberg (2021) report increased trust in the Afghan government following terrorist attacks by the Taliban, suggesting that in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, people rallied around a government.

[2] The integrative model of organizational trust was originally proposed by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) working in Management Science. Further dimensions, e.g., value similarity and transparency, have been proposed for organizational or institutional trust, while one-dimensional trust indicators are still commonly applied as well. In our experiment, we use an adaptation of the conceptual framework of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995).

Table 1
Expectations about trust across different dimensions and organizations.

Organizations	Ability	Inclusiveness	Integrity
United Nations (IO)	↑↑	↓↓	↓↓
International NGOs	↑	↓	↓
LCOs	_#	_#	_#

Note: _# baseline category, average perception of trust (↑) higher, or (↓) lower, all relative to the baseline category, namely Local Community Organizations (LCO).

Haiti where associational life tends to be more organic, we find a strong positive relationship between civic engagement and institutional trust in 2008 and 2012."[3] The distance between the local population and INGOs and especially IOs, such as the UN, is larger. The common Haitian practice to refer to all foreigners as *blan* illustrates how much these organizations are perceived as 'other'.

IOs and INGOs are, however, generally aware of the need to engage with the local population and to give them a voice in the implementation of peacebuilding initiatives. They commonly work with local partners to strengthen local capacity. Community Driven Development and Reconstruction projects provide block grants to build local governance capacity by supporting Community Development Councils (Adveenko and Gilligan, 2015; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2015). Regardless, external organizations are commonly accused of failing to fully understand local conditions, not listening to what locals want and need, and giving preferential treatment to some groups. At the same time, LCOs may also reproduce local cleavages in society and represent special interests or be tied to specific political parties. Despite the selective approach in some LCOs' activities, we still expect that they perform better in terms of inclusiveness due to their local knowledge and that this will increase people's trust in LCOs. At the same time, we expect a medium performance from INGOs because of their attention to the individual as their fundamental role in peacebuilding, and the IOs coming last as the organizations with the least individualized approach.

INTEGRITY The resources available to international organizations often contrast sharply with their performance 'on the ground' feeding suspicions about the intentions of interveners. Organizations are often perceived as primarily serving their own interests. Relatedly, UN peacekeeping is seen as primarily serving the interests of the major powers or the Permanent Five of the Security Council, and INGOs as representing their main donors (Gent et al., 2013). Deployment to crisis areas also present opportunities for career advancement for UN and foreign INGO staff. UN missions and humanitarian missions further offer economic opportunities for local authorities and – well connected – individuals, as well as for outright corruption. In contrast, an organization is perceived to have integrity if it has the intention to deliver on its promises. It is seen as reliable and honest. Particularly important in the Haitian context, it deserves respect. It is also predictable in the sense that it will try to follow up on its statements and promises.

A carefully built reputation for integrity can be undone quickly when believable allegations for corruption or abuse are made (Beesley and Hawkins, 2022). Gordon and Young (2017, 72) find that Haitians who had observed abusive behavior by UN peacekeepers, "including paying for sex, stealing, unjustly using force, and abusing women", were much less likely to hold positive beliefs about the UN – seeing them all less effective, more abusive, and less benevolent. Not only the UN but also international NGOs had to deal with scandals giving the local population reasons to question their integrity. At the same time, local organizations are also commonly accused of corruption, abuse, and preferentialism, but such 'local' scandals are much less likely to become national or even

international news.

Mayer, David and Schoorman (1995, 719) argue that: "[t]he relationship between integrity and trust involves the trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable". This understanding of integrity coincides well with the commonly held notion that 'being corrupt' is the opposite of integrity. It is also somewhat problematic since it requires an identification of the principles held by the trustors.[4] In post-conflict societies we expect that people often perceive organizations as highly corrupt due to the overall instability affecting the country. Even so, we propose a comparison among organizations' integrity and the effect on political trust theoretically based on shared interests and principles. Although, LCOs and INGOs may be related to donors whose trustworthiness may be questioned, they are still likely to be perceived as the least corrupted as charities often represent neutral interests and humanitarian principles. We expect people to perceive the integrity of IOs most unfavorably because of IOs are seen primarily as political organizations representing the interests of foreign governments rather than humanitarian principles of the international community.

Table 1 summarizes our theoretical expectations on how identifying organizations as IOs (i.e., the UN), INGOs, and LCOs respectively will affect different dimensions of trust (distinguishing ability, inclusiveness, and integrity), using LCOs as the baseline for the comparisons. Our expectation is that specifying that the project is sponsored by an IO – rather than a LCO – will make respondents more inclined to expect that the clinic will be finished on time, and that this effect will be stronger compared to mentioning that an INGO is the sponsor. We expect trust in IOs (and to a lesser extent INGOs) to derive mainly from their resources and thus ability to intervene effectively. The trust in LCOs will mainly be based on inclusiveness, because of their close links to the community, while INGOs and especially IOs will be seen as more distant. Finally, we expect relatively high levels of distrust where Haitians question the integrity of organizations, highlighting that scandals have especially undermined trust in the UN.

Ultimately, we would like to understand better how trust in organizations affects their ability to operate in a post-conflict environment. In other words, we aim to show whether and how each type of organization inspires each dimension of trust.

4. Research design

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND SAMPLE In the autumn of 2019, we fielded a nationwide survey with an embedded experiment in Haiti to assess how the strength of trust varies across different types of political organizations. The survey was designed by the authors, while a local team of Haitian social workers and graduate students fielded the survey.[5] Of the 3,000 Haitian residents interviewed,[6] the sample was matched down to include 2,335 respondents to produce the final dataset. The sampling frame was based on the estimated number of social service providers serving children in the communal section. This guaranteed that there was at least one social service provider in each of the selected

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[3] Stoyan et al. (2016) do not observe a similar strong effect for 2010 which they blame on the special circumstances following the earthquake.

[4] Defined in this way, integrity is also difficult to distinguish empirically from benevolence, defined as: "the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor" Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, 718). Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007, 346) propose that the separation between integrity and benevolence requires a long-term relationship, but it is more practical to distinguish between whether the trustee is seen to act primarily in line its stated goals rather than serving its private interests (integrity) and whether the trustee is acting in line with the needs of the trustor (inclusiveness).

[5] The research was given ethical approval via the authors' affiliated organisations on 15 October 2018.

[6] The sample was further balanced according to gender, age, and education to match the characteristics of the population (see Table A1 for socio-demographic information in the appendix) and we removed from our analysis participants who did not complete the survey, resulting in N = 2,335.

Fig. 1. Size of treatments.

communes, and ultimately, at least one type of organization of interest that had been active (i.e., a UN agency, an INGO or LCO) in the area. Only adults above 18 years old were interviewed. The survey took place on a face-to-face basis where only one adult per household was randomly selected to increase integrity of answers. A household was defined as 'you and everyone who lives with you and shares food, money, and other resources in this same place; they do not need to be related to you by marriage or blood'.

The experimental setup enables us to identify average treatment effects rather than a representative picture of public opinion in the country (see also Imai, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2013). Using an experimental design minimizes the risks of omitted variable bias. Crucially, the design of our experiment avoids framing the evaluations since respondents are asked to evaluate only one category of organization: an IO, INGO, or LCO. The setup allows for pairwise comparisons of different types of organizations. The alternative – asking respondents to evaluate all three types of organizations – is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, respondents may be tempted to make their answers consistent across organizations; for example, if they believe corruption to be a serious problem, they will highlight this concern for *all* types of organizations. Secondly, they may be inclined to provide perceptions relative to the type of organization asked previously; for example, the answer to the perception of the IO – when asked first – will affect the answer for the organization asked next. Despite randomization, the order in which organizations are presented in the survey will matter and it may artificially inflate the variation in responses. Both mechanisms introduce unique and opposing biases making it near impossible to analyze the answers (Dorussen, Bakaki, and Kolbe, 2021). The questionnaire refers explicitly to peacebuilding organizations that have been active in Haiti and had a significant presence (Table A2 in the appendix details all organizations named in the survey questionnaire). We named the UN for the International Organization treatment. Starting with the first peacekeeping mission (UNMIH), the UN has been present in Haiti since 1993. The mission was re-established with MINUSTAH in 2004 and lasted until 2017. As examples of INGOs we rely on a variety of organizations that have been active across the country, for instance, Save the Children has been helping children in Haiti since 1985 providing health, food, and education. In the experiment, we refer generically to 'neighborhood /

local organizations.'[7]

The treatment wording refers to activities that all different types of organizations could have implemented and that we expect to be of interest to many Haitians irrespective of their political preferences. Quick impact projects (QIPS) are useful in this respect because these small projects have relatively low cost and a short timeframe. Existing literature suggests that QIPS aim to build trust by cooperating with locals (Gordon and Young, 2017). To this end, after some introductory script and the consent page, we asked participants (in a random order) about the political situation in Haiti, their awareness and experience with peacebuilding organizations, perceptions on security, and sociodemographic information. Next, participants were randomly assigned to information that presented the construction of a clinic as a peacebuilding quick impact project either as an initiative by an IO, an INGO or an LCO (as different treatment groups). After exposure to this information, which resulted in three groups as shown in Fig. 1, participants responded to a series of questions about their expectations about the construction of the clinic. The answers are indicators of measures of trust relating to ability, inclusiveness, and integrity.

As expected, and in line with the narrative that peacebuilding organizations are highly active across Haiti, participants are generally aware of the presence of organizations. Yet there remains notable variation across organizations. Fig. 2 shows that participants are most aware of local organizations (95%) such as local churches or Fonkoze, compared to 70% being aware of the UN, and 63% reporting awareness of INGOs such as Action Aid.[8]

DEPENDENT VARIABLES – DIMENSIONS OF TRUST In the experimental part of the study, to capture the suggested dimensions of trust we use three survey items. To ascertain a good understanding of the questions, and thus increase the accuracy of responses we rely on three binary survey items where respondents answered yes or no. Based on our theoretical expectations, we measure ability with a question on *time*. A question on whether the project (i.e., the clinic) will meet the society's *needs* measures inclusiveness. Last, we measure integrity by asking whether it is likely that the project will be disrupted by *corruption,* seen as the inverse of integrity. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the dependent variables showing that in general levels of trust in political organizations are high except when we ask about impact of corruption (see Table A3 in the appendix for detailed survey questions).[9]

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: TREATMENT CONDITIONS Participants randomly selected into the treatment conditions (the three different types of organizations), where each treated participant received one treatment. Detailed wording of treatments is shown below in Table 2. To avoid messenger and other types of effects on participants that are not of interest in this paper, the treatments were similar in structure and wording (except the actual treatment difference: type of organization). The treatment texts were kept short and clear by using a stylized example, rather than actual organizations' activities. Given that this is a face-to-face survey it is very unlikely that each participant would have had sufficient time to read and understand a more complex treatment. The stylistic treatment is however realistic in presenting people with a scenario that could have taken place. It thus avoids possible confusion or

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[7] In other parts of the survey, e.g., when we ask about awareness, we named some local organizations, for example Fonkoze which enhances Haitians' employability skills through business skills training, in addition to referring to local churches that play an important role in Haiti.

[8] Beyond awareness, we also address in the appendix (A4) the factor of experience with the organizations employed in the study to thoroughly investigate the role of organizations in people's daily life. We did not include this variable in our main analysis due to missing data.

[9] Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies (2017) also adapt a trust scale originally based on Mayer, David and Schoorman (1995) to a specific type of object, namely public administration. Van der Meer and Hakvherdian (2017) explicitly analyse the relevance of corruption in trust evaluation.

Note: We directly ask participants whether they are aware of the organizations employed in our study. Refer to the appendix for detailed survey questionnaire.

Fig. 2. Mean of awareness across organizations.

Notes: Survey questions from left to right panel: Would you expect the organization to finish the clinic on time? Would you expect the clinic to meet the needs of the community? Is it likely that corruption in the organization will disrupt the building of the clinic?

Fig. 3. Distribution of Dependent Variables.

Table 2
Wording of treatments.

Treatment	Description
IOs	An <u>international organization, such as the UN,</u> is responsible for building a clinic in your neighborhood to help citizens with medical assistance and treatment.
INGOs	An <u>international non-governmental organization, such as Action Aid or Save the Children,</u> is responsible for building a clinic in your neighborhood to help citizens with medical assistance and treatment.
LCOs	A <u>neighborhood/local organization</u> is responsible for building a clinic in your neighborhood to help citizens with medical assistance and treatment.

evoking negative reactions from respondents who are more aware of the political situation. Since the stylized treatments were administered during political instability in Haiti, participants in all groups may have been exposed to additional information about organizations and their

impact in the country. Accordingly, the timing of our survey puts the hypotheses to a hard test since it makes it tougher to identify statistically significant and distinct treatment effects. From a purely methodological standpoint, our choice of timing is fine as long as the random assignment to group conditions is effective, because effective randomization homogenizes the probability of exposure to additional (non-experimental) information across groups. Subsequent random assignment of participants to treatment groups ensures that individuals who were more (or less) motivated to acquire additional information outside the experiment do not cluster in one of our experimental groups.

CONTROL VARIABLES Although participants are randomly assigned to treatment conditions, we still employ several control variables to increase the precision of the estimate but by design they should have no effect on the coefficient of the treatment variables (Imai et al., 2011).

Table 3
The impact of peacebuilding organizations on political trust.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Ability	Inclusiveness	Integrity
IOs	−0.55***	−1.20***	0.27*
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.16)
INGOs	−2.39***	3.19***	3.26***
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Awareness IOs	0.10	−0.20	0.24*
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Awareness INGOs	0.22**	0.11	−0.13
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Awareness LCOs	0.03	−0.18	−0.38
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Gender	−0.01	−0.14	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Age	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Employment	−0.08	0.04	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Education	0.07	−0.06	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Income	−0.04	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Safety	−0.53	0.18	0.19
	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Constant	0.56	−2.33**	3.14***
	(0.72)	(1.01)	(0.98)
N	2,294	2,294	2,294
Pseudo Log-likelihood	−1320.041	−930.672	−994.676
Prob > χ^2	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; Party identification binary variables are included in all models; Regional fixed effects included in all models.

Socioeconomic indicators are *Employment* asking participants whether they are employed, and *Income* measured as last month income in Haitian dollars.[11] Given that Haiti is a post-conflict society, we also asked participants about their feelings on *Safety* with a binary item. Participants were asked about their political beliefs by questioning what they consider to be the most suitable political party for governing the country. The models include binary party identification items. Lastly, we control for regional fixed effects.

5. Results

Table 3 presents the results of the full statistical models where the coefficients for IOs and INGOs give a comparison of external with local organizations. Models 1–3 show the disaggregated dimensions of political trust, based on logit models due to the binary nature of the trust-variables. As expected because of random assignment to different treatments, the sociodemographic control variables are statistically insignificant. To this end, we can proceed to the experimental part of our analysis and the examination of the treatment effects on the dimensions of trust.

Fig. 4 shows the effects of each of the trust dimensions across treatment groups for a more fine-grained analysis. We offer a comparison between the two types of foreign organizations (IOs and INGOs) and the local organizations (LCOs) as the baseline category. To start with the dimension of ability, we find that participants who were treated with either the IOs or the INGOs treatment show lower levels of trust, in comparison with the LCOs. This means that participants trust LCOs more than the foreign organizations in terms of their ability to deliver the project on time. The mean value of *ability* in IOs is 10 percentage points lower than the mean value of the baseline group (LCOs). The mean value

Notes: Percentage points denote mean differences between each treatment and the baseline group (LCOs) set to 0. Whiskers do not cross the 0-dashed line, and the estimated treatment effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.

Fig. 4. Effects of types of organizations on dimensions of political trust.

First, models include variables on *Awareness* for all categories of organizations employed in the study.[10] In addition, we include *Gender* and *Age* as sociodemographic characteristics. Since education is highly correlated with political attitudes and behavioral patterns (Schlozman et al., 2012), the models include education measured as the highest level of completed education. Education is a categorical variable coding for 'no schooling', primary education, secondary and tertiary education.

of *ability* in INGOs is 52 percentage points lower than the mean value of the baseline group. These findings imply generally high levels of trust the project will finish on time when is undertaken by local community organizations.

Regarding the inclusiveness dimension – whether the project will meet the needs of the community – we find that the mean value of *inclusiveness* for IOs is 16 percentage points smaller than the mean value for the baseline group. On one hand, LCOs are more trusted in terms of inclusiveness in comparison to IOs. On the other hand, this finding raises questions about whether LCOs are indeed representing the needs of the community as commonly assumed. In contrast, the mean value for

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[10] We also estimate our models focusing only on those individuals who report awareness to the organisations suggested in the survey. Despite the decrease in observations, the results remain qualitatively the same. We present the results in the appendix in A19.

[11] Haitians commonly speak about Haitian dollars, where 5 Gourdes is equivalent to 1 Haitian Dollar. Haitian Dollars only exist as a concept. Cash is always in Gourdes.

Note: We ask participants whether they have noticed the presence of each organization employed in our study. Refer to the appendix for detailed survey questionnaire.

Fig. A1. Mean of experience with organizations Note: We ask participants whether they have noticed the presence of each organization employed in our study. Refer to the appendix for detailed survey questionnaire.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A2. Moderating effect of *experience* and *ability* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

INGOs is 62 percentage points higher than the mean value of the baseline group. In other words, participants perceive INGOs as most trustworthy in meeting community needs.

The perceived likelihood that corruption will disrupt the building of the clinic measures the dimension of integrity. The affirmative response

by 66% of participants shows that corruption is indeed commonly expected. With regards our treatment effects, the mean value of *integrity* in INGOs is 64 percentage points higher than the mean value of the baseline group. In other words, participants who are in the INGOs treatment group believe the building of the clinic is less likely to be affected by

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A3. Moderating effect of *experience* and *inclusiveness*.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A4. Moderating effect of *experience* and *integrity* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

I trust the national government does the right thing for people like me.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A5. **Moderating effect of** *trust in national government* **and ability** Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

I trust the national government does the right thing for people like me.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A6. **Moderating effect of** *trust in national government* **and inclusiveness** Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

I trust the national government does the right thing for people like me.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A7. Moderating effect of *trust in national government* and integrity Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.


Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A8. Moderating effect of *ability in regions* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A9. Moderating effect of *Inclusiveness in regions* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A10. Moderating effect of *integrity in regions* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A11. Moderating effect of *ability across age* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.


Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A12. Moderating effect of *inclusiveness across age* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A13. Moderating effect of *integrity across age* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.


Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A14. Moderating effect of *trust across Gender* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

corruption than those in the baseline group. Therefore, INGOs are considered to have *more* integrity compared to the LCOs. The mean value of *integrity* in IOs is about 3 percentage points higher than the mean value of the baseline group showing that participants expressed higher levels of corruption for the LCOs even when comparing with IOs (i.e., UN).

The treatment effects are regularly distinct from our expectations

(Table 1) portraying how peacebuilding organizations along with their activities define people's disaggregated perceptions of trust. Priming INGOs and IOs leads to low evaluation of ability though in comparison to LCOs. The findings suggest that Haitians may well use a broader definition of resources which not just include material resources but also human and societal capital. The ability of LCOs to harness such local resources can explain confidence in their ability to finish a project on

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A15. **Moderating effect of *trust across Education*** Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A16. **Moderating effect of *ability across income*** Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

time. INGOs were judged as most inclusive, but as expected IOs were judged as particular distant in comparison to LCOs. Although LCOs might be the most knowledgeable of the local environment they are often driven by groups in the local population which may create bias and even resentment, whilst INGOs might be considered as less biased. INGOs (with the IOs showing lower levels than the INGOs) were also judged as less affected by corruption in comparison to LCOs, even

though some of them have been accused of improper behavior. Priming on IOs shows a small but still significant positive impact on integrity; that is, despite the general climate in Haiti locals have retained faith in the integrity foreign efforts, arguably even more so than in local organizations. Beesley and Hawkins (2022) observe that petty corruption, rather than grand corruption, decreases institutional trust. Our findings are in line with theirs, if LCOs are associated more with petty corruption

Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A17. Moderating effect of *inclusiveness across income* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.


Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. A18. Moderating effect of *integrity across income* Notes: Solid lines indicate marginal effects for LCOs, IOs, and INGOs, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Notes: Percentage points denote mean differences between each treatment and the baseline group (LCOs) set to 0. Whiskers do not cross the 0-dashed line, and the estimated treatment effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.

Fig. A19. Effects of types of organizations on dimensions of trust focusing on individuals reporting aware of the organizations of the study (IOs, INGOs, LCOs) Notes: Percentage points denote mean differences between each treatment and the baseline group (LCOs) set to 0. Whiskers do not cross the 0-dashed line, and the estimated treatment effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.

Table A1
Socio-demographic characteristics of our sample.

	Our sample	Population	Source of population data
Party identification	Haitian Tèt Kale Party 0.69%	55.60%	2016 presidential elections results available at
	LAPEH 19.43%	19.57%	www. haitilibre.com
	Platfòm Pitit Desalin 9.78%	11.04%	(Accessed July 2021)
	Lavalas Family 4.80%	9.01%	
	Renmen Ayiti 0.69%	0.75%	
	Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats 0.64%	0.64%	
	Randevou 0.51%	0.50%	
	Other 9.43%	2.19%	
	None of these 54.03%	0.68%	
Education	The median value of education attainment is Primary school (up to 3rd grade)	The median value of education attainment is Primary school	The World Bank
Income	The median value household monthly income is: G1,000–2,000	The 2019 Haitian median value of household income was $790	Statista.com
Gender (male: female ratio)	1:1	0.97:1 (2015 est.) (97.41 males per 100 females)	The World Factbook (CIA)
Age	The median value of age is 30	The median value of age is 24 (2015 est.)	The World Factbook (CIA)

Note: The most recent population data on party identification is from 2016 (3 years before our survey) where the voter turnout was just 18.11.

Table A2
List of organizations employed in the survey questionnaire.

Types of organizations	Organizations
International Organizations (IOs)	The United Nations
International Non-Governmental Organizations	Save the Children
	Caritas
	Action Aid
	Compassion
	International
Local Non-Governmental and Community Organizations	Fonkoze
	Fokal
	Zanmi Lasante (ZL)
	Local churches

and external organizations more with grand, or large-scale, corruption.

General distrust among the local population in local authorities may also influence their perceptions on local community organizations. In post-conflict societies, such as Haiti, we can expect that trust in

peacebuilding organizations is also related to the role of national authorities and in turn how much people trust the national authorities and the government (see also Sacks and Larizza, 2012, 2). To explore this further, in the Appendix (Figs. A5–A7) we look at how trust in national government impacts on the examined dimensions of political trust in peacebuilding organizations conditional on the treatment effect of interest.

The design of our study implies that socio-demographic indicators are insignificant to our dependent variables. In the appendix (Figs. A8–A18) we examine whether our results are consistent across different demographic groups and along different socio-economic dimensions. That is, we offer moderating effects of socio-demographic indicators we include in our models (Table 3). Along with our main findings, people show lower levels of trust to INGOs in terms of ability, and higher in terms of inclusiveness and integrity. However, these findings are not significant different across the categories of the socio-demographic indicators under examination i.e., age, gender, education, income, education and across regions in Haiti that verifies our

Table A3
Detailed survey questions employed in the study.

Variables	Survey question
Trust (ability)	Would you expect the organization to finish the clinic on time? Yes No
Trust (inclusiveness)	Would you expect the clinic to meet the needs of the community? Yes No
Trust (integrity)	Is it likely that corruption will disrupt the building of the clinic? Yes No
Awareness IOs	Are you aware of the UN? Yes/No
Awareness INGOs	Are you aware of Action Aid? Yes/No Are you aware of Save the Children? Yes/No Are you aware of Caritas? Yes/No Are you aware of Fonkoze? Yes/No Are you aware of Compassion international? Yes/No
Awareness local NGOs	Are you aware of Fokal? Yes/No Are you aware of Zanmi Lasante (ZL)? Yes/No Are you aware of a local church? Yes/No
Experience IOs	Have you noticed the presence of the UN? Yes/No
Experience INGOs	Have you noticed the presence of Action Aid? Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of Save the Children Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of Caritas? Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of Fonkoze? Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of Compassion international? Yes/No
Experience local NGOs	Have you noticed the presence of Fokal? Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of Zanmi Lasante (ZL)? Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of the local church? Yes/No Have you noticed the presence of any other neighborhood/local organization? Yes/No
Gender	Gender Male Female
Employment	Are you working? Yes/No
Education	What is your highest year of education? Did not attend Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education
Income	What would you estimate is you household's income over the past month? Between G 0–1000 More than G 1000 but less than G 2000 More than G 2000 but less than G 3000 More than G 3000 but less than G 4000 More than G 4000 but less than G 5000 More than G 5000 but less than G 8000 More than G 8000 but less than G 12,000 More than G 12,000 but less than G 15,000 More than G 15,000
Safety	Do you worry about your own or your family's physical safety these days? Often Rarely
Party identification	Which of these political parties do you think is the best one for Haiti right now? Haitian Tèt Kale Party LAPEH Platfòm Pitit Desalin Lavalas Family Renmen Ayiti Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats Randevou Other None of these
Trust in national government	I trust the national government does the right thing for people like me. True Somewhat true/somewhat false False

initial expectation.[12]

6. Conclusions

The record of achievements of humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations in Haiti has been mixed at best. In addition, they have become embroiled in several controversies and scandals. UN peacekeepers bore responsibility for a devastating outbreak of cholera in 2010. The UN and INGOs have also been accused of covering up sexual abuse by peacekeepers and aid workers.[13] Persistent insecurity and controversies in post-conflict societies are particularly concerning because they are likely to decrease the willingness of individuals to cooperate with peacebuilding initiatives. Organizations need to maintain trust among the local population to succeed in their efforts to promote peace and stability (Wong, 2016). In their study of civilian engagement with peacekeepers in Haiti, Gordon and Young (2017) show that exposure to security and relief activities of UN peacekeepers increases the willingness of individuals to cooperate with them by sharing information. At the same time, "exposure to abuse dramatically undermines civilian opinions of how effective, benevolent, and abusive peacekeepers are but has a smaller effect on cooperation" (Gordon and Young, 2017, 64). Suspecting corruption and out of a general lack of confidence in government institutions, peacekeepers and peacebuilding organizations have commonly opted to by-pass the Haitian government and to work with local communities directly. Katz (2013) accordingly typifies Haiti as a 'republic of NGOs'. These practices – sometimes referred to as Community-Driven Development and Reconstruction (Adveenko and Gilligan, 2015; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2015) – strengthen the role of local non-governmental organizations and community organizations (LCOs) but assume that citizens trust these organizations more (Fig. A19).

The goal of our research was to understand the micro-mechanisms behind trust in peacebuilding organizations by distinguishing between different types of organizations and different dimensions of trust. This aligns with the conclusion of van der Meer and Ouattara (2019: 2999) that: "[t]rust objects have some unique meaning to respondents, as they function as more than mere indicators of an underlying scale." Although we examine the micro-mechanisms in the specific Haitian context, our findings may well apply beyond Haiti to other contexts with external involvement.[14] For example, we find that priming on organizations indeed impacts political trust, but not always as evaluations of the effectiveness of international projects suggest. First, *only* priming on INGOs mostly leads to higher levels of reported political trust. Projects led by INGOs are seen as more likely to meet to needs of the community and less likely to be plagued by corruption. These findings raise some doubts about the perceived strength of local community organizations as most aware of local needs and most representative of local interests. The close connection between LCOs and the communities they represent is commonly emphasized in studies on Haiti (Bell, 2013; Stoyan et al, 2016). Our failure to find supporting evidence for inclusiveness and integrity as dimensions of trust in Haitian LCOs not only questions these assessments but also shows that strong statements for the central role of LCOs in peacebuilding in other places than Haiti (e.g., Autesserre, 2014)

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[12] See Marien (2017) on the issue of equivalence of instruments measuring trust.
[13] On the UN, see Lee and Bartels (2020) and (Bell et al., 2018). The accusations against Oxfam in 2018 are best documented, see the BBC website for an overview of events: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43112200 (accessed 13 January 2023). Our survey predates the 2021 earthquake and political unrest following the assassination of President Moïse on July 7, 2021.
[14] Research into trust in peacebuilding organizations is still rare, see Gordon and Young (2017) for another study on trust in UN peacekeepers in Haiti. Bargsted, Somma and Castillo (2017) survey research on political trust in Latin America.

may need more evidence.

Our findings, however, may also reflect the common practice among INGOs to collaborate with local partners. The generally positive evaluation of INGOs shows that international scandals (such as affecting Oxfam) may have only a small impact locally. That said, primed on INGOs shows lower levels of trust in terms of ability, meaning that participants consider LCOs better in delivering a project on time. This shows that resources extend beyond material resources and that close links to the community are seen as providing an important resource to deliver projects on time. It is also likely that LCOs only undertake smaller projects that are widely accessible to local people. The ability of LCOs to effectively organize human and societal capital is likely to extend beyond Haiti. Similarly, the relative advantage of LCOs to deliver small-scale project is not unique to Haiti but indicative of the important contributions that LCOs can make to development. We find that IOs are seen as the least able and inclusive, which reflects the contested role of the UN in Haiti; in particular, its role in introducing cholera, and the allocation of resources. IOs are seen as slightly less corrupt than the local organizations. This may be driven by the belief that local organizations are often led by elites with specific priorities and individual benefits.

Arguably, from a policy perspective, it is crucial to understand the exact elements that increase the likelihood of successful intervention. To get peacebuilding policies right, it obviously matters how the population attributes different dimensions of trust to international and local organizations and how this affects their role in development following conflict and disasters. Challenging the common, but possibly inaccurate perception that local organizations are always trusted more than interveners can help the UN and other organizations to design missions that allow for effective engagement and support more fruitful cooperation with the local population.

Although the focus of this study is Haiti, a highly politicized and unstable post-conflict society, our theoretical and empirical findings should apply also to other cases with similar circumstances. In other words, our experimental set up allows for generalizations given that we primarily focus on treatment effects and their impact on trust in peacebuilding organizations and not on public opinion across Haiti in general. Of course, sociodemographic and other structural characteristics may play a role in shaping trust in peacebuilding organizations but in our experimental setup these factors are, as expected, largely insignificant. Regardless, specific experiences with and mandate given to interveners also varies across (post-)conflict situations and may limit how well our findings generalize beyond Haiti. The scope of this paper is to investigate specific dimensions of trust related to peacebuilding organizations. Yet we acknowledge that we may see different levels of trust when looking at an aggregate measurement or at other measurements of trust as suggested by previous literature. It would be worth exploring further these other elements of trust (e.g., Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Van der Meer and Ouattara, 2019; Zmerli and Van der Meer, 2017). Additionally, a comparison of dimensions of trust in foreign and local actors in other countries with a notable presence of peacebuilding organizations would improve our understanding of the micro-dynamics of peacebuilding.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

We provide a folder with replication data

Appendix

A1. Socio-demographics

Table A1 offers a comparison between census socio-demographics and the corresponding distributions in our sample. It displays socio-demographic distributions for party identification, education, income, gender and age. The comparison shows that our sample tends to be somewhat wealthier and older than the Haitian population.

A2. Peacebuilding organizations selected for the survey instrument
A3. Survey wording

A4. Experience with organizations

Fig. A1 indicates that in general participants' experience with organizations to the extent that they have noticed the presence of an organization is significantly lower than the level of awareness (as presented in the main analysis). To this end, the mean of participants having noticed the presence of IOs (the UN) is 40 percent, whilst for INGOs is significantly lower at<10 percent. Most of participants express they have noticed the presence of local NGOs at 73 percent. The result of the local community organizations is primarily driven by the presence of church with 92 percent of the participants indicating that they have noticed the presence of a local church.

Figs. A2–A4 show moderating effects of experience and all the dimensions of political trust employed in the main analysis having asked participants whether they have noticed the presence of an organization. Regardless of whether participants have experience with an organization they show higher levels of trust, in terms of ability, when they are treated with the LCOs. Likewise, experience is not significant different when treated with INGOs, but in this case trust is lower in comparison to other organizations. Experience matters, however, for the IOs treatment. In this case, when participants are treated with IOs show lower levels of trust when they indicated they have had experience with an organization.

In terms of inclusiveness (Fig. A3), experience is not significant different for any of the groups, and we find that participants treated with INGOs show higher levels of trust in being included in the process of the project. Similarly, we find no significant difference for experience, regarding integrity (Fig. A4). This means people's integrity is not related to their experience with an organization. Along the lines of the findings in the main analysis, participants treated with INGOs show higher levels of integrity.

A5. Trust in national government

As we have discussed in this study trust in political organizations is a multidimensional concept that varies across different elements and is subsequently affected by aspects of daily life from perceptions to personal satisfaction. Our survey instrument also asked participants whether they trust the national government doing the right thing for people like them, and we find that only about 1.54 percent of our sample agrees that the government does the right thing for people like them. To further exam trust in national government, we look at how trust in national government impacts on the examined dimensions of political trust in peacebuilding organizations conditional on the treatment effect of interest. The results in Figs. A5–A7 show that there is no moderating

influence from trust in national government on trust in peacebuilding organizations. This likely implies that participants differentiate the national authorities from organizations.

A6. Trust in socio-demographic characteristics

Due to the nature of our study that is an experimental survey setup we do not expect the various socio-demographic variables to have a significant impact. People show lower levels of trust to INGOs in terms of ability, and higher in terms of inclusiveness and integrity. Likewise, people in Haiti show higher levels of trust for ability to IOs, with the LCOs coming first in ability. IOs are the least trustworthy in terms of inclusiveness, with the LCOs in a slightly better position. People consider INGOs having the highest levels of integrity, and the IOs like LCOs in a lower position. These findings are not significant different across the categories of the socio-demographic indicators under examination i.e., regions, age, gender, education, and income that verifies our initial expectation.

A7. Awareness

When discussing the activities of organizations, we also consider people's awareness of these organizations. In general, and as shown in the main analysis (Fig. 2) our participants have shown relatively high levels of awareness to the organizations we study. Nonetheless, we offer an additional analysis limiting our sample (N = 958) to those individuals who reported awareness to these organizations. The results are very similar to those in the main analysis showing that people show lower levels of trust to INGOs in terms of ability, and higher in terms of inclusiveness and integrity.

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