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Keywords: *egypt, islamic state, the muslim brotherhood, ISIS.*

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Egypt towards an Islamic State

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Abstract- Albeit the ridiculous claim on the implementation of the *Hudud* in Egyptian society, the history of this demand failed due to several reasons. Crucially, the unqualified community. Besides that, the Islamist movements translated the understanding of the Islamic State prejudicially. In the meantime, the demand for implementations of the Islamic State in Egypt has been a demand for a very long time, yet it never occurred. The failure of establishing the Islamic State instigated an unstable political spectrum. However, the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring in 2011 was an ample sign for establishing the Islamic State. In a paradox, the Muslim Brotherhood failed in several political and economic fields, which hastened the topple of the movement in 2013. This study analyses the incidents that occurred in Egypt towards the Islamic State implementation. By looking profoundly into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, this paper ascertained that the failure of democracy in Egypt instigated the emergence of ISIS in Sinai and besmirched the January Revolution reputation in Egypt and worldwide. This paper answers an arguable question: why Egypt fail to establish an Islamic State, albeit it is recognised as one of the leaders of Islamic countries and Arabs?

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I. INTRODUCTION

Islam is the religion of more than one billion inhabitants. Islam was sent from God to his Prophet Mohamed SAW. Since that time hitherto, and Islam has been disseminated throughout the world. For instance, Islam has entered Egypt in the year 641. However, Egyptians did not initially embrace Islam, but it took approximately two hundred years to alter the bulk of Egyptians to become Muslims, contrary to Christians. Islam had affected Egyptians culturally, linguistically and – of course – politically. Egypt had been ruled by the *Hudud* for hundreds of years. Still, the last two centuries observed a tangible transformation in the Egyptian political culture. The *Hudud* was ceased due to social reasons. Crucially, the uprising of liberalists' voices. On the other side, the collapse of Khalifah in Turkey had undoubtedly influenced Egyptian politics. The political scene in Egypt witnessed no religious rule in the government. Islam was solely placed at Mosques. Ironically, several Islamic clerics demanded the uprising

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of Islam to encompass all aspects of lives, particularly political culture. This political motivation had conclusively conducted various Islamist movements into the political scene, significantly Ikhwanul Muslimin the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The Islamist organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded by Hassan Al-Banna, the schoolteacher. Al-Banna pursued to implement Islamic law in Egyptian society. Alas, he failed to attend the success of his effort as he was assassinated in 1949. But the dissemination of the Muslim Brotherhood has posthumously reached the globe after his death. Politically, the Muslim Brotherhood governed Egypt for a year from 2012 until 2013. Therefore, as the title of this paper insinuates, this study examines the challenges that faced the Muslim Brotherhood by two methods, religious and sociological scopes, to look in-depth at Egypt Towards an Islamic State.

II. ISLAMIC STATE

The theory of understanding the meaning of the Islamic state revolves around Islamic teaching – and – how Islam regulations should be affected. Strategically, for Islamic rules to occur in such a society as Egypt, there should be a shred of awareness in society. This indisputably includes the role of the family to socialise the children based on Islamic teachings (Ahmed, Clauss &, Salvaterra, 2013). Faruqi (2005) argues that schools conjointly play such a crucial role in this process of development in the Islamic State. Beneath the Islamic State, the pupils will be subjugated to learn the Islamic curriculum to become prepared for ruling the Islamic State. Profoundly, the investigation of the Islamic State focuses on constrain. The constrain of political behaviours, religious fatwa, schools, and media. Correspondingly, the new concept of entrenching the Islamic State had effectively failed. It sociologically failed for the vacuum of experience and misunderstanding of the crucial steps that develop the Islamic State. For instance, the Caliphates of Abbasid, Umayyad and Ayyubid had historically indicated the veridical concept of the Islamic State. They produced clerics, scientists, and even new theories in the wars (Mukatel, n.d.) Moreover, main understanding of the Islamic State was not the focus solely on the *Hudud*. This is particularly indicating that implementing the *Hudud* had constantly taken place in their rules. Yet, they established schools, hospitals and developed the state economically and politically. Initially, this is undoubtedly the evidence that those Caliphates existed for more than centuries.

Furthermore, the Islamic State at that period witnessed the tolerance between the Muslims and non-Muslims (Kennedy, 1998). Egypt, however, constrained by Umayyad and Ayyubid dynasty, had remarked the tolerance between the Muslims and Christians. The rulers did not force the Christians to embrace Islam. Conclusively, those Caliphates established the most crucial constituent of politics, which is political stability. However, the current understanding of the Islamic State had completely morphed from a theory to another. This massive change in understanding the meaning of the Islamic State occurred palpably after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. Since then, the Islamic world impacted by unlimited scholars who produced a meaning of the Islamic State. Some of them had mutually pursued to establish a theoretical framework that could be implemented on the ground. At the same time, those scholars faced several challenges that sapped their ideology and physically dispatched them behind bars. Yet, hitherto, the Islamic world had never witnessed an actual implementation of the Islamic State. Undoubtedly, this eloquently dereliction is due to several internal and external reason.

The internal failure of the Islamic State had recently revolved around the unprepared individuals who took the lead. The preparation at this juncture highlights each aspect of lives. The individuals, for instance, in Al-Qaeda are not politically and socially socialised to establish a state as it is recognised in the country dictionary (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2021). Hence, Al-Qaeda members are not socialised to become teachers, doctors, and engineers. They, however, are socialised and trained to become combatants (Torok, 2010). With this, Al-Qaeda failed to establish the Islamic State. Furthermore, ISIS had been in a rigorous war in the Middle East in Syria and Iraq to establish an Islamic State. ISIS had seized half land of Iraq and Syria. It had cajoled the Muslims in Europe, Middle East, and Asia to come to Syria and Iraq to the Caliphate land (Fernandez, 2015). Accordingly, it was extremely vivid that ISIS had a coherent political state that seems unbreakable. However, ISIS had accordingly followed the same trajectory as Al-Qaeda (Wood, 2015). The focus was on recruitment without prior acknowledge of the individual background. ISIS had also shifted the children into combatants instead of students. In fact, shifting the whole community to combatants is the first step of dereliction. The community cannot succeed without education, health and political discourse. On the other side, the external reason behind the dereliction of establishing the Islamic State had been in the West's accounts. The West had rebuffed the concept of establishing the Islamic State. Of course, the West did not seek to fight the ideology of the Islamic State individually. The Arabian Regimes had assiduously juxtaposed fought the idea of establishing the Islamic

State. Hitherto, the idea of establishing the Islamic State is a theory that arduously can occur.

Indeed, Iran, for instance, considered itself as an Islamic State. It had profoundly established a coherent Islamic system that abjectly in the hand control of Ali Khamenei. Khamenei has been the forehead of the Iranian Islamic state since 1989 hitherto. His political ascendancy had reached Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain. As a Shiite Revolution, Khamenei and his doctrine Wilayat Al-Faqih believe in exporting the Iranian Revolution behind the country's borders. Henceforward, Iran had been involved in the Civil War in Syria and Hizbul Allah in Lebanon. Besides, the Support of Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran as Islamic State failed in several social factors. It fails to establish an environment for political dissenters (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2021). As a result, the political dissenters of the Islamic Iranian Revolutions are victimised to marginalisation. They are reckoned as quislings. Islamically, the meaning of political opposition took place in Islam During the Prophet Mohamed period. The Companions had different perspective contrary to the Prophet in many incidents. It is, of course, known as the differences were not regarding the credo but political differences (Islamstory, 2016). Still, there was respect and mutual understanding between the two parts. At this juncture, it is peculiar how the Iranian Regime executes its political dissenter. This rationale led Islamists and sociologist to abnegate the abomination of the Iranian Regime against its political dissenters. This abomination does not lead to prosperity and democracy but dictatorship.

In referring to democracy, several countries pursued to establish Islamic State but in a different meaning. For instance, Aceh state in Indonesia implements the *Hudud* since 2006 hitherto. The government of Aceh is responsible for the *Hudud* and its formal implementation. On the other side, the Indonesian government does not implement the *Hudud* in each diameter in the country (Saâ, 2016), but solely Aceh.

III. THE STORY OF EGYPT

Islam in Egypt had been presented through different accounts. Profoundly, it is critical to state that Islam is embraced by secularists, liberalists, modern Muslims, and terrorists. Critically, not all – Muslims – serve Islam as a whole. Yet, there are Muslims who rebuff to follow Islamic instruction. Still, there are Muslims who bear peremptory to their clerics. Vividly, the issue is not regarding Islam, but Muslims and their understanding of Islam.

The story of the Islamic State in Egypt shifted on several occasions. Historically, Egypt ruled by different rulers such as, Umayyad Ottomans, Mohamed Ali Pasha, and his family. Furthermore, in 1952, the Free

Officers toppled King Farouk and declared Egypt a republic nor kingdom (Gordon, 1992). Those rulers produced a different understanding of Islamic State – and – crucially Islamic Sharia. For instance, the existence of the Umayyad caliphate witnessed the expansion of Islam in Morocco and 'Al-Andalus' Spain. At that juncture, the negotiation over the *Hudud* played no part. It was compulsory to implement the *Hudud*. The Egyptian Muslims lived juxtaposed the Egyptian Christians under the *Hudud*. Yet, history did not investigate the negative response from Christians towards the *Hudud*. In the meantime, the political discourse over the *Hudud* had developed and became physical violence. The argument over reckoning Egypt as an Islamic State or Liberalist State is discursive. It has no sufficient answer to both sides, who assume Egypt is an Islamic State and those who consider Egypt as a Liberalist State.

According to Shaukrallah (1994), Islamists are predominantly stemming from rejecting all political discourse. Shukarallah assumes that Islamists utilise physical actions (violence) to attain their political agenda. Islamist movements assassinated Sadat, the third Egyptian President in, 1981. However, this assumption is erroneously proved. Islamist movements participate in political discourses since their foundations. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, sought to win the People's Assembly on various instances. This fact scotched the assumption that Islamist movements reject democracy. So far, the struggle to prove that Islamist movements are politically prepared for democracy is inaccurate. Islamist movements are atomised into several organisations. There are moderate Islamist movements, emissary Islamist movements and ultimately terrorist Islamist movements. Each category of those Islamist movements represents an Islamic ideology. For instance, emissary Islamist movements, such as Tablighi Jamaat, eschews the political discourse. The movements believe that politics is the main reason for the dispute among Muslims. Hence, they do not include politics in their programs (Alexiev, 2005). Whilst terrorist movements, such as ISIS, believes in physical violence to associate with the *Hudud*. It abnegates all political discourse. Besides, it declares *Jihad* as the sole method of bringing Islam on the right trajectory (Styszynsk, 2014). Conclusively, intermediate Islamist movements presume democracy and political discourse is merely a method of prosperity and renaissance. However, Egypt contains all varieties of Islamist movements. The imagination of Islamic Unity under one banner in Egypt seems elusive. There are no mutual interests among all Islamist movements. On the other side, intermediate Islamist movements are victimised to the abomination of Islam as a whole. The dissenters of Islam - and – political Islam do not differentiate between the sort of the Islamist movements. For them, violence and

terrorism occur because of the existence of the Islamist movements. In the case of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood have been struggling to represent political Islam in a good image. Alas, the movement faced several tribulations, such as incarcerations and ostracisation (Trager, 2011). Albeit the Muslim Brotherhood adopts the intermediate ideology of political Islam. Although the movement's dissidents had not ceased to promulgate rumours to besmirch the Muslim Brotherhood's reputation. Prior to the Muslim Brotherhood rise in 2012, the movement had historically reckoned as a nationalist movement. Of course, it had placed in vortex situations on different occasions. Yet, the movement had never been linked to any violence, particularly during the Mubarak Presidency. Nowadays, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a terrorist movement in Egypt (Dalacoura, 2018). It is, banned from practising politics and appearing in any social activity.

To understand the Story of Egypt towards the Islamic State in-depth: this paper examines a current issue that still uninvestigated. How historically is Egypt prepared for the Islamic State? Genuinely, the de facto history regarding this issue had never been placed on the negotiation table. Since Mohamed Ali Pasha hitherto, the pursuance to establish Islamic State had never occurred in favour of all governments. It is obscure whether Egypt does not consider this issue due to the minority of Copts rather preferring Egypt as a Liberalist State. In addition, beneath the Ottoman Caliphate and the British occupation, the *Hudud* had evanesced. However, Egyptian history witnessed various abortive attempts to revitalise the *Hudud*. The Muslim Brotherhood, alongside political elites Mostafa Kamel and Sayyid Qutb to establish the *Hudud* again. At this juncture, the Muslims, Christians, and Jews maintained their religious affairs. Egypt did not struggle with this political issue (Berger & Sonneveld, 2010). The differences between the current situation now and the Companions era is revolving around internal and external factors. The Companions learned the Koran to know the new teachings and guidance from God. There was no cultural influence on Muslims. The Persian and Roman Empires had not played a religious and cultural influence role on Arabs. Thus, the current situation of Muslims and Egyptians differentiate from the past (Qutb, 1964). Muslims nowadays are impacted by various external factors. For instance, the Western influence on Egyptians had led the country to utilise the English and French language as a compulsory language to work in the government. Learning a new language is a stimulus to learn new culture and adopt new habits as well. Egyptians who studied in France had been influenced by the Western culture: they pursued to bring it to Egypt. Yet, Mohamed Abdu, the Egyptian scholar who went to France for an academic purpose, returned to Egypt to normalise Egyptians

based on the Islamic teachings: he criticised the Western culture that in paradox with Islam (Hadoor, 2017). Undeniably, Al-Azhar did not declare such a rigorous stance to cease this Western influence. It had solely enjoyed an ethos by Egyptians and Saad Zaghloul (Hatina, 2000). Al-Azhar is historically known as the pulpit for Muslims worldwide. Yet, its role is lacuna during serious circumstances. One of the external factors that influenced Egyptians is the media. The Western media had not solely played a salient role in Egyptian society, but it morphed the identity of Egyptians. The discourse over Egyptians is Pharaohs or Arabs had complicatedly accentuated a profound social problem in Egypt. Egyptian secularists declare themselves Pharaohs. On the contrary, Islamists declare themselves Arabs. This dispute is probably not leading to physical abuse. Yet, it leads to a transformation in identity. The identity, however, shapes the personality and develop the individual's thoughts. An instance of Egyptian Islamists, considering them as Pharaohs, will marginalise the Islamic side, which encompasses the Islamic teachings and Arabic language. As a result, the Islamic State will play no role in the Egyptian political scene. Egypt will manifestly shift to a Secular State.

The comparative analysis of the differences between the Companion's period and the current situation highlights the collapse of the identity. All Islamist movements in Egypt inveigle their cohorts to establish an Islamic State and envisage reviving the Caliphate. Notwithstanding, those Islamist movements had left a gap among its members to have an in-depth understanding of the movement's identity, objectives, and ideology. Thus, the continuum of most of those Islamist movements collapsed and evaporated. One of those movements is Takfir Wal Hijrah. According to Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil (2021), this movement instigated chaos and harmed the political stability in Egypt. Hence, the Egyptian government made a pragmatic decision to remove this Islamist movement. It was palpable for Egyptians that Takfir Wal Hijrah is causing troubles instead of developing society. As such, Egypt, at this juncture, was in an ideological battle against the communists and socialists who seized the social activities and universities during Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second Egyptians President. In addition, Takfir Wal Hijrah declared Egypt as Islamic State without considering all ramification of their declaration. The de facto is a preposterous idea to propagate for the Islamic State whilst the cohorts of the movements are not well prepared. Egypt was simultaneously teetering on the brink of collapse due to its war against Israel. Besides, the members of Takfir Wal Hijrah were mostly released from the incarcerations. They have not been socialised socially, politically and even religiously to establish this alleged Islamic State. Arguably, the miss understanding of the movement's identity is, unquestionably, the main culprit of the dereliction of the Islamist movements.

IV. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD A CASE STUDY

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the world. It was founded in 1928 by the schoolteacher Hassan Al-Banna. As a founder of the movement, Al-Banna emphasised Islam and politics are inseparable (Farahat, 2017). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood has been struggling to establish the Islamic Laws in the legitimate rules. The pursuit has been ambling on the trajectory of democracy, rebuffing all extremist ideologies. Accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood eschewed extremism and the language of violence. This has valorised the movement's stance against its dissenters. On the contrary, extremist movements have an abject denunciation against the Muslim Brotherhood. They assume the intermediate ideology adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood is the main culprit of the Muslims ignorance. Of course, this seemed plausible in the Muslim Brotherhood dissenters' accounts. Particularly after the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 by a military coup committed by the Minister of Defense Abdul Fattah Assisi.

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood did not witness prosperity and sophistication. As the movement played the role of the main dissenter in the face of dictatorship: it had faced dissolution, incarceration, and confiscation of its properties (Munson, 2001). For critics, this had occurred because of the movement's motto that emphasises 'Allah is their destiny, the Prophet is their leader, Koran is their constitution, and the death for the sake of Allah is their destination' (Khalid, Hassan & Sajid, 2020). This motto, of course, stands against several ideologies. It does not coexist with the principle of Secularism that believes religion and politics must be bifurcated. It accordingly does not concur with the interest of the Egyptian military. Arguably, these discrepancies between the motto of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military headed to a recondite situation. The relationship between the two sides has been sapped in various political incidents. The constant grapple over the political ascendancy indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood had lost in many political battles. Since 1954 until the collapse of Mohamed Morsi the first civilian President of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood hurled in incarcerations and faced executions. Antithesis from the oppression and political deprivation, the Muslim Brotherhood won most of the Egyptian elections, particularly after the January Revolution in 2011. Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood believed in democracy to attain its political agenda. Its political agenda is the fulcrum of the argument to establish the Islamic State. However, the distinguish between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements to establish the Islamic State is extremely non-

comparative. It argues that the Muslim Brotherhood took the political ascendancy not only in Egypt, but Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya (al-Anani, 2020).

To establish an Islamic State, Hassan Al-Banna pursued and cracked to ascertain answers for all disputable issues. This encompasses social issues, religious issues, even sportive issues. He inculcated to his cohorts that to establish an Islamic State that implements Islamic teachings in its society, the Muslim must unite beneath one banner. However, the challenges faced by the Muslim Brotherhood have been recurring in each decade. With a vituperative attack on the movement's structure, the Muslim Brotherhood had not challenged external crisis in Egypt, but its members subjugated to an internal crisis that successfully bifurcated the movement into two sides in different periods. Ironically, the oppression towards the Muslim Brotherhood did not cease its expansion on Egypt's soil. Even the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 had remarkably witnessed the dissemination of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology worldwide. Several scholars have attributed to the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's society and worldwide (Munson, 2001; Zollner, 2009 al-Anani, 2016). Sociologically, the Muslim Brotherhood sufficiently has an epiphany towards the hazard committed by the Egyptian government. Therefore, it entrenched a coherent sociological network in Egypt by having more than 100 branches in all Egyptian diameters. Those branches were juxtaposed with schools, social clubs, and clinics. The domination of the Muslim Brotherhood over Egyptian society did not favour the movement itself. Yet, it had intriguingly favoured Mubarak's regime economy. According to Leiken & Brooke (2007), the Muslim Brotherhood is not a revolutionary movement; it inveigled Egyptians to win their hearts for a gradual Islamisation. The whole ideology and structure of the Muslim Brotherhood are built on the Islamic ideology. Besides, the movement focused on socialising its members on Islamic teachings, nationalism, and Islamic globalisation. According to (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2020), the Muslim Brotherhood main ideology is *Ustaziatul Alam* which means to govern the world by Islamic perspective. The Muslim Brotherhood focuses on shaping individuals to become stalwart members to promulgate the concept of the movement in all Egyptian diameters. The members sought to procure social dominance prior to political ascendancy. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in physical violence as a solution to establish the Islamic State; it believes in the democratic trajectory as the sole and crucial method for a developed state. This developed state will uprise by individuals. Crucially, the internal system of the Muslim Brotherhood is reflexively producing the image of political Islam. This political Islam was not grappled by the military to cease the envision of establishing the Islamic State. The Islamist

movements that argued with the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the movement concept: had disowned the movement strategy to seek political ascendancy. Those movements had likewise considered the Muslim Brotherhood as the pursuers of power. Arguably, after the collapse of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, those Islamist movements established their political parties to become other pivotal roles for political Islam in Egypt. Certainly, those movements such as Salafi and Jamaat Islamiyah were far from the Muslim Brotherhood experience. However, the political environment in Egypt was felicitous for all social and political movements to practise their agenda. Alas, Islamist movements failed to become united beneath one banner. Accordingly, the demand for political Islam had rumbustiously concealed. The prevailing environment in Egyptian politics focused on the procurement of more seats in the Parliament. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood obtained the majority of the Parliament Election: it also won the Presidential Election in 2012 (Aknur, 2013).

Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood acquisitively encountered the political and social domination in Egypt: it has hankered down due to other Islamist movements inclinations. Crucially, those Islamist movements perturbed the Muslim Brotherhood to implement Sharia Law. Salafis and even Tablighi Jamaat that abjure politics beseeched Morsi to proceed with the *Hudud*. This, paradoxically, produced nuisances to the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt, politically, economically and socially, was not prepared to morph from the applied legitimacy to the *Hudud*. The linearity of the Muslim Brotherhood was to subject Mubarak's regime on trial. Morsi, the Egyptian President, faced several political challenges that – regrettably – hastened his collapse in 2013. According to critics, the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected to bear political pressures from all Egyptian sides; hence, the movement did not apportion its account to establish an Islamic State. At the political level, the dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood were not in the stage of accepting the *Hudud*. Vitally, the essential key player in the Egyptian political scene, the military. It had its stance against that decision. Egyptians themselves were not prepared to socialise based on Islamic teachings and considering Egypt as an Islamic State. Contrarily, the Muslim Brotherhood never pursued to morph the Egyptian constitution and resort to Koran as the legitimate law. Despite this, the Muslim Brotherhood faced several scandals that undoubtedly besmirched the Muslim Brotherhood reputation. One of those political calumny was the inclination of the Muslim Brotherhood to turn Egypt into another Kandahar (Al-Hadad, 2021). Towards the end, the internal political and economic crisis were ample to accentuate the instability of the Muslim Brotherhood government. This government had also failed to palliate the abomination that propagated on social media and talk shows. Thus, this political

dereliction highlights that the State of Apparatus was fiercer than the Muslim Brotherhood – and – the Muslim Brotherhood did not govern Egypt. It had solely won the Presidential seat; thus, the government collapsed after a year. The military coup that toppled the Muslim Brotherhood government occurred with the assistance of Al-Azhar, Mohamed ElBaradei, Assisi, Pope Tawadros II, and ultimately Salafis, who betrayed the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafis, who placed the Muslim Brotherhood in a vortex situation several times due to their Islamic demand, emerged in the military coup and declared their rebuff to the Muslim Brotherhood government and demanded Morsi to step down (Delibas, 2019). Conclusively, the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood failed the January Revolution. It brought the military again to power. The consequence of the military coup did not lead Morsi's supporters to face the music. It resulted in thousands of martyrs in Rabba Sit-in in 2013. Hitherto, there are more than 60000 political detainees behind bars (Oxford Analytica, 2021). This military coup had successfully devastated the objectives of Egyptian to end up the military rule that took place in 1952 until 2011.

The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood did not outright the demand of the Islamic State. Alas, it instigated a new key challenger in the political scene in the Middle East, which is ISIS. The new key challenger annexed half Syria and Iraq. They declared their land as the awaiting Caliphate – The Islamic State. The propaganda of ISIS cajoled Muslims in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to agglutinate them. At this juncture, ISIS recruited tens of thousands of children, women, and youths. The declared Islamic State did not focus on educating the children and providing a felicitous role for women in society. Antithesis from this, ISIS socialised its new members as combatants. Crucially, ISIS brainwashed them on the abomination of the West and the Arab Regimes. Besides, the physical socialisation that shaped their identity as *Mujahideen*. However, the neglect of society and its demand caused the collapse of Syria and Iraq. The awaiting Caliphate failed to attain its objectives due to the extremism of ISIS. The continuation of ISIS was an intimidation not merely for the Middle Easters but for the world (Gross, 2017). Genuinely, ISIS promulgated in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Uganda, Egypt, Nigeria and the Philippines. So far, NATO battled ISIS and defeated it in Syria and Iraq. Yet, the existence of ISIS still in the continuum in Egypt. Sinai contains an obscure number of ISIS combatants. Those combatants were previous members of the Muslim Brotherhood who joined ISIS after the collapse of the movement. Furthermore, ISIS in Egypt has antecedent police and military officers who stripped off their accustomed lives to shift into extremists. Only the emergence of ISIS occurred after the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that the failure of democratisation in Egypt was one reason why ISIS

cajoled the previous members of the Muslim Brotherhood and adjoined them. This path of ISIS caused the lives of Egyptian officers and augmented inescapable chaos in Sinai.

V. DISCUSSION

The interpretive analysis of the literature review shows that the failure of political Islam in Egypt caused the emergence of ISIS in Egypt. Of course, the Muslim Brotherhood is an indisputable fact with ISIS, but the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood was a sign for Muslim youths that political Islam leads to no destination but to retrograde. In contrast, the denunciation against the Muslim Brotherhood for the emergence of ISIS is extremely unreasonable. Egyptian history had witnessed the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a democratic state. Yet, it failed because of the military intervention in politics. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in society indicates a pertinent relationship between the movement and Egyptians. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood grappled with the British occupation, dispatched its members for jihad against the Zionists in 1948; it also participated in the January Revolution. However, the dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood considered the movement as an antagonist of democracy because of its demand to establish an Islamic State. Nevertheless, the political vicissitude in Egypt indicates that it is elusive to turn Egypt into Islamic State. The steps to entrench a coherent Islamic State in Egypt requires the community to be fully educated Islamically. For instance, the change of school curriculum: as such, teaches that Egypt is a civilian country. Without going into much detail regarding the Islamic State, the alleged Islamic State by ISIS was not profoundly a State. It argues that ISIS did not build school, hospitals, authorities. Their faked Islamic State was such propaganda to recruit more members and instigate chaos in the Middle East.

During the Muslim Brotherhood government, the faced challenges were hugely more than expected. The movement struggled politically to unite all the revolutionists of the January Revolution into one hand against Mubarak's regime. Alas, it failed due to the discrepancy of thoughts. Ironically, the revolutionists were against the Islamic project led by the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the Islamists adjured the Muslim Brotherhood to proceed with the *Hudud*. This, of course, requires the Muslim Brotherhood to change the Egyptian culture and the constitution. At least nominally, the Egyptian economy was teetering on the brink of collapse. Furthermore, the Egyptian streets had witnessed a weekly demonstration demanding Morsi to step down. Conclusively, proceeding with the *Hudud* and considering Egypt as Islamic State is a very reckless political movement. It would be, undoubtedly, an ambush to incite the Egyptian streets against the Muslim Brotherhood. Towards the end, according to the

literature review, the Muslim Brotherhood had practised politics since 1928, but the movement was not prepared politically and socially to govern Egypt. Thus, the movement did not predict the military coup and lost in the second political battle against the military after the first battle in 1954.

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