Patrimonial Politics as a Functional Threat to Good Governance and Development in West Africa

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Abstract- Beyond the abstract use of the term 'patrimonialism' and its variants appended with prefix "neo-" or adjectives 'modern', 'traditional' or 'developmental', the leadership challenges in Africa manifesting in festering governance crisis have not benefitted from the deserved scholarly debate in a particularized manner. From the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), in particular his Economy and Society and his tripartite dichotomy of leadership – legal, traditional, and charismatic – to the different notions of patrimonialism, patronage or clientelism employed by notable writers like Roth (1968); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Eisenstadt (1973), all have fallen short of explaining the functional threat to destructive politics and underdevelopment of African societies. Even the neo-liberal scholars like Le Vine's (1980) attempt to coin 'African patrimonialism' have foundered in understanding the pattern of political organisation, struggle and puzzling change translating into democratic authoritarian rule of the few, characterized by co-optation, factionalism, and clientelism, and other modes of elitist domination.

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Abstract- Beyond the abstract use of the term 'patrimonialism' and its variants appended with prefix "neo-" or adjectives 'modern', 'traditional' or 'developmental', the leadership challenges in Africa manifesting in festering governance crisis have not benefitted from the deserved scholarly debate in a particularized manner. From the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), in particular his *Economy and Society* and his tripartite dichotomy of leadership – legal, traditional, and charismatic – to the different notions of patrimonialism, patronage or clientelism employed by notable writers like Roth (1968); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Eisenstadt (1973), all have fallen short of explaining the functional threat to destructive politics and underdevelopment of African societies. Even the neo-liberal scholars like Le Vine's (1980) attempt to coin 'African patrimonialism' have foundered in understanding the pattern of political organisation, struggle and puzzling change translating into democratic authoritarian rule of the few, characterized by co-optation, factionalism, and clientelism, and other modes of elitist domination. In contrast to all the works discussed above in which a universalistic approach to patrimonialism is taken, this paper adopts a particularistic approach to grapple with the narrow and narrowing peculiarities that currently dominate the processes and structures of leadership crisis, which has led to dearth of good governance and development occurring in Nigeria, in particular, and a number of West Africa countries. The paper argues that a culture of institutionalised subjugation of the political sphere over the economic pervades in the sub-region, leading to a norm of profoundly state-driven economy and a character of patron-clientele interactions between the state and the economy. Following independence, for instance, both Ghana and Nigeria have a leading sector (cocoa and petroleum respectively), which might have significantly paved way for the development of an assertive economic class empowered enough to drive home-grown development and politically agitative middle class independent enough to foster accountable governance. However, successive governments in both countries over-exploited these sectors, thus consolidating a neo-patrimonial fusion of economic and political elites in which the business class had little or no influence on the course of economic policy and in the process, further blunted the rough edges of democratic values bequeathed by the departed colonial fathers. In this paper, we examine the political trajectories of increasing predatory and ambitious forms of political monopoly in Africa and give an overview of how the ensuing inevitable governance crisis has contributed to its perception as a global prototype of the 'anti-developmental' state.

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I. Introduction

As countries in Africa attempt solutions to the realities of transition to good governance and economic growth, many reforms are often necessary in the arena of governance. People clamoring for changes in the developing regions such as West Africa and the neighbouring continents have been making positive attempts to strengthen their public administrative system, with a view to building a system that provide feedbacks to the citizens, and which effectively support economic development and growth. A major threat therefore is that in most political systems of Africa there are stronger men than strong institutions – a situation tagged 'patrimonialism'. Indeed the word 'patrimonialism' was employed as a way of explaining political cohesion in African societies of government's apparatus built in patron-client model around a strong personality and not the institution and which urgently need administrative re-configuration and disciplined workforce. Weber (1947) coined the phrase patrimonialism to describe situations where the administrative apparatus is appointed by and responsible to the leaders (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009). Patrimonial administration is closely associated with clientelistic politics, for administrative jobs are among the choicest plums a boss or patron can offer his protégés. Such jobs are more valuable than the equivalent posts in a state subject to the rule of law and that has carefully the circumscribed job descriptions. Under the patrimonial system Administrators are recruited and promoted as reward for personal connections with political leaders, there is an unspoken hierarchy, with little specialization or specification of output and uncertain reporting channels, important information may be given orally (Yahaya, 2007). The argument here is that governance systems are basically the same and that clientelistic politics and patrimonial administration cannot deliver the need impetus to deliver good governance. As societies grow richer and more complex, they tend to rely more heavily on the universalistic and egalitarian principles typical of democratic and rational-legal governance (Kensall, 2011). This is both a positive end in itself and a means

for making further social, economic and technological improvements. Asserting the essential role that institutions play in the growth of a nation, Court, Hyden and Mease (2003) posited that the manner in which institutions are allowed to operate impacts greatly on a country's economic and development performance. According to them, since dissent cannot be avoided among individuals and groups, every society requires strong institutions 'that can resolve disputes'.

African countries entered the period after the Second World War on the basis of a gradually intensifying popular mobilisation against continued colonial domination. The sources of the popular discontent against colonial rule were many. As Adebayo (2005) aptly pointed out, they included a strong desire to overturn the affront against human liberty and the dignity of the African which colonialism represented and a generalized rejection of the continued. Others, according to him, are the issues of racially based segregation of opportunities for social advancement and access to resources, amenities and services. This led inevitably and increasingly to the highly disputed politico-administrative framework that denied the colonized full, unfettered participation and representation in the structures of governance (Adebayo, 2005). Nigeria as a postcolonial nation has experienced many of the problems common to other new nations. It began its independent existence in the enviable position of having proven reserves of oil (it currently produces between $US18 and $US30 billion of oil a year), a relatively developed infrastructure associated with strong primary industry development, and a fully functioning administrative bureaucracy. Yet, its subsequent history is one of economic difficulty, political violence, and growing poverty amongst its peoples (Sachs and Warner, 1995).

A notable argument in the literature on Nigerian, and nay African, governance is that the arenas of politics are highly personalized. Without recourse to the constructive potentials that strong personalities wield, the literature appear to present the situation more from the gloomy side than otherwise. Nevertheless, historical records are replete with personalities who have utilized their (rather) overbearing influences to move their societies forward. For instance, Walshe (1971:6) and Akyeampong, Gates and Steven (2012:181-182) discussed how the South African activist of the late 1800s, John Tengo Jabavu, utilized his 'strong personality' to discourage political leaders of the Cape Province to eschew tribal sentiment and participate in the political process as recognized in the constitution. Pretorius (2009:42) wrote of the very influential, far-sighted and impressive personality profile of the First post-apartheid South Africa in, not only making the country a 'regional heavyweight' in global reckoning, but also in ensuring the instilling of democratic ethos in the then military-ruled Nigeria.

Anda (2000:89) submitted that Kwame Nkrumah's 'strong personality' effectively converted the potentials available in Ghana early 1960s to the enviable heights later attained. According to him, 'the significant role of leaders' ideologies in West Africa' led to 'the emergence of radical, moderate and conservative approaches in the quest for solutions to inter-African problems.' He argued that the constructive interplay of the 'gradualism' approach of the Brazzaville-Monrovia Group of 1960 (subsequently known as the Lagos Group in 1962) and the ideological militancy of the Casablanca Group of 1961 produced the ingredients for the laudable collaborative efforts between/among West African States 'in much of the 1960s' (Anda, 2000:80-83). Thus, perhaps but for the hard-wearing postures of these leaders and their respective holds on their people, the logger-heads occasioned by the colonial leaders could have been successful and retarded the process of independence.

Yet, the struggle to overcome the scourge of underdevelopment has led many writers to blame it on the leadership. As the personalities at the helms of affairs, such attribution is irreducible. In some States of Africa, the formations of political parties are deliberately skewed towards personality prejudice. As Chege (2007) pointed out, most parties in Africa are governed by 'strong personalities' that operated these important institutions as though it were family affairs. He submitted that crucial decision are therefore taken at the unofficial levels of familial interactions than in strict party loyalty and discipline. This leads, invariably, to followership anchored on personalities rather than on ideological similitude and dearth of 'strong foundation for a durable competitive party system' (Chege, 2007:8). With this scenario in place, party leaders, often the founding personalities or the succeeding surrogates to whom leadership is bestowed upon by the original leaders, wield tremendous singular powers. And, because of the large following that the aforementioned often engender, the clientele relationship between the followers and the leaders develop and predominate in the system. In another instance, Mangwanda and Lacombe (2015) underscore how the South African politics and governance system is more of personality-based than issue-based- in cold contrast with politics in the United States of America. Ngara, Esebonu and Ayabam (2013:82) argued that despite the institutions of democracy which ideally should serve as constraints, President Olusegun Obasanjo's strong personality 'had overbearing and domineering influence on both domestic and foreign policies'. This ruler-knows-it-all has been tagged in political science as 'patrimonialism'. In a patrimonial state, the rule dovetails to an individual, not the institution, and he/she rules by whims and caprices belayed in his/her pride and prestige. According to Shopeju and Ojukwu (2013), authority in a patrimonial state is by personal prejudice, and not

necessarily according to established rules and regulations. Unfortunately, this scenario is threatening to pervade the entire political landscape of Africa. In South Africa, 'an exception to the general trends that shape political life elsewhere in sub-Saharan', the ruling party ANC's leaders' attitude, 'in which specific public services and resources are offered to particular groups in exchange for political support', is a pointer to this (somewhat wrong) direction (Lodge, 2014:3). Lodge (2014) significantly traced this to three sources: historically, the ANC's struggles built around the personality of her largely exiled leaders; operationally, the resort to felony for political liberation that created a kind of radicalism within the party fold; and a general tendency in the country's culture of clientele politics and economic. Pretorius (2009) argued that the puzzle perhaps lies in the first-pass-the-post (FPTP) electoral system adopted in most African political system. Such arrangement inevitably leads to the formation and administration of political parties that is '[rather] personality-based, without clear policy and ideological direction'. (Pretorius, 2009:77).

At any rate, patrimonialism have been severally and severely condemned by scholars and commentators alike because of its negative impact on good governance but not many have attempted a causal investigation into the phenomenon and the factors sustaining it despite its torpedoing effect on peace, political security and the development of the nation. The studies that have been carried out, especially on the phenomenon in Oyo-State (Ibadan) and Anambra States, have paid much attention to the central figures involved and the impact on the polity without equal attention to the variables that sustain it. Though the issues that constitute banes for consolidation are many, the issues of godfatherism, violence and political insecurity have been manifest in the Nigerian polity since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007) especially in Ibadan, the socio-economic and political centre of Oyo state. Hence the need to attempt a conceptual clarification for the concept as practiced by late Chief Lamidi Adedibu, the acclaimed godfather of Oyo-State politics (Simbine, 2004).

There is no doubt that political institutions and governance are leading items on the African development agenda. Most observers recognize that any adequate account of the region's poor performance must extend well beyond narrow the economic factors. Adverse world market conditions and internal structural rigidities on their own do not adequately explain Africa's stagnation and decline. Meanwhile, the changes in relative prices central to the structural adjustment programme controversially prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have, whatever their merits, proved insufficient to generate sustained growth and development (Derick Brinkerhoff

and Goldsmith, 2002; Erdmann and Engel, 2006). Although, on face assessment, it would seem that much of the current interest in the issue of democratization, economic reform and governance emanates from the international donor agencies presently involved in Africa, especially the World Bank, it is important to emphasize at this stage that long before the donor community turned its attention to this question, numerous African groups and social forces had been involved in struggles for the expansion of the democratic space on the continent as well as for the institution of structures of governance that would permit the will of the majority of the people to prevail (Ukeje and Olaiya, 2009). This is evident from the entire history of the anti-colonial struggle, which was as much about political reforms as about economic and social change with a view to enhancing individual liberties and popular participation. This article addressed how patrimonialism is a functional threat to good governance and the development of West African nations. Among others, the distinguishing and continued presence of political situation, in which personalities, rather than issues, determine the sways of electoral outcomes, is delved into. The paper also examined the interwoven aspects of political leadership and followership in some states of Africa, vis-à-vis the development agenda of the States. The aftereffect inherent in such peculiar political system on good governance is the principal onus of this work.

a) Conceptual Linkages and Clarifications

Essentially, clarifications in terms of definitions of key concepts of this discourse has been attempted here. The whole essence is to establish a firm grasp of the subject matter of the discourse from clear definitioons of the operational words. This is considered especially imperative for the purpose of establishing the necessary connection between patrimonial political arrangement and dearth of good governance and development.

i. *Definition and Conceptualisation of Patrimonialism*

Patrimonial politics is both peculiar and diverse. While it can be addressed from different perspectives, it could also be construed from the monolithic standpoint. For instance, it has been established that patrimonialism seems to be best suited to the least developed countries, where relatively simple economic structures are more responsive to relationship-based governance (Roth, 1968). As the economy grows and becomes more sophisticated, more rules-based governance is probably required. Also, patrimonialism seems unlikely to work in all political systems. Where power is regularly or continually changing hands through the ballot box, there are strong incentives for political leaders to focus on short-term rent-management rather than plan for the long term. Increased, personalized, centralization of rents by either party leader in these circumstances would be likely to prove very controversial and

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damaging. Subsequently, rent-centralization is likely to be exceedingly difficult in societies where a few large ethnic groups are competing for political power, as in Nigeria and contemporary Kenya. Moreover, countries such as Equatorial Guinea or Central African Republic, where technocratic integrity has reached very low ebb, are unlikely to make a success of rent-centralisation (Soest, 2010). Nevertheless there are some nations in which developmental patrimonialism looks the most viable route to pro-poor growth. An example, albeit rare, can be cited of Ethiopia – an extremely poor, landlocked economy with no liberal tradition of note and in which market failures are widespread. Kensall (2011) submitted that in the past two decades the dominant regime of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), under a near-domineering leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, has presided over the increased centralisation of rents and implementation of a long-horizon development strategy that aims to guide Ethiopia to middle income status (Kelsall, 2011).

In the words of Stewart and Brown (2009), key features include control over a large state-owned enterprise sector and substantial regional development organisations, together with tight regulation of financial institutions and expansion of the tax base. Regional 'endowment funds' are also important. These are charitable trusts with strong links to the ruling party that act as holding companies for a variety of different businesses. They play a role in financing or facilitating investment in areas of weak private involvement, and by small or new businesses, including emergent youth cooperatives (Wolf, 2006). A category of donors, namely Western governments and their official and agencies, went on to embrace a new "political conditionality" under which economic aid was tied to the progress of African governments with political reform and respect for human rights. Yet, as we shall see in greater detail later, the notions of political and economic reform, which the donors have generally attempted to promote in Africa, run counter to those held by the main bearers within the continent of the struggle for democratization and popular participation. Structural adjustment programmes was then introduced into Africa on a massive scale from the early 1980s onward at a time when most African economies were already caught in deep crises of accumulation (Olaiya, 2011). These crises manifested themselves not only in terms of rapidly declining output and productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors but also in terms of worsening payments and budget deficits, acute shortages of inputs and soaring inflation, growing domestic debt and a major problem of external debt management, decaying infrastructure, a massive flight of capital and declining per capital GDP and GNP among others. The reform programmes that were introduced under donor pressure and supervision were aimed at stabilizing the African economies, re-structuring the basis for accumulation, and permitting the resumption of growth. What the medium to long-term effects of the adjustment programmes would be not only on the economy but also on the practice of politics and the process of administration became the subject of a major theoretical debate involving two broad schools. The differing positions articulated by both schools, namely, the Neo-liberal and the Radical Political Economy schools, is, in many respects, a function of their understanding of the sources of the African economic crises and the role of the post-colonial state in the developmental process (Adebayo, 2002).

ii. *The Concept of "Good Governance"*

The term "good governance" first appeared in development aid policy at the beginning of the 1990s in connection with the events surrounding the end of the cold war and subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall. At that time, it became clear that the effectiveness of development cooperation depended on governments, including NGOs and CBOs, to react swiftly, reliably and transparently were critical to meeting the expanding needs of the people. The World Bank then coined the term "good governance" with the intention of increasing the effectiveness of public funds. Around the same time, a German version "gute Regierungsführung/good government leadership" emerged but the English term was preferable by the global leaders due to its reference to both the leaders of public as well as nongovernmental institutions and also because the "gute Regierungsführung' is prone to misinterpretation. Thus the preferred English term appeared broader in scope to encompass interrelation and division of roles between the state, civil society and the private sector. Such roles are founded upon some important principles, namely, participation, transparency, non-discrimination, effectiveness and reliability of public affairs. The whole essence of this is to ensure that the citizens of a country – either as individuals or as a group – can participate and contribute fully in their development process while being fully aware of their rights and obligations. *Ipso facto,* "good governance" became a term that development institutions and other global players taunt as precursors to development and economic growth. As the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued, "good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development". Ban Ki Moon (2012) also stated that the development of a truly global partnership for driving a lasting development includes, although not limited to, good governance.

However, despite over two decades of constant usage and appearance of the term "good governance' in various literature, the term has nevertheless acquired the notoriety of having no single and exhaustive definition, nor is there a definite delimitation of its scope, that commands universal acceptance. The term "good

governance" could imply many different things in many different contexts, depending on the circumstances or institution(s) or the mission at hand. The term has been extremely elusive despite a degree of consensus around its usage. It means different things to different organizations, not to mention to different actors within these organizations. As Gisselquist (2012) pointed out the 'routinely focus on other types of governance — global governance, corporate governance, IT governance, participatory governance and so on — by governance experts make matters even more confusing. These variant of governance related only peripherally to the good governance agenda vis-à-vis domestic politics and administration considering the simple fact that these variants of governance and the issues they address appeared veered away from the necessary intendment of the World Bank and other allied institutions from whom the term originated. The work by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks on good governance, according to Gisselquist (2012), addresses economic institutions and public sector management, including transparency and accountability, regulatory reform, and public sector skills and leadership. Other organizations, like the United Nations, European Commission and OECD, also highlight democratic practices and human rights, aspects of political governance not focused by the Bank. Other issues treated under the governance programmes of various organisations include election monitoring, political party support, combating corruption, building independent judiciaries, security sector reform, improved service delivery, transparency of government accounts, decentralization, civil and political rights, government responsiveness and "forward vision", and the stability of the regulatory environment for private sector activities (including price systems, exchange regimes, and banking systems).

However, the term has acquired a popularity that is difficult to ignore in the literature on political economy. Because it is used with great flexibility, the situation has had an advantage of dynamism and adaptability for assessing effectiveness in the entire terrain of socio-political and economic contexts. However, such dynamism could also constitute a source of some difficulty at the operational level. For instance, it could be difficult to assess a state that has advanced in one area while the other areas are still at large. Nevertheless, depending on the context and the overriding objective sought, good governance has been said at various times to encompass democratic practices, respect for human rights, adherence to the tenets of rule of law, popular participation, multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, institutional transparency and accountability, charismatic leadership, an efficient and effective public sector management, political legitimacy, freedom of information and unfettered access to knowledge and education,

banishment of poverty and political empowerment of people, economic sustainability, and political culture that foster responsible citizens and responsive government, cultural harmony and religious tolerance.

However, there appears to be a significant degree of consensus that good governance relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development. It has been said that good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law. Thus, even though the term 'good governance' appears vague in definition but nevertheless has gained a seeming consensus in the international development literature. The UNCHR (2010) submitted that good governance describes how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources in order to guarantee the realization of public welfare, rule of law and conducive business and political environment. Hugue and Zafarullah (2005) argued that 'good governance' revolves primarily around the exercise of authority of government and how the authority is exercised in accountable manners. They demonstrated that the idea of good governance is to build (market) institutions that will eventually foster development.

b) *Principal Elements of Good Governance*

The key attributes to good governance can be summarised as

- participation of all and sundry, including the marginalized, in decision-making process;

- ensuring devolution of powers and decentralized and supply-driven planning and service delivery;

- taking and enforcing decisions in a manner that follows laid-down rules and regulations;

- developing internal capacity of government and NGOs in terms of financial, institutional, and management aspects;

- Increased level of transparency and accountability of the service providers;

- bridging the identified gaps between policy and practice;

- eradicating poverty and squalor through by identifying and targeting the hardcore poor, the aged, the physically/mentally challenged and the disoriented members of the society;

- networking of government bureaucracy through increased coordination among sector stakeholders to provide a template for harmonization of social service delivery; and

- effectiveness and efficiency in the actions of governments and other stakeholders'

The concept has been further clarified in 2009 by an important publication of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). The work highlighted 8 major characteristics for good governance (discussed below).

As represented in Figure 2 below, good governance is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.

Source: UNESCAP (2009)

Figure 1 : Characteristics of Good Governance

Each of these characteristics is discussed thus:

- Citizens' Participation

    Participation in the decision-making and decision-execution process by citizen of diverse creed and sexes is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could either be through direct citizens' involvement in the decision process or indirectly through legitimate intermediate institutions or accredited/democratic representatives of the political will of the people. The latter is called representation democracy in which even though the minority will have their say, it is the majority that will eventually have their way. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that in representative democracy the concerns of the under-priviledged or the most vulnerable members of the society would be taken into consideration in decision making. It only means that since participation of all members of the society would be informed and organized, through freedom of information, association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand, the ultimate decision taken would have factored in the need of all and sundry, except in situations when such could not be accommodated.

- *Rule of law*

    The rule of law is a legal maxim whereby governmental decisions are made by applying known legal principles and decisions are taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows laid-down rules and regulations. It is a state of order in which events and decision-making and execution conform to the law. Good governance requires the principle of government by law and fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. Such structure is expected to be

built on the principle that all people and institutions are subject to and accountable to law that is fairly applied and enforced. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.

- *Transparency in Governance*

    Transparency means that government actions, decisions and decision-making processes are open to an appropriate level of scrutiny by affected member(s) of the public, the media, the others parts of government, civil society and, in some instances, outside institutions and governments. Transparency International (2012), a global civil society organization that seeks to fight government corruption, defines transparency as "a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes. The UNESCAP (2009) also submitted that transparency means that information is freely available and directly accessible, in easily understandable forms and media, to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. Both "transparency" and "openness in governance" work together to ensure an egalitarian society. There is therefore no gainsaying the fact that having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. Nevertheless, even though an accessible and transparent government is one goal of a functioning democracy, but access to government information may not always be warranted or safe. Certain records may need to be kept secret by the federal government to protect national security, personal privacy, or economic

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security. Oftentimes, transparency and secrecy—both of which are inherent values of democratic governance—are in tension with one another. Transparency International, for example, surveys a variety of people and institutions on their perceptions of transparency in selected nations to create a "Corruption Perceptions Index." The index supposes that perceptions of corruption serve as a proxy for transparency in government. Though the two may be related, it is unclear whether corruption or perceptions of corruption provide a reliable measure of a particular government's efforts to be transparent. There is also the Global Integrity, an independent, non-profit organization that tracks "governance and corruption trends around the world," uses journalists' reports and structured surveys to create its Global Integrity report, which measures governance and corruption.

- *Responsiveness*

Good governance entails that government has the willingness, capacity and flexibility to respond rapidly to societal changes, takes into account the expectations of civil society in identifying the general public interest, and is willing to critically re-examine herself as to the role of government in delivering public good. Thus, the need to tackle ineffectiveness of public policy enforcement and implementation is one of the cardinal attributes of good governance. Ordinarily, government is run for the benefit of all people as a mark of responsiveness to the will of the people. Therefore, trust in government appears to be highly related to how much people perceive the government as being responsive to the will of the people. There was widespread perception that governments are not responsive to the popular, among others, which appears to be contributing to the low levels of confidence in government found around the world. The emergence of good governance strategies brought the evolution of the New Public Management (NPM) movement as a panacea to the increased pressure on state bureaucracies to become more responsive to citizens as though they are clients in the private sector. Among other things, good governance highlights the importance of information flows about policy actions in increasing government responsiveness, particularly the role of mass media in creating an incentive for governments to respond to citizens' needs in good time. Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe and be responsive to the present and future needs of society. Nevertheless, good governance also breeds a system that encourages citizens to identify with and finance the government as a panacea for the ever-dwindling foreign direct investment by developing citizens' incentives to pay tax.

- *Consensus Orientation*

Good governance is built on the democratic principle that the will of the people should be the basis for the authority of government. There are several actors and as many view points in a given society. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a given society or community. endorse the democratic principle that "government leaders should be selected through elections in which all citizens can vote.' (UNESCAP, 2009)

- *Equity and inclusiveness*

Good governance is about the equal participation of all citizens - men and women, young and old - in public and political life. Equality between men and women is also a cardinal focus of good governance. Good governance averts the general low levels of trust in governments to do the right thing, or in which majorities in most nations perceive their government as serving powerful special interests rather than the interests of the people as a whole. It is built on the utilitarian principle that seeks the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Fair and inclusive government is the bedrock of good governance, i.e. (1) the fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract; (2) the fair, just and equitable distribution of public services and implementation of public policy; and (3) the commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in the formation of public policy. The assumption is predicated on the simple fact that a society's well being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, to have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. It also requires that the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making.

- *Effectiveness and Efficiency*

Successful and judicious delivery of momentous decision is key to good governance. It spurs government to strive for and produce quality public outputs, including services delivered to citizens, at the best cost, and ensures that outputs meet the original intentions of policymakers. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, the class of the political leadership and the quality of their political will, the degree of government independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the sincerity of the government's commitment to such policies. Good governance means

that processes and institutions produce results that ultimately meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources devoid of environmental despoliation. The quality of the country's bureaucracy is expected to be guaranteed with diligence and safety. The better the bureaucracy the quicker decisions are made and the more easily domestic and foreign investors can go about their business. Good governance also entails policy consistency and forward planning within the framework of continuity of economic policy stance i.e. whether a change of government will entail major policy disruption, and whether the current government has pursued a coherent strategy. Good governance also guarantees that policies of government are far-sighted aimed at both short-term and long-term economic advantage. Finally, efficiency in good governance means the ability of government to anticipate future problems and issues based on current data and trends and develop policies that take into account future contingencies.

- Accountability

Credibility is the crux of good governance. Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. The ability and willingness of government to show the extent to which its actions and decisions are consistent with clearly defined and agreed-upon objectives determines its level of compliance with the tenets of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. A more practical corruption crusade to foster transparency and citizens' confidence in government.

i. *Challenges to Good Governance in Developing States*

Virtually all countries in West Africa have experienced catastrophic economic and political crises, leading inevitably to their inability to meet the delivery of basic needs and security to their citizens. The reason for this appears to be the presence of certain factors that are inimical to the government efficiency and good governance. These challenges can be highlighted thus:

- Trust in government is generally low.
- The quality of public administration is not creditable.
- Government economic policies do not always adapt quickly to changes in the economy.
- Quality of budgetary and financial mobilization and management is at low ebb.

- The public service is not independent of and insulated from political interference, coupled with dearth of capacity and will on the part of political authorities to implement reforms.
- Government decisions are not effectively implemented, in addition to wastage in cost and time.
- Excessive bureaucracy that hinders business activity, coupled with the red tape and low quality of bureaucracy causing institutional ineffectiveness.
- The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient.
- Policy direction is not consistent.
- Inefficiency of revenue mobilization.

This listing is by no means exhaustive as there are still many more factors that can impinge on good governance in the developing world. However, the presence of these challenges despite the invested best of efforts and intentions has led to a new governance strategy pioneered by the World Bank, in which specific aspects of governance, known as indictors, are assessed severally or jointly. Nevertheless, the codifications of the term 'good governance in itself allows for some of the lackeys. As Gisselquist (2012) pointed out, the concept of 'good governance' bears more of esoteric propagation and lacks methodological clarity in some sense. Relying on the generic assessment provided by Gerring (1999) in his epic work entitled "What makes a concept good: a criterial framework for understanding concept formation in the social sciences", Gisselquist (2012) argued that the concept contains somewhat 'good things' that do not logically fit together in a consequential way. Essentially, the author noted that parsimony and differentiation. To these extents, given precise definition that would not sound like defining a 'functioning liberal democracy' in a one-size-fits-all is a major challenge to this important concept. The author further argued that the rather convoluted characteristics that good governance is meant to serve beg coherence and utility. For instance, there appears no possible convergence as how issues of human rights relates with regulations for efficient banking. In the same vein, issues relating to voice and accountability hardly belong to taxation and revenue issues that affect cost of doing business in a given state. In addition, the author submitted that the research utility functions relating to the 'formulation of theory and the related project of hypothesis testing' are largely absent in the concept of good governance. The totality of these inadequacies, especially in Africa, is that it, first, provides a leeway for the so-called leader to escape culpability in the governance challenges. Most importantly, the vague situation incapacitates the ordinary citizen to assert necessary claims and, in turn, invigorates the leaders to further consolidate their powers.

Yet, as Court and Hyden (2005) have noted, governance matters. Its supply in good direction, especially if pursued through virile institutions is capable of driving broad-based development. Thus, Gisselquist (2002) conclusion has become instructive for African settings where institutions are weak as opposed to individual members of the political and economic class who remain strong. Yet, these apparent limitations of the concept leave a huge gap for assessments of the strength of the political and economic institutions outside the personalities driving them. Nevertheless, governance in Africa appears to be affected not only by the above. As Jeng (2012) pointed out, a good number of African states today are rocked by patrimonialism in which public resources are administered as or diverted to private estate. The author argued that the situation has rocked 'the governance structure such that the provision of public goods is hampered by state officials who serve certain interests… [and] who try to capture funds and aids meant for development purposes (Jeng, 2012:7).

II. Patrimonialism, Development and Governance Crisis in Africa

Deciphering how patrimonialism has become 'the corefeature of post-colonial politics in Africa' Jeng (2012) argued that the character of the pre-colonial and colonial societies depicted of loose tyrannical system operated by the local and colonial elites, respectively. The author submitted that in both cases, there was no institution but rather strong individuals who unleashed tyranny on the people 'because there was no strong institutionalization, no effective political structures or an accountable, checks and balance system' (Jeng, 2012: 7). Bach and Gazibo (2012) argued that patrimonialism is a political system in which rulers administer national resources as though it were personal benefit with a view to securing the followership of the people. This section essentially discussed the series of events that led to the emergence of clientele form of politics in Africa. It traced the root causes to the advent of colonialism and the pattern of states that the former colonies metamorphosed into. The essence is to demonstrate that the emergence of strong individuals (statement) in much of African States is not unconnected with the nature of governance perpetuated in the colonies. If anything, the statemen that later emerged, with larger-than-life status witnessed the tyranny against their people by the colonialists: only that they too could not resist the enormity of powers that led to such tyrannical rule in the first place. This leadership crisis comes in different forms. Albin-Lackey (2009) argued that even though the Nigerian godfathers hardly nurse ambition to attain political offices, they nonetheless wield the strong power to ensure the election of (often less credible) candidates. They then become the mobilisers of the state resources within the control of these stooges, to maintain/expand their hegemonies and also to ward off possible contenders.

Decades ago, African countries entered the period after the Second World War on the basis of gradual intensification of popular uprisings against continued colonial domination. The sources of the popular discontent against colonial rule were many. In summary, they included a strong desire to overturn the affront against human liberty and the dignity of Africans, which colonialism represented. As Adebayo (2005) pointed out, it also boiled down to a widespread rejection of the continued, racially-based segregation of opportunities for social advancement and access to resources, amenities and services; the increasingly untenable politico-administrative framework that denied the colonised full, unfettered participation and representation in the structures of governance; and the intensive draining of the resources of the colonies without a corresponding commensurate investment in the development of their physical and social infrastructure, as well as in their human resources.

All of these concerns crystallized into a concrete political agenda and momentum for the decolonisation of Africa; they were also the critical platforms on which popular support for the anti-colonial struggle was mobilised. Indeed, this was being pointed out by many students of the African anti-colonial movement, the unity between the nationalist politicians who spearheaded the independence struggle and the popular social movements, including mass organisations of workers, peasants, students, and the urban poor, that sustained the struggle was built around these concerns. The promise of independence nationalism lay not only in discarding colonial rule and the broad-ranging exclusion on the basis of which it thrived but also opening up access to economic, social and political opportunities. In other words, the anti-colonial nationalist coalition was held together by the promise of freedom, unity and development. In this sense, the promise was at the core of the post-colonial social contract that linked state and society in the post-independence period. On the whole, much of the first decade of independence was marked by efforts to give meaning to the social bargain that underpinned the nationalist anti-colonial struggle. Irrespective of whether they declared themselves as being socialist, free market, or mixed economy in orientation, the independence governments all invested, without exception, in expansion of the social and physical infrastructure of their countries in a manner which widened access to education, modern health facilities, transportation, housing, skills development, and employment on a scale that exceeded what colonialism was able to offer.

For this purpose, and again irrespective of the ideological leanings that they professed, all of the independent governments reserved an important role for the state in the development process (Schafer, 1998).

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Also, they undertook varying degrees of planning designed not only to improve the foundations of the economy but also to continually increase access to opportunities in a context of huge, pent-up demand (Schafer, 1998). They were aided in this regard by the reasonably high levels of economic growth which most countries recorded during the first decade of independence and which, in virtually all countries, was above the rate of population growth. Indeed, when the average growth rates recorded by African countries over the period from the 1960s to the early 1970s are compared with those that were experienced during the structural adjustment years of the 1980s and 1990s, the immediate post-independence years, for all their shortcomings, would seem to have been golden years of some sort in spite of the best efforts of the Berg Report to falsify the history of that period. To be sure, the effort to give content and meaning to the post-colonial social contract was not without its internal contradictions and limitations. Nowhere were these contradictions more evident than in the realm of the political framework within which the post-colonial development process was undertaken. Initially involving the gradual demobilisation of the social movements whose engagement and activism gave life and momentum to the anti-colonial struggle, the post-independence political framework was eventually to take the form of the narrowing of the national political space as political pluralism gave way to political monopoly symbolised by the rise of the one-party state and military dictatorship.

The immediate context for this constriction of the political space and political participation was defined by the way in which the goal of national unity and integration was handled: the assumption that the objective of uniting the multi-ethnic and, in many cases, multi-religious countries of Africa after decades of colonial strategies of divide and rule was one which could only be constituted from above by the state. This top-down approach to the national unity project soon translated into a monopolisation of the political terrain by the state in a process which was accelerated first by dissolution of the anti-colonial nationalist coalition, then by the slowdown of the rate of economic growth and, therefore, of the rate of expansion of opportunities for different categories of people, and, finally, the emergence in the course of the 1970s of a deep-seated crisis in the post-colonial model of accumulation that signalled the beginning of the end of the post-colonial social contract. A rich literature already exists on the origins and dimensions of the African economic crisis to warrant an exclusion of their detailed discussion here (Sanni, 2007; Smith, 2003; Sindzingre, 2010). It is important, however, to underline two points. First, the management of the crisis was accompanied by increased levels of political repression and exclusion, which further widened the gulf between state and society, popular social forces and the wielders of state power. Secondly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank structural adjustment framework that triumphed in the quest for reversing the dwindling economic fortunes of Africa not only exacerbated the crisis of decline but also represented the final nail in the coffin of the post-colonial model of accumulation and the social contract that was built into it. In the face of the failure of structural adjustment to redress the crises of decline facing the continent, both increased political repression/authoritarianism and the worsening problems of livelihood combined, in the course of the 1980s, to raise serious questions about the representativeness and legitimacy of the state.

The deepening social crisis across the African continent, including reversals in some of the health and educational gains of independence, also generated concerns about citizenship and citizenship rights which, in some instances, translated into concerted challenges to the entire post-independence nation-state project. In the worst cases, the combination of diminished state and governmental legitimacy, increased political authoritarianism, and the erosion of citizenship rights resulted in the efflorescence of competing ethno-regional and religious identities which expressed themselves violently and caused the collapse of central governmental authority. Integral to the agenda of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment and, therefore, the irretrievable collapse of the post-colonial social contract was the promotion of a narrow, neoliberal model of the market and its workings. In practice, this model of economic reform, strongly anti-state as it was in ideological orientation, resulted in the incapacitation of the African state as a socio-political and economic actor (World Bank, 2006). This remained so in spite of the introduction, nearly a decade after structural adjustment first made its entry into the African economic crisis management approach, of a governance programme which was heralded as the framework for reforming the legal-administrative structures and processes of the African state. Defined in terms of the promotion of civil service reforms, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, the free flow of information, and policy predictability, the programme was closely associated with the post-Cold War political conditionality which the leading Western powers introduced into their dealings with African countries and under which the latter were required to carry out domestic political reforms.

The huge social and political costs exacted by prolonged economic crisis and structural adjustment propelled popular agitations for political reforms during the course of the 1990s. These agitations were to result in the end of single party and military rule in most of Africa; they also led to the outright overthrow of the *ancien regime* in several countries (Ross, 1999). But the

full import of the rebirth of politico-electoral pluralism in Africa was severely limited by two factors: the failure, in spite of the investment of effort in constitutionalism and constitutional reform, to overhaul the foundations of the post-colonial state itself and the context of continued neo-liberal economic reform within which the transition from authoritarianism was attempted. Ross, argued that the consequence was that power and its exercise were not brought under popular democratic control while what passed for the political reforms that were implemented were soon shown to be lacking in a meaningful socio-economic and ideological content that could constitute an enduring basis both for the reconstruction of the legitimacy of the state, a new vision of the future, and the negotiation of a new social contract. The widespread feeling of powerlessness and choicelessness that pervades the African political landscape in spite of the strong push made by popular forces for the reform and expansion of the political space explains why such commentators as Claude Ake have suggested that the 1990s in Africa were characterised by the democratisation of disempower-ment in which people voted without choosing. Clearly then, the political question remained a key outstanding issue even as Africa was ushered into the new millennium (Adebayo, 2002).

Beyond the façade of what they promised, both the governance programme of the IMF/World Bank and the political conditionality of the Western powers formed part of the strategic objective of securing the neo-liberal reform agenda in Africa. Indeed, the governance programme of the international financial institutions was presented as the missing link in the structural adjustment chain while the political conditionality of the Western powers was built on the assumption, in part at least, that it could produce a more conducive framework for the pursuit of market reforms (World Bank, 1998). For this reason, both interventions failed to address the roots of the crisis of the governance of the political space and public life that was in evidence in different countries. As Brett (2006:4) deduced, this failure came about, neither because corrective measures 'imported' into African States were altogether incongruous, nor because African rejected them, but for reasons he termed 'fundamental social conflict and structural weaknesses'. The author posited that the failure was inevitable in Africa where, unlike in the advanced liberal communities, the subjects are not politically informed and economically autonomous to discern and respond accordingly. The African States, the author argued, composed of former slaved and impoverished subjects that fundamentally lacked the political will and economic powers to 'practice the possessive individualism' necessary to drive the so-called institutional transformations (Brett, 2006:4). In addition, the resources to run the costly and 'complex state apparatuses, political parties, pressure groups, media

organisations, and educational and research institutions that sustain democracy' are lacking in the created States of Africa (Brett, 2006:4). Hence, the leaders lost grip of the system and resulted to patronage politics of payee and paymaster to retain foothold, which the theory of patrimonialism explains today.

a) Latest Order of Patrimonialism: 'Stomach Infrastructure' Syndrome in Nigeria

Patrimonialism is undoubtedly the pessimistic insights used by political scientists to 'explain the political catastrophes experienced in [Africa]' and its attendant primary accumulation tendency that generates 'destructive effects'. (Brett, 2006: 6). The author justified this by asserting that, since patrimonialism is the use of clientelistic value systems to sustain political support, rather than legitimized means associated with electoral, democratic and liberal values, the consequence 'is likely to be institutional failures' (Brett, 2006: 4-5). This, according to the author, is because the existing old structure would clash the newly introduced ones and produce dysfunctional institutional collisions.

With respect to Nigeria, however, the situation appears more complex. From the analysis above, the institutional clash is expected to occur during, and perhaps shortly after, the transition from old to new structures. The situation of Nigeria appeared sustainable on take off, due largely to the advent of crude oil windfall that stabilized the political economy (Olaiya, 2013). But, no sooner had the system stabilized than the concatenation of serious patronage politics began to materialize. A number of works have established that, following the advent of oil revenue and the attendant profligacy of public funds; hardly can anything pass by without gratification (Aremu and Ahmed, 2011; Olaiya, 2013; Macebong, 2014; Ejiofor, 2015). In the very recent time, a process in which voters are openly gratified with consumable items on (or close to) election days has led to the emergence of another political vocabulary called 'stomach infrastructure'. 'Stomach infrastructure involves bribing electorate in a brazen manner, with material incentives like rice, vegetable oil and 'small cash' during elections. Sometimes, voters openly demand this indulgence while on queue to cast their votes (Ojo, 2014). The term literally emerged around the mid-2014 during the governorship election in Ekiti State of Nigeria. During the time, the incumbent governor, Kayode Fayemi of All Progressive Congress (APC), relied on his radical development provision of social infrastructure as a guarantee for victory at the poll. On the other hand, his challenger, Ayodele Fayose of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), subscribed to and embarked on distribution of consumables to the citizens and eventually won the election with a wide margin.

As the so-called stomach infrastructure crept into the Nigerian Political lexicon, it has attracted a number of conceptualisations, at least in the domestic

realm. The concept has been approached from various walks of life. Aremu and Ahmed (2011) argued sociologically that the concept of gratifications in Nigeria is a reflection of government's failure to curb crime and provide gainful employments to the youth. Macebong (2014) positioned 'Stomach infrastructure' philosophically as simply the anecdote that describes 'the system by which political patronage is dispensed to various groups in a particular society'. He argued that such 'patronage' predates and transcends election manipulations and can manifest in varying forms. According to him, influencing job placement for a relative by 'putting in a good word' to a high-ranking ruling party chieftain; ensuring awards of contract to a close political ally or their relative; and guaranteeing issuance of necessary documents to meet a point and time of need, are a recurring decimal in Nigeria. The author further argued that the term 'grassroots politics' insofar as 'Nigeria is concerned, is more or less a fancy term for building and maintaining stomach infrastructure' or having a strong 'political structure' that constantly dispense political gratifications to the 'masses'. To Ejiofor, (2015) 'stomach infrastructure' is a two-side coin – history and psychology of African masses.

Historically, Ejiofor (2015) argued that 'the concept of the *stomach infrastructure'* dates back to the 'pre-independence regional elections across the country'. To him, Nigerian political history shows that 'politicians who appealed to the conscience of the masses *via their stomach* always had the upper hand' in elections. Since then, and across the board, a good number of the elections conducted at all levels 'were won and lost courtesy of the stomach infrastructure.' (Ejiofor, 2015). Psychologically, Ejiofor (2015) argued that, as established in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, nutrition is the most basic of physiological and safety essentials, which should be top on the agenda of the governments of Africa. The author surmised that, because food-related poverty is rampant in Africa, it should be expected that a hungry man could be too angry to appreciate the benefits of the physical and social infrastructures that are built for him. Idike (2014) in her study entitled "Reinforcing democracy in Nigeria" explained how politicians in Nigeria and their proxies have cashed in on the weakness of the social fabric created by pent-up poverty to arrive at 'stomach infrastructure'.

Following from these various works, most especially Idike (2014) study, we therefore developed a paradoxical twin-paradigm explanation of voters' preference that led to the development of 'stomach infrastructure'. The first paradigm is a familiar one but with bizarre outcome: it relates to losing election despite developing physical and social infrastructures that, in conventional governance parlance, should guarantee 'landslide' victory. The second paradigm is not quite

familiar but comes also with curious outcome: it relates to winning election by 'directly giving bailout cash to needy citizens, giving them food items and attending to their sundry personal problems' (Idike, 2014:5). Hence, 'stomach infrastructure' can be both a cause and effect of clientele politics of the rentier states, a process described (and condemned) by democracy theorist as abhorrent to the development drives of the states.

III. Conclusions

Research into the emergence of strong personality bestriding the political landscapes of African states like colossus have been at low ebbs. Thus, rather than witness the emergence of strong institution in the continent, the strong personalities have eclipsed the growth and development of political institutions like the Lilliputians. Beyond the abstract use of the term 'patrimonialism' and its variants appended with prefix "neo-" or adjectives "modern" or "traditional", the leadership challenges in Africa manifesting in festering governance crisis has not benefitted from the deserved scholarly debate in a particularized manner. From the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), in particular his *Economy and Society* and his tripartite dichotomy of leadership – legal, traditional, and charismatic – to the different notions of patrimonialism, patronage or clientelism employed by notable writers like Roth (1968); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Eisenstadt (1973), all have fallen short of explaining the functional threat to destructive politics and [mis]development of African societies. A generic definition of patrimonialism in the classical work of Erdmann and Engel (1980) based on Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy all but failed to factor in the peculiar and constantly heralding nature of clientele politics in the contemporary Africa. Even the neo-liberal scholars like Le Vine's (1980) attempt to coin "African patrimonialism" have foundered in understanding the pattern of political organisation, struggle and puzzling change translating into democratic authoritarian rule of the few, characterized by co-optation, factionalism, and clientelism, and other modes of elitist domination. In contrast to all the works discussed above in which a universalistic approach to patrimonialism is taken, this paper adopts a particularistic approach to grapple with the narrow and narrowing peculiarities that currently dominate the processes and structures of leadership crisis, which has led to dearth of good governance and development occurring in Nigeria, in particular, and a number of Africa countries. The paper argued that a culture of institutionalised subjugation of the political sphere over the economic pervades in the region, leading to a norm of profoundly state-driven economy and a character of patron-clientele interactions between the state and the economy.

Following independence, for instance, both Ghana and Nigeria have a leading sector (cocoa and petroleum respectively), which might have significantly paved way for the development of an assertive economic class empowered enough to drive home-grown development and politically agitative middle class independent enough to foster accountable governance. However, successive governments in both countries over-exploited these sectors, thus consolidating a neo-patrimonial fusion of economic and political elites in which the business class had little or no influence on the course of economic policy. In the process, this further blunted the rough edges of democratic values bequeathed by the departed colonial fathers. In all, the political trajectories of increasing predatory and ambitious forms of political monopoly of the instruments of force and power were rampant in Africa. In the ensuing circumstances, a functional threat that resulted in governance crisis became inevitable and this has contributed to its perception as a set of global prototype of the 'anti-development' state.

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