



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: C
SOCIOLOGY & CULTURE
Volume 14 Issue 7 Version 1.0 Year 2014
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Boko Haram Insurgency and National Security Challenges in Nigeria: An Analysis of a Failed State

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Keywords: *boko haram, insurgents, security, sectarians, development, neighborhood watch.*

GJHSS-C Classification : *FOR Code: 370199p*



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I. INTRODUCTION

Globally, the issue of security, peace and development is at the centre stage of local, national and international discourse. States, especially developing ones are constantly in search for security, (Barry, 1983).

Nigeria is post-colonial state in its form and Post – colonial state is tied to the offshoot of imperialism. Over the years, different governments, individuals and institutions in Nigeria have systematically entrenched a culture of marginalization, inequality within the social order. The modern social system has produced widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable deprivation that have

snowballed into serious national security challenges, (Philip, 2008).

Since Nigeria was granted flag independence on October 1st 1960, it has not been well with her as a nation. Nigeria is buffeted with economic, political, and social crises, metamorphosing into national insecurity; historically ranging from the coups d' etat of 1960s to 1990s. The civil war (1967-1970) that claimed more than three million lives, the Maitatsine religious riots of the 1980s and early 1990s, the SAP saga and its effects, the 1993 June 12 election and struggle to reclaim mandate, Odi genocide, Sagamu bloody riots of 2000, the Niger Delta perennial crisis, armed robberies, inter and intra communal conflicts, kidnappings and political assassinations among others. These protests are driven for marginalization, resource control, or ethnic conflagration.

Recently, the emergence of the Boko Haram has added to the corpus of violence and insecurity in the country. Boko Haram is an extremist Islamic sect that is said to have a link with the Al Qaeda terrorist group. Its ideology presumably is to Islamize Nigeria. In today's Nigeria, the fear of Boko Haram is the beginning of wisdom, (TELL October 17, 2011), as they have created an atmosphere of violence and insecurity in the minds of Nigerians through actions that have left many dead, property worth billions destroyed and many displaced. Yet, the government does not have the magic wand to stop and/or protect lives and properties of the citizenry. From January till now, Human Right Watch says 425 people have been killed by the sect, (TELL November 21, 2011). The activities of Boko Haram have paralyzed commercial activities particularly in the northern part of the country with waves of threats across the nation. It becomes very dicey to situate the problems or agitation of the sect whether it is a religious agenda or not. Their mayhem cut across religious and non religious persons and institutions.

In a work titled "BOKO HARAM: History, Ideas and Revolt", Shehu Sani traced the emergence of Boko Haram to radical Islamic teachings in Nigeria. He looked at the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in 1980 which claimed 4,177 and left another 8,712 with varying degree of injuries as a watershed of large-

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scale ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. He went on to examine the emergence and activities of Yobe Talibans and states;

There was confusion as to the true identity of the group that enacted the bestial act that held Yobe hostage for three weeks. Those who seem to know saw them as a reformed Maitatsine sect of the 1980s, while others said the Yobe Talibans could be those sympathetic to the Al-Qaeda Cabal of Osama bin Laden, who spilled over to Nigeria in their bid to escape the United State aggression in 2001.

He further states; the self-styled Talibans of Yobe were not Afghans who infiltrated Nigeria,

rather they were Nigerian university undergraduates, former military personnel and professionals. They were easily identified by their Spartan dress code and long beard, reminiscent of Osama bin Laden. The Yobe Taliban emerged around 2002. The group, on emergence, decided to call itself Al Sunna Wal Jamma, which in Arabic language is literally translated as "follower of Prophet Mohammed teaching",.... Security report had it that the group was also engaged in covert military training and warfare, (The Guardian, July 6 2011).

Therefore, the paper argued that the activities of the Boko Haram sect have impeded the economic, political and social matrix of the Nigeria state. Its activities has created orgy of destruction of lives and properties and displacement of persons in the country.

II. THE PROBLEM

Security and development are very cardinal to the peace, unity and development of any nation. Every nation does have a security system put in place to unleash the individual and collective potential of its people as a nation. This security system must be holistic, that is, embrace the military and socio-economic, cultural, environmental, political and technological aspects of security. These cardinal elements of security are well encapsulated in Nigeria's Grand Strategy for National Security. It provides that;

The primary objective of national security shall be to strengthen the federal republic of Nigeria and to advance her interests and objectives to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth, and improve the welfare and wellbeing and quality of life of every citizen, (cited in Dike, 2010).

This, according to Dike (ibid), entails the followings;

1. State security and human security,
2. The preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country and asset.

The perennial and pervasive nature of unemployment, poverty, armed robbery, conflicts-

(Niger Delta, ethno-religious, Jos, pre/post-election) and the menace, seems to have launched a frontal attack on this Grand Strategy and a challenge to Nigerian motto of Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress.

Obviously, the alarming rate of violence and insecurity, among others, prompted a US Security Report in 2000, to predict the disintegration of Nigeria as political entity in 2015, about four years away. And recently, John Campbell, former US ambassador to Nigeria, in his book titled "Dancing on the Brink" warned that Nigeria might fail as a united country. He described Nigeria as tottering at the brink of failure as a result of poverty amidst plenty. He blamed this on a set of dysfunctions: "a weak government and rigged election; a ruling elite who view the state as a dispensary of petro-profits; endemic corruption; bloody sectarian violence between radical Muslims and Christians and the curse of oil wealth, which encourages Nigeria to ignore industrial development and agriculture", (TELL October 17, 2011).

Nigeria has been engulfed with one form of problem or another. The most reoccurring is the challenge of security. This, no doubt, prompted the dissolution and restructuring of Nigeria's National Security Organization (NSO) by Ibrahim Babangida's administration in 1986 through decree 19. In its place, three other security organs were created. These include the State Security Service (SSS), responsible for domestic intelligence, National Intelligence Agency (NIA), responsible for foreign intelligence and counter intelligence and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) responsible for military intelligence.

The 21st century creeping menace of Islamic sect manifesting into Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, has put the nation's security apparatus on the spot; opening to public doubt and scrutiny of an intelligence community that has enjoyed shadow coverage and handling since the nations return to democracy. According to Okujagu (2004) these prevailing era of insecurity to life and property experienced so far cuts across many facets that include political, economic, social and even in the religious arenas. Also, Paul (2008) saw the overwhelming challenge of the internal security in post-colonial Nigeria and averred that;

Nigeria's national security is threatened by the problem of inefficiency, collusion and despondency of its major institutions and structures as instruments of social action and rectification. This has ensured that the various governments and the state agencies have been unable consistently and institutionally to guarantee the adequate protection, peace and wellbeing of the citizens. This lapse has occasioned serious conflicts, situations of uncertainty, helplessness and instability that have compromised the very territorial and national integrity of this nation

and exposed the bulk of the citizens to unnecessary fear, deprivation and chaos. Thus in setting up a framework for the critical and discursive analysis of the national security problem in Nigeria, we are in need of a new idea or vision of security that can effectively ensure the redemption and rectification of the Nigerian situation.

Consequently, this social virus engulfed the South-eastern part of the country where as observed by Agwanwo and Onwukwe (2010) that in the south east, old and young, rich and poor, even little children are kidnapped for ransom ranging from #5,000 to millions of naira. This came to national glare when members of Nigeria Union of Journalist (NUJ), who were on an official assignment, were kidnapped in Abia State. In a recent survey conducted by Campaign for Democracy, a Non-Governmental Organization, states that no fewer than 938 persons were kidnapped in Southeast between January 2008 and August 2012 and a ransom of about N 1.2 billion paid by families whose members were kidnapped, (Okodili n.d).

Boko Haram, an Islamic insurgent sect, whose heinous activities came to the fore when its foremost leader, Mohammed Yusuf was ingloriously killed by the Nigerian Police in 2009. Before his death, Yusuf had pioneered pocket of violence in the north that had its toll on the lives and property of the people. After his death, a number of observers thought that the violence by this radical Islamic fundamentalist would abate. But, later events seem to have proved them wrong. What has happened and still happening is an intense reverberations of orgy of violence in the country particularly in the North. This has threatened the existence of the state and the Federal government does not have the magic wand to control the insurgency.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The theoretical framework adopted in this paper is the Anomie theory of Durkheim and Merton. Durkheim opted that the source of anomie is the collapse of the social structure caused by rapid social change, (Wosu, 2013). The social structure normally regulates the infinite human drives. If the social structure collapses, these drives are no longer regulated. Thus, valid regulation and norms of behavior lose their function which eventually leads to deviant behavior in one form or another.

While Merton asserted that it is not the breakdown of the social structure that is responsible for anomie but that anomie is an inherent part of a society itself. Anomie emerges when the culture of a society prescribes specific goals to the majority of his members, but the social structures do not provide the legitimate means to achieve these goals to a portion of them. Hence, anomie results from the discrepancy

between goals and means. Therefore, deviant behavior or action (behavior that is considered as illegitimate by the respective society) is caused by social pressure as people are expected to reach certain goals but do not have the means to do so. The predisposition to anomie depends on a person's specific position in a particular society – defined by age, sex, ethnicity, religion etc. Anomie can occur on different systemic levels (i.e in different subsystems to which an individual belongs) and can also be of varying degrees, (Wosu, ibid)

The import of the study is to examine the state of anomie or insurgency caused by Boko Haram sect as a complete breakdown of consensual norms and values of the people. The possession of arms, ammunition and small light weapons by the sect for supposedly to Islamize Nigeria has caused orgy of destruction of lives and properties and so many people displaced. More so, the economic the cultural and economic heritage of the people is destroyed. The terrorist attack which is now a global phenomenon has created tremendous consequences that have destroyed the communities in the North yet is still not abating. Therefore, the relevance of anomie theory has being justified in the research on the emergence and maintenance of non-state armed groups such as the possession of arms and ammunition by the Boko Haram insurgent group.

The methodology of this work is simply hinged on secondary data – literature, journals, magazines, internet etc. The essence of relying on secondary data is due to the complex nature of the sect. the area is unsafe to carry out interview or administer a questionnaire as people are scared and do not know whom to trust. The paper relied more on information from television, radio, newspaper etc. So, in analyzing the data, the study adopted qualitative (descriptive) , rather than quantitative method. The reason is simply because qualitative method does not pose the problem of obscurantism and therefore makes clearer the critical elements contained in the study. In other words, it obviates unwarranted manipulation of figures which sometimes defeats the aim of social researches, (Wosu and Anele, 2010).



IV. FINDINGS

The table below shows the number of persons killed by Boko Haram from 2009 to March 2012

DATE	PLACE OF ATTACK	CIVILIANS	SECURITY AGENTS	BOKO HARAM	INJURED PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGED
26/7/2009	Dutsen-Jashi Police Station Bauchi State	39	2 policemen & 1 soldier	Police	-	Station
27/7/2009	Divisional police Headquarters potiskum, Yobe State	Unknown	3 policemen & one fire service officer.	39	-	Police station
29/7/2009	Mamudo village Yobe State	-	-	33 members killed.	-	-
29/7/2009	Railway Terminus, Maiduguri, Borno State	Unconfirmed.	-	-	-	Property worth considerable amount
January, 2010	Dala Alenderi ward, Maiduguri Borno State.	4 killed	-	-	-	-
8/9/2010	Jos North Plateau State.	300 killed	-	-	-	Worth – millions
13/3/2010	Jos North Plateau State	300 killed	-	-	-	Worth millions
24/12/2010	Barkin Ladi, Jos plateau State	8 killed	-	-	-	Unconfirmed
31/12/2010	Miogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja	10 killed	-	-	-	Worth millions destroyed
28/1/2011	laBuker ward Maduguri, Borno State	7 killed	-	-	-	Non
2/3/2011	DPO residence, Rigasc Kaduna State.	-	2 policemen	-	-	-
30/3/2011	Damaturu, Yobe State	-	1 policeman	-	-	-
1/4/2011	Police State, Bauchi	-	-	-	Unreguted	Uncomformed
2/4/2011	Dutsen-Tanshi police state	-	-	-	2 policemen	-
8/4/2011	INEC office, Suleja Niger State	10 corps members killed	-	1 killed	-	-
9/4/2011	Polling Station, Unguwar Doki, Muduguri, Borno	-	-	1	-	-
15/4/2011	INEC office, Maidugun Borono State	Unconfirmed figure	-	-	Unconfirmed figure	-
20/4/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	1 killed (Muslim cleric)	Policemen ambushed	-	-	-
21/4/2011	Kaduna state	-	-	2 killed (suspected bomb makers)	-	-
22/4/2011	Prison, Yola Adamena State	-	-	-	-	Prison
25/4/2011	Motor park Maiduguri, Borno State	2 killed	-	-	-	-
26/4/2011	London Ciki & Baga roads, Borno State	3 killed	-	-	Second injured	-

5/5/2011	Maduguri Government house Borno State	1 killed	7 killed		1	
9/5/2011	Marri & Bulabulum wards Maiduguri, Borno state and Benchi, State	2 killed (Islamic clerics) 1 killed	-	-	-	-
13/5/2011	Londi chnki, Maiduguri Borno State	2 killed	-	-	-	Unconfirmed
15/5/2011	Maiduguri Borno State		1 policemen killed		5 injured	
29/5/2011	Military barrack, Bauchi State	14 person killed (no identity given)	-	-	-	Unconfirmed
30/5/2011	Baga road, maiduguri Borno State	13 killed			40 injured	
31/5/2011	Borno State	1 killed	-	-	-	-
1/6/2011	Police state, Madiuguri Borno State	5 killed	-	-	-	-
12/6/2011	Bulumkutu Maiduguri, Borno State	4 killed	-	-	Unreprinted	Unconfirmed
16/6/2011	Nigeria police headquartes Abuja	-	2 killed	1 killed	-	Many vehicles damaged
20/6/2011	Kankara police station Katsino State	-	7 policemen killed, 2 private security men killed	-	-	-
3/7/2011	Welari police, barack's Mammy market in Maiduguri, Borno State	6 killed	-	-	13 injured	-
9/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	31 person killed			Unconfirmed	Worth millions
	Sulep, Niger State	4 killed	-	-	Many injured	-
11/7/2011	Fokados street, kadune state	-	-	-	-	-
15/7/2011	Maiduguri Borno State	-	-	-	5 injured	-
23/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	-	-	-	3 injured	-
25/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	8 killed	-	-	-	-
26/8/2011	United Nations building Abuja	23 killed			60 injured.	Trel building and cars
5/5/2011	Maiduguri Government House Borno State	1 killed	7 killed		1	
9/5/2011	Marri & bulabulum wards Maiduguri, Borno State and Bauchi State	2 killed (Islamic clerics) 1 killed	-	-	-	-
13/5/2011	Londo Chinki, Maiduguri Borno State	2 killed	-	-	-	Unconfirmed
15/5/2011	Maiduguri Borno State		1 policemen killed		5 injured	
29/5/2011	Military barrack, Bauchi State	14 person killed (no identity given)	-	-	-	Unconfirmed
30/5/2011	Baga road, Maiduguri Borno State	13 killed				
31/5/2011	Borno State	1 killed	-	-	-	-
1/6/2011	Police state, Maiduguri	5 killed	-	-	-	-

	Borno State						
12/6/2011	Bulumkutu Maiduguri Borno State	4 killed	-	-	-	-	-
16/6/2011	Dambon town, Maiduguri Borno State	4 killed	-	-	Unreprinted	Unconfirmed	
16/6/2011	Nigeria police headquarter Abuja		2 killed	1 killed	-	Many vehicles damaged	
20/6/2011	Kankara police station Katsino state	-	7 policemen killed, 2 private security men killed	-	-	-	
3/7/2011	Welari police, Borrack's Mammy market in Maiduguri, Borno State	6 killed	-	-	13 injured	-	
9/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	31 persons killed			Unconfirmed	Worth millions	
	Sulja, Niger Sttae	4 killed	-	-	-	-	
11/7/2011	Fokadrs street, Kaduna state	-	-	-	-	-	
12/7/2011	-	-	5 killed (military)	-	-	-	Vehicle
15/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	-	-	-	5 injured	-	
23/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	-	-	-	3 injured	-	
25/7/2011	Maiduguri, Borno State	8 killed	-	-	-	-	
26/8/2011	United Nations building Abuja	23 killed			60 injured	Ttrel building cars	
12/9/2011	Police state, Misan Bauchi State	7 killed	4 policemen killed	-	-	-	
13/9/2011	Borno State	-	-	-	4 injured	-	
17/9/2011	Borno state	1 killed	-	-	-	-	
3/10/2011	Baga market, Maiduguri Borno State	3 killed	-	-	-	-	
16/10/2011	Maiduguri Borno State	1 killed	-	-	-	-	
22/10/2011	Maiduguri Borno State	1 killed	-	-	-	-	
4/11/2011	Yobe State	150 killed	-	-	Many	Unconfirmed	
11/11/2011	Bauchi State	-	-	-	5 injured	-	
27/11/2011	Geidam, Yobe State	7 killed	-	-	-	-	
8/12/2011	Kaduna State	15 killed	-	-	-	-	
24/12/2012	Jos, Plataen State	80 killed	-	-	-	-	
25/12/2011	Madalla, Niger State	50 killed	-	-	Many injured	Worth millions destroyed	
30/12/2011	Maiduym, Borno State	7 killed	-	-	-	-	
4/1/2012	Jigawa State	1 killed	-	-	Police station	1 police man	
5/1/2012	Gombe State	6 killed	-	-	-	-	
6/1/2012	Yola, Adamawa State	37 killed	-	-	-	-	
20/1/2012	Kano State	250 killed	-	-	-	-	
22/1/12	Bunchi State-	8 killed	2 military personnel	-	Unconfir med	Two churches, Tafiwn Balewa	

			killed and a policeman			Local Government
24/1/2012	Kano	-	-	2 members	Many	Properly worth millions police station
26/1/2012	Sabon-gari, Kano State.	-	-	-	Many injured.	Worth millions destroyed
27/1/2012	Kaduna Mandawan police	-	1 policeman	4 sect member	Many	Police station
28/1/2012	Kaduna	-	1 police		-	-
28/1/2012	Maiduguri	-	-	11	1	-
29/1/2012	Kano	2				
30/1/2012	Bornu	4	2 Airforce	-	Many	With hundreds of thousands
6/2/2012	Bormu/Maiduguri	-	-	12	Few	-
7/2/2012	One division Nigerian Army Kaduna	-	4 soldiers	1	Many	Worth millions
14/2/2012	Kaduna (2 diff attacks)	-	1		2	-
15/2/2012	Kogi, Koton Karfe Prison	-	1 warder	Freed sech members	May	Prison yard
19/2/2012	Niger State	-	-		5 people	3 cars & 2 churches buildings
23/2/2012	Kano /	-	4 policemen		2	-
-	Muna Niger State	-	2		1	
26/2/2012	Jos (COCIN)	8	-	-	38	Church Building
26/2/2012	Adamawa	-	3 police men		4	Police station
27/2/2012	Bauchi State	-	3 police men		Few	Police station & Bank
27/2/2012	Maiduguri	5	1 custom officer	-	Few	Primary school
7/3/2012	Maiduguri	5	-	-	Few	Church building
7/3/2012	Funakaye LGA Gomba State	-	4 policemen	-	-	-
8/3/2012	Sokoto	2 foreigners Briton Italian	-	-	-	-
11/3/2012	Jos	11	-	4	More than 30	Church building & cars
12/3/2012	Adamawa State	2	2	7	Few	
13/3/2012	Kano	-	2	1	-	

The above table is endless and shows the height of mayhem caused by the Boko Haram sect in Northern Nigeria from 2009 to March 2012. No wonder the President of Nigeria alleged that insecurity in the polity creates a difficult situation to accomplish his electioneering promises to the people due to the activities of the Boko Haram sect. The recent and heart aching one is the abduction of Chibok secondary school girls in April 2014. This has left the populace with mixed feelings. Development cannot thrive in an atmosphere of insecurity. It is now a daily debate in the media but no concrete solution to the problem.

The Nigerian state has failed in its social responsibility to provide security to the populace. The present situation has witnessed an increasing number

of varying degrees of state weakness and ineffectiveness; hence the state is unable to deliver basic public good to the people. Fragile involves weak institutions and poor governance, which threaten their existence and that of their neighbors and global security, PPT Peace building Centre (2005). We may now ask what the characteristics of a fragile state are. They are:

- Weak and declining economic growth – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and human development Index (HDI);
- Weak governance;
- Volatile security environment ;
- Low level of trust between donor and recipient government ;

- Forced migration and displacement population.

Therefore, a cursory examination of insurgency in the Northern states revealed a tremendous orgy destruction of lives and properties. Millions of people are living on less than \$1 a day, high level of child mortality and maternal mortality. It becomes impossible to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Northern States, unless progress can be made to restore peace in the fragile states. Otherwise, with this situation we are gradually getting to the state of anarchy and / or disintegration.

Further, the heightening state of insecurity in Nigeria manifesting in shootings, bombings and the destruction of lives and property has been widely acknowledged globally. The sect has as its main targets the police, police stations, prisons, army barracks, churches, mosque, schools, markets and other public places. Nigerians are not safe in their own country, as a lot of people now sleep with one eye open. The activities of this insurgent sect have in no quantifiable proportion undermined the peace, unity and security of the country. One of the attacks of the group that attracted international opprobrium was the bombing of U.N facility in Abuja. According to Scott, (2012)

At first, Boko Haram was involved mostly in fomenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms. Boko Haram came to international attention following serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in thousands of deaths. By late 2010, Boko Haram had added Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to its tactical repertoire. This tactical advancement was reflected in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Jos, Plateau states, on Christmas Eve 2010. Boko Haram conducted a number of armed assaults and small IEDs attacks in early 2011. The IEDs involved in the attacks were either improvised hand grenades constructed by filling soft drinks cans with explosives- which were frequently thrown from motorcycles- or slightly larger device left at the target. This attack had a paradigm shift on June 16, 2011, when Boko Haram launched a suicide vehicle-borne improved device (VBIED) attack against the headquarters of the Nigerian national police in Abuja.

He further states that; Boko Haram conducted its second suicide VBIED attack in Abuja on August 26, 2011, this time targeting a U.N. compound in the city's diplomatic district. This attack proved far more deadly because the driver was able to enter the compound and reach a parking garage before detonating his device near the building's entrance. The attack against the U.N. compound also marked a break from Boko Haram's traditional target set of

government and Christian facilities. If the intelligence that triggered the warnings of hotel attacks in November 2011 is accurate, it appears the group may also have considered transnational targets at least to the extent of seeking to eliminate involvement by the international community in Nigeria in order to undercut Abuja. This shift in targeting raised concerns that the group's contacts with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and/or al Shabaab had influenced it.

It also raised fears that due to its rapidly evolving attack capability, Boko Haram now was on a trajectory to become the next jihadist franchise group to become a transnational terrorist threat, following the steps of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based al Qaeda franchise group, (p3).

In his stern reaction to the above, the U.N secretary General Ban Ki-moon, opines that the UN agencies operating in Nigeria include the World Health Organization, the UN development programme, the children's organization, UNICEF, the Office of Drug and Crime, the Joint Program on HIV and AIDS and the Development Fund for Women. The building hit by the attack housed 26 UN humanitarian and development agencies. This point to the fact that Nigeria faces development and security challenges as Boko Haram and its attendant collateral damage have ravaged institution enunciated to garner her development. With all these unpalatable events in recent times, Soyinka observed and correctly too that Nigeria is close to breaking up and its leadership has descended into theatre of the absurd. Nigeria is now a "failed state" where ordinary people's anger has peaked with potentially lethal consequences, (TELL, 2010).

V. CONCLUSION

Now, the seamless spate of bombings, killing and other violent act since the second quarter of 2011 in the Northern part of the country seems to suggest that Nigeria and Nigerians are faced with an insurmountable challenge of insecurity. What started like a childish play has dovetailed into serious national security concern and the government is cut in the web of dilemma on how to deal with the issues.

The paper, therefore, collaborate with Ogunyemi (2012) who opted that to fix the security challenges would require, at the barest minimum that we demonstrate a strong commitment to transparency and accountability in the political process, embrace a vibrant social security programme, and remove safety nets for corrupt and corruptible state officials. The take-off point is demystifying a slogan which is gaining increased popularity within and outside government circles; if you fight corruption, corruption will fight back. But, it may be asked; is there a Nigerian leader yet who can take corruption headlong to free resources that go the bottomless pit in this country?

So, the emerging threats of violence and potentials for violent attack become more threatening these days because, as a nation, it appears we do not have adequate, meaningful and enduring response. Or is it that Nigeria cannot afford a social security regime or that the Nigerian Leadership does not see the need for it? Imagine the trillions and billions of naira that the elite class swindles in the name of petroleum subsidy on a yearly basis. Think of the scam fraud that goes on in our banks, ministries, universities, agencies on a daily basis.

It is on this note the paper advocates for a holistic approach for our leaders to have a change of attitude towards governance and restore the dignity and glory of this nation. We have advocated elsewhere the following panacea; first, the revenue from oil should be channeled into maximum utilization by creating job opportunities for the large unemployed youths. This will address the saying that an idle mind is the devils workshop. Second, socio-economic, political and religious issues should be addressed timely as soon as they arise to forestall their escalation and degeneration beyond control. This view seemed important because the state security agencies claimed they gave early warnings on the formation of Boko Haram but no action; hence, the manifestations of destruction of lives and property. Third, the use of dialogue cannot be undermined if the parties are identified. Meaningful dialogue will lead to positive results. Fourth, the fight against terrorism should be a collective responsibility between African nations, Middle East, European Union and America. This is key because terrorism is a global phenomenon, with modern sophisticated technology for mass destruction, Chuku, Wosu & Amugo (2013). Lastly, the deployment of an effective organized neighborhood watch (NW) in conjunction with the state apparatus will not only acts as a panacea, but will complement the effort of the government in curbing the menace of terrorism.

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