

SOCIAL PREDICTION AND THE “ALLEGIANCE BIAS”

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Two studies examined the allegiance bias – the rendering of biased predictions by individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome. In Study 1, fans of either Notre Dame or University of Miami college football read information about an upcoming game between the two teams and then explained a hypothetical victory either by Notre Dame or Miami. Although explaining a hypothetical victory biased the judgments of controls (i.e., fans of neither team) in the direction of the team explained, the judgments of Notre Dame and Miami fans favored their team in every explanation condition. In addition, fans exhibited biased recall for facts favoring their own teams and this biased recall predicted fans’ judgments regarding the upcoming game. Study 2 attempted to specify a debiasing technique that might attenuate the allegiance bias. Indiana University basketball fans described what they thought might happen in an upcoming game between Indiana and the University of Michigan while anticipating having a discussion about the game (i.e., predecisional accountability) with either an Indiana fan, a Michigan fan, or a fan of unknown allegiance. As predicted, anticipating a discussion with a fan of unknown allegiance engendered game predictions that were the least biased in favor of an Indiana victory. Implications for social explanation and prediction research are discussed.

People often grapple with decisions that involve making predictions about the future: Will my decision to buy a more expensive car allow me to save money on service and repairs? Will my children receive more attention from their professors if I send them to a small liberal arts college? Will I be happier in the future with a lower paying, but ultimately more rewarding, job? People attempt to answer questions such as these by

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projecting into the future and predicting whether the specified outcome is likely to occur.

For more than two decades, researchers have attempted to describe the processes underlying how individuals arrive at such predictions (e.g., Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Hirt & Markman, 1995; Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Koehler, 1991). A particularly robust finding in this literature has been termed the explanation bias. In this work, a particular future outcome is specified, and participants are asked to imagine and explain how and why such a future outcome might come about. The typical finding is that when participants imagine or generate explanations for how a specified hypothetical outcome might be true, they show increased subjective likelihood estimates for the specified outcome relative to participants that are not asked to imagine or explain that outcome.

In the first study to demonstrate this effect, Ross, Lepper, Strack, and Steinmetz (1977) had participants read detailed clinical case histories, and participants were asked to generate explanations for why particular hypothetical events (e.g., committing suicide or contributing to the Peace Corps) might have occurred later in a patient's life. The results indicated that participants who had explained a given hypothetical event actually believed that the patient was more likely to perform these behaviors in the future. In subsequent studies, participants have been asked to imagine and explain a variety of future occurrences, including the outcomes of political elections (Carroll, 1978), sporting events (Hirt & Sherman, 1985; S. J. Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 1983), and the impact on people of watching televised aggression (Anderson & Sechler, 1986). In all cases, engaging in the imagination–explanation task increased subjective likelihood estimates for the target outcome relative to participants not given the imagination–explanation task.

The prevailing explanation offered for the explanation bias argues that an explanation task enhances the accessibility in memory of information consistent with the event explained at the time of judgment (e.g., Anderson et al., 1980; Hirt & Markman, 1995; Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Koehler, 1991). Participants then use the enhanced availability of this information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the correspondingly greater ease of constructing a scenario or outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) as an indication of likelihood. However, because participants base their judgments on the information accessible at the time of judgment and fail to take into account the biasing effects of the earlier explanation task, the resulting likelihood judgments are systematically biased in favor of the event explained. In so doing, participants fail to consider how well the evidence might fit alternative outcomes (cf. Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982).

Have boundary conditions on the explanation bias been discovered? Sherman et al. (1983) posited that a mediating factor in the explanation effect might be the extent to which participants enter the explanation task with a general impression or preformed judgment of the event. Person memory research (e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Lingle & Ostrom, 1981; see also Hastie & Park, 1986) had previously demonstrated that participants who form initial impressions of a target (impression set) often base their subsequent related judgments on these initial impressions rather than on the original facts presented or on the facts recalled at the time of judgment. In line with this reasoning, Sherman et al. (1983) found that even though the explanation task biased the recall of the presented information in favor of the outcome explained, participants who had been asked to form an initial impression of a football game in preparation for a future judgment task later displayed little judgmental bias as a result of the explanation task relative to participants who had been asked to memorize the factual information in preparation for a future recall task. In subsequent research, Hirt and Sherman (1985) found that this ability to resist the explanation bias was limited to knowledgeable (football) participants who were given both an initial impression set and information that was easily integrated with past knowledge.

MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS OF ALLEGIANCE

When people are asked to imagine or explain a hypothetical future event, it is assumed that they retrieve, from memory, information that is consistent with the outcome to be explained. Furthermore, it is assumed that people are easily capable of accessing material that is consistent with any number of possible future outcomes. Thus, people should be able to retrieve from memory facts that would be consistent with a victory by either team in an upcoming football game or by either candidate in an upcoming election (Johnson & Sherman, 1990). In an experimental context, participants then fall prey to the explanation bias by relying on this outcome-consistent material to render their subsequent likelihood judgments.

Although we agree that people are capable of retrieving information that is consistent with many possible future outcomes, we contend that people may not always choose to make use of this more accessible information when rendering likelihood judgments. Instead, we propose that when people are psychologically invested in seeing events turn out a particular way—with a particular outcome in mind—they will be resistant to the typical effects of the imagination-explanation task. More specifically, and paralleling work by Kunda and her colleagues (e.g.,

Kunda, 1990; Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, & Reber, 1993; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990; see also Ross, 1989), we suggest that individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome may engage in a biased search through memory for facts that favor the desired outcome, and the retrieval of such facts subsequently biases judgments in the favored direction. In essence, then, we are positing that a cognitively driven bias—the enhanced accessibility of material consistent with the outcome to be explained—may often be superseded by a motivationally driven bias—the desire to see the outcome turn out in a particular way (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). We refer to the rendering of biased predictions by individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome as the *allegiance bias*.

To some extent, the biasing nature of allegiance mirrors the effects of providing an initial impression set (e.g., Sherman et al., 1983) in that participants approach the task with a preformed opinion regarding the eventual outcome and, thus, subsequent predictions are not influenced by the biased recall engendered by the explanation task. Highly allegiant participants may simply ignore the facts and base their predictions on their own preconceptions and expectations. Conversely, allegiance may play its own role in biasing recall so that subsequent outcome predictions will be biased, in part, by the selective retrieval of facts that support the desired outcome.

One domain where we are particularly likely to find individuals with vested interest in outcomes is sports fandom—one's allegiance to favorite sports teams. Past research has suggested that people are motivated to develop and maintain positive social identities (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and fandom, like any other important social identity, constitutes an affiliation in which a great deal of emotional significance and value are derived from group membership (Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992). Thus, for many sports fans, commitment to their identity as a fan of a particular team comprises an integral part of their self-identity (McCall & Simmons, 1966; Nuttbrock & Freudiger, 1991). Moreover, a number of theorists (e.g., Edwards, 1973; Hirt et al., 1992; Izenberg, 1968, 1972; Lawther, 1951; Roberts, 1976; Weiss, 1969) believe that fandom provides an individual with an opportunity to affirm his or her own self-worth by basking in the reflected glory (BIRGing); (Cialdini et al., 1976) of a successful team. Given that the tendency to BIRG has been found to be greatest when one's public image is threatened (cf. Schlenker, 1980), BIRGing has come to be regarded as a strategic impression management strategy whereby individuals raise their esteem in the eyes of others (Hirt et al., 1992).

It has also been documented that sports fans tend to make biased predictions regarding the outcome of a competition involving their favorite team. For instance, Hirt et al. (1992) found that fans gave positive estimates of their team's future performance unless they had just observed the team lose a competition, and these effects were mediated by level of identification with the team. Similarly, Wann and Dolan (1994) found that in comparison to less identified spectators, highly allegiant fans predicted that their team would perform better in the future and were more likely to accomplish several team goals.

OVERVIEW OF STUDY 1

Study 1 was designed to test whether team allegiance attenuates the biasing effects of imagining and explaining outcomes on predictions of future outcomes. Participants who identified themselves as fans of either the University of Notre Dame or University of Miami (Fla.) college football teams read detailed information about an upcoming game between the two teams along with a third group of participants (controls) who had indicated that they were neither fans of Notre Dame nor Miami. One group of participants was told to imagine and explain a hypothetical victory by Notre Dame, a second group imagined and explained a hypothetical victory by Miami, and a third (no explanation) group neither imagined nor explained a victory by either team. Finally, participants made judgments about what they thought would actually happen in the game and completed a free recall measure.

It was predicted that explaining a hypothetical victory would bias the judgments of controls in the direction of the team explained—the typical explanation effect. On the other hand, the judgments of Notre Dame fans should be biased in favor of their team regardless of whether they have been asked to explain a Notre Dame victory, a Miami victory, or generate no explanation at all, whereas the judgments of Miami fans should be biased in favor of their team regardless of the explanation condition to which they have been assigned. In all cases, recall should be biased in favor of the team explained (cf. Hirt & Sherman, 1985; Hirt & Markman, 1995). However, because team allegiance comprises an important part of their self-identity, both Notre Dame and Miami fans should be psychologically invested in seeing their teams prevail in the upcoming game and thus should also recall a greater proportion of facts favoring their own team. In turn, biased recall should be predictive of participants' judgments concerning the game, thereby moderating the biasing effects of allegiance on predictions.

STUDY 1

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

One hundred fifty students enrolled in the introductory psychology course at the University of Wisconsin–Madison participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. In a mass testing session conducted earlier in the semester, students had indicated whether they were fans of University of Notre Dame football (ND fans), University of Miami (Fla.) football (MIA fans), or were not fans of either team (controls).

To be included in the ND or MIA fan group, a student must have rated that team positively (on a –4 strong negative feelings to +4 strong positive feelings about the team scale), rated the rival neutral or negatively on the same scale, and must have listed that team as one of their four favorite teams on the pretest. Controls had to have rated the two teams evenly and not listed either team as one of their favorites or most despised teams. Approximately equivalent numbers of participants from these three groups were recruited for the experiment and then randomly assigned to one of the explanation conditions.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE MEASURE

On arrival at the testing site, participants were told that they would be asked to respond to information that they would be provided about college football. Participants were then given a series of 10 questions and items designed to assess their general knowledge of college football (e.g., “What is the penalty that is called when a player is blocked from the rear?” or “Who won last year’s NCAA National Championship?”). Scores on these items could range from 0 to 10.

PROCEDURE

After completing the general knowledge measure, participants were told that they would be reading some information about two college football teams—the University of Notre Dame and the University of Miami (Fla.). Participants then received a packet containing detailed factual information about both teams. This information included win–loss records against previous opponents, the latest Associated Press rankings, and relevant statistics regarding the offenses and defenses of both teams.

Participants were given 15 min to read the information and were told that, once they had read the information, they would be asked to recall facts about the teams without referring back to the passage (they could not take notes). Thus, participants were given a recall set as they read the passage. Previous research by Hirt and Sherman (1985) and Sherman et al. (1983) has shown that the explanation bias is particularly strong when participants are given a recall set at the time of encoding the passage information. Thus, the choice of a recall set allowed us to examine the interaction between team allegiance and explanation conditions more closely. Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine experimental conditions:

- (1) control–no explanation,
- (2) control–explain ND,
- (3) control–explain MIA,
- (4) ND fan–no explanation,
- (5) ND fan–explain ND,
- (6) ND fan–explain MIA,
- (7) MIA fan–no explanation,
- (8) MIA fan–explain ND, or
- (9) MIA fan–explain MIA.

No Explanation Conditions. After reading the packet of information for 15 min, no explanation participants were given the following instructions:

We, of course, don't know how the football game between Miami and Notre Dame will actually turn out. It won't be played for a couple of weeks. However, based on what you read in the passage, we would like you to answer several questions about what you think *will* happen when the game is actually played. Try to anticipate the future.

These participants then went on to the dependent measures.

Explanation Conditions. After reading the packet of information, participants in these conditions were given the following instructions:

One thing psychologists are interested in is how people explain hypothetical events. Of course, we don't know at the present time which team will win. However, we want you to *imagine* that the game has been played and that Miami [Notre Dame] actually won. Remember, the game hasn't yet been played, but we want you to imagine that it has been and think about it as though it already took place. We are interested in what evidence, if any, you can write down which might help one to explain, or might have allowed one to anticipate a victory by Miami [Notre Dame].

After writing their explanations, participants read the control condition instructions and then went on to the dependent measures.

Dependent Measures. As in Sherman et al. (1983) and Hirt & Sherman (1985), the primary dependent measures were the estimated probability that one or the other team would win, made on a scale ranging from *Miami (Fla.) will very probably win* (1) to *Notre Dame will very probably win* (13), and the predicted final score of the game between Miami and Notre Dame (i.e., participants had to list each team's score). Participants also responded to a 13-point scale concerning how confident they were in their predictions regarding the game's outcome.

In addition to the judgment measures, participants were also given a free recall measure. This measure asked participants to list all the information that they could remember from the passage and then go back and rate (a) the importance of each piece of information in making a prediction about the game's outcome ((on a 4-point scale ranging from *not important* (1) to *very important* (4)) and (b) which team each fact supported (either Miami, Notre Dame, or neither team). The order of completion of these two dependent measures was counterbalanced: half of the participants completed the judgment measures first and then recalled the information (judgment-recall order), and half recalled the information prior to making their judgments (recall-judgment order). Order did not yield significant effects in any of the subsequent analyses and, thus, all of the reported results were collapsed across this factor.

Manipulation Checks. Following completion of the judgment and recall measures, participants were asked to briefly indicate their feelings toward Miami and Notre Dame (on two separate 3-point scales ranging from *positive* (1) to *negative* (3)), and also to indicate how they would *like* to see the outcome of the game come out. Thus, participants were asked to list both teams and the scores for both teams. After completing these measures, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks and General Knowledge Data. Two $3(\text{Allegiance: ND fan vs. control vs. MIA fan}) \times 3(\text{Explanation: Explain ND vs. No explanation vs. Explain MIA})$ ANOVAs conducted on the feelings toward Miami and Notre Dame measures yielded significant main effects of Allegiance on the Miami measure, $F(2, 141) = 127.92, p < .001$, and on the Notre Dame measure, $F(2, 141) = 134.57, p < .001$. Simple effects analyses revealed that MIA fans felt more positively toward Miami ($M = 1.10$) than did controls ($M = 1.76$), $F(3, 141) = 13.84, p < .001$ or ND fans ($M =$

2.86), $F(3, 141) = 83.87, p < .001$, whereas ND fans felt more positively toward Notre Dame ($M = 1.08$) than did controls ($M = 1.65$), $F(3, 141) = 7.64, p < .001$ or MIA fans ($M = 2.83$), $F(3, 141) = 70.71, p < .001$. An index of how participants wanted the outcome of the game to turn out was created by subtracting the number of points they wanted to see Miami score from the number of points they wanted to see Notre Dame score (i.e., with positive numbers indicating a desire to see Notre Dame win and negative numbers indicating a desire to see Miami win). The Allegiance main effect was significant, $F(2, 141) = 98.62, p < .001$, and further analyses revealed that ND fans hoped Notre Dame would win by a greater margin ($M = +23.91$) than did controls ($M = +1.38$), $F(3, 141) = 9.91, p < .001$, or MIA fans ($M = -33.69$), $F(3, 141) = 64.47, p < .001$. Clearly, then, both ND fans and MIA fans hoped that their team would win the game by a substantial margin.

Analyses of scores on the general knowledge test (grand mean = 8.13) yielded a marginally significant Allegiance main effect, $F(2, 141) = 2.51, p = .085$, with ND fans scoring higher ($M = 8.62$) than both MIA fans ($M = 7.89$) and controls ($M = 7.87$). No other effects were significant, $ps > .30$. Interestingly, higher scores on the general knowledge test were correlated with a greater perceived probability that Notre Dame would win the game, $r(149) = .22, p = .006$, suggesting that more knowledgeable fans were aware that Notre Dame was favored to win this particular game.¹

Judgment Data. According to predictions, the judgments of control participants were expected to be biased by the explanation task, whereas the judgments of ND and MIA fans were expected to be biased in favor of their team regardless of the explanation condition. Table 1 depicts participants' mean judgments for the two main dependent measures (probability of winning and point difference).

The main effect of Allegiance was significant for the probability of winning measure, $F(2, 141) = 23.87, p < .001$, indicating that ND fans thought a Notre Dame win was more likely than did controls or MIA fans. In addition, the main effect of Explanation was also significant, $F(2, 141) = 3.63, p = .03$, indicating that Explain ND participants thought a Notre Dame win was more likely than did no explanation or Explain MIA participants. Importantly, these main effects were qualified by an Allegiance \times Explanation interaction, $F(4, 141) = 2.68, p = .03$. As predicted, the judgments of controls were biased by the explanation task:

1. According to the Associated Press Coaches Poll (November, 1989), Notre Dame was ranked No. 1 going into the game, whereas Miami was ranked No. 7.

Control–Explain ND participants thought that a Notre Dame victory was more likely than did Control–No explanation participants, $F(1, 141) = 5.10, p = .025$, whereas Control–Explain MIA participants thought that a Miami victory was more likely than did Control–No explanation participants, $F(1, 141) = 3.60, p = .05$. On the other hand, the judgments of ND fans did not differ significantly from one another in any of the explanation conditions and, likewise, neither did the judgments of MIA fans. Rather, the judgments of MIA fans in the Explain ND condition continued to be biased in favor of Miami in comparison to controls, $F(1, 141) = 17.87, p < .001$, and ND fans, $F(1, 141) = 22.22, p < .001$ (while controls and ND fans did not differ, $F < 1$), whereas the judgments of ND fans in the Explain MIA condition continued to be biased in favor of Notre Dame in comparison to controls, $F(1, 141) = 14.99, p < .001$, and MIA fans, $F(1, 141) = 16.69, p < .001$ (while controls and MIA fans did not differ, $F < 1$).

To create a point difference index, the number of points participants believed Miami would score was subtracted from the number of points they believed Notre Dame would score. Consistent with the probability of winning measure, the Allegiance and Explanation main effects were significant, $F(2, 141) = 21.58, p < .001$ and $F(2, 141) = 4.77, p = .01$, respectively, and the predicted Allegiance \times Explanation interaction was obtained, $F(4, 141) = 3.15, p = .02$. Control–Explain ND participants thought that Notre Dame would win by more points than did Control–No explanation participants, $F(1, 141) = 2.97, p = .09$, albeit marginally, whereas Control–Explain MIA participants thought that Miami would win by more points than did Control–No explanation participants, $F(1, 141) = 9.33, p = .003$. Once again, however, the judgments of ND fans did not differ significantly from one another in any of the explanation conditions and, likewise, neither did the judgments of MIA fans. Rather, the judgments of MIA fans in the Explain ND condition continued to be biased in favor of Miami in comparison to controls, $F(1, 141) = 17.45, p < .001$, and ND fans, $F(1, 141) = 12.49, p < .001$ (while controls and ND fans did not differ, $F < 1$), whereas the judgments of ND fans in the Explain MIA condition continued to be biased in favor of Notre Dame in comparison to controls, $F(1, 141) = 15.25, p < .001$, and MIA fans, $F(1, 141) = 14.92, p < .001$ (while controls and MIA fans did not differ, $F < 1$). There were no significant effects on the expressed confidence measure (grand mean = 7.73), all F s < 1 .

Recall Data. A recall bias measure was computed for each participant from their free recall of the presented information by calculating the ratio of facts favoring Notre Dame to the sum of the facts favoring Notre Dame plus the facts favoring Miami (Notre Dame/Notre Dame + Mi-

TABLE 1. Probability of Winning and Point Difference by Allegiance and Explanation Condition

Allegiance	Explanation Condition		
	Explain ND	No Explanation	Explain MIA
Probability of Winning			
ND Fans	9.71 ^a	8.68 ^{ac}	9.13 ^a
Controls	9.27 ^a	7.50 ^b	6.06 ^c
MIA Fans	6.00 ^b	6.38 ^b	5.94 ^{bc}
Point Difference			
ND Fans	4.71 ^a	4.63 ^a	4.31 ^a
Controls	5.80 ^a	2.50 ^a	-3.25 ^b
MIA Fans	-2.11 ^b	-2.38 ^b	-3.06 ^b

Note: Row and column means that do not share common subscripts differ at the $p < .05$ level. Probability of winning judgments are on a scale from Miami (Fla.) will very probably win (1) to Notre Dame will very probably win (13). Point Difference reflects participants' predicted final score for MIA subtracted from participants' predicted final score for ND.

ami). Facts favoring neither team were ignored.² Table 2 depicts the means on this measure for each condition.

An ANOVA revealed a significant Explanation main effect, $F(2, 138) = 3.61, p < .03$. Explain ND participants recalled a greater proportion of facts favoring Notre Dame ($M = .500$) than did Explain MIA participants ($M = .436$), $F(3, 138) = 2.58, p = .056$. Controls ($M = 4.96$), however, did not differ from Explain ND participants, $F < 1$, or Explain MIA participants, $F(3, 138) = 1.55, p = .21$. Importantly, however, there was also a main effect of Allegiance, $F(2, 138) = 9.91, p < .001$. Notre Dame fans recalled a greater proportion of facts favoring Notre Dame ($M = .540$) than did MIA fans ($M = .418$), $F(3, 138) = 6.59, p < .001$ and controls ($M = .479$), $F(3, 138) = 2.31, p = .08$, albeit marginally, whereas MIA fans recalled a greater proportion of facts favoring Miami than did controls, $F(3, 138) = 2.93, p = .04$. The interaction was not significant, $F < 1$. Overall, then, recall was bi-

2. As in Hirt and Markman (1995), we also computed a weighted recall bias measure for each participant by weighing all facts by participants' importance ratings. This measure was correlated with the recall bias measure ($r = .87, p < .001$); moreover, the same pattern of results was obtained on both measures. We chose to report the unweighted recall bias measure because past reviewers have argued that the weighted recall bias measure can be construed as another judgment measure rather than a pure measure of recall; thus, correlations between judgments and this weighted recall measure cannot be viewed as recall-judgment correlations.

TABLE 2. Recall Bias by Allegiance and Explanation Condition

Allegiance	Explanation Condition		
	Explain ND	No Explanation	Explain MIA
ND Fans	.552	.561	.501
Controls	.551	.465	.432
MIA Fans	.421	.453	.381

Note: Recall Bias reflects a calculation of the ratio of facts favoring Notre Dame to the sum of the facts favoring Notre Dame plus the facts favoring Miami (Notre Dame/Notre Dame + Miami).

ased by both the explanation condition (Hirt & Sherman, 1985, Sherman et al., 1983) and team allegiance.

Finally, correlations were computed between recall bias and the two main dependent measures, partialling out the effects of Allegiance, Explanation condition, judgment–recall order, and level of knowledge (i.e., participants' scores on the general knowledge measure) on this relation. The partial correlations between recall bias and probability of winning, as well as between recall bias and point difference, were both significant, $r(149) = .25, p = .003$ for the former, $r(149) = .28, p = .001$ for the latter, indicating a positive relationship between recall bias and predicted outcome.³

Coding of Protocols from the Explanation Conditions. An analysis of the written protocols generated by participants in the explanation conditions was also performed. We were particularly interested in examining whether the explanations participants provided in the conditions in which they were asked to explain a hypothetical win by a hated rival differed in quality from the explanations generated for a win by one's own team. Two judges, blind to experimental condition, coded the written protocols along four dimensions: total word count, number of arguments generated, overall quality of the explanations (on a 1 = low quality to 5 = high quality scale), and instances of phrases or statements that qualified explanations for a win by the team participants were told to explain (e.g., "even though almost all the previous information listed shows Miami with statistical dominance over Notre Dame, Notre Dame played a stronger game"). Interrater reliability on these ratings ranged

3. Analyses examining the *accuracy* of recall (i.e., number of items correctly recalled) yielded no significant effects, allowing us to discount a more cognitive–informational explanation for the pattern of outcome prediction results.

from 75% (number of arguments) to 96% (total word count), and all discrepancies were resolved by discussion.

As can be seen in Table 3, a consistent pattern of results emerged for the number of arguments as well as the quality ratings. To examine the nature of these effects more closely, analyses included only ND and MIA fans. A significant Allegiance \times Explanation interaction was obtained for the number of arguments, $F(1, 59) = 4.80, p = .03$, indicating that while ND fans generated more arguments when they explained a Notre Dame victory than when they explained a Miami victory, MIA fans generated more arguments when they explained a Miami victory than when they explained a Notre Dame victory. In a similar vein, ND fans were judged as generating higher quality explanations when they explained a Notre Dame victory than when they explained a Miami victory, whereas MIA fans were judged as generating higher quality explanations when they explained a Miami victory than when they judged a Notre Dame victory, $F(1, 59) = 12.82, p < .001$. Thus, it appears that allegiant fans generated stronger explanations for their favorite team than for their team's rival.

Further examination of the explanation data also revealed that, consistently, the explanations of ND fans contained more qualifying statements when they explained a Miami victory than when they explained a Notre Dame victory, whereas the reverse was the case for the explanations of MIA fans, $F(1, 59) = 3.96, p = .05$. Participants explaining a hypothetical win by a hated rival showed a significant tendency to include disclaimers ("despite the fact that the game is being played in the Orange Bowl, Notre Dame won because of their stellar special teams play") or qualifiers (maybe, perhaps, possibly, surprisingly). Indeed, a subset of participants in these conditions (10 out of 37) went so far as to spontaneously generate a detailed counterexplanation on the subsequent page, elaborating how the (undesired) outcome previously explained would not actually occur and explaining instead how and why their favorite team would be victorious.

Thus, it appears that not only did participants make somewhat weaker explanations when asked to explain a victory by their team's rival; they also actively sabotaged the potentially biasing effects of the explanation by making disclaimers in the explanation itself or spontaneously generating a counterexplanation afterwards. By discounting the validity of their explanation and recruiting evidence consistent with the desired outcome, allegiant fans were able to sustain the belief that their favorite team would in fact be victorious in the upcoming game.

TABLE 3. Number of Arguments, Quality Ratings, and Number of Qualifiers by Allegiance and Explanation Condition

Allegiance	Explanation Condition	
	Explain ND	Explain MIA
Number of Arguments		
ND Fans	4.40	3.93
Controls	3.64	4.13
MIA Fans	3.18	4.13
Quality Rating		
ND Fans	3.27	2.53
Controls	2.64	2.67
MIA Fans	2.18	3.25
Number of Qualifiers		
ND Fans	0.00	0.40
Controls	0.43	0.07
MIA Fans	0.94	0.31

Note: Quality ratings are on a 1 = low quality to 4 = high quality scale.

DISCUSSION

The results of Study 1 suggest that when an individual desires to see an event turn out in a particular way, the typical biasing effects of an imagination–explanation task on likelihood judgments can be attenuated. Although the judgments of controls were biased in the direction of the team explained, the judgments of Notre Dame and Miami fans favored their team in every explanation condition. This effect was particularly striking in those conditions where ND and MIA fans were asked to explain victories by their team’s rival. In both cases, participants continued to predict victory for their favorite teams even after they explained a hypothetical victory by the other team. Replicating previous findings (e.g., Anderson, New, & Speer, 1985, Hirt & Markman, 1995, Sherman et al., 1983), recall was biased in favor of the team explained. In addition, team allegiance also exerted an effect on recall, as ND and MIA fans tended to exhibit biased recall for facts favoring their own teams, and subsequent correlational analyses indicated a positive relationship between recall bias and outcome predictions.

DEBIASING

Study 1 provided a demonstration of how one (cognitively-driven) bias—the explanation bias—can be superceded by another (motivationally-driven) bias—the allegiance bias. Study 2 examined the inevitability of the allegiance bias and sought to specify a *debiasing* technique that might effectively reverse or reduce the wishful thinking invoked by this bias.

Prior research has explored debiasing techniques for explanation effects and the most prominent of these has been that of asking participants to engage in a counterexplanation task. Participants asked to explain one outcome of an event are then asked to explain an alternative outcome to the same event. Several experiments have demonstrated that instructing participants to “consider-the-opposite” (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Hoch, 1985; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984) or, more generally, to consider multiple plausible alternatives (Hirt & Markman, 1995; see also Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) reduces the explanation bias. This same technique has proven successful in reducing other judgmental errors such as overconfidence (Hoch, 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980), hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1982; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977), and anchoring effects (Müssweiler, Strack, & Pfeffer, 2000). Hirt and Markman (1995) have advanced a simulation heuristic explanation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) to account for the effectiveness of counterexplanation tasks. These researchers have proposed that the act of engaging in a counterexplanation task encourages participants to consider multiple alternative outcomes for an event in addition to those specified by the counterexplanation task, thereby leading to a more thorough and comprehensive consideration of the likely outcome of the event.

Although counterexplanation has proven to be an effective debiasing tool in many judgmental domains, the results of Study 1 suggest that this technique will fail if individuals are psychologically invested in a particular outcome. As noted earlier, the predictions of ND and MIA fans were still heavily biased in their teams’ favor even after engaging in what amounts to a counterexplanation task—explaining a victory by the unfavored team. Indeed, several of these individuals inserted disclaimers in their explanations or spontaneously generated a counterexplanation to negate the potentially biasing influence of the previous explanation task. In this way, they actively undermined the effectiveness of the manipulation on their likelihood judgments. What, then, can be done to prompt individuals who favor a particular outcome to consider alternative outcomes and thereby undermine the allegiance bias?

ACCOUNTABILITY

People often make decisions in social settings in which they have to justify themselves to others, and such expectations of accountability put constraints on what they do (“If I do this, how will others react, and what could I say in response?”). Knowing that they will be held accountable for their actions and decisions, people seek approval and respect (e.g., Jones & Wortman, 1973; Schlenker, 1982; Sherif & Cantril, 1947). According to Tetlock and his colleagues (e.g., Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock & Lerner, 1999), the manner in which accountability influences judgments hinges, in part, on the degree of ambiguity in the social task of constructing an effective justification. When people are accountable to an audience whose preferences are known, and they do not feel locked into any prior attitudinal commitment (predecisional accountability), they often shift their views toward the prospective audience to win approval (Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). On the other hand, when the views of the audience are completely unknown, predecisional accountability often leads people to engage in preemptive self-criticism (Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989) whereby they consider multiple perspectives on an issue and try to anticipate the objections that reasonable individuals might raise to the positions they take.

Predecisional accountability to an unknown audience has been shown to improve judgment in a wide variety of domains, including decreasing reliance on dispositional attributions for a target’s behavior (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock, 1985; Wells, Petty, Harkins, Kagehiro, & Harvey, 1977), increasing attention to effort-demanding cues in persuasive messages (Chaiken, 1980), and increasing the correspondence between judgment accuracy and judgment confidence (Kassin, Castillo, & Rigby, 1991; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). In a recent review of the accountability literature, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) concluded that predecisional accountability to an unknown audience attenuates biases that specifically arise from a lack of self-critical attention to decision processes and a failure to use all relevant cues.

OVERVIEW OF STUDY 2

The analysis of the written protocols in Study 1 suggested that allegiance has the effect of producing biased and less effortfully constructed construals of undesired possible outcomes. Thus, an important goal of Study 2 was to employ predecisional accountability to an unknown au-

dience in an attempt to engender less biased construals and enhance the integrative complexity of participants' construals. Integratively complex thinking is characterized by a tendency to process information in differentiated and integrated ways (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2001). Tetlock and Kim (1987), for instance, found that predecisional accountability increased the integrative complexity of impressions participants formed of target individuals.

More generally, Study 2 was designed to test whether predecisional accountability to an unknown audience attenuates the biasing effects of allegiance on predictions of future outcomes. Participants who identified themselves as fans of Indiana University (IU) college basketball read detailed information about an upcoming game between IU and the University of Michigan (UM). Not accountable (NA) participants described what they thought might happen in the upcoming game between IU and UM. In addition to generating these descriptions, participants in the accountability conditions also anticipated having a discussion with either an IU fan (IU-accountable), a UM fan (UM-accountable), or a fan of unknown allegiance (unknown-accountable) about who would win the upcoming game. Finally, participants made judgments about what they thought would happen in the game.

It was predicted that unknown-accountable participants would be debiased and render evenhanded game predictions relative to participants in the NA, IU-accountable, and UM-accountable conditions, whose game predictions would favor IU. Given the results of Study 1, as well as prior research (e.g., Hirt et al., 1992; Wann & Dolan, 1994), it was clear to us that participants in the NA and IU-accountable conditions would demonstrate the allegiance bias and generate game predictions that favored IU. On the other hand, predictions regarding UM-accountable participants were somewhat less clear in light of previous research showing how expecting to discuss one's views with an audience whose views are known can lead people to strategically shift their attitudes toward that of the audience (e.g., Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Jones & Wortman, 1973; Tetlock et al., 1989). However, we felt that UM-accountable participants would have sufficient psychological investment in the outcome of the game to overwhelm any motivation to gain favor with one's future interaction partner. Moreover, research in the attitude inoculation (e.g., McGuire, 1964) and reactance (e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981) literatures suggests that anticipating having a discussion with an individual who will be making a persuasion attempt should motivate one to develop counterarguments, thereby bolstering one's current attitude.

STUDY 2

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

Forty-four students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Indiana University participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Experiment sign-up sheets requested that students should only participate if they were “big fans of Indiana University basketball”. Those who chose to participate were then randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions – NA, IU-accountable, UM-accountable, or unknown-accountable.

TEAM IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE MEASURES

Upon arrival at the testing site, participants completed a version of Wann and Branscombe’s (1993) “Team Identification Questionnaire”, modified to be specific to IU basketball. The questionnaire was comprised of 8 items designed to assess their level of identification with IU basketball (e.g., “How important to you is it that the IU basketball team wins?”, “How strongly do your friends see you as a fan of the IU basketball team?”, “How much do you dislike IU basketball’s greatest rivals?”). Total scores on this scale could range from 8 to 64, with higher scores indicating higher identification with IU basketball. Following completion of this measure, participants were then given a series of 10 questions and items designed to assess their general knowledge of college basketball (e.g., “How long does a college basketball game last?” or “What team won last year’s National Championship in college basketball?”). Scores on these items could range from 0 to 10.

PROCEDURE

After completing the identification and general knowledge measures, participants were told that they would be reading some information about two college basketball teams—Indiana University and the University of Michigan. Participants then received a packet containing detailed factual information about both teams. This information included won-loss records against previous opponents, statistics from the previous year, and a recap of a game that IU and UM had recently played against each other. As in Study 1, participants were given 15 min to read

the information and were told that, once they had read the information, they would be asked to recall facts about the teams without referring back to the passage.

NA Condition. After reading the packet of information for 15 min, NAs were given the following instructions:

As psychologists, we are interested in how people anticipate events that haven't yet occurred. We, of course, don't know how the February 16th game between IU and UM will actually turn out. However, based on the information you read about the two teams, we would like you to describe what you think *will* happen when these two teams actually play each other. Thus, we are asking you to anticipate the future.

In accordance with previous work on accountability (e.g., Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989), participants in this condition were assured of the confidentiality of their responses by receiving the following instructions:

You should understand that everything you write down will be *completely confidential* and not traceable to you personally. In fact, the responses you make will not even be analyzed by researchers at this university. The data will be shipped to researchers at another institution who specialize in analyzing these types of "free response" materials. Please respond with complete candor and honesty in order to ensure the success of the project. We need to know what you think when you don't have to worry about how other people will react to your views.

After writing their descriptions, participants then completed the dependent measures.

Accountability Conditions. After reading the packet of information, IU-accountable, UM-accountable, and unknown-accountable participants received the same instructions as NAs asking them to describe what would happen in the upcoming game and were then provided with the following additional instructions (cf. Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989):

To help us better understand the interpersonal communication of predictions about sporting events, there will also be a *communication phase* to this experiment. In the communication phase, you will be asked to *explain* and *justify* your opinions and predictions about the upcoming IU-UM game to one of several graduate students from the Speech Communications or Journalism departments who are participating in this joint project. You will be meeting with this person face-to-face and discussing your predictions with them after you complete these measures. We would like to *audiotape* your

discussion with this person to facilitate analysis of the communication process. We need to get your written permission, however, to authorize the use of your audiotaped conversation for further data analytic purposes. If you agree to be audiotaped, please sign your name below.

All participants consented to having their discussions taped. After signing the consent form, participants were told that in order to facilitate an interaction, "...people often find it helpful to know a little bit about the person with whom they will be interacting. Thus, at this point, we would like you to fill out a brief personal information sheet that will be delivered to your interaction partner. You will also be receiving one from your partner." Participants were then given a few minutes to complete the personal information sheet while the experimenter, ostensibly, waited to collect that information from the other person. The experimenter then returned a few minutes later and gave participants the sheets describing their interaction partner. In addition to some personal and demographic information, their partner explained that they were participating in the present experiment for the following reason:

I'm in this experiment as part of a requirement for my J525 class. The class focuses on sports writing, which is something I would like to do. I have done a little freelance writing for my local paper, but am hoping to get an internship this summer either with the [Herald Times or one of the Indianapolis papers] [Ann Arbor News or the Detroit Free Press] [a newspaper in this general area] in their sports department.

In the IU-accountable and UM-accountable conditions, the interaction partner also indicated that:

I follow college basketball mostly. I have been a big [IU Hoosier] [Michigan] fan since I was a kid. My dad is an IU [UM] alum and took us to lots of games when we were kids. [I never miss a game.] [I try to watch every game I can on cable].

In the unknown-accountable condition, the interaction partner indicated that:

I follow college basketball mostly. Since I've been here, I have mostly followed the Big 10 teams, which definitely is its own brand of basketball. I watch a lot of games on TV.

After taking a minute to examine their partner's personal information sheet, participants provided written descriptions of what they thought

would happen in the upcoming game and then completed the dependent measures.

Dependent Measures. Primary dependent measures included the estimated probability that IU would beat UM in their upcoming game, made on a scale ranging from *Michigan will definitely win* (1) to *IU will definitely win* (13), and the predicted final score of the game between IU and UM (i.e., participants had to list each team's score). Participants also responded to a 13-point scale concerning how confident they were in their predictions regarding the game's outcome. In addition, two trained coders, one blind to the experimental hypotheses and both blind to experimental condition, scored participants' written descriptions of the game outcome for integrative complexity.⁴ The coders reached a percentage agreement of 83%, and thus their ratings were averaged together for subsequent analysis.⁵

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Judgment Data. The judgments of participants in the unknown-accountable condition were expected to be less biased in favor of an Indiana victory than were the judgments of participants in any of the other conditions. Table 4 depicts participants' mean judgments for the main dependent measures. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Accountability on the probability of winning measure, $F(3, 40) = 4.67, p$

4. Integrative complexity is defined along two dimensions: conceptual differentiation and integration. *Differentiation* refers to the number of evaluatively distinct interpretations that an individual considers in analyzing an event or issue (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Thus, an undifferentiated view of a target person would focus on only one consistent theme running through the evidence, whereas a more differentiated statement would recognize alternative perspectives on the person. *Integration* refers to the development of complex connections among differentiated characteristics (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). The complexity of integration depends on whether the individual perceives the differentiated characteristics as existing in isolation (low integration), in simple interactions (moderate integration), or in multiple and contingent patterns (high integration). Integrative complexity is scored on a 1–7 scale. Scores of 1 indicate no evidence of either differentiation or integration (Baker–Brown et al., 1992), scores of 3 indicate moderate or even high differentiation but no integration, scores of 5 indicate moderate to high differentiation and moderate integration, and scores of 7 indicate high differentiation and high integration. Scores of 2, 4, and 6 represent transitional levels in conceptual structure. The coding system has demonstrated reliability and construct validity and has been successfully applied in numerous research contexts to test hypotheses concerning determinants of complexity of information processing (e.g., Schroeder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967; Streufert & Streufert, 1978).

5. According to Baker–Brown et al. (1992), prospective coders should ideally reach a percentage agreement of at least 80%.

TABLE 4. Probability of Winning, Point Difference, and Integrative Complexity by Accountability Condition

	Accountability Condition			
	NA	IU- accountable	UM- accountable	Unknown- accountable
Probability of Winning	8.00	8.57	7.73	5.05
Point Difference	+4.45	+4.00	+4.09	-2.82
Integrative Complexity	3.09	3.30	3.45	4.55

Note: Probability of winning judgments are on a scale ranging from Michigan will definitely win (1) to IU will definitely win (13). Point Difference reflects participants' predicted final score for UM subtracted from participants' predicted final score for IU.

= .007. As predicted, unknown-accountable participants thought that an Indiana victory was less probable ($M = 5.05$) than did participants in the other three conditions, $F(1, 40) = 13.32, p = .001$. Analyses on the point difference index (predicted UM score subtracted from predicted IU score) also yielded an Accountability main effect, $F(3, 40) = 3.03, p = .04$. Participants in the NA, IU-accountable, and UM-accountable conditions predicted that Indiana would beat Michigan by a larger margin than did unknown-accountable participants ($M = -2.82$), $F(1, 40) = 9.06, p = .005$. There were no significant effects on the expressed confidence measure (grand mean = 7.69), all $F_s < 1$.

Integrative Complexity. Analyses of the integrative complexity content analyses also revealed a main effect of Accountability, $F(3, 40) = 3.30, p = .03$. As predicted, unknown-accountable participants generated game descriptions that were more integratively complex ($M = 4.55$) than the descriptions generated by participants in the other three conditions, $F(1, 40) = 11.46, p = .002$. Correlations were also computed between integrative complexity and the two main dependent measures, partialling out the effects of Accountability condition, level of team identification (Wann & Branscombe, 1993), and level of knowledge on this relation.⁶ The partial correlations between complexity and probability of winning, as well as between complexity and point difference, were both significant, $r(38) = -.36, p = .02$ for the former, $r(38) = -.33, p = .04$ for the latter.

6. Correlations were also computed between level of team identification and the two main dependent measures, partialling out the effects of Accountability condition, level of knowledge, and integrative complexity on this relation. Providing further evidence for an allegiance bias, higher levels of identification with the Indiana University basketball team were associated with a higher estimated probability that IU would win, $r(38) = .43, p = .005$, and a larger predicted margin of victory for IU, $r(38) = .41, p = .008$.

Thus, there appears to be a relationship between integratively complex thinking and less biased (i.e., in Indiana's favor) outcome predictions.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The goal of Study 1 was to examine whether team allegiance attenuates the biasing effects of imagining and explaining outcomes on predictions of future outcomes. Fans of Notre Dame and Miami football, along with control participants (i.e., who were neither fans of Notre Dame nor Miami), read information about an upcoming game between the two teams and then explained either a hypothetical victory by Notre Dame, a hypothetical victory by Miami, or did not explain a victory by either team. As predicted, explaining a hypothetical victory biased the judgments of controls in the direction of the team explained – the typical explanation effect. On the other hand, the judgments of Notre Dame and Miami fans favored their team in every explanation condition, including those where they were asked to explain victories by their disfavored team. In addition, it was predicted that team allegiance would lead participants to remember a greater proportion of facts favoring their own team. Consistent with this prediction, Notre Dame and Miami fans did exhibit biased recall for facts favoring their own teams and, moreover, partial correlations indicated a positive relationship between recall bias and outcome predictions.

The finding that fans exhibited biased recall for facts favoring their own teams and that this biased recall predicted fans' judgments regarding the upcoming game supports our proposed mechanism for the allegiance bias – the rendering of biased predictions by individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome. Consistent with the motivated reasoning model proposed by Kunda and her colleagues (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Kunda et al., 1993; Sanitioso et al., 1990), it is suggested that when individuals with a strong team allegiance think about upcoming games involving their team, they engage in a biased search through memory for facts that favor the likelihood of a win by their team, and the retrieval of such facts subsequently biases their judgments in the favored direction. It should be noted that empirical support for this model has been found mostly in studies examining motivated changes in self-views (e.g., Klein & Kunda, 1993; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Sanitioso et al., 1990; see also Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995). However, McDonald and Hirt (1997) demonstrated that the use of such motivated processing in reconstructive memory of the past, in that participants biased their recall of past information to fit their desired beliefs to see another person improve or decline. The present research extends

the application of the model to the domain of social prediction, illustrating the motivated rendering of outcome predictions for future events in which one has some degree of psychological investment. In the case of the allegiance bias, this psychological investment stems from how one's self-identity is tied to team affiliation (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1976; Hirt et al., 1992; Tajfel, 1981).

Following the demonstration of the allegiance bias in Study 1, Study 2 attempted to specify a debiasing technique that might prompt individuals who favor a particular outcome to consider alternative outcomes and thereby attenuate the biasing effects of allegiance on predictions of future outcomes. According to Tetlock and his colleagues (e.g., Lerner et al., 1998; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989), predecisional accountability to an unknown audience leads people to engage in preemptive self-criticism whereby they consider multiple perspectives on an issue and try to anticipate the objections that reasonable individuals might raise to the positions they take. In Study 2, Indiana University basketball fans described what they thought might happen in an upcoming game between IU and the University of Michigan, and some of these fans also anticipated having a discussion with either an IU fan, a UM fan, or a fan of unknown allegiance about who would win the upcoming game. As predicted, unknown-allegiance participants were less biased in their predictions of an IU victory than were those who expected to interact with an IU or UM fan, as well as those who did not expect to have an interaction at all. In addition, unknown-accountable participants exhibited more integratively complex thinking than participants in any other condition and, moreover, higher integrative complexity scores predicted judgments that were less biased in favor of an IU victory.

When people imagine or generate explanations for how a specified hypothetical outcome might be true, they show increased subjective likelihood estimates for the specified outcome relative to people who are not asked to imagine or explain that outcome – this robust finding has been termed the explanation bias. The present research, however, imposes a powerful limiting condition on the imagination/explanation effect: If a person does not *want* a specified hypothetical outcome to be true, then that person will *not* necessarily show increased subjective likelihood estimates for the specified outcome. Thus, if a Notre Dame fan is asked to imagine and explain a Miami victory in their upcoming football game, the mere act of imagining/explaining will not necessarily shake the Notre Dame fan's self-serving faith and, perhaps, biased predictions regarding a Notre Dame victory. Rather, the Notre Dame fan will apparently construct weaker explanations, characterized by hedging, qualifiers, and fewer overall arguments. Moreover, the Notre Dame fan

may spontaneously counterargue the explanation, replacing it instead with an explanation more in line with the desired outcome.

Indeed, this demonstration of spontaneous counterexplanation was particularly striking in the case of Notre Dame fans in Study 1, given the fact that Miami had statistical superiority going into the game. After explaining a Miami victory, Notre Dame fans often began their counterexplanations with statements asserting the fact that statistics are often misleading and refuting the validity of the statistical information for predicting the outcome of the event. Here is an illustrative counterexplanation by one Notre Dame fan:

I do not base my predictions on statistics. Statistically, Miami should win the game. I don't believe so. Notre Dame has Lou Holtz, a major factor. Holtz is a football genius. Notre Dame has also come through in the big games. They beat Michigan and USC. Miami has only had one challenge and they came up short against Florida State. Notre Dame always seems to come out on top with very solid play. Notre Dame will win, 24–17.

Importantly, then, although the earlier explanation task may have enhanced the accessibility in memory of information consistent with the event explained, individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome appear to also engage (simultaneously or subsequently) in the generation of counterarguments of this accessible information along with a motivated search through memory for information that favor the desired outcome. Much like the participants given an initial impression set in Sherman et al. (1983) and Hirt and Sherman (1985), these participants relied not on the information made accessible by the explanation task, but on the results of their own motivated search, as a basis for subsequent likelihood judgments.⁷

As Study 2 demonstrates, however, the allegiance bias is not inevitable. Instead, it appears that expecting to have to discuss one's predictions with an individual of unknown allegiance precipitates the consideration of alternatives and engenders more integratively complex thinking. Future research should be directed toward examining other factors – both motivational *and* cognitive – that might moderate or attenuate the allegiance bias. The perceived plausibility of the desired outcome (cf. Hirt & Markman, 1995) is one possibility, as are individual differences in optimism (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1985) and collective

7. We stress the term *moderating* role here because we certainly acknowledge that factors other than our proposed biased retrieval mechanism (e.g., optimism, wishful thinking, etc.) may also partially account for the allegiance effects we observed.

self-esteem (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). In general, then, we believe that the present studies provide a further illustration of the often complex interactions between cognition and motivation. We look forward to studies that further elucidate these processes.

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