

# SEMÁNTICA Y PRAGMÁTICA DEL INGLÉS

## ENGLISH SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS

Optional subject in the Degree in English Studies



### Basic theoretical contents Exercises

Marta Carretero  
mcarrete@ucm.es  
Departamento de Filología Inglesa I  
Facultad de Filología  
Universidad Complutense de Madrid  
2014

# INDEX

	Page
Preliminary notes and acknowledgements .....	4
Abbreviations and signs .....	6
1. INTRODUCTION .....	7
1.1. The concepts semantics and pragmatics .....	7
1.2. The relation between semantics and pragmatics .....	9
1.3. Lexical, phrasal and clausal semantics .....	10
1.4. Examples of pragmatic approaches to linguistic phenomena .....	11
Further reading .....	12
2. REFERENCE AND SENSE .....	13
2.1. The concepts of reference and referring expressions .....	13
2.2. Indefinite, indefinite and generic reference .....	13
2.3. The concept of sense. Difference between sense and reference .....	18
2.4. Semantic ambiguity of sentences and disambiguation by the context .....	19
2.5. Constant reference and variable reference .....	19
2.6. Reference in discourse .....	21
2.7. Reference, truth and existence .....	23
2.8. Reference in opaque contexts .....	24
Final exercises .....	27
Further reading .....	28
3. DEIXIS .....	29
3.1. The concept of deixis .....	29
3.2. The deictic centre .....	29
3.3. Person deixis .....	30
3.4. Temporal deixis .....	31
3.5. Spatial deixis .....	33
3.6. Discourse deixis .....	34
3.7. Social deixis .....	35
3.8. Deixis and reference .....	36
3.9. Deictic and non-deictic uses of deictic expressions .....	37
Final exercises .....	39
Further reading .....	40
4. PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT .....	41
4.1. The concept of presupposition .....	41
4.2. Characteristics of presuppositions .....	41
4.2.1. <i>Constancy under negation and questioning</i> .....	41
4.2.2. <i>Constancy in modal and conditional contexts</i> .....	42
4.2.3. <i>Defeasibility (cancellability)</i> .....	42

4.2.4. <i>Non-detachability</i> .....	43
4.3. Presupposition-triggers.....	44
4.4. The status of presuppositions in discourse.....	47
4.5. Presuppositions about speech situations .....	50
4.6. Entailment: foregrounded and backgrounded entailments .....	51
Final exercises .....	52
Further reading .....	55
5. POLITENESS .....	56
5.1. Basic concepts: politeness, politeness strategies, face, and face-threatening acts .....	56
5.2. Superstrategies for performing face-threatening acts.....	59
5.2.1. <i>Bald on record strategies</i> .....	59
5.2.2. <i>Redressive on-record strategies</i> .....	59
5.2.3. <i>Off-record strategies</i> .....	59
5.2.4. <i>No performance of the FTA</i> .....	60
5.3. Positive politeness strategies .....	60
5.4. Negative politeness strategies.....	61
5.5. The linguistic expressions of politeness strategies.....	66
Final exercises .....	67
Further reading .....	74
6. COGNITIVE SEMANTICS.....	75
6.1. A brief characterization of cognitive linguistics .....	75
6.2. Cognitive linguistics and linguistic categorization .....	75
6.2.1. <i>Classical categorization</i> .....	75
6.2.2. <i>The categorization of colour and shape</i> .....	76
6.2.3. <i>Prototypes: concept and characteristics</i> .....	78
6.2.4. <i>Folk and expert categories</i> .....	85
6.2.5. <i>Superordinate, basic level and subordinate categories</i> .....	87
6.3. Polysemy and meaning chains.....	91
6.3.1. <i>Polysemy and homonymy</i> .....	91
6.3.2. <i>Monocentric and polycentric categories</i> .....	91
6.2.3. <i>Polysemy and prepositions: the case of over</i> .....	93
6.4. Category extensions: metonymy and metaphor .....	93
6.4.1. <i>The concepts of metonymy and metaphor</i> .....	93
6.4.2. <i>Metonymy: types and examples</i> .....	95
6.4.3. <i>Metaphor: types and examples</i> .....	96
Final exercises .....	101
Further reading .....	105
FINAL EXERCISES – WORK ON TEXTS .....	106
ORIENTATIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAM .....	109
KEY TO THE EXERCISES .....	111
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	144

## PRELIMINARY NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This manual covers the basic contents of *Semántica y pragmática del inglés* ('English semantics and pragmatics'), an optional subject in the Degree in English Studies at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. This course will enable students to familiarize themselves with a number of phenomena of semantics and pragmatics applied to English, and to analyze these phenomena in authentic linguistic expressions and connected spoken and written language, independently of context or in different communicative situations.

The contents of the manual comprise the semantic and pragmatic phenomena under study. The approach presented here is based on critical readings of key references as well as observations and reflections that stem from my lecturing experience. In the areas of most disagreement in the literature, I have included a brief discussion of different positions and a reasoned proposal of a concrete position to be adopted. These issues, as well as a number of issues that easily lead to confusion and a number of observations have been signalled with thick discontinuous lines and the heading 'Note(s)', with the aim that students pay extra attention to them. Students are encouraged to think critically on these and other topics, and to present their own viewpoints in classroom sessions or course papers.

The contents are presented in units, in the order in which they figure out in the programme. The topics are presented in an accesible way, and are geared at avoiding or diminishing frequent students' errors that have come across during my lecturing experience. All the units include practical exercises, many of which are based on authentic texts. The key to the answers is provided at the end of the book. The answers should not always be considered as an end in themselves, but might well give way to discussions.

This manual is to be complemented by discussions in class about concrete points of the contents, as well as further references, some obligatory and others optional (not part of the course; only for those students who are

interested in knowing more about concrete areas), which are indicated at the end of each unit.

My thanks are due to all those persons who have helped me in different ways to write this manual. The list of persons who have contributed to shape my present knowledge and thoughts about the contents are endless. For reasons of space, and with the risk of being quite far from completely fair, I am obliged to mention only a few.

On the academic side, my thanks go to:

- Angela Downing, to whom I owe most gratitude for her mentoring and counseling for many years and, most importantly, for the influence she will always have on my views of linguistics;
- Julia Lavid and Juana I. Marín-Arrese, professors of my Department, to whose work I invariably resort as food for thought;
- Many colleagues, most remarkably Jorge Arús-Hita and Carmen Maíz-Arévalo, with whom I have had fruitful discussions on a substantial part of the contents of this subject;
- My husband, José Luis Sancho Bermejo, an expert in classical Latin and Greek, always available whenever I ask him about problematic issues;
- Last but not least, my students over all my years of lecturing, who, with their suggestions and comments, and also with their errors, have contributed to the improvement of both my vision of the topics concerned and the pedagogical adequacy of the materials.

Needless to say, the remaining shortcomings and inconsistencies of the manual are my only responsibility.

On the affective side, my thanks go again to José Luis, and also to my son, Miguel, and my parents, Julio and Esther, for providing me with a good family environment, and also for putting up with my absent-mindedness, due to untimely intrusions of problems of linguistics into my mind.

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGNS**

NG – Nominal Group

s/w – speaker / writer

VG – Verbal Group

### **SIGNS**

\* - a syntactically incorrect sentence

! – a pragmatically anomalous sentence

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. The concepts of semantics and pragmatics

-Semantics and pragmatics study how languages organize and express meanings. Semantics concerns the meaning of linguistic expressions independently of the context in which they occur. Pragmatics is meaning in use / context.

-The difference between semantics and pragmatics is clearly expressed in Rühlemann (2010: 288):

“The question underlying semantics is: ‘What does X mean?’ The question underlying pragmatics is, ‘What does a speaker mean by X?’ Hence, pragmatics deals with speaker meaning rather than sentence meaning.”

-Compare:

*What does serendipity mean?* (asking about the semantic sense)

*What do you mean by saying he’s too sociable?* (asking about the pragmatic meaning).

-The difference between semantics and pragmatics can be illustrated by the following example:

*The boss is coming now.*

Semantic (context-independent) meanings: Definite article + superior at work + move towards the speaker + present progressive + time of speaking

Pragmatic (context-dependent) meanings: This sentence may function as a warning (‘you’d better resume work’), a promise (‘as I told you, you can ask her about a salary increase’), etc., depending on the context.

-The difference between semantics and pragmatics is reflected in the difference between **sentences** and **utterances**: the sentence is a syntactic and semantic linguistic unit, and the utterance is a pragmatic unit used in a concrete situation. Utterances are realizations of sentences.

-For example, if I say 'The cat is on the mat' on three different occasions and later write it, the sentence is the same in the four cases, but these are four different utterances of the same sentence.

.....  
WARM-UP QUESTION

What do you think is 'the context'?

.....

-Many approaches to **context** have been proposed (Cutting 2002, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Levinson 2000, Hurford et al. 2007, among many others). In this approach, context includes the following four dimensions:

- The linguistic context: the linguistic material preceding and following a word or utterance;
- The situational context: the situation in which an utterance takes place (time, place, participants in the conversation);
- The background knowledge context: the set of background assumptions (i.e. knowledge of the world) necessary for an utterance to be intelligible (or to understand it well). These assumptions change in different situations: it is not the same to talk to a friend or to a stranger;
- The context of culture. It is not the same to talk to a person from your country or to a foreign person who knows little about your country.

-The context is not static, but dynamic: it constantly changes as discourse goes on. The linguistic material increases continuously, and so does the set of background assumptions. The situation may change (for example, a participant leaves or a new participant comes in), time moves slowly, and place may change too (during a trip). The context of culture usually moves more slowly, with some exceptions, as when someone from a different country speaks about habits of their country so as to give the addressee a rough idea about how life in that country is.

-Sentences such as the following need the context in order to be interpreted:

*Go ahead.*

*For sale. / To let.*



*Mind the gap.*

*Keep away from children.*

*50 euros please.*

## 1.2. The relation between semantics and pragmatics

-The relationship between semantics and pragmatics is viewed in different ways, depending on the approaches to linguistics:

-According to many functional approaches to linguistics, there is a continuum between semantics and pragmatics. That is to say, there are degrees between complete context-independence and complete context-dependence. This is the view that I endorse.

-The evolution of the meanings of words and expressions provide evidence in favour of this position. Meanings which, at a given stage, were pragmatic (context-dependent), became conventionalized and context-independent. For example, *goodbye* was not originally an expression of farewell, but meant 'God be with you'; the expression of farewell only occurred in some context, thus being pragmatic. Later, it was sometimes used as an expression of farewell; and now this meaning has become context-independent (thus belonging to semantics).

-Other approaches (for example, Relevance Theory) consider that semantics and pragmatics are separate. Most work on Relevance Theory considers that whenever there is context dependence, the phenomenon in question is pragmatic. These views often have a modular view of the mind, according to which the decoding of semantic meanings and the interpretation of pragmatic meanings are carried out in different parts of the brain.

-For example, let us consider the modal auxiliary *must*:

-Its main meanings are 'obligation-necessity' and 'supposition', as in:

*I **must** go to the dentist now.* (obligation)

*Someone **must** be in the room, because the light is on.* (supposition)

-Most approaches to modality treat these two uses as different meanings of *must*. Each of them occurs in a large number of contexts, and zeugma (ellipsis in two neighbouring class) provokes an effect of oddness:

*!John must come here at once and have green eyes.*

-However, let us consider the use *I must have made a mistake* when the speaker knows that s/he has made a mistake. This use could be included in 'supposition'; however, the real motivation for its use is not lack of total certainty, but a wish to save face, since the information communicated is unfavourable to the speaker. This face-saving use of *must* depends highly on the context, so that it could be considered to be a pragmatic use of *must*.

-An intermediate case, lying in between semantics and pragmatics, might be the frequent use of *must* for mock-suppositions about the addressee, such as

*You must be joking / crazy...*

-However, for most scholars following a Relevance Theory approach to pragmatics, all the issues of *must* explained here, including the distinction between obligation or supposition, belong to pragmatics, since the interpretation of one or the other depends on the context.

### 1.3. Lexical, phrasal and clausal semantics

-Lexical semantics concerns the meanings of morphemes, words and lexical expressions consisting of more than one word, such as idioms.

Examples of phenomena studied in lexical semantics:

-Semantic fields (furniture, colours, etc.);

-Lexical relations: synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, meronymy.

-Phrasal and clausal semantics concern the meanings of linguistic units consisting of more than one word and expression, linked among themselves by syntactic relationships.

-Phrasal semantics concerns the semantics of the phrase, and clausal semantics, the semantics of the clause. For example, phrasal semantics explains why pairs such as the following do not have the same meaning, even if they consist of the same words:

*the books under the box*

*the box under the books*

-Clausal semantics explains, for example, why the meanings of the following pairs of clauses are not identical, even if they consist of the same words:

*The dog hit the cat / The cat hit the dog.*

*Peter gave John the book / John gave Peter the book.*

---

#### EXERCISE 1-1

Discuss the meaning differences between the following stretches of language. Are they a question of phrasal semantics, clausal semantics or both?

*the rapid industrialization of Russia in the twentieth century*

*Russia rapidly became industrialized in the twentieth century.*

---

### 1.4. Examples of pragmatic approaches to linguistic phenomena

-Syntactic, semantic and pragmatic anomalies are different. Some examples of each kind of ambiguity are the following:

-*\*I are fond in animals.* - syntactic anomaly

(break of morphosyntactic rules)

-*My cat is studying Linguistics* - semantic anomaly

(break of selection restrictions, because of the clash between the 'non-human' semantic feature of *my cat* and the 'human' feature that the verb STUDY requires for its Subject')

-*Spain is larger than China* - pragmatic anomaly

(no break of morphosyntactic or semantic rules, but clash with world knowledge).

-Some examples of the influence of pragmatics on grammar are the following:

A) The use of *who* or of *which* to refer to animals, depending on the affection felt towards them.

B) The use of *and* in logic and in everyday language. In logic, *and* always expresses addition. In everyday language, however, chronology and causality do make a difference.

---

.....  
EXERCISE 1-2

State whether, in everyday language, the order of the two clauses joined by *and* does or does not really matter:

- A. *I've just borrowed a book from the library and bought a pair of shoes.*  
*I've just bought a pair of shoes and borrowed a book from the library.*
- B. *My friend Sally got married and got pregnant.*  
*My friend Sally got pregnant and got married.*
- C. *Jim lost his job and started to drink.*  
*Jim started to drink and lost his job.*
- .....

FURTHER READING

Obligatory reading

Hurford, Heasley and Smith (2007), Part one, Unit 1 'About semantics', pp. 1-15.

Optional reading

Cutting (2002), A1 'Context', pp. 1-8.

## UNIT 2. REFERENCE AND SENSE

### 2.1. The concepts of reference and referring expressions

-Reference is the concept that mediates between a word or expression and an entity that the word or expression stands for in a concrete utterance.

-Examples of expressions that refer to objects in the classroom: *the door, the ceiling, the window, the blackboard, my bag*, names of students...

If we were in another classroom, the objects signalled by these referring expressions would be different.

-Referring expressions are those that, in a given context, enable a listener or reader to identify someone or something. The same expression may be referring or non-referring:

*We need **another typist** for our Seville office* (non-referring)

*We have hired **another typist** for our Seville office.* (referring)

-Some expressions can be used as referring expressions. Others cannot, such as:

- Verbs and verb phrases;
- Prepositions;
- Conjunctions;
- Adverbs of manner, etc.

### 2.2. Indefinite, definite and generic reference

-Indefinite reference indicates that the speaker/writer (s/w) refers to an entity, but the addressee cannot identify this entity. For example, if the s/w says

*Yesterday I bought **a green dress**.*

s/he is referring to a concrete green dress, indicating that the addressee cannot identify it among the objects s/he knows.

-The following devices express indefinite reference in Nominal Groups:

- The indefinite article, with countable nouns: *I saw **a squirrel** in the park.*

-The 'zero article', with uncountable and plural countable nouns:

*John is drinking **whisky**.*

*I have **cousins** in Mexico.*

-Quantifiers: *some*, *a lot of* with countable and uncountable nouns; *many* with countable nouns, *much* with uncountable nouns:

*John is eating **some rice / sandwiches**.*

*John has bought **a lot of sugar / apples**.*

*John has got **many fans** in Singapore.*

*Helen doesn't have **much money**.*

-Indefinite reference may be specific, when it refers to a given entity or entities, or non-specific, when it occurs within the scope of an expression of frequency and refers to different entities for each individual situation:

*Peter married **a Spanish woman**. (specific)*

*Yesterday we visited **some friends**. (specific)*

*Every week, my neighbour gives me **a chocolate cake**. (non-specific)*

*I'd like to have **some scones**. (non-specific)*

-In certain cases, it is not known whether indefinite reference is specific or non-specific. This is a case of indeterminacy.

*Every morning, **a sparrow** sings by my window.*

.....  
NOTE

-**Indeterminacy** occurs when the sense of an expression does not make a distinction between two or more subsenses. Indeterminacy may provoke the addressee's perception that the speaker's utterance is not sufficiently precise: an addressee hearing *Every morning, **a sparrow** sings by my window* may demand for more precision (*is it always the same sparrow?*) but need not do so, if s/he is satisfied simply by understanding that the speaker hears the singing of a sparrow every morning, no matter whether this sparrow is or is not the same every day.

-Another example of indeterminacy is *baby* in *Sally has just had a baby*, in the sense that the baby may be a boy or a girl. Again, the use of *baby* may or may not be satisfactory, depending on the communicative context.

**-Ambiguity** differs from indeterminacy in that it needs a choice between two (or more) possibilities if communication is to be satisfactory. Examples of ambiguity are the following (from Gillon 2004, 159-163):

*Jim saw a man with a telescope.*

*The mother of the girl and the boy left.*

*They found hospitals.*

Ambiguity and indeterminacy are also different from **vagueness**, which occurs with gradable words that render a subjective truth value to the sentence. Suppose that there is a man with not much hair, and someone says:

*This man is bald.*

Not everyone would agree that the man's amount of hair is small enough to consider him as bald.

For a more technical account of the difference between ambiguity, indeterminacy and vagueness, see Gillon (2004: 157-187).

.....

-Indefinite Nominal Groups are predicative, and hence non-referring, when they are used in order to predicate a property of an entity, and not to refer to it. Predicative constructions may occur in copular constructions and in appositions:

*My downstairs neighbour is **a professional writer**.*

*My downstairs neighbour, **a professional writer**, stays at home a good deal.*

**-Definite reference** combines reference with definiteness. That is, by the use of definite referring expressions, the s/w indicates that the addressee can not only understand that the expression stands for a concrete entity, but also identify this concrete entity.

-The entity need not be known by the addressee.

-It may be previously introduced by an indefinite referring expression:

*Yesterday I met **a very interesting boy** (indefinite). **He** (definite) was tall and dark.*

-It need not be previously introduced:

*Yesterday I went to the library with **my aunt**.*

(the addressee, due to his/ her knowledge of the world, infers that the speaker has an aunt; there is no need of previous introduction by an utterance such as 'I have an aunt').

.....  
NOTE

The use of definite reference to mention unexpected entities for the first time is pragmatically inadequate; it may even create humouristic effects. If a stranger that you have just met accidentally tells you

*I'd better go home because I must feed **my cat**.*

you would not be surprised. But imagine your reaction if a stranger tells you

*I'd better go home because I must feed **my snake**.*

.....

-The following devices express definite reference in Nominal Groups:

-the definite article *the*: *Look at **the window!***

-demonstrative and possessive determiners; -s' genitive:

***That girl** can run very fast.*

***John's girlfriend** is twenty-seven.*

-personal pronouns;

-proper names.

-Definite reference may also be expressed with nominal relative clauses:

*Don't worry; I know **what you want**.*

-Plural definite reference may be:

-Distributive: ***These two candidates** have a PhD. (each of them)*

-Collective: ***My three brothers** own a bookshop. (one bookshop for them all)*

-Definite reference may be specific (when it refers to a specific entity or entities) or non-specific. The following are cases of non-specific reference:

*Every day I listen to **the weather forecast**.*

***Smith's murderer** is insane. (in the interpretation: 'whoever killed Smith').*



*Whenever John has problems, he goes to **the doctor**.* (it need not be always the same doctor)

-A non-referring expression can be the antecedent of a definite NG; this NG indicates that the entity has been conceptualized as if it existed (hypothetical entity); therefore, it is considered as a non-specific generic expression:

*We need to hire **a secretary** (non-referring) for our Seville office. **She** (referring) would be in charge of foreign customers.*

-Equatives are sentences consisting of two definite referring expressions equated by a copula. Equatives assert that the two referents refer to the same entity:

***My boss is that tall man over there.***

***Dr Jekyll is Mr Hyde.***

-One of the referents may be a Nominal Group in which the head is modified by a superlative Adjectival Group:

***Jane Wexford is the best student in this class.***

-The corresponding negative clauses also have two referring expressions, but they are not equatives:

***My boss is not that tall man over there.***

-Appositions that include two definite NGs function like equatives. The two referring expressions are separated only by a pause in spoken language and a comma in written language:

***My boss, that man over there, wants me to work until 7 pm today.***

-Equative sentences are reversible: if the order of the two referring expressions is changed, the sentence would still be grammatical:

***That tall man over there is my boss.***

***Mr Hyde is Dr Jekyll.***

.....  
NOTE

However, the positions of the two referents are not always pragmatically interchangeable. The expression that transmits the new information for the addressee should occur in second position. If I am with a friend walking by the street and the person in question emerges within sight, it is better to say

***That tall man over there is my boss.***

However, if your friend visits you at the office and asks you who your boss and your subordinates are, you would rather say

***My boss is that tall man over there.***

This difference is related to the distribution of Given and New information, which is dealt extensively in the obligatory 4<sup>th</sup> year subject “Pragmatics and discourse in English”.

.....

**-Generic reference** is reference to classes of entities.

-Generic reference may be realized in three ways:

-With indefinite NGs: ***A lion is a friendly beast.***

-With definite singular NGs: ***The lion is a friendly beast.***

-With definite plural NGs: ***Lions are friendly beasts.***

-These realizations are not always intersubstitutable. For example, indefinite Nominal Groups cannot be used in cases in which they would trigger a non-generic interpretation. Compare:

***A lion is no longer to be seen roaming the hills of Scotland.*** (non-generic)

***The lion is no longer to be seen roaming the hills of Scotland.*** (generic)

### **2.3. The concept of sense. Difference between sense and reference**

-The sense of an expression may be equated with its meaning. Senses form systems of semantic relationships with other expressions in language (synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, meronymy etc).

These relationships are treated at length in the obligatory 4<sup>th</sup> year subject “English semantics”.

-Sense is an abstraction, while reference involves entities. Sense is largely a context-independent entity, thus belonging to semantics.

-Sense is a property of **all** linguistic expressions, in contrast to reference.

-For example, *and, however, is swimming, under, yes, oh* are expressions that have sense but are not referring expressions.

-Example of a pun with an invented sense of a word, from a speech by Glenda Jackson, MP (Thomas 1995:15):

*They call it a “classless society”. And it is classless. There are no classes for the children turned away for the lack of a qualified teacher.*

-Certain expressions may stand for the same referent and have different senses: *Napoleon Bonaparte, the victor of Jena, the loser of Waterloo.*

-Vagueness plays a role in this versatility of referring expressions: the same entity might be referred to as *the hill* or *the mountain*.

-Sense may give way to ambiguity and indeterminacy. In everyday language, ambiguity created by senses tends to be solved by the context:

*They passed the **port** at midnight.* (ambiguity)

*Mary had a **child** last week.* (indeterminacy: boy or girl)

.....  
EXERCISE 2-1

Choose real or fictional persons, and refer to them by as many referring expressions with different senses as you can think.

.....

## 2.4. Semantic ambiguity of sentences and its disambiguation by the context

-Semantic ambiguity of sentences may be caused by

1) Lexical ambiguity, caused by polysemous words, homonyms, homophones or homographs.

*They passed the **port** at midnight.* (the sea port / the port wine)

2) Syntactic ambiguity: *Visiting relatives can be boring.*

-Ambiguous sentences can be easily constructed; however, ambiguous utterances are rare: they are most often disambiguated by the context.

## 2.5. Constant reference and variable reference

- Expressions which normally refer to the same entity have constant reference.

Examples: *the sun, the moon, Spain, Mars...*

-Exceptions can be found with expressions normally associated with constant reference:

***The moon*** looks real in this painting. (representation)

In my life, you're ***the sun!!!*** (metaphor)

The students will have the opportunity to see ***a different Spain***.

(metonymy: a different part / side of Spain)

-Expressions that refer to different entities, depending on the context, have **variable reference**. Most referring expressions are in this category: *the house, my friend, that book over there...*

-Many expressions have high referential versatility, i.e. capacity to refer to very different entities, depending on the context. The relation between the referent and the sense of the referring expression may be loose. For example, one waiter to another may say:

***The apple pie*** left without paying.

(In Spanish, this kind of versatility seems less frequent, because there is the construction 'El del pastel de manzana se marchó sin pagar', which has just one syllable more than the literal translation of the English original.)

-Referring expressions in reported discourse may be transferred *de dicto* or *de re*. Reports *de dicto* are faithful to both the referring expression and the referent; reports *de re* use a different referring expression to refer to the same entity as the original speech; that is, they are faithful to the referent, but not to the expression.

-Example:

-A customer says: *I'd like to see Mr Jones.*

-The employee may report this information using a referring expression:

-*de dicto*: *She says she would like to see **Mr Jones**.*

-*de re*: *She would like to see **that idiot**.*

.....

.....  
 EXERCISE 2-2

Do you think that the expression *the sea* has constant reference, variable reference, or the kind of reference depends on the context in which it is used?

.....  
 EXERCISE 2-3

(based on a real case)

I was a teenager on an English summer course, and I was living in a residence in Ireland. A visit to a museum was scheduled. The head of the residence ordered me to tell younger students to behave at that visit because we had been assigned to a guide that tended to get nervous if people spoke at the same time as him. I gave them this information, trying to communicate exactly what the head had told me. Two hours later, I was told off because a rumour was circulating that we would be having a crazy guide.

-Was my report to the young students likely to be *de dicto* or *de re*?

-When the students transmitted this information among themselves, were all the reports *de dicto*?

.....

## 2.6. Reference in discourse

-In authentic discourse, the use of a referring expression is successful when it enables the addressee to identify the referent. The distinction between successful and unsuccessful reference applies only to definite reference, since indefinite reference does not involve identification of the referent.

-Unsuccessful reference would very probably occur if I tell a three-year-old child

*Give me **the English monolingual dictionary**.*

instead of telling him, for instance,

*Give me **that big blue book**.*

-Reference is divided into the following types, according to the means used for achieving successfulness:

1. Endophoric reference: the referent is meant to be identified through the linguistic context. It is divided into two subtypes:

a) Anaphoric reference, when the referent is identified by means of the previous linguistic context. Anaphoric reference is subdivided into two types:

- Direct anaphoric, i.e. reference to the same entity:

*I just rented a house. **It** is really big.*

- Indirect anaphoric, which is divided into subtypes

- Reference to part of the entity:

*I just rented a house. **The kitchen** is really big.*

- Reference to the class to which the entity belongs:

*We had Chardonnay for dinner. **The wine** was the best part.*

- Reference to an entity connected with the first in other ways:

*The bus came on time, but **he** did not stop.*

- Indirect anaphoric reference may be indefinite:

*The whole class went to the lecture. **Some students** really enjoyed it.*

- Anaphoric reference may be realized by ellipsis or substitution:

-Ellipsis: *Kim cooked an apple pie and  $\emptyset$  ate it.* (direct)

-Substitution: *Do you prefer the red dress or **the green one**?* (indirect)

A detailed study of ellipsis and substitution is carried out in the 4<sup>th</sup> year obligatory subject 'Pragmatics and discourse in English'.

- In certain contexts (as with the so-called 'pronouns of laziness'), personal pronouns are used to express indirect anaphoric reference:

*The man who gave **his paycheck** to his wife was wiser than the man who gave **it** to his mistress. ('it' refers to the paycheck of the second man)*

- b) Cataphoric reference, i.e. reference to an entity that is introduced later in the linguistic context, with an expression that specifies more clearly what or who the referent is.

-**She** is a very special woman, Mrs Johnson.

-Let me tell you **this**: you shouldn't think about John any longer.

- Cataphoric reference is commonly used by TV presenters for introducing singers or other artists before they appear on the scene.

2. Exophoric reference: the referent is meant to be identified through means other than the linguistic context. It is also divided into two subtypes:

a) Identification by premodification or postmodification of the head noun. For example, in a context where there is only coat around, it would be sufficient to say:

*Please give me **the coat**.*

However, if there are plenty of coats around, the sense of the referring expression has to be richer. A speaker may need to say:

*Please give me **the green coat hanged beside the red bag**.*

b) Identification by knowledge of the world:

-The immediate situational context:

*Close **the door!*** (the only open door within the addressee's sight)

-Shared world knowledge. Suppose my husband tells me:

***My cousin** has phoned this morning.*

(I know that my husband has a favourite cousin, Vega, and whenever he says "my cousin" without further details, it is to Vega that he refers.)

## 2.7. Reference, truth and existence

-A referring expression may be successful even if it is not true about the referent. Examples:

*-Ask **the Chinese man** if he has enjoyed the conference.*

(said in a situation where the man is from Thailand, but the reference is nevertheless successful if the addressee understands who the speaker means, because there is only one man with Oriental features in the group)

*-I like **your blouse!***

(if the blouse has been borrowed by the addressee from some friend, the utterance is true only if *your* is interpreted in the sense of 'the blouse you are wearing', but not in the sense of 'the blouse you own').

-Referents need not exist; they are then conceptualized as if they existed (see 2.2.):

-They may be imaginary entities (reference to unicorns, mermaids, etc.).

-They may be hypothetical entities:

*Imagine you had **a sister**. **She** would have to share your room.*

## 2.8. The behaviour of referring expressions in opaque contexts

-This section will start with a recount of Oedipus' story. Just after he killed a man he met at the crossroads, we can say about him:

*Oedipus knew that he had killed **the man that he had met at the crossroads**.*

But not:

*Oedipus knew that he had killed **his father**.*

Because at that time he did not know the equation between the two referents:

***The man that he had met at the crossroads** was **his father**.*

-Opaque contexts are those created by parts of sentences where the replacement of a referring expression with another with the same referent results in different truth conditions. In the example above, *Oedipus knew* creates an opaque context.

-Another example is the following:

*Nancy **wants** to get married when **the Morning Star** is in the sky.*

*Nancy **wants** to get married when **the Evening Star** is in the sky.*

-Expressions that create opaque contexts are mainly expressions of knowledge (*KNOW, REALIZE, BE AWARE...*); belief (*THINK, BELIEVE, BE POSSIBLE...*); saying or reporting (*SAY, STATE, DENY...*), and wish (*WANT, WISH...*).

## ..... ORIENTATION TO PRACTICAL EXERCISES

-In exercises about detecting referring expressions in authentic texts, the following classification will be used: a) Indefinite non-anaphoric; b) Direct anaphoric; c) Indirect anaphoric; d) Definite, identifiable by pre- and/or postmodification; e) Definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world; f) Generic.

-In order to detect referring expressions in discourse, notice that a referring expression can occur within the scope of another.

*I like [**the girl [we met] at [the supermarket]**].*

.....



(That is to say, the referring expression ‘the girl we met at the supermarket’ contains in its turn the referring expressions ‘we’ and ‘the supermarket’.)

-If two labels can apply, the hierarchical order is the following:

direct anaphoric > indirect anaphoric

For example, if, in a text about a house, the expression *the living room* appears several times, it is indirect anaphoric the first time, and direct anaphoric the rest of the times.

reference identifiable by pre- and/or postmodification > reference identifiable by knowledge of the world

For example, *the eight Finnish universities that educate teachers* should be classified as identifiable by pre- and/or postmodification, although knowledge of the world (for example, knowledge of what ‘Finnish’ means) is also necessary to identify the referent.

.....

Here is an example of a text in which referring expressions have been signalled and analyzed:

1[George]<sub>b/e</sub> decided that [cows]<sub>f</sub> were pretty boring because [they]<sub>b</sub>

2mostly talked about [what [they]<sub>b</sub> were eating]<sub>c</sub>. [They]<sub>b</sub> talked about

3[how [hay]<sub>f</sub> tasted different when [it]<sub>b</sub> was growing in [the fields]<sub>e</sub>]<sub>c</sub>.

4[They]<sub>b</sub> sure were boring. In [the afternoon]<sub>e</sub> [George]<sub>b</sub> was already

5talking to [the cows]<sub>e</sub> and [they]<sub>b</sub> were amazed that [a frog]<sub>a</sub> was talking

6to [them]<sub>b</sub>.

Adapted from R. Dennis Middlemist, *George Washington’s smallest army* (2009)

Notes to the analysis:

- 1) “George” (line 1) should be classified as b) if he was mentioned previously, and otherwise as e), in the sense that we can make ourselves to the idea about who he is by resorting to our knowledge of the world.
- 2) The subordinate clauses beginning with ‘what’ in line 2 and with ‘how’ in line 3 are referring expressions, since they are nominal clauses that can be replaced by pronouns. They concern abstract entities (situations) related to the entities mentioned before, and have consequently been classified as c).
- 3) “Cows” in line 1 has generic reference, but “the cows” in line 5 does not: this expression refers to the specific cows to which George had access.

NOTE. FURTHER ADVICE ABOUT PRACTICE WITH REFERRING EXPRESSIONS

These indications are based on frequent errors in the signalling of referring expressions, and are meant to avoid such errors as far as possible.

-The scope of a referring expression should be a whole NG (or nominal expression):

*I met **a man with a beard**.*

***My cousin David** works as a vet.*

-Possessive determiners are not referring expressions inside the NG in which they occur, since they indicate that their referent has appeared previously. Other expressions in the’s genitive are referring expressions, since they signal entities that are introduced (or reintroduced) in the text:

*her hands* – 1 referring expression

*[the old man]’s hands* – 2 referring expressions, one embedded in the other

-The following are cases of non-referring NGs (the entity does not exist and is not conceptualized as existing):

*She is like **a rose**.*

*This machine has the power of **forty buses**.*

-NGs with negative determiners are referring expressions when they are definite, but not when they are indefinite:

**Neither of them** came. (referring: it refers to ‘them’)

She has **no friends**. (non-referring)

-Indefinite referring expressions may contain definite expressions within its scope. In the following examples, the referring expression with wider scope refers to part of the referent of the expression with the narrower scope:

*some of [his friends], many of [the students], some of [that cake]*

.....

## FINAL EXERCISES

**2-4.** Put the referring expressions in square brackets, and classify them into the following types:

**a.** indefinite non-anaphoric; **b.** direct anaphoric; **c.** indirect anaphoric; **d.** definite, identifiable by pre-or post-modification; **e.** definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world; **f.** generic.

Adapted from <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/PRchurchill.htm>, accessed 15-10-2012.

On 16 December 1910, a gang attempted to break into the rear of a shop in [Houndsditch](#). An adjacent shopkeeper heard their hammering, and informed the police. When the police arrived, the robbers burst out, shooting three officers dead.

**2-5.** Adapted from the tale of *Cinderella*,

<http://www.fpx.de/fp/Disney/Tales/Cinderella.html>, accessed 15-10-2012.

a) Put the referring expressions into square brackets, and classify them into the following types, considering that Cinderella and her stepsisters, but not her house, have been mentioned previously:

**a.** indefinite non-anaphoric; **b.** direct anaphoric; **c.** indirect anaphoric; **d.** definite, identifiable by pre-or post-modification; **e.** definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world.

One day, beautiful new dresses arrived at the house. A ball was to be held at Court and the stepsisters were getting ready to go to it. Cinderella didn't even dare ask, "What about me?" for she knew very well the answer that she would get.

b) Did you consider “what” as a referring expression? Justify your answer.

**2-6.** In the following sentence, is the expression in bold referring, non-referring or ambiguous out of context?

*Elena would like to share her flat with **an English woman**.*

.....

#### FURTHER READING

##### Obligatory reading

Hurford, Heasley and Smith (2007), Part one, Unit 3 ‘Reference and sense’, pp. 26-35 and Part two, Unit 4 ‘Referring expressions’, pp. 36-44, and Unit 6 ‘Predicates, referring expressions, and universe of discourse’ pp. 56-64.

##### Optional reading

Cruse (2004), part of Chapter 16 ‘Reference and deixis’, pp. 317-332.

## UNIT 3. DEIXIS

.....

### EXERCISE 3-1

Warm-up question: suppose you find an old small piece of paper in the street that says

*I'll meet you tomorrow at 6 pm at this place.*

How would you understand it?

.....

### 3.1. The concept of deixis

-Deictic expressions are those expressions that take some element of their meaning from the extralinguistic situation of the utterance in which they are used.

In order to be interpreted, they need the extralinguistic context.

-Examples of deictic expressions: *here, there, now, yesterday, tomorrow, this country...*

-Deixis is the most obvious way in which the relationship between language and context is reflected in language structure, thus being a borderline area between semantics and pragmatics.

-The scope of deictic expressions may be variable, depending on the context (*here* can mean *in this room, in Madrid or in Spain*).

-Deixis is to be distinguished from anaphora and cataphora, which involve dependence on the linguistic context for an expression to be interpreted:

-**She's** my best friend. (deictic use: in a group of people with several men and only one woman apart from the speaker)

-I'm really fond of Sally; in fact, **she's** my best friend. (anaphoric use)

### 3.2. The deictic centre

-The deictic centre is the speaker at the time and place of the utterance (speaker's here-and-now), as may be seen in the interpretation of sentences such as

*I've finished this book just now.*

- This organization of deixis is reflected in language; for instance, in the use of personal pronouns, tense of the verbs and deictic adverbs of time and place (*here, there, now, then*), and in many other ways.
- In English, exceptions occasionally take place, in which the deictic centre is shifted to the addressee: *I'll **come** to your place in a minute.*
- In reported speech, the speaker's here-and-now corresponds to the reporter. Consequently, deictic expressions undergo changes:

**-Direct speech:**

Yesterday Mary said: "I      finished      your dress      a week ago".  
                                    1                   2                   3                   4

(Deictic centre of the direct speech: Mary when she said that sentence)

**-Indirect reported speech:**

Yesterday Mary said that she had finished      my dress a week before.  
                                    1                   2                   3                   4

(Deictic centre of the reported speech: the speaker that reports Mary's speech at the moment when s/he utters the sentence above)

### 3.3. Person deixis

- This subtype of deixis concerns person.
- In English (and many other languages), person deixis is organized in a basic three-part division, grammaticalized in the first (s/w (+ others)), second (addressee(s) (+ others)) and third persons.
- Personal subject and object pronouns, as well as possessive pronouns, can convey person deixis.

-First person plural pronouns have inclusive and exclusive uses. Inclusive *we* includes the s/w and the addressee, and other persons in some cases; exclusive *we* includes the s/w and other persons, but not the addressee.

-For example, a lecturer speaking to her students at university often use inclusive and exclusive first person plural pronouns:

-Inclusive *we*: *Your final results are great! **We**'ve made a good effort together.*

-Exclusive *we*: *I'll correct your tests as soon as I can; you know, now **we** [lecturers] are busy with the design of the new curricula.*

-*You* and *we* also have generic uses (referring to people in general):

*When you age, you change your way of looking at certain things.*

*We are not always considerate with others.*

-A distinction can be made between 'hearer' and 'addressee'. The addressee is the hearer (or reader) to whom the message is directed, while the label 'hearer' also includes persons within hearing to whom the message is not directed.

-There is a 'distant' use of the third person to refer to addressees:

*Mum, **Johnny** has broken two glasses uttered in front of the referent of Johnny.*

-The following are two additional facts about the use of person deixis:

A) Peculiarities of person deixis in the absence of face-to-face contact:

***This** is Marta on the phone...*

B) The use of plural pronouns to refer to single individuals of unknown sex:

*Someone broke the window glass, didn't **they**?*

### 3.4. Temporal deixis

-This subtype of deixis concerns time.

-Temporal deixis may be 'pure', as in *now, then, or before, afterwards*, as adverbs, or 'impure', which shows interaction between deictic and non-deictic methods of time reckoning, i.e. the time unit is specified (*this afternoon, next year*).

-'Impure' temporal deictic expressions may give way to ambiguity:

-A case in point is 'year'. For example, *next year* can refer to the following 365 days after the speech event, the calendar year or the academic year. Think about

*I've made some good purposes for this year,*

said on the speaker's birthday, on New Year's Eve, or on the first day of a course.

-Similar problems arise with *this week / this month*, but not with *this August*.

-Complexities also arise when coding time and decoding time do not coincide (for example, the interpretation of *next Thursday* read in a letter written the previous week). With the evolution of communication, this fact is becoming less important in everyday life.

-Tense is a 'pure' deictic device: in

*John **worked/works/will work** in a library.*

the Verbal Group expresses past, present and future time, respectively, with respect to the time of the utterance.

-Tense interacts with aspectual and modal features, which are non-deictic by themselves:

*Jim **is working** in a library.* (progressive aspect and present time)

*John **may have finished** the paper.* (modality-probability and past time)

*You **must go** to the dentist right now.* (modality-obligation and future time)

.....

## NOTE

1. We will adopt the convention of signalling the whole Verbal Group as a deictic expression, because tense is often realized by the whole Verbal Group or a significant part of it. In the last two examples above, all the words of the VG continue to signal past and future time, respectively.



2. In contrast to what is often stated, I believe that the Present Perfect is deictic. Although it differs from the Simple Past in that it focuses more on current relevance and less on anteriority, it nevertheless indicates that the event took place, or started to take place, before the speech time:

-*Jane has just phoned the doctor.* (the action has finished before the speech time)

-*Jane has been living in Madrid for seven years.* (she started living in Madrid before the speech time, and still lives in Madrid)

The past perfect and the future perfect are also deictic, since they also ultimately point to the speech time. They indicate relativeness to another action, which, in its turn, is anterior or posterior to the speech time:

-Example with the past perfect:

*I had already done my homework when you came.*

(the past perfect indicates anteriority to a state or event which, in its turn, is anterior to the speech time)

Temporality: past perfect > simple past > speech time

-Example with the future perfect:

*He will arrive; by that time I will have already done my homework*

(the future perfect indicates that the action is anterior to a state or event action which, in its turn, is posterior to the speech time)

Temporality: speech time > future perfect > future simple

\*\*\*\*\*

### 3.5. Spatial deixis

-Spatial deixis concerns space.

-Like temporal deixis, spatial deixis may be 'pure', as in *here, there, or over, under*, etc. when they are adverbs, and the demonstrative pronouns.

-‘Impure’ spatial deixis shows interaction between deictic and non-deictic methods of space reckoning: *two miles away, this side of the box*, etc.

-The demonstratives may also indicate empathetic deixis (psychological proximity or distance: compare *I'm fond of **this** picture* with *I'm tired of **that** picture*).

-Spatial deixis is also expressed with the motion verbs *come* and *go*.

.....

-It may be home-based, as in *Bring those books home* uttered outside the speaker's home.

-Speaker orientation may clash with intrinsic orientation of objects that have a front part and a rear part. Due to this interaction, expressions such as *The cat is behind the car* may be vague or ambiguous. We all have experienced how tricky it is to give indications to find a street, or to give instructions to someone in order to find an object that we have lost.

The difference between vagueness and ambiguity is explained in Section 2.2. of this manual.

-Temporal and spatial deixis may interact. Examples:

(In a train) *Did you see the snow **ten miles ago**?*

*The bus is **ten minutes from here**.*

-Spatial deixis may be metaphorical:

*I was talking to you, but you were **miles away**.*

### 3.6. Discourse deixis

-Discourse deixis concerns the stretch of discourse / text.

-Examples of expressions of discourse deixis:

A) Discourse markers: *well* (indicates that more information is to come), *and that's it* (indication to close a topic).

B) In written discourse: chapter numbers, section numbers, page numbers and other similar expressions; these need the extralinguistic context (in this case, the document to which they belong) in order to be interpreted.

C) Some expressions of spatial or temporal deixis express discourse deixis in certain contexts. Examples: *here* (in this document), *now* (at this point of the discourse), etc.

-A case of interaction between temporal and discourse deixis is *good night*, which may express not only (or not even) the time of the day, but also the end of a stretch of discourse (for example, when two people are parting at 6 pm).

---

#### NOTE

Some phenomena commonly signalled as discourse deixis in bibliographical references will be considered here as anaphoric (or cataphoric), since they stand

for information mentioned elsewhere in the discourse, and their accessibility is due to the preceding discourse rather than extralinguistic features of the speech situation:

-Pronouns, especially *it*, *this* and *that*, when they refer one or more situations (with Participants, Processes and optionally Circumstances) expressed in the discourse:

*I love swimming in the sea because **it** is very relaxing.*

*Did you know that Sally finally won the prize? **This** is great news.*

*(After a 30-minute story) In sum, **that's** what my life is like.*

-In Spanish, the demonstrative anaphoric pronouns referring to parts of discourse are *esto*, *eso* and *aquello*.

-Discourse markers such as *however*, *therefore* or *in addition* are anaphoric, since they evoke the previous linguistic context.

This position was set forth in FUNKNET, a list where issues in functional linguistics are discussed. There were responses for and against this view. Those who advocated for a wide approach to discourse deixis focused mainly on typology. Given that this course is oriented to English, I decided to maintain the position defended here. My thanks to all those who responded. Any remaining inconsistencies are my sole responsibility.

.....

### 3.7. Social deixis

-Social deixis concerns the social situation in which the speech event occurs.

-There is a high degree of interaction between person deixis and social deixis:

-The T/V (*tu* / *vous*) distinction, virtually non-existent in contemporary English;

-Honorific forms reserved for authorized recipients (*Your Honour*, *Mr President*, etc.).

-Vocatives with different degrees of politeness (*Your Highness*, *sir*, *madam...* (*hey*) *you*).

-Another phenomenon to be included in social deixis is the use of informal and formal language (grammar, lexis, intonation...) Compare the following statements about the contents about an academic article:

*This is fucking nonsense!!*

*The article is deficient in many respects.*

-Japanese is a language rich in affixes indicating social deixis.

### 3.8. Deixis and reference

-Referring expressions may be deictic or contain deictic words, or they may be non-deictic:

*I like **this dress!*** (the dress the speaker is wearing: deictic);

*I bought a new green dress at Zara. **This dress** is very stylish for the price.*

(anaphoric)

-Deictic expressions may refer to a different referent of the same kind as the one presented:

*If you give correct answers to all the questions, you will win **this ball!***

(The addressee might be given an identical ball to the ball the speaker is showing.)

-Deictic expressions, in their turn, may be referring or non-referring. For example, tensed Verbal Groups are deictic and non-referring.

#### NOTE

Locative deictic expressions, such as *here, there, now, yesterday* or *tonight* differ from referring expressions in that they are not aimed at selecting an entity in discourse, but at selecting a spatial or temporal location for another entity. However, they can be paraphrased by expressions that are not referring themselves, but contain referring expressions:

here – in *this place* (the referring expression is 'this place')

now – at *this moment*

yesterday – on *the previous day*, etc.

and referring expressions can be their antecedents, so that they may occur in cases of direct anaphoric reference:

*I like London; I lived **there** some of the happiest years of my life.*

Therefore, they will be considered as referring expressions.

.....

### 3.9. Deictic and non-deictic uses of deictic expressions

-Deictic uses may be of the following kinds:

-Gestural uses, in which the deictic expression can be interpreted only with reference to a physical monitoring of the speech event:

***This** one is genuine, but **this** one is a fake.* (pointing with finger)

-Symbolic uses. The knowledge of the basic spatio-temporal parameters of the speech event is sufficient to interpret them:

***This** city is really beautiful.* (the city where the speech event occurs)

-Non-deictic uses may also be divided into two kinds:

-Anaphoric or cataphoric uses, which pick out an entity mentioned in the previous or following discourse as referent:

*John came in and **he** lit a fire.* (anaphoric)

*I'm going to show you **this**: the picture I've just made.* (cataphoric)

-Uses in idiomatic constructions:

***There** we go. We did **this** and **that**.*

-Deixis and anaphora may be combined:

*I was born in London and have lived **there** ever since.*

-anaphoric use:      -*there* points to London as location;

-deictic use:         -the speaker, signalled with 'I', is not in London;

                          -the speech act does not take place in London.

-Some spatial words may be deictic or anaphoric when they are adverbs, but not when they are prepositions:

*I like the bar **opposite**.* (Deictic: ‘the bar opposite the place where the speaker is’)

*At the end of the street, there is a theatre. His house is just **opposite**.*  
(Anaphoric: ‘opposite the theatre’)

*I like the bar **opposite** the library in my street.* (Non-deictic, non-anaphoric)

*There is a man waiting **outside**.* (Deictic: ‘outside the place where the speaker is’)

*You’d better leave the library; your boyfriend is waiting **outside**.*  
(Anaphoric: ‘outside the library’)

*There is a man waiting **outside** the library.* (Non-deictic, non-anaphoric)

*Please go **away**!!* (‘Deictic: ‘away from where the speaker is’)

*He left the office and went **away**.* (anaphoric: ‘away from the office’)

*Please get **away** from the cooker!* (Non-deictic, non-anaphoric)

.....  
NOTE

-The definite article may be considered as deictic when the current context of situation is involved in the identification of the referent. In these cases, the reference is exophoric, and the referent is retrievable by knowledge of the world (see 2.6 above).

*Look at **the ceiling**!*

you will look at the ceiling of the room we are in. However, the definite article does not have semantic features that indicate the kind of deixis (person, temporal, spatial, discourse or social). It could be argued that this type of deixis is spatio-temporal, since it is the spatial and temporal parameters that make the referent retrievable.

-The same holds for proper names: In

***David**, come here!*

the referent of David is retrieved from the extralinguistic context.  
.....

## FINAL EXERCISES

**3-2.** Underline the deictic expressions, and state the type of deixis in each case (person, spatial, temporal, discourse, social). In certain cases, deixis belongs to more than one type:

- This ring costs sixty euros.
- I am looking at those clouds over there.
- My friend has gone back to Paris.
- You showed me that picture last week.
- Sorry, sir. We haven't got any more tickets.
- She has finished Chapter 3.
- You are my best friend here.
- Yesterday all my troubles seemed so far away.
- Hey you, your seat is right over there!
- My son wrote two novels here two years ago.
- Your daughter found page 33 interesting.
- Do you know whose purse this is?
- Ladies and gentlemen, now I will talk about foreign investments in China.
- A: I'm sorry I stepped on your toe!  
B: It's all right, madam.

**3-3.** Underline the deictic expressions in this song chorus, and state the kind of deixis in each case (person, spatial, temporal, discourse):

Right here, right now  
I'm lookin' at you  
And my heart loves the view  
Cause you mean everything  
Right here, I promise you somehow  
That tomorrow can wait some other day to be  
But right now there's you and me  
(Vanessa Hudgens, Zac Efron)

**3-4.** Read the following sentences and decide whether the **speaker** gives any indication of his/her location in space or time, and state this indication.

Underline the expression or expressions by which this indication is given (not all deictic expressions!):

- a) 1989 will be a good year for you.
- b) Sally is going back to London next summer.
- c) I enjoy living in Madrid because the weather is lovely here.

Explain why, in sentence c, the expression concerned is anaphoric as well as deictic.

#### FURTHER READING

##### Obligatory reading

Hurford, Heasley and Smith (2007), Part two, Unit 7 'Deixis and definiteness', pp. 65-78.

##### Optional reading

Grundy (2008), Chapter 2 'Deixis: the relation of reference to the point of origin of the utterance', pp. 22-47.



## UNIT 4. PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT

---

### EXERCISE 4-1

Warm-up activity: at the beginning of this unit, the lecturer asks the students:

‘Why are you all smoking in class?’

How would you react?

---

### 4.1. The concept of presupposition

-**Presuppositions** are assumptions that something is the case when making an utterance.

-Examples of presuppositions:

*John went back to France.* P: ‘John was to France at least once before.’

*I’ll feed my cat tonight.* P: ‘I have a cat.’

-Presuppositions may vary in apparently similar linguistic contexts. Compare:

*Sue cried before she finished her thesis.* (P: ‘Sue finished her thesis’.)

*Sue died before she finished her thesis.* (this P does not exist)

---

### NOTE

The truth-value of utterances with false presuppositions, such as *The present King of France is bald* uttered now, has been argued in the literature to be non-existent. However, if people chosen at random were asked about the truth of such statements, most would say that they are false. We will give priority to the view of the average user of language, and therefore consider that such utterances are false.

---

### 4.2. Characteristics of presuppositions

#### 4.2.1. Constancy under negation and questioning

-The change of an affirmative clause into a negative clause (or *vice versa*) or an interrogative does not change its presuppositions. For example, the three examples below presuppose ‘John ate all the pudding before dinner’:

*John regrets that he ate all the pudding before dinner.*

*John does not regret that he ate all the pudding before dinner.*

*Does John regret that he ate all the pudding?*

---

NOTE

Although it has been argued that this should not be the only criterion to identify presuppositions, it is a pedagogically useful method to detect them. In this course, constancy under negation will be the standard test to be used in order to distinguish presuppositions from other phenomena such as implicatures or entailments.

---

#### 4.2.2. Constancy in modal and conditional contexts

-The turning of a categorical clause into a modalized or a conditional clause does not change its presuppositions. For example, the presupposition 'John ate all the pudding' is common to the three following utterances:

*John regrets that he ate all the pudding.*

*John **may** regret that he ate all the pudding.*

*If John regrets that he ate all the pudding, he is not the same as he used to be.*

#### 4.2.3. Defeasibility (cancellability)

-This property concerns the possibility for presuppositions to be cancelled or suspended explicitly but without self-correction.

-Example of cancellation:

*She did not **regret** doing a PhD, because in fact she did not do any.*

(P cancelled: "She did a PhD")

-Example of suspension:

*Give these toys to your children, if you have any.*

(P suspended: 'you have children')

-Cancellation is easier with negative or interrogative clauses:

*John does not regret that he ate all the pudding, because in fact he did not eat all of it.*

*A: Did she regret doing a PhD? B: No, because finally she didn't do any.*

*A: Mary regretted doing a PhD. B: No, because finally she didn't do any.*

.....  
NOTE

Cancellation of presuppositions is normally face-threatening, because the addressee does not expect it. Straightforward cancellations, such as those stated below, have an ironical flavour and are therefore impolite in most cases; there are more polite cancellations of presuppositions, where the speaker shows understanding of the addressee's state of knowledge:

*A: Did she regret doing a PhD?*

*B: Oh, I forgot to tell you that finally she didn't do it!*

.....

-Certain verbs such as *KNOW* provoke asymmetries depending on person and tense. For example, (a) and (b), but not (c), presuppose (d):

a) *John doesn't know that Bill came.*

b) *I didn't know that Bill came.*

c) *I don't know whether Bill came.*

d) *Bill came.*

#### 4.2.4. Non-detachability

-Presuppositions are maintained if the words or expressions of the sentence are replaced with synonyms. In other words, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain expressions with similar meanings and different presuppositions. Presuppositions are, therefore, dependent on meaning rather than on form. If we consider, for example, the utterance

*John regrets that he ate all the pudding*

-The presupposition 'He ate all the pudding' is maintained if we replace *regrets* by *is sorry*, *is repented of*, etc.

-Presuppositions may be weakened or suspended with hedges (*kind of*, *sort of*, *or something...*) For example, two speakers are in a lonely place, afraid that no one is around. One of them sees something at a long distance and says:

*I can see a man walking his dog or something.*

The presupposition 'the man has a dog' is suspended, or at least weakened.

### 4.3. Presupposition triggers

-Presupposition triggers are lexical expressions, syntactic constructions or other linguistic phenomena that create ('trigger') presuppositions. Levinson (1983: 181-184) provides an exhaustive taxonomy of presupposition triggers, which will be used in this course.

-The following are examples of presupposition triggers of different kinds:

a) **Lexical items**: factive verbs (*REGRET, REALIZE*, etc.), implicative verbs (*MANAGE, FORGET, AVOID...*), change of state verbs (*STOP, BEGIN, CONTINUE, FINISH...*), iteratives (*again, any more, another time*, verbs such as *REPEAT*), etc.

*John managed / didn't manage to open the door.*

P: 'John tried to open the door.'

*John went / didn't go to England again.*

P: 'John had been to England before.'

b) **Syntactic constructions**: NGs with possessive determiners, subordinate clauses of different kinds, cleft sentences, comparisons and contrasts, restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses, counterfactual conditionals.

*Jane is / isn't playing with her dog.*

P: Jane has a dog.

*It is / isn't my glasses that I'm looking for.*

P: 'I am looking for something.'

---

#### NOTE

-Restrictive relative clauses trigger presuppositions with indefinite reference:

*The old woman **who visited Jim yesterday** is / isn't in good health.*

P: 'An old woman visited Jim yesterday'

However, non-restrictive relative clauses trigger presuppositions with definite reference:

*The old woman, **who lives in a little village**, felt/didn't feel comfortable in Paris.*

P: 'The old woman lives in a little village.'

---

c) **Contrastive stress** plays a similar role to clefts:

*Helen is / isn't looking for her GLASSES.*

P: 'Helen is looking for something.'

d) **Speech act types**:

d1) **Questions**:

-Polar (yes / no) questions presuppose the disjunction of their possible answers.

This presupposition is vacuous, except for alternative questions. Compare:

*-Did Jim go to the doctor?*

P: 'Jim either went or did not go to the doctor.' (vacuous)

*-Is John in the library or in the bar? (in the either / or reading)*

P: 'John is either in the library or in the bar.' (non-vacuous)

-Wh-questions. In some cases, these presuppositions cannot undergo the test of constancy under negation in all the cases. However, they share the status or presuppositions in discourse (see 4.4.), and hence they are considered as presuppositions.

*What is Jim reading?*

P: 'Jim is reading something.'

*Who are they talking to?*

P: 'They are talking to someone.'

*Where did Mary find that original carpet? (no constancy under negation)*

P: 'Mary found that original carpet somewhere.'

*Why are you crying? (no constancy under negation)*

P: 'You are crying for some reason.'

d2) **Directives**. Example:

*-Close / don't close the door!* presupposes:

a) the door is not closed;

b) the addressee is able to close the door.

.....  
EXERCISE 4-2

Do all imperative clauses trigger similar presuppositions? Think about the following cases:

*Get well soon!*

*Beat him!!* (said at a boxing fight)

---

## NOTES

1. In most contexts, definite referring expressions presuppose that the referent exists (existential presupposition):

*I saw / I didn't see the pen on your desk.* P: The pen exists.

By contrast, indefinite referring expressions do not have the existential presupposition:

*I saw / didn't see a pen on your desk.*

(The negative clause does not indicate that there is any pen.)

2. In order to detect the presuppositions triggered by subordinate clauses, the constancy under negation test has to be applied *to the verb of the main clause*:

*He washed / didn't wash his hands when he arrived.* P: 'He arrived'.

3. *Even, just, only* have often been considered as presupposition triggers that express contrast with previous expectations according to the 'constancy in modal and conditional contexts' property, but cannot undergo the 'constancy under negation' test:

*Even John tasted the chocolate cake.*

*If even John tasted the chocolate cake, he's not the same as he used to be.*

'In contrast to what was predictable, John tasted the chocolate cake.'

However, this inference is not cancellable. Therefore, the feature of 'contrast with previous expectations' is not a presupposition, but part of the semantic meaning of these words. This position agrees with the consideration of context dependence as the key feature to distinguish semantics from pragmatics (see 1.1.)

---

#### 4.4. The status of presuppositions in discourse

-We will follow Talmy Givón's (1990) view that presupposition as a subtype of epistemic contract between the s/w and the addressee called 'uncontested knowledge', in opposition to 'realis assertions' and 'irrealis assertions'.

-'Realis' assertions are those that present states or events as true at the speech moment:

*Laura lives in Madrid.*

*The cat hit the dog.*

-In contrast, irrealis assertions do not present states or events as true at the speech moment. Some examples of irrealis assertions are:

a) Statements about the future: *Laura will live in Madrid next year.*

b) Questions: *Does Laura live in Madrid?*

c) Directives: *Come here, please!* (The addressee is not at that place yet)

d) Most conditional clauses: ***If Andy behaves, I'll buy him a toy car.***

(Notice that the main clause is a statement about the future, and hence also irrealis)

e) Complement clauses preceded by verbs of wish: ***I want to have an ice-cream.***

(Notice that the main clause is realis: the speaker's wish to have an ice-cream is true; what is not true at that moment is his/her having and ice-cream)

-Irrealis contexts can block existential presuppositions derived from definite NPs:

*If we had invited John to Australia, we would have had to cover **his expenses** there.*

(Since we did not invite John to Australia, he had no expenses there.)

-As an epistemic contract, presuppositions are characterized as follows:

a) The s/w strongly believes P; this characteristic is common to some realis assertions.

b) The s/w assumes that the addressee is familiar with P, believes P or is ready to believe P. If the addressee did not know the presupposition before, s/he will accommodate it in his/her background knowledge, unless it is challenged (Lewis 1979).

*I finished my PhD dissertation in 1995.*

‘The speaker has a PhD dissertation.’

---

## NOTES

From the pragmatic point of view:

1. It is not adequate to transmit unexpected or surprising information for the first time by means of a presupposition. Suppose I meet a man in a bus for the first time, and we get off at the same stop. He says:

*I'd better go home and feed **my cat**.*

Obviously, I did not know before that he had a cat, but I would not find this statement surprising, and I would easily accommodate it in my background knowledge. However, my reaction would be different if he said instead

*I'd better go home and feed **my snake**.*

2. Presuppositions are useful in mass-media, because they provide a good way to transmit information for readers with varying degrees of previous knowledge. For example, if an article says

*The president of the UK, David Cameron...*

This utterance presupposes that ‘the president of the UK is David Cameron’. This presupposition provides some people (for example, some foreign tourists in the UK) with an opportunity to acquire this information; however, it does not bother readers whose knowledge about politics in the UK goes far beyond basic information such as this; this kind of readers would feel undervalued (or even insulted) if information of this kind were transmitted as realis.

---

c) The s/w assumes that his/ her presuppositions are not likely to be challenged, and s/he is unwilling to face those challenges.

As was seen before (4.2.3.), cancelling presuppositions is face-threatening. Similarly, challenging presuppositions is also face-threatening. Imagine what speaker A would think about B’s contribution to the following dialogue:



A: *I finished my PhD dissertation in 1995.*

B: *But did you really finish your thesis?*

-The realis and irrealis assertions are to be distinguished from the presuppositions contained in them. For example, if I state:

*Yesterday I cleaned my bedroom.*

the fact that the s/w cleaned his/her bedroom is presented as realis, and the fact that s/he has a bedroom, as a presupposition. And if I state

*Jim might visit the Prado museum again.*

the fact that Jim visited the Prado museum in the past is presented as a presupposition, and his possible new visit is presented as irrealis.

-Information transmitted as realis can be subsequently treated as a presupposition if it is not challenged by the addressee (think of the saying 'Silence gives consent' / 'El que calla otorga'):

*Last year I **went to Germany on holiday** (realis). This year I am thinking of going **back** there.* (presupposition: 'The speaker has been to Germany before')

-Due to this status of presuppositions in discourse, they have a strong potential for manipulation, which is exploited, for example, in ads.

.....  
NOTE

Definite NGs, due to the existential presupposition that they trigger, are a powerful (and often manipulative) device for creating presuppositions. For example,

*the rapid industrialization of Russia in the twentieth century*

presupposes that Russia was rapidly industrialized in the twentieth century.

Let us now revise Unit 1, exercise 1-1: the same content is communicated as a presupposition by means of a NG, and as realis by means of a clause.

.....  
COMMENTS ON PRESUPPOSITIONS IN PARTS OF TWO ADS

1. **Ponds** <http://www.pakcosmetics.com/brand/Ponds>, accessed 23-11-2009

The beauty of Ponds shines through in so many ways. In the ways Ponds products care for and enhance women's skin. In women who reach 40 feeling

more beautiful, smart and confident than ever. And in sharing information and advice that help all women look and feel their best.

The ad contains the following presuppositions, among others:

- Ponds has beauty;
- Ponds products care for and enhance women's skin in some ways.
- There are women who reach 40 feeling more beautiful, smart and confident than ever.
- Ponds share information and advice that help all women look and feel their best.

In sum, the fact that Ponds cares for women's beauty is expressed mainly by means of presupposition, rather than by means of realis assertions.

2. **Campbell's** <http://www.campbellsoup.com>, accessed 23-11-2009

Did you know that in addition to being the world's largest soup manufacturer, we're also a leading producer of juice beverages, sauces, and biscuits? We invite you to learn more.

The ad contains the following presuppositions, among others:

- Campbell's are the world's largest soup manufacturers.
- The addressee knows something about Campbell's (presupposition triggered from 'to learn more').

That is to say, the ad assumes previous knowledge about Campbell's on the part of the addressees, and presents this knowledge by means of presuppositions.

#### **4.5. Presuppositions about speech situations**

-Certain expressions trigger presuppositions about speech situations: this is the case, for instance, of the expression of social deixis. The use of the vocatives *sir* or *madam* presuppose a respectful relationship between the speaker and the addressee, vocatives such as *Your Highness* presuppose the social status of the addressee, etc.

-Presuppositions about speech situations are also triggered by types of discourse. For example:

- authors of academic articles presuppose that their readers are specialists (or at least very knowledgeable) in their field;
- teachers presuppose that students are less knowledgeable than them about the contents of their lessons, etc.

#### **4.6. Entailment: foregrounded and backgrounded entailments**

-Entailments are deductions that logically follow from what is asserted in a sentence. Entailments are a property of sentences, thus belonging to semantics.

For example,

*Harry gave Sally three books.*

has the following entailments:

- ‘Harry gave Sally three of something.’
- ‘Harry gave Sally something.’
- ‘Harry gave someone three books.’
- ‘Someone gave Sally three books.’
- ‘Someone gave someone something’, etc.

-The most salient entailment is determined by Focus. This entailment is treated as information previously known to the addressee, or at least as predictable information. Let us see the difference with the following example:

*Harry gave Sally three books.*

→Harry gave Sally three of something.

*Harry gave Sally three books.*

→Someone gave Sally three books.

*Harry gave Sally three books.*

→Harry gave Sally a certain quantity of books.

Etc.

-When the Focus is contrastive, the corresponding entailment acquires the status of a presupposition (see 4.3.).

A detailed study of Focus is carried out in the obligatory 4<sup>th</sup> year subject ‘Pragmatics and discourse in English’.

-Unlike presuppositions, entailments have no constancy under negation.

-They may be suspended, but not cancelled, without self-correction:

*Harry gave Sally three books; oh, no, he sold them to her.* (cancellation:  
self-correction is necessary)

*Harry gave Sally three books, or he sold them to her.* (suspension)

.....

## FINAL EXERCISES

**4-3.** Identify one presupposition (or more, if you can) from each of the sentences below, except for existential presuppositions:

1. Mary was sorry that it rained.
2. Sue remembered to phone us.
3. Jane managed to shut the door.
4. Have you stopped smoking?
5. It continued to rain.
6. Mary failed the exam for the fifth time.
7. It is my glasses that I am looking for.
8. What she needs is a good holiday.
9. Anne did not continue studying Italian.
10. When Sally came, our house was in a mess.
11. John was not aware that the glass was broken.
12. Robin forgot to bring us the book.
13. Since her son left Madrid, she is feeling lonely.
14. Where did Joe hide his cigarettes?
15. Why are you crying?
16. Andrew knows that his father won the prize.
17. Anna is happy with her salary increase.
18. My neighbour's dog died last summer.
19. Pete, who lives in the centre of London, usually gets stuck in traffic jams.
20. Will you go back to Japan?
21. Bridget started writing her diary last year.
22. Mary recovered from her illness.
23. What did she say about me?
24. I am revising my notes on presupposition for the sixth time.

25. It is with Paula that he is going out.
26. It was odd that she did not tell us the news.
27. My grandma stopped knitting immediately.
28. This novel, which I bought at the airport, is really boring!
29. Mark is a better lawyer than his brother.
30. Where were you born?
31. Jim gave Laura the book.
32. Finally our friend did not leave Paris.
33. Yesterday my friends came to Madrid.
34. I did not go to Rome.
35. They do not eat too much anymore.
36. What she has lost is a book on semantics.
37. The thief took the wallet from my pocket.
38. While you were sleeping, I prepared our lunch.
39. What Jane found was not my lipstick.
40. Barcelona is as good a football team as Real Madrid.
41. The ex-minister came back to teaching.
42. It is Halliday who leads systemic-functional linguistics.
43. The scientist repeated the experiment.
44. Smith did not notice his friend's new haircut.
45. Molly, who is really fond of art, visited the two museums of my town.

**4-4.** In the following text, from Paul Auster's *City of Glass* (1985),

“I'd like to leave a message for one of your guests,” Quinn said.

The man looked up at him slowly, as if wishing him to disappear.

“I'd like to leave a message for one of your guests,” Quinn said again.

“No guests here,” said the man. “We call them residents.”

“For one of your residents, then. I'd like to leave a message.”

- a) Which is the presupposition cancelled?
- b) Does this cancellation, as is stated, have a face-threatening effect? Justify your answer.
- c) State another presupposition of this text.

**4-5.** a) Identify and write 5 presuppositions triggered from the following paragraph. Existential presuppositions are not valid:

Adapted from “A school story”, by M.R. James (1911)

(James writes about his Latin classes; Sampson was the teacher)

There was one other incident of the same kind as the last which I told you. Several times since that day we had had to make up examples in school to illustrate different rules, but there had never been any quarrel except when we did them wrong. One day, we were told to make a conditional sentence. We did it, right or wrong, and showed up our bits of paper, and Sampson began looking through them. All at once he got up, made some odd sort of noise in his throat, and rushed out by a door that was just by his desk. We sat there for a minute or two, and then we went up, I and one or two others, to look at the papers on his desk. I thought someone must have put down some nonsense or other, and Sampson had gone off to report him. All the same, I noticed that he hadn't taken any of the papers with him when he ran out. Well, the top paper on the desk was written in red ink, which no one used. They all looked at it and swore that it wasn't theirs. Then I thought of counting the bits of paper: there were seventeen bits of paper on the desk, and sixteen boys in class. Well, I bagged the extra paper, and kept it, and I believe I have it now.

b) Is ‘They all looked at something’ a presupposition derived from ‘They all looked at it’? Justify your answer.

**4-6.** Identify and write 5 presuppositions triggered from the following paragraph. Existential presuppositions are not valid.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul\\_McCartney](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_McCartney), accessed 17-1-2014.

Sir James Paul McCartney (born 18 June 1942) is an English musician, singer, songwriter, multi-instrumentalist and composer. With [John Lennon](#), [George Harrison](#) and [Ringo Starr](#), he gained worldwide fame as a member of [the Beatles](#); his [songwriting partnership with Lennon](#) is one of the most celebrated of the 20th century. After [the band's break-up](#), he pursued a solo career, and later formed [Wings](#) with his first wife, [Linda](#), and [Denny Laine](#).

**4-7.** Identify and write 5 presuppositions triggered from the following paragraph. Existential presuppositions are not valid.

On *Duck Soup* (1933). Adapted from: <http://www.filmsite.org/duck.html>, accessed 21-12-2010

The Marx Brothers' greatest and funniest masterpiece - the classic comedy *Duck Soup* (1933) - is a short, but brilliant satire of dictatorial leaders, Fascism and authoritarian government. The film, produced by Herman Mankiewicz, was prepared during the crisis period of the Depression.

The film opens with the flag of Freedonia, an imaginary small Balkan state. Freedonia has gone bankrupt through mismanagement and is on the verge of revolution. The country's richest millionairess, the wide and widowed benefactress Mrs. Gloria Teasdale, has offered \$20 million to sponsor and support the cash-poor government, but only if it is placed under new leadership: "The government has been mismanaged. I will lend the money, but only on condition that His Excellency withdraw and place the government in new hands."

#### FURTHER READING

##### Obligatory reading

Levinson (1983), pp. 181-184 (taxonomy of presupposition triggers).

##### Optional readings

Levinson (1983), the whole chapter on presuppositions (Chapter 4), pp. 167-225.

Birner, Betty J. (2013), Chapter 5 'Presupposition', pp. 146-174.

## UNIT 5. POLITENESS

The approach followed here is essentially Brown and Levinson's (1987), except for the notions of positive and negative politeness, adopted from Leech (1983).

### 5.1. Basic concepts: politeness, politeness strategies, face, and face-threatening acts

-Politeness may be defined as the “socio-culturally determined behaviour directed towards the goal of establishing and/or maintaining in a state of equilibrium the personal relationships between the individuals of a social group, whether open or closed, during the ongoing process of interaction” (Brown and Levinson 1987).

-Politeness is not always about social rules in the strict sense: sometimes it means showing a friendly attitude to others.

-Face is the public self-image that everyone has; everyone has the right to protect his / her face, and the duty to respect others' faces. Although face might well be considered as a universal concept, a person's face is highly influenced by the society s/he lives in, so that face management varies in different societies.

-For example, let us consider physical contact and proximity. A reasonable distance in Morocco may be considered as face-threatening in the United States. The expectations about hospitality also vary from country to country.

-The perception of politeness and impoliteness varies from individual to individual, from context to context and from culture to culture. For example, in the Madrid of the 2010s, a woman may appreciate that a friend gives a negative evaluation of the clothes she is wearing, because she appreciates sincerity and even might see an opportunity to learn more about how to get properly dressed, but another woman may see impoliteness on the part of her friend, because she thinks that her way of dressing is an entirely personal issue.

-In order to study politeness, we will assume that there is a certain consensus among people about what politeness is (the word 'universal' seems excessive).

.....



.....

### EXERCISE 5-1

The British are reputed to give more importance to their personal freedom than people from other countries, for example the Spaniards. From your own experience, do you think this statement is true? In which respects did you see it? (Especially, those students who have been recently abroad for an Erasmus stay or another reason could tell us about their experiences).

.....

-There are acts which are normally inherently polite: for example, praising someone or expressing agreement (even if, in some cultures, praise may be embarrassing).

-However, many other acts, which need to be done in the course of life, are inherently impolite: giving an order, doing criticism (even if it is constructive), transmitting unfavourable information about a third person, asking very personal questions... These acts threaten the speaker's face, as is the case of making an offer or transmitting bad news, or (more commonly) the addressee's face; therefore, they are called face-threatening acts (FTAs).

-Positive politeness consists in enhancing acts that are inherently polite. Positive politeness strategies are used as social accelerators:

*What a nice dress you are wearing!* (praise to the addressee)

A: *I think the best painting is John's.* B: *Yes, indeed!* (agreement)

-Negative politeness consists in mitigating a FTA. The ways in which this is carried out are called negative politeness strategies.

*Could you please help me with this exercise if you have time?*  
(weakening a directive)

.....

### NOTE

This concept of positive and negative politeness is different from Brown and Levinson's (1983), who distinguish a positive face, based on the individual's wish to be appreciated, and a negative face, based on the individual's desire

not to be impeded or put upon; positive and negative politeness strategies concern positive and negative face, respectively. However, these two kinds of face provoke certain problems of understanding: for example, it is difficult to understand that a speech act such as *How stupid you've been!* concerns the addressee's positive face (since it a despective evaluation of the addressee).

.....

-Obviously, not all the FTAs have the same importance. Their ranking depends on the following factors:

- 1) The **relative power** of the speaker over the addressee. The power may be basically of three kinds:
  - Legitimate power: boss over employee, parents over children, aged people over young people, laws over citizens...
  - Referent power: famous footballers, actors or actresses, politicians, etc., over people in general, and more concretely their fans or supporters;
  - Expert power: this power is conferred by knowledge. For example, if an employee knows a computer programme very well and is working with his / her boss, there is a temporal shift of power roles (at the computer, it is the employee who gives more orders).
- 2) The **social distance** between speaker and addressee:
  - For example, the difference among classmates, depending on the degree of friendship or contact;
  - Social distance is decreased among strangers who share knowledge of the world, such as professional knowledge (for example, academics). It is also decreased among people who share difficult situations, e.g. those who are looking after a relative in hospital.
- 3) The **size of the imposition** involved by the FTA. It is not the same to ask for some sheets of paper than to ask for 100€.
- 4) The **rights and obligations**. For example, not surprisingly, a lecturer will find it easier to ask his/her students to finish a paper by the deadline than to ask them to write the paper in green ink.

- 5) The **situation**: the influence of register on politeness. A lecturer who normally uses quite informal language with a student must speak very formally at the defence of the dissertation of that student.

## 5.2. Superstrategies for performing face-threatening acts

### 5.2.1. Bald-on-record strategies

-This strategy consists in performing a FTA without any redress (bald-on-record). The most frequent causes for these speech acts are: emergencies (*Fire!!*), time constraints, channel limitations, task-oriented situations (two people hanging a lamp), small degree of imposition according to the factors described above, orientation of the FTA towards the speaker's face (offers).

-Examples of FTAs performed bald-on-record are the following:

*-Fire!!*

*-Give me two nails.*

*-Have some of this cake.*

### 5.2.2. Redressive on record strategies

The FTAs are explicit, but they are performed by means of strategies that indicate that the speaker takes care of the addressee's face, or his/her own face:

*Could I please borrow your phone?*

*I'm afraid I must have made a few mistakes.* (the speaker positively knows that s/he has made a few mistakes)

### 5.2.3. Redressive off record strategies

Off-record strategies are those that do not make the FTA explicit, such as

*I would need to phone my family*

uttered as a directive (request) to borrow the addressee's phone. Off-record strategies tend to sound more polite if the FTA is important, but involve more processing cost and a higher risk of not being understood. The context is decisive for a correct interpretation.

#### **5.2.4. No performance of the FTA**

This is a genuine and strategic 'opting out choice'. This strategy may be used, for instance, if the FTA is too weighty: for example, when someone may consider asking a friend to lend them some money, but they decide to cut expenses instead; this strategy is also used if the FTA is considered to be avoidable: someone goes to their neighbour's and see a chocolate cake; they would like to try it, but say nothing with the hope that the neighbour will offer it anyway.

.....  
**NOTE**

The taxonomy of politeness strategies set in 5.3. and 5.4. is proposed by this lecturer and based on her readings of the following references: Leech (1983), Brown and Levinson (1987), and her own PhD Thesis (Carretero 1995). The taxonomy contains a manageable number of strategies (10), plus three subsidiary strategies.

.....

### **5.3. Positive Politeness strategies**

These strategies put emphasis on inherently polite speech acts; they act as social accelerators.

#### 1. Claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership

The emphasis on common knowledge can be carried out in several ways:

- a) Claiming the addressee's knowledge of that kind of situation (*you know...*).
- b) Using jokes based on mutual shared background knowledge.
- c) Banter (*You're my worst enemy* i.e. my best friend).
- d) Using in-group identity markers (*blondie, mate, sweetheart...*).
- e) Being optimistic: presuppose that the addressee will be collaborative in doing a favour (*You'll lend me your lawnmower for the weekend, I hope*) (strategy involving PP and NP).
- f) Inclusive *we*: (*Let's have a cookie, then*: the speaker starts).

## 2. Agreement

Emphasis on agreement may be carried out in different ways:

- a) Exaggerating agreement with intensifying adverbials (*for sure, really, exactly...*)
- b) Repetition of (all or part of) a previous utterance by the addressee.

## 3. Attention to the addressee's interests or needs

- a) Praise to the addressee: exaggerating the high value of the addressee or some property of his or her, with intensifying adjectives or adverbials (*How absolutely marvellous/incredible!*)
- b) Attention to the addressee's personal needs:
  - b1) deduction of the addressee's needs (*You must be hungry after our long walk*).
  - b2) expressing shared feelings (*I'm terribly sorry to hear that your cat died*).
- c) Switching the deictic centre from speaker to addressee (*I'll **come** to your place in five minutes*).
- d) Making a story or report interesting:
  - d1) hyperbole: (*There were **a million** people in the concert last night!*)
  - d2) historic present.
  - d3) using metaphors (*John is a real fish* (he swims/drinks like a fish)).
  - d4) increasing the force of one's message (for instance, by using rhyme and rhythm): *See you later, alligator*.

## 4. Modesty

This strategy consists in understating one's own achievements or qualities (*The meal was not so bad, was it?* if the meal was cooked by the speaker).

## **5.4. Negative Politeness strategies**

These strategies are ways of mitigating FTAs.

### 5. Tact

In this approach to politeness, tact concerns unfavourable information (especially about the addressee or a third person), which is particularly

uncomfortable to transmit. The speaker's face, the addressee's face or both may be threatened.

a) On-record:

a1) Negation (litotes), especially with gradable adjectives (*The meeting was **not particularly well** attended*).

a2) Hedges (*I **sort of** hate to say this, but...*)

a3) Agentless passive for not mentioning who is responsible (*The glass has broken* instead of *I have broken the glass*).

a4) Hedges on the illocutionary force (*We **regret to inform** you that your paper was not accepted for the journal.*)

a5) Expressions of epistemic modality: (*I **should think it must be** cancer...*)

b) Off-record:

b1) Understatement (*This house needs a touch of paint*).

b2) Irony (*I think maybe John just might be a little bit of a genius*).

b3) Ambiguity (*John's a pretty sharp/smooth cookie*).

b4) Vagueness, especially of referents (*Perhaps someone did something naughty*).

b5) Omission of information (*We'll all miss Bill and Agatha, won't we? - Well, we'll all miss Bill*).

## 6. Directive weakening

This strategy is very common. Not surprisingly, there are different ways of weakening a directive:

a) On-record:

a1) Conventional indirect questions (*Can you please pass the salt?*).

a2) Minimizing the imposition (*Wait a **minute!***).

a3) Giving options (*Please read this manuscript **if you have some time***).

a4) Being pessimistic, especially with negation and/or remoteness indicated by the past tense or by expressions of weak probability (*I **don't** imagine there'd be any chance of...*).

a5) Giving deference (*Excuse me, **sir**, ...*).

a6) Apologizing:

-laying emphasis on the impingement (*I'd like to ask you a big favour*)

-indicating reluctance (*I normally wouldn't ask you this, but...*)

-giving overwhelming reasons (*I'm absolutely lost...*)

-begging forgiveness (*I hope you'll forgive me if...*)

a7) Impersonalizing speaker and addressee, esp. by the existential construction, the passive voice, and nominalization (*The windows need to be cleaned*)

a8) Stating the FTA as a general rule (*We don't sit on tables, we sit on chairs*).

a9) Expressing indebtedness (*I'd be eternally grateful if you...*)

a10) Using hedged metalinguistic utterances (*Could you tell me..., May I ask...*)

b) Off-record:

b1) Giving hints (*It's cold in here*).

b2) Over-generalizing (*A penny saved is a penny earned*).

## 7. Asking for permission

Example: *Would you mind if I smoke?*

## 8. Seeking information about the addressee

If a speaker seeks certain kinds of information about the addressee, the addressee may feel that the speaker is intruding into his / her private domain.

This intrusion may be mitigated in different ways:

a) Making inferences (*you just seemed to be out...*)

b) Referring to past beliefs, apparently false (*I thought you were studying French...*)

## 9. Avoidance or reduction of disagreement

This strategy is the NP counterpart of the PP strategy 'Agreement'.

Disagreement may be avoided or reduced in different ways:

a) hedging disagreement (*I really sort of think/hope/wonder...*)

b) using adverbs such as *quite* (*New York is **quite** a nice place to live, considering*).

c) expressing initial agreement (*yes, but...*)

-Cancellation of presuppositions (see 4.2.3. above) is a type of disagreement; consequently, it is advisable to perform it by means of politeness strategies.

Compare:

A: *Did she regret doing a PhD?*

B1: *No, because she didn't do any.* (bald-on-record)

B2: **Oh, no!** *In the end, she got tired and gave it up.* (politeness strategy)

#### 10. Offer / accepting an offer

Offers may be considered as face threats towards the speaker him/herself; commitment of an offer involves permission for the other person in one's life or belongings. The most polite FTAs are usually bald-on-record strategies (except in very formal contexts), since they downtone the importance on the FTA:

a) Directness in offering (*Have another cake*).

b) Trying to persuade addressee to accept the offer (*I'm sure you'll enjoy our party*).

c) Emphasis on the speaker's determination to do a favour (*Sure (I can)*).

Accepting an offer is also usually carried out by means of politeness strategies:

Examples: *That would be great, It's very kind of you...*

These are the main 10 strategies that will appear in the exercises. There are other less common Negative Politeness strategies:

#### 11. Expressing concern about having forgotten common knowledge

This strategy is the NP counterpart of the PP strategy 'claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership'.

*Sorry, could you tell me what your name was?*

#### 12. Hedging topic shift

Hedges for topic shift are often mitigated, thinking that the addressee is not necessarily willing to change the topic (*Sorry, I've just thought...*)



### 13. Overstating one's own faults

When the speaker has unfavourable information about him/her, s/he may choose to overstate it instead of understating it; that is, the strategy is the opposite to Tact. Compare:

*I'm afraid I must have made a few mistakes.* (Tact)

*Oh, silly me, I can see quite a few mistakes!* (Overstating one's faults)

.....  
NOTE

Some reported differences in politeness in different cultures are the following:

-In Cuba, friends should not say 'thank you' to one another; this strategy is considered to be unnecessary and could cause offence (putting up barriers).

-In China, hosts choose the best pieces and put them on their guests' plate (attention to the addressee's interests or needs).

-British speakers reject personal compliments (modesty) more than people of many other cultures.

-Teachers praising students in public is socially acceptable in Britain (maxim of approbation) but Chinese students felt threatened.

.....  
EXERCISE 5-2

Let us go back to the example *You'll lend me your lawnmower for the weekend, I hope.*

- a) Do you think there is an FTA in this utterance? If so, which is it?
- b) Does the speaker use any strategy to perform this FTA?
- c) Can you say that this strategy is 'mitigating'?

.....  
NOTE

FTAs can be performed with positive politeness strategies (normally used with no FTAs), instead of negative politeness strategies, as in the example above.

Some other common cases are:

-Directives expressed with praise to the addressee (i.e. 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs'):

*You're great at maths! I'm sure you can solve even this problem.*

.....

.....  
 -A speaker may ask about personal information with the strategy 'Claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership'

*.I'm your best friend... There should be no secrets between you and me.*  
 .....

### EXERCISE 5-3

Discussion on the nature of the politeness strategies:

- a) Can you think about examples that are borderline cases between two or more politeness strategies?
  - b) Can two or more different strategies be combined in a single speech act, or even in a single utterance?
- .....

## 5.5. The linguistic expression of politeness strategies

In this section, some frequent expressions of politeness are listed, in order to facilitate the detection of linguistic expressions of politeness in practical tasks.

Positive politeness strategies are often realized by expressions that enhance assertiveness, i.e. expressions that add strength to the message:

-Expressions of certainty or high probability:

-Adverbs: *certainly, definitely, evidently, indeed, obviously, sure...*

-Adjectives: *certain, likely, sure...*

B) Vocatives: *My dear, darling, sweetheart...*

C) Exclamative structures. Example of compliments:

*What a nice coat you're wearing!*

*How wonderful it is to speak English like that!*

On the other hand, negative politeness strategies tend to be realized by expressions that downtone assertiveness:

-Hedges asking for solidarity: *you know, you see.*

-Other hedges: *I mean, kind of, sort of, or something...*

-Expressions of weak probability:

-Adverbs: *apparently, perhaps, possibly, presumably, probably...*

-Modal auxiliaries: *may, might, could, would...*

-Verbs: *I believe, I suppose, I think...; I should think, I should have thought; I don't know; seem, appear.*

-The continuative *well*, which indicates information that the speaker finds it uncomfortable to transmit.

-Pauses, hesitant repetitions of words, truncated utterances. These may be voluntary (and therefore genuine strategies), or involuntary. So as not to complicate things further, we will consider these devices as politeness strategies.

.....  
EXERCISE 5-4

a) Underline the expressions that communicate politeness in the following examples, extracted from the London-Lund corpus of spoken English:

(1) you know I mean he was suspected of having lung cancer, and presumably he's got something equally fatal, or perhaps it is lung cancer (1-4, 1042-43)

(2) A: don't suppose you're having a list, are you? That's a bit old hat now I think

B: well, we've we've tried to compile a list for our own purposes (2-10, 208)

(3) I think I think possibly she [b] I came to the conclusion independently that she might be interested, be interesting (2-6, 856)

b) The speaker in (3) is very dubitative. State a possible reason for this attitude.

.....

FINAL EXERCISES

**5-5.** Adapted from the URL

<http://ebookbrowse.com/gdoc.php?id=33886647&url=0fb76ea57cba80efd9ab511472e6dd50>

For each example, decide whether B1 or B2 is more polite. Justify your answers.

(1) A: How do you like my new handbag?

B1: It's amazing.

B2: It's too big for anyone to carry.

(2) A: I enjoyed watching your film on TV last night.

B1: Many others have also praised my acting.

B2: Actually, the director contributed a great deal towards its success.

(3) A: It was an outstanding exhibition, wasn't it?

B1: True, but the lighting could have been better.

B2: No, the rooms were too dim.

(4) A: Satellite TV channels are quite beneficial.

B1: Oh, I disagree absolutely.

B2: True but some of the violent programs are not censored.

(5) A1: We have four days off for the feast.

B1: Come and spend them with us in our flat in Sharm.

B2: We will invite ourselves to your chalet in Sharm.

(6) A and B are close friends and are having lunch together.

B1: Pass the salt.

B2: I was wondering if it is possible for you to pass the salt.

(7) A is a passenger on a train.

B1 Please lend me your paper.

B2: Have you finished reading your paper?

(8) This is an excellent book.

B1: It's fun.

B2: Only the simple minded enjoy this kind of books.

(9) A1: I enjoyed the barbecue at Steve's garden.

B1: It was awful.

B2: It was fun, but the weather was too hot and I kept sweating all the time.

(10) A: Do you like the apples I bought?

B1: They are French, aren't they?

B2: Not really.

**5-6.** Describe the following utterances in terms of politeness. In each case, specify:

- whether it is positive or negative politeness;
- the actual politeness strategy or strategies used;
- the linguistic devices used to perform the strategy.
  - a) I'm sorry, Your Highness, but I'm afraid you must stay inside.
  - b) We regret to tell you that your essay is very badly written.
  - c) I'm going to tell you the most unbelievable story ever told.
  - d) I know you're very busy now, but I need your help desperately!

**5-7.** Describe the underlined parts of the following short dialogues in terms of politeness. In each case, specify:

- whether it is positive or negative politeness;
- the actual politeness strategy or strategies used;
- how the underlined the linguistic devices contribute to perform the strategy.

- (1) B: [someone else said these questions] didn't make any difference really to the result of the examination  
A: but they do I think  
B: I'm quite certain that they do  
A: I'm quite certain that they affect it (London-Lund 1-1, 1056)
- (2) b: he is feeble, he is weak, he is totally unorganized  
a: yes, that may be so, but I'm sure he's capable of lifting few pieces of furniture from the van (London-Lund 4-2, 854)
- (3) A: How glad am I to see you again!  
B: So am I!  
A: Do you like my new look?  
B: Mm... I find it a little strange...
- (4) (Filling in an insurance policy)

Officer: Excuse me, but I'm afraid I must ask you if you've ever had any serious illness... This information is compulsory for this kind of policy.

Customer: Ok, no problem. Let me think...

(5) A: The concert was marvellous, wasn't it?

B: Yes, it was all right on the whole, but... well... perhaps the drums sounded too loud at certain moments.

(6) A: Do you have anything to tell me?

B: Oh, I'm afraid so... I saw our friend Jane and I think she looked sort of untidy... I mean her clothes were not really neat or clean...

(7) A: Are you enjoying Jim Smith's last novel?

B: Oh, my, my, my...! It's as boring as watching paint dry!

**5-8.** Imagine that a speaker utters the linguistic stretches a), b) or c) with the intention of ordering the addressee to clean the kitchen:

*a) Clean the kitchen!*

*b) Could you please clean the kitchen? I've already cleaned the bathroom and tidied the living-room.*

*c) The kitchen is very dirty. I'm tired now because I've already cleaned the bathroom and tidied the living room.*

Explain the similarities and differences between these utterances in terms of politeness as has been studied in this course.

**5-9.** Which of the responses is more adequate, in the communicative situation of a student speaking to another in a university classroom? Justify your answer.

*a) Excuse me, María, I'm afraid I must interrupt you for a second... Could you please give me a sheet of paper by any chance?*

*b) María, could you give me a sheet of paper?*

**5-10.** In the following dialogue, from the film *Duck Soup* (1933), the three contributions contain FTAs.

(Note: Freedonia is an imaginary state, Mrs Teasdale is a rich widow and Vera is a sinuous Latin temptress/dancer)

Trentino: *I've given up the idea of a revolution. I have a better plan...I can gain control of Freedonia much easier by marrying Mrs. Teasdale.*

Vera: *Ha, ha, ha. Maybe that's not going to be so easy...From what I hear, you see, Mrs. Teasdale is rather sweet on this Rufus T. Firefly.*

Trentino: *Oh, well that's where you come in. I'm going to place him in your hands. And I don't have to tell you what to do or how to...*

- a) Which are the FTAs?
- b) How does Trentino perform these FTAs? And Vera? Consequently, who is the more polite of the two?

**5-11.** The examples to be analyzed in this exercise contain expressions of epistemic modality, i.e. expressions of degrees of probability and certainty.

Epistemic expressions include:

-Modal auxiliaries: *may, might, could, should, must, ought to, will, would*. *Can* is included only in the negative.

-Adjectives: *certain, doubtful, likely, sure...*

-Adverbs: *certainly, definitely, maybe, perhaps, possibly, probably, surely...*

-Lexical verbs: *I believe, I guess, I suppose, I think...*

Evidentiality is a near category which refers to the kind or source of the evidence in favour of the truth of the proposition. Some evidential expressions are *apparently, evidently, obviously*, or the verbs *seem* and *appear*.

In this exercise, the distinction between epistemic and evidential expressions will not be considered.

Weak epistemic expressions (*may, might, possibly, seem...*) are often used with negative politeness, while strong epistemic expressions (*certainly, obviously, I am sure...*) are associated with positive politeness.

Analyze the dialogues below, from the London-Lund corpus (Svartvik and Quirk 1980) in terms of politeness. Specify:

- a) whether the politeness is positive or negative;
- b) the actual politeness strategy;

c) the epistemic expressions used in the strategy.

- (1) you know I mean he was suspected of having lung cancer, and presumably he's got something equally fatal, or perhaps it is lung cancer (1-4, 1042-43)
- (2) sort of one can imagine a sort of middle-aged woman with a coat that seemed you know sort of just slightly exaggerated her form; you know I mean she could sort of slip things in inside pockets (2-13, 406-408)
- (3) a: before you sit down I'll get another glass  
B: excellent, Mike! You're on the ball, obviously  
a: oh, yes (1-7, 509)
- (4) B: getting married is an awfully complicated business  
c: yeah I know, so I believe I think I one ought to hand it all over to an agency or something (2-11, 371)
- (5) b: well apparently in fact there's a brand of barleywater – by Robertson's in fact  
C: thought it was Robinson  
B: Robinson's oh that's it yes (2-7, 1039)
- (6) A: he has persuaded Oscar to go to the [st]  
B: well [aeng] perhaps Oscar didn't need any persuading (1-2, 347)
- (7) A: I think that went very well  
B: yes, I I think it did on the whole  
A: you sound a bit dubious  
B: no; well, I I get rather fed up of some of the youngsters and the claptrap they talk sometimes (1-1, 767)
- (8) a: general science, general medicine now I thought was the non-elitist



A: oh no! it's very elitist

a: I thought it was the specialists who are elitist

A: no, but general medicine is a speciality; I mean, general medicine... (2-9, 629)

(9) a: Zorm and Leigh Hunt have have computerized (3 to 4 sylls)

A: yes I think you've more or less got to; it saves a tremendous lot of donkey work (2-2, 476)

(10) B: since I've

a: ah yes

B: been trying to rule out all such activities next summer, at least I thought I could take something with me (1-2, 1117)

(11) can I ask you then to have a go at talking about [dhi] Piggottian aesthetic? I know that's a hard, presumably a very hard question (3-6, 526)

(12) C: it was I must have been just unlucky in the time I phoned; you just seemed to be out

b: [m] (giggles)

a: no we were just out at the pub (2 sylls) (2-7, 221)

.....  
JOINT PROJECT

Students are given a 7-day deadline to recall:

-Differences in politeness among countries. For those foreign students or those who have had an experience abroad, explain the differences found in politeness in different walks of life, such as the relations lecturer-student, student-student, parent-child, doctor-patient, shop assistant-customer, etc.

-Different unexpected experiences with politeness, with special mention of the situation and of the country or place in which the experience occurred. Situations where cultural differences had an influence on politeness.

.....

These differences will be discussed: students are to bring written drafts to class, and their recounts will give way to an informal discussion about cross-cultural pragmatics (i.e. pragmatics across cultures) and intercultural pragmatics (i.e. the pragmatics of the communication between language users with different first language and culture background).

.....

#### FURTHER READING

##### Optional reading

Cutting (2002), Chapter A6 'Politeness', pp. 44-54. Interested students are also encouraged to read more specialized contents on politeness in this book (Sections B6, C6 and D6).

## UNIT 6. COGNITIVE SEMANTICS

The basic references of this chapter are Taylor (1989) and Ungerer and Schmid (2013).

### 6.1. A brief characterization of cognitive linguistics

-Cognitive linguistics, in a similar way to functional linguistics and in opposition to much work in generative linguistics, posits an intimate relationship between structure and function of language, and between language and more general cognitive abilities. We might claim that concepts expressed in words, such as *red* and *dog*, mirror really existing properties of the world (although these properties are seen through the human brain).

-Cognitive linguistics lays emphasis on the relationship between knowledge and language. Language acquisition goes hand-in-hand with knowledge acquisition, and language shapes the acquisition of knowledge. Functional linguistics concentrates mainly on language as a means of communication, and cognitive linguistics, on the way language contributes to understanding the world. Both tendencies, which are not incompatible, give us a picture of the two sides of language: communication and cognition.

-For cognitivists, the meaning of a lexical item is not language internal (that is, it does not consist of its paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations with other lexical items), but language external: meanings are cognitive structures, embedded in patterns of knowledge and belief. For example, *toothbrush* is conceptualized 'in its own way', not in opposition to *nailbrush* or *hairbrush*.

### 6.2. Cognitive linguistics and linguistic categorization

#### 6.2.1. Classical categorization

#### EXERCISE 6.1

Warm-up question:

Imagine that 20 people are given 100 small cards of different shades of colours, except black and white, and are told to classify them according to the categories: 'red', 'yellow', 'blue', 'green', 'orange', 'purple', 'brown' and 'grey'.

- a) Do you think everyone would coincide in the classification of all the cards?
- b) Would the participants show higher degrees of coincidence in some cards than in others?

-Cognitive linguistics is deeply concerned with how language users categorize the world via linguistic words and expressions.

-According to the 'classical approach', categories had the following characteristics:

- Categories are defined in terms of a conjunction of necessary and sufficient features;

- Features are binary;

- Categories have clear boundaries;

- All members of a category have equal status.

-According to cognitive linguistics, this is not the way people categorize different entities. The inadequacy of the classical approach to categorization is shown in a series of experiments, some of which are reported below.

### *6.2.2. The categorization of colour and shape*

-In order to explain the principles of linguistic categorization, research was done on **colour categorization**. For a long time, most researchers believed that colour categories are totally arbitrary. Anthropologists (for example, Brown and Lenneberg) found out that colour names differed enormously among languages. This difference was thought to support the relativist view of languages (proposed by Sapir and Whorf), according to which languages divide and structure reality into totally different ways.

#### Berlin and Kay's experiments with colours

-However, concerning the categorization of colour, this relativist view was refuted by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (1969), who carried out a series of experiments that showed that **there is a hierarchy of focal colours that can be considered as universal**.

-Berlin and Kay worked with 329 standardized colour chips (Munsell colour chips). 320 were coloured chips, and the remaining 9 chips were white, black and seven levels of grey. The chips were ordered in a large colour card, according to colour and brightness.

-Berlin and Kay selected informants who were native speakers of 20 different languages. They collected the basic colour terms of these 20 languages by

means of a 'verbal elicitation test', i.e. by asking the informants to name the colours.

-In the next stage, the informants were asked to point out:

-all the chips of the colour card of a given colour x;

-the best examples of that colour x.

-The results were amazing: there was a high degree of coincidence in the best examples of colours, even with languages that had fewer colour terms than English. The coincidence became lower for the chips that were less clear instances of colours. That is to say, colour categorization is not arbitrary, but anchored in focal colours that are shared by speakers of different languages.

### Eleanor Rosch's experiments with colours

-Eleanor Rosch, in the early 1970s, did two experiments with 3-year-old children. The children were given colour chips; some consisted of focal colours and others consisted of non-focal colours. First, they were told to show any colour they liked, and they showed more chips of focal colours than of non-focal colours. Next, they were given colour chips and were asked to match them with the corresponding chip in another array. The children matched chips of focal colours more accurately than chips of non-focal colours.

-Rosch did another experiment with speakers of Dani (a New Guinea language with only two colour terms) and Americans. They were shown eight focal and eight non-focal colours, and were asked to match the colour chip with the corresponding chip on a colour card of the Berlin and Kay type. Once again, chips of focal colours were matched more accurately. Another finding was that the Americans matched both the focal and the non-focal colours more accurately; this may be due to the fact that the existence of specific words for focal colours facilitates colour recognition.

-Rosch did still another experiment: the Dani were taught the names of eight new colours (which were given the names of Dani clans). After some time, they were given focal and non-focal colour chips and asked about the name of the colours. The result was that they remembered focal colours more accurately.

-The results of Rosch's experiments can be summarized as follows (Ungerer and Schmid 2013: 14):

“(1) Focal colours are perceptually more salient than non-focal colours. [...]

.....

(2) Focal colours are more accurately remembered in short-term memory and more easily retained in long-term memory.

(3) The names of focal colours are more rapidly produced in colour-naming tasks and acquired earlier by children.”

### Eleanor Rosch’s experiments with shapes

-In a later experiment, Rosch (1973) experimented with shapes: using sets of prototypical squares and less prototypical squares (with slightly different shapes and/or gaps), she took Dani informants, who did not have a word for ‘square’ (she used approximate Dani expressions), and the Dani associated the names with drawings more easily in the case of prototypical squares.

-Therefore, “these results suggest that natural prototypes have a crucial function in the various stages involved in the formation and learning of categories” (Ungerer and Schmid 2013: 16).

-In conclusion, the experiments reported above provide evidence against the postulates of classical categorization: there are better examples of a category than others, the boundaries between membership and non-membership are not always clear, etc.

-We may also conclude that categorization is influenced by both universal features and language-specific features: the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is not to be totally dismissed.

### *6.2.3. Prototypes: concept and characteristics*

-The inadequacy of classical categories indicates that human categories are better captured with the concept of **prototype**. A prototype is a mental representation of the conceptual core of a category; a concrete entity can *be an instance of* a prototype.

#### ..... EXERCISE 6-2

Think about a bird, a fruit and a piece of furniture for a few seconds.

Did anyone think, for example, about an ostrich, a lemon or a carpet, respectively? Why (not)?

.....

**-Hedges** are linguistic resources for expressing degree of category membership:

-signalling prototypes: *par excellence*;

-for more peripheral members: *loosely speaking, strictly speaking, in that..., so-called, as such, kind of, sort of*, graphological devices (inverted commas), intonation patterns, etc.

-Other expressions, like *real* or the prefixes *quasi-* or *pseudo-* can indicate that an entity is not a member of a category in the strict sense, but shares attributes with prototypical members of that category: *Mary's husband is a real bachelor*.

-Most categories in life have prototypical and non-prototypical members: birds, fruits, flowers, vehicles, weapons, furniture, etc. These categories have some 'better' examples than others. There are few exceptions, in which categories have clear boundaries, such as blood groups in people: A, B, AB, O, positive and negative Rh, etc.

---

### EXERCISE 6-3

Students are to list 5 good examples, 5 middle examples and 5 bad examples of the category 'ave' (bird).

The results will be discussed in class; the responses of native and non-native speakers of Spanish will be compared.

---

-Eleanor Rosch (1973) asked a number of informants (this time, American college students) to list 'good' and 'bad' examples of the category 'bird'. The results were (the Spanish names of some of the birds are in brackets):

-Top 8: robin (petirrojo), sparrow (gorrión), bluejay (arrendajo azul), bluebird (pájaro azul), canary (canario), blackbird (mirlo), dove (paloma), lark (alondra).

-Middle rank: hawk (halcón), raven (cuervo), goldfinch (jilguero), parrot (loro), sandpiper (andarríos, lavandera).

-Last five: ostrich (avestruz), titmouse (paro), emu (emú), penguin (pingüino), bat (murciélago).

---

-From these results, Rosch ordered the properties as follows, according to importance in terms of prototypicality: (1) lays eggs, (2) has a beak, (3) has two wings and two legs, (4) has feathers, (5) can fly, (6) is small and lightweight, (7) chirps/sings, (8) has thin, short legs, (9) has a short tail, (10) has a red breast (only the robin). Property (1) is common to all birds, while property (10) is specific to the robin. Other properties have an intermediate position.

-Let us compare the differences between the results of Rosch's experiment with 'bird' and the experiment carried out in class with 'ave'.

-It is predictable that, in Spanish, the coexistence of the words 'ave' and 'pájaro' seems to bring about English-Spanish crosslinguistic differences as far as prototypicality is concerned (Diccionario RAE: "pájaro: ave, especialmente si es pequeña"). Probably, a sparrow would count as a prototypical 'pájaro', but not as a prototypical 'ave'.

-The comparison of these experiments shows that lexis in a concrete language can have an influence on linguistic categorization.

-This kind of phenomenon interests the cognitive linguist, since it is an instance of how categorization underlies the use of words and the use of language in general. The categories, taken together, make up the **mental lexicon** (i.e. a dictionary that people have in their minds).

-Category boundaries are indeterminate, or **fuzzy** (the corresponding noun is **fuzziness**); fuzziness becomes obvious when trying to answer questions such as the following:

-Can you imagine an object that makes you doubt whether it is a piece of fruit or not?

-Is a picture, a carpet or a big vase a piece of furniture?

-In contrast, the terms **vague** and **vagueness** refer to the lack of clear-cut boundaries of entities. In this respect, entities such as *mountain*, *knee* or *fog* are vague.

Vagueness is also mentioned in Unit 2, section 2.2., and Unit 3, Section 3.5., of this manual.

Prototypicality is also supported by the following experiments:

.....



William Labov's experiments (1973) with cups and bowls:

-William Labov (1973) did an experiment with drawings of a prototypical cup and 4 similar containers, whose width varied increasingly (see Figure 1, which contains an approximate illustration of the containers). The first three containers were almost unanimously called *cup*, the fourth started to be called *bowl*, and the fifth was often called *bowl*.

-Labov did another experiment with the same containers but the informants were asked to imagine different scenes: a coffee-drinking situation, a dinner table situation in which the container was filled with mashed potatoes, and a scene where the objects were filled with flowers. The category boundaries shifted with the context: for example, in the dinner table situation, the third item was called *bowl* by half the informants.

.....



Fig.1. A prototypical cup and similar containers gradually increasing in width.

\*\*\*\*\*

Rosch and Mervis' (1975) experiment

-Rosch and Mervis did an experiment with 400 American psychology students, each of whom was given six sheets of paper, each with a prototypical or non-prototypical member of the categories *bird*, *fruit*, *vehicle*, *furniture*, *weapon*. They had to list as many attributes as possible of each of the objects. The results were as follows (Ungerer and Schmid 2013: 32-33):

“(1) Prototypical members of cognitive categories have the largest number of attributes in common with other members of the category and the smallest number of attributes which also occur with members of neighbouring categories.  
[...]

(2) Bad examples (or marginal category members) share only a small number of attributes with other members of their category, but have several attributes

which belong to other categories as well, which is, of course, just another way of saying that category boundaries are fuzzy.” (For instance, non-prototypical birds can run very fast on earth, like some mammals.)

-Properties do play a role in categorizing different kinds of entities as prototypical or peripheral members of a category. However, according to cognitive psychologists, in order to categorize an entity we see it first as a whole, rather than analyzing its attributes. In principle, we only evaluate specific attributes when we are not sure about how to categorize an entity, or when the attributes are very specific (the stripes of a zebra, the neck of a giraffe, the trunk of an elephant...).

-This ‘gestalt’ perception of categories is the reason why dictionaries often provide illustrations of words, together with their definition (for example, *cottage*).

.....  
NOTE

-There are two ways of understanding the notion of prototype from the cognitive viewpoint:

- 1) The best examples of a category, i.e. central or typical members. For example, a robin or a sparrow for the category of ‘bird’.
- 2) A mental representation, as a sort of cognitive reference (for example, an imagined animal of a certain – not always clear – size, colour, etc.). This is the conception of prototype that Ungerer and Schmid advocate (1996: 41-42).

-Which way of understanding seems more plausible to you?

-Can a person conceive some prototypes in the first way and other prototypes in the second way, depending on the category concerned? (For example, an object seen in the early childhood can impress you...)

\*\*\*\*\*

-Prototypicality is by no means exclusive to concrete entities or qualities. Other kinds of entities also have prototypical and peripheral members.

-This is the case of **speech acts**, i.e. kinds of actions carried out by means of language.

.....

Speech acts are studied in depth in the 4h year obligatory subject 'Pragmatics and discourse in English'.

Let us consider two examples of speech acts: lies and apologies.

A) LIES. Ungerer and Schmid (2013: 101-102), categorize prototypical lies as follows:

- Factual falsehood: an utterance is false;
- Falsity of belief: the speaker believes that the utterance is false;
- Intention to deceive the addressee.

There are examples of peripheral lies according to these characteristics:

a) The utterance is literally true, but relevant information has been omitted;

A: *I don't feel well.*

B: *Have you been eating chocolates again?*

A: *Oh, no!* (said when A has been eating cream cakes: once again, the reason for A's feeling ill is having eaten too much of something sweet)

b) The speaker does not believe that the utterance is false, but later s/he realizes that it is false (in Spanish, "miento" is used in these contexts: *Pedro tiene tres hijos; miento, cuatro.*).

c) The lie is uttered with the aim of benefitting the addressee.

B) APOLOGIES. Thomas (1995: 99-102) state that apologies cannot be characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient properties, as characterized by Searle:

- Propositional act: the speaker S expresses regret for a past act A of S.
- Preparatory condition: S believes that A was not in H's best interest.
- Sincerity condition: S regrets act A.

*Sorry for letting you down!*

- Essential condition: the speech act counts as an apology for act A.

These may be considered as the features of prototypical apologies. However, many apologies do not actually follow all the criteria:

.....

*Sorry: I'll have to use your phone!* (the act to be regretted is future)  
*Sorry, I've lost your cigarettes!* (in a context where the speaker is helping the addressee to give up smoking)

\*\*\*\*\*

#### EXERCISE 6-4

Let us discuss prototypical and peripheral examples of the following categories:

a) The syntactic function Direct Object. Think of the following examples.

*The boy kicked **the red ball**.*

*Sally gave John **the red ball**.*

*Sally has **two sisters**.*

*Mary told me **that her brother had been in hospital**.*

b) The politeness strategy 'Directive weakening'.

\*\*\*\*\*

-**Prototypicality** also applies to abstract qualities or concepts: for example, *friend* and *loneliness* are categories with prototypical and peripheral members.

-Prototypes are not fixed reference points for categories; rather, they undergo changes if the context changes.

The concept 'context' is studied in Unit 1.

-Imagine I tell you:

*My upstairs neighbour has **a dog**.*

-Now listen to the following sentences (from Ungerer and Schmid 2013: 45-46):

(1) *The hunter took his gun, left the lodge and called **his dog**.*

(2) *Right from the start of the race **the dogs** began chasing the rabbit.*

(3) *She took **her dog** to the salon to have its curls reset.*

(4) *The policemen lined up with **the dogs** to face the rioters.*

-You will probably have imagined dogs of different kinds for each situation: the salient features are different (ability to retrieve, speed, small size, ability to fight). Even if you have some knowledge about dogs, you will have imagined dogs of different races.

.....

-The context-dependence of prototypes can be accounted for by **cognitive schemata**, which are conceptualizations of stored knowledge about a situation (state or event). Situations involve several entities (and therefore, several conceptual categories) that interact.

-Examples of cognitive schemata: a restaurant, a wedding, a library, a university classroom...

-Examples of categories within the schema of a restaurant: tables, waiters, dishes, crockery, cutlery, drinks, price, decoration...

-A cognitive schema is called up after hearing most utterances. For example,

***The boy was building a sandcastle with his bucket and his spade.***

triggers the following schema: beach/sandpit-young male human being – small castle – open container made of plastic or metal – tool for digging...

Compare with: *I clean the kitchen floor with a bucket and mop.*

*The gardener is digging a hole with a spade.*

***These boys*** are so efficient... (talking about work colleagues)

.....  
NOTE

-Cognitive schemata vary from culture to culture. For example, a person who knows the cognitive schema of a Japanese house imagines a desk lying on the floor, with no legs or drawers.

-Cross-cultural contact may influence cognitive models: for example, the British and the Spanish cognitive models for breakfast have traditionally been different, but now Spaniards, when they go to hotels of a certain standard, expect a breakfast offering a buffet which covers the kinds of food usually associated with an English breakfast.

\*\*\*\*\*6

#### 6.2.4. Folk and expert categories

-**Folk categories** are categories as they are conceptualized by ordinary language users.

-Folk categories are organized in **folk taxonomies**, which group categories of a certain area of knowledge. Folk taxonomies are often inaccurate or have gaps, but are effective for a person's everyday needs. For instance, someone may

classify the penguin as a bird and doubt whether the penguin lays eggs or not, but his/her knowledge about birds is anyway sufficient for the needs of everyday life.

-For example, in classifying animals, how many people think of *vertebrate animals*? In contrast, the word *pet* does not correspond to any scientific classification, but is common in folk categorization of animals. *Domestic animals* and *wild animals* are criteria based on functions, not on the physical characteristics of animals. Similarly, in Spanish, the distinction between *ave* and *pájaro* is based on size rather than on scientific characteristics.

-Example of a folk taxonomy: Tzeltal plant classification.

-Tzeltal is a Mayan language spoken in southern Mexico.

-In Tzeltal, there is no term for 'plant'. The terms of the highest level are the correlates of the following English terms:

*tree – vine – grass – broad-leafed plant – corn – bean*

-There are no terms such as 'cereal' or 'legume'. Beans are divided into many subtypes.

\*\*\*\*\*

#### EXERCISE 6-5

Can you think about some reasons for the structure of the Tzeltal plant classification?

\*\*\*\*\*

-However, folk categories are not sufficient for specialists in a certain area of knowledge. Professionals or knowledgeable people on certain areas have **expert categories**, grouped into expert taxonomies. Expert categories sometimes resemble classical categories: in order to be operative, a number of features must be specified, and a clear distinction between membership and non-membership is necessary. For example, the category **crime** is different for lay people than for lawyers. An **adult** is legally any mentally non-disabled person aged from eighteen onwards.

-Folk and expert categories and taxonomies coexist within a community, and even within an individual.

\*\*\*\*\*

.....

## EXERCISE 6-6

- a) How does the category *fish* differ, for instance, from the perspective of a biologist and the perspective of a housewife?
- b) Can you imagine a person using both kinds of categorization for *fish*, depending on the moments of his/her everyday life?
- .....

## EXERCISE 6-7

Among the categories that you have learned at university, think about some that you use in a 'folk' way and in an 'expert' way. For example: the noun 'sound' or the adjective 'pragmatic'. Do you use the term 'sentence' as a folk category? And the term 'utterance'? Think about the way you speak about this category with your colleagues or lecturers, or else with non-specialists in linguistics or literature.

.....

6.2.5. *Superordinate, basic level and subordinate categories*

-Categories may be divided into the following types: a) superordinate; b) basic level; c) subordinate.

.....

## EXERCISE 6-8

Which term would you normally use in order to tell a friend about an incident?

Last night a ..... ran over my downstairs neighbour.

- a. vehicle; b. car; c. Audi

What would the use of the terms 'vehicle' and 'Audi' implicate?

.....

-**Basic level categories** have the following properties: they are first learned by children, culturally salient, rooted in basic biological needs, readily available for human interaction, balanced between internal similarity and external distinctiveness. For example, **chair** is a basic-level category: all chairs have a seat, have a back and are used to sit on. Types of chairs, such as *kitchen chair*, *living room chair*, *garden chair*, etc. are subordinate categories. They have these attributes plus other specific attributes not shared by the whole category.

-This basicness is often reflected in the morphological structure of the word, as may be seen in these examples (the word at the right of the hyphen is the word used for the corresponding superordinate category):

-*Bracelet, ring, necklace* - *jewellery*.

-*Flute, guitar, piano, violin, cello...* - *musical instrument*.

-*Table, chair, sofa, lamp, cupboard...* - *furniture*.

-*Car, lorry, bus, bicycle/bike, motorbike...* - *vehicle*.

-The basic level has the highest **cognitive economy**, since “the largest amount of information about an item can be obtained with the least cognitive effort” (Ungerer and Schmid 2013: 71).

---

#### NOTE

Subordinate categories are not parts of basic level categories: the basic level category *man* has, for instance, *footballer* or *Englishman* as subordinate terms, but not *head*, *arm* or *leg*.

---

-It is easier to trigger attributes of basic-level categories than of superordinate categories: signalling attributes of *necklaces*, *bracelets*, *rings* is easier than signalling common attributes of the entities belonging to the category *jewellery*.

-Prototype categories are most fully developed on the basic level: it is easier to imagine a prototypical *chair* than a prototypical piece of *furniture*. In fact, when names of superordinate categories are heard, they seem to evoke collections of objects, rather than individual objects.

-Ungerer and Schmid (2013: 76) state: “When Rosch carried out her experiments on the basic level she found that for a former airplane mechanic the basic level had shifted from the category PLANE to more specific categories.” We may think of an interaction of the following issues:

-The existence of cultural models in the mechanic’s mind;

-The adequacy of the choice of words in the situational context.”

---

#### PROJECT (voluntary; to be done in groups)

-Study the classification of objects in a supermarket or department store, and explain how there is a compromise between cognitive models and commercial interests.

-For example, the importance of brands for some categories is reflected in the distribution of space.



-Perfumery: *Christian Dior / Yves Saint-Laurent / Carolina Herrera / Loewe... / general perfumery*. There is a similar division for clothes.  
 -However, there is no similar organization for the sections of books, videos or hardware.

-Subordinate categories, especially those formed by noun-noun compounds, have attributes that are not shared with other members of the corresponding basic level categories:

-*Apple juice* was described as ‘naturally cloudy’ and ‘mixed with soda water’.

(Anecdote: a little girl had ‘orange juice’ as a basic level category before she realized that it was juice made with oranges.)

-*Wheelchair* is associated with concepts such as *invalid* and *hospital* rather than with other chairs.

-Some words, like *newspaper* and *airplane*, shifted from subordinate status to basic-level status.

-Some entities belonging to subordinate categories have a close status to the basic level, in that they are expected to be used in default contexts. A typical example is *jeans* in the category of *trousers*.

.....  
 EXERCISE 6-9

-Let us take a look at the different members of the categories *flower* and *fruit*:

-flowers: *rose, carnation, daffodil, daisy, lily ...*

-fruits: *orange, apple, pear, banana, passion fruit, prickly pear* (‘higo chumbo’).

-Which is more clearly a basic level category, *flower* or *fruit*? Think about possible reasons.

-Do the two categories contain members whose status is near the basic level, and other members whose status is farther from the basic level?

.....

.....  
NOTE

-The division of categories into three levels is a simplified description of categories. There may be more levels, as in: *sportsman – footballer – forward – centre forward, false centre forward, etc.*

-The levels depend on the individual's knowledge of the field: some people may only have the levels *sportsman – footballer*, with the possible exception of *goalkeeper*. And experts have another lower category, with many types of centre forwards (*pure centre forward, false centre forward, etc.*).

.....  
-Some nouns of subordinate categories have metaphorical origins: *daisy* ('day's eye' referring to the sun); *buttercup* (allusion to shape and colour); *terrier* (linked to Latin *terra*, because a terrier digs in order to hunt)...

-States and events expressed by verbs also have basic-level and subordinate categories. For example, Ungerer and Schmid (2013: 104-105) propose the following subordinate categories for *walk* (basic level), whose superordinate verb is *move*, according to different specific characteristics:

-*limp*: 'lamely, unevenly, usually because one's leg has been hurt'

-*hobble*: 'in an awkward way, like rocking from one side to another'

-*amble*: 'at an easy gentle rate, in a way suggested by an ambling horse'

-*stroll*: 'slowly and leisurely'

-*wander*: 'around without a fixed course'

-*stride*: 'with long steps'

-*strut*: 'in a proud way, with pompous, erect gait'

-*march*: 'with a regular, esp. forceful step'

-*pace*: 'with even steps'

-*stamp*: 'pushing (one's foot) down heavily'

.....  
EXERCISE 6-10.

(Adapted from Ungerer and Schmid 2013: 110, exercise 1).

-With the aid of a thesaurus, state verbs with meanings of subordinate categories corresponding to the basic-level categories *eat, clean, cook, read, say*.

-NOTE. Some of these verbs seem to have superordinate verbs (for example, *communicate* in the case of *say*); there is no correlate verb for the category 'receive communication', which would be a superordinate of *read*: *eat*, *drink*, *clean* and *cook* do not seem to have superordinate verbs.

.....

### 6.3. Polysemy and meaning chains

#### 6.3.1. Polysemy and homonymy

-**Polysemy** is the association of two or more related senses with a single linguistic form. **Homonymy** differs from polysemy in that the senses of the single form are not related. Homonymy is an accidental phenomenon, while polysemy is a consequence of the way human beings use language to categorize items in the world. Cognitive linguistics tends to maximize polysemy at the expense of homonymy.

.....

#### EXERCISE 6-11.

Look at the different senses of the word *mean*:

-noun: in maths, the average of a set of numbers:

*The mean of 2, 7 and 9 is 6.*

-verb. Compare:

*What does 'serendipity' mean?*

*What do you mean when you say that he is often late?*

State the relationship between the three senses of *mean*.

.....

#### 6.3.2. Monocentric and polycentric categories

-Monocentric categories are those which have only a centre, and a prototype. The related senses of a polysemous item share a meaning core:

-Example of a monocentric category: *nose*. The prototype has the following features:

- 1) physical part of a person;
- 2) physical front pointed part of something.

-A prototypical use of *nose* is: *Her nose is bleeding*, which has features 1) and 2).

-Peripheral examples include:

-‘front part of a plain’. It has feature 2, but not feature 1.

-metaphorical examples, which contain feature 1 (since the concept ‘nose’ is applied to persons) but not feature 2 (since the concept is not used in the physical sense: *to have a good nose for something, it’s no skin off my nose* (‘it does not worry me’), *turn your nose up at something* (‘refuse something’), *under your nose* (‘where you should notice it, but you do not’).

-Polycentric categories have more than one centre, and more than a prototype.

-An example of a polycentric category is that expressed with the verb *climb*, whose senses can be described as follows:

-ascending locomotion with the limbs: *The boy climbed the tree.*

-ascending mechanical locomotion: *The locomotive climbed the mountainside.*

-ascending movement in the air: *The plane climbed to 30,000 feet.*

-non-physical elevation: *The temperature/ the prices climbed day by day.*

*During his life, he climbed steadily.*

-descending locomotion with the limbs: *The boy climbed down the tree.*

There is no common semantic feature for *climb* in all the examples. This category may be considered to have two centres: physical locomotion / ascension. Prototypical examples have the two features. The feature ‘with the limbs’ also plays a role in this category.

-**Zeugma** (ellipsis in a contiguous clause) creates an effect of oddness when different senses of a polysemous item, which do not occupy adjacent places in the continuum, occur in coordination or ellipsis:

*!Peter is climbing a mountain, and the temperature to forty degrees.*

*!Arthur and his driving licence expired last Thursday.*

-However, coordination or ellipsis may be acceptable if the senses are slightly different but do not occupy distant places in the continuum:

*The pedestrians and the vehicles climbed the mountain. MIRARLO*

### 6.3.3. Polysemy and prepositions: the case of 'over'

-One of the greatest merits of cognitive linguistics is the improvement brought about in the analysis of prepositions: their apparently chaotic proliferation of senses is now proved to have some internal logic.

-As a sample of the way prepositions have been studied in cognitive linguistics, let us analyze *over* as a preposition. Its related senses may be described as follows:

- a) Static relationship of place, physically superior position, without contact: *He walked over the hill.*
- b) Dynamic relationship of place, physically superior position, without contact: *The plane flew over the city.*
- c) Dynamic relationship of place, with contact: *He walked over the street.*
- d) Dynamic relationship of place, with contact and shape of path: *He walked over the hill.*

Other curved paths: *He turned over a page, He fell over a stone, etc.*

- e) Static relationship of place, with contact: *He lives over the hill.*
- f) Dynamic relationship of place; the end-point of the path is imaginary: *Come over here.*
- g) Covering (partial) relationship: *He walked all over the city.*
- h) Covering (complete) relationship, physically superior position: *He laid the tablecloth over the table.*
- i) Power relations: *He has no authority over me.*
- j) Non-physical obstacle: *He got over his parents' death.*

-The senses of *over* relate chain-like; the only common feature seems to be physical or non-physical superiority, also in the sense of inclusion of all the entity or a considerable portion of it, as in examples d, f and g.

## 6.4. Category extensions: metonymy and metaphor

### 6.4.1. The concepts of metonymy and metaphor

-Both **metonymy** and **metaphor** involve the transfer of properties from an entity  $e^1$  (source) to another entity  $e^2$  (target). The difference lies in that, in metonymy,

the two entities involved belong to the same cognitive domain, whereas in metaphor they belong to two different cognitive domains. Therefore, in metaphor, but not in metonymy, we can speak about source domain and target domain.

-The names 'source' and 'target' seem counterintuitive: the source stands for the target.

-For example, the noun *mouth* can be the source domain of both metonymy and metaphor:

*John has six **mouths** to feed.* (metonymy: six persons). Both *mouth* and *person* are part of the same domain ('human being')

*John is taking a photo of the **mouth** of the river.* (metaphor: the source domain is 'human being' and the target domain is 'river')

-Both metaphors and metonymies resemble each other in the following respects:

- They can be explained as mapping processes (from a source to a target).
- They are conceptual in nature.
- They are means of extending the resources of a language.
- They can be conventionalized, so that they often become unconscious.

-The traditional view of metonymy and metaphor suggested that these were more 'complicated' ways of saying something than the 'normal' equivalent. The truth is really the opposite, since both usually involve the use of a concrete and apprehensible entity instead of an abstract or more complex entity. Metaphors do not often cause difficulties for understanding objects or concepts; on the other hand, they facilitate understanding of the target domain by resorting to the source domain, which is often easier to grasp.

-Here we will see how metonymy and metaphor are not limited to creative literary examples: they play a role in the very organization of knowledge, in many cases they are unconscious, and occur with words such as prepositions.

#### 6.4.2. Metonymy: types and examples

-The most interesting cases of metonymy are those of **synecdoche**, in which a part or subcategory can stand metonymically for the whole category for the purpose of making inferences or judgements. In our study, metonymy will also cover the cases in which **usual** properties of a given category are used as if they were **necessary** properties of the category.

-Ungerer and Schmid (2013: 117-118) distinguish the following contiguity relations in metonymy. The structure of the explanation is 'source for target' (the examples are theirs):

- Part for whole (synecdoche): *all **hands** on deck.*
- Whole for part: *to fill up the **car**.*
- Container for content – *I'll have a **glass**.*
- Material for object – *a **glass**, an **iron**.*
- Producer for product – *have a **Löwenbräu**, buy a **Ford**.*
- Place for institution – *talks between **Washington** and **Moscow**.*
- Place for event – ***Watergate** changed our politics.*
- Controlled for controller – *The **buses** are on strike.*
- Cause for effect – *His native **tongue** is German.*

-In certain cases, the part mentioned is the most relevant part of the whole in the situation described:

- We need a couple of strong **bodies** for our team.*
- There are a lot of good **heads** in the university.*
- We need some new **faces** around here.*

-Some peripheral examples of metonymy are the following:

- social stereotypes: *He's a politician, **but** he's honest.*
- prototypical examples-all examples (peripheral examples are excluded): *fruit **and** tomatoes.*
- salient examples (the DC-10 plane type became stigmatized after one of them crashed in the States).

-There are cognitive constraints on metonymy: you cannot say, for instance, *Mary was delicious*, meaning by *Mary* a cheesecake that Mary made. Metonymy needs to be sanctioned by a body of knowledge and beliefs on the part of the linguistic community.

#### 6.4.3. *Metaphor: types and examples*

-**Metaphor**, from the cognitive point of view, is seen as a means whereby more abstract and intangible areas of experience can be conceptualized in terms of the familiar and concrete.

-Therefore, the understanding of a metaphor does not require special pragmatic abilities: the understanding of any utterance requires an act of context-sensitive interpretation by the listener/hearer; metaphorical utterances, on this view, do not form a special set.

-Sometimes, the only way to design an entity is a metaphorical word or expression; therefore, it does not have any non-metaphorical equivalent. Examples: *mouse* (in computer), *crane* (for building houses), etc.

-Source domains are often expressed by basic level words:

*He is a lion / a real pig / a fox...* (!He is a fox-terrier)

*Feel blue / be green with envy* (!crimson, scarlet, ochre, olive...)

-**Synaesthesia** is a type of metaphor in which one sensory domain is mapped on to another (*loud/warm colour, sweet music, black mood, I'm feeling blue, dull sound*).

-Some of the main sources of metaphor are Lakoff's **FECHA** image schemas, which we humans form in our mind as a result of sensory experience, in order to understand different (and gradually more complex) experiences of the world. The source is a spatial domain and the target is temporal or non-physical.

a) containment: linguistic forms: *put into words, empty words*;



emotional states: *be in love, fall out of love...*

- b) a journey and its component parts: *my life isn't getting anywhere...*
- c) proximity and distance: *a close friend, a distant person, to keep one's distance...*
- d) linkage and separation: *keep in touch, break family ties, stick together...*
- e) front-back orientation: *look forward to the future, look back on the past...*
- f) linear order: *first (before), second (later)...*
- g) up/down orientation:
  - quantity (more is up, less is down): *high number/temperature/price...*
  - evaluation (good is up, bad is down): *high quality/opinion/hopes...*
  - control (power is up, powerlessness is down): *high society/command...*

-Lakoff suggests that these image schemas might be so deeply grounded in common human experience that they constitute, as it were, universal prelinguistic cognitive structures. Metaphor is a powerful tool for the acquisition and structure of conceptual knowledge (i.e. the organization of knowledge in the brain). Therefore, conceptual organization of space places a crucial role in the way we shape the organization of knowledge, and therefore on the way that this organization is reflected by the meanings of words and more complex linguistic expressions.

-Diversity can be expected if different language communities draw on different experiential bases in their conceptualization of reality: *heat* tends to be associated with positively valued states in English and with negative valued states in Sotho languages, in Africa.

-Some linguistic approaches restrict metaphor to the cases in which there is some degree of consciousness of the transfer of domains, as in literary metaphor. Cognitive linguistics includes conventionalized metaphors in which language users are normally not conscious of the transfer of domains. However, the approach to metaphor to be chosen depends on the actual task to be carried out: the cognitive concept of metaphor may be too broad for a paper about the style of a literary author.

-Other conventionalized metaphors commonly belong to the following types:

-concreting (concrete source, abstract target): *the light of learning, a vicious circle*;

-animistic (animate source, inanimate target): *an angry sky, killing half an hour*;

-humanizing (human source, non-human target): *a charming river, a friendly city*.

#### Common pairings Source-Target:

-MONEY (source) and TIME (target):

*give some time, waste time, spend time, run out of time.*

-JOURNEY (source) and LIFE (target):

She *went* through life with a good heart.

He knows where he *is going* in life.

I don't know which *path* to take.

He worked his *way* among many obstacles.

#### Common source domain: parts of the body

-*head*: of department, of state, of a queue, of a bed, of a syntactic construction;

-*face*: of a mountain, of a building, of a watch;

-*eye*: of a needle, of a potato;

-*mouth*: of a hole, of a tunnel, of a cave, of a river;

-*neck*: of a shirt; bottle-neck;

-*arm*: of a chair, of a coat or jacket;

-*hands*: of a watch or clock.

-*foot*: of a lamp, of a bed...

-*heart*: of the matter, of the city...

#### Common target domains (examples from Ungerer and Schmid 2013)

-ARGUMENTS:

-Source domain: JOURNEY:

When we *get to the next point*, we shall see that philosophy is historically an achievement of Western culture.

We *have arrived* at a disturbing conclusion.

-Source domain: BATTLE:

She *attacked* every weak point in my argument.

They *defended* their position ferociously.

He *withdrew* his offensive remarks.

He had to *succumb* to the force of her arguments.

-Source domain: CONTAINER:

Your argument doesn't have much *content*.

That argument has *holes* in it.

I'm tired of your *empty* arguments.

-Source domain: BUILDING:

We've got a *framework* for a *solid* argument.

With the *groundwork* you've got, you can *construct* a pretty *solid* argument.

-THOUGHTS, IDEAS and FEELINGS. Source domains: PHYSICAL ACTIONS:

Try to *pack* more thoughts into fewer words.

*Insert* those ideas elsewhere in the paragraph.

The sentence *was filled* with emotion.

Try to *get* your thoughts *across* better.

You still *haven't given* me any idea of what you mean.

Can you *extract* coherent ideas from that prose?

Let me know if you *find* any good ideas in the essay.

### Other common metaphors

-In politics: *the right, the left*;

-In computer science: *virus, mouse*;

-It is not easy to determine if the terms *folders* and *files* also metaphorical.

Probably virtual objects are objects (books, pages...) in their own right. The virtual world may be considered to be metaphorical, in that there is an attempt to transfer properties of the physical objects into the virtual objects.

-In linguistics: *valency* (from chemistry to complementation of the Verbal Group).

.....

.....  
 EXERCISE 6-12.

Invent clauses that contain metaphor, with the source and target domains specified below.

<u>Source</u>	<u>Target</u>
dangerous animal	anger
journey	argument
war	argument
departure	death
plants	ideas
day	lifetime
war	love
buildings	theories
money	time
seeing	understanding
theatre	world

.....

The case of JOY, ANGER and FEAR as target domains

Certain cases where joy, anger and fear is expressed main be considered as cases of metonymy, in that the part (the physiological effects) stands for the whole (the mental state and the subsequent physiological effects), or else they may be considered as cases of metaphor, when the description of the physiological effects is considered as exaggerated, so that there is transfer from a physical domain to a non-physical domain:

-Metonymic / metaphorical expressions of ANGER:

She was flushed with anger.

His heart pounded.

She was quivering.

-Metonymic / metaphorical expressions of FEAR:

I was chilled to the bone.

She turned white as a sheet.

She was paralyzed with fear.

-Metonymic / metaphorical expressions of JOY:

You radiate (with joy)!!

-Expressions nearer the metaphorical, where the physiological effects are expressed in a non-rigorous way:

He just exploded.

She was bursting with anger.

Anger made his blood boil.

-Purely metaphorical expressions:

You've added fuel to the fire.

She hit the ceiling. (of joy or of anger)

I'm six foot off the ground.

I'm on cloud nine.

She's walking on air.

## ..... FINAL EXERCISES

**6-13.** Do you think that the categories stated below, as the average person conceives them are best explained in terms of necessary and sufficient properties, or in terms of prototypical and peripheral members? Justify your answer by using the terms listed in each case:

-FURNITURE - table, chair, cupboard, wardrobe, sofa, shelf, bed, fridge, washing-machine, computer, lamp, picture, carpet, vase.

-FRUIT - orange, apple, pear, banana, strawberry, cherry, grapefruit, lemon, tomato.

-CLOTHES - trousers, skirt, shirt, blouse, cardigan, coat, scarf, pants, bra, panties, socks, shoes, belt.

-HOUSE - apartment, cottage, mansion, hotel, camping tent, chalet, hut, cave, caravan, shack.

-FOOD - vegetables, fruit, vitamin pills, meat, fish, grass, eggs, lollipops, legumes, sweets, candies, chewing-gum, ice-cream.

**6-14.** State whether the italicized expressions of the following cases are instances of metonymy or of metaphor:

a) Jim always *defends* his customers' interests.

- b) At the stadium, *thousands of eyes* were watching me.
- c) Look at the *eyes* of this potato! It must be very old.
- d) I hope that the negotiations between *London* and *Madrid* will be successful.
- e) This practice does not *cover* deixis.
- f) She got very nervous when she saw hundreds of *eyes* looking at her.
- g) I think the interview *went* very well.
- h) She did not *break*, even after hours of intense interrogation.
- i) Negotiations between *Madrid* and *Berlin* over the submarine question are far from ended.
- j) Suddenly *my attention* was caught by a van parked a short distance ahead.
- k) Some might be a little concerned that several of these Essays were written by authors *who later abandoned Marxism*, or even became opponents of it.
- l) *The underground* was on strike several times last month.

**6-15.** Explain why the italicized part of the following sentences can be understood both as metonymy and as metaphor:

When Jane saw the injection, *she went pale*.

When John declared his love to me, *my face went red*.

When the thief saw the policeman, *his heart started to race*.

**6-16.** State whether, in everyday language, the categories stated below are superordinate, basic level or subordinate. Justify your answers.

cutlery, chicken, apple tree, relative (noun), shirt, mammal, rock chair, brother-in-law

**6-17.** State the metaphors in the following dialogue (from the film *Duck Soup*, 1933) and explain why they are metaphors.

(Trentino wishes to marry Mrs Teasdale in order to gain control of Freedonia.)

Vera: *Ha, ha, ha. Maybe that's not going to be so easy... From what I hear, you see, Mrs. Teasdale is rather sweet on this Rufus T. Firefly.*

Trentino: *Oh, well that's where you come in. I'm going to place him in your hands. And I don't have to tell you what to do or how to...*

**6-18.** Underline the cases of metonymy and metaphor in the following text:

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25461551>, accessed 27-12-2013

### **Labour would give councils power to ban roulette machines**

#### **Ed Miliband: "Gambling machines cause debt and misery for families"**

Ed Miliband has vowed to give councils the power to ban high stakes roulette machines from bookmakers' shops if Labour wins the next election.

Punters can bet up to £300 a minute on so-called Fixed Odds Betting Terminals.

Mr Miliband said they were "spreading like an epidemic [simile]" causing "debt and misery" and acting as a magnet for crime and anti-social behaviour.

He said Labour would amend planning and gambling laws so councils in England, Scotland and Wales could ban them.

He told BBC News fixed odds machines were "addictive for some people" and the gambling industry targeted poorer parts of the country.

"Somebody has got to step in and stand up to the betting industry," he added.

#### **'Mini casinos'**

There are over 33,000 FOBT machines making over £1.5bn each year for the big bookmakers - about half their annual profits.

Critics say the machines are highly addictive and lead to crime and poverty but the gambling industry says there is no hard evidence of this and have promised a new code of conduct to allow players to limit their own stakes.

The government has not ruled out taking action to cut the stakes and prizes on FOBT machines to make them less potentially addictive.

But it is awaiting the outcome of a study into how harmful the machines are to individual players, which is due to report next autumn.

It was changes to gambling legislation brought in by Labour that allowed bookmakers to start installing FOBT machines.

But Mr Miliband said the current limit of four per betting shop, had simply led to "clusters" of shops opening together, often operating from 7.30am to 10pm, with councils powerless to act.

Labour would legislate to put betting shops in a separate use class so that councils can use planning powers to control the number opening in their area - at the moment they are in the same class as banks.

The party would also review the number of high-speed, high-stakes FOBTs allowed on bookmakers' premises - including banning them altogether.

And it would take steps to make the machines less addictive by cutting time between plays, requiring pop-ups and breaks in play.

Mr Miliband said: "In towns and cities across Britain today, you can see how the old bookies are being turned into mini-casinos.

"In the poorest areas, these are spreading like an epidemic [simile] along high streets with the pawn shops and pay day lenders that are becoming symbols of Britain's cost-of-living crisis."

### **'Pull the plug'**

He added: "In Newham there are 87 betting shops with an estimated 348 machines and across the five Liverpool constituencies there are 153 betting shops with around 559 FOBTs.

"This has huge consequences for our communities, causing debt and misery for families, and often acting as a magnet for crime and anti-social behaviour.

"But currently, there is almost nothing that can be done to stop the spread of FOBTs.

"Laws passed restricting betting shops to a maximum of four of these betting machines has meant more betting shops in clusters sometimes open from 7.30am to 10pm at night.

"The time has come to give local communities the right to pull the plug on these machines - the right to decide if they want their high streets to be the place for high stakes, high speed, high cost gambling."

The Liberal Democrats voted to give councils the power to limit the number of betting shops in their area at their party conference in September.

### **'Playing politics'**

A spokesman for the Association of British Bookmakers said that while it was possible to bet up to £100 a spin, "hardly anyone does" and the industry was committed to helping problem gamblers.



"This announcement has nothing to do with helping problem gamblers; it is simply about playing politics with the jobs of 40,000 people, and the enjoyment of eight million people for no reason," said the spokesman.

But former betting shop manager Adrian Parkinson, of the Campaign for Fairer Gambling, welcomed Mr Miliband's announcement.

He said it was not just about curbing problem gambling as there was an equally big concern about the proliferation of bookmakers shops in deprived areas.

A string of local authorities have passed "symbolic" motions in recent months calling for FOBTs to be banned, he said.

He claimed the industry would be "dumfounded" by Mr Miliband's announcement as it believed it had escaped the threat of legislation.

## FURTHER READING

### Optional readings

Ungerer and Schmid (2013), Chapter 1 'Prototypes and categories' (pp. 7-63), Chapter 2 'Levels of categorization' (pp. 64-113) and / or Chapter 3 'Conceptual metaphors and metonymies' (pp. 114-162).

Evans and Green (2006), Chapter 9 'Metaphor and metonymy' (pp. 286-327).

## FINAL EXERCISES: WORK ON TEXTS

### 1. Work on the following text:

<http://www.gettysburg.com/maryjemison/> accessed 13-11-2013.

Born aboard ship en route from Ireland, Mary Jemison (née Jameson) was just 15 when she was abducted in 1758 from her Buchanan Valley home. While her Shawnee captors killed other members of her family, they spared Mary, later trading her to a Seneca Nation where she was adopted by two Seneca women.

After the war Mary lived on with her Seneca family, becoming a leading member of the tribe. She was twice married to Seneca chiefs and acquired substantial property in New York state. Although she had chances later in life to leave the Seneca, she chose not to. Mary died at the age of 90.

**a) State three presuppositions (existential presuppositions are excluded).**

**b) State four referring expressions of your choice, and classify them as a.** indefinite non-anaphoric; **b.** direct anaphoric; **c.** indirect anaphoric; **d.** definite, identifiable by pre-or post-modification; **e.** definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world; **f)** generic.

**c) Identify the deictic expression in the following sentence, and specify the kind of deixis that this expression has.**

Mary died at the age of 90.

### 2. Work on the following text (adapted from

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia\\_Woolf](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_Woolf))

According to Virginia Woolf's memoirs, her most vivid childhood memories were not of London but of [St. Ives](#) in [Cornwall](#), where the family spent every summer until 1895. Her family's summer home, Talland House, looked out over Porthminster Bay, and is still standing today, though somewhat altered. Memories of these family holidays and impressions of the landscape, especially

the [Godrevy Lighthouse](#), informed the fiction Woolf wrote in later years, most notably [To the Lighthouse](#).

**-State three presuppositions (existential presuppositions are excluded):**

**-State two referring expressions that refer to two different entities, and classify the expressions selected as a. indefinite non-anaphoric; b. direct anaphoric; c. indirect anaphoric; d. definite, identifiable by pre-or post-modification; e. definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world; f. generic.**

**3. Work on the following text**, adapted from:

<http://www.sing365.com/music/lyric.nsf/John-Lennon-Biography/DB7F22DADCB472614825686D00341339>, accessed January 27, 2013.

At Quarry Bank High School, he met a woman by the name of Cynthia Powell, who became his first wife. As a child, John lived a life of uninterrupted calm. He didn't recall feeling desperately sad or unusually happy. Unfortunately that calm was suddenly shattered when his mother died before his 18th birthday. John did not like to talk about the death of his mother, because it was too great a sorrow to be publicized. John went to live with his Aunt Mimi, whom he considered the greatest person. They lived in a little house, with frilly curtains at the windows and an old apple tree in the front garden. When John was away from home, he thought about Aunt Mimi and her frilly curtains and her apple tree, and he realized how fortunate he was. Because, though his mother was taken away from him, he was given something precious in return.

**a) Write five referring expressions, each of them belonging to a different type:**

**a. indefinite non-anaphoric; b. direct anaphoric; c. indirect anaphoric; d. definite, identifiable by pre-or post-modifiers; e. definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world.**

**b) Trigger 5 presuppositions from the text.**

#### 4. Work on the following text:

Source: *Friends* (American sitcom, first released in 1994), Episode: “The one where Monica gets a new roommate”

[Scene: Monica’s Apartment, Rachel is talking on the phone and pacing.]

**Rachel:** Barry, I’m sorry, I am so sorry... I know you probably think that this is all about what I said the other day about you making love with your socks on, but it isn’t... it isn’t, it’s about me, and I ju- (She stops talking and dials the phone). Hi, machine cut me off again... anyway... look, look, I know that some girl is going to be incredibly lucky to become Mrs. Barry Finkel, but it isn’t me, it’s not me. And not that I have any idea who me is right now, but you just have to give me a chance too... (The machine cuts her off again and she redials.)

**a) Write three presuppositions that occur in the text. Existential presuppositions do not count.**

**b) Describe one of the politeness strategies that occurs in the text.**

**Specify:**

- 1) whether the speaker is doing a FTA or not; if so, whether it concerns the speaker’s or the addressee’s face;
- 2) the actual politeness strategy;
- 3) the linguistic expressions in the text that are indicators of this strategy.

**c) Specify four different referring expressions, apart from the pronouns *I*, *me* and *you*, and state its kind: a. indefinite non-anaphoric; b. direct anaphoric; c. indirect anaphoric; d. definite, identifiable by pre-or post-modifiers; e. definite, identifiable by knowledge of the world.**

## ORIENTATIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAM

### Examples of essay questions

-Explain how the experiments carried out by Berlin and Kay and by Ross, cited in Ungerer and Schmid (1996), show that the categorization of colour is universal to a great extent, although it may also be influenced by native language.

-Explain how the speech act type 'Apology' can be described in terms of prototypical and peripheral members.

-Explain how the category 'vehicles', as is conceived by ordinary language users, is better explained in terms of prototypical and peripheral members than in terms of necessary and sufficient properties. Illustrate your explanation with examples of prototypical and peripheral members of this category.

### Examples of shorter questions

-Give an example of an utterance that is syntactically and semantically correct, but pragmatically inadequate in a given context.

-Explain how the verb *mean* may concern either semantic meanings or pragmatic meanings.

-Give two examples of *That's wonderful* occurring in two pragmatically different contexts. Explain how the speaker's intention is different in both cases.

-Can a person's profession have an influence on his/her categorization of entities in terms of superordinate, basic level and subordinate categories? Justify your answer.

-Explain how Berlin and Kay's (or Rosch's) experiments show that colour categorization has universal features, even if people speak different languages.

-Explain the difference between metonymy and metaphor, giving an example of each.

-Describe two kinds of negative politeness strategies in which the FTA is performed on record. Give examples of each.

**Examples of terms to be defined**

Definite reference

Presupposition trigger

Superordinate category-

Basic level category

Subordinate category

Face-threatening act (FTA)

Existential presupposition

Spatial (or place) deixis

Prototype

Positive/negative politeness

**Practical exercises, similar to those carried out during the course.**

## KEY TO THE EXERCISES

### UNIT 1. INTRODUCTION

#### Exercise 1-1

Some of the meaning differences between the two stretches of language are: 1) the specification of the past tense by the verb *became*, which is present only in the second stretch; in the first stretch, past time is expressed by the Prepositional Phrase *in the twentieth century*; 2) *industrialization* is a noun, and therefore gives a character of 'entity' to the phenomenon, while *industrialized* is an adjective and therefore presents the phenomenon as a quality.

Since the first stretch of language is a NG and the second is a clause, the study of meaning differences of this kind lies in between phrasal semantics and clausal semantics. (Concretely, the first it is an instance of nominalization, an issue that is best placed in the obligatory subject 'English semantics').

#### Exercise 1-2

In the first pair, the order in which the two coordinates are presented does not really matter, because there is no causal relation between borrowing a book from the library and buying a pair of shoes, and the chronology is not important. In the other two pairs, however, the order does matter, because it implicates chronology and causality: the first event occurs before the second and is interpreted as being the cause of the second.

### UNIT 2. REFERENCE AND SENSE

#### Exercise 2-1

For example, John Lennon could be referred to by the expressions 'John Lennon', 'the murdered Beatle', 'Yoko Ono's partner', 'the Beatle with glasses', 'my favourite songwriter', 'that genius', etc.

#### Exercise 2-2

It might be argued that *the sea* sometimes has variable reference, because it may refer to a sea with a concrete name, depending on the context. For example, someone in Barcelona may say 'the sea is not rich in fish' referring to the Mediterranean. However, *the sea* may also refer to the salty

water that covers about 70% of the earth, including all the oceans and smaller seas.

### Exercise 2-3

In my report to the young children, the referring expression was *de dicto* (I did not want to take risks) but, given the complexity of the message, it was not surprising that the children transferred it to one another in their own words (and in doing so they added sensationalism); that is to say, their reports were *de re*.

### Exercise 2-4

On [16 December 1910]<sub>e</sub>, [a gang]<sub>a</sub> attempted to break into [the rear of [a shop in [[Houndsditch](#)]<sub>e,a</sub>]<sub>d</sub>. [An adjacent shopkeeper]<sub>a</sub> heard [their hammering]<sub>c</sub>, and informed [the police]<sub>e</sub>. When [the police]<sub>b</sub> arrived, [the robbers]<sub>b</sub> burst out, shooting [three officers]<sub>c</sub> dead.

### Exercise 2-5

a) [One day]<sub>a</sub>, [beautiful new dresses]<sub>a</sub> arrived at [the house]<sub>c</sub>. [A ball]<sub>a</sub> was to be held at [Court]<sub>e</sub> and [the stepsisters]<sub>b</sub> were getting ready to go to [it]<sub>b</sub>. [Cinderella]<sub>b</sub> didn't even dare ask, "What about [me]<sub>b</sub>?" for [she]<sub>b</sub> knew very well [the answer that [she]<sub>b</sub> would get]<sub>d</sub>.

b) *What* is not a referring expression, since it does not refer to a concrete entity; it asks the addressee to answer with a referring expression.

### Exercise 2-6

In this sentence, *an English woman* is ambiguous out of context: it may mean a concrete English woman, or else a woman who has not been singled out yet, and has to meet the requisite of being English.

## UNIT 3. DEIXIS

### Exercise 3-1

A person who finds the paper in those conditions cannot make sense of it, because s/he does not know who *I*, *you*, *tomorrow* or *this place* stand for. The sentence contains five deictic expressions:



I      ll meet      you      tomorrow at 6 pm      at      this place.  
 1      2      3      4      5

**Exercise 3-2**

-This ring      costs sixty euros.  
 spatial      temporal

-I      am looking      at those clouds      over there.  
 person      temporal      spatial      spatial

-My friend      has gone back      to Paris.  
 person      temporal

NOTE: *has gone back* has been underlined together because it is a phrasal verb ('back') is an adverb; however, *at* in *look at* is a preposition, and consequently has been excluded from the Verbal Group.

-You      showed      me      that picture      last week.  
 person      temporal      person      spatial      temporal

-Sorry, sir.      We      haven't got any more tickets.  
 person / social      person      temporal

-She      has finished      Chapter 3.  
 person      temporal      discourse

-You      are      my best friend      here.  
 person      temporal      person      temporal

-Yesterday      all my troubles      seemed      so far away.  
 temporal      person      temporal      temporal

NOTE: 'far away' is literally a spatial expression, but here it expresses temporal deixis metaphorically.

-Hey you,      your seat      is      right over there!  
 Person/social      person      temporal      spatial

-My son      wrote a novel      here      two years ago.  
 person      temporal      spatialtemporal

-Your daughter      found      page 33      interesting.  
 person temporal      temporal      discourse

-Do      you      know      whose purse      this      is?  
 Temporal      person      temporal      spatialtemporal

-Ladies and gentlemen, now I will talk about foreign  
 Person/social temporal person temporal  
 investments in China.

- A: I 'm sorry I stepped on your toe!  
 person temporal person temporal person

B: It 's all right, madam.  
 temporal social

NOTE: According to the view presented here, *it* is anaphoric. In other approaches, it would have been considered as discourse-deictic.

### Exercise 3.3

Right here, right now  
 person temporal

I 'm lookin' at you  
 person temporal person

And my heart loves the view  
 person temporal

NOTE: The definite article in 'the view' has anaphoric function, because this Noun Phrase is understood as referring to the previous verse 'I'm looking at you'.

Cause you mean everything  
 person temporal

Right here, I promise you somehow  
 spatial person temporal person

That tomorrow can wait some other day to be  
 temporal temporal

But right now there's you and me  
 temporal temporal person temporal

### Exercise 3.4

- The deictic expression *will be* (future temporal deixis) indicates that the (speaker's) event is placed before 1989.
- The deictic expression *going back* (spatial deixis) indicates that the speaker is not in London.
- The deictic expression *here* is anaphoric, since it refers anaphorically to Madrid, and deictic, since it indicates that the speaker is in Madrid.

**UNIT 4. PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT****Exercise 4-1**

The intention of formulating these questions is to get an answer such as ‘But this is absurd!’ Then the lecturer explains the reason for the absurdity: the utterance contains the false presupposition ‘You are all smoking in class’.

**Exercise 4-2**

These cases are syntactically imperative clauses, but are not directives, because the addressee does not have full control to carry out the action. These clauses express wishes, so that a presupposition beginning with ‘the addressee is able to...’ is not triggered. However, the presuppositions ‘You are not well’ and ‘You are going to fight him’ are triggered.

**Exercise 4-3**

1. Mary was sorry that it rained.

‘It rained’.

2. Sue remembered to phone us.

‘Sue intended to phone us.’

NOTE: ‘Sue phoned us’ is not a presupposition, since it has no constancy under negation.

3. Jane managed to shut the door.

‘Jane tried to shut the door.’

4. Have you stopped smoking?

‘You were smoking before.’

5. It continued to rain.

‘It was rained before.’

6. Mary failed the exam for the fifth time.

‘Mary failed the exam four times before.’

‘Mary did the exam five times.’

7. It is my glasses that I am looking for.

‘I am looking for something.’

8. What she needs is a good holiday.

‘She needs something.’

9. Anne did not continue studying Italian.

‘Anne was studying Italian before.’

10. When Sally came, our house was in a mess.

‘Sally came.’

‘We have a house.’

11. John was not aware that the glass was broken.

‘The glass was broken.’

NOTE. Paraphrases of presuppositions are also valid, e.g. ‘Someone broke the glass’ here. However, it is not necessary to do them.

12. Robin forgot to bring us the book.

‘Robin intended to bring us the book.’

‘Robin was in possession of the book for some time.’

13. Since her son left Madrid, she is feeling lonely.

‘Her son left Madrid.’

‘Her son was in Madrid for some time.’

14. Where did Joe hide his cigarettes?

‘Joe hid his cigarettes somewhere.’

‘Joe had cigarettes.’

15. Why are you crying?

‘You are crying for some reason.’

16. Andrew knows that his father won the prize.

‘Andrew’s father won the prize.’

‘Andrew has or had a father.’

17. Anna is happy with her salary increase.

‘Anna had a salary increase.’

18. My neighbour’s dog died last summer.

‘My neighbour had a dog for some time.’

19. Pete, who lives in the centre of London, usually gets stuck in traffic jams.

‘Pete lives in the centre of London.’

‘London has a centre.’

20. Will you go back to Japan?

‘You have been to Japan before.’

21. Bridget started writing her diary last year.

- 'Bridget has a diary.'
22. Mary recovered from her illness.  
'Mary was/got ill.'
23. What did she say about me?  
'She said something about me.'
24. I am revising my notes on presupposition for the sixth time.  
'I have notes on presupposition.'  
'I have revised my notes on presupposition five times before.'
25. It is with Paula that he is going out.  
'He is going out with someone.'
26. It was odd that she did not tell us the news.  
'She did not tell us the news.'  
'She had news to tell.'
27. My grandma stopped knitting immediately.  
'My grandma was knitting.'
28. This novel, which I bought at the airport, is really boring!  
'I bought this novel at the airport.'
29. Mark is a better lawyer than his brother.  
'Both Mark and his brother are lawyers.'  
'Mark has a brother.'
30. Where were you born?  
'You were born somewhere.'
31. Jim gave Laura the book.  
'Jim had a book for some time.'
32. Finally our friend did not leave Paris.  
'We have a friend.'  
'Our friend was in Paris.'
33. Yesterday my friends came to Madrid.  
'I have friends.'  
'My friends were not in Madrid before.'
34. I did not go to Rome.  
'I was not in Rome.'
35. They do not eat too much anymore.  
'They used to eat too much.'

36. What she has lost is a book on semantics.

‘She has lost something.’

37. The thief took the wallet from my pocket.

‘I had a wallet in my pocket.’

‘I had a pocket.’

‘I was confronted with a thief.’

38. While you were sleeping, I cleaned your computer.

‘You were sleeping.’

‘You have a computer.’

39. What Jane found was not my lipstick.

‘Jane found something.’

40. Barcelona is as good a football team as Real Madrid.

‘Both Barcelona and Real Madrid are football teams.’

41. The ex-minister came back to teaching.

‘The ex-minister was teaching before s/he was minister.’

‘That man/woman was a minister before.’

42. It is Halliday who leads systemic-functional linguistics.

‘Someone leads systemic-functional linguistics.’

43. The scientist repeated the experiment.

‘The experiment was done at least once before.’

NOTE: ‘The scientist’ is not expressed in the presupposition because the experiment might have been done by someone else.

44. Smith did not notice his friend’s new haircut.

‘Smith has a friend.’

‘Smith’s friend had a new haircut.’

45. Molly, who is really fond of art, visited the two museums of my town.

‘Molly is really fond of art.’

‘I live in a town.’

‘My town has two museums.’

#### **Exercise 4-4**

a) The presupposition cancelled is ‘You have guests’, in Quinn’s second contribution.

b) This cancellation has a face-threatening effect, because it is formulated without any politeness strategy (and moreover, with ellipsis). The fact that the cancellation is due to the lexical item chosen ('residents' instead of 'guests') may increase the face-threatening effect, and/or give Quinn an unfavourable impression of the man.

c) Other presuppositions from the text are:

-Third line: 'Quinn had said that he would like to leave a message for one of the man's guests before' (direct reported speech may also be used);

-Fifth line: The man had residents.

#### Exercise 4-5

a) Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number.

There was one other incident (1) of the same kind as the last which I told you (2). Several times since that day we had had to make up examples in school to illustrate different rules (3), but there had never been any quarrel except when we did them wrong (4). One day, we were told to make a conditional sentence. We did it, right or wrong, and showed up our bits of paper (5), and Sampson began looking through them (6) All at once he got up, made some odd sort of noise in his throat (7), and rushed out by a door that was just by his desk (8) (9). We sat there for a minute or two, and then we went up (10) I and one or two others, to look at the papers on his desk (11). I thought someone must have put down some nonsense or other, and Sampson had gone off to report him. All the same, I noticed that he hadn't taken any of the papers with him when he ran out (12) (13). Well, the top paper on the desk was written in red ink, which no one used (14). They all looked at it and swore that it wasn't theirs. Then I thought of counting the bits of paper: there were seventeen bits of paper on the desk, and sixteen boys in class. Well, I bagged the extra paper, and kept it, and I believe I have it now.

(1) There had been at least one incident before.

(2) I told you about an incident.

(3) We had learned different rules at school.

(4) Sometimes we did them wrong.

- (5) We had bits of paper.
- (6) Sampson was not looking at the bits of paper before.
- (7) Sampson has a throat.
- (8) There was a door by Sampson's desk.
- (9) Sampson has a desk.
- (10) We were not up before.
- (11) Sampson has a desk.
- (12) Sampson hadn't taken any of the papers with him when he ran out.
- (13) Sampson ran out.
- (14) No one used red ink.

b) 'They all looked at something' is an entailment of 'They all looked at it', not a presupposition, because it has no constancy under negation: if you state 'They all didn't look at it' the presupposition 'They all looked at something' is not maintained.

#### Exercise 4-6

Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number:

Sir James Paul McCartney (born 18 June 1942)(1) is an English musician, singer, songwriter, multi-instrumentalist and composer. With John Lennon, George Harrison and Ringo Starr (2), he gained worldwide fame as a member of the Beatles (3); his songwriting partnership with Lennon (4) is one of the most celebrated of the 20th century (5). After the band's break-up, he pursued a solo career, and later formed Wings with his first wife, Linda (6) (7), and Denny Laine.

- (1) Sir James Paul Mc Cartney was born 18 June 1942.
- (2) He was (sang) with John Lennon, George Harrison and Ringo Starr.
- (3) He was a member of the Beatles;
- (4) He had a songwriting partnership with Lennon.
- (5) He sang in the 20th century.
- (6) He has had at least two wives.



(7) His first wife's name is or was Linda.

### Exercise 4-7

Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number.

The Marx Brothers' greatest and funniest masterpiece - the classic comedy *Duck Soup* (1933) (1)- is a short, but brilliant satire of dictatorial leaders, Fascism and authoritarian government. The film, produced by Herman Mankiewicz (2), was prepared during the crisis period of the Depression(3).

The film opens with the flag of Freedonia, an imaginary small Balkan state (4). Freedonia has gone bankrupt through mismanagement (5) and is on the verge of revolution. The country's richest millionairess, the wide and widowed benefactress Mrs. Gloria Teasdale (6), has offered \$20 million to sponsor and support the cash-poor government (7), but only if it is placed under new leadership (8):

“The government has been mismanaged. I will lend the money (9), but only on condition that His Excellency withdraw and place the government in new hands (10)”.

- (1) The Marx Brothers' greatest and funniest masterpiece is the classic comedy *Duck Soup* (1933).
- (2) *Duck Soup* was produced by Herman Mankiewicz.
- (3) The Depression was a crisis period.
- (4) Freedonia is an imaginary small Balkan state.
- (5) Freedonia has been mismanaged.
- (6) The country's richest millionairess, the wide and widowed benefactress is Mrs. Gloria Teasdale.
- (7) The government is cash-poor.
- (8) There is a current leadership.
- (9) Mrs Teasdale has the money.
- (10) The government is currently in someone's hands.

## UNIT 5. POLITENESS

### Exercise 5-1

The development of this discussion will depend on the students' individual contributions and their colleagues' comments about them.

### Exercise 5-2

a) There is an FTA in this utterance, concretely a directive: the speaker wants the addressee to lend him / her the lawnmower for this weekend.

b) Yes; the strategy, as stated above, is 'claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership', concretely the subtype 'be optimistic'. By the way the speaker states it, we can infer that the speaker expects an affirmative answer. The reasons for this are known to the speaker and the addressee: for example, they have a long tradition of doing mutual favours such as that to each other, or the speaker borrows the addressee's lawnmower frequently.

c) At first sight, it is not mitigating, since the speaker does not speak in an apologetic way. However, the strategy 'claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership' downtones the size of the imposition, so that asking for the favour is presented as natural, and this could be considered as a type of mitigation.

### Exercise 5-3

a) The strategies have no limited boundaries, but make up continua. It is not difficult to find examples of borderline cases between two or more strategies. The students' proposals will be discussed. Here, a few examples will be offered: *-I just had good luck* said to an opponent in a competition after beating him / her may be considered to perform both the PP strategy 'modesty' and the NP strategy 'tact'.

-You may agree about an issue that concerns the addressee, so that the PP strategies 'Agreement' and 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs' are merged. This would be the case of the utterance *Oh yes, that was great indeed!!* after the speaker tells you about an experience and finishes his/her account by saying that it was unforgettable.

-An utterance such as *If you don't mind, please tell me how you manage to make such delicious strawberry cupcakes* may be considered as an instance of both 'Directive weakening' and 'Seeking information about the addressee', since the addressee may feel that the recipe is personal knowledge achieved after some effort.

b) Two or more different strategies can be easily combined in a speech act, which may consist of one or more utterances. The students' proposals are to be discussed. The following examples are offered here:

*-Please pass me the sugar, sweetheart!*

(Directive weakening + claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership.)

*-I do agree with you about the music but not so much about the dance.*

(Agreement + avoidance or reduction of disagreement.)

#### Exercise 5-4

a) The expressions that contribute most to the politeness strategies are underlined:

(1) you know I mean he was suspected of having lung cancer, and presumably he's got something equally fatal, or perhaps it is lung cancer (1-4, 1042-43)

(2) A: don't suppose you're having a list, are you? That's a bit old hat now I think  
B: well, we've we've tried to compile a list for our own purposes (2-10, 208)

NOTE: 'for our own purposes' has been underlined because it restricts the area of the future use of the list, which the other speaker considers unnecessary.

(3) I think I think possibly she [b] I came to the conclusion independently that she might be interested, be interesting (2-6, 856)

b) The reason for the speaker's doubtfulness is not easy to detect, and all reasonable explanations will be accepted. One possible reason is that the referent of *she* is to make a decision of some importance that concerns the speaker and the addressee (for example, participation in a joint project), and the

addressee, who is perhaps a speaker's subordinate, is cautious so as not to disappoint the addressee is the referent of *she* finally changes her mind.

### Exercise 5-5

- (7) B1 is more polite, since it could be considered to be an example of the strategy 'Tact', while B2 communicates the same information by means of a bald-on-record strategy.
- (8) B2 is more polite, since it performs the strategy 'Modesty', while B1 responds to the addressee's praise with a boast.
- (9) B1 is more polite, since it performs the strategy 'Avoidance or reduction of disagreement', while in B2 the disagreement is expressed bald-on-record.
- (10) B2 is more polite, since it performs the strategy 'Avoidance or reduction of disagreement', while in B1 the disagreement is expressed bald-on-record.
- (11) B1 is more polite, since it is an Offer (and therefore, it is the speaker's face that is threatened), while B2 is a directive ('Give us a place in your chalet...'), which threatens the addressee's face (and the threat is not small in this case).
- (12) B1 is more polite than B2: this is a case of a directive with a very weak degree of imposition, so that the bald-on-record strategy is more adequate than a very elaborate strategy such as that carried out in B2.
- (13) B2 is more polite than B1: this is another case of a directive, but the size of imposition is larger. We can say that B2 is a strategy that combines 'Directive weakening' and 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs', since it asks for the addressee's need of the paper. However, B1 is in this case a too simple way to perform the strategy.
- (14) B1 is more polite, since it performs the strategy 'Avoidance or reduction of disagreement', while in B2 the disagreement is expressed bald-on-record and, moreover, the speaker dispraises the addressee by implicated that s/he is simple minded.
- (15) B1 is more polite, since it performs the strategy 'Avoidance or reduction of disagreement' by expressing initial agreement (even though the

disagreement becomes obvious later) while in B2 the disagreement is expressed bald-on-record.

- (16) B1 is more polite, since it avoids answering the question directly (and therefore counts as the strategy of Tact), while B communicates the unfavourable information ('I don't like the apples you bought') quite straightforwardly.

### Exercise 5-6

- a) Negative politeness. In order to weaken the directive, two strategies are used: praising the addressee (strategy 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs') by means of the vocative 'Your Highness' and Directive weakening, realized by the hedge 'I'm afraid'.
- b) Negative politeness. The s/w is to transmit unfavourable information to the addressee. The verb 'regret' realizes the strategy of Tact; we must also note that 'very badly written' is communicated bald-on-record.
- c) Positive politeness. The strategy is 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs'. The speaker wishes to make his/her report interesting, and this is why s/he uses the hyperbole 'the most unbelievable story ever told'.
- d) Negative politeness. This is another case of directive weakening; in this case, the directive is weakened by means of two apologies, the first laying emphasis on the impingement ('I know you're very busy now', which could also count as 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs'), the second giving overwhelming reasons ('I need your help desperately').

### Exercise 5-7

- (1) The underlined expressions realize the PP strategy 'Agreement'. Both speakers put emphasis on agreement. B uses the expression *I'm quite certain*, and A repeats this expression.
- (2) The underlined expressions realize the NP strategy 'Avoidance of reduction of disagreement'. The underlined words contribute to this strategy by expressing initial agreement.
- (3) The first underlined words realize the PP strategy 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs'. The last underlined words realize the NP strategy 'Tact', by hesitating and downtoning with *a little*.

- (4) The underlined words realize the NP strategy 'Seeking information about the addressee', by means of apologetic expressions (Excuse me, I'm afraid), giving reasons (there is an obligation, expressed with *must* and *compulsory*), and hesitating.
- (5) The underlined expressions realize the NP strategy 'Avoidance or reduction of disagreement', by expressing initial agreement, hesitating, and used weakening expressions such as *perhaps* and *at certain moments*.
- (6) The underlined stretch realizes the NP strategy 'tact': the unfavourable information about a third person is transmitted by using hedges (*oh, I'm afraid, I think, sort of, I mean*), litotes (*not really*), and hesitations.
- (7) The underlined stretch realizes the PP strategy 'Attention to the addressee's interests or needs': the speaker utters an unusual and creative response, with metaphor and rhyme.

### Exercise 5-8

The three utterances perform the same FTA: they are directives that order the addressee to clean the kitchen. The difference between them lies in the way the FTA is performed: bald-on-record in the first utterance, with a redressive on-record strategy in the second, and with an off-record strategy in the third.

### Exercise 5-9

In that situation, response b) is more adequate. Given the small size of the imposition, response a) is too elaborate and contains too many ways of performing the strategy 'Directive weakening'.

### Exercise 5-10

a) Trentino, in his first contribution, transmits the information that he wants to marry Mrs Teasdale with the (morally doubtful) purpose of gaining control over Freedonia.

-Vera makes an unfavourable prediction about him: his aim is going to be difficult to fulfil because Mrs Teasdale likes Rufus T. Firefly.

-Then, Trentino gives Vera an order: she is to seduce that man.

b) Trentino performs his two FTAs bald-on-record: he does not use the strategy 'Tact' in his first contribution, nor the strategy 'Directive weakening' in his last contribution. By contrast, Vera does use politeness strategies: weakening expressions such as *maybe*, *from what you hear*, *you see*, litotes (*that's not going to be so easy...*), hesitation, and *is rather sweet* on, an unusual way of saying 'being in love with'. However, these politeness strategies contribute to transmit irony, suggesting that Trentino is too simple-minded.

### Exercise 5-11

- (1) a) NP; b) Tact; c) *presumably* and *perhaps*.
- (2) a) NP; b) Tact; c) *seemed* and *could*.
- (3) a) PP; b) Attention to the addressee's interests or needs; c) *obviously*.
- (4) There are two politeness strategies;
  - a) PP; b) Agreement; c) *I know*;
  - b) NP; b) Tact; c) *I think I believe*.
- (5) a) NP; b) Avoidance or reduction of disagreement; c) *I thought*.
- (6) a) NP; b) Avoidance or reduction of disagreement; c) *perhaps*.
- (7) The politeness strategy is carried out by speaker B.
  - a) NP; b) Avoidance or reduction of disagreement; c) *I think*.
- (8) The politeness strategy is carried out by speaker a:
  - a) NP; b) Avoidance or reduction of disagreement; c) *I thought*.
- (9) The politeness strategy is carried out by speaker A:
  - a) NP; b) Directive weakening; c) *I think*.
- (10) a) NP; b) Asking for permission; c) *I thought*.  
*Could* expresses deontic modality (permission).
- (11) a) NP; b) Directive weakening; c) *I know*; *presumably*.
- (12) a) NP; b) Seeking information about the addressee; c) *must*, *seemed*.

## UNIT 6. COGNITIVE SEMANTICS

### Exercise 6-1

- a) In all probability, some differences would be found among the participants.

b) There is likely to be higher degrees of coincidence in the cards that are good examples of each colour, and more differences in the cards that lie in between one colour and another.

### Exercise 6-2

It is unlikely that anyone should have thought about an ostrich, a lemon or a carpet, because these are not prototypical cases of birds, fruits or furniture, respectively.

### Exercise 6-3

The development of this exercise depends on the responses given by the students.

### Exercise 6-4

A) The prototypical Direct Object has the following features: 1) it is a concrete entity; 2) it is physically affected by the action expressed by the verb; 3) it can be the subject of a passive clause. According to these features, the first is the most prototypical Direct Object, followed by the second, in which the physical affectedness consists simply in being transferred from one entity to another. The last two cases are quite peripheral examples: the third occurs with a verb that does not have a meaning of physical action, and cannot be the subject of a passive; the fourth is not a concrete entity, and it is rare as the subject of a passive.

B) Examples of factors contributing to prototypicality in Directive weakening are the following: on-record politeness strategies, in which the directive is explicitly mentioned; the strategy is clear; the addressee is in full control of the action to be carried out; the speaker has power over the addressee. For example, the following are prototypical cases of this strategy:

Could you please help me with the lunch?

Switch off the radio, if you don't mind.

More peripheral cases are

a) Off-record strategies:



*A stitch in time saves nine.*

(telling the addressee to solve a small problem).

- b) Cases in which the directive is quite direct, so that the strategy is almost bald-on-record:

*You can send those messages.* (boss to employee)

- c) Cases in which the addressee is not in full control of the action:

*I'd like you to pass all your exams this year.*

- d) Cases where the speaker does not have power over the addressee. For example, when someone says to a friend:

*You should smoke less.*

In the discussion, other factors may be mentioned.

### **Exercise 6-5**

It may well be the case that grapes or wine and corn are basic products for everyday needs; that is why they are on a par with terms with much more general meaning. Beans also seem quite basic; however, there does not seem to be any kind of tree that plays a special role in Tzeltal life.

### **Exercise 6-6**

- a) Biologists consider fishes in terms of the traits that make the different species a member of that category. Housewives think of fish as products to be eaten. In Spanish, the distinction is made by the terms, *pez* and *pescado*.
- b) Yes: we can imagine a biologist whose job is doing research with fishes of certain types. S/he might well conceive 'fish' as an expert category when at work, and as a folk category when buying fish in the market, although possibly his/her perception of fish in the market may be influenced by the expertise about fish.

### **Exercise 6-7**

'Sound' in linguistics refers to a subset of all physical sounds, namely those made by speakers, or the technical reproduction of these sounds. In linguistics, 'pragmatic' means relative to the study of language in context, while in everyday life it means 'practical'. In everyday life, the distinction between sentences and

utterances tends to be neutralized; normally, the term ‘sentence’ is used for both.

### Exercise 6-8

The term to be used normally is ‘car’. The use of the term ‘vehicle’ would implicate that the speaker does not know what kind of vehicle it was, or that it was an odd vehicle, difficult to classify. The use of the term ‘Audi’ would implicate connotations about this car brand, for example, that the driver must be rich.

### Exercise 6-9

-In everyday language, at least in many Western countries, *flower* may be considered to be a basic-level category, while *fruit* is a superordinate category. Even if flowers and fruits have the same status within plants, the two categories play a different role in everyday needs: we constantly need to choose among different fruits in our shopping, while the choice of flowers is much more occasional. We have a closer perception of some fruits: we eat fruits, while we only smell flowers (with the exception of peripheral members of the category such as *cauliflowers*).

-Even if flowers constitute a basic-level category, some prototypical members, most remarkably *rose* and *daisy* (and *clavel* in Spanish, and probably *tulip* in Dutch) have a close status to basic-level category.

-The category *fruit* also has prototypical members (*orange, apple, pear, peach, banana*) and more peripheral members, which are close to the status of subordinate categories, such as *passion fruit* and *prickly pear*.

### Exercise 6-10

Sample subordinate categories are the following (obtained with the aid of [www.thesaurus.com](http://www.thesaurus.com), accessed September 9, 2014).

EAT: attack, chew, devour, ingest, lunch, pig out, snack, swallow, wolf;

COOK: bake, boil, burn, fry, grill, melt, poach, pressure-cook, roast, scald, stew, toast;

CLEAN: bathe, brush, dust, flush, mop, scrub, soak, sweep, vacuum, wash, wash up, wipe;

SAY: acknowledge, announce, answer, claim, confess, declare, mention, point out, reply, reveal, state.

### Exercise 6-11

-The meaning of *mean* as a noun is completely different than the meaning of *mean* as a verb, so there is homonymy between these words. However, the two senses of the verb *mean* are related, so that their relation is polysemous: the first is the meaning of words or expressions (that is to say, what semantics is about); the second sense is the s/w's meaning by the use of words or expressions (that is to say, what pragmatics is about).

-NOTE: In Spanish, there are two different expressions for the two senses of *mean*: 'significar' (semantic sense) and 'querer decir' (pragmatic sense).

### Exercise 6.12

The invented sentences will be discussed in class. Here, an example is given of a sentence for each metaphor:

-dangerous animal-anger:

When I mentioned the matter to her, she reacted like a hyena.

-journey-argument:

With these theories, he won't go very far.

-war-argument:

Did you see the debate? I think Sally beat Harry.

-departure-death:

Geoffrey Leech passed away in August 2014.

-plants-ideas:

Your ideas have firm roots indeed.

-day-lifetime:

Don't be so worried about tomorrow!

-war-love:

I'm really trapped by this boy!

-buildings-theories:

Butler's theories are well-grounded indeed.

-money-time:

I have wasted three hours watching this awful film.

-seeing-understanding:

I can see your point, but I don't know if everyone will agree.

-theatre-world:

I don't want to play such a prominent role in this affair.

### **Exercise 6-13**

All the categories stated below, as the average person conceives them, are better explained in terms of prototypical and peripheral members. The kinds of evidence stated here apply to all the categories; a more concrete explanation will be given of the category 'furniture':

-The fact that, if we ask people to name two or three items belonging to the category, some items will invariably appear more often than others. In the category 'furniture', *table*, *chair* and *cupboard* will appear more frequently than *carpet*, *picture* or *vase*.

-Everyone agrees that a table or a cupboard is a piece of furniture; however, not everyone would agree that a picture or a vase is a piece of furniture.

-If people are asked to give properties of each category, the properties apply better to the prototypical members than to the peripheral members. Some properties of furniture likely to be mentioned are: made of hard material, big, difficult to move. Those electric devices that perform a certain function, such as computers, washing-machines and dishwashers, are not considered as prototypical members of the category 'furniture'. Perhaps tradition is a weighty factor here: these devices are recent in human history.

### **Exercise 6-14**

a) metaphor; b) metonymy; c) metaphor; d) metonymy; e) metaphor; f) metonymy; g) metaphor; h) metaphor; i) metonymy; j) metaphor; k) metaphor; l) metonymy.

### **Exercise 6-15**

In the three sentences, the physical reaction to a psychological phenomenon is described. Cases of this kind can be considered as metonymy, since a part (the physical reaction) is mentioned instead of the whole (the psychological phenomenon and the corresponding physical reaction), or as metaphor, in the sense that the physical reaction does not strictly occur, and it is just mentioned

in order to describe the psychological reaction. It may be argued that the third sentence should be considered as pure metonymy, since it is most likely that a thief's heart starts to race at the sight of a policeman.

### Exercise 6-16

*Cutlery* – superordinate. The basic level terms are mainly *knife*, *fork* and *spoon*, *Apple tree* and the subtypes (carving knife, teaspoon, table spoon, etc.) are subordinate terms.

*Chicken* - basic level. The superordinate term is *animal* (or more arguably *bird*). *Chicken* is a peripheral member of the category *bird*, but is important in our life due to its role in our nutrition: then it has the status of a basic-level category, in contrast to other birds such as *sparrow* or *robin*.

*Apple tree* – subordinate. The basic level term is *tree*, and the superordinate term, *plant*.

*relative* (noun) – superordinate. Basic level terms are *father*, *brother*, *sister*, etc. In English, this category has no subordinate terms encoded in lexical items.

*shirt* – basic level. The superordinate term is *clothes*.

*mammal* – superordinate. Basic-level categories are *cat*, *dog*, *cow*, *sheep*, etc.

*rock chair* – subordinate. A basic-level category is *chair*, and a superordinate category, *furniture*.

*brother-in-law* – basic-level. *Brother-in-law* is a more peripheral member of the category *relative* than other terms, such as *father*, *mother*, *brother* or *sister*, but still the level is the same.

### Exercise 6-17

The cases of metaphor in the dialogue are the following:

*going to* – source: space; target: time. This metaphor is not easy to detect, since the periphrastic expression BE GOING TO is strongly grammaticalized in English.

*you see* – source: the visual domain; target: the mental (understanding).

*is rather sweet*: source: taste; target: feelings. This is a case of synaesthesia.

*you come in* – source: space; target: mental participation;

*place him in your hands* – source: space; target: mental domain.

**Exercise 6-18**

-Clear cases of metaphor are signalled in yellow. Normally, the source domain is physical and the target domain is mental.

-Possible cases of metaphor, which might be detected by a diachronic analysis of the words or expressions, are signalled in blue.

-Metonymies are signalled in pink.

**Labour would give councils power to ban roulette machines****Ed Miliband: "Gambling machines cause debt and misery for families"**

Ed Miliband has vowed to give councils the power to ban high stakes roulette machines from bookmakers' shops if Labour wins the next election.

Punters can bet up to £300 a minute on so-called Fixed Odds Betting Terminals.

Mr Miliband said they were "spreading like an epidemic [simile]" causing "debt and misery" and acting as a magnet for crime and anti-social behaviour.

He said Labour would amend planning and gambling laws so councils in England, Scotland and Wales could ban them.

He told BBC News fixed odds machines were "addictive for some people" and the gambling industry targeted poorer parts of the country.

"Somebody has got to step in and stand up to the betting industry," he added.

**'Mini casinos'**

There are over 33,000 FOBT machines making over £1.5bn each year for the big bookmakers - about half their annual profits.

Critics say the machines are highly addictive and lead to crime and poverty but the gambling industry says there is no hard evidence of this and have promised a new code of conduct to allow players to limit their own stakes.

The government has not ruled out taking action to cut the stakes and prizes on FOBT machines to make them less potentially addictive.

But it is awaiting the outcome of a study into how harmful the machines are to individual players, which is due to report next autumn.

It was changes to gambling legislation brought in by Labour that allowed bookmakers to start installing FOBT machines.

But Mr Miliband said the current **limit** of four per betting shop, had simply **led** to "clusters" of shops opening together, often operating from 7.30am to 10pm, with councils powerless to act.

**Labour** would legislate to **put** betting shops in a **separate** use class so that councils can use planning powers to control the number opening in their area - at the moment they are **in** the same class as banks.

**The party** would also review the number of **high**-speed, **high**-stakes FOBTs allowed **on** bookmakers' premises - including banning them altogether.

And it would take **steps** to make the machines less addictive by **cutting** time between plays, requiring pop-ups and **breaks** in play.

Mr Miliband said: "In towns and cities across Britain today, you can see how the old bookies are being turned **into** mini-casinos.

"In the poorest areas, these are spreading **like an epidemic** [simile] along **high** streets with the pawn shops and pay day lenders that are becoming symbols of Britain's cost-of-living crisis."

### **'Pull the plug'**

(NOTE: Interesting metonymy: this is part of the action to be done on these machines; obviously, after pulling the plug the machines are to be removed from bookmaker's shops)

He added: "In Newham there are 87 betting shops with an estimated 348 machines and across the five Liverpool constituencies there are 153 betting shops with **around** 559 FOBTs.

"This has **huge** consequences for our communities, causing debt and misery for families, and often acting as a **magnet** for crime and anti-social behaviour.

"But currently, there is almost nothing that can be done to stop the spread of FOBTs.

"Laws **passed** restricting betting shops to a maximum of four of these betting machines has meant more betting shops in clusters sometimes open from 7.30am to 10pm at night.

"The time has **come** to **give** local communities the right to **pull the plug** on these machines - the right to decide if they want their **high** streets to be the place for **high stakes**, **high** speed, **high** cost gambling."

The Liberal Democrats voted to **give** councils the power to limit the number of betting shops in their area at their party conference in September.

## 'Playing politics'

A spokesman for the Association of British Bookmakers said that while it was possible to bet up to £100 a spin, "hardly anyone does" and **the industry** was committed to helping problem gamblers.

"This announcement has nothing to **do** with helping problem gamblers; it is simply about **playing** politics with the jobs of 40,000 people, and the enjoyment of eight million people for no reason," said the spokesman.

But former betting shop manager Adrian Parkinson, of the Campaign for Fairer Gambling, welcomed Mr Miliband's announcement.

He said it was not just about **curbing** problem gambling as there was an equally **big** concern about the proliferation of bookmakers shops in deprived areas.

A **string** of local authorities have **passed** "symbolic" motions in recent months calling for FOBTs to be banned, he said.

He claimed **the industry** would be "dumfounded" by Mr Miliband's announcement as it believed it had **escaped** the threat of legislation.

## FINAL EXERCISES: WORK ON REFERENCE, PRESUPPOSITIONS AND POLITENESS

### Exercise 1

a) Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number:

Born aboard ship en route from Ireland (1), Mary Jemison (née Jameson) (2) was just 15 when she was abducted in 1758 from her Buchanan Valley home (3) (4). While her Shawnee captors killed other members of her family (5) (6) they spared Mary, later trading her to a Seneca Nation (7) where she was adopted by two Seneca women (8).

After the war (9) Mary lived on with her Seneca family (10) becoming a leading member of the tribe (11) (12). She was twice married to Seneca chiefs and



acquired substantial property in New York state. Although she had chances later in life to leave the Seneca (13), she chose not to. Mary died at the age of 90.

- (1) Mary Jemison was born aboard ship en route from Ireland.
- (2) She was born with the name 'Jameson'.
- (3) She was abducted in 1758.
- (4) Before being abducted, she lived in Buchanan Valley.
- (5) Her captors were Shawnee.
- (6) Her captors killed other members of her family.
- (7) The Shawnee traded her to a Seneca nation.
- (8) She was adopted by two Seneca women.
- (9) There was a war.
- (10) She had a Seneca family.
- (11) She lived in a tribe.
- (12) She became a leading member of the tribe.
- (13) She had chances later in life to leave the Seneca.

NOTE: Presuppositions (10) and (11) are examples of how information communicated earlier in the text as realis is later coded as presupposition.

**b)** The referring expressions in the text are as follows:

Born aboard [ship]<sub>a</sub> en route from [Ireland]<sub>e</sub>, [Mary Jemison]<sub>e</sub> (née Jameson) was just 15 when [she]<sub>b</sub> was abducted in [1758]<sub>e</sub> from [her [Buchanan Valley]<sub>e</sub> home]<sub>c</sub>. While [her Shawnee captors]<sub>c</sub> killed [other members of [her family]<sub>c</sub>]<sub>a</sub>, [they]<sub>b</sub> spared [Mary]<sub>b</sub>, later trading [her]<sub>b</sub> to [a Seneca Nation]<sub>a</sub> where [she]<sub>b</sub> was adopted by [two Seneca women]<sub>a</sub>.

After [the war]<sub>e</sub> [Mary]<sub>b</sub> lived on with [her Seneca family]<sub>b</sub>, becoming a leading member of [the tribe]<sub>b</sub>. [She]<sub>b</sub> was twice married to [Seneca chiefs]<sub>a</sub> and acquired [substantial property]<sub>a</sub> in [New York state]<sub>e</sub>. Although [she]<sub>b</sub> had chances later in [life]<sub>c</sub> to leave [the Seneca]<sub>c</sub>, [she]<sub>b</sub> chose not to. [Mary]<sub>b</sub> died at [the age of 90]<sub>d</sub>.

## NOTES

-The expressions 'her Seneca family' and 'the tribe' have been analyzed as definite reference on the interpretation that they refer directly to the previous expressions 'two Seneca women' and 'a Seneca nation', respectively.

-“Life” has been analyzed as indirect anaphoric reference, since it refers to Mary’s life.

**c)** The deictic expression in the sentence is *died*, and it indicates temporal deixis.

**Exercise 2**

**a)** Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number:

According to Virginia Woolf's memoirs (1), her most vivid childhood memories (2) were not of London but of St. Ives in Cornwall, where the family spent every summer until 1895 (3). Her family's summer home (4) Talland House (5), looked out over Porthminster Bay, and is still standing today, though somewhat altered. Memories of these family holidays and impressions of the landscape (6) especially the Godrevy Lighthouse, informed the fiction Woolf wrote in later years (7) most notably To the Lighthouse.

(1) Virginia Woolf wrote memoirs.

(2) She had vivid childhood memories.

(3) Her family spent every summer until 1895 in Cornwall.

(4) Her family had a summer home.

(5) Her family's summer home was called Talland House.

(6) She had memories of these family holidays and impressions of the landscape.

(7) She wrote fiction in later years.

NOTE. Presupposition (6) is a good example of how information communicated earlier in the text as realis is later coded as a presupposition.

**b)** The referring expressions in the text are as follows:

According to [[Virginia Woolf]<sub>e</sub>'s memoirs]<sub>c</sub>, [her most vivid childhood memories]<sub>c</sub> were not of [London]<sub>e</sub> but of [[St. Ives](#) in [Cornwall](#)]<sub>e</sub>, where [the family]<sub>c</sub> spent [every summer until [1895]<sub>e</sub>]. [[Her family]<sub>b</sub>'s summer home]<sub>c</sub>, [Talland House]<sub>c</sub>, looked out over [Porthminster Bay]<sub>e</sub>, and is still standing [today]<sub>e</sub>, though somewhat altered. [Memories of [these family holidays]<sub>c</sub> and [impressions of [the landscape]<sub>c</sub>, especially [the [Godrevy Lighthouse](#)]<sub>c</sub>], informed [the fiction [Woolf]<sub>b</sub> wrote in [later years]<sub>c</sub>], most notably [[To the Lighthouse](#)]<sub>c</sub>.

NOTE. The frequency of indirect anaphoric reference reflects the recurrent mention of entities connected with Virginia Woolf (her memories, her family, her literary works, the places where she stayed, different times of her life). There are also some instances of reference identified by knowledge of the world, most of which are different places of England.

### Exercise 3

a) The referring expressions in the text are as follows:

At [Quarry Bank High School]<sub>e</sub>, he met [a woman by the name of Cynthia Powell]<sub>a</sub>, who became [his first wife]<sub>b</sub>. As a child, [John]<sub>b</sub> lived [a life of uninterrupted calm]. [He]<sub>b</sub> didn't recall feeling desperately sad or unusually happy. Unfortunately [that calm]<sub>b</sub> was suddenly shattered when [his mother]<sub>c</sub> died before [his 18th birthday]<sub>c</sub>. [John]<sub>b</sub> did not like to talk about [the death of his mother]<sub>b</sub>, because [it]<sub>b</sub> was too great a sorrow to be publicized. After [the death of his mother]<sub>b</sub>, [John]<sub>b</sub> went to live with [his Aunt Mimi]<sub>c</sub>, [whom]<sub>b</sub> [he]<sub>b</sub> considered [the greatest person]<sub>b</sub>. [They]<sub>b</sub> lived in [a little house]<sub>a</sub>, with [frilly curtains at [the windows]<sub>c</sub>]<sub>a</sub> and [an old apple tree [in the front garden]<sub>c</sub>]<sub>a</sub>. When [John]<sub>b</sub> was away from [home]<sub>b</sub>, [he]<sub>b</sub> thought about [Aunt Mimi]<sub>b</sub> and [her frilly curtains]<sub>b</sub> and [her apple tree]<sub>b</sub>, and [he]<sub>b</sub> realized how fortunate [he]<sub>b</sub> was. Because, though [his mother]<sub>b</sub> was taken away from [him]<sub>b</sub>, [he]<sub>b</sub> was given [something precious]<sub>a</sub> in return.

### NOTES

-‘A child’ is not a referring expression, because it is attributive.

**b)** Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number:

At Quarry Bank High School, he met a woman by the name of Cynthia Powell, who became his first wife (1). As a child (2), John lived a life of uninterrupted calm. He didn't recall feeling desperately sad or unusually happy. Unfortunately that calm was suddenly shattered when his mother died before his 18th birthday (3). John did not like to talk about the death of his mother (4), because it was too great a sorrow to be publicized. John went to live with his Aunt Mimi (5), whom he considered the greatest person (6). They lived in a little house, with frilly curtains at the windows (7) and an old apple tree in the front garden (8). When John was away from home (9), he thought about Aunt Mimi and her frilly curtains (10) and her apple tree (11), and he realized how fortunate he was (12). Because, though his mother was taken away from him (13), he was given something precious in return.

- (1) Cynthia Powell became John Lennon's first wife.
- (2) At some time of his life, John Lennon was a child.
- (3) His mother died before his 18<sup>th</sup> birthday.
- (4) His mother died.
- (5) He had an aunt called Mimi.
- (6) He considered his aunt Mimi the greatest person.
- (7) Their house had windows.
- (8) Their house had a front garden.
- (9) John was away from home (at least once).
- (10) Aunt Mimi had frilly curtains.
- (11) Aunt Mimi had an apple tree.
- (12) Lennon was fortunate.
- (13) His mother was taken away from him.

NOTE. Some presuppositions, such as (4), (10), (11) and (13) show how already given information sounds less repetitive if it is coded as a presupposition.

**Exercise 4**

**a)** Sample presuppositions are stated below the text. The parts of the text that trigger them are underlined in the text, with the corresponding number:

**Rachel:** Barry, I'm sorry, I am so sorry... I know you probably think that this is all about what I said the other day about you making love with your socks on (1) (2), but it isn't... it isn't, it's about me, and I ju- (She stops talking (3) and dials the phone). Hi, machine cut me off again... (4) anyway... look, look, I know that some girl is going to be incredibly lucky to become Mrs. Barry Finkel (5) but it isn't me, it's not me (6). And not that I have any idea who me is right now, but you just have to give me a chance too... (The machine cuts her off again (7) and she redials (8).)

(1) Barry probably thinks that that [problem] is about what Rachel said the other day about him making in love with his socks on.

(2) Rachel said something the other day about Barry making love with his socks on.

(3) She was talking before.

(4) The machine had cut her off before.

(5) Some girl is going to be incredibly lucky to become Mrs Barry Finkel.

(6) The same presupposition as (5), this time triggered by an elliptical cleft ('it isn't me who is going to be incredibly lucky...')

(7) The machine had cut her off before.

(8) She had dialled at least once before.

NOTE: The verb 'know' is used as an attempt to create empathy; it does not indicate genuine knowledge. For this reason, presuppositions (2), (5) and (6) are weakened. There is a clash between presuppositions (5) and (6) and Rachel's wish to be Barry's wife; moreover, these presuppositions are about the future. For these reasons, they are not to be bluntly believed as true.

**b)** The most obvious politeness strategies are the following:

1) First strategy:

-In the first part of the paragraph (up to “and I ju”), Rachel does an FTA against her own face, concretely an apology for having offended Barry.

-The NP strategy ‘Tact’; due to *I know*, we can argue that this strategy is performed together with the PP strategy ‘Claiming common knowledge and/or in-group membership’.

-The Tact strategy is realized by means of the vocative *Barry*, apologetic expressions (*I’m sorry, I am so sorry*), a verb of knowledge (*I know*), giving reasons for self-defence (*it isn’t... it isn’t, it’s about me, and I ju-*), and many hesitations.

2) Second strategy: from “look, look until “not me”.

-There is no FTA;

-The strategy is ‘Attention to the addressee’s interests and/or needs’, concretely, Rachel praises Barry;

-The linguistic expressions give emphasis to what Rachel says: repetition (*look, look; it isn’t me, it’s not me*) and evaluative expressions (*incredibly lucky*). know that some girl is going to be incredibly lucky to become Mrs. Barry Finkel, but it isn’t me, it’s not me.

3) From “And not that” until I “a chance too...”

-There is an FTA against Barry’s face

-The strategy is ‘Directive weakening’.

-The strategy begins with an apology “And not that I have any idea who me is right now” and then utters the directive, minimizing the imposition with the words but you just have to *just* and *chance*.

It may be stated that the second strategy prepares the ground for the third: praise to the addressee precedes directive weakening.

**c)** The referring expressions in the text, except *I, me* and *you*, are as follows (we imagine that this text is the beginning of a story):

**Rachel:** [Barry]<sub>e</sub>, I’m sorry, I am so sorry... I know you probably think that [this]<sub>e</sub> is all about [what I said the other day about you making love with your socks on]<sub>d</sub>, but [it]<sub>b</sub> isn’t... [it]<sub>b</sub> isn’t, [it]<sub>b</sub>’s about me, and I ju- ([She]<sub>b</sub> stops talking and dials [the phone]<sub>e</sub>). Hi, [machine]<sub>b</sub> cut me off again... anyway... look, look, I know that [some girl]<sub>a</sub> is going to be incredibly

lucky to become [Mrs. Barry Finkel]<sub>b</sub>, but it isn't me, it's not me. And not that I have any idea who me is right now, but you just have to give me a chance too... ([The machine]<sub>b</sub> cuts [her]<sub>b</sub> off again and [she]<sub>b</sub> redials.)

NOTE: We have classified *what I said the other day about you making love with your socks on* under 'd', because the circumstances expressed by the Adjuncts in the clause permits the referent to be identified.

#### TRUE-FALSE QUIZ

1) True; 2) False; 3) True; 4) True; 5) True; 6) False; 7) False; 8) True; 9) True; 10) True; 11) False; 12) False; 13) False; 14) True; 15) False; 16) True; 17) True; 18) False; 19) False; 20) True; 21) True; 22) True; 23) False; 24) True; 25) False; 26) False; 27) False; 28) True; 29) True; 30) False.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### STUDENTS' BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Birner, Betty J. (2013). *Introduction to Pragmatics*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Cruse, Alan (2004). *Meaning in Language. An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics*. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cutting, Joan (2002). *Pragmatics and Discourse. A Resource Book for Students*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Evans, Vyvyan and Melanie Green (2006). *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Grundy, Peter (2008). *Doing Pragmatics*. Third edition. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hurford, Janet R., Brendan Heasley, Brendan and Michael B. Smith (2007). *Semantics: A coursebook*. (Second edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, Stephen C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ungerer, Friedrich and Hans-Jörg Schmid (2006). *An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics*. London: Longman. Published in 2013 by Routledge.

### GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Archer, Paul and Peter Grundy, eds. (2011). *The Pragmatics Reader*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bennet, Paul (2002). *Semantics: An Introduction to Non-Lexical Aspects of Meaning*. LINCUM Coursebooks in Linguistics 12. München: Lincolnm.
- Berlin, Brent and Paul Kay (1969) *Basic Color Terms. Their Universality and Evolution*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Blum-Kulka, Shoshana, Juliane House and Gabriele Kasper (2011). Cross-cultural pragmatics: requests and apologies. In Archer and Grundy (eds.), 344-353.
- Brown, Penelope and Levinson, Stephen. (1987). *Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cruse, Alan. (1986) *Lexical Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



- Davis, Steven and Brendan S. Gillon, eds. (2004). *Semantics. A Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Downing, Angela, Moya Guijarro, Jesús and Albentosa Hernández, José Ignacio (coordinadores) (1998). *Patterns in Discourse and Text. Ensayos del análisis del discurso en lengua inglesa. Colección ESTUDIOS, Nº 50*. Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha.
- Gillon, Brendan S. (2004). Ambiguity, indeterminacy, deixis, and vagueness. In Davis and Gillon (eds.), 157-187.
- Givón, Talmy (1990). *Syntax: A Functional-Typological Introduction*. Vol. II. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Hidalgo Downing, Laura (1998) Reference, deixis and the delimitation of text worlds: an analysis of Lewis Carroll's *Alice* books. In Downing, Moya y Albentosa (coordinators), 109-27.
- Johnson, Mark (1987) *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kreidler, Charles W. (2014). *Introducing English Semantics*. Second edition. London: Routledge.
- Labov, William (1973). The boundaries of words and their meaning. In Charles-James N. Bailey and Roger W. Shuy, eds. *New Ways of Analyzing Variation in English*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 340-373.
- Leech, Geoffrey (1983). *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- Levinson, Stephen (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, Stephen (2000). *Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. *Journal of Philosophical Language* 8, 339-359.
- Lyons, John (1977). *Semantics*. (2 vols.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mott, Brian (2009). *Introductory Semantics and Pragmatics for Spanish Learners of English*. Barcelona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Barcelona.
- Sperber, Dan and Wilson, Deirdre (1995). *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Second edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Thomas, Jenny (1995). *Meaning in Interaction. An Introduction to Pragmatics*.  
London and New York: Longman.

Verschueren, Jef (1999). *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Arnold.

Watts, Richard J. (2003). *Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yule, George (1996). *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.