

# UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID

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## TESIS DOCTORAL

**La retórica como herramienta analítica**

**Rhetoric as analytical tool**

MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR

PRESENTADA POR

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**UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID**

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**Presentada por:**

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*For my mother*





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## **INTRODUCTION / METHODOLOGY**

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you *can* make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”

-- Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*

The aim of this dissertation is to present and apply a way of looking at literature that is based on a reading of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. In Part 1, I first provide a general introduction to the problem of defining rhetoric. This leads to a discussion on rhetoric’s field of operations: opinion. I finish with a brief review of the literature. In Part 2, I present a model based primarily on a reading of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. This consists of an in-depth discussion of the three modes (deliberative, judicial and epideictic) after which I present aspects of the three rhetorical proofs: *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*. In Part 3, I first discuss the role played by the audience as judge. I then discuss the work by scholars who use rhetoric in fields that are somewhat distant from literary studies. I also briefly discuss travel literature in order to provide background for the second narrative under study. Part 4, I use the model presented in Part 2 to critique and analyze two narratives. The first narrative to be analyzed in Part 4 is a fictional narrative from William H. Gass’ *Fiction and the Figures of Life*. The second is a non-fiction narrative by David Lansing, “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” General conclusions follow Part 4.

I am using the phrase “way of looking at literature” in the sense used by Peter Barry in his seminal *Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory* (6). In this primer, which begins with I. A. Richards’ method (Practical Criticism) in the 1920s and ends with theoretical approaches of the 1990s (postcolonialism and postmodernism) (12-34), Barry explains in clear and comprehensible language the various ways of looking at literature in use during this

time period. He then proceeds to illustrate their use by example. My dissertation is modeled after these two aspects of Barry's text (i.e. the type of language he uses and his procedure of explanation and illustration). But these are not the only attractive features of Barry's primer, for he is also quite fair-minded in his presentation of the various contemporary approaches. That is, not only does he present the respective merits of each, but also reveals what he views as flaws. Barry is thus, in my opinion, a scholar who does not let himself, in spite of his pro-theoretical stance, to cease from being a critical thinker. His example is one that, in an age where post-modern theorists are pitted or pit themselves against so-called Liberal Humanists and vice versa, merits imitation. An important conclusion we can draw from Barry's equitable treatment is that each approach has something valuable to offer and yet at the same time must be examined for inadequacies or inconsistencies.

The question "Which rhetoric?" must be answered for, as the reader will discover in my discussion, the definition of the term rhetoric has been a subject of dispute since its earliest extant appearance in Plato's *Gorgias*. Several different definitions of rhetoric were being proposed and fought over in antiquity and that number has grown ever since. Rhetoric and its practices are being defined and redefined today. What I present below is, in effect, one possible definition of "classical rhetoric." We can add to the myriad past and present definitions another problem. For even supposing that one chooses a particular definition of rhetoric – in the present study an "Aristotelian" definition – each one usually has so many aspects that it is only possible to reasonably address a few of them. Thus the reader must keep in mind during the discussion below it has been necessary to focus on certain aspects that form part of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric and to leave many others aside. Further, even after narrowing down my focus on certain elements, I have only managed in my discussion to

scratch the surface, due to the vast amount of literature. Be that as it may, it is my hope that the way of looking at literature that I am presenting here will fill what has been identified by scholars as a gap in terms of critical approaches in English studies. The approach I present is based on classical rhetoric with borrowings of ideas, concepts and methodology from classics scholars, from contemporary scholars of rhetoric and literature, and from scholars working in fields not normally associated with literary studies: sociology and business administration. While maintaining certain aspects taken from the abovementioned sources, I then provide an approach that I believe is different from other current approaches. I am aware that that a classics scholar like Heinrich Plett might rightly level the accusation against me that there is nothing new under rhetoric's sun.<sup>1</sup> Still, I believe that the way of looking at literature I am presenting differs from other rhetoric-based approaches advanced in recent decades by scholars of English and literature.

The question, "Why rhetoric?" must also be answered. In 1983, Terry Eagleton made a call for a return to rhetoric in *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. Eagleton states in this primer to literary theory that rhetoric has been in disuse for several centuries.<sup>2</sup> Thus, my dissertation is, in some way, a response to the plea made by Eagleton (and other scholars) for students of literature to return to rhetorical methods practiced in 4th century Athens. But rather than focusing on the power and signification of discursive political ideology the way Eagleton does, I instead use concepts from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to examine how *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos* are at work in the texts under study to persuade their audience or readership. These same rhetorical proofs can be used to reveal and evaluate the system of values in which the discourse is enmeshed. My definition is similar to Eagleton's in that I seek to reveal the effects of argumentative

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<sup>1</sup> See Plett.

<sup>2</sup> See Eagleton.

discourse as well as how these effects are produced and what they mean in a particular historical socio-cultural milieu. However, the way I go about doing so is different in that I seek to show in the narratives under study basic rhetorical mechanisms presented in Aristotle's treatise. Eagleton defines rhetoric as a socio-political discursive ensemble. I break that ensemble down into its constituent parts.

Eagleton made his plea in 1983. It is therefore, given his importance as a theorist, perhaps surprising that twelve years later rhetoric does not figure in Barry's introduction to literary theory as an approach for looking at or analyzing literature – in either an ancient or contemporary version. Barry does, however, state that theory about literature “goes back to Greek and Latin originals,” meanwhile identifying Aristotle's *Poetics* as the “earliest work of theory” (21). To Barry's assertion must be added the very important fact that it is best not to read the *Poetics* in isolation from other works in the Aristotelian corpus. One reason for this is because in the *Poetics* Aristotle refers his readers to the *Rhetoric* for his discussion of *dianoia*, or thought, a major component of discourse that appears in his discussion of poetics. Nor does Aristotle stop there. For, in Aristotle's definition, rhetoric is the “offshoot” or “counterpart” of dialectic, which is the object of study in his *Topics*. Further, in Aristotle's framework, rhetoric is linked with politics which he equates with ethics. This means that in order to gain an adequate understanding of what Aristotle means when he discusses literary theory in his *Poetics*, the student of literature must at very least have read Aristotle's *Topics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Politics*. The original texts that have traditionally been used in relation to literary criticism and theory have only been Aristotle's *Poetics*, and, much less frequently, his *Rhetoric*. Both texts have traditionally been studied in isolation not only from each other but from the other works by Aristotle mentioned above. For most students of English studies have read or are obliged to read Aristotle's *Poetics*. A



somewhat smaller number, perhaps motivated by Eagleton's behest or work done by other contemporary scholars of literature, have read his *Rhetoric*. But very few will have obtained a more comprehensive picture of Aristotle's conception of rhetoric and "poetics" (i.e., literature) within the broader framework of his corpus.

Nor is it just rhetoric which the student of literature ought to have gained adequate knowledge of in order to understand how it has been defined throughout history. The importance of also gaining as much related knowledge as possible about a field of inquiry can be illustrated by taking a brief look at an article written during the period when literary theory was at the height of fashion. Michele Lamont, in "How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida," analyzes the deconstructionist philosopher's enormous success from the perspective of sociology. Calling deconstruction a metascience that "seeks both to contain and transcend philosophy" (593), she makes the following interesting and important observation:

Deconstruction gives its audience the means to interpret the whole philosophical tradition and to overcome it by becoming acquainted with a single system. As such, it offers important payoffs to those unfamiliar with the classics; for example, one of my informants has observed that, on the basis of Derrida's work, *American undergraduate students in literary criticism currently discuss the logocentrism of the philosophical tradition without having read a single classic of philosophy* (593 - italics mine).

Not only did the American students mentioned by Lamont manage to engage in philosophical discussions about logocentrism, but they probably did so without having read the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche and Hegel (593), philosophers whom Derrida had studied in depth. The question that arises is the following: Is it possible to gain an adequate understanding of work done by Derrida without having read the conversation he as a philosopher entered into or, equally important, without having gained significant knowledge on the dialogue that has gone on since the "logocentric" tradition started? Or is it, in fact – in the case of deconstruction – *not* possible to attempt

to adequately understand in order to make an informed and valid critique of this theoretical approach without having read and critically thought about at least a good percentage of the dialogue of the major thinkers in philosophy on which Derrida's system is based?<sup>3</sup> It would seem that the proper attitude of anyone intending to use an approach to analyze and critique literature would be similar to that of the classics scholar Kidd, who imposed the following guidelines upon himself when studying Posidonius:

Here, first of all again, it seems to me, knowledge of context, this time the larger context of genre, is essential. Since Posidonius is a philosopher writing in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, it is necessary to be fully acquainted with the history of philosophy up to his contemporaries; and not just in general, but in detail (235).

Kidd asserts here that the larger context and detailed knowledge of *previous argument* are crucial to guaranteeing adequate knowledge and academic rigor. So we can ask, in the case of students of literature, whether the same type of preparation ought to be carried out when attempting to understand and then utilize critical approaches that are based on other disciplines (i.e., political, psychoanalytic, linguistic, and so forth) – that is, when using any of the approaches based on the writing of thinkers who – one assumes – have undertaken the academic labor necessary in order to produce crucial theoretical works in their respective fields.

The point that I am making here has to do with attaining a proper orientation as illustrated by philosopher Charles Taylor in order to avoid getting lost in a field of inquiry.<sup>4</sup> That is, in order to avoid missing the forest for the trees – or vice versa – one must do extensive reading in a field of inquiry to prevent skewed visions or misreadings in one's academic undertakings. Taylor uses the metaphor of a visitor to a geographic region who can either fly over the region in a plane, which gives the visitor one

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<sup>3</sup> A question that arises is whether the Sokal hoax could have been avoided had students of literature done the necessary work in order to properly understand deconstruction. See Sokal.

<sup>4</sup> See Taylor, Charles, for an extended metaphor on orientation, pp. 41-42.

perspective, or be taken by a guide through the same region on foot. In Taylor's metaphor for orientation, one needs both vantage points in order to get an adequate idea of the geographical region being visited. To experience just one of the perspectives is inadequate.<sup>5</sup> In addition, if one has done the necessary academic work in a particular field of study, one will be able to 1) identify the perspective of writers doing work on the same area, 2) identify the particular tradition they are basing their work on, and 3) identify their insights and blindspots.

What I am presenting below is, in effect, a definition of classical rhetoric. Definitions are more or less unstable, due to the fact that they represent, in the end, agreements about the limits, qualities and characteristics that a particular term, concept, system and so on has. Broadly speaking, definitions are either based on 1) empirically provable assertions or 2) opinions. While, as I discuss below, it is true that empirical facts are not completely stable or fixed, at this point it bears mentioning briefly that in Aristotle's definition, rhetoric is the mode of discourse that we use when determining the truth or apparent truth about matters which can have various arguments that are contradictory. That is, matters which cannot be determined using science, mathematics or logic. If, for example, we want to know how tall the tallest building in the world is, we simply take out the equipment and measure it to find the answer. Similarly, if we want to know how many cars there are at a certain point in time on the island of Madagascar, we just have to go there and count them. There can be no argument here. The exact number of cars can be determined and it is not a matter of opinion as it can be proved. In cases of pure logic we find the same situation. Since the sun has been rising and setting from the beginning of known history, we logically assume – perhaps while

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<sup>5</sup> Since rhetoric's field of operations is opinion, the caveat against obtaining skewed readings can quite easily be countered with a somewhat ironic statement Jonathan Barnes makes regarding two philosophers whose readings, although less than adequate in his view, nevertheless produced good philosophy: "After all, a misreading or a lazy reading of a text may be more fruitful philosophically than a profound and accurate study" (Companion, xvii).

keeping Hume's (completely valid) arguments in mind – that the sun will in fact rise and set tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, and so on ad infinitum. Another example where empiricism holds sway would be a statement like “You can't walk through walls.” Putting aside miracle stories that argue the contrary, this assertion can be proven true using the experimental method. Try as you may, it is simply not possible. The examples that I have provided above are what I call in my dissertation “hard facts.” There is no arguing about these issues, precisely because they can be proven by empirical and rational means. Rhetoric, on the other hand, operates in the field of opinion, in which it is possible to present arguments that contradict each other, and in which it is not possible to reach a conclusion using scientific method.<sup>6</sup>

A simple example would be to try and answer questions like, “What is love?” or “What is happiness?” or “Which form of government is the best?” It goes without saying that the opinions on these questions are myriad and, of course, disputable. This is where rhetoric operates. Since opinions, not “hard facts” are the stuff of rhetoric, this means, as Aristotle states, that persuasion is the key factor when we using this mode of reasoning. If a matter cannot be proven by empirical means, it is then a question of discovering arguments that are persuasive. Rhetoric, in Aristotle's definition, has to do with issues about which we as human wish to determine what is true and what is right (in an ethical sense) about these issues in the sublunary realm. Aristotle is optimistic in this regard, for in his definition of rhetoric it is possible to discover the truth or apparent truth on the issues which comprise its object. This is, of course, Aristotle's definition, and as such it cannot be proven empirically and is therefore open to dispute. This means that rhetoric is its own object, in the sense that any definition of it will be a matter on which various arguable perspectives are possible.

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<sup>6</sup> Throughout my discussion, I contrast opinion with scientific “hard facts.” See Dawkins for a discussion on proofs in mathematics and science, which reveals important differences between what is accepted in these fields as intractable proofs or “facts.”

In Aristotle's definition, rhetoric is the mode of discourse that we use 1) to make decisions about the future, 2) to pass judgments on past acts (i.e., to determine whether or not they occurred and whether they were just or unjust) and, with respect to the present, 3) to praise or condemn persons, places, things and so on. These three spheres fall into the field of rhetoric, that is, opinion.

It is, for example, impossible to predict the future with empirical certainty in the vast number of cases. The question, "Given X, what is the best plan of action?" can only be answered with opinions. Similarly, it is often impossible to know with certainty what has happened in the past, on the one hand, and further, where human agency is involved, determining whether the action was either just or unjust will also be a matter open to debate. This same paradigm holds when evaluating, in the present, a person or an object (i.e., individual, thing, place, idea, and so on) for positive or negative qualities. Various opinions will surface with reference to the same person/object, each of which is capable of being argued from different stances.

These three areas correspond to Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three spheres: deliberative, judicial and epideictic (i.e., celebratory). These three spheres corresponded to the respective socio-political frameworks in 4<sup>th</sup> century Athens of 1) political assemblies, 2) law courts and 3) ceremonial public occasions for praising or blaming, such as funeral orations. In all three cases, as the reader will discover in the course of my discussion, judgment takes place. The judgment is based on informal logic or reasoning that is enmeshed in a system of values that provides the basis for any sort of judgment. Thus, agency and ethics enter into my discussion below. I borrow Aristotle's model and apply its temporal/functional framework to narrative. As the two texts that I analyze are narratives, the primary framework that I use when examining the texts under study is judicial. This is because, as I hope to show, the narratives that I

examine can be read as pleadings, in which the narrator (or the person being narrated about, in the fictional case under study) acts as a defendant and attempts to persuade the audience or readership to evaluate them as praiseworthy. A case is being made for an agent in both narratives which is judged by the reader. In the first case study, it is the guilt or innocence of a woman who has left her husband and taken the children with her. The narrative presents details that allow the reader to judge her from the standpoint of ethics. In the second case study – a travel narrative - the narrator tells the story of transporting contraband to the United States from France. His aim is to persuade the audience that he should be pardoned and is worthy of praise, both for his actions as well as for his talent as a writer. In both texts, I demonstrate how *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* function implicitly and explicitly to make judgment from the standpoint of ethics possible. In Part 2 I go into depth on the three proofs, but at this point the schema that Ross provides an initial definition:

Ethos – persuasive bearing on the *character* of the speaker (i.e. devices of speech by which he induces his hearers to form a favourable opinion of his character).

Pathos – arousing of *emotion* in the hearers.

Logos – which produce proof or its appearance by sheer force of *argument* (281).

The schema above is very brief, and, as the large number of pages dedicated to each proof in Part 2 shows, inadequate. Still, as an introduction, it is sufficient. These three proofs function simultaneously and come to bear in argumentative discourse whose object is to persuade when it is not possible to obtain proof by empirical means. In my analysis, I reveal how these proofs function both implicitly and explicitly in the narratives under study, and how they are inextricably linked in their function as tools to persuade the reader of the arguments being put forth either by the narrator or the content of the text itself.

The judgments made by the reader are necessarily based on the system of values in which the producers and consumers of both texts under study are enmeshed. I argue

in my dissertation that it is possible, using rhetoric as analytical and critical tool, 1) to reveal the system of values that provides the basis of the judgment that occurs and 2) to subsequently examine this same system of values with a view to evaluating it. My analysis is descriptive, not prescriptive. I describe what I have detected as components and characteristics of a particular system of values in the respective texts.

My primary aim is to show that the definition I present of classical rhetoric is a valuable tool that can be used advantageously on several planes by students of literature. I focus primarily on one of these planes in my study. That is, I attempt to show how rhetorical analysis makes it possible to reveal the system of values in a particular text with a view to opening a dialogue on issues related to this system. My definition will necessarily be a matter of debate, but this is the nature of rhetoric itself – this has been rhetoric’s history from its earliest moments: a matter of dispute as to just what it is and precisely how it can be used. For the debate over how to define rhetoric is still alive, as Erik Gunderson asserts. After discussing several versions of rhetoric from antiquity, he writes in the introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric*:

Assuredly, none of the aforementioned alternate approaches to rhetoric are by any means “false,” but each does correspond to a vision of what most defines rhetoric and hence properly shapes an account of rhetoric. Their various forms are thus an index of a variety of theories of rhetoric, theories that are being promulgated by modern as well as by ancient authors. This volume adopts and adapts these approaches while nevertheless recognizing that the very desire to specify the nature of our relationship to words is itself a rhetorical move. And this desire to define often bespeaks a desire to end the debate about the nature of language. It is useful to resist this impulse as it can efface the complexity of the debate itself (10 – 11).

There are few points that I wish to make on the passage above. First, there is Gunderson’s idea that each account of rhetoric, while a variant, still has elements of “truth” that bring important issues to bear on the overall discussion of what rhetoric is. That each variant has elements of “truth” parallels the point that I made above in reference to Barry’s treatment of approaches to literature. That is, Barry brings into his

discussion the merits and flaws of each. Second, Gunderson does not dismiss the past, but instead connects it with the present. My choice to present a definition of “classical rhetoric” is an attempt to do the same. The third point that I wish to make has to do with Gunderson’s warning that those who wish to define often betray the desire to present the final word on what he insists should be an open debate on the nature of language. In this regard, the definition that I present below of rhetoric, a definition that I do not pretend is conclusive by any means but instead is subject to scrutiny and debate, is at the same time, in my view, a mode of argumentative discourse that makes it possible to contribute to the debate about what literary analysis and criticism is.





**PART 1**  
**A GENERAL OVERVIEW**



## 1.1 THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE RHETORIC

The first task facing the student of literature whose aim is to use rhetoric as a form of criticism is to attempt to reasonably assess the myriad definitions the word has yielded since its earliest extant documentation in Plato's *Gorgias*.<sup>7</sup> The origins of rhetorical practices can be traced as far back as Homer and Hesiod, but Plato's dialogue stands as a reasonable point of departure to discuss the struggle over meaning that has lasted more than twenty three centuries.<sup>8</sup> In this dialogue Socrates attempts to strong-arm Gorgias, Polus and Callicles into telling him precisely what they mean by rhetoric, each of whom then responds with his own version, or versions, of what the term means. Socrates alone refers to three different types (Hamilton, 299). During their discussion, the interlocutors bring to the fore many rhetorical concepts and characteristics which provide what stands today as the theoretical bedrock upon which later definitions were built. The debate in the *Gorgias* on rhetoric reflects an attempt made by the participants to define what rhetoric is (i.e., its essence) and how it is to be used (i.e., its function).<sup>9</sup> In a later dialogue – Plato's *Phaedrus* – the conversation is picked up again by Socrates and yet another participant (475). In this dialogue, Socrates expands upon and refines statements he has made in the *Gorgias*. The concepts addressed by Plato are later dealt with by Aristotle, who adds further layers and responses in his own magisterial treatise, which is, in essence, an extended definition of the same term. The point that I wish to make here is that the term rhetoric as used in antiquity yields multiple and highly

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<sup>7</sup> With regard to definitions, Schiappa argues that attempts to answer the question "What is X?", which he calls an attempt to accurately describe "facts of essence," are "unproductive," as there are "infinite answers to such questions" (Evaluating, 78). He suggests that it is more profitable when defining to employ "issues of linguistic usage." That is, we should turn "What is X?" questions into "How should we use X?" questions (67-68). Schiappa's case, while perhaps overstated, nevertheless provides a neat dichotomy with which to categorize the various definitions that follow, whether the texts are ancient or contemporary. For both types of definitions surface in the work of the scholars cited.

<sup>8</sup> Dugan discusses the problematics of defining terms in "Modern Critical Approaches to Rhetoric." He states, "Each of the central terms of this investigation ("modern," "critical approaches," and "rhetoric") is open to a range of interpretations" (9).

<sup>9</sup> See Yunis for an exploration of the various stances put forth in the *Gorgias*.

complex definitions and does not mean quite the same thing when used by Socrates, Gorgias or Aristotle. This idea bears mentioning because, according to Heinrich Plett, modern rhetoricians have been misled to view classical rhetoric as a unified system of concepts and structures. Plett argues that the histories of classical rhetoric written by scholars such as Richard Volkmann, George A. Kennedy and Josef Martin “rather provide extensive evidence of the diversity of concepts and structures in the rhetorical theory and practice” (125). In other words, the various definitions arrived at in antiquity betray a struggle over the meaning of the term rhetoric, for which we find evidence in Plato’s abovementioned dialogues. The division over what rhetoric means and what use it has forms part of its history, and the debate is still alive today. It is wise to always keep in mind the above-mentioned twenty-three-century-old history, as well as the highly divergent rhetorics that have appeared. It is also important to be aware that contemporary scholars work within their respective academic discipline, which influences its interpretation and application.<sup>10</sup>

It is not just defining what rhetoric is or how it is used that is disputed. It is also possible to detect in the literature division on rhetoric’s current and historical status. Some scholars call recent interest in rhetoric a renaissance, while others affirm that classical rhetoric has always been present in some form. For instance, Mortara Garavelli identifies a beginning of renewed interest in rhetoric with the publication of *The New Rhetoric* by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Mortara Garavelli calls this movement a “revival” that is more than half a century old (12). Against this position, Heinrich Plett argues that classical rhetoric has in every age been interpreted as a practice that has current relevance, that is, as being modern (125). Thus we can see that when reference is made to a “revival” in rhetoric, it can, from the standpoint of a

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<sup>10</sup> For a thorough discussion of the many ways in which rhetoric has been defined and used throughout history, see Vickers.

classics scholar, be placed against the larger picture of other movements that have taken place throughout history – ever since, as suggested by Plett’s commentary, rhetoric has been a practice of discourse in the western tradition. I do not wish to trivialize claims made about current academic activity in rhetorical studies. Instead I want to underscore the idea that – if Plett’s view is taken into consideration – classical rhetoric has always held great importance, has always been re-invented by successive generations, has, throughout twenty-three centuries, been part of the western academic tradition. Plett’s stance is, of course, the stance of a classics scholar. Those scholars and critics who speak of a renewed interest and activity in rhetoric tend to be working in other disciplines, and so from their perspective, rhetoric can be seen as undergoing a revival. Curiously however, even Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, scholars working in the tradition of classical rhetoric, state in their treatise that it is their hope to “contribute to the revival of an ancient and glorious tradition” (5).<sup>11</sup>

Whether or not we call it a renaissance, a wave of activity in rhetorical studies during recent decades has been identified, which reveals the interest taken in this discipline. For instance, in *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, Edward Schiappa states that his intention is to “contribute to a scholarly conversation of the origins of rhetorical theory that is taking place across four disciplines: classics, philosophy, communication studies, and English” (vii). This conversation, a reflection of the recent interest being taken in rhetoric, involves “issues of philology, methodology, historiography, and philosophy of language” (vii). Whether we view recent activity in rhetoric telescopically as does Plett, or whether we view it with a magnifying glass, as Mortara Garavelli and Schiappa do, we can see that rhetoric is still

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<sup>11</sup> Bice Mortara Garavelli, who also works in the classical tradition, states that Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s *New Rhetoric* has, “more than any other work . . . driven the current renaissance of rhetoric” (12).

considered as a significant framework for discourse theory in a large number of disciplines.

Mortara Garavelli lists several of these disciplines when advocating for the importance of rhetoric:

Treinta años de estudios neorretóricos eximen de justificaciones previas de la materia. Sus teorías, hoy ampliamente difundidas, conciernen a las investigaciones filosóficas, jurídicas, lingüísticas, literarias, semióticas, pragmáticas, a los estudios sobre las técnicas de la información y de la comunicación de masas: el conjunto es desordenado y voluminoso, pero aún le falta mucho para estar completo (7).

We can add a number of other disciplines to the above list: Sociology, Business Administration, Speech, Composition, as well as cross-disciplinary work carried out by scholars from other fields. Depending on the discipline within which each writer is working – as well as their respective theoretical, political or methodological stances and practices – a different opinion on how to define rhetoric obtains both in terms of its essence or “linguistic usage” (see footnote 7 above). For example, Thomas Cole identifies our age as “antirhetorical,” meanwhile describing revivals in rhetoric as failures (20). What is more, backing his argument with Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, he accuses neorhetoricians Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman of “aggrandiz[ing rhetoric] virtually beyond recognition.”<sup>12</sup> Cole’s stance can be juxtaposed with Plett’s abovementioned perspective, who might call the former’s position a “(pseudo-) rejection” of classical rhetoric that is taking place not during a lull, but instead during a current high point of activity in rhetoric’s long history (125).

Other contemporary scholars have questioned whether there is any turning back to Aristotle. Robert Gaines provides a summary of how Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian

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<sup>12</sup> Cole writes: “Kenneth Burke and Ch. Perelman, for example – who wish to turn it into an art of practical reasoning concerned not simply with mastering, as need arises, premises drawn from ethics, politics, psychology, or wherever, but making significant additions on its own to the total store of such wisdom. To proceed in this fashion is, as Aristotle says (*Rhet.* 1.4 1359b12), to claim for rhetoric what belongs to a different art; and later antiquity, with the exception of Cicero and Quintilian in their more assertive moments, would have agreed” (20).

criticism came into and fell out of fashion in the United States between 1925 and 1965.

Referring to neo-Aristotelian Edwin Black, he writes:

Black's critique, along with the works of others in the late 1960s and early 1970s, reduced 'neo-Aristotelian criticism' to a minor, 'old-fashioned' approach within a broad spectrum of critical methods. And although there have been attempts to revive its influence (Hill, 1972; Leff and Mohrmann, 1974; Mohrmann and Leff, 1974), it remains in disrepute (6).

Gaines' statement above would appear to contradict the optimism of Gross and Walzer who – while asserting that there are primarily two fields (communication and composition) that draw on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as fountainhead – write in the same volume that there are “rising numbers of scholars in other disciplines – history, anthropology, and law, to name a few – who have found a rhetorical perspective useful in their own work” (xi).

These differences of viewpoints fall solidly within rhetoric's field of operation – expressed in Burnyeat's re-phrasing of a line from the *Rhetoric* which states that its field of operations is “about things, which, in the main, are capable of being otherwise than they are” (100). These differences also demonstrate the challenge that I have identified with respect to making a reasonable assessment of the vast number of definitions of rhetoric.

Since rhetoric is a term whose definition is a matter of opinion and therefore dispute, the contemporary student of literature must keep this in mind when it is used, for many of the participants in the above-mentioned revival of rhetoric work are scholars of literature. Unless an in depth understanding of how rhetoric was being defined from its beginnings is obtained, it will be difficult for the student of literature to properly understand and evaluate the directions being taken by contemporary writers, some of whom are towering figures in literary and cultural studies. For instance, as mentioned above, Terry Eagleton has made pleas since 1983 for students of literature to



return to this ancient practice. Paul de Man has also been designated as a literary theorist using rhetoric as a form of criticism, which can be seen in the title of one of his works: *The Rhetoric of Romanticism*.<sup>13</sup> Further, in recent work a number of less prominent literary scholars have used rhetoric, or one of its definitions, when analyzing literary texts. The student of literature must bear in mind that literary scholars (nearly always) use a different definition of rhetoric, often – perhaps conveniently – without mentioning the diverse number of meanings the term has generated in its long existence as signifier.

The etymology of the term and the various ways it has been translated provides insight into its meaning and its polysemous nature. The word rhetoric is derived from *rheo* (ρέω) in Greek, which can be translated with the idea of “to flow” (Garrido, 33), which is applicable to speech, but it is also the root for words in Greek translatable as “a saying,” “speech,” “declaration,” “tale,” “a verbal agreement,” “bargain,” “covenant,” as well as the Greek words “*rhetor*” and “*rhetorike*” (Walker – Poetics, 5). The suffixes *-ike* and *-ikos*, both of which are added to *rhetor*, can mean a “person with a particular skill” (Schiappa – Beginnings, 15). The word *rhetor* normally meant court or Assembly politicians engaging in legal and political procedures, respectively (Schiappa, Hamm, 5). Walker provides a concise summary of who the *rhetores* were and what role they played in 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E. Greek society:

By the fourth century there emerged a small, elite class of more or less professional *rhetores*: men who generally came from aristocratic or wealthy families, who had the requisite education and the confidence, who regularly spoke before the people in civic forums, and who were the dominant force in city politics. These leading citizens had a social role and status comparable to that of career politicians and lawyers today, and like them were regarded with mixed feelings of respect and distrust (Poetics, 31).

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<sup>13</sup> Interestingly, de Man makes the following statement in the introduction to this work: “Like Monsieur Jourdan’s proverbial prose, I was apparently doing rhetorical analysis before I knew such a thing existed by name” (viii). His approach is, in essence, the interpretation of images.

Although the early *rhetoires* represented a privileged minority, and it is possible to see that ancient rhetoric is still, in the sense given in the passage above, alive in contemporary politics and law, both Plato and Aristotle also consider rhetoric to be the domain of ordinary people (see below). In any case, the ancient *rhetoires* mentioned in the passage above operated in two of rhetoric's three modes: the legislative and deliberative. (Epidictic is the third mode which eventually comprised, among other types of rhetorical practices, poetry and literature [Schiappa - Beginnings, 202-03].) The link of rhetoric with presenting different argumentative stances is evident in the roles played by the *rhetoires*: proponents of political policy and legal advocates. Further, rhetoric's importance with respect to major political and governmental institutions comes to the fore in the defining aspects considered above.

Schiappa informs us that in the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E., "the term [*rhētorikē*] quickly became useful as a means of organizing thought and effort around a specific set of problems – those of being a persuasive *rhētor*" (Schiappa – Beginnings, 27-28). The persuasive aspect of rhetoric provides the axis of Aristotle's definition, and is tightly linked to its contentious nature. However, prior to launching into considering Aristotle's position – the object of this dissertation – I shall consider Plato's views. For Aristotle's treatise is a response to Plato's position.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates condemns rhetoric (as used by Gorgias) as mere flattery, meanwhile contrasting it with dialectic, which he defines as a tool to discover absolute Truth. He thus equates Gorgianic rhetoric with falsehood and trickery. However, in the *Gorgias* Socrates also mentions – albeit only once and in passing – what he calls the "true rhetoric," which he later expands upon in the *Phaedrus*. The true rhetoric he speaks of is the rhetoric that will be used by the philosopher only after he has – by means of dialectical inquiry – gained true knowledge. Only then will he

attempt to be persuasive. Plato thus identifies two rhetorics, each with its respective terrain: Gorgianic rhetoric is flattery, falsehood, and trickery that has to do with the particular and evanescent, whereas true rhetoric expresses absolute knowledge obtained via dialectic. Kennedy provides a concise summary of Plato's preliminary, negative stance in the *Gorgias*:

Socrates apparently taught that truth was absolute and knowable and that a clear distinction should be made between dialectic, the question and answer method of obtaining the one correct answer, and rhetoric, which does not seem interested in the universal validity of the answer but only in its persuasiveness for the moment. This criticism Plato developed to such an extent that he is the most famous and most thorough-going of the enemies of rhetoric; the other Socratics do not seem to have felt an equally intense aversion (Kennedy – Persuasion, 14).

Regardless of Plato's attack on rhetoric – which, it must be noted, is less harsh in the *Phaedrus* (a work written after the *Gorgias*)<sup>14</sup> – care must perhaps be taken not to view either Socrates or Plato as dogmatic adherents to doctrine. For, as Jaeger writes, there was a perennial search for the truth among students in Plato's Academy: The “classic doctrines about the Ideas, about unity and multiplicity, about pleasure and pain, about the state, about the soul and virtue, were by no means inviolable sanctuaries in the discussions of the students. They were constantly being tested, defended, and altered, in [terms of the] logical validity” (14).

We must not forget that the abovementioned discussions were predominantly conducted using oral, as opposed to written discourse, a newly arrived form of communication that posed a threat to the established framework. With a view to obtaining a proper orientation (as described by Charles Taylor) of the terrain we are now exploring, we can consider comments made by Socrates that, ironically, are preserved in writing. His observations, which shed light on how spoken and written discourse were being analyzed in antiquity, are pertinent and worth reflecting on today.

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<sup>14</sup> “He [Plato] did rehabilitate it [rhetoric] in the *Phaedrus*, but only in a completely reconstructed form identifying the genuinely accomplished orator with the philosopher who has full knowledge of ethical and political matters and who will also apply it in moral practice” (Engberg-Pedersen, 116).

This dispute bears recalling, for it still has relevance, in spite of (or perhaps *because of*) the tendency to regard written texts as sources of great reliability.<sup>15</sup> In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates compares writing with speaking:

*Soc.* You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing about writing, which makes it truly analogous to painting. The painter's products stand before us as though they were alive: but if you question them, they maintain a most majestic silence. It is the same with written words: they seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing for ever. And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right people, and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself (Hackforth, 158).

Socrates' point is perhaps taken for granted, and perhaps a bit too obvious. But caution must always be used with written texts by any author, for the reasons Socrates gives above. Further, since most thinkers change and evolve throughout their lives, often their earlier works do not express the mature thought of the same writer at a later period in life. We might ask, for instance, how many thinkers fall into the same category as Hans Georg Gadamer, who, in the second edition of *Truth and Method* writes that although he had read the criticisms of this work, he did not heed the requests for modifications due to the fact that, in his opinion, the method he had arrived at was still valid 15 years later (xvi). The question that arises is whether or not a greater number of scholars stand closer Montaigne in his *Apology for Raymond Sebond*, thinking one thing one day (or minute) and another the next.<sup>16</sup> The point that I wish to make here is that, in spite of the reliability usually attributed to written texts, there are dangers involved with such a position, dangers that Socrates identified in the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E.

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<sup>15</sup> I am speaking in general terms. Obviously, many theorists argue that all discourse, written and oral, is completely unstable. Derrida, for instance, takes the position in "Plato's Pharmacy" that neither written nor spoken discourse is free from ambiguity. This is, however, a stance that has generated an unresolved dispute among scholars that continues to the present. Further, it is a point of view foreshadowed by Gorgias in *On What Is Not* (see Wardy: 1996).

<sup>16</sup> See Frame.

To the problems associated with written discourse we can add another: the possible evolution of the writer in terms of his thought. Both Plato and Aristotle present challenges, for both thinkers evolved over time. It is necessary to keep the developments of each in mind when examining their works. As Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is the focus of this dissertation, contributions made by scholars on his development and writing bear consideration. In relation with his development, Werner Jaeger argues that the reason for what have been viewed as blatant inconsistencies in Aristotle's surviving works is that he had gone through a transition from being a full-blown Platonist to rebelling and becoming his own thinker.<sup>17</sup> According to Jaeger, Aristotle underwent dramatic changes in his philosophical thought, which must be kept in mind when reading his works and attempting to present how one interprets the way he defines and expresses his terms and ideas.

Jonathan Barnes identifies other challenges specific to Aristotle's corpus. First of all, the surviving works "were not 'written up for publication' and they were not given a literary polish – indeed, they were not literary texts at all" (12). Instead, they were "working drafts," having nothing in common with works such as "the *Theaetetus* or the *Meditations* or the *Critique of Pure Reason*" (14-15). Barnes then gives sound advice on how to read Aristotle: "You should surely read Aristotle's drafts in the manner in which you would read the notes which a philosopher had written for his own use" (Companion, 15). Barnes states that Aristotle's sentences are "crabbed" and "sometimes telegraphic: you must expand and illustrate them. The arguments are enthymematic – or mere hints: you must supply the missing premisses. The transitions are sudden – and often implicit: you must articulate and smooth and explain" (15). After telling us that there are "downright contradictions and inconsistencies" and providing a

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<sup>17</sup> See Jaeger.

number of examples and then referring to Jaeger's stance, Barnes sums up with his general sense of Aristotle's writing as a whole:

More generally, in reading through Aristotle's works, you do not gain the impression that you are gradually becoming familiar with a systematic construction. On the contrary, you seem to be led through a series of exhibition rooms, each stocked with problems and difficulties: the problems and difficulties can be looked at from this angle and from that . . . but – for the most part – nothing systematic seems to emerge. Rather, Aristotle is still searching for the answer – and inviting us to search with him (24).

Barnes view that Aristotle is inviting us to join him on a quest for answers he has not found the answer to defines the stance that, in my opinion, ought to be utilized not only when reading Aristotle's works, but to any work we as critical thinkers explore. In any case, we can also add to Barnes' suggestions that common sense ought also to be used when reading Aristotle. Barnes tells us that we must read Aristotle's works in the way outlined above, and that that while it is "difficult", "challenging", and "fun", there are also "dangers", for "disciplined reading sometimes softens into imaginative interpretation – and then in to free association" (15). Barnes rounds off his discussion by stating that "only a small portion of Aristotle's work has actually survived. . . . we only possess a few of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, and they do not suffice to determine the original picture" (23).

In spite of the gaping holes in Aristotle's surviving works, and no doubt due to the ability of the human mind to build towering structures of thought based on a mere fragment<sup>18</sup> as well as what Abbot identifies as an automatic, subconscious narrative-generating mechanism in the human mind,<sup>19</sup> scholars have constructed and continue to construct pictures of Aristotle and versions of what they believe his thought is as if they were delivered by Aristotle himself. How accurate these pictures and formulations really are can be questioned, including the present study.

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<sup>18</sup> See Most.

<sup>19</sup> See Abbot.

Keeping the above mentioned caveats in mind, we can now discuss in greater depth aspects of Aristotle's definition of the term under consideration, a definition which is necessarily an opinion that stands in opposition not only to Plato's but to those of other thinkers, past and present.

Aristotle departed from Plato in the first line of his manual. As Robert Wardy writes, "The famous first words of the treatise, 'rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic' (1354a1), flatly reject Socrates' uncompromising thesis that philosophical arguments are categorially [sic] distinct from rhetorical pleas" (Mighty, 58). Aristotle's stance was thus different from Plato's. Based on this schism, Hunt makes the assertion that the "history of rhetoric can be read as a series of responses to Plato."<sup>20</sup> Aristotle's *Rhetoric* stands as the most significant (if not most formidable) rejoinder to Plato's position. A systemized account of the principles and ideas in Plato's and other works from the period, Aristotle's treatise is, according to Thomas B. Farrell, inexhaustible in terms of its content and complexity. We will never manage to have the last academic word on it:

As with the Greek language, or perhaps Mozart's muse, there is something curiously bracing in the realization that we will never quite get "to the bottom" of all the mysteries in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It is simply too densely layered, with far-reaching, albeit elusive, tributaries to other aspects of his thought, Greek culture, and unknowable circumstance. So be it (93).

This is elegant testimony to the profound and wide-ranging content of Aristotle's treatise, which, as mentioned above, can be read not only as having responded to and participated in the conversation on defining rhetoric that appears in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, but also as having supplied a rich resource for subsequent attempts to do the same.

Aristotle provides two short definitions of rhetoric in his treatise. The rest of the *Rhetoric* can, in my opinion, be read as a discussion that is, in essence, an extended definition built upon them. The first short definition Aristotle makes appears in Book I:

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<sup>20</sup> Cited by Kastely (29).

Rhetoric is an *antistrophos* to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, up to a point try both to test and uphold and argument [as in dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric] (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 30 – author’s brackets).

In the above passage, a major difference in terms of definition vis-à-vis that of Plato’s comes to the fore. As stated above, dialectic as presented in the *Gorgias* was in Plato’s view a tool to discover absolute and universal truths whereas rhetoric was denigrated as a mere knack like cookery. Plato later defines rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* as the means to convince souls of the universal truths of dialectic. In contrast, Aristotle in the above passage conflates rhetoric and dialectic. Since the Greek term *antistrophos* can be translated as “counterpart,” “correlative,” “coordinate” or “complement” (30 - footnote 4), he considers two modes of discourse that Plato had isolated from one another to be sister arts. Whereas Plato separates dialectic from rhetoric and assigns each practice different functions, Aristotle links them together with similar functions. (Universal and irrefutable truths are dealt with by Aristotle in his *Analytics*.) In any case, we can see that the two philosophers take, on this significant point, divergent stances.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> With respect to Kennedy’s translation above, we immediately run into further challenges with respect to written texts. For in addition to Socrates’ assertion that a text cannot explain itself, on the one hand, and, on the other, the problems that arise with written texts due to the evolution of their authors, another difficulty arises: scholarly interpretation. For when Kennedy translates the above passage, he inserts brackets that link dialectic with testing and upholding an argument and later in the passage brackets that link rhetoric with defending one’s position. He thereby separates the functions of rhetoric and dialectic in a way that a careful reader of Aristotle will easily identify as erroneous. For in *Sophistical Refutations* Aristotle makes the following points about dialectic: “Hence, everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of examining; for all undertake to some extent a test of those who profess to know things. What serves them here is the general principles; for they know these themselves just as well as the scientist, even if in what they say they seem to go wildly astray. All, then, are engaged in refutation; for they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic is concerned professionally; and he is a dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of deduction” (Barnes - Complete, 292).

Aristotle is speaking in this passage of dialectic, whose users participate in two activities: 1) the carrying out of tests of the knowledge that they possess and 2) refutation. Aristotle attributes functions to dialectic that Kennedy has separated in his translation. Kennedy has read Aristotle as stating that rhetoric is for attack and defense and that dialectic is for examining an argument. Since Aristotle merges rhetoric with dialectic, it would appear that both modes of discourse, if we consider the above text from *Sophistical Refutations*, deal not only with examining arguments for their soundness, but with defending one’s own arguments and attacking those of others. Both arts,



A key observation that Aristotle makes regarding both rhetoric and dialectic in the passage above <sup>22</sup> is that, in his definition, all people use both modes of discourse.<sup>23</sup> The mechanisms and devices of both rhetoric and dialectic are, in his opinion, universally employed.<sup>24</sup> Along these lines and working in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Perelman appropriates Aristotle's assertion when he comments on everyday conversations among individuals, while making the important observation that most authors of treatises have practically eliminated this area of rhetoric's application from their discussions:

In ordinary dialogue the participants are simply trying to persuade their audience so as to bring about some immediate or future action; most of our arguments in daily life develop at this practical level. It is a curious and noteworthy fact that this everyday activity of persuasive discussion has received very scant attention from the theoreticians. Most authors of treatises on rhetoric have regarded it as foreign to their discipline (Treatise, 39).

In relation to the above, Perelman writes that "Alfonso Reyes has rightly pointed out that private discourse is a field contiguous to that of ancient rhetoric; it is indeed in the course of daily conversation that the opportunity to engage in argumentation most commonly presents itself" (Treatise, 39). We can see that – as participants in an ongoing conversation that began in 4<sup>th</sup> century Athens, both Perelman and Alfonso Reyes are rewording and expanding upon statements made by Plato, Aristotle and other thinkers.

Take, for instance, the following comments made by Socrates in Plato's *Phaedrus*:

Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also? And must it not be the same art that is concerned with issues great and small, its right employment commanding no more respect when dealing

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in Aristotle's definition, have similar aims, and should not, as Kennedy's translation has it, be read as performing separate functions. So we can see that while Aristotle's stance in the same passage is perhaps somewhat condescending when he speaks of amateurs as going "wildly astray" in their arguments, the danger looms large for experts as well. In this case, Kennedy does not seem to take into consideration the passage from *Sophistical Refutations*.

<sup>22</sup> See also footnote 22 above.

<sup>23</sup> Lausberg asserts that it is through education that awareness of the latent knowledge of rhetoric that humans possess naturally occurs (14).

<sup>24</sup> Certain authors extend Aristotle's definition and assert not only that all humans engage in rhetorical activity, but that 1) "persuasion is at the heart of all communication be it in discourse with the self or the other" (Grimaldi, 4) and 2) that "[a]ll symbol/language-use is rhetorical" (Schiappa, Hamm, 5). The assertion that all human communication is rhetorical is disputable.

with important matters than with unimportant? Is that what you have been told about? (Hackforth, 158).

We have stated that Aristotle's definition of rhetoric and dialectic are different from Plato's. But, if we look closely, we can follow Aristotle's thought and see where his position – at least with respect to rhetoric – is similar with Plato's. For there are similarities not only in the first lines of his treatise, but in the second short definition he provides:

1. Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion. This is the function of no other art; for each of the others is instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example medicine about health and disease and geometry about the properties of magnitudes and arithmetic about numbers and similarly in the case of the other arts and sciences (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 37-38).

The first, and most important similarity we find, has to do with essence. Socrates infers that rhetoric is the influencing of the mind using words. Aristotle calls it an ability to see the available means of persuasion. The similarity we find lies in the terms influence and persuasion for, roughly speaking, we could say that to influence is to persuade and vice versa.<sup>25</sup>

The two thinkers also agree in general terms on who uses rhetoric. For Socrates states that the influencing of the mind that he has identified is carried out not only in courts of law and other public places, but in private places also. Aristotle states that all people use rhetoric and dialectic when they put their arguments to the test or defend them. We can thus read both Plato and Aristotle as asserting that rhetoric, which in Plato's wording is influencing the mind and in Aristotle's is identifying the means of persuasion, are activities that all humans engage in. (We

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<sup>25</sup> Hackforth writes: "Rhetoric is [for Plato] at bottom persuasion, and persuasion is generically the same whatever be the mode of its expression, oral or written, poetry or prose." (Hackforth, 115-116)

have seen above that contemporary scholars Perelman and Reyes agree on this point as well.)

Now, while it is true that Aristotle states that all people use rhetoric in order to show its pervasiveness in human discourse, one of his aims could very well be to defend his position (contrary to Plato's) of rhetoric as *techne*. For just as Aristotle discusses representation in relation with children's imitative behavior in his *Poetics* in order to show its development from a natural activity to *techne*, his discussion here about rhetoric's being used by everyone is to highlight his refining and bringing its structures to light. In this sense, he defines rhetoric at a higher level in terms of its essence and function than Plato does.<sup>26</sup> Further, that he gives it as a mode of discourse more value than Plato can be seen first in his calling it the *antistrophos* to dialectic, as well as in his having written this treatise for the ancient equivalents of today's politicians and lawyers (Walker – *Poetics*, 31), who practiced the art of oratory in Athen's assemblies, courts of law, and at events appropriate for epideictic, or celebratory rhetoric.

Aristotle's main focus is on three primary modes of rhetorical operations in his *Rhetoric*. Other scholars have expanded on his (and other ancient scholars') ideas, demonstrating rhetoric's near all-pervasiveness in the various modes of human discourse, thereby elaborating on Aristotle's definition of rhetoric's domain. For instance, the medieval rhetorician Furió's view was that “all of the other [academic] disciplines are subject to rhetoric, not due to their nature, but because all of them are expressed in and learned through speech” (Garrido, 34 – my brackets). Along these

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<sup>26</sup> Plato, when giving a more positive appraisal of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*, nonetheless champs considerably at the bit, as evidenced by Socrates' commentary: “So contending with words is a practice found not only in lawsuits and public harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak we find this single art, *if indeed it is an art, which enables people to make out everything to be like everything else*, within the limits of possible comparison, and to expose the corresponding attempts of others who disguise what they are saying” (Hackforth, 124 – my italics).

lines and extending the types of discourse that comprise rhetoric's domain, Kennedy writes:

Wherever persuasion is the end, rhetoric is present. This is most marked in formal speeches in epic or drama or history, but it can be found in passages not formally oratorical both in lyric and in philosophy. This philosopher in weighing the evidence, drawing the conclusion, and presenting a literate exposition is fulfilling much the same functions as the orator in court, and so is the historian, who has similar problems of witnesses, psychological credibility, narration of incident, ascription of motive, weighing of evidence, and estimation of justice, expediency or honor. The Greek philosopher and dramatist share the concern of the historian and orator with justice and responsibility (Rhetoric, 7).

Rhetoric's near-all-pervasiveness in human discourse and its modes is also highlighted by Walker, who, in his discussion of the origins of epideictic rhetoric, writes as follows:

From the presocratic philosophers, historians, and sophists onward, it [epideictic rhetoric] proliferates into the varied kinds of spoken and written prose – histories and prose romances, dialogues and treatises, lectures and panegyrics, declamations and literary imitations of *pragmatika*, “hymns” and “monodies,” and so forth – that, with the more traditional forms of poetry, continue to constitute the rhetorical *paideia* (Poetics, 128).

We can find a parallel in the passage above in the writings of Suetonius (1<sup>st</sup> century A.D.). He includes, in the content of rhetoric, “the study and composition of fables, narratives, eulogies, invectives and arguments for and against a thesis, and the staging of debates” (Morgan, 309). Rhetoric takes other forms as well, such as “the sermon, the political pamphlet, the educational treatise, the funeral encomium, and the imaginative exercise, as well as the more expected judicial and deliberative orations” (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 7). All of the above manifestations from ancient sources give credence to and demonstrate a link with Eagleton's assertion in 1983 that a return to rhetoric ought to be initiated, in order to “develop a form of study which would look at the various sign-systems and signifying practices in our own society, all the way from *Moby Dick* to the Muppet Show, from Dryden and Jean-Luc-Goddard to the portrayal of women in advertisements and the rhetorical techniques of Government reports” (Introduction,

207).<sup>27</sup> The concrete examples Eagleton provides are manifestations of signifying practices from a variety of fields (i.e., literature, TV, film, advertising, and so on).

Aristotle distinguishes between rhetoric and other fields in the first of his two short definitions. For he contrasts rhetoric as an ability to see the available means of persuasion in each case, while in other disciplines such as medicine, geometry and other arts and sciences, he states that they *are* persuasive with respect to their content. Rhetoric, in contrast, is content free. We find this idea in the *Rhetoric* in passages where Aristotle speaks, for example of using rhetoric in politics and distinguishes between the two fields. His text was written for the politicians and lawyers to be of his day, and so the examples that he uses are specific to their practices. But in his treatise he consistently states that when the content from another discipline is employed in rhetorical argumentation, it ceases to be rhetoric per se. Aristotle viewed rhetoric as a system of reasoning that used mechanisms translated as commonplaces that are outlined in his *Rhetoric* and *Topics*. They are logical structures that are not connected to a particular discipline, but that can be utilized in many different types of argument and across disciplines. As stated, Aristotle differs from Plato in that his definition of rhetoric and dialectic are tools not – as Plato’s Socrates argues – for discovering absolute Truth but for arguing opinion. But we shall see below that, in Aristotle’s lights, even opinions have their “truths.”

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. Cicero who in *De Inventione* views rhetoric as being applicable to all forms of literature (Culpepper Stroup, 26).

## 1.2 RHETORIC'S FIELD: OPINION

We have stated that although Aristotle maintains Plato's position that rhetoric is concerned with persuasion, he differs from Plato in that he does not view dialectic as a tool to discover universal truths, but as being concerned with opinion. He states this blatantly in the *Topics*, his treatise on dialectic: "For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to opinion" (Barnes – Complete, 176). In this phrase Aristotle states clearly that dialectic is concerned with opinion, which he differentiates from philosophical truth. Since, as we have seen, Aristotle views dialectic and rhetoric as sister arts, we can read assertions he makes in the *Topics* about dialectic as informing rhetoric, and vice versa. Thus, his assertion above that dialectic is used for opinion can also be applied to rhetoric. The following assertion about dialectic also applies: "Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it" (167). Here we can identify three basic concepts that can be applied to both rhetoric and dialectic. The first concept is that both dialectic and rhetoric can be read as operating in the terrain of reputable opinions as opposed to empirically demonstrable issues (which in this dissertation I am calling hard facts). The other two concepts Aristotle sets forth in the passage above are that 1) dialectic and rhetoric can be used for any subject and that 2) the aim is to avoid contradiction. When Aristotle distinguishes rhetoric and dialectic from Plato's definitions of the same terms and views these disciplines as sister arts and as having to do with reputable opinion, he is defining rhetoric and dialectic as the argumentative tools we use for maneuvering in the uncertainties of our material existence, where much of the time we do not have absolute answers to the questions that arise in our minute-by-minute existence. We argue with ourselves about what the truth of a matter is, often taking different

perspectives that in their argumentative structure are sound, but that nevertheless contradict other opposite (or varying) perspectives. That is, while a particular argument may not contain any contradictions, this does not mean that other perspectives presented as arguments structured by informal logic will not present contrary – and sound – arguments. Each argument ought to stand on its own in terms of informal logic. This idea is presented in the quote above when Aristotle states that when arguing, the aim is to “avoid saying anything contrary” to that argument. An opinion, by definition, can be contradicted or challenged by another opinion. Aristotle also makes this point in the *Rhetoric*: “None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this . . .” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 35).<sup>28</sup>

The division between opinion and hard facts is discussed by Perelman, who identifies where one field stops and the other starts. According to Perelman, the first extreme which stands as a limit to rhetoric’s possible application is “where the admitted thesis is self-evident and imposes upon every attentive mind there is no cause for argumentation” (Perelman – Justice, 120). In such cases, there is no use for rhetoric, for where truth is concerned, there is no need for argumentation: “When truth is manifestly clear, when self-evidence leaves no room for willful choice, all rhetoric is superfluous” (120). Perelman notes mathematical equations as an example of this type of case. That is, no judge is needed to “arrive at the conclusion that two plus two equals four” (120).<sup>29</sup> He states that Plato shows in the *Euthyphro* how “[w]hen we must justify preferences, deliberate about a decision, or discuss values, then argumentation and recourse to dialectics are indispensable” (151). While Plato would argue that these areas of

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<sup>28</sup> The possibility of arguing from opposite poles is one of the reasons that scholars often link rhetoric with the rise of democracy, and indicating its low presence in tyrannies and monarchies, which often resort to the bestowal of gifts or benefits for persuasion, or, as Erskine informs us, to arms for coercion (279). The results may be the same, but the means are different (Perelman - Treatise, 54).

<sup>29</sup> Whereas Perelman has overstated his case by not taking into consideration Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*, his argument holds true for non-specialists.

argumentation can be reduced to absolute truths, in Aristotle's definition preferences, decisions and values all fall into the category of opinion. So we can see that rhetoric is the mode of reasoning that we use when dealing with the inconsistencies and uncertainties of human action and knowledge in our material existence. Moreau paraphrases the discussion in the *Euthyphro*, showing the inherent predicament that takes place, not with respect to hard facts, but instead with abstract notions:

We do not discuss what can be objectively determined by incontestable procedures. If we differ in opinion, you and me, says Socrates to Euthyphro, about the number of eggs in the basket, about the length of a piece of cloth or about the weight of a sack of corn we will not argue about it, we will not discuss it; it will be sufficient to count, to measure, to weigh and our difference is resolved. Differences are prolonged and poisoned when such procedures and objective criteria are lacking. This is precisely the case, Euthyphro, when we disagree on the just, the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad: in one word, on values (Cited by Perelman - Justice, 151).

The first point that can be made from the passage above is that where it is possible to demonstrate the answer to a question empirically, there is no need for argumentation. The second, very important point is that we can see that where opinion is involved, values necessarily enter in. This aspect is primarily due to the need in these areas for qualitative judgment as opposed to quantitative measurement.

The other limit of rhetoric's field, according to Perelman, is mindless compulsion through physical violence. That is, where "the thesis is shown to be arbitrary and there is no reason to favor it, the demand for submission to a constraining power can come about only through brutal force, without any concern for intellectual acceptance" (120). The distinction between *bis* (force) and *logos* is crucial. When a gun is pointed at one's head, no real power to decide or to judge exists based on reason. But Perelman notes that the two limits he discusses are exceptional, and so he concludes that



“the field of rhetoric is thus immense” (120).<sup>30</sup> It is in this immense field that a “judge is indispensable,” in situations where “there is reason to make a decision and not when the result can be had from a calculator” (120). The idea of a judge is critical, and I shall expand on this concept in Part 2. But even where no judge is assumed to be necessary, there are writers like Dostoevsky who even take to task cases that are based on mathematics. In *Notes from Underground*, the narrator disputes the notion that numerical equations stand as uncontroversial facts:

Twice two’s four, well in my opinion it’s a cheek. Twice two’s four watches smugly, stands in the middle of your road with his arms akimbo, and spits. I agree that twice two’s four is a marvellous thing; but to give everything its due praise, twice two is five can also be a very nice little thing (34).

Dostoevsky’s underground man’s comment is, of course, an attack on the attempt to reduce human behavior to formal rules of math or logic, which would thereby eliminate free will. And the fact is, if one changes the axiomatic bases of a mathematical equation, it is possible to multiply two times two and have it equal five. Still, although Dostoevsky’s challenge is both intriguing and intellectually stimulating as an exercise in unconventional (but sound) logic, in this dissertation I differentiate opinion from hard facts. The latter can be proved empirically from the standpoint of a layperson, and removed from a system of values involved in choice and agency. Opinions, by comparison, can only be proved in terms of probability and, as we shall see, emotions, and are at the same time tied to a system of values as seen in the following passage. Plato’s Socrates had already presented ideas that Perelman certainly draws on with respect to rhetoric’s vast field:

*Soc.* Well now, is not the following assertion obviously true, that there are some words about which we all agree, and others about which we are at variance?  
*Ph.* I think I grasp your meaning, but you might make it still plainer.

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<sup>30</sup> In “The Politics of Rhetorical Education,” Joy Connolly takes a stance that differs radically from Perelman’s. She argues that the violence of political systems is masked by means of rhetoric. In this way, she asserts, rhetoric participates in violence. See Connolly, *Politics*.

*Soc.* When someone utters the word ‘iron’ or ‘silver’, we all have the same object before our minds, haven’t we?

*Ph.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But what about the words ‘just’ and ‘good’? Don’t we diverge, and dispute not only with one another but with our own selves?

*Ph.* Yes indeed.

*Soc.* So in some cases we agree, and in others we don’t.

*Ph.* Quite so.

*Soc.* Now in which of the cases are we more apt to be misled, and in which is rhetoric more effective?

*Ph.* Plainly in the case where we fluctuate.

*Soc.* Then the intending student of the art of rhetoric ought, in the first place, to make a systematic division of words, and get hold of some mark distinguishing the two kinds of words, those namely in the use of which the multitude are bound to fluctuate, and those in which they are not.

*Ph.* To grasp that, Socrates, would certainly be an excellent piece of discernment.

*Soc.* And secondly, I take it, when he comes across a particular word he must realise what it is, and be swift to perceive which of the two kinds the thing he proposes to discuss really belongs to.

*Ph.* To be sure.

*Soc.* Well then, shall we reckon love as one of the disputed terms, or as one of the other sort?

*Ph.* As a disputed term, surely. [. . .]

*Soc.* [. . .] But now tell me this . . . did I define love at the beginning of my speech?

*Ph.* Yes indeed, and immensely thorough you were about it (Hackforth, 126-127).

Socrates’ point is not complex: there are words whose meanings cannot be disputed, like “iron” and “silver”, for we know, or, in any case, have all agreed on what these terms mean. By comparison, there are terms that are not so easy to define, and further, that were we able to manage to arrive at definitions for terms like “just” and “good” that did not fluctuate but were agreed on, like “gold” and “silver”, such insight would, as Phaedrus suggests, be admirable. The problem, of course, is that there is disagreement about the words that Socrates calls disputed terms.

In this passage it is possible to see Plato’s stance with respect to dialectic and rhetoric. Rhetoric is more effective where the chance to err when defining terms occurs. Socrates, in this dialogue, attempts to reach a final and absolute definition of love through dialectic which can then be related through rhetoric. It is here that Aristotle and Plato differ: Plato attempts, through dialectic, to find universal definitions (or truths),

whereas Aristotle would argue that it is possible to use dialectic and hence, rhetoric, to argue in opposing directions about terms like love, the good, the just, and so on.<sup>31</sup>

Another concept discussed in antiquity will add to Socrates' assertions, for it is linked to the change that disputable, abstract terms undergo when manifested in concrete human action. Epictetus in his *Dialogues* discusses what he calls prenotions, which, in Stoic philosophy, manifest in human thought by the age of seven. These prenotions are equivalent to Socrates' fluctuating terms:

Prenotions are common to all men. No prenotation is in contradiction with any other. Who among us does not accept that good is something useful and desirable, to be sought and pursued in all circumstances? Who does not accept that right is something beautiful and suitable? Then, at what point is there a contradiction? When one applies the prenotions to particular realities, when one says: 'He acted honestly, he is a courageous man' and another says, 'No, he is a fool.' There is thus conflict between them. Such is the conflict which opposes Jews, Syrians, Egyptians and Romans: that it is necessary above all to respect holiness and to seek it in everything is not in question; but one wonders whether the act of eating pork conforms to holiness or not. Such is the conflict which opposes Agamemnon and Achilles. Call them before you. What will you say to Agamemnon? Is it not necessary to act as one should and with honesty? It is necessary. And you, Achilles, what do you say? Are you not of the opinion that one must act honestly? I am totally of that opinion. Now, apply these prenotions: here is where the conflict beings (Perelman – Justice, 124).

The above excerpt details the how abstract values, when expressed in concrete action by particular groups or individuals, become matters of dispute. Nearly everyone will agree that it is good to be honest, brave, and so forth, but it is in the action itself that difference of opinion arises as to whether or not the action is, in fact, a concrete

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<sup>31</sup> As an interesting aside, we can note that terms like gold and silver, which are indisputable for the layman, are questioned by scientists, such as F. Waisman: "For instance, we define gold in contrast to some other metals such as allows. This suffices for our present needs, and we do not probe any further. We tend to *overlook* the fact that there are always other directions in which the concept has not been defined. And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which would necessitate new limitations. In short, it is not possible to define a concept like gold with absolute precision, i.e., in such a way that every nook and cranny is blocked entry of doubt" (Cited by Perelman – Treatise, 130).

Although discussions like the one from the passage above are fascinating in and of themselves, for the purposes of this dissertation, rhetoric shall be defined as operating in the field that lies between "hard facts" indicated by terms such as "gold" and "silver" or statements such as "one plus one equals two". Rhetoric, for our purposes, must be interpreted as operating in connection with those terms and actions that are normally associated with possible dispute. That is, terms like just and good, not gold and silver.

example of the term under consideration. In Part 4 I bring rhetorical mechanisms to the surface that are necessarily tied to a system of values. The narrator, as human agent, takes action based on abstract notions that will be interpreted differently by each member of the audience or readership. It is in the analysis of the narrator's actions and motives that rhetoric provides insight into the mechanisms of reasoning that are used by humans when carrying out their deeds and as defined by their place in society and the role they play in it.

With respect to our discussion of the matters falling into the vast field in which rhetoric and dialectic operate, that is, controversial matters, it must be noted that Aristotle, when touching on issues that might be viewed from various perspectives, gives clues that make it seem that he believes that it is in the arguing about or presenting of different viewpoints that truth or ostensible truth may be found (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 39). In this regard, W.K.C. Guthrie writes that Aristotle was driven by a “constant anxiety to give due consideration to the opinions of others” (Aristotle, 91). Guthrie quotes Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on this point: “Therefore we must pay attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older men, or those of practical wisdom, no less than to demonstrations; for through the eye of experience they see correctly” (203). As can be seen, in the above assertion, Aristotle attributes similar value to sayings and opinions based on experience or age as he does to empirically demonstrable facts. In this sense, he equates opinion with truth, albeit not (necessarily or unnecessarily) absolute or universal. Aristotle not only lends credence to opinions based on experience and wisdom, but he is also, as Guthrie underscores with eyebrows raised, apparently not at all averse to utilizing premisses for argumentation which are, in effect, *ad populam* fallacies:

His [Aristotle's] defiant (in view of people like Parmenides and Plato) championship of the *consensus omnium* is truly remarkable: “We maintain that

what everyone believes is true. Whoever destroys this faith will hardly find a more credible one.” In the *Ethics* (1153b27) he quotes with approval the line of Hesiod (*Erga* 763): “No word is ever wholly lost that many peoples speak.” At the least, lay or earlier philosophic opinions made an excellent starting-point for argument. Brought to bear on them, the mind trained in dialectic and analytics could purge the dross of unscientific thinking and extract the true metal that remains. “If on any question, that in itself is sufficient proof” (1145b6) (Aristotle, 91).

We have already mentioned that everyone, in Aristotle’s lights, uses rhetoric to argue and persuade. *Vox populi* arguments have their element of truth, and it is in the use of rhetorical argumentation that certain truths, or perhaps types of truths, can be discovered. Aristotle writes in the *Rhetoric*, “Persuasion occurs through the arguments [*logoi*] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case” (Kennedy – *Rhetoric*, 39). If the aim is to discover the truth for ourselves, here and now, it is possible to take Aristotle’s contention that a variety of opinions must be heard in order to do so. Guthrie expands on Aristotle’s method for seeking truth from the opinions of others when examining a particular subject:

The first book [of *De philosophia*] illustrates a practice of Aristotle familiar from the first books of the *Metaphysics*, *De anima* and elsewhere, that of introducing his own study of a subject in the context of a historical review of previous opinions. This in turn resulted from the characteristically Aristotelian faith (which I personally find attractive) that in every sincerely held belief, however overlaid with error, patient sifting will reveal a grain of truth (Aristotle, 83-84).

Guthrie relates how Aristotle took pains to consider all possible opinions on a subject, however unassuming, as possible sources of wisdom or truth: “Once again, [in *De philosophia*] he [Aristotle] refuses to dismiss popular wisdom as beneath the notice of the philosopher” (86). The dialectical and rhetorical process, whether involving the truth of a specialist or that of the man or woman on the street, is the same: two sides (at least) are presented in their most reasonable form, and, based on the arguments, an assessment is made.

When discussing the truth of rhetoric, we must keep in mind statements Aristotle makes in this regard. Here we must use common sense and infer that Aristotle

distinguished between the “truth” of rhetoric and dialectic the pure or abstract “Truth” of philosophical speculation, as well as that of pure logic (analytics). This idea becomes clear in statements that Aristotle makes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* about the “science” of ethics, and its “truths”:

We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each of our statements be *received*; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs (Barnes – Complete, 1730).

Aristotle qualifies the truth of ethics in the above passage by stating that we must be satisfied with premises that lead to it roughly and in outline. This is due to the low possibility of achieving absolute precision in matters upon which often very little agreement has been achieved.<sup>32</sup> This is due to the great number of opinions on the subjects that rhetoric deals with, and over which we as humans dispute. We find an example in Aristotle’s *Politics*, where he discusses the problems that surface with respect to the term education, which is, in the end, a pre-notion on which little agreement has been achieved:

Education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of the state . . . For men are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to excellence or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral excellence. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows on what principle we should proceed – should the useful in life, or should excellence, or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training? – all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agreement (2121).

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<sup>32</sup> In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle writes the following with respect to the subject of his treatise. Ethics, he tells us, is a nebulous field from which little precision can be expected: “And we must also remember what has been said before, and not to look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer look for right angles in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth” (Barnes – Complete, 1735-1736).

We see here the problematics related to a term about which aims this same term ought to hold, or how these aims should be carried out in real practice. Opinions differ, and, as Aristotle points out, there is division about how education ought to be implemented in concrete terms. It appears as if things have not changed much over time, especially if we consider the recent Bologna Accords whose aim is to reform higher education in Europe. There is also a parallel in the affirmation Aristotle makes about education being a matter of the state. In connection with this, it bears mentioning that in his treatise, Aristotle also calls rhetoric an offshoot of ethics and politics. For after stating that in rhetoric persuasion is the result of showing the truth or plausible truth of a particular case, he then goes on to assert the following: “The result is that rhetoric is like some offshoot [*paraphues*] of dialectic and ethical studies (which is rightly called politics)” (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 39). What I wish to underscore here is the interconnectedness of rhetoric and dialectic with politics and ethics. In Aristotle’s definition, there is no separating the three fields. And so, according to Aristotle, we can only, when dealing with any of these disciplines, be as precise as the subject matter allows. Here it might be possible to argue that Aristotle means not to shrug our shoulders and throw in the ethical towel, but to be as exact as humanly possible when dealing with matters that are, by nature, inexact.

The imprecision necessarily involved in rhetorical operations and its field (opinion) is tightly linked to the concept of contingency. The consensus that is attained through argumentation is often based on opinions that are based on common sense or experience, that provide the basis for decision-making and judgment. A.E. Bons states that this awareness of the need to use opinions is crucial due to the uncertainty which human beings confront:

Humankind lives in a contingent world, in which the state of affairs or (lack of) facts alone more often than not is not sufficient to reach a clear decision on an

issue. . . there is reasoning on the basis of probability (*eikos*). If decisive proof is lacking, the question of fact or the interpretation of fact depends on criteria of comparison with what the person or persons called upon to judge take to be the case or the state of affairs generally. Their criteria are based on experience and commonly accepted knowledge about human behavior, and the expectations they have on the basis of this (Bons – Gorgias, 41).

The material world presents circumstances that are, by nature, only predictable to varying degrees. Past experience is a source for prediction based on probability. Still, as there is no fool-proof mechanism for determining how future events will fall into place, in the end, predictions based on experience stand as opinions. As noted throughout our discussion, an issue that is the object of rhetorical debate will always have at least two, conflicting perspectives, each of which can be argued forcefully. That is, arguments based on experience and commonly accepted knowledge about human behavior will have respective proponents that disagree on the same issue, and how it is to be judged.

Along these lines, Connolly makes the following assertion: “Rhetoric’s abstracting and rationalizing impulse imposes systematic order on speech that always threatens to escape its proper bounds. It anchors persuasive eloquence in a rational system that seeks to compensate for contingencies with a superabundance of possibilities for classification” (Order, 148). The threat to go beyond its own limits is an echo of Aristotle’s caveat against using logic but at the same time going wildly astray in argumentation. This is a danger, but, in normal circumstances, rhetoric aims for fixity in a framework of reality that presents differing degrees of order. The aim of rhetoric is to ascertain correctly, using past experience as its base, to take the chaos of contingency and make sense out of it. In this sense, it is tightly linked to narrative. That is, the aim of both rhetoric and narrative can be read as making sense out of what often seems to be pure chaos. The unruliness of our existence in the physical world is brought under control, at least on the page and, one assumes, in the mind of the writer. Chaos becomes orderliness; bedlam becomes structure and harmony. Of course, as Connolly



suggests above, out of this chaos a vast number of interpretations, all based on syllogistic reasoning is possible. The aim, when using rhetoric, is to either predict what will happen or to establish what has happened accurately. Both modes of reasoning have as their aim to achieve certainty amidst uncertainty, and, in this sense, represent means that attempt to fulfill the deep-rooted human desire for unshakeable knowledge.

Curious in this regard is Ross' opinion on Aristotle's position with respect to contingency, for he believes it is difficult to pin Aristotle down in this respect:

It is excessively hard to be sure whether Aristotle thinks in the long run that there is a sphere of real contingency in the world. He sometimes speaks as if necessity ruled in the celestial and contingency in the sublunary region. But even in the sublunary world there are necessary connexions – the connexions between a subject and its genus, differentiae, and properties. And even in the celestial region there is contingency; a planet which is here is capable of being there. The contingency attaching to the heavenly bodies, however, is only a capacity for movement, while terrestrial things have also the capacity of changing in quality, of growing and diminishing, and of coming to be and passing away (31).

The first point that I wish to bring up about the above passage is that we can see how contingency operates even in the commentaries that experts make on a particular thinker. For depending on how one reads Aristotle, it is possible to conclude as Ross has, that it is difficult to determine whether Aristotle believes contingency per se exists in the world. At the same time, if one reads the *Topics*, Aristotle states clearly that dialectical, and thus, by association, rhetorical arguments have to do with both “hard facts” and the contingent: “Some things occur of necessity, others for the most part, others however it may chance . . .” (Barnes – Complete, 187). In this statement it appears as if Aristotle views both contingency and necessity as existing and forming part of the real world. It is possible that Ross has misread Aristotle. Our knowledge is thus contingent upon careful reading of available texts, upon which we must exercise our reason in order to attempt to discover the truth.

Be that as it may, in the above passage Aristotle defines three categories for things that happen: 1) those that are inexorable, 2) those that usually, or as a norm, happen, and 3) those that are subject to chance. In this tri-partite division, Aristotle neatly sums up the vast majority of events that occur in the physical world. Whether or not Ross is right about Aristotle's views on contingency, we experience life and the reality it presents as if it did exist – in the way Aristotle describes it in the passage above. The reasonable choice is to confront our existence as if contingency does, in fact, exist. We then make decisions based on a system of values that lead to action and which can be judged. The fact is, however, that in our dealings with others, there is often very little certainty or agreement on what the right course of concrete action is. It is precisely in this sphere that rhetoric, as counterpart to dialectic, operates. The sphere of rhetoric stands, for all practical intents and purposes, in full contrast with hard sciences, even though the latter is an evolving body of knowledge and is subject to argument and interpretation of data. Few if any phenomena are free from contingency and flux. Toulmin argues that only mathematics can be placed outside of uncertainty:

Mathematical arguments alone seem entirely safe: given the assurance that every sequence of six or more integers between 1 and 100 contains at least one prime number, and also the information that none of the numbers from 62 up to 66 is a prime, I can thankfully conclude that the number 67 is a prime; and that is an argument whose validity neither time nor the flux of change can call in question. This unique character of mathematical arguments is significant. Pure mathematics is possibly the only intellectual activity whose problems and solutions are 'above time' (Return, 127).

Thus we must take Aristotle's famous advice cited above when entering into the sphere in which rhetoric operates. That is, it is equally unreasonable to expect a mathematician to deal in the logic of probability or to expect a rhetorician to deal in hard, provable facts. Again, Aristotle may not here be looking down his nose at the rhetorician. Rather, it would seem that he is stating that one ought to apply a determined mode of thought as dependent on its aims and aspects. That is, a mathematician's aims for intellectual

query and the attendant premisses are much different from those of the rhetorician who is dealing with possibility, probability, and the unforeseeable on the one hand, and myriad points of view regarding the how and the what of things in the material world on the other. The formal knowledge of mathematics and philosophy must be distinguished from the sticky business of the quotidian. Just because rhetoric's aim is not the formal truth of either geometry or philosophy, this does not mean, from Aristotle's point of view, that the arguments it puts forward are unreasonable. For as we have already seen in the *Topics*, Aristotle states that the aim of dialectic is to avoid contradiction in argumentation (Barnes – Complete, 167). That is, opinions, as assailable as they may be, also have their own logic upon which solid arguments can be built. Whether or not they establish certainty is part of the reasoning that defines rhetoric and dialectic. This means that, in both dialectic and rhetoric, arguments can be based on both “hard facts” and reputable opinion. In the end, even arguments permeated with contingency have some basis in the physical world. A simple example will illustrate this idea: if a human being goes without water for more than three days, he/she will die. (Here contingency also enters, for the number of days a human can survive depends on the temperature.<sup>33</sup>) This is one example of what I am calling a “hard fact”. It is also a “hard fact” that it is physically possible to load a Land Rover with enough water that will make it possible to cross the Sahara. Within the boundaries of these two hard facts lies the contingency of the trip itself. Assuming all goes well, we will make it safely across the desert. However, if things go awry – that is, if we are hit by a sandstorm and end up drinking most of the water – we then run the risk of dying in the attempt. Our daily existence is filled with contingent possibilities that operate in the arena of “hard facts,” most of them much less dramatic than the example given here. Most of the time in our daily lives we

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<sup>33</sup> See: U.S. Government. [www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/09-29981.pdf](http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/09-29981.pdf)

have to make much more mundane decisions, such as whether or not to take an umbrella to avoid getting rained on. But whether or not the consequences are as dire as running out of water in the desert is immaterial, at least with respect to the fact that this is rhetoric's field of operations. That is, in the end we use rhetoric-based reasoning to make our way through and face a material existence that is made up of both hard facts and contingent possibilities.

Thus the rhetorical thought structures that provide the reasoning upon which opinions are based, are, in spite of the chance to err, logical. Taylor affirms this idea, when he states that rhetoric studies “deductions, it studies logic” (Barnes – Companion, 261). His assertions are based on affirmations Aristotle makes in the *Rhetoric* that define it as a deductive thought process: “It is plain, then, that the technical study of rhetoric is a sort of proof (since we are most persuaded when we consider a thing to have been proved); the orator's proofs are enthymemes, and an enthymeme is a sort of deduction . . .” (261). Aristotle defines an enthymeme as a sort of syllogism, calling it the equivalent of a dialectical syllogism (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 34). I shall deal in greater detail with this aspect of rhetoric in Part 2, in the section I devote to the proof *logos*. At this point I am simply bringing to the fore Aristotle's idea that rhetorical thinking has to do with logic. That is, opinions are necessarily based on reasonable thought processes.

We can add the following commentary by McCroskey along these lines to our discussion:

Rhetorical thought is neither logical nor illogical: it is psychological. This is not to suggest that rhetorical thought is irrational; quite the contrary. It is rational, but it takes account of the fact that human reasoning does not occur in a vacuum. Research has indicated that reasoning is strongly affected by an individual's attitudes. Consequently, matters of formal logical validity have little relevance for the communicator concerned with influencing an audience. The real test of a communicator's reasoning is acceptance by the audience (103-104).

In the passage above, what is important to note is that McCroskey distinguishes between “rational” and “logical,” and that when he refers to logic, he is referring to formal logic. He perhaps overstates his case when he states that rhetoric is “neither logical nor illogical,” for, as Taylor notes when reiterating Aristotle’s ideas, rhetoric is a logical process. However, in a strict, formal sense, rhetoric cannot be viewed as logical, due to its sphere of operations, where contingency and probability come into play. When McCroskey states that rhetoric is psychological he ignores the deductive thought processes that are active when rhetorical thought is used. When McCroskey makes his assertions, he is no doubt referring to formal logic, which operates in a different area, where absolutes come into play. In any case, McCroskey would concur that when a speaker’s ideas are accepted by the audience, they are, in the end, being persuaded by her arguments that support an opinion, as opposed to a fact that can be verified by empirical means.

What is the arena and what are the components where opposing opinions are presented and tackled? Bons provides a schema for rhetorical activity where differing opinions are asserted using informal logic:

The area of operation for a reasonable argument has the following constituents: first of all, there has to be an issue about which there are opposing claims, but the conclusive proof of either claim cannot be given by both parties involved. Then, the matter in question allows of being otherwise and, thirdly, both parties, or at least one if this party challenges an already existing claim made by the other, intend to make their case as strong as possible by showing that it stands to reason. Finally, the rhetorical situation is in most cases some kind of dicanic or deliberative gathering, like a court room or an assembly, but other situations of a more private character can be imagined as well (Reasonable, 14).

Bons here provides a succinct summary of the basics of rhetorical argument: 1) an issue that is disputable, due to its inconclusive nature, 2) at least two parties that take opposite positions, 3) a setting in which a judgment is made on the opposing views, in order to

determine which is the most reasonable. The views of Van Eemeren and Houtlosser shed further light on the rhetorical process that seeks truth from contrary opinions:

At any rate, there always has to be an issue – however indeterminate – about which there is supposed to be critical doubt, disagreement, controversy, a dispute, disagreement, or even a conflict. This means that there are at least two parties involved, irrespective of whether these parties voice their views orally or in writing or keep silent, and irrespective of how many people the parties consist of. The speaker or writer may address one other party, but also two or [sic] more parties at the same time. These other parties may be present during argumentation, and actively engage in the argumentative discourse, but they may also consist of a listening (and watching) audience or a collection of readers known or unknown to the writer (Always, 10).

In the passage above we see again that in rhetorical argumentation, a disputed issue or opinion is necessarily present and that there are at least two parties. What these authors add to the discussion is that the parties may speak, write or maintain silence, and further, that the arena where the argumentation and the latter's enactment takes place is necessary. However, they refine this aspect by stating that the parties may or may not be present, may or may not actively engage in discourse, and may be listeners, watchers, or readers, known or unknown to the writer. Two important points to note here with respect to this dissertation is that in the analysis to be carried out in Part 4, the audience is necessarily a reader unknown to the writer on the one hand, and, on the other, the writer/narrator is physically absent. In other words, the judgment will take place in the mind of the audience/reader through the act of reading. The narrator of the travel narrative presents, in my interpretation, a case that is controversial, with the aim of resolving a difference of opinion. The narrator is, in effect, pleading a case, using argumentation whose aim (among others) is, in Van Eemeren and Houtlosser's words, "creating consensus" (Always, 10). As for the fictional case under study, details are presented that seek resolution, but in the end are inconclusive.

The possibility to argue in opposite directions in the frameworks outlined above has, as we have been asserting, the concern of rhetoric throughout history. Skinner, in

his discussion of Cicero, speaks of how the latter admired the orator Carneades for his ability to convincingly argue opposing sides of the same issue. In the case Skinner elaborates on, the term under consideration is “justice”:

[Cicero’s] admiration flows from the fact that Carneades managed on a famous occasion to argue convincingly in favour of justice on one day and no less convincingly against it on the day following. He thereby demonstrated that, even when discussing the virtues, it will always be possible to uphold the central contention of rhetorical theory, the contention that there are two sides to every question, and thus that one can always argue *in utramque parte* (9-10).

Arguing *in utramque partem*, on both sides of an issue, became the most prized of skills in Roman oratory as evidenced by the writing of Cicero and Quintilian. The skill to argue *in utramque partem* reached its zenith in the Renaissance, where, according to Skinner, there was an “unparalleled degree of interest in the exploration of paradoxes, dialogues and other forms of argument lacking obvious closure. The dictum that there will always be two sides to any question eventually became proverbial . . .” (99). And it is this skill and thought process that we as humans use to discover the “truth” on an issue. In the case Skinner discusses, Carneades argues forcefully in both directions, and is able to persuade for and against justice. In both cases, even though different conclusions were reached, a separate truth was affirmed. What is crucial to note here is that the arguments for and against will necessarily depend on the bases used in each argument. Contingency and extenuating circumstances can be used to argue that justice can be either a virtue or a vice. Skinner also brings to the fore what he identifies as rhetorical theory’s central contention: arguing both sides of an issue is always possible.

Just what are the issues that comprise the object to be disputed in rhetoric? Goodwin states: “an issue is a more or less determinate object of contention that is, under the circumstances, worth arguing about” (86). But it is not just the arguing that matters or that is the aim of rhetoric. As Goodwin asserts, an issue must have “some significant consequences for action or belief” (85). Goodwin argues correctly here, but

it must be noted that the “significant consequences” can always be placed on a scale of importance. If the consequences are that by saving fifteen minutes one may sit in front of the TV a bit longer before going to bed and thus disconnect from one’s worries, the significance of this decision is of much less importance than if the same fifteen minutes will provide time enough for a lover’s tryst, before one or both of the parties must return to their respective wife, husband or partner. The first circumstance and its results – fifteen extra minutes of TV – would make for a poor story, unless some other highly significant components were introduced into the event. The second situation, however, is the stuff of literature and, due to its high moral content, a matter of dispute that must be pleaded and judged. The narrator of a lover’s tryst may opt to present the story in such a way so that this crime of passion will be forgiven, approved, condemned or dismissed as insubstantial by the reader through rhetoric. Much – if not all – of the reader’s ensuing judgment depends on how the story is told, the case is pleaded and what values come into play on both the narrator’s and reader’s part. These issues are called “hoary problems” by Toulmin, who reminds us that even in philosophical ethics, “general ethical truths can aspire at best to hold good in the absence of effective counter-claims: conflicts of duty are an inescapable feature of the moral life” (Argument, 117). Such conflicts are the stuff of literature in general, and, in particular of the travel narrative and narrative in dialogue form to be examined in Part 4. The actions narrated in both cases involve human agency, and difference of agreement about whether they players have acted appropriately or not will necessarily surface.

Can the decisions and judgments on issues be categorized in terms of quality? In Aristotle’s lights, there is wise and unwise rhetorical thinking that leads to action. The name that Aristotle gives to the knowledge or wisdom used when making decisions in the contingency of human affairs is *phronesis*, often translated as “practical wisdom,”



which governs both rhetoric and dialectic (Reinhardt – Rhetoric, 376). Isocrates, like Aristotle who cites him often in the *Rhetoric*, believes that *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, is based on the use of opinions:

For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a knowledge (*episteme*) by the possession of which we can know positively (*eidenai*) what we should do or what we should say, henceforth I hold that the man to be wise (*sophos*) who is able by his opinions (*doxais*) to arrive in most cases (*hose pi to polu*) at the best course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher (*philosophos*) who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight (*phronesis*) (Bons – Reasonable, 16).

Isocrates views *logon techne*, or the “art of discourse,” to be the manner in which a young man obtains practical wisdom. Walker argues that Isocrates’ art of discourse is, in essence, rhetoric, which was a misnomer coined by Plato in his attack on the sophist Gorgias and rhetors in general.<sup>34</sup> Here we see again that there is no absolute knowledge about human action, and that the man who is able to make decisions based on opinions that make it possible, for the most part, to act appropriately in most circumstances, is the *philosophos* in possession of insight. The right course of action necessarily entails the material act itself for the good, as well as its ethical nature. It is in using one’s *phronesis* to make the right decisions that matters above all.

Using *phronesis* to argue both sides of an issue is necessarily tied to ethics in Aristotle’s treatise, as can be seen in the passage below from the *Rhetoric*. Logical reasoning comes into play that may be used to argue with equal force from opposite stances, but this skill must be used for virtuous ends:

Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 35).

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<sup>34</sup> Walker writes, “*Rhetorike* from the beginning is the misname of an art that keeps resolving itself back into, or that simply becomes, or that always was, something like an Isocratean *logon techne*” (Poetics, 40-41).

Aristotle's parenthetical comment that rhetoric ought not to be used for debased ends brings his stance that the capacity to argue from different perspectives should instead be used for persuading what is good. Kennedy tells us that the term *ta phaula* in Greek can mean "whatever is bad, cheap, or morally and socially useless" (35 – footnote 26). We shall see that in the travel narrative under study in Part 4 that just how the term good is defined is also a matter of dispute and is based on a system of values that the narrator uses to his advantage when pleading his case.

Other aspects of rhetoric must be considered in order to complete our discussion in relation with rhetoric's field. For instance, Day argues that persuasion is rhetoric's aim and is linked to the audience, which will be "swayed in proportion as its members perceive the speaker's conclusions as following from principles that they themselves accept" (379). Here rhetoric's importance as a rational communicative and social activity is highlighted. As mentioned above, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, rather than use the word persuasive, prefer instead to call the audience's response "adherence". In this way they bring to the fore the reasoning used by the audience when evaluating the discourse, whether spoken or written.

Edwin brings out another possible aspect of rhetoric in connection with the persuasion or adherence of an audience when he states that that the speaker is "compelled to use discourse that can overcome an active opposition and, simultaneously, contribute to the attractiveness and credibility of the rhetor's ideas" (150). Viewing rhetoric in this way highlights the possibility for conflict, which was part of the game of ancient rhetoric and dialectic.<sup>35</sup> The *agon* of presenting a winning argument can also be seen in modern-day presidential debates.

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<sup>35</sup> See Smith, 1997.

Whereas contemporary scholars of rhetoric view persuasion as the primary aim of this discipline, Aristotle himself held somewhat different views, or, in any case, saw the “art” of rhetoric as an analytical capacity. For, as we have seen, he argues that to persuade is not rhetoric’s function, rather seeing the possible means of persuasion in each particular case (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 36). Thus, in Aristotle’s statement on rhetoric’s function, the ability to see the available means of persuasion is an analytical activity, which, however ingenious this ability is in its conception, may not produce the desired results because of the audience, which he compares with a person that is terminally ill. The simile of treating an individual suffering from an incurable disease can be tied with Aristotle’s (and Plato’s) negative view of the audience. The term Aristotle uses for the audience in Greek is *mochtheria*, which has, according to certain authors, connotations of “depravity” (Walker – Pathos, 75), “bad moral character” (Engberg-Pedersen, 133), or of persons that are “at least less than thoroughly good” (119). Walker, however, discusses the etymology of this term which offers other possible interpretations:

*Mochtheriak* derives from *mochtheo*, which means *to be weary with toil, to labor, to undergo hardships or execute painful tasks*. Aristotle has in mind, it seems, the blunted, lowbrow sensibilities of *hoi polloi*, “the many,” the crowds of working-class citizens who fill the theatres and assembly places of Greek cities for poetic and oratorical performances (283).

Whatever inferences can be made for Aristotle’s looking down on or perhaps condescending to the *hoi polloi*, a parallel he draws metaphorically between medicine/incurable patient and rhetoric/*mochtheria* indicates that he at times thought that no matter how well an argument is constructed, due to the audience’s negative attributes, the capacity to think and persuade rhetorically used to create that same argument may very well be a good that is wasted. This means that, at least on two levels, it is possible to fail to persuade. Firstly, the opposite argument may be more

convincing. Secondly, the argument may be lost on an audience that is incapable or hostile to what is being presented logically. In both cases, opinion enters in. The first situation is obvious: the second opinion is simply argued more convincingly. In the second situation, the audience is embedded within its own rhetorical, hence, opinion-laden framework, and either prefers to remain therein or is incapable of perceiving a differing viewpoint.

The major point of the above discussion has been that rhetoric deals with opinion, and that if there is an issue which is disputable, from a rhetorical standpoint it can be argued both ways, that is, *in utramque partem*. This does not, however, mean that, as stated above, rhetoric is to be used for debased or evil ends, that is, to make a lie sound like the truth, even though this is possible. We have seen above that Aristotle views rhetoric and dialectic as tools for discovering the truth of an argument. Further, in the *Rhetoric* he states that the power to persuade will do enormous damage if improperly used, just like other goods that are capable of misuse:

And if it is argued that great harm can be done by unjustly using such power of words, this objection applies to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to the most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and military strength; for by using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm (Kennedy – *Rhetoric*, 36).

The conclusion to be drawn here is obvious: a virtuous person would not use rhetoric for evil intentions. This does not mean, however, that Aristotle was innocently unaware of its potential for damage. Nor were the Roman rhetoricians, who gave pride of place to arguing *in utramque partem*, for they defined rhetoric as *sapientia* combined with *eloquentia*, that is, wisdom with eloquence. As Skinner writes, in reference to the Roman rhetoricians, “The man of eloquence, they declared, is not merely the model of a good citizen; he is nothing less than the embodiment of humanity in its highest form” (106).

Precisely what the highest form of humanity or its particular characteristics are was a matter of dispute in antiquity. As we have seen, no unanimity existed on the concrete expression of abstract terms and concepts. Aristotle writes in the *Politics* that there are three goods, and that everyone agrees that the “happy man must have all three” (Barnes – Complete, 2100). These goods Aristotle divides into three separate categories: “external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul” (2100). As we have seen in this discussion on opinion however, it should come as no surprise that, in the case of the pre-notion “the good life” and stances taken with respect to it, Aristotle asserts, “These propositions are almost universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good” (2100).

And so while Aristotle views rhetoric as a tool for discovering the truth on matters, the possibility for disagreement and dispute in this search is always present. Burnyeat sums up the intricacies of rhetoric advocating its use, while, at the same time recognizing the potential for conflict: “[T]he clash of opposing arguments . . . is a positive expression of human reasonableness in a world where issues are complex and deciding them is difficult, because there really is something to be said on either side. As such, Aristotle’s doctrine is one of his greatest and most original achievements” (91). The complexity of human interact difficulties inherent in any decision or judgment are brought out concisely by Burnyeat in the passage above, and his assertion that both sides of an issue will be characterized by sound arguments underscores the responsibility that we as critical thinkers have when engaging in our search for the best, the most accurate, or truest evaluation possible. This sense of responsibility, although a burden, can also serve as a source of motivation to make decisions based upon principles which have also been determined through critical thinking to be best. If, of

course, we accept Aristotle's view that it is possible to use rhetoric as a tool to discover truth or apparent truth for virtuous ends and undesirable to do otherwise.

Now that I have discussed aspects related to rhetoric's field of operations (i.e., opinion), I shall in the following section provide a brief review of some of the recent work in the literature in order to show some of the directions scholars have been taking in their work related to this age-old discipline.

### 1.3 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Before discussing the work of scholars in English Studies and Literature, a brief review of the literature from other fields will illustrate the position taken by many academics that there has been a cross-disciplinary renaissance of rhetoric underway in recent work. At the same time, the broad scope of rhetoric's application will become evident.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* often stands as the fountainhead text among contemporary scholars for the renewed academic interest and activity; however, much of the work being done in various disciplines also focuses on other seminal works of rhetoric written over its long history (i.e., from antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the 20<sup>th</sup> century). The material is so vast that a representative but by no means exhaustive selection is presented below.

In philosophy, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty's aim is to "reclaim the *Rhetoric* as a philosophic work" (ix). In this regard, she enters into the more-than-two-millennium-old turf war begun in Plato's *Gorgias* between the two disciplines (i.e., philosophy vs. rhetoric).<sup>36</sup> Troels Engberg-Pedersen works along the same lines in his attempt to answer the question whether Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a mere *Redetechnologie*, or is, instead, a *Wahrheitsfindung* worthy of philosophical inquiry (122). In the field of history, P. Chiron compares Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with Anaximines' *Rhetoric to Alexander*, the former focusing on "dialectic, ethics and politics," the latter on "very practical ambitions" (122). A number of scholars have recently made efforts to re-write rhetoric's history, at times revising the anti-sophist stance initiated in Plato's dialogues to put the sophists in a better light, at times taking the same anti-sophist position.<sup>37</sup> Focusing on the literary history of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Lawrence Green explores the

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<sup>36</sup> See Reinhardt 2006 for a discussion on the struggle between philosophy and rhetoric.

<sup>37</sup> See Kennedy (1963), Cole, and Schiappa (1999).

influence of Aristotelian *lexis* (style) on Renaissance writers.<sup>38</sup> Theorists in educational history have also shown the importance of rhetoric in educational curricula whether due to influence from Aristotle or from Isocrates, whose “influential form of intellectual inquiry and education . . . continues into present times” (Papillon, 71).<sup>39</sup> Bringing into focus ancient practices in education and their relation to socio-economics, Vanderspool demonstrates that “a rhetorical education became virtually a minimum requirement for full élite status” in Hellenistic times (129).<sup>40</sup> In ethics, Hanna M. Roisman analyzes what she terms “right rhetoric” in Homer, comparing speeches made by Odysseus, Thersites and Agamemnon in the *Iliad*. Here it bears mentioning that Homer was in later antiquity deemed as source for material related to rhetorical theory and practice.<sup>41</sup> In political science, Andrew Erskine argues that rhetoric is tightly linked with the democracy of the *polis*. The rise of democracy linked with rhetoric stands as a major theme in the literature.<sup>42</sup> But it is not just the democracy of the *polis* or contemporary political arenas that provide an arena for rhetorical activity: Ken Dowden shows its importance in religion, as rhetorical mechanisms can be shown to be present in texts that supplicate the gods in prayer. Rhetoric, therefore, and contrary to Perelman’s and other scholars’ assertions in this regard, appears to be quite alive in non-democratic frameworks as well. Both the gods and despots are capable of being persuaded, and there are formulae for doing so. In the field of discourse analysis Robert Gaines examines how contemporary thinkers working in the theory, criticism and pedagogy of the practical arts of discourse have made use of the *Rhetoric*. Eugene Garver, working

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<sup>38</sup> See Green, Lawrence D. 2000.

<sup>39</sup> See also Morgan.

<sup>40</sup> See also Connolly: 2009.

<sup>41</sup> Kennedy writes: “Techniques of rhetorical theory are already evident in the speeches of the Homeric poems to such a degree that later antiquity found formal rhetoric everywhere in Homer and on the basis of *Iliad*, 15.283 f., even conjured up a picture of practice declamations among the Homeric heroes” (*Rhetoric*, 35-36).

<sup>42</sup> Erskine writes: “Rhetoric, the art of public speaking, developed out of the *polis*, or more precisely, the democratic *polis*” (*Polis*, 272).



from an ethical-psychological perspective, argues that there is no easy way “back to Aristotle” through the latter’s practical reasoning, in spite of attempts to do so in ethics - there is simply too much time between us and the Greeks, and things were so different then (57). Alan G. Gross, a semantics scholar, tries to answer the question, “What did Aristotle mean by rhetoric?” His study is an attempt to determine what type of Aristotelian art rhetoric is. We can compare Gross’s position with that of Michael Leff’s. Whereas Leff writes that “scholars have argued respectively that rhetoric is a productive art, a theoretical art, a practical art, or some combination (318-323),” Gross takes a hardline position, arguing that rhetoric is “a productive art, and only a productive art” (24). A. López Eire, takes a deconstructionist look at several figures from antiquity such as Gorgias, Democritus, and Protagoras.

Major work in rhetoric has been conducted in the pragma-dialectics school.<sup>43</sup> With the ultimate goal of conflict resolution, this approach is tightly linked with informal logic in terms of its highly-structured framework of rule-governed phases.<sup>44</sup> In the field of legal history, Craig Cooper challenges Aristotle’s assertion that deliberative oratory holds pride of place over forensic (204). On the “revival” in rhetoric in general, Takis Poulakos takes a significantly different stance from scholars who study classical rhetoric to “appropriate it for contemporary concerns”; he insists that, instead, there is a “responsibility to explore classical rhetoric in itself” (18). Poulakos’ position stands in direct contradiction to that of Plett, who argues, as mentioned above, that classical rhetoric is constantly being defined and applied by successive generations.

Work using rhetoric as a dialogic approach has been done in sociology. George Myerson, in *Rhetoric, Reason and Society: Rationality as Dialogue*, creates a platform for “new dialogues” using his interpretations of major contemporary thinkers (i.e.

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<sup>43</sup> See Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002.

<sup>44</sup> For an introduction to informal logic, see Walton 1989.

Habermas, Putnam) as well as other viewpoints (i.e. communication based on dialogic rationalism, feminist philosophy, political theory, and so on) (4). Myerson's aim is to promote rationalism as manifested in dialogue in order to regain "confidence in the power of ideas, particularly the power of ideas to change societies" (18). His work promotes theory as a means for change (19).

Another sociologist working in relation with rhetoric is Richard Harvey Brown, in *Society as Text: Essays on Rhetoric, Reason, and Reality*. His work is of interest because he is similar to Eagleton, who, according to David Kirby, is well-known as a "[s]till an unreconstructed champion of the lower classes."<sup>45</sup> Brown wants to help the lower classes and is interested in finding a connection between theory and practice (279). Like Eagleton, he finds an answer in rhetorical theory and criticism:

How might social theory be linked with political praxis in a humanizing, nontechnicist way? How may we join knowledge of society with public moral action? My belief is that for this to occur we must restore judgment to its former privileged status in intellectual and public life. One resource for this project is the critical theory of rhetoric, since rhetoric on the one hand shows that all knowledge is achieved through the persuasive use of language, and on the other hand provides canons of reasoned judgment in political discourse (1).

Brown's desire to find a way to link sociological theory with political practice that is "nontechnicist" has an echo in other scholars' attempt to bring literary studies down to earth. For instance, Andrew Ford (discussed below) states that recent work in criticism indicates that certain scholars are abandoning the "absorbing complications of literary theory" (ix).

In the excerpt above, Brown's reference to judgment is crucial, as it is an aspect of rhetoric that plays a major role. Brown's work is also of interest here because the final goal of this paper is to use classical rhetoric as a critical approach to analyze a travel narrative. Thus, one of the questions to be addressed is Brown's assertion below:

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<sup>45</sup> See Kirby, David.

Contemporary society is eviscerated of narrative form. The notion of moral agency in protagonists, or of meaningful plots in social events, has become harder to find in fiction, social science, and life. This is because factual or fictional narratives presuppose a social order of meaning in which public action by moral agents is possible, and in which lived connections between personal character and public conduct prevail. Because such a presupposition is no longer valid in advanced industrial societies, the narrative social text has become an extinct or endangered species. Despite this, however, narrative remains vitally needed in contemporary civic discourse (3).

In Part 4, I contradict Brown's assertion that contemporary society has no narrative form and that there is a hard-to-detect notion of moral agency in its protagonists. Once I have articulated the definition of rhetoric to be used for analysis in Part 2, the analysis I carry out demonstrates that, contrary to Brown's view and in accordance with scholars such as Paul Ricoeur, narrative by definition provides examples of action carried out by moral agents. However, just what societal values are being represented and the function their narratives serve in relation to the latter must be closely examined, in order to reveal the values held by both narrator and audience/readership.

Some scholars have explored rhetoric as a form of power embodied in discourse. For instance, in his discussion on the influence that Isocrates has on Cicero Michael Leff states that Cicero conceives of "rhetoric as an unbounded art of eloquence and pragmatic discourse . . . [spanning] all fields of human inquiry . . . and functioning as a culture-shaping art that both constructs and preserves the possibilities of civil community" (79).<sup>46</sup>

Not only is rhetoric attributed with power to build and change society due to its persuasiveness, but it is viewed by contemporary scholars as having a link with epistemology. For, according to Ross, rhetoric plays a role in the apprehension of reality

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<sup>46</sup> One of the foci of scholars is the effects of rhetoric. For instance, Walker informs us that as far back as Plato's *Phaedrus* the term *psychagogia* is used to name its power for persuasiveness, and that the sophist Gorgias referred to poetry and rhythmic prose as "witchcraft" or as having a "druglike power" (Poetics, 72). If we turn to Cicero, we find that in *De Inventione* he attributes the foundation of cities to the persuasive power of reasoned eloquence, i.e. *eloquentia* united with *sapientia*, which also works to fight evil for the common good (65).

(22). Other scholars, such as Clifford Geertz, Renato Rosaldo, Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish and Judith Butler, coincide with Ross when they argue that “epistemology is a matter of rhetoric”, and that human knowledge is “rhetorically constructed.”<sup>47</sup>

We use rhetoric, therefore, to grapple with the reality of our material existence. As a major part of the reality that we face as humans lies in the realm of the contingent and probable, hard facts and absolute truth must give way to opinion, upon which the premises of rhetoric are predominantly based. In this way, rhetoric provides the means to “work with the messy inconsistencies of popular opinion, not to mention with the special contingencies, including the emotions, of the moment” (Vanderspoel, 152). Rhetoric, by means of “reasoned argument and emotional arousal . . . closely identifies language’s power to order language with language’s power to order the world” (152). In this respect, rhetoric also functions as the means by which humans take the chaos of the sublunary realm and make sense out of it, as mentioned earlier.

Connected with the idea that rhetoric operates epistemologically, Schiappa asserts that it constructs social reality, which is necessarily tied to ideology:

Most, though not all, argumentation/rhetorical critics are guided by the belief that our communicative interactions are epistemic and inform most of what we come to know about the world. As a result, rhetoric/argument is important because it is both the *how* and *what* of socially-constructed reality. Rhetorical/argumentation analysis is thus also ideological analysis, since all understandings of the world serve particular interests (Beginnings, 67).

Schiappa asserts in the passage above that it is through rhetorically governed discourse that we obtain most of our knowledge. He then states that the importance of rhetoric is tied to its function in terms of *how* reality is created and *what* that reality is. What Schiappa does not say directly but perhaps intends to suggest when he states that rhetorical analysis is also ideological is the fact that rhetoric also functions with the *why*

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<sup>47</sup> See Olson 2003.

of epistemologically-based knowledge whose construction, as he states, is determined by particular interests.

Schiappa and Hamm in their definition of rhetoric assert that it can be used in five categories:

- 1) rhetoric as an instance of speech-making (or oratory);
- 2) rhetoric as persuasive technique;
- 3) rhetoric as a tactical function of language use (rhetoricity);
- 4) rhetoric as an educational agenda or program that inculcates the art or skill of the rhetor; and
- 5) rhetoric as a theory about human communication (5).

Item 2 is of interest in connection with the approach to be used for the analysis of the travel narrative under study, for the narrator persuades the reader to view the events of the story and the narrator as human agent in a particular way. This ties in with point 3 above, rhetoric as a tactical function, for to persuade is strategic. The other items on the list above identify rhetoric's link with other major disciplines: public speaking, education and communication. In this way, the idea brought out earlier that rhetoric takes part in all disciplines and all forms of persuasive communication is reinforced.

Dugan writes that rhetoric has taken on new dimensions among literary theorists, giving it a definition that departs from the classical idea of rhetoric being limited to public speaking and instead affirms that "rhetoric is a basic component of all language" (13). He links this comment to the explosion of literary theory that has taken place and refers the reader to Eagleton's introduction to literary theory, which he calls a "reliable and readable account" (13). Equating rhetoric with linguistics, Dugan states that "insights into the nature of language proved a major impetus for literary study" (13).He

then makes an assertion that coincides with the idea that epistemology is the terrain of rhetoric:

This ‘linguistic turn’ (to borrow a phrase from the philosopher Richard Rorty) in the humanities and social sciences emphasized the notion that there is no way to get beyond language: the world as we know it comes to us as a linguistic phenomenon (13).

I also bring up Dugan’s discussion because there is a tendency among literary theorists to conflate “rhetoric” with “linguistics” when defining the former term.

Now that we have discussed scholars from various fields working in rhetoric, we can turn to those who have used or advocated a return to rhetoric as a form of literary criticism and analysis in recent literature. I have already mentioned Terry Eagleton, but he has not been the only critic in the history of literary criticism from the 20<sup>th</sup> century to have made an attempt to bring rhetoric back to life as a critical approach. In 1936, I.A. Richards, another major scholar who appears in both Eagleton’s and Barry’s primers as an important figure in the history of English literary criticism, published a series of lectures on rhetoric he delivered at Bryn Mawr.<sup>48</sup> In the introduction to *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Richards states that he is making an attempt to “revive an old subject” (3). His aim in this work was to give life to “the dreariest and least profitable part of the waste that the unfortunate travel through in Freshman English!” (3). Richards’ distinguishes between the “old Rhetoric,” which he calls “an offspring of dispute” and which “developed as the rationale of pleadings and persuadings” and other uses to which rhetoric can be put (24). Richards’ object is to show that “[p]ersuasion is only one among the aims of discourse,” (24) and that more important is the endeavor to embark on “a persistent, systematic, detailed inquiry into how words work that will take the place of the discredited subject which goes by the name of Rhetoric” (23). Richards’ lectures detail a redefining of rhetoric in terms of semantics. We can see this when he

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<sup>48</sup> NB: Neither Eagleton nor Barry mention Richard’s work in rhetoric.

states that what is needed is “a revived Rhetoric, or study of verbal understanding and misunderstanding, [which] must undertake its own inquiry into the modes of meaning” (24). He thus steers away from rhetoric as a tool for reasoning and argumentation, while insisting that “this inquiry must be philosophic” (23). “Rhetoric,” declares Richards, “should be a study of misunderstandings and its remedies” (3). In these lectures, Richards discusses “shifts” in meaning that occur in language, thereby bringing into focus the “fluidity of meaning.” With respect to the meaning that is unstable, Richards asserts that we must manage “not to resist these shifts but to learn to follow them” (Lyons, 73). The Cambridge Professor of English then makes the following claim: “And with such a clarification, such a translation of our skills into comprehension, a new era of human understanding and co-operation would be at hand” (73).

The suspicion that arises immediately is that this sort of visionary zealotry has to do with what Eagleton calls “the peculiar history of English” (Introduction, 199). That is, as both Eagleton and Barry assert, English literature was used as an educational and political tool to serve as a substitute for religion, which was on the wane as English studies were on the rise.<sup>49</sup> In any case, the time was not ripe for Richards’ version of rhetoric, whose ardent delivery in the United States received a cool reception, at least if we consider a 1939 review of Richards’ book whose tone is caustic in its irony: “Unfortunately we are not enlightened as to the pattern of shifts by which desirable ambiguity becomes systematic clarity. The new era of understanding must wait” (Lyons, 214).

Curiously, Richards’ work on rhetoric could seem, based on the same review above, to be a precursor of poststructuralist/deconstructionist theories of language: “In his endeavor to emphasize the fluidity of meaning, Richards, if he is correct, makes one

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<sup>49</sup> On literature as substitute for religion, see Eagleton and Barry.

cease to wonder at loss in communication; one doubts its possibility at all” (214). The ironically cool reception might, however, have had less to do with the timing of Richards’ philosophical approach to meaning in language than with his possibly low appeal in terms of rhetorical ethos (see Part 2 below) as compared to the high ethos appeal of French theorists like Derrida. I.A. Richards perhaps lacked what the French have always been famous for and, as a result, was less persuasive: sex appeal.

Another scholar of literature, writing in 1947, uses yet another definition of rhetoric and articulates yet another approach. Rosemond Tuve, in *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth-Century Critics*, discusses the “logical” base for rhetorical images in Renaissance poetry. Her background and training in rhetoric is solidly classical. She states that it is not enough to study the significance of an image, but that its underlying logic must also come into critical play: “It is obvious from the reading of any sixteenth- or seventeenth-century poem using figures of even a minor degree of complication that to discuss the significance of images and stop short of their possible logical functions in a poem is an impossibility” (251). Tuve’s approach is significant due to its focus on the logical structures of images. Tuve argues that applying her methods wholesale does not always work for the poetic images of the present. In her lights, contemporary notions of poetic images are radically different from their notions in the Renaissance, which were, in essence, based on classical notions of rhetoric.

With respect to the applicability of classical rhetoric, some scholars question whether doing so is anachronistic when working with contemporary texts or for texts that precede the codification of rhetoric in 4<sup>th</sup> century Athens. For instance, Cole takes an extreme position with respect to its use in the present: “The study of “rhetorical” techniques and strategies as now conducted is far more likely to involve an adaptation



of ancient terminology to the expressionist notion of the uniquely adequate verbalization of a unique idea” (21). What Cole is asserting here is that the ancient terminology has very little or no place when it comes to analyzing contemporary literature and poetry. Conversely, William H. Race, with respect to applying classical rhetoric on texts of the past, provides a rationale for using it to analyze lyric poetry written prior to rhetoric’s being established as a “discipline” in the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E. While admitting that dangers of anachronism loom, he nevertheless makes an appeal to authority of authors such as Schmid, who in 1616 “read [Pindar’s] odes through the lense of forensic and deliberative rhetoric” (511). Race also appeals to the work carried out by Bundy and Walker. Both of these scholars apply concepts of 4<sup>th</sup> century rhetoric to archaic poetry pre-dating Plato and Aristotle (518).

Although Cole asserts that classical rhetoric cannot at present be properly applied to poetry or literature, he does allow for its use in other fields: “[v]irtually the only areas where rhetoric is still vigorously practiced are those of propaganda and advertising” (108). His stance can be brought into question. One look at the course outline – for example – of any U.S. college-level composition and writing course picked at random will prove Cole’s statement wrong: that is, although different terminology is used, the practice in these courses find their source in classical rhetoric. In any case, Cole’s stance figures as one of many competing and often conflicting opinions in recent literature as to what rhetoric is and how it is to be defined and applied.<sup>50</sup> My stance is first that classical rhetoric still holds value as a way of looking at literature, and second, that it is not, in my view, an anachronism to use it (in the way I define it) as a form of criticism and analysis on texts produced before, at the same time as, or subsequent to the *Gorgias* and the *Rhetoric*.

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<sup>50</sup> See Enos, Richard Leo and Lois Peters Agnew, who state that the contemporary “re-examination” of rhetoric “has led to rival interpretations that have fueled considerable controversy” (xi).

R.S. Crane is identified by Booth as a rhetorical critic.<sup>51</sup> Crane's approach in *The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry* falls in line with classical rhetorical practice. His discussion of definitions has parallels with Epictetus' prenotions. In Crane's view, we must be precise about what Critic X means when using the word "drama" as opposed to what Critic Y means when using the same word. The confusion that results from the various critical voices or languages is that each critic is defining the essential words of literary criticism in a personal way. If we attend to the meaning of each critic's usage, the confusion will vanish, and we will have instead, a variety of perspectives – *valuable* perspectives, all of which are equally valid and which add to the experience of literature:

The true state of affairs, however, often reveals itself whenever, on being confronted with an extreme clash of doctrines between two obviously serious and intelligent critics employing the same vocabulary, we undertake to pry into the hidden structures of definitions and assumptions which their respective arguments presuppose (14).

The above passage is Socrates and Epictetus revisited in the sense that both of these ancient thinkers would argue that defining one's terms is crucial to understanding as well as a source of conflict. The focus of Crane's work is meaning, and so is similar to I.A. Richards' approach, except that Crane does not speak of meanings that shift. Defining terms is, in essence, a practice of dialectic. Since Aristotle equates the two as sister arts, the definition of terms can be viewed as rhetorical practice.

In the 60s and 70s, Wayne Booth's *Rhetoric of Fiction* gained considerable renown. His approach defines the various "artificial devices" used in narrative (3). Booth's work, however, appears at first glance to be more closely related to narrative technique than classical rhetoric. We can see this in the beginning lines of his book:

One of the most obviously artificial devices of the storyteller is the trick of going beneath the surface of the action to obtain a reliable view of a character's mind and heart. Whatever our ideas may be about the natural way to tell a story, artifice

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<sup>51</sup> See Booth (93: footnote 8).

is unmistakably present whenever the author tells us what no one in so-called real life could possibly know (3).

Terms like “going beneath the surface of the action” and “the natural way to tell a story” are indicators that Booth is equating rhetoric with narrative devices.<sup>52</sup> One searches in vain throughout *A Rhetoric of Fiction* for a definition of precisely what he means by rhetoric, and the only answer that repeatedly surfaces is “artificial device” and “trick.” At one point, in fact, Booth reveals that his definition is new, and perhaps not based on classical definitions of rhetoric. In the footnote immediately following a discussion contrasting showing as opposed to telling we read, “This is not to say that *what I am calling rhetoric* has been entirely ignored” (90 – italics mine). To give a word a personal definition is fair game in academic practice as well as in the practice of rhetoric throughout history. As opinion is the rule in rhetoric and since so many different definitions of rhetoric have surfaced throughout the history of the word, Booth’s assigning a personal definition is justifiable. Interestingly, the description of Wayne Booth’s approach in Wikipedia<sup>53</sup> sounds like classical rhetoric in that the proof *logos*, or argument, is described as being a primary component: “In this book, Booth argues that all narrative is a form of rhetoric, that is, an argument on the part of author in defense of his or her “various commitments, secret or overt [that] determine our response to the work.”<sup>54</sup> Perhaps Booth was taking fundamental rhetorical concepts for granted in his work, and for this reason chose not to provide definitions and explanations in his seminal text.

As already stated, Terry Eagleton advocates rhetoric as a form of criticism that ought to be taken up again in *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. He highlights rhetoric’s

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<sup>52</sup> Rodden makes the following important observation on Booth’s treatment of rhetoric: “*The Rhetoric of Fiction* principally discusses the use of fictional *devices*, with rhetoric conceived not primarily as argumentation but as technique or style” (155).

<sup>53</sup> I am aware that Wikipedia is not, by academic standards, the most reputable of sources.

<sup>54</sup> “Wayne C. Booth.” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayne\\_Booth#cite\\_note-0](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayne_Booth#cite_note-0).

long and important, albeit abandoned, history. He writes that rhetoric “was the received form of critical analysis all the way from ancient society to the eighteenth century” (205). He makes his call for a return to rhetoric because he sees both the plethora of approaches he has discussed in his primer and the literary scholars practicing them as lacking unity and coherence (199).

In the light of this situation, he asks whether the fact that there are numerous ways to tackle literature critically is not, actually, something to be happy about, and if our stance ought not to be to embrace them all, meanwhile rejoicing in the liberty of not being under the thumb of just one critical method (198). He then, however, pulls the rug out from under the theoretical utopia he has just outlined. This is because, as he states, “not all of these methods are mutually compatible” (198). To illustrate this incompatibility, he provides a graphic, if somewhat sardonic, portrayal of literary scholars:

Literary criticism is rather like a laboratory in which some of the staff are seated in white coats at control panels, while others are throwing sticks in the air or spinning coins. Genteel amateurs jostle with hard-nosed professionals, and after a century or so of ‘English’ they have still not decided to which camp the subject really belongs (199).

The point Eagleton makes here is that the various methods and theoretical frameworks providing the bases for literary analysis have egregious differences, a situation which results in discord. Eagleton informs us that the reasons for the incompatibility are ideological (199). Further, he explains in a famous statement that there is no resolving the discord because “departments of literature in higher education . . . are part of the ideological apparatus of the modern capitalist state” (199-200).

As a possible solution for criticism’s inability to define precisely what literature is or to decide which critical lens to view it through, Eagleton proposes rhetoric. In what he calls at once a radical as well as a traditionalist position (206), Eagleton describes

rhetoric as a single, critical approach that might bring scholars together – regardless of their critical leanings (i.e. structuralist, deconstructionist, and so on) – and that could make it possible to critically analyze the entirety of discourses generated by what he deems a very illusive object of study: literature. Eagleton contrasts the aims of the various critical approaches – aims which, in his opinion, have little to do with what the true aims of literary criticism should be – with that of rhetoric’s:

It saw speaking and writing not merely as textual objects, to be aesthetically contemplated or endlessly deconstructed, but as forms of *activity* inseparable from the wider social relations between writers and readers, orators and audiences, and as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which they are embedded” (206 – author’s italics).

Eagleton here argues that, rather than removing the activities of speaking and writing from the social schema they are embedded in, ancient rhetoric defines discourse as being fully integral to the social matrix within which it is set. Also, instead of objectifying discourse through mere empty theorizing disconnected from the real world, rhetoric would instead be a means to analyze and participate in “*genuine* moral argument, which sees the relations between individual qualities and values and our whole material conditions of existence” (208 – author’s italics). The aim of using rhetoric as a form of critical inquiry, according to Eagleton, would be to study “the *effects* which discourses produce, and how they produce them” (205 – author’s italics). He states that his wish is “to recall literary criticism from certain, fashionable, new-fangled ways of thinking it has been seduced by – ‘literature’ as a specially privileged object, the ‘aesthetic’ as separable from social determinants, and so on – and return it to the ancient paths which it has abandoned” (206). Rhetoric will enable literary critics to push the question of whether literature exists to one side and enter into the task of critiquing the entirety of human discourse.

A safe assumption would be to read Eagleton's goal as a desire to define literary criticism as an activity that is directly connected with human political and social concerns; that is, an activity whose goal is to make possible a fairer distribution of wealth and power.<sup>55</sup> He writes,

Since all art is rhetorical, the tasks of the revolutionary cultural worker are essentially threefold. First, to participate in the production of works and events which, within transformed 'cultural' media, so fictionalize the 'real' as to intend those effects conducive to the victory of socialism. Second, as 'critic', to expose the rhetorical structures by which non-socialist works produce politically undesirable effects, as a way of combating what it is now unfashionable to call false consciousness. Third, to interpret such works where possible 'against the grain', so as to appropriate them from whatever may be valuable for socialism. The practice of the socialist cultural worker, in brief, is projective, polemical and appropriative (Walter, 113).

Eagleton's tripartite plan includes 1) production of new works of art that will further the socialist revolution, 2) analysis of works whose effects deter the revolution in order to expose them, and 3) interpretation and analysis of the same works with a view to making them useful for the revolution. The final aim of rhetorical criticism in Eagleton's definition is major social and political change.

It is not just in *Literary Theory* that Eagleton makes a call for a return to rhetoric. In *How to Read a Poem* (2006), he again advocates a return to the practices of ancient oratory, suggesting that we can only move forward politically and socially by looking backward through the lens of his reading of rhetoric's beginnings, where he describes logos and politics as being still united with real human action. In *How to Read a Poem*, however, there is a difference. Whereas in *Literary Theory* Eagleton writes as if no academics were using rhetoric as a form of literary criticism, he maintains in *How to Read a Poem* that certain scholars in literature have, in fact, been conducting

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<sup>55</sup> Eagleton's "A Short History of Rhetoric" bears this assertion out. His interpretation of the history of rhetoric is Marxist, at once looking back to the past when, in his view, there was a tighter link between rhetoric and the polis, and between logos and human action. Meanwhile, he advocates for a return to rhetoric as a cure for the post-modern disconnect. See Bernard-Donals and Glejzer: pp. 180 – 205.

academic work in line with his definition of the classical rhetorical tradition. Making reference to the theoretical trends that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, Eagleton writes:

From feminist criticism to cultural materialism, the devotees of Mikhail Bakhtin to the New Historicism, there were other lines of inquiry which sought to keep faith with the project of classical rhetoric. Ironically, it is now these so-called newfangled theorists who were most in line with tradition. They, too, set out to investigate literary works as both patterns of meaning and historical events, places where power and signification converged (15).

Following the same argument, Eagleton states, “What is known today as cultural theory is a modern version of traditional criticism” (16). By traditional criticism Eagleton here means classical rhetoric, as he has defined it. He opposes this group of critics/theorists (traditional criticism’s modern version) with another group of scholars, whom he also labels traditionalist – although he distinguishes the term by using inverted commas: “It is the ‘traditionalist’ opponents of . . . [cultural] theory who are the blow-ins and interlopers” (16). Eagleton here appears to be labelling the ‘traditionalists’ as reactionaries that stand in opposition to cultural theorists who he claims are carrying on with what he views as the classical tradition of rhetoric. He ends his discussion with a crescendo: “The slogan of a *radical literary criticism* . . . is clear: Forward to antiquity!” (16 – italics mine). His point is clear: classical rhetoric can be used as a form of literary criticism or discourse analysis to produce socio-economic change. Doubtless due to his stance as Marxist critic, Eagleton’s desire here is to present rhetoric as a form of criticism that has direct practical results.

Putting aside the fact that Eagleton grouped what he calls the new-fangled theorists with those he in 1983 accused of tossing sticks in the air or spinning coins, he nonetheless argues forcefully for choosing rhetoric as an alternative critical form for analyzing “the field of discursive practices in society as a whole” (205). We might ask, however, whether Eagleton has been the voice of one crying in the wilderness, for it is

questionable if much attention has been paid to either of his rhetorical calls to arms.<sup>56</sup> Barry (1995) gives full consideration to several other critical approaches that Eagleton had either not addressed or that had developed during the period following *Literary Theory*'s 1983 publication. For instance, Barry discusses gay and lesbian criticism, cultural materialism, new historicism, and so on. However, neither Eagleton's plea nor rhetoric as a critical approach appears in Barry's primer. In any case, for the moment, a full-scale rhetoric-based revolution – political, cultural, or otherwise – has not erupted, as in the case of the massive social and political upheavals for which Karl Marx's writings acted as catalyst.

Another critic, James Kastely, takes a stance similar to Eagleton's – that is, he views using rhetoric as fundamentally a political activity.<sup>57</sup> In *Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition* (1997), Kastely argues against certain postmodern scholars' tendency to view ancient rhetoric as attenuated and thus ineffectual with respect to taking action towards resolving society's socio-economic ills. Kastely, a professor of English at the University of Houston, takes a new look at early texts such as Plato's dialogues and the dramas of Sophocles and Euripides, with a view to re-connecting the post-modern age with what he sees as a tradition of Platonic, refutational rhetoric. Both his aims and his definition of rhetoric are political.

Andrew Ford, in *The Origins of Criticism*, also argues for taking a fresh look – from the standpoint of a classics scholar – at ancient rhetoric. Reviewing what he calls “a series of theoretical revolutions” in recent decades, Ford describes how these same “revolutions” supply a stimulus for necessary change:

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<sup>56</sup> Clifford and Schilb testify to a wave of activity, but I have not been able to find evidence other than their article.

<sup>57</sup> Wohl's discussion on citizenship in ancient Athens provides a backdrop for the political roots both Eagleton and Kastely hark back to. She states, “The rhetoric of citizenship not only has a politics but *is* a politics, for the ways in which citizens speak about their relation to the city and to one another not only reflect but create those relations. Rhetoric opens channels of thought along which real political relations can flow” (166).



We have . . . witnessed a great burst of critical activity since the 1960's, when the relatively placid reign of New Criticism broke up and was succeeded by a series of theoretical revolutions as structuralist, poststructuralist, psychological, and sociological approaches to literature radically reconceived its nature, and in some cases rejected its coherence as a subject. These debates became quite sharp at times . . . attracting the notice not only of other disciplines within the academy – such as law, history, and politics – but also of a wider public questioning the goals of a traditional education in literature. One of the benefits of our own critical wars has been at least that we have been forced to reconsider what literary criticism can and ought to do and what value literary study might have in education (ix).

What is significant in Ford's commentary is his assertion that scholars of literature, due to the "critical wars" that have been taking place, have no choice but to attempt to answer the questions that have arisen as a result of these same wars. His position is similar to Gunderson's in that he infers that debate is still possible with respect to what literary criticism is and how it is to be put to use. Ford's *The Origins of Criticism* can be seen as an invitation to study and provide an answer to charges of literary scholars being "hopelessly out of touch with both reality and literature".<sup>58</sup> Further, Ford's book could be viewed as a sort of answer, albeit unintentional, to Eagleton's request in 1983 for an approach that more fully connects literary studies with social and/or political issues. In fact, the historical approach Ford uses takes its lead from other critical work that has taken a different academic direction, that is, work that is entering new areas of research in a different way:

A historical perspective on criticism may be of interest, as is suggested by recent work that has turned from the absorbing complications of theory to examine the social and institutional history of criticism. Within this perspective, which has so far focused on the rise of "modern" criticism since the eighteenth century, the period to which this book is dedicated may be of special interest, for it can fairly be described as the point when Greek, and hence Western, literary criticism was founded" (ix).

As Ford states above, his historical perspective focuses on the social and institutional history of criticism. His work is thus an attempt to provide a substantive alternative to the complications of theory that may provide value for literary studies by returning to

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<sup>58</sup> See Kirby, David.

the origins of literary criticism. However, although Ford presents his work as an alternative, it would perhaps fall in line with what I have suggested in the present dissertation. That is, rather than attempt to erase the past and disregard previous approaches, it would prove more fruitful to scrutinize the approaches that have been utilized in the past for their strengths and weaknesses with a view to benefitting from what they have to offer and learning from their inadequacies. Thus, when Ford homes in on rhetoric's terminology and practices as the oldest form of literary criticism, as well as on its socio-linguistic functions, his work can be examined with a view to benefitting from his scholarship and perspective. Ford's viewing rhetoric in terms of its socio-linguistic functions parallels Eagleton's position that rhetoric viewed written and oral communication as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which they are embedded. Ford suggests that there is something to be learned from the link between rhetoric and real social practices "from the end of the archaic age in the late sixth century to the rise of poetics in the late fourth" (x). Although Ford's is not a "radical" position like Eagleton's, and although it is a work of history examining ancient literary practices, there is a link between Ford's work and Eagleton's behest in terms of increasing literary criticism's relevance to real world issues.<sup>59</sup>

Stephen Walker's seminal *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* rewrites the history of rhetoric. Walker's claim is that ancient poetry originally functioned as rhetorical discourse. In his argument, Walker challenges the standard history of rhetoric:

Practical rhetoric is understood as an art of argumentation and persuasion suitable for deliberation, debate, discussion, and decision in the civic arena – or what Jürgen Habermas might call the "public sphere" – while epideictic, poetic, or literary rhetoric is understood as "display" (or "*mere* display") of formal eloquence serving chiefly to provide aesthetic pleasure or diversion, or to provide occasions for elegant consumption and displays of high-class taste or to rehearse, reconfirm, and intensify dominant ideologies. From this point of view, a conversion of "rhetorical" genres or techniques from practical to epideictic

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<sup>59</sup> David Kirby writes, "Eagleton now accuses theory of toying with esoterica while ignoring the real issues of life dealt with by literature."

purposes is often seen as a step toward decadence, and is typically thought to reflect corruption of the civic sphere by autocratic or oppressive political regimes (viii).

Rather than mere ornamentation, Walker argues that early poetry functioned rhetorically to persuade on issues in politics and ethics. William Race sums up Walker's argument:

Indeed, Walker argues in his book that archaic lyric embodies an epideictic discourse which is the theoretical and historical forerunner of later rhetoric. By employing a definition of *enthymeme* as argumentation intended to persuade the *thymos* (heart) of the listener, particularly in striking 'caps', he argues that Hesiod, Theognis, Pindar, Alcaeus, Sappho, and Solon (among others) employ a 'rhetorical transaction' that requires their audiences to make ethical and political judgements (518).

The importance of Walker's study for this paper lies in its view of ancient poetry as a form of persuasive discourse that links it to politics and moral agency, as opposed to empty ornamentation on the one hand or, on the other, the expression of an individual's subjective state. Walker's argument is that ancient poetic texts argue with a view to persuade. He focuses on the enthymemes that are embedded in poetic texts, which he brings to the surface in order to analyze the underlying logic whose aim is to persuade. I borrow from Walker's analysis in that I believe that both of the texts that I examine can be examined with a view to making underlying syllogisms explicit in order to show how persuasion is at work, as well as how persuasion is intertwined with and dependent upon the system of values that infuses the logic upon which the writers build their arguments.

Other scholars such as Enos and Lauer also see a tie between ethics and rhetoric, for they call it "an evolving interplay of images, ideas, values, and beliefs, whose power is channeled through art into what Neel calls 'strong discourse,' which argues for desirable courses of action with consequences for society" (210-211). In this definition, the content of rhetorical discourse is presented as a complex, which is a source of power that leads to action that has impact on the community. Enos and Lauer's linking rhetoric with action can be tied with comments Eagleton makes:

Rhetoric in its major phase was neither a ‘humanism’, concerned in some intuitive way with people’s experience of language, nor a ‘formalism’, preoccupied simply with analyzing linguistic devices. It looked at such devices in terms of concrete performance – they were means of pleading, persuading, inciting and so on – and at people’s responses to discourse in terms of linguistic structures and the material situations in which they functioned (206).

In the passage above, we can see that Eagleton makes a direct link between rhetorical linguistic structures and concrete action, as do Enos and Lauer. In this way all of these scholars support the idea of rhetoric’s being linked with ethics, for action is dependent on choice by a human agent.

The other aspect of rhetoric Eagleton brings out in the excerpt above in relation with concrete performance is the materiality of the situations in which the linguistic structures are at work. This idea can be linked with Michael Leff’s reading of Epictetus, who he interprets as having divided dialectic’s and rhetoric’s functions respectively into *thesis* and *hypothesis*. The *hypothesis*, or “case,” is necessarily concrete, and entails per force reactions from the human agents who act as judges on various levels. These *hypotheses*, or what Walker calls “practical, real-world situations” find their source in a *thesis* (2000b: 60)<sup>60</sup> which is evaluated by the community. Cicero translates *thesis* and *hypothesis* into Latin as *quaestiones* and *causae*, “propositions” and “cases” (60). Edward Schiappa asserts that “exemplary case studies or problem solutions” in rhetorical studies are more productive than “highly abstract theoretical debate” (2002:

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<sup>60</sup> Michael Leff discusses Epictetus’ division of dialectic’s territory from that of rhetoric, and presents a good example of the difference between the abstract idea – in this case on marriage being good or not – and its concrete, particular manifestation: “In his *De topicis differentiis*, Boethius succinctly articulates one of the most persistent distinctions made in separating dialectic from rhetoric: ‘The dialectical discipline examines the thesis only; a thesis is a question not involved in circumstances. The rhetorical [discipline], on the other hand, discusses the hypothesis, that is, questions hedged in by a multitude of circumstances. Circumstances are who, what, where, when, why, how, by what means’ (1205C). The dialectical thesis – e.g. should a man marry? – is unencumbered by particulars, and thus dialectical arguments focus upon principles of inference per se. On the other hand, the rhetorical hypothesis – e.g. should Cato marry? – must deal with the specific persons and actions that enter into consideration of a social or political situation, and so rhetorical argument must apply principles to actual cases” (53-54).

Whether Aristotle would agree with the separation is disputable, given his definition of rhetoric and dialectic (see above). What is important here is the example that provides an extension to Epictetus’ concept of prenotions.

67). By using this line of attack, it becomes possible to reveal, in narratives, “habits of thought, value hierarchies, forms of knowledge, and cultural conventions,” which Warnick asserts must be taken into consideration in rhetorical transactions (108). For, in order to argue rhetorically, it is necessary to “know the values, presumptions, predispositions, and expectations of the audience” (108) in order to attain what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call “adherence.” That is, it is necessary, as will be explained below, to argue from premisses that the audience accepts in order to persuade or convince its members of the arguments put forth in speech or writing. This necessarily involves argument that is based on the values, knowledge and thought schema held by the audience.

Another important concept in that Eagleton brings to the fore in the passage above is the performative aspect of rhetoric. For in my analysis, I shall view the narratives as particular cases, but cases that are necessarily performances. For both of the texts under study can be conceived of as written performances due to the fact that they are, in the end, stories told by story-tellers. The performative aspect of rhetoric has to do with the *how* of a rhetorical enactment, as opposed to the *what* or the *why*. In the third book of his treatise, Aristotle deals superficially with rhetoric’s performative aspect: delivery. However, it does come into play whenever rhetoric is at work. My aim at this point is merely to bring to the fore another aspect that adds to the definition of rhetoric that I am presenting. The importance that rhetoric’s performative aspect holds will become evident when I analyze Lansing’s travel narrative.

The narratives to be analyzed in part two of this paper epitomize abstract notions and thus provide material for analysis and critique of these same concrete manifestations as expressed by the narrators. It will be seen that little has changed since the time of Achilles and Agamemnon, with respect to the possible interpretations of

how a particular human agent puts what Epictetus calls prenotions into concrete action, and, further, how an agent makes a case – by means of rhetorical strategies – which is then presented to or performed before the court of the text’s readership.

As can be seen from the recent literature on rhetoric, scholars have varied and often conflicting opinions on what rhetoric is and how it is to be used. In the next section I shall present a definition based on a reading of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* that will necessarily be a matter of agreement or disagreement, due to its being a matter of opinion.



**PART 2**  
**RHETORICAL MODES AND PROOFS**





## 2.1 INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL MODES

In this section I shall present a model of classical rhetoric based primarily on a reading of Aristotle's treatise and of works by authors who also use this seminal text as a cornerstone for rhetorical theory and practice. I shall use this rhetorical model to analyze and interpret the text under study in Part 4. The discussion that follows brings to the fore a great number of points that reveal the multifaceted nature of rhetoric. I use the term multifaceted first because it is a trope derived from gemology and thus has connotations of beauty and complexity, and secondly in order to alert the reader to the extremely high number of concepts that any attempt to define rhetoric as a term entails. The aspects that are brought to the fore in the discussion that follows are too numerous to be brought to bear on the final analysis that I carry out in Part 4. Nevertheless, as part of my intention is to present a model for rhetorical analysis and criticism which I believe will be new information for students of literature, what is presented below will hopefully serve as a source of useful background information that will make it possible to use this same model for a variety of critical and analytical ends.

Aristotle tells us that there are three species of rhetoric: "*symbouleutikon* ['deliberative'], *dikanikon* ['judicial'], *epideiktikon* ['demonstrative']" (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 48). Each of these species has its respective audience, time frame and objective (48). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle bases his division on the aims and listeners in each context, for it is the listener which must be persuaded. In in each case, the listener is there for a specific objective (Oksenberg, 3). In rhetoric, the aim of the discourse is to persuade the listener and, according to Aristotle, in the three genera the listener differs and is present in respective frameworks of discourse. Aristotle tells us that the listener is either an observer [*theoros*] or judge [*krites*], depending on the species. According to Aristotle, the listener is a judge in both deliberative and judicial rhetoric, for in these

two species, he is “a judge of either past or future happenings” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 47-48). In the case of deliberative rhetoric, the listener is a judge of future happenings, whereas in the case of judicial rhetoric, the listener is a judge of past happenings. In demonstrative or epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle views the listener as an observer who “is concerned with the ability (*dynamis*) [of the speaker]” (48). As will be seen below, this concern with the speaker’s ability is also a form of judgment.

Whereas the time frame for judicial rhetoric is the past and for deliberative rhetoric the future, that of epideictic rhetoric is the present (48-49). And so we have in Aristotle’s definition of rhetorical thought the basic time frames of human existence in the material world: past, present, future. The events that Aristotle refers to in the past of judicial rhetoric are to be judged as just or unjust (49), whereas the future events in deliberative rhetoric are to be judged in terms of their being advantageous or harmful. If the future event is advantageous, the end for the deliberative speaker is to persuade the listener to decide in favor of taking action based thereon; if the future event is harmful, the deliberative speaker’s aim is to dissuade the listener from taking a particular course of action (49). In the case of epideictic rhetoric, the end is to present “the honorable [*kalon*] and the shameful” (49). In each species, the speaker makes reference to considerations relative to the qualities that define their aims, with a view to persuading the listener of the same.

The means of achieving the respective ends in each species of rhetoric are also identified by Aristotle. In deliberative rhetoric the speaker exhorts and dissuades towards the advantageous or away from the harmful; in judicial rhetoric the speaker either accuses or defends with respect to past happenings that are to be judged as either just or unjust; in epideictic rhetoric the speaker either praises or blames with respect to the honorable or disgraceful (49).

It is important to keep in mind that Aristotle did not view the above schema as hard and fast rules that pertain only to or are to be used only with each species. For example, when he speaks of the rhetoric used in democratic assemblies, he states that “deliberative speakers often advance other facts . . .” (49). I mention this here as a backdrop that must be kept in mind when considering the schema below which presents the three species with their respective characteristics and aims:

<b>Species of rhetoric</b>	<b>Where</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>Aim</b>
Symbouleutic discourse	Political Assemblies	Future	Exhort Dissuade	Beneficial Harmful
Dikanic discourse	Law Courts	Past	Accuse Defend	Just Unjust
Epideictic discourse	Non-pragmatic ceremonial settings	Present	Praise Blame	Honorable Shameful

Although there is evidence that Aristotle approved of the mixing of strategies from the different species of rhetoric, his threefold division has come under fire from various thinkers. Walker, for example, states that “this all too tidy classification scheme obscures the historically and socially determined specificity of the speech genres Aristotle is describing, and tends to make of them a set of timeless paradigms with only an approximate correspondence to actual speaking practices” (Poetics, 39). Perelman also criticizes Aristotle’s schema. He does not accept the threefold division by Aristotle into deliberative, judicial and epideictic species as valid for studying argumentation. Nevertheless, he concedes that they indicate the importance to be given the functions of the audience (21). Against these criticisms Krabbe informs us that Aristotle tells us that “there is an alleged proof that these are all the kinds there are (*Rhet. I 3.1, 1358a36-b8*)” (33). It is arguable that the tripartite schema was a springboard for types of rhetorical arguments that could be used together or separately, depending on the circumstance. For Walker writes that in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, “Anaximenes . . . notes that all the types of *politikos logos* can be used in combination with each other as well as separately

(5 1427b), suggesting that he is thinking of their application in relatively fluid, unstructured speaking situations” (Poetics, 53). We can easily deduce that Aristotle also would agree that there is a certain fluidity to the speaking situations, for he tells us that everyone uses rhetoric (as discussed in Part 1) and also refers to public and private advising when he writes of deliberative rhetoric (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 48-49). Oksenberg Rorty, citing Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, writes that the “deliberative rhetorician can – by turning a phrase – use *encomia* [praise] to counsel a course of action. ‘If you intend to praise, consider what you would have suggested; if you intend to suggest (*hupotheschai*), consider what you would praise’ (1368a6 ff.) (4). To round the idea of mixing genres off, we can consider Walker’s following commentary:

But the only way that Aristotle’s taxonomy can be made to work, and in truth the way it usually has been made to work, is by simply disengaging the situational forum-and-function aspect of the definitions from the universalizing time-and-subject aspect, and by treating the three rhetorical genres as general argumentative modes defined by the kinds of questions they deal with, modes that occur at least potentially (and for the most part actually) in both epideictic and pragmatic discourse. But when “rhetoric” has been defined as a “counterpart of dialectic,” a general art of reasoning and argument dealing with questions of advantage, honor, and justice in any kind of discourse – which brings us back to Plato’s equivocation between *techne rhetorike* and *logon techne* – there is no longer any need to identify “rhetoric” exclusively or narrowly with the characteristic genres of the professional *rhetor* (Poetics, 39).

The point that Walker makes in the above passage is that the genres can intermingle with each other on the one hand, and, on the other, if we view rhetoric and dialectic as sister arts, the generic division is superfluous. We can safely conclude that the tripartite structure functions primarily to orient its user in terms of basic argumentative aims. Once the aim has been decided on, the characteristics necessary for the same can then be adopted and adapted to suit an argument in particular.

Now that we have discussed the fundamental aspects of each species of rhetoric as Aristotle has defined it, we can examine each of them in greater detail. I begin with deliberative rhetoric because its time frame is the future, and provides a point of

departure for the rhetorical model that I am presenting in terms of its chronology in terms of human thought. That is, the framework for human action defined by choice is divided into: 1) thought about the future, 2) thought about the past, and 3) thought about the present. This sequence is often repeated, and is thus cyclical. For in our decision-making about our actions, we first deliberate about the future to determine the end we desire and how best to achieve that end. Once the action has been carried out, we look back on it and identify it in order to place it into a category of action. Since we look back on it, it is judgment of past actions. Once the action has been categorized, it can be labeled as either being praise- or blameworthy, which is the function of epideictic rhetoric, whose time is the present. Actions that have been labeled as praise or blameworthy provide models to either imitate or avoid in terms of future action, thereby completing the circular time framework of rhetorical thought. The cycle is then repeated.

As stated above, the thought processes involved in rhetorical thinking are highly complex and the division of this complexity into neat categories of future, past and present is an oversimplification. This basis framework nevertheless provides a starting point for our discussion. We deliberate about what we are to do in the future, judge what we have done in the past, and once judgment has taken place on our past actions we then establish these actions as models for future action by praising or condemning them in the present. We can now turn to deliberative rhetoric.

## 2.2 DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC

Aristotle addresses future rhetors in his treatise. Its contents are tailored to the topics that his pupils would have been taking into consideration as well as the audience they would have been addressing. Their audience was the “senate,” which would listen to and decide upon future action for the *polis*. For this reason, deliberative rhetoric is also at times referred to in the literature as “symbouleutic oratory.” The root for this term is *boule*, the “senate” or council, from which are also obtained *symbouloi*, “statesmen” and *symbouleutikon*, the discourse of the *boule* (Usher, 220; Walker – Poetics, 38). The council members would take into consideration matters related to the future of the *polis* to be delivered via oratory to the *ekklesia*, or popular assembly (Walker, 38). According to Aristotle, the topics that the council members would deliberate about and subsequently deliver were “mostly five in number . . . finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 53). The five areas identified by Aristotle are, of course, relevant to the aims of his treatise. For rhetoric in general, any future matter in which human agency is involved is fair game for this mode of argumentation.

Crucial to molding the supporting arguments is the need to take into consideration the audience. In this regard, Aristotle declares the importance of knowing the constitution specific to the audience to be addressed. He mentions four types of constitutions, and advises that the end of each must be kept in mind in order to select the arguments that will persuade: “There are four forms of constitution: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy” (74). The end of each is as follows: 1) democracy – freedom, 2) oligarchy – wealth, 3) aristocracy – things related to education and

traditions of law and 4) tyranny – self-preservation (74).<sup>61</sup> Since each type of constitution has a different aim which depends on those who have drafted them, in each case we can conclude that the aims are related to general goals for the good of those governing and being governed by the respective constitutions, and the welfare, or *eudaimonia*, as defined by each. The rhetor must present his arguments so that they coincide with the audience’s view of how *eudaimonia* is defined, in order to then persuade the audience of the usefulness or the harm that a particular proposition may bring (Oksenberg, 6). In the list Aristotle provides of the four types of government, the complete adaptability of rhetoric to content surfaces.

With respect to what we deliberate about, Aristotle is keen to point out that we only do so about things that are both possible and that are in our power to achieve:

First, then, one must grasp what kinds of good and evil the deliberative speaker advises about, since [he will be concerned] not with all, but [only] with those that can both possibly come to pass or not (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 52-53).

Aristotle’s use of the adverb “possibly” highlights the contingent nature of matters that are the concern of deliberative rhetoric in particular and rhetorical topics in general. At the same time, he marks the limits of rhetoric’s field in this mode by inferring that things that are impossible and are not in our power to carry out fall outside of the limits of rhetoric. On the other hand, those things that can possibly occur are necessarily based on other possibilities and certainties, all in a complex web of probability and in which – as the bases themselves used for arguing about whether or not specific possibilities will come about are not always absolutely certain – opinion plays an important role. On another level, whether or not the consequences of the decision to be made are beneficial or harmful is also a matter of opinion subject to debate. Finally, ethics enter in, as often decisions about the future are characterized by a conflict between expediency and

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<sup>61</sup> The contemporary association of rhetoric with democracy in current scholarship can be contrasted with the types of government Aristotle lists.



morality. Often morality is sacrificed for the sake of expediency and vice versa.

Aristotle adds further layers to his discussion of what is worth deliberating about:

Nor is there deliberation about all contingent matters; for some benefits among those that can come to pass or not are the work of nature or happen by chance, on which deliberation is not worthwhile (53).

And so we can see that within the uncertain and contingent sphere that rhetoric deals with, there are matters that although contingent, do not merit consideration due to the fact that they are beyond control or unpredictable. Here Aristotle mentions the work of nature and chance. As these types of events cannot be predicted with certainty, in Aristotle's view they have no place in deliberative argumentation. However, because of our comparatively greater scientific knowledge of nature, accumulated data based on observation could be used and applied in argumentation. An obvious example would be earthquakes or tsunamis. A particular case is Japan's 2011 disaster. Based on the Japanese history of the last 100 years, a question that certainly loomed large was not whether that area of Japan would experience a major earthquake, rather it was a question of when. In spite of the probability for disaster, decisions were made to build nuclear reactors upon unsafe ground that finally brought negative consequences of spectacular magnitude. But so many forces come into play that, while hindsight is always one hundred percent accurate, desire for immediate or present material wellbeing and its respective arguments overshadowed those arguments that predicted disaster. Risk, as we can see, is necessarily a factor that plays an important role in rhetorical argumentation, and is linked to the uncertainty of how events occur in life.

Aristotle rounds off his discussion of what can or cannot be considered in deliberative rhetoric as follows:

But the subjects of deliberation are clear, and these are whatever, by their nature, are within our power and of which the inception lies with us. [As judges] we limit our consideration to the point of discovering what is possible or impossible for us to do (53).

In the end, we decide what is possible and impossible and within our power to carry out. Things that are impossible or lie beyond our capabilities are not reasonable to enter into debate over. For it makes no sense at all to deliberate about things that are impossible.<sup>62</sup> Aristotle refines his definition of what he means when he states in the *Nichomachean Ethics* that “we deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done”:

And in the case of the exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of money-making” (Barnes - Complete, 1756).

Vital here is the point Aristotle makes about what he calls self-contained sciences, for it adds another dimension to how he conceives of possible and impossible. In the chapter on opinion a distinction was made between opinion and hard facts. Hard facts can be reflected in normal day-to-day language such as “You can’t walk through walls” or “What goes up must come down.” These types of expressions exemplify what Aristotle means when he states that “no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise” (1798). But here we see that, in the example of how to write the letters of the alphabet, the indisputable area is that we know how to write the letters of the alphabet and do not argue over such issues. This does not mean that the alphabet could not be written differently. For indeed this is possible. But the convention that has been agreed upon is that the alphabet is written in a certain way and is thus not a topic for deliberation. Aristotle contrasts the way the alphabet is written with medicine and finance, two fields that are much less precise as to possible outcomes and thus are areas in which deliberation and decisions to be made for the future come into play. He gives further examples in order to reinforce his point:

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<sup>62</sup> Aristotle expands on the topic of deliberation in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, where not only does he state that “we deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done,” but also things that “can be done by their [men’s] own efforts” (Barnes - Complete, 1756).

And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio, and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have more doubt about the former (1756).

There is a graduated continuum of possibilities that have been worked out based on the past, as well as on inductive logic. Each example in each field that builds the respective data base that provides the basis upon which to make future decisions reinforces the proof used in argument. In *Truth and Method*, Hans Georg Gadamer comments on the differences between the hard sciences and human sciences. Everything can be logically proven – *ex post facto*. The main difference between the hard sciences and the human sciences is that not enough data has been collected for the human sciences to make them predictable enough to earn the title of scientific. Gadamer uses the science of meteorology as prime example of a so-called hard science that has much in common with the human sciences. It is not that the weather cannot be predicted; its “unpredictability” has more to do with collected data that would make its prediction possible. Similarly, he argues that if we had more data on human behavior, more accurate predictions could be made, and, in turn, the human sciences could then be denominated hard sciences. The problem is one of insufficient data.<sup>63</sup> Because of this, human behavior is predictable only to certain degrees of probability.

The more contingency enters into a particular matter, the greater role the art of deliberation plays when deciding about it. The example of navigation as opposed to gymnastics demonstrates this difference concisely. If we then move towards the opposite pole to the science of mathematics, these examples show how the need for deliberation decreases at this end, and increases as we travel the opposite direction towards meteorology or human psychology.

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<sup>63</sup> See Gadamer.

Aristotle tells us that when deliberating about the future we often do not trust our own intuition and seek input from third parties:

Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way and for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding (1756).

Perelman picks up this idea of seeking aid from a person or persons we trust by referring to the Antoine de La Salle story “Le réconfort de Madame du Fresne.” Antoine de La Salle must make a morally complex decision, a decision which his wife reinforces:

The decision is never in doubt, but Antoine de La Salle nonetheless attaches great importance to the wife’s words, which he relates with a wealth of detail. Her words transform the way in which the decision is face: she gives her husband a sense of pride in himself, poise, confidence, and consolation. She puts order into his ideas, gives the decision its setting, and, in so doing, reinforces it. She is like the theologian who provides the rational proofs for a dogma in which all members of the church already believe (Perelman – Treatise, 43).

The terms that describe the benefits of good counsel proliferate in the paragraph above, thereby showing the importance given to the same in human decision making. The list could easily be expanded, but pride, poise, confidence, consolation, and rationality are salves that allay anxieties that surface with our ignorance when facing the future, both that future before the decision has been made, and that future that extends beyond the point the decision that has been carried out, and which is defined by consequences. The fact that we seek reinforcement from another, whose system of values are similar or coincide with ours, demonstrates the common need we have as humans for reassurance in matters that cannot be determined by empirical, mathematical or strictly logical means. Our own judgment is dependent upon the judgment of others whom we trust.

What motivates this calling out, this unwanted yet necessary need for outside counsel? Aristotle tells us point blank: “Fear makes people deliberative” (cited by Konstan, 417). Konstan tells us that, according to Aristotle, “it is not pain itself that

induces fear, but rather things that threaten pain” (417). Here the importance of the future aspect comes into high relief. Our decisions for future action can by no means be made with complete accuracy with regards to outcome. And the stakes are high. This is an important point, for once the negative consequences of a poor decision have begun, our natural response is to take measures to rectify the poor decisions, in order to avoid further deleterious effects. Our deliberation is based on fear of future ills that have not materialized. This fear of things that might lead to unwanted and negative consequences is due to the great possibility for error that we have in our decision making. This possibility to err or ascertain produces anxiety and hope, and the concomitant risk that is ever-present gives an edge not only to the decision process, but to human existence itself.

Fear of painful consequences is a primary motive for deliberation about the future, but pleasure is also important. Our decisions about the future are based on hope and desire to avoid unpleasant consequences of poor decisions and to attain positive results of good decisions. According to Perelman, our beliefs are determined to a great by our expectations and wants related to the future, which are linked with the pleasurable. In this regard, Perelman argues that it is not our beliefs which determine our hopes and desires, but the contrary. He writes: “It is almost commonplace to insist on the way in which our hopes and desires determine our beliefs” (Treatise, 61). He links this with what we as humans perceive as pleasurable, quoting Pascal: “All men whatsoever are almost always led into belief not because a thing is proved but because it is pleasing” (61). Pascal provides the following rationale for his assertion:

Things are true or false according to the aspect in which we look at them. The will, which prefers one aspect to another, turns away the mind from considering the qualities of all that it does not like to see; and thus the mind, moving in accord with the will, stops to consider the aspect which it likes and so judges by what it sees (61).

The above passage asserts that humans determine whether something is true or not based solely on whether it is or is not viewed as pleasing. Thus our ethics could be seen, on one level, as hedonism – that is, as the avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. While this idea is a commonplace – and, granted, an oversimplification – it provides us with a vantage point to analyze our thought processes when deciding about the future.

According to Perelman, rhetoric (argumentation) provides us with a tool that gives insight into how our decision-making process operates:

Argumentation alone (of which deliberation constitutes a special case) allows us to understand our decisions. This is why we will consider argumentation above all in its practical effects: oriented toward the future, it sets out to bring about some action or to prepare for it by acting, by discursive methods, on the minds of the hearers (47).

Narrative plays a role in deliberative rhetoric. For the efforts to bring about some action or to prepare for the future occurs in the present, and, as Paul de Ricoeur spells out in *Time and Narrative*, is the result of making the future a present as an existing event. Ricoeur writes, “We are in fact prepared to consider as existing, not the past and future as such, but the temporal qualities that can exist in the present, without the things of which we speak, when we recount them or predict them, still existing or already existing” (10). According to Ricoeur we speak of the future as already existing in the present, thus we examine what we imagine the future to be from the vantage point of the present, viewing it as future-having-passed. We use the events and deliberation of the future-having-passed in order to guide us towards the best decision about the real future to come, with a view to avoiding error in the decision-making process. Similarly, we make events of the past present by re-telling them. In our decisions about the future, we attempt to avoid error and pursue proper action by recounting the events of the past by treating them as present occurrences – that is, as if they still existed.

A point that I wish to make here is the importance of creating an envisioned future to come through discourse, a future that may or may not occur as imagined once it transpires in the present. It is this aspect of deliberative rhetoric in which the risk factor surfaces. For our plans for the future seldom match exactly what manifests as present reality. The hopes and desires we plan for are always in jeopardy, on the one hand, and in a state of possible fulfillment on the other. The stakes are high, and as players in this game of risk we place our bets to win while facing the prospect of losing. For the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure provide the undercurrents of narrative tension. We are innate judges of the events that unfold in our own lives as well as those of others, examining both the decision-based action and underlying motives. Tom Waits, in a meditation on the human need for resolution in the face of narrative tension, sings as follows: “Everyone wants to know / How’s it going to end?”<sup>64</sup> And the fact is that everyone wants to know the end of each story, in order to not only put all the pieces of the narrative puzzle in their place, but to subsequently judge from an ethical and esthetic standpoint. As the creators/protagonists of our own life narrative, we wish to make adequate decisions about our future in order that, once the means to achieve the decisions’ end have been carried out, our life is viewed with approval – not only our own approval, but that of those who know us. To please the crowd that pleases us is our objective. Making the right decision makes this possible. The risks can be high, and the possibility for pain or pleasure is great.

We have mentioned above that the input from another trusted individual aids us in our decision-making, both prior and subsequent to having made a decision. But we also engage in private self-deliberation. Perelman comments on this aspect of human thought. His insights merit examination:

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<sup>64</sup> See Waits.

The secrecy of self deliberation seems to guarantee its value and sincerity. Thus we find Chaignet, in the last work in French to consider rhetoric as a technique of persuasion, contrasting persuasion and conviction in these terms: “When we are convinced, we are overcome only by ourselves, by our own ideas. When we are persuaded, it always by another (41).

Chaignet distinguishes in the passage above between persuasion, which comes from others, and conviction which comes from within ourselves. The obvious question that arises is, since we become members of a community through language itself, whether any of our thoughts can be separated from the thoughts of the community in which we are enmeshed. While this question lies beyond the scope of the present study, Perelman’s observations on self-deliberation which he contrasts with deliberation with others give pride of place to the latter:

We feel . . . that it is highly desirable to consider self-deliberation as a particular kind of argumentation . . . It also very often happens that discussion with someone else is simply a means we use to see things more clearly ourselves accordingly, from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice versa (41).

Perelman’s point in the excerpt above is that even though the act of self-deliberation is carried out in solitude, it is in the presenting of our arguments to others that we can understand our own arguments. For the opinions and standpoints that we entertain when carrying out self-deliberation necessarily come from others with whom we have had contact via some form of discourse. We have, as it were, our own assembly, if not jostling throng, of voices that we can retrieve via memory in the logical processes when arguing a specific point in private. Pros and contras from the past become present syllogistic arguments that we utilize in self-deliberation with a view to making proper decisions about the future. Even still, due to the great chance to err in our deliberation, we do not completely put all of our faith in our own capability to make the right decision, or to reason accurately. We even suspect that, while deliberating alone, we are capable of duping ourselves:



Can we wholly rely on the sincerity of the deliberating subject to find out whether he is in quest of the best line of conduct or is pleading a case within himself? Depth psychology has taught us to distrust even that which seems unquestionable to our own consciousness (42).

The possibility for self-deception increases the risk for poor decision-making, and, at the same time, increases the tension that we experience as protagonists playing our respective roles in our particular material existence. And so Tom Wait's question, "How's it going to end?" takes on much more meaning when we realize that the question is, in effect, "How are we going to *try* and make it end?"

I have stated in Part 1 that to make wise decisions is to possess and utilize what Aristotle calls *phronesis*, which is translated into English as "practical wisdom." The "this-worldliness" character of rhetoric, which I have been emphasizing, can immediately be detected in the translation of *phronesis*. The practically wise man is a *phronimos*. In Aristotle's definition, both terms are necessarily linked to excellence and the good, for he states "it is impossible to be practically wise without being good" (Barnes – Complete, 1807). Important here is to emphasize the fact that what is "good" is a matter of opinion and subject to dispute. Aristotle states that every system of human thought, irrespective of its political or philosophical underpinnings, aims at some good in the beginning of his *Nichomachean Ethics*. He then proceeds to offer his version of the good. But his version of the good is necessarily an opinion which is not beyond criticism.

We can now consider the basic model that Aristotle uses for choices when using practical wisdom when deliberating about the future:

It is plain that the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than without excellence; for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end (1808).

Proper choice is based on practical wisdom and excellence. Of course, the definition of both practical wisdom and excellence will be different for each person. I have hinted at

this when discussing the fact that Aristotle brings the need for being knowledgeable about the different types of constitutions and the aims of each. Each was written with a particular definition of excellence in mind. Further, I have also mentioned in Part 1 the prenotions Epictetus writes of in his *Dialogues*. Achilles and Agamemnon would both agree that to act honestly is important, but just how the abstract prenotation honesty is interpreted by each is a term for dispute. It is my opinion that Aristotle would have the hope that some sort of truth can be agreed on through rhetorical thinking. But at the same time, I believe that, as he provides the various types of constitutions with a view to arguing for those particular audiences, he would also state that that is precisely how things work in this world as opposed to the ideal sphere of Plato's Forms. Aristotle's writing provides support for this argument. For when speaking of *phronesis*, or "practical wisdom," Aristotle distinguishes it from the wisdom we associate with philosophers, which is not practical:

From what has been said it is plain, then, that wisdom is knowledge, combined with comprehension, of the things that are highest by nature. This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have wisdom but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek (1802).

Here we can see that *phronesis* is not the wisdom of philosophers who "have their heads in a cloud," so to speak. *Phronesis* has to do with the rough and tumble of our day-to-day and physical existence, with the choices that we deliberate about and then make in real-world decisions.

Aristotle bases what is a conclusion above about the nature of correct choice (when using *phronesis*) on the following assertions:

So that since moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts (1798).

Here we see that there is, in Aristotle's conception of choice, interplay between reason and desire. Reason must be defined by truth, and desire by goodness for a choice to be judged as morally excellent. This same framework for determining the quality of a choice can be used to analyze any choice whatsoever, regardless of the political or ethical stance held by the subject doing so. And so vice and virtue necessarily enter into Aristotle's discussion on the subject's responsibility for choices that lead to actions:

Excellence also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa . . . Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious (1758).

The subject, in Aristotle's definition, is capable of carrying out acts that are virtuous or vice-ridden. Important here, for our purposes, is to keep in mind that the definition of vice and virtue is open to discussion. If, as some scholars of literature affirm, Satan is the real hero in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, that evaluation is based on a system of values that can be examined. Similarly, if the real hero of Flannery O'Connors' "A Good Man Is Hard to Find" is the Misfit – and of course he is an anti-hero – we must examine why a character of that sort can be seen as being "good" from the system of values is being used to provide a foundation for that appraisal. As for recits de voyage, there is a correlation between the author and the narrator. That is, we assume that the author of the text is the narrator, and so we assume that we are reading narratives that have to do with things that really happened, and, by extension, actions that were in the narrator's power to decide whether to carry them out or not. We can connect this with another point that Aristotle makes in the *Nichomachean Ethics*:

We cannot refer actions to moving principles other than those in ourselves, the acts whose moving principles are in us must themselves also be in our power and voluntary (1758).

Aristotle would insist that we are responsible for our actions, which are based on choice. In practical terms, our actions are subject to law, a point which Aristotle also makes:

Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their private capacity and by legislators themselves; for these punish and take vengeance on those who do wicked acts (unless they have acted under compulsion or as a result of ignorance for which they are not themselves responsible), while they honour those who do noble acts, as though they meant to encourage the latter and deter the former (1758).

We are, on a practical and legal plane, responsible for our actions which we, as subjects, choose to do, and these very actions are punishable by law or praised as honorable. We judge the choices and actions we make and carry out, as well as those of others from an ethical standpoint, and, according to Aristotle, use our judgments to decide who, in fact, possesses *phronesis*:

Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general (1800).

Again, the terms Aristotle uses, “man of practical wisdom” and “the good life in general,” are necessarily open to interpretation. Not everyone will agree on precisely what is the good life or precisely what things produce it. And the persons whom we attribute with practical wisdom will depend on our own system of values. Aristotle, using his system of values, presents examples of persons that in his appraisal possessed *phronesis*:

It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or states (1800).

It is interesting that Aristotle uses Pericles, for in the *Gorgias*, Plato’s Socrates attacks Pericles as not acting in the best interest of the state. The dispute that occurs between

Socrates and the other speakers in the *Gorgias* demonstrates the point that I wish to make here: 1) that whether certain actions are determined as being products of *phronesis*, and 2) that whether certain persons are judged as possessing this faculty will depend on those who judge the actions, using their own system of values as foundation for their reasoning. And so, when Aristotle states, “[p]ractical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (1801), we must always keep in mind that the appraisal will necessarily be made by a judge or group of judges whose system of values may differ from another judge or group.<sup>65</sup> If we accept this reasoning, it becomes possible to use the core logic of Aristotle’s definition of practical wisdom to engage in a dialogue about precisely what that might mean here and now, with a view to evolving as individuals that are interconnected with others in what is, due to globalization, a planet-wide *polis*.<sup>66</sup>

Aristotle fleshes out his discussion on what we deliberate about, which, as we have mentioned above, has limits. He links the limits he establishes below to *phronesis*:

Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation about some things? We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of deliberation. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, i.e. about the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. . . . (1756).

In Aristotle’s definition of *phronesis*, fools and madmen are excluded. And here we could argue that first, just what a fool or madman is needs to be defined, and second, whether examples of foolish or mad reasoning do or do not produce *eudaimonia* as defined by certain individuals. Two examples from literature will suffice to demonstrate this idea. First, there is Dostoevsky’s *Underground Man*, who takes to task the idea that

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<sup>65</sup> Jaeger rephrases Aristotle’s definition of *phronesis* as follows: “In common usage it is a practical faculty, concerned both with the choice of the ethically desirable and with the prudent perception of one’s own advantage” (82-83).

<sup>66</sup> See Sanders on how globalization has resulted in the evolution of ethics, making questionable earlier frameworks.

an individual does best when acting in their own interest. Underground Man asserts that there are times that what a person must do is act against his or her own self-interest as defined by reason, and that that is precisely what produces *eudaimonia* – according to an alternative definition. In the field of rhetoric, any stance can be argued, and that is precisely what Dostoevsky does with great force in this work. Another example is Henry Miller’s *Tropic of Cancer*, with his famous cry at the outset: “I have no money, no resources, no hopes. I am the happiest man alive.”<sup>67</sup> Miller is speaking of his definition of *eudaimonia*, which he can argue has validity, and which, as he was very persuasive, convinced and still convinces some readers that there is another way that is worth living, a way that does not follow the straight and narrow path set forth by television commercials and Facebook aficionados.

Aristotle in the passage above adds to his limits eternal things, such as the universe and the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. He does this to hammer away at his point that we only deliberate about things that are within our capability to make happen. Along these lines he states:

[One chooses] only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts. Again, wish relates rather the end, choice to what contributes to the end; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which will make us healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things in our own power (1755).

The choices that we make have to do with the means. The end, according to Aristotle, has to do with desire. And the means must be within our power to execute, for if it were otherwise, choice would not be possible. Curious here is Aristotle’s stance that one cannot choose to be happy, which flies in the face of many current notions of happiness that, if we are to take only self-help books as an example, state the opposite.

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<sup>67</sup> See Miller, Henry.

That our choices have to do with ethics, as we have stated above, Aristotle states point blank: “Choice is determined by goodness or badness” (1755). Again, precisely what is goodness and what is badness are issues about which we can enter into dialogue using rhetoric.

With respect to the choices that people make and who can be seen to possess *phronesis*, Aristotle tells us that it is one thing to have the right opinion, and quite another to choose what is good:

And we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do not know at all; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the best choices and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason of vice to choose what they should not (1755).

Knowing what right choices are and carrying them out are two different capabilities. Here again, we can recall Dostoevsky’s *Underground Man*, or we can see this same incapability to choose what is identified by most as the good in travel stories like “Absinthe Makes the Heart Grow” by Taras Gresco. After spelling out all of the dangers drinking absinthe presents and stating that absinthe was, in terms of dangerous substances, the cocaine of its day, the narrator nevertheless sets out to find out for himself what drinking this wormwood containing beverage is all about. He takes a risk that is potentially dangerous, yet, we must infer – based on his arguments – that he is seeking the good, or his definition thereof. This is, after all, very often the stuff of literature: rebelling against the rules established by law and society in order to discover another definition of the good, regardless of the damage that may incur. The writing of authors like Charles Bukowski or Raymond Carver epitomize the idealization of making what are, by conventional standards, “bad” choices. There is an entire set of values that extols this type of behavior in literature, and, by using rhetoric as analytical tool, frameworks of this sort can be analyzed in order to bring to the fore the arguments being used as foundations.

Sometimes, in our deliberation about the future, Aristotle in the *Topics* asserts that we hit rational dead-ends. That is, at times when hashing out the best decision to make when two objectives are in play we cannot come up with an answer that is satisfactory, and the result is a dilemma:

Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would seem to be a cause of perplexity; for it is when we reflex on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of the two we are to do (245).

Aristotle is spelling out that sometimes it is not true that there is a lesser of two evils, for example, or at times, one simply has to accept the truth of statements like “You’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t.” This also applies to ends that are positive for often, when given the possibility to choose between two goods, regardless of how much we weigh the possible advantages and disadvantages, the equation comes out equal, and we have no choice but to toss a coin or be arbitrary.

Whether the balance tilts in the direction of one choice or the other, the deliberative mode of rhetoric has to do with freedom. Grimaldi writes:

In this matter of ‘persuasion’ Aristotle’s thesis is simply that good rhetoric effectively places before the other person all the means necessary for such decision making. At this point the person must exercise his own freedom (5).

Freedom is always tied to responsibility. And this is where judgment enters and where narrative tension has its source. This is where we, as individuals that are free to choose how to reach our specific goals, find ourselves facing how to best act with respect to our own (and others’) anticipated future that eventually makes its transit through the present and finally becomes the past, from where the stuff of narrative is mined. The use of freedom by an individual that manifests in specific action is, as Ross states, an attempt on Aristotle’s part to formulate a conception of the will:



Thus choice is ‘deliberate desire of things in our own power,’ or, as Aristotle puts it elsewhere, ‘it is either desirous reason or reasonable desire, and that sort of origin of action is a man (207).<sup>68</sup>

The conception of the will that Ross affirms Aristotle did not fully examine or explain is, in his opinion, the “plain man’s,” as opposed to the philosopher’s belief in it (209). That is, will as conceived of by the man- or woman-on-the-street, who believes that he or she is the agent of his or her decisions, who believes that freedom to choose does indeed exist and further, has consequences.<sup>69</sup>

A final point of interest with respect to deliberation and to the object of study (i.e. travel narratives) is the one that Aristotle makes in the *Rhetoric* when discussing this mode of rhetoric for making decisions about the future:

Thus, it is clear that in constitutional revision the reports of travelers are useful (for there one can learn the laws of foreign nations) and [that] for debates about going to war the research of those writing about history [is useful]. But all these subjects belong to politics, not to rhetoric (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 55).

Here we can see that Aristotle is telling future 4<sup>th</sup> century rhetors to rely on travelers’ reports when revising constitutions. And while he insists that matters of constitutions and warfare are not rhetoric but politics, it is nevertheless relevant to our discussion, for the final object of study is a travel narrative. *Recits de voyage* can be utilized from this perspective as models for deliberation about the future with respect to travel. For the input of other travelers can often be highly valuable on several fronts were one to travel to the same place the narrative takes place in. Nor is the value that travel narratives hold just in relation to practical information. More critical and far more arresting are the rhetorical arguments underlying the choice-based action carried out by the narrator in a specific place and time in a particular sample of travel writing. Analyzing the arguments

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<sup>68</sup> Interestingly, in Aristotle’s definition of *phronesis*, not just humans, but even animals are accorded this faculty. So while Aristotle would deny fools and madmen the capacity to make correct choices, he nevertheless states that “even some of the lower animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own life” (Barnes - Complete, 1802).

<sup>69</sup> While arguments have been presented throughout history that free-will does not exist, it is still an issue open to debate. See Mackie.

used by the narrator will shed light on both the system of values adhered to by both the author and readership on several levels.

## **2.3 JUDICIAL RHETORIC**

Once an act has been carried out by an agent it makes the transition from future possibility through the present to become a past event, and as such falls within the sphere of judicial rhetoric. As stated above in the section introducing the three rhetorical modes, the aim of judicial rhetoric is justice and its time frame is the past. Since the culpability of a person who has been accused of having committed an offense must be determined, the initial twofold aim of judicial rhetoric is to establish 1) whether or not the action did in fact take place and if so, 2) who the agent was. Once it has been established that a particular agent carried out a particular criminal act, a secondary aim guides the process: the evaluation of the nature of the crime. This is necessary in order for justice to be adequately meted out, which means that the consequences that the agent is to assume for having committed the crime must match its severity. These must neither be too harsh nor too lenient in order for justice to be perceived by the community as having been carried out with equanimity. Two enormous challenges arise with respect to the aims of judicial rhetoric. First, there will be criminals that, in the hopes of evading the consequences dictated by the community's judicial system, either commit perjury on the one hand, or attempt to cover up the evidence on the other, thereby obstructing justice. That is, they will, using deceit, make the determining of whether the act occurred or not difficult or impossible. Second, the possibility of an innocent person being accused or charged with criminal acts of which she is not the agent arises. With respect to the two types of challenges, there would ideally be sufficient evidence to empirically prove innocence or guilt. As this is often not the case, due to the fact that we are dealing with events from the past and the collection of evidence for a particular act can be hampered by circumstance or human agents, contemporary law dictates that proof must be beyond reasonable doubt in order to convict an individual of a crime. And it is the impossibility itself of presenting irrefutable empirical proof in certain cases

that, in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, locates events of this type within the sphere of rhetoric. For as we have said, rhetoric's field of operation is opinion. While the connotations of the term opinion are pejorative, it is precisely the conjectural nature of judicial cases that legal expressions like "prove beyond reasonable doubt" epitomize, albeit in a way that removes or at any rate glosses over any negative connotations the term opinion conveys. (This in itself is a rhetorical mechanism: the restatement of a concept in terms that define it positively or negatively.) Within this framework of facts that cannot be proven with absolute empirical certainty, argumentation through probability necessarily forms part of the process leading to proof. The nature of this process entails utilizing other means for determining truth and falsehood that operate in conjunction with informal logic. For when we as humans weigh the evidence of or consider arguments whose bases are defined by likelihood, our emotions play an important role in our efforts to determine the truth of a matter. Since rhetorical argumentation operates beyond the confines of empirically provable hard facts, the possibility of using its mechanisms to deceive by manipulating the emotions that we use to judge whether a particular argument is true or not exists and, as is well-known, stands as an enormous challenge when a particular case is being presented. For because we know that the possibility of having our emotions swayed by unethical means or of the matters of a case being distorted by false or impertinent evidence exists, the ability to read between the lines in order not to be either deluded due to being carried away by clever emotional appeals or duped by shrewd manipulation of logic stands as both a crucial task and ability. Aristotle knew this, and it is on these two points that he focuses when discussing judicial rhetoric. In his treatise he gives deliberative rhetoric pride of place, for it is his opinion that one ought to argue using *logos*, or reasoned argumentation as the primary means. His view is that deliberative rhetoric is not

contaminated by appeals to the emotions, that it is governed by *logos*-based arguments. Thus he views deliberative rhetoric as being less characterized by irrelevant (thus unethical) emotional appeals, due to the fact that its audience is affected personally, and is therefore engaged emotionally because of self-interest. Aristotle spells this out when he compares deliberative and judicial rhetoric:

It is for this reason that although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking is the same and though deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than private transactions, [the handbook writers] have nothing to say about the former, and all try to describe the art of speaking in a law court, because it is less serviceable to speak things outside the subject in deliberative situations; for there the judge judges about matters that affect himself, so that nothing is needed except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says (33).

In the above passage we see Aristotle's complaint about the writers of rhetorical handbooks is formulated in terms of logical argumentation. For when he states above that to bring in issues that are irrelevant to the argument and that in deliberative forums it is only necessary to "show that circumstances are as the speaker says," he is, in effect, asserting that argument in deliberative rhetoric has a more solid grounding in *logos* – that is, in reasonable or logical argument. The connection with emotions is evident in the excerpt above when he states that with respect to deliberative situations the judge appraises matters that affect him. Because the judge in deliberative rhetoric has a personal, vested interest, he is already (and necessarily) emotionally engaged.

The link between emotions and logical argument in Aristotle's definition comes to the fore in the passage above. Aristotle criticizes the other writers for only writing about judicial rhetoric, where it is possible to both manipulate the emotions and bring in irrelevant issues. I shall deal more specifically with Aristotle's criticism of the unethical use of emotions in the chapter I devote to *pathos*.

Whereas Aristotle's main focus in his treatise is deliberative rhetoric, and states that not enough attention has been paid to it, other thinkers from antiquity writing after

him consider judicial rhetoric to be the most important of the three genres. Cicero, as Walker informs us, deems judicial rhetoric “the ‘most difficult’ and crowning genre in which the whole art is subsumed” (Poetics, 79). Further, when claims are made in antiquity for rhetoric having in its early (and mythical) stages brought humans out of savagery into community and civilization, it is identified as playing a major role in this process in the judicial arena. Aelius Aristides, writing in a response that defies the position taken by Socrates in Plato’s *Gorgias*, describes in the second century A.D. how rhetoric descended from the gods and made human community possible:

As Aristides says, in his version of the myth of rhetoric’s beginnings, “[w]hen rhetoric had come among humankind from the Gods [being sent by Zeus, via Hermes, at the instigation of Prometheus], humankind were enabled to escape the savage way of life among the animals, stopping the cycle of strife against all, and they discovered the origin of community.” From this “discovery” proceeds the establishment of communal agreements, which make possible the foundation of laws and civil institutions . . . which in turn make possible the practices of pragmatic rhetoric in political/administrative and judicial forums (Walker – Poetics, 399-400).

Here we can see the importance given rhetoric in antiquity with respect to our human and political nature, which at bottom means judging acts on moral grounds with respect to the community’s welfare, using its system of values as base.

In connection with the community, Walker discusses Quintilian’s comments on the role that judicial rhetoric plays in the organization of the state:

[The] overwhelming impression of the *Institutio Oratorio* is that Quintilian’s orator-in-training is preparing to serve the state and emperor primarily through judicial oratory, and especially through what Quintilian regularly figures as the “gladiatorial” combats of the courts (99).

While Quintilian glorifies the confrontations that occurred in the courts as “gladiatorial,” it must be kept in mind that this heroic portrayal is in fact a search and struggle for truth. In Quintilian’s language a substantive connection with a search that is defined by confrontation over the truth of a case – whose procedures and outcome would be operative in the state’s management of its legal issues – becomes evident.

Judicial rhetoric's connection and involvement with the management of the state give it, in Quintilian's view, pride of place in terms of the three species. The importance of judicial rhetoric can also be seen in the administrative institutions of government that have arisen over time and that are in existence to this day:

From Augustus's principate onward, juristic scholarship evolved as a function of imperial administration . . . Out of this imperially sponsored scholarship emerged the first true law schools of the Western world, schools meant specifically for the training of professional jurists (91).

The importance of judicial rhetoric in the affairs of the state is evident in the excerpt above, as well as its continued influence and presence. Still, the establishing of written laws and communal agreements does not mean that rhetoric's job is finished. Constant evaluation and further judgment that develops over time is necessary:

As Aristides adds, "while the art of legislation is done with once it has established laws, and that of jurisprudence busies itself no more after the vote [of acquittal or conviction], yet like some sleepless guard [rhetoric] never ends its watch; it was joined with those arts from the beginning, both guiding and teaching, and even now it treats all things anew, making proposals, going on embassies, forever shaping present circumstances" (401).

The ongoing nature that rhetoric plays in the shaping of community is paramount. Important in the passage above is the notion that rhetoric is separate from both judicial and deliberative rhetoric. We find in Aristotle's treatise the germ for this concept when he discusses, for example, politics and ethics in relation to rhetoric, but then reminds the reader that they are separate fields. Walker, commenting on Aristides' comments above in *Against Plato Concerning Rhetoric* brings the separateness of rhetoric from other disciplines and fields of discourse to the fore:

Rhetoric, that is, continually constructs and reconstructs the larger sphere of discourse within which specific acts of legislation and jurisprudence (decrees and judgments) have occurred and will occur. It not only leads to the production of laws and institutions through the cultivation of communal assent, and thence to the production of specific judgments in specific forums which enact and enforce the laws, but it also continues to cultivate the shared agreements on which the laws depend, as well as to instigate and shape the processes through which existing laws, policies, and civil institutions will be altered. As such *rhetorike* is

the “guide” and “teacher” of legislation and jurisprudence and is necessarily “joined” with them “from the beginning” of civil society but is not identical with them or limited to their sphere. It is, rather, their condition of possibility (111-112).

Walker states point blank that rhetoric is the condition upon which civil society’s legislation and jurisprudence are made possible. At this point it bears mentioning that while the focus of the treatises on rhetoric from antiquity is institutional, we must keep in mind the above-mentioned separateness of rhetoric, as well as Aristotle’s affirmation that all people use rhetoric. This means that the same mechanisms that are used in the organization of the state are at work in a much smaller scale. That is, the interactions that occur between individuals on an interpersonal level are characterized by the same mechanisms that are in operation in large-scale political or judicial forums. Walker’s assertion concerning the enormous rhetoric importance has as the condition that makes civil society possible is applicable in our small-scale, day-to-day interactions with others.

From the above discussion we can see that writers from antiquity after Aristotle view judicial rhetoric as the most important of the three modes. Aristotle’s perspective is based on what he viewed as the inappropriateness of how judicial rhetoric was being used, which we can now discuss in greater depth. Aristotle’s bias is due to his desire for rhetoric to be based primarily on *logos*. Kennedy writes: “They [i.e., the rhetorical handbooks of the day] were, he complains, concerned only with judicial rhetoric and its parts and neglected deliberative oratory, a finer genre, and they gave too much attention to arousing emotions to the neglect of logical argument” (Rhetoric, 10). Aristotle’s stance is based on his adverse reaction to the actual goings on in the courts. His disapproval of arguing outside the subject belies a desire to aim at the ideal of a rhetoric



whose basis is syllogistic.<sup>70</sup> Logical argument should determine whether certain circumstances or events are or are not (in terms of probability or actual fact) possible or whether they have or have not occurred.<sup>71</sup> The example given most often of what Aristotle meant with by things outside the subject in the law courts of his day is when the defendant's wife and children were dragged into court in order to appeal to pity, regardless of the crime that was committed. The obvious danger of this type of activity is that justice will not, due to manipulation of emotions, be administered fairly.

Craig Cooper, in his study on forensic oratory in 4<sup>th</sup> century Athens, provides a summary from the *Wasps* of just what "trickery" the orators were known to utilize. The character Philocleon expects to encounter the following:

All sorts of words aimed at securing acquittal; there will be flattery of the dicasts, pleas of poverty to elicit pity, fanciful stories told, funny little tales from Aesop and even some joking to raise a laugh and release his anger. If all else fails the defendant will parade his small children and aged father before him. . . (205).

As comical as this may appear to a contemporary reader when considering the enormous emphasis placed on factual evidence, we will see that in the travel narrative to be analyzed the narrator also plays with the reader's emotions, making appeals that are ethically questionable, but at the same time quite convincing. And it is the ethical aspect that keeps the reader engaged. Although the *what* is important in literature, without the *why* a succession of events from the past would hold very little interest.

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<sup>70</sup> Reeve writes, in his interpretation of Aristotle's aims when the latter discusses cities where rhetoric is being used appropriately, "Thus rhetoric is not only restricted to enthymemes in such cities, but enthymemes are restricted to the very narrow role of establishing the facts. The speaker is not even allowed to comment on whether what happened is 'important or trivial, just or unjust' (1354a28-29). Let us say, then, that in well-ordered cities rhetoric – whether deliberative or judicial – is narrowly enthymematic. To be sure, this ideal is closely approximated only in cities with good laws, and fully achieved only in cities with the very best ones, but it remains the ideal nonetheless" (197).

<sup>71</sup> Important with respect to judicial rhetoric is to keep in mind that while Aristotle wished to give priority to *logos*, he at the same time recognized the importance of *ethos* and *pathos* as argumentative, rhetorical proofs: "Aristotle does not want to deny the utility of emotional appeal in judicial oratory, but he does believe that the writers of handbooks have failed to recognize not only the importance of rational argument but also that of persuasion through character" (Fortenbraugh, 115).

Although the use of “trickery” is an obvious threat to the meting out of justice, Cooper provides an argument that allows for justifiable appeals to the emotions. Writing in relation to the emotional appeals discussed above and other means of persuasion, he states that he does not think “that forensic oratory was more about plausibility than truth” (214). Cooper explains that it “was about justice and equality, and in an effort to obtain these, the truth sometimes needed rhetorical assistance” (214). This meant that the rhetorical means of argumentation were necessary in order to obtain justice:

As I have shown, such emotional appeals and arguments were absolutely essential as they allowed the litigant not only to grab and focus the attention of the dicasts but also to fire their imagination and define for them juristically the actual issue at hand. Was this particular action, let us say, *hybris* or not? Moreover, the stakes were often high, life and death, satisfaction for a crime against one’s person or family, and a litigant needed to use whatever rhetorical means at his disposal in order to persuade his fellow citizens of the justice of his case. In similar circumstances we would do no less (215).

Cooper makes a strong argument for the use of devices other than logical proof in order to achieve justice. The extreme issues he mentions were being judged by a potentially indifferent jury, and so the job of the rhetor was to ensure that her audience was engaged. In addition, Cooper’s argument squares with Aristotle’s stance that rhetoric should not be used for evil aims, and that, if used properly, truth and justice will prevail.

Aristotle makes this clear when he criticizes the handbooks of the day:

That other writers describe as an art things outside the subject [of a speech] and that they have rather too much inclined toward judicial oratory is clear; 12. But rhetoric *is* useful, [first] because the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 35).

In the above passage, Aristotle expresses his disapproval of using rhetoric to defeat what is true and fair. At the same time, we see Aristotle’s faith in the capacity of rhetoric to discover truth and impart justice.

I have referred to the vested interest that Aristotle states would characterize a judge in a deliberative forum, and how a personal stake in the decision process affects

the outcome. Aristotle indicates the influence on judgment that being affected personally by the issue under consideration holds, and distinguishes deliberative from judicial rhetoric on this count. The assemblyman that is deliberating on a future action is emotionally engaged at bottom due to selfishness. But this selfishness is not necessarily a drawback. In fact, Aristotle gives every indication that selfishness can be seen as a virtue, for when no self-interest is involved, the possibility for abuse increases. Garver, while arguing that Aristotle's system of ethics has no relevance for us moderns, nevertheless provides a good summary of Aristotle's viewpoint. He first presents the modern conception of justice which views judicial rhetoric as more fair due to the absence of personal interest:

We [moderns] act more justly and morally in judicial rhetoric because of the lack of a personal stake, while in deliberation selfishness is inevitable, and even appropriate. But Aristotle says that judicial rhetoric is more open to abuse because of this lack of personal interest. We want to get things right in deliberative rhetoric because they affect us. If judicial rhetoric is characteristically less ethical than deliberative reasoning, then selfishness is not the prime enemy of morality. Failing to take things personally disables us from taking them morally. The judicial audience can ask, "Why should I be moral? (71).

The judicial audience's question above demonstrates the need for employing emotional strategies as outlined above by Cooper. Aristotle's stance – initially against emotional appeal and subsequently in favour – is based on a realistic appraisal of human behaviour and how to manage it. His position is one of the factors that contributes to what have been read as inconsistencies in the *Rhetoric*, especially in what appears at first glance as a contradictory standpoint with respect to the use of emotions (*pathos*) and personality (*ethos*) as proofs when persuading during argumentation. For at first, as will be seen in the section on *pathos*, Aristotle argues that the emotions must not be used to warp the jury's judgment. Later, however, he argues that the judge must be prepared emotionally in order to obtain a proper judgment on the case at hand. What we must not forget in the face of these seeming contradictions is that it is difficult to label Aristotle as a complete

cynic, for in his treatise he reiterates the possibility in the judicial sphere to determine, in the face of rhetorically presented cases, the truth:

7. And [one can say] that the just is something true and advantageous but what seems to be just may not be; thus, the written law may not be; for it does not [always] perform the function of the law. And [one can say] that the judge is like an assayer of silver in that he distinguishes counterfeit and true justice (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 104).

Here Aristotle is drawing a distinction between the written law and the spirit of the law, while arguing that it is possible to ascertain between falsehood and truth with respect to justice. This same capacity for distinguishing the truth can be applied to all cases being judged by an audience. In this dissertation, when analyzing the texts under study, it is my aim to identify what I view as the underlying truth of the narrators' words, and to judge the system of values that provide the framework for the narrative itself. By doing so, I do not pretend to hold the final word on the matter, rather to open up a possible conversation on what I view as present in the explicit and implicit *logos* of the narrative. I shall view narratives under study as testimony. For this reason I call them case studies, which must be taken on their own terms and viewed as unique. The narrations will be read as cases being made with the aim of persuading their audience to view the actions, character and – in David Lansing's *recit de voyage* – writing skills as laudable.

As stated above, the two primary aims of judicial rhetoric are: 1) the determination of whether an act was committed or not, and 2) whether the act was just or unjust. As readers, we do this automatically with respect to ethics while reading a narrative, if only because motive is a necessary element for plot to exist in the first place. Without motives, narrative becomes mere sequence of events, outside the realm of morality. When reading a narrative, each reader determines individually how the events are to be judged. Each reader can then present her assessment and enter into the

dialectical/rhetorical fray to make the attempt to determine the arguments and underlying motives of the actions described in the narratives.

On one side of a rhetorical event is the judge, and, at the other, the persuader. Aristotle, in his attempt to steer rhetoric away from unethical emotional appeals made by the rhetor who is, in judicial rhetoric, attempting to persuade, insisted that the proofs of an oration should be logically valid: “1. Proofs should be demonstrative” (242). In this regard, Kennedy informs us that Aristotle “anticipates some categories of later stasis theory. His four questions are fact [denial something was done], harm [it did no harm], importance [it was or was not important] just [it was done justly]” (242 – author’s brackets). Questions of this sort can provide guidelines for the questions that might be asked of narrative texts, with a view to judging them on several planes, including those on matters that are related to facts and to ethics.

Vanderspoel presents Aristotle’s configuration in different terms, basing his model on its expression in the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, which drew on, extended and developed principles outlined in Aristotle’s treatise:

After the orator decides whether the issue is a matter of fact (did he do it), legal (did it, how is act defined under the law), or judicial (did it, but action justified) he then analyzes the conflict “with a view toward plausibility of presentation and ultimate resolution. He must decide whether the case is honorable, suspicious, or petty, whether it demands direct or indirect introduction, and whether the defendant will benefit from a straightforward or subtle presentation of the evidence (150).<sup>72</sup>

Judicial rhetoric provides possible avenues for analyzing narratives with the final aim of evaluating the system of values embedded within them. When the Auctor of the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* writes that the orator must decide if the case is honorable, suspicious or petty, we are provided with a with a model which can be extended to the ethical evaluation of a travel text, if only to question its inherent morality and how its

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<sup>72</sup> This quote contradicts Corbett’s assertion: “Whereas judicial discourse is concerned primarily with a man’s *legal* innocence or guilt, ceremonial discourse is concerned primarily with a man’s *moral* goodness or badness” (140).

value system resonates with the readership. Further, the terms honorable, suspicious and petty are only three of a multitude of possible evaluative terms in relation with ethics and values. The possibility of using a vast number of evaluative terms demonstrates the complexity and importance of rhetoric when it comes to critiquing and appraising on ethical grounds.

It is possible to question whether or not the story being told is the complete truth, which as we have stated is an aim of judicial rhetoric. However, as the narrator is not present for “cross-examination,” the details of the narrative must be accepted as true, with a basis on the autobiographical pact. That is, since the *I* of the narrator is the *I* of the author, the assumption is that what the narrator relates are facts. It would be naïve, of course, to assume that all narrators of travel narratives are always telling the truth.<sup>73</sup> And examples of recits de voyages that are either completely or partially false abound in the literature. But as it is impossible to speak directly with the narrator in order to exact more details with a view to ascertaining the truth or falsehood of what has been related, the reader must accept the content of the tale as true, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

We have stated that Aristotle’s aim was to present a *logos*-based rhetoric. His *Topics* provided a cross-reference in his corpus for building arguments built on *logos* when attempting to prove a case. Later, the Roman rhetoricians would use Aristotle’s treatise and expand on the “commonplaces” or *loci*, in judicial argumentation. When searching for *loci*, questions related to the case would be used to provide orientation:

The *De inventione* and the *Ad Herennium* both provide examples of the *loci* in which we can hope to discover such wise saws and modern instances. First they consider the predicament of the judicial orator, whose concern is either with prosecution or defense. Among the headings under which he is advised to search for general maxims are the following. Should we consider only the crime itself, or also the motives for committing it? Should we consider only the text of the law or

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<sup>73</sup> For an excellent discussion of the truthfulness or lack thereof in travel writing, see chapter 2 in Adams: “The Truth-lie dichotomy.”

also the intentions of the legislator? Should we always follow court procedures or is there room for flexibility? (Skinner, 114).

In the excerpt above we see the importance that interpretation plays in judicial rhetoric. That is, the evaluation of the specific case, keeping in mind all of the possible details in order to reach an adequate and fair judgment. In the recit de voyage to be examined in this dissertation, the crime that the narrator presents must be evaluated against the underlying motives, as well as the extenuating circumstances as the narrator presents them. Details related to motive and circumstance will also prove to be the sought after details by the interlocutors in Gass' narrative. T.H. Irwin comments on the assessment of human action from a rhetorical perspective, where the act and motives are taken into consideration:

Moral assessment is not directed simply to the gravity of the action, but to the attitude underlying it (1374b24-29); that is why evidence of premeditation warrants a harsher judgment (1375a7), and why we distinguish action on decision from action on emotion (1373b35-38). We present our character in making our *prohairesis* clear (1395b13-14); since a *prohairesis* characterizes a person as a whole, a reference to a person's *prohairesis* draws attention to the broader context of his action, and therefore to his normal behavior, so that we do not confine ourselves to this particular action (1374b13-16) (164).

The motives behind an act necessarily color our moral evaluation of the agent. The motives determine the way in which we, as judges, evaluate the actions and, by extension, of the responsible agent's character. This sort of ethical evaluation is necessarily complex, as will be seen in Part 4 in the hypothetical case presented by Gass of a woman who "abandons" her husband, taking her children with her. Only when sufficient information about a particular case is obtained can an adequate judgment be made on it. In this way the moral character of an individual, her *prohairesis*, can be evaluated in particular cases. It is interesting to note, as T.H. Irwin tells us, that Aristotle deals with certain topics of ethics more fully in his *Rhetoric* than he does in his *Ethics* (142). This is due to the tight connection that rhetoric has with ethics, although

Aristotle would argue that once we have begun to use syllogisms from the field of ethics, we have left the field of rhetoric per se behind.

We can now, with a view to bringing to the fore further aspects of the judicial sphere of rhetoric, examine other commentary made by Aristotle in his treatise that will add to the critical and analytical tools that it provides:

7. Thus, all accusations are either in regard to [wrongs done to] the community or to the individual, the accused having acted either in ignorance and involuntarily or voluntarily and knowingly and in the latter case either with deliberate choice or through emotion (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 98).

We see here the increasing complexity with which Aristotle examines human action. First, there is the dichotomy between community and individual. The examples that Aristotle provides are: “[c]ommitting adultery and beating someone up are wrongs to some defined individual; refusing to serve in the army wrongs the community” (97). As stated in the passage above, ignorance, will and knowledge all play a part in the judgment of an action as just or unjust. If emotions play a part, further nuance is added. Aristotle also distinguishes between written and unwritten laws: “8. And [one can say] that it is characteristic of a better man to use and conform to the unwritten rather than the written [laws]” (104). Aristotle’s assertion that the unwritten laws are more important than the written laws carries much weight. For the unwritten laws govern our behavior with each other in the human community and are those which, as they are not expressed in writing, necessarily require a greater degree of tact and character in order to meet their standards.

Aristotle writes that sometimes there are written laws on the books that have become obsolete, which reveals that legal matters are always in a state of flux, that that what has been put in writing often does not reflect the current reality:

11. And if, on the one hand, the situation for which the law was established no longer prevails but the law still exists, one should try to make this clear and fight with this [argument] against the law (104).



The system of values that a community uses to base its evaluation of acts on is always in evolution. What is deemed ethical or unethical at one point in time is often later viewed as obsolete. Attitudes and customs change as society and culture change. An obvious case in point would be the use of the so-called soft drugs. The varying attitudes towards the use of marijuana, for example, from the 1950s to the present shows how the pendulum of values has swung back and forth, and continues to do so up to the present.<sup>74</sup>

Aristotle also writes of the importance of defining wrongs. People will admit to having done an action, but will disagree on how it is to be categorized or labeled:

For this reason, [in speaking we] should give definitions of these things: What is theft? What [is] violent assault? In so doing, if we wish to show that some legal term applies or does not, we will be able to make clear what is a just verdict . . . for if someone has struck another it does not in all cases mean he has “violently assaulted” him, [only] if he has done so for a certain reason, such as to dishonor him or to please himself. Nor has he committed “theft” in all cases if he took something but [only] if for harm and his own advantage. The situation in other cases is similar to this (98-99).

This passage from the *Rhetoric* demonstrates to what extent contingent variables affect the definition of a particular action being judged in a case. Precise definition is necessary in order to judge appropriately. In order to attain a precise definition, as much pertinent detail as possible must be obtained. This point will be illustrated in Part 4 of this dissertation with the first narrative under study, but it is crucial in any case that is being evaluated: a definition of a specific case must be made based on attainable details of actions carried out by human agents, which will lead to a judgment that is based on their interpretation. The details, must, at the same time, match a particular definition.

The facts of each particular case also include the meaning of what has been stated or put into writing. We find this practice in the works of Plato for, as Walker

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<sup>74</sup> See Nagourney, Adam. “Marijuana, Not Yet Legal for Californians, Might as Well Be.” [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/us/politics/stigma-fading-marijuana-common-in-california.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/us/politics/stigma-fading-marijuana-common-in-california.html?_r=0)

informs us, in the *Protagoras* much of the discussion has to do with establishing what the poet Simonides meant. Walker writes:

This hermeneutical, philological sort of operation is, of course, necessarily a step on the way to judgment in a rhetorical encounter: one must determine an agreed-on version of the “facts” in any given case before advancing arguments and making judgments about those facts; one must reach a perception of what a poem says and what persuasions it advances before one can assent (or not) to those persuasions (Walker – *Poetics*, 150-51).

The establishing of facts has to do not only with the motives that lie behind actions, but a clear understanding of meaning in written and spoken discourse. This procedure forms part of the rhetorical process: an attempt must be made to determine the meaning of the words and statements used therein. The attempt to do so is linked with the identification of what Goodwin calls the “issues” of a case, which she states “are what the trial is supposed to be about” (81). She identifies the various ways in which issues can be explored in judicial discourse:

If the arguing is aimed to resolve, it is the issues that are resolved; if it is aimed to clarify, it is the issues that are clarified; if it is aimed to explore, it is the issues that are explored. Contrariwise, any aspect of the arguing that does not bear on the issues can be criticized – e.g., as a fallacy – and perhaps even excluded (82).

These examples bring into high relief the various directions rhetorical analysis can take. It is not impossible for all four to be found in (or brought to bear on) a single discussion on a particular topic. Although Goodwin’s focus is legal cases, her schema provide valuable frameworks that can provide analytical shape to argumentative discourse in general.

Although judicial rhetoric is a field that is not at first glance connected with literary studies, if we do some violence to ideas presented in Toulmin’s discussion of field dependence, a case can be made for overlapping of methods in legal and literary argumentation methods. Toulmin argues that the type of argumentation one uses is dependent on the field in which one is working. In his view, it does not make sense to

apply the argumentative procedures of one discipline to those of another. Each has its own specific discourse and corresponding rules:

Legal principles hold good in virtue of statutory enactments and judicial precedents, the scientist's laws of nature in virtue of the experiments and observations by which they were established, and so on. In all fields, the force of our warrants is to authorise the step from certain types of data to certain types of conclusions, but, after all we have seen about the field-dependence of the criteria we employ in the practical business of argument, it is only natural to expect that inference-warrants in different fields should need establishing by quite different sorts of procedure (Toulmin – Return, 129).

Toulmin distinguishes between very disparate fields in his discussion above, and argues that a different form of argument must be used for each field. While this is true, it is possible for some overlap between fields to occur. That is, two fields may have much in common in terms of their essential characteristics, and, even though they are very different on the surface, at a deeper level the argument tactics that might be employed are similar. Literary studies and law are ostensibly very different fields, but I would argue that a narrator can be viewed as pleading a case. Thus, some of the procedures applied in judicial rhetoric can be applied in rhetorical criticism of a travel narrative. There is a parallel between a defendant and a narrator in their presentation of the details of their particular experience, which allows us to view, as I have been asserting, a narrative to be conceived of as a specific case. The narrator presents the case and the reader – in the role of judge – passes judgment on several levels that parallel legal procedures of argumentation. I am basing my argument on a broad view of the term “case,” as presented in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Kennedy's remarks on Aristotle's terminology will shed light on this idea:

It may help the reader if other terms in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric are explained in advance. “In each case” (*peri hekaston*) refers to the fact that rhetoric deals with specific circumstances (e.g., particular political or judicial decisions) . . . “The available means of persuasion” renders *to endekhomenon pithanon*, “what is inherently and potentially persuasive” in the facts, circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc. (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 37).

Kennedy's discussion reveals that the term *peri hekaston* pertains to both political and judicial decisions, which can be extended to the judgments of particular cases of narrative. We can see that Toulmin's argument can be supported by Aristotle's terminology in that what is inherently and potentially persuasive in each case will allow for field-specific inference-warrants and procedures. At the same time, if there are parallels between the procedures of different fields, due to the similarity in terms of those characteristics that define a case, it is possible to use similar procedures in different disciplines. As narrative is used in judicial cases as a proof which must be judged as persuasive or not, judicial procedure can be applied when critiquing and analyzing narrative in general. Along these lines, the courtroom can be viewed as an extension and institutionalization of what happens on a smaller scale among individuals who use narrative in their attempts to persuade and convince their listeners in argumentation.

Now that aspects of judicial rhetoric have been presented, we can turn to the third mode of rhetorical argumentation in Aristotle's definition. For once judgment has been passed on actions that have taken place in the past, these same deeds can then be evaluated as either blame- or praiseworthy in the present. This is the territory of epideictic rhetoric.

## 2.4 EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC

The third sphere addressed by Aristotle in his treatise is epideictic rhetoric. Carey provides the etymology for the word *epideixis* in Greek which can be translated as “display,” “show,” or “demonstration” which, at first glance, indicates low practicality and high ornamentation (Carey 237). The time frame, as has been mentioned above, is the present, and its aim is to praise worthy actions or to denounce unworthy actions.

Corbett provides a succinct description:

All the rhetoricians agreed that the general aim of ceremonial discourse is praise or censure of someone . . . the obvious special topics would be virtue and vice or, more generally, the noble and the base. . . Whereas judicial discourse is concerned primarily with a man’s *legal* innocence or guilt, ceremonial discourse is concerned primarily with a man’s *moral* goodness or badness (140).

At once we can see the connection with ethics and epideictic rhetoric. That is, the actions of an individual are, in epideictic rhetoric, deemed either praise- or blameworthy, evaluative terms that are based on goodness or badness, as Corbett states above.

Focusing only on goodness, Schiappa provides a list of qualities that would be praised by Aristotle as honorable and excellent:

Aristotle provides a definition and description of *to kalon*, “the honorable,” which is the “end” or *telos* of the epideictic genre. The relationship between *to kalon* and *arête* (“excellence” or “virtue”) is described . . . The list of praiseworthy qualities described by Aristotle would be appropriate primarily for *encomia* – “justice, manly courage [*andreia*], self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom” (1.9.5) (Schiappa – Beginnings, 201).

The above list of qualities is linked tightly to what, in Aristotle’s system of values would be considered praiseworthy. Of course, an entirely different list of qualities that contradict what Aristotle considers praiseworthy could be formulated by another individual or group of individuals. None of the values Aristotle lists are necessarily universal. “Manly courage,” for example, might be viewed with suspicion from any number of critical perspectives. Further, as already discussed, the concrete and specific

manifestation of these qualities often leads to dispute about whether or not they are, in fact, material epitomes of abstract notions as defined by a particular individual or group. What is magnificence to one individual or group could be perceived as extravagance by another. What is considered prudence by one individual will be labeled as cowardice by another. Along these lines, we have seen how Aristotle prefigures the possibility for differing opinion with regards to what different political groups consider the good in the discussion in Part 1 on the different types of constitutions. That is, each political group has different goods that they value. This idea holds true with differing readerships. In this dissertation, I shall, in Part 4 analyze the rhetorical mechanisms present in the travel narrative under study from the standpoint of a group that I call a “highly educated and cultured readership.” The content of the system of values also surfaces in my analysis. The way I define this group is – like other abstract notions – open to dispute, and I do not pretend that my definition is conclusive. Further, what I assert to be viewed as honorable and excellent by “highly educated and cultured readers” is a definition that is meant to be an invitation to a dialogue, with a view to discovering the truth with respect to the system of values that underlies the way in which this readership construct evaluates the narrator as agent and the *recit de voyage* under study as work of literature. This will become apparent in Part 4 of this dissertation when the text under study is examined at close range.

Due to the celebratory and “ornamental” nature of epideictic rhetoric, its usefulness has been questioned. As for judicial and deliberative rhetoric, both have an obvious direct link with practical outcomes. In the case of the former, it is to determine the facts of a case, and subsequently, the innocence or guilt of the agent being judged. As for deliberative, it has as its aim decision-making either for or against particular matters in order to prevent harm from coming to the *polis* on the one hand and to benefit

it on the other. Scholars are divided as to whether or not epideictic rhetoric leads to practical action or not. Carey, for example, identifies what he views as the role epideictic rhetoric takes in decision-making when he states that, unlike judicial rhetoric, it has “no immediate practical outcome.” The key word in Carey’s evaluation is immediate. For epideictic rhetoric may be viewed as having a persuasive function that, although characterized by a lack of immediacy, leads to action which uses the epideictic mode as source for the bases of decision-making. The reason for this is that the praise or blame of epideictic rhetoric is based on the content of the system of values of the community during celebrations, for example, in which this rhetorical mode manifests. Along these lines, Walker describes the authority epideictic discourse holds in oral societies, and how this rhetorical mode functions as a storehouse of the very values that act as the governing persuasive force that both gives shape as well as cohesion to what he calls “traditional” societies:

This power [i.e., suasive] derives, in part, from its felt authority as “permanent” or “timeless” discourse embodying ancient, ancestral wisdom. We might say, to speak in more contemporary terms, that the epideictic discourse of an oral or “traditional” society enunciates, or is felt to enunciate, that society’s archival knowledge, its deep belief systems, its sacred postulates, its precedents and premises (Poetics, 12).

Walker is writing about oral societies, but it is possible to make the same claims about contemporary societies as well, with regard to epideictic discourse. That is, contemporary societies’ archival knowledge, deep belief systems, sacred postulates, their precedents and premises can also be seen to be present in and operating within epideictic discourse documented in written texts. And here it is important to be aware that it would be a mistake to assume that what Walker calls ancient, ancestral wisdom were an indisputable, monolithic body of knowledge and rules that every member of so-called “traditional” societies adhered to without questioning. Difference of opinion has been present since the beginning of human interaction, even among early or traditional

communities. Although we moderns bemoan our fragmented state when we compare our current so-called alienation with that of the Greek *polis*, division has been part of the human story from time immemorial, and when scholars look back on the past and view primitive societies as having more cohesion, certainly no small amount of idealization of what are often called “golden ages” of humankind is taking place. What does remain constant is that at present, we also have a code of values that provides meaning to our existence, as well as standards by which to judge what we deem as *to kalon*, just like ancient or previous cultures had. The bases of what is deemed excellent may be similar or different, but there is now and always has been a system of values that informs human existence, and that is used as a referent for evaluation of praise- or blameworthy actions. Literature, as we shall see below, falls under the rubric of epideictic rhetoric, and is a similar vehicle for the shaping, storage and transmission of the deep belief systems, sacred postulates, precedents and premises of contemporary culture and society. If we then take Walker’s assertion that epideictic is “*the central and fundamental mode of rhetoric in human culture*” (10 – my italics), we can gain an idea of the importance that literary studies hold not only for providing exempla for making decisions and taking action, but also for judging that action as being worthwhile or not during the fleeting and precarious time we spend, collectively and as individuals, between the cradle and the grave.

Nor are these the only important functions that epideictic rhetoric, and therefore literature, holds. Carey writes that this mode of rhetoric has the function of determining what he calls “collective self-definition and self-assertion” (see below). What Carey discusses below are the effects that epideictic rhetoric has on the community, in its transmission of the deep values contained in a society’s archival knowledge that we have mentioned above:



While commemorating the achievements of the specific honorandi, it locates them in a larger tradition and in the process defines the group present at the event, in this case the whole *polis*, (at least in theory). It thus becomes an act of collective self-definition and self-assertion. This is the task of persuasion for the speaker of the funeral oration. He must present that collective self-image in a way that is inherently convincing and so conducive to the general sense of identity (Epideictic, 243).

The values that are present within the society's archival knowledge are transmitted and reflected in commemorative orations. The knowledge that is shared must be presented to the listeners so that a feeling of collective identity is attained. This is a major function of epideictic rhetoric: creating a sense of a group which holds similar values. In this function the overpowering tendency on the part of humans to wish to belong to a group composed of individuals that hold similar values is highly evident. Nietzsche calls the human tendency to band together in a group the herd instinct, and states that it is linked with morality.<sup>75</sup> The *we* of epideictic discourse becomes a communal *I* that identifies with the underlying values that are embedded in the speech or text. Of course, when Carey states above that the whole *polis* is defined "in theory" by the process he describes, he is suggesting that any society will have its dissenters. To think that an entire community completely and harmoniously adheres to all of the rules would be absurd. This being the case, it is still true that specific groups can be shown to be sharing, along general lines, the same system of values, and that epideictic rhetoric is the tool used to express and reinforce these same values in spoken and written discourse.

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<sup>75</sup> Nietzsche writes about this behavior in *The Gay Science*: "*Herd instinct*: - Wherever we encounter a morality, we find an evaluation and ranking of human drives and actions. These evaluations and rankings are always the expression of the needs of a community and herd: that which benefits *it* the most – and second most, and third most – is also the highest standard of value for all individuals. With morality the individual is instructed to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function. Since the conditions for preserving one community have been very different from those of another community, there have been very different moralities; and in view of essential changes in herds and communities, states and societies that are yet to come, one can prophesy that there will yet be very divergent moralities. Morality is herd-instinct in the individual" (114 – 115).

It is the capacity of members of the same community to evaluate and judge that makes dissent and/or difference of opinion possible. We have already discussed the respective functions of judicial and deliberative rhetoric where a judgment must be made. In the case of epideictic rhetoric, the question of whether the audience is a judge or not arises. For since epideictic rhetoric has no immediate and no practical outcome, the role of the audience is less clear. In this sense, Aristotle can be read as creating a dichotomy between judicial/deliberative rhetoric on the one hand and, on the other, epideictic rhetoric. For in Aristotle's definition of the three genres, he states that the hearer of judicial and deliberative rhetoric is a judge, but that the hearer of epideictic rhetoric is a spectator. As Kennedy explains, the orator spoke "before spectators rather than before judges of fact or policy" (*Persuasion*, 153). We must, however, bear in mind Jonathan Barnes' advice on how to read Aristotle – that is, we should read Aristotle's writings as unfinished texts, as bringing up questions or problems without necessarily providing complete answers, or as being thought in process. This makes it possible to critically explore what Aristotle has put in writing, instead of using his corpus as a final or definitive basis for a system of thought. This way of reading Aristotle also invites us to critique or attack his views for inconsistencies. I have also extended this idea and suggested that, were he here today, Aristotle would – in the spirit of seeking the truth of opinions that characterizes his works – not object to readers' critiquing his work with a view to reaching some sort of reasonable answer to the problems that he presents. This is precisely what Brunschwig does in his critical, close reading of the two types of hearers found in the *Rhetoric* (i.e., judicial/deliberative vs. epideictic):

According to the first dichotomy, the hearer of epideictic speeches should be a mere spectator, and not a judge. However, in the following lines, he turns out to be a judge of a sort, namely the judge of the ability of the speaker (*krinon* is certainly to be understood at the beginning of the sentence that concerns him) (48).

Brunschwig includes the epideictic hearer in the category of judge, in this case of the speaker's ability. But we could also reasonably extend the bounds of the object under scrutiny and include the content of the speech (i.e., not mere delivery), as well as the object of the speaker's speech (that is, once having heard the oration, the listener could then judge if the person [for example] about whom the speech was delivered was, in fact, as blame- or praise-worthy as described by the orator). All of this is fair game, especially when we consider the fact that the object of praise or blame will be based on the norms for this type of assessment held by the specific group that makes up the audience. The object of praise or blame either meets or falls short of the standards of the community's agreed upon values. As for dissenters, they will judge the content and object of the speech based on their respective system of values, even though there will necessarily be overlapping – for dissenters are embedded within the same system. What is important here is that, whether as a member of the status quo or as a dissenter, the listener acts as a judge, even though there is no immediate practical outcome. The listener (or reader) of epideictic rhetoric judges the speaker's (or writer's ability) as well as the content presented in the body of the speech or text. Action based on the assessment may come afterwards.

Walker writes along these same lines (i.e., practicality vs. impracticality of a particular rhetorical mode) when he provides an overview of the differences between *pragmatikon* and *epidikteon*. In his discussion he sheds light on the functions of each type of discourse with respect to judgment and action. According to Walker, the traditional division placed the *pragmatikon* into two categories: 1) legal accusation and defense speeches and 2) political assembly speeches. As for the *epidikteon*, Walker states that the “panegyric” discourse used by Isocrates and described as having similarities with poetry whose content dealt with “philosophical” questions was the

most influential (7). Other models of epideictic discourse were Thucydides and the dialogues of Plato. As Walker states, “*Epideiktikon* . . . came to include everything that modernity has tended to describe as ‘literature,’ and more and more comprised a range of genres much greater and more various than the handful of speech-types identified as *pragmatika*” (7). Walker takes a sophistic notion of *epideiktikon*, distinguishing it from the *pragmatikon* based on the audience and venue it is aimed at, as well as the purpose it serves. The basic difference between the two modes is that the *pragmatikon* discourses were delivered to judges whose decisions led to specific action. In the case of judicial rhetoric the decisions led to a decision on guilt or innocence on the one hand, and the enactment or rejection of a law on the other. In the case of deliberative rhetoric the enactment or rejection of a proposal which led to action was the objective (8). Walker disagrees with the way contemporary scholars oppose the *pragmatikon* from the *epideiktikon* based on the non-pragmatic nature of the latter. He argues that if the *epideiktikon* are defined by being presented in “nonpragmatic settings, such as festivals, public ceremonies, or symposia” (8) in which the audience does not vote for the enactment or reject of a verdict or a law but simply applauds and departs, then by the same token, if a speech by Cicero is read outside of a courtroom or a speech by Demosthenes is read outside of the assembly – *due to the fact that no judgment is made* – they “cease to be *pragmatika* and instead become *epideiktika*: they become, in effect, performances the reader ‘witnesses,’ as if in a theater – or performances the reader mimetically rehearses . . .” (8-9). Walker then states that the audience of epideictic rhetoric, according to Aristotle, “is to be not a *krites* but a *theoros*, that is one who is to make ‘observations’ (*theoriai*) about what is praiseworthy, preferable, desirable or worthy of belief in the speaker’s *logos*.” This quality of the audience presents epideictic

“in more positive terms” (9).<sup>76</sup> Walker rounds off his discussion by affirming the importance epideictic rhetoric has in terms of its function in the community:

In every case the function of the epideictic in its nonpragmatic setting is a suasive “demonstration,” display, or showing-forth (*epidixis*) of things, leading its audience of *theoroi* to contemplation (*theoria*) and insight and ultimately to the formation of opinions and desires on matters of philosophical, social, ethical, and cultural concern (Poetics, 9 – author’s italics).

The first important point that I wish to highlight in the above passage is Walker’s assertion that it is the setting that determines whether texts are to be defined as *pragmatika* or *epidiktea*. That is, texts such as Cicero’s courtroom speeches or Demosthenes’ assembly speeches were in their first setting *pragmatika*, but when read outside of the setting of the courtroom or assembly were *epidiktea*. The interplay between the function of the *epideiktea* to present and promote values and that of *pragmatika* to make judgments and decisions based on the former comes in to high relief in Walker’s discussion. The discourse whose function was decision-making or judgment becomes, outside of their original settings, part of the archive of exempla that make up the content of epideictic rhetoric. They are, in essence, judgments and decisions which have been made already, and thus represent particular instances of the system of values of the community. Their functions in their original settings no longer have a use with respect to the issues they were concerned with. Still, they are recorded representations of previous decisions and judgments made, based on the society’s belief system. The second crucial point that Walker makes in his discussion is that the role of an epideictic’s audience is to be not a *krites* but a *theoros*, and that, in this role, the audience engages in the contemplation and formation of opinions and desires on matters

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<sup>76</sup> Kennedy, who writes that the aim of epideictic speeches is “usually the demonstration of the honorable or disgraceful,” adds the important point for our discussion that these orations “are adapted to being read as well as being heard by the exactness and detail of the style (1414a18)” (Persuasion, 152-53). The important point that Kennedy makes here is that not only do epideictic speeches lend themselves to the auditorium, but to the reading room as well. As stated, epideictic rhetoric over time became equated with literature.

of philosophical, social, ethical, and cultural concern. Keeping Walker's comments in mind, we can add Brunschwig's abovementioned stance regarding the role of the audience in epideictic rhetoric as being a judge, due to Aristotle's having used the Greek term *krinon* to describe its function. That is, that the audience acts as judge. In this respect he contradicts Walker's reading. Be that as it may, if we take both Walker's and Brunschwig's commentaries into consideration, we see that opinions can be formed on the one hand and, on the other, that judgment takes place in epideictic rhetoric. When we connect these ideas with the third important point that Walker makes in the passage above, that is, that this rhetorical genre has come to include everything modernity describes as "literature,"<sup>77</sup> the role that a student of literature plays as evaluator and judge of not only the aesthetics, but the ethical content with which literary texts are saturated, takes on great importance.

We can take statements that Walker makes when rounding off his discussion of the difference between the *epideiktikon* and the *pragmatikon* in terms of how each functions in the larger mechanism of human thought and communication:

In this view, "epideictic" appears as that which shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the individual members of a community identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the fundamental grounds, the "deep" commitments and presuppositions, that will underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic forums. As such, epideictic suasion is not limited to the reinforcement of existing beliefs and ideologies, or to merely ornamental displays of clever speech (though clearly it can serve such purposes as well). Epideictic can also work to challenge or transform conventional beliefs – plainly the purposes of Plato's dialogues, Isocrates' panegyrics, what remains of Gorgias' epideictics (particularly *Helen* and the surviving paraphrases of *On the Nonexistent*), and the sophistic or Protagorean practice of antilogy that is parodied in the "speech of Lysias" in Plato's *Phaedrus*. All such discourses, again, are "epideictic" according to the late-sophistic theory of Hermogenes of Tarsus . . . . When conceived in positive terms and not simply in terms of lack, epideictic discourse reveals itself (as

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<sup>77</sup> Schiappa writes: "In antiquity, for example, Cicero and Quintilian would later expand the epideictic category to include poetry and history. And 'modern rhetoricians prefer to think of epideictic rhetoric as a discourse in any literary genre' that does not urge specific action (Kennedy 1994, 61-62)" (Schiappa – Beginnings, 202-03).

Perelman recognized) as the central and fundamental mode of rhetoric in human culture. . . . Conceived in positive terms, then, the distinction between the *epideiktikon* and the *pragmatikon* comes down to this: the *epideiktikon* is the rhetoric of belief and desire; the *pragmatikon* the rhetoric of practical civic business, a rhetoric that necessarily depends on and appeals to the beliefs/desires that epideictic cultivates (2000 Walker, 9-10).<sup>78</sup>

Several important points surface in Walker's discussion. First, epideictic rhetoric functions to shape and cultivate the basic codes of values that a particular society or culture uses to live by, as well as the ideologies and imageries used by individuals and the community. More important is epideictic's role as the fundamental grounds in terms of shared values for decision-making and debate in their respective settings. Thus, as Walker asserts, epideictic is not mere reinforcement of the system of values in effect, rather it functions to modify this same system by challenging its tenets. His final comment that belief and desire govern the *epideiktikon* and that the *pragmatikon*, whose aims are the management of the practical affairs of the community, shows the interdependence as well as the interplay between the two categories. Belief and desire establish and provide the motives for the action carried out by material agents in a system that operates in mutual feedback. There is cross-pollination between the three spheres of rhetoric in terms of values. All three reinforce each other and come into play with one another. In relation to these ideas, Walker in his discussion cites Perelman, to whom we can now turn.

In his treatise on rhetoric, Perelman also argues that in its function to persuade or to increase adherence epideictic rhetoric has practical value and does not necessarily present heady, theoretical ideas; rather its final aims are similar to judicial and deliberative rhetoric: practical and decisive concrete action:

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<sup>78</sup> Perelman views epideictic as reinforcing the value system held by the community of listeners, and in this way provides solid ground for the judgments arrived at in judicial and deliberative speeches: "The purpose of an epideictic speech is to increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker. The epideictic speech has an important part to play, for without such common values upon what foundation could deliberative and legal speeches rest?" (Treatise, 52-53).

The intensity of the adherence sought is not limited to obtaining purely intellectual results, to a declaration that a certain thesis seems more probable than another, but will very often be reinforced until the desired action is actually performed (Perelman – Treatise, 49).

Praise of an action can easily be interpreted as motivation for the listener (or reader) to imitate and carry out the same action. Censure of an action or individual can be read as providing the sign posts leading away from the action that is denigrated in the discourse, whether oral or written. So we see that viewing epideictic rhetoric as mere ornamentation is, in Perelman's lights, wrongheaded. He takes to task the theoreticians who might perceive this mode as mere display of that which is beautiful (*to kalon*) or ugly (*to kakon*):

They state that the speaker's sole concern in epideictic oratory is that which is beautiful or ugly . . . To the theoreticians, it was a degenerate kind of eloquence with no other aim than to please and to enhance, by embellishing them, facts that were certain or, at least, uncontested. . . According to Aristotle . . . in epideictic oratory, which is concerned with praise and blame, his sole concern is with what is beautiful or ugly. It is a question, then, of recognizing values. But in the absence of the concept of value-judgment, and of that of intensity of adherence, the theoreticians of speech, from Aristotle on, readily confused the concept of the beautiful, as the object of the speech (which was, besides, equivalent to the concept of "good") with the aesthetic value of the speech itself . . . The epideictic genre of oratory thus seemed to have more connection with literature than with argumentation (49).

Perelman's interpretation of Aristotle in the above text is, in my view, perhaps a misreading. Earlier in this dissertation we have seen that Aristotle has compared the judge of judicial rhetoric to an assayer of silver in terms of discovering what is true or not about a case. Further, given Aristotle's work in ethics and how the good is to be interpreted on a vast number of areas as well as the attention he pays to minute details of every topic he examines, it seems a bit unreasonable to assume that, in his model of epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle only pays attention to superficial elements related with beauty. Aristotle, as we have seen, states that rhetoric (in general) ought not to be used for debased ends. This statement, in my view, necessarily implies that Aristotle presents



a definition of rhetoric that, as an art and practice, is linked to ethics in all three forms that he has delineated. Perelman's comment on the theoretician's appraisal of epideictic rhetoric as being degenerate eloquence due to their conflating, from Aristotle on, the concept of the beautiful with the object of the speech, whether mistaken or not, is not new. Whether epideictic rhetoric is mere surface ornamentation or whether it has substantive depth in terms of values has been a point of contention since antiquity.<sup>79</sup> Perelman then accuses the theoreticians of viewing epideictic rhetoric as being related only to literature and not to persuasion, meanwhile presenting his views as innovative. Walker's work on epideictic rhetoric provides a view that in this regard stands in stark contrast. In any case, Perelman's assertion that epideictic does, in fact, have persuasion as its aim or, in any case, often results in persuasion towards action, is crucial to the way in which I am using rhetorical analysis to examine what is, in fact and effect, a literary (i.e., epideictic) text. My analysis is thus in agreement with both Walker's and Perelman's stance in that they perceive epideictic rhetoric as playing a crucial role in argumentation and persuasion towards concrete action, as well as a form of discourse that often challenges existing beliefs and conventions of the community.

The argumentative bases for the challenges made via epideictic rhetoric are to be found in the same system of values that necessarily has opposing points of view. Perelman illustrates this idea when he states that "the argumentation in epideictic discourse sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with them" (51). Along these lines, Perelman makes the important point that when epideictic rhetoric is used to reinforce the values of

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<sup>79</sup> Carey reveals that early in antiquity there was divided opinion, even in the same theoretician, over the value of epideictic rhetoric: "Blanket dismissal of *epideixis* . . . is especially common in Isocrates (cf. 4.17, 12.271, 15.247) . . . But despite his sometimes dismissive tone, Isocrates was perfectly happy to practice epideictic oratory. He took it seriously" (237).

the community, the orator functions as an educator (51). When challenging norms and beliefs, the orator may be viewed, from one extreme, as a proponent of change to its opposite, that is, as enemy of the community, assuming the stance taken is viewed as radically contrary to latter's interests. In any case, given Walker's and Perelman's arguments, literary texts can, on a very important level, be seen to function as guidebooks that contain the deep values of our culture, and that provide us with models for ethical behavior that also reveal points of friction within the same system of values, due to inherent yet differing interpretations about what is right and what is wrong. Based on the arguments that affirm the persuasive function of epideictic rhetoric towards action, it is possible to view literary texts in general and recits de voyage in particular as having the power to persuade in favor of or against certain types of behavior. In the recit de voyage to be examined in Part 4, the reader as judge can decide whether the narrator's actions are either praiseworthy or blameworthy. Once the judgment has been made, the narrator's actions as described in his narrative can be viewed as a model that serves as a source of inspiration for future action to be taken by the reader of the text its opposite: behavior to be shunned.

Walker and Perelman are not alone in their view of epideictic rhetoric's function as persuasive. Oksenberg Rorty also views epideictic rhetoric, due to its embeddedness in the system of values, as having an intentional effect on action to be carried out, not only by those in power, but by the population at large:

Even when epideictic rhetoric is directed to ordinary people whose judgments are not, by virtue of any public office, constitutive of action, it is intended to form that sort of evaluative judgment which is intended to influence their future actions (29).

In Oksenberg Rorty's view, therefore, epideictic rhetoric can be viewed as providing a model or anti-model for future behavior or action. This type of modeling is inescapably tied to ethics, which, as Walker states above, come into play when the reader or listener,

as *theoros*, contemplates the content of epideictic discourse, or as Brunschwig asserts, she acts as judge (*krinon*) of its content, form, or both.

What forms does epideictic rhetoric take? It has been mentioned above that epideictic rhetoric came to be known as what modernity calls “literature.” This process had its beginnings in antiquity, and its extension is broad, for, as Kennedy informs us, 4<sup>th</sup> century epideictic rhetoric later evolved into different genres:

The subdivisions of epideictic recognized in later antiquity, for example panegyric, encomium, invective, and funeral oration, are all concerned with praising or blaming, and from the rhetorical point of view the more apparently unworthy the subject the greater the achievement . . . (Persuasion, 153).

In addition to these subdivisions, all poetry was included in the category epideictic (153). This tradition carried over into Roman rhetoric and had an enduring influence on rhetorical practices in the system of education:

The preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*) which formed the cornerstone of rhetorical training in the Roman period included both praise (*enkomion*) and invective (*psogos*), refutation (*anaskeue*) and confirmation (*kataskeue*) of a range of issues (Carey – Epideictic, 249).

The exercises often took the form of paradoxes, in which seemingly unimportant things were praised, such as mice, salt, death, beggars, and so on (247). But this does not mean that the function of these exercises in epideictic rhetoric was entertainment alone. Carey writes:

Certainly amusement is one of the effects sought by (at least some of) these exercises. We have to remember always that most people probably encountered these texts in performance. Entertainment value must have been an important factor in performance for an audience. But since Gorgias uses his praise of Helen to make some important (and programmatic) statements about the art of the *logos* that he professed, this should not be taken as indicating lack of seriousness (247).

Obviously, the idea of entertainment that does not necessarily mean a lack of seriousness can also be applied to literary texts written throughout history. The recit de voyage to be examined in Part 4, while highly entertaining, can also be read as a serious critique of values that are manifest in political practices and the behavior of the players

that take part in the narrative. Further, as the narrator uses rhetoric to make a case for himself as agent in a narrative that necessarily conforms to the values of the community of readers at whom he aims his discourse, the same system of values can be revealed and challenged for its worth in terms of ethics. And so, the narrator, who might be read as a sort of dissenter from conventional thought and actions of the community at large he is a member of, may also have dissenters that challenge his system of values.

Connected to epideictic rhetoric's function of providing models is its use in antiquity for honoring the deceased. As Carey states, in "Athens the most important opportunity for declamation was at the state funeral for the war dead" (239). In this way, the grave can be interpreted as a sort of symbolic repository that contains the entirety of the human community's system of values. It is at once a reminder of where each individual is headed, as well as a point of reference from which to judge action carried out while alive. Much like the texts that were once *pragmatikon* but that, once their function was carried out, made the transition to *epideiktikon*, the actions of the dead speak to those of us who will one day join their ranks. The dead function, therefore, as agents of the narratives in which they have been immortalized, as crucial definers of that which is praise- or blameworthy in our present existence. The actions of the dead, whether recorded in memory or writing, hold immense sway over the living. Montaigne speaks of the vanity of being desirous of fame, and yet the possibility for doing good or harm even after one has passed away exists. Ironically, Montaigne's essays stand as an example in point.

In relation with our actions and their effects, Ross states that using our will and making decisions play an enormous role, for it is "only for voluntary actions that men are praised or blamed" (205). These same voluntary actions are recorded in a variety of forms, the most important one in a general sense being some form of narrative.

Carey brings out other aspects of this rhetorical mode when he states that in antiquity the “need for and claims of originality are constant themes” (244). In this sense, literature has remained the same throughout history, for contemporary writers also strive for originality. Also important is the artistic use of language. Carey writes that epideictic rhetoric was different from judicial and deliberative rhetoric in terms of its ornate use of language: “Since it is written as a performance, it can afford to put on display the verbal craftsmanship that produced it” (245). Thus, instead of perceiving epideictic rhetoric as empty ornamentation, it can be viewed as discourse that has value not only in terms of its content, but for having been artistically or technically well-wrought. This demonstration of ability enhances the speaker’s or writer’s status in a highly competitive arena: “Thus though the outcomes of epideictic oratory have none of the urgency of the other categories, the stakes for the speaker are still high, in terms of public standing and (sometimes) profit” (239-240). The above remains true for contemporary writers of literature. A writer can make a name for herself due to her talent, and, at the same time, if the community in its judgment of her skills places her among the great, she can also parlay her skills into lucrative gain. Money and fame have been and still are possible rewards for those who publish works of epideictic rhetoric.

There are three other aspects of epideictic rhetoric that are important for the present discussion: 1) its relation to laughter, 2) the naming of vice as virtue and virtue as vice, and 3) its function as a game for a highly educated and elite group. As I have been affirming throughout my discussion, epideictic rhetoric both praises and blames. One form of blame that is connected with this genre is laughter, for it functions as both a revealer of and a deterrent to inappropriate behavior:

We start with a principle – the essential association of laughter with ridicule and denigration, and its use against targets regarded as ‘shameful’. This would have commanded wide assent from Greeks, since it ties comedy to the observable

function of derision in a culture which possessed a strongly developed sensitivity to public reproach and dishonour (Poetics, 85).

Laughter can also be used not only against targets that are regarded as shameful, but as illogical, unimportant, and so on. In both texts to be analyzed in Part 4, the narrators attempt to make their readers laugh, with similar aims of revealing certain aspects of human behavior, thought and values as worthy of reproach. Laughter is also a tool that is used to disarm the listener or reader, and thus functions, via *logos* and *pathos* to the building of *ethos*.

Related to praise and blame is the naming of a virtue as vice or vice as virtue. When Aristotle presents his list of attributes that are worthy of praise, he also gives advice that has seemed to many scholars as being duplicitous. Schiappa writes:

The section bothers many commentators because Aristotle's advice is purely strategic and implies that speakers should stretch the truth where necessary. For example, Aristotle suggests that one should call "an irascible and excitable person 'straightforward' and an arrogant person 'high-minded' and 'imposing' and (speak of) those given to excess as actually in states of virtue, for example the rash one as 'courageous,' the spendthrift as 'liberal'; for this will seem true to most people and at the same time is a fallacious argument" (1367a33-1367b4) (Beginnings, 201).

The important concept presented in the above passage is the fact that, on one level, what one person calls thrifty another person will call mean. On another level, Aristotle was practical, and, as he had a somewhat less than optimistic view of the audience at large, gave advice that – whether one agrees with it or not – is, in essence, expedient. Aristotle in this sense was no idealist as was Plato (although even Plato, as is well known, advocated lying to citizens, and viewed it as necessary). And so, with respect to how a particular behavior or characteristic is perceived, we again find ourselves in rhetoric's field: opinion. Every vice can be viewed as a virtue, and vice versa. It is then up to the speaker or writer to argue her case and present sufficient proof in order to convince the listener or reader of the tags she uses when qualifying a person's character or behavior.

The final aspect that merits discussion is epideictic's function as a sophisticated game for highly educated elitists. This is important for my dissertation because the travel narrative under study is a product that has been produced, packaged and marketed for a readership that I am calling "highly educated and cultured." In the construct that I present, this same readership could easily be labeled as elitist. And this group of readers plays the game based on the system of values to which it adheres. This game has its roots in antiquity, as Ford informs us. He states that in Plato's *Simonides* the importance of being able to show off a sense for *ta kala*, which is "what the game is about" is present (193). This display was to be sophisticated, and was the territory of the elite, which both Plato and Aristotle agree on (Ford, 193-195). Ford spells this out in his discussion on Plato's *Simonides* as follows:

At the dinner party, by contrast, art is regarded from the point of view of the connoisseur, one who can praise and blame the products of artisans. The "aesthetic" observations here serve to establish social differences between general and schoolteacher, Athenian and Eretrian, and, by implication, between guest and servant, and indeed between the dyer-maid and one who can wear a purple cloak. These gentlemen regard the producers of art as a banausic class removed from "the fair" (193).

A major difference that immediately comes to the fore is that in contemporary society there is a cult of the artist that, for all intents and purposes, deifies their endeavours. Be that as it may, the point that I wish to bring out is the game that has been played since antiquity by those "in the know" about what is fine and what is not fine in terms of art, music and literature – the good life – is still being played. What is more, the competition is fierce, and those who play, play to win. Just like the symposiasts mentioned above, contemporary connoisseurs use their knowledge to create difference in terms of socio-economics, placing themselves at the apex of the hierarchical construct whose foundation is built upon what is, at bottom, opinion of what the good life consists of. This sort of elitist attitude and behavior is still important among students

and readers of literature, as we will see in the analysis I undertake of the travel narrative examined in Part 4.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> See Bourdieu.



## 2.5 INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL PROOFS

Now that major aspects of the three rhetorical modes in Aristotle's definition have been presented, we may now turn to the bases of argumentation that are necessarily present and utilized in all three. As rhetoric's area of operations is opinion and not hard facts, the most important structural element that provides the foundation for persuading or convincing a listener or reader of the argument that one is presenting are the reasons that give credence to the view being advocated. We have already mentioned that Aristotle, in his discussion of judicial rhetoric, complains that prior manuals only provided strategies for emotional appeals to persuade the listener, and that his aim was to put *logos* at the center of his art of rhetoric, or art of persuasion. Later, however, to *logos* he adds *pathos* and *ethos*, the three of which he calls *pisteis*, or proofs.<sup>81</sup> In the following passage from the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle criticizes the composers of manuals prior to his own with respect to their treatment of proofs:

As things are now, those who have composed *Arts of Speech* have worked on a small part of the subject; for only *pisteis* are artistic (other things are supplementary), and these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the "body" of persuasion, while they give their attention to matters external to the subject (Kennedy – *Rhetoric*, 31).

In the passage above we see that Aristotle initially divides forms of persuasion into two categories, artistic and non-artistic. He states that only *pisteis* are artistic, and that previous composers of manuals of rhetoric have not addressed the issue of enthymemes. That is, as we have mentioned above, they have only focused on appeals to the emotions which, as Aristotle states in this part of the *Rhetoric*, are not relevant to rhetorical argumentation. Kennedy provides a concise summary of the two categories Aristotle has delineated:

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<sup>81</sup> Kennedy provides several possible definitions of *pistis*: "*Pistis* (pl. *pisteis*) has a number of different meanings in different contexts: 'proof, means of persuasion, belief,' etc." (Kennedy – *Rhetoric*, 31)

Forms of persuasion are either:

- a. *Non-artistic*: direct evidence – facts, witnesses, documents
- b. *Artistic*: logical arguments constructed by speaker of two types:
  - i. Inductive argument, called paradigm, or example
  - ii. Deductive argument, called enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, from stated or implied premises (21).

Non-artistic proofs such as direct evidence, facts, witnesses and so on are not created by the rhetor, rather they exist already and can be used as they stand. One simply needs, say, in the case of witnesses, to have them repeat their version of the event they have observed, their testimony serving as support to prove the case being made. Of course, as De Brauw argues, the non-artistic proofs were often utilized in an artful way.<sup>82</sup> One need only consider the way the witness might put into words their version of what they perceived. The same is true of documents or evidence. It is not just the *what* of presenting evidence that matters. The *how* carries enormous weight as well. Still, in the Aristotelian model of proofs, those he calls artistic are different in the sense that the rhetor using the art of rhetoric – which, as we have seen, Aristotle views as an ability to perceive what is persuasive – must create them. These artistic proofs are based on inductive and deductive probability, due to rhetoric's field being opinion. Thus, they are based on logic and reason.

Aristotle then identifies three *pisteis*, or categories of artistic proof in the *Rhetoric*: “that found in the character of the speaker, that found in the state of mind produced in the hearer, and that found in the speech itself insofar as it proves or seems to prove (81356a1 ff.)” (Kennedy – Persuasion, 90). The first category in the above excerpt is *ethos*, the second is *pathos*, and the third is *logos*. Thus, while Aristotle's aim at the beginning of his treatise is to create a rhetoric in which *logos* functions as the core proof, he also recognizes the importance that *pathos* (emotion) has, as well as a third

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<sup>82</sup> De Brauw writes: “Aristotle's distinction between artistic and artless proofs is seminal, yet in oratorical practice the distinction is blurred, for artless proofs are handled quite artfully” (196).

proof which is equally or perhaps even more important: *ethos* (character). The three types of proofs are, in the definition of rhetoric that Aristotle elaborates, inextricably woven together. They make up the driving force behind rhetorical persuasion, and together stand as the underlying reasons that provide the foundation for reasonable argument.

As Aristotle's *modus operandi* throughout his works is to critique (both positively and negatively) previous thinkers and writers,<sup>83</sup> we can, at this point, with a view to providing a context for Aristotle's ideas on this issue, consider some of the thinkers who were also working with argumentative discourse in 4<sup>th</sup> century Athens and earlier. In this way it will be possible to see in what ways Aristotle worked along similar lines, and how he distinguished himself.

Gorgias was one of these thinkers. Kennedy writes: "In addition to logical argument Gorgias recognized the persuasive force of emotion. He regarded an orator as a *psychagogos*, like a poet, a leader of souls through a kind of incantation" (63). Gorgias, therefore, based his method of argumentation on both *logos* and *pathos*. Nor was he the only thinker from antiquity that can be identified as using more than one proof as a tool for argumentation. Kennedy writes that "[f]ifth century oratory as seen especially in Antiphon and Euripides uses *ethos* and *pathos* as forms of proof, but then so did Homeric oratory" (63). So here we can conclude that, on the one hand, Gorgias addressed at least two of the proofs that Aristotle claims he is the first to theorize on and, on the other, that the usage in Antiphon, Euripides and Homer of *ethos* and *pathos* as forms of proof show that the two means were – at least in practice – known. Lysias also utilized several forms of proof, including direct evidence, refutation by probability and character (91). Thus, Lysias – although without categorizing them as such - utilized

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<sup>83</sup> Cicero followed Aristotle's method, attacking earlier writers. See Dominik and Hall, "Confronting Roman Rhetoric."

the two categories of proofs defined by Aristotle (i.e., artistic and non-artistic) in combination with the proofs *logos* and *ethos* (91).

Isocrates was another thinker who recognized two categories of proofs. For, according to de Brauw, Isocrates' *Rhetoric to Alexander* "employs essentially the same distinction [*pisteis atechnoi, pisteis entechnoi*] with different terminology" (195). So we see that other thinkers at the time were working along similar lines as Aristotle. However, Aristotle's great achievement lies in his having brought the concept of artistic and non-artistic proofs together with the three *pisteis* (i.e., *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*) and having combined all of these concepts into a single method of persuasive argumentation. We can now look at the text from the *Rhetoric* which outlines the above discussion:

3. Of the *pisteis* provided through speech there are three species; for some are in the character [*ethos*] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way [*pathos*], and some in the speech [*logos*] itself, by showing or seeming to show something (Kennedy – *Rhetoric*, 38).

It is important to bear in mind in Aristotle's threefold division of proofs that the three proofs are inextricably woven together, and are always present in persuasive argumentation. Another point that comes to the fore in the above passage is the idea that the bases of argumentation used in rhetoric include probability as well as hard facts. For when Aristotle states above that some of the proofs are in the speech, or *logos*, itself, and that these proofs show or seem to show something, he is stating in no uncertain terms that the field of rhetoric is opinion. At the same time however, classic syllogisms of pure logic that are not based on probability but on empirically verifiable truths also come into play. Aristotle goes on to define the two proofs *ethos* and *pathos* in greater detail. He first fleshes out his definition of *ethos*, or character:

4. [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in

general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the handbook writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [*epieikeia*] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the most authoritative form of persuasion (38 – 39).

What Aristotle is detailing in the excerpt above is the *how* of rhetorical transmission. For he states that when the speech is spoken in a way that makes the listeners believe the speaker, it has to do less with the content of the argument contained in *logos*, as with the manner in which the arguments are presented. Aristotle mentions fair-mindedness as being a quality that the speaker must present herself as possessing in terms of her character. This quality (among others he discusses later) works to persuade the audience. It is at this point in his treatise that Aristotle also makes the very important point that the audience's perception of the speaker as being fair-minded must not come from the speaker's prior reputation. Rather, it must come from the speech itself – at the time the speech is delivered. The other striking point that Aristotle concedes in this passage is that *ethos* perhaps is the proof that carries the most weight in persuasion. What he is implying here is that a speaker might argue using *logos* forcefully, managing to not say anything that contradicts the point she is making, but if she does not present an image of herself as being fair-minded or amicable, she will not manage to convince her audience.<sup>84</sup> This means that the opposite situation, where the arguments are poorly constructed yet the speaker manages to convince the audience in terms of her character, is possible. This, as we all know, is the strategy used by many politicians, where political elections are often more of a personality contest than campaigns that present reasonable argumentation for the policies that each candidate intends to implement.

Aristotle then expands on his definition of *pathos*:

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<sup>84</sup> In Roman rhetoric, a speaker's *auctoritas* could, at times, make *logos* superfluous, even offensive. See Dugan (in Gunderson).

5. [There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [*pathos*] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile. To this and only this we said contemporary technical writers try to give their attention. The details on this subject will be made clear when we speak about the emotions (38-39).

In the above excerpt we see again that the speaker must arouse emotions (*pathe*) through what she says in the speech (*logos*), and that emotional states affect the way we judge a particular case or circumstance.

In this concise summary, Aristotle provides the basic weaponry of argumentation: Through *logos* a speaker shows or seems to show something via argumentative discourse - what I have been calling reasoning and informal logic. However, *logos* is not sufficient in and of itself: we believe a speaker who manages to prove to us that he is trustworthy in terms of his character. Crucial here is Aristotle's comment that it is the way the speech is delivered that leads to belief. Finally, Aristotle states that we are persuaded when our emotions have been guided in a particular way. In relation with the emotions, Aristotle makes the important point that our emotions affect the way in which we perceive the reality of any given situation. Someone who is angry does not view the same situation on a Monday morning as she would on, say, a Friday afternoon.

Aristotle sums up succinctly the three *pisteis* as follows: "All people are persuaded either because as judges they themselves are affected in some way or because they suppose the speakers have certain qualities or because something has been logically demonstrated" (194). In this excerpt Aristotle refers to *pathos*, *ethos* and *logos*, respectively. Important is his repetition of the term judges with respect to persuasion in general. This reinforces the idea that the listener of an epideictic speech is a judge. The other nuance that is important here is Aristotle's stating that people view themselves as being affected in some way. This indicates the importance that selfishness plays with

respect to the emotions. If the listener views herself as being affected, she will necessarily become emotionally involved. The job of the rhetor is to effectively engage the listener emotionally, and that is done through making listeners feel that they are somehow implicated by the argument being presented.

As for Aristotle's stating that the speakers have certain qualities, here we see that it is not just presenting oneself as being fair-minded, rather that there is an entire set of qualities that the speaker must project if she is to be an effective persuader. Throughout the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle brings more of the qualities that he views as necessary into his discussion. Crucial here also is that the speaker must be perceived as being a certain type of person for a particular audience. This concept is highly important, for a community of listeners is usually persuaded by a speaker who holds qualities that are demonstrative of the value system upon which the audience bases its evaluation of what is desirable. If a speaker is classed as an undesirable, the chances of persuading her audience of her position are low to nil, no matter how well she argues it. The usual rule for rhetorical persuasion in terms of *ethos* and *logos* is "like attracts like," not "opposites attract."

The basic model presented by Aristotle on the three proofs has been commented on extensively throughout history. The commentaries shed light upon what Aristotle was trying to transmit in his model. Also, the way readers of Aristotle's ideas reword what was presented in the *Rhetoric* adds to our understanding, thereby showing the richness of the original text. For example, the way in which Kennedy presents Aristotle's arguments also adds nuance to our knowledge of Aristotle's text. Kennedy states that three things provide the basis of persuasion: "[T]he truth and logical validity of what is being argued, the speaker's success in conveying to the audience the perception that he or she can be trusted, and the emotions that a speaker is able to

awaken in an audience to accept the views advanced and act in accordance with them” (Rhetoric, x). Kennedy places importance on truth and logic with respect to *logos*, and in this way equates the two. This undermines criticisms of rhetoric as being purely sophistic argument that is used only by corrupt politicians or executives using Wall Street advertising tactics. Important here is the idea that the speaker must be perceived as trustworthy, for, although it is somewhat obvious to even make this assertion, an audience must view the speaker as being both credible and honorable. Kennedy goes on to state that contemporary rhetoric has expanded “somewhat” (quotation marks are Kennedy’s) Aristotle’s definitions: “Logical argument is called *logos*; projection of the speaker’s character is called *ethos*; awakening the emotions of the audience *pathos*” (x). Kennedy discusses Aristotle’s influence on later writers from antiquity. For Quintilian, Cicero and the Stoics all interpreted the *Rhetoric* differently and to their own ends:

Quintilian 3.5.2) [sic] revived a set of three functions – to teach, to charm, and to move – which are basically the three forms of proof accepted by Aristotle – logical, ethical, and pathetic. In justifying the latter of the three Cicero introduced the notion that the orator must sincerely feel the emotions he is trying to awaken in his listeners (*De oratore* 2.189 ff.). The Stoic concept made unnecessary any distinction between a good statesman and philosopher on the one hand and a good orator on the other, for to the Stoics the thought of the speech *was* the speech and would produce its own natural and good expression. *Rem tene, verba sequentur*, ‘hold to the subject, the words will follow,’ was Cato’s expression of it . . . (Persuasion, 293).

The interpretation of rhetoric in a way that modifies Aristotle’s version can be seen as the appropriation and use of rhetoric for ends that Aristotle may or may not have agreed with. This is a repetition of the process of evolution that Aristotle himself participated in. For, as we have seen, Aristotle took Plato’s definition of dialectic and rhetoric and reworked it to fit the way he viewed rhetoric as a method for argumentation, and, in his redefinition, radically changed its structure and aims. This is fair game in rhetorical practice, and, in the end, it is the audience that must decide which definition to use,



based on how convincingly the definition is presented in argument. That being the case, Quintilian's use of the words to teach, to charm and to move in his discussion of their Greek parallels, *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos* provides further insight into the way rhetoric is perceived as functioning, as well as into the system of values to which Quintilian adhered. For to translate *logos* as to teach is not quite the same as to prove logically. And to state that *ethos* has to do with charm adds nuance that we do not see in Aristotle's text, but that nevertheless adds color to this proof's qualities. At the same time, the term charm indicates how a person may convince through means that are not necessarily logical, their personal charisma often having an overpowering effect that perhaps has little to do with the force of argument, and which makes it possible to persuade, even in the absence of sound logic.

The notion introduced by Cicero that the speaker must sincerely feel the emotions could indicate uneasiness with what has been perceived as Aristotle's having tossed in the towel in terms of ethics. That is, as Aristotle's treatise is rife with ambiguities, he can be interpreted as being expedient to an extreme when it comes to persuading an audience – so much so that commentators label him as unethical. We have seen this in relation with his treatment of the virtues, where he asserts that a vice must be presented positively, for example, if someone is tight-fisted, they should be described as being thrifty. His discussion of the emotions comes under similar fire, for Aristotle can be interpreted as advocating the use of emotions to manipulate the judge unfairly, rather than using emotions to put the judge in the proper state of mind in order to adequately evaluate the seriousness of a particular case, or to engage the judge emotionally in order to ensure that he takes a vested interest in the case. So Cicero's idea that the speaker must sincerely feel the emotions being aroused can be read as a desire to make sure that the emotions are not used for unfair manipulation.

The Stoic notion *rem tene, verba sequentur* that Kennedy mentions in the passage above shows a similar preoccupation with the character of the speaker along ethical lines. As Walker states it, “[s]peaking well was a function of knowing well and thinking prudently, and the authority of what was said would arise from the speaker’s *dignitas* (Poetics, 74). A person that is morally upright will necessarily produce a *logos* that reflects her character.

In relation with the three *pisteis*, Grimaldi accurately states that they address the whole person: “It should not, then appear strange that when Aristotle studies the art which is directed to pre-disposing the person to action he would consider the art as affecting the whole person: *intellect, ethos, pathos*” (27-28). Grimaldi extends his argument as follows:

Philosophically no other approach would seem possible for Aristotle. Rhetoric incorporated as integral components *reason, ethos* and *pathos* and addressed itself to the whole man. There could be no division or separation between reason and purely logical demonstration on one side and the emotions and appetitive dynamism on the other. If rhetoric is to work within the terms of Aristotle’s philosophical commitments reason and appetite must cooperate (28).

In Grimaldi’s discussion, we can see the particular bias that he (as well as many other scholars) gives to the institution of rhetoric. For when he states that “philosophically” no other approach would seem possible to Aristotle, his use of this term is no doubt an attempt to elevate rhetorical studies to the level of philosophy. I have mentioned this age-old dispute in my overview of the literature, but here the point that I wish to bring out is that Grimaldi is also participating in the process of borrowing and subsequent appropriation that Aristotle modeled when he wrote a treatise that stood, in many respects, in stark opposition to Plato’s ideas on the same discipline. The question that arises here is whether Aristotle would use the term philosophically to describe the approach he has articulated in the *Rhetoric* in the same way Grimaldi does, or whether there would be egregious differences in terms of how the two thinkers define the same

term. In any case, the way Grimaldi colors the tri-partite system of proofs outlined by Aristotle is interesting, in that it betrays a desire to take what, in my opinion, Aristotle viewed as a highly practical system to be used in the crush and hubbub of the material world, to the lofty heights of philosophical speculation, even though Grimaldi links it with desire. In any case, Grimaldi's observation that Aristotle's version of rhetoric works on the whole man, while using 20<sup>th</sup> century terminology, provides an interesting stance in terms of how the three *pisteis* operate in conjunction within a single individual.

Other contemporary scholars add nuance to Aristotle's text when they use the term psychological. Oksenberg Rorty does so in order to describe the connections between the three *pisteis*:

Aristotle distinguishes three interconnected dimensions of persuasion (*pistis*): *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. Each of these interdependent avenues to persuasion explains the *dominant* place that Aristotle accords psychology in the *Rhetoric*. . . First, the knowledge of psychology enables the orator to present himself as having a trustworthy *ethos*. Second, it enables him to address the interests of his audience persuasively. Third, it provides some of the basic premises for his arguments (8).

To apply the term psychology to the thought of 4<sup>th</sup> century Athenians is perhaps an anachronism.<sup>85</sup> Still, this appropriation by Oksenberg Rorty demonstrates Plett's view that classical rhetoric is constantly being "re-invented," and in this way continues to play a major role in human communication, as it has been doing throughout history. Oksenberg Rorty continues her argument on the psychological nature of Aristotle's version of rhetoric:

The third reason for Aristotle's including a detailed discussion of the *ethe* and *pathe* among rhetorical *topoi* is that pretheoretical psychology provides useful information for practical deliberation. Like the poet, the rhetorician needs rough generalizations to represent the thoughts and desires, speech and action of many different types of agents, as they would be perceived by his audience (10).

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<sup>85</sup> In the next passage she uses the term "pretheoretical psychology."

In popular, contemporary language usage, we would say that the rhetor, or orator, needs to “psych her audience out.” In Oksenberg Rorty’s discussion, therefore, we can observe the very practical nature of rhetorical discourse. The deployment of these same psychological skills needed to persuade an audience are, as Skinner informs us, also explored by Quintilian:

The skill required, as Quintilian repeatedly emphasises, is that of knowing how to relate our views to popular opinion (*vulgi opinione*), how to make use of assumptions that are generally accepted (*publice recepta*) and how if necessary to make straightforward appeals to the prejudices of our audience (117).

Quintilian’s method can also be viewed from a contemporary perspective as psychological. There are parallels in Perelman’s practice in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Both writers use the *Rhetoric* as their source:

Our thesis is, on the one hand, that a belief, once established, can always be intensified, and, on the other hand, that argumentation is a function of the audience being addressed. Consequently, it is legitimate that the person who has acquired a certain conviction should be at pains to strengthen it for himself and, more especially, against possible attack from without. And he will naturally consider all arguments capable of reinforcing that conviction. These new reasons may intensify his conviction, protect it against certain lines of attack he had not thought of originally, make its significance clearer (Treatise, 44).

The assertions above about tailoring one’s speech to the particular audience using the proofs *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos*, are psycho-logical. Perelman’s comments illustrate the importance of knowing and addressing the needs of the audience. And it will be the *phronimos* who, by means of the psychological art of persuasion, will manage to persuade the crowd of his arguments. Of course, Aristotle concedes that, due to the audience, even the best *phronimos* may not manage to persuade. As already stated, he compares this situation to doctors who, regardless of how well they diagnose, cannot always cure a patient.

Aristotle provides the format for persuasion based on the three *pisteis*:

7. Since *pisteis* come about through these [three means], it is clear that to grasp an understanding of them is the function of one who can reason logically and be observant about characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of

the emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be and how) . . . The result is that rhetoric is like some offshoot [*paraphues*] of dialectic and ethical studies (which is rightly called politics). Thus, too, rhetoric dresses itself up in the form of politics . . . (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 39).

In Aristotle's view, in order to persuade using the three proofs, one needs to possess the capacity to grasp an understanding of the *pisteis* with logical reasoning, know the characters and virtues, and understand emotions. As we have seen, Oksenberg Rorty calls this pretheoretical psychology. And although Aristotle's recipe is quite simple in its basic ingredients, it is, in fact, quite complex psychologically. To manage to convince an audience of one's arguments is not easy. Nor, for that matter, is it easy to convince a single individual.

Aristotle then states in the passage above to call rhetoric an offshoot of dialectic and ethical studies, which he states is rightly called politics. Doubtless this is due to Aristotle's viewing ethics in relation to the existence of an Other. Once there is an Other, ethics come into play, and given sufficient numbers of others, this can be equated with politics. Politics is ethics on a large scale, and rhetoric is its vehicle, in Aristotle's system.

The fact that Aristotle includes *ethos* and *pathos* in his definition of rhetoric has importance with respect to its tradition. According to Brunschwig, having included these two proofs stand as a response to Plato's anti-rhetorical stance:

In this way, he [Aristotle] is able to determine to what extent some parts of these data (rejected as a whole in a somewhat simplified version of the antirhetorical Platonic tradition, and one-sidedly exploited, on the contrary, by some technographers) could be saved and incorporated within a new rhetoric, both philosophically respectable and practically efficient (46-47).

Vis-à-vis Plato's Socrates' true rhetoric, Aristotle's salvaging of and incorporation of *ethos* and *pathos* into what was then a new rhetoric is both sound, in terms of reasonableness, and functional with respect to practical efficiency as it is related to how argumentation fits within human affairs. Aristotle's presentation of *ethos* and *pathos* in

his text is seminal and masterly, for it is in his text that these two elements are fully interconnected with *logos* and properly defined as respectable and adequate proofs for argumentation. In fact, we must extend this argument further by stating that Aristotle recognized the roles that these two proofs *necessarily* play in the art of persuasion and argumentation. Without *ethos* and *pathos*, *logos* fails. In real rhetorical practice, both character and emotions can and do function as a guide to the validity or non-validity of arguments. Kennedy summarizes Aristotle's position on *pathos*:

In the first half of book two Aristotle discusses the disposition of mind which creates emotion, the persons at whom it is directed, and the occasion which produces it; anger and mildness, love and hate, shame, favor, pity, and envy are the principal emotions discussed. It is not Aristotle's intention to recommend a change in practice – he points out the special need for a knowledge of the emotions in the peroration (1419b10 ff.) – but only to provide depth of knowledge and to emphasize those features of oratory which are in fact most important in successful speaking (Persuasion, 94).

Here the point that I make above is reinforced: Aristotle was well-aware of the role that the *pathe* play in persuasion. This is also true for *ethos*, which at one point he, as Brunschwig informs us, “goes so far as to qualify *ethos*, although with some caution, as ‘so to say, the main proof’ (1356a13)” (46).

There are other aspects of rhetoric that might also be considered proofs: *lexis* (style) and *hypokrisis* (delivery). Elocution also plays a role in gaining the trust of an audience. All three of these can be seen as manifestations of or at least as being tightly connected to *ethos*, for we judge a person's character based on their style of speaking (or writing), as well as on their delivery and elocution. The speaker (or writer) who does not have good style or delivery is certain to fail. Some theorists are unhappy with Aristotle's having included these elements in his treatise, doubtless because they want a rhetoric whose arguments are based only on *logos*. But other scholars side with Aristotle:

Daniele Barbaro, for example, defends Aristotelian *lexis* and *hupokrisis* by arguing that every motion of the mind has its own face, and voice, and gesture, and it is important that these inevitable concomitants of expression not be at odds with what is expressed [Barbaro and Barbaro, 1545, 547-48] (Green, 57).

This ties in nicely with the idea of expressing the truth, or, at any rate, what one believes to be the truth. If what the speaker has within is felt to be true, that which is expressed should accurately reflect that truth. As for elocution, Green writes that Cipriano Suarez, a 16<sup>th</sup> century rhetorician makes the following statement:

Inattention to *elocution* is like “leaving a sharpened sword in its scabbard” (*similia gladio condito atque intra vaginam haerenti*; Suarez, 1569, fol. 47v). So also for *action*, which is eloquence of the body (158).

The simile brings into focus the link between truth and its potential vs. real power. For if a sword remains in its scabbard its true qualities cannot be put into use. In this simile the idea that Suarez wishes to bring out is that the truth of an argument must be uncovered and presented in its form per se, and that it is through elocution that its full effect and force will be achieved. It is through elocution that a sort of unveiling occurs, allowing the aim for which the argument is designed to be achieved. On the contrary, poor elocution will hamper the reception of the message being transmitted due to its being hidden, thereby reducing its capacity for persuasion.<sup>86</sup>

The three *pisteis* – *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* – infuse narrative as a functional unit that operates as an integrated ensemble of proof in rhetoric. Narrative in classical rhetoric was often included in the proof section, one of the basic sections of an oration. Kennedy lists the four basic sections of an oration: “1) prooemium or introduction . . . 2) narration . . . , [which is] the exposition of the background and factual details, 3) proof . . . , and 4) epilogue or conclusion. . .” (Persuasion, 11). So here we see also that

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<sup>86</sup> Poor elocution can also have a positive persuasive effect, depending on the circumstances. For it is possible that a sincerely, but poorly delivered speech (in terms of elocution) could arouse pity and in that way be persuasive.

narrative functions to provide background and factual details of a judicial case. De Brauw explains how narrative functions in the proof section as a proof in itself:

[The proof sections] often consist of large portions of narration. The introduction of documents, for example, might require the speaker to relate additional background . . . [or to] recount a story to impeach an opposing witness' credibility. . . [to] cite historical events . . . assert damaging 'facts' . . . hurl invective . . . (196).

De Brauw states that the proof section is in practice “something of a catchall category” (196). His comment describes the various uses to which narrative can be put to use. The usefulness of narrative as example and basis for argumentation was known to Isocrates as well, as can be seen in this quote from his *Panegyricus*:

For the deeds of the past are indeed an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to think of what is relevant about them in each instance (*ta prosekonta . . . enthumethenai*), and to set them forth well in words, is the peculiar gift of men who can think well (*ton euphronounton*)” (Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 9, tr. G. Norlin, adapted) (Bons - Reasonable, 18).

I bring this up because one of the functions I have mentioned above that the travel narrative to be examined potentially has is to provide a historical example that may provide a reference point for deliberative thought about future decisions. This also falls in line with Isocrates' practice, for in the *Areopagiticus* he urges to be on guard for future problems in a time of peace and prosperity based on what has occurred in the past: “[Isocrates'] claim may seem uncalled for in the present circumstances, but he substantiates his call for alertness by referring to history” (17). From narratives about the past we can form *doxa* by which to guide our present and future actions and make predictions about the future:

By observing what regularly happens as a consequence of something else one can gain insight in the laws of cause and effect, and this in turn provides one with a kind of prognostic capability by which one can react effectively in future occasions . . . [Isocrates' phraseology in Greek] indicates that what Isocrates is thinking of is the tackling of pragmatic problems with reasoning of the basis of probability (17 – author's brackets).



Isocrates' aim is to use narrative examples from history as a form of proof when attempting to persuade rhetorically. As I will demonstrate in Part 4 of this dissertation, narrative necessarily utilizes *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* in order to convince the reader of the underlying arguments. All three elements are always present in any narration, whether explicit or implicit. Since the three proofs are necessarily present in a narrative, this mode of discourse has persuasion as one of its aims, and thus has the capacity of standing as a proof in itself.

In addition to implicit arguments that can be made explicit in narrative, surface arguments can also be identified. Walker brings this point up in his discussion of whether story or argument is more elemental:

It may be, of course, that posing a question whether story (narration) or argument (discursus) is more "fundamental" can only lead us to a chicken-or-the-egg problem that we ought not try to solve. Perhaps the most that we can say is that there will be places in an argument, or in a "speech" or "lyric," where stories/narratives will arise – most notably, for classical rhetoric, in the *narratio* section of the standard oration, though story/narrative can arise anywhere for purposes of amplification and even for proof – and there will be places in a story/narrative where argument/discursus (or "speeches") will arise, as the narrator and /or characters comment on their situations, deliver their rationales for one or another choice of action, debate with one another, reflect on the way of the world, apostrophize, and so forth (Poetics, 166-167).

There are parallels between Walker's commentary above and the work of Booth. Booth's work on what he called rhetoric had, as a major focus, the division between telling and showing, which corresponds to Walker's discussion above. In any case, it is possible to dig beneath the surface of both "story" and "argument" found in a narrative and reveal implicit syllogisms/enthymemes. By examining closely the underlying *logos*, along with a narrative's *ethos* and *pathos*, we can then bring to light the ethical stance that informs the narrative, as well as the system of values on which the underlying arguments rest.

Before turning to the individual *pisteis*, the following excerpt will demonstrate how *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos* are present in what is perhaps the shortest speech in history:

“Quirites!” This is the infamous one-word speech by which Julius Caesar won his rebellious legions over to fight the republican army in North Africa, in 46 BC. After having fought a great number of battles under Caesar’s command, the soldiers had refused to follow him again. Caesar’s use of the word *quirites* as form of address had a devastating effect. According to the classical scholar Anton Leeman (1992), ‘quirites’ was the dignified word a Roman magistrate used to address an assembly. Caesar’s use of this word to his soldiers made it clear to them that they had not only lost their privilege of being addressed as *commilitones*, or ‘comrades,’ but were even no longer entitled to a Roman general’s normal form of address for his soldiers: *milites*. “We are *milites*!” they reportedly shouted when they all volunteered to follow Caesar once more into battle. Caesar’s use of the ‘neutral’ *quirites* as a qualification of argumentative language use can only be grasped if the discourse is first put in a functional perspective in which its social context and the commitments assumed by the participants are duly taken into account (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser - Strategic, 131-132).

The story speaks for itself, but we can see that the proof *logos* can be expressed in a syllogistic format that is in operation beneath the surface of Caesar’s one-word speech:

True soldiers are not rebellious

Only true soldiers have the right to be called *milites*.

As you have lost that right, I shall address you as *quirites*.

This one word, with its underlying syllogism,<sup>87</sup> hit the soldier’s pride hard, and in this way, moved them to action. Calling them *quirites* could be seen as being on par with accusing them of being namby pambies or of cowardice. It is in this way that *pathos* functions in conjunction with *logos* in this speech. Neither characteristic is that of a true soldier, and a true soldier would pride himself emotionally in being nothing more or nothing less than a soldier, which is, by definition, both fierce and brave. To add that Caesar’s *ethos* was very high is to state the obvious, but his power here in this sense and the effect that it had on his listeners cannot be underestimated. This one word functions

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<sup>87</sup> The use of the term “syllogism” is broader than that used by formal logic. See next section.

rhetorically as it resonates in the system of values that were held by the speaker and listeners. The same speech would have little effect on a different audience, say, on anti-war protesters, whose response would certainly be quite different, due to their system of values. We can now discuss in turn and in greater detail each of the *pisteis*: *logos*, *ethos*, *pathos*.

## 2.6 LOGOS

Since Aristotle's aim was, as mentioned above, to place *logos* at the center of rhetorical persuasion, I shall begin by considering further aspects from those discussed in the introduction to the rhetorical proofs that define this highly polysemous term over whose definition a dispute has been underway since its earliest documented appearances.

Gorgias' opinion of how *logos* was to be defined merits consideration. Walker summarizes what rhetoric's most prominent figure in terms of what has been deemed its unethical use asserts in relation with this term:

In the *Helen* (8-11) . . . Gorgias declares that *logos* is a "great potentate" that can "stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity" as well as shape the "opinion" (*doxa*) that is the soul's chief "counselor" (*symbolos*), the soul having no other source of knowledge (Poetics, 27).

Not only does Gorgias define *logos* as an all-powerful sovereign, but at other points he compares it to a powerful drug. Gorgias' highly metaphoric language gives a perspective with which to perceive *logos* as the most significant and powerful motor of human affairs. Ford writes that Gorgias implies in his *Helen* that *logos* "works autocratically, with no need of truth or goodness to wield power" (176). Gorgias' assertions provide a framework that makes it possible to understand why Aristotle argues against the unethical use of rhetoric. Due to its tremendous power, *logos* does not need in Gorgias' conception of this term either hard facts or virtue in order to change the beliefs of an audience. *Logos* vanquishes all those who come under its influence. We might temper this extreme position by recalling that each community (or form of government, if we consider the different types of constitutions delineated by Aristotle) bases the way it perceives reality on its own system of values. And so Gorgias' stance, while extreme, ostensibly does not take into consideration the underlying reasons for the power *logos* holds. The audience must be convinced of what the orator is trying to argue for, and that depends on shared values which necessarily

determine what is accepted as true and false, good and evil. Hitler, or any other exceptional orator for that matter, did not clamor in a vacuum. If an orator manages to present arguments that are based on shared values, the power of *logos* is then tremendous. This means that in order to control the masses, persuasive *logos* must be based on value-laden components embedded within the discursive framework the audience utilizes in its mediation of the phenomenological construct that, according to some scholars, is created by rhetorical mechanisms.

Alongside and in contrast with Gorgias' definition of *logos* as some sort of almighty tyrant we have another view presented by Isocrates, another "sophist" that played a role in the shaping of discursive argumentation, and whose ideas Ford summarizes:

The high civic role he [Isocrates] claims for artistic prose belongs to a larger, humanistic vision of the role of speech in society, a theme he repeated several times in his works. In opposition to Plato, Isocrates' sense of "philosophy" did not aspire to advance beyond common reason; *doxa* was not Plato's "opinion," but the collective judgments people make about things that are impossible to know or difficult to decide. On Isocrates' view, after getting as close to an understanding of realities as human nature permits (*Antidosis* 184, 271), society must construct its morality and wisdom somewhere between pure skepticism and pure idealism. And it is just here that *logos* plays its crucial role. Nature has given to us no other instrument than language to ensure our survival and self-realization. Language enables human beings to communicate with each other, to articulate values and organize societies, and ultimately to become civilized. A capacity bestowed equally on all by nature, *logos* yet distinguishes human beings from other animals, and its artistic employment may distinguish the true sages among men. Such a wise artisan will harness the resources of language to the good of the polity: its harmonious symmetries can charm citizens into reasonable accord. For all its strategic advantages, Isocrates' literary formalism derives not from a fetishism of technique, but from an enlightened, humanistic view of language as a natural endowment that art may perfect to serve human ends (257-58).

The view of *logos* that Isocrates presents is surprisingly modern, and betrays a faith in language as the ultimate tool for creating, organizing, and unifying human society. His views could easily be added to Aristotle's definition, especially because of the optimistic stance that he takes with respect to the benefits that the proper use of *logos*

brings to the human community. Isocrates' conception of *logos* differs from the tyrannical power Gorgias attributes to it because he views it as a shared or communal activity: reasoning together about matters that are impossible or difficult to predict or decide. Isocrates' vision is based on the logic and ethics of those who collaborate together in wisdom, not on some all-powerful force that operates outside the bounds of reason and goodness.

Another defining aspect of *logos* that can be culled from antiquity and that remains alive today is provided by the Stoics. *Logos* manifests in two basic modes: internal and external:

Speech is external *logos*, thought internal *logos*, according to the Stoics, who are in accord with older views like that of Plato, who defined thought as internal speech (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 8.275; Pl. *Sophist* 263e) (Allen, 350).

We find this conception of *logos* in contemporary expressions used in academic environments (i.e., high school and university English composition courses) like “writing is thinking on the page” or “put those thoughts down in pen and ink.” Plato's and the Stoic's defining *logos* as internal speech brings to the fore the idea of argumentation both with oneself and with others. Its transmission occurs either verbally or in writing, and it is in these two formats that positions are taken with respect to an opinion and where accord or discord surfaces. Internal thought within an individual that is characterized by division is a reflection of what occurs externally in the community of those participating in the construct of the discourse by which its members organize themselves and take action using argumentative bases that are accepted as true. While keeping in mind that the truth or truths that constitute objects of rhetoric are – due to the impossibility of determining their validity by empirical means – in fact and essence opinions, and that these opinions can function as operative bases for decision making that at least ex post facto become empirically provable truths, we can recall that

Aristotle asserts in the *Rhetoric* that “[p]ersuasion occurs through the arguments [*logoi*] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case” (Kennedy – Persuasion, 39). Interesting here is his affirmation that through *logoi* we show the truth or the *apparent* truth, for it reveals what I have been asserting throughout my discussion the role that both hard facts, on the one hand, and, on the other, opinion and probability play in rhetoric. Aristotle seems to be arguing here that rhetoric brings to the eyes the appearance of truth that later becomes truth as in deliberative rhetoric, or, as in judicial rhetoric, what appears to have been the truth in the past, or, as in epideictic rhetoric, what appears to be true at this very moment. When we cannot scientifically demonstrate the arguments that we put forth, rhetoric provides the machinery to present plausible truths that may or may not coincide with the real. What Aristotle means by apparent truth in the passage above is most likely that which appears to be truthful until proven false. It is important to bear in mind that this framework, which at first glance may appear to be somewhat flimsy in terms of its truth value, is in fact no different from the framework used by the hard sciences. Scientific truths are only accepted as true until they are proven to be false.<sup>88</sup> Science is an evolving body of knowledge, for discoveries are constantly being made that prove previous “facts” and scientific theories to be false. In Aristotle’s system, *logos* was to be the central proof to persuade audiences of the points being argued. And it is with *logos* that we argue either alone in debate with ourselves or together with others – through speech and writing.

Kennedy comments on Aristotle’s insistence on the great importance *logos* has as argumentative proof in his version of rhetoric:

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<sup>88</sup> In this regard, Eagleton affirms: “A lot of scientists are fairly sceptical about science, seeing it as much more of a hit-and-miss, rule-of-thumb affair than the gullible layperson imagines. It is people in the humanities who still naively think that scientists consider themselves the white-coated custodians of absolute truth, and so waste a lot of time trying to discredit them. Humanists have always been sniffy about scientists” (After, 18).

Aristotle repeatedly says that the logical side of rhetorical theory is underdeveloped and yet is the most important (1354a14 ff. and 1354b21 ff.) He wishes to correct this situation and to offer practical help to the orator by an application of logic to rhetoric (Persuasion, 96).

Aristotle provides argumentative bases called topics in order to equip the orator using his treatise with tools that are logic based. I shall discuss the topics in greater detail below, but at this point it bears mentioning that logic's importance in rhetorical transactions involving a speaker (or writer) and audience (as listener or reader) is always characterized by transmission that flows in both directions. That is, not only does the orator bear the burden of making cogent, rational arguments that prove her case, but the listener is also responsible, for as Allen states: "Arguments serve as instruments of persuasion because anyone who takes an argument to be valid and accepts its premises as true is bound on pain of irrationality also to accept its conclusion" (350). This is where rhetoric's similarity with dialectic is clear. For there is always a back-and-forth communicative movement in dialectic that, while it appears to be absent in rhetoric due to the rhetor's presenting while the listener receives the message in silence, the listener must evaluate the argument and, if no valid argument to the contrary occurs to her, is obligated to accept the conclusions that the rhetor is arguing for. The good rhetor will, of course, anticipate the questions and doubts that the audience might have, and answer them in the body of his speech. This is also true in the underlying logic enmeshed in the rhetorical mechanisms found, both explicitly and explicitly, in narrative. The implicit logic must cohere and answer the questions that the reader may have in order for the story to make sense, and for the reader to accept the rational premises of both its sequence and plot.

I have stated earlier that Aristotle's corpus is cross-referential. That is, Aristotle in his *Poetics*, for example, when speaking of *dianoia*, or thought, refers his reader to the *Rhetoric* for a full discussion. Since Aristotle equates rhetoric with dialectic, in the



*Rhetoric* he makes cross-references to the work that deals with dialectic, the *Topics*. In this work Aristotle establishes his method for *logos*-based reasoning, and provides what are called the commonplaces for argumentation.

The commonplaces are what are, in effect, pre-fabricated arguments whose underlying structures may be applied in a variety of situations, depending on one's aims in argumentation.<sup>89</sup> Perelman writes in this regard: "In his *Topics*, Aristotle studies every kind of *locus* that can serve as premise for dialectical or rhetorical syllogisms. He classifies them, according to the viewpoints established in his philosophy, as *loci* relating to accident, species, property, definition, and sameness (Treatise, 84)." Perelman goes on to state that the approach he uses is distinct from Aristotle's. In spite of certain differences, he nevertheless borrows from Aristotle's treatise, and provides explanations and examples. My aim here is to give an idea of what Aristotelian *loci* are as summarized by Perelman in order to illustrate how the former's system works. The topic related to quantity provides a general starting point:

By *loci* relating to quantity we mean those *loci communes* which affirm that one thing is better than another for quantitative reasons. More often than not, a *locus* relating to quantity constitutes a major, though implied, premise, without which the conclusion would have no basis. Aristotle mentions some of these *loci*: a greater number of good things is more desirable than a smaller; a good thing useful for a comparatively large number of ends is more desirable than one useful to a lesser degree; that which is more lasting or durable is more desirable than that which is less so. We note also that the superiority in question attaches to negative as well as positive values, so that a lasting evil is greater than one that is momentary. Isocrates declares that the merit of a person is proportional to the number to those to whom he is of service: athletes are inferior to those who teach, since their strength benefits only themselves, whereas those who think soundly are useful to all (85-86).

In the examples that Perelman discusses, their relation with values held in common by the community is obvious. What is important here is Perelman's observation that the *loci* are syllogistic. He brings this idea to the surface when he states above that, in the *loci* presented in the above passage, there is an implied major premise. So the first case

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<sup>89</sup> Much of what Aristotle explores in the *Topics* is directly related to definitions as well.

above could be restated as follows: A good thing is desirable / More of a good thing is more desirable / Therefore, a greater number of this good thing is more desirable than a smaller number of the same good thing. From this basic component of syllogistic reasoning Isocrates makes his assertion that teachers are superior to athletes: It is a good thing to benefit others / More are benefitted by teachers than by athletes, since the good that teachers possess benefits not only themselves (as is the case with the good that athletes possess) but others / Given that a greater amount of a good thing (the case of teachers) is superior to a lesser amount (the case of athletes), we can conclude / Therefore, that teachers are superior to athletes.

Barnes concurs with the idea that *logos* plays a central part in rhetorical persuasion. He states, “rhetoric, insofar as it is a technical or an art, studies deductions, it studies logic” (Companion, 261).<sup>90</sup> Rhetorical arguments are presented via deductive logic. But we must ask what argument is in this sense. Smith informs us that “[a]rgument is discourse that tries to prove a point: any argument purports to give reasons for accepting some proposition” (Smith – Logic, 29). Smith writes that the basic form for this type of mechanism of thought is the syllogism. But this term also has various definitions:

Logicians normally use “syllogism” to *mean* one of the specific forms of valid argument Aristotle discusses in *An. Pr* I.I-6, but Aristotle’s definition of *sullogismos* comprehends a much wider class: pretty much any valid argument, or at least any argument with a conclusion different from its premises (Logic, 30).

What is important to grasp here is the notion that *sullogismos*, in Aristotle’s definition, is a very broad category. It is not, in Smith’s reading, only the classic syllogism in which Socrates’ mortality is presented as inevitable or those outlined in the *Prior Analytics*. Other forms of argument that attempt to prove something different from their premises count as syllogisms in Aristotle’s conception of this term. In Part 4 of this

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<sup>90</sup> Barnes states that this “would surely have surprised Aristotle’s contemporaries” (261).

dissertation, the syllogisms that are embedded in the travel narratives to be analyzed will be identified as informal logic couched in non-technical language.<sup>91</sup>

One form of *sullogismos* is the *enthumema*, which Aristotle calls the syllogism of rhetoric. Much has been written on this term which has puzzled commentators of the *Rhetoric* since its appearance. This is no doubt due to the nature of Aristotle's treatise, which as Barnes has informed us, must be read as incomplete notes, as a springboard for critical thought, as a way of exploring certain problems he poses. And so rather than enter into the labyrinth of arguments presented by scholars on this term, it is best to view the enthymeme as a syllogism, in the sense Smith uses above for *sullogismos*. That is, as a form of valid argument. What is perhaps more important than trying to determine exactly what Aristotle meant by *enthumema*, is its meaning in Greek: "Given its etymology, *enthumema* . . . is cognate to the verb *enthumeisthai* "to think to consider," which includes both rational thought and feeling" (Reasonable, 26). What I want to propose here is that its function as a mechanism of thought is more important

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<sup>91</sup> Toulmin's discussion in his text on argumentation, where he takes to task formal logician's methods, proves interesting in connection with the discussion above. For he asks an important question about the syllogism: "Can we properly classify all the elements in our arguments under the three headings, 'major premiss', 'minor premiss' and 'conclusion', or are these categories misleadingly few in number?" (Argument, 96). What Toulmin is after here is viewing argumentation as an organic process, one that is not tied to formulaic structures that are independent of specific fields of thought. He writes: "Light is thrown on these questions by the analogy with jurisprudence. This would naturally lead us to adopt a layout of greater complexity than has been customary. . ." (96). He then clarifies his methodology in terms of procedure in legal philosophy by asking a question: "'What different sorts of propositions', a legal philosopher will ask, 'are uttered in the course of a law-case, and in what different ways can such propositions bear on the soundness of a legal claim?'" (96). What Toulmin wishes to demonstrate here is the inadequacy of the classic syllogism to provide proof when considering complex issues: "Legal utterance has many distinct functions. Statements of claim, evidence of identification, testimony about events in dispute, interpretations of a statute or discussions of its validity, claims to exemption from the application of a law pleas in extenuation, verdicts, sentences: all these different classes of proposition have their parts to play in the legal process, and the differences between them are in practice far from trifling" (96). Of course, a formal logician could easily argue that the entire complex of the different classes of propositions that Toulmin is outlining here can be expressed with classical syllogisms. The formal logician's claim would be that it might be excruciatingly tedious and extensive, but nevertheless possible. But what I want to use from Toulmin's argument is the idea that the way a literature student would go about arguing a point using rhetoric as her tool must address the object under study with language and structures that are appropriate to that object. I have already discussed how parallels can be drawn between judicial argumentation and narratives. This means that, in spite of Toulmin's argument that each field of discourse must use its own bases of argumentation, some fields hold enough similarities to warrant the use of the same methods and procedures for more than one.

than trying to determine its precise form.<sup>92</sup> As Bitzer argues, an enthymeme can be used for probability or formal absolutes (181), whether or not there are propositions that are not expressed implicitly. The following enthymeme demonstrates the capacity of an enthymeme to function as an irrefutable argument:

Socrates is a man.

Therefore, Socrates must die.

The missing proposition is All men die. Thus, in spite of the above enthymeme's being a truncated syllogism, it possesses the full force of an intractable argument expressed in formal logic. For the purpose of this dissertation, I shall bypass the complexities of distinguishing between enthymeme and syllogism and opt for a definition of syllogism as Smith has defined it. In this way, less importance is placed on the determination of the precise form, with the aim of presenting the underlying *logos* in the texts under study in language that will hopefully be clear, simple and cogent.

The syllogism (in the broadest sense of the word) is the basic unit of argumentation in rhetoric. We have seen that in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle refers his readers to the *topoi*, or topics which are to provide the content of the syllogistic arguments. Not surprisingly, many different definitions of precisely what a topic or commonplace is have surfaced and been fought over throughout the twenty-four centuries since Aristotle wrote his *Topics*. Kennedy writes that Aristotle, as he did not provide a definition, took it for granted that his readers would be familiar with the term (*Rhetoric*, 45). The fact that Aristotle did not provide a definition has led to enormous polysemy for the term *topos* among contemporary scholars. Carolyn Miller, citing Michael Leff, writes:

“The term ‘topic’ incorporates a bewildering diversity of meanings. Hence among modern authors we find conceptions of the topics ranging from recurrent themes in literature, to heuristic devices that encourage innovation of ideas, to

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<sup>92</sup> See Bitzer for a discussion on differences and similarities between classic syllogisms and enthymemes.

regions of experience from which one draws the substance of an argument (Leff, 1983, 23-24)” (132).

Perhaps if we fold back to Aristotle’s heir of the peripatetic school, Theophrastus, we can obtain a definition that matches more precisely Aristotle’s use of the term.

Brunschwig provides Theophrastus’ definition followed by a commentary:

The *topos* is a principle or element, out of which (*aph’hou*) we grasp the principles [i.e., the premises] concerning each thing [i.e., each problem]; it is determinate as far as its description is concerned, and indeterminate as far as its particular applications are concerned. This Theophrastean definition, far from being revisionary in respect to Aristotle, seems to me to capture the essence of the *topos* in the *Topics* much better than any antistrophic version we could extract from the definition given in the *Rhetoric*. Substituting *aph’hou* for *eis ho* is a highly significant change in the definition of *topos*: *aph’hou* suggests that the *topos* is essentially the source from which the premises of a syllogism are to be derived; *eis ho* suggests that the *topos* is derived by reflection on what is common to a collection of particular instances of arguments (41-42).

Theophrastus’ definition squares with Kennedy’s observations: “The materials of enthymemes come from the premises of other disciplines, especially politics and ethics, but their formal structure draws on *topics*, strategies of argument useful in dealing with any subject” (*Rhetoric*, 21). Another way of stating this is to define the *topoi* as Enos and Lauer have: “[T]he *topoi* are generative codifications for proofs that have already been invented by successful rhetors” (206). Skinner comments further on what came to be the purpose of the *topoi* as they were put together in compendia in the 1600s: “The whole purpose of assembling books of commonplaces was to build of stores of sententious generalities with which to amplify specific arguments” (119).

Skinner then goes on the comment on how rather than using the codified topics as sources for arguments, the topics listed were overused to the point of ennui, for, during the Renaissance, the doctrine of commonplaces came to be not the “places or headings under which general maxims should be sought, but rather to the maxims themselves” (119). He then goes on to state: “It is thus a somewhat melancholy reflection on the contents of such compilations that, within a generation, the term

‘commonplace’ came to be used instead to refer to excessively obvious or well-worn platitudes” (119). Skinner informs us that Bacon in his ‘Of Discourse,’ wrote that “certain writers, due to the use of common places, lack variety and seem ridiculous when perceived” (119).

The sad state of affairs into which rhetorical *topoi* evolved must be set side by side with Aristotle’s original formula, in order to get a sense of the enervating knowledge that, as can be perceived when reading the *Rhetoric*, was being delivered. Solmsen gives us a nice glimpse of this in his discussion on what the *topoi* were meant to be in the Aristotelian framework:

Aristotle compares this instruction to a procedure by which instead of learning the art of making shoes the apprentice receives a great number of ready-made shoes without any suggestion as to how to make them . . . He replaces this method by an altogether different system of τόποι, conceiving the τόπος as a “type” or “form” of argument of which you need grasp only the basic structural idea to apply it forthwith to discussions about any and every subject. Once you have grasped the τόπος of the “More or Less” you will be able to argue: If not even the gods know everything, human beings will certainly not know everything; or, Whoever beats his father will certainly also beat his neighbors, or to form any other argument of the same kind, always proceeding from the less likely thing (which has nevertheless occurred) to the more likely. What matters in this system is the “form” of the argument, this being perfectly independent of any particular subject-matter or content (217-18).

Here the idea that rhetoric is to be based on logic in the Aristotelian framework is reiterated, and then we see the very nice conceit that Aristotle uses when attacking the previous writers of handbooks of rhetoric. He states that it was as if, while trying to teach how to make shoes, they had provided several examples of shoes without explaining the basics of how they were made. The example then provided demonstrates more than adequately the way a specific *topos* (i.e., the “more or less”) may be used.<sup>93</sup>

Solmsen informs us that, in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, the author of this text falls in

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<sup>93</sup> “Solmsen writes that “Aristotle . . . bequeathed to the later rhetoricians a new conception of the τόπος. As we have seen, his new approach sprang from the idea that instead of providing a great number of ready-made arguments (one and all applying to quite definite and specific subjects or situations) the teacher of rhetoric ought to concentrate on general forms or types of arguments . . .” (226).

line with the framework Aristotle uses: “The *loci* or *sedes argumentorum* enumerated in II, 163-173 are of the Aristotelian type . . . They are not connected with any definite subject-matter, and yet they are applicable to every subject” (226).

Aristotle’s system of *topoi* makes it possible to generate a potentially infinite number of arguments for a broad array of situations. But even this is not sufficient, for as Cicero argues, they will only be effective if the orator knows how to best utilize them:

This doctrine of *loci communes* clearly presupposes a particular view about the nature of the argumentative skills we need to cultivate. We must recognise, as Crassus reminds Antonius in book II of *De oratore*, that ‘although you yourself are able to speak with novelty and brilliance, the *loci* from which you derive what you say are nevertheless the sources of familiar maxims and widely accepted principles’. The most effective orator will therefore be the one who knows best how to select and appeal to such ‘popularities’ and apply them to uphold his own cause (Skinner, 117).

One must appeal to the audience, but one must have the “know-how” necessary to make already accepted arguments and devices work. In this lies the art of rhetoric. The framework we have been discussing provides a storehouse for invention that increases the tools based on logic available to the rhetor which can be used to produce arguments. But as the old saw goes, it is not what you say, but how you say it.

Enos and Lauer tell us that Grimaldi argues that the twenty-eight *topoi* can be grouped into three basic categories, which imply a static quality. They assert that in spite of this connotation, Aristotle’s framework is productive of meaningful thought structures:

Normally, *topoi* are characterized as “places” and, in that sense, connote a static quality. Taken with the meaning of heuristic advanced here, however, we can better capture the meaning of *topoi* as heuristics having the potentially dynamic characteristic of energizing thought by shaping meaning. *Topoi*, then, may appear as dormant “places” but can also energize ideas through the socially shared understanding of such modes of relational thought. In this sense, *heuristic* captures the meaning of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as an instrumental activity of invention through shared discourse. Such a perspective gives us a window to view

not only how ancient Greeks tried to share thoughts and sentiments with others but also how they came to artistically conceive of discursive meaning itself (206).

In addition to the idea that Aristotle's *topoi* are generative, Enos and Lauer make the important assertion that invention occurs within a framework of shared discourse. That is, often the invention will be the utilization of already existing modes of discourse known to the community of listeners. But they then give an important, second meaning to Aristotle's phrase "invented by us." They bring to the fore the function that the *topoi* have as generators of new proofs, and, in this way, show how much power new *topoi* can have in a particular community:

The second application of the phrase "invented by us" refers to entirely new proofs generated by the rhetor. For example, Jesus Christ invented new proofs for making judgments about social action. . . James L. Kinneavy's detailed account of *pistis* in the New Testament reveals that Christian faith itself, rooted in the notion of rhetorical *pistis*, constituted a set of new proofs by which to live. So new were the arguments that both Matthew (7.28) and Luke (4.22) record that the multitude were sometimes baffled and perplexed. George A. Kennedy asserts that Christ's efforts at articulating new faith-proofs occasionally left listeners "astonished" . . . These proofs were not existing *topoi* but were invented within a faith community (206).

Enos and Lauer's discussion demonstrates a faith in the innovativeness that is possible using rhetorical mechanisms, however static they may be in terms of basic structure. This is no different from music, where, for example, the major scale remains ever the same, but is still the basic structure that can still be used as a basis for innovation. Along these lines, one way to view the *topoi* is as "building blocks, used again and again after being memorized" (Kennedy – Persuasion, 53). Carolyn Miller reinforces the above-mentioned idea of the *topoi* as having a generative function, rather than a mere depository of ready-made arguments to be taken as is and inserted into a text: "*Topoi* have been considered as instruments of decorum, serving a managerial function in rhetoric, but McKeon noted that they can also be understood as sources of novelty, as having a generative function" (130).



The ready-made structures provided by the *topoi* are always based on argumentative structures whose aim is to persuade via logic. Oksenberg Rorty reminds us of the very strong tie rhetoric has with dialectic, while at the same time bringing to the fore the idea that the arguments that are used come from discourse repositories that are codified in the *Topics* and the *Rhetoric* in the form of *topoi*, arguments which are often at odds and which the rhetor must use to make her case. Crucial for the present discussion is the link Oksenberg Rorty states rhetorical argument has with teachings (*doxa*) and the good life (*eudaimonia*):

The *rhetorician* himself relies on the results, the methods, and the skills of dialectic. Like the dialectician, the rhetorician does not have a distinctive, specific subject matter (1354a1-12, 1355b32 ff.). He depends on – and must skillfully use – a heterogeneous collection of accepted and often conflicting opinions for the details of his arguments: general *endoxa* about *eudaimonia*, the opinion of strategists about what is genuinely dangerous in battle, the views of philosophers about criteria for voluntary action, and the view of experienced legislators about what sorts of laws are enforceable. Like the dialectician and sophist, the successful rhetorician must be able to construct contrary arguments: he must first represent and then refute the considerations that appear to weigh against his position (7-8).

The ability to argue in such a way that demolishes opposing arguments is crucial. It is this type of reasoning that makes rhetoric a tool to discover truth, even if it is the truth of the moment that will later be refuted by a new perspective on an issue or new scientific knowledge, which, as we have been asserting throughout this dissertation, is also stable until proved otherwise, and which also plays a role in the rhetorical process. (That is, empirical knowledge can be used to warrant inferences to argue an opinion.) Oksenberg Rorty underscores in the above passage the connection Aristotle makes between finding the truth via rhetorical argumentation and the good life. Throughout my discussion I have been referring to the link between rhetoric and values. By using an approach that is based on rhetoric, the student of literature can analyze text with a view to finding its true or apparently true arguments that, according to Aristotle, enable one

to apply knowledge of what is accepted as truth to the way one lives. We see this in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

True arguments seem, then, most useful, not only with a view to knowledge, but with a view to life also; for since they harmonize with the facts they are believed, and so they stimulate those who understand them to live according to them (Barnes – Complete, 1853).

It is, of course, up to each individual to choose which arguments to live by according to her own vision of what *eudaimonia* is.

Now that aspects of what Aristotle considered to be the most important rhetorical proof has been examined, we can now turn to *pathos*. For, as Krabbe writes, “Logos constitutes the core-business of rhetoric . . . but other means of persuasion are not neglected by Aristotle” (33). And it is precisely in the interweaving of Aristotle’s three proofs that his genius when defining his version of rhetoric shines through most.

## 2.7 PATHOS

With regards to *pathos*, Aristotle attacks the other writers on rhetoric at the beginning of his treatise, meanwhile setting the stage for the stance that he will take on the subject:

1.1.4. [F]or verbal attack and pity and anger and such emotions of the mind do not relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman. As a result, if all trials were conducted as they are in some present-day states and especially in those well-governed [the handbook writers] would have nothing to say (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 31).

In this excerpt Aristotle establishes a dichotomy between emotional appeals and the facts of a particular case. Aristotle's underlying statement is that the handbook writers of the day had only written about the use of the irrelevant manipulation of emotions, which he considers improper. In this section of the rhetoric, Aristotle states indirectly that the correct way to argue in judicial cases is through the presentation of facts. He then states his position in no uncertain terms:

For it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity; that is the same as if someone made a straight-edge ruler crooked before using it. 6. And further, it is clear that the opponents have no function except to show that something is or is not true or has happened or has not happened; whether it is important or trivial or just or unjust, in so far as the lawmaker has not provided a definition, the juror should somehow decide himself and not learn from the opponents (31-32).

Aristotle's stance here is hardline: it is wrong to manipulate the jury emotionally, for the judgment that they will reach will not be accurate. The rhetor's only job is to try to prove the truth of a matter or to attempt to show that something has occurred via *logos*. The jury is to be presented the facts, and based on the evidence, judge for itself, without having been swayed emotionally. The rhetor, via *logos*, is also to argue for the significance and fairness of the act as defined by lawmakers. If there is no definition, the juror is to do the interpreting based on the arguments presented. This is judicial rhetoric's twofold process: to prove whether an act occurred or not, and the subsequent evaluation based on the system of values held by the community in which the rhetorical

enactment takes place. Aristotle then states that the other writers have called the swaying of emotions an art, rather than becoming enthymematic:

“If this is so [i.e., that judges are influenced by grief and pleasure],” says Aristotle, “it is clear that matters external to the subject are described as an art by those who define other things: . . . for [in treating these matters] they concern themselves only with how they may put the judge in a certain frame of mind, while they explain nothing about artistic proofs; and that is the question of how one may become *enthymematic*” (33 – Kennedy’s brackets and italics).

Aristotle’s schema of artistic vs. inartistic proofs has been considered above, as well as enthymemes. What I would like to focus on in the excerpt above is Aristotle’s dissatisfaction with the other writers’ work, which taught manipulation of the emotions using irrelevant (and inartistic) proofs as an art. A typical example of this type of emotional manipulation would be to bring in the wife and children of a person accused of murder in order to elicit pity. Whether the person accused has a wife or children has nothing to do with the facts of the case, nor, in Aristotle’s opinion, should factors of this sort have anything to do with the sentence to be delivered. Aristotle here tells the reader that he will be doing what no other writer has done: provide instruction on how to be enthymematic, that is, how to use *logos*, or the argument of probability when defending or representing a case. Aristotle then makes statements that, on first glance, would appear to contradict his hardline position stated above:

But in judicial speeches this is not enough; rather, it is first serviceable to gain over the hearer; for the judgment is about other people’s business and the judges, considering the matter in relation to their own affairs and listening with partiality, lend themselves to [the needs of] the litigants but do not judge [objectively]; thus, as we said earlier, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject [in court cases]; in deliberative assemblies the judges themselves adequately guard against this (33 – Kennedy’s brackets).

When Aristotle states above that in judicial speeches this is not enough, he is referring to a statement just prior, where he writes that, in deliberative proceedings, “nothing is needed except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says” (33). When deliberating about laws, the rhetor only needs to present the situation as it is. There is no

need to try to influence the lawmakers of the assembly emotionally. This is due to the fact Aristotle believes that the lawmakers will, in his view, put laws into effect legitimately, since as we have stated above, they already see themselves as being affected by the laws that are to be passed because, as Aristotle states above, they consider the matter in relation to their own affairs. They have a vested interest in deliberation about legislation. However, in judicial cases, Aristotle now contradicts his first hardline stance when he states in the excerpt above that it is not sufficient to show that the circumstances are as the speaker says they are. He instead states that it is first a good idea to gain over the hearer. This means that the hearer needs to be emotionally engaged in order to reach a proper judgment. This is, at first glance, a glaring contradiction.

Aristotle then defines emotions within the context he is discussing:

Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites (2.1, 1378a20-23) (Konstan, 414).

Aristotle states in this passage above point blank that emotions affect the way people judge situations. And so, as he states that it is necessary to gain over the hearer, he appears to have changed his position radically from his hardline stance of strict presentation of the facts of a case free from emotional manipulation. These statements have produced enormous controversy among scholars, due to the what are viewed as blatant contradictions. At the beginning of his treatise, Aristotle is arguing for a *logos*-based rhetoric that only takes the facts and syllogistic logic as the basis for proof, but later allows emotions to enter in. Walker comments on this portion of the text where Aristotle takes a stance against the use of emotions:

[In *Rhetoric* 1.1.5] one detects a vehement moral judgment in the philosopher's words: The verb "twist," *diastrephein*, can also mean "pervert"; and the idea that

the rhetor is “pandering” to envy or pity, *proagontas*, portrays the pandering rhetor as a *proagogos*, a pimp . . . (Pathos, 74 – my brackets).

Walker’s discussion of the possible connotations that the verb *diastrephein* holds shows the tight link between rhetoric and ethics, for it shows Aristotle’s view that the improper manipulation of emotions is, in the end, unethical. Further, it is Aristotle’s view that to manipulate a jury emotionally results in a distortion of justice. And it is this hardline, ethical stance that Aristotle’s subsequent, opposing position produces such surprise, as can be seen in Walker’s commentary below:

Such statements [i.e., *Rhetoric* 1.1.5 above] seem to reflect a settled, serious conviction; they suggest an ethics of persuasion. At the beginning of *Rhetoric* 2, however, Aristotle declares the necessity of “preparing” (*kataskeuazein*, 2.1.7) the “judge” (*kreseis*) to “change” (*metaballein*, 2.1.8) – and then he proceeds to offer ten extraordinary chapters on several key *pathe* (2.2-11), starting with anger and including both pity and jealousy, the very ones he has proscribed as “perverters” of judgment (74-75).

Walker brings into clear focus the problem encountered in Aristotle’s treatise with regard to what might be called a *logos – pathos* either/or divide. How is it possible for Aristotle to take such an uncompromising stance and then make an about face? Walker comments on this discrepancy, and then provides possible explanations:

Not only does the account of the *pathe* in Book 2 seem inconsistent with the expressed ethico-political convictions of *Rhetoric* 1.1 (and 3.1), but that account also seems, as George Kennedy has remarked, to have been imported into the text from somewhere else, as a late addition, and with only minimal adaptation to a discussion of rhetoric . . . The apparent inconsistency . . . has typically been explained within the given case; Aristotle’s psychology is opposed only to irrelevant appeals to emotion while leaving room for those emotions that are reasonable within the given case; Aristotle’s psychology provides emotion with a rationality similar to (and part of) that of the enthymeme, and thus he brings *pathos* under the rule of reason; Aristotle’s statements have been composed at different times and reflect earlier and later opinions, as he is moving away from Aristotle’s [sic – read: Plato’s] influence; or, in Book 2 as again in *Rhetoric* 3’s account of style and delivery, Aristotle is recognizing the rhetor’s practical necessity to accommodate the “depravity” (*mochtheria*) of the audience of common citizens, the crowd of *hoi polloi* (“the many”) that does the judging in the jury-courts and public assemblies (75).

What is important to always bear in mind with inconsistencies such as the above is Barnes’ advice on how to read Aristotle, as discussed early on in this dissertation. That

is, it is necessary to read Aristotle's works as unfinished texts, and that it is often necessary to follow Aristotle's lead and to fill in gaps. In the above passage Walker touches on what is a reasonable solution to the problem that is presented when he states that Aristotle is only opposed to irrelevant emotional appeals and recognizes the need to emotionally guide the listener. I shall discuss this solution below, but first the "depravity" of the common citizens bears consideration. In *Rhetoric* 3.7 Aristotle could be seen as throwing in the idealist ethical towel. That is, perhaps due to his frustration with the moral integrity or intellectual capacity of the listeners, he follows a line of reasoning that is the complete opposite of his first comments where he states that it is wrong to emotionally warp the listeners. For, as Wardy informs us, in this chapter of his treatise, Aristotle appears to advocate unconscionable emotional manipulation in the style of Gorgias:

*Rhetoric* 3.7 establishes a particular connection between effective word choice and oratorical working on the *pathe* of the auditors: "Appropriate phrasing also enhances plausibility; for the soul reasons as if the truth were being spoken, because people's attitude to things like this is such that they think that things are as the speaker says, even if they are not; and the listener always sympathizes with [literally, "shares the *pathos* of"] someone who speaks with *pathos*, even if what he says amounts to nothing" (1408a19-24). This is almost undiluted Gorgias, whose rhetorical psychology is nothing but psychopathology, the theory of the dominance of the passive *psyche* by the active *logos*. Its mention of cognitive error induced by emotional distortion confirms that the passage is prescribing full-scale emotional manipulation, not mere appeal to emotions that might *complement* true *logos*. If his auditors are reasoning faultily, that must be because their supposition that this orator speaks the truth is false; his "appropriate" phrasing – appropriate for deception – has cozened them. This orator is a sophisticated rhetorician pure and simple, a rampant instance of Plato's worst nightmare (and the persuasive paragon of *The Encomium of Helen*) come to life. And consider Aristotle's last, deflationary, remark: most orators really are "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Listening to them is like being hit over the head (Mighty, 79).

The words "as if the truth were being spoken" from Aristotle's text above glare out at the reader, especially when Aristotle's extreme position against emotional manipulation is kept in mind. As Wardy states, this is undiluted Gorgias, and Aristotle is, in effect,

advocating pure, unmitigated manipulation. Here Aristotle is, to my mind, simply admitting that Gorgias was right in certain cases, whether we like it or not. He is admitting that another type of rhetoric, a psychagogic, or “soul-guiding” rhetoric, which, in Mortara Garavelli’s words, does not need to prove a case by technically impeccable means, but instead derives its power of persuasion “mediante la atracción que la palabra, sabiamente manipulada, podía ejercer sobre los espectadores” (18). That is, the objective was “la reacción emotiva, no la adhesión racional” (18-19). And so Aristotle here is quite possibly just facing facts: sometimes it is necessary to snow the public with nonsense. This would fit well with recent newscasts in Spain and France on national television when the figures of the current economic crisis are discussed. It is often impossible for the average viewer to understand what the graphs and tables mean, and the viewer is left baffled and perhaps dazed, which is no doubt better than the opposite possibility. That is, a presentation of the reality of the crisis that might end up angering the citizens who might then start demonstrating or, even worse in the eyes of those holding power, start rioting or a revolution.

The two extremes and the various positions that might be taken in between have been a subject for discussion throughout history. Kennedy tells us that Quintilian made reference to the emotion-free use of rhetorical argument as practiced by the Stoics:

Quintilian gives a glimpse of the Stoic theory, though he does not mention the Stoics, when he says . . . that some have thought the sole duty of the orator (*oratoris officium*) is to teach, and they have excluded all appeals to the emotions on the grounds that perturbation of mind is a fault, that the judge ought not to be distracted from the truth, and that it is unworthy of a man to seek to charm his audience in pursuit of a rhetorical victory (Persuasion, 292).

And so the question remains: what is the appropriate stance to take? Ought emotions enter into rhetorical argument or not? Wardy, while addressing *Rhetoric* 3.7 with its admission that orators are full of sound and fury yet saying nothing, nevertheless credits



Aristotle with a major achievement in his categorization of the two basic uses of emotions:

The modes of persuasion [i.e., emotional pleas] ostensibly rejected in 1.1 are clearly detailed later in the *Rhetoric* and most certainly do not conform to a program of exclusively rationalistic persuasion . . . one of the crowning virtues of Aristotelian philosophy of mind is precisely that it permits us to drive a wedge between the concepts of emotional appeal and of emotional manipulation (Mighty, 62-63).

Wardy's comments are insightful. There is a difference between emotional appeal and emotional manipulation. Identifying this difference is the first and highly important step towards the ethical use of emotions in persuasion. Chiron provides a concise and insightful discussion of what could have been the evolution of Aristotle's thought in this regard:

- 1) One is that 1.1 introduces an ideal rhetoric that limits itself to arguing the issue. That ideal is put aside in 1.2, where Aristotle turns to real political oratory, which includes emotional appeal. The trouble with this response is that emotional appeal need not be hostile to arguing the issue. Indeed, arguing the issue may arouse an appropriate emotion.
- 2) [C]riticism in 1.1 is narrowly directed against contemporaries of Aristotle who were prepared to arouse emotions by non-discursive means like cries and tears and wry faces. But nowhere in 1.1 does Aristotle suggest that his criticism has such a restricted target. Indeed, it seems natural to read the text as a sweeping rejection of all forms of emotional appeal. For that reason, I much prefer a third answer:
- 3) 1.2 and 2.1-11 reflect a development in Aristotle's thought. We know from Plato's *Philebus* and Aristotle's *Topics* that during Aristotle's residence in the Platonic Academy the relation between emotion and thought was a subject of discussion. Aristotle came to see thought as the efficient cause of emotional response, and that encouraged him to adopt a new and friendlier attitude toward emotional appeal. Changing thoughts is what orators do, and when the change is accomplished through reasonable arguments that result in emotional response, then the orator has done nothing wrong. He is performing his task in an artful manner (117-18).

Chiron's statement that Aristotle came to view thought as the efficient cause of emotional response is crucial to this discussion. Aristotle has laid the groundwork for 20<sup>th</sup> century cognitive psychology, which asserts that what one thinks determines how one feels, and that emotions play a role in our reasoning process, especially in relation to evaluation and judgment. The emotions form part of ethical reasoning. They are not

to be the focus, however, as Oksenberg Rorty asserts: “And although he [Aristotle] denies that rhetoricians are primarily concerned with swaying the emotions of their audiences, he manifestly thinks that this is an important feature of rhetorical argument” (7). The emotions are crucial, but are not to take the place of *logos*, in Aristotle’s version of rhetoric. As Ross states, “[Aristotle] himself recognises the part played by the appeal to emotion, but insists that the emotion must be produced by the speech itself and not by the cheap adventitious devices common in the Greek law-courts” (280). The devices that Ross is referring to are those already mentioned. That is, for example, parading one’s wife and children in order to appeal to pity, declaring all the good things that a person has done in order to detract from the crime committed, and so on.

Aristotle’s position was also important with respect to his teacher and friend, Plato. Wardy writes of the significance of Aristotle’s stance as opposed to that held in the Academy:

The consequences for rhetorical oratory could not be more radical. Whatever version of the Platonic soul one chooses, Platonic emotions are irrational, not in the sense that they are reducible to, for example, simple tastes or tactile feelings, but rather because they are, by definition, unmotivated and unmodified by the full-blown, active rationality most evident in philosophical *logos*. In complete contrast, Aristotelian emotions are permeated by reason. When I, for instance, unhappily perceive it *as* unfortunate: cognitive, evaluative, and affective responses are, apart from pathological cases, typically indissoluble (Mighty, 63).

Wardy rightly states that the emotions are inseparable from thought in evaluative thought. If an event is perceived as unfortunate, the corresponding emotion mirrors the thought. As such, Aristotle’s work on the emotions stands as an achievement in emotional psychology, due to the linking of emotion with rational processes and with discourse. As Konstan asserts: “Aristotle was also offering an account [of emotions] that corresponded far better to the actual way in which appeals to emotion worked in discourse than other writers had done” (419). And so Aristotle in his discussion of the emotions in relation with *logos* has presented a middle position that squares with

common sense. Humans are not machines that reason with cold logic. The emotions enter into the decisions we make as valid and necessary components in the process, as Kennedy asserts:

In Book 2, chs. 2-11, Aristotle's inclusion of emotion as a mode of persuasion, despite his objections to the handbooks, is a recognition that among human beings judgment is not entirely a rational act. There are morally valid emotions in every situation, and it is part of the orator's duty to clarify these in the minds of the audience (Rhetoric, 39 – footnote 43).

Our rational processes are inextricably linked to our emotions, and, as Kennedy brings to the fore in the above excerpt, the emotions are tightly linked with morality.

We can conclude, therefore, that, in Aristotle's version of rhetoric, appeals to the emotions are both necessary and legitimate, and not irrelevant, provided the speaker is doing so in an ethical way. As we have already stated, rhetoric is not, in Aristotle's opinion, to be used for evil ends. Thus, provided the influencing of emotions is done ethically, this type of rhetorical activity is fair game. Frede's commentary supports the idea of a fair use of emotional appeal:

“Working on the audience's feelings” (1377b28-31) is a legitimate part of oratory. Although it is not part of a proof of the subject matter (“outside the demonstration,” 1378a7), it is a legitimate part of speaking to the subject as long as it is not used as a mere camouflage for speaking “outside the subject matter.” . . . in forensic speech the emotions are used to explain the defendant's actions; when it comes to the audience's dispositions it is rather a matter of influencing their judgment (265).

Frede takes the stance that to guide the audience emotionally is not unfair, but necessary. Interesting here is her erroneous conclusion that, in Aristotle's version of rhetoric, emotional appeals are not part of a proof of the subject matter. For the emotions (*pathos*) are, in Aristotle's definition, a proof. The emotions themselves persuade us that a given argument is true or not and are, for Aristotle, part of the proof of an argument's validity. Frede's error is no doubt due to a desire to separate rational processes from emotions. But in Aristotelian rhetorical thinking, emotions form a crucial part of the judgment process. Aristotle views their use as negative and irrelevant

only when they are used unethically and without a connection to the details of the case at hand. That is, when emotions are not used as an appeal, but instead as unfair or irrelevant manipulation. Brunschwig details what Aristotle viewed as “outside the demonstration”:

*Pathos* can find its legitimate place in the overall repertory of available technical means. This condition is precisely stated, in the description of the entechanical *pathos*, by the phrase *hupo tou logou* (1356a14): appealing to the passions is an entechanical practice when the *pathos* is raised in the audience “by the speech itself” (in contradistinction with nondiscursive means, like cries, tears, gesticulations, wry faces, or the production of moaning women or weeping children) (46).

Here again we see the importance given by Aristotle to *logos*. That is, that if the emotions are to be influenced, in Aristotle’s version of rhetoric this is to be done in the arguments of the text itself, not by histrionics or by bringing out crying women and babies.

The ethical use of *pathos* is, in Aristotle’s system, carried out through *logos* which, as Striker points out, functions in order to highlight the morally important aspects of a case. Striker here is discussing deliberative rhetoric, but the emotions play a part in all three rhetorical genres, due to the fact that some sort of judgment is made in each type:

The role of emotion as described by Aristotle seems rather to be that of directing one’s attention to the practically or morally relevant features of a situation: “Fear makes people good at deliberation,” as he puts it in *Rhetoric* 2.5.1383a6–7 . . . It is the right kind of emotional disposition that enables the morally virtuous person to see or recognize what is the best in any situation. A bad person, by contrast, might be described as morally blind: not only will she fail to notice the relevant aspects of a situation but even if someone told her “what is best,” she might fail to recognize it as the best. If this is correct, then the Aristotelians have a stronger argument to use against those who would rid us of our passions than just that emotions seem to be a natural phenomenon. They could claim that *our capacity for emotional responses is what alerts us to morally important features of situations that we need to take into account in attempting to arrive at a rational judgment* . . . In the contest of deliberation, an emotional response can be described as one that is in proportion to the good or evil perceived, and hence adequate, if the initial impression holds up under reflective scrutiny (298 – my italics).

Striker makes the very important point that a virtuous person will have the appropriate response to a particular situation, as opposed to a bad person, who will not. (Aristotle makes this same point in his work on ethics.) It is the emotions that act as the guides by alerting us to what matters in any particular rhetorical event. The obvious problem here is how to determine who the virtuous person is and who the vice-ridden person is. This, however, is precisely what a rhetorical approach to analyzing literature can make possible: the opening of a conversation on what is ethically right or wrong, or on what a definition of the good life is.<sup>94</sup> And here Striker's insightful comment that a judgment must hold up under reflective scrutiny is crucial, for the evaluation of a decision or of an action may vary over time. Ethical evaluations that do not change over time after ongoing examination often prove true. Striker's observation also sheds light on the complexity and difficulty of reaching a judgment that will manage to withstand the test of both time and extensive analysis.

Aristotle's work changed the way emotions were to be viewed subsequently in rhetorical theory, as Chiron asserts:

Recognizing the involvement of thought in emotional response had important consequences for rhetoric. In particular, emotional appeal could no longer be viewed as an extra-rational force that works on an audience in the manner of a drug or enchantment (cf. Gorgias, *Helen* 10-19). . . . Through argument, the orator controls what a listener believes, and in this way he arouses an emotional response. To be sure, argument can be misused so that inappropriate emotions are aroused or emotions are intensified in an unreasonable way. But the possibility of misusing emotional appeal does not mean that all emotional appeal must be condemned. An orator of wisdom, virtue and goodwill advances reasonable arguments, and in doing so, he excites emotional responses that are appropriate to the situation (117).

Chiron's comments add to the already discussed departure Aristotle made with respect to views put forth in Plato's *Gorgias*. Aristotle's treatise broke important ground in the way that emotions were to be viewed from that moment onward. The emotions, as

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<sup>94</sup> Charles Taylor writes that "moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life . . ." (3). In this way, he broadens the scope of moral philosophy's possible concerns.

Aristotle defines them, form part of the rational process. They are inseparable from reason. Aristotle's emotions are, in effect, syllogistic. In the excerpt above Chiron also brings out the important notion that *logos* can also be used to unfairly manipulate emotions and thus distort the judgment of the listeners. This idea highlights the audience's responsibility to be critical in its reception of and response to the arguments themselves in order not to be emotionally swept away by a manipulative speaker or writer towards poor judgments, whether in terms of reason, ethics, or both.

Obviously, Aristotle did not invent the use of emotions to influence judgment. As Kennedy informs us, "These emotions, filial love, pity, reverence of the gods, respect for the aged, are feelings to which orators appealed throughout antiquity" (Persuasion, 93). (Along these lines it is interesting that Aristotle's *De anima* is not the best place for finding discussions on the emotions in antiquity; rather, works on rhetoric, such as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or Cicero's *De inventione* provide extensive discussion in this regard. Another related text in this regard is Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*.)

Aristotle provides a list of emotions which he analyzes in terms of how they function. The good orator will have a good grasp on all of the emotions and how they function, for Aristotle states that "if we understood one or two of these [emotions] but not all, it would be impossible to create anger [in someone]" (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 113).<sup>95</sup>

At this point citing Aristotle's definition of the emotions and how they function bears re-examining:

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<sup>95</sup> John M. Cooper writes: "He [Aristotle] gives separate, formal treatment to twelve, in the following order: feeling angry (*orge*), feeling mildly (*praotes*), feeling friendly (*philia*, i.e., *to philein*), feeling hatred (*misos*), feeling afraid (*phobos*), feeling confident in the face of danger (*tharrein*), feeling disgraced (*aischune*), feeling kindly (*charin echein*), pity (*eleos*), righteous indignation (*nemesan*), envy (*phthonos*), and feeling eagerness to match the accomplishments of others (*zelos*). Aristotle also examines *schadenfreude* and experiencing disdainful and pleasurable feeling at the punishment or other come-down of those who deserve it" (242).

8. The emotions [*pathe*] are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 113).

The two aspects that Aristotle brings to the fore here are 1) the emotions change while at the same time changing the judgment of the person experiencing them, and 2) they are characterized by pain and pleasure. Aristotle's discussion of the emotions shows which underlying motive is in operation with each as well as their respective targets.

Aristotle's definition of anger will provide a typical example:

1. Let anger be [defined as] desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for apparent retaliation because of an apparent slight that was directed, without justification, against oneself or those near to one. . . and a kind of pleasure follow all experience of anger from the hope of getting retaliation (116).

Anger is the result of an unjustified apparent offence against a person or those near to her. The perception of this offence is accompanied by pain (i.e., distress) at the injustice of the offence. Once the offence has been perceived as such, anger turns into a desire for revenge that is accompanied by pleasure. In this model, the syllogistic nature of the emotions can be seen, as well as how they function in relation to judgment, on the one hand, and as stimulants for action, on the other. This means that a rhetor, through her arguments, could present a situation as an example of an unjustified offence, which the listeners would experience as pain – the pain of injustice. The logic is quite simple: since someone has been unjustly offended, pain at this injustice is experienced. Since an injustice has been experienced, a desire for retaliation emerges. The rhetor then could work on the desire for revenge by presenting possibilities to the audience to be later put into action. John M. Cooper provides a concise summary of Aristotle's method:

After giving his definition of the specific state of feeling, he goes on to discuss (not always in the same order) (a) what personal conditions or circumstances, especially what psychological conditions (what other feelings or beliefs, in general what frames of mind), make people apt to experience the feeling (*pos echontes* or *diakeimenoi*), (b) what sorts of people they do or do not feel the

feeling toward (*tisin* or *pros tinas*), and (c) what the occasions are of their having, or not having, the feeling for that kind of person (*epi poiois* or *dia poia*) (243).

Cooper outlines the three main aspects of Aristotle's analysis:

Aristotle seems to recognize three central elements as constituting the emotions – they are agitated, *affected* states of mind, arising from the ways events or conditions *strike* the one affected, which are at the same time *desires* for a specific range of reactive behaviors or other changes in the situation as it appears to her or him to be (251).

Here again the syllogistic nature of the emotions becomes clear. All three elements can also be detected in the narratives under study in this dissertation. The narrators' presentation of the events will strike the reader in a certain way, which will lead to thoughts that are accompanied by emotional pain or pleasure (depending on the moral evaluation made by the reader). This evaluation can be then shown to lead to a particular desire for a change in the situation on the part of the reader, which the narrator then provides as part of the narrative.

Aristotle's linking pain and pleasure as accompaniments to emotions is tied to ethics. In his view, it is the proper experiencing of pain or pleasure when evaluating situations that determines whether a person is virtuous or not. The emotions are the response to a stimulus (i.e., some situation or action), and are accompanied by either pain or pleasure. As Leighton writes, "The pleasure or pain is part of the concept of the emotion; neither is separable from the emotion" (220). We have already discussed Pascal's observation that, in the end, what we view as ethical are those things that are pleasing to us. But it is also the experience of both pain and pleasure that determines what is ethical in Aristotle's system. Ross explains how this notion functions in Aristotelian thought:

The best indication of a man's disposition is his feeling pleasure or pain in the doing of virtuous or vicious acts. Pleasure and pain may indeed be called the subject-matter of moral virtue. The pursuit of pleasure, the avoidance of pain, are the main sources of vicious action. Virtue is concerned with actions and feelings, and all of these are accompanied by pleasure or pain (201).



An individual will either feel pain or pleasure in the face of situations in which ethical judgment takes place, and this determines whether the same individual is evil or good. To experience pleasure upon evaluating an unethical situation would be an indicator of a person whose system of values is questionable. As accompaniments to emotions, pain and pleasure are in themselves amoral for Aristotle. They must be shaped according to an ethical system in order to be proper indicators of virtue:

The tendencies to feel pleasure and pain are not to be suppressed but to be moulded into the right shape . . . Aristotle neither praises nor condemns the tendencies inherent in man. They are indifferent in themselves; they become good or bad according as they are subjugated to or allowed to assert themselves against the ‘right rule’ which our reasonable nature grasps for itself and seeks to impose on them (201).

The notion of pain and pleasure as becoming good or bad depending on one’s experience of them in relation with emotions shows how both pain and pleasure are indicators of one’s system of values. As humans we use pain and pleasure as connected to particular emotions to guide us in our reactions to situations as well as in the moral choices we make. In Cooper’s evaluation, “the emotions as Aristotle represents them in the *Rhetoric* Book 2 are feelings either of being distressed and upset about something, or of being excited about and relishing something” (246). In this analysis, we can see that, in Aristotle’s method, one is first struck by a situation which has the corresponding effect of pain or pleasure, which then leads to desire, which is accompanied by pleasure. It is this process that the rhetor must understand and manage in order to persuade her listeners. Oksenberg Rorty writes along these lines:

Because Aristotle sees no need to develop a general theory about how *pathe* affect evaluative decisions, we can only extrapolate what he might say from his discussion of the aftermath of specific emotions – anger tends to lead to revenge, envy to emulation, and so on. The rhetorician evokes a cluster of *pathe*-laden memories: “Would your fathers have tolerated the persistent pattern of your neighbors’ provocations? Remember how our fathers’ responses to such challenges brought us both honor and benefit.” Having aroused the audience’s indignation and emulation, the rhetorician can direct their *phantasiai* of revenge or competition to actions that appear to satisfy long-standing attitudes and desires

(1385a21 ff., 1388a36 ff.). Even passions that are not immediately motivational – grief, for example – can be directed toward specific action-guiding *phantasiai*: for example, commissioning a memorial tribute of some kind (1384a24, 1385b16 ff., 1387b22 ff.) (17).

Oksenberg Rorty then outlines how the skillful rhetor will use his knowledge of the emotions to motivate his listeners into action:

A skillful rhetorician can persuade an audience to accept a course of action by eliciting *pathe* that are typically associated with an appropriate desire. For instance, if he wants to provoke his audience to revenge, he tries to make them angry by trying to convince them that former allies have unjustly injured the *polis* (1382a18 ff.). Or, if he wants to persuade his audience to retreat from an exposed position, he elicits fear by evoking vivid *phantasiai* of imminent danger (1382a20 ff.). In order for the rhetorician to form just the right sort of action-guiding desire, rather than whirligig diffuse *pathe*, he must be quite precise about the implications of his speech. Because *phantasiai* specify the intentional content of their associated *pathe*, they affect its typical concomitant desires: the pleasure of a specific sort of revenge in anger, for instance, rather than that of winning a race at the Olympics (19).

In the *recit de voyage* under study, the narrator makes appeals to the reader's emotions in order to be judged positively on several levels, one of the most important being his participation in the narration as an ethical agent. His aim – by means of what is, in effect, making his case – is for his readers to praise him for his actions, actions which, as we will see, could also be judged as unethical. In the fictional narrative, it is possible to see how the introduction of data relevant to the case modifies the emotional response as well as the corresponding judgment on the part of the reader. And it is in the evaluation of the narrator's use of rhetorical *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos* that it will be possible to bring to the surface the underlying system of values that function as the prime motor of the narrative. Once elements of a system of values is brought to the surface, it can then be evaluated in ethical terms. This will lead to a possible evaluation of narrators as well as readerships.

We can see, then, that emotions are, in Reinhardt's words, "knowledge-related." That is, they can be "explained with reference to judgments, opinions, and convictions of orator and audience alike; Aristotle holds that generating a certain emotion or set of

emotions on the part of the audience will require inducing them to make a series of judgements and evaluations” (Rhetoric, 376). The connection between *logos*, *pathos* and ethics can clearly be seen here in Reinhardt’s use of the terms judgments, opinions and convictions. The rational processes that we use when judging, holding an opinion or having a certain conviction are accompanied by emotions that we use to guide us in terms of quality and matters of morality.

Our judgments, opinions and convictions are not necessarily stable, and, depending on opposing arguments, can be modified. Striker comments on how rational processes affect the emotions:

Emotions are not based on reasoning, but, as Aristotle puts it, they (that is, the “part of the soul” to which they belong) can be persuaded by reason . . . This means not only that we can sometimes be talked out of an emotion by arguments to show that our first impression was mistaken; it also means that our reason-based beliefs and convictions will make us disposed to be impressed in certain ways and to have the corresponding emotional responses (299).

As Striker rightly asserts, we can have our minds changed by the arguments of others, and we can be shown to have been mistaken. Our emotions are changed depending on the argument. The possibility for error brings into focus the communal nature of our judgments and opinions as related to emotions. As humans we need others to aid us in evaluations we make on all levels. Skinner states that Montaigne discusses this instability of the emotional-rational process, which he asserts is in nearly if not constant flux:

There [in the ‘Apology’ for the Spanish theologian Raymond Sebond] he [Montaigne] insists that our beliefs are so deeply affected by our passions, and our passions so wayward in themselves, that even in legal arguments ‘an exceeding confusion of judgements must arise’. The inevitable outcome is that ‘what one company hath judged another will adjudge the contrary, and the very same will another time change opinion’ (128 – my brackets).

The communal aspect that our judgments depend on is brought out in Montaigne’s commentary, as well as the complexity involved in attempting to reach a final

conclusion on any matter, even legal ones.<sup>96</sup> Not only do we respond to the arguments of others, but our own arguments are subject to our own rational and emotional responses to them. There is a back-and-forth movement between the emotions and reason that enters into the decision-making process. We argue with others and with ourselves in order to reach a proper evaluation. It could be said that there is a dialectic between rational thought and the emotions, each influencing the other. This process, as stated above, does not occur in a vacuum, rather in a social context within a dialectic framework as Konstan asserts:

If Aristotle's conception of the emotions is cognitive and evaluative in nature . . . it is in no small part because he understands the emotions fundamentally as products of social exchanges, in which the stimulus takes the form of an intentional act and the response, in turn, is an evaluation of that act together with a corresponding action or disposition (416).

Konstan calls Aristotle's approach "surprisingly cognitive-mediational" (412). That is, argumentation produces emotions that allow the audience to judge properly in a social setting where discourse is the medium for the exchange of ideas:

If cognition, as opposed to instinctive reaction, indeed plays so central a role in Aristotle's analysis of emotion, the reason in no small part is precisely the tendency to treat emotion in the context of dialogue and persuasion (412).

In this setting of dialogue and persuasion where the possibility to err looms large, the proper guiding of emotional reactions is crucial. This is the task of the rhetor, who must present a case through *logos*, meanwhile eliciting an emotional response that matches the case itself. To the facts of the case and the story itself must be added an emotional element, for it is through our emotional response that we evaluate on the level of morality. It is only through the proper guiding of emotions that that justice can be

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<sup>96</sup> Heidegger makes the following observations on publicness as a mode of being, and its relationship to the emotions in the *Rhetoric*: "Aristotle investigates the *pathe* [affects] in the second book of his *Rhetoric*. Contrary to the traditional orientation, this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another. Publicness, as the kind of Being which belongs to the "they" not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and "makes" them for itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright" (As quoted in Kennedy – *Rhetoric*, 115).

achieved. The audience's judgment must be influenced; this is legitimate use of *pathos* as proof. As the possibility to err is present, the audience may, without the proper guidance, not experience the emotions proper to the particular case. Cooper comments on this possibility in his analysis of Aristophanes' *Wasps*:

As Euxitheus notes in his opening statement (*prooimion*) in defence of the murder of Herodes, many innocent people, who had lacked speaking ability, were condemned because they were unconvincing in arguing the truth, whereas many others, who were able speakers, were acquitted because they were convincing with their lies (206).

As Cooper states above, falsehood can be passed off as truth, provided the spokesperson is capable of persuading through argument and the appropriate emotional responses. Cooper's discussion underscores the importance of being able to convince an audience of the truth, for facts do not necessarily speak for themselves. The truth of a particular case, it seems, needs a spokesperson:

Neither the testimony of the witnesses (*martyriai*) nor the narration of facts (*erga*) is sufficient to get across the seriousness of the offence. And here is where emotionally charged appeals often contained in the proof section of a forensic speech become so important in achieving the vividness needed to recreate the outrage (208).

The vividness that Cooper mentions can be created by narrative, as well as reasoned argument. Unless a case is presented in a way so that an emotional response that is appropriate to the case at hand is elicited, the possibility to misinterpret and to therefore judge inadequately exists. It is here that the orator's skill is crucial in order to get the audience to see things as he wishes them to be seen:

An orator who seeks to produce a certain attitude in his audience need not, and in most cases does not, intend to get his listeners to proceed to immediate action. His aim is to make them see the case at hand in a certain way: to look favorably upon his client or upon the orator himself, or to take a negative view of his opponent. Which attitude they have will depend crucially, as Aristotle says, on the emotions they feel toward the persons involved in the case (Striker, 291-293).

But it is not only the seriousness of the offence that needs getting across. At times the law itself is ambiguous or difficult to interpret. Here, too, emotions aid in guiding the

audience to the spirit, as opposed to the letter, of the law. Cooper tells us that this was the case in Athens:

As Carey rightly notes, “the jurors are asked to become emotionally involved”, and far from being extraneous [they are] relevant as they helped to define juristically the issue at stake, since the law itself was not always a clear guide (207 – my brackets).

Not only does the argument need to convince, it also needs to “feel” right. This is a common human experience: we often listen to someone who is very convincing in terms of logic, but, as the colloquial expression goes, “It just doesn’t feel right!” Thought and feelings need to mesh with each other in order for humans to be convinced of the truth of an argument or an evaluation.

In addition to the use of emotions when defining an issue, Cooper also makes the important point that the emotions are necessary to make it possible for the speaker “to grab and sustain the attention of the dicasts” (210). Keeping the attention of one’s listener is made possible by producing the proper emotional response. The same holds true for writers: they must be adept at engaging their readers emotionally if they want their readers to finish the work they have produced. In the case of narrative, the ethics of the story, not just the events, are what “hook” the reader emotionally, for we as humans want to know why things happen in order to judge the events that have been narrated from our own value-laden reference point.

Cooper’s discussion refers to judicial settings, and therefore is related to the values of the community in which the trials occur. The shared values are the basis on which the judgments are made:

In Athens juries were extensions of the community at large, sharing the same social values as the litigants, and it is to these shared values that litigants must direct their emotional appeals and arguments (207).

Even though a community shares values, the emotional reaction to a particular issue or case may be mistaken. The possibility to err in terms of an emotional response exists on

two levels. Firstly, the emotions that a particular individual experiences may not be appropriate to a particular case. This then, would be a matter of shaping the individual's emotions towards a proper response through education. The other possibility would be an individual that in general does respond appropriately on an emotional level to morally charged situations, but who does not view a particular case from a perspective that allows for an appropriate response. It is the latter case that a rhetor must be able to correct. That is, the rhetor must be able to present a case in the proper light so that her audience will respond with the proper emotions, and thereby reach a fair and appropriate judgment. Martha Nussbaum writes along these same lines:

Emotions, in Aristotle's view, are not always correct, any more than beliefs or actions are always correct. They need to be educated, and brought into harmony with a correct view of the good human life. But, so educated, they are not just essential as forces motivating to virtuous action, they are also, as I have suggested, recognitions of truth and value. And as such they are not just instruments of virtue, they are constituent parts of virtuous agency: virtue, as Aristotle says again and again, is a "mean disposition" (disposition to pursue the appropriate) "with regard to both passions and actions" (*NE* 1105b25-26, 1106b16-17, etc.) (316).

In Nussbaum's discussion above we can see that emotions need to be educated in order to be indicators of right and wrong, truth and falsehood. Aristotle's "mean disposition," which Nussbaum calls a disposition to pursue the appropriate, would be based, obviously, on the system of values that Aristotle held. This system of values is, as I have argued earlier on in this dissertation, in my opinion, open to scrutiny. It is reasonable to assume that Aristotle himself would be open to entering into a dialogue on the merits or flaws of his own system. I have also stated above in my discussion that even within the same community there will be difference of opinion on the system of values held by its members. Where no difference of opinion is present, rhetoric is unnecessary. It is therefore the job of the rhetor to legitimately guide the emotions of

her listeners through argument. This task will always be carried out from the standpoint of the community's system of values.

Now if emotional dispositions are what underlie virtue of character, the influence of emotion on judgment cannot be regarded as merely distorting, a distraction, as it were, from rational thought. An orator's attempt to arouse or dispel emotions should also not be seen as mere manipulation, or as an attempt to produce conviction by illegitimate means. If morally good people can be expected to have certain characteristic emotional responses, then, the influence of emotions may sometimes be what is needed to see things in the right way. For example, it may be perfectly appropriate for a speaker to remind the people in the audience of services rendered to the community by his client, so as to make them feel grateful; and it may be equally legitimate to arouse pity for the victim of an undeserved misfortune. If the audience were impervious to such feelings, it might well arrive at an unfair or overly harsh verdict. Since emotion will have an influence on how we see and judge people and their actions, the right kind of emotional disposition may be what enables us to see things in the right moral perspective (Striker, 297-298).

In Striker's discussion we can see again that a speaker has a responsibility to direct her listeners towards experiencing the right kind of emotional response in order to reach a judgment that is ethically correct. And so, although Aristotle in the third book of his *Rhetoric* allows for persuasion based on word choice that has no truth value, on the whole, the aim when influencing the emotions is not to manipulate, but to guide listeners towards an appropriate emotional response based on arguments that do not exist in isolation. That is, as Walker affirms, the community's discursive framework will contain various perspectives which could be argued forcefully. Properly guided emotions will be the indicators of proper judgment:

This is not to say that rhetoric as a *techne* of emotional *katharsis* is an art merely of irrational emotion-mongering via stylistic manipulation. Rather, it is to say that, insofar as enthymematic argumentation in rhetoric (or perhaps any argumentation whatsoever) is necessarily always engaged with the shaping and guiding of an audience's *pathe*, and insofar as the structure of emotion is itself "enthymematic" or "syllogistic," and insofar as the *pathe* rise from cognitive frameworks that typically (and in a debate necessarily) will include *competing premises*, it will never be sufficient for the rhetor merely to declare the "premises" that should conduce to one or another mode of emotion-intention-judgment-action in the practical reasoning of an audience (Pathos, 85).



We see here again the idea that merely stating the argument is insufficient to persuade. The emotions must enter into play, in order for the audience to be able to judge or evaluate. Also important in the above passage is that the same system of values will necessarily have opposing positions, which must be argued using both *logos* and *pathos*. Perelman adds nuance to the arguments above, stating that even in the selection of elements to be presented to the audience their importance is made evident:

By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a *presence*, which is an essential factor in argumentation and one that is far too much neglected in rationalistic conceptions of reasoning (Treatise, 116).

It could be argued that mere selection and presentation must be accompanied by arguments that, through guiding the emotions, reveal their significance in order to persuade the audience. Still, Perelman's argument that endowing elements with presence increases their emotional impact on the audience thereby augments their capacity to move the audience into action is significant. In this sense, narrative can also be seen as the making present of an event through discourse with the objective of influencing the audience in a particular way.

Walker, in the passage cited earlier, brings to the fore the idea that within the same community there will be competing arguments on the same issue.<sup>97</sup> Obviously, the arguments will be based on ethical standpoints that are open to dispute. We have already stated above that an emotional response is a reaction to the perception of good and/or evil, and that the response will be an indicator of an individual's virtue or lack thereof. Due to ambiguities in Aristotle's texts, the question arises whether Aristotle's objective was for the readers of his treatise to strive towards moral excellence in their

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<sup>97</sup> Cooper brings the idea of competing emotional stances into focus: "The orator's purpose [with regard to emotional state of mind] is actually to make his hearers feel in some of these ways, and prevent them from feeling in other ways, toward specific persons on given occasions and circumstances (toward his client in a judicial case, for example), and to use these feelings to direct or influence their judgment" (Cooper – Aristotelian, 241).

rhetoric or to give in to the *mochtheria*, that is, to the unruly mob that made up the audience. In this regard, Oksenberg Rorty interprets Aristotle as follows:

The rhetorician is concerned with the typical psychology of the ambitious youth or the power-hungry demagogue rather than with the idealized psychology of the *phronimos* or that of the relatively noble tragic protagonist. Even the best deliberative rhetorician attempting to persuade his audience of significant benefits and dangers can only rely on rough generalizations about the psychology – the interests, motives, and habits – that might be typical of potential allies and enemies. He can only address the fears and hatreds that are typical of various audiences, presenting considerations that are, at best, only likely to move them to pity or emulation. Instead of resembling a quasi-scientific treatise on breeding the best, most fertile chickens, the *Rhetoric* is like a treatise telling farmers how to get ordinary chickens to lay good eggs (10-11).

Rather than appealing to *phronimoi*, the rhetorician's aim in Oksenberg Rorty's view is to reach garden variety members of the community. Her interpretation is that Aristotle has his sights set at the middle, or lower middle in terms of *arête* – excellence as related to virtue. Striker, however, believes Aristotle had higher aims:

Aristotle no doubt expects a virtuous person's emotions to be in line with "what the person of practical wisdom would determine" (*NE* 2.6.1107a1) because her spontaneous reactions will not be independent of her education, her previous experience, and the advice of others (299).

As discussed earlier on in this dissertation, a person of practical wisdom is a *phronimos*, the ideal in terms of ethics and knowledge of appropriate decision-making and action in the *polis*. A middle stance is also possible with respect to Aristotle's aims. It is possible that he wrote his treatise with a view to accommodating all types of audiences and situations. That is, Aristotle could have simply taken a realistic stance towards the social reality of his day. If this is true, the contents of his treatise interpreted as applicable to contemporary socio-political reality as well.

In any case, and in order round off the discussion of *pathos* in my reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, we can consider what scholars have said with respect to which emotions ought to be aroused in a rhetorical event. We have already mentioned that emotions such as filial love, pity and reverence for the gods were feelings that were

typically appealed to in antiquity. In a judicial setting, however, Kennedy states that the prosecution used one emotion more than the others, while the defense used another:

The prosecution makes most use of indignation or anger, which the speaker tries to arouse against the crime and person of the defendant. The latter needs most of all to arouse the feeling of pity. . . A clever orator is not content to leave pathos entirely to the end of a speech; much of his art consists in the subtle way in which he insinuates his cause into the soul of his hearers, evoking their unconscious sympathy, horror, astonishment, and indignation as the case unfolds (Persuasion, 94).

Important here is, in addition to the emotions most used by prosecution and defense, the list of other emotions that the litigants wished to insinuate into their listeners' souls (*psyches*) throughout the process of the case at hand. This means that a variety of emotions can enter into play in rhetorical persuasion, and that their use is significant and necessary in order to reach a proper judgment. Konstan writes that Cicero provides a list of the crucial emotions that a good orator must seek to arouse:

Cicero, in his essay *On the Orator* (2.206), observes that the most important emotions that an orator must aspire to arouse are 'love, hate, anger, envy, pity, hope, joy, fear, and distress' (*amor, odium, iracundia, invidia, misericordia, spes, laetitia, timor, molestia*) (422).

This list may seem unreasonably long, but Cicero defines a great speech by its audience's experiencing an outright roller-coaster of varied emotions:

In the *Brutus* (188) . . . Cicero says that a crowd listening to a good speaker 'feels pleasure and pain, laughs and cries, hates, scorns, envies, is moved to pity, shame, and disgust, grows angry, calms down, hopes, and fears' (*gaudet, dolet, ridet, plorat, favet, odit, contemnit, invidet, ad misericordiam inducitur, ad pudendum, ad pigendum, irascitur, mitigatur, sperat, timet*) (422-23).

What is particularly interesting about Cicero's conception of a good speaker is the limits to which he has taken an idea presented in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and expanded upon it. It is important to keep in mind that, while Cicero's description of a crowd's reaction to what he calls a good speaker is quantitatively impressive, the qualitative aspect remains all-important in Aristotle's framework. Still, Cicero's commentary stands as a highly

significant contribution to rhetoric's evolution and development, and reveals the multi-faceted nature of this complex discipline.

## 2.8 ETHOS

Evidence for *ethos* as a component of oratory can, according to Kennedy, be found as early as Homer's *Iliad*. When Agamemnon engages in debate with Achilles, his personal authority and the impression he creates give weight to his argument (Persuasion, 37). In the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E., the legendary founders of rhetoric, Tisias and Corax, also placed emphasis on this aspect of argumentation (McCroskey, 83). *Ethos* formed part of 5<sup>th</sup> century Athenian speech writer and politician Antiphon's rhetorical strategies as well:

In practice as early as Antiphon a Greek orator concentrates in the prooemium on presenting the character of the speaker in a favorable light. Usually, like Socrates in the *Apology*, the speaker claims to be unskilled in speaking, simple, honest, deserving, but caught up in circumstances; his opponent is sly, cunning, and worthless (Kennedy – Persuasion, 91).

In Part 4 of this dissertation, the narrator of the *recit de voyage* under study has similar aims. The narrator of “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler” attempts to present himself in the best light possible, meanwhile denigrating other characters as well as social and political institutions in the narrative with a view to enhancing the impression he creates of his own character. In the fictional case that Gass creates, it is the woman's moral integrity that is in the balance. Each detail provided as background is at the same time a reflection on her character, which influences the reader's judgment of her actions.

We have already discussed Plato's shifting stance with regards to rhetoric. He takes an anti-rhetorical stance in the *Gorgias*, yet in the *Apology* uses rhetorical skills with great aplomb to “preserve the character and principles of Socrates” in a way which has “won the good will of posterity” (150). Kennedy tells us that although Socrates does not, in his defense, use flattery or emotional appeal, and although his argument is not developed by formulae characteristic of the courtroom, he nevertheless uses “many of the commonplaces and in general observes the rules for oratorical participation (prooemium, narration, refutation of charges, a section demonstrating his character,

peroration) with the aim of “demonstrating moral integrity by specifically rejecting the usual pathetic conventions” (151). As we can see, Plato’s aim was to use *ethos* in order to persuade and convince his readers of Socrates’ moral integrity, and to present his character in a favorable light.<sup>98</sup> As Plato’s Socrates defines in the *Phaedrus* what he calls a true rhetoric, we can assume that, in the *Apology*, Socrates is putting his definition into practice.

Walzer, Tiffany and Gross inform us that *ethos*, in the framework of the *Rhetoric*, has three components: “Aristotle describes *ethos* as a tripartite complex consisting of *phronesis* (practical wisdom), *arête* (moral virtue), and *eunoia* (good will)” (194). These three aspects that make up the *ethos* complex have withstood the test of time. The terms themselves have changed, but their essence remains constant:

Twenty-three hundred years later, three social psychologists, Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janus, and Harold H. Kelly, when studying source credibility, identified the dimensions as expertness, trustworthiness, and intention towards the receiver. When we examine these writings, we find remarkable similarity. Aristotle and the three psychologists agree that a source is judged by an audience in terms of her or his knowledge of the subject of discourse, veracity, and attitude toward the well-being of the audience (McCroskey, 85).

According to McCroskey, the power of *ethos* has been proven scientifically to be the most valid constituent of rhetorical proof:

Of all the aspects of classical rhetorical theory, the one that has the greatest support from modern empirical research is the theoretical importance of *ethos* in rhetorical communication. Almost without exception, experimental studies have demonstrated the power of *ethos* (83).

McCroskey asserts that *ethos* has maintained its status as a powerful force in argumentation, a position it has maintained since rhetoric’s legendary founders taught Syracusans how to defend themselves in litigation:

Since the days of Corax and Tisias, rhetorical theorists have been concerned with the role of *ethos* in communication. During this twenty-four-hundred-year period,

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<sup>98</sup> Interestingly, Xenophon’s Socrates was less “rhetorical” with respect to *ethos*, and “dealt immediately and directly with the charges made” (151).

Aristotle's view that *ethos* is the most potent means of persuasion has seldom been challenged (83).<sup>99</sup>

We have seen that Aristotle does state that *ethos* is perhaps the most powerful of the *pisteis* he has identified in his construct of rhetoric. He makes this affirmation in spite of his initial stated desire for *logos* to be the central proof. *Ethos*, like *pathos*, is in Aristotle's system to be used to influence the pending judgment to be made. Judgment, as we have been saying, is always part of the rhetorical process. Aristotle makes this clear in his treatise, as well as the role *ethos* plays in this regard:

2. But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what is said in deliberation, and judicial proceedings are also a judgment), it is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the judge;

3. for it makes much difference in regard to persuasion (especially in deliberations but also in trials) that the speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed toward them in a certain way and in addition if they, too, happen to be disposed a certain way [favorably or unfavorably to him] (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 112 – author's brackets).

Aristotle does not mention epideictic rhetoric in the above passage, but, as we have already stated, judgment is necessarily involved with this genre also. Thus, in epideictic rhetoric, the importance of creating a good impression on the audience also takes on great importance when attempting to persuade. In the excerpt above Aristotle refers to *logos* when he states that it is necessary to look to the argument, but then immediately speaks of the rhetorician's need to construct an image of herself as a certain type of person in order to prepare the judge. The similarity with *pathos* in this regard is obvious. Aristotle's text here is crabbed, but the conclusion that can be drawn is that the speaker must create an image of herself as being a friend to the audience, which will dispose the latter towards a favorable judgment. If the speaker does not manage to

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<sup>99</sup> With respect to the tremendous power of *ethos*, Skinner tells us that Hobbes, like Livy, "suggests . . . that the rise of new religions may depend less on the content of their creeds than on the success of their founders at establishing themselves in the eyes of the populace as persons of wisdom and sincerity . . . The successful establishment of *ethos* may be sufficient in itself to induce belief" (360-361).

present a friendly image but instead creates a hostile one, the judgment will not be favorable. In this sense we can see the importance of creating kinship with one's audience. The friend/foe dichotomy that we as humans use to determine whether or not we will work together with or against another individual or group of individuals is evident here. If it is true that in love relationships opposites are at times attracted to one another, in persuasion things work quite the other way around: like attracts like. Aristotle then goes on to mention what he considers three aspects of *ethos* that he views as necessary in order to manage to persuade an audience, which McCroskey rewords, as stated above, as expertness, trustworthiness, and intention:

5. There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are three things we trust other than logical demonstration. These are practical wisdom [*phronesis*] and virtue [*arete*] and good will [*eunoia*]; for speakers make mistakes in what they say through [failure to exhibit] either all or one of these;

6. for either through lack of practical sense they do not form opinions rightly; or though forming opinions rightly they do not say what they think because of a bad character; or they are prudent and fair-minded but lack good will, so that it is possible for people not to give the best advice although they know [what] it [is]. These are the only possibilities. Therefore, a person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers (112-113 – Kennedy's brackets).

Aristotle makes it clear that *ethos* plays an enormous role in the persuasive process. For, as he states, what we trust *in addition to* logical demonstration are the three *ethos* factors: *phronesis*, *arete* and *eunoia*.<sup>100</sup> He then goes on to state that even though a speaker may know what the best advice possible is, they may not be able to persuade due to their inability to appear practical, as possessing the right moral character, or as being favorably disposed towards the audience. Aristotle tells his readers that it is possible to appear prudent and good by analyzing the virtues. Good will and friendliness he connects with his discussion on the emotions. It is here that the way the different proofs are inextricably woven together in Aristotle's system becomes apparent.

Brunschwig brings out the interconnection between *logos* and *ethos*, which in his

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<sup>100</sup> McCroskey provides one of many possible translations from the Greek original: "Aristotle identified the dimensions as intelligence, character, and good will" (85).



system is part of the art of rhetoric. The rhetorician is to create the right image by means of the discourse:

When Aristotle deals with *ethos*, he uses the same general criterion in order to legitimate its place among entechnical proofs: the confidence inspired by the speaker must “be due to the speech itself, not to any pre-established reputation of the speaker” (1356a9-10). Aristotle goes so far as to qualify *ethos*, although with some caution, as “so to say, the main proof” (1356a13) (46).

So we can see that *logos* is to create what, as McCroskey states, is the speaker’s knowledge of the subject of discourse, veracity, and attitude toward the well-being of the audience. Skinner writes that Quintilian agreed with Aristotle’s assertion that a speaker’s *ethos* must be embodied in the discourse itself:

The analysis he [Quintilian] goes on to offer can hardly be said to meet his own accustomed standards of clarity, but he appears to have two closely related points in mind. One is that the creation of good *ethos* is partly a matter of presenting a good image or impression of ourselves. “If the term *ethos* refers to disposition or character”, he suggests, “then our speeches must themselves reflect good character when we are portraying those who possess it” (128).

Quintilian’s use of the word “reflect” suggests a mirror. Discourse can be viewed as mirror of the mind of the speaker or writer, and, by association, the character of the person who has produced the discourse. It is this conception of discourse that makes it possible for Jaeger, as Kennedy informs us, to create an image of Demosthenes’ character, based on the latter’s speeches: “If Demosthenes did speak in person we can see his image in the *ethos* of the speech. Jaeger drew a picture of a restrained, dignified, somewhat aristocratic advisor – in a word a humanist” (Persuasion, 220). Whether we are mistaken or not, or whether we are projecting our own image onto that of the image reflected in a particular text, we inevitably draw conclusions regarding the character a person who has produced a text or who gives a speech based on her discourse. We then, also inevitably, judge that person from our own system of values. This judgment is obviously open to debate, and in the sharing of opinions on a particular individual’s

discourse it is possible, through rhetoric's dialectical aspect, to decide with others whether our own particular judgment is accurate or not.

An important point that Aristotle brings out in relation to the creation of *ethos* through discourse is that the speaker's previous reputation should not matter. Aristotle's ideas are accurate on this point, and can be easily applied to any public figure. For even if a person becomes famous, they can maintain a high-ranking position before a critical audience only if they continue delivering quality that is on par with that which made them famous in the first place, regardless of the area in which they are working. Famous people that "no longer have it" are proverbial. It is, as a norm, not possible to rest on one's laurels without eventually falling from grace in the audience's eyes. And it is possible to fall from grace during the rhetorical act, due to not being able to maintain high *ethos*. Rhetoric, in this sense, can be viewed as a dangerous and complicated game. We can now turn to other general characteristics of *ethos* in Aristotle's rhetorical framework.

Kennedy agrees with other scholars that Aristotle's view of *ethos* is highly psychological, which he inherited from Plato:<sup>101</sup>

It is this knowledge which Aristotle undertakes to impart, and it is Plato's emphasis here on psychology, the need to understand character and the way character is "enchanted" by argument and by emotional elements, which eventually moved him to give such a prominent place in his theory to character and pathos (95).

We see in the excerpt above the link between reason and emotions. Emotions are influenced by *logos* and by *ethos*. The interplay between *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*

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<sup>101</sup> Kennedy discusses the psychological approach to rhetoric as follows: "A third type of rhetorical ethos of interest to Aristotle is the character of the audience to which the speaker must suit his language and argument (1365b22 ff. and 1388b31 ff.). This is the psychological approach to rhetoric inherent in Gorgias' theory of *kairos*, or the opportune, and developed slightly by Plato in the *Phaedrus* (271a4 ff., cf. also *Gorgias* 513b8 f.)" (Persuasion, 92-93).

constitutes its dynamic and highly complex psychological nature.<sup>102</sup> Thus, an individual's character traits that an audience interprets are by nature labyrinthine and characterized by multiple facets, as Oksenberg Rorty argues:

The dispositions and habits that constitute character are layered in a veritable archeological site. Some traits – like being hot-tempered or slow-witted – are constitutionally based; others derive from a person's social condition (as those with power are said to be serious and dignified [2.16-17]); yet others are formed by an individual's polity (as citizens in a democracy are said to love liberty). Still others (the habits that constitute the virtues and vices, for example) derive from individual education and experience (1114b26 ff.) (11).

The various categories that make up an individual's character are outlined by Oksenberg Rorty: constitution, social condition, polity and education and experience. This is, however, just half of the picture that Aristotle is painting of character. The above categories provide a basic point of reference upon which reasoned choices are made. It is the combination of the traits of character with reasoned choice that constitute an individual's *ethos*:

Character is the configuration of hierarchically ordered, long-standing, actively dispositional qualities and traits – a person's capacities and habits – that (by setting the general direction of his desires and the range of his passions) direct but surely do not determine his choices. In one way, therefore, a person's character can be summarized by his ends: they form an organized system of ordered preferences, the structure of his practical reasoning. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle puts the importance of this aspect of character very strongly. Choice (*prohairesis*), he says, involves reasoning toward an end; it requires the combination of thought (*dianoia*) and desire (*orexis*) (*NE* 1.1.1139a32 ff.). Since thought moves nothing, choices require a combination of thought and *ethos*. The ultimate source (*arche*) of action is the person (*anthropos*), presumably conceived as a structured unity of his character traits. For the purpose of understanding deliberation and choice, a person's character is a structured unity of a special kind, the union of reason and desire (13).

The union of reason and desire which the individual then bases his choice to take action on provides the complex of *ethos* that the audience judges. A person's character, in Aristotle's system, is manifested in action, which is the result of reasoned choices.

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<sup>102</sup> Kennedy writes that Plato's Socrates teaches that the "orator must know (271d2 ff.) that some people are affected one way, some another by certain things, and he must learn to apply this principle to individuals, that is, learn what arguments to use with what man" (95).

While a person's socio-economic background (to use contemporary terminology) may predispose her to act in a certain way, this does not discount the possibility for her to make decisions that contradict expectations. In this sense, although Aristotle would argue that we are predisposed towards predictable behavior, it is still possible for an individual to make decisions that, if they contradict expectations, show that there is considerable freedom of choice. Since it is possible to choose contrary to expectations, judgment is possible. Were we not able to make choices that contradicted our socio-economic configuration, freedom of choice would not exist, and judgment would be superfluous, as choice would be determined. Still, in Aristotle's estimation, we are predisposed by what Oksenberg Rorty calls deep-seated dispositions:

The psychology of the *Rhetoric* forms a neat pairing of character and emotions as, respectively, the active and passive features that affect a person's judgment and choice. Aristotle stresses the active aspect of character: a person's *hexeis* form and direct patterns of salience in his perceptions, thoughts and desires. Character sets a pattern of activity that does not necessarily require any external intervention for its exercise. By contrast, *pathe* derive from contingent and fortuitous changes brought about by external causes. Aristotle's definition of the emotions in the *Rhetoric* ("those modifications [*metaballontes*] which bring about changes [*diapherousi*] in [a person's] judgments and are accompanied by pain and pleasure" [1378a21]) develops the central motif of his general definition in the *Metaphysics*: *pathe* are exogenous and contingent changes that affect a person's judgment and motivation. For all of that, a person's character – his deep-seated dispositions – defines his relative susceptibility or immunity to a specific range of emotional responses: a proud man is susceptible to anger, a courageous man finds little to fear. Since political systems influence character, freedom-loving democrats are more prone to be jealous of those better off than are the citizens of an aristocracy (15).

Here we must note that, although surprises may occur, particular groups are prone to particular types of behavior.<sup>103</sup> This sort of profiling, to use a politically charged term, makes it possible for the speaker to present herself as having similar attributes, and thus, as being a friend whom the audience can trust and, as a result, worth paying attention to.

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<sup>103</sup> Fortenbraugh writes with respect to category types tied to age and fortune that will be prone to certain emotional reactions according to Aristotle: young men, old men, then good birth, wealth and power. Fortenbraugh asserts that the placement in Aristotle's treatise of this analysis suggests that "this discussion of character was intended to supplement the analysis of emotion" (118).

In Part 4 of this dissertation, I shall present my reading of the narrator's *ethos* in the *recit de voyage* and how he uses it to his advantage in order to plead his case and persuade his readers that he is praiseworthy – based on the system of values held in common by both the narrator and his readership. In the case written by Gass, the narrator presents the facts as an observer, and so they represent the woman by proxy.

The role the emotions play in an individual's attitude is crucial in the defining of his *ethos*. Interestingly, the emotions that an individual experiences in the face of his life experiences contribute to what the audience views as his *ethos*, an evaluation that also reveals the shape and definition of the *ethos* of the audience. The audience reacts to the speaker with reason and emotions it is prone to due to its character traits.

Grimaldi reduces Aristotle's discussion of *ethos* to the emotional reactions that predominate in connection with decision-making or reactions to morally-charged circumstances:

*Ethos* ultimately . . . is nothing more nor less than an established attitude with respect to one's dominant emotional reactions (*EN* 1098a 3ff; 1102a 27 ff.; 1105b 19ff.; 1139a 17 ff. are a few places which indicate this), or a firm disposition of the appetitive part of the soul with respect to all the elements which make up this part of the soul (27 – footnote 14).

How one reacts emotionally to action which is the result of desire (here Grimaldi refers to desire as the appetitive part of the soul) or to the events that occur in our human existence determine what an individual's character is in Aristotle's system. A person of good moral character will experience the emotions appropriate to virtue. A person of bad moral character will do the opposite. Similarly, the emotions that come into play when making decisions also determine an individual's character. When making a decision, the emotions necessarily come into play and aid in making a decision. And so similar to the emotional reaction an individual experiences in the face of morally-charged circumstances, a person of good moral character will experience emotions that

are appropriate to virtue when making decisions, and the morally corrupt individual will experience emotions that are not appropriate when making a decision.

McCroskey makes some interesting albeit debatable observations on *ethos* in his rhetoric handbook. The first is his idea that the speaker (or source, in his terminology) does not have *ethos*:

Two things need to be made clear at the outset. First, we shall frequently refer to a source's *ethos*. This may mislead some people into thinking that a *source* has *ethos*. The source does not. The receiver has the *ethos*. It is in the mind of the receiver, just as any other attitude is. Thus, the *ethos* of a source may vary greatly from receiver to receiver or among receivers in a collective audience. It is not something a source *has*, but it is convenient to talk about *ethos* as if this were the case (83-84).

His position that the source does not have *ethos* is extreme in that his argument makes it seem as if the speaker (or source) were character-free. If *ethos* is something that a source does not have, the question arises of precisely what it is that the audience is perceiving. In Aristotle's model, both the source and the audience have *ethos*, and it is in the interplay between the two parties that emotional responses are elicited and persuasion either occurs or does not occur. McCroskey makes this assertion no doubt because it is possible for different receivers to have different perceptions of the same source. If different perceptions are possible that means, in McCroskey's lights, that the real locus of *ethos* must be in the receiver. But his argument, while interesting, does not take into consideration the possibility of different reactions to the *ethos* of a particular individual. Oksenberg Rorty's position – a reflection of Aristotle's – would seem to be more reasonable. That is, when she states that freedom-loving democrats are more prone to be jealous of those better off than are the citizens of an aristocracy, she is allowing, as Aristotle would, for two different reactions to a particular circumstance. In this case, it is the reaction of democrats and aristocrats to those who are better off. It seems impossible to argue that those better off do not have an *ethos* that would provoke an

emotional response due to how it was perceived by the two groups. Further, in Aristotle's system, as we have noted, while a particular group may be prone to certain behavior patterns and attitudes, there is always room for differences within the group that contradict expectations.

Although McCroskey's position that *ethos* only exists in the mind of the receiver is extreme and, in my opinion, inaccurate, he nevertheless states correctly that *ethos* is an attitude held by the audience with respect to its perception of the speaker, and the terminology he uses adds to the understanding of the term itself:

Ethos is the attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver. Source credibility, prestige, and personal proof are terms that have been used to refer to constructs similar to what we have here defined as ethos (83).

The terms that McCroskey uses, source credibility, prestige and personal proof add nuance to the term *ethos*, and aid in the understanding of how *ethos* functions as a proof in Aristotelian rhetoric. Credibility, for example, is a term that we use to refer to an individual's trustworthiness. A person can have high or low credibility. A contemporary term like credibility clarifies for contemporary readers the idea that Aristotle was attempting to get across, and facilitates the idea of *ethos* having an impact on persuasion. This is because a person of low credibility would not be conceived of as persuasive, whereas a person of high credibility would. The audience will be more disposed to listening to her arguments, and, as a result, more readily persuaded. The same is true for prestige. For prestige arises from past and consistent demonstrations of quality and consistency, and thus provides the bases for the subsequent inductive reasoning that makes persuasion possible. If a writer, for example, can boast having published articles in the "New Yorker," she will have much greater *ethos* than a writer who has published in a low-ranking university publication. Personal proof is also important. If a well-known expert makes an assertion about something in his field, the

immediate response will again be based on inductive logic: this person has proven to be an expert in his field; therefore his statements must be true. The emotional responses to these three bases would necessarily be positive and also aid in the persuasive rhetorical process.

McCroskey brings up other important aspects of rhetorical *ethos* that come to bear on the present discussion. One observation that he makes is that *ethos* is an attitude:

Ethos is an attitude. . . This dimension has been called the *evaluative* dimension . . . Our evaluations of things range between good and bad, harmful and beneficial, wise and foolish, and so forth. If our attitude is favorable, we think the thing is good, beneficial, wise. If our attitude is unfavorable, we think the thing is bad, harmful, foolish. Our attitude, then, is our evaluation of something (85).

Just as the various scholars' wordings and rewordings shed light on the way Aristotle conceives of *logos* in his approach to rhetoric, McCroskey's wording here and interpretation of Aristotelian rhetoric brings out aspects that aid in our understanding of *ethos*. Here the key phrase that clearly illuminates *ethos* is favorable or unfavorable attitude. It is the way we perceive something or someone. And it is our attitude that determines whether or not we are positively disposed towards a speaker or a writer, which will subsequently allow us to consider with greater receptivity the arguments that are being made.

Another observation that McCroskey brings up with respect to *ethos* is that it changes within the same receiver, and may do so in the same rhetorical event:

A source's *ethos* may vary greatly from time to time, even with the same receiver. Like other attitudes, *ethos* is subject to change as a result of experiences the receiver has with the source. It will often change markedly in the course of a single communicative act (84).

This observation affirms how it is possible for a speaker to make an initial good impression but then create just the opposite, with the attending consequences. The opposite is also possible: a speaker may create an initially poor impression but could



conceivably, through the course of her speech or writing, change the perception to a more positive one. This demonstrates the importance of managing to say the right thing to the right audience, something, as already mentioned, that Plato's Socrates also knew. With respect to the mercurial nature of ethos, McCroskey identifies three different types of possible *ethos* in the same communicative act: initial, derived and terminal *ethos*. He describes initial *ethos* as follows: "*Initial ethos* is the ethos of a source prior to the beginning of a given communicative act. It is the speaker's *ethos* just before he or she begins to speak or the writer's *ethos* just before the reader begins to read (83)." Here McCroskey allows for *ethos* to exist prior to what he calls the communicative act. We have noted above that Aristotle's goal is for *ethos* to arise from the discourse itself, and not from any prior reputation. Arguments could be made for both approaches, but here what is important to take into consideration is that McCroskey's system reflects the reality of a rhetorical event. That is, a speaker may very well have *ethos* prior to the communicative act, and this initial *ethos* can affect either favorably or adversely what follows. That is why, in McCroskey's approach, the next type of *ethos* is important:

*Derived ethos* is the ethos of a source produced during the act of communicating. It includes the impact of the message, the effect of the circumstances in which the communication takes place, and (if oral) the delivery of the message (83).

We have already discussed the possibility of a speaker or writer to either increase or diminish her *ethos* potential during the communicative act or rhetorical event. *Ethos* is fluid and may improve or get worse, depending on the speaker's or writer's ability to present an image that is favorable to the audience or readership. This precarious situation is dependent upon both what the speaker says and how she says it, and upon the *ethos* of the audience itself. The expression "An audience can kill a comedian!" applies here with great force. The same comedian will make one audience laugh uncontrollably and another audience boo and sneer. Anyone who has had experience in

public speaking will attest to the “chemistry” being right with one audience and wrong with another, and experiencing success in the first instance and failure in the second, in spite of having given the same presentation twice. McCroskey rounds off his discussion with the third type of *ethos* that he has identified: “*Terminal ethos* is the ethos of a source at the completion of a communicative act. It is the product of the interaction of initial and derived ethos” (83). McCroskey adds to the above statement the following observations:

Terminal ethos is the product of the interaction between initial ethos and derived ethos. Terminal ethos should always be considered by the source prior to a communicative act. In some cases it will be the source’s prime concern; only in a very few cases will it be relatively unimportant (95).

McCroskey, perhaps rightly, asserts that terminal *ethos* is, on the whole, highly important, and perhaps the most important of the three types. It is possible, however, to add to his model a fourth type of *ethos*, which, if we borrow the show-business term “staying power,” could be called *staying ethos*. For it is one thing for an audience to be convinced at the end of a communicative act, and quite another for it to remain convinced once the emotions that have been aroused during the act have worn off. The persuasion would not, in this case, be mere enchantment (to use Plato’s terminology). The total effects of *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* would, in the case of *staying ethos*, remain intact, and the persuasion would not be ephemeral. For persuasion to be lasting at least two things must not occur. First, the audience must not, following the communicative act (whether spoken or written), reconsider the act and conclude that her emotions were being unfairly manipulated. The second situation that must not occur but that is also highly possible, especially when we consider Aristotle’s low evaluation of the audiences of his day, is when the audience, due to its fickle nature or indifference to truth, decides to ignore what the speaker has argued cogently and appropriately. There is no accounting for the potentially unstable nature of an audience. The expression “I

could care less what anyone says!” would apply here, as well as Dostoevsky’s position that we, as humans, are in our right and are not necessarily mistaken when making the wrong decision, even when it goes against the dictates of conventional reason.<sup>104</sup>

McCroskey sums up the highly changeable nature of *ethos* rightly as follows:

Ethos, then, is a dynamic construct. It is always subject to change and may even be said to be volatile. As noted later, even apparently small things can drastically alter a source’s ethos (85).

In spite of the highly volatile nature of rhetoric, persuasion does, at times occur.

McCroskey provides an interesting recipe for possible success in his rhetoric handbook, in relation to *ethos*:

To summarize, sources are most likely to find their *ethos* increased if they carefully select propositions to support so as to be certain that they are not highly discrepant with the audience’s attitudes; support arguments with evidence from well-qualified sources; present the message in a sincere manner to establish credibility; establish common ground and good will with the audience; appear to be open-minded; and make the audience aware of the favorable aspects of their background, experience, and affiliations. In some cases, sources may also benefit from using unfamiliar words and irrelevant or humorous digressions. The source who makes a serious attempt to employ these methods whenever appropriate is not likely to have *ethos* reduced as a result of the communication (95).

All of the above is pure Aristotle, reworded for contemporary university students in their first semester of rhetoric. McCroskey’s disclaimer is also pure Aristotle. That is, he states that if the source follows the above suggestions *whenever appropriate*, she is *not likely* to have *ethos* reduced. Aristotle made the same assertions when, as discussed earlier in this dissertation, he compares the doctor who prescribes the appropriate cure, but, due to the patient’s being terminally ill, cannot cure his patient, with the rhetorician, who, in spite of following all the rules of right rhetoric, does not manage to persuade or convince the audience.

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<sup>104</sup> See Dostoevsky: *Notes from the Underground*.

McCroskey brings up other important points about *ethos* that will come to bear on the analysis of Part 4. The source can be more than just one person. In fact, a source can be things other than people:

A source is not necessarily a single person. However, because most sources are individual people, we will treat the term *source* as grammatically singular throughout this book. A source may also be a group, an organization, a government agency, or even a country. . . . While her or his individual ethos may in some cases affect the impact of the message, the primary ethos involved is that of the organization (84).

McCroskey's observations will prove to be crucial to the discussion in Part 4. For I analyze the impact that the company that has published the story under study has in terms of *ethos*, as well as the way the story is marketed. Both the name and the marketing add to the *ethos* of the travel narrative, and, in this way, act as a springboard from which the narrator operates upon telling his tale.

Aristotle's discussion of *ethos* in his *Poetics* can also be utilized when analyzing rhetorical mechanisms in narrative. *Ethos* is used in oratory to persuade by creating a positive image of the speaker or narrator, but in Aristotle's system this idea can also be applied to the mimetic creation of characters. What is crucial to bear in mind is that whether it is the creating of a character for a tragic drama or that of a positive image of oneself in a rhetorical event, in Aristotle's construct there is always a link with ethics.

Halliwell, in his seminal study on the *Poetics*, brings this out:

When Ar. discusses *ethos*, which we have to translate as 'character(isation)', we need to divest the latter term of almost all its strong sense of a high degree of individual differentiation. Whether as critic or as philosopher, Ar. regards the fundamental question about character to be not, in what does the distinctiveness or even uniqueness of this person consist?, but, what ethical virtues or vices are embodied in his active life? (*Poetics*, 140).

The first point that merits focusing on in the above excerpt is Halliwell's translation of *ethos* in Aristotle's *Poetics* as 'character(isation)', due to the highly literary overtones inherent in the term as he has phrased it. His translation fits with the fabric of the text he is analyzing. And although it could be argued that he has arrived at the above translation

with its respective connotations because of its appropriateness for a work of literary theory, if we keep in mind the fact that when discussing *ethos* in his *Rhetoric* Aristotle states that it is important for the speaker to present himself as *seeming* to be positively disposed towards the audience, it is also possible to conclude that in Aristotle's conception of rhetorical *ethos*, there is both room and perhaps a need for fictive appearances with respect to the persona an orator presents. For seeming to be friendly and actually being friendly are two very different things. And which of us does not, in some way, create a persona when performing on the various stages that life sets before us? The same process occurs when one writes a work of non-fiction, as is the case of travel narrative. That is, the author creates a persona for her narrator, a persona whose *ethos* will be interpreted by the reader as possessing certain character traits – even if those traits are real traits that she selects when representing her self. These same traits will then, in the framework of Aristotelian rhetoric, influence the judgment of the reader.

Although in Halliwell's interpretation a character's uniqueness or distinctiveness are not concerns of Aristotle, this does not prevent contemporary writers or readers from focusing on or taking attributes of this sort into consideration. In fact, a narrator's uniqueness or distinctiveness will have no small amount of *ethos* value for contemporary readerships.

Now that the "what" of *ethos* has been discussed, its "how" can be considered. Kennedy draws up a list of things an orator can do to create an impression of friendliness based on Aristotle's discussion of the same in the *Rhetoric*:

A good example is the list of qualities that create friendly feeling, given in 2.4.11-22. The audience will feel friendly to a speaker who is pleasant and good-tempered: he can accomplish this by not criticizing other people's faults, by joking, by praising other people, by being neat in appearance, by refraining from slander, by being serious about serious things, by showing himself to be like his hearers in interests and desires, and so on (*Rhetoric*, 115).

The list of things that a speaker ought to do in order to create positive *ethos* which is perceived as friendliness can perhaps all be subsumed under the last item in the excerpt above, that is, by showing himself to be like his hearers in terms of their interests and desires. The list Kennedy has created based on Aristotle's discussion of friendship also reinforces to what a great extent the like seeking and/or attracting like herd mentality is at play in persuasive argument. Although a term like herd mentality can have pejorative connotations because of the contemporary notion that an individual needs to distinguish herself and to be "different," a simultaneous and very human desire to belong to a group exists and functions as the constitutive basis of all political systems. In Aristotle's definition, politics is a sort of large scale friendship. That is, Aristotle extends the basic model of friendship between two individuals to a large group. So here again we can see the important role similarity plays in persuasion.

Skinner discusses Quintilian's views on how to create a positive image using *ethos* that would pave the way for persuasion. In the latter's view, it is crucial to appear to be acting benevolently: ". . . 'if the orator seems to be undertaking cases out of the goodness of his heart, this will greatly benefit him in most of the cases he undertakes'" (130). This positive image, in Quintilian's model, arouses emotions that affect the audience's perception of what is being presented:

He . . . maintains that the term [*ethos*] refers to the feelings an orator can hope to arouse if he is successful in presenting an attractive image of himself. By these means an orator can hope to excite a number of calmer passions, prompting his auditors to view his cause with a heightened sense of attention and docility, and even with an increased feeling of benevolence and friendliness (129).

The audience pays more attention to what the speaker is saying, and, at the same time, becomes docile in terms of reception, if the latter is successful in her efforts. Benevolence and friendliness are also increased according to Quintilian. We shall see in the travel narrative under study that acting not out of benevolence but malevolence can

also produce positive effects that foster persuasion. For, depending on the circumstances and audience of the rhetorical act, maliciousness can increase the speaker's or writer's *ethos* if handled properly.

Skinner discusses further ideas Quintilian presents on the creation of *ethos* in order to persuade:

We must be sure to speak with moderation and modesty, avoiding the least sign of anger or hatred as well as any trace of self-importance or loftiness. We must remember that 'anyone who, in the process of speaking, appears to be a bad man can already be said to be speaking incompetently'(130).

Quintilian's assertions are accurate but context dependent. For, depending on the audience, moderation and modesty may or may not have *ethos* power. A recent president of the United States, George W. Bush, could hardly have been described as moderate or modest when speaking. In fact, the image he projected was quite the opposite: a brash and cocky "don't mess with me" All American. These attributes are precisely what those voters who supported him saw as a likeness that allowed them to view him as a friend to trust in, as someone who acted in a way similar to their way of acting, and who, as a result, managed to persuade the same population of voters to unite with him in the causes that he promoted during his presidency. He appealed to those citizens whose notion of American aggrandized self-importance on both a national and international scale was interpreted as a virtue. And it is also quite possible that Bush's famous incompetence in speaking had, among his supporters, a positive *ethos* value, due to the anti-intellectual image that he projected. Here we can see the point that I have brought out earlier in Part 2 of this dissertation: among the same population difference of opinion exists – division is present, if only latently, always. In the United States there exists a division between highbrow pro-intellectuals typically epitomized by the inhabitants of New York, and the lowbrow, anti- or non-intellectuals epitomized by those inhabitants of southern states – Texas and Alabama being the most typically

represented in this way. In Part 4 I will show how the narrator of the *recit de voyage* under study plays with both high-brow and low-brow stances, using both to his advantage when he creates an *ethos* that is positive for his particular readership.

Skinner writes that according to Quintilian, another way to increase one's *ethos* is to appear to avoid taking sides: "We must give an impression of complete impartiality, 'making it seem that everything we say arises out of the facts of the case and the characters of the persons involved' (130)." This piece of advice demonstrates the discursive legerdemain that the speaker or writer must be capable of. For if the aim is to persuade, the speaker or writer is necessarily biased, and ought to do everything possible to persuade her audience of her case. However, due to the very human resistance to being manipulated, it is crucial for the speaker or writer to do precisely what Quintilian advises. That is, to appear to be impartial and, at the same time, to let the facts of the particular case speak for themselves. Still, an argument could be made for a speaker making her bias evident, provided that the audience shares similar attitudes with respect to the same issue.

We have been presenting Aristotle's as well as other writers' idea that persuasion based on *ethos* should come from the discourse itself. However, appearance also plays a significant role in creating *ethos*. Vanderspoel discusses how Marcus, a fourth century orator, used this to his advantage:

A contemporary of Polemon, Marcus, came from an ancient Byzantine family, served as an ambassador to Hadrian, and played a key role in mediating a serious dispute between Athens and Megara (Philostratus, *Lives* 529-530). He imitated the fourth century Attic orator Isaeus, to great acclaim, but cultivated a rather coarse, 'rough and ready' appearance, apparently designed to match his talent at extemporization (159).

Marcus obviously dressed the part, bringing into the play the question of whether it is the man who makes the clothes or the clothes that make the man. There is no questioning the importance appearance holds in creating positive *ethos*, a phenomenon



that is manifest in all areas of society. It is common knowledge that John F. Kennedy was the first U.S. president whose campaign and presidency was created by the media, and that the visual image of a young, attractive and “modern” family man that marketing experts created for him had enormous appeal to a great number of voters in the United States. This is yet another manifestation of the herd mentality that permeates human consciousness and that plays such an important role in the cohesion of groups. One need only think of high school social environments and the groups that arise based on similar appearance to witness this phenomenon in its rawest form. Humans, on the whole, naturally gravitate to those possessing similar visible physical characteristics. The incidence of like attracting like is much greater on the average than opposites attracting. In the case of Marcus, he created a look that fit his style of public speaking. This same creation of a particular look can be observed in popular music groups, the most famous being the Beatles and the Rolling Stones at the outset of their careers. In their early days, the Beatles created a nice-boy-next-door look to their advantage, whereas the Rolling Stones created a bad-boy-from-the-wrong-side-of-the-tracks look, which also worked to their advantage. Fans at the time could be divided based on their preference: some were loyal to the Stones, others to the Fab Four. Both groups (and in this sense, the groups include the musical group and aficionados) could be defined by their appearance and respective system of values represented in the lyrics. Generally, one was either first a Stones fan or first a Beatles fan. Those who opposed one’s preference were the enemy, even in the “peace-loving” sixties.

With respect to division and enmity that occurs between opposed groups, the question arises whether it is advisable to use this to one’s advantage when employing rhetorical strategies for creating a positive image through *ethos*. That is, it must be asked whether it is perilous or wise to denigrate the opposition in order to strengthen the

possible bonds of friendship that the orator or writer wishes to create with her audience or readership. In our discussion above we quoted Aristotle as giving advice to avoid the least sign of hatred. But, as Skinner writes, the *Ad Herennium* takes the opposite stance:

We can hope to provoke hatred of our antagonists ‘if we can point to some base, proud, perfidious, cruel, arrogant, malicious or disgraceful act they have committed’. We can hope to turn them into object of odium ‘if we can pin on them such attributes as violence, lust for power, factiousness, excessive wealth and promiscuousness’. And we can hope to bring them into contempt ‘if we are able to draw attention to their idleness, their cowardice, their inactivity and their luxuriousness’ (131).

Eric Hoffer asserts in *The True Believer* – a work that analyzes the nature of mass movements – that whereas love does very little to unify a large group of people, hatred does quite the opposite.<sup>105</sup> That is, by creating an enemy, a group will be unified in hatred against that enemy. What is needed is a devil. In the case of the Nazis, the devil that Hitler created (among others) was the Jew. Fidel Castro and communist Cuba is, even at present, the devil that American politicians use to band American citizens together in their hatred for socialism and communism. Castro is an interesting devil, for he has been somewhat of a toothless tiger since the Cuban missile crisis under J.F.K.’s rule. But as the fear and hatred for communism and socialism is so strong in the United States, just the mention of these words together with media-based representations of the Cuban leader are still enough to get the American population’s blood boiling with the hatred that unifies.<sup>106</sup> The *Ad Herrenium* gives similar advice. Firing up rage against the opponent will increase the *ethos* of the speaker, and win the audience over to her side.

Skinner cites this work:

Besides establishing the excellence of our own character, we must take advantage of the fact that ‘the benevolence of our audience can also be won if we can manage to bring the character of our adversaries into hatred, odium and contempt’ (131).

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<sup>105</sup> See Hoffer.

<sup>106</sup> Mitt Romney uses this strategy in his 2012 acceptance speech. See “Mitt Romney, the Republican Presidential Nominee”: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGTi4-ysJS8>

By denigrating the enemy, the character of the speaker is enhanced. This type of strategy is part and parcel of the mud-slinging that takes place in politics, especially during elections. Quintilian, however, takes a more Aristotelian stance:

To Quintilian this seems a dangerous as well as an unworthy enterprise, and he reminds us of the need ‘to avoid appearing abusive, malignant, arrogant or slanderous to any individual or body of people’ (131).

Skinner writes that although Quintilian concedes that it is possible to arouse strong emotions by attacking the opposition, he “more soberly concludes that we can rarely hope for more than an increase ‘in benevolence, attention, and docility’” (133). Again, modern political practice takes the side of the *Ad Herennium*, and so the conclusion that appears to be obvious is that if it is a practice, it must work. In the recit de voyage under study, I shall show how the narrator creates enemies through his description that enhance his *ethos* and make him more praiseworthy in the eyes of his readership.

While it is true that appearances are important in rhetorical encounters and it may or may not be a good idea to denigrate the opposition or to create a devil, in the Aristotelian rhetorical model *ethos* is – *ideally* - to be established through the body of the text. Isocrates also concurred with this notion. Walker writes:

Discourse is constitutive of intelligence and is its embodiment. As Isocrates declares, one’s speaking is the ‘great sign’ of one’s *phronesis*: discourse that is ‘true and lawful and just’ is the ‘image’ of a ‘good and trustworthy soul’ (*Against the Sophists* 14-15; *Antidosis* 181-182, 255-257) (Rhetoric, 29).

We have touched upon the fact that discourse can portray character when discussing Jaeger’s view of Demosthenes as restrained, dignified and somewhat aristocratic, based on his contemporary reading of the latter’s texts. In Isocrates’ lights, it is possible to detect through discourse whether or not the speaker or writer possesses *phronesis*, translated as practical wisdom, which he deemed one of the highest goods. Isocrates’ use of the term image again suggests the idea of a mirror, that is, that discourse (spoken or written) produces on some level a reflection of the “soul” (i.e., psyche) of the speaker

or writer that attains some sort of physical quality that can be imagined visually. If an individual's soul is just and good, the discourse will also be just and good. If the soul is evil, then, Isocrates would argue that the discourse will necessarily reflect that quality.

Oksenberg Rorty's discussion of Aristotle shows that Aristotle held a similar view:

The character of the speaker is manifest in his discourse – in what he says and how he says it. It is implicit in the way he argues and in the way he addresses the character and emotions of his audience (1356a5 ff.). Particularly when he might seem to speak from his own interests or on his own behalf, the rhetorician must establish his credibility, his intelligence (*phronesis* and *eunoia*), and character (*arête*) as such traits might be perceived by his audience. Of course, land mines surround the phrase “perceived by his audience.” The rhetorician must understand his audience's perspective: he shows himself to be trustworthy in their eyes by showing that he understands their interests (8-9).

Oksenberg Rorty argues cogently that it is in what the speaker says and how he says it that allows *ethos* to be embodied in the discourse. She then indicates the complexity involved in the attempt to present oneself as possessing the attributes that are valued by the audience, for it is in the latter's perception – a point already discussed above and emphasized by McCroskey – that everything takes place. That is, the rhetorician must possess the savvy to understand her audience, to “psych out” her listeners. This is no easy feat, and it takes enormous psychological acuity to form an estimate of an audience's psyche in order to present an image to which they will respond positively in terms of *ethos*. We see here again the “like attracts like” herd mentality so necessary in this type of discourse.

Fortenbraugh also refers to Aristotle's requirement that the image that is projected must be established by the text itself. He asserts that the speaker, “*through what he says*, is to present himself as an upright person who is worthy of trust (1356a2-13)” (114 – my italics). The possibility of a person of renown to fall on her face due to poor performance has been discussed above, as well as McCroskey's observations that a speaker's *ethos* may rise or fall during one specific communicative event. It is no easy

thing to maintain *ethos*, and the possibility of failing due to a faux pas on the one hand, or to the fickle nature of listeners, on the other, underscore the precarious nature of this Aristotelian proof, as well as the enormous skill that is needed to win the audience over with one's character. Oksenberg Rorty speaks of the necessity of the speaker's understanding the audience's needs and desires in order to do so:

It is entirely appropriate – and indeed necessary – for the rhetorician to address the character of his audience: he crystallizes their general ends into specific desires. The orator's speech – what he says and how he says it – links the character and desires of his audience to the decisions and actions the orator wants them to take (1355a20 ff.) (10).

The path from general to specific in the passage above reflects the concept that we have been discussing about a repository of values that the rhetor bases her arguments upon. What a particular community of listeners or readers views as desirable aims in general can be made concrete through discourse and promoted through argumentation. Character is tied to desire, which is tied to that which is valued as the good.

It is common knowledge that it is possible to write discourse that *appears* to a particular audience to be ethically sound. Any politician knows this, as well as all citizens possessing normal awareness of the goings on in the political arena. That politicians hire professional speech-writers who create discourse tailored to the audience's needs, that is, discourse that tells the audience either what they want or need (or both) to hear, is no secret.<sup>107</sup> This of course means that the opposite is possible. That is, it is also possible to please an audience that desires an ethically unsound discourse without necessarily adhering to a system of values that promotes evil. One only needs to consider the example of music groups that advocate worshipping Satan. Often the image these groups create through apparel, lifestyle and lyrics is mere window-dressing that allows these musicians to earn enormous amounts of money and, after a concert, laugh

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<sup>107</sup> Worthington writes: "The *rhetoires* of classical Athens have left a legacy that modern politicians (and their speechwriters) do not hesitate to use when the occasion demands, good or bad" (Rise, 268).

all the way to the bank. The conclusion to be drawn here, in any case, is that it is possible to present an image of oneself, whether false or not, that possesses certain attributes that will be attractive to one's audience in terms of *ethos* and that the audience identifies with. If the speaker or writer expresses herself in the right way, her *ethos* will increase, with the concomitant effect of greater possibility to persuade.

In relation with the idea that the speaker's *ethos* must be made manifest in the discourse itself is the case of Lysias, who made important contributions to rhetorical theory, in relation to two spheres: 1) style and 2) *ethopoia*. As for Lysias' contribution to style, Kennedy writes that Lysias' style "became the standard of Attic purity and grace 350 years later – a vocabulary which consciously distinguished the proper word for each object, action, and quality" (Persuasion, 136). In this sense, Lysias can be seen as the originator or precursor of what is called Standard English in the United States or Received Pronunciation in England. In this sense, what Lysias did was determine a style that was to be used for all citizens, regardless of their origins. In this way, the basis for *ethos* based on a standard version of discourse was established. Kennedy writes:

In general this character portrayal is effected by the thought rather than the style. What the speaker says, his demonstrations of pride or folly, show what he is like. Lysias does not attempt to vary the diction to suit the speaker, and farmers, merchants, and aristocrats all speak the same, simple, flawless Attic (136).

Lysias' contribution to style can be viewed as highly democratic in that it places all groups in the same discursive category: a common register for all. In this way, regional or class differences would be eliminated, and the thought itself present in the discourse would necessarily become the vehicle to enhance one's *ethos*. An aristocrat, who might have an advantage (or disadvantage) due to her style of speech, is placed next to the farmer, whose handicap or privilege (depending on the audience) is likewise eliminated. It is, in effect, the homogenization of numerous styles of discourse into a single style. The burden is then placed, as Kennedy writes, on the demonstrations of character that

are conveyed through the mono-style, through the thought itself. Since the same style is used for all, the emphasis shifts to content, rather than form.

Once the danger or privilege of style has been removed, Lysias' second contribution, *ethopoiia* can be employed to great effect. *Ethopoiia* was Lysias' "technique of conveying something of the character of the speaker into the orations he wrote for a customer to deliver" (136). Kennedy writes in this regard:

By showing some trivial human weaknesses of character he establishes a rapport with the audience and convinces them of the general human virtue of his client. . . for example, the defendant is old-fashioned and blunt in his ways; one might not choose him for a friend or even respect him, but because of Lysias' portrayal it is difficult to believe that he has laid a subtle trap for his wife's love and very easy to believe that he killed the lover when taken in the act of adultery (Persuasion, 136).

What Lysias does is create character through discourse. This is precisely what Halliwell is speaking about when he refers to Aristotle's use of the word *ethos* in the *Poetics*: 'character(isation).' It is a creative act that may or may not be a fiction, or is perhaps a mingling of truth and fiction. In any case, the discourse itself is the medium that conveys the character of the speaker or writer, making it possible for the audience to identify or sympathize with her, based on what she says about herself, without differences of style.

It could be argued that the same sort of stylistic procedures used by Lysias are in operation at the editor's desk of a particular publication. For example, the publication from which the recit de voyage under study has been selected has its requirements in terms of style. If the writer does not meet the formalized standards established by the respective publication, he will not be published. And so what Lysias did when writing speeches for his clients is, in essence, being carried out by the publication and its weeding out of what are deemed inappropriate styles for its audience. The difference is that the brunt is now on the writer to meet the standards. In the case of Lysias, it was his

job to ensure that his client's pleadings were couched in the stylistic requirements of Attic purity and grace. The effect, however, is the same. Just as Lysias' clients all ended up using the same style, so the writers submitting to a particular publication write within the stylistic norms dictated by the publishing company's editor. The style and content of any publication in question will necessarily be tailored to its respective audience, which will (or will not) be persuaded by the text at hand.

While Aristotle's goal was for *ethos* to come from the body of the discourse itself, reality dictates that other factors foreign to both the text and the speaker's prior, already established *ethos* come into play. According to McCroskey, studies prove that the person or organization that presents the speaker also has an effect on the amount of *ethos* generated in a communicative act:

It appears from these studies that objectively irrelevant ethos factors ordinarily do not have a major effect on attitude change. *In some circumstances, however, factors that appear to be unrelated to a source's ethos may make a meaningful impact . . .* Termed *sponsorship effect*, it concerns the circumstances surrounding the communicative event (89 – author's italics).

If a speaker or writer is sponsored by Oxford University Press, for example, her chances of persuading an audience of academics, due to the high *ethos* power brought by McCroskey's concept in the passage above, would be much greater than a communicative event in which the same speaker were presented to the same audience by, say, the city hall or newspaper of the town where the communicative act takes place.

McCroskey writes:

The implications of the sponsorship effect are important for the source. *One may expect to have substantially higher ethos if introduced by a person respected by the audience than one would have without such an introduction.* If the message appears in a national news magazine, the source may expect to have substantially higher ethos, at least for most receivers, than it will if the message appears in a movie magazine (89 – author's italics).

It is not quite the same thing to be sponsored by a respected university's publishing house as say, by that of a small town city college. And while for an academic the initial



supposition is that a publishing company such as Oxford University Press would have greater effect on *ethos*, what really matters, as indicated above, is the respect conferred on the sponsor by the audience. This means that, depending on the audience, it will perhaps be promotion by a Hollywood movie magazine that brings higher *ethos*. Thus the selection of the sponsor must match the character of the audience, with its respective system of values and needs. McCroskey is accurate, therefore, when he writes, “A speaker, then, may enhance initial ethos by carefully selecting the person who introduces her or him to the audience” (89). The emphasis must be placed on the qualifying adverb “carefully.” It is necessary to be able to match as accurately as possible the *ethos* of the speaker or writer with that of the audience in order for persuasion to occur. As already stated, rhetoric is, in this sense, tightly linked to the herd mentality manifest in human behavior. Rhetoric, therefore, holds great value as a fundamental vehicle for setting human collective activity into motion.

Another effective strategy for getting the listeners’ or readers’ attention is to emphasize the content of the discourse in terms of its novelty, strangeness or benefits. Skinner writes that the classical rhetoricians advised “promising our auditors to inform them of something at once novel and of public importance (129). This strategy is no doubt a stimulus that results in a basic animal response. When a stranger enters a room, all eyes are immediately upon her. It is her strangeness, novelty, and possible promise for benefit or threat of harm that excites the onlookers. In the *Ad Herennium*, Skinner writes that Quintilian tells us that we will get our listeners’ attention by using the strategy of claiming that what we are about to present is new and/or unusual:

The *Ad Herennium* agrees that ‘we shall guarantee attentive hearers if we promise to treat of great or new or unusual affairs, or such as concern the commonwealth’. Quintilian similarly observes in his chapter on the exordium that ‘nothing makes a judge more attentive than the sense that the issue about to be discussed is novel, important, atrocious, relevant to setting a precedent, or above all something that concerns either him personally or the good of the community’ (129).

Both the *Ad Herennium* and Quintilian advocate the use of novelty, strangeness and personal interest in order to increase *ethos* during a communicative event. This communicative event, as I have been indicating, can be written, or spoken. The use of this strategy affects the emotions of the listeners or readers, paving the way for persuasion to occur with greater ease.

Crucial to this dissertation is the use of narrative when pleading a case as a technique for increasing *ethos*. One of the strategies used in antiquity was to use the framework of formal argumentation as the guiding structure for a narrative:

Though the speech falls into the standard formal parts: prooemium . . . narrative . . . proof. . . refutation. . . and peroration. . . the impression of the speech [prosecution of his guardian Aphobus] is entirely narrative, as though the orator were telling his story and proving every word. Except for the increase in pathos at the end the parts do not show the stylistic differences found in parts of other such speeches. Nothing is probably more reassuring and convincing to a jury than this candid technique. An orator can only use it if he has a very good case with many documents and witnesses and is himself the complete master of the material (Persuasion, 210).

Here we see that the basic sections of formal judicial rhetorical argumentation underlie the narrative. Since the argument is put into narrative form, the effect is that the rhetorician is relating personal details that he experienced. The “telling of one’s own story” increases *ethos*, provided the audience believes what is being told. The possibility for influencing the audience’s emotions positively through the use of narrative told in the first person is enormous, due to its highly personal, if not intimate nature. That is, the narrator present personal and intimate details of his life, which, provided the audience is convinced of his sincerity, will increase *ethos*, and thus facilitate persuasion.

The narrator can also use other devices that will enhance the narrative, and, at the same time, *ethos*. Representation of the visual through words, whose aim is to make an object or event present in the listener’s or reader’s mind’s eye, is discussed in chapter

10 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. This is a technique that is utilized in fiction writing as well.

Webb comments on its use and effects:

[Elementary rhetorical students] also learned “characterization through speech . . . training in the verbal representation of the visual . . . the evocation through words of any number of sights, situations, places, even happenings . . . This exercise is therefore relevant to all of the vivid re-creations of events in the novels. In fact the type of illusion of presence that ekphrasis specialised in lies at the heart of fictional discourse. Through its appeal to the imagination, ekphrasis invites us into the world that is created by the novelist and gives us an illusion of presence ‘making listeners (as ancient readers were) into spectators’ (Webb, 529 – brackets mine).

We see here again the use of the word “characterization,” for *ethos* is created not only through abstract notions, but through the representation of actions and visual characteristics. As Webb puts it, the listeners become spectators. This technique is accomplished through discourse and is woven into the narrative. The recreation of an event from the past in the imagination of the listener or reader makes it possible for them to better comprehend what occurred, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that they visualize the event increases their identification with the narrator, due to the fact that it is made possible for the audience to vicariously experience the event. Thus *ethos* can be enhanced. This technique is carried out via *logos* (discourse) and also has an effect on *pathos*. The tripartite system of proofs that Aristotle describes, as we have said above, is inextricably woven together. It is not possible to separate one proof from the other two, as they always work in conjunction.

We can now look more closely at Halliwell's seminal work on the *Poetics*, which provides enormous insight into Aristotle's ideas on *ethos* in the framework of tragic drama. The concepts that Halliwell discusses, can, as already stated, be applied to non-fiction narrative as well.

Aristotle gives enormous importance to the action of tragic personae, who are agents whose actions we judge. We base our judgment of the personae's actions on how

they are characterized. Who they are and the motives they give for their actions provide the dramatic stuff, so to speak, that we examine through the lens of our system of values. Halliwell writes:

Since tragedy is a representation of an action, and is enacted by agents, who must be characterised in both their character and their thought (for it is through these that we can also judge the qualities of their actions, and it is in their actions that all men either succeed or fail), we have the plot-structure as the mimesis of the action (for by this term 'plot-structure' I mean the organization of the events) while characterization is what allows us to judge the nature of the agents, and 'thought' represents the parts in which by their speech they put forward arguments or make statements (Poetics, 37).

We see here the importance of judgment, which I have been emphasizing in this dissertation. The agent's character (who she is), what she does (action), and the reasons for making the decisions and acting in the way she does (i.e., thought, which reveals motives), all work in unison to reveal ethical aspects of the persona's character. We examine all of the elements both separately and together in order to reach a judgment that either considers the agent's actions to be laudable or inappropriate. This judgment is then, in Aristotle's framework of tragedy, connected to the idea of success or failure in life. We must keep in mind the fact that in Aristotle's construct, as much as possible of the life of a particular agent is compressed into one work with the objective of representing the entirety of the person's life within a manageable period of dramatic representation with respect to time. In the case of the texts under study, it is not an entire life that is being represented, rather a short period from the narrator's or player's existence that is being presented. What we are examining, therefore, in the present study, is a small segment taken from the entirety of one real, one fictional character's existence. This does not mean, however, that we cannot or do not judge the narrator and his actions or those of the woman being depicted from the standpoint of our system of values. The narrative gives insight into a small part of the life that the agents lived and took action in. And while it would not make any sense to decide whether the life of

either the narrator or the woman being depicted was, on the whole, a success or failure, it is still possible to decide whether the particular event that the narrator describes stands as a particular instance of ethical success or failure, and, whether the agents' actions, and by association, the agents themselves, are praise- or blameworthy. In relation with agency, we can take into consideration an excerpt from Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*:

The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Barnes – Complete, 1746).

Aristotle here is laying the foundation for what ethical behavior is. It is based on choice, and the choice is based on knowledge of what is being chosen. The choice that the agent makes is inextricably connected to who the agent is. That is, the agent's firm and unchangeable character (*ethos*) is the center from which the agent acts. Aristotle's use of the terms firm and unchangeable in this excerpt reveals his goal of guiding the reader to higher values. That is, in the text under consideration, Aristotle's aim is to prescribe a standard of ethics based on an ideal character that his reader ought to attempt to achieve. In the analysis of the texts under study, the same idea of an ideal agent who is firm and unchangeable could be applied, but with very different characteristics from those that Aristotle is referring to here. This is simply again the concept of prenotions that I have already talked about. Just what an agent ought to be firm in and unchangeable about in Aristotle's view (and, particularly, in the *Nichomachean Ethics*) will be quite different from the readers' of the narratives under study. That is, what Aristotle is defining as the good in his treatise on ethics will differ radically from what the readers of the texts under study define as the good. In every case, an agent's actions are judged (in Aristotle's view) depending on their knowledge when carrying them out.

In connection with the idea of agency is the discussion Paul Ricoeur holds in *Time and Narrative*. Paul Ricoeur's discussion on this issue is crucial for the present study on two levels. First, agency holds importance from the standpoint of narrative, for agents are the stuff, so to speak, or "beings" upon which this form of discourse depends. Without agents there can be no action. Without action there can be no narrative. As actions carried out by agents with motives, the second level of importance for the present discussion is the evaluation, or judgment of the same from the standpoint of ethics. It is this aspect for which Ricoeur's discussion provides a solid base for understanding and executing judgment of the agents in a narrative:

Actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not confused with some foreseen or predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action depends. Actions, moreover, refer to motives, which explain why someone does or did something, in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event leads to another. Actions also have agents, who do and can do things which are taken as *their* work, or *their* deed. As a result, these agents can be held responsible for certain consequences of their actions. In this network, the infinitive regression opened by the question "Why?" is not incompatible with the finite regression opened by the question "Who?" To identify an agent and to recognize this agent's motives are complementary operations (Time, 54).

Actions are carried out by agents who have motives, and, as a result these very agents can at once be identified as the owners of the actions and, thus, they are responsible for the consequences of their deeds, which are based on motives. Motives are more important than the act itself, and provide the meaning behind the actions. This framework is applicable to narrative, where actions and motives are depicted. Making sense of a narrative necessarily involves judgment from an ethical standpoint of action and, more importantly, motives, which are inescapably tied to responsibility. This is precisely what the term agent identifies: a person responsible for certain acts which, we assume, were carried out based on motives. The combination of motives and action make possible the teleological evaluation of narrative, in the sense Ricoeur brings out in *Time and Narrative*. The agent's motives and corresponding responsibility take away

any notion of randomness or necessity that can be applied to mere physical movement. It is this lack of randomness or sheer physical inexorability that furnishes narratives and stories with a gap that we humans, whether as readers, viewers or listeners, experience their unfolding as an audience. We attempt to fill the gap that is created by asking the question *why*. Without this question, narrative has no hook to keep our interest, for we seek reasons and motives behind the physical actions that take place in order to make sense of what occurs in terms of events.

The sum total of the components that comprise the scenario (what might be called influencing or mitigating circumstances) also plays a role in the audience's evaluation of what transpires in narrative. Ricoeur writes:

We also understand that these agents act and suffer in circumstances they did not make that nevertheless do not belong to the practical field, precisely inasmuch as they circumscribe the intervention of historical agents in the course of physical events and offer favorable or unfavorable occasions for their action. This intervention, in turn, implies that acting makes what an agent can do – in terms of “basic actions” – and what, without observation, he knows he is capable of doing, coincide with the initial state of a closed physical system (54).

Ricoeur's point is that the agents represented in narrative find themselves in circumstances that they did not create, and that these same circumstances affect the range of possible action the agents can carry out. These circumstances may be favorable or unfavorable. These two aspects of the closed physical system in which the agents find themselves color the way in which the audience will evaluate the actions. The variables are myriad, and that is why each narrative stands as a case that must be evaluated on its own terms.

Nor is the agent alone when we speak of action as Ricoeur conceives it. To say that the basis of ethics is the existence of the Other is a truism, but perhaps bringing this point to the fore, however obvious, is crucial:

Moreover, to act is always to act “with” others. Interaction can take the form of cooperation or competition or struggle. The contingencies of this interaction then

rejoin those of our circumstances through their character of helping or hindering us. Finally, the outcome of an action may be a change in fortune toward happiness or misfortune (54).

To the physical circumstances of the scenario within which the emplotment unfolds are added other agents, which also affect the outcome of the plot, as well as what boundaries can be placed on the acts of the protagonist. Ricoeur rounds off the preliminaries of his discussion of agency with a list of the relative questions and terms that can be used in the conceptual framework that he is articulating:

In short, these terms or others akin to them occur in our answers to questions that can be classified as questions about “what,” “why,” “who,” “how,” “with whom,” or “against whom” in regard to any action. On the one hand, every narrative presupposes a familiarity with terms such as agent, goal, means, circumstance, help, hostility, cooperation, conflict, success, failure, etc., on the part of its narrator and any listener. In this sense, the minimal narrative sentence is an action sentence of the form “X did A in such and such circumstances.” In the final analysis, narratives have acting and suffering as their theme (54-56).

Although doubtless Ricoeur takes this for granted – due to his already having distinguished mere physical movement from motivated action – his minimal narrative sentence could be expanded as follows: “X did A in such and such circumstances *for the following motives.*” It is at this point that Ricoeur brings in the idea of evaluation of narrative in terms of ethics:

As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences. They thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action is more valuable than that one. These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be extended to the agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or worse . . . We thus rejoin, by way of cultural anthropology, some of the “ethical” presuppositions of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, which I can therefore attach to the level of mimesis<sup>1</sup>. The *Poetics* presupposes not just “doers” but characters endowed with ethical qualities that make them noble or vile. If tragedy can represent them as “better” and comedy as “worse” than actual human beings, it is because the practical understanding authors share with their audiences necessarily involves an evaluation of the characters and their actions in terms of good and bad. *There is no action that does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles.* When the time comes, I shall discuss the question of whether a mode of reading that would entirely suspend all evaluation of an ethical character is possible. What, in particular, would remain of the pity Aristotle taught us to link to unmerited misfortune, if aesthetic pleasure were to be totally dissociated from



any sympathy or antipathy for the characters' ethical quality? We shall see that this possible ethical neutrality has to be conquered by force in an encounter with one originary and inherent feature of action: precisely that it can never be ethically neutral. One reason for thinking that this neutrality is neither possible nor desirable is that the actual order of action does not just offer the artist conventions and convictions to dissolve, but also ambiguities and perplexities to resolve in a hypothetical mode. Many contemporary critics, reflecting on the relation between art and culture, have emphasized the conflicting character of the norms that culture offers for poets' mimetic activity. They were preceded on this score by Hegel in his famous meditation on Sophocles' *Antigone*. But, at the same time, does not such ethical neutrality of the artist suppress one of the oldest functions of art, that it constitutes an ethical laboratory where the artist pursues through the mode of fiction experimentation with values? Whatever our response to these questions, poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics, even when it advocates the suspension of all ethical judgment or its ironic inversion. The very project of ethical neutrality presupposes the original ethical quality of action on the prior side of fiction. This ethical quality is itself only a corollary of the major characteristics of action, that it is always symbolically mediated (57-59).

Ricoeur is speaking of works of fiction, but the same ideas that he presents above can be applied to travel writing, which represent real events from the past. In any case, the point that I want to drive home here is simply that when we read a narrative – whether it is a work of fiction or non-fiction – we inevitably evaluate what is being told from the standpoint of ethics, and that it is ethics which provides the primary motor that makes engagement when reading, viewing or listening to a story possible. Ricoeur's statement that poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics sums up concisely what I am arguing here. When he states that attempting to criticize or create narrative action that is free from ethics demonstrates that there has been a connection to ethics previously stands as a challenge to those who would argue for a system of value-free aesthetics. Finally, his point that there is no action that is not judged for approval or disapproval comes to bear on and informs the present discussion.

Halliwell's discussion on Aristotle's views on the poet's manipulation of the plot also comes into play here:

The poet must handle plots to 'good effect', possible a) for the deed to be done with full knowledge and understanding . . . b) for the deed to be done, but by agents who do not know the terrible thing they are doing, and later recognize . . .

c) for one who is on the point of committing an incurable deed in ignorance to come to a recognition before he has done it (46).

What we see in the above excerpt are various degrees of knowledge with respect to the decisions that the agent makes resulting in actions that are carried out. All three possibilities will have different effects on the audience. Each case will result in judgment that will depend on the knowledge that the agent holds when committing the acts that are represented. The possibilities Aristotle presents are related to his discussion of tragedy. Of course, other scenarios with respect to knowledge are possible for tragedy, and, by extension for other genres as well. But what is important here is to keep in mind the idea that, in this regard, the knowledge the agent has with respect to the actions that he is going to carry out, whether limited or complete, will affect the audience's or readership's judgment of the agent's actions and character. We shall see that, in the *recit de voyage* under study, the narrator passes from ignorance to knowledge with respect to the circumstances he describes and within which he takes action, and it is this very passage from what might be called innocence to culpable realization that he uses in the pleading of his case. Whether he is judged blame- or praiseworthy will depend, on the one hand, on how effective a rhetorician he is, and how he employs the three proofs (i.e., *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*) to establish his praiseworthiness, and, on the other, on the readership's reception of his persuasive arguments.

Our focus at this point is *ethos*, but, as we have been stating, it is inextricably connected with *logos*, which is linked to *dianoia*, or thought. What the agent thinks and says about her actions reveals motive, and therefore, character. Halliwell tells us that if there is no choice, no character judgment can be made. It is action based on decision that determines a person's character:

Character is the element which reveals the nature of a moral choice, in cases where it is not anyway clear what a person is choosing or avoiding (and so speeches in which the speaker chooses or avoids nothing at all do not possess character); while thought arises in passages where people show that something is or is not the case, or present some universal proposition (38).

A person may talk extensively about a particular ethical issue, but until she takes action, it is not possible to judge her. She must make a decision and act in order for the observer to decide how she measures up within the latter's scale of values that merits praise or blame.

Halliwell tells us that Aristotle's *Poetics* lays the groundwork that, at the theoretical level, considers fictive (mimetic) works as a good:

But in firmly asserting human action to be the province of poetry, Ar. is also laying the basis for a theory of poetic value. In Aristotelian philosophy, 'action' denotes intrinsically *purposive* behaviour: in their actions, men engage in the distinctively human pursuit of aims, the realization of their intentions. So ch. 2's formula, 'people in action', implies that poetry is capable of treating, if only in fictional form, the fundamental patterns of life (75).

The representation of purposive behavior, which, as we have been asserting, involves agents that carry out actions that can be judged morally, in Aristotle's theoretical framework, constitute human behavior within a system of behavior that can be identified as repetitive, and thus, as a source for reflecting on our own actions. The same model can be applied to works of non-fiction. That is, fundamental patterns of life can be detected in biographical and autobiographical narratives. In Part 3 of this dissertation, I shall discuss the work of scholars not working in literature that affirm that personal narrative is a mode that humans use to make sense of their lives. It follows that patterns of behavior will emerge that can be categorized and subsequently evaluated for their worth in terms of existential meaning as well as in terms of the place they hold as a good within the respective system of values they are embedded in. In Aristotle's theory of tragic representation, the agents act within an ethical framework that, in order for the

work to be effective and to hold value, dictates that they can be perceived as noble agents carrying out noble actions:

It should follow that the characteristic subject-matter of tragedy, as Ar. sees it, must in some sense be natural for a poetic genre which aims to portray ‘noble actions and noble agents’. This means that Ar. accepts vulnerability and instability, which he will later identify as the crux of tragedy, to be an inescapable part of the human pursuit of excellence and goodness (82).

As always, we must remember that the “noble” human pursuit of excellence and goodness are abstract notions or prenotions that will be defined differently depending on the respective individual or group. Thus, the narrator of the *recit de voyage*, whose work is part of a publication that asserts that it is a work of the “best” American travel writing, presents himself at times as noble, at others as playfully devious, while making every attempt to win the reader over to his side as he makes his case with a view to his being judged as pursuing excellence and goodness as he defines it. He tells a story that gives insight into his thought and motives, which provide the backdrop for the action that he describes, not only actions that he carries out, but the action of others. In this way he provides characterization not only of himself, but of the other players in his narrative. In his story, vulnerability and instability also play a role. These two characteristics hold high *ethos* value, for an agent that possesses these qualities is perceived as being human, and it is in this way that identification with and sympathy for the agent are achieved, thereby increasing *ethos*.

It is the interconnectedness of character, motive and action that reveals character from an Aristotelian standpoint, as Halliwell asserts:

Ar. believes in a reciprocal relation between character and action – character motivating action, and action cumulatively helping to shape character . . . What matters in life is that people should engage in the pursuit of suitable aims and ends, not that they should rest quiescent in a fixed or achieved state; and since drama is, on Ar.’s premises, the mimesis or representation of life, it too must centre on people’s actions rather than their characters as such. But this does not eliminate the need for characterisation, since the latter can help to give a fuller dramatisation of the significance of the agent’s actions (94-95).

We see in the excerpt above that while Aristotle's emphasis is on action, the agents' character nevertheless fleshes out the acts undertaken within the dramatic work. Aristotle's emphasis does not prevent a contemporary student of literature from bringing the motives behind the action into greater relief, and by so doing explore in depth the psychological complexities that underlie human action. By examining in depth both action and psychology represented in a work of literature – whether it is a work of fiction or non-fiction – she can explore what is or is not important in life:

Tragic drama offers us images of the actions on which depends the difference between happiness and unhappiness, terms which for Ar. signify judgements on the success or failure of a life in the fullest ethical sense. Against such a background, 'action' is no loose or empty term for whatever may occur in a play, but a way of denoting tragedy's encompassment of the significant goals of life (95).

I have mentioned Eagleton's assertion that there has been a tendency for students of literature to evade moral issues, due to their being perceived as personal rather than political. But it could be and, in fact, is argued, that true politics begins with the individual. Unless an individual takes account for and judges her own actions within an ethical framework, the bigger task of large-scale political reformation will only amount to empty arguments with no real foundation. That is, that true reformation begins with the individual, and it is the individual that must take action, based on a system of values that the agent adheres to personally.

Halliwell discusses happiness and unhappiness in the excerpt above. This is an area rife with possibilities for discussion and analysis, using literary texts as springboard for discussion. For happiness is, in the opinion of the vast majority of human beings, the greatest good to be sought. What happiness is and its relation to action and ethics can be examined in depth using a rhetorical approach to looking at literature.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> In their work on ethics, Aristotle and Kant assume that happiness is the goal of human life. See Mackie.

It is interesting that certain actions, in Halliwell's reading of Aristotle, can, in and of themselves, be viewed as characterizing the agent carrying them out, regardless of whether the motives are supplied through the discourse. That is, the actions themselves are *ethos* laden:

[There are] signs of a slight equivocation . . . some degree of characterisation is inevitable (ch.2), and that it can (though should not) be dispensed with altogether (ch. 6). The fundamental principle, I think, is that many actions will necessarily have a degree of characterisation built into them, since their nature will presuppose particular ethical dispositions; but some actions are not of this kind, and in these cases characterless action is a possibility (95).

It is quite possible that Aristotle might not agree with the above reading, especially when we consider the unfinished nature of his corpus, as I have already discussed. Whether or not he would agree does not prevent us, however, from insisting that actions must not be taken at face value. That is, the motives must be revealed in order to reach a proper judgment. Halliwell tells us that Aristotle allows for both implicit and explicit representation of *ethos*, but that he places the greatest emphasis on action that can be represented outwardly:

There is, then, probably a sense in which Ar. considers that character can be either implicit or explicit, but it is the latter – the positive ways in which a dramatist can illuminate the moral motivations of his agents – which he has in mind when making most of his remarks on the subject (95).

Halliwell's view that Aristotle's emphasis is on ways motivation can explicitly be represented is linked to the fact that he discussion of *dianoia* (thought) to his *Rhetoric*.<sup>109</sup> For in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle insists, as already stated, that *ethos* must come from *logos*. That is, *ethos* must come from the discourse itself. Thus it could be argued that in a tragic work, what the characters say necessarily takes on great importance, and

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<sup>109</sup> Halliwell writes: “[Aristotle] relegates the study of it [‘thought’] precisely to his ‘discourses on rhetoric’. That late passage indicates that ‘thought’ is the sphere of the ‘*internal*’ rhetoric of tragedy, the rhetoric used by the characters to explain, defend or justify themselves, or to state their attitudes to one another” (96).

that both action and thought are woven together, and it is in the combination of the two that *ethos* is revealed.

Aristotle also places limits on the characterization of tragic personae. They must be similar to the audience, in order for the latter to sympathize with them:

This brings in Ar.'s requirement for tragic figures who are 'like ourselves' – that is, within the range of our moral experience and comprehension. Pity and fear presuppose and involve, in other words, a fundamental *sympathy* for the tragic agents, and a sympathy which is not purely spontaneous or unreflective, but one which engages us imaginatively in understanding the causal nexus of the tragedy (125).

Halliwell's discussion focuses on tragic characters, but the same requirements apply to other genres as well. In the case of the *recit de voyage* under study, the sympathy that the narrator attempts to achieve with his readership is tied to pity and fear, the predominant emotions that arise in Aristotle's definition of tragic drama. The narrator also attempts to guide his readership to other emotions as well: indignation, joy, and so on. In any case, the rule of similarity applies. That is, the narrator of a travel narrative, in order to be able to persuade her readers of what she is arguing, must also be similar to those persons reading her text. In Part 4 of this dissertation I shall show the similarities between the narrator and his readership that make it possible for the latter to become engaged in what is being told, which leads to a judgment. Halliwell brings up the very important point that when Aristotle writes about characterization, he is necessarily writing about ethics, a subject he explores in other works:

It is clear, then, that Ar.'s view of character, both in life and in artistic mimesis, is conceived in terms of explicit, unambiguous and essentially ethical attributes – above all, indeed, in terms of the virtues and vices which he defines and explores in his two *Ethics* (140).

Crucial here is Halliwell's position that Aristotle views character to be related to ethical attributes both in life and in artistic mimesis. In the case of travel narratives, the assumption is that the representation that takes place in the body of the text is of events

that have actually occurred. This means that what is represented in a travel narrative can be judged from the standpoint of ethics. It is also important to keep in mind the connection that Aristotle makes between *ethos* and an individual's ethics, as stated in the above excerpt. (As stated at the outset of this dissertation, in order to use Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or *Poetics* when analyzing a particular text, it is necessary to have read other related works in his corpus.)

Halliwell asserts that Aristotle's position requires that the characters should be "good." That is, that their actions should, from the standpoint of the audience, be depicted as praiseworthy:

This allows him to state in the present chapter his series of four principles for tragic characterisation. Of these, 'goodness' is required . . . and this entails that its central figures should, in large, be seen to be striving for laudable aims: it is important, for example, that Sophocles in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* shows Oedipus to be acting, and to have acted in the past, for motives which a Greek audience could recognise as noble ones (140).

The same rule applies to the two narratives under study. Just what is deemed laudable is, as I shall demonstrate, a matter of opinion, and a matter of the respective audience. In other words, the rule that there must be some similarity between the narrator and the audience in order for the narrator to persuade her readership that she is indeed praiseworthy applies. Halliwell states that, in Aristotle's *Poetics*, the characters ought to be depicted as "ethically elevated" (142). As it is the audience that, using its system of values as the reference point for evaluating precisely what is ethically elevated behavior, the rule of similarity again applies. That is, the pursuits of the tragic agents must be "ethically elevated" according to the audience's standards. We see that, as we have been asserting, in Aristotle's framework of *ethos*, like attracts like, and it is in the quest for similarity that persuasion takes place.

Halliwell discusses other aspects of character that, in contemporary terms, are socio-economic: "Ar. regards character as partially circumscribed or qualified by social



and related factors . . . it helps to keep in mind the difference between ancient and modern notions of character. . . the character of a slave or a woman is inevitably deemed to have lower possibilities of achievement (141).” Although the term slave is abhorrent to contemporary readers, it could be argued that, in terms of socio-economic status, little has changed. That is, a non-documented worker in a sweatshop in Los Angeles working for sub-standard wages, whether a real person or as represented in a work of literature, would, to a contemporary audience, be considered as capable of achieving less on the socio-economic ladder – for obvious reasons. This is true regardless of whether or not the institution of slavery is in force. The reality is, in effect, the same. But what is important here is that the depictions adhere with the audience’s conception of reality, which means, in the end, that the writer of literature, whether fiction or non-fiction, must create representations that coincide with the audience’s conception of social reality. Kennedy highlights the same point in his discussion of *ethos* or “character(isation)”:

An old man and a young man must show quite different attitudes; a rich man would not think of things in the same way as a poor man. Such dramatic character is treated by Aristotle under style (1408a25 ff. and 1417a15ff.) and is called *ethopoiia* by critics (e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias* 8). It is especially important in the narration (Persuasion, 92).

The same concepts apply today, as will become evident in the analysis of the *recit de voyage* under consideration. Each character in the narrative can be analyzed in terms of their socio-economic status. How *ethos* works in the socio-economic framework can then be examined, as well as how *ethos* functions rhetorically in order to bring about persuasion.

I have discussed the *phronimos*, which is Aristotle’s paragon of political and ethical behavior. That is, the *phronimos* stands as model citizen, an ideal the readers of his treatise ought to aspire to be. This ideal stands at one end of the spectrum of ethical

behavior. Oksenberg Rorty uses this extreme to discuss those who are not *phronimoi* – that is, the vast majority of humanity:

So much for the *phronimos*. For the rest of us, matters are more complicated, the fit between our thoughts and desires is not so neat. Each type of character has its own perspective on what is desirable, seeing it as noble, or as expedient, or as pleasant (1113a30 ff.). The practical reasons of ordinary folk, however intelligent and astute they may be, is influenced by their character-*hexeis*, their age, social status, and polity (14-15).

What is important to cull from Oksenberg Rorty's commentary is the idea that each person's *ethos* will be, to a great extent, a product of who they are in terms of socio-economics. The various elements that make up a person's social status come into play, and, in the literary work, whether fiction or non-fiction, either contribute to or hinder persuasion. This is again, due to the audience's tendency to seek similarity in the characters being represented in works of literature. It is similarity that makes it possible for sympathy with and compassion for the characters to occur. These emotional responses to the *ethos* of the character being represented are audience-specific. In Part 4 I assert that what I call a "highly educated and cultured readership" will identify with and be persuaded by both texts under study. It is an audience for which we find forerunners in a 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE work by Apuleius, the *Apologia*.

Apuleius' *Apologia* provides a case in point of the various factors that enter into persuasion through character, in its face-off between Apuleius and what are depicted as bumpkins that have accused him of being irreligious. Apuleius' text is interesting for this study for it provides an example of a character who is, on the one hand, cultured and well-read (by the literary and academic standards of the day) and who, on the other, must defend himself against the accusations of a number of uncultured (by academic standards) characters. It is possible to see in Apuleius' *Apologia* how judgment, to a very significant extent, is determined by like seeking like. For the judge whom Apuleius appeals to is also a man of letters and sophistication, and due to the socio-cultural status

he shares with the defendant, passes judgment in the latter's favor. Sharing similar ideas in terms of what the good is has great impact in terms of *ethos*, which I discuss in relationship to the marketing of the anthology in which the *recit de voyage* I examine was published due to its being an outstanding example of travel writing – based, of course, on the standards set by the editorial staff. Parallels can be drawn between ancient and contemporary literary texts which show that the system of values that provides the base for today's readers has many aspects in common with audiences/readerships of the past.

As for the *Apologia*, Walker discusses the identification that occurs between the judge, who has much in common with the pleadings of Apuleius, and, by extension, the readership of this ancient work:

Whatever the true origins of the *Apologia* may have been, it is clear that, as a literary declamation, the text invites its Roman reader to identify with Apuleius and (perhaps more important) with the learned proconsul, Claudius Maximus, while regarding as an object of derision not only Aemilianus, Pudens, and the other accusers, but also the sort of culture and the sort of rhetorical practice they represent – for theirs is a narrow, conservative, provincial version of Roman culture, productive of an *ethos* interested only in practical advantage in the crassest sense, motivated chiefly by avarice, and indifferent, suspicious, or actively hostile toward the kind of culture that Apuleius represents. Likewise, as I have noted, theirs is the “bloodthirsty, gain-getting,” and “gladiatorial” rhetoric that defines the world of *delatores*: the philosophically vapid, ethically indifferent, power-seeking *kako*-rhetoric that Cicero describes as eloquence's evil twin and that Dionysius portrays as a corrupting force in the “house” or polis where communal life transpires. In the *Apologia*, such culture and such *kako*-rhetoric are portrayed as the source and instrument of injustice (Poetics, 126).

It can easily be inferred that Walker also sides with Claudius Maximus and Apuleius in terms of culture. And it is here that, in order to be objective, it is possible to affirm that crucial terms like provincial, crass, materialist describe characteristics that the highly educated and cultured readership that I shall articulate in Part 4 would attribute to others. It is easy to see that the system of values that underlies the ethical framework of persons steeped in the tradition of literary studies creates an *ethos* that is particular to its

members, and that what is determined as goods, both tangible and intangible, will enter into the rhetorical event and provide the bases for judgment. Walker makes the very important point that the accusers in Apuleius' text are portrayed as members of a culture and users of *kako*-rhetoric that represent injustice. What must be kept in mind with such comments is the fact that, were the text written not by Apuleius but by a writer whose system of values were the same as those of Aemilianus, Pudens, and the other accusers, there would be a readership that, due to shared culture and values and in so doing, would view Apuleius as an arch snob, an effete, and as someone who reads and values excessively intellectual literature. In order to persuade, the narrator must display attributes that are valued by her readership. Identification is achieved through shared values, which are, in the end, socio-economic and cultural. The question that arises, of course, is whether or not, in the example I have just given, one position is truer than – or preferable to – the other. This is a difficult question to answer, but one way of looking at the two parties' described above being at loggerheads is to view each stance as necessary, if only to provide definition for each system's respective system of values.

Walker continues:

Moreover, Maximus [the judge] is presumed throughout to be familiar with, and to enjoy discussion of, the varied literature and fields of knowledge that Apuleius digresses into. It is this shared *paideia*, then, that enables Apuleius's discursive art to attain the "clemency of understanding" and to receive fair justice from his judge according to law. Apuleius's gestures toward Maximus's learning are thus not merely conventional efforts to conciliate or flatter a powerful authority (though they are that too), but – through the text's function as a literary declamation – they also are expressions of a cultural and ethical solidarity the reader is asked to share. As Apuleius at one point says, "[s]ee, Maximus, what a tumult they have raised, now that I have mentioned a few magicians by name! What shall I do with such rubes, such savages? Shall I demonstrate in reply that I have come across all these and very many other names in public libraries while reading the most distinguished writers? . . . Or, which is much better, relying on your learning, Maximus, and your perfect erudition, shall I disdain to give these clods and dullards a response to such things? Indeed that's most what I'd like to do (91)." More important, perhaps, the reader is asked to affirm, at least implicitly, a rhetoric founded on a broad, Isocratean *paideia* as that which sustains and makes possible civil culture, and indeed to affirm that Roman civil culture

should be guided and informed by the sort of *paideia* that both Apuleius and Maximus embody. In its incarnation as a literary declamation, then, Apuleius's *Apologia* belongs to a series of "defences of rhetoric" that begins at least with Isocrates' *Antidosis* and that embodies the more or less Isocratean philosophy we find resurgent in such documents as Cicero's *De Oratore*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *On the Ancient Orators*, Tacitus's *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, and Aelius Aristides' *Against Plato Concerning Rhetoric*. As such, the *Apologia* both continues and embodies a tradition that for Apuleius is already more than five hundred years old, while it figures forth, in a paradigmatic scene, what is and what will be the place of rhetoric in the Roman world for the rest of antiquity and in the Byzantine world as well for another thousand years (126-27).

Crucial in the passage above is the role that cultural and ethical solidarity play in delivering justice. Fairness is determined by shared values, which are necessarily socio-economic. A system of shared values necessarily creates difference. What is fair to one group is not fair to another. The construct of the Other in the above text reveals the division that is necessarily present in rhetorical encounters. Opinions are pitted against opinions, and, in the end, the power structures that make decisions on fairness or unfairness are determined by shared values, which are, as I have been arguing, also opinions with respect to what is good. We have seen this above in the discussion of the various constitutions that Aristotle identified, each with its respective system of values.

The other point that Walker makes is that Apuleius is participating in a tradition that at the time of the *Apologia*'s writing was more than five hundred years old and that, in his view, lasted for another thousand years. My opinion is that while the rhetorical practice has perhaps changed somewhat, the same system of values remains, *mutatis mutandis*, intact at present. The type of readers that value what Apuleius and his readers valued have been in existence since antiquity in the western tradition.

Be that as it may, the key to rhetorical persuasion is understanding that the audience seeks not an Other, but instead *An-other*, an alter ego. The Other functions as a defining limit against which cohesion of a particular human herd can be achieved. McCroskey's thoughts on human nature can be directly applied here:

Essential to our understanding of rhetorical thought is an understanding of human nature. Humans are basically self-centered creatures. They normally do things because they think they will benefit from their actions. They normally believe a thing because the belief fits nicely inside their little ego-centered world. Self-interest is the primary motivating factor in human life. [But] Most noble aspirations and acts are also prompted by self-interest (80).

If we are as self-centered as McCroskey indicates, it follows that an audience would seek in an orator, or, in the case of this dissertation, a writer with whom its respective readership identifies. McCroskey's realistic, if not cynical observation "*Altruism* is another term for 'enlightened self-interest'" (80) could be seen as applicable. This enlightened self-interest is necessarily the product of cultural goods, both tangible and intangible, that are valued by a respective group. Precisely which goods are valued by the narrator/writer and readership in the cases under study will surface in the discussion in Part 4.



**PART 3**  
**FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS & OBJECT OF STUDY**





### 3.1 JUDGEMENT BY THE AUDIENCE

When Eagleton makes a request to examine a vast spectrum of human discourse under the lens of rhetoric, he can do so because rhetorical devices and structures are present in any text or object where persuasive argumentation occurs. What he is calling for is the audience (or consumers) of these cultural artifacts to act as judge. The types of texts that Eagleton identifies as possible objects manifest in a broad array of genres. His list bears repeating here: “from *Moby Dick* to the Muppet Show, from Dryden and Jean-Luc Godard to the portrayal of women in advertisements and the rhetorical techniques of Government reports.” We can see that not only is the rhetoric of written discourse to be targeted for critique, but the rhetoric of visual arts like advertising and film also come into play. As Eagleton mentions Dryden, he also includes poetry as possible material for rhetorical analysis. Eagleton is not alone here, for in Part 1 I have discussed Rosemond Tuve’s method in which she analyzes poetry of the Renaissance for their logical structures. Logical structures in poetic texts are detectable as well in ancient texts, as Walker illustrates in his seminal *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity*. Walker argues that there is an underlying logic of persuasion in early poetry. Conclusions that Walker draws about the audience and the role it plays in relation to the poetry he analyzes are also applicable to the rhetorical analysis of narrative. Major points of his discussion are presented below.

Two points made by Walker are cardinal: 1) the audience acts as judge and 2) if wise judgment is to take place, the experience of hearing (or reading) the poem is neither merely aesthetic nor just the attempt to understand the meaning of the text. Instead, the audience must, when analyzing rhetorically, use *sophia* (wisdom):

This rhetorical *sophia*, and the principle of answerability it implies, also includes a recognition that the role of the poet’s audience is to judge, not simply to have an aesthetic experience, and not simply to understand what the poet means – though the aesthetic experience is part of what will make the poet’s discourse persuasive and is part of what the audience’s judgment will respond to, and though an

intelligent judgment must proceed from an understanding of the poet's probable meaning and intentions (143-44).

Important in the excerpt above is the word *answerability* (as related to *sophia*), for the audience is, in the end, answerable for the judgments it makes. Appreciation of the aesthetics and ascertaining the meaning of the text are crucial, but not the end-all when it comes to judging the discourse. As Walker affirms, wise judgment must be based on understanding of the poet's meaning and intentions in combination with the aesthetics of the text. The audience must address these three aspects of a poem in order to be able to critically judge the arguments present in it. This is what Walker is getting at when he discusses answerability, for the audience or reader must take responsibility for the judgment they make on a poet's persuasiveness. In order to take on this sort of responsibility, the audience or reader must be able to both demonstrate that they have understood the probable meaning of the poem on several levels and to provide arguments that logically cohere with those of the poem in the case of agreement, or that contradict those of the poem in case of disagreement.

Walker asserts that poetic discourse is used both "as a rhetorical transaction and as an instrument of ethical *paideia*" (148). It is in this transaction that "the speaker, as a competitor in an *agon* with other voices, attempts to persuade/seduce his addressee to choose and keep him as a companion, mentor, and ethical model," on the one hand, and also that "the role of the audience is to exercise its powers of judgment and response, in choosing to be persuaded by his counsels" (148). Earlier in this dissertation the idea that within the system of values and discursive framework utilized for the functioning of a single community opposing voices are present. A single system of values is necessarily characterized by opposing argumentative forces that form part of the repository shared by the same community. Walker uses the poetry of Theognis to sum up the relationship between speaker and audience that functions in this space where opposition occurs:

As the audience rehearses its acts of judgment in response to the poetry, and insofar as it judges Theognis admirable and persuasive, it rehearses also various acts of assent that constitute a will to identify with the poet's *ethos* or, more precisely, with the shifting, complex, varied ethical positions figured forth in the poet's self-embodiment in his poetry (148).

The judgment that the audience makes in the face of the shifting and complex ethical positions will depend on the persuasive force with which the pleader argues his or point. Walker makes the crucial points that the audience responds and then, in an act of will, decides to identify with the various *ethical* positions embodied by the poet and his poetry. Thus we see the importance that ethics play in rhetorical transactions – whenever judgment and choice take place. Walker discusses some of the earliest rhetorical enactments in the poetry of Homer, where the audience must judge complex issues. He states that when Achilles argues that he does not want to participate in the war because a long life at home without glory is preferable to the early death and eternal fame that prophecy has foretold for him, he is challenging the audience's system of values, and putting it in an uncomfortable position where no easy answer comes immediately to the fore:

Homer's audience . . . is presented with a strikingly (even vehemently) well put yet paradoxical argument that, on one hand, agonistically challenges a dominant value-scheme and that, on the other hand, is fairly persuasive within its context, thereby calling for a complex exercise of judgment. Is Achilles just rationalizing what might otherwise be seen as cowardice, or as a young noble's excessive sensitivity to insult? Is his argument valid or persuasive only within a certain very specific context?" (163)

Crucial here is Walker's bringing to the fore the *agon* of rhetorical enactments. This aspect has been alluded to throughout Part 1 where rhetoric's field has been discussed. That is, it is possible to argue forcefully either for or against the issues rhetoric deals with. Also crucial is Walker's identification of context. For, as stated throughout this dissertation, persuasion is case-specific. Arguments that are persuasive to one audience in one context may not be persuasive to the same audience in a different context.

Further, the complexities of judging arguments are highlighted in Walker's discussion, a characteristic that holds true in all cases that are objects of rhetorical analysis. The decision of an audience as to whether an argument is valid or not is dependent upon the specifics and complexities of the particular instance. Each bit of information obtained in relation to a particular case colors the eventual and ongoing judgment. Without crucial bits of information a snap decision might be made about the justice or injustice of a particular case, a judgment that could be erroneous. We see in the above text on Achilles that opposing arguments are present when rhetoric is used to persuade. Judging which argument is most persuasive is a complex procedure, due to their inherent persuasive force, as Perelman affirms:

Practical eloquence, including judicial and deliberative genres, was the traditionally favored field of confrontation of litigants and politicians who defended, by argumentation, opposed and sometimes even contradictory theses. In such oratorical contests, the adversaries would seek to win the adherence of their audience on certain debated subjects, in which the pros and cons would often have equally able and apparently equally honorable defenders (Rhetoric, 45).

We have already seen that Perelman believes that not only judicial and deliberative rhetoric, but that epideictic rhetoric also functions as a persuasive vehicle for change. The idea that there are opposing points of view that are ably defended, and that a rhetorical encounter is often adversarial is brought out in the excerpt above. Perelman also brings out the important point that positions are defended honorably. The term honorable highlights again the ethical and complex nature of rhetorical persuasion. The example of Achilles provided by Walker demonstrates this point, for the former's position was in opposition to the status quo, and in his speech he, in effect, engaged in a battle of opposing ideas that could, depending on the circumstances and how they are presented, could prove to be more persuasive.

As stated above, the speech, rhetor and audience constitute units of a much larger web of interconnected variables in human interaction and civic management.

Halliwell asserts that rhetorical enactments do not occur in a vacuum:

The judgment occurrent in rhetorical contexts involves an interplay between audience and rhetorician; it is the entire institutional procedure, not the persuasive speech alone, which carries the processes of deliberation, decision, and action (Poetics, 178).

Halliwell is writing about deliberative rhetoric, but the same holds true for judicial rhetoric. The processes of deliberation, decision and action operate within a larger mechanism of human societal administration governed by discourse. As such, the effectiveness of the arguments, although often presented alongside contradictory and complex theses, nevertheless falls within a framework of thought dictated by *vox populi*. As Halliwell writes, “the material on which this skill is manipulatively exercised is, in large part, the substance of popular morality as embodied in the convictions presumed to be widely shared by a representative audience” (178). Arguments that are classified as “unusual” or “provocative” will always be judged from the perspective of a system of values that is normative and accepted. In the end, perhaps what is called unconventional perhaps amounts only, in fact, to the *conventionally unconventional*, with the greater good as defined by those in power finally constituting the foundation of judgments made. Walker argues, however, that there is always conflict in a culture’s value-hierarchies, and that change or novelty can be promoted.

The rhetor’s necessity, in short, is to work within or through the presuppositional sets that both rhetor and audience can share, or that the rhetor is willing to concede, in order to win the audience’s assent to the rhetor’s particular claims – and to what is new and distinctive in the rhetor’s discourse. This inescapable situation does not necessarily produce a mere reiteration of conventional beliefs (or “ideologies”) because no body of conventional beliefs is ever (or can ever be) fully coherent, internally consistent, or systematic. Any culture’s conventional values and beliefs, and value-hierarchies, are inevitably heterogenous because they are the sedimented products of tradition, the happenstance products of a history and of cultural forces that no one person can ever fully perceive or control. It is always the case that at least some values/beliefs or hierarchies will be at least

potentially in tension or conflict with at least some others, *especially in specific situations that bring those conflicts into high relief*. It is always possible to promote, demote, refute, problematize, satirize, rearrange, revise, revalidate (and so on) one established set of values by means of appeal to some other established set or, by the same means, to promote an unconventional or novel set (164).

Walker is arguing that the conflict is generic to the hierarchical system of values held by the community. No system of values is fully coherent, and it is the contradictions found within the community's system of values that provide the basis for the differing arguments.

Whether the arguments represent positions of the value system dictated by a community's status quo or others that are in conflict with the latter, it appears as if, in the end, advantage is the aim. Halliwell argues that, in Aristotle's system, *sumpheron*, or "advantage," holds sway in most human decisions and judgments. He contrasts this with actions that are based on nobility:

*Sumpheron* seems, on the face of it, to be an intrinsically selfish or self-regarding criterion: by definition, it refers always to the advantage or benefit of an "interested party," whereas nobility offers an express contrast to this (1.9.17-19.1366b36-1367a61, 2.13.9.1390a1), and virtue in general is held by Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric* at any rate, to involve behavior that benefits others (*euergetein*). Twice, indeed, the *Rhetoric* cites the idea – as a commonplace, and hence rhetorically serviceable, prejudice – that human beings are, in harsh reality, incorrigibly committed to pursuing self-interest, however much their public professions might suggest otherwise. All this appears to fit well with the thesis, shared by some modern scholars with Plato, that it was rhetoric itself, and its exploitation by hard-headed Sophistic "realism" or *realpolitik*, which had established and disseminated the notion of expediency as a dominant mechanism of human behavior, especially in struggles for political power (182).

We have seen that the idea that incorrigible commitment to self-interest is the motor of nearly all human action earlier, as presented by McCroskey. McCroskey would argue that what Aristotle calls service to others is, in fact, enlightened self-interest. If this is the case, then dialectic and rhetoric are the tools that all human value systems use to attain what are, in the end, selfish aims. Halliwell writes, "For advantage is, of course, stated to be the supreme concern of deliberative oratory (1.3.5-6.1358b20-36,

1.6.1.1362a17-18), and in view of the observation that it is a standard by which ‘all men are persuaded’ (1.8.2.1365b25), it has a claim to be regarded as paradigmatic of the content and workings of popular morality” (181). Although Aristotle in the citations Halliwell refers to is discussing deliberative rhetoric, advantage can also be seen as the supreme concern in both judicial and epideictic rhetoric. This means that all rhetorical transactions, whether their aim is to promote, demote, refute and so on a particular set of values, are characterized by selfishness, and it is this selfishness that must be appealed to, using as base the inherent values held as normative within a particular culture. As Walker informs us, Aristotle’s poet does not bring forth issues that are utterly opposed or completely original assertions. The values of the culture being addressed must always be kept in mind when attempting to persuade. The speaker must always work within a framework of existing normative criteria:

When we consider this penchant for agonistic competition from a rhetorical perspective, it is clear that it need not and indeed *cannot* require that poets place themselves in utter opposition to the dominant value-schemes of their culture, or the audiences they perform for. Rather, as every rhetorician knows, all that is possible is to question a particular position, assert an attitude, rearrange a value-hierarchy, or make the case for a minority position (that is, “make the weaker case stronger”) by means of connecting the “new” or unconventional position (or hierarchy) to an existing set of values and beliefs that the intended audience already considers authoritative. To the degree that the audience’s adherence to that preexisting scheme can be intensified and transferred to the “new” position, the “new” position is correspondingly validated and made persuasive (164).

Interesting in Walker’s text are the quotation marks used with the term new, by which he suggests that, in fact, no truly new positions are ever argued for. That is, what he calls the “new” position is really one that is already present in the scheme of already existing values, which are often in conflict.<sup>110</sup> What the rhetorician does is bring to the

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<sup>110</sup> We have stated from the outset that Aristotle views rhetoric as the counterpart to dialectic. Both forms of argumentation argue in opposite directions. Cole explores and expands upon the link rhetoric has with dialectic. His comments identify in different terminology the bases of rhetorical argumentation discussed by Walker: “The rhetoric that is a counterpart to this [i.e., dialectic], or compounded out of it and some other set of skills, requires a corresponding ability to produce the premises and inferences a deliberative or judicial body is likely to accept (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356b35-



fore a position that is part of the values scheme but is not a dominant one. As Walker asserts above, only a sort of transference is possible. In this sense, it could be argued that what a rhetorician does is persuade the audience of something that it already believes in, but that it has deluded itself into thinking that it is opposed to it. Values are always shifting in Walker's vision, and it is a question of which values set prevails at a given point in time, and whether another set can replace the one that is currently accepted as being in force. In any case, Walker then adds that the listener still must exercise rational judgment and decide whether the rhetorician's arguments are persuasive without feeling that he or she is being coerced. The listener must exercise her freedom of choice following critical scrutiny and heartfelt evaluation:

But the person addressed is also to make an effort to understand or "gather in mind" what the poet says and is not to do anything with which his own *thymos* does not agree: his assent or being-persuaded, in short, is not to be forced. Rather, it is to be a willing agreement based on careful assessment of the poet's charmingly persuasive telling, or in other words a response that has been mediated by some thought-taking. The function of the poet's telling is to persuade the listener's heart; the role of the listener is to exercise his judgment (144).

Both the persuasion of the poet (who acts, in any case, as a rhetorician) and the listener's heart will make claim to *sophia*, according to Walker. What is crucial here is Walker's insistence that the heart (read: *pathos*) plays a role that is just as important as reason. The two Aristotelian proofs, *pathos* and *logos*, work in conjunction when an individual's will (*thymos*) is being exercised. Further, the judgment that is based on *sophia* will necessarily be a shared agreement of what is considered wise by the audience. The two I's involved here (i.e., poet and listener) become *we*. And it is in the

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57a1). And insofar as it is provided by Aristotle's great treatise, the rhetorician's training in dialectic or a counterpart to dialectic involves mastering, first, an inventory of truths, partial truths, and received truths of the sort likely to provide acceptable premises for argument, and then another inventory (much less extensive than that required of the dialectician) of the logical operations by which further truths can be derived, or made to seem to derive, from those premises. The premises, drawn from the realms of ethics, politics, jurisprudence, and criminology, and arranged according to the type of oratory (forensic, deliberative, or epideictic) most likely to make use of them, constitute the bulk of Book 1 of the *Rhetoric*, whereas the inventory of logical operations closes Book 2" (10).

we that wisdom is elevated through the syllogistic argumentation of rhetoric. Wisdom is a shared value, whose definition is logically built upon the community's accepted beliefs.

As stated above, Walker argues that the aesthetics of a poet's discourse function as a persuasive factor. In the critique and analysis carried out in Part 4, aesthetics will be considered as part of the general framework of values held by the readership. But the way aesthetics are considered will be from the standpoint of argumentation, not from the standpoint of critiquing artistic beauty. Walker, whose study on the origins of rhetoric in early poetry brings to the fore the underlying rational properties of ancient poems, discusses how even the ancients fell into the trap of starting a critique of a poem with rhetorical language, yet, in the end, practicing art appreciation. The example he discusses is Dio Chrysostom's *Oration 52*:

Dio's reading of the plays, as one would expect of a sophist, is in many ways informed by a fundamentally rhetorical orientation: he says that he played the role of *dikastes*, "judge" (4); he remarks, though rather casually and in passing, on how the choral odes and speeches . . . are "most political and rhetorical" (11); . . . But he offers no serious critique of the poems as rhetorical transactions, no sense of what issues were at stake when their poets composed them, and no sense of what still might be at stake for a reader of them now, other than questions of artistic excellence. . . Dio does not so much enact a rhetorical encounter with the poems as represent an exercise in educated art appreciation (306).

My aim in this study is to avoid the type of reading that Walker describes Dio as having undertaken, and to reveal the rhetorical underpinnings of the texts to be examined.

Walker's thesis in his seminal *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* can be summed up as follows: There are implicit rational, syllogistic arguments of persuasion in poetry that it is possible to make explicit. He does this by identifying a series of syllogisms embedded in the poetic texts that make up arguments whose aim is to persuade the listeners of the positions being set forth. In the following section, work by scholars whose approach to analyzing narrative is to bring to the surface underlying structures of

persuasive argument is discussed. The work of these scholars will provide concepts and procedures that inform the analysis carried out in Part 4.

### 3.2 SCHOLARS FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES USING RHETORIC

I have intentionally reserved this section of my dissertation for a discussion of scholars working in rhetoric that are rather more remote from literary studies than those I discussed in the review of the literature in Part 1. For what is interesting about the scholars that I am about to discuss is that although their disciplines would be considered in terms of both tradition and practice as having less than psychology, philosophy or linguistics have to do with literature, they nevertheless borrow methodology from literary history and criticism, which they recognize they have appropriated:

To some degree, the literary readings collected here are a borrowing, a transportation of methodologies from the humanities, particularly literary history and criticism, to the social sciences. The unit of analysis is often big gulps of text – entire stories – rather than the more discrete units of discourse that are explored later in this book. Likewise, the authors in Part 1 apply literary concepts such as author, narrator, reader, genre, plot, poetics, metaphor, and aesthetics, as tools for interpreting and analyzing their data. But there is also an emphasis here on the impact of literature itself, that is, how socioculturally relevant literary genre and rhetorical traditions – even specific works of literature – shape individual lives and development (Daiute – Narrative, 2).

That there is a link with the present study, on the level of both concepts and methodology, is evident in the passage above. Firstly, the authors use conceptual terms that I have been using throughout my discussion: narrator, reader, plot, and poetics. Secondly, they study the impact that socioculturally relevant literary genre and rhetorical traditions have on individual lives. Thus, bringing the work of these scholars into my discussion might be read as a sort of *re-appropriation* of the methodology and practice of literary studies from Social Science, Sociology, and Public Administration. After providing an overview and description of the work of these scholars, I then discuss the work of John Rodden, a scholar working within the field of Literary Studies who advocates an approach that is based on classical rhetoric. The reason that I have

placed the discussion Rodden's work at this point in my dissertation is that his methodology is similar to the work of Feldman et al (see below) in that he makes implicit syllogistic (or enthymematic) arguments explicit in order to show how the *logos* of rhetoric functions in narrative.

The aim of scholars working in social science when undertaking narrative analysis can be seen in the title of the following text: *Narrative Analysis: Studying the Development of Individuals in Society*. Narrative necessarily presents events that individuals have experienced in time, experiences that involve the evolution and development of the individual. The authors outline the various planes that this type of analysis makes possible:

Researchers who have adopted narrative methods have found them particularly useful for addressing the unmet challenge of integrating culture, person, and change – a challenge that has become especially acute in the last quarter century. Facilitated by advances in medicine, technology, communication, and transportation, the texture of modern life is increasingly defined by weaving together separate generations, life stages, cultures, and social and political ideologies. At the same time, understanding these life systems, in all their complexity and diversity, is essential to such daily affairs as educating our children, caring for our elderly, designing equitable intervention and assessment programs, and formulating policies bent on nurturing the development and well-being of individuals across diverse contexts (Daiute et al – Narrative, viii).

There are parallels between the work that these scholars are undertaking and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and other works that are cross-referenced with it. For instance, when they state that modern life is increasingly defined by weaving together separate generations, life stages, cultures, and social and political ideologies, the similarities are, on a thematic level, apparent. Aristotle in his treatise addresses the psychology of the young, middle-aged and old. Further, he speaks of the various constitutions for the different political systems that he has studied, constitutions that arose in different cultural contexts of the day. Finally, when in the above passage the authors speak of the proper education of children, care for the elderly (for example) and the formulation of whose aim is

nurturing the development and well-being of individuals across diverse contexts (viii), the echoes with Aristotle's *Politics*, where he discusses education, and his *Nichomachean Ethics*, where he discusses the common good, are clear. Thus it is possible to assert, that, on certain levels, medicine, technology, communication and transport have evolved, but humans have changed little in the last 2,400 years. Technology has advanced tremendously, but it could be argued we still remain the same beings searching for meaning under the same sun, moon and stars that shone over 4<sup>th</sup> century Athens.

The social scientists assert that their approach is cross-disciplinary, and “may employ literary tools like metaphors, linguistic devices like pronouns, or cultural conventions like time for insights about diversity within and across participants in their research . . .” (viii). My focus in this dissertation has been primarily its argumentative components as opposed to its connection with metaphoric uses and the aesthetics of language. Still, the use these scholars make of metaphors and linguistic devices falls within other spheres of rhetoric. There are also thematic links between their work and the definition that Terry Eagleton provides of rhetorical criticism, as can be seen in the following passage:

We are therefore pleased to present this collection of theory-based case studies of narrative analysis seeking clarity around the issues of educational inequity, gender and racial discrimination, conformity and agency in response to oppressive institutions, context-sensitive concepts of mental health, citizenship, and ideas about development across the life span (ix).

If we remove the social science focus on mental health, citizenship and studying development across the life span, the above text sounds like a student of cultural theory could have written it, especially if one considers the terms inequity, gender and racial discrimination, and oppressive institutions in the above excerpt. Agency also surfaces as a focus of inquiry in the above passage, which I have also discussed in depth. Further,

the passage above refers to case studies of narrative analysis. The two narratives examined in Part 4 section stand as particular cases are examined and analyzed using rhetoric as the methodological base to do so.

That these scholars use components from rhetoric in their approach is also apparent when they speak of “the nature and role of audience in narrative writing; the multiple stances of narrators as speakers, subjects, and cultural interpreters; and the issue of research data and their relationship to life” (ix). I have explained the role the audience plays in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric. The multiple stances of the narrator as speakers, subjects and culture interpreters can be seen as the evolution and development of Aristotle’s discussion of the rhetorician’s *ethos* and delivery vis-à-vis a diverse audience, which he insists must be addressed properly in order to persuade. These authors state that their approach “relies on themes, mostly drawn from literary theory, to explain vicissitudes in the drama of interpreted lives, including time, truth, beauty, character, and conflict” (x). What is interesting in these assertions made by Daiute and Lightfoot is that the themes time, truth, beauty, character and conflict are those traditionally related with literary studies. This is a manifestation of the cross-pollination that has been taking place among academic fields during recent decades.

The social scientists under consideration outline the various appeals that narrative analysis has for their field. The fourth appeal they identify has a direct link with the work I am carrying out, for it has to do with the “why” of narrative, and, as a consequence, with values:

Finally, narrative analysis *permits the incursion of value and evaluation into the research process*. Two major narrative theorists of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century found that narrative discourse interweaves two phases of meaning when describing past events (Labov & Waletzky, 1997). In one phase, referential language in narratives points to the physical world . . . to “landscapes of action,” while in the other phase, evaluative language in narratives contains messages from the narrator to the listener or reader that say why the story is being told (xiii).

The two phases of meaning presented in the above passage coincide with what I have been repeatedly discussing in this dissertation. The first phase, the “landscapes of action” is the “what” of narrative. The second phase is the “why.” Rhetoric is concerned with and inseparable from both phases. Daiute and Lightfoot also state that their analysis has to do with “moral judgment” (xiv). We have already stated that without motive, no plot exists. And motive is necessarily tied to ethics, providing the basis for the “why” that gives meaning to actions carried out by agents in the narrative. If students of literature have, as Eagleton has stated, shied away from discussing morality, these social scientists take quite a different tack, which, in my opinion, merits consideration and imitation – if only because they do not hesitate to recognize their indebtedness to literary studies:

Scholars have long equated life with the story of life. Epic poetry imposed order in ancient times. The Bible added moral order. The conflict plot prevalent in some cultures integrates temporal and moral representations, while the spiritual quality of folktales in many cultures, and character-rich moral tales in others, are frameworks for how people perceive and evaluate their lives (xiv).

In the passage above, the idea of evaluation of a life in moral terms surfaces. During my discussion, I have been referring to Terry Eagleton, who has asserted that there has been an aversion among students of literature to discuss moral issues. He discusses this aversion in *After Theory*:

For a long time, cultural theorists avoided the question of morality as something of an embarrassment. It seemed preachy, unhistorical, priggish and heavy-handed. For the harder-nosed kind of theorist, it was also soppy and unscientific. It was too often just a fancy name for oppressing other people. Morality is a question of what our parents believe, not what we think. Most of it seems to be about sex, or more precisely about why you should not have it. Since having sex in the 1960s was a kind of sacred obligation, like wearing mascara or worshipping your ancestors, morality rapidly gave way to style. Or, indeed, to politics. The ethical was for suburbanites, while the political was cool (140).

Thus we see that in Eagletons’ lights, morality, or the ethical, was replaced by politics. But I would argue that while the terms morality and ethics were avoided, as Eagleton



asserts, the politically correct, or PC movement has a moral agenda. That is, matters of inequality with respect to gender, socio-economics, and ethnicity – all post-modern, politically correct themes – are related to morality and its adherents' system of values. This is evident in the term inequality, which is a term that indicates an ethics-laden judgment call. The aversion to morality has been to that type of morality that has been identified with religion. It is the post-modern aversion to religion and anything related to them that has in literary studies resulted in the distancing from any talk about individual responsibility with respect to action. The focus has been on institutions. Morality has been codified in the post-modern framework as the territory of the church, and has been labeled as an ipso facto evil by those holding the politically correct banner high. The conservators of religion are also identified as politically conservative. This is evident in terms like the Moral Majority, which was used by the far-right to identify itself, and, at the same time, as a term of disparagement and abuse by liberals in the United States. The term morality has such powerful connotations in this regard that my attempt to use it – as the social scientists do – in a dissertation about literature is perhaps an exercise in futility. Depending on one's perspective, and in this case I am referring to a perspective that is neither PC nor conservative, one could take Eagleton's irony about the morality being a fancy name for oppressing other people and ask whether the liberals fighting against the oppression of a morality that they do not adhere to have not, in fact, created a system of oppression also. The question from antiquity, *quid custodiet ipsos custodes* must, in my view, always be asked. But these questions can only be answered by opening a dialogue that focuses on the question at hand, in which rhetoric and dialectic come into play, as opposed to dogmatism. In any case, it is interesting that – unlike students of literature – social scientists discuss ethics and morality with no qualms, and as a constitutive aspect of the narrative analysis they undertake:

Narrative is a cultural tool in several senses. Narratives are cultural forms often referred to as scripts (or dominant discourses, or master narratives) with embedded values and moralities. Tensions in the practices of cultural and personal narratives provoke the creation of and reflection about individual lives and about the society. It is in these milieu [sic] that symbol systems evolve. The culturally relevant symbol systems discussed in this book include genres, event scripts, selves, transcendent scripts, and exclusionary scripts like “illegal” person. These symbol systems are the building blocks of the higher order thinking that organizes identity and knowledge (xiv-xv).

In the above passage the authors bring to the fore the conflict that can occur between an individual and society, and how analyzing narrative makes it possible to demarcate the symbol systems that create identity and knowledge. For social scientists, morality and narrative are tightly connected, and provide a rich source of material whose study leads to valuable insights. In the passage above, the authors use terms like “illegal” person. A parallel category idea in relation to illicitness surfaces in the text that I examine. The narrator presents himself as an infractor, which can be seen in the title of the text: “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” I will examine the case of this illicit person from a perspective that extols him as a hero rather than a victim, and will examine the underlying system of value of those readers who see his illicit behavior as a good rather than an evil. The narrator uses *ethos* to win the audience over and judge him as praiseworthy, in spite of his thoughts and actions which would be interpreted by other readerships as unethical. Interestingly, in this regard, the social scientists in their introduction describe the position of one the writers as follows: “Bamberg (Chapter 2.3) explains that the narrator is a ‘subject constantly seeking to legitimate itself, situated in language practices and interactively accomplished, where ‘world- and person-making take place simultaneously’” (137). The link to persuasion in connection with the proof *ethos* is apparent. We have stated that Aristotle, in his treatise, indicated the importance of convincing the audience that the speaker is worthy – in terms of her character – of being listened to, which then paves the way for convincing or persuading the listeners of

her position. Bamberg is saying quite the same thing when stating that the narrator is a subject constantly seeking to legitimate itself.

One of the social scientists that has contributed to the text I am discussing admits that his practice is more poetic than scientific. This is interesting, if only because what may be read, since the 1950s (or earlier) as an anxiety on the part of students of literature to employ methodology that is more scientific and philosophical. That is, students of literature could easily be read as wanting to be less poetic, less romantic. Just the term “literary theory” alone provides evidence. This is interesting when we consider that social scientist Freeman states openly that his approach is not scientific, per se, but is instead, in his definition, poetic:

The approach suggested herein tends more toward the *qualitative* than the quantitative; it is more *idiographic*, focusing on the individual person, than nomothetic, focusing on generalities across individuals; it looks more toward interpretive *understanding* than explanation; and, not least, it relies more on *poetic* than scientific modes of writing and is thus oriented not only toward the cognitive and discursive functions of language but also toward the emotional and evocative. On the face of it, this shift of emphasis would seem to take narrative inquiry away from psychology’s customary aim of portraying objectively a given phenomenon; it seems more ambiguous, indefinite, “subjective.” But it may very well be that only through more interpretive modes of inquiry and more poetic modes of writing can there emerge that sort of fidelity to the phenomena that is the first requirement of the narrative analysis of human lives. Put more quaintly, this shift of emphasis seeks to practice greater fidelity to the *reality* of human experience and thereby to tell a more *truthful* story about it (63-64).

What is interesting here is Freeman’s veering away from scientific method in order to achieve a more faithful reading of human experience as related to truth. And so we have the students of literature attempting to be scientific and philosophical, while Freeman the social scientist leans towards the poetic, steering clear of the typical questionnaires that social scientists design to collect quantitative data. Freeman is trying to take a methodological tack that is more in line with his object of study: human beings. Freeman bases his approach on the work of Paul Ricoeur, whose ideas that are pertinent to his discussion he summarizes as follows:

Human action consists of events that are, essentially, “episodes in the making” – that is, events that will *become* episodes, retroactively, by virtue of their interrelationship with other events, both antecedent and subsequent, as well as with those “endings” that will ultimately serve to transfigure them into the stuff of narrative. In a distinct sense, one often does not know “what is happening” until the moment is past, until it can be located within some broader constellation of events, read for its significance in some larger whole (64).

Because it is not possible to know what is happening until it is past, the way to interpret what eventually becomes narratives or stories is the “hermeneutical circle” that Ricoeur employs in his work. Freeman provides a concise summary:

On the one hand, it may be said that the beginnings and middles of stories determine their endings. At the same time, however, it can also be said that endings determine beginnings and middles; for only when a story has ended – whether the ending in question is temporary, as in life, or permanent, as in death – is it possible to discern the meaning and significance of what has come before. There must, again, be a synoptic act of *reading*, whereby events are seen together in their interrelatedness as episodes in an evolving narrative. Ricoeur (1981b) thus speaks of two distinct dimensions of narrative: the “episodic,” which refers to the events of which a story is comprised, and the “configurational,” which refers to this process of seeing- or grasping- together, “eliciting a pattern from a succession” ([Ricoeur] p. 174) (64-65).

Due to the nature or process of building or creating narratives from the stuff of life, which parallels literary modes of story-telling or narrative building, we can analyze human experience as retold by its subjects in the same way we would analyze a literary work. Freeman writes, “‘Reading’ human action partakes of the same temporal dialectic that is involved in reading literature. What Ricoeur calls ‘narrative time’ may thus be regarded as a constitutive feature of human experience” (65). In the above passage the reference to death provides further evidence of its importance in human discourse as a reference point to determine meaning. Freeman takes the point about reading human experience as narrative even further:

This brings me to a final set of reasons for considering human experience as a kind of literature, and it is one with which we are all familiar: Our very lives are bathed in stories, in comedies and tragedies, with happy endings and shocking, or unanticipated, or disappointing ones. I do not wish to overdramatize human experience. It can be uneventful and quite tedious. It can also be truly chaotic, possessing no discernible meaning at all, even in retrospect. But much of the time

it is quite different than this. Stories abound and proliferate. Data are everywhere (65-66).

Freeman equates a substantial part of life with literature, and for that reason analyzes narratives with a view to finding data that reveal meaning. He operates under the assumption that it is through narrative that we make sense of our lives, and it is in the analysis of these stories that we engage in what Franzosi calls a double hermeneutic: analysis of the analysis. By means of the double hermeneutic, we can gain insight into our behavior as humans, and use this analysis to examine our own system of values in an attempt to comprehend it and possibly benefit from the analysis.

Study of narrative makes it possible, according to Freeman, to attain knowledge on several levels. He outlines these levels in an analysis he undertook of a case study in narrative form written by a man whose wife died of cancer. I have provided a summary of his outlook below:

- 1) Interpretation: the new “data” that the man discovered about himself had to be put into some sort of interpretive context, in order to understand the change (77).
- 2) Self-interpretation: self-interpretation is both *self-construction* or *poiesis*. That is, the act of self-interpretation is “the fashioning of a new, and perhaps more adequate view of who and what one is. It is an act of development, a *reconfiguring* of the self (77).
- 3) Self-narrative is linked to culture: the cultural narratives (i.e., of the happy American family, the quintessential Mother-Provider), no longer provided a framework. Against these failed cultural resources, a new narrative is constructed (in Freeman’s study) (77-78).
- 4) Use of the imagination to re-fashion the self: in Freeman’s words, “Narratives don’t simply maintain and uphold the status quo; they can

also change it, revise it, exactly through the kind of imaginative labor that had been exercised in this case” (78). Freeman states that it was a process of “*deconstruction*” after which came a process of “*reconstruction*” (78).

- 5) The social dimension: the self is located in a specific culture, where there is a wider world, “the world of the individual in society,” which provides the background or setting for the story. In Freeman’s words, “This is the world of doctors and x-rays, norms and values, wives and children. There is no story apart from this world (78).

As we can see, Freeman’s work as a social scientist here is to show how individuals have experiences and how they change as a result. For Freeman, the resultant change provides a way in which, through analyzing this change as it is documented in narrative form, it becomes possible to discover truths about oneself. This process of analysis leads to discoveries about the cultural framework within which one lives. Freeman’s aims are those of a social scientist, and like the sociologist Franzosi’s approach (to be discussed below), brings to the fore data that are relevant to his field. Still, in his work, he writes of various narratives that express the human social framework, within which the narrative of the individual is intermeshed. Freeman states that his approach is poetic, which he juxtaposes and contrasts with scientific methodology.<sup>111</sup>

That a poetic approach is used by a scholar from a field that is scientific by definition reveals, in my opinion, the value that the non-scientific has in scientific disciplines. If scientists are using poetic approaches, the question that arises is why

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<sup>111</sup> Freeman states that his approach goes beyond empiricism: “Narrative analysis of the sort being considered here also moves beyond the confines of a “theory” as it is ordinarily conceived. I emphasize the phrase ‘as ordinarily conceived.’ Ordinarily, theory is conceived in rationalistic, scientific terms. One develops a theory, about this or that, in order to rationally account for a particular sphere of reality. One then goes on to test the theory, which may in turn lead to further refinement and differentiation of its terms or, if the data prove to be too recalcitrant, abandonment” (78-79).

should students of literature not do the same? In this regard, Gore Vidal expressed dissatisfaction with attempts by literary scholars to be scientific or theoretical during theory's heyday. In an essay titled "American Plastic: The Matter of Fiction," Vidal makes the following observations in reference to Roland Barthes, a major post-modern theorist:

Barthes's American admirers are particularly fascinated by semiology, a quasi-science of signs first postulated by Ferdinand de Saussure in his *Course in General Linguistics* (1916). For some years the school of Paris and its American annex have made much of signs and signification, linguistic and otherwise. Barthes's *Elements of Semiology* (1964) is a key work and not easy to understand. It is full of graphs and theorems as well as definitions and puzzles (101).

Interesting here is the fact that this essay was published in the 1970s, which demonstrates that a major intellectual took a critical stance at the early stages of theory when, for all intents and purposes, it had been completely adopted by departments of literature. Also interesting is Vidal's identification of semiology as a "quasi-science." At another point in his essay, he refers to semiology as the "science" of signs. The quotation marks are Vidal's, indicating that he questions whether or not Barthes' approach is, in fact and essence, scientific. In the excerpt above Vidal mentions the graphs, theorems, definitions and puzzles that are not easy to understand. He writes in this regard:

Like so many of today's academic critics, Barthes resorts to formulas, diagrams; the result, no doubt, of teaching in classrooms equipped with blackboards and chalk. Envious of the half-erased theorems – the prestigious *signs* – of the physicists, English teachers now compete by chalking up theorems and theories of their own, words having failed them yet again (101-102).

Vidal is relentless in his irony, and his statement that words failed the English teachers of the day hits hard. My interpretation of the passage above is that Vidal's subtext is that literary studies are not scientific per se, and that that does not matter, for they are not meant to be. Leave science for the scientists. Literary studies has other concerns that are as valid if not more so than what scientists deal with.

Vidal takes a position that attacks scientific or theoretical approaches to literature. Here it is worth recalling Barry's approach which I discussed at the outset of my dissertation. That is, he attempts to present the various theoretical approaches in a clear manner, meanwhile indicating the merits and flaws of each. Vidal is somewhat less fair in his attack. But I would argue that, even though Vidal takes an aggressive stance towards literary theory, his arguments must be examined and evaluated with a view to discovering their flaws and merits. In this way it will be possible to discover to what extent his position is valid or not.

Freeman's methodology, as I have mentioned above, is based to a large extent on the work of Paul Ricoeur. He also makes reference to the work of hermeneutist Gadamer. One of the main thrusts of Gadamer's seminal text, *Truth and Method*, is that empiricism, which aims to undermine hermeneutics due to its not being scientific, has in its own discourse the seeds of its own destruction. That is, Gadamer insists that truth is not necessarily nor always quantifiable by empirical means except *ex post facto*.<sup>112</sup> Thus, while moving away from empiricism, Freeman is siding with other scholars who see the value that "unscientific" methodologies hold, and, at the same time, is arguing that narrative analysis may be used in order to discover the "truth" of life, which, as he states, can be read as literature.

Another aspect of Freeman's approach is his aim to reconnect academic discourse and activity with reality. (I have already mentioned this topic in the work of Eagleton and Ford, both of whom see a disconnect between the academy and the real world outside its walls.)

This sort of project isn't for everyone. For some, however, working in this way sometimes allows there to be more of a bridge between work and life, between the academic and the lived realm of narrative. The two become continuous: trying to make sense of experience and trying to think about narrative become one and the

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<sup>112</sup> See Gadamer.



same undivided process. Maddening though this can sometimes be, it helps ensure that narrative analysis remains anchored in the world we most intimately know (79).

Freeman's aim is to connect academic work with life, which, as I have stated, is also the aim of several scholars whom I have been discussing. This is also the aim, whether directly stated or not, of sociologist Roberto Franzosi.

Franzosi's work is interesting and relevant to this discussion, for he is a sociologist that analyzes narrative and in his discussion and makes explicit reference to rhetorical devices and how they function in the text to create meaning and to persuade. In his essay, "Narrative Analysis – Or Why (and How) Sociologists Should be Interested in Narrative," Franzosi states that the answer to the question why in the above title is because "[n]arrative texts are packed with sociological information, and a great deal of our empirical evidence is in narrative form" (517).

That narrative texts are packed with sociological information is undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, although Franzosi states that a great deal of empirical evidence comes from narrative texts, in this article he does not follow strict empirical procedure. Instead, his method is rhetorical and hermeneutical. Franzosi's use of rhetoric and hermeneutics provides arguments for a return to classical rhetoric by students of literature.

When stating his objective, Franzosi recognizes that his approach is a borrowing from other disciplines: "My goal is to introduce sociologists to the basic concepts, particularly as elaborated by linguists, and to show how linguistics and sociology interplay at the level of a text" (518). Franzosi's approach is both rhetorical and hermeneutical, and thus is relevant to the overall framework within which I am working. We can see in his work, like that of Freeman's, a shift away from strict empiricism, from the analysis of quantifiable data to a more qualitative approach:

What is characteristic about these new techniques is that their real contribution does not seem to lie so much in the methodological but in the epistemological realm. As Abbot argues with reference to sequence analysis, sequence analysis is not just “a particular technique [of data analysis, but] ... rather a body of questions about social processes” (Abbot 1995:93). No doubt, a view of social reality fundamentally based on narrative data shifts sociologists’ concerns away from variables to actors, away from regression-based statistical models to networks, and away from a variable-based conception of causality to narrative sequences. That view promises to bring sociology closer to history and sociology’s own original concerns with issues of human agency (527 – author’s brackets).

One of the primary reasons that Eagleton in his *Literary Theory: An Introduction* makes a plea for a return to rhetoric is that he views rhetoric as the original model on which real politics in the real world were based. In the above passage we can see that Franzosi has a similar aim, as his wish is to bring sociology back to its original concerns, which he states is issues of human agency. This is just one of the links that Franzosi’s work has with rhetoric.

In his explanation of how to analyze narrative, Franzosi states that “ideological color” created implicitly in narratives needs to be made explicit (532). This, according to Franzosi (who bases his ideas on work done by Labov), is the difference between the what and the why:

According to Labov, the sequence of purely narrative clauses performs the referential function of narrative. Basically, that function deals with the question: What is the story? But narratives are also characterized by a second function – the evaluative function – which deals with the question: Why is the story told? (What’s the story’s point? See e.g. Toolan 1988:147.) A typical story will contain explicit evaluative statements that reveal the teller’s attitudes to the events recounted (532).

The point that I want to make on the above passage is that the attitudes that Franzosi states are explicit are necessarily expressions of the system of values embedded in the story. His methodology is thus rhetorical in the way that I am defining it. Franzosi analyses a narrative about a man called Neville, which brings this idea to the fore:

Certainly, Neville’s story suggests (or is at least compatible with) the following causal proposition: Because a wife kicks out a husband, the husband ends up

homeless. There is some truth to that. In a survey of three different populations of single homeless people conducted in England in 1991, the breakdown of a relationship is the main reason for homeless persons leaving their last home (Anderson et al 1993:70-73). But that, of course, is dodging the question: Why did Neville's wife kick him out in the first place? (533).

Franzosi's question is both crucial and incisive. For without knowing why Neville's wife kicked him out, the reader cannot make a fair judgment on her (or his) actions. And it is questions like these, questions to which there are not always answers but attempts at doing so can be made based on the evidence provided by the narrative using rhetoric as the analytical tool.

I have discussed in Part 2 how certain actions are necessarily *ethos*-laden. That is, the action itself appears to contain a particular motive. Franzosi discusses this rhetorical mechanism in his analysis of the Neville case, juxtaposing action with the explicit creation of *ethos*, which he calls character traiting:

In the absence of explicit character traiting, we can also infer character from action (Rimmon-Kenan 1983:60-61; Toolan 1988:102). Thus, the dramatic opening of Neville's story "After my wife kicked me out" implicitly points an accusatory finger towards the wife. After all, as far as we know, Neville did nothing to deserve this. In his narrative, Neville does not volunteer any information on the reasons why he was kicked out of the house. We are left to imagine: Because he abused his wife, because he refused to carry any responsibility around the house, because he had affairs, because he was a drunk or a drug addict... In fact, the violence perpetrated against Neville in the opening clause – violence all the more senseless and gratuitous because it has no (narrative) explanation – helps to bring Neville into focus as a victim rather than a villain. We feel sorry and we sympathize for victims, while we are repulsed by villains (535).

Franzosi's observation, that the dramatic opening of Neville's story points an accusatory finger towards the wife – thus identifying her as malefactor – but nevertheless leaves the reader with important questions that need to be answered in order to weigh her actions on a scale of ethics, has parallels with the first case study that I examine in Part 4. For in the narrative that Gass has created, one of the speakers in the dialogue reports that a woman left her husband, taking her child with her. The other

participant in the dialogue then unleashes a barrage of questions in order to obtain as much information on the case as possible in order to 1) understand why the woman left – that is, what her motives were for her actions – which will lead to 2) a moral judgment of her as a person. In both cases, that of Neville and that of the woman in Gass' story, the underlying *logos* can be brought to the surface using rhetorical criticism with a view to revealing the syllogistic reasoning that leads the reader to an evaluation, and how this evaluation develops and evolves with each detail relevant to each case. Feldman's work, which I shall be discussing below, does just that: the syllogistic reasoning is brought to the surface in order to demonstrate the logical, and therefore rhetorical underpinnings, that inform the texts she analyzes.

Franzosi's commentary above demonstrates rhetorical criticism in action, for, as he asserts, Neville presents himself as victim rather than villain, with a view to gaining sympathy from the reader. We can see that the three proofs of rhetoric, *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*, are operative here. *Logos*: a man should not be kicked out of his own house, Neville was kicked out; therefore, he has been unjustly treated, and is a fortiori, a victim. *Ethos*: as Neville is a victim, he must not be a villain. Therefore, his character is good. *Pathos*: victims deserve sympathy, Neville is a victim. Therefore, the reader sympathizes with him. All three proofs are inextricably woven together and operate in unison with a view to persuading the reader that Neville is a good person that deserves sympathy. Neville, while narrating, acts as his own advocate. His narration employs mechanisms of judicial rhetoric, in the sense that he is pleading his case, with, on one level, a view to presenting his character as not guilty, as deserving of compassion. One other point deserves mentioning: Franzosi's system of values, in his role as sociologist, dictates that victims deserve our sympathy whereas villains do not. We shall see that

this system of values does not necessarily hold true in the case of students of literature. At times “villains” are heroes.

As Franzosi states above, Neville does not provide sufficient information so we are left to imagine the causes for his being kicked out. Were we to know the details of Neville’s case, we doubtless would judge differently, each bit of knowledge modifying our judgment of him as praise- or blameworthy. The point that I want to bring out here is that, in spite of the absence of information, Franzosi still, using his imagination and intuition, is engaging in rhetorical analysis, and that, in spite of its not being empirically sound by hard scientific standards, is nevertheless based on sound reasoning.

Franzosi discusses the clues that Neville leaves in order to build his *ethos*. Franzosi states that, based on evidence in Neville’s discourse, in all probability he is young and white. This is the *ethos* of rhetoric at work and, at the same time, these factors influence the emotional reaction for or against Neville as advocate pleading his own case. Franzosi tells us that, based on clues Neville provides, he is probably poor and most likely unemployed. These *ethos* creating variables also increase his *pathos* in terms of compassion. Other factors that provide clues to who Neville is are purely linguistic, such as the speech community that Franzosi categorizes him in: the lower ranks of British society (537-538). Franzosi then discusses the “language of power” that is used by the upper ranks, as opposed to “a powerless language” used by working-class individuals in Britain (538). All of these *ethos* creating factors increase Neville’s capacity to arouse sympathy via *pathos*, and, in so doing, increase the reader’s adherence to Neville’s argument. Of course, depending on the readership, an adverse reaction may be aroused. In the recit de voyage that I examine in Part 4, the importance of language as *ethos*-building tool will be explored.

Taste can also be factored into the rhetorical transaction that occurs in Neville's narrative:

In his study of taste, Bourdieu provides quantitative evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic background and images of an "ideal home" (Bourdieu 1984:247-48). "The proportion of choices emphasizing overtly aesthetic properties (studied, imaginative, harmonious) grows as one moves up the social hierarchy, whereas the proportion of 'functionalist' choices (clean, practical, easy to maintain) declines" (Bourdieu 1984:247) (538).

We have already seen in Walker's discussion of Apuleius' *Apologia* how the level of culture aids in *ethos*-based persuasion. Taste is a reflection of the cultural level of an individual, and in rhetorical enactments functions as a factor of persuasion through identification.

Franzosi notes that there are no clues that indicate "posture, gestures, gaze, or voice pitch," which is, in his opinion, "unfortunate" (538 – footnote 16). We have seen that extralinguistic factors such as the above as well as others are also explored by Aristotle when he considers delivery in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*. While these aspects are fascinating and constitute fundamental aspects of rhetoric as a discipline, they lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. It must be pointed out that Franzosi, in this article on narrative analysis, discusses basic rhetorical devices and strategies without identifying them as such.

What value does narrative analysis hold for the sociologist? Franzosi makes the following statements:

About Neville we know very little. All we know is what he has left behind in a short narrative of a moment of his life. In fact, we cannot even be sure that Neville is a real or fictitious character. We do not know what the purpose of the story is.

Yet, the linguistic analysis of Neville's narrative has allowed us to shed light on many real lives like his. Narrative analysis has not only revealed the close relationship between the words in a text and between a text and other texts (e.g. stories and advertisements). Narrative analysis has brought out relationships between people – texts do not just index a relation between words and between texts, but between text and social reality. Sociology has crept in behind linguistics. Neville's simple (and perhaps, fictitious) narrative has sparked our

sociological imagination; it has allowed us to get a glimpse of British society at the turn of the second millennium (547).

The main point that I wish to make is that Franzosi is using methodology transferred from the province of literary studies and is applying it in the field of sociology, with the objective of making a bridge between academic research and the real world. Franzosi admits that his conclusions may be “‘too brazen a claim’ in the eyes of the sociological ‘scientist’” (547). He states that historians deal with lives from the past, that linguists argue “over the structure and meaning of a four-line text” and that “[o]ther members of the academic community make their living on the basis of a single story” (547). Franzosi contrasts the work of these disciplines with that of sociology: “[S]ociology is about discovering general laws. Sociology is a science. It is not interested in the particular; its objective is the universal. We can hardly find any interest in this man’s [Neville’s] life a man we do not even know is real” (547). This phrase represents sociology’s party line, which Franzosi questions. He questions the validity of a content analysis approach to narrative, which sociologists use in an attempt to maintain scientific rigor. Against content analysis, which he states sociologists use to “count and tabulate” themes found in narrative, Franzosi writes:

In analyzing “respondents’ stories,” sociologists cut up individual stories and recompose the pieces into new stories, with the coherence and context of each original narrative lost and forgotten. Upon the new stories, sociologists then impose the coherence of the “scientific” ethnographic text in the context of sociological “literature.”

Yet, “precisely because they are essential meaning-making structures, narratives must be preserved, not fractured, by investigators, who must respect respondents’ ways of constructing meaning and analyze how it is accomplished” (Kohler Riessman 1993:4). That, of course, is easier said than done (548).

Franzosi is arguing against the practices of sociology, whose empirical methods take the sociologist far afield from the social realities whose conditions it is the sociologists’ job to analyze and discover something other than numbers reflected in statistics. It appears as if Franzosi is saying, yes, we now have the stats, but so what? That is, what good

does it do to have a high number of statistics-based tables and graphs if there is no connection with the human object being studied? After questioning what he calls scientists' use of scientific language, he states, "the emphasis on 'objective,' 'systematic,' or 'scientific' in the process of going from text to coding may succeed in drawing attention away from the murky waters of text understanding, but .. it does not get us any closer to finding real solutions to the problem" (549): Franzosi then asks, pointedly:

Has the current culture of scientific or pseudoscientific discourse blinded us to the point that we actually believe some of the things that we are writing? . . . Perhaps, in light of the themes discussed in this chapter, what we need is more "open texts," scientific texts that are open to the conditions of their own production. Hopefully, in this process of self-reflectivity, we will not have fallen prey to postmodernist gibberish, nor will we have given up an honest search for rigor in the social sciences" (549).

Franzosi's use of the term "pseudoscientific discourse" resonates with the passages that I have cited above from Gore Vidal. It is my opinion that Franzosi is expressing a concern about the disconnect between the academy and the reality outside its walls, that scientific and post-modern discourse have created (in his opinion). In this sense, he is making the same assertion as Ford, who, as one of his aims, wished to present a method that was less theory-oriented, and that had more to do with the real world, in order to re-evaluate the place of literary studies in the educational system. We can see that Franzosi hopes to bridge the gap in the following excerpt:

The narrative analysis of Neville's story also points to a different way of looking at the relationship between the micro and the macro, the particular and the universal. The process of contextualizing a text for narrative understanding – the foreknowledge of knowledge – quickly leads us away from Neville's microcosm to the macrocosm of British society. That same process quickly leads us away from narrow linguistic concerns. I have provided a handful of examples on how to link a linguistic analysis to a sociological analysis, how to go from text to context, from Neville's particular to the universal (549-550).

In his search to find universals from particulars, Franzosi believes that the approach that he is using shows "that narrative analysis (broadly conceived here as the analysis of



both linguistic and extralinguistic characteristics of speech acts) yields an understanding of social relations as embedded in linguistic practices” (550). He contrasts his approach with the standard approach of sociologists that obtains knowledge that is “based on tenuous statistical relations between poorly measured and even more poorly understood concepts in the context of poorly estimated models, even if the rules on how to go from the particular to the universal are scientifically embedded in the procedures we use” (550). What Franzosi is expressing here is a dissatisfaction with “scientific” methods (the inverted commas are Franzosi’s – note the parallel with Vidal’s criticisms), that he believes do not properly answer the questions that it is sociologists’ jobs to answer. He also suggests that his method might allow sociologists to analyze their own practices: “[N]arrative analysis may have also shown how social scientific practices involve specific language games in relation to the people we draw information from (our subjects/objects of study) and pass information to (our readers)” (550). Franzosi is arguing that by using narrative analysis, it may be possible to identify problems within the discipline of sociology itself, with the obvious aim of evaluating and providing solutions to those problems. Franzosi sums up his article as follows:

To the novice, all of this will surely sound like a daunting task (perhaps it is easier to let the computer run regressions). The understanding of the text has required us to zoom down on linguistic problems the understanding of the context has required us to open up to neighboring and distant disciplines, to harness knowledge that comes from far afield. Don’t despair! The good news is that literary competence is not intuitive but learned (Culler 1975:113-30); Toolan 1988:29; Cohan & Shires 1988:22; see also Bourdieu 1984:399). And so is the “competence” of linking a narrative analysis to a sociological analysis. Just start from Statistics 101 ... sorry ... *Narrative* 101 (550).

Franzosi’s assertions reflect his discontentment with the state of affairs in the discipline of his field, sociology. His solution is for sociologists to change, or at least, to add to their methodology the practice of narrative analysis, which he states is knowledge that comes from distant disciplines: linguistics and literature. In his approach, Franzosi is

appropriating knowledge and methodology which I – as I have already stated – am reappropriating.

Social scientists are not the only scholars interested in using narrative and rhetoric in their methodology. Scholars that are even further afield than sociologists are also using rhetoric. It will perhaps come as a surprise to students of literature that scholars in the field of Public Administration have written an article with the following title: “Making Sense of Stories: A Rhetorical Approach to Narrative Analysis.” One of the primary aims of the article is to examine “data about change in city administrations” (147). In the abstract to the article, the authors write, “We demonstrate the use and usefulness of a method for analyzing narratives that is based in concepts from classical rhetoric and semiotics. The method allows researchers to make more available the unstated, implicit understandings that underlie the stories people tell” (147). In the title alone we note an important difference from the articles examined above by Freeman and Franzosi, for the term “rhetoric” figures explicitly. Further, Feldman et al outline how they use the *logos* of classical rhetoric in their methodology. By making implicit understandings in the stories people tell explicit, these scholars make sense out of them. We can also conclude – due to the fact that they are conducting research on real people telling real stories – that they are attempting to bridge the gap between the academy and the real world. As stated above, this approach allows the researchers to examine change in city administrations. Feldman et al’s methodology is an unexpected use of rhetoric in an unexpected discipline, a case that might even be viewed as embarrassing since those who were in the past labeled by students of literature as Philistines (i.e. Business students) are using an approach that was once ours.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Feldman states that this approach, which has “an air of novelty,” has been in existence for quite some time in the field of administration and policy and of administration and policy management. For Feldman, writing in 2004, cites work being carried out as early as 1957 by Selznick, in 1972 by Clark and in 1975 by Mitroff and Kilmann (147).

Why would narrative analysis using a rhetorical approach be of interest to Business students? Feldman et al spell out their reasons in the article under study:

Stories are useful to both participants and observers of organizations because they are a basic tool that individuals use to communicate and create understanding with other people and for themselves. Stories are used to make sense of organizational life (Weick 1995) and to communicate the sense created (Orr 1996). Stories carry information relevant to decision making (Czarniawska and Sköldberg 2003; Maretin et al. 1983) and enable participants in policy and administration to “predict, empower and even fashion change” (Boje 1991, 124). Stories have been said to mediate reality and construct political space and are critical constitutive forces in politics and public policy making (Schram and Neisser 1997). People outside organizations, such as scholars, have demonstrated both the study of organizations *as* narratives and the study of narratives and stories *in* organizations as ways of making sense of the world of administration (Czarniawska 1998; Hummel 1990, 1991) (147-148).

The first point that surfaces here is the concept of story that functions as a tool for the following uses:

- 1) communicating
- 2) creating understanding
- 3) making sense (i.e. of organizational life)
- 4) communication of the sense that has been created

Due to these uses, the analysis of stories reaps the following analytical benefits:

- 1) information depository (i.e., on decision-making)
- 2) enabling of prediction, empowerment, and the fashioning of change

Further uses of stories identified by Feldman et al are:

- 1) mediation of reality
- 2) construction of political space
- 3) constitutive forces in politics and public policy making

Feldman et al sum up the entirety of the uses listed above by stating that scholars, by analyzing narrative rhetorically, are able to make sense of the world of administration.

We can compare the above uses with the uses identified by Daiute and Franzosi. Daiute states that researchers use stories to discover “the values, practices, and controls inherent in groups determining who the heroes are, what life should be like, and what should be heralded or hidden” (x). Franzosi states that his analysis makes it possible to move from the microcosm of the specific narrative to the macrocosm of society (in the case under study, British society). All of the methods argue that humans use narrative to create meaning and to make sense, which they then communicate via story-telling.

The conclusion that I wish to make here is that these scholars, who are working outside of the field of literature, find narrative to be a fertile field for the discovery of knowledge about the creation of meaning from the chaos of lived experience, and that the rhetorical analysis of stories is a useful tool for their respective fields and objectives. All of the abovementioned methods are based on the assumption that the meaning is often implicit, and that it is the researcher’s job to make the underlying logic of stories explicit. Feldman writes, in this regard:

In order to understand research participants’ stories about change, we use a methodological technique that opens up narratives to an analysis of the internal arguments they make. Our analysis reveals an implicit logic in the explicit examples of actions and understandings of our storytellers. This analysis enables us as researchers to uncover the process of how change plans have translated into specific, and sometimes unanticipated, changed actions in these cities (148).

So we see that the stories have a surface structure underneath which lies a logic where the meaning of the story can be made explicit. Once made explicit, the underlying logic is for Feldman et al a rich depository of information that reveals the processes of change.

All of the scholars under study in this section explain the why of studying narrative. Feldman follows form, in this regard:

Why narratives, in particular? Narratives are useful data because individuals often make sense of the world and their place in it through narrative form. Through telling their stories, people distill and reflect a particular understanding of social

and political relations. Stories are a common, habitual method people use to communicate their ideas. Barthes extols narrative's universality, noting that "all classes, all human groups, have their narratives . . . narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural; it is simply there, like life itself" (1977, 79). In other words, we are likely to find our research informants providing us with information by means of narrative (148).

It is in these international, transhistorical, transcultural phenomena that Feldman et al find underlying implicit logic through rhetorical analysis that provides the information that they seek as scholars of Public Administration. Important are the roles played by researcher and narrator/protagonist, for we again see the "what" of the story, which attains meaning through its "why":

Generally, the job of the narrative researcher is to interpret the stories people tell (Riessman 1993). As the narrative analysis has to do with "how protagonists interpret things" (Bruner 1990, 51), narrative analysts tend to ask why the story was told that way and what the storyteller means (Franzosi 1998) by looking at form, structure and content (148).

As we can see by the statement above, Feldman et al's analysis has to do with interpreting interpretation. That is, the narrator/protagonist interprets or makes sense of her life experience by putting it into words, but it is from a particular interpretation of what she has experienced. In this article, Feldman et al "discuss the nature of stories and why they are both important to and facilitate the interpretation of meaning" (149). This is a crucial concept: the interpretation of meaning. For the protagonist interprets the meaning of a particular life experience and then presents the interpretation in story format. The researcher must discover the embedded interpretation and make it explicit in order to reveal how the protagonist has interpreted the meaning of the particular experience. Once the implicit interpretation is made explicit, the research can then analyze and evaluate. In other words, the researcher, using rhetorical methodology, passes critical judgment on the data discovered through analysis.

In their rhetorical analysis of narrative, Feldman et al stipulate that when applying their methodology, which is "based on concepts derived from logic and

semiotics,” they are not seeking to assert scientific truths. They state that their methodology has different aims, that is, a search for meaning:

We appropriate these concepts of classical scholars to explore social interactions and constructed meanings, rather than mathematical reasons and logic. As we are interpretive researchers, our work engages the meaning embedded in narratives, rather than [sic] the external validity of probability claims (306).

The importance that these scholars give to the mining and interpretation of data culled from narrative is evident. At the same time, these scholars assert that the interpretation of meaning they arrive at is not necessarily the only one. Feldman et al state that “one can expose implicit understandings in narrative, reason or representational practices, without also claiming that this is the only way to interpret a narrative” (151). This is rhetorical practice, for, as I have been asserting, various stances are possible and can be argued with force. The authors grant that several views can be taken on the same narrative with respect to its meaning or meanings:

Indeed, our analysis is based in the presumption that we live in a social world characterized by multiple interpretations and that as people tell stories these numerous interpretations are manifest in multiple and sometimes conflicting logics (151).

That multiple interpretations exist with respect to interpretation and that these same numerous interpretations are manifest in multiple and sometimes conflicting logics parallels Aristotle’s defining rhetoric and dialectic as having to do with matters that can be argued in opposing directions. We have also seen these ideas reflected in the work of Walker and Cole. Their work thus has direct links with rhetorical practice other than the ones they recognize.

As for the rhetorical mechanisms that they state they employ in their analysis, Feldman et al state that they make enthymemes that are implicit in the narratives explicit. I have discussed the problematics of the term enthymeme in Part 2 of this

dissertation. The model of enthymeme that Feldman et al use in their approach is the incomplete or truncated syllogism:

Generally speaking, an enthymeme is an incomplete or “careless” logical inference. That is, enthymeme takes the form of an argument or, more formally, a syllogism, one of whose parts is missing. Often and most typically, the missing part is the major premise, but sometimes it may also be the minor premise or even the conclusion. A second but somewhat less recognized property of the enthymeme is that it is a plausible, likely, or probabilistic inference, rather than a logically binding one (as in a perfect syllogism) (152).

As already stated, scholars of logic and rhetoric have, over the last two millennia, debated what Aristotle meant when he used the term enthymeme in his *Rhetoric*. I have stated that the term *sullogismos* is used by Aristotle to identify a logical argument in its broadest sense, that is, not necessarily as a perfect syllogism as the authors state above. But for these scholars’ purposes, the definition they utilize functions. They then state that “[s]torytellers often have enthymemes embedded in their stories” (152). The method that Feldman et al utilize makes the embedded, implicit enthymemes explicit, with a view to analyzing the underlying reasoning of the storyteller:

Our analysis allows us to present the implicit argument made by the storyteller. Our concern is not with whether the argument is right or wrong or whether the events in question actually happened but, rather, with the understandings that the storyteller is expressing through the story. This task is directly related to the larger epistemological stance that contends that human communication in all of its forms is imbued with what Fisher calls *mythos* – “ideas that cannot be verified or probed in any absolute way” (1987, 19). People tell stories in order to convince, and our concern is with the understandings that they are trying to convey through their stories (152).

What is most important in the above extract is the authors’ assertion that the understandings, or embedded reasoning of a story have to do with ideas that cannot be verified or probed in any absolute way, and that *humans tell stories to convince*. They are, in essence, stating that they are working with the ambiguities of human reasoning in their interactions. To state that ideas cannot be verified or probed in any absolute way is a rewording of the idea that they are dealing with opinions. I have discussed this

tendency in legal terminology earlier, which is an attempt to remove the negative connotations that the term opinion contains. That Feldman et al state that humans tell stories to convince parallels my argument that a narrative can be viewed as a pleading that is argued using logic, both at the surface level and hidden beneath.

Feldman et al summarize their approach as follows:

We use these rhetorical and semiotic concepts in the manner described below to provide a systematic surfacing of the arguments used by the storyteller. The concept of the enthymeme provides the researcher with a tool to transform the implicit parts of the arguments into explicit and analyzable data. Because stories often have multiple arguments, this form of analysis facilitates disentangling the various arguments in a story. Often one syllogism serves as a stepping-stone to other arguments in the story (152).

The primary aspect that I shall be transporting from Feldman et al's approach is the identifying and making explicit of implicit, embedded reasoning in two narratives, with a view to analyzing the system of values inherent in the reasoning used by the narrators. In their analysis, Feldman et al first identify the story line, which they define as follows: "The story line is the basic point (sometimes points) that the analyst thought the interviewee was trying to make about change" (154). This aspect of Feldman et al's approach also provides a useful analytical tool, and parallels the practice in literary studies of reducing a narrative to its basic plot in order to identify the moral. This aspect of their methodology answers two questions, what is the story about and why is the narrator telling it?

Highly important in the analysis carried out by Feldman et al is the terminology they use when describing the observations that they make, as seen in the passage below:

From these statements [made by the narrator] we *infer* that he considers playing the game to be a failure and providing the best service at the lowest cost to be success. Although he never says explicitly that doing the right thing for the wrong reason results in failure whereas doing the right thing for the right reasons results in success, we *felt* it was a reasonable interpretation of the combination of statements he makes (156 – my italics).



The language that I wish to highlight here are the terms “infer” and “felt.” In their analysis, Feldman et al are making reasonable, but not necessarily intractable assertions using formal logic that are based on data that is not explicit. That is, in essence, they use rhetorical reasoning (enthymematic/syllogistic) as the base for their observations. This practice is much more ambiguous when compared to the strict rules of empirical science or formal logic.

The final scholar that I shall bring into this discussion, whose approach is very similar to the one just examined, has done work in English Studies.

John Rodden, in the article “How Do Stories Convince Us? Notes Towards a Rhetoric of Narrative,” includes as a prefatory text a quote from a book published in 1907 written by Ida Tarbell, that illustrates a major point that I have been making in my dissertation:

I tell you he got more arguments out of stories than he did out of law books, and the queer part was you couldn't answer 'em – they just made you see it and you couldn't get around it. I'm a Democrat, but I'll be blamed if I didn't have to vote for Mr. Lincoln as President, couldn't help it, and it was all on account of that snake story of his on illuminatin' the taking of slaves into Nebraska and Kansas. Remember it? (Tarbell 1907, 9) (148).

The main thrust of this excerpt is that stories can function as vehicles of (or proofs for) persuasion, due to the fact that they contain logical arguments. In Part 2 in the discussion of the traditional division of rhetoric into five parts we have seen that narratives were used in the proof section. The excerpt above falls in line with rhetorical practices from antiquity: narrative functions as a proof in argumentation. The passage above is interesting firstly due to its assertion that stories function as tools in argumentation, because of their capacity to illuminate or illustrate a point, and secondly because of the speaker's claim that the person he is speaking about was able to get more arguments from stories than from law books. The irony is of course that one would expect just the opposite. The stories referred to in the excerpt above argued a point, and,

in the case of their interlocutor, the point was made so forcefully in narrative form that the listener could not argue against them and, being convinced, acted accordingly. Rodden, in effect, uses a story that makes the point that stories argue in order to make the same point: stories argue. This assertion simply reinforces what I have been suggesting throughout my discussion above: narratives have implicit and explicit rational arguments that act as the motor that drives the narrative. Stories have a point, if not many points to argue. Further, story is where agency and motivation find their expression, and underlying the deeds and events expressed in the narrative is a logic that, together with the particular agent and her character traits, provides the stuff that we as audience and judge evaluate as either praise- or blameworthy.

Rodden's article is highly relevant to my dissertation, for he bases his approach on classical rhetoric. Rodden states that his aim is to "tak[e] a sharp turn away from contemporary narrative theory and toward classical rhetoric" (158). Rodden thus takes a stance similar to other scholars discussed in this dissertation (i.e., Eagleton, Ford, Kastely, etc.) who also advocate a return to the roots of literary criticism. In his discussion, Rodden states that it is his aim is to demonstrate how enthymemes function to persuade. He distinguishes between the aims of formal logic and rhetoric:

As with logic, the defining unit in rhetoric is the proposition. Whereas the syllogism is the instrument in logic, however, the *enthymeme* (the rhetorical syllogism that deals in probabilities rather than proofs) is the instrument of rhetoric. The aim of rhetoric is not proof but *assent* (151).

In the passage above illustrates the idea that rhetoric does not deal with matters that can be proved by formal logic, mathematics or empirical means, due to its field of operations: opinion. As opinions cannot be proved, we can only hope for assent on the audience's part. Rodden, in a definition that he borrows from another scholar, describes the process of using probability to gain assent, which is, in Perelman's terminology, adherence:

An established definition of rhetoric is that it is “the function of adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas” (Bryant 1953, 123). This process ranges on a continuum of poles between a complete accommodation of speaker ideas to audience views (“telling people only what they want to hear”) at one extreme to total intransigence at the other (“my facts speak for themselves” or “my viewpoint is the only reasonable/moral/etc. one”). The would-be convincing speaker, therefore, must always be adjusting his or her ideas (and self) to the listeners; the listeners are always “measuring the speaker up,” bending toward him or resisting him. He projects a certain image to them, as his discourse proceeds, they reconsider their impressions of him, filling in the missing links of his argument, placing it within the context of their own experience and relating to it in their own idiosyncratic way (154).

What is important in the above excerpt is the idea of how the speaker either does or does not accommodate ideas to the audience, and that this accommodation can be placed on a continuum ranging from complete accommodation to a complete absence thereof. The listeners are always measuring the speaker up. That is, they are judging what she is saying, based on the image they have of her, an image that we must add is based on the speaker’s *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*. Also crucial here is Rodden’s very insightful observation that each listener, while engaged in a sort of intellectual tug-of-war in which they either bend toward or away from her, place the argument within the context of their own experience and relate to it in their own idiosyncratic way. This concept has its roots in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, which, as we have seen, advocates adjusting one’s discourse to the audience at hand.

Also important in the excerpt above in relation to the measuring up that the listener carries out throughout the arguments presented by the narrator is the idea that she must take into consideration counter arguments that the listener (or, in the case of travel narratives – or any written narrative – reader) may come up with and must address them accordingly. That is, the writer of a narrative must, in the course of her narrative, weave counter-counter arguments into the fabric of the narrative in order to provide reasons that will undermine the counter arguments that occur to the reader. Taking Wayne Booth’s concept of the implied author, Rodden creates the “implied

orator.” In this sense, Rodden’s view of rhetoric coincides with Aristotle’s model of rhetoric. I have been arguing that the narrator can be viewed as pleading a case with a view to persuading the readership to accept his arguments, on the one hand, and, on the other, to find her praise- as opposed to blameworthy. Rodden, borrowing from the work of Iser, also creates the implied auditor, which I have been labeling reader or readership. The point that I wish to make here is that, although the terminology is different, Rodden’s ideas coincide with those I have presented in this dissertation. That is, the reader, in the role of judge, evaluates the arguments of the particular case as presented by the narrator who is acting as a sort of litigant:

The scene for the implied orator and the implied auditor is more properly a courtroom. Here they interact as advocate and jury member, respectively. The jury (presumably less so than the judge) will be “convinced” not only by rational argument but also by emotional and ethical appeals. Instead of “realizing a world,” the implied auditor weighs appeals and then assents or rejects. Whereas the implied reader’s [Iser’s term] overriding task is to interpret a world and “take an active part in the composition of the novel’s meaning,” the implied auditor’s ambition is to evaluate a case and (re-)actively shape the terms of the argument (Iser 1978, xiii) (156).

Rodden’s uses the image of the courtroom, which also coincides with the way that I view the rhetorical framework of narrative. As stated in Part 2, I have based the function of the reader/listener on Aristotle’s presentation of judicial rhetoric.

In his discussion of rhetoric’s classical framework, Rodden brings up the quinquartite model speech. Ancient rhetoric’s five main divisions “from Aristotle through Quintilian” were: “*invention* (discovery and invention), *dispositio* (arrangement, adaptation), *elocutio* (style), *memoria* (memory), and *pronunciatio* (delivery)” (158). Rodden discusses the place narrative occupies in the categories listed above:

Classical scholars beginning with Aristotle considered the *narratio* and *argumentum* to be the two essential parts of *dispositio*. Classical theorists worked primarily from the model of the forensic (courtroom) speech. Thus *narratio* was the statement of the case; *argumentum* was the “proof” of the case (159-160).

Rodden defines narrative as I am using it in the model that I have articulated in Part 2. The difference is that, in the framework that I have articulated, *narratio* and *argumentum* are combined and present in the narration itself. At times the “proof” of the *argumentum* is explicit, and at times it is implicit.

In his article, Rodden explains what the aim of *narratio* is from Quintilian’s perspective. He also discusses the role it played in deliberative and epideictic rhetoric:

The precise nature of the *narratio* was to “indicate the nature of the subject on which he [the judge] will have to give judgments” (Quintilian 1805, iv. 2. 1). In practice, it was not merely informative but also suasive, “a speech in miniature” (Ragsdale 1966, 21). Quintilian advised that *narratio* function “not merely to instruct but rather to persuade the judge” (1805, iv. 2. 21). Forensic oratory was most appropriate to a statement of the facts since the province of courtroom speech is the past, but deliberative and epideictic (ceremonial) oratory also made use of reciting past events as a basis for recommendations about the future and present – and so *narratio* also came by Quintilian’s time to figure prominently in non-forensic discourse (160).

Although Rodden states that by Quintilian’s time *narratio* was used in non-forensic rhetorical discourse, the fact is that there are examples of narrative being used in epideictic and deliberative rhetoric in Aristotle’s treatise. Be that as it may, the point that I wish to make from the above passage is that two functions that narrative has, whether used in deliberative, judicial or epideictic rhetoric, are: 1) the presentation of past events in story form and 2) persuasion. Another important point is that combining the three modes has been a practice since (at least) Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was written. That is, the lines separating tactical practices in judicial, deliberative and epideictic rhetoric were not hard and fast, and elements from each sphere were often used indiscriminately in the others, depending on the aims of the orator.

The texts that Rodden uses in this article are passages from Orwell’s *1984*. At one point in his article Rodden states that “it seems likely that not all narratives argue – not all of them advance logical appeals. Certainly not all advance rational arguments

that may be formulated in enthymematic chains” (165). Rodden’s ideas reflect the title of his argument title in the arguments he sets forth. That is, he is still in the drawing board stage of moving *towards* a rhetoric of narrative. This can be seen clearly when he shifts back and forth between arguing that narratives do or do not argue or persuade:

Still it might be said that all stories, at least in a weak sense, persuade us (or at least a few readers) of something. For even if we consider a story on the model of a “fictional world” [here Rodden is reverting to Booth’s conception of rhetoric] rather than a speaker-listener exchange, we as readers enter a world that is animated by values. Whether we grant or withhold assent, whether we are “moved” to embrace the story’s *Weltanschauung* or not, we nevertheless confront that world’s axiology when we enter it – just as surely as we do when we enter a different culture (165-166).

Rodden here is, in my opinion, mistaken when he states that all stories at least persuade in a weak sense of something. In my view, all stories attempt to persuade. Whether they manage to achieve this end is another matter which Aristotle addresses when he states at the beginning of his treatise, “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.” To see is not necessarily to manage to perceive. Aristotle illustrates this idea metaphorically when he equates the rhetorician with a doctor who follows all the procedures of medicine to cure a patient that is incurably ill. So the point that I made at the outset regarding gaining as much knowledge as possible about a field of study in order to be conversant as possible in the field on the one hand, and, on the other to be able to identify the insights and blindspots of other scholars working in the same field that either have not done sufficient research or are “fudging” when they put their ideas down on paper holds weight in this case. The other interesting thing that Rodden is doing, since he has read Booth, is to conflate rhetorical “convincing” with artful story telling. For that is what I assume he means when he says that we either are or are not “moved” to embrace the story’s *Weltanschauung*. That is, he views the persuasion on the part of the narrator as having to do with convincing the reader of the story’s verisimilitude in terms of narrative

technique, which is something quite different from what Aristotle's treatise was about – in my reading. Still, on a more positive note, Rodden hits the nail on the head when he states that the world of narrative is animated by values. And it is values that provide the implicit reasoning of a narrative that can be extracted and expressed in syllogistic form.

Rodden argues in fits and starts, perhaps because he has not thought the matter through, or because he has read Booth, whose work is, in my view, often perplexing. For first Rodden says that not all narratives advance arguments that can be expressed in enthymematic chains, but then he states that all stories – “at least in a weak sense” – persuade us (or at least a few readers) of something. Rodden's expression is highly ambiguous. Precisely what is that something that Rodden is referring to? Does he even know? If all stories persuade, they are, a fortiori, rhetorical by nature, and can, therefore, be analyzed for the implicit reasoning. Rodden concludes as weakly as he begins:

Are stories arguments? Are narratives persuasive discourses?

Sometimes. If they progress primarily by conceptual chains or by motifs carrying ideas, we may posit, enthymematically, a tentative “yes.” But as with the interrelation of *inventio* and *dispositio*, and with the dynamic, dialectical character of the communicative act, the *what* of narrative is not a separate question from the *how*. We must constantly be attentive as to how narratives move if we are to distinguish the modes within them accurately.

Only then will we become aware of how they are moving us (169).

In my view, Rodden has a confused idea of how stories or narratives (I use the terms interchangeably) function rhetorically, and how, for that reason, they are necessarily persuasive discourse that argue based on an underlying system of values which can be examined by analyzing the implicit reasoning embedded in the narration itself. In spite of what I see as flaws in Rodden's work, his intentions are good, for he at least attempts to take us closer to the earliest form of literary analysis by using a definition (however mistaken) of classical rhetoric.

In their analysis of narratives, both Feldman et al and Rodden make implicit enthymemes explicit using as their object complete narratives that can be several paragraphs long (in the case of Feldman et al) or paragraphs from larger texts (Rodden analyzes paragraphs from Orwell's *1984*). In the case of Feldman et al, as many as three or four enthymemes are extracted from a paragraph, and then linked together in order to illustrate the rhetorical component (in terms of *logos*) present in the narrative. Rodden, in his article, extracts only one enthymeme per paragraph (or entire section of text) analyzed. My work will differ in two respects: first, I shall break the narrative down into its smallest units, at times discussing a single word in order to demonstrate how it can function to produce an argument in its broadest sense.<sup>114</sup> At times I shall examine larger units, such as the title, and show how a small group of terms functions rhetorically, that is, how *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos* are at work in the smallest units possible of the text under study. At other points in my discussion, I shall consider, like Feldman et al and Rodden, larger portions of the recite de voyage, in order to demonstrate how the narrator is pleading his case in the "courtroom" of the readership. The implicit arguments that are made implicit I then examine in terms of the system of values that informs the narrative.

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<sup>114</sup> We have already seen how one word constituted an entire rhetorical enactment in the chapter on *ethos*.



### 3.3 TRAVEL LITERATURE

The object of study, a short travel narrative, belongs to a genre that had long been ignored by scholars of literature and other academic fields, but which became an object of interest in the 1980s. Kowalewski writes:

In the last ten years there has been a resurgence of interest in travel writing unequaled since the twenties and thirties. This revival is evident not only in the recent reprinting of travel classics but in the remarkable number of new travel writers and otherwise established authors who try their hand at the genre, both commanding sizable popular audiences (1).

In 2002 Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs write in *The Cambridge Companion to Travel*

*Writing*:

Travel has recently emerged as a key theme for the humanities and social sciences, and the amount of scholarly work on travel writing has reached unprecedented levels. The academic disciplines of literature, history, geography, and anthropology have all overcome their previous reluctance to take travel writing seriously and have begun to produce a body of interdisciplinary criticism which will allow the full historical complexity of the genre to be appreciated (1).

What was once a minor art became, due to recent academic interest, a fertile field that had been virtually unploughed.<sup>115</sup> Suddenly legitimate, travel writing provided a fresh object for academics from various fields. Mary Baine Campbell writes that since 1980, “theoretical models were developing which would help to launch illuminating readings of texts once considered ‘subliterary’, of mainly archival use for narrative history, or just boring” (261).

Percy Adams’ *Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel* (1983) is a seminal text for students of travel literature, to a great extent because of its scope. After providing evidence that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries travel accounts were more popular than *romans* and novels (75), Adams writes:

By now this sketch of the history and types of the literature of travel should have made certain facts obvious. One of the most important is that, like the novel, it

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<sup>115</sup> See Duncan and Gregory for a post-modern interpretation of the new interest in travel writing.

was always more or less international. In the ancient world, the writings of Herodotus and those other traveler-historians concern the whole Mediterranean and often more. In the Middle Ages, the volumes filled by the author of *Mandeville*, who by some scholars is considered English, are nearly all Continental. The letters of Columbus and Vespucci were translated into many languages immediately, while the great collection of the de Brys – published in Latin and French but in Germany – favored the literature of no nation. And, finally, the collections of the eighteenth century, such as those of the Churchills and J.-F. Bernard, were in each case non-nationalistic. Perhaps because of the vastness of the subject, however, most students of travels other than the historians of exploration have not ventured into languages other than their own, or even into translation of foreign books. Such a limitation mars the effectiveness of studies by R.W. Frantz (1932-33) and A. Lytton Sells (1964), who consider only English travelers, and of Gilbert Chinard and his disciple Geoffroy Atkinson, whose various books – in spite of their excellence – seldom consider any but French travelers (75-76).

The importance that travel writing had had throughout history is evident in the above passage. Adams also brings out the important point that travel writing was, for the most part, international, and the texts produced were widely read. Adams writes that “the historians of ideas, including students of the novel, must know that those many readers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – and of course long before – had access to and knew well the travel literature of many nations” (76). Due to its popularity, travel writing had significant influence, a fact that is, according to Adams, now being appreciated among contemporary scholars working in a variety of disciplines:

With all this wide reading of the literature of travel, the influence on every phase of the history of ideas was incredibly broad and deep. Geographers and students of exploration have long been aware of it, but now that influence is being estimated and described more and more in special studies in other realms of thought (77).

Where was this influence felt, according to Adams? He states that the books produced by businessmen and ministers of state made it easier for others to follow their paths, and also “inspired a longing for exotic goods that quickly became necessities. As a result, accounts written by men engaged in such travel were often propagandistic” for international trade and colonization (77). Geographers and cartographers were highly

dependent on récits de voyages, making it possible for them “to draw better and better maps” (77-78). Adams writes that although much travel literature was full of exaggerations and “incredibilities,” they “also recorded facts that belong to the real, the valuable, world of science,” and became more accurate over time, as the various texts could be compared (78). So science also is indebted to the literature of travel. Adams writes that the “gripping, yet untold, story – travel literature and the evolution of science – is one of the most important for the history of ideas (79). Finally, Adams outlines the influence of the literature of travel on religion, which is linked to its influence on science:

First, science helped the traveling Jesuits to evangelize the pagan world . . . Leibnitz was convinced that the success of the Jesuits in Asia was due “solely to the wonderment aroused by their introduction of European inventions and discoveries” in science. Second, the Jesuits more than any other religious group were so eager to convert pagans that they found closer and closer ties between Chinese ethics and Christian practices – Confucius became almost a saint – or between the gods of Canada and the god of Europe . . . Third, travelers other than Jesuits or Protestant pastors affected religious thought in many ways, but as Frank Manuel and others have shown, they were especially important to philosophers proving the universality of religious beliefs, to deists attacking revealed religion, or to the adherents of one religious sect arguing with those of another. . . For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then, travel literature was both a source of revolution in religion and a sourcebook to be drawn on by biased readers searching for evidence to support their preconceived notions about religion (79-80).

Adams sums up his discussion of the influences of the literature of travel in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when he states that “[t]he importance of travels, in fact, extends to every realm of thought, to every significant business, political, religious, academic, or creative enterprise undertaken during the centuries when the European novel was maturing so fast” (80). He asserts further that not only is there proof of the importance of travel literature for religion and science, but that there is also proof of its importance “for political science, for philosophy, or for the visual arts” (80).

As for the importance of travel literature with respect to discovering the Other

(a term that had not yet been coined, but whose concept was alive), Adams writes: Obviously travelers as far back as “Mandeville,” with his liberal contrasts of English with Arabs and of Christianity with other religions, were instrumental in leading Europeans to consider satisfactory not only a plurality of religions for a given country and for the world, or political systems, or languages but also to recognize their own insularity. It is indeed true, as Lévi-Strauss argues, that, beginning with the Renaissance, western Europe experienced “that crucial moment . . . when, thanks to the great voyages of discovery, a human community which had believed itself to be complete and in its final form suddenly learned . . . that it was not alone, that it was part of a greater whole, and that, in order to achieve self-knowledge, it must first of all contemplate its unrecognizable image in this mirror” (80).

Experiencing what in post-modern terms is called alterity is still a topic in travel literature and its theory and criticism. It is also interesting to note the very different conclusions that Adams reaches vis-à-vis those of Said in *Orientalism*, which brings to the surface mechanisms of imperialism present in the same genre.<sup>116</sup> Nor is the image of the traveler necessarily as positive as Adams paints it, as Hulme and Youngs indicate: “Societal attitudes to travel have always been ambivalent. Travel broadens the mind, and knowledge of distant places and people often confers status, but travellers sometimes return as different people or do not come back at all” (2). Due to this ambivalence, Hulme and Youngs insightfully identify one of the earliest travelers as the archetype for this group: “So the ambiguous figure of Odysseus – adventurous, powerful, unreliable – is perhaps the appropriate archetype for the traveller, and by extension for the travel writer” (2). In spite of this ambiguity, what travel writing has probably always offered is “observed experience and curiosity towards other lifeways,”

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<sup>116</sup> See Said 1979.

(3) which, whether the effects have been positive or negative, nevertheless makes it impossible not to view the framework within which one lives with different eyes. Along these lines, Hulme and Youngs state when writing about the sixteenth century that “the real power of travel writing lay in its independence of perspective. The claim to have been there and to have seen with one’s own eyes could defeat speculation” (4). They concur with Adams with respect to the great influence travel writing had in the seventeenth century: “it was in effect travel writing which provided the vehicle for the conveyance of the new information which laid the foundations for the scientific and philosophical revolutions of the seventeenth century” (4).

Hulme and Youngs also bring out the traveler/tourist dichotomy, a topic that is the source for a large amount of disagreement, as well as an image that is either desirable or undesirable:

Increasingly, too, travellers were defined, or defined themselves, against the figure of the tourist. Modernity is a deeply contested term, but its original form – as Baudelaire’s *modernité*, dating from an 1863 essay – ties it closely to notions of movement and individuality which, in the aristocratic figure of the *flâneur*, or stroller, stand out against the democratization of travel marked by the appearance of Thomas Cook’s first tour in 1841 (7).

The traveler/tourist dichotomy is a highly ploughed theme in the criticism of travel writing. Travelers never want to be associated with tourists, considering themselves to be the elite of those making journeys across geographical spaces. Perhaps there is something to the idea that there is a difference between travelers and tourists, but in “Storming the Beach,” Rolf Potts tells of a conversation he had among “travelers” in Thailand, in which they all, after some intellectual sparring, agreed that, in the end (and sadly) both travelers and tourists were mere consumers.<sup>117</sup> His ironic position is, of course, yet another opinion that could be debated forcefully in dialectical or rhetorical discourse.

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<sup>117</sup> See Potts.

Another important point that Hulme and Youngs bring out about travel writing is the transition it makes, in the twentieth century, from undervalued travel writing to art form: travel literature:

Whereas scientists and explorers would inevitably – to use an old shorthand – put content before form, literary writers were also beginning to travel and to write about their travels: Dickens, Trollope, Stendhal, and Flaubert had done so earlier in the nineteenth century; but now writers such as Robert Louis Stevenson, Henry James, Edith Wharton, and D.H. Lawrence began to commit large amounts of time to travelling and travel writing. Travel writing was becoming travel *literature* and was therefore taken with new seriousness . . . (7)

The transition to literature's terrain has given travel writing greater importance, adding to its worth as an object of study.

I have shown the difficulties and complexities involved with defining the term rhetoric in the first part of this dissertation. A similar situation arises with respect to defining travel writing. Due to limitations of time and space, I shall present only three ways of defining travel writing, and then add some comments for the purposes of this study. Percy Adams, whose work examines the relationship between the novel and travel writing throughout history, states the following: “[W]e have noted how “novel,” or long prose fiction, cannot itself be defined to the satisfaction of any group. And to define travel literature – that is, the *récit de voyage*, perhaps a better term – is just as impossible.” (279). Adams states, in the face of this impossibility, that travel writing is perhaps best defined through negatives.<sup>118</sup> Adams concludes his list of negatives as follows:

Finally, the *récit de voyage* cannot be a literary genre with a fixed definition any more than the novel is; it is not even *sui generis* since it includes so many types both by form and by content. For, like other forms just as amorphous, it evolves and will continue to evolve (282).

Adams' conclusion parallels Hulme and Youngs, who state:

In putting together this Companion we have strengthened our sense that travel writing is best considered as a broad and ever-shifting genre, with a complex

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<sup>118</sup> See Adams, pp. 280-282, for a list of the negatives.

history which has yet to be properly studied . . . just as the ways and means of travel are constantly changing, so travel writing will continue to change in their wake: stories emerging from space travel, from virtual travel, and from the ‘travails’ of the world’s refugees and migrants will doubtless continue to extend the genre in the years to come (10-11).

Given the difficulties related to defining travel writing as a genre, perhaps the best definition of travel literature is that given by Bill Bryson:

Travel writing, as I once observed elsewhere, is the most accommodating – one might almost say the most promiscuous – of genres. Write a book or essay that might otherwise be catalogued under memoir, humor, anthropology, or natural history, and as long as you leave the property at some point, you can call it travel writing (xviii).

Bryson’s definition, in which he skirts any scholarly dispute over genre with aplomb, nevertheless is satisfactory for the purposes of this study.<sup>119</sup> What I shall add to this is that the travel narrative that I have chosen to examine is a story that is written in the first person that is presented as being true. As it is written in the first person and presented as being true accounts of the events described, it falls in the category of subgenre of autobiography.

Related to its being a form of autobiography is another allure that travel writing holds. The often transgressive nature of individual travellers which they put into writing makes this genre attractive, perhaps because readers experience vicarious thrills or because they experience some sort of illicit frisson as voyeurs. As Hulme and Youngs write, travellers do not always follow the instructions from their superiors (i.e., those issued by the Royal Society), nor do they follow the same societal roles when in other territories:

Travellers will usually follow their instincts and opportunities, rather than directions from home, and it is travellers’ eccentricities and extravagances – in the literal sense of wanderings off – which have attracted many readers to the genre of travel writing (5).

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<sup>119</sup> See Glaser for further discussion of defining travel writing as a genre.

Hulme and Youngs call this aspect of travel writing its “idiosyncrasy,” and state that it “marks much modern travel writing” (5). While the idiosyncratic aspect of travel writers and writing is not the focus of my dissertation, the fact that the *recit de voyage* is written in the first person leads to what Philippe Lejeune calls the autobiographical pact which assumes that the author and the narrator are one and the same, and that this person is telling a true story.<sup>120</sup> Since the story is true, its content necessarily provides data about the narrator, the other persons that appear, as well as the descriptions made. Along these lines, Hulme and Youngs write:

Travel writing and the novel, especially in its first-person form, have often shared a focus on the centrality of the self, a concern with empirical detail, and a movement through time and place which is simply sequential (6).

Two points come to the fore in the above passage: the focus on the self and recording of facts. In my discussion above on the work carried out by sociologists and business administration scholars, the idea that humans make sense out of their lives through story-telling or narrative has been examined. The focus on the centrality of the self in travel writing (a form of autobiography) and the idea of putting one’s self in writing and narrating about oneself in order to give meaning to one’s own life all come to the fore. And by using rhetoric to examine the events that have been put into writing by an agent it becomes possible to evaluate the details of the narrative from the standpoint of a system of values. And so while it is true – as Hulme and Youngs state above – that at times, travel writing merely depicts movement through time and space which is simply sequential, the narrative tells not only the *what* of the narrator’s experience, but also the *why*. The *why* of the narrative provides the reader with the motives that underlie the narrator’s actions, as well as her position on the actions of other persons in his tale.

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<sup>120</sup> See Lejeune, who defines autobiography as follows: “Retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in particular the story of his personality” (2).



And it is the individual in the particular tale – or case study – that provides the focus of examination.

**PART 4**  
**ANALYSIS**



## 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The model of rhetoric as critical and analytical tool that has been presented in the chapters above contains more aspects than can realistically be brought to bear on the analysis that follows. Thus, only certain concepts will be applied. The core concept from which all of the other related concepts that make up the definition of rhetoric that has been presented is Aristotle's point of departure for his definition in the *Rhetoric*: "Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion." The entire discussion found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is built upon this initial proposition. And it is the word "persuasion" in this same proposition that has generated the countless volumes produced since its appearance more than 2,000 years ago. For what Aristotle attempted to do and what has been attempted ever since was to answer the question, "What does it mean to persuade?" or "Just what does seeing the ability to persuade entail?" The nature of rhetorical argumentation terminology can be brought into high relief by juxtaposing "to persuade" with terminology such as "to prove empirically, logically or mathematically." That is, when placed side by side with methods employed by disciplines whose aim is the designation of hard facts, we see that rhetoric is about argumentation with respect to opinion. While elements of absolute certainty come into play as possible bases for argumentation, in the end, only matters that cannot be proven with absolute logical, mathematical or empirical certainty are the object of rhetorical discourse. We have seen that defining rhetoric in this way is an opinion and so the model of rhetoric that Aristotle presents is also subject to dispute. His initial defining propositions is therefore, like countless other definitions which provide the bases for humans in the management of their affairs, acquires value only as an agreed upon convention.

The second defining proposition that Aristotle sets forth in his treatise provides the other base upon which his construct for argumentative discourse rests. He calls

rhetoric the *antistrophos* to dialectic, which requires the answering of another question: “Precisely what is dialectic? In answering it, we have seen that Aristotle’s definition of dialectic differs from Plato’s. Plato views dialectic as a means for discovering absolute truth, whereas Aristotle views dialectic as a means for arguing about matters which can be argued in at least two opposing ways – the search for absolute truth is reserved for his *Analytics*, which as already stated is, in essence, formal, as opposed to informal logic. Aristotle’s second assertion is thus another opinion and, as a definition, an agreed upon convention from which, combined with the first, the rest of the discussion in his treatise is derived. These two propositions then, lead to the entire body of other assertions, illustrations and explanations aimed at answering precisely what is meant by the initial propositions. A fundamental aim of Parts I and II of this dissertation has been to reveal the ways in which the two initial propositions have been built upon by Aristotle and other thinkers.

These two assertions, therefore, provide the core concepts that function as the theoretical backdrop for the analysis in Part 4. At the same time, a selection of concepts that have been explored in the first three parts of this dissertation will also be used in the analysis when relevant. The first concept that forms part of the critical and analytical framework to be employed is that it is possible to discover truth or what appears to be truth in relation with matters where judgment must be made. Judgment is necessary due to rhetoric’s field being opinion – opinions which can be contradicted by other, opposing opinions that can also be argued forcefully. The audience must judge the arguments that are set forth and decide, using reason, which of the opinions rings truest. We have seen that judicial rhetoric attempts to prove past events that have, in fact, occurred, so in this sense rhetoric, using probability, aims to establish real events as they actually happened. That is, the determination of whether a crime actually occurred

is a goal of this mode of rhetoric. Although past events often cannot be proven with absolute precision and certainty, what is taken for granted is that some action carried out by human agency did, in fact, occur. This means that with adequate empirical or logical proofs, the hard facts, or absolute truths of an action could be ascertained. We have discussed the difficulties of doing so, due to the problems related with empirically proving past events on the one hand, as well as problems related with attempts made by human agents whose goal is the obstruction of justice by deliberately hiding or falsifying evidence or matters related with the particular event.

The other type of truth Aristotle addresses in his treatise is the evaluation of the actions carried out. This type of truth is, by comparison, distanced from the verification of actual events that have taken place, and is thus lies fully in the field that rhetoric deals with: opinion. While this at first glance may appear to be contradictory in that opinions per se cannot be either true or false due to the impossibility of quantifying the assertions made, judgments of this sort can be compared with the evaluations that J.L. Mackie explores in *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. He asserts that evaluations that can be labeled as true or false are commonly made when there are agreed upon or assumed standards:

The classing of wool, the grading of apples, the awarding of prizes at sheepdog trials, flower shows, skating and diving championships, and even the marking of examination papers are carried out in relation to standards of quality or merit which are peculiar to each particular subject-matter or type of contest, which may be explicitly laid down but which, even if they are nowhere explicitly stated, are fairly well understood and agreed by those who are recognized as judges or experts in each particular field. Given any sufficiently determinate standards, it will be an objective issue, a matter of truth and falsehood, how well any particular specimen measures up to those standards. Comparative judgements in particular will be capable of truth and falsehood: it will be a factual question whether this sheepdog has performed better than that one (25 – 26).

The point that is made in the passage above is that within certain frameworks of agreed upon conventions – in this case standards – it is possible to *objectively* identify truth and

falsehood. Aristotle's addresses this type of truth in his *Rhetoric* when he speaks of discovering truth and/or apparent truth. The focus of his discussion is judicial rhetoric, which ties in with Mackie's argument, and is at the same time highly relevant to the present discussion:

There is an objective distinction which applies in many such fields [i.e., aesthetic and moral], and yet would itself be regarded as a peculiarly moral one: the distinction between justice and injustice. In one important sense of the word it is a paradigm case of injustice if a court declares someone to be guilty of an offence of which it knows him to be innocent. More generally still, any award of marks, prizes, or the like is unjust if it is at variance with the agreed standards for the contest in question: if one diver's performance in fact measure up better to the accepted standards for diving than another's, it will be unjust if the latter is awarded higher marks or the prize. In this way the justice or injustice of decisions relative to standards can be a thoroughly objective matter, though there may still be a subjective element in the interpretation or application of standards (26).

The relevance to the present discussion is evident, for the mode of rhetoric that is being superimposed on the narratives under study is judicial. Judgments are based on fairness and can be argued in opposite directions. But this does not mean that each particular case does not, based on conventions accepted by the community, have any value with respect to truth and falsehood. It is in this sense that Aristotle argues that the judge in rhetoric can be compared to an assayer of silver.<sup>121</sup> Further, the subjective nature underlying what are objective judgement calls due to agreed upon standards creates the framework for evaluating the qualitative aspects of a particular case. The subjective nature of "objective" judgements will be brought into focus in the analysis carried out in Part 4. In judicial rhetoric, the judge's (or jury's) responsibility is to decide, based on the arguments set forth, whether an act has occurred and whether the defendant is guilty or not. The nature of the crime must also be defined. In this dissertation, the judicial model is superimposed on the overall structure of a narrative act composed of narrator

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<sup>121</sup>Another type of truth or falsehood related with rhetorical argumentation is ex post facto proofs. That is, in deliberative rhetoric when opinions are given about the results of future events, they can be proven true once they have occurred as foreseen.

and readership. These roles parallel that of the defendant and jury/judge in judicial rhetoric. The narration thus stands as a sort of pleading in the framework that is being proposed.

Another concept to be brought to bear on the analysis in Part 4 is the framework for any rhetorical transaction. We have seen the framework for rhetorical enactments as presented by Bons and by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser. There must be: 1) an issue with opposing claims which is characterized by critical doubt, disagreement, controversy or conflict; 2) there are at least two parties, whose participation demonstrates that the issue at stake can allow of being otherwise; 3) both parties attempt to make the best possible case when arguing, which can be done orally or in writing (in the latter case, the rhetorical enactment is carried out in silence); 4) the arena in which the rhetorical transaction takes place is similar to a court room or assembly where judgment takes place. These characteristics provide a framework that makes it possible to put Eagleton's proposal to use rhetoric as a means to enter into a dialogue on "*genuine* moral argument, which sees the relations between individual qualities and values and our whole material conditions of existence" (see p. 79 above).

It is crucial to bear in mind when utilizing rhetoric as a critical and analytical tool for entering into a dialogue on ethics and values that the judgments made are necessarily based on the community's system of values. The audience, whether listeners or readers, are persuaded to the extent that the arguments that are put forth are based on principles they accept. The principles are components of what the community determines to be good or evil, as well as what it identifies as "the good life," "well-being," or *eudaimonia*, in both tangible and intangible terms. It has been stated above that within the same community there will be complex and often conflicting values, and that often when rhetorical persuasion takes place it is, in effect, the reinforcing of values



that are already shared but which are latent. Further, within the same community there is necessarily a multitude of voices, each of which expresses its opinion on what is good and evil, right and wrong, praise- or blameworthy. Rhetorical transactions are often, if not necessarily, characterized by conflict and strife among opposing groups and/or individuals within the same community.

Due to the fact that the two narrative texts under consideration fall in the category of literature, they are, in rhetorical terms, epideictic works. The first text is a dialogue in which the amount of information given on a particular action affects the judgment made by the interlocutors on the agent who has carried out the actions, and so while the text is epideictic in category, it has characteristics of a judicial rhetorical enactment. The same is true of the second text, a *recit de voyage*. It is a narrative and can thus be classified as epideictic, due to the contemporary practice of equating this rhetorical mode with literature. But its quality as a judicial rhetorical enactment is apparent in the title alone: “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” A confession assumes 1) a guilty (or possibly guilty) party, and 2) some type of crime (or sin, if the context is religious – still, in a religious confessional transaction judgment and evaluation of the sins committed takes place). If there is a confession, this same confession will be evaluated and a judgment will be made on the agent’s actions in terms of truth and falseness, as well as guilt and innocence. The narrator pleads on his own behalf with a view to being judged as innocent – or if not innocent, as deserving both pardon and praise, as will be shown in the analysis. Linked to the acts of pleading and judgment within a judicial rhetorical framework is Ricoeur’s statement cited in a previous chapter that “There is no action that does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles.” And so the rhetorical transaction in a narrative about past

actions can be understood as a courtroom in which a defendant pleads his case and will be judged based on principles inherent in the community's system of values, while at the same time, due to its being epideictic, as an artifact of discourse, it necessarily – as Walker asserts – represents and participates in the shaping and cultivation of essential factors of values and beliefs that govern a society or culture, and in this way reflects the ideology of individuals in a community which binds them together due to their identification with what he calls the “deep” commitments and presuppositions that inform decision making. Walker, as already stated, gives pride of place to epideictic works as “the central and fundamental mode of rhetoric in human culture” (see p. 143 above). If we accept Walker's position, the role that the student of literature plays as judge and commentator of cultural artifacts expressed in writing can be seen as taking on great significance with respect to the critique of the system of values within which the object being evaluated is embedded. Students of literature can thus, within this conception of literature, participate in the advocating of societal change.<sup>122</sup>

In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, assertions made by Brown were explored, against which it was stated that evidence would be presented that argues a position contrary to his. That is, Brown affirms that contemporary society is “eviscerated” of narrative form, on the one hand, and on the other, that it is hard to find moral agency – that there is “no social order of meaning in advanced industrial societies.” The two cases that are presented in Part 4 of this dissertation are contemporary narratives, which as such, contradict Brown's first assertion. His second assertion will be challenged in the analysis, for by using rhetoric as critical and analytical tool, both narratives will

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<sup>122</sup> Nussbaum argues that the study of literature, Greek tragedy in particular, can be a catalyst for ethical action. She writes, “As Philoctetes knew, pity means action: intervention on behalf of the suffering, even if it is difficult and repellent. If you leave out the action, you are an ignoble coward, perhaps also a hypocrite and a liar. If you help, you have done something fine” (*Fragility*, xxxvii).

provide evidence, both fictional and factual, of motive-based action carried out by moral agents.

Ricoeur's equation of agency in narrative will come to bear in the analysis of the two narratives: X did A in such and such circumstance. The circumstance in which the protagonist or main character of a narrative acts provides great numbers of variables from which to examine the actions carried out that were based on decisions with their underlying motives. Tied to Ricoeur's equation and discussion on the necessarily ethical nature of actions carried out by humans is Halliwell's seminal study on Aristotle's *Poetics* which has been explored in the chapters above. Halliwell argues that, in Aristotle's vision of dramatic *ethos*, character, motive and action provide the means by which it is possible to determine and evaluate the essential character being portrayed in the dramatic work. This same concept will be applied in the analysis of narrative, with a view to demonstrating another argument that has been presented in this dissertation: rhetoric can be used as a tool to discover and judge characters depicted in narrative who are engaging in the pursuit of their respective aims and ends, basing this discovery and judgment on the system of values upon which the action is based. At the same time, since the judgment that is taking place is based on community's system of values, this same system becomes an object of evaluation, also subject to approbation or reprobation.

The three *pisteis*, or proofs, as defined by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* – *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* – will come to bear on the analysis in Part 4. All three rhetorical proofs operate in unison. *Logos*, which is present both implicitly and explicitly in the narratives, will be stated in an informal, syllogistic format, as well as how it functions in unison with *pathos* and *logos*. In addition to the concepts outlined in this introduction,

other concepts that have been presented in the first three parts of this dissertation will be applied based on relevance.

One of the aims of this dissertation is to provide a model to address, analyze and critique morals from the standpoint of the system of values in which they are embedded. In this way, what follows is a response to the subtext in Eagleton's assertion that scholars of literature have been shamefaced with respect to moral issues. That is, the discussion which follows presents a model with which to candidly discuss morals, ethics and values. However, this dissertation contrasts with Eagleton's, whose work is informed by his ideology. For when he states that a method be developed with which to examine a broad array of cultural artifacts from the standpoint of rhetoric, his aim, as stated above, is to promote socialism – as he defines it – using rhetoric – as he defines it. Eagleton's methodology is thus prescriptive, whereas the way of looking at literature is meant to make analytical description possible for subsequent critique. It would, of course, be naïve to assume that there is no underlying ideology that provides the basis for the methodology that has been presented herein. For even the aim of making the free exchange of ideas possible must rest on underlying or assumed premises. Still, it is one thing to promote a particular political or philosophical view and quite another to suggest that to examine all views could prove fruitful for students of literature. As stated at the outset, the aims of this dissertation are to present a way of looking at literature that will, in the first place, provide what has been perceived as a gap in the critical-analytical tools used by students of literature that will add to the other approaches they already have, and in the second place, to use this tool to critique and analyze discourse, whether primary or secondary (i.e., critical and theoretical), in order to make it possible to open a dialogue on what values are embedded in the discursive artifacts (including the method presented in this dissertation), with a view to evaluating the merits and flaws

present within them. Whether or not change is necessary once evaluation has taken place will be a matter for those participating in the conversation to decide subsequent to the critique and analysis.

## 4.2 A FICTIONAL CASE

In the following case study, Ricoeur's equation of agency in narrative (i.e., X did A in such and such circumstance) will provide the focal point for the analysis. We have seen how this is rhetorical practice that originates in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and which was later developed as stasis theory. This equation leads necessarily to aspects that portray both the agent of the acts carried out and the context within which they were performed. The primary aim of the discussion that follows is to demonstrate how we as humans seek as much information possible in order to adequately judge actions in terms of approbation and reprobation. In the fictive dialogue that follows, the starting point (i.e., the first sentence of the text) is a brief summary of an event. This summary is the catalyst for an initial judgment, which provides the motor for seeking out further details related to the actions carried out in the past being described and the agents in question. As the dialogue progresses, each detail adds aspects to the overall case, which modifies each successive judgment. If we follow this argument, what occurs in the dialogue below is, in essence, a defining process. That is, the details that are added to the particular case make it possible to progressively define with increasing precision what happened. This defining process is addressed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* when he discusses the need to adequately define offences and crimes. Details are needed in order to determine the gravity or levity of each act before passing judgment. We have seen how judgment occurs in all three rhetorical modes (i.e., deliberative, judicial, epideictic). In the case below, due to its being presented in a narrative that takes place in the past, the rhetorical mode that applies in a generic sense is judicial. I say in a generic sense because the narrative that follows does not take place in a courtroom. But, as it will become obvious upon examining the text, a great amount of judgment takes place not only on the part of the interlocutors of the text but on the part of the readership. Opinions are presented implicitly and explicitly via *logos*. They are, in no small way, already a judgment. The

interlocutors of the text deliver their opinions/judgments in response to each added detail. The reader's job is to then evaluate the judgments being presented.

While in the second case to be analyzed the narrative is in first person and the narrator acts as his own defendant that attempts to persuade, in the first narrative (in dialogue format) there is no defendant/persuader per se. Instead, it is the circumstances and facts of the case related in the dialogue that make both persuasion and judgment possible. Based on what is told, it is the details themselves of the case that persuade for a mother's innocence or guilt, negligence or responsibility. Each detail, with its attendant opinion thus stands as a specific facet of the case which affects the way in which it is appraised and judged.

The case below, although brief, is highly complex, as are most rhetorical events. The text is a fictional situation William Gass calls a confusing case, which shows very clearly how we are, in the first place, natural judges of human behavior and, in the second place, how we seek more information in order to properly assess the actions of a case in terms of goodness and wickedness. Gass writes; "I think we decide cases where there is some doubt by stating what it is about them that puzzles us. We hunt for more facts, hoping that the case will clear." The dialogue which follows exemplifies his point:

"She left her husband with a broken hand and took the children."

"She did! the ungrateful bitch!"

"He broke his hand hammering her head."

"Dear me, how distressing, but after all, what's one time?"

"He beat her every Thursday after tea and she finally couldn't stand it any longer."

"Ah, of course. But the poor children."

"He beat them, too. On Fridays. And on Saturday he beat the dog."

“My, my – such a terrible man. And was there no other way?”

“The court would grant her no injunction.”

“Why not?”

“Judge Bridelgoose is a fool.”

“Ah, of course, poor thing, she did right, no doubt about it. Except – why didn’t she also take the dog?” (Gass, 237)

Gass’ tone is highly ironic, but this does not detract from his subtext whose seriousness takes on an even more sober tone precisely for that reason. Let us look at this case point by point.

In the first sentence, we are told that a woman left her husband and took their children with her. Her husband has a broken hand. At first glance, it appears as if the woman has acted unfairly. We see this in the listener’s response when they call the woman an ungrateful bitch. She is perceived as a transgressor of a rule that stands as one of the prime clauses of the marriage contract: to stand together in sickness and in health until death. The second rule she is perceived as transgressing is that one must not engage in unjustified violence against another person. Especially, we might add, if it is one’s family member. The judgment might have stood as it is, that is, with the woman as culprit, but the listener is then provided with further details in relation to the case: it was the husband, not the wife, who broke his own hand while hammering on his wife’s head. Here Gass plays with social reactions to violence against women, for when the woman is perceived as the aggressor she is harshly condemned as an ungrateful bitch, but when the male is the transgressor, his behavior is met with a much milder appraisal: “how distressing.” So, although the blame begins to shift in his direction, the husband is not condemned with the label “dirty bastard,” or “son of a bitch,” value-laden terms roughly equivalent to “ungrateful bitch.” Further, at this point, even though the listener



is also informed that the beatings occurred on a weekly basis, additional doubt is placed on the case for, if one is to consider the children and their need to have both a father and a mother, the implicit question and opinion in “But the poor children” that can be made explicit – even though his behavior is distressing – is, “Couldn’t she have put up with her head being banged on weekly for the children’s sake? After all, children do need a father.” The great irony here is the suggestion that the mother, a woman, should sacrifice her health and well-being for her children at any cost – even if it puts her own health and safety in jeopardy. Here we can see the system of values that is in operation and that provide the basis for the opinions/judgments being delivered. The children and father are what really matter, not the mother. It is only when the listener discovers that the children, too, are being beaten that the second interlocutor approves of the dismantling of the institution of the family with father at head. The children must not be put in jeopardy by their father, and if a father beats his children, that action provides the listener with justification for the children’s being separated from him. Even more biting is Gass’ suggestion that perhaps it is not even the children’s but the dog’s being beaten that supplies justification for the rupture of the marital institution. For the dog is brought in at the end, in the same breath as the children, thereby creating ambivalence about the worth of both categories (children / dog). Here again the judgment made against the husband is not very harsh. That is, when the listener hears that the father is beating the children on Fridays and the dog on Saturdays, she uses the weak expletive “my, my,” followed by “such a terrible man.” The use of this expletive does not compare in terms of the harshness with the judgment that the woman received when she is labeled as ungrateful bitch at the beginning of this case. The expression, “such a(n) X” is much less emphatic in terms of its expression of surprise or disapproval than the expression “What a(n) X!” The statement “What a terrible man!” would have indicated much

harsher objection. “Such a terrible man” is, by comparison, too refined and rational, bordering on genteel.

The listener, although informed of the reasons the woman left her husband, nevertheless continues to search for a way to keep the institution intact, by asking whether there was no other way to solve the situation. We discover that not even the court would grant her an injunction, due to Judge Bridlegoose’s foolishness. And so, finally persuaded, the listener grants that the woman, the “poor thing” – a term of condescending disregard – is justified not only for breaking up the marriage but also for breaking the law. Not, however, without further ambivalence about her worth as a person in connection with her behavior towards the dog. That is, doubt is inserted about whether she has acted in a completely ethical way. For once the listener grants that the children had to be separated, she then asks why the woman did not take the dog as well. The obvious suggestion is that the mother has, in trying to save her children from harm, perhaps not acted as morally as possible. And the fact is that, in the values system upon which this case and its judgment rests, the interlocutor’s asking why the mother has not taken the dog as well is a perfectly valid question. For pets are important members of the family and also have rights. (Perhaps a cat may not have elicited the same *pathos*.) But it is at this point that Gass brings his narrative to an abrupt halt and allows judgment on that crucial aspect of the case to hang in full suspension. As judges, we are left both unsatisfied and impotent, our minds crying for motives that explain her behavior in relation with the dog. Without motives, her character and moral code remain dubious, no matter how virtuously she behaved on behalf of her children. Questions surface, but we remain in ignorance. Until this ignorance becomes knowledge, we remain incapable of carrying out a proper and full assessment of this case.

In spite of the suspension of judgment due to its having ended abruptly, a very ironic and indirect suggestion that comes to the surface in Gass' narrative is that in the system of values held by the community being represented, the mother, a woman, holds less worth than a dog. This is very likely Gass' major aim in this piece: to reveal that certain members of society or perhaps society on the whole greatly undervalue women and that this is an issue that must be addressed. His not mentioning this directly allows us to act as sleuths and to discover it for ourselves, thus making the impact of what he is suggesting even greater – the reader is effectively hammered on the head – by the force of Gass' argument.

The obvious final question is whether any good will come of this discovery. That is, will readers of Gass' text begin to value women more? Or is it a text that merely allows readers to reconsider/examine values that they already hold as well as put into practice? For the type of reader that would consume this text would almost certainly already agree with the opinion that Gass is presenting. That is, although undervalued by certain other segments of society, women have great worth. The members of society that might undervalue women in the way that Gass suggests might not read this text or might not even “get it” in the first place. In any case, Gass' narrative participates in a conversation that has been taking place in Europe and the United States since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. While in Aristotle's model, rhetoric does not necessarily lead to action, Gass' narrative in dialogue form nevertheless stands as an expression of dissatisfaction published in 1970 that contributes to the conversation on women's position in society. It is therefore, in that sense, a reflection of the values system of the “highly educated and cultured readership” to which it is addressed.

### 4.3 A NON-FICTIONAL CASE: “CONFESSIONS OF A CHEESE SMUGGLER”

The three proofs Aristotle identifies, *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos*, function simultaneously and are inextricably interconnected. As all three proofs operate in conjunction, it is artificial to isolate each one during analysis. It is, however, only in this way that the individual functioning of a particular proof with respect to persuasion or what is persuasive can be analyzed. The analysis carried out below stands as one out of many other possible perspectives. Analysis by another student of literature would reap different conclusions. It is, nevertheless, in the sharing of the conclusions that the dialectical aspect of rhetoric surfaces, and it is in this dialectical process that truth – in the sense indicated above in the references to Mackie – can be discovered – until another voice with greater capacity to persuade from yet another perspective manages to weaken the argumentative bases of previous opinions.

The narrative “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler” will be analyzed first from the standpoint of *logos*. Subsequently, the way in which both *ethos* and *pathos* function in connection with *logos* will be considered. This order of analysis has been chosen primarily due to the fact that, in Aristotle’s model, *logos* is meant to function as the central proof. Another reason for this order is that the *recit de voyage* is a written text, and, as such, the rhetorical transaction takes place through reading. This does not mean that *pathos* or *ethos* could not function as initial catalyst prior to the enactment. For as the text under discussion is found in a book, it is possible that its color scheme and design could have an effect on *pathos*, that is, the visual presentation of the book itself could create some sort of initial positive emotional response on the reader’s part, thereby contributing to the overall persuasive power of the text itself. It is even possible that the materials the book is made of function, on both the cognitive and tactile planes,

as elements that persuade. That is, the quality of paper as well as the ink used could trigger emotional responses that induce persuasion, thereby contributing to putting the reader in a receptive frame of mind for the contents. For instance, Cambridge University Press uses forest green for its series on the history of philosophy. The quality of paper and ink is very high, and the sensations produced – tactile, visual, even the weight – all work together and on par with the established *ethos* of the institution. The message conveyed by the material object of the book is: You, reader, hold in your hands academic work of the highest quality, which is also matched on the physical and aesthetic planes. When the abovementioned characteristics combine with the *ethos* established in the institution of higher learning Cambridge, the presentation itself becomes even more persuasive – depending, of course, on the reader examining the book.

Similarly, the place of purchase can have impact on the *ethos* plane. If, for example, the place of purchase is Barnes and Noble, a bookstore chain in the United States whose reputation for selling quality reading material aimed at consumers with high levels of education whose tastes are labeled as intellectual or cultured, the already established *ethos* of this bookstore will be transferred to the book's contents. In this way, the author's primary *ethos* is linked to an institution. The syllogistic logical process that works in conjunction with *ethos* and *pathos* can be expressed as follows: Barnes and Noble sells high quality books / This book is sold at Barnes and Noble / Therefore, this book and its content are high quality. Of course, the critical reader will ultimately judge and decide from the perspective of her system of values after having read the book whether the product sold by the bookstore whose *ethos* is very high has met the standards of quality that are promised.

As stated above, the publishing company also persuades by means of *ethos*. The travel story that has been selected for analysis was published in an anthology titled *The Best American Series 2000*. This story has been selected for reasons that, on one level, have to do with the product delivered by the publishing company itself. For in addition to the data it provides for analysis – due to its claim to present what is best in the year 2000 – it functions as an entity that evaluates written works within the framework of United States literary culture. Thus the system of values that inform the judgment of the texts found in this volume can also be examined. Another reason for selecting a narrative from this publication is the fact that this story was published recently (2000), and is therefore contemporary. Because of this, it can be defined as participating in the present era when compared with certain texts published say, in the 1960s. The mindset and cultural milieu of the 1960s were quite different from the decades that followed. Texts like *Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas*, for example, now reek of the past by comparison with the publication to be analyzed below. The recit de voyage that is the object of study is, comparatively speaking, seamless in terms of continuity with the present historical moment. It is as if it had been published in this morning's edition of *The New York Times*. As the narrative under study is to be examined from the standpoint of ethics, using a text that is close to the present moment is important, for value systems change over time. Using a text that is contemporary makes the discussion relevant to present concerns. The narrative under study has been chosen for its having been judged (by the publication's process) as highest in its genre in terms of its quality of writing. As such, the work provides data that will make it possible to examine the system of values that provided the bases by which it was evaluated as outstanding and popular travel writing. It will therefore provide insights into the narrator and readership community in which it exists as a cultural artifact that has been classified as a good.

Rhetorical persuasion begins with the title of the series from which the story has been taken: *The Best American Travel Writing 2000*. Prior to examining the contents on the cover of this volume, I shall consider first a later volume from the year 2004 in order to demonstrate how the publishing company of this series utilizes *ethos* to persuade, which adds to the *ethos* value of both the narrative under study and author. The tactics are the same, but the later volume provides additional data which will make it possible to reveal how institutional *ethos* functions to build the *ethos* of the writers the publishing company showcases.

Implicit *sullogismoi* embedded in the text of the book cover blurbs in the volume published in 2004 that contribute to its *ethos*-based persuasion can be made explicit. Since the *Best American Series* makes the claim that the contents of the present volume are the very “best,” then the quality is assumed to be high. The basic argumentative assumption is that the editorial staff, whose criteria are believed or proven to be high in terms of standards, have made a selection from a number of texts and have compiled their selection into a single volume. We are already being persuaded, based on the *ethos* of the entity or institution *The Best American Series* that the story will be of high value in terms of its artistic or literary merit. When we turn to the back cover of this volume we encounter the following blurb:

Since its conception in 1915, the Best American Series has become the premier annual showcase for the country’s finest short fiction and nonfiction. For each volume, a series editor reads pieces from hundreds of periodicals, then selects between fifty and a hundred outstanding works. That selection is pared down to twenty or so very best pieces by a guest editor who is widely recognized as a leading writer in his or her field. This unique system has helped make the Best American series the most respected – and most popular – of its kind.

*The Best American Series* is providing proof using *ethos* that is established via *logos* of its credentials as an entity that provides high quality short fiction and nonfiction. The date 1915 is offered as a proof whose underlying *logos* can be expressed as follows: If a

publication has been in existence for a long time / Then it has high value. This represents the value time has in this context: the longer something good exists, the greater value this thing has as a good.<sup>123</sup> 1915, by American standards, is viewed as a very long time ago. If the common argument that the longer an institution has remained in business the greater worth/credibility/quality it has is effective, the *ethos* of the entity and its products increases and, as a result, its power to persuade.

The procedure for the selection of the texts that are chosen is then outlined on the cover. In the first step, we are informed that the series editor selects between fifty and a hundred outstanding works from hundreds of periodicals. Thus, in the first step, the following argument can be made explicit: Since an expert has selected outstanding works from many works (which cannot all be outstanding) / The quality of the works selected by the expert is very high. The second step in the process of selection is then described. That is, in order to guarantee even higher quality, another expert is brought in to decide on the outstanding works from the recently chosen few that is now a “many” from which even more excellence is obtained. That is, even among the fifty to a hundred outstanding works that were initially selected, only a few will stand out from that number. The guest editor, described as “a leading writer in his or her field,” is the designated expert for this task. The blurb then states that this “unique” twofold process has contributed to the company’s products’ becoming the most respected and most popular short fiction and nonfiction publication in its field. Even the term “unique” increases the *ethos* value of the publishing company by means of the same logic that only a very small number can be graded as the best. For if from the many a few outstanding are chosen and from the outstanding even fewer are chosen to be the best, if it is a single thing that stands in a class by itself, it must, following the same line of

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<sup>123</sup> An opposite argument can be made based on the amount of time something exists: Because X has been around for so many years, it is now old-fashioned or *démodé*. In either case, it is up to the audience to determine the truth value of the claim being made.



argument, be excellent also. The overall logic can be expressed as follows: Since an expert in short fiction and nonfiction has selected the outstanding from the many and afterwards yet another widely recognized expert writer has pared down even further what has been chosen in terms of excellence / The entity *The Best American Series* has established by means of this unique process a reputation that is both the most respected and most popular of its kind. This is the establishing of *ethos* through *logos*, where *ethos* holds the highest value in terms of persuasion with respect to the three *pisteis* Aristotle defines in his *Rhetoric*. The corresponding *pathos* that the reader experiences can be expressed as follows: *The Best American Series* has high *ethos* for having produced high quality and popular short fiction and nonfiction over several decades / Since the reader desires the best and the most popular / The reader feels pleasant anticipation as well as increased personal *ethos* through the expectation to participate in as well as through identification with the entity's claim to excellence.

The process of identification that occurs between the reader/purchaser in relation with excellence and popularity that takes place results in desire, a desire to be associated with excellence on the one hand and to be part of the crowd (of purchasers or appreciators of excellence) on the other. There is an obvious contradiction here, in that "popular" is a reference to "many," and, if the same standard of selection were to be applied to the readers/purchasers the contradiction could only be removed by using a label like "elitist," but this would doubtless go against the entity's aim of selling the highest number of volumes possible. For while a limited number of members of the community would wish to be classed as elitist, those who would be opposed to being classified in that way could be alienated. So the publishing house plays a very wily rhetorical game when it states that it delivers difficult to obtain excellence due to its being rare that has made it the most popular product of its kind. The question that arises

is that if excellence is, in the first case, based on a low number, how can excellence in the second case be based on a high number? But the reader/purchaser solves this apparent contradiction by reasoning that although the many see, for instance, McDonald's hamburgers as a good, this is not the same as the many seeing a Rolls Royce as a good. Sometimes the many are wrong (assuming the reader, contrary to popular opinion, views McDonald's hamburgers as an evil – this notion surfaces in the narrative under study), and sometimes the many are right – as is the case with Rolls Royce's. And so the *ethos* in relation with excellence and popularity functions nicely in the blurb, and increases its power of persuasion when arguing that the product delivered by the entity *The Best American Series* is both high quality and popular.

The *ethos* of the 2004 volume is increased further in the blurb on the back cover via the short bio provided of the in-house series editor: "Jason Wilson has written for the *Washington Post*, *Condé Nast Traveler*, *Travel & Leisure*, and *Salon.com*." These credentials provide added weight to the argument that the entity produces short fiction and nonfiction of the highest quality. The logic is that if Jason Wilson has worked for the above-mentioned high profile and high quality publishing entities, he is an editor that has criteria for selecting excellence which is backed up by his professional background and experience. His selection will thus be outstanding in terms of quality.

The same logical process is applicable to the short bio given for the guest editor: "Pico Iyer writes novels and essays and is also the author of several books of travel, among them *Video Night in Kathmandu*, *The Lady and the Monk*, *The Global Soul*, and *Sun After Dark*. He lives in suburban Japan." It goes without saying (among those in the know about contemporary travel writing) that Pico Iyer is a recognized and high-profile author that produces high quality work in his field. His having published several travel books is added proof of his credentials. The fact that he lives in suburban Japan

increases his *ethos* value even further, for this means he is a non-tourist, which is deemed a good in travel writing circles. Living in a country places one a notch above the already higher category of traveler. The fact that Iyer lives in another culture is a warrant for his being an expert on and insider of that culture, which can be opposed either to a traveler (which, although given high marks, is still an outsider) or a crass tourist. And as the post-modern stance is to view the Other with equanimity, the conclusion that the reader/purchaser draws based on the brief bio is that Iyer is the man for the job for deciding which works stand out from the selection made by Jason Wilson, series editor. The *pathos* that derives is trust and exhilaration. The logic on one plane is that if Pico Iyer, recognized expert in travel literature, has made a selection, then the selection must be outstanding – he is to be trusted. On the second plane, it is exhilarating, instructive, and entertaining to read outstanding nonfiction travel writing. If a reader buys/reads this volume, she will be exhilarated, entertained and instructed. All of this feels good. Feeling good is equated with happiness. The reader wants to feel good/happy, so she will read/purchase the volume, based on the *ethos* proofs encountered on the book's front and back cover.

Further *ethos* is derived from the following paragraph that appears on the back cover:

*The Best American Travel Writing 2004* transports readers from Patagonia to Ivory Coast to small-town Vermont. Readers are treated to skiing in Kashmir, horseback riding with gauchos, driving by car and truck across America, and rescuing gorillas in the heart of the Congo. This year's volume is edited by Pico Iyer, who writes in his fascinating introduction, "Restlessness is part of the American way. It's part of what brought many of the rest of us to America."

Just the word "travel" has high *ethos* power, due to connotations of romance and adventure. So, in the very first sentence of the blurb, the writers use connected terms as part of their rhetorical strategy. The signifier "transports" has enormous value on both a physical and imaginary plane. The slippage between concepts of physical and mental or

spiritual transport increases the series' value as a good, for to be transported from one's circumstances on an imaginary or spiritual plane stands as part of the system of values held by the community at which the text is aimed. Travel, transport, movement from one place to another – are goods that lead to happiness, well-being, *eudaimonia*. The reader can imagine having her desire of being carried away (“transport” has erotic or amorous overtones) from the humdrum albeit comfortable existence of her living room, or, on another level, from the trap in which she finds her very self caught, that is, the space enveloping her as a physical and sentient being: her body. The publisher's message: If you read this travel literature, you will be carried aloft, possibly even transmogrified (a post-modern term) on an internal journey of discovery, pleasure, and satisfaction. We have seen that Aristotle states that the speaker needs to present herself as possessing goodwill. To be an agent that professes capability of conveying the reader/consumer to such exhilarating states can be read as goodwill. In this way, the *ethos* of *The Best American Series* increases greatly, while its matter-of-fact tone when asserting that the series does transport its readers to places that are both far away and close to home makes the possibility of experiencing this good more plausible, more *persuasive*.

The entity's goodwill is also manifest in the term “treat.” For not only will the reader be transported, but she will experience a pleasurable boon on behalf of *The Best American Series*. To be able to say “What a treat!” is a good in American culture, and thus the use of this term imbues the publishing company with even higher *ethos*. The places listed that the reader will be treated to combine the exotic with the home country: Patagonia, Ivory Coast and small-town Vermont. In this case, even home is infused with exotic color. Finding one's own country exotic is an ironic concept that is given high value as a good among highly-educated/cultured readers. That *The Best American Series*

makes it possible to be transported to exotic places in one's own backyard also increases its *ethos* greatly in the view of this type of reader.

The blurb's use of the signifiers "America" and "American restlessness" in relation with other, more distant and exotic terrains also has enormous *ethos* power. Skiing in Kashmir is truly exotic, for very few Americans ever go to Kashmir, and even fewer ski there. Horseback riding with gauchos exploits the traveler vs. tourist paradigm: a typical American tourist would most likely just take pictures of the "quaint" gauchos on horseback, only to rush back to a five-star restaurant for an enormous slab of Argentinian beef and an evening in the hotel's hot-tub. In this case, the *ethos* value generated by the exotic and unusual nature of the trips being described is an appeal to the desire on the readers' part to be among those who wish to participate in activities that stand as a class apart. That is, as those who appreciate things and activities that the "collective mass of humanity" does not ordinarily value. In other words, the publishing company is increasing its *ethos* through an appeal to a select few – a tactic which is a powerful and highly persuasive tool.

After Kashmir and Argentina, the next treat referred to repeats the motif of eroticizing of the homeland: driving by car and truck across America. This type of journey reverberates strongly with the Beat generation's sojourns that Kerouac immortalized in his *On the Road* (see below) as well as Route 66, the consecrated path on which the true American road trip transpires. And this driving experience, this vicarious transport the readers are treated to is not only done in a car but in a truck as well. In this way the *ethos* of *The Best American Series* increases even further, for the signifier "truck" suggests the rough-and-ready, the down-and-dirty, the All-American way of rambling aimlessly across the country's vast and wide-open spaces. Traveling in a truck is far more romantic than a car, for some of the passengers may be riding in the

back, the wind blowing in their hair, their cares and caution having been thrown to the wind. That *The Best American Series* offers such a treat identifies it as a benefactor that provides a good that appeals to the vast majority of Americans.

The blurb does not stop there, however. It ends in a crescendo that outdoes the emblematic road trip across the U.S.A.: rescuing gorillas in the heart of the Congo. The allusion to Conrad's novel is blatant and effective, yet it is not linked to violence. The appeal that rescuing the poor mountain gorillas holds is huge, for it speaks to those readers who are environmentally concerned. This treat, which is at once exotic, romantic and politically correct, stands as an enormous good provided by the benefactor *The Best American Series*, which in so doing adds further to its power of persuasion through *ethos*.

The use of the term restlessness can now be explored in greater depth. The power of abstract concepts cannot be underestimated, and Pico Iyer's exploitation of this term in the passage cited above to increase his own *ethos* and that of *The Best American Series* is magisterial in terms of its rhetorical strategy. Iyer states that this intangible good, restlessness, is part of the American way. This term resonates powerfully in the American system of values in both music and literature. For instance, bluesman Fred McDowell's "You Gotta Move," was popularized by the Rolling Stones in 1971: "You got to move, child / You got to move / But when the Lord get ready / You got to move." The religious overtones of the lyrics mesh nicely with and reverberate profoundly with the themes of not staying in one place: the pervasive restlessness in the American consciousness. Movement as a good is linked to physical, political and religious/spiritual freedom that goes back to the earliest memory of U.S. history – the Puritans' flight from England instantiating the starting point. In this blues song, it would appear that even God is restless in the American imaginarium, or, in any

case, keeps his children on their toes, commanding readiness to move at any moment. It is impossible to keep still under such terms, which, whether classified as a categorical, as opposed to hypothetical imperative,<sup>124</sup> stands as an unquestioned good in American culture.

The lyrics of the Allman Brothers' "Ramblin Man" also reveal the importance of the term restlessness in the American psyche and system of values: "Lord I was born a rambling man / Tryin' to make a livin' and doin' the best I can." In this song the theme of surviving to the best of one's ability linked with restless movement surfaces, as well as the innate inquietude Americans perceive themselves as possessing, for they imagine themselves as having come into the world already in transit, as being born on the run: "I was born in the backseat of a Greyhound bus / Cause I was born a rambling man." The themes of religion, non-stop movement and survival – all of which form part of the American mindset – permeate this song that became a top ten single in 1971.

In literature, Jack Kerouac's novel *On the Road* details the exploits of Sal Paradise and Dean Moriarty as they travel together on spontaneous journeys across the American continent. Both characters can be defined by their restlessness, their inability to stay in one place. Their restlessness is, in part, the result of an overpowering urge to experience life to the fullest and wildest. So when Iyer states that restlessness is part of the American way, he is striking a powerful chord in the American consciousness. And when he then connects it to immigrants who have come to the United States because of their restlessness, he is stating quite directly that America is a haven for those who are restless, and that restlessness is a good for those who come to and are born in America. Restlessness is a good which functions as a catalyst for travel, which has the benefit of allowing one to live life to the utmost and "discover what's out there." *The Best*

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<sup>124</sup> See Mackie, chapter 1.

*American Series* promises that this intangible good will be delivered to the reader when it rounds off the citations from Iyer's introduction as follows: "*The Best American Travel Writing 2004* displays American restlessness at its most tantalizing and entertaining." Here we have the *pathos* component of the rhetorical transaction that is taking place on the front and back cover of this volume. The logic is this: *The Best American Series* provides, using its expertise, exotic treats which will transport the reader who will, as a result, be tantalized and entertained. These two terms are blatant emotional appeals. The expectation of being tantalized (a somewhat illicit form of pleasure in that it has sado-masochistic overtones) and entertained constitute goods that promise that the reader will be thrilled if he reads the stories contained in *The Best American Series*. This use of *pathos* combines with the already high *ethos* established in the blurb to persuade the reader that buying and reading the publishing company's products will lead to well-being on several planes: intellectual, emotional and psychological. For the reader will, upon consuming the product, enhance his knowledge, will experience pleasant emotional states, and will feel better about himself as an individual for having consumed what has been identified by two authorities as outstanding literature. All of these benefits are promises to enhance the reader's *eudaimonia*, well-being.

*The Best American Travel Writing 2004* has been examined prior to the edition of the same series in which the narrative to be analyzed appears because it uses multiple rhetorical devices that attempt to persuade the reader of the quality of its contents as well as the quality of the experience the reader will obtain if she reads them. However, even though the number of devices used in *The Best American Travel Writing 2000* is lower, they still have high impact. On the front cover in bold capital letters appears the name of the most popular American travel writer in the twentieth century: Bill Bryson.



The appeal that Bryson's name has in terms of *ethos* is huge, much greater than that of Pico Iyer. It is perhaps for this reason that no front or back cover blurb appears on this edition of the series. Bill Bryson's name speaks for itself, and, in this way, provides argumentative rhetorical proof that the contents are of the highest quality. The logic is: If Bill Bryson, a high-profile travel writer, is the editor / The contents must also be high quality. Underneath Bryson's name appears the series editor, Jason Wilson, but his name does not have the same clout on a popular level as Bryson's. Wilson's name, however, does have *ethos* weight within the readership that consumes travel writing.

On the back cover, the titles of all the entries are listed with their respective authors. Although many of the writers have established reputations, two stand out more than the others in terms of reputation: Ryszard Kapuscinski and William T. Vollmann. Both of these authors, due to their reputation, bring high *ethos* to this volume in terms of quality. Although the appearance of Bryson's name would have been sufficient to imbue the volume with high *ethos*, the two additional authors add even more.

In the forward to *The Best American Travel Writing 2000*, Jason Wilson plays the advocate for travel writing, arguing that it is through this medium that we shatter reductive stereotypes by experiencing the particular:

Having a travel writer report on particular things, small things, the specific ways in which people act and interact, is perhaps our best way of getting beyond the clichés that we tell each other about different places and cultures, and about ourselves (xii).

He takes his argument further by quoting Pico Iyer: "Travel is the best way we have of rescuing the humanity of places, and saving them from abstraction or ideology" (xii). Wilson and Iyer are arguing here for the uniqueness of the particular, which cannot necessarily be subsumed by ideology, grand narratives or reductive universals. The particular must be taken and judged on its own terms, not on those of homogenizing conceptual frameworks. This perspective resonates deeply with those who identify with

post-modern ideology, and has a powerful effect in terms of both *pathos* and *ethos*.

Wilson, along these lines and in defense of the particular, even calls globalization a mega-myth:

Abstraction is what has given rise to one of the biggest myths going: the supposed “globalization” of the world. The idea that we all share one insidious monoculture. That very soon the world will all be the same. . . Just because our American pop culture has spread like a virus doesn’t mean the world is suddenly turning monochromatic. Look closely at the specific ways in which various cultures adopt American icons and ideas and see how quickly your notion of globalization becomes confounded (xii).

The arguments in Wilson’s forward present travel writing as a cure to fears we might have of cultures’ losing their identity through the globalization process. He thus increases the *ethos* of the showcased writers as providers of yet another good: knowledge that the uniqueness of the Other is intact, and, by extension, the reader’s also. Both the practice and effects of travel writing are presented as a good in this argument, which can be added to the other goods obtained through reading the works selected by the publishing company’s staff discussed above.

These rhetorical strategies are picked up by Bill Bryson, in his introduction to this edition. He bemoans the previous absence of interest for travel writing in the United States, while assuring the reader that that situation has changed. Travel writing has become as big in the U.S as in other countries. This is an argument from popularity that starts as follows: Travel writing has been important in European countries (particularly Britain), therefore it has high value / It is currently gaining importance in the U.S. / Therefore, we Americans are finally waking up to the fact that travel writing has high value. The appeal to popularity here is obvious, and functions as a proof based on *ethos*. That is, if Europeans who are known for recognizing quality appreciate travel writing, it must be good. Bryson continues in this vein, by linking the interest of Europeans in travel writing to journalists:

As the pages that follow amply demonstrate, many of the sharpest minds and freshest voices in journalism are drawn to foreign subjects these days – increasingly (and encouragingly) to places far beyond the trampled paths of tourism (xxi).

This interest on the part of many of the sharpest minds and freshest voices in journalism gives credence based on *ethos* that the stories contained in the volume will be of the highest quality. The reference to the tourist/traveler dichotomy is an appeal to the value system of the readership, which will generally view tourists as blame, rather than praiseworthy. This reference increases via *ethos* the value of the texts contained within the edition as a high quality good.

At the end of his introduction, Bryson describes what, in his estimation, goes into good travel writing. Discomfort and dislocation – not the comfort of a well-beaten path – contribute to great revelations and adventure. Thus taking adversity and turning it to one's advantage is presented as a good that some of the stories are characterized by. One does not need to travel far in order to produce good travel writing, "You just have to be able to see things in a different way" (xxvi). This is the idea that traveling in one's own back yard with a fresh perspective can yield benefits. "Seeing things with new eyes" is a highly valued good for the community of readers he is addressing. Finally, Bryson writes that the stories in the 2000 edition all share one quality: "a penetrating curiosity, an almost compulsive desire to experience and try to understand the world at some unfamiliar level" (xxvi). The curiosity to learn and to better understand the world in different ways are qualities that are revered by "highly educated and cultured" readers in the U.S., and, since Bryson affirms that that is precisely what all of the articles in *The Best American Series* have as a quality, the reader will be able to participate in that good which can be defined as a desire to seek new knowledge. The value placed on knowledge for *The Best American Series*' readership cannot be underestimated, and the possibility to obtain such knowledge by reading the articles

Bryson is promoting functions as an *ethos* proof aimed at persuading the readers that the activity that they are about to engage in is of high value. Bryson rounds off his discussion as follows:

The fact is, of course, that there is an amazing world out there – full of interesting, delightful, unexpected, extraordinary stuff that most of us know little about and consider much too seldom. Turn the page and I promise you will begin to see what I mean (xxvii).

This is Bill Bryson speaking, the best known American travel writer of the twentieth century. As he is an unquestioned authority on travel and travel writing, his words, it is assumed, are true. Due to his high *ethos* power, Bryson's capacity to persuade the reader that he will now experience part of the amazing world out there and its interesting, delightful, unexpected and extraordinary stuff, is great.

We can now turn the analysis of the *recit de voyage* selected for this dissertation: "Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler" by David Lansing.

The title itself has rhetorical force. The term confessions is a term both religious and judicial that is permeated with serious overtones: crimes committed against other individuals, God and the state must be confessed and either punished or forgiven. Further, the term confession is linked to one of the three autobiographical genres: confession, apology and memoir.<sup>125</sup> The "highly educated and cultured reader" will, therefore, based on the title of the *recit de voyage* under study, immediately place the text within the genre of autobiography.<sup>126</sup> One tells the truth about oneself when one writes an autobiographical confession, and "comes clean" in the process by revealing the ugly truth behind the façade of one's life. The motive underlying a confession counts as a virtue – that is, to play fair with those who have been beguiled with the confessor's previously deceptive appearances. Thus the term confession has serious overtones. The term in the title confession stands in parallel with the term smuggler

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<sup>125</sup> See Goodwin, James.

<sup>126</sup> For a discussion on the definition of the term "autobiography," see Durán Giménez Rico.

which, although informal, nevertheless falls in the sphere of criminal behavior. The initial connotations of the term smuggler are thus also serious. The gravity of these two terms is, however, turned on its head in the title itself by the term by the term cheese. This is because, as a rule, the types of goods that are generally designated as contraband are, for instance, narcotics, arms, precious gems – *not* cheese. The title, due to the narrator's having juxtaposed the three terms in a prepositional phrase, will be interpreted by "highly educated and cultured readers" as ironic, as heavy with comic overtones. This is seriousness which is not to be taken seriously, and the *recit de voyage*, is, therefore, categorized as a spoof even before the story begins. We can now make explicit the implicit *logoi* that imbue the title with rhetorical force.

One possible reading of the implicit *sylogismoi* is the following: The genre confession is normally about serious topics / Due to the juxtaposition of serious terms with a term that, in this context, cannot be interpreted as serious / The story that follows is therefore to be taken as playful and humorous. Once we accept this as a possible implicit argument made explicit from the standpoint of *logos*, the following chain of reasoning obtains with regards to *ethos*: Cheese smuggling is unusual. A confession about cheese smuggling is even more unusual / Since this story is ironic, humorous and playful due to its title, and further, since the topic is unusual / The writer/narrator is therefore, from the standpoint of the system of values of a "highly educated and cultured readership," highly clever. That is, the writer thus far is delivering what the blurb and Bill Bryson's introduction have promised. Since the writer is clever on a sophisticated level, the reader can expect to be entertained intelligently. So we see that the writer/narrator has, using only five words in his title, created the *ethos* of an intelligent and entertaining storyteller. It is also possible to add the term creative to this list of positive attributes, because to put such contrary notions in the same title

demonstrates this quality, which is a good that ranks among the highest in the value system of the readership. Because of this, the highly educated and cultured reader will, in the act of reading, give the narrator a favorable evaluation in terms of the *ethos* contained in the title alone. This positive *ethos* wins the reader over, with the simultaneous and corresponding *pathos*. That is, the *logos* and *ethos* of the title discussed above produce amusement in the reader. Perhaps the reader will even smile or laugh ironically at the title. Aristotle states in the *Rhetoric* that a person does not see the same event the same when happy or sad, so the narrator in this case, having made the reader laugh (together with appreciation due to the writer's cleverness, sophistication and creativity) has prepared the reader psychologically to view what is to follow not only with a smile, but, from the very start, feelings of approval for the self-declared criminal.<sup>127</sup> The defendant has already gained his readership's sympathy. This means that the initial judgment on the character of the narrator – who is the agent and is, therefore, responsible for the actions that are to be detailed – will, for the moment, be favorable. So far, the narrator is preparing his readers with a view to reaching his goal: to be cherished and appreciated for both who he is and for his ability as a writer before the court of readers he is pleading to. Obviously, this reading is based on a readership defined as “highly educated and cultured.” It is a construct that holds parallels with the judge in Apuleius' case discussed in Part 2. Another reader could very well obtain a radically different reading and evaluation. Take, for example, a reader who has not done university coursework and who either does not get or does not appreciate irony. The response to the title would not be positive, for this reader would argue as follows, based on the same text: Confessions are supposed to be serious. Cheese smugglers do not normally exist / This story is, therefore, not serious, and mocks serious institutions (i.e.,

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<sup>127</sup> On humor in rhetoric, see Rabbie.

religious and legal) / Since this story is not serious and mocks sacred institutions, it is not good. In fact, it is evil / Therefore, this story should not be read and should perhaps be banned. This reader, who is less educated (by academic standards), wants a *real* story about *real* criminals smuggling *real* contraband with *real* consequences and does not want an ironic spoof that attacks institutions held sacred in the system of values of the community in which he participates, because to do so is neither moral nor normal by his standards. Because this story is neither moral nor normal, the “less educated” or “unsophisticated” reader would not even bother to read the story, as he will not have been won over by the cleverness in the title but will have, instead and from the very start, given the narrator a negative evaluation. This reader, put off by the title, passes judgment and condemns both the *recit de voyage* and the narrator as an evil, as blameworthy, based on his system of values.

This negative evaluation stands in contrast with the classification of the written work as “best” by the publication in which it appears. And this evaluation has truth and value based on the framework within which it operates. It thus stands as one of many other possible responses to the text under study, thereby demonstrating the complexity of making judgments based on values in the first place. The possibility of alternative evaluations also functions as a reminder to the “highly educated and cultured reader” that other viewpoints are in existence and perhaps merit consideration.

For the moment, however, the focus of our discussion is the reaction obtained from the construct “highly educated and cultured readership.” Lansing’s having made the readers from this construct smile from the beginning with the title is powerful rhetorical strategy. His title also shows promise of treating the reader to something good, of the reader’s being delighted with unexpected stuff, as promised by Bryson in the introduction. But this is only the title, and the narrator, who has set very high

standards for himself, must now prove, if his *ethos* is to remain high in this rhetorical transaction, that he can continue in the same vein. That is, since the title is high quality, the question that surfaces in the reader's mind is: Will Lansing continue to deliver what he has delivered so far? The story then begins:

Elaine has done me a favor. A huge favor. As the public relations account executive for a major European hotel chain, she's managed to arrange several nights accommodation for my wife and me at a very swanky establishment in Paris, the Hôtel Lutétia. During the high season, mind you (128).

In this paragraph the narrator/protagonist/agent begins his story *in media res*, and informs the reader that he has received an enormous favor from "Elaine," a high level executive. The favor is several nights' accommodation in Paris at a luxury hotel. Were this not already a big enough favor, the fact that Elaine has arranged things during the high season makes it all the more significant in terms of its weight. But so far we have only been informed of the *what* of the story. That is, Elaine has done the narrator an enormous favor. And so, in the reader's mind a series of *why* questions will arise, as well as certain hypothetical reasons that answer the same questions. The first and most important question is related to her motives: "Why would she do a thing like that?" And the possible reasons that arise are, "She must be a really good friend," or "Maybe she likes doing people favors for the fun of it," or "Maybe she's paying back a favor." Since this is a story and therefore necessarily has a plot, the first possible reason, that is, Elaine's being a good friend, will not make for good story-telling on its own: My friend did me a huge favor because she's a nice person, let me tell you what a nice person she is..... the end. This is a boring story, if it is a story. So, the highly educated reader thinks, "Okay, perhaps she is a good friend, but she must be doing that favor for a reason. What's the hitch? Nobody does a favor like that for free. Elaine must want a favor in return." This formula makes for good story telling, because it allows for her to ask for another big favor in return, and this big favor could involve complications for



the narrator. Based on this assumption, the following implicit reasoning (*logos*) can be made explicit: If someone does a favor / A favor in return and in kind can be expected. If the favor is big, the return favor will most likely also be big. This equation, a favor done deserves a favor returned in kind, leads the reader immediately to the ethics of the favor being done and its being repaid. Questions such as the following surface immediately in the reader's mind: "Was the initial favor legitimate?" and "What kind of person is Elaine? Is she a(n) good/bad/crazy/honorable/and so on person?" These questions, which are just like those questions asked about Gass' example that was provided earlier on, provide the wanted details that add to the plot and which, as Ricoeur would argue, are necessarily woven into the poetic act of story-telling. That is, ethics and poetics cannot be separated. Similar questions arise about the narrator: "What is his relationship to this woman Elaine?" and "Will he honor the moral code that underlies the dictum "If-you-scratch-my-back-I'll-scratch-yours"?" That is, "Will the narrator, once he is asked for a favor in return, do the right thing and return the favor?" All of these questions stand as a framework for seeking details about the case at hand, with a view to defining it in terms of what has happened, who has acted, and, most importantly, what motives underlay the actions carried out. Ricoeur's narrative equation, X did Y in such and such circumstance provides the basic focus for inquiry, as in the first narrative examined in this section.

The narrator, because he is – at least in the view of the editors of *The Best American Series* – one of the best travel writers for the year 2000, certainly knows that these questions must be answered, and that his reputation is at stake. He must convince the readers that his character, his *ethos*, is good in the sense explored by Halliwell as discussed in Part 2 Chapter 7 above. That is, he must persuade his readers that he is

attempting to achieve laudable aims, that his motives are good – *from the standpoint of his readers' system of values*.

And, in fact, the narrator has been working hard at creating high *ethos* in the excerpt above, on several levels. One way he does so is through his tone. He speaks directly to the reader as if she were right in front of him and as if she were an intimate friend. Lansing's tone is matter-of-fact, straightforward – not aloof. This builds *ethos* and creates a feeling of camaraderie at the *pathos* level. When he uses the very informal (thus amicable) expression, “mind you,” it is as if he were putting his hand on the reader's shoulder while telling her his tale. This draws the reader in even further, in terms of closeness, which is deft use of *pathos*.

The narrator's use of the term “swanky” is also shrewd use of rhetoric on the lexical level. Swanky is a term that is out-of-register for the one the narrator has used to describe the hotel. The terms he uses prior all fit within what could be called terms and phrases found in newspaper or magazine journalese: “public relations account executive,” “major European hotel chain,” “managed to arrange several nights' accommodation,” “establishment in Paris,” “the high season.” All of these expressions fit together nicely in terms of tone and register, and so when the narrator utilizes the term “swanky,” he is giving his reader a wink, and undermining just a bit the – by comparison – elevated register that he has been using. Because the reader knows that the narrator has intentionally used this term, she knows that this writer is in absolute control of his language on the one hand, and, as he is continuing to use the ironic, somewhat flippant tone established in the title, the highly educated and cultured reader knows that Lansing is in control of his tone as well. Further, to call the Parisian Hôtel Lutétia “very swanky” will make an American reader laugh, because of the national inferiority complex that many “highly educated and cultured” Americans have with

respect to the French. To use an unsophisticated term for the group of people that are considered by many – and most of all by themselves – to be the most sophisticated humans on earth will bring a wry and vindictive smile to the face of the red-blooded American highly educated and cultured reader.<sup>128</sup> Revenge is sweet and we must remember that the cultural underdog, in this case the American literati, have their pride, too. Paris with its museums and boulangeries is a fabulous and grand old place to visit, the “highly educated and cultured” American will say defensively, but give me New York with its Central Park and a hot dog with “da woiks” any day. So, the narrator, by making the reader laugh derisively by taking a stab at a nation that considers itself culturally superior, but which is, as every American will proudly assert, politically inferior (in terms of economic and military might), has further disarmed his reader with humor, which, as we have seen, rhetoricians of antiquity recommend in their works on the subject. Thus, the narrator continues to gain in terms of *ethos*. That is, the reader who gets the narrator’s irony every step of the way is persuaded that, so far, the latter is a clever and funny writer worth listening to. The *ethos* transferred by Wilson’s and Bryson’s introductory remarks combines with the *ethos* that the narrator is creating from the body of the text, which is in line with Aristotle’s recommendations on this proof. The narrator continues:

“Darling”—that’s Elaine talking, not my wife; Elaine is very continental and always calls me darling—“Darling, you’re a very lucky man. The Lutétia is *très chic*.”

Elaine is from Los Angeles but she can get away with nonsense like this because she’s married to a Parisian, though I doubt if her husband has ever said “*très chic*” in his life.

Anyway, I’m indebted. “Sweetheart,” I say to her (these silly endearments are a game we play), “what can I bring you back from the City of Light? Foie gras from Fauchon? A lacquered tray from Palladio? Tell me, *mon petit écureuil*, what do you desire?”

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<sup>128</sup> For an interesting discussion on Cicero’s use of similar techniques of language and style, see Ramsey.

Elaine does a little trilling laugh over the phone that she knows drives me crazy. “*Rien, rien, rien,*” she says. And then she pauses. “Unless....”

Ah hah! I think. Payback time. “Yes?” (128)

In this section of the narrative, the narrator answers the questions that arose in the previous section. He begins to give details about Elaine. She is from Los Angeles, and uses what the narrator calls nonsensical French expressions not even her French husband would use. By describing her in this way he undermines the way he has described her previously, that is, as continental. In this way, he is painting a picture of her as a person with the following implicit *logos*: Elaine is from Los Angeles but, because she is very continental, uses the term darling. However, she also uses French terms which not even her French husband would use / Therefore, Elaine is a bit (if not very) pretentious. The fact that the narrator delivers this evaluation of Elaine increases his *ethos*, because, in line with the attack he has made against the French earlier, he is attacking Elaine for being a Franco-monger. This sort of attack would sit well with certain “highly educated and cultured” American readers, who, although they might hold French culture in very high regard, would consider it poor taste to put on airs using expressions like *très chic*. Again, the average red-blooded American with a Liberal Arts degree or who is well-read has her pride, and might even speak and read French fluently, but to intersperse French expressions in the way Elaine does would be tacky. (Behavior carried out in poor taste is an offence in the system of values held by the readership construct that is being articulated in the present analysis.) Although the narrator does hold Elaine in very high regard (on several levels) he nevertheless, at the same time, presents her as somewhat pretentious and a bit superficial. The *logos* of this character description can be stated as follows: Pretentious people lack integrity / Elaine is pretentious / Thus, Elaine lacks integrity, is false, not authentic. The highly educated

and cultured reader values integrity and authenticity, both of which are goods in the system of values that provide the basis for his having depicted her negatively. Categorizing Elaine in this way is crucial for the overall evaluation of both her and the narrator, for her pretentiousness provides a contrast with which to compare the narrator's sincerity with his readers and, as will be seen when he is dealing with his wife – insincerity. Whether his insincerity is justifiable or pardonable is a matter for the judges in his readership to decide, once he has pleaded his case.

When the narrator says, “Anyway, I’m indebted,” he is letting his reader know that although he thinks she is a bit false, he is going to ignore that about her and, respecting and adhering to the terms held sacrosanct with respect to favors, asks what he can do for her. His holding to the terms that regulate doing and responding to favors in kind reveal his character: he has integrity, which is a highly valued good in the system of values held by his readers.

The narrator does not define the relationship with a specific term (i.e., friend, lover, ex work-colleague), but based on the conversation that he repeats it becomes apparent that they are close. She calls him darling and he calls her sweetheart, which he, in order to dispel any suspicion on the reader's part of infidelity or of their directly devaluing the relationship that each is involved in (i.e., marriage), claims that the terms of endearment “darling” and “sweetheart” are “silly” and part of a game they play. The reason he does this is to counteract the conclusions of the following reasoning, based on everyday ethics: One should only call one's partner, spouse, lover, wife, husband, significant other and so on “darling” and/or “sweetheart” in earnest / Both Elaine and the narrator are married, thus they should not be using the terms “darling” or “sweetheart” with each other in earnest / Since they are not using these terms in earnest, they are not transgressing the code expressed in the first sentence of this argument. The

conclusion that the reader arrives at is since Elaine and the narrator are not in fact and deed transgressing the code, but are playing an ironic game, that is, calling each other “darling” and “sweetheart” knowing full well that they are playfully breaking societal rules connected with these terms, they demonstrate the capacity to recognize a rule and to play with it. To do so is ironic sophistication, and to be ironically sophisticated is, as a norm, given high value in the system of values of the “highly educated and cultured readership,” whose members recognize and appreciate outstanding literature. So, the narrator increases his *ethos* because he is being clever and a bit devilish at the same time. Highly educated readers find devils endearing – especially playful, ironic and rule-breaking devils who are not doing much, if any, harm at all. *Pathos* is at work here in the narrative. At the same time, although Elaine is perhaps a bit silly because she is a fake, she nevertheless gains in *ethos* status because she is the narrator’s playmate in the sophisticated language game they play. The narrator’s *ethos* also increases here, because he sees the societal rules that “highly educated and cultured readers” know are societal constructs that, in other circumstances, would have no value. His playful scoffing at the rules endears the reader to him via *pathos*, and aids him in presenting himself as a “good” and, at the same time, quite complex, person. The fact that he is giving the reader the details in what appears as frank honesty, along with his offer to make good on the favor-for-a-favor pact, also increases his *ethos*. Ironically, when he later undermines his own credibility, his *ethos* as perceived by the audience of highly educated readers that he making his plea to, increases even further, as the analysis will reveal.

As the story continues the circumstances in which the narrator acts becomes more complex, for the things he says cast doubt on the statements he has just made. That is, doubt enters with respect to their game playing. First, he calls Elaine *mon petit*

écureuil, a noun-phrase even “highly educated and cultured readers” might have to look up in their French-English dictionary. And they will, because they pride themselves on looking up words they do not know in order to increase their knowledge of other languages, in this case French (this is also a highly valued good, especially among students of English literature – French not only has huge *ethos* allure but sex-appeal as well). The term écureuil (squirrel) is a term of endearment in French. In English, however, the term squirrel has very different connotations, especially when referring to women. On one level, the term squirrel in English, especially when referring to a woman (i.e., a squirrely girl), does not have positive connotations. Instead, squirrely can be equated with nervousness and a lack of seriousness. Since the narrator has already poked fun at her pretentiousness with respect to her use of French when speaking English, we might assume that he is making inferences from English usage. The implicit *logos* is the following: The term squirrel, when applied to a woman, indicates a lack of seriousness / The narrator calls Elaine a squirrel / Thus, Elaine is not to be taken seriously. There is yet another possible level: squirrel as rodent. The implicit *logos* can be expressed explicitly as follows: Rodents are foul / The narrator has called Elaine a rodent / Therefore, Elaine is (on some level) foul. Perhaps she is not the most ethical person, and perhaps the game they are playing is not either.

When the narrator offers to do a favor in return and uses the term “desire,” there are sexual overtones. This idea is backed up with what follows in the narrative. After he asks Elaine what she desires, she makes a little trilling laugh that he states she knows drives him crazy. The term trilling has unambiguous sexual overtones, and we can see here the rhetoric of desire in action in the text on another level, between the characters in the text. Elaine is effectively using her sex to persuade the narrator to do what she wants. She switches to French: rien, rien, rien, she says. Nothing, nothing, nothing.

This, as we shall see, is the use of logical irony – that is, calling something its opposite. For the “nothing” that Elaine requests, as the “highly educated and cultured reader” will guess, will not be nothing at all. She then pauses (itself a rhetorical and musical device, which functions to create tension and imbues what follows the silence with greater impact) and says, “Unless . . .” And here, both the reader and narrator are thinking the same thing. This is the narrative device that is known as Chekov’s gun. That is, Chekov stated that if there is a gun on a table in chapter one, someone must die by chapter three. In Lansing’s narrative, the reader witnesses Elaine offering the narrator a huge favor, knowing full well that later she will ask for a favor in kind. And that is precisely what happens at this point in the story. The narrator, true to form (that is, he continues dropping occasional low register lexical items in the framework of a high-level and sophisticated register – always in perfect control) says: “Aha! I think. Payback time.” The narrator’s having used the low-register term payback further increases his *ethos*. He continues to present himself as a cool, down-and-dirty but sophisticated literato, who is both bookwise and streetsmart. The “highly educated and cultured” American readership being articulated in this analysis aspires to this level of cool sophistication – an abstract notion of great worth in the readership’s value system. They want to be bookish, but they do not want to be nerds. If push comes to shove, they like to think that they can slug it out or slum it with the best of them, but, at the same time, imagine that they are capable of holding their own when dining with aristocrats. Lansing appeals to his readership’s system of values, which mirrors what Trigg calls a “trickle-round model” of cultural capital as defined by Bourdieu:

Bourdieu introduces the concept of cultural capital in order to interpret individual tastes as an accumulated stock of knowledge. Individuals adopt strategic strategies that enable them to acquire the required cultural capital to secure particular positions in the social hierarchy. In taking this approach to taste formation, Bourdieu is able to show that there can be feedback of tastes from the bottom to the top of the social ladder. The upper classes sometimes adopt the tastes of those



at the bottom of the social ladder in order to outflank members of the aspiring middle class who find it difficult to compete due to insufficient stocks of cultural capital. In contrast to the restrictive trickle-down model a more general trickle-round model is suggested by Bourdieu's approach (Trigg, 113).

Lansing, solidly middle or perhaps upper-middle class, adopts a variety of positions, moving up and down the social ladder with aplomb. In this way he utilizes the cultural capital he possesses to secure a position with his readership on the level of *ethos*. His strategy is brought into high relief through his use of the term "payback." The term payback has currency among African Americans who are, by definition in the cultural framework of the United States, the final and absolute standard of cool. The term cool in its popular meaning has its origins in the African American ghetto – black Americans are the manifestation of this abstract notion which is imitated by non-blacks in the United States and by vast numbers of people from other cultures around the world. To be cool is one of the highest goods of Americans in general, and Americans that are "highly educated and cultured" in particular. So by using the term "payback," the narrator increases his *ethos* through identification with black American culture and, on the level of *pathos*, creates a feeling of admiration in his audience.<sup>129</sup>

Elaine repeats that what she is asking for is not important, and, at the same time, provides the narrator an opportunity to escape from his duty of returning the favor by suggesting that it would be too much trouble for him. She states: "No, nothing. It would be an inconvenience." In his response, he continues with the flirtatious game they are playing, using yet another term of endearment and repeating the term desire: "Tell me, my little ferret. What do you desire?"

His use of the term desire is repetition of the motif that has been occurring in his conversation with her, the framework of which is playful *eros*. He also repeats the use

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<sup>129</sup> The importance of this term in black American (and American popular) culture is evidenced by James Brown's hit "The Payback."

of an animal as pet name when he refers to her. This time, however, the language is not French but English: my little ferret. The connotations of the term ferret are not usually positive. Ferrets stink, they bite, they are nervous little animals that cannot sit still. The etymology of ferret is also negative, for *furittus* in Vulgar Latin means “little thief.” At the same time, ferrets are affectionate animals that are often kept as pets. Elaine, it seems, possesses similar attributes – that is, she has positive characteristics – which can be seen in that she and the narrator are quite affectionate with each other. In spite of this, however, the use of the term ferret as a term of endearment is unusual, and, if we consider the fact that ferrets are members of the weasel family, the negative connotations are even greater. If the term weasel is used in reference to a person, they are classed as untrustworthy. Thus, the implicit *logos* that can be expressed with respect to Elaine is the following: The term ferret has blameworthy connotations: nervous, untrustworthy, and, at the same time, affectionate / The narrator calls Elaine a ferret / Thus, Elaine is, in his opinion, untrustworthy and affectionate. As the student of literature will immediately be aware, this is the Chekovian narrative technique referred to above in operation once again. The narrative tension created by the question “Why is he calling her *écureuil* and ferret?” will be released later on in the text of the narrative. For the moment, Elaine, in question form, asks for some French cheese. At this point, part of the narrative tension created by the first question posed in the narrative (i.e., What favor will Elaine ask in return?) is released. The other parts of the narrative tension – that is, the answers to the questions 1) What will the favor *in kind* Elaine is asking for really be and 2) Why does he use terms of endearment that connote negative qualities – will be answered towards the end of the narrative when the fact that she has done an enormous favor in order to get an even bigger favor in return on the one hand and that she is rather devious on the other is revealed as the events of the narrative pan

out. For it will be discovered that Elaine has asked him to bring back an illegal substance from Paris: unpasteurized cheese. For the moment, the favor she asks for appears to be innocuous, although the fact that Elaine is downplaying the importance of her favor in both French and English functions as foreshadowing for its enormity due to its being the criminal offence referred to in the title: smuggling.

The narrator, bowled over by her erotic language games and coyness, takes the bait: “That’s it?” He says. The phrasing of this interrogative reveals the narrator’s naiveté and contributes to the irony: what he believes at the beginning of the narrative to be “nothing” will turn out to be its complete opposite. His response to her request is comic and, at the same time, is further evidence of his ingenuousness in the face of what will later be revealed as her deviousness:

That’s it? I’m going to Paris and she wants a wedge of *fromage*? Meaning to be generous, I suggest something special. “Pepper roll, perhaps? Cranberry-flavored *Neufchâtel*?” (128)

His naiveté will earn him *ethos* points for to be innocent is endearing to the readership that is being articulated in our analysis. We have seen in the presentation of the approach that all virtues can be expressed as vices but, due to his having befriended and charmed the reader, the possibility of his being called a fool (for being too naïve) is null. His weakness works on the level of *pathos* to enchant his audience. His use of French further endears him to his readers, for his language use is masterly in terms of its comic effect, in the juxtaposition of *fromage* with the English word *wedge*. *Wedge* has base connotations – especially if we compare this term with a comparable term, *slice*. The yoking of *fromage* with its connotations of high culture merely due to its being a French word is high comic irony. Lansing’s cleverness further increases – due to his sophistication and control of language and culture – his *ethos*. The humor-based *pathos* also continues to work as a proof in the narrator’s underlying argument that he is at

once good and somewhat devilish in terms of his character. That he offers something special to Elaine has the same effect, as he shows that he wants to do the right thing by responding in kind to the favor she has done for him. His knowledge of cheeses also increases his *ethos*, for he shows that he is similar to his readers in terms of education and culture. Many of the “highly educated and cultured readers” in his audience will not even know that cranberry-flavored *Neufchâtel* exists. This esoteric knowledge will impress his audience and, as they also gain knowledge by consuming this text, his narrative delivers a boon in this respect, as knowledge is highly prized by this readership. We have seen this in the section above on the introductions and blurbs that present the contents of *The Best American Series*. What follows next in the narrator’s and Elaine’s conversation functions to further increase the narrative tension on several planes:

“*Epoisses*,” she growls. Of course, this is before I know what it is, so to me it sounds like she’s just said “I pass” with a Brooklyn accent.

I ask her to repeat herself. “*Ay-pwoss*,” she cries, and I have to admit it is the sexiest thing I’ve ever heard her say.

“But of course,” I say, having no idea what she’s just asked for. “A little *Ay-pwoss*” (128 - 129).

The depiction of Elaine in terms of animal imagery is reinforced and accented with the term “growls.” She persists in using her sex as a weapon to persuade, if not convince, the narrator to agree to carry out her petition. This reinforces the image of her as untrustworthy ferret, while underscoring the narrator’s innocence. His claim of absolute ignorance to his readers about what he is getting into - even though he is only pretending to understand her - scores him high points on the level of *ethos*, for “to tell the truth and nothing but the truth” is a much-touted and oft-repeated legal expression that constitutes the core of what Americans view their code of personal integrity to be.

Lansing gains *pathos* and *ethos* points through humor when he draws comparisons between the phonological aspects of a high-register term in French and those of a low-register Brooklyn accent. This appeals to the anti-snob sentiments of his audience. In this way, he continues poking fun at Elaine's (and by extension, at the French) overestimation of French culture while at the same time approving of French culture in general. He is doing a complex balancing act on a precarious tightrope, but doing it masterfully. At the same time, as he is also "highly educated and cultured," he will in his narrative describe his journey to reach even greater depths in terms of knowledge about culture, in this case French, which both impresses and endears him in terms of *pathos* and *ethos* to his audience.

On another plane, when Elaine cries the name of the cheese out, a comparison can be made between sexual climax and this section of the narrative. It is possible to see the incremental rise in pitch in the narrator's depiction of her on the lexical plane as a rise that parallels sexual climax. For he describes her as first talking, then as doing a trilling laugh, then as growling, and finally, as crying out in ecstasy. The narrator expresses precisely what effect this transition from low to high intensity in terms of animal desire has on him when he admits that it is the sexiest thing he has ever heard her say. The effect this has on the narrator's *ethos* parallels the rise in pitch. The implicit *logos* can be made explicit as follows: A "highly educated and cultured," sophisticated, devilish, yet charmingly naïve narrator is being seduced at the discourse level by a charming and seductive *femme fatale*. In this way, he lets himself, or *cannot help but fall prey* to what countless male protagonists have fallen to since before Samson met Delilah. In this way, the narrator identifies himself with other all-too-human males in the western narrative. His *ethos* therefore continues to move upward to greater heights, which, combined with sympathetic *pathos*, works towards persuading the reader of the

narrator's goal: to be cherished and praised as both an outstanding travel writer and "good" person (i.e., "good" within the system of values adhered to by his "highly educated and cultured readership").

At this point, the narrator turns the tables on his own *ethos*, which has the effect he desires: even more approval from the readership. His first reaction is to honor the favor-pact that has been established from the outset of the narrative. "But of course" is a formulaic term used by gentleman and ladies, precisely because they are ladies and gentlemen. With this he shows his chameleon-like ability to bounce adeptly from one socio-economic pose to another. This ability to put on a socio-economic façade at will is demonstrative of his sophistication and eagle's-eye-view of social constructs, thereby revealing their vulnerability, or, at least, their fabricated, and, therefore, assailable nature. To be able to express these qualities in a literary mode of discourse is a skill that is highly valued by the readership he is appealing to. But he then confesses (in line with the genre he has chosen) that he does not know what she is talking about when she repeats the name of the cheese. Not, however, to Elaine. He instead confesses to the audience. His bringing the audience in on a little secret he has with respect to what Elaine knows about him increases his *ethos* on at least two levels. On the first level, he privileges the audience with the knowledge that not only is he playing in his eros-charged discourse with Elaine, but is also playing a sort of poker game with her by not revealing his full hand. That is, perhaps due to pride, he does not tell her that he does not know what the word *epoisses* means. Although he is being dishonest, the audience through compassionate and affectionate *pathos* forgives him and is again endeared by him, because he reveals human weakness. For often both weakness and vulnerability cause humans to feel compassion or affection for one another. This helps the narrator to plead his case at the level of *pathos* as well as *ethos*. Further, since he has cast doubt on

Elaine's moral integrity, the audience will happily turn a blind eye to what is, by comparison, a small crime. In fact, the audience will approve of his fudging a bit here, for he does so innocently. His is a knee-jerk reaction to maintain appearances that – since he has built up his *ethos* with such aplomb thus far – in so-doing he actually gains the approval for this minor infraction. In fact, the audience might even argue that Elaine does not deserve his complete honesty or that perhaps she, due to her manipulative nature, would not even appreciate it. When he responds that he will of course bring back a little ay-pwoss without knowing what it is, he is honoring his half of the bargain. The fact that he says a “little” adds to the enormity of the favor she is asking him, which will be revealed once it is too late for him to back out gracefully.

The next section takes place two weeks after the phone conversation with Elaine. Now in Paris, it is at this point that the narrator introduces the reader to his wife with a brief, but crucial, character sketch:

Two weeks later, my wife is sitting in a bathtub drinking Veuve Clicquot. She is in total heaven. She loves the antique stores around Carré Rive Gauche, the wild strawberry sorbet at Berthillon, and the silk underwear at Sabbia Rosa, but mostly she loves lounging in the oversize tub in our hotel room sipping champagne and admiring the Eiffel Tower, which juts up into the cloudy sky just blocks away (129).

We must bear in mind that the narrator and his wife are in Paris, a major European city whose offerings in terms of history, culture, art and architecture are vast. The narrator's wife is in heaven, we are told, and we are told why, but not at first. The narrator lists the things she loves about Paris: antique stores, wild strawberry sorbet and silk underwear from Sabbia Rosa. What is important in the first part of the description of his wife is perhaps what is *not* mentioned. Here she is, in one of the most important cultural centers of the western world, and nothing is said about her with respect to art, music, history, architecture, literature or culture in general. Instead she is interested in house furnishings (granted, they are antique), food, and sexy lingerie. The question that arises

immediately to the highly educated reader is: She travelled half way across the world for that? She then goes from bad to worse in his depiction of her because his audience then discovers what she most loves is drinking champagne in a hotel room bathtub while gazing at the Eiffel Tower. The picture he paints of his wife is not quite that of a seeker of what Paris has to offer as a place to discover art, culture and history. Instead, he depicts her as being a complete and irresolute, albeit elevated in terms of taste, materialist. It is also interesting that the narrator does not yet mention her name, something he has done immediately with Elaine. Curious, too, is the fact that there is, so far, no evidence of the two partners in this marriage's doing anything together, or having anything in common – other than sharing a hotel room. At the same time, however, the narrator does not directly paint a negative picture of his spouse. He merely paints an image of a complete hedonist who enjoys some of the finer consumables of life and the most stereotypical artifacts of this European city. The implicit *logos* can be expressed as follows: The narrator is a very cultured man who appreciates what his “highly educated and cultured readership” regards as the finer (and important) things of life / The narrator's wife does not appear to appreciate the same things that the narrator does / Thus, the narrator is perhaps caught in an odd, possibly unhappy, marriage. The narrator could very well deserve better. This can be interpreted as a sort of denigration that, as we have seen in Part 2, the *Ad Herennium* advocates in order to strengthen the bond of friendship between speaker and listener. David Lansing, by (indirectly) making a sort of enemy out of his wife on a cultural level, strengthens the bonds of friendship that he is creating with his readership. In this way, his strategic use of *ethos* increases his appeal in terms of *pathos*.

Certain other arguments also can now be made explicit, which explain the narrator's relationship with Elaine: For all her failings, Elaine is at least “continental,”



and meets a need that the narrator has with respect to European culture that his wife does not. This explains the sophisticated flirting the narrator engages in with Elaine. His intellectual and emotional needs are not being met at home, so he plays a game with Elaine in a sort of surrogate relationship that, however inadequate, is better than nothing. Were the reader to judge him for being too flirtatious – even though it is playful – he is now forgiven because his wife does not seem to meet his intellectual, psychological and perhaps emotional needs.

If this argument is followed, the character sketch of his wife, which conjures up the relationship the narrator has with Elaine as well as her character, can then be put in high relief with the following paragraph that describes a French woman, whose name the reader also finds out right away:

I am sitting shirtless and shoeless on a green couch in the Hôtel Lutétia's Opera Suite, eating a nougat bar, wedge by wedge, speaking on the phone with Diane Mincel, an extraordinarily beautiful and charming (aren't all French women?) *jeune femme* from the hotel's marketing department who, during our three-day stay, has done everything but walk our dog—and I'm sure she would have done that if we'd had one. I have waited until the last minute to secure Elaine's cheese, but we are leaving tomorrow, early, so I have asked Diane where, *s'il vous plaît*, I might find a little "Ay-pwoss" (129).

Here the reader is first given a brief sketch of the narrator, which sheds further light on his relationship with his wife: he seems to enjoy eating nougat without his shirt or shoes on. Something they might have in common could be food and basic creature comforts. However, this snapshot could also be a portrayal of the narrator as someone who enjoys sweets and knows when to be comfortable. It does not make him out to be a grossly materialist consumer. That he is not a mere consumer is clear due to the amount of discourse he has devoted to explaining what he knows and is still discovering about French culture. As stated above, to be a seeker of in-depth knowledge is highly valued by readership, and further increases his *ethos*.

The picture painted thus far in the passage above of the Frenchwoman Diane Mincel stands in sharp contrast to the one the narrator paints of his wife. Not only does he describe Diane as extraordinarily beautiful and charming, but the fact that she has done everything but walk their dog (something which the narrator affirms is only because they do not have one – more humor, more *ethos* via *pathos*) suggests that Diane is a woman of substance when placed side by side with his ostensibly superficial wife. Curious here is the narrator's very enthusiastic appreciation for Diane, when (one assumes) his wife is lying naked in the hotel room bathtub. One would expect that if there were still some embers glowing in the relationship he would at least have made an aside about his wife's physical charms or sexual allure as she looks winsomely out at what he calls the jutting (a term with possible sexual overtones) Parisian tower (perhaps a phallic symbol). He instead remarks on Diane's beauty and asks rhetorically whether all French women are not extraordinarily beautiful and charming. By comparison, his wife might as well be a plastic pool lounge floating motionless amid soap suds.

When he asks Diane about the cheese, she reacts with a gesture that the narrator calls peculiarly French. He describes this gesture metaphorically as follows:

Diane makes that peculiarly French blowing noise, like giving the raspberry without sticking your tongue out, which, loosely translated, means either "Your guess is as good as mine" or "What a silly question" (129).

Aristotle states that the ability to create metaphors is a gift, and places high value on it. The comparison that David Lansing makes between a modification of the raspberry, an uncouth gesture whose aim is to demean the recipient, and the French reaction to questions that are either difficult to answer or silly, is quite ingenious. He thus increases his *ethos* value on several counts. First, his ability to come up with a metaphor that is at once very precise and at the same time humorous earns him high marks. Second, he, in his loose translation (the fact that he describes his translation as "loose" also earns him

points) shows the ambiguity that he perceives in the French in this circumstance. It is an ambiguity that is sincere, on the one hand, for they express their ignorance. But at the same time, the penchant the French have for believing that they do know what is appropriate or not (in terms of seriousness and silliness) is also portrayed. This is yet another stab Lansing takes at the French which, through *pathos*, makes possible the joy “highly educated and cultured” American readers experience when little attacks are made on this culture’s signature haughtiness. For, as already mentioned, the American readership Lansing is addressing on the one hand also have their pride, and, on the other, another rule in this readership’s system of values dictates that it is poor taste to gloat (without irony) about one’s knowledge with a view to belittling another individual. All of this increases the narrator’s *ethos* even further. The implicit *logos* is: The narrator is capable of creating metaphors that are both imaginative and humorous. Both his metaphor and the subsequent explanation illuminate his shrewd insight as a traveler and thinker / Thus, the narrator is a writer and thinker of high worth, and the rewards reaped from reading his travel writing are great. The corresponding *pathos* could be expressed as follows: Since the reader appreciates the articulate and talented way the narrator expresses himself, the reader is also, at least at the critical level, similar to the narrator. This perceived similarity that takes place in the reader’s mind creates – via *logos* that leads to *pathos* – a feeling of contentment and pride. The feeling of contentment comes from identification with high quality. The feeling of pride comes from the reader’s evaluation of herself as someone who recognizes quality. Through this identification via *pathos*, Lansing disarms his reader, with a view to his being judged positively from the standpoint of his readership’s system of values – in spite of the fact that, on one level, he could be viewed as a shameless scoundrel. What Lansing is playing with here are the contradictions latent in any community’s system of values.

The fact that they are present in both the narrator and the readership makes the way they are presented crucial in order for a proper assessment of his character to be made.

At this point the narrator complicates matters further, thereby gaining more *ethos* points for his keen insight. For although he has put Diane (and the whole of French women) on a pedestal he, a sophisticate who knows that perfection only exists in the imagination, then pulls the rug from out from under the image he has created of her. He describes the noise French people make when asked a question they do not know how to answer, and then makes insightful comments on Diane's (and French people's in general) use of the word "perhaps" when he asks her if she can find the cheese he has promised to take back to Elaine:

"Perhaps I can find out for you," she says. The French always qualify everything by saying "perhaps." This way they always look like heroes when they actually do something. "I will call you back immediately" (129).

This is penetrating and humorous commentary on the character of the French, and increases his level of *ethos*. The fact that he is being reductive is immaterial. To attack top dogs, especially they are self-proclaimed, is fair game. He is continuing with his balancing act of praising the French, while at the same time taking little jabs at them. He has praised Diane's extraordinary beauty and charm only to bring to light a quirk that she has because she is French: a need to be perceived as heroes that weighs down so much on the culture that they have a convention that ensures that they do, in fact, appear as heroes. The *ethos* increasing *logos* is the following: The narrator is a "highly educated and cultured" individual that truly appreciates the positive attributes of a group of people from the Old World / However, as he also sees the flaws in this same group of people, his appreciation does not give way to blind adoration / The narrator is thus a "highly educated and cultured" American who has appreciation for high culture, but can

also deliver a metaphorical right jab when necessary. The narrator makes the reader laugh while doing this, thereby further increasing his *ethos*.

Diane does, in fact, manage to come off as a heroine, as she has found a shop that sells the sought after illegal foodstuff. It is at this point that the narrator delivers what a good, if not great, travel writer delivers: details about a culture that would otherwise be hard to come by. In this way he demonstrates the profound curiosity and desire to experience and understand the world in new ways that Bill Bryson states characterizes the texts in the anthology he has introduced. The narrator, in a sort of flash forward, now treats the reader to a lesson on French cheese-making which is both interesting and very thorough without being tedious or dry. A real traveler (as opposed to crass tourist), he has interacted with the local culture, and can now bring back the privileged knowledge to those who either are unable to travel, or who have not had the peculiar experience that he describes in what the publisher claims is outstanding prose. In this sense, the narrator is not just a traveler but also a sort of hero who has experienced travails (travel – travail) and now brings home the boon of knowledge. His concise and highly informative introduction to French cheese-making earns him even more points on the level of *ethos* due to the sincere interest he takes in other cultures, a good highly valued by his readership, as well as his eventual participation in that culture's customs (in this case eating unpasteurized cheese), which results in a revelation that changes his outlook on both his home culture and that of the target culture.

What must be kept in mind is the fact that a confession requires a judgment on the part of the listener (or, in this case, reader) that will either lead to a pardon or condemnation. This confession is not unlike Apuleius' apology referred to above, in that his appeals are from a defendant that is a cultured sophisticate made to a judge who

can be qualified as similar. Just like Apuleius who appeals to the judge's appreciation for culture and disdain for the lack thereof, the narrator of this story appeals to the highly educated and cultured reader as he reveals the details of his case in self-advocacy. This aspect can be seen in how the narrator next depicts his wife:

I tell Jan I'm off to get le cheese. She doesn't care. She has half a bottle of the Veuve Clicquot left and the bathwater is still hot. So, with Diane's meticulous but complicated directions in hand, I head off in the general direction of the golden cupola heralding Napoleon's tomb, which, evidently, is near the cheese shop (129 – 130).

The narrator's calling epouisses "le cheese" will draw a wry smile on an American reader's face, again due to the difference in register of the two terms. That is, the narrator places the article "le" (an article that is from what many "highly educated and cultured" as well as everyday speakers of English consider as the most romantic language of all) alongside the word "cheese." English does not score high marks in romance when compared to French, and, if there are any connotations that could be drawn from associations with great literature, the word "cheese" demolishes any possible romanticism whatsoever. For the word cheese has many negative and humorous overtones, which can be seen in expressions like "cheesy" or the term of disrespect when referring to another person as a "cheesebag." In order for the word cheese to have any value in terms of high culture it must be linked with other words like "French," as in the noun phrase "French cheese." Lansing's linguistic play is a bit of silliness that the reader will appreciate, for in American culture a bit – if not a lot – of playful silliness is given high marks. It is also yet another lighthearted attack on French culture by an American cultural underdog.

The narrator reveals his wife's name in the same breath as he makes his joke. Her response is illuminating: "She doesn't care." Her indifference can be brought into focus by comparing the same sentence with "She doesn't mind," or any number of other

ways she could have responded. She is portrayed as completely uninterested in the object of his quest and, at the same time, the narrator underscores what she really is interested in: hot bathwater and a bottle of French wine. His wife's attitude is brought into greater relief with the description of Diane's instructions: "meticulous but complicated," which further show that Diane is a woman who takes heartfelt interest in the narrator's mission. It could be argued that Diane is simply doing her job, but the manner in which she carries out her duties depicts her as a person who takes special care when doing so. The narrator's depiction of Diane's attitude and character sheds more light on his wife's character and attitude when the two women are placed in juxtaposition.

At this point, the narrator also brings into focus the significance of the food product he is after. Mentioning the golden cupola that heralds Napoleon's tomb increases the historical *ethos* of both the object of his quest as well as the narrator's. The *logos* related to the product is: The cheese shop is near to Napoleon's tomb / Napoleon was no ordinary individual. French history and culture is also extraordinary / Thus, the product that the narrator is seeking is extraordinary. Napoleon's *ethos*, that is, increases the *ethos* of the cheese by association. We have discussed this transference of *ethos* in Part 2 of this dissertation. The narrator gains further points due to his mentioning these details of place, with a view to illustrating the significance of the food product he has been asked to obtain. His *ethos* thus stands in very sharp contrast with that of his wife's. Jan's *ethos* drops considerably when the reader compares her complete indifference to anything but hot bathwater and good wine with the narrator's dedication – as a true traveler, not a lowly tourist – to seeking knowledge of and taking great interest in other cultures. The narrator's values are similar to those of his readership. Everything that has been said thus far with respect to the narrator's *ethos* who is, in effect, his own

advocate, can be seen as guiding the reader into evaluating him with approval and appreciation. The aim of narrator's rhetorical strategy is to obtain not only a pardon from the judges (i.e., readers) based on his confession (however ironic), but is also to obtain an evaluation of his character as praiseworthy, not blameworthy.

The narrator now fast-forwards and provides the reader with knowledge about the cheese that he is unaware of, but is crucial to the unfolding of his confession. He provides a brief but thorough explanation of the French custom of making unpasteurized cheeses. He sets up a basic contrast between pasteurized and unpasteurized cheeses, where the basic argument is that although there is a risk of disease being transmitted in unpasteurized cheese, the rewards in terms of flavor are so great that the French take this risk. The narrator then contrasts the French custom of cheese-making with that of the United States (his calling the latter the good ol' US of A is a stab at his own culture, which will earn high points from "highly educated and cultured readers," who are not uncritical of their homeland) (130). In France, half of the cheeses are made from unpasteurized milk, whereas in the United States this never occurs, because, as the narrator affirms, it is "a no-no," "positively forbidden" and "as illegal as Cuban cigars" (130).

The highly educated reader at whom this narration is aimed will note the irony in the fact that the process that eliminates disease from cheeses was, "as every schoolkid knows," invented by a Frenchman (130). At the same time, the thinking reader will follow other arguments in her head, based on the information given. The most important argument is the following: If half of the cheeses in France are made from unpasteurized milk, how dangerous can eating them be? Wouldn't cases of deaths and illnesses due to consuming these types of cheeses be part of common knowledge? Vox populi, a source of "truth" that Aristotle, as we have said, trusted in, proves to be a solid reference point



with respect to the consumption of water and food products when traveling. Nearly everyone in the U.S. has either experienced or heard of someone who has experienced traveler's dysentery in Mexico. So the reader will examine her memory banks and will draw a complete zero in this regard. That is, neither personal nor friends' experiences will provide evidence for the dangers involved in eating cheeses made in France from unpasteurized milk. What is more, no newspaper articles will be retrieved from the same memory archives. So the question that arises is: Is it really that dangerous to eat unpasteurized cheeses?

Another question arises with respect to the practices of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, whose reputation is far from immaculate. The reader who does not take everything the Food and Drug Administration asserts at face value will wonder whether some sort of economic protectionism is taking place. That is, she will question whether the highly-developed and long-standing process of making cheeses in France is illegal because if French cheeses were not illegal, thereby allowing their importation, the American cheese-manufacturers' revenues would suffer.

Not only does the narrator inform the reader of the scientific details related to the supposed dangers, but he also explains the culture of eating French cheeses in terms of the right season and the best time to eat them. He provides a specific example to illustrate what he means:

Take a nice artisanal goat cheese like Pourly. These goats graze on grass from the limestone plateaus of Bourgogne. The most abundant, flavorful grass is the new growth in the spring. And the cheese takes only two to four weeks to properly age. So the best time to eat Pourly is late spring to early summer. And if you are a true French cheese-geek, that is when you would buy it from your local *fromager* (131).

In the first five sentences, the narrator provides in straightforward and well written expository prose a detailed yet concise summary that illustrates the importance of the seasons and aging in French artisanal cheese production. This information increases his

*ethos* value due to the high quality of information delivered that is both academic yet down-to-earth. The narrator then gives his signature finishing touch in the last sentence, where he again mixes high and low register terms. The term French cheese-geek is popular, non-academic language that takes a word and turns it on its head. “Geek” is a term of abuse on par with “freak” or “weirdo” used by American high school students when belittling each other. However, to be a chocolate-geek, or computer-geek, or what-you-will-geek means to be a complete fan of the first term in a compound noun construction. In this formulation, the term geek takes on positive overtones that are humorous at the same time. One can thus hold one’s head high if one is a French cheese geek. This popular term is then set in contradistinction with *fromager*, where the narrator demonstrates his knowledge of French culture, but does so different from Elaine, whose use of French is done in poor taste due because she puts on airs when doing so. When Lansing uses the term *fromager*, it is in tribute to French culture, as well as yet another demonstration of his knowledge of French. In the framework of this sentence and of the entire article, his use of the French language is appropriately academic, and will earn points for his *ethos* as traveler and travel writer in this confession. His “highly educated and cultured readers” will also, on the level of *pathos*, identify positively with the narrator’s love of knowledge in terms of culture and language. For Lansing’s readers view learning other languages and cultures as a good that expands one’s horizons, still another good. The formula “like attracts like” is at work here, creating bonds of friendship as advocated by Aristotle and rhetoricians who use his treatise as a source for the theory and practice of persuasive argumentation. Instead of presenting himself as Other, Lansing presents himself as an-Other, as someone like his readers, which, in Aristotle’s model of rhetoric, influences them positively on his behalf when it comes to judging his character.

The narrator walks his readers down a Parisian “narrow little side street” to the shop which is halfway between the already mentioned Eiffel Tower and Napoleon’s tomb (131). This is further *ethos* for the cheese itself as a food item that is a product of an Old World culture with its romantic and winding streets. He then introduces Marie-Anne Cantin, whom he describes as “sharp, perky, greatly opinionated” (131). This description he then undermines using humor by saying that she reminds him “just a bit of Debbie Reynolds” (131). The narrator then continues in the same humorous vein that combines high and low culture in linguistic expressions:

Cantin is a second-generation fromager, having taken over the business from her father. I ask her if she has any Ay-pwoss, blowing out the second syllable as if getting rid of something nasty in my mouth, and she makes that same little raspberry noise that Diane made and leads me to one of her stunning little cheese displays where we stare, together, at four little creamy rounds that look like pumpkin-colored CDs (131).

The narrator now incorporates the term “fromager” into his text unitalicized as if it were an English term, since there is now no question about its meaning. As there is no real equivalent in the English language, this is proper usage and form at the academic level, something his readers will notice and appreciate. He then capitalizes on the attention he has been paying to in his narratives of the sounds made while communicating in French. The first is related to the pronunciation of the name of the cheese, while the second is the noise that French people make when they do not know the answer to a question or think that it is silly. The narrator, in an attempt at humor, is making blowing noises while the shop owner responds with more blowing noises. It is here that the “highly educated and cultured reader” might perhaps say that the narrator has stooped to using sarcasm instead of irony in his humor, which may not earn him points. For stating that he pronounces the second syllable of *epoisses* as if “getting rid of something nasty” in his mouth could be interpreted by some readers as having been done in poor taste. Some readers might argue that although all of the ingredients for a good comparison are there

and that the possibility for humor is great, the execution suffers. To say that it is as if he is getting rid of something nasty in his mouth is an attempt to poke more fun at French culture (in particular, its language) as he has been doing, and, at the same time, to connect this jab with the theme of his narrative, which is a great-tasting cheese. His readers may wince a bit here, for the narrator has lowered his standards and has been crass due to the fact that what he is really saying is that he is spitting out something from his mouth that is disagreeable. This image could be viewed as repulsive, and since the entire narrative is aimed, on one level, at extolling the outstanding flavor of a cheese that is remarkable due to not only the way it tastes but also due to the process that goes into making it – not to mention the long history that it has in French culture – his attempt at humor could be judged as inappropriate. This demonstrates the importance of not only creating but maintaining *ethos* in the body of the text itself as stipulated by Aristotle. We have seen how both McCroskey and Rodden have commented on the precariousness in which the narrator finds herself when being placed on the ideological and value-laden balance of her audience's system of values. But Lansing then saves himself in his next attempt at humor, when he describes the shop owner as she holds her wares up for display: “*Voilà!*” says Madame Cantin, as if she had just produced photos of her grandchildren” (131). He then, as outstanding travel writer, fully rescues himself from being judged negatively when he describes Madame Cantin's lesson in the art of cheese appreciation:

She carefully lifts one up to my face. I smile and sniff. It is...odoriferous. Seeing my reaction, Madame Cantin gives me my first lesson in French cheese appreciation: “The worse the cheese smells,” she tells me, “the better it tastes.” Then she shrugs and adds, “This is a hard thing for Americans to understand.” What the hell. Since I'm not eating it, I don't care (131).

The use of the word “odoriferous” works nicely in terms of irony, for the narrator is being euphemistic: the underlying meaning is “it stinks.” So changing this base reaction

to a lofty one earns him more points in *ethos* because of his subtle cleverness. Subtlety is a highly valued quality in his readerships' system of values. He then, at the end of the paragraph above, descends from this elevated and ironic usage to a very low register after being told that it is difficult for Americans to understand the smell – taste opposition: “What the hell” is a comic yet coarse expression, which coincides nicely with the American cultured but tough guy pose he has been developing throughout his narrative. This, for the American “highly educated and cultured reader,” is important in terms of image as has been asserted above, and works well in terms of the narrator's *ethos*. The Old World French knowledge that Madame Cantin possesses versus the New World American lack of understanding sets up a nice division that shows a lack of understanding on the part of both cultures in terms of the Other. Madame Cantin's shrug indicates bewilderment in her encounter with the American Other, and the narrator's indifference displays the attitude typically displayed by Americans that are ignorant of the culture of the Other: since he does not understand it, he reacts with complete disregard when using the phrases “What the hell” and “I don't care.”

Once the arrangements for delivery have been discussed, Madame Cantin, in the narrator's words “delivers the bombshell” (131). She informs him that the cheese is illegal in the United States. When he confesses his ignorance of this fact to her, she realizes what has happened to him. The narrator then fuses her realization with his own realization that he has been deceived by Elaine:

And then she sees the problem: I am a dupe. A rube. A cheese mule, as it were. I have been asked to carry nine ounces of an illegal substance, something I know nothing about. So her mission is clear. If I am to go through with this, first I must learn what I'm dealing with. Before she will sell me the Epoisses, she insists on giving me a crash course in French cheesemaking (most of which I have already revealed to you) (131 – 132).

By calling himself dupe, rube, cheese mule – expressions which identify him as a naïf that has been emotionally swindled by Elaine – he uses self-effacement and blunt

honesty to gain points in terms of *ethos* and *pathos*. For by “calling a spade a spade,” that is, the narrator’s not mincing harsh words – *especially with regards to himself* – ties in with the concept of being completely honest when judging oneself (the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth) that is so valued in Anglo-American culture (most “highly educated and cultured readers” will recall and revere the advice Polonius gives to Laertes: “This above all – to thine own self be true” [Greenblatt, 1680]).<sup>130</sup> To be hard on oneself, to not lie to oneself, is a highly prized good in American culture, and in doing so the narrator earns important *ethos* points by demonstrating his capacity for revealing the bald-faced truth about himself, even though it is negative. This earns him sympathy at the level of *pathos* as well. Further, his admission works nicely in terms of *ethos* and *pathos*, for he has made every effort to honor his end of a bargain. It is at this point that Chekov’s gun fires in the narrative. The narrator has been taken advantage of by a shrewd ferret of a “friend,” and is thus a victim the reader sympathizes with. All of this adds to the sympathy he has already managed to obtain for himself via *pathos* throughout the narrative based on several levels, as we have seen. The reader looks past his weakness of having given in to Elaine’s powerful sexual manipulation and sides with him. The *logos* is: This devilish yet naïve seeker of knowledge has, when attempting to honor a promise to return a favor, fallen prey to the wiles of a weasel-like American femme fatale, who has manipulated him unfairly to her advantage / Thus, he is a victim that deserves pity. The pity that he manages to inspire is the *pathos* of the rhetorical enactment that is both implicit and explicit, and which stands as the ethical motor of the plot.

Madame Cantin, in comparison with Elaine, turns out to be truly honorable. She refuses to let the narrator take the cheese without his obtaining proper knowledge of the

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<sup>130</sup> *Hamlet*, Act 1, Scene 3, 78 – 82.

substance that he has decided to smuggle. The shop owner's action builds an additional case being presented in the narrative to the readers for the French and French Old World culture against what now seem unreasonable norms stipulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The *logos* with respect to the contraband is as follows: The ban on French cheeses made from unpasteurized milk does not seem to make much sense / Thus, the illegal cheese should be made legal. With this logic, the American government's restrictions seem ridiculous, and the educated and cultured reader sympathizes first with French culture, whose products seem to have been banned for political or economic reasons, rather than reasons of health. In this sense, there is a political statement being put forth in this recit de voyage about the arbitrary nature of governments which reads as follows: The norms established by governments can be evaluated in terms of appearance and reality / These norms should be evaluated on the basis of reality in order to ensure that they are not unreasonably unfair.

The narrator then provides further details of the "crash course" he has been graciously and honorably treated to. The description the narrator gives is vivid and to the point – and, of course, not without its humor. At one point he describes the cheese cellar as "The Fort Knox of chèvre" (132). This is a nice simile which indicates, in its equation of cheese slabs with gold ingots, the high value that this cultural product has in his view.

The narrator then launches into an extended conceit that is as clever as it is serious and humorous. It is at this point in the narrative that the cultural and legal divide between the U.S.A. and France on raw-milk cheeses which results in their being declared contraband is presented to the court of readers to judge:

Madame Cantin is a high priestess in the religion of raw-milk cheeses, and she works hard to convert me, putting out a large tray of different raw cow and goat-milk cheeses, any one of which would be illegal to sell in the United States.

Seeing my trepidation, she says, “How can you be afraid to eat my cheese but not be afraid to eat a McDonald’s hamburger?”

It is a question for which I have no answer.

I sample her cheeses. They are magnificent. She sees the look in my eyes and knows: I am a believer. Praise the lowly goat!

Now—and only now—will she sell me the outrageously expensive Epoisses (132).

Madame Cantin’s logic is as elegant as it is devastating. She delivers the death blow to the narrator’s fear of eating a potentially dangerous substance by suggesting that the McDonald’s hamburgers he eats unquestioningly and without fear is an equally if not more dangerous foodstuff. And the fact is, in the face of this logic, perhaps the raw-milk cheese is a safer bet. One only needs to think of the quality of and path that the ingredients a McDonald’s burger is composed of take before they finally end up on the counter in order to see that eating one could be rather less than safe. The implicit *logos* is: The narrator is afraid of getting sick from eating a potentially dangerous French foodstuff. At the same time, he fearlessly eats an American foodstuff which is equally, if not more dangerous / Shouldn’t one be afraid in both cases? Or at any rate, shouldn’t one not be afraid in either case? The argument can then be extended with reference to quality: In the case of the McDonald’s hamburger, the narrator experiences no fear when consuming a potentially dangerous foodstuff whose taste and nutritional qualities are marginal. In the case of the raw-milk French cheese, he experiences fear about a potentially dangerous foodstuff whose taste is outstanding, and whose nutritional value is high by comparison with the McDonald’s hamburger. If one is going to take a calculated risk, which product stands as the better choice in terms of quality foodstuff on the one hand, and health, on the other? The obvious answer is that the French raw-milk cheeses are, in terms of quality fare and health, the more intelligent choice.



What is also interesting here is the narrator's transition from non-believer to believer in the "religion" that he has adroitly created in his extended conceit. The narrator's final ecstatic shout, "Praise the lowly goat!" works very nicely as a persuasive rhetorical device that advocates the value of the illicit substance that he has decided to bring back. The reader can identify with his emotion-charged reaction, meanwhile laughing at his ironic eulogy. We have seen in Chapter 3 that in antiquity things that were apparently insignificant were praised in epideictic rhetoric (i.e., mice, salt, death, beggars, and so on). Lansing's praise thus falls firmly in an ancient tradition.

When the goods arrive to his hotel, the narrator describes them in loving detail:

The next morning, as we are checking out of the Hôtel Lutétia, a messenger arrives from Madame Cantin's fromagerie. He has a very large bundle for me. Two vacuum-packed parcels wrapped in tissue paper. About 10 kilos of unpasteurized cheeses, including all four rounds of the Epoisses Madame Cantin had in her shop.

I also have Camembert de Normandie, Langres, Vacherin Mont d'Or, and a dozen different fresh chèvres, some covered in ash, others rippling with a pale blue mold, all completely and totally illegal to bring back to the States (132).

The difference between the favor that Elaine has asked for (i.e., a little epaisse) and the enormous quantities of cheeses that the narrator has – in his religious fervor – purchased, functions as the climax of the tension that has been building on one level throughout the course of this travel tale. For the question that is raised at the beginning of the narrative is: How will he respond in kind to the enormous favor that Elaine has done for him? His having gone completely overboard when keeping his end of the deal is high comedy at its best, and earns huge points in terms of *ethos* for the narrator. What would have perhaps been judged as crass extravagance is justified in the reader's mind because the careful preparation that the narrator has been carrying out in order to reach the end of his story. Since the narrator has described his passage from blind ignorance to true believer in French raw-milk cheese culture by detailing his experience on several planes combined with humor, the fact that he has lost control a bit in his purchase is, in

this particular case, forgivable, if not worthy of praise. Now that the narrator has the “highly educated and cultured readers” complete approval and has, in effect, completely charmed and disarmed them, he can then deliver the final blow which, had he not adequately prepared his audience with his shrewd rhetorical strategies, might have been judged as unethical:

My wife looks at me with alarm. “What’s that smell?” she says as I hand her the packages and ask her to carry them for me.

“It’s nothing,” I tell her. “Just a little cheese” (132).

His response, a slightly modified mirroring of Elaine’s response when he asked her what she desired him to bring back from Paris, is both clever and artful. First, there is his wife’s reaction which is based on ignorance. She is completely in the dark about the illegal cheeses. The narrator and his readers had also been in the dark. But because of the narrator’s quest for knowledge and culture which has resulted in his obtaining the crucial information he has gained about French raw-milk cheeses, the reader, who has been following him every step of the way, meanwhile appreciating his dedication in doing so and his capacity as a writer to express himself at a level of quality that meets high literary standards, has also vicariously undergone a passage from ignorance to knowledge, which now stands in glaring opposition to the ignorance of the narrator’s “better” half. The inside joke that the reader enjoys based on the inside knowledge that she has obtained puts her in a position of superiority in terms of the difference of knowledge. Here it must be underscored that that reader who has appreciated this story at the level of a true seeker of knowledge has not only just taken the time and made efforts to understand the present story. The “highly educated and cultured reader” has also *necessarily made efforts prior to the reading of the story that have made her appreciation possible*. That is, the reader, much like the *recit de voyage*’s seeker of knowledge about other cultures, must also have done considerable reading at an

academic and intellectual level prior to having read the story in order to fully comprehend and appreciate all of the nuances as well as the hard work that the narrator has put into his article.<sup>131</sup> Therefore, as the narrator has painted a less than favorable picture of his wife in terms of her level of culture and the interest she takes in it, her surprised reaction will result in derisive laughter from the audience. Here we can recall that when the narrator leaves the hotel to find the cheese shop and tells his wife that he is going to get le cheese, he states that *she does not care*. Her complete indifference to the efforts he has been making for cultural knowledge which results in her ignorance about the package she has just been handed make the situation comic. The reader, in her mind, will perhaps say, “If you only knew!” or, “If you’d been paying attention, you wouldn’t be in the dark.” The bundle of cheeses that she has been handed is much more than the illegal contents inside the packaging. The narrator and the reader know the history and circumstance that imbue the package with its importance, and also know that the amount of discourse that the narrator has spent on the story that he has related has only scratched the surface, for there is much more to tell about French raw-milk cheeses.

When the narrator, in response to his wife’s question tells her it is nothing, just a bit of cheese, he is, as the reader knows, mirroring the same words that Elaine used when she asked him for the favor. This is high quality in terms of writing craft, and the implicit *logos* that makes it possible for the reader to positively evaluate what would in other circumstances be grossly unethical behavior, is the following: The narrator’s wife has taken no interest whatsoever in her husband’s quest to find and find out about the cheeses. She should have done so, rather than spending her time drinking wine in a bathtub and staring at the Eiffel Tower / She therefore, due to her indifference, now

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<sup>131</sup> Vladimir Nabokov writes, “Up a trackless slope climbs the master artist, and at the top, on a windy ridge, whom do you think he meets? The panting and happy reader . . .” (Bowers, 2).

deserves to be duped. (The narrator, due to his weakness for things French and for Elaine's erotic manipulation, perhaps also deserved to be duped, but, as he is married to Jan, a complete dullard with respect to high culture, the reader justifies forgiving him. Jan's attitude has no excuse, and she gets what she deserves.)

Throughout the discussion of this narrative the narrator has presented himself as a bit of a devil. A likeable, if not *loveable* devil. Because of his deft use of *ethos* and *pathos* and due to his outstanding skills as a writer and self-advocate, he has the reader completely on his side. When he tells his wife that the packages he has given her contain "just a little cheese," she asks a question about its legality, he responds in true form. That is, as the likeable (or loveable) devil he has made himself out to be:

"Is it okay to bring back?"

I do my little French snort. "Of course," I lie. "It's nothing. *Rien, rien, rien.*" And then, as the taxi pulls away from the hotel, the precious bundles of cheese sitting prettily on her lap, I give her a kiss on the cheek. "Trust me, darling" (133).

The repetition of three components that begin the tale functions as an exceedingly well-wrought framing device that encases this piece of travel writing. Much like a composer, who repeats motifs in a work of music, the narrator repeats, with artistic changes, three key items that have been appeared within the tale. First, there is the peculiarly French noise that the French make when asked a question they do not know how to respond to or that is silly. But it is now *his*, for he states: I do *my* little French snort. He has made it his and he has renamed it by calling it a snort (his readers will recognize this device of making minute changes to the same linguistic element as demonstrative of artistic capability). Further, the word "snort," due to its being onomatopoeic, has comic overtones, and so he is, up to the very last moment, making the reader laugh with a view to evaluating his crime with greater benevolence due to *pathos*. The second key item he repeats are the same words that Elaine used at the beginning of the narrative when

describing what she wanted as payback for her favor: 1) “nothing” and 2) its French equivalent, *rien, rien, rien*. The reader that has been paying attention will notice that the narrator has reversed the order of these terms as they first appear in the text. That is, Elaine first says that what she wants is “nothing,” and then uses the French: “*rien, rien, rien*.” The narrator, in reversing the order, is working as an artist, giving geometric as well as visual and auditory balance and harmony to these lexical items as they appear in his work:

*rien, rien, rien / nothing – nothing / rien, rien, rien.*

This control and creativity over language use scores the narrator more points as a wordsmith, along with the repetition of logical irony. That is, what he calls “nothing” is really not “nothing” at all. Also, he tells his reader that he has lied. In this sense, he keeps his end of another bargain that he has made with his audience: to confess. He is, in telling the truth about putting his wife in legal jeopardy, doing precisely what the institution of confession demands. By confessing and through his art as a writer, he further increases his *ethos*. The corresponding *pathos* is high appreciation. That is, the reader evaluates with approbation the narrator’s capacity as writer and integrity as confessor. The narrator’s integrity in fulfilling the demands of the confessional pact, combined with the way he has portrayed his wife, imbues him with high *ethos*, facilitating the audience’s view of his actions as praiseworthy.

Lansing ends his tale with the third item he repeats when he gives his wife a kiss on the cheek and tells her, “Trust me, my darling.” Here the reader will recall that the first phrase that comes from Elaine’s mouth is the same term of endearment, which he immediately clarifies as being spoken by her (i.e., “‘Darling’—that’s Elaine talking, not my wife.”) The clarifying that he does at the start of the narrative sets up the ambiguous and ironic play that characterizes the game that he and Elaine engage in and,

at the same time, foreshadows the type of relationship he has with his wife. The term “darling” has been used in an ironic game, and so its worth as a straightforward term of endearment is null. When he uses the same term with his wife, apart from achieving artistic balance and harmony in the text yet again, he reveals that this term of endearment is in all probability also empty when he uses it with his wife. Here he portrays himself as a complete devil but since he has – by means of his art – manipulated his reader throughout the tale in an elaborate appeal to pity (it must be remembered that to forgive requires compassion, and the narrator is making a confession), he at this point demonstrates his outstanding capability for expression in high-level narrative discourse. With this final strategic and rhetorical maneuver, rather than being condemned as a shamefaced scoundrel, David Lansing wins the approval of his audience as an endearing devil and outstanding travel writer. His confession brings not only absolution but approbation (on several levels) as well.

Now that an analysis using *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos* has been carried out, the system of values embedded in the text can be examined from the standpoint of a framework of ethics/morals articulated by J.L. Mackie. The question that Mackie tackles is the problem of universalization with respect to morals or ethics (the term for the purposes of this dissertation can be used indiscriminately). Mackie, working from the standpoint of moral skepticism, uses the following logical proposition as basis for a moral system consisting of three stages: “Moral judgements are universalizable” (83).

Mackie identifies the differences in each stage of universalization:

There are, then, different kinds or stages of universalization. In each of them a moral judgement is taken to carry with it a similar view about any relevantly similar case. But the first stage rules out as irrelevant only the numerical difference between one individual and another; the second stage rules out generic differences which one is tempted to regard as morally relevant only because of one’s particular mental or physical qualities or condition, one’s social status or resources; the third stage rules out differences with answer to particular tastes, preferences, values, and ideals (97).

An example of a moral judgement at the first stage is expressed in the maxim which Mackie argues is “well formulated by Hobbes: ‘That a man . . . be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself’” (88). This common-sense basis for morality is capable of universalization. It is, however, limited, for it does not take into consideration possible qualitative differences mentioned above (i.e., mental, physical qualities or condition, social status, resources and so on). Included in these qualities are the well-known differences based on race, color, sex, religion, and age. Mackie provides examples that extend beyond these qualities to show the limitations of the first level of universalization: “The teetotaler may be happy to prescribe universally that no-one should drink wine or beer, the philistine that old houses should never be allowed to prevent the construction of motorways or divert their course, the sturdy individualist that social services should be kept to a minimum” (89 - 90). In each of these cases, the liberties or restrictions that each type of individual described are dependent on particular qualities. In order to keep such qualitative differences from obstructing fairness, an extension of the first phase of universalization is applied in the second phase: “putting oneself in the other person’s place” (90). Mackie outlines this phase as follows:

To decide whether some maxim that you are inclined to assert is really universalizable, imagine yourself in the other man’s place and ask whether you can then accept it as a directive guiding the behavior of others towards you. Having a large income, no dependents, and an iron constitution, you are inclined to judge that everyone should pay in full, from his own pocket, for any medical attention he requires; but imagine that you are on a modest weekly wage and have developed a chronic kidney complaint, or have a child with a hole in the heart: do you still endorse the proposed rule? (90).

At this stage, Mackie asserts that putting oneself in another’s gumboots makes it possible to take into consideration differences that are not addressed at the first stage of

universalization. It is through taking into consideration the qualities of the Other that one's own qualities are kept in check.

The second stage of universalization also needs to be put in check by further tests in order for fairness to be attained in the ethical framework Mackie has articulated. He calls this test the third stage of universalization, whose process he states involves "taking account of different tastes and rival ideals" (92). Mackie describes this process as follows:

The third stage that is called for involves putting oneself even more thoroughly into the other person's place, so that one takes on his desires, tastes, preferences, ideals, and values as well as his other qualities and abilities and external situation (92 – 93).

Mackie states that the possibility of discovering "any principles [that] will pass so severe a test" is highly unlikely. And it is precisely the third test that presents the greatest difficulties with respect to the universalization of any sort of moral principles, much more than the second phase, as Mackie affirms: "Of course there are some basic desires that almost everyone has, but besides these there are radically divergent preferences and values, and it is from these that obstinate moral disagreements arise" (93). Most individuals will grant, in their morality, the test for universalization and thus fairness that the second phase of universalization requires. With respect to the third phase, however, Mackie argues as follows: "It is not only logically possible to opt out of this third variety of moral language game; it is quite common and conventional for people with strong moral convictions to remain outside it, and it may well require a conscious decision to opt into it" (102). A parallel between Epictetus' prenotions and Mackie's third stage of universalization can be drawn, for while vast numbers of individuals will describe themselves as adhering to some version of the Golden Rule cited above – or, in any case, expecting others to do so – it is in the concrete manifestation of its being put into practice that differences and disputes arise.



Three maxims that are universalizable at the first level and which come into play in the travel narrative analyzed above provide the basis for the moral conflict of the confession which the narrator attempts to resolve by means of the art of persuasion. The first maxim can be expressed in popular terms as “One good turn deserves another.” It is this principle that is at play and which puts the narrator’s character in terms of his *ethos* at stake. For since Elaine has done him a favor, by accepting the favor he agrees to subject himself to the conditions stipulated in this maxim. Of course, the circumstances which make up the arena in which the events of his fulfilling his responsibilities in this pact mitigate at the second stage his responsibility. For we discover that he has been deceived, which would exonerate him from the requirement of fulfilling his duty. He decides, nevertheless, to adhere to the conditions of the first maxim, thus overriding his privilege by invoking a second maxim, “A deal is a deal,” which imbues him with what is viewed by his audience as a good. By invoking the second maxim, he adheres to the letter of the first one. This increases his *ethos* in the view of the readership, which is also buoyed due to his adamant quest for knowledge of culture when fulfilling his end of the bargain. All of this weighs heavily in his favor when later in the narrative he transgresses a code held sacred by his “highly educated and cultured” readership, especially in relation with those who are close as individuals: “Honesty is the best policy.” In the first place, whether or not he is faithful to his wife or is hiding something from her on this count is placed in doubt because of his flirtatious behavior with Elaine. But as this is left highly ambiguous in the narrative, this point can easily be waived. It is the second rupture of this code that creates a significant moral hurdle that he needs to overcome. That is, when he deceives his wife Jan, telling her that the illicit contents of the package he hands her on their way to the airport are okay to bring back. At the first level of universalization, he is guilty, for one should not

lie *unnecessarily* to one's loved ones (or perhaps to Others in general). Even the circumstances that make up his having decided to smuggle the illegal substance do not free him from honoring this second maxim. That is, the fact that he has been lied to does not relieve him, for, as popular morality dictates, "Two wrongs do not make a right." Thus, he cannot justify lying to his wife simply because he has been lied to. It is instead, at the third stage of universalization that he finds the bases for justifying components of the crime he is confessing to: having lied to his wife and having put her in legal jeopardy. That is, he bases his decision to lie to his wife using the ideals, values and tastes that he holds in common with his "highly educated and cultured" audience. In this way, he manages to obtain forgiveness for his having lied to his wife. How does he manage to do so? First, the category of illicit goods that the narrative suggests she ends up taking past customs has been effectively argued as being nearly absurd. Lansing's description of his experience when discovering this unpasteurized and therefore illegal cheese convinces the reader that its status as contraband is highly unreasonable. When the reader takes the narrator's description of his (near) religious conversion in which he becomes a true believer in the French consumable and Jan's indifference and apparent lack of culture into consideration – as compared to the narrator's high level of interest in culture and history – his transgressing the code of honesty is overridden based on a preference that is governed, in the end, by the tastes and ideals he holds in common with his readers. This can be evidenced by expressing the ideal that Lansing is appealing to in an obligatory maxim: One must take interest in other cultures. It could be argued that one *ought* to take interest in other cultures or that it is a good or nice idea to do so, but it would be risible to attempt to convert the above dictum into a universal maxim. This is because it is possible to respect other cultures without necessarily taking interest in them. It is possible to convert this second concept, the idea of respecting

other cultures, into a universal maxim. That is, at the first stage of universalization, it could be asserted that one must, or in any case, ought to respect other cultures, for to do so is, in effect, an extension of the Golden Rule. Taking great interest in other cultures is, by comparison, a matter of taste or ideals. Since it is an ideal that the “highly educated and cultured reader” holds, it carries great weight as a mitigating factor when judging the narrator’s actions in terms of motives. That is, since his motives are, from the perspective of the “highly educated and cultured reader,” both good and honorable with respect to his interest in other cultures, when they are put in the balance with his having transgressed the code of honesty, the scale tips in favor of his worth as an individual on the level of ideals and taste. His high interest in culture outweighs his having been dishonest, the readership granting a pardon for the latter infraction.

Thus we see that some sort of inversion occurs with respect to maxims and their being universalizable or not. For as humans we tend to place greater value on our system of values and preferences with respect to taste and ideals than to more general principles that provide the guidelines for our behavior. As Mackie asserts, it is at the third stage of universalization that the differences that are most difficult to overcome manifest.

The system of values that the “highly educated and cultured reader” uses when pronouncing judgments on actions carried out by human agents can be examined further. The “highly educated and cultured reader” is a product of the academy, individuals that view themselves as adhering to Mackie’s first and second stages of universalization. These readers view themselves as “progressive” or “liberal” in their political stance and as individuals that appreciate “the finer things of life” and that see moral issues in shades of grey as opposed to black and white. These qualities stand as some of the determinants that form part of what is defined as “good” for the “highly

educated and cultured readership/audience” that I have constructed, and which can be placed in binary opposition to those of the system of values held by what members of the same readership construct would label as an “unsophisticated” audience/readership. The latter group may or may not be university educated, but in any case does not adequately appreciate cultural artifacts in the way that having been educated in the liberal arts at an institution of higher learning provides. As a result, these two readerships will come into conflict at the third stage of universalization of Mackie’s ethical framework, where ideals, values and taste are the variables that distinguish both individuals and groups from one another.

The gulf that exists between these two readership constructs can be illustrated by identifying components of their respective systems of values. For instance, the most important defining characteristic of the “highly educated and cultured” readership can be seen in its relation to and appreciation of *logos*, whether spoken or written. For due to the fact that the “highly educated and cultured” audience has been trained by and in the academy, the importance that high quality written and spoken discourse *as defined by the academy* holds is paramount. I focused on the importance of quality discourse in my analysis of the *ethos* of the bookstore (Barnes and Noble) whose reputation for selling what the “highly educated and cultured readership” identifies as excellent literature is high, as well as in my analysis of the blurbs found on the front and back covers of (and introductions to) the series in which the narrative is found. In my analysis I also focused on what I call excellent use of language in Lansing’s text, showing how his “clever” use of words earns him high points in the category of *ethos*. Of course, we enter into trouble when labeling a type of literature as outstanding or excellent, for the same reason that we enter into trouble when trying to define any abstract concept. Not only will a particular individual define excellent literature based

on her system of values, but the group to which she belongs will as well. This individual and her group will contrast themselves with other individuals and groups that define the same terms differently, resulting in a clash at the level of *logos* as expressed in literature. For example, the “highly educated and cultured” reader would consider books judged as high art by *The New York Times Book Review* to be quality reading material, yet would label books written by Louis L’Amour and those published by Harlequin Enterprises Ltd. as being *excellent examples of low quality literature*. (Academics categorize Westerns by L’Amour as popular art.<sup>132</sup>) An important value that L’Amour’s and Harlequin romances hold for the “highly educated and cultured” reader is their value as objects of scorn or as examples of low art which they then patronizingly elevate to the status of high art by labeling it kitsch (see below). At the same time, it must be kept in mind that both L’Amour the author and Harlequin romances have huge readerships that consider their works to be high quality literature. Their evaluation is, of course, based on their system of values. As I have stated, the readership that consumes these works would be identified by the “highly educated and cultured” reader as “unsophisticated.” What is interesting about all of this is that most members of the “unsophisticated” readership might view being labeled in that way as an insult, for they might consider themselves to be “cultured” and “sophisticated” – based on their own definition of that term. (They might also proudly take a stance that is either anti-high culture or anti-intellectual.) The fact is, along general lines, the members of both groups judge the other group in negative terms – as most groups do. That is, both groups view

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<sup>132</sup> Marsden writes that scant attention has been paid by literary scholars to L’Amour and other writers of westerns, as opposed to the same genre in film: “Studies of Western literature have been curiously devoid of references to popular Western writers from Zane Grey to Louis L’Amour. This is unfortunate, for L’Amour’s seventy or so works have sold over 70,000,000 copies, making him the best selling Western fiction writer of all time. Although a remarkable amount of scholarship has been devoted to its sister art form, the popular Western film, the “Western” stands as an equally rich and historian valuable insight into popular attitudes and values . . .” (203). The reason that more attention has been paid to film Westerns is obvious: scholars deem (certain) Western films as de facto high art. In any case, Marsden equates high numbers with high value – an egregious fallacy.

the members of the group that is not their own as Others. The “highly educated and cultured” reader will use terms such as bumpkin, rube, ignoramus and so on to describe the readership of L’Amour’s books and Harlequin romance novels. The readers of L’Amour’s books and Harlequin romances will label the “highly educated and cultured” readers as snobs, know-it-alls, high-fallutin’, pretentious and so on. The groups are pitted against each other at Mackie’s third stage of universalization in terms of their taste in reading material. They are also, on the whole, pitted against each other along political lines. The “highly educated and cultured” readers will perceive themselves as leaning to the left and middle-left politically, whereas the “unsophisticated” readers will, in general, lean to the right. Be that as it may, what is important here is that two very different groups appreciate very different types of written discourse. The respective system of values of each type can be revealed through rhetorical analysis.

There are other qualities that define the “highly educated and cultured readers” that bring them into conflict with the “unsophisticated” readers in this binary construct. Perhaps the most important defining characteristic of what the “highly educated and cultured reader” calls excellent literature is irony. We have seen this in the highly ironic title of Lansing’s narrative: “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” Tightly connected, if not inseparable from irony, is the term *play*. The “highly educated and cultured” producer or consumer of discourse plays with language, with institutions, with ideas, and mostly, with things that are held sacred. The reader of Harlequin romances and Louis L’Amour stories do not have this same sense of play and are much more black and white in their attributing of values to what is dictated by what the “highly cultured and educated” reader would call “old-fashioned,” “preachy” and “heartland” morals.

With respect to the concepts irony and play, I have discussed how Lansing takes the term “confession” and turns it on its head. Members of the “unsophisticated” group

would not play with an institution of this sort (i.e., legal and religious), mainly because good and evil are black and white categories for members of this group. For this group, heroes and villains are well-defined characters in the sense that the heroes are good through and through and the villains are thoroughly evil. A villain, therefore, would need to confess sincerely and in many cases, in spite of having confessed, be punished. The use of irony is unacceptable to the “unsophisticated” reader in relation with a form of discourse that makes it possible to admit that one has transgressed against a community law, whether written or unwritten. Confession is to be sincere because the transgressor is perceived to have behaved in a highly transgressive and immoral manner. To play with the confession format is to play with the value-laden rules that govern a given community. If an individual plays ironically with the values and rules of a community, the underlying message is that the values are questionable. From the perspective of “unsophisticated” readers, values are not to be questioned or, for that matter, played with. More important, the “unsophisticated” reader will not scoff at the system of values, as Lansing does, beginning with the title of his travel narrative and throughout the text.

For Lansing undermines other institutions in his ironic play. In his flirtatious discourse with Elaine he makes his reader question whether he is ever sincere at all when he uses terms of endearment, both in his relationship with her and, as I have suggested, with his wife, a relationship sanctioned by the institution of marriage. If this sort of behavior were to be imitated and were to spread throughout the community, an institution that is already scarcely intact might be eroded even further. A common argument presented by “unsophisticated” readers is that further weakening of the family – the core institution of the human community – could, in this readership’s view, lead to

the complete downfall of U.S. society, ending in the country's absolute and utter disintegration and demise.

Lansing also attacks in his ironic play the consummate American food icon: McDonald's. He thereby infers that another culture's food products are superior and perhaps less risky to consume. In this sense, Lansing could be viewed as an enemy to his own country's culture in terms of its heartland cuisine. An "unsophisticated" reader would not criticize anything that is American made and would certainly not promote French products. French products are for elitist snobs with too much education – like David Lansing. "Unsophisticated" readers might argue that he should, for these reasons and others, be silenced. These readers would not sympathize with the subtexts of Lansing's travel tale and would most likely not appreciate his sense of humor.

When Lansing quotes Madame Cantin who questions his unquestioned consumption of McDonald's food products, he is appealing to a "highly educated and cultured" readership that would, much like the judge in Apuleius' text, laugh with him at the "rubes" that would oppose and attack him. At the same time, the "unsophisticated" readers would question whether the term "best" in *The Best American Series* actually describes either what is "best" or "American" with respect to U.S. culture and society. Many members would argue that Louis L'Amour's westerns and Harlequin romances are 1) the highest quality literature produced in the United States and 2) the most American – especially in terms of the values they promote. In L'Amour's novels good guys are good guys and bad guys are bad guys, and there are no shades of grey when it comes to what is right and wrong. There is no undermining of heartland American values in these works of fiction, nor is there irony or play. In Harlequin romances, the standard values of consumerist American are not questioned:



to be wealthy, good-looking and successful are the goals to be reached for. Any other sort of aims would be incomprehensible to this readership.

The “highly educated and cultured reader” will appreciate L’Amour’s novels and Harlequin romances as examples of low art, which she will assess *only* in terms of their kitsch value. When the “highly educated and cultured reader” uses the term kitsch in relation to cultural artifacts, it is a (not very subtle) form of condescension. This evaluation shows the inherent feelings of superiority on the level of culture and ethics that the “highly educated and cultured” reader experiences when comparing himself with the “unsophisticated” reader, in spite of copious assertions to the contrary about embracing the Other. Ironically, the same logical mechanisms are in force when the “unsophisticated” reader judges the “highly educated and cultured” reader and the texts this group consumes. She too feels superior in terms of her ethics and system of values and would have only negative appraisals for Lansing as a writer and as an individual, as well as for his narrative. For, on the one hand, Lansing does not match the ideal portrayed by Harlequin romance protagonists: good-looking, astonishingly successful, and a “perfect gentlemen.” Instead, Lansing would no doubt be perceived as a not-very-good-looking, bookish nerd who wastes his time writing not-very-funny and unromantic travel stories that probably makes less than 150,000 dollars a year. In other words, the “unsophisticated” reader would categorize Lansing with the worst label possible in the American system of values: a *loser*. The “highly educated and cultured reader” would respond by calling the “unsophisticated” reader a “crass materialist with no appreciation whatsoever of higher culture.”

I am, in this discussion, attempting to reveal what I view as the components of the value systems of two groups: “highly educated and cultured” readers and “unsophisticated” readers. The question that arises is whether either group’s “truths”

have greater worth than those of the other group. Ironically, members of both groups would in all likelihood answer in the affirmative, each claiming that the “truths” they adhere to and which give cohesion to and provide the bases of judgment for actions in terms of approbation and reprobation for their community are superior to those of the other’s, while declaring the other group’s “truths” to be either inferior or mistaken thus false. This is true even though both groups would certainly agree on most of the points listed in Mackie’s description of what he calls “our conception of the good” in terms of “higher pleasures or indirect means to happiness” (150):

Liberty of thought and discussion, thought and discussion themselves, understanding of all sorts of things, including ourselves and other human beings, a self-reliant, enterprising, and experimental spirit and way of life, artistic creation and craftsmanship of many sorts, the enjoyment and appreciation of beauty, and general participatory self-government both in smaller institutions and in the determination of large scale social policies and laws (150).

I state above that there would certainly be agreement by both groups on *most of the points* listed in Mackie’s description because what he presents is a list of pleasures or indirect means to happiness that would be accepted unreservedly by the group he belongs to and is writing to: “highly educated and cultured readers.” It is, however, quite possible that the members of the “unsophisticated readers” would not agree with Mackie on certain aspects that he lists. For instance, the “unsophisticated reader” might not view understanding other human beings as one of the means to happiness. Instead, indifference or even intolerance in this regard could be a means to happiness for this group. (“Highly educated and cultured readers” are also capable of indifference and intolerance with respect to “unsophisticated readers,” but they often mask this type of attitudinal response with a façade of philanthropy phrased as alterity.) An experimental spirit and way of life might also be viewed with suspicion by the “unsophisticated reader,” due to a general tendency to adhere to “conservative” principles or guidelines

with respect to living life. Trust (or belief) in and following pre-established and authoritative rules would, for this readership, instead lead to happiness.

Even if we assume one group's goods to be superior, the question whether anything ought to be done about it arises. Should the group whose truths were agreed to be superior – given this qualitative distinction – be granted the power to then impose its system of values on the other group? Take, for example, the two groups that I have described above. The “highly educated and cultured readers” have, with respect to “unsophisticated readers,” very few (if any) doubts about the superiority of their system of values and of the “truths” that they adhere to. Would the “highly educated and cultured” group, because of what it *knows* to be superior, thus ordain a system that would enforce adherence to and participation in this same system of values? It is unlikely that any members of this group would consent to this, because this would mean the establishment of a dogmatic regime (of values), which would contradict other values this group holds sacred. The most important value in relation with this issue is freedom of choice, which is associated with both individual liberty and democratic forms of government. If the “highly educated and cultured readers” were given the power to enforce their system of values on the “unsophisticated readers,” personal and social freedom would be undermined, leading to a state of affairs that would be viewed as intolerable. In fact, it would most likely not even be necessary to pass from the first to the second stage of Mackie's morality framework to reach this conclusion. There would be no need for the “highly educated and cultured reader” to put herself in the “unsophisticated reader's” place in order to see the drawbacks of such an imposition. This issue is easily solved at the first stage of universalization by invoking the maxim to allow oneself as much liberty against others as one would allow others against oneself. And so because the “highly educated and cultured reader” would not tolerate being

subjected to the system of values adhered to by “unsophisticated readers,” she would not participate in or endorse the establishing of a power structure that would enforce the system of values that she herself adheres to, in spite of her conviction that her own system of values is unquestionably superior. What is not clear is whether the “unsophisticated reader” would follow suite. That is, it is not fully certain whether the “unsophisticated reader” would ungrudgingly and unquestioningly relinquish a desire to impose her system of values on the “highly educated and cultured reader,” due to her group’s perception of moral matters in terms of black and white – even though her group would wholeheartedly uphold individual freedom as a primary tenet. It would perhaps only be by making the passage from the first to the second stage of universalization, that is, by putting herself in the other reader’s shoes that she might concede that, as she would not want to be forced to adopt the system of values held by the “highly educated and cultured reader” – the equivalent of being subjected to the power structure of a non-democratic government – she would not wish to impose her system of values on the “highly educated and cultured reader,” even though she would think and believe that she ought to be allowed to do so, due to her perception of her “truths” as superior.

In the readership constructs that I have articulated above, conflict ensues at times due to differing abstract values, at others due to disagreement over concrete manifestations of abstract values held in common by both groups. These conflicts reveal, in the end, differing positions on what “truth” is, as well as what is considered to be good or evil, whether in general, moral or aesthetic terms. The division that occurs is based on fundamental differences that are expressed above in “structuralist” paired opposites: highly educated (thus sophisticated) / unsophisticated – liberal / conservative – crass materialist / idealist – gross consumer / connoisseur of high culture, and so on.

While these sorts of dyads have been the object of attack by post-structuralist theorists, a very important question arises which I hope will meet objections to this type of theoretical framework.<sup>133</sup> If we accept, for instance, that post-structuralist theory has proven that the structuralist conception of discourse was mistaken, due to “slippage” and “spillage” between signifiers in the syntagmatic chains that structuralists affirm make the sign system of language possible (Barry, 64), as well as “long-dormant metaphorical bases of words . . . [that] interfere with literal sense, or with the stating of single meanings” of words (65), do these same paired opposites not provide the structure that is to be subsequently deconstructed? That is, without structuralism, we must ask whether post-structuralism is possible. To put it another way, if the universe is in fact a decentered universe, did it not have to become dislodged – if only at the level of the text or, at any rate, if only as inscribed within discourse – at some point from the fixed site from which it is now decentered? Even if that fixed site was illusory, was never in fact anchored, was always astray, was there not a specific moment in time when it was identified to never have been fixed, to have always been adrift from any discursive moorings whatsoever? If there is a before / after diad that can be identified, this would suggest that the edifice of structuralism, however illusory due to post-structuralist theory’s dismantling of what was not there in the first place, functioned as a necessary *presence of absence* that had to be taken apart in order to show that it was not there in the primary instance and that the “truths” of post-structuralism hold sway instead.

Along these lines we – as critical thinkers – can also question, with regards to literary theory, why introductory texts such as those written by Peter Barry and Terry

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<sup>133</sup> Terry Eagleton comments wryly on the contradictions that can be observed among scholars engaged in “cultural thinking”: “With an arrogance thinly masked as humility, the cult of the Other assumes that there are no major conflicts or contradictions within the social majority themselves. Or, for that matter, within the minorities. There is just Them and Us, margins and majorities. *Some of the people who hold this view are also deeply suspicious of binary oppositions*” (After, 21 – italics mine).

Eagleton categorize and explain different theoretical approaches by means of descriptive and illustrative texts which are, in effect, syntagmatic chains that consist of rather vast expanses of standard academic discourse. Access to theoretical concepts appears to be limited to insiders, unless the abovementioned categories are created and illustrated using discourse that adheres to the rules of pre-theoretical writing style. Even structuralism requires explanation, which is dependent upon discursive modes of knowledge transmission in order to present the uninitiated with its operational and defining concepts.

It is possible to witness the attempt to provide access to the complexities of literary theory in the way Peter Barry has written his primer. The style he uses to explain the various theoretical approaches is, in essence and effect, “Aristotelian.”<sup>134</sup> That is, his text is written in pre-theoretical, (standard) academic expository prose – not in a post-structuralist style. His discursive praxis at the functional level operates as if there were some sort of correlation between the *logos* of his written discourse and other texts, as if the latter were ontological entities firmly rooted in an empirically quantifiable materiality capable of storing printed data. The assumption that has to be made in this regard is that standard academic writing/thought is a necessary preliminary form of discourse that enables the decoding of structuralist and post-structuralist writing – even if the resulting meaning, according to the tenets of post-structuralist theory is, due to “slippage” and “spillage,” always shifting, always adrift, never ascertainable. Even fully post-structuralist texts such as Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” are composed

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<sup>134</sup> I have stated in the beginning of my dissertation that I am imitating Barry’s style of writing. The way Barry writes is Aristotelian as described, *mutatis mutandis*, by W.K.C. Guthrie: “Here at last was a Greek who reflected my own thoughts in plain and comprehensible terms, a mind that worked on the same lines and bridged the gap of millennia between us, though it might be truer to say that it is we who have learned to think in Aristotle’s way. After all, he laid down the rules of logical thinking that guided European thought till the nineteenth century, and if professional logicians have in the last hundred years gone beyond him, the thinking of the ordinary man, whether he realizes it or not, is still conducted mainly within an Aristotelian framework” (Encounter, 3).

of segments of discourse that adheres to the norms of traditional academic writing. There is, of course, a liquid movement, a playful to-and-fro between discursive styles, a sort of washing up onto the shores of pre-structuralist discursive *terra firma*, so to speak, then back out to the vast and open seas of decentered and free-floating signifiers. It appears that access to theory can only be gained via discourse that is plain, clear and concise. That is, it would appear that this style of discourse is necessary for the majority of students that attempt to tackle the concepts that different theoretical approaches are built on.

Throughout my dissertation, the problem of definitions has surfaced. This is true not only with the term “rhetoric” throughout its long existence as a signifier – as I have attempted to show – but with any concept that cannot be proved using scientific, mathematical or strictly logical means. As indicated earlier in my discussion, even terms that have been classed by empirical means are characterized by ambiguity, if one looks closely enough at the identifiable defining characteristics. This means that at some point an agreement must be made on the defining limits for a particular term. And so, the two categories of readerships which I have articulated as standing in opposition to one another have value only if the reader agrees to accept the definitions as conventions which find their meaning via structuralist binary opposition.

## **GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

My first aim in this dissertation has been to argue that classical rhetoric can – for contemporary students of literature – serve as a valuable tool for analysis and criticism of any discourse in which rhetorical mechanisms are present. This led to a discussion about the problem of defining rhetoric, which began in Classical antiquity and continues to the present. As stated at the outset, the debate over how to define rhetoric is still alive – rhetoric continues to be defined and redefined today. The fact that the debate over rhetoric is still alive means that a variety of opinions, often contradictory, about how to define rhetoric have been and are still being articulated. This means, as I have already stated, that rhetoric lies in its own field of operations: opinion. The definition that I have proposed is based primarily on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where he presents a definition (an opinion) of what rhetoric is and how it is used. My definition is also based on readings by other scholars whose definitions draw on, reflect and develop the one presented by Aristotle and whose academic positions fall, on the whole, in line with what can be called traditional academic discourse and thought. The style of writing that I have chosen to use is a reflection of the style used by these same scholars. The reason that I have used a traditional academic discursive style is that, like Peter Barry in his introduction to theory, I am introducing a way of looking at literature (and discourse) that, as certain scholars have asserted, has been in disuse for three centuries in literary studies. Thus, my aim in using this style is to provide students of literature with the basic concepts of Aristotelian rhetoric in a comprehensible way. As such, what I am presenting is meant to be a starting point. The definition that I have provided and utilized in the chapters above is perhaps, in comparison with the work of other scholars, more rudimentary. This does not mean, however, that the model that I have presented is



simple, as has been borne out by its articulation in the chapters that explore the model's integral concepts.

What I am presenting is not a rejection of literary theory or theoretical approaches. I have provided what I believe is a valuable tool for critical thinking that can be added to the arsenal of approaches available to students of literature and discourse. What this means is that rhetoric as I have defined it can be used to analyze and critique any text where rhetoric is in operation. This means that the discourse that is capable of being critiqued and analyzed using the definition of rhetoric as defined in this dissertation has argumentation as a primary characteristic. As rhetoric's field is opinion, the discourse that can be critiqued and analyzed by the approach that I have presented operates in areas of knowledge where empirical, mathematical or strictly logical means cannot be used to determine truth or falsehood. I have stated that the definition of rhetoric that I have proposed is necessarily an opinion, and thus is an object that is subject to dispute regulated by the method itself. Rhetoric is at once its own object and subject. If this is a paradox, it is no more mysterious than the capability we as humans have of questioning, critiquing and analyzing our own thoughts. While the definition of rhetoric that I have proposed is necessarily an opinion, the risk of falling into the fallacy of infinite regress is avoided by the agreement which has to be made when defining all terms used in human discourse. Definitions are, in the end, agreed upon conventions. This means that the charge can be leveled that the definition I have proposed and the field of rhetoric (opinion) have very little if anything to do with "truth" (or Truth) and can for that reason be dispensed with. The way in which I have attempted to meet with this criticism is to refer to the "truths" that Mackie discusses in relation to particular fields of knowledge or particular practices and their agreed upon or assumed standards. Wherever there are agreed upon or assumed standards, it is possible to determine truth

or falsehood within the framework the standards are contained in. Since Aristotle on the one hand states that both dialectic and rhetoric deal with matters about which opposing views can be argued for and, on the other, he states that rhetoric deals with truth, it can be assumed that one type of truth that he is referring to has to do with agreed upon conventions in the sense Mackie has described. To enter into the debate of whether rhetoric is a viable tool for discovering absolute Truth lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. This is a debate that, as we have seen, goes back to Plato's *Gorgias*, and which has not been settled. For the present, the types of truths that Mackie and Aristotle describe present sufficient and profound challenges.

I have asserted at the outset that a primary aim in this dissertation is to imitate the way Peter Barry presents the various approaches to looking at literature in his introduction to literary theory. That is, he attempts to explain in a clear and precise manner each respective approach that brings into focus not only their merits but flaws as well. It is important to bear in mind that Barry does not state outright that the approaches that he explains and illustrates are necessarily argumentative positions. That is, he does not state that the ways of looking at literature he explores are fully embedded with rhetorical devices that can be challenged, due to their falling in rhetoric's field of operations: opinion. Assuming that the definition of rhetoric that I have proposed is accepted, one of the conclusions to be drawn is that each way of looking at literature presented by Barry will have in its framework of operations criteria with which to identify what are, based on the principles and perspective of the particular approach, truths and falsehoods. Russian formalism, practical criticism, "Liberal Humanism," structuralism, post-structuralism (deconstruction), psychoanalytic criticism, feminist criticism, lesbian/gay criticism, Marxist criticism, new historicism, cultural materialism, postcolonial criticism, stylistics – in short, any of these approaches or any others that

have appeared prior to or subsequent to those listed above will contain agreed upon or assumed standards (as well as identifiable systems of value) by which respective “truth” or “falsehood” can be determined using rhetoric as critical and analytical tool.

Obviously, conflicts ensue among the various approaches with respect to the truths or falsehoods that can be identified from within the framework of each approach. This has occurred on the one hand as a result of the way literary criticism and theory has evolved, and at other times due to differences in terms of theoretical positions. One obvious example is the rejection of what has been called “Liberal Humanism” by scholars adhering to the “truths” of post-modern theory. Along the same lines, post-structuralism takes the tenets of structuralism to task, building on while at the same time rejecting the latter’s core concepts. (At present, “post-postmodernism” takes postmodernism to task, announcing that the latter is dead.)<sup>135</sup>

An important concept in this regard is that any approach can be used to critique or analyze discourse written in the framework or from the perspective of another approach. That is, it is possible to carry out a post-structuralist analysis of “Liberal humanist” methodology, and vice versa. It is also possible to undertake a Marxist analysis of feminist criticism – and vice versa. Any or all of the approaches listed above can be used to critique and analyze any or all of the others. What is crucial to keep in mind is that *none of the approaches are neutral – all of them are based on opinion as opposed to empirically verifiable, hard facts*. None of the approaches has a monopoly on truth. All of the approaches are embedded within their particular systems of values by which truth and falsehood, good or evil (or absence thereof, depending on the approach) and so on are attributed – *rhetoric included*. For even though rhetoric – in the definition that I have proposed in this dissertation – functions on the surface as a

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<sup>135</sup> See Kirby, Alan.

neutral device for critiquing and analyzing discourse, as a sort of “meta-approach” that stands outside of other approaches it can, when put into application, also easily be identified as being enmeshed in a system of values. I have used the term “critical thinker,” and have stated that we, as students of literature ought to make it our aim to be critical thinkers when examining critically any text we encounter. But even the term “critical thinker” is a term based on a particular set of defining values subject to scrutiny. The stance that I have utilized in this dissertation is by no means beyond reproach and can easily be challenged and, from the standpoint of the agreed upon conventions of another approach, be evaluated as holding either “truths” or “falsehoods.”

What I have attempted to do with this dissertation is return to the very origins of discourse and literary analysis. The reason I have done this is, on the one hand, as I have stated at the beginning of this dissertation, to answer a plea made by Terry Eagleton. For in his primer to literary theory he suggests that classical rhetoric is a single approach that can be used to analyze the whole of western discourse. He states that rhetoric as an approach has been in disuse for three centuries. He later modifies his statement in subsequent work where he states that cultural materialists, feminist critics and so on have been carrying out rhetorical criticism in the classical tradition. And, *from the standpoint of his definition of rhetoric*, he is not mistaken. That is, the critical approaches he mentions undertake what can be called rhetorical criticism. But what these approaches do not do is use concepts or mechanisms in the way that I have proposed; a model which I believe is rhetoric that has been broken down into its fundamental parts. Deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric are the basic modes that provide the structuring of persuasive argumentation, while *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* function as the proofs used to argue both coherently and convincingly. *Logos* as proof

entails the manner in which logic and reason enter into argumentation. *Pathos* stands as the emotional, thus psychological component whose importance cannot be underestimated in the art of persuasion. Finally, *ethos* provides a basis for persuasion based on the character (i.e., authority on several levels) of the rhetor in question. The three proofs function together and are inseparable. In this sense, the proofs feed on themselves. For it is possible to take a single argument and examine it bringing into focus just one of the three proofs, yet the other two can be shown to be fully and simultaneously operative. And it is precisely this definition of rhetoric – a definition I have articulated based on Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric and other texts from his corpus – which I believe can be highly useful to students of literature as a fundamental and powerful critical and analytical tool.

I have made Plato’s *Gorgias* my point of departure. As stated at the outset, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is a response to Plato. I have made reference to various thinkers from antiquity as well as thinkers from history up to the present who use, on the whole, an Aristotelian definition of rhetoric. I have done this because, as I have suggested at the beginning of this dissertation, if a student of any discipline intends on entering into dialogue with other thinkers of that discipline, she must gain as much knowledge as possible on what has taken place previously. I have cited Lamont in this regard, who when writing about Derrida asserted that the latter’s theoretical approach made it possible for students to discuss the so-called logocentrism of the philosophical tradition without having read a single classic of philosophy. I compared this with Kidd’s stance, which argues for in depth erudition when entering into a field of knowledge. So rather than using, say, Perelman’s approach to rhetoric (which is based on the classical tradition) – which he articulated in the middle of the twentieth century - as a my starting point for entering into the conversation, I have started from rhetoric’s beginnings in

order to provide an adequate basis for understanding how this mode of persuasive discourse has been defined from its earliest instances. What is interesting along these lines that *the* major introduction to critical literary theory written by Eagleton uses the eighteenth century as its point of departure (17) and Peter Barry's introduction starts with the "first quarter of the nineteenth century" (12). Both Eagleton and Barry are, of course, writing their primers from the standpoint of English literature, which in part explains their insularity. And while it is true that Eagleton argues that it is necessary to return to ancient rhetoric and that Barry identifies Aristotle's *Poetics* as the earliest work of theory (21), both of their works focus on literary studies' development from the standpoint of English literature, meanwhile providing somewhat incomplete accounts of the classical tradition. These two primers stand as major starting points for students of English literature today who wish to enter into the complexities of literary and cultural theory. It is for this reason that I have made my focus Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. My aim has been to fill a gap in order to provide students of (not just English) literature with a more in-depth account of the beginnings of discourse analysis. What I have presented is by no means comprehensive, but is meant to be a starting point, in the sense Aristotle writes of in his *Nichomachean Ethics*.

But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to determine them correctly, since they have a great influence on what follows. *For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it* (Barnes – Complete – 1736, italics mine).

Since the definition that Aristotle provides of rhetoric in his treatise is the most comprehensive and developed of early accounts and effectively changed the history of the term and how rhetoric has been defined and understood subsequently throughout history, it stands as a crucial point of departure for students of literature who wish to add the oldest form of discourse analysis to the critical and analytical tools they are in

command of. I have stated in the introduction that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is cross-referenced with other works which add further dimensions to his definition: *Sophistical Refutations*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Poetics*, *Politics*, *Topics*, and so on. Gaining as much knowledge on other works by other thinkers at the time is also crucial. I have explored works by other major contributors to the conversation on rhetoric as well, in order to provide an adequate base with which to understand and use this way of analyzing and critiquing written and spoken discourse.

The definition of rhetoric that I have proposed in this dissertation is a method that can, in my opinion, be used for critical thinking. That is, its concepts can be used to analyze not only literary texts, but any and all discourse where the mechanisms of rhetoric are present. It is my belief that what I have presented is an extremely powerful tool that will enable students to identify the rhetorical, that is, *argumentative as opposed to empirical, strictly logical (in a formal sense) and mathematical* proofs and mechanisms utilized by the authors of the texts when analyzing the latter's works. The ability to identify the rhetorical mechanisms utilized by writers, thinkers, scholars – or even by their next door neighbors – will empower students to identify both the strengths and weakness of the *opinions* they are being presented in rhetorical arguments. Because of the empowerment that a solid footing in classical rhetoric provides, students will be able to decide whether or not to accept a particular argument as persuasive or convincing, and will thereby be equipped to question and attack arguments advanced even by scholars whose *ethos* is huge, and to decide whether the arguments (i.e., opinions) put forth by major thinkers hold water or are, in Aristotle's words, only “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” That is, the model of rhetoric that I have presented here will enhance and enable students' capacity for critical thought.

I have attempted to show that rhetoric, as I have defined it, makes it possible to reveal the system of values in which texts that are analyzed with this approach are embedded, which makes it possible to evaluate the morality informed by the same system. In this respect, Mackie's definition of what he calls the "problem of morality in the narrow sense" system is will prove illuminating:

We must think of a 'game' in which most, perhaps all, of the 'players' are largely selfish, or have limited sympathies, in a situation where scarce resources and the like tend to produce conflicts of interest; further, it is important for most of the 'players' that certain roughly specifiable evils (which, other things being equal, would result from the basic situation) should be prevented or reduced; we are asking what are the possibly acceptable principles of constraint on action the general encouragement of and widespread respect for which will do most to counter these evils, subject to the assumption that these constraints will not be respected by all the 'players' all the time (165).

I have shown how David Lansing's narrative functions as a rhetorical argument in which he makes his case in order to obtain absolution for his "crime" on the one hand, and praise for his ability to write, on the other. I have attempted to show how he makes his plea to "highly educated and cultured readers" who, in their seeking of An-other (as opposed to an Other), identify with him due to a shared value system.<sup>136</sup> I have contrasted this group of readers with the "unsophisticated" readers, which demonstrates what Mackie is referring to above. Both groups are composed of 'players' who are largely selfish and view their own system of values to be superior. Both groups are in competition and, in their respective ways, employ means to obtain and maintain power over the other group. (Whether the means are fair or unfair is a matter to be decided by each individual, by each critical thinker.) Both groups have limited sympathies for the other group. Mackie's comments on the problem of morality is, of course, meant to be applied in a general sense to all of humanity.

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<sup>136</sup> In this sense I differ from theorists who posit "alterity" as the dominant paradigm of ethics. See Hale; also Sanders.



In order to demonstrate the model of rhetoric that I am presenting, I have highlighted two constructs, the “highly educated and cultured readers” and “unsophisticated readers.” In my discussion I have brought to the fore what each group perceives as “good” from the standpoint of their system of values. In doing this I borrow from Aristotle’s ideas when he outlines the various constitutions that govern different communities: democracy, whose basic motivating principle he states is freedom; oligarchy, whose basic motivating principle he states is wealth; aristocracy, whose basic motivating principle he states is things related to education and traditions of law; and tyranny, whose basic motivating principle he states is self-preservation. These groups – which are categorized broadly in political terms – would necessarily, due to their differing and selfish interests, come into conflict. Eagleton mirrors Aristotle’s mode of categorization when he identifies three basic groups that come into conflict on a political plane: conservatives, radicals and liberals. He identifies the values he believes are held sacred by each group:

For conservatives, there is that in the world which cannot be tampered with, known as property. For radicals, too, there is that which is beyond our meddling, known as the autonomy of others. It is this which grounds our notions of objectivity. Liberals, characteristically, back both horses, believing in both property and autonomy (After, 139).

So we can see that these various groups – which serve here as examples and whose systems of values are capable of being presented in reductive form – are described by Mackie’s model, which asserts that different ‘players’ come into conflict in the ‘game’ he describes.

I do not pretend that the model of rhetoric that I have presented will solve any conflict, rather that it will enable students to critically analyze the rhetorically charged discourse that is produced by members of any group, whether or not they are aware of this fact or will admit it. One always argues tooth and nail for one’s own opinions,

presenting them as “truth,” while attacking the “truths” of others as being mere *opinions*.

This leads us finally back to the original quote that provides the backstage lighting to the rhetorical performance that has just been enacted. That is, Humpty Dumpty’s insightful and very “true” comment that it does not matter how many meanings a word can have – if a word can mean anything at all in the postmodern (or post-postmodern, pseudo-Modernist, digitally Humanistic) world – but instead, as Humpty says, what matters is which word is to be *master*. And that word will be the *logos* whose power is enforced by the existing regime at any given point in history. Precisely how this power is enforced is a matter that lies beyond the scope of this dissertation, whose aim has been to equip students with the ability to identify and evaluate, to analyze, critique and question any discourse in which rhetorical mechanisms are present.



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