Ideology vs Perception of Economic Threat: the predictors of voting for far-right parties in Portugal.

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M

2023

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IDEOLOGY VS PERCEPTION THE ECONOMIC THREAT: THE PREDICTORS OF VOTING FOR FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN PORTUGAL.

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June, 2023

Dissertation presented for the Master's in Psychology, Organizational, Social, and Work Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of University of Porto, supervised by Professor *Isabel Rocha Pinto* (F.P.C.E.U.P.)

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Acknowledgements

Em primeiro lugar, gostaria de agradecer *aos participantes* que gentilmente se disponibilizaram a colaborar neste estudo, tornando tudo isto possível.

Agradeço, também, a todos os professores que me acompanharam ao longo destes 5 anos e impulsionaram o meu desenvolvimento pessoal e profissional.

Agradecer, particularmente, à professora Doutora *Isabel Pinto* por toda a dedicação e acompanhamento. Estou grata por ter tido a oportunidade de aprender com alguém tão apaixonada pela área. Agradecer, ainda, pela paciência, mas, principalmente, por ter acreditado e confiado em mim desde o primeiro dia quando sugeri este tema tão delicado e controverso. Agradeço por todas as palavras de encorajamento e incentivo.

Um obrigado (gigante) à *Sara*. A pessoa que foi incansável durante todo este processo. A pessoa que me apoiou nos momentos de dúvida. A pessoa que sempre procurou arranjar soluções para os problemas que pareciam não ter solução. A pessoa que sempre quis ajudar e me acompanhou de perto. Obrigada pela disponibilidade, preocupação e por teres tornado esta jornada desafiadora mais leve.

Agradeço, também, à minha *família* por todo o amor incondicional. Obrigada por me terem proporcionado o melhor possível para que conseguisse sempre alcançar os meus sonhos. Em especial, agradecer às minhas irmãs, *Magali* e *Tatiana*, pelo apoio constante, pelas horas infinitas de desabafos e conselhos e por terem feito de mim a mulher que sou hoje.

Agradecer a todos os meus *amigos*, que tiveram de me aturar durante os tempos mais complicados deste processo, mas que nunca me deixaram desistir. Em especial, agradecer à *Gaio* e ao *Marcos* que foram os melhores amigos, os meus pilares destes cinco anos e as melhores pessoas que a faculdade me deu e que levarei para a vida.

Agradecer ao *Tiago* por ter estado sempre presente, por ter sido o amparo que tantas vezes necessitei, por ter sempre acreditado em mim e nas minhas capacidades e por permitir que eu fosse sempre a melhor versão de mim mesma. Agradecer por ser o meu porto seguro, a minha pessoa e o melhor namorado.

Por fim, agradecer ao meu avô que será, para sempre, das pessoas mais especiais da minha vida. Obrigada por teres sempre incentivado a que fosse mais e melhor, obrigada pelas palavras sempre tão sábias, obrigada por sempre acreditares que seria capaz e por sempre incentivares a que seguisse os meus sonhos.

Resumo

Este estudo procura contribuir para o estudo das motivações para a adesão a partidos políticos de extrema-direita na Europa, com especial enfoque em Portugal, ao investigar a relação entre crenças ideológicas e perceção de ameaça económica. Através de um estudo correlacional ($N = 279$), analisamos os preditores de voto em partidos de extrema-direita em Portugal, utilizando a Tendência Política e a Perceção de Ameaça Económica como variáveis independentes e a Disposição para Votar num Partido de Extrema-direita como variável dependente. Além disso, exploramos o papel mediador de variáveis como Concordância com Posições Anti-imigração, Nacionalistas, Tradicionalistas e Autoritárias. Como seria de esperar, os resultados revelam que quanto mais inclinados à direita são os participantes, mais propensos estão a votar em partidos de extrema-direita. No entanto, e mais interessante para os resultados, este acordo é mediado pelo acordo com posições tradicionalistas e autoritárias e não com o acordo com posições anti-imigração e nacionalistas. A perceção de ameaça económica, apesar de não predizer diretamente o comportamento de voto, modera a relação entre a tendência política e a concordância com posições tradicionalistas (apenas), amplificando a sua influência entre indivíduos de direita e reforçando ainda mais o apoio aos partidos de extrema-direita. Estes resultados são discutidos à luz das implicações destes processos psicossociais para a evidência empírica atual, e quanto às suas implicações para decisores políticos e atores sociais que procuram lidar com o aumento do extremismo político e promover uma sociedade mais harmoniosa e equitativa.

Palavras-chave: Partidos de extrema-direita; crenças ideológicas; perceção de ameaça económica; comportamento de voto.

Abstract

This study aims to contribute to the understanding of motivations for joining far-right political parties in Europe, with a specific focus on Portugal, by investigating the relationship between ideological beliefs and perception of economic threat. Through a correlational study ($N = 279$), we analyzed the predictors of voting for far-right parties in Portugal, using Political Tendency and Perception of Economic Threat as independent variables, and Willingness to Vote for a Far-Right Party as the dependent variable. Additionally, we explored the mediating role of variables such as Agreement with Anti-immigration, Nationalist, Traditionalist, and Authoritarian Stances. As expected, the results reveal that participants who lean more towards the right are more likely to vote for far-right parties. However, and more interestingly, this association is mediated by agreement with traditionalist and authoritarian positions, rather than with anti-immigration and nationalist positions. While perception of economic threat does not directly predict voting behavior, it moderates the relationship between political tendency and agreement with traditionalist positions (only), amplifying its influence among right-leaning individuals and further reinforcing support for far-right parties. These findings are discussed considering their implications for current empirical evidence and their relevance for policymakers and social actors seeking to address the rise of political extremism and promote a more harmonious and equitable society.

Keywords: Far-right parties; ideological beliefs; economic threat perception; voting behavior

Résumé

Cette étude vise à contribuer à la compréhension des motivations de l'adhésion aux partis politiques d'extrême droite en Europe, avec une attention particulière sur le Portugal, en examinant la relation entre les croyances idéologiques et la perception de la menace économique. À travers une étude corrélationnelle ($N = 279$), nous avons analysé les prédicteurs du vote pour les partis d'extrême droite au Portugal, en utilisant la Tendance Politique et la Perception de la Menace Économique comme variables indépendantes, et la Volonté de Voter pour un Parti d'Extrême Droite comme variable dépendante. De plus, nous avons exploré le rôle médiateur de variables telles que l'Accord avec les Positions Anti-immigration, Nationalistes, Traditionnalistes et Autoritaires. Comme prévu, les résultats révèlent que plus les participants penchent à droite, plus ils sont enclins à voter pour les partis d'extrême droite. Cependant, et plus intéressant encore pour les résultats, cette association est médiatisée par l'accord avec les positions traditionnalistes et autoritaires, plutôt qu'avec les positions anti-immigration et nationalistes. Bien que la perception de la menace économique ne prédise pas directement le comportement de vote, elle module la relation entre la tendance politique et l'accord avec les positions traditionnalistes (uniquement), amplifiant son influence parmi les individus penchants à droite et renforçant davantage le soutien aux partis d'extrême droite. Ces résultats sont discutés à la lumière de leurs implications pour les preuves empiriques actuelles et leur pertinence pour les décideurs politiques et les acteurs sociaux cherchant à faire face à la montée de l'extrémisme politique et à promouvoir une société plus harmonieuse et équitable.

Mots-clés : Partis d'extrême droite ; croyances idéologiques ; perception des menaces économiques ; comportement électoral.

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Introduction

Most theories argued that far-right parties could not achieve political success in Europe during the post-World War II era (Carter 2005; Hainsworth, 2008). However, far-right parties have become more popular in Europe in recent years and are now represented in several national parliaments (Hainsworth, 2008).

Most new far-right parties were founded in the 1980s and 1990s, with some even created in the 1970s, as in the case of the French National Front. They began to gain more significant electoral support in the mid-1980s and tend to label themselves as "Fronts" or "Blocks," such as Forces for Democracy, Liberty, and Progress, avoiding the term "party" in their official names (Hainsworth, 2008). The reason for this avoidance is that the term "party" is perceived as legitimizing social divisions and fragmenting society by pitting groups belonging to the same collective body against one another. As a result, depending on the party, its leaders, and members, they may not self-identify as belonging to the far-right (Givens, 2005). Even though some of their origins can be linked to ex-fascists or other groups supporting these extreme right-wing movements from the past, currently, they all seek to distance themselves from such a negative stereotype perceived by the public opinion (Ignazi, 2006).

The far-right parties that have gained electoral support in post-war Europe have distanced themselves from fascism and racist violence, adopting a modernized discourse that avoids direct references to race and that claims a distance from fascism (Golder 2003; Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). Their rise is associated with globalization, multiculturalism, large migration flows, and the construction of the European Union. Indeed, these changes lead to increased contact between different cultures, which is commonly related to perceived threat by the population, as a form of probable loss of control over their culture identity and traditional values (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). Moreover, these changes also bring uncertainty regarding their own nation, which is an uncomfortable state of mind (Hogg, 2007) and perception of competition for limited resources which is also related to negative reactions against outgroups in competitive contexts (Sherif, 1954). These sentiments can contribute to the growth of far-right parties, which offer simplistic and nationalist solutions to address these concerns (Golder, 2003). Although they are also nationalist, these parties define "difference" through ideological criteria, seeking to protect national identity and maintain a traditional way of life (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). They work within the parameters of liberal democracy and seek to implement change from within the system. The

parties of the "new far-right" have three common characteristics: the use of populist rhetoric, nativism, and authoritarianism (Heyne & Manucci, 2021). As such, the spread of far-right ideologies, characterized by authoritarianism, nationalism, xenophobia, traditionalism, among others, can have detrimental effects on democratic values, social cohesion, and human rights.

In addition to understanding the motivations and concerns of voters susceptible to the appeal of far-right parties, it is important to consider the broader context in which these parties gain support. Studies have shown that during times of crisis, such as economic downturns or social upheavals, these parties tend to experience increased popularity and gain momentum (Droves, 2014; Fritsche et al., 2011; Jesuit et al., 2009). Considering our current socioeconomic context, in which a pandemic and a war between Russia and Ukraine are currently affecting people's livelihoods and lead to a deeply installed economic crisis, comprehending the underlying factors contributing to the growth of these parties and exploring effective strategies to counteract their influence is of utmost importance and urgency. Particularly, it is important to comprehend the factors that drive individuals to vote for far-right parties during times of crisis and whether this choice is mainly based on their ideological beliefs or influenced by their perception of economic threat. Furthermore, understanding the motivating factors behind support for these parties can aid in the development of effective strategies to combat the growth of political extremism and foster a fairer and more inclusive society.

1. Perception of Economic Threat in a time of economic decline

Individuals tend to experience feelings of threat when they understand that they have lack of ability to effectively cope with actual or anticipated demands (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). Though there are several typologies of threats. Specifically, we are interested in economic threat, which is a realistic threat, i.e. a threat to the satisfaction of real human needs that are related to material resources and physical integrity (Fritsche & Jugert, 2017). Furthermore, it refers to economic needs such as possessions (e.g., money) or sources of income (e.g., employment). This type of threat can be experienced on a personal level (e.g., when there is fear of personal economic descent) or on a collective level (e.g., when the country is facing an economic crisis) (Stephan et al., 2008).

During periods of recession, people tend to develop threat perceptions about their financial situation which triggers negative psychological consequences, such as increased

stress levels and reduced self-efficacy, control, and confidence (Viseu et al., 2019; Alonso-Ferres et al., 2020). One of the consequences of a scenario with a high perception of threat, such as a decline in the economic condition of their country is uncertainty (Fritsche et al., 2011). According to Hogg (2007), joining groups in a time of threat helps to reduce the uncertainty that individuals feel when they are threatened. But this relationship only works if groups have certain characteristics, namely, structure, clear boundaries, shared goals, consensual group prototype, and interdependence among group members (Hogg, 2007). By identifying with a group, individuals incorporate the group prototype, which includes the group's values and norms. Some of the consequences that result from the connection with far-right parties are nationalism, ethnocentrism and, consequently, the derogation of other groups, since these are characteristics of the far-right parties (Hogg, 2007).

Also of note is that, when individuals enter a situation where they feel threatened, such as an economic crisis, they tend to develop more prejudiced attitudes and be less tolerant of those who differ from them (Burke et al., 2010; Duckitt et al., 2002). In turn, and in opposition, they seem to attribute greater approval to those they strongly support and identify as members of their group (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Furthermore, economic threat is a factor that enhances prejudice against groups that are not linked to intergroup economic struggle, such as religious, ethnic, and immigrant groups (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013).

2. Far-right

The concept of the far-right is a very broad one, as it has received theoretical input from various authors. According to Lowy (2015), we can verify the existence of three subgroups within the far-right: parties of a directly fascist and/or Nazi character, semi-fascist parties, and far-right parties that do not have fascist origins but share these ideological ideals. In turn, Ignazi (1996) admits that there are two types of far-right parties: traditional forces and the new far-right. The traditional forces reflect the historical past based on fascism and violence. The new far-right is characterized by the evolution following the post-industrial society triggered by new social cleavages (Tostes, 2009). It is according to this perspective that the author defends the existence of anti-system parties in which the far right-wing political actors fit (Ignazi, 1996). In addition, there are also authors who distinguish between the extreme right and ideas around "right-wing radicalism". Thus, far-right parties are characterized by being anti-democratic, and against the fundamental principle of the

sovereignty of the people (Mudde, 2007). In contrast, the parties of radicalism are democratic, even if they oppose some fundamental values of liberal democracy.

2.1. The ideology of the far-right

Although different authors defend different typologies, the literature admits that it is possible to standardize the aspects surrounding the far-right by grouping together the common ideological characteristics most highlighted in the literature. For this reason, identical practices and discourses are found among the various far-right parties. Thus, notions such as "anti-democracy," "nationalism," " anti-immigration", "traditionalism," and "authoritarianism" are recurrently associated with the far-right, composing its ideological bases (Droves, 2014; Guimarães, 2011).

As mentioned before, to move away from the past associated with fascism, far-right parties defend the existence of democracy and currently seek to respond to the changes brought about by globalization (Golder, 2003; Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). The political bases of the far-right focus mainly on the defense of traditional values and institutions (Mudde, 2007). For these groups, family, education, and religious practices are the basis for building a standardized society. This society is characterized by organicism and traditionalism that tends to benefit some individuals or groups in society, who are considered superior. This means that the far-right rejects all those who deviate from these standards, leading, for example, to antisemitism, homophobia, and misogyny (Silva et al., 2014).

In addition to this, far-right individuals are highly nationalistic, admitting that one should always defend national interests on a political, economic, and social level (Mudde, 2007). This strong nationalistic sense leads to extreme intolerance of social diversity, triggering, for example, xenophobia, racism, hatred of immigrants, and anti-communism (Droves, 2014).

Not surprisingly, these groups are also characterized by anti-immigration discourses (Guimarães, 2011). This is, again, linked to nationalism, since these parties argue that the reception and integration of immigrants is detrimental to national interests, to the employment, economically, educationally, and even in healthcare (Guimarães, 2011). Therefore, these groups consider that their economy, culture, and values should be protected at all costs by expelling immigrants from their countries, as they contend that the immigrants are responsible for the limited job opportunities available to native citizens (Droves, 2014). In addition to this, they often associate immigrants, particularly Muslims, with insecurity

and social unrest in European societies (Borjas, 1994; Givens, 2002; Mitra, 1988; Mudde, 2007).

2.2. The growth of the far-right in Portugal

For several years, Portugal was considered an anomaly in the European context due to the absence of a significant far-right party (Afonso, 2021; Lopes, 2021; Mendes & Dennison, 2020). In fact, this country has usually been seen as "immune" to the rise of the far-right that has been observed in the rest of Europe (Afonso, 2021; Fernandes & Magalhães, 2020). The lack of a significant party along this ideological line has been attributed to the authoritarian past that may have immunized the Portuguese political system against such forces, thus fascist ideas tend to be widely rejected due to their associations with violence, racial extermination, authoritarianism, and opposition to democracy (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018).

In Portugal, the peculiar status of immunity to the far-right ended with the creation of the Chega party in 2019. Despite winning only 1.3% of the vote in that year's parliamentary elections, its leader, André Ventura, managed to garner 11.9% of the vote in the January 2021 presidential elections, achieving third place, just one point behind the second candidate, and surpassing several candidates from established parties (Afonso, 2021¸ Fernandes & Magalhães, 2020; Heyne & Manucci, 2021). Never in Portugal had a far-right party obtained such a high score in national elections (Fernandes & Magalhães, 2020; Heyne & Manucci, 2021). More recently, Chega again achieved significant results, becoming the 3rd largest political force in Portugal in the 2022 legislative elections, with 7.2% of the vote.

Chega shares several common characteristics with the radical right populist parties that have emerged in Europe in recent years (Afonso, 2021). In its Founding Political Manifesto (Chega, s/d), the party assumes itself as "national, conservative, liberal and personalist." Chega also advocates tougher policies on crime, such as the reintroduction of life imprisonment, chemical castration for sex offenders, and an increase in neighborhood police (Fernandes & Magalhães, 2020). The party also positions itself as a defender of free speech and individual liberty, opposing identity politics and political correctness (Madeira et al., 2021). The Chega party's emphasis on conservative values, including tradition, family, and religion, as well as nationalist and authoritarian ideals, defines its core focus (Fernandes & Magalhães, 2020; Heyne & Manucci, 2021; Mendes, 2021). While this party's representatives do make occasional anti-immigration remarks in their speeches (e.g. Guerreiro, 2023), these aspects do not overshadow their broader agenda. It is worth noting that in contemporary society, issues like anti-immigration are widely condemned and viewed

unfavorably (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). Therefore, Chega's relative success as the third-largest political force in Portugal may stem from their ability to balance their conservative values with rhetoric that validates public dissatisfaction with the government, steering clear of extreme positions that could alienate a significant portion of the electorate. Indeed, the failure of the far-right party PNR (Partido Nacional Renovador) in Portugal has been attributed to factors such as its origins, limited media presence, and its portrayal as a nostalgic extremist group of the past regime (Marchi, 2013); in comparison, Chega benefited from both substantially greater media attention and less stigmatization compared to PNR (Mendes & Dennison, 2020).

2.3. Voting for far-right parties

One of the reasons why the far-right has been gaining territory is the crisis and economic insecurity, being one of the factors that explain voting for a far-right party (Guimarães, 2011; Jesuit et al., 2009; Miller, 2017; Milojev et al., 2014). Far-right electoral performance has been found to always increase in the five years following economic recessions (Funke et al., 2016). Unemployment has been regarded as the most visible aspect of an economic crisis, and thus assumes importance in approaches to voting for the far-right (Anastasakis, 2001; Carter, 2005; Droves, 2014; Jesuit et al., 2009; Norris, 2005). Unemployment explains voting not only based on the incidence of personal economic threat, but also based on societal fear (Anastasakis, 2001). It is for this reason that, in various election campaigns, we observe references to unemployment, with them attributing the cause of this phenomenon not only to the state of the economy, but also to immigration (Droves, 2014).

3. Overview and Research Question

The economic, political, and social crisis has become increasingly acute in Portugal and other European countries, due to the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the escalating conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The crisis has been a contributing factor to the rise of far-right parties throughout Europe (Guimarães, 2011; Jesuit et al., 2009; Miller, 2017; Milojev et al., 2014), and this may be seen in Portugal as well.

The present study aims to investigate the predictors of voting for far-right parties in Portugal, specifically seeking to determine whether individuals are more likely to vote for a

far-right party solely based on their ideological beliefs or if their decision to vote for such parties is influenced by the economic threat they perceive.

According to literature, to reduce a state of threat, people tend to ally themselves with certain groups that provide them with structure and clear and well-defined prescriptions on how to act, feel and think, and how they should relate to others (Hogg, 2007). Considering that far-right groups have these characteristics, it is anticipated that individuals facing economic threats will be more inclined to vote for a far-right party. Additionally, it is expected that this association will be mediated by their attitudes associated with the ideologies of this same group, such as anti-immigrant, traditionalist, and authoritarian attitudes, which in turn will lead to a greater likelihood of voting for a far-right party. In a scenario of economic threat, people's dissatisfaction and discontent increases, which should lead to the development of nationalistic and anti-immigration thoughts to protect the country's economy, culture, and values (Droves, 2014). These are aspects that are associated with the far-right ideology, as discussed by Droves (2014), Guimarães (2011) and Mudde (2007). Moreover, the literature indicates that feelings of threat are associated with political conservatism, of which nationalism, traditionalism and authoritarianism are main dimensions (Mudde, 2000). Therefore, as people adhere more strongly to the ideologies associated with the far-right, they are more likely to become predisposed to vote for these parties.

In parallel, studies have shown that when it comes to voting behavior, ideology is more important than context (Lachat, 2008; Levendusky, 2010; Singer, 2016). This is because, in such critical contexts, parties tend to clearly present a set of political positions that are more coherent and more associated with ideological orientations (that supposedly respond to the crisis contexts), which makes it easier for voters to use these references to describe themselves and recognize parties, as well as to associate their ideological preferences more easily with their vote (Levendusky, 2010; Lachat, 2008; Singer, 2016). Indeed, individuals tend to disregard the role of contexts on their voting behavior and ascribe ideology as the main justification for it (Singer, 2016).

So, it remains unclear whether voting for far-right parties is solely driven by ideological alignment or if situational factors, such as perceived economic threats, may also serve as a predictor and mainly as a moderator (since it is usually neglected by individuals' assumed motivations) of such voting behavior. Following on from this, the study aims to answer the following research question: Which roles do ideological and contextual factors play on the prediction of voting for far-right parties in Portugal? We intend to respond to

this question through mediation moderation models in which Political Tendency is tested as independent variable (see Figure 1) and Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party as the dependent variable. In addition, we will test several mediators of this association in parallel, including Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances, Agreement with Nationalist Stances, Agreement with Traditionalist Stances and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances. We will also test the same model, but with the inclusion of Perception of Economic Threat as the predictor instead of Political Tendency (see Figure 2). The idea is to examine the idea that this last model would, at least, explain less variability of the dependent measure, than the previous one, given that literature predicts contextual factors as less relevant to explain voting behavior in far-right parties. Moreover, and more importantly for our rationale, we will investigate the moderating effect of Perception of Economic Threat on the relationship between Political Tendency and each mediator (ideological dimensions), with the aim of trying to understand if the perception of economic threat can influence the relationship between political tendency and willingness to agree with each of the stances and consequent impact on willingness to vote for far-right party (see Figure 3). By testing these models, we aim to shed light on the mechanisms that underlie the link between political ideology and support for far-right parties in Portugal. We expect perceived economic threat to reinforce these relationships and will explore which ideological dimensions are used to justify such adherence.

Figure 1

Mediation Model 1

Figure 2

Mediation Model 2

Figure 3

Mediation Model 3

Pilot Study

We conducted a pilot study (see Appendix A) with the aim of finding a stimulus that would allow all participants to be induced with the same level of economic threat triggered by the most recent events (Pandemic COVID-19 and Ukraine-Russia War). We tested four stimuli (see Appendix B, C, D and E) with the intention of making salient the economic crisis, along with a control condition where no stimulus was present.

1. Participants

The sample was selected by convenience, making use of an online platform - Qualtrics. A total of 115 participants completed this survey; they were aged between 18 and 66 years ($M = 24.63$, $SD = 8.99$), with 31 (27%) male and 83 (72.2%) female participants, as well as one participant (0.9%) that identified with another gender[1]. More detailed information about the sociodemographic data can be found in Table 1.

2. Procedure

Participants were included in one of five conditions, four with different stimuli and one was the control condition. The first stimulus was an open question, where participants named three consequences of an economic crisis (e.g., Ukrainian-Russian War, Pandemic COVID-19). The second stimulus was a fictitious news article, which was based on some real facts and concerns. The news warns that Portugal may be on the verge of stagflation - a period of low economic growth, high inflation, and high unemployment - due to recent events such as the pandemic crisis and the effects of the Ukrainian-Russian War. Prices of energy, raw materials, and food have been rising, which can affect families and their ability to cope with expenses. The third stimulus consisted of a video (see Appendix D) taken from the *SIC Notícias* website, related to the impact that the war between Russia and Ukraine, along with the effects of the pandemic, are having on food prices.

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[1]We collected data from 189 participants. We performed a database cleaning and removed 15 outliers, participants who didn't answer the full questionnaire (48) or who didn't consent to participate (11).

Finally, the fourth stimulus corresponded to a report (see Appendix E) depicting the projection of GDP in volume over the next 4 years. Although these stimuli differed regarding the content and the psychosocial processes that potentially would turn salient (information processing, empathy, vulnerability, etc), we wanted to obtain that the one that would evoke feelings of concern, anxiety, or uncertainty in participants regarding the economic crisis, resulting in a heightened emotional response. Consequently, this could lead to greater authenticity and sincerity, and thus more reliable daily-life responses, as participants are emotionally engaged.

At the end of each stimulus, in all conditions, participants were asked to answer some items related to the perception that individuals have about the current financial situation of Portugal. The scale used was the Financial Threat Perception (Marjanovic et al., 2013). The instrument is a 5-item scale ($M = 3.36$, $SD = .77$), from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely) ($\alpha = .86$). In the control condition, only this scale was presented.

Table 1

Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Participants in the Pilot Study

	Participants ($n = 115$)
Gender	
Male	27%
Female	72.2%
Other	0.9%
Age	
18 - 30 years old	85.8%
31 - 40 years old	8%
41 years old or older	6.2%
Mean	24.63
Professional Status	
Worker	26.1%
Student	59.1%
Student Worker	8.7%
Unemployed	4.3%
Retired	0.9%
Unpaid domestic work	0.9%

3. Results

The results of the pilot study found no significant differences between the different conditions, $F_{(4,110)} = 1.29$; $p = .279$. Although non-significant, through an analysis of the means, we found that the condition that differs most from the control condition ($M = 3.14$, $SD = .77$) is the condition where the stimulus is a news article ($M = 3.57$, $SD = .64$). Moreover, we conducted One Sample T-Tests comparing each mean condition with the middle-point of the scale (3). These analyses would inform which are the stimula that significantly differentiate from the neutral position, indicating significant perceived economic threat. The news condition is significantly higher than 3 ($t = 4.09$; $p < .001$). In contrast, the control condition did not significantly differ from 3 ($t = .68$; $p = .504$). This means that we were able to observe a relatively high level of economic threat stimulated by the news as compared to a baseline (control condition), which lead us to use this stimulus in the main study.

We considered this stimulus to the study, with a few changes to reinforce the induction of salience of economic threat.

Present study

1. Participants

Our final sample consists of a total of 279 participants, aged between 18 and 71 years ($M = 25.71$, $SD = 10.12$), with 167 (59.9%) female and 112 (40.1%) male participants[2]. Most of the participants are students (60.9%) and leaning left in terms of political orientation ($M = 3.39$, $SD = 1.46$) (Political tendency: 1 = left-wing; 7 = right-wing). More detailed information about the sociodemographic data can be found in Table 2.

Table 2

Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Participants

	Participants (n = 279)
Gender	
Male	40.1%
Female	59.9%
Age	
18 - 30 years old	80.4%
31 - 40 years old	8.8%
41 - 50 years old	5.9%
51 years old or older	4.9%
Mean	25.71
Professional Status	
Worker	10.8%
Student	60.9%
Student Worker	26.6%
Unemployed	0.7%
Retired	1.1%

2. Procedure

This convenience sample was collected from an online questionnaire, disseminated through social media. The platform used for the development of the questionnaire was Qualtrics. Participants were asked to complete a survey about their opinion on the current economic situation in Portugal considering recent events, such as Covid 19 pandemic and the war Ukraine-Russia. This was stated in the social media post, as well as in the informed consent, in which we reinforced the anonymity of the answers and voluntary character of their participation. No personal information was requested from the participants. To ensure that all participants were exposed to the same level of crisis salience, the stimulus that resulted from the pilot study was presented.

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[2]We collected data from 885 participants. We performed a database cleaning and removed 84 outliers, participants who didn't answer the full questionnaire (219) and participants who answered the induction control measures incorrectly (203).

3. Measures

The questionnaire (see Appendix F) began with questions about sociodemographic information. These were similar to the pilot study (gender, age, employment status), with the addition of political tendency (1 = left-wing; 7 = right-wing) and socio-economic status (1 = very low; 7 = very high). Then, participants were induced with a piece of news (that resulted from the pilot study) to ensure that the same information about the current economic crisis was salient to the participants. After reading the news article, participants answered three induction-check measures, to see if they have read carefully and understood the news: "Does this news story portray the increase in the price of fuel?", (yes/no); "Does the news story portray the concern by various experts about the possibility of returning to a period of stagflation?", (yes/no); "Are the experts concerned with the current economy?" (yes/no).

3.1. Perception of Economic Threat

To measure the participants' Perception of Economic Threat, we used the Financial Threat Perception Scale (Marjanovic et al., 2013), translated (our translation) into Portuguese. The participants answered the following question and items (1= "Not at all" and 7 = "Extremely"): "Please indicate how you feel about the current Portuguese financial situation... e.g. "How uncertain do you feel?" and (2) "How threatened do you feel?". The scale consists of 5 items ($M = 5.24$, $SD = .93$) and we averaged these items into an Economic Threat Perception index (Cronbach's alpha = .88).

3.2. Agreement with Anti-immigration, Nationalism, Traditionalism and Authoritarianism Stances

The participants were presented with some phrases that would have been said by a supposed political leader. In total there were 12 sentences, which were divided into four categories (three items per category): anti-immigration (e.g., "Immigrants bring values that are not compatible with those of our society. If they want to come here, they have to live according to our culture"), nationalism (e.g., "Our country should try with all its strength to be independent from other nations, both economically and politically."), traditionalism (e.g., "It is important that we preserve our traditional values and moral standards") and authoritarianism (e.g., "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn"). We selected these four categories because they are linked to far-right ideology, as indicated by the literature (Droves, 2014; Guimarães, 2011; Mudde, 2007).

The statements present in the anti-immigration category and in the nationalism category were developed based on speeches of extreme right-wing politicians. The statements in the remaining categories are items from the Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Scale (Duckitt et al., 2010).

After each item, subjects were to indicate their degree of agreement with them on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). The mean of the agreement with the 3 items in each category was calculated to create a score for the agreement with each ideology (Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances: $\alpha = 0.85$, $M = 1.67$, $SD = .80$); Agreement with Nationalist Stances: $\alpha = 0.79$, $M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.49$; Agreement with Tradicionalist Stances: $\alpha = 0.85$, $M = 2.12$, $SD = 1.16$; Agreement with Authoritarian Stances: $\alpha = 0.89$, $M = 1.99$, $SD = 1.06$). A factor analysis with oblique rotation was performed on the complete set of items, yielding four factors as anticipated. Factor 1 explained 32.53% of the variance in the items, Factor 2 explained 16.17% of the item variance, Factor 3 explained 12.55% of the item variance, and Factor 4 accounted for 9.12% of the item variance.

3.3. Willingness to vote for a far-right party

After responding to each category of items, participants were asked to tell us to what extent they would be willing to vote for a political leader who had that same speech (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much). The average of the responses to all categories correspond to the measure of the willingness to vote for a far-right party ($M = 1.96$, $SD = .75$).

Results

1. Correlational Analyses

We tested the associations between the variables before testing the mediation and moderated mediation models (see Table 3).

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Political Tendency	3.39	1.46						
2. Perception of Economic Threat	5.24	.93	-.14*					
3. Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances	1.67	.80	.40**	-.04				
4. Agreement with Nationalist Stances	3.55	1.49	.02	-.05	.26**			
5. Agreement with Tradicionalist Stances	2.12	1.16	.39**	-.01	.43**	.16**		
6. Agreement with Authoritarian Stances	1.99	1.06	.31**	-.04	.26**	.12*	.38**	
7. Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party	1.96	.75	.27**	-.03	.42**	.60**	.60**	.57**

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 3 shows that Political Tendency is negatively correlated with the Perception of Economic Threat, meaning that the more right leaning an individual is the lower is their perception of threat. Political Tendency is also correlated with Agreement with Anti-immigration, Traditionalist, and Authoritarian Stances (but not with Nationalist Stances), meaning that the more right leaning one is, the more they identify with these ideologic dimensions. Agreement with Anti-immigration, Nationalist, Traditionalist, and Authoritarian Stances are strongly and significantly positively correlated with each other. They also show significant positive correlations with Willingness to Vote for a Far-Right Party, suggesting that such willingness is associated with a conservative, nationalist, anti-immigration, and authoritarian ideologic political stance (all remaining variables had p > .05).

Overall, our results encourage us to proceed to the mediation and moderated mediation analyses.

2. Mediation Analyses

We used the PROCESS macro for SPSS with 5000 bootstraps (Model 4; Hayes, 2017) to test the mediation models (Hayes, 2018). The purpose of the study is to determine if individuals are more likely to vote for a far-right party solely based on their ideological beliefs (and which dimension is more determinant in this process) or if their decision to vote

for such parties and the use of such ideological determinants are influenced by their perception of high economic threat.

The first model includes Political Tendency as the independent variable and Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party as the dependent variable. The model tested several potential mediators of this association in parallel: Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances, Agreement with Nationalist Stances, Agreement with Traditionalist Stances and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances. The second model differs from the first only in the independent variable (Perception of Economic Threat). The third model is a replica of the first, with the addition of Perception of Economic Threat as a moderator of the relationship between Political Tendency and each mediator (Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances, Agreement with Nationalist Stances, Agreement with Traditionalist Stances and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances).

Model 1. We found that the impact of Political Tendency was significant on the variables Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances ($b = 0.22$, $p < 0.001$), Agreement with Traditionalist Stances ($b = 0.31$, $p < 0.001$) and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances ($b = 0.22$, $p < 0.001$). However, it was not significant on the variable Agreement with Nationalist Stances ($p = 0.793$). This means that the more a person is right-wing, the more they agree with anti-immigration, traditionalist, and authoritarian stances. Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances ($b = 0.05$, $p = 0.164$) did not significantly predict Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party, however agreement with Nationalist Stances ($b = 0.24$, $p < 0.001$), Agreement with Traditionalist Stances ($b = 0.24$, $p < 0.001$) and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances ($b = 0.26$, $p < 0.001$) showed a statistically significant effect. A further inspection on the results revealed that we can only trust the mediation of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances (effect = 0.07, 95%CI = [0.05; 0.10]) and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances (effect = 0.06, 95%CI = [0.04; 0.08]) as significant mediators of the association between Political Tendency and Willingness to vote for far-right party, meaning that the more right-wing participants are, the more they hold higher levels of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances and, in turn, the more they show willingness to vote for a far-right party.

Model 2. Perception of Economic Threat dis not predict significantly the variability found in the variables Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances ($p = 0.465$), Agreement with Nationalist Stances ($p = 0.396$), Agreement with Traditionalist Stances ($p = 0.851$) and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances ($p = 0.480$). Thus, Perception of Economic Threat does not directly predict adherence to far right ideologic dimensions.

Model 3. We conducted a Model 7 in PROCESS to examine the moderator effect of Perception of Economic Threat on the mediation model analyzed in Model 1. Interestingly, the direct effect of economic threat on each mediator was not significant (Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances: $p = 0.677$, Agreement with Nationalist Stances: $p = 0.100$, Agreement with Traditionalist Stances: $p = 0.278$, and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances: $p = 0.457$). However, in line with the significant Index of Moderated Mediation, we found a significant interaction between Political Tendency and Perception of Economic Threat ($b = .11$; $p = .005$), such that the relationship between political tendency and traditionalism is stronger when the perception of economic threat is more pronounced. This suggests that people who lean further to the right on the political spectrum hold even higher levels of traditionalism in situations of high economic threat perception. No other significant interactions were found. By analyzing the indirect effects, it is possible to conclude that the higher the economic threat, the stronger the relationship between Political Tendency and Agreement with Traditionalist Stances which, in turn, is associated with Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party (effect = 0.05 CI [0.02, 0.08], when economic threat is low; effect = 0.07 CI [0.05, 0.10], when economic threat is average; effect = 0.10 CI [0.06, 0.13], when economic threat is high).

Moreover, agreement with Anti-immigration Stances ($b = 0.05$, $p = 0. 164$) did not show a significant effect on the Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party. Agreement with Nationalist Stances ($b = 0.24$, $p < 0.001$), Agreement with Traditionalist Stances ($b = 0. 24$, $p < 0.001$) and Agreement with Authoritarian Stances ($b = 0.25$, $p < 0.001$) emerged as significant predictors. The index of moderated mediation was only significant for Agreement with Traditionalist Stances (*Index* = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95%CI = [0.00; 0.05]) as the mediator in the regression equation model.

In sum, the results of model 1 suggest that the more individuals have a right-wing political tendency, the higher their levels of Agreement with Traditionalist and Authoritarian Stances, which, in turn, are associated with a greater Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party. In turn, the results of model 2 reveal that perceived economic threat does not predict Far-right ideologic dimensions per se. Results of model 3 suggest that perceived economic threat has a significant moderator effect on the relationship between Political Tendency and levels of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances, indicating that in a situation of high economic threat, the more an individual is right leaning the more they tend to exhibit higher levels of Agreement with Traditional Stances, which is associated with a higher Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party.

Table 4

Results for the Model 1

	Model 1									
	Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances		Agreement with Nationalist Stances		Agreement with Traditionalist Stances		Agreement with Authoritarian Stances		Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Political Tendency	.22***	.03	.02	.06	.31***	.04	.22***	.04	-.01	.02
Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances									0.05	.04
Agreement with Nationalist Stances									.24***	.02
Agreement with Traditionalist Stances									.24***	.02
Agreement with Authoritarian Stances									.25***	.03
F									104.47***	
R^2									.73	
Indirect effect of Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances					.012 [-.008; .035]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Nationalist Stances					.004 [-.027; .034]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances					.073 [.048; .101]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Authoritarian Stances					.057 [.036; .079]					

Table 5

Results for the Model 2

	Model 2									
	Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances		Agreement with Nationalist Stances		Agreement with Traditionalist Stances		Agreement with Authoritarian Stances		Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Perception of Economic Threat	.-.04	.05	-.08	.40	-.01	.07	-.05	.07	.02	.03
Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances									0.05	.04
Agreement with Nationalist Stances									.25***	.02
Agreement with Traditionalist Stances									.23***	.02
Agreement with Authoritarian Stances									.25***	.02
F									104.60***	
R²									.73	
Indirect effect of Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances					-.002 [-.011; .004]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Nationalist Stances					-.020 [-.067; .028]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances					-.003 [-.039; .031]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Authoritarian Stances					-.012 [-.048; .021]					

Table 6

Results for the Model 3

	Model 2									
	Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances		Agreement with Nationalist Stances		Agreement with Traditionalist Stances		Agreement with Authoritarian Stances		Willingness to Vote for a Far-right Party	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Political Tendency	.07	.18	-.00	.35	-.27	.25	.18	.24	-.01	.02
Perception of Economic Threat	-.09	.13	-.09	.26	-.35	.18	-.03	.17		
Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances									0.06	.04
Agreement with Nationalist Stances									.24***	.02
Agreement with Traditionalist Stances									.24***	.03
Agreement with Authoritarian Stances									.25***	.03
Interaction (Political Tendency* Perception of Economic Threat)	.75		.00		5.58**		.038			
F									104.47***	
R²									.73	
Index of moderated mediation for Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances					.001 [-.007; .033]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances at low (-1 sd) level of economic threat					.012 [-.007; .033]					
Indirect effect of Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances at average level of economic threat					.012 [-.008; .035]					

Indirect effect of Agreement with Anti-immigration Stances at hight (+ 1sd) level of economic threat	.014 [-.010; .039]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Nationalist Stances	.000 [-.034; .035]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Nationalist Stances at low (-1 sd) level of economic threat	.002 [-.040; .043]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Nationalist Stances at average level of economic threat	.002 [-.028; .033]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Nationalist Stances at hight (+ 1sd) level of economic threat	.003 [-.042; .051]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances	.003 [.003; .005]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances at low (-1 sd) level of economic threat	.048 [.020; .082]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances at average level of economic threat	.073 [.047; .101]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances at hight (+ 1sd) level of economic threat	.097 [.062; .134]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Authoritarian Stances	.002[-.022; .025]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances at low (-1 sd) level of economic threat	.055 [.024; .091]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances at average level of economic threat	.057 [.035; .091]
Indirect effect of Agreement with Traditionalist Stances at hight (+ 1sd) level of economic threat	.059 [.031; .091]

General Discussion and Conclusions

The present study seeks to contribute to address the growing concern surrounding the rise of far-right political parties in Europe, particularly in the context of Portugal, where the economic, political, and social crisis has been a significant contributing factor to their emergence. It is essential to understand the underlying factors driving individuals to vote for far-right parties in times of crisis, and whether this choice is influenced primarily by their ideological beliefs or their perception of economic threat. Therefore, this study aims to identify predictors of voting for far-right parties in Portugal, focusing specifically on the role that ideological beliefs and perceived economic threat play on individuals' decision to vote for such parties. By examining these factors, we hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of the drivers of political extremism.

The results of this study suggest that traditionalist and authoritarian ideologies play a mediating role between one's political tendency and one's intention to vote for a far-right party. That is, the more right-leaning individuals are, the more likely they are to agree with traditionalist and authoritarian stances, which leads to a greater willingness to vote for a far-right party. In turn, the more left-leaning individuals are, the more they tend to distance themselves from traditionalist and authoritarian ideologies. On the other hand, exclusionary ideologies (anti-immigrant ones) do not mediate this relationship in this sample. This is consistent with literature that explains the rise of far-right political parties in Portugal with the historical and cultural context in which the rise of far-right parties occurs. In Portugal, the experience of living under a dictatorship has undoubtedly left a deep imprint on the collective memory and consciousness of the population, shaping their political attitudes and beliefs (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). The rejection of fascist attitudes and values, such as violence and intolerance, has become a fundamental aspect of the country's democratic identity, which may make individuals not willing to disclose anti-immigrant motives for voting for a far-right party. However, the exclusive motive is hidden in participants' responses. Indeed, taking a careful look at the measures of agreement with traditionalism vision, we can observe that the concern to protect the country's symbolic traditions, "the truth" identity is in its basis. Such concern for the "pure" identity and its protection from any other influence from the outside, seems a sophisticated form of exclusive attitudes against outgroups. Modern far-right has adapted to the new political and social context and discourse, presenting themselves as defenders of national identity; they focus more on maintaining a traditional way of life (free of new possible influences coming from the

outside), and in the need for someone, a leader, to keep everything in order, rather than openly advocating for fascist or racist ideologies (Heyne & Manucci, 2021). This shift in discourse (form an exclusion of outgroups towards an ingroup protective argument) allows them to attract a broader range of supporters, including individuals who may not necessarily identify themselves as far-right supporters, but are worried about issues such as globalization, and economic insecurity (Golder 2003; Halikiopoulou et al., 2018).

As an obvious fact, we can see that a person's ideology is undoubtedly an important factor that influences their willingness to vote for a far-right party, with right-leaning individuals being more predisposed to vote for such a party. Furthermore, and more importantly, the results demonstrate that the perception of economic threat does not directly influence the willingness to vote for a far-right party but, and as expected, has a significant impact on this process. It appears that experiencing economic threat may not be sufficient to induce significant changes in individuals' agreement with certain ideologies that are widely criticized in contemporary society (Golder 2003; Halikiopoulou et al., 2018), particularly in a country that so vehemently opposes them (Mendes & Dennison, 2020).

Indeed, the perception of economic threat does function as a significant moderator in the relationship between Political Tendency and Agreement with Traditionalist Stances. In other words, the more economically threatened individuals that are more right-leaning feel, the more likely they are to exhibit higher levels of agreement with Traditionalist stances (ingroup protection of their identity), which is associated with a greater willingness to vote for a far-right party. Thus, although political tendency is an important predictor of voting intention for a far-right party, the context, in this case characterized by economic threat, strengthens the relationship between political tendency and agreement with the traditionalism justification for voting for a far-right party.

This process is consistent with the idea that people tend to ally themselves with groups that provide them with structure, prescriptions on how to act, feel and think, and how to relate to others and protect ingroup identity, to reduce a state of threat (Hogg, 2007). Considering that far-right groups align perfectly with this description, it is expected that individuals facing economic threats are more likely to vote for a far-right party. Furthermore, our results seem to suggest that, when people feel threatened, which may happen in times of instability, such as an economic crisis, people may be more drawn to ideologies and political parties that promote nostalgia for the "good old days" and offer a sense of ingroup security and protection, and a return to a lost stability. In this regard, traditionalism can become an attractive factor for voters during times of crisis and threat, as

politicians emphasize the narrative of returning to past values and practices, which are perceived as being prevalent in more stable and reliable times. For instance, in Portugal, the Chega party is primarily known for its messages that appeal to nostalgia and the reconstruction of a cultural and national identity that is believed to have been lost (Mendes, 2021), which may be one of the reasons for its significant growth in recent years. Interestingly, if we take the complementary vision of our results, they also suggest that the more one leans left, the less one agrees with traditionalist stances, when economic threat is very high. This may be related to the fact that leftist ideologies embrace progress and changes in the current economic model (Jost et al., 2009) and this need for change may be exacerbated by economic threat as it may signify that the current economic model is not working. As such, in times of high economic threat, there may be a polarization of opinions on whether the system should continue to progress or revert to what it was, in terms of one's political tendency. This may be a cause for concern as polarization in society has been shown to strengthen individuals' political identities, leading them to increasingly identify with a particular political group and adopt behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions aligned with that identity (Jung & Mittal, 2020) concomitant to the increase in hostility and devaluation of external political groups (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). As polarization intensifies, individuals are more likely to adopt extreme political opinions and exhibit negative emotions toward members of opposing political groups, which can create an environment of partisanship and mutual distrust among different groups (Van Prooijen et al., 2015). Political polarization can also lead to social conflicts, including increased hostility, discrimination against vulnerable groups, and an atmosphere of outgroup exclusion, promoting stigmatization and prejudice (Nisbet et al., 2015). This may be due to a formation of rigid collective identities and the construction of social barriers between different groups, resulting in the marginalization and exclusion of outgroups, who are perceived as being different or divergent in terms of politics, ideology, or culture (Körösényi, 2013).

1. Limitations of our study

It is important to acknowledge the limitations of our study. The study relied on self-reported measures to assess variables such as Political Tendency and Willingness to Vote for a Far-Right Party which may be subject to possible biases and limitations since participants may not be fully aware of their own political attitudes and behaviors. While self-report measures are commonly used in research, it is important to acknowledge that self-reported

willingness may not always translate into actual behavior (Chandon et al., 2005). Another constraint of this study may be the absence of the examination of causal relationships. The implementation of a longitudinal or experimental design could strengthen and enhance the obtained results, enabling a more precise analysis of the cause-effect relationships between the variables under investigation. A longitudinal study would allow tracking participants over time, observing changes in their political attitudes and behaviors, while an experimental study could manipulate key variables to examine their direct effects on the dependent variables. In this regard, we could have created two conditions, one where the news stimulus was presented and another as a control condition. It is important to emphasize that to ensure a proper experimental study, it would be necessary to carefully develop the stimulus material in order to ensure its effectiveness and differentiation from the control condition.

2. Future studies

To build upon this research, it would be interesting to conduct comparative studies between different countries to examine the differences and similarities in the predictors of voting for far-right parties. Each country's unique history, traditions, and political experiences can influence the manifestation of support for far-right parties (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). For instance, in the case of Portugal, a country with a history of dictatorship, there has been a distancing from more fascist values (Halikiopoulou et al., 2018). Therefore, it would be interesting to examine which are the arguments that support far-right parties in countries with a more consolidated democratic tradition; perhaps, in countries with a larger immigrant population, the relationship between political tendency and the willingness to vote for far-right parties will also be mediated by ideologies of anti-immigration (more blatant exclusive arguments that might be more accepted in those countries). In this regard, considering that previous studies have shown an increase in intolerance towards outgroups (also towards social minorities and not just immigrants) during economic crises (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013), it could be interesting to conduct a study in which xenophobic and ethnocentric attitudes function as mediators in the relationship between the perception of economic threat and the intention to vote for a far-right party. According to the literature, economic insecurity induces a perception of ethical competition over scarce resources (Billiet et al., 2014), leading individuals to feel threatened and develop intolerance towards groups different from their own since they perceive them as a threat or competition for those limited resources (Burke et al., 2010; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011;

Duckitt et al., 2002; Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013). Consequently, an increased level of openly expressed ethnocentrism and xenophobia is expected, as individuals develop negative attitudes towards immigrants and social minorities, justifying that they are not worthy of accessing those resources (Billiet et al., 2014). This, in turn, can trigger a greater predisposition to vote for political parties that advocate ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes, particularly far-right parties, as they are perceived as a threat or competition for those limited resources (Burke et al., 2010; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Duckitt et al., 2002; Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013).

3. Final Remark

In conclusion, this study contributes to our understanding of the predictors of voting for far-right parties in Portugal, shedding light on the role of ideology and economic threat in shaping individuals' voting behavior. By recognizing these factors and their interplay, policymakers and researchers can develop strategies and interventions aimed at addressing the underlying drivers of political extremism and fostering a more inclusive and cohesive society, as commonly expressed as desirable values, by the EU Agenda. Furthermore, studies such as this one that investigate the factors that drive support for the far right can provide valuable information about the types of political discourse that can help prevent the fostering of this movement. This study also points to the urgent need to reverse the process of perceived threat that people tend to feel during times of economic crisis. The relevance of democratic politicians in conveying clear and effective messages aimed at reducing the perception of economic threat while addressing concerns related to the values of Portuguese culture is emphasized. For example, by highlighting the gains that multiculturalism brings to Portuguese culture, it is possible to promote greater understanding and social harmony. By understanding the motivations and concerns of voters who are susceptible to the appeal of the far-right, politicians can tailor their messages and approaches to address these issues in constructive and inclusive ways. One example would be to invest in policies that reduce socioeconomic inequalities and promote the inclusion of all groups in society. This can include initiatives aimed at job creation, equal access to public services, combating discrimination in the labor market, and promoting opportunities for all. Additionally, politicians can work to combat the dissemination of false information and hate speech or demonization against outgroups that fuel extremist ideologies, through awareness campaigns, appropriate regulation of social media, and the promotion of a safe and

responsible digital environment. Politicians can also play a crucial role in promoting democratic, ethical, and inclusive values. By being legitimated leaders, they can positively influence the behavior and attitudes of their followers, demonstrating respect for diversity, inclusive decision-making, and defense of human rights. This understanding can help shape political discourses that promote social cohesion, respect for diversity, and the search for equitable solutions to the challenges facing society. In this way, studies on the factors that influence support for the far right can contribute to greater awareness and responsibility in the political sphere, helping to build a more harmonious society that is resistant to the appeal of extremism.

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Appendix

Appendix A. Survey – Pilot Study

Informações sobre o estudo e Consentimento Informado

Introdução e contexto: Convidamo-lo a participar neste estudo, integrado num projeto de Dissertação de Mestrado em Psicologia da Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade do Porto.

Objetivo: O objetivo do presente estudo é recolher a opinião dos portugueses em relação à situação atual económica, face aos recentes eventos.

Procedimentos: Enquanto participante deste estudo, ser-lhe-á pedido que forneça a sua opinião relativamente a aspetos relacionados com uma notícia. Serão também pedidas algumas informações demográficas (como idade e género). A resposta a este questionário demora aproximadamente 3 minutos. Não existem respostas erradas, pelo que pedimos que responda o mais sinceramente possível.

Elegibilidade: Poderá participar neste estudo qualquer cidadão português com, pelo menos, 18 anos de idade.

Riscos e benefícios: Não há riscos previsíveis associados à sua participação neste estudo. Embora este estudo não o beneficie pessoalmente, esperamos que os nossos resultados forneçam mais conhecimento sobre determinados processos psicossociais associados a fenómenos sociais relevantes. Acreditamos, também, que a resposta ao questionário permitirá aos participantes uma reflexão sobre alguns assuntos que consideramos relevantes.

Confidencialidade: As suas respostas serão anónimas e confidenciais. Os dados recolhidos não serão analisados individualmente, mas de forma agregada, conjuntamente com as respostas dos restantes participantes.

Participação voluntária: A participação neste estudo é completamente voluntária. Pode interromper a sua participação a qualquer momento.

Questões: Para o esclarecimento de qualquer questão relativamente a este estudo poderá contactar o investigador responsável, através do endereço eletrónico: up201807166@fpce.up.pt

Gostaria de participar neste estudo? Ao avançar está a indicar que tem mais de 18 anos; que leu e compreendeu as informações acima e aceita participar de livre vontade neste estudo. Ao avançar está também a autorizar a recolha, tratamento e armazenamento dos dados pessoais acima identificados para o fim a que se destinam, e a indicar que está de acordo com o método de disseminação dos resultados.

Indique, por favor, o seu género

Feminino

Masculino

Outro

Por favor, indique a sua idade

Qual a sua situação profissional?

Trabalhador/a

Estudante

Trabalhador/a estudante

Desempregado/a

Reformado/a

Trabalho doméstico não remunerado

É português/portuguesa?

Sim

Não

Vive em Portugal?

Sim

Não

Apenas com o objetivo de tentar compreender que entendeu o vídeo, iremos fazer algumas perguntas sobre a sua interpretação do mesmo. Por favor, leia com atenção e responda às seguintes questões.

Este vídeo é sobre o aumento dos combustíveis?

Sim
Não

O vídeo retrata a subida dos preços de bens alimentares?

Sim
Não

O aumento do preço da carne de aves e de porco é diário?

Sim
Não

Indique, por favor, como se sente em relação à atual situação financeira portuguesa, respondendo às seguintes questões de 1 a 5, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Nada" e 5 a "Extremamente".

	1 - Nada	2	3	4	5 - Extremamente
Quão incerto/a se sente?	○	○	○	○	○
Quão em risco se sente?	○	○	○	○	○
Quão ameaçado/a se sente?	○	○	○	○	○
Quão preocupado/a se sente?	○	○	○	○	○
Quão frequentemente pensa no assunto?	○	○	○	○	○

Agradecimento e Debriefing

Em primeiro lugar, agradecemos a sua participação e o tempo que disponibilizou para o preenchimento deste questionário. O seu contributo é extremamente importante para a nossa investigação.

Em Psicologia Social, para podermos estudar determinados fenómenos e observar os processos psicossoais a eles associados frequentemente recorremos à construção de "cenários", para permitir que os nossos participantes sejam colocados em situações semelhantes às que queremos estudar. Estes cenários respondem a dois objetivos:

1. Conhecer as causas de determinados fenómenos. Ao construirmos estes cenários, estamos a controlar, dentro dos possíveis, as condições em que os nossos participantes se encontram. Assim, podemos conhecer que alterações dos cenários causam diferenças nos comportamentos das pessoas.
2. Proteger os nossos participantes enquanto estudamos temas delicados. Por exemplo, se queremos estudar a discriminação não devemos provocá-la de forma a vê-la acontecer realmente, porque haverá sempre alguém que poderá ser vítima deste fenómeno. Assim, ao construirmos estes cenários protegemos potenciais vítimas.

No estudo em que participou, a noticia foi realizada com base em algumas informações reais e construída apenas para efeitos de estudo, pelo que o Jornal do Douro não existe. O nosso objetivo foi compreender os níveis de perceção de ameaça económica na população portuguesa face aos recentes eventos. Este objetivo não pôde ser mencionado no início porque levaria a que os nossos participantes não respondessem de forma espontânea perante a situação que expusemos. Caso tenha alguma questão, relembramos que pode entrar em contacto com a responsável - Inês Almeida Pereira - pelo email up201807166@fpce.up.pt

Appendix B. Stimulus – Open Question

Por favor, indique três consequências para a economia portuguesa que prevê que resultarão dos mais recentes eventos (por exemplo: pandemia de COVID-19, guerra entre Rússia e Ucrânia, seca).

Appendix C. Sitmulus – News Article

Convidamo-lo/a a ler um pequeno excerto de uma notícia publicada no Jornal do Douro, que reporta algumas preocupações, por parte de especialistas, face aos recentes eventos. Por favor, leia com atenção e responda às questões seguintes

A estagflação: irá a história se repetir?

01/04/2022
Por Luís Castro

A estagflação foi um período marcado pela elevada inflação, pelo baixo crescimento da economia e pela elevada taxa de desemprego, que ocorreu na década de 70 devido a um choque petrolífero. A questão que atormenta é se este período se irá repetir, tendo em conta os recentes eventos.

O governador do Banco de Portugal, Mário Centeno, afirmou que "Um cenário próximo da estagflação não está fora das possibilidades que podemos enfrentar". O cenário mais provável centra-se numa desaceleração da economia europeia, uma vez que o PIB, ainda, está a recuperar da crise pandémica. Contudo, não é preciso que uma economia entre em recessão para que se viva um período de estagflação, bastando que o crescimento económico seja bastante reduzido e que, simultaneamente, os preços subam exponencialmente.

Também, António Ascenção Costa, economista e professor do ISEG (Escola de Economia e Gestão da Universidade de Lisboa), partilha a mesma preocupação admitindo que "A estagflação, como possível ameaça futura, começa a fazer sentido porque o impacto desta crise sobre os preços da energia parece estar a ser muito grande e potencialmente prolongado, e essa subida dos preços da energia vai sustentar uma inflação mais geral

NOTÍCIAS MAIS LIDAS

Cadela atropelada foi encontrada com vida em Vila das Aves

Batalha da Ponte de Negrelos foi há 213 anos

Faleceu Luiz Gonçalves Ferreira, membro da direção do Futebol Clube de Rebordões

João Vale vence em Góis na segunda ronda do campeonato nacional de todo terreno

Seleção Nacional de Futsal defronta a Bélgica em Santo Tirso

Cartão Branco para jogador de futsal do Desportivo das Aves

Appendix D. Stimulus – Video

Convidamo-lo/a a assistir a este curto vídeo, que relata a subida dos preços causados pelos recentes eventos. Por favor, veja e ouça com atenção e responda às questões seguintes.

Fonte: https://sicnoticias.pt/pais/aumento-dos-precos-comerciantes-e-clientes-de-aveiro-preocupados/

Appendix E. Stimulus – Report

Convidamo-lo/a a ler um excerto do relatório "Perpsetivas Económicas e Orçamentais 2022-2026" realizado pelo Conselho das Finanças Públicas (CFP). Por favor, leia com atenção e responda às questões seguintes.

Fonte: https://www.cfp.pt/pt/publicacoes/perspetivas-economicas-e-orcamentais/perspetivas-economicas-e-orcamentais-2022-2026

Projeção do PIB em volume
(taxa de variação, em %)

Fonte: CFP e INE.

As projeções do CFP apontam para um abrandamento do ritmo de crescimento do produto interno bruto (PIB) real português para 4,8% em 2022 e para 2,8% em 2023. O enquadramento deste cenário caracteriza-se pela elevada incerteza, associada ao conflito militar entre a Rússia e a Ucrânia, não obstante a situação mais estável nos desenvolvimentos da pandemia por COVID-19.

A projeção macroeconómica aponta para um abrandamento do ritmo de crescimento do produto interno bruto (PIB) real para 4,8% em 2022 e para 2,8% em 2023 (4,9% em 2021).

PERSPETIVAS ECONÓMICAS E ORÇAMENTAIS 2022-2026

8

Appendix F. Survey – Present study

U.PORTO

**FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA
E DE CIÊNCIAS DA EDUCAÇÃO**
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

Informações sobre o estudo e Consentimento

Informado Introdução e contexto: Convidamo-lo a participar neste estudo, integrado num projeto de Dissertação de Mestrado em Psicologia da Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação da Universidade do Porto.

Objetivo: O objetivo do presente estudo é recolher a opinião dos portugueses em relação à situação atual económica, em Portugal, face aos recentes eventos.

Procedimentos: Enquanto participante deste estudo, ser-lhe-á pedido que forneça a sua opinião relativamente a aspetos relacionados com a situação económica atual em Portugal. Serão também pedidas algumas informações demográficas (como idade e género). A resposta a este questionário demora aproximadamente 10 minutos. Não existem respostas erradas, pelo que pedimos que responda o mais sinceramente possível.

Elegibilidade: Poderá participar neste estudo qualquer cidadão português com, pelo menos, 18 anos de idade.

Riscos e benefícios: Não há riscos previsíveis associados à sua participação neste estudo. Embora este estudo não o beneficie pessoalmente, esperamos que os nossos resultados forneçam mais conhecimento sobre determinados processos psicossociais associados a fenómenos sociais relevantes. Acreditamos, também, que a resposta ao questionário permitirá aos participantes uma reflexão sobre alguns assuntos que consideramos relevantes.

Confidencialidade: O questionário encontra-se implementado numa plataforma gerida pela Qualtrics, sujeito às condições da licença subscrita pela FPCEUP. As suas respostas serão descarregadas da plataforma para o computador da investigadora, onde serão analisadas de forma agregada, conjuntamente com as respostas dos restantes participantes. A informação será tratada de forma confidencial pela investigadora e conservada apenas pelo período necessário para cumprir as finalidades que motivaram a sua recolha.

Participação voluntária: A participação neste estudo é completamente voluntária. Pode interromper a sua participação a qualquer momento.

Questões: Para o esclarecimento de qualquer questão relativamente a este estudo poderá contactar o investigador responsável, através do endereço eletrónico: up201807166@fpce.up.pt

Gostaria de participar neste estudo? Ao avançar está a indicar que tem mais de 18 anos; que leu e compreendeu as informações acima e aceita participar de livre vontade neste estudo. Ao avançar está também a autorizar a recolha, tratamento e armazenamento dos dados pessoais acima identificados para o fim a que se destinam, e a indicar que está de acordo com o método de disseminação dos resultados.

Indique, por favor, o seu género

Feminino

Masculino

Outro

Por favor, indique a sua idade

Qual a sua situação profissional?

Trabalhador/a

Estudante

Trabalhador/a estudante

Desempregado/a

Trabalho doméstico não remunerado

Reformado/a

À procura do 1º emprego

É português/portuguesa?

Sim

Não

Vive em Portugal?

Sim

Não

Como se posiciona politicamente?

1 - Mais à esquerda	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Mais à direita

Em comparação com os restantes cidadãos do país onde vive, qual a sua perceção em relação ao seu estatuto socioeconómico?

1 - Muito baixo	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito alto

Convidamo-lo/a a ler um pequeno excerto de uma notícia publicada no Jornal do Douro, que reporta algumas preocupações, por parte de especialistas, face aos recentes eventos. Por favor, leia com atenção e responda às questões seguintes.

JD Jornal do Douro — Desporto   Edição Papel ▾   Videos   Insólito   Assinatura ▾   Procurar 🔍

A estagflação: irá a história repetir-se?
01/06/2022
Por Filipe Moreira

A estagflação, período marcado pela elevada inflação, pelo baixo crescimento da economia e pela elevada taxa de desemprego, poderá voltar a repetir-se, tendo em conta os recentes eventos. O governador do Banco de Portugal, Mário Centeno, concorda com esta projeção. Também António Ascenção Costa, economista e professor do ISEG, partilha a mesma preocupação, admitindo que estamos perante uma ameaça muito grande para a economia portuguesa e, consequentemente, para a vida dos portugueses.

Assim, estamos perante uma continuação da desaceleração da economia portuguesa, uma vez que o PIB ainda está a recuperar da crise pandémica. Acrescentando a isto, Portugal enfrenta agora os efeitos de uma guerra, que se têm revelado devastadores para a economia do país, assim como para a situação financeira dos portugueses.

Para além disto, a incerteza à volta de toda a situação fez com que os preços da energia e das matérias-primas, bem como dos alimentos, subissem exponencialmente – consequências que os portugueses já começam, seriamente, a sentir e que se espera que se prolonguem no tempo. A previsão dos especialistas é que o aperto das famílias aumente e diminua a sua capacidade para fazer face às despesas, uma vez que a guerra já está a aumentar a fome e a instabilidade em várias partes do mundo.

Apenas com o objetivo de tentar garantir que a notícia é compreensível, iremos fazer algumas perguntas sobre a sua interpretação do mesmo. Por favor, leia com atenção e responda às seguintes questões.

Esta notícia retrata o aumento do preço do combustível?

Sim

Não

A notícia retrata a preocupação por parte de vários especialistas sobre a possibilidade de voltarmos a um período de estagflação?

Sim

Não

Os especialistas estão preocupados com a economia atual?

Sim

Não

Indique, por favor, como se sente em relação à atual situação financeira portuguesa, respondendo às seguintes questões de 1 a 7, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Nada" e 7 a "Extremamente"

	1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Extremamente
Quão incerto/a se sente?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quão em risco se sente?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quão ameaçado/a se sente?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quão preocupado/a se sente?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Por favor, leia atentamente as seguintes frases, ditas por um líder político, e indique, para cada uma, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Discordo totalmente" e 7 "Concordo totalmente"

"[Os imigrantes] têm de voltar para casa. Temos de acabar com a ideia de que temos espaço - não há lugar para todos."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"A crise imigratória tem resultado em problemas sérios. Vêm roubar os nossos empregos, as nossas casas, vivem dos nossos impostos e nós ficamos sem nada!"

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"Os imigrantes trazem valores que não são compatíveis com os da nossa sociedade. Se querem vir para cá, têm de viver de acordo a nossa cultura"

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

De seguida, gostaríamos de saber a sua opinião sobre este político em particular. Assim sendo, por favor, indique, para cada uma das perguntas, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Nada" e 7 "Muito".

Em que medida estaria disposto/a a votar num líder político que tivesse este discurso?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Em que medida considera que este líder representa as suas crenças, ideias e valores?

1 - Nada	2	2	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Considere, agora, as seguintes frases ditas por um outro líder político. Por favor, indique, para cada uma, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Discordo totalmente" e 7 "Concordo totalmente".

"O futuro do país pertence às pessoas deste país."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"O nosso país deve tentar com todas as suas forças ser independente das outras nações, tanto económica como politicamente."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"A melhor maneira do nosso país progredir é se mantiver uma forte identidade e um sentimento de um povo independente."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

De seguida, gostaríamos de saber a sua opinião sobre este político em particular. Assim sendo, por favor, indique, para cada uma das perguntas, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Nada" e 7 "Muito".

Em que medida estaria disposto/a a votar num líder político que tivesse este discurso?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Em que medida considera que este líder representa as suas crenças, ideias e valores?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

De seguida, serão apresentadas mais algumas frases ditas por um outro líder político. Novamente, por favor, indique, para cada uma, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Discordo totalmente" e 7 "Concordo totalmente".

"Este país prosperará apenas quando os jovens deixarem de experimentar drogas, álcool, e sexo, e prestarem mais atenção aos valores da família."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"É importante preservarmos os nossos valores tradicionais e os nossos padrões morais."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"As novas formas de viver de muitos jovens de hoje em dia podem vir a destruir a nossa sociedade."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

Agora, gostaríamos de saber a sua opinião sobre este político em particular. Deste modo, por favor, indique, para cada uma das perguntas, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Nada" e 7 "Muito".

Em que medida estaria disposto/a a votar num líder político que tivesse este discurso?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Em que medida considera que este líder representa as suas crenças, ideias e valores?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Posteriormente, serão apresentadas as seguintes frases ditas, também, por um líder político. Por favor, indique, para cada uma, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Discordo totalmente" e 7 "Concordo totalmente".

"As verdadeiras chaves para a "boa vida" são o respeito pela autoridade e a obediência a aqueles que estão no comando."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"As autoridades devem ser obedecidas, pois elas estão na melhor posição para saber o que é bom para o nosso país."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

"A obediência e o respeito pela autoridade são os valores mais importantes que as crianças devem aprender."

1 - Discordo totalmente	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Concordo totalmente

De seguida, gostaríamos de saber a sua opinião sobre este político em particular. Assim sendo, indique, por favor, para cada uma das perguntas, o quão concorda com as mesmas, sendo que 1 corresponde a "Nada" e 7 "Muito".

Em que medida estaria disposto/a a votar num líder político que tivesse este discurso?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Em que medida considera que este líder representa as suas crenças, ideias e valores?

1 - Nada	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Muito

Agradecemos a sua participação neste inquérito.
A sua resposta foi registada.

FACULDADE DE **PSICOLOGIA E DE CIÊNCIAS DA EDUCAÇÃO**