

Counting the population in need of international protection globally

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Introduction

The significance of counting populations in need of international protection has become increasingly acknowledged as central to the effective design and delivery of humanitarian policies. Recent initiatives have emphasised the need for better data (IOM and McKinsey, 2018), as evidenced in the 2016 Global Compact for Migrants and Refugees and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Of the 17 goals and 169 targets included in the Agenda, one specific migration target seeks to 'facilitate orderly, safe, regular migration' while others concern legal identity, birth registration, human trafficking and disaggregating data. Thus the International Forum on Migration Statistics held in Paris in January 2018 noted the salience of public debates around data and the need to look at data in the broader context within which they are created.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2016 there was a total of 22.5 million refugees,¹ with 17.2 million under UNHCR's mandate and 5.3 million refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (UNHCR, 2017). The total number of refugees is the highest on record, although the annual rate of growth has slowed since 2012. In 2017, approximately 2 million people lodged applications for asylum while 2.8 million asylum seekers were awaiting determination of their refugee status (Table 7.1) **[[ok?]]**.

Table 7.1: Number of first instance applications lodged in 2016

Host state	Number of applications
Germany	720,000
United States	262,000
Italy	123,000

1 UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2016, those under 18 years
2 of age constituted roughly 51% of the global refugee population. The
3 proportion of adult females remained relatively stable, at between 47%
4 and 49%, over the same period. An estimated 60% of refugees were
5 located in urban areas at the end of 2016.

6 However, one major problem complicating the task of effective
7 humanitarian protection is the absence of accurate data on the
8 populations most affected. For only some of the populations are
9 disaggregated data available by age and sex. Furthermore, official
10 statistics and data from major international agencies often struggle to
11 cope with the messiness and fluidity of categories of people on the
12 move as they transit, reside and possibly return to countries of previous
13 residence or origin. Data are compiled by a diversity of organisations
14 ranging from national states, regional bodies and international
15 organisations, many of which operate with different definitions or
16 collect data with different levels of detail and disaggregation.

17 This chapter reviews statistics and the coverage of those in need
18 of international protection as set out in the UNHCR's guidelines
19 and the different institutions involved in data collection. It identifies
20 gaps in datasets used by UN and multilateral agencies tasked with the
21 protection of refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and other
22 people of concern and suggests that these need to be broadened to
23 include other categories of vulnerable individuals and groups and that
24 further disaggregation is needed.

26 Sources of data

28 Data sources on refugees and people in need of international protection
29 are compiled by states as well as a range of international organisations
30 including the United Nations Department of Economic and Social
31 Affairs (UNDESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
32 and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization
33 (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for
34 Refugees, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC),
35 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the
36 International Organization for Migration (IOM).

37 Of particular relevance are the datasets produced by the UNHCR.
38 While other agencies also deal with migrants, the UNHCR is the
39 most authoritative agency mandated to protect refugees, asylum
40 seekers, IDPs, returned refugees, as well as stateless people. For
41 some populations – mostly in developing countries – UNHCR has
42 additional demographic and socioeconomic information, including

date and place of birth, language, occupation, civil status, religion and education level. In locations where governments are exclusively responsible for data collection, comprehensive disaggregated data on refugees, IDPs and others of concern are often lacking or unavailable.

In addition to the UNHCR, we note the growing importance of the IOM as a source of data and in particular its establishment of the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC), jointly with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and development of the first global Migration Data Portal, which includes information on immigration and emigration; migrant flows; vulnerability; integration and well-being; forced migration; development; migration policy and public opinion. Other UN agencies such as UNICEF **[[please give in full]]** gather significant information which is published annually in the State of the World's Children Report, including data on child migration and displacement as well as statistics which bear on post-conflict settings and which are relevant to international protection, for example information on birth registration. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime produces the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons which includes data on victims of trafficking as well as projections for undetected victims.

Most of these global datasets are dependent on figures and estimates provided by national statistical offices, sometimes collected by specific agencies including police and law enforcement. These departments provide baseline and crucial demographic information, much of which is drawn from life history events and regular censuses. In addition, there are cyclical and sector-specific surveys which gather information on behalf of national governments and international agencies. For example, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), household surveys developed by UNICEF, seek to provide internationally comparable and statistically rigorous data on the situation of women and children. Since it began in 1995, more than 300 surveys have been conducted in over 100 countries, measuring the progress of the Millennium Development Goals and now Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) **[[ok?]]**.

The MICS are frequently compared to the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) initiated by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which collects information on fertility, reproductive, maternal and child health, immunisation and survival, HIV/AIDS; maternal mortality, child mortality, malaria, nutrition among women and children (see also Chapter 6, by Roy Carr-Hill). One important difference is in terms of geographical coverage. Related to the DHS is the Key Indicators Survey (KIS), which supports the

1 evaluation of US government programmes in population and health in
2 developing countries. The value-added of this dataset is that it can be
3 used to produce household-level data for small areas including regional
4 and sub-regional units as well as producing nationally representative
5 surveys.

6 There has also been an increase in the amount of data collected by
7 regional organisations, especially the OECD and European Union.
8 The OECD is now among the most authoritative sources on the
9 mobility of labour and presence of foreign-born nationals, though
10 their datasets do not include refugees and asylum seekers as defined
11 categories and foreign-born populations do not reflect immigration
12 status or policy categories (for example students, highly skilled
13 migrants, or refugees).

14 Eurostat, the statistical arm of the EU, coordinates, collates and
15 systematises national data from member states, including the presence
16 of asylum seekers in European host countries. It has provided data since
17 2008 under the provisions of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 862/2007.
18 Data are provided to Eurostat monthly (for asylum application
19 statistics), quarterly (for first instance decisions) or annually frequency
20 (for final decisions based on appeal or review, resettlement and
21 unaccompanied minors). These statistics are based on administrative
22 sources and are supplied by national statistical authorities, home office
23 ministries/ministries of the interior or related immigration agencies
24 in the EU member states.

25 Two different categories of persons are available in the Eurostat
26 databank. The first includes asylum seekers who have lodged an
27 application under consideration by a relevant authority. The second
28 is composed of recognised refugees, or those granted another kind
29 of international protection (for example subsidiary protection or
30 authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons), or those whose claims
31 were rejected. The rates of recognition under each of the categories
32 vary enormously for the same nationality in different EU member
33 states. Since the entry into force of Regulation (EC) 862/2007,
34 statistics on asylum decisions have become available for different stages
35 of the asylum procedure.

36 Additionally Frontex, or the European Border and Coast Guard
37 Agency, was established in 2004 for the management of operational
38 cooperation at EU external borders.

39 Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and research bodies also
40 produce independent datasets and occasional surveys which, while they
41 may offer more specific coverage, still provide useful information. For
42 example, the most widely publicised dataset produced by Amnesty

International and the polling company GlobeScan took the form of a global survey which used rankings to explore the degree to which respondents in the selected states were ‘willing’ to let refugees live in their countries, towns, neighbourhoods and homes, among other welcome indicators (see Blitz, 2017).

Limitations

Data collection in the context of conflicts, violence and disasters is inherently challenging (Abel and Sander, 2014; Bakewell, 1999). Methodological, operational and political complexities arise due to the nature of emergencies, as well as the characteristics, vulnerability and ‘visibility’ of the populations being measured (Chatelard, 2010).

The shortage of quantitative data on environmentally induced migration represents a key gap. The multi-causal nature of such movements also presents particular challenges and increases the risk of over-counting people on the move, or failing to capture them in the dataset altogether. Evidence on long-term trends associated with disasters, such as duration of displacement and subsequent movements, is also scarce (IOM and McKinsey, 2018 **[[changed to match reference]]**).

Two key limitations are the coverage of populations of concern and the definitions used in sampling selected groups, which raises the question of possible biases in the data-gathering process. While people may enjoy different statuses under law which bring with them varying entitlements, these labels have become politicised (Zetter, 2007) and there are often competing interests at stake between donors and host providers (Harrell-Bond et al, 1992; O’Donnell, 2017 **[[please provide reference]]**). States are under pressure in many instances to reduce numbers of refugees and asylum seekers on their territory, by removing them or closing down camps. In other situations, there may equally be a strong incentive for inflating numbers of people since that may inform the amount of aid directed to the host state (Edwards, 2013).

Most importantly, the terms used to describe those in need of protection bear on their entitlements, including levels of financial assistance received and opportunities for integration, including the right to family reunification. In practice, recognised *and* non-recognised refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants may be at risk of abuse, including trafficking, and may require humanitarian protection. The critical issue is under what category the protecting authority decides to place them.

1 Further, although UN agencies and partner organisations such as
2 the World Bank are among the most authoritative sources, their data,
3 however similar, are not always identical. In practice, coverage may
4 differ based on the organisation's mission and rationale for collecting
5 data. One consequence of such gaps is the challenge of looking for
6 causal relationships.

7 The gaps between such datasets are especially important in the
8 context of ill-defined groups of displaced people where there is much
9 potential overlap. We note that the UNHCR's definition of people of
10 concern departs from some others which do not include those who
11 are returned (UNHCR, 2016[[please provide reference]]). It is
12 especially difficult to gather accurate data on returnees. Similarly, the
13 quality of UNHCR's data varies from one category of protected person
14 to another, thus potentially raising questions for the management and
15 delivery of protection-related services. Most evident is their reporting
16 on stateless people.

17 While the UNHCR has data on registered refugees for most
18 countries, their data on stateless people and IDPs are incomplete.
19 Even though the UNHCR has required its country offices to include
20 stateless people among those to be monitored, it did so with little
21 guidance regarding the definitions of certain categories of stateless
22 people. As a result, it has published reports suggesting that in some
23 large countries such as Brazil there are just four stateless people.

24 A report published by the UNHCR in 2010 advocated including
25 de facto stateless people – those who may have no effective tie to
26 their country of nationality – under existing categories (UNHCR,
27 2010). Elsewhere, the UNHCR has tended to aggregate data,
28 bracketing larger numbers of 'people of concern' who did not fall
29 neatly within legally proscribed definitions based on UN conventions
30 and interpretations of international law. This problem is not exclusive
31 to the UNHCR; elsewhere, others have noted the ambiguities of
32 portmanteau expressions, such as 'modern slavery' (Gallagher, 2017)
33 and 'economic migrant', which in turn affect reporting.

34 Moreover, UNHCR's data are not always disaggregated by age
35 and gender, and in spite of greater efforts at multilateral cooperation,
36 these datasets do not cover the same populations as those produced
37 by other agencies, including the IOM. Hence, there are major
38 differences both in coverage and categorisation of populations, which
39 complicates analysis across datasets and undermines critical assessment
40 of interventions.

41 The use of migration-specific datasets is also problematic. In
42 the case of OECD data, foreign-born populations do not reflect

immigration status or policy categories (such as students, highly skilled migrants or refugees). Capturing such attributes is inherently difficult. First, a person's immigration status can be fluid and change quickly. For example, many international migrants who may be described as 'undocumented' or 'irregular' enter countries on valid visas and then stay in contravention of one or more visa conditions. In fact, there are many paths to irregularity, such as crossing borders without authorisation, unlawfully overstaying a visa period, working in contravention of visa conditions, being born into irregularity, or remaining after a negative decision on an asylum application has been made.

The inclusion of data from law enforcement agencies also introduces methodological challenges, not least because they tend to focus on interceptions, arrests or past activities. In the case of Frontex, one of the problems arises from its emphasis on border management. Sources of data include information on: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing; (2) detections of facilitators; (3) detections of illegal stay; (4) refusals of entry; and (5) asylum applications. This approach introduces a number of limitations, which Frontex recognises: the reliance on detection, in turn, depends on the amount of resources available (Frontex, 2015a). There is also a considerable delay before their data are published and therefore the Frontex reports offer a snapshot of previous flows and trends in migration, which may have changed by the time of publication. Further, the data are collected with a particular audience in mind, namely border-control authorities, an important but by no means exclusive audience (Frontex, 2015b). Finally, Frontex data are not immediately disaggregated by migrant category and this undermines their utility for the planning and management of migration policy beyond reception.

In spite of much standardisation among statistical reporting bodies, other data sources bring with them their own problems. While the use of censuses to collect baseline data is increasingly common, the ways in which information is recorded varies and may include self-completed postal surveys, online surveys, phone and on-the-spot interviews. For example, in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and 13 other countries in Europe, a census is taken every 10 years where the householder receives a questionnaire in the post, completes it, and either submits it online or sends it back in the post. In other European countries, field teams visit and collect census forms from households. Annual registration is common in a number of EU countries. In Eastern Europe and in many parts of the developing world, statistical offices rely heavily on enumerators which may introduce the potential

1 for abuse and corruption. Moreover, some governments explicitly
2 exclude certain groups from participating in the census; for example,
3 Kurds in Syria were repeatedly left off the census for decades (Blitz,
4 2009). Their removal has complicated the correct allocation of aid and
5 humanitarian assistance.

6 Public opinion datasets carry additional limitations since they assume
7 participants have a high degree of political awareness. For example, the
8 initial question asked by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey – ‘do you
9 approve/disapprove of the way the European Union is dealing with the
10 refugee issue?’ – assumes respondents can identify a distinctly European
11 Union-level response. Yet, while the EU has both legal bases and
12 polices underpinning the Common Agenda on Migration, within the
13 EU immigration and asylum policies remain highly nationalised. Some
14 states like the UK have opted out of the migration-specific directives
15 and there are also many differences in terms of state practice. With
16 the suspension of the Schengen Agreement, the closure of national
17 borders remains an area of national – not EU -- control. These
18 political realities may not be understood by the populations sampled.

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20 *Analysis*

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22 The above discussion illustrates the challenges of producing
23 comparative data that accurately reflect global trends. Yet there is a
24 growing consensus that data are essential for effective humanitarian
25 planning and resource allocation. UNHCR (2016, p 51) has intensified
26 its efforts to systematically collect data disaggregated by location and
27 demographic characteristics, including in humanitarian emergencies.
28 These data are time-sensitive, and the quicker they are collected and
29 shared, the sooner they can be used to help those in need of assistance
30 and to hold relevant parties to their commitments. In general, however,
31 the quality of demographic data tends to be highest in countries
32 where UNHCR and its partners have an operational role, undertake
33 registration and primary data collection, and have been engaged for a
34 year or more. Thus, while many echo the need for better data capture,
35 in many displacement contexts national agencies cannot do this job
36 as effectively.

37 While contemporary outflows from the Middle East, the Rohingya
38 crisis, and displacement in Yemen have forced the UNHCR and its
39 partners to improve their data collection, many problems remain. In
40 addition to definitional issues noted above, high-intensity conflicts have
41 made it especially difficult to operate among displaced populations in
42 the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen and Syria. As a result,

the Agency and other humanitarian actors have been more reliant on local sources of information

The relevance of collecting disaggregated data in particular has become more evident as affirmed in the SDG Agenda. Even in relation to the large-scale flows across the Mediterranean in 2015–16, more disaggregated data was available in Greece, where it was directly involved in setting up the hot spots and a more effective asylum system for the country and providing accommodation, than in Italy (Kofman, 2018). Disaggregated data on vulnerable populations was fairly rudimentary during the period of mass flows halted by the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016. After this UNHCR and the Hellenic Asylum Service began to collect data on vulnerable groups as defined by the EU Reception Directive and Greek asylum legislation.

Of the total population of concern at the end of 2015, data disaggregated by sex was available for 29.3 million – 46% of the total population of concern to UNHCR. Of the data available on sex at the end of 2015, females and males accounted for 14.3 million and 15.0 million people, respectively. Information disaggregated by age was less complete. Only 141 countries provided age-disaggregated data at the end of 2015, although coverage has increased over time. Data disaggregated by age were available for 21.2 million people (33%) at the end of 2015, compared to 17.0 million people at the end of 2014. Of the 21.2 million people covered by age-disaggregated data, 51% (10.9 million) were children.

In terms of datasets created by private organisations and NGOs, we must recognise that information is being collected at a time of great sensitivity around questions of migration and asylum and the potential for bias applies to both protectionist and pro-migrant camps. Further, the nature of current crises, which have involved many small NGOs and non-traditional actors has created additional documentary challenges that potentially impact on humanitarian responses. In the absence of archivists and information scientists who can systematically document these crises, much reporting may not be classified in a way that permits future comparisons across the many different types of data, included in NGO publications and occasional reports.

Conclusion

The above discussion suggests that the call for more and better data is fraught with challenges. These are especially relevant to those seeking to use both official and unofficial datasets for comparative research

1 purposes. While the UNHCR is rapidly improving its data collection,
 2 there is still a gap between humanitarian data and development-focused
 3 data produced by other UN agencies and collected through MICS,
 4 DHS, national censuses and other surveys. This is most important
 5 when considering that post-conflict situations carry additional
 6 challenges both for protecting former refugees and IDPs and gathering
 7 data on their needs.

8 A truly radical approach to the collection of statistical data on
 9 populations in need of protection would seek to redefine protection
 10 on the basis of demonstrable need. As we argue above, the way in
 11 which categories of concern are defined and the degree to which
 12 they are included in influential datasets has great bearing on the
 13 treatment people may receive. While all people have human rights,
 14 in practice, categories of ‘concern’ determine categories of perceived
 15 need and hence the allocation of resources. We suggest that additional
 16 demographic techniques are required to identify people’s needs from
 17 the ground up, rather than rely on legally proscribed categories which
 18 reflect political interests and hence carry the prospect of bias and
 19 potential exclusion.

20 21 **Note**

22 ¹ Refugees may be recognised on a group basis, or they may be recognised as refugees
 23 after having undergone a process of individual status determination.

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