Hybrid Binary-Ternary Joint Sparse Form and its Application in Elliptic Curve Cryptography

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Abstract

Multi-exponentiation is a common and time consuming operation in public-key cryptography. Its elliptic curve counterpart, called multi-scalar multiplication is extensively used for digital signature verification. Several algorithms have been proposed to speed-up those critical computations. They are based on simultaneously recoding a set of integers in order to minimize the number of general multiplications or point additions. When signed-digit recoding techniques can be used, as in the world of elliptic curves, Joint Sparse Form (JSF) and interleaving *w*-NAF are the most efficient algorithms. In this paper, a novel recoding algorithm for a pair of integers is proposed, based on a decomposition that mixes powers of 2 and powers of 3. The so-called Hybrid Binary-Ternary Joint Sparse Form require fewer digits and is sparser than the JSF and the interleaving *w*-NAF. Its advantages are illustrated for elliptic curve double-scalar multiplication; the operation counts show a gain of up to 18%.

Index Terms

Multi-exponentiation, Multi-scalar multiplication, Joint sparse form, Binary-ternary number system, Elliptic curves.

I. INTRODUCTION

Multi-exponentiation is a common operation in public-key cryptography. Most digital signatures are verified by evaluating an expression of the form $g^a h^b$, where g, h are elements of a multiplicative group; typically the group \mathbb{F}_q^* of non-zero elements of the finite field \mathbb{F}_q . To speed-up this operation, one generally uses the well known Shamir's trick (see [1] and [2]), which is based on the simple fact it is unnecessary to compute the two expressions separately since only the product is needed. Shamir first suggested to apply the square-and-multiply algorithm to the binary expansions of both a and b at the same time, and further noticed that some extra savings can be obtained by precomputing the product gh. If t denote the bit-length of the largest exponent, this method requires t squarings and 3t/4 multiplications on average.

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L. Imbert is with the CNRS "PIMS-Europe" (UMI 3069), Centre for Information Security and Cryptography (CISaC), Department of Mathematics & Statistics at the University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. NW, Calgary, AB, T2N 1N4, Canada (e-mail: Laurent.Imbert@ucalgary.ca) In the world of elliptic curves, the same critical operation rewrites [k]P + [l]Q, where k and l are two positive integers, and P, Q are two elements of the group of points of an elliptic curve; a nice group, denoted additively, where elements can be easily inverted (the cost of computing -P from P is negligible). The square-and-multiply algorithm immediately translates into a double-and-add-subtract algorithm. Naturally, joint signed binary expansions [3], with digits in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ have been considered. The scalars k, l are represented as a $2 \times t$ matrix

$$k = (k_{t-1} \dots k_1 \ k_0)$$
$$l = (l_{t-1} \dots l_1 \ l_0),$$

with $k_i, l_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ for all *i*. The number of additions required by Shamir's simultaneous method is equal to the so-called joint Hamming weight; i.e., the number of non-zero columns. For example, if k and l are both written in the Non-Adjacent Form [4], [5], the computation of [k]P + [l]Q costs t + 1 doublings and 5t/9 additions on average.

Example 1: The 2×9 matrix given by the NAFs of k = 145 and l = 207

$$145 = (0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1)$$
$$207 = (1 \ 0 \ \overline{1} \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ \overline{1})$$

has joint Hamming weight 5.

In [6], Solinas introduced the Joint Sparse Form (JSF) to further reduce the average number of non-zero columns. The main idea behind Solinas' algorithm is to make sure that out of three consecutive columns, at least one is a zero-column. Solinas' algorithm is given in terms of arithmetic operations but it basically reduces to computations modulo 8 (bit operations). By carefully choosing the positive/negative values of the remainders (mod 8), Solinas proves the uniqueness and optimality (in the context of joint signed binary expansions) of the JSF, showing that the computation of [k]P + [l]Q requires t doublings and t/2 additions on average.

Example 2: Using the same values as above (k = 145, l = 207), the JSF

$$145 = (1 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 1)$$
$$207 = (1 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad \overline{1})$$

has Hamming weight 4.

The simultaneous methods described above require precomputations of points involving both P and Q. For example, the JSF algorithm needs the points P+Q and P-Q to be precomputed. On the other hand, interleaving methods use precomputed values that only involve a single point, which allows the use of different methods for each scalar (such as different width-w NAFs); the doubling steps being done jointly. When the same width-w NAF is used for both k and l, the overall cost of interleaving methods is t doublings and 2t/(w+1) additions on average (see [2, pp 111–113] for more details). We give an example of interleaving w-NAF in Section III.

In this paper, we describe a novel joint recoding scheme which uses both bases 2 and 3 in order to reduce the average number of non-zero columns. In Section II, we present the basics of the so-called hybrid binary-ternary number systems. In Section III, we extend the concept to represent pairs of integers and we introduce a new joint recoding algorithm. We analyzes our algorithm in Section IV and present some numerical comparisons in Section V.

II. HYBRID BINARY-TERNARY NUMBER SYSTEM

The Hybrid Binary-Ternary Number System (HBTNS) was introduced by Dimitrov and Cooklev in [7] for speeding-up modular exponentiation. In this system, an integer is written as a sum of powers of 2 and powers of 3; i.e., it mixes bits and trits (radix-3 digits) except that the digit 2 never occurs. The use of base 3 naturally reduces the number of digits¹ required to represent a *t*-bit integer. In fact, it can be shown that the average base $\beta = 2^{10/13}3^{3/13} \approx 2.19617$ and that the digit length is almost 12% smaller than the binary length ($\log_{\beta}(2) \approx 0.88106$) digits (see [7] for more details). More importantly, this number system is also very sparse; the average number of non-zero digits in HBTNS is 5/13, leading to $\approx t/3$ for a *t*-bit number. Algorithm 1 computes the HBTNS of a positive integer.

Algorithm 1 HBTNS representation

```
Input : An integer n > 0
Output : Arrays digits[], base[]
 1: i = 0
 2: while n > 0 do
      if n \equiv 0 \pmod{3} then
 3.
        base[i] = 3; digits[i] = 0; n = n/3;
 4:
      else if n \equiv 0 \pmod{2} then
 5:
        base[i] = 2; digits[i] = 0; n = n/2;
 6:
      else
 7:
        base[i] = 2; digits[i] = 1; n = n/2;
 8:
      end if
 <u>و</u>
10:
      i = i + 1
11: end while
12: return digits[], base[]
```

Example 3: The hybrid binary-ternary representation of $n = 703 = (1010111111)_2$

digits[] = [1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1]base[] = [2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, 2].

has only 8 digits among which 3 only are non-zero. Note that the binary representation requires 10 bits, out of which 8 are different from zero. Observe that the least significant digit is the left-most value in digits[], such that $703 = 1 + 2^{1}3^{3} + 2^{3}3^{4}$.

The idea of mixing bases 2 and 3 for elliptic curve scalar multiplication has been proposed by Ciet et al. in [8] using the same decomposition as in Algorithm 1. Dimitrov, Imbert and Mishra generalized this concept in [9] by

¹Although we only deal with 0s and 1s, the term "digit" is more appropriate than "bit" because of the use of base 3.




Fig. 1. An example of staircase walk for a double-base chain representing 703

using a greedy approach to compute special signed double-base expansions; i.e., expressions of the form

$$\sum_{i} \pm 2^{a_i} 3^{b_i}, \text{ with } a_i, b_i \ge 0,$$

where the exponents form two simultaneously decreasing sequences. These expansions, called double-base chains (see Def. 1 below), allows for fast scalar multiplication. See [10] for more details about this number system.

Definition 1 (Double-base chain): Given k > 0, a sequence $(K_n)_{n>0}$, of positive integers satisfying: $K_1 = 1$, $K_{n+1} = 2^u 3^v K_n + s$, with $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ for some $u, v \ge 0$, and such that $K_m = k$ for some m > 0, is called a double-base chain for k. The length, m, of a double-base chain is equal to the number of terms (often called $\{2, 3\}$ -integers), used to represent k.

Any elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm based on mixing powers of 2 and powers of 3 requires point doublings and additions, as well as, possibly fast, point triplings. In [9], Dimitrov et al. also proposed an efficient tripling formula in Jacobian coordinates for ordinary elliptic curves over large prime fields (see [11] for improved formulas). In [12], Doche and Imbert further extended the concept of double-base chains by allowing digits from larger sets as in the *w*-NAF algorithm.

An easy way to visualize expansions using two bases (say e.g. 2 and 3), is to use a two-dimensional array (the columns represent the powers of 2 and the rows represent the powers of 3) into which each non-zero cell contains the sign of the corresponding term. (by convention, the upper-left corner corresponds to $2^{0}3^{0} = 1$.) A double-base chain can thus be represented by a staircase walk from the bottom-right corner to the upper-left corner, with non-zero digits distributed along this path. An example of such a double-base chain is shown in Fig. 1; it was obtained using Algorithm 1. (Since a given set of non-zero cells can lead to many different staircase walks, we adopt the convention to walk North as much as we can before going East.)

In the next section, we consider an hybrid binary-ternary joint sparse form for a pair of integers. We propose an algorithm which computes two double-base chains that share the same staircase walk; only the distribution of the digits along the path differ.

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III. HYBRID BINARY TERNARY JOINT SPARSE FORM

In Algorithm 2, the hybrid binary-ternary joint sparse form of a pair of integers is calculated by first checking whether both k_1 and k_2 are divisible by 3. If this is the case, both digits are set to 0 and the base set to 3, otherwise we check whether they are both divisible by 2 and proceed accordingly. Finally, if the pair is not divisible by 3 or 2, we make both numbers divisible by 6 by subtracting k_i mods $6 \in \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ from k_i , and then divide the results by 2. Therefore, in the next step, both numbers are divisible by 3 and we generate a zero column.

```
Algorithm 2 Hybrid binary-ternary joint sparse form (HBTJSF)
Input : Two positive integers k_1, k_2
Output : Arrays hbt1[], hbt2[], base[]
 1: i = 0
 2: while k_1 > 0 or k_2 > 0 do
      if k_1 \equiv 0 \pmod{3} and k_2 \equiv 0 \pmod{3} then
 3:
        base[i] = 3;
 4:
       hbt1[i] = hbt2[i] = 0;
 5:
        k_1 = k_1/3; k_2 = k_2/3;
 6:
      else if k_1 \equiv 0 \pmod{2} and k_2 \equiv 0 \pmod{2} then
 7:
        base[i] = 2;
 8:
        hbt1[i] = hbt2[i] = 0;
 9:
        k_1 = k_1/2; k_2 = k_2/2;
10:
11:
      else
        base[i] = 2;
12:
        hbt1[i] = k_1 \mod 6; hbt2[i] = k_2 \mod 6;
13:
        k_1 = (k_1 - \text{hbtl}[i])/2; \quad k_2 = (k_2 - \text{hbtl}[i])/2;
14:
15:
      end if
      i = i + 1
16:
17: end while
18: return hbt1[], hbt2[], base[]
```

Example 4: The following example illustrates the advantage of the HBTJSF. For $k_1 = 1225$ and $k_2 = 723$ the Joint Sparse Form

has joint Hamming weight 7. The interleaving w-NAF (with w = 5 for 1225 and w = 4 for 723)

 $5-\text{NAF}(1225) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -13 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 9 \\ 4-\text{NAF}(723) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 3 & 0 & 0 & -3 & 0 & 0 & 3 \\ \end{pmatrix}$




Fig. 2. Double-base chains for 1225 and 723

TABLE I

THE 14 POINTS THAT HAVE TO BE PRECOMPUTED FOR HBTJSF SCALAR MULTIPLICATION

	Р	-	-
Q	$P\pm Q$	$2P\pm Q$	$3P\pm Q$
-	$P\pm 2Q$	-	$3P \pm 2Q$
-	$P\pm 3Q$	$2P\pm 3Q$	-

has 6 non-zero elements² (using w = 4 for 1225 and w = 5 for 723 also leads to 6 non-zero elements). Using Algorithm 2, the hybrid binary-ternary joint sparse form

1225 = (3	0	Ī	0	0	0	0	1)
723 = (2	0	$\overline{2}$	0	0	0	0	3)
base[] = (2	3	2	2	2	3	3	2)

only requires 8 digits and has joint Hamming weight 3. We show the corresponding double-base chains in Fig. 2. Note the digits are distributed along the same staircase walk.

Since the HBTJSF uses the digit set $\{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$, a total of 14 points have to be precomputed (see Table I). Note that the points 2P, 2Q, 3P, 3Q are not needed as they correspond to pairs of integers that are simultaneously divisible by 2 or 3. Also, since the negation of a point is negligible, only one set of point difference need to be calculated; for example, 2Q - P is easily deduced from P - 2Q.

IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Let us analyse the behaviour of Algorithm 2. We consider integers of the form 6k + j with $j \in \{-2, ..., 3\}$. We want to know how often our algorithm performs a division by 3 and how often it performs a division by 2. More importantly, we want to know how many non-zero columns we can expect on average.

We consider all pairs of numbers of the form (6i + j, 6i' + j') with $j, j' \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$. (Note that this is equivalent to $j, j' \in \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$.) Clearly, we have 36 such states, that we denote $S_{i,j}$. We can therefore

²In the interleaving method, the non-zero elements in both w-NAF representations are considered, instead of joint Hamming weight.

define the 36×36 transition matrix M, where M[6i + j, 6i' + j'] is equal to the probability $P(S_{i',j'}|S_{i,j})$ to go from state $S_{i,j}$ to state $S_{i',j'}$. For example, the state $S_{0,0}$ corresponds to the case where both numbers are divisible by 6. The divisions by 3 performed in step 6 of Algorithm 2 therefore lead to any of the states $S_{0,0}, S_{0,2}, S_{0,4}, S_{2,0}, S_{2,2}, S_{2,4}, S_{4,0}, S_{4,2}, S_{4,4}$, which correspond to a pair of even numbers, with probability 1/9. Similarly, if both numbers are even, the divisions by 2 in step 10 lead to four different states with probability 1/4. For example, we go from $S_{0,2}$ to any of $S_{0,1}, S_{0,4}, S_{3,1}, S_{3,4}$ with probability 1/4. In the last case; i.e., when numbers are neither simultaneously divisible by 3 or 2, we make them divisible by 6 and perform a division by 2. Hence, we reach one of the four states $S_{0,0}, S_{0,3}, S_{3,0}, S_{3,3}$ that correspond to pairs of multiples of 3, with probability 1/4. The complete transition matrix is given in Appendix.

The stationary distribution π_{∞} is obtained as $\lim_{n\to\infty} \pi_0 M^n$, with $\pi_0 = (1/36, \ldots, 1/36)$ our initial probabilities (although they do not play any role). We have

$$\pi_{\infty}[i] = rac{27}{236}$$
 if $i \in \{0, 3, 18, 21\}$
 $\pi_{\infty}[i] = rac{1}{59}$ otherwise.

This allows us to compute the following average probabilities:

$$p_3 = \sum_{i=0}^5 \sum_{j=0}^5 \pi_\infty[6i+j] \quad \text{if } i, j \equiv 0 \pmod{3},$$

$$p_z = \sum_{i=0}^5 \sum_{j=0}^5 \pi_\infty[6i+j] \quad \text{if } i, j \equiv 0 \pmod{3} \text{ or } i, j \equiv 0 \pmod{2},$$

where p_3 denotes the probability to perform a division by 3 and p_z denote the probability to generate a zero column. Clearly, the probability to perform a division by 2 is $p_2 = 1 - p_3$ and the probability to generate a non-zero column is $p_{nz} = 1 - p_z$. We have

$$p_2 = \frac{32}{59}, \quad p_3 = \frac{27}{59}, \quad p_z = \frac{35}{59}, \quad p_{nz} = \frac{24}{59}.$$
 (1)

Now, using p_2 and p_3 , we can evaluate the average base

$$\beta = \sqrt[59]{2^{32}3^{27}} = \sqrt[59]{32751691810479015985152} \approx 2.407765$$

For a pair of t-bit integers, the average number of columns of the HBTJSF array is thus approximately

$$(\log_{\beta} 2) \times t \approx 0.7888 \times t. \tag{2}$$

Finally, from (1) and (2), we derive that the expected number of elliptic curve additions per bit is approximately

$$\frac{24}{59} \times 0.7888 \approx 0.3209.$$

We summarized our theoretical results in Table II, with real values rounded to the nearest hundredth. (For simplicity, we consider that the same window width is used for both numbers in the interleaving w-NAF method.)

TABLE II

THEORETICAL COMPARISON OF HBTJSF, JSF AND INTERLEAVING w-NAF FOR A t-BIT PAIR OF INTEGERS

Parameters	HBTJSF	JSF	Interleaving w-NAF						
Average base	2.41	2	2						
Avg # col.	0.79t	t+1	t+1						
Avg # base 2 col.	0.43t	t+1	t+1						
Avg # base 3 col.	0.36t	0	0						
Avg # non-zero col.	0.32t	0.5t	2t/(w+1)						
Precomp.	14	2	$2^{w-1} - 2$						

TABLE III

Costs of some curve operations for ordinary elliptic curves over prime fields in Jacobian coordinates (a = -3) and

TRIPLING-ORIENTED DIK CURVES

Weierstrass / Jacob	a = -3	5)
	Cost	S =

	Cost	S = 0.8M								
Doubling	3M + 5S	7M								
Tripling	7M + 7S	12.6M								
Addition (mixed)	7M + 4S	10.2M								
Tripling-oriented DIK										
	Cost	S = 0.8M								
Doubling	2M + 7S	7.6 M								
Tripling	6M + 6S	10.8 M								
Addition (mixed)	7M + 4S	10.2 M								

V. COMPARISONS

Based on the above analysis, we compare our algorithm with the JSF and the w-NAF interleaving method (assuming windows of size w = 4 for both scalars). We consider two kinds of curves for which we know that triplings are useful [13]:

- Ordinary elliptic curves over large prime fields with Jacobian coordinates (with a = -3),
- tripling-oriented Doche-Icart-Kohel curves [14].

The costs of the necessary curve operations are given in Table III; the last column give equivalent multiplication counts assuming S = 0.8M. These costs are reported in the comprehensive and accurate explicit-formulas database [11]. Our results are summarized in Table IV for 256-bit pairs of integers (similar values can be observed for other sizes).

Remark 1: Note that the cost of precomputations is not included in our operation counts. In the case of JSF, only P + Q and P - Q have to be computed, which is (almost, but not exactly) equivalent to two additions. In the case of interleaving w-NAF, we have to precompute 3P, 3Q, 5P, 5Q, ..., $(2^{w-1}-1)P$, $(2^{w-1}-1)Q$; that is, a total of $2^{w-1}-2$ points. The exact operation counts depends on the way those computations are implemented. In the case

TABLE IV

COMPARISONS BETWEEN HBTJSF, JSF AND INTERLEAVING w-NAF FOR 256-BIT INTEGERS

Weierstrass / Jacobian $(a = -3)$													
	HBTJSF	JSF	Inter. 4-NAF	Inter 5-NAF									
Mult. counts for dbl.	770	1792	1792	1792									
Mult. counts for tpl.	1159	0	0	0									
Mult. counts for add	836	1306	1044	870									
Total mult. counts	2765	3098	2836	2662									
Precomp.	14	2	6	14									
Overhead		12.04%	2.57%	-3.73% ^(a)									
Tripling-oriented DIK													
	HBTJSF	JSF	Inter. 4-NAF	Inter. 5-NAF									
Mult. counts for dbl.	836	1946	1946	1946									
Mult. counts for tpl.	994	0	0	0									
Mult. counts for add	836	1306	1044	870									
Total mult. counts	2666	3252	2990	2816									
Precomp.	14	2	6	14									
Overhead		21.98%	12.15%	5.63%									

^(a) Interleaving 5-NAF seems slightly better than HBTJSF for ordinary curves over \mathbb{F}_p , but this is without considering precomputation costs (see Rem. 1).

of HBTJSF, 14 points are needed as shown in Table I. The exact number of field operations is less than the field cost of 2 doublings plus 16 additions, since common subexpressions eliminations techniques can be considered. We believe that the more compact (the largest multiples are triples) set of points used in HBTJSF should give more opportunities for savings than for Interleaving w-NAF.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A new recoding algorithm for a pair of integers has been proposed. It is based on a decomposition of two integers using mixed powers of 2 and 3. Our analysis shows that it requires almost 20% fewer digits than the binary representation and that the average number of non-zero columns per bit is less than 1/3. We have illustrated the advantages of the so-called HBTJSF for elliptic curve double-scalar multiplication. Compared to the commonly used JSF and interleaving *w*-NAF methods, the savings obtained with HBTJSF are significant (up to 18%) for curves for which triplings are useful, such as e.g. ordinary curves over large prime fields or tripling-oriented DIK curves.

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APPENDIX

 36×36 transition matrix

	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0)	١
	$\frac{1}{4}$																																		0		
	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
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